Adding upstream version 1:9.2p1.upstream/1%9.2p1upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

863 files changed, 248203 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/.depend b/.depend
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5226523
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.depend
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+# Automatically generated by makedepend.
+# Run "make depend" to rebuild.
+
+# DO NOT DELETE
+addr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h addr.h
+addrmatch.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h addr.h match.h log.h ssherr.h
+atomicio.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h
+audit-bsm.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+audit-linux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+audit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth-bsdauth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth-krb5.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h misc.h servconf.h uidswap.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
+auth-options.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h sshkey.h match.h ssh2.h auth-options.h
+auth-pam.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth-passwd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h servconf.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h
+auth-rhosts.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h uidswap.h pathnames.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h servconf.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
+auth-shadow.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth-sia.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth.o: authfile.h monitor_wrap.h compat.h channels.h
+auth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h groupaccess.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h canohost.h uidswap.h packet.h dispatch.h
+auth2-chall.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h servconf.h
+auth2-gss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth2-hostbased.o: canohost.h monitor_wrap.h pathnames.h match.h
+auth2-hostbased.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshbuf.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
+auth2-kbdint.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h
+auth2-none.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h ssh2.h monitor_wrap.h
+auth2-passwd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssherr.h log.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h monitor_wrap.h misc.h servconf.h
+auth2-pubkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshbuf.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
+auth2-pubkey.o: pathnames.h uidswap.h auth-options.h canohost.h monitor_wrap.h authfile.h match.h channels.h session.h sk-api.h
+auth2-pubkeyfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h compat.h sshkey.h digest.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h authfile.h match.h
+auth2.o: digest.h
+auth2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h pathnames.h monitor_wrap.h
+authfd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h compat.h log.h ssherr.h atomicio.h misc.h
+authfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h ssh.h log.h ssherr.h authfile.h misc.h atomicio.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h krl.h
+bitmap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h bitmap.h
+canohost.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h canohost.h misc.h
+chacha.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h chacha.h
+channels.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h misc.h channels.h compat.h canohost.h sshkey.h authfd.h pathnames.h match.h
+cipher-aes.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+cipher-aesctr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h
+cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+cipher-chachapoly.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h
+cipher.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h misc.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h digest.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+cleanup.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h
+clientloop.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h compat.h channels.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
+clientloop.o: myproposal.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h readconf.h clientloop.h sshconnect.h authfd.h atomicio.h sshpty.h match.h msg.h hostfile.h
+compat.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h log.h ssherr.h match.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
+dh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+digest-libc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h digest.h
+digest-openssl.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+dispatch.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh2.h log.h ssherr.h dispatch.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h compat.h
+dns.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h ssherr.h dns.h log.h digest.h
+ed25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h
+entropy.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+fatal.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h
+groupaccess.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h groupaccess.h match.h log.h ssherr.h
+gss-genr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+gss-serv-krb5.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+gss-serv.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+hash.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h
+hmac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf.h digest.h hmac.h
+hostfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h sshkey.h hostfile.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h pathnames.h digest.h hmac.h sshbuf.h
+kex.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh.h ssh2.h atomicio.h version.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h log.h ssherr.h
+kex.o: match.h misc.h monitor.h sshbuf.h digest.h
+kexc25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshbuf.h digest.h ssherr.h ssh2.h
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+kexgen.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h log.h ssherr.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h digest.h
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+log.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h match.h
+loginrec.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h hostfile.h ssh.h loginrec.h log.h ssherr.h atomicio.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h canohost.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h sshbuf.h misc.h
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+match.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h misc.h
+misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h misc.h log.h ssherr.h ssh.h sshbuf.h
+moduli.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+monitor.o: chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h dh.h packet.h dispatch.h auth-options.h sshpty.h channels.h session.h sshlogin.h canohost.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h monitor_fdpass.h compat.h ssh2.h authfd.h match.h sk-api.h
+monitor.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h
+monitor_fdpass.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h monitor_fdpass.h
+monitor_wrap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h
+monitor_wrap.o: loginrec.h auth-options.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h atomicio.h monitor_fdpass.h misc.h channels.h session.h servconf.h
+msg.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h atomicio.h msg.h misc.h
+mux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h log.h ssherr.h ssh.h ssh2.h pathnames.h misc.h match.h sshbuf.h channels.h msg.h packet.h dispatch.h monitor_fdpass.h sshpty.h sshkey.h readconf.h clientloop.h
+nchan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h packet.h dispatch.h channels.h compat.h log.h
+packet.o: channels.h ssh.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h
+packet.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h compat.h ssh2.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h digest.h log.h ssherr.h canohost.h misc.h
+platform-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+platform-pledge.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+platform-tracing.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h
+platform.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
+poly1305.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h poly1305.h
+progressmeter.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h progressmeter.h atomicio.h misc.h utf8.h
+readconf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssherr.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h pathnames.h log.h sshkey.h misc.h readconf.h match.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
+readconf.o: uidswap.h myproposal.h digest.h
+readpass.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h misc.h pathnames.h log.h ssherr.h ssh.h uidswap.h
+rijndael.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h rijndael.h
+sandbox-capsicum.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-darwin.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-null.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-pledge.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-rlimit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-seccomp-filter.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-solaris.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-systrace.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+scp.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h xmalloc.h ssh.h atomicio.h pathnames.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h progressmeter.h utf8.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h
+servconf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h pathnames.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h
+servconf.o: kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h match.h channels.h groupaccess.h canohost.h packet.h dispatch.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h myproposal.h digest.h
+serverloop.o: cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h session.h auth-options.h serverloop.h
+serverloop.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h servconf.h canohost.h sshpty.h channels.h compat.h ssh2.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h
+session.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h match.h uidswap.h compat.h channels.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h
+session.o: rijndael.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h authfd.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h servconf.h sshlogin.h serverloop.h canohost.h session.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h monitor_wrap.h sftp.h atomicio.h
+sftp-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h log.h atomicio.h progressmeter.h misc.h utf8.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h
+sftp-common.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h sftp.h sftp-common.h
+sftp-glob.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h
+sftp-realpath.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sftp-server-main.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h sftp.h misc.h xmalloc.h
+sftp-server.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h match.h uidswap.h sftp.h sftp-common.h
+sftp-usergroup.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h log.h ssherr.h xmalloc.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h sftp-usergroup.h
+sftp.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h ssherr.h pathnames.h misc.h utf8.h sftp.h sshbuf.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h sftp-usergroup.h
+sk-usbhid.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sntrup761.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+srclimit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h addr.h canohost.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h srclimit.h xmalloc.h
+ssh-add.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h ssherr.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h misc.h digest.h ssh-sk.h sk-api.h hostfile.h
+ssh-agent.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h compat.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h digest.h match.h msg.h pathnames.h ssh-pkcs11.h sk-api.h myproposal.h
+ssh-dss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+ssh-ecdsa-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h digest.h sshkey.h
+ssh-ecdsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+ssh-ed25519-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h ssh.h digest.h
+ssh-ed25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h ssh.h
+ssh-keygen.o: cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h
+ssh-keygen.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h authfile.h sshbuf.h pathnames.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h match.h hostfile.h dns.h ssh.h ssh2.h ssh-pkcs11.h atomicio.h krl.h digest.h utf8.h authfd.h sshsig.h ssh-sk.h sk-api.h cipher.h
+ssh-keyscan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h compat.h myproposal.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h
+ssh-keyscan.o: ssherr.h atomicio.h misc.h hostfile.h ssh_api.h ssh2.h dns.h addr.h
+ssh-keysign.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h ssherr.h sshkey.h ssh.h ssh2.h misc.h sshbuf.h authfile.h msg.h canohost.h pathnames.h readconf.h uidswap.h
+ssh-pkcs11-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+ssh-pkcs11-helper.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h sshkey.h authfd.h ssh-pkcs11.h
+ssh-pkcs11.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h sshkey.h
+ssh-rsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+ssh-sk-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h msg.h digest.h pathnames.h ssh-sk.h misc.h
+ssh-sk-helper.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h ssherr.h sshkey.h authfd.h misc.h sshbuf.h msg.h uidswap.h ssh-sk.h
+ssh-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+ssh-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+ssh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h canohost.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h channels.h
+ssh.o: sshkey.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h clientloop.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h readconf.h sshconnect.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshpty.h match.h msg.h version.h myproposal.h utf8.h
+ssh_api.o: authfile.h misc.h version.h myproposal.h sshbuf.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+ssh_api.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh_api.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h dispatch.h compat.h log.h ssherr.h
+sshbuf-getput-basic.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
+sshbuf-getput-crypto.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sshbuf-io.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h atomicio.h
+sshbuf-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
+sshbuf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h
+sshconnect.o: authfd.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
+sshconnect.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h hostfile.h ssh.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h sshkey.h sshconnect.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h readconf.h atomicio.h dns.h monitor_fdpass.h ssh2.h version.h authfile.h
+sshconnect2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h packet.h dispatch.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
+sshconnect2.o: myproposal.h sshconnect.h authfile.h dh.h authfd.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h readconf.h match.h canohost.h msg.h pathnames.h uidswap.h hostfile.h utf8.h ssh-sk.h sk-api.h
+sshd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h match.h servconf.h uidswap.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h
+sshd.o: poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h myproposal.h authfile.h pathnames.h atomicio.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h authfd.h msg.h channels.h session.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h ssh-sandbox.h auth-options.h version.h sk-api.h srclimit.h dh.h
+ssherr.o: ssherr.h
+sshkey-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sshkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h ssh2.h ssherr.h misc.h sshbuf.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h match.h ssh-sk.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+sshlogin.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshlogin.h ssherr.h loginrec.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
+sshpty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h
+sshsig.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h authfd.h authfile.h log.h ssherr.h misc.h sshbuf.h sshsig.h sshkey.h match.h digest.h
+sshtty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h
+ttymodes.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h ssherr.h compat.h sshbuf.h ttymodes.h
+uidswap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h uidswap.h xmalloc.h
+umac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h
+umac128.o: umac.c includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h
+utf8.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h utf8.h
+xmalloc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h ssherr.h
+xmss_commons.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+xmss_fast.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+xmss_hash.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+xmss_hash_address.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+xmss_wots.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
diff --git a/.git_allowed_signers b/.git_allowed_signers
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0313c1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.git_allowed_signers
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+dtucker@dtucker.net ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIKecyjh9aNmD4rb8WblA8v91JjRb0Cd2JtkzqxcggGeG
+djm@mindrot.org sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBLnJo3ZVDENYZGXm5uO9lU7b0iDFq5gHpTu1MaHPWTEfPdvw+AjFQQ/q5YizuMJkXGsMdYmblJEJZYHpm9IS7ZkAAAAEc3NoOg==
+djm@mindrot.org sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBJoAXBTQalfg+kC5wy1vE7HkIHtVnmV6AUuuIo9KQ1P+70juHwvsFKpsGaqQbrHJkTVgYDGVP02XHj8+Fb18yBIAAAAEc3NoOg==
+djm@mindrot.org sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBH+z1I48s6ydOhP5SJmI02zVCLf0K15B+UMHgoTIKVfUIv5oDoVX7e9f+7QiRmTeEOdZfQydiaVqsfi7qPSve+0AAAAEc3NoOg==
+djm@mindrot.org sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBPM4BmUg/fMnsl42JwktTekk/mB8Be3M+yK2ayg6lqYsqEri8yhRx84gey51OHKVk1TwlGbJjcMHI4URreDBEMQAAAAEc3NoOg==
diff --git a/.git_allowed_signers.asc b/.git_allowed_signers.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5fc6118
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.git_allowed_signers.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
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+H9s0bIti42dPHqurgh92KS2mDGVIW8Y8MvxFUr678+hdem1U7Xvjoo0uaveNhJhe
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+u9Mdz1pY9mowKbd0c0dR+3fauvjM133dzKuyeDHMqDa5JPyd59o=
+=kgnS
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/.github/ci-status.md b/.github/ci-status.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d13bbfa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/ci-status.md
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+master :
+[![C/C++ CI](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml?query=branch:master)
+[![C/C++ CI self-hosted](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/selfhosted.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/selfhosted.yml?query=branch:master)
+[![Upstream self-hosted](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/upstream.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/upstream.yml?query=branch:master)
+[![CIFuzz](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/cifuzz.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/cifuzz.yml)
+[![Fuzzing Status](https://oss-fuzz-build-logs.storage.googleapis.com/badges/openssh.svg)](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/list?sort=-opened&can=1&q=proj:openssh)
+
+9.1 :
+[![C/C++ CI](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml/badge.svg?branch=V_9_1)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml?query=branch:V_9_1)
+[![C/C++ CI self-hosted](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/selfhosted.yml/badge.svg?branch=V_9_1)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted/actions/workflows/selfhosted.yml?query=branch:V_9_1)
diff --git a/.github/configs b/.github/configs
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..bdd5ddb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/configs
@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# usage: configs vmname test_config (or '' for default)
+#
+# Sets the following variables:
+# CONFIGFLAGS           options to ./configure
+# SSHD_CONFOPTS         sshd_config options
+# TEST_TARGET           make target used when testing.  defaults to "tests".
+# LTESTS
+
+config=$1
+if [ "$config" = "" ]; then
+	config="default"
+fi
+
+unset CC CFLAGS CPPFLAGS LDFLAGS LTESTS SUDO
+
+TEST_TARGET="tests compat-tests"
+LTESTS=""
+SKIP_LTESTS=""
+SUDO=sudo	# run with sudo by default
+TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS=1
+# Stop on first test failure to minimize logs
+TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL=yes
+
+CONFIGFLAGS=""
+LIBCRYPTOFLAGS=""
+
+case "$config" in
+    default|sol64)
+	;;
+    c89)
+	CC="gcc"
+	CFLAGS="-Wall -std=c89 -pedantic -Werror=vla"
+	CONFIGFLAGS="--without-zlib"
+	LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--without-openssl"
+	TEST_TARGET=t-exec
+	;;
+    cygwin-release)
+	# See https://cygwin.com/git/?p=git/cygwin-packages/openssh.git;a=blob;f=openssh.cygport;hb=HEAD
+	CONFIGFLAGS="--with-xauth=/usr/bin/xauth --with-security-key-builtin"
+	CONFIGFLAGS="$CONFIGFLAGS --with-kerberos5=/usr --with-libedit --disable-strip"
+	;;
+   clang-12-Werror)
+	CC="clang-12"
+	# clang's implicit-fallthrough requires that the code be annotated with
+	# __attribute__((fallthrough)) and does not understand /* FALLTHROUGH */
+	CFLAGS="-Wall -Wextra -O2 -Wno-error=implicit-fallthrough -Wno-error=unused-parameter"
+	CONFIGFLAGS="--with-pam --with-Werror"
+	;;
+    *-sanitize-*)
+	case "$config" in
+	gcc-*)
+		CC=gcc
+		;;
+	clang-*)
+		# Find the newest available version of clang
+		for i in `seq 10 99`; do
+		    clang="`which clang-$i 2>/dev/null`"
+		    [ -x "$clang" ] && CC="$clang"
+		done
+		;;
+	esac
+	# Put Sanitizer logs in regress dir.
+	SANLOGS=`pwd`/regress
+	# - We replace chroot with chdir so that the sanitizer in the preauth
+	#   privsep process can read /proc.
+	# - clang does not recognizes explicit_bzero so we use bzero
+	#   (see https://github.com/google/sanitizers/issues/1507
+	# - openssl and zlib trip ASAN.
+	# - sp_pwdp returned by getspnam trips ASAN, hence disabling shadow.
+	case "$config" in
+	*-sanitize-address)
+	    CFLAGS="-fsanitize=address -fno-omit-frame-pointer"
+	    LDFLAGS="-fsanitize=address"
+	    CPPFLAGS='-Dchroot=chdir -Dexplicit_bzero=bzero -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=0 -DASAN_OPTIONS=\"detect_leaks=0:log_path='$SANLOGS'/asan.log\"'
+	    CONFIGFLAGS=""
+	    TEST_TARGET="t-exec"
+	    ;;
+	clang-sanitize-memory)
+	    CFLAGS="-fsanitize=memory -fsanitize-memory-track-origins -fno-omit-frame-pointer"
+	    LDFLAGS="-fsanitize=memory"
+	    CPPFLAGS='-Dchroot=chdir -Dexplicit_bzero=bzero -DMSAN_OPTIONS=\"log_path='$SANLOGS'/msan.log\"'
+	    CONFIGFLAGS="--without-openssl --without-zlib --without-shadow"
+	    TEST_TARGET="t-exec"
+	    ;;
+	*-sanitize-undefined)
+	    CFLAGS="-fsanitize=undefined"
+	    LDFLAGS="-fsanitize=undefined"
+	    ;;
+	*)
+	     echo unknown sanitize option;
+	     exit 1;;
+	esac
+	features="--disable-security-key --disable-pkcs11"
+	hardening="--without-sandbox --without-hardening --without-stackprotect"
+	privsep="--with-privsep-user=root"
+	CONFIGFLAGS="$CONFIGFLAGS $features $hardening $privsep"
+	# Because we hobble chroot we can't test it.
+	SKIP_LTESTS=sftp-chroot
+	;;
+    gcc-11-Werror)
+	CC="gcc"
+	# -Wnoformat-truncation in gcc 7.3.1 20180130 fails on fmt_scaled
+	CFLAGS="-Wall -Wextra -O2 -Wno-format-truncation -Wimplicit-fallthrough=4 -Wno-unused-parameter"
+	CONFIGFLAGS="--with-pam --with-Werror"
+	;;
+    clang*|gcc*)
+	CC="$config"
+	;;
+    kitchensink)
+	CONFIGFLAGS="--with-kerberos5 --with-libedit --with-pam"
+	CONFIGFLAGS="${CONFIGFLAGS} --with-security-key-builtin --with-selinux"
+	CFLAGS="-DSK_DEBUG -DSANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG"
+	;;
+    hardenedmalloc)
+	CONFIGFLAGS="--with-ldflags=-lhardened_malloc"
+	;;
+    tcmalloc)
+	CONFIGFLAGS="--with-ldflags=-ltcmalloc"
+	;;
+    krb5|heimdal)
+	CONFIGFLAGS="--with-kerberos5"
+	;;
+    libedit)
+	CONFIGFLAGS="--with-libedit"
+	;;
+    musl)
+	CC="musl-gcc"
+	CONFIGFLAGS="--without-zlib"
+	LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--without-openssl"
+	TEST_TARGET="t-exec"
+	;;
+    pam-krb5)
+	CONFIGFLAGS="--with-pam --with-kerberos5"
+	SSHD_CONFOPTS="UsePam yes"
+	;;
+    *pam)
+	CONFIGFLAGS="--with-pam"
+	SSHD_CONFOPTS="UsePam yes"
+	;;
+    libressl-*)
+	LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--with-ssl-dir=/opt/libressl --with-rpath=-Wl,-rpath,"
+	;;
+    openssl-*)
+	LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--with-ssl-dir=/opt/openssl --with-rpath=-Wl,-rpath,"
+	# OpenSSL 1.1.1 specifically has a bug in its RNG that breaks reexec
+	# fallback.  See https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3483
+	if [ "$config" = "openssl-1.1.1" ]; then
+		SKIP_LTESTS="reexec"
+	fi
+	;;
+    selinux)
+	CONFIGFLAGS="--with-selinux"
+	;;
+    sk)
+	CONFIGFLAGS="--with-security-key-builtin"
+        ;;
+    without-openssl)
+	LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--without-openssl"
+	TEST_TARGET=t-exec
+	;;
+    valgrind-[1-5]|valgrind-unit)
+	# rlimit sandbox and FORTIFY_SOURCE confuse Valgrind.
+	CONFIGFLAGS="--without-sandbox --without-hardening"
+	CONFIGFLAGS="$CONFIGFLAGS --with-cppflags=-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=0"
+	TEST_TARGET="t-exec USE_VALGRIND=1"
+	TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES=1
+	export TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES
+	# Valgrind slows things down enough that the agent timeout test
+	# won't reliably pass, and the unit tests run longer than allowed
+	# by github so split into separate tests.
+	tests2="integrity try-ciphers"
+	tests3="krl forward-control sshsig agent-restrict kextype sftp"
+	tests4="cert-userkey cert-hostkey kextype sftp-perm keygen-comment percent"
+	tests5="rekey"
+	case "$config" in
+	    valgrind-1)
+		# All tests except agent-timeout (which is flaky under valgrind),
+		# connection-timeout (which doesn't work since it's so slow)
+		# and hostbased (since valgrind won't let ssh exec keysign).
+		# Slow ones are run separately to increase parallelism.
+		SKIP_LTESTS="agent-timeout connection-timeout hostbased"
+		SKIP_LTESTS="$SKIP_LTESTS ${tests2} ${tests3} ${tests4} ${tests5}"
+		;;
+	    valgrind-2)
+		LTESTS="${tests2}"
+		;;
+	    valgrind-3)
+		LTESTS="${tests3}"
+		;;
+	    valgrind-4)
+		LTESTS="${tests4}"
+		;;
+	    valgrind-5)
+		LTESTS="${tests5}"
+		;;
+	    valgrind-unit)
+		TEST_TARGET="unit USE_VALGRIND=1"
+		;;
+	esac
+	;;
+    *)
+	echo "Unknown configuration $config"
+	exit 1
+	;;
+esac
+
+# The Solaris 64bit targets are special since they need a non-flag arg.
+case "$config" in
+    sol64*)
+	CONFIGFLAGS="x86_64 --with-cflags=-m64 --with-ldflags=-m64 ${CONFIGFLAGS}"
+	LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--with-ssl-dir=/usr/local/ssl64"
+	;;
+esac
+
+case "${TARGET_HOST}" in
+    aix*)
+	# These are slow real or virtual machines so skip the slowest tests
+	# (which tend to be thw ones that transfer lots of data) so that the
+	# test run does not time out.
+	# The agent-restrict test fails due to some quoting issue when run
+	# with sh or ksh so specify bash for now.
+	TEST_TARGET="t-exec TEST_SHELL=bash"
+	SKIP_LTESTS="rekey sftp"
+	;;
+    debian-riscv64)
+	# This machine is fairly slow, so skip the unit tests.
+	TEST_TARGET="t-exec"
+	;;
+    dfly58*|dfly60*)
+	# scp 3-way connection hangs on these so skip until sorted.
+	SKIP_LTESTS=scp3
+	;;
+    fbsd6)
+	# Native linker is not great with PIC so OpenSSL is built w/out.
+	CONFIGFLAGS="${CONFIGFLAGS} --disable-security-key"
+	;;
+    hurd)
+	SKIP_LTESTS="forwarding multiplex proxy-connect hostkey-agent agent-ptrace"
+	;;
+    minix3)
+	LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--without-openssl --disable-security-key"
+	# Minix does not have a loopback interface so we have to skip any
+	# test that relies on one.
+	# Also, Minix seems to be very limited in the number of select()
+	# calls that can be operating concurrently, so prune additional tests for that.
+	T="addrmatch agent-restrict brokenkeys cfgmatch cfgmatchlisten cfgparse
+	    connect connect-uri exit-status forwarding hostkey-agent
+	    key-options keyscan knownhosts-command login-timeout
+	    reconfigure reexec rekey scp scp-uri scp3 sftp sftp-badcmds
+	    sftp-batch sftp-cmds sftp-glob sftp-perm sftp-uri stderr-data
+	    transfer"
+	# Unix domain sockets don't work quite like we expect, so also skip any tests
+	# that use multiplexing.
+	T="$T connection-timeout dynamic-forward forward-control multiplex"
+	SKIP_LTESTS="$(echo $T)"
+	TEST_TARGET=t-exec
+	SUDO=""
+	;;
+    nbsd4)
+	# System compiler will ICE on some files with fstack-protector
+	# SHA256 functions in sha2.h conflict with OpenSSL's breaking sk-dummy
+	CONFIGFLAGS="${CONFIGFLAGS} --without-hardening --disable-security-key"
+	;;
+    openwrt-*)
+	CONFIGFLAGS="${CONFIGFLAGS} --without-openssl --without-zlib"
+	TEST_TARGET="t-exec"
+	;;
+    sol10|sol11)
+	# sol10 VM is 32bit and the unit tests are slow.
+	# sol11 has 4 test configs so skip unit tests to speed up.
+	TEST_TARGET="tests SKIP_UNIT=1"
+	;;
+    win10)
+	# No sudo on Windows.
+	SUDO=""
+	;;
+esac
+
+case "`./config.guess`" in
+*cygwin)
+	SUDO=""
+	# Don't run compat tests on cygwin as they don't currently compile.
+	TEST_TARGET="tests"
+	;;
+*-darwin*)
+	# Unless specified otherwise, build without OpenSSL on Mac OS since
+	# modern versions don't ship with libcrypto.
+	LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--without-openssl"
+	TEST_TARGET=t-exec
+	;;
+esac
+
+# If we have a local openssl/libressl, use that.
+if [ -z "${LIBCRYPTOFLAGS}" ]; then
+	# last-match
+	for i in /usr/local /usr/local/ssl /usr/local/opt/openssl; do
+		if [ -x ${i}/bin/openssl ]; then
+			LIBCRYPTOFLAGS="--with-ssl-dir=${i}"
+		fi
+	done
+fi
+
+CONFIGFLAGS="${CONFIGFLAGS} ${LIBCRYPTOFLAGS}"
+
+if [ -x "$(which plink 2>/dev/null)" ]; then
+	REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes
+	export REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY
+fi
+
+export CC CFLAGS CPPFLAGS LDFLAGS LTESTS SUDO
+export TEST_TARGET TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL
diff --git a/.github/configure.sh b/.github/configure.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..bd00377
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/configure.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+. .github/configs $1
+
+printf "$ "
+
+if [ "x$CC" != "x" ]; then
+	printf "CC='$CC' "
+fi
+if [ "x$CFLAGS" != "x" ]; then
+	printf "CFLAGS='$CFLAGS' "
+fi
+if [ "x$CPPFLAGS" != "x" ]; then
+	printf "CPPFLAGS='$CPPFLAGS' "
+fi
+if [ "x$LDFLAGS" != "x" ]; then
+	printf "LDFLAGS='$LDFLAGS' "
+fi
+
+echo ./configure ${CONFIGFLAGS}
+./configure ${CONFIGFLAGS} 2>&1
diff --git a/.github/run_test.sh b/.github/run_test.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..8eeaf5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/run_test.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+. .github/configs $1
+
+[ -z "${SUDO}" ] || ${SUDO} mkdir -p /var/empty
+
+set -ex
+
+# If we want to test hostbased auth, set up the host for it.
+if [ ! -z "$SUDO" ] && [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_HOSTBASED_AUTH" ]; then
+    sshconf=/usr/local/etc
+    hostname | $SUDO tee $sshconf/shosts.equiv >/dev/null
+    echo "EnableSSHKeysign yes" | $SUDO tee $sshconf/ssh_config >/dev/null
+    $SUDO mkdir -p $sshconf
+    $SUDO cp -p /etc/ssh/ssh_host*key* $sshconf
+    $SUDO make install
+    for key in $sshconf/ssh_host*key*.pub; do
+        echo `hostname` `cat $key` | \
+            $SUDO tee -a $sshconf/ssh_known_hosts >/dev/null
+    done
+fi
+
+output_failed_logs() {
+    for i in regress/failed*; do
+        if [ -f "$i" ]; then
+            echo -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+            echo LOGFILE $i
+            cat $i
+            echo -------------------------------------------------------------------------
+        fi
+    done
+}
+trap output_failed_logs 0
+
+if [ -z "${LTESTS}" ]; then
+    make ${TEST_TARGET} SKIP_LTESTS="${SKIP_LTESTS}"
+else
+    make ${TEST_TARGET} SKIP_LTESTS="${SKIP_LTESTS}" LTESTS="${LTESTS}"
+fi
+
+if [ ! -z "${SSHD_CONFOPTS}" ]; then
+    echo "rerunning t-exec with TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS='${SSHD_CONFOPTS}'"
+    if [ -z "${LTESTS}" ]; then
+        make t-exec SKIP_LTESTS="${SKIP_LTESTS}" TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS="${SSHD_CONFOPTS}"
+    else
+        make t-exec SKIP_LTESTS="${SKIP_LTESTS}" LTESTS="${LTESTS}" TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS="${SSHD_CONFOPTS}"
+    fi
+fi
diff --git a/.github/setup_ci.sh b/.github/setup_ci.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..e4480e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/setup_ci.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+PACKAGES=""
+
+ . .github/configs $@
+
+case "`./config.guess`" in
+*cygwin)
+	PACKAGER=setup
+	echo Setting CYGWIN sustem environment variable.
+	setx CYGWIN "binmode"
+	chmod -R go-rw /cygdrive/d/a
+	umask 077
+	PACKAGES="$PACKAGES,autoconf,automake,cygwin-devel,gcc-core"
+	PACKAGES="$PACKAGES,make,openssl-devel,zlib-devel"
+	;;
+*-darwin*)
+	PACKAGER=brew
+	brew install automake
+	exit 0
+	;;
+*)
+	PACKAGER=apt
+esac
+
+TARGETS=$@
+
+INSTALL_FIDO_PPA="no"
+export DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive
+
+#echo "Setting up for '$TARGETS'"
+
+set -ex
+
+if [ -x "`which lsb_release 2>&1`" ]; then
+	lsb_release -a
+fi
+
+# Ubuntu 22.04 defaults to private home dirs which prevent the
+# agent-getpeerid test from running ssh-add as nobody.  See
+# https://github.com/actions/runner-images/issues/6106
+if [ ! -z "$SUDO" ] && ! "$SUDO" -u nobody test -x ~; then
+	echo ~ is not executable by nobody, adding perms.
+	chmod go+x ~
+fi
+
+if [ "${TARGETS}" = "kitchensink" ]; then
+	TARGETS="krb5 libedit pam sk selinux"
+fi
+
+for flag in $CONFIGFLAGS; do
+    case "$flag" in
+    --with-pam)		TARGETS="${TARGETS} pam" ;;
+    --with-libedit)	TARGETS="${TARGETS} libedit" ;;
+    esac
+done
+
+for TARGET in $TARGETS; do
+    case $TARGET in
+    default|without-openssl|without-zlib|c89)
+        # nothing to do
+        ;;
+    clang-sanitize*)
+        PACKAGES="$PACKAGES clang-12"
+        ;;
+    cygwin-release)
+        PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libcrypt-devel libfido2-devel libkrb5-devel"
+        ;;
+    gcc-sanitize*)
+        ;;
+    clang-*|gcc-*)
+        compiler=$(echo $TARGET | sed 's/-Werror//')
+        PACKAGES="$PACKAGES $compiler"
+        ;;
+    krb5)
+        PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libkrb5-dev"
+	;;
+    heimdal)
+        PACKAGES="$PACKAGES heimdal-dev"
+        ;;
+    libedit)
+	case "$PACKAGER" in
+	setup)	PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libedit-devel" ;;
+	apt)	PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libedit-dev" ;;
+	esac
+        ;;
+    *pam)
+        PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libpam0g-dev"
+        ;;
+    sk)
+        INSTALL_FIDO_PPA="yes"
+        PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libfido2-dev libu2f-host-dev libcbor-dev"
+        ;;
+    selinux)
+        PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libselinux1-dev selinux-policy-dev"
+        ;;
+    hardenedmalloc)
+        INSTALL_HARDENED_MALLOC=yes
+        ;;
+    musl)
+	PACKAGES="$PACKAGES musl-tools"
+	;;
+    tcmalloc)
+        PACKAGES="$PACKAGES libgoogle-perftools-dev"
+        ;;
+    openssl-noec)
+	INSTALL_OPENSSL=OpenSSL_1_1_1k
+	SSLCONFOPTS="no-ec"
+	;;
+    openssl-*)
+        INSTALL_OPENSSL=$(echo ${TARGET} | cut -f2 -d-)
+        case ${INSTALL_OPENSSL} in
+          1.1.1_stable)	INSTALL_OPENSSL="OpenSSL_1_1_1-stable" ;;
+          1.*)	INSTALL_OPENSSL="OpenSSL_$(echo ${INSTALL_OPENSSL} | tr . _)" ;;
+          3.*)	INSTALL_OPENSSL="openssl-${INSTALL_OPENSSL}" ;;
+        esac
+        PACKAGES="${PACKAGES} putty-tools"
+       ;;
+    libressl-*)
+        INSTALL_LIBRESSL=$(echo ${TARGET} | cut -f2 -d-)
+        case ${INSTALL_LIBRESSL} in
+          master) ;;
+          *) INSTALL_LIBRESSL="$(echo ${TARGET} | cut -f2 -d-)" ;;
+        esac
+        PACKAGES="${PACKAGES} putty-tools"
+       ;;
+    valgrind*)
+       PACKAGES="$PACKAGES valgrind"
+       ;;
+    *) echo "Invalid option '${TARGET}'"
+        exit 1
+        ;;
+    esac
+done
+
+if [ "yes" = "$INSTALL_FIDO_PPA" ]; then
+    sudo apt update -qq
+    sudo apt install -qy software-properties-common
+    sudo apt-add-repository -y ppa:yubico/stable
+fi
+
+tries=3
+while [ ! -z "$PACKAGES" ] && [ "$tries" -gt "0" ]; do
+    case "$PACKAGER" in
+    apt)
+	sudo apt update -qq
+	if sudo apt install -qy $PACKAGES; then
+		PACKAGES=""
+	fi
+	;;
+    setup)
+	if /cygdrive/c/setup.exe -q -P `echo "$PACKAGES" | tr ' ' ,`; then
+		PACKAGES=""
+	fi
+	;;
+    esac
+    if [ ! -z "$PACKAGES" ]; then
+	sleep 90
+    fi
+    tries=$(($tries - 1))
+done
+if [ ! -z "$PACKAGES" ]; then
+	echo "Package installation failed."
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+if [ "${INSTALL_HARDENED_MALLOC}" = "yes" ]; then
+    (cd ${HOME} &&
+     git clone https://github.com/GrapheneOS/hardened_malloc.git &&
+     cd ${HOME}/hardened_malloc &&
+     make -j2 && sudo cp out/libhardened_malloc.so /usr/lib/)
+fi
+
+if [ ! -z "${INSTALL_OPENSSL}" ]; then
+    (cd ${HOME} &&
+     git clone https://github.com/openssl/openssl.git &&
+     cd ${HOME}/openssl &&
+     git checkout ${INSTALL_OPENSSL} &&
+     ./config no-threads shared ${SSLCONFOPTS} \
+         --prefix=/opt/openssl &&
+     make && sudo make install_sw)
+fi
+
+if [ ! -z "${INSTALL_LIBRESSL}" ]; then
+    if [ "${INSTALL_LIBRESSL}" = "master" ]; then
+        (mkdir -p ${HOME}/libressl && cd ${HOME}/libressl &&
+         git clone https://github.com/libressl-portable/portable.git &&
+         cd ${HOME}/libressl/portable &&
+         git checkout ${INSTALL_LIBRESSL} &&
+         sh update.sh && sh autogen.sh &&
+         ./configure --prefix=/opt/libressl &&
+         make -j2 && sudo make install)
+    else
+        LIBRESSL_URLBASE=https://cdn.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/LibreSSL
+        (cd ${HOME} &&
+         wget ${LIBRESSL_URLBASE}/libressl-${INSTALL_LIBRESSL}.tar.gz &&
+         tar xfz libressl-${INSTALL_LIBRESSL}.tar.gz &&
+         cd libressl-${INSTALL_LIBRESSL} &&
+         ./configure --prefix=/opt/libressl && make -j2 && sudo make install)
+    fi
+fi
diff --git a/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml b/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e6ea495
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/c-cpp.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+name: C/C++ CI
+
+on:
+  push:
+    paths: [ '**.c', '**.h', '**.m4', '**.sh', '.github/**', '**/Makefile.in', 'configure.ac' ]
+  pull_request:
+    paths: [ '**.c', '**.h', '**.m4', '**.sh', '.github/**', '**/Makefile.in', 'configure.ac' ]
+
+jobs:
+  ci:
+    if: github.repository != 'openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted'
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        # First we test all OSes in the default configuration.
+        target: [ubuntu-20.04, ubuntu-22.04, macos-11, macos-12, windows-2019, windows-2022]
+        config: [default]
+        # Then we include any extra configs we want to test for specific VMs.
+        # Valgrind slows things down quite a bit, so start them first.
+        include:
+          - { target: windows-2019, config: cygwin-release }
+          - { target: windows-2022, config: cygwin-release }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: valgrind-1 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: valgrind-2 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: valgrind-3 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: valgrind-4 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: valgrind-5 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: valgrind-unit }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: c89 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: clang-6.0 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: clang-8 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: clang-9 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: clang-10 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: clang-11 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: clang-12-Werror }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: clang-sanitize-address }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: clang-sanitize-undefined }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: gcc-sanitize-address }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: gcc-sanitize-undefined }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: gcc-7 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: gcc-8 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: gcc-10 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: gcc-11-Werror }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: pam }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: kitchensink }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: hardenedmalloc }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: tcmalloc }
+          - { target: ubuntu-20.04, config: musl }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-master }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-2.2.9 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-2.8.3 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-3.0.2 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-3.2.6 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-3.3.6 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-3.4.3 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-3.5.3 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-3.6.1 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: libressl-3.7.0 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-master }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-noec }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.0.1 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.0.1u }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.0.2u }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.1.0h }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.1.1 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.1.1k }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.1.1n }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.1.1q }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.1.1s }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-3.0.0 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-3.0.5 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-3.0.7 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-1.1.1_stable }
+          - { target: ubuntu-latest, config: openssl-3.0 }  # stable branch
+          - { target: ubuntu-22.04, config: pam }
+          - { target: ubuntu-22.04, config: krb5 }
+          - { target: ubuntu-22.04, config: heimdal }
+          - { target: ubuntu-22.04, config: libedit }
+          - { target: ubuntu-22.04, config: sk }
+          - { target: ubuntu-22.04, config: selinux }
+          - { target: ubuntu-22.04, config: kitchensink }
+          - { target: ubuntu-22.04, config: without-openssl }
+          - { target: macos-11, config: pam }
+          - { target: macos-12, config: pam }
+    runs-on: ${{ matrix.target }}
+    steps:
+    - name: set cygwin git params
+      if: ${{ startsWith(matrix.target, 'windows') }}
+      run: git config --global core.autocrlf input
+    - name: install cygwin
+      if: ${{ startsWith(matrix.target, 'windows') }}
+      uses: cygwin/cygwin-install-action@master
+    - uses: actions/checkout@main
+    - name: setup CI system
+      run: sh ./.github/setup_ci.sh ${{ matrix.config }}
+    - name: autoreconf
+      run: sh -c autoreconf
+    - name: configure
+      run: sh ./.github/configure.sh ${{ matrix.config }}
+    - name: save config
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@main
+      with:
+        name: ${{ matrix.target }}-${{ matrix.config }}-config
+        path: config.h
+    - name: make clean
+      run: make clean
+    - name: make
+      run: make -j2
+    - name: make tests
+      run: sh ./.github/run_test.sh ${{ matrix.config }}
+      env:
+        TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS: 1
+        TEST_SSH_HOSTBASED_AUTH: yes
+    - name: save logs
+      if: failure()
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@main
+      with:
+        name: ${{ matrix.target }}-${{ matrix.config }}-logs
+        path: |
+          config.h
+          config.log
+          regress/*.log
+          regress/valgrind-out/
+          regress/asan.log.*
+          regress/msan.log.*
diff --git a/.github/workflows/cifuzz.yml b/.github/workflows/cifuzz.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ca8c47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/cifuzz.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+name: CIFuzz
+on:
+  push:
+    paths: [ '**.c', '**.h', '**.m4', '**.sh', '.github/**', '**/Makefile.in', 'configure.ac' ]
+  pull_request:
+    paths: [ '**.c', '**.h', '**.m4', '**.sh', '.github/**', '**/Makefile.in', 'configure.ac' ]
+
+jobs:
+  Fuzzing:
+    if: github.repository != 'openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted'
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+    - name: Build Fuzzers
+      id: build
+      uses: google/oss-fuzz/infra/cifuzz/actions/build_fuzzers@master
+      with:
+        oss-fuzz-project-name: 'openssh'
+        dry-run: false
+        language: c++
+    - name: Run Fuzzers
+      uses: google/oss-fuzz/infra/cifuzz/actions/run_fuzzers@master
+      with:
+        oss-fuzz-project-name: 'openssh'
+        fuzz-seconds: 600
+        dry-run: false
+        language: c++
+    - name: Upload Crash
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@main
+      if: failure() && steps.build.outcome == 'success'
+      with:
+        name: artifacts
+        path: ./out/artifacts
diff --git a/.github/workflows/selfhosted.yml b/.github/workflows/selfhosted.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..50bc9ff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/selfhosted.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+name: C/C++ CI self-hosted
+
+on:
+  push:
+    paths: [ '**.c', '**.h', '**.m4', '**.sh', '.github/**', '**/Makefile.in', 'configure.ac' ]
+
+jobs:
+  selfhosted:
+    if: github.repository == 'openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted'
+    runs-on: ${{ matrix.host }}
+    timeout-minutes: 600
+    env:
+      HOST: ${{ matrix.host }}
+      TARGET_HOST: ${{ matrix.target }}
+      TARGET_CONFIG: ${{ matrix.config }}
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      # We use a matrix in two parts: firstly all of the VMs are tested with the
+      # default config.  "target" corresponds to a label associated with the
+      # worker.  The default is an ephemeral VM running under libvirt.
+      matrix:
+        target:
+          - alpine
+          - debian-i386
+          - dfly30
+          - dfly48
+          - dfly58
+          - dfly60
+          - dfly62
+          - fbsd10
+          - fbsd12
+          - fbsd13
+          - minix3
+          - nbsd3
+          - nbsd4
+          - nbsd8
+          - nbsd9
+          - obsd51
+          - obsd67
+          - obsd69
+          - obsd70
+          - obsdsnap
+          - obsdsnap-i386
+          - openindiana
+          - sol10
+          - sol11
+        config:
+          - default
+        host:
+          - libvirt
+        include:
+          # Then we include extra libvirt test configs.
+          - { target: aix51, config: default, host: libvirt }
+          - { target: debian-i386, config: pam, host: libvirt }
+          - { target: dfly30, config: without-openssl, host: libvirt}
+          - { target: dfly48, config: pam ,host: libvirt }
+          - { target: dfly58, config: pam, host: libvirt }
+          - { target: dfly60, config: pam, host: libvirt }
+          - { target: dfly62, config: pam, host: libvirt }
+          - { target: fbsd10, config: pam, host: libvirt }
+          - { target: fbsd12, config: pam, host: libvirt }
+          - { target: fbsd13, config: pam, host: libvirt }
+          - { target: nbsd8,  config: pam, host: libvirt }
+          - { target: nbsd9,  config: pam, host: libvirt }
+          - { target: openindiana, config: pam, host: libvirt }
+          - { target: sol10,  config: pam, host: libvirt }
+          - { target: sol11,  config: pam-krb5, host: libvirt }
+          - { target: sol11,  config: sol64, host: libvirt }
+          # VMs with persistent disks that have their own runner.
+          - { target: win10, config: default, host: win10 }
+          - { target: win10, config: cygwin-release, host: win10 }
+          # Physical hosts, with either native runners or remote via ssh.
+          - { target: ARM, config: default, host: ARM }
+          - { target: ARM64, config: default, host: ARM64 }
+          - { target: ARM64, config: pam, host: ARM64 }
+          - { target: debian-riscv64, config: default, host: debian-riscv64 }
+          - { target: openwrt-mips, config: default, host: openwrt-mips }
+          - { target: openwrt-mipsel, config: default, host: openwrt-mipsel }
+    steps:
+    - name: shutdown VM if running
+      run: vmshutdown
+      working-directory: ${{ runner.temp }}
+    - uses: actions/checkout@main
+    - name: autoreconf
+      run: autoreconf
+    - name: startup VM
+      run: vmstartup
+      working-directory: ${{ runner.temp }}
+    - name: configure
+      run: vmrun ./.github/configure.sh ${{ matrix.config }}
+    - name: save config
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@main
+      with:
+        name: ${{ matrix.target }}-${{ matrix.config }}-config
+        path: config.h
+    - name: make clean
+      run: vmrun make clean
+    - name: make
+      run: vmrun make
+    - name: make tests
+      run: vmrun ./.github/run_test.sh ${{ matrix.config }}
+      timeout-minutes: 600
+    - name: save logs
+      if: failure()
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@main
+      with:
+        name: ${{ matrix.target }}-${{ matrix.config }}-logs
+        path: |
+          config.h
+          config.log
+          regress/*.log
+          regress/valgrind-out/
+    - name: shutdown VM
+      if: always()
+      run: vmshutdown
+      working-directory: ${{ runner.temp }}
diff --git a/.github/workflows/upstream.yml b/.github/workflows/upstream.yml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1e2c2ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.github/workflows/upstream.yml
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+name: Upstream self-hosted
+
+on:
+  push:
+    branches: [ master ]
+    paths: [ '**.c', '**.h', '.github/**' ]
+
+jobs:
+  selfhosted:
+    if: github.repository == 'openssh/openssh-portable-selfhosted'
+    runs-on: 'libvirt'
+    env:
+      HOST: 'libvirt'
+      TARGET_HOST: ${{ matrix.target }}
+      TARGET_CONFIG: ${{ matrix.config }}
+    strategy:
+      fail-fast: false
+      matrix:
+        target: [ obsdsnap, obsdsnap-i386 ]
+        config: [ default, without-openssl, ubsan ]
+    steps:
+    - name: shutdown VM if running
+      run: vmshutdown
+      working-directory: ${{ runner.temp }}
+    - uses: actions/checkout@main
+    - name: startup VM
+      run: vmstartup
+      working-directory: ${{ runner.temp }}
+    - name: update source
+      run: vmrun "cd /usr/src && cvs up -dPA usr.bin/ssh regress/usr.bin/ssh"
+    - name: make clean
+      run: vmrun "cd /usr/src/usr.bin/ssh && make obj && make clean && cd /usr/src/regress/usr.bin/ssh && make obj && make clean && sudo chmod -R g-w /usr/src /usr/obj"
+    - name: make
+      run: vmrun "cd /usr/src/usr.bin/ssh && case ${{ matrix.config }} in without-openssl) make OPENSSL=no;; ubsan) make DEBUG='-fsanitize-minimal-runtime -fsanitize=undefined';; *) make; esac"
+    - name: make install
+      run: vmrun "cd /usr/src/usr.bin/ssh && sudo make install"
+    - name: make tests`
+      run: vmrun "cd /usr/src/regress/usr.bin/ssh && case ${{ matrix.config }} in without-openssl) make OPENSSL=no;; ubsan) make DEBUG='-fsanitize-minimal-runtime -fsanitize=undefined';; *) make; esac"
+      env:
+        SUDO: sudo
+      timeout-minutes: 300
+    - name: save logs
+      if: failure()
+      uses: actions/upload-artifact@main
+      with:
+        name: ${{ matrix.target }}-${{ matrix.config }}-logs
+        path: |
+          /usr/obj/regress/usr.bin/ssh/obj/*.log
+    - name: shutdown VM
+      if: always()
+      run: vmshutdown
+      working-directory: ${{ runner.temp }}
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e4ae5a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+Makefile
+buildpkg.sh
+config.h
+config.h.in
+config.h.in~
+config.log
+config.status
+configure
+aclocal.m4
+openbsd-compat/Makefile
+openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile
+openssh.xml
+opensshd.init
+survey.sh
+**/*.0
+**/*.o
+**/*.lo
+**/*.so
+**/*.out
+**/*.a
+autom4te.cache/
+scp
+sftp
+sftp-server
+ssh
+ssh-add
+ssh-agent
+ssh-keygen
+ssh-keyscan
+ssh-keysign
+ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ssh-sk-helper
+sshd
+!regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile
+!regress/unittests/sshsig/Makefile
+tags
diff --git a/.skipped-commit-ids b/.skipped-commit-ids
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59e8051
--- /dev/null
+++ b/.skipped-commit-ids
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+5317f294d63a876bfc861e19773b1575f96f027d	remove libssh from makefiles
+a337e886a49f96701ccbc4832bed086a68abfa85	Makefile changes
+f2c9feb26963615c4fece921906cf72e248b61ee	more Makefile
+fa728823ba21c4b45212750e1d3a4b2086fd1a62	more Makefile refactoring
+1de0e85522051eb2ffa00437e1885e9d7b3e0c2e	moduli update
+814b2f670df75759e1581ecef530980b2b3d7e0f	remove redundant make defs
+04431e8e7872f49a2129bf080a6b73c19d576d40	moduli update
+c07772f58028fda683ee6abd41c73da3ff70d403	moduli update
+db6375fc302e3bdf07d96430c63c991b2c2bd3ff	moduli update
+5ea3d63ab972691f43e9087ab5fd8376d48e898f	uuencode.c Makefile accident
+99dd10e72c04e93849981d43d64c946619efa474	include sshbuf-misc.c
+9e1c23476bb845f3cf3d15d9032da3ed0cb2fcf5	sshbuf-misc.c in regress
+569f08445c27124ec7c7f6c0268d844ec56ac061	Makefile tweaks for !openssl
+58ec755be4e51978ecfee73539090eb68652a987	moduli update
+4bd5551b306df55379afe17d841207990eb773bf	Makefile.inc
+14806a59353152f843eb349e618abbf6f4dd3ada	Makefile.inc
+8ea4455a2d9364a0a04f9e4a2cbfa4c9fcefe77e	Makefile.inc
+d9b910e412d139141b072a905e66714870c38ac0	Makefile.inc
+7b7b619c1452a459310b0cf4391c5757c6bdbc0f	moduli update
+5010ff08f7ad92082e87dde098b20f5c24921a8f	moduli regen script update
+3bcae7a754db3fc5ad3cab63dd46774edb35b8ae	moduli regen script update
+52ff0e3205036147b2499889353ac082e505ea54	moduli update
+07b5031e9f49f2b69ac5e85b8da4fc9e393992a0	Makefile.inc
+cc12a9029833d222043aecd252d654965c351a69	moduli-gen Makefile
+7ac6c252d2a5be8fbad4c66d9d35db507c9dac5b	moduli update
+6b52cd2b637f3d29ef543f0ce532a2bce6d86af5	makefile change
+f9a0726d957cf10692a231996a1f34e7f9cdfeb0	moduli update
+1e0a2692b7e20b126dda60bf04999d1d30d959d8	sshd relinking makefile changes
+e1dc11143f83082e3154d6094f9136d0dc2637ad	more relinking makefile tweaks
+
+Old upstream tree:
+
+321065a95a7ccebdd5fd08482a1e19afbf524e35	Update DH groups
+d4f699a421504df35254cf1c6f1a7c304fb907ca	Remove 1k bit groups
+aafe246655b53b52bc32c8a24002bc262f4230f7	Remove intermediate moduli
+8fa9cd1dee3c3339ae329cf20fb591db6d605120	put back SSH1 for 6.9
+f31327a48dd4103333cc53315ec53fe65ed8a17a	Generate new moduli
+edbfde98c40007b7752a4ac106095e060c25c1ef	Regen moduli
+052fd565e3ff2d8cec3bc957d1788f50c827f8e2	Switch to tame-based sandbox
+7cf73737f357492776223da1c09179fa6ba74660	Remove moduli <2k
+180d84674be1344e45a63990d60349988187c1ae	Update moduli
+f6ae971186ba68d066cd102e57d5b0b2c211a5ee	systrace is dead.
+96c5054e3e1f170c6276902d5bc65bb3b87a2603	remove DEBUGLIBS from Makefile
+6da9a37f74aef9f9cc639004345ad893cad582d8	Update moduli file
+77bcb50e47b68c7209c7f0a5a020d73761e5143b	unset REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY
+38c2133817cbcae75c88c63599ac54228f0fa384	Change COMPILER_VERSION tests
+30c20180c87cbc99fa1020489fe7fd8245b6420c	resync integrity.sh shell
+1e6b51ddf767cbad0a4e63eb08026c127e654308	integrity.sh reliability
+fe5b31f69a60d47171836911f144acff77810217	Makefile.inc bits
+5781670c0578fe89663c9085ed3ba477cf7e7913	Delete sshconnect1.c
+ea80f445e819719ccdcb237022cacfac990fdc5c	Makefile.inc warning flags
+b92c93266d8234d493857bb822260dacf4366157	moduli-gen.sh tweak
+b25bf747544265b39af74fe0716dc8d9f5b63b95	Updated moduli
+1bd41cba06a7752de4df304305a8153ebfb6b0ac	rsa.[ch] already removed
+e39b3902fe1d6c4a7ba6a3c58e072219f3c1e604	Makefile changes
diff --git a/CREDITS b/CREDITS
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6cc3512
--- /dev/null
+++ b/CREDITS
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> - Creator of SSH
+
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song - Creators of OpenSSH
+
+Ahsan Rashid <arms@sco.com> - UnixWare long passwords
+Alain St-Denis <Alain.St-Denis@ec.gc.ca> - Irix fix
+Alexandre Oliva <oliva@lsd.ic.unicamp.br> - AIX fixes
+Andre Lucas <andre@ae-35.com> - new login code, many fixes
+Andreas Steinmetz <ast@domdv.de> - Shadow password expiry support
+Andrew McGill <andrewm@datrix.co.za> - SCO fixes
+Andrew Morgan <morgan@transmeta.com> - PAM bugfixes
+Andrew Stribblehill <a.d.stribblehill@durham.ac.uk> - Bugfixes
+Andy Sloane <andy@guildsoftware.com> - bugfixes
+Aran Cox <acox@cv.telegroup.com> - SCO bugfixes
+Arkadiusz Miskiewicz <misiek@pld.org.pl> - IPv6 compat fixes
+Ben Lindstrom <mouring@eviladmin.org> - NeXT support
+Ben Taylor <bent@clark.net> - Solaris debugging and fixes
+Bratislav ILICH <bilic@zepter.ru> - Configure fix
+Charles Levert <charles@comm.polymtl.ca> - SunOS 4 & bug fixes
+Chip Salzenberg <chip@valinux.com> - Assorted patches
+Chris Adams <cmadams@hiwaay.net> - OSF SIA support
+Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com> - SuSE packaging
+Chris, the Young One <cky@pobox.com> - Password auth fixes
+Christos Zoulas <christos@zoulas.com> - Autoconf fixes
+Chun-Chung Chen <cjj@u.washington.edu> - RPM fixes
+Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com> - Cygwin support
+Chad Mynhier <mynhier@interstel.net> - Solaris Process Contract support
+Dan Brosemer <odin@linuxfreak.com> - Autoconf support, build fixes
+Darren Hall <dhall@virage.org> - AIX patches
+Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au> - AIX BFF package scripts
+David Agraz <dagraz@jahoopa.com> - Build fixes
+David Del Piero <David.DelPiero@qed.qld.gov.au> - bug fixes
+David Hesprich <darkgrue@gue-tech.org> - Configure fixes
+David Rankin <drankin@bohemians.lexington.ky.us> - libwrap, AIX, NetBSD fixes
+Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des at freebsd.org> - Challenge-Response PAM code.
+Dhiraj Gulati <dgulati@sco.com> - UnixWare long passwords
+Ed Eden <ede370@stl.rural.usda.gov> - configure fixes
+Garrick James <garrick@james.net> - configure fixes
+Gary E. Miller <gem@rellim.com> - SCO support
+Ged Lodder <lodder@yacc.com.au> - HPUX fixes and enhancements
+Gert Doering <gd@hilb1.medat.de> - bug and portability fixes
+HARUYAMA Seigo <haruyama@unixuser.org> - Translations & doc fixes
+Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@ecei.tohoku.ac.jp> - IPv6 and bug fixes
+Hiroshi Takekawa <takekawa@sr3.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp> - Configure fixes
+Holger Trapp <Holger.Trapp@Informatik.TU-Chemnitz.DE> - KRB4/AFS config patch
+IWAMURO Motonori <iwa@mmp.fujitsu.co.jp> - bugfixes
+Jani Hakala <jahakala@cc.jyu.fi> - Patches
+Jarno Huuskonen <jhuuskon@hytti.uku.fi> - Bugfixes
+Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com> - Many patches
+Jonchen (email unknown) - the original author of PAM support of SSH
+Juergen Keil <jk@tools.de> - scp bugfixing
+KAMAHARA Junzo <kamahara@cc.kshosen.ac.jp> - Configure fixes
+Kees Cook <cook@cpoint.net> - scp fixes
+Kenji Miyake <kenji@miyake.org> - Configure fixes
+Kevin Cawlfield <cawlfiel@us.ibm.com> - AIX fixes.
+Kevin O'Connor <kevin_oconnor@standardandpoors.com> - RSAless operation
+Kevin Steves <stevesk@pobox.com> - HP support, bugfixes, improvements
+Kiyokazu SUTO <suto@ks-and-ks.ne.jp> - Bugfixes
+Larry Jones <larry.jones@sdrc.com> - Bugfixes
+Lutz Jaenicke <Lutz.Jaenicke@aet.TU-Cottbus.DE> - Bugfixes
+Marc G. Fournier <marc.fournier@acadiau.ca> - Solaris patches
+Mark D. Baushke <mdb@juniper.net> - bug fixes
+Martin Johansson <fatbob@acc.umu.se> - Linux fixes
+Mark D. Roth <roth+openssh@feep.net> - Features, bug fixes
+Mark Miller <markm@swoon.net> - Bugfixes
+Matt Richards <v2matt@btv.ibm.com> - AIX patches
+Michael Steffens <michael_steffens at hp.com> - HP-UX fixes
+Michael Stone <mstone@cs.loyola.edu> - Irix enhancements
+Nakaji Hiroyuki <nakaji@tutrp.tut.ac.jp> - Sony News-OS patch
+Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin.dahyabhai@pobox.com> - PAM environment patch
+Nate Itkin <nitkin@europa.com> - SunOS 4.1.x fixes
+Niels Kristian Bech Jensen <nkbj@image.dk> - Assorted patches
+Pavel Kankovsky <peak@argo.troja.mff.cuni.cz> - Security fixes
+Pavel Troller <patrol@omni.sinus.cz> - Bugfixes
+Pekka Savola <pekkas@netcore.fi> - Bugfixes
+Peter Kocks <peter.kocks@baygate.com> - Makefile fixes
+Peter Stuge <stuge@cdy.org> - mdoc2man.awk script
+Phil Hands <phil@hands.com> - Debian scripts, assorted patches
+Phil Karn <karn@ka9q.ampr.org> - Autoconf fixes
+Philippe WILLEM <Philippe.WILLEM@urssaf.fr> - Bugfixes
+Phill Camp <P.S.S.Camp@ukc.ac.uk> - login code fix
+Rip Loomis <loomisg@cist.saic.com> - Solaris package support, fixes
+Robert Dahlem <Robert.Dahlem at siemens.com> - Reliant Unix fixes
+Roumen Petrov <openssh@roumenpetrov.info> - Compile & configure fixes
+SAKAI Kiyotaka <ksakai@kso.netwk.ntt-at.co.jp> - Multiple bugfixes
+Simon Wilkinson <sxw@dcs.ed.ac.uk> - PAM fixes, Compat with MIT KrbV
+Solar Designer <solar@openwall.com> - many patches and technical assistance
+Svante Signell <svante.signell@telia.com> - Bugfixes
+Thomas Neumann <tom@smart.ruhr.de> - Shadow passwords
+Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net> - Portability & SCO fixes
+Tobias Oetiker <oetiker@ee.ethz.ch> - Bugfixes
+Tom Bertelson's <tbert@abac.com> - AIX auth fixes
+Tor-Ake Fransson <torake@hotmail.com> - AIX support
+Tudor Bosman <tudorb@jm.nu> - MD5 password support
+Udo Schweigert <ust@cert.siemens.de> - ReliantUNIX support
+Wendy Palm <wendyp at cray.com> - Cray support.
+Zack Weinberg <zack@wolery.cumb.org> - GNOME askpass enhancement
+
+Apologies to anyone I have missed.
+
+Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4251831
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -0,0 +1,11196 @@
+commit 6dfb65de949cdd0a5d198edee9a118f265924f33
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 2 23:21:54 2023 +1100
+
+    crank versions in RPM specs
+
+commit d07cfb11a0ca574eb68a3931d8c46fbe862a2021
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 2 23:21:45 2023 +1100
+
+    update version in README
+
+commit 9fe207565b4ab0fe5d1ac5bb85e39188d96fb214
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 2 23:17:49 2023 +1100
+
+    adapt compat_kex_proposal() test to portable
+
+commit 903c556b938fff2d7bff8da2cc460254430963c5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 2 12:12:52 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: test compat_kex_proposal(); by dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0e404ee264db546f9fdbf53390689ab5f8d38bf2
+
+commit 405fba71962dec8409c0c962408e09049e5624b5
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 19 07:53:45 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: Check if we can copy sshd or need to use sudo to do so
+    
+    during reexec test. Skip test if neither can work.  Patch from anton@, tweaks
+    from me.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 731b96ae74d02d5744e1f1a8e51d09877ffd9b6d
+
+commit b2a2a8f69fd7737ea17dc044353c514f2f962f35
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 2 12:10:22 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: openssh-9.2
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f7389f32413c74d6e2055f05cf65e7082de03923
+
+commit 12da7823336434a403f25c7cc0c2c6aed0737a35
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 2 12:10:05 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix double-free caused by compat_kex_proposal(); bz3522
+    
+    by dtucker@, ok me
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2bfc37cd2d41f67dad64c17a64cf2cd3806a5c80
+
+commit 79efd95ab5ff99f4cb3a955e2d713b3f54fb807e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Feb 1 17:17:26 2023 +1100
+
+    Skip connection-timeout test on minix3.
+    
+    Minix 3's Unix domain sockets don't seem to work the way we expect, so
+    skip connection-timeout test on that platform.  While there, group
+    together all similarly skipped tests and explicitly comment.
+
+commit 6b508c4e039619842bcf5a16f8a6b08dd6bec44a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 1 12:12:05 2023 +1100
+
+    fix libfido2 detection without pkg-config
+    
+    Place libfido2 before additional libraries (that it may depend upon)
+    and not after. bz3530 from James Zhang; ok dtucker@
+
+commit 358e300fed5e6def233a2c06326e51e20ebed621
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 18 20:56:36 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: delete useless dependency
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1dc11143f83082e3154d6094f9136d0dc2637ad
+
+commit a4cb9be1b021b511e281ee55c356f964487d9e82
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 18 20:43:15 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: Create and install sshd random relink kit.
+    
+    ../Makefile.inc and Makfile are concatenated for reuse, which hopefully won't
+    be too fragile, we'll see if we need a different approach. The resulting sshd
+    binary is tested with the new sshd -V option before installation.  As the
+    binary layout is now semi-unknown (meaning relative, fixed, and gadget
+    offsets are not precisely known), change the filesystem permissions to 511 to
+    prevent what I call "logged in BROP". I have ideas for improving this further
+    but this is a first step ok djm
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e0a2692b7e20b126dda60bf04999d1d30d959d8
+
+commit bc7de6f91a9a0ae2f148a9d31a4027d441a51999
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 18 06:55:32 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: tweak previous; ok djm
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: df71ce4180c58202dfdc1d92626cfe900b91b7c3
+
+commit a20b7e999773e6333c8aa9b0a7fa41966e63b037
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Jan 31 19:35:44 2023 +1100
+
+    Skip connection-timeout test under Valgrind.
+    
+    Valgrind slows things down so much that the timeout test fails.  Skip
+    this test until we figure out if we can make it work.
+
+commit c3ffb54b4fc5e608206037921db6ccbc2f5ab25f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Jan 25 21:58:40 2023 +1100
+
+    Skip connection-timeout when missing FD passing.
+    
+    This tests uses multiplexing which uses file descriptor passing, so
+    skip it if we don't have that.  Fixes test failures on Cygwin.
+
+commit 35253af01d8c0ab444c8377402121816e71c71f5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 18 02:00:10 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: when restoring non-blocking mode to stdio fds, restore
+    
+    exactly the flags that ssh started with and don't just clobber them with
+    zero, as this could also remove the append flag from the set;
+    
+    bz3523; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1336b03e881db7564a4b66014eb24c5230e9a0c0
+
+commit 7d17ea151c0b2519f023bd9cc7f141128833ac47
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 18 01:50:21 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add a -V (version) option to sshd like the ssh client
+    
+    has. OK markus@ deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: abe990ec3e636fb040132aab8cbbede98f0c413e
+
+commit 62360feb7f08f2a4c6fc36f3b3449309203c42c9
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 17 18:52:44 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: For "ssh -V" always exit 0, there is no need to check opt
+    
+    again. This was missed when the fallthrough in the switch case above it was
+    removed.  OK deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5583e5d8f6d62a8a4215cfa95a69932f344c8120
+
+commit 12492c0abf1eb415d08a897cc1d8b9e789888230
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 17 10:15:10 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: also check that an active session inhibits
+    
+    UnusedConnectionTimeout idea markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 55c0fb61f3bf9e092b0a53f9041d3d2012f14003
+
+commit cef2593c33ac46a58238ff998818754eabdf64ff
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 17 10:02:34 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: regression test for UnusedConnectionTimeout
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7f29001374a68e71e5e078f69e4520cf4bcca084
+
+commit aff9493a89c71d6a080419b49ac64eead9730491
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 16 04:11:29 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: unbreak test: cannot access shell positional parameters
+    
+    past $9 without wrapping the position in braces (i.e. need ${10}, etc.)
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3750ec98d5d409ce6a93406fedde6f220d2ea2ac
+
+commit 0293c19807f83141cdf33b443154459f9ee471f6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 17 09:44:48 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add a sshd_config UnusedConnectionTimeout option to terminate
+    
+    client connections that have no open channels for some length of time. This
+    complements the recently-added ChannelTimeout option that terminates inactive
+    channels after a timeout.
+    
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ca983be74c0350364c11f8ba3bd692f6f24f5da9
+
+commit 8ec2e3123802d2beeca06c1644b0b647f6d36dab
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 15 23:35:10 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: adapt to ed25519 changes in src/usr.bin/ssh
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4b3e7ba7ee486ae8a0b4790f8112eded2bb7dcd5
+
+commit 9fbbfeca1ce4c7ec0001c827bbf4189a3ba0964b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 15 23:05:32 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: update OpenSSH's Ed25519 code to the last version of SUPERCOP
+    
+    (20221122) and change the import approach to the same one we use for
+    Streamlined NTRUPrime: use a shell script to extract the bits we need from
+    SUPERCOP, make some minor adjustments and squish them all into a single file.
+    
+    ok tb@ tobhe@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bc0fd624cb6af440905b8ba74ac7c03311b8e3b
+
+commit 6283f4bd83eee714d0f5fc55802eff836b06fea8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jan 14 22:02:44 2023 +1100
+
+    Allow writev is seccomp sandbox.
+    
+    This seems to be used by recent glibcs at least in some configurations.
+    From bz#3512, ok djm@
+
+commit 923c3f437f439cfca238fba37e97a7041782f615
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 14 10:05:54 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: Shell syntax fix. From ren mingshuai vi github PR#369.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6696b2eeefe128099fc3d7ea9f23252cc35156f9
+
+commit 4d87a00f704e0365e11c3c38b170c1275ec461fc
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 14 09:57:08 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: Instead of skipping the all-tokens test if we don't have
+    
+    OpenSSL (since we use it to compute the hash), put the hash at the end and
+    just omit it if we don't have it.  Prompted by bz#3521.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c79ecba64250ed3b6417294b6c965e6b12ca5eea
+
+commit b05406d6f93b8c8ec11ec8b27e7c76cc7a5a55fb
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 13 07:13:40 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix double phrase in previous;
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 671e6c8dc5e9230518b2bbfa143daaa88adc66c2
+
+commit 40564812b659c530eb1f4b62d09e85612aef3107
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 13 03:16:29 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: Document "UserKnownHostsFile none". ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f695742d39e34ecdcc3c861c3739a84648a4bce5
+
+commit d03e245e034019a37388f6f5f893ce848ab6d2e2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jan 13 23:02:34 2023 +1100
+
+    Retry package installation 3 times.
+    
+    When setting up the CI environment, retry package installation 3 times
+    before going up.  Should help prevent spurious failures during
+    infrastructure issues.
+
+commit 625f6bc39840167dafb3bf5b6a3e18503ac986e8
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 13 04:47:34 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: Move scp path setting to a helper function. The previous
+    
+    commit to add scp to the test sshd's path causes the t-envpass test to fail
+    when the test scp is given using a fully qualified path.  Put this in a
+    helper function and only call it from the scp tests.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7533dc1c4265c1de716abb062957994195b36df4
+
+commit 6e6f88647042b3cde54a628545c2f5fb656a9327
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 13 04:23:00 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add scp's path to test sshd's PATH.
+    
+    If the scp we're testing is fully qualified (eg it's not in the system
+    PATH) then add its path to the under-test sshd's PATH so we can find
+    it. Prompted by bz#3518.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7df4f5a0be3aa135495b7e5a6719d3cbc26cc4c0
+
+commit 8a5e99a70fcf9b022a8aa175ebf6a71f58511da3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jan 13 15:49:48 2023 +1100
+
+    Remove skipping test when scp not in path.
+    
+    An upcoming change renders this obsolete by adding scp's path to the
+    test sshd's PATH, and removing this first will make the subsequent sync
+    easier.
+
+commit 41f36dd896c8fb8337d403fcf476762986976e9d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 13 02:58:20 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add a "Host" line to the output of ssh -G showing the
+    
+    original host arg. Inspired by patch from vincent at bernat.ch via bz#3343,
+    ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59c0f60a222113a44d0650cd394376e3beecc883
+
+commit f673b49f3be3eb51074fbb8a405beb6cd0f7d93e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 13 02:44:02 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: avoid printf("%s", NULL) if using ssh
+    
+    -oUserKnownHostsFile=none and a hostkey in one of the system known hosts file
+    changes; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ca87614bfc6da491315536a7f2301434a9fe614
+
+commit 93fc7c576563e3d88a1dc019dd213f65607784cc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 11 05:39:38 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: clamp the minimum buffer lengths and number of inflight
+    
+    requests too
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c4965f62fa0ba850940fd66ae3f60cf516bbcd56
+
+commit 48bf234322e639d279c5a28435eae50155e9b514
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 11 05:36:50 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: ignore bogus upload/download buffer lengths in the limits
+    
+    extension
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c5b023e0954693ba9a5376e4280c739b5db575f8
+
+commit 36b00d31833ca74cb0f7c7d8eda1bde55700f929
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 11 02:13:52 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: remove whitespace at EOL from code extracted from SUPERCOP
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ec524ff2fbb9387d731601437c82008f35a60f4
+
+commit d888de06c5e4d7dbf2f2b85f2b5bf028c570cf78
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 11 00:51:27 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: rewrite this test to use a multiplexed ssh session so we can
+    
+    control its lifecycle without risk of race conditions; fixes some of the
+    Github integration tests for openssh-portable
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5451cad59ba0d43ae9eeda48ec80f54405fee969
+
+commit 4bcc737a35fdd9cc4af7423d6c23dfd0c7ef4786
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 11 11:45:17 2023 +1100
+
+    remove buffer len workaround for NetBSD 4.x
+    
+    Switching to from pipes to a socketpair for communicating with the
+    ssh process avoids the (kernel bug?) problem.
+
+commit f5154d2aac3e6a32a1b13dec23a701a087850cdc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 11 11:44:19 2023 +1100
+
+    add back use of pipes in scp.c under USE_PIPES
+    
+    This matches sftp.c which prefers socketpair but uses pipes on
+    some older platforms.
+
+commit eec737b59cf13841de46134967a206607000acd4
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 10 23:22:15 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: Switch scp from using pipes to a socketpair for
+    
+    communication with it's ssh sub-processes.  We no longer need to reserve two
+    descriptors to ensure that we don't end up using fd 0-2 unexpectedly, that is
+    handled by sanitise_stdfd() in main(). Based on an original diff from djm@.
+    OK deraadt@ djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b80c372faac462471e955ddeab9480d668a2e48d
+
+commit d213d126a4a343abd3a1eb13687d39c1891fe5c8
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 6 08:44:11 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: tweak previous; ok djm
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 229c493452766d70a78b0f02f6ff9894f9028858
+
+commit 4a5590a5ee47b7dfd49773e9fdba48ad3089fe64
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 9 16:33:56 2023 +1100
+
+    try to improve logging for dynamic-forward test
+    
+    previously the logs from the ssh used to exercise the forwarding
+    channel would clobber the logs from the ssh actually doing the
+    forwarding
+
+commit 715bc25dcfccf9fb2bee820155fe071d01a618db
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jan 7 23:24:50 2023 +1100
+
+    Skip dynamic-forward test on minix3.
+    
+    This test relies on loopback addresses which minix does not have.
+    Previously the test would not run at all since it also doesn't have
+    netcat, but now we use our own netcat it tries and fails.
+
+commit dd1249bd5c45128a908395c61b26996a70f82205
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Jan 8 12:08:59 2023 +1100
+
+    don't test IPv6 addresses if platform lacks support
+
+commit d77fc611a62f2dfee0b654c31a50a814b13310dd
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 6 12:33:33 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: When OpenSSL is not available, skip parts of percent test
+    
+    that require it. Based on github pr#368 from ren mingshuai.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 49a375b2cf61ccb95b52e75e2e025cd10988ebb2
+
+commit 1cd2aac312af9172f1b5cb06c2e1cd090abb83cf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jan 7 23:01:11 2023 +1100
+
+    Use our own netcat for dynamic-forward test.
+    
+    That way we can be surer about its behaviour rather than trying to
+    second-guess the behaviour of various netcat implementations.
+
+commit 26cab41c05d7b0859d2a1ea5b6ed253d91848a80
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jan 7 14:30:43 2023 +1100
+
+    Use autoconf to find openssl binary.
+    
+    It's possible to install an OpenSSL in a path not in the system's
+    default library search path.  OpenSSH can still use this (eg if you
+    specify an rpath) but the openssl binary there may not work.  If one is
+    available on the system path just use that.
+
+commit 5532e010a0eeb6aa264396514f9aed7948471538
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jan 7 10:34:18 2023 +1100
+
+    Check openssl_bin path is executable before using.
+
+commit 5d7b16cff48598d5908db970bfdc9ff9326142c8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jan 6 23:19:07 2023 +1100
+
+    Set OPENSSL_BIN from OpenSSL directory.
+
+commit 344a0e8240eaf08da5d46a5e3a9ecad6e4f64c35
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 6 08:50:33 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: Save debug logs from ssh for debugging purposes.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 109e40b06de1c006a3b8e0d8745b790b2c5870a0
+
+commit e1ef172646f7f49c80807eea90225ef5e0be55a8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 6 08:07:39 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: regression test for ChannelTimeout
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 280bfbefcfa415428ad744e43f69a8dede8ad685
+
+commit 2393ea8daf25853459eb07a528d7577688847777
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 6 07:18:18 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix typo in verbose logging
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0497cdb66e003b2f50ed77291a9104fba2e017e9
+
+commit 161a5378a3cc2e7aa3f9674cb7f4686ae6ce9586
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 6 02:59:50 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: unit tests for misc.c:ptimeout_* API
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 01f8fb12d08e5aaadd4bd4e71f456b6588be9a94
+
+commit 018d671d78145f03d6f07ae9d64d51321da70325
+Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 4 22:48:57 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: Copy bytes from the_banana[] rather than banana()
+    
+    Fixes test failure due to segfault seen on arm64 with xonly snap.
+    
+    ok djm
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 86e2aa4bbd1dff1bc4ebb2969c0d6474485be046
+
+commit ab6bb69e251faa8b24f81b25c72ec0120f20cad4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 6 19:13:36 2023 +1100
+
+    unbreak scp on NetBSD 4.x
+    
+    e555d5cad5 effectively increased the default copy buffer size for SFTP
+    transfers. This caused NetBSD 4.x to hang during the "copy local file to
+    remote file in place" scp.sh regression test.
+    
+    This puts back the original 32KB copy buffer size until we can properly
+    figure out why.
+    
+    lots of debugging assistance from dtucker@
+
+commit 2d1ff2b9431393ad99ef496d5e3b9dd0d4f5ac8c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 6 02:47:18 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: Implement channel inactivity timeouts
+    
+    This adds a sshd_config ChannelTimeouts directive that allows channels that
+    have not seen traffic in a configurable interval to be automatically closed.
+    Different timeouts may be applied to session, X11, agent and TCP forwarding
+    channels.
+    
+    Note: this only affects channels over an opened SSH connection and not
+    the connection itself. Most clients close the connection when their channels
+    go away, with a notable exception being ssh(1) in multiplexing mode.
+    
+    ok markus dtucker
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ae8bba3ed9d9f95ff2e2dc8dcadfa36b48e6c0b8
+
+commit 0e34348d0bc0b1522f75d6212a53d6d1d1367980
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 6 02:42:34 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add channel_set_xtype()
+    
+    This sets an "extended" channel type after channel creation (e.g.
+    "session:subsystem:sftp") that will be used for setting channel inactivity
+    timeouts.
+    
+    ok markus dtucker
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42564aa92345045b4a74300528f960416a15d4ca
+
+commit ceedf09b2977f3a756c759a6e7eb8f8e9db86a18
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 6 02:41:49 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: tweak channel ctype names
+    
+    These are now used by sshd_config:ChannelTimeouts to specify timeouts by
+    channel type, so force them all to use a similar format without whitespace.
+    
+    ok dtucker markus
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 66834765bb4ae14f96d2bb981ac98a7dae361b65
+
+commit c60438158ad4b2f83d8504257aba1be7d0b0bb4b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 6 02:39:59 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add channel_force_close()
+    
+    This will forcibly close an open channel by simulating read/write errors,
+    draining the IO buffers and calling the detach function.
+    
+    Previously the detach function was only ever called during channel garbage
+    collection, but there was no way to signal the user of a channel (e.g.
+    session.c) that its channel was being closed deliberately (vs. by the
+    usual state-machine logic). So this adds an extra "force" argument to the
+    channel cleanup callback to indicate this condition.
+    
+    ok markus dtucker
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 23052707a42bdc62fda2508636e624afd466324b
+
+commit d478cdc7ad6edd4b1bcd1e86fb2f23194ff33d5a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 6 02:38:23 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: replace manual poll/ppoll timeout math with ptimeout API
+    
+    feedback markus / ok markus dtucker
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c5ec4f2d52684cdb788cd9cbc1bcf89464014be2
+
+commit 4adf3817a24efe99b06e62630577d683c7cd8065
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 6 02:37:04 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: add ptimeout API for keeping track of poll/ppoll
+    
+    timeouts; ok dtucker markus
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3335268ca135b3ec15a947547d7cfbb8ff929ead
+
+commit 8c7c69d32375d2f3ce9da0109c9bffc560842316
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 5 05:49:13 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: suppress "Connection closed" message when in quiet mode
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a3ab7176764da55f60bfacfeae9b82d84e3908f
+
+commit 845ceecea2ac311b0c267f9ecbd34862e1876fc6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 2 07:03:57 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: regression test for PermitRemoteOpen
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8271aafbf5c21950cd5bf966f08e585cebfe630c
+
+commit b3daa8dc582348d6ab8150bc1e571b7aa08c5388
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 2 07:03:30 2023 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix bug in PermitRemoteOpen which caused it to ignore its
+    
+    first argument unless it was one of the special keywords "any" or "none".
+    
+    Reported by Georges Chaudy in bz3515; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c5678a39f1ff79993d5ae3cfac5746a4ae148ea5
+
+commit 0872663a7be0301bcc3d49acdbc9b740a3d972d4
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Dec 26 19:16:03 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: spelling fixes; from paul tagliamonte amendments to his
+    
+    diff are noted on tech
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d776dd03d0b882ca9c83b84f6b384f6f9bd7de4a
+
+commit 797da2812a71785b34890bb6eb44767a7d09cd34
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Dec 16 07:13:22 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Mention that scp uses the SFTP protocol and remove
+    
+    reference to legacy flag. Spotted by, feedback and ok jmc@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9dfe04966f52e941966b46c7a2972147f95281b3
+
+commit 93f2ce8c050a7a2a628646c00b40b9b53fef93ef
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Dec 16 06:56:47 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Clear signal mask early in main(); sshd may have been
+    
+    started with one or more signals masked (sigprocmask(2) is not cleared
+    on fork/exec) and this could interfere with various things, e.g. the
+    login grace timer.
+    
+    Execution environments that fail to clear the signal mask before running
+    sshd are clearly broken, but apparently they do exist.
+    
+    Reported by Sreedhar Balasubramanian; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77078c0b1c53c780269fc0c416f121d05e3010ae
+
+commit 4acfaabfae41badb9d334a2ee88c5c6ad041c0d5
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Dec 16 06:52:48 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: add -X to usage();
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bdc3df7de11d766587b0428318336dbffe4a9d0
+
+commit e555d5cad5afae7d5ef2bbc02ca591178fe16fed
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Dec 16 03:40:03 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: add a -X option to both scp(1) and sftp(1) to allow
+    
+    control over some SFTP protocol knobs: the copy buffer length and
+    the number of inflight requests, both of which are used during
+    upload/download.
+    
+    Previously these could be controlled in sftp(1) using the -b/-R options.
+    This makes them available in both SFTP protocol clients using the same
+    option character sequence.
+    
+    ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27502bffc589776f5da1f31df8cb51abe9a15f1c
+
+commit 5a7a7acab2f466dc1d7467b5d05d35268c3137aa
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 15 18:20:39 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: The idiomatic way of coping with signed char vs unsigned
+    
+    char (which did not come from stdio read functions) in the presence of
+    ctype macros, is to always cast to (unsigned char).  casting to (int)
+    for a "macro" which is documented to take int, is weird.  And sadly wrong,
+    because of the sing extension risk.. same diff from florian
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65b9a49a68e22ff3a0ebd593f363e9f22dd73fea
+
+commit b0b58222c7cc62efd8212c4fb65a545f58ebb22d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Dec 19 18:49:51 2022 +1100
+
+    Simply handling of SSH_CONNECTION PAM env var.
+    
+    Prompted by bz#3508: there's no need to cache the value of
+    sshpam_conninfo so remove the global.  While there, add check of
+    return value from pam_putenv.  ok djm@
+
+commit ed8444572ae684fdb892f97bae342c6cb6456f04
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Dec 19 18:42:34 2022 +1100
+
+    Add tests for LibreSSL 3.7.0 and OpenSSL 1.1.1s.
+
+commit abb9a8aaddfcacbd12641f6e4f203da0fa85a287
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Dec 18 21:36:25 2022 +1100
+
+    Use sudo when resetting perms on directories.
+
+commit 2f5664c5908d84697cbe91302d5d5c4d83cb2121
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Dec 18 21:19:33 2022 +1100
+
+    Set group perms on regress dir.
+    
+    This ensures that the tests don't fail due to StrictMode checks.
+
+commit 137196300fc1540affadde880210f02ba6cb4abf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Dec 18 21:13:42 2022 +1100
+
+    Fetch regress logs from obj dir.
+
+commit 5f93c4836527d9fda05de8944a1c7b4a205080c7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Dec 13 20:59:54 2022 +1100
+
+    obsdsnap test VMs runs-on libvirt too.
+
+commit 8386886fb1ab7fda73069fb0db1dbe0e5a52f758
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Dec 13 20:55:37 2022 +1100
+
+    Run upstream obsdsnap tests on ephemeral runners.
+
+commit b6e01459b55ece85d7f296b2bc719d1841e1009e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Dec 13 20:48:56 2022 +1100
+
+    Move obsdsnap test VMs to ephemeral runners.
+
+commit ea6fdf9a1aa71a411f7db218a986392c4fb55693
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Dec 9 18:00:21 2022 +1100
+
+    use calloc for allocating arc4random structs
+    
+    ok dtucker
+
+commit 4403b62f5548e91389cb3339d26a9d0c4bb07b34
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Dec 9 00:22:29 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Warn if no host keys for hostbased auth can be loaded.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a0a13132000cf8d3593133c1b49768aa3c95977
+
+commit a6183e25e3f1842e21999fe88bc40bb99b121dc3
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Dec 9 00:17:40 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add server debugging for hostbased auth.
+    
+    auth_debug_add queues messages about the auth process which is sent to
+    the client after successful authentication.  This also sends those to
+    the server debug log to aid in debugging.  From bz#3507, ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46ff67518cccf9caf47e06393e2a121ee5aa258a
+
+commit b85c3581c16aaf6e83b9a797c80705a56b1f312e
+Author: cheloha@openbsd.org <cheloha@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 4 23:50:49 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: remove '?' from getopt(3) loops
+    
+    userspace: remove vestigial '?' cases from top-level getopt(3) loops
+    
+    getopt(3) returns '?' when it encounters a flag not present in the in
+    the optstring or if a flag is missing its option argument.  We can
+    handle this case with the "default" failure case with no loss of
+    legibility.  Hence, remove all the redundant "case '?':" lines.
+    
+    Prompted by dlg@.  With help from dlg@ and millert@.
+    
+    Link: https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-tech&m=167011979726449&w=2
+    
+    ok naddy@ millert@ dlg@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b2f89346538ce4f5b33ab8011a23e0626a67e66e
+
+commit 9a067e8d28a2249fd73f004961e30c113ee85e5d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Dec 7 11:45:43 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Fix comment typo.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3b04faced6511bb5e74648c6a4ef4bf2c4decf03
+
+commit ce3c3e78ce45d68a82c7c8dc89895f297a67f225
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Dec 7 18:58:25 2022 +1100
+
+    Add SANDBOX_DEBUG to the kitchensink test build.
+
+commit bc234605fa3eb10f56bf0d74c8ecb0d91ada9d05
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Dec 7 18:38:25 2022 +1100
+
+    disable SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+    
+    It was mistakenly enabled in 2580916e4872
+    
+    Reported by Peter sec-openssh-com.22.fichtner AT 0sg.net
+
+commit b087c5cfa011b27992e01589314fec830266f99d
+Author: Rose <83477269+AtariDreams@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date:   Tue Nov 29 15:12:54 2022 -0500
+
+    Update autotools
+    
+    Regenerate config files using latest autotools
+
+commit d63f5494978a185c7421d492b9c2f6f05bb54138
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Dec 6 12:22:36 2022 +1100
+
+    Fix typo in comment.  Spotted by tim@
+
+commit 73dcca12115aa12ed0d123b914d473c384e52651
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 4 11:03:11 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Remove duplicate includes.
+    
+     Patch from AtariDreams via github PR#364.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b9186638a05cb8b56ef7c0de521922b6723644ea
+
+commit 3cec15543010bc8d6997d896b1717a650afb7e92
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Dec 2 04:40:27 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: make struct sshbuf private
+    
+    and remove an unused field; ok dtucker
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7a3d77c0b8c153d463398606a8d57569186a0c3
+
+commit 5796bf8ca9535f9fa7d01829a540d2550e05c860
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Dec 2 11:43:36 2022 +1100
+
+    Restore ssh-agent permissions on exit.
+    
+    ...enough that subsequent builds can overwrite ssh-agent if necessary.
+
+commit ccf5a13868cbb4659107458cac1e017c98abcbda
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 1 02:22:13 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Clean up ssh-add and ssh-agent logs.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9eda8e4c3714d7f943ab2e73ed58a233bd29cd2c
+
+commit 7a8b40cf6a5eda80173140cc6750a6db8412fa87
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 1 02:19:29 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Log output of ssh-agent and ssh-add
+    
+    This should  make debugging easier.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5974b02651f428d7e1079b41304c498ca7e306c8
+
+commit 4a1805d532616233dd6072e5cd273b96dd3062e6
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Nov 29 22:41:14 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add void to client_repledge args to fix compiler warning. ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e964a641ce4a0a0a11f047953b29929d7a4b866
+
+commit 815c4704930aa449edf6e812e99d69e9ffd31f01
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 28 01:38:22 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: tighten pledge(2) after session establishment
+    
+    feedback, ok & testing in snaps deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aecf4d49d28586dfbcc74328d9333398fef9eb58
+
+commit f7cebbbf407d772ed71403d314343766782fe540
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 28 01:37:36 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: New EnableEscapeCommandline ssh_config(5) option
+    
+    This option (default "no") controls whether the ~C escape is available.
+    Turning it off by default means we will soon be able to use a stricter
+    default pledge(2) in the client.
+    
+    feedback deraadt@ dtucker@; tested in snaps for a while
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e277595d60acb8263118dcb66554472257b387a
+
+commit d323f7ecf52e3d4ec1f4939bf31693e02f891dca
+Author: mbuhl@openbsd.org <mbuhl@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Nov 18 19:47:40 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: In channel_request_remote_forwarding the parameters for
+    
+    permission_set_add are leaked as they are also duplicated in the call. Found
+    by CodeChecker. ok djm
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4aef50fa9be7c0b138188814c8fe3dccc196f61e
+
+commit 62cc33e6eed847aafdc29e34aa69e9bd82a0ee16
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Nov 30 11:23:11 2022 +1100
+
+    Use -fzero-call-used-regs=used on clang 15.
+    
+    clang 15 seems to have a problem with -fzero-call-used-reg=all which
+    causes spurious "incorrect signature" failures with ED25519.  On those
+    versions, use -fzero-call-used-regs=used instead.  (We may add exceptions
+    later if specific versions prove to be OK).  Also move the GCC version
+    check to match.
+    
+    Initial investigation by Daniel Pouzzner (douzzer at mega nu), workaround
+    suggested by Bill Wendling (morbo at google com).  bz#3475, ok djm@
+
+commit f84b9cffd52c9c5c359a54a1929f9948e803ab1d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Nov 28 21:09:28 2022 +1100
+
+    Skip unit tests on slow riscv64 hardware.
+
+commit 9f2747e0bed3faca92679eae69aef10c95dc82f5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Nov 27 15:26:22 2022 +1100
+
+    Rework how selfhosted tests interact with runners.
+    
+    Previously there was one runner per test target (mostly VMs).  This had
+    a few limitations:
+     - multiple tests that ran on the same target (eg multiple build
+       configs) were serialized on availability or that runner.
+     - it needed manual balancing of VMs over host machines.
+    
+    To address this, make VMs that use ephemeral disks (ie most of them)
+    all use a pool of runners with the "libvirt" label.  This requires that
+    we distinguish between "host" and "target" for those.  Native runners
+    and VMs with persistent disks (eg the constantly-updated snapshot ones)
+    specify the same host and target.
+    
+    This should improve test throughput.
+
+commit d664ddaec87bdc7385be8ef7f1337793e1679d48
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Nov 27 12:19:37 2022 +1100
+
+    Run vmstartup from temp dir.
+    
+    This will allow us to create ephemeral disk images per-runner.
+
+commit 0fa16e952b1fc1c4cf65e3dd138b0e87003e2e45
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Nov 27 12:14:00 2022 +1100
+
+    Make "config" in matrix singular and pass in env.
+    
+    This will allow the startup scripts to adapt their behaviour based on
+    the type and config.
+
+commit e8857043af54809187be1e8b06749db61112899f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Nov 27 11:42:22 2022 +1100
+
+    Add "libvirt" label to dfly30.
+
+commit 9775473d84902dc37753686cd10ae71fbe67efda
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Nov 27 09:28:20 2022 +1100
+
+    Rename "os" in matrix to "target".
+    
+    This is in preparation to distinguish this from the host that the runner
+    runs on in case where they are separate (eg VMs).
+
+commit 04fd00ceff39f4544ced6f5342060abe584835d0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Nov 27 09:23:04 2022 +1100
+
+    Remove unused self-hosted test targets.
+
+commit c9d9fcad2a11c1cd1550a541f44091d65f0b5584
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Nov 27 09:16:15 2022 +1100
+
+    Remove explicit "default" test config argument.
+    
+    Not specifying the test config implicitly selects default args.
+
+commit 15a01cf15f396f87c6d221c5a6af98331c818962
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Nov 23 13:18:54 2022 +1100
+
+    Add fallback for old platforms w/out MAP_ANON.
+
+commit 6b9bbbfe8b26db6e9a30a7e08c223e85421aed98
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Nov 23 13:09:11 2022 +1100
+
+    If we haven't found it yet, recheck for sys/stat.h.
+    
+    On some very old platforms, sys/stat.h needs sys/types.h, however
+    autoconf 2.71's AC_CHECK_INCLUDES_DEFAULT checks for them in the
+    opposite order, which in combination with modern autoconf's
+    "present but cannot be compiled" behaviour causes it to not be
+    detected.
+
+commit 8926956f22639132a9f2433fcd25224e01b900f5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Nov 11 11:25:37 2022 +1100
+
+    Add dfly62 test target.
+
+commit 650de7ecd3567b5a5dbf16dd1eb598bd8c20bca8
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 10 23:03:10 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Handle dynamic remote port forwarding in escape commandline's
+    
+    -R processing. bz#3499, ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 194ee4cfe7ed0e2b8ad0727f493c798a50454208
+
+commit 5372db7e7985ba2c00f20fdff8942145ca99e033
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Nov 10 12:44:51 2022 +1100
+
+    Remove seed passing over reexec.
+    
+    This was added for the benefit of platforms using ssh-rand-helper to
+    prevent a delay on each connection as sshd reseeded itself.
+    
+    ssh-random-helper is long gone, and since the re-exec happens before the
+    chroot the re-execed sshd can reseed itself normally. ok djm@
+
+commit ca98d3f8c64cfc51af81e1b01c36a919d5947ec2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Nov 9 20:59:20 2022 +1100
+
+    Skip reexec test on OpenSSL 1.1.1 specifically.
+    
+    OpenSSL 1.1.1 has a bug in its RNG that breaks reexec fallback, so skip
+    that test.  See bz#3483 for details.
+
+commit 5ec4ebc2548e5f7f1b55b2a5cef5b67bdca8146f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Nov 9 09:04:12 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Fix typo in fatal error message.
+    
+    Patch from vapier at chromium.org.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a0c164a6a25eef0eedfc30df95bfa27644e35cf
+
+commit e6abafe9a6d809422d3432b95b3f9747b0acaa71
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Nov 9 09:01:52 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Remove errant colon and simplify format
+    
+    string in error messages. Patch from vapier at chromium.org.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc28466ebc7b74e0072331947a89bdd239c160d3
+
+commit db2027a687516f87c3fb141e87154bb3d8a7807c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Nov 9 01:37:44 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: rename client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm() to
+    
+    client_global_hostkeys_prove_confirm(), as it handles the
+    "hostkeys-prove00@openssh.com" message; no functional change
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 31e09bd3cca6eed26855b88fb8beed18e9bd026d
+
+commit 1c2be7c2004cf1abcd172fee9fe3eab57cd4c426
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Nov 9 00:15:59 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: typo in comment
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39c58f41e0f32d1ff31731fa6f5bbbc3ad25084a
+
+commit cf1a9852d7fc93e4abc4168aed09529a57427cdc
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Nov 9 09:23:47 2022 +1100
+
+    Defer seed_rng until after closefrom call.
+    
+    seed_rng will initialize OpenSSL, and some engine providers (eg Intel's
+    QAT) will open descriptors for their own use.  bz#3483, patch from
+    joel.d.schuetze at intel.com, ok djm@
+
+commit dffa64480163fbf76af7e4fb62c26bb0dd6642aa
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Nov 9 08:27:47 2022 +1100
+
+    Fix comment text.  From emaste at freebsd.org.
+
+commit d9df5689c29823ab830ec4f54c83c6cc3c0077ad
+Author: Pierre Ossman <ossman@cendio.se>
+Date:   Wed Jul 6 13:52:10 2022 +0200
+
+    Avoid assuming layout of fd_set
+    
+    POSIX doesn't specify the internal layout of the fd_set object, so let's
+    not assume it is just a bit mask. This increases compatibility with
+    systems that have a different layout.
+    
+    The assumption is also worthless as we already refuse to use file
+    descriptors over FD_SETSIZE anyway. Meaning that the default size of
+    fd_set is quite sufficient.
+
+commit 419aa8a312e8d8f491933ca3d5933e602cb05aae
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Nov 8 12:42:52 2022 +1100
+
+    Shutdown any VM before trying to check out repo.
+    
+    In the case where the previous run did not clean up, the checkout will
+    fail as it'll leave a stale mount.
+
+commit a32c07cbb78f65d8527642b96474a83b413f8108
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Nov 8 11:33:25 2022 +1100
+
+    Run vm startup and shutdown from runner temp dir.
+    
+    Should work even if the github workspace dir is on a stale sshfs mount.
+
+commit 2b40a7dfcdb8e616155b9504145aa52b271455aa
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Nov 8 11:03:31 2022 +1100
+
+    Add valrind-5 test here too.
+
+commit 2ea03d1f6d0a05ee2b63ed2dc0f2d54f1e4655a1
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Nov 8 09:21:10 2022 +1100
+
+    Update checkout and upload actions.
+    
+    Update actions/checkout and actions/upload-artifact to main branch for
+    compatibility with node.js v16.
+
+commit 4e316ff0f18a118232bb9ac6512ee62773a9e8ea
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Nov 8 09:17:04 2022 +1100
+
+    Split out rekey test since it runs the longest.
+
+commit 21625a6424258a92a96a3bb73ae6aabc5ed8a6b4
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 7 10:09:28 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: The IdentityFile option in ssh_config can also be used to
+    
+    specify a public key file, as documented in ssh.1 for the -i option. Document
+    this also for IdentityFile in ssh_config.5, for documentation completeness.
+    From laalsaas at systemli.org via portable github PR#352, ok jmc@ djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2f943be9f96e60ef81a9a4faa25b009999f9883b
+
+commit 747691604d3325ed2b62bad85b6fd8563ad32f6c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 7 10:05:38 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Remove some set but otherwise unused variables, spotted
+    
+    in -portable by clang 16's -Wunused-but-set-variable.  ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3d943ddf2369b38fbf89f5f19728e7dc1daf3982
+
+commit 1d78d25653805aefc7a8dd9d86cd7359ada3823c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 7 10:02:59 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Check for and disallow MaxStartups values less than or
+    
+    equal to zero during config parsing, rather than faling later at runtime.
+    bz#3489, ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d79c2b7a8601eb9be493629a91245d761154308b
+
+commit a00f59a645072e5f5a8d207af15916a7b23e2642
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 7 04:04:40 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix parsing of hex cert expiry time; was checking whether the
+    
+    start time began with "0x", not the expiry time.
+    
+    from Ed Maste
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6269242c3e1a130b47c92cfca4d661df15f05739
+
+commit f58acaf8c7315483f4ac87d46a1aa2142a713cd8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Nov 7 15:10:59 2022 +1100
+
+    Fix merge conflict.
+
+commit 162e5741020a8d996c0c12b988b118e71ed728e6
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Nov 7 15:04:33 2022 +1100
+
+    Branch-specific links for master status badges.
+
+commit e4b7c12ab24579312aa3ed38ce7041a439ec2d56
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Nov 7 14:46:38 2022 +1100
+
+    Add CIFuzz status badge.
+
+commit b496b9f831acd1e5bcd875e26e797488beef494a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Nov 7 14:45:16 2022 +1100
+
+    Do not run CIFuzz on selfhosted tree.
+    
+    We already run it on the regular tree, no need to double up.
+
+commit 2138b1c4ddb300129a41a5104627b0d561184c7b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Nov 7 14:41:58 2022 +1100
+
+    Whitespace change to trigger CIFuzz workflow.
+
+commit 4670b97ef87c7b0f21283c9b07c7191be88dda05
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Nov 7 14:34:04 2022 +1100
+
+    Run cifuzz workflow on the actions as regular CI.
+
+commit 79391e66ce851ace1baf3c6a35e83a23f08ec2ba
+Author: David Korczynski <david@adalogics.com>
+Date:   Tue Nov 30 11:45:20 2021 +0000
+
+    Add CIFuzz integration
+
+commit c1893364a0be243270014d7d34362a8101d55112
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 7 02:21:22 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Import regenerated moduli.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b0e54ee4d703bd6929bbc624068666a7a42ecb1f
+
+commit 5c3f18fb994ef27e685b205ee2351851b80fdbd1
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 7 01:53:01 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Fix typo. From pablomh via -portable github PR#344.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d056ee2e73691dc3ecdb44a6de68e6b88cd93827
+
+commit e1c6fcc142066417c9832e634463faa3dd5d116c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Nov 7 12:46:58 2022 +1100
+
+    Link to branch-specific queries for V_9_1 status.
+
+commit 4f4a5fad6d8892c3f8ee9cd81ec7de6458210c9f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Nov 6 10:55:59 2022 +1100
+
+    Use "prohibit-password" in -portable comments.
+    
+    "without-password" is the deprecated alias for "prohibit-password",
+    so we should reference the latter. From emaste at freebsd.org.
+
+commit 0f7e1eba55259ec037f515000b4c4afbf446230a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Nov 6 10:50:01 2022 +1100
+
+    Fix tracing disable on FreeBSD.
+    
+    Some versions of FreeBSD do not support using id 0 to refer to the
+    current pid for procctl, so pass getpid() explicitly.  From
+    emaste at freebsd.org.
+
+commit 32fddb982fd61b11a2f218a115975a87ab126d43
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Nov 7 10:39:01 2022 +1100
+
+    Fix setres*id checks to work with clang-16.
+    
+    glibc has the prototypes for setresuid and setresgid behind _GNU_SOURCE,
+    and clang 16 will error out on implicit function definitions, so add
+    _GNU_SOURCE and the required headers to the configure checks.  From
+    sam at @gentoo.org via bz#3497.
+
+commit 12af712d116f42164bcfa56db901d06e4fa27199
+Author: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
+Date:   Sun Nov 6 04:52:38 2022 +0000
+
+    configure.ac: Fix -Wstrict-prototypes
+    
+    Clang 16 now warns on this and it'll be removed in C23, so let's
+    just be future proof. It also reduces noise when doing general
+    Clang 16 porting work (which is a big job as it is).  github PR#355.
+    
+    Signed-off-by: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
+
+commit 40b0a5eb6e3edfa2886b60c09c7803353b0cc7f5
+Author: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
+Date:   Sun Nov 6 04:47:35 2022 +0000
+
+    configure.ac: Add <pty.h> include for openpty
+    
+    Another Clang 16ish fix (which makes -Wimplicit-function-declaration
+    an error by default).  github PR#355.
+    
+    See: 2efd71da49b9cfeab7987058cf5919e473ff466b
+    See: be197635329feb839865fdc738e34e24afd1fca8
+
+commit 6b17e128879ec6cc32ca2c28b5d894b4aa72e32d
+Author: Rochdi Nassah <rochdinassah.1998@gmail.com>
+Date:   Fri Oct 28 01:26:31 2022 +0100
+
+    Fix broken zlib link.
+
+commit 99500df246ccb736ddbdd04160dcc82165d81a77
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Nov 4 16:59:26 2022 +1100
+
+    Don't run openbsd-compat tests on Cygwin.
+    
+    Add "compat-tests" to the default TEST_TARGET so we can override as
+    necessary.  Override TEST_TARGET for Cygwin as the tests don't currently
+    compile there.
+
+commit 3cae9f92a31897409666aa1e6f696f779759332b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 3 21:59:20 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: replace recently-added valid_domain() check for hostnames
+    
+    going to known_hosts with a more relaxed check for bad characters; previous
+    commit broke address literals. Reported by/feedback from florian@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 10b86dc6a4b206adaa0c11b58b6d5933898d43e0
+
+commit 9655217231c9056200bea7ae2dffcc9c0c3eb265
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Nov 3 23:07:50 2022 +1100
+
+    Rerun tests on changes to Makefile.in in any dir.
+
+commit 3500f0405a3ab16b59a26f3508c4257a3fc3bce6
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Nov 3 23:04:08 2022 +1100
+
+    Link libssh into compat tests.
+    
+    The cygwin compat code uses xmalloc, so add libssh.a so pick up that.
+
+commit ec59effcf65b8a4c85d47ff5a271123259dd0ab8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Nov 3 21:44:23 2022 +1100
+
+    Fix compat regress to work with non-GNU make.
+
+commit 73550a218e7dfbbd599534cbf856309bc924f6fd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Nov 3 13:41:16 2022 +1100
+
+    Increase selfhosted job timeout.
+    
+    The default job timeout of 360 (6h) is not enough to complete the
+    regress tests for some of the slow VMs depending on the load on the host.
+    Increase to 600 (10h).
+
+commit db97d8d0b90c6ce52b94b153d6f8f5f7d3b11777
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Nov 3 10:00:43 2022 +1100
+
+    Only run opensslver tests if built with OpenSSL.
+
+commit ba053709638dff2f6603df0c1f340352261d63ea
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Nov 2 14:16:04 2022 +1100
+
+    Add tests for OpenSSL 3.0.7 and LibreSSL 3.6.1.
+
+commit edd24101c7e17d1a8f6576e1aaf62233b47ad6f5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Nov 3 08:17:39 2022 +1100
+
+    Run compat regress tests too.
+
+commit fe88d67e7599b0bc73f6e4524add28d743e7f977
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Nov 3 08:14:05 2022 +1100
+
+    Compat tests need libcrypto.
+    
+    This was moved to CHANNELLIBS during the libs refactor.  Spotted by
+    rapier at psc.edu.
+
+commit 96b519726b7944eee3c23a54eee3d5c031ba1533
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Nov 3 04:24:39 2022 +1100
+
+    Include time.h when defining timegm.
+    
+    Fixes build on some platforms eg recent AIX.
+
+commit da6038bd5cd55eb212eb2aec1fc8ae79bbf76156
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Nov 1 19:10:30 2022 +1100
+
+    Always use compat getentropy.
+    
+    Have it call native getentropy and fall back as required.  Should fix
+    issues of platforms where libc has getentropy but it is not implemented
+    in the kernel.  Based on github PR#354 from simsergey.
+
+commit 5ebe18cab6be3247b44c807ac145164010465b82
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Nov 2 10:51:48 2022 +1100
+
+    Check for sockaddr_in.sin_len.
+    
+    If found, set SOCK_HAS_LEN which is used in addr.c.  Should fix keyscan
+    tests on platforms with this (eg old NetBSD).
+
+commit a1febadf426536612c2734168d409147c392e7cf
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Oct 30 18:42:07 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Use variable for diff options
+    
+    instead of unconditionally specifying "-rN". This will make life easier
+    in -portable where not all diff's understand -N.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8b8a407115546be1c6d72d350b1e4f1f960d3cd3
+
+commit f6d3ed9a8a9280cbb68d6a499850cfe810e92bd0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Oct 31 05:13:02 2022 +1100
+
+    OpenSSL dev branch is 302 not 320.
+    
+    While there, also accept 301 which it shat it was previously.
+
+commit 25c8a2bbcc10c493d27faea57c42a6bf13fa51f2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 28 02:47:04 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: put sshkey_check_rsa_length() back in sshkey.c to unbreak
+    
+    OPENSSL=no builds
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99eec58abe382ecd14b14043b195ee1babb9cf6e
+
+commit 1192588546c29ceec10775125f396555ea71850f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 28 02:29:34 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: allow ssh-keyscan(1) to accept CIDR address ranges, e.g.
+    
+    ssh-keyscan 192.168.0.0/24
+    
+    If a CIDR range is passed, then it will be expanded to all possible
+    addresses in the range including the all-0s and all-1s addresses.
+    
+    bz#976 feedback/ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce6c5211f936ac0053fd4a2ddb415277931e6c4b
+
+commit 64af4209309461c79c39eda2d13f9d77816c6398
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 28 12:54:35 2022 +1100
+
+    fix merge botch
+
+commit 27267642699342412964aa785b98afd69d952c88
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 28 00:44:44 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: refactor sshkey_private_deserialize
+    
+    feedback/ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f5ca6932fdaf840a5e8250becb38315a29b5fc9f
+
+commit 2519a7077a9332f70935e5242ba91ee670ed6b87
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 28 00:44:17 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: refactor sshkey_private_serialize_opt()
+    
+    feedback/ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61e0fe989897901294efe7c3b6d670cefaf44cbd
+
+commit 11a768adf98371fe4e43f3b06014024c033385d5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 28 00:43:30 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: refactor certify
+    
+    feedback/ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35d742992e223eaca3537e6fb3d3002c08eed4f6
+
+commit 3fbc58bb249d967cc43ebdc554f6781bb73d4a58
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 28 00:43:08 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: refactor sshkey_sign() and sshkey_verify()
+    
+    feedback/ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 368e662c128c99d05cc043b1308d2b6c71a4d3cc
+
+commit a1deb6cdbbe6afaab74ecb08fcb62db5739267be
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 28 00:41:52 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: refactor sshkey_from_blob_internal()
+    
+    feedback/ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f46c0cbb8060ee9666a02749594ad6658c8e283
+
+commit 7d00799c935271ce89300494c5677190779f6453
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 28 00:41:17 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: refactor sshkey_from_private()
+    
+    feedback/ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5dbe7a3545930c50f70ee75c867a1e08b382b53
+
+commit 262647c2e920492ca57f1b9320d74f4a0f6e482b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 28 00:39:29 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: factor out key generation
+    
+    feedback/ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b4211bff4de8d9adb84bc72857a8c42c44e7ceb
+
+commit 401c74e7dc15eab60540653d2f94d9306a927bab
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 28 00:38:58 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: refactor and simplify sshkey_read()
+    
+    feedback/ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0d93b7a56e31cd06a8bb0d2191d084ce254b0971
+
+commit 591fed94e66a016acf87f4b7cd416ce812f2abe8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 28 00:37:24 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: factor out public key serialization
+    
+    feedback/ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a3570c4b97290c5662890aea7328d87f55939033
+
+commit 1e78844ae2b2dc01ba735d5ae740904c57e13685
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 28 00:36:31 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: factor out sshkey_equal_public()
+    
+    feedback/ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1368ba114cb37732fe6ec3d89c7e6d27ea6fdc94
+
+commit 25de1c01a8b9a2c8ab9b1da22444a03e89c982de
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 28 00:35:40 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: begin big refactor of sshkey
+    
+    Move keytype data and some of the type-specific code (allocation,
+    cleanup, etc) out into each key type's implementation. Subsequent
+    commits will move more, with the goal of having each key-*.c file
+    owning as much of its keytype's implementation as possible.
+    
+    lots of feedback + ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f2b4334f73914344e9e5b3d33522d41762a57ec
+
+commit 445363433ba20b8a3e655b113858c836da46a1cb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Oct 24 22:43:36 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Be more paranoid with host/domain names coming from the
+    
+    never write a name with bad characters to a known_hosts file.
+    
+    reported by David Leadbeater, ok deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba9b25fa8b5490b49398471e0c9657b0cbc7a5ad
+
+commit 7190154de2c9fe135f0cc1ad349cb2fa45152b89
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Oct 24 21:52:50 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: regress test for unmatched glob characters; fails before
+    
+    previous commit but passes now. bz3488; prodded by dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0cc5cc9ea4a6fd170dc61b9212f15badaafb3bbd
+
+commit a4821a592456c3add3cd325db433110cdaaa3e5c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Oct 24 21:51:55 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: when scp(1) is using the SFTP protocol for transport (the
+    
+    default), better match scp/rcp's handling of globs that don't match the
+    globbed characters but do match literally (e.g. trying to transfer
+    "foo.[1]").
+    
+    Previously scp(1) in SFTP mode would not match these pathnames but
+    legacy scp/rcp mode would.
+    
+    Reported by Michael Yagliyan in bz3488; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d8a3773f53015ba811fddba7473769a2fd343e11
+
+commit 18376847b8043ba967eabbe23692ef74c9a3fddc
+Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 13 09:09:28 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: use correct type with sizeof ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d6c882c2e8a42ff831a5b3cbc2c961ecb2dd6143
+
+commit 4a4883664d6b4e9e4e459a8cdc16bd8d4b735de9
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 7 06:00:58 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh-agent.1: - use Nm not Xr for self-ref - while here,
+    
+    wrap a long line
+    
+    ssh-agent.c:
+    - add -O to usage()
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 855dac4695cef22e96d69c53436496bc408ca389
+
+commit 9fd2441113fce2a83fc7470968c3b27809cc7f10
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 7 04:06:26 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: document "-O no-restrict-websafe"; spotted by Ross L
+    
+    Richardson
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe9eaa50237693a14ebe5b5614bf32a02145fe8b
+
+commit 614252b05d70f798a0929b1cd3d213030ad4d007
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Oct 18 06:29:16 2022 +1100
+
+    OpenSSL dev branch now identifies as 3.2.0.
+
+commit 195e5a65fd793a738ea8451ebfdd1919db5aff3e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Oct 17 09:41:47 2022 +1100
+
+    revert c64b62338b4 and guard POLL* defines instead
+    
+    c64b62338b4 broke OSX builds, which do have poll.h but lack ppoll(2)
+    Spotted by dtucker
+
+commit bc2e480d99613bd59720edae244d1764636544c4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 14 14:52:22 2022 +1100
+
+    undef _get{short,long} before redefining
+
+commit 5eb796a369c64f18d55a6ae9b1fa9b35eea237fb
+Author: Harmen Stoppels <harmenstoppels@gmail.com>
+Date:   Thu Oct 13 16:08:46 2022 +0200
+
+    Fix snprintf configure test for clang 15
+    
+    Clang 15 -Wimplicit-int defaults to an error in C99 mode and above.
+    A handful of tests have "main(..." and not "int main(..." which caused
+    the tests to produce incorrect results.
+
+commit c64b62338b46ffa08839f05f21ad69fa6234dc17
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Oct 10 12:32:43 2022 +1100
+
+    skip bsd-poll.h if poll.h found; ok dtucker
+
+commit 5ee2b8ccfcf4b606f450eb0ff2305e311f68b0be
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 6 22:42:37 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: honour user's umask if it is more restrictive then the ssh
+    
+    default (022); based on patch from Alex Henrie, ok dtucker@ deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe1b9e15fc9a4f49fc338e848ce14d8727abe82d
+
+commit a75cffc2700cebd3e2dd9093f7f7388d2be95cb7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Oct 7 03:54:56 2022 +1100
+
+    Add LibreSSL 3.6.0 to test suite.
+    
+    While there, bump OpenSSL to latest 1.1.1q release.
+
+commit fcc0f0c0e96a30076683fea9a7c9eedc72931742
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Oct 6 21:18:16 2022 +1100
+
+    Add 9.1 branch to CI status page.
+
+commit ef211eee63821d894a8bf81f22bfba9f6899d0fe
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Oct 4 23:20:23 2022 +1100
+
+    Test commits to all branches of portable.
+    
+    Only test OpenBSD upstream on commits to master since that's what it
+    tracks.
+
+commit fe646de03cafb6593ff4e4954bca9ec4b4b753a8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 5 03:47:26 2022 +1100
+
+    whitespace at EOL
+
+commit a6e1852d10c63a830196e82168dadd957aaf28ec
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 5 03:40:01 2022 +1100
+
+    mention libfido2 autodetection
+
+commit 7360c2c206f33d309edbaf64036c96fadf74d640
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 5 03:37:36 2022 +1100
+
+    remove mention of --with-security-key-builtin
+    
+    it is enabled by default when libfido2 is installed
+
+commit 0ffb46f2ee2ffcc4daf45ee679e484da8fcf338c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Oct 4 01:51:42 2022 +1100
+
+    update .depend
+
+commit 657e676ff696c7bb787bffb0e249ea1be3b474e1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Oct 4 01:45:52 2022 +1100
+
+    update release notes URL
+
+commit f059da2b29840c0f048448809c317ce2ae014da7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Oct 4 01:45:41 2022 +1100
+
+    crank versions in RPM spec files
+
+commit b51f3f172d87cbdb80ca4eb7b2149e56a7647557
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Sep 26 22:18:40 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: openssh-9.1
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a467b2ee81da01a86adf1ad93b62b1728494e56
+
+commit 4cf8d0c0f3030f594a238bab21a0695735515487
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Sep 21 22:26:50 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Fix typo. From AlexanderStohr via github PR#343.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a134c9b4039e48803fc6a87f955b0f4a03181497
+
+commit 8179fed3264d5919899900ed8881d5f9bb57ca33
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Sep 19 21:39:16 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: add RequiredRSASize to the list of keywords accepted by
+    
+    -o; spotted by jmc@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe871408cf6f9d3699afeda876f8adbac86a035e
+
+commit 5f954929e9f173dd1e279e07d0e8b14fa845814d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Sep 19 20:59:34 2022 +1000
+
+    no need for glob.h here
+    
+    it also causes portability problems
+
+commit 03d94a47207d58b3db37eba4f87eb6ae5a63168a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Sep 19 20:59:04 2022 +1000
+
+    avoid Wuninitialized false positive in gcc-12ish
+
+commit 9d952529113831fb3071ab6e408d2726fd72e771
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Sep 19 10:46:00 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: use users-groups-by-id@openssh.com sftp-server extension
+    
+    (when available) to fill in user/group names for directory listings.
+    Implement a client-side cache of see uid/gid=>user/group names. ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f239aeeadfa925a37ceee36ee8b256b8ccf4466e
+
+commit 8ff680368b0bccf88ae85d4c99de69387fbad7a6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Sep 19 10:43:12 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: sftp client library support for
+    
+    users-groups-by-id@openssh.com; ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ddb2f33a2da6349a9a89a8b5bcb9ca7c999394de
+
+commit 488f6e1c582212c2374a4bf8cd1b703d2e70fb8b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Sep 19 10:41:58 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: extend sftp-common.c:extend ls_file() to support supplied
+    
+    user/group names; ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c70c70498b1fdcf158531117e405b6245863bfb0
+
+commit 74b77f7497dba3a58315c8f308883de448078057
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Sep 19 10:40:52 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: sftp-server(8): add a "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com"
+    
+    extension request that allows the client to obtain user/group names that
+    correspond to a set of uids/gids.
+    
+    Will be used to make directory listings more useful and consistent
+    in sftp(1).
+    
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ebabde0bcb95ef949c4840fe89e697e30df47d3
+
+commit 231a346c0c67cc7ca098360f9a554fa7d4f1eddb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Sep 19 08:49:50 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: better debugging for connect_next()
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d16a307a0711499c971807f324484ed3a6036640
+
+commit 1875042c52a3b950ae5963c9ca3774a4cc7f0380
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Sep 17 10:34:29 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add RequiredRSASize for sshd(8); RSA keys that fall
+    
+    beneath this limit will be ignored for user and host-based authentication.
+    
+    Feedback deraadt@ ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 187931dfc19d51873df5930a04f2d972adf1f7f1
+
+commit 54b333d12e55e6560b328c737d514ff3511f1afd
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Sep 17 10:33:18 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: add a RequiredRSASize for checking RSA key length in
+    
+    ssh(1). User authentication keys that fall beneath this limit will be
+    ignored. If a host presents a host key beneath this limit then the connection
+    will be terminated (unfortunately there are no fallbacks in the protocol for
+    host authentication).
+    
+    feedback deraadt, Dmitry Belyavskiy; ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 430e339b2a79fa9ecc63f2837b06fdd88a7da13a
+
+commit 07d8771bacfefbcfb37fa8a6dc6103bcc097e0ab
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Sep 17 10:30:45 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add a sshkey_check_rsa_length() call for checking the
+    
+    length of an RSA key; ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: de77cd5b11594297eda82edc594b0d32b8535134
+
+commit 3991a0cf947cf3ae0f0373bcec5a90e86a7152f5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Sep 17 10:11:29 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: actually hook up restrict_websafe; the command-line flag
+    
+    was never actually used. Spotted by Matthew Garrett
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0b363518ac4c2819dbaa3dfad4028633ab9cdff1
+
+commit 30b2a7e4291fb9e357f80a237931ff008d686d3b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Sep 16 06:55:37 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: correct error value
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 780efcbad76281f11f14b2a5ff04eb6db3dfdad4
+
+commit ac1ec9545947d9f9657259f55d04cb49d3a94c8a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Sep 16 03:33:14 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: sftp: Be a bit more clever about completions
+    
+    There are commands (e.g. "get" or "put") that accept two
+    arguments, a local path and a remote path. However, the way
+    current completion is written doesn't take this distinction into
+    account and always completes remote or local paths.
+    
+    By expanding CMD struct and "cmds" array this distinction can be
+    reflected and with small adjustment to completer code the correct
+    path can be completed.
+    
+    By Michal Privoznik, ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1396d921c4eb1befd531f5c4a8ab47e7a74b610b
+
+commit 590db83384f9d99fc51c84505792d26d1ef60df9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Sep 16 03:13:34 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: sftp: Don't attempt to complete arguments for
+    
+    non-existent commands
+    
+    If user entered a non-existent command (e.g. because they made a
+    typo) there is no point in trying to complete its arguments. Skip
+    calling complete_match() if that's the case.
+    
+    From Michal Privoznik
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf39c811a68cde2aeb98fc85addea4000ef6b07a
+
+commit ff9809fdfd1d9a91067bb14a77d176002edb153c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Sep 14 00:14:37 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: sk_enroll: never drop SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD flag
+    
+    from response
+    
+    Now that all FIDO signing calls attempt first without PIN and then
+    fall back to trying PIN only if that attempt fails, we can remove the
+    hack^wtrick that removed the UV flag from the keys returned during
+    enroll.
+    
+    By Corinna Vinschen
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 684517608c8491503bf80cd175425f0178d91d7f
+
+commit 940dc10729cb5a95b7ee82c10184e2b9621c8a1d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Sep 14 00:13:13 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: a little extra debugging
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: edf1601c1d0905f6da4c713f4d9cecc7d1c0295a
+
+commit 4b5f91cb959358141181b934156513fcb8a6c1e3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Sep 14 00:02:03 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh-agent: attempt FIDO key signing without PIN and use
+    
+    the error to determine whether a PIN is required and prompt only if
+    necessary. from Corinna Vinschen
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd6be6a0b7148608e834ee737c3479b3270b00dd
+
+commit 113523bf0bc33600b07ebb083572c8c346b6fdf4
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Sep 11 06:38:11 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: .Li -> .Vt where appropriate; from josiah frentsos,
+    
+    tweaked by schwarze
+    
+    ok schwarze
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 565046e3ce68b46c2f440a93d67c2a92726de8ed
+
+commit 86af013b56cecb5ee58ae0bd9d495cd586fc5918
+Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Sep 10 08:50:53 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix repeated words ok miod@ jmc@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6765daefe26a6b648cc15cadbbe337596af709b7
+
+commit 0ba39b93b326a7d5dfab776cc9b9d326161a9b16
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Sep 9 03:31:42 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: notifier_complete(NULL, ...) is a noop, so no need to test
+    
+    that ctx!=NULL; from Corinna Vinschen
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ade2f2e9cc519d01a586800c25621d910bce384a
+
+commit be197635329feb839865fdc738e34e24afd1fca8
+Author: Sam James <sam@gentoo.org>
+Date:   Thu Sep 8 02:49:29 2022 +0100
+
+    openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf: add <stdio.h> include for vsnprintf
+    
+    Fixes the following build failure with Clang 15 on musl:
+    ```
+    bsd-asprintf.c:51:8: error: call to undeclared library function 'vsnprintf' with type 'int (char *, unsigned long, const char *, struct __va_list_tag *)'; ISO C99 and laterclang -O2 -pipe -fdiagnostics-color=always -frecord-gcc-switches -pipe -Wunknown-warning-option -Qunused-arguments -Wall -Wpointer-arith -Wuninitialized -Wsign-compare -Wformat-security -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess -Wno-pointer-sign -Wno-unused-result -Wmisleading-indentation -Wbitwise-instead-of-logical -fno-strict-aliasing -mretpoline  -ftrapv -fzero-call-used-regs=all -fno-builtin-memset -fstack-protector-strong -fPIE   -I. -I.  -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE -DSSHDIR=\"/etc/ssh\" -D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"/usr/bin/ssh\" -D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"/usr/lib/misc/ssh-askpass\" -D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"/usr/lib/misc/sftp-server\" -D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"/usr/lib/misc/ssh-keysign\" -D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"/usr/lib/misc/ssh-pkcs11-helper\" -D_PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER=\"/usr/lib/misc/ssh-sk-helper\" -D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"/run\" -D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"/var/empty\" -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -c cipher-aes.c -o cipher-aes.o
+     do not support
+          implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
+            ret = vsnprintf(string, INIT_SZ, fmt, ap2);
+                  ^
+    bsd-asprintf.c:51:8: note: include the header <stdio.h> or explicitly provide a declaration for 'vsnprintf'
+    1 error generated.
+    ```
+
+commit 6cb6f660bb35f77a0456dd2581ddf39c29398a5e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Sep 2 16:43:27 2022 +1000
+
+    Remove DEF_WEAK, it's already in defines.h.
+
+commit ce39e7d8b70c4726defde5d3bc4cb7d40d131153
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Sep 2 14:28:14 2022 +1000
+
+    Resync arc4random with OpenBSD.
+    
+    This brings us up to current, including djm's random-reseeding change,
+    as prompted by logan at cyberstorm.mu in bz#3467.  It brings the
+    platform-specific hooks from LibreSSL Portable, simplified to match our
+    use case.  ok djm@.
+
+commit beaddde26f30e2195b8aa4f3193970e140e17305
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Sep 2 14:20:04 2022 +1000
+
+    Move OPENBSD ORIGINAL marker.
+    
+    Putting this after the copyright statement (which doesn't change)
+    instead of before the version identifier (which does) prevents merge
+    conflicts when resyncing changes.
+
+commit c83e467ead67a8cb48ef4bec8085d6fb880a2ff4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Sep 2 14:17:28 2022 +1000
+
+    Remove arc4random_uniform from arc4random.c
+    
+    This was previously moved into its own file (matching OpenBSD) which
+    prematurely committed in commit 73541f2.
+
+commit 5f45c2395c60865e59fa44152ff1d003a128c5bc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Sep 2 04:20:02 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: sk-usbhid: fix key_lookup() on tokens with built-in UV
+    
+    explicitly test whether the token performs built-in UV (e.g. biometric
+    tokens) and enable UV in that case. From Pedro Martelletto via GHPR#388
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 007eb7e387d27cf3029ab06b88224e03eca62ccd
+
+commit 03277a4aa49b80af541a3e691f264c0c0d8f9cec
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Aug 31 20:26:30 2022 +1000
+
+    Move sftp from valgrind-2 to 3 to rebalance.
+
+commit fcf5365da69c516817321ba89c3a91df98d098df
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 31 02:56:40 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: whitespace
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c2bcbf93610d3d62ed206cdf9bf9ff98c6aaf232
+
+commit e60136a3d7a223dd8e84ba8a6895bc3142360993
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Aug 29 13:27:45 2022 +1000
+
+    additional keys
+
+commit 2b02dcb505288c462d1b5dd1ac04e603d01340eb
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Aug 29 13:23:43 2022 +1000
+
+    cross-sign allowed_signers with PGP key
+    
+    Provides continuity of trust from legacy PGP release key to
+    the SSHSIG signing keys that we will use henceforth for git
+    signing.
+
+commit 51b345f177ae981b8755f6bdf8358b1cc5e83d67
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Aug 27 21:49:27 2022 +1000
+
+    Add libcrypt-devel to cygwin-release deps.
+    
+    Based on feedback from vinschen at redhat.com.
+
+commit 9f81736cf16dd8dda1c8942f1973a5f80b8cd78c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Aug 27 09:37:40 2022 +1000
+
+    Add Windows 2022 test targets.
+
+commit 85e1a69243f12be8520438ad6a3cfdc0b7fcbb2d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Aug 26 16:26:06 2022 +1000
+
+    Add cygwin-release test target.
+    
+    This also moves the cygwin package install from the workflow file to
+    setup_ci.sh so that we can install different sets of Cygwin packages
+    for different test configs.
+
+commit 92382dbe8bf9ea1225b16858f9b9b208c15c7e8d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 26 08:16:27 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: whitespace
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a5d015efbfd228dc598ffdef612d2da3a579e5d8
+
+commit 70a5de0a50e84d7250eb4e4537f765599f64c4af
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 26 08:12:56 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: whitespace
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d297e4387935d4aef091c5e9432578c2e513f538
+
+commit 3a683a19fd116ea15ebf8aa13d02646cceb302a9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 26 14:23:55 2022 +1000
+
+    initial list of allowed signers
+
+commit 6851f4b8c3fc1b3e1114c56106e4dc31369c8513
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Aug 19 17:22:18 2022 +1000
+
+    Install Cygwin packages based on OS not config.
+
+commit f96480906893ed93665df8cdf9065865c51c1475
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 19 06:07:47 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: attemp FIDO key signing without PIN and use the error
+    
+    code returned to fall back only if necessary. Avoids PIN prompts for FIDO
+    tokens that don't require them; part of GHPR#302
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f752aaf9f2e7c28bcaaf3d4f8fc290131bd038e
+
+commit 5453333b5d28e313284cb9aae82899704103f98d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 19 05:53:28 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: remove incorrect check that can break enrolling a
+    
+    resident key (introduced in r1.40)
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4cab364d518470e29e624af3d3f9ffa9c92b6f01
+
+commit ff89b1bed80721295555bd083b173247a9c0484e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 19 04:02:46 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Strictly enforce the maximum allowed SSH2 banner size in
+    
+    ssh-keyscan and prevent a one-byte buffer overflow.  Patch from Qualys, ok
+    djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ae664f9f4db6e8a0589425f74cd0bbf3aeef4e4
+
+commit 1b470b9036639cef4f32fb303bb35ea0b711178d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Aug 19 15:18:09 2022 +1000
+
+    Fix cygwin conditional steps.
+
+commit fd6ee741ab16714b7035d60aca924123ba28135a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Aug 19 15:12:57 2022 +1000
+
+    Add a bit more debug output.
+
+commit a9305c4c739f4d91a3d3a92c0b6d4949404a36c5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Aug 12 15:08:47 2022 +1000
+
+    Add Cygwin (on windows-2019) test target.
+    
+    In addition to installing the requisite Cygwin packages, we also need to
+    explicitly invoke "sh" for steps that run other scripts since the runner
+    environment doesn't understand #! paths.
+
+commit 5062ad48814b06162511c4f5924a33d97b6b2566
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 19 03:06:30 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: double free() in error path; from Eusgor via GHPR333
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39f35e16ba878c8d02b4d01d8826d9b321be26d4
+
+commit 5a5c580b48fc6006bdfa731fc2f6d4945c2c0e4e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Aug 18 21:36:39 2022 +1000
+
+    Check for perms to run agent-getpeereid test.
+    
+    Ubuntu 22.04 defaults to private home dirs which prevents "nobody"
+    running ssh-add during the agent-getpeereid test.  Check for this and
+    add the necessary permissions.
+
+commit cd06a76b7ccc706e2bb4f1cc4aa9e9796a28a812
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 17 16:04:16 2022 +1000
+
+    on Cygwin, prefer WinHello FIDO device
+    
+    If no FIDO device was explictly specified, then prefer the
+    windows://hello FIDO device. An exception to this is when
+    probing resident FIDO keys, in which case hardware FIDO
+    devices are preferred.
+
+commit 47f72f534ac5cc2cd3027675a3df7b00a8f77575
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 17 06:01:57 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: add an extra flag to sk_probe() to indicate whether we're
+    
+    probing for a FIDO resident key or not. Unused here, but will make like
+    easier for portable
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 432c8ff70e270378df9dbceb9bdeaa5b43b5a832
+
+commit edb0bcb3c79b16031dc87a8e57aecc3c4a3414f0
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 16 20:24:08 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: use .Cm for "sign"; from josiah frentsos
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7f80a53d54857ac6ae49ea6ad93c5bd12231d1e4
+
+commit cccb011e130cbbac538b1689d10e4a067298df8b
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Thu Aug 11 20:19:35 2022 +0200
+
+    Revert "check_sk_options: add temporary WinHello workaround"
+    
+    Cygwin now comes with libfido2 1.11.0, so this workaround
+    isn't required anymore.
+    
+    This reverts commit 242c044ab111a37aad3b0775727c36a4c5f0102c.
+    
+    Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+
+commit 9468cd7cf9d989dfa2ac20e2a0268ba6e93bfa5a
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Thu Aug 11 20:18:17 2022 +0200
+
+    fido_dev_is_winhello: return 0, not "false"
+    
+    "false" is not used anywhere in OpenSSH, so return 0 like
+    everywhere else.
+    
+    Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+
+commit 730a80609472ee0451c99482d75c9c41f3ebc42d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 12 05:20:28 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: sftp-server: support home-directory request
+    
+    Add support to the sftp-server for the home-directory extension defined
+    in draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00. This overlaps a bit with the
+    existing expand-path@openssh.com, but uses a more official protocol name,
+    and so is a bit more likely to be implemented by non-OpenSSH clients.
+    
+    From Mike Frysinger, ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfc580d05cc0c817831ae7ecbac4a481c23566ab
+
+commit 5e820bf79ce3ce99ef7e98b0ab642b0a0a4f396c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Aug 12 14:56:55 2022 +1000
+
+    Replace deprecated ubuntu-18.04 runners with 22.04
+
+commit 87b0d9c1b789d3ff958ec45df2ac912e24461bae
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Aug 11 22:48:23 2022 +1000
+
+    Add a timegm implementation from Heimdal via Samba.
+    
+    Fixes build on (at least Solaris 10).
+
+commit d0c4fa58594577994921b593f10037c5282597ca
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Aug 11 14:23:58 2022 +1000
+
+    Rerun tests if any .github config file changes.
+
+commit 113fe6c77ab43769fc61e953d07cb619fd7ea54b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Aug 11 13:33:51 2022 +1000
+
+    Skip hostbased during Valgrind tests.
+    
+    Valgrind doesn't let ssh exec ssh-keysign (because it's setuid) so skip
+    it during the Valgrind based tests.
+    
+    See https://bugs.kde.org/show_bug.cgi?id=119404 for a discussion of this
+    (ironically there the problematic binary was ssh(1) back when it could
+    still be setuid).
+
+commit b98a42afb69d60891eb0488935990df6ee571c4d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Aug 11 01:57:50 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: add some tests for parse_absolute_time(), including cases
+    
+    where it is forced to the UTC timezone. bz3468 ok dtucker
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ea07ca31c2f3847a38df028ca632763ae44e8759
+
+commit ec1ddb72a146fd66d18df9cd423517453a5d8044
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Aug 11 01:56:51 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: allow certificate validity intervals, sshsig verification
+    
+    times and authorized_keys expiry-time options to accept dates in the UTC time
+    zone in addition to the default of interpreting them in the system time zone.
+    YYYYMMDD and YYMMDDHHMM[SS] dates/times will be interpreted as UTC if
+    suffixed with a 'Z' character.
+    
+    Also allow certificate validity intervals to be specified in raw
+    seconds-since-epoch as hex value, e.g. -V 0x1234:0x4567890. This
+    is intended for use by regress tests and other tools that call
+    ssh-keygen as part of a CA workflow.
+    
+    bz3468 ok dtucker
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 454db1cdffa9fa346aea5211223a2ce0588dfe13
+
+commit 4df246ec75751da7eb925e1880498300d8bda187
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Aug 11 10:23:55 2022 +1000
+
+    Fix conditional for running hostbased tests.
+
+commit 2580916e48721802220c61ce9e0df1297c00bc07
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Aug 11 08:58:28 2022 +1000
+
+    fix SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+
+commit fdbd5bf507fc271ff813714fab8a72ff2c6cb5ca
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Aug 10 17:35:52 2022 +1000
+
+    Test hostbased auth on github runners.
+
+commit 7e2f51940ba48a1c0fae1107801ea643fa83c971
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Aug 10 17:25:24 2022 +1000
+
+    Rename our getentropy to prevent possible loops.
+    
+    Since arc4random seeds from getentropy, and we use OpenSSL for that
+    if enabled, there's the possibility that if we build on a system that
+    does not have getentropy then run on a system that does have it, then
+    OpenSSL could end up calling our getentropy and getting stuck in a loop.
+    Pointed out by deraadt@, ok djm@
+
+commit 7a01f61be8d0aca0e975e7417f26371495fe7674
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Aug 8 12:17:04 2022 +1000
+
+    Actually put HAVE_STDINT_H around the stdint.h.
+
+commit 73541f29f0b50480da6c20dceb7a7191bd8ea7d3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Aug 8 10:30:34 2022 +1000
+
+    Give unused param a name.
+    
+    Fixes builds on platforms that do have fido2 but don't have
+    fido_dev_is_winhello.
+
+commit 2a108c0ea960381bd9b14ee0d84e818a23df4482
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 5 05:01:40 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: don't prompt for FIDO passphrase before attempting to enroll
+    
+    the credential, just let the enroll operating fail and we'll attempt to get a
+    PIN anyway. Might avoid some unneccessary PIN prompts.
+    
+    Part of GHPR#302 from Corinna Vinschen; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd5342ffc353ee37d39617906867c305564d1ce2
+
+commit 2886975c0ad9244e60dc5e4be34fde3aa573a4b5
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Fri Feb 11 14:33:41 2022 +0100
+
+    sk_sign: set FIDO2 uv attribute explicitely for WinHello
+    
+    WinHello via libfido2 performs user verification by default.
+    However, if we stick to that, there's no way to differentiate
+    between keys created with or without "-O  verify-required".
+    Set FIDO2 uv attribute explicitely to FIDO_OPT_FALSE, then check
+    if user verification has been requested.
+    
+    Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+
+commit 242c044ab111a37aad3b0775727c36a4c5f0102c
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Tue Feb 15 11:28:08 2022 +0100
+
+    check_sk_options: add temporary WinHello workaround
+    
+    Up to libfido 1.10.0, WinHello advertises "clientPin" rather
+    than "uv" capability.  This is fixed in 1.11.0.  For the time
+    being, workaround it here.
+    
+    Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+
+commit 78774c08cc4b4997382975b0f414a86e06b6780c
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Thu Feb 10 18:19:29 2022 +0100
+
+    compat code for fido_dev_is_winhello()
+    
+    Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+
+commit 3d3a932a019aedfb891e0779bb4990cd5008a390
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Aug 5 13:12:27 2022 +1000
+
+    Factor out getrnd() and rename to getentropy().
+    
+    Factor out the arc4random seeding into its own file and change the
+    interface to match getentropy.  Use native getentropy if available.
+    This will make it easier to resync OpenBSD changes to arc4random.
+    Prompted by bz#3467, ok djm@.
+
+commit 9385d277b787403be9dfcb229cf372202496d2f3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Aug 4 18:55:48 2022 +1000
+
+    Include CHANNEL and FIDO2 libs in configure output
+
+commit 141535b904b6fba01724444f38193a8599201f82
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Aug 1 11:09:26 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: avoid double-free in error path introduced in r1.70; report
+    
+    and fix based on GHPR#332 by v-rzh ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3d21aa127b1f37cfc5bdc21461db369a663a951f
+
+commit dba7099ffcba3ca07b3946f017ba6a4c3158d9b1
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Jul 27 18:40:12 2022 +1000
+
+    Remove deprecated MacOS 10.15 runners.
+
+commit 722a56439aa5972c830e4a9a724cf52aff4a950a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Jul 27 18:31:14 2022 +1000
+
+    Move stale-configure check as early as possible.
+    
+    We added a check in Makefile to catch the case where configure needs to
+    be rebuilt, however this did not happen until a build was attempted in
+    which case all of the work done by configure was wasted.  Move this check
+     to the start of configure to catch it as early as possible.  ok djm@
+
+commit 099d6b56288b421ba38531d26dc1bd6bb685e311
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jul 22 10:47:19 2022 +1000
+
+    Move libcrypto into CHANNELLIBS.
+    
+    This will result in sftp, sftp-server and scp no longer being linked
+    against libcrypto.  ok djm@
+
+commit 1bdf86725b77733bb5f17c54888b88a10b2f6538
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jul 22 10:45:47 2022 +1000
+
+    Remove seed_rng calls from scp, sftp, sftp-server.
+    
+    These binaries don't use OpenSSL's random functions.  The next step
+    will be to stop linking them against libcrypto.  ok djm@
+
+commit d73f77b8cb9b422f1ac4facee7890aa10ff2bc21
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jul 22 09:51:51 2022 +1000
+
+    Group libcrypto and PRNGD checks together.
+    
+    They're related more than the libcrypt or libiaf checks which are
+    currently between them.  ok djm@
+
+commit f117e372b3f42f2fbdb0a578d063b2609ab58e1f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jul 22 09:24:45 2022 +1000
+
+    Do not link scp, sftp and sftp-server w/ zlib.
+    
+    Some of our binaries (eg sftp, sftp-server, scp) do not interact with
+    the channels code and thus do use libraries such as zlib and libcrypto
+    although they are linked with them.  This adds a CHANNELLIBS and starts
+    by moving zlib into it, which means the aformentioned binaries are no
+    longer linked against zlib.  ok djm@
+
+commit 800c2483e68db38bd1566ff69677124be974aceb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Jul 25 21:49:04 2022 +1000
+
+    Remove workarounds for OpenSSL missing AES-CTR.
+    
+    We have some compatibility hacks that were added to support OpenSSL
+    versions that do not support AES CTR mode.  Since that time, however,
+    the minimum OpenSSL version that we support has moved to 1.0.1 which
+    *does* have CTR, so this is no longer needed.  ok djm@
+
+commit b7c56b65c12f51fe0dbae798d19c8f58224a5d95
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Jul 25 21:43:00 2022 +1000
+
+    Remove workarounds for OpenSSL missing AES-GCM.
+    
+    We have some compatibility hacks that were added to support OpenSSL
+    versions that do not support AES GCM mode.  Since that time, however,
+    the minimum OpenSSL version that we support has moved to 1.0.1 which
+    *does* have GCM, so this is no longer needed.  ok djm@
+
+commit 5a4a9f7a968fbf92cc1eac519c65638e79ae9f1f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 25 07:12:45 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Restore missing "!" in TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES test.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 38783f9676ec348c5a792caecee9a16e354b37b0
+
+commit 0ff886be132299386cc29d87c2aa16ff68a1aa08
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jul 24 23:29:10 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Test TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES for empty string not
+    
+    executable.  No-op on most platforms but should prevent warnings in -portable
+    on systems that don't have 'date %s'.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e39d79867b8065e33d0c5926fa1a31f85659d2a4
+
+commit f69319ad8ad1dd50f90bbcf5912e11cc8ed3e037
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jul 23 14:38:22 2022 +1000
+
+    Convert "have_prog" function into "which".
+    
+    "which" and its behaviour is not standardized, so convert the existing
+    have_prog function into "which" so we can rely on it being available
+    and what its semantics are.  Add a have_prog wrapper that maintains the
+    existing behaviour.
+
+commit ea7ecc2c3ae39fdf5c6ad97b7bc0b47a98847f43
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jul 23 14:36:38 2022 +1000
+
+    Skip scp3 test if there's no scp on remote path.
+    
+    scp -3 ends up using the scp that's in the remote path and will fail if
+    one is not available.  Based on a patch from rapier at psc.edu.
+
+commit c46f6fed419167c1671e4227459e108036c760f8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 20 13:39:14 2022 +1000
+
+    crank SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR in sk-dummy.so
+
+commit f208e3b9ffb5ee76cf9c95df7ff967adc7f51c7d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 20 03:33:22 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh-keygen: fix touch prompt, pin retries;
+    
+    part of GHPR329 from Pedro Martelletto
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 75d1005bd2ef8f29fa834c90d2684e73556fffe8
+
+commit 8638a2ce7e90c8a51d9af3143404282126c524f8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 20 03:31:42 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: sk-usbhid: preserve error code returned by key_lookup()
+    
+    it conveys useful information, such as the supplied pin being wrong.
+    
+    Part of GHPR329 from Pedro Martelletto
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c0647eb9290f793add363d81378439b273756c1b
+
+commit 9ab929ca2d820520327b41929372bcb9e261534c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 20 03:29:14 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: when enrolling a resident key on a security token, check
+    
+    if a credential with matching application and user ID strings already exists.
+    if so, prompt the user for confirmation before overwriting the credential.
+    
+    patch from Pedro Martelletto via GHPR329
+    
+    NB. cranks SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR, so any third-party FIDO middleware
+    implementations will need to adjust
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e45e9f1bf2b2f32d9850669e7a8dbd64acc5fca4
+
+commit 5bcfc788b38d5b64e4c347bdc04bd9a01bbc36da
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 20 03:13:04 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: pull passphrase reading and confirmation into a separate
+    
+    function so it can be used for FIDO2 PINs; no functional change
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bf34f76b8283cc1d3f54633e0d4f13613d87bb2f
+
+commit eb679e2959bdb15454eb94751930eb4c9110da94
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jul 15 21:31:48 2022 +1000
+
+    Move vmshutdown to first step.
+    
+    If a previous run on a physical runner has failed to clean up, the next
+    run will fail because it'll try to check out the code to a broken
+    directory mount.  Make cleanup the first step.
+
+commit 46b91b70ff3cb9c147e2875ef5dc609fd64c0c96
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jul 15 20:25:27 2022 +1000
+
+    Rename bbone test target to ARM.
+
+commit 751d22cdeffed9fe921db78eedc32a29f9e80510
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jul 15 13:37:29 2022 +1000
+
+    Add AUDIT_ARCH_PPC to supported seccomp arches.
+    
+    Patch from dries.deschout at dodeco.eu.
+
+commit a061792a6e8d235fc40a9b5d4c22a1762bb75a7b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Jul 14 19:20:24 2022 +1000
+
+    Remove unintended changes.
+    
+    I inadvertently included a couple of local changes with the OpenSSL
+    3.0.4 change.  Revert, anything that should be there will be committed
+    separately.
+
+commit 527cb43fa1b4e55df661feabbac51b8e608b6519
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Jul 14 11:22:08 2022 +1000
+
+    Return ERANGE from getcwd() if buffer size is 1.
+    
+    If getcwd() is supplied a buffer size of exactly 1 and a path of "/", it
+    could result in a nul byte being written out of array bounds.  POSIX says
+    it should return ERANGE if the path will not fit in the available buffer
+    (with terminating nul). 1 byte cannot fit any possible path with its nul,
+    so immediately return ERANGE in that case.
+    
+    OpenSSH never uses getcwd() with this buffer size, and all current
+    (and even quite old) platforms that we are currently known to work
+    on have a native getcwd() so this code is not used on those anyway.
+    Reported by Qualys, ok djm@
+
+commit 36857fefd8849c4b0e877cfd9d1eb22f79b76650
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Jul 14 10:02:35 2022 +1000
+
+    Split README.platform into its own line.
+    
+    README.platform has general platform-specific information, having it
+    following text about FIDO2 on the same line could imply that it only
+    has information about FIDO2.
+
+commit 00a496c6c14f2d41f2a9365714d494dd5f3aac9f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Jul 14 09:56:01 2022 +1000
+
+    Clarify README.md text.
+    
+    Clarify the text about the implications of building without OpenSSL, and
+    prefix the "configure --help" example command with a "./" so it's likely
+    to work as-is in more shells.  From bz#3461.
+
+commit f40b52f21fbc52eb513279168a49d3285c65256c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Jul 12 19:48:44 2022 +1000
+
+    Remove special casing of crypt().
+    
+    Configure goes to some lengths to pick crypt() from either libcrypt
+    or OpenSSL's libcrypto because they can more or less featureful (eg
+    supporting md5-style passwords).
+    
+    OpenSSL removed its crypt() interface in 2002:
+    https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/69deec58 so these hijinks
+    should no longer be necessary.  This also only links sshd with libcrypt
+    which is the only thing that needs it.  ok djm@
+
+commit 76f4e48631d7b09fb243b47d7b393d100d3741b7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Jul 13 13:17:47 2022 +1000
+
+    Only refuse to use OpenSSL 3.0.4 on x86_64.
+    
+    The potential RCE only impacts x86_64, so only refuse to use it if we're
+    targetting a potentially impacted architecture.  ok djm@
+
+commit e75bbc1d88491fa85e61b2cc8783d4bbd00cd131
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Jul 12 14:37:15 2022 +1000
+
+    Capture stderr output from configure.
+
+commit d9eaea4bea6271bcee6a2b9428f1271faf2d033b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Jul 12 12:54:49 2022 +1000
+
+    Refuse to use OpenSSL 3.0.4 due to potential RCE.
+    
+    OpenSSL has a potential RCE in its RSA implementation (CVE-2022-2274)
+    so refuse to use that specific version.
+
+commit fb2f3a61bf3d28fff285524535f7ffcd177c9235
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Jul 12 12:54:24 2022 +1000
+
+    Move unset to before we set anything.
+
+commit c483a5c0fb8e8b8915fad85c5f6113386a4341ca
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Jul 6 11:52:54 2022 +1000
+
+    Test against openssl-3.0.5.
+
+commit 669a56bcfe73f8b985f2bba476ba834d55253acf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Jul 5 18:35:53 2022 +1000
+
+    Update sanitizer test targets:
+    
+     - remove clang-sanitize-memory for now.  It takes so long that the test
+       times out.
+     - add gcc sanitize-address and sanitize-undefined test targets.
+
+commit 48cc68b69118b3ce8d07fd4f82e00d58667d5379
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Jul 5 16:23:28 2022 +1000
+
+    Add GCC address sanitizer build/test.
+
+commit 55c60bdd39b82457e92efa77da8d16cfa6a49391
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Jul 5 12:02:33 2022 +1000
+
+    Move sanitizer logs into regress for collection.
+
+commit 35ef2b3b6ef198f8574904a45780487ec2f17858
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 4 09:10:31 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add TEST_REGRESS_CACHE_DIR.
+    
+    If set, it is used to cache regress test names that have succeeded and
+    skip those on a re-run.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a7570dd29a58df59f2cca647c3c2ec989b49f247
+
+commit 7394ed80c4de8b228a43c8956cf2fa1b9c6b2622
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Jul 3 21:46:44 2022 +1000
+
+    Add clang sanitizer tests.
+
+commit bfce0e66b6017a9bfab450b9dc7d4b16f90de817
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Jul 3 18:14:09 2022 +1000
+
+    Skip all rlimit tests when sandboxing disabled.
+    
+    The rlimit tests can hang when being run with some compiler sanitizers
+    so skip all of them if sandbox=no.
+
+commit 6208d611520f9ea94d5369f9da404b709930029d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Jul 3 17:54:49 2022 +1000
+
+    Move checks for pollfd.fd and nfds_t.
+    
+    Move the checks for struct pollfd.fd and nfds_t to before the sandboxing
+    checks.  This groups all the sandbox checks together so we can skip them
+    all when sandboxing is disabled.
+
+commit 322964f8f2e9c321e77ebae1e4d2cd0ccc5c5a0b
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 1 05:08:23 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Remove leftover line.
+    
+    Remove extra line leftover from merge conflict. ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 460e2290875d7ae64971a7e669c244b1d1c0ae2e
+
+commit 7ec81daad0e03a64e8d91c5590960c48c1a899a3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 1 04:45:50 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: use consistent field names (s/char/byte)
+    
+    in format description
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3de33572733ee7fcfd7db33d37db23d2280254f0
+
+commit 32e82a392d9f263485effdd606ff5862d289a4a0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jul 1 13:55:19 2022 +1000
+
+    Skip select+rlimit check if sandboxing is disabled
+    
+    It's not needed in that case, and the test can fail when being built
+    with some compiler memory sanitizer flags.  bz#3441
+
+commit 4be7184ebe2a2ccef175983517a35ee06766e1b4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 1 03:52:57 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: bump up loglevel from debug to info when unable to open
+    
+    authorized keys/principals file for errno != ENOENT; bz2042 ok dtucker
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e79aa550d91ade6a80f081bda689da24c086d66b
+
+commit 6c31ba10e97b6953c4f325f526f3e846dfea647a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 1 03:39:44 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Don't leak the strings allocated by order_hostkeyalgs()
+    
+    and list_hostkey_types() that are passed to compat_pkalg_proposal(). Part of
+    github PR#324 from ZoltanFridrich, ok djm@
+    
+    This is a roll-forward of the previous rollback now that the required
+    changes in compat.c have been done.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7cd93730b3b9f53cdad3ae32462922834ef73eb
+
+commit 486c4dc3b83b4b67d663fb0fa62bc24138ec3946
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 1 03:35:45 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Always return allocated strings from the kex filtering so
+    
+    that we can free them later.  Fix one leak in compat_kex_proposal.  Based on
+    github PR#324 from ZoltanFridrich with some simplications by me. ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9171616da3307612d0ede086fd511142f91246e4
+
+commit 96faa0de6c673a2ce84736eba37fc9fb723d9e5c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 1 00:36:30 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: ignore SIGPIPE earlier in main(), specifically before
+    
+    muxclient() which performs operations that could cause one; Reported by Noam
+    Lewis via bz3454, ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 63d8e13276869eebac6d7a05d5a96307f9026e47
+
+commit 33efac790f6b09d54894ba6c3e17dfb08b6fc7e1
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jun 28 06:09:14 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: reflect the update to -D arg name in usage();
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: abdcde4f92b1ef094ae44210ee99d3b0155aad9c
+
+commit c71a1442d02f0a3586109dfe2cb366de36dee08e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Jun 29 18:28:47 2022 +1000
+
+    Update OpenSSL tests to the most recent releases.
+
+commit 2a822f29300b2de7335fbff65f0b187a0c582304
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jun 27 21:41:55 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: allow arguments to sftp -D option, e.g. sftp -D
+    
+    "/usr/libexec/sftp-server -el debug3"
+    
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a002b9f3a7aef2731fc0ffa9c921cf15f38ecce
+
+commit 2369a2810187e08f2af5d58b343956062fb96ee8
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 24 10:45:06 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Roll back previous KEX changes as they aren't safe until
+    
+    compat_pkalg_proposal and friends always allocate their returned strings.
+    Reported by Qualys.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1c7a88a0d5033f42f88ab9bec58ef1cf72c81ad0
+
+commit 646686136c34c2dbf6a01296dfaa9ebee029386d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 24 04:37:00 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Don't leak the strings allocated by order_hostkeyalgs()
+    
+    and list_hostkey_types() that are passed to compat_pkalg_proposal(). Part of
+    github PR#324 from ZoltanFridrich, ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b2f6e5f60f2bba293b831654328a8a0035ef4a1b
+
+commit 193c6d8d905dde836b628fc07a7b9cf2d347e2a3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jun 25 12:16:15 2022 +1000
+
+    Zero out LIBFIDO2 when SK support not usable.
+    
+    Prevents us from trying to link them into ssh-sk-helper and failing to
+    build.
+
+commit 40f5d849d25c60b4ae21261e78484d435f5cfd51
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jun 25 11:47:28 2022 +1000
+
+    Disable SK support if FIDO libs not found.
+
+commit 5fd922ade1b25880fe8a8249f5c0385e413108f9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 24 14:43:54 2022 +1000
+
+    fix broken case statement in previous
+
+commit f51423bdaf0008d46b6af082bcfd7a22a87375f0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 24 14:40:42 2022 +1000
+
+    request 1.1x API compatibility for OpenSSL >=3.x
+    
+    idea/patch from Pedro Martelletto via GHPR#322; ok dtucker@
+
+commit 455cee8d6c2e4c48c5af9faead3599c49948411e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 24 04:27:14 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: make it clear that RekeyLimit applies to both transmitted
+    
+    and received data. GHPR#328 from Jan Pazdziora
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d180a905fec9ff418a75c07bb96ea41c9308c3f9
+
+commit 17904f05802988d0bb9ed3c8d1d37411e8f459c3
+Author: tobhe@openbsd.org <tobhe@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jun 21 14:52:13 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Make sure not to fclose() the same fd twice in case of an
+    
+    error.
+    
+    ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e384c4e05d5521e7866b3d53ca59acd2a86eef99
+
+commit f29d6cf98c25bf044079032d22c1a57c63ab9d8e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jun 18 02:17:16 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Don't attempt to fprintf a null identity comment. From
+    
+    Martin Vahlensieck via tech@.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c54d20a8e8e4e9912c38a7b4ef5bfc5ca2e05c2
+
+commit ad1762173bb38716a106e8979806149fd0f2753e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 17 01:00:03 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Log an error if pipe() fails while accepting a
+    
+    connection.  bz#3447, from vincent-openssh at vinc17 net, ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d59f19872b94900a5c79da2d57850241ac5df94
+
+commit 9c59e7486cc8691401228b43b96a3edbb06e0412
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 24 14:20:43 2022 +1000
+
+    automatically enable built-in FIDO support
+    
+    If libfido2 is found and usable, then enable the built-in
+    security key support unless --without-security-key-builtin
+    was requested.
+    
+    ok dtucker@
+
+commit 7d25b37fb2a5ff4dadabcbdac6087a97479434f5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 24 13:46:39 2022 +1000
+
+    fix possible NULL deref when built without FIDO
+    
+    Analysis/fix from kircher in bz3443; ok dtucker@
+
+commit f5ba85daddfc2da6a8dab6038269e02c0695be44
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jun 15 16:08:25 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: make sure that UseDNS hostname lookup happens in the monitor
+    
+    and not in the pledge(2)'d unprivileged process; fixes regression caused by
+    recent refactoring spotted by henning@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a089870b95101cd8881a2dff65b2f1627d13e88d
+
+commit acb2059febaddd71ee06c2ebf63dcf211d9ab9f2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 3 04:47:21 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: move auth_openprincipals() and auth_openkeyfile() over to
+    
+    auth2-pubkeyfile.c too; they make more sense there.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9970d99f900e1117fdaab13e9e910a621b7c60ee
+
+commit 3d9b0845f34510111cc693bb99a667662ca50cd8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 3 04:31:54 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: test setenv in both client and server, test first-match-wins
+    
+    too
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4c8804f9db38a02db480b9923317457b377fe34b
+
+commit 22e1a3a71ad6d108ff0c5f07f93c3fcbd30f8b40
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 3 04:30:46 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Make SetEnv directives first-match-wins in both
+    
+    sshd_config and sshd_config; previously if the same name was reused then the
+    last would win (which is the opposite to how the config is supposed to work).
+    
+    While there, make the ssh_config parsing more like sshd_config.
+    
+    bz3438, ok dtucker
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 797909c1e0262c0d00e09280459d7ab00f18273b
+
+commit 38ed6c57e9e592c08e020fa6e82b45b4e1040970
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 3 04:00:15 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add missing *-sk types to ssh-keyscan manpage. From
+    
+    skazi0 via github PR#294.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fda2c869cdb871f3c90a89fb3f985370bb5d25c0
+
+commit ea97ec98c41ec2b755dfab459347db674ff9a5de
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 3 03:21:09 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add period at end of "not known by any other names"
+    
+    message.  github PR#320 from jschauma, ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd60809803c4bfd3ebb7c5c4d918b10e275266f2
+
+commit 88e376fcd67478ad1660d94bc73ab348ac9f4527
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 3 03:17:42 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh-keygen -A: do not generate DSA keys by default.
+    
+    Based on github PR#303 from jsegitz with man page text from jmc@, ok markus@
+    djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c4c57bdd7063ff03381cfb6696659dd3f9f5b9f
+
+commit 6b3fb624675082a1e5aa615d1b8479873d8b5731
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue May 31 14:05:12 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh-keygen: implement "verify-required" certificate option.
+    
+    This was already documented when support for user-verified FIDO
+    keys was added, but the ssh-keygen(1) code was missing.
+    
+    ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f660f973391b593fea4b7b25913c9a15c3eb8a06
+
+commit b7f86ffc301be105bba9a3e0618b6fab3ae379bd
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat May 28 05:57:56 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: keywords ref ssh_config.5;
+    
+    from caspar schutijser
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f146a19d7d5c9374c3b9c520da43b2732d7d1a4e
+
+commit dc7bc52372f2744fa39191577be5306ee57aacd4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon May 30 09:29:09 2022 +1000
+
+    fix some bugs in the fuzzer
+
+commit 1781f507c113667613351c19898efaf1e311a865
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri May 27 18:19:48 2022 +1000
+
+    Test against OpenSSL 1.1.1o and 3.0.3.
+
+commit c53906e0c59e569691b4095d3e8db79cf78fa058
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri May 27 18:18:31 2022 +1000
+
+    Test against LibreSSL 3.5.3.
+
+commit 9b3ad432ad2f19319bcc089370e356c6315d682f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri May 27 17:00:43 2022 +1000
+
+    fuzzer for authorized_keys parsing
+    
+    mostly redundant to authopt_fuzz, but it's sensitive code so IMO it
+    makes sense to test this layer too
+
+commit c83d8c4d6f3ccceef84d46de107f6b71cda06359
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 27 05:02:46 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: split the low-level file handling functions out from
+    
+    auth2-pubkey.c
+    
+    Put them in a new auth2-pubkeyfile.c to make it easier to refer to them
+    (e.g. in unit/fuzz tests) without having to refer to everything else
+    pubkey auth brings in.
+    
+    ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3fdca2c61ad97dc1b8d4a7346816f83dc4ce2217
+
+commit 3b0b142d2a0767d8cd838e2f3aefde8a0aaa41e1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 27 05:01:25 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: refactor authorized_keys/principals handling
+    
+    remove "struct ssh *" from arguments - this was only used to pass the
+    remote host/address. These can be passed in instead and the resulting
+    code is less tightly coupled to ssh_api.[ch]
+    
+    ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d4373d013edc4cc4b5c21a599e1837ac31dda0d
+
+commit 2c334fd36f80cb91cc42e4b978b10aa35e0df236
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 27 04:29:40 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: f sshpkt functions fail, then password is not cleared
+    
+    with freezero. Unconditionally call freezero to guarantee that password is
+    removed from RAM.
+    
+    From tobias@ and c3h2_ctf via github PR#286, ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6b093619c9515328e25b0f8093779c52402c89cd
+
+commit 5d3a77f4c5ae774c6796387266503f52c7cdc7c2
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 27 04:27:49 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Avoid kill with -1 argument. The out_ctx label can be
+    
+    reached before fork has been called. If this happens, then kill -1 would be
+    called, sending SIGTERM to all processes reachable by the current process.
+    
+    From tobias@ and c3h2_ctf via github PR#286, ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6277af1207d81202f5daffdccfeeaed4c763b1a8
+
+commit 533b31cd08e4b97f455466f91c36915e2924c15a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 27 04:13:24 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Note that ProxyJump also accepts the same tokens as
+    
+    ProxyCommand. From pallxk via github PR#305.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7115ac351b129205f1f1ffa6bbfd62abd76be7c5
+
+commit 9d8c80f8a304babe61ca28f2e3fb5eb6dc9c39bf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed May 25 06:03:44 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: revert previous; it was broken (spotted by Theo)
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 457c79afaca2f89ec2606405c1059b98b30d8b0d
+
+commit 9e0d02ef7ce88b67643bfb1c2272c9f5f04cc680
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed May 25 00:31:13 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: make SSHBUF_DBG/SSHBUF_TELL (off by default and only enabled
+    
+    via #define) dump to stderr rather than stdout
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 10298513ee32db8390aecb0397d782d68cb14318
+
+commit 2487163630f28be28b7e2396b4bd6511b98f1d3e
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Tue May 24 10:21:25 2022 -0700
+
+    configure.ac: Add missing AC_DEFINE for caph_cache_tzdata test causing
+    HAVE_CAPH_CACHE_TZDATA to be missing from config.h.in.
+    Spotted by Bryan Drewery
+
+commit bedb93415b60db3dfd704a3d525e82adb14a2481
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun May 15 23:48:07 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: regress test for in-place transfers and clobbering larger
+    
+    files with smaller ones; would have caught last regression in scp(1)
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 19de4e88dd3a4f7e5c1618c9be3c32415bd93bc2
+
+commit b4f0d719c2548cb74da509fb65f384dada4ebd37
+Author: anton@openbsd.org <anton@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 22 05:08:43 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Only run agent-ptrace.sh if gdb is available as all
+    
+    architectures do not ship with gdb.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ec53e928803e6b87f9ac142d38888ca79a45348d
+
+commit 9b73345f80255a7f3048026462f2c0c6a241eeac
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun May 15 23:47:21 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix in-place copies; r1.163 incorrectly skipped truncation in
+    
+    all cases, not just at the start of a transfer. This could cause overwrites
+    of larger files to leave junk at the end. Spotted by tb@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b189f19cd68119548c8e24e39c79f61e115bf92c
+
+commit 56a0697fe079ff3e1ba30a2d5c26b5e45f7b71f8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 13 06:31:50 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: arrange for scp, when in sftp mode, to not ftruncate(3) files
+    
+    early
+    
+    previous behavious of unconditionally truncating the destination file
+    would cause "scp ~/foo localhost:" and "scp localhost:foo ~/" to
+    delete all the contents of their destination.
+    
+    spotted by solene@ sthen@, also bz3431; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ca39fdd39e0ec1466b9666f15cbcfddea6aaa179
+
+commit fbcef70c2832712f027bccea1aa9bc4b4103da93
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon May 9 08:25:27 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Remove errant apostrophe. From haruyama at queen-ml org.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc6b294567cb84b384ad6ced9ca469f2bbf0bd10
+
+commit 0086a286ea6bbd11ca9b664ac3bb12b27443d6eb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon May 9 03:09:53 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Allow existing -U (use agent) flag to work with "-Y sign"
+    
+    operations, where it will be interpreted to require that the private keys is
+    hosted in an agent; bz3429, suggested by Adam Szkoda; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7bc69873b99c32c42c7628ed9ea91565ba08c2f
+
+commit cb010744cc98f651b1029bb09efa986eb54e4ccf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun May 8 22:58:35 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: improve error message when 'ssh-keygen -Y sign' is unable to
+    
+    load a private key; bz3429, reported by Adam Szkoda ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb57b285e67bea536ef81b1055467be2fc380e74
+
+commit aa61fc82c63d309a90c22ca74fb1da6c6f4372fd
+Author: Tobias Heider <me@tobhe.de>
+Date:   Mon May 9 02:00:01 2022 +0200
+
+    Remove duplicate bcrypt_pbkdf.o from Makefile
+    
+    bcrypt_pbkdf.o is duplicated in the openbsd-compat Makefile's object
+    file list.
+
+commit deb506d00da8d11fb04c1e7b9b1e1cc379c1705c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun May 8 22:32:36 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: When performing operations that glob(3) a remote path, ensure
+    
+    that the implicit working directory used to construct that path escapes
+    glob(3) characters.
+    
+    This prevents glob characters from being processed in places they
+    shouldn't, e.g. "cd /tmp/a*/", "get *.txt" should have the get operation
+    treat the path "/tmp/a*" literally and not attempt to expand it.
+    
+    Reported by Lusia Kundel; ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f647f58482cbad3d58b1eab7f6a1691433deeef
+
+commit f38cf74f20b5da113cfa823afd5bfb5c6ba65f3d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri May 6 14:50:18 2022 +1000
+
+    Also retest OpenBSD upstream on .yml changes.
+
+commit f87a132800ba3710ab130d703448a31ef1128d77
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri May 6 14:46:09 2022 +1000
+
+    Note that, for now, we need variadic macros.
+
+commit 217b518e0f7c52c4b909e935141a55344c61e644
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri May 6 14:39:34 2022 +1000
+
+    Add ubsan minimal testcase on OpenBSD.
+    
+    As suggested by djm@.
+
+commit 457dce2cfef6a48f5442591cd8b21c7e8cba13f8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu May 5 01:04:14 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: sshkey_unshield_private() contains a exact duplicate of
+    
+    the code in private2_check_padding(). Pull private2_check_padding() up so the
+    code can be reused. From Martin Vahlensieck, ok deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 876884c3f0e62e8fd8d1594bab06900f971c9c85
+
+commit 0e44db4d9cb313e68a59a44d27884af66c02356e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu May 5 00:56:58 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: channel_new no longer frees remote_name. So update the
+    
+    comment accordingly.  As remote_name is not modified, it can be const as
+    well. From Martin Vahlensieck
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e4e10dc8dc9f40c166ea5a8e991942bedc75a76a
+
+commit 37b62fd5caf19c85a48241535277cefff65adace
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu May 5 00:55:11 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: mux.c: mark argument as const; from Martin Vahlensieck
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 69a1a93a55986c7c2ad9f733c093b46a47184341
+
+commit f4e67c0ad259b4cf10177277a5827fa5545bac53
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed May 4 07:31:22 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: make sure stdout is non-blocking; ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64940fffbd1b882eda2d7c8c7a43c79368309c0d
+
+commit e5c036d2092c00bef395e9161dc5ce42d4be9565
+Author: florian@openbsd.org <florian@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue May 3 07:42:27 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add FIDO AUTHENTICATOR section and explain a bit how FIDO
+    
+    works. The wording came mostly from the 8.2 OpenSSH release notes, addapted
+    to fit the man page. Then move the -O bits into the new section as is already
+    done for CERTIFICATES and MODULI GENERATION. Finally we can explain the
+    trade-offs of resident keys. While here, consistently refer to the FIDO
+    thingies as "FIDO authenticators", not "FIDO tokens".
+    
+    input & OK jmc, naddy
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd98748d7644df048f78dcf793b3b63db9ab1d25
+
+commit 575771bf79bef7127be6aaccddc46031ea15529e
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon May 2 05:40:37 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: remove an obsolete rsa1 format example from an example;
+    
+    from megan batty
+    ok djm
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db2c89879c29bf083df996bd830abfb1e70d62bf
+
+commit 0bc6b4c8f04e292577bdb44d5dc6b630d3448087
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun May 1 23:20:30 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix some integer overflows in sieve_large() that show up when
+    
+    trying to generate modp groups > 16k bits. Reported via GHPR#306 by Bertram
+    Felgenhauer, but fixed in a different way. feedback/ok tb@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 81cbc6dd3a21c57bd6fadea10e44afe37bca558e
+
+commit a45615cb172bc827e21ec76750de39dfb30ecc05
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 29 04:55:07 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: be stricter in which characters will be accepted in
+    
+    specifying a mask length; allow only 0-9. From khaleesicodes via GHPR#278; ok
+    dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e267746c047ea86665cdeccef795a8a56082eeb2
+
+commit 4835544d2dd31de6ffc7dba59f92093aea98155b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Apr 30 10:56:41 2022 +1000
+
+    Add Mac OS X 12 test target.
+
+commit 97a6a8b8c1f2da09712d0e72d0ef800e4edd34cd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Apr 29 18:27:34 2022 +1000
+
+    Only run tests when source files change.
+    
+    Also run tests on changes to V_9_0 branch.
+
+commit 6d0392b9ff4b50a56ac5685d1b9392e2cd432ca3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Apr 29 18:22:34 2022 +1000
+
+    Remove now-empty int32_minmax.inc.
+
+commit af59463553b5ad52d3b42c4455ee3c5600158bb7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 29 03:24:30 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: mention that the helpers are used by ssh(1), ssh-agent(1)
+    
+    and ssh-keygen(1). Previously only ssh(1) was mentioned. From Pedro
+    Martelletto
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30f880f989d4b329589c1c404315685960a5f153
+
+commit 3e26b3a6eebcee27be177207cc0846fb844b7a56
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 29 03:16:48 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Don't leak SK device. Patch from Pedro Martelletto via
+    
+    github PR#316. ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 17d11327545022e727d95fd08b213171c5a4585d
+
+commit 247082b5013f0d4fcae8f97453f2a2f01bcda811
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 29 03:13:32 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix memleak on session-bind path; from Pedro Martelletto, ok
+    
+    dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e85899a26ba402b4c0717b531317e8fc258f0a7e
+
+commit e05522008092ceb86a87bdd4ad7878424315db89
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Apr 28 02:53:31 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: avoid printing hash algorithm twice; from lucas AT sexy.is
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d24671e10a84141b7c504396cabad600e47a941
+
+commit 0979e29356915261d69a9517a1e0aaade7c9fc75
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Apr 27 11:08:55 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add authfd path to debug output. ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f735a17d1a6f2bee63bfc609d76ef8db8c090890
+
+commit 67b7c784769c74fd4d6b147d91e17e1ac1a8a96d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Apr 26 07:41:44 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Check sshauthopt_new() for NULL. bz#3425, from
+    
+    tessgauthier at microsoft.com.  ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af0315bc3e44aa406daa7e0ae7c2d719a974483f
+
+commit d571314d14b919fbd7c84a61f9bf2065fc0a6841
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Apr 20 16:00:25 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Remove unnecessary includes: openssl/hmac.h and
+    
+    openssl/evp.h. From Martin Vahlensieck.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a6debb5fb0c8a44e43e8d5ca7cc70ad2f3ea31c3
+
+commit da8dddf8cc1f2516ff894b8183e83a7c5ba3ef80
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Apr 20 15:59:18 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add missing includes of stdlib.h and stdint.h. We need
+    
+    stdlib.h for malloc(3) and stdint.h for SIZE_MAX. Unlike the other xmss
+    files, ssh-xmss.c does not include xmss_commons.h so ssh-xmss.c must include
+    those headers itself. From Martin Vahlensieck
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 70e28a9818cee3da1be2ef6503d4b396dd421e6b
+
+commit fe9d87a6800a7a33be08f4d5ab662a758055ced2
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Apr 20 15:56:49 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Avoid an unnecessary xstrdup in rm_env() when matching
+    
+    patterns. Since match_pattern() doesn't modify its arguments (they are
+    const), there is no need to make an extra copy of the strings in
+    options->send_env. From Martin Vahlensieck
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c9db31e3f4d3403b49642c64ee048b2a0a39351
+
+commit 7bf2eb958fbb551e7d61e75c176bb3200383285d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Apr 26 23:30:59 2022 +1000
+
+    Add debian-riscv64 test target.
+
+commit 3913c935523902482974c4c503bcff20bd850a6a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Apr 25 17:20:06 2022 +1000
+
+    Update OpenSSL and LibreSSL versions in tests.
+
+commit dcd8dca29bcdb193ff6be35b96fc55e6e30d37d9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Apr 23 20:40:28 2022 +1000
+
+    Include stdlib.h for free() prototype.
+    
+    ... which is used inside the CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG block.
+
+commit 4cc05de568e1c3edd7834ff3bd9d8214eb34861b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Apr 23 20:17:26 2022 +1000
+
+    Cache timezone data in capsicum sandbox.
+    
+    From emaste at freebsd.org, originally part of FreeBSD commit r339216
+    / fc3c19a9 with autoconf bits added by me.
+
+commit c31404426d212e2964ff9e5e58e1d0fce3d83f27
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Apr 21 01:36:46 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: It looks like we can't completely avoid
+    
+    waiting for processes to exit so retrieve the pid via controlmaster and
+    use that.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8246f00f22b14e49d2ff1744c94897ead33d457b
+
+commit d19b21afab5c8e2f3df6bd8aee9766bdad3d8c58
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Apr 20 13:25:55 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Use ssh -f and ControlPersist ..
+    
+    to start up test forwards and ssh -O stop to shut them down intead of
+    sleep loops.  This speeds up the test by an order of magnitude.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: eb3db5f805100919b092a3b2579c611fba3e83e7
+
+commit 5f76286a126721fa005de6edf3d1c7a265555f19
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Apr 20 05:24:13 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Simplify forward-control test.
+    
+    Since we no longer need to support SSH1 we don't need to run shell
+    commands on the other end of the connection and can use ssh -N instead.
+    This also makes the test less racy.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 32e94ce272820cc398f30b848b2b0f080d10302c
+
+commit 687bbf23572d8bdf25cbbcdf8ac583514e1ba710
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Mar 31 03:07:33 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: regression test for sftp cp command
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c96bea9edde3a384b254785e7f9b2b24a81cdf82
+
+commit f1233f19a6a9fe58f52946f50df4772f5b136761
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Apr 20 01:13:47 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Import regenerated moduli
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f9a0726d957cf10692a231996a1f34e7f9cdfeb0
+
+commit fec014785de198b9a325d1b94e324bb958c5fe7b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Apr 20 04:19:11 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Try to continue running local I/O for channels in state
+    
+    OPEN during SSH transport rekeying. The most visible benefit is that it
+    should make ~-escapes work in the client (e.g. to exit) if the connection
+    happened to have stalled during a rekey event. Based work by and ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a66e8f254e92edd4ce09c9f750883ec8f1ea5f45
+
+commit e68154b0d4f0f5085a050ea896955da1b1be6e30
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Apr 20 01:13:47 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Import regenerated moduli
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f9a0726d957cf10692a231996a1f34e7f9cdfeb0
+
+commit 69928b106d8f0fa15b88cf3850d992ed81c44ae0
+Author: tj@openbsd.org <tj@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Apr 16 00:22:31 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: list the correct version number
+    
+    for when usage of the sftp protocol became default and fix a typo
+    from ed maste
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 24e1795ed2283fdeacf16413c2f07503bcdebb31
+
+commit 21042a05c0b304c16f655efeec97438249d2e2cc
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Apr 12 05:09:49 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Correct path for system known hosts file in description
+    
+    of IgnoreUserKnownHosts.  Patch from Martin Vahlensieck via tech@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9b7784f054fa5aa4d63cb36bd563889477127215
+
+commit 53f4aff60a7c1a08a23917bd47496f8901c471f5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Apr 16 14:33:20 2022 +1000
+
+    Resync moduli.5 with upstream.
+    
+    1.18: remove duplicate publication year; carsten dot kunze at arcor dot de
+    1.19: ssh-keygen's -G/-T have been replaced with -M generate/screen.
+
+commit d2b888762b9844eb0d8eb59909cdf5af5159f810
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Apr 16 14:31:13 2022 +1000
+
+    Retire fbsd6 test VM.
+    
+    It's long since out of support, relatively slow (it's i686) and the
+    compiler has trouble with PIE.
+
+commit cd1f70009860a154b51230d367c55ea5f9a4504e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Apr 11 22:52:08 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: clear io_want/io_ready flags at start of poll() cycle;
+    
+    avoids plausible spin during rekeying if channel io_want flags are reused
+    across cycles. ok markus@ deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91034f855b7c73cd2591657c49ac30f10322b967
+
+commit aa1920302778273f7f94c2091319aba199068ca0
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 8 05:43:39 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Note that curve25519-sha256 was later published in
+    
+    RFC8731.  ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ac2b5d642d4cf5918eaec8653cad9a4460b2743
+
+commit 4673fa8f2be983f2f88d5afd754adb1a2a39ec9e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 8 04:40:40 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: two defensive changes from Tobias Stoeckmann via GHPR287
+    
+    enforce stricter invarient for sshbuf_set_parent() - never allow
+    a buffer to have a previously-set parent changed.
+    
+    In sshbuf_reset(), if the reallocation fails, then zero the entire
+    buffer and not the (potentially smaller) default initial alloc size.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14583203aa5d50ad38d2e209ae10abaf8955e6a9
+
+commit 26eef015e2d2254375e13afaaf753b78932b1bf5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Apr 11 16:07:09 2022 +1000
+
+    Revert "update build-aux files to match autoconf-2.71"
+    
+    This reverts commit 0a8ca39fac6ad19096b6c263436f8b2dd51606f2.
+    
+    It turns out that the checked-in copies of these files are actually newer
+    than autoconf-2.71's copies, so this was effectively a downgrade.
+    Spotted by Bo Anderson via github
+
+commit 0a8ca39fac6ad19096b6c263436f8b2dd51606f2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 8 14:48:58 2022 +1000
+
+    update build-aux files to match autoconf-2.71
+    
+    i.e. config.guess, config.sub and install-sh
+
+commit 94eb6858efecc1b4f02d8a6bd35e149f55c814c8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Apr 6 10:47:48 2022 +1000
+
+    update version numbers for release
+
+commit 8e4a8eadf4fe74e65e6492f34250f8cf7d67e8da
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Apr 4 22:45:25 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: openssh-9.0
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0dfb461188f4513ec024c1534da8c1ce14c20b64
+
+commit a9f23ea2e3227f406880c2634d066f6f50fa5eaa
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Mar 31 17:58:44 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh: document sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com as
+    
+    default KEX
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12545bfa10bcbf552d04d9d9520d0f4e98b0e171
+
+commit 9ec2713d122af79d66ebb9c1d6d9ae8621a8945f
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Mar 31 17:27:27 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: man pages: add missing commas between subordinate and
+    
+    main clauses
+    
+    jmc@ dislikes a comma before "then" in a conditional, so leave those
+    untouched.
+    
+    ok jmc@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9520801729bebcb3c9fe43ad7f9776ab4dd05ea3
+
+commit 3741df98ffaaff92b474ee70d8ef276b5882f85a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Apr 4 23:52:11 2022 +1000
+
+    Disable security key on fbsd6 test host.
+
+commit 32c12236f27ae83bfe6d2983b67c9bc67a83a417
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Apr 4 15:16:51 2022 +1000
+
+    Specify TEST_SHELL=bash on AIX.
+    
+    The system shells cause the agent-restrict test to fail due to some
+    quoting so explicitly specify bash until we can get configure to
+    autmatically work around that.
+
+commit 90452c8b69d065b7c7c285ff78b81418a75bcd76
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Apr 1 23:38:44 2022 +1100
+
+    Only return events from ppoll that were requested.
+    
+    If the underlying system's select() returns bits that were not in the
+    request set, our ppoll() implementation can return revents for events
+    not requested, which can apparently cause a hang.  Only return revents
+    for activity in the requested event set.  bz#3416, analysis and fix by
+    yaroslav.kuzmin at vmssoftware com, ok djm@
+
+commit 6c49eb5fabc56f4865164ed818aa5112d09c31a8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Apr 1 23:21:40 2022 +1100
+
+    Only run regression tests on slow VMs.
+
+commit f67e47903977b42cb6abcd5565a61bd7293e4dc3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Apr 1 23:21:06 2022 +1100
+
+    Increase test timeout to allow slow VMs to finish
+
+commit 02488c1b54065ddc4f25835dbd2618b2a2fe21f5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Apr 1 16:27:38 2022 +1100
+
+    Use bash or ksh if available for SH in Makefile.
+
+commit 34c7018c316af4773e432066de28d0ef9d0888cd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Apr 1 14:56:54 2022 +1100
+
+    Set Makefile SHELL as determined by configure.
+    
+    This should improve compatibility for users with non-POSIX shells.  If
+    using Makefile.in directly (eg make -f Makefile.in distprep) then SHELL
+    will need to be specified on the command line (along with MANFMT in that
+    particular case).  ok djm@
+
+commit 5b054d76402faab38c48377efd112426469553a0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Apr 1 13:16:47 2022 +1100
+
+    Skip slow tests on (very) slow test targets.
+
+commit b275818065b31a865142c48c2acf6a7c1655c542
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Mar 31 14:11:36 2022 +1100
+
+    depend
+
+commit 3fa539c3ffaabd6211995512d33e29150f88c5c5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Mar 31 03:07:03 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: add a sftp client "cp" command that supports server-side
+    
+    copying of files. Useful for this task and for testing the copy-data
+    extension. Patch from Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bb1b950af0d49f0d5425b1f267e197aa1b57444
+
+commit 7988bfc4b701c4b3fe9b36c8561a3d1c5d4c9a74
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Mar 31 03:05:49 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: add support for the "corp-data" protocol extension to
+    
+    allow server-side copies to be performed without having to go via the client.
+    Patch by Mike Frysinger, ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00aa510940fedd66dab1843b58682de4eb7156d5
+
+commit 32dc1c29a4ac9c592ddfef0a4895eb36c1f567ba
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 30 21:13:23 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: select post-quantum KEX
+    
+    sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com as the default; ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f02d99cbfce22dffec2e2ab1b60905fbddf48fb9
+
+commit d6556de1db0822c76ba2745cf5c097d9472adf7c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 30 21:10:25 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix poll() spin when a channel's output fd closes without
+    
+    data in the channel buffer. Introduce more exact packing of channel fds into
+    the pollfd array. fixes bz3405 and bz3411; ok deraadt@ markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 06740737849c9047785622ad5d472cb6a3907d10
+
+commit 8a74a96d25ca4d32fbf298f6c0ac5a148501777d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 30 04:33:09 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh is almost out of getopt() characters; note the
+    
+    remaining remaining available ones in a comment
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48d38cef59d6bc8e84c6c066f6d601875d3253fd
+
+commit 6d4fc51adb9d8a42f67b5474f02f877422379de6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 30 04:27:51 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: avoid NULL deref via ssh-keygen -Y find-principals.
+    
+    bz3409, reported by Mateusz Adamowski
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a3b2c02438052ee858e0ee18e5a288586b5df2c5
+
+commit e937514920335b92b543fd9be79cd6481d1eb0b6
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Mar 28 17:51:03 2022 +1100
+
+    Add AIX 5.1 test target.
+
+commit 4bbe815ba974b4fd89cc3fc3e3ef1be847a0befe
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Mar 26 22:01:31 2022 +1100
+
+    Drop leading "v" from release version identifier.
+    
+    It's present in the git tags but not in the release tarball names.
+    Also drop extra "/" from URL path.
+
+commit f5cdd3b3c275dffaebfca91df782dca29975e9ac
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Mar 26 16:28:04 2022 +1100
+
+    Use tarballs when testing LibreSSL releases.
+    
+    This means they'll still work when the combination of -portable and
+    openbsd github repos no longer match.
+
+commit 24dc37d198f35a7cf71bf4d5384363c7ef4209d4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Mar 26 15:02:45 2022 +1100
+
+    Remove now-unused passwd variable.
+
+commit 5b467ceef2c356f0a77f5e8ab4eb0fac367e4d24
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Mar 26 13:15:44 2022 +1100
+
+    Missing semicolon.
+
+commit 2923d026e55998133c0f6e5186dca2a3c0fa5ff5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Mar 26 12:49:50 2022 +1100
+
+    Factor out platform-specific locked account check.
+    
+    Also fixes an incorrect free on platforms with both libiaf and shadow
+    passwords (probably only Unixware).  Prompted by github PR#284,
+    originally from @c3h2_ctf and stoeckmann@.
+
+commit d23efe4b12886ffe416be10bc0a7da6ca8aa72d1
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Mar 26 08:13:46 2022 +1100
+
+    Add OpenWRT mips and mipsel test targets.
+
+commit 16ea8b85838dd7a4dbeba4e51ac4f43fd68b1e5b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Mar 20 08:52:17 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: don't leak argument list; bz3404, reported by Balu
+    
+    Gajjala ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fddc32d74e5dd5cff1a49ddd6297b0867eae56a6
+
+commit a72bde294fe0518c9a44ba63864093a1ef2425e3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Mar 20 08:51:21 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: make addargs() and replacearg() a little more robust and
+    
+    improve error reporting
+    
+    make freeargs(NULL) a noop like the other free functions
+    
+    ok dtucker as part of bz3403
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15f86da83176978b4d1d288caa24c766dfa2983d
+
+commit 731087d2619fa7f01e675b23f57af10d745e8af2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Mar 18 04:04:11 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: don't try to resolve ListenAddress directives in the sshd
+    
+    re-exec path - we're never going to use the result and if the operation fails
+    then it can prevent connections from being accepted. Reported by Aaron
+    Poffenberger; with / ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44c53a43909a328e2f5ab26070fdef3594eded60
+
+commit 1c83c082128694ddd11ac05fdf31d70312ff1763
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Mar 18 02:50:21 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: remove blank line
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5e0182965b2fbfb03ad5f256d1a1ce5706bcddf
+
+commit 807be68684da7a1fe969c399ddce2fafb7997dcb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Mar 18 02:32:22 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: helpful comment
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3315a45cb04e7feeb614d76ec80a9fe4ca0e8c7
+
+commit a0b5816f8f1f645acdf74f7bc11b34455ec30bac
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Mar 18 02:31:25 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate requires namespace or SEGV
+    
+    will ensue. Patch from Mateusz Adamowski via GHPR#307
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99e8ec38f9feb38bce6de240335be34aedeba5fd
+
+commit 5a252d54a63be30d5ba4be76210942d754a531c0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 15 05:27:37 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: improve DEBUG_CHANNEL_POLL debugging message
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2275eb7bc4707d019b1a0194b9c92c0b78da848f
+
+commit ce324cf58ba2840e31afeb996935800780c8fa4b
+Author: cheloha@openbsd.org <cheloha@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Mar 13 23:27:54 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh: xstrdup(): use memcpy(3)
+    
+    Copying the given string into the buffer with strlcpy(3) confers no
+    benefit in this context because we have already determined the
+    string's length with strlen(3) in order to allocate that buffer.
+    
+    Thread: https://marc.info/?l=openbsd-tech&m=164687525802691&w=2
+    
+    ok dtucker@ millert@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8bfc082e36e2d2dc4e1feece02fe274155ca11a
+
+commit 2893c5e764557f48f9d6a929e224ed49c59545db
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Mar 11 18:43:58 2022 +1100
+
+    Resync fmt_scaled. with OpenBSD.
+    
+    Fixes underflow reported in bz#3401.
+
+commit 5ae31a0fdd27855af29f48ff027491629fff5979
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Mar 9 09:41:56 2022 +1100
+
+    Provide killpg implementation.
+    
+    Based on github PR#301 for Tandem NonStop.
+
+commit c41c84b439f4cd74d4fe44298a4b4037ddd7d2ae
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Mar 9 09:29:30 2022 +1100
+
+    Check for missing ftruncate prototype.
+    
+    From github PR#301 in conjunction with rsbeckerca.
+
+commit 8cf5275452a950869cb90eeac7d220b01f77b12e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Mar 8 20:04:06 2022 +1100
+
+    Default to not using sandbox when cross compiling.
+    
+    On most systems poll(2) does not work when the number of FDs is reduced
+    with setrlimit, so assume it doesn't when cross compiling and we can't
+    run the test.  bz#3398.
+
+commit 379b30120da53d7c84aa8299c26b18c51c2a0dac
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 1 01:59:19 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: pack pollfd array before server_accept_loop() ppoll()
+    
+    call, and terminate sshd if ppoll() returns errno==EINVAL
+    
+    avoids spin in ppoll when MaxStartups > RLIMIT_NOFILE, reported by
+    Daniel Micay
+    
+    feedback/ok deraadt
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbab1c24993ac977ec24d83283b8b7528f7c2c15
+
+commit eceafbe0bdbbd9bd2f3cf024ccb350666a9934dd
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Feb 27 01:33:59 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: include rejected signature algorithm in error message and
+    
+    not the (useless) key type; ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0c0f552a4d9161203e07e95d58a76eb602a76ff
+
+commit f2f3269423618a83157e18902385e720f9776007
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 25 09:46:24 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Remove the char * casts from arguments to do_lstat,
+    
+    do_readdir and do_stat paths since the underlying functions now take a const
+    char *. Patch from vapier at gentoo.org.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9e4d964dbfb0ed683a2a2900711b88e7f1c0297b
+
+commit 4a66dac052c5ff5047161853f36904607649e4f9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 25 02:09:27 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: save an unneccessary alloc/free, based on patch from
+    
+    Martin Vahlensieck; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 90ffbf1f837e509742f2c31a1fbf2c0fd376fd5f
+
+commit 6f117cb151efe138ac57bdd8e26165f350328f5f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Mar 1 09:02:06 2022 +1100
+
+    Remove unused ivbits argument from chacha_keysetup
+
+commit 15974235dd528aeab0ec67fb92a0a1d733f62be2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Mar 1 09:00:20 2022 +1100
+
+    Add OPENBSD ORIGINAL marker.
+
+commit f2ff669347d320532e7c1b63cdf5c62f46e73150
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Feb 28 22:21:36 2022 +1100
+
+    No unused param warnings for clang-12 and gcc-11.
+    
+    These have too many false positives in -Werror tests on the github CI
+    since we often provide empty stub functions for functionality not needed
+    for particular configurations.
+
+commit 96558ecd87adac62efa9a2b5479f686ab86b0be1
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Feb 26 14:10:41 2022 +1100
+
+    Add debian-i386 test target.
+
+commit 284b6e5394652d519e31782e3b3cdfd7b21d1a81
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Feb 26 14:06:14 2022 +1100
+
+    Allow ppoll_time64 in seccomp sandbox.
+    
+    Should fix sandbox violations on (some? at least i386 and armhf) 32bit
+    Linux platforms.  Patch from chutzpahu at gentoo.org and cjwatson at
+    debian.org via bz#3396.
+
+commit 0132056efabc5edb85c3c7105d2fb6dee41843c6
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 25 19:47:48 2022 +1100
+
+    Improve handling of _getshort and _getlong.
+    
+    If the system native ones are exactly as required then use them,
+    otherwise use the local versions mapped to another name to prevent
+    name collisions.
+
+commit 8e206e0dd6b9f757b07979e48f53ad5bf9b7b52b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 25 15:14:22 2022 +1100
+
+    Constify utimes in compat library to match specs.
+    
+    Patch from vapier at chromium.org.
+
+commit 1b2920e3b63db2eddebeec7330ffe8b723055573
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 25 13:50:56 2022 +1100
+
+    ANSIfy getshort and getlong.
+    
+    These functions appear to have come from OpenBSD's lib/libc/net/res_comp.c
+    which made this change in 2005.
+
+commit 54a86f4f6e1c43a2ca2be23ef799ab8910d4af70
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 25 13:23:04 2022 +1100
+
+    Use PICFLAG instead of hard coding -fPIC.
+
+commit 3016ba47035ac3561aabd48e2be70167fe157d6a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 25 11:37:11 2022 +1100
+
+    Add tests for latest releases of {Libre,Open}SSL.
+
+commit f107467179428a0e3ea9e4aa9738ac12ff02822d
+Author: Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 24 16:04:18 2022 +0000
+
+    Improve detection of -fzero-call-used-regs=all support
+    
+    GCC doesn't tell us whether this option is supported unless it runs into
+    the situation where it would need to emit corresponding code.
+
+commit 3383b2cac0e9275bc93c4b4760e6e048f537e1d6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 23 21:21:49 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: free(3) wants stdlib.h
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 227a8c70a95b4428c49e46863c9ef4bd318a3b8a
+
+commit a4537e79ab4ac6db4493c5158744b9ebde5efcb0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 23 21:21:16 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: put back the scp manpage changes for SFTP mode too
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 05dc53921f927e1b5e5694e1f3aa314549f2e768
+
+commit 449bcb8403adfb9724805d02a51aea76046de185
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 23 19:01:00 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: and we go back to testing sftp-scp after the 8.9
+    
+    release...
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a80440168258adca543a4607b871327a279c569c
+
+commit 166456cedad3962b83b848b1e9caf80794831f0f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 23 22:31:11 2022 +1100
+
+    makedepend
+
+commit 32ebaa0dbca5d0bb86e384e72bebc153f48413e4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 23 11:18:13 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: avoid integer overflow of auth attempts (harmless, caught
+    
+    by monitor)
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 488ad570b003b21e0cd9e7a00349cfc1003b4d86
+
+commit 6e0258c64c901753df695e06498b26f9f4812ea6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 23 11:17:10 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: randomise the password used in fakepw
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34e159f73b1fbf0a924a9c042d8d61edde293947
+
+commit bf114d6f0a9df0b8369823d9a0daa6c72b0c4cc9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 23 11:15:57 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: use asprintf to construct .rhosts paths
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8286e8d3d2c6ff916ff13d041d1713073f738a8b
+
+commit c07e154fbdc7285e9ec54e78d8a31f7325d43537
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 23 11:07:09 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: openssh-8.9
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c5f791c87c483cdab6d9266b43acdd9ca7bde0e
+
+commit bc16667b4a1c3cad7029304853c143a32ae04bd4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Feb 22 15:29:22 2022 +1100
+
+    Extend select+rlimit sanbox test to include poll.
+    
+    POSIX specifies that poll() shall fail if "nfds argument is greater
+    than {OPEN_MAX}".  The setrlimit sandbox sets this to effectively zero
+    so this causes poll() to fail in the preauth privsep process.
+    
+    This is likely the underlying cause for the previously observed similar
+    behaviour of select() on plaforms where it is implement in userspace on
+    top of poll().
+
+commit 6520c488de95366be031d49287ed243620399e23
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Feb 22 13:08:59 2022 +1100
+
+    Add Alpine Linux test VM.
+
+commit a4b325a3fc82d11e0f5d61f62e7fde29415f7afb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Feb 22 12:27:07 2022 +1100
+
+    Include sys/param.h if present.
+    
+    Needed for howmany() on MUSL systems such as Alpine.
+
+commit 5a102e9cb287a43bd7dfe594b775a89a8e94697c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Feb 22 12:25:52 2022 +1100
+
+    Only include sys/poll.h if we don't have poll.h.
+    
+    Prevents warnings on MUSL based systems such as Alpine.
+
+commit 7c0d4ce911d5c58b6166b2db754a4e91f352adf5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 22 11:14:51 2022 +1100
+
+    disable agent-restrict test on minix3
+    
+    Minix seems to have a platform-wide limit on the number of
+    select(2) syscalls that can be concurrently issued. This test
+    seems to exceed this limit.
+    
+    Refer to:
+    
+    https://github.com/Stichting-MINIX-Research-Foundation/minix/blob/R3.3.0/minix/servers/vfs/select.c#L114
+    https://github.com/Stichting-MINIX-Research-Foundation/minix/blob/R3.3.0/minix/servers/vfs/select.c#L30-L31
+
+commit 81d33d8e3cf7ea5ce3a5653c6102b623e019428a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Feb 21 21:27:20 2022 +1100
+
+    Skip agent-getpeereid when running as root.
+
+commit fbd772570a25436a33924d91c164d2b24021f010
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Feb 20 03:47:26 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Aproximate realpath on the expected output by deduping
+    
+    leading slashes. Fixes test failure when user's home dir is / which is
+    possible in some portable configurations.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 53b8c53734f8893806961475c7106397f98d9f63
+
+commit 336685d223a59f893faeedf0a562e053fd84058e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Feb 20 13:30:52 2022 +1100
+
+    Really move DSA to end of list.
+    
+    In commit ad16a84e syncing from OpenBSD, RSA was accidentally moved to
+    the end of the list instead of DSA.  Spotted by andrew at fyfe.gb.net.
+
+commit 63bf4f49ed2fdf2da6f97136c9df0c8168546eb3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 18 12:12:21 2022 +1100
+
+    Add test configs for MUSL C library.
+
+commit f7fc6a43f1173e8b2c38770bf6cee485a562d03b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 17 22:54:19 2022 +1100
+
+    minix needs BROKEN_POLL too; chokes on /dev/null
+
+commit 667fec5d4fe4406745750a32f69b5d2e1a75e94b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 17 10:58:27 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: check for EINTR/EAGAIN failures in the rfd fast-path; caught
+    
+    by dtucker's minix3 vm :) ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e2c895a3e82ef347aa6694394a76a438be91361
+
+commit 41417dbda9fb55a0af49a8236e3ef9d50d862644
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Feb 17 22:05:29 2022 +1100
+
+    Comment hurd test, the VM is currently broken.
+
+commit b2aee35a1f0dc798339b3fcf96136da71b7e3f6d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 17 21:15:16 2022 +1100
+
+    find sk-dummy.so when build_dir != src_dir
+    
+    spotted by Corinna Vinschen; feedback & ok dtucker@
+
+commit 62a2d4e50b2e89f2ef04576931895d5139a5d037
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 16 16:26:17 2022 +1100
+
+    update versions in preparation for 8.9 release
+
+commit dd6d3dded721ac653ea73c017325e5bfeeec837f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 15 05:13:36 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: document the unbound/host-bound options to
+    
+    PubkeyAuthentication; spotted by HARUYAMA Seigo
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 298f681b66a9ecd498f0700082c7a6c46e948981
+
+commit df93529dd727fdf2fb290700cd4f1adb0c3c084b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Feb 14 14:19:40 2022 +1100
+
+    Test if sshd accidentally acquires controlling tty
+    
+    When SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY is defined, test for the problematic behaviour
+    in the STREAMS code before activating the workaround.  ok djm@
+
+commit 766176cfdbfd7ec38bb6118dde6e4daa0df34888
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Feb 12 10:24:56 2022 +1100
+
+    Add cygwin-release test config.
+    
+    This tests the flags used to build the cygwin release binaries.
+
+commit b30698662b862f5397116d23688aac0764e0886e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 11 21:00:35 2022 +1100
+
+    Move SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY workaround into compat.
+    
+    On some (most? all?) SysV based systems with STREAMS based ptys,
+    sshd could acquire a controlling terminal during pty setup when
+    it pushed the "ptem" module, due to what is probably a bug in
+    the STREAMS driver that's old enough to vote.  Because it was the
+    privileged sshd's controlling terminal, it was not available for
+    the user's session, which ended up without one.  This is known to
+    affect at least Solaris <=10, derivatives such as OpenIndiana and
+    several other SysV systems.  See bz#245 for the backstory.
+    
+    In the we past worked around that by not calling setsid in the
+    privileged sshd child, which meant it was not a session or process
+    group leader.  This solved controlling terminal problem because sshd
+    was not eligble to acquire one, but had other side effects such as
+    not cleaning up helper subprocesses in the SIGALRM handler since it
+    was not PG leader.  Recent cleanups in the signal handler uncovered
+    this, resulting in the LoginGraceTime timer not cleaning up privsep
+    unprivileged processes.
+    
+    This change moves the workaround into the STREAMS pty allocation code,
+    by allocating a sacrificial pty to act as sshd's controlling terminal
+    before allocating user ptys, so those are still available for users'
+    sessions.
+    
+    On the down side:
+     - this will waste a pty per ssh connection on affected platforms.
+    
+    On the up side:
+     - it makes the process group behaviour consistent between platforms.
+    
+     - it puts the workaround nearest the code that actually causes the
+       problem and competely out of the mainline code.
+    
+     - the workaround is only activated if you use the STREAMS code.  If,
+       say, Solaris 11 has the bug but also a working openpty() it doesn't
+       matter that we defined SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY.
+    
+     - the workaround is only activated when the fist pty is allocated,
+       ie in the post-auth privsep monitor.  This means there's no risk
+       of fd leaks to the unprivileged processes, and there's no effect on
+       sessions that do not allocate a pty.
+    
+    Based on analysis and work by djm@, ok djm@
+
+commit cd00b48cf10f3565936a418c1e6d7e48b5c36140
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 11 20:09:32 2022 +1100
+
+    Simplify handling of --with-ssl-dir.
+    
+    ok djm@
+
+commit ea13fc830fc0e0dce2459f1fab2ec5099f73bdf0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 11 13:39:29 2022 +1100
+
+    Stop testing OpenBSD HEAD on 6.9 and 7.0.
+    
+    HEAD is not guaranteed to work on previous stable branches, and at the
+    moment is broken due to libfido API changes.
+
+commit 50b9e4a4514697ffb9592200e722de6b427cb9ff
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 11 00:43:56 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Always initialize delim before passing to hpdelim2 which
+    
+    might not set it. Found by the Valgrind tests on github, ok deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c830c0db185ca43beff3f41c19943c724b4f636d
+
+commit 6ee53064f476cf163acd5521da45b11b7c57321b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 11 10:03:06 2022 +1100
+
+    Fix helper include path and remove excess code.
+    
+    Looks like test_hpdelim.c was imported twice into the same file.
+    Spotted by kevin.brott at gmail com and chris at cataclysmal org.
+
+commit 9fa63a19f68bc87452d3cf5c577cafad2921b7a4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Feb 10 23:27:02 2022 +1100
+
+    Put poll.h inside ifdef.
+
+commit 3ac00dfeb54b252c15dcbf1971582e9e3b946de6
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Feb 10 22:17:31 2022 +1100
+
+    We now support POLLPRI so actually define it.
+
+commit 25bd659cc72268f2858c5415740c442ee950049f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Feb 6 22:58:33 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add test for empty hostname with port.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e19e89d3c432b68997667efea44cf015bbe2a7e3
+
+commit a29af853cff41c0635f0378c00fe91bf9c91dea4
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 4 07:53:44 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add unit tests for hpdelim.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: be97b85c19895e6a1ce13c639765a3b48fd95018
+
+commit 9699151b039ecc5fad9ac6c6c02e9afdbd26f15f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 10 04:12:38 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: revert for imminent OpenSSH release, which wil ship with
+    
+    scp in RCP mode.
+    
+    > revision 1.106
+    > date: 2021/10/15 14:46:46;  author: deraadt;  state: Exp;  lines: +13 -9;  commitid: w5n9B2RE38tFfggl;
+    > openbsd 7.0 release shipped with the (hopefully last) scp that uses RCP
+    > protocol for copying.  Let's get back to testing the SFTP protocol.
+    
+    This will be put back once the OpenSSH release is done.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c725481a78210aceecff1537322c0b2df03e768
+
+commit 45279abceb37c3cbfac8ba36dde8b2c8cdd63d32
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 8 08:59:12 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Switch hpdelim interface to accept only ":" as delimiter.
+    
+    Historicallly, hpdelim accepted ":" or "/" as a port delimiter between
+    hosts (or addresses) and ports.  These days most of the uses for "/"
+    are no longer accepted, so there are several places where it checks the
+    delimiter to disallow it.  Make hpdelim accept only ":" and use hpdelim2
+    in the other cases.  ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e6420bd1be87590b6840973f5ad5305804e3102
+
+commit a1bcbf04a7c2d81944141db7ecd0ba292d175a66
+Author: pedro martelletto <pedro@yubico.com>
+Date:   Mon Feb 7 09:09:59 2022 +0100
+
+    fix typos in previous
+
+commit 56192518e329b39f063487bc2dc4d796f791eca0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 7 12:53:47 2022 +1100
+
+    compat code for fido_assert_set_clientdata()
+
+commit d6b5aa08fdcf9b527f8b8f932432941d5b76b7ab
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 7 01:25:12 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: use libfido2 1.8.0+ fido_assert_set_clientdata() instead
+    
+    of manually hashing data outselves. Saves a fair bit of code and makes life
+    easier for some -portable platforms.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 351dfaaa5ab1ee928c0e623041fca28078cff0e0
+
+commit 86cc93fd3c26b2e0c7663c6394995fb04ebfbf3b
+Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Feb 6 00:29:03 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: remove please from manual pages ok jmc@ sthen@ millert@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6543acb00f4f38a23472538e1685c013ca1a99aa
+
+commit ad16a84e64a8cf1c69c63de3fb9008320a37009c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 4 02:49:17 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Since they are deprecated, move DSA to the end of the
+    
+    default list of public keys so that they will be tried last.  From github
+    PR#295 from "ProBackup-nl", ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e5d575cf4971d4e2de92e0b6d6efaba53598bf0
+
+commit 253de42753de85dde266e061b6fec12ca6589f7d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 2 16:52:07 2022 +1100
+
+    portable-specific string array constification
+    
+    from Mike Frysinger
+
+commit dfdcc2220cf359c492d5d34eb723370e8bd8a19e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 1 23:37:15 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: test 'ssh-keygen -Y find-principals' with wildcard
+    
+    principals; from Fabian Stelzer
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fbe4da5f0032e7ab496527a5bf0010fd700f8f40
+
+commit 968e508967ef42480cebad8cf3172465883baa77
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 21 02:54:41 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Enable all supported ciphers and macs in the server
+    
+    before trying to benchmark them.  Increase the data file size to get more
+    signal.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: dc3697d9f7defdfc51c608782c8e750128e46eb6
+
+commit 15b7199a1fd37eff4c695e09d573f3db9f4274b7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 1 23:34:47 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: allow 'ssh-keygen -Y find-principals' to match wildcard
+    
+    principals in allowed_signers files; from Fabian Stelzer
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e970b9c025b80717dddff5018fe5e6f470c5098
+
+commit 541667fe6dc26d7881e55f0bb3a4baa6f3171645
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 1 23:32:51 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: mark const string array contents const too, i.e. static
+    
+    const char *array => static const char * const array from Mike Frysinger
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a664e31ea6a795d7c81153274a5f47b22bdc9bc1
+
+commit 8cfa73f8a2bde4c98773f33f974c650bdb40dd3c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 1 23:11:11 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: better match legacy scp behaviour: show un-expanded paths
+    
+    in error messages. Spotted by and ok tb@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 866c8ffac5bd7d38ecbfc3357c8adfa58af637b7
+
+commit 4e62c13ab419b4b224c8bc6a761e91fcf048012d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 1 07:57:32 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Remove explicit kill of privsep preauth child's PID in
+    
+    SIGALRM handler. It's no longer needed since the child will get terminated by
+    the SIGTERM to the process group that cleans up any auth helpers, it
+    simplifies the signal handler and removes the risk of a race when updating
+    the PID. Based on analysis by HerrSpace in github PR#289, ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2be1ffa28b4051ad9e33bb4371e2ec8a31d6d663
+
+commit 2a7ccd2ec4022917b745af7186f514f365b7ebe9
+Author: guenther@openbsd.org <guenther@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 28 06:18:42 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: When it's the possessive of 'it', it's spelled "its",
+    
+    without the apostrophe.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb6ab9c65bd31de831da1eb4631ddac018c5fae7
+
+commit 8a0848cdd3b25c049332cd56034186b7853ae754
+Author: Alex James <theracermaster@gmail.com>
+Date:   Sun Jan 30 16:13:36 2022 -0600
+
+    sandbox-seccomp-filter: allow gettid
+    
+    Some allocators (such as Scudo) use gettid while tracing allocations [1].
+    Allow gettid in preauth to prevent sshd from crashing with Scudo.
+    
+    [1]: https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/blob/llvmorg-13.0.0/compiler-rt/lib/gwp_asan/common.cpp#L46
+
+commit b30d32159dc3c7052f4bfdf36357996c905af739
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 22 00:49:34 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: add a ssh_packet_process_read() function that reads from
+    
+    a fd directly into the transport input buffer.
+    
+    Use this in the client and server mainloops to avoid unnecessary
+    copying. It also lets us use a more greedy read size without penalty.
+    
+    Yields a 2-3% performance gain on cipher-speed.sh (in a fairly
+    unscientific test tbf)
+    
+    feedback dtucker@ ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: df4112125bf79d8e38e79a77113e1b373078e632
+
+commit a1a8efeaaa9cccb15cdc0a2bd7c347a149a3a7e3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 22 00:45:31 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Use sshbuf_read() to read directly into the channel input
+    
+    buffer rather than into a stack buffer that needs to be copied again;
+    Improves performance by about 1% on cipher-speed.sh feedback dtucker@ ok
+    markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bf5e6e3c821ac3546dc8241d8a94e70d47716572
+
+commit 29a76994e21623a1f84d68ebb9dc5a3c909fa3a7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 25 11:52:34 2022 +1100
+
+    depend
+
+commit 754e0d5c7712296a7a3a83ace863812604c7bc4f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 22 00:43:43 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add a sshbuf_read() that attempts to read(2) directly in
+    
+    to a sshbuf; ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2d8f249040a4279f3bc23c018947384de8d4a45b
+
+commit c7964fb9829d9ae2ece8b51a76e4a02e8449338d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 21 07:04:19 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: add a helper for writing an error message to the
+    
+    stderr_buf and setting quit_pending; no functional change but saves a bunch
+    of boilerplate
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0747657cad6b9eabd514a6732adad537568e232d
+
+commit d23b4f7fdb1bd87e2cd7a9ae7c198ae99d347916
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 21 06:58:06 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: correct comment and use local variable instead of long
+    
+    indirection; spotted by dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5f65f5f69db2b7d80a0a81b08f390a63f8845965
+
+commit d069b020a02b6e3935080204ee44d233e8158ebb
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 21 00:53:40 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: When poll(2) returns -1, for some error conditions
+    
+    pfd[].revents is not cleared.  There are subtle errors in various programs.
+    In this particular case, the program should error out. ok djm millert
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f839b16861f7fb2adcf122e95e8a82fa6a375c
+
+commit e204b34337a965feb439826157c191919fd9ecf8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 22 11:38:21 2022 +1100
+
+    restore tty force-read hack
+    
+    This portable-specific hack fixes a hang on exit for ttyful sessions
+    on Linux and some SysVish Unix variants. It was accidentally disabled
+    in commit 5c79952dfe1a (a precursor to the mainloop poll(2) conversion).
+    
+    Spotted by John in bz3383
+
+commit 68085066b6bad43643b43f5957fcc5fd34782ccd
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Fri Jan 21 03:22:56 2022 +1100
+
+    Fix signedness bug in Cygwin code
+    
+    The Cygwin-specific pattern match code has a bug.  It checks
+    the size_t value returned by mbstowcs for being < 0.  The right
+    thing to do is to check against (size_t) -1.  Fix that.
+    
+    Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+
+commit 2e5cfed513e84444483baf1d8b31c40072b05103
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Jan 20 13:26:27 2022 +1100
+
+    Improve compatibility of early exit trap handling.
+    
+    Dash (as used by the github runners) has some differences in its trap
+    builtin:
+     - it doesn't have -p (which is fine, that's not in posix).
+     - it doesn't work in a subshell (which turns out to be in compliance
+       with posix, which means bash isn't).
+     - it doesn't work in a pipeline, ie "trap|cat" produces no output.
+
+commit 3fe6800b6027add478e648934cbb29d684e51943
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Jan 20 00:49:57 2022 +1100
+
+    Move more tests out of valgrind-1 runner.
+
+commit 20da6ed136dd76e6a0b229ca3036ef9c7c7ef798
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Jan 19 15:37:39 2022 +1100
+
+    Invoke EXIT handler early when using Valgrind.
+    
+    When using Valgrind, we need to wait for all invoked programs to
+    complete before checking their valgrind logs.  Some tests, notably
+    agent-restrict, set an EXIT trap handler to clean up things like
+    ssh-agent, but those do not get invoked until test-exec.sh exits.
+    This causes the Valgrind wait to deadlock, so if present invoke
+    the EXIT handler before checking the Valgrind logs.
+
+commit ad2e0580c87b0714cf166bca9d926a95ddeee1c8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Jan 18 12:55:21 2022 +1100
+
+    Remove line leftover from upstream sync.
+
+commit d1051c0f11a6b749027e26bbeb61b07df4b67e15
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 17 22:56:04 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: when decompressing zlib compressed packets, use
+    
+    Z_SYNC_FLUSH instead of Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH as the latter is not actually
+    specified as a valid mode for inflate(). There should be no practical change
+    in behaviour as the compression side ensures a flush that should make all
+    data available to the receiver in all cases.
+    
+    repoted by lamm AT ibm.com via bz3372; ok markus
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67cfc1fa8261feae6d2cc0c554711c97867cc81b
+
+commit d5981b1883746b1ae178a46229c26b53af99e37a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 17 21:41:04 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: make most of the sftp errors more idiomatic, following
+    
+    the general form of "[local/remote] operation path: error message"; ok markus
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61364cd5f3a9fecaf8d63b4c38a42c0c91f8b571
+
+commit ac7c9ec894ed0825d04ef69c55babb49bab1d32e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jan 17 21:39:51 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: when transferring multiple files in SFTP mode, create the
+    
+    destination directory if it doesn't already exist to match olde-scp(1)
+    behaviour. noticed by deraadt@ ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf44dfa231d4112f697c24ff39d7ecf2e6311407
+
+commit 39d17e189f8e72c34c722579d8d4e701fa5132da
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 14 03:43:48 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: allow pin-required FIDO keys to be added to ssh-agent(1).
+    
+    ssh-askpass will be used to request the PIN at authentication time.
+    
+    From Pedro Martelletto, ok djm
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: de8189fcd35b45f632484864523c1655550e2950
+
+commit 52423f64e13db2bdc31a51b32e999cb1bfcf1263
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 14 03:35:10 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh-sk: free a resident key's user id
+    
+    From Pedro Martelletto; ok dtucker & me
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 47be40d602b7a6458c4c71114df9b53d149fc2e9
+
+commit 014e2f147a2788bfb3cc58d1b170dcf2bf2ee493
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 14 03:34:00 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: sshsk_load_resident: don't preallocate resp
+    
+    resp is allocated by client_converse(), at which point we lose
+    the original pointer.
+    
+    From Pedro Martelletto; ok dtucker & me
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f1b5ea3282017d6584dfed4f8370dc1db1f44b1
+
+commit c88265f207dfe0e8bdbaf9f0eda63ed6b33781cf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 14 03:32:52 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: sshsk_sign: trim call to sshkey_fingerprint()
+    
+    the resulting fingerprint doesn't appear to be used for anything,
+    and we end up leaking it.
+    
+    from Pedro Martelletto; ok dtucker & me
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5625cf6c68f082bc2cbbd348e69a3ed731d2f9b7
+
+commit 1cd1b2eac39661b849d5a4b4b56363e22bb5f61e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 14 03:31:52 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: use status error message to communicate ~user expansion
+    
+    failures; provides better experience for scp in sftp mode, where ~user paths
+    are more likely to be used; spotted jsg, feedback jsg & deraadt ok jsg &
+    markus
+    
+    (forgot to include this file in previous commit)
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d37cc4c8c861ce48cd6ea9899e96aaac3476847b
+
+commit a1d42a6ce0398da3833bedf374ef2571af7fea50
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 14 13:49:32 2022 +1100
+
+    fix edge case in poll(2) wrapper
+    
+    Correct handling of select(2) exceptfds. These should only be consulted
+    for POLLPRI flagged pfds and not unconditionally converted to POLLERR.
+    
+    with and ok dtucker@
+
+commit 976b9588b4b5babcaceec4767a241c11a67a5ccb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jan 14 13:46:35 2022 +1100
+
+    Wrap OpenSSL includes in unit tests in ifdef.
+    
+    Fixes unit test on systems that do not have OpenSSL headers installed.
+
+commit c171879374b2e8b07157503f5639ed0bce59ce89
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Jan 13 15:53:33 2022 +1100
+
+    Remove sort wrapper.
+    
+    agent-restrict now takes care of this itself.
+
+commit 9cc2654403f1a686bb26c07a6ac790edf334cef5
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 13 04:53:16 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Set LC_ALL in both local and remote shells so that sorted
+    
+    output matches regardless of what the user's shell sets it to.  ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4e97dd69a68b05872033175a4c2315345d01837f
+
+commit 7a75f748cb2dd2f771bf70ea72698aa027996ab1
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 13 04:22:10 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Avoid %'s in commands (not used in OpenBSD, but used in
+    
+    -portable's Valgrind test) being interpretted as printf format strings.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: dc8655db27ac4acd2c386c4681bf42a10d80b043
+
+commit 6c435bd4994d71442192001483a1cdb846e5ffcd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Jan 12 16:58:13 2022 +1100
+
+    Stop on first test failure to minimize logs.
+
+commit 4bc2ba6095620a4484b708ece12842afd8c7685b
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 12 07:18:37 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Use egrep when searching for an anchored string.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: dd114a2ac27ac4b06f9e4a586d3f6320c54aeeb4
+
+commit 6bf2efa2679da1e8e60731f41677b2081dedae2c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Jan 12 18:25:06 2022 +1100
+
+    Add "rev" command replacement if needed.
+
+commit 72bcd7993dadaf967bb3d8564ee31cbf38132b5d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 12 03:30:32 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Don't log NULL hostname in restricted agent code,
+    
+    printf("%s", NULL) is not safe on all platforms.  with & ok djm
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: faf10cdae4adde00cdd668cd1f6e05d0a0e32a02
+
+commit acabefe3f8fb58c867c99fed9bbf84dfa1771727
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 11 22:33:16 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: remove hardcoded domain and use window.location.host, so this
+    
+    can be run anywhere
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2ac2ade3b6227d9c547351d3ccdfe671e62b7f92
+
+commit 96da0946e44f34adc0397eb7caa6ec35a3e79891
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 11 02:56:19 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: "void" functions should not return anything. From Tim Rice
+    
+    via -portable.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce6616304f4c9881b46413e616b226c306830e2a
+
+commit a882a09722c9f086c9edb65d0c4022fd965ec1ed
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 11 01:26:47 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: suppress "Connection to xxx closed" messages at LogLevel >=
+    
+    error bz3378; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5bf457d5d2eb927b81d0663f45248a31028265c
+
+commit 61a1a6af22e17fc94999a5d1294f27346e6c4668
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 12 08:57:49 2022 +1100
+
+    OS X poll(2) is broken; use compat replacement
+    
+    Darwin's poll(2) implementation is broken. For character-special
+    devices like /dev/null, it returns POLLNVAL when polled with
+    POLLIN.
+    
+    Apparently this is Apple bug 3710161, which is AFAIK not public,
+    but a websearch will find other OSS projects rediscovering it
+    periodically since it was first identified in 2005 (!!)
+
+commit 613a6545fc5a9542753b503cbe5906538a640b60
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Jan 11 20:56:01 2022 +1100
+
+    libhardended_malloc.so moved into out dir.
+
+commit 61761340be5e11046556623f8f5412b236cefa95
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Mon Jan 10 11:07:04 2022 -0800
+
+    Make USL compilers happy
+    UX:acomp: ERROR: "sftp-server.c", line 567: void function cannot return value
+
+commit 3ef403f351e80a59b6f7e9d43cb82c181855483c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Jan 10 21:07:38 2022 +1100
+
+    Add wrapper for "sort" to set LC_ALL=C.
+    
+    Found by djm, this should make sorts stable and reduce test flakiness.
+
+commit bd69e29f5716090181dbe0b8272eb7eab1a383bb
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 8 07:55:26 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Remove errant "set -x" left over from debugging.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cd989268e034264cec5df97be7581549032c87dc
+
+commit 1a7c88e26fd673813dc5f61c4ac278564845e004
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 8 07:01:13 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Enable all supported hostkey algorithms (but no others).
+    
+    Allows hostbased test to pass when built without OpenSSL.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5ddd677a68b672517e1e78460dc6ca2ccc0a9562
+
+commit 12b457c2a42ff271e7967d9bedd068cebb048db9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 8 07:37:32 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: use status error message to communicate ~user expansion
+    
+    failures; provides better experience for scp in sftp mode, where ~user paths
+    are more likely to be used; spotted jsg, feedback jsg & deraadt ok jsg &
+    markus
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc610ce00ca0cdc2ecdabbd49ce7cb82033f905f
+
+commit 63670d4e9030bcee490d5a9cce561373ac5b3b23
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 8 07:36:11 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix some corner-case bugs in scp sftp-mode handling of
+    
+    ~-prefixed paths; spotted by jsg; feedback jsg & deraadt, ok jsg & markus
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d1697dbaaa9f0f5649d69be897eab25c7d37c222
+
+commit e14940bbec57fc7d3ce0644dbefa35f5a8ec97d0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 8 07:34:57 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: more idiomatic error messages; spotted by jsg & deraadt
+    
+    ok jsg & markus
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43618c692f3951747b4151c477c7df22afe2bcc8
+
+commit 9acddcd5918c623f7ebf454520ffe946a8f15e90
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 8 07:33:54 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: add a variant of send_status() that allows overriding the
+    
+    default, generic error message. feedback/ok markus & jsg
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 81f251e975d759994131b717ee7c0b439659c40f
+
+commit 961411337719d4cd78f1ab33e4ac549f3fa22f50
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 8 07:32:45 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: refactor tilde_expand_filename() and make it handle ~user
+    
+    paths with no trailing slash; feedback/ok markus and jsg
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a2ab365598a902f0f14ba6a4f8fb2d07a9b5d51d
+
+commit dc38236ab6827dec575064cac65c8e7035768773
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 6 22:14:25 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Don't explicitly set HostbasedAuthentication in
+    
+    sshd_config. It defaults to "no", and not explicitly setting it allows us to
+    enable it for the (optional) hostbased test.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: aa8e3548eb5793721641d26e56c29f363b767c0c
+
+commit e12d912ddf1c873cb72e5de9a197afbe0b6622d2
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 6 21:46:56 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add test for hostbased auth. It requires some external
+    
+    setup (see comments at the top) and thus is disabled unless
+    TEST_SSH_HOSTBASED_AUTH and SUDO are set.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3ec8ba3750c5b595fc63e7845d13483065a4827a
+
+commit a48533a8da6a0f4f05ecd055dc8048047e53569e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jan 7 09:24:26 2022 +1100
+
+    depend
+
+commit d9dbb5d9a0326e252d3c7bc13beb9c2434f59409
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 6 22:06:51 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: allow hostbased auth to select RSA keys when only
+    
+    RSA/SHA2 are configured (this is the default case); ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 411c18c7bde40c60cc6dfb7017968577b4d4a827
+
+commit fdb1d58d0d3888b042e5a500f6ce524486aaf782
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 6 22:05:42 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: add a helper function to match a key type to a list of
+    
+    signature algorithms. RSA keys can make signatures with multiple algorithms,
+    so some special handling is required. ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 03b41b2bda06fa4cd9c84cef6095033b9e49b6ff
+
+commit 11e8c4309a5086a45fbbbc87d0af5323c6152914
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 6 22:04:20 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: log some details on hostkeys that ssh loads for
+    
+    hostbased authn ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: da17061fa1f0e58cb31b88478a40643e18233e38
+
+commit c6706f661739514a34125aa3136532a958929510
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 6 22:03:59 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: log signature algorithm during verification by monitor;
+    
+    ok markus
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 02b92bb42c4d4bf05a051702a56eb915151d9ecc
+
+commit 8832402bd500d1661ccc80a476fd563335ef6cdc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 6 22:02:52 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: piece of UpdateHostkeys client strictification: when
+    
+    updating known_hosts with new keys, ignore NULL keys (forgot to include in
+    prior commit)
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 49d2eda6379490e1ceec40c3b670b973f63dea08
+
+commit c2d9ced1da0276961d86690b3bd7ebdaca7fdbf7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 6 22:01:14 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: include rejected signature algorithm in error message
+    
+    and not the (useless) key type; ok markus
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4180b5ec7ab347b43f84e00b1972515296dab023
+
+commit 7aa7b096cf2bafe2777085abdeed5ce00581f641
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 6 22:00:18 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: make ssh-keysign use the requested signature algorithm
+    
+    and not the default for the keytype. Part of unbreaking hostbased auth for
+    RSA/SHA2 keys. ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5639a14462948970da3a8020dc06f9a80ecccdc
+
+commit 291721bc7c840d113a49518f3fca70e86248b8e8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 6 21:57:28 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: stricter UpdateHostkey signature verification logic on
+    
+    the client- side. Require RSA/SHA2 signatures for RSA hostkeys except when
+    RSA/SHA1 was explicitly negotiated during initial KEX; bz3375
+    
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46e75e8dfa2c813781805b842580dcfbd888cf29
+
+commit 0fa33683223c76289470a954404047bc762be84c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 6 21:55:23 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Fix signature algorithm selection logic for
+    
+    UpdateHostkeys on the server side. The previous code tried to prefer RSA/SHA2
+    for hostkey proofs of RSA keys, but missed some cases. This will use RSA/SHA2
+    signatures for RSA keys if the client proposed these algorithms in initial
+    KEX. bz3375
+    
+    Mostly by Dmitry Belyavskiy with some tweaks by me.
+    
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c17ba0c3236340d2c6a248158ebed042ac6a8029
+
+commit 17877bc81db3846e6e7d4cfb124d966bb9c9296b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 6 21:48:38 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: convert ssh, sshd mainloops from select() to poll();
+    
+    feedback & ok deraadt@ and markus@ has been in snaps for a few months
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a77e16a667d5b194dcdb3b76308b8bba7fa7239c
+
+commit 5c79952dfe1aa36105c93b3f383ce9be04dee384
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jan 6 21:46:23 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: prepare for conversion of ssh, sshd mainloop from
+    
+    select() to poll() by moving FD_SET construction out of channel handlers into
+    separate functions. ok markus
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 937fbf2a4de12b19fb9d5168424e206124807027
+
+commit 24c5187edfef4651a625b7d5d692c8c7e794f71f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 5 21:54:37 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: add a comment so I don't make this mistake again
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 69c7f2362f9de913bb29b6318580c5a1b52c921e
+
+commit 7369900441929058263a17f56aa67e05ff7ec628
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 5 21:50:00 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix cut-and-pasto in error message
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4cc5c619e4b456cd2e9bb760d17e3a9c84659198
+
+commit 294c11b1c7d56d3fb61e329603a782315ed70c62
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 5 08:25:05 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: select all RSA hostkey algorithms for UpdateHostkeys tests,
+    
+    not just RSA-SHA1
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b40e62b65863f2702a0c10aca583b2fe76772bd8
+
+commit 2ea1108c30e3edb6f872dfc1e6da10b041ddf2c0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 5 04:56:15 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: regress test both sshsig message hash algorithms, possible
+    
+    now because the algorithm is controllable via the CLI
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0196fa87acc3544b2b4fd98de844a571cb09a39f
+
+commit 2327c306b5d4a2b7e71178e5a4d139af9902c2b0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 5 04:50:11 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: allow selection of hash at sshsig signing time; code
+    
+    already supported either sha512 (default) or sha256, but plumbing wasn't
+    there mostly by Linus Nordberg
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1b536404b9da74a84b3a1c8d0b05fd564cdc96cd
+
+commit 56e941d0a00d6d8bae88317717d5e1b7395c9529
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 5 04:27:54 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: add missing -O option to usage() for ssh-keygen -Y sign;
+    
+    from Linus Nordberg
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e78feb4aa830727ab76bb2e3d940440ae1d7af0
+
+commit 141a14ec9b0924709c98df2dd8013bde5d8d12c7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 5 04:27:01 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: move sig_process_opts() to before sig_sign(); no
+    
+    functional code change
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: da02d61f5464f72b4e8b299f83e93c3b657932f9
+
+commit 37a14249ec993599a9051731e4fb0ac5e976aec1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 5 04:10:39 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: regression test for find-principals NULL deref; from Fabian
+    
+    Stelzer
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f845a8632a5a7d5ae26978004c93e796270fd3e5
+
+commit eb1f042142fdaba93f6c9560cf6c91ae25f6884a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jan 5 04:02:42 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: NULL deref when using find-principals when matching an
+    
+    allowed_signers line that contains a namespace restriction, but no
+    restriction specified on the command-line; report and fix from Fabian Stelzer
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a201b86afb668c908d1a559c6af456a61f4b145
+
+commit 8f3b18030579f395eca2181da31a5f945af12a59
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 4 08:38:53 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: Log command invocation while debugging.
+    
+    This will aid in manually reproducing failing commands.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b4aba8d5ac5675ceebeeeefa3261ce344e67333a
+
+commit bbf285164df535f0d38c36237f007551bbdae27f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Dec 26 10:31:15 2021 +1100
+
+    Always save config.h as build artifact.
+    
+    Should allow better comparison between failing and succeeding test
+    platforms.
+
+commit 03bd4ed0db699687c5cd83405d26f81d2dc28d22
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Dec 25 16:42:51 2021 +1100
+
+    Add OpenBSD 7.0 target.  Retire 6.8.
+
+commit c45a752f0de611afd87755c2887c8a24816d08ee
+Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 1 05:55:06 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: spelling
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c63e43087a64d0727af13409c708938e05147b62
+
+commit c672f83a89a756564db0d3af9934ba0e1cf8fa3e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jan 4 07:20:33 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: unbreak test: was picking up system ssh-add instead of the
+    
+    one supposedly being tested. Spotted by dtucker and using his VM zoo (which
+    includes some systems old enough to lack ed25519 key support)
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7976eb3df11cc2ca3af91030a6a8c0cef1590bb5
+
+commit a23698c3082ffe661abed14b020eac9b0c25eb9f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 1 04:18:06 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix memleak in process_extension(); oss-fuzz issue #42719
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d8d49f840162fb7b8949e3a5adb8107444b6de1e
+
+commit cb885178f36b83d0f14cfe9f345d2068103feed0
+Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jan 1 01:55:30 2022 +0000
+
+    upstream: spelling ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfc7ba74c22c928de2e257328b3f1274a3dfdf19
+
+commit 6b977f8080a32c5b3cbb9edb634b9d5789fb79be
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 26 23:34:41 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: split method list search functionality from
+    
+    authmethod_lookup() into a separate authmethod_byname(), for cases where we
+    don't need to check whether a method is enabled, etc.
+    
+    use this to fix the "none" authentication method regression reported
+    by Nam Nguyen via bugs@
+    
+    ok deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8cd188dc3a83aa8abe5b7693e762975cd8ea8a17
+
+commit 0074aa2c8d605ee7587279a22cdad4270b4ddd07
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Dec 22 06:56:41 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: sort -H and -h in SYNOPSIS/usage(); tweak the -H text;
+    
+    ok djm
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 90721643e41e9e09deb5b776aaa0443456ab0965
+
+commit 1c9853a68b2319f2e5f929179735e8fbb9988a67
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Dec 22 19:33:10 2021 +1100
+
+    Use SHA.*_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE if needed.
+    
+    If the platform has a native SHA2, does not define SHA.*_BLOCK_LENGTH
+    but does define SHA.*_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE (eg Solaris) then use the latter.
+    Should fix --without-openssl build on Solaris.
+
+commit 715c892f0a5295b391ae92c26ef4d6a86ea96e8e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Dec 22 09:02:50 2021 +1100
+
+    remove sys/param.h in -portable, after upstream
+
+commit 7a7c69d8b4022b1e5c0afb169c416af8ce70f3e8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Dec 20 13:05:20 2021 +1100
+
+    add agent-restrict.sh file, missed in last commit
+
+commit f539136ca51a4976644db5d0be8158cc1914c72a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 19 22:20:12 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: regression test for destination restrictions in ssh-agent
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3c799d91e736b1753b4a42d80c42fc40de5ad33d
+
+commit 6e4980eb8ef94c04874a79dd380c3f568e8416d6
+Author: anton@openbsd.org <anton@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Dec 18 06:53:59 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Make use of ntests variable, pointed out by clang 13.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4241a3d21bdfa1630ed429b6d4fee51038d1be72
+
+commit 3eead8158393b697f663ec4301e3c7b6f24580b1
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Dec 14 21:25:27 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: sys/param.h cleanup, mostly using MINIMUM() and
+    
+    <limits.h> ok dtucker
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 172a4c45d3bcf92fa6cdf6c4b9db3f1b3abe4db0
+
+commit 266678e19eb0e86fdf865b431b6e172e7a95bf48
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 19 22:15:42 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: document host-bound publickey authentication
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea6ed91779a81f06d961e30ecc49316b3d71961b
+
+commit 3d00024b3b156aa9bbd05d105f1deb9cb088f6f7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 19 22:15:21 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: document agent protocol extensions
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 09e8bb391bbaf24c409b75a4af44e0cac65405a7
+
+commit c385abf76511451bcba78568167b1cd9e90587d5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 19 22:14:47 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: PubkeyAuthentication=yes|no|unbound|host-bound
+    
+    Allow control over which pubkey methods are used. Added out of
+    concern that some hardware devices may have difficulty signing
+    the longer pubkey authentication challenges. This provides a
+    way for them to disable the extension. It's also handy for
+    testing.
+    
+    feedback / ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ee52580db95c355cf6d563ba89974c210e603b1a
+
+commit 34b1e9cc7654f41cd4c5b1cc290b999dcf6579bb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 19 22:14:12 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: document destination-constrained keys
+    
+    feedback / ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd8c526c77268f6d91c06adbee66b014d22d672e
+
+commit a6d7677c4abcfba268053e5867f2acabe3aa371b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 19 22:13:55 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Use hostkey parsed from hostbound userauth request
+    
+    Require host-bound userauth requests for forwarded SSH connections.
+    
+    The hostkey parsed from the host-bound userauth request is now checked
+    against the most recently bound session ID / hostkey on the agent socket
+    and the signature refused if they do not match.
+    
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d69877c9a3bd8d1189a5dbdeceefa432044dae02
+
+commit baaff0ff4357cc5a079621ba6e2d7e247b765061
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 19 22:13:33 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: agent support for parsing hostkey-bound signatures
+    
+    Allow parse_userauth_request() to work with blobs from
+    publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com userauth attempts.
+    
+    Extract hostkey from these blobs.
+    
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 81c064255634c1109477dc65c3e983581d336df8
+
+commit 3e16365a79cdeb2d758cf1da6051b1c5266ceed7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 19 22:13:12 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: EXT_INFO negotiation of hostbound pubkey auth
+    
+    the EXT_INFO packet gets a new publickey-hostbound@openssh.com to
+    advertise the hostbound public key method.
+    
+    Client side support to parse this feature flag and set the kex->flags
+    indicator if the expected version is offered (currently "0").
+    
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4cdb2ca5017ec1ed7a9d33bda95c1d6a97b583b0
+
+commit 94ae0c6f0e35903b695e033bf4beacea1d376bb1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 19 22:12:54 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: client side of host-bound pubkey authentication
+    
+    Add kex->flags member to enable the publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com
+    authentication method.
+    
+    Use the new hostbound method in client if the kex->flags flag was set,
+    and include the inital KEX hostkey in the userauth request.
+    
+    Note: nothing in kex.c actually sets the new flag yet
+    
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a6fce8c6c8a77a80ee1526dc467d91036a5910d
+
+commit 288fd0218dbfdcb05d9fbd1885904bed9b6d42e6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 19 22:12:30 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: sshd side of hostbound public key auth
+    
+    This is identical to the standard "publickey" method, but it also includes
+    the initial server hostkey in the message signed by the client.
+    
+    feedback / ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ea01bb7238a560c1bfb426fda0c10a8aac07862
+
+commit dbb339f015c33d63484261d140c84ad875a9e548
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 19 22:12:07 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: prepare for multiple names for authmethods
+    
+    allow authentication methods to have one additional name beyond their
+    primary name.
+    
+    allow lookup by this synonym
+    
+    Use primary name for authentication decisions, e.g. for
+    PermitRootLogin=publickey
+    
+    Pass actual invoked name to the authmethods, so they can tell whether they
+    were requested via the their primary name or synonym.
+    
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9e613fcb44b8168823195602ed3d09ffd7994559
+
+commit 39f00dcf44915f20684160f0a88d3ef8a3278351
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 19 22:11:39 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh-agent side of destination constraints
+    
+    Gives ssh-agent the ability to parse restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com
+    constraints and to apply them to keys.
+    
+    Check constraints against the hostkeys recorded for a SocketEntry when
+    attempting a signature, adding, listing or deleting keys. Note that
+    the "delete all keys" request will remove constrained keys regardless of
+    location.
+    
+    feedback Jann Horn & markus@
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 84a7fb81106c2d609a6ac17469436df16d196319
+
+commit ce943912df812c573a33d00bf9e5435b7fcca3f7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 19 22:11:06 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh-add side of destination constraints
+    
+    Have ssh-add accept a list of "destination constraints" that allow
+    restricting where keys may be used in conjunction with a ssh-agent/ssh
+    that supports session ID/hostkey binding.
+    
+    Constraints are specified as either "[user@]host-pattern" or
+    "host-pattern>[user@]host-pattern".
+    
+    The first form permits a key to be used to authenticate as the
+    specified user to the specified host.
+    
+    The second form permits a key that has previously been permitted
+    for use at a host to be available via a forwarded agent to an
+    additional host.
+    
+    For example, constraining a key with "user1@host_a" and
+    "host_a>host_b". Would permit authentication as "user1" at
+    "host_a", and allow the key to be available on an agent forwarded
+    to "host_a" only for authentication to "host_b". The key would not
+    be visible on agent forwarded to other hosts or usable for
+    authentication there.
+    
+    Internally, destination constraints use host keys to identify hosts.
+    The host patterns are used to obtain lists of host keys for that
+    destination that are communicated to the agent. The user/hostkeys are
+    encoded using a new restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com key
+    constraint.
+    
+    host keys are looked up in the default client user/system known_hosts
+    files. It is possible to override this set on the command-line.
+    
+    feedback Jann Horn & markus@
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6b52cd2b637f3d29ef543f0ce532a2bce6d86af5
+
+commit 5e950d765727ee0b20fc3d2cbb0c790b21ac2425
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 19 22:10:24 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh-add side of destination constraints
+    
+    Have ssh-add accept a list of "destination constraints" that allow
+    restricting where keys may be used in conjunction with a ssh-agent/ssh
+    that supports session ID/hostkey binding.
+    
+    Constraints are specified as either "[user@]host-pattern" or
+    "host-pattern>[user@]host-pattern".
+    
+    The first form permits a key to be used to authenticate as the
+    specified user to the specified host.
+    
+    The second form permits a key that has previously been permitted
+    for use at a host to be available via a forwarded agent to an
+    additional host.
+    
+    For example, constraining a key with "user1@host_a" and
+    "host_a>host_b". Would permit authentication as "user1" at
+    "host_a", and allow the key to be available on an agent forwarded
+    to "host_a" only for authentication to "host_b". The key would not
+    be visible on agent forwarded to other hosts or usable for
+    authentication there.
+    
+    Internally, destination constraints use host keys to identify hosts.
+    The host patterns are used to obtain lists of host keys for that
+    destination that are communicated to the agent. The user/hostkeys are
+    encoded using a new restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com key
+    constraint.
+    
+    host keys are looked up in the default client user/system known_hosts
+    files. It is possible to override this set on the command-line.
+    
+    feedback Jann Horn & markus@
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef47fa9ec0e3c2a82e30d37ef616e245df73163e
+
+commit 4c1e3ce85e183a9d0c955c88589fed18e4d6a058
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 19 22:09:23 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh-agent side of binding
+    
+    record session ID/hostkey/forwarding status for each active socket.
+    
+    Attempt to parse data-to-be-signed at signature request time and extract
+    session ID from the blob if it is a pubkey userauth request.
+    
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a80fd41e292b18b67508362129e9fed549abd318
+
+commit e9497ecf73f3c16667288bce48d4e3d7e746fea1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 19 22:08:48 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh client side of binding
+    
+    send session ID, hostkey, signature and a flag indicating whether the
+    agent connection is being forwarded to ssh agent each time a connection
+    is opened via a new "session-bind@openssh.com" agent extension.
+    
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2f154844fe13167d3ab063f830d7455fcaa99135
+
+commit b42c61d6840d16ef392ed0f365e8c000734669aa
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 19 22:08:06 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Record session ID, host key and sig at intital KEX
+    
+    These will be used later for agent session ID / hostkey binding
+    
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a9af29e33772b18e3e867c6fa8ab35e1694a81fe
+
+commit 26ca33d186473d58a32d812e19273ce078b6ffff
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Dec 7 22:06:45 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: better error message for FIDO keys when we can't match
+    
+    them to a token
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 58255c2a1980088f4ed144db67d879ada2607650
+
+commit adb0ea006d7668190f0c42aafe3a2864d352e34a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Dec 15 10:50:33 2021 +1100
+
+    Correct value for IPTOS_DSCP_LE.
+    
+    It needs to allow for the preceeding two ECN bits.  From daisuke.higashi
+    at gmail.com via OpenSSH bz#3373, ok claudio@, job@, djm@.
+
+commit 3dafd3fe220bd9046f11fcf5191a79ec8800819f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Dec 10 11:57:30 2021 +1100
+
+    Increase timeout for test step.
+
+commit 5aefb05cd5b843e975b191d6ebb7ddf8de35c112
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Dec 10 10:27:27 2021 +1100
+
+    Update the list of tests that don't work on Minix.
+    
+    While there, remove CC (configure will now find clang) and make the test
+    list easier to update via cut and paste.
+
+commit 1c09bb1b2e207d091cec299c49416c23d24a1b31
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Dec 10 10:12:57 2021 +1100
+
+    Add minix host tuple.
+    
+    Define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID for it which should make privsep work.
+
+commit a2188579032cf080213a78255373263466cb90cc
+Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Dec 5 12:28:27 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix unintended sizeof pointer in debug path ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b9c0481ffc0cd801e0840e342e6a282a85aac93c
+
+commit da40355234068c82f1a36196f2d18dd2d81aaafd
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Dec 4 00:05:39 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: RSA/SHA-1 is not used by default anymore on the server
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64abef6cfc3e53088225f6b8a1dcd86d52dc8353
+
+commit e9c71498a083a8b502aa831ea931ce294228eda0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 2 23:45:36 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: hash full host:port when asked to hash output, fixes hashes
+    
+    for non- default ports. bz3367 ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 096021cc847da7318ac408742f2d0813ebe9aa73
+
+commit b5601202145a03106012c22cb8980bcac2949f0b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 2 23:23:13 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: improve the testing of credentials against inserted FIDO
+    
+    keys a little more: ask the token whether a particular key belongs to it in
+    cases where the token support on-token user- verification (e.g. biometrics)
+    rather than just assuming that it will accept it.
+    
+    Will reduce spurious "Confirm user presence" notifications for key
+    handles that relate to FIDO keys that are not currently inserted in at
+    least some cases.
+    
+    Motivated by bz3366; by Pedro Martelletto
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffac7f3215842397800e1ae2e20229671a55a63d
+
+commit ca709e27c41c90f4565b17282c48dca7756e083c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 2 22:40:05 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: move check_sk_options() up so we can use it earlier
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67fe98ba1c846d22035279782c4664c1865763b4
+
+commit b711bc01a7ec76bb6a285730990cbce9b8ca5773
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 2 22:35:05 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh-rsa is no longer in the default for
+    
+    PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34a9e1bc30966fdcc922934ae00f09f2596cd73c
+
+commit dc91ceea33cd4a9f05be953e8d8062f732db5c8a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Dec 2 02:44:44 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: don't put the tty into raw mode when SessionType=none, avoids
+    
+    ^c being unable to kill such a session. bz3360; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83960c433052303b643b4c380ae2f799ac896f65
+
+commit e6e7d2654a13ba10141da7b42ea683ea4eeb1f38
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 29 14:11:03 2021 +1100
+
+    previous commit broke bcrypt_pbkdf()
+    
+    Accidentally reverted part of the conversion to use SHA512 from SUPERCOP
+    instead of OpenBSD-style libc SHA512.
+
+commit c0459588b8d00b73e506c6095958ecfe62a4a7ba
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Nov 29 14:03:19 2021 +1100
+
+    Fix typo in Neils' name.
+
+commit 158bf854e2a22cf09064305f4a4e442670562685
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 29 12:30:22 2021 +1100
+
+    sync bcrypt-related files with OpenBSD
+    
+    The main change is that Niels Provos kindly agreed to rescind the
+    BSD license advertising clause, shifting them to the 3-term BSD
+    license.
+    
+    This was the last thing in OpenSSH that used the advertising clause.
+
+commit e8976d92a42883ff6b8991438f07df60c2c0d82d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 29 12:29:29 2021 +1100
+
+    depend
+
+commit 8249afeec013e557fe7491a72ca3285de03e25b1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Nov 28 07:21:26 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: sshsig: return "key not found" when searching empty files
+    
+    rather than "internal error"
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e2ccae554c78d7a7cd33fc5d217f35be7e2507ed
+
+commit 9e3227d4dbb5ad9c9091b4c14982cab4bba87b4d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Nov 28 07:15:10 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh-keygen -Y match-principals doesn't accept any -O
+    
+    options at present, so don't say otherwise in SYNOPSIS; spotted jmc@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9cc43a18f4091010741930b48b3db2f2e4f1d35c
+
+commit 56db1f4a4cf5039fc3b42e84c4b16291fdff32b1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Nov 28 07:14:29 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix indenting in last commit
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b9ba989815d0dec1fdf5427a4a4b58eb9cac4d2
+
+commit 50bea24a9a9bdebad327c76e700def3261f5694e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Nov 28 07:10:18 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: missing initialisation for oerrno
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 05d646bba238080259bec821c831a6f0b48d2a95
+
+commit 5a0f4619041d09cd29f3a08da41db5040372bdd1
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Nov 28 15:31:37 2021 +1100
+
+    Correct ifdef to activate poll() only if needed.
+
+commit d4035c81a71237f690edd7eda32bef7d63fd9528
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Nov 27 07:23:35 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: whitespac e
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b9511d41568056bda489e13524390167889908f8
+
+commit a443491e6782ef0f5a8bb87a5536c8ee4ff233a1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Nov 27 07:20:58 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: regression test for match-principals. Mostly by Fabian
+    
+    Stelzer
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ced0bec89af90935103438986bbbc4ad1df9cfa7
+
+commit 78230b3ec8cbabc1e7de68732dc5cbd4837c6675
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Nov 27 07:14:46 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add ssh-keygen -Y match-principals operation to perform
+    
+    matching of principals names against an allowed signers file.
+    
+    Requested by and mostly written by Fabian Stelzer, towards a TOFU
+    model for SSH signatures in git. Some tweaks by me.
+    
+    "doesn't bother me" deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d1b71f5a4127bc5e10a880c8ea6053394465247
+
+commit 15db86611baaafb24c40632784dabf82e3ddb1a7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 25 23:02:24 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: debug("func: ...") -> debug_f("...")
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d58494dc05c985326a895adfbe16fbd5bcc54347
+
+commit b7ffbb17e37f59249c31f1ff59d6c5d80888f689
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Nov 19 18:53:46 2021 +1100
+
+    Allow for fd = -1 in compat ppoll overflow check.
+    
+    Fixes tests on at least FreeBSD 6, possibly others.
+
+commit 04b172da5b96a51b0d55c905b423ababff9f4e0b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Nov 19 16:01:51 2021 +1100
+
+    Don't auto-enable Capsicum sandbox on FreeBSD 9/10.
+    
+    Since we changed from select() to ppoll() tests have been failing.
+    This seems to be because FreeBSD 10 (and presumably 9) do not allow
+    ppoll() in the privsep process and sshd will fail with "Not permitted in
+    capability mode".  Setting CAP_EVENT on the FDs doesn't help, but weirdly,
+    poll() works without that.  Those versions are EOL so this situation is
+    unlikely to change.
+
+commit a823f39986e7b879f26412e64c15630e1cfa0dc5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 18 03:53:48 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: regression test for ssh-keygen -Y find-principals fix; from
+    
+    Fabian Stelzer ok djm markus
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 34fe4088854c1a2eb4c0c51cc4676ba24096bac4
+
+commit 199c4df66c0e39dd5c3333b162af274678c0501d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 18 21:32:11 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: less confusing debug message; bz#3365
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 836268d3642c2cdc84d39b98d65837f5241e4a50
+
+commit 97f9b6e61316c97a32dad94b7a37daa9b5f6b836
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 18 21:11:01 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: avoid xmalloc(0) for PKCS#11 keyid for ECDSA keys (we
+    
+    already did this for RSA keys). Avoids fatal errors for PKCS#11 libraries
+    that return empty keyid, e.g. Microchip ATECC608B "cryptoauthlib"; bz#3364
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 054d4dc1d6a99a2e6f8eebc48207b534057c154d
+
+commit c74aa0eb73bd1edf79947d92d9c618fc3424c4a6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 18 03:50:41 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh-keygen -Y find-principals was verifying key validity
+    
+    when using ca certs but not with simple key lifetimes within the allowed
+    signers file.
+    
+    Since it returns the first keys principal it finds this could
+    result in a principal with an expired key even though a valid
+    one is just below.
+    
+    patch from Fabian Stelzer; feedback/ok djm markus
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b108ed0a76b813226baf683ab468dc1cc79e0905
+
+commit d902d728dfd81622454260e23bc09d5e5a9a795e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Nov 18 23:44:07 2021 +1100
+
+    Correct calculation of tv_nsec in poll().
+
+commit 21dd5a9a3fb35e8299a1fbcf8d506f1f6b752b85
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Nov 18 23:11:37 2021 +1100
+
+    Add compat implementation of ppoll using pselect.
+
+commit b544ce1ad4afb7ee2b09f714aa63efffc73fa93a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Nov 18 23:05:34 2021 +1100
+
+    Put poll.h inside ifdef HAVE_POLL_H.
+
+commit 875408270c5a7dd69ed5449e5d85bd7120c88f70
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 18 03:31:44 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: check for POLLHUP wherever we check for POLLIN
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6aa6f3ec6b17c3bd9bfec672a917f003a76d93e5
+
+commit 36b5e37030d35bbaa18ba56825b1af55971d18a0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 18 03:07:59 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fd leak in sshd listen loop error path; from Gleb
+    
+    Smirnoff
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7a2be27a690a74bf2381bc16cea38e265657412
+
+commit b99498d0c93f1edd04857b318308a66b28316bd8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 18 03:07:20 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: check for POLLHUP as well as POLLIN in sshd listen loop;
+    
+    ok deraadt millert
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4f1244c5a9c2b08dac4f3b1dc22e9d1dc60c587
+
+commit 1f3055d788e8cf80851eb1728b535d57eb0dba6a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 18 03:06:03 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: check for POLLHUP as well as POLLIN, handle transient IO
+    
+    errors as well as half-close on the output side; ok deraadt millert
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: de5c5b9939a37476d256328cbb96305bdecf511e
+
+commit 9778a15fa6dbdac6a95bf15865c2688b4bd6944e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 18 10:16:55 2021 +1100
+
+    adjust seccomp filter for select->poll conversion
+    
+    Needed to add ppoll syscall but also to relax the fallback rlimit
+    sandbox. Linux poll() fails with EINVAL if npfds > RLIMIT_NOFILE,
+    so we have to allow a single fd in the rlimit.
+
+commit fcd8d895bbb849c64f0aed934e3303d37f696f5d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 18 10:16:44 2021 +1100
+
+    update depends
+
+commit 76292787a1e93e668f10e36b4bf59ce0ae28e156
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 18 09:26:20 2021 +1100
+
+    compat for timespecsub() and friends
+
+commit fd7e7de4ddb4399c7e929b44f2bbfc118eddfcf8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Nov 17 21:06:39 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: set num_listen_socks to 0 on close-all instead of -1,
+    
+    which interferes with the new poll()-based listen loop; spotted and debugged
+    by anton@+deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f7ab8ab124f615a2e0c45fee14c38d2f2abbabbd
+
+commit fd9343579afac30a971f06643a669733d9acb407
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Nov 14 18:47:43 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: use ppoll() instead of pselect() with djm
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 980f87c9564d5d2ad55722b7a6f44f21284cd215
+
+commit 092d29b232ef1a19609a5316ed7e4d896bb2e696
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Nov 14 06:15:36 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: match .events with .fd better
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77eef212ca0add905949532af390164489c5984b
+
+commit 8d642c9a90fa4ed5a3effd785fb3591e14de00cd
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Nov 14 03:25:10 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: convert select() to poll() ok djm
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b53e4940ff10dd24f8d16e8db8ef1970015d7ead
+
+commit 6582a31c388968f4073af2bd8621880735c3d42b
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Nov 13 21:14:13 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: replace select() with ppoll(), including converting
+    
+    timeval's to timespec's to make things easier. back and forth and ok; djm
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 89d3b23c60875da919e7820f9de6213286ffbec9
+
+commit 7c025c005550c86a40200a2bcdd355d09413d61a
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Nov 13 17:26:13 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: It really looks like pledge "stdio dns" is possible
+    
+    earlier. Discussed with mestre
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 610873de63a593e0ac7bbbcb7a0f2894d36f4c01
+
+commit 06acb04c20ee483fe4757bd12aec870cc4bb1076
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Nov 12 05:23:49 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: aggressively pre-fill the pollfd array with fd=-1
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c2a525de8f83c1a04405bd79122c424140552a5b
+
+commit 7eec76793dec06e8f06b6cf71f9473141c69d109
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Nov 11 15:32:32 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Convert from select() to ppoll(). Along the way, I
+    
+    observed that the select() code was using exceptfds incorrectly.. ok millert
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 548e05bfc31b2af02319eb3d051286d4128dec96
+
+commit e665ed2d0c24fe11d5470ce72fa1e187377d3fc4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Nov 12 22:55:27 2021 +1100
+
+    Switch from LibreSSL 3.4.0 to 3.4.1.
+    
+    The LibreSSL 3.4.0 release has an OPENBSD_BRANCH that points to
+    "master" and that branch no longer has the files LibreSSL expects
+    and thus it will no longer build, breaking the test.
+
+commit 21b6b5a06c8c53c548d25e6074c5240e88e2ef34
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Nov 10 06:29:25 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: add the sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com hybrid
+    
+    ECDH/x25519 + Streamlined NTRU Prime post-quantum KEX to the default
+    KEXAlgorithms list (after the ECDH methods but before the prime-group DH
+    ones).
+    
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 22b77e27a04e497a10e22f138107579652854210
+
+commit 239da797cbf07a640d7b1ea02d3f99ace3ef792d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Nov 10 06:25:08 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix ssh-keysign for KEX algorithms that use SHA384/512
+    
+    exchange hashes; feedback/ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 09a8fda1c081f5de1e3128df64f28b7bdadee239
+
+commit 6997a592ecb1013df0c6d7f8df3e6517827aef11
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Nov 8 21:32:49 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: improve error message when trying to expand a ~user path
+    
+    for a user that doesn't exist; better matches what the shell does
+    
+    ok deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ddefa3c3a78b69ce13d1b8f67bc9f2cefd23ad6
+
+commit 10b899a15c88eb40eb5f73cd0fa84ef0966f79c9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Nov 10 12:34:25 2021 +1100
+
+    Don't trust closefrom() on Linux.
+    
+    glibc's closefrom implementation does not work in a chroot when the kernel
+    does not have close_range.  It tries to read from /proc/self/fd and when
+    that fails dies with an assertion of sorts.  Instead, call close_range
+    ourselves from our compat code and fall back if that fails.  bz#3349,
+    with william.wilson at canonical.com and fweimer at redhat.com.
+
+commit eb1f63195a9a38b519536a5b398d9939261ec081
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Nov 6 10:13:39 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Plug a couple of minor mem leaks. From beldmit at
+    
+    gmail.com via github PR#283, ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ec1fa7d305d46226861c3ca6fb9c9beb2ada2892
+
+commit e4f501bf1d3b53f1cc23d9521fd7c5163307b760
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Nov 5 03:10:58 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: move cert_filter_principals() to earlier in the file for
+    
+    reuse; no code change
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 598fa9528b656b2f38bcc3cf5b6f3869a8c115cf
+
+commit 59c60f96fee321c7f38f00372826d37f289534af
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Nov 3 22:00:56 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Many downstreams expect ssh to compile as non-C99...
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6aa3e08bda68e5fb838fc8a49b1d2dfc38ee783
+
+commit 7a78fe63b0b28ef7231913dfefe9d08f9bc41c61
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Nov 6 21:07:03 2021 +1100
+
+    Skip getline() on HP-UX 10.x.
+    
+    HP-UX 10.x has a getline() implementation in libc that does not behave
+    as we expect so don't use it.  With correction from Thorsten Glaser and
+    typo fix from Larkin Nickle.
+
+commit 343ae252ebb35c6ecae26b447bf1551a7666720e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Nov 3 12:08:21 2021 +1100
+
+    basic SECURITY.md (refers people to the website)
+
+commit ed45a0168638319e0a710633f6085b96b9cec656
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Nov 2 22:57:27 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: crank SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR to match recent change in
+    
+    usr/bin/ssh
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 113d181c7e3305e138db9b688cdb8b0a0019e552
+
+commit f3c34df860c4c1ebddacb973954e58167d9dbade
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Nov 2 22:56:40 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Better handle FIDO keys on tokens that provide user
+    
+    verification (UV) on the device itself, including biometric keys.
+    
+    Query the token during key creation to determine whether it supports
+    on-token UV and, if so, clear the SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD flag
+    in the key so that ssh(1) doesn't automatically prompty for PIN later.
+    
+    When making signatures with the key, query the token's capabilities
+    again and check whether the token is able (right now) to perform user-
+    verification without a PIN. If it is then the PIN prompt is bypassed
+    and user verification delegated to the token. If not (e.g. the token
+    is biometric capable, but no biometric are enrolled), then fall back
+    to user verification via the usual PIN prompt.
+    
+    Work by Pedro Martelletto; ok myself and markus@
+    
+    NB. cranks SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e318a8c258d9833a0b7eb0236cdb68b5143b2f27
+
+commit 0328a081f38c09d2d4d650e94461a47fb5eef536
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 29 03:03:06 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: sshsig: add tests for signing key validity and
+    
+    find-principals
+    
+    - adds generic find-principals tests (this command had none before)
+    - tests certs with a timeboxed validity both with and without a
+     restriced lifetime for the CA
+    - test for a revoked CA cert
+    
+    by Fabian Stelzer
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9704b2c6df5b8ccfbdf2c06c5431f5f8cad280c9
+
+commit ccd358e1e25e25c13f0825996283cbf7a1647a3b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 29 02:48:19 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: avoid signedness warning; spotted in -portable
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4cacc126086487c0ea7f3d86b42dec458cf0d0c6
+
+commit 2741f52beb11490d7033a25e56ed0496f0c78006
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 29 03:20:46 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh-keygen: make verify-time argument parsing optional
+    
+    From Fabian Stelzer
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ff35e4c366a45a073663df90381be6a8ef4d370
+
+commit a1217d363b88b32cfe54c4f02c6c1cf4bdefdd23
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 29 13:48:34 2021 +1100
+
+    unbreak fuzz harness for recent changes
+
+commit 68e522ed8183587c9367fa3842c5b75f64f3d12b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Oct 29 13:32:24 2021 +1100
+
+    Use -Wbitwise-instead-of-logical if supported.
+
+commit be28b23012aa3fa323be7ec84863cf238927c078
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 28 16:24:53 2021 +1100
+
+    use -Wmisleading-indentation cflag if available
+    
+    ok dtucker@
+
+commit 2e6f5f24dd2f9217f4ab8b737ed428d5d5278f91
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 28 16:24:44 2021 +1100
+
+    depend
+
+commit a5ab4882348d26addc9830a44e053238dfa2cb58
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu May 6 10:08:30 2021 +1000
+
+    remove built-in support for md5crypt()
+    
+    Users of MD5-hashed password should arrange for ./configure to link
+    against libxcrypt or similar. Though it would be better to avoid use
+    of MD5 password hashing entirely, it's arguably worse than DEScrypt.
+    
+    feedback and ok dtucker@
+
+commit c5de1fffa6328b8246b87da28fa9df05813f76a3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 28 02:55:30 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: increment SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR to match last change
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 17873814d1cbda97f49c8528d7b5ac9cadf6ddc0
+
+commit 0001d04e55802d5bd9d6dece1081a99aa4ba2828
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Oct 28 02:54:18 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: When downloading resident keys from a FIDO token, pass
+    
+    back the user ID that was used when the key was created and append it to the
+    filename the key is written to (if it is not the default).
+    
+    Avoids keys being clobbered if the user created multiple
+    resident keys with the same application string but different
+    user IDs.
+    
+    feedback Pedro Martelletto; ok markus
+    
+    NB. increments SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbd658b5950f583106d945641a634bc6562dd3a3
+
+commit d4bed5445646e605c383a4374fa962e23bf9e3a3
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Oct 24 21:24:17 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: For open/openat, if the flags parameter does not contain
+    
+    O_CREAT, the 3rd (variadic) mode_t parameter is irrelevant.  Many developers
+    in the past have passed mode_t (0, 044, 0644, or such), which might lead
+    future people to copy this broken idiom, and perhaps even believe this
+    parameter has some meaning or implication or application. Delete them all.
+    This comes out of a conversation where tb@ noticed that a strange (but
+    intentional) pledge behaviour is to always knock-out high-bits from mode_t on
+    a number of system calls as a safety factor, and his bewilderment that this
+    appeared to be happening against valid modes (at least visually), but no
+    sorry, they are all irrelevant junk.  They could all be 0xdeafbeef. ok
+    millert
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 503d11633497115688c0c6952686524f01f53121
+
+commit d575cf44895104e0fcb0629920fb645207218129
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Oct 22 23:27:41 2021 +1100
+
+    kitchensink test target now needs krb5.
+
+commit 4ae39cada214e955bcfd3448ff28f0ed18886706
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Oct 22 22:54:33 2021 +1100
+
+    Test both MIT KRB5 and Heimdal.
+
+commit 22b2681d88619e5247dc53c9f112058a7e248d48
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 22 10:51:57 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Plug mem addrinfo mem leaks.
+    
+    Prevent mem leaks in the (unlikely) event that getaddrinfo returns
+    no addresses.  ALso, remove an unneeded NULL check in addr_ntop. From
+    khaleesicodes via github PR#281, ok deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8a5afc686376637c355c5f7e122dc4b080b9c1a
+
+commit 27c8c343b610263f83ac2328735feeb881c6c92f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 22 09:22:04 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Remove unnecessary semicolons
+    
+    ... in case statements. From khaleesicodes via github PR#280.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1e89360b65775cff83e77ce040b342015caf4ed
+
+commit e7eb73b8d1fe1008d92433ea949491ce654bfaba
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 22 09:19:34 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Fix typos in comments.
+    
+    From khaleesicodes via github PR#280.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26fdd83652c40f098bf7c685e8ebb9eb72cc45fc
+
+commit 052a9d8494175e24312daa6c132665e58c17fe6e
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 15 14:46:46 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: switch scp(1) back to sftp protocol.
+    
+    openbsd 7.0 release shipped with the (hopefully last) scp that uses RCP
+    protocol for copying.  Let's get back to testing the SFTP protocol.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9eaa35d95fd547b78b0a043b3f518e135f151f30
+
+commit a07664646bf6d293f5bbd45a5de54f3c36bb85da
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Oct 22 14:00:05 2021 +1100
+
+    Source configs script so setup_ci can use settings
+
+commit 34df52c201c6b47e5a46b50c215e4d98a8bf6587
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Oct 22 09:42:14 2021 +1100
+
+    Install libedit and pam based on config flags.
+
+commit 8c626cc563e8d21d844d06f9971a9ee01de6aa2a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Oct 21 16:53:39 2021 +1100
+
+    Don't use 'here string", it's not POSIX.
+
+commit 086a4b5977472aefa3de918b88efad0faf83b2b1
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Oct 21 15:33:27 2021 +1100
+
+    Remove -Werror from compiler package to install.
+
+commit 5a7a4687507d057f9b5e7497f3d3f82e64753c02
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Oct 21 15:00:53 2021 +1100
+
+    Build with -Werror on most recent gcc and clang.
+
+commit 4d2cbdb525d673acf941d48a7044fcf03125611a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Oct 15 12:59:06 2021 +1100
+
+    Include string.h and stdio.h for strerror.
+
+commit fff13aaa262b7b3ec83ed21e29674cbf331780a7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Oct 15 12:43:36 2021 +1100
+
+    Include error reason if trace disabling fails.
+
+commit d4b38144c02f3faa5271e5fb35df93507e06f1b4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Oct 12 22:55:51 2021 +1100
+
+    Add tcmalloc test target.
+
+commit 002d65b0a30063c6e49bf8a53e709d8d5a0d45c1
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Oct 9 10:52:42 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Document that CASignatureAlgorithms, ExposeAuthInfo and
+    
+    PubkeyAuthOptions can be used in a Match block.  Patch from eehakkin via
+    github PR#277.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c0a63f5f52e918645967ac022b28392da4b866aa
+
+commit 40bd3709dddaae3a1b6113748bec3faa6a607531
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Oct 7 15:55:49 2021 +1100
+
+    Skip SK unit tests when built without security-key
+
+commit 482f73be10f10b93f818df19fcc8a912c0c371fc
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Oct 7 15:55:04 2021 +1100
+
+    Include relevant env vars on command line.
+    
+    Makes it easier to reproduce a build by cut/pasting the configure line.
+
+commit ef5916b8acd9b1d2f39fad4951dae03b00dbe390
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Oct 7 14:28:02 2021 +1100
+
+    Only enable sk-* key types if ENABLE_SK is defined
+
+commit 52d4232b493a9858fe616e28a8bbcc89afa2ad4d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Oct 6 18:14:37 2021 +1100
+
+    Disable security key on minix3.
+    
+    The test doesn't work so disable.
+
+commit 7cd062c3a29669b8d7dc2a97e6575f4dcb7d35a2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Oct 6 17:45:28 2021 +1100
+
+    Add USE_LIBC_SHA2 for (at least) NetBSD 9.
+
+commit 639c440f6c3c2a8216a5eb9455ef13bf4204089c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Oct 6 17:09:31 2021 +1100
+
+    Define OPENSSL_NO_SHA including OpenSSL from test.
+    
+    We don't use SHA256 from OpenSSL in the sk-dummy module and the
+    definitions can conflict with system sha2.h (eg on NetBSD) so define
+    OPENSSL_NO_SHA so we don't attempt to redefine them.
+
+commit 8f4be526a338d06624f146fa26007bb9dd3a4f7b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Oct 6 15:40:58 2021 +1100
+
+    Disable security key on NetBSD4 test.
+    
+    sk-dummy used for the security key test includes both sha2.h and OpenSSL
+    causing the definitions conflict so disable security key support on this
+    platform.
+
+commit 3b353ae58aa07a1cbbeb1da3ace21fc0dcccd66a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 6 15:07:01 2021 +1100
+
+    clean regress/misc/sk-dummy in cleandir target
+
+commit 57680a2ab43518c5ccbd8242c40482106cde6ac1
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Oct 2 03:17:01 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Dynamically allocate encoded HashKnownHosts and free as
+    
+    appropriate. Saves 1k of static storage and prevents snprintf "possible
+    truncation" warnings from newer compilers (although in this case it's false
+    positive since the actual sizes are limited by the output size of the SHA1).
+    ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e254ae723f7e3dce352c7d5abc4b6d87faf61bf4
+
+commit e3e62deb549fde215b777d95276c304f84bf00c6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 6 03:35:13 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: use libc SHA256 functions; make this work when compiled
+    
+    !WITH_OPENSSL
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fda0764c1097cd42f979ace29b07eb3481259890
+
+commit 12937d867019469ebce83c2ff614cdc6688fc2d8
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 1 05:20:20 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add test for ssh hashed known_hosts handling.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: bcef3b3cd5a1ad9899327b4b2183de2541aaf9cf
+
+commit 5a37cc118f464416d08cd0291a9b1611d8de9943
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Oct 6 13:16:21 2021 +1100
+
+    fix broken OPENSSL_HAS_ECC test
+    
+    spotted by dtucker
+
+commit 16a25414f303cd6790eb967aeb962040e32c9c7a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 1 22:40:06 2021 +1000
+
+    make sk-dummy.so work without libcrypto installed
+
+commit dee22129bbc61e25b1003adfa2bc584c5406ef2d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 1 16:35:49 2021 +1000
+
+    make OPENSSL_HAS_ECC checks more thorough
+    
+    ok dtucker
+
+commit 872595572b6c9a584ed754165e8b7c4c9e7e1d61
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 1 16:35:05 2021 +1000
+
+    fix FIDO key support for !OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case
+    
+    ok dtucker
+
+commit 489741dc68366940d369ac670b210b4834a6c272
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 1 14:51:37 2021 +1000
+
+    enable security key support for --without-openssl
+
+commit c978565c8589acfe4ea37ab5099d39c84158c713
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 1 13:27:50 2021 +1000
+
+    need stdlib.h for free(3)
+
+commit 76a398edfb51951b2d65d522d7b02c72304db300
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Sep 30 05:26:26 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Fix up whitespace left by previous
+    
+    change removing privsep.  No other changes.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 87adec225d8afaee4d6a91b2b71203f52bf14b15
+
+commit ddcb53b7a7b29be65d57562302b2d5f41733e8dd
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Sep 30 05:20:08 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Remove references to privsep.
+    
+    This removes several do..while loops but does not change the
+    indentation of the now-shallower loops, which will be done in a separate
+    whitespace-only commit to keep changes of style and substance separate.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4bed1a0249df7b4a87c965066ce689e79472a8f7
+
+commit ece2fbe486164860de8df3f8b943cccca3085eff
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Sep 30 04:22:50 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Use "skip" instead of "fatal"
+    
+    if SUDO isn't set for the *-command tests. This means running "make tests"
+    without SUDO set will perform all of the tests that it can instead of
+    failing on the ones it cannot run.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: bd4dbbb02f34b2e8c890558ad4a696248def763a
+
+commit bb754b470c360e787a99fb4e88e2668198e97b41
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Oct 1 04:50:36 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: unbreak FIDO sk-ed25519 key enrollment for OPENSSL=no builds;
+    
+    ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6323a5241728626cbb2bf0452cf6a5bcbd7ff709
+
+commit 207648d7a6415dc915260ca75850404dbf9f0a0b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Sep 29 20:03:58 2021 +1000
+
+    Include stdlib.h for arc4random_uniform prototype.
+
+commit 696aadc854582c164d5fc04933d2f3e212dc0e06
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Sep 29 20:00:30 2021 +1000
+
+    Look for clang after cc and gcc.
+
+commit a3c6375555026d85dbf811fab566b9f76f196144
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Sep 29 19:30:59 2021 +1000
+
+    Use backticks instead of $(..) for portability.
+    
+    Older shells (eg /bin/sh on Solaris 10) don't support $() syntax.
+
+commit 958aaa0387133d51f84fe9c8f30bca03025f2867
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Sep 29 18:53:32 2021 +1000
+
+    Skip file-based tests by default on Mac OS.
+    
+    The file-based tests need OpenSSL so skip them.
+
+commit 55c8bdf6e9afb0f9fa8e4f10c25c7f0081b48fd0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Sep 29 18:42:47 2021 +1000
+
+    Build without OpenSSL on Mac OS.
+    
+    Modern versions don't ship enough libcrypto to build against.
+
+commit c9172193ea975415facf0afb356d87df21535f88
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Sep 29 18:33:38 2021 +1000
+
+    Remove TEST_SSH_ECC.
+    
+    Convert the only remaining user of it to runtime detection using ssh -Q.
+
+commit 5e6d28b7874b0deae95d2c68947c45212d32e599
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Sep 29 17:48:09 2021 +1000
+
+    Split c89 test openssl setting out.
+
+commit c4ac7f98e230e83c015678dc958b1ffe828564ad
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Sep 29 17:40:50 2021 +1000
+
+    Expand TEST_SHELL consistently with other vars.
+
+commit cfe5f7b0eb7621bfb0a756222de0431315c2ab8b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Sep 29 17:26:50 2021 +1000
+
+    Replace `pwd` with make variable in regress cmd.
+
+commit 899be59da5fbc3372444bd0fbe74af48313bed33
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Sep 29 17:14:33 2021 +1000
+
+    Get BUILDDIR from autoconf.
+    
+    Use this to replace `pwd`s in regress test command line.
+
+commit c8d92d3d4f7d560146f2f936156ec4dac3fc5811
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Sep 29 13:28:56 2021 +1000
+
+    Add make clean step to tests.
+
+commit 360fb41ef8359619ab90b0d131c914494e55d3dd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Sep 29 11:36:13 2021 +1000
+
+    Test all available clang and gcc versions.
+
+commit 4fb49899d7da22952d35a4bc4c9bdb2311087893
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Sep 29 01:32:21 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Test certificate hostkeys held in ssh-agent too. Would have
+    
+    caught regression fixed in sshd r1.575
+    
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1f164d7bd89f83762db823eec4ddf2d2556145ed
+
+commit ce4854e12e749a05646e5775e9deb8cfaf49a755
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Sep 29 01:33:32 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: add some debug output showing how many key file/command lines
+    
+    were processed. Useful to see whether a file or command actually has keys
+    present
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0bd9ff94e84e03a22df8e6c12f6074a95d27f23c
+
+commit 15abdd523501c349b703d9a27e2bb4252ad921ef
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Sep 28 11:14:50 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Make prototype for rijndaelEncrypt match function
+    
+    including the bounds. Fixes error in portable where GCC>=11 takes notice of
+    the bounds. ok deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdd2f05fd1549e1786a70871e513cf9e9cf099a6
+
+commit d1d29ea1d1ef1a1a54b209f062ec1dcc8399cf03
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Sep 28 11:10:05 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Import regenerated moduli.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4bec5db13b736b64b06a0fca704cbecc2874c8e1
+
+commit 39f2111b1d5f00206446257377dcce58cc72369f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Sep 29 10:53:55 2021 +1000
+
+    Add new compiler hardening flags.
+    
+    Add -fzero-call-used-regs and -ftrivial-auto-var-init to the list of
+    compiler hardening flags that configure checks for.  These are supported
+    by clang and gcc, and make ROP gadgets less useful and mitigate
+    stack-based infoleaks respectively.  ok djm@
+
+commit bf944e3794eff5413f2df1ef37cddf96918c6bde
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Sep 27 00:03:19 2021 +1000
+
+    initgroups needs grp.h
+
+commit 8c5b5655149bd76ea21026d7fe73ab387dbc3bc7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Sep 26 14:01:11 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: openssh-8.8
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12357794602ac979eb7312a1fb190c453f492ec4
+
+commit f3cbe43e28fe71427d41cfe3a17125b972710455
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Sep 26 14:01:03 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: need initgroups() before setresgid(); reported by anton@,
+    
+    ok deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6aa003ee658b316960d94078f2a16edbc25087ce
+
+commit 8acaff41f7518be40774c626334157b1b1c5583c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sun Sep 26 22:16:36 2021 +1000
+
+    update version numbers for release
+
+commit d39039ddc0010baa91c70a0fa0753a2699bbf435
+Author: kn@openbsd.org <kn@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Sep 25 09:40:33 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: RSA/SHA-1 is not used by default anymore
+    
+    OK dtucker deraadt djm
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 055c51a221c3f099dd75c95362f902da1b8678c6
+
+commit 9b2ee74e3aa8c461eb5552a6ebf260449bb06f7e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Sep 24 11:08:03 2021 +1000
+
+    Move the fgrep replacement to hostkey-rotate.sh.
+    
+    The fgrep replacement for buggy greps doesn't work in the sftp-glob test
+    so move it to just where we know it's needed.
+
+commit f7039541570d4b66d76e6f574544db176d8d5c02
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Sep 24 08:04:14 2021 +1000
+
+    Replacement function for buggy fgrep.
+    
+    GNU (f)grep <=2.18, as shipped by FreeBSD<=12 and NetBSD<=9 will
+    occasionally fail to find ssh host keys in the hostkey-rotate test.
+    If we have those versions, use awk instead.
+
+commit f6a660e5bf28a01962af87568e118a2d2e79eaa0
+Author: David Manouchehri <david.manouchehri@riseup.net>
+Date:   Thu Sep 23 17:03:18 2021 -0400
+
+    Don't prompt for yes/no questions.
+
+commit 7ed1a3117c09f8c3f1add35aad77d3ebe1b85b4d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Sep 20 06:53:56 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix missing -s in SYNOPSYS and usage() as well as a
+    
+    capitalisation mistake; spotted by jmc@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ed8ee085c7503c60578941d8b45f3a61d4c9710
+
+commit 8c07170135dde82a26886b600a8bf6fb290b633d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Sep 20 04:02:13 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Fix "Allocated port" debug message
+    
+    for unix domain sockets. From peder.stray at gmail.com via github PR#272,
+    ok deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d5ef3fbdcdd29ebb0792b5022a4942db03f017e
+
+commit 277d3c6adfb128b4129db08e3d65195d94b55fe7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Sep 20 01:55:42 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Switch scp back to use the old protocol by default, ahead of
+    
+    release. We'll wait a little longer for people to pick up sftp-server(8) that
+    supports the extension that scp needs for ~user paths to continue working in
+    SFTP protocol mode. Discussed with deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f281f603a705fba317ff076e7b11bcf2df941871
+
+commit ace19b34cc15bea3482be90450c1ed0cd0dd0669
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Sep 18 02:03:25 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: better error message for ~user failures when the
+    
+    sftp-server lacks the expand-path extension; ok deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c1d965d389411f7e86f0a445158bf09b8f9e4bc
+
+commit 6b1238ba971ee722a310d95037b498ede5539c03
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Sep 16 15:22:22 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: make some more scp-in-SFTP mode better match Unix idioms
+    
+    suggested by deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f2439404ed4cf0b0be8bf49a1ee734836e1ac87
+
+commit e694f8ac4409931e67d08ac44ed251b20b10a957
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Sep 16 15:11:19 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: allow log_stderr==2 to prefix log messages with argv[0]
+    
+    use this to make scp's SFTP mode error messages more scp-like
+    
+    prompted by and ok deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0e821dbde423fc2280e47414bdc22aaa5b4e0733
+
+commit 8a7a06ee505cb833e613f74a07392e9296286c30
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Sep 17 13:03:31 2021 +1000
+
+    Test against LibreSSL 3.2.6, 3.3.4, 3.4.0.
+
+commit c25c84074a47f700dd6534995b4af4b456927150
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Sep 16 05:36:03 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: missing space character in ssh -G output broke the
+    
+    t-sshcfgparse regression test; spotted by anton@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bcc36fae2f233caac4baa8e58482da4aa350eed0
+
+commit a4bee1934bf5e5575fea486628f4123d6a29dff8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Sep 15 06:56:01 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: allow CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs=none in ssh_config; ok
+    
+    markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 668a82ba8e56d731b26ffc5703213bfe071df623
+
+commit d0fffc88c8fe90c1815c6f4097bc8cbcabc0f3dd
+Author: mbuhl@openbsd.org <mbuhl@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Sep 14 11:04:21 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: put back the mux_ctx memleak fix for SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT
+    
+    OK mfriedl@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1aba1da828956cacaadb81a637338734697d9798
+
+commit 19b3d846f06697c85957ab79a63454f57f8e22d6
+Author: schwarze@openbsd.org <schwarze@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Sep 11 09:05:50 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Do not ignore SIGINT while waiting for input if editline(3)
+    
+    is not used. Instead, in non-interactive mode, exit sftp(1), like for other
+    serious errors. As pointed out by dtucker@, when compiled without editline(3)
+    support in portable OpenSSH, the el == NULL branch is also used for
+    interactive mode. In that case, discard the input line and provide a fresh
+    prompt to the user just like in the case where editline(3) is used. OK djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7d06f4d3ebba62115527fafacf38370d09dfb393
+
+commit ba61123eef9c6356d438c90c1199a57a0d7bcb0a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Sep 11 00:40:24 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: when using SFTP protocol, continue transferring files after a
+    
+    transfer error occurs. This matches original scp/rcp behaviour. ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dfe4558d71dd09707e9b5d6e7d2e53b793da69fa
+
+commit b0ec59a708b493c6f3940336b1a537bcb64dd2a7
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Sep 10 11:38:38 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Document that non-interactive commands are run via the user's
+    
+    shell using the -c flag.  ok jmc@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f0d912077732eead10423afd1acf4fc0ceec477
+
+commit 66a658b5d9e009ea11f8a0ca6e69c7feb2d851ea
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Sep 10 10:26:02 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Document behaviour of arguments following non-interactive
+    
+    commands. Prompted by github PR#139 from EvanTheB, feedback & ok djm@ jmc@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc758d1fe0471dfab4304fcad6cd4ecc3d79162a
+
+commit 1d47e28e407d1f95fdf8f799be23f48dcfa5206b
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Sep 10 07:11:11 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Clarify which file's attributes -p preserves, and that
+    
+    it's specifically the file mode bits. bz#3340 from calestyo at scientia.net,
+    ok djm@ jmc@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f09e6098ed1c4be00c730873049825f8ee7cb884
+
+commit b344db7a413478e4c21e4cadba4a970ad3e6128a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Sep 10 05:46:09 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: openssh-7.4 was incorrectly listed twice; spotted by
+    
+    Dmitry Belyavskiy, ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4b823ae448f6e899927ce7b04225ac9e489f58ef
+
+commit 9136d6239ad7a4a293e0418a49b69e70c76d58b8
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Sep 9 06:17:39 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: - move CAVEATS to its correct order - use the term
+    
+    "legacy" protocol rather than "original", as the latter made the text
+    misleading - uppercase SCP
+    
+    ok djm
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8479255746d5fa76a358ee59e7340fecf4245ff0
+
+commit 2d678c5e3bdc2f5c99f7af5122e9d054925d560d
+Author: David Carlier <devnexen@gmail.com>
+Date:   Wed Sep 8 19:49:54 2021 +0100
+
+    Disable tracing on FreeBSD using procctl.
+    
+    Placed at the start of platform_disable_tracing() to prevent declaration
+    after code errors from strict C89 compilers (in the unlikely event that
+    more than one method is enabled).
+
+commit 73050fa38fb36ae3326d768b574806352b97002d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Sep 8 23:31:39 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Use the SFTP protocol by default. The original scp/rcp
+    
+    protocol remains available via the -O flag.
+    
+    Note that ~user/ prefixed paths in SFTP mode require a protocol extension
+    that was first shipped in OpenSSH 8.7.
+    
+    ok deraadt, after baking in snaps for a while without incident
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 23588976e28c281ff5988da0848cb821fec9213c
+
+commit c4565e69ffa2485cff715aa842ea7a350296bfb6
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Sep 8 21:09:49 2021 +1000
+
+    Really fix test on OpenSSL 1.1.1 stable.
+
+commit 79f1bb5f56cef3ae9276207316345b8309248478
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Sep 8 18:51:39 2021 +1000
+
+    Correct OpenSSL 1.1.1 stable identifier.
+
+commit b6255593ed5ccbe5e7d3d4b26b2ad31ad4afc232
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Sep 8 18:39:44 2021 +1000
+
+    Increment nfds when coming from startup_pipe.
+    
+    If we have to increase nfds because startup_pipe[0] is above any of the
+    descriptors passed in the fd_sets, we also need to add 1 to nfds since
+    select takes highest FD number plus one.  bz#3345 from yaroslav.kuzmin
+    at vmssoftware.com.
+
+commit a3e92a6794817df6012ac8546aea19652cc91b61
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Sep 8 13:45:10 2021 +1000
+
+    Tests for OpenSSL 3.0.0 release & 1.1.1 branch.
+
+commit 4afe431da98ec1cf6a2933fe5658f4fd68dee9e2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Sep 8 03:23:44 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: correct my mistake in previous fix; spotted by halex
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3cc62d92e3f70006bf02468fc146bfc36fffa183
+
+commit ca0e455b9331213ff9505a21b94c38e34faa2bba
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Sep 7 06:03:51 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: avoid NULL deref in -Y find-principals. Report and fix
+    
+    from Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón
+    MIME-Version: 1.0
+    Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+    Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6238486f8ecc888d6ccafcd9ad99e621bb41f1e0
+
+commit 37616807f150fb46610bbd5031c31af4857ad1e9
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Sep 6 00:36:01 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: revision 1.381 neglected to remove
+    
+    sChallengeResponseAuthentication from the enum.  Noticed by
+    christos@zoulas.com.  OK dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b533283a4dd6d04a867da411a4c7a8fbc90e34ff
+
+commit 7acb3578cdfec0b3d34501408071f7a96c1684ea
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Sep 5 20:45:42 2021 +1000
+
+    Correct version_num for OpenSSL dev branch.
+
+commit 65bb01111320dfd0d25e21e1fd4d3f2b77532669
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Sep 5 19:37:39 2021 +1000
+
+    Test against OpenSSL 3 branch as well as dev.
+    
+    Now that OpenSSL development has moved to 3.1, test against the most
+    recent version of the openssl-3.0 branch too.
+
+commit 864ed0d5e04a503b97202c776b7cf3f163f3eeaa
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Sep 5 19:33:22 2021 +1000
+
+    OpenSSL development is now 3.1.*
+
+commit a60209a586a928f92ab323bf23bd07f57093342e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Sep 3 07:43:23 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Use .Cm instead of .Dq in StrictHostKeyChecking list for
+    
+    consistency. Patch from scop via github PR#257, ok jmc@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3652a91564570779431802c31224fb4a9cf39872
+
+commit 8d1d9eb6de37331e872700e9e399a3190cca1242
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Sep 3 07:27:03 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Mention using ssh -i for specifying the public key file
+    
+    in the case where the private key is loaded into ssh-agent but is not present
+    locally.  Based on patch from rafork via github PR#215, ok jmc@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2282e83b0ff78d2efbe705883b67240745fa5bb2
+
+commit eb4362e5e3aa7ac26138b11e44d8c191910aff64
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Sep 3 05:25:50 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Refer to KEX "algorithms" instead of "methods" to match
+    
+    other references and improve consistency.  Patch from scop via github PR#241,
+    ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 840bc94ff6861b28d8603c8e8c16499bfb65e32c
+
+commit b3318946ce5725da43c4bf7eeea1b73129c47d2a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Sep 3 05:12:25 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Remove redundant attrib_clear in upload_dir_internal.
+    
+    The subsequent call to stat_to_attrib clears the struct as its first step
+    anyway. From pmeinhardt via github PR#220, ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f5234fc6d7425b607e179acb3383f21716f3029e
+
+commit 7cc3fe28896e653956a6a2eed0a25d551b83a029
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Sep 3 04:11:13 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add test for client termination status on signal.
+    
+    Based on patch from Alexxz via github PR#235 with some tweaks, to
+    match patch in bz#3281.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d87c7446fb8b5f8b45894fbbd6875df326e729e2
+
+commit 5428b0d239f6b516c81d1dd15aa9fe9e60af75d4
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Sep 2 21:03:54 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: sys/param.h is not needed for any visible reason
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8bdea2d0c75692e4c5777670ac039d4b01c1f368
+
+commit 1ff38f34b4c4545eb28106629cafa1e0496bc726
+Author: Shchelkunov Artem <a.shchelkunov@ideco.ru>
+Date:   Wed Aug 11 18:07:58 2021 +0500
+
+    Fix memory leak in error path.
+    
+    *info is allocated via xstrdup but was leaked in the PAM_AUTH_ERR path.
+    From github PR#266.
+
+commit cb37e2f0c0ca4fef844ed7edc5d0e3b7d0e83f6a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Sep 1 03:16:06 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Fix ssh-rsa fallback for old PuTTY interop tests.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a19ac929da604843a5b5f0f48d2c0eb6e0773d37
+
+commit 8b02ef0f28dc24cda8cbcd8b7eb02bda8f8bbe59
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Sep 1 00:50:27 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add a function to skip remaining tests.
+    
+    Many tests skip tests for various reasons but not in a consistent way and
+    don't always clean up, so add that and switch the tests that do that over.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 72d2ec90a3ee8849486956a808811734281af735
+
+commit d486845c07324c04240f1674ac513985bd356f66
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 31 07:13:59 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Specify path to PuTTY keys.
+    
+    Portable needs this and it makes no difference on OpenBSD, so resync
+    them.  (Id sync only, Portable already had this.)
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 33f6f66744455886d148527af8368811e4264162
+
+commit d22b299115e27606e846b23490746f69fdd4fb38
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 31 06:13:23 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Better compat tests with old PuTTY.
+    
+    When running PuTTY interop tests and using a PuTTY version older than
+    0.76, re-enable the ssh-rsa host key algorithm (the 256 and 512 variants
+    of RSA were added some time between 0.73 and 0.76).
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e6138d6987aa705fa1e4f216db0bb386e1ff38e1
+
+commit 87ad70d605c3e39c9b8aa275db27120d7cc09b77
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Aug 31 17:04:50 2021 +1000
+
+    Resync PuTTY interop tests.
+    
+    Resync behaviour when REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY is not set with OpenBSD.
+
+commit e47b82a7bf51021afac218bf59a3be121827653d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 31 01:25:27 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Specify hostkeyalgorithms in SSHFP test.
+    
+    Specify host key algorithms in sshd's default set for the SSHFP test,
+    from djm@.  Make the reason for when the test is skipped a bit clearer.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4f923dfc761480d5411de17ea6f0b30de3e32cea
+
+commit 7db3e0a9e8477c018757b59ee955f7372c0b55fb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Aug 30 01:15:45 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: adapt to RSA/SHA1 deprectation
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 952397c39a22722880e4de9d1c50bb1a14f907bb
+
+commit 2344750250247111a6c3c6a4fe84ed583a61cc11
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Aug 29 23:53:10 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: After years of forewarning, disable the RSA/SHA-1
+    
+    signature algorithm by default. It is feasible to create colliding SHA1
+    hashes, so we need to deprecate its use.
+    
+    RSA/SHA-256/512 remains available and will be transparently selected
+    instead of RSA/SHA1 for most SSH servers released in the last five+
+    years. There is no need to regenerate RSA keys.
+    
+    The use of RSA/SHA1 can be re-enabled by adding "ssh-rsa" to the
+    PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms directives on the client and server.
+    
+    ok dtucker deraadt
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 189bcc4789c7254e09e23734bdd5def8354ff1d5
+
+commit 56c4455d3b54b7d481c77c82115c830b9c8ce328
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Aug 29 23:44:07 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: wrap at 80 columns
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 47ca2286d6b52a9747f34da16d742879e1a37bf0
+
+commit 95401eea8503943449f712e5f3de52fc0bc612c5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Aug 20 18:14:13 2021 +1000
+
+    Replace shell function with ssh-keygen -A.
+    
+    Prevents the init script in the SysV package from trying (and failing)
+    to generate unsupported key types.  Remove now-unused COMMENT_OUT_ECC.
+    ok tim@
+
+commit d83ec9ed995a76ed1d5c65cf10b447222ec86131
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Aug 20 15:39:05 2021 +1000
+
+    Remove obsolete Redhat PAM config and init script.
+
+commit e1a596186c81e65a34ce13076449712d3bf97eb4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 20 14:03:49 2021 +1000
+
+    depend
+
+commit 5450606c8f7f7a0d70211cea78bc2dab74ab35d1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 20 13:59:43 2021 +1000
+
+    update version numbers
+
+commit feee2384ab8d694c770b7750cfa76a512bdf8246
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 20 03:22:55 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: openssh-8.7
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8769dff0fd76ae3193d77bf83b439adee0f300cd
+
+commit 9a2ed62173cc551b2b5f479460bb015b19499de8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Aug 20 10:48:13 2021 +1000
+
+    Also check pid in pselect_notify_setup.
+    
+    Spotted by djm@.
+
+commit deaadcb93ca15d4f38aa38fb340156077792ce87
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Aug 20 08:39:33 2021 +1000
+
+    Prefix pselect functions to clarify debug messages
+
+commit 10e45654cff221ca60fd35ee069df67208fcf415
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Aug 20 08:30:42 2021 +1000
+
+    Fix race in pselect replacement code.
+    
+    On the second and subsequent calls to pselect the notify_pipe was not
+    added to the select readset, opening up a race that om G. Christensen
+    discovered on multiprocessor Solaris <=9 systems.
+    
+    Also reinitialize notify_pipe if the pid changes.  This will prevent a
+    parent and child from using the same FD, although this is not an issue
+    in the current structure it might be in future.
+
+commit 464ba22f1e38d25402e5ec79a9b8d34a32df5a3f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Aug 18 12:51:30 2021 +1000
+
+    Check compiler for c99 declarations after code.
+    
+    The sntrup761 reference code contains c99-style declarations after code
+    so don't try to build that if the compiler doesn't support it.
+
+commit 7d878679a4b155a359d32104ff473f789501748d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Aug 17 15:12:04 2021 +1000
+
+    Remove trailing backslash on regress-unit-binaries
+
+commit b71b2508f17c68c5d9dbbe537686d81cedb9a781
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Aug 17 07:59:27 2021 +1000
+
+    Put stdint.h inside HAVE_STDINT_H.
+    
+    From Tom G. Christensen.
+
+commit 6a24567a29bd7b4ab64e1afad859ea845cbc6b8c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Aug 16 14:13:02 2021 +1000
+
+    Improve github test driver script.
+    
+     - use a trap to always output any failed regress logs (since the script
+       sets -e, the existing log output is never invoked).
+     - pass LTESTS and SKIP_LTESTS when re-running with sshd options (eg.
+       UsePAM).
+
+commit b467cf13705f59ed348b620722ac098fe31879b7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Aug 16 11:32:23 2021 +1000
+
+    Remove deprecated ubuntu-16.04 test targets.
+    
+    Github has deprecated ubuntu-16.04 and it will be removed on 20
+    September.
+
+commit 20e6eefcdf78394f05e453d456c1212ffaa6b6a4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Aug 15 23:25:26 2021 +1000
+
+    Skip agent ptrace test on hurd.
+
+commit 7c9115bbbf958fbf85259a061c1122e2d046aabf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Aug 15 19:37:22 2021 +1000
+
+    Add hurd test target.
+
+commit 7909a566f6c6a78fcd30708dc49f4e4f9bb80ce3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Aug 15 12:45:10 2021 +1000
+
+    Skip scp3 tests on all dfly58 and 60 configs.
+
+commit e65198e52cb03534e8c846d1bca74c310b1526de
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date:   Sat Aug 14 13:08:07 2021 -0700
+
+    openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h: put bsd-signal.h before bsd-misc.h
+    to get sigset_t from signal.h needed for the pselect replacement.
+
+commit e50635640f79920d9375e0155cb3f4adb870eee5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Aug 13 13:21:00 2021 +1000
+
+    Test OpenSSH from OpenBSD head on 6.8 and 6.9.
+
+commit e0ba38861c490c680117b7fe0a1d61a181cd00e7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Aug 13 13:00:14 2021 +1000
+
+    Skip scp3 test on dragonfly 58 and 60.
+    
+    The tests hang, so skip until we figure them out.
+
+commit dcce2a2bcf007bf817a2fb0dce3db83fa9201e92
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Aug 12 23:59:25 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: mention that CASignatureAlgorithms accepts +/- similarly to
+    
+    the other algorithm list directives; ok jmc bz#3335
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0d46b53995817052c78e2dce9dbd133963b073d9
+
+commit 090a82486e5d7a8f7f16613d67e66a673a40367f
+Author: schwarze@openbsd.org <schwarze@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Aug 12 09:59:00 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: In the editline(3) branch of the sftp(1) event loop,
+    
+    handle SIGINT rather than ignoring it, such that the user can use Ctrl-C to
+    discard the currently edited command line and get a fresh prompt, just like
+    in ftp(1), bc(1), and in shells.
+    
+    It is critical to not use ssl_signal() for this particular case
+    because that function unconditionally sets SA_RESTART, but here we
+    need the signal to interrupt the read(2) in the el_gets(3) event loop.
+    
+    OK dtucker@ deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8025115a773f52e9bb562eaab37ea2e021cc7299
+
+commit e1371e4f58404d6411d9f95eb774b444cea06a26
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 11 14:07:54 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: scp: tweak man page and error message for -3 by default
+    
+    Now that the -3 option is enabled by default, flip the documentation
+    and error message logic from "requires -3" to "blocked by -R".
+    
+    ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a872592118444fb3acda5267b2a8c3d4c4252020
+
+commit 49f46f6d77328a3d10a758522b670a3e8c2235e7
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 11 14:05:19 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: scp: do not spawn ssh with two -s flags for
+    
+    remote-to-remote copies
+    
+    Do not add another "-s" to the argument vector every time an SFTP
+    connection is initiated.  Instead, introduce a subsystem flag to
+    do_cmd() and add "-s" when the flag is set.
+    
+    ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25df69759f323661d31b2e1e790faa22e27966c1
+
+commit 2a2cd00783e1da45ee730b7f453408af1358ef5b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 11 08:55:04 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: test -Oprint-pubkey
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3d51afb6d1f287975fb6fddd7a2c00a3bc5094e0
+
+commit b9f4635ea5bc33ed5ebbacf332d79bae463b0f54
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 11 08:54:17 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: when verifying sshsig signatures, support an option
+    
+    (-Oprint-pubkey) to dump the full public key to stdout; based on patch from
+    Fabian Stelzer; ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0598000e5b9adfb45d42afa76ff80daaa12fc3e2
+
+commit 750c1a45ba4e8ad63793d49418a0780e77947b9b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 11 05:21:32 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: oops, missed one more %p
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e7e62818d1564cc5cd9086eaf7a51cbd1a9701eb
+
+commit b5aa27b69ab2e1c13ac2b5ad3f8f7d389bad7489
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 11 05:20:17 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: remove a bunch of %p in format strings; leftovers of
+    
+    debuggings past. prompted by Michael Forney, ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4853a0d6c9cecaba9ecfcc19066e52d3a8dcb2ac
+
+commit 419aa01123db5ff5dbc68b2376ef23b222862338
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Aug 11 09:21:09 2021 +1000
+
+    Add includes.h to compat tests.
+    
+    On platforms where closefrom returns void (eg glibc>=2.34) the prototype
+    for closefrom in its compat tests would cause compile errors.  Remove
+    this and have the tests pull in the compat headers in the same way as
+    the main code.  bz#3336.
+
+commit 931f592f26239154eea3eb35a086585897b1a185
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 10 03:35:45 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: adapt to scp -M flag change; make scp3.sh test SFTP mode too
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 43fea26704a0f0b962b53c1fabcb68179638f9c0
+
+commit 391ca67fb978252c48d20c910553f803f988bd37
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 10 03:33:34 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Prepare for a future where scp(1) uses the SFTP protocol by
+    
+    default. Replace recently added -M option to select the protocol with -O
+    (olde) and -s (SFTP) flags, and label the -s flag with a clear warning that
+    it will be removed in the near future (so no, don't use it in scripts!).
+    
+    prompted by/feedback from deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92ad72cc6f0023c9be9e316d8b30eb6d8d749cfc
+
+commit bfdd4b722f124a4fa9173d20dd64dd0fc69856be
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Aug 9 23:56:36 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: make scp -3 the default for remote-to-remote copies. It
+    
+    provides a much better and more intuitive user experience and doesn't require
+    exposing credentials to the source host.
+    
+    thanks naddy@ for catching the missing argument in usage()
+    
+    "Yes please!" - markus@
+    "makes a lot of sense" - deraadt@
+    "the right thing to do" - dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0d2af5f0965c5192ba5b2fa461c9f9b130e5dd9
+
+commit 2f7a3b51cef689ad9e93d0c6c17db5a194eb5555
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Aug 9 23:49:31 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: make scp in SFTP mode try to use relative paths as much
+    
+    as possible. Previosuly, it would try to make relative and ~/-rooted paths
+    absolute before requesting transfers.
+    
+    prompted by and much discussion deraadt@
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46639d382ea99546a4914b545fa7b00fa1be5566
+
+commit 2ab864010e0a93c5dd95116fb5ceaf430e2fc23c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Aug 9 23:47:44 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: SFTP protocol extension to allow the server to expand
+    
+    ~-prefixed paths, in particular ~user ones. Allows scp in sftp mode to accept
+    these paths, like scp in rcp mode does.
+    
+    prompted by and much discussion deraadt@
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7d794def9e4de348e1e777f6030fc9bafdfff392
+
+commit 41b019ac067f1d1f7d99914d0ffee4d2a547c3d8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Aug 9 23:44:32 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: when scp is in SFTP mode, try to deal better with ~
+    
+    prefixed paths. ~user paths aren't supported, but ~/ paths will be accepted
+    and prefixed with the SFTP server starting directory (more to come)
+    
+    prompted by and discussed with deraadt@
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 263a071f14555c045fd03132a8fb6cbd983df00d
+
+commit b4b3f3da6cdceb3fd168b5fab69d11fba73bd0ae
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Aug 9 07:21:01 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: on fatal errors, make scp wait for ssh connection before
+    
+    exiting avoids LogLevel=verbose (or greater) messages from ssh appearing
+    after scp has returned exited and control has returned to the shell; ok
+    markus@
+    
+    (this was originally committed as r1.223 along with unrelated stuff that
+    I rolled back in r1.224)
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1261fd667ad918484889ed3d7aec074f3956a74b
+
+commit 2ae7771749e0b4cecb107f9d4860bec16c3f4245
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Aug 9 07:19:12 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: rever r1.223 - I accidentally committed unrelated changes
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb73f3865b2647a27dd94db73d6589506a9625f9
+
+commit 986abe94d481a1e82a01747360bd767b96b41eda
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Aug 9 07:16:09 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: show only the final path component in the progress meter;
+    
+    more useful with long paths (that may truncate) and better matches
+    traditional scp behaviour; spotted by naddy@ ok deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26b544d0074f03ebb8a3ebce42317d8d7ee291a3
+
+commit 2b67932bb3176dee4fd447af4368789e04a82b93
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Aug 9 07:13:54 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: on fatal errors, make scp wait for ssh connection before
+    
+    exiting avoids LogLevel=verbose (or greater) messages from ssh appearing
+    after scp has returned exited and control has returned to the shell; ok
+    markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef9dab5ef5ae54a6a4c3b15d380568e94263456c
+
+commit 724eb900ace30661d45db2ba01d0f924d95ecccb
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Aug 8 08:49:09 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: xstrdup environment variable used by ForwardAgent. bz#3328
+    
+    from goetze at dovetail.com, ok djm@ deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 760320dac1c3b26904284ba417a7d63fccc5e742
+
+commit 86b4cb3a884846b358305aad17a6ef53045fa41f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Aug 8 08:27:28 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Although it's POSIX, not all shells used in Portable support
+    
+    the implicit 'in "$@"' after 'for i'.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3c9aec6bca4868f85d2742b6ba5223fce110bdbc
+
+commit f2ccf6c9f395923695f22345e626dfd691227aaf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Aug 8 17:39:56 2021 +1000
+
+    Move portable specific settings down.
+    
+    This brings the top hunk of the file back in sync with OpenBSD
+    so patches to the CVS Id should apply instead of always being
+    rejected.
+
+commit 71b0eb997e220b0fc9331635af409ad84979f2af
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Aug 8 07:27:52 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Move setting of USER further down the startup In portable
+    
+    we have to change this and having it in the same hunk as the CVS Id string
+    means applying changes fails every. single. time.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 87cd603eb6db58c9b430bf90adacb7f90864429b
+
+commit f0aca2706c710a0da1a4be705f825a807cd15400
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Aug 8 06:38:33 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Drop -q in ssh-log-wrapper.sh to preserve logs.
+    
+    scp and sftp like to add -q to the command line passed to ssh which
+    overrides the LogLevel we set in the config files and suppresses output
+    to the debug logs so drop any "-q" from the invoked ssh.  In the one
+    case where we actually want to use -q in the banner test, call the ssh
+    binary directly bypassing the logging wrapper.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e2c97d3c964bda33a751374c56f65cdb29755b75
+
+commit cf27810a649c5cfae60f8ce66eeb25caa53b13bc
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 7 01:57:08 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Fix prototype mismatch for do_cmd. ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1c1598bb5237a7ae0be99152f185e0071163714d
+
+commit 85de69f64665245786e28c81ab01fe18b0e2a149
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 7 01:55:01 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: sftp-client.c needs poll.h
+    
+    remove unused variable
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 233ac6c012cd23af62f237167a661db391055a16
+
+commit 397c4d72e50023af5fe3aee5cc2ad407a6eb1073
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Aug 7 11:30:57 2021 +1000
+
+    Include poll.h and friends for struct pollfd.
+
+commit a9e2c533195f28627f205682482d9da384c4c52e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 7 00:14:17 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: do_upload() used a near-identical structure for
+    
+    tracking expected status replies from the server to what do_download() was
+    using.
+    
+    Refactor it to use the same structure and factor out some common
+    code into helper functions.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c167df8ab6df4a5292c32421922b0cf379e9054
+
+commit 7b1cbcb7599d9f6a3bbad79d412604aa1203b5ee
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 7 00:12:09 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: make scp(1) in SFTP mode follow symlinks like
+    
+    traditional scp(1) ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97255e55be37e8e26605e4ba1e69f9781765d231
+
+commit 133b44e500422df68c9c25c3b6de35c0263132f1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 7 00:10:49 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix incorrect directory permissions on scp -3
+    
+    transfers; ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64b2abaa5635a2be65ee2e77688ad9bcebf576c2
+
+commit 98b59244ca10e62ff67a420856770cb700164f59
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 7 00:09:57 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: a bit more debugging of file attributes being
+    
+    sent/received over the wire
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f68c4e207b08ef95200a8b2de499d422808e089b
+
+commit c677e65365d6f460c084e41e0c4807bb8a9cf601
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 7 00:08:52 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: make scp(1) in SFTP mode output better match original
+    
+    scp(1) by suppressing "Retrieving [path]" lines that were emitted to support
+    the interactive sftp(1) client. ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 06be293df5f156a18f366079be2f33fa68001acc
+
+commit 48cd39b7a4e5e7c25101c6d1179f98fe544835cd
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 7 00:07:18 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: factor out a structure duplicated between downloading
+    
+    and crossloading; ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 96eede24d520569232086a129febe342e4765d39
+
+commit 318c06bb04ee21a0cfa6b6022a201eacaa53f388
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 7 00:06:30 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: use sftp_client crossloading to implement scp -3
+    
+    feedback/ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7db4c0086cfc12afc9cfb71d4c2fd3c7e9416ee9
+
+commit de7115b373ba0be3861c65de9b606a3e0e9d29a3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 7 00:02:41 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: support for "cross"-loading files/directories, i.e.
+    
+    downloading from one SFTP server while simultaneously uploading to another.
+    
+    feedback & ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3982878e29d8df0fa4ddc502f5ff6126ac714235
+
+commit a50bd0367ff2063bbc70a387740a2aa6914de094
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 7 00:01:29 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: factor our SSH2_FXP_OPEN calls into their own function;
+    
+    "looks fine" markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d3dea2153f08855c6d9dacc01973248944adeffb
+
+commit e3c0ba05873cf3d3f7d19d595667a251026b2d84
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Aug 7 00:00:33 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: prepare for scp -3 implemented via sftp
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 194aac0dd87cb175334b71c2a30623a5ad55bb44
+
+commit 395d8fbdb094497211e1461cf0e2f80af5617e0a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 6 09:00:18 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Make diff invocation more portable.
+    
+    POSIX does not require diff to have -N, so compare in both directions
+    with just -r, which should catch missing files in either directory.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0e2ec8594556a6f369ed5a0a90c6806419b845f7
+
+commit d247a73ce27b460138599648d9c637c6f2b77605
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 4 21:28:00 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: regression test for scp -3
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b44375d125c827754a1f722ec6b6b75b634de05d
+
+commit 35c8e41a6f6d8ad76f8d1cd81ac2ea23d0d993b2
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Aug 6 05:04:42 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Document "ProxyJump none". bz#3334.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f78cc6f55731f2cd35c3a41d5352ac1ee419eba7
+
+commit 911ec6411821bda535d09778df7503b92f0eafab
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 4 01:34:55 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Allow for different (but POSIX compliant) behaviour of
+    
+    basename(3) and prevent a use-after-free in that case in the new sftp-compat
+    code.
+    
+    POSIX allows basename(3) to either return a pointer to static storage
+    or modify the passed string and return a pointer to that.  OpenBSD does
+    the former and works as is, but on other platforms "filename" points
+    into "tmp" which was just freed.  This makes the freeing of tmp
+    consistent with the other variable in the loop.
+    
+    Pinpointed by the -portable Valgrind regress test.  ok djm@ deraadt@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 750f3c19bd4440e4210e30dd5d7367386e833374
+
+commit 6df1fecb5d3e51f3a8027a74885c3a44f6cbfcbd
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Aug 4 11:05:11 2021 +1000
+
+    use openbsd-compat glob.h is required
+
+commit 9ebd1828881dfc9014a344587934a5ce7db6fa1b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Aug 3 21:03:23 2021 +1000
+
+    Missing space between macro arg and punctuation.
+    
+    From jmc@
+
+commit 0fd3f62eddc7cf54dcc9053be6f58998f3eb926a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Aug 3 21:02:33 2021 +1000
+
+    Avoid lines >80 chars.  From jmc@
+
+commit af5d8094d8b755e1daaf2e20ff1dc252800b4c9b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Aug 3 01:05:24 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: regression tests for scp SFTP protocol support; mostly by
+    
+    Jakub Jelen in GHPR#194 ok markus
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 36f1458525bcb111741ec8547eaf58b13cddc715
+
+commit e4673b7f67ae7740131a4ecea29a846593049a91
+Author: anton@openbsd.org <anton@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jul 29 15:34:09 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Treat doas with arguments as a valid SUDO variable.
+    
+    Allows one to specify SUDO="doas -n" which I do while running make regress.
+    
+    ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4fe5814b5010dbf0885500d703bea06048d11005
+
+commit 197e29f1cca190d767c4b2b63a662f9a9e5da0b3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Aug 2 23:38:27 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: support for using the SFTP protocol for file transfers in
+    
+    scp, via a new "-M sftp" option. Marked as experimental for now.
+    
+    Some corner-cases exist, in particular there is no attempt to
+    provide bug-compatibility with scp's weird "double shell" quoting
+    rules.
+    
+    Mostly by Jakub Jelen in GHPR#194 with some tweaks by me. ok markus@
+    Thanks jmc@ for improving the scp.1 bits.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ce4c9157ff17b650ace571c9f7793d92874051c
+
+commit dd533c7ab79d61a7796b77b64bd81b098e0d7f9f
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 30 14:28:13 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix a formatting error and add some Xr; from debian at
+    
+    helgefjell de
+    
+    removed references to rlogin etc. as no longer relevant;
+    suggested by djm
+    
+    ok djm dtucker
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c431c303068d3aec5bb18573a0bd5e0cd77c5ae
+
+commit c7cd347a8823819411222c1e10a0d26747d0fd5c
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 30 14:25:01 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix a formatting error and mark up known_hosts
+    
+    consistently; issues reported by debian at helgefjell de
+    
+    ok djm dtucker
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a1fd8d21dc77f507685443832df0c9700481b0ce
+
+commit 4455aec2e4fc90f64ae4fc47e78ebc9c18721738
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 28 05:57:42 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: no need to talk about version 2 with the -Q option, so
+    
+    rewrite the text to read better;
+    
+    issue reported by debian at helgefjell de
+    ok djm dtucker
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59fe2e8219c37906740ad062e0fdaea487dbe9cf
+
+commit bec429338e9b30d2c7668060e82608286a8a4777
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jul 27 14:28:46 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: word fix; reported by debian at helgefjell de
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c6fd22142422a25343c5bd1a618f31618f41ece
+
+commit efad4deb5a1f1cf79ebefd63c6625059060bfbe1
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jul 27 14:14:25 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: standardise the grammar in the options list; issue
+    
+    reported by debian at helgefjell de
+    
+    ok dtucker djm
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ac15575045d82f4b205a42cc7d5207fe4c3f8e6
+
+commit 1e11fb24066f3fc259ee30db3dbb2a3127e05956
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Aug 2 18:56:29 2021 +1000
+
+    Check for RLIMIT_NOFILE before trying to use it.
+
+commit 0f494236b49fb48c1ef33669f14822ca4f3ce2f4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Jul 27 17:45:34 2021 +1000
+
+    lastenv is only used in setenv.
+    
+    Prevents an unused variable warning on platforms that have setenv but
+    not unsetenv.
+
+commit a1f78e08bdb3eaa88603ba3c6e01de7c8671e28a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Jul 26 12:45:30 2021 +1000
+
+    Move SUDO to "make test" command line.
+    
+    Environment variables don't get passed by vmrun, so move to command
+    line.
+
+commit 02e624273b9c78a49a01239159b8c09b8409b1a0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Jul 25 23:26:36 2021 +1000
+
+    Set SUDO for tests and cleanup.
+
+commit 460ae5d93051bab70239ad823dd784822d58baad
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Jul 25 22:37:55 2021 +1000
+
+    Pass OPENSSL=no to make tests too.
+
+commit b398f499c68d74ebe3298b73757cf3f36e14e0cb
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jul 25 12:27:37 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Skip unit and makefile-based key conversion tests when
+    
+    we're building with OPENSSL=no.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 20455ed9a977c93f846059d1fcb48e29e2c8d732
+
+commit 727ce36c8c5941bde99216d27109405907caae4f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jul 25 12:13:03 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Replace OPENSSL as the variable that points to the
+    
+    openssl binary with OPENSSL_BIN.  This will allow us to use the OPENSSL
+    variable from mk.conf or the make(1) command line indicating if we're
+    building with our without OpenSSL, and ultimately get the regress tests
+    working in the OPENSSL=no configuration.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2d788fade3264d7803e5b54cae8875963f688c4e
+
+commit 55e17101a9075f6a63af724261c5744809dcb95c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jul 24 02:57:28 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Skip RFC4716 format import and export tests when built
+    
+    without OpenSSL.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d2c2d5d38c1acc2b88cc99cfe00a2eb8bb39dfa4
+
+commit f5ccb5895d39cd627ad9e7b2c671d2587616100d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jul 24 02:51:14 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Don't omit ssh-keygen -y from usage when built without
+    
+    OpenSSL.  It is actually available, albeit only for ed25519 keys.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7a254c33d0e6a55c30c6b016a8d298d3cb7a7674
+
+commit 819d57ac23469f1f03baa8feb38ddefbada90fdc
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jul 24 02:08:13 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Exclude key conversion options from usage when built
+    
+    without OpenSSL since those are not available, similar to what we currently
+    do with the moduli screening options.  We can also use this to skip the
+    conversion regression tests in this case.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c82caa398cf99cd4518c23bba5a2fc66b16bafe
+
+commit b6673b1d2ee90b4690ee84f634efe40225423c38
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jul 24 13:02:51 2021 +1000
+
+    Test OpenBSD upstream with and without OpenSSL.
+
+commit 9d38074b5453c1abbdf888e80828c278d3b886ac
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jul 24 01:54:23 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: test for first-match-wins in authorized_keys environment=
+    
+    options
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1517c90276fe84b5dc5821c59f88877fcc34c0e8
+
+commit 2b76f1dd19787e784711ea297ad8fc938b4484fd
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 23 05:53:02 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Simplify keygen-convert by using $SSH_KEYTYPES directly.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cdbe408ec3671ea9ee9b55651ee551370d2a4108
+
+commit 7d64a9fb587ba9592f027f7a2264226c713d6579
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jul 24 01:55:19 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: don't leak environment= variable when it is not the first
+    
+    match
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fbdc3dfe0032deaf003fd937eeb4d434ee4efe0
+
+commit db2130e2340bf923e41c791aa9cd27b9e926042c
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 23 06:01:17 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: punctuation;
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64be152e378c45975073ab1c07e0db7eddd15806
+
+commit 03190d10980c6fc9124e988cb2df13101f266507
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 23 05:56:47 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: mention in comment that read_passphrase(..., RP_ALLOW_STDIN)
+    
+    will try to use askpass first. bz3314
+    
+    convert a couple of debug() -> debug_f() while here
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7e812aebc28fcc5db06d4710e0f73613dee545c
+
+commit 1653ece6832b2b304d46866b262d5f69880a9ec7
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 23 05:07:16 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Test conversion of ed25519 and ecdsa keys too.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3676d2d00e58e0d6d37f2878f108cc2b83bbe4bb
+
+commit 8b7af02dcf9d2b738787efd27da7ffda9859bed2
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 23 04:56:21 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add test for exporting pubkey from a passphrase-protected
+    
+    private key.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: da99d93e7b235fbd5b5aaa01efc411225e6ba8ac
+
+commit 441095d4a3e5048fe3c87a6c5db5bc3383d767fb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 23 03:54:55 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: regression test for time-limited signature keys
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2a6f3bd900dbee0a3c96f1ff23e032c93ab392bc
+
+commit 9e1882ef6489a7dd16b6d7794af96629cae61a53
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 23 05:24:02 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: note successful authentication method in final "Authenticated
+    
+    to ..." message and partial auth success messages (all at LogLevel=verbose)
+    ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 06834b89ceb89f8f16c5321d368a66c08f441984
+
+commit a917e973a1b90b40ff1e950df083364b48fc6c78
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 23 04:04:52 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add a ForkAfterAuthentication ssh_config(5) counterpart
+    
+    to the ssh(1) -f flag. Last part of GHPR231 from Volker Diels-Grabsch. ok
+    dtucker
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b18aeda12efdebe2093d55263c90fe4ea0bce0d3
+
+commit e0c5088f1c96a145eb6ea1dee438010da78f9ef5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 23 04:00:59 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add a StdinNull directive to ssh_config(5) that allows
+    
+    the config file to do the same thing as -n does on the ssh(1) commandline.
+    Patch from Volker Diels-Grabsch via GHPR231; ok dtucker
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 66ddf3f15c76796d4dcd22ff464aed1edd62468e
+
+commit e3957e21ffdc119d6d04c0b1686f8e2fe052f5ea
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 23 03:57:20 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: make authorized_keys environment="..." directives
+    
+    first-match-wins and more strictly limit their maximum number; prompted by
+    OOM reported by OSS-fuzz (35470).
+    
+    feedback and ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f63fc10dcd995e7aed9c378ad879161af83121
+
+commit d0bb1ce731762c55acb95817df4d5fab526c7ecd
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 23 03:37:52 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Let allowed signers files used by ssh-keygen(1)
+    
+    signatures support key lifetimes, and allow the verification mode to specify
+    a signature time to check at. This is intended for use by git to support
+    signing objects using ssh keys. ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3e2c67b7dcd94f0610194d1e8e4907829a40cf31
+
+commit 44142068dc7ef783d135e91ff954e754d2ed432e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 19 08:48:33 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Use SUDO when setting up hostkey.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 990cf4481cab8dad62e90818a9b4b36c533851a7
+
+commit 6b67f3f1d1d187597e54a139cc7785c0acebd9a2
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 19 05:08:54 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Increase time margin for rekey tests. Should help
+    
+    reliability on very heavily loaded hosts.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4c28a0fce3ea89ebde441d7091464176e9730533
+
+commit 7953e1bfce9e76bec41c1331a29bc6cff9d416b8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Jul 19 13:47:51 2021 +1000
+
+    Add sshfp-connect.sh file missed in previous.
+
+commit b75a80fa8369864916d4c93a50576155cad4df03
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 19 03:13:28 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Ensure that all returned SSHFP records for the specified host
+    
+    name and hostkey type match instead of only one.  While there, simplify the
+    code somewhat and add some debugging.  Based on discussion in bz#3322, ok
+    djm@.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0a6a0a476eb7f9dfe8fe2c05a1a395e3e9b22ee4
+
+commit 1cc1fd095393663cd72ddac927d82c6384c622ba
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 19 02:21:50 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Id sync only, -portable already has this.
+    
+    Put dh_set_moduli_file call inside ifdef WITH_OPENSSL. Fixes
+    build with OPENSSL=no.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af54abbebfb12bcde6219a44d544e18204defb15
+
+commit 33abbe2f4153f5ca5c874582f6a7cc91ae167485
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 19 02:46:34 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add test for host key verification via SSHFP records. This
+    
+    requires some external setup to operate so is disabled by default (see
+    comments in sshfp-connect.sh).
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c52c461bd1df3a803d17498917d156ef64512fd9
+
+commit f0cd000d8e3afeb0416dce1c711c3d7c28d89bdd
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 19 02:29:28 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add ed25519 key and test SSHFP export of it. Only test
+    
+    RSA SSHFP export if we have RSA functionality compiled in.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b4ff5181b8c9a5862e7f0ecdd96108622333a9af
+
+commit 0075511e27e5394faa28edca02bfbf13b9a6693e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 19 00:16:26 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Group keygen tests together.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 07e2d25c527bb44f03b7c329d893a1f2d6c5c40c
+
+commit 034828820c7e62652e7c48f9ee6b67fb7ba6fa26
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jul 18 23:10:10 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add test for ssh-keygen printing of SSHFP records.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fde9566b56eeb980e149bbe157a884838507c46b
+
+commit 52c3b6985ef1d5dadb4c4fe212f8b3a78ca96812
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jul 17 00:38:11 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: wrap some long lines
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f5186b1466656762dae37d3e569438d900c350d
+
+commit 43ec991a782791d0b3f42898cd789f99a07bfaa4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jul 17 00:36:53 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix sftp on ControlPersist connections, broken by recent
+    
+    SessionType change; spotted by sthen@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c5ddc5698790ae6ff50d2a4f8f832f0eeeaa234
+
+commit 073f45c236550f158c9a94003e4611c07dea5279
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 16 09:00:23 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Explicitly check for and start time-based rekeying in the
+    
+    client and server mainloops.
+    
+    Previously the rekey timeout could expire but rekeying would not start
+    until a packet was sent or received. This could cause us to spin in
+    select() on the rekey timeout if the connection was quiet.
+    
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4356cf50d7900f3df0a8f2117d9e07c91b9ff987
+
+commit ef7c4e52d5d840607f9ca3a302a4cbb81053eccf
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jul 14 06:46:38 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: reorder SessionType; ok djm
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7dd0b39e942b1caf4976a0b1cf0fed33d05418c
+
+commit 8aa2f9aeb56506dca996d68ab90ab9c0bebd7ec3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Jul 14 11:26:50 2021 +1000
+
+    Make whitespace consistent.
+
+commit 4f4297ee9b8a39f4dfd243a74c5f51f9e7a05723
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Jul 14 11:26:12 2021 +1000
+
+    Add ARM64 Linux self-hosted runner.
+
+commit eda8909d1b0a85b9c3804a04d03ec6738fd9dc7f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jul 13 23:48:36 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: add a SessionType directive to ssh_config, allowing the
+    
+    configuration file to offer equivalent control to the -N (no session) and -s
+    (subsystem) command-line flags.
+    
+    Part of GHPR#231 by Volker Diels-Grabsch with some minor tweaks;
+    feedback and ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 726ee931dd4c5cc7f1d7a187b26f41257f9a2d12
+
+commit 7ae69f2628e338ba6e0eae7ee8a63bcf8fea7538
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 12 02:12:22 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix some broken tests; clean up output
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1d5038edb511dc4ce1622344c1e724626a253566
+
+commit f5fc6a4c3404bbf65c21ca6361853b33d78aa87e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Jul 12 18:00:05 2021 +1000
+
+    Add configure-time detection for SSH_TIME_T_MAX.
+    
+    Should fix printing cert times exceeding INT_MAX (bz#3329) on platforms
+    were time_t is a long long.  The limit used is for the signed type, so if
+    some system has a 32bit unsigned time_t then the lower limit will still
+    be imposed and we would need to add some way to detect this.  Anyone using
+    an unsigned 64bit can let us know when it starts being a problem.
+
+commit fd2d06ae4442820429d634c0a8bae11c8e40c174
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 12 06:22:57 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Make limit for time_t test unconditional in the
+    
+    format_absolute_time fix for bz#3329 that allows printing of timestamps past
+    INT_MAX. This was incorrectly included with the previous commit.   Based on
+    discussion with djm@.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 835936f6837c86504b07cabb596b613600cf0f6e
+
+commit 6c29b387cd64a57b0ec8ae7d2c8d02789d88fcc3
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 12 06:08:57 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Use existing format_absolute_time() function when
+    
+    printing cert validity instead of doing it inline.  Part of bz#3329.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a13d4e3c4f59644c23745eb02a09b2a4e717c00c
+
+commit 99981d5f8bfa383791afea03f6bce8454e96e323
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 9 09:55:56 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: silence redundant error message; reported by Fabian Stelzer
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9349a703016579a60557dafd03af2fe1d44e6aa2
+
+commit e86097813419b49d5bff5c4b51d1c3a5d4d2d804
+Author: John Ericson <John.Ericson@Obsidian.Systems>
+Date:   Sat Dec 26 11:40:49 2020 -0500
+
+    Re-indent krb5 section after pkg-config addition.
+
+commit 32dd2daa56c294e40ff7efea482c9eac536d8cbb
+Author: John Ericson <John.Ericson@Obsidian.Systems>
+Date:   Sat Dec 26 11:40:49 2020 -0500
+
+    Support finding Kerberos via pkg-config
+    
+    This makes cross compilation easier.
+
+commit def7a72234d7e4f684d72d33a0f7229f9eee0aa4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jul 9 14:34:06 2021 +1000
+
+    Update comments about EGD to include prngd.
+
+commit b5d23150b4e3368f4983fd169d432c07afeee45a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 5 01:21:07 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Fix a couple of whitespace things. Portable already has
+    
+    these so this removes two diffs between the two.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 769f017ebafd8e741e337b3e9e89eb5ac73c9c56
+
+commit 8f57be9f279b8e905f9883066aa633c7e67b31cf
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 5 01:16:46 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Order includes as per style(9). Portable already has
+    
+    these so this removes a handful of diffs between the two.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8bd7452d809b199c19bfc49511a798f414eb4a77
+
+commit b75624f8733b3ed9e240f86cac5d4a39dae11848
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 5 00:50:25 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Remove comment referencing now-removed
+    
+    RhostsRSAAuthentication.  ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3d864bfbd99a1d4429a58e301688f3be464827a9
+
+commit b67eb12f013c5441bb4f0893a97533582ad4eb13
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jul 5 00:25:42 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: allow spaces to appear in usernames for local to remote,
+    
+    and scp -3 remote to remote copies. with & ok dtucker bz#1164
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e9b550f3a85ffbb079b6720833da31317901d6dd
+
+commit 8c4ef0943e574f614fc7c6c7e427fd81ee64ab87
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 2 07:20:44 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Remove obsolete comments about SSHv1 auth methods. ok
+    
+    djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6060f70966f362d8eb4bec3da2f6c4712fbfb98f
+
+commit 88908c9b61bcb99f16e8d398fc41e2b3b4be2003
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jul 3 23:00:19 2021 +1000
+
+    Remove reference to ChallengeResponse.
+    
+    challenge_response_authentication was removed from the struct, keeping
+    kbd_interactive_authentication.
+
+commit 321874416d610ad2158ce6112f094a4862c2e37f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jul 3 20:38:09 2021 +1000
+
+    Move signal.h up include order to match upstream.
+
+commit 4fa83e2d0e32c2dd758653e0359984bbf1334f32
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jul 3 20:36:06 2021 +1000
+
+    Remove old OpenBSD version marker.
+    
+    Looks like an accidental leftover from a sync.
+
+commit 9d5e31f55d5f3899b72645bac41a932d298ad73b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jul 3 20:34:19 2021 +1000
+
+    Remove duplicate error on error path.
+    
+    There's an extra error() call on the listen error path, it looks like
+    its removal was missed during an upstream sync.
+
+commit 888c459925c7478ce22ff206c9ac1fb812a40caf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jul 3 20:32:46 2021 +1000
+
+    Remove some whitespace not in upstream.
+    
+    Reduces diff vs OpenBSD by a small amount.
+
+commit 4d2d4d47a18d93f3e0a91a241a6fdb545bbf7dc2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jul 3 19:27:43 2021 +1000
+
+    Replace remaining references to ChallengeResponse.
+    
+    Portable had a few additional references to ChallengeResponse related to
+    UsePAM, replaces these with equivalent keyboard-interactive ones.
+
+commit 53237ac789183946dac6dcb8838bc3b6b9b43be1
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jul 3 19:23:28 2021 +1000
+
+    Sync remaining ChallengeResponse removal.
+    
+    These were omitted from commit 88868fd131.
+
+commit 2c9e4b319f7e98744b188b0f58859d431def343b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Jul 3 19:17:31 2021 +1000
+
+    Disable rocky84 to figure out why agent test fails
+
+commit bfe19197a92b7916f64a121fbd3c179abf15e218
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jul 2 15:43:28 2021 +1000
+
+    Remove now-unused SSHv1 enums.
+    
+    sRhostsRSAAuthentication and sRSAAuthentication are protocol 1 options
+    and are no longer used.
+
+commit c73b02d92d72458a5312bd098f32ce88868fd131
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 2 05:11:20 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Remove references to ChallengeResponseAuthentication in
+    
+    favour of KbdInteractiveAuthentication.  The former is what was in SSHv1, the
+    latter is what is in SSHv2 (RFC4256) and they were treated as somewhat but
+    not entirely equivalent.  We retain the old name as deprecated alias so
+    config files continue to work and a reference in the man page for people
+    looking for it.
+    
+    Prompted by bz#3303 which pointed out the discrepancy between the two
+    when used with Match.  Man page help & ok jmc@, with & ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c1bff8e5c9852cfcdab1f3ea94dfef5a22f3b7e
+
+commit f841fc9c8c7568a3b5d84a4cc0cefacb7dbc16b9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jul 2 15:20:32 2021 +1000
+
+    Fix ifdefs around get_random_bytes_prngd.
+    
+    get_random_bytes_prngd() is used if either of PRNGD_PORT or PRNGD_SOCKET
+    are defined, so adjust ifdef accordingly.
+
+commit 0767627cf66574484b9c0834500b42ea04fe528a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Jul 2 14:30:23 2021 +1000
+
+    wrap get_random_bytes_prngd() in ifdef
+    
+    avoid unused static function warning
+
+commit f93fdc4de158386efe1116bd44c5b3f4a7a82c25
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Jun 28 13:06:37 2021 +1000
+
+    Add rocky84 test target.
+
+commit d443006c0ddfa7f6a5bd9c0ae92036f3d5f2fa3b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 25 06:30:22 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix decoding of X.509 subject name; from Leif Thuresson
+    
+    via bz3327 ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ea2e28f39750dd388b7e317bc43dd997a217ae8
+
+commit 2a5704ec142202d387fda2d6872fd4715ab81347
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 25 06:20:39 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Use better language to refer to the user. From l1ving
+    
+    via github PR#250, ok jmc@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07ca3526626996613e128aeddf7748c93c4d6bbf
+
+commit 4bdf7a04797a0ea1c431a9d54588417c29177d19
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 25 03:38:17 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Replace SIGCHLD/notify_pipe kludge with pselect.
+    
+    Previously sshd's SIGCHLD handler would wake up select() by writing a
+    byte to notify_pipe.  We can remove this by blocking SIGCHLD, checking
+    for child terminations then passing the original signal mask through
+    to pselect.  This ensures that the pselect will immediately wake up if
+    a child terminates between wait()ing on them and the pselect.
+    
+    In -portable, for platforms that do not have pselect the kludge is still
+    there but is hidden behind a pselect interface.
+    
+    Based on other changes for bz#2158, ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 202c85de0b3bdf1744fe53529a05404c5480d813
+
+commit c9f7bba2e6f70b7ac1f5ea190d890cb5162ce127
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jun 25 15:08:18 2021 +1000
+
+    Move closefrom() to before first malloc.
+    
+    When built against tcmalloc, tcmalloc allocates a descriptor for its
+    internal use, so calling closefrom() afterward causes the descriptor
+    number to be reused resulting in a corrupted connection.  Moving the
+    closefrom a little earlier should resolve this.  From kircherlike at
+    outlook.com via bz#3321, ok djm@
+
+commit 7ebfe4e439853b88997c9cfc2ff703408a1cca92
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jun 18 20:41:45 2021 +1000
+
+    Put second -lssh in link line for sftp-server.
+    
+    When building --without-openssl the recent port-prngd.c change adds
+    a dependency on atomicio, but since nothing else in sftp-server uses
+    it, the linker may not find it.  Add a second -lssh similar to other
+    binaries.
+
+commit e409d7966785cfd9f5970e66a820685c42169717
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jun 18 18:34:08 2021 +1000
+
+    Try EGD/PRNGD if random device fails.
+    
+    When built --without-openssl, try EGD/PRGGD (if configured) as a last
+    resort before failing.
+
+commit e43a898043faa3a965dbaa1193cc60e0b479033d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jun 18 18:32:51 2021 +1000
+
+    Split EGD/PRNGD interface into its own file.
+    
+    This will allow us to use it when building --without-openssl.
+
+commit acb2887a769a1b1912cfd7067f3ce04fad240260
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Jun 17 21:03:19 2021 +1000
+
+    Handle GIDs > 2^31 in getgrouplist.
+    
+    When compiled in 32bit mode, the getgrouplist implementation may fail
+    for GIDs greater than LONG_MAX.  Analysis and change from ralf.winkel
+    at tui.com.
+
+commit 31fac20c941126281b527605b73bff30a8f02edd
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jun 10 09:46:28 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Use $SUDO when reading sshd's pidfile here too.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6bfb0d455d493f24839034a629c5306f84dbd409
+
+commit a3a58acffc8cc527f8fc6729486d34e4c3d27643
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jun 10 09:43:51 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Use $SUDO when reading sshd's pidfile in case it was
+    
+    created with a very restrictive umask.  This resyncs with -portable.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 07fd2af06df759d4f64b82c59094accca1076a5d
+
+commit 249ad4ae51cd3bc235e75a4846eccdf8b1416611
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jun 10 09:37:59 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Set umask when creating hostkeys to prevent excessive
+    
+    permissions warning.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 382841db0ee28dfef7f7bffbd511803e1b8ab0ef
+
+commit 9d0892153c005cc65897e9372b01fa66fcbe2842
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jun 10 03:45:31 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add regress test for SIGHUP restart
+    
+    while handling active and unauthenticated clients.  Should catch anything
+    similar to the pselect bug just fixed in sshd.c.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3b3c19b5e75e43af1ebcb9586875b3ae3a4cac73
+
+commit 73f6f191f44440ca3049b9d3c8e5401d10b55097
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Jun 10 03:14:14 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Continue accept loop when pselect
+    
+    returns -1, eg if it was interrupted by a signal.  This should prevent
+    the hang discovered by sthen@ wherein sshd receives a SIGHUP while it has
+    an unauthenticated child and goes on to a blocking read on a notify_pipe.
+    feedback deraadt@, ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0243c1c5544fca0974dae92cd4079543a3fceaa0
+
+commit c785c0ae134a8e8b5c82b2193f64c632a98159e4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jun 8 22:30:27 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: test that UserKnownHostsFile correctly accepts multiple
+    
+    arguments; would have caught readconf.c r1.356 regression
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 71ca54e66c2a0211b04999263e56390b1f323a6a
+
+commit 1a6f6b08e62c78906a3032e8d9a83e721c84574e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jun 8 22:06:12 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix regression in r1.356: for ssh_config options that
+    
+    accepted multiple string arguments, ssh was only recording the first.
+    Reported by Lucas via bugs@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7cbf182f7449bf1cb7c5b4452667dc2b41170d6d
+
+commit 78e30af3e2b2dd540a341cc827c6b98dd8b0a6de
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jun 8 07:40:12 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: test argv_split() optional termination on comments
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9fd1c4a27a409897437c010cfd79c54b639a059c
+
+commit a023138957ea2becf1c7f93fcc42b0aaac6f2b03
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jun 8 07:05:27 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add testcases from bz#3319 for IPQoS and TunnelDevice
+    
+    being overridden on the command line.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 801674d5d2d02abd58274a78cab2711f11de14a8
+
+commit 660cea10b2cdc11f13ba99c89b1bbb368a4d9ff2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jun 8 06:52:43 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: sprinkle some "# comment" at end of configuration lines
+    
+    to test comment handling
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cb82fbf40bda5c257a9f742c63b1798e5a8fdda7
+
+commit acc9c32dcb6def6c7d3688bceb4c0e59bd26b411
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jun 8 06:51:47 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: more descriptive failure message
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5300f6faf1d9e99c0cd10827b51756c5510e3509
+
+commit ce04dd4eae23d1c9cf7c424a702f48ee78573bc1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jun 7 01:16:34 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: test AuthenticationMethods inside a Match block as well
+    
+    as in the main config section
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ebe0a686621b7cb8bb003ac520975279c28747f7
+
+commit 9018bd821fca17e26e92f7a7e51d9b24cd62f2db
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jun 7 00:00:50 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: prepare for stricter sshd_config parsing that will refuse
+    
+    a config that has {Allow,Deny}{Users,Groups} on a line with no subsequent
+    arguments. Such lines are permitted but are nonsensical noops ATM
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ef65463fcbc0bd044e27f3fe400ea56eb4b8f650
+
+commit a10f929d1ce80640129fc5b6bc1acd9bf689169e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jun 8 07:09:42 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: switch sshd_config parsing to argv_split()
+    
+    similar to the previous commit, this switches sshd_config parsing to
+    the newer tokeniser. Config parsing will be a little stricter wrt
+    quote correctness and directives appearing without arguments.
+    
+    feedback and ok markus@
+    
+    tested in snaps for the last five or so days - thanks Theo and those who
+    caught bugs
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c4305631d20c2d194661504ce11e1f68b20d93e
+
+commit ea9e45c89a4822d74a9d97fef8480707d584da4d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jun 8 07:07:15 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Switch ssh_config parsing to use argv_split()
+    
+    This fixes a couple of problems with the previous tokeniser,
+    strdelim()
+    
+    1. strdelim() is permissive wrt accepting '=' characters. This is
+      intended to allow it to tokenise "Option=value" but because it
+      cannot keep state, it will incorrectly split "Opt=val=val2".
+    2. strdelim() has rudimentry handling of quoted strings, but it
+      is incomplete and inconsistent. E.g. it doesn't handle escaped
+      quotes inside a quoted string.
+    3. It has no support for stopping on a (unquoted) comment. Because
+      of this readconf.c r1.343 added chopping of lines at '#', but
+      this caused a regression because these characters may legitimately
+      appear inside quoted strings.
+    
+    The new tokeniser is stricter is a number of cases, including #1 above
+    but previously it was also possible for some directives to appear
+    without arguments. AFAIK these were nonsensical in all cases, and the
+    new tokeniser refuses to accept them.
+    
+    The new code handles quotes much better, permitting quoted space as
+    well as escaped closing quotes. Finally, comment handling should be
+    fixed - the tokeniser will terminate only on unquoted # characters.
+    
+    feedback & ok markus@
+    
+    tested in snaps for the last five or so days - thanks Theo and those who
+    caught bugs
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc72fd12af9d5398f4d9e159d671f9269c5b14d5
+
+commit d786424986c04d1d375f231fda177c8408e05c3e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jun 8 07:02:46 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Check if IPQoS or TunnelDevice are already set before
+    
+    overriding. Prevents values in config files from overriding values supplied
+    on the command line.  bz#3319, ok markus.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3b08b898c324debb9195e6865d8999406938f74
+
+commit aae4b4d3585b9f944d7dbd3c9e5ba0006c55e457
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jun 8 06:54:40 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Allow argv_split() to optionally terminate tokenisation
+    
+    when it encounters an unquoted comment.
+    
+    Add some additional utility function for working with argument
+    vectors, since we'll be switching to using them to parse
+    ssh/sshd_config shortly.
+    
+    ok markus@ as part of a larger diff; tested in snaps
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fd9c108cef2f713f24e3bc5848861d221bb3a1ac
+
+commit da9f9acaac5bab95dca642b48e0c8182b246ab69
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Jun 7 19:19:23 2021 +1000
+
+    Save logs on failure for upstream test
+
+commit 76883c60161e5f3808787085a27a8c37f8cc4e08
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Jun 7 14:36:32 2021 +1000
+
+    Add obsdsnap-i386 upstream test target.
+
+commit d45b9c63f947ec5ec314696e70281f6afddc0ac3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Jun 7 03:38:38 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix debug message when finding a private key to match a
+    
+    certificate being attempted for user authentication. Previously it would
+    print the certificate's path, whereas it was supposed to be showing the
+    private key's path. Patch from Alex Sherwin via GHPR247
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5af3be66d0f22c371dc1fe6195e774a18b2327b
+
+commit 530739d42f6102668aecd699be0ce59815c1eceb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jun 6 11:34:16 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Match host certificates against host public keys, not private
+    
+    keys. Allows use of certificates with private keys held in a ssh-agent.
+    Reported by Miles Zhou in bz3524; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25f5bf70003126d19162862d9eb380bf34bac22a
+
+commit 4265215d7300901fd7097061c7517688ade82f8e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jun 6 03:40:39 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Client-side workaround for a bug in OpenSSH 7.4: this release
+    
+    allows RSA/SHA2 signatures for public key authentication but fails to
+    advertise this correctly via SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO. This causes clients of these
+    server to incorrectly match PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms and potentially refuse
+    to offer valid keys.
+    
+    Reported by and based on patch from Gordon Messmer via bz3213, thanks
+    also for additional analysis by Jakub Jelen. ok dtucker
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d6d0b7351d5d44c45f3daaa26efac65847a564f7
+
+commit bda270d7fb8522d43c21a79a4b02a052d7c64de8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jun 6 03:17:02 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: degrade gracefully if a sftp-server offers the
+    
+    limits@openssh.com extension but fails when the client tries to invoke it.
+    Reported by Hector Martin via bz3318
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd9d1839c41811616ede4da467e25746fcd9b967
+
+commit d345d5811afdc2d6923019b653cdd93c4cc95f76
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Jun 6 03:15:39 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: the limits@openssh.com extension was incorrectly marked
+    
+    as an operation that writes to the filesystem, which made it unavailable in
+    sftp-server read-only mode. Spotted by Hector Martin via bz3318
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f054465230787e37516c4b57098fc7975e00f067
+
+commit 2b71010d9b43d7b8c9ec1bf010beb00d98fa765a
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Jun 5 13:47:00 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: PROTOCOL.certkeys: update reference from IETF draft to
+    
+    RFC
+    
+    Also fix some typos.
+    ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e855b6c5a22b5b13f8ffa3897a868e40d349b44
+
+commit aa99b2d9a3e45b943196914e8d8bf086646fdb54
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jun 4 23:41:29 2021 +1000
+
+    Clear notify_pipe from readset if present.
+    
+    Prevents leaking an implementation detail to the caller.
+
+commit 6de8dadf6b4d0627d35bca0667ca44b1d61c2c6b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jun 4 23:24:25 2021 +1000
+
+    space->tabs.
+
+commit c8677065070ee34c05c7582a9c2f58d8642e552d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jun 4 18:39:48 2021 +1000
+
+    Add pselect implementation for platforms without.
+    
+    This is basically the existing notify_pipe kludge from serverloop.c
+    moved behind a pselect interface.  It works by installing a signal
+    handler that writes to a pipe that the select is watching, then calls
+    the original handler.
+    
+    The select call in serverloop will become pselect soon, at which point the
+    kludge will be removed from thereand will only exist in the compat layer.
+    Original code by markus, help from djm.
+
+commit 7cd7f302d3a072748299f362f9e241d81fcecd26
+Author: Vincent Brillault <vincent.brillault@cern.ch>
+Date:   Sun May 24 09:15:06 2020 +0200
+
+    auth_log: dont log partial successes as failures
+    
+    By design, 'partial' logins are successful logins, so initially with
+    authenticated set to 1, for which another authentication is required. As
+    a result, authenticated is always reset to 0 when partial is set to 1.
+    However, even if authenticated is 0, those are not failed login
+    attempts, similarly to attempts with authctxt->postponed set to 1.
+
+commit e7606919180661edc7f698e6a1b4ef2cfb363ebf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 4 06:19:07 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: The RB_GENERATE_STATIC(3) macro expands to a series of
+    
+    function definitions and not a statement, so there should be no semicolon
+    following them. Patch from Michael Forney
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c975dd180580f0bdc0a4d5b7d41ab1f5e9b7bedd
+
+commit c298c4da574ab92df2f051561aeb3e106b0ec954
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 4 05:59:18 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: rework authorized_keys example section, removing irrelevant
+    
+    stuff, de-wrapping the example lines and better aligning the examples with
+    common usage and FAQs; ok jmc
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d59f1c9281f828148e2a2e49eb9629266803b75c
+
+commit d9cb35bbec5f623589d7c58fc094817b33030f35
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 4 05:10:03 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: adjust SetEnv description to clarify $TERM handling
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b8cc0124856bc1094949d55615e5c44390bcb22
+
+commit 771f57a8626709f2ad207058efd68fbf30d31553
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 4 05:09:08 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Switch the listening select loop from select() to
+    
+    pselect() and mask signals while checking signal flags, umasking for pselect
+    and restoring afterwards. Also restore signals before sighup_restart so they
+    don't remain blocked after restart.
+    
+    This prevents a race where a SIGTERM or SIGHUP can arrive between
+    checking the flag and calling select (eg if sshd is processing a
+    new connection) resulting in sshd not shutting down until the next
+    time it receives a new connection.  bz#2158, with & ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bf85bf880fd78e00d7478657644fcda97b9a936f
+
+commit f64f8c00d158acc1359b8a096835849b23aa2e86
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 4 05:02:40 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: allow ssh_config SetEnv to override $TERM, which is otherwise
+    
+    handled specially by the protocol. Useful in ~/.ssh/config to set TERM to
+    something generic (e.g. "xterm" instead of "xterm-256color") for destinations
+    that lack terminfo entries. feedback and ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38b1ef4d5bc159c7d9d589d05e3017433e2d5758
+
+commit 60107677dc0ce1e93c61f23c433ad54687fcd9f5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Jun 4 04:02:21 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: correct extension name "no-presence-required" =>
+    
+    "no-touch-required"
+    
+    document "verify-required" option
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1879ff4062cf61d79b515e433aff0bf49a6c55c5
+
+commit ecc186e46e3e30f27539b4311366dfda502f0a08
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Jun 2 13:54:11 2021 +1000
+
+    Retire fbsd7 test target.
+    
+    It's the slowest of the selfhosted targets (since it's 32bit but has
+    most of the crypto algos). We still have coverage for 32bit i386.
+
+commit 5de0867b822ec48b5eec9abde0f5f95d1d646546
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Jun 2 11:21:40 2021 +1000
+
+    Check for $OPENSSL in md5 fallback too.
+
+commit 1db69d1b6542f8419c04cee7fd523a4a11004be2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Jun 2 11:17:54 2021 +1000
+
+    Add dfly60 target.
+
+commit a3f2dd955f1c19cad387a139f0e719af346ca6ef
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Jun 2 00:17:45 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Merge back shell portability changes
+    
+    bringing it back in sync with -portable.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c07905ba931e66ad7d849b87b7d19648007175d1
+
+commit 9d482295c9f073e84d75af46b720a1c0f7ec2867
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Jun 1 23:56:20 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Use a default value for $OPENSSL,
+    
+    allowing it to be overridden. Do the same in the PuTTY tests since it's
+    needed there and not exported by test-exec.sh.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c49dcd6aa7602a8606b7afa192196ca1fa65de16
+
+commit 07660b3c99f8ea74ddf4a440e55c16c9f7fb3dd1
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon May 24 10:25:18 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Find openssl binary via environment variable. This
+    
+    allows overriding if necessary (eg in -portable where we're testing against a
+    specific version of OpenSSL).
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 491f39cae9e762c71aa4bf045803d077139815c5
+
+commit 1a4d1da9188d7c88f646b61f0d6a3b34f47c5439
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 21 04:03:47 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix memleak in test
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5e529d0982aa04666604936df43242e97a7a6f81
+
+commit 60455a5d98065a73ec9a1f303345856bbd49aecc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 21 03:59:01 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: also check contents of remaining string
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d526fa07253f4eebbc7d6205a0ab3d491ec71a28
+
+commit 39f6cd207851d7b67ca46903bfce4a9f615b5b1c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 21 03:48:07 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: unit test for misc.c:strdelim() that mostly servces to
+    
+    highlight its inconsistencies
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8d2bf970fcc01ccc6e36a5065f89b9c7fa934195
+
+commit 7a3a1dd2c7d4461962acbcc0ebee9445ba892be0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu May 27 21:23:15 2021 +1000
+
+    Put minix3 config in the host-specific block.
+
+commit 59a194825f12fff8a7f75d91bf751ea17645711b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon May 31 06:48:42 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Hash challenge supplied by client during FIDO key enrollment
+    
+    prior to passing it to libfido2, which does expect a hash.
+    
+    There is no effect for users who are simply generating FIDO keys using
+    ssh-keygen - by default we generate a random 256 bit challenge, but
+    people building attestation workflows around our tools should now have
+    a more consistent experience (esp. fewer failures when they fail to
+    guess the magic 32-byte challenge length requirement).
+    
+    ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b8d5363a6a7ca3b23dc28f3ca69470472959f2b5
+
+commit eb68e669bc8ab968d4cca5bf1357baca7136a826
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu May 27 21:14:15 2021 +1000
+
+    Include login_cap.h for login_getpwclass override.
+    
+    On minix3, login_getpwclass is __RENAME'ed to __login_getpwclass50 so
+    without this the include overriding login_getpwclass causes a compile
+    error.
+
+commit 2063af71422501b65c7a92a5e14c0e6a3799ed89
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu May 27 21:13:38 2021 +1000
+
+    Add minix3 test target.
+
+commit 2e1efcfd9f94352ca5f4b6958af8a454f8cf48cd
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed May 26 01:47:24 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix SEGV in UpdateHostkeys debug() message, triggered
+    
+    when the update removed more host keys than remain present. Fix tested by
+    reporter James Cook, via bugs@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44f641f6ee02bb957f0c1d150495b60cf7b869d3
+
+commit 9acd76e6e4d2b519773e7119c33cf77f09534909
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun May 23 18:22:57 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh: The client configuration keyword is
+    
+    "hostbasedacceptedalgorithms"
+    
+    This fixes a mistake that slipped in when "HostbasedKeyTypes" was
+    renamed to "HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms".
+    
+    Bug report by zack@philomathiclife.com
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d745a7e8e50b2589fc56877f322ea204bc784f38
+
+commit 078a0e60c92700da4c536c93c007257828ccd05b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue May 25 11:40:47 2021 +1000
+
+    Rename README.md to ci-status.md.
+    
+    The original intent was to provide a status page for the CIs configured
+    in that directory, but it had the side effect of replacing the top-level
+    README.md.
+
+commit 7be4ac813662f68e89f23c50de058a49aa32f7e4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed May 19 01:24:05 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: restore blocking status on stdio fds before close
+    
+    ssh(1) needs to set file descriptors to non-blocking mode to operate
+    but it was not restoring the original state on exit. This could cause
+    problems with fds shared with other programs via the shell, e.g.
+    
+    > $ cat > test.sh << _EOF
+    > #!/bin/sh
+    > {
+    >         ssh -Fnone -oLogLevel=verbose ::1 hostname
+    >         cat /usr/share/dict/words
+    > } | sleep 10
+    > _EOF
+    > $ ./test.sh
+    > Authenticated to ::1 ([::1]:22).
+    > Transferred: sent 2352, received 2928 bytes, in 0.1 seconds
+    > Bytes per second: sent 44338.9, received 55197.4
+    > cat: stdout: Resource temporarily unavailable
+    
+    This restores the blocking status for fds 0,1,2 (stdio) before ssh(1)
+    abandons/closes them.
+    
+    This was reported as bz3280 and GHPR246; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8cc67346f05aa85a598bddf2383fcfcc3aae61ce
+
+commit c4902e1a653c67fea850ec99c7537f358904c0af
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon May 17 11:43:16 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix breakage of -W forwaring introduced in 1.554; reported by
+    
+    naddy@ and sthen@, ok sthen@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f72558e643a26dc4150cff6e5097b5502f6c85fd
+
+commit afea01381ad1fcea1543b133040f75f7542257e6
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon May 17 07:22:45 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Regenerate moduli.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83c93a2a07c584c347ac6114d6329b18ce515557
+
+commit be2866d6207b090615ff083c9ef212b603816a56
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon May 17 09:40:23 2021 +1000
+
+    Handle Android libc returning NULL pw->pw_passwd
+    
+    Reported by Luke Dashjr
+
+commit 5953c143008259d87342fb5155bd0b8835ba88e5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 14 05:20:32 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix previous: test saved no_shell_flag, not the one that just
+    
+    got clobbered
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b8deace085d9d941b2d02f810243b9c302e5355d
+
+commit 1e9fa55f4dc4b334651d569d3448aaa3841f736f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 14 03:09:48 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Fix ssh started with ControlPersist incorrectly executing a
+    
+    shell when the -N (no shell) option was specified. bz3290 reported by Richard
+    Schwab; patch from markus@ ok me
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea1ea4af16a95687302f7690bdbe36a6aabf87e1
+
+commit d1320c492f655d8f5baef8c93899d79dded217a5
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed May 12 11:34:30 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Clarify language about moduli. While both ends of the
+    
+    connection do need to use the same parameters (ie groups), the DH-GEX
+    protocol takes care of that and both ends do not need the same contents in
+    the moduli file, which is what the previous text suggested.  ok djm@ jmc@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f0c18cc8e79c2fbf537a432a9070ed94e96a622a
+
+commit d3cc4d650ce3e59f3e370b101778b0e8f1c02c4d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 7 04:11:51 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: include pid in LogVerbose spam
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aacb86f96ee90c7cb84ec27452374285f89a7f00
+
+commit e3c032333be5fdbbaf2751f6f478e044922b4ec4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 7 03:09:38 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: don't sigdie() in signal handler in privsep child process;
+    
+    this can end up causing sandbox violations per bz3286; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7f40b2141dca4287920da68ede812bff7ccfdda
+
+commit a4039724a3f2abac810735fc95cf9114a3856049
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 7 09:23:40 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Increase ConnectionAttempts from 4 to 10 as the tests
+    
+    occasionally time out on heavily loaded hosts.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 29a8cdef354fc9da471a301f7f65184770434f3a
+
+commit c0d7e36e979fa3cdb60f5dcb6ac9ad3fd018543b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 7 02:26:55 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: dump out a usable private key string too; inspired by Tyson
+    
+    Whitehead
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 65572d5333801cb2f650ebc778cbdc955e372058
+
+commit 24fee8973abdf1c521cd2c0047d89e86d9c3fc38
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri May 7 02:29:40 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: correct mistake in spec - the private key blobs are encoded
+    
+    verbatim and not as strings (i.e. no 4-byte length header)
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3606b5d443d72118c5b76c4af6dd87a5d5a4f837
+
+commit f43859159cc62396ad5d080f0b1f2635a67dac02
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue May 4 22:53:52 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Don't pass NULL as a string in debugging as it does not work
+    
+    on some platforms in -portable.  ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 937c892c99aa3c9c272a8ed78fa7c2aba3a44fc9
+
+commit ac31aa3c6341905935e75f0539cf4a61bbe99779
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon May 3 00:16:45 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: more debugging for UpdateHostKeys signature failures
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ee95f03875e1725df15d5e4bea3e73493d57d36
+
+commit 8e32e97e788e0676ce83018a742203614df6a2b3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat May 1 20:07:47 2021 +1000
+
+    Add obsd69 test target.
+
+commit f06893063597c5bb9d9e93f851c4070e77d2fba9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 30 04:29:53 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: a little debugging in the main mux process for status
+    
+    confirmation failures in multiplexed sessions
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6e27b87c95176107597035424e1439c3232bcb49
+
+commit e65cf00da6bc31e5f54603b7feb7252dc018c033
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 30 04:02:52 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Remove now-unused skey function prototypes leftover from
+    
+    skey removal.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2fc36d519fd37c6f10ce74854c628561555a94c3
+
+commit ae5f9b0d5c8126214244ee6b35aae29c21028133
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Apr 29 13:01:50 2021 +1000
+
+    Wrap sntrup761x25519 inside ifdef.
+    
+    From balu.gajjala at gmail.com via bz#3306.
+
+commit 70a8dc138a6480f85065cdb239915ad4b7f928cf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Apr 28 14:44:07 2021 +1000
+
+    Add status badges for Actions-based tests.
+
+commit 40b59024cc3365815381474cdf4fe423102e391b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Apr 28 12:22:11 2021 +1000
+
+    Add obsdsnap (OpenBSD snapshot) test target.
+
+commit e627067ec8ef9ae8e7a638f4dbac91d52dee3e6d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Apr 28 11:35:28 2021 +1000
+
+    Add test building upstream OpenBSD source.
+
+commit 1b8108ebd12fc4ed0fb39ef94c5ba122558ac373
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Apr 27 14:22:20 2021 +1000
+
+    Test against OpenSSL 1.1.0h instead of 1.1.0g.
+    
+    1.1.0g requires a perl glob module that's not installed by default.
+
+commit 9bc20efd39ce8525be33df3ee009f5a4564224f1
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Apr 27 12:37:59 2021 +1000
+
+    Use the default VM type for libcrypto ver tests.
+
+commit 9f79e80dc40965c2e73164531250b83b176c1eea
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Apr 27 12:24:10 2021 +1000
+
+    Always build OpenSSL shared.
+    
+    This is the default for current versions but we need it to test against
+    earlier versions.
+
+commit b3cc9fbdff2782eca79e33e02ac22450dc63bce9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Apr 27 09:18:02 2021 +1000
+
+    Fix custom OpenSSL tests.
+    
+    Check out specified OpenSSL version.  Install custom libcrypto where
+    configure expects to find it.  Remove unneeded OpenSSL config time
+    options.  Older OpenSSL versions were not make -j safe so remove it.
+
+commit 77532609874a99a19e3e2eb2d1b7fa93aef963bb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Apr 26 17:18:25 2021 +1000
+
+    Export CC and CFLAGS for c89 test.
+
+commit 33f62dfbe865f4de77980ab88774bf1eb5e4e040
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Apr 26 17:13:44 2021 +1000
+
+    Add c89 here too.
+
+commit da9d59f526fce58e11cba49cd8eb011dc0bf5677
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Apr 26 15:34:23 2021 +1000
+
+    Add test against OpenSSL w/out ECC.
+
+commit 29e194a752359ebf85bf7fce100f23a0477fc4de
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Apr 26 14:49:59 2021 +1000
+
+    Ensure we can still build with C89.
+
+commit a38016d369d21df5d35f761f2b67e175e132ba22
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Apr 26 14:29:03 2021 +1000
+
+    Interop test agains PuTTY.
+
+commit 095b0307a77be8803768857cc6c0963fa52ed85b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Apr 26 14:02:03 2021 +1000
+
+    Support testing against arbitary libcrytpo vers.
+    
+    Add tests against various LibreSSL and OpenSSL versions.
+
+commit b16082aa110fa7128ece2a9037ff420c4a285317
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Apr 26 13:35:44 2021 +1000
+
+    Add fbsd10 test target.
+
+commit 2c805f16b24ea37cc051c6018fcb05defab6e57a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Apr 25 14:15:02 2021 +1000
+
+    Disable compiler hardening on nbsd4.
+    
+    The system compiler supports -fstack-protector-all, but using it will
+    result in an internal compiler error on some files.
+
+commit 6a5d39305649da5dff1934ee54292ee0cebd579d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sun Apr 25 13:01:34 2021 +1000
+
+    Add nbsd3, nbsd4 and nbsd9 test targets.
+
+commit d1aed05bd2e4ae70f359a394dc60a2d96b88f78c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Apr 24 22:03:46 2021 +1000
+
+    Comment out nbsd2 test target for now.
+
+commit a6b4ec94e5bd5a8a18cd2c9942d829d2e5698837
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Apr 24 17:52:24 2021 +1000
+
+    Add OPENBSD ORIGINAL marker.
+
+commit 3737c9f66ee590255546c4b637b6d2be669a11eb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Apr 23 19:49:46 2021 +1000
+
+    Replace "==" (a bashism) with "=".
+
+commit a116b6f5be17a1dd345b7d54bf8aa3779a28a0df
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Apr 23 16:34:48 2021 +1000
+
+    Add nbsd2 test target.
+
+commit 196bf2a9bb771f45d9b0429cee7d325962233c44
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Apr 23 14:54:10 2021 +1000
+
+    Add obsd68 test target.
+
+commit e3ba6574ed69e8b7af725cf5e8a9edaac04ff077
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Apr 23 14:53:32 2021 +1000
+
+    Remove dependency on bash.
+
+commit db1f9ab8feb838aee9f5b99c6fd3f211355dfdcf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Apr 23 14:41:13 2021 +1000
+
+    Add obsd67 test target.
+
+commit c039a6bf79192fe1daa9ddcc7c87dd98e258ae7c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Apr 23 11:08:23 2021 +1000
+
+    Re-add macos-11.0 test target.
+
+commit a6db3a47b56adb76870d59225ffb90a65bc4daf2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Apr 23 10:28:28 2021 +1000
+
+    Add openindiana test target.
+
+commit 3fe7e73b025c07eda46d78049f1da8ed7dfc0c69
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Apr 23 10:26:35 2021 +1000
+
+    Test krb5 on Solaris 11 too.
+
+commit f57fbfe5eb02df1a91f1a237c4d27165afd87c13
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Apr 22 22:27:26 2021 +1000
+
+    Don't always set SUDO.
+    
+    Rely on sourcing configs to set as appropriate.
+
+commit e428f29402fb6ac140b52f8f12e06ece7bb104a0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Apr 22 22:26:08 2021 +1000
+
+    Remove now-unused 2nd arg to configs.
+
+commit cb4ff640d79b3c736879582139778f016bbb2cd7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Apr 21 01:08:04 2021 +1000
+
+    Add win10 test target.
+
+commit 4457837238072836b2fa3107d603aac809624983
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Apr 20 23:31:29 2021 +1000
+
+    Add nbsd8 test target.
+
+commit bd4fba22e14da2fa196009010aabec5a8ba9dd42
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Apr 17 09:55:47 2021 +1000
+
+    Add obsd51 target.
+
+commit 9403d0e805c77a5741ea8c3281bbe92558c2f125
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Apr 16 18:14:25 2021 +1000
+
+    Add fbsd13 target.
+
+commit e86968280e358e62649d268d41f698d64d0dc9fa
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 16 13:55:25 2021 +1000
+
+    depend
+
+commit 2fb25ca11e8b281363a2a2a4dec4c497a1475d9a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 16 13:53:02 2021 +1000
+
+    crank version in README and RPM spec files
+
+commit b2b60ebab0cb77b5bc02d364d72e13db882f33ae
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Apr 16 03:42:00 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: openssh-8.6
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5f3e133c846127ec114812248bc17eff07c3e19
+
+commit faf2b86a46c9281d237bcdec18c99e94a4eb820a
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Apr 15 16:24:31 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: do not pass file/func to monitor; noted by Ilja van Sprundel;
+    
+    ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85ae5c063845c410283cbdce685515dcd19479fa
+
+commit 2dc328023f60212cd29504fc05d849133ae47355
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Apr 14 11:42:55 2021 +1000
+
+    sshd don't exit on transient read errors
+    
+    openssh-8.5 introduced a regression that would cause sshd to exit
+    because of transient read errors on the network socket (e.g. EINTR,
+    EAGAIN). Reported by balu.gajjala AT gmail.com via bz3297
+
+commit d5d6b7d76d171a2e6861609dcd92e714ee62ad88
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Apr 10 18:45:00 2021 +1000
+
+    perform report_failed_grab() inline
+
+commit ea996ce2d023aa3c6d31125e2c3ebda1cb42db8c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Apr 10 18:22:57 2021 +1000
+
+    dedicated gnome-ssk-askpass3 source
+    
+    Compatibility with Wayland requires that we use the gdk_seat_grab()
+    API for grabbing mouse/keyboard, however these API don't exist in
+    Gtk+2.
+    
+    This branches gnome-ssk-askpass2.c => gnome-ssk-askpass3.c and
+    makes the changes to use the gdk_seat_grab() instead of grabbing
+    mouse/focus separately via GDK.
+    
+    In the future, we can also use the branched file to avoid some
+    API that has been soft-deprecated in GTK+3, e.g. gtk_widget_modify_fg
+
+commit bfa5405da05d906ffd58216eb77c4375b62d64c2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Apr 8 15:18:15 2021 +1000
+
+    Ensure valgrind-out exists.
+    
+    Normally the regress tests would create it, but running the unit tests
+    on their own would fail because the directory did not exist.
+
+commit 1f189181f3ea09a9b08aa866f78843fec800874f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Apr 8 15:17:19 2021 +1000
+
+    Pass OBJ to unit test make invocation.
+    
+    At least the Valgrind unit tests uses $OBJ.
+
+commit f42b550c281d28bd19e9dd6ce65069164f3482b0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Apr 8 14:20:12 2021 +1000
+
+    Add pattern for valgrind-unit.
+
+commit 19e534462710e98737478fd9c44768b50c27c4c6
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Apr 8 13:31:08 2021 +1000
+
+    Run unit tests under valgrind.
+    
+    Run a separate build for the unit tests under Valgrind.  They take long
+    enough that running in parallel with the other Valgrind tests helps.
+
+commit 80032102d05e866dc2a48a5caf760cf42c2e090e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Apr 8 13:25:57 2021 +1000
+
+    ifdef out MIN and MAX.
+    
+    In -portable, defines.h ensures that these are defined, so redefining
+    potentially causes a warning.  We don't just delete it to make any
+    future code syncs a little but easier.  bz#3293.
+
+commit d1bd184046bc310c405f45da3614a1dc5b3e521a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Apr 7 10:23:51 2021 +1000
+
+    Remove only use of warn().
+    
+    The warn() function is only used in one place in portable and does not
+    exist upstream.  Upgrade the only instance it's used to fail()
+    (the privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect, from back when that was new) and
+    remove the now-unused function.
+
+commit fea8f4b1aa85026ad5aee5ad8e1599a8d5141fe0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Apr 7 10:18:32 2021 +1000
+
+    Move make_tmpdir() into portable-specific area.
+    
+    Reduces diff vs OpenBSD and makes it more likely diffs will apply
+    cleanly.
+
+commit 13e5fa2acffd26e754c6ee1d070d0afd035d4cb7
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Apr 6 23:57:56 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES environment variable to print the
+    
+    elapsed time in seconds of each test.  This depends on "date +%s" which is
+    not specified by POSIX but is commonly implemented.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ec3c8c19ff49b2192116a0a646ee7c9b944e8a9c
+
+commit ef4f46ab4387bb863b471bad124d46e8d911a79a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Apr 7 09:59:15 2021 +1000
+
+    Move the TEST_SSH_PORT section down a bit.
+    
+    This groups the portable-specific changes together and makes it a
+    little more likely that patches will apply cleanly.
+
+commit 3674e33fa70dfa1fe69b345bf576113af7b7be11
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Apr 7 10:05:10 2021 +1000
+
+    Further split Valgrind tests.
+    
+    Even split in two, the Valgrind tests take by far the longest to run,
+    so split them four ways to further increase parallelism.
+
+commit 961af266b861e30fce1e26170ee0dbb5bf591f29
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Apr 6 23:24:30 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: include "ssherr.h" not <ssherr.h>; from Balu Gajjala via
+    
+    bz#3292
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e9535cd9966eb2e69e73d1ede1f44905c30310bd
+
+commit e7d0a285dbdd65d8df16123ad90f15e91862f959
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Apr 7 08:50:38 2021 +1000
+
+    wrap struct rlimit in HAVE_GETRLIMIT too
+
+commit f283a6c2e0a9bd9369e18462acd00be56fbe5b0d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Wed Apr 7 08:20:35 2021 +1000
+
+    wrap getrlimit call in HAVE_GETRLIMIT; bz3291
+
+commit 679bdc4a5c9244f427a7aee9c14b0a0ed086da1f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Apr 6 09:07:33 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Don't check return value of unsetenv(). It's part of the
+    
+    environment setup and not part of the actual test, and some platforms
+    -portable runs on declare it as returning void, which prevents the test from
+    compiling.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 24f08543ee3cdebc404f2951f3e388cc82b844a1
+
+commit 320af2f3de6333aa123f1b088eca146a245e968a
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 4 11:36:56 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: remove stray inserts; from matthias schmidt
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c36ebdc54e14bbf1daad70c6a05479a073d5c63
+
+commit 801f710953b24dd2f21939171c622eac77c7484d
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Apr 4 06:11:24 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: missing comma; from kawashima james
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 31cec6bf26c6db4ffefc8a070715ebef274e68ea
+
+commit b3ca08cb174266884d44ec710a84cd64c12414ea
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Apr 5 23:46:42 2021 +1000
+
+    Install libcbor with libfido2.
+
+commit f3ca8af87a4c32ada660da12ae95cf03d190c083
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Apr 3 18:21:08 2021 +1100
+
+    enable authopt and misc unit tests
+    
+    Neither were wired into the build, both required some build
+    adaptations for -portable
+
+commit dc1b45841fb97e3d7f655ddbcfef3839735cae5f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Apr 3 06:58:30 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: typos in comments; GHPR#180 from Vill
+    
+    =?UTF-8?q?e=20Skytt=C3=A4?=
+    MIME-Version: 1.0
+    Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+    Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93c732381ae0e2b680c79e67c40c1814b7ceed2c
+
+commit 53ea05e09b04fd7b6dea66b42b34d65fe61b9636
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Apr 3 06:55:52 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: sync CASignatureAlgorithms lists with reality. GHPR#174 from
+    
+    Matt Hazinski
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f05e4ca54d7e67b90fe58fe1bdb1d2a37e0e2696
+
+commit 57ed647ee07bb883a2f2264231bcd1df6a5b9392
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Apr 3 17:47:37 2021 +1100
+
+    polish whitespace for portable files
+
+commit 31d8d231eb9377df474746a822d380c5d68d7ad6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Apr 3 06:18:40 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: highly polished whitespace, mostly fixing spaces-for-tab
+    
+    and bad indentation on continuation lines. Prompted by GHPR#185
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5c81f0cbdcc6144df1ce468ec1bac366d8ad6e9
+
+commit 34afde5c73b5570d6f8cce9b49993b23b77bfb86
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Apr 3 05:54:14 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: whitespace (tab after space)
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0e2b3f7674e985d3f7c27ff5028e690ba1c2efd4
+
+commit 7cd262c1c5a08cc7f4f30e3cab108ef089d0a57b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Apr 3 16:59:10 2021 +1100
+
+    Save config.h and config.log on failure too.
+
+commit 460aee9298f365357e9fd26851c22e0dca51fd6a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Apr 3 05:46:41 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix incorrect plural; from Ville Skyt
+    
+    =?UTF-8?q?t=C3=A4=20via=20GHPR#181?=
+    MIME-Version: 1.0
+    Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+    Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92f31754c6296d8f403d7c293e09dc27292d22c9
+
+commit 082804c14e548cada75c81003a3c68ee098138ee
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Apr 3 05:40:39 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: ensure that pkcs11_del_provider() is called before exit -
+    
+    some PKCS#11 providers get upset if C_Initialize is not matched with
+    C_Finalize.
+    
+    From Adithya Baglody via GHPR#234; ok markus
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8e770e03b416ee9a58f9762e162add900f832b6
+
+commit 464ebc82aa926dd132ec75a0b064574ef375675e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Apr 3 05:28:43 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: unused variable
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85f6a394c8e0f60d15ecddda75176f112007b205
+
+commit dc3c0be8208c488e64a8bcb7d9efad98514e0ffb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Apr 3 05:21:46 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Fix two problems in string->argv conversion: 1) multiple
+    
+    backslashes were not being dequoted correctly and 2) quoted space in the
+    middle of a string was being incorrectly split.
+    MIME-Version: 1.0
+    Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+    Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+    
+    A unit test for these cases has already been committed
+    
+    prompted by and based on GHPR#223 by Eero Häkkinen; ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d7ef27abb4eeeaf6e167e9312e4abe9e89faf1e4
+
+commit f75bcbba58a08c670727ece5e3f8812125969799
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Sat Apr 3 16:22:48 2021 +1100
+
+    missing bits from 259d648e
+
+commit 4cbc4a722873d9b68cb5496304dc050d7168df78
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 31 21:59:26 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: cannot effectively test posix-rename extension after
+    
+    changes in feature advertisment.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5e390bf88d379162aaa81b60ed86b34cb0c54d29
+
+commit 259d648e63e82ade4fe2c2c73c8b67fe57d9d049
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Mar 19 04:23:50 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: add a test for misc.c:argv_split(), currently fails
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ad6b96d6ebeb9643b698b3575bdd6f78bb144200
+
+commit 473ddfc2d6b602cb2d1d897e0e5c204de145cd9a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Mar 19 03:25:01 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: split
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f6c03c0e4c58b3b9e04b161757b8c10dc8378c34
+
+commit 1339800fef8d0dfbfeabff71b34670105bcfddd2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 31 22:16:34 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Use new limits@openssh.com protocol extension to let the
+    
+    client select good limits based on what the server supports. Split the
+    download and upload buffer sizes to allow them to be chosen independently.
+    
+    In practice (and assuming upgraded sftp/sftp-server at each end), this
+    increases the download buffer 32->64KiB and the upload buffer
+    32->255KiB.
+    
+    Patches from Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ebd61c80d85b951b794164acc4b2f2fd8e88606c
+
+commit 6653c61202d104e59c8e741329fcc567f7bc36b8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 31 21:58:07 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: do not advertise protocol extensions that have been
+    
+    disallowed by the command-line options (e.g. -p/-P/-R); ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3a8a76b3f5131741aca4b41bfab8d101c9926205
+
+commit 71241fc05db4bbb11bb29340b44b92e2575373d8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Mon Mar 29 15:14:25 2021 +1100
+
+    gnome-ssh-askpass3 is a valid target here
+
+commit 8a9520836e71830f4fccca066dba73fea3d16bda
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Mar 19 02:22:34 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: return non-zero exit status when killed by signal; bz#3281 ok
+    
+    dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 117b31cf3c807993077b596bd730c24da9e9b816
+
+commit 1269b8a686bf1254b03cd38af78167a04aa6ec88
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Mar 19 02:18:28 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: increase maximum SSH2_FXP_READ to match the maximum
+    
+    packet size. Also handle zero-length reads that are borderline nonsensical
+    but not explicitly banned by the spec. Based on patch from Mike Frysinger,
+    feedback deraadt@ ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e67d60d81bde7b84a742b4ee5a34001bdf80d9c
+
+commit 860b67604416640e8db14f365adc3f840aebcb1f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 16 06:15:43 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: don't let logging clobber errno before use
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce6cca370005c270c277c51c111bb6911e1680ec
+
+commit 5ca8a9216559349c56e09039c4335636fd85c241
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Mar 13 14:40:43 2021 +1100
+
+    Only call dh_set_moduli_file if using OpenSSL.
+    
+    Fixes link failure when configuring --without-openssl since dh.c is not
+    linked in.
+
+commit 867a7dcf003c51d5a83f83565771a35f0d9530ac
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Mar 13 13:52:53 2021 +1100
+
+    Don't install moduli during tests.
+    
+    Now that we have TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE pointing to the moduli in the
+    soure directory we don't need to install the file to prevent warnings
+    about it being missing.
+
+commit 0c054538fccf92b4a028008321d3711107bee6d5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Mar 13 13:51:26 2021 +1100
+
+    Point TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE at our own moduli.
+    
+    This will allow the test to run without requiring a moduli file
+    installed at the configured default path.
+
+commit 4d48219c72ab0c71238806f057f0e9630b7dd25c
+Author: jsg@openbsd.org <jsg@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Mar 12 05:18:01 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: spelling
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 478bc3db04f62f1048ed6e1765400f3ab325e60f
+
+commit 88057eb6df912abf2678ea5c846d9d9cbc92752c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Mar 12 04:08:19 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add ModuliFile keyword to sshd_config to specify the
+    
+    location of the "moduli" file containing the groups for DH-GEX.  This will
+    allow us to run tests against arbitrary moduli files without having to
+    install them. ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8df99d60b14ecaaa28f3469d01fc7f56bff49f66
+
+commit f07519a2af96109325b5a48b1af18b57601074ca
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Mar 12 03:43:40 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: pwcopy() struct passwd that we're going to reuse across a
+    
+    bunch of library calls; bz3273 ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6eafa977b2e44607b1b121f5de855107809b762
+
+commit 69d6d4b0c8a88d3d1288415605f36e2df61a2f12
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 10 06:32:27 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Import regenerated moduli file.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ac6c252d2a5be8fbad4c66d9d35db507c9dac5b
+
+commit e5895e8ecfac65086ea6b34d0d168409a66a15e1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 10 04:58:45 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: no need to reset buffer after send_msg() as that is done
+    
+    for us; patch from Mike Frysinger
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 565516495ff8362a38231e0f1a087b8ae66da59c
+
+commit 721948e67488767df0fa0db71ff2578ee2bb9210
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Mar 13 01:52:16 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE variable to allow overriding of the
+    
+    moduli file used during the test run.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: be10f785263120edb64fc87db0e0d6570a10220a
+
+commit 82fef71e20ffef425b932bec26f5bc46aa1ed41c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Mar 12 15:58:57 2021 +1100
+
+    Allow (but return EACCES) fstatat64 in sandbox.
+    
+    This is apparently used in some configurations of OpenSSL when glibc
+    has getrandom().  bz#3276, patch from Kris Karas, ok djm@
+
+commit 1cd67ee15ce3d192ab51be22bc4872a6a7a4b6d9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Mar 12 13:16:10 2021 +1100
+
+    Move generic includes outside of ifdef.
+    
+    This ensures that the macros in log.h are defined in the case where
+    either of --with-solaris-projects or --with-solaris-privs are used
+    without --with-solaris-contracts.  bz#3278.
+
+commit 2421a567a8862fe5102a4e7d60003ebffd1313dd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Mar 10 17:41:21 2021 +1100
+
+    Import regenerated moduli file.
+
+commit e99080c05d9d48dbbdb022538533d53ae1bd567d
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Mar 6 20:36:31 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Fix PRINT macro, the suffix param to sshlog() was missing.
+    
+    Also remove redundant __func__ prefix from PRINT calls as the macro already
+    adds __FILE__, __func__ and __LINE__.  From Christos Zoulas. OK dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01fdfa9c5541151b5461d9d7d6ca186a3413d949
+
+commit 160db17fc678ceb5e3fd4a7e006cc73866f484aa
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 3 22:41:49 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: don't sshbuf_get_u32() into an enum; reported by goetze
+    
+    AT dovetail.com via bz3269
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99a30a8f1df9bd72be54e21eee5c56a0f050921a
+
+commit cffd033817a5aa388764b6661855dcdaabab0588
+Author: sthen@openbsd.org <sthen@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 3 21:40:16 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: typo in other_hostkeys_message() display output, ok djm
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 276f58afc97b6f5826e0be58380b737603dbf5f5
+
+commit 7fe141b96b13bd7dc67ca985e14d55b9bd8a03fd
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Mar 3 08:42:52 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: needs FILE*; from Mike Frysinger
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dddb3aa9cb5792eeeaa37a1af67b5a3f25ded41d
+
+commit d2afd717e62d76bb41ab5f3ab4ce6f885c8edc98
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 2 21:31:47 2021 +1100
+
+    update depend
+
+commit f0c4eddf7cf224ebcac1f07ac8afdb30c6e9fe0a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 2 21:30:14 2021 +1100
+
+    update relnotes URL
+
+commit 67a8bb7fe62a381634db4c261720092e7d514a3d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 2 21:29:54 2021 +1100
+
+    update RPM spec version numbers
+
+commit 0a4b23b11b9a4e6eec332dd5c6ab2ac6f62aa164
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Mar 2 01:48:18 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: openssh-8.5
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 185e85d60fe042b8f8fa1ef29d4ef637bdf397d6
+
+commit de3866383b6720ad4cad83be76fe4c8aa111a249
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Mar 1 21:13:24 2021 +1100
+
+    Only upload config logs if configure fails.
+
+commit 85ff2a564ce838f8690050081176c1de1fb33116
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Feb 28 22:56:30 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Add %k to list of keywords. From
+    
+    =?UTF-8?q?=20Eero=20H=C3=A4kkinenvia=20bz#3267?=
+    MIME-Version: 1.0
+    Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+    Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c87f39a048cee2a7d1c8bab951b2f716256865e
+
+commit e774bac35933e71f924f4301786e7fb5bbe1422f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sun Feb 28 01:50:47 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Do not try to reset signal handler for signal 0 in
+    
+    subprocess. Prevents spurious debug message.  ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7f9785e292dcf304457566ad4637effd27ad1d46
+
+commit 351c5dbbd74ce300c4f058112f9731c867c6e225
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Sat Feb 27 23:42:37 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix alphabetic ordering of options; spotted by Iain Morgan
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f955fec617d74af0feb5b275831a9fee813d7ad5
+
+commit 0d1c9dbe578597f8d45d3ac7690df10d32d743e5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Feb 27 12:25:25 2021 +1100
+
+    zlib is now optional.
+
+commit b7c6ee7b437d9adfd19ef49d6c0f19f13f26f9b3
+Author: Jeffrey H. Johnson <61629094+johnsonjh@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date:   Sat Feb 27 01:04:58 2021 +0000
+
+    Fix punctuatio and typo in README.md.
+    
+    Some very minor fixes, missing 's' and punctuation.
+
+commit 6248b86074804983e8f7a2058856a516dbfe2924
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 26 16:45:50 2021 +1100
+
+    Revert "ssh: optional bind interface if bind address specified."
+    
+    This reverts commit 5a878a71a3528c2626aa1d331934fd964782d41c.
+    
+    Apologies - I accidentally pushed this.
+
+commit 493339a940b13be6071629c3c2dd5a3b6fc17023
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 26 15:45:38 2021 +1100
+
+    detech BSD libc hash functions in libbsd / libmd
+    
+    Some Linux distributions are shipping the BSD-style hashing functions
+    (e.g. SHA256Update) in libbsd and/or libmd. Detect this situation to
+    avoid header/replacement clashes later. ok dtucker@
+
+commit 5a878a71a3528c2626aa1d331934fd964782d41c
+Author: Dmitrii Turlupov <dturlupov@factor-ts.ru>
+Date:   Thu Feb 4 16:27:31 2021 +0300
+
+    ssh: optional bind interface if bind address specified.
+    
+    Allows the -b and -B options to be used together.
+    For example, when the interface is in the VRF.
+
+commit 1fe4d70df94d3bcc2b35fd57cad6b5fc4b2d7b16
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 26 04:18:42 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: remove this KEX fuzzer; it's awkward to use and doesn't play
+    
+    nice with popular fuzzing drivers like libfuzzer. AFAIK nobody has used it
+    but me.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cad919522b3ce90c147c95abaf81b0492ac296c9
+
+commit 24a3a67bd7421740d08803b84bd784e764107928
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 26 11:49:19 2021 +1100
+
+    Remove macos-11.00 PAM test target too.
+    
+    These are failing apparently due to some kind of infrastructure problem,
+    making it look like every commit is busted.
+
+commit 473201783f732ca8b0ec528b56aa55fa0d8cf717
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 26 00:16:58 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: a bit more debugging behind #ifdef DEBUG_SK
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9fbce14945721061cb322f0084c2165d33d1993
+
+commit fd9fa76a344118fe1ef10b9a6c9e85d39599e9a8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 26 01:15:10 2021 +1100
+
+    Remove macos-11.0 from the test target list.
+    
+    It has been consistently failing for the past few days with a github
+    actions internal error.
+
+commit 476ac8e9d33dbf96ef97aab812b8d7089d0cdc24
+Author: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+Date:   Wed Feb 24 23:43:16 2021 +0100
+
+    tidy the $INSTALLKEY_SH code layout a little
+    
+    SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 78178aa5017222773e4c23d9001391eeaeca8983
+
+commit 983e05ef3b81329d76d6a802b39ad0d1f637c06c
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Tue Sep 29 10:02:45 2020 +0000
+
+    if unable to add a missing newline, fail
+    
+    SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 76b25e18f55499ea9edb4c4d6dc4a80bebc36d95
+
+commit 3594b3b015f6014591da88ba71bf6ff010be7411
+Author: Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+Date:   Tue Oct 13 14:12:58 2020 +0200
+
+    use $AUTH_KEY_DIR, now that we have it
+    
+    since that was a change made since jjelen's commit was written
+    
+    also, quote the variables
+    
+    SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 588cd8e5cbf95f3443d92b9ab27c5d73ceaf6616
+
+commit 333e25f7bc43cee6e36f766e39dad6f9918b318c
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date:   Tue Sep 29 10:00:01 2020 +0000
+
+    restorecon the correct directory
+    
+    if using different path for authorized_keys file
+    
+    SSH-Copy-ID-Upstream: 791a3df47b48412c726bff6f7b1d190721e65d51
+
+commit 9beeab8a37a49a9e3ffb1972fff6621ee5bd7a71
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 25 03:27:34 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: s/PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes/PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms/
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3dbc005fa29f69dc23d97e433b6dffed6fe7cb69
+
+commit 2dd9870c16ddbd83740adeead5030d6840288c8f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 24 23:12:35 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Rename pubkeyacceptedkeytypes to pubkeyacceptedalgorithms in
+    
+    test to match change to config-dump output.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 74c9a4ad50306be873d032819d5e55c24eb74d5d
+
+commit b9225c3a1c3f5827e31d5d64a71b8e0504a25619
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 24 01:18:08 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Put obsolete aliases for hostbasedalgorithms and
+    
+    pubkeyacceptedalgorithms after their current names so that the config-dump
+    mode finds and uses the current names.  Spotted by Phil Pennock.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5dd10e93cccfaff3aaaa09060c917adff04a9b15
+
+commit 8b8b60542d6652b2c91e0ef9e9cc81bcb65e6b42
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 23 21:55:08 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: lots more s/key types/signature algorithms/ mostly in
+    
+    HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms and HostKeyAlgorithms; prompted by Jakub Jelen
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3f719de4385b1a89e4323b2549c66aae050129cb
+
+commit 0aeb508aaabc4818970c90831e3d21843c3c6d09
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 23 21:50:18 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Correct reference to signature algorithms as keys; from
+    
+    Jakub Jelen
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36f7ecee86fc811aa0f8e21e7a872eee044b4be5
+
+commit f186a020f2ba5f9c462a23293750e29ba0a746b1
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Tue Feb 23 16:05:22 2021 +1100
+
+    Add a couple more test VMs.
+
+commit ffcdd3d90e74176b3bb22937ad1f65a6c1cd3f9d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Mon Feb 22 08:09:27 2021 +1100
+
+    Valgrind test: split and move up list.
+    
+    Since the valgrind test takes so long it approaches the limit allowed by
+    github, move it to the head of the list so it's the first one started and
+    split the longest tests out into a second instance that runs concurrently
+    with the first.
+
+commit c3b1636770785cc2830dedd0f22ef7d3d3491d6d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 23 00:05:31 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: warn when the user specifies a ForwardAgent path that does
+    
+    not exist and exit if ExitOnForwardFailure is set; bz3264
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 72f7875865e723e464c71bf8692e83110699bf26
+
+commit 5fcb0514949d61aadaf4a89cf16eb78fb47491ec
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Feb 20 13:34:02 2021 +1100
+
+    Disable rlimit sandbox, doesn't work with valgrind
+    
+    Only run regress tests, runing unit tests as well makes it run longer
+    than allowed y github.
+
+commit bb0b9bf45396c19486080d3eb0a159f94de7e6ba
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Feb 20 13:06:25 2021 +1100
+
+    Upload valgrind logs on failure.
+
+commit ebb3b75e974cb241c6b9b9f5881b09c7bd32b651
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 19 22:18:50 2021 +1100
+
+    Rename "vm" to "os" in selfhosted to match c-cpp.
+    
+    Should make it easier to share code or maybe merge at some point.
+
+commit 76c0be0fe0465cb2b975dbd409f8d38b55e55bcb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 19 22:15:22 2021 +1100
+
+    Upload regress failure logs in c-cpp too.
+
+commit 8751b6c3136f5225c40f41bbf29aa29e15795f6e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 19 22:13:36 2021 +1100
+
+    Comment out Solaris 64bit PAM build...
+    
+    until I can figure out why it's failing.
+
+commit e9f6d563c06886b277c6b9abafa99fa80726dc48
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 19 10:20:17 2021 +1100
+
+    Actually run Valgrind tests.
+
+commit 41d232e226624f1a81c17091c36b44c9010aae62
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Feb 19 10:16:56 2021 +1100
+
+    Add test against Valgrind.
+
+commit e6528d91f12fba05f0ea64224091c9d0f38bdf1d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 16:30:01 2021 +1100
+
+    Add fbsd12 test target.
+
+commit 6506cb2798d98ff03a7cc06567c392a81f540680
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 15:21:13 2021 +1100
+
+    Remove unused arg.
+
+commit 93c31a623973b0fad508214593aab6ca94b11dcb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 14:54:07 2021 +1100
+
+    Add DEBUG_SK to kitchensink builds.
+
+commit 65085740d3574eeb3289d592f042df62c2689bb0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 14:53:14 2021 +1100
+
+    Add bbone test target (arm32).
+
+commit 63238f5aed66148b8d6ca7bd5fb347d624200155
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 02:49:35 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Fix the hostkeys rotation extension documentation
+    
+    The documentation was lacking the needed want-reply field in the initial
+    global request.
+    
+    https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/218 by dbussink
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 051824fd78edf6d647a0b9ac011bf88e28775054
+
+commit 34c5ef6e2d06d9f0e20cb04a9aebf67a6f96609a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 02:15:07 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: make names in function prototypes match those in
+    
+    definition from https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/225 by
+    ZenithalHourlyRate
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c736307bf3f2c7cb24d6f82f244eee959485acd
+
+commit 88e3d4de31ab4f14cac658e9e0c512043b15b146
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 02:13:58 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: unbreak SK_DEBUG builds
+    
+    from https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/225 by
+    ZenithalHourlyRate
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 28d7259ce1b04d025411464decfa2f1a097b43eb
+
+commit 788cbc5b74a53956ba9fff11e1ca506271a3597f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 00:30:17 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: sftp-server: implement limits@openssh.com extension
+    
+    This is a simple extension that allows the server to clearly
+    communicate transfer limits it is imposing so the client doesn't
+    have to guess, or force the user to manually tune.  This is
+    particularly useful when an attempt to use too large of a value
+    causes the server to abort the connection.
+    
+    Patch from Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f96293221e5aa24102d9bf30e4f4ef04d5f4fb51
+
+commit 324449a68d510720d0e4dfcc8e9e5a702fe6a48f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 12:06:25 2021 +1100
+
+    support OpenSSL 3.x cipher IV API change
+    
+    OpenSSL renamed the "get current CIPHER_CTX" IV operation in 3.x.
+    This uses the new name if available.
+    
+    https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/13411
+    
+    bz#3238 ok dtucker@
+
+commit 845fe9811c047063d935eca89188ed55c993626b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 11:25:38 2021 +1100
+
+    prefer login_getpwclass() to login_getclass()
+    
+    FreeBSD has login_getpwclass() that does some special magic for
+    UID=0. Prefer this to login_getclass() as its easier to emulate
+    the former with the latter.
+    
+    Based on FreeBSD PR 37416 via Ed Maste; ok dtucker@
+
+commit d0763c8d566119cce84d9806e419badf20444b02
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 10:45:27 2021 +1100
+
+    Fixing quoting for installing moduli on target guest.
+
+commit b3afc243bc820f323a09e3218e9ec8a30a3c1933
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 10:27:16 2021 +1100
+
+    Install moduli on target not host.
+
+commit f060c2bc85d59d111fa18a12eb3872ee4b9f7e97
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 10:33:58 2021 +1100
+
+    don't free string returned by login_getcapstr(3)
+    
+    OpenBSD and NetBSD require the caller to free strings returned
+    bu the login_* functions, but FreeBSD requires that callers don't.
+    
+    Fortunately in this case, we can harmlessly leak as the process is
+    about to exec the shell/command.
+    
+    From https://reviews.freebsd.org/D28617 via Ed Maste; ok dtucker@
+
+commit bc9b0c25703215501da28aa7a6539f96c0fa656f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 10:10:00 2021 +1100
+
+    Skip unit tests on sol11 to speed things up.
+
+commit 161873035c12cc22211fc73d07170ade47746bc5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 10:09:27 2021 +1100
+
+    Remove SKIP_UNIT as it needs to be a make arg.
+
+commit 1c293868e4b4e8e74e3ea15b8dff90f6b089967a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 10:05:03 2021 +1100
+
+    Always intall moduli.
+    
+    Allows us to run tests without falling back to a fixed modulus.  Ensure that
+    the directory exists.
+
+commit 5c8f41ad100601ec2fdcbccdfe92890c31f81bbe
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 09:59:09 2021 +1100
+
+    Quote SSHD_CONFOPTS in case it contains spaces.
+
+commit 4653116c1f5384ea7006e6396d9b53c33d218975
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Feb 18 09:51:18 2021 +1100
+
+    Fix labels on targets (dots vs underscores).
+
+commit 4512047f57ca3c6e8cd68f0cc69be59e98b25287
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Feb 17 21:47:48 2021 +1100
+
+    More compact representation of config matrix.
+
+commit 0406cd09f05c2e419b113dd4c0eac8bc34ec915b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Feb 17 21:19:18 2021 +1100
+
+    Skip unit tests on hosted VMs to speed things up.
+
+commit 4582612e6147d766c336198c498740242fb8f1ec
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Feb 17 20:21:29 2021 +1100
+
+    Merge macos and ubuntu tests.
+
+commit 09f4b84654b71099559492e9aed5e1a38bf24815
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Feb 17 18:41:30 2021 +1100
+
+    Convert most github hosted tests to new config structure.
+
+commit 65380ff7e054be1454e5ab4fd7bb9c66f8fcbaa9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Wed Feb 17 18:27:36 2021 +1100
+
+    Only run selfhosted tests from selfhosted repo.
+
+commit f031366535650b88248ed7dbf23033afdf466240
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Fri Jan 15 14:11:43 2021 +1100
+
+    Add self-hosted runners for VMs of other platforms.
+    
+    Github only hosts a limited number of platforms, and the runner code
+    is only supported on slightly wider range of platforms.  To increase
+    our test coverage beyond that, we run the runner natively on a VM host,
+    where it runs a jobs that boot VMs of other platforms, waits for them
+    to come up then runs the build and test by ssh'ing into the guest.
+    This means that the minimum dependencies for the guests are quite low
+    (basically just sshd, a compiler and make).
+    
+    The interface to the VM host is fairly simple (basically 3 scripts:
+    vmstartup, vmrun and vmshutdown), but those are specific to the VM host
+    so are not in the public repo.  We also mount the working directory on the
+    host via sshfs, so things like artifact upload by the runner also work.
+    
+    As part of this we are moving the per-test-target configs into a single
+    place (.github/configs) where there will be referenced by a single short
+    "config" key.  I plan to make the github-hosted runners use this too.
+    
+    The self-hosted runners are run off a private repo on github since that
+    prevents third parties from accessing them[0], and since runner quota is
+    limited on private repos, we avoid running the tests we run on the public
+    repo.
+    
+    [0] https://docs.github.com/en/actions/hosting-your-own-runners/about-self-hosted-runners#self-hosted-runner-security-with-public-repositories
+
+commit 64bbd7444d658ef7ee14a7ea5ccc7f5810279ee7
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Wed Feb 17 03:59:00 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Make sure puttygen is new enough to successfully run the
+    
+    PuTTY interop tests, otherwise skip them.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 34565bb50b8aec58331ed02a5e9e0a9a929bef51
+
+commit da0a9afcc446a30ca49dd216612c41ac3cb1f2d4
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 15 20:43:15 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: ssh: add PermitRemoteOpen for remote dynamic forwarding
+    
+    with SOCKS ok djm@, dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64fe7b6360acc4ea56aa61b66498b5ecc0a96a7c
+
+commit b696858a7f9db72a83d02cb6edaca4b30a91b386
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 15 20:36:35 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: factor out opt_array_append; ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 571bc5dd35f99c5cf9de6aaeac428b168218e74a
+
+commit ad74fc127cc45567e170e8c6dfa2cfd9767324ec
+Author: dlg@openbsd.org <dlg@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Mon Feb 15 11:09:22 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: ProxyJump takes "none" to disable processing like
+    
+    ProxyCommand does
+    
+    ok djm@ jmc@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 941a2399da2193356bdc30b879d6e1692f18b6d3
+
+commit 16eacdb016ccf38dd9959c78edd3a6282513aa53
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 12 03:49:09 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: sftp: add missing lsetstat@openssh.com documentation
+    
+    patch from Mike Frysinger
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c114db88d505864075bfe7888b7c8745549715b
+
+commit e04fd6dde16de1cdc5a4d9946397ff60d96568db
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 12 03:14:18 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: factor SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION parsing into its own
+    
+    function and remove an unused variable; ok dtucker@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1a938657fbf7ef0ba5e73b30365734a0cc96559
+
+commit 1bb130ed34721d46452529d094d9bbf045607d79
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Thu Feb 11 10:18:05 2021 +1100
+
+    Add __NR_futex_time64 to seccomp sandbox.
+    
+    This is apparently needed for (some) 32 bit platforms with glibc 2.33.
+    Patch from nix at esperi.org.uk and jjelen at redhat.com via bz#3260.
+
+commit f88a7a431212a16e572ecabd559e632f369c363e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date:   Sat Feb 6 09:37:01 2021 +1100
+
+    Add a hostname function for systems that don't have it.
+    
+    Some systems don't have a hostname command (it's not required by POSIX).
+    The do have uname -n (which is), but as found by tim@ some others (eg
+    UnixWare) do not report the FQDN from uname -n.
+
+commit 5e385a71ef2317856f37c91a98658eb12eb5a89c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 5 22:03:40 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Roll back the hostname->uname change in rev 1.10. It turns
+    
+    out uname -n doesn't do what we need for some platforms in portable, so we'll
+    fix the original problem (that some other platforms don't have hostname at
+    all) by providing wrapper function to implement it.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 827a707d6201d5a8e196a8c28aec1d2c76c52341
+
+commit b446c214279de50ed8388e54897eb1be5281c894
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 5 06:01:58 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: hostname is not specified by POSIX but uname -n is, so use
+    
+    the latter for portability.  Patch from Geert Hendrickx via github PR#208.
+    
+    OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d6a79c7c4d141a0d05ade4a042eb57dddbce89f3
+
+commit 1cb6ce98d658e5fbdae025a3bd65793980e3b5d9
+Author: David Carlier <devnexen@gmail.com>
+Date:   Sat Nov 21 12:22:23 2020 +0000
+
+    Using explicit_memset for the explicit_bzero compatibility layer.
+    
+    Favoriting the native implementation in this case.
+
+commit 2e0beff67def2120f4b051b1016d7fbf84823e78
+Author: Luca Weiss <luca@z3ntu.xyz>
+Date:   Sun Nov 8 14:19:23 2020 +0100
+
+    Deny (non-fatal) statx in preauth privsep child.
+
+commit a35d3e911e193a652bd09eed40907e3e165b0a7b
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Fri Feb 5 02:20:23 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: Remove debug message from sigchld handler. While this
+    
+    works on OpenBSD it can cause problems on other platforms.  From kircherlike
+    at outlook.com via bz#3259, ok djm@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3e241d7ac1ee77e3de3651780b5dc47b283a7668
+
+commit 69338ab46afe9e3dfb7762ad65351d854077c998
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 2 22:36:59 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: whitespace
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 544bb092e03fcbecb420196cd0f70af13ea868ad
+
+commit f71219a01d8f71c4b3ed7e456337a84ddba1653e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 2 22:36:46 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: fix memleaks in private key deserialisation; enforce more
+    
+    consistency between redundant fields in private key certificate and private
+    key body; ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dec344e414d47f0a7adc13aecf3760fe58101240
+
+commit 3287790e78bf5b53c4a3cafb67bb5aa03e3910f0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date:   Tue Feb 2 22:35:14 2021 +0000
+
+    upstream: memleak on error path; ok markus@
+    
+    OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2091a36d6ca3980c81891a6c4bdc544e63cb13a8
diff --git a/INSTALL b/INSTALL
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..68b15e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/INSTALL
@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+1. Prerequisites
+----------------
+
+A C compiler.  Any C89 or better compiler that supports variadic macros
+should work.  Where supported, configure will attempt to enable the
+compiler's run-time integrity checking options.  Some notes about
+specific compilers:
+ - clang: -ftrapv and -sanitize=integer require the compiler-rt runtime
+  (CC=clang LDFLAGS=--rtlib=compiler-rt ./configure)
+
+To support Privilege Separation (which is now required) you will need
+to create the user, group and directory used by sshd for privilege
+separation.  See README.privsep for details.
+
+
+The remaining items are optional.
+
+A working installation of zlib:
+Zlib 1.1.4 or 1.2.1.2 or greater (earlier 1.2.x versions have problems):
+https://zlib.net/
+
+libcrypto from either of LibreSSL or OpenSSL.  Building without libcrypto
+is supported but severely restricts the available ciphers and algorithms.
+ - LibreSSL (https://www.libressl.org/)
+ - OpenSSL (https://www.openssl.org) with any of the following versions:
+   - 1.0.x >= 1.0.1 or 1.1.0 >= 1.1.0g or any 1.1.1
+
+Note that due to a bug in EVP_CipherInit OpenSSL 1.1 versions prior to
+1.1.0g can't be used.
+
+LibreSSL/OpenSSL should be compiled as a position-independent library
+(i.e. -fPIC, eg by configuring OpenSSL as "./config [options] -fPIC"
+or LibreSSL as "CFLAGS=-fPIC ./configure") otherwise OpenSSH will not
+be able to link with it.  If you must use a non-position-independent
+libcrypto, then you may need to configure OpenSSH --without-pie.
+
+If you build either from source, running the OpenSSL self-test ("make
+tests") or the LibreSSL equivalent ("make check") and ensuring that all
+tests pass is strongly recommended.
+
+NB. If you operating system supports /dev/random, you should configure
+libcrypto (LibreSSL/OpenSSL) to use it. OpenSSH relies on libcrypto's
+direct support of /dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd.
+
+PRNGD:
+
+If your system lacks kernel-based random collection, the use of Lutz
+Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended. It requires that libcrypto be configured
+to support it.
+
+http://prngd.sourceforge.net/
+
+EGD:
+
+The Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) supports the same interface as prngd.
+It also supported only if libcrypto is configured to support it.
+
+http://egd.sourceforge.net/
+
+PAM:
+
+OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your
+system supports it. PAM is standard most Linux distributions, Solaris,
+HP-UX 11, AIX >= 5.2, FreeBSD, NetBSD and Mac OS X.
+
+Information about the various PAM implementations are available:
+
+Solaris PAM:	http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/pam/
+Linux PAM:	http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
+OpenPAM:	http://www.openpam.org/
+
+If you wish to build the GNOME passphrase requester, you will need the GNOME
+libraries and headers.
+
+GNOME:
+http://www.gnome.org/
+
+Alternatively, Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com> has written an excellent X11
+passphrase requester. This is maintained separately at:
+
+http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/
+
+LibEdit:
+
+sftp supports command-line editing via NetBSD's libedit.  If your platform
+has it available natively you can use that, alternatively you might try
+these multi-platform ports:
+
+http://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/
+http://sourceforge.net/projects/libedit/
+
+LDNS:
+
+LDNS is a DNS BSD-licensed resolver library which supports DNSSEC.
+
+http://nlnetlabs.nl/projects/ldns/
+
+Autoconf:
+
+If you modify configure.ac or configure doesn't exist (eg if you checked
+the code out of git yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.69 and
+automake-1.16.1 to rebuild the automatically generated files by running
+"autoreconf".  Earlier versions may also work but this is not guaranteed.
+
+http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/
+http://www.gnu.org/software/automake/
+
+Basic Security Module (BSM):
+
+Native BSM support is known to exist in Solaris from at least 2.5.1,
+FreeBSD 6.1 and OS X.  Alternatively, you may use the OpenBSM
+implementation (http://www.openbsm.org).
+
+makedepend:
+
+https://www.x.org/archive/individual/util/
+
+If you are making significant changes to the code you may need to rebuild
+the dependency (.depend) file using "make depend", which requires the
+"makedepend" tool from the X11 distribution.
+
+libfido2:
+
+libfido2 allows the use of hardware security keys over USB.  libfido2
+in turn depends on libcbor.  libfido2 >= 1.5.0 is strongly recommended.
+Limited functionality is possible with earlier libfido2 versions.
+
+https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2
+https://github.com/pjk/libcbor
+
+
+2. Building / Installation
+--------------------------
+
+To install OpenSSH with default options:
+
+./configure
+make
+make install
+
+This will install the OpenSSH binaries in /usr/local/bin, configuration files
+in /usr/local/etc, the server in /usr/local/sbin, etc. To specify a different
+installation prefix, use the --prefix option to configure:
+
+./configure --prefix=/opt
+make
+make install
+
+Will install OpenSSH in /opt/{bin,etc,lib,sbin}. You can also override
+specific paths, for example:
+
+./configure --prefix=/opt --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh
+make
+make install
+
+This will install the binaries in /opt/{bin,lib,sbin}, but will place the
+configuration files in /etc/ssh.
+
+If you are using PAM, you may need to manually install a PAM control
+file as "/etc/pam.d/sshd" (or wherever your system prefers to keep
+them).  Note that the service name used to start PAM is __progname,
+which is the basename of the path of your sshd (e.g., the service name
+for /usr/sbin/osshd will be osshd).  If you have renamed your sshd
+executable, your PAM configuration may need to be modified.
+
+A generic PAM configuration is included as "contrib/sshd.pam.generic",
+you may need to edit it before using it on your system. If you are
+using a recent version of Red Hat Linux, the config file in
+contrib/redhat/sshd.pam should be more useful.  Failure to install a
+valid PAM file may result in an inability to use password
+authentication.  On HP-UX 11 and Solaris, the standard /etc/pam.conf
+configuration will work with sshd (sshd will match the other service
+name).
+
+There are a few other options to the configure script:
+
+--with-audit=[module] enable additional auditing via the specified module.
+Currently, drivers for "debug" (additional info via syslog) and "bsm"
+(Sun's Basic Security Module) are supported.
+
+--with-pam enables PAM support. If PAM support is compiled in, it must
+also be enabled in sshd_config (refer to the UsePAM directive).
+
+--with-prngd-socket=/some/file allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD
+support and to specify a PRNGd socket. Use this if your Unix lacks
+/dev/random.
+
+--with-prngd-port=portnum allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD support
+and to specify a EGD localhost TCP port. Use this if your Unix lacks
+/dev/random.
+
+--with-lastlog=FILE will specify the location of the lastlog file.
+./configure searches a few locations for lastlog, but may not find
+it if lastlog is installed in a different place.
+
+--without-lastlog will disable lastlog support entirely.
+
+--with-osfsia, --without-osfsia will enable or disable OSF1's Security
+Integration Architecture.  The default for OSF1 machines is enable.
+
+--with-utmpx enables utmpx support. utmpx support is automatic for
+some platforms.
+
+--without-shadow disables shadow password support.
+
+--with-ipaddr-display forces the use of a numeric IP address in the
+$DISPLAY environment variable. Some broken systems need this.
+
+--with-default-path=PATH allows you to specify a default $PATH for sessions
+started by sshd. This replaces the standard path entirely.
+
+--with-pid-dir=PATH specifies the directory in which the sshd.pid file is
+created.
+
+--with-xauth=PATH specifies the location of the xauth binary
+
+--with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your Libre/OpenSSL
+libraries are installed.
+
+--with-ssl-engine enables Libre/OpenSSL's (hardware) ENGINE support
+
+--without-openssl builds without using OpenSSL.  Only a subset of ciphers
+and algorithms are supported in this configuration.
+
+--without-zlib builds without zlib.  This disables the Compression option.
+
+--with-4in6 Check for IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and convert them to
+real (AF_INET) IPv4 addresses. Works around some quirks on Linux.
+
+If you need to pass special options to the compiler or linker, you
+can specify these as environment variables before running ./configure.
+For example:
+
+CC="/usr/foo/cc" CFLAGS="-O" LDFLAGS="-s" LIBS="-lrubbish" ./configure
+
+3. Configuration
+----------------
+
+The runtime configuration files are installed by in ${prefix}/etc or
+whatever you specified as your --sysconfdir (/usr/local/etc by default).
+
+The default configuration should be instantly usable, though you should
+review it to ensure that it matches your security requirements.
+
+To generate a host key, run "make host-key". Alternately you can do so
+manually using the following commands:
+
+    ssh-keygen -t [type] -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ""
+
+for each of the types you wish to generate (rsa, dsa or ecdsa) or
+
+    ssh-keygen -A
+
+to generate keys for all supported types.
+
+Replacing /etc/ssh with the correct path to the configuration directory.
+(${prefix}/etc or whatever you specified with --sysconfdir during
+configuration).
+
+If you have configured OpenSSH with EGD/prngd support, ensure that EGD or
+prngd is running and has collected some entropy first.
+
+For more information on configuration, please refer to the manual pages
+for sshd, ssh and ssh-agent.
+
+4. (Optional) Send survey
+-------------------------
+
+$ make survey
+[check the contents of the file "survey" to ensure there's no information
+that you consider sensitive]
+$ make send-survey
+
+This will send configuration information for the currently configured
+host to a survey address.  This will help determine which configurations
+are actually in use, and what valid combinations of configure options
+exist.  The raw data is available only to the OpenSSH developers, however
+summary data may be published.
+
+5. Problems?
+------------
+
+If you experience problems compiling, installing or running OpenSSH,
+please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at
+https://www.openssh.com/
diff --git a/LICENCE b/LICENCE
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b0db54
--- /dev/null
+++ b/LICENCE
@@ -0,0 +1,371 @@
+This file is part of the OpenSSH software.
+
+The licences which components of this software fall under are as
+follows.  First, we will summarize and say that all components
+are under a BSD licence, or a licence more free than that.
+
+OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
+
+1)
+     * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+     *                    All rights reserved
+     *
+     * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+     * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+     * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+     * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+     * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+
+    [Tatu continues]
+     *  However, I am not implying to give any licenses to any patents or
+     * copyrights held by third parties, and the software includes parts that
+     * are not under my direct control.  As far as I know, all included
+     * source code is used in accordance with the relevant license agreements
+     * and can be used freely for any purpose (the GNU license being the most
+     * restrictive); see below for details.
+
+    [However, none of that term is relevant at this point in time.  All of
+    these restrictively licenced software components which he talks about
+    have been removed from OpenSSH, i.e.,
+
+     - RSA is no longer included, found in the OpenSSL library
+     - IDEA is no longer included, its use is deprecated
+     - DES is now external, in the OpenSSL library
+     - GMP is no longer used, and instead we call BN code from OpenSSL
+     - Zlib is now external, in a library
+     - The make-ssh-known-hosts script is no longer included
+     - TSS has been removed
+     - MD5 is now external, in the OpenSSL library
+     - RC4 support has been replaced with ARC4 support from OpenSSL
+     - Blowfish is now external, in the OpenSSL library
+
+    [The licence continues]
+
+    Note that any information and cryptographic algorithms used in this
+    software are publicly available on the Internet and at any major
+    bookstore, scientific library, and patent office worldwide.  More
+    information can be found e.g. at "http://www.cs.hut.fi/crypto".
+
+    The legal status of this program is some combination of all these
+    permissions and restrictions.  Use only at your own responsibility.
+    You will be responsible for any legal consequences yourself; I am not
+    making any claims whether possessing or using this is legal or not in
+    your country, and I am not taking any responsibility on your behalf.
+
+
+			    NO WARRANTY
+
+    BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
+    FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN
+    OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
+    PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
+    OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS
+    TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE
+    PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
+    REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
+
+    IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
+    WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
+    REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
+    INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
+    OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
+    TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
+    YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
+    PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
+    POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+
+3)
+    ssh-keyscan was contributed by David Mazieres under a BSD-style
+    license.
+
+     * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
+     *
+     * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
+     * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
+     * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
+
+4)
+    The Rijndael implementation by Vincent Rijmen, Antoon Bosselaers
+    and Paulo Barreto is in the public domain and distributed
+    with the following license:
+
+     * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
+     *
+     * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
+     *
+     * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+     * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+     * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br>
+     *
+     * This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
+     *
+     * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
+     * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+     * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+     * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+     * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+     * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+     * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+     * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+     * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
+     * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
+     * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+5)
+    One component of the ssh source code is under a 3-clause BSD license,
+    held by the University of California, since we pulled these parts from
+    original Berkeley code.
+
+     * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995
+     *      The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+     *
+     * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+     * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+     * are met:
+     * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+     *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+     * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+     *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+     *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+     * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+     *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+     *    without specific prior written permission.
+     *
+     * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+     * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+     * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+     * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+     * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+     * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+     * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+     * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+     * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+     * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+     * SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+6)
+    Remaining components of the software are provided under a standard
+    2-term BSD licence with the following names as copyright holders:
+
+	Markus Friedl
+	Theo de Raadt
+	Niels Provos
+	Dug Song
+	Aaron Campbell
+	Damien Miller
+	Kevin Steves
+	Daniel Kouril
+	Wesley Griffin
+	Per Allansson
+	Nils Nordman
+	Simon Wilkinson
+
+    Portable OpenSSH additionally includes code from the following copyright
+    holders, also under the 2-term BSD license:
+
+	Ben Lindstrom
+	Tim Rice
+	Andre Lucas
+	Chris Adams
+	Corinna Vinschen
+	Cray Inc.
+	Denis Parker
+	Gert Doering
+	Jakob Schlyter
+	Jason Downs
+	Juha Yrjölä
+	Michael Stone
+	Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+	Solar Designer
+	Todd C. Miller
+	Wayne Schroeder
+	William Jones
+	Darren Tucker
+	Sun Microsystems
+	The SCO Group
+	Daniel Walsh
+	Red Hat, Inc
+	Simon Vallet / Genoscope
+
+     * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+     * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+     * are met:
+     * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+     *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+     * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+     *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+     *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+     *
+     * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+     * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+     * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+     * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+     * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+     * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+     * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+     * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+     * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+     * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+8) Portable OpenSSH contains the following additional licenses:
+
+    a) snprintf replacement
+
+	* Copyright Patrick Powell 1995
+	* This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell
+	* (papowell@astart.com) It may be used for any purpose as long as this
+	* notice remains intact on all source code distributions
+
+    b) Compatibility code (openbsd-compat)
+
+       Apart from the previously mentioned licenses, various pieces of code
+       in the openbsd-compat/ subdirectory are licensed as follows:
+
+       Some code is licensed under a 3-term BSD license, to the following
+       copyright holders:
+
+	Todd C. Miller
+	Theo de Raadt
+	Damien Miller
+	Eric P. Allman
+	The Regents of the University of California
+	Constantin S. Svintsoff
+	Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+
+	* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+	* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+	* are met:
+	* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+	*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+	* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+	*    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+	*    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+	* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+	*    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+	*    without specific prior written permission.
+	*
+	* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+	* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+	* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+	* ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+	* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+	* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+	* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+	* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+	* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+	* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+	* SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+       Some code is licensed under an ISC-style license, to the following
+       copyright holders:
+
+	Internet Software Consortium.
+	Todd C. Miller
+	Reyk Floeter
+	Chad Mynhier
+
+	* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+	* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+	* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+	*
+	* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND TODD C. MILLER DISCLAIMS ALL
+	* WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+	* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL TODD C. MILLER BE LIABLE
+	* FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+	* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION
+	* OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN
+	* CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+
+       Some code is licensed under a MIT-style license to the following
+       copyright holders:
+
+	Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+	* Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a  *
+	* copy of this software and associated documentation files (the            *
+	* "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including      *
+	* without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,      *
+	* distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell       *
+	* copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is    *
+	* furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:                 *
+	*                                                                          *
+	* The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included  *
+	* in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.                   *
+	*                                                                          *
+	* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS  *
+	* OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF               *
+	* MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.   *
+	* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,   *
+	* DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR    *
+	* OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR    *
+	* THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.                               *
+	*                                                                          *
+	* Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright   *
+	* holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the     *
+	* sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written       *
+	* authorization.                                                           *
+	****************************************************************************/
+
+       The Blowfish cipher implementation is licensed by Niels Provos under
+       a 3-clause BSD license:
+
+         * Blowfish - a fast block cipher designed by Bruce Schneier
+         *
+         * Copyright 1997 Niels Provos <provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de>
+         * All rights reserved.
+         *
+         * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+         * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+         * are met:
+         * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+         *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+         * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+         *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+         *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+         * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+         *    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+         *
+         * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+         * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+         * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+         * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+         * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+         * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+         * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+         * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+         * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+         * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+       Some replacement code is licensed by the NetBSD foundation under a
+       2-clause BSD license:
+
+         * Copyright (c) 2001 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
+         * All rights reserved.
+         *
+         * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
+         * by Todd Vierling.
+         *
+         * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+         * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+         * are met:
+         * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+         *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+         * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+         *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+         *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+         *
+         * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
+         * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
+         * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+         * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
+         * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+         * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+         * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+         * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+         * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+         * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+         * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+------
+$OpenBSD: LICENCE,v 1.20 2017/04/30 23:26:16 djm Exp $
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0ebfa0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -0,0 +1,780 @@
+SHELL=@SH@
+
+AUTORECONF=autoreconf
+
+prefix=@prefix@
+exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@
+bindir=@bindir@
+sbindir=@sbindir@
+libexecdir=@libexecdir@
+datadir=@datadir@
+datarootdir=@datarootdir@
+mandir=@mandir@
+mansubdir=@mansubdir@
+sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
+piddir=@piddir@
+srcdir=@srcdir@
+top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+abs_top_srcdir=@abs_top_srcdir@
+abs_top_builddir=@abs_top_builddir@
+
+DESTDIR=
+VPATH=@srcdir@
+SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
+ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
+SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
+PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
+TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
+BUILDDIR=@abs_top_builddir@
+
+PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
+	-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
+	-D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
+	-D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"$(SFTP_SERVER)\" \
+	-D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"$(SSH_KEYSIGN)\" \
+	-D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)\" \
+	-D_PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$(SSH_SK_HELPER)\" \
+	-D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"$(piddir)\" \
+	-D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"$(PRIVSEP_PATH)\"
+
+CC=@CC@
+LD=@LD@
+CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+CFLAGS_NOPIE=@CFLAGS_NOPIE@
+CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+PICFLAG=@PICFLAG@
+LIBS=@LIBS@
+CHANNELLIBS=@CHANNELLIBS@
+K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
+SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
+LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
+LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
+AR=@AR@
+AWK=@AWK@
+RANLIB=@RANLIB@
+INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+SED=@SED@
+XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
+LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+LDFLAGS_NOPIE=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS_NOPIE@
+EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+MANFMT=@MANFMT@
+MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
+
+.SUFFIXES: .lo
+
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
+
+XMSS_OBJS=\
+	ssh-xmss.o \
+	sshkey-xmss.o \
+	xmss_commons.o \
+	xmss_fast.o \
+	xmss_hash.o \
+	xmss_hash_address.o \
+	xmss_wots.o
+
+LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
+	ssh_api.o \
+	ssherr.o \
+	sshbuf.o \
+	sshkey.o \
+	sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
+	sshbuf-misc.o \
+	sshbuf-getput-crypto.o \
+	krl.o \
+	bitmap.o \
+	${XMSS_OBJS}
+
+LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+	authfd.o authfile.o \
+	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \
+	cleanup.o \
+	compat.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
+	log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
+	readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addr.o addrmatch.o \
+	atomicio.o dispatch.o mac.o misc.o utf8.o \
+	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-ecdsa-sk.o \
+	ssh-ed25519-sk.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
+	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
+	ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
+	poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o \
+	ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o \
+	hmac.o ed25519.o hash.o \
+	kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
+	kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \
+	kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
+	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
+	sshbuf-io.o
+
+SKOBJS=	ssh-sk-client.o
+
+SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
+	sshconnect.o sshconnect2.o mux.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
+	audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
+	sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \
+	auth.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \
+	auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
+	auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
+	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \
+	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
+	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \
+	srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
+	sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \
+	sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+SFTP_CLIENT_OBJS=sftp-common.o sftp-client.o sftp-glob.o
+
+SCP_OBJS=	scp.o progressmeter.o $(SFTP_CLIENT_OBJS)
+
+SSHADD_OBJS=	ssh-add.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+SSHAGENT_OBJS=	ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+SSHKEYGEN_OBJS=	ssh-keygen.o sshsig.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS=ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+P11HELPER_OBJS=	ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+SKHELPER_OBJS=	ssh-sk-helper.o ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o
+
+SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS=ssh-keyscan.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+SFTPSERVER_OBJS=sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
+
+SFTP_OBJS=	sftp.o sftp-usergroup.o progressmeter.o $(SFTP_CLIENT_OBJS)
+
+MANPAGES	= moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out ssh-sk-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
+MANPAGES_IN	= moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 ssh-sk-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
+MANTYPE		= @MANTYPE@
+
+CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out
+CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli
+
+PATHSUBS	= \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/sshd_config|$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config|g' \
+	-e 's|/usr/libexec|$(libexecdir)|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key|g' \
+	-e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
+	-e 's|/etc/ssh/sshrc|$(sysconfdir)/sshrc|g' \
+	-e 's|/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth|$(XAUTH_PATH)|g' \
+	-e 's|/var/empty|$(PRIVSEP_PATH)|g' \
+	-e 's|/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin|@user_path@|g'
+
+FIXPATHSCMD	= $(SED) $(PATHSUBS)
+FIXALGORITHMSCMD= $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/fixalgorithms $(SED) \
+		     @UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS@
+
+all: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
+
+$(LIBSSH_OBJS): Makefile.in config.h
+$(SSHOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
+$(SSHDOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
+
+.c.o:
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+
+LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
+$(LIBCOMPAT): always
+	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
+always:
+
+libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
+	$(AR) rv $@ $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
+	$(RANLIB) $@
+
+ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+
+sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+
+scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SCP_OBJS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SCP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHADD_OBJS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHADD_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+
+ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHAGENT_OBJS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHAGENT_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+
+ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYGEN_OBJS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYGEN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+
+ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+
+ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(P11HELPER_OBJS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(P11HELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+
+ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+
+ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+
+sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+
+sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SFTP_OBJS)
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(SFTP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
+
+# test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
+logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+
+$(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
+	if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
+		manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \
+	else \
+		manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.out$$//'`; \
+	fi; \
+	if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "man"; then \
+		$(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) | \
+		    $(AWK) -f $(srcdir)/mdoc2man.awk > $@; \
+	else \
+		$(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) > $@; \
+	fi
+
+$(CONFIGFILES): $(CONFIGFILES_IN)
+	conffile=`echo $@ | sed 's/.out$$//'`; \
+	$(FIXPATHSCMD) $(srcdir)/$${conffile} > $@
+
+# fake rule to stop make trying to compile moduli.o into a binary "moduli.o"
+moduli:
+	echo
+
+clean:	regressclean
+	rm -f *.o *.lo *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
+	rm -f *.out core survey
+	rm -f regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT)
+	rm -f regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT)
+	rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a
+	rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/authopt/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/authopt/test_authopt$(EXEEXT)
+	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT)
+	rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT)
+	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT)
+	rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT)
+	rm -f regress/unittests/match/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT)
+	rm -f regress/unittests/misc/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/misc/test_misc$(EXEEXT)
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT)
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT)
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT)
+	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
+	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o
+	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo
+	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
+	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean)
+
+distclean:	regressclean
+	rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
+	rm -f *.out core opensshd.init openssh.xml
+	rm -f Makefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.status
+	rm -f survey.sh openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile *~ 
+	rm -rf autom4te.cache
+	rm -f regress/check-perm
+	rm -f regress/mkdtemp
+	rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a
+	rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/authopt/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/authopt/test_authopt
+	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap
+	rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion
+	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys
+	rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex
+	rm -f regress/unittests/match/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match
+	rm -f regress/unittests/misc/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/misc/test_misc
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig
+	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
+	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8
+	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o
+	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo
+	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
+	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean)
+	if test -d pkg ; then \
+		rm -fr pkg ; \
+	fi
+
+veryclean: distclean
+	rm -f configure config.h.in *.0
+
+cleandir: veryclean
+
+mrproper: veryclean
+
+realclean: veryclean
+
+catman-do:
+	@for f in $(MANPAGES_IN) ; do \
+		base=`echo $$f | sed 's/\..*$$//'` ; \
+		echo "$$f -> $$base.0" ; \
+		$(MANFMT) $$f | cat -v | sed -e 's/.\^H//g' \
+			>$$base.0 ; \
+	done
+
+depend: depend-rebuild
+	rm -f .depend.bak
+
+depend-rebuild:
+	mv .depend .depend.old
+	rm -f config.h .depend
+	touch config.h .depend
+	makedepend -w1000 -Y. -f .depend *.c 2>/dev/null
+	(echo '# Automatically generated by makedepend.'; \
+	 echo '# Run "make depend" to rebuild.'; sort .depend ) >.depend.tmp
+	mv .depend.tmp .depend
+	rm -f .depend.bak
+	mv .depend.old .depend.bak
+	rm -f config.h
+
+depend-check: depend-rebuild
+	cmp .depend .depend.bak || (echo .depend stale && exit 1)
+
+distprep: catman-do depend-check
+	$(AUTORECONF)
+	-rm -rf autom4te.cache .depend.bak
+
+install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf host-key check-config
+install-nokeys: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf
+install-nosysconf: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files
+
+check-config:
+	-$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd -t -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config
+
+install-files:
+	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
+	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
+	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
+	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5
+	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
+	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
+	$(MKDIR_P) -m 0755 $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) scp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-sk-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-sk-helper.8
+
+install-sysconf:
+	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)
+	@if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \
+		$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \
+	else \
+		echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
+	fi
+	@if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config ]; then \
+		$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config; \
+	else \
+		echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
+	fi
+	@if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli ]; then \
+		if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes ]; then \
+			echo "moving $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes to $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \
+			mv "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes" "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \
+		else \
+			$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli; \
+		fi ; \
+	else \
+		echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
+	fi
+
+host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+	@if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \
+		./ssh-keygen -A; \
+	fi
+
+host-key-force: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh$(EXEEXT)
+	./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ""
+	./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ""
+	./ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N ""
+	if ./ssh -Q key | grep ecdsa >/dev/null ; then \
+		./ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N ""; \
+	fi
+
+uninstallall:	uninstall
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config
+	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)
+	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
+	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
+	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
+	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
+	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)
+	-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
+
+uninstall:
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
+	-rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+	-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-sk-helper.8
+
+regress-prep:
+	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper
+	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/authopt
+	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap
+	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/conversion
+	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys
+	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex
+	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/match
+	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/misc
+	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf
+	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
+	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshsig
+	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8
+	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/sk-dummy
+	[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
+	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
+
+REGRESSLIBS=libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT)
+TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+
+regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \
+	$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+
+regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c \
+	$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+
+regress/netcat$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c \
+	$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+
+regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c \
+	$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+
+regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/mkdtemp.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/mkdtemp.c \
+	$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.o \
+	regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.o
+
+regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a: ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS}
+	$(AR) rv $@ $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS)
+	$(RANLIB) $@
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.o
+
+regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshkey/common.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.o \
+	$(SKOBJS)
+
+regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHSIG_OBJS=\
+	sshsig.o \
+	regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.o \
+	$(SKOBJS)
+
+regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHSIG_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHSIG_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.o
+
+regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_AUTHOPT_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/authopt/tests.o \
+	auth-options.o \
+	$(SKOBJS)
+
+regress/unittests/authopt/test_authopt$(EXEEXT): \
+    ${UNITTESTS_TEST_AUTHOPT_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_AUTHOPT_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/conversion/tests.o
+
+regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT): \
+    ${UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/kex/tests.o \
+	regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.o \
+	regress/unittests/kex/test_proposal.o \
+	$(SKOBJS)
+
+regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.o \
+	regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.o \
+	$(SKOBJS)
+
+regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT): \
+    ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/match/tests.o
+
+regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT): \
+    ${UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_MISC_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/misc/tests.o \
+	regress/unittests/misc/test_parse.o \
+	regress/unittests/misc/test_expand.o \
+	regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.o \
+	regress/unittests/misc/test_argv.o \
+	regress/unittests/misc/test_strdelim.o \
+	regress/unittests/misc/test_hpdelim.o \
+	regress/unittests/misc/test_ptimeout.o
+
+regress/unittests/misc/test_misc$(EXEEXT): \
+    ${UNITTESTS_TEST_MISC_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_MISC_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+
+UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS=\
+	regress/unittests/utf8/tests.o
+
+regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT): \
+    ${UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS} \
+    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
+	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS) \
+	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
+
+# These all need to be compiled -fPIC, so they are treated differently.
+SK_DUMMY_OBJS=\
+	regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.lo \
+	regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.lo \
+	ed25519.lo hash.lo
+
+SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY=@SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY@
+
+.c.lo: Makefile.in config.h
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+
+regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so: $(SK_DUMMY_OBJS)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(PICFLAG) -shared -o $@ $(SK_DUMMY_OBJS) \
+	    -L. -Lopenbsd-compat -lopenbsd-compat $(LDFLAGS_NOPIE) $(TESTLIBS)
+
+regress-binaries: regress-prep $(LIBCOMPAT) \
+	regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/netcat$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT) \
+	$(SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY)
+
+regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(REGRESSLIBS) \
+	regress/unittests/authopt/test_authopt$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/misc/test_misc$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
+
+tests:	file-tests t-exec interop-tests unit
+	echo all tests passed
+
+unit: regress-unit-binaries
+	cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \
+	$(MAKE) \
+		.CURDIR="$(abs_top_srcdir)/regress" \
+		.OBJDIR="$(BUILDDIR)/regress" \
+		OBJ="$(BUILDDIR)/regress" \
+		$@ && echo $@ tests passed
+
+interop-tests t-exec file-tests: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS)
+	cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \
+	EGREP='@EGREP@' \
+	OPENSSL_BIN='@OPENSSL_BIN@' \
+	$(MAKE) \
+		.CURDIR="$(abs_top_srcdir)/regress" \
+		.OBJDIR="$(BUILDDIR)/regress" \
+		BUILDDIR="$(BUILDDIR)" \
+		OBJ="$(BUILDDIR)/regress" \
+		PATH="$(BUILDDIR):$${PATH}" \
+		TEST_ENV=MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \
+		TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \
+		TEST_SSH_SCP="$(BUILDDIR)/scp" \
+		TEST_SSH_SSH="$(BUILDDIR)/ssh" \
+		TEST_SSH_SSHD="$(BUILDDIR)/sshd" \
+		TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$(BUILDDIR)/ssh-agent" \
+		TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$(BUILDDIR)/ssh-add" \
+		TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$(BUILDDIR)/ssh-keygen" \
+		TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$(BUILDDIR)/ssh-pkcs11-helper" \
+		TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$(BUILDDIR)/ssh-keyscan" \
+		TEST_SSH_SFTP="$(BUILDDIR)/sftp" \
+		TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="$(BUILDDIR)/ssh-pkcs11-helper" \
+		TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER="$(BUILDDIR)/ssh-sk-helper" \
+		TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$(BUILDDIR)/sftp-server" \
+		TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE="$(abs_top_srcdir)/moduli" \
+		TEST_SSH_PLINK="plink" \
+		TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="puttygen" \
+		TEST_SSH_CONCH="conch" \
+		TEST_SSH_IPV6="@TEST_SSH_IPV6@" \
+		TEST_SSH_UTF8="@TEST_SSH_UTF8@" \
+		TEST_SHELL="$(TEST_SHELL)" \
+		EXEEXT="$(EXEEXT)" \
+		$@ && echo all $@ passed
+
+compat-tests: $(LIBCOMPAT)
+	(cd openbsd-compat/regress && $(MAKE))
+
+regressclean:
+	if [ -f regress/Makefile ] && [ -r regress/Makefile ]; then \
+		(cd regress && $(MAKE) clean) \
+	fi
+
+survey: survey.sh ssh
+	@$(SHELL) ./survey.sh > survey
+	@echo 'The survey results have been placed in the file "survey" in the'
+	@echo 'current directory.  Please review the file then send with'
+	@echo '"make send-survey".'
+
+send-survey:	survey
+	mail portable-survey@mindrot.org <survey
+
+package: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
+	if [ "@MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED@" = yes ]; then \
+		sh buildpkg.sh; \
+	fi
+
+# @DEPEND@
diff --git a/OVERVIEW b/OVERVIEW
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cec7cd7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/OVERVIEW
@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+[Note: This file has not been updated for OpenSSH versions after
+OpenSSH-1.2 and should be considered OBSOLETE.  It has been left in
+the distribution because some of its information may still be useful
+to developers.]
+
+This document is intended for those who wish to read the ssh source
+code.  This tries to give an overview of the structure of the code.
+
+Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+Updated 17 Nov 1995.
+Updated 19 Oct 1999 for OpenSSH-1.2
+Updated 20 May 2001 note obsolete for > OpenSSH-1.2
+
+The software consists of ssh (client), sshd (server), scp, sdist, and
+the auxiliary programs ssh-keygen, ssh-agent, ssh-add, and
+make-ssh-known-hosts.  The main program for each of these is in a .c
+file with the same name.
+
+There are some subsystems/abstractions that are used by a number of
+these programs.
+
+  Buffer manipulation routines
+
+    - These provide an arbitrary size buffer, where data can be appended.
+      Data can be consumed from either end.  The code is used heavily
+      throughout ssh.  The buffer manipulation functions are in
+      sshbuf*.c (header sshbuf.h).
+
+  Compression Library
+
+    - Ssh uses the GNU GZIP compression library (ZLIB).
+
+  Encryption/Decryption
+
+    - Ssh contains several encryption algorithms.  These are all
+      accessed through the cipher.h interface.  The interface code is
+      in cipher.c, and the implementations are either in libc or
+      LibreSSL.
+
+  Multiple Precision Integer Library
+
+    - Uses the LibreSSL BIGNUM sublibrary.
+
+  Random Numbers
+
+    - Uses arc4random() and such.
+
+  RSA key generation, encryption, decryption
+
+    - Ssh uses the RSA routines in libssl.
+
+  RSA key files
+
+    - RSA keys are stored in files with a special format.  The code to
+      read/write these files is in authfile.c.  The files are normally
+      encrypted with a passphrase.  The functions to read passphrases
+      are in readpass.c (the same code is used to read passwords).
+
+  Binary packet protocol
+
+    - The ssh binary packet protocol is implemented in packet.c.  The
+      code in packet.c does not concern itself with packet types or their
+      execution; it contains code to build packets, to receive them and
+      extract data from them, and the code to compress and/or encrypt
+      packets.
+
+    - The code in packet.c calls the buffer manipulation routines
+      (buffer.c, bufaux.c), compression routines (zlib), and the
+      encryption routines.
+
+  X11, TCP/IP, and Agent forwarding
+
+    - Code for various types of channel forwarding is in channels.c.
+      The file defines a generic framework for arbitrary communication
+      channels inside the secure channel, and uses this framework to
+      implement X11 forwarding, TCP/IP forwarding, and authentication
+      agent forwarding.
+      The new, Protocol 1.5, channel close implementation is in nchan.c
+
+  Authentication agent
+
+    - Code to communicate with the authentication agent is in authfd.c.
+
+  Authentication methods
+
+    - Code for various authentication methods resides in auth-*.c
+      (auth-passwd.c, auth-rh-rsa.c, auth-rhosts.c, auth-rsa.c).  This
+      code is linked into the server.  The routines also manipulate
+      known hosts files using code in hostfile.c.  Code in canohost.c
+      is used to retrieve the canonical host name of the remote host.
+      Code in match.c is used to match host names.
+
+    - In the client end, authentication code is in sshconnect.c.  It
+      reads Passwords/passphrases using code in readpass.c.  It reads
+      RSA key files with authfile.c.  It communicates the
+      authentication agent using authfd.c.
+
+  The ssh client
+
+    - The client main program is in ssh.c.  It first parses arguments
+      and reads configuration (readconf.c), then calls ssh_connect (in
+      sshconnect.c) to open a connection to the server (possibly via a
+      proxy), and performs authentication (ssh_login in sshconnect.c).
+      It then makes any pty, forwarding, etc. requests.  It may call
+      code in ttymodes.c to encode current tty modes.  Finally it
+      calls client_loop in clientloop.c.  This does the real work for
+      the session.
+
+  Pseudo-tty manipulation and tty modes
+
+    - Code to allocate and use a pseudo tty is in pty.c.  Code to
+      encode and set terminal modes is in ttymodes.c.
+
+  Logging in (updating utmp, lastlog, etc.)
+
+    - The code to do things that are done when a user logs in are in
+      login.c.  This includes things such as updating the utmp, wtmp,
+      and lastlog files.  Some of the code is in sshd.c.
+
+  Writing to the system log and terminal
+
+    - The programs use the functions fatal(), log(), debug(), error()
+      in many places to write messages to system log or user's
+      terminal.  The implementation that logs to system log is in
+      log-server.c; it is used in the server program.  The other
+      programs use an implementation that sends output to stderr; it
+      is in log-client.c.  The definitions are in ssh.h.
+
+  The sshd server (daemon)
+
+    - The sshd daemon starts by processing arguments and reading the
+      configuration file (servconf.c).  It then reads the host key,
+      starts listening for connections, and generates the server key.
+      The server key will be regenerated every hour by an alarm.
+
+    - When the server receives a connection, it forks, disables the
+      regeneration alarm, and starts communicating with the client.
+      They first perform identification string exchange, then
+      negotiate encryption, then perform authentication, preparatory
+      operations, and finally the server enters the normal session
+      mode by calling server_loop in serverloop.c.  This does the real
+      work, calling functions in other modules.
+
+    - The code for the server is in sshd.c.  It contains a lot of
+      stuff, including:
+	- server main program
+	- waiting for connections
+	- processing new connection
+	- authentication
+	- preparatory operations
+	- building up the execution environment for the user program
+	- starting the user program.
+
+  Auxiliary files
+
+    - There are several other files in the distribution that contain
+      various auxiliary routines:
+	ssh.h	     the main header file for ssh (various definitions)
+	uidswap.c    uid-swapping
+	xmalloc.c    "safe" malloc routines
+
+$OpenBSD: OVERVIEW,v 1.15 2018/10/23 05:56:35 djm Exp $
diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27804d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/PROTOCOL
@@ -0,0 +1,715 @@
+This documents OpenSSH's deviations and extensions to the published SSH
+protocol.
+
+Note that OpenSSH's sftp and sftp-server implement revision 3 of the SSH
+filexfer protocol described in:
+
+https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
+
+Newer versions of the draft will not be supported, though some features
+are individually implemented as extensions described below.
+
+The protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent is described in the file
+PROTOCOL.agent
+
+1. Transport protocol changes
+
+1.1. transport: Protocol 2 MAC algorithm "umac-64@openssh.com"
+
+This is a new transport-layer MAC method using the UMAC algorithm
+(rfc4418). This method is identical to the "umac-64" method documented
+in:
+
+https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-umac-01.txt
+
+1.2. transport: Protocol 2 compression algorithm "zlib@openssh.com"
+
+This transport-layer compression method uses the zlib compression
+algorithm (identical to the "zlib" method in rfc4253), but delays the
+start of compression until after authentication has completed. This
+avoids exposing compression code to attacks from unauthenticated users.
+
+The method is documented in:
+
+https://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt
+
+1.3. transport: New public key algorithms "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+     "ssh-dsa-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+     "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+     "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
+     "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+
+OpenSSH introduces new public key algorithms to support certificate
+authentication for users and host keys. These methods are documented
+in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys
+
+1.4. transport: Elliptic Curve cryptography
+
+OpenSSH supports ECC key exchange and public key authentication as
+specified in RFC5656. Only the ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
+and ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 curves over GF(p) are supported. Elliptic
+curve points encoded using point compression are NOT accepted or
+generated.
+
+1.5 transport: Protocol 2 Encrypt-then-MAC MAC algorithms
+
+OpenSSH supports MAC algorithms, whose names contain "-etm", that
+perform the calculations in a different order to that defined in RFC
+4253. These variants use the so-called "encrypt then MAC" ordering,
+calculating the MAC over the packet ciphertext rather than the
+plaintext. This ordering closes a security flaw in the SSH transport
+protocol, where decryption of unauthenticated ciphertext provided a
+"decryption oracle" that could, in conjunction with cipher flaws, reveal
+session plaintext.
+
+Specifically, the "-etm" MAC algorithms modify the transport protocol
+to calculate the MAC over the packet ciphertext and to send the packet
+length unencrypted. This is necessary for the transport to obtain the
+length of the packet and location of the MAC tag so that it may be
+verified without decrypting unauthenticated data.
+
+As such, the MAC covers:
+
+      mac = MAC(key, sequence_number || packet_length || encrypted_packet)
+
+where "packet_length" is encoded as a uint32 and "encrypted_packet"
+contains:
+
+      byte      padding_length
+      byte[n1]  payload; n1 = packet_length - padding_length - 1
+      byte[n2]  random padding; n2 = padding_length
+
+1.6 transport: AES-GCM
+
+OpenSSH supports the AES-GCM algorithm as specified in RFC 5647.
+Because of problems with the specification of the key exchange
+the behaviour of OpenSSH differs from the RFC as follows:
+
+AES-GCM is only negotiated as the cipher algorithms
+"aes128-gcm@openssh.com" or "aes256-gcm@openssh.com" and never as
+an MAC algorithm. Additionally, if AES-GCM is selected as the cipher
+the exchanged MAC algorithms are ignored and there doesn't have to be
+a matching MAC.
+
+1.7 transport: chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com authenticated encryption
+
+OpenSSH supports authenticated encryption using ChaCha20 and Poly1305
+as described in PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305.
+
+1.8 transport: curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key exchange algorithm
+
+OpenSSH supports the use of ECDH in Curve25519 for key exchange as
+described at:
+http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
+
+This is identical to curve25519-sha256 as later published in RFC8731.
+
+2. Connection protocol changes
+
+2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
+
+The SSH connection protocol (rfc4254) provides the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF
+message to allow an endpoint to signal its peer that it will send no
+more data over a channel. Unfortunately, there is no symmetric way for
+an endpoint to request that its peer should cease sending data to it
+while still keeping the channel open for the endpoint to send data to
+the peer.
+
+This is desirable, since it saves the transmission of data that would
+otherwise need to be discarded and it allows an endpoint to signal local
+processes of the condition, e.g. by closing the corresponding file
+descriptor.
+
+OpenSSH implements a channel extension message to perform this
+signalling: "eow@openssh.com" (End Of Write). This message is sent by
+an endpoint when the local output of a session channel is closed or
+experiences a write error. The message is formatted as follows:
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST
+	uint32		recipient channel
+	string		"eow@openssh.com"
+	boolean		FALSE
+
+On receiving this message, the peer SHOULD cease sending data of
+the channel and MAY signal the process from which the channel data
+originates (e.g. by closing its read file descriptor).
+
+As with the symmetric SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF message, the channel does
+remain open after a "eow@openssh.com" has been sent and more data may
+still be sent in the other direction. This message does not consume
+window space and may be sent even if no window space is available.
+
+NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
+of this message (in contravention of RFC4254 section 5.4), this
+message is only sent to OpenSSH peers (identified by banner).
+Other SSH implementations may be listed to receive this message
+upon request.
+
+2.2. connection: disallow additional sessions extension
+     "no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
+
+Most SSH connections will only ever request a single session, but a
+attacker may abuse a running ssh client to surreptitiously open
+additional sessions under their control. OpenSSH provides a global
+request "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" to mitigate this attack.
+
+When an OpenSSH client expects that it will never open another session
+(i.e. it has been started with connection multiplexing disabled), it
+will send the following global request:
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+	string		"no-more-sessions@openssh.com"
+	char		want-reply
+
+On receipt of such a message, an OpenSSH server will refuse to open
+future channels of type "session" and instead immediately abort the
+connection.
+
+Note that this is not a general defence against compromised clients
+(that is impossible), but it thwarts a simple attack.
+
+NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt
+of this message, the no-more-sessions request is only sent to OpenSSH
+servers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be
+listed to receive this message upon request.
+
+2.3. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun@openssh.com"
+
+OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun@openssh.com"
+channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets
+with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with
+interfaces like the BSD tun(4) device. Tunnel forwarding channels are
+requested by the client with the following packet:
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
+	string		"tun@openssh.com"
+	uint32		sender channel
+	uint32		initial window size
+	uint32		maximum packet size
+	uint32		tunnel mode
+	uint32		remote unit number
+
+The "tunnel mode" parameter specifies whether the tunnel should forward
+layer 2 frames or layer 3 packets. It may take one of the following values:
+
+	SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT  1		/* layer 3 packets */
+	SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET     2		/* layer 2 frames */
+
+The "tunnel unit number" specifies the remote interface number, or may
+be 0x7fffffff to allow the server to automatically choose an interface. A
+server that is not willing to open a client-specified unit should refuse
+the request with a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE error. On successful
+open, the server should reply with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS.
+
+Once established the client and server may exchange packet or frames
+over the tunnel channel by encapsulating them in SSH protocol strings
+and sending them as channel data. This ensures that packet boundaries
+are kept intact. Specifically, packets are transmitted using normal
+SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA packets:
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA
+	uint32		recipient channel
+	string		data
+
+The contents of the "data" field for layer 3 packets is:
+
+	uint32			packet length
+	uint32			address family
+	byte[packet length - 4]	packet data
+
+The "address family" field identifies the type of packet in the message.
+It may be one of:
+
+	SSH_TUN_AF_INET		2		/* IPv4 */
+	SSH_TUN_AF_INET6	24		/* IPv6 */
+
+The "packet data" field consists of the IPv4/IPv6 datagram itself
+without any link layer header.
+
+The contents of the "data" field for layer 2 packets is:
+
+	uint32			packet length
+	byte[packet length]	frame
+
+The "frame" field contains an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet frame, including
+header.
+
+2.4. connection: Unix domain socket forwarding
+
+OpenSSH supports local and remote Unix domain socket forwarding
+using the "streamlocal" extension.  Forwarding is initiated as per
+TCP sockets but with a single path instead of a host and port.
+
+Similar to direct-tcpip, direct-streamlocal is sent by the client
+to request that the server make a connection to a Unix domain socket.
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
+	string		"direct-streamlocal@openssh.com"
+	uint32		sender channel
+	uint32		initial window size
+	uint32		maximum packet size
+	string		socket path
+	string		reserved
+	uint32		reserved
+
+Similar to forwarded-tcpip, forwarded-streamlocal is sent by the
+server when the client has previously send the server a streamlocal-forward
+GLOBAL_REQUEST.
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN
+	string		"forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"
+	uint32		sender channel
+	uint32		initial window size
+	uint32		maximum packet size
+	string		socket path
+	string		reserved for future use
+
+The reserved field is not currently defined and is ignored on the
+remote end.  It is intended to be used in the future to pass
+information about the socket file, such as ownership and mode.
+The client currently sends the empty string for this field.
+
+Similar to tcpip-forward, streamlocal-forward is sent by the client
+to request remote forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
+
+	byte		SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+	string		"streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"
+	boolean		TRUE
+	string		socket path
+
+Similar to cancel-tcpip-forward, cancel-streamlocal-forward is sent
+by the client cancel the forwarding of a Unix domain socket.
+
+	byte		SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+	string		"cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"
+	boolean		FALSE
+	string		socket path
+
+2.5. connection: hostkey update and rotation "hostkeys-00@openssh.com"
+and "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
+
+OpenSSH supports a protocol extension allowing a server to inform
+a client of all its protocol v.2 host keys after user-authentication
+has completed.
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+	string		"hostkeys-00@openssh.com"
+	char		0 /* want-reply */
+	string[]	hostkeys
+
+Upon receiving this message, a client should check which of the
+supplied host keys are present in known_hosts.
+
+Note that the server may send key types that the client does not
+support. The client should disregard such keys if they are received.
+
+If the client identifies any keys that are not present for the host,
+it should send a "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com" message to request the
+server prove ownership of the private half of the key.
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST
+	string		"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
+	char		1 /* want-reply */
+	string[]	hostkeys
+
+When a server receives this message, it should generate a signature
+using each requested key over the following:
+
+	string		"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"
+	string		session identifier
+	string		hostkey
+
+These signatures should be included in the reply, in the order matching
+the hostkeys in the request:
+
+	byte		SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS
+	string[]	signatures
+
+When the client receives this reply (and not a failure), it should
+validate the signatures and may update its known_hosts file, adding keys
+that it has not seen before and deleting keys for the server host that
+are no longer offered.
+
+These extensions let a client learn key types that it had not previously
+encountered, thereby allowing it to potentially upgrade from weaker
+key algorithms to better ones. It also supports graceful key rotation:
+a server may offer multiple keys of the same type for a period (to
+give clients an opportunity to learn them using this extension) before
+removing the deprecated key from those offered.
+
+2.6. connection: SIGINFO support for "signal" channel request
+
+The SSH channels protocol (RFC4254 section 6.9) supports sending a
+signal to a session attached to a channel. OpenSSH supports one
+extension signal "INFO@openssh.com" that allows sending SIGINFO on
+BSD-derived systems.
+
+3. Authentication protocol changes
+
+3.1. Host-bound public key authentication
+
+This is trivial change to the traditional "publickey" authentication
+method. The authentication request is identical to the original method
+but for the name and one additional field:
+
+	byte		SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
+	string		username
+	string		"ssh-connection"
+	string		"publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com"
+	bool		has_signature
+	string		pkalg
+	string		public key
+	string		server host key
+
+Because the entire SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST message is included in
+the signed data, this ensures that a binding between the destination
+user, the server identity and the session identifier is visible to the
+signer. OpenSSH uses this binding via signed data to implement per-key
+restrictions in ssh-agent.
+
+A server may advertise this method using the SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO
+mechanism (RFC8308), with the following message:
+
+	string		"publickey-hostbound@openssh.com"
+	string		"0" (version)
+
+Clients should prefer host-bound authentication when advertised by
+server.
+
+4. SFTP protocol changes
+
+4.1. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK
+
+When OpenSSH's sftp-server was implemented, the order of the arguments
+to the SSH_FXP_SYMLINK method was inadvertently reversed. Unfortunately,
+the reversal was not noticed until the server was widely deployed. Since
+fixing this to follow the specification would cause incompatibility, the
+current order was retained. For correct operation, clients should send
+SSH_FXP_SYMLINK as follows:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		targetpath
+	string		linkpath
+
+4.2. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION
+
+OpenSSH's sftp-server lists the extensions it supports using the
+standard extension announcement mechanism in the SSH_FXP_VERSION server
+hello packet:
+
+	uint32		3		/* protocol version */
+	string		ext1-name
+	string		ext1-version
+	string		ext2-name
+	string		ext2-version
+	...
+	string		extN-name
+	string		extN-version
+
+Each extension reports its integer version number as an ASCII encoded
+string, e.g. "1". The version will be incremented if the extension is
+ever changed in an incompatible way. The server MAY advertise the same
+extension with multiple versions (though this is unlikely). Clients MUST
+check the version number before attempting to use the extension.
+
+4.3. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename@openssh.com"
+
+This operation provides a rename operation with POSIX semantics, which
+are different to those provided by the standard SSH_FXP_RENAME in
+draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt. This request is implemented as a
+SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following format:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"posix-rename@openssh.com"
+	string		oldpath
+	string		newpath
+
+On receiving this request the server will perform the POSIX operation
+rename(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+4.4. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs@openssh.com" and
+         "fstatvfs@openssh.com"
+
+These requests correspond to the statvfs and fstatvfs POSIX system
+interfaces. The "statvfs@openssh.com" request operates on an explicit
+pathname, and is formatted as follows:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"statvfs@openssh.com"
+	string		path
+
+The "fstatvfs@openssh.com" operates on an open file handle:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"fstatvfs@openssh.com"
+	string		handle
+
+These requests return a SSH_FXP_STATUS reply on failure. On success they
+return the following SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply:
+
+	uint32		id
+	uint64		f_bsize		/* file system block size */
+	uint64		f_frsize	/* fundamental fs block size */
+	uint64		f_blocks	/* number of blocks (unit f_frsize) */
+	uint64		f_bfree		/* free blocks in file system */
+	uint64		f_bavail	/* free blocks for non-root */
+	uint64		f_files		/* total file inodes */
+	uint64		f_ffree		/* free file inodes */
+	uint64		f_favail	/* free file inodes for to non-root */
+	uint64		f_fsid		/* file system id */
+	uint64		f_flag		/* bit mask of f_flag values */
+	uint64		f_namemax	/* maximum filename length */
+
+The values of the f_flag bitmask are as follows:
+
+	#define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY	0x1	/* read-only */
+	#define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID	0x2	/* no setuid */
+
+Both the "statvfs@openssh.com" and "fstatvfs@openssh.com" extensions are
+advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "2".
+
+4.5. sftp: Extension request "hardlink@openssh.com"
+
+This request is for creating a hard link to a regular file. This
+request is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the
+following format:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"hardlink@openssh.com"
+	string		oldpath
+	string		newpath
+
+On receiving this request the server will perform the operation
+link(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+4.6. sftp: Extension request "fsync@openssh.com"
+
+This request asks the server to call fsync(2) on an open file handle.
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"fsync@openssh.com"
+	string		handle
+
+On receiving this request, a server will call fsync(handle_fd) and will
+respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+4.7. sftp: Extension request "lsetstat@openssh.com"
+
+This request is like the "setstat" command, but sets file attributes on
+symlinks.  It is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the
+following format:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"lsetstat@openssh.com"
+	string		path
+	ATTRS		attrs
+
+See the "setstat" command for more details.
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+4.8. sftp: Extension request "limits@openssh.com"
+
+This request is used to determine various limits the server might impose.
+Clients should not attempt to exceed these limits as the server might sever
+the connection immediately.
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"limits@openssh.com"
+
+The server will respond with a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply:
+
+	uint32		id
+	uint64		max-packet-length
+	uint64		max-read-length
+	uint64		max-write-length
+	uint64		max-open-handles
+
+The 'max-packet-length' applies to the total number of bytes in a
+single SFTP packet.  Servers SHOULD set this at least to 34000.
+
+The 'max-read-length' is the largest length in a SSH_FXP_READ packet.
+Even if the client requests a larger size, servers will usually respond
+with a shorter SSH_FXP_DATA packet.  Servers SHOULD set this at least to
+32768.
+
+The 'max-write-length' is the largest length in a SSH_FXP_WRITE packet
+the server will accept.  Servers SHOULD set this at least to 32768.
+
+The 'max-open-handles' is the maximum number of active handles that the
+server allows (e.g. handles created by SSH_FXP_OPEN and SSH_FXP_OPENDIR
+packets).  Servers MAY count internal file handles against this limit
+(e.g. system logging or stdout/stderr), so clients SHOULD NOT expect to
+open this many handles in practice.
+
+If the server doesn't enforce a specific limit, then the field may be
+set to 0.  This implies the server relies on the OS to enforce limits
+(e.g. available memory or file handles), and such limits might be
+dynamic.  The client SHOULD take care to not try to exceed reasonable
+limits.
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+4.9. sftp: Extension request "expand-path@openssh.com"
+
+This request supports canonicalisation of relative paths and
+those that need tilde-expansion, i.e. "~", "~/..." and "~user/..."
+These paths are expanded using shell-like rules and the resultant
+path is canonicalised similarly to SSH2_FXP_REALPATH.
+
+It is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following
+format:
+
+	uint32		id
+	string		"expand-path@openssh.com"
+	string		path
+
+Its reply is the same format as that of SSH2_FXP_REALPATH.
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+4.10. sftp: Extension request "copy-data"
+
+This request asks the server to copy data from one open file handle and
+write it to a different open file handle.  This avoids needing to transfer
+the data across the network twice (a download followed by an upload).
+
+	byte		SSH_FXP_EXTENDED
+	uint32		id
+	string		"copy-data"
+	string		read-from-handle
+	uint64		read-from-offset
+	uint64		read-data-length
+	string		write-to-handle
+	uint64		write-to-offset
+
+The server will copy read-data-length bytes starting from
+read-from-offset from the read-from-handle and write them to
+write-to-handle starting from write-to-offset, and then respond with a
+SSH_FXP_STATUS message.
+
+It's equivalent to issuing a series of SSH_FXP_READ requests on
+read-from-handle and a series of requests of SSH_FXP_WRITE on
+write-to-handle.
+
+If read-from-handle and write-to-handle are the same, the server will
+fail the request and respond with a SSH_FX_INVALID_PARAMETER message.
+
+If read-data-length is 0, then the server will read data from the
+read-from-handle until EOF is reached.
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+This request is identical to the "copy-data" request documented in:
+
+https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00#section-7
+
+4.11. sftp: Extension request "home-directory"
+
+This request asks the server to expand the specified user's home directory.
+An empty username implies the current user.  This can be used by the client
+to expand ~/ type paths locally.
+
+	byte		SSH_FXP_EXTENDED
+	uint32		id
+	string		"home-directory"
+	string		username
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+This provides similar information as the "expand-path@openssh.com" extension.
+
+This request is identical to the "home-directory" request documented in:
+
+https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-extensions-00#section-5
+
+4.12. sftp: Extension request "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com"
+
+This request asks the server to return user and/or group names that
+correspond to one or more IDs (e.g. as returned from a SSH_FXP_STAT
+request). This may be used by the client to provide usernames in
+directory listings.
+
+	byte		SSH_FXP_EXTENDED
+	uint32		id
+	string		"users-groups-by-id@openssh.com"
+	string		uids
+	string		gids
+
+Where "uids" and "gids" consists of one or more integer user or group
+identifiers:
+
+	uint32		id-0
+	...
+
+The server will reply with a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY:
+
+	byte		SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY
+	string		usernames
+	string		groupnames
+
+Where "username" and "groupnames" consists of names in identical request
+order to "uids" and "gids" respectively:
+
+	string		name-0
+	...
+
+If a name cannot be identified for a given user or group ID, an empty
+string will be returned in its place.
+
+It is acceptable for either "uids" or "gids" to be an empty set, in
+which case the respective "usernames" or "groupnames" list will also
+be empty.
+
+This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version
+"1".
+
+5. Miscellaneous changes
+
+5.1 Public key format
+
+OpenSSH public keys, as generated by ssh-keygen(1) and appearing in
+authorized_keys files, are formatted as a single line of text consisting
+of the public key algorithm name followed by a base64-encoded key blob.
+The public key blob (before base64 encoding) is the same format used for
+the encoding of public keys sent on the wire: as described in RFC4253
+section 6.6 for RSA and DSA keys, RFC5656 section 3.1 for ECDSA keys
+and the "New public key formats" section of PROTOCOL.certkeys for the
+OpenSSH certificate formats.
+
+5.2 Private key format
+
+OpenSSH private keys, as generated by ssh-keygen(1) use the format
+described in PROTOCOL.key by default. As a legacy option, PEM format
+(RFC7468) private keys are also supported for RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys
+and were the default format before OpenSSH 7.8.
+
+5.3 KRL format
+
+OpenSSH supports a compact format for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). This
+format is described in the PROTOCOL.krl file.
+
+5.4 Connection multiplexing
+
+OpenSSH's connection multiplexing uses messages as described in
+PROTOCOL.mux over a Unix domain socket for communications between a
+master instance and later clients.
+
+5.5. Agent protocol extensions
+
+OpenSSH extends the usual agent protocol. These changes are documented
+in the PROTOCOL.agent file.
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.48 2022/11/07 01:53:01 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.agent b/PROTOCOL.agent
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dba76b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/PROTOCOL.agent
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+The SSH agent protocol is described in
+https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-miller-ssh-agent-04
+
+This file documents OpenSSH's extensions to the agent protocol.
+
+1. session-bind@openssh.com extension
+
+This extension allows a ssh client to bind an agent connection to a
+particular SSH session identifier as derived from the initial key
+exchange (as per RFC4253 section 7.2) and the host key used for that
+exchange. This binding is verifiable at the agent by including the
+initial KEX signature made by the host key.
+
+The message format is:
+
+	byte		SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION (0x1b)
+	string		session-bind@openssh.com
+	string		hostkey
+	string		session identifier
+	string		signature
+	bool		is_forwarding
+
+Where 'hostkey' is the encoded server host public key, 'session
+identifier' is the exchange hash derived from the initial key
+exchange, 'signature' is the server's signature of the session
+identifier using the private hostkey, as sent in the final
+SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY/SSH2_MSG_KEXECDH_REPLY message of the initial key
+exchange. 'is_forwarding' is a flag indicating whether this connection
+should be bound for user authentication or forwarding.
+
+When an agent received this message, it will verify the signature and
+check the consistency of its contents, including refusing to accept
+a duplicate session identifier, or any attempt to bind a connection
+previously bound for authentication. It will then then record the
+binding for the life of the connection for use later in testing per-key
+destination constraints.
+
+2. restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com key constraint extension
+
+The key constraint extension supports destination- and forwarding path-
+restricted keys. It may be attached as a constraint when keys or
+smartcard keys are added to an agent.
+
+	byte		SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION (0xff)
+	string		restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com
+	constraint[]	constraints
+
+Where a constraint consists of:
+
+	string		from_username (must be empty)
+	string		from_hostname
+	keyspec[]	from_hostkeys
+	string		to_username
+	string		to_hostname
+	keyspec[]	to_hostkeys
+
+And a keyspec consists of:
+
+	string		keyblob
+	bool		is_ca
+
+When receiving this message, the agent will ensure that the
+'from_username' field is empty, and that 'to_hostname' and 'to_hostkeys'
+have been supplied (empty 'from_hostname' and 'from_hostkeys' are valid
+and signify the initial hop from the host running ssh-agent). The agent
+will then record the constraint against the key.
+
+Subsequent operations on this key including add/remove/request
+identities and, in particular, signature requests will check the key
+constraints against the session-bind@openssh.com bindings recorded for
+the agent connection over which they were received.
+
+3. SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN key constraint
+
+This key constraint allows communication to an agent of the maximum
+number of signatures that may be made with an XMSS key. The format of
+the constraint is:
+
+	byte		SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN (0x03)
+	uint32		max_signatures
+
+This option is only valid for XMSS keys.
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.18 2022/09/21 22:26:50 dtucker Exp $
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.certkeys b/PROTOCOL.certkeys
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..68622e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/PROTOCOL.certkeys
@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
+This document describes a simple public-key certificate authentication
+system for use by SSH.
+
+Background
+----------
+
+The SSH protocol currently supports a simple public key authentication
+mechanism. Unlike other public key implementations, SSH eschews the use
+of X.509 certificates and uses raw keys. This approach has some benefits
+relating to simplicity of configuration and minimisation of attack
+surface, but it does not support the important use-cases of centrally
+managed, passwordless authentication and centrally certified host keys.
+
+These protocol extensions build on the simple public key authentication
+system already in SSH to allow certificate-based authentication. The
+certificates used are not traditional X.509 certificates, with numerous
+options and complex encoding rules, but something rather more minimal: a
+key, some identity information and usage options that have been signed
+with some other trusted key.
+
+A sshd server may be configured to allow authentication via certified
+keys, by extending the existing ~/.ssh/authorized_keys mechanism to
+allow specification of certification authority keys in addition to
+raw user keys. The ssh client will support automatic verification of
+acceptance of certified host keys, by adding a similar ability to
+specify CA keys in ~/.ssh/known_hosts.
+
+All certificate types include certification information along with the
+public key that is used to sign challenges. In OpenSSH, ssh-keygen
+performs the CA signing operation.
+
+Certified keys are represented using new key types:
+
+    ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com
+    ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com
+    ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com
+    ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com
+    ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com
+    ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
+
+Two additional types exist for RSA certificates to force use of
+SHA-2 signatures (SHA-256 and SHA-512 respectively):
+
+    rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com
+    rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com
+
+These RSA/SHA-2 types should not appear in keys at rest or transmitted
+on the wire, but do appear in a SSH_MSG_KEXINIT's host-key algorithms
+field or in the "public key algorithm name" field of a "publickey"
+SSH_USERAUTH_REQUEST to indicate that the signature will use the
+specified algorithm.
+
+Protocol extensions
+-------------------
+
+The SSH wire protocol includes several extensibility mechanisms.
+These modifications shall take advantage of namespaced public key
+algorithm names to add support for certificate authentication without
+breaking the protocol - implementations that do not support the
+extensions will simply ignore them.
+
+Authentication using the new key formats described below proceeds
+using the existing SSH "publickey" authentication method described
+in RFC4252 section 7.
+
+New public key formats
+----------------------
+
+The certificate key types take a similar high-level format (note: data
+types and encoding are as per RFC4251 section 5). The serialised wire
+encoding of these certificates is also used for storing them on disk.
+
+#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER    1
+#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST    2
+
+RSA certificate
+
+    string    "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+    string    nonce
+    mpint     e
+    mpint     n
+    uint64    serial
+    uint32    type
+    string    key id
+    string    valid principals
+    uint64    valid after
+    uint64    valid before
+    string    critical options
+    string    extensions
+    string    reserved
+    string    signature key
+    string    signature
+
+DSA certificate
+
+    string    "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+    string    nonce
+    mpint     p
+    mpint     q
+    mpint     g
+    mpint     y
+    uint64    serial
+    uint32    type
+    string    key id
+    string    valid principals
+    uint64    valid after
+    uint64    valid before
+    string    critical options
+    string    extensions
+    string    reserved
+    string    signature key
+    string    signature
+
+ECDSA certificate
+
+    string    "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" |
+              "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" |
+              "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+    string    nonce
+    string    curve
+    string    public_key
+    uint64    serial
+    uint32    type
+    string    key id
+    string    valid principals
+    uint64    valid after
+    uint64    valid before
+    string    critical options
+    string    extensions
+    string    reserved
+    string    signature key
+    string    signature
+
+ED25519 certificate
+
+    string    "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+    string    nonce
+    string    pk
+    uint64    serial
+    uint32    type
+    string    key id
+    string    valid principals
+    uint64    valid after
+    uint64    valid before
+    string    critical options
+    string    extensions
+    string    reserved
+    string    signature key
+    string    signature
+
+The nonce field is a CA-provided random bitstring of arbitrary length
+(but typically 16 or 32 bytes) included to make attacks that depend on
+inducing collisions in the signature hash infeasible.
+
+e and n are the RSA exponent and public modulus respectively.
+
+p, q, g, y are the DSA parameters as described in FIPS-186-2.
+
+curve and public key are respectively the ECDSA "[identifier]" and "Q"
+defined in section 3.1 of RFC5656.
+
+pk is the encoded Ed25519 public key as defined by RFC8032.
+
+serial is an optional certificate serial number set by the CA to
+provide an abbreviated way to refer to certificates from that CA.
+If a CA does not wish to number its certificates, it must set this
+field to zero.
+
+type specifies whether this certificate is for identification of a user
+or a host using a SSH_CERT_TYPE_... value.
+
+key id is a free-form text field that is filled in by the CA at the time
+of signing; the intention is that the contents of this field are used to
+identify the identity principal in log messages.
+
+"valid principals" is a string containing zero or more principals as
+strings packed inside it. These principals list the names for which this
+certificate is valid; hostnames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST certificates and
+usernames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER certificates. As a special case, a
+zero-length "valid principals" field means the certificate is valid for
+any principal of the specified type.
+
+"valid after" and "valid before" specify a validity period for the
+certificate. Each represents a time in seconds since 1970-01-01
+00:00:00. A certificate is considered valid if:
+
+    valid after <= current time < valid before
+
+critical options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as
+below. All such options are "critical" in the sense that an implementation
+must refuse to authorise a key that has an unrecognised option.
+
+extensions is a set of zero or more optional extensions. These extensions
+are not critical, and an implementation that encounters one that it does
+not recognise may safely ignore it.
+
+Generally, critical options are used to control features that restrict
+access where extensions are used to enable features that grant access.
+This ensures that certificates containing unknown restrictions do not
+inadvertently grant access while allowing new protocol features to be
+enabled via extensions without breaking certificates' backwards
+compatibility.
+
+The reserved field is currently unused and is ignored in this version of
+the protocol.
+
+The signature key field contains the CA key used to sign the
+certificate. The valid key types for CA keys are ssh-rsa,
+ssh-dss, ssh-ed25519 and the ECDSA types ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521. "Chained" certificates, where
+the signature key type is a certificate type itself are NOT supported.
+Note that it is possible for a RSA certificate key to be signed by a
+Ed25519 or ECDSA CA key and vice-versa.
+
+signature is computed over all preceding fields from the initial string
+up to, and including the signature key. Signatures are computed and
+encoded according to the rules defined for the CA's public key algorithm
+(RFC4253 section 6.6 for ssh-rsa and ssh-dss, RFC5656 for the ECDSA
+types, and RFC8032 for Ed25519).
+
+Critical options
+----------------
+
+The critical options section of the certificate specifies zero or more
+options on the certificate's validity. The format of this field
+is a sequence of zero or more tuples:
+
+    string       name
+    string       data
+
+Options must be lexically ordered by "name" if they appear in the
+sequence. Each named option may only appear once in a certificate.
+
+The name field identifies the option and the data field encodes
+option-specific information (see below). All options are
+"critical"; if an implementation does not recognise a option,
+then the validating party should refuse to accept the certificate.
+
+Custom options should append the originating author or organisation's
+domain name to the option name, e.g. "my-option@example.com".
+
+No critical options are defined for host certificates at present. The
+supported user certificate options and the contents and structure of
+their data fields are:
+
+Name                    Format        Description
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+force-command           string        Specifies a command that is executed
+                                      (replacing any the user specified on the
+                                      ssh command-line) whenever this key is
+                                      used for authentication.
+
+source-address          string        Comma-separated list of source addresses
+                                      from which this certificate is accepted
+                                      for authentication. Addresses are
+                                      specified in CIDR format (nn.nn.nn.nn/nn
+                                      or hhhh::hhhh/nn).
+                                      If this option is not present, then
+                                      certificates may be presented from any
+                                      source address.
+
+verify-required         empty         Flag indicating that signatures made
+                                      with this certificate must assert FIDO
+                                      user verification (e.g. PIN or
+                                      biometric). This option only makes sense
+                                      for the U2F/FIDO security key types that
+                                      support this feature in their signature
+                                      formats.
+
+Extensions
+----------
+
+The extensions section of the certificate specifies zero or more
+non-critical certificate extensions. The encoding and ordering of
+extensions in this field is identical to that of the critical options,
+as is the requirement that each name appear only once.
+
+If an implementation does not recognise an extension, then it should
+ignore it.
+
+Custom options should append the originating author or organisation's
+domain name to the option name, e.g. "my-option@example.com".
+
+No extensions are defined for host certificates at present. The
+supported user certificate extensions and the contents and structure of
+their data fields are:
+
+Name                    Format        Description
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+no-touch-required       empty         Flag indicating that signatures made
+                                      with this certificate need not assert
+                                      FIDO user presence. This option only
+                                      makes sense for the U2F/FIDO security
+                                      key types that support this feature in
+                                      their signature formats.
+
+permit-X11-forwarding   empty         Flag indicating that X11 forwarding
+                                      should be permitted. X11 forwarding will
+                                      be refused if this option is absent.
+
+permit-agent-forwarding empty         Flag indicating that agent forwarding
+                                      should be allowed. Agent forwarding
+                                      must not be permitted unless this
+                                      option is present.
+
+permit-port-forwarding  empty         Flag indicating that port-forwarding
+                                      should be allowed. If this option is
+                                      not present, then no port forwarding will
+                                      be allowed.
+
+permit-pty              empty         Flag indicating that PTY allocation
+                                      should be permitted. In the absence of
+                                      this option PTY allocation will be
+                                      disabled.
+
+permit-user-rc          empty         Flag indicating that execution of
+                                      ~/.ssh/rc should be permitted. Execution
+                                      of this script will not be permitted if
+                                      this option is not present.
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.19 2021/06/05 13:47:00 naddy Exp $
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 b/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0bfff28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+This document describes the chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com authenticated
+encryption cipher supported by OpenSSH.
+
+Background
+----------
+
+ChaCha20 is a stream cipher designed by Daniel Bernstein and described
+in [1]. It operates by permuting 128 fixed bits, 128 or 256 bits of key,
+a 64 bit nonce and a 64 bit counter into 64 bytes of output. This output
+is used as a keystream, with any unused bytes simply discarded.
+
+Poly1305[2], also by Daniel Bernstein, is a one-time Carter-Wegman MAC
+that computes a 128 bit integrity tag given a message and a single-use
+256 bit secret key.
+
+The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com combines these two primitives into an
+authenticated encryption mode. The construction used is based on that
+proposed for TLS by Adam Langley in [3], but differs in the layout of
+data passed to the MAC and in the addition of encryption of the packet
+lengths.
+
+Negotiation
+-----------
+
+The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com offers both encryption and
+authentication. As such, no separate MAC is required. If the
+chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com cipher is selected in key exchange,
+the offered MAC algorithms are ignored and no MAC is required to be
+negotiated.
+
+Detailed Construction
+---------------------
+
+The chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com cipher requires 512 bits of key
+material as output from the SSH key exchange. This forms two 256 bit
+keys (K_1 and K_2), used by two separate instances of chacha20.
+The first 256 bits constitute K_2 and the second 256 bits become
+K_1.
+
+The instance keyed by K_1 is a stream cipher that is used only
+to encrypt the 4 byte packet length field. The second instance,
+keyed by K_2, is used in conjunction with poly1305 to build an AEAD
+(Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data) that is used to encrypt
+and authenticate the entire packet.
+
+Two separate cipher instances are used here so as to keep the packet
+lengths confidential but not create an oracle for the packet payload
+cipher by decrypting and using the packet length prior to checking
+the MAC. By using an independently-keyed cipher instance to encrypt the
+length, an active attacker seeking to exploit the packet input handling
+as a decryption oracle can learn nothing about the payload contents or
+its MAC (assuming key derivation, ChaCha20 and Poly1305 are secure).
+
+The AEAD is constructed as follows: for each packet, generate a Poly1305
+key by taking the first 256 bits of ChaCha20 stream output generated
+using K_2, an IV consisting of the packet sequence number encoded as an
+uint64 under the SSH wire encoding rules and a ChaCha20 block counter of
+zero. The K_2 ChaCha20 block counter is then set to the little-endian
+encoding of 1 (i.e. {1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0}) and this instance is used
+for encryption of the packet payload.
+
+Packet Handling
+---------------
+
+When receiving a packet, the length must be decrypted first. When 4
+bytes of ciphertext length have been received, they may be decrypted
+using the K_1 key, a nonce consisting of the packet sequence number
+encoded as a uint64 under the usual SSH wire encoding and a zero block
+counter to obtain the plaintext length.
+
+Once the entire packet has been received, the MAC MUST be checked
+before decryption. A per-packet Poly1305 key is generated as described
+above and the MAC tag calculated using Poly1305 with this key over the
+ciphertext of the packet length and the payload together. The calculated
+MAC is then compared in constant time with the one appended to the
+packet and the packet decrypted using ChaCha20 as described above (with
+K_2, the packet sequence number as nonce and a starting block counter of
+1).
+
+To send a packet, first encode the 4 byte length and encrypt it using
+K_1. Encrypt the packet payload (using K_2) and append it to the
+encrypted length. Finally, calculate a MAC tag and append it.
+
+Rekeying
+--------
+
+ChaCha20 must never reuse a {key, nonce} for encryption nor may it be
+used to encrypt more than 2^70 bytes under the same {key, nonce}. The
+SSH Transport protocol (RFC4253) recommends a far more conservative
+rekeying every 1GB of data sent or received. If this recommendation
+is followed, then chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com requires no special
+handling in this area.
+
+References
+----------
+
+[1] "ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20", Daniel Bernstein
+    http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf
+
+[2] "The Poly1305-AES message-authentication code", Daniel Bernstein
+    http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf
+
+[3] "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 based Cipher Suites for TLS", Adam Langley
+    http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305,v 1.5 2020/02/21 00:04:43 dtucker Exp $
+
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.key b/PROTOCOL.key
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cbf7a70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/PROTOCOL.key
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+This document describes the private key format for OpenSSH.
+
+1. Overall format
+
+The key consists of a header, a list of public keys, and
+an encrypted list of matching private keys.
+
+#define AUTH_MAGIC      "openssh-key-v1"
+
+	byte[]	AUTH_MAGIC
+	string	ciphername
+	string	kdfname
+	string	kdfoptions
+	uint32	number of keys N
+	string	publickey1
+	string	publickey2
+	...
+	string	publickeyN
+	string	encrypted, padded list of private keys
+
+2. KDF options for kdfname "bcrypt"
+
+The options:
+
+	string salt
+	uint32 rounds
+
+are concatenated and represented as a string.
+
+3. Unencrypted list of N private keys
+
+The list of privatekey/comment pairs is padded with the
+bytes 1, 2, 3, ... until the total length is a multiple
+of the cipher block size.
+
+	uint32	checkint
+	uint32	checkint
+	byte[]	privatekey1
+	string	comment1
+	byte[]	privatekey2
+	string	comment2
+	...
+	string	privatekeyN
+	string	commentN
+	byte	1
+	byte	2
+	byte	3
+	...
+	byte	padlen % 255
+
+where each private key is encoded using the same rules as used for
+SSH agent.
+
+Before the key is encrypted, a random integer is assigned
+to both checkint fields so successful decryption can be
+quickly checked by verifying that both checkint fields
+hold the same value.
+
+4. Encryption
+
+The KDF is used to derive a key, IV (and other values required by
+the cipher) from the passphrase. These values are then used to
+encrypt the unencrypted list of private keys.
+
+5. No encryption
+
+For unencrypted keys the cipher "none" and the KDF "none"
+are used with empty passphrases. The options if the KDF "none"
+are the empty string.
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.key,v 1.3 2022/07/01 04:45:50 djm Exp $
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.krl b/PROTOCOL.krl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..115f80e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/PROTOCOL.krl
@@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
+This describes the key/certificate revocation list format for OpenSSH.
+
+1. Overall format
+
+The KRL consists of a header and zero or more sections. The header is:
+
+#define KRL_MAGIC		0x5353484b524c0a00ULL  /* "SSHKRL\n\0" */
+#define KRL_FORMAT_VERSION	1
+
+	uint64	KRL_MAGIC
+	uint32	KRL_FORMAT_VERSION
+	uint64	krl_version
+	uint64	generated_date
+	uint64	flags
+	string	reserved
+	string	comment
+
+Where "krl_version" is a version number that increases each time the KRL
+is modified, "generated_date" is the time in seconds since 1970-01-01
+00:00:00 UTC that the KRL was generated, "comment" is an optional comment
+and "reserved" an extension field whose contents are currently ignored.
+No "flags" are currently defined.
+
+Following the header are zero or more sections, each consisting of:
+
+	byte	section_type
+	string	section_data
+
+Where "section_type" indicates the type of the "section_data". An exception
+to this is the KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section, that has a slightly different
+format (see below).
+
+The available section types are:
+
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES		1
+#define KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY		2
+#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1		3
+#define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE			4
+#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256		5
+
+2. Certificate section
+
+These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES to revoke certificates by
+serial number or key ID. The consist of the CA key that issued the
+certificates to be revoked and a reserved field whose contents is currently
+ignored.
+
+	string ca_key
+	string reserved
+
+Where "ca_key" is the standard SSH wire serialisation of the CA's
+public key. Alternately, "ca_key" may be an empty string to indicate
+the certificate section applies to all CAs (this is most useful when
+revoking key IDs).
+
+Followed by one or more sections:
+
+	byte	cert_section_type
+	string	cert_section_data
+
+The certificate section types are:
+
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST	0x20
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE	0x21
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP	0x22
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID		0x23
+
+2.1 Certificate serial list section
+
+This section is identified as KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST. It revokes
+certificates by listing their serial numbers. The cert_section_data in this
+case contains:
+
+	uint64	revoked_cert_serial
+	uint64	...
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+2.2. Certificate serial range section
+
+These sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE and hold
+a range of serial numbers of certificates:
+
+	uint64	serial_min
+	uint64	serial_max
+
+All certificates in the range serial_min <= serial <= serial_max are
+revoked.
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+2.3. Certificate serial bitmap section
+
+Bitmap sections use type KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP and revoke keys
+by listing their serial number in a bitmap.
+
+	uint64	serial_offset
+	mpint	revoked_keys_bitmap
+
+A bit set at index N in the bitmap corresponds to revocation of a keys with
+serial number (serial_offset + N).
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+2.4. Revoked key ID sections
+
+KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID sections revoke particular certificate "key
+ID" strings. This may be useful in revoking all certificates
+associated with a particular identity, e.g. a host or a user.
+
+	string	key_id[0]
+	...
+
+This section must contain at least one "key_id". This section may appear
+multiple times.
+
+3. Explicit key sections
+
+These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY, revoke keys
+(not certificates). They are less space efficient than serial numbers,
+but are able to revoke plain keys.
+
+	string	public_key_blob[0]
+	....
+
+This section must contain at least one "public_key_blob". The blob
+must be a raw key (i.e. not a certificate).
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+4. SHA1/SHA256 fingerprint sections
+
+These sections, identified as KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 and
+KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256, revoke plain keys (i.e. not
+certificates) by listing their hashes:
+
+	string	public_key_hash[0]
+	....
+
+This section must contain at least one "public_key_hash". The hash blob
+is obtained by taking the SHA1 or SHA256 hash of the public key blob.
+Hashes in this section must appear in numeric order, treating each hash
+as a big-endian integer.
+
+This section may appear multiple times.
+
+5. KRL signature sections
+
+The KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE section serves a different purpose to the
+preceding ones: to provide cryptographic authentication of a KRL that
+is retrieved over a channel that does not provide integrity protection.
+Its format is slightly different to the previously-described sections:
+in order to simplify the signature generation, it includes as a "body"
+two string components instead of one.
+
+	byte	KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE
+	string	signature_key
+	string	signature
+
+The signature is calculated over the entire KRL from the KRL_MAGIC
+to this subsection's "signature_key", including both and using the
+signature generation rules appropriate for the type of "signature_key".
+
+This section must appear last in the KRL. If multiple signature sections
+appear, they must appear consecutively at the end of the KRL file.
+
+Implementations that retrieve KRLs over untrusted channels must verify
+signatures. Signature sections are optional for KRLs distributed by
+trusted means.
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.krl,v 1.5 2018/09/12 01:21:34 djm Exp $
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.mux b/PROTOCOL.mux
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a3dd5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/PROTOCOL.mux
@@ -0,0 +1,298 @@
+This document describes the multiplexing protocol used by ssh(1)'s
+ControlMaster connection-sharing.
+
+Multiplexing starts with a ssh(1) configured to act as a multiplexing
+master. This will cause ssh(1) to listen on a Unix domain socket for
+requests from clients. Clients communicate over this socket using a
+simple packetised protocol, where each message is proceeded with
+a length and message type in SSH uint32 wire format:
+
+    uint32  packet length
+    uint32  packet type
+    ...     packet body
+
+Most messages from the client to the server contain a "request id"
+field. This field is returned in replies as "client request id" to
+facilitate matching of responses to requests.
+
+Many multiplexing (mux) client requests yield immediate responses from
+the mux process; requesting a forwarding, performing an alive check or
+requesting the master terminate itself fall in to this category.
+
+The most common use of multiplexing however is to maintain multiple
+concurrent sessions. These are supported via two separate modes:
+
+"Passenger" clients start by requesting a new session with a
+MUX_C_NEW_SESSION message and passing stdio file descriptors over the
+Unix domain control socket. The passenger client then waits until it is
+signaled or the mux server closes the session. This mode is so named as
+the client waits around while the mux server does all the driving.
+
+Stdio forwarding (requested using MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD) is another
+example of passenger mode; the client passes the stdio file descriptors
+and passively waits for something to happen.
+
+"Proxy" clients, requested using MUX_C_PROXY, work quite differently. In
+this mode, the mux client/server connection socket will stop speaking
+the multiplexing protocol and start proxying SSH connection protocol
+messages between the client and server. The client therefore must
+speak a significant subset of the SSH protocol, but in return is able
+to access basically the full suite of connection protocol features.
+Moreover, as no file descriptor passing is required, the connection
+supporting a proxy client may itself be forwarded or relayed to another
+host if necessary.
+
+1. Connection setup
+
+When a multiplexing connection is made to a ssh(1) operating as a
+ControlMaster from a client ssh(1), the first action of each is send
+a hello messages to its peer:
+
+	uint32	MUX_MSG_HELLO
+	uint32  protocol version
+	string  extension name [optional]
+	string  extension value [optional]
+	...
+
+The current version of the mux protocol is 4. A client should refuse
+to connect to a master that speaks an unsupported protocol version.
+
+Following the version identifier are zero or more extensions represented
+as a name/value pair. No extensions are currently defined.
+
+2. Opening a passenger mode session
+
+To open a new multiplexed session in passenger mode, a client sends the
+following request:
+
+	uint32	MUX_C_NEW_SESSION
+	uint32  request id
+	string	reserved
+	bool	want tty flag
+	bool	want X11 forwarding flag
+	bool	want agent flag
+	bool	subsystem flag
+	uint32	escape char
+	string	terminal type
+	string	command
+	string	environment string 0 [optional]
+	...
+
+To disable the use of an escape character, "escape char" may be set
+to 0xffffffff. "terminal type" is generally set to the value of
+$TERM. zero or more environment strings may follow the command.
+
+The client then sends its standard input, output and error file
+descriptors (in that order) using Unix domain socket control messages.
+
+The contents of "reserved" are currently ignored.
+
+If successful, the server will reply with MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED
+
+	uint32	MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED
+	uint32	client request id
+	uint32	session id
+
+Otherwise it will reply with an error: MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or
+MUX_S_FAILURE.
+
+Once the server has received the fds, it will respond with MUX_S_OK
+indicating that the session is up. The client now waits for the
+session to end. When it does, the server will send an exit status
+message:
+
+	uint32	MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE
+	uint32	session id
+	uint32	exit value
+
+The client should exit with this value to mimic the behaviour of a
+non-multiplexed ssh(1) connection. Two additional cases that the
+client must cope with are it receiving a signal itself and the
+server disconnecting without sending an exit message.
+
+A master may also send a MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL before MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE
+if remote TTY allocation was unsuccessful. The client may use this to
+return its local tty to "cooked" mode.
+
+	uint32	MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL
+	uint32	session id
+
+3. Requesting passenger-mode stdio forwarding
+
+A client may request the master to establish a stdio forwarding:
+
+	uint32	MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD
+	uint32	request id
+	string	reserved
+	string	connect host
+	string	connect port
+
+The client then sends its standard input and output file descriptors
+(in that order) using Unix domain socket control messages.
+
+The contents of "reserved" are currently ignored.
+
+A server may reply with a MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED
+or a MUX_S_FAILURE.
+
+4. Health checks
+
+The client may request a health check/PID report from a server:
+
+	uint32	MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK
+	uint32	request id
+
+The server replies with:
+
+	uint32	MUX_S_ALIVE
+	uint32	client request id
+	uint32	server pid
+
+5. Remotely terminating a master
+
+A client may request that a master terminate immediately:
+
+	uint32	MUX_C_TERMINATE
+	uint32	request id
+
+The server will reply with one of MUX_S_OK or MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED.
+
+6. Requesting establishment of port forwards
+
+A client may request the master to establish a port forward:
+
+	uint32	MUX_C_OPEN_FWD
+	uint32	request id
+	uint32	forwarding type
+	string	listen host
+	uint32	listen port
+	string	connect host
+	uint32	connect port
+
+forwarding type may be MUX_FWD_LOCAL, MUX_FWD_REMOTE, MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC.
+
+If listen port is (unsigned int) -2, then the listen host is treated as
+a unix socket path name.
+
+If connect port is (unsigned int) -2, then the connect host is treated
+as a unix socket path name.
+
+A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT, a
+MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a MUX_S_FAILURE.
+
+For dynamically allocated listen port the server replies with
+
+	uint32	MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT
+	uint32	client request id
+	uint32	allocated remote listen port
+
+7. Requesting closure of port forwards
+
+Note: currently unimplemented (server will always reply with MUX_S_FAILURE).
+
+A client may request the master to close a port forward:
+
+	uint32	MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD
+	uint32	request id
+	uint32	forwarding type
+	string	listen host
+	uint32	listen port
+	string	connect host
+	uint32	connect port
+
+A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a
+MUX_S_FAILURE.
+
+8. Requesting shutdown of mux listener
+
+A client may request the master to stop accepting new multiplexing requests
+and remove its listener socket.
+
+	uint32	MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING
+	uint32	request id
+
+A server may reply with a MUX_S_OK, a MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED or a
+MUX_S_FAILURE.
+
+9. Requesting proxy mode
+
+A client may request that the control connection be placed in proxy
+mode:
+
+	uint32	MUX_C_PROXY
+	uint32	request id
+
+When a mux master receives this message, it will reply with a
+confirmation:
+
+	uint32	MUX_S_PROXY
+	uint32	request id
+
+And go into proxy mode. All subsequent data over the connection will
+be formatted as unencrypted, unpadded, SSH transport messages:
+
+	uint32	packet length
+	byte	0 (padding length)
+	byte	packet type
+	byte[packet length - 2] ...
+
+The mux master will accept most connection messages and global requests,
+and will translate channel identifiers to ensure that the proxy client has
+globally unique channel numbers (i.e. a proxy client need not worry about
+collisions with other clients).
+
+10. Status messages
+
+The MUX_S_OK message is empty:
+
+	uint32	MUX_S_OK
+	uint32	client request id
+
+The MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED and MUX_S_FAILURE include a reason:
+
+	uint32	MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED
+	uint32	client request id
+	string	reason
+
+	uint32	MUX_S_FAILURE
+	uint32	client request id
+	string	reason
+
+11. Protocol numbers
+
+#define MUX_MSG_HELLO		0x00000001
+#define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION	0x10000002
+#define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK	0x10000004
+#define MUX_C_TERMINATE		0x10000005
+#define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD		0x10000006
+#define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD		0x10000007
+#define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD	0x10000008
+#define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING	0x10000009
+#define MUX_S_OK		0x80000001
+#define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED	0x80000002
+#define MUX_S_FAILURE		0x80000003
+#define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE	0x80000004
+#define MUX_S_ALIVE		0x80000005
+#define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED	0x80000006
+#define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT	0x80000007
+#define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL	0x80000008
+
+#define MUX_FWD_LOCAL	1
+#define MUX_FWD_REMOTE	2
+#define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC	3
+
+XXX TODO
+XXX extended status (e.g. report open channels / forwards)
+XXX lock (maybe)
+XXX watch in/out traffic (pre/post crypto)
+XXX inject packet (what about replies)
+XXX server->client error/warning notifications
+XXX send signals via mux
+XXX ^Z support in passengers
+XXX extensions for multi-agent
+XXX extensions for multi-X11
+XXX session inspection via master
+XXX signals via mux request
+XXX list active connections via mux
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.mux,v 1.13 2022/01/01 01:55:30 jsg Exp $
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.sshsig b/PROTOCOL.sshsig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78457dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/PROTOCOL.sshsig
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+This document describes a lightweight SSH Signature format
+that is compatible with SSH keys and wire formats.
+
+At present, only detached and armored signatures are supported.
+
+1. Armored format
+
+The Armored SSH signatures consist of a header, a base64
+encoded blob, and a footer.
+
+The header is the string "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----"
+followed by a newline. The footer is the string
+"-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----" immediately after a newline.
+
+The header MUST be present at the start of every signature.
+Files containing the signature MUST start with the header.
+Likewise, the footer MUST be present at the end of every
+signature.
+
+The base64 encoded blob SHOULD be broken up by newlines
+every 76 characters.
+
+Example:
+
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgJKxoLBJBivUPNTUJUSslQTt2hD
+jozKvHarKeN8uYFqgAAAADZm9vAAAAAAAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAKNC4IEbt
+Tq0Fb56xhtuE1/lK9H9RZJfON4o6hE9R4ZGFX98gy0+fFJ/1d2/RxnZky0Y7GojwrZkrHT
+FgCqVWAQ==
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
+
+2. Blob format
+
+#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG"
+#define SIG_VERSION    0x01
+
+        byte[6]   MAGIC_PREAMBLE
+        uint32    SIG_VERSION
+        string    publickey
+        string    namespace
+        string    reserved
+        string    hash_algorithm
+        string    signature
+
+The publickey field MUST contain the serialisation of the
+public key used to make the signature using the usual SSH
+encoding rules, i.e RFC4253, RFC5656,
+draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448, etc.
+
+Verifiers MUST reject signatures with versions greater than those
+they support.
+
+The purpose of the namespace value is to specify a unambiguous
+interpretation domain for the signature, e.g. file signing.
+This prevents cross-protocol attacks caused by signatures
+intended for one intended domain being accepted in another.
+The namespace value MUST NOT be the empty string.
+
+The reserved value is present to encode future information
+(e.g. tags) into the signature. Implementations should ignore
+the reserved field if it is not empty.
+
+Data to be signed is first hashed with the specified hash_algorithm.
+This is done to limit the amount of data presented to the signature
+operation, which may be of concern if the signing key is held in limited
+or slow hardware or on a remote ssh-agent. The supported hash algorithms
+are "sha256" and "sha512".
+
+The signature itself is made using the SSH signature algorithm and
+encoding rules for the chosen key type. For RSA signatures, the
+signature algorithm must be "rsa-sha2-512" or "rsa-sha2-256" (i.e.
+not the legacy RSA-SHA1 "ssh-rsa").
+
+This blob is encoded as a string using the RFC4253 encoding
+rules and base64 encoded to form the middle part of the
+armored signature.
+
+
+3. Signed Data, of which the signature goes into the blob above
+
+#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG"
+
+        byte[6]   MAGIC_PREAMBLE
+        string    namespace
+        string    reserved
+        string    hash_algorithm
+        string    H(message)
+
+The preamble is the six-byte sequence "SSHSIG". It is included to
+ensure that manual signatures can never be confused with any message
+signed during SSH user or host authentication.
+
+The reserved value is present to encode future information
+(e.g. tags) into the signature. Implementations should ignore
+the reserved field if it is not empty.
+
+The data is concatenated and passed to the SSH signing
+function.
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.sshsig,v 1.4 2020/08/31 00:17:41 djm Exp $
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.u2f b/PROTOCOL.u2f
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f8ca56b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/PROTOCOL.u2f
@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+This document describes OpenSSH's support for U2F/FIDO security keys.
+
+Background
+----------
+
+U2F is an open standard for two-factor authentication hardware, widely
+used for user authentication to websites. U2F tokens are ubiquitous,
+available from a number of manufacturers and are currently by far the
+cheapest way for users to achieve hardware-backed credential storage.
+
+The U2F protocol however cannot be trivially used as an SSH protocol key
+type as both the inputs to the signature operation and the resultant
+signature differ from those specified for SSH. For similar reasons,
+integration of U2F devices cannot be achieved via the PKCS#11 API.
+
+U2F also offers a number of features that are attractive in the context
+of SSH authentication. They can be configured to require indication
+of "user presence" for each signature operation (typically achieved
+by requiring the user touch the key). They also offer an attestation
+mechanism at key enrollment time that can be used to prove that a
+given key is backed by hardware. Finally the signature format includes
+a monotonic signature counter that can be used (at scale) to detect
+concurrent use of a private key, should it be extracted from hardware.
+
+U2F private keys are generated through an enrollment operation,
+which takes an application ID - a URL-like string, typically "ssh:"
+in this case, but a HTTP origin for the case of web authentication,
+and a challenge string (typically randomly generated). The enrollment
+operation returns a public key, a key handle that must be used to invoke
+the hardware-backed private key, some flags and signed attestation
+information that may be used to verify that a private key is hosted on a
+particular hardware instance.
+
+It is common for U2F hardware to derive private keys from the key handle
+in conjunction with a small per-device secret that is unique to the
+hardware, thus requiring little on-device storage for an effectively
+unlimited number of supported keys. This drives the requirement that
+the key handle be supplied for each signature operation. U2F tokens
+primarily use ECDSA signatures in the NIST-P256 field, though the FIDO2
+standard specifies additional key types, including one based on Ed25519.
+
+Use of U2F security keys does not automatically imply multi-factor
+authentication. From sshd's perspective, a security key constitutes a
+single factor of authentication, even if protected by a PIN or biometric
+authentication.  To enable multi-factor authentication in ssh, please
+refer to the AuthenticationMethods option in sshd_config(5).
+
+
+SSH U2F Key formats
+-------------------
+
+OpenSSH integrates U2F as new key and corresponding certificate types:
+
+	sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com
+	sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com
+	sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com
+	sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
+
+While each uses ecdsa-sha256-nistp256 as the underlying signature primitive,
+keys require extra information in the public and private keys, and in
+the signature object itself. As such they cannot be made compatible with
+the existing ecdsa-sha2-nistp* key types.
+
+The format of a sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com public key is:
+
+	string		"sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
+	string		curve name
+	ec_point	Q
+	string		application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:")
+
+The corresponding private key contains:
+
+	string		"sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
+	string		curve name
+	ec_point	Q
+	string		application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:")
+	uint8		flags
+	string		key_handle
+	string		reserved
+
+The format of a sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com public key is:
+
+	string		"sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"
+	string		public key
+	string		application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:")
+
+With a private half consisting of:
+
+	string		"sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"
+	string		public key
+	string		application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:")
+	uint8		flags
+	string		key_handle
+	string		reserved
+
+The certificate form for SSH U2F keys appends the usual certificate
+information to the public key:
+
+	string		"sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+	string		nonce
+	string		curve name
+	ec_point	Q
+	string		application
+	uint64		serial
+	uint32		type
+	string		key id
+	string		valid principals
+	uint64		valid after
+	uint64		valid before
+	string		critical options
+	string		extensions
+	string		reserved
+	string		signature key
+	string		signature
+
+and for security key ed25519 certificates:
+
+	string		"sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+	string		nonce
+	string		public key
+	string		application
+	uint64		serial
+	uint32		type
+	string		key id
+	string		valid principals
+	uint64		valid after
+	uint64		valid before
+	string		critical options
+	string		extensions
+	string		reserved
+	string		signature key
+	string		signature
+
+Both security key certificates use the following encoding for private keys:
+
+	string		type (e.g. "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com")
+	string		pubkey (the above key/cert structure)
+	string		application
+	uint8		flags
+	string		key_handle
+	string		reserved
+
+During key generation, the hardware also returns attestation information
+that may be used to cryptographically prove that a given key is
+hardware-backed. Unfortunately, the protocol required for this proof is
+not privacy-preserving and may be used to identify U2F tokens with at
+least manufacturer and batch number granularity. For this reason, we
+choose not to include this information in the public key or save it by
+default.
+
+Attestation information is useful for out-of-band key and certificate
+registration workflows, e.g. proving to a CA that a key is backed
+by trusted hardware before it will issue a certificate. To support this
+case, OpenSSH optionally allows retaining the attestation information
+at the time of key generation. It will take the following format:
+
+	string		"ssh-sk-attest-v01"
+	string		attestation certificate
+	string		enrollment signature
+	string		authenticator data (CBOR encoded)
+	uint32		reserved flags
+	string		reserved string
+
+A previous version of this format, emitted prior to OpenSSH 8.4 omitted
+the authenticator data.
+
+	string		"ssh-sk-attest-v00"
+	string		attestation certificate
+	string		enrollment signature
+	uint32		reserved flags
+	string		reserved string
+
+OpenSSH treats the attestation certificate and enrollment signatures as
+opaque objects and does no interpretation of them itself.
+
+SSH U2F signatures
+------------------
+
+In addition to the message to be signed, the U2F signature operation
+requires the key handle and a few additional parameters. The signature
+is signed over a blob that consists of:
+
+	byte[32]	SHA256(application)
+	byte		flags (including "user present", extensions present)
+	uint32		counter
+	byte[]		extensions
+	byte[32]	SHA256(message)
+
+No extensions are yet defined for SSH use. If any are defined in the future,
+it will be possible to infer their presence from the contents of the "flags"
+value.
+
+The signature returned from U2F hardware takes the following format:
+
+	byte		flags (including "user present")
+	uint32		counter
+	byte[]		ecdsa_signature (in X9.62 format).
+
+For use in the SSH protocol, we wish to avoid server-side parsing of ASN.1
+format data in the pre-authentication attack surface. Therefore, the
+signature format used on the wire in SSH2_USERAUTH_REQUEST packets will
+be reformatted to better match the existing signature encoding:
+
+	string		"sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
+	string		ecdsa_signature
+	byte		flags
+	uint32		counter
+
+Where the "ecdsa_signature" field follows the RFC5656 ECDSA signature
+encoding:
+
+	mpint		r
+	mpint		s
+
+For Ed25519 keys the signature is encoded as:
+
+	string		"sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"
+	string		signature
+	byte		flags
+	uint32		counter
+
+webauthn signatures
+-------------------
+
+The W3C/FIDO webauthn[1] standard defines a mechanism for a web browser to
+interact with FIDO authentication tokens. This standard builds upon the
+FIDO standards, but requires different signature contents to raw FIDO
+messages. OpenSSH supports ECDSA/p256 webauthn signatures through the
+"webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com" signature algorithm.
+
+The wire encoding for a webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com
+signature is similar to the sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com format:
+
+	string		"webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
+	string		ecdsa_signature
+	byte		flags
+	uint32		counter
+	string		origin
+	string		clientData
+	string		extensions
+
+Where "origin" is the HTTP origin making the signature, "clientData" is
+the JSON-like structure signed by the browser and "extensions" are any
+extensions used in making the signature.
+
+[1] https://www.w3.org/TR/webauthn-2/
+
+ssh-agent protocol extensions
+-----------------------------
+
+ssh-agent requires a protocol extension to support U2F keys. At
+present the closest analogue to Security Keys in ssh-agent are PKCS#11
+tokens, insofar as they require a middleware library to communicate with
+the device that holds the keys. Unfortunately, the protocol message used
+to add PKCS#11 keys to ssh-agent does not include any way to send the
+key handle to the agent as U2F keys require.
+
+To avoid this, without having to add wholly new messages to the agent
+protocol, we will use the existing SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED message
+with a new key constraint extension to encode a path to the middleware
+library for the key. The format of this constraint extension would be:
+
+	byte		SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION
+	string		sk-provider@openssh.com
+	string		middleware path
+
+This constraint-based approach does not present any compatibility
+problems.
+
+OpenSSH integration
+-------------------
+
+U2F tokens may be attached via a number of means, including USB and NFC.
+The USB interface is standardised around a HID protocol, but we want to
+be able to support other transports as well as dummy implementations for
+regress testing. For this reason, OpenSSH shall support a dynamically-
+loaded middleware libraries to communicate with security keys, but offer
+support for the common case of USB HID security keys internally.
+
+The middleware library need only expose a handful of functions and
+numbers listed in sk-api.h. Included in the defined numbers is a
+SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR that should be incremented for each incompatible
+API change.
+
+miscellaneous options may be passed to the middleware as a NULL-
+terminated array of pointers to struct sk_option. The middleware may
+ignore unsupported or unknown options unless the "required" flag is set,
+in which case it should return failure if an unsupported option is
+requested.
+
+At present the following options names are supported:
+
+	"device"
+
+	Specifies a specific FIDO device on which to perform the
+	operation. The value in this field is interpreted by the
+	middleware but it would be typical to specify a path to
+	a /dev node for the device in question.
+
+	"user"
+
+	Specifies the FIDO2 username used when enrolling a key,
+	overriding OpenSSH's default of using an all-zero username.
+
+In OpenSSH, the middleware will be invoked by using a similar mechanism to
+ssh-pkcs11-helper to provide address-space containment of the
+middleware from ssh-agent.
+
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.u2f,v 1.26 2020/09/09 03:08:01 djm Exp $
diff --git a/README b/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..89bcddd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/README
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#9.2p1 for the release notes.
+
+Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html for bug reporting
+instructions and note that we do not use Github for bug reporting or
+patch/pull-request management.
+
+This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other
+Unices.
+
+OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample
+implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to
+external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features
+reintroduced and many other clean-ups.  OpenSSH has been created by
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt,
+and Dug Song. It has a homepage at https://www.openssh.com/
+
+This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM
+support, EGD/PRNGD support and replacements for OpenBSD library
+functions that are (regrettably) absent from other unices. This port
+has been best tested on AIX, Cygwin, HP-UX, Linux, MacOS/X,
+FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, OpenServer, Solaris and UnixWare.
+
+This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository.
+
+The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of
+commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for
+all logins, not just when using password authentication.
+
+There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please
+refer to https://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join.
+
+Please send bug reports and patches to https://bugzilla.mindrot.org or
+the mailing list openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org.  To mitigate spam, the
+list only allows posting from subscribed addresses.  Code contribution
+are welcomed, but please follow the OpenBSD style guidelines[1].
+
+Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on dependencies and
+how to install OpenSSH on your system.
+
+Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+
+Miscellania -
+
+This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD CVS
+repository which in turn was based on the last free sample implementation
+released by Tatu Ylonen.
+
+References -
+
+[0] https://www.openssh.com/
+[1] https://man.openbsd.org/style.9
+
diff --git a/README.dns b/README.dns
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29ecaee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/README.dns
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+How to verify host keys using OpenSSH and DNS
+---------------------------------------------
+
+OpenSSH contains support for verifying host keys using DNS as described
+in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4255. The document contains very brief
+instructions on how to use this feature. Configuring DNS is out of the
+scope of this document.
+
+
+(1) Server: Generate and publish the DNS RR
+
+To create a DNS resource record (RR) containing a fingerprint of the
+public host key, use the following command:
+
+	ssh-keygen -r hostname -f keyfile -g
+
+where "hostname" is your fully qualified hostname and "keyfile" is the
+file containing the public host key file. If you have multiple keys,
+you should generate one RR for each key.
+
+In the example above, ssh-keygen will print the fingerprint in a
+generic DNS RR format parsable by most modern name server
+implementations. If your nameserver has support for the SSHFP RR
+you can omit the -g flag and ssh-keygen will print a standard SSHFP RR.
+
+To publish the fingerprint using the DNS you must add the generated RR
+to your DNS zone file and sign your zone.
+
+
+(2) Client: Enable ssh to verify host keys using DNS
+
+To enable the ssh client to verify host keys using DNS, you have to
+add the following option to the ssh configuration file
+($HOME/.ssh/config or /etc/ssh/ssh_config):
+
+    VerifyHostKeyDNS yes
+
+Upon connection the client will try to look up the fingerprint RR
+using DNS. If the fingerprint received from the DNS server matches
+the remote host key, the user will be notified.
+
+
+	Jakob Schlyter
+	Wesley Griffin
+
+
+$OpenBSD: README.dns,v 1.2 2003/10/14 19:43:23 jakob Exp $
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3da9338
--- /dev/null
+++ b/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+# Portable OpenSSH
+
+[![C/C++ CI](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml/badge.svg)](https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/actions/workflows/c-cpp.yml)
+[![Fuzzing Status](https://oss-fuzz-build-logs.storage.googleapis.com/badges/openssh.svg)](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/list?sort=-opened&can=1&q=proj:openssh)
+
+OpenSSH is a complete implementation of the SSH protocol (version 2) for secure remote login, command execution and file transfer. It includes a client ``ssh`` and server ``sshd``, file transfer utilities ``scp`` and ``sftp`` as well as tools for key generation (``ssh-keygen``), run-time key storage (``ssh-agent``) and a number of supporting programs.
+
+This is a port of OpenBSD's [OpenSSH](https://openssh.com) to most Unix-like operating systems, including Linux, OS X and Cygwin. Portable OpenSSH polyfills OpenBSD APIs that are not available elsewhere, adds sshd sandboxing for more operating systems and includes support for OS-native authentication and auditing (e.g. using PAM).
+
+## Documentation
+
+The official documentation for OpenSSH are the man pages for each tool:
+
+* [ssh(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1)
+* [sshd(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8)
+* [ssh-keygen(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keygen.1)
+* [ssh-agent(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-agent.1)
+* [scp(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/scp.1)
+* [sftp(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/sftp.1)
+* [ssh-keyscan(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keyscan.8)
+* [sftp-server(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/sftp-server.8)
+
+## Stable Releases
+
+Stable release tarballs are available from a number of [download mirrors](https://www.openssh.com/portable.html#downloads). We recommend the use of a stable release for most users. Please read the [release notes](https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html) for details of recent changes and potential incompatibilities.
+
+## Building Portable OpenSSH
+
+### Dependencies
+
+Portable OpenSSH is built using autoconf and make. It requires a working C compiler, standard library and headers.
+
+``libcrypto`` from either [LibreSSL](https://www.libressl.org/) or [OpenSSL](https://www.openssl.org) may also be used.  OpenSSH may be built without either of these, but the resulting binaries will have only a subset of the cryptographic algorithms normally available.
+
+[zlib](https://www.zlib.net/) is optional; without it transport compression is not supported.
+
+FIDO security token support needs [libfido2](https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2) and its dependencies and will be enabled automatically if they are found.
+
+In addition, certain platforms and build-time options may require additional dependencies; see README.platform for details about your platform.
+
+### Building a release
+
+Releases include a pre-built copy of the ``configure`` script and may be built using:
+
+```
+tar zxvf openssh-X.YpZ.tar.gz
+cd openssh
+./configure # [options]
+make && make tests
+```
+
+See the [Build-time Customisation](#build-time-customisation) section below for configure options. If you plan on installing OpenSSH to your system, then you will usually want to specify destination paths.
+
+### Building from git
+
+If building from git, you'll need [autoconf](https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/) installed to build the ``configure`` script. The following commands will check out and build portable OpenSSH from git:
+
+```
+git clone https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable # or https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git
+cd openssh-portable
+autoreconf
+./configure
+make && make tests
+```
+
+### Build-time Customisation
+
+There are many build-time customisation options available. All Autoconf destination path flags (e.g. ``--prefix``) are supported (and are usually required if you want to install OpenSSH).
+
+For a full list of available flags, run ``./configure --help`` but a few of the more frequently-used ones are described below. Some of these flags will require additional libraries and/or headers be installed.
+
+Flag | Meaning
+--- | ---
+``--with-pam`` | Enable [PAM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pluggable_authentication_module) support. [OpenPAM](https://www.openpam.org/), [Linux PAM](http://www.linux-pam.org/) and Solaris PAM are supported.
+``--with-libedit`` | Enable [libedit](https://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/) support for sftp.
+``--with-kerberos5`` | Enable Kerberos/GSSAPI support. Both [Heimdal](https://www.h5l.org/) and [MIT](https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/) Kerberos implementations are supported.
+``--with-selinux`` | Enable [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) support.
+
+## Development
+
+Portable OpenSSH development is discussed on the [openssh-unix-dev mailing list](https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev) ([archive mirror](https://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev)). Bugs and feature requests are tracked on our [Bugzilla](https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/).
+
+## Reporting bugs
+
+_Non-security_ bugs may be reported to the developers via [Bugzilla](https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/) or via the mailing list above. Security bugs should be reported to [openssh@openssh.com](mailto:openssh.openssh.com).
diff --git a/README.platform b/README.platform
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b754ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/README.platform
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+This file contains notes about OpenSSH on specific platforms.
+
+AIX
+
+Beginning with OpenSSH 3.8p1, sshd will honour an account's password
+expiry settings, where prior to that it did not.  Because of this,
+it's possible for sites that have used OpenSSH's sshd exclusively to
+have accounts which have passwords expired longer than the inactive time
+(ie the "Weeks between password EXPIRATION and LOCKOUT" setting in SMIT
+or the maxexpired chuser attribute).
+
+Accounts in this state must have their passwords reset manually by the
+administrator.  As a precaution, it is recommended that the administrative
+passwords be reset before upgrading from OpenSSH <3.8.
+
+As of OpenSSH 4.0p1, configure will attempt to detect if your version
+and maintenance level of AIX has a working getaddrinfo, and will use it
+if found.  This will enable IPv6 support.  If for some reason configure
+gets it wrong, or if you want to build binaries to work on earlier MLs
+than the build host then you can add "-DBROKEN_GETADDRINFO" to CFLAGS
+to force the previous IPv4-only behaviour.
+
+IPv6 known to work: 5.1ML7 5.2ML2 5.2ML5
+IPv6 known broken: 4.3.3ML11 5.1ML4
+
+If you wish to use dynamic libraries that aren't in the normal system
+locations (eg IBM's OpenSSL and zlib packages) then you will need to
+define the environment variable blibpath before running configure, eg
+
+blibpath=/lib:/usr/lib:/opt/freeware/lib ./configure \
+  --with-ssl-dir=/opt/freeware --with-zlib=/opt/freeware
+
+If sshd is built with the WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE option (which is enabled
+by default) then sshd checks that users are permitted via the
+loginrestrictions() function, in particular that the user has the
+"rlogin" attribute set.  This check is not done for the root account,
+instead the PermitRootLogin setting in sshd_config is used.
+
+If you are using the IBM compiler you probably want to use CC=xlc rather
+than the default of cc.
+
+
+Cygwin
+------
+To build on Cygwin, OpenSSH requires the following packages:
+gcc, gcc-mingw-core, mingw-runtime, binutils, make, openssl,
+openssl-devel, zlib, minres, minires-devel.
+
+
+Darwin and MacOS X
+------------------
+Darwin does not provide a tun(4) driver required for OpenSSH-based
+virtual private networks. The BSD manpage still exists, but the driver
+has been removed in recent releases of Darwin and MacOS X.
+
+Nevertheless, tunnel support is known to work with Darwin 8 and
+MacOS X 10.4 in Point-to-Point (Layer 3) and Ethernet (Layer 2) mode
+using a third party driver. More information is available at:
+	http://www-user.rhrk.uni-kl.de/~nissler/tuntap/
+
+
+Linux
+-----
+
+Some Linux distributions (including Red Hat/Fedora/CentOS) include
+headers and library links in the -devel RPMs rather than the main
+binary RPMs. If you get an error about headers, or complaining about a
+missing prerequisite then you may need to install the equivalent
+development packages.  On Redhat based distros these may be openssl-devel,
+zlib-devel and pam-devel, on Debian based distros these may be
+libssl-dev, libz-dev and libpam-dev.
+
+
+Solaris
+-------
+If you enable BSM auditing on Solaris, you need to update audit_event(4)
+for praudit(1m) to give sensible output.  The following line needs to be
+added to /etc/security/audit_event:
+
+	32800:AUE_openssh:OpenSSH login:lo
+
+The BSM audit event range available for third party TCB applications is
+32768 - 65535.  Event number 32800 has been chosen for AUE_openssh.
+There is no official registry of 3rd party event numbers, so if this
+number is already in use on your system, you may change it at build time
+by configure'ing --with-cflags=-DAUE_openssh=32801 then rebuilding.
+
+
+Platforms using PAM
+-------------------
+As of OpenSSH 4.3p1, sshd will no longer check /etc/nologin itself when
+PAM is enabled.  To maintain existing behaviour, pam_nologin should be
+added to sshd's session stack which will prevent users from starting shell
+sessions.  Alternatively, pam_nologin can be added to either the auth or
+account stacks which will prevent authentication entirely, but will still
+return the output from pam_nologin to the client.
diff --git a/README.privsep b/README.privsep
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d658c46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/README.privsep
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+Privilege separation, or privsep, is method in OpenSSH by which
+operations that require root privilege are performed by a separate
+privileged monitor process.  Its purpose is to prevent privilege
+escalation by containing corruption to an unprivileged process.
+More information is available at:
+	http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/ssh/privsep.html
+
+Privilege separation is now mandatory.  During the pre-authentication
+phase sshd will chroot(2) to "/var/empty" and change its privileges to the
+"sshd" user and its primary group.  sshd is a pseudo-account that should
+not be used by other daemons, and must be locked and should contain a
+"nologin" or invalid shell.
+
+You should do something like the following to prepare the privsep
+preauth environment:
+
+	# mkdir /var/empty
+	# chown root:sys /var/empty
+	# chmod 755 /var/empty
+	# groupadd sshd
+	# useradd -g sshd -c 'sshd privsep' -d /var/empty -s /bin/false sshd
+
+/var/empty should not contain any files.
+
+configure supports the following options to change the default
+privsep user and chroot directory:
+
+  --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot
+  --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation
+
+PAM-enabled OpenSSH is known to function with privsep on AIX, FreeBSD, 
+HP-UX (including Trusted Mode), Linux, NetBSD and Solaris.
+
+On Cygwin, Tru64 Unix and OpenServer only the pre-authentication part
+of privsep is supported.  Post-authentication privsep is disabled
+automatically (so you won't see the additional process mentioned below).
+
+Note that for a normal interactive login with a shell, enabling privsep
+will require 1 additional process per login session.
+
+Given the following process listing (from HP-UX):
+
+     UID   PID  PPID  C    STIME TTY       TIME COMMAND
+    root  1005     1  0 10:45:17 ?         0:08 /opt/openssh/sbin/sshd -u0
+    root  6917  1005  0 15:19:16 ?         0:00 sshd: stevesk [priv]
+ stevesk  6919  6917  0 15:19:17 ?         0:03 sshd: stevesk@2
+ stevesk  6921  6919  0 15:19:17 pts/2     0:00 -bash
+
+process 1005 is the sshd process listening for new connections.
+process 6917 is the privileged monitor process, 6919 is the user owned
+sshd process and 6921 is the shell process.
diff --git a/README.tun b/README.tun
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5e1cb07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/README.tun
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+How to use OpenSSH-based virtual private networks
+-------------------------------------------------
+
+OpenSSH contains support for VPN tunneling using the tun(4) network
+tunnel pseudo-device which is available on most platforms, either for
+layer 2 or 3 traffic.
+
+The following brief instructions on how to use this feature use
+a network configuration specific to the OpenBSD operating system.
+
+(1) Server: Enable support for SSH tunneling
+
+To enable the ssh server to accept tunnel requests from the client, you
+have to add the following option to the ssh server configuration file
+(/etc/ssh/sshd_config):
+
+	PermitTunnel yes
+
+Restart the server or send the hangup signal (SIGHUP) to let the server
+reread it's configuration.
+
+(2) Server: Restrict client access and assign the tunnel
+
+The OpenSSH server simply uses the file /root/.ssh/authorized_keys to
+restrict the client to connect to a specified tunnel and to
+automatically start the related interface configuration command. These
+settings are optional but recommended:
+
+	tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... reyk@openbsd.org
+
+(3) Client: Configure the local network tunnel interface
+
+Use the hostname.if(5) interface-specific configuration file to set up
+the network tunnel configuration with OpenBSD. For example, use the
+following configuration in /etc/hostname.tun0 to set up the layer 3
+tunnel on the client:
+
+	inet 192.168.5.1 255.255.255.252 192.168.5.2
+
+OpenBSD also supports layer 2 tunneling over the tun device by adding
+the link0 flag:
+
+	inet 192.168.1.78 255.255.255.0 192.168.1.255 link0
+
+Layer 2 tunnels can be used in combination with an Ethernet bridge(4)
+interface, like the following example for /etc/bridgename.bridge0:
+
+	add tun0
+	add sis0
+	up
+
+(4) Client: Configure the OpenSSH client
+
+To establish tunnel forwarding for connections to a specified
+remote host by default, use the following ssh client configuration for
+the privileged user (in /root/.ssh/config):
+
+	Host sshgateway
+		Tunnel yes
+		TunnelDevice 0:any
+		PermitLocalCommand yes
+	        LocalCommand sh /etc/netstart tun0
+
+A more complicated configuration is possible to establish a tunnel to
+a remote host which is not directly accessible by the client.
+The following example describes a client configuration to connect to
+the remote host over two ssh hops in between. It uses the OpenSSH
+ProxyCommand in combination with the nc(1) program to forward the final
+ssh tunnel destination over multiple ssh sessions.
+
+	Host access.somewhere.net
+	        User puffy
+	Host dmzgw
+	        User puffy
+	        ProxyCommand ssh access.somewhere.net nc dmzgw 22
+	Host sshgateway
+	        Tunnel Ethernet
+	        TunnelDevice 0:any
+	        PermitLocalCommand yes
+	        LocalCommand sh /etc/netstart tun0
+	        ProxyCommand ssh dmzgw nc sshgateway 22
+
+The following network plan illustrates the previous configuration in
+combination with layer 2 tunneling and Ethernet bridging.
+
++--------+       (          )      +----------------------+
+| Client |------(  Internet  )-----| access.somewhere.net |
++--------+       (          )      +----------------------+
+    : 192.168.1.78                             |
+    :.............................         +-------+
+     Forwarded ssh connection    :         | dmzgw |
+     Layer 2 tunnel              :         +-------+
+                                 :             |
+                                 :             |
+                                 :      +------------+
+                                 :......| sshgateway |
+                                      | +------------+
+--- real connection                 Bridge ->  |          +----------+
+... "virtual connection"                     [ X ]--------| somehost |
+[X] switch                                                +----------+
+                                                          192.168.1.25
+
+(5) Client: Connect to the server and establish the tunnel
+
+Finally connect to the OpenSSH server to establish the tunnel by using
+the following command:
+
+	ssh sshgateway
+
+It is also possible to tell the client to fork into the background after
+the connection has been successfully established:
+
+	ssh -f sshgateway true
+
+Without the ssh configuration done in step (4), it is also possible
+to use the following command lines:
+
+	ssh -fw 0:1 sshgateway true
+	ifconfig tun0 192.168.5.1 192.168.5.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
+
+Using OpenSSH tunnel forwarding is a simple way to establish secure
+and ad hoc virtual private networks. Possible fields of application
+could be wireless networks or administrative VPN tunnels.
+
+Nevertheless, ssh tunneling requires some packet header overhead and
+runs on top of TCP. It is still suggested to use the IP Security
+Protocol (IPSec) for robust and permanent VPN connections and to
+interconnect corporate networks.
+
+	Reyk Floeter
+
+$OpenBSD: README.tun,v 1.4 2006/03/28 00:12:31 deraadt Exp $
diff --git a/SECURITY.md b/SECURITY.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba436c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SECURITY.md
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# Reporting OpenSSH Security Issues
+
+To report security issues in OpenSSH, please refer to our website
+[OpenSSH Security](https://www.openssh.com/security.html).
+
diff --git a/TODO b/TODO
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b76529c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/TODO
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+Documentation:
+
+- Update the docs
+  - Update README
+  - Update INSTALL
+  - Merge INSTALL & README.privsep
+
+- Install FAQ?
+
+- General FAQ on S/Key, TIS, RSA, RSA2, DSA, etc and suggestions on when it
+  would be best to use them.
+
+- Create a Documentation/ directory?
+
+Programming:
+
+- Grep for 'XXX' comments and fix
+
+- Link order is incorrect for some systems using Kerberos 4 and AFS. Result
+  is multiple inclusion of DES symbols. Holger Trapp
+  <holger.trapp@hrz.tu-chemnitz.de> reports that changing the configure
+  generated link order from:
+	-lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl  -lutil -lkafs -lkrb -ldes -lcrypto
+  to:
+	-lresolv -lkrb -lz -lnsl  -lutil -lcrypto -lkafs -lkrb -ldes
+  fixing the problem.
+
+- Write a test program that calls stat() to search for EGD/PRNGd socket
+  rather than use the (non-portable) "test -S".
+
+- More platforms for for setproctitle() emulation (testing needed)
+
+- Improve PAM ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+ - Informational messages
+ - Use different PAM service name for kbdint vs regular auth (suggest from
+   Solar Designer)
+ - Ability to select which ChallengeResponseAuthentications may be used
+   and order to try them in e.g. "ChallengeResponseAuthentication pam"
+
+- Complete Tru64 SIA support
+ - It looks like we could merge it into the password auth code to cut down
+   on diff size. Maybe PAM password auth too?
+
+- Finish integrating kernel-level auditing code for IRIX and SOLARIS
+  (Gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com)
+
+- 64-bit builds on HP-UX 11.X (stevesk@pobox.com):
+  - utmp/wtmp get corrupted (something in loginrec?)
+  - can't build with PAM (no 64-bit libpam yet)
+
+Clean up configure/makefiles:
+- Clean up configure.ac - There are a few double #defined variables
+  left to do.  HAVE_LOGIN is one of them.  Consider NOT looking for
+  information in wtmpx or utmpx or any of that stuff if it's not detected
+  from the start
+
+- Replace the whole u_intXX_t evilness in acconfig.h with something better???
+ - Do it in configure.ac
+
+- Consider splitting the u_intXX_t test for sys/bitype.h  into separate test
+  to allow people to (right/wrongfully) link against Bind directly.
+
+- Consider splitting configure.ac into separate files which do logically
+  similar tests. E.g move all the type detection stuff into one file,
+  entropy related stuff into another.
+
+Packaging:
+- HP-UX: Provide DEPOT package scripts.
+  (gilbert.r.loomis@saic.com)
+
+PrivSep Issues:
+- PAM
+  + See above PAM notes
+- AIX
+  + usrinfo() does not set TTY, but only required for legacy systems.  Works
+    with PrivSep.
+- OSF
+  + SIA is broken
+- Cygwin
+  + Privsep for Pre-auth only (no fd passing)
diff --git a/aclocal.m4 b/aclocal.m4
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a19d27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/aclocal.m4
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# generated automatically by aclocal 1.16.5 -*- Autoconf -*-
+
+# Copyright (C) 1996-2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+# This file is free software; the Free Software Foundation
+# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it,
+# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
+
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without
+# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A
+# PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+m4_ifndef([AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS], [m4_defun([_AM_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS], [])m4_defun([AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS], [_AM_CONFIG_MACRO_DIRS($@)])])
+m4_include([m4/openssh.m4])
diff --git a/addr.c b/addr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db9ab7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/addr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,506 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: addr.c,v 1.6 2022/10/28 02:29:34 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2008 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "addr.h"
+
+#define _SA(x)	((struct sockaddr *)(x))
+
+int
+addr_unicast_masklen(int af)
+{
+	switch (af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		return 32;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		return 128;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+static inline int
+masklen_valid(int af, u_int masklen)
+{
+	switch (af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		return masklen <= 32 ? 0 : -1;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		return masklen <= 128 ? 0 : -1;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+int
+addr_xaddr_to_sa(const struct xaddr *xa, struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t *len,
+    u_int16_t port)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
+
+	if (xa == NULL || sa == NULL || len == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	switch (xa->af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		if (*len < sizeof(*in4))
+			return -1;
+		memset(sa, '\0', sizeof(*in4));
+		*len = sizeof(*in4);
+#ifdef SOCK_HAS_LEN
+		in4->sin_len = sizeof(*in4);
+#endif
+		in4->sin_family = AF_INET;
+		in4->sin_port = htons(port);
+		memcpy(&in4->sin_addr, &xa->v4, sizeof(in4->sin_addr));
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		if (*len < sizeof(*in6))
+			return -1;
+		memset(sa, '\0', sizeof(*in6));
+		*len = sizeof(*in6);
+#ifdef SOCK_HAS_LEN
+		in6->sin6_len = sizeof(*in6);
+#endif
+		in6->sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+		in6->sin6_port = htons(port);
+		memcpy(&in6->sin6_addr, &xa->v6, sizeof(in6->sin6_addr));
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID
+		in6->sin6_scope_id = xa->scope_id;
+#endif
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert struct sockaddr to struct xaddr
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+addr_sa_to_xaddr(struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t slen, struct xaddr *xa)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
+
+	memset(xa, '\0', sizeof(*xa));
+
+	switch (sa->sa_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		if (slen < (socklen_t)sizeof(*in4))
+			return -1;
+		xa->af = AF_INET;
+		memcpy(&xa->v4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof(xa->v4));
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		if (slen < (socklen_t)sizeof(*in6))
+			return -1;
+		xa->af = AF_INET6;
+		memcpy(&xa->v6, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof(xa->v6));
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID
+		xa->scope_id = in6->sin6_scope_id;
+#endif
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+addr_invert(struct xaddr *n)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (n == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	switch (n->af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		n->v4.s_addr = ~n->v4.s_addr;
+		return 0;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+			n->addr32[i] = ~n->addr32[i];
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate a netmask of length 'l' for address family 'af' and
+ * store it in 'n'.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+addr_netmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (masklen_valid(af, l) != 0 || n == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	memset(n, '\0', sizeof(*n));
+	switch (af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		n->af = AF_INET;
+		if (l == 0)
+			return 0;
+		n->v4.s_addr = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) & 0xffffffff);
+		return 0;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		n->af = AF_INET6;
+		for (i = 0; i < 4 && l >= 32; i++, l -= 32)
+			n->addr32[i] = 0xffffffffU;
+		if (i < 4 && l != 0)
+			n->addr32[i] = htonl((0xffffffff << (32 - l)) &
+			    0xffffffff);
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+int
+addr_hostmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n)
+{
+	if (addr_netmask(af, l, n) == -1 || addr_invert(n) == -1)
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform logical AND of addresses 'a' and 'b', storing result in 'dst'.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+addr_and(struct xaddr *dst, const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (dst == NULL || a == NULL || b == NULL || a->af != b->af)
+		return -1;
+
+	memcpy(dst, a, sizeof(*dst));
+	switch (a->af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		dst->v4.s_addr &= b->v4.s_addr;
+		return 0;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		dst->scope_id = a->scope_id;
+		for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+			dst->addr32[i] &= b->addr32[i];
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+int
+addr_or(struct xaddr *dst, const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (dst == NULL || a == NULL || b == NULL || a->af != b->af)
+		return (-1);
+
+	memcpy(dst, a, sizeof(*dst));
+	switch (a->af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		dst->v4.s_addr |= b->v4.s_addr;
+		return (0);
+	case AF_INET6:
+		for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+			dst->addr32[i] |= b->addr32[i];
+		return (0);
+	default:
+		return (-1);
+	}
+}
+
+int
+addr_cmp(const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (a->af != b->af)
+		return (a->af == AF_INET6 ? 1 : -1);
+
+	switch (a->af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		/*
+		 * Can't just subtract here as 255.255.255.255 - 0.0.0.0 is
+		 * too big to fit into a signed int
+		 */
+		if (a->v4.s_addr == b->v4.s_addr)
+			return 0;
+		return (ntohl(a->v4.s_addr) > ntohl(b->v4.s_addr) ? 1 : -1);
+	case AF_INET6:
+		/*
+		 * Do this a byte at a time to avoid the above issue and
+		 * any endian problems
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+			if (a->addr8[i] - b->addr8[i] != 0)
+				return (a->addr8[i] - b->addr8[i]);
+		if (a->scope_id == b->scope_id)
+			return (0);
+		return (a->scope_id > b->scope_id ? 1 : -1);
+	default:
+		return (-1);
+	}
+}
+
+int
+addr_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	switch (a->af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		return (a->v4.s_addr == 0 ? 0 : -1);
+	case AF_INET6:
+		for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+			if (a->addr32[i] != 0)
+				return -1;
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Increment the specified address. Note, does not do overflow checking */
+void
+addr_increment(struct xaddr *a)
+{
+	int i;
+	uint32_t n;
+
+	switch (a->af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		a->v4.s_addr = htonl(ntohl(a->v4.s_addr) + 1);
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+			/* Increment with carry */
+			n = ntohl(a->addr32[3 - i]) + 1;
+			a->addr32[3 - i] = htonl(n);
+			if (n != 0)
+				break;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test whether host portion of address 'a', as determined by 'masklen'
+ * is all zeros.
+ * Returns 0 if host portion of address is all-zeros,
+ * -1 if not all zeros or on failure.
+ */
+int
+addr_host_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *a, u_int masklen)
+{
+	struct xaddr tmp_addr, tmp_mask, tmp_result;
+
+	memcpy(&tmp_addr, a, sizeof(tmp_addr));
+	if (addr_hostmask(a->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1)
+		return -1;
+	if (addr_and(&tmp_result, &tmp_addr, &tmp_mask) == -1)
+		return -1;
+	return addr_is_all0s(&tmp_result);
+}
+
+#if 0
+int
+addr_host_to_all0s(struct xaddr *a, u_int masklen)
+{
+	struct xaddr tmp_mask;
+
+	if (addr_netmask(a->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	if (addr_and(a, a, &tmp_mask) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+addr_host_to_all1s(struct xaddr *a, u_int masklen)
+{
+	struct xaddr tmp_mask;
+
+	if (addr_hostmask(a->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	if (addr_or(a, a, &tmp_mask) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse string address 'p' into 'n'.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n)
+{
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai;
+
+	memset(&hints, '\0', sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+
+	if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (ai == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (n != NULL && addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+	    n) == -1) {
+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	freeaddrinfo(ai);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+addr_sa_pton(const char *h, const char *s, struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t slen)
+{
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai;
+
+	memset(&hints, '\0', sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+
+	if (h == NULL || getaddrinfo(h, s, &hints, &ai) != 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (ai == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (sa != NULL) {
+		if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen) {
+			freeaddrinfo(ai);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		memcpy(sa, &ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
+	}
+
+	freeaddrinfo(ai);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+addr_ntop(const struct xaddr *n, char *p, size_t len)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_storage ss;
+	socklen_t slen = sizeof(ss);
+
+	if (addr_xaddr_to_sa(n, _SA(&ss), &slen, 0) == -1)
+		return -1;
+	if (p == NULL || len == 0)
+		return -1;
+	if (getnameinfo(_SA(&ss), slen, p, len, NULL, 0,
+	    NI_NUMERICHOST) == -1)
+		return -1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a CIDR address (x.x.x.x/y or xxxx:yyyy::/z).
+ * Return -1 on parse error, -2 on inconsistency or 0 on success.
+ */
+int
+addr_pton_cidr(const char *p, struct xaddr *n, u_int *l)
+{
+	struct xaddr tmp;
+	long unsigned int masklen = 999;
+	char addrbuf[64], *mp, *cp;
+
+	/* Don't modify argument */
+	if (p == NULL || strlcpy(addrbuf, p, sizeof(addrbuf)) >= sizeof(addrbuf))
+		return -1;
+
+	if ((mp = strchr(addrbuf, '/')) != NULL) {
+		*mp = '\0';
+		mp++;
+		masklen = strtoul(mp, &cp, 10);
+		if (*mp < '0' || *mp > '9' || *cp != '\0' || masklen > 128)
+			return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (addr_pton(addrbuf, &tmp) == -1)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (mp == NULL)
+		masklen = addr_unicast_masklen(tmp.af);
+	if (masklen_valid(tmp.af, masklen) == -1)
+		return -2;
+	if (addr_host_is_all0s(&tmp, masklen) != 0)
+		return -2;
+
+	if (n != NULL)
+		memcpy(n, &tmp, sizeof(*n));
+	if (l != NULL)
+		*l = masklen;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+addr_netmatch(const struct xaddr *host, const struct xaddr *net, u_int masklen)
+{
+	struct xaddr tmp_mask, tmp_result;
+
+	if (host->af != net->af)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (addr_netmask(host->af, masklen, &tmp_mask) == -1)
+		return -1;
+	if (addr_and(&tmp_result, host, &tmp_mask) == -1)
+		return -1;
+	return addr_cmp(&tmp_result, net);
+}
diff --git a/addr.h b/addr.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..180e9fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/addr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004,2005 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Address handling routines */
+
+#ifndef _ADDR_H
+#define _ADDR_H
+
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+struct xaddr {
+	sa_family_t	af;
+	union {
+		struct in_addr		v4;
+		struct in6_addr		v6;
+		u_int8_t		addr8[16];
+		u_int16_t		addr16[8];
+		u_int32_t		addr32[4];
+	} xa;		    /* 128-bit address */
+	u_int32_t	scope_id;	/* iface scope id for v6 */
+#define v4	xa.v4
+#define v6	xa.v6
+#define addr8	xa.addr8
+#define addr16	xa.addr16
+#define addr32	xa.addr32
+};
+
+int addr_unicast_masklen(int af);
+int addr_xaddr_to_sa(const struct xaddr *xa, struct sockaddr *sa,
+    socklen_t *len, u_int16_t port);
+int addr_sa_to_xaddr(struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t slen, struct xaddr *xa);
+int addr_netmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n);
+int addr_hostmask(int af, u_int l, struct xaddr *n);
+int addr_invert(struct xaddr *n);
+int addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n);
+int addr_sa_pton(const char *h, const char *s, struct sockaddr *sa,
+    socklen_t slen);
+int addr_pton_cidr(const char *p, struct xaddr *n, u_int *l);
+int addr_ntop(const struct xaddr *n, char *p, size_t len);
+int addr_and(struct xaddr *dst, const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b);
+int addr_or(struct xaddr *dst, const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b);
+int addr_cmp(const struct xaddr *a, const struct xaddr *b);
+int addr_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *n);
+int addr_host_is_all0s(const struct xaddr *n, u_int masklen);
+int addr_host_to_all0s(struct xaddr *a, u_int masklen);
+int addr_host_to_all1s(struct xaddr *a, u_int masklen);
+int addr_netmatch(const struct xaddr *host, const struct xaddr *net,
+    u_int masklen);
+void addr_increment(struct xaddr *a);
+#endif /* _ADDR_H */
diff --git a/addrmatch.c b/addrmatch.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0dc096
--- /dev/null
+++ b/addrmatch.c
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: addrmatch.c,v 1.17 2021/04/03 06:18:40 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2008 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "addr.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+/*
+ * Match "addr" against list pattern list "_list", which may contain a
+ * mix of CIDR addresses and old-school wildcards.
+ *
+ * If addr is NULL, then no matching is performed, but _list is parsed
+ * and checked for well-formedness.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
+ * Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL.
+ * Returns -1 on negated match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
+ * Returns -2 on invalid list entry.
+ */
+int
+addr_match_list(const char *addr, const char *_list)
+{
+	char *list, *cp, *o;
+	struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr;
+	u_int masklen, neg;
+	int ret = 0, r;
+
+	if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) {
+		debug2_f("couldn't parse address %.100s", addr);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) {
+		neg = *cp == '!';
+		if (neg)
+			cp++;
+		if (*cp == '\0') {
+			ret = -2;
+			break;
+		}
+		/* Prefer CIDR address matching */
+		r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen);
+		if (r == -2) {
+			debug2_f("inconsistent mask length for "
+			    "match network \"%.100s\"", cp);
+			ret = -2;
+			break;
+		} else if (r == 0) {
+			if (addr != NULL && addr_netmatch(&try_addr,
+			    &match_addr, masklen) == 0) {
+ foundit:
+				if (neg) {
+					ret = -1;
+					break;
+				}
+				ret = 1;
+			}
+			continue;
+		} else {
+			/* If CIDR parse failed, try wildcard string match */
+			if (addr != NULL && match_pattern(addr, cp) == 1)
+				goto foundit;
+		}
+	}
+	free(o);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Match "addr" against list CIDR list "_list". Lexical wildcards and
+ * negation are not supported. If "addr" == NULL, will verify structure
+ * of "_list".
+ *
+ * Returns 1 on match found (never returned when addr == NULL).
+ * Returns 0 on if no match found, or no errors found when addr == NULL.
+ * Returns -1 on error
+ */
+int
+addr_match_cidr_list(const char *addr, const char *_list)
+{
+	char *list, *cp, *o;
+	struct xaddr try_addr, match_addr;
+	u_int masklen;
+	int ret = 0, r;
+
+	if (addr != NULL && addr_pton(addr, &try_addr) != 0) {
+		debug2_f("couldn't parse address %.100s", addr);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if ((o = list = strdup(_list)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	while ((cp = strsep(&list, ",")) != NULL) {
+		if (*cp == '\0') {
+			error_f("empty entry in list \"%.100s\"", o);
+			ret = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * NB. This function is called in pre-auth with untrusted data,
+		 * so be extra paranoid about junk reaching getaddrino (via
+		 * addr_pton_cidr).
+		 */
+
+		/* Stop junk from reaching getaddrinfo. +3 is for masklen */
+		if (strlen(cp) > INET6_ADDRSTRLEN + 3) {
+			error_f("list entry \"%.100s\" too long", cp);
+			ret = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+#define VALID_CIDR_CHARS "0123456789abcdefABCDEF.:/"
+		if (strspn(cp, VALID_CIDR_CHARS) != strlen(cp)) {
+			error_f("list entry \"%.100s\" contains invalid "
+			    "characters", cp);
+			ret = -1;
+		}
+
+		/* Prefer CIDR address matching */
+		r = addr_pton_cidr(cp, &match_addr, &masklen);
+		if (r == -1) {
+			error("Invalid network entry \"%.100s\"", cp);
+			ret = -1;
+			break;
+		} else if (r == -2) {
+			error("Inconsistent mask length for "
+			    "network \"%.100s\"", cp);
+			ret = -1;
+			break;
+		} else if (r == 0 && addr != NULL) {
+			if (addr_netmatch(&try_addr, &match_addr,
+			    masklen) == 0)
+				ret = 1;
+			continue;
+		}
+	}
+	free(o);
+
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/atomicio.c b/atomicio.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7650733
--- /dev/null
+++ b/atomicio.c
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.c,v 1.30 2019/01/24 02:42:23 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Anil Madhavapeddy. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+#  include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+/*
+ * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite
+ */
+size_t
+atomicio6(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n,
+    int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *cb_arg)
+{
+	char *s = _s;
+	size_t pos = 0;
+	ssize_t res;
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+
+	pfd.fd = fd;
+#ifndef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
+	pfd.events = f == read ? POLLIN : POLLOUT;
+#else
+	pfd.events = POLLIN|POLLOUT;
+#endif
+	while (n > pos) {
+		res = (f) (fd, s + pos, n - pos);
+		switch (res) {
+		case -1:
+			if (errno == EINTR) {
+				/* possible SIGALARM, update callback */
+				if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, 0) == -1) {
+					errno = EINTR;
+					return pos;
+				}
+				continue;
+			} else if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
+				(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+				continue;
+			}
+			return 0;
+		case 0:
+			errno = EPIPE;
+			return pos;
+		default:
+			pos += (size_t)res;
+			if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, (size_t)res) == -1) {
+				errno = EINTR;
+				return pos;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return pos;
+}
+
+size_t
+atomicio(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n)
+{
+	return atomicio6(f, fd, _s, n, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev
+ */
+size_t
+atomiciov6(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
+    const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt,
+    int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *cb_arg)
+{
+	size_t pos = 0, rem;
+	ssize_t res;
+	struct iovec iov_array[IOV_MAX], *iov = iov_array;
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+
+	if (iovcnt < 0 || iovcnt > IOV_MAX) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Make a copy of the iov array because we may modify it below */
+	memcpy(iov, _iov, (size_t)iovcnt * sizeof(*_iov));
+
+	pfd.fd = fd;
+#ifndef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
+	pfd.events = f == readv ? POLLIN : POLLOUT;
+#else
+	pfd.events = POLLIN|POLLOUT;
+#endif
+	for (; iovcnt > 0 && iov[0].iov_len > 0;) {
+		res = (f) (fd, iov, iovcnt);
+		switch (res) {
+		case -1:
+			if (errno == EINTR) {
+				/* possible SIGALARM, update callback */
+				if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, 0) == -1) {
+					errno = EINTR;
+					return pos;
+				}
+				continue;
+			} else if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) {
+				(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+				continue;
+			}
+			return 0;
+		case 0:
+			errno = EPIPE;
+			return pos;
+		default:
+			rem = (size_t)res;
+			pos += rem;
+			/* skip completed iov entries */
+			while (iovcnt > 0 && rem >= iov[0].iov_len) {
+				rem -= iov[0].iov_len;
+				iov++;
+				iovcnt--;
+			}
+			/* This shouldn't happen... */
+			if (rem > 0 && (iovcnt <= 0 || rem > iov[0].iov_len)) {
+				errno = EFAULT;
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (iovcnt == 0)
+				break;
+			/* update pointer in partially complete iov */
+			iov[0].iov_base = ((char *)iov[0].iov_base) + rem;
+			iov[0].iov_len -= rem;
+		}
+		if (cb != NULL && cb(cb_arg, (size_t)res) == -1) {
+			errno = EINTR;
+			return pos;
+		}
+	}
+	return pos;
+}
+
+size_t
+atomiciov(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
+    const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt)
+{
+	return atomiciov6(f, fd, _iov, iovcnt, NULL, NULL);
+}
diff --git a/atomicio.h b/atomicio.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b3cc6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/atomicio.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: atomicio.h,v 1.12 2018/12/27 03:25:25 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1995,1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _ATOMICIO_H
+#define _ATOMICIO_H
+
+struct iovec;
+
+/*
+ * Ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==read || f==vwrite
+ */
+size_t
+atomicio6(ssize_t (*f) (int, void *, size_t), int fd, void *_s, size_t n,
+    int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *);
+size_t	atomicio(ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t), int, void *, size_t);
+
+#define vwrite (ssize_t (*)(int, void *, size_t))write
+
+/*
+ * ensure all of data on socket comes through. f==readv || f==writev
+ */
+size_t
+atomiciov6(ssize_t (*f) (int, const struct iovec *, int), int fd,
+    const struct iovec *_iov, int iovcnt, int (*cb)(void *, size_t), void *);
+size_t	atomiciov(ssize_t (*)(int, const struct iovec *, int),
+    int, const struct iovec *, int);
+
+#endif /* _ATOMICIO_H */
diff --git a/audit-bsm.c b/audit-bsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ccfcf6f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/audit-bsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,455 @@
+/*
+ * TODO
+ *
+ * - deal with overlap between this and sys_auth_allowed_user
+ *   sys_auth_record_login and record_failed_login.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 1988-2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+/* #pragma ident	"@(#)bsmaudit.c	1.1	01/09/17 SMI" */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if defined(USE_BSM_AUDIT)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API
+#include <libscf.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+#ifndef AUE_openssh
+# define AUE_openssh     32800
+#endif
+#include <bsm/audit.h>
+#include <bsm/libbsm.h>
+#include <bsm/audit_uevents.h>
+#include <bsm/audit_record.h>
+#include <locale.h>
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR)
+#define	AuditInfoStruct		auditinfo_addr
+#define AuditInfoTermID		au_tid_addr_t
+#define SetAuditFunc(a,b)	setaudit_addr((a),(b))
+#define SetAuditFuncText	"setaudit_addr"
+#define AUToSubjectFunc		au_to_subject_ex
+#define AUToReturnFunc(a,b)	au_to_return32((a), (int32_t)(b))
+#else
+#define	AuditInfoStruct		auditinfo
+#define AuditInfoTermID		au_tid_t
+#define SetAuditFunc(a,b)	setaudit(a)
+#define SetAuditFuncText	"setaudit"
+#define AUToSubjectFunc		au_to_subject
+#define AUToReturnFunc(a,b)	au_to_return((a), (u_int)(b))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef cannot_audit
+extern int	cannot_audit(int);
+#endif
+extern void	aug_init(void);
+extern void	aug_save_auid(au_id_t);
+extern void	aug_save_uid(uid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_euid(uid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_gid(gid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_egid(gid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_pid(pid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_asid(au_asid_t);
+extern void	aug_save_tid(dev_t, unsigned int);
+extern void	aug_save_tid_ex(dev_t, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t);
+extern int	aug_save_me(void);
+extern int	aug_save_namask(void);
+extern void	aug_save_event(au_event_t);
+extern void	aug_save_sorf(int);
+extern void	aug_save_text(char *);
+extern void	aug_save_text1(char *);
+extern void	aug_save_text2(char *);
+extern void	aug_save_na(int);
+extern void	aug_save_user(char *);
+extern void	aug_save_path(char *);
+extern int	aug_save_policy(void);
+extern void	aug_save_afunc(int (*)(int));
+extern int	aug_audit(void);
+extern int	aug_na_selected(void);
+extern int	aug_selected(void);
+extern int	aug_daemon_session(void);
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETTEXT
+# define gettext(a)	(a)
+#endif
+
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+static AuditInfoTermID ssh_bsm_tid;
+
+#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API
+/* For some reason this constant is no longer defined
+   in Solaris 11. */
+#define BSM_TEXTBUFSZ 256
+#endif
+
+/* Below is the low-level BSM interface code */
+
+/*
+ * aug_get_machine is only required on IPv6 capable machines, we use a
+ * different mechanism in audit_connection_from() for IPv4-only machines.
+ * getaudit_addr() is only present on IPv6 capable machines.
+ */
+#if defined(HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR)
+extern int aug_get_machine(char *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *);
+#else
+static int
+aug_get_machine(char *host, u_int32_t *addr, u_int32_t *type)
+{
+	struct addrinfo *ai; 
+	struct sockaddr_in *in4;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+	int ret = 0, r;
+
+	if ((r = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, NULL, &ai)) != 0) {
+		error("BSM audit: getaddrinfo failed for %.100s: %.100s", host,
+		    r == EAI_SYSTEM ? strerror(errno) : gai_strerror(r));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	
+	switch (ai->ai_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr;
+		*type = AU_IPv4;
+		memcpy(addr, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr));
+		break;
+#ifdef AU_IPv6
+	case AF_INET6: 
+		in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr;
+		*type = AU_IPv6;
+		memcpy(addr, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof(struct in6_addr));
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:
+		error("BSM audit: unknown address family for %.100s: %d",
+		    host, ai->ai_family);
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+	freeaddrinfo(ai);
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API
+/*
+  In Solaris 11 the audit daemon has been moved to SMF. In the process
+  they simply dropped getacna() from the API, since it read from a now
+  non-existent config file. This function re-implements getacna() to
+  read from the SMF repository instead.
+ */
+int
+getacna(char *auditstring, int len)
+{
+	scf_handle_t *handle = NULL;
+	scf_property_t *property = NULL;
+	scf_value_t *value = NULL;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * The man page for getacna on Solaris 10 states we should return -2
+	 * in case of error and set errno to indicate the error. We don't
+	 * bother with errno here, though, since the only use of this function
+	 * below doesn't check for errors anyway.
+	*/
+	handle = scf_handle_create(SCF_VERSION);
+	if (handle == NULL) 
+		return -2;
+
+	ret = scf_handle_bind(handle);
+	if (ret == -1) 
+		return -2;
+
+	property = scf_property_create(handle);
+	if (property == NULL) 
+		return -2;
+
+	ret = scf_handle_decode_fmri(handle, 
+	    "svc:/system/auditd:default/:properties/preselection/naflags",
+	    NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, property, 0);
+	if (ret == -1) 
+		return -2;
+
+	value = scf_value_create(handle);
+	if (value == NULL) 
+		return -2;
+
+	ret = scf_property_get_value(property, value);
+	if (ret == -1) 
+		return -2;
+
+	ret = scf_value_get_astring(value, auditstring, len);
+	if (ret == -1) 
+		return -2;
+
+	scf_value_destroy(value);
+	scf_property_destroy(property);
+	scf_handle_destroy(handle);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Check if the specified event is selected (enabled) for auditing.
+ * Returns 1 if the event is selected, 0 if not and -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+selected(char *username, uid_t uid, au_event_t event, int sf)
+{
+	int rc, sorf;
+	char naflags[512];
+	struct au_mask mask;
+
+	mask.am_success = mask.am_failure = 0;
+	if (uid < 0) {
+		/* get flags for non-attributable (to a real user) events */
+		rc = getacna(naflags, sizeof(naflags));
+		if (rc == 0)
+			(void) getauditflagsbin(naflags, &mask);
+	} else
+		rc = au_user_mask(username, &mask);
+
+	sorf = (sf == 0) ? AU_PRS_SUCCESS : AU_PRS_FAILURE;
+	return(au_preselect(event, &mask, sorf, AU_PRS_REREAD));
+}
+
+static void
+bsm_audit_record(int typ, char *string, au_event_t event_no)
+{
+	int		ad, rc, sel;
+	uid_t		uid = -1;
+	gid_t		gid = -1;
+	pid_t		pid = getpid();
+	AuditInfoTermID	tid = ssh_bsm_tid;
+
+	if (the_authctxt != NULL && the_authctxt->valid) {
+		uid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid;
+		gid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_gid;
+	}
+
+	rc = (typ == 0) ? 0 : -1;
+	sel = selected(the_authctxt->user, uid, event_no, rc);
+	debug3("BSM audit: typ %d rc %d \"%s\"", typ, rc, string);
+	if (!sel)
+		return;	/* audit event does not match mask, do not write */
+
+	debug3("BSM audit: writing audit new record");
+	ad = au_open();
+
+	(void) au_write(ad, AUToSubjectFunc(uid, uid, gid, uid, gid,
+	    pid, pid, &tid));
+	(void) au_write(ad, au_to_text(string));
+	(void) au_write(ad, AUToReturnFunc(typ, rc));
+
+#ifdef BROKEN_BSM_API
+	/*
+	 * The last argument is the event modifier flags. For some seemingly
+	 * undocumented reason it was added in Solaris 11.
+	 */
+	rc = au_close(ad, AU_TO_WRITE, event_no, 0);
+#else
+	rc = au_close(ad, AU_TO_WRITE, event_no);
+#endif
+
+	if (rc < 0)
+		error("BSM audit: %s failed to write \"%s\" record: %s",
+		    __func__, string, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+static void
+bsm_audit_session_setup(void)
+{
+	int rc;
+	struct AuditInfoStruct info;
+	au_mask_t mask;
+
+	if (the_authctxt == NULL) {
+		error("BSM audit: session setup internal error (NULL ctxt)");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (the_authctxt->valid)
+		info.ai_auid = the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid;
+	else
+		info.ai_auid = -1;
+	info.ai_asid = getpid();
+	mask.am_success = 0;
+	mask.am_failure = 0;
+
+	(void) au_user_mask(the_authctxt->user, &mask);
+
+	info.ai_mask.am_success  = mask.am_success;
+	info.ai_mask.am_failure  = mask.am_failure;
+
+	info.ai_termid = ssh_bsm_tid;
+
+	rc = SetAuditFunc(&info, sizeof(info));
+	if (rc < 0)
+		error("BSM audit: %s: %s failed: %s", __func__,
+		    SetAuditFuncText, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+static void
+bsm_audit_bad_login(const char *what)
+{
+	char textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ];
+
+	if (the_authctxt->valid) {
+		(void) snprintf(textbuf, sizeof (textbuf),
+			gettext("invalid %s for user %s"),
+			    what, the_authctxt->user);
+		bsm_audit_record(4, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
+	} else {
+		(void) snprintf(textbuf, sizeof (textbuf),
+			gettext("invalid user name \"%s\""),
+			    the_authctxt->user);
+		bsm_audit_record(3, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
+
+void
+audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
+{
+	AuditInfoTermID *tid = &ssh_bsm_tid;
+	char buf[1024];
+
+	if (cannot_audit(0))
+		return;
+	debug3("BSM audit: connection from %.100s port %d", host, port);
+
+	/* populate our terminal id structure */
+#if defined(HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR)
+	tid->at_port = (dev_t)port;
+	aug_get_machine((char *)host, &(tid->at_addr[0]), &(tid->at_type));
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x %08x %08x %08x", tid->at_addr[0],
+	    tid->at_addr[1], tid->at_addr[2], tid->at_addr[3]);
+	debug3("BSM audit: iptype %d machine ID %s", (int)tid->at_type, buf);
+#else
+	/* this is used on IPv4-only machines */
+	tid->port = (dev_t)port;
+	tid->machine = inet_addr(host);
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%08x", tid->machine);
+	debug3("BSM audit: machine ID %s", buf);
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+audit_run_command(const char *command)
+{
+	/* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	/* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	/* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+{
+	char    textbuf[BSM_TEXTBUFSZ];
+	static int logged_in = 0;
+	const char *user = the_authctxt ? the_authctxt->user : "(unknown user)";
+
+	if (cannot_audit(0))
+		return;
+
+	switch(event) {
+	case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
+		logged_in = 1;
+		bsm_audit_session_setup();
+		snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf),
+		    gettext("successful login %s"), user);
+		bsm_audit_record(0, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+		/*
+		 * We can also get a close event if the user attempted auth
+		 * but never succeeded.
+		 */
+		if (logged_in) {
+			snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf),
+			    gettext("sshd logout %s"), the_authctxt->user);
+			bsm_audit_record(0, textbuf, AUE_logout);
+		} else {
+			debug("%s: connection closed without authentication",
+			    __func__);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
+		bsm_audit_record(1,
+		    gettext("logins disabled by /etc/nologin"), AUE_openssh);
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+		snprintf(textbuf, sizeof(textbuf),
+		    gettext("too many tries for user %s"), the_authctxt->user);
+		bsm_audit_record(1, textbuf, AUE_openssh);
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+		bsm_audit_record(2, gettext("not_console"), AUE_openssh);
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+		bsm_audit_bad_login("password");
+		break;
+
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
+		bsm_audit_bad_login("interactive password entry");
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* BSM */
diff --git a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3fcbe5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/audit-linux.c
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ * Use is subject to license terms.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if defined(USE_LINUX_AUDIT)
+#include <libaudit.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+
+const char *audit_username(void);
+
+int
+linux_audit_record_event(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
+    const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success)
+{
+	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
+
+	if ((audit_fd = audit_open()) < 0) {
+		if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+		    errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+			return 1; /* No audit support in kernel */
+		else
+			return 0; /* Must prevent login */
+	}
+	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN,
+	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
+	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
+	saved_errno = errno;
+	close(audit_fd);
+
+	/*
+	 * Do not report error if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non
+	 * root user.
+	 */
+	if ((rc == -EPERM) && (geteuid() != 0))
+		rc = 0;
+	errno = saved_errno;
+
+	return rc >= 0;
+}
+
+/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
+
+void
+audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
+{
+	/* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_run_command(const char *command)
+{
+	/* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	if (linux_audit_record_event(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname, NULL,
+	    li->line, 1) == 0)
+		fatal("linux_audit_write_entry failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	/* not implemented */
+}
+
+void
+audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+{
+	switch(event) {
+	case SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS:
+	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+	case SSH_NOLOGIN:
+	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+		break;
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
+		linux_audit_record_event(-1, audit_username(), NULL,
+		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "sshd", 0);
+		break;
+	default:
+		debug("%s: unhandled event %d", __func__, event);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
diff --git a/audit.c b/audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd2f035
--- /dev/null
+++ b/audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+
+#include "audit.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+/*
+ * Care must be taken when using this since it WILL NOT be initialized when
+ * audit_connection_from() is called and MAY NOT be initialized when
+ * audit_event(CONNECTION_ABANDON) is called.  Test for NULL before using.
+ */
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+
+/* Maybe add the audit class to struct Authmethod? */
+ssh_audit_event_t
+audit_classify_auth(const char *method)
+{
+	if (strcmp(method, "none") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE;
+	else if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD;
+	else if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(method, "rsa") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY;
+	else if (strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT;
+	else if (strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(method, "rhosts-rsa") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED;
+	else if (strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
+		return SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI;
+	else
+		return SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN;
+}
+
+/* helper to return supplied username */
+const char *
+audit_username(void)
+{
+	static const char unknownuser[] = "(unknown user)";
+	static const char invaliduser[] = "(invalid user)";
+
+	if (the_authctxt == NULL || the_authctxt->user == NULL)
+		return (unknownuser);
+	if (!the_authctxt->valid)
+		return (invaliduser);
+	return (the_authctxt->user);
+}
+
+const char *
+audit_event_lookup(ssh_audit_event_t ev)
+{
+	int i;
+	static struct event_lookup_struct {
+		ssh_audit_event_t event;
+		const char *name;
+	} event_lookup[] = {
+		{SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,	"LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES"},
+		{SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,		"LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS,		"AUTH_SUCCESS"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE,		"AUTH_FAIL_NONE"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,		"AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,		"AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY,		"AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED,	"AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED"},
+		{SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,		"AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI"},
+		{SSH_INVALID_USER,		"INVALID_USER"},
+		{SSH_NOLOGIN,			"NOLOGIN"},
+		{SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE,		"CONNECTION_CLOSE"},
+		{SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	"CONNECTION_ABANDON"},
+		{SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN,		"AUDIT_UNKNOWN"}
+	};
+
+	for (i = 0; event_lookup[i].event != SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN; i++)
+		if (event_lookup[i].event == ev)
+			break;
+	return(event_lookup[i].name);
+}
+
+# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+/*
+ * Null implementations of audit functions.
+ * These get used if SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS is defined but no audit module is enabled.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Called after a connection has been accepted but before any authentication
+ * has been attempted.
+ */
+void
+audit_connection_from(const char *host, int port)
+{
+	debug("audit connection from %s port %d euid %d", host, port,
+	    (int)geteuid());
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called when various events occur (see audit.h for a list of possible
+ * events and what they mean).
+ */
+void
+audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+{
+	debug("audit event euid %d user %s event %d (%s)", geteuid(),
+	    audit_username(), event, audit_event_lookup(event));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called when a user session is started.  Argument is the tty allocated to
+ * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
+ *
+ * Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used
+ * within a single connection.
+ */
+void
+audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	const char *t = li->line ? li->line : "(no tty)";
+
+	debug("audit session open euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(),
+	    audit_username(), t);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called when a user session is closed.  Argument is the tty allocated to
+ * the session, or NULL if no tty was allocated.
+ *
+ * Note that this may be called multiple times if multiple sessions are used
+ * within a single connection.
+ */
+void
+audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	const char *t = li->line ? li->line : "(no tty)";
+
+	debug("audit session close euid %d user %s tty name %s", geteuid(),
+	    audit_username(), t);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This will be called when a user runs a non-interactive command.  Note that
+ * it may be called multiple times for a single connection since SSH2 allows
+ * multiple sessions within a single connection.
+ */
+void
+audit_run_command(const char *command)
+{
+	debug("audit run command euid %d user %s command '%.200s'", geteuid(),
+	    audit_username(), command);
+}
+# endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff --git a/audit.h b/audit.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38cb5ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/audit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SSH_AUDIT_H
+# define _SSH_AUDIT_H
+
+#include "loginrec.h"
+
+struct ssh;
+
+enum ssh_audit_event_type {
+	SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES,
+	SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED,
+	SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS,
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_NONE,
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD,
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT,	/* keyboard-interactive or challenge-response */
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY,	/* ssh2 pubkey or ssh1 rsa */
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED,	/* ssh2 hostbased or ssh1 rhostsrsa */
+	SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI,
+	SSH_INVALID_USER,
+	SSH_NOLOGIN,		/* denied by /etc/nologin, not implemented */
+	SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE,	/* closed after attempting auth or session */
+	SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON,	/* closed without completing auth */
+	SSH_AUDIT_UNKNOWN
+};
+typedef enum ssh_audit_event_type ssh_audit_event_t;
+
+void	audit_connection_from(const char *, int);
+void	audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
+void	audit_session_open(struct logininfo *);
+void	audit_session_close(struct logininfo *);
+void	audit_run_command(const char *);
+ssh_audit_event_t audit_classify_auth(const char *);
+
+#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff --git a/auth-bsdauth.c b/auth-bsdauth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d124e99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth-bsdauth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,143 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.15 2018/07/09 21:35:50 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+static void *
+bsdauth_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	return authctxt;
+}
+
+int
+bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
+   u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+	char *challenge = NULL;
+
+	*infotxt = NULL;
+	*numprompts = 0;
+	*prompts = NULL;
+	*echo_on = NULL;
+
+	if (authctxt->as != NULL) {
+		debug2("bsdauth_query: try reuse session");
+		challenge = auth_getitem(authctxt->as, AUTHV_CHALLENGE);
+		if (challenge == NULL) {
+			auth_close(authctxt->as);
+			authctxt->as = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (challenge == NULL) {
+		debug2("bsdauth_query: new bsd auth session");
+		debug3("bsdauth_query: style %s",
+		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "<default>");
+		authctxt->as = auth_userchallenge(authctxt->user,
+		    authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", &challenge);
+		if (authctxt->as == NULL)
+			challenge = NULL;
+		debug2("bsdauth_query: <%s>", challenge ? challenge : "empty");
+	}
+
+	if (challenge == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	*name = xstrdup("");
+	*infotxt = xstrdup("");
+	*numprompts = 1;
+	*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
+	*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
+	(*prompts)[0] = xstrdup(challenge);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+	int authok;
+
+	if (!authctxt->valid)
+		return -1;
+
+	if (authctxt->as == NULL)
+		error("bsdauth_respond: no bsd auth session");
+
+	if (numresponses != 1)
+		return -1;
+
+	authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, responses[0], 0);
+	authctxt->as = NULL;
+	debug3("bsdauth_respond: <%s> = <%d>", responses[0], authok);
+
+	return (authok == 0) ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+static void
+bsdauth_free_ctx(void *ctx)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
+
+	if (authctxt && authctxt->as) {
+		auth_close(authctxt->as);
+		authctxt->as = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+KbdintDevice bsdauth_device = {
+	"bsdauth",
+	bsdauth_init_ctx,
+	bsdauth_query,
+	bsdauth_respond,
+	bsdauth_free_ctx
+};
+
+KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device = {
+	"bsdauth",
+	bsdauth_init_ctx,
+	mm_bsdauth_query,
+	mm_bsdauth_respond,
+	bsdauth_free_ctx
+};
+#endif
diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c99e4e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth-krb5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.24 2021/04/03 06:18:40 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ *    Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines.
+ *
+ * From: FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v 1.6 2001/02/13 16:58:04 assar
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Daniel Kouril.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <krb5.h>
+
+extern ServerOptions	 options;
+
+static int
+krb5_init(void *context)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context;
+	krb5_error_code problem;
+
+	if (authctxt->krb5_ctx == NULL) {
+		problem = krb5_init_context(&authctxt->krb5_ctx);
+		if (problem)
+			return (problem);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+#ifndef HEIMDAL
+	krb5_creds creds;
+	krb5_principal server;
+#endif
+	krb5_error_code problem;
+	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
+	int len;
+	char *client, *platform_client;
+	const char *errmsg;
+
+	/* get platform-specific kerberos client principal name (if it exists) */
+	platform_client = platform_krb5_get_principal_name(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
+	client = platform_client ? platform_client : authctxt->pw->pw_name;
+
+	temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+
+	problem = krb5_init(authctxt);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	problem = krb5_parse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, client,
+		    &authctxt->krb5_user);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+#ifdef HEIMDAL
+# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
+	problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+	    krb5_mcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &ccache);
+# else
+	problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache);
+# endif
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
+		authctxt->krb5_user);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	restore_uid();
+
+	problem = krb5_verify_user(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
+	    ccache, password, 1, NULL);
+
+	temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
+	problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+	    krb5_fcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+# else
+	problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_fcc_ops,
+	    &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+# endif
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	problem = krb5_cc_copy_cache(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache,
+	    authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+	krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
+	ccache = NULL;
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+#else
+	problem = krb5_get_init_creds_password(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds,
+	    authctxt->krb5_user, (char *)password, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	problem = krb5_sname_to_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, NULL, NULL,
+	    KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	restore_uid();
+	problem = krb5_verify_init_creds(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds, server,
+	    NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, server);
+	temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user,
+	    authctxt->pw->pw_name)) {
+		problem = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+	    &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+	    authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, authctxt->krb5_user);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+
+	problem = krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+	    authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &creds);
+	if (problem)
+		goto out;
+#endif
+
+	authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+
+	len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6;
+	authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len);
+	snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s",
+	    authctxt->krb5_ticket_file);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam)
+		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+#endif
+
+ out:
+	restore_uid();
+	
+	free(platform_client);
+
+	if (problem) {
+		if (ccache)
+			krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache);
+
+		if (authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL && problem!=-1) {
+			errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+			    problem);
+			debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %s",
+			    errmsg);
+			krb5_free_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx, errmsg);
+		} else
+			debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %d",
+			    problem);
+
+		krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+
+		if (options.kerberos_or_local_passwd)
+			return (-1);
+		else
+			return (0);
+	}
+	return (authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0);
+}
+
+void
+krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called");
+	if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) {
+		krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+		authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL;
+	}
+	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
+		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
+		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
+	}
+	if (authctxt->krb5_ctx) {
+		krb5_free_context(authctxt->krb5_ctx);
+		authctxt->krb5_ctx = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+#ifndef HEIMDAL
+krb5_error_code
+ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+	char ccname[40];
+	mode_t old_umask;
+
+	ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname),
+	    "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid());
+	if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname))
+		return ENOMEM;
+
+	old_umask = umask(0177);
+	tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:"));
+	oerrno = errno;
+	umask(old_umask);
+	if (tmpfd == -1) {
+		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+		return oerrno;
+	}
+
+	if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+		close(tmpfd);
+		return oerrno;
+	}
+	close(tmpfd);
+
+	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
+}
+#endif /* !HEIMDAL */
+#endif /* KRB5 */
diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7cb2a64
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth-options.c
@@ -0,0 +1,909 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.98 2022/02/08 08:59:12 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+
+static int
+dup_strings(char ***dstp, size_t *ndstp, char **src, size_t nsrc)
+{
+	char **dst;
+	size_t i, j;
+
+	*dstp = NULL;
+	*ndstp = 0;
+	if (nsrc == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if ((dst = calloc(nsrc, sizeof(*src))) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	for (i = 0; i < nsrc; i++) {
+		if ((dst[i] = strdup(src[i])) == NULL) {
+			for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+				free(dst[j]);
+			free(dst);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	/* success */
+	*dstp = dst;
+	*ndstp = nsrc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL	1
+#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS	2
+static int
+cert_option_list(struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *oblob,
+    u_int which, int crit)
+{
+	char *command, *allowed;
+	char *name = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *c = NULL, *data = NULL;
+	int r, ret = -1, found;
+
+	if ((c = sshbuf_fromb(oblob)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshbuf_fromb failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	while (sshbuf_len(c) > 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(data);
+		data = NULL;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(c, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_froms(c, &data)) != 0) {
+			error_r(r, "Unable to parse certificate options");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		debug3("found certificate option \"%.100s\" len %zu",
+		    name, sshbuf_len(data));
+		found = 0;
+		if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0) {
+			if (strcmp(name, "no-touch-required") == 0) {
+				opts->no_require_user_presence = 1;
+				found = 1;
+			} else if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) {
+				opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
+				found = 1;
+			} else if (strcmp(name,
+			    "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) {
+				opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
+				found = 1;
+			} else if (strcmp(name,
+			    "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) {
+				opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
+				found = 1;
+			} else if (strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0) {
+				opts->permit_pty_flag = 1;
+				found = 1;
+			} else if (strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0) {
+				opts->permit_user_rc = 1;
+				found = 1;
+			}
+		}
+		if (!found && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0) {
+			if (strcmp(name, "verify-required") == 0) {
+				opts->require_verify = 1;
+				found = 1;
+			} else if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) {
+				if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &command,
+				    NULL)) != 0) {
+					error_r(r, "Unable to parse \"%s\" "
+					    "section", name);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				if (opts->force_command != NULL) {
+					error("Certificate has multiple "
+					    "force-command options");
+					free(command);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				opts->force_command = command;
+				found = 1;
+			} else if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) {
+				if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &allowed,
+				    NULL)) != 0) {
+					error_r(r, "Unable to parse \"%s\" "
+					    "section", name);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				if (opts->required_from_host_cert != NULL) {
+					error("Certificate has multiple "
+					    "source-address options");
+					free(allowed);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				/* Check syntax */
+				if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, allowed) == -1) {
+					error("Certificate source-address "
+					    "contents invalid");
+					goto out;
+				}
+				opts->required_from_host_cert = allowed;
+				found = 1;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (!found) {
+			if (crit) {
+				error("Certificate critical option \"%s\" "
+				    "is not supported", name);
+				goto out;
+			} else {
+				logit("Certificate extension \"%s\" "
+				    "is not supported", name);
+			}
+		} else if (sshbuf_len(data) != 0) {
+			error("Certificate option \"%s\" corrupt "
+			    "(extra data)", name);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		free(name);
+		name = NULL;
+	}
+	/* successfully parsed all options */
+	ret = 0;
+
+ out:
+	free(name);
+	sshbuf_free(data);
+	sshbuf_free(c);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+struct sshauthopt *
+sshauthopt_new(void)
+{
+	struct sshauthopt *ret;
+
+	if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	ret->force_tun_device = -1;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+sshauthopt_free(struct sshauthopt *opts)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (opts == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	free(opts->cert_principals);
+	free(opts->force_command);
+	free(opts->required_from_host_cert);
+	free(opts->required_from_host_keys);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < opts->nenv; i++)
+		free(opts->env[i]);
+	free(opts->env);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitopen; i++)
+		free(opts->permitopen[i]);
+	free(opts->permitopen);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitlisten; i++)
+		free(opts->permitlisten[i]);
+	free(opts->permitlisten);
+
+	freezero(opts, sizeof(*opts));
+}
+
+struct sshauthopt *
+sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults(void)
+{
+	struct sshauthopt *ret = NULL;
+
+	if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* Defaults for authorized_keys flags */
+	ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
+	ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
+	ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
+	ret->permit_pty_flag = 1;
+	ret->permit_user_rc = 1;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse and record a permitopen/permitlisten directive.
+ * Return 0 on success. Return -1 on failure and sets *errstrp to error reason.
+ */
+static int
+handle_permit(const char **optsp, int allow_bare_port,
+    char ***permitsp, size_t *npermitsp, const char **errstrp)
+{
+	char *opt, *tmp, *cp, *host, **permits = *permitsp;
+	size_t npermits = *npermitsp;
+	const char *errstr = "unknown error";
+
+	if (npermits > SSH_AUTHOPT_PERMIT_MAX) {
+		*errstrp = "too many permission directives";
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((opt = opt_dequote(optsp, &errstr)) == NULL) {
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (allow_bare_port && strchr(opt, ':') == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * Allow a bare port number in permitlisten to indicate a
+		 * listen_host wildcard.
+		 */
+		if (asprintf(&tmp, "*:%s", opt) == -1) {
+			free(opt);
+			*errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
+			return -1;
+		}
+		free(opt);
+		opt = tmp;
+	}
+	if ((tmp = strdup(opt)) == NULL) {
+		free(opt);
+		*errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
+		return -1;
+	}
+	cp = tmp;
+	/* validate syntax before recording it. */
+	host = hpdelim2(&cp, NULL);
+	if (host == NULL || strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
+		free(tmp);
+		free(opt);
+		*errstrp = "invalid permission hostname";
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * don't want to use permitopen_port to avoid
+	 * dependency on channels.[ch] here.
+	 */
+	if (cp == NULL ||
+	    (strcmp(cp, "*") != 0 && a2port(cp) <= 0)) {
+		free(tmp);
+		free(opt);
+		*errstrp = "invalid permission port";
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* XXX - add streamlocal support */
+	free(tmp);
+	/* Record it */
+	if ((permits = recallocarray(permits, npermits, npermits + 1,
+	    sizeof(*permits))) == NULL) {
+		free(opt);
+		/* NB. don't update *permitsp if alloc fails */
+		*errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
+		return -1;
+	}
+	permits[npermits++] = opt;
+	*permitsp = permits;
+	*npermitsp = npermits;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct sshauthopt *
+sshauthopt_parse(const char *opts, const char **errstrp)
+{
+	char **oarray, *opt, *cp, *tmp;
+	int r;
+	struct sshauthopt *ret = NULL;
+	const char *errstr = "unknown error";
+	uint64_t valid_before;
+	size_t i, l;
+
+	if (errstrp != NULL)
+		*errstrp = NULL;
+	if ((ret = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL)
+		goto alloc_fail;
+
+	if (opts == NULL)
+		return ret;
+
+	while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') {
+		/* flag options */
+		if ((r = opt_flag("restrict", 0, &opts)) != -1) {
+			ret->restricted = 1;
+			ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
+			ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
+			ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
+			ret->permit_pty_flag = 0;
+			ret->permit_user_rc = 0;
+		} else if ((r = opt_flag("cert-authority", 0, &opts)) != -1) {
+			ret->cert_authority = r;
+		} else if ((r = opt_flag("port-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
+			ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = r == 1;
+		} else if ((r = opt_flag("agent-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
+			ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = r == 1;
+		} else if ((r = opt_flag("x11-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
+			ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = r == 1;
+		} else if ((r = opt_flag("touch-required", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
+			ret->no_require_user_presence = r != 1; /* NB. flip */
+		} else if ((r = opt_flag("verify-required", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
+			ret->require_verify = r == 1;
+		} else if ((r = opt_flag("pty", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
+			ret->permit_pty_flag = r == 1;
+		} else if ((r = opt_flag("user-rc", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
+			ret->permit_user_rc = r == 1;
+		} else if (opt_match(&opts, "command")) {
+			if (ret->force_command != NULL) {
+				errstr = "multiple \"command\" clauses";
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			ret->force_command = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr);
+			if (ret->force_command == NULL)
+				goto fail;
+		} else if (opt_match(&opts, "principals")) {
+			if (ret->cert_principals != NULL) {
+				errstr = "multiple \"principals\" clauses";
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			ret->cert_principals = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr);
+			if (ret->cert_principals == NULL)
+				goto fail;
+		} else if (opt_match(&opts, "from")) {
+			if (ret->required_from_host_keys != NULL) {
+				errstr = "multiple \"from\" clauses";
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			ret->required_from_host_keys = opt_dequote(&opts,
+			    &errstr);
+			if (ret->required_from_host_keys == NULL)
+				goto fail;
+		} else if (opt_match(&opts, "expiry-time")) {
+			if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL)
+				goto fail;
+			if (parse_absolute_time(opt, &valid_before) != 0 ||
+			    valid_before == 0) {
+				free(opt);
+				errstr = "invalid expires time";
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			free(opt);
+			if (ret->valid_before == 0 ||
+			    valid_before < ret->valid_before)
+				ret->valid_before = valid_before;
+		} else if (opt_match(&opts, "environment")) {
+			if (ret->nenv > SSH_AUTHOPT_ENV_MAX) {
+				errstr = "too many environment strings";
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL)
+				goto fail;
+			/* env name must be alphanumeric and followed by '=' */
+			if ((tmp = strchr(opt, '=')) == NULL) {
+				free(opt);
+				errstr = "invalid environment string";
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			if ((cp = strdup(opt)) == NULL) {
+				free(opt);
+				goto alloc_fail;
+			}
+			l = (size_t)(tmp - opt);
+			cp[l] = '\0'; /* truncate at '=' */
+			if (!valid_env_name(cp)) {
+				free(cp);
+				free(opt);
+				errstr = "invalid environment string";
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			/* Check for duplicates; XXX O(n*log(n)) */
+			for (i = 0; i < ret->nenv; i++) {
+				if (strncmp(ret->env[i], cp, l) == 0 &&
+				    ret->env[i][l] == '=')
+					break;
+			}
+			free(cp);
+			/* First match wins */
+			if (i >= ret->nenv) {
+				/* Append it. */
+				oarray = ret->env;
+				if ((ret->env = recallocarray(ret->env,
+				    ret->nenv, ret->nenv + 1,
+				    sizeof(*ret->env))) == NULL) {
+					free(opt);
+					/* put it back for cleanup */
+					ret->env = oarray;
+					goto alloc_fail;
+				}
+				ret->env[ret->nenv++] = opt;
+				opt = NULL; /* transferred */
+			}
+			free(opt);
+		} else if (opt_match(&opts, "permitopen")) {
+			if (handle_permit(&opts, 0, &ret->permitopen,
+			    &ret->npermitopen, &errstr) != 0)
+				goto fail;
+		} else if (opt_match(&opts, "permitlisten")) {
+			if (handle_permit(&opts, 1, &ret->permitlisten,
+			    &ret->npermitlisten, &errstr) != 0)
+				goto fail;
+		} else if (opt_match(&opts, "tunnel")) {
+			if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL)
+				goto fail;
+			ret->force_tun_device = a2tun(opt, NULL);
+			free(opt);
+			if (ret->force_tun_device == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
+				errstr = "invalid tun device";
+				goto fail;
+			}
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Skip the comma, and move to the next option
+		 * (or break out if there are no more).
+		 */
+		if (*opts == '\0' || *opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t')
+			break;		/* End of options. */
+		/* Anything other than a comma is an unknown option */
+		if (*opts != ',') {
+			errstr = "unknown key option";
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		opts++;
+		if (*opts == '\0') {
+			errstr = "unexpected end-of-options";
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* success */
+	if (errstrp != NULL)
+		*errstrp = NULL;
+	return ret;
+
+alloc_fail:
+	errstr = "memory allocation failed";
+fail:
+	sshauthopt_free(ret);
+	if (errstrp != NULL)
+		*errstrp = errstr;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+struct sshauthopt *
+sshauthopt_from_cert(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	struct sshauthopt *ret;
+
+	if (k == NULL || !sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type) || k->cert == NULL ||
+	    k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* Handle options and critical extensions separately */
+	if (cert_option_list(ret, k->cert->critical,
+	    OPTIONS_CRITICAL, 1) == -1) {
+		sshauthopt_free(ret);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (cert_option_list(ret, k->cert->extensions,
+	    OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 0) == -1) {
+		sshauthopt_free(ret);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Merges "additional" options to "primary" and returns the result.
+ * NB. Some options from primary have primacy.
+ */
+struct sshauthopt *
+sshauthopt_merge(const struct sshauthopt *primary,
+    const struct sshauthopt *additional, const char **errstrp)
+{
+	struct sshauthopt *ret;
+	const char *errstr = "internal error";
+	const char *tmp;
+
+	if (errstrp != NULL)
+		*errstrp = NULL;
+
+	if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
+		goto alloc_fail;
+
+	/* cert_authority and cert_principals are cleared in result */
+
+	/* Prefer access lists from primary. */
+	/* XXX err is both set and mismatch? */
+	tmp = primary->required_from_host_cert;
+	if (tmp == NULL)
+		tmp = additional->required_from_host_cert;
+	if (tmp != NULL && (ret->required_from_host_cert = strdup(tmp)) == NULL)
+		goto alloc_fail;
+	tmp = primary->required_from_host_keys;
+	if (tmp == NULL)
+		tmp = additional->required_from_host_keys;
+	if (tmp != NULL && (ret->required_from_host_keys = strdup(tmp)) == NULL)
+		goto alloc_fail;
+
+	/*
+	 * force_tun_device, permitopen/permitlisten and environment all
+	 * prefer the primary.
+	 */
+	ret->force_tun_device = primary->force_tun_device;
+	if (ret->force_tun_device == -1)
+		ret->force_tun_device = additional->force_tun_device;
+	if (primary->nenv > 0) {
+		if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv,
+		    primary->env, primary->nenv) != 0)
+			goto alloc_fail;
+	} else if (additional->nenv) {
+		if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv,
+		    additional->env, additional->nenv) != 0)
+			goto alloc_fail;
+	}
+	if (primary->npermitopen > 0) {
+		if (dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen,
+		    primary->permitopen, primary->npermitopen) != 0)
+			goto alloc_fail;
+	} else if (additional->npermitopen > 0) {
+		if (dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen,
+		    additional->permitopen, additional->npermitopen) != 0)
+			goto alloc_fail;
+	}
+
+	if (primary->npermitlisten > 0) {
+		if (dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten,
+		    primary->permitlisten, primary->npermitlisten) != 0)
+			goto alloc_fail;
+	} else if (additional->npermitlisten > 0) {
+		if (dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten,
+		    additional->permitlisten, additional->npermitlisten) != 0)
+			goto alloc_fail;
+	}
+
+#define OPTFLAG_AND(x) ret->x = (primary->x == 1) && (additional->x == 1)
+#define OPTFLAG_OR(x) ret->x = (primary->x == 1) || (additional->x == 1)
+	/* Permissive flags are logical-AND (i.e. must be set in both) */
+	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
+	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
+	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
+	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_pty_flag);
+	OPTFLAG_AND(permit_user_rc);
+	OPTFLAG_AND(no_require_user_presence);
+	/* Restrictive flags are logical-OR (i.e. must be set in either) */
+	OPTFLAG_OR(require_verify);
+#undef OPTFLAG_AND
+
+	/* Earliest expiry time should win */
+	if (primary->valid_before != 0)
+		ret->valid_before = primary->valid_before;
+	if (additional->valid_before != 0 &&
+	    additional->valid_before < ret->valid_before)
+		ret->valid_before = additional->valid_before;
+
+	/*
+	 * When both multiple forced-command are specified, only
+	 * proceed if they are identical, otherwise fail.
+	 */
+	if (primary->force_command != NULL &&
+	    additional->force_command != NULL) {
+		if (strcmp(primary->force_command,
+		    additional->force_command) == 0) {
+			/* ok */
+			ret->force_command = strdup(primary->force_command);
+			if (ret->force_command == NULL)
+				goto alloc_fail;
+		} else {
+			errstr = "forced command options do not match";
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	} else if (primary->force_command != NULL) {
+		if ((ret->force_command = strdup(
+		    primary->force_command)) == NULL)
+			goto alloc_fail;
+	} else if (additional->force_command != NULL) {
+		if ((ret->force_command = strdup(
+		    additional->force_command)) == NULL)
+			goto alloc_fail;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	if (errstrp != NULL)
+		*errstrp = NULL;
+	return ret;
+
+ alloc_fail:
+	errstr = "memory allocation failed";
+ fail:
+	if (errstrp != NULL)
+		*errstrp = errstr;
+	sshauthopt_free(ret);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy options
+ */
+struct sshauthopt *
+sshauthopt_copy(const struct sshauthopt *orig)
+{
+	struct sshauthopt *ret;
+
+	if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+#define OPTSCALAR(x) ret->x = orig->x
+	OPTSCALAR(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
+	OPTSCALAR(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
+	OPTSCALAR(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
+	OPTSCALAR(permit_pty_flag);
+	OPTSCALAR(permit_user_rc);
+	OPTSCALAR(restricted);
+	OPTSCALAR(cert_authority);
+	OPTSCALAR(force_tun_device);
+	OPTSCALAR(valid_before);
+	OPTSCALAR(no_require_user_presence);
+	OPTSCALAR(require_verify);
+#undef OPTSCALAR
+#define OPTSTRING(x) \
+	do { \
+		if (orig->x != NULL && (ret->x = strdup(orig->x)) == NULL) { \
+			sshauthopt_free(ret); \
+			return NULL; \
+		} \
+	} while (0)
+	OPTSTRING(cert_principals);
+	OPTSTRING(force_command);
+	OPTSTRING(required_from_host_cert);
+	OPTSTRING(required_from_host_keys);
+#undef OPTSTRING
+
+	if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv, orig->env, orig->nenv) != 0 ||
+	    dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen,
+	    orig->permitopen, orig->npermitopen) != 0 ||
+	    dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten,
+	    orig->permitlisten, orig->npermitlisten) != 0) {
+		sshauthopt_free(ret);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+serialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char **a, size_t n)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	size_t i;
+	int r;
+
+	if (n > INT_MAX)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, a[i])) != 0) {
+			sshbuf_free(b);
+			return r;
+		}
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, n)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b)) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(b);
+		return r;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+deserialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char ***ap, size_t *np)
+{
+	char **a = NULL;
+	size_t i, n = 0;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	u_int tmp;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &tmp)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (tmp > INT_MAX) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	n = tmp;
+	if (n > 0 && (a = calloc(n, sizeof(*a))) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &a[i], NULL)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+	*ap = a;
+	a = NULL;
+	*np = n;
+	n = 0;
+ out:
+	if (a != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+			free(a[i]);
+		free(a);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+serialise_nullable_string(struct sshbuf *m, const char *s)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, s == NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+deserialise_nullable_string(struct sshbuf *m, char **sp)
+{
+	int r;
+	u_char flag;
+
+	*sp = NULL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &flag)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, flag ? NULL : sp, NULL)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshauthopt_serialise(const struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *m,
+    int untrusted)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	/* Flag options */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_pty_flag)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_user_rc)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->restricted)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->cert_authority)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->no_require_user_presence)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->require_verify)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* Simple integer options */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, opts->valid_before)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* tunnel number can be negative to indicate "unset" */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->force_tun_device == -1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, (opts->force_tun_device < 0) ?
+	    0 : (u_int)opts->force_tun_device)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* String options; these may be NULL */
+	if ((r = serialise_nullable_string(m,
+	    untrusted ? "yes" : opts->cert_principals)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = serialise_nullable_string(m,
+	    untrusted ? "true" : opts->force_command)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = serialise_nullable_string(m,
+	    untrusted ? NULL : opts->required_from_host_cert)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = serialise_nullable_string(m,
+	    untrusted ? NULL : opts->required_from_host_keys)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* Array options */
+	if ((r = serialise_array(m, opts->env,
+	    untrusted ? 0 : opts->nenv)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = serialise_array(m, opts->permitopen,
+	    untrusted ? 0 : opts->npermitopen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = serialise_array(m, opts->permitlisten,
+	    untrusted ? 0 : opts->npermitlisten)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* success */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshauthopt_deserialise(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshauthopt **optsp)
+{
+	struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	u_char f;
+	u_int tmp;
+
+	if ((opts = calloc(1, sizeof(*opts))) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+	/* Flag options */
+#define OPT_FLAG(x) \
+	do { \
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &f)) != 0) \
+			goto out; \
+		opts->x = f; \
+	} while (0)
+	OPT_FLAG(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
+	OPT_FLAG(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
+	OPT_FLAG(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
+	OPT_FLAG(permit_pty_flag);
+	OPT_FLAG(permit_user_rc);
+	OPT_FLAG(restricted);
+	OPT_FLAG(cert_authority);
+	OPT_FLAG(no_require_user_presence);
+	OPT_FLAG(require_verify);
+#undef OPT_FLAG
+
+	/* Simple integer options */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &opts->valid_before)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* tunnel number can be negative to indicate "unset" */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &f)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &tmp)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	opts->force_tun_device = f ? -1 : (int)tmp;
+
+	/* String options may be NULL */
+	if ((r = deserialise_nullable_string(m, &opts->cert_principals)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = deserialise_nullable_string(m, &opts->force_command)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = deserialise_nullable_string(m,
+	    &opts->required_from_host_cert)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = deserialise_nullable_string(m,
+	    &opts->required_from_host_keys)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Array options */
+	if ((r = deserialise_array(m, &opts->env, &opts->nenv)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = deserialise_array(m,
+	    &opts->permitopen, &opts->npermitopen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = deserialise_array(m,
+	    &opts->permitlisten, &opts->npermitlisten)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+	*optsp = opts;
+	opts = NULL;
+ out:
+	sshauthopt_free(opts);
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/auth-options.h b/auth-options.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e29b72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth-options.h
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.31 2021/07/23 03:57:20 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef AUTH_OPTIONS_H
+#define AUTH_OPTIONS_H
+
+struct passwd;
+struct sshkey;
+
+/* Maximum number of permitopen/permitlisten directives to accept */
+#define SSH_AUTHOPT_PERMIT_MAX	4096
+
+/* Maximum number of environment directives to accept */
+#define SSH_AUTHOPT_ENV_MAX	1024
+
+/*
+ * sshauthopt represents key options parsed from authorized_keys or
+ * from certificate extensions/options.
+ */
+struct sshauthopt {
+	/* Feature flags */
+	int permit_port_forwarding_flag;
+	int permit_agent_forwarding_flag;
+	int permit_x11_forwarding_flag;
+	int permit_pty_flag;
+	int permit_user_rc;
+
+	/* "restrict" keyword was invoked */
+	int restricted;
+
+	/* key/principal expiry date */
+	uint64_t valid_before;
+
+	/* Certificate-related options */
+	int cert_authority;
+	char *cert_principals;
+
+	int force_tun_device;
+	char *force_command;
+
+	/* Custom environment */
+	size_t nenv;
+	char **env;
+
+	/* Permitted port forwardings */
+	size_t npermitopen;
+	char **permitopen;
+
+	/* Permitted listens (remote forwarding) */
+	size_t npermitlisten;
+	char **permitlisten;
+
+	/*
+	 * Permitted host/addresses (comma-separated)
+	 * Caller must check source address matches both lists (if present).
+	 */
+	char *required_from_host_cert;
+	char *required_from_host_keys;
+
+	/* Key requires user presence asserted */
+	int no_require_user_presence;
+	/* Key requires user verification (e.g. PIN) */
+	int require_verify;
+};
+
+struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_new(void);
+struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults(void);
+void sshauthopt_free(struct sshauthopt *opts);
+struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_copy(const struct sshauthopt *orig);
+int sshauthopt_serialise(const struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *m, int);
+int sshauthopt_deserialise(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshauthopt **opts);
+
+/*
+ * Parse authorized_keys options. Returns an options structure on success
+ * or NULL on failure. Will set errstr on failure.
+ */
+struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_parse(const char *s, const char **errstr);
+
+/*
+ * Parse certification options to a struct sshauthopt.
+ * Returns options on success or NULL on failure.
+ */
+struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_from_cert(struct sshkey *k);
+
+/*
+ * Merge key options.
+ */
+struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_merge(const struct sshauthopt *primary,
+    const struct sshauthopt *additional, const char **errstrp);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b324953
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth-pam.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1403 @@
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
+ * NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc.
+ * under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
+ * DARPA CHATS research program.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Based on FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE)
+extern char *__progname;
+# define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE		__progname
+#endif
+
+/* OpenGroup RFC86.0 and XSSO specify no "const" on arguments */
+#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
+# define sshpam_const		/* Solaris, HP-UX, SunOS */
+#else
+# define sshpam_const	const	/* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM, AIX */
+#endif
+
+/* Ambiguity in spec: is it an array of pointers or a pointer to an array? */
+#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
+# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member)
+#else
+# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member)
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
+
+/* so we don't silently change behaviour */
+#ifdef USE_POSIX_THREADS
+# error "USE_POSIX_THREADS replaced by UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Formerly known as USE_POSIX_THREADS, using this is completely unsupported
+ * and generally a bad idea.  Use at own risk and do not expect support if
+ * this breaks.
+ */
+#ifdef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+#include <pthread.h>
+/*
+ * Avoid namespace clash when *not* using pthreads for systems *with*
+ * pthreads, which unconditionally define pthread_t via sys/types.h
+ * (e.g. Linux)
+ */
+typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t;
+#else
+typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t;
+#define pthread_exit	fake_pthread_exit
+#define pthread_create	fake_pthread_create
+#define pthread_cancel	fake_pthread_cancel
+#define pthread_join	fake_pthread_join
+#endif
+
+struct pam_ctxt {
+	sp_pthread_t	 pam_thread;
+	int		 pam_psock;
+	int		 pam_csock;
+	int		 pam_done;
+};
+
+static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+static struct pam_ctxt *cleanup_ctxt;
+
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+/*
+ * Simulate threads with processes.
+ */
+
+static int sshpam_thread_status = -1;
+static sshsig_t sshpam_oldsig;
+
+static void
+sshpam_sigchld_handler(int sig)
+{
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+	if (cleanup_ctxt == NULL)
+		return;	/* handler called after PAM cleanup, shouldn't happen */
+	if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, WNOHANG)
+	    <= 0) {
+		/* PAM thread has not exitted, privsep slave must have */
+		kill(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, SIGTERM);
+		while (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread,
+		    &sshpam_thread_status, 0) == -1) {
+			if (errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+	if (WIFSIGNALED(sshpam_thread_status) &&
+	    WTERMSIG(sshpam_thread_status) == SIGTERM)
+		return;	/* terminated by pthread_cancel */
+	if (!WIFEXITED(sshpam_thread_status))
+		sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited unexpectedly");
+	if (WEXITSTATUS(sshpam_thread_status) != 0)
+		sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly");
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+pthread_exit(void *value)
+{
+	_exit(0);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr,
+    void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg)
+{
+	pid_t pid;
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctx = arg;
+
+	sshpam_thread_status = -1;
+	switch ((pid = fork())) {
+	case -1:
+		error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno));
+		return errno;
+	case 0:
+		close(ctx->pam_psock);
+		ctx->pam_psock = -1;
+		thread_start(arg);
+		_exit(1);
+	default:
+		*thread = pid;
+		close(ctx->pam_csock);
+		ctx->pam_csock = -1;
+		sshpam_oldsig = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+pthread_cancel(sp_pthread_t thread)
+{
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
+	return (kill(thread, SIGTERM));
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value)
+{
+	int status;
+
+	if (sshpam_thread_status != -1)
+		return (sshpam_thread_status);
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
+	while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) == -1) {
+		if (errno == EINTR)
+			continue;
+		fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	return (status);
+}
+#endif
+
+
+static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NULL;
+static int sshpam_err = 0;
+static int sshpam_authenticated = 0;
+static int sshpam_session_open = 0;
+static int sshpam_cred_established = 0;
+static int sshpam_account_status = -1;
+static int sshpam_maxtries_reached = 0;
+static char **sshpam_env = NULL;
+static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL;
+static const char *sshpam_password = NULL;
+static char *sshpam_rhost = NULL;
+static char *sshpam_laddr = NULL;
+
+/* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
+#ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
+static char **
+pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh)
+{
+	/*
+	 * XXX - If necessary, we can still support environment passing
+	 * for platforms without pam_getenvlist by searching for known
+	 * env vars (e.g. KRB5CCNAME) from the PAM environment.
+	 */
+	 return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+static int
+pam_putenv(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name_value)
+{
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_PAM_PUTENV */
+
+/*
+ * Some platforms, notably Solaris, do not enforce password complexity
+ * rules during pam_chauthtok() if the real uid of the calling process
+ * is 0, on the assumption that it's being called by "passwd" run by root.
+ * This wraps pam_chauthtok and sets/restore the real uid so PAM will do
+ * the right thing.
+ */
+#ifdef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID
+static int
+sshpam_chauthtok_ruid(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags)
+{
+	int result;
+
+	if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("PAM: sshpam_authctxt not initialized");
+	if (setreuid(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, -1) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	result = pam_chauthtok(pamh, flags);
+	if (setreuid(0, -1) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	return result;
+}
+# define pam_chauthtok(a,b)	(sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b)))
+#endif
+
+static void
+sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd)
+{
+	extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
+	static int saved_port, saved_agent, saved_x11;
+
+	debug3("%s %d", __func__, reqd);
+	if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__);
+	sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange = reqd;
+	if (reqd) {
+		saved_port = auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag;
+		saved_agent = auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag;
+		saved_x11 = auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag;
+		auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
+		auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
+		auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
+	} else {
+		if (saved_port)
+			auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = saved_port;
+		if (saved_agent)
+			auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = saved_agent;
+		if (saved_x11)
+			auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = saved_x11;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Import regular and PAM environment from subprocess */
+static void
+import_environments(struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	char *env;
+	u_int n, i, num_env;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+	/* Import variables set by do_pam_account */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	if (n > INT_MAX)
+		fatal("%s: invalid PAM account status %u", __func__, n);
+	sshpam_account_status = (int)n;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	sshpam_password_change_required(n != 0);
+
+	/* Import environment from subprocess */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	if (num_env > 1024)
+		fatal("%s: received %u environment variables, expected <= 1024",
+		    __func__, num_env);
+	sshpam_env = xcalloc(num_env + 1, sizeof(*sshpam_env));
+	debug3("PAM: num env strings %d", num_env);
+	for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(sshpam_env[i]), NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	}
+	sshpam_env[num_env] = NULL;
+
+	/* Import PAM environment from subprocess */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	debug("PAM: num PAM env strings %d", num_env);
+	for (i = 0; i < num_env; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &env, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		/* Errors are not fatal here */
+		if ((r = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, env)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+			error("PAM: pam_putenv: %s",
+			    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, r));
+		}
+		/*
+		 * XXX this possibly leaks env because it is not documented
+		 * what pam_putenv() does with it. Does it copy it? Does it
+		 * take ownweship? We don't know, so it's safest just to leak.
+		 */
+	}
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Conversation function for authentication thread.
+ */
+static int
+sshpam_thread_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *buffer;
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
+	struct pam_response *reply;
+	int r, i;
+	u_char status;
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
+	*resp = NULL;
+
+	if (data == NULL) {
+		error("PAM: conversation function passed a null context");
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+	}
+	ctxt = data;
+	if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+	if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+		return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+	if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		free(reply);
+		return PAM_CONV_ERR;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+		switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer,
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
+				fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+			if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1)
+				goto fail;
+
+			if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, buffer) == -1)
+				goto fail;
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &status)) != 0)
+				fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+			if (status != PAM_AUTHTOK)
+				goto fail;
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer,
+			    &reply[i].resp, NULL)) != 0)
+				fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+			break;
+		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer,
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
+				fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+			if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1)
+				goto fail;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		sshbuf_reset(buffer);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(buffer);
+	*resp = reply;
+	return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+
+ fail:
+	for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		free(reply[i].resp);
+	}
+	free(reply);
+	sshbuf_free(buffer);
+	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authentication thread.
+ */
+static void *
+sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
+{
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
+	struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
+	struct pam_conv sshpam_conv;
+	int r, flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
+	    PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+	extern char **environ;
+	char **env_from_pam;
+	u_int i;
+	const char *pam_user;
+	const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
+	char *tz = getenv("TZ");
+
+	sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER,
+	    (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		goto auth_fail;
+
+	environ[0] = NULL;
+	if (tz != NULL)
+		if (setenv("TZ", tz, 1) == -1)
+			error("PAM: could not set TZ environment: %s",
+			    strerror(errno));
+
+	if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) {
+		setproctitle("%s [pam]",
+		    sshpam_authctxt->valid ? pam_user : "unknown");
+	}
+#endif
+
+	sshpam_conv.conv = sshpam_thread_conv;
+	sshpam_conv.appdata_ptr = ctxt;
+
+	if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__);
+
+	if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+	    (const void *)&sshpam_conv);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		goto auth_fail;
+	sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES)
+		sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		goto auth_fail;
+
+	if (!do_pam_account()) {
+		sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
+		goto auth_fail;
+	}
+	if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+		sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle,
+		    PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
+		if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+			goto auth_fail;
+		sshpam_password_change_required(0);
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, "OK")) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
+	/* Export variables set by do_pam_account */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_account_status)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+	/* Export any environment strings set in child */
+	for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		/* Count */
+		if (i > INT_MAX)
+			fatal("%s: too many environment strings", __func__);
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, environ[i])) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	}
+	/* Export any environment strings set by PAM in child */
+	env_from_pam = pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle);
+	for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		/* Count */
+		if (i > INT_MAX)
+			fatal("%s: too many PAM environment strings", __func__);
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, env_from_pam[i])) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	}
+#endif /* UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK */
+
+	/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
+	ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, buffer);
+	sshbuf_free(buffer);
+	pthread_exit(NULL);
+
+ auth_fail:
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer,
+	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer);
+	else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
+		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
+	else
+		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, buffer);
+	sshbuf_free(buffer);
+	pthread_exit(NULL);
+
+	return (NULL); /* Avoid warning for non-pthread case */
+}
+
+void
+sshpam_thread_cleanup(void)
+{
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = cleanup_ctxt;
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+	if (ctxt != NULL && ctxt->pam_thread != 0) {
+		pthread_cancel(ctxt->pam_thread);
+		pthread_join(ctxt->pam_thread, NULL);
+		close(ctxt->pam_psock);
+		close(ctxt->pam_csock);
+		memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt));
+		cleanup_ctxt = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+sshpam_null_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+	debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
+	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL };
+
+static int
+sshpam_store_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+	struct pam_response *reply;
+	int r, i;
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
+	*resp = NULL;
+
+	if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+	if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+		switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+			if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n",
+			    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
+				fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+			reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+	*resp = reply;
+	return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+
+ fail:
+	for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		free(reply[i].resp);
+	}
+	free(reply);
+	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv store_conv = { sshpam_store_conv, NULL };
+
+void
+sshpam_cleanup(void)
+{
+	if (sshpam_handle == NULL || (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor()))
+		return;
+	debug("PAM: cleanup");
+	pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv);
+	if (sshpam_session_open) {
+		debug("PAM: closing session");
+		pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT);
+		sshpam_session_open = 0;
+	}
+	if (sshpam_cred_established) {
+		debug("PAM: deleting credentials");
+		pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
+		sshpam_cred_established = 0;
+	}
+	sshpam_authenticated = 0;
+	pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+	sshpam_handle = NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+sshpam_init(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	const char *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user;
+	const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
+	int r;
+
+#if defined(PAM_SUN_CODEBASE) && defined(PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE)
+	/* Protect buggy PAM implementations from excessively long usernames */
+	if (strlen(user) >= PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE)
+		fatal("Username too long from %s port %d",
+		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+#endif
+	if (sshpam_handle == NULL) {
+		if (ssh == NULL) {
+			fatal("%s: called initially with no "
+			    "packet context", __func__);
+		}
+	} if (sshpam_handle != NULL) {
+		/* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */
+		sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle,
+		    PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
+		if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0)
+			return (0);
+		pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+		sshpam_handle = NULL;
+	}
+	debug("PAM: initializing for \"%s\"", user);
+	sshpam_err =
+	    pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &store_conv, &sshpam_handle);
+	sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
+
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+		sshpam_handle = NULL;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	if (ssh != NULL && sshpam_rhost == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * We need to cache these as we don't have packet context
+		 * during the kbdint flow.
+		 */
+		sshpam_rhost = xstrdup(auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh,
+		    options.use_dns));
+		sshpam_laddr = get_local_ipaddr(
+		    ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+	}
+	if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) {
+		debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost);
+		sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST,
+		    sshpam_rhost);
+		if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+			pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+			sshpam_handle = NULL;
+			return (-1);
+		}
+	}
+	if (ssh != NULL && sshpam_laddr != NULL) {
+		char *conninfo;
+
+		/* Put SSH_CONNECTION in the PAM environment too */
+		xasprintf(&conninfo, "SSH_CONNECTION=%.50s %d %.50s %d",
+		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+		    sshpam_laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
+		if ((r = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, conninfo)) != PAM_SUCCESS)
+			logit("pam_putenv: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, r));
+		free(conninfo);
+	}
+
+#ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
+	/*
+	 * Some silly PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate.
+	 * sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and
+	 * may not even set one (for tty-less connections)
+	 */
+	debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"ssh\"");
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, "ssh");
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
+		sshpam_handle = NULL;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+#endif
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static void
+expose_authinfo(const char *caller)
+{
+	char *auth_info;
+
+	/*
+	 * Expose authentication information to PAM.
+	 * The environment variable is versioned. Please increment the
+	 * version suffix if the format of session_info changes.
+	 */
+	if (sshpam_authctxt->session_info == NULL)
+		auth_info = xstrdup("");
+	else if ((auth_info = sshbuf_dup_string(
+	    sshpam_authctxt->session_info)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
+
+	debug2("%s: auth information in SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", caller);
+	do_pam_putenv("SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", auth_info);
+	free(auth_info);
+}
+
+static void *
+sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
+	int result, socks[2];
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+	/*
+	 * Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled or do_pam_account
+	 * has previously failed.
+	 */
+	if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_account_status == 0)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* Initialize PAM */
+	if (sshpam_init(NULL, authctxt) == -1) {
+		error("PAM: initialization failed");
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	expose_authinfo(__func__);
+	ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt);
+
+	/* Start the authentication thread */
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, PF_UNSPEC, socks) == -1) {
+		error("PAM: failed create sockets: %s", strerror(errno));
+		free(ctxt);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	ctxt->pam_psock = socks[0];
+	ctxt->pam_csock = socks[1];
+	result = pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt);
+	if (result != 0) {
+		error("PAM: failed to start authentication thread: %s",
+		    strerror(result));
+		close(socks[0]);
+		close(socks[1]);
+		free(ctxt);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	cleanup_ctxt = ctxt;
+	return (ctxt);
+}
+
+static int
+sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
+    u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *buffer;
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
+	size_t plen;
+	u_char type;
+	char *msg;
+	size_t len, mlen;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+	if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+	*name = xstrdup("");
+	*info = xstrdup("");
+	*prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
+	**prompts = NULL;
+	plen = 0;
+	*echo_on = xmalloc(sizeof(u_int));
+	while (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_psock, buffer) == 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &type)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer, &msg, &mlen)) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		switch (type) {
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+			*num = 1;
+			len = plen + mlen + 1;
+			**prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len);
+			strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
+			plen += mlen;
+			**echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON);
+			free(msg);
+			sshbuf_free(buffer);
+			return (0);
+		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+			/* accumulate messages */
+			len = plen + mlen + 2;
+			**prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len);
+			strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
+			plen += mlen;
+			strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen);
+			plen++;
+			free(msg);
+			break;
+		case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
+		case PAM_MAXTRIES:
+			if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
+				sshpam_account_status = 0;
+			if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
+				sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case PAM_AUTH_ERR:
+			debug3("PAM: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, type));
+			if (**prompts != NULL && strlen(**prompts) != 0) {
+				free(*info);
+				*info = **prompts;
+				**prompts = NULL;
+				*num = 0;
+				**echo_on = 0;
+				ctxt->pam_done = -1;
+				free(msg);
+				sshbuf_free(buffer);
+				return 0;
+			}
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case PAM_SUCCESS:
+			if (**prompts != NULL) {
+				/* drain any accumulated messages */
+				debug("PAM: %s", **prompts);
+				if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, **prompts,
+				    strlen(**prompts))) != 0)
+					fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+				free(**prompts);
+				**prompts = NULL;
+			}
+			if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+				if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid ||
+				    (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+				    options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
+					fatal("Internal error: PAM auth "
+					    "succeeded when it should have "
+					    "failed");
+				import_environments(buffer);
+				*num = 0;
+				**echo_on = 0;
+				ctxt->pam_done = 1;
+				free(msg);
+				sshbuf_free(buffer);
+				return (0);
+			}
+			error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg,
+			    sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",
+			    sshpam_authctxt->user, sshpam_rhost);
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		default:
+			*num = 0;
+			**echo_on = 0;
+			free(msg);
+			ctxt->pam_done = -1;
+			sshbuf_free(buffer);
+			return (-1);
+		}
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(buffer);
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied.
+ * Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that
+ * vary processing time in proportion to password length.
+ */
+static char *
+fake_password(const char *wire_password)
+{
+	const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
+	char *ret = NULL;
+	size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0;
+
+	if (l >= INT_MAX)
+		fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);
+
+	ret = malloc(l + 1);
+	if (ret == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
+		ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
+	ret[i] = '\0';
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */
+static int
+sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *buffer;
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
+	char *fake;
+	int r;
+
+	debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num);
+	switch (ctxt->pam_done) {
+	case 1:
+		sshpam_authenticated = 1;
+		return (0);
+	case 0:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (num != 1) {
+		error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+	if (sshpam_authctxt->valid &&
+	    (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
+	    options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES)) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, *resp)) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	} else {
+		fake = fake_password(*resp);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, fake)) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		free(fake);
+	}
+	if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, buffer) == -1) {
+		sshbuf_free(buffer);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(buffer);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static void
+sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
+{
+	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
+	sshpam_thread_cleanup();
+	free(ctxt);
+	/*
+	 * We don't call sshpam_cleanup() here because we may need the PAM
+	 * handle at a later stage, e.g. when setting up a session.  It's
+	 * still on the cleanup list, so pam_end() *will* be called before
+	 * the server process terminates.
+	 */
+}
+
+KbdintDevice sshpam_device = {
+	"pam",
+	sshpam_init_ctx,
+	sshpam_query,
+	sshpam_respond,
+	sshpam_free_ctx
+};
+
+KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device = {
+	"pam",
+	mm_sshpam_init_ctx,
+	mm_sshpam_query,
+	mm_sshpam_respond,
+	mm_sshpam_free_ctx
+};
+
+/*
+ * This replaces auth-pam.c
+ */
+void
+start_pam(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		fatal("PAM: initialisation requested when UsePAM=no");
+
+	if (sshpam_init(ssh, authctxt) == -1)
+		fatal("PAM: initialisation failed");
+}
+
+void
+finish_pam(void)
+{
+	sshpam_cleanup();
+}
+
+
+u_int
+do_pam_account(void)
+{
+	debug("%s: called", __func__);
+	if (sshpam_account_status != -1)
+		return (sshpam_account_status);
+
+	expose_authinfo(__func__);
+
+	sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0);
+	debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err,
+	    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
+		sshpam_account_status = 0;
+		return (sshpam_account_status);
+	}
+
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD)
+		sshpam_password_change_required(1);
+
+	sshpam_account_status = 1;
+	return (sshpam_account_status);
+}
+
+void
+do_pam_setcred(int init)
+{
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+	    (const void *)&store_conv);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	if (init) {
+		debug("PAM: establishing credentials");
+		sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
+	} else {
+		debug("PAM: reinitializing credentials");
+		sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
+	}
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+		sshpam_cred_established = 1;
+		return;
+	}
+	if (sshpam_authenticated)
+		fatal("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	else
+		debug("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+}
+
+static int
+sshpam_tty_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+	char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
+	struct pam_response *reply;
+	int i;
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
+
+	*resp = NULL;
+
+	if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO))
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+	if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+		switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+			reply[i].resp =
+			    read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg),
+			    RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+			reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+			break;
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+			fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+			if (fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin) == NULL)
+				input[0] = '\0';
+			if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(input)) == NULL)
+				goto fail;
+			reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+			break;
+		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+			fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+			reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+	*resp = reply;
+	return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+
+ fail:
+	for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		free(reply[i].resp);
+	}
+	free(reply);
+	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv tty_conv = { sshpam_tty_conv, NULL };
+
+/*
+ * XXX this should be done in the authentication phase, but ssh1 doesn't
+ * support that
+ */
+void
+do_pam_chauthtok(void)
+{
+	if (use_privsep)
+		fatal("Password expired (unable to change with privsep)");
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+	    (const void *)&tty_conv);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	debug("PAM: changing password");
+	sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		fatal("PAM: pam_chauthtok(): %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+}
+
+void
+do_pam_session(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	debug3("PAM: opening session");
+
+	expose_authinfo(__func__);
+
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+	    (const void *)&store_conv);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	sshpam_err = pam_open_session(sshpam_handle, 0);
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS)
+		sshpam_session_open = 1;
+	else {
+		sshpam_session_open = 0;
+		auth_restrict_session(ssh);
+		error("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+	}
+
+}
+
+int
+is_pam_session_open(void)
+{
+	return sshpam_session_open;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set a PAM environment string. We need to do this so that the session
+ * modules can handle things like Kerberos/GSI credentials that appear
+ * during the ssh authentication process.
+ */
+int
+do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
+{
+	int ret = 1;
+	char *compound;
+	size_t len;
+
+	len = strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2;
+	compound = xmalloc(len);
+
+	snprintf(compound, len, "%s=%s", name, value);
+	ret = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, compound);
+	free(compound);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+char **
+fetch_pam_child_environment(void)
+{
+	return sshpam_env;
+}
+
+char **
+fetch_pam_environment(void)
+{
+	return (pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle));
+}
+
+void
+free_pam_environment(char **env)
+{
+	char **envp;
+
+	if (env == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	for (envp = env; *envp; envp++)
+		free(*envp);
+	free(env);
+}
+
+/*
+ * "Blind" conversation function for password authentication.  Assumes that
+ * echo-off prompts are for the password and stores messages for later
+ * display.
+ */
+static int
+sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+{
+	struct pam_response *reply;
+	int r, i;
+	size_t len;
+
+	debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
+
+	*resp = NULL;
+
+	if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+	if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
+		return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+		switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
+		case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+			if (sshpam_password == NULL)
+				goto fail;
+			if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(sshpam_password)) == NULL)
+				goto fail;
+			reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+			break;
+		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+			len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
+			if (len > 0) {
+				if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n",
+				    PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
+					fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+					    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+			}
+			if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL)
+				goto fail;
+			reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
+			break;
+		default:
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+	*resp = reply;
+	return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+
+ fail:
+	for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		free(reply[i].resp);
+	}
+	free(reply);
+	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
+}
+
+static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { sshpam_passwd_conv, NULL };
+
+/*
+ * Attempt password authentication via PAM
+ */
+int
+sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+{
+	int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
+	    PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
+	char *fake = NULL;
+
+	if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL)
+		fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to "
+		    "initialise.", __func__);
+
+	sshpam_password = password;
+	sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted
+	 * by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking
+	 * information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail).
+	 */
+	if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+	    options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
+		sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password);
+
+	sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
+	    (const void *)&passwd_conv);
+	if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
+		fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__,
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+
+	sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
+	sshpam_password = NULL;
+	free(fake);
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES)
+		sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
+	if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
+		debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
+		    authctxt->user);
+		return 1;
+	} else {
+		debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s",
+		    authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user",
+		    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+int
+sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void)
+{
+	return sshpam_maxtries_reached;
+}
+
+void
+sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int reached)
+{
+	if (reached == 0 || sshpam_maxtries_reached)
+		return;
+	sshpam_maxtries_reached = 1;
+	options.password_authentication = 0;
+	options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
+}
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
diff --git a/auth-pam.h b/auth-pam.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9fcea27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth-pam.h
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+
+struct ssh;
+
+void start_pam(struct ssh *);
+void finish_pam(void);
+u_int do_pam_account(void);
+void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
+void do_pam_setcred(int );
+void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
+int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
+char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
+char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
+void free_pam_environment(char **);
+void sshpam_thread_cleanup(void);
+void sshpam_cleanup(void);
+int sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+int sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void);
+void sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int);
+int is_pam_session_open(void);
+
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
diff --git a/auth-passwd.c b/auth-passwd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..347d91e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth-passwd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.48 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Password authentication.  This file contains the functions to check whether
+ * the password is valid for the user.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+
+extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+extern login_cap_t *lc;
+#endif
+
+
+#define DAY		(24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
+#define TWO_WEEKS	(2L * 7 * DAY)	/* 2 weeks in seconds */
+
+#define MAX_PASSWORD_LEN	1024
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate the user using password.  Returns true if
+ * authentication succeeds.
+ */
+int
+auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+	int result, ok = authctxt->valid;
+#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+	static int expire_checked = 0;
+#endif
+
+	if (strlen(password) > MAX_PASSWORD_LEN)
+		return 0;
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)
+		ok = 0;
+#endif
+	if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+	if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) {
+		int ret = auth_krb5_password(authctxt, password);
+		if (ret == 1 || ret == 0)
+			return ret && ok;
+		/* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */
+	}
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	{
+		HANDLE hToken = cygwin_logon_user(pw, password);
+
+		if (hToken == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
+			return 0;
+		cygwin_set_impersonation_token(hToken);
+		return ok;
+	}
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam)
+		return (sshpam_auth_passwd(authctxt, password) && ok);
+#endif
+#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+	if (!expire_checked) {
+		expire_checked = 1;
+		if (auth_shadow_pwexpired(authctxt))
+			authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
+	}
+#endif
+	result = sys_auth_passwd(ssh, password);
+	if (authctxt->force_pwchange)
+		auth_restrict_session(ssh);
+	return (result && ok);
+}
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+static void
+warn_expiry(Authctxt *authctxt, auth_session_t *as)
+{
+	int r;
+	quad_t pwtimeleft, actimeleft, daysleft, pwwarntime, acwarntime;
+
+	pwwarntime = acwarntime = TWO_WEEKS;
+
+	pwtimeleft = auth_check_change(as);
+	actimeleft = auth_check_expire(as);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	if (authctxt->valid) {
+		pwwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "password-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
+		    TWO_WEEKS);
+		acwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "expire-warn", TWO_WEEKS,
+		    TWO_WEEKS);
+	}
+#endif
+	if (pwtimeleft != 0 && pwtimeleft < pwwarntime) {
+		daysleft = pwtimeleft / DAY + 1;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg,
+		    "Your password will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
+		    daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s")) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+	}
+	if (actimeleft != 0 && actimeleft < acwarntime) {
+		daysleft = actimeleft / DAY + 1;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg,
+		    "Your account will expire in %lld day%s.\n",
+		    daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s")) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+	}
+}
+
+int
+sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	auth_session_t *as;
+	static int expire_checked = 0;
+
+	as = auth_usercheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh",
+	    (char *)password);
+	if (as == NULL)
+		return (0);
+	if (auth_getstate(as) & AUTH_PWEXPIRED) {
+		auth_close(as);
+		auth_restrict_session(ssh);
+		authctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
+		return (1);
+	} else {
+		if (!expire_checked) {
+			expire_checked = 1;
+			warn_expiry(authctxt, as);
+		}
+		return (auth_close(as));
+	}
+}
+#elif !defined(CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD)
+int
+sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+	char *encrypted_password, *salt = NULL;
+
+	/* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
+	char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
+
+	if (pw_password == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Check for users with no password. */
+	if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	/*
+	 * Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt, or pass a
+	 * NULL and let xcrypt pick one.
+	 */
+	if (authctxt->valid && pw_password[0] && pw_password[1])
+		salt = pw_password;
+	encrypted_password = xcrypt(password, salt);
+
+	/*
+	 * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
+	 * are identical.
+	 */
+	return encrypted_password != NULL &&
+	    strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/auth-rhosts.c b/auth-rhosts.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5672467
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth-rhosts.c
@@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.57 2022/12/09 00:17:40 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Rhosts authentication.  This file contains code to check whether to admit
+ * the login based on rhosts authentication.  This file also processes
+ * /etc/hosts.equiv.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
+# include <netgroup.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int use_privsep;
+
+/*
+ * This function processes an rhosts-style file (.rhosts, .shosts, or
+ * /etc/hosts.equiv).  This returns true if authentication can be granted
+ * based on the file, and returns zero otherwise.
+ */
+
+static int
+check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname,
+		  const char *ipaddr, const char *client_user,
+		  const char *server_user)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+#define RBUFLN 1024
+	char buf[RBUFLN];/* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */
+	int fd;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	/* Open the .rhosts file, deny if unreadable */
+	if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1)
+		return 0;
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
+		close(fd);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+		logit("User %s hosts file %s is not a regular file",
+		    server_user, filename);
+		close(fd);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	unset_nonblock(fd);
+	if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
+		close(fd);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) {
+		/* All three must have length >= buf to avoid overflows. */
+		char hostbuf[RBUFLN], userbuf[RBUFLN], dummy[RBUFLN];
+		char *host, *user, *cp;
+		int negated;
+
+		for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+			;
+		if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\n' || !*cp)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * NO_PLUS is supported at least on OSF/1.  We skip it (we
+		 * don't ever support the plus syntax).
+		 */
+		if (strncmp(cp, "NO_PLUS", 7) == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * This should be safe because each buffer is as big as the
+		 * whole string, and thus cannot be overwritten.
+		 */
+		switch (sscanf(buf, "%1023s %1023s %1023s", hostbuf, userbuf,
+		    dummy)) {
+		case 0:
+			auth_debug_add("Found empty line in %.100s.", filename);
+			continue;
+		case 1:
+			/* Host name only. */
+			strlcpy(userbuf, server_user, sizeof(userbuf));
+			break;
+		case 2:
+			/* Got both host and user name. */
+			break;
+		case 3:
+			auth_debug_add("Found garbage in %.100s.", filename);
+			continue;
+		default:
+			/* Weird... */
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		host = hostbuf;
+		user = userbuf;
+		negated = 0;
+
+		/* Process negated host names, or positive netgroups. */
+		if (host[0] == '-') {
+			negated = 1;
+			host++;
+		} else if (host[0] == '+')
+			host++;
+
+		if (user[0] == '-') {
+			negated = 1;
+			user++;
+		} else if (user[0] == '+')
+			user++;
+
+		/* Check for empty host/user names (particularly '+'). */
+		if (!host[0] || !user[0]) {
+			/* We come here if either was '+' or '-'. */
+			auth_debug_add("Ignoring wild host/user names "
+			    "in %.100s.", filename);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Verify that host name matches. */
+		if (host[0] == '@') {
+			if (!innetgr(host + 1, hostname, NULL, NULL) &&
+			    !innetgr(host + 1, ipaddr, NULL, NULL))
+				continue;
+		} else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) &&
+		    strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0)
+			continue;	/* Different hostname. */
+
+		/* Verify that user name matches. */
+		if (user[0] == '@') {
+			if (!innetgr(user + 1, NULL, client_user, NULL))
+				continue;
+		} else if (strcmp(user, client_user) != 0)
+			continue;	/* Different username. */
+
+		/* Found the user and host. */
+		fclose(f);
+
+		/* If the entry was negated, deny access. */
+		if (negated) {
+			auth_debug_add("Matched negative entry in %.100s.",
+			    filename);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		/* Accept authentication. */
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Authentication using this file denied. */
+	fclose(f);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to authenticate the user using the .shosts or .rhosts file. Returns
+ * true if authentication succeeds.  If ignore_rhosts is true, only
+ * /etc/hosts.equiv will be considered (.rhosts and .shosts are ignored).
+ */
+int
+auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
+    const char *ipaddr)
+{
+	char *path = NULL;
+	struct stat st;
+	static const char * const rhosts_files[] = {".shosts", ".rhosts", NULL};
+	u_int rhosts_file_index;
+	int r;
+
+	debug2_f("clientuser %s hostname %s ipaddr %s",
+	    client_user, hostname, ipaddr);
+
+	/* Switch to the user's uid. */
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+	/*
+	 * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files and
+	 * no system hosts.equiv/shosts.equiv files exist then return
+	 * failure immediately without doing costly lookups from name
+	 * servers.
+	 */
+	for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
+	    rhosts_file_index++) {
+		/* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
+		xasprintf(&path, "%s/%s",
+		    pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+		r = stat(path, &st);
+		free(path);
+		if (r >= 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	/* Switch back to privileged uid. */
+	restore_uid();
+
+	/*
+	 * Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there
+	 * are no system-wide files.
+	 */
+	if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] &&
+	    stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) == -1 &&
+	    stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) == -1) {
+		debug3_f("no hosts access files exist");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and
+	 * shosts.equiv.
+	 */
+	if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
+		debug3_f("root user, ignoring system hosts files");
+	else {
+		if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
+		    client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
+			auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by "
+			    "/etc/hosts.equiv.", hostname, ipaddr);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr,
+		    client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
+			auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by "
+			    "%.100s.", hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is
+	 * not group or world writable.
+	 */
+	if (stat(pw->pw_dir, &st) == -1) {
+		logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
+		    "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
+		auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
+		    "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (options.strict_modes &&
+	    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+	    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+		logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
+		    "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
+		auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
+		    "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+	/* Check all .rhosts files (currently .shosts and .rhosts). */
+	for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index];
+	    rhosts_file_index++) {
+		/* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
+		xasprintf(&path, "%s/%s",
+		    pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+		if (stat(path, &st) == -1) {
+			debug3_f("stat %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+			free(path);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Make sure that the file is either owned by the user or by
+		 * root, and make sure it is not writable by anyone but the
+		 * owner.  This is to help avoid novices accidentally
+		 * allowing access to their account by anyone.
+		 */
+		if (options.strict_modes &&
+		    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+			logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
+			    "bad modes for %.200s", pw->pw_name, path);
+			auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", path);
+			free(path);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts
+		 * and .shosts files.
+		 */
+		if (options.ignore_rhosts == IGNORE_RHOSTS_YES ||
+		    (options.ignore_rhosts == IGNORE_RHOSTS_SHOSTS &&
+		    strcmp(rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index], ".shosts") != 0)) {
+			auth_debug_add("Server has been configured to "
+			    "ignore %.100s.", rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+			free(path);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Check if authentication is permitted by the file. */
+		if (check_rhosts_file(path, hostname, ipaddr,
+		    client_user, pw->pw_name)) {
+			auth_debug_add("Accepted by %.100s.",
+			    rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
+			/* Restore the privileged uid. */
+			restore_uid();
+			auth_debug_add("Accepted host %s ip %s client_user "
+			    "%s server_user %s", hostname, ipaddr,
+			    client_user, pw->pw_name);
+			free(path);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		free(path);
+	}
+
+	/* Restore the privileged uid. */
+	restore_uid();
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/auth-shadow.c b/auth-shadow.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c77ee8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth-shadow.c
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#ifdef DAY
+# undef DAY
+#endif
+#define DAY	(24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */
+
+extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+
+/*
+ * For the account and password expiration functions, we assume the expiry
+ * occurs the day after the day specified.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Check if specified account is expired.  Returns 1 if account is expired,
+ * 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int
+auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *spw)
+{
+	time_t today;
+	int daysleft;
+	int r;
+
+	today = time(NULL) / DAY;
+	daysleft = spw->sp_expire - today;
+	debug3("%s: today %d sp_expire %d days left %d", __func__, (int)today,
+	    (int)spw->sp_expire, daysleft);
+
+	if (spw->sp_expire == -1) {
+		debug3("account expiration disabled");
+	} else if (daysleft < 0) {
+		logit("Account %.100s has expired", spw->sp_namp);
+		return 1;
+	} else if (daysleft <= spw->sp_warn) {
+		debug3("account will expire in %d days", daysleft);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, 
+		    "Your account will expire in %d day%s.\n", daysleft,
+		    daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s")) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks password expiry for platforms that use shadow passwd files.
+ * Returns: 1 = password expired, 0 = password not expired
+ */
+int
+auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
+	const char *user = ctxt->pw->pw_name;
+	time_t today;
+	int r, daysleft, disabled = 0;
+
+	if ((spw = getspnam((char *)user)) == NULL) {
+		error("Could not get shadow information for %.100s", user);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	today = time(NULL) / DAY;
+	debug3("%s: today %d sp_lstchg %d sp_max %d", __func__, (int)today,
+	    (int)spw->sp_lstchg, (int)spw->sp_max);
+
+#if defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+	if (iscomsec()) {
+		struct pr_passwd *pr;
+
+		pr = getprpwnam((char *)user);
+
+		/* Test for Trusted Mode expiry disabled */
+		if (pr != NULL && pr->ufld.fd_min == 0 &&
+		    pr->ufld.fd_lifetime == 0 && pr->ufld.fd_expire == 0 &&
+		    pr->ufld.fd_pw_expire_warning == 0 &&
+		    pr->ufld.fd_schange != 0)
+			disabled = 1;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* TODO: check sp_inact */
+	daysleft = spw->sp_lstchg + spw->sp_max - today;
+	if (disabled) {
+		debug3("password expiration disabled");
+	} else if (spw->sp_lstchg == 0) {
+		logit("User %.100s password has expired (root forced)", user);
+		return 1;
+	} else if (spw->sp_max == -1) {
+		debug3("password expiration disabled");
+	} else if (daysleft < 0) {
+		logit("User %.100s password has expired (password aged)", user);
+		return 1;
+	} else if (daysleft <= spw->sp_warn) {
+		debug3("password will expire in %d days", daysleft);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, 
+		    "Your password will expire in %d day%s.\n", daysleft,
+		    daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s")) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif	/* USE_SHADOW && HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
diff --git a/auth-sia.c b/auth-sia.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ebe9d8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth-sia.c
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Chris Adams.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+#include <sia.h>
+#include <siad.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh_api.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-sia.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int saved_argc;
+extern char **saved_argv;
+
+int
+sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *pass)
+{
+	int ret;
+	SIAENTITY *ent = NULL;
+	const char *host;
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+
+	host = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+
+	if (!authctxt->user || pass == NULL || pass[0] == '\0')
+		return (0);
+
+	if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, authctxt->user,
+	    NULL, 0, NULL) != SIASUCCESS)
+		return (0);
+
+	if ((ret = sia_ses_authent(NULL, pass, ent)) != SIASUCCESS) {
+		error("Couldn't authenticate %s from %s",
+		    authctxt->user, host);
+		if (ret & SIASTOP)
+			sia_ses_release(&ent);
+
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	sia_ses_release(&ent);
+
+	return (1);
+}
+
+void
+session_setup_sia(struct passwd *pw, char *tty)
+{
+	SIAENTITY *ent = NULL;
+	const char *host;
+
+	host = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns);
+
+	if (sia_ses_init(&ent, saved_argc, saved_argv, host, pw->pw_name,
+	    tty, 0, NULL) != SIASUCCESS)
+		fatal("sia_ses_init failed");
+
+	if (sia_make_entity_pwd(pw, ent) != SIASUCCESS) {
+		sia_ses_release(&ent);
+		fatal("sia_make_entity_pwd failed");
+	}
+
+	ent->authtype = SIA_A_NONE;
+	if (sia_ses_estab(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS)
+		fatal("Couldn't establish session for %s from %s",
+		    pw->pw_name, host);
+
+	if (sia_ses_launch(sia_collect_trm, ent) != SIASUCCESS)
+		fatal("Couldn't launch session for %s from %s",
+		    pw->pw_name, host);
+
+	sia_ses_release(&ent);
+
+	setuid(0);
+	permanently_set_uid(pw);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
diff --git a/auth-sia.h b/auth-sia.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27cbb93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth-sia.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Chris Adams.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+
+void	session_setup_sia(struct passwd *, char *);
+
+#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..03a777c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,857 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.159 2022/12/09 00:17:40 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+#include <login.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SHADOW
+#include <shadow.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "groupaccess.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "loginrec.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern struct include_list includes;
+extern int use_privsep;
+extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
+extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
+
+/* Debugging messages */
+static struct sshbuf *auth_debug;
+
+/*
+ * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
+ * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
+ * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
+ * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
+ * listed there, false will be returned.
+ * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
+ * Otherwise true is returned.
+ */
+int
+allowed_user(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL;
+	u_int i;
+	int r;
+
+	/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
+	if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!options.use_pam && platform_locked_account(pw)) {
+		logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
+		    pw->pw_name);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
+	 * are chrooting.
+	 */
+	if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
+	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
+		char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
+		    _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */
+
+		if (stat(shell, &st) == -1) {
+			logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
+			    "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
+			free(shell);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
+		    (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
+			logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
+			    "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
+			free(shell);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		free(shell);
+	}
+
+	if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
+	    options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
+		hostname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
+		ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+	}
+
+	/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
+	if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
+		for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) {
+			r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+			    options.deny_users[i]);
+			if (r < 0) {
+				fatal("Invalid DenyUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
+				    options.deny_users[i]);
+			} else if (r != 0) {
+				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
+				    "because listed in DenyUsers",
+				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
+	if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
+		for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) {
+			r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
+			    options.allow_users[i]);
+			if (r < 0) {
+				fatal("Invalid AllowUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
+				    options.allow_users[i]);
+			} else if (r == 1)
+				break;
+		}
+		/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
+		if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
+			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
+			    "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
+		/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
+		if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
+			logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
+			    "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
+		if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
+			if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
+			    options.num_deny_groups)) {
+				ga_free();
+				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
+				    "because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
+				    pw->pw_name, hostname);
+				return 0;
+			}
+		/*
+		 * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
+		 * isn't listed there
+		 */
+		if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
+			if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
+			    options.num_allow_groups)) {
+				ga_free();
+				logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
+				    "because none of user's groups are listed "
+				    "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
+				return 0;
+			}
+		ga_free();
+	}
+
+#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
+	if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, loginmsg))
+		return 0;
+#endif
+
+	/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Formats any key left in authctxt->auth_method_key for inclusion in
+ * auth_log()'s message. Also includes authxtct->auth_method_info if present.
+ */
+static char *
+format_method_key(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	const struct sshkey *key = authctxt->auth_method_key;
+	const char *methinfo = authctxt->auth_method_info;
+	char *fp, *cafp, *ret = NULL;
+
+	if (key == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
+		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+		cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+		xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
+		    sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
+		    key->cert->key_id,
+		    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
+		    sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key),
+		    cafp == NULL ? "(null)" : cafp,
+		    methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ",
+		    methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo);
+		free(fp);
+		free(cafp);
+	} else {
+		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+		xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s", sshkey_type(key),
+		    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
+		    methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ",
+		    methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo);
+		free(fp);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+auth_log(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, int partial,
+    const char *method, const char *submethod)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+	int level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
+	const char *authmsg;
+	char *extra = NULL;
+
+	if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
+		return;
+
+	/* Raise logging level */
+	if (authenticated == 1 ||
+	    !authctxt->valid ||
+	    authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
+	    strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
+		level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+
+	if (authctxt->postponed)
+		authmsg = "Postponed";
+	else if (partial)
+		authmsg = "Partial";
+	else
+		authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
+
+	if ((extra = format_method_key(authctxt)) == NULL) {
+		if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL)
+			extra = xstrdup(authctxt->auth_method_info);
+	}
+
+	do_log2(level, "%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2%s%s",
+	    authmsg,
+	    method,
+	    submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
+	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+	    authctxt->user,
+	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+	    ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+	    extra != NULL ? ": " : "",
+	    extra != NULL ? extra : "");
+
+	free(extra);
+
+#if defined(CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN) || defined(SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS)
+	if (authenticated == 0 && !(authctxt->postponed || partial)) {
+		/* Log failed login attempt */
+# ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
+		if (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
+		    strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
+		    strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)
+			record_failed_login(ssh, authctxt->user,
+			    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
+# endif
+# ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+		audit_event(ssh, audit_classify_auth(method));
+# endif
+	}
+#endif
+#if defined(CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN) && defined(WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE)
+	if (authenticated)
+		sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
+		    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh",
+		    loginmsg);
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+auth_maxtries_exceeded(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+
+	error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for "
+	    "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2",
+	    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+	    authctxt->user,
+	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+	    ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+	ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Too many authentication failures");
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether root logins are disallowed.
+ */
+int
+auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+{
+	switch (options.permit_root_login) {
+	case PERMIT_YES:
+		return 1;
+	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
+		if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
+		    strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
+		    strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
+			return 1;
+		break;
+	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
+		if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) {
+			logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
+			return 1;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s port %d",
+	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
+ * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
+ * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
+ *
+ * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
+ */
+char *
+expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	char *file, uidstr[32], ret[PATH_MAX];
+	int i;
+
+	snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
+	    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
+	file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+	    "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
+	 * compatible and prepend the '%h/'
+	 */
+	if (path_absolute(file))
+		return (file);
+
+	i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
+	if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
+		fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
+	free(file);
+	return (xstrdup(ret));
+}
+
+char *
+authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
+}
+
+/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
+HostStatus
+check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *host,
+    const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
+{
+	char *user_hostfile;
+	struct stat st;
+	HostStatus host_status;
+	struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
+	const struct hostkey_entry *found;
+
+	hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
+	load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile, 0);
+	if (userfile != NULL) {
+		user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
+		if (options.strict_modes &&
+		    (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
+		    ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
+		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
+			logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
+			    "bad owner or modes for %.200s",
+			    pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
+			auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
+			    user_hostfile);
+		} else {
+			temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+			load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile, 0);
+			restore_uid();
+		}
+		free(user_hostfile);
+	}
+	host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
+	if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
+		error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
+		    host);
+	else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
+		debug_f("key for %s found at %s:%ld",
+		    found->host, found->file, found->line);
+	else
+		debug_f("key for host %s not found", host);
+
+	free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
+
+	return host_status;
+}
+
+struct passwd *
+getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	extern login_cap_t *lc;
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+	auth_session_t *as;
+#endif
+#endif
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	struct connection_info *ci;
+	u_int i;
+
+	ci = get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns);
+	ci->user = user;
+	parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci);
+	log_change_level(options.log_level);
+	log_verbose_reset();
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++)
+		log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]);
+	process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
+
+#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
+	aix_setauthdb(user);
+#endif
+
+	pw = getpwnam(user);
+
+#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
+	aix_restoreauthdb();
+#endif
+	if (pw == NULL) {
+		logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s port %d",
+		    user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
+		record_failed_login(ssh, user,
+		    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+		audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw))
+		return (NULL);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	if ((lc = login_getpwclass(pw)) == NULL) {
+		debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+	if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
+	    auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
+		debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
+		pw = NULL;
+	}
+	if (as != NULL)
+		auth_close(as);
+#endif
+#endif
+	if (pw != NULL)
+		return (pwcopy(pw));
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
+int
+auth_key_is_revoked(struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	char *fp = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		error_fr(r, "fingerprint key");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = sshkey_check_revoked(key, options.revoked_keys_file);
+	switch (r) {
+	case 0:
+		break; /* not revoked */
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
+		error("Authentication key %s %s revoked by file %s",
+		    sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file);
+		goto out;
+	default:
+		error_r(r, "Error checking authentication key %s %s in "
+		    "revoked keys file %s", sshkey_type(key), fp,
+		    options.revoked_keys_file);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Success */
+	r = 0;
+
+ out:
+	free(fp);
+	return r == 0 ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
+void
+auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+	va_list args;
+	int r;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	debug3("%s", buf);
+	if (auth_debug != NULL)
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(auth_debug, buf)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_cstring");
+}
+
+void
+auth_debug_send(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	char *msg;
+	int r;
+
+	if (auth_debug == NULL)
+		return;
+	while (sshbuf_len(auth_debug) != 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(auth_debug, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_get_cstring");
+		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "%s", msg);
+		free(msg);
+	}
+}
+
+void
+auth_debug_reset(void)
+{
+	if (auth_debug != NULL)
+		sshbuf_reset(auth_debug);
+	else if ((auth_debug = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+}
+
+struct passwd *
+fakepw(void)
+{
+	static int done = 0;
+	static struct passwd fake;
+	const char hashchars[] = "./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
+	    "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"; /* from bcrypt.c */
+	char *cp;
+
+	if (done)
+		return (&fake);
+
+	memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
+	fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
+	fake.pw_passwd = xstrdup("$2a$10$"
+	    "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx");
+	for (cp = fake.pw_passwd + 7; *cp != '\0'; cp++)
+		*cp = hashchars[arc4random_uniform(sizeof(hashchars) - 1)];
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
+	fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
+#endif
+	fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid;
+	fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid;
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
+	fake.pw_class = "";
+#endif
+	fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
+	fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
+	done = 1;
+
+	return (&fake);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
+ * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
+ * called.
+ * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
+ * attacks on based on conflation of hostnames and IP addresses.
+ */
+
+static char *
+remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+	socklen_t fromlen;
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
+	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+
+	/* Get IP address of client. */
+	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
+		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		return xstrdup(ntop);
+	}
+
+	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+
+	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
+	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
+	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
+	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
+		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
+		return xstrdup(ntop);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
+	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
+	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
+	 */
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
+		    name, ntop);
+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+		return xstrdup(ntop);
+	}
+
+	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
+	lowercase(name);
+
+	/*
+	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
+	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
+	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
+	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
+	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
+	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
+	 * the domain).
+	 */
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
+		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
+		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
+		return xstrdup(ntop);
+	}
+	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
+	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
+		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
+		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
+				break;
+	}
+	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
+	if (ai == NULL) {
+		/* Address not found for the host name. */
+		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
+		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
+		return xstrdup(ntop);
+	}
+	return xstrdup(name);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
+ * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
+ * several times.
+ */
+
+const char *
+auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
+{
+	static char *dnsname;
+
+	if (!use_dns)
+		return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+	else if (dnsname != NULL)
+		return dnsname;
+	else {
+		dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
+		return dnsname;
+	}
+}
+
+/* These functions link key/cert options to the auth framework */
+
+/* Log sshauthopt options locally and (optionally) for remote transmission */
+void
+auth_log_authopts(const char *loc, const struct sshauthopt *opts, int do_remote)
+{
+	int do_env = options.permit_user_env && opts->nenv > 0;
+	int do_permitopen = opts->npermitopen > 0 &&
+	    (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0;
+	int do_permitlisten = opts->npermitlisten > 0 &&
+	    (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) != 0;
+	size_t i;
+	char msg[1024], buf[64];
+
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", opts->force_tun_device);
+	/* Try to keep this alphabetically sorted */
+	snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "key options:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
+	    opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ? " agent-forwarding" : "",
+	    opts->force_command == NULL ? "" : " command",
+	    do_env ?  " environment" : "",
+	    opts->valid_before == 0 ? "" : "expires",
+	    opts->no_require_user_presence ? " no-touch-required" : "",
+	    do_permitopen ?  " permitopen" : "",
+	    do_permitlisten ?  " permitlisten" : "",
+	    opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ? " port-forwarding" : "",
+	    opts->cert_principals == NULL ? "" : " principals",
+	    opts->permit_pty_flag ? " pty" : "",
+	    opts->require_verify ? " uv" : "",
+	    opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : " tun=",
+	    opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : buf,
+	    opts->permit_user_rc ? " user-rc" : "",
+	    opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag ? " x11-forwarding" : "");
+
+	debug("%s: %s", loc, msg);
+	if (do_remote)
+		auth_debug_add("%s: %s", loc, msg);
+
+	if (options.permit_user_env) {
+		for (i = 0; i < opts->nenv; i++) {
+			debug("%s: environment: %s", loc, opts->env[i]);
+			if (do_remote) {
+				auth_debug_add("%s: environment: %s",
+				    loc, opts->env[i]);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Go into a little more details for the local logs. */
+	if (opts->valid_before != 0) {
+		format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		debug("%s: expires at %s", loc, buf);
+	}
+	if (opts->cert_principals != NULL) {
+		debug("%s: authorized principals: \"%s\"",
+		    loc, opts->cert_principals);
+	}
+	if (opts->force_command != NULL)
+		debug("%s: forced command: \"%s\"", loc, opts->force_command);
+	if (do_permitopen) {
+		for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitopen; i++) {
+			debug("%s: permitted open: %s",
+			    loc, opts->permitopen[i]);
+		}
+	}
+	if (do_permitlisten) {
+		for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitlisten; i++) {
+			debug("%s: permitted listen: %s",
+			    loc, opts->permitlisten[i]);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/* Activate a new set of key/cert options; merging with what is there. */
+int
+auth_activate_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshauthopt *opts)
+{
+	struct sshauthopt *old = auth_opts;
+	const char *emsg = NULL;
+
+	debug_f("setting new authentication options");
+	if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_merge(old, opts, &emsg)) == NULL) {
+		error("Inconsistent authentication options: %s", emsg);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Disable forwarding, etc for the session */
+void
+auth_restrict_session(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct sshauthopt *restricted;
+
+	debug_f("restricting session");
+
+	/* A blank sshauthopt defaults to permitting nothing */
+	if ((restricted = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshauthopt_new failed");
+	restricted->permit_pty_flag = 1;
+	restricted->restricted = 1;
+
+	if (auth_activate_options(ssh, restricted) != 0)
+		fatal_f("failed to restrict session");
+	sshauthopt_free(restricted);
+}
diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d2d397
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth.h
@@ -0,0 +1,247 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.106 2022/06/15 16:08:25 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef AUTH_H
+#define AUTH_H
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+#include <login_cap.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+#include <bsd_auth.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+#include <krb5.h>
+#endif
+
+struct passwd;
+struct ssh;
+struct sshbuf;
+struct sshkey;
+struct sshkey_cert;
+struct sshauthopt;
+
+typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt;
+typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod;
+typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice;
+
+struct Authctxt {
+	sig_atomic_t	 success;
+	int		 authenticated;	/* authenticated and alarms cancelled */
+	int		 postponed;	/* authentication needs another step */
+	int		 valid;		/* user exists and is allowed to login */
+	int		 attempt;
+	int		 failures;
+	int		 server_caused_failure;
+	int		 force_pwchange;
+	char		*user;		/* username sent by the client */
+	char		*service;
+	struct passwd	*pw;		/* set if 'valid' */
+	char		*style;
+
+	/* Method lists for multiple authentication */
+	char		**auth_methods;	/* modified from server config */
+	u_int		 num_auth_methods;
+
+	/* Authentication method-specific data */
+	void		*methoddata;
+	void		*kbdintctxt;
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+	auth_session_t	*as;
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+	krb5_context	 krb5_ctx;
+	krb5_ccache	 krb5_fwd_ccache;
+	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
+	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
+	char		*krb5_ccname;
+#endif
+	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
+
+	/* Authentication keys already used; these will be refused henceforth */
+	struct sshkey	**prev_keys;
+	u_int		 nprev_keys;
+
+	/* Last used key and ancillary information from active auth method */
+	struct sshkey	*auth_method_key;
+	char		*auth_method_info;
+
+	/* Information exposed to session */
+	struct sshbuf	*session_info;	/* Auth info for environment */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for
+ * non-existing users, or for users that are not allowed to login. In this
+ * case 'valid' is set to 0, but 'user' points to the username requested by
+ * the client.
+ */
+
+struct Authmethod {
+	char	*name;
+	char	*synonym;
+	int	(*userauth)(struct ssh *, const char *);
+	int	*enabled;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Keyboard interactive device:
+ * init_ctx	returns: non NULL upon success
+ * query	returns: 0 - success, otherwise failure
+ * respond	returns: 0 - success, 1 - need further interaction,
+ *		otherwise - failure
+ */
+struct KbdintDevice
+{
+	const char *name;
+	void*	(*init_ctx)(Authctxt*);
+	int	(*query)(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
+		    u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on);
+	int	(*respond)(void *ctx, u_int numresp, char **responses);
+	void	(*free_ctx)(void *ctx);
+};
+
+int
+auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+
+int      auth_password(struct ssh *, const char *);
+
+int	 hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *,
+	    const char *, char *, struct sshkey *);
+int	 user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *,
+    int, struct sshauthopt **);
+int	 auth2_key_already_used(Authctxt *, const struct sshkey *);
+
+/*
+ * Handling auth method-specific information for logging and prevention
+ * of key reuse during multiple authentication.
+ */
+void	 auth2_authctxt_reset_info(Authctxt *);
+void	 auth2_record_key(Authctxt *, int, const struct sshkey *);
+void	 auth2_record_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *, ...)
+	    __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)))
+	    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
+void	 auth2_update_session_info(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *);
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+int	auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *);
+int	auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt);
+int	auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password);
+void	krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt);
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+
+#if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+#include <shadow.h>
+int auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *);
+int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *);
+#endif
+
+#include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "audit.h"
+void remove_kbdint_device(const char *);
+
+void	do_authentication2(struct ssh *);
+
+void	auth_log(struct ssh *, int, int, const char *, const char *);
+void	auth_maxtries_exceeded(struct ssh *) __attribute__((noreturn));
+void	userauth_finish(struct ssh *, int, const char *, const char *);
+int	auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *, const char *);
+
+char	*auth2_read_banner(void);
+int	 auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int);
+int	 auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *);
+int	 auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *);
+int	 auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *);
+
+void	privsep_challenge_enable(void);
+
+int	auth2_challenge(struct ssh *, char *);
+void	auth2_challenge_stop(struct ssh *);
+int	bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int	bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+
+int	allowed_user(struct ssh *, struct passwd *);
+struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *user);
+
+char	*expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
+char	*authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
+
+int	 auth_key_is_revoked(struct sshkey *);
+
+const char	*auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *, int);
+
+HostStatus
+check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, const char *,
+    const char *, const char *);
+
+/* hostkey handling */
+struct sshkey	*get_hostkey_by_index(int);
+struct sshkey	*get_hostkey_public_by_index(int, struct ssh *);
+struct sshkey	*get_hostkey_public_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
+struct sshkey	*get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *);
+int	 get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *);
+int	 sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
+    u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
+
+/* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */
+const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *);
+int	 auth_activate_options(struct ssh *, struct sshauthopt *);
+void	 auth_restrict_session(struct ssh *);
+void	 auth_log_authopts(const char *, const struct sshauthopt *, int);
+
+/* debug messages during authentication */
+void	 auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void	 auth_debug_send(struct ssh *);
+void	 auth_debug_reset(void);
+
+struct passwd *fakepw(void);
+
+/* auth2-pubkeyfile.c */
+int	 auth_authorise_keyopts(struct passwd *, struct sshauthopt *, int,
+    const char *, const char *, const char *);
+int	 auth_check_principals_line(char *, const struct sshkey_cert *,
+    const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
+int	 auth_process_principals(FILE *, const char *,
+    const struct sshkey_cert *, struct sshauthopt **);
+int	 auth_check_authkey_line(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *,
+    char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
+int	 auth_check_authkeys_file(struct passwd *, FILE *, char *,
+    struct sshkey *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
+FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+
+int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* AUTH_H */
diff --git a/auth2-chall.c b/auth2-chall.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..021df82
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth2-chall.c
@@ -0,0 +1,382 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.54 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static int auth2_challenge_start(struct ssh *);
+static int send_userauth_info_request(struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_info_response(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+extern KbdintDevice bsdauth_device;
+#else
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
+#endif
+#endif
+
+KbdintDevice *devices[] = {
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+	&bsdauth_device,
+#else
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	&sshpam_device,
+#endif
+#endif
+	NULL
+};
+
+typedef struct KbdintAuthctxt KbdintAuthctxt;
+struct KbdintAuthctxt
+{
+	char *devices;
+	void *ctxt;
+	KbdintDevice *device;
+	u_int nreq;
+	u_int devices_done;
+};
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+void
+remove_kbdint_device(const char *devname)
+{
+	int i, j;
+
+	for (i = 0; devices[i] != NULL; i++)
+		if (strcmp(devices[i]->name, devname) == 0) {
+			for (j = i; devices[j] != NULL; j++)
+				devices[j] = devices[j+1];
+			i--;
+		}
+}
+#endif
+
+static KbdintAuthctxt *
+kbdint_alloc(const char *devs)
+{
+	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	int i, r;
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		remove_kbdint_device("pam");
+#endif
+
+	kbdintctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(KbdintAuthctxt));
+	if (strcmp(devs, "") == 0) {
+		if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+		for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
+			if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s",
+			    sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "", devices[i]->name)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+		}
+		if ((kbdintctxt->devices = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+		sshbuf_free(b);
+	} else {
+		kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(devs);
+	}
+	debug("kbdint_alloc: devices '%s'", kbdintctxt->devices);
+	kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
+	kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
+	kbdintctxt->nreq = 0;
+
+	return kbdintctxt;
+}
+static void
+kbdint_reset_device(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
+{
+	if (kbdintctxt->ctxt) {
+		kbdintctxt->device->free_ctx(kbdintctxt->ctxt);
+		kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
+	}
+	kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
+}
+static void
+kbdint_free(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
+{
+	if (kbdintctxt->device)
+		kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
+	free(kbdintctxt->devices);
+	freezero(kbdintctxt, sizeof(*kbdintctxt));
+}
+/* get next device */
+static int
+kbdint_next_device(Authctxt *authctxt, KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
+{
+	size_t len;
+	char *t;
+	int i;
+
+	if (kbdintctxt->device)
+		kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
+	do {
+		len = kbdintctxt->devices ?
+		    strcspn(kbdintctxt->devices, ",") : 0;
+
+		if (len == 0)
+			break;
+		for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
+			if ((kbdintctxt->devices_done & (1 << i)) != 0 ||
+			    !auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
+			    "keyboard-interactive", devices[i]->name))
+				continue;
+			if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name,
+			    len) == 0) {
+				kbdintctxt->device = devices[i];
+				kbdintctxt->devices_done |= 1 << i;
+			}
+		}
+		t = kbdintctxt->devices;
+		kbdintctxt->devices = t[len] ? xstrdup(t+len+1) : NULL;
+		free(t);
+		debug2("kbdint_next_device: devices %s", kbdintctxt->devices ?
+		    kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
+	} while (kbdintctxt->devices && !kbdintctxt->device);
+
+	return kbdintctxt->device ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * try challenge-response, set authctxt->postponed if we have to
+ * wait for the response.
+ */
+int
+auth2_challenge(struct ssh *ssh, char *devs)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	debug("auth2_challenge: user=%s devs=%s",
+	    authctxt->user ? authctxt->user : "<nouser>",
+	    devs ? devs : "<no devs>");
+
+	if (authctxt->user == NULL || !devs)
+		return 0;
+	if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL)
+		authctxt->kbdintctxt = kbdint_alloc(devs);
+	return auth2_challenge_start(ssh);
+}
+
+/* unregister kbd-int callbacks and context */
+void
+auth2_challenge_stop(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	/* unregister callback */
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL);
+	if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) {
+		kbdint_free(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
+		authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+/* side effect: sets authctxt->postponed if a reply was sent*/
+static int
+auth2_challenge_start(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
+
+	debug2("auth2_challenge_start: devices %s",
+	    kbdintctxt->devices ?  kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
+
+	if (kbdint_next_device(authctxt, kbdintctxt) == 0) {
+		auth2_challenge_stop(ssh);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	debug("auth2_challenge_start: trying authentication method '%s'",
+	    kbdintctxt->device->name);
+
+	if ((kbdintctxt->ctxt = kbdintctxt->device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL) {
+		auth2_challenge_stop(ssh);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (send_userauth_info_request(ssh) == 0) {
+		auth2_challenge_stop(ssh);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE,
+	    &input_userauth_info_response);
+
+	authctxt->postponed = 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+send_userauth_info_request(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
+	char *name, *instr, **prompts;
+	u_int r, i, *echo_on;
+
+	kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
+	if (kbdintctxt->device->query(kbdintctxt->ctxt,
+	    &name, &instr, &kbdintctxt->nreq, &prompts, &echo_on))
+		return 0;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, instr)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||	/* language not used */
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kbdintctxt->nreq)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "start packet");
+	for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, prompts[i])) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, echo_on[i])) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "assemble packet");
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+
+	for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++)
+		free(prompts[i]);
+	free(prompts);
+	free(echo_on);
+	free(name);
+	free(instr);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
+	int authenticated = 0, res;
+	int r;
+	u_int i, nresp;
+	const char *devicename = NULL;
+	char **response = NULL;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal_f("no authctxt");
+	kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
+	if (kbdintctxt == NULL || kbdintctxt->ctxt == NULL)
+		fatal_f("no kbdintctxt");
+	if (kbdintctxt->device == NULL)
+		fatal_f("no device");
+
+	authctxt->postponed = 0;	/* reset */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nresp)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+	if (nresp != kbdintctxt->nreq)
+		fatal_f("wrong number of replies");
+	if (nresp > 100)
+		fatal_f("too many replies");
+	if (nresp > 0) {
+		response = xcalloc(nresp, sizeof(char *));
+		for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) {
+			if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &response[i], NULL)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse response");
+		}
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+
+	res = kbdintctxt->device->respond(kbdintctxt->ctxt, nresp, response);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) {
+		explicit_bzero(response[i], strlen(response[i]));
+		free(response[i]);
+	}
+	free(response);
+
+	switch (res) {
+	case 0:
+		/* Success! */
+		authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0;
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		/* Authentication needs further interaction */
+		if (send_userauth_info_request(ssh) == 1)
+			authctxt->postponed = 1;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Failure! */
+		break;
+	}
+	devicename = kbdintctxt->device->name;
+	if (!authctxt->postponed) {
+		if (authenticated) {
+			auth2_challenge_stop(ssh);
+		} else {
+			/* start next device */
+			/* may set authctxt->postponed */
+			auth2_challenge_start(ssh);
+		}
+	}
+	userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive",
+	    devicename);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+privsep_challenge_enable(void)
+{
+#if defined(BSD_AUTH) || defined(USE_PAM)
+	int n = 0;
+#endif
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+	extern KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device;
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	extern KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+	devices[n++] = &mm_bsdauth_device;
+#else
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	devices[n++] = &mm_sshpam_device;
+#endif
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2062609
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth2-gss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.33 2021/12/19 22:12:07 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+
+/*
+ * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
+ * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
+ */
+static int
+userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	gss_OID_desc goid = {0, NULL};
+	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
+	int r, present;
+	u_int mechs;
+	OM_uint32 ms;
+	size_t len;
+	u_char *doid = NULL;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &mechs)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+
+	if (mechs == 0) {
+		debug("Mechanism negotiation is not supported");
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	do {
+		mechs--;
+
+		free(doid);
+
+		present = 0;
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &doid, &len)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse oid");
+
+		if (len > 2 && doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE &&
+		    doid[1] == len - 2) {
+			goid.elements = doid + 2;
+			goid.length   = len - 2;
+			ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(&ms, &goid, &present);
+		} else {
+			logit("Badly formed OID received");
+		}
+	} while (mechs > 0 && !present);
+
+	if (!present) {
+		free(doid);
+		authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
+		debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
+		free(doid);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) {
+		if (ctxt != NULL)
+			ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
+		free(doid);
+		authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1;
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	authctxt->methoddata = (void *)ctxt;
+
+	/* Return the OID that we received */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, doid, len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+
+	free(doid);
+
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
+	authctxt->postponed = 1;
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, flags;
+	u_char *p;
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+
+	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+
+	recv_tok.value = p;
+	recv_tok.length = len;
+	maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
+	    &send_tok, &flags));
+
+	free(p);
+
+	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
+		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
+			    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
+			    send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "send ERRTOK packet");
+		}
+		authctxt->postponed = 0;
+		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+		userauth_finish(ssh, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+	} else {
+		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
+			    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
+			    send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "send TOKEN packet");
+		}
+		if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+			ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+			if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)
+				ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC,
+				    &input_gssapi_mic);
+			else
+				ssh_dispatch_set(ssh,
+				    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE,
+				    &input_gssapi_exchange_complete);
+		}
+	}
+
+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+	OM_uint32 maj_status;
+	int r;
+	u_char *p;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+
+	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+	recv_tok.value = p;
+	recv_tok.length = len;
+
+	/* Push the error token into GSSAPI to see what it says */
+	maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok,
+	    &send_tok, NULL));
+
+	free(recv_tok.value);
+
+	/* We can't return anything to the client, even if we wanted to */
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+
+	/* The client will have already moved on to the next auth */
+
+	gss_release_buffer(&maj_status, &send_tok);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called when the client thinks we've completed authentication.
+ * It should only be enabled in the dispatch handler by the function above,
+ * which only enables it once the GSSAPI exchange is complete.
+ */
+
+static int
+input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	int r, authenticated;
+	const char *displayname;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't need to check the status, because we're only enabled in
+	 * the dispatcher once the exchange is complete
+	 */
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+
+	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+
+	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+	    (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
+		auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
+
+	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
+	userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+	int r, authenticated = 0;
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
+	const char *displayname;
+	u_char *p;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep))
+		fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context");
+
+	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	mic.value = p;
+	mic.length = len;
+	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
+	    "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id);
+
+	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
+	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
+
+	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
+		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
+	else
+		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
+
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	free(mic.value);
+
+	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+	    (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
+		auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
+
+	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
+	userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+Authmethod method_gssapi = {
+	"gssapi-with-mic",
+	NULL,
+	userauth_gssapi,
+	&options.gss_authentication
+};
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b517db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.50 2022/09/17 10:34:29 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "match.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static int
+userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost;
+	u_char *pkblob, *sig;
+	size_t alen, blen, slen;
+	int r, pktype, authenticated = 0;
+
+	/* XXX use sshkey_froms() */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, &alen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+
+	debug_f("cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %zu",
+	    cuser, chost, pkalg, slen);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	debug("signature:");
+	sshbuf_dump_data(sig, slen, stderr);
+#endif
+	pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
+	if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+		/* this is perfectly legal */
+		logit_f("unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
+		    pkalg);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "key_from_blob");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (key == NULL) {
+		error_f("cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (key->type != pktype) {
+		error_f("type mismatch for decoded key "
+		    "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
+	    (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
+		error("Refusing RSA key because peer uses unsafe "
+		    "signature format");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.hostbased_accepted_algos, 0) != 1) {
+		logit_f("signature algorithm %s not in "
+		    "HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms", pkalg);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key,
+	    options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) {
+		logit_fr(r, "certificate signature algorithm %s",
+		    (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ?
+		    "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key,
+	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+		logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key));
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
+		debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	/* reconstruct packet */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, cuser)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "reconstruct packet");
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+#endif
+
+	auth2_record_info(authctxt,
+	    "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);
+
+	/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
+	authenticated = 0;
+	if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
+	    chost, key)) &&
+	    PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
+	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL)) == 0)
+		authenticated = 1;
+
+	auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+done:
+	debug2_f("authenticated %d", authenticated);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	free(pkalg);
+	free(pkblob);
+	free(cuser);
+	free(chost);
+	free(sig);
+	return authenticated;
+}
+
+/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
+int
+hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
+    const char *cuser, char *chost, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason;
+	HostStatus host_status;
+	int len;
+	char *fp;
+
+	if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
+		return 0;
+
+	resolvedname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
+	ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+
+	debug2_f("chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s",
+	    chost, resolvedname, ipaddr);
+
+	if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') {
+		debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost);
+		chost[len - 1] = '\0';
+	}
+
+	if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) {
+		if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0) {
+			debug2_f("auth_rhosts2 refused user \"%.100s\" "
+			    "host \"%.100s\" (from packet)", cuser, chost);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		lookup = chost;
+	} else {
+		if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0)
+			logit("userauth_hostbased mismatch: "
+			    "client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s",
+			    chost, ipaddr, resolvedname);
+		if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0) {
+			debug2_f("auth_rhosts2 refused "
+			    "user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" addr \"%.100s\"",
+			    cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		lookup = resolvedname;
+	}
+	debug2_f("access allowed by auth_rhosts2");
+
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
+	    sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(key, 1, 0, 0, lookup, &reason)) {
+		error("%s", reason);
+		auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
+	    _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
+	    options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
+
+	/* backward compat if no key has been found. */
+	if (host_status == HOST_NEW) {
+		host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
+		    _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2,
+		    options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL :
+		    _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
+	}
+
+	if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
+		if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+				fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
+			verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
+			    "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
+			    sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
+			    cuser, lookup);
+		} else {
+			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
+			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+				fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
+			verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
+			    sshkey_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
+		}
+		free(fp);
+	}
+
+	return (host_status == HOST_OK);
+}
+
+Authmethod method_hostbased = {
+	"hostbased",
+	NULL,
+	userauth_hostbased,
+	&options.hostbased_authentication
+};
diff --git a/auth2-kbdint.c b/auth2-kbdint.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae7eca3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth2-kbdint.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.14 2021/12/19 22:12:07 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static int
+userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+{
+	int r, authenticated = 0;
+	char *lang, *devs;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &devs, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+
+	debug("keyboard-interactive devs %s", devs);
+
+	if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
+		authenticated = auth2_challenge(ssh, devs);
+
+	free(devs);
+	free(lang);
+	return authenticated;
+}
+
+Authmethod method_kbdint = {
+	"keyboard-interactive",
+	NULL,
+	userauth_kbdint,
+	&options.kbd_interactive_authentication
+};
diff --git a/auth2-none.c b/auth2-none.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d9f9722
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth2-none.c
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.24 2021/12/19 22:12:07 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/* "none" is allowed only one time */
+static int none_enabled = 1;
+
+static int
+userauth_none(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	none_enabled = 0;
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+	if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication)
+		return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(ssh, "")));
+	return (0);
+}
+
+Authmethod method_none = {
+	"none",
+	NULL,
+	userauth_none,
+	&none_enabled
+};
diff --git a/auth2-passwd.c b/auth2-passwd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc12cfb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth2-passwd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.21 2022/05/27 04:29:40 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static int
+userauth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+{
+	char *password = NULL;
+	int authenticated = 0, r;
+	u_char change;
+	size_t len = 0;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &change)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &password, &len)) != 0 ||
+	    (change && (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+		freezero(password, len);
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+	}
+
+	if (change)
+		logit("password change not supported");
+	else if (PRIVSEP(auth_password(ssh, password)) == 1)
+		authenticated = 1;
+	freezero(password, len);
+	return authenticated;
+}
+
+Authmethod method_passwd = {
+	"password",
+	NULL,
+	userauth_passwd,
+	&options.password_authentication
+};
diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5d59feb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,815 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.117 2022/09/17 10:34:29 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */
+#include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */
+#include "sk-api.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static char *
+format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	char *ret, *fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
+	    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+
+	xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp);
+	free(fp);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL, *hostkey = NULL;
+	char *pkalg = NULL, *userstyle = NULL, *key_s = NULL, *ca_s = NULL;
+	u_char *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL, have_sig;
+	size_t blen, slen;
+	int hostbound, r, pktype;
+	int req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, authenticated = 0;
+	struct sshauthopt *authopts = NULL;
+	struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
+
+	hostbound = strcmp(method, "publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com") == 0;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &have_sig)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse %s packet", method);
+
+	/* hostbound auth includes the hostkey offered at initial KEX */
+	if (hostbound) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &b)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshkey_fromb(b, &hostkey)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse %s hostkey", method);
+		if (ssh->kex->initial_hostkey == NULL)
+			fatal_f("internal error: initial hostkey not recorded");
+		if (!sshkey_equal(hostkey, ssh->kex->initial_hostkey))
+			fatal_f("%s packet contained wrong host key", method);
+		sshbuf_free(b);
+		b = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2) {
+		char *keystring;
+		struct sshbuf *pkbuf;
+
+		if ((pkbuf = sshbuf_from(pkblob, blen)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("sshbuf_from failed");
+		if ((keystring = sshbuf_dtob64_string(pkbuf, 0)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("sshbuf_dtob64 failed");
+		debug2_f("%s user %s %s public key %s %s",
+		    authctxt->valid ? "valid" : "invalid", authctxt->user,
+		    have_sig ? "attempting" : "querying", pkalg, keystring);
+		sshbuf_free(pkbuf);
+		free(keystring);
+	}
+
+	pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
+	if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+		/* this is perfectly legal */
+		verbose_f("unsupported public key algorithm: %s", pkalg);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse key");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (key == NULL) {
+		error_f("cannot decode key: %s", pkalg);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (key->type != pktype) {
+		error_f("type mismatch for decoded key "
+		    "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
+	    (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
+		logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
+		    "signature scheme");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
+		logit("refusing previously-used %s key", sshkey_type(key));
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) != 1) {
+		logit_f("signature algorithm %s not in "
+		    "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms", pkalg);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key,
+	    options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) {
+		logit_fr(r, "certificate signature algorithm %s",
+		    (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ?
+		    "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key,
+	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+		logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key));
+		goto done;
+	}
+	key_s = format_key(key);
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(key))
+		ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key);
+
+	if (have_sig) {
+		debug3_f("%s have %s signature for %s%s%s",
+		    method, pkalg, key_s,
+		    ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ", ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse signature packet");
+		if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+		if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+			if ((r = sshbuf_putb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "put old session id");
+		} else {
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b,
+			    ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "put session id");
+		}
+		if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
+			debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
+			goto done;
+		}
+		/* reconstruct packet */
+		xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+		    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+		    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "reconstruct %s packet", method);
+		if (hostbound &&
+		    (r = sshkey_puts(ssh->kex->initial_hostkey, b)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "reconstruct %s packet", method);
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+		sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+#endif
+		/* test for correct signature */
+		authenticated = 0;
+		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
+		    PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
+		    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
+		    (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
+		    ssh->compat, &sig_details)) == 0) {
+			authenticated = 1;
+		}
+		if (authenticated == 1 && sig_details != NULL) {
+			auth2_record_info(authctxt, "signature count = %u",
+			    sig_details->sk_counter);
+			debug_f("sk_counter = %u, sk_flags = 0x%02x",
+			    sig_details->sk_counter, sig_details->sk_flags);
+			req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
+			    PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) ||
+			    !authopts->no_require_user_presence;
+			if (req_presence && (sig_details->sk_flags &
+			    SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) {
+				error("public key %s signature for %s%s from "
+				    "%.128s port %d rejected: user presence "
+				    "(authenticator touch) requirement "
+				    "not met ", key_s,
+				    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+				    authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+				    ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+				authenticated = 0;
+				goto done;
+			}
+			req_verify = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
+			    PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) ||
+			    authopts->require_verify;
+			if (req_verify && (sig_details->sk_flags &
+			    SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) == 0) {
+				error("public key %s signature for %s%s from "
+				    "%.128s port %d rejected: user "
+				    "verification requirement not met ", key_s,
+				    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+				    authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+				    ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+				authenticated = 0;
+				goto done;
+			}
+		}
+		auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
+	} else {
+		debug_f("%s test pkalg %s pkblob %s%s%s", method, pkalg, key_s,
+		    ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ", ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
+
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+
+		if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
+			debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
+			goto done;
+		}
+		/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
+		/*
+		 * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
+		 * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
+		 * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
+		 * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
+		 * issue? -markus
+		 */
+		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 0, NULL))) {
+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK))
+			    != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+			authctxt->postponed = 1;
+		}
+	}
+done:
+	if (authenticated == 1 && auth_activate_options(ssh, authopts) != 0) {
+		debug_f("key options inconsistent with existing");
+		authenticated = 0;
+	}
+	debug2_f("authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg);
+
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	sshauthopt_free(authopts);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	sshkey_free(hostkey);
+	free(userstyle);
+	free(pkalg);
+	free(pkblob);
+	free(key_s);
+	free(ca_s);
+	free(sig);
+	sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
+	return authenticated;
+}
+
+static int
+match_principals_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
+    struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	int success;
+
+	if (authoptsp != NULL)
+		*authoptsp = NULL;
+
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+	debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
+	if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
+		restore_uid();
+		return 0;
+	}
+	success = auth_process_principals(f, file, cert, authoptsp);
+	fclose(f);
+	restore_uid();
+	return success;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command.
+ * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw,
+    const struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+{
+	struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
+	const struct sshkey_cert *cert = key->cert;
+	FILE *f = NULL;
+	int r, ok, found_principal = 0;
+	int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0;
+	pid_t pid;
+	char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
+	char *ca_fp = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *catext = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
+	char serial_s[32], uidstr[32];
+	void (*osigchld)(int);
+
+	if (authoptsp != NULL)
+		*authoptsp = NULL;
+	if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) {
+		error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, "
+		    "skipping");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
+	 * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
+	 */
+	osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+
+	/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
+	username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user,
+	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+	runas_pw = getpwnam(username);
+	if (runas_pw == NULL) {
+		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
+		    username, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
+	if (argv_split(options.authorized_principals_command,
+	    &ac, &av, 0) != 0) {
+		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains "
+		    "invalid quotes", options.authorized_principals_command);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (ac == 0) {
+		error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
+		    options.authorized_principals_command);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key,
+	    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
+	    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(cert->signature_key, &catext)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_base64 failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_base64 failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	snprintf(serial_s, sizeof(serial_s), "%llu",
+	    (unsigned long long)cert->serial);
+	snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
+	    (unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid);
+	for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
+		tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
+		    "U", uidstr,
+		    "u", user_pw->pw_name,
+		    "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
+		    "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+		    "T", sshkey_ssh_name(cert->signature_key),
+		    "f", key_fp,
+		    "F", ca_fp,
+		    "k", keytext,
+		    "K", catext,
+		    "i", cert->key_id,
+		    "s", serial_s,
+		    (char *)NULL);
+		if (tmp == NULL)
+			fatal_f("percent_expand failed");
+		free(av[i]);
+		av[i] = tmp;
+	}
+	/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
+	command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
+
+	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
+	    ac, av, &f,
+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	uid_swapped = 1;
+	temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);
+
+	ok = auth_process_principals(f, "(command)", cert, authoptsp);
+
+	fclose(f);
+	f = NULL;
+
+	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command, 0) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Read completed successfully */
+	found_principal = ok;
+ out:
+	if (f != NULL)
+		fclose(f);
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+		free(av[i]);
+	free(av);
+	if (uid_swapped)
+		restore_uid();
+	free(command);
+	free(username);
+	free(ca_fp);
+	free(key_fp);
+	free(catext);
+	free(keytext);
+	return found_principal;
+}
+
+/* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
+static int
+user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
+    const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
+    struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+{
+	char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
+	const char *reason;
+	struct sshauthopt *principals_opts = NULL, *cert_opts = NULL;
+	struct sshauthopt *final_opts = NULL;
+	int r, ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals;
+
+	if (authoptsp != NULL)
+		*authoptsp = NULL;
+
+	if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+	    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
+	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0)) != 0) {
+		debug2_fr(r, "CA %s %s is not listed in %s",
+		    sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
+		    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate
+	 * principals against the names in that file rather than matching
+	 * against the username.
+	 */
+	if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
+		if (match_principals_file(pw, principals_file,
+		    key->cert, &principals_opts))
+			found_principal = 1;
+	}
+	/* Try querying command if specified */
+	if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key,
+	    &principals_opts))
+		found_principal = 1;
+	/* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */
+	use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL ||
+	    options.authorized_principals_command != NULL;
+	if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) {
+		reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
+		goto fail_reason;
+	}
+	if (use_authorized_principals && principals_opts == NULL)
+		fatal_f("internal error: missing principals_opts");
+	if (sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(key, 0, 1, 0,
+	    use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
+		goto fail_reason;
+
+	/* Check authority from options in key and from principals file/cmd */
+	if ((cert_opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) {
+		reason = "Invalid certificate options";
+		goto fail_reason;
+	}
+	if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, cert_opts, 0,
+	    remote_ip, remote_host, "cert") != 0) {
+		reason = "Refused by certificate options";
+		goto fail_reason;
+	}
+	if (principals_opts == NULL) {
+		final_opts = cert_opts;
+		cert_opts = NULL;
+	} else {
+		if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, principals_opts, 0,
+		    remote_ip, remote_host, "principals") != 0) {
+			reason = "Refused by certificate principals options";
+			goto fail_reason;
+		}
+		if ((final_opts = sshauthopt_merge(principals_opts,
+		    cert_opts, &reason)) == NULL) {
+ fail_reason:
+			error("%s", reason);
+			auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Success */
+	verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by "
+	    "%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
+	    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
+	    sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
+	    options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
+	if (authoptsp != NULL) {
+		*authoptsp = final_opts;
+		final_opts = NULL;
+	}
+	ret = 1;
+ out:
+	sshauthopt_free(principals_opts);
+	sshauthopt_free(cert_opts);
+	sshauthopt_free(final_opts);
+	free(principals_file);
+	free(ca_fp);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether key is allowed in file.
+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
+    char *file, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
+    struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	int found_key = 0;
+
+	if (authoptsp != NULL)
+		*authoptsp = NULL;
+
+	/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+	debug("trying public key file %s", file);
+	if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
+		found_key = auth_check_authkeys_file(pw, f, file,
+		    key, remote_ip, remote_host, authoptsp);
+		fclose(f);
+	}
+
+	restore_uid();
+	return found_key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey *key,
+    const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
+    struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+{
+	struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
+	FILE *f = NULL;
+	int r, ok, found_key = 0;
+	int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0;
+	pid_t pid;
+	char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
+	char uidstr[32], *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
+	void (*osigchld)(int);
+
+	if (authoptsp != NULL)
+		*authoptsp = NULL;
+	if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
+		error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
+	 * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
+	 */
+	osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+
+	/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
+	username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
+	    "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
+	runas_pw = getpwnam(username);
+	if (runas_pw == NULL) {
+		error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
+		    username, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */
+	if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_base64 failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
+	if (argv_split(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av, 0) != 0) {
+		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes",
+		    options.authorized_keys_command);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (ac == 0) {
+		error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
+		    options.authorized_keys_command);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
+	    (unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid);
+	for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
+		tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
+		    "U", uidstr,
+		    "u", user_pw->pw_name,
+		    "h", user_pw->pw_dir,
+		    "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+		    "f", key_fp,
+		    "k", keytext,
+		    (char *)NULL);
+		if (tmp == NULL)
+			fatal_f("percent_expand failed");
+		free(av[i]);
+		av[i] = tmp;
+	}
+	/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
+	command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
+
+	/*
+	 * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments
+	 * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the
+	 * target username as a single argument.
+	 */
+	if (ac == 1) {
+		av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av));
+		av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name);
+		av[2] = NULL;
+		/* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */
+		free(command);
+		xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
+	}
+
+	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command,
+	    ac, av, &f,
+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	uid_swapped = 1;
+	temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);
+
+	ok = auth_check_authkeys_file(user_pw, f,
+	    options.authorized_keys_command, key, remote_ip,
+	    remote_host, authoptsp);
+
+	fclose(f);
+	f = NULL;
+
+	if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command, 0) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Read completed successfully */
+	found_key = ok;
+ out:
+	if (f != NULL)
+		fclose(f);
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+		free(av[i]);
+	free(av);
+	if (uid_swapped)
+		restore_uid();
+	free(command);
+	free(username);
+	free(key_fp);
+	free(keytext);
+	return found_key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
+ */
+int
+user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
+    int auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+{
+	u_int success = 0, i;
+	char *file;
+	struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
+	const char *remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+	const char *remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh,
+	    options.use_dns);
+
+	if (authoptsp != NULL)
+		*authoptsp = NULL;
+
+	if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
+		return 0;
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
+	    auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
+		return 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
+		if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
+			continue;
+		file = expand_authorized_keys(
+		    options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
+		success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file,
+		    remote_ip, remote_host, &opts);
+		free(file);
+		if (!success) {
+			sshauthopt_free(opts);
+			opts = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	if (success)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key, remote_ip, remote_host,
+	    &opts)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	sshauthopt_free(opts);
+	opts = NULL;
+
+	if ((success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key, remote_ip,
+	    remote_host, &opts)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	sshauthopt_free(opts);
+	opts = NULL;
+
+ out:
+	if (success && authoptsp != NULL) {
+		*authoptsp = opts;
+		opts = NULL;
+	}
+	sshauthopt_free(opts);
+	return success;
+}
+
+Authmethod method_pubkey = {
+	"publickey",
+	"publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com",
+	userauth_pubkey,
+	&options.pubkey_authentication
+};
diff --git a/auth2-pubkeyfile.c b/auth2-pubkeyfile.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0cfacac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth2-pubkeyfile.c
@@ -0,0 +1,501 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkeyfile.c,v 1.3 2022/07/01 03:52:57 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+int
+auth_authorise_keyopts(struct passwd *pw, struct sshauthopt *opts,
+    int allow_cert_authority, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host,
+    const char *loc)
+{
+	time_t now = time(NULL);
+	char buf[64];
+
+	/*
+	 * Check keys/principals file expiry time.
+	 * NB. validity interval in certificate is handled elsewhere.
+	 */
+	if (opts->valid_before && now > 0 &&
+	    opts->valid_before < (uint64_t)now) {
+		format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		debug("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf);
+		auth_debug_add("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* Consistency checks */
+	if (opts->cert_principals != NULL && !opts->cert_authority) {
+		debug("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc);
+		auth_debug_add("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc);
+		/* deny access */
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* cert-authority flag isn't valid in authorized_principals files */
+	if (!allow_cert_authority && opts->cert_authority) {
+		debug("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc);
+		auth_debug_add("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc);
+		/* deny access */
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Perform from= checks */
+	if (opts->required_from_host_keys != NULL) {
+		switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip,
+		    opts->required_from_host_keys )) {
+		case 1:
+			/* Host name matches. */
+			break;
+		case -1:
+		default:
+			debug("%s: invalid from criteria", loc);
+			auth_debug_add("%s: invalid from criteria", loc);
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case 0:
+			logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with "
+			    "correct key but not from a permitted "
+			    "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s, required=%.200s).",
+			    loc, pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip,
+			    opts->required_from_host_keys);
+			auth_debug_add("%s: Your host '%.200s' is not "
+			    "permitted to use this key for login.",
+			    loc, remote_host);
+			/* deny access */
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	/* Check source-address restriction from certificate */
+	if (opts->required_from_host_cert != NULL) {
+		switch (addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip,
+		    opts->required_from_host_cert)) {
+		case 1:
+			/* accepted */
+			break;
+		case -1:
+		default:
+			/* invalid */
+			error("%s: Certificate source-address invalid", loc);
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case 0:
+			logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with valid "
+			    "certificate but not from a permitted source "
+			    "address (%.200s).", loc, pw->pw_name, remote_ip);
+			auth_debug_add("%s: Your address '%.200s' is not "
+			    "permitted to use this certificate for login.",
+			    loc, remote_ip);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	/*
+	 *
+	 * XXX this is spammy. We should report remotely only for keys
+	 *     that are successful in actual auth attempts, and not PK_OK
+	 *     tests.
+	 */
+	auth_log_authopts(loc, opts, 1);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+{
+	char *result;
+	u_int i;
+
+	/* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
+
+	for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+		if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
+		    principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
+			debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
+			    result);
+			free(result);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process a single authorized_principals format line. Returns 0 and sets
+ * authoptsp is principal is authorised, -1 otherwise. "loc" is used as a
+ * log preamble for file/line information.
+ */
+int
+auth_check_principals_line(char *cp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert,
+    const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+{
+	u_int i, found = 0;
+	char *ep, *line_opts;
+	const char *reason = NULL;
+	struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
+
+	if (authoptsp != NULL)
+		*authoptsp = NULL;
+
+	/* Trim trailing whitespace. */
+	ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
+	while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
+		*ep-- = '\0';
+
+	/*
+	 * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
+	 * key options.
+	 */
+	line_opts = NULL;
+	if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
+	    (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
+		for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
+			;
+		line_opts = cp;
+		cp = ep;
+	}
+	if ((opts = sshauthopt_parse(line_opts, &reason)) == NULL) {
+		debug("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
+		auth_debug_add("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* Check principals in cert against those on line */
+	for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) != 0)
+			continue;
+		debug3("%s: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
+		    loc, cert->principals[i]);
+		found = 1;
+	}
+	if (found && authoptsp != NULL) {
+		*authoptsp = opts;
+		opts = NULL;
+	}
+	sshauthopt_free(opts);
+	return found ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int
+auth_process_principals(FILE *f, const char *file,
+    const struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+{
+	char loc[256], *line = NULL, *cp, *ep;
+	size_t linesize = 0;
+	u_long linenum = 0, nonblank = 0;
+	u_int found_principal = 0;
+
+	if (authoptsp != NULL)
+		*authoptsp = NULL;
+
+	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+		linenum++;
+		/* Always consume entire input */
+		if (found_principal)
+			continue;
+
+		/* Skip leading whitespace. */
+		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+			;
+		/* Skip blank and comment lines. */
+		if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL)
+			*ep = '\0';
+		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
+			continue;
+
+		nonblank++;
+		snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
+		if (auth_check_principals_line(cp, cert, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
+			found_principal = 1;
+	}
+	debug2_f("%s: processed %lu/%lu lines", file, nonblank, linenum);
+	free(line);
+	return found_principal;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a single line of an authorized_keys-format file. Returns 0 if key
+ * matches, -1 otherwise. Will return key/cert options via *authoptsp
+ * on success. "loc" is used as file/line location in log messages.
+ */
+int
+auth_check_authkey_line(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
+    char *cp, const char *remote_ip, const char *remote_host, const char *loc,
+    struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+{
+	int want_keytype = sshkey_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type;
+	struct sshkey *found = NULL;
+	struct sshauthopt *keyopts = NULL, *certopts = NULL, *finalopts = NULL;
+	char *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
+	const char *reason = NULL;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	if (authoptsp != NULL)
+		*authoptsp = NULL;
+
+	if ((found = sshkey_new(want_keytype)) == NULL) {
+		debug3_f("keytype %d failed", want_keytype);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* XXX djm: peek at key type in line and skip if unwanted */
+
+	if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
+		/* no key?  check for options */
+		debug2("%s: check options: '%s'", loc, cp);
+		key_options = cp;
+		if (sshkey_advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) {
+			reason = "invalid key option string";
+			goto fail_reason;
+		}
+		skip_space(&cp);
+		if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
+			/* still no key?  advance to next line*/
+			debug2("%s: advance: '%s'", loc, cp);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	/* Parse key options now; we need to know if this is a CA key */
+	if ((keyopts = sshauthopt_parse(key_options, &reason)) == NULL) {
+		debug("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
+		auth_debug_add("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* Ignore keys that don't match or incorrectly marked as CAs */
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+		/* Certificate; check signature key against CA */
+		if (!sshkey_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key) ||
+		    !keyopts->cert_authority)
+			goto out;
+	} else {
+		/* Plain key: check it against key found in file */
+		if (!sshkey_equal(found, key) || keyopts->cert_authority)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* We have a candidate key, perform authorisation checks */
+	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
+	    SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
+
+	debug("%s: matching %s found: %s %s", loc,
+	    sshkey_is_cert(key) ? "CA" : "key", sshkey_type(found), fp);
+
+	if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, keyopts,
+	    sshkey_is_cert(key), remote_ip, remote_host, loc) != 0) {
+		reason = "Refused by key options";
+		goto fail_reason;
+	}
+	/* That's all we need for plain keys. */
+	if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+		verbose("Accepted key %s %s found at %s",
+		    sshkey_type(found), fp, loc);
+		finalopts = keyopts;
+		keyopts = NULL;
+		goto success;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Additional authorisation for certificates.
+	 */
+
+	/* Parse and check options present in certificate */
+	if ((certopts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) {
+		reason = "Invalid certificate options";
+		goto fail_reason;
+	}
+	if (auth_authorise_keyopts(pw, certopts, 0,
+	    remote_ip, remote_host, loc) != 0) {
+		reason = "Refused by certificate options";
+		goto fail_reason;
+	}
+	if ((finalopts = sshauthopt_merge(keyopts, certopts, &reason)) == NULL)
+		goto fail_reason;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the user has specified a list of principals as
+	 * a key option, then prefer that list to matching
+	 * their username in the certificate principals list.
+	 */
+	if (keyopts->cert_principals != NULL &&
+	    !match_principals_option(keyopts->cert_principals, key->cert)) {
+		reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
+		goto fail_reason;
+	}
+	if (sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(key, 0, 0, 0,
+	    keyopts->cert_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL,
+	    &reason) != 0)
+		goto fail_reason;
+
+	verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) "
+	    "signed by CA %s %s found at %s",
+	    key->cert->key_id,
+	    (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
+	    sshkey_type(found), fp, loc);
+
+ success:
+	if (finalopts == NULL)
+		fatal_f("internal error: missing options");
+	if (authoptsp != NULL) {
+		*authoptsp = finalopts;
+		finalopts = NULL;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	ret = 0;
+	goto out;
+
+ fail_reason:
+	error("%s", reason);
+	auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
+ out:
+	free(fp);
+	sshauthopt_free(keyopts);
+	sshauthopt_free(certopts);
+	sshauthopt_free(finalopts);
+	sshkey_free(found);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
+ * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int
+auth_check_authkeys_file(struct passwd *pw, FILE *f, char *file,
+    struct sshkey *key, const char *remote_ip,
+    const char *remote_host, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
+{
+	char *cp, *line = NULL, loc[256];
+	size_t linesize = 0;
+	int found_key = 0;
+	u_long linenum = 0, nonblank = 0;
+
+	if (authoptsp != NULL)
+		*authoptsp = NULL;
+
+	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+		linenum++;
+		/* Always consume entire file */
+		if (found_key)
+			continue;
+
+		/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
+		cp = line;
+		skip_space(&cp);
+		if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+			continue;
+
+		nonblank++;
+		snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
+		if (auth_check_authkey_line(pw, key, cp,
+		    remote_ip, remote_host, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
+			found_key = 1;
+	}
+	free(line);
+	debug2_f("%s: processed %lu/%lu lines", file, nonblank, linenum);
+	return found_key;
+}
+
+static FILE *
+auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
+    int log_missing, char *file_type)
+{
+	char line[1024];
+	struct stat st;
+	int fd;
+	FILE *f;
+
+	if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
+		if (errno != ENOENT) {
+			logit("Could not open user '%s' %s '%s': %s",
+			    pw->pw_name, file_type, file, strerror(errno));
+		} else if (log_missing) {
+			debug("Could not open user '%s' %s '%s': %s",
+			    pw->pw_name, file_type, file, strerror(errno));
+		}
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
+		close(fd);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+		logit("User '%s' %s '%s' is not a regular file",
+		    pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
+		close(fd);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	unset_nonblock(fd);
+	if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
+		close(fd);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (strict_modes &&
+	    safe_path_fd(fileno(f), file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
+		fclose(f);
+		logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
+		auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return f;
+}
+
+
+FILE *
+auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
+{
+	return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
+}
+
+FILE *
+auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
+{
+	return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
+	    "authorized principals");
+}
+
diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c06193
--- /dev/null
+++ b/auth2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,847 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.164 2022/02/23 11:18:13 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "stdlib.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+
+/* methods */
+
+extern Authmethod method_none;
+extern Authmethod method_pubkey;
+extern Authmethod method_passwd;
+extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+#endif
+
+Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+	&method_none,
+	&method_pubkey,
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	&method_gssapi,
+#endif
+	&method_passwd,
+	&method_kbdint,
+	&method_hostbased,
+	NULL
+};
+
+/* protocol */
+
+static int input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+
+/* helper */
+static Authmethod *authmethod_byname(const char *);
+static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *, const char *);
+static char *authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt);
+
+#define MATCH_NONE	0	/* method or submethod mismatch */
+#define MATCH_METHOD	1	/* method matches (no submethod specified) */
+#define MATCH_BOTH	2	/* method and submethod match */
+#define MATCH_PARTIAL	3	/* method matches, submethod can't be checked */
+static int list_starts_with(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+
+char *
+auth2_read_banner(void)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	char *banner = NULL;
+	size_t len, n;
+	int fd;
+
+	if ((fd = open(options.banner, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+		return (NULL);
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
+		close(fd);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	if (st.st_size <= 0 || st.st_size > 1*1024*1024) {
+		close(fd);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	len = (size_t)st.st_size;		/* truncate */
+	banner = xmalloc(len + 1);
+	n = atomicio(read, fd, banner, len);
+	close(fd);
+
+	if (n != len) {
+		free(banner);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	banner[n] = '\0';
+
+	return (banner);
+}
+
+static void
+userauth_send_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *msg)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, msg)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||	/* language, unused */
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+	debug("%s: sent", __func__);
+}
+
+static void
+userauth_banner(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	char *banner = NULL;
+
+	if (options.banner == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if ((banner = PRIVSEP(auth2_read_banner())) == NULL)
+		goto done;
+	userauth_send_banner(ssh, banner);
+
+done:
+	free(banner);
+}
+
+/*
+ * loop until authctxt->success == TRUE
+ */
+void
+do_authentication2(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+
+	ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request);
+	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success);
+	ssh->authctxt = NULL;
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static int
+input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	char *service = NULL;
+	int r, acceptit = 0;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &service, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_service_request: no authctxt");
+
+	if (strcmp(service, "ssh-userauth") == 0) {
+		if (!authctxt->success) {
+			acceptit = 1;
+			/* now we can handle user-auth requests */
+			ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST,
+			    &input_userauth_request);
+		}
+	}
+	/* XXX all other service requests are denied */
+
+	if (acceptit) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, service)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	} else {
+		debug("bad service request %s", service);
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "bad service request %s", service);
+	}
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(service);
+	return r;
+}
+
+#define MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 0.005
+static double
+user_specific_delay(const char *user)
+{
+	char b[512];
+	size_t len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512);
+	u_char *hash = xmalloc(len);
+	double delay;
+
+	(void)snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%llu%s",
+	    (unsigned long long)options.timing_secret, user);
+	if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, b, strlen(b), hash, len) != 0)
+		fatal_f("ssh_digest_memory");
+	/* 0-4.2 ms of delay */
+	delay = (double)PEEK_U32(hash) / 1000 / 1000 / 1000 / 1000;
+	freezero(hash, len);
+	debug3_f("user specific delay %0.3lfms", delay/1000);
+	return MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS + delay;
+}
+
+static void
+ensure_minimum_time_since(double start, double seconds)
+{
+	struct timespec ts;
+	double elapsed = monotime_double() - start, req = seconds, remain;
+
+	/* if we've already passed the requested time, scale up */
+	while ((remain = seconds - elapsed) < 0.0)
+		seconds *= 2;
+
+	ts.tv_sec = remain;
+	ts.tv_nsec = (remain - ts.tv_sec) * 1000000000;
+	debug3_f("elapsed %0.3lfms, delaying %0.3lfms (requested %0.3lfms)",
+	    elapsed*1000, remain*1000, req*1000);
+	nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static int
+input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	Authmethod *m = NULL;
+	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *style = NULL;
+	int r, authenticated = 0;
+	double tstart = monotime_double();
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_userauth_request: no authctxt");
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &user, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &service, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &method, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method);
+	debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures);
+
+	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
+		*style++ = 0;
+
+	if (authctxt->attempt >= 1024)
+		auth_maxtries_exceeded(ssh);
+	if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) {
+		/* setup auth context */
+		authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(ssh, user));
+		authctxt->user = xstrdup(user);
+		if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) {
+			authctxt->valid = 1;
+			debug2_f("setting up authctxt for %s", user);
+		} else {
+			authctxt->valid = 0;
+			/* Invalid user, fake password information */
+			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER));
+#endif
+		}
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+		if (options.use_pam)
+			PRIVSEP(start_pam(ssh));
+#endif
+		ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
+		    authctxt->valid ? "authenticating " : "invalid ", user);
+		setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown",
+		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
+		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
+		if (use_privsep)
+			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+		userauth_banner(ssh);
+		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
+			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
+			    "no authentication methods enabled");
+	} else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 ||
+	    strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) {
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Change of username or service "
+		    "not allowed: (%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)",
+		    authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service);
+	}
+	/* reset state */
+	auth2_challenge_stop(ssh);
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	/* XXX move to auth2_gssapi_stop() */
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL);
+#endif
+
+	auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt);
+	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+	authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0;
+
+	/* try to authenticate user */
+	m = authmethod_lookup(authctxt, method);
+	if (m != NULL && authctxt->failures < options.max_authtries) {
+		debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
+		authenticated =	m->userauth(ssh, method);
+	}
+	if (!authctxt->authenticated)
+		ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart,
+		    user_specific_delay(authctxt->user));
+	userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL);
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(service);
+	free(user);
+	free(method);
+	return r;
+}
+
+void
+userauth_finish(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, const char *packet_method,
+    const char *submethod)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	Authmethod *m = NULL;
+	const char *method = packet_method;
+	char *methods;
+	int r, partial = 0;
+
+	if (authenticated) {
+		if (!authctxt->valid) {
+			fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s",
+			    authctxt->user);
+		}
+		if (authctxt->postponed)
+			fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated and postponed");
+		/* prefer primary authmethod name to possible synonym */
+		if ((m = authmethod_byname(method)) == NULL)
+			fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: bad method %s", method);
+		method = m->name;
+	}
+
+	/* Special handling for root */
+	if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+	    !auth_root_allowed(ssh, method)) {
+		authenticated = 0;
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+		PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED));
+#endif
+	}
+
+	if (authenticated && options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
+		if (!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, method, submethod)) {
+			authenticated = 0;
+			partial = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Log before sending the reply */
+	auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial, method, submethod);
+
+	/* Update information exposed to session */
+	if (authenticated || partial)
+		auth2_update_session_info(authctxt, method, submethod);
+
+	if (authctxt->postponed)
+		return;
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
+		int r, success = PRIVSEP(do_pam_account());
+
+		/* If PAM returned a message, send it to the user. */
+		if (sshbuf_len(loginmsg) > 0) {
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, "\0", 1)) != 0)
+				fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+			userauth_send_banner(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(loginmsg));
+			if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) {
+				sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
+				    "%s: send PAM banner", __func__);
+			}
+		}
+		if (!success) {
+			fatal("Access denied for user %s by PAM account "
+			    "configuration", authctxt->user);
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (authenticated == 1) {
+		/* turn off userauth */
+		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST,
+		    &dispatch_protocol_ignore);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "send success packet");
+		/* now we can break out */
+		authctxt->success = 1;
+		ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
+	} else {
+		/* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */
+		if (!partial && !authctxt->server_caused_failure &&
+		    (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0))
+			authctxt->failures++;
+		if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+			PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES));
+#endif
+			auth_maxtries_exceeded(ssh);
+		}
+		methods = authmethods_get(authctxt);
+		debug3_f("failure partial=%d next methods=\"%s\"",
+		    partial, methods);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, methods)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, partial)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "send failure packet");
+		free(methods);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether method is allowed by at least one AuthenticationMethods
+ * methods list. Returns 1 if allowed, or no methods lists configured.
+ * 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int
+auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
+    const char *submethod)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * NB. authctxt->num_auth_methods might be zero as a result of
+	 * auth2_setup_methods_lists(), so check the configuration.
+	 */
+	if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
+		return 1;
+	for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
+		if (list_starts_with(authctxt->auth_methods[i], method,
+		    submethod) != MATCH_NONE)
+			return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static char *
+authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	char *list;
+	int i, r;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0)
+			continue;
+		if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
+		    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0)
+			continue;
+		if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name,
+		    NULL))
+			continue;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "",
+		    authmethods[i]->name)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+	}
+	if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return list;
+}
+
+static Authmethod *
+authmethod_byname(const char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (name == NULL)
+		fatal_f("NULL authentication method name");
+	for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0 ||
+		    (authmethods[i]->synonym != NULL &&
+		    strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->synonym) == 0))
+			return authmethods[i];
+	}
+	debug_f("unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static Authmethod *
+authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *name)
+{
+	Authmethod *method;
+
+	if ((method = authmethod_byname(name)) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (method->enabled == NULL || *(method->enabled) == 0) {
+		debug3_f("method %s not enabled", name);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, method->name, NULL)) {
+		debug3_f("method %s not allowed "
+		    "by AuthenticationMethods", name);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return method;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a comma-separated list of methods for validity. Is need_enable is
+ * non-zero, then also require that the methods are enabled.
+ * Returns 0 on success or -1 if the methods list is invalid.
+ */
+int
+auth2_methods_valid(const char *_methods, int need_enable)
+{
+	char *methods, *omethods, *method, *p;
+	u_int i, found;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	if (*_methods == '\0') {
+		error("empty authentication method list");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	omethods = methods = xstrdup(_methods);
+	while ((method = strsep(&methods, ",")) != NULL) {
+		for (found = i = 0; !found && authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) {
+			if ((p = strchr(method, ':')) != NULL)
+				*p = '\0';
+			if (strcmp(method, authmethods[i]->name) != 0)
+				continue;
+			if (need_enable) {
+				if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL ||
+				    *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) {
+					error("Disabled method \"%s\" in "
+					    "AuthenticationMethods list \"%s\"",
+					    method, _methods);
+					goto out;
+				}
+			}
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (!found) {
+			error("Unknown authentication method \"%s\" in list",
+			    method);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	free(omethods);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prune the AuthenticationMethods supplied in the configuration, removing
+ * any methods lists that include disabled methods. Note that this might
+ * leave authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0, even when multiple required auth
+ * has been requested. For this reason, all tests for whether multiple is
+ * enabled should consult options.num_auth_methods directly.
+ */
+int
+auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	/* First, normalise away the "any" pseudo-method */
+	if (options.num_auth_methods == 1 &&
+	    strcmp(options.auth_methods[0], "any") == 0) {
+		free(options.auth_methods[0]);
+		options.auth_methods[0] = NULL;
+		options.num_auth_methods = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (options.num_auth_methods == 0)
+		return 0;
+	debug3_f("checking methods");
+	authctxt->auth_methods = xcalloc(options.num_auth_methods,
+	    sizeof(*authctxt->auth_methods));
+	authctxt->num_auth_methods = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) {
+		if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], 1) != 0) {
+			logit("Authentication methods list \"%s\" contains "
+			    "disabled method, skipping",
+			    options.auth_methods[i]);
+			continue;
+		}
+		debug("authentication methods list %d: %s",
+		    authctxt->num_auth_methods, options.auth_methods[i]);
+		authctxt->auth_methods[authctxt->num_auth_methods++] =
+		    xstrdup(options.auth_methods[i]);
+	}
+	if (authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0) {
+		error("No AuthenticationMethods left after eliminating "
+		    "disabled methods");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+list_starts_with(const char *methods, const char *method,
+    const char *submethod)
+{
+	size_t l = strlen(method);
+	int match;
+	const char *p;
+
+	if (strncmp(methods, method, l) != 0)
+		return MATCH_NONE;
+	p = methods + l;
+	match = MATCH_METHOD;
+	if (*p == ':') {
+		if (!submethod)
+			return MATCH_PARTIAL;
+		l = strlen(submethod);
+		p += 1;
+		if (strncmp(submethod, p, l))
+			return MATCH_NONE;
+		p += l;
+		match = MATCH_BOTH;
+	}
+	if (*p != ',' && *p != '\0')
+		return MATCH_NONE;
+	return match;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Remove method from the start of a comma-separated list of methods.
+ * Returns 0 if the list of methods did not start with that method or 1
+ * if it did.
+ */
+static int
+remove_method(char **methods, const char *method, const char *submethod)
+{
+	char *omethods = *methods, *p;
+	size_t l = strlen(method);
+	int match;
+
+	match = list_starts_with(omethods, method, submethod);
+	if (match != MATCH_METHOD && match != MATCH_BOTH)
+		return 0;
+	p = omethods + l;
+	if (submethod && match == MATCH_BOTH)
+		p += 1 + strlen(submethod); /* include colon */
+	if (*p == ',')
+		p++;
+	*methods = xstrdup(p);
+	free(omethods);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called after successful authentication. Will remove the successful method
+ * from the start of each list in which it occurs. If it was the last method
+ * in any list, then authentication is deemed successful.
+ * Returns 1 if the method completed any authentication list or 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int
+auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
+    const char *submethod)
+{
+	u_int i, found = 0;
+
+	debug3_f("updating methods list after \"%s\"", method);
+	for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) {
+		if (!remove_method(&(authctxt->auth_methods[i]), method,
+		    submethod))
+			continue;
+		found = 1;
+		if (*authctxt->auth_methods[i] == '\0') {
+			debug2("authentication methods list %d complete", i);
+			return 1;
+		}
+		debug3("authentication methods list %d remaining: \"%s\"",
+		    i, authctxt->auth_methods[i]);
+	}
+	/* This should not happen, but would be bad if it did */
+	if (!found)
+		fatal_f("method not in AuthenticationMethods");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Reset method-specific information */
+void auth2_authctxt_reset_info(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	sshkey_free(authctxt->auth_method_key);
+	free(authctxt->auth_method_info);
+	authctxt->auth_method_key = NULL;
+	authctxt->auth_method_info = NULL;
+}
+
+/* Record auth method-specific information for logs */
+void
+auth2_record_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+	int i;
+
+	free(authctxt->auth_method_info);
+	authctxt->auth_method_info = NULL;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	i = vasprintf(&authctxt->auth_method_info, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+
+	if (i == -1)
+		fatal_f("vasprintf failed");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Records a public key used in authentication. This is used for logging
+ * and to ensure that the same key is not subsequently accepted again for
+ * multiple authentication.
+ */
+void
+auth2_record_key(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated,
+    const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	struct sshkey **tmp, *dup;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &dup)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "copy key");
+	sshkey_free(authctxt->auth_method_key);
+	authctxt->auth_method_key = dup;
+
+	if (!authenticated)
+		return;
+
+	/* If authenticated, make sure we don't accept this key again */
+	if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &dup)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "copy key");
+	if (authctxt->nprev_keys >= INT_MAX ||
+	    (tmp = recallocarray(authctxt->prev_keys, authctxt->nprev_keys,
+	    authctxt->nprev_keys + 1, sizeof(*authctxt->prev_keys))) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("reallocarray failed");
+	authctxt->prev_keys = tmp;
+	authctxt->prev_keys[authctxt->nprev_keys] = dup;
+	authctxt->nprev_keys++;
+
+}
+
+/* Checks whether a key has already been previously used for authentication */
+int
+auth2_key_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	char *fp;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_keys; i++) {
+		if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_keys[i])) {
+			fp = sshkey_fingerprint(authctxt->prev_keys[i],
+			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+			debug3_f("key already used: %s %s",
+			    sshkey_type(authctxt->prev_keys[i]),
+			    fp == NULL ? "UNKNOWN" : fp);
+			free(fp);
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Updates authctxt->session_info with details of authentication. Should be
+ * whenever an authentication method succeeds.
+ */
+void
+auth2_update_session_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method,
+    const char *submethod)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (authctxt->session_info == NULL) {
+		if ((authctxt->session_info = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	}
+
+	/* Append method[/submethod] */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(authctxt->session_info, "%s%s%s",
+	    method, submethod == NULL ? "" : "/",
+	    submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "append method");
+
+	/* Append key if present */
+	if (authctxt->auth_method_key != NULL) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, ' ')) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshkey_format_text(authctxt->auth_method_key,
+		    authctxt->session_info)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "append key");
+	}
+
+	if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL) {
+		/* Ensure no ambiguity here */
+		if (strchr(authctxt->auth_method_info, '\n') != NULL)
+			fatal_f("auth_method_info contains \\n");
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, ' ')) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_putf(authctxt->session_info, "%s",
+		    authctxt->auth_method_info)) != 0) {
+			fatal_fr(r, "append method info");
+		}
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(authctxt->session_info, '\n')) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "append");
+}
+
diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b633e35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/authfd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,755 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.130 2022/04/27 11:08:55 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 implementation,
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+#define MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES	2048		/* Max keys in agent reply */
+#define MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN	(256 * 1024)	/* Max bytes in agent reply */
+
+/* macro to check for "agent failure" message */
+#define agent_failed(x) \
+    ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || \
+    (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
+    (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
+
+/* Convert success/failure response from agent to a err.h status */
+static int
+decode_reply(u_char type)
+{
+	if (agent_failed(type))
+		return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+	else if (type == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS)
+		return 0;
+	else
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Opens an authentication socket at the provided path and stores the file
+ * descriptor in fdp. Returns 0 on success and an error on failure.
+ */
+int
+ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(const char *authsocket, int *fdp)
+{
+	int sock, oerrno;
+	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+
+	debug3_f("path '%s'", authsocket);
+	memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
+	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
+
+	if ((sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+
+	/* close on exec */
+	if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1 ||
+	    connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) == -1) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		close(sock);
+		errno = oerrno;
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	}
+	if (fdp != NULL)
+		*fdp = sock;
+	else
+		close(sock);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Opens the default authentication socket and stores the file descriptor in
+ * fdp. Returns 0 on success and an error on failure.
+ */
+int
+ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp)
+{
+	const char *authsocket;
+
+	if (fdp != NULL)
+		*fdp = -1;
+
+	authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+	if (authsocket == NULL || *authsocket == '\0')
+		return SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT;
+
+	return ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(authsocket, fdp);
+}
+
+/* Communicate with agent: send request and read reply */
+static int
+ssh_request_reply(int sock, struct sshbuf *request, struct sshbuf *reply)
+{
+	int r;
+	size_t l, len;
+	char buf[1024];
+
+	/* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
+	len = sshbuf_len(request);
+	POKE_U32(buf, len);
+
+	/* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, 4) != 4 ||
+	    atomicio(vwrite, sock, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(request),
+	    sshbuf_len(request)) != sshbuf_len(request))
+		return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
+	/*
+	 * Wait for response from the agent.  First read the length of the
+	 * response packet.
+	 */
+	if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, 4) != 4)
+	    return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
+
+	/* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
+	len = PEEK_U32(buf);
+	if (len > MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+
+	/* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */
+	sshbuf_reset(reply);
+	while (len > 0) {
+		l = len;
+		if (l > sizeof(buf))
+			l = sizeof(buf);
+		if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, l) != l)
+			return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put(reply, buf, l)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		len -= l;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Communicate with agent: sent request, read and decode status reply */
+static int
+ssh_request_reply_decode(int sock, struct sshbuf *request)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *reply;
+	int r;
+	u_char type;
+
+	if ((reply = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, request, reply)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(reply, &type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = decode_reply(type)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(reply);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was
+ * obtained).  The argument must have been returned by
+ * ssh_get_authentication_socket().
+ */
+void
+ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock)
+{
+	if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
+		close(sock);
+}
+
+/* Lock/unlock agent */
+int
+ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password)
+{
+	int r;
+	u_char type = lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK;
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, password)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = ssh_request_reply_decode(sock, msg)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	return r;
+}
+
+
+static int
+deserialise_identity2(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+	int r;
+	char *comment = NULL;
+	const u_char *blob;
+	size_t blen;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(ids, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, keyp)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (commentp != NULL) {
+		*commentp = comment;
+		comment = NULL;
+	}
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(comment);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Fetch list of identities held by the agent.
+ */
+int
+ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp)
+{
+	u_char type;
+	u_int32_t num, i;
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	struct ssh_identitylist *idl = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	/*
+	 * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the
+	 * identities it can represent.
+	 */
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (agent_failed(type)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+		goto out;
+	} else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &num)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (num > MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (num == 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Deserialise the response into a list of keys/comments */
+	if ((idl = calloc(1, sizeof(*idl))) == NULL ||
+	    (idl->keys = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->keys))) == NULL ||
+	    (idl->comments = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->comments))) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < num;) {
+		if ((r = deserialise_identity2(msg, &(idl->keys[i]),
+		    &(idl->comments[i]))) != 0) {
+			if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
+				/* Gracefully skip unknown key types */
+				num--;
+				continue;
+			} else
+				goto out;
+		}
+		i++;
+	}
+	idl->nkeys = num;
+	*idlp = idl;
+	idl = NULL;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	if (idl != NULL)
+		ssh_free_identitylist(idl);
+	return r;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (idl == NULL)
+		return;
+	for (i = 0; i < idl->nkeys; i++) {
+		if (idl->keys != NULL)
+			sshkey_free(idl->keys[i]);
+		if (idl->comments != NULL)
+			free(idl->comments[i]);
+	}
+	free(idl->keys);
+	free(idl->comments);
+	free(idl);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if the ssh agent has a given key.
+ * Returns 0 if found, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int
+ssh_agent_has_key(int sock, const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	int r, ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+	size_t i;
+	struct ssh_identitylist *idlist = NULL;
+
+	if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(sock, &idlist)) != 0) {
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) {
+		if (sshkey_equal_public(idlist->keys[i], key)) {
+			ret = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sends a challenge (typically from a server via ssh(1)) to the agent,
+ * and waits for a response from the agent.
+ * Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the correct answer, zero
+ * otherwise.
+ */
+
+
+/* encode signature algorithm in flag bits, so we can keep the msg format */
+static u_int
+agent_encode_alg(const struct sshkey *key, const char *alg)
+{
+	if (alg != NULL && sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
+		if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0 ||
+		    strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0)
+			return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256;
+		if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0 ||
+		    strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0)
+			return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* ask agent to sign data, returns err.h code on error, 0 on success */
+int
+ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key,
+    u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_char *sig = NULL, type = 0;
+	size_t len = 0;
+	u_int flags = 0;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	*sigp = NULL;
+	*lenp = 0;
+
+	if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	flags |= agent_encode_alg(key, alg);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_puts(key, msg)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, flags)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (agent_failed(type)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+		goto out;
+	} else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &sig, &len)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* Check what we actually got back from the agent. */
+	if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(sig, len, alg)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	*sigp = sig;
+	*lenp = len;
+	sig = NULL;
+	len = 0;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	freezero(sig, len);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
+
+static int
+encode_dest_constraint_hop(struct sshbuf *m,
+    const struct dest_constraint_hop *dch)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	u_int i;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, dch->user)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, dch->hostname)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0)) != 0) /* reserved */
+		goto out;
+	for (i = 0; i < dch->nkeys; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_puts(dch->keys[i], b)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, dch->key_is_ca[i] != 0)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+encode_dest_constraint(struct sshbuf *m, const struct dest_constraint *dc)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = encode_dest_constraint_hop(b, &dc->from) != 0) ||
+	    (r = encode_dest_constraint_hop(b, &dc->to) != 0) ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0)) != 0) /* reserved */
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+encode_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign,
+    const char *provider, struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints,
+    size_t ndest_constraints)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (life != 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, life)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (confirm != 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (maxsign != 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, maxsign)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (provider != NULL) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m,
+		    SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
+		    "sk-provider@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, provider)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (dest_constraints != NULL && ndest_constraints > 0) {
+		if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < ndest_constraints; i++) {
+			if ((r = encode_dest_constraint(b,
+			    dest_constraints[i])) != 0)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m,
+		    SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
+		    "restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Adds an identity to the authentication server.
+ * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
+ */
+int
+ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
+    const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign,
+    const char *provider, struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints,
+    size_t ndest_constraints)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r, constrained = (life || confirm || maxsign ||
+	    provider || dest_constraints);
+	u_char type;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+	switch (key->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	case KEY_RSA:
+	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+	case KEY_DSA:
+	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+	case KEY_ECDSA:
+	case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+	case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+	case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+#endif
+	case KEY_ED25519:
+	case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+	case KEY_XMSS:
+	case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
+		type = constrained ?
+		    SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
+		    SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(key, msg, maxsign,
+		    0)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, comment)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		break;
+	default:
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (constrained &&
+	    (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, maxsign,
+	    provider, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = ssh_request_reply_decode(sock, msg)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Removes an identity from the authentication server.
+ * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
+ */
+int
+ssh_remove_identity(int sock, const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r;
+	u_char *blob = NULL;
+	size_t blen;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+	if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg,
+		    SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	} else {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = ssh_request_reply_decode(sock, msg)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if (blob != NULL)
+		freezero(blob, blen);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add/remove an token-based identity from the authentication server.
+ * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
+ */
+int
+ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin,
+    u_int life, u_int confirm,
+    struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r, constrained = (life || confirm);
+	u_char type;
+
+	if (add) {
+		type = constrained ?
+		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED :
+		    SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY;
+	} else
+		type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, reader_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (constrained &&
+	    (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, 0, NULL,
+	    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = ssh_request_reply_decode(sock, msg)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Removes all identities from the agent.
+ * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
+ *
+ * This supports the SSH protocol 1 message to because, when clearing all
+ * keys from an agent, we generally want to clear both protocol v1 and v2
+ * keys.
+ */
+int
+ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_char type = (version == 1) ?
+	    SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES :
+	    SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = ssh_request_reply_decode(sock, msg)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Binds a session ID to a hostkey via the initial KEX signature. */
+int
+ssh_agent_bind_hostkey(int sock, const struct sshkey *key,
+    const struct sshbuf *session_id, const struct sshbuf *signature,
+    int forwarding)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r;
+
+	if (key == NULL || session_id == NULL || signature == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "session-bind@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_puts(key, msg)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(msg, session_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(msg, signature)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, forwarding ? 1 : 0)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = ssh_request_reply_decode(sock, msg)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/authfd.h b/authfd.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a1c0dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/authfd.h
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.51 2021/12/19 22:10:24 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Functions to interface with the SSH_AUTHENTICATION_FD socket.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef AUTHFD_H
+#define AUTHFD_H
+
+struct sshbuf;
+struct sshkey;
+
+/* List of identities returned by ssh_fetch_identitylist() */
+struct ssh_identitylist {
+	size_t nkeys;
+	struct sshkey **keys;
+	char **comments;
+};
+
+/* Key destination restrictions */
+struct dest_constraint_hop {
+	char *user;	/* wildcards allowed */
+	char *hostname; /* used to matching cert principals and for display */
+	int is_ca;
+	u_int nkeys;	/* number of entries in *both* 'keys' and 'key_is_ca' */
+	struct sshkey **keys;
+	int *key_is_ca;
+};
+struct dest_constraint {
+	struct dest_constraint_hop from;
+	struct dest_constraint_hop to;
+};
+
+int	ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp);
+int	ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(const char *authsocket, int *fdp);
+void	ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock);
+
+int	ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password);
+int	ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp);
+void	ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl);
+int	ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
+    const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign,
+    const char *provider, struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints,
+    size_t ndest_constraints);
+int	ssh_agent_has_key(int sock, const struct sshkey *key);
+int	ssh_remove_identity(int sock, const struct sshkey *key);
+int	ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id,
+	    const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm,
+	    struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints,
+	    size_t ndest_constraints);
+int	ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version);
+
+int	ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key,
+	    u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+	    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat);
+
+int	ssh_agent_bind_hostkey(int sock, const struct sshkey *key,
+    const struct sshbuf *session_id, const struct sshbuf *signature,
+    int forwarding);
+
+/* Messages for the authentication agent connection. */
+#define SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES	1
+#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER		2
+#define SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE		3
+#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE			4
+#define SSH_AGENT_FAILURE			5
+#define SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS			6
+#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY		7
+#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY		8
+#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES	9
+
+/* private OpenSSH extensions for SSH2 */
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES		11
+#define SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER		12
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST		13
+#define SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE		14
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY		17
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY		18
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES	19
+
+/* smartcard */
+#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY		20
+#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY		21
+
+/* lock/unlock the agent */
+#define SSH_AGENTC_LOCK				22
+#define SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK			23
+
+/* add key with constraints */
+#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED	24
+#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED		25
+#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26
+
+/* generic extension mechanism */
+#define SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION			27
+
+#define	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME		1
+#define	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM		2
+#define	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN		3
+#define	SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION		255
+
+/* extended failure messages */
+#define SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE			30
+
+/* additional error code for ssh.com's ssh-agent2 */
+#define SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE			102
+
+#define	SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE			0x01
+#define	SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256			0x02
+#define	SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512			0x04
+
+#endif				/* AUTHFD_H */
diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ed4f4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/authfile.c
@@ -0,0 +1,526 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.143 2022/06/21 14:52:13 tobhe Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "krl.h"
+
+#define MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE	(1024 * 1024)
+
+/* Save a key blob to a file */
+static int
+sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename)
+{
+	int r;
+	mode_t omask;
+
+	omask = umask(077);
+	r = sshbuf_write_file(filename, keybuf);
+	umask(omask);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
+    const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
+    int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment,
+	    format, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(keyblob);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* XXX remove error() calls from here? */
+int
+sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1)
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	/*
+	 * if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the
+	 * permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user,
+	 * then we don't care.
+	 */
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	if (check_ntsec(filename))
+#endif
+	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
+		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");
+		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+		error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.",
+		    (u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename);
+		error("It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.");
+		error("This private key will be ignored.");
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+    struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+	int fd, r;
+
+	if (keyp != NULL)
+		*keyp = NULL;
+	if (commentp != NULL)
+		*commentp = NULL;
+
+	if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+
+	r = sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename);
+	if (r != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp);
+	if (r == 0 && keyp && *keyp)
+		r = sshkey_set_filename(*keyp, filename);
+ out:
+	close(fd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+    struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+	return sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, passphrase,
+	    keyp, commentp);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
+    struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (keyp != NULL)
+		*keyp = NULL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &buffer)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, type,
+	    passphrase, keyp, commentp)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(buffer);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Load a pubkey from the unencrypted envelope of a new-format private key */
+static int
+sshkey_load_pubkey_from_private(const char *filename, struct sshkey **pubkeyp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
+	int r, fd;
+
+	if (pubkeyp != NULL)
+		*pubkeyp = NULL;
+
+	if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &buffer)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(buffer,
+	    KEY_UNSPEC, &pubkey)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = sshkey_set_filename(pubkey, filename)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	if (pubkeyp != NULL) {
+		*pubkeyp = pubkey;
+		pubkey = NULL;
+	}
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	close(fd);
+	sshbuf_free(buffer);
+	sshkey_free(pubkey);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_try_load_public(struct sshkey **kp, const char *filename,
+    char **commentp)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	char *line = NULL, *cp;
+	size_t linesize = 0;
+	int r;
+	struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+
+	*kp = NULL;
+	if (commentp != NULL)
+		*commentp = NULL;
+	if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	if ((k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+		fclose(f);
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+		cp = line;
+		switch (*cp) {
+		case '#':
+		case '\n':
+		case '\0':
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Abort loading if this looks like a private key */
+		if (strncmp(cp, "-----BEGIN", 10) == 0 ||
+		    strcmp(cp, "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE") == 0)
+			break;
+		/* Skip leading whitespace. */
+		for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
+			;
+		if (*cp) {
+			if ((r = sshkey_read(k, &cp)) == 0) {
+				cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0';
+				if (commentp) {
+					*commentp = strdup(*cp ?
+					    cp : filename);
+					if (*commentp == NULL)
+						r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+				}
+				/* success */
+				*kp = k;
+				free(line);
+				fclose(f);
+				return r;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	free(k);
+	free(line);
+	fclose(f);
+	return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+}
+
+/* load public key from any pubkey file */
+int
+sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+	char *pubfile = NULL;
+	int r, oerrno;
+
+	if (keyp != NULL)
+		*keyp = NULL;
+	if (commentp != NULL)
+		*commentp = NULL;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(keyp, filename, commentp)) == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* try .pub suffix */
+	if (asprintf(&pubfile, "%s.pub", filename) == -1)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(keyp, pubfile, commentp)) == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* finally, try to extract public key from private key file */
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_pubkey_from_private(filename, keyp)) == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Pretend we couldn't find the key */
+	r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	errno = ENOENT;
+
+ out:
+	oerrno = errno;
+	free(pubfile);
+	errno = oerrno;
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Load the certificate associated with the named private key */
+int
+sshkey_load_cert(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+	struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
+	char *file = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (keyp != NULL)
+		*keyp = NULL;
+
+	if (asprintf(&file, "%s-cert.pub", filename) == -1)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+	r = sshkey_try_load_public(keyp, file, NULL);
+	free(file);
+	sshkey_free(pub);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Load private key and certificate */
+int
+sshkey_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
+    struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL, *cert = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (keyp != NULL)
+		*keyp = NULL;
+
+	switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	case KEY_RSA:
+	case KEY_DSA:
+	case KEY_ECDSA:
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	case KEY_ED25519:
+	case KEY_XMSS:
+	case KEY_UNSPEC:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(type, filename,
+	    passphrase, &key, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_load_cert(filename, &cert)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Make sure the private key matches the certificate */
+	if (sshkey_equal_public(key, cert) == 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(key)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, key)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	r = 0;
+	if (keyp != NULL) {
+		*keyp = key;
+		key = NULL;
+	}
+ out:
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	sshkey_free(cert);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns success if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename",
+ * SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: if the key is not listed or another error.
+ * If "strict_type" is set then the key type must match exactly,
+ * otherwise a comparison that ignores certificate data is performed.
+ * If "check_ca" is set and "key" is a certificate, then its CA key is
+ * also checked and sshkey_in_file() will return success if either is found.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type,
+    int check_ca)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	char *line = NULL, *cp;
+	size_t linesize = 0;
+	int r = 0;
+	struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
+
+	int (*sshkey_compare)(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *) =
+	    strict_type ?  sshkey_equal : sshkey_equal_public;
+
+	if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+
+	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+		sshkey_free(pub);
+		pub = NULL;
+		cp = line;
+
+		/* Skip leading whitespace. */
+		for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
+			;
+
+		/* Skip comments and empty lines */
+		switch (*cp) {
+		case '#':
+		case '\n':
+		case '\0':
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		switch (r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) {
+		case 0:
+			break;
+		case SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH:
+			continue;
+		default:
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (sshkey_compare(key, pub) ||
+		    (check_ca && sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
+		    sshkey_compare(key->cert->signature_key, pub))) {
+			r = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+ out:
+	free(line);
+	sshkey_free(pub);
+	fclose(f);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether the specified key is revoked, returning 0 if not,
+ * SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED if it is or another error code if something
+ * unexpected happened.
+ * This will check both the key and, if it is a certificate, its CA key too.
+ * "revoked_keys_file" may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	r = ssh_krl_file_contains_key(revoked_keys_file, key);
+	/* If this was not a KRL to begin with then continue below */
+	if (r != SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC)
+		return r;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the file is not a KRL or we can't handle KRLs then attempt to
+	 * parse the file as a flat list of keys.
+	 */
+	switch ((r = sshkey_in_file(key, revoked_keys_file, 0, 1))) {
+	case 0:
+		/* Key found => revoked */
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND:
+		/* Key not found => not revoked */
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		/* Some other error occurred */
+		return r;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Advanced *cpp past the end of key options, defined as the first unquoted
+ * whitespace character. Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure (e.g.
+ * unterminated quotes).
+ */
+int
+sshkey_advance_past_options(char **cpp)
+{
+	char *cp = *cpp;
+	int quoted = 0;
+
+	for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+		if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+			cp++;	/* Skip both */
+		else if (*cp == '"')
+			quoted = !quoted;
+	}
+	*cpp = cp;
+	/* return failure for unterminated quotes */
+	return (*cp == '\0' && quoted) ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+/* Save a public key */
+int
+sshkey_save_public(const struct sshkey *key, const char *path,
+    const char *comment)
+{
+	int fd, oerrno;
+	FILE *f = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if ((fd = open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		close(fd);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) != 0)
+		goto fail;
+	fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
+	if (ferror(f)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (fclose(f) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		f = NULL;
+ fail:
+		if (f != NULL) {
+			oerrno = errno;
+			fclose(f);
+			errno = oerrno;
+		}
+		return r;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/authfile.h b/authfile.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1db067a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/authfile.h
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.25 2020/01/25 23:02:13 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef AUTHFILE_H
+#define AUTHFILE_H
+
+struct sshbuf;
+struct sshkey;
+
+/* XXX document these */
+/* XXX some of these could probably be merged/retired */
+
+int sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *, const char *,
+    const char *, const char *, int, const char *, int);
+int sshkey_load_cert(const char *, struct sshkey **);
+int sshkey_load_public(const char *, struct sshkey **, char **);
+int sshkey_load_private(const char *, const char *, struct sshkey **, char **);
+int sshkey_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *,
+    struct sshkey **);
+int sshkey_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *,
+    struct sshkey **, char **);
+int sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
+    struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
+int sshkey_perm_ok(int, const char *);
+int sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *, const char *, int, int);
+int sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file);
+int sshkey_advance_past_options(char **cpp);
+int sshkey_save_public(const struct sshkey *key, const char *path,
+    const char *comment);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/bitmap.c b/bitmap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5ecfe68
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,214 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: bitmap.c,v 1.9 2017/10/20 01:56:39 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "bitmap.h"
+
+#define BITMAP_WTYPE	u_int
+#define BITMAP_MAX	(1<<24)
+#define BITMAP_BYTES	(sizeof(BITMAP_WTYPE))
+#define BITMAP_BITS	(sizeof(BITMAP_WTYPE) * 8)
+#define BITMAP_WMASK	((BITMAP_WTYPE)BITMAP_BITS - 1)
+struct bitmap {
+	BITMAP_WTYPE *d;
+	size_t len; /* number of words allocated */
+	size_t top; /* index of top word allocated */
+};
+
+struct bitmap *
+bitmap_new(void)
+{
+	struct bitmap *ret;
+
+	if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	if ((ret->d = calloc(1, BITMAP_BYTES)) == NULL) {
+		free(ret);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	ret->len = 1;
+	ret->top = 0;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+bitmap_free(struct bitmap *b)
+{
+	if (b != NULL && b->d != NULL) {
+		bitmap_zero(b);
+		free(b->d);
+		b->d = NULL;
+	}
+	free(b);
+}
+
+void
+bitmap_zero(struct bitmap *b)
+{
+	memset(b->d, 0, b->len * BITMAP_BYTES);
+	b->top = 0;
+}
+
+int
+bitmap_test_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n)
+{
+	if (b->top >= b->len)
+		return 0; /* invalid */
+	if (b->len == 0 || (n / BITMAP_BITS) > b->top)
+		return 0;
+	return (b->d[n / BITMAP_BITS] >> (n & BITMAP_WMASK)) & 1;
+}
+
+static int
+reserve(struct bitmap *b, u_int n)
+{
+	BITMAP_WTYPE *tmp;
+	size_t nlen;
+
+	if (b->top >= b->len || n > BITMAP_MAX)
+		return -1; /* invalid */
+	nlen = (n / BITMAP_BITS) + 1;
+	if (b->len < nlen) {
+		if ((tmp = recallocarray(b->d, b->len,
+		    nlen, BITMAP_BYTES)) == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		b->d = tmp;
+		b->len = nlen;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+bitmap_set_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n)
+{
+	int r;
+	size_t offset;
+
+	if ((r = reserve(b, n)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	offset = n / BITMAP_BITS;
+	if (offset > b->top)
+		b->top = offset;
+	b->d[offset] |= (BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (n & BITMAP_WMASK);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Resets b->top to point to the most significant bit set in b->d */
+static void
+retop(struct bitmap *b)
+{
+	if (b->top >= b->len)
+		return;
+	while (b->top > 0 && b->d[b->top] == 0)
+		b->top--;
+}
+
+void
+bitmap_clear_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n)
+{
+	size_t offset;
+
+	if (b->top >= b->len || n > BITMAP_MAX)
+		return; /* invalid */
+	offset = n / BITMAP_BITS;
+	if (offset > b->top)
+		return;
+	b->d[offset] &= ~((BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (n & BITMAP_WMASK));
+	/* The top may have changed as a result of the clear */
+	retop(b);
+}
+
+size_t
+bitmap_nbits(struct bitmap *b)
+{
+	size_t bits;
+	BITMAP_WTYPE w;
+
+	retop(b);
+	if (b->top >= b->len)
+		return 0; /* invalid */
+	if (b->len == 0 || (b->top == 0 && b->d[0] == 0))
+		return 0;
+	/* Find MSB set */
+	w = b->d[b->top];
+	bits = (b->top + 1) * BITMAP_BITS;
+	while (!(w & ((BITMAP_WTYPE)1 << (BITMAP_BITS - 1)))) {
+		w <<= 1;
+		bits--;
+	}
+	return bits;
+}
+
+size_t
+bitmap_nbytes(struct bitmap *b)
+{
+	return (bitmap_nbits(b) + 7) / 8;
+}
+
+int
+bitmap_to_string(struct bitmap *b, void *p, size_t l)
+{
+	u_char *s = (u_char *)p;
+	size_t i, j, k, need = bitmap_nbytes(b);
+
+	if (l < need || b->top >= b->len)
+		return -1;
+	if (l > need)
+		l = need;
+	/* Put the bytes from LSB backwards */
+	for (i = k = 0; i < b->top + 1; i++) {
+		for (j = 0; j < BITMAP_BYTES; j++) {
+			if (k >= l)
+				break;
+			s[need - 1 - k++] = (b->d[i] >> (j * 8)) & 0xff;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+bitmap_from_string(struct bitmap *b, const void *p, size_t l)
+{
+	int r;
+	size_t i, offset, shift;
+	const u_char *s = (const u_char *)p;
+
+	if (l > BITMAP_MAX / 8)
+		return -1;
+	if ((r = reserve(b, l * 8)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	bitmap_zero(b);
+	if (l == 0)
+		return 0;
+	b->top = offset = ((l + (BITMAP_BYTES - 1)) / BITMAP_BYTES) - 1;
+	shift = ((l + (BITMAP_BYTES - 1)) % BITMAP_BYTES) * 8;
+	for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+		b->d[offset] |= (BITMAP_WTYPE)s[i] << shift;
+		if (shift == 0) {
+			offset--;
+			shift = BITMAP_BITS - 8;
+		} else
+			shift -= 8;
+	}
+	retop(b);
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/bitmap.h b/bitmap.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..336e90b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bitmap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: bitmap.h,v 1.2 2017/10/20 01:56:39 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BITMAP_H
+#define _BITMAP_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+/* Simple bit vector routines */
+
+struct bitmap;
+
+/* Allocate a new bitmap. Returns NULL on allocation failure. */
+struct bitmap *bitmap_new(void);
+
+/* Free a bitmap */
+void bitmap_free(struct bitmap *b);
+
+/* Zero an existing bitmap */
+void bitmap_zero(struct bitmap *b);
+
+/* Test whether a bit is set in a bitmap. */
+int bitmap_test_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n);
+
+/* Set a bit in a bitmap. Returns 0 on success or -1 on error */
+int bitmap_set_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n);
+
+/* Clear a bit in a bitmap */
+void bitmap_clear_bit(struct bitmap *b, u_int n);
+
+/* Return the number of bits in a bitmap (i.e. the position of the MSB) */
+size_t bitmap_nbits(struct bitmap *b);
+
+/* Return the number of bytes needed to represent a bitmap */
+size_t bitmap_nbytes(struct bitmap *b);
+
+/* Convert a bitmap to a big endian byte string */
+int bitmap_to_string(struct bitmap *b, void *p, size_t l);
+
+/* Convert a big endian byte string to a bitmap */
+int bitmap_from_string(struct bitmap *b, const void *p, size_t l);
+
+#endif /* _BITMAP_H */
diff --git a/buildpkg.sh.in b/buildpkg.sh.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..15555cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/buildpkg.sh.in
@@ -0,0 +1,677 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# Fake Root Solaris/SVR4/SVR5 Build System - Prototype
+#
+# The following code has been provide under Public Domain License.  I really
+# don't care what you use it for.  Just as long as you don't complain to me
+# nor my employer if you break it. - Ben Lindstrom (mouring@eviladmin.org)
+#
+umask 022
+#
+# Options for building the package
+# You can create a openssh-config.local with your customized options
+#
+REMOVE_FAKE_ROOT_WHEN_DONE=yes
+#
+# uncommenting TEST_DIR and using
+# configure --prefix=/var/tmp --with-privsep-path=/var/tmp/empty
+# and
+# PKGNAME=tOpenSSH should allow testing a package without interfering
+# with a real OpenSSH package on a system. This is not needed on systems
+# that support the -R option to pkgadd.
+#TEST_DIR=/var/tmp	# leave commented out for production build
+PKGNAME=OpenSSH
+# revisions within the same version (REV=a)
+#REV=
+SYSVINIT_NAME=opensshd
+AWK=${AWK:="nawk"}
+MAKE=${MAKE:="make"}
+SSHDUID=67	# Default privsep uid
+SSHDGID=67	# Default privsep gid
+# uncomment these next three as needed
+#PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN=no
+#X11_FORWARDING=yes
+#USR_LOCAL_IS_SYMLINK=yes
+# System V init run levels
+SYSVINITSTART=S98
+SYSVINITSTOPT=K30
+# We will source these if they exist
+POST_MAKE_INSTALL_FIXES=./pkg-post-make-install-fixes.sh
+POST_PROTOTYPE_EDITS=./pkg-post-prototype-edit.sh
+# We'll be one level deeper looking for these
+PKG_PREINSTALL_LOCAL=../pkg-preinstall.local
+PKG_POSTINSTALL_LOCAL=../pkg-postinstall.local
+PKG_PREREMOVE_LOCAL=../pkg-preremove.local
+PKG_POSTREMOVE_LOCAL=../pkg-postremove.local
+PKG_REQUEST_LOCAL=../pkg-request.local
+# end of sourced files
+#
+OPENSSHD=opensshd.init
+OPENSSH_MANIFEST=openssh.xml
+OPENSSH_FMRI=svc:/site/${SYSVINIT_NAME}:default
+SMF_METHOD_DIR=/lib/svc/method/site
+SMF_MANIFEST_DIR=/var/svc/manifest/site
+
+PATH_GROUPADD_PROG=@PATH_GROUPADD_PROG@
+PATH_USERADD_PROG=@PATH_USERADD_PROG@
+PATH_PASSWD_PROG=@PATH_PASSWD_PROG@
+#
+# list of system directories we do NOT want to change owner/group/perms
+# when installing our package
+SYSTEM_DIR="/etc	\
+/etc/init.d		\
+/etc/rcS.d		\
+/etc/rc0.d		\
+/etc/rc1.d		\
+/etc/rc2.d		\
+/etc/opt		\
+/lib			\
+/lib/svc		\
+/lib/svc/method		\
+/lib/svc/method/site	\
+/opt			\
+/opt/bin		\
+/usr			\
+/usr/bin		\
+/usr/lib		\
+/usr/sbin		\
+/usr/share		\
+/usr/share/man		\
+/usr/share/man/man1	\
+/usr/share/man/man8	\
+/usr/local		\
+/usr/local/bin		\
+/usr/local/etc		\
+/usr/local/libexec	\
+/usr/local/man		\
+/usr/local/man/man1	\
+/usr/local/man/man8	\
+/usr/local/sbin		\
+/usr/local/share	\
+/var			\
+/var/opt		\
+/var/run		\
+/var/svc		\
+/var/svc/manifest	\
+/var/svc/manifest/site  \
+/var/tmp		\
+/tmp"
+
+# We may need to build as root so we make sure PATH is set up
+# only set the path if it's not set already
+[ -d /opt/bin ]  &&  {
+	echo $PATH | grep ":/opt/bin"  > /dev/null 2>&1
+	[ $? -ne 0 ] && PATH=$PATH:/opt/bin
+}
+[ -d /usr/local/bin ]  &&  {
+	echo $PATH | grep ":/usr/local/bin"  > /dev/null 2>&1
+	[ $? -ne 0 ] && PATH=$PATH:/usr/local/bin
+}
+[ -d /usr/ccs/bin ]  &&  {
+	echo $PATH | grep ":/usr/ccs/bin"  > /dev/null 2>&1
+	[ $? -ne 0 ] && PATH=$PATH:/usr/ccs/bin
+}
+export PATH
+#
+
+[ -f Makefile ]  ||  {
+	echo "Please run this script from your build directory"
+	exit 1
+}
+
+# we will look for openssh-config.local to override the above options
+[ -s ./openssh-config.local ]  &&  . ./openssh-config.local
+
+START=`pwd`
+FAKE_ROOT=$START/pkg
+
+## Fill in some details, like prefix and sysconfdir
+for confvar in prefix exec_prefix bindir sbindir libexecdir datadir mandir sysconfdir piddir srcdir
+do
+	eval $confvar=`grep "^$confvar=" Makefile | cut -d = -f 2`
+done
+
+## Are we using Solaris' SMF?
+DO_SMF=0
+if egrep "^#define USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS" config.h > /dev/null 2>&1
+then
+	DO_SMF=1
+fi
+
+## Collect value of privsep user
+for confvar in SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+do
+	eval $confvar=`awk '/#define[ \t]'$confvar'/{print $3}' config.h`
+done
+
+## Set privsep defaults if not defined
+if [ -z "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ]
+then
+	SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
+fi
+
+## Extract common info requires for the 'info' part of the package.
+VERSION=`./ssh -V 2>&1 | sed -e 's/,.*//'`
+
+ARCH=`uname -m`
+DEF_MSG="\n"
+OS_VER=`uname -v`
+SCRIPT_SHELL=/sbin/sh
+UNAME_R=`uname -r`
+UNAME_S=`uname -s`
+case ${UNAME_S} in
+	SunOS)	UNAME_S=Solaris
+		OS_VER=${UNAME_R}
+		ARCH=`uname -p`
+		RCS_D=yes
+		DEF_MSG="(default: n)"
+		;;
+	SCO_SV)	case ${UNAME_R} in
+			3.2)	UNAME_S=OpenServer5
+		OS_VER=`uname -X | grep Release | sed -e 's/^Rel.*3.2v//'`
+				;;
+			5)	UNAME_S=OpenServer6
+				;;
+		esac
+		SCRIPT_SHELL=/bin/sh
+		RC1_D=no
+		DEF_MSG="(default: n)"
+		;;
+esac
+
+case `basename $0` in
+	buildpkg.sh)
+## Start by faking root install
+echo "Faking root install..."
+[ -d $FAKE_ROOT ]  &&  rm -fr $FAKE_ROOT
+mkdir $FAKE_ROOT
+${MAKE} install-nokeys DESTDIR=$FAKE_ROOT
+if [ $? -gt 0 ]
+then
+	echo "Fake root install failed, stopping."
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+## Setup our run level stuff while we are at it.
+if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
+then
+	# For Solaris' SMF, /lib/svc/method/site is the preferred place
+	# for start/stop scripts that aren't supplied with the OS, and
+	# similarly /var/svc/manifest/site for manifests.
+	mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_METHOD_DIR}
+	mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}
+
+	cp ${OPENSSHD} $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_METHOD_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
+	chmod 744 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_METHOD_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
+
+	cat ${OPENSSH_MANIFEST} | \
+	    sed -e "s|__SYSVINIT_NAME__|${SYSVINIT_NAME}|" \
+	    -e "s|__SMF_METHOD_DIR__|${SMF_METHOD_DIR}|" \
+	    > $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml
+	chmod 644 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml
+else
+	mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d
+
+	cp ${OPENSSHD} $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
+	chmod 744 $FAKE_ROOT${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME}
+fi
+
+[ "${PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN}" = no ]  &&  \
+	perl -p -i -e "s/#PermitRootLogin yes/PermitRootLogin no/" \
+		$FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
+[ "${X11_FORWARDING}" = yes ]  &&  \
+	perl -p -i -e "s/#X11Forwarding no/X11Forwarding yes/" \
+		$FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
+# fix PrintMotd
+perl -p -i -e "s/#PrintMotd yes/PrintMotd no/" \
+	$FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
+
+# We don't want to overwrite config files on multiple installs
+mv $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/ssh_config $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/ssh_config.default
+mv $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config $FAKE_ROOT${sysconfdir}/sshd_config.default
+
+# local tweeks here
+[ -s "${POST_MAKE_INSTALL_FIXES}" ]  &&  . ${POST_MAKE_INSTALL_FIXES}
+
+cd $FAKE_ROOT
+
+## Ok, this is outright wrong, but it will work.  I'm tired of pkgmk
+## whining.
+for i in *; do
+  PROTO_ARGS="$PROTO_ARGS $i=/$i";
+done
+
+## Build info file
+echo "Building pkginfo file..."
+cat > pkginfo << _EOF
+PKG=$PKGNAME
+NAME="OpenSSH Portable for ${UNAME_S}"
+DESC="Secure Shell remote access utility; replaces telnet and rlogin/rsh."
+VENDOR="OpenSSH Portable Team - https://www.openssh.com/portable.html"
+ARCH=$ARCH
+VERSION=$VERSION$REV
+CATEGORY="Security,application"
+BASEDIR=/
+CLASSES="none"
+PSTAMP="${UNAME_S} ${OS_VER} ${ARCH} `date '+%d%b%Y %H:%M'`"
+_EOF
+
+## Build empty depend file that may get updated by $POST_PROTOTYPE_EDITS
+echo "Building depend file..."
+touch depend
+
+## Build space file
+echo "Building space file..."
+if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
+then
+	# XXX Is this necessary?  If not, remove space line from mk-proto.awk.
+	touch space
+else
+	cat > space << _EOF
+# extra space required by start/stop links added by installf
+# in postinstall
+$TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1
+$TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1
+_EOF
+	[ "$RC1_D" = no ]  ||  \
+	echo "$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1" >> space
+	[ "$RCS_D" = yes ]  &&  \
+	echo "$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME} 0 1" >> space
+fi
+
+## Build preinstall file
+echo "Building preinstall file..."
+cat > preinstall << _EOF
+#! ${SCRIPT_SHELL}
+#
+_EOF
+
+# local preinstall changes here
+[ -s "${PKG_PREINSTALL_LOCAL}" ]  &&  . ${PKG_PREINSTALL_LOCAL}
+
+cat >> preinstall << _EOF
+#
+if [ "\${PRE_INS_STOP}" = "yes" ]
+then
+	if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
+	then
+		svcadm disable $OPENSSH_FMRI
+	else
+		${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} stop
+	fi
+fi
+
+exit 0
+_EOF
+
+## Build postinstall file
+echo "Building postinstall file..."
+cat > postinstall << _EOF
+#! ${SCRIPT_SHELL}
+#
+[ -f \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/ssh_config ]  ||  \\
+	cp -p \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/ssh_config.default \\
+		\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/ssh_config
+[ -f \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/sshd_config ]  ||  \\
+	cp -p \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/sshd_config.default \\
+		\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
+
+# make rc?.d dirs only if we are doing a test install
+[ -n "${TEST_DIR}" ]  &&  [ $DO_SMF -ne 1 ] && {
+	[ "$RCS_D" = yes ]  &&  mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rcS.d
+	mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rc0.d
+	[ "$RC1_D" = no ]  ||  mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rc1.d
+	mkdir -p ${TEST_DIR}/etc/rc2.d
+}
+
+if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
+then
+	# Delete the existing service, if it exists, then import the
+	# new one.
+	if svcs $OPENSSH_FMRI > /dev/null 2>&1
+	then
+		svccfg delete -f $OPENSSH_FMRI
+	fi
+	# NOTE, The manifest disables sshd by default.
+	svccfg import ${TEST_DIR}${SMF_MANIFEST_DIR}/${SYSVINIT_NAME}.xml
+else
+	if [ "\${USE_SYM_LINKS}" = yes ]
+	then
+		[ "$RCS_D" = yes ]  &&  \\
+	installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
+		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
+		[ "$RC1_D" = no ]  ||  \\
+		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
+		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=../init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} s
+	else
+		[ "$RCS_D" = yes ]  &&  \\
+	installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rcS.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
+		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc0.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
+		[ "$RC1_D" = no ]  ||  \\
+		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc1.d/${SYSVINITSTOPT}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
+		installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/rc2.d/${SYSVINITSTART}${SYSVINIT_NAME}=\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} l
+	fi
+fi
+
+# If piddir doesn't exist we add it. (Ie. --with-pid-dir=/var/opt/ssh)
+[ -d $piddir ]  ||  installf ${PKGNAME} \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}$TEST_DIR$piddir d 0755 root sys
+
+_EOF
+
+# local postinstall changes here
+[ -s "${PKG_POSTINSTALL_LOCAL}" ]  &&  . ${PKG_POSTINSTALL_LOCAL}
+
+cat >> postinstall << _EOF
+installf -f ${PKGNAME}
+
+# Use chroot to handle PKG_INSTALL_ROOT
+if [ ! -z "\${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}" ]
+then
+	chroot="chroot \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}"
+fi
+# If this is a test build, we will skip the groupadd/useradd/passwd commands
+if [ ! -z "${TEST_DIR}" ]
+then
+	chroot=echo
+fi
+
+	echo "PrivilegeSeparation user always required."
+	if cut -f1 -d: \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/passwd | egrep '^'$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER'\$' >/dev/null
+	then
+		echo "PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER already exists."
+		SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP=\`grep "^$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER:" \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/passwd | awk -F: '{print \$4}'\`
+		SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP=\`grep ":\$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP:" \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/group | awk -F: '{print \$1}'\`
+	else
+		DO_PASSWD=yes
+	fi
+	[ -z "\$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP" ]  &&  SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP=$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+
+	# group required?
+	if cut -f1 -d: \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/group | egrep '^'\$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP'\$' >/dev/null
+	then
+		echo "PrivSep group \$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP already exists."
+	else
+		DO_GROUP=yes
+	fi
+
+	# create group if required
+	[ "\$DO_GROUP" = yes ]  &&  {
+		# Use gid of 67 if possible
+		if cut -f3 -d: \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/group | egrep '^'$SSHDGID'\$' >/dev/null
+		then
+			:
+		else
+			sshdgid="-g $SSHDGID"
+		fi
+		echo "Creating PrivSep group \$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP."
+		\$chroot ${PATH_GROUPADD_PROG} \$sshdgid \$SSH_PRIVSEP_GROUP
+	}
+
+	# Create user if required
+	[ "\$DO_PASSWD" = yes ]  &&  {
+		# Use uid of 67 if possible
+		if cut -f3 -d: \${PKG_INSTALL_ROOT}/etc/passwd | egrep '^'$SSHDUID'\$' >/dev/null
+		then
+			:
+		else
+			sshduid="-u $SSHDUID"
+		fi
+		echo "Creating PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER."
+		\$chroot ${PATH_USERADD_PROG} -c 'SSHD PrivSep User' -s /bin/false -g $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER \$sshduid $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+		\$chroot ${PATH_PASSWD_PROG} -l $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+	}
+
+if [ "\${POST_INS_START}" = "yes" ]
+then
+	if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
+	then
+		svcadm enable $OPENSSH_FMRI
+	else
+		${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} start
+	fi
+fi
+exit 0
+_EOF
+
+## Build preremove file
+echo "Building preremove file..."
+cat > preremove << _EOF
+#! ${SCRIPT_SHELL}
+#
+if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
+then
+	svcadm disable $OPENSSH_FMRI
+else
+	${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} stop
+fi
+_EOF
+
+# local preremove changes here
+[ -s "${PKG_PREREMOVE_LOCAL}" ]  &&  . ${PKG_PREREMOVE_LOCAL}
+
+cat >> preremove << _EOF
+exit 0
+_EOF
+
+## Build postremove file
+echo "Building postremove file..."
+cat > postremove << _EOF
+#! ${SCRIPT_SHELL}
+#
+if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
+then
+	if svcs $OPENSSH_FMRI > /dev/null 2>&1
+	then
+		svccfg delete -f $OPENSSH_FMRI
+	fi
+fi
+_EOF
+
+# local postremove changes here
+[ -s "${PKG_POSTREMOVE_LOCAL}" ]  &&  . ${PKG_POSTREMOVE_LOCAL}
+
+cat >> postremove << _EOF
+exit 0
+_EOF
+
+## Build request file
+echo "Building request file..."
+cat > request << _EOF
+trap 'exit 3' 15
+
+_EOF
+
+[ -x /usr/bin/ckyorn ]  ||  cat >> request << _EOF
+
+ckyorn() {
+# for some strange reason OpenServer5 has no ckyorn
+# We build a striped down version here
+
+DEFAULT=n
+PROMPT="Yes or No [yes,no,?,quit]"
+HELP_PROMPT="        Enter y or yes if your answer is yes; n or no if your answer is no."
+USAGE="usage: ckyorn [options]
+where options may include:
+        -d default
+        -h help
+        -p prompt
+"
+
+if [ \$# != 0 ]
+then
+	while getopts d:p:h: c
+	do
+		case \$c in
+			h)	HELP_PROMPT="\$OPTARG" ;;
+			d)	DEFAULT=\$OPTARG ;;
+			p)	PROMPT=\$OPTARG ;;
+			\\?)	echo "\$USAGE" 1>&2
+				exit 1 ;;
+		esac
+	done
+	shift \`expr \$OPTIND - 1\`
+fi
+
+while true
+do
+	echo "\${PROMPT}\\c " 1>&2
+	read key
+	[ -z "\$key" ]  &&  key=\$DEFAULT
+	case \$key in
+		[n,N]|[n,N][o,O]|[y,Y]|[y,Y][e,E][s,S])	echo "\${key}\\c"
+			exit 0 ;;
+		\\?)	echo \$HELP_PROMPT 1>&2 ;;
+		q|quit)	echo "q\\c" 1>&2
+			exit 3 ;;
+	esac
+done
+
+}
+
+_EOF
+
+if [ $DO_SMF -eq 1 ]
+then
+	# This could get hairy, as the running sshd may not be under SMF.
+	# We'll assume an earlier version of OpenSSH started via SMF.
+	cat >> request << _EOF
+PRE_INS_STOP=no
+POST_INS_START=no
+# determine if should restart the daemon
+if [ -s ${piddir}/sshd.pid  ] && \\
+    /usr/bin/svcs -H $OPENSSH_FMRI 2>&1 | egrep "^online" > /dev/null 2>&1
+then
+	ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\
+-p "Should the running sshd daemon be restarted? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$?
+	case \$ans in
+		[y,Y]*)	PRE_INS_STOP=yes
+			POST_INS_START=yes
+			;;
+	esac
+
+else
+
+# determine if we should start sshd
+	ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\
+-p "Start the sshd daemon after installing this package? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$?
+	case \$ans in
+		[y,Y]*)	POST_INS_START=yes ;;
+	esac
+fi
+
+# make parameters available to installation service,
+# and so to any other packaging scripts
+cat >\$1 <<!
+PRE_INS_STOP='\$PRE_INS_STOP'
+POST_INS_START='\$POST_INS_START'
+!
+
+_EOF
+else
+	cat >> request << _EOF
+USE_SYM_LINKS=no
+PRE_INS_STOP=no
+POST_INS_START=no
+# Use symbolic links?
+ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\
+-p "Do you want symbolic links for the start/stop scripts? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$?
+case \$ans in
+	[y,Y]*)	USE_SYM_LINKS=yes ;;
+esac
+
+# determine if should restart the daemon
+if [ -s ${piddir}/sshd.pid  -a  -f ${TEST_DIR}/etc/init.d/${SYSVINIT_NAME} ]
+then
+	ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\
+-p "Should the running sshd daemon be restarted? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$?
+	case \$ans in
+		[y,Y]*)	PRE_INS_STOP=yes
+			POST_INS_START=yes
+			;;
+	esac
+
+else
+
+# determine if we should start sshd
+	ans=\`ckyorn -d n \\
+-p "Start the sshd daemon after installing this package? ${DEF_MSG}"\` || exit \$?
+	case \$ans in
+		[y,Y]*)	POST_INS_START=yes ;;
+	esac
+fi
+
+# make parameters available to installation service,
+# and so to any other packaging scripts
+cat >\$1 <<!
+USE_SYM_LINKS='\$USE_SYM_LINKS'
+PRE_INS_STOP='\$PRE_INS_STOP'
+POST_INS_START='\$POST_INS_START'
+!
+
+_EOF
+fi
+
+# local request changes here
+[ -s "${PKG_REQUEST_LOCAL}" ]  &&  . ${PKG_REQUEST_LOCAL}
+
+cat >> request << _EOF
+exit 0
+
+_EOF
+
+## Next Build our prototype
+echo "Building prototype file..."
+cat >mk-proto.awk << _EOF
+	    BEGIN { print "i pkginfo"; print "i depend"; \\
+		    print "i preinstall"; print "i postinstall"; \\
+ 		    print "i preremove"; print "i postremove"; \\
+		    print "i request"; print "i space"; \\
+		    split("$SYSTEM_DIR",sys_files); }
+	    {
+	     for (dir in sys_files) { if ( \$3 != sys_files[dir] )
+		     { if ( \$1 == "s" )
+			{ \$5=""; \$6=""; }
+		     else
+			{ \$5="root"; \$6="sys"; }
+		     }
+		else
+		     { \$4="?"; \$5="?"; \$6="?"; break;}
+	    } }
+	    { print; }
+_EOF
+
+find . | egrep -v "prototype|pkginfo|mk-proto.awk" | sort | \
+	pkgproto $PROTO_ARGS | ${AWK} -f mk-proto.awk > prototype
+
+# /usr/local is a symlink on some systems
+[ "${USR_LOCAL_IS_SYMLINK}" = yes ]  &&  {
+	grep -v "^d none /usr/local ? ? ?$" prototype > prototype.new
+	mv prototype.new prototype
+}
+
+## Step back a directory and now build the package.
+cd ..
+# local prototype tweeks here
+[ -s "${POST_PROTOTYPE_EDITS}" ]  &&  . ${POST_PROTOTYPE_EDITS}
+
+echo "Building package.."
+pkgmk -d ${FAKE_ROOT} -f $FAKE_ROOT/prototype -o
+echo | pkgtrans -os ${FAKE_ROOT} ${START}/$PKGNAME-$VERSION$REV-$UNAME_S-$ARCH.pkg
+	;;
+
+	justpkg.sh)
+rm -fr ${FAKE_ROOT}/${PKGNAME}
+grep -v "^PSTAMP=" $FAKE_ROOT/pkginfo > $$tmp
+mv $$tmp $FAKE_ROOT/pkginfo
+cat >> $FAKE_ROOT/pkginfo << _EOF
+PSTAMP="${UNAME_S} ${OS_VER} ${ARCH} `date '+%d%b%Y %H:%M'`"
+_EOF
+pkgmk -d ${FAKE_ROOT} -f $FAKE_ROOT/prototype -o
+echo | pkgtrans -os ${FAKE_ROOT} ${START}/$PKGNAME-$VERSION$REV-$UNAME_S-$ARCH.pkg
+	;;
+
+esac
+
+[ "${REMOVE_FAKE_ROOT_WHEN_DONE}" = yes ]  &&  rm -rf $FAKE_ROOT
+exit 0
+
diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a810da0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/canohost.c
@@ -0,0 +1,204 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.75 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Functions for returning the canonical host name of the remote site.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+void
+ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr;
+	struct sockaddr_in *a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr;
+	struct in_addr inaddr;
+	u_int16_t port;
+
+	if (addr->ss_family != AF_INET6 ||
+	    !IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&a6->sin6_addr))
+		return;
+
+	debug3("Normalising mapped IPv4 in IPv6 address");
+
+	memcpy(&inaddr, ((char *)&a6->sin6_addr) + 12, sizeof(inaddr));
+	port = a6->sin6_port;
+
+	memset(a4, 0, sizeof(*a4));
+
+	a4->sin_family = AF_INET;
+	*len = sizeof(*a4);
+	memcpy(&a4->sin_addr, &inaddr, sizeof(inaddr));
+	a4->sin_port = port;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the local/remote IP-address/hostname of socket as a string.
+ * The returned string must be freed.
+ */
+static char *
+get_socket_address(int sock, int remote, int flags)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+	socklen_t addrlen;
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
+	int r;
+
+	/* Get IP address of client. */
+	addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+
+	if (remote) {
+		if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) != 0)
+			return NULL;
+	} else {
+		if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) != 0)
+			return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */
+	if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
+		addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+		ipv64_normalise_mapped(&addr, &addrlen);
+	}
+
+	switch (addr.ss_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+	case AF_INET6:
+		/* Get the address in ascii. */
+		if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop,
+		    sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, flags)) != 0) {
+			error_f("getnameinfo %d failed: %s",
+			    flags, ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		return xstrdup(ntop);
+	case AF_UNIX:
+		/* Get the Unix domain socket path. */
+		return xstrdup(((struct sockaddr_un *)&addr)->sun_path);
+	default:
+		/* We can't look up remote Unix domain sockets. */
+		return NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+char *
+get_peer_ipaddr(int sock)
+{
+	char *p;
+
+	if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 1, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL)
+		return p;
+	return xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+}
+
+char *
+get_local_ipaddr(int sock)
+{
+	char *p;
+
+	if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL)
+		return p;
+	return xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+}
+
+char *
+get_local_name(int fd)
+{
+	char *host, myname[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+	/* Assume we were passed a socket */
+	if ((host = get_socket_address(fd, 0, NI_NAMEREQD)) != NULL)
+		return host;
+
+	/* Handle the case where we were passed a pipe */
+	if (gethostname(myname, sizeof(myname)) == -1) {
+		verbose_f("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
+		host = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+	} else {
+		host = xstrdup(myname);
+	}
+
+	return host;
+}
+
+/* Returns the local/remote port for the socket. */
+
+static int
+get_sock_port(int sock, int local)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+	socklen_t fromlen;
+	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	int r;
+
+	/* Get IP address of client. */
+	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+	if (local) {
+		if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
+			error("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			return 0;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
+			debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */
+	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
+		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+
+	/* Non-inet sockets don't have a port number. */
+	if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Return port number. */
+	if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, NULL, 0,
+	    strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0)
+		fatal_f("getnameinfo NI_NUMERICSERV failed: %s",
+		    ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+	return atoi(strport);
+}
+
+int
+get_peer_port(int sock)
+{
+	return get_sock_port(sock, 0);
+}
+
+int
+get_local_port(int sock)
+{
+	return get_sock_port(sock, 1);
+}
diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26d6285
--- /dev/null
+++ b/canohost.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: canohost.h,v 1.12 2016/03/07 19:02:43 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CANOHOST_H
+#define _CANOHOST_H
+
+char		*get_peer_ipaddr(int);
+int		 get_peer_port(int);
+char		*get_local_ipaddr(int);
+char		*get_local_name(int);
+int		get_local_port(int);
+
+#endif /* _CANOHOST_H */
+
+void		 ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *, socklen_t *);
diff --git a/chacha.c b/chacha.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a84c25e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/chacha.c
@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+/*
+chacha-merged.c version 20080118
+D. J. Bernstein
+Public domain.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "chacha.h"
+
+/* $OpenBSD: chacha.c,v 1.1 2013/11/21 00:45:44 djm Exp $ */
+
+typedef unsigned char u8;
+typedef unsigned int u32;
+
+typedef struct chacha_ctx chacha_ctx;
+
+#define U8C(v) (v##U)
+#define U32C(v) (v##U)
+
+#define U8V(v) ((u8)(v) & U8C(0xFF))
+#define U32V(v) ((u32)(v) & U32C(0xFFFFFFFF))
+
+#define ROTL32(v, n) \
+  (U32V((v) << (n)) | ((v) >> (32 - (n))))
+
+#define U8TO32_LITTLE(p) \
+  (((u32)((p)[0])      ) | \
+   ((u32)((p)[1]) <<  8) | \
+   ((u32)((p)[2]) << 16) | \
+   ((u32)((p)[3]) << 24))
+
+#define U32TO8_LITTLE(p, v) \
+  do { \
+    (p)[0] = U8V((v)      ); \
+    (p)[1] = U8V((v) >>  8); \
+    (p)[2] = U8V((v) >> 16); \
+    (p)[3] = U8V((v) >> 24); \
+  } while (0)
+
+#define ROTATE(v,c) (ROTL32(v,c))
+#define XOR(v,w) ((v) ^ (w))
+#define PLUS(v,w) (U32V((v) + (w)))
+#define PLUSONE(v) (PLUS((v),1))
+
+#define QUARTERROUND(a,b,c,d) \
+  a = PLUS(a,b); d = ROTATE(XOR(d,a),16); \
+  c = PLUS(c,d); b = ROTATE(XOR(b,c),12); \
+  a = PLUS(a,b); d = ROTATE(XOR(d,a), 8); \
+  c = PLUS(c,d); b = ROTATE(XOR(b,c), 7);
+
+static const char sigma[16] = "expand 32-byte k";
+static const char tau[16] = "expand 16-byte k";
+
+void
+chacha_keysetup(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits)
+{
+  const char *constants;
+
+  x->input[4] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 0);
+  x->input[5] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 4);
+  x->input[6] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 8);
+  x->input[7] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 12);
+  if (kbits == 256) { /* recommended */
+    k += 16;
+    constants = sigma;
+  } else { /* kbits == 128 */
+    constants = tau;
+  }
+  x->input[8] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 0);
+  x->input[9] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 4);
+  x->input[10] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 8);
+  x->input[11] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 12);
+  x->input[0] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 0);
+  x->input[1] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 4);
+  x->input[2] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 8);
+  x->input[3] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 12);
+}
+
+void
+chacha_ivsetup(chacha_ctx *x, const u8 *iv, const u8 *counter)
+{
+  x->input[12] = counter == NULL ? 0 : U8TO32_LITTLE(counter + 0);
+  x->input[13] = counter == NULL ? 0 : U8TO32_LITTLE(counter + 4);
+  x->input[14] = U8TO32_LITTLE(iv + 0);
+  x->input[15] = U8TO32_LITTLE(iv + 4);
+}
+
+void
+chacha_encrypt_bytes(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes)
+{
+  u32 x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15;
+  u32 j0, j1, j2, j3, j4, j5, j6, j7, j8, j9, j10, j11, j12, j13, j14, j15;
+  u8 *ctarget = NULL;
+  u8 tmp[64];
+  u_int i;
+
+  if (!bytes) return;
+
+  j0 = x->input[0];
+  j1 = x->input[1];
+  j2 = x->input[2];
+  j3 = x->input[3];
+  j4 = x->input[4];
+  j5 = x->input[5];
+  j6 = x->input[6];
+  j7 = x->input[7];
+  j8 = x->input[8];
+  j9 = x->input[9];
+  j10 = x->input[10];
+  j11 = x->input[11];
+  j12 = x->input[12];
+  j13 = x->input[13];
+  j14 = x->input[14];
+  j15 = x->input[15];
+
+  for (;;) {
+    if (bytes < 64) {
+      for (i = 0;i < bytes;++i) tmp[i] = m[i];
+      m = tmp;
+      ctarget = c;
+      c = tmp;
+    }
+    x0 = j0;
+    x1 = j1;
+    x2 = j2;
+    x3 = j3;
+    x4 = j4;
+    x5 = j5;
+    x6 = j6;
+    x7 = j7;
+    x8 = j8;
+    x9 = j9;
+    x10 = j10;
+    x11 = j11;
+    x12 = j12;
+    x13 = j13;
+    x14 = j14;
+    x15 = j15;
+    for (i = 20;i > 0;i -= 2) {
+      QUARTERROUND( x0, x4, x8,x12)
+      QUARTERROUND( x1, x5, x9,x13)
+      QUARTERROUND( x2, x6,x10,x14)
+      QUARTERROUND( x3, x7,x11,x15)
+      QUARTERROUND( x0, x5,x10,x15)
+      QUARTERROUND( x1, x6,x11,x12)
+      QUARTERROUND( x2, x7, x8,x13)
+      QUARTERROUND( x3, x4, x9,x14)
+    }
+    x0 = PLUS(x0,j0);
+    x1 = PLUS(x1,j1);
+    x2 = PLUS(x2,j2);
+    x3 = PLUS(x3,j3);
+    x4 = PLUS(x4,j4);
+    x5 = PLUS(x5,j5);
+    x6 = PLUS(x6,j6);
+    x7 = PLUS(x7,j7);
+    x8 = PLUS(x8,j8);
+    x9 = PLUS(x9,j9);
+    x10 = PLUS(x10,j10);
+    x11 = PLUS(x11,j11);
+    x12 = PLUS(x12,j12);
+    x13 = PLUS(x13,j13);
+    x14 = PLUS(x14,j14);
+    x15 = PLUS(x15,j15);
+
+    x0 = XOR(x0,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 0));
+    x1 = XOR(x1,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 4));
+    x2 = XOR(x2,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 8));
+    x3 = XOR(x3,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 12));
+    x4 = XOR(x4,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 16));
+    x5 = XOR(x5,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 20));
+    x6 = XOR(x6,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 24));
+    x7 = XOR(x7,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 28));
+    x8 = XOR(x8,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 32));
+    x9 = XOR(x9,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 36));
+    x10 = XOR(x10,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 40));
+    x11 = XOR(x11,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 44));
+    x12 = XOR(x12,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 48));
+    x13 = XOR(x13,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 52));
+    x14 = XOR(x14,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 56));
+    x15 = XOR(x15,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 60));
+
+    j12 = PLUSONE(j12);
+    if (!j12) {
+      j13 = PLUSONE(j13);
+      /* stopping at 2^70 bytes per nonce is user's responsibility */
+    }
+
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 0,x0);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 4,x1);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 8,x2);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 12,x3);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 16,x4);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 20,x5);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 24,x6);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 28,x7);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 32,x8);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 36,x9);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 40,x10);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 44,x11);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 48,x12);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 52,x13);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 56,x14);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 60,x15);
+
+    if (bytes <= 64) {
+      if (bytes < 64) {
+        for (i = 0;i < bytes;++i) ctarget[i] = c[i];
+      }
+      x->input[12] = j12;
+      x->input[13] = j13;
+      return;
+    }
+    bytes -= 64;
+    c += 64;
+    m += 64;
+  }
+}
diff --git a/chacha.h b/chacha.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19a61e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/chacha.h
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: chacha.h,v 1.5 2021/04/03 05:54:14 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+chacha-merged.c version 20080118
+D. J. Bernstein
+Public domain.
+*/
+
+#ifndef CHACHA_H
+#define CHACHA_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+struct chacha_ctx {
+	u_int input[16];
+};
+
+#define CHACHA_MINKEYLEN	16
+#define CHACHA_NONCELEN		8
+#define CHACHA_CTRLEN		8
+#define CHACHA_STATELEN		(CHACHA_NONCELEN+CHACHA_CTRLEN)
+#define CHACHA_BLOCKLEN		64
+
+void chacha_keysetup(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *k, u_int kbits)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CHACHA_MINKEYLEN)));
+void chacha_ivsetup(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *iv, const u_char *ctr)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CHACHA_NONCELEN)))
+    __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 3, CHACHA_CTRLEN)));
+void chacha_encrypt_bytes(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *m,
+    u_char *c, u_int bytes)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 4)))
+    __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 3, 4)));
+
+#endif	/* CHACHA_H */
+
diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0d26358
--- /dev/null
+++ b/channels.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5271 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.427 2023/01/18 02:00:10 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * This file contains functions for generic socket connection forwarding.
+ * There is also code for initiating connection forwarding for X11 connections,
+ * arbitrary tcp/ip connections, and the authentication agent connection.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "match.h"
+
+/* XXX remove once we're satisfied there's no lurking bugs */
+/* #define DEBUG_CHANNEL_POLL 1 */
+
+/* -- agent forwarding */
+#define	NUM_SOCKS	10
+
+/* -- tcp forwarding */
+/* special-case port number meaning allow any port */
+#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT	0
+
+/* special-case wildcard meaning allow any host */
+#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST	"*"
+
+/* -- X11 forwarding */
+/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
+#define MAX_DISPLAYS  1000
+
+/* Per-channel callback for pre/post IO actions */
+typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c);
+
+/*
+ * Data structure for storing which hosts are permitted for forward requests.
+ * The local sides of any remote forwards are stored in this array to prevent
+ * a corrupt remote server from accessing arbitrary TCP/IP ports on our local
+ * network (which might be behind a firewall).
+ */
+/* XXX: streamlocal wants a path instead of host:port */
+/*      Overload host_to_connect; we could just make this match Forward */
+/*	XXX - can we use listen_host instead of listen_path? */
+struct permission {
+	char *host_to_connect;		/* Connect to 'host'. */
+	int port_to_connect;		/* Connect to 'port'. */
+	char *listen_host;		/* Remote side should listen address. */
+	char *listen_path;		/* Remote side should listen path. */
+	int listen_port;		/* Remote side should listen port. */
+	Channel *downstream;		/* Downstream mux*/
+};
+
+/*
+ * Stores the forwarding permission state for a single direction (local or
+ * remote).
+ */
+struct permission_set {
+	/*
+	 * List of all local permitted host/port pairs to allow for the
+	 * user.
+	 */
+	u_int num_permitted_user;
+	struct permission *permitted_user;
+
+	/*
+	 * List of all permitted host/port pairs to allow for the admin.
+	 */
+	u_int num_permitted_admin;
+	struct permission *permitted_admin;
+
+	/*
+	 * If this is true, all opens/listens are permitted.  This is the
+	 * case on the server on which we have to trust the client anyway,
+	 * and the user could do anything after logging in.
+	 */
+	int all_permitted;
+};
+
+/* Used to record timeouts per channel type */
+struct ssh_channel_timeout {
+	char *type_pattern;
+	u_int timeout_secs;
+};
+
+/* Master structure for channels state */
+struct ssh_channels {
+	/*
+	 * Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels.  The array
+	 * is dynamically extended as needed.
+	 */
+	Channel **channels;
+
+	/*
+	 * Size of the channel array.  All slots of the array must always be
+	 * initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL
+	 */
+	u_int channels_alloc;
+
+	/*
+	 * 'channel_pre*' are called just before IO to add any bits
+	 * relevant to channels in the c->io_want bitmasks.
+	 *
+	 * 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for
+	 * channels which have c->io_ready events pending.
+	 */
+	chan_fn **channel_pre;
+	chan_fn **channel_post;
+
+	/* -- tcp forwarding */
+	struct permission_set local_perms;
+	struct permission_set remote_perms;
+
+	/* -- X11 forwarding */
+
+	/* Saved X11 local (client) display. */
+	char *x11_saved_display;
+
+	/* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */
+	char *x11_saved_proto;
+
+	/* Saved X11 authentication data.  This is the real data. */
+	char *x11_saved_data;
+	u_int x11_saved_data_len;
+
+	/* Deadline after which all X11 connections are refused */
+	u_int x11_refuse_time;
+
+	/*
+	 * Fake X11 authentication data.  This is what the server will be
+	 * sending us; we should replace any occurrences of this by the
+	 * real data.
+	 */
+	u_char *x11_fake_data;
+	u_int x11_fake_data_len;
+
+	/* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */
+	int IPv4or6;
+
+	/* Channel timeouts by type */
+	struct ssh_channel_timeout *timeouts;
+	size_t ntimeouts;
+};
+
+/* helper */
+static void port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype);
+static const char *channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host);
+
+/* non-blocking connect helpers */
+static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *);
+static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *);
+static Channel *rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *, char *, char *);
+static int rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+
+/* Setup helper */
+static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc);
+
+/* -- channel core */
+
+void
+channel_init_channels(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc;
+
+	if ((sc = calloc(1, sizeof(*sc))) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("allocation failed");
+	sc->channels_alloc = 10;
+	sc->channels = xcalloc(sc->channels_alloc, sizeof(*sc->channels));
+	sc->IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
+	channel_handler_init(sc);
+
+	ssh->chanctxt = sc;
+}
+
+Channel *
+channel_by_id(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+
+	if (id < 0 || (u_int)id >= ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc) {
+		logit_f("%d: bad id", id);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[id];
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		logit_f("%d: bad id: channel free", id);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return c;
+}
+
+Channel *
+channel_by_remote_id(struct ssh *ssh, u_int remote_id)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
+		c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
+		if (c != NULL && c->have_remote_id && c->remote_id == remote_id)
+			return c;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the channel if it is allowed to receive protocol messages.
+ * Private channels, like listening sockets, may not receive messages.
+ */
+Channel *
+channel_lookup(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+
+	if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	switch (c->type) {
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN:
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH:
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY:
+		return c;
+	}
+	logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add a timeout for open channels whose c->ctype (or c->xctype if it is set)
+ * match type_pattern.
+ */
+void
+channel_add_timeout(struct ssh *ssh, const char *type_pattern,
+    u_int timeout_secs)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+
+	debug2_f("channel type \"%s\" timeout %u seconds",
+	    type_pattern, timeout_secs);
+	sc->timeouts = xrecallocarray(sc->timeouts, sc->ntimeouts,
+	    sc->ntimeouts + 1, sizeof(*sc->timeouts));
+	sc->timeouts[sc->ntimeouts].type_pattern = xstrdup(type_pattern);
+	sc->timeouts[sc->ntimeouts].timeout_secs = timeout_secs;
+	sc->ntimeouts++;
+}
+
+/* Clears all previously-added channel timeouts */
+void
+channel_clear_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	size_t i;
+
+	debug3_f("clearing");
+	for (i = 0; i < sc->ntimeouts; i++)
+		free(sc->timeouts[i].type_pattern);
+	free(sc->timeouts);
+	sc->timeouts = NULL;
+	sc->ntimeouts = 0;
+}
+
+static u_int
+lookup_timeout(struct ssh *ssh, const char *type)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sc->ntimeouts; i++) {
+		if (match_pattern(type, sc->timeouts[i].type_pattern))
+			return sc->timeouts[i].timeout_secs;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets "extended type" of a channel; used by session layer to add additional
+ * information about channel types (e.g. shell, login, subsystem) that can then
+ * be used to select timeouts.
+ * Will reset c->inactive_deadline as a side-effect.
+ */
+void
+channel_set_xtype(struct ssh *ssh, int id, const char *xctype)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+
+	if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("missing channel %d", id);
+	if (c->xctype != NULL)
+		free(c->xctype);
+	c->xctype = xstrdup(xctype);
+	/* Type has changed, so look up inactivity deadline again */
+	c->inactive_deadline = lookup_timeout(ssh, c->xctype);
+	debug2_f("labeled channel %d as %s (inactive timeout %u)", id, xctype,
+	    c->inactive_deadline);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or
+ * when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd
+ */
+static void
+channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
+    int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty)
+{
+	int val;
+
+	if (rfd != -1)
+		fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+	if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd)
+		fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+	if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
+		fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+
+	c->rfd = rfd;
+	c->wfd = wfd;
+	c->sock = (rfd == wfd) ? rfd : -1;
+	c->efd = efd;
+	c->extended_usage = extusage;
+
+	if ((c->isatty = is_tty) != 0)
+		debug2("channel %d: rfd %d isatty", c->self, c->rfd);
+#ifdef _AIX
+	/* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */
+	c->wfd_isatty = is_tty || isatty(c->wfd);
+#endif
+
+	/* enable nonblocking mode */
+	c->restore_block = 0;
+	if (nonblock == CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO) {
+		/*
+		 * Special handling for stdio file descriptors: do not set
+		 * non-blocking mode if they are TTYs. Otherwise prepare to
+		 * restore their blocking state on exit to avoid interfering
+		 * with other programs that follow.
+		 */
+		if (rfd != -1 && !isatty(rfd) &&
+		    (val = fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL)) != -1 && !(val & O_NONBLOCK)) {
+			c->restore_flags[0] = val;
+			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD;
+			set_nonblock(rfd);
+		}
+		if (wfd != -1 && !isatty(wfd) &&
+		    (val = fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL)) != -1 && !(val & O_NONBLOCK)) {
+			c->restore_flags[1] = val;
+			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD;
+			set_nonblock(wfd);
+		}
+		if (efd != -1 && !isatty(efd) &&
+		    (val = fcntl(efd, F_GETFL)) != -1 && !(val & O_NONBLOCK)) {
+			c->restore_flags[2] = val;
+			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD;
+			set_nonblock(efd);
+		}
+	} else if (nonblock) {
+		if (rfd != -1)
+			set_nonblock(rfd);
+		if (wfd != -1)
+			set_nonblock(wfd);
+		if (efd != -1)
+			set_nonblock(efd);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket.
+ */
+Channel *
+channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
+    u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, const char *remote_name,
+    int nonblock)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	u_int i, found = 0;
+	Channel *c;
+	int r;
+
+	/* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */
+	for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
+		if (sc->channels[i] == NULL) {
+			/* Found a free slot. */
+			found = i;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (i >= sc->channels_alloc) {
+		/*
+		 * There are no free slots. Take last+1 slot and expand
+		 * the array.
+		 */
+		found = sc->channels_alloc;
+		if (sc->channels_alloc > CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS)
+			fatal_f("internal error: channels_alloc %d too big",
+			    sc->channels_alloc);
+		sc->channels = xrecallocarray(sc->channels, sc->channels_alloc,
+		    sc->channels_alloc + 10, sizeof(*sc->channels));
+		sc->channels_alloc += 10;
+		debug2("channel: expanding %d", sc->channels_alloc);
+	}
+	/* Initialize and return new channel. */
+	c = sc->channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel));
+	if ((c->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (c->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (c->extended = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_set_max_size(c->input, CHAN_INPUT_MAX)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_set_max_size");
+	c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN;
+	c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN;
+	channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0);
+	c->self = found;
+	c->type = type;
+	c->ctype = ctype;
+	c->local_window = window;
+	c->local_window_max = window;
+	c->local_maxpacket = maxpack;
+	c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name);
+	c->ctl_chan = -1;
+	c->delayed = 1;		/* prevent call to channel_post handler */
+	c->inactive_deadline = lookup_timeout(ssh, c->ctype);
+	TAILQ_INIT(&c->status_confirms);
+	debug("channel %d: new %s [%s] (inactive timeout: %u)",
+	    found, c->ctype, remote_name, c->inactive_deadline);
+	return c;
+}
+
+int
+channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int *fdp)
+{
+	int ret, fd = *fdp;
+
+	if (fd == -1)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* restore blocking */
+	if (*fdp == c->rfd &&
+	    (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD) != 0)
+		(void)fcntl(*fdp, F_SETFL, c->restore_flags[0]);
+	else if (*fdp == c->wfd &&
+	    (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD) != 0)
+		(void)fcntl(*fdp, F_SETFL, c->restore_flags[1]);
+	else if (*fdp == c->efd &&
+	    (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD) != 0)
+		(void)fcntl(*fdp, F_SETFL, c->restore_flags[2]);
+
+	if (*fdp == c->rfd) {
+		c->io_want &= ~SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD;
+		c->io_ready &= ~SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD;
+		c->rfd = -1;
+		c->pfds[0] = -1;
+	}
+	if (*fdp == c->wfd) {
+		c->io_want &= ~SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD;
+		c->io_ready &= ~SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD;
+		c->wfd = -1;
+		c->pfds[1] = -1;
+	}
+	if (*fdp == c->efd) {
+		c->io_want &= ~SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD;
+		c->io_ready &= ~SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD;
+		c->efd = -1;
+		c->pfds[2] = -1;
+	}
+	if (*fdp == c->sock) {
+		c->io_want &= ~SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK;
+		c->io_ready &= ~SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK;
+		c->sock = -1;
+		c->pfds[3] = -1;
+	}
+
+	ret = close(fd);
+	*fdp = -1; /* probably redundant */
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Close all channel fd/socket. */
+static void
+channel_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	int sock = c->sock, rfd = c->rfd, wfd = c->wfd, efd = c->efd;
+
+	channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
+	if (rfd != sock)
+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd);
+	if (wfd != sock && wfd != rfd)
+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd);
+	if (efd != sock && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
+}
+
+static void
+fwd_perm_clear(struct permission *perm)
+{
+	free(perm->host_to_connect);
+	free(perm->listen_host);
+	free(perm->listen_path);
+	memset(perm, 0, sizeof(*perm));
+}
+
+/* Returns an printable name for the specified forwarding permission list */
+static const char *
+fwd_ident(int who, int where)
+{
+	if (who == FORWARD_ADM) {
+		if (where == FORWARD_LOCAL)
+			return "admin local";
+		else if (where == FORWARD_REMOTE)
+			return "admin remote";
+	} else if (who == FORWARD_USER) {
+		if (where == FORWARD_LOCAL)
+			return "user local";
+		else if (where == FORWARD_REMOTE)
+			return "user remote";
+	}
+	fatal("Unknown forward permission list %d/%d", who, where);
+}
+
+/* Returns the forwarding permission list for the specified direction */
+static struct permission_set *
+permission_set_get(struct ssh *ssh, int where)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+
+	switch (where) {
+	case FORWARD_LOCAL:
+		return &sc->local_perms;
+		break;
+	case FORWARD_REMOTE:
+		return &sc->remote_perms;
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal_f("invalid forwarding direction %d", where);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Returns pointers to the specified forwarding list and its element count */
+static void
+permission_set_get_array(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where,
+    struct permission ***permpp, u_int **npermpp)
+{
+	struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where);
+
+	switch (who) {
+	case FORWARD_USER:
+		*permpp = &pset->permitted_user;
+		*npermpp = &pset->num_permitted_user;
+		break;
+	case FORWARD_ADM:
+		*permpp = &pset->permitted_admin;
+		*npermpp = &pset->num_permitted_admin;
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal_f("invalid forwarding client %d", who);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Adds an entry to the specified forwarding list */
+static int
+permission_set_add(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where,
+    const char *host_to_connect, int port_to_connect,
+    const char *listen_host, const char *listen_path, int listen_port,
+    Channel *downstream)
+{
+	struct permission **permp;
+	u_int n, *npermp;
+
+	permission_set_get_array(ssh, who, where, &permp, &npermp);
+
+	if (*npermp >= INT_MAX)
+		fatal_f("%s overflow", fwd_ident(who, where));
+
+	*permp = xrecallocarray(*permp, *npermp, *npermp + 1, sizeof(**permp));
+	n = (*npermp)++;
+#define MAYBE_DUP(s) ((s == NULL) ? NULL : xstrdup(s))
+	(*permp)[n].host_to_connect = MAYBE_DUP(host_to_connect);
+	(*permp)[n].port_to_connect = port_to_connect;
+	(*permp)[n].listen_host = MAYBE_DUP(listen_host);
+	(*permp)[n].listen_path = MAYBE_DUP(listen_path);
+	(*permp)[n].listen_port = listen_port;
+	(*permp)[n].downstream = downstream;
+#undef MAYBE_DUP
+	return (int)n;
+}
+
+static void
+mux_remove_remote_forwardings(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
+	struct permission *perm;
+	int r;
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
+		perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
+		if (perm->downstream != c)
+			continue;
+
+		/* cancel on the server, since mux client is gone */
+		debug("channel %d: cleanup remote forward for %s:%u",
+		    c->self, perm->listen_host, perm->listen_port);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
+		    "cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
+		    channel_rfwd_bind_host(perm->listen_host))) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, perm->listen_port)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self);
+		}
+		fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */
+	}
+}
+
+/* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */
+void
+channel_free(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	char *s;
+	u_int i, n;
+	Channel *other;
+	struct channel_confirm *cc;
+
+	for (n = 0, i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
+		if ((other = sc->channels[i]) == NULL)
+			continue;
+		n++;
+		/* detach from mux client and prepare for closing */
+		if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT &&
+		    other->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY &&
+		    other->mux_ctx == c) {
+			other->mux_ctx = NULL;
+			other->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+			other->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
+			other->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED;
+		}
+	}
+	debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self,
+	    c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n);
+
+	if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) {
+		mux_remove_remote_forwardings(ssh, c);
+		free(c->mux_ctx);
+		c->mux_ctx = NULL;
+	} else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER) {
+		free(c->mux_ctx);
+		c->mux_ctx = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) {
+		s = channel_open_message(ssh);
+		debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s);
+		free(s);
+	}
+
+	channel_close_fds(ssh, c);
+	sshbuf_free(c->input);
+	sshbuf_free(c->output);
+	sshbuf_free(c->extended);
+	c->input = c->output = c->extended = NULL;
+	free(c->remote_name);
+	c->remote_name = NULL;
+	free(c->path);
+	c->path = NULL;
+	free(c->listening_addr);
+	c->listening_addr = NULL;
+	free(c->xctype);
+	c->xctype = NULL;
+	while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) {
+		if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL)
+			cc->abandon_cb(ssh, c, cc->ctx);
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
+		freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
+	}
+	if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL)
+		c->filter_cleanup(ssh, c->self, c->filter_ctx);
+	sc->channels[c->self] = NULL;
+	freezero(c, sizeof(*c));
+}
+
+void
+channel_free_all(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++)
+		if (sc->channels[i] != NULL)
+			channel_free(ssh, sc->channels[i]);
+
+	free(sc->channels);
+	sc->channels = NULL;
+	sc->channels_alloc = 0;
+
+	free(sc->x11_saved_display);
+	sc->x11_saved_display = NULL;
+
+	free(sc->x11_saved_proto);
+	sc->x11_saved_proto = NULL;
+
+	free(sc->x11_saved_data);
+	sc->x11_saved_data = NULL;
+	sc->x11_saved_data_len = 0;
+
+	free(sc->x11_fake_data);
+	sc->x11_fake_data = NULL;
+	sc->x11_fake_data_len = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Closes the sockets/fds of all channels.  This is used to close extra file
+ * descriptors after a fork.
+ */
+void
+channel_close_all(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++)
+		if (ssh->chanctxt->channels[i] != NULL)
+			channel_close_fds(ssh, ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Stop listening to channels.
+ */
+void
+channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
+		c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
+		if (c != NULL) {
+			switch (c->type) {
+			case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
+			case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
+			case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
+			case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
+			case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
+			case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
+				channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
+				channel_free(ssh, c);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or
+ * more channel is overfull.
+ */
+int
+channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	u_int maxsize = ssh_packet_get_maxsize(ssh);
+	Channel *c;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
+		c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
+		if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
+			continue;
+		if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > maxsize) {
+			debug2("channel %d: big output buffer %zu > %u",
+			    c->self, sshbuf_len(c->output), maxsize);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Returns true if any channel is still open. */
+int
+channel_still_open(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
+		c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
+		if (c == NULL)
+			continue;
+		switch (c->type) {
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
+			continue;
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
+			continue;
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY:
+			return 1;
+		default:
+			fatal_f("bad channel type %d", c->type);
+			/* NOTREACHED */
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */
+int
+channel_find_open(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
+		c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
+		if (c == NULL || !c->have_remote_id)
+			continue;
+		switch (c->type) {
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
+			continue;
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
+			return i;
+		default:
+			fatal_f("bad channel type %d", c->type);
+			/* NOTREACHED */
+		}
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/* Returns the state of the channel's extended usage flag */
+const char *
+channel_format_extended_usage(const Channel *c)
+{
+	if (c->efd == -1)
+		return "closed";
+
+	switch (c->extended_usage) {
+	case CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE:
+		return "write";
+	case CHAN_EXTENDED_READ:
+		return "read";
+	case CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE:
+		return "ignore";
+	default:
+		return "UNKNOWN";
+	}
+}
+
+static char *
+channel_format_status(const Channel *c)
+{
+	char *ret = NULL;
+
+	xasprintf(&ret, "t%d [%s] %s%u i%u/%zu o%u/%zu e[%s]/%zu "
+	    "fd %d/%d/%d sock %d cc %d io 0x%02x/0x%02x",
+	    c->type, c->xctype != NULL ? c->xctype : c->ctype,
+	    c->have_remote_id ? "r" : "nr", c->remote_id,
+	    c->istate, sshbuf_len(c->input),
+	    c->ostate, sshbuf_len(c->output),
+	    channel_format_extended_usage(c), sshbuf_len(c->extended),
+	    c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->sock, c->ctl_chan,
+	    c->io_want, c->io_ready);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a message describing the currently open forwarded connections,
+ * suitable for sending to the client.  The message contains crlf pairs for
+ * newlines.
+ */
+char *
+channel_open_message(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *buf;
+	Channel *c;
+	u_int i;
+	int r;
+	char *cp, *ret;
+
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf,
+	    "The following connections are open:\r\n")) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+	for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
+		c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
+		if (c == NULL)
+			continue;
+		switch (c->type) {
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
+			continue;
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY:
+		case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
+			cp = channel_format_status(c);
+			if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf, "  #%d %.300s (%s)\r\n",
+			    c->self, c->remote_name, cp)) != 0) {
+				free(cp);
+				fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+			}
+			free(cp);
+			continue;
+		default:
+			fatal_f("bad channel type %d", c->type);
+			/* NOTREACHED */
+		}
+	}
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string");
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+open_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, Channel *c, const char *type)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) {
+		fatal_r(r, "%s: channel %i: open", where, c->self);
+	}
+}
+
+void
+channel_send_open(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
+	int r;
+
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		logit("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id);
+		return;
+	}
+	debug2("channel %d: send open", id);
+	open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, c->ctype);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self);
+}
+
+void
+channel_request_start(struct ssh *ssh, int id, char *service, int wantconfirm)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
+	int r;
+
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		logit_f("%d: unknown channel id", id);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (!c->have_remote_id)
+		fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self);
+
+	debug2("channel %d: request %s confirm %d", id, service, wantconfirm);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, service)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, wantconfirm)) != 0) {
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self);
+	}
+}
+
+void
+channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id,
+    channel_confirm_cb *cb, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb, void *ctx)
+{
+	struct channel_confirm *cc;
+	Channel *c;
+
+	if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("%d: bad id", id);
+
+	cc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cc));
+	cc->cb = cb;
+	cc->abandon_cb = abandon_cb;
+	cc->ctx = ctx;
+	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
+}
+
+void
+channel_register_open_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id,
+    channel_open_fn *fn, void *ctx)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
+
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		logit_f("%d: bad id", id);
+		return;
+	}
+	c->open_confirm = fn;
+	c->open_confirm_ctx = ctx;
+}
+
+void
+channel_register_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id,
+    channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id);
+
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		logit_f("%d: bad id", id);
+		return;
+	}
+	c->detach_user = fn;
+	c->detach_close = do_close;
+}
+
+void
+channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id);
+
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		logit_f("%d: bad id", id);
+		return;
+	}
+	c->detach_user = NULL;
+	c->detach_close = 0;
+}
+
+void
+channel_register_filter(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn,
+    channel_outfilter_fn *ofn, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *cfn, void *ctx)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
+
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		logit_f("%d: bad id", id);
+		return;
+	}
+	c->input_filter = ifn;
+	c->output_filter = ofn;
+	c->filter_ctx = ctx;
+	c->filter_cleanup = cfn;
+}
+
+void
+channel_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
+    int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty, u_int window_max)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
+	int r;
+
+	if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)
+		fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id);
+	if (!c->have_remote_id)
+		fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self);
+
+	channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, is_tty);
+	c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+	c->lastused = monotime();
+	c->local_window = c->local_window_max = window_max;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	c->io_want = SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self);
+	c->io_want = SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	c->io_want = 0;
+	if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN &&
+	    c->remote_window > 0 &&
+	    sshbuf_len(c->input) < c->remote_window &&
+	    sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0)
+		c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD;
+	if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
+	    c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+		if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0) {
+			c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD;
+		} else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+			if (CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c))
+				debug2("channel %d: "
+				    "obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)", c->self,
+				    c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended));
+			else
+				chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c);
+		}
+	}
+	/** XXX check close conditions, too */
+	if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED &&
+	    c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)) {
+		if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE &&
+		    sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0)
+			c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_W;
+		else if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
+		    (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ ||
+		    c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) &&
+		    sshbuf_len(c->extended) < c->remote_window)
+			c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_R;
+	}
+	/* XXX: What about efd? races? */
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is a special state for X11 authentication spoofing.  An opened X11
+ * connection (when authentication spoofing is being done) remains in this
+ * state until the first packet has been completely read.  The authentication
+ * data in that packet is then substituted by the real data if it matches the
+ * fake data, and the channel is put into normal mode.
+ * XXX All this happens at the client side.
+ * Returns: 0 = need more data, -1 = wrong cookie, 1 = ok
+ */
+static int
+x11_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	u_char *ucp;
+	u_int proto_len, data_len;
+
+	/* Is this being called after the refusal deadline? */
+	if (sc->x11_refuse_time != 0 &&
+	    (u_int)monotime() >= sc->x11_refuse_time) {
+		verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
+		    "expired");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
+	if (sshbuf_len(b) < 12)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Parse the lengths of variable-length fields. */
+	ucp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b);
+	if (ucp[0] == 0x42) {	/* Byte order MSB first. */
+		proto_len = 256 * ucp[6] + ucp[7];
+		data_len = 256 * ucp[8] + ucp[9];
+	} else if (ucp[0] == 0x6c) {	/* Byte order LSB first. */
+		proto_len = ucp[6] + 256 * ucp[7];
+		data_len = ucp[8] + 256 * ucp[9];
+	} else {
+		debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x",
+		    ucp[0]);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Check if the whole packet is in buffer. */
+	if (sshbuf_len(b) <
+	    12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3) + ((data_len + 3) & ~3))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Check if authentication protocol matches. */
+	if (proto_len != strlen(sc->x11_saved_proto) ||
+	    memcmp(ucp + 12, sc->x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) {
+		debug2("X11 connection uses different authentication protocol.");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */
+	if (data_len != sc->x11_fake_data_len ||
+	    timingsafe_bcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
+		sc->x11_fake_data, sc->x11_fake_data_len) != 0) {
+		debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data.");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* Check fake data length */
+	if (sc->x11_fake_data_len != sc->x11_saved_data_len) {
+		error("X11 fake_data_len %d != saved_data_len %d",
+		    sc->x11_fake_data_len, sc->x11_saved_data_len);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Received authentication protocol and data match
+	 * our fake data. Substitute the fake data with real
+	 * data.
+	 */
+	memcpy(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
+	    sc->x11_saved_data, sc->x11_saved_data_len);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+void
+channel_force_close(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int abandon)
+{
+	debug3_f("channel %d: forcibly closing", c->self);
+	if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN)
+		chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
+	if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+		sshbuf_reset(c->input);
+		chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
+	}
+	if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
+	    c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+		sshbuf_reset(c->output);
+		chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
+	}
+	if (c->detach_user)
+		c->detach_user(ssh, c->self, 1, NULL);
+	if (c->efd != -1)
+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
+	if (abandon)
+		c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED;
+	/* exempt from inactivity timeouts */
+	c->inactive_deadline = 0;
+	c->lastused = 0;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_x11_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	int ret = x11_open_helper(ssh, c->output);
+
+	/* c->force_drain = 1; */
+
+	if (ret == 1) {
+		c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+		c->lastused = monotime();
+		channel_pre_open(ssh, c);
+	} else if (ret == -1) {
+		logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong "
+		    "authentication.");
+		debug2("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d",
+		    c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
+		channel_force_close(ssh, c, 0);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+channel_pre_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	c->io_want = 0;
+	if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && !c->mux_pause &&
+	    sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0)
+		c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD;
+	if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+		/* clear buffer immediately (discard any partial packet) */
+		sshbuf_reset(c->input);
+		chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
+		/* Start output drain. XXX just kill chan? */
+		chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c);
+	}
+	if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
+	    c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+		if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0)
+			c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD;
+		else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)
+			chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c);
+	}
+}
+
+/* try to decode a socks4 header */
+static int
+channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output)
+{
+	const u_char *p;
+	char *host;
+	u_int len, have, i, found, need;
+	char username[256];
+	struct {
+		u_int8_t version;
+		u_int8_t command;
+		u_int16_t dest_port;
+		struct in_addr dest_addr;
+	} s4_req, s4_rsp;
+	int r;
+
+	debug2("channel %d: decode socks4", c->self);
+
+	have = sshbuf_len(input);
+	len = sizeof(s4_req);
+	if (have < len)
+		return 0;
+	p = sshbuf_ptr(input);
+
+	need = 1;
+	/* SOCKS4A uses an invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */
+	if (p[4] == 0 && p[5] == 0 && p[6] == 0 && p[7] != 0) {
+		debug2("channel %d: socks4a request", c->self);
+		/* ... and needs an extra string (the hostname) */
+		need = 2;
+	}
+	/* Check for terminating NUL on the string(s) */
+	for (found = 0, i = len; i < have; i++) {
+		if (p[i] == '\0') {
+			found++;
+			if (found == need)
+				break;
+		}
+		if (i > 1024) {
+			/* the peer is probably sending garbage */
+			debug("channel %d: decode socks4: too long",
+			    c->self);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	if (found < need)
+		return 0;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.version, 1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.command, 1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_port, 2)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_addr, 4)) != 0) {
+		debug_r(r, "channels %d: decode socks4", c->self);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	have = sshbuf_len(input);
+	p = sshbuf_ptr(input);
+	if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) {
+		error("channel %d: decode socks4: unterminated user", c->self);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	len = strlen(p);
+	debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len);
+	len++; /* trailing '\0' */
+	strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username));
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self);
+	free(c->path);
+	c->path = NULL;
+	if (need == 1) {			/* SOCKS4: one string */
+		host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr);
+		c->path = xstrdup(host);
+	} else {				/* SOCKS4A: two strings */
+		have = sshbuf_len(input);
+		p = sshbuf_ptr(input);
+		if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) {
+			error("channel %d: decode socks4a: host not nul "
+			    "terminated", c->self);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		len = strlen(p);
+		debug2("channel %d: decode socks4a: host %s/%d",
+		    c->self, p, len);
+		len++;				/* trailing '\0' */
+		if (len > NI_MAXHOST) {
+			error("channel %d: hostname \"%.100s\" too long",
+			    c->self, p);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		c->path = xstrdup(p);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self);
+	}
+	c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port);
+
+	debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks4 host %s port %u command %u",
+	    c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s4_req.command);
+
+	if (s4_req.command != 1) {
+		debug("channel %d: cannot handle: %s cn %d",
+		    c->self, need == 1 ? "SOCKS4" : "SOCKS4A", s4_req.command);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	s4_rsp.version = 0;			/* vn: 0 for reply */
+	s4_rsp.command = 90;			/* cd: req granted */
+	s4_rsp.dest_port = 0;			/* ignored */
+	s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY;	/* ignored */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp))) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: append reply", c->self);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* try to decode a socks5 header */
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE	0x1000
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH	0x00
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4		0x01
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN	0x03
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6		0x04
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT	0x01
+#define SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS	0x00
+
+static int
+channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output)
+{
+	/* XXX use get/put_u8 instead of trusting struct padding */
+	struct {
+		u_int8_t version;
+		u_int8_t command;
+		u_int8_t reserved;
+		u_int8_t atyp;
+	} s5_req, s5_rsp;
+	u_int16_t dest_port;
+	char dest_addr[255+1], ntop[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+	const u_char *p;
+	u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af;
+	int r;
+
+	debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self);
+	p = sshbuf_ptr(input);
+	if (p[0] != 0x05)
+		return -1;
+	have = sshbuf_len(input);
+	if (!(c->flags & SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE)) {
+		/* format: ver | nmethods | methods */
+		if (have < 2)
+			return 0;
+		nmethods = p[1];
+		if (have < nmethods + 2)
+			return 0;
+		/* look for method: "NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED" */
+		for (found = 0, i = 2; i < nmethods + 2; i++) {
+			if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH) {
+				found = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (!found) {
+			debug("channel %d: method SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH not found",
+			    c->self);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, nmethods + 2)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self);
+		/* version, method */
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, 0x05)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: append reply", c->self);
+		c->flags |= SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE;
+		debug2("channel %d: socks5 auth done", c->self);
+		return 0;				/* need more */
+	}
+	debug2("channel %d: socks5 post auth", c->self);
+	if (have < sizeof(s5_req)+1)
+		return 0;			/* need more */
+	memcpy(&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req));
+	if (s5_req.version != 0x05 ||
+	    s5_req.command != SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT ||
+	    s5_req.reserved != 0x00) {
+		debug2("channel %d: only socks5 connect supported", c->self);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	switch (s5_req.atyp){
+	case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4:
+		addrlen = 4;
+		af = AF_INET;
+		break;
+	case SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN:
+		addrlen = p[sizeof(s5_req)];
+		af = -1;
+		break;
+	case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6:
+		addrlen = 16;
+		af = AF_INET6;
+		break;
+	default:
+		debug2("channel %d: bad socks5 atyp %d", c->self, s5_req.atyp);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	need = sizeof(s5_req) + addrlen + 2;
+	if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN)
+		need++;
+	if (have < need)
+		return 0;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, sizeof(s5_req))) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self);
+	if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) {
+		/* host string length */
+		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, 1)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self);
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_addr, addrlen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_port, 2)) != 0) {
+		debug_r(r, "channel %d: parse addr/port", c->self);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	dest_addr[addrlen] = '\0';
+	free(c->path);
+	c->path = NULL;
+	if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) {
+		if (addrlen >= NI_MAXHOST) {
+			error("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 hostname "
+			    "\"%.100s\" too long", c->self, dest_addr);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		c->path = xstrdup(dest_addr);
+	} else {
+		if (inet_ntop(af, dest_addr, ntop, sizeof(ntop)) == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		c->path = xstrdup(ntop);
+	}
+	c->host_port = ntohs(dest_port);
+
+	debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 host %s port %u command %u",
+	    c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s5_req.command);
+
+	s5_rsp.version = 0x05;
+	s5_rsp.command = SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS;
+	s5_rsp.reserved = 0;			/* ignored */
+	s5_rsp.atyp = SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4;
+	dest_port = 0;				/* ignored */
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(output, ntohl(INADDR_ANY))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port))) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: append reply", c->self);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+Channel *
+channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh,
+    const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect,
+    int in, int out, int nonblock)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+
+	debug_f("%s:%d", host_to_connect, port_to_connect);
+
+	c = channel_new(ssh, "stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out,
+	    -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+	    0, "stdio-forward", nonblock);
+
+	c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect);
+	c->host_port = port_to_connect;
+	c->listening_port = 0;
+	c->force_drain = 1;
+
+	channel_register_fds(ssh, c, in, out, -1, 0, 1, 0);
+	port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip");
+
+	return c;
+}
+
+/* dynamic port forwarding */
+static void
+channel_pre_dynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	const u_char *p;
+	u_int have;
+	int ret;
+
+	c->io_want = 0;
+	have = sshbuf_len(c->input);
+	debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: have %d", c->self, have);
+	/* sshbuf_dump(c->input, stderr); */
+	/* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
+	if (have < 3) {
+		/* need more */
+		c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD;
+		return;
+	}
+	/* try to guess the protocol */
+	p = sshbuf_ptr(c->input);
+	/* XXX sshbuf_peek_u8? */
+	switch (p[0]) {
+	case 0x04:
+		ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->input, c->output);
+		break;
+	case 0x05:
+		ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->input, c->output);
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = -1;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
+	} else if (ret == 0) {
+		debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: need more", c->self);
+		/* need more */
+		c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD;
+		if (sshbuf_len(c->output))
+			c->io_want |= SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD;
+	} else {
+		/* switch to the next state */
+		c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
+		port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip");
+	}
+}
+
+/* simulate read-error */
+static void
+rdynamic_close(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+	channel_force_close(ssh, c, 0);
+}
+
+/* reverse dynamic port forwarding */
+static void
+channel_before_prepare_io_rdynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	const u_char *p;
+	u_int have, len;
+	int r, ret;
+
+	have = sshbuf_len(c->output);
+	debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: have %d", c->self, have);
+	/* sshbuf_dump(c->output, stderr); */
+	/* EOF received */
+	if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, have)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self);
+		rdynamic_close(ssh, c);
+		return;
+	}
+	/* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
+	if (have < 3)
+		return;
+	/* try to guess the protocol */
+	p = sshbuf_ptr(c->output);
+	switch (p[0]) {
+	case 0x04:
+		/* switch input/output for reverse forwarding */
+		ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->output, c->input);
+		break;
+	case 0x05:
+		ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->output, c->input);
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = -1;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (ret < 0) {
+		rdynamic_close(ssh, c);
+	} else if (ret == 0) {
+		debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: need more", c->self);
+		/* send socks request to peer */
+		len = sshbuf_len(c->input);
+		if (len > 0 && len < c->remote_window) {
+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, c->input)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+				fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: rdynamic", c->self);
+			}
+			if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "channel %d: consume", c->self);
+			c->remote_window -= len;
+		}
+	} else if (rdynamic_connect_finish(ssh, c) < 0) {
+		/* the connect failed */
+		rdynamic_close(ssh, c);
+	}
+}
+
+/* This is our fake X11 server socket. */
+static void
+channel_post_x11_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	Channel *nc;
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+	int r, newsock, oerrno, remote_port;
+	socklen_t addrlen;
+	char buf[16384], *remote_ipaddr;
+
+	if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R) == 0)
+		return;
+
+	debug("X11 connection requested.");
+	addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+	newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
+	if (c->single_connection) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener.");
+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
+		chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
+		errno = oerrno;
+	}
+	if (newsock == -1) {
+		if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
+		    errno != ECONNABORTED)
+			error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
+			c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
+		return;
+	}
+	set_nodelay(newsock);
+	remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock);
+	remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock);
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d",
+	    remote_ipaddr, remote_port);
+
+	nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11-connection",
+	    SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1,
+	    c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, buf, 1);
+	open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "x11");
+	if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, remote_port)) != 0) {
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self);
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: send", c->self);
+	free(remote_ipaddr);
+}
+
+static void
+port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype)
+{
+	char *local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(c->sock);
+	int local_port = c->sock == -1 ? 65536 : get_local_port(c->sock);
+	char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock);
+	int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock);
+	int r;
+
+	if (remote_port == -1) {
+		/* Fake addr/port to appease peers that validate it (Tectia) */
+		free(remote_ipaddr);
+		remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("127.0.0.1");
+		remote_port = 65535;
+	}
+
+	free(c->remote_name);
+	xasprintf(&c->remote_name,
+	    "%s: listening port %d for %.100s port %d, "
+	    "connect from %.200s port %d to %.100s port %d",
+	    rtype, c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port,
+	    remote_ipaddr, remote_port, local_ipaddr, local_port);
+
+	open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, rtype);
+	if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) {
+		/* target host, port */
+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->host_port)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self);
+	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		/* target path */
+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self);
+	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		/* listen path */
+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self);
+	} else {
+		/* listen address, port */
+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, local_port)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self);
+	}
+	if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		/* reserved for future owner/mode info */
+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self);
+	} else {
+		/* originator host and port */
+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)remote_port)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: reply", c->self);
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: send", c->self);
+	free(remote_ipaddr);
+	free(local_ipaddr);
+}
+
+void
+channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *ssh, u_int refuse_time)
+{
+	ssh->chanctxt->x11_refuse_time = refuse_time;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port.
+ */
+static void
+channel_post_port_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	Channel *nc;
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+	int newsock, nextstate;
+	socklen_t addrlen;
+	char *rtype;
+
+	if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R) == 0)
+		return;
+
+	debug("Connection to port %d forwarding to %.100s port %d requested.",
+	    c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port);
+
+	if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) {
+		nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
+		rtype = "forwarded-tcpip";
+	} else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) {
+		nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
+		rtype = "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com";
+	} else if (c->host_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) {
+		nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
+		rtype = "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com";
+	} else if (c->host_port == 0) {
+		nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC;
+		rtype = "dynamic-tcpip";
+	} else {
+		nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
+		rtype = "direct-tcpip";
+	}
+
+	addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+	newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
+	if (newsock == -1) {
+		if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
+		    errno != ECONNABORTED)
+			error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
+			c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
+		return;
+	}
+	if (c->host_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
+		set_nodelay(newsock);
+	nc = channel_new(ssh, rtype, nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1,
+	    c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, rtype, 1);
+	nc->listening_port = c->listening_port;
+	nc->host_port = c->host_port;
+	if (c->path != NULL)
+		nc->path = xstrdup(c->path);
+
+	if (nextstate != SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC)
+		port_open_helper(ssh, nc, rtype);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from
+ * clients.
+ */
+static void
+channel_post_auth_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	Channel *nc;
+	int r, newsock;
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+	socklen_t addrlen;
+
+	if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R) == 0)
+		return;
+
+	addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+	newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
+	if (newsock == -1) {
+		error("accept from auth socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
+			c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
+		return;
+	}
+	nc = channel_new(ssh, "agent-connection",
+	    SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1,
+	    c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket,
+	    0, "accepted auth socket", 1);
+	open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "auth-agent@openssh.com");
+	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	int err = 0, sock, isopen, r;
+	socklen_t sz = sizeof(err);
+
+	if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W) == 0)
+		return;
+	if (!c->have_remote_id)
+		fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self);
+	/* for rdynamic the OPEN_CONFIRMATION has been sent already */
+	isopen = (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH);
+	if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &sz) == -1) {
+		err = errno;
+		error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed");
+	}
+	if (err == 0) {
+		debug("channel %d: connected to %s port %d",
+		    c->self, c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port);
+		channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx);
+		c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+		c->lastused = monotime();
+		if (isopen) {
+			/* no message necessary */
+		} else {
+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
+			    SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "channel %i open confirm", c->self);
+		}
+	} else {
+		debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s",
+		    c->self, strerror(err));
+		/* Try next address, if any */
+		if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) {
+			close(c->sock);
+			c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock;
+			return;
+		}
+		/* Exhausted all addresses */
+		error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.",
+		    c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port);
+		channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx);
+		if (isopen) {
+			rdynamic_close(ssh, c);
+		} else {
+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
+			    SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh,
+			    SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, strerror(err))) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: failure", c->self);
+			chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+channel_handle_rfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
+	ssize_t len;
+	int r, force;
+	size_t nr = 0, have, avail, maxlen = CHANNEL_MAX_READ;
+	int pty_zeroread = 0;
+
+#ifdef PTY_ZEROREAD
+	/* Bug on AIX: read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd */
+	pty_zeroread = c->isatty;
+#endif
+
+	force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
+
+	if (!force && (c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD) == 0)
+		return 1;
+	if ((avail = sshbuf_avail(c->input)) == 0)
+		return 1; /* Shouldn't happen */
+
+	/*
+	 * For "simple" channels (i.e. not datagram or filtered), we can
+	 * read directly to the channel buffer.
+	 */
+	if (!pty_zeroread && c->input_filter == NULL && !c->datagram) {
+		/* Only OPEN channels have valid rwin */
+		if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+			if ((have = sshbuf_len(c->input)) >= c->remote_window)
+				return 1; /* shouldn't happen */
+			if (maxlen > c->remote_window - have)
+				maxlen = c->remote_window - have;
+		}
+		if (maxlen > avail)
+			maxlen = avail;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_read(c->rfd, c->input, maxlen, &nr)) != 0) {
+			if (errno == EINTR || (!force &&
+			    (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)))
+				return 1;
+			debug2("channel %d: read failed rfd %d maxlen %zu: %s",
+			    c->self, c->rfd, maxlen, ssh_err(r));
+			goto rfail;
+		}
+		if (nr != 0)
+			c->lastused = monotime();
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	errno = 0;
+	len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+	/* fixup AIX zero-length read with errno set to look more like errors */
+	if (pty_zeroread && len == 0 && errno != 0)
+		len = -1;
+	if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR ||
+	    ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force)))
+		return 1;
+	if (len < 0 || (!pty_zeroread && len == 0)) {
+		debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %zd: %s",
+		    c->self, c->rfd, len,
+		    len == 0 ? "closed" : strerror(errno));
+ rfail:
+		if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+			debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self);
+			chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
+			return -1;
+		} else {
+			chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
+		}
+		return -1;
+	}
+	c->lastused = monotime();
+	if (c->input_filter != NULL) {
+		if (c->input_filter(ssh, c, buf, len) == -1) {
+			debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self);
+			chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
+		}
+	} else if (c->datagram) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->input, buf, len)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: put datagram", c->self);
+	} else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: put data", c->self);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_handle_wfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	struct termios tio;
+	u_char *data = NULL, *buf; /* XXX const; need filter API change */
+	size_t dlen, olen = 0;
+	int r, len;
+
+	if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD) == 0)
+		return 1;
+	if (sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
+	olen = sshbuf_len(c->output);
+	if (c->output_filter != NULL) {
+		if ((buf = c->output_filter(ssh, c, &data, &dlen)) == NULL) {
+			debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self);
+			if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
+				chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
+			else
+				chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	} else if (c->datagram) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(c->output, &data, &dlen)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: get datagram", c->self);
+		buf = data;
+	} else {
+		buf = data = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(c->output);
+		dlen = sshbuf_len(c->output);
+	}
+
+	if (c->datagram) {
+		/* ignore truncated writes, datagrams might get lost */
+		len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen);
+		free(data);
+		if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
+		    errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+			return 1;
+		if (len <= 0)
+			goto write_fail;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+	/* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */
+	if (c->wfd_isatty)
+		dlen = MINIMUM(dlen, 8*1024);
+#endif
+
+	len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen);
+	if (len == -1 &&
+	    (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+		return 1;
+	if (len <= 0) {
+ write_fail:
+		if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+			debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self);
+			chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
+			return -1;
+		} else {
+			chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
+		}
+		return -1;
+	}
+	c->lastused = monotime();
+#ifndef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
+	if (c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') {
+		if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 &&
+		    !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) {
+			/*
+			 * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of
+			 * traffic analysis. We need to match the
+			 * size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message
+			 * (4 byte channel id + buf)
+			 */
+			if ((r = sshpkt_msg_ignore(ssh, 4+len)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: ignore", c->self);
+		}
+	}
+#endif /* BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self);
+ out:
+	c->local_consumed += olen - sshbuf_len(c->output);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_handle_efd_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	int r;
+	ssize_t len;
+
+	if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_W) == 0)
+		return 1;
+	if (sshbuf_len(c->extended) == 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	len = write(c->efd, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended),
+	    sshbuf_len(c->extended));
+	debug2("channel %d: written %zd to efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd);
+	if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
+	    errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
+		return 1;
+	if (len <= 0) {
+		debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd);
+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
+	} else {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self);
+		c->local_consumed += len;
+		c->lastused = monotime();
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_handle_efd_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
+	ssize_t len;
+	int r, force;
+
+	force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
+
+	if (!force && (c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_R) == 0)
+		return 1;
+
+	len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+	debug2("channel %d: read %zd from efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd);
+	if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN ||
+	    errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force)))
+		return 1;
+	if (len <= 0) {
+		debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d", c->self, c->efd);
+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	c->lastused = monotime();
+	if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE)
+		debug3("channel %d: discard efd", c->self);
+	else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, buf, len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: append", c->self);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_handle_efd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	if (c->efd == -1)
+		return 1;
+
+	/** XXX handle drain efd, too */
+
+	if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE)
+		return channel_handle_efd_write(ssh, c);
+	else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ ||
+	    c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE)
+		return channel_handle_efd_read(ssh, c);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_check_window(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
+	    !(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) &&
+	    ((c->local_window_max - c->local_window >
+	    c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
+	    c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) &&
+	    c->local_consumed > 0) {
+		if (!c->have_remote_id)
+			fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
+		    SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i", c->self);
+		}
+		debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d", c->self,
+		    c->local_window, c->local_consumed);
+		c->local_window += c->local_consumed;
+		c->local_consumed = 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_post_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	channel_handle_rfd(ssh, c);
+	channel_handle_wfd(ssh, c);
+	channel_handle_efd(ssh, c);
+	channel_check_window(ssh, c);
+}
+
+static u_int
+read_mux(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, u_int need)
+{
+	char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
+	ssize_t len;
+	u_int rlen;
+	int r;
+
+	if (sshbuf_len(c->input) < need) {
+		rlen = need - sshbuf_len(c->input);
+		len = read(c->rfd, buf, MINIMUM(rlen, CHAN_RBUF));
+		if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
+			return sshbuf_len(c->input);
+		if (len <= 0) {
+			debug2("channel %d: ctl read<=0 rfd %d len %zd",
+			    c->self, c->rfd, len);
+			chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
+			return 0;
+		} else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: append", c->self);
+	}
+	return sshbuf_len(c->input);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_post_mux_client_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	u_int need;
+
+	if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD) == 0)
+		return;
+	if (c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)
+		return;
+	if (c->mux_pause)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't not read past the precise end of packets to
+	 * avoid disrupting fd passing.
+	 */
+	if (read_mux(ssh, c, 4) < 4) /* read header */
+		return;
+	/* XXX sshbuf_peek_u32 */
+	need = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(c->input));
+#define CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET	(256 * 1024)
+	if (need > CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET) {
+		debug2("channel %d: packet too big %u > %u",
+		    c->self, CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET, need);
+		chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (read_mux(ssh, c, need + 4) < need + 4) /* read body */
+		return;
+	if (c->mux_rcb(ssh, c) != 0) {
+		debug("channel %d: mux_rcb failed", c->self);
+		chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
+		return;
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+channel_post_mux_client_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	ssize_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD) == 0)
+		return;
+	if (sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0)
+		return;
+
+	len = write(c->wfd, sshbuf_ptr(c->output), sshbuf_len(c->output));
+	if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
+		return;
+	if (len <= 0) {
+		chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
+		return;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_post_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	channel_post_mux_client_read(ssh, c);
+	channel_post_mux_client_write(ssh, c);
+}
+
+static void
+channel_post_mux_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	Channel *nc;
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+	socklen_t addrlen;
+	int newsock;
+	uid_t euid;
+	gid_t egid;
+
+	if ((c->io_ready & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R) == 0)
+		return;
+
+	debug("multiplexing control connection");
+
+	/*
+	 * Accept connection on control socket
+	 */
+	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+	addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+	if ((newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr,
+	    &addrlen)) == -1) {
+		error_f("accept: %s", strerror(errno));
+		if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
+			c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (getpeereid(newsock, &euid, &egid) == -1) {
+		error_f("getpeereid failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+		close(newsock);
+		return;
+	}
+	if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) {
+		error("multiplex uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u",
+		    (u_int)euid, (u_int)getuid());
+		close(newsock);
+		return;
+	}
+	nc = channel_new(ssh, "mux-control", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT,
+	    newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max,
+	    c->local_maxpacket, 0, "mux-control", 1);
+	nc->mux_rcb = c->mux_rcb;
+	debug3_f("new mux channel %d fd %d", nc->self, nc->sock);
+	/* establish state */
+	nc->mux_rcb(ssh, nc);
+	/* mux state transitions must not elicit protocol messages */
+	nc->flags |= CHAN_LOCAL;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc)
+{
+	chan_fn **pre, **post;
+
+	if ((pre = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*pre))) == NULL ||
+	    (post = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*post))) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("allocation failed");
+
+	pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] =			&channel_pre_open;
+	pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] =		&channel_pre_x11_open;
+	pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] =	&channel_pre_listener;
+	pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] =	&channel_pre_listener;
+	pre[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] =	&channel_pre_listener;
+	pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] =	&channel_pre_listener;
+	pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] =		&channel_pre_listener;
+	pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] =		&channel_pre_listener;
+	pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] =		&channel_pre_connecting;
+	pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] =		&channel_pre_dynamic;
+	pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] =	&channel_pre_connecting;
+	pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] =		&channel_pre_listener;
+	pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] =		&channel_pre_mux_client;
+
+	post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] =		&channel_post_open;
+	post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] =	&channel_post_port_listener;
+	post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] =	&channel_post_port_listener;
+	post[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] =	&channel_post_port_listener;
+	post[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] =	&channel_post_port_listener;
+	post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] =	&channel_post_x11_listener;
+	post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] =		&channel_post_auth_listener;
+	post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] =		&channel_post_connecting;
+	post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] =		&channel_post_open;
+	post[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] =	&channel_post_connecting;
+	post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] =	&channel_post_mux_listener;
+	post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] =		&channel_post_mux_client;
+
+	sc->channel_pre = pre;
+	sc->channel_post = post;
+}
+
+/* gc dead channels */
+static void
+channel_garbage_collect(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	if (c == NULL)
+		return;
+	if (c->detach_user != NULL) {
+		if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, c->detach_close))
+			return;
+
+		debug2("channel %d: gc: notify user", c->self);
+		c->detach_user(ssh, c->self, 0, NULL);
+		/* if we still have a callback */
+		if (c->detach_user != NULL)
+			return;
+		debug2("channel %d: gc: user detached", c->self);
+	}
+	if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, 1))
+		return;
+	debug2("channel %d: garbage collecting", c->self);
+	channel_free(ssh, c);
+}
+
+enum channel_table { CHAN_PRE, CHAN_POST };
+
+static void
+channel_handler(struct ssh *ssh, int table, struct timespec *timeout)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	chan_fn **ftab = table == CHAN_PRE ? sc->channel_pre : sc->channel_post;
+	u_int i, oalloc;
+	Channel *c;
+	time_t now;
+
+	now = monotime();
+	for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) {
+		c = sc->channels[i];
+		if (c == NULL)
+			continue;
+		/* Try to keep IO going while rekeying */
+		if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh) && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
+			continue;
+		if (c->delayed) {
+			if (table == CHAN_PRE)
+				c->delayed = 0;
+			else
+				continue;
+		}
+		if (ftab[c->type] != NULL) {
+			if (table == CHAN_PRE &&
+			    c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
+			    c->inactive_deadline != 0 && c->lastused != 0 &&
+			    now >= c->lastused + c->inactive_deadline) {
+				/* channel closed for inactivity */
+				verbose("channel %d: closing after %u seconds "
+				    "of inactivity", c->self,
+				    c->inactive_deadline);
+				channel_force_close(ssh, c, 1);
+			} else if (c->notbefore <= now) {
+				/* Run handlers that are not paused. */
+				(*ftab[c->type])(ssh, c);
+				/* inactivity timeouts must interrupt poll() */
+				if (timeout != NULL &&
+				    c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
+				    c->lastused != 0 &&
+				    c->inactive_deadline != 0) {
+					ptimeout_deadline_monotime(timeout,
+					    c->lastused + c->inactive_deadline);
+				}
+			} else if (timeout != NULL) {
+				/*
+				 * Arrange for poll() wakeup when channel pause
+				 * timer expires.
+				 */
+				ptimeout_deadline_monotime(timeout,
+				    c->notbefore);
+			}
+		}
+		channel_garbage_collect(ssh, c);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create sockets before preparing IO.
+ * This is necessary for things that need to happen after reading
+ * the network-input but need to be completed before IO event setup, e.g.
+ * because they may create new channels.
+ */
+static void
+channel_before_prepare_io(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	Channel *c;
+	u_int i, oalloc;
+
+	for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) {
+		c = sc->channels[i];
+		if (c == NULL)
+			continue;
+		if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN)
+			channel_before_prepare_io_rdynamic(ssh, c);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+dump_channel_poll(const char *func, const char *what, Channel *c,
+    u_int pollfd_offset, struct pollfd *pfd)
+{
+#ifdef DEBUG_CHANNEL_POLL
+	debug3("%s: channel %d: %s r%d w%d e%d s%d c->pfds [ %d %d %d %d ] "
+	    "io_want 0x%02x io_ready 0x%02x pfd[%u].fd=%d "
+	    "pfd.ev 0x%02x pfd.rev 0x%02x", func, c->self, what,
+	    c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->sock,
+	    c->pfds[0], c->pfds[1], c->pfds[2], c->pfds[3],
+	    c->io_want, c->io_ready,
+	    pollfd_offset, pfd->fd, pfd->events, pfd->revents);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Prepare pollfd entries for a single channel */
+static void
+channel_prepare_pollfd(Channel *c, u_int *next_pollfd,
+    struct pollfd *pfd, u_int npfd)
+{
+	u_int ev, p = *next_pollfd;
+
+	if (c == NULL)
+		return;
+	if (p + 4 > npfd) {
+		/* Shouldn't happen */
+		fatal_f("channel %d: bad pfd offset %u (max %u)",
+		    c->self, p, npfd);
+	}
+	c->pfds[0] = c->pfds[1] = c->pfds[2] = c->pfds[3] = -1;
+	/*
+	 * prepare c->rfd
+	 *
+	 * This is a special case, since c->rfd might be the same as
+	 * c->wfd, c->efd and/or c->sock. Handle those here if they want
+	 * IO too.
+	 */
+	if (c->rfd != -1) {
+		ev = 0;
+		if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD) != 0)
+			ev |= POLLIN;
+		/* rfd == wfd */
+		if (c->wfd == c->rfd) {
+			if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD) != 0)
+				ev |= POLLOUT;
+		}
+		/* rfd == efd */
+		if (c->efd == c->rfd) {
+			if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_R) != 0)
+				ev |= POLLIN;
+			if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_W) != 0)
+				ev |= POLLOUT;
+		}
+		/* rfd == sock */
+		if (c->sock == c->rfd) {
+			if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R) != 0)
+				ev |= POLLIN;
+			if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W) != 0)
+				ev |= POLLOUT;
+		}
+		/* Pack a pfd entry if any event armed for this fd */
+		if (ev != 0) {
+			c->pfds[0] = p;
+			pfd[p].fd = c->rfd;
+			pfd[p].events = ev;
+			dump_channel_poll(__func__, "rfd", c, p, &pfd[p]);
+			p++;
+		}
+	}
+	/* prepare c->wfd if wanting IO and not already handled above */
+	if (c->wfd != -1 && c->rfd != c->wfd) {
+		ev = 0;
+		if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD))
+			ev |= POLLOUT;
+		/* Pack a pfd entry if any event armed for this fd */
+		if (ev != 0) {
+			c->pfds[1] = p;
+			pfd[p].fd = c->wfd;
+			pfd[p].events = ev;
+			dump_channel_poll(__func__, "wfd", c, p, &pfd[p]);
+			p++;
+		}
+	}
+	/* prepare c->efd if wanting IO and not already handled above */
+	if (c->efd != -1 && c->rfd != c->efd) {
+		ev = 0;
+		if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_R) != 0)
+			ev |= POLLIN;
+		if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_W) != 0)
+			ev |= POLLOUT;
+		/* Pack a pfd entry if any event armed for this fd */
+		if (ev != 0) {
+			c->pfds[2] = p;
+			pfd[p].fd = c->efd;
+			pfd[p].events = ev;
+			dump_channel_poll(__func__, "efd", c, p, &pfd[p]);
+			p++;
+		}
+	}
+	/* prepare c->sock if wanting IO and not already handled above */
+	if (c->sock != -1 && c->rfd != c->sock) {
+		ev = 0;
+		if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R) != 0)
+			ev |= POLLIN;
+		if ((c->io_want & SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W) != 0)
+			ev |= POLLOUT;
+		/* Pack a pfd entry if any event armed for this fd */
+		if (ev != 0) {
+			c->pfds[3] = p;
+			pfd[p].fd = c->sock;
+			pfd[p].events = 0;
+			dump_channel_poll(__func__, "sock", c, p, &pfd[p]);
+			p++;
+		}
+	}
+	*next_pollfd = p;
+}
+
+/* * Allocate/prepare poll structure */
+void
+channel_prepare_poll(struct ssh *ssh, struct pollfd **pfdp, u_int *npfd_allocp,
+    u_int *npfd_activep, u_int npfd_reserved, struct timespec *timeout)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	u_int i, oalloc, p, npfd = npfd_reserved;
+
+	channel_before_prepare_io(ssh); /* might create a new channel */
+	/* clear out I/O flags from last poll */
+	for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
+		if (sc->channels[i] == NULL)
+			continue;
+		sc->channels[i]->io_want = sc->channels[i]->io_ready = 0;
+	}
+	/* Allocate 4x pollfd for each channel (rfd, wfd, efd, sock) */
+	if (sc->channels_alloc >= (INT_MAX / 4) - npfd_reserved)
+		fatal_f("too many channels"); /* shouldn't happen */
+	npfd += sc->channels_alloc * 4;
+	if (npfd > *npfd_allocp) {
+		*pfdp = xrecallocarray(*pfdp, *npfd_allocp,
+		    npfd, sizeof(**pfdp));
+		*npfd_allocp = npfd;
+	}
+	*npfd_activep = npfd_reserved;
+	oalloc = sc->channels_alloc;
+
+	channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_PRE, timeout);
+
+	if (oalloc != sc->channels_alloc) {
+		/* shouldn't happen */
+		fatal_f("channels_alloc changed during CHAN_PRE "
+		    "(was %u, now %u)", oalloc, sc->channels_alloc);
+	}
+
+	/* Prepare pollfd */
+	p = npfd_reserved;
+	for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++)
+		channel_prepare_pollfd(sc->channels[i], &p, *pfdp, npfd);
+	*npfd_activep = p;
+}
+
+static void
+fd_ready(Channel *c, int p, struct pollfd *pfds, u_int npfd, int fd,
+    const char *what, u_int revents_mask, u_int ready)
+{
+	struct pollfd *pfd = &pfds[p];
+
+	if (fd == -1)
+		return;
+	if (p == -1 || (u_int)p >= npfd)
+		fatal_f("channel %d: bad pfd %d (max %u)", c->self, p, npfd);
+	dump_channel_poll(__func__, what, c, p, pfd);
+	if (pfd->fd != fd) {
+		fatal("channel %d: inconsistent %s fd=%d pollfd[%u].fd %d "
+		    "r%d w%d e%d s%d", c->self, what, fd, p, pfd->fd,
+		    c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->sock);
+	}
+	if ((pfd->revents & POLLNVAL) != 0) {
+		fatal("channel %d: invalid %s pollfd[%u].fd %d r%d w%d e%d s%d",
+		    c->self, what, p, pfd->fd, c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->sock);
+	}
+	if ((pfd->revents & (revents_mask|POLLHUP|POLLERR)) != 0)
+		c->io_ready |= ready & c->io_want;
+}
+
+/*
+ * After poll, perform any appropriate operations for channels which have
+ * events pending.
+ */
+void
+channel_after_poll(struct ssh *ssh, struct pollfd *pfd, u_int npfd)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	u_int i;
+	int p;
+	Channel *c;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_CHANNEL_POLL
+	for (p = 0; p < (int)npfd; p++) {
+		if (pfd[p].revents == 0)
+			continue;
+		debug_f("pfd[%u].fd %d rev 0x%04x",
+		    p, pfd[p].fd, pfd[p].revents);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* Convert pollfd into c->io_ready */
+	for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
+		c = sc->channels[i];
+		if (c == NULL)
+			continue;
+		/* if rfd is shared with efd/sock then wfd should be too */
+		if (c->rfd != -1 && c->wfd != -1 && c->rfd != c->wfd &&
+		    (c->rfd == c->efd || c->rfd == c->sock)) {
+			/* Shouldn't happen */
+			fatal_f("channel %d: unexpected fds r%d w%d e%d s%d",
+			    c->self, c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->sock);
+		}
+		c->io_ready = 0;
+		/* rfd, potentially shared with wfd, efd and sock */
+		if (c->rfd != -1 && (p = c->pfds[0]) != -1) {
+			fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->rfd,
+			    "rfd", POLLIN, SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD);
+			if (c->rfd == c->wfd) {
+				fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->wfd,
+				    "wfd/r", POLLOUT, SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD);
+			}
+			if (c->rfd == c->efd) {
+				fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->efd,
+				    "efdr/r", POLLIN, SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_R);
+				fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->efd,
+				    "efdw/r", POLLOUT, SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_W);
+			}
+			if (c->rfd == c->sock) {
+				fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->sock,
+				    "sockr/r", POLLIN, SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R);
+				fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->sock,
+				    "sockw/r", POLLOUT, SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W);
+			}
+			dump_channel_poll(__func__, "rfd", c, p, pfd);
+		}
+		/* wfd */
+		if (c->wfd != -1 && c->wfd != c->rfd &&
+		    (p = c->pfds[1]) != -1) {
+			fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->wfd,
+			    "wfd", POLLOUT, SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD);
+			dump_channel_poll(__func__, "wfd", c, p, pfd);
+		}
+		/* efd */
+		if (c->efd != -1 && c->efd != c->rfd &&
+		    (p = c->pfds[2]) != -1) {
+			fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->efd,
+			    "efdr", POLLIN, SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_R);
+			fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->efd,
+			    "efdw", POLLOUT, SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_W);
+			dump_channel_poll(__func__, "efd", c, p, pfd);
+		}
+		/* sock */
+		if (c->sock != -1 && c->sock != c->rfd &&
+		    (p = c->pfds[3]) != -1) {
+			fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->sock,
+			    "sockr", POLLIN, SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R);
+			fd_ready(c, p, pfd, npfd, c->sock,
+			    "sockw", POLLOUT, SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W);
+			dump_channel_poll(__func__, "sock", c, p, pfd);
+		}
+	}
+	channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_POST, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Enqueue data for channels with open or draining c->input.
+ */
+static void
+channel_output_poll_input_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	size_t len, plen;
+	const u_char *pkt;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->input)) == 0) {
+		if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
+			/*
+			 * input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown:
+			 * tell peer, that we will not send more data:
+			 * send IEOF.
+			 * hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still
+			 * in use.
+			 */
+			if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c))
+				debug2("channel %d: "
+				    "ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)",
+				    c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended));
+			else
+				chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
+		}
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!c->have_remote_id)
+		fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self);
+
+	if (c->datagram) {
+		/* Check datagram will fit; drop if not */
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(c->input, &pkt, &plen)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: get datagram", c->self);
+		/*
+		 * XXX this does tail-drop on the datagram queue which is
+		 * usually suboptimal compared to head-drop. Better to have
+		 * backpressure at read time? (i.e. read + discard)
+		 */
+		if (plen > c->remote_window || plen > c->remote_maxpacket) {
+			debug("channel %d: datagram too big", c->self);
+			return;
+		}
+		/* Enqueue it */
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkt, plen)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: send datagram", c->self);
+		c->remote_window -= plen;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Enqueue packet for buffered data. */
+	if (len > c->remote_window)
+		len = c->remote_window;
+	if (len > c->remote_maxpacket)
+		len = c->remote_maxpacket;
+	if (len == 0)
+		return;
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->input), len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: send data", c->self);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self);
+	c->remote_window -= len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Enqueue data for channels with open c->extended in read mode.
+ */
+static void
+channel_output_poll_extended_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->extended)) == 0)
+		return;
+
+	debug2("channel %d: rwin %u elen %zu euse %d", c->self,
+	    c->remote_window, sshbuf_len(c->extended), c->extended_usage);
+	if (len > c->remote_window)
+		len = c->remote_window;
+	if (len > c->remote_maxpacket)
+		len = c->remote_maxpacket;
+	if (len == 0)
+		return;
+	if (!c->have_remote_id)
+		fatal_f("channel %d: no remote id", c->self);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended), len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: data", c->self);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: consume", c->self);
+	c->remote_window -= len;
+	debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %zu", c->self, len);
+}
+
+/* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */
+void
+channel_output_poll(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	Channel *c;
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
+		c = sc->channels[i];
+		if (c == NULL)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * We are only interested in channels that can have buffered
+		 * incoming data.
+		 */
+		if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
+			continue;
+		if ((c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) {
+			/* XXX is this true? */
+			debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close",
+			    c->self);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Get the amount of buffered data for this channel. */
+		if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN ||
+		    c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)
+			channel_output_poll_input_open(ssh, c);
+		/* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */
+		if (!(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
+		    c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ)
+			channel_output_poll_extended_read(ssh, c);
+	}
+}
+
+/* -- mux proxy support  */
+
+/*
+ * When multiplexing channel messages for mux clients we have to deal
+ * with downstream messages from the mux client and upstream messages
+ * from the ssh server:
+ * 1) Handling downstream messages is straightforward and happens
+ *    in channel_proxy_downstream():
+ *    - We forward all messages (mostly) unmodified to the server.
+ *    - However, in order to route messages from upstream to the correct
+ *      downstream client, we have to replace the channel IDs used by the
+ *      mux clients with a unique channel ID because the mux clients might
+ *      use conflicting channel IDs.
+ *    - so we inspect and change both SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN and
+ *      SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION messages, create a local
+ *      SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channel and replace the mux clients ID
+ *      with the newly allocated channel ID.
+ * 2) Upstream messages are received by matching SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY
+ *    channels and processed by channel_proxy_upstream(). The local channel ID
+ *    is then translated back to the original mux client ID.
+ * 3) In both cases we need to keep track of matching SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
+ *    messages so we can clean up SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels.
+ * 4) The SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels also need to closed when the
+ *    downstream mux client are removed.
+ * 5) Handling SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN messages from the upstream server
+ *    requires more work, because they are not addressed to a specific
+ *    channel. E.g. client_request_forwarded_tcpip() needs to figure
+ *    out whether the request is addressed to the local client or a
+ *    specific downstream client based on the listen-address/port.
+ * 6) Agent and X11-Forwarding have a similar problem and are currently
+ *    not supported as the matching session/channel cannot be identified
+ *    easily.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * receive packets from downstream mux clients:
+ * channel callback fired on read from mux client, creates
+ * SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels and translates channel IDs
+ * on channel creation.
+ */
+int
+channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *downstream)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *original = NULL, *modified = NULL;
+	const u_char *cp;
+	char *ctype = NULL, *listen_host = NULL;
+	u_char type;
+	size_t have;
+	int ret = -1, r;
+	u_int id, remote_id, listen_port;
+
+	/* sshbuf_dump(downstream->input, stderr); */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(downstream->input, &cp, &have))
+	    != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (have < 2) {
+		error_f("short message");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	type = cp[1];
+	/* skip padlen + type */
+	cp += 2;
+	have -= 2;
+	if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
+		debug3_f("channel %u: down->up: type %u",
+		    downstream->self, type);
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN:
+		if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL ||
+		    (modified = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+			error_f("alloc");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &ctype, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &id)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "parse");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		c = channel_new(ssh, "mux-proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY,
+		    -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, ctype, 1);
+		c->mux_ctx = downstream;	/* point to mux client */
+		c->mux_downstream_id = id;	/* original downstream id */
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(modified, ctype)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "compose");
+			channel_free(ssh, c);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		break;
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION:
+		/*
+		 * Almost the same as SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, except then we
+		 * need to parse 'remote_id' instead of 'ctype'.
+		 */
+		if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL ||
+		    (modified = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+			error_f("alloc");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &remote_id)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &id)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "parse");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		c = channel_new(ssh, "mux-proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY,
+		    -1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, "mux-down-connect", 1);
+		c->mux_ctx = downstream;	/* point to mux client */
+		c->mux_downstream_id = id;
+		c->remote_id = remote_id;
+		c->have_remote_id = 1;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, remote_id)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "compose");
+			channel_free(ssh, c);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		break;
+	case SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST:
+		if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL) {
+			error_f("alloc");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &ctype, NULL)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "parse");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (strcmp(ctype, "tcpip-forward") != 0) {
+			error_f("unsupported request %s", ctype);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(original, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &listen_host, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &listen_port)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "parse");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (listen_port > 65535) {
+			error_f("tcpip-forward for %s: bad port %u",
+			    listen_host, listen_port);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
+		permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, "<mux>", -1,
+		    listen_host, NULL, (int)listen_port, downstream);
+		listen_host = NULL;
+		break;
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE:
+		if (have < 4)
+			break;
+		remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp);
+		if ((c = channel_by_remote_id(ssh, remote_id)) != NULL) {
+			if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)
+				channel_free(ssh, c);
+			else
+				c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	if (modified) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, modified)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "send");
+			goto out;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put(ssh, cp, have)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "send");
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	free(ctype);
+	free(listen_host);
+	sshbuf_free(original);
+	sshbuf_free(modified);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * receive packets from upstream server and de-multiplex packets
+ * to correct downstream:
+ * implemented as a helper for channel input handlers,
+ * replaces local (proxy) channel ID with downstream channel ID.
+ */
+int
+channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *c, int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	Channel *downstream;
+	const u_char *cp = NULL;
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	/*
+	 * When receiving packets from the peer we need to check whether we
+	 * need to forward the packets to the mux client. In this case we
+	 * restore the original channel id and keep track of CLOSE messages,
+	 * so we can cleanup the channel.
+	 */
+	if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY)
+		return 0;
+	if ((downstream = c->mux_ctx) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	switch (type) {
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE:
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA:
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF:
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA:
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION:
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE:
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST:
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS:
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE:
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST:
+		break;
+	default:
+		debug2_f("channel %u: unsupported type %u", c->self, type);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		error_f("alloc reply");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* get remaining payload (after id) */
+	cp = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &len);
+	if (cp == NULL) {
+		error_f("no packet");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* translate id and send to muxclient */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 ||	/* padlen */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, c->mux_downstream_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(b, cp, len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(downstream->output, b)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "compose muxclient");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); */
+	if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
+		debug3_f("channel %u: up->down: type %u", c->self, type);
+ out:
+	/* update state */
+	switch (type) {
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION:
+		/* record remote_id for SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE */
+		if (cp && len > 4) {
+			c->remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp);
+			c->have_remote_id = 1;
+		}
+		break;
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE:
+		if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)
+			channel_free(ssh, c);
+		else
+			c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD;
+		break;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* -- protocol input */
+
+/* Parse a channel ID from the current packet */
+static int
+channel_parse_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what)
+{
+	u_int32_t id;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0) {
+		error_r(r, "%s: parse id", where);
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s message", what);
+	}
+	if (id > INT_MAX) {
+		error_r(r, "%s: bad channel id %u", where, id);
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s channel id", what);
+	}
+	return (int)id;
+}
+
+/* Lookup a channel from an ID in the current packet */
+static Channel *
+channel_from_packet_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what)
+{
+	int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, where, what);
+	Channel *c;
+
+	if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
+		    "%s packet referred to nonexistent channel %d", what, id);
+	}
+	return c;
+}
+
+int
+channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	const u_char *data;
+	size_t data_len, win_len;
+	Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "data");
+	int r;
+
+	if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */
+	if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
+	    c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN &&
+	    c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH &&
+	    c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Get the data. */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: get data", c->self);
+
+	win_len = data_len;
+	if (c->datagram)
+		win_len += 4;  /* string length header */
+
+	/*
+	 * The sending side reduces its window as it sends data, so we
+	 * must 'fake' consumption of the data in order to ensure that window
+	 * updates are sent back. Otherwise the connection might deadlock.
+	 */
+	if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) {
+		c->local_window -= win_len;
+		c->local_consumed += win_len;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (win_len > c->local_maxpacket) {
+		logit("channel %d: rcvd big packet %zu, maxpack %u",
+		    c->self, win_len, c->local_maxpacket);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (win_len > c->local_window) {
+		logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %zu, win %u",
+		    c->self, win_len, c->local_window);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	c->local_window -= win_len;
+
+	if (c->datagram) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: append datagram", c->self);
+	} else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i: append data", c->self);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	const u_char *data;
+	size_t data_len;
+	u_int32_t tcode;
+	Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "extended data");
+	int r;
+
+	if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
+		return 0;
+	if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
+		logit("channel %d: ext data for non open", c->self);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) {
+		if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF)
+			debug("channel %d: accepting ext data after eof",
+			    c->self);
+		else
+			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received extended_data "
+			    "after EOF on channel %d.", c->self);
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &tcode)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse tcode");
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message");
+	}
+	if (c->efd == -1 ||
+	    c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE ||
+	    tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) {
+		logit("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse data");
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message");
+	}
+
+	if (data_len > c->local_window) {
+		logit("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %zu, win %u",
+		    c->self, data_len, c->local_window);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %zu", c->self, data_len);
+	/* XXX sshpkt_getb? */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, data, data_len)) != 0)
+		error_fr(r, "append");
+	c->local_window -= data_len;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "ieof");
+	int r;
+
+        if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse data");
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid ieof message");
+	}
+
+	if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
+		return 0;
+	chan_rcvd_ieof(ssh, c);
+
+	/* XXX force input close */
+	if (c->force_drain && c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) {
+		debug("channel %d: FORCE input drain", c->self);
+		c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN;
+		if (sshbuf_len(c->input) == 0)
+			chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "oclose");
+	int r;
+
+	if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
+		return 0;
+        if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse data");
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid oclose message");
+	}
+	chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open confirmation");
+	u_int32_t remote_window, remote_maxpacket;
+	int r;
+
+	if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
+		return 0;
+	if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING)
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received open confirmation for "
+		    "non-opening channel %d.", c->self);
+	/*
+	 * Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel
+	 * is now open.
+	 */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_window)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "window/maxpacket");
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open confirmation message");
+	}
+
+	c->have_remote_id = 1;
+	c->remote_window = remote_window;
+	c->remote_maxpacket = remote_maxpacket;
+	c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
+	if (c->open_confirm) {
+		debug2_f("channel %d: callback start", c->self);
+		c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 1, c->open_confirm_ctx);
+		debug2_f("channel %d: callback done", c->self);
+	}
+	c->lastused = monotime();
+	debug2("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self,
+	    c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static char *
+reason2txt(int reason)
+{
+	switch (reason) {
+	case SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED:
+		return "administratively prohibited";
+	case SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED:
+		return "connect failed";
+	case SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE:
+		return "unknown channel type";
+	case SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE:
+		return "resource shortage";
+	}
+	return "unknown reason";
+}
+
+int
+channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open failure");
+	u_int32_t reason;
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
+		return 0;
+	if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING)
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received open failure for "
+		    "non-opening channel %d.", c->self);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse reason");
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open failure message");
+	}
+	/* skip language */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse msg/lang");
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open failure message");
+	}
+	logit("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", c->self,
+	    reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : "");
+	free(msg);
+	if (c->open_confirm) {
+		debug2_f("channel %d: callback start", c->self);
+		c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 0, c->open_confirm_ctx);
+		debug2_f("channel %d: callback done", c->self);
+	}
+	/* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */
+	chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "window adjust");
+	Channel *c;
+	u_int32_t adjust;
+	u_int new_rwin;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
+		logit("Received window adjust for non-open channel %d.", id);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
+		return 0;
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &adjust)) != 0 ||
+            (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse adjust");
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid window adjust message");
+	}
+	debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", c->self, adjust);
+	if ((new_rwin = c->remote_window + adjust) < c->remote_window) {
+		fatal("channel %d: adjust %u overflows remote window %u",
+		    c->self, adjust, c->remote_window);
+	}
+	c->remote_window = new_rwin;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "status confirm");
+	Channel *c;
+	struct channel_confirm *cc;
+
+	/* Reset keepalive timeout */
+	ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0);
+
+	debug2_f("type %d id %d", type, id);
+
+	if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
+		logit_f("%d: unknown", id);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
+		return 0;
+        if (sshpkt_get_end(ssh) != 0)
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid status confirm message");
+	if ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	cc->cb(ssh, type, c, cc->ctx);
+	TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
+	freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* -- tcp forwarding */
+
+void
+channel_set_af(struct ssh *ssh, int af)
+{
+	ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6 = af;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether or not a port forward listens to loopback, the
+ * specified address or wildcard. On the client, a specified bind
+ * address will always override gateway_ports. On the server, a
+ * gateway_ports of 1 (``yes'') will override the client's specification
+ * and force a wildcard bind, whereas a value of 2 (``clientspecified'')
+ * will bind to whatever address the client asked for.
+ *
+ * Special-case listen_addrs are:
+ *
+ * "0.0.0.0"               -> wildcard v4/v6 if SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR
+ * "" (empty string), "*"  -> wildcard v4/v6
+ * "localhost"             -> loopback v4/v6
+ * "127.0.0.1" / "::1"     -> accepted even if gateway_ports isn't set
+ */
+static const char *
+channel_fwd_bind_addr(struct ssh *ssh, const char *listen_addr, int *wildcardp,
+    int is_client, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
+{
+	const char *addr = NULL;
+	int wildcard = 0;
+
+	if (listen_addr == NULL) {
+		/* No address specified: default to gateway_ports setting */
+		if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports)
+			wildcard = 1;
+	} else if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports || is_client) {
+		if (((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR) &&
+		    strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") == 0 && is_client == 0) ||
+		    *listen_addr == '\0' || strcmp(listen_addr, "*") == 0 ||
+		    (!is_client && fwd_opts->gateway_ports == 1)) {
+			wildcard = 1;
+			/*
+			 * Notify client if they requested a specific listen
+			 * address and it was overridden.
+			 */
+			if (*listen_addr != '\0' &&
+			    strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") != 0 &&
+			    strcmp(listen_addr, "*") != 0) {
+				ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh,
+				    "Forwarding listen address "
+				    "\"%s\" overridden by server "
+				    "GatewayPorts", listen_addr);
+			}
+		} else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "localhost") != 0 ||
+		    strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 ||
+		    strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Accept explicit localhost address when
+			 * GatewayPorts=yes. The "localhost" hostname is
+			 * deliberately skipped here so it will listen on all
+			 * available local address families.
+			 */
+			addr = listen_addr;
+		}
+	} else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 ||
+	    strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * If a specific IPv4/IPv6 localhost address has been
+		 * requested then accept it even if gateway_ports is in
+		 * effect. This allows the client to prefer IPv4 or IPv6.
+		 */
+		addr = listen_addr;
+	}
+	if (wildcardp != NULL)
+		*wildcardp = wildcard;
+	return addr;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
+    struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port,
+    struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	int sock, r, success = 0, wildcard = 0, is_client;
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+	const char *host, *addr;
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	in_port_t *lport_p;
+
+	is_client = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER);
+
+	if (is_client && fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
+		host = fwd->connect_path;
+	} else {
+		host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ?
+		    fwd->listen_host : fwd->connect_host;
+		if (host == NULL) {
+			error("No forward host name.");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
+			error("Forward host name too long.");
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Determine the bind address, cf. channel_fwd_bind_addr() comment */
+	addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(ssh, fwd->listen_host, &wildcard,
+	    is_client, fwd_opts);
+	debug3_f("type %d wildcard %d addr %s", type, wildcard,
+	    (addr == NULL) ? "NULL" : addr);
+
+	/*
+	 * getaddrinfo returns a loopback address if the hostname is
+	 * set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE
+	 */
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
+	hints.ai_flags = wildcard ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", fwd->listen_port);
+	if ((r = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+		if (addr == NULL) {
+			/* This really shouldn't happen */
+			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "getaddrinfo: fatal error: %s",
+			    ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+		} else {
+			error_f("getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", addr,
+			    ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (allocated_listen_port != NULL)
+		*allocated_listen_port = 0;
+	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		switch (ai->ai_family) {
+		case AF_INET:
+			lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr)->
+			    sin_port;
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr)->
+			    sin6_port;
+			break;
+		default:
+			continue;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * If allocating a port for -R forwards, then use the
+		 * same port for all address families.
+		 */
+		if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER &&
+		    fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
+		    *allocated_listen_port > 0)
+			*lport_p = htons(*allocated_listen_port);
+
+		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
+		    strport, sizeof(strport),
+		    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
+			error_f("getnameinfo failed");
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Create a port to listen for the host. */
+		sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+		if (sock == -1) {
+			/* this is no error since kernel may not support ipv6 */
+			verbose("socket [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		set_reuseaddr(sock);
+		if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+			sock_set_v6only(sock);
+
+		debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.",
+		    ntop, strport);
+
+		/* Bind the socket to the address. */
+		if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+			/*
+			 * address can be in if use ipv6 address is
+			 * already bound
+			 */
+			if (!ai->ai_next)
+				error("bind [%s]:%s: %.100s",
+				    ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
+			else
+				verbose("bind [%s]:%s: %.100s",
+				    ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
+
+			close(sock);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Start listening for connections on the socket. */
+		if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1) {
+			error("listen [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			close(sock);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * fwd->listen_port == 0 requests a dynamically allocated port -
+		 * record what we got.
+		 */
+		if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER &&
+		    fwd->listen_port == 0 &&
+		    allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
+		    *allocated_listen_port == 0) {
+			*allocated_listen_port = get_local_port(sock);
+			debug("Allocated listen port %d",
+			    *allocated_listen_port);
+		}
+
+		/* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
+		c = channel_new(ssh, "port-listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
+		    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+		    0, "port listener", 1);
+		c->path = xstrdup(host);
+		c->host_port = fwd->connect_port;
+		c->listening_addr = addr == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(addr);
+		if (fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
+		    !(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT))
+			c->listening_port = *allocated_listen_port;
+		else
+			c->listening_port = fwd->listen_port;
+		success = 1;
+	}
+	if (success == 0)
+		error_f("cannot listen to port: %d", fwd->listen_port);
+	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+	return success;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
+    struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+	const char *path;
+	Channel *c;
+	int port, sock;
+	mode_t omask;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
+		if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
+			if (strlen(fwd->connect_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) {
+				error("Local connecting path too long: %s",
+				    fwd->connect_path);
+				return 0;
+			}
+			path = fwd->connect_path;
+			port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+		} else {
+			if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) {
+				error("No forward host name.");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			if (strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
+				error("Forward host name too long.");
+				return 0;
+			}
+			path = fwd->connect_host;
+			port = fwd->connect_port;
+		}
+		break;
+	case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
+		path = fwd->listen_path;
+		port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+		break;
+	default:
+		error_f("unexpected channel type %d", type);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (fwd->listen_path == NULL) {
+		error("No forward path name.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (strlen(fwd->listen_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) {
+		error("Local listening path too long: %s", fwd->listen_path);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	debug3_f("type %d path %s", type, fwd->listen_path);
+
+	/* Start a Unix domain listener. */
+	omask = umask(fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_mask);
+	sock = unix_listener(fwd->listen_path, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG,
+	    fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+	umask(omask);
+	if (sock < 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	debug("Local forwarding listening on path %s.", fwd->listen_path);
+
+	/* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
+	c = channel_new(ssh, "unix-listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
+	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+	    0, "unix listener", 1);
+	c->path = xstrdup(path);
+	c->host_port = port;
+	c->listening_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+	c->listening_addr = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh,
+    const char *host, u_short port)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	int found = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
+		Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
+		if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER)
+			continue;
+		if (strcmp(c->path, host) == 0 && c->listening_port == port) {
+			debug2_f("close channel %d", i);
+			channel_free(ssh, c);
+			found = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return found;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	int found = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
+		Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
+		if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER)
+			continue;
+		if (c->path == NULL)
+			continue;
+		if (strcmp(c->path, path) == 0) {
+			debug2_f("close channel %d", i);
+			channel_free(ssh, c);
+			found = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return found;
+}
+
+int
+channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
+{
+	if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
+		return channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(ssh,
+		    fwd->listen_path);
+	} else {
+		return channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(ssh,
+		    fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh,
+    const char *lhost, u_short lport, int cport,
+    struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	int found = 0;
+	const char *addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(ssh, lhost, NULL, 1, fwd_opts);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
+		Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
+		if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER)
+			continue;
+		if (c->listening_port != lport)
+			continue;
+		if (cport == CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC) {
+			/* skip dynamic forwardings */
+			if (c->host_port == 0)
+				continue;
+		} else {
+			if (c->host_port != cport)
+				continue;
+		}
+		if ((c->listening_addr == NULL && addr != NULL) ||
+		    (c->listening_addr != NULL && addr == NULL))
+			continue;
+		if (addr == NULL || strcmp(c->listening_addr, addr) == 0) {
+			debug2_f("close channel %d", i);
+			channel_free(ssh, c);
+			found = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return found;
+}
+
+static int
+channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	int found = 0;
+
+	if (path == NULL) {
+		error_f("no path specified.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
+		Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
+		if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER)
+			continue;
+		if (c->listening_addr == NULL)
+			continue;
+		if (strcmp(c->listening_addr, path) == 0) {
+			debug2_f("close channel %d", i);
+			channel_free(ssh, c);
+			found = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return found;
+}
+
+int
+channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct ssh *ssh,
+    struct Forward *fwd, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
+{
+	if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
+		return channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(ssh,
+		    fwd->listen_path);
+	} else {
+		return channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(ssh,
+		    fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, cport, fwd_opts);
+	}
+}
+
+/* protocol local port fwd, used by ssh */
+int
+channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh,
+    struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
+{
+	if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
+		return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh,
+		    SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts);
+	} else {
+		return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh,
+		    SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER, fwd, NULL, fwd_opts);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Matches a remote forwarding permission against a requested forwarding */
+static int
+remote_open_match(struct permission *allowed_open, struct Forward *fwd)
+{
+	int ret;
+	char *lhost;
+
+	/* XXX add ACLs for streamlocal */
+	if (fwd->listen_path != NULL)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (fwd->listen_host == NULL || allowed_open->listen_host == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (allowed_open->listen_port != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT &&
+	    allowed_open->listen_port != fwd->listen_port)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Match hostnames case-insensitively */
+	lhost = xstrdup(fwd->listen_host);
+	lowercase(lhost);
+	ret = match_pattern(lhost, allowed_open->listen_host);
+	free(lhost);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Checks whether a requested remote forwarding is permitted */
+static int
+check_rfwd_permission(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	struct permission_set *pset = &sc->remote_perms;
+	u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
+	struct permission *perm;
+
+	/* XXX apply GatewayPorts override before checking? */
+
+	permit = pset->all_permitted;
+	if (!permit) {
+		for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
+			perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
+			if (remote_open_match(perm, fwd)) {
+				permit = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) {
+		permit_adm = 0;
+		for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) {
+			perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i];
+			if (remote_open_match(perm, fwd)) {
+				permit_adm = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	return permit && permit_adm;
+}
+
+/* protocol v2 remote port fwd, used by sshd */
+int
+channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd,
+    int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
+{
+	if (!check_rfwd_permission(ssh, fwd)) {
+		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "port forwarding refused");
+		if (fwd->listen_path != NULL)
+			/* XXX always allowed, see remote_open_match() */
+			logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to "
+			    "remote forward to path \"%.100s\", "
+			    "but the request was denied.",
+			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+			    fwd->listen_path);
+		else if(fwd->listen_host != NULL)
+			logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to "
+			    "remote forward to host %.100s port %d, "
+			    "but the request was denied.",
+			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+			    fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port );
+		else
+			logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to remote "
+			    "forward, but the request was denied.",
+			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
+		return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh,
+		    SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts);
+	} else {
+		return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh,
+		    SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER, fwd, allocated_listen_port,
+		    fwd_opts);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Translate the requested rfwd listen host to something usable for
+ * this server.
+ */
+static const char *
+channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host)
+{
+	if (listen_host == NULL) {
+		return "localhost";
+	} else if (*listen_host == '\0' || strcmp(listen_host, "*") == 0) {
+		return "";
+	} else
+		return listen_host;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initiate forwarding of connections to port "port" on remote host through
+ * the secure channel to host:port from local side.
+ * Returns handle (index) for updating the dynamic listen port with
+ * channel_update_permission().
+ */
+int
+channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
+{
+	int r, success = 0, idx = -1;
+	const char *host_to_connect, *listen_host, *listen_path;
+	int port_to_connect, listen_port;
+
+	/* Send the forward request to the remote side. */
+	if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
+		    "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, fwd->listen_path)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "request streamlocal");
+	} else {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "tcpip-forward")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
+		    channel_rfwd_bind_host(fwd->listen_host))) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, fwd->listen_port)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "request tcpip-forward");
+	}
+	/* Assume that server accepts the request */
+	success = 1;
+	if (success) {
+		/* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
+		host_to_connect = listen_host = listen_path = NULL;
+		port_to_connect = listen_port = 0;
+		if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
+			host_to_connect = fwd->connect_path;
+			port_to_connect = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+		} else {
+			host_to_connect = fwd->connect_host;
+			port_to_connect = fwd->connect_port;
+		}
+		if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
+			listen_path = fwd->listen_path;
+			listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+		} else {
+			listen_host = fwd->listen_host;
+			listen_port = fwd->listen_port;
+		}
+		idx = permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL,
+		    host_to_connect, port_to_connect,
+		    listen_host, listen_path, listen_port, NULL);
+	}
+	return idx;
+}
+
+static int
+open_match(struct permission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost,
+    int requestedport)
+{
+	if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (allowed_open->port_to_connect != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT &&
+	    allowed_open->port_to_connect != requestedport)
+		return 0;
+	if (strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST) != 0 &&
+	    strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, requestedhost) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note that in the listen host/port case
+ * we don't support FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT and
+ * need to translate between the configured-host (listen_host)
+ * and what we've sent to the remote server (channel_rfwd_bind_host)
+ */
+static int
+open_listen_match_tcpip(struct permission *allowed_open,
+    const char *requestedhost, u_short requestedport, int translate)
+{
+	const char *allowed_host;
+
+	if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (allowed_open->listen_port != requestedport)
+		return 0;
+	if (!translate && allowed_open->listen_host == NULL &&
+	    requestedhost == NULL)
+		return 1;
+	allowed_host = translate ?
+	    channel_rfwd_bind_host(allowed_open->listen_host) :
+	    allowed_open->listen_host;
+	if (allowed_host == NULL || requestedhost == NULL ||
+	    strcmp(allowed_host, requestedhost) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+open_listen_match_streamlocal(struct permission *allowed_open,
+    const char *requestedpath)
+{
+	if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (allowed_open->listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
+		return 0;
+	if (allowed_open->listen_path == NULL ||
+	    strcmp(allowed_open->listen_path, requestedpath) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of connection host:port from
+ * local side.
+ */
+static int
+channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh,
+    const char *host, u_short port)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
+	int r;
+	u_int i;
+	struct permission *perm = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
+		perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
+		if (open_listen_match_tcpip(perm, host, port, 0))
+			break;
+		perm = NULL;
+	}
+	if (perm == NULL) {
+		debug_f("requested forward not found");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, channel_rfwd_bind_host(host))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, port)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send cancel");
+
+	fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of Unix domain socket
+ * path from local side.
+ */
+static int
+channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
+	int r;
+	u_int i;
+	struct permission *perm = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
+		perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
+		if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(perm, path))
+			break;
+		perm = NULL;
+	}
+	if (perm == NULL) {
+		debug_f("requested forward not found");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
+	    "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, path)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send cancel");
+
+	fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of a connection from local side.
+ */
+int
+channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
+{
+	if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
+		return channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(ssh,
+		    fwd->listen_path);
+	} else {
+		return channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(ssh,
+		    fwd->listen_host,
+		    fwd->listen_port ? fwd->listen_port : fwd->allocated_port);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Permits opening to any host/port if permitted_user[] is empty.  This is
+ * usually called by the server, because the user could connect to any port
+ * anyway, and the server has no way to know but to trust the client anyway.
+ */
+void
+channel_permit_all(struct ssh *ssh, int where)
+{
+	struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where);
+
+	if (pset->num_permitted_user == 0)
+		pset->all_permitted = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Permit the specified host/port for forwarding.
+ */
+void
+channel_add_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where,
+    char *host, int port)
+{
+	int local = where == FORWARD_LOCAL;
+	struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where);
+
+	debug("allow %s forwarding to host %s port %d",
+	    fwd_ident(who, where), host, port);
+	/*
+	 * Remote forwards set listen_host/port, local forwards set
+	 * host/port_to_connect.
+	 */
+	permission_set_add(ssh, who, where,
+	    local ? host : 0, local ? port : 0,
+	    local ? NULL : host, NULL, local ? 0 : port, NULL);
+	pset->all_permitted = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Administratively disable forwarding.
+ */
+void
+channel_disable_admin(struct ssh *ssh, int where)
+{
+	channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where);
+	permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where,
+	    NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Clear a list of permitted opens.
+ */
+void
+channel_clear_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where)
+{
+	struct permission **permp;
+	u_int *npermp;
+
+	permission_set_get_array(ssh, who, where, &permp, &npermp);
+	*permp = xrecallocarray(*permp, *npermp, 0, sizeof(**permp));
+	*npermp = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update the listen port for a dynamic remote forward, after
+ * the actual 'newport' has been allocated. If 'newport' < 0 is
+ * passed then they entry will be invalidated.
+ */
+void
+channel_update_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int idx, int newport)
+{
+	struct permission_set *pset = &ssh->chanctxt->local_perms;
+
+	if (idx < 0 || (u_int)idx >= pset->num_permitted_user) {
+		debug_f("index out of range: %d num_permitted_user %d",
+		    idx, pset->num_permitted_user);
+		return;
+	}
+	debug("%s allowed port %d for forwarding to host %s port %d",
+	    newport > 0 ? "Updating" : "Removing",
+	    newport,
+	    pset->permitted_user[idx].host_to_connect,
+	    pset->permitted_user[idx].port_to_connect);
+	if (newport <= 0)
+		fwd_perm_clear(&pset->permitted_user[idx]);
+	else {
+		pset->permitted_user[idx].listen_port =
+		    (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT) ? 0 : newport;
+	}
+}
+
+/* returns port number, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT or -1 on error */
+int
+permitopen_port(const char *p)
+{
+	int port;
+
+	if (strcmp(p, "*") == 0)
+		return FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT;
+	if ((port = a2port(p)) > 0)
+		return port;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/* Try to start non-blocking connect to next host in cctx list */
+static int
+connect_next(struct channel_connect *cctx)
+{
+	int sock, saved_errno;
+	struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr;
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
+	char strport[MAXIMUM(NI_MAXSERV, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path))];
+
+	for (; cctx->ai; cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next) {
+		switch (cctx->ai->ai_family) {
+		case AF_UNIX:
+			/* unix:pathname instead of host:port */
+			sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)cctx->ai->ai_addr;
+			strlcpy(ntop, "unix", sizeof(ntop));
+			strlcpy(strport, sunaddr->sun_path, sizeof(strport));
+			break;
+		case AF_INET:
+		case AF_INET6:
+			if (getnameinfo(cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen,
+			    ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+			    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
+				error_f("getnameinfo failed");
+				continue;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			continue;
+		}
+		debug_f("start for host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s)",
+		    cctx->host, ntop, strport);
+		if ((sock = socket(cctx->ai->ai_family, cctx->ai->ai_socktype,
+		    cctx->ai->ai_protocol)) == -1) {
+			if (cctx->ai->ai_next == NULL)
+				error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			else
+				verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (set_nonblock(sock) == -1)
+			fatal_f("set_nonblock(%d)", sock);
+		if (connect(sock, cctx->ai->ai_addr,
+		    cctx->ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 && errno != EINPROGRESS) {
+			debug_f("host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s): %.100s",
+			    cctx->host, ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
+			saved_errno = errno;
+			close(sock);
+			errno = saved_errno;
+			continue;	/* fail -- try next */
+		}
+		if (cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_UNIX)
+			set_nodelay(sock);
+		debug_f("connect host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s) in progress, fd=%d",
+		    cctx->host, ntop, strport, sock);
+		cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next;
+		return sock;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static void
+channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx)
+{
+	free(cctx->host);
+	if (cctx->aitop) {
+		if (cctx->aitop->ai_family == AF_UNIX)
+			free(cctx->aitop);
+		else
+			freeaddrinfo(cctx->aitop);
+	}
+	memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return connecting socket to remote host:port or local socket path,
+ * passing back the failure reason if appropriate.
+ */
+static int
+connect_to_helper(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name, int port, int socktype,
+    char *ctype, char *rname, struct channel_connect *cctx,
+    int *reason, const char **errmsg)
+{
+	struct addrinfo hints;
+	int gaierr;
+	int sock = -1;
+	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+
+	if (port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) {
+		struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr;
+		struct addrinfo *ai;
+
+		if (strlen(name) > sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)) {
+			error("%.100s: %.100s", name, strerror(ENAMETOOLONG));
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Fake up a struct addrinfo for AF_UNIX connections.
+		 * channel_connect_ctx_free() must check ai_family
+		 * and use free() not freeaddirinfo() for AF_UNIX.
+		 */
+		ai = xmalloc(sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr));
+		memset(ai, 0, sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr));
+		ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1);
+		ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(*sunaddr);
+		ai->ai_family = AF_UNIX;
+		ai->ai_socktype = socktype;
+		ai->ai_protocol = PF_UNSPEC;
+		sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)ai->ai_addr;
+		sunaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+		strlcpy(sunaddr->sun_path, name, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path));
+		cctx->aitop = ai;
+	} else {
+		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+		hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
+		hints.ai_socktype = socktype;
+		snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+		if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx->aitop))
+		    != 0) {
+			if (errmsg != NULL)
+				*errmsg = ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr);
+			if (reason != NULL)
+				*reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED;
+			error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", name,
+			    ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	cctx->host = xstrdup(name);
+	cctx->port = port;
+	cctx->ai = cctx->aitop;
+
+	if ((sock = connect_next(cctx)) == -1) {
+		error("connect to %.100s port %d failed: %s",
+		    name, port, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return sock;
+}
+
+/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */
+static Channel *
+connect_to(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, int port,
+    char *ctype, char *rname)
+{
+	struct channel_connect cctx;
+	Channel *c;
+	int sock;
+
+	memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx));
+	sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname,
+	    &cctx, NULL, NULL);
+	if (sock == -1) {
+		channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1,
+	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1);
+	c->host_port = port;
+	c->path = xstrdup(host);
+	c->connect_ctx = cctx;
+
+	return c;
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns either the newly connected channel or the downstream channel
+ * that needs to deal with this connection.
+ */
+Channel *
+channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *ssh, const char *listen_host,
+    u_short listen_port, char *ctype, char *rname)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
+	u_int i;
+	struct permission *perm;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
+		perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
+		if (open_listen_match_tcpip(perm,
+		    listen_host, listen_port, 1)) {
+			if (perm->downstream)
+				return perm->downstream;
+			if (perm->port_to_connect == 0)
+				return rdynamic_connect_prepare(ssh,
+				    ctype, rname);
+			return connect_to(ssh,
+			    perm->host_to_connect, perm->port_to_connect,
+			    ctype, rname);
+		}
+	}
+	error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown listen_port %d",
+	    listen_port);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+Channel *
+channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path,
+    char *ctype, char *rname)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
+	u_int i;
+	struct permission *perm;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
+		perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
+		if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(perm, path)) {
+			return connect_to(ssh,
+			    perm->host_to_connect, perm->port_to_connect,
+			    ctype, rname);
+		}
+	}
+	error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown path %.100s",
+	    path);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */
+Channel *
+channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port,
+    char *ctype, char *rname, int *reason, const char **errmsg)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
+	struct channel_connect cctx;
+	Channel *c;
+	u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
+	int sock;
+	struct permission *perm;
+
+	permit = pset->all_permitted;
+	if (!permit) {
+		for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
+			perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
+			if (open_match(perm, host, port)) {
+				permit = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) {
+		permit_adm = 0;
+		for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) {
+			perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i];
+			if (open_match(perm, host, port)) {
+				permit_adm = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
+		logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to connect to "
+		    "host %.100s port %d, but the request was denied.",
+		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), host, port);
+		if (reason != NULL)
+			*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx));
+	sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname,
+	    &cctx, reason, errmsg);
+	if (sock == -1) {
+		channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1,
+	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1);
+	c->host_port = port;
+	c->path = xstrdup(host);
+	c->connect_ctx = cctx;
+
+	return c;
+}
+
+/* Check if connecting to that path is permitted and connect. */
+Channel *
+channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path,
+    char *ctype, char *rname)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
+	u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
+	struct permission *perm;
+
+	permit = pset->all_permitted;
+	if (!permit) {
+		for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
+			perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
+			if (open_match(perm, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) {
+				permit = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) {
+		permit_adm = 0;
+		for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) {
+			perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i];
+			if (open_match(perm, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) {
+				permit_adm = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
+		logit("Received request to connect to path %.100s, "
+		    "but the request was denied.", path);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return connect_to(ssh, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL, ctype, rname);
+}
+
+void
+channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	struct winsize ws;
+	int r;
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
+		if (sc->channels[i] == NULL || !sc->channels[i]->client_tty ||
+		    sc->channels[i]->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
+			continue;
+		if (ioctl(sc->channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == -1)
+			continue;
+		channel_request_start(ssh, i, "window-change", 0);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_col)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_row)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_xpixel)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_ypixel)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "channel %u; send window-change", i);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Return RDYNAMIC_OPEN channel: channel allows SOCKS, but is not connected */
+static Channel *
+rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, char *rname)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	int r;
+
+	c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN, -1, -1, -1,
+	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1);
+	c->host_port = 0;
+	c->path = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to open the channel before we have a FD,
+	 * so that we can get SOCKS header from peer.
+	 */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "channel %i; confirm", c->self);
+	return c;
+}
+
+/* Return CONNECTING socket to remote host:port or local socket path */
+static int
+rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
+	struct permission *perm;
+	struct channel_connect cctx;
+	u_int i, permit_adm = 1;
+	int sock;
+
+	if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) {
+		permit_adm = 0;
+		for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) {
+			perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i];
+			if (open_match(perm, c->path, c->host_port)) {
+				permit_adm = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (!permit_adm) {
+		debug_f("requested forward not permitted");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx));
+	sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, c->path, c->host_port, SOCK_STREAM, NULL,
+	    NULL, &cctx, NULL, NULL);
+	if (sock == -1)
+		channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx);
+	else {
+		/* similar to SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING but we've already sent the open */
+		c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH;
+		c->connect_ctx = cctx;
+		channel_register_fds(ssh, c, sock, sock, -1, 0, 1, 0);
+	}
+	return sock;
+}
+
+/* -- X11 forwarding */
+
+/*
+ * Creates an internet domain socket for listening for X11 connections.
+ * Returns 0 and a suitable display number for the DISPLAY variable
+ * stored in display_numberp , or -1 if an error occurs.
+ */
+int
+x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
+    int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection,
+    u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
+{
+	Channel *nc = NULL;
+	int display_number, sock;
+	u_short port;
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	int gaierr, n, num_socks = 0, socks[NUM_SOCKS];
+
+	if (chanids == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
+	    display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
+	    display_number++) {
+		port = 6000 + display_number;
+		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+		hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
+		hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
+		hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+		snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+		if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport,
+		    &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+			error("getaddrinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+			return -1;
+		}
+		for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+			if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET &&
+			    ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+				continue;
+			sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
+			    ai->ai_protocol);
+			if (sock == -1) {
+				if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+#ifdef EPFNOSUPPORT
+				    && (errno != EPFNOSUPPORT)
+#endif 
+				    ) {
+					error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+					freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+					return -1;
+				} else {
+					debug("x11_create_display_inet: Socket family %d not supported",
+						 ai->ai_family);
+					continue;
+				}
+			}
+			if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+				sock_set_v6only(sock);
+			if (x11_use_localhost)
+				set_reuseaddr(sock);
+			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+				debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port,
+				    strerror(errno));
+				close(sock);
+				for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++)
+					close(socks[n]);
+				num_socks = 0;
+				break;
+			}
+			socks[num_socks++] = sock;
+			if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
+				break;
+		}
+		freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+		if (num_socks > 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
+		error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* Start listening for connections on the socket. */
+	for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
+		sock = socks[n];
+		if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1) {
+			error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			close(sock);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Allocate a channel for each socket. */
+	*chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids));
+	for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
+		sock = socks[n];
+		nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11-listener",
+		    SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1,
+		    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+		    0, "X11 inet listener", 1);
+		nc->single_connection = single_connection;
+		(*chanids)[n] = nc->self;
+	}
+	(*chanids)[n] = -1;
+
+	/* Return the display number for the DISPLAY environment variable. */
+	*display_numberp = display_number;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
+{
+	int sock;
+	struct sockaddr_un addr;
+
+	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (sock == -1)
+		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
+		return sock;
+	close(sock);
+	error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
+	return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
+}
+
+#ifdef __APPLE__
+static int
+is_path_to_xsocket(const char *display, char *path, size_t pathlen)
+{
+	struct stat sbuf;
+
+	if (strlcpy(path, display, pathlen) >= pathlen) {
+		error("%s: display path too long", __func__);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (display[0] != '/')
+		return 0;
+	if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) {
+		return 1;
+	} else {
+		char *dot = strrchr(path, '.');
+		if (dot != NULL) {
+			*dot = '\0';
+			if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) {
+				return 1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+x11_connect_display(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	u_int display_number;
+	const char *display;
+	char buf[1024], *cp;
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	int gaierr, sock = 0;
+
+	/* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */
+	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+	if (!display) {
+		error("DISPLAY not set.");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Now we decode the value of the DISPLAY variable and make a
+	 * connection to the real X server.
+	 */
+
+#ifdef __APPLE__
+	/* Check if display is a path to a socket (as set by launchd). */
+	{
+		char path[PATH_MAX];
+
+		if (is_path_to_xsocket(display, path, sizeof(path))) {
+			debug("x11_connect_display: $DISPLAY is launchd");
+
+			/* Create a socket. */
+			sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(path);
+			if (sock < 0)
+				return -1;
+
+			/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
+			return sock;
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+	/*
+	 * Check if it is a unix domain socket.  Unix domain displays are in
+	 * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s]
+	 */
+	if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 ||
+	    display[0] == ':') {
+		/* Connect to the unix domain socket. */
+		if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u",
+		    &display_number) != 1) {
+			error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: "
+			    "%.100s", display);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		/* Create a socket. */
+		sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number);
+		if (sock < 0)
+			return -1;
+
+		/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
+		return sock;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Connect to an inet socket.  The DISPLAY value is supposedly
+	 * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address.
+	 */
+	strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf));
+	cp = strchr(buf, ':');
+	if (!cp) {
+		error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	*cp = 0;
+	/*
+	 * buf now contains the host name.  But first we parse the
+	 * display number.
+	 */
+	if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
+		error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
+		    display);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Look up the host address */
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
+	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+		error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
+		ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		/* Create a socket. */
+		sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+		if (sock == -1) {
+			debug2("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Connect it to the display. */
+		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+			debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
+			    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
+			close(sock);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Success */
+		break;
+	}
+	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+	if (!ai) {
+		error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
+		    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	set_nodelay(sock);
+	return sock;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Requests forwarding of X11 connections, generates fake authentication
+ * data, and enables authentication spoofing.
+ * This should be called in the client only.
+ */
+void
+x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *ssh, int client_session_id,
+    const char *disp, const char *proto, const char *data, int want_reply)
+{
+	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
+	u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2;
+	u_int i, value;
+	const char *cp;
+	char *new_data;
+	int r, screen_number;
+
+	if (sc->x11_saved_display == NULL)
+		sc->x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp);
+	else if (strcmp(disp, sc->x11_saved_display) != 0) {
+		error("x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing: different "
+		    "$DISPLAY already forwarded");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	cp = strchr(disp, ':');
+	if (cp)
+		cp = strchr(cp, '.');
+	if (cp)
+		screen_number = (u_int)strtonum(cp + 1, 0, 400, NULL);
+	else
+		screen_number = 0;
+
+	if (sc->x11_saved_proto == NULL) {
+		/* Save protocol name. */
+		sc->x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto);
+
+		/* Extract real authentication data. */
+		sc->x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len);
+		for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
+			if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1) {
+				fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad "
+				    "authentication data: %.100s", data);
+			}
+			sc->x11_saved_data[i] = value;
+		}
+		sc->x11_saved_data_len = data_len;
+
+		/* Generate fake data of the same length. */
+		sc->x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len);
+		arc4random_buf(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len);
+		sc->x11_fake_data_len = data_len;
+	}
+
+	/* Convert the fake data into hex. */
+	new_data = tohex(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len);
+
+	/* Send the request packet. */
+	channel_request_start(ssh, client_session_id, "x11-req", want_reply);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* bool: single connection */
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, proto)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, new_data)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, screen_number)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send x11-req");
+	free(new_data);
+}
diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..101843a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/channels.h
@@ -0,0 +1,399 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.148 2023/01/18 02:00:10 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef CHANNEL_H
+#define CHANNEL_H
+
+/* Definitions for channel types. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER	1	/* Listening for inet X11 conn. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER	2	/* Listening on a port. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING		3	/* waiting for confirmation */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN		4	/* normal open two-way channel */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED		5	/* waiting for close confirmation */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET		6	/* authentication socket */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN		7	/* reading first X11 packet */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL		10	/* larval session */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER	11	/* Listening to a R-style port  */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING		12
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC		13
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE		14	/* Almost dead. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER	15	/* Listener for mux conn. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT		16	/* Conn. to mux client */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED		17	/* Abandoned session, eg mux */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER	18	/* Listening on a domain socket. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER	19	/* Listening to a R-style domain socket. */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY		20	/* proxy channel for mux-client */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN	21	/* reverse SOCKS, parsing request */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH	22	/* reverse SOCKS, finishing connect */
+#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE		23
+
+#define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC	-1
+
+/* nonblocking flags for channel_new */
+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_LEAVE	0 /* don't modify non-blocking state */
+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_SET	1 /* set non-blocking state */
+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO	2 /* set non-blocking and restore on close */
+
+/* c->restore_block mask flags */
+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD	0x01
+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD	0x02
+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD	0x04
+
+/* TCP forwarding */
+#define FORWARD_DENY		0
+#define FORWARD_REMOTE		(1)
+#define FORWARD_LOCAL		(1<<1)
+#define FORWARD_ALLOW		(FORWARD_REMOTE|FORWARD_LOCAL)
+
+#define FORWARD_ADM		0x100
+#define FORWARD_USER		0x101
+
+struct ssh;
+struct Channel;
+typedef struct Channel Channel;
+struct fwd_perm_list;
+
+typedef void channel_open_fn(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
+typedef void channel_callback_fn(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
+typedef int channel_infilter_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, char *, int);
+typedef void channel_filter_cleanup_fn(struct ssh *, int, void *);
+typedef u_char *channel_outfilter_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *,
+    u_char **, size_t *);
+
+/* Channel success/failure callbacks */
+typedef void channel_confirm_cb(struct ssh *, int, struct Channel *, void *);
+typedef void channel_confirm_abandon_cb(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, void *);
+struct channel_confirm {
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(channel_confirm) entry;
+	channel_confirm_cb *cb;
+	channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb;
+	void *ctx;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(channel_confirms, channel_confirm);
+
+/* Context for non-blocking connects */
+struct channel_connect {
+	char *host;
+	int port;
+	struct addrinfo *ai, *aitop;
+};
+
+/* Callbacks for mux channels back into client-specific code */
+typedef int mux_callback_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *);
+
+/*
+ * NB. channel IDs on the wire and in c->remote_id are uint32, but local
+ * channel IDs (e.g. c->self) only ever use the int32 subset of this range,
+ * because we use local channel ID -1 for housekeeping. Remote channels have
+ * a dedicated "have_remote_id" flag to indicate their validity.
+ */
+
+struct Channel {
+	int     type;		/* channel type/state */
+
+	int     self;		/* my own channel identifier */
+	uint32_t remote_id;	/* channel identifier for remote peer */
+	int	have_remote_id;	/* non-zero if remote_id is valid */
+
+	u_int   istate;		/* input from channel (state of receive half) */
+	u_int   ostate;		/* output to channel  (state of transmit half) */
+	int     flags;		/* close sent/rcvd */
+	int     rfd;		/* read fd */
+	int     wfd;		/* write fd */
+	int     efd;		/* extended fd */
+	int     sock;		/* sock fd */
+	u_int	io_want;	/* bitmask of SSH_CHAN_IO_* */
+	u_int	io_ready;	/* bitmask of SSH_CHAN_IO_* */
+	int	pfds[4];	/* pollfd entries for rfd/wfd/efd/sock */
+	int     ctl_chan;	/* control channel (multiplexed connections) */
+	int     isatty;		/* rfd is a tty */
+#ifdef _AIX
+	int     wfd_isatty;	/* wfd is a tty */
+#endif
+	int	client_tty;	/* (client) TTY has been requested */
+	int     force_drain;	/* force close on iEOF */
+	time_t	notbefore;	/* Pause IO until deadline (time_t) */
+	int     delayed;	/* post-IO handlers for newly created
+				 * channels are delayed until the first call
+				 * to a matching pre-IO handler.
+				 * this way post-IO handlers are not
+				 * accidentally called if a FD gets reused */
+	int	restore_block;	/* fd mask to restore blocking status */
+	int	restore_flags[3];/* flags to restore */
+	struct sshbuf *input;	/* data read from socket, to be sent over
+				 * encrypted connection */
+	struct sshbuf *output;	/* data received over encrypted connection for
+				 * send on socket */
+	struct sshbuf *extended;
+
+	char    *path;
+		/* path for unix domain sockets, or host name for forwards */
+	int     listening_port;	/* port being listened for forwards */
+	char   *listening_addr;	/* addr being listened for forwards */
+	int     host_port;	/* remote port to connect for forwards */
+	char   *remote_name;	/* remote hostname */
+
+	u_int	remote_window;
+	u_int	remote_maxpacket;
+	u_int	local_window;
+	u_int	local_window_max;
+	u_int	local_consumed;
+	u_int	local_maxpacket;
+	int     extended_usage;
+	int	single_connection;
+
+	char   *ctype;		/* const type - NB. not freed on channel_free */
+	char   *xctype;		/* extended type */
+
+	/* callback */
+	channel_open_fn		*open_confirm;
+	void			*open_confirm_ctx;
+	channel_callback_fn	*detach_user;
+	int			detach_close;
+	struct channel_confirms	status_confirms;
+
+	/* filter */
+	channel_infilter_fn	*input_filter;
+	channel_outfilter_fn	*output_filter;
+	void			*filter_ctx;
+	channel_filter_cleanup_fn *filter_cleanup;
+
+	/* keep boundaries */
+	int			datagram;
+
+	/* non-blocking connect */
+	/* XXX make this a pointer so the structure can be opaque */
+	struct channel_connect	connect_ctx;
+
+	/* multiplexing protocol hook, called for each packet received */
+	mux_callback_fn		*mux_rcb;
+	void			*mux_ctx;
+	int			mux_pause;
+	int			mux_downstream_id;
+
+	/* Inactivity timeouts */
+
+	/* Last traffic seen for OPEN channels */
+	time_t			lastused;
+	/* Inactivity timeout deadline in seconds (0 = no timeout) */
+	u_int			inactive_deadline;
+};
+
+#define CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE		0
+#define CHAN_EXTENDED_READ		1
+#define CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE		2
+
+/* default window/packet sizes for tcp/x11-fwd-channel */
+#define CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT	(32*1024)
+#define CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT	(64*CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT)
+#define CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT	(32*1024)
+#define CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT	(64*CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT)
+#define CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT	(16*1024)
+#define CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT	(4*CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT)
+
+/* possible input states */
+#define CHAN_INPUT_OPEN			0
+#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN		1
+#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE		2
+#define CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED		3
+
+/* possible output states */
+#define CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN		0
+#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN		1
+#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF		2
+#define CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED		3
+
+#define CHAN_CLOSE_SENT			0x01
+#define CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD			0x02
+#define CHAN_EOF_SENT			0x04
+#define CHAN_EOF_RCVD			0x08
+#define CHAN_LOCAL			0x10
+
+/* file descriptor events */
+#define SSH_CHAN_IO_RFD			0x01
+#define SSH_CHAN_IO_WFD			0x02
+#define SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_R		0x04
+#define SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_W		0x08
+#define SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD			(SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_R|SSH_CHAN_IO_EFD_W)
+#define SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R		0x10
+#define SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W		0x20
+#define SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK		(SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_R|SSH_CHAN_IO_SOCK_W)
+
+/* Read buffer size */
+#define CHAN_RBUF	(16*1024)
+
+/* Maximum size for direct reads to buffers */
+#define CHANNEL_MAX_READ	CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT
+
+/* Maximum channel input buffer size */
+#define CHAN_INPUT_MAX	(16*1024*1024)
+
+/* Hard limit on number of channels */
+#define CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS	(16*1024)
+
+/* check whether 'efd' is still in use */
+#define CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c) \
+	(c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && \
+	(c->efd != -1 || \
+	sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0))
+#define CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c) \
+	(c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && \
+	c->efd != -1 && (!(c->flags & (CHAN_EOF_RCVD|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) || \
+	sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0))
+
+/* Add channel management structures to SSH transport instance */
+void channel_init_channels(struct ssh *ssh);
+
+/* channel management */
+
+Channel	*channel_by_id(struct ssh *, int);
+Channel	*channel_by_remote_id(struct ssh *, u_int);
+Channel	*channel_lookup(struct ssh *, int);
+Channel *channel_new(struct ssh *, char *, int, int, int, int,
+	    u_int, u_int, int, const char *, int);
+void	 channel_set_fds(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, int,
+	    int, int, u_int);
+void	 channel_free(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+void	 channel_free_all(struct ssh *);
+void	 channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *);
+void	 channel_force_close(struct ssh *, Channel *, int);
+void	 channel_set_xtype(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
+
+void	 channel_send_open(struct ssh *, int);
+void	 channel_request_start(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
+void	 channel_register_cleanup(struct ssh *, int,
+	    channel_callback_fn *, int);
+void	 channel_register_open_confirm(struct ssh *, int,
+	    channel_open_fn *, void *);
+void	 channel_register_filter(struct ssh *, int, channel_infilter_fn *,
+	    channel_outfilter_fn *, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *, void *);
+void	 channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *, int,
+	    channel_confirm_cb *, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *);
+void	 channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *, int);
+int	 channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, Channel *, int *);
+void	 channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *);
+
+/* channel inactivity timeouts */
+void channel_add_timeout(struct ssh *, const char *, u_int);
+void channel_clear_timeouts(struct ssh *);
+
+/* mux proxy support */
+
+int	 channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *, Channel *mc);
+int	 channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *, int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+
+/* protocol handler */
+
+int	 channel_input_data(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+int	 channel_input_extended_data(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+int	 channel_input_ieof(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+int	 channel_input_oclose(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+int	 channel_input_open_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+int	 channel_input_open_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+int	 channel_input_port_open(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+int	 channel_input_window_adjust(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+int	 channel_input_status_confirm(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+
+/* file descriptor handling (read/write) */
+struct pollfd;
+struct timespec;
+
+void	 channel_prepare_poll(struct ssh *, struct pollfd **,
+	    u_int *, u_int *, u_int, struct timespec *);
+void	 channel_after_poll(struct ssh *, struct pollfd *, u_int);
+void     channel_output_poll(struct ssh *);
+
+int      channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(struct ssh *);
+void     channel_close_all(struct ssh *);
+int      channel_still_open(struct ssh *);
+const char *channel_format_extended_usage(const Channel *);
+char	*channel_open_message(struct ssh *);
+int	 channel_find_open(struct ssh *);
+
+/* tcp forwarding */
+struct Forward;
+struct ForwardOptions;
+void	 channel_set_af(struct ssh *, int af);
+void     channel_permit_all(struct ssh *, int);
+void	 channel_add_permission(struct ssh *, int, int, char *, int);
+void	 channel_clear_permission(struct ssh *, int, int);
+void	 channel_disable_admin(struct ssh *, int);
+void	 channel_update_permission(struct ssh *, int, int);
+Channel	*channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *, const char *, u_short,
+	    char *, char *, int *, const char **);
+Channel *channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *, const char *, char *, char *);
+Channel	*channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, const char*,
+	    u_short, int, int, int);
+Channel	*channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *, const char *,
+	    u_short, char *, char *);
+Channel	*channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *, const char *,
+	    char *, char *);
+int	 channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *, struct Forward *);
+int	 channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *,
+	    struct ForwardOptions *);
+int	 channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct ssh *, struct Forward *);
+int	 channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *,
+	    int *, struct ForwardOptions *);
+int	 channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *);
+int	 channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *,
+	    int, struct ForwardOptions *);
+int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
+
+/* x11 forwarding */
+
+void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int);
+int	 x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
+int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
+void	 x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int,
+	    const char *, const char *, const char *, int);
+
+/* channel close */
+
+int	 chan_is_dead(struct ssh *, Channel *, int);
+void	 chan_mark_dead(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+
+/* channel events */
+
+void	 chan_rcvd_oclose(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+void	 chan_rcvd_eow(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+void	 chan_read_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+void	 chan_ibuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+void	 chan_rcvd_ieof(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+void	 chan_write_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+void	 chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/cipher-aes.c b/cipher-aes.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b10172
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cipher-aes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "rijndael.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#define RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE 16
+struct ssh_rijndael_ctx
+{
+	rijndael_ctx	r_ctx;
+	u_char		r_iv[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE];
+};
+
+static int
+ssh_rijndael_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv,
+    int enc)
+{
+	struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
+		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
+	}
+	if (key != NULL) {
+		if (enc == -1)
+			enc = ctx->encrypt;
+		rijndael_set_key(&c->r_ctx, (u_char *)key,
+		    8*EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx), enc);
+	}
+	if (iv != NULL)
+		memcpy(c->r_iv, iv, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_rijndael_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src,
+    LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len)
+{
+	struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c;
+	u_char buf[RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE];
+	u_char *cprev, *cnow, *plain, *ivp;
+	int i, j, blocks = len / RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+
+	if (len == 0)
+		return (1);
+	if (len % RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE)
+		fatal("ssh_rijndael_cbc: bad len %d", len);
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) {
+		error("ssh_rijndael_cbc: no context");
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (ctx->encrypt) {
+		cnow  = dest;
+		plain = (u_char *)src;
+		cprev = c->r_iv;
+		for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++, plain+=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE,
+		    cnow+=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) {
+			for (j = 0; j < RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; j++)
+				buf[j] = plain[j] ^ cprev[j];
+			rijndael_encrypt(&c->r_ctx, buf, cnow);
+			cprev = cnow;
+		}
+		memcpy(c->r_iv, cprev, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+	} else {
+		cnow  = (u_char *) (src+len-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+		plain = dest+len-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+
+		memcpy(buf, cnow, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+		for (i = blocks; i > 0; i--, cnow-=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE,
+		    plain-=RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE) {
+			rijndael_decrypt(&c->r_ctx, cnow, plain);
+			ivp = (i == 1) ? c->r_iv : cnow-RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+			for (j = 0; j < RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE; j++)
+				plain[j] ^= ivp[j];
+		}
+		memcpy(c->r_iv, buf, RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE);
+	}
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_rijndael_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
+		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+		free(c);
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
+	}
+	return (1);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char * iv, u_int len)
+{
+	struct ssh_rijndael_ctx *c;
+
+	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL)
+		fatal("ssh_rijndael_iv: no context");
+	if (doset)
+		memcpy(c->r_iv, iv, len);
+	else
+		memcpy(iv, c->r_iv, len);
+}
+
+const EVP_CIPHER *
+evp_rijndael(void)
+{
+	static EVP_CIPHER rijndal_cbc;
+
+	memset(&rijndal_cbc, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER));
+	rijndal_cbc.nid = NID_undef;
+	rijndal_cbc.block_size = RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+	rijndal_cbc.iv_len = RIJNDAEL_BLOCKSIZE;
+	rijndal_cbc.key_len = 16;
+	rijndal_cbc.init = ssh_rijndael_init;
+	rijndal_cbc.cleanup = ssh_rijndael_cleanup;
+	rijndal_cbc.do_cipher = ssh_rijndael_cbc;
+#ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
+	rijndal_cbc.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
+	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
+#endif
+	return (&rijndal_cbc);
+}
+#endif /* USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL */
diff --git a/cipher-aesctr.c b/cipher-aesctr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eed95c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cipher-aesctr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-aesctr.c,v 1.2 2015/01/14 10:24:42 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include "cipher-aesctr.h"
+
+/*
+ * increment counter 'ctr',
+ * the counter is of size 'len' bytes and stored in network-byte-order.
+ * (LSB at ctr[len-1], MSB at ctr[0])
+ */
+static inline void
+aesctr_inc(u8 *ctr, u32 len)
+{
+	ssize_t i;
+
+#ifndef CONSTANT_TIME_INCREMENT
+	for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--)
+		if (++ctr[i])	/* continue on overflow */
+			return;
+#else
+	u8 x, add = 1;
+
+	for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+		ctr[i] += add;
+		/* constant time for: x = ctr[i] ? 1 : 0 */
+		x = ctr[i];
+		x = (x | (x >> 4)) & 0xf;
+		x = (x | (x >> 2)) & 0x3;
+		x = (x | (x >> 1)) & 0x1;
+		add *= (x^1);
+	}
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+aesctr_keysetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits,u32 ivbits)
+{
+	x->rounds = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(x->ek, k, kbits);
+}
+
+void
+aesctr_ivsetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *iv)
+{
+	memcpy(x->ctr, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+void
+aesctr_encrypt_bytes(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes)
+{
+	u32 n = 0;
+	u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+
+	while ((bytes--) > 0) {
+		if (n == 0) {
+			rijndaelEncrypt(x->ek, x->rounds, x->ctr, buf);
+			aesctr_inc(x->ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+		}
+		*(c++) = *(m++) ^ buf[n];
+		n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	}
+}
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/cipher-aesctr.h b/cipher-aesctr.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85d55bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cipher-aesctr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-aesctr.h,v 1.1 2014/04/29 15:39:33 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OPENSSH_AESCTR_H
+#define OPENSSH_AESCTR_H
+
+#include "rijndael.h"
+
+#define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16
+
+typedef struct aesctr_ctx {
+	int	rounds;				/* keylen-dependent #rounds */
+	u32	ek[4*(AES_MAXROUNDS + 1)];	/* encrypt key schedule */
+	u8	ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];		/* counter */
+} aesctr_ctx;
+
+void aesctr_keysetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits,u32 ivbits);
+void aesctr_ivsetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *iv);
+void aesctr_encrypt_bytes(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c b/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..719f9c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.c,v 1.1 2020/04/03 04:32:21 djm Exp $ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_EVP_CHACHA20) && !defined(HAVE_BROKEN_CHACHA20)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdarg.h> /* needed for log.h */
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>  /* needed for misc.h */
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "cipher-chachapoly.h"
+
+struct chachapoly_ctx {
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *main_evp, *header_evp;
+};
+
+struct chachapoly_ctx *
+chachapoly_new(const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
+{
+	struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx;
+
+	if (keylen != (32 + 32)) /* 2 x 256 bit keys */
+		return NULL;
+	if ((ctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	if ((ctx->main_evp = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (ctx->header_evp = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+		goto fail;
+	if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx->main_evp, EVP_chacha20(), key, NULL, 1))
+		goto fail;
+	if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx->header_evp, EVP_chacha20(), key + 32, NULL, 1))
+		goto fail;
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx->header_evp) != 16)
+		goto fail;
+	return ctx;
+ fail:
+	chachapoly_free(ctx);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+chachapoly_free(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx)
+{
+	if (cpctx == NULL)
+		return;
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cpctx->main_evp);
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cpctx->header_evp);
+	freezero(cpctx, sizeof(*cpctx));
+}
+
+/*
+ * chachapoly_crypt() operates as following:
+ * En/decrypt with header key 'aadlen' bytes from 'src', storing result
+ * to 'dest'. The ciphertext here is treated as additional authenticated
+ * data for MAC calculation.
+ * En/decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'. Use
+ * POLY1305_TAGLEN bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication
+ * tag. This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption.
+ */
+int
+chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest,
+    const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen, int do_encrypt)
+{
+	u_char seqbuf[16]; /* layout: u64 counter || u64 seqno */
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	u_char expected_tag[POLY1305_TAGLEN], poly_key[POLY1305_KEYLEN];
+
+	/*
+	 * Run ChaCha20 once to generate the Poly1305 key. The IV is the
+	 * packet sequence number.
+	 */
+	memset(seqbuf, 0, sizeof(seqbuf));
+	POKE_U64(seqbuf + 8, seqnr);
+	memset(poly_key, 0, sizeof(poly_key));
+	if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx->main_evp, NULL, NULL, seqbuf, 1) ||
+	    EVP_Cipher(ctx->main_evp, poly_key,
+	    poly_key, sizeof(poly_key)) < 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* If decrypting, check tag before anything else */
+	if (!do_encrypt) {
+		const u_char *tag = src + aadlen + len;
+
+		poly1305_auth(expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key);
+		if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) != 0) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Crypt additional data */
+	if (aadlen) {
+		if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx->header_evp, NULL, NULL, seqbuf, 1) ||
+		    EVP_Cipher(ctx->header_evp, dest, src, aadlen) < 0) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Set Chacha's block counter to 1 */
+	seqbuf[0] = 1;
+	if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx->main_evp, NULL, NULL, seqbuf, 1) ||
+	    EVP_Cipher(ctx->main_evp, dest + aadlen, src + aadlen, len) < 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* If encrypting, calculate and append tag */
+	if (do_encrypt) {
+		poly1305_auth(dest + aadlen + len, dest, aadlen + len,
+		    poly_key);
+	}
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(expected_tag, sizeof(expected_tag));
+	explicit_bzero(seqbuf, sizeof(seqbuf));
+	explicit_bzero(poly_key, sizeof(poly_key));
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Decrypt and extract the encrypted packet length */
+int
+chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx,
+    u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len)
+{
+	u_char buf[4], seqbuf[16];
+
+	if (len < 4)
+		return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+	memset(seqbuf, 0, sizeof(seqbuf));
+	POKE_U64(seqbuf + 8, seqnr);
+	if (!EVP_CipherInit(ctx->header_evp, NULL, NULL, seqbuf, 0))
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	if (EVP_Cipher(ctx->header_evp, buf, (u_char *)cp, sizeof(buf)) < 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	*plenp = PEEK_U32(buf);
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* defined(HAVE_EVP_CHACHA20) && !defined(HAVE_BROKEN_CHACHA20) */
diff --git a/cipher-chachapoly.c b/cipher-chachapoly.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..716f8d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cipher-chachapoly.c
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.c,v 1.9 2020/04/03 04:27:03 djm Exp $ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_EVP_CHACHA20) || defined(HAVE_BROKEN_CHACHA20)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdarg.h> /* needed for log.h */
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>  /* needed for misc.h */
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "cipher-chachapoly.h"
+
+struct chachapoly_ctx {
+	struct chacha_ctx main_ctx, header_ctx;
+};
+
+struct chachapoly_ctx *
+chachapoly_new(const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
+{
+	struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx;
+
+	if (keylen != (32 + 32)) /* 2 x 256 bit keys */
+		return NULL;
+	if ((ctx = calloc(1, sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	chacha_keysetup(&ctx->main_ctx, key, 256);
+	chacha_keysetup(&ctx->header_ctx, key + 32, 256);
+	return ctx;
+}
+
+void
+chachapoly_free(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx)
+{
+	freezero(cpctx, sizeof(*cpctx));
+}
+
+/*
+ * chachapoly_crypt() operates as following:
+ * En/decrypt with header key 'aadlen' bytes from 'src', storing result
+ * to 'dest'. The ciphertext here is treated as additional authenticated
+ * data for MAC calculation.
+ * En/decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'. Use
+ * POLY1305_TAGLEN bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication
+ * tag. This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption.
+ */
+int
+chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest,
+    const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen, int do_encrypt)
+{
+	u_char seqbuf[8];
+	const u_char one[8] = { 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; /* NB little-endian */
+	u_char expected_tag[POLY1305_TAGLEN], poly_key[POLY1305_KEYLEN];
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	/*
+	 * Run ChaCha20 once to generate the Poly1305 key. The IV is the
+	 * packet sequence number.
+	 */
+	memset(poly_key, 0, sizeof(poly_key));
+	POKE_U64(seqbuf, seqnr);
+	chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
+	chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx,
+	    poly_key, poly_key, sizeof(poly_key));
+
+	/* If decrypting, check tag before anything else */
+	if (!do_encrypt) {
+		const u_char *tag = src + aadlen + len;
+
+		poly1305_auth(expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key);
+		if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) != 0) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Crypt additional data */
+	if (aadlen) {
+		chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
+		chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, src, dest, aadlen);
+	}
+
+	/* Set Chacha's block counter to 1 */
+	chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, one);
+	chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx, src + aadlen,
+	    dest + aadlen, len);
+
+	/* If encrypting, calculate and append tag */
+	if (do_encrypt) {
+		poly1305_auth(dest + aadlen + len, dest, aadlen + len,
+		    poly_key);
+	}
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(expected_tag, sizeof(expected_tag));
+	explicit_bzero(seqbuf, sizeof(seqbuf));
+	explicit_bzero(poly_key, sizeof(poly_key));
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Decrypt and extract the encrypted packet length */
+int
+chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx,
+    u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len)
+{
+	u_char buf[4], seqbuf[8];
+
+	if (len < 4)
+		return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+	POKE_U64(seqbuf, seqnr);
+	chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL);
+	chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, cp, buf, 4);
+	*plenp = PEEK_U32(buf);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_EVP_CHACHA20) || defined(HAVE_BROKEN_CHACHA20) */
diff --git a/cipher-chachapoly.h b/cipher-chachapoly.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..026d2de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cipher-chachapoly.h
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.h,v 1.5 2020/04/03 04:27:03 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) Damien Miller 2013 <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+#ifndef CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H
+#define CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include "chacha.h"
+#include "poly1305.h"
+
+#define CHACHA_KEYLEN	32 /* Only 256 bit keys used here */
+
+struct chachapoly_ctx;
+
+struct chachapoly_ctx *chachapoly_new(const u_char *key, u_int keylen)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 1, 2)));
+void chachapoly_free(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx);
+
+int	chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx, u_int seqnr,
+    u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen,
+    int do_encrypt);
+int	chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx,
+    u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 4, 5)));
+
+#endif /* CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H */
diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02aea40
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cipher.c
@@ -0,0 +1,526 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.119 2021/04/03 06:18:40 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX void
+#endif
+
+struct sshcipher_ctx {
+	int	plaintext;
+	int	encrypt;
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp;
+	struct chachapoly_ctx *cp_ctx;
+	struct aesctr_ctx ac_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
+	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+};
+
+struct sshcipher {
+	char	*name;
+	u_int	block_size;
+	u_int	key_len;
+	u_int	iv_len;		/* defaults to block_size */
+	u_int	auth_len;
+	u_int	flags;
+#define CFLAG_CBC		(1<<0)
+#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY	(1<<1)
+#define CFLAG_AESCTR		(1<<2)
+#define CFLAG_NONE		(1<<3)
+#define CFLAG_INTERNAL		CFLAG_NONE /* Don't use "none" for packets */
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	const EVP_CIPHER	*(*evptype)(void);
+#else
+	void	*ignored;
+#endif
+};
+
+static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
+	{ "3des-cbc",		8, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
+#endif
+	{ "aes128-cbc",		16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
+	{ "aes192-cbc",		16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
+	{ "aes256-cbc",		16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
+	{ "aes128-ctr",		16, 16, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
+	{ "aes192-ctr",		16, 24, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
+	{ "aes256-ctr",		16, 32, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
+	{ "aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
+				16, 16, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm },
+	{ "aes256-gcm@openssh.com",
+				16, 32, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm },
+#else
+	{ "aes128-ctr",		16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
+	{ "aes192-ctr",		16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
+	{ "aes256-ctr",		16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
+#endif
+	{ "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com",
+				8, 64, 0, 16, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY, NULL },
+	{ "none",		8, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL },
+
+	{ NULL,			0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
+};
+
+/*--*/
+
+/* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */
+char *
+cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only)
+{
+	char *tmp, *ret = NULL;
+	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
+	const struct sshcipher *c;
+
+	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
+		if ((c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0)
+			continue;
+		if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0)
+			continue;
+		if (ret != NULL)
+			ret[rlen++] = sep;
+		nlen = strlen(c->name);
+		if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
+			free(ret);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		ret = tmp;
+		memcpy(ret + rlen, c->name, nlen + 1);
+		rlen += nlen;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+const char *
+compression_alg_list(int compression)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+	return compression ? "zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none" :
+	    "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib";
+#else
+	return "none";
+#endif
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *c)
+{
+	return (c->block_size);
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *c)
+{
+	return (c->key_len);
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *c)
+{
+	if (strcmp("3des-cbc", c->name) == 0)
+		return 14;
+	return cipher_keylen(c);
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *c)
+{
+	return (c->auth_len);
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *c)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Default is cipher block size, except for chacha20+poly1305 that
+	 * needs no IV. XXX make iv_len == -1 default?
+	 */
+	return (c->iv_len != 0 || (c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) ?
+	    c->iv_len : c->block_size;
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *c)
+{
+	return (c->flags & CFLAG_CBC) != 0;
+}
+
+u_int
+cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
+{
+	return cc->plaintext;
+}
+
+const struct sshcipher *
+cipher_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+	const struct sshcipher *c;
+	for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
+		if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
+			return c;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+#define	CIPHER_SEP	","
+int
+ciphers_valid(const char *names)
+{
+	const struct sshcipher *c;
+	char *cipher_list, *cp;
+	char *p;
+
+	if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+		return 0;
+	if ((cipher_list = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
+	    (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) {
+		c = cipher_by_name(p);
+		if (c == NULL || (c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0) {
+			free(cipher_list);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	free(cipher_list);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+const char *
+cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
+{
+	if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	/* XXX repurpose for CBC warning */
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+int
+cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, const struct sshcipher *cipher,
+    const u_char *key, u_int keylen, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen,
+    int do_encrypt)
+{
+	struct sshcipher_ctx *cc = NULL;
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	const EVP_CIPHER *type;
+	int klen;
+#endif
+
+	*ccp = NULL;
+	if ((cc = calloc(sizeof(*cc), 1)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+	cc->plaintext = (cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0;
+	cc->encrypt = do_encrypt;
+
+	if (keylen < cipher->key_len ||
+	    (iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher_ivlen(cipher))) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	cc->cipher = cipher;
+	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
+		cc->cp_ctx = chachapoly_new(key, keylen);
+		ret = cc->cp_ctx != NULL ? 0 : SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) {
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
+		aesctr_keysetup(&cc->ac_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, 8 * ivlen);
+		aesctr_ivsetup(&cc->ac_ctx, iv);
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	goto out;
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	type = (*cipher->evptype)();
+	if ((cc->evp = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv,
+	    (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (cipher_authlen(cipher) &&
+	    !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
+	    -1, (u_char *)iv)) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(cc->evp);
+	if (klen > 0 && keylen != (u_int)klen) {
+		if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(cc->evp, keylen) == 0) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ret = 0;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ out:
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		/* success */
+		*ccp = cc;
+	} else {
+		if (cc != NULL) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cc->evp);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+			freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
+		}
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cipher_crypt() operates as following:
+ * Copy 'aadlen' bytes (without en/decryption) from 'src' to 'dest'.
+ * These bytes are treated as additional authenticated data for
+ * authenticated encryption modes.
+ * En/Decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'.
+ * Use 'authlen' bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication tag.
+ * This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption.
+ * Both 'aadlen' and 'authlen' can be set to 0.
+ */
+int
+cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest,
+   const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen)
+{
+	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
+		return chachapoly_crypt(cc->cp_ctx, seqnr, dest, src,
+		    len, aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt);
+	}
+	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) {
+		memcpy(dest, src, aadlen + len);
+		return 0;
+	}
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
+		if (aadlen)
+			memcpy(dest, src, aadlen);
+		aesctr_encrypt_bytes(&cc->ac_ctx, src + aadlen,
+		    dest + aadlen, len);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+#else
+	if (authlen) {
+		u_char lastiv[1];
+
+		if (authlen != cipher_authlen(cc->cipher))
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		/* increment IV */
+		if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
+		    1, lastiv))
+			return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		/* set tag on decyption */
+		if (!cc->encrypt &&
+		    !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG,
+		    authlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen + len))
+			return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	}
+	if (aadlen) {
+		if (authlen &&
+		    EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)src, aadlen) < 0)
+			return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		memcpy(dest, src, aadlen);
+	}
+	if (len % cc->cipher->block_size)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, dest + aadlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen,
+	    len) < 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	if (authlen) {
+		/* compute tag (on encrypt) or verify tag (on decrypt) */
+		if (EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, NULL, NULL, 0) < 0)
+			return cc->encrypt ?
+			    SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
+		if (cc->encrypt &&
+		    !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG,
+		    authlen, dest + aadlen + len))
+			return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	}
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Extract the packet length, including any decryption necessary beforehand */
+int
+cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr,
+    const u_char *cp, u_int len)
+{
+	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
+		return chachapoly_get_length(cc->cp_ctx, plenp, seqnr,
+		    cp, len);
+	if (len < 4)
+		return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+	*plenp = PEEK_U32(cp);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
+{
+	if (cc == NULL)
+		return;
+	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
+		chachapoly_free(cc->cp_ctx);
+		cc->cp_ctx = NULL;
+	} else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0)
+		explicit_bzero(&cc->ac_ctx, sizeof(cc->ac_ctx));
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cc->evp);
+	cc->evp = NULL;
+#endif
+	freezero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exports an IV from the sshcipher_ctx required to export the key
+ * state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent
+ * process.
+ */
+int
+cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
+{
+	const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
+
+	if ((c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	else if ((c->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0)
+		return sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr);
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp);
+#else
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int
+cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *iv, size_t len)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
+	int evplen;
+#endif
+
+	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
+		if (len != 0)
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
+		if (len != sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr))
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		memcpy(iv, cc->ac_ctx.ctr, len);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp);
+	if (evplen == 0)
+		return 0;
+	else if (evplen < 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	if ((size_t)evplen != len)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (cipher_authlen(c)) {
+		if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
+		    len, iv))
+			return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	} else if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv(cc->evp, iv, len))
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *iv, size_t len)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
+	int evplen = 0;
+#endif
+
+	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp);
+	if (evplen <= 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	if ((size_t)evplen != len)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (cipher_authlen(c)) {
+		/* XXX iv arg is const, but EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl isn't */
+		if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp,
+		    EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, (void *)iv))
+			return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	} else if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv(cc->evp, iv, evplen))
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/cipher.h b/cipher.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a591cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cipher.h
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.55 2020/01/23 10:24:29 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef CIPHER_H
+#define CIPHER_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif
+#include "cipher-chachapoly.h"
+#include "cipher-aesctr.h"
+
+#define CIPHER_ENCRYPT		1
+#define CIPHER_DECRYPT		0
+
+struct sshcipher;
+struct sshcipher_ctx;
+
+const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
+const char *cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
+int	 ciphers_valid(const char *);
+char	*cipher_alg_list(char, int);
+const char *compression_alg_list(int);
+int	 cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **, const struct sshcipher *,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, int);
+int	 cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int, u_char *, const u_char *,
+    u_int, u_int, u_int);
+int	 cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int *, u_int,
+    const u_char *, u_int);
+void	 cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *);
+u_int	 cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *);
+u_int	 cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *);
+u_int	 cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *);
+u_int	 cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *);
+u_int	 cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *);
+u_int	 cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *);
+
+u_int	 cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *);
+
+int	 cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_char *, size_t);
+int	 cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const u_char *, size_t);
+int	 cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
+
+#endif				/* CIPHER_H */
diff --git a/cleanup.c b/cleanup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..238f965
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cleanup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: cleanup.c,v 1.5 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+/* default implementation */
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+	_exit(i);
+}
diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fef9efc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/clientloop.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2698 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.387 2023/01/06 02:39:59 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * The main loop for the interactive session (client side).
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *
+ * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "clientloop.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+
+/* Permitted RSA signature algorithms for UpdateHostkeys proofs */
+#define HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS	"rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256"
+
+/* import options */
+extern Options options;
+
+/* Control socket */
+extern int muxserver_sock; /* XXX use mux_client_cleanup() instead */
+
+/*
+ * Name of the host we are connecting to.  This is the name given on the
+ * command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a
+ * configuration file.
+ */
+extern char *host;
+
+/*
+ * If this field is not NULL, the ForwardAgent socket is this path and different
+ * instead of SSH_AUTH_SOCK.
+ */
+extern char *forward_agent_sock_path;
+
+/*
+ * Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has
+ * not yet been processed.  This will cause a message indicating the new
+ * window size to be sent to the server a little later.  This is volatile
+ * because this is updated in a signal handler.
+ */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_window_change_signal = 0;
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_signal = 0;
+
+/* Time when backgrounded control master using ControlPersist should exit */
+static time_t control_persist_exit_time = 0;
+
+/* Common data for the client loop code. */
+volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */
+static int last_was_cr;		/* Last character was a newline. */
+static int exit_status;		/* Used to store the command exit status. */
+static struct sshbuf *stderr_buffer;	/* Used for final exit message. */
+static int connection_in;	/* Connection to server (input). */
+static int connection_out;	/* Connection to server (output). */
+static int need_rekeying;	/* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */
+static int session_closed;	/* In SSH2: login session closed. */
+static u_int x11_refuse_time;	/* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */
+static time_t server_alive_time;	/* Time to do server_alive_check */
+static int hostkeys_update_complete;
+static int session_setup_complete;
+
+static void client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh);
+int	session_ident = -1;
+
+/* Track escape per proto2 channel */
+struct escape_filter_ctx {
+	int escape_pending;
+	int escape_char;
+};
+
+/* Context for channel confirmation replies */
+struct channel_reply_ctx {
+	const char *request_type;
+	int id;
+	enum confirm_action action;
+};
+
+/* Global request success/failure callbacks */
+/* XXX move to struct ssh? */
+struct global_confirm {
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(global_confirm) entry;
+	global_confirm_cb *cb;
+	void *ctx;
+	int ref_count;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(global_confirms, global_confirm);
+static struct global_confirms global_confirms =
+    TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms);
+
+void ssh_process_session2_setup(int, int, int, struct sshbuf *);
+static void quit_message(const char *fmt, ...)
+    __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 1, 2)));
+
+static void
+quit_message(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	char *msg;
+	va_list args;
+	int r;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	xvasprintf(&msg, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer, "%s\r\n", msg)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+	quit_pending = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH).  This just sets a
+ * flag indicating that the window has changed.
+ */
+/*ARGSUSED */
+static void
+window_change_handler(int sig)
+{
+	received_window_change_signal = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate.  These
+ * signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes.
+ */
+/*ARGSUSED */
+static void
+signal_handler(int sig)
+{
+	received_signal = sig;
+	quit_pending = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets control_persist_exit_time to the absolute time when the
+ * backgrounded control master should exit due to expiry of the
+ * ControlPersist timeout.  Sets it to 0 if we are not a backgrounded
+ * control master process, or if there is no ControlPersist timeout.
+ */
+static void
+set_control_persist_exit_time(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	if (muxserver_sock == -1 || !options.control_persist
+	    || options.control_persist_timeout == 0) {
+		/* not using a ControlPersist timeout */
+		control_persist_exit_time = 0;
+	} else if (channel_still_open(ssh)) {
+		/* some client connections are still open */
+		if (control_persist_exit_time > 0)
+			debug2_f("cancel scheduled exit");
+		control_persist_exit_time = 0;
+	} else if (control_persist_exit_time <= 0) {
+		/* a client connection has recently closed */
+		control_persist_exit_time = monotime() +
+			(time_t)options.control_persist_timeout;
+		debug2_f("schedule exit in %d seconds",
+		    options.control_persist_timeout);
+	}
+	/* else we are already counting down to the timeout */
+}
+
+#define SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS ":/.-_"
+static int
+client_x11_display_valid(const char *display)
+{
+	size_t i, dlen;
+
+	if (display == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	dlen = strlen(display);
+	for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) {
+		if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) &&
+		    strchr(SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS, display[i]) == NULL) {
+			debug("Invalid character '%c' in DISPLAY", display[i]);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+#define SSH_X11_PROTO		"MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
+#define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK	60
+int
+client_x11_get_proto(struct ssh *ssh, const char *display,
+    const char *xauth_path, u_int trusted, u_int timeout,
+    char **_proto, char **_data)
+{
+	char *cmd, line[512], xdisplay[512];
+	char xauthfile[PATH_MAX], xauthdir[PATH_MAX];
+	static char proto[512], data[512];
+	FILE *f;
+	int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, r;
+	struct stat st;
+	u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
+
+	*_proto = proto;
+	*_data = data;
+	proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0';
+
+	if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
+		if (display != NULL)
+			logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding",
+			    display);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) {
+		debug("No xauth program.");
+		xauth_path = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (xauth_path != NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
+		 * not match an authorization entry.  For this we
+		 * just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum".
+		 * XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal
+		 *      is not perfect.
+		 */
+		if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) {
+			if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
+			    display + 10)) < 0 ||
+			    (size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) {
+				error_f("display name too long");
+				return -1;
+			}
+			display = xdisplay;
+		}
+		if (trusted == 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie.
+			 *
+			 * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
+			 * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to
+			 * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server.
+			 */
+			mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir));
+			if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) {
+				error_f("mkdtemp: %s", strerror(errno));
+				return -1;
+			}
+			do_unlink = 1;
+			if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile),
+			    "%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 ||
+			    (size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) {
+				error_f("xauthfile path too long");
+				rmdir(xauthdir);
+				return -1;
+			}
+
+			if (timeout == 0) {
+				/* auth doesn't time out */
+				xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s "
+				    "untrusted 2>%s",
+				    xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
+				    SSH_X11_PROTO, _PATH_DEVNULL);
+			} else {
+				/* Add some slack to requested expiry */
+				if (timeout < UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK)
+					x11_timeout_real = timeout +
+					    X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK;
+				else {
+					/* Don't overflow on long timeouts */
+					x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX;
+				}
+				xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s "
+				    "untrusted timeout %u 2>%s",
+				    xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
+				    SSH_X11_PROTO, x11_timeout_real,
+				    _PATH_DEVNULL);
+			}
+			debug2_f("xauth command: %s", cmd);
+
+			if (timeout != 0 && x11_refuse_time == 0) {
+				now = monotime() + 1;
+				if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
+					x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
+				else
+					x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
+				channel_set_x11_refuse_time(ssh,
+				    x11_refuse_time);
+			}
+			if (system(cmd) == 0)
+				generated = 1;
+			free(cmd);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * When in untrusted mode, we read the cookie only if it was
+		 * successfully generated as an untrusted one in the step
+		 * above.
+		 */
+		if (trusted || generated) {
+			xasprintf(&cmd,
+			    "%s %s%s list %s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
+			    xauth_path,
+			    generated ? "-f " : "" ,
+			    generated ? xauthfile : "",
+			    display);
+			debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
+			f = popen(cmd, "r");
+			if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
+			    sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2)
+				got_data = 1;
+			if (f)
+				pclose(f);
+			free(cmd);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (do_unlink) {
+		unlink(xauthfile);
+		rmdir(xauthdir);
+	}
+
+	/* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */
+	if (!trusted && !got_data) {
+		error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
+		    "xauth key data not generated");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
+	 * data.  The forwarding code will check the validity of the
+	 * response anyway, and substitute this data.  The X11
+	 * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use
+	 * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise
+	 * for the local connection.
+	 */
+	if (!got_data) {
+		u_int8_t rnd[16];
+		u_int i;
+
+		logit("Warning: No xauth data; "
+		    "using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding.");
+		strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto);
+		arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+		for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rnd); i++) {
+			snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x",
+			    rnd[i]);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to
+ * the server if so.  The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software
+ * interrupt on Unix); this just checks the flag and sends a message if
+ * appropriate.
+ */
+
+static void
+client_check_window_change(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	if (!received_window_change_signal)
+		return;
+	received_window_change_signal = 0;
+	debug2_f("changed");
+	channel_send_window_changes(ssh);
+}
+
+static int
+client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct global_confirm *gc;
+
+	if ((gc = TAILQ_FIRST(&global_confirms)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (gc->cb != NULL)
+		gc->cb(ssh, type, seq, gc->ctx);
+	if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) {
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
+		freezero(gc, sizeof(*gc));
+	}
+
+	ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+schedule_server_alive_check(void)
+{
+	if (options.server_alive_interval > 0)
+		server_alive_time = monotime() + options.server_alive_interval;
+}
+
+static void
+server_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) > options.server_alive_count_max) {
+		logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host);
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "keepalive@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||		/* boolean: want reply */
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+	/* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */
+	client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL);
+	schedule_server_alive_check();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Waits until the client can do something (some data becomes available on
+ * one of the file descriptors).
+ */
+static void
+client_wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh, struct pollfd **pfdp,
+    u_int *npfd_allocp, u_int *npfd_activep, int rekeying,
+    int *conn_in_readyp, int *conn_out_readyp)
+{
+	struct timespec timeout;
+	int ret;
+	u_int p;
+
+	*conn_in_readyp = *conn_out_readyp = 0;
+
+	/* Prepare channel poll. First two pollfd entries are reserved */
+	ptimeout_init(&timeout);
+	channel_prepare_poll(ssh, pfdp, npfd_allocp, npfd_activep, 2, &timeout);
+	if (*npfd_activep < 2)
+		fatal_f("bad npfd %u", *npfd_activep); /* shouldn't happen */
+
+	/* channel_prepare_poll could have closed the last channel */
+	if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh) &&
+	    !ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) {
+		/* clear events since we did not call poll() */
+		for (p = 0; p < *npfd_activep; p++)
+			(*pfdp)[p].revents = 0;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* Monitor server connection on reserved pollfd entries */
+	(*pfdp)[0].fd = connection_in;
+	(*pfdp)[0].events = POLLIN;
+	(*pfdp)[1].fd = connection_out;
+	(*pfdp)[1].events = ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh) ? POLLOUT : 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Wait for something to happen.  This will suspend the process until
+	 * some polled descriptor can be read, written, or has some other
+	 * event pending, or a timeout expires.
+	 */
+	set_control_persist_exit_time(ssh);
+	if (control_persist_exit_time > 0)
+		ptimeout_deadline_monotime(&timeout, control_persist_exit_time);
+	if (options.server_alive_interval > 0)
+		ptimeout_deadline_monotime(&timeout, server_alive_time);
+	if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && !rekeying) {
+		ptimeout_deadline_sec(&timeout,
+		    ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(ssh));
+	}
+
+	ret = poll(*pfdp, *npfd_activep, ptimeout_get_ms(&timeout));
+
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		/*
+		 * We have to clear the events because we return.
+		 * We have to return, because the mainloop checks for the flags
+		 * set by the signal handlers.
+		 */
+		for (p = 0; p < *npfd_activep; p++)
+			(*pfdp)[p].revents = 0;
+		if (errno == EINTR)
+			return;
+		/* Note: we might still have data in the buffers. */
+		quit_message("poll: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	*conn_in_readyp = (*pfdp)[0].revents != 0;
+	*conn_out_readyp = (*pfdp)[1].revents != 0;
+
+	if (options.server_alive_interval > 0 && !*conn_in_readyp &&
+	    monotime() >= server_alive_time) {
+		/*
+		 * ServerAlive check is needed. We can't rely on the poll
+		 * timing out since traffic on the client side such as port
+		 * forwards can keep waking it up.
+		 */
+		server_alive_check(ssh);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+client_suspend_self(struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr)
+{
+	/* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */
+	if (sshbuf_len(bout) > 0)
+		atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(bout),
+		    sshbuf_len(bout));
+	if (sshbuf_len(berr) > 0)
+		atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(berr),
+		    sshbuf_len(berr));
+
+	leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+
+	sshbuf_reset(bin);
+	sshbuf_reset(bout);
+	sshbuf_reset(berr);
+
+	/* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */
+	kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP);
+
+	/* Reset window sizes in case they have changed */
+	received_window_change_signal = 1;
+
+	enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+}
+
+static void
+client_process_net_input(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	/*
+	 * Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of
+	 * the packet subsystem.
+	 */
+	schedule_server_alive_check();
+	if ((r = ssh_packet_process_read(ssh, connection_in)) == 0)
+		return; /* success */
+	if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) {
+		if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+			return;
+		if (errno == EPIPE) {
+			quit_message("Connection to %s closed by remote host.",
+			    host);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+	quit_message("Read from remote host %s: %s", host, ssh_err(r));
+}
+
+static void
+client_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, Channel *c, void *ctx)
+{
+	struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = (struct channel_reply_ctx *)ctx;
+	char errmsg[256];
+	int r, tochan;
+
+	/*
+	 * If a TTY was explicitly requested, then a failure to allocate
+	 * one is fatal.
+	 */
+	if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY &&
+	    (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE ||
+	    options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES))
+		cr->action = CONFIRM_CLOSE;
+
+	/* XXX suppress on mux _client_ quietmode */
+	tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR &&
+	    c->ctl_chan != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE;
+
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
+		debug2("%s request accepted on channel %d",
+		    cr->request_type, c->self);
+	} else if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
+		if (tochan) {
+			snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg),
+			    "%s request failed\r\n", cr->request_type);
+		} else {
+			snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg),
+			    "%s request failed on channel %d",
+			    cr->request_type, c->self);
+		}
+		/* If error occurred on primary session channel, then exit */
+		if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE && c->self == session_ident)
+			fatal("%s", errmsg);
+		/*
+		 * If error occurred on mux client, append to
+		 * their stderr.
+		 */
+		if (tochan) {
+			debug3_f("channel %d: mux request: %s", c->self,
+			    cr->request_type);
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, errmsg,
+			    strlen(errmsg))) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+		} else
+			error("%s", errmsg);
+		if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY) {
+			/*
+			 * If a TTY allocation error occurred, then arrange
+			 * for the correct TTY to leave raw mode.
+			 */
+			if (c->self == session_ident)
+				leave_raw_mode(0);
+			else
+				mux_tty_alloc_failed(ssh, c);
+		} else if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE) {
+			chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
+			chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
+		}
+	}
+	free(cr);
+}
+
+static void
+client_abandon_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, void *ctx)
+{
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+void
+client_expect_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, const char *request,
+    enum confirm_action action)
+{
+	struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cr));
+
+	cr->request_type = request;
+	cr->action = action;
+
+	channel_register_status_confirm(ssh, id, client_status_confirm,
+	    client_abandon_status_confirm, cr);
+}
+
+void
+client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *cb, void *ctx)
+{
+	struct global_confirm *gc, *last_gc;
+
+	/* Coalesce identical callbacks */
+	last_gc = TAILQ_LAST(&global_confirms, global_confirms);
+	if (last_gc && last_gc->cb == cb && last_gc->ctx == ctx) {
+		if (++last_gc->ref_count >= INT_MAX)
+			fatal_f("last_gc->ref_count = %d",
+			    last_gc->ref_count);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	gc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*gc));
+	gc->cb = cb;
+	gc->ctx = ctx;
+	gc->ref_count = 1;
+	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns non-zero if the client is able to handle a hostkeys-00@openssh.com
+ * hostkey update request.
+ */
+static int
+can_update_hostkeys(void)
+{
+	if (hostkeys_update_complete)
+		return 0;
+	if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK &&
+	    options.batch_mode)
+		return 0; /* won't ask in batchmode, so don't even try */
+	if (!options.update_hostkeys || options.num_user_hostfiles <= 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+client_repledge(void)
+{
+	debug3_f("enter");
+
+	/* Might be able to tighten pledge now that session is established */
+	if (options.control_master || options.control_path != NULL ||
+	    options.forward_x11 || options.fork_after_authentication ||
+	    can_update_hostkeys() ||
+	    (session_ident != -1 && !session_setup_complete)) {
+		/* Can't tighten */
+		return;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * LocalCommand and UpdateHostkeys have finished, so can get rid of
+	 * filesystem.
+	 *
+	 * XXX protocol allows a server can to change hostkeys during the
+	 *     connection at rekey time that could trigger a hostkeys update
+	 *     but AFAIK no implementations support this. Could improve by
+	 *     forcing known_hosts to be read-only or via unveil(2).
+	 */
+	if (options.num_local_forwards != 0 ||
+	    options.num_remote_forwards != 0 ||
+	    options.num_permitted_remote_opens != 0 ||
+	    options.enable_escape_commandline != 0) {
+		/* rfwd needs inet */
+		debug("pledge: network");
+		if (pledge("stdio unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1)
+			fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
+	} else if (options.forward_agent != 0) {
+		/* agent forwarding needs to open $SSH_AUTH_SOCK at will */
+		debug("pledge: agent");
+		if (pledge("stdio unix proc tty", NULL) == -1)
+			fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
+	} else {
+		debug("pledge: fork");
+		if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1)
+			fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+	/* XXX further things to do:
+	 *
+	 * - might be able to get rid of proc if we kill ~^Z
+	 * - ssh -N (no session)
+	 * - stdio forwarding
+	 * - sessions without tty
+	 */
+}
+
+static void
+process_cmdline(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	void (*handler)(int);
+	char *s, *cmd;
+	int ok, delete = 0, local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0;
+	struct Forward fwd;
+
+	memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+
+	leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+	handler = ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
+	cmd = s = read_passphrase("\r\nssh> ", RP_ECHO);
+	if (s == NULL)
+		goto out;
+	while (isspace((u_char)*s))
+		s++;
+	if (*s == '-')
+		s++;	/* Skip cmdline '-', if any */
+	if (*s == '\0')
+		goto out;
+
+	if (*s == 'h' || *s == 'H' || *s == '?') {
+		logit("Commands:");
+		logit("      -L[bind_address:]port:host:hostport    "
+		    "Request local forward");
+		logit("      -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport    "
+		    "Request remote forward");
+		logit("      -D[bind_address:]port                  "
+		    "Request dynamic forward");
+		logit("      -KL[bind_address:]port                 "
+		    "Cancel local forward");
+		logit("      -KR[bind_address:]port                 "
+		    "Cancel remote forward");
+		logit("      -KD[bind_address:]port                 "
+		    "Cancel dynamic forward");
+		if (!options.permit_local_command)
+			goto out;
+		logit("      !args                                  "
+		    "Execute local command");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (*s == '!' && options.permit_local_command) {
+		s++;
+		ssh_local_cmd(s);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (*s == 'K') {
+		delete = 1;
+		s++;
+	}
+	if (*s == 'L')
+		local = 1;
+	else if (*s == 'R')
+		remote = 1;
+	else if (*s == 'D')
+		dynamic = 1;
+	else {
+		logit("Invalid command.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	while (isspace((u_char)*++s))
+		;
+
+	/* XXX update list of forwards in options */
+	if (delete) {
+		/* We pass 1 for dynamicfwd to restrict to 1 or 2 fields. */
+		if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, 1, 0)) {
+			logit("Bad forwarding close specification.");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (remote)
+			ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, &fwd) == 0;
+		else if (dynamic)
+			ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd,
+			    0, &options.fwd_opts) > 0;
+		else
+			ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd,
+			    CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC,
+			    &options.fwd_opts) > 0;
+		if (!ok) {
+			logit("Unknown port forwarding.");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		logit("Canceled forwarding.");
+	} else {
+		/* -R specs can be both dynamic or not, so check both. */
+		if (remote) {
+			if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, 0, remote) &&
+			    !parse_forward(&fwd, s, 1, remote)) {
+				logit("Bad remote forwarding specification.");
+				goto out;
+			}
+		} else if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, dynamic, remote)) {
+			logit("Bad local forwarding specification.");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (local || dynamic) {
+			if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd,
+			    &options.fwd_opts)) {
+				logit("Port forwarding failed.");
+				goto out;
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd) < 0) {
+				logit("Port forwarding failed.");
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		logit("Forwarding port.");
+	}
+
+out:
+	ssh_signal(SIGINT, handler);
+	enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+	free(cmd);
+	free(fwd.listen_host);
+	free(fwd.listen_path);
+	free(fwd.connect_host);
+	free(fwd.connect_path);
+}
+
+/* reasons to suppress output of an escape command in help output */
+#define SUPPRESS_NEVER		0	/* never suppress, always show */
+#define SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT	1	/* don't show in mux client sessions */
+#define SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER	2	/* don't show in mux master sessions */
+#define SUPPRESS_SYSLOG		4	/* don't show when logging to syslog */
+#define SUPPRESS_NOCMDLINE	8	/* don't show when cmdline disabled*/
+struct escape_help_text {
+	const char *cmd;
+	const char *text;
+	unsigned int flags;
+};
+static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = {
+    {".",  "terminate session", SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER},
+    {".",  "terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)",
+	SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
+    {"B",  "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
+    {"C",  "open a command line", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT|SUPPRESS_NOCMDLINE},
+    {"R",  "request rekey", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
+    {"V/v",  "decrease/increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
+    {"^Z", "suspend ssh", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
+    {"#",  "list forwarded connections", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
+    {"&",  "background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)",
+	SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
+    {"?", "this message", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
+};
+
+static void
+print_escape_help(struct sshbuf *b, int escape_char, int mux_client,
+    int using_stderr)
+{
+	unsigned int i, suppress_flags;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b,
+	    "%c?\r\nSupported escape sequences:\r\n", escape_char)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+
+	suppress_flags =
+	    (mux_client ? SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT : 0) |
+	    (mux_client ? 0 : SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER) |
+	    (using_stderr ? 0 : SUPPRESS_SYSLOG) |
+	    (options.enable_escape_commandline == 0 ? SUPPRESS_NOCMDLINE : 0);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(esc_txt)/sizeof(esc_txt[0]); i++) {
+		if (esc_txt[i].flags & suppress_flags)
+			continue;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, " %c%-3s - %s\r\n",
+		    escape_char, esc_txt[i].cmd, esc_txt[i].text)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b,
+	    " %c%c   - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n"
+	    "(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after "
+	    "newline.)\r\n", escape_char, escape_char)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process the characters one by one.
+ */
+static int
+process_escapes(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
+    struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr,
+    char *buf, int len)
+{
+	pid_t pid;
+	int r, bytes = 0;
+	u_int i;
+	u_char ch;
+	char *s;
+	struct escape_filter_ctx *efc = c->filter_ctx == NULL ?
+	    NULL : (struct escape_filter_ctx *)c->filter_ctx;
+
+	if (c->filter_ctx == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (len <= 0)
+		return (0);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (u_int)len; i++) {
+		/* Get one character at a time. */
+		ch = buf[i];
+
+		if (efc->escape_pending) {
+			/* We have previously seen an escape character. */
+			/* Clear the flag now. */
+			efc->escape_pending = 0;
+
+			/* Process the escaped character. */
+			switch (ch) {
+			case '.':
+				/* Terminate the connection. */
+				if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c.\r\n",
+				    efc->escape_char)) != 0)
+					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+				if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) {
+					channel_force_close(ssh, c, 1);
+					return 0;
+				} else
+					quit_pending = 1;
+				return -1;
+
+			case 'Z' - 64:
+				/* XXX support this for mux clients */
+				if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) {
+					char b[16];
+ noescape:
+					if (ch == 'Z' - 64)
+						snprintf(b, sizeof b, "^Z");
+					else
+						snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%c", ch);
+					if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
+					    "%c%s escape not available to "
+					    "multiplexed sessions\r\n",
+					    efc->escape_char, b)) != 0)
+						fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+					continue;
+				}
+				/* Suspend the program. Inform the user */
+				if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
+				    "%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n",
+				    efc->escape_char)) != 0)
+					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+
+				/* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */
+				client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr);
+
+				/* We have been continued. */
+				continue;
+
+			case 'B':
+				if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
+				    "%cB\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0)
+					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+				channel_request_start(ssh, c->self, "break", 0);
+				if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1000)) != 0 ||
+				    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+					fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+				continue;
+
+			case 'R':
+				if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
+					logit("Server does not "
+					    "support re-keying");
+				else
+					need_rekeying = 1;
+				continue;
+
+			case 'V':
+				/* FALLTHROUGH */
+			case 'v':
+				if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
+					goto noescape;
+				if (!log_is_on_stderr()) {
+					if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
+					    "%c%c [Logging to syslog]\r\n",
+					    efc->escape_char, ch)) != 0)
+						fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+					continue;
+				}
+				if (ch == 'V' && options.log_level >
+				    SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
+					log_change_level(--options.log_level);
+				if (ch == 'v' && options.log_level <
+				    SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+					log_change_level(++options.log_level);
+				if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
+				    "%c%c [LogLevel %s]\r\n",
+				    efc->escape_char, ch,
+				    log_level_name(options.log_level))) != 0)
+					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+				continue;
+
+			case '&':
+				if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
+					goto noescape;
+				/*
+				 * Detach the program (continue to serve
+				 * connections, but put in background and no
+				 * more new connections).
+				 */
+				/* Restore tty modes. */
+				leave_raw_mode(
+				    options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+
+				/* Stop listening for new connections. */
+				channel_stop_listening(ssh);
+
+				if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c& "
+				    "[backgrounded]\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0)
+					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+
+				/* Fork into background. */
+				pid = fork();
+				if (pid == -1) {
+					error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+					continue;
+				}
+				if (pid != 0) {	/* This is the parent. */
+					/* The parent just exits. */
+					exit(0);
+				}
+				/* The child continues serving connections. */
+				/* fake EOF on stdin */
+				if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, 4)) != 0)
+					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8");
+				return -1;
+			case '?':
+				print_escape_help(berr, efc->escape_char,
+				    (c && c->ctl_chan != -1),
+				    log_is_on_stderr());
+				continue;
+
+			case '#':
+				if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c#\r\n",
+				    efc->escape_char)) != 0)
+					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+				s = channel_open_message(ssh);
+				if ((r = sshbuf_put(berr, s, strlen(s))) != 0)
+					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+				free(s);
+				continue;
+
+			case 'C':
+				if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
+					goto noescape;
+				if (options.enable_escape_commandline == 0) {
+					if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
+					    "commandline disabled\r\n")) != 0)
+						fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+					continue;
+				}
+				process_cmdline(ssh);
+				continue;
+
+			default:
+				if (ch != efc->escape_char) {
+					if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin,
+					    efc->escape_char)) != 0)
+						fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8");
+					bytes++;
+				}
+				/* Escaped characters fall through here */
+				break;
+			}
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * The previous character was not an escape char.
+			 * Check if this is an escape.
+			 */
+			if (last_was_cr && ch == efc->escape_char) {
+				/*
+				 * It is. Set the flag and continue to
+				 * next character.
+				 */
+				efc->escape_pending = 1;
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Normal character.  Record whether it was a newline,
+		 * and append it to the buffer.
+		 */
+		last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n');
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, ch)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8");
+		bytes++;
+	}
+	return bytes;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as
+ * there are packets available.
+ *
+ * Any unknown packets received during the actual
+ * session cause the session to terminate.  This is
+ * intended to make debugging easier since no
+ * confirmations are sent.  Any compatible protocol
+ * extensions must be negotiated during the
+ * preparatory phase.
+ */
+
+static void
+client_process_buffered_input_packets(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending);
+}
+
+/* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */
+
+/* Helper: allocate a new escape_filter_ctx and fill in its escape char */
+void *
+client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int escape_char)
+{
+	struct escape_filter_ctx *ret;
+
+	ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
+	ret->escape_pending = 0;
+	ret->escape_char = escape_char;
+	return (void *)ret;
+}
+
+/* Free the escape filter context on channel free */
+void
+client_filter_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *ctx)
+{
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+int
+client_simple_escape_filter(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *buf, int len)
+{
+	if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE)
+		return 0;
+
+	return process_escapes(ssh, c, c->input, c->output, c->extended,
+	    buf, len);
+}
+
+static void
+client_channel_closed(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int force, void *arg)
+{
+	channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id);
+	session_closed = 1;
+	leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Implements the interactive session with the server.  This is called after
+ * the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the
+ * remote host.  If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character
+ * used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session.
+ */
+int
+client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
+    int ssh2_chan_id)
+{
+	struct pollfd *pfd = NULL;
+	u_int npfd_alloc = 0, npfd_active = 0;
+	double start_time, total_time;
+	int r, len;
+	u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
+	int conn_in_ready, conn_out_ready;
+
+	debug("Entering interactive session.");
+	session_ident = ssh2_chan_id;
+
+	if (options.control_master &&
+	    !option_clear_or_none(options.control_path)) {
+		debug("pledge: id");
+		if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns recvfd sendfd proc exec id tty",
+		    NULL) == -1)
+			fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	} else if (options.forward_x11 || options.permit_local_command) {
+		debug("pledge: exec");
+		if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc exec tty",
+		    NULL) == -1)
+			fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	} else if (options.update_hostkeys) {
+		debug("pledge: filesystem");
+		if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc tty",
+		    NULL) == -1)
+			fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	} else if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) ||
+	    options.fork_after_authentication) {
+		debug("pledge: proc");
+		if (pledge("stdio cpath unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1)
+			fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	} else {
+		debug("pledge: network");
+		if (pledge("stdio unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1)
+			fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	/* might be able to tighten now */
+	client_repledge();
+
+	start_time = monotime_double();
+
+	/* Initialize variables. */
+	last_was_cr = 1;
+	exit_status = -1;
+	connection_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
+	connection_out = ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh);
+
+	quit_pending = 0;
+
+	/* Initialize buffer. */
+	if ((stderr_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	client_init_dispatch(ssh);
+
+	/*
+	 * Set signal handlers, (e.g. to restore non-blocking mode)
+	 * but don't overwrite SIG_IGN, matches behaviour from rsh(1)
+	 */
+	if (ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+		ssh_signal(SIGHUP, signal_handler);
+	if (ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+		ssh_signal(SIGINT, signal_handler);
+	if (ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+		ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler);
+	if (ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+		ssh_signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler);
+	ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler);
+
+	if (have_pty)
+		enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+
+	if (session_ident != -1) {
+		if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) {
+			channel_register_filter(ssh, session_ident,
+			    client_simple_escape_filter, NULL,
+			    client_filter_cleanup,
+			    client_new_escape_filter_ctx(
+			    escape_char_arg));
+		}
+		channel_register_cleanup(ssh, session_ident,
+		    client_channel_closed, 0);
+	}
+
+	schedule_server_alive_check();
+
+	/* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */
+	while (!quit_pending) {
+
+		/* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */
+		client_process_buffered_input_packets(ssh);
+
+		if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh))
+			break;
+
+		if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
+			debug("rekeying in progress");
+		} else if (need_rekeying) {
+			/* manual rekey request */
+			debug("need rekeying");
+			if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "kex_start_rekex");
+			need_rekeying = 0;
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * Make packets from buffered channel data, and
+			 * enqueue them for sending to the server.
+			 */
+			if (ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh))
+				channel_output_poll(ssh);
+
+			/*
+			 * Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a
+			 * message about it to the server if so.
+			 */
+			client_check_window_change(ssh);
+
+			if (quit_pending)
+				break;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Wait until we have something to do (something becomes
+		 * available on one of the descriptors).
+		 */
+		client_wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, &pfd, &npfd_alloc,
+		    &npfd_active, ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh),
+		    &conn_in_ready, &conn_out_ready);
+
+		if (quit_pending)
+			break;
+
+		/* Do channel operations. */
+		channel_after_poll(ssh, pfd, npfd_active);
+
+		/* Buffer input from the connection.  */
+		if (conn_in_ready)
+			client_process_net_input(ssh);
+
+		if (quit_pending)
+			break;
+
+		/* A timeout may have triggered rekeying */
+		if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "cannot start rekeying");
+
+		/*
+		 * Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the
+		 * sender.
+		 */
+		if (conn_out_ready) {
+			if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
+				sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
+				    "%s: ssh_packet_write_poll", __func__);
+			}
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * If we are a backgrounded control master, and the
+		 * timeout has expired without any active client
+		 * connections, then quit.
+		 */
+		if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) {
+			if (monotime() >= control_persist_exit_time) {
+				debug("ControlPersist timeout expired");
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	free(pfd);
+
+	/* Terminate the session. */
+
+	/* Stop watching for window change. */
+	ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL);
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "disconnected by user")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||	/* language tag */
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send disconnect");
+
+	channel_free_all(ssh);
+
+	if (have_pty)
+		leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+
+	/*
+	 * If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote
+	 * exit status to be returned.  In that case, clear error code if the
+	 * connection was deliberately terminated at this end.
+	 */
+	if (options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_NONE &&
+	    received_signal == SIGTERM) {
+		received_signal = 0;
+		exit_status = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (received_signal) {
+		verbose("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating
+	 * that the connection has been closed.
+	 */
+	if (have_pty && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
+		quit_message("Connection to %s closed.", host);
+
+	/* Output any buffered data for stderr. */
+	if (sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer) > 0) {
+		len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr),
+		    (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(stderr_buffer),
+		    sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer));
+		if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer))
+			error("Write failed flushing stderr buffer.");
+		else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(stderr_buffer, len)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_consume");
+	}
+
+	/* Clear and free any buffers. */
+	sshbuf_free(stderr_buffer);
+
+	/* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */
+	total_time = monotime_double() - start_time;
+	ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
+	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes, in %.1f seconds",
+	    (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes, total_time);
+	if (total_time > 0)
+		verbose("Bytes per second: sent %.1f, received %.1f",
+		    obytes / total_time, ibytes / total_time);
+	/* Return the exit status of the program. */
+	debug("Exit status %d", exit_status);
+	return exit_status;
+}
+
+/*********/
+
+static Channel *
+client_request_forwarded_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type,
+    int rchan, u_int rwindow, u_int rmaxpack)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	char *listen_address, *originator_address;
+	u_int listen_port, originator_port;
+	int r;
+
+	/* Get rest of the packet */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &listen_address, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &listen_port)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator_address, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+
+	debug_f("listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d",
+	    listen_address, listen_port, originator_address, originator_port);
+
+	if (listen_port > 0xffff)
+		error_f("invalid listen port");
+	else if (originator_port > 0xffff)
+		error_f("invalid originator port");
+	else {
+		c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(ssh,
+		    listen_address, listen_port, "forwarded-tcpip",
+		    originator_address);
+	}
+
+	if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) {
+		if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+			error_f("alloc reply");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/* reconstruct and send to muxclient */
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 ||	/* padlen */
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, request_type)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rchan)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rwindow)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rmaxpack)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, listen_address)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, listen_port)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, originator_address)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, originator_port)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, b)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "compose for muxclient");
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	free(originator_address);
+	free(listen_address);
+	return c;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh,
+    const char *request_type, int rchan)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	char *listen_path;
+	int r;
+
+	/* Get the remote path. */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &listen_path, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||	/* reserved */
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+
+	debug_f("request: %s", listen_path);
+
+	c = channel_connect_by_listen_path(ssh, listen_path,
+	    "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com", "forwarded-streamlocal");
+	free(listen_path);
+	return c;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+client_request_x11(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	char *originator;
+	u_int originator_port;
+	int r, sock;
+
+	if (!options.forward_x11) {
+		error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding.");
+		error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a "
+		    "malicious server.");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) {
+		verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
+		    "expired");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+	/* XXX check permission */
+	/* XXX range check originator port? */
+	debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %u", originator,
+	    originator_port);
+	free(originator);
+	sock = x11_connect_display(ssh);
+	if (sock < 0)
+		return NULL;
+	c = channel_new(ssh, "x11",
+	    SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
+	c->force_drain = 1;
+	return c;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+client_request_agent(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	int r, sock;
+
+	if (!options.forward_agent) {
+		error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding.");
+		error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a "
+		    "malicious server.");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (forward_agent_sock_path == NULL) {
+		r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock);
+	} else {
+		r = ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(forward_agent_sock_path, &sock);
+	}
+	if (r != 0) {
+		if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
+			debug_fr(r, "ssh_get_authentication_socket");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((r = ssh_agent_bind_hostkey(sock, ssh->kex->initial_hostkey,
+	    ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->initial_sig, 1)) == 0)
+		debug_f("bound agent to hostkey");
+	else
+		debug2_fr(r, "ssh_agent_bind_hostkey");
+
+	c = channel_new(ssh, "authentication agent connection",
+	    SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
+	    "authentication agent connection", 1);
+	c->force_drain = 1;
+	return c;
+}
+
+char *
+client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int tun_mode,
+    int local_tun, int remote_tun, channel_open_fn *cb, void *cbctx)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	int r, fd;
+	char *ifname = NULL;
+
+	if (tun_mode == SSH_TUNMODE_NO)
+		return 0;
+
+	debug("Requesting tun unit %d in mode %d", local_tun, tun_mode);
+
+	/* Open local tunnel device */
+	if ((fd = tun_open(local_tun, tun_mode, &ifname)) == -1) {
+		error("Tunnel device open failed.");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname);
+
+	c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
+	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
+	c->datagram = 1;
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
+	if (options.tun_open == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
+		channel_register_filter(ssh, c->self, sys_tun_infilter,
+		    sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL);
+#endif
+
+	if (cb != NULL)
+		channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, cb, cbctx);
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "tun@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window_max)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, tun_mode)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, remote_tun)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
+
+	return ifname;
+}
+
+/* XXXX move to generic input handler */
+static int
+client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	char *ctype = NULL;
+	int r;
+	u_int rchan;
+	size_t len;
+	u_int rmaxpack, rwindow;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &ctype, &len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rchan)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rwindow)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rmaxpack)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	debug("client_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d",
+	    ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack);
+
+	if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) {
+		c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ssh, ctype, rchan, rwindow,
+		    rmaxpack);
+	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		c = client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(ssh, ctype, rchan);
+	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) {
+		c = client_request_x11(ssh, ctype, rchan);
+	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		c = client_request_agent(ssh, ctype, rchan);
+	}
+	if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) {
+		debug3("proxied to downstream: %s", ctype);
+	} else if (c != NULL) {
+		debug("confirm %s", ctype);
+		c->remote_id = rchan;
+		c->have_remote_id = 1;
+		c->remote_window = rwindow;
+		c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack;
+		if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) {
+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+				sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
+		}
+	} else {
+		debug("failure %s", ctype);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, rchan)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "open failed")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send failure", __func__);
+	}
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(ctype);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	char *rtype = NULL;
+	u_char reply;
+	u_int id, exitval;
+	int r, success = 0;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (id <= INT_MAX)
+		c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
+	if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
+		return 0;
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &reply)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %u rtype %s reply %d",
+	    id, rtype, reply);
+
+	if (c == NULL) {
+		error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: "
+		    "unknown channel", id);
+	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c);
+	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &exitval)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if (c->ctl_chan != -1) {
+			mux_exit_message(ssh, c, exitval);
+			success = 1;
+		} else if ((int)id == session_ident) {
+			/* Record exit value of local session */
+			success = 1;
+			exit_status = exitval;
+		} else {
+			/* Probably for a mux channel that has already closed */
+			debug_f("no sink for exit-status on channel %d",
+			    id);
+		}
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (reply && c != NULL && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
+		if (!c->have_remote_id)
+			fatal_f("channel %d: no remote_id", c->self);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ?
+		    SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send failure", __func__);
+	}
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(rtype);
+	return r;
+}
+
+struct hostkeys_update_ctx {
+	/* The hostname and (optionally) IP address string for the server */
+	char *host_str, *ip_str;
+
+	/*
+	 * Keys received from the server and a flag for each indicating
+	 * whether they already exist in known_hosts.
+	 * keys_match is filled in by hostkeys_find() and later (for new
+	 * keys) by client_global_hostkeys_prove_confirm().
+	 */
+	struct sshkey **keys;
+	u_int *keys_match;	/* mask of HKF_MATCH_* from hostfile.h */
+	int *keys_verified;	/* flag for new keys verified by server */
+	size_t nkeys, nnew, nincomplete; /* total, new keys, incomplete match */
+
+	/*
+	 * Keys that are in known_hosts, but were not present in the update
+	 * from the server (i.e. scheduled to be deleted).
+	 * Filled in by hostkeys_find().
+	 */
+	struct sshkey **old_keys;
+	size_t nold;
+
+	/* Various special cases. */
+	int complex_hostspec;	/* wildcard or manual pattern-list host name */
+	int ca_available;	/* saw CA key for this host */
+	int old_key_seen;	/* saw old key with other name/addr */
+	int other_name_seen;	/* saw key with other name/addr */
+};
+
+static void
+hostkeys_update_ctx_free(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		return;
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++)
+		sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]);
+	free(ctx->keys);
+	free(ctx->keys_match);
+	free(ctx->keys_verified);
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++)
+		sshkey_free(ctx->old_keys[i]);
+	free(ctx->old_keys);
+	free(ctx->host_str);
+	free(ctx->ip_str);
+	free(ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns non-zero if a known_hosts hostname list is not of a form that
+ * can be handled by UpdateHostkeys. These include wildcard hostnames and
+ * hostnames lists that do not follow the form host[,ip].
+ */
+static int
+hostspec_is_complex(const char *hosts)
+{
+	char *cp;
+
+	/* wildcard */
+	if (strchr(hosts, '*') != NULL || strchr(hosts, '?') != NULL)
+		return 1;
+	/* single host/ip = ok */
+	if ((cp = strchr(hosts, ',')) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	/* more than two entries on the line */
+	if (strchr(cp + 1, ',') != NULL)
+		return 1;
+	/* XXX maybe parse cp+1 and ensure it is an IP? */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* callback to search for ctx->keys in known_hosts */
+static int
+hostkeys_find(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+	struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
+	size_t i;
+	struct sshkey **tmp;
+
+	if (l->key == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (l->status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) {
+		/* Record if one of the keys appears on a non-matching line */
+		for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+			if (sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i])) {
+				ctx->other_name_seen = 1;
+				debug3_f("found %s key under different "
+				    "name/addr at %s:%ld",
+				    sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]),
+				    l->path, l->linenum);
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Don't proceed if revocation or CA markers are present */
+	/* XXX relax this */
+	if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
+		debug3_f("hostkeys file %s:%ld has CA/revocation marker",
+		    l->path, l->linenum);
+		ctx->complex_hostspec = 1;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* If CheckHostIP is enabled, then check for mismatched hostname/addr */
+	if (ctx->ip_str != NULL && strchr(l->hosts, ',') != NULL) {
+		if ((l->match & HKF_MATCH_HOST) == 0) {
+			/* Record if address matched a different hostname. */
+			ctx->other_name_seen = 1;
+			debug3_f("found address %s against different hostname "
+			    "at %s:%ld", ctx->ip_str, l->path, l->linenum);
+			return 0;
+		} else if ((l->match & HKF_MATCH_IP) == 0) {
+			/* Record if hostname matched a different address. */
+			ctx->other_name_seen = 1;
+			debug3_f("found hostname %s against different address "
+			    "at %s:%ld", ctx->host_str, l->path, l->linenum);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * UpdateHostkeys is skipped for wildcard host names and hostnames
+	 * that contain more than two entries (ssh never writes these).
+	 */
+	if (hostspec_is_complex(l->hosts)) {
+		debug3_f("hostkeys file %s:%ld complex host specification",
+		    l->path, l->linenum);
+		ctx->complex_hostspec = 1;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Mark off keys we've already seen for this host */
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+		if (!sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i]))
+			continue;
+		debug3_f("found %s key at %s:%ld",
+		    sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum);
+		ctx->keys_match[i] |= l->match;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* This line contained a key that not offered by the server */
+	debug3_f("deprecated %s key at %s:%ld", sshkey_ssh_name(l->key),
+	    l->path, l->linenum);
+	if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->old_keys, ctx->nold, ctx->nold + 1,
+	    sizeof(*ctx->old_keys))) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("recallocarray failed nold = %zu", ctx->nold);
+	ctx->old_keys = tmp;
+	ctx->old_keys[ctx->nold++] = l->key;
+	l->key = NULL;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* callback to search for ctx->old_keys in known_hosts under other names */
+static int
+hostkeys_check_old(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+	struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
+	size_t i;
+	int hashed;
+
+	/* only care about lines that *don't* match the active host spec */
+	if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED || l->key == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	hashed = l->match & (HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED);
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) {
+		if (!sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->old_keys[i]))
+			continue;
+		debug3_f("found deprecated %s key at %s:%ld as %s",
+		    sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->old_keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum,
+		    hashed ? "[HASHED]" : l->hosts);
+		ctx->old_key_seen = 1;
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check known_hosts files for deprecated keys under other names. Returns 0
+ * on success or -1 on failure. Updates ctx->old_key_seen if deprecated keys
+ * exist under names other than the active hostname/IP.
+ */
+static int
+check_old_keys_othernames(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	size_t i;
+	int r;
+
+	debug2_f("checking for %zu deprecated keys", ctx->nold);
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) {
+		debug3_f("searching %s for %s / %s",
+		    options.user_hostfiles[i], ctx->host_str,
+		    ctx->ip_str ? ctx->ip_str : "(none)");
+		if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[i],
+		    hostkeys_check_old, ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str,
+		    HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY, 0)) != 0) {
+			if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno == ENOENT) {
+				debug_f("hostkeys file %s does not exist",
+				    options.user_hostfiles[i]);
+				continue;
+			}
+			error_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach failed for %s",
+			    options.user_hostfiles[i]);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+hostkey_change_preamble(LogLevel loglevel)
+{
+	do_log2(loglevel, "The server has updated its host keys.");
+	do_log2(loglevel, "These changes were verified by the server's "
+	    "existing trusted key.");
+}
+
+static void
+update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	int r, was_raw = 0, first = 1;
+	int asking = options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK;
+	LogLevel loglevel = asking ?  SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
+	char *fp, *response;
+	size_t i;
+	struct stat sb;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+		if (!ctx->keys_verified[i])
+			continue;
+		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->keys[i],
+		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+		if (first && asking)
+			hostkey_change_preamble(loglevel);
+		do_log2(loglevel, "Learned new hostkey: %s %s",
+		    sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), fp);
+		first = 0;
+		free(fp);
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) {
+		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->old_keys[i],
+		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+		if (first && asking)
+			hostkey_change_preamble(loglevel);
+		do_log2(loglevel, "Deprecating obsolete hostkey: %s %s",
+		    sshkey_type(ctx->old_keys[i]), fp);
+		first = 0;
+		free(fp);
+	}
+	if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) {
+		if (get_saved_tio() != NULL) {
+			leave_raw_mode(1);
+			was_raw = 1;
+		}
+		response = NULL;
+		for (i = 0; !quit_pending && i < 3; i++) {
+			free(response);
+			response = read_passphrase("Accept updated hostkeys? "
+			    "(yes/no): ", RP_ECHO);
+			if (strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0)
+				break;
+			else if (quit_pending || response == NULL ||
+			    strcasecmp(response, "no") == 0) {
+				options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+				break;
+			} else {
+				do_log2(loglevel, "Please enter "
+				    "\"yes\" or \"no\"");
+			}
+		}
+		if (quit_pending || i >= 3 || response == NULL)
+			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+		free(response);
+		if (was_raw)
+			enter_raw_mode(1);
+	}
+	if (options.update_hostkeys == 0)
+		return;
+	/*
+	 * Now that all the keys are verified, we can go ahead and replace
+	 * them in known_hosts (assuming SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK didn't
+	 * cancel the operation).
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) {
+		/*
+		 * NB. keys are only added to hostfiles[0], for the rest we
+		 * just delete the hostname entries.
+		 */
+		if (stat(options.user_hostfiles[i], &sb) != 0) {
+			if (errno == ENOENT) {
+				debug_f("known hosts file %s does not "
+				    "exist", options.user_hostfiles[i]);
+			} else {
+				error_f("known hosts file %s "
+				    "inaccessible: %s",
+				    options.user_hostfiles[i], strerror(errno));
+			}
+			continue;
+		}
+		if ((r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[i],
+		    ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str,
+		    i == 0 ? ctx->keys : NULL, i == 0 ? ctx->nkeys : 0,
+		    options.hash_known_hosts, 0,
+		    options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "hostfile_replace_entries failed for %s",
+			    options.user_hostfiles[i]);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+client_global_hostkeys_prove_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
+    u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx)
+{
+	struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
+	size_t i, ndone;
+	struct sshbuf *signdata;
+	int r, plaintype;
+	const u_char *sig;
+	const char *rsa_kexalg = NULL;
+	char *alg = NULL;
+	size_t siglen;
+
+	if (ctx->nnew == 0)
+		fatal_f("ctx->nnew == 0"); /* sanity */
+	if (type != SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
+		error("Server failed to confirm ownership of "
+		    "private host keys");
+		hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(
+	    ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)) == KEY_RSA)
+		rsa_kexalg = ssh->kex->hostkey_alg;
+	if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	/*
+	 * Expect a signature for each of the ctx->nnew private keys we
+	 * haven't seen before. They will be in the same order as the
+	 * ctx->keys where the corresponding ctx->keys_match[i] == 0.
+	 */
+	for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+		if (ctx->keys_match[i])
+			continue;
+		plaintype = sshkey_type_plain(ctx->keys[i]->type);
+		/* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */
+		sshbuf_reset(signdata);
+		if ( (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata,
+		    "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(signdata,
+		    ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshkey_puts(ctx->keys[i], signdata)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "compose signdata");
+		/* Extract and verify signature */
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "parse sig");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &alg)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "server gave unintelligible signature "
+			    "for %s key %zu", sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Special case for RSA keys: if a RSA hostkey was negotiated,
+		 * then use its signature type for verification of RSA hostkey
+		 * proofs. Otherwise, accept only RSA-SHA256/512 signatures.
+		 */
+		if (plaintype == KEY_RSA && rsa_kexalg == NULL &&
+		    match_pattern_list(alg, HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS, 0) != 1) {
+			debug_f("server used untrusted RSA signature algorithm "
+			    "%s for key %zu, disregarding", alg, i);
+			free(alg);
+			/* zap the key from the list */
+			sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]);
+			ctx->keys[i] = NULL;
+			ndone++;
+			continue;
+		}
+		debug3_f("verify %s key %zu using sigalg %s",
+		    sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i, alg);
+		free(alg);
+		if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen,
+		    sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata),
+		    plaintype == KEY_RSA ? rsa_kexalg : NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "server gave bad signature for %s key %zu",
+			    sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/* Key is good. Mark it as 'seen' */
+		ctx->keys_verified[i] = 1;
+		ndone++;
+	}
+	/* Shouldn't happen */
+	if (ndone != ctx->nnew)
+		fatal_f("ndone != ctx->nnew (%zu / %zu)", ndone, ctx->nnew);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+		error_f("protocol error");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Make the edits to known_hosts */
+	update_known_hosts(ctx);
+ out:
+	hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
+	hostkeys_update_complete = 1;
+	client_repledge();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns non-zero if the key is accepted by HostkeyAlgorithms.
+ * Made slightly less trivial by the multiple RSA signature algorithm names.
+ */
+static int
+key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	const char *ktype = sshkey_ssh_name(key);
+	const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms;
+
+	if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
+		return 0;
+	if (key->type == KEY_RSA &&
+	    (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1 ||
+	    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1))
+		return 1;
+	return match_pattern_list(ktype, hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle hostkeys-00@openssh.com global request to inform the client of all
+ * the server's hostkeys. The keys are checked against the user's
+ * HostkeyAlgorithms preference before they are accepted.
+ */
+static int
+client_input_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	const u_char *blob = NULL;
+	size_t i, len = 0;
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL, **tmp;
+	int r, prove_sent = 0;
+	char *fp;
+	static int hostkeys_seen = 0; /* XXX use struct ssh */
+	extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* XXX from ssh.c */
+	struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+	u_int want;
+
+	if (hostkeys_seen)
+		fatal_f("server already sent hostkeys");
+	if (!can_update_hostkeys())
+		return 1;
+	hostkeys_seen = 1;
+
+	ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx));
+	while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
+		sshkey_free(key);
+		key = NULL;
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &len)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "parse key");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, len, &key)) != 0) {
+			do_log2_fr(r, r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN ?
+			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+			    "convert key");
+			continue;
+		}
+		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+		debug3_f("received %s key %s", sshkey_type(key), fp);
+		free(fp);
+
+		if (!key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(key)) {
+			debug3_f("%s key not permitted by "
+			    "HostkeyAlgorithms", sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Skip certs */
+		if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+			debug3_f("%s key is a certificate; skipping",
+			    sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Ensure keys are unique */
+		for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+			if (sshkey_equal(key, ctx->keys[i])) {
+				error_f("received duplicated %s host key",
+				    sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		/* Key is good, record it */
+		if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nkeys + 1,
+		    sizeof(*ctx->keys))) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("recallocarray failed nkeys = %zu",
+			    ctx->nkeys);
+		ctx->keys = tmp;
+		ctx->keys[ctx->nkeys++] = key;
+		key = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (ctx->nkeys == 0) {
+		debug_f("server sent no hostkeys");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((ctx->keys_match = calloc(ctx->nkeys,
+	    sizeof(*ctx->keys_match))) == NULL ||
+	    (ctx->keys_verified = calloc(ctx->nkeys,
+	    sizeof(*ctx->keys_verified))) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("calloc failed");
+
+	get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host,
+	    options.check_host_ip ? (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr : NULL,
+	    options.port, &ctx->host_str,
+	    options.check_host_ip ? &ctx->ip_str : NULL);
+
+	/* Find which keys we already know about. */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) {
+		debug_f("searching %s for %s / %s",
+		    options.user_hostfiles[i], ctx->host_str,
+		    ctx->ip_str ? ctx->ip_str : "(none)");
+		if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[i],
+		    hostkeys_find, ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str,
+		    HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY, 0)) != 0) {
+			if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno == ENOENT) {
+				debug_f("hostkeys file %s does not exist",
+				    options.user_hostfiles[i]);
+				continue;
+			}
+			error_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach failed for %s",
+			    options.user_hostfiles[i]);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Figure out if we have any new keys to add */
+	ctx->nnew = ctx->nincomplete = 0;
+	want = HKF_MATCH_HOST | ( options.check_host_ip ? HKF_MATCH_IP : 0);
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+		if (ctx->keys_match[i] == 0)
+			ctx->nnew++;
+		if ((ctx->keys_match[i] & want) != want)
+			ctx->nincomplete++;
+	}
+
+	debug3_f("%zu server keys: %zu new, %zu retained, "
+	    "%zu incomplete match. %zu to remove", ctx->nkeys, ctx->nnew,
+	    ctx->nkeys - ctx->nnew - ctx->nincomplete,
+	    ctx->nincomplete, ctx->nold);
+
+	if (ctx->nnew == 0 && ctx->nold == 0) {
+		debug_f("no new or deprecated keys from server");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Various reasons why we cannot proceed with the update */
+	if (ctx->complex_hostspec) {
+		debug_f("CA/revocation marker, manual host list or wildcard "
+		    "host pattern found, skipping UserKnownHostsFile update");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (ctx->other_name_seen) {
+		debug_f("host key found matching a different name/address, "
+		    "skipping UserKnownHostsFile update");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * If removing keys, check whether they appear under different
+	 * names/addresses and refuse to proceed if they do. This avoids
+	 * cases such as hosts with multiple names becoming inconsistent
+	 * with regards to CheckHostIP entries.
+	 * XXX UpdateHostkeys=force to override this (and other) checks?
+	 */
+	if (ctx->nold != 0) {
+		if (check_old_keys_othernames(ctx) != 0)
+			goto out; /* error already logged */
+		if (ctx->old_key_seen) {
+			debug_f("key(s) for %s%s%s exist under other names; "
+			    "skipping UserKnownHostsFile update",
+			    ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str == NULL ? "" : ",",
+			    ctx->ip_str == NULL ? "" : ctx->ip_str);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ctx->nnew == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * We have some keys to remove or fix matching for.
+		 * We can proceed to do this without requiring a fresh proof
+		 * from the server.
+		 */
+		update_known_hosts(ctx);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * We have received previously-unseen keys from the server.
+	 * Ask the server to confirm ownership of the private halves.
+	 */
+	debug3_f("asking server to prove ownership for %zu keys", ctx->nnew);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
+	    "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* bool: want reply */
+		fatal_fr(r, "prepare hostkeys-prove");
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+		if (ctx->keys_match[i])
+			continue;
+		sshbuf_reset(buf);
+		if ((r = sshkey_putb(ctx->keys[i], buf)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "assemble hostkeys-prove");
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send hostkeys-prove");
+	client_register_global_confirm(
+	    client_global_hostkeys_prove_confirm, ctx);
+	ctx = NULL;  /* will be freed in callback */
+	prove_sent = 1;
+
+	/* Success */
+ out:
+	hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	if (!prove_sent) {
+		/* UpdateHostkeys handling completed */
+		hostkeys_update_complete = 1;
+		client_repledge();
+	}
+	/*
+	 * NB. Return success for all cases. The server doesn't need to know
+	 * what the client does with its hosts file.
+	 */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	char *rtype;
+	u_char want_reply;
+	int r, success = 0;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d",
+	    rtype, want_reply);
+	if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com") == 0)
+		success = client_input_hostkeys(ssh);
+	if (want_reply) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ? SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS :
+		    SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(rtype);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void
+client_send_env(struct ssh *ssh, int id, const char *name, const char *val)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	debug("channel %d: setting env %s = \"%s\"", id, name, val);
+	channel_request_start(ssh, id, "env", 0);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, val)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send setenv");
+}
+
+void
+client_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem,
+    const char *term, struct termios *tiop, int in_fd, struct sshbuf *cmd,
+    char **env)
+{
+	size_t i, j, len;
+	int matched, r;
+	char *name, *val;
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+
+	debug2_f("id %d", id);
+
+	if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("channel %d: unknown channel", id);
+
+	ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, want_tty,
+	    options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
+
+	if (want_tty) {
+		struct winsize ws;
+
+		/* Store window size in the packet. */
+		if (ioctl(in_fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == -1)
+			memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
+
+		channel_request_start(ssh, id, "pty-req", 1);
+		client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "PTY allocation", CONFIRM_TTY);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, term != NULL ? term : ""))
+		    != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_col)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_row)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_xpixel)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_ypixel)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "build pty-req");
+		if (tiop == NULL)
+			tiop = get_saved_tio();
+		ssh_tty_make_modes(ssh, -1, tiop);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "send pty-req");
+		/* XXX wait for reply */
+		c->client_tty = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Transfer any environment variables from client to server */
+	if (options.num_send_env != 0 && env != NULL) {
+		debug("Sending environment.");
+		for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++) {
+			/* Split */
+			name = xstrdup(env[i]);
+			if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) {
+				free(name);
+				continue;
+			}
+			*val++ = '\0';
+
+			matched = 0;
+			for (j = 0; j < options.num_send_env; j++) {
+				if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[j])) {
+					matched = 1;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			if (!matched) {
+				debug3("Ignored env %s", name);
+				free(name);
+				continue;
+			}
+			client_send_env(ssh, id, name, val);
+			free(name);
+		}
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
+		/* Split */
+		name = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
+		if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) {
+			free(name);
+			continue;
+		}
+		*val++ = '\0';
+		client_send_env(ssh, id, name, val);
+		free(name);
+	}
+
+	len = sshbuf_len(cmd);
+	if (len > 0) {
+		if (len > 900)
+			len = 900;
+		if (want_subsystem) {
+			debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s",
+			    (int)len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd));
+			channel_request_start(ssh, id, "subsystem", 1);
+			client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "subsystem",
+			    CONFIRM_CLOSE);
+		} else {
+			debug("Sending command: %.*s",
+			    (int)len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd));
+			channel_request_start(ssh, id, "exec", 1);
+			client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "exec", CONFIRM_CLOSE);
+		}
+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, cmd)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "send command");
+	} else {
+		channel_request_start(ssh, id, "shell", 1);
+		client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "shell", CONFIRM_CLOSE);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "send shell");
+	}
+
+	session_setup_complete = 1;
+	client_repledge();
+}
+
+static void
+client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error);
+
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &channel_input_status_confirm);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &channel_input_status_confirm);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &client_input_global_request);
+
+	/* rekeying */
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+
+	/* global request reply messages */
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &client_global_request_reply);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &client_global_request_reply);
+}
+
+void
+client_stop_mux(void)
+{
+	if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
+		unlink(options.control_path);
+	/*
+	 * If we are in persist mode, or don't have a shell, signal that we
+	 * should close when all active channels are closed.
+	 */
+	if (options.control_persist || options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_NONE) {
+		session_closed = 1;
+		setproctitle("[stopped mux]");
+	}
+}
+
+/* client specific fatal cleanup */
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+	leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+	if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
+		unlink(options.control_path);
+	ssh_kill_proxy_command();
+	_exit(i);
+}
diff --git a/clientloop.h b/clientloop.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3163055
--- /dev/null
+++ b/clientloop.h
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.h,v 1.37 2020/04/03 02:40:32 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <termios.h>
+
+struct ssh;
+
+/* Client side main loop for the interactive session. */
+int	 client_loop(struct ssh *, int, int, int);
+int	 client_x11_get_proto(struct ssh *, const char *, const char *,
+	    u_int, u_int, char **, char **);
+void	 client_global_request_reply_fwd(int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	 client_session2_setup(struct ssh *, int, int, int,
+	    const char *, struct termios *, int, struct sshbuf *, char **);
+char	 *client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *, int, int, int,
+    channel_open_fn *, void *);
+void	 client_stop_mux(void);
+
+/* Escape filter for protocol 2 sessions */
+void	*client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int);
+void	 client_filter_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, void *);
+int	 client_simple_escape_filter(struct ssh *, Channel *, char *, int);
+
+/* Global request confirmation callbacks */
+typedef void global_confirm_cb(struct ssh *, int, u_int32_t, void *);
+void	 client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *, void *);
+
+/* Channel request confirmation callbacks */
+enum confirm_action { CONFIRM_WARN = 0, CONFIRM_CLOSE, CONFIRM_TTY };
+void client_expect_confirm(struct ssh *, int, const char *,
+    enum confirm_action);
+
+/* Multiplexing protocol version */
+#define SSHMUX_VER			4
+
+/* Multiplexing control protocol flags */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN		1	/* Open new connection */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK	2	/* Check master is alive */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE	3	/* Ask master to exit */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD	4	/* Open stdio fwd (ssh -W) */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD		5	/* Forward only, no command */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP		6	/* Disable mux but not conn */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD	7	/* Cancel forwarding(s) */
+#define SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY		8	/* Open new connection */
+
+void	muxserver_listen(struct ssh *);
+int	muxclient(const char *);
+void	mux_exit_message(struct ssh *, Channel *, int);
+void	mux_tty_alloc_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *);
+
diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..478a940
--- /dev/null
+++ b/compat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.121 2023/02/02 12:10:05 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+
+/* determine bug flags from SSH protocol banner */
+void
+compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
+{
+	int i;
+	static struct {
+		char	*pat;
+		int	bugs;
+	} check[] = {
+		{ "OpenSSH_2.*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_3.0*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_3.1*",	SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR|
+					SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
+		{ "OpenSSH_3.*",	SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE },
+		{ "Sun_SSH_1.0*",	SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|
+					SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
+		{ "OpenSSH_2*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_3*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_4*",		SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE },
+		{ "OpenSSH_5*",		SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT|
+					SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
+		{ "OpenSSH_6.6.1*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
+		{ "OpenSSH_6.5*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_6.6*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|
+					SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
+		{ "OpenSSH_7.4*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE|
+					SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74},
+		{ "OpenSSH_7.0*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_7.1*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_7.2*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_7.3*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_7.5*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_7.6*,"
+		  "OpenSSH_7.7*",	SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE},
+		{ "OpenSSH*",		SSH_NEW_OPENSSH },
+		{ "*MindTerm*",		0 },
+		{ "3.0.*",		SSH_BUG_DEBUG },
+		{ "3.0 SecureCRT*",	SSH_OLD_SESSIONID },
+		{ "1.7 SecureFX*",	SSH_OLD_SESSIONID },
+		{ "1.2.18*,"
+		  "1.2.19*,"
+		  "1.2.20*,"
+		  "1.2.21*,"
+		  "1.2.22*",		SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
+		{ "1.3.2*",		/* F-Secure */
+					SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG },
+		{ "Cisco-1.*",		SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE|
+					SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS },
+		{ "*SSH Compatible Server*",			/* Netscreen */
+					SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
+		{ "*OSU_0*,"
+		  "OSU_1.0*,"
+		  "OSU_1.1*,"
+		  "OSU_1.2*,"
+		  "OSU_1.3*,"
+		  "OSU_1.4*,"
+		  "OSU_1.5alpha1*,"
+		  "OSU_1.5alpha2*,"
+		  "OSU_1.5alpha3*",	SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD },
+		{ "*SSH_Version_Mapper*",
+					SSH_BUG_SCANNER },
+		{ "PuTTY_Local:*,"	/* dev versions < Sep 2014 */
+		  "PuTTY-Release-0.5*," /* 0.50-0.57, DH-GEX in >=0.52 */
+		  "PuTTY_Release_0.5*,"	/* 0.58-0.59 */
+		  "PuTTY_Release_0.60*,"
+		  "PuTTY_Release_0.61*,"
+		  "PuTTY_Release_0.62*,"
+		  "PuTTY_Release_0.63*,"
+		  "PuTTY_Release_0.64*",
+					SSH_OLD_DHGEX },
+		{ "FuTTY*",		SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, /* Putty Fork */
+		{ "Probe-*",
+					SSH_BUG_PROBE },
+		{ "TeraTerm SSH*,"
+		  "TTSSH/1.5.*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.1*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.2*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.3*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.4*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.5*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.6*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.70*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.71*,"
+		  "TTSSH/2.72*",	SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS },
+		{ "WinSCP_release_4*,"
+		  "WinSCP_release_5.0*,"
+		  "WinSCP_release_5.1,"
+		  "WinSCP_release_5.1.*,"
+		  "WinSCP_release_5.5,"
+		  "WinSCP_release_5.5.*,"
+		  "WinSCP_release_5.6,"
+		  "WinSCP_release_5.6.*,"
+		  "WinSCP_release_5.7,"
+		  "WinSCP_release_5.7.1,"
+		  "WinSCP_release_5.7.2,"
+		  "WinSCP_release_5.7.3,"
+		  "WinSCP_release_5.7.4",
+					SSH_OLD_DHGEX },
+		{ "ConfD-*",
+					SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE },
+		{ "Twisted_*",		0 },
+		{ "Twisted*",		SSH_BUG_DEBUG },
+		{ NULL,			0 }
+	};
+
+	/* process table, return first match */
+	ssh->compat = 0;
+	for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
+		if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) {
+			debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
+			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
+			ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+	debug_f("no match: %s", version);
+}
+
+/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+char *
+compat_cipher_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *cipher_prop)
+{
+	if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES))
+		return xstrdup(cipher_prop);
+	debug2_f("original cipher proposal: %s", cipher_prop);
+	if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_denylist(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL)
+		fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+	debug2_f("compat cipher proposal: %s", cipher_prop);
+	if (*cipher_prop == '\0')
+		fatal("No supported ciphers found");
+	return cipher_prop;
+}
+
+/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+char *
+compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *pkalg_prop)
+{
+	if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5))
+		return xstrdup(pkalg_prop);
+	debug2_f("original public key proposal: %s", pkalg_prop);
+	if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_denylist(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL)
+		fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+	debug2_f("compat public key proposal: %s", pkalg_prop);
+	if (*pkalg_prop == '\0')
+		fatal("No supported PK algorithms found");
+	return pkalg_prop;
+}
+
+/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+char *
+compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *p)
+{
+	char *cp = NULL, *cp2 = NULL;
+
+	if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
+		return xstrdup(p);
+	debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
+	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
+		if ((cp = match_filter_denylist(p,
+		    "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
+			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
+		if ((cp2 = match_filter_denylist(cp ? cp : p,
+		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
+		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
+			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+		free(cp);
+		cp = cp2;
+	}
+	if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
+		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found");
+	debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", cp);
+	return cp;
+}
+
diff --git a/compat.h b/compat.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..167409b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/compat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.57 2021/06/06 03:40:39 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef COMPAT_H
+#define COMPAT_H
+
+#define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
+#define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
+#define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
+/* #define unused		0x00000008 */
+#define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
+/* #define unused		0x00000020 */
+#define SSH_BUG_DEBUG		0x00000040
+/* #define unused		0x00000080 */
+#define SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG	0x00000100
+/* #define unused		0x00000200 */
+#define SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD	0x00000400
+#define SSH_BUG_SCANNER		0x00000800
+#define SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES	0x00001000
+#define SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5	0x00002000
+#define SSH_OLD_DHGEX		0x00004000
+#define SSH_BUG_NOREKEY		0x00008000
+/* #define unused		0x00010000 */
+/* #define unused		0x00020000 */
+/* #define unused		0x00040000 */
+/* #define unused		0x00100000 */
+#define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF		0x00200000
+#define SSH_BUG_PROBE		0x00400000
+/* #define unused		0x00800000 */
+#define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR	0x01000000
+/* #define unused		0x02000000 */
+#define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH		0x04000000
+#define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT	0x08000000
+#define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD	0x10000000
+#define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS	0x20000000
+#define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE	0x40000000
+
+struct ssh;
+
+void    compat_banner(struct ssh *, const char *);
+char	*compat_cipher_proposal(struct ssh *, char *);
+char	*compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *, char *);
+char	*compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *, char *);
+#endif
diff --git a/config.guess b/config.guess
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..980b020
--- /dev/null
+++ b/config.guess
@@ -0,0 +1,1774 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# Attempt to guess a canonical system name.
+#   Copyright 1992-2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+# shellcheck disable=SC2006,SC2268 # see below for rationale
+
+timestamp='2022-09-17'
+
+# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+# (at your option) any later version.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+# General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+#
+# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you
+# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a
+# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under
+# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that
+# program.  This Exception is an additional permission under section 7
+# of the GNU General Public License, version 3 ("GPLv3").
+#
+# Originally written by Per Bothner; maintained since 2000 by Ben Elliston.
+#
+# You can get the latest version of this script from:
+# https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/config.git/plain/config.guess
+#
+# Please send patches to <config-patches@gnu.org>.
+
+
+# The "shellcheck disable" line above the timestamp inhibits complaints
+# about features and limitations of the classic Bourne shell that were
+# superseded or lifted in POSIX.  However, this script identifies a wide
+# variety of pre-POSIX systems that do not have POSIX shells at all, and
+# even some reasonably current systems (Solaris 10 as case-in-point) still
+# have a pre-POSIX /bin/sh.
+
+
+me=`echo "$0" | sed -e 's,.*/,,'`
+
+usage="\
+Usage: $0 [OPTION]
+
+Output the configuration name of the system \`$me' is run on.
+
+Options:
+  -h, --help         print this help, then exit
+  -t, --time-stamp   print date of last modification, then exit
+  -v, --version      print version number, then exit
+
+Report bugs and patches to <config-patches@gnu.org>."
+
+version="\
+GNU config.guess ($timestamp)
+
+Originally written by Per Bothner.
+Copyright 1992-2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+This is free software; see the source for copying conditions.  There is NO
+warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE."
+
+help="
+Try \`$me --help' for more information."
+
+# Parse command line
+while test $# -gt 0 ; do
+  case $1 in
+    --time-stamp | --time* | -t )
+       echo "$timestamp" ; exit ;;
+    --version | -v )
+       echo "$version" ; exit ;;
+    --help | --h* | -h )
+       echo "$usage"; exit ;;
+    -- )     # Stop option processing
+       shift; break ;;
+    - )	# Use stdin as input.
+       break ;;
+    -* )
+       echo "$me: invalid option $1$help" >&2
+       exit 1 ;;
+    * )
+       break ;;
+  esac
+done
+
+if test $# != 0; then
+  echo "$me: too many arguments$help" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+# Just in case it came from the environment.
+GUESS=
+
+# CC_FOR_BUILD -- compiler used by this script. Note that the use of a
+# compiler to aid in system detection is discouraged as it requires
+# temporary files to be created and, as you can see below, it is a
+# headache to deal with in a portable fashion.
+
+# Historically, `CC_FOR_BUILD' used to be named `HOST_CC'. We still
+# use `HOST_CC' if defined, but it is deprecated.
+
+# Portable tmp directory creation inspired by the Autoconf team.
+
+tmp=
+# shellcheck disable=SC2172
+trap 'test -z "$tmp" || rm -fr "$tmp"' 0 1 2 13 15
+
+set_cc_for_build() {
+    # prevent multiple calls if $tmp is already set
+    test "$tmp" && return 0
+    : "${TMPDIR=/tmp}"
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2039,SC3028
+    { tmp=`(umask 077 && mktemp -d "$TMPDIR/cgXXXXXX") 2>/dev/null` && test -n "$tmp" && test -d "$tmp" ; } ||
+	{ test -n "$RANDOM" && tmp=$TMPDIR/cg$$-$RANDOM && (umask 077 && mkdir "$tmp" 2>/dev/null) ; } ||
+	{ tmp=$TMPDIR/cg-$$ && (umask 077 && mkdir "$tmp" 2>/dev/null) && echo "Warning: creating insecure temp directory" >&2 ; } ||
+	{ echo "$me: cannot create a temporary directory in $TMPDIR" >&2 ; exit 1 ; }
+    dummy=$tmp/dummy
+    case ${CC_FOR_BUILD-},${HOST_CC-},${CC-} in
+	,,)    echo "int x;" > "$dummy.c"
+	       for driver in cc gcc c89 c99 ; do
+		   if ($driver -c -o "$dummy.o" "$dummy.c") >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+		       CC_FOR_BUILD=$driver
+		       break
+		   fi
+	       done
+	       if test x"$CC_FOR_BUILD" = x ; then
+		   CC_FOR_BUILD=no_compiler_found
+	       fi
+	       ;;
+	,,*)   CC_FOR_BUILD=$CC ;;
+	,*,*)  CC_FOR_BUILD=$HOST_CC ;;
+    esac
+}
+
+# This is needed to find uname on a Pyramid OSx when run in the BSD universe.
+# (ghazi@noc.rutgers.edu 1994-08-24)
+if test -f /.attbin/uname ; then
+	PATH=$PATH:/.attbin ; export PATH
+fi
+
+UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -m) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_MACHINE=unknown
+UNAME_RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_RELEASE=unknown
+UNAME_SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_SYSTEM=unknown
+UNAME_VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_VERSION=unknown
+
+case $UNAME_SYSTEM in
+Linux|GNU|GNU/*)
+	LIBC=unknown
+
+	set_cc_for_build
+	cat <<-EOF > "$dummy.c"
+	#include <features.h>
+	#if defined(__UCLIBC__)
+	LIBC=uclibc
+	#elif defined(__dietlibc__)
+	LIBC=dietlibc
+	#elif defined(__GLIBC__)
+	LIBC=gnu
+	#else
+	#include <stdarg.h>
+	/* First heuristic to detect musl libc.  */
+	#ifdef __DEFINED_va_list
+	LIBC=musl
+	#endif
+	#endif
+	EOF
+	cc_set_libc=`$CC_FOR_BUILD -E "$dummy.c" 2>/dev/null | grep '^LIBC' | sed 's, ,,g'`
+	eval "$cc_set_libc"
+
+	# Second heuristic to detect musl libc.
+	if [ "$LIBC" = unknown ] &&
+	   command -v ldd >/dev/null &&
+	   ldd --version 2>&1 | grep -q ^musl; then
+		LIBC=musl
+	fi
+
+	# If the system lacks a compiler, then just pick glibc.
+	# We could probably try harder.
+	if [ "$LIBC" = unknown ]; then
+		LIBC=gnu
+	fi
+	;;
+esac
+
+# Note: order is significant - the case branches are not exclusive.
+
+case $UNAME_MACHINE:$UNAME_SYSTEM:$UNAME_RELEASE:$UNAME_VERSION in
+    *:NetBSD:*:*)
+	# NetBSD (nbsd) targets should (where applicable) match one or
+	# more of the tuples: *-*-netbsdelf*, *-*-netbsdaout*,
+	# *-*-netbsdecoff* and *-*-netbsd*.  For targets that recently
+	# switched to ELF, *-*-netbsd* would select the old
+	# object file format.  This provides both forward
+	# compatibility and a consistent mechanism for selecting the
+	# object file format.
+	#
+	# Note: NetBSD doesn't particularly care about the vendor
+	# portion of the name.  We always set it to "unknown".
+	UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`(uname -p 2>/dev/null || \
+	    /sbin/sysctl -n hw.machine_arch 2>/dev/null || \
+	    /usr/sbin/sysctl -n hw.machine_arch 2>/dev/null || \
+	    echo unknown)`
+	case $UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH in
+	    aarch64eb) machine=aarch64_be-unknown ;;
+	    armeb) machine=armeb-unknown ;;
+	    arm*) machine=arm-unknown ;;
+	    sh3el) machine=shl-unknown ;;
+	    sh3eb) machine=sh-unknown ;;
+	    sh5el) machine=sh5le-unknown ;;
+	    earmv*)
+		arch=`echo "$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH" | sed -e 's,^e\(armv[0-9]\).*$,\1,'`
+		endian=`echo "$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH" | sed -ne 's,^.*\(eb\)$,\1,p'`
+		machine=${arch}${endian}-unknown
+		;;
+	    *) machine=$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH-unknown ;;
+	esac
+	# The Operating System including object format, if it has switched
+	# to ELF recently (or will in the future) and ABI.
+	case $UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH in
+	    earm*)
+		os=netbsdelf
+		;;
+	    arm*|i386|m68k|ns32k|sh3*|sparc|vax)
+		set_cc_for_build
+		if echo __ELF__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
+			| grep -q __ELF__
+		then
+		    # Once all utilities can be ECOFF (netbsdecoff) or a.out (netbsdaout).
+		    # Return netbsd for either.  FIX?
+		    os=netbsd
+		else
+		    os=netbsdelf
+		fi
+		;;
+	    *)
+		os=netbsd
+		;;
+	esac
+	# Determine ABI tags.
+	case $UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH in
+	    earm*)
+		expr='s/^earmv[0-9]/-eabi/;s/eb$//'
+		abi=`echo "$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH" | sed -e "$expr"`
+		;;
+	esac
+	# The OS release
+	# Debian GNU/NetBSD machines have a different userland, and
+	# thus, need a distinct triplet. However, they do not need
+	# kernel version information, so it can be replaced with a
+	# suitable tag, in the style of linux-gnu.
+	case $UNAME_VERSION in
+	    Debian*)
+		release='-gnu'
+		;;
+	    *)
+		release=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/[-_].*//' | cut -d. -f1,2`
+		;;
+	esac
+	# Since CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM:
+	# contains redundant information, the shorter form:
+	# CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM is used.
+	GUESS=$machine-${os}${release}${abi-}
+	;;
+    *:Bitrig:*:*)
+	UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/Bitrig.//'`
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH-unknown-bitrig$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:OpenBSD:*:*)
+	UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/OpenBSD.//'`
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH-unknown-openbsd$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:SecBSD:*:*)
+	UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/SecBSD.//'`
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH-unknown-secbsd$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:LibertyBSD:*:*)
+	UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/^.*BSD\.//'`
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH-unknown-libertybsd$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:MidnightBSD:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-midnightbsd$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:ekkoBSD:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-ekkobsd$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:SolidBSD:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-solidbsd$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:OS108:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-os108_$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    macppc:MirBSD:*:*)
+	GUESS=powerpc-unknown-mirbsd$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:MirBSD:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-mirbsd$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:Sortix:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-sortix
+	;;
+    *:Twizzler:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-twizzler
+	;;
+    *:Redox:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-redox
+	;;
+    mips:OSF1:*.*)
+	GUESS=mips-dec-osf1
+	;;
+    alpha:OSF1:*:*)
+	# Reset EXIT trap before exiting to avoid spurious non-zero exit code.
+	trap '' 0
+	case $UNAME_RELEASE in
+	*4.0)
+		UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $3}'`
+		;;
+	*5.*)
+		UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $4}'`
+		;;
+	esac
+	# According to Compaq, /usr/sbin/psrinfo has been available on
+	# OSF/1 and Tru64 systems produced since 1995.  I hope that
+	# covers most systems running today.  This code pipes the CPU
+	# types through head -n 1, so we only detect the type of CPU 0.
+	ALPHA_CPU_TYPE=`/usr/sbin/psrinfo -v | sed -n -e 's/^  The alpha \(.*\) processor.*$/\1/p' | head -n 1`
+	case $ALPHA_CPU_TYPE in
+	    "EV4 (21064)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE=alpha ;;
+	    "EV4.5 (21064)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE=alpha ;;
+	    "LCA4 (21066/21068)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE=alpha ;;
+	    "EV5 (21164)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev5 ;;
+	    "EV5.6 (21164A)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev56 ;;
+	    "EV5.6 (21164PC)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;;
+	    "EV5.7 (21164PC)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca57 ;;
+	    "EV6 (21264)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev6 ;;
+	    "EV6.7 (21264A)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev67 ;;
+	    "EV6.8CB (21264C)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;;
+	    "EV6.8AL (21264B)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;;
+	    "EV6.8CX (21264D)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;;
+	    "EV6.9A (21264/EV69A)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev69 ;;
+	    "EV7 (21364)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev7 ;;
+	    "EV7.9 (21364A)")
+		UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev79 ;;
+	esac
+	# A Pn.n version is a patched version.
+	# A Vn.n version is a released version.
+	# A Tn.n version is a released field test version.
+	# A Xn.n version is an unreleased experimental baselevel.
+	# 1.2 uses "1.2" for uname -r.
+	OSF_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/^[PVTX]//' | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz`
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-dec-osf$OSF_REL
+	;;
+    Amiga*:UNIX_System_V:4.0:*)
+	GUESS=m68k-unknown-sysv4
+	;;
+    *:[Aa]miga[Oo][Ss]:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-amigaos
+	;;
+    *:[Mm]orph[Oo][Ss]:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-morphos
+	;;
+    *:OS/390:*:*)
+	GUESS=i370-ibm-openedition
+	;;
+    *:z/VM:*:*)
+	GUESS=s390-ibm-zvmoe
+	;;
+    *:OS400:*:*)
+	GUESS=powerpc-ibm-os400
+	;;
+    arm:RISC*:1.[012]*:*|arm:riscix:1.[012]*:*)
+	GUESS=arm-acorn-riscix$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    arm*:riscos:*:*|arm*:RISCOS:*:*)
+	GUESS=arm-unknown-riscos
+	;;
+    SR2?01:HI-UX/MPP:*:* | SR8000:HI-UX/MPP:*:*)
+	GUESS=hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxmpp
+	;;
+    Pyramid*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:SMP_DC-OSx*:*:*)
+	# akee@wpdis03.wpafb.af.mil (Earle F. Ake) contributed MIS and NILE.
+	case `(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null` in
+	    att) GUESS=pyramid-pyramid-sysv3 ;;
+	    *)   GUESS=pyramid-pyramid-bsd   ;;
+	esac
+	;;
+    NILE*:*:*:dcosx)
+	GUESS=pyramid-pyramid-svr4
+	;;
+    DRS?6000:unix:4.0:6*)
+	GUESS=sparc-icl-nx6
+	;;
+    DRS?6000:UNIX_SV:4.2*:7* | DRS?6000:isis:4.2*:7*)
+	case `/usr/bin/uname -p` in
+	    sparc) GUESS=sparc-icl-nx7 ;;
+	esac
+	;;
+    s390x:SunOS:*:*)
+	SUN_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-ibm-solaris2$SUN_REL
+	;;
+    sun4H:SunOS:5.*:*)
+	SUN_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+	GUESS=sparc-hal-solaris2$SUN_REL
+	;;
+    sun4*:SunOS:5.*:* | tadpole*:SunOS:5.*:*)
+	SUN_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+	GUESS=sparc-sun-solaris2$SUN_REL
+	;;
+    i86pc:AuroraUX:5.*:* | i86xen:AuroraUX:5.*:*)
+	GUESS=i386-pc-auroraux$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    i86pc:SunOS:5.*:* | i86xen:SunOS:5.*:*)
+	set_cc_for_build
+	SUN_ARCH=i386
+	# If there is a compiler, see if it is configured for 64-bit objects.
+	# Note that the Sun cc does not turn __LP64__ into 1 like gcc does.
+	# This test works for both compilers.
+	if test "$CC_FOR_BUILD" != no_compiler_found; then
+	    if (echo '#ifdef __amd64'; echo IS_64BIT_ARCH; echo '#endif') | \
+		(CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -m64 -E - 2>/dev/null) | \
+		grep IS_64BIT_ARCH >/dev/null
+	    then
+		SUN_ARCH=x86_64
+	    fi
+	fi
+	SUN_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+	GUESS=$SUN_ARCH-pc-solaris2$SUN_REL
+	;;
+    sun4*:SunOS:6*:*)
+	# According to config.sub, this is the proper way to canonicalize
+	# SunOS6.  Hard to guess exactly what SunOS6 will be like, but
+	# it's likely to be more like Solaris than SunOS4.
+	SUN_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+	GUESS=sparc-sun-solaris3$SUN_REL
+	;;
+    sun4*:SunOS:*:*)
+	case `/usr/bin/arch -k` in
+	    Series*|S4*)
+		UNAME_RELEASE=`uname -v`
+		;;
+	esac
+	# Japanese Language versions have a version number like `4.1.3-JL'.
+	SUN_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/-/_/'`
+	GUESS=sparc-sun-sunos$SUN_REL
+	;;
+    sun3*:SunOS:*:*)
+	GUESS=m68k-sun-sunos$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    sun*:*:4.2BSD:*)
+	UNAME_RELEASE=`(sed 1q /etc/motd | awk '{print substr($5,1,3)}') 2>/dev/null`
+	test "x$UNAME_RELEASE" = x && UNAME_RELEASE=3
+	case `/bin/arch` in
+	    sun3)
+		GUESS=m68k-sun-sunos$UNAME_RELEASE
+		;;
+	    sun4)
+		GUESS=sparc-sun-sunos$UNAME_RELEASE
+		;;
+	esac
+	;;
+    aushp:SunOS:*:*)
+	GUESS=sparc-auspex-sunos$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    # The situation for MiNT is a little confusing.  The machine name
+    # can be virtually everything (everything which is not
+    # "atarist" or "atariste" at least should have a processor
+    # > m68000).  The system name ranges from "MiNT" over "FreeMiNT"
+    # to the lowercase version "mint" (or "freemint").  Finally
+    # the system name "TOS" denotes a system which is actually not
+    # MiNT.  But MiNT is downward compatible to TOS, so this should
+    # be no problem.
+    atarist[e]:*MiNT:*:* | atarist[e]:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*)
+	GUESS=m68k-atari-mint$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    atari*:*MiNT:*:* | atari*:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*)
+	GUESS=m68k-atari-mint$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *falcon*:*MiNT:*:* | *falcon*:*mint:*:* | *falcon*:*TOS:*:*)
+	GUESS=m68k-atari-mint$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    milan*:*MiNT:*:* | milan*:*mint:*:* | *milan*:*TOS:*:*)
+	GUESS=m68k-milan-mint$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    hades*:*MiNT:*:* | hades*:*mint:*:* | *hades*:*TOS:*:*)
+	GUESS=m68k-hades-mint$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:*MiNT:*:* | *:*mint:*:* | *:*TOS:*:*)
+	GUESS=m68k-unknown-mint$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    m68k:machten:*:*)
+	GUESS=m68k-apple-machten$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    powerpc:machten:*:*)
+	GUESS=powerpc-apple-machten$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    RISC*:Mach:*:*)
+	GUESS=mips-dec-mach_bsd4.3
+	;;
+    RISC*:ULTRIX:*:*)
+	GUESS=mips-dec-ultrix$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    VAX*:ULTRIX*:*:*)
+	GUESS=vax-dec-ultrix$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    2020:CLIX:*:* | 2430:CLIX:*:*)
+	GUESS=clipper-intergraph-clix$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    mips:*:*:UMIPS | mips:*:*:RISCos)
+	set_cc_for_build
+	sed 's/^	//' << EOF > "$dummy.c"
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+#include <stdio.h>  /* for printf() prototype */
+	int main (int argc, char *argv[]) {
+#else
+	int main (argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; {
+#endif
+	#if defined (host_mips) && defined (MIPSEB)
+	#if defined (SYSTYPE_SYSV)
+	  printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssysv\\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
+	#endif
+	#if defined (SYSTYPE_SVR4)
+	  printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssvr4\\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
+	#endif
+	#if defined (SYSTYPE_BSD43) || defined(SYSTYPE_BSD)
+	  printf ("mips-mips-riscos%sbsd\\n", argv[1]); exit (0);
+	#endif
+	#endif
+	  exit (-1);
+	}
+EOF
+	$CC_FOR_BUILD -o "$dummy" "$dummy.c" &&
+	  dummyarg=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -n 's/\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p'` &&
+	  SYSTEM_NAME=`"$dummy" "$dummyarg"` &&
+	    { echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; }
+	GUESS=mips-mips-riscos$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    Motorola:PowerMAX_OS:*:*)
+	GUESS=powerpc-motorola-powermax
+	;;
+    Motorola:*:4.3:PL8-*)
+	GUESS=powerpc-harris-powermax
+	;;
+    Night_Hawk:*:*:PowerMAX_OS | Synergy:PowerMAX_OS:*:*)
+	GUESS=powerpc-harris-powermax
+	;;
+    Night_Hawk:Power_UNIX:*:*)
+	GUESS=powerpc-harris-powerunix
+	;;
+    m88k:CX/UX:7*:*)
+	GUESS=m88k-harris-cxux7
+	;;
+    m88k:*:4*:R4*)
+	GUESS=m88k-motorola-sysv4
+	;;
+    m88k:*:3*:R3*)
+	GUESS=m88k-motorola-sysv3
+	;;
+    AViiON:dgux:*:*)
+	# DG/UX returns AViiON for all architectures
+	UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p`
+	if test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = mc88100 || test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = mc88110
+	then
+	    if test "$TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE"x = m88kdguxelfx || \
+	       test "$TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE"x = x
+	    then
+		GUESS=m88k-dg-dgux$UNAME_RELEASE
+	    else
+		GUESS=m88k-dg-dguxbcs$UNAME_RELEASE
+	    fi
+	else
+	    GUESS=i586-dg-dgux$UNAME_RELEASE
+	fi
+	;;
+    M88*:DolphinOS:*:*)	# DolphinOS (SVR3)
+	GUESS=m88k-dolphin-sysv3
+	;;
+    M88*:*:R3*:*)
+	# Delta 88k system running SVR3
+	GUESS=m88k-motorola-sysv3
+	;;
+    XD88*:*:*:*) # Tektronix XD88 system running UTekV (SVR3)
+	GUESS=m88k-tektronix-sysv3
+	;;
+    Tek43[0-9][0-9]:UTek:*:*) # Tektronix 4300 system running UTek (BSD)
+	GUESS=m68k-tektronix-bsd
+	;;
+    *:IRIX*:*:*)
+	IRIX_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/-/_/g'`
+	GUESS=mips-sgi-irix$IRIX_REL
+	;;
+    ????????:AIX?:[12].1:2)   # AIX 2.2.1 or AIX 2.1.1 is RT/PC AIX.
+	GUESS=romp-ibm-aix    # uname -m gives an 8 hex-code CPU id
+	;;                    # Note that: echo "'`uname -s`'" gives 'AIX '
+    i*86:AIX:*:*)
+	GUESS=i386-ibm-aix
+	;;
+    ia64:AIX:*:*)
+	if test -x /usr/bin/oslevel ; then
+		IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel`
+	else
+		IBM_REV=$UNAME_VERSION.$UNAME_RELEASE
+	fi
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-ibm-aix$IBM_REV
+	;;
+    *:AIX:2:3)
+	if grep bos325 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		set_cc_for_build
+		sed 's/^		//' << EOF > "$dummy.c"
+		#include <sys/systemcfg.h>
+
+		main()
+			{
+			if (!__power_pc())
+				exit(1);
+			puts("powerpc-ibm-aix3.2.5");
+			exit(0);
+			}
+EOF
+		if $CC_FOR_BUILD -o "$dummy" "$dummy.c" && SYSTEM_NAME=`"$dummy"`
+		then
+			GUESS=$SYSTEM_NAME
+		else
+			GUESS=rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.5
+		fi
+	elif grep bos324 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		GUESS=rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.4
+	else
+		GUESS=rs6000-ibm-aix3.2
+	fi
+	;;
+    *:AIX:*:[4567])
+	IBM_CPU_ID=`/usr/sbin/lsdev -C -c processor -S available | sed 1q | awk '{ print $1 }'`
+	if /usr/sbin/lsattr -El "$IBM_CPU_ID" | grep ' POWER' >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		IBM_ARCH=rs6000
+	else
+		IBM_ARCH=powerpc
+	fi
+	if test -x /usr/bin/lslpp ; then
+		IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/lslpp -Lqc bos.rte.libc | \
+			   awk -F: '{ print $3 }' | sed s/[0-9]*$/0/`
+	else
+		IBM_REV=$UNAME_VERSION.$UNAME_RELEASE
+	fi
+	GUESS=$IBM_ARCH-ibm-aix$IBM_REV
+	;;
+    *:AIX:*:*)
+	GUESS=rs6000-ibm-aix
+	;;
+    ibmrt:4.4BSD:*|romp-ibm:4.4BSD:*)
+	GUESS=romp-ibm-bsd4.4
+	;;
+    ibmrt:*BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*)            # covers RT/PC BSD and
+	GUESS=romp-ibm-bsd$UNAME_RELEASE    # 4.3 with uname added to
+	;;                                  # report: romp-ibm BSD 4.3
+    *:BOSX:*:*)
+	GUESS=rs6000-bull-bosx
+	;;
+    DPX/2?00:B.O.S.:*:*)
+	GUESS=m68k-bull-sysv3
+	;;
+    9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:1.*:*)
+	GUESS=m68k-hp-bsd
+	;;
+    hp300:4.4BSD:*:* | 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:2.*:*)
+	GUESS=m68k-hp-bsd4.4
+	;;
+    9000/[34678]??:HP-UX:*:*)
+	HPUX_REV=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'`
+	case $UNAME_MACHINE in
+	    9000/31?)            HP_ARCH=m68000 ;;
+	    9000/[34]??)         HP_ARCH=m68k ;;
+	    9000/[678][0-9][0-9])
+		if test -x /usr/bin/getconf; then
+		    sc_cpu_version=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_CPU_VERSION 2>/dev/null`
+		    sc_kernel_bits=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_KERNEL_BITS 2>/dev/null`
+		    case $sc_cpu_version in
+		      523) HP_ARCH=hppa1.0 ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_0
+		      528) HP_ARCH=hppa1.1 ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_1
+		      532)                      # CPU_PA_RISC2_0
+			case $sc_kernel_bits in
+			  32) HP_ARCH=hppa2.0n ;;
+			  64) HP_ARCH=hppa2.0w ;;
+			  '') HP_ARCH=hppa2.0 ;;   # HP-UX 10.20
+			esac ;;
+		    esac
+		fi
+		if test "$HP_ARCH" = ""; then
+		    set_cc_for_build
+		    sed 's/^		//' << EOF > "$dummy.c"
+
+		#define _HPUX_SOURCE
+		#include <stdlib.h>
+		#include <unistd.h>
+
+		int main ()
+		{
+		#if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS)
+		    long bits = sysconf(_SC_KERNEL_BITS);
+		#endif
+		    long cpu  = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION);
+
+		    switch (cpu)
+			{
+			case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0"); break;
+			case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1"); break;
+			case CPU_PA_RISC2_0:
+		#if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS)
+			    switch (bits)
+				{
+				case 64: puts ("hppa2.0w"); break;
+				case 32: puts ("hppa2.0n"); break;
+				default: puts ("hppa2.0"); break;
+				} break;
+		#else  /* !defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) */
+			    puts ("hppa2.0"); break;
+		#endif
+			default: puts ("hppa1.0"); break;
+			}
+		    exit (0);
+		}
+EOF
+		    (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -o "$dummy" "$dummy.c" 2>/dev/null) && HP_ARCH=`"$dummy"`
+		    test -z "$HP_ARCH" && HP_ARCH=hppa
+		fi ;;
+	esac
+	if test "$HP_ARCH" = hppa2.0w
+	then
+	    set_cc_for_build
+
+	    # hppa2.0w-hp-hpux* has a 64-bit kernel and a compiler generating
+	    # 32-bit code.  hppa64-hp-hpux* has the same kernel and a compiler
+	    # generating 64-bit code.  GNU and HP use different nomenclature:
+	    #
+	    # $ CC_FOR_BUILD=cc ./config.guess
+	    # => hppa2.0w-hp-hpux11.23
+	    # $ CC_FOR_BUILD="cc +DA2.0w" ./config.guess
+	    # => hppa64-hp-hpux11.23
+
+	    if echo __LP64__ | (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) |
+		grep -q __LP64__
+	    then
+		HP_ARCH=hppa2.0w
+	    else
+		HP_ARCH=hppa64
+	    fi
+	fi
+	GUESS=$HP_ARCH-hp-hpux$HPUX_REV
+	;;
+    ia64:HP-UX:*:*)
+	HPUX_REV=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'`
+	GUESS=ia64-hp-hpux$HPUX_REV
+	;;
+    3050*:HI-UX:*:*)
+	set_cc_for_build
+	sed 's/^	//' << EOF > "$dummy.c"
+	#include <unistd.h>
+	int
+	main ()
+	{
+	  long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION);
+	  /* The order matters, because CPU_IS_HP_MC68K erroneously returns
+	     true for CPU_PA_RISC1_0.  CPU_IS_PA_RISC returns correct
+	     results, however.  */
+	  if (CPU_IS_PA_RISC (cpu))
+	    {
+	      switch (cpu)
+		{
+		  case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
+		  case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
+		  case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: puts ("hppa2.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
+		  default: puts ("hppa-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break;
+		}
+	    }
+	  else if (CPU_IS_HP_MC68K (cpu))
+	    puts ("m68k-hitachi-hiuxwe2");
+	  else puts ("unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2");
+	  exit (0);
+	}
+EOF
+	$CC_FOR_BUILD -o "$dummy" "$dummy.c" && SYSTEM_NAME=`"$dummy"` &&
+		{ echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; }
+	GUESS=unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2
+	;;
+    9000/7??:4.3bsd:*:* | 9000/8?[79]:4.3bsd:*:*)
+	GUESS=hppa1.1-hp-bsd
+	;;
+    9000/8??:4.3bsd:*:*)
+	GUESS=hppa1.0-hp-bsd
+	;;
+    *9??*:MPE/iX:*:* | *3000*:MPE/iX:*:*)
+	GUESS=hppa1.0-hp-mpeix
+	;;
+    hp7??:OSF1:*:* | hp8?[79]:OSF1:*:*)
+	GUESS=hppa1.1-hp-osf
+	;;
+    hp8??:OSF1:*:*)
+	GUESS=hppa1.0-hp-osf
+	;;
+    i*86:OSF1:*:*)
+	if test -x /usr/sbin/sysversion ; then
+	    GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-osf1mk
+	else
+	    GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-osf1
+	fi
+	;;
+    parisc*:Lites*:*:*)
+	GUESS=hppa1.1-hp-lites
+	;;
+    C1*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C1*:*)
+	GUESS=c1-convex-bsd
+	;;
+    C2*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C2*:*)
+	if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc
+	then echo c32-convex-bsd
+	else echo c2-convex-bsd
+	fi
+	exit ;;
+    C34*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C34*:*)
+	GUESS=c34-convex-bsd
+	;;
+    C38*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C38*:*)
+	GUESS=c38-convex-bsd
+	;;
+    C4*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C4*:*)
+	GUESS=c4-convex-bsd
+	;;
+    CRAY*Y-MP:*:*:*)
+	CRAY_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'`
+	GUESS=ymp-cray-unicos$CRAY_REL
+	;;
+    CRAY*[A-Z]90:*:*:*)
+	echo "$UNAME_MACHINE"-cray-unicos"$UNAME_RELEASE" \
+	| sed -e 's/CRAY.*\([A-Z]90\)/\1/' \
+	      -e y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/ \
+	      -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'
+	exit ;;
+    CRAY*TS:*:*:*)
+	CRAY_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'`
+	GUESS=t90-cray-unicos$CRAY_REL
+	;;
+    CRAY*T3E:*:*:*)
+	CRAY_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'`
+	GUESS=alphaev5-cray-unicosmk$CRAY_REL
+	;;
+    CRAY*SV1:*:*:*)
+	CRAY_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'`
+	GUESS=sv1-cray-unicos$CRAY_REL
+	;;
+    *:UNICOS/mp:*:*)
+	CRAY_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/'`
+	GUESS=craynv-cray-unicosmp$CRAY_REL
+	;;
+    F30[01]:UNIX_System_V:*:* | F700:UNIX_System_V:*:*)
+	FUJITSU_PROC=`uname -m | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz`
+	FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz | sed -e 's/\///'`
+	FUJITSU_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/ /_/'`
+	GUESS=${FUJITSU_PROC}-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}
+	;;
+    5000:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*)
+	FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz | sed -e 's/\///'`
+	FUJITSU_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | tr ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz | sed -e 's/ /_/'`
+	GUESS=sparc-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}
+	;;
+    i*86:BSD/386:*:* | i*86:BSD/OS:*:* | *:Ascend\ Embedded/OS:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-bsdi$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    sparc*:BSD/OS:*:*)
+	GUESS=sparc-unknown-bsdi$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:BSD/OS:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-bsdi$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    arm:FreeBSD:*:*)
+	UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p`
+	set_cc_for_build
+	if echo __ARM_PCS_VFP | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
+	    | grep -q __ARM_PCS_VFP
+	then
+	    FREEBSD_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`
+	    GUESS=$UNAME_PROCESSOR-unknown-freebsd$FREEBSD_REL-gnueabi
+	else
+	    FREEBSD_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`
+	    GUESS=$UNAME_PROCESSOR-unknown-freebsd$FREEBSD_REL-gnueabihf
+	fi
+	;;
+    *:FreeBSD:*:*)
+	UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p`
+	case $UNAME_PROCESSOR in
+	    amd64)
+		UNAME_PROCESSOR=x86_64 ;;
+	    i386)
+		UNAME_PROCESSOR=i586 ;;
+	esac
+	FREEBSD_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`
+	GUESS=$UNAME_PROCESSOR-unknown-freebsd$FREEBSD_REL
+	;;
+    i*:CYGWIN*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-cygwin
+	;;
+    *:MINGW64*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-mingw64
+	;;
+    *:MINGW*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-mingw32
+	;;
+    *:MSYS*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-msys
+	;;
+    i*:PW*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-pw32
+	;;
+    *:SerenityOS:*:*)
+        GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-serenity
+        ;;
+    *:Interix*:*)
+	case $UNAME_MACHINE in
+	    x86)
+		GUESS=i586-pc-interix$UNAME_RELEASE
+		;;
+	    authenticamd | genuineintel | EM64T)
+		GUESS=x86_64-unknown-interix$UNAME_RELEASE
+		;;
+	    IA64)
+		GUESS=ia64-unknown-interix$UNAME_RELEASE
+		;;
+	esac ;;
+    i*:UWIN*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-uwin
+	;;
+    amd64:CYGWIN*:*:* | x86_64:CYGWIN*:*:*)
+	GUESS=x86_64-pc-cygwin
+	;;
+    prep*:SunOS:5.*:*)
+	SUN_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/[^.]*//'`
+	GUESS=powerpcle-unknown-solaris2$SUN_REL
+	;;
+    *:GNU:*:*)
+	# the GNU system
+	GNU_ARCH=`echo "$UNAME_MACHINE" | sed -e 's,[-/].*$,,'`
+	GNU_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's,/.*$,,'`
+	GUESS=$GNU_ARCH-unknown-$LIBC$GNU_REL
+	;;
+    *:GNU/*:*:*)
+	# other systems with GNU libc and userland
+	GNU_SYS=`echo "$UNAME_SYSTEM" | sed 's,^[^/]*/,,' | tr "[:upper:]" "[:lower:]"`
+	GNU_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-$GNU_SYS$GNU_REL-$LIBC
+	;;
+    x86_64:[Mm]anagarm:*:*|i?86:[Mm]anagarm:*:*)
+	GUESS="$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-managarm-mlibc"
+	;;
+    *:[Mm]anagarm:*:*)
+	GUESS="$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-managarm-mlibc"
+	;;
+    *:Minix:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-minix
+	;;
+    aarch64:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    aarch64_be:Linux:*:*)
+	UNAME_MACHINE=aarch64_be
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    alpha:Linux:*:*)
+	case `sed -n '/^cpu model/s/^.*: \(.*\)/\1/p' /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null` in
+	  EV5)   UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev5 ;;
+	  EV56)  UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev56 ;;
+	  PCA56) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;;
+	  PCA57) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;;
+	  EV6)   UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev6 ;;
+	  EV67)  UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev67 ;;
+	  EV68*) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;;
+	esac
+	objdump --private-headers /bin/sh | grep -q ld.so.1
+	if test "$?" = 0 ; then LIBC=gnulibc1 ; fi
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    arc:Linux:*:* | arceb:Linux:*:* | arc32:Linux:*:* | arc64:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    arm*:Linux:*:*)
+	set_cc_for_build
+	if echo __ARM_EABI__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
+	    | grep -q __ARM_EABI__
+	then
+	    GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	else
+	    if echo __ARM_PCS_VFP | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \
+		| grep -q __ARM_PCS_VFP
+	    then
+		GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-${LIBC}eabi
+	    else
+		GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-${LIBC}eabihf
+	    fi
+	fi
+	;;
+    avr32*:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    cris:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-axis-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    crisv32:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-axis-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    e2k:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    frv:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    hexagon:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    i*86:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    ia64:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    k1om:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    loongarch32:Linux:*:* | loongarch64:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    m32r*:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    m68*:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    mips:Linux:*:* | mips64:Linux:*:*)
+	set_cc_for_build
+	IS_GLIBC=0
+	test x"${LIBC}" = xgnu && IS_GLIBC=1
+	sed 's/^	//' << EOF > "$dummy.c"
+	#undef CPU
+	#undef mips
+	#undef mipsel
+	#undef mips64
+	#undef mips64el
+	#if ${IS_GLIBC} && defined(_ABI64)
+	LIBCABI=gnuabi64
+	#else
+	#if ${IS_GLIBC} && defined(_ABIN32)
+	LIBCABI=gnuabin32
+	#else
+	LIBCABI=${LIBC}
+	#endif
+	#endif
+
+	#if ${IS_GLIBC} && defined(__mips64) && defined(__mips_isa_rev) && __mips_isa_rev>=6
+	CPU=mipsisa64r6
+	#else
+	#if ${IS_GLIBC} && !defined(__mips64) && defined(__mips_isa_rev) && __mips_isa_rev>=6
+	CPU=mipsisa32r6
+	#else
+	#if defined(__mips64)
+	CPU=mips64
+	#else
+	CPU=mips
+	#endif
+	#endif
+	#endif
+
+	#if defined(__MIPSEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL) || defined(_MIPSEL) || defined(MIPSEL)
+	MIPS_ENDIAN=el
+	#else
+	#if defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(MIPSEB)
+	MIPS_ENDIAN=
+	#else
+	MIPS_ENDIAN=
+	#endif
+	#endif
+EOF
+	cc_set_vars=`$CC_FOR_BUILD -E "$dummy.c" 2>/dev/null | grep '^CPU\|^MIPS_ENDIAN\|^LIBCABI'`
+	eval "$cc_set_vars"
+	test "x$CPU" != x && { echo "$CPU${MIPS_ENDIAN}-unknown-linux-$LIBCABI"; exit; }
+	;;
+    mips64el:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    openrisc*:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=or1k-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    or32:Linux:*:* | or1k*:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    padre:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=sparc-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    parisc64:Linux:*:* | hppa64:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=hppa64-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    parisc:Linux:*:* | hppa:Linux:*:*)
+	# Look for CPU level
+	case `grep '^cpu[^a-z]*:' /proc/cpuinfo 2>/dev/null | cut -d' ' -f2` in
+	  PA7*) GUESS=hppa1.1-unknown-linux-$LIBC ;;
+	  PA8*) GUESS=hppa2.0-unknown-linux-$LIBC ;;
+	  *)    GUESS=hppa-unknown-linux-$LIBC ;;
+	esac
+	;;
+    ppc64:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=powerpc64-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    ppc:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=powerpc-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    ppc64le:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=powerpc64le-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    ppcle:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=powerpcle-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    riscv32:Linux:*:* | riscv32be:Linux:*:* | riscv64:Linux:*:* | riscv64be:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    s390:Linux:*:* | s390x:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-ibm-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    sh64*:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    sh*:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    sparc:Linux:*:* | sparc64:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    tile*:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    vax:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-dec-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    x86_64:Linux:*:*)
+	set_cc_for_build
+	CPU=$UNAME_MACHINE
+	LIBCABI=$LIBC
+	if test "$CC_FOR_BUILD" != no_compiler_found; then
+	    ABI=64
+	    sed 's/^	    //' << EOF > "$dummy.c"
+	    #ifdef __i386__
+	    ABI=x86
+	    #else
+	    #ifdef __ILP32__
+	    ABI=x32
+	    #endif
+	    #endif
+EOF
+	    cc_set_abi=`$CC_FOR_BUILD -E "$dummy.c" 2>/dev/null | grep '^ABI' | sed 's, ,,g'`
+	    eval "$cc_set_abi"
+	    case $ABI in
+		x86) CPU=i686 ;;
+		x32) LIBCABI=${LIBC}x32 ;;
+	    esac
+	fi
+	GUESS=$CPU-pc-linux-$LIBCABI
+	;;
+    xtensa*:Linux:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-linux-$LIBC
+	;;
+    i*86:DYNIX/ptx:4*:*)
+	# ptx 4.0 does uname -s correctly, with DYNIX/ptx in there.
+	# earlier versions are messed up and put the nodename in both
+	# sysname and nodename.
+	GUESS=i386-sequent-sysv4
+	;;
+    i*86:UNIX_SV:4.2MP:2.*)
+	# Unixware is an offshoot of SVR4, but it has its own version
+	# number series starting with 2...
+	# I am not positive that other SVR4 systems won't match this,
+	# I just have to hope.  -- rms.
+	# Use sysv4.2uw... so that sysv4* matches it.
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-sysv4.2uw$UNAME_VERSION
+	;;
+    i*86:OS/2:*:*)
+	# If we were able to find `uname', then EMX Unix compatibility
+	# is probably installed.
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-os2-emx
+	;;
+    i*86:XTS-300:*:STOP)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-stop
+	;;
+    i*86:atheos:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-atheos
+	;;
+    i*86:syllable:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-syllable
+	;;
+    i*86:LynxOS:2.*:* | i*86:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | i*86:LynxOS:4.[02]*:*)
+	GUESS=i386-unknown-lynxos$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    i*86:*DOS:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-msdosdjgpp
+	;;
+    i*86:*:4.*:*)
+	UNAME_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed 's/\/MP$//'`
+	if grep Novell /usr/include/link.h >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
+		GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-univel-sysv$UNAME_REL
+	else
+		GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-sysv$UNAME_REL
+	fi
+	;;
+    i*86:*:5:[678]*)
+	# UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX and OpenServer 6.
+	case `/bin/uname -X | grep "^Machine"` in
+	    *486*)	     UNAME_MACHINE=i486 ;;
+	    *Pentium)	     UNAME_MACHINE=i586 ;;
+	    *Pent*|*Celeron) UNAME_MACHINE=i686 ;;
+	esac
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}${UNAME_SYSTEM}${UNAME_VERSION}
+	;;
+    i*86:*:3.2:*)
+	if test -f /usr/options/cb.name; then
+		UNAME_REL=`sed -n 's/.*Version //p' </usr/options/cb.name`
+		GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-isc$UNAME_REL
+	elif /bin/uname -X 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then
+		UNAME_REL=`(/bin/uname -X|grep Release|sed -e 's/.*= //')`
+		(/bin/uname -X|grep i80486 >/dev/null) && UNAME_MACHINE=i486
+		(/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium' >/dev/null) \
+			&& UNAME_MACHINE=i586
+		(/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pent *II' >/dev/null) \
+			&& UNAME_MACHINE=i686
+		(/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium Pro' >/dev/null) \
+			&& UNAME_MACHINE=i686
+		GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-sco$UNAME_REL
+	else
+		GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-sysv32
+	fi
+	;;
+    pc:*:*:*)
+	# Left here for compatibility:
+	# uname -m prints for DJGPP always 'pc', but it prints nothing about
+	# the processor, so we play safe by assuming i586.
+	# Note: whatever this is, it MUST be the same as what config.sub
+	# prints for the "djgpp" host, or else GDB configure will decide that
+	# this is a cross-build.
+	GUESS=i586-pc-msdosdjgpp
+	;;
+    Intel:Mach:3*:*)
+	GUESS=i386-pc-mach3
+	;;
+    paragon:*:*:*)
+	GUESS=i860-intel-osf1
+	;;
+    i860:*:4.*:*) # i860-SVR4
+	if grep Stardent /usr/include/sys/uadmin.h >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+	  GUESS=i860-stardent-sysv$UNAME_RELEASE    # Stardent Vistra i860-SVR4
+	else # Add other i860-SVR4 vendors below as they are discovered.
+	  GUESS=i860-unknown-sysv$UNAME_RELEASE     # Unknown i860-SVR4
+	fi
+	;;
+    mini*:CTIX:SYS*5:*)
+	# "miniframe"
+	GUESS=m68010-convergent-sysv
+	;;
+    mc68k:UNIX:SYSTEM5:3.51m)
+	GUESS=m68k-convergent-sysv
+	;;
+    M680?0:D-NIX:5.3:*)
+	GUESS=m68k-diab-dnix
+	;;
+    M68*:*:R3V[5678]*:*)
+	test -r /sysV68 && { echo 'm68k-motorola-sysv'; exit; } ;;
+    3[345]??:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??A:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??/*:*:4.0:3.0 | 4400:*:4.0:3.0 | 4850:*:4.0:3.0 | SKA40:*:4.0:3.0 | SDS2:*:4.0:3.0 | SHG2:*:4.0:3.0 | S7501*:*:4.0:3.0)
+	OS_REL=''
+	test -r /etc/.relid \
+	&& OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid`
+	/bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
+	  && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3"$OS_REL"; exit; }
+	/bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \
+	  && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3"$OS_REL"; exit; } ;;
+    3[34]??:*:4.0:* | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:*)
+	/bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
+	  && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4; exit; } ;;
+    NCR*:*:4.2:* | MPRAS*:*:4.2:*)
+	OS_REL='.3'
+	test -r /etc/.relid \
+	    && OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid`
+	/bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \
+	    && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3"$OS_REL"; exit; }
+	/bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \
+	    && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3"$OS_REL"; exit; }
+	/bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep pteron >/dev/null \
+	    && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3"$OS_REL"; exit; } ;;
+    m68*:LynxOS:2.*:* | m68*:LynxOS:3.0*:*)
+	GUESS=m68k-unknown-lynxos$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    mc68030:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*)
+	GUESS=m68k-atari-sysv4
+	;;
+    TSUNAMI:LynxOS:2.*:*)
+	GUESS=sparc-unknown-lynxos$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    rs6000:LynxOS:2.*:*)
+	GUESS=rs6000-unknown-lynxos$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    PowerPC:LynxOS:2.*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:4.[02]*:*)
+	GUESS=powerpc-unknown-lynxos$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    SM[BE]S:UNIX_SV:*:*)
+	GUESS=mips-dde-sysv$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    RM*:ReliantUNIX-*:*:*)
+	GUESS=mips-sni-sysv4
+	;;
+    RM*:SINIX-*:*:*)
+	GUESS=mips-sni-sysv4
+	;;
+    *:SINIX-*:*:*)
+	if uname -p 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then
+		UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null`
+		GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-sni-sysv4
+	else
+		GUESS=ns32k-sni-sysv
+	fi
+	;;
+    PENTIUM:*:4.0*:*)	# Unisys `ClearPath HMP IX 4000' SVR4/MP effort
+			# says <Richard.M.Bartel@ccMail.Census.GOV>
+	GUESS=i586-unisys-sysv4
+	;;
+    *:UNIX_System_V:4*:FTX*)
+	# From Gerald Hewes <hewes@openmarket.com>.
+	# How about differentiating between stratus architectures? -djm
+	GUESS=hppa1.1-stratus-sysv4
+	;;
+    *:*:*:FTX*)
+	# From seanf@swdc.stratus.com.
+	GUESS=i860-stratus-sysv4
+	;;
+    i*86:VOS:*:*)
+	# From Paul.Green@stratus.com.
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-stratus-vos
+	;;
+    *:VOS:*:*)
+	# From Paul.Green@stratus.com.
+	GUESS=hppa1.1-stratus-vos
+	;;
+    mc68*:A/UX:*:*)
+	GUESS=m68k-apple-aux$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    news*:NEWS-OS:6*:*)
+	GUESS=mips-sony-newsos6
+	;;
+    R[34]000:*System_V*:*:* | R4000:UNIX_SYSV:*:* | R*000:UNIX_SV:*:*)
+	if test -d /usr/nec; then
+		GUESS=mips-nec-sysv$UNAME_RELEASE
+	else
+		GUESS=mips-unknown-sysv$UNAME_RELEASE
+	fi
+	;;
+    BeBox:BeOS:*:*)	# BeOS running on hardware made by Be, PPC only.
+	GUESS=powerpc-be-beos
+	;;
+    BeMac:BeOS:*:*)	# BeOS running on Mac or Mac clone, PPC only.
+	GUESS=powerpc-apple-beos
+	;;
+    BePC:BeOS:*:*)	# BeOS running on Intel PC compatible.
+	GUESS=i586-pc-beos
+	;;
+    BePC:Haiku:*:*)	# Haiku running on Intel PC compatible.
+	GUESS=i586-pc-haiku
+	;;
+    ppc:Haiku:*:*)	# Haiku running on Apple PowerPC
+	GUESS=powerpc-apple-haiku
+	;;
+    *:Haiku:*:*)	# Haiku modern gcc (not bound by BeOS compat)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-haiku
+	;;
+    SX-4:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+	GUESS=sx4-nec-superux$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    SX-5:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+	GUESS=sx5-nec-superux$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    SX-6:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+	GUESS=sx6-nec-superux$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    SX-7:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+	GUESS=sx7-nec-superux$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    SX-8:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+	GUESS=sx8-nec-superux$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    SX-8R:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+	GUESS=sx8r-nec-superux$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    SX-ACE:SUPER-UX:*:*)
+	GUESS=sxace-nec-superux$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    Power*:Rhapsody:*:*)
+	GUESS=powerpc-apple-rhapsody$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:Rhapsody:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-apple-rhapsody$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    arm64:Darwin:*:*)
+	GUESS=aarch64-apple-darwin$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:Darwin:*:*)
+	UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p`
+	case $UNAME_PROCESSOR in
+	    unknown) UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc ;;
+	esac
+	if command -v xcode-select > /dev/null 2> /dev/null && \
+		! xcode-select --print-path > /dev/null 2> /dev/null ; then
+	    # Avoid executing cc if there is no toolchain installed as
+	    # cc will be a stub that puts up a graphical alert
+	    # prompting the user to install developer tools.
+	    CC_FOR_BUILD=no_compiler_found
+	else
+	    set_cc_for_build
+	fi
+	if test "$CC_FOR_BUILD" != no_compiler_found; then
+	    if (echo '#ifdef __LP64__'; echo IS_64BIT_ARCH; echo '#endif') | \
+		   (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | \
+		   grep IS_64BIT_ARCH >/dev/null
+	    then
+		case $UNAME_PROCESSOR in
+		    i386) UNAME_PROCESSOR=x86_64 ;;
+		    powerpc) UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc64 ;;
+		esac
+	    fi
+	    # On 10.4-10.6 one might compile for PowerPC via gcc -arch ppc
+	    if (echo '#ifdef __POWERPC__'; echo IS_PPC; echo '#endif') | \
+		   (CCOPTS="" $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | \
+		   grep IS_PPC >/dev/null
+	    then
+		UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc
+	    fi
+	elif test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = i386 ; then
+	    # uname -m returns i386 or x86_64
+	    UNAME_PROCESSOR=$UNAME_MACHINE
+	fi
+	GUESS=$UNAME_PROCESSOR-apple-darwin$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:procnto*:*:* | *:QNX:[0123456789]*:*)
+	UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p`
+	if test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = x86; then
+		UNAME_PROCESSOR=i386
+		UNAME_MACHINE=pc
+	fi
+	GUESS=$UNAME_PROCESSOR-$UNAME_MACHINE-nto-qnx$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:QNX:*:4*)
+	GUESS=i386-pc-qnx
+	;;
+    NEO-*:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
+	GUESS=neo-tandem-nsk$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    NSE-*:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
+	GUESS=nse-tandem-nsk$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    NSR-*:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
+	GUESS=nsr-tandem-nsk$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    NSV-*:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
+	GUESS=nsv-tandem-nsk$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    NSX-*:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*)
+	GUESS=nsx-tandem-nsk$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:NonStop-UX:*:*)
+	GUESS=mips-compaq-nonstopux
+	;;
+    BS2000:POSIX*:*:*)
+	GUESS=bs2000-siemens-sysv
+	;;
+    DS/*:UNIX_System_V:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-$UNAME_SYSTEM-$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:Plan9:*:*)
+	# "uname -m" is not consistent, so use $cputype instead. 386
+	# is converted to i386 for consistency with other x86
+	# operating systems.
+	if test "${cputype-}" = 386; then
+	    UNAME_MACHINE=i386
+	elif test "x${cputype-}" != x; then
+	    UNAME_MACHINE=$cputype
+	fi
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-plan9
+	;;
+    *:TOPS-10:*:*)
+	GUESS=pdp10-unknown-tops10
+	;;
+    *:TENEX:*:*)
+	GUESS=pdp10-unknown-tenex
+	;;
+    KS10:TOPS-20:*:* | KL10:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE4:TOPS-20:*:*)
+	GUESS=pdp10-dec-tops20
+	;;
+    XKL-1:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE5:TOPS-20:*:*)
+	GUESS=pdp10-xkl-tops20
+	;;
+    *:TOPS-20:*:*)
+	GUESS=pdp10-unknown-tops20
+	;;
+    *:ITS:*:*)
+	GUESS=pdp10-unknown-its
+	;;
+    SEI:*:*:SEIUX)
+	GUESS=mips-sei-seiux$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+    *:DragonFly:*:*)
+	DRAGONFLY_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-dragonfly$DRAGONFLY_REL
+	;;
+    *:*VMS:*:*)
+	UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null`
+	case $UNAME_MACHINE in
+	    A*) GUESS=alpha-dec-vms ;;
+	    I*) GUESS=ia64-dec-vms ;;
+	    V*) GUESS=vax-dec-vms ;;
+	esac ;;
+    *:XENIX:*:SysV)
+	GUESS=i386-pc-xenix
+	;;
+    i*86:skyos:*:*)
+	SKYOS_REL=`echo "$UNAME_RELEASE" | sed -e 's/ .*$//'`
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-skyos$SKYOS_REL
+	;;
+    i*86:rdos:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-rdos
+	;;
+    i*86:Fiwix:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-pc-fiwix
+	;;
+    *:AROS:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-aros
+	;;
+    x86_64:VMkernel:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-esx
+	;;
+    amd64:Isilon\ OneFS:*:*)
+	GUESS=x86_64-unknown-onefs
+	;;
+    *:Unleashed:*:*)
+	GUESS=$UNAME_MACHINE-unknown-unleashed$UNAME_RELEASE
+	;;
+esac
+
+# Do we have a guess based on uname results?
+if test "x$GUESS" != x; then
+    echo "$GUESS"
+    exit
+fi
+
+# No uname command or uname output not recognized.
+set_cc_for_build
+cat > "$dummy.c" <<EOF
+#ifdef _SEQUENT_
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(ultrix) || defined(_ultrix) || defined(__ultrix) || defined(__ultrix__)
+#if defined (vax) || defined (__vax) || defined (__vax__) || defined(mips) || defined(__mips) || defined(__mips__) || defined(MIPS) || defined(__MIPS__)
+#include <signal.h>
+#if defined(_SIZE_T_) || defined(SIGLOST)
+#include <sys/utsname.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+main ()
+{
+#if defined (sony)
+#if defined (MIPSEB)
+  /* BFD wants "bsd" instead of "newsos".  Perhaps BFD should be changed,
+     I don't know....  */
+  printf ("mips-sony-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+#include <sys/param.h>
+  printf ("m68k-sony-newsos%s\n",
+#ifdef NEWSOS4
+  "4"
+#else
+  ""
+#endif
+  ); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (NeXT)
+#if !defined (__ARCHITECTURE__)
+#define __ARCHITECTURE__ "m68k"
+#endif
+  int version;
+  version=`(hostinfo | sed -n 's/.*NeXT Mach \([0-9]*\).*/\1/p') 2>/dev/null`;
+  if (version < 4)
+    printf ("%s-next-nextstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version);
+  else
+    printf ("%s-next-openstep%d\n", __ARCHITECTURE__, version);
+  exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (MULTIMAX) || defined (n16)
+#if defined (UMAXV)
+  printf ("ns32k-encore-sysv\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+#if defined (CMU)
+  printf ("ns32k-encore-mach\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+  printf ("ns32k-encore-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (__386BSD__)
+  printf ("i386-pc-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (sequent)
+#if defined (i386)
+  printf ("i386-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#if defined (ns32000)
+  printf ("ns32k-sequent-dynix\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (_SEQUENT_)
+  struct utsname un;
+
+  uname(&un);
+  if (strncmp(un.version, "V2", 2) == 0) {
+    printf ("i386-sequent-ptx2\n"); exit (0);
+  }
+  if (strncmp(un.version, "V1", 2) == 0) { /* XXX is V1 correct? */
+    printf ("i386-sequent-ptx1\n"); exit (0);
+  }
+  printf ("i386-sequent-ptx\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+#if defined (vax)
+#if !defined (ultrix)
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#if defined (BSD)
+#if BSD == 43
+  printf ("vax-dec-bsd4.3\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+#if BSD == 199006
+  printf ("vax-dec-bsd4.3reno\n"); exit (0);
+#else
+  printf ("vax-dec-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+#else
+  printf ("vax-dec-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#else
+#if defined(_SIZE_T_) || defined(SIGLOST)
+  struct utsname un;
+  uname (&un);
+  printf ("vax-dec-ultrix%s\n", un.release); exit (0);
+#else
+  printf ("vax-dec-ultrix\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+#if defined(ultrix) || defined(_ultrix) || defined(__ultrix) || defined(__ultrix__)
+#if defined(mips) || defined(__mips) || defined(__mips__) || defined(MIPS) || defined(__MIPS__)
+#if defined(_SIZE_T_) || defined(SIGLOST)
+  struct utsname *un;
+  uname (&un);
+  printf ("mips-dec-ultrix%s\n", un.release); exit (0);
+#else
+  printf ("mips-dec-ultrix\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined (alliant) && defined (i860)
+  printf ("i860-alliant-bsd\n"); exit (0);
+#endif
+
+  exit (1);
+}
+EOF
+
+$CC_FOR_BUILD -o "$dummy" "$dummy.c" 2>/dev/null && SYSTEM_NAME=`"$dummy"` &&
+	{ echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; }
+
+# Apollos put the system type in the environment.
+test -d /usr/apollo && { echo "$ISP-apollo-$SYSTYPE"; exit; }
+
+echo "$0: unable to guess system type" >&2
+
+case $UNAME_MACHINE:$UNAME_SYSTEM in
+    mips:Linux | mips64:Linux)
+	# If we got here on MIPS GNU/Linux, output extra information.
+	cat >&2 <<EOF
+
+NOTE: MIPS GNU/Linux systems require a C compiler to fully recognize
+the system type. Please install a C compiler and try again.
+EOF
+	;;
+esac
+
+cat >&2 <<EOF
+
+This script (version $timestamp), has failed to recognize the
+operating system you are using. If your script is old, overwrite *all*
+copies of config.guess and config.sub with the latest versions from:
+
+  https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/config.git/plain/config.guess
+and
+  https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/config.git/plain/config.sub
+EOF
+
+our_year=`echo $timestamp | sed 's,-.*,,'`
+thisyear=`date +%Y`
+# shellcheck disable=SC2003
+script_age=`expr "$thisyear" - "$our_year"`
+if test "$script_age" -lt 3 ; then
+   cat >&2 <<EOF
+
+If $0 has already been updated, send the following data and any
+information you think might be pertinent to config-patches@gnu.org to
+provide the necessary information to handle your system.
+
+config.guess timestamp = $timestamp
+
+uname -m = `(uname -m) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -r = `(uname -r) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -s = `(uname -s) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -v = `(uname -v) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+
+/usr/bin/uname -p = `(/usr/bin/uname -p) 2>/dev/null`
+/bin/uname -X     = `(/bin/uname -X) 2>/dev/null`
+
+hostinfo               = `(hostinfo) 2>/dev/null`
+/bin/universe          = `(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null`
+/usr/bin/arch -k       = `(/usr/bin/arch -k) 2>/dev/null`
+/bin/arch              = `(/bin/arch) 2>/dev/null`
+/usr/bin/oslevel       = `(/usr/bin/oslevel) 2>/dev/null`
+/usr/convex/getsysinfo = `(/usr/convex/getsysinfo) 2>/dev/null`
+
+UNAME_MACHINE = "$UNAME_MACHINE"
+UNAME_RELEASE = "$UNAME_RELEASE"
+UNAME_SYSTEM  = "$UNAME_SYSTEM"
+UNAME_VERSION = "$UNAME_VERSION"
+EOF
+fi
+
+exit 1
+
+# Local variables:
+# eval: (add-hook 'before-save-hook 'time-stamp)
+# time-stamp-start: "timestamp='"
+# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d"
+# time-stamp-end: "'"
+# End:
diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f80d542
--- /dev/null
+++ b/config.h.in
@@ -0,0 +1,2118 @@
+/* config.h.in.  Generated from configure.ac by autoheader.  */
+
+/* Define if building universal (internal helper macro) */
+#undef AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD
+
+/* Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address
+   */
+#undef AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK
+
+/* Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) */
+#undef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG
+
+/* System only supports IPv4 audit records */
+#undef AU_IPv4
+
+/* Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname */
+#undef BIND_8_COMPAT
+
+/* The system has incomplete BSM API */
+#undef BROKEN_BSM_API
+
+/* broken in chroots on older kernels */
+#undef BROKEN_CLOSEFROM
+
+/* Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly */
+#undef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE
+
+/* getaddrinfo is broken (if present) */
+#undef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO
+
+/* getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1 */
+#undef BROKEN_GETGROUPS
+
+/* getline is not what we expect */
+#undef BROKEN_GETLINE
+
+/* FreeBSD glob does not do what we need */
+#undef BROKEN_GLOB
+
+/* Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue) */
+#undef BROKEN_INET_NTOA
+
+/* Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name
+   */
+#undef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
+
+/* System poll(2) implementation is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_POLL
+
+/* Can't do comparisons on readv */
+#undef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
+
+/* NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons
+   against it */
+#undef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
+
+/* Needed for NeXT */
+#undef BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS
+
+/* Define if your setregid() is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_SETREGID
+
+/* Define if your setresgid() is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_SETRESGID
+
+/* Define if your setresuid() is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_SETRESUID
+
+/* Define if your setreuid() is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_SETREUID
+
+/* LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation */
+#undef BROKEN_SETVBUF
+
+/* QNX shadow support is broken */
+#undef BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE
+
+/* Define if your snprintf is busted */
+#undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF
+
+/* strndup broken, see APAR IY61211 */
+#undef BROKEN_STRNDUP
+
+/* strnlen broken, see APAR IY62551 */
+#undef BROKEN_STRNLEN
+
+/* strnvis detected broken */
+#undef BROKEN_STRNVIS
+
+/* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */
+#undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
+
+/* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */
+#undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX
+
+/* Define if you have BSD auth support */
+#undef BSD_AUTH
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file */
+#undef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file */
+#undef CONF_UTMP_FILE
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file */
+#undef CONF_WTMPX_FILE
+
+/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file */
+#undef CONF_WTMP_FILE
+
+/* Need to call setpgrp as root */
+#undef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog */
+#undef DISABLE_LASTLOG
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call */
+#undef DISABLE_LOGIN
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp */
+#undef DISABLE_PUTUTLINE
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx */
+#undef DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE
+
+/* Define if you want to disable shadow passwords */
+#undef DISABLE_SHADOW
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use utmp */
+#undef DISABLE_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use utmpx */
+#undef DISABLE_UTMPX
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use wtmp */
+#undef DISABLE_WTMP
+
+/* Define if you don't want to use wtmpx */
+#undef DISABLE_WTMPX
+
+/* Enable for PKCS#11 support */
+#undef ENABLE_PKCS11
+
+/* Enable for U2F/FIDO support */
+#undef ENABLE_SK
+
+/* Enable for built-in U2F/FIDO support */
+#undef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+
+/* define if fflush(NULL) does not work */
+#undef FFLUSH_NULL_BUG
+
+/* File names may not contain backslash characters */
+#undef FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH
+
+/* fsid_t has member val */
+#undef FSID_HAS_VAL
+
+/* fsid_t has member __val */
+#undef FSID_HAS___VAL
+
+/* getpgrp takes one arg */
+#undef GETPGRP_VOID
+
+/* Conflicting defs for getspnam */
+#undef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS
+
+/* Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension */
+#undef GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC
+
+/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t */
+#undef GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC
+
+/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_statv options in glob_t */
+#undef GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV
+
+/* Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol */
+#undef GSSAPI
+
+/* Define if you want to use shadow password expire field */
+#undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
+
+/* Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing */
+#undef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_buf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_stir' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_uniform' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `asprintf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ASPRINTF
+
+/* OpenBSD's gcc has bounded */
+#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__
+
+/* Have attribute nonnull */
+#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__
+
+/* OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel */
+#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `aug_get_machine' function. */
+#undef HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_ntop' function. */
+#undef HAVE_B64_NTOP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_pton' function. */
+#undef HAVE_B64_PTON
+
+/* Define if you have the basename function. */
+#undef HAVE_BASENAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcopy' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BCOPY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcrypt_pbkdf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bindresvport_sa' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `blf_enc' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BLF_ENC
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <blf.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_BLF_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expand0state' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expandstate' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPANDSTATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_initstate' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_stream2word' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_STREAM2WORD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `BN_is_prime_ex' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <bsd/libutil.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <bsm/audit.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <bstring.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_BSTRING_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bzero' function. */
+#undef HAVE_BZERO
+
+/* calloc(0, x) returns NULL */
+#undef HAVE_CALLOC
+
+/* Define if you have caph_cache_tzdata */
+#undef HAVE_CAPH_CACHE_TZDATA
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <capsicum_helpers.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_CAPSICUM_HELPERS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `cap_rights_limit' function. */
+#undef HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `clock' function. */
+#undef HAVE_CLOCK
+
+/* Have clock_gettime */
+#undef HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME
+
+/* define if you have clock_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_CLOCK_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `closefrom' function. */
+#undef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `close_range' function. */
+#undef HAVE_CLOSE_RANGE
+
+/* Define if gai_strerror() returns const char * */
+#undef HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO
+
+/* Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing */
+#undef HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' function. */
+#undef HAVE_CRYPT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypto/sha2.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_CRYPTO_SHA2_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypt.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_CRYPT_H
+
+/* Define if you are on Cygwin */
+#undef HAVE_CYGWIN
+
+/* Define if your libraries define daemon() */
+#undef HAVE_DAEMON
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `AI_NUMERICSERV', and to 0 if
+   you don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `authenticate', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `bzero', and to 0 if you don't.
+   */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_BZERO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `ftruncate', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_FTRUNCATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `getentropy', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_GETENTROPY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `getpeereid', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_GETPEEREID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GLOB_NOMATCH', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE',
+   and to 0 if you don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `howmany', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `h_errno', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginfailed', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginrestrictions', and to 0 if
+   you don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginsuccess', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `MAXSYMLINKS', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `memmem', and to 0 if you don't.
+   */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `NFDBITS', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `offsetof', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `O_NONBLOCK', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `passwdexpired', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `readv', and to 0 if you don't.
+   */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_READV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `setauthdb', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `SHUT_RD', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `UINT32_MAX', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `writev', and to 0 if you don't.
+   */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_WRITEV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getlong', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL__GETLONG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getshort', and to 0 if you
+   don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DES_crypt' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DES_CRYPT
+
+/* Define if you have /dev/ptmx */
+#undef HAVE_DEV_PTMX
+
+/* Define if you have /dev/ptc */
+#undef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_get0_key' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_get0_pqg' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set0_key' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set0_pqg' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set_length' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <dirent.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_DIRENT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirfd' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DIRFD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirname' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DIRNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dlopen' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DLOPEN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_generate_parameters_ex' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_get0_key' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_get0_pqg' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_set0_key' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_set0_pqg' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_SIG_get0' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_SIG_set0' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ECDSA_SIG_get0' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ECDSA_SIG_set0' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EC_KEY_METHOD_new' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <elf.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_ELF_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `endgrent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ENDGRENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <endian.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ENDUTENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutxent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ENDUTXENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `err' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ERR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `errx' function. */
+#undef HAVE_ERRX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <err.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_ERR_H
+
+/* Define if your system has /etc/default/login */
+#undef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_chacha20' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_CHACHA20
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_updated_iv' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_UPDATED_IV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestFinal_ex' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTFINAL_EX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestInit_ex' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_free' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_init' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_new' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha256' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha384' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_SHA384
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha512' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EVP_SHA512
+
+/* Define if you have ut_exit in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_bzero' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_memset' function. */
+#undef HAVE_EXPLICIT_MEMSET
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FCHMOD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmodat' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FCHMODAT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchown' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FCHOWN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchownat' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FCHOWNAT
+
+/* Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom */
+#undef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <fcntl.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fd_mask'. */
+#undef HAVE_FD_MASK
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <features.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_FEATURES_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_assert_set_clientdata' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FIDO_ASSERT_SET_CLIENTDATA
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_cred_prot' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FIDO_CRED_PROT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_cred_set_clientdata' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FIDO_CRED_SET_CLIENTDATA
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_cred_set_prot' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FIDO_CRED_SET_PROT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_dev_get_touch_begin' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_BEGIN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_dev_get_touch_status' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_STATUS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_dev_is_winhello' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_IS_WINHELLO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fido_dev_supports_cred_prot' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_SUPPORTS_CRED_PROT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <floatingpoint.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `flock' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FLOCK
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fmt_scaled' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FMT_SCALED
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fnmatch' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FNMATCH
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <fnmatch.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_FNMATCH_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `freeaddrinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `freezero' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FREEZERO
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsblkcnt_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsfilcnt_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_FSFILCNT_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatfs' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FSTATFS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatvfs' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FSTATVFS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `futimes' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FUTIMES
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `gai_strerror' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaddrinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETAUDIT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit_addr' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getcwd' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETCWD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getentropy' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETENTROPY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrouplist' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrset' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETGRSET
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getlastlogxbyname' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getline' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETLINE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getluid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETLUID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getnameinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getopt' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETOPT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <getopt.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GETOPT_H
+
+/* Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset */
+#undef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
+
+/* Define if your libraries define getpagesize() */
+#undef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeereid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETPEEREID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeerucred' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETPEERUCRED
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETPGID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgrp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETPGRP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpwanam' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETPWANAM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrandom' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETRANDOM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrlimit' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETRLIMIT
+
+/* Define if getrrsetbyname() exists */
+#undef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getseuserbyname' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getsid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETSID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `gettimeofday' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getttyent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETTTYENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutline' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTLINE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTXENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTXID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxline' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTXLINE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxuser' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GETUTXUSER
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `get_default_context_with_level' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `glob' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GLOB
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <glob.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GLOB_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `group_from_gid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
+
+/* Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h */
+#undef HAVE_HEADER_AD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `HMAC_CTX_init' function. */
+#undef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_INIT
+
+/* Define if you have ut_host in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_host in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <iaf.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_IAF_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ia.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_IA_H
+
+/* Define if you have ut_id in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_id in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ifaddrs.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_aton' function. */
+#undef HAVE_INET_ATON
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntoa' function. */
+#undef HAVE_INET_NTOA
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntop' function. */
+#undef HAVE_INET_NTOP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `innetgr' function. */
+#undef HAVE_INNETGR
+
+/* define if you have int64_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_INT64_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `intmax_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_INTMAX_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <inttypes.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_INTTYPES_H
+
+/* define if you have intxx_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_INTXX_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_addr_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_port_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_IN_PORT_T
+
+/* Define if you have isblank(3C). */
+#undef HAVE_ISBLANK
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `killpg' function. */
+#undef HAVE_KILLPG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_cc_new_unique' function. */
+#undef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_free_error_message' function. */
+#undef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_get_error_message' function. */
+#undef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <langinfo.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LANGINFO_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <lastlog.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+
+/* Define if you want ldns support */
+#undef HAVE_LDNS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <libaudit.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `bsm' library (-lbsm). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBBSM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dl' library (-ldl). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBDL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <libgen.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
+
+/* Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id */
+#undef HAVE_LIBIAF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `network' library (-lnetwork). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBNETWORK
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam' library (-lpam). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBPAM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <libproc.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LIBPROC_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `socket' library (-lsocket). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBSOCKET
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <libutil.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `xnet' library (-lxnet). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBXNET
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `z' library (-lz). */
+#undef HAVE_LIBZ
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <limits.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/audit.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/filter.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LINUX_FILTER_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/if_tun.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/seccomp.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LINUX_SECCOMP_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `llabs' function. */
+#undef HAVE_LLABS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <locale.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LOCALE_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `localtime_r' function. */
+#undef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `login' function. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGIN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <login_cap.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `login_getcapbool' function. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `login_getpwclass' function. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGIN_GETPWCLASS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <login.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `logout' function. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGOUT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `logwtmp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_LOGWTMP
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long double'. */
+#undef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long long'. */
+#undef HAVE_LONG_LONG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <maillock.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if your system has a GNU libc compatible `malloc' function, and
+   to 0 otherwise. */
+#undef HAVE_MALLOC
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `mblen' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MBLEN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `mbtowc' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MBTOWC
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `memmem' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MEMMEM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `memmove' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MEMMOVE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `memset_s' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MEMSET_S
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_MKDTEMP
+
+/* define if you have mode_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_MODE_T
+
+/* Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc */
+#undef HAVE_NANOSLEEP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ndir.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_NDIR_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <netdb.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_NETDB_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <netgroup.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <net/if_tun.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <net/route.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H
+
+/* Define if you are on NeXT */
+#undef HAVE_NEXT
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `nfds_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_NFDS_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ngetaddrinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_NGETADDRINFO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `nl_langinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `nsleep' function. */
+#undef HAVE_NSLEEP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ogetaddrinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_OGETADDRINFO
+
+/* Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to
+   pam_strerror */
+#undef HAVE_OLD_PAM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `openlog_r' function. */
+#undef HAVE_OPENLOG_R
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `openpty' function. */
+#undef HAVE_OPENPTY
+
+/* as a macro */
+#undef HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `OPENSSL_init_crypto' function. */
+#undef HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `OpenSSL_version' function. */
+#undef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `OpenSSL_version_num' function. */
+#undef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
+
+/* Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture */
+#undef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_getenvlist' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <pam/pam_appl.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_putenv' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <paths.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_PATHS_H
+
+/* Define if you have ut_pid in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP
+
+/* define if you have pid_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_PID_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pledge' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PLEDGE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `poll' function. */
+#undef HAVE_POLL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <poll.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_POLL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `ppoll' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PPOLL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `prctl' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PRCTL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `priv_basicset' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <priv.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_PRIV_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `procctl' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PROCCTL
+
+/* Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd */
+#undef HAVE_PROC_PID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `proc_pidinfo' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PROC_PIDINFO
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pselect' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PSELECT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pstat' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PSTAT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <pty.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_PTY_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututline' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PUTUTLINE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututxline' function. */
+#undef HAVE_PUTUTXLINE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `raise' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RAISE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `readpassphrase' function. */
+#undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <readpassphrase.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if your system has a GNU libc compatible `realloc' function,
+   and to 0 otherwise. */
+#undef HAVE_REALLOC
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `reallocarray' function. */
+#undef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function. */
+#undef HAVE_REALPATH
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `recallocarray' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `recvmsg' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RECVMSG
+
+/* sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC */
+#undef HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <rpc/types.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `rresvport_af' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_generate_key_ex' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_crt_params' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_factors' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_key' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get_default_method' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_dup' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_free' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_get_finish' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set1_name' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_finish' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_priv_dec' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_priv_enc' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_crt_params' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_factors' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_key' function. */
+#undef HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sandbox.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SANDBOX_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sandbox_init' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SANDBOX_INIT
+
+/* define if you have sa_family_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `scan_scaled' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED
+
+/* Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database */
+#undef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <security/pam_appl.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sendmsg' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SENDMSG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setauthdb' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setdtablesize' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setegid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETEGID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setenv' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETENV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `seteuid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETEUID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroupent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETGROUPENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroups' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETGROUPS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlinebuf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETLINEBUF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlogin' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETLOGIN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setluid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETLUID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpassent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETPASSENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpcred' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETPCRED
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpflags' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETPFLAGS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setppriv' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETPPRIV
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setproctitle' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setregid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETREGID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresgid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETRESGID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresuid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETRESUID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setreuid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETREUID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setrlimit' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setsid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETSID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETUTENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxdb' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETUTXDB
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxent' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETUTXENT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `setvbuf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SETVBUF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `set_id' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SET_ID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA256Update' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SHA256UPDATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sha2.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SHA2_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA384Update' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SHA384UPDATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA512Update' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SHA512UPDATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <shadow.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SHADOW_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigaction' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SIGACTION
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sighandler_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_SIGHANDLER_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigvec' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SIGVEC
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sig_atomic_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
+
+/* define if you have size_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_SIZE_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `snprintf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `socketpair' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
+
+/* Have PEERCRED socket option */
+#undef HAVE_SO_PEERCRED
+
+/* define if you have ssize_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_SSIZE_T
+
+/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
+#undef HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS
+
+/* Define if you have ut_ss in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_SS_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `statfs' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STATFS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `statvfs' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STATVFS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <stddef.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_STDDEF_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdint.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_STDINT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdio.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_STDIO_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdlib.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_STDLIB_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strcasestr' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRCASESTR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strdup' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRDUP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strerror' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRERROR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strftime' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRFTIME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <strings.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_STRINGS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <string.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_STRING_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcat' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRLCAT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcpy' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRLCPY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strmode' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRMODE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strndup' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRNDUP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnlen' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRNLEN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnvis' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRNVIS
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strptime' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRPTIME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsep' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRSEP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsignal' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRSIGNAL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoll' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRTOLL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtonum' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRTONUM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoul' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRTOUL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoull' function. */
+#undef HAVE_STRTOULL
+
+/* define if you have struct addrinfo data type */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO
+
+/* define if you have struct in6_addr data type */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR
+
+/* Define to 1 if `pw_change' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE
+
+/* Define to 1 if `pw_class' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
+
+/* Define to 1 if `pw_expire' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
+
+/* Define to 1 if `pw_gecos' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
+
+/* Define to 1 if `fd' is a member of `struct pollfd'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_POLLFD_FD
+
+/* define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
+
+/* Define to 1 if `sin6_scope_id' is a member of `struct sockaddr_in6'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID
+
+/* define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE
+
+/* Define to 1 if `f_files' is a member of `struct statfs'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FILES
+
+/* Define to 1 if `f_flags' is a member of `struct statfs'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS
+
+/* Define to 1 if `st_blksize' is a member of `struct stat'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE
+
+/* Define to 1 if `st_mtim' is a member of `struct stat'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM
+
+/* Define to 1 if `st_mtime' is a member of `struct stat'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME
+
+/* define if you have struct timespec */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC
+
+/* define if you have struct timeval */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `swap32' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SWAP32
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `sysconf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_SYSCONF
+
+/* Define if you have syslen in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/audit.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bitypes.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bsdtty.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/byteorder.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_BYTEORDER_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/capsicum.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_CAPSICUM_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/cdefs.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/dir.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_DIR_H
+
+/* Define if your system defines sys_errlist[] */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/file.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/label.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mman.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mount.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ndir.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H
+
+/* Define if your system defines sys_nerr */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_NERR
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/param.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/poll.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/prctl.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/procctl.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_PROCCTL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/pstat.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ptms.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ptrace.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/random.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/select.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/statvfs.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stat.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stream.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stropts.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/strtio.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/sysctl.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H
+
+/* Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/sysmacros.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/timers.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/time.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/types.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/un.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/vfs.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcgetpgrp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcsendbreak' function. */
+#undef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `time' function. */
+#undef HAVE_TIME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `timegm' function. */
+#undef HAVE_TIMEGM
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <time.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_TIME_H
+
+/* Define if you have ut_time in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_time in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `timingsafe_bcmp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <tmpdir.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_TMPDIR_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `truncate' function. */
+#undef HAVE_TRUNCATE
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ttyent.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_TTYENT_H
+
+/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define if you have ut_type in utmp.h */
+#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
+
+/* Define if you have ut_type in utmpx.h */
+#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <ucred.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UCRED_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `uintmax_t'. */
+#undef HAVE_UINTMAX_T
+
+/* define if you have uintxx_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_UINTXX_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <unistd.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `unsetenv' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UNSETENV
+
+/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `unsigned long long'. */
+#undef HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmp' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UPDWTMP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmpx' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <usersec.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_USERSEC_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `user_from_uid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `usleep' function. */
+#undef HAVE_USLEEP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <util.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UTIL_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `utimensat' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UTIMENSAT
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `utimes' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UTIMES
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <utime.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UTIME_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpname' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UTMPNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpxname' function. */
+#undef HAVE_UTMPXNAME
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmpx.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmp.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_UTMP_H
+
+/* define if you have u_char data type */
+#undef HAVE_U_CHAR
+
+/* define if you have u_int data type */
+#undef HAVE_U_INT
+
+/* define if you have u_int64_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_U_INT64_T
+
+/* define if you have u_intxx_t data type */
+#undef HAVE_U_INTXX_T
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `vasprintf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_VASPRINTF
+
+/* Define if va_copy exists */
+#undef HAVE_VA_COPY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <vis.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_VIS_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `vsnprintf' function. */
+#undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `waitpid' function. */
+#undef HAVE_WAITPID
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `warn' function. */
+#undef HAVE_WARN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <wchar.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_WCHAR_H
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `wcwidth' function. */
+#undef HAVE_WCWIDTH
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getlong' function. */
+#undef HAVE__GETLONG
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getpty' function. */
+#undef HAVE__GETPTY
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getshort' function. */
+#undef HAVE__GETSHORT
+
+/* Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern */
+#undef HAVE__RES_EXTERN
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_ntop' function. */
+#undef HAVE___B64_NTOP
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_pton' function. */
+#undef HAVE___B64_PTON
+
+/* Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__ */
+#undef HAVE___FUNCTION__
+
+/* Define if libc defines __progname */
+#undef HAVE___PROGNAME
+
+/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
+#undef HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS
+
+/* Define if __va_copy exists */
+#undef HAVE___VA_COPY
+
+/* Define if compiler implements __func__ */
+#undef HAVE___func__
+
+/* Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5 */
+#undef HEIMDAL
+
+/* Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY */
+#undef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY
+
+/* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4 */
+#undef IPV4_IN_IPV6
+
+/* Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting */
+#undef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN
+
+/* Define if you want Kerberos 5 support */
+#undef KRB5
+
+/* Define if pututxline updates lastlog too */
+#undef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE
+
+/* Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return
+   EOPNOTSUPP. */
+#undef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
+
+/* Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer */
+#undef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+
+/* max value of long long calculated by configure */
+#undef LLONG_MAX
+
+/* min value of long long calculated by configure */
+#undef LLONG_MIN
+
+/* Account locked with pw(1) */
+#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
+
+/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
+#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
+
+/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
+#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
+
+/* Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work */
+#undef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+
+/* Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR */
+#undef MAIL_DIRECTORY
+
+/* Need setpgrp to for controlling tty */
+#undef NEED_SETPGRP
+
+/* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on prototype args */
+#undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS
+
+/* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types */
+#undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE
+
+/* SA_RESTARTed signals do no interrupt select */
+#undef NO_SA_RESTART
+
+/* Define to disable UID restoration test */
+#undef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST
+
+/* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */
+#undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS
+
+/* Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void */
+#undef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
+
+/* OpenSSL has ECC */
+#undef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+
+/* libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1 */
+#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
+
+/* libcrypto has NID_secp384r1 */
+#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384
+
+/* libcrypto has NID_secp521r1 */
+#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+
+/* libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions */
+#undef OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES
+
+/* Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only */
+#undef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+
+/* Define to the address where bug reports for this package should be sent. */
+#undef PACKAGE_BUGREPORT
+
+/* Define to the full name of this package. */
+#undef PACKAGE_NAME
+
+/* Define to the full name and version of this package. */
+#undef PACKAGE_STRING
+
+/* Define to the one symbol short name of this package. */
+#undef PACKAGE_TARNAME
+
+/* Define to the home page for this package. */
+#undef PACKAGE_URL
+
+/* Define to the version of this package. */
+#undef PACKAGE_VERSION
+
+/* Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to
+   the conversation function with an extra level of indirection */
+#undef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
+
+/* Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY */
+#undef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
+
+/* must supply username to passwd */
+#undef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
+
+/* System dirs owned by bin (uid 2) */
+#undef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
+
+/* Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
+#undef PRNGD_PORT
+
+/* Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
+#undef PRNGD_SOCKET
+
+/* read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd */
+#undef PTY_ZEROREAD
+
+/* Sandbox using capsicum */
+#undef SANDBOX_CAPSICUM
+
+/* Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3) */
+#undef SANDBOX_DARWIN
+
+/* no privsep sandboxing */
+#undef SANDBOX_NULL
+
+/* Sandbox using pledge(2) */
+#undef SANDBOX_PLEDGE
+
+/* Sandbox using setrlimit(2) */
+#undef SANDBOX_RLIMIT
+
+/* Sandbox using seccomp filter */
+#undef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER
+
+/* setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works */
+#undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE
+
+/* define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things */
+#undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE
+
+/* Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges */
+#undef SANDBOX_SOLARIS
+
+/* Sandbox using systrace(4) */
+#undef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE
+
+/* Specify the system call convention in use */
+#undef SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH
+
+/* Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid */
+#undef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID
+
+/* The size of `int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#undef SIZEOF_INT
+
+/* The size of `long int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#undef SIZEOF_LONG_INT
+
+/* The size of `long long int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#undef SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT
+
+/* The size of `short int', as computed by sizeof. */
+#undef SIZEOF_SHORT_INT
+
+/* The size of `time_t', as computed by sizeof. */
+#undef SIZEOF_TIME_T
+
+/* Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt */
+#undef SNPRINTF_CONST
+
+/* sockaddr_in has sin_len */
+#undef SOCK_HAS_LEN
+
+/* Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by
+   bsd-setproctitle.c */
+#undef SPT_TYPE
+
+/* Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid() */
+#undef SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY
+
+/* sshd PAM service name */
+#undef SSHD_PAM_SERVICE
+
+/* Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user */
+#undef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID
+
+/* Use audit debugging module */
+#undef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+
+/* Windows is sensitive to read buffer size */
+#undef SSH_IOBUFSZ
+
+/* non-privileged user for privilege separation */
+#undef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+
+/* Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD */
+#undef SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF
+
+/* Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way */
+#undef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD
+
+/* Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way */
+#undef SSH_TUN_LINUX
+
+/* No layer 2 tunnel support */
+#undef SSH_TUN_NO_L2
+
+/* Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way */
+#undef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
+
+/* Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic */
+#undef SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF
+
+/* Define to 1 if all of the C90 standard headers exist (not just the ones
+   required in a freestanding environment). This macro is provided for
+   backward compatibility; new code need not use it. */
+#undef STDC_HEADERS
+
+/* Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser */
+#undef SUPERUSER_PATH
+
+/* syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler */
+#undef SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
+
+/* Support routing domains using Linux VRF */
+#undef SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX
+
+/* Support passwords > 8 chars */
+#undef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
+
+/* Specify default $PATH */
+#undef USER_PATH
+
+/* Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support */
+#undef USE_AFS
+
+/* Use BSM audit module */
+#undef USE_BSM_AUDIT
+
+/* Use btmp to log bad logins */
+#undef USE_BTMP
+
+/* Use libedit for sftp */
+#undef USE_LIBEDIT
+
+/* Use Linux audit module */
+#undef USE_LINUX_AUDIT
+
+/* Enable OpenSSL engine support */
+#undef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+
+/* Define if you want to enable PAM support */
+#undef USE_PAM
+
+/* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
+#undef USE_PIPES
+
+/* Define if you have Solaris privileges */
+#undef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
+
+/* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */
+#undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+
+/* Define if you have Solaris projects */
+#undef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
+
+/* compiler variable declarations after code */
+#undef VARIABLE_DECLARATION_AFTER_CODE
+
+/* compiler supports variable length arrays */
+#undef VARIABLE_LENGTH_ARRAYS
+
+/* Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp */
+#undef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY
+
+/* Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function */
+#undef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+
+/* Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session management, not C
+   arrays) */
+#undef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX audit trails */
+#undef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs */
+#undef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
+
+/* Define if you want IRIX project management */
+#undef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
+
+/* use libcrypto for cryptography */
+#undef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+/* Define if you want SELinux support. */
+#undef WITH_SELINUX
+
+/* Enable zlib */
+#undef WITH_ZLIB
+
+/* Define WORDS_BIGENDIAN to 1 if your processor stores words with the most
+   significant byte first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel). */
+#if defined AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD
+# if defined __BIG_ENDIAN__
+#  define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1
+# endif
+#else
+# ifndef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+#  undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* Define if xauth is found in your path */
+#undef XAUTH_PATH
+
+/* Number of bits in a file offset, on hosts where this is settable. */
+#undef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS
+
+/* Define for large files, on AIX-style hosts. */
+#undef _LARGE_FILES
+
+/* log for bad login attempts */
+#undef _PATH_BTMP
+
+/* Full path of your "passwd" program */
+#undef _PATH_PASSWD_PROG
+
+/* Specify location of ssh.pid */
+#undef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR
+
+/* Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h */
+#undef __res_state
+
+/* Define to rpl_calloc if the replacement function should be used. */
+#undef calloc
+
+/* Define to `__inline__' or `__inline' if that's what the C compiler
+   calls it, or to nothing if 'inline' is not supported under any name.  */
+#ifndef __cplusplus
+#undef inline
+#endif
+
+/* Define to rpl_malloc if the replacement function should be used. */
+#undef malloc
+
+/* Define to rpl_realloc if the replacement function should be used. */
+#undef realloc
+
+/* type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined */
+#undef socklen_t
diff --git a/config.sub b/config.sub
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..baf1512
--- /dev/null
+++ b/config.sub
@@ -0,0 +1,1907 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# Configuration validation subroutine script.
+#   Copyright 1992-2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+# shellcheck disable=SC2006,SC2268 # see below for rationale
+
+timestamp='2022-09-17'
+
+# This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+# the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
+# (at your option) any later version.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+# MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+# General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program; if not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
+#
+# As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you
+# distribute this file as part of a program that contains a
+# configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under
+# the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that
+# program.  This Exception is an additional permission under section 7
+# of the GNU General Public License, version 3 ("GPLv3").
+
+
+# Please send patches to <config-patches@gnu.org>.
+#
+# Configuration subroutine to validate and canonicalize a configuration type.
+# Supply the specified configuration type as an argument.
+# If it is invalid, we print an error message on stderr and exit with code 1.
+# Otherwise, we print the canonical config type on stdout and succeed.
+
+# You can get the latest version of this script from:
+# https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/config.git/plain/config.sub
+
+# This file is supposed to be the same for all GNU packages
+# and recognize all the CPU types, system types and aliases
+# that are meaningful with *any* GNU software.
+# Each package is responsible for reporting which valid configurations
+# it does not support.  The user should be able to distinguish
+# a failure to support a valid configuration from a meaningless
+# configuration.
+
+# The goal of this file is to map all the various variations of a given
+# machine specification into a single specification in the form:
+#	CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM
+# or in some cases, the newer four-part form:
+#	CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM
+# It is wrong to echo any other type of specification.
+
+# The "shellcheck disable" line above the timestamp inhibits complaints
+# about features and limitations of the classic Bourne shell that were
+# superseded or lifted in POSIX.  However, this script identifies a wide
+# variety of pre-POSIX systems that do not have POSIX shells at all, and
+# even some reasonably current systems (Solaris 10 as case-in-point) still
+# have a pre-POSIX /bin/sh.
+
+me=`echo "$0" | sed -e 's,.*/,,'`
+
+usage="\
+Usage: $0 [OPTION] CPU-MFR-OPSYS or ALIAS
+
+Canonicalize a configuration name.
+
+Options:
+  -h, --help         print this help, then exit
+  -t, --time-stamp   print date of last modification, then exit
+  -v, --version      print version number, then exit
+
+Report bugs and patches to <config-patches@gnu.org>."
+
+version="\
+GNU config.sub ($timestamp)
+
+Copyright 1992-2022 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+
+This is free software; see the source for copying conditions.  There is NO
+warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE."
+
+help="
+Try \`$me --help' for more information."
+
+# Parse command line
+while test $# -gt 0 ; do
+  case $1 in
+    --time-stamp | --time* | -t )
+       echo "$timestamp" ; exit ;;
+    --version | -v )
+       echo "$version" ; exit ;;
+    --help | --h* | -h )
+       echo "$usage"; exit ;;
+    -- )     # Stop option processing
+       shift; break ;;
+    - )	# Use stdin as input.
+       break ;;
+    -* )
+       echo "$me: invalid option $1$help" >&2
+       exit 1 ;;
+
+    *local*)
+       # First pass through any local machine types.
+       echo "$1"
+       exit ;;
+
+    * )
+       break ;;
+  esac
+done
+
+case $# in
+ 0) echo "$me: missing argument$help" >&2
+    exit 1;;
+ 1) ;;
+ *) echo "$me: too many arguments$help" >&2
+    exit 1;;
+esac
+
+# Split fields of configuration type
+# shellcheck disable=SC2162
+saved_IFS=$IFS
+IFS="-" read field1 field2 field3 field4 <<EOF
+$1
+EOF
+IFS=$saved_IFS
+
+# Separate into logical components for further validation
+case $1 in
+	*-*-*-*-*)
+		echo Invalid configuration \`"$1"\': more than four components >&2
+		exit 1
+		;;
+	*-*-*-*)
+		basic_machine=$field1-$field2
+		basic_os=$field3-$field4
+		;;
+	*-*-*)
+		# Ambiguous whether COMPANY is present, or skipped and KERNEL-OS is two
+		# parts
+		maybe_os=$field2-$field3
+		case $maybe_os in
+			nto-qnx* | linux-* | uclinux-uclibc* \
+			| uclinux-gnu* | kfreebsd*-gnu* | knetbsd*-gnu* | netbsd*-gnu* \
+			| netbsd*-eabi* | kopensolaris*-gnu* | cloudabi*-eabi* \
+			| storm-chaos* | os2-emx* | rtmk-nova* | managarm-*)
+				basic_machine=$field1
+				basic_os=$maybe_os
+				;;
+			android-linux)
+				basic_machine=$field1-unknown
+				basic_os=linux-android
+				;;
+			*)
+				basic_machine=$field1-$field2
+				basic_os=$field3
+				;;
+		esac
+		;;
+	*-*)
+		# A lone config we happen to match not fitting any pattern
+		case $field1-$field2 in
+			decstation-3100)
+				basic_machine=mips-dec
+				basic_os=
+				;;
+			*-*)
+				# Second component is usually, but not always the OS
+				case $field2 in
+					# Prevent following clause from handling this valid os
+					sun*os*)
+						basic_machine=$field1
+						basic_os=$field2
+						;;
+					zephyr*)
+						basic_machine=$field1-unknown
+						basic_os=$field2
+						;;
+					# Manufacturers
+					dec* | mips* | sequent* | encore* | pc533* | sgi* | sony* \
+					| att* | 7300* | 3300* | delta* | motorola* | sun[234]* \
+					| unicom* | ibm* | next | hp | isi* | apollo | altos* \
+					| convergent* | ncr* | news | 32* | 3600* | 3100* \
+					| hitachi* | c[123]* | convex* | sun | crds | omron* | dg \
+					| ultra | tti* | harris | dolphin | highlevel | gould \
+					| cbm | ns | masscomp | apple | axis | knuth | cray \
+					| microblaze* | sim | cisco \
+					| oki | wec | wrs | winbond)
+						basic_machine=$field1-$field2
+						basic_os=
+						;;
+					*)
+						basic_machine=$field1
+						basic_os=$field2
+						;;
+				esac
+			;;
+		esac
+		;;
+	*)
+		# Convert single-component short-hands not valid as part of
+		# multi-component configurations.
+		case $field1 in
+			386bsd)
+				basic_machine=i386-pc
+				basic_os=bsd
+				;;
+			a29khif)
+				basic_machine=a29k-amd
+				basic_os=udi
+				;;
+			adobe68k)
+				basic_machine=m68010-adobe
+				basic_os=scout
+				;;
+			alliant)
+				basic_machine=fx80-alliant
+				basic_os=
+				;;
+			altos | altos3068)
+				basic_machine=m68k-altos
+				basic_os=
+				;;
+			am29k)
+				basic_machine=a29k-none
+				basic_os=bsd
+				;;
+			amdahl)
+				basic_machine=580-amdahl
+				basic_os=sysv
+				;;
+			amiga)
+				basic_machine=m68k-unknown
+				basic_os=
+				;;
+			amigaos | amigados)
+				basic_machine=m68k-unknown
+				basic_os=amigaos
+				;;
+			amigaunix | amix)
+				basic_machine=m68k-unknown
+				basic_os=sysv4
+				;;
+			apollo68)
+				basic_machine=m68k-apollo
+				basic_os=sysv
+				;;
+			apollo68bsd)
+				basic_machine=m68k-apollo
+				basic_os=bsd
+				;;
+			aros)
+				basic_machine=i386-pc
+				basic_os=aros
+				;;
+			aux)
+				basic_machine=m68k-apple
+				basic_os=aux
+				;;
+			balance)
+				basic_machine=ns32k-sequent
+				basic_os=dynix
+				;;
+			blackfin)
+				basic_machine=bfin-unknown
+				basic_os=linux
+				;;
+			cegcc)
+				basic_machine=arm-unknown
+				basic_os=cegcc
+				;;
+			convex-c1)
+				basic_machine=c1-convex
+				basic_os=bsd
+				;;
+			convex-c2)
+				basic_machine=c2-convex
+				basic_os=bsd
+				;;
+			convex-c32)
+				basic_machine=c32-convex
+				basic_os=bsd
+				;;
+			convex-c34)
+				basic_machine=c34-convex
+				basic_os=bsd
+				;;
+			convex-c38)
+				basic_machine=c38-convex
+				basic_os=bsd
+				;;
+			cray)
+				basic_machine=j90-cray
+				basic_os=unicos
+				;;
+			crds | unos)
+				basic_machine=m68k-crds
+				basic_os=
+				;;
+			da30)
+				basic_machine=m68k-da30
+				basic_os=
+				;;
+			decstation | pmax | pmin | dec3100 | decstatn)
+				basic_machine=mips-dec
+				basic_os=
+				;;
+			delta88)
+				basic_machine=m88k-motorola
+				basic_os=sysv3
+				;;
+			dicos)
+				basic_machine=i686-pc
+				basic_os=dicos
+				;;
+			djgpp)
+				basic_machine=i586-pc
+				basic_os=msdosdjgpp
+				;;
+			ebmon29k)
+				basic_machine=a29k-amd
+				basic_os=ebmon
+				;;
+			es1800 | OSE68k | ose68k | ose | OSE)
+				basic_machine=m68k-ericsson
+				basic_os=ose
+				;;
+			gmicro)
+				basic_machine=tron-gmicro
+				basic_os=sysv
+				;;
+			go32)
+				basic_machine=i386-pc
+				basic_os=go32
+				;;
+			h8300hms)
+				basic_machine=h8300-hitachi
+				basic_os=hms
+				;;
+			h8300xray)
+				basic_machine=h8300-hitachi
+				basic_os=xray
+				;;
+			h8500hms)
+				basic_machine=h8500-hitachi
+				basic_os=hms
+				;;
+			harris)
+				basic_machine=m88k-harris
+				basic_os=sysv3
+				;;
+			hp300 | hp300hpux)
+				basic_machine=m68k-hp
+				basic_os=hpux
+				;;
+			hp300bsd)
+				basic_machine=m68k-hp
+				basic_os=bsd
+				;;
+			hppaosf)
+				basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp
+				basic_os=osf
+				;;
+			hppro)
+				basic_machine=hppa1.1-hp
+				basic_os=proelf
+				;;
+			i386mach)
+				basic_machine=i386-mach
+				basic_os=mach
+				;;
+			isi68 | isi)
+				basic_machine=m68k-isi
+				basic_os=sysv
+				;;
+			m68knommu)
+				basic_machine=m68k-unknown
+				basic_os=linux
+				;;
+			magnum | m3230)
+				basic_machine=mips-mips
+				basic_os=sysv
+				;;
+			merlin)
+				basic_machine=ns32k-utek
+				basic_os=sysv
+				;;
+			mingw64)
+				basic_machine=x86_64-pc
+				basic_os=mingw64
+				;;
+			mingw32)
+				basic_machine=i686-pc
+				basic_os=mingw32
+				;;
+			mingw32ce)
+				basic_machine=arm-unknown
+				basic_os=mingw32ce
+				;;
+			monitor)
+				basic_machine=m68k-rom68k
+				basic_os=coff
+				;;
+			morphos)
+				basic_machine=powerpc-unknown
+				basic_os=morphos
+				;;
+			moxiebox)
+				basic_machine=moxie-unknown
+				basic_os=moxiebox
+				;;
+			msdos)
+				basic_machine=i386-pc
+				basic_os=msdos
+				;;
+			msys)
+				basic_machine=i686-pc
+				basic_os=msys
+				;;
+			mvs)
+				basic_machine=i370-ibm
+				basic_os=mvs
+				;;
+			nacl)
+				basic_machine=le32-unknown
+				basic_os=nacl
+				;;
+			ncr3000)
+				basic_machine=i486-ncr
+				basic_os=sysv4
+				;;
+			netbsd386)
+				basic_machine=i386-pc
+				basic_os=netbsd
+				;;
+			netwinder)
+				basic_machine=armv4l-rebel
+				basic_os=linux
+				;;
+			news | news700 | news800 | news900)
+				basic_machine=m68k-sony
+				basic_os=newsos
+				;;
+			news1000)
+				basic_machine=m68030-sony
+				basic_os=newsos
+				;;
+			necv70)
+				basic_machine=v70-nec
+				basic_os=sysv
+				;;
+			nh3000)
+				basic_machine=m68k-harris
+				basic_os=cxux
+				;;
+			nh[45]000)
+				basic_machine=m88k-harris
+				basic_os=cxux
+				;;
+			nindy960)
+				basic_machine=i960-intel
+				basic_os=nindy
+				;;
+			mon960)
+				basic_machine=i960-intel
+				basic_os=mon960
+				;;
+			nonstopux)
+				basic_machine=mips-compaq
+				basic_os=nonstopux
+				;;
+			os400)
+				basic_machine=powerpc-ibm
+				basic_os=os400
+				;;
+			OSE68000 | ose68000)
+				basic_machine=m68000-ericsson
+				basic_os=ose
+				;;
+			os68k)
+				basic_machine=m68k-none
+				basic_os=os68k
+				;;
+			paragon)
+				basic_machine=i860-intel
+				basic_os=osf
+				;;
+			parisc)
+				basic_machine=hppa-unknown
+				basic_os=linux
+				;;
+			psp)
+				basic_machine=mipsallegrexel-sony
+				basic_os=psp
+				;;
+			pw32)
+				basic_machine=i586-unknown
+				basic_os=pw32
+				;;
+			rdos | rdos64)
+				basic_machine=x86_64-pc
+				basic_os=rdos
+				;;
+			rdos32)
+				basic_machine=i386-pc
+				basic_os=rdos
+				;;
+			rom68k)
+				basic_machine=m68k-rom68k
+				basic_os=coff
+				;;
+			sa29200)
+				basic_machine=a29k-amd
+				basic_os=udi
+				;;
+			sei)
+				basic_machine=mips-sei
+				basic_os=seiux
+				;;
+			sequent)
+				basic_machine=i386-sequent
+				basic_os=
+				;;
+			sps7)
+				basic_machine=m68k-bull
+				basic_os=sysv2
+				;;
+			st2000)
+				basic_machine=m68k-tandem
+				basic_os=
+				;;
+			stratus)
+				basic_machine=i860-stratus
+				basic_os=sysv4
+				;;
+			sun2)
+				basic_machine=m68000-sun
+				basic_os=
+				;;
+			sun2os3)
+				basic_machine=m68000-sun
+				basic_os=sunos3
+				;;
+			sun2os4)
+				basic_machine=m68000-sun
+				basic_os=sunos4
+				;;
+			sun3)
+				basic_machine=m68k-sun
+				basic_os=
+				;;
+			sun3os3)
+				basic_machine=m68k-sun
+				basic_os=sunos3
+				;;
+			sun3os4)
+				basic_machine=m68k-sun
+				basic_os=sunos4
+				;;
+			sun4)
+				basic_machine=sparc-sun
+				basic_os=
+				;;
+			sun4os3)
+				basic_machine=sparc-sun
+				basic_os=sunos3
+				;;
+			sun4os4)
+				basic_machine=sparc-sun
+				basic_os=sunos4
+				;;
+			sun4sol2)
+				basic_machine=sparc-sun
+				basic_os=solaris2
+				;;
+			sun386 | sun386i | roadrunner)
+				basic_machine=i386-sun
+				basic_os=
+				;;
+			sv1)
+				basic_machine=sv1-cray
+				basic_os=unicos
+				;;
+			symmetry)
+				basic_machine=i386-sequent
+				basic_os=dynix
+				;;
+			t3e)
+				basic_machine=alphaev5-cray
+				basic_os=unicos
+				;;
+			t90)
+				basic_machine=t90-cray
+				basic_os=unicos
+				;;
+			toad1)
+				basic_machine=pdp10-xkl
+				basic_os=tops20
+				;;
+			tpf)
+				basic_machine=s390x-ibm
+				basic_os=tpf
+				;;
+			udi29k)
+				basic_machine=a29k-amd
+				basic_os=udi
+				;;
+			ultra3)
+				basic_machine=a29k-nyu
+				basic_os=sym1
+				;;
+			v810 | necv810)
+				basic_machine=v810-nec
+				basic_os=none
+				;;
+			vaxv)
+				basic_machine=vax-dec
+				basic_os=sysv
+				;;
+			vms)
+				basic_machine=vax-dec
+				basic_os=vms
+				;;
+			vsta)
+				basic_machine=i386-pc
+				basic_os=vsta
+				;;
+			vxworks960)
+				basic_machine=i960-wrs
+				basic_os=vxworks
+				;;
+			vxworks68)
+				basic_machine=m68k-wrs
+				basic_os=vxworks
+				;;
+			vxworks29k)
+				basic_machine=a29k-wrs
+				basic_os=vxworks
+				;;
+			xbox)
+				basic_machine=i686-pc
+				basic_os=mingw32
+				;;
+			ymp)
+				basic_machine=ymp-cray
+				basic_os=unicos
+				;;
+			*)
+				basic_machine=$1
+				basic_os=
+				;;
+		esac
+		;;
+esac
+
+# Decode 1-component or ad-hoc basic machines
+case $basic_machine in
+	# Here we handle the default manufacturer of certain CPU types.  It is in
+	# some cases the only manufacturer, in others, it is the most popular.
+	w89k)
+		cpu=hppa1.1
+		vendor=winbond
+		;;
+	op50n)
+		cpu=hppa1.1
+		vendor=oki
+		;;
+	op60c)
+		cpu=hppa1.1
+		vendor=oki
+		;;
+	ibm*)
+		cpu=i370
+		vendor=ibm
+		;;
+	orion105)
+		cpu=clipper
+		vendor=highlevel
+		;;
+	mac | mpw | mac-mpw)
+		cpu=m68k
+		vendor=apple
+		;;
+	pmac | pmac-mpw)
+		cpu=powerpc
+		vendor=apple
+		;;
+
+	# Recognize the various machine names and aliases which stand
+	# for a CPU type and a company and sometimes even an OS.
+	3b1 | 7300 | 7300-att | att-7300 | pc7300 | safari | unixpc)
+		cpu=m68000
+		vendor=att
+		;;
+	3b*)
+		cpu=we32k
+		vendor=att
+		;;
+	bluegene*)
+		cpu=powerpc
+		vendor=ibm
+		basic_os=cnk
+		;;
+	decsystem10* | dec10*)
+		cpu=pdp10
+		vendor=dec
+		basic_os=tops10
+		;;
+	decsystem20* | dec20*)
+		cpu=pdp10
+		vendor=dec
+		basic_os=tops20
+		;;
+	delta | 3300 | motorola-3300 | motorola-delta \
+	      | 3300-motorola | delta-motorola)
+		cpu=m68k
+		vendor=motorola
+		;;
+	dpx2*)
+		cpu=m68k
+		vendor=bull
+		basic_os=sysv3
+		;;
+	encore | umax | mmax)
+		cpu=ns32k
+		vendor=encore
+		;;
+	elxsi)
+		cpu=elxsi
+		vendor=elxsi
+		basic_os=${basic_os:-bsd}
+		;;
+	fx2800)
+		cpu=i860
+		vendor=alliant
+		;;
+	genix)
+		cpu=ns32k
+		vendor=ns
+		;;
+	h3050r* | hiux*)
+		cpu=hppa1.1
+		vendor=hitachi
+		basic_os=hiuxwe2
+		;;
+	hp3k9[0-9][0-9] | hp9[0-9][0-9])
+		cpu=hppa1.0
+		vendor=hp
+		;;
+	hp9k2[0-9][0-9] | hp9k31[0-9])
+		cpu=m68000
+		vendor=hp
+		;;
+	hp9k3[2-9][0-9])
+		cpu=m68k
+		vendor=hp
+		;;
+	hp9k6[0-9][0-9] | hp6[0-9][0-9])
+		cpu=hppa1.0
+		vendor=hp
+		;;
+	hp9k7[0-79][0-9] | hp7[0-79][0-9])
+		cpu=hppa1.1
+		vendor=hp
+		;;
+	hp9k78[0-9] | hp78[0-9])
+		# FIXME: really hppa2.0-hp
+		cpu=hppa1.1
+		vendor=hp
+		;;
+	hp9k8[67]1 | hp8[67]1 | hp9k80[24] | hp80[24] | hp9k8[78]9 | hp8[78]9 | hp9k893 | hp893)
+		# FIXME: really hppa2.0-hp
+		cpu=hppa1.1
+		vendor=hp
+		;;
+	hp9k8[0-9][13679] | hp8[0-9][13679])
+		cpu=hppa1.1
+		vendor=hp
+		;;
+	hp9k8[0-9][0-9] | hp8[0-9][0-9])
+		cpu=hppa1.0
+		vendor=hp
+		;;
+	i*86v32)
+		cpu=`echo "$1" | sed -e 's/86.*/86/'`
+		vendor=pc
+		basic_os=sysv32
+		;;
+	i*86v4*)
+		cpu=`echo "$1" | sed -e 's/86.*/86/'`
+		vendor=pc
+		basic_os=sysv4
+		;;
+	i*86v)
+		cpu=`echo "$1" | sed -e 's/86.*/86/'`
+		vendor=pc
+		basic_os=sysv
+		;;
+	i*86sol2)
+		cpu=`echo "$1" | sed -e 's/86.*/86/'`
+		vendor=pc
+		basic_os=solaris2
+		;;
+	j90 | j90-cray)
+		cpu=j90
+		vendor=cray
+		basic_os=${basic_os:-unicos}
+		;;
+	iris | iris4d)
+		cpu=mips
+		vendor=sgi
+		case $basic_os in
+		    irix*)
+			;;
+		    *)
+			basic_os=irix4
+			;;
+		esac
+		;;
+	miniframe)
+		cpu=m68000
+		vendor=convergent
+		;;
+	*mint | mint[0-9]* | *MiNT | *MiNT[0-9]*)
+		cpu=m68k
+		vendor=atari
+		basic_os=mint
+		;;
+	news-3600 | risc-news)
+		cpu=mips
+		vendor=sony
+		basic_os=newsos
+		;;
+	next | m*-next)
+		cpu=m68k
+		vendor=next
+		case $basic_os in
+		    openstep*)
+		        ;;
+		    nextstep*)
+			;;
+		    ns2*)
+		      basic_os=nextstep2
+			;;
+		    *)
+		      basic_os=nextstep3
+			;;
+		esac
+		;;
+	np1)
+		cpu=np1
+		vendor=gould
+		;;
+	op50n-* | op60c-*)
+		cpu=hppa1.1
+		vendor=oki
+		basic_os=proelf
+		;;
+	pa-hitachi)
+		cpu=hppa1.1
+		vendor=hitachi
+		basic_os=hiuxwe2
+		;;
+	pbd)
+		cpu=sparc
+		vendor=tti
+		;;
+	pbb)
+		cpu=m68k
+		vendor=tti
+		;;
+	pc532)
+		cpu=ns32k
+		vendor=pc532
+		;;
+	pn)
+		cpu=pn
+		vendor=gould
+		;;
+	power)
+		cpu=power
+		vendor=ibm
+		;;
+	ps2)
+		cpu=i386
+		vendor=ibm
+		;;
+	rm[46]00)
+		cpu=mips
+		vendor=siemens
+		;;
+	rtpc | rtpc-*)
+		cpu=romp
+		vendor=ibm
+		;;
+	sde)
+		cpu=mipsisa32
+		vendor=sde
+		basic_os=${basic_os:-elf}
+		;;
+	simso-wrs)
+		cpu=sparclite
+		vendor=wrs
+		basic_os=vxworks
+		;;
+	tower | tower-32)
+		cpu=m68k
+		vendor=ncr
+		;;
+	vpp*|vx|vx-*)
+		cpu=f301
+		vendor=fujitsu
+		;;
+	w65)
+		cpu=w65
+		vendor=wdc
+		;;
+	w89k-*)
+		cpu=hppa1.1
+		vendor=winbond
+		basic_os=proelf
+		;;
+	none)
+		cpu=none
+		vendor=none
+		;;
+	leon|leon[3-9])
+		cpu=sparc
+		vendor=$basic_machine
+		;;
+	leon-*|leon[3-9]-*)
+		cpu=sparc
+		vendor=`echo "$basic_machine" | sed 's/-.*//'`
+		;;
+
+	*-*)
+		# shellcheck disable=SC2162
+		saved_IFS=$IFS
+		IFS="-" read cpu vendor <<EOF
+$basic_machine
+EOF
+		IFS=$saved_IFS
+		;;
+	# We use `pc' rather than `unknown'
+	# because (1) that's what they normally are, and
+	# (2) the word "unknown" tends to confuse beginning users.
+	i*86 | x86_64)
+		cpu=$basic_machine
+		vendor=pc
+		;;
+	# These rules are duplicated from below for sake of the special case above;
+	# i.e. things that normalized to x86 arches should also default to "pc"
+	pc98)
+		cpu=i386
+		vendor=pc
+		;;
+	x64 | amd64)
+		cpu=x86_64
+		vendor=pc
+		;;
+	# Recognize the basic CPU types without company name.
+	*)
+		cpu=$basic_machine
+		vendor=unknown
+		;;
+esac
+
+unset -v basic_machine
+
+# Decode basic machines in the full and proper CPU-Company form.
+case $cpu-$vendor in
+	# Here we handle the default manufacturer of certain CPU types in canonical form. It is in
+	# some cases the only manufacturer, in others, it is the most popular.
+	craynv-unknown)
+		vendor=cray
+		basic_os=${basic_os:-unicosmp}
+		;;
+	c90-unknown | c90-cray)
+		vendor=cray
+		basic_os=${Basic_os:-unicos}
+		;;
+	fx80-unknown)
+		vendor=alliant
+		;;
+	romp-unknown)
+		vendor=ibm
+		;;
+	mmix-unknown)
+		vendor=knuth
+		;;
+	microblaze-unknown | microblazeel-unknown)
+		vendor=xilinx
+		;;
+	rs6000-unknown)
+		vendor=ibm
+		;;
+	vax-unknown)
+		vendor=dec
+		;;
+	pdp11-unknown)
+		vendor=dec
+		;;
+	we32k-unknown)
+		vendor=att
+		;;
+	cydra-unknown)
+		vendor=cydrome
+		;;
+	i370-ibm*)
+		vendor=ibm
+		;;
+	orion-unknown)
+		vendor=highlevel
+		;;
+	xps-unknown | xps100-unknown)
+		cpu=xps100
+		vendor=honeywell
+		;;
+
+	# Here we normalize CPU types with a missing or matching vendor
+	armh-unknown | armh-alt)
+		cpu=armv7l
+		vendor=alt
+		basic_os=${basic_os:-linux-gnueabihf}
+		;;
+	dpx20-unknown | dpx20-bull)
+		cpu=rs6000
+		vendor=bull
+		basic_os=${basic_os:-bosx}
+		;;
+
+	# Here we normalize CPU types irrespective of the vendor
+	amd64-*)
+		cpu=x86_64
+		;;
+	blackfin-*)
+		cpu=bfin
+		basic_os=linux
+		;;
+	c54x-*)
+		cpu=tic54x
+		;;
+	c55x-*)
+		cpu=tic55x
+		;;
+	c6x-*)
+		cpu=tic6x
+		;;
+	e500v[12]-*)
+		cpu=powerpc
+		basic_os=${basic_os}"spe"
+		;;
+	mips3*-*)
+		cpu=mips64
+		;;
+	ms1-*)
+		cpu=mt
+		;;
+	m68knommu-*)
+		cpu=m68k
+		basic_os=linux
+		;;
+	m9s12z-* | m68hcs12z-* | hcs12z-* | s12z-*)
+		cpu=s12z
+		;;
+	openrisc-*)
+		cpu=or32
+		;;
+	parisc-*)
+		cpu=hppa
+		basic_os=linux
+		;;
+	pentium-* | p5-* | k5-* | k6-* | nexgen-* | viac3-*)
+		cpu=i586
+		;;
+	pentiumpro-* | p6-* | 6x86-* | athlon-* | athalon_*-*)
+		cpu=i686
+		;;
+	pentiumii-* | pentium2-* | pentiumiii-* | pentium3-*)
+		cpu=i686
+		;;
+	pentium4-*)
+		cpu=i786
+		;;
+	pc98-*)
+		cpu=i386
+		;;
+	ppc-* | ppcbe-*)
+		cpu=powerpc
+		;;
+	ppcle-* | powerpclittle-*)
+		cpu=powerpcle
+		;;
+	ppc64-*)
+		cpu=powerpc64
+		;;
+	ppc64le-* | powerpc64little-*)
+		cpu=powerpc64le
+		;;
+	sb1-*)
+		cpu=mipsisa64sb1
+		;;
+	sb1el-*)
+		cpu=mipsisa64sb1el
+		;;
+	sh5e[lb]-*)
+		cpu=`echo "$cpu" | sed 's/^\(sh.\)e\(.\)$/\1\2e/'`
+		;;
+	spur-*)
+		cpu=spur
+		;;
+	strongarm-* | thumb-*)
+		cpu=arm
+		;;
+	tx39-*)
+		cpu=mipstx39
+		;;
+	tx39el-*)
+		cpu=mipstx39el
+		;;
+	x64-*)
+		cpu=x86_64
+		;;
+	xscale-* | xscalee[bl]-*)
+		cpu=`echo "$cpu" | sed 's/^xscale/arm/'`
+		;;
+	arm64-* | aarch64le-*)
+		cpu=aarch64
+		;;
+
+	# Recognize the canonical CPU Types that limit and/or modify the
+	# company names they are paired with.
+	cr16-*)
+		basic_os=${basic_os:-elf}
+		;;
+	crisv32-* | etraxfs*-*)
+		cpu=crisv32
+		vendor=axis
+		;;
+	cris-* | etrax*-*)
+		cpu=cris
+		vendor=axis
+		;;
+	crx-*)
+		basic_os=${basic_os:-elf}
+		;;
+	neo-tandem)
+		cpu=neo
+		vendor=tandem
+		;;
+	nse-tandem)
+		cpu=nse
+		vendor=tandem
+		;;
+	nsr-tandem)
+		cpu=nsr
+		vendor=tandem
+		;;
+	nsv-tandem)
+		cpu=nsv
+		vendor=tandem
+		;;
+	nsx-tandem)
+		cpu=nsx
+		vendor=tandem
+		;;
+	mipsallegrexel-sony)
+		cpu=mipsallegrexel
+		vendor=sony
+		;;
+	tile*-*)
+		basic_os=${basic_os:-linux-gnu}
+		;;
+
+	*)
+		# Recognize the canonical CPU types that are allowed with any
+		# company name.
+		case $cpu in
+			1750a | 580 \
+			| a29k \
+			| aarch64 | aarch64_be \
+			| abacus \
+			| alpha | alphaev[4-8] | alphaev56 | alphaev6[78] \
+			| alpha64 | alpha64ev[4-8] | alpha64ev56 | alpha64ev6[78] \
+			| alphapca5[67] | alpha64pca5[67] \
+			| am33_2.0 \
+			| amdgcn \
+			| arc | arceb | arc32 | arc64 \
+			| arm | arm[lb]e | arme[lb] | armv* \
+			| avr | avr32 \
+			| asmjs \
+			| ba \
+			| be32 | be64 \
+			| bfin | bpf | bs2000 \
+			| c[123]* | c30 | [cjt]90 | c4x \
+			| c8051 | clipper | craynv | csky | cydra \
+			| d10v | d30v | dlx | dsp16xx \
+			| e2k | elxsi | epiphany \
+			| f30[01] | f700 | fido | fr30 | frv | ft32 | fx80 \
+			| h8300 | h8500 \
+			| hppa | hppa1.[01] | hppa2.0 | hppa2.0[nw] | hppa64 \
+			| hexagon \
+			| i370 | i*86 | i860 | i960 | ia16 | ia64 \
+			| ip2k | iq2000 \
+			| k1om \
+			| le32 | le64 \
+			| lm32 \
+			| loongarch32 | loongarch64 \
+			| m32c | m32r | m32rle \
+			| m5200 | m68000 | m680[012346]0 | m68360 | m683?2 | m68k \
+			| m6811 | m68hc11 | m6812 | m68hc12 | m68hcs12x \
+			| m88110 | m88k | maxq | mb | mcore | mep | metag \
+			| microblaze | microblazeel \
+			| mips | mipsbe | mipseb | mipsel | mipsle \
+			| mips16 \
+			| mips64 | mips64eb | mips64el \
+			| mips64octeon | mips64octeonel \
+			| mips64orion | mips64orionel \
+			| mips64r5900 | mips64r5900el \
+			| mips64vr | mips64vrel \
+			| mips64vr4100 | mips64vr4100el \
+			| mips64vr4300 | mips64vr4300el \
+			| mips64vr5000 | mips64vr5000el \
+			| mips64vr5900 | mips64vr5900el \
+			| mipsisa32 | mipsisa32el \
+			| mipsisa32r2 | mipsisa32r2el \
+			| mipsisa32r3 | mipsisa32r3el \
+			| mipsisa32r5 | mipsisa32r5el \
+			| mipsisa32r6 | mipsisa32r6el \
+			| mipsisa64 | mipsisa64el \
+			| mipsisa64r2 | mipsisa64r2el \
+			| mipsisa64r3 | mipsisa64r3el \
+			| mipsisa64r5 | mipsisa64r5el \
+			| mipsisa64r6 | mipsisa64r6el \
+			| mipsisa64sb1 | mipsisa64sb1el \
+			| mipsisa64sr71k | mipsisa64sr71kel \
+			| mipsr5900 | mipsr5900el \
+			| mipstx39 | mipstx39el \
+			| mmix \
+			| mn10200 | mn10300 \
+			| moxie \
+			| mt \
+			| msp430 \
+			| nds32 | nds32le | nds32be \
+			| nfp \
+			| nios | nios2 | nios2eb | nios2el \
+			| none | np1 | ns16k | ns32k | nvptx \
+			| open8 \
+			| or1k* \
+			| or32 \
+			| orion \
+			| picochip \
+			| pdp10 | pdp11 | pj | pjl | pn | power \
+			| powerpc | powerpc64 | powerpc64le | powerpcle | powerpcspe \
+			| pru \
+			| pyramid \
+			| riscv | riscv32 | riscv32be | riscv64 | riscv64be \
+			| rl78 | romp | rs6000 | rx \
+			| s390 | s390x \
+			| score \
+			| sh | shl \
+			| sh[1234] | sh[24]a | sh[24]ae[lb] | sh[23]e | she[lb] | sh[lb]e \
+			| sh[1234]e[lb] |  sh[12345][lb]e | sh[23]ele | sh64 | sh64le \
+			| sparc | sparc64 | sparc64b | sparc64v | sparc86x | sparclet \
+			| sparclite \
+			| sparcv8 | sparcv9 | sparcv9b | sparcv9v | sv1 | sx* \
+			| spu \
+			| tahoe \
+			| thumbv7* \
+			| tic30 | tic4x | tic54x | tic55x | tic6x | tic80 \
+			| tron \
+			| ubicom32 \
+			| v70 | v850 | v850e | v850e1 | v850es | v850e2 | v850e2v3 \
+			| vax \
+			| visium \
+			| w65 \
+			| wasm32 | wasm64 \
+			| we32k \
+			| x86 | x86_64 | xc16x | xgate | xps100 \
+			| xstormy16 | xtensa* \
+			| ymp \
+			| z8k | z80)
+				;;
+
+			*)
+				echo Invalid configuration \`"$1"\': machine \`"$cpu-$vendor"\' not recognized 1>&2
+				exit 1
+				;;
+		esac
+		;;
+esac
+
+# Here we canonicalize certain aliases for manufacturers.
+case $vendor in
+	digital*)
+		vendor=dec
+		;;
+	commodore*)
+		vendor=cbm
+		;;
+	*)
+		;;
+esac
+
+# Decode manufacturer-specific aliases for certain operating systems.
+
+if test x$basic_os != x
+then
+
+# First recognize some ad-hoc cases, or perhaps split kernel-os, or else just
+# set os.
+case $basic_os in
+	gnu/linux*)
+		kernel=linux
+		os=`echo "$basic_os" | sed -e 's|gnu/linux|gnu|'`
+		;;
+	os2-emx)
+		kernel=os2
+		os=`echo "$basic_os" | sed -e 's|os2-emx|emx|'`
+		;;
+	nto-qnx*)
+		kernel=nto
+		os=`echo "$basic_os" | sed -e 's|nto-qnx|qnx|'`
+		;;
+	*-*)
+		# shellcheck disable=SC2162
+		saved_IFS=$IFS
+		IFS="-" read kernel os <<EOF
+$basic_os
+EOF
+		IFS=$saved_IFS
+		;;
+	# Default OS when just kernel was specified
+	nto*)
+		kernel=nto
+		os=`echo "$basic_os" | sed -e 's|nto|qnx|'`
+		;;
+	linux*)
+		kernel=linux
+		os=`echo "$basic_os" | sed -e 's|linux|gnu|'`
+		;;
+	managarm*)
+		kernel=managarm
+		os=`echo "$basic_os" | sed -e 's|managarm|mlibc|'`
+		;;
+	*)
+		kernel=
+		os=$basic_os
+		;;
+esac
+
+# Now, normalize the OS (knowing we just have one component, it's not a kernel,
+# etc.)
+case $os in
+	# First match some system type aliases that might get confused
+	# with valid system types.
+	# solaris* is a basic system type, with this one exception.
+	auroraux)
+		os=auroraux
+		;;
+	bluegene*)
+		os=cnk
+		;;
+	solaris1 | solaris1.*)
+		os=`echo "$os" | sed -e 's|solaris1|sunos4|'`
+		;;
+	solaris)
+		os=solaris2
+		;;
+	unixware*)
+		os=sysv4.2uw
+		;;
+	# es1800 is here to avoid being matched by es* (a different OS)
+	es1800*)
+		os=ose
+		;;
+	# Some version numbers need modification
+	chorusos*)
+		os=chorusos
+		;;
+	isc)
+		os=isc2.2
+		;;
+	sco6)
+		os=sco5v6
+		;;
+	sco5)
+		os=sco3.2v5
+		;;
+	sco4)
+		os=sco3.2v4
+		;;
+	sco3.2.[4-9]*)
+		os=`echo "$os" | sed -e 's/sco3.2./sco3.2v/'`
+		;;
+	sco*v* | scout)
+		# Don't match below
+		;;
+	sco*)
+		os=sco3.2v2
+		;;
+	psos*)
+		os=psos
+		;;
+	qnx*)
+		os=qnx
+		;;
+	hiux*)
+		os=hiuxwe2
+		;;
+	lynx*178)
+		os=lynxos178
+		;;
+	lynx*5)
+		os=lynxos5
+		;;
+	lynxos*)
+		# don't get caught up in next wildcard
+		;;
+	lynx*)
+		os=lynxos
+		;;
+	mac[0-9]*)
+		os=`echo "$os" | sed -e 's|mac|macos|'`
+		;;
+	opened*)
+		os=openedition
+		;;
+	os400*)
+		os=os400
+		;;
+	sunos5*)
+		os=`echo "$os" | sed -e 's|sunos5|solaris2|'`
+		;;
+	sunos6*)
+		os=`echo "$os" | sed -e 's|sunos6|solaris3|'`
+		;;
+	wince*)
+		os=wince
+		;;
+	utek*)
+		os=bsd
+		;;
+	dynix*)
+		os=bsd
+		;;
+	acis*)
+		os=aos
+		;;
+	atheos*)
+		os=atheos
+		;;
+	syllable*)
+		os=syllable
+		;;
+	386bsd)
+		os=bsd
+		;;
+	ctix* | uts*)
+		os=sysv
+		;;
+	nova*)
+		os=rtmk-nova
+		;;
+	ns2)
+		os=nextstep2
+		;;
+	# Preserve the version number of sinix5.
+	sinix5.*)
+		os=`echo "$os" | sed -e 's|sinix|sysv|'`
+		;;
+	sinix*)
+		os=sysv4
+		;;
+	tpf*)
+		os=tpf
+		;;
+	triton*)
+		os=sysv3
+		;;
+	oss*)
+		os=sysv3
+		;;
+	svr4*)
+		os=sysv4
+		;;
+	svr3)
+		os=sysv3
+		;;
+	sysvr4)
+		os=sysv4
+		;;
+	ose*)
+		os=ose
+		;;
+	*mint | mint[0-9]* | *MiNT | MiNT[0-9]*)
+		os=mint
+		;;
+	dicos*)
+		os=dicos
+		;;
+	pikeos*)
+		# Until real need of OS specific support for
+		# particular features comes up, bare metal
+		# configurations are quite functional.
+		case $cpu in
+		    arm*)
+			os=eabi
+			;;
+		    *)
+			os=elf
+			;;
+		esac
+		;;
+	*)
+		# No normalization, but not necessarily accepted, that comes below.
+		;;
+esac
+
+else
+
+# Here we handle the default operating systems that come with various machines.
+# The value should be what the vendor currently ships out the door with their
+# machine or put another way, the most popular os provided with the machine.
+
+# Note that if you're going to try to match "-MANUFACTURER" here (say,
+# "-sun"), then you have to tell the case statement up towards the top
+# that MANUFACTURER isn't an operating system.  Otherwise, code above
+# will signal an error saying that MANUFACTURER isn't an operating
+# system, and we'll never get to this point.
+
+kernel=
+case $cpu-$vendor in
+	score-*)
+		os=elf
+		;;
+	spu-*)
+		os=elf
+		;;
+	*-acorn)
+		os=riscix1.2
+		;;
+	arm*-rebel)
+		kernel=linux
+		os=gnu
+		;;
+	arm*-semi)
+		os=aout
+		;;
+	c4x-* | tic4x-*)
+		os=coff
+		;;
+	c8051-*)
+		os=elf
+		;;
+	clipper-intergraph)
+		os=clix
+		;;
+	hexagon-*)
+		os=elf
+		;;
+	tic54x-*)
+		os=coff
+		;;
+	tic55x-*)
+		os=coff
+		;;
+	tic6x-*)
+		os=coff
+		;;
+	# This must come before the *-dec entry.
+	pdp10-*)
+		os=tops20
+		;;
+	pdp11-*)
+		os=none
+		;;
+	*-dec | vax-*)
+		os=ultrix4.2
+		;;
+	m68*-apollo)
+		os=domain
+		;;
+	i386-sun)
+		os=sunos4.0.2
+		;;
+	m68000-sun)
+		os=sunos3
+		;;
+	m68*-cisco)
+		os=aout
+		;;
+	mep-*)
+		os=elf
+		;;
+	mips*-cisco)
+		os=elf
+		;;
+	mips*-*)
+		os=elf
+		;;
+	or32-*)
+		os=coff
+		;;
+	*-tti)	# must be before sparc entry or we get the wrong os.
+		os=sysv3
+		;;
+	sparc-* | *-sun)
+		os=sunos4.1.1
+		;;
+	pru-*)
+		os=elf
+		;;
+	*-be)
+		os=beos
+		;;
+	*-ibm)
+		os=aix
+		;;
+	*-knuth)
+		os=mmixware
+		;;
+	*-wec)
+		os=proelf
+		;;
+	*-winbond)
+		os=proelf
+		;;
+	*-oki)
+		os=proelf
+		;;
+	*-hp)
+		os=hpux
+		;;
+	*-hitachi)
+		os=hiux
+		;;
+	i860-* | *-att | *-ncr | *-altos | *-motorola | *-convergent)
+		os=sysv
+		;;
+	*-cbm)
+		os=amigaos
+		;;
+	*-dg)
+		os=dgux
+		;;
+	*-dolphin)
+		os=sysv3
+		;;
+	m68k-ccur)
+		os=rtu
+		;;
+	m88k-omron*)
+		os=luna
+		;;
+	*-next)
+		os=nextstep
+		;;
+	*-sequent)
+		os=ptx
+		;;
+	*-crds)
+		os=unos
+		;;
+	*-ns)
+		os=genix
+		;;
+	i370-*)
+		os=mvs
+		;;
+	*-gould)
+		os=sysv
+		;;
+	*-highlevel)
+		os=bsd
+		;;
+	*-encore)
+		os=bsd
+		;;
+	*-sgi)
+		os=irix
+		;;
+	*-siemens)
+		os=sysv4
+		;;
+	*-masscomp)
+		os=rtu
+		;;
+	f30[01]-fujitsu | f700-fujitsu)
+		os=uxpv
+		;;
+	*-rom68k)
+		os=coff
+		;;
+	*-*bug)
+		os=coff
+		;;
+	*-apple)
+		os=macos
+		;;
+	*-atari*)
+		os=mint
+		;;
+	*-wrs)
+		os=vxworks
+		;;
+	*)
+		os=none
+		;;
+esac
+
+fi
+
+# Now, validate our (potentially fixed-up) OS.
+case $os in
+	# Sometimes we do "kernel-libc", so those need to count as OSes.
+	musl* | newlib* | relibc* | uclibc*)
+		;;
+	# Likewise for "kernel-abi"
+	eabi* | gnueabi*)
+		;;
+	# VxWorks passes extra cpu info in the 4th filed.
+	simlinux | simwindows | spe)
+		;;
+	# Now accept the basic system types.
+	# The portable systems comes first.
+	# Each alternative MUST end in a * to match a version number.
+	gnu* | android* | bsd* | mach* | minix* | genix* | ultrix* | irix* \
+	     | *vms* | esix* | aix* | cnk* | sunos | sunos[34]* \
+	     | hpux* | unos* | osf* | luna* | dgux* | auroraux* | solaris* \
+	     | sym* |  plan9* | psp* | sim* | xray* | os68k* | v88r* \
+	     | hiux* | abug | nacl* | netware* | windows* \
+	     | os9* | macos* | osx* | ios* \
+	     | mpw* | magic* | mmixware* | mon960* | lnews* \
+	     | amigaos* | amigados* | msdos* | newsos* | unicos* | aof* \
+	     | aos* | aros* | cloudabi* | sortix* | twizzler* \
+	     | nindy* | vxsim* | vxworks* | ebmon* | hms* | mvs* \
+	     | clix* | riscos* | uniplus* | iris* | isc* | rtu* | xenix* \
+	     | mirbsd* | netbsd* | dicos* | openedition* | ose* \
+	     | bitrig* | openbsd* | secbsd* | solidbsd* | libertybsd* | os108* \
+	     | ekkobsd* | freebsd* | riscix* | lynxos* | os400* \
+	     | bosx* | nextstep* | cxux* | aout* | elf* | oabi* \
+	     | ptx* | coff* | ecoff* | winnt* | domain* | vsta* \
+	     | udi* | lites* | ieee* | go32* | aux* | hcos* \
+	     | chorusrdb* | cegcc* | glidix* | serenity* \
+	     | cygwin* | msys* | pe* | moss* | proelf* | rtems* \
+	     | midipix* | mingw32* | mingw64* | mint* \
+	     | uxpv* | beos* | mpeix* | udk* | moxiebox* \
+	     | interix* | uwin* | mks* | rhapsody* | darwin* \
+	     | openstep* | oskit* | conix* | pw32* | nonstopux* \
+	     | storm-chaos* | tops10* | tenex* | tops20* | its* \
+	     | os2* | vos* | palmos* | uclinux* | nucleus* | morphos* \
+	     | scout* | superux* | sysv* | rtmk* | tpf* | windiss* \
+	     | powermax* | dnix* | nx6 | nx7 | sei* | dragonfly* \
+	     | skyos* | haiku* | rdos* | toppers* | drops* | es* \
+	     | onefs* | tirtos* | phoenix* | fuchsia* | redox* | bme* \
+	     | midnightbsd* | amdhsa* | unleashed* | emscripten* | wasi* \
+	     | nsk* | powerunix* | genode* | zvmoe* | qnx* | emx* | zephyr* \
+	     | fiwix* | mlibc* )
+		;;
+	# This one is extra strict with allowed versions
+	sco3.2v2 | sco3.2v[4-9]* | sco5v6*)
+		# Don't forget version if it is 3.2v4 or newer.
+		;;
+	none)
+		;;
+	kernel* )
+		# Restricted further below
+		;;
+	*)
+		echo Invalid configuration \`"$1"\': OS \`"$os"\' not recognized 1>&2
+		exit 1
+		;;
+esac
+
+# As a final step for OS-related things, validate the OS-kernel combination
+# (given a valid OS), if there is a kernel.
+case $kernel-$os in
+	linux-gnu* | linux-dietlibc* | linux-android* | linux-newlib* \
+		   | linux-musl* | linux-relibc* | linux-uclibc* | linux-mlibc* )
+		;;
+	uclinux-uclibc* )
+		;;
+	managarm-mlibc* | managarm-kernel* )
+		;;
+	-dietlibc* | -newlib* | -musl* | -relibc* | -uclibc* | -mlibc* )
+		# These are just libc implementations, not actual OSes, and thus
+		# require a kernel.
+		echo "Invalid configuration \`$1': libc \`$os' needs explicit kernel." 1>&2
+		exit 1
+		;;
+	-kernel* )
+		echo "Invalid configuration \`$1': \`$os' needs explicit kernel." 1>&2
+		exit 1
+		;;
+	*-kernel* )
+		echo "Invalid configuration \`$1': \`$kernel' does not support \`$os'." 1>&2
+		exit 1
+		;;
+	kfreebsd*-gnu* | kopensolaris*-gnu*)
+		;;
+	vxworks-simlinux | vxworks-simwindows | vxworks-spe)
+		;;
+	nto-qnx*)
+		;;
+	os2-emx)
+		;;
+	*-eabi* | *-gnueabi*)
+		;;
+	-*)
+		# Blank kernel with real OS is always fine.
+		;;
+	*-*)
+		echo "Invalid configuration \`$1': Kernel \`$kernel' not known to work with OS \`$os'." 1>&2
+		exit 1
+		;;
+esac
+
+# Here we handle the case where we know the os, and the CPU type, but not the
+# manufacturer.  We pick the logical manufacturer.
+case $vendor in
+	unknown)
+		case $cpu-$os in
+			*-riscix*)
+				vendor=acorn
+				;;
+			*-sunos*)
+				vendor=sun
+				;;
+			*-cnk* | *-aix*)
+				vendor=ibm
+				;;
+			*-beos*)
+				vendor=be
+				;;
+			*-hpux*)
+				vendor=hp
+				;;
+			*-mpeix*)
+				vendor=hp
+				;;
+			*-hiux*)
+				vendor=hitachi
+				;;
+			*-unos*)
+				vendor=crds
+				;;
+			*-dgux*)
+				vendor=dg
+				;;
+			*-luna*)
+				vendor=omron
+				;;
+			*-genix*)
+				vendor=ns
+				;;
+			*-clix*)
+				vendor=intergraph
+				;;
+			*-mvs* | *-opened*)
+				vendor=ibm
+				;;
+			*-os400*)
+				vendor=ibm
+				;;
+			s390-* | s390x-*)
+				vendor=ibm
+				;;
+			*-ptx*)
+				vendor=sequent
+				;;
+			*-tpf*)
+				vendor=ibm
+				;;
+			*-vxsim* | *-vxworks* | *-windiss*)
+				vendor=wrs
+				;;
+			*-aux*)
+				vendor=apple
+				;;
+			*-hms*)
+				vendor=hitachi
+				;;
+			*-mpw* | *-macos*)
+				vendor=apple
+				;;
+			*-*mint | *-mint[0-9]* | *-*MiNT | *-MiNT[0-9]*)
+				vendor=atari
+				;;
+			*-vos*)
+				vendor=stratus
+				;;
+		esac
+		;;
+esac
+
+echo "$cpu-$vendor-${kernel:+$kernel-}$os"
+exit
+
+# Local variables:
+# eval: (add-hook 'before-save-hook 'time-stamp)
+# time-stamp-start: "timestamp='"
+# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d"
+# time-stamp-end: "'"
+# End:
diff --git a/configure b/configure
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..9ad9699
--- /dev/null
+++ b/configure
@@ -0,0 +1,24290 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# Guess values for system-dependent variables and create Makefiles.
+# Generated by GNU Autoconf 2.71 for OpenSSH Portable.
+#
+# Report bugs to <openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org>.
+#
+#
+# Copyright (C) 1992-1996, 1998-2017, 2020-2021 Free Software Foundation,
+# Inc.
+#
+#
+# This configure script is free software; the Free Software Foundation
+# gives unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it.
+## -------------------- ##
+## M4sh Initialization. ##
+## -------------------- ##
+
+# Be more Bourne compatible
+DUALCASE=1; export DUALCASE # for MKS sh
+as_nop=:
+if test ${ZSH_VERSION+y} && (emulate sh) >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+  emulate sh
+  NULLCMD=:
+  # Pre-4.2 versions of Zsh do word splitting on ${1+"$@"}, which
+  # is contrary to our usage.  Disable this feature.
+  alias -g '${1+"$@"}'='"$@"'
+  setopt NO_GLOB_SUBST
+else $as_nop
+  case `(set -o) 2>/dev/null` in #(
+  *posix*) :
+    set -o posix ;; #(
+  *) :
+     ;;
+esac
+fi
+
+
+
+# Reset variables that may have inherited troublesome values from
+# the environment.
+
+# IFS needs to be set, to space, tab, and newline, in precisely that order.
+# (If _AS_PATH_WALK were called with IFS unset, it would have the
+# side effect of setting IFS to empty, thus disabling word splitting.)
+# Quoting is to prevent editors from complaining about space-tab.
+as_nl='
+'
+export as_nl
+IFS=" ""	$as_nl"
+
+PS1='$ '
+PS2='> '
+PS4='+ '
+
+# Ensure predictable behavior from utilities with locale-dependent output.
+LC_ALL=C
+export LC_ALL
+LANGUAGE=C
+export LANGUAGE
+
+# We cannot yet rely on "unset" to work, but we need these variables
+# to be unset--not just set to an empty or harmless value--now, to
+# avoid bugs in old shells (e.g. pre-3.0 UWIN ksh).  This construct
+# also avoids known problems related to "unset" and subshell syntax
+# in other old shells (e.g. bash 2.01 and pdksh 5.2.14).
+for as_var in BASH_ENV ENV MAIL MAILPATH CDPATH
+do eval test \${$as_var+y} \
+  && ( (unset $as_var) || exit 1) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset $as_var || :
+done
+
+# Ensure that fds 0, 1, and 2 are open.
+if (exec 3>&0) 2>/dev/null; then :; else exec 0</dev/null; fi
+if (exec 3>&1) 2>/dev/null; then :; else exec 1>/dev/null; fi
+if (exec 3>&2)            ; then :; else exec 2>/dev/null; fi
+
+# The user is always right.
+if ${PATH_SEPARATOR+false} :; then
+  PATH_SEPARATOR=:
+  (PATH='/bin;/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 && {
+    (PATH='/bin:/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
+      PATH_SEPARATOR=';'
+  }
+fi
+
+
+# Find who we are.  Look in the path if we contain no directory separator.
+as_myself=
+case $0 in #((
+  *[\\/]* ) as_myself=$0 ;;
+  *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    test -r "$as_dir$0" && as_myself=$as_dir$0 && break
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+     ;;
+esac
+# We did not find ourselves, most probably we were run as `sh COMMAND'
+# in which case we are not to be found in the path.
+if test "x$as_myself" = x; then
+  as_myself=$0
+fi
+if test ! -f "$as_myself"; then
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_myself: error: cannot find myself; rerun with an absolute file name" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+
+# Use a proper internal environment variable to ensure we don't fall
+  # into an infinite loop, continuously re-executing ourselves.
+  if test x"${_as_can_reexec}" != xno && test "x$CONFIG_SHELL" != x; then
+    _as_can_reexec=no; export _as_can_reexec;
+    # We cannot yet assume a decent shell, so we have to provide a
+# neutralization value for shells without unset; and this also
+# works around shells that cannot unset nonexistent variables.
+# Preserve -v and -x to the replacement shell.
+BASH_ENV=/dev/null
+ENV=/dev/null
+(unset BASH_ENV) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset BASH_ENV ENV
+case $- in # ((((
+  *v*x* | *x*v* ) as_opts=-vx ;;
+  *v* ) as_opts=-v ;;
+  *x* ) as_opts=-x ;;
+  * ) as_opts= ;;
+esac
+exec $CONFIG_SHELL $as_opts "$as_myself" ${1+"$@"}
+# Admittedly, this is quite paranoid, since all the known shells bail
+# out after a failed `exec'.
+printf "%s\n" "$0: could not re-execute with $CONFIG_SHELL" >&2
+exit 255
+  fi
+  # We don't want this to propagate to other subprocesses.
+          { _as_can_reexec=; unset _as_can_reexec;}
+if test "x$CONFIG_SHELL" = x; then
+  as_bourne_compatible="as_nop=:
+if test \${ZSH_VERSION+y} && (emulate sh) >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+  emulate sh
+  NULLCMD=:
+  # Pre-4.2 versions of Zsh do word splitting on \${1+\"\$@\"}, which
+  # is contrary to our usage.  Disable this feature.
+  alias -g '\${1+\"\$@\"}'='\"\$@\"'
+  setopt NO_GLOB_SUBST
+else \$as_nop
+  case \`(set -o) 2>/dev/null\` in #(
+  *posix*) :
+    set -o posix ;; #(
+  *) :
+     ;;
+esac
+fi
+"
+  as_required="as_fn_return () { (exit \$1); }
+as_fn_success () { as_fn_return 0; }
+as_fn_failure () { as_fn_return 1; }
+as_fn_ret_success () { return 0; }
+as_fn_ret_failure () { return 1; }
+
+exitcode=0
+as_fn_success || { exitcode=1; echo as_fn_success failed.; }
+as_fn_failure && { exitcode=1; echo as_fn_failure succeeded.; }
+as_fn_ret_success || { exitcode=1; echo as_fn_ret_success failed.; }
+as_fn_ret_failure && { exitcode=1; echo as_fn_ret_failure succeeded.; }
+if ( set x; as_fn_ret_success y && test x = \"\$1\" )
+then :
+
+else \$as_nop
+  exitcode=1; echo positional parameters were not saved.
+fi
+test x\$exitcode = x0 || exit 1
+blah=\$(echo \$(echo blah))
+test x\"\$blah\" = xblah || exit 1
+test -x / || exit 1"
+  as_suggested="  as_lineno_1=";as_suggested=$as_suggested$LINENO;as_suggested=$as_suggested" as_lineno_1a=\$LINENO
+  as_lineno_2=";as_suggested=$as_suggested$LINENO;as_suggested=$as_suggested" as_lineno_2a=\$LINENO
+  eval 'test \"x\$as_lineno_1'\$as_run'\" != \"x\$as_lineno_2'\$as_run'\" &&
+  test \"x\`expr \$as_lineno_1'\$as_run' + 1\`\" = \"x\$as_lineno_2'\$as_run'\"' || exit 1
+test \$(( 1 + 1 )) = 2 || exit 1"
+  if (eval "$as_required") 2>/dev/null
+then :
+  as_have_required=yes
+else $as_nop
+  as_have_required=no
+fi
+  if test x$as_have_required = xyes && (eval "$as_suggested") 2>/dev/null
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+as_found=false
+for as_dir in /bin$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/bin$PATH_SEPARATOR$PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+  as_found=:
+  case $as_dir in #(
+	 /*)
+	   for as_base in sh bash ksh sh5; do
+	     # Try only shells that exist, to save several forks.
+	     as_shell=$as_dir$as_base
+	     if { test -f "$as_shell" || test -f "$as_shell.exe"; } &&
+		    as_run=a "$as_shell" -c "$as_bourne_compatible""$as_required" 2>/dev/null
+then :
+  CONFIG_SHELL=$as_shell as_have_required=yes
+		   if as_run=a "$as_shell" -c "$as_bourne_compatible""$as_suggested" 2>/dev/null
+then :
+  break 2
+fi
+fi
+	   done;;
+       esac
+  as_found=false
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+if $as_found
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  if { test -f "$SHELL" || test -f "$SHELL.exe"; } &&
+	      as_run=a "$SHELL" -c "$as_bourne_compatible""$as_required" 2>/dev/null
+then :
+  CONFIG_SHELL=$SHELL as_have_required=yes
+fi
+fi
+
+
+      if test "x$CONFIG_SHELL" != x
+then :
+  export CONFIG_SHELL
+             # We cannot yet assume a decent shell, so we have to provide a
+# neutralization value for shells without unset; and this also
+# works around shells that cannot unset nonexistent variables.
+# Preserve -v and -x to the replacement shell.
+BASH_ENV=/dev/null
+ENV=/dev/null
+(unset BASH_ENV) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset BASH_ENV ENV
+case $- in # ((((
+  *v*x* | *x*v* ) as_opts=-vx ;;
+  *v* ) as_opts=-v ;;
+  *x* ) as_opts=-x ;;
+  * ) as_opts= ;;
+esac
+exec $CONFIG_SHELL $as_opts "$as_myself" ${1+"$@"}
+# Admittedly, this is quite paranoid, since all the known shells bail
+# out after a failed `exec'.
+printf "%s\n" "$0: could not re-execute with $CONFIG_SHELL" >&2
+exit 255
+fi
+
+    if test x$as_have_required = xno
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "$0: This script requires a shell more modern than all"
+  printf "%s\n" "$0: the shells that I found on your system."
+  if test ${ZSH_VERSION+y} ; then
+    printf "%s\n" "$0: In particular, zsh $ZSH_VERSION has bugs and should"
+    printf "%s\n" "$0: be upgraded to zsh 4.3.4 or later."
+  else
+    printf "%s\n" "$0: Please tell bug-autoconf@gnu.org and
+$0: openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org about your system,
+$0: including any error possibly output before this
+$0: message. Then install a modern shell, or manually run
+$0: the script under such a shell if you do have one."
+  fi
+  exit 1
+fi
+fi
+fi
+SHELL=${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh}
+export SHELL
+# Unset more variables known to interfere with behavior of common tools.
+CLICOLOR_FORCE= GREP_OPTIONS=
+unset CLICOLOR_FORCE GREP_OPTIONS
+
+## --------------------- ##
+## M4sh Shell Functions. ##
+## --------------------- ##
+# as_fn_unset VAR
+# ---------------
+# Portably unset VAR.
+as_fn_unset ()
+{
+  { eval $1=; unset $1;}
+}
+as_unset=as_fn_unset
+
+
+# as_fn_set_status STATUS
+# -----------------------
+# Set $? to STATUS, without forking.
+as_fn_set_status ()
+{
+  return $1
+} # as_fn_set_status
+
+# as_fn_exit STATUS
+# -----------------
+# Exit the shell with STATUS, even in a "trap 0" or "set -e" context.
+as_fn_exit ()
+{
+  set +e
+  as_fn_set_status $1
+  exit $1
+} # as_fn_exit
+# as_fn_nop
+# ---------
+# Do nothing but, unlike ":", preserve the value of $?.
+as_fn_nop ()
+{
+  return $?
+}
+as_nop=as_fn_nop
+
+# as_fn_mkdir_p
+# -------------
+# Create "$as_dir" as a directory, including parents if necessary.
+as_fn_mkdir_p ()
+{
+
+  case $as_dir in #(
+  -*) as_dir=./$as_dir;;
+  esac
+  test -d "$as_dir" || eval $as_mkdir_p || {
+    as_dirs=
+    while :; do
+      case $as_dir in #(
+      *\'*) as_qdir=`printf "%s\n" "$as_dir" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"`;; #'(
+      *) as_qdir=$as_dir;;
+      esac
+      as_dirs="'$as_qdir' $as_dirs"
+      as_dir=`$as_dirname -- "$as_dir" ||
+$as_expr X"$as_dir" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)//*[^/][^/]*/*$' \| \
+	 X"$as_dir" : 'X\(//\)[^/]' \| \
+	 X"$as_dir" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
+	 X"$as_dir" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
+printf "%s\n" X"$as_dir" |
+    sed '/^X\(.*[^/]\)\/\/*[^/][^/]*\/*$/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  /^X\(\/\/\)[^/].*/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  /^X\(\/\/\)$/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  /^X\(\/\).*/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  s/.*/./; q'`
+      test -d "$as_dir" && break
+    done
+    test -z "$as_dirs" || eval "mkdir $as_dirs"
+  } || test -d "$as_dir" || as_fn_error $? "cannot create directory $as_dir"
+
+
+} # as_fn_mkdir_p
+
+# as_fn_executable_p FILE
+# -----------------------
+# Test if FILE is an executable regular file.
+as_fn_executable_p ()
+{
+  test -f "$1" && test -x "$1"
+} # as_fn_executable_p
+# as_fn_append VAR VALUE
+# ----------------------
+# Append the text in VALUE to the end of the definition contained in VAR. Take
+# advantage of any shell optimizations that allow amortized linear growth over
+# repeated appends, instead of the typical quadratic growth present in naive
+# implementations.
+if (eval "as_var=1; as_var+=2; test x\$as_var = x12") 2>/dev/null
+then :
+  eval 'as_fn_append ()
+  {
+    eval $1+=\$2
+  }'
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_append ()
+  {
+    eval $1=\$$1\$2
+  }
+fi # as_fn_append
+
+# as_fn_arith ARG...
+# ------------------
+# Perform arithmetic evaluation on the ARGs, and store the result in the
+# global $as_val. Take advantage of shells that can avoid forks. The arguments
+# must be portable across $(()) and expr.
+if (eval "test \$(( 1 + 1 )) = 2") 2>/dev/null
+then :
+  eval 'as_fn_arith ()
+  {
+    as_val=$(( $* ))
+  }'
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_arith ()
+  {
+    as_val=`expr "$@" || test $? -eq 1`
+  }
+fi # as_fn_arith
+
+# as_fn_nop
+# ---------
+# Do nothing but, unlike ":", preserve the value of $?.
+as_fn_nop ()
+{
+  return $?
+}
+as_nop=as_fn_nop
+
+# as_fn_error STATUS ERROR [LINENO LOG_FD]
+# ----------------------------------------
+# Output "`basename $0`: error: ERROR" to stderr. If LINENO and LOG_FD are
+# provided, also output the error to LOG_FD, referencing LINENO. Then exit the
+# script with STATUS, using 1 if that was 0.
+as_fn_error ()
+{
+  as_status=$1; test $as_status -eq 0 && as_status=1
+  if test "$4"; then
+    as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$3"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: $2" >&$4
+  fi
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: $2" >&2
+  as_fn_exit $as_status
+} # as_fn_error
+
+if expr a : '\(a\)' >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
+   test "X`expr 00001 : '.*\(...\)'`" = X001; then
+  as_expr=expr
+else
+  as_expr=false
+fi
+
+if (basename -- /) >/dev/null 2>&1 && test "X`basename -- / 2>&1`" = "X/"; then
+  as_basename=basename
+else
+  as_basename=false
+fi
+
+if (as_dir=`dirname -- /` && test "X$as_dir" = X/) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  as_dirname=dirname
+else
+  as_dirname=false
+fi
+
+as_me=`$as_basename -- "$0" ||
+$as_expr X/"$0" : '.*/\([^/][^/]*\)/*$' \| \
+	 X"$0" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
+	 X"$0" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
+printf "%s\n" X/"$0" |
+    sed '/^.*\/\([^/][^/]*\)\/*$/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  /^X\/\(\/\/\)$/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  /^X\/\(\/\).*/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  s/.*/./; q'`
+
+# Avoid depending upon Character Ranges.
+as_cr_letters='abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'
+as_cr_LETTERS='ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'
+as_cr_Letters=$as_cr_letters$as_cr_LETTERS
+as_cr_digits='0123456789'
+as_cr_alnum=$as_cr_Letters$as_cr_digits
+
+
+  as_lineno_1=$LINENO as_lineno_1a=$LINENO
+  as_lineno_2=$LINENO as_lineno_2a=$LINENO
+  eval 'test "x$as_lineno_1'$as_run'" != "x$as_lineno_2'$as_run'" &&
+  test "x`expr $as_lineno_1'$as_run' + 1`" = "x$as_lineno_2'$as_run'"' || {
+  # Blame Lee E. McMahon (1931-1989) for sed's syntax.  :-)
+  sed -n '
+    p
+    /[$]LINENO/=
+  ' <$as_myself |
+    sed '
+      s/[$]LINENO.*/&-/
+      t lineno
+      b
+      :lineno
+      N
+      :loop
+      s/[$]LINENO\([^'$as_cr_alnum'_].*\n\)\(.*\)/\2\1\2/
+      t loop
+      s/-\n.*//
+    ' >$as_me.lineno &&
+  chmod +x "$as_me.lineno" ||
+    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: cannot create $as_me.lineno; rerun with a POSIX shell" >&2; as_fn_exit 1; }
+
+  # If we had to re-execute with $CONFIG_SHELL, we're ensured to have
+  # already done that, so ensure we don't try to do so again and fall
+  # in an infinite loop.  This has already happened in practice.
+  _as_can_reexec=no; export _as_can_reexec
+  # Don't try to exec as it changes $[0], causing all sort of problems
+  # (the dirname of $[0] is not the place where we might find the
+  # original and so on.  Autoconf is especially sensitive to this).
+  . "./$as_me.lineno"
+  # Exit status is that of the last command.
+  exit
+}
+
+
+# Determine whether it's possible to make 'echo' print without a newline.
+# These variables are no longer used directly by Autoconf, but are AC_SUBSTed
+# for compatibility with existing Makefiles.
+ECHO_C= ECHO_N= ECHO_T=
+case `echo -n x` in #(((((
+-n*)
+  case `echo 'xy\c'` in
+  *c*) ECHO_T='	';;	# ECHO_T is single tab character.
+  xy)  ECHO_C='\c';;
+  *)   echo `echo ksh88 bug on AIX 6.1` > /dev/null
+       ECHO_T='	';;
+  esac;;
+*)
+  ECHO_N='-n';;
+esac
+
+# For backward compatibility with old third-party macros, we provide
+# the shell variables $as_echo and $as_echo_n.  New code should use
+# AS_ECHO(["message"]) and AS_ECHO_N(["message"]), respectively.
+as_echo='printf %s\n'
+as_echo_n='printf %s'
+
+
+rm -f conf$$ conf$$.exe conf$$.file
+if test -d conf$$.dir; then
+  rm -f conf$$.dir/conf$$.file
+else
+  rm -f conf$$.dir
+  mkdir conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null
+fi
+if (echo >conf$$.file) 2>/dev/null; then
+  if ln -s conf$$.file conf$$ 2>/dev/null; then
+    as_ln_s='ln -s'
+    # ... but there are two gotchas:
+    # 1) On MSYS, both `ln -s file dir' and `ln file dir' fail.
+    # 2) DJGPP < 2.04 has no symlinks; `ln -s' creates a wrapper executable.
+    # In both cases, we have to default to `cp -pR'.
+    ln -s conf$$.file conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null && test ! -f conf$$.exe ||
+      as_ln_s='cp -pR'
+  elif ln conf$$.file conf$$ 2>/dev/null; then
+    as_ln_s=ln
+  else
+    as_ln_s='cp -pR'
+  fi
+else
+  as_ln_s='cp -pR'
+fi
+rm -f conf$$ conf$$.exe conf$$.dir/conf$$.file conf$$.file
+rmdir conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null
+
+if mkdir -p . 2>/dev/null; then
+  as_mkdir_p='mkdir -p "$as_dir"'
+else
+  test -d ./-p && rmdir ./-p
+  as_mkdir_p=false
+fi
+
+as_test_x='test -x'
+as_executable_p=as_fn_executable_p
+
+# Sed expression to map a string onto a valid CPP name.
+as_tr_cpp="eval sed 'y%*$as_cr_letters%P$as_cr_LETTERS%;s%[^_$as_cr_alnum]%_%g'"
+
+# Sed expression to map a string onto a valid variable name.
+as_tr_sh="eval sed 'y%*+%pp%;s%[^_$as_cr_alnum]%_%g'"
+
+
+test -n "$DJDIR" || exec 7<&0 </dev/null
+exec 6>&1
+
+# Name of the host.
+# hostname on some systems (SVR3.2, old GNU/Linux) returns a bogus exit status,
+# so uname gets run too.
+ac_hostname=`(hostname || uname -n) 2>/dev/null | sed 1q`
+
+#
+# Initializations.
+#
+ac_default_prefix=/usr/local
+ac_clean_files=
+ac_config_libobj_dir=.
+LIBOBJS=
+cross_compiling=no
+subdirs=
+MFLAGS=
+MAKEFLAGS=
+
+# Identity of this package.
+PACKAGE_NAME='OpenSSH'
+PACKAGE_TARNAME='openssh'
+PACKAGE_VERSION='Portable'
+PACKAGE_STRING='OpenSSH Portable'
+PACKAGE_BUGREPORT='openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org'
+PACKAGE_URL=''
+
+ac_unique_file="ssh.c"
+# Factoring default headers for most tests.
+ac_includes_default="\
+#include <stddef.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDIO_H
+# include <stdio.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H
+# include <stdlib.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
+# include <string.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_INTTYPES_H
+# include <inttypes.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
+# include <strings.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+# include <unistd.h>
+#endif"
+
+ac_header_c_list=
+ac_subst_vars='LTLIBOBJS
+CFLAGS_NOPIE
+LDFLAGS_NOPIE
+DEPEND
+UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS
+TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS
+TEST_SSH_UTF8
+TEST_SSH_IPV6
+piddir
+user_path
+mansubdir
+MANTYPE
+XAUTH_PATH
+STRIP_OPT
+xauth_path
+PRIVSEP_PATH
+CHANNELLIBS
+K5LIBS
+GSSLIBS
+KRB5CONF
+SSHDLIBS
+SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+LIBFIDO2
+SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY
+OPENSSL_BIN
+openssl_bin
+PICFLAG
+LIBEDIT
+LDNSCONFIG
+LIBOBJS
+LD
+PATH_PASSWD_PROG
+STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL
+MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED
+PATH_USERADD_PROG
+PATH_GROUPADD_PROG
+MANFMT
+TEST_SHELL
+PKGCONFIG
+MANDOC
+NROFF
+GROFF
+SH
+TEST_MINUS_S_SH
+SED
+KILL
+CAT
+ac_ct_AR
+AR
+MKDIR_P
+EGREP
+GREP
+INSTALL_DATA
+INSTALL_SCRIPT
+INSTALL_PROGRAM
+RANLIB
+CPP
+AWK
+host_os
+host_vendor
+host_cpu
+host
+build_os
+build_vendor
+build_cpu
+build
+OBJEXT
+EXEEXT
+ac_ct_CC
+CPPFLAGS
+LDFLAGS
+CFLAGS
+CC
+target_alias
+host_alias
+build_alias
+LIBS
+ECHO_T
+ECHO_N
+ECHO_C
+DEFS
+mandir
+localedir
+libdir
+psdir
+pdfdir
+dvidir
+htmldir
+infodir
+docdir
+oldincludedir
+includedir
+runstatedir
+localstatedir
+sharedstatedir
+sysconfdir
+datadir
+datarootdir
+libexecdir
+sbindir
+bindir
+program_transform_name
+prefix
+exec_prefix
+PACKAGE_URL
+PACKAGE_BUGREPORT
+PACKAGE_STRING
+PACKAGE_VERSION
+PACKAGE_TARNAME
+PACKAGE_NAME
+PATH_SEPARATOR
+SHELL'
+ac_subst_files=''
+ac_user_opts='
+enable_option_checking
+enable_largefile
+with_openssl
+with_stackprotect
+with_hardening
+with_rpath
+with_cflags
+with_cflags_after
+with_cppflags
+with_ldflags
+with_ldflags_after
+with_libs
+with_Werror
+with_solaris_contracts
+with_solaris_projects
+with_solaris_privs
+with_osfsia
+with_zlib
+with_zlib_version_check
+with_ldns
+with_libedit
+with_audit
+with_pie
+enable_pkcs11
+enable_security_key
+with_security_key_builtin
+with_ssl_dir
+with_openssl_header_check
+with_ssl_engine
+with_prngd_port
+with_prngd_socket
+with_pam
+with_pam_service
+with_privsep_user
+with_sandbox
+with_selinux
+with_kerberos5
+with_privsep_path
+with_xauth
+enable_strip
+with_maildir
+with_mantype
+with_shadow
+with_ipaddr_display
+enable_etc_default_login
+with_default_path
+with_superuser_path
+with_4in6
+with_bsd_auth
+with_pid_dir
+enable_lastlog
+enable_utmp
+enable_utmpx
+enable_wtmp
+enable_wtmpx
+enable_libutil
+enable_pututline
+enable_pututxline
+with_lastlog
+'
+      ac_precious_vars='build_alias
+host_alias
+target_alias
+CC
+CFLAGS
+LDFLAGS
+LIBS
+CPPFLAGS
+CPP'
+
+
+# Initialize some variables set by options.
+ac_init_help=
+ac_init_version=false
+ac_unrecognized_opts=
+ac_unrecognized_sep=
+# The variables have the same names as the options, with
+# dashes changed to underlines.
+cache_file=/dev/null
+exec_prefix=NONE
+no_create=
+no_recursion=
+prefix=NONE
+program_prefix=NONE
+program_suffix=NONE
+program_transform_name=s,x,x,
+silent=
+site=
+srcdir=
+verbose=
+x_includes=NONE
+x_libraries=NONE
+
+# Installation directory options.
+# These are left unexpanded so users can "make install exec_prefix=/foo"
+# and all the variables that are supposed to be based on exec_prefix
+# by default will actually change.
+# Use braces instead of parens because sh, perl, etc. also accept them.
+# (The list follows the same order as the GNU Coding Standards.)
+bindir='${exec_prefix}/bin'
+sbindir='${exec_prefix}/sbin'
+libexecdir='${exec_prefix}/libexec'
+datarootdir='${prefix}/share'
+datadir='${datarootdir}'
+sysconfdir='${prefix}/etc'
+sharedstatedir='${prefix}/com'
+localstatedir='${prefix}/var'
+runstatedir='${localstatedir}/run'
+includedir='${prefix}/include'
+oldincludedir='/usr/include'
+docdir='${datarootdir}/doc/${PACKAGE_TARNAME}'
+infodir='${datarootdir}/info'
+htmldir='${docdir}'
+dvidir='${docdir}'
+pdfdir='${docdir}'
+psdir='${docdir}'
+libdir='${exec_prefix}/lib'
+localedir='${datarootdir}/locale'
+mandir='${datarootdir}/man'
+
+ac_prev=
+ac_dashdash=
+for ac_option
+do
+  # If the previous option needs an argument, assign it.
+  if test -n "$ac_prev"; then
+    eval $ac_prev=\$ac_option
+    ac_prev=
+    continue
+  fi
+
+  case $ac_option in
+  *=?*) ac_optarg=`expr "X$ac_option" : '[^=]*=\(.*\)'` ;;
+  *=)   ac_optarg= ;;
+  *)    ac_optarg=yes ;;
+  esac
+
+  case $ac_dashdash$ac_option in
+  --)
+    ac_dashdash=yes ;;
+
+  -bindir | --bindir | --bindi | --bind | --bin | --bi)
+    ac_prev=bindir ;;
+  -bindir=* | --bindir=* | --bindi=* | --bind=* | --bin=* | --bi=*)
+    bindir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -build | --build | --buil | --bui | --bu)
+    ac_prev=build_alias ;;
+  -build=* | --build=* | --buil=* | --bui=* | --bu=*)
+    build_alias=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -cache-file | --cache-file | --cache-fil | --cache-fi \
+  | --cache-f | --cache- | --cache | --cach | --cac | --ca | --c)
+    ac_prev=cache_file ;;
+  -cache-file=* | --cache-file=* | --cache-fil=* | --cache-fi=* \
+  | --cache-f=* | --cache-=* | --cache=* | --cach=* | --cac=* | --ca=* | --c=*)
+    cache_file=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  --config-cache | -C)
+    cache_file=config.cache ;;
+
+  -datadir | --datadir | --datadi | --datad)
+    ac_prev=datadir ;;
+  -datadir=* | --datadir=* | --datadi=* | --datad=*)
+    datadir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -datarootdir | --datarootdir | --datarootdi | --datarootd | --dataroot \
+  | --dataroo | --dataro | --datar)
+    ac_prev=datarootdir ;;
+  -datarootdir=* | --datarootdir=* | --datarootdi=* | --datarootd=* \
+  | --dataroot=* | --dataroo=* | --dataro=* | --datar=*)
+    datarootdir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -disable-* | --disable-*)
+    ac_useropt=`expr "x$ac_option" : 'x-*disable-\(.*\)'`
+    # Reject names that are not valid shell variable names.
+    expr "x$ac_useropt" : ".*[^-+._$as_cr_alnum]" >/dev/null &&
+      as_fn_error $? "invalid feature name: \`$ac_useropt'"
+    ac_useropt_orig=$ac_useropt
+    ac_useropt=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_useropt" | sed 's/[-+.]/_/g'`
+    case $ac_user_opts in
+      *"
+"enable_$ac_useropt"
+"*) ;;
+      *) ac_unrecognized_opts="$ac_unrecognized_opts$ac_unrecognized_sep--disable-$ac_useropt_orig"
+	 ac_unrecognized_sep=', ';;
+    esac
+    eval enable_$ac_useropt=no ;;
+
+  -docdir | --docdir | --docdi | --doc | --do)
+    ac_prev=docdir ;;
+  -docdir=* | --docdir=* | --docdi=* | --doc=* | --do=*)
+    docdir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -dvidir | --dvidir | --dvidi | --dvid | --dvi | --dv)
+    ac_prev=dvidir ;;
+  -dvidir=* | --dvidir=* | --dvidi=* | --dvid=* | --dvi=* | --dv=*)
+    dvidir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -enable-* | --enable-*)
+    ac_useropt=`expr "x$ac_option" : 'x-*enable-\([^=]*\)'`
+    # Reject names that are not valid shell variable names.
+    expr "x$ac_useropt" : ".*[^-+._$as_cr_alnum]" >/dev/null &&
+      as_fn_error $? "invalid feature name: \`$ac_useropt'"
+    ac_useropt_orig=$ac_useropt
+    ac_useropt=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_useropt" | sed 's/[-+.]/_/g'`
+    case $ac_user_opts in
+      *"
+"enable_$ac_useropt"
+"*) ;;
+      *) ac_unrecognized_opts="$ac_unrecognized_opts$ac_unrecognized_sep--enable-$ac_useropt_orig"
+	 ac_unrecognized_sep=', ';;
+    esac
+    eval enable_$ac_useropt=\$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -exec-prefix | --exec_prefix | --exec-prefix | --exec-prefi \
+  | --exec-pref | --exec-pre | --exec-pr | --exec-p | --exec- \
+  | --exec | --exe | --ex)
+    ac_prev=exec_prefix ;;
+  -exec-prefix=* | --exec_prefix=* | --exec-prefix=* | --exec-prefi=* \
+  | --exec-pref=* | --exec-pre=* | --exec-pr=* | --exec-p=* | --exec-=* \
+  | --exec=* | --exe=* | --ex=*)
+    exec_prefix=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -gas | --gas | --ga | --g)
+    # Obsolete; use --with-gas.
+    with_gas=yes ;;
+
+  -help | --help | --hel | --he | -h)
+    ac_init_help=long ;;
+  -help=r* | --help=r* | --hel=r* | --he=r* | -hr*)
+    ac_init_help=recursive ;;
+  -help=s* | --help=s* | --hel=s* | --he=s* | -hs*)
+    ac_init_help=short ;;
+
+  -host | --host | --hos | --ho)
+    ac_prev=host_alias ;;
+  -host=* | --host=* | --hos=* | --ho=*)
+    host_alias=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -htmldir | --htmldir | --htmldi | --htmld | --html | --htm | --ht)
+    ac_prev=htmldir ;;
+  -htmldir=* | --htmldir=* | --htmldi=* | --htmld=* | --html=* | --htm=* \
+  | --ht=*)
+    htmldir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -includedir | --includedir | --includedi | --included | --include \
+  | --includ | --inclu | --incl | --inc)
+    ac_prev=includedir ;;
+  -includedir=* | --includedir=* | --includedi=* | --included=* | --include=* \
+  | --includ=* | --inclu=* | --incl=* | --inc=*)
+    includedir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -infodir | --infodir | --infodi | --infod | --info | --inf)
+    ac_prev=infodir ;;
+  -infodir=* | --infodir=* | --infodi=* | --infod=* | --info=* | --inf=*)
+    infodir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -libdir | --libdir | --libdi | --libd)
+    ac_prev=libdir ;;
+  -libdir=* | --libdir=* | --libdi=* | --libd=*)
+    libdir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -libexecdir | --libexecdir | --libexecdi | --libexecd | --libexec \
+  | --libexe | --libex | --libe)
+    ac_prev=libexecdir ;;
+  -libexecdir=* | --libexecdir=* | --libexecdi=* | --libexecd=* | --libexec=* \
+  | --libexe=* | --libex=* | --libe=*)
+    libexecdir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -localedir | --localedir | --localedi | --localed | --locale)
+    ac_prev=localedir ;;
+  -localedir=* | --localedir=* | --localedi=* | --localed=* | --locale=*)
+    localedir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -localstatedir | --localstatedir | --localstatedi | --localstated \
+  | --localstate | --localstat | --localsta | --localst | --locals)
+    ac_prev=localstatedir ;;
+  -localstatedir=* | --localstatedir=* | --localstatedi=* | --localstated=* \
+  | --localstate=* | --localstat=* | --localsta=* | --localst=* | --locals=*)
+    localstatedir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -mandir | --mandir | --mandi | --mand | --man | --ma | --m)
+    ac_prev=mandir ;;
+  -mandir=* | --mandir=* | --mandi=* | --mand=* | --man=* | --ma=* | --m=*)
+    mandir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -nfp | --nfp | --nf)
+    # Obsolete; use --without-fp.
+    with_fp=no ;;
+
+  -no-create | --no-create | --no-creat | --no-crea | --no-cre \
+  | --no-cr | --no-c | -n)
+    no_create=yes ;;
+
+  -no-recursion | --no-recursion | --no-recursio | --no-recursi \
+  | --no-recurs | --no-recur | --no-recu | --no-rec | --no-re | --no-r)
+    no_recursion=yes ;;
+
+  -oldincludedir | --oldincludedir | --oldincludedi | --oldincluded \
+  | --oldinclude | --oldinclud | --oldinclu | --oldincl | --oldinc \
+  | --oldin | --oldi | --old | --ol | --o)
+    ac_prev=oldincludedir ;;
+  -oldincludedir=* | --oldincludedir=* | --oldincludedi=* | --oldincluded=* \
+  | --oldinclude=* | --oldinclud=* | --oldinclu=* | --oldincl=* | --oldinc=* \
+  | --oldin=* | --oldi=* | --old=* | --ol=* | --o=*)
+    oldincludedir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -prefix | --prefix | --prefi | --pref | --pre | --pr | --p)
+    ac_prev=prefix ;;
+  -prefix=* | --prefix=* | --prefi=* | --pref=* | --pre=* | --pr=* | --p=*)
+    prefix=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -program-prefix | --program-prefix | --program-prefi | --program-pref \
+  | --program-pre | --program-pr | --program-p)
+    ac_prev=program_prefix ;;
+  -program-prefix=* | --program-prefix=* | --program-prefi=* \
+  | --program-pref=* | --program-pre=* | --program-pr=* | --program-p=*)
+    program_prefix=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -program-suffix | --program-suffix | --program-suffi | --program-suff \
+  | --program-suf | --program-su | --program-s)
+    ac_prev=program_suffix ;;
+  -program-suffix=* | --program-suffix=* | --program-suffi=* \
+  | --program-suff=* | --program-suf=* | --program-su=* | --program-s=*)
+    program_suffix=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -program-transform-name | --program-transform-name \
+  | --program-transform-nam | --program-transform-na \
+  | --program-transform-n | --program-transform- \
+  | --program-transform | --program-transfor \
+  | --program-transfo | --program-transf \
+  | --program-trans | --program-tran \
+  | --progr-tra | --program-tr | --program-t)
+    ac_prev=program_transform_name ;;
+  -program-transform-name=* | --program-transform-name=* \
+  | --program-transform-nam=* | --program-transform-na=* \
+  | --program-transform-n=* | --program-transform-=* \
+  | --program-transform=* | --program-transfor=* \
+  | --program-transfo=* | --program-transf=* \
+  | --program-trans=* | --program-tran=* \
+  | --progr-tra=* | --program-tr=* | --program-t=*)
+    program_transform_name=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -pdfdir | --pdfdir | --pdfdi | --pdfd | --pdf | --pd)
+    ac_prev=pdfdir ;;
+  -pdfdir=* | --pdfdir=* | --pdfdi=* | --pdfd=* | --pdf=* | --pd=*)
+    pdfdir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -psdir | --psdir | --psdi | --psd | --ps)
+    ac_prev=psdir ;;
+  -psdir=* | --psdir=* | --psdi=* | --psd=* | --ps=*)
+    psdir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -q | -quiet | --quiet | --quie | --qui | --qu | --q \
+  | -silent | --silent | --silen | --sile | --sil)
+    silent=yes ;;
+
+  -runstatedir | --runstatedir | --runstatedi | --runstated \
+  | --runstate | --runstat | --runsta | --runst | --runs \
+  | --run | --ru | --r)
+    ac_prev=runstatedir ;;
+  -runstatedir=* | --runstatedir=* | --runstatedi=* | --runstated=* \
+  | --runstate=* | --runstat=* | --runsta=* | --runst=* | --runs=* \
+  | --run=* | --ru=* | --r=*)
+    runstatedir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -sbindir | --sbindir | --sbindi | --sbind | --sbin | --sbi | --sb)
+    ac_prev=sbindir ;;
+  -sbindir=* | --sbindir=* | --sbindi=* | --sbind=* | --sbin=* \
+  | --sbi=* | --sb=*)
+    sbindir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -sharedstatedir | --sharedstatedir | --sharedstatedi \
+  | --sharedstated | --sharedstate | --sharedstat | --sharedsta \
+  | --sharedst | --shareds | --shared | --share | --shar \
+  | --sha | --sh)
+    ac_prev=sharedstatedir ;;
+  -sharedstatedir=* | --sharedstatedir=* | --sharedstatedi=* \
+  | --sharedstated=* | --sharedstate=* | --sharedstat=* | --sharedsta=* \
+  | --sharedst=* | --shareds=* | --shared=* | --share=* | --shar=* \
+  | --sha=* | --sh=*)
+    sharedstatedir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -site | --site | --sit)
+    ac_prev=site ;;
+  -site=* | --site=* | --sit=*)
+    site=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -srcdir | --srcdir | --srcdi | --srcd | --src | --sr)
+    ac_prev=srcdir ;;
+  -srcdir=* | --srcdir=* | --srcdi=* | --srcd=* | --src=* | --sr=*)
+    srcdir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -sysconfdir | --sysconfdir | --sysconfdi | --sysconfd | --sysconf \
+  | --syscon | --sysco | --sysc | --sys | --sy)
+    ac_prev=sysconfdir ;;
+  -sysconfdir=* | --sysconfdir=* | --sysconfdi=* | --sysconfd=* | --sysconf=* \
+  | --syscon=* | --sysco=* | --sysc=* | --sys=* | --sy=*)
+    sysconfdir=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -target | --target | --targe | --targ | --tar | --ta | --t)
+    ac_prev=target_alias ;;
+  -target=* | --target=* | --targe=* | --targ=* | --tar=* | --ta=* | --t=*)
+    target_alias=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -v | -verbose | --verbose | --verbos | --verbo | --verb)
+    verbose=yes ;;
+
+  -version | --version | --versio | --versi | --vers | -V)
+    ac_init_version=: ;;
+
+  -with-* | --with-*)
+    ac_useropt=`expr "x$ac_option" : 'x-*with-\([^=]*\)'`
+    # Reject names that are not valid shell variable names.
+    expr "x$ac_useropt" : ".*[^-+._$as_cr_alnum]" >/dev/null &&
+      as_fn_error $? "invalid package name: \`$ac_useropt'"
+    ac_useropt_orig=$ac_useropt
+    ac_useropt=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_useropt" | sed 's/[-+.]/_/g'`
+    case $ac_user_opts in
+      *"
+"with_$ac_useropt"
+"*) ;;
+      *) ac_unrecognized_opts="$ac_unrecognized_opts$ac_unrecognized_sep--with-$ac_useropt_orig"
+	 ac_unrecognized_sep=', ';;
+    esac
+    eval with_$ac_useropt=\$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -without-* | --without-*)
+    ac_useropt=`expr "x$ac_option" : 'x-*without-\(.*\)'`
+    # Reject names that are not valid shell variable names.
+    expr "x$ac_useropt" : ".*[^-+._$as_cr_alnum]" >/dev/null &&
+      as_fn_error $? "invalid package name: \`$ac_useropt'"
+    ac_useropt_orig=$ac_useropt
+    ac_useropt=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_useropt" | sed 's/[-+.]/_/g'`
+    case $ac_user_opts in
+      *"
+"with_$ac_useropt"
+"*) ;;
+      *) ac_unrecognized_opts="$ac_unrecognized_opts$ac_unrecognized_sep--without-$ac_useropt_orig"
+	 ac_unrecognized_sep=', ';;
+    esac
+    eval with_$ac_useropt=no ;;
+
+  --x)
+    # Obsolete; use --with-x.
+    with_x=yes ;;
+
+  -x-includes | --x-includes | --x-include | --x-includ | --x-inclu \
+  | --x-incl | --x-inc | --x-in | --x-i)
+    ac_prev=x_includes ;;
+  -x-includes=* | --x-includes=* | --x-include=* | --x-includ=* | --x-inclu=* \
+  | --x-incl=* | --x-inc=* | --x-in=* | --x-i=*)
+    x_includes=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -x-libraries | --x-libraries | --x-librarie | --x-librari \
+  | --x-librar | --x-libra | --x-libr | --x-lib | --x-li | --x-l)
+    ac_prev=x_libraries ;;
+  -x-libraries=* | --x-libraries=* | --x-librarie=* | --x-librari=* \
+  | --x-librar=* | --x-libra=* | --x-libr=* | --x-lib=* | --x-li=* | --x-l=*)
+    x_libraries=$ac_optarg ;;
+
+  -*) as_fn_error $? "unrecognized option: \`$ac_option'
+Try \`$0 --help' for more information"
+    ;;
+
+  *=*)
+    ac_envvar=`expr "x$ac_option" : 'x\([^=]*\)='`
+    # Reject names that are not valid shell variable names.
+    case $ac_envvar in #(
+      '' | [0-9]* | *[!_$as_cr_alnum]* )
+      as_fn_error $? "invalid variable name: \`$ac_envvar'" ;;
+    esac
+    eval $ac_envvar=\$ac_optarg
+    export $ac_envvar ;;
+
+  *)
+    # FIXME: should be removed in autoconf 3.0.
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: you should use --build, --host, --target" >&2
+    expr "x$ac_option" : ".*[^-._$as_cr_alnum]" >/dev/null &&
+      printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: invalid host type: $ac_option" >&2
+    : "${build_alias=$ac_option} ${host_alias=$ac_option} ${target_alias=$ac_option}"
+    ;;
+
+  esac
+done
+
+if test -n "$ac_prev"; then
+  ac_option=--`echo $ac_prev | sed 's/_/-/g'`
+  as_fn_error $? "missing argument to $ac_option"
+fi
+
+if test -n "$ac_unrecognized_opts"; then
+  case $enable_option_checking in
+    no) ;;
+    fatal) as_fn_error $? "unrecognized options: $ac_unrecognized_opts" ;;
+    *)     printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: unrecognized options: $ac_unrecognized_opts" >&2 ;;
+  esac
+fi
+
+# Check all directory arguments for consistency.
+for ac_var in	exec_prefix prefix bindir sbindir libexecdir datarootdir \
+		datadir sysconfdir sharedstatedir localstatedir includedir \
+		oldincludedir docdir infodir htmldir dvidir pdfdir psdir \
+		libdir localedir mandir runstatedir
+do
+  eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
+  # Remove trailing slashes.
+  case $ac_val in
+    */ )
+      ac_val=`expr "X$ac_val" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)' \| "X$ac_val" : 'X\(.*\)'`
+      eval $ac_var=\$ac_val;;
+  esac
+  # Be sure to have absolute directory names.
+  case $ac_val in
+    [\\/$]* | ?:[\\/]* )  continue;;
+    NONE | '' ) case $ac_var in *prefix ) continue;; esac;;
+  esac
+  as_fn_error $? "expected an absolute directory name for --$ac_var: $ac_val"
+done
+
+# There might be people who depend on the old broken behavior: `$host'
+# used to hold the argument of --host etc.
+# FIXME: To remove some day.
+build=$build_alias
+host=$host_alias
+target=$target_alias
+
+# FIXME: To remove some day.
+if test "x$host_alias" != x; then
+  if test "x$build_alias" = x; then
+    cross_compiling=maybe
+  elif test "x$build_alias" != "x$host_alias"; then
+    cross_compiling=yes
+  fi
+fi
+
+ac_tool_prefix=
+test -n "$host_alias" && ac_tool_prefix=$host_alias-
+
+test "$silent" = yes && exec 6>/dev/null
+
+
+ac_pwd=`pwd` && test -n "$ac_pwd" &&
+ac_ls_di=`ls -di .` &&
+ac_pwd_ls_di=`cd "$ac_pwd" && ls -di .` ||
+  as_fn_error $? "working directory cannot be determined"
+test "X$ac_ls_di" = "X$ac_pwd_ls_di" ||
+  as_fn_error $? "pwd does not report name of working directory"
+
+
+# Find the source files, if location was not specified.
+if test -z "$srcdir"; then
+  ac_srcdir_defaulted=yes
+  # Try the directory containing this script, then the parent directory.
+  ac_confdir=`$as_dirname -- "$as_myself" ||
+$as_expr X"$as_myself" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)//*[^/][^/]*/*$' \| \
+	 X"$as_myself" : 'X\(//\)[^/]' \| \
+	 X"$as_myself" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
+	 X"$as_myself" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
+printf "%s\n" X"$as_myself" |
+    sed '/^X\(.*[^/]\)\/\/*[^/][^/]*\/*$/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  /^X\(\/\/\)[^/].*/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  /^X\(\/\/\)$/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  /^X\(\/\).*/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  s/.*/./; q'`
+  srcdir=$ac_confdir
+  if test ! -r "$srcdir/$ac_unique_file"; then
+    srcdir=..
+  fi
+else
+  ac_srcdir_defaulted=no
+fi
+if test ! -r "$srcdir/$ac_unique_file"; then
+  test "$ac_srcdir_defaulted" = yes && srcdir="$ac_confdir or .."
+  as_fn_error $? "cannot find sources ($ac_unique_file) in $srcdir"
+fi
+ac_msg="sources are in $srcdir, but \`cd $srcdir' does not work"
+ac_abs_confdir=`(
+	cd "$srcdir" && test -r "./$ac_unique_file" || as_fn_error $? "$ac_msg"
+	pwd)`
+# When building in place, set srcdir=.
+if test "$ac_abs_confdir" = "$ac_pwd"; then
+  srcdir=.
+fi
+# Remove unnecessary trailing slashes from srcdir.
+# Double slashes in file names in object file debugging info
+# mess up M-x gdb in Emacs.
+case $srcdir in
+*/) srcdir=`expr "X$srcdir" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)' \| "X$srcdir" : 'X\(.*\)'`;;
+esac
+for ac_var in $ac_precious_vars; do
+  eval ac_env_${ac_var}_set=\${${ac_var}+set}
+  eval ac_env_${ac_var}_value=\$${ac_var}
+  eval ac_cv_env_${ac_var}_set=\${${ac_var}+set}
+  eval ac_cv_env_${ac_var}_value=\$${ac_var}
+done
+
+#
+# Report the --help message.
+#
+if test "$ac_init_help" = "long"; then
+  # Omit some internal or obsolete options to make the list less imposing.
+  # This message is too long to be a string in the A/UX 3.1 sh.
+  cat <<_ACEOF
+\`configure' configures OpenSSH Portable to adapt to many kinds of systems.
+
+Usage: $0 [OPTION]... [VAR=VALUE]...
+
+To assign environment variables (e.g., CC, CFLAGS...), specify them as
+VAR=VALUE.  See below for descriptions of some of the useful variables.
+
+Defaults for the options are specified in brackets.
+
+Configuration:
+  -h, --help              display this help and exit
+      --help=short        display options specific to this package
+      --help=recursive    display the short help of all the included packages
+  -V, --version           display version information and exit
+  -q, --quiet, --silent   do not print \`checking ...' messages
+      --cache-file=FILE   cache test results in FILE [disabled]
+  -C, --config-cache      alias for \`--cache-file=config.cache'
+  -n, --no-create         do not create output files
+      --srcdir=DIR        find the sources in DIR [configure dir or \`..']
+
+Installation directories:
+  --prefix=PREFIX         install architecture-independent files in PREFIX
+                          [$ac_default_prefix]
+  --exec-prefix=EPREFIX   install architecture-dependent files in EPREFIX
+                          [PREFIX]
+
+By default, \`make install' will install all the files in
+\`$ac_default_prefix/bin', \`$ac_default_prefix/lib' etc.  You can specify
+an installation prefix other than \`$ac_default_prefix' using \`--prefix',
+for instance \`--prefix=\$HOME'.
+
+For better control, use the options below.
+
+Fine tuning of the installation directories:
+  --bindir=DIR            user executables [EPREFIX/bin]
+  --sbindir=DIR           system admin executables [EPREFIX/sbin]
+  --libexecdir=DIR        program executables [EPREFIX/libexec]
+  --sysconfdir=DIR        read-only single-machine data [PREFIX/etc]
+  --sharedstatedir=DIR    modifiable architecture-independent data [PREFIX/com]
+  --localstatedir=DIR     modifiable single-machine data [PREFIX/var]
+  --runstatedir=DIR       modifiable per-process data [LOCALSTATEDIR/run]
+  --libdir=DIR            object code libraries [EPREFIX/lib]
+  --includedir=DIR        C header files [PREFIX/include]
+  --oldincludedir=DIR     C header files for non-gcc [/usr/include]
+  --datarootdir=DIR       read-only arch.-independent data root [PREFIX/share]
+  --datadir=DIR           read-only architecture-independent data [DATAROOTDIR]
+  --infodir=DIR           info documentation [DATAROOTDIR/info]
+  --localedir=DIR         locale-dependent data [DATAROOTDIR/locale]
+  --mandir=DIR            man documentation [DATAROOTDIR/man]
+  --docdir=DIR            documentation root [DATAROOTDIR/doc/openssh]
+  --htmldir=DIR           html documentation [DOCDIR]
+  --dvidir=DIR            dvi documentation [DOCDIR]
+  --pdfdir=DIR            pdf documentation [DOCDIR]
+  --psdir=DIR             ps documentation [DOCDIR]
+_ACEOF
+
+  cat <<\_ACEOF
+
+System types:
+  --build=BUILD     configure for building on BUILD [guessed]
+  --host=HOST       cross-compile to build programs to run on HOST [BUILD]
+_ACEOF
+fi
+
+if test -n "$ac_init_help"; then
+  case $ac_init_help in
+     short | recursive ) echo "Configuration of OpenSSH Portable:";;
+   esac
+  cat <<\_ACEOF
+
+Optional Features:
+  --disable-option-checking  ignore unrecognized --enable/--with options
+  --disable-FEATURE       do not include FEATURE (same as --enable-FEATURE=no)
+  --enable-FEATURE[=ARG]  include FEATURE [ARG=yes]
+  --disable-largefile     omit support for large files
+  --disable-pkcs11        disable PKCS#11 support code [no]
+  --disable-security-key  disable U2F/FIDO support code no
+  --disable-strip         Disable calling strip(1) on install
+  --disable-etc-default-login Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login no
+  --disable-lastlog       disable use of lastlog even if detected no
+  --disable-utmp          disable use of utmp even if detected no
+  --disable-utmpx         disable use of utmpx even if detected no
+  --disable-wtmp          disable use of wtmp even if detected no
+  --disable-wtmpx         disable use of wtmpx even if detected no
+  --disable-libutil       disable use of libutil (login() etc.) no
+  --disable-pututline     disable use of pututline() etc. (uwtmp) no
+  --disable-pututxline    disable use of pututxline() etc. (uwtmpx) no
+
+Optional Packages:
+  --with-PACKAGE[=ARG]    use PACKAGE [ARG=yes]
+  --without-PACKAGE       do not use PACKAGE (same as --with-PACKAGE=no)
+  --without-openssl       Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL**
+  --without-stackprotect  Don't use compiler's stack protection
+  --without-hardening     Don't use toolchain hardening flags
+  --without-rpath         Disable auto-added -R linker paths
+  --with-cflags           Specify additional flags to pass to compiler
+  --with-cflags-after     Specify additional flags to pass to compiler after configure
+  --with-cppflags         Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor
+  --with-ldflags          Specify additional flags to pass to linker
+  --with-ldflags-after    Specify additional flags to pass to linker after configure
+  --with-libs             Specify additional libraries to link with
+  --with-Werror           Build main code with -Werror
+  --with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)
+  --with-solaris-projects Enable Solaris projects (experimental)
+  --with-solaris-privs    Enable Solaris/Illumos privileges (experimental)
+  --with-osfsia           Enable Digital Unix SIA
+  --with-zlib=PATH        Use zlib in PATH
+  --without-zlib-version-check Disable zlib version check
+  --with-ldns[=PATH]      Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)
+  --with-libedit[=PATH]   Enable libedit support for sftp
+  --with-audit=module     Enable audit support (modules=debug,bsm,linux)
+  --with-pie              Build Position Independent Executables if possible
+  --with-security-key-builtin include builtin U2F/FIDO support
+  --with-ssl-dir=PATH     Specify path to OpenSSL installation
+  --without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check
+  --with-ssl-engine       Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support
+  --with-prngd-port=PORT  read entropy from PRNGD/EGD TCP localhost:PORT
+  --with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)
+  --with-pam              Enable PAM support
+  --with-pam-service=name Specify PAM service name
+  --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation
+  --with-sandbox=style    Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, capsicum, darwin, rlimit, seccomp_filter, systrace, pledge)
+  --with-selinux          Enable SELinux support
+  --with-kerberos5=PATH   Enable Kerberos 5 support
+  --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)
+  --with-xauth=PATH       Specify path to xauth program
+  --with-maildir=/path/to/mail    Specify your system mail directory
+  --with-mantype=man|cat|doc  Set man page type
+  --without-shadow        Disable shadow password support
+  --with-ipaddr-display   Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY
+  --with-default-path=    Specify default $PATH environment for server
+  --with-superuser-path=  Specify different path for super-user
+  --with-4in6             Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses
+  --with-bsd-auth         Enable BSD auth support
+  --with-pid-dir=PATH     Specify location of sshd.pid file
+  --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location common locations
+
+Some influential environment variables:
+  CC          C compiler command
+  CFLAGS      C compiler flags
+  LDFLAGS     linker flags, e.g. -L<lib dir> if you have libraries in a
+              nonstandard directory <lib dir>
+  LIBS        libraries to pass to the linker, e.g. -l<library>
+  CPPFLAGS    (Objective) C/C++ preprocessor flags, e.g. -I<include dir> if
+              you have headers in a nonstandard directory <include dir>
+  CPP         C preprocessor
+
+Use these variables to override the choices made by `configure' or to help
+it to find libraries and programs with nonstandard names/locations.
+
+Report bugs to <openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org>.
+_ACEOF
+ac_status=$?
+fi
+
+if test "$ac_init_help" = "recursive"; then
+  # If there are subdirs, report their specific --help.
+  for ac_dir in : $ac_subdirs_all; do test "x$ac_dir" = x: && continue
+    test -d "$ac_dir" ||
+      { cd "$srcdir" && ac_pwd=`pwd` && srcdir=. && test -d "$ac_dir"; } ||
+      continue
+    ac_builddir=.
+
+case "$ac_dir" in
+.) ac_dir_suffix= ac_top_builddir_sub=. ac_top_build_prefix= ;;
+*)
+  ac_dir_suffix=/`printf "%s\n" "$ac_dir" | sed 's|^\.[\\/]||'`
+  # A ".." for each directory in $ac_dir_suffix.
+  ac_top_builddir_sub=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_dir_suffix" | sed 's|/[^\\/]*|/..|g;s|/||'`
+  case $ac_top_builddir_sub in
+  "") ac_top_builddir_sub=. ac_top_build_prefix= ;;
+  *)  ac_top_build_prefix=$ac_top_builddir_sub/ ;;
+  esac ;;
+esac
+ac_abs_top_builddir=$ac_pwd
+ac_abs_builddir=$ac_pwd$ac_dir_suffix
+# for backward compatibility:
+ac_top_builddir=$ac_top_build_prefix
+
+case $srcdir in
+  .)  # We are building in place.
+    ac_srcdir=.
+    ac_top_srcdir=$ac_top_builddir_sub
+    ac_abs_top_srcdir=$ac_pwd ;;
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]* )  # Absolute name.
+    ac_srcdir=$srcdir$ac_dir_suffix;
+    ac_top_srcdir=$srcdir
+    ac_abs_top_srcdir=$srcdir ;;
+  *) # Relative name.
+    ac_srcdir=$ac_top_build_prefix$srcdir$ac_dir_suffix
+    ac_top_srcdir=$ac_top_build_prefix$srcdir
+    ac_abs_top_srcdir=$ac_pwd/$srcdir ;;
+esac
+ac_abs_srcdir=$ac_abs_top_srcdir$ac_dir_suffix
+
+    cd "$ac_dir" || { ac_status=$?; continue; }
+    # Check for configure.gnu first; this name is used for a wrapper for
+    # Metaconfig's "Configure" on case-insensitive file systems.
+    if test -f "$ac_srcdir/configure.gnu"; then
+      echo &&
+      $SHELL "$ac_srcdir/configure.gnu" --help=recursive
+    elif test -f "$ac_srcdir/configure"; then
+      echo &&
+      $SHELL "$ac_srcdir/configure" --help=recursive
+    else
+      printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: no configuration information is in $ac_dir" >&2
+    fi || ac_status=$?
+    cd "$ac_pwd" || { ac_status=$?; break; }
+  done
+fi
+
+test -n "$ac_init_help" && exit $ac_status
+if $ac_init_version; then
+  cat <<\_ACEOF
+OpenSSH configure Portable
+generated by GNU Autoconf 2.71
+
+Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+This configure script is free software; the Free Software Foundation
+gives unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it.
+_ACEOF
+  exit
+fi
+
+## ------------------------ ##
+## Autoconf initialization. ##
+## ------------------------ ##
+
+# ac_fn_c_try_compile LINENO
+# --------------------------
+# Try to compile conftest.$ac_ext, and return whether this succeeded.
+ac_fn_c_try_compile ()
+{
+  as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
+  rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam
+  if { { ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+  *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+  *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
+  (eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.err
+  ac_status=$?
+  if test -s conftest.err; then
+    grep -v '^ *+' conftest.err >conftest.er1
+    cat conftest.er1 >&5
+    mv -f conftest.er1 conftest.err
+  fi
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+  test $ac_status = 0; } && {
+	 test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+	 test ! -s conftest.err
+       } && test -s conftest.$ac_objext
+then :
+  ac_retval=0
+else $as_nop
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+	ac_retval=1
+fi
+  eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
+  as_fn_set_status $ac_retval
+
+} # ac_fn_c_try_compile
+
+# ac_fn_c_try_run LINENO
+# ----------------------
+# Try to run conftest.$ac_ext, and return whether this succeeded. Assumes that
+# executables *can* be run.
+ac_fn_c_try_run ()
+{
+  as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
+  if { { ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+  *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+  *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
+  (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+  ac_status=$?
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+  test $ac_status = 0; } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
+  { { case "(($ac_try" in
+  *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+  *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
+  (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+  ac_status=$?
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+  test $ac_status = 0; }; }
+then :
+  ac_retval=0
+else $as_nop
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me: program exited with status $ac_status" >&5
+       printf "%s\n" "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+       ac_retval=$ac_status
+fi
+  rm -rf conftest.dSYM conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo
+  eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
+  as_fn_set_status $ac_retval
+
+} # ac_fn_c_try_run
+
+# ac_fn_c_check_header_compile LINENO HEADER VAR INCLUDES
+# -------------------------------------------------------
+# Tests whether HEADER exists and can be compiled using the include files in
+# INCLUDES, setting the cache variable VAR accordingly.
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile ()
+{
+  as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $2" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $2... " >&6; }
+if eval test \${$3+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+$4
+#include <$2>
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  eval "$3=yes"
+else $as_nop
+  eval "$3=no"
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+eval ac_res=\$$3
+	       { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_res" >&6; }
+  eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
+
+} # ac_fn_c_check_header_compile
+
+# ac_fn_c_try_cpp LINENO
+# ----------------------
+# Try to preprocess conftest.$ac_ext, and return whether this succeeded.
+ac_fn_c_try_cpp ()
+{
+  as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
+  if { { ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+  *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+  *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
+  (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.err
+  ac_status=$?
+  if test -s conftest.err; then
+    grep -v '^ *+' conftest.err >conftest.er1
+    cat conftest.er1 >&5
+    mv -f conftest.er1 conftest.err
+  fi
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+  test $ac_status = 0; } > conftest.i && {
+	 test -z "$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+	 test ! -s conftest.err
+       }
+then :
+  ac_retval=0
+else $as_nop
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+    ac_retval=1
+fi
+  eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
+  as_fn_set_status $ac_retval
+
+} # ac_fn_c_try_cpp
+
+# ac_fn_check_decl LINENO SYMBOL VAR INCLUDES EXTRA-OPTIONS FLAG-VAR
+# ------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Tests whether SYMBOL is declared in INCLUDES, setting cache variable VAR
+# accordingly. Pass EXTRA-OPTIONS to the compiler, using FLAG-VAR.
+ac_fn_check_decl ()
+{
+  as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
+  as_decl_name=`echo $2|sed 's/ *(.*//'`
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether $as_decl_name is declared" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether $as_decl_name is declared... " >&6; }
+if eval test \${$3+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  as_decl_use=`echo $2|sed -e 's/(/((/' -e 's/)/) 0&/' -e 's/,/) 0& (/g'`
+  eval ac_save_FLAGS=\$$6
+  as_fn_append $6 " $5"
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+$4
+int
+main (void)
+{
+#ifndef $as_decl_name
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+  (void) $as_decl_use;
+#else
+  (void) $as_decl_name;
+#endif
+#endif
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  eval "$3=yes"
+else $as_nop
+  eval "$3=no"
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+  eval $6=\$ac_save_FLAGS
+
+fi
+eval ac_res=\$$3
+	       { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_res" >&6; }
+  eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
+
+} # ac_fn_check_decl
+
+# ac_fn_c_try_link LINENO
+# -----------------------
+# Try to link conftest.$ac_ext, and return whether this succeeded.
+ac_fn_c_try_link ()
+{
+  as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
+  rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest$ac_exeext
+  if { { ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+  *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+  *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
+  (eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.err
+  ac_status=$?
+  if test -s conftest.err; then
+    grep -v '^ *+' conftest.err >conftest.er1
+    cat conftest.er1 >&5
+    mv -f conftest.er1 conftest.err
+  fi
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+  test $ac_status = 0; } && {
+	 test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
+	 test ! -s conftest.err
+       } && test -s conftest$ac_exeext && {
+	 test "$cross_compiling" = yes ||
+	 test -x conftest$ac_exeext
+       }
+then :
+  ac_retval=0
+else $as_nop
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+	ac_retval=1
+fi
+  # Delete the IPA/IPO (Inter Procedural Analysis/Optimization) information
+  # created by the PGI compiler (conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo), as it would
+  # interfere with the next link command; also delete a directory that is
+  # left behind by Apple's compiler.  We do this before executing the actions.
+  rm -rf conftest.dSYM conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo
+  eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
+  as_fn_set_status $ac_retval
+
+} # ac_fn_c_try_link
+
+# ac_fn_c_check_func LINENO FUNC VAR
+# ----------------------------------
+# Tests whether FUNC exists, setting the cache variable VAR accordingly
+ac_fn_c_check_func ()
+{
+  as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $2" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $2... " >&6; }
+if eval test \${$3+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+/* Define $2 to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $2.
+   For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday.  */
+#define $2 innocuous_$2
+
+/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
+   which can conflict with char $2 (); below.  */
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#undef $2
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char $2 ();
+/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
+    to always fail with ENOSYS.  Some functions are actually named
+    something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias.  */
+#if defined __stub_$2 || defined __stub___$2
+choke me
+#endif
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return $2 ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  eval "$3=yes"
+else $as_nop
+  eval "$3=no"
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+eval ac_res=\$$3
+	       { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_res" >&6; }
+  eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
+
+} # ac_fn_c_check_func
+
+# ac_fn_c_check_type LINENO TYPE VAR INCLUDES
+# -------------------------------------------
+# Tests whether TYPE exists after having included INCLUDES, setting cache
+# variable VAR accordingly.
+ac_fn_c_check_type ()
+{
+  as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $2" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $2... " >&6; }
+if eval test \${$3+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  eval "$3=no"
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+$4
+int
+main (void)
+{
+if (sizeof ($2))
+	 return 0;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+$4
+int
+main (void)
+{
+if (sizeof (($2)))
+	    return 0;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  eval "$3=yes"
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+eval ac_res=\$$3
+	       { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_res" >&6; }
+  eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
+
+} # ac_fn_c_check_type
+
+# ac_fn_c_check_member LINENO AGGR MEMBER VAR INCLUDES
+# ----------------------------------------------------
+# Tries to find if the field MEMBER exists in type AGGR, after including
+# INCLUDES, setting cache variable VAR accordingly.
+ac_fn_c_check_member ()
+{
+  as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $2.$3" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $2.$3... " >&6; }
+if eval test \${$4+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+$5
+int
+main (void)
+{
+static $2 ac_aggr;
+if (ac_aggr.$3)
+return 0;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  eval "$4=yes"
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+$5
+int
+main (void)
+{
+static $2 ac_aggr;
+if (sizeof ac_aggr.$3)
+return 0;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  eval "$4=yes"
+else $as_nop
+  eval "$4=no"
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+eval ac_res=\$$4
+	       { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_res" >&6; }
+  eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
+
+} # ac_fn_c_check_member
+
+# ac_fn_c_compute_int LINENO EXPR VAR INCLUDES
+# --------------------------------------------
+# Tries to find the compile-time value of EXPR in a program that includes
+# INCLUDES, setting VAR accordingly. Returns whether the value could be
+# computed
+ac_fn_c_compute_int ()
+{
+  as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
+  if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
+    # Depending upon the size, compute the lo and hi bounds.
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+$4
+int
+main (void)
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) >= 0)];
+test_array [0] = 0;
+return test_array [0];
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_lo=0 ac_mid=0
+  while :; do
+    cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+$4
+int
+main (void)
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) <= $ac_mid)];
+test_array [0] = 0;
+return test_array [0];
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_hi=$ac_mid; break
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_arith $ac_mid + 1 && ac_lo=$as_val
+			if test $ac_lo -le $ac_mid; then
+			  ac_lo= ac_hi=
+			  break
+			fi
+			as_fn_arith 2 '*' $ac_mid + 1 && ac_mid=$as_val
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+  done
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+$4
+int
+main (void)
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) < 0)];
+test_array [0] = 0;
+return test_array [0];
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_hi=-1 ac_mid=-1
+  while :; do
+    cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+$4
+int
+main (void)
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) >= $ac_mid)];
+test_array [0] = 0;
+return test_array [0];
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_lo=$ac_mid; break
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_arith '(' $ac_mid ')' - 1 && ac_hi=$as_val
+			if test $ac_mid -le $ac_hi; then
+			  ac_lo= ac_hi=
+			  break
+			fi
+			as_fn_arith 2 '*' $ac_mid && ac_mid=$as_val
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+  done
+else $as_nop
+  ac_lo= ac_hi=
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+# Binary search between lo and hi bounds.
+while test "x$ac_lo" != "x$ac_hi"; do
+  as_fn_arith '(' $ac_hi - $ac_lo ')' / 2 + $ac_lo && ac_mid=$as_val
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+$4
+int
+main (void)
+{
+static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) <= $ac_mid)];
+test_array [0] = 0;
+return test_array [0];
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_hi=$ac_mid
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_arith '(' $ac_mid ')' + 1 && ac_lo=$as_val
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+done
+case $ac_lo in #((
+?*) eval "$3=\$ac_lo"; ac_retval=0 ;;
+'') ac_retval=1 ;;
+esac
+  else
+    cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+$4
+static long int longval (void) { return $2; }
+static unsigned long int ulongval (void) { return $2; }
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+  FILE *f = fopen ("conftest.val", "w");
+  if (! f)
+    return 1;
+  if (($2) < 0)
+    {
+      long int i = longval ();
+      if (i != ($2))
+	return 1;
+      fprintf (f, "%ld", i);
+    }
+  else
+    {
+      unsigned long int i = ulongval ();
+      if (i != ($2))
+	return 1;
+      fprintf (f, "%lu", i);
+    }
+  /* Do not output a trailing newline, as this causes \r\n confusion
+     on some platforms.  */
+  return ferror (f) || fclose (f) != 0;
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  echo >>conftest.val; read $3 <conftest.val; ac_retval=0
+else $as_nop
+  ac_retval=1
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+rm -f conftest.val
+
+  fi
+  eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
+  as_fn_set_status $ac_retval
+
+} # ac_fn_c_compute_int
+ac_configure_args_raw=
+for ac_arg
+do
+  case $ac_arg in
+  *\'*)
+    ac_arg=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_arg" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"` ;;
+  esac
+  as_fn_append ac_configure_args_raw " '$ac_arg'"
+done
+
+case $ac_configure_args_raw in
+  *$as_nl*)
+    ac_safe_unquote= ;;
+  *)
+    ac_unsafe_z='|&;<>()$`\\"*?[ ''	' # This string ends in space, tab.
+    ac_unsafe_a="$ac_unsafe_z#~"
+    ac_safe_unquote="s/ '\\([^$ac_unsafe_a][^$ac_unsafe_z]*\\)'/ \\1/g"
+    ac_configure_args_raw=`      printf "%s\n" "$ac_configure_args_raw" | sed "$ac_safe_unquote"`;;
+esac
+
+cat >config.log <<_ACEOF
+This file contains any messages produced by compilers while
+running configure, to aid debugging if configure makes a mistake.
+
+It was created by OpenSSH $as_me Portable, which was
+generated by GNU Autoconf 2.71.  Invocation command line was
+
+  $ $0$ac_configure_args_raw
+
+_ACEOF
+exec 5>>config.log
+{
+cat <<_ASUNAME
+## --------- ##
+## Platform. ##
+## --------- ##
+
+hostname = `(hostname || uname -n) 2>/dev/null | sed 1q`
+uname -m = `(uname -m) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -r = `(uname -r) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -s = `(uname -s) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+uname -v = `(uname -v) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+
+/usr/bin/uname -p = `(/usr/bin/uname -p) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+/bin/uname -X     = `(/bin/uname -X) 2>/dev/null     || echo unknown`
+
+/bin/arch              = `(/bin/arch) 2>/dev/null              || echo unknown`
+/usr/bin/arch -k       = `(/usr/bin/arch -k) 2>/dev/null       || echo unknown`
+/usr/convex/getsysinfo = `(/usr/convex/getsysinfo) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
+/usr/bin/hostinfo      = `(/usr/bin/hostinfo) 2>/dev/null      || echo unknown`
+/bin/machine           = `(/bin/machine) 2>/dev/null           || echo unknown`
+/usr/bin/oslevel       = `(/usr/bin/oslevel) 2>/dev/null       || echo unknown`
+/bin/universe          = `(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null          || echo unknown`
+
+_ASUNAME
+
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    printf "%s\n" "PATH: $as_dir"
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+} >&5
+
+cat >&5 <<_ACEOF
+
+
+## ----------- ##
+## Core tests. ##
+## ----------- ##
+
+_ACEOF
+
+
+# Keep a trace of the command line.
+# Strip out --no-create and --no-recursion so they do not pile up.
+# Strip out --silent because we don't want to record it for future runs.
+# Also quote any args containing shell meta-characters.
+# Make two passes to allow for proper duplicate-argument suppression.
+ac_configure_args=
+ac_configure_args0=
+ac_configure_args1=
+ac_must_keep_next=false
+for ac_pass in 1 2
+do
+  for ac_arg
+  do
+    case $ac_arg in
+    -no-create | --no-c* | -n | -no-recursion | --no-r*) continue ;;
+    -q | -quiet | --quiet | --quie | --qui | --qu | --q \
+    | -silent | --silent | --silen | --sile | --sil)
+      continue ;;
+    *\'*)
+      ac_arg=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_arg" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"` ;;
+    esac
+    case $ac_pass in
+    1) as_fn_append ac_configure_args0 " '$ac_arg'" ;;
+    2)
+      as_fn_append ac_configure_args1 " '$ac_arg'"
+      if test $ac_must_keep_next = true; then
+	ac_must_keep_next=false # Got value, back to normal.
+      else
+	case $ac_arg in
+	  *=* | --config-cache | -C | -disable-* | --disable-* \
+	  | -enable-* | --enable-* | -gas | --g* | -nfp | --nf* \
+	  | -q | -quiet | --q* | -silent | --sil* | -v | -verb* \
+	  | -with-* | --with-* | -without-* | --without-* | --x)
+	    case "$ac_configure_args0 " in
+	      "$ac_configure_args1"*" '$ac_arg' "* ) continue ;;
+	    esac
+	    ;;
+	  -* ) ac_must_keep_next=true ;;
+	esac
+      fi
+      as_fn_append ac_configure_args " '$ac_arg'"
+      ;;
+    esac
+  done
+done
+{ ac_configure_args0=; unset ac_configure_args0;}
+{ ac_configure_args1=; unset ac_configure_args1;}
+
+# When interrupted or exit'd, cleanup temporary files, and complete
+# config.log.  We remove comments because anyway the quotes in there
+# would cause problems or look ugly.
+# WARNING: Use '\'' to represent an apostrophe within the trap.
+# WARNING: Do not start the trap code with a newline, due to a FreeBSD 4.0 bug.
+trap 'exit_status=$?
+  # Sanitize IFS.
+  IFS=" ""	$as_nl"
+  # Save into config.log some information that might help in debugging.
+  {
+    echo
+
+    printf "%s\n" "## ---------------- ##
+## Cache variables. ##
+## ---------------- ##"
+    echo
+    # The following way of writing the cache mishandles newlines in values,
+(
+  for ac_var in `(set) 2>&1 | sed -n '\''s/^\([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)=.*/\1/p'\''`; do
+    eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
+    case $ac_val in #(
+    *${as_nl}*)
+      case $ac_var in #(
+      *_cv_*) { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cache variable $ac_var contains a newline" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cache variable $ac_var contains a newline" >&2;} ;;
+      esac
+      case $ac_var in #(
+      _ | IFS | as_nl) ;; #(
+      BASH_ARGV | BASH_SOURCE) eval $ac_var= ;; #(
+      *) { eval $ac_var=; unset $ac_var;} ;;
+      esac ;;
+    esac
+  done
+  (set) 2>&1 |
+    case $as_nl`(ac_space='\'' '\''; set) 2>&1` in #(
+    *${as_nl}ac_space=\ *)
+      sed -n \
+	"s/'\''/'\''\\\\'\'''\''/g;
+	  s/^\\([_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*\\)=\\(.*\\)/\\1='\''\\2'\''/p"
+      ;; #(
+    *)
+      sed -n "/^[_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*=/p"
+      ;;
+    esac |
+    sort
+)
+    echo
+
+    printf "%s\n" "## ----------------- ##
+## Output variables. ##
+## ----------------- ##"
+    echo
+    for ac_var in $ac_subst_vars
+    do
+      eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
+      case $ac_val in
+      *\'\''*) ac_val=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_val" | sed "s/'\''/'\''\\\\\\\\'\'''\''/g"`;;
+      esac
+      printf "%s\n" "$ac_var='\''$ac_val'\''"
+    done | sort
+    echo
+
+    if test -n "$ac_subst_files"; then
+      printf "%s\n" "## ------------------- ##
+## File substitutions. ##
+## ------------------- ##"
+      echo
+      for ac_var in $ac_subst_files
+      do
+	eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
+	case $ac_val in
+	*\'\''*) ac_val=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_val" | sed "s/'\''/'\''\\\\\\\\'\'''\''/g"`;;
+	esac
+	printf "%s\n" "$ac_var='\''$ac_val'\''"
+      done | sort
+      echo
+    fi
+
+    if test -s confdefs.h; then
+      printf "%s\n" "## ----------- ##
+## confdefs.h. ##
+## ----------- ##"
+      echo
+      cat confdefs.h
+      echo
+    fi
+    test "$ac_signal" != 0 &&
+      printf "%s\n" "$as_me: caught signal $ac_signal"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me: exit $exit_status"
+  } >&5
+  rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* &&
+    rm -f -r conftest* confdefs* conf$$* $ac_clean_files &&
+    exit $exit_status
+' 0
+for ac_signal in 1 2 13 15; do
+  trap 'ac_signal='$ac_signal'; as_fn_exit 1' $ac_signal
+done
+ac_signal=0
+
+# confdefs.h avoids OS command line length limits that DEFS can exceed.
+rm -f -r conftest* confdefs.h
+
+printf "%s\n" "/* confdefs.h */" > confdefs.h
+
+# Predefined preprocessor variables.
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define PACKAGE_NAME \"$PACKAGE_NAME\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define PACKAGE_TARNAME \"$PACKAGE_TARNAME\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define PACKAGE_VERSION \"$PACKAGE_VERSION\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define PACKAGE_STRING \"$PACKAGE_STRING\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define PACKAGE_BUGREPORT \"$PACKAGE_BUGREPORT\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define PACKAGE_URL \"$PACKAGE_URL\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+# Let the site file select an alternate cache file if it wants to.
+# Prefer an explicitly selected file to automatically selected ones.
+if test -n "$CONFIG_SITE"; then
+  ac_site_files="$CONFIG_SITE"
+elif test "x$prefix" != xNONE; then
+  ac_site_files="$prefix/share/config.site $prefix/etc/config.site"
+else
+  ac_site_files="$ac_default_prefix/share/config.site $ac_default_prefix/etc/config.site"
+fi
+
+for ac_site_file in $ac_site_files
+do
+  case $ac_site_file in #(
+  */*) :
+     ;; #(
+  *) :
+    ac_site_file=./$ac_site_file ;;
+esac
+  if test -f "$ac_site_file" && test -r "$ac_site_file"; then
+    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: loading site script $ac_site_file" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: loading site script $ac_site_file" >&6;}
+    sed 's/^/| /' "$ac_site_file" >&5
+    . "$ac_site_file" \
+      || { { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
+as_fn_error $? "failed to load site script $ac_site_file
+See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
+  fi
+done
+
+if test -r "$cache_file"; then
+  # Some versions of bash will fail to source /dev/null (special files
+  # actually), so we avoid doing that.  DJGPP emulates it as a regular file.
+  if test /dev/null != "$cache_file" && test -f "$cache_file"; then
+    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: loading cache $cache_file" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: loading cache $cache_file" >&6;}
+    case $cache_file in
+      [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]* ) . "$cache_file";;
+      *)                      . "./$cache_file";;
+    esac
+  fi
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: creating cache $cache_file" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: creating cache $cache_file" >&6;}
+  >$cache_file
+fi
+
+# Test code for whether the C compiler supports C89 (global declarations)
+ac_c_conftest_c89_globals='
+/* Does the compiler advertise C89 conformance?
+   Do not test the value of __STDC__, because some compilers set it to 0
+   while being otherwise adequately conformant. */
+#if !defined __STDC__
+# error "Compiler does not advertise C89 conformance"
+#endif
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+struct stat;
+/* Most of the following tests are stolen from RCS 5.7 src/conf.sh.  */
+struct buf { int x; };
+struct buf * (*rcsopen) (struct buf *, struct stat *, int);
+static char *e (p, i)
+     char **p;
+     int i;
+{
+  return p[i];
+}
+static char *f (char * (*g) (char **, int), char **p, ...)
+{
+  char *s;
+  va_list v;
+  va_start (v,p);
+  s = g (p, va_arg (v,int));
+  va_end (v);
+  return s;
+}
+
+/* OSF 4.0 Compaq cc is some sort of almost-ANSI by default.  It has
+   function prototypes and stuff, but not \xHH hex character constants.
+   These do not provoke an error unfortunately, instead are silently treated
+   as an "x".  The following induces an error, until -std is added to get
+   proper ANSI mode.  Curiously \x00 != x always comes out true, for an
+   array size at least.  It is necessary to write \x00 == 0 to get something
+   that is true only with -std.  */
+int osf4_cc_array ['\''\x00'\'' == 0 ? 1 : -1];
+
+/* IBM C 6 for AIX is almost-ANSI by default, but it replaces macro parameters
+   inside strings and character constants.  */
+#define FOO(x) '\''x'\''
+int xlc6_cc_array[FOO(a) == '\''x'\'' ? 1 : -1];
+
+int test (int i, double x);
+struct s1 {int (*f) (int a);};
+struct s2 {int (*f) (double a);};
+int pairnames (int, char **, int *(*)(struct buf *, struct stat *, int),
+               int, int);'
+
+# Test code for whether the C compiler supports C89 (body of main).
+ac_c_conftest_c89_main='
+ok |= (argc == 0 || f (e, argv, 0) != argv[0] || f (e, argv, 1) != argv[1]);
+'
+
+# Test code for whether the C compiler supports C99 (global declarations)
+ac_c_conftest_c99_globals='
+// Does the compiler advertise C99 conformance?
+#if !defined __STDC_VERSION__ || __STDC_VERSION__ < 199901L
+# error "Compiler does not advertise C99 conformance"
+#endif
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+extern int puts (const char *);
+extern int printf (const char *, ...);
+extern int dprintf (int, const char *, ...);
+extern void *malloc (size_t);
+
+// Check varargs macros.  These examples are taken from C99 6.10.3.5.
+// dprintf is used instead of fprintf to avoid needing to declare
+// FILE and stderr.
+#define debug(...) dprintf (2, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define showlist(...) puts (#__VA_ARGS__)
+#define report(test,...) ((test) ? puts (#test) : printf (__VA_ARGS__))
+static void
+test_varargs_macros (void)
+{
+  int x = 1234;
+  int y = 5678;
+  debug ("Flag");
+  debug ("X = %d\n", x);
+  showlist (The first, second, and third items.);
+  report (x>y, "x is %d but y is %d", x, y);
+}
+
+// Check long long types.
+#define BIG64 18446744073709551615ull
+#define BIG32 4294967295ul
+#define BIG_OK (BIG64 / BIG32 == 4294967297ull && BIG64 % BIG32 == 0)
+#if !BIG_OK
+  #error "your preprocessor is broken"
+#endif
+#if BIG_OK
+#else
+  #error "your preprocessor is broken"
+#endif
+static long long int bignum = -9223372036854775807LL;
+static unsigned long long int ubignum = BIG64;
+
+struct incomplete_array
+{
+  int datasize;
+  double data[];
+};
+
+struct named_init {
+  int number;
+  const wchar_t *name;
+  double average;
+};
+
+typedef const char *ccp;
+
+static inline int
+test_restrict (ccp restrict text)
+{
+  // See if C++-style comments work.
+  // Iterate through items via the restricted pointer.
+  // Also check for declarations in for loops.
+  for (unsigned int i = 0; *(text+i) != '\''\0'\''; ++i)
+    continue;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+// Check varargs and va_copy.
+static bool
+test_varargs (const char *format, ...)
+{
+  va_list args;
+  va_start (args, format);
+  va_list args_copy;
+  va_copy (args_copy, args);
+
+  const char *str = "";
+  int number = 0;
+  float fnumber = 0;
+
+  while (*format)
+    {
+      switch (*format++)
+	{
+	case '\''s'\'': // string
+	  str = va_arg (args_copy, const char *);
+	  break;
+	case '\''d'\'': // int
+	  number = va_arg (args_copy, int);
+	  break;
+	case '\''f'\'': // float
+	  fnumber = va_arg (args_copy, double);
+	  break;
+	default:
+	  break;
+	}
+    }
+  va_end (args_copy);
+  va_end (args);
+
+  return *str && number && fnumber;
+}
+'
+
+# Test code for whether the C compiler supports C99 (body of main).
+ac_c_conftest_c99_main='
+  // Check bool.
+  _Bool success = false;
+  success |= (argc != 0);
+
+  // Check restrict.
+  if (test_restrict ("String literal") == 0)
+    success = true;
+  char *restrict newvar = "Another string";
+
+  // Check varargs.
+  success &= test_varargs ("s, d'\'' f .", "string", 65, 34.234);
+  test_varargs_macros ();
+
+  // Check flexible array members.
+  struct incomplete_array *ia =
+    malloc (sizeof (struct incomplete_array) + (sizeof (double) * 10));
+  ia->datasize = 10;
+  for (int i = 0; i < ia->datasize; ++i)
+    ia->data[i] = i * 1.234;
+
+  // Check named initializers.
+  struct named_init ni = {
+    .number = 34,
+    .name = L"Test wide string",
+    .average = 543.34343,
+  };
+
+  ni.number = 58;
+
+  int dynamic_array[ni.number];
+  dynamic_array[0] = argv[0][0];
+  dynamic_array[ni.number - 1] = 543;
+
+  // work around unused variable warnings
+  ok |= (!success || bignum == 0LL || ubignum == 0uLL || newvar[0] == '\''x'\''
+	 || dynamic_array[ni.number - 1] != 543);
+'
+
+# Test code for whether the C compiler supports C11 (global declarations)
+ac_c_conftest_c11_globals='
+// Does the compiler advertise C11 conformance?
+#if !defined __STDC_VERSION__ || __STDC_VERSION__ < 201112L
+# error "Compiler does not advertise C11 conformance"
+#endif
+
+// Check _Alignas.
+char _Alignas (double) aligned_as_double;
+char _Alignas (0) no_special_alignment;
+extern char aligned_as_int;
+char _Alignas (0) _Alignas (int) aligned_as_int;
+
+// Check _Alignof.
+enum
+{
+  int_alignment = _Alignof (int),
+  int_array_alignment = _Alignof (int[100]),
+  char_alignment = _Alignof (char)
+};
+_Static_assert (0 < -_Alignof (int), "_Alignof is signed");
+
+// Check _Noreturn.
+int _Noreturn does_not_return (void) { for (;;) continue; }
+
+// Check _Static_assert.
+struct test_static_assert
+{
+  int x;
+  _Static_assert (sizeof (int) <= sizeof (long int),
+                  "_Static_assert does not work in struct");
+  long int y;
+};
+
+// Check UTF-8 literals.
+#define u8 syntax error!
+char const utf8_literal[] = u8"happens to be ASCII" "another string";
+
+// Check duplicate typedefs.
+typedef long *long_ptr;
+typedef long int *long_ptr;
+typedef long_ptr long_ptr;
+
+// Anonymous structures and unions -- taken from C11 6.7.2.1 Example 1.
+struct anonymous
+{
+  union {
+    struct { int i; int j; };
+    struct { int k; long int l; } w;
+  };
+  int m;
+} v1;
+'
+
+# Test code for whether the C compiler supports C11 (body of main).
+ac_c_conftest_c11_main='
+  _Static_assert ((offsetof (struct anonymous, i)
+		   == offsetof (struct anonymous, w.k)),
+		  "Anonymous union alignment botch");
+  v1.i = 2;
+  v1.w.k = 5;
+  ok |= v1.i != 5;
+'
+
+# Test code for whether the C compiler supports C11 (complete).
+ac_c_conftest_c11_program="${ac_c_conftest_c89_globals}
+${ac_c_conftest_c99_globals}
+${ac_c_conftest_c11_globals}
+
+int
+main (int argc, char **argv)
+{
+  int ok = 0;
+  ${ac_c_conftest_c89_main}
+  ${ac_c_conftest_c99_main}
+  ${ac_c_conftest_c11_main}
+  return ok;
+}
+"
+
+# Test code for whether the C compiler supports C99 (complete).
+ac_c_conftest_c99_program="${ac_c_conftest_c89_globals}
+${ac_c_conftest_c99_globals}
+
+int
+main (int argc, char **argv)
+{
+  int ok = 0;
+  ${ac_c_conftest_c89_main}
+  ${ac_c_conftest_c99_main}
+  return ok;
+}
+"
+
+# Test code for whether the C compiler supports C89 (complete).
+ac_c_conftest_c89_program="${ac_c_conftest_c89_globals}
+
+int
+main (int argc, char **argv)
+{
+  int ok = 0;
+  ${ac_c_conftest_c89_main}
+  return ok;
+}
+"
+
+as_fn_append ac_header_c_list " stdio.h stdio_h HAVE_STDIO_H"
+as_fn_append ac_header_c_list " stdlib.h stdlib_h HAVE_STDLIB_H"
+as_fn_append ac_header_c_list " string.h string_h HAVE_STRING_H"
+as_fn_append ac_header_c_list " inttypes.h inttypes_h HAVE_INTTYPES_H"
+as_fn_append ac_header_c_list " stdint.h stdint_h HAVE_STDINT_H"
+as_fn_append ac_header_c_list " strings.h strings_h HAVE_STRINGS_H"
+as_fn_append ac_header_c_list " sys/stat.h sys_stat_h HAVE_SYS_STAT_H"
+as_fn_append ac_header_c_list " sys/types.h sys_types_h HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H"
+as_fn_append ac_header_c_list " unistd.h unistd_h HAVE_UNISTD_H"
+
+# Auxiliary files required by this configure script.
+ac_aux_files="install-sh config.guess config.sub"
+
+# Locations in which to look for auxiliary files.
+ac_aux_dir_candidates="${srcdir}${PATH_SEPARATOR}${srcdir}/..${PATH_SEPARATOR}${srcdir}/../.."
+
+# Search for a directory containing all of the required auxiliary files,
+# $ac_aux_files, from the $PATH-style list $ac_aux_dir_candidates.
+# If we don't find one directory that contains all the files we need,
+# we report the set of missing files from the *first* directory in
+# $ac_aux_dir_candidates and give up.
+ac_missing_aux_files=""
+ac_first_candidate=:
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: looking for aux files: $ac_aux_files" >&5
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+as_found=false
+for as_dir in $ac_aux_dir_candidates
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+  as_found=:
+
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}:  trying $as_dir" >&5
+  ac_aux_dir_found=yes
+  ac_install_sh=
+  for ac_aux in $ac_aux_files
+  do
+    # As a special case, if "install-sh" is required, that requirement
+    # can be satisfied by any of "install-sh", "install.sh", or "shtool",
+    # and $ac_install_sh is set appropriately for whichever one is found.
+    if test x"$ac_aux" = x"install-sh"
+    then
+      if test -f "${as_dir}install-sh"; then
+        printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}:   ${as_dir}install-sh found" >&5
+        ac_install_sh="${as_dir}install-sh -c"
+      elif test -f "${as_dir}install.sh"; then
+        printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}:   ${as_dir}install.sh found" >&5
+        ac_install_sh="${as_dir}install.sh -c"
+      elif test -f "${as_dir}shtool"; then
+        printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}:   ${as_dir}shtool found" >&5
+        ac_install_sh="${as_dir}shtool install -c"
+      else
+        ac_aux_dir_found=no
+        if $ac_first_candidate; then
+          ac_missing_aux_files="${ac_missing_aux_files} install-sh"
+        else
+          break
+        fi
+      fi
+    else
+      if test -f "${as_dir}${ac_aux}"; then
+        printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}:   ${as_dir}${ac_aux} found" >&5
+      else
+        ac_aux_dir_found=no
+        if $ac_first_candidate; then
+          ac_missing_aux_files="${ac_missing_aux_files} ${ac_aux}"
+        else
+          break
+        fi
+      fi
+    fi
+  done
+  if test "$ac_aux_dir_found" = yes; then
+    ac_aux_dir="$as_dir"
+    break
+  fi
+  ac_first_candidate=false
+
+  as_found=false
+done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+if $as_found
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_error $? "cannot find required auxiliary files:$ac_missing_aux_files" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+# These three variables are undocumented and unsupported,
+# and are intended to be withdrawn in a future Autoconf release.
+# They can cause serious problems if a builder's source tree is in a directory
+# whose full name contains unusual characters.
+if test -f "${ac_aux_dir}config.guess"; then
+  ac_config_guess="$SHELL ${ac_aux_dir}config.guess"
+fi
+if test -f "${ac_aux_dir}config.sub"; then
+  ac_config_sub="$SHELL ${ac_aux_dir}config.sub"
+fi
+if test -f "$ac_aux_dir/configure"; then
+  ac_configure="$SHELL ${ac_aux_dir}configure"
+fi
+
+# Check that the precious variables saved in the cache have kept the same
+# value.
+ac_cache_corrupted=false
+for ac_var in $ac_precious_vars; do
+  eval ac_old_set=\$ac_cv_env_${ac_var}_set
+  eval ac_new_set=\$ac_env_${ac_var}_set
+  eval ac_old_val=\$ac_cv_env_${ac_var}_value
+  eval ac_new_val=\$ac_env_${ac_var}_value
+  case $ac_old_set,$ac_new_set in
+    set,)
+      { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: \`$ac_var' was set to \`$ac_old_val' in the previous run" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: \`$ac_var' was set to \`$ac_old_val' in the previous run" >&2;}
+      ac_cache_corrupted=: ;;
+    ,set)
+      { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: \`$ac_var' was not set in the previous run" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: \`$ac_var' was not set in the previous run" >&2;}
+      ac_cache_corrupted=: ;;
+    ,);;
+    *)
+      if test "x$ac_old_val" != "x$ac_new_val"; then
+	# differences in whitespace do not lead to failure.
+	ac_old_val_w=`echo x $ac_old_val`
+	ac_new_val_w=`echo x $ac_new_val`
+	if test "$ac_old_val_w" != "$ac_new_val_w"; then
+	  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: \`$ac_var' has changed since the previous run:" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: \`$ac_var' has changed since the previous run:" >&2;}
+	  ac_cache_corrupted=:
+	else
+	  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: warning: ignoring whitespace changes in \`$ac_var' since the previous run:" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: warning: ignoring whitespace changes in \`$ac_var' since the previous run:" >&2;}
+	  eval $ac_var=\$ac_old_val
+	fi
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}:   former value:  \`$ac_old_val'" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me:   former value:  \`$ac_old_val'" >&2;}
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}:   current value: \`$ac_new_val'" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me:   current value: \`$ac_new_val'" >&2;}
+      fi;;
+  esac
+  # Pass precious variables to config.status.
+  if test "$ac_new_set" = set; then
+    case $ac_new_val in
+    *\'*) ac_arg=$ac_var=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_new_val" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"` ;;
+    *) ac_arg=$ac_var=$ac_new_val ;;
+    esac
+    case " $ac_configure_args " in
+      *" '$ac_arg' "*) ;; # Avoid dups.  Use of quotes ensures accuracy.
+      *) as_fn_append ac_configure_args " '$ac_arg'" ;;
+    esac
+  fi
+done
+if $ac_cache_corrupted; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: changes in the environment can compromise the build" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: changes in the environment can compromise the build" >&2;}
+  as_fn_error $? "run \`${MAKE-make} distclean' and/or \`rm $cache_file'
+	    and start over" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+## -------------------- ##
+## Main body of script. ##
+## -------------------- ##
+
+ac_ext=c
+ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
+ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
+ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
+ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
+
+
+
+
+
+# Check for stale configure as early as possible.
+for i in $srcdir/configure.ac $srcdir/m4/*.m4; do
+	if test "$i" -nt "$srcdir/configure"; then
+		as_fn_error $? "$i newer than configure, run autoreconf" "$LINENO" 5
+	fi
+done
+
+ac_ext=c
+ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
+ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
+ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
+ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
+
+
+ac_config_headers="$ac_config_headers config.h"
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ac_ext=c
+ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
+ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
+ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
+ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
+if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
+  for ac_prog in cc gcc clang
+  do
+    # Extract the first word of "$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_prog_CC+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if test -n "$CC"; then
+  ac_cv_prog_CC="$CC" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_prog_CC="$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+CC=$ac_cv_prog_CC
+if test -n "$CC"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CC" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$CC" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+    test -n "$CC" && break
+  done
+fi
+if test -z "$CC"; then
+  ac_ct_CC=$CC
+  for ac_prog in cc gcc clang
+do
+  # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if test -n "$ac_ct_CC"; then
+  ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC="$ac_ct_CC" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC="$ac_prog"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+ac_ct_CC=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC
+if test -n "$ac_ct_CC"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_CC" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_ct_CC" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+  test -n "$ac_ct_CC" && break
+done
+
+  if test "x$ac_ct_CC" = x; then
+    CC=""
+  else
+    case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
+yes:)
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
+ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
+esac
+    CC=$ac_ct_CC
+  fi
+fi
+
+
+test -z "$CC" && { { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
+as_fn_error $? "no acceptable C compiler found in \$PATH
+See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
+
+# Provide some information about the compiler.
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for C compiler version" >&5
+set X $ac_compile
+ac_compiler=$2
+for ac_option in --version -v -V -qversion -version; do
+  { { ac_try="$ac_compiler $ac_option >&5"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+  *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+  *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
+  (eval "$ac_compiler $ac_option >&5") 2>conftest.err
+  ac_status=$?
+  if test -s conftest.err; then
+    sed '10a\
+... rest of stderr output deleted ...
+         10q' conftest.err >conftest.er1
+    cat conftest.er1 >&5
+  fi
+  rm -f conftest.er1 conftest.err
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+  test $ac_status = 0; }
+done
+
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+ac_clean_files_save=$ac_clean_files
+ac_clean_files="$ac_clean_files a.out a.out.dSYM a.exe b.out"
+# Try to create an executable without -o first, disregard a.out.
+# It will help us diagnose broken compilers, and finding out an intuition
+# of exeext.
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether the C compiler works" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether the C compiler works... " >&6; }
+ac_link_default=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_link" | sed 's/ -o *conftest[^ ]*//'`
+
+# The possible output files:
+ac_files="a.out conftest.exe conftest a.exe a_out.exe b.out conftest.*"
+
+ac_rmfiles=
+for ac_file in $ac_files
+do
+  case $ac_file in
+    *.$ac_ext | *.xcoff | *.tds | *.d | *.pdb | *.xSYM | *.bb | *.bbg | *.map | *.inf | *.dSYM | *.o | *.obj ) ;;
+    * ) ac_rmfiles="$ac_rmfiles $ac_file";;
+  esac
+done
+rm -f $ac_rmfiles
+
+if { { ac_try="$ac_link_default"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+  *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+  *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
+  (eval "$ac_link_default") 2>&5
+  ac_status=$?
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+  test $ac_status = 0; }
+then :
+  # Autoconf-2.13 could set the ac_cv_exeext variable to `no'.
+# So ignore a value of `no', otherwise this would lead to `EXEEXT = no'
+# in a Makefile.  We should not override ac_cv_exeext if it was cached,
+# so that the user can short-circuit this test for compilers unknown to
+# Autoconf.
+for ac_file in $ac_files ''
+do
+  test -f "$ac_file" || continue
+  case $ac_file in
+    *.$ac_ext | *.xcoff | *.tds | *.d | *.pdb | *.xSYM | *.bb | *.bbg | *.map | *.inf | *.dSYM | *.o | *.obj )
+	;;
+    [ab].out )
+	# We found the default executable, but exeext='' is most
+	# certainly right.
+	break;;
+    *.* )
+	if test ${ac_cv_exeext+y} && test "$ac_cv_exeext" != no;
+	then :; else
+	   ac_cv_exeext=`expr "$ac_file" : '[^.]*\(\..*\)'`
+	fi
+	# We set ac_cv_exeext here because the later test for it is not
+	# safe: cross compilers may not add the suffix if given an `-o'
+	# argument, so we may need to know it at that point already.
+	# Even if this section looks crufty: it has the advantage of
+	# actually working.
+	break;;
+    * )
+	break;;
+  esac
+done
+test "$ac_cv_exeext" = no && ac_cv_exeext=
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_file=''
+fi
+if test -z "$ac_file"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+{ { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
+as_fn_error 77 "C compiler cannot create executables
+See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for C compiler default output file name" >&5
+printf %s "checking for C compiler default output file name... " >&6; }
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_file" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_file" >&6; }
+ac_exeext=$ac_cv_exeext
+
+rm -f -r a.out a.out.dSYM a.exe conftest$ac_cv_exeext b.out
+ac_clean_files=$ac_clean_files_save
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for suffix of executables" >&5
+printf %s "checking for suffix of executables... " >&6; }
+if { { ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+  *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+  *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
+  (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+  ac_status=$?
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+  test $ac_status = 0; }
+then :
+  # If both `conftest.exe' and `conftest' are `present' (well, observable)
+# catch `conftest.exe'.  For instance with Cygwin, `ls conftest' will
+# work properly (i.e., refer to `conftest.exe'), while it won't with
+# `rm'.
+for ac_file in conftest.exe conftest conftest.*; do
+  test -f "$ac_file" || continue
+  case $ac_file in
+    *.$ac_ext | *.xcoff | *.tds | *.d | *.pdb | *.xSYM | *.bb | *.bbg | *.map | *.inf | *.dSYM | *.o | *.obj ) ;;
+    *.* ) ac_cv_exeext=`expr "$ac_file" : '[^.]*\(\..*\)'`
+	  break;;
+    * ) break;;
+  esac
+done
+else $as_nop
+  { { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
+as_fn_error $? "cannot compute suffix of executables: cannot compile and link
+See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
+fi
+rm -f conftest conftest$ac_cv_exeext
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_exeext" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_exeext" >&6; }
+
+rm -f conftest.$ac_ext
+EXEEXT=$ac_cv_exeext
+ac_exeext=$EXEEXT
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <stdio.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+FILE *f = fopen ("conftest.out", "w");
+ return ferror (f) || fclose (f) != 0;
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+ac_clean_files="$ac_clean_files conftest.out"
+# Check that the compiler produces executables we can run.  If not, either
+# the compiler is broken, or we cross compile.
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are cross compiling" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether we are cross compiling... " >&6; }
+if test "$cross_compiling" != yes; then
+  { { ac_try="$ac_link"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+  *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+  *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
+  (eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
+  ac_status=$?
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+  test $ac_status = 0; }
+  if { ac_try='./conftest$ac_cv_exeext'
+  { { case "(($ac_try" in
+  *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+  *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
+  (eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
+  ac_status=$?
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+  test $ac_status = 0; }; }; then
+    cross_compiling=no
+  else
+    if test "$cross_compiling" = maybe; then
+	cross_compiling=yes
+    else
+	{ { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
+as_fn_error 77 "cannot run C compiled programs.
+If you meant to cross compile, use \`--host'.
+See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
+    fi
+  fi
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $cross_compiling" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$cross_compiling" >&6; }
+
+rm -f conftest.$ac_ext conftest$ac_cv_exeext conftest.out
+ac_clean_files=$ac_clean_files_save
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for suffix of object files" >&5
+printf %s "checking for suffix of object files... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_objext+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+rm -f conftest.o conftest.obj
+if { { ac_try="$ac_compile"
+case "(($ac_try" in
+  *\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
+  *) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
+esac
+eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
+  (eval "$ac_compile") 2>&5
+  ac_status=$?
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+  test $ac_status = 0; }
+then :
+  for ac_file in conftest.o conftest.obj conftest.*; do
+  test -f "$ac_file" || continue;
+  case $ac_file in
+    *.$ac_ext | *.xcoff | *.tds | *.d | *.pdb | *.xSYM | *.bb | *.bbg | *.map | *.inf | *.dSYM ) ;;
+    *) ac_cv_objext=`expr "$ac_file" : '.*\.\(.*\)'`
+       break;;
+  esac
+done
+else $as_nop
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
+sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
+
+{ { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
+as_fn_error $? "cannot compute suffix of object files: cannot compile
+See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
+fi
+rm -f conftest.$ac_cv_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_objext" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_objext" >&6; }
+OBJEXT=$ac_cv_objext
+ac_objext=$OBJEXT
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether the compiler supports GNU C" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether the compiler supports GNU C... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+#ifndef __GNUC__
+       choke me
+#endif
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_compiler_gnu=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_compiler_gnu=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu=$ac_compiler_gnu
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu" >&6; }
+ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
+
+if test $ac_compiler_gnu = yes; then
+  GCC=yes
+else
+  GCC=
+fi
+ac_test_CFLAGS=${CFLAGS+y}
+ac_save_CFLAGS=$CFLAGS
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether $CC accepts -g" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether $CC accepts -g... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_prog_cc_g+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_save_c_werror_flag=$ac_c_werror_flag
+   ac_c_werror_flag=yes
+   ac_cv_prog_cc_g=no
+   CFLAGS="-g"
+   cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_prog_cc_g=yes
+else $as_nop
+  CFLAGS=""
+      cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_c_werror_flag=$ac_save_c_werror_flag
+	 CFLAGS="-g"
+	 cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_prog_cc_g=yes
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+   ac_c_werror_flag=$ac_save_c_werror_flag
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_prog_cc_g" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_prog_cc_g" >&6; }
+if test $ac_test_CFLAGS; then
+  CFLAGS=$ac_save_CFLAGS
+elif test $ac_cv_prog_cc_g = yes; then
+  if test "$GCC" = yes; then
+    CFLAGS="-g -O2"
+  else
+    CFLAGS="-g"
+  fi
+else
+  if test "$GCC" = yes; then
+    CFLAGS="-O2"
+  else
+    CFLAGS=
+  fi
+fi
+ac_prog_cc_stdc=no
+if test x$ac_prog_cc_stdc = xno
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $CC option to enable C11 features" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $CC option to enable C11 features... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_prog_cc_c11+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_prog_cc_c11=no
+ac_save_CC=$CC
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+$ac_c_conftest_c11_program
+_ACEOF
+for ac_arg in '' -std=gnu11
+do
+  CC="$ac_save_CC $ac_arg"
+  if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_prog_cc_c11=$ac_arg
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam
+  test "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c11" != "xno" && break
+done
+rm -f conftest.$ac_ext
+CC=$ac_save_CC
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c11" = xno
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: unsupported" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "unsupported" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+  if test "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c11" = x
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: none needed" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "none needed" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_prog_cc_c11" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_prog_cc_c11" >&6; }
+     CC="$CC $ac_cv_prog_cc_c11"
+fi
+  ac_cv_prog_cc_stdc=$ac_cv_prog_cc_c11
+  ac_prog_cc_stdc=c11
+fi
+fi
+if test x$ac_prog_cc_stdc = xno
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $CC option to enable C99 features" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $CC option to enable C99 features... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_prog_cc_c99+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_prog_cc_c99=no
+ac_save_CC=$CC
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+$ac_c_conftest_c99_program
+_ACEOF
+for ac_arg in '' -std=gnu99 -std=c99 -c99 -qlanglvl=extc1x -qlanglvl=extc99 -AC99 -D_STDC_C99=
+do
+  CC="$ac_save_CC $ac_arg"
+  if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_prog_cc_c99=$ac_arg
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam
+  test "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c99" != "xno" && break
+done
+rm -f conftest.$ac_ext
+CC=$ac_save_CC
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c99" = xno
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: unsupported" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "unsupported" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+  if test "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c99" = x
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: none needed" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "none needed" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_prog_cc_c99" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_prog_cc_c99" >&6; }
+     CC="$CC $ac_cv_prog_cc_c99"
+fi
+  ac_cv_prog_cc_stdc=$ac_cv_prog_cc_c99
+  ac_prog_cc_stdc=c99
+fi
+fi
+if test x$ac_prog_cc_stdc = xno
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $CC option to enable C89 features" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $CC option to enable C89 features... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_prog_cc_c89+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_prog_cc_c89=no
+ac_save_CC=$CC
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+$ac_c_conftest_c89_program
+_ACEOF
+for ac_arg in '' -qlanglvl=extc89 -qlanglvl=ansi -std -Ae "-Aa -D_HPUX_SOURCE" "-Xc -D__EXTENSIONS__"
+do
+  CC="$ac_save_CC $ac_arg"
+  if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_prog_cc_c89=$ac_arg
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam
+  test "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" != "xno" && break
+done
+rm -f conftest.$ac_ext
+CC=$ac_save_CC
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" = xno
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: unsupported" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "unsupported" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+  if test "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" = x
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: none needed" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "none needed" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" >&6; }
+     CC="$CC $ac_cv_prog_cc_c89"
+fi
+  ac_cv_prog_cc_stdc=$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89
+  ac_prog_cc_stdc=c89
+fi
+fi
+
+ac_ext=c
+ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
+ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
+ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
+ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
+
+
+# XXX relax this after reimplementing logit() etc.
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports C99-style variadic macros" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports C99-style variadic macros... " >&6; }
+
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+int f(int a, int b, int c) { return a + b + c; }
+#define F(a, ...) f(a, __VA_ARGS__)
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return F(1, 2, -3);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+   as_fn_error $? "*** OpenSSH requires support for C99-style variadic macros" "$LINENO" 5
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+
+
+
+  # Make sure we can run config.sub.
+$SHELL "${ac_aux_dir}config.sub" sun4 >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
+  as_fn_error $? "cannot run $SHELL ${ac_aux_dir}config.sub" "$LINENO" 5
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking build system type" >&5
+printf %s "checking build system type... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_build+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_build_alias=$build_alias
+test "x$ac_build_alias" = x &&
+  ac_build_alias=`$SHELL "${ac_aux_dir}config.guess"`
+test "x$ac_build_alias" = x &&
+  as_fn_error $? "cannot guess build type; you must specify one" "$LINENO" 5
+ac_cv_build=`$SHELL "${ac_aux_dir}config.sub" $ac_build_alias` ||
+  as_fn_error $? "$SHELL ${ac_aux_dir}config.sub $ac_build_alias failed" "$LINENO" 5
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_build" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_build" >&6; }
+case $ac_cv_build in
+*-*-*) ;;
+*) as_fn_error $? "invalid value of canonical build" "$LINENO" 5;;
+esac
+build=$ac_cv_build
+ac_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS='-'
+set x $ac_cv_build
+shift
+build_cpu=$1
+build_vendor=$2
+shift; shift
+# Remember, the first character of IFS is used to create $*,
+# except with old shells:
+build_os=$*
+IFS=$ac_save_IFS
+case $build_os in *\ *) build_os=`echo "$build_os" | sed 's/ /-/g'`;; esac
+
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking host system type" >&5
+printf %s "checking host system type... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_host+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if test "x$host_alias" = x; then
+  ac_cv_host=$ac_cv_build
+else
+  ac_cv_host=`$SHELL "${ac_aux_dir}config.sub" $host_alias` ||
+    as_fn_error $? "$SHELL ${ac_aux_dir}config.sub $host_alias failed" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_host" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_host" >&6; }
+case $ac_cv_host in
+*-*-*) ;;
+*) as_fn_error $? "invalid value of canonical host" "$LINENO" 5;;
+esac
+host=$ac_cv_host
+ac_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS='-'
+set x $ac_cv_host
+shift
+host_cpu=$1
+host_vendor=$2
+shift; shift
+# Remember, the first character of IFS is used to create $*,
+# except with old shells:
+host_os=$*
+IFS=$ac_save_IFS
+case $host_os in *\ *) host_os=`echo "$host_os" | sed 's/ /-/g'`;; esac
+
+
+ac_header= ac_cache=
+for ac_item in $ac_header_c_list
+do
+  if test $ac_cache; then
+    ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" $ac_header ac_cv_header_$ac_cache "$ac_includes_default"
+    if eval test \"x\$ac_cv_header_$ac_cache\" = xyes; then
+      printf "%s\n" "#define $ac_item 1" >> confdefs.h
+    fi
+    ac_header= ac_cache=
+  elif test $ac_header; then
+    ac_cache=$ac_item
+  else
+    ac_header=$ac_item
+  fi
+done
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+if test $ac_cv_header_stdlib_h = yes && test $ac_cv_header_string_h = yes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define STDC_HEADERS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether byte ordering is bigendian" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether byte ordering is bigendian... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_c_bigendian+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_c_bigendian=unknown
+    # See if we're dealing with a universal compiler.
+    cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#ifndef __APPLE_CC__
+	       not a universal capable compiler
+	     #endif
+	     typedef int dummy;
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+	# Check for potential -arch flags.  It is not universal unless
+	# there are at least two -arch flags with different values.
+	ac_arch=
+	ac_prev=
+	for ac_word in $CC $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS; do
+	 if test -n "$ac_prev"; then
+	   case $ac_word in
+	     i?86 | x86_64 | ppc | ppc64)
+	       if test -z "$ac_arch" || test "$ac_arch" = "$ac_word"; then
+		 ac_arch=$ac_word
+	       else
+		 ac_cv_c_bigendian=universal
+		 break
+	       fi
+	       ;;
+	   esac
+	   ac_prev=
+	 elif test "x$ac_word" = "x-arch"; then
+	   ac_prev=arch
+	 fi
+       done
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+    if test $ac_cv_c_bigendian = unknown; then
+      # See if sys/param.h defines the BYTE_ORDER macro.
+      cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+	     #include <sys/param.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+#if ! (defined BYTE_ORDER && defined BIG_ENDIAN \
+		     && defined LITTLE_ENDIAN && BYTE_ORDER && BIG_ENDIAN \
+		     && LITTLE_ENDIAN)
+	      bogus endian macros
+	     #endif
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  # It does; now see whether it defined to BIG_ENDIAN or not.
+	 cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+		#include <sys/param.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+#if BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN
+		 not big endian
+		#endif
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_c_bigendian=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+    fi
+    if test $ac_cv_c_bigendian = unknown; then
+      # See if <limits.h> defines _LITTLE_ENDIAN or _BIG_ENDIAN (e.g., Solaris).
+      cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <limits.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+#if ! (defined _LITTLE_ENDIAN || defined _BIG_ENDIAN)
+	      bogus endian macros
+	     #endif
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  # It does; now see whether it defined to _BIG_ENDIAN or not.
+	 cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <limits.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+#ifndef _BIG_ENDIAN
+		 not big endian
+		#endif
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_c_bigendian=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+    fi
+    if test $ac_cv_c_bigendian = unknown; then
+      # Compile a test program.
+      if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+  # Try to guess by grepping values from an object file.
+	 cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+unsigned short int ascii_mm[] =
+		  { 0x4249, 0x4765, 0x6E44, 0x6961, 0x6E53, 0x7953, 0 };
+		unsigned short int ascii_ii[] =
+		  { 0x694C, 0x5454, 0x656C, 0x6E45, 0x6944, 0x6E61, 0 };
+		int use_ascii (int i) {
+		  return ascii_mm[i] + ascii_ii[i];
+		}
+		unsigned short int ebcdic_ii[] =
+		  { 0x89D3, 0xE3E3, 0x8593, 0x95C5, 0x89C4, 0x9581, 0 };
+		unsigned short int ebcdic_mm[] =
+		  { 0xC2C9, 0xC785, 0x95C4, 0x8981, 0x95E2, 0xA8E2, 0 };
+		int use_ebcdic (int i) {
+		  return ebcdic_mm[i] + ebcdic_ii[i];
+		}
+		extern int foo;
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return use_ascii (foo) == use_ebcdic (foo);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  if grep BIGenDianSyS conftest.$ac_objext >/dev/null; then
+	      ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
+	    fi
+	    if grep LiTTleEnDian conftest.$ac_objext >/dev/null ; then
+	      if test "$ac_cv_c_bigendian" = unknown; then
+		ac_cv_c_bigendian=no
+	      else
+		# finding both strings is unlikely to happen, but who knows?
+		ac_cv_c_bigendian=unknown
+	      fi
+	    fi
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+$ac_includes_default
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	     /* Are we little or big endian?  From Harbison&Steele.  */
+	     union
+	     {
+	       long int l;
+	       char c[sizeof (long int)];
+	     } u;
+	     u.l = 1;
+	     return u.c[sizeof (long int) - 1] == 1;
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_c_bigendian=no
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+    fi
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_c_bigendian" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_c_bigendian" >&6; }
+ case $ac_cv_c_bigendian in #(
+   yes)
+     printf "%s\n" "#define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1" >>confdefs.h
+;; #(
+   no)
+      ;; #(
+   universal)
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+     ;; #(
+   *)
+     as_fn_error $? "unknown endianness
+ presetting ac_cv_c_bigendian=no (or yes) will help" "$LINENO" 5 ;;
+ esac
+
+
+# Checks for programs.
+for ac_prog in gawk mawk nawk awk
+do
+  # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_prog_AWK+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if test -n "$AWK"; then
+  ac_cv_prog_AWK="$AWK" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_prog_AWK="$ac_prog"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+AWK=$ac_cv_prog_AWK
+if test -n "$AWK"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $AWK" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$AWK" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+  test -n "$AWK" && break
+done
+
+ac_ext=c
+ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
+ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
+ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
+ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking how to run the C preprocessor" >&5
+printf %s "checking how to run the C preprocessor... " >&6; }
+# On Suns, sometimes $CPP names a directory.
+if test -n "$CPP" && test -d "$CPP"; then
+  CPP=
+fi
+if test -z "$CPP"; then
+  if test ${ac_cv_prog_CPP+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+      # Double quotes because $CC needs to be expanded
+    for CPP in "$CC -E" "$CC -E -traditional-cpp" cpp /lib/cpp
+    do
+      ac_preproc_ok=false
+for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes
+do
+  # Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc
+  # with a fresh cross-compiler works.
+  # On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser,
+  # not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case.
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <limits.h>
+		     Syntax error
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  # Broken: fails on valid input.
+continue
+fi
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
+
+  # OK, works on sane cases.  Now check whether nonexistent headers
+  # can be detected and how.
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <ac_nonexistent.h>
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"
+then :
+  # Broken: success on invalid input.
+continue
+else $as_nop
+  # Passes both tests.
+ac_preproc_ok=:
+break
+fi
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
+
+done
+# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped.
+rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+if $ac_preproc_ok
+then :
+  break
+fi
+
+    done
+    ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP
+
+fi
+  CPP=$ac_cv_prog_CPP
+else
+  ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CPP" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$CPP" >&6; }
+ac_preproc_ok=false
+for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes
+do
+  # Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc
+  # with a fresh cross-compiler works.
+  # On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser,
+  # not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case.
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <limits.h>
+		     Syntax error
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  # Broken: fails on valid input.
+continue
+fi
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
+
+  # OK, works on sane cases.  Now check whether nonexistent headers
+  # can be detected and how.
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <ac_nonexistent.h>
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"
+then :
+  # Broken: success on invalid input.
+continue
+else $as_nop
+  # Passes both tests.
+ac_preproc_ok=:
+break
+fi
+rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
+
+done
+# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped.
+rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
+if $ac_preproc_ok
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  { { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
+as_fn_error $? "C preprocessor \"$CPP\" fails sanity check
+See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
+fi
+
+ac_ext=c
+ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
+ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
+ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
+ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
+
+if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
+  # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_prog_RANLIB+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if test -n "$RANLIB"; then
+  ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="$RANLIB" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+RANLIB=$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB
+if test -n "$RANLIB"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $RANLIB" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$RANLIB" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+fi
+if test -z "$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB"; then
+  ac_ct_RANLIB=$RANLIB
+  # Extract the first word of "ranlib", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ranlib; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then
+  ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="$ac_ct_RANLIB" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="ranlib"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+ac_ct_RANLIB=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB
+if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_RANLIB" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_ct_RANLIB" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+  if test "x$ac_ct_RANLIB" = x; then
+    RANLIB=":"
+  else
+    case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
+yes:)
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
+ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
+esac
+    RANLIB=$ac_ct_RANLIB
+  fi
+else
+  RANLIB="$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB"
+fi
+
+
+  # Find a good install program.  We prefer a C program (faster),
+# so one script is as good as another.  But avoid the broken or
+# incompatible versions:
+# SysV /etc/install, /usr/sbin/install
+# SunOS /usr/etc/install
+# IRIX /sbin/install
+# AIX /bin/install
+# AmigaOS /C/install, which installs bootblocks on floppy discs
+# AIX 4 /usr/bin/installbsd, which doesn't work without a -g flag
+# AFS /usr/afsws/bin/install, which mishandles nonexistent args
+# SVR4 /usr/ucb/install, which tries to use the nonexistent group "staff"
+# OS/2's system install, which has a completely different semantic
+# ./install, which can be erroneously created by make from ./install.sh.
+# Reject install programs that cannot install multiple files.
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for a BSD-compatible install" >&5
+printf %s "checking for a BSD-compatible install... " >&6; }
+if test -z "$INSTALL"; then
+if test ${ac_cv_path_install+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    # Account for fact that we put trailing slashes in our PATH walk.
+case $as_dir in #((
+  ./ | /[cC]/* | \
+  /etc/* | /usr/sbin/* | /usr/etc/* | /sbin/* | /usr/afsws/bin/* | \
+  ?:[\\/]os2[\\/]install[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]OS2[\\/]INSTALL[\\/]* | \
+  /usr/ucb/* ) ;;
+  *)
+    # OSF1 and SCO ODT 3.0 have their own names for install.
+    # Don't use installbsd from OSF since it installs stuff as root
+    # by default.
+    for ac_prog in ginstall scoinst install; do
+      for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+	if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"; then
+	  if test $ac_prog = install &&
+	    grep dspmsg "$as_dir$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+	    # AIX install.  It has an incompatible calling convention.
+	    :
+	  elif test $ac_prog = install &&
+	    grep pwplus "$as_dir$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+	    # program-specific install script used by HP pwplus--don't use.
+	    :
+	  else
+	    rm -rf conftest.one conftest.two conftest.dir
+	    echo one > conftest.one
+	    echo two > conftest.two
+	    mkdir conftest.dir
+	    if "$as_dir$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" -c conftest.one conftest.two "`pwd`/conftest.dir/" &&
+	      test -s conftest.one && test -s conftest.two &&
+	      test -s conftest.dir/conftest.one &&
+	      test -s conftest.dir/conftest.two
+	    then
+	      ac_cv_path_install="$as_dir$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext -c"
+	      break 3
+	    fi
+	  fi
+	fi
+      done
+    done
+    ;;
+esac
+
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+rm -rf conftest.one conftest.two conftest.dir
+
+fi
+  if test ${ac_cv_path_install+y}; then
+    INSTALL=$ac_cv_path_install
+  else
+    # As a last resort, use the slow shell script.  Don't cache a
+    # value for INSTALL within a source directory, because that will
+    # break other packages using the cache if that directory is
+    # removed, or if the value is a relative name.
+    INSTALL=$ac_install_sh
+  fi
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $INSTALL" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$INSTALL" >&6; }
+
+# Use test -z because SunOS4 sh mishandles braces in ${var-val}.
+# It thinks the first close brace ends the variable substitution.
+test -z "$INSTALL_PROGRAM" && INSTALL_PROGRAM='${INSTALL}'
+
+test -z "$INSTALL_SCRIPT" && INSTALL_SCRIPT='${INSTALL}'
+
+test -z "$INSTALL_DATA" && INSTALL_DATA='${INSTALL} -m 644'
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for grep that handles long lines and -e" >&5
+printf %s "checking for grep that handles long lines and -e... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_GREP+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if test -z "$GREP"; then
+  ac_path_GREP_found=false
+  # Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_prog in grep ggrep
+   do
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+      ac_path_GREP="$as_dir$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"
+      as_fn_executable_p "$ac_path_GREP" || continue
+# Check for GNU ac_path_GREP and select it if it is found.
+  # Check for GNU $ac_path_GREP
+case `"$ac_path_GREP" --version 2>&1` in
+*GNU*)
+  ac_cv_path_GREP="$ac_path_GREP" ac_path_GREP_found=:;;
+*)
+  ac_count=0
+  printf %s 0123456789 >"conftest.in"
+  while :
+  do
+    cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp"
+    mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in"
+    cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl"
+    printf "%s\n" 'GREP' >> "conftest.nl"
+    "$ac_path_GREP" -e 'GREP$' -e '-(cannot match)-' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break
+    diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break
+    as_fn_arith $ac_count + 1 && ac_count=$as_val
+    if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_GREP_max-0}; then
+      # Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one
+      ac_cv_path_GREP="$ac_path_GREP"
+      ac_path_GREP_max=$ac_count
+    fi
+    # 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough
+    test $ac_count -gt 10 && break
+  done
+  rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;;
+esac
+
+      $ac_path_GREP_found && break 3
+    done
+  done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  if test -z "$ac_cv_path_GREP"; then
+    as_fn_error $? "no acceptable grep could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" "$LINENO" 5
+  fi
+else
+  ac_cv_path_GREP=$GREP
+fi
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_path_GREP" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_path_GREP" >&6; }
+ GREP="$ac_cv_path_GREP"
+
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for egrep" >&5
+printf %s "checking for egrep... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_EGREP+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if echo a | $GREP -E '(a|b)' >/dev/null 2>&1
+   then ac_cv_path_EGREP="$GREP -E"
+   else
+     if test -z "$EGREP"; then
+  ac_path_EGREP_found=false
+  # Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_prog in egrep
+   do
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+      ac_path_EGREP="$as_dir$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"
+      as_fn_executable_p "$ac_path_EGREP" || continue
+# Check for GNU ac_path_EGREP and select it if it is found.
+  # Check for GNU $ac_path_EGREP
+case `"$ac_path_EGREP" --version 2>&1` in
+*GNU*)
+  ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" ac_path_EGREP_found=:;;
+*)
+  ac_count=0
+  printf %s 0123456789 >"conftest.in"
+  while :
+  do
+    cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp"
+    mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in"
+    cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl"
+    printf "%s\n" 'EGREP' >> "conftest.nl"
+    "$ac_path_EGREP" 'EGREP$' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break
+    diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break
+    as_fn_arith $ac_count + 1 && ac_count=$as_val
+    if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_EGREP_max-0}; then
+      # Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one
+      ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP"
+      ac_path_EGREP_max=$ac_count
+    fi
+    # 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough
+    test $ac_count -gt 10 && break
+  done
+  rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;;
+esac
+
+      $ac_path_EGREP_found && break 3
+    done
+  done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  if test -z "$ac_cv_path_EGREP"; then
+    as_fn_error $? "no acceptable egrep could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" "$LINENO" 5
+  fi
+else
+  ac_cv_path_EGREP=$EGREP
+fi
+
+   fi
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&6; }
+ EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP"
+
+
+
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for a race-free mkdir -p" >&5
+printf %s "checking for a race-free mkdir -p... " >&6; }
+if test -z "$MKDIR_P"; then
+  if test ${ac_cv_path_mkdir+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/opt/sfw/bin
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_prog in mkdir gmkdir; do
+	 for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+	   as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" || continue
+	   case `"$as_dir$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" --version 2>&1` in #(
+	     'mkdir ('*'coreutils) '* | \
+	     'BusyBox '* | \
+	     'mkdir (fileutils) '4.1*)
+	       ac_cv_path_mkdir=$as_dir$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext
+	       break 3;;
+	   esac
+	 done
+       done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+
+  test -d ./--version && rmdir ./--version
+  if test ${ac_cv_path_mkdir+y}; then
+    MKDIR_P="$ac_cv_path_mkdir -p"
+  else
+    # As a last resort, use the slow shell script.  Don't cache a
+    # value for MKDIR_P within a source directory, because that will
+    # break other packages using the cache if that directory is
+    # removed, or if the value is a relative name.
+    MKDIR_P="$ac_install_sh -d"
+  fi
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MKDIR_P" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$MKDIR_P" >&6; }
+
+if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
+  for ac_prog in ar
+  do
+    # Extract the first word of "$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_prog_AR+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if test -n "$AR"; then
+  ac_cv_prog_AR="$AR" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_prog_AR="$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+AR=$ac_cv_prog_AR
+if test -n "$AR"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $AR" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$AR" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+    test -n "$AR" && break
+  done
+fi
+if test -z "$AR"; then
+  ac_ct_AR=$AR
+  for ac_prog in ar
+do
+  # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then
+  ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_ct_AR" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_prog"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+fi
+fi
+ac_ct_AR=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR
+if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_AR" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_ct_AR" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+  test -n "$ac_ct_AR" && break
+done
+
+  if test "x$ac_ct_AR" = x; then
+    AR=""
+  else
+    case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
+yes:)
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
+ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
+esac
+    AR=$ac_ct_AR
+  fi
+fi
+
+# Extract the first word of "cat", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy cat; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_CAT+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $CAT in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_CAT="$CAT" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_CAT="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+CAT=$ac_cv_path_CAT
+if test -n "$CAT"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CAT" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$CAT" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "kill", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy kill; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_KILL+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $KILL in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_KILL="$KILL" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_KILL="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+KILL=$ac_cv_path_KILL
+if test -n "$KILL"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $KILL" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$KILL" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "sed", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy sed; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_SED+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $SED in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_SED="$SED" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_SED="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+SED=$ac_cv_path_SED
+if test -n "$SED"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SED" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$SED" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "bash", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy bash; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH
+if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "ksh", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ksh; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH
+if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy sh; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH
+if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "bash", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy bash; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_SH+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $SH in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_SH="$SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_SH="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+SH=$ac_cv_path_SH
+if test -n "$SH"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SH" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$SH" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "ksh", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ksh; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_SH+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $SH in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_SH="$SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_SH="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+SH=$ac_cv_path_SH
+if test -n "$SH"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SH" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$SH" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy sh; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_SH+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $SH in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_SH="$SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_SH="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+SH=$ac_cv_path_SH
+if test -n "$SH"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SH" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$SH" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "groff", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy groff; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_GROFF+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $GROFF in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_GROFF="$GROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_GROFF="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+GROFF=$ac_cv_path_GROFF
+if test -n "$GROFF"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $GROFF" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$GROFF" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "nroff awf", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy nroff awf; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_NROFF+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $NROFF in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_NROFF="$NROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_NROFF="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+NROFF=$ac_cv_path_NROFF
+if test -n "$NROFF"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NROFF" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$NROFF" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "mandoc", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy mandoc; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_MANDOC+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $MANDOC in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$MANDOC" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+MANDOC=$ac_cv_path_MANDOC
+if test -n "$MANDOC"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MANDOC" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$MANDOC" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
+  # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $PKGCONFIG in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG
+if test -n "$PKGCONFIG"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PKGCONFIG" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$PKGCONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+fi
+if test -z "$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"; then
+  ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$PKGCONFIG
+  # Extract the first word of "pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy pkg-config; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG
+if test -n "$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+  if test "x$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" = x; then
+    PKGCONFIG="no"
+  else
+    case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
+yes:)
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
+ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
+esac
+    PKGCONFIG=$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG
+  fi
+else
+  PKGCONFIG="$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"
+fi
+
+TEST_SHELL=sh
+
+
+if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then
+	MANFMT="$MANDOC"
+elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then
+	MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc"
+elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then
+	MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii"
+else
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: no manpage formatter found" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: no manpage formatter found" >&2;}
+	MANFMT="false"
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "groupadd", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy groupadd; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="groupadd"
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+PATH_GROUPADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG
+if test -n "$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "useradd", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy useradd; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $PATH_USERADD_PROG in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$PATH_USERADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="useradd"
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+PATH_USERADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG
+if test -n "$PATH_USERADD_PROG"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+# Extract the first word of "pkgmk", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy pkgmk; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then
+  ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" # Let the user override the test.
+else
+as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="yes"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  test -z "$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" && ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="no"
+fi
+fi
+MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED=$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED
+if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+if test -x /sbin/sh; then
+	STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/sbin/sh
+
+else
+	STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/bin/sh
+
+fi
+
+# System features
+# Check whether --enable-largefile was given.
+if test ${enable_largefile+y}
+then :
+  enableval=$enable_largefile;
+fi
+
+if test "$enable_largefile" != no; then
+
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for special C compiler options needed for large files" >&5
+printf %s "checking for special C compiler options needed for large files... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=no
+     if test "$GCC" != yes; then
+       ac_save_CC=$CC
+       while :; do
+	 # IRIX 6.2 and later do not support large files by default,
+	 # so use the C compiler's -n32 option if that helps.
+	 cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
+    We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
+    since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
+    incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807.  */
+#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 31 << 31) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 31 << 31))
+  int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
+		       && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
+		      ? 1 : -1];
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+	 if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  break
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam
+	 CC="$CC -n32"
+	 if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=' -n32'; break
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam
+	 break
+       done
+       CC=$ac_save_CC
+       rm -f conftest.$ac_ext
+    fi
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&6; }
+  if test "$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" != no; then
+    CC=$CC$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC
+  fi
+
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files" >&5
+printf %s "checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  while :; do
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
+    We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
+    since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
+    incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807.  */
+#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 31 << 31) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 31 << 31))
+  int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
+		       && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
+		      ? 1 : -1];
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=no; break
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS 64
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
+    We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
+    since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
+    incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807.  */
+#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 31 << 31) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 31 << 31))
+  int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
+		       && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
+		      ? 1 : -1];
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=64; break
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+  ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=unknown
+  break
+done
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&6; }
+case $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits in #(
+  no | unknown) ;;
+  *)
+printf "%s\n" "#define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >>confdefs.h
+;;
+esac
+rm -rf conftest*
+  if test $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits = unknown; then
+    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files" >&5
+printf %s "checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_sys_large_files+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  while :; do
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
+    We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
+    since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
+    incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807.  */
+#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 31 << 31) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 31 << 31))
+  int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
+		       && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
+		      ? 1 : -1];
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_sys_large_files=no; break
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#define _LARGE_FILES 1
+#include <sys/types.h>
+ /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
+    We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
+    since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
+    incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807.  */
+#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 31 << 31) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 31 << 31))
+  int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
+		       && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
+		      ? 1 : -1];
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_sys_large_files=1; break
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+  ac_cv_sys_large_files=unknown
+  break
+done
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&6; }
+case $ac_cv_sys_large_files in #(
+  no | unknown) ;;
+  *)
+printf "%s\n" "#define _LARGE_FILES $ac_cv_sys_large_files" >>confdefs.h
+;;
+esac
+rm -rf conftest*
+  fi
+fi
+
+
+if test -z "$AR" ; then
+	as_fn_error $? "*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+# Extract the first word of "passwd", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy passwd; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $PATH_PASSWD_PROG in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG="$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+PATH_PASSWD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG
+if test -n "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_PASSWD_PROG" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG \"$PATH_PASSWD_PROG\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+LD="$CC"
+
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for inline" >&5
+printf %s "checking for inline... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_c_inline+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_c_inline=no
+for ac_kw in inline __inline__ __inline; do
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#ifndef __cplusplus
+typedef int foo_t;
+static $ac_kw foo_t static_foo (void) {return 0; }
+$ac_kw foo_t foo (void) {return 0; }
+#endif
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_c_inline=$ac_kw
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+  test "$ac_cv_c_inline" != no && break
+done
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_c_inline" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_c_inline" >&6; }
+
+case $ac_cv_c_inline in
+  inline | yes) ;;
+  *)
+    case $ac_cv_c_inline in
+      no) ac_val=;;
+      *) ac_val=$ac_cv_c_inline;;
+    esac
+    cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#ifndef __cplusplus
+#define inline $ac_val
+#endif
+_ACEOF
+    ;;
+esac
+
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $CC options needed to detect all undeclared functions" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $CC options needed to detect all undeclared functions... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_c_undeclared_builtin_options+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_save_CFLAGS=$CFLAGS
+   ac_cv_c_undeclared_builtin_options='cannot detect'
+   for ac_arg in '' -fno-builtin; do
+     CFLAGS="$ac_save_CFLAGS $ac_arg"
+     # This test program should *not* compile successfully.
+     cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+(void) strchr;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  # This test program should compile successfully.
+        # No library function is consistently available on
+        # freestanding implementations, so test against a dummy
+        # declaration.  Include always-available headers on the
+        # off chance that they somehow elicit warnings.
+        cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <float.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+extern void ac_decl (int, char *);
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+(void) ac_decl (0, (char *) 0);
+  (void) ac_decl;
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  if test x"$ac_arg" = x
+then :
+  ac_cv_c_undeclared_builtin_options='none needed'
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_c_undeclared_builtin_options=$ac_arg
+fi
+          break
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+    done
+    CFLAGS=$ac_save_CFLAGS
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_c_undeclared_builtin_options" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_c_undeclared_builtin_options" >&6; }
+  case $ac_cv_c_undeclared_builtin_options in #(
+  'cannot detect') :
+    { { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
+as_fn_error $? "cannot make $CC report undeclared builtins
+See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; } ;; #(
+  'none needed') :
+    ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options='' ;; #(
+  *) :
+    ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options=$ac_cv_c_undeclared_builtin_options ;;
+esac
+
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "LLONG_MAX" "ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" "#include <limits.h>
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" = xyes
+then :
+  have_llong_max=1
+fi
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "LONG_LONG_MAX" "ac_cv_have_decl_LONG_LONG_MAX" "#include <limits.h>
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_LONG_LONG_MAX" = xyes
+then :
+  have_long_long_max=1
+fi
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" "ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" "
+	#include <sys/types.h>
+	#include <sys/param.h>
+	#include <dev/systrace.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" = xyes
+then :
+  have_systr_policy_kill=1
+fi
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "RLIMIT_NPROC" "ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC" "
+	#include <sys/types.h>
+	#include <sys/resource.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC /**/" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" "ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" "
+	#include <sys/types.h>
+	#include <linux/prctl.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" = xyes
+then :
+  have_linux_no_new_privs=1
+fi
+
+openssl=yes
+openssl_bin=openssl
+
+# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
+if test ${with_openssl+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_openssl;   if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+		openssl=no
+		openssl_bin=""
+	   fi
+
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography... " >&6; }
+if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define WITH_OPENSSL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+use_stack_protector=1
+use_toolchain_hardening=1
+
+# Check whether --with-stackprotect was given.
+if test ${with_stackprotect+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_stackprotect;
+    if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
+	use_stack_protector=0
+    fi
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-hardening was given.
+if test ${with_hardening+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_hardening;
+    if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
+	use_toolchain_hardening=0
+    fi
+fi
+
+
+# We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is
+# on by default" for things like -fPIE.
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports -Werror" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports -Werror... " >&6; }
+saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+int main(void) { return 0; }
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+	  WERROR="-Werror"
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	  WERROR=""
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking gcc version" >&5
+printf %s "checking gcc version... " >&6; }
+	GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'`
+	case "$GCC_VER" in
+		1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
+		2.8* | 2.9*)
+		     no_attrib_nonnull=1
+		     ;;
+		2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
+		*) ;;
+	esac
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $GCC_VER" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$GCC_VER" >&6; }
+
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking clang version" >&5
+printf %s "checking clang version... " >&6; }
+	CLANG_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/clang version /{print $3}'`
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CLANG_VER" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$CLANG_VER" >&6; }
+
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -pipe" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -pipe... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -pipe"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-pipe"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunknown-warning-option" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunknown-warning-option... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wunknown-warning-option"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wunknown-warning-option"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-error=format-truncation" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-error=format-truncation... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wno-error=format-truncation"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wno-error=format-truncation"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Qunused-arguments"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Qunused-arguments"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wall" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wall... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wall"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wall"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wextra" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wextra... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wextra"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wextra"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-arith" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-arith... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wpointer-arith"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wpointer-arith"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wuninitialized" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wuninitialized... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wuninitialized"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wuninitialized"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsign-compare" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsign-compare... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wsign-compare"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wsign-compare"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wformat-security" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wformat-security... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wformat-security"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wformat-security"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-sign" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-sign... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wpointer-sign"
+	_define_flag="-Wno-pointer-sign"
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wpointer-sign"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunused-parameter" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunused-parameter... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wunused-parameter"
+	_define_flag="-Wno-unused-parameter"
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wunused-parameter"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunused-result" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunused-result... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wunused-result"
+	_define_flag="-Wno-unused-result"
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wunused-result"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wimplicit-fallthrough" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wimplicit-fallthrough... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wimplicit-fallthrough"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wimplicit-fallthrough"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wmisleading-indentation" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wmisleading-indentation... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wmisleading-indentation"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wmisleading-indentation"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wbitwise-instead-of-logical" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wbitwise-instead-of-logical... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wbitwise-instead-of-logical"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wbitwise-instead-of-logical"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -fno-strict-aliasing" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -fno-strict-aliasing... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -fno-strict-aliasing"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-fno-strict-aliasing"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+    if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -mretpoline" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -mretpoline... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -mretpoline"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-mretpoline"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+} # clang
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,retpolineplt" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,retpolineplt... " >&6; }
+	saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,retpolineplt"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,retpolineplt"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	long long p = n * o;
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+else
+		  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,relro" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,relro... " >&6; }
+	saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,relro"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,relro"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	long long p = n * o;
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+else
+		  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,now" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,now... " >&6; }
+	saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,now"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,now"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	long long p = n * o;
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+else
+		  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,noexecstack" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,noexecstack... " >&6; }
+	saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,noexecstack"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,noexecstack"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	long long p = n * o;
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+else
+		  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	# NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in
+	# the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations
+	# that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it
+	# actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number
+	# of integer operations that should exercise this.
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -ftrapv and linking succeeds" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -ftrapv and linking succeeds... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -ftrapv"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-ftrapv"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	long long int p = n * o;
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	# clang 15 seems to have a bug in -fzero-call-used-regs=all.  See
+	# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3475 and
+	# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/59242
+	case "$CLANG_VER" in
+	15.*) {
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -fzero-call-used-regs=used" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -fzero-call-used-regs=used... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -fzero-call-used-regs=used"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-fzero-call-used-regs=used"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+} ;;
+	*)    {
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -fzero-call-used-regs=all" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -fzero-call-used-regs=all... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -fzero-call-used-regs=all"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-fzero-call-used-regs=all"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+} ;;
+	esac
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+    fi
+
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <string.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b));
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+	# -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions
+	# and/or platforms, so we test if we can.  If it's not supported
+	# on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror.
+	if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then
+	    for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \
+		    -fstack-protector; do
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports $t" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports $t... " >&6; }
+		saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+		saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+		CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror"
+		LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror"
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+	#include <stdio.h>
+	int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;}
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	char x[256];
+	snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1));
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		      CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t"
+		      LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t"
+		      { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $t works" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $t works... " >&6; }
+		      if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: cannot test" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: cannot test" >&2;}
+			  break
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+	#include <stdio.h>
+	int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;}
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	char x[256];
+	snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1));
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+			  break
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+		LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+	    done
+	fi
+
+	if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
+		# retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes
+		unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX
+		saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+		CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99"
+		ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "LLONG_MAX" "ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" "#include <limits.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" = xyes
+then :
+  have_llong_max=1
+else $as_nop
+  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+fi
+	fi
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types" >&5
+printf %s "checking if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types... " >&6; }
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+__attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ exit(0);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if compiler allows __attribute__ prototype args" >&5
+printf %s "checking if compiler allows __attribute__ prototype args... " >&6; }
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+typedef void foo(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ exit(0);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if compiler supports variable length arrays" >&5
+printf %s "checking if compiler supports variable length arrays... " >&6; }
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <stdlib.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ int i; for (i=0; i<3; i++){int a[i]; a[i-1]=0;} exit(0);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define VARIABLE_LENGTH_ARRAYS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if compiler accepts variable declarations after code" >&5
+printf %s "checking if compiler accepts variable declarations after code... " >&6; }
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <stdlib.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ int a; a = 1; int b = 1; exit(a-b);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define VARIABLE_DECLARATION_AFTER_CODE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__ 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-rpath was given.
+if test ${with_rpath+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_rpath;
+		if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+			rpath_opt=""
+		elif test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+			rpath_opt="-R"
+		else
+			rpath_opt="$withval"
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Allow user to specify flags
+
+# Check whether --with-cflags was given.
+if test ${with_cflags+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_cflags;
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval"
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-cflags-after was given.
+if test ${with_cflags_after+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_cflags_after;
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			CFLAGS_AFTER="$withval"
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-cppflags was given.
+if test ${with_cppflags+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_cppflags;
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval"
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-ldflags was given.
+if test ${with_ldflags+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_ldflags;
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval"
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-ldflags-after was given.
+if test ${with_ldflags_after+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_ldflags_after;
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			LDFLAGS_AFTER="$withval"
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-libs was given.
+if test ${with_libs+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_libs;
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			LIBS="$LIBS $withval"
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-Werror was given.
+if test ${with_Werror+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_Werror;
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"; then
+			werror_flags="-Werror"
+			if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+				werror_flags="$withval"
+			fi
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_stat_h" != "xyes"; then
+	unset ac_cv_header_sys_stat_h
+	ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/stat.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_stat_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_stat_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_STAT_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "blf.h" "ac_cv_header_blf_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_blf_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_BLF_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "bstring.h" "ac_cv_header_bstring_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_bstring_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_BSTRING_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "crypt.h" "ac_cv_header_crypt_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_crypt_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_CRYPT_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "crypto/sha2.h" "ac_cv_header_crypto_sha2_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_crypto_sha2_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_CRYPTO_SHA2_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "dirent.h" "ac_cv_header_dirent_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_dirent_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DIRENT_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "endian.h" "ac_cv_header_endian_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_endian_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ENDIAN_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "elf.h" "ac_cv_header_elf_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ELF_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "err.h" "ac_cv_header_err_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_err_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ERR_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "features.h" "ac_cv_header_features_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_features_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FEATURES_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "fcntl.h" "ac_cv_header_fcntl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_fcntl_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FCNTL_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "floatingpoint.h" "ac_cv_header_floatingpoint_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_floatingpoint_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "fnmatch.h" "ac_cv_header_fnmatch_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_fnmatch_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FNMATCH_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "getopt.h" "ac_cv_header_getopt_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_getopt_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETOPT_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "glob.h" "ac_cv_header_glob_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_glob_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GLOB_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "ia.h" "ac_cv_header_ia_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_ia_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_IA_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "iaf.h" "ac_cv_header_iaf_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_iaf_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_IAF_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "ifaddrs.h" "ac_cv_header_ifaddrs_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_ifaddrs_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_IFADDRS_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "inttypes.h" "ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_INTTYPES_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "langinfo.h" "ac_cv_header_langinfo_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_langinfo_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LANGINFO_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "limits.h" "ac_cv_header_limits_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_limits_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LIMITS_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "locale.h" "ac_cv_header_locale_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_locale_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LOCALE_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "login.h" "ac_cv_header_login_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_login_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LOGIN_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "maillock.h" "ac_cv_header_maillock_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_maillock_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_MAILLOCK_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "ndir.h" "ac_cv_header_ndir_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_ndir_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_NDIR_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "net/if_tun.h" "ac_cv_header_net_if_tun_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_net_if_tun_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "netdb.h" "ac_cv_header_netdb_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_netdb_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_NETDB_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "netgroup.h" "ac_cv_header_netgroup_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_netgroup_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_NETGROUP_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "pam/pam_appl.h" "ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "paths.h" "ac_cv_header_paths_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_paths_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PATHS_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "poll.h" "ac_cv_header_poll_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_poll_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_POLL_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "pty.h" "ac_cv_header_pty_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_pty_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PTY_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "readpassphrase.h" "ac_cv_header_readpassphrase_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_readpassphrase_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "rpc/types.h" "ac_cv_header_rpc_types_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_rpc_types_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "security/pam_appl.h" "ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sha2.h" "ac_cv_header_sha2_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sha2_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SHA2_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "shadow.h" "ac_cv_header_shadow_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_shadow_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SHADOW_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "stddef.h" "ac_cv_header_stddef_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_stddef_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STDDEF_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "stdint.h" "ac_cv_header_stdint_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STDINT_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "string.h" "ac_cv_header_string_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_string_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRING_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "strings.h" "ac_cv_header_strings_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_strings_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRINGS_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/bitypes.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/byteorder.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_byteorder_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_byteorder_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_BYTEORDER_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/bsdtty.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_bsdtty_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bsdtty_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/cdefs.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_cdefs_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_cdefs_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/dir.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_dir_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_dir_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_DIR_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/file.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_file_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_file_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_FILE_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/mman.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_mman_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_mman_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/label.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_label_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_label_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/ndir.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_ndir_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_ndir_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/param.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_param_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_param_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/poll.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_poll_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_poll_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_POLL_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/prctl.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_prctl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_prctl_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/procctl.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_procctl_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_procctl_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_PROCCTL_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/pstat.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_pstat_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_pstat_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/ptrace.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_ptrace_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_ptrace_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/random.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_random_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_random_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/select.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_select_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_select_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/stream.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_stream_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_stream_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/stropts.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_stropts_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_stropts_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/strtio.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_strtio_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_strtio_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/statvfs.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_statvfs_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_statvfs_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/sysmacros.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_sysmacros_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_sysmacros_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/time.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_time_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_time_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_TIME_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/timers.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_timers_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_timers_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/vfs.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_vfs_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_vfs_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_VFS_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "time.h" "ac_cv_header_time_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_time_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_TIME_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "tmpdir.h" "ac_cv_header_tmpdir_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_tmpdir_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_TMPDIR_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "ttyent.h" "ac_cv_header_ttyent_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_ttyent_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_TTYENT_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "ucred.h" "ac_cv_header_ucred_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_ucred_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UCRED_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "unistd.h" "ac_cv_header_unistd_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_unistd_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UNISTD_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "usersec.h" "ac_cv_header_usersec_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_usersec_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_USERSEC_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "util.h" "ac_cv_header_util_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_util_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UTIL_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "utime.h" "ac_cv_header_utime_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_utime_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UTIME_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "utmp.h" "ac_cv_header_utmp_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_utmp_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UTMP_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "utmpx.h" "ac_cv_header_utmpx_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_utmpx_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UTMPX_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "vis.h" "ac_cv_header_vis_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_vis_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_VIS_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "wchar.h" "ac_cv_header_wchar_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_wchar_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_WCHAR_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+# On some platforms (eg SunOS4) sys/audit.h requires sys/[time|types|label.h]
+# to be included first.
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/audit.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_audit_h" "
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H
+# include <sys/label.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_audit_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+# sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/capsicum.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" "
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_CAPSICUM_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "capsicum_helpers.h" "ac_cv_header_capsicum_helpers_h" "
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_capsicum_helpers_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_CAPSICUM_HELPERS_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for caph_cache_tzdata" >&5
+printf %s "checking for caph_cache_tzdata... " >&6; }
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <capsicum_helpers.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+caph_cache_tzdata();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_CAPH_CACHE_TZDATA 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+# net/route.h requires sys/socket.h and sys/types.h.
+# sys/sysctl.h also requires sys/param.h
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "net/route.h" "ac_cv_header_net_route_h" "
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_net_route_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/sysctl.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_sysctl_h" "
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_sysctl_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+# lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "lastlog.h" "ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" "
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LASTLOG_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+# sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/ptms.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_ptms_h" "
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
+# include <sys/stream.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_ptms_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+# login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "login_cap.h" "ac_cv_header_login_cap_h" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_login_cap_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+# older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/mount.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_mount_h" "
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_mount_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+# Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/un.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_un_h" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_un_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_UN_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+# Messages for features tested for in target-specific section
+SIA_MSG="no"
+SPC_MSG="no"
+SP_MSG="no"
+SPP_MSG="no"
+
+# Support for Solaris/Illumos privileges (this test is used by both
+# the --with-solaris-privs option and --with-sandbox=solaris).
+SOLARIS_PRIVS="no"
+
+# Check for some target-specific stuff
+case "$host" in
+*-*-aix*)
+	# Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at
+	# -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that
+	# particularly with older versions of vac or xlc.
+	# It also throws errors about null macro arguments, but these are
+	# not fatal.
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if compiler allows macro redefinitions" >&5
+printf %s "checking if compiler allows macro redefinitions... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#define testmacro foo
+#define testmacro bar
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ exit(0);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	      CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+	      CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+	      CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)" >&5
+printf %s "checking how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)... " >&6; }
+	if (test -z "$blibpath"); then
+		blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib"
+	fi
+	saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+	if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then
+		flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:"
+	else
+		flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath,"
+	fi
+	for tryflags in $flags ;do
+		if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
+			LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath"
+			cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  blibflags=$tryflags
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+		fi
+	done
+	if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "not found" >&6; }
+		as_fn_error $? "*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log" "$LINENO" 5
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $blibflags" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$blibflags" >&6; }
+	fi
+	LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+		ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "authenticate" "ac_cv_func_authenticate"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_authenticate" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for authenticate in -ls" >&5
+printf %s "checking for authenticate in -ls... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-ls  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char authenticate ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return authenticate ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate" = xyes
+then :
+   printf "%s\n" "#define WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+				LIBS="$LIBS -ls"
+
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+		ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "authenticate" "ac_cv_have_decl_authenticate" "#include <usersec.h>
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_authenticate" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "loginrestrictions" "ac_cv_have_decl_loginrestrictions" "#include <usersec.h>
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_loginrestrictions" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "loginsuccess" "ac_cv_have_decl_loginsuccess" "#include <usersec.h>
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_loginsuccess" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "passwdexpired" "ac_cv_have_decl_passwdexpired" "#include <usersec.h>
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_passwdexpired" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "setauthdb" "ac_cv_have_decl_setauthdb" "#include <usersec.h>
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_setauthdb" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+
+		ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "loginfailed" "ac_cv_have_decl_loginfailed" "#include <usersec.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_loginfailed" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+if test $ac_have_decl = 1
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if loginfailed takes 4 arguments" >&5
+printf %s "checking if loginfailed takes 4 arguments... " >&6; }
+	    cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <usersec.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ (void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+	ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getgrset" "ac_cv_func_getgrset"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getgrset" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETGRSET 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setauthdb" "ac_cv_func_setauthdb"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setauthdb" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETAUTHDB 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+	ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "F_CLOSEM" "ac_cv_have_decl_F_CLOSEM" " #include <limits.h>
+	      #include <fcntl.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_F_CLOSEM" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+	check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define PTY_ZEROREAD 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID 2" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_STRNDUP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_STRNLEN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	;;
+*-*-android*)
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	;;
+*-*-cygwin*)
+	LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_CYGWIN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSH_IOBUFSZ 65535" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	# Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical
+	# reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings.
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-attributes" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-attributes... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wno-attributes"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wno-attributes"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	;;
+*-*-dgux*)
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	;;
+*-*-darwin*)
+	use_pie=auto
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if we have working getaddrinfo" >&5
+printf %s "checking if we have working getaddrinfo... " >&6; }
+	if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: assume it is working" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "assume it is working" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <mach-o/dyld.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+int main(void) { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
+		exit(0);
+	else
+		exit(1);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: working" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "working" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: buggy" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "buggy" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_GLOB 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BIND_8_COMPAT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+	ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "AU_IPv4" "ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4" "$ac_includes_default" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define AU_IPv4 0" >>confdefs.h
+
+	    #include <bsm/audit.h>
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h
+
+	ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "sandbox_init" "ac_cv_func_sandbox_init"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SANDBOX_INIT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+	ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sandbox.h" "ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SANDBOX_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for sandbox_apply in -lsandbox" >&5
+printf %s "checking for sandbox_apply in -lsandbox... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lsandbox  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char sandbox_apply ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return sandbox_apply ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply" = xyes
+then :
+
+	    SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lsandbox"
+
+fi
+
+	# proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() replacement.
+	ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "libproc.h" "ac_cv_header_libproc_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_libproc_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LIBPROC_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+	ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "proc_pidinfo" "ac_cv_func_proc_pidinfo"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_proc_pidinfo" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PROC_PIDINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+	# poll(2) is broken for character-special devices (at least).
+	# cf. Apple bug 3710161 (not public, but searchable)
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_POLL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	;;
+*-*-dragonfly*)
+	SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS"
+	TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
+	;;
+*-*-haiku*)
+	LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd "
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D_BSD_SOURCE"
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for socket in -lnetwork" >&5
+printf %s "checking for socket in -lnetwork... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_network_socket+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lnetwork  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char socket ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return socket ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_network_socket=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_network_socket=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_network_socket" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_network_socket" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_network_socket" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LIBNETWORK 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+  LIBS="-lnetwork $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	MANTYPE=man
+	;;
+*-*-hpux*)
+	# first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases
+	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1"
+	IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
+	printf "%s\n" "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_PSTAT" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID 2" >>confdefs.h
+
+	maildir="/var/mail"
+	LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for t_error in -lxnet" >&5
+printf %s "checking for t_error in -lxnet... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lxnet  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char t_error ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return t_error ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LIBXNET 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+  LIBS="-lxnet $LIBS"
+
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_error $? "*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+	# next, we define all of the options specific to major releases
+	case "$host" in
+	*-*-hpux10*)
+		if test -z "$GCC"; then
+			CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae"
+		fi
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_GETLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		;;
+	*-*-hpux11*)
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1
+		check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1
+		;;
+	esac
+
+	# lastly, we define options specific to minor releases
+	case "$host" in
+	*-*-hpux10.26)
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SECUREWARE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		disable_ptmx_check=yes
+		LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw"
+		;;
+	esac
+	;;
+*-*-irix5*)
+	PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_INET_NTOA 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+	;;
+*-*-irix6*)
+	PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define WITH_IRIX_ARRAY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define WITH_IRIX_PROJECT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define WITH_IRIX_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "jlimit_startjob" "ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define WITH_IRIX_JOBS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_INET_NTOA 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+	;;
+*-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu)
+	printf "%s\n" "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"!\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define _PATH_BTMP \"/var/log/btmp\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	;;
+*-*-linux*)
+	no_dev_ptmx=1
+	use_pie=auto
+	check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE -D_GNU_SOURCE"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_CLOSEFROM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"!\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO EPERM" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define _PATH_BTMP \"/var/log/btmp\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define LINUX_OOM_ADJUST 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	inet6_default_4in6=yes
+	case `uname -r` in
+	1.*|2.0.*)
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		;;
+	esac
+	# tun(4) forwarding compat code
+	ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "linux/if_tun.h" "ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+	if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSH_TUN_LINUX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	fi
+	ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "linux/if.h" "ac_cv_header_linux_if_h" "
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_h" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+	ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "linux/seccomp.h" "ac_cv_header_linux_seccomp_h" "#include <linux/types.h>
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_seccomp_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LINUX_SECCOMP_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "linux/filter.h" "ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" "#include <linux/types.h>
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LINUX_FILTER_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "linux/audit.h" "ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" "#include <linux/types.h>
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+	# Obtain MIPS ABI
+	case "$host" in
+	mips*)
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIO32
+#error
+#endif
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  mips_abi="o32"
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIN32
+#error
+#endif
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  mips_abi="n32"
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABI64
+#error
+#endif
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  mips_abi="n64"
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_error $? "unknown MIPS ABI" "$LINENO" 5
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+		;;
+	esac
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for seccomp architecture" >&5
+printf %s "checking for seccomp architecture... " >&6; }
+	seccomp_audit_arch=
+	case "$host" in
+	x86_64-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
+		;;
+	i*86-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
+		;;
+	arm*-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
+		;;
+	aarch64*-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
+		;;
+	s390x-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X
+		;;
+	s390-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390
+		;;
+	powerpc-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC
+		;;
+	powerpc64-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64
+		;;
+	powerpc64le-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE
+		;;
+	mips-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS
+		;;
+	mipsel-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL
+		;;
+	mips64-*)
+		case "$mips_abi" in
+		"n32")
+			seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32
+			;;
+		"n64")
+			seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64
+			;;
+		esac
+		;;
+	mips64el-*)
+		case "$mips_abi" in
+		"n32")
+			seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32
+			;;
+		"n64")
+			seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64
+			;;
+		esac
+		;;
+	riscv64-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64
+		;;
+	esac
+	if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: \"$seccomp_audit_arch\"" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "\"$seccomp_audit_arch\"" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH $seccomp_audit_arch" >>confdefs.h
+
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: architecture not supported" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "architecture not supported" >&6; }
+	fi
+	;;
+*-*-minix)
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	# poll(2) seems to choke on /dev/null; "Bad file descriptor"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_POLL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	;;
+mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define NEED_SETPGRP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	SONY=1
+	;;
+*-*-netbsd*)
+	if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		rpath_opt="-R"
+	fi
+	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_OPENBSD_SOURCE"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "net/if_tap.h" "ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSH_TUN_NO_L2 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	;;
+*-*-freebsd*)
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"*LOCKED*\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "net/if_tap.h" "ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSH_TUN_NO_L2 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_GLOB 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
+	# Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload
+	# and will crash if they cannot be opened.
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	case "$host" in
+	*-*-freebsd9.*|*-*-freebsd10.*)
+		# Capsicum on 9 and 10 do not allow ppoll() so don't auto-enable.
+		disable_capsicum=yes
+	esac
+	;;
+*-*-bsdi*)
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	;;
+*-next-*)
+	conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog"
+	conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
+	conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp
+	maildir=/usr/spool/mail
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_NEXT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	;;
+*-*-openbsd*)
+	use_pie=auto
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__ 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__ 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSH_TUN_OPENBSD 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
+	;;
+*-*-solaris*)
+	if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		rpath_opt="-R"
+	fi
+	printf "%s\n" "#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+	# Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty.
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	external_path_file=/etc/default/login
+	# hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions)
+	conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog"
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x" >&5
+printf %s "checking for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x... " >&6; }
+	sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[0-9]\.//'`
+	if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+	ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setpflags" "ac_cv_func_setpflags"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setpflags" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETPFLAGS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+	ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setppriv" "ac_cv_func_setppriv"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETPPRIV 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+	ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "priv_basicset" "ac_cv_func_priv_basicset"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_priv_basicset" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+	ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "priv.h" "ac_cv_header_priv_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PRIV_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-solaris-contracts was given.
+if test ${with_solaris_contracts+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_solaris_contracts;
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ct_tmpl_activate in -lcontract" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ct_tmpl_activate in -lcontract... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lcontract  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char ct_tmpl_activate ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return ct_tmpl_activate ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			  LIBS="$LIBS -lcontract"
+			  SPC_MSG="yes"
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-solaris-projects was given.
+if test ${with_solaris_projects+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_solaris_projects;
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for setproject in -lproject" >&5
+printf %s "checking for setproject in -lproject... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_project_setproject+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lproject  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char setproject ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return setproject ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_project_setproject=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_project_setproject=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_project_setproject" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_project_setproject" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_project_setproject" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			LIBS="$LIBS -lproject"
+			SP_MSG="yes"
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-solaris-privs was given.
+if test ${with_solaris_privs+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_solaris_privs;
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for Solaris/Illumos privilege support" >&5
+printf %s "checking for Solaris/Illumos privilege support... " >&6; }
+		if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = "xyes" -a \
+			"x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = "xyes" ; then
+			SOLARIS_PRIVS=yes
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: found" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "found" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			SPP_MSG="yes"
+		else
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "not found" >&6; }
+			as_fn_error $? "*** must have support for Solaris privileges to use --with-solaris-privs" "$LINENO" 5
+		fi
+
+fi
+
+	TEST_SHELL=$SHELL	# let configure find us a capable shell
+	;;
+*-*-sunos4*)
+	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4"
+	ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpwanam" "ac_cv_func_getpwanam"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpwanam" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETPWANAM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
+	conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp
+	conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog
+	printf "%s\n" "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	;;
+*-ncr-sysv*)
+	LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
+	printf "%s\n" "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	;;
+*-sni-sysv*)
+	# /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for dlsym in -ldl" >&5
+printf %s "checking for dlsym in -ldl... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-ldl  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char dlsym ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return dlsym ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LIBDL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+  LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+	# -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for res_query in -lresolv" >&5
+printf %s "checking for res_query in -lresolv... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lresolv  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char res_query ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return res_query ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query" = xyes
+then :
+   LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
+fi
+
+	IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
+	printf "%s\n" "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	external_path_file=/etc/default/login
+	# /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX
+	# Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc,
+	# otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog
+	;;
+# UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel.
+*-*-sysv4.2*)
+	printf "%s\n" "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+	TEST_SHELL=$SHELL	# let configure find us a capable shell
+	;;
+# UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8
+*-*-sysv5*)
+	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	TEST_SHELL=$SHELL	# let configure find us a capable shell
+	case "$host" in
+	*-*-sysv5SCO_SV*)	# SCO OpenServer 6.x
+		maildir=/var/spool/mail
+		printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getluid in -lprot" >&5
+printf %s "checking for getluid in -lprot... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lprot  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char getluid ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return getluid ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" = xyes
+then :
+   LIBS="$LIBS -lprot"
+			ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getluid" "ac_cv_func_getluid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getluid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETLUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setluid" "ac_cv_func_setluid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setluid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETLUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+		;;
+	*)	printf "%s\n" "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+		;;
+	esac
+	;;
+*-*-sysv*)
+	;;
+# SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX
+*-*-sco3.2v4*)
+	as_fn_error $? "\"This Platform is no longer supported.\"" "$LINENO" 5
+	;;
+# SCO OpenServer 5.x
+*-*-sco3.2v5*)
+	if test -z "$GCC"; then
+		CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf"
+	fi
+	LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm"
+	no_dev_ptmx=1
+	printf "%s\n" "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SECUREWARE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getluid" "ac_cv_func_getluid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getluid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETLUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setluid" "ac_cv_func_setluid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setluid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETLUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+	MANTYPE=man
+	TEST_SHELL=$SHELL	# let configure find us a capable shell
+	SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes
+	;;
+*-dec-osf*)
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for Digital Unix SIA" >&5
+printf %s "checking for Digital Unix SIA... " >&6; }
+	no_osfsia=""
+
+# Check whether --with-osfsia was given.
+if test ${with_osfsia+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_osfsia;
+			if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+				{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: disabled" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "disabled" >&6; }
+				no_osfsia=1
+			fi
+
+fi
+
+	if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then
+		if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_OSF_SIA 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_LOGIN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud"
+			SIA_MSG="yes"
+		else
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR \"Nologin\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	fi
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	;;
+
+*-*-nto-qnx*)
+	printf "%s\n" "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	enable_etc_default_login=no	# has incompatible /etc/default/login
+	case "$host" in
+	*-*-nto-qnx6*)
+		printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		;;
+	esac
+	;;
+
+*-*-ultrix*)
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_GETGROUPS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define NEED_SETPGRP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	# DISABLE_FD_PASSING so that we call setpgrp as root, otherwise we
+	# don't get a controlling tty.
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	# On Ultrix some headers are not protected against multiple includes,
+	# so we create wrappers and put it where the compiler will find it.
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: creating compat wrappers for headers" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: creating compat wrappers for headers" >&2;}
+	mkdir -p netinet
+	for header in netinet/ip.h netdb.h resolv.h; do
+		name=`echo $header | tr 'a-z/.' 'A-Z__'`
+		cat >$header <<EOD
+#ifndef _SSH_COMPAT_${name}
+#define _SSH_COMPAT_${name}
+#include "/usr/include/${header}"
+#endif
+EOD
+	done
+	;;
+
+*-*-lynxos)
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D__NO_INCLUDE_WARN__"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETVBUF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	;;
+esac
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking compiler and flags for sanity" >&5
+printf %s "checking compiler and flags for sanity... " >&6; }
+if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+  	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity" >&2;}
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ exit(0);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		as_fn_error $? "*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+# Checks for libraries.
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setsockopt" "ac_cv_func_setsockopt"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setsockopt" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for setsockopt in -lsocket" >&5
+printf %s "checking for setsockopt in -lsocket... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lsocket  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char setsockopt ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return setsockopt ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LIBSOCKET 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+  LIBS="-lsocket $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+fi
+
+
+
+  for ac_func in dirname
+do :
+  ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "dirname" "ac_cv_func_dirname"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_dirname" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DIRNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "libgen.h" "ac_cv_header_libgen_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_libgen_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LIBGEN_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+else $as_nop
+
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for dirname in -lgen" >&5
+printf %s "checking for dirname in -lgen... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lgen  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char dirname ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return dirname ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname" = xyes
+then :
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for broken dirname" >&5
+printf %s "checking for broken dirname... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_broken_dirname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+			save_LIBS="$LIBS"
+			LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
+			if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no"
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+    char *s, buf[32];
+
+    strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32);
+    s = dirname(buf);
+    if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) {
+	exit(1);
+    } else {
+	exit(0);
+    }
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes"
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+			LIBS="$save_LIBS"
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then
+			LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
+			printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DIRNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "libgen.h" "ac_cv_header_libgen_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_libgen_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LIBGEN_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+		fi
+
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getspnam" "ac_cv_func_getspnam"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getspnam" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getspnam in -lgen" >&5
+printf %s "checking for getspnam in -lgen... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lgen  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char getspnam ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return getspnam ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam" = xyes
+then :
+  LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
+fi
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing basename" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing basename... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_basename+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char basename ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return basename ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' gen
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_basename=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_basename+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_basename+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_basename=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_basename" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_basename" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_basename
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_BASENAME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+zlib=yes
+
+# Check whether --with-zlib was given.
+if test ${with_zlib+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_zlib;  if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+		zlib=no
+	  elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then
+		if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
+			if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
+				LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+			else
+				LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+			fi
+		else
+			if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
+				LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${rpath_opt}${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+			else
+				LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+			fi
+		fi
+		if test -d "$withval/include"; then
+			CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
+		else
+			CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
+		fi
+	fi
+
+fi
+
+
+# These libraries are needed for anything that links in the channel code.
+CHANNELLIBS=""
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for zlib" >&5
+printf %s "checking for zlib... " >&6; }
+if test "x${zlib}" = "xno"; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+else
+    saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+    CHANNELLIBS="$CHANNELLIBS -lz"
+    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define WITH_ZLIB 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+    ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "zlib.h" "ac_cv_header_zlib_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_zlib_h" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_error $? "*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for deflate in -lz" >&5
+printf %s "checking for deflate in -lz... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_z_deflate+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lz  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char deflate ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return deflate ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_z_deflate=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_z_deflate=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_z_deflate" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_z_deflate" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_z_deflate" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LIBZ 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+  LIBS="-lz $LIBS"
+
+else $as_nop
+
+		saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
+		saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+				if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
+			LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${rpath_opt}/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
+		else
+			LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
+		fi
+		CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}"
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char deflate ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return deflate ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LIBZ 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+
+				as_fn_error $? "*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-zlib-version-check was given.
+if test ${with_zlib_version_check+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_zlib_version_check;   if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+		zlib_check_nonfatal=1
+	   fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for possibly buggy zlib" >&5
+printf %s "checking for possibly buggy zlib... " >&6; }
+    if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+  	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking zlib version" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking zlib version" >&2;}
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <zlib.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v;
+	n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d);
+	if (n != 3 && n != 4)
+		exit(1);
+	v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d;
+	fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v);
+
+	/* 1.1.4 is OK */
+	if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4)
+		exit(0);
+
+	/* 1.2.3 and up are OK */
+	if (v >= 1020300)
+		exit(0);
+
+	exit(2);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+	  if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then
+		as_fn_error $? "*** zlib too old - check config.log ***
+Your reported zlib version has known security problems.  It's possible your
+vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number.  If you
+are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running
+\"./configure --without-zlib-version-check\".
+If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater.
+See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details." "$LINENO" 5
+	  else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: zlib version may have security problems" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: zlib version may have security problems" >&2;}
+	  fi
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+    LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strcasecmp" "ac_cv_func_strcasecmp"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strcasecmp" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for strcasecmp in -lresolv" >&5
+printf %s "checking for strcasecmp in -lresolv... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lresolv  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char strcasecmp ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return strcasecmp ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" = xyes
+then :
+  LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+  for ac_func in utimes
+do :
+  ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "utimes" "ac_cv_func_utimes"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_utimes" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UTIMES 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for utimes in -lc89" >&5
+printf %s "checking for utimes in -lc89... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lc89  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char utimes ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return utimes ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UTIMES 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+					LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "bsd/libutil.h" "ac_cv_header_bsd_libutil_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_bsd_libutil_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "libutil.h" "ac_cv_header_libutil_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_libutil_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LIBUTIL_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing fmt_scaled" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing fmt_scaled... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char fmt_scaled ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return fmt_scaled ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' util bsd
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing scan_scaled" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing scan_scaled... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char scan_scaled ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return scan_scaled ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' util bsd
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_scan_scaled=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_scan_scaled=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_scan_scaled" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_scan_scaled" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_scan_scaled
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing login" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing login... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_login+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char login ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return login ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' util bsd
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_login=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_login+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_login+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_login=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_login" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_login" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_login
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing logout" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing logout... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_logout+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char logout ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return logout ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' util bsd
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_logout=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_logout+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_logout+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_logout=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_logout" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_logout" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_logout
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing logwtmp" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing logwtmp... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char logwtmp ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return logwtmp ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' util bsd
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_logwtmp=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_logwtmp=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_logwtmp" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_logwtmp" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_logwtmp
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing openpty" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing openpty... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_openpty+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char openpty ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return openpty ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' util bsd
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_openpty=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_openpty+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_openpty+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_openpty=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_openpty" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_openpty" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_openpty
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing updwtmp" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing updwtmp... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char updwtmp ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return updwtmp ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' util bsd
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_updwtmp=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_updwtmp=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_updwtmp" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_updwtmp" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_updwtmp
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "fmt_scaled" "ac_cv_func_fmt_scaled"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_fmt_scaled" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FMT_SCALED 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "scan_scaled" "ac_cv_func_scan_scaled"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_scan_scaled" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SCAN_SCALED 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "login" "ac_cv_func_login"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_login" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LOGIN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "logout" "ac_cv_func_logout"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_logout" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LOGOUT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "openpty" "ac_cv_func_openpty"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_openpty" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_OPENPTY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "updwtmp" "ac_cv_func_updwtmp"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_updwtmp" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UPDWTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "logwtmp" "ac_cv_func_logwtmp"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_logwtmp" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LOGWTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+# On some platforms, inet_ntop and gethostbyname may be found in libresolv
+# or libnsl.
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing inet_ntop" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing inet_ntop... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char inet_ntop ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return inet_ntop ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' resolv nsl
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_inet_ntop=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_inet_ntop=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_inet_ntop" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_inet_ntop" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_inet_ntop
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing gethostbyname" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing gethostbyname... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_gethostbyname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char gethostbyname ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return gethostbyname ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' resolv nsl
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_gethostbyname=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_gethostbyname+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_gethostbyname+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_gethostbyname=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_gethostbyname" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_gethostbyname" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_gethostbyname
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+
+# Some Linux distribtions ship the BSD libc hashing functions in
+# separate libraries.
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing SHA256Update" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing SHA256Update... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_SHA256Update+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char SHA256Update ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return SHA256Update ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' md bsd
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_SHA256Update=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_SHA256Update+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_SHA256Update+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_SHA256Update=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_SHA256Update" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_SHA256Update" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_SHA256Update
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+
+# "Particular Function Checks"
+# see https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/manual/autoconf-2.69/html_node/Particular-Functions.html
+
+  for ac_func in strftime
+do :
+  ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strftime" "ac_cv_func_strftime"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strftime" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRFTIME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+  # strftime is in -lintl on SCO UNIX.
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for strftime in -lintl" >&5
+printf %s "checking for strftime in -lintl... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lintl  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char strftime ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return strftime ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRFTIME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+LIBS="-lintl $LIBS"
+fi
+
+fi
+
+done
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GNU libc compatible malloc" >&5
+printf %s "checking for GNU libc compatible malloc... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+  case "$host_os" in # ((
+		  # Guess yes on platforms where we know the result.
+		  *-gnu* | freebsd* | netbsd* | openbsd* | bitrig* \
+		  | hpux* | solaris* | cygwin* | mingw* | msys* )
+		    ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull=yes ;;
+		  # If we don't know, assume the worst.
+		  *) ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull=no ;;
+		esac
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+void *p = malloc (0);
+		   int result = !p;
+		   free (p);
+		   return result;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull=no
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull = yes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_MALLOC 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_MALLOC 0" >>confdefs.h
+
+   case " $LIBOBJS " in
+  *" malloc.$ac_objext "* ) ;;
+  *) LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS malloc.$ac_objext"
+ ;;
+esac
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define malloc rpl_malloc" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GNU libc compatible realloc" >&5
+printf %s "checking for GNU libc compatible realloc... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+  case "$host_os" in # ((
+		  # Guess yes on platforms where we know the result.
+		  *-gnu* | freebsd* | netbsd* | openbsd* | bitrig* \
+		  | hpux* | solaris* | cygwin* | mingw* | msys* )
+		    ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull=yes ;;
+		  # If we don't know, assume the worst.
+		  *) ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull=no ;;
+		esac
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+void *p = realloc (0, 0);
+		   int result = !p;
+		   free (p);
+		   return result;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull=no
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull = yes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_REALLOC 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_REALLOC 0" >>confdefs.h
+
+   case " $LIBOBJS " in
+  *" realloc.$ac_objext "* ) ;;
+  *) LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS realloc.$ac_objext"
+ ;;
+esac
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define realloc rpl_realloc" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+# autoconf doesn't have AC_FUNC_CALLOC so fake it if malloc returns NULL;
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if calloc(0, N) returns non-null" >&5
+printf %s "checking if calloc(0, N) returns non-null... " >&6; }
+if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming same as malloc" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming same as malloc" >&2;}
+	  func_calloc_0_nonnull="$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull"
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ void *p = calloc(0, 1); exit(p == NULL);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+   func_calloc_0_nonnull=yes
+else $as_nop
+   func_calloc_0_nonnull=no
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $func_calloc_0_nonnull" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$func_calloc_0_nonnull" >&6; }
+
+if test "x$func_calloc_0_nonnull" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_CALLOC 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_CALLOC 0" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define calloc rpl_calloc" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+# Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support" >&5
+printf %s "checking for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support... " >&6; }
+
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+		#include <glob.h>
+		#ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC
+		FOUNDIT
+		#endif
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "FOUNDIT" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+
+# Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gl_matchc field in glob_t" >&5
+printf %s "checking for gl_matchc field in glob_t... " >&6; }
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <glob.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+# Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob" >&5
+printf %s "checking for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob... " >&6; }
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <glob.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+#ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT
+#error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension"
+#endif
+glob_t g;
+g.gl_statv = NULL;
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "GLOB_NOMATCH" "ac_cv_have_decl_GLOB_NOMATCH" "#include <glob.h>
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_GLOB_NOMATCH" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "VIS_ALL" "ac_cv_have_decl_VIS_ALL" "#include <vis.h>
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_VIS_ALL" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name... " >&6; }
+if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME" >&2;}
+		printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	struct dirent d;
+	exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for /proc/pid/fd directory" >&5
+printf %s "checking for /proc/pid/fd directory... " >&6; }
+if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PROC_PID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+# Check whether user wants to use ldns
+LDNS_MSG="no"
+
+# Check whether --with-ldns was given.
+if test ${with_ldns+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_ldns;
+	ldns=""
+	if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+		if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
+  # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}ldns-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}ldns-config; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $LDNSCONFIG in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG="$LDNSCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+LDNSCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG
+if test -n "$LDNSCONFIG"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $LDNSCONFIG" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$LDNSCONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+fi
+if test -z "$ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG"; then
+  ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG=$LDNSCONFIG
+  # Extract the first word of "ldns-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ldns-config; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG="$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG
+if test -n "$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+  if test "x$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" = x; then
+    LDNSCONFIG="no"
+  else
+    case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
+yes:)
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
+ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
+esac
+    LDNSCONFIG=$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG
+  fi
+else
+  LDNSCONFIG="$ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG"
+fi
+
+		if test "x$LDNSCONFIG" = "xno"; then
+			LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
+			ldns=yes
+		else
+			LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`"
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`"
+			ldns=yes
+		fi
+	elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+			LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
+			LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
+			ldns=yes
+	fi
+
+	# Verify that it works.
+	if test "x$ldns" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LDNS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		LDNS_MSG="yes"
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ldns support" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ldns support... " >&6; }
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <ldns/ldns.h>
+int main(void) { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); }
+
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+
+					{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+					as_fn_error $? "** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries." "$LINENO" 5
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+	fi
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether user wants libedit support
+LIBEDIT_MSG="no"
+
+# Check whether --with-libedit was given.
+if test ${with_libedit+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_libedit;  if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+			if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
+				{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit... " >&6; }
+				if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then
+					{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+					use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes
+				else
+					{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+				fi
+			fi
+		else
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+			if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
+				LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+			else
+				LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+			fi
+		fi
+		if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then
+			LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit`
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`"
+		else
+			LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses"
+		fi
+		OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'`
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for el_init in -ledit" >&5
+printf %s "checking for el_init in -ledit... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-ledit  $OTHERLIBS
+		 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char el_init ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return el_init ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define USE_LIBEDIT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			  LIBEDIT_MSG="yes"
+
+
+else $as_nop
+   as_fn_error $? "libedit not found" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libedit version is compatible" >&5
+printf %s "checking if libedit version is compatible... " >&6; }
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <histedit.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	int i = H_SETSIZE;
+	el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	exit(0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		      as_fn_error $? "libedit version is not compatible" "$LINENO" 5
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+	fi
+
+fi
+
+
+AUDIT_MODULE=none
+
+# Check whether --with-audit was given.
+if test ${with_audit+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_audit;
+	  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for supported audit module" >&5
+printf %s "checking for supported audit module... " >&6; }
+	  case "$withval" in
+	  bsm)
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: bsm" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "bsm" >&6; }
+		AUDIT_MODULE=bsm
+				       for ac_header in bsm/audit.h
+do :
+  ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "bsm/audit.h" "ac_cv_header_bsm_audit_h" "
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+# include <time.h>
+#endif
+
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_bsm_audit_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_error $? "BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+done
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getaudit in -lbsm" >&5
+printf %s "checking for getaudit in -lbsm... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lbsm  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char getaudit ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return getaudit ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LIBBSM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+  LIBS="-lbsm $LIBS"
+
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_error $? "BSM enabled and required library not found" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+  for ac_func in getaudit
+do :
+  ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getaudit" "ac_cv_func_getaudit"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaudit" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETAUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_error $? "BSM enabled and required function not found" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+done
+		# These are optional
+		ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getaudit_addr" "ac_cv_func_getaudit_addr"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaudit_addr" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "aug_get_machine" "ac_cv_func_aug_get_machine"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_aug_get_machine" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define USE_BSM_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then
+			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_BSM_API 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+		;;
+	  linux)
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: linux" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "linux" >&6; }
+		AUDIT_MODULE=linux
+				ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "libaudit.h" "ac_cv_header_libaudit_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_libaudit_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+		SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define USE_LINUX_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		;;
+	  debug)
+		AUDIT_MODULE=debug
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: debug" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "debug" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		;;
+	  no)
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		;;
+	  *)
+		as_fn_error $? "Unknown audit module $withval" "$LINENO" 5
+		;;
+	esac
+
+fi
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-pie was given.
+if test ${with_pie+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_pie;
+	if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
+		use_pie=no
+	fi
+	if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then
+		use_pie=yes
+	fi
+
+
+fi
+
+if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then
+	use_pie=no
+fi
+if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
+	# Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off.
+	use_pie=no
+fi
+if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
+	# Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gcc >= 4.x" >&5
+printf %s "checking for gcc >= 4.x... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4
+#error gcc is too old
+#endif
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	  use_pie=no
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then
+	SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -fPIE" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $CC supports compile flag -fPIE... " >&6; }
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -fPIE"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-fPIE"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	{
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -pie" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $LD supports link flag -pie... " >&6; }
+	saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -pie"
+	_define_flag=""
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-pie"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	long long p = n * o;
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+else
+		  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+	# We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither.
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported... " >&6; }
+	if echo "x $CFLAGS"  | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+	   echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie'  >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
+		LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS"
+	fi
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether -fPIC is accepted" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether -fPIC is accepted... " >&6; }
+SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fPIC"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ exit(0);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+    PICFLAG="-fPIC";
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+    PICFLAG="";
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
+
+
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "Blowfish_initstate" "ac_cv_func_Blowfish_initstate"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_Blowfish_initstate" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "Blowfish_expandstate" "ac_cv_func_Blowfish_expandstate"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_Blowfish_expandstate" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPANDSTATE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "Blowfish_expand0state" "ac_cv_func_Blowfish_expand0state"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_Blowfish_expand0state" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "Blowfish_stream2word" "ac_cv_func_Blowfish_stream2word"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_Blowfish_stream2word" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_BLOWFISH_STREAM2WORD 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "SHA256Update" "ac_cv_func_SHA256Update"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_SHA256Update" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SHA256UPDATE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "SHA384Update" "ac_cv_func_SHA384Update"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_SHA384Update" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SHA384UPDATE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "SHA512Update" "ac_cv_func_SHA512Update"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_SHA512Update" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SHA512UPDATE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "asprintf" "ac_cv_func_asprintf"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_asprintf" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ASPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "b64_ntop" "ac_cv_func_b64_ntop"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_b64_ntop" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_B64_NTOP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "__b64_ntop" "ac_cv_func___b64_ntop"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func___b64_ntop" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE___B64_NTOP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "b64_pton" "ac_cv_func_b64_pton"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_b64_pton" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_B64_PTON 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "__b64_pton" "ac_cv_func___b64_pton"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func___b64_pton" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE___B64_PTON 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "bcopy" "ac_cv_func_bcopy"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_bcopy" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_BCOPY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "bcrypt_pbkdf" "ac_cv_func_bcrypt_pbkdf"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_bcrypt_pbkdf" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "bindresvport_sa" "ac_cv_func_bindresvport_sa"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_bindresvport_sa" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "blf_enc" "ac_cv_func_blf_enc"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_blf_enc" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_BLF_ENC 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "bzero" "ac_cv_func_bzero"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_bzero" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_BZERO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "cap_rights_limit" "ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "clock" "ac_cv_func_clock"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_clock" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_CLOCK 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "closefrom" "ac_cv_func_closefrom"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_closefrom" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_CLOSEFROM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "close_range" "ac_cv_func_close_range"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_close_range" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_CLOSE_RANGE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "dirfd" "ac_cv_func_dirfd"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_dirfd" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DIRFD 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "endgrent" "ac_cv_func_endgrent"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_endgrent" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ENDGRENT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "err" "ac_cv_func_err"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_err" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ERR 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "errx" "ac_cv_func_errx"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_errx" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ERRX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "explicit_bzero" "ac_cv_func_explicit_bzero"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_explicit_bzero" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "explicit_memset" "ac_cv_func_explicit_memset"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_explicit_memset" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EXPLICIT_MEMSET 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "fchmod" "ac_cv_func_fchmod"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_fchmod" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FCHMOD 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "fchmodat" "ac_cv_func_fchmodat"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_fchmodat" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FCHMODAT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "fchown" "ac_cv_func_fchown"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_fchown" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FCHOWN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "fchownat" "ac_cv_func_fchownat"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_fchownat" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FCHOWNAT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "flock" "ac_cv_func_flock"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_flock" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FLOCK 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "fnmatch" "ac_cv_func_fnmatch"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_fnmatch" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FNMATCH 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "freeaddrinfo" "ac_cv_func_freeaddrinfo"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_freeaddrinfo" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FREEADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "freezero" "ac_cv_func_freezero"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_freezero" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FREEZERO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "fstatfs" "ac_cv_func_fstatfs"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_fstatfs" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FSTATFS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "fstatvfs" "ac_cv_func_fstatvfs"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_fstatvfs" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FSTATVFS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "futimes" "ac_cv_func_futimes"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_futimes" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FUTIMES 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getaddrinfo" "ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getcwd" "ac_cv_func_getcwd"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getcwd" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETCWD 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getentropy" "ac_cv_func_getentropy"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getentropy" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETENTROPY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getgrouplist" "ac_cv_func_getgrouplist"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getgrouplist" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETGROUPLIST 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getline" "ac_cv_func_getline"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getline" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getnameinfo" "ac_cv_func_getnameinfo"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getnameinfo" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETNAMEINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getopt" "ac_cv_func_getopt"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getopt" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETOPT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpagesize" "ac_cv_func_getpagesize"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpagesize" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpeereid" "ac_cv_func_getpeereid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETPEEREID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpeerucred" "ac_cv_func_getpeerucred"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETPEERUCRED 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpgid" "ac_cv_func_getpgid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpgid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETPGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "_getpty" "ac_cv_func__getpty"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func__getpty" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE__GETPTY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getrlimit" "ac_cv_func_getrlimit"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getrlimit" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETRLIMIT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getrandom" "ac_cv_func_getrandom"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getrandom" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETRANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getsid" "ac_cv_func_getsid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getsid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETSID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getttyent" "ac_cv_func_getttyent"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getttyent" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETTTYENT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "glob" "ac_cv_func_glob"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_glob" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GLOB 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "group_from_gid" "ac_cv_func_group_from_gid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_group_from_gid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "inet_aton" "ac_cv_func_inet_aton"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_inet_aton" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_INET_ATON 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "inet_ntoa" "ac_cv_func_inet_ntoa"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_inet_ntoa" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_INET_NTOA 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "inet_ntop" "ac_cv_func_inet_ntop"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_inet_ntop" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_INET_NTOP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "innetgr" "ac_cv_func_innetgr"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_innetgr" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_INNETGR 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "killpg" "ac_cv_func_killpg"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_killpg" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_KILLPG 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "llabs" "ac_cv_func_llabs"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_llabs" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LLABS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "localtime_r" "ac_cv_func_localtime_r"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_localtime_r" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LOCALTIME_R 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "login_getcapbool" "ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "login_getpwclass" "ac_cv_func_login_getpwclass"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_login_getpwclass" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LOGIN_GETPWCLASS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "memmem" "ac_cv_func_memmem"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_memmem" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_MEMMEM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "memmove" "ac_cv_func_memmove"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_memmove" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_MEMMOVE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "memset_s" "ac_cv_func_memset_s"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_memset_s" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_MEMSET_S 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "mkdtemp" "ac_cv_func_mkdtemp"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_mkdtemp" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_MKDTEMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "ngetaddrinfo" "ac_cv_func_ngetaddrinfo"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_ngetaddrinfo" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_NGETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "nsleep" "ac_cv_func_nsleep"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_nsleep" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_NSLEEP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "ogetaddrinfo" "ac_cv_func_ogetaddrinfo"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_ogetaddrinfo" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_OGETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "openlog_r" "ac_cv_func_openlog_r"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_openlog_r" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_OPENLOG_R 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "pledge" "ac_cv_func_pledge"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PLEDGE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "poll" "ac_cv_func_poll"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_poll" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_POLL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "ppoll" "ac_cv_func_ppoll"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_ppoll" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PPOLL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "prctl" "ac_cv_func_prctl"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PRCTL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "procctl" "ac_cv_func_procctl"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_procctl" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PROCCTL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "pselect" "ac_cv_func_pselect"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_pselect" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PSELECT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "pstat" "ac_cv_func_pstat"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_pstat" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PSTAT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "raise" "ac_cv_func_raise"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_raise" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RAISE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "readpassphrase" "ac_cv_func_readpassphrase"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_readpassphrase" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_READPASSPHRASE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "reallocarray" "ac_cv_func_reallocarray"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_reallocarray" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_REALLOCARRAY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "realpath" "ac_cv_func_realpath"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_realpath" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_REALPATH 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "recvmsg" "ac_cv_func_recvmsg"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_recvmsg" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RECVMSG 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "recallocarray" "ac_cv_func_recallocarray"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_recallocarray" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "rresvport_af" "ac_cv_func_rresvport_af"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_rresvport_af" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "sendmsg" "ac_cv_func_sendmsg"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_sendmsg" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SENDMSG 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setdtablesize" "ac_cv_func_setdtablesize"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setdtablesize" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setegid" "ac_cv_func_setegid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setegid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETEGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setenv" "ac_cv_func_setenv"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setenv" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETENV 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "seteuid" "ac_cv_func_seteuid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_seteuid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETEUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setgroupent" "ac_cv_func_setgroupent"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setgroupent" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETGROUPENT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setgroups" "ac_cv_func_setgroups"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setgroups" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETGROUPS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setlinebuf" "ac_cv_func_setlinebuf"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setlinebuf" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETLINEBUF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setlogin" "ac_cv_func_setlogin"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setlogin" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETLOGIN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setpassent" "ac_cv_func_setpassent"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setpassent" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETPASSENT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setpcred" "ac_cv_func_setpcred"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setpcred" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETPCRED 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setproctitle" "ac_cv_func_setproctitle"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setproctitle" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETPROCTITLE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setregid" "ac_cv_func_setregid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setregid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setreuid" "ac_cv_func_setreuid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setreuid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setrlimit" "ac_cv_func_setrlimit"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETRLIMIT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setsid" "ac_cv_func_setsid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setsid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETSID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setvbuf" "ac_cv_func_setvbuf"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setvbuf" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETVBUF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "sigaction" "ac_cv_func_sigaction"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_sigaction" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SIGACTION 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "sigvec" "ac_cv_func_sigvec"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_sigvec" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SIGVEC 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "snprintf" "ac_cv_func_snprintf"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "socketpair" "ac_cv_func_socketpair"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_socketpair" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SOCKETPAIR 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "statfs" "ac_cv_func_statfs"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_statfs" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STATFS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "statvfs" "ac_cv_func_statvfs"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_statvfs" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STATVFS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strcasestr" "ac_cv_func_strcasestr"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strcasestr" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRCASESTR 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strdup" "ac_cv_func_strdup"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strdup" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRDUP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strerror" "ac_cv_func_strerror"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strerror" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRERROR 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strlcat" "ac_cv_func_strlcat"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strlcat" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRLCAT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strlcpy" "ac_cv_func_strlcpy"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strlcpy" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRLCPY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strmode" "ac_cv_func_strmode"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strmode" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRMODE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strndup" "ac_cv_func_strndup"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strndup" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRNDUP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strnlen" "ac_cv_func_strnlen"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strnlen" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRNLEN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strnvis" "ac_cv_func_strnvis"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strnvis" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRNVIS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strptime" "ac_cv_func_strptime"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strptime" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRPTIME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strsignal" "ac_cv_func_strsignal"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strsignal" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRSIGNAL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strtonum" "ac_cv_func_strtonum"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strtonum" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRTONUM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strtoll" "ac_cv_func_strtoll"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strtoll" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRTOLL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strtoul" "ac_cv_func_strtoul"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strtoul" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRTOUL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strtoull" "ac_cv_func_strtoull"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strtoull" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRTOULL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "swap32" "ac_cv_func_swap32"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_swap32" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SWAP32 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "sysconf" "ac_cv_func_sysconf"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_sysconf" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYSCONF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "tcgetpgrp" "ac_cv_func_tcgetpgrp"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_tcgetpgrp" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_TCGETPGRP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "timegm" "ac_cv_func_timegm"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_timegm" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_TIMEGM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "timingsafe_bcmp" "ac_cv_func_timingsafe_bcmp"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_timingsafe_bcmp" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "truncate" "ac_cv_func_truncate"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_truncate" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_TRUNCATE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "unsetenv" "ac_cv_func_unsetenv"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_unsetenv" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UNSETENV 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "updwtmpx" "ac_cv_func_updwtmpx"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_updwtmpx" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "utimensat" "ac_cv_func_utimensat"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_utimensat" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UTIMENSAT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "user_from_uid" "ac_cv_func_user_from_uid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_user_from_uid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_USER_FROM_UID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "usleep" "ac_cv_func_usleep"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_usleep" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_USLEEP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "vasprintf" "ac_cv_func_vasprintf"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_vasprintf" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_VASPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "vsnprintf" "ac_cv_func_vsnprintf"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_VSNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "waitpid" "ac_cv_func_waitpid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_waitpid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_WAITPID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "warn" "ac_cv_func_warn"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_warn" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_WARN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "bzero" "ac_cv_have_decl_bzero" "$ac_includes_default" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_bzero" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_BZERO $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "memmem" "ac_cv_have_decl_memmem" "$ac_includes_default" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_memmem" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "mblen" "ac_cv_func_mblen"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_mblen" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_MBLEN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "mbtowc" "ac_cv_func_mbtowc"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_mbtowc" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_MBTOWC 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "nl_langinfo" "ac_cv_func_nl_langinfo"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_nl_langinfo" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_NL_LANGINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "wcwidth" "ac_cv_func_wcwidth"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_wcwidth" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_WCWIDTH 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+TEST_SSH_UTF8=${TEST_SSH_UTF8:=yes}
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for utf8 locale support" >&5
+printf %s "checking for utf8 locale support... " >&6; }
+if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <locale.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	char *loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "en_US.UTF-8");
+	if (loc != NULL)
+		exit(0);
+	exit(1);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	 TEST_SSH_UTF8=no
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <ctype.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ return (isblank('a'));
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ISBLANK 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+disable_pkcs11=
+# Check whether --enable-pkcs11 was given.
+if test ${enable_pkcs11+y}
+then :
+  enableval=$enable_pkcs11;
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			disable_pkcs11=1
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+disable_sk=
+# Check whether --enable-security-key was given.
+if test ${enable_security_key+y}
+then :
+  enableval=$enable_security_key;
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			disable_sk=1
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+enable_sk_internal=
+
+# Check whether --with-security-key-builtin was given.
+if test ${with_security_key_builtin+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_security_key_builtin;  enable_sk_internal=$withval
+
+fi
+
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing dlopen" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing dlopen... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_dlopen+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char dlopen ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return dlopen ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' dl
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_dlopen=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_dlopen+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_dlopen+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_dlopen=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_dlopen" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_dlopen" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dlopen
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "dlopen" "ac_cv_func_dlopen"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_dlopen" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DLOPEN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "RTLD_NOW" "ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" "#include <dlfcn.h>
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" = xyes
+then :
+
+fi
+
+# IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror()
+
+  for ac_func in gai_strerror
+do :
+  ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "gai_strerror" "ac_cv_func_gai_strerror"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_gai_strerror" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GAI_STRERROR 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GAI_STRERROR 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+
+const char *gai_strerror(int);
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	char *str;
+	str = gai_strerror(0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+done
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing nanosleep" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing nanosleep... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char nanosleep ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return nanosleep ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' rt posix4
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_nanosleep=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_nanosleep=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_nanosleep" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_nanosleep" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_nanosleep
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_NANOSLEEP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing clock_gettime" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing clock_gettime... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char clock_gettime ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return clock_gettime ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' rt
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_clock_gettime=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_clock_gettime=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_clock_gettime" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_clock_gettime" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_clock_gettime
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "localtime_r" "ac_cv_have_decl_localtime_r" " #include <time.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_localtime_r" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+   saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
+	  CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_REENTRANT"
+	  unset ac_cv_have_decl_localtime_r
+	  ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "localtime_r" "ac_cv_have_decl_localtime_r" " #include <time.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_localtime_r" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+   CPPFLAGS="$saved_CPPFLAGS"
+fi
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "strsep" "ac_cv_have_decl_strsep" "
+#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
+# include <string.h>
+#endif
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_strsep" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strsep" "ac_cv_func_strsep"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strsep" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRSEP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "tcsendbreak" "ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak" "#include <termios.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "tcsendbreak" "ac_cv_func_tcsendbreak"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_tcsendbreak" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "h_errno" "ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno" "#include <netdb.h>
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "SHUT_RD" "ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "getpeereid" "ac_cv_have_decl_getpeereid" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_getpeereid" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_GETPEEREID $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "O_NONBLOCK" "ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "ftruncate" "ac_cv_have_decl_ftruncate" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_ftruncate" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_FTRUNCATE $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "getentropy" "ac_cv_have_decl_getentropy" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_getentropy" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_GETENTROPY $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "readv" "ac_cv_have_decl_readv" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_readv" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_READV $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "writev" "ac_cv_have_decl_writev" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_writev" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_WRITEV $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "MAXSYMLINKS" "ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS" "
+#include <sys/param.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "offsetof" "ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof" "
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+# extra bits for select(2)
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "howmany" "ac_cv_have_decl_howmany" "
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+#include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_howmany" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "NFDBITS" "ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS" "
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+#include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+
+ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fd_mask" "ac_cv_type_fd_mask" "
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+#include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_type_fd_mask" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FD_MASK 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+  for ac_func in setresuid
+do :
+  ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setresuid" "ac_cv_func_setresuid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setresuid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETRESUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setresuid seems to work" >&5
+printf %s "checking if setresuid seems to work... " >&6; }
+	if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&2;}
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	errno=0;
+	setresuid(0,0,0);
+	if (errno==ENOSYS)
+		exit(1);
+	else
+		exit(0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETRESUID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		 { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not implemented" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "not implemented" >&6; }
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+
+  for ac_func in setresgid
+do :
+  ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setresgid" "ac_cv_func_setresgid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setresgid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETRESGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setresgid seems to work" >&5
+printf %s "checking if setresgid seems to work... " >&6; }
+	if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&2;}
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	errno=0;
+	setresgid(0,0,0);
+	if (errno==ENOSYS)
+		exit(1);
+	else
+		exit(0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SETRESGID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		 { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not implemented" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "not implemented" >&6; }
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for working fflush(NULL)" >&5
+printf %s "checking for working fflush(NULL)... " >&6; }
+if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming working" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming working" >&2;}
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+fflush(NULL); exit(0);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define FFLUSH_NULL_BUG 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "gettimeofday" "ac_cv_func_gettimeofday"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_gettimeofday" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "time" "ac_cv_func_time"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_time" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_TIME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "endutent" "ac_cv_func_endutent"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_endutent" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ENDUTENT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getutent" "ac_cv_func_getutent"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getutent" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETUTENT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getutid" "ac_cv_func_getutid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getutid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETUTID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getutline" "ac_cv_func_getutline"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getutline" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETUTLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "pututline" "ac_cv_func_pututline"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_pututline" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PUTUTLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setutent" "ac_cv_func_setutent"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setutent" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETUTENT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "utmpname" "ac_cv_func_utmpname"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_utmpname" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UTMPNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "endutxent" "ac_cv_func_endutxent"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_endutxent" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ENDUTXENT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getutxent" "ac_cv_func_getutxent"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getutxent" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETUTXENT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getutxid" "ac_cv_func_getutxid"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getutxid" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETUTXID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getutxline" "ac_cv_func_getutxline"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getutxline" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETUTXLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getutxuser" "ac_cv_func_getutxuser"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getutxuser" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETUTXUSER 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "pututxline" "ac_cv_func_pututxline"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_pututxline" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PUTUTXLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setutxdb" "ac_cv_func_setutxdb"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setutxdb" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETUTXDB 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setutxent" "ac_cv_func_setutxent"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_setutxent" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SETUTXENT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "utmpxname" "ac_cv_func_utmpxname"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_utmpxname" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UTMPXNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getlastlogxbyname" "ac_cv_func_getlastlogxbyname"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getlastlogxbyname" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "daemon" "ac_cv_func_daemon"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_daemon" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DAEMON 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for daemon in -lbsd" >&5
+printf %s "checking for daemon in -lbsd... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lbsd  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char daemon ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return daemon ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon" = xyes
+then :
+  LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DAEMON 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpagesize" "ac_cv_func_getpagesize"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpagesize" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getpagesize in -lucb" >&5
+printf %s "checking for getpagesize in -lucb... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lucb  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char getpagesize ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return getpagesize ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize" = xyes
+then :
+  LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check for broken snprintf
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings... " >&6; }
+	if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;}
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	char b[5];
+	snprintf(b,5,"123456789");
+	exit(b[4]!='\0');
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: ****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&2;}
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether snprintf understands %zu" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether snprintf understands %zu... " >&6; }
+	if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;}
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	size_t a = 1, b = 2;
+	char z[128];
+	snprintf(z, sizeof z, "%zu%zu", a, b);
+	exit(strcmp(z, "12"));
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+fi
+
+# We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the
+# number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3)
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow... " >&6; }
+	if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()" >&2;}
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	size_t ret;
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+char x[1];
+if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
+	return 1;
+if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
+	return 1;
+return 0;
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: ****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&2;}
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+fi
+
+# On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio,
+# check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *.
+# This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt... " >&6; }
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; }
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	snprintf(0, 0, 0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SNPRINTF_CONST const" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+    printf "%s\n" "#define SNPRINTF_CONST /* not const */" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+# Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support
+NO_PEERCHECK=""
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+int i = SO_PEERCRED;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SO_PEERCRED 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		NO_PEERCHECK=1
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if openpty correctly handles controlling tty" >&5
+printf %s "checking if openpty correctly handles controlling tty... " >&6; }
+	if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&6; }
+
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H
+# include <pty.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	pid_t pid;
+	int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status;
+
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid < 0) {		/* failed */
+		exit(1);
+	} else if (pid > 0) {	/* parent */
+		waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
+		if (WIFEXITED(status))
+			exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
+		else
+			exit(2);
+	} else {		/* child */
+		close(0); close(1); close(2);
+		setsid();
+		openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+		if (fd >= 0)
+			exit(3);	/* Acquired ctty: broken */
+		else
+			exit(0);	/* Did not acquire ctty: OK */
+	}
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+			printf "%s\n" "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
+    test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if getaddrinfo seems to work" >&5
+printf %s "checking if getaddrinfo seems to work... " >&6; }
+	if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&6; }
+
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#define TEST_PORT "2222"
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	int err, sock;
+	struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
+
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+
+	err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
+	if (err != 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+			continue;
+
+		err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
+		    sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+		    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
+
+		if (err != 0) {
+			if (err == EAI_SYSTEM)
+				perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM");
+			else
+				fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n",
+				    gai_strerror(err));
+			exit(2);
+		}
+
+		sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+		if (sock < 0)
+			perror("socket");
+		if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+			if (errno == EBADF)
+				exit(3);
+		}
+	}
+	exit(0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+			printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
+    test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if getaddrinfo seems to work" >&5
+printf %s "checking if getaddrinfo seems to work... " >&6; }
+	if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: cross-compiling, assuming no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "cross-compiling, assuming no" >&6; }
+
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#define TEST_PORT "2222"
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	int err, sock;
+	struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
+
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+
+	err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
+	if (err != 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+			continue;
+
+		err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
+		    sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+		    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
+
+		if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) {
+			perror("getnameinfo");
+			exit(2);
+		}
+	}
+	exit(0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+else $as_nop
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+			printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes"; then
+	ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "AI_NUMERICSERV" "ac_cv_have_decl_AI_NUMERICSERV" "#include <sys/types.h>
+	     #include <sys/socket.h>
+	     #include <netdb.h>
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_AI_NUMERICSERV" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ exit(0);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strnvis" = "xyes"; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for working strnvis" >&5
+printf %s "checking for working strnvis... " >&6; }
+	if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming broken" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming broken" >&2;}
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <vis.h>
+static void sighandler(int sig) { _exit(1); }
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	char dst[16];
+
+	signal(SIGSEGV, sighandler);
+	if (strnvis(dst, "src", 4, 0) && strcmp(dst, "src") == 0)
+		exit(0);
+	exit(1)
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if SA_RESTARTed signals interrupt select()" >&5
+printf %s "checking if SA_RESTARTed signals interrupt select()... " >&6; }
+if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+static void sighandler(int sig) { }
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	int r;
+	pid_t pid;
+	struct sigaction sa;
+
+	sa.sa_handler = sighandler;
+	sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, NULL);
+	if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { /* child */
+		pid = getppid();
+		sleep(1);
+		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+		sleep(1);
+		if (getppid() == pid) /* if parent did not exit, shoot it */
+			kill(pid, SIGKILL);
+		exit(0);
+	} else { /* parent */
+		r = select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	}
+	exit(r == -1 ? 0 : 1);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define NO_SA_RESTART 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+
+  for ac_func in getpgrp
+do :
+  ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpgrp" "ac_cv_func_getpgrp"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpgrp" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETPGRP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if getpgrp accepts zero args" >&5
+printf %s "checking if getpgrp accepts zero args... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+$ac_includes_default
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ getpgrp();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define GETPGRP_VOID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define GETPGRP_VOID 0" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+# Search for OpenSSL
+saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
+saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+openssl_bin_PATH="$PATH"
+
+# Check whether --with-ssl-dir was given.
+if test ${with_ssl_dir+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_ssl_dir;
+		if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+			as_fn_error $? "cannot use --with-ssl-dir when OpenSSL disabled" "$LINENO" 5
+		fi
+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			case "$withval" in
+				# Relative paths
+				./*|../*)	withval="`pwd`/$withval"
+			esac
+			if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
+				libcrypto_path="${withval}/lib"
+			elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then
+				libcrypto_path="$withval/lib64"
+			else
+				# Built but not installed
+				libcrypto_path="${withval}"
+			fi
+			if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
+				LDFLAGS="-L${libcrypto_path} ${rpath_opt}${libcrypto_path} ${LDFLAGS}"
+			else
+				LDFLAGS="-L${libcrypto_path} ${LDFLAGS}"
+			fi
+			if test -d "$withval/include"; then
+				CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
+			else
+				CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
+			fi
+			openssl_bin_PATH="${PATH}${PATH_SEPARATOR}${withval}/bin${PATH_SEPARATOR}${withval}/apps"
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+for ac_prog in openssl
+do
+  # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_openssl_bin+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $openssl_bin in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_openssl_bin="$openssl_bin" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $openssl_bin_PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_openssl_bin="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+openssl_bin=$ac_cv_path_openssl_bin
+if test -n "$openssl_bin"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $openssl_bin" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$openssl_bin" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+  test -n "$openssl_bin" && break
+done
+
+OPENSSL_BIN=${openssl_bin}
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-openssl-header-check was given.
+if test ${with_openssl_header_check+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_openssl_header_check;
+		if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+			openssl_check_nonfatal=1
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+openssl_engine=no
+
+# Check whether --with-ssl-engine was given.
+if test ${with_ssl_engine+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_ssl_engine;
+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+				as_fn_error $? "cannot use --with-ssl-engine when OpenSSL disabled" "$LINENO" 5
+			fi
+			openssl_engine=yes
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+nocrypto_saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+	LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS"
+	CHANNELLIBS="-lcrypto $CHANNELLIBS"
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char RAND_add ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return RAND_add ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_error $? "*** working libcrypto not found, check config.log" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+	ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "openssl/opensslv.h" "ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_error $? "*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+
+	# Determine OpenSSL header version
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking OpenSSL header version" >&5
+printf %s "checking OpenSSL header version... " >&6; }
+	if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
+
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+	#include <stdlib.h>
+	#include <stdio.h>
+	#include <string.h>
+	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+	#define DATA "conftest.sslincver"
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+		FILE *fd;
+		int rc;
+
+		fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+		if(fd == NULL)
+			exit(1);
+
+		if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n",
+		    (unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
+		     OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) < 0)
+			exit(1);
+
+		exit(0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver`
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ssl_header_ver" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ssl_header_ver" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "not found" >&6; }
+			as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL version header not found." "$LINENO" 5
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+	# Determining OpenSSL library version is version dependent.
+	ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "OpenSSL_version" "ac_cv_func_OpenSSL_version"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_OpenSSL_version" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "OpenSSL_version_num" "ac_cv_func_OpenSSL_version_num"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_OpenSSL_version_num" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+	# Determine OpenSSL library version
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking OpenSSL library version" >&5
+printf %s "checking OpenSSL library version... " >&6; }
+	if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
+
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+	#include <stdio.h>
+	#include <stdlib.h>
+	#include <string.h>
+	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+	#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+	#define DATA "conftest.ssllibver"
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+		FILE *fd;
+		int rc;
+
+		fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+		if(fd == NULL)
+			exit(1);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
+# define OpenSSL_version	SSLeay_version
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
+# define OpenSSL_version_num	SSLeay
+#endif
+		if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n",
+		    (unsigned long)OpenSSL_version_num(),
+		    OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION))) < 0)
+			exit(1);
+
+		exit(0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver`
+			# Check version is supported.
+			case "$ssl_library_ver" in
+			10000*|0*)
+				as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have \"$ssl_library_ver\")" "$LINENO" 5
+		                ;;
+			100*)   ;; # 1.0.x
+			101000[0123456]*)
+				# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613
+				as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL 1.1.x versions prior to 1.1.0g have a bug that breaks their use with OpenSSH (have \"$ssl_library_ver\")" "$LINENO" 5
+				;;
+			101*)   ;; # 1.1.x
+			200*)   ;; # LibreSSL
+			300*)
+				# OpenSSL 3; we use the 1.1x API
+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L"
+				;;
+			301*|302*)
+				# OpenSSL development branch; request 1.1x API
+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L"
+				;;
+		        *)
+				as_fn_error $? "Unknown/unsupported OpenSSL version (\"$ssl_library_ver\")" "$LINENO" 5
+		                ;;
+			esac
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ssl_library_ver" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ssl_library_ver" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "not found" >&6; }
+			as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL library not found." "$LINENO" 5
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+	case "$host" in
+	x86_64-*)
+		case "$ssl_library_ver" in
+		3000004*)
+			as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL 3.0.4 has a potential RCE in its RSA implementation (CVE-2022-2274)" "$LINENO" 5
+			;;
+		esac
+	esac
+
+	# Sanity check OpenSSL headers
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL's headers match the library" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether OpenSSL's headers match the library... " >&6; }
+	if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
+
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+	#include <stdlib.h>
+	#include <string.h>
+	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+	#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
+# define OpenSSL_version_num	SSLeay
+#endif
+		exit(OpenSSL_version_num() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+			if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then
+				as_fn_error $? "Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
+	library. Check config.log for details.
+	If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check
+	by running \"./configure --without-openssl-header-check\".
+	Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.
+	" "$LINENO" 5
+			else
+				{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
+	library. Check config.log for details.
+	Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches." >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
+	library. Check config.log for details.
+	Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches." >&2;}
+			fi
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if programs using OpenSSL functions will link" >&5
+printf %s "checking if programs using OpenSSL functions will link... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+			LIBS="$LIBS -ldl"
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl" >&5
+printf %s "checking if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl... " >&6; }
+			cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ ERR_load_crypto_strings();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+					{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+					CHANNELLIBS="$CHANNELLIBS -ldl"
+
+else $as_nop
+
+					{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+	ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "BN_is_prime_ex" "ac_cv_func_BN_is_prime_ex"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_BN_is_prime_ex" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "DES_crypt" "ac_cv_func_DES_crypt"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_DES_crypt" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DES_CRYPT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "DSA_generate_parameters_ex" "ac_cv_func_DSA_generate_parameters_ex"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_DSA_generate_parameters_ex" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_DigestFinal_ex" "ac_cv_func_EVP_DigestFinal_ex"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_DigestFinal_ex" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EVP_DIGESTFINAL_EX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_DigestInit_ex" "ac_cv_func_EVP_DigestInit_ex"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_DigestInit_ex" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup" "ac_cv_func_EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex" "ac_cv_func_EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_MD_CTX_init" "ac_cv_func_EVP_MD_CTX_init"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_MD_CTX_init" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "HMAC_CTX_init" "ac_cv_func_HMAC_CTX_init"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_HMAC_CTX_init" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_HMAC_CTX_INIT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "RSA_generate_key_ex" "ac_cv_func_RSA_generate_key_ex"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_RSA_generate_key_ex" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "RSA_get_default_method" "ac_cv_func_RSA_get_default_method"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_RSA_get_default_method" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
+	ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" "ac_cv_func_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" "ac_cv_have_decl_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" "#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+fi
+
+
+	# LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API
+	ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "OPENSSL_init_crypto" "ac_cv_func_OPENSSL_init_crypto"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_OPENSSL_init_crypto" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "DH_get0_key" "ac_cv_func_DH_get0_key"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_DH_get0_key" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "DH_get0_pqg" "ac_cv_func_DH_get0_pqg"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_DH_get0_pqg" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "DH_set0_key" "ac_cv_func_DH_set0_key"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_DH_set0_key" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "DH_set_length" "ac_cv_func_DH_set_length"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_DH_set_length" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "DH_set0_pqg" "ac_cv_func_DH_set0_pqg"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_DH_set0_pqg" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "DSA_get0_key" "ac_cv_func_DSA_get0_key"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_DSA_get0_key" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "DSA_get0_pqg" "ac_cv_func_DSA_get0_pqg"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_DSA_get0_pqg" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "DSA_set0_key" "ac_cv_func_DSA_set0_key"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_DSA_set0_key" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "DSA_set0_pqg" "ac_cv_func_DSA_set0_pqg"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_DSA_set0_pqg" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "DSA_SIG_get0" "ac_cv_func_DSA_SIG_get0"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_DSA_SIG_get0" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "DSA_SIG_set0" "ac_cv_func_DSA_SIG_set0"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_DSA_SIG_set0" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "ECDSA_SIG_get0" "ac_cv_func_ECDSA_SIG_get0"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_ECDSA_SIG_get0" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "ECDSA_SIG_set0" "ac_cv_func_ECDSA_SIG_set0"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_ECDSA_SIG_set0" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv" "ac_cv_func_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst" "ac_cv_func_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv" "ac_cv_func_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_updated_iv" "ac_cv_func_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_updated_iv"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_updated_iv" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_UPDATED_IV 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv" "ac_cv_func_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "RSA_get0_crt_params" "ac_cv_func_RSA_get0_crt_params"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_RSA_get0_crt_params" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "RSA_get0_factors" "ac_cv_func_RSA_get0_factors"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_RSA_get0_factors" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "RSA_get0_key" "ac_cv_func_RSA_get0_key"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_RSA_get0_key" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "RSA_set0_crt_params" "ac_cv_func_RSA_set0_crt_params"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_RSA_set0_crt_params" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "RSA_set0_factors" "ac_cv_func_RSA_set0_factors"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_RSA_set0_factors" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "RSA_set0_key" "ac_cv_func_RSA_set0_key"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_RSA_set0_key" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "RSA_meth_free" "ac_cv_func_RSA_meth_free"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_RSA_meth_free" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "RSA_meth_dup" "ac_cv_func_RSA_meth_dup"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_RSA_meth_dup" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "RSA_meth_set1_name" "ac_cv_func_RSA_meth_set1_name"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_RSA_meth_set1_name" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "RSA_meth_get_finish" "ac_cv_func_RSA_meth_get_finish"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_RSA_meth_get_finish" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "RSA_meth_set_priv_enc" "ac_cv_func_RSA_meth_set_priv_enc"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_RSA_meth_set_priv_enc" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "RSA_meth_set_priv_dec" "ac_cv_func_RSA_meth_set_priv_dec"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_RSA_meth_set_priv_dec" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "RSA_meth_set_finish" "ac_cv_func_RSA_meth_set_finish"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_RSA_meth_set_finish" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA" "ac_cv_func_EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_MD_CTX_new" "ac_cv_func_EVP_MD_CTX_new"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_MD_CTX_new" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_MD_CTX_free" "ac_cv_func_EVP_MD_CTX_free"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_MD_CTX_free" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_chacha20" "ac_cv_func_EVP_chacha20"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_chacha20" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EVP_CHACHA20 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+	if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for OpenSSL ENGINE support" >&5
+printf %s "checking for OpenSSL ENGINE support... " >&6; }
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+	#include <openssl/engine.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+				ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+				ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+else $as_nop
+   as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL ENGINE support not found" "$LINENO" 5
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+	fi
+
+	# Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+	#include <stdlib.h>
+	#include <string.h>
+	#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+		exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int" >&5
+printf %s "checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+	#include <stdlib.h>
+	#include <string.h>
+	#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+		if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0))
+			exit(0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+	# Check for SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 support in OpenSSL
+	ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_sha256" "ac_cv_func_EVP_sha256"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_sha256" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EVP_SHA256 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_sha384" "ac_cv_func_EVP_sha384"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_sha384" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EVP_SHA384 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_sha512" "ac_cv_func_EVP_sha512"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_sha512" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EVP_SHA512 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+	# Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+	#include <openssl/ec.h>
+	#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+	#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+	#include <openssl/evp.h>
+	#include <openssl/objects.h>
+	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+		EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+		const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		  enable_nistp256=1
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+	#include <openssl/ec.h>
+	#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+	#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+	#include <openssl/evp.h>
+	#include <openssl/objects.h>
+	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+		EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1);
+		const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		  enable_nistp384=1
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+	#include <openssl/ec.h>
+	#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+	#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+	#include <openssl/evp.h>
+	#include <openssl/objects.h>
+	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+		EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
+		const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+		  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional" >&5
+printf %s "checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional... " >&6; }
+		  if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
+			  enable_nistp521=1
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+	#include <stdlib.h>
+	#include <openssl/ec.h>
+	#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+	#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+	#include <openssl/evp.h>
+	#include <openssl/objects.h>
+	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+			EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
+			const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
+			exit(e == NULL || m == NULL);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+			  enable_nistp521=1
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+	if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \
+	    test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define OPENSSL_HAS_ECC 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EC_KEY_METHOD_new" "ac_cv_func_EC_KEY_METHOD_new"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_EC_KEY_METHOD_new" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+		openssl_ecc=yes
+	else
+		openssl_ecc=no
+	fi
+	if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	else
+		unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
+			ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \
+			ecdh-sha2-nistp256 \
+			ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+	fi
+	if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	else
+		unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
+			ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \
+			ecdh-sha2-nistp384 \
+			ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+	fi
+	if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	else
+		unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
+			ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \
+			ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 \
+			ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+	fi
+fi
+
+# PKCS11/U2F depend on OpenSSL and dlopen().
+enable_pkcs11=yes
+enable_sk=yes
+if test "x$openssl" != "xyes" ; then
+	enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing libcrypto"
+fi
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_dlopen" != "xyes" ; then
+	enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing dlopen(3)"
+	enable_sk="disabled; missing dlopen(3)"
+fi
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" != "xyes" ; then
+	enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW"
+	enable_sk="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW"
+fi
+if test ! -z "$disable_pkcs11" ; then
+	enable_pkcs11="disabled by user"
+fi
+if test ! -z "$disable_sk" ; then
+	enable_sk="disabled by user"
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to enable PKCS11" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether to enable PKCS11... " >&6; }
+if test "x$enable_pkcs11" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define ENABLE_PKCS11 /**/" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $enable_pkcs11" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$enable_pkcs11" >&6; }
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to enable U2F" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether to enable U2F... " >&6; }
+if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define ENABLE_SK /**/" >>confdefs.h
+
+	SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY=regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
+
+else
+	# Do not try to build sk-dummy library.
+	SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY=""
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $enable_sk" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$enable_sk" >&6; }
+
+# Now check for built-in security key support.
+if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" -a "x$enable_sk_internal" != "xno" ; then
+	use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2=
+	if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libfido2" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libfido2... " >&6; }
+		if "$PKGCONFIG" libfido2; then
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+			use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2=yes
+		else
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		fi
+	fi
+	if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2" = "xyes"; then
+		LIBFIDO2=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libfido2`
+		CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libfido2`"
+	else
+		LIBFIDO2="-lfido2 -lcbor"
+	fi
+	OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBFIDO2 | sed 's/-lfido2//'`
+	fido2_error=
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for fido_init in -lfido2" >&5
+printf %s "checking for fido_init in -lfido2... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lfido2  $OTHERLIBS
+	 $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char fido_init ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return fido_init ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+   fido2_error="missing/unusable libfido2"
+fi
+
+	ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "fido.h" "ac_cv_header_fido_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_fido_h" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+   fido2_error="missing fido.h from libfido2"
+fi
+
+	ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "fido/credman.h" "ac_cv_header_fido_credman_h" " #include <fido.h>
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_fido_credman_h" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+   fido2_error="missing fido/credman.h from libfido2"
+fi
+
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for usable libfido2 installation" >&5
+printf %s "checking for usable libfido2 installation... " >&6; }
+	if test ! -z "$fido2_error" ; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $fido2_error" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$fido2_error" >&6; }
+		if test "x$enable_sk_internal" = "xyes" ; then
+			as_fn_error $? "No usable libfido2 library/headers found" "$LINENO" 5
+		fi
+		LIBFIDO2=""
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL /**/" >>confdefs.h
+
+		enable_sk="built-in"
+		saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+		LIBS="$LIBFIDO2 $LIBS"
+		ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "fido_assert_set_clientdata" "ac_cv_func_fido_assert_set_clientdata"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_fido_assert_set_clientdata" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FIDO_ASSERT_SET_CLIENTDATA 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "fido_cred_prot" "ac_cv_func_fido_cred_prot"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_fido_cred_prot" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FIDO_CRED_PROT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "fido_cred_set_prot" "ac_cv_func_fido_cred_set_prot"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_fido_cred_set_prot" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FIDO_CRED_SET_PROT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "fido_cred_set_clientdata" "ac_cv_func_fido_cred_set_clientdata"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_fido_cred_set_clientdata" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FIDO_CRED_SET_CLIENTDATA 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "fido_dev_get_touch_begin" "ac_cv_func_fido_dev_get_touch_begin"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_fido_dev_get_touch_begin" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_BEGIN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "fido_dev_get_touch_status" "ac_cv_func_fido_dev_get_touch_status"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_fido_dev_get_touch_status" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_STATUS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "fido_dev_supports_cred_prot" "ac_cv_func_fido_dev_supports_cred_prot"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_fido_dev_supports_cred_prot" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FIDO_DEV_SUPPORTS_CRED_PROT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "fido_dev_is_winhello" "ac_cv_func_fido_dev_is_winhello"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_fido_dev_is_winhello" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FIDO_DEV_IS_WINHELLO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+		LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+	fi
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "arc4random" "ac_cv_func_arc4random"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_arc4random" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "arc4random_buf" "ac_cv_func_arc4random_buf"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_arc4random_buf" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "arc4random_stir" "ac_cv_func_arc4random_stir"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_arc4random_stir" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "arc4random_uniform" "ac_cv_func_arc4random_uniform"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_arc4random_uniform" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+### Configure cryptographic random number support
+
+# Check whether OpenSSL seeds itself
+if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded... " >&6; }
+	if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
+			# This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if
+			# OpenSSL is not seeded correctly.
+			OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
+
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+	#include <stdlib.h>
+	#include <string.h>
+	#include <openssl/rand.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+		exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+fi
+
+# PRNGD TCP socket
+
+# Check whether --with-prngd-port was given.
+if test ${with_prngd_port+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_prngd_port;
+		case "$withval" in
+		no)
+			withval=""
+			;;
+		[0-9]*)
+			;;
+		*)
+			as_fn_error $? "You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port" "$LINENO" 5
+			;;
+		esac
+		if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
+			PRNGD_PORT="$withval"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define PRNGD_PORT $PRNGD_PORT" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# PRNGD Unix domain socket
+
+# Check whether --with-prngd-socket was given.
+if test ${with_prngd_socket+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_prngd_socket;
+		case "$withval" in
+		yes)
+			withval="/var/run/egd-pool"
+			;;
+		no)
+			withval=""
+			;;
+		/*)
+			;;
+		*)
+			as_fn_error $? "You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket" "$LINENO" 5
+			;;
+		esac
+
+		if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
+			if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
+				as_fn_error $? "You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket" "$LINENO" 5
+			fi
+			if test ! -r "$withval" ; then
+				{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Entropy socket is not readable" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: Entropy socket is not readable" >&2;}
+			fi
+			PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define PRNGD_SOCKET \"$PRNGD_SOCKET\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+
+else $as_nop
+
+		# Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already
+		if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PRNGD/EGD socket" >&5
+printf %s "checking for PRNGD/EGD socket... " >&6; }
+			# Insert other locations here
+			for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do
+				if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then
+					PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock"
+					printf "%s\n" "#define PRNGD_SOCKET \"$PRNGD_SOCKET\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+					break;
+				fi
+			done
+			if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
+				{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PRNGD_SOCKET" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$PRNGD_SOCKET" >&6; }
+			else
+				{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "not found" >&6; }
+			fi
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Which randomness source do we use?
+if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
+	RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT"
+elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
+	RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET"
+elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY"
+elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible" >&2;}
+else
+	as_fn_error $? "OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+LIBS="$nocrypto_saved_LIBS"
+
+saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-liaf  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char ia_openinfo ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return ia_openinfo ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" = xyes
+then :
+
+	LIBS="$LIBS -liaf"
+
+  for ac_func in set_id
+do :
+  ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "set_id" "ac_cv_func_set_id"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_set_id" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SET_ID 1" >>confdefs.h
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LIBIAF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+fi
+
+LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+# Check for crypt() in libcrypt.  If we have it, we only need it for sshd.
+saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5
+printf %s "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lcrypt  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char crypt ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return crypt ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes
+then :
+
+	LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS"
+	SSHDLIBS="-lcrypt $SSHDLIBS"
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "crypt" "ac_cv_func_crypt"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_crypt" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_CRYPT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+# Check for PAM libs
+PAM_MSG="no"
+
+# Check whether --with-pam was given.
+if test ${with_pam+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_pam;
+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \
+			   test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then
+				as_fn_error $? "PAM headers not found" "$LINENO" 5
+			fi
+
+			saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for dlopen in -ldl" >&5
+printf %s "checking for dlopen in -ldl... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-ldl  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char dlopen ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return dlopen ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LIBDL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+  LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_set_item in -lpam" >&5
+printf %s "checking for pam_set_item in -lpam... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lpam  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char pam_set_item ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return pam_set_item ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LIBPAM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+  LIBS="-lpam $LIBS"
+
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_error $? "*** libpam missing" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+			ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "pam_getenvlist" "ac_cv_func_pam_getenvlist"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_pam_getenvlist" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+			ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "pam_putenv" "ac_cv_func_pam_putenv"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_pam_putenv" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PAM_PUTENV 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+			LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+			PAM_MSG="yes"
+
+			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define USE_PAM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+			if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then
+				case "$LIBS" in
+				*-ldl*)
+					# libdl already in LIBS
+					;;
+				*)
+					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
+					;;
+				esac
+			fi
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-pam-service was given.
+if test ${with_pam_service+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_pam_service;
+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+		   test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE \"$withval\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check for older PAM
+if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
+	# Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM)
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether pam_strerror takes only one argument" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether pam_strerror takes only one argument... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_OLD_PAM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+			PAM_MSG="yes (old library)"
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+case "$host" in
+*-*-cygwin*)
+	SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+	;;
+*)
+	SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
+	;;
+esac
+
+# Check whether --with-privsep-user was given.
+if test ${with_privsep_user+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_privsep_user;
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" >>confdefs.h
+
+else
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER \"$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER" "ac_cv_have_decl_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER" "
+	#include <sys/types.h>
+	#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER" = xyes
+then :
+  have_seccomp_filter=1
+fi
+fi
+if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking kernel for seccomp_filter support" >&5
+printf %s "checking kernel for seccomp_filter support... " >&6; }
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+		#include <errno.h>
+		#include <elf.h>
+		#include <linux/audit.h>
+		#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+		#include <stdlib.h>
+		#include <sys/prctl.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ int i = $seccomp_audit_arch;
+	   errno = 0;
+	   prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0);
+	   exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		# Disable seccomp filter as a target
+		have_seccomp_filter=0
+
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct pollfd" "fd" "ac_cv_member_struct_pollfd_fd" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+#include <sys/poll.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_pollfd_fd" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRUCT_POLLFD_FD 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+
+ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "nfds_t" "ac_cv_type_nfds_t" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+#include <sys/poll.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_type_nfds_t" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_NFDS_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Decide which sandbox style to use
+sandbox_arg=""
+
+# Check whether --with-sandbox was given.
+if test ${with_sandbox+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_sandbox;
+		if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+			sandbox_arg=""
+		else
+			sandbox_arg="$withval"
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+if test "x$sandbox_arg" != "xno"; then
+# POSIX specifies that poll() "shall fail with EINVAL if the nfds argument
+# is greater than OPEN_MAX".  On some platforms that includes implementions
+# of select in userspace on top of poll() so check both work with rlimit
+# NOFILES so check that both work before enabling the rlimit sandbox.
+    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if select and/or poll works with descriptor rlimit" >&5
+printf %s "checking if select and/or poll works with descriptor rlimit... " >&6; }
+    if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming no" >&2;}
+	 select_works_with_rlimit=no
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+# include <poll.h>
+#elif HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+# include <sys/poll.h>
+#endif
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	struct rlimit rl_zero;
+	int fd, r;
+	fd_set fds;
+	struct timeval tv;
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+#endif
+
+	fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
+	FD_ZERO(&fds);
+	FD_SET(fd, &fds);
+	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+	setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero);
+	setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
+	tv.tv_sec = 1;
+	tv.tv_usec = 0;
+	r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
+	if (r == -1)
+		exit(1);
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL
+	pfd.fd = fd;
+	pfd.events = POLLIN;
+	r = poll(&pfd, 1, 1);
+	if (r == -1)
+		exit(2);
+#endif
+	exit(0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+	 select_works_with_rlimit=yes
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	 select_works_with_rlimit=no
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works" >&5
+printf %s "checking if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works... " >&6; }
+    if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
+	 rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	struct rlimit rl_zero;
+	int r;
+
+	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+	r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
+	exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+	 rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	 rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works" >&5
+printf %s "checking if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works... " >&6; }
+    if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+		struct rlimit rl_zero;
+
+		rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+		exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+fi
+
+if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xpledge" || \
+   ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" = "xyes" ) ; then
+	test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" != "xyes" && \
+		as_fn_error $? "pledge sandbox requires pledge(2) support" "$LINENO" 5
+	SANDBOX_STYLE="pledge"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SANDBOX_PLEDGE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \
+   ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then
+	test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \
+		as_fn_error $? "systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support" "$LINENO" 5
+	SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SANDBOX_SYSTRACE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \
+     ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \
+       test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then
+	test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \
+	     "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \
+		as_fn_error $? "Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function" "$LINENO" 5
+	SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SANDBOX_DARWIN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \
+     ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
+       test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \
+       test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \
+       test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \
+       test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \
+       test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \
+       test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \
+       test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then
+	test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \
+		as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host" "$LINENO" 5
+	test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \
+		as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" "$LINENO" 5
+	test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \
+		as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers" "$LINENO" 5
+	test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \
+		as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function" "$LINENO" 5
+	SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \
+     ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
+       test "x$disable_capsicum" != "xyes" && \
+       test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \
+       test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then
+       test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \
+		as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header" "$LINENO" 5
+       test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \
+		as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function" "$LINENO" 5
+       SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SANDBOX_CAPSICUM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \
+     ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \
+       test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \
+       test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then
+	test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \
+		as_fn_error $? "rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function" "$LINENO" 5
+	test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \
+		as_fn_error $? "rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit" "$LINENO" 5
+	SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SANDBOX_RLIMIT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsolaris" || \
+   ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$SOLARIS_PRIVS" = "xyes" ) ; then
+	SANDBOX_STYLE="solaris"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SANDBOX_SOLARIS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \
+     test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then
+	SANDBOX_STYLE="none"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SANDBOX_NULL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else
+	as_fn_error $? "unsupported --with-sandbox" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+# Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right.
+if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then
+  LIBS="$LIBS -liberty";
+fi
+
+# Check for long long datatypes
+ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "long long" "ac_cv_type_long_long" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_type_long_long" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LONG_LONG 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "unsigned long long" "ac_cv_type_unsigned_long_long" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_type_unsigned_long_long" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "long double" "ac_cv_type_long_double" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_type_long_double" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check datatype sizes
+# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
+# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
+# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
+# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of short int" >&5
+printf %s "checking size of short int... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_sizeof_short_int+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (short int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_short_int"        "$ac_includes_default"
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  if test "$ac_cv_type_short_int" = yes; then
+     { { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
+as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (short int)
+See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
+   else
+     ac_cv_sizeof_short_int=0
+   fi
+fi
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_short_int" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_sizeof_short_int" >&6; }
+
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SIZEOF_SHORT_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_short_int" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
+# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
+# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
+# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of int" >&5
+printf %s "checking size of int... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_sizeof_int+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_int"        "$ac_includes_default"
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  if test "$ac_cv_type_int" = yes; then
+     { { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
+as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (int)
+See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
+   else
+     ac_cv_sizeof_int=0
+   fi
+fi
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_int" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_sizeof_int" >&6; }
+
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SIZEOF_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_int" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
+# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
+# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
+# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of long int" >&5
+printf %s "checking size of long int... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_sizeof_long_int+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (long int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_long_int"        "$ac_includes_default"
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  if test "$ac_cv_type_long_int" = yes; then
+     { { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
+as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (long int)
+See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
+   else
+     ac_cv_sizeof_long_int=0
+   fi
+fi
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" >&6; }
+
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SIZEOF_LONG_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
+# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
+# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
+# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of long long int" >&5
+printf %s "checking size of long long int... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (long long int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int"        "$ac_includes_default"
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  if test "$ac_cv_type_long_long_int" = yes; then
+     { { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
+as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (long long int)
+See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
+   else
+     ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0
+   fi
+fi
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" >&6; }
+
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
+# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
+# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
+# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of time_t" >&5
+printf %s "checking size of time_t... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_sizeof_time_t+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (time_t))" "ac_cv_sizeof_time_t"        "
+    #include <sys/types.h>
+    #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+    # include <sys/time.h>
+    #endif
+    #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+    # include <time.h>
+    #endif
+
+
+"
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  if test "$ac_cv_type_time_t" = yes; then
+     { { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
+as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (time_t)
+See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
+   else
+     ac_cv_sizeof_time_t=0
+   fi
+fi
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_time_t" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_sizeof_time_t" >&6; }
+
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SIZEOF_TIME_T $ac_cv_sizeof_time_t" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+
+# Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX)
+if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then
+	ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0
+fi
+
+# compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them.
+if test -z "$have_llong_max" && test -z "$have_long_long_max"; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for max value of long long" >&5
+printf %s "checking for max value of long long... " >&6; }
+	if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
+
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+/* Why is this so damn hard? */
+#ifdef __GNUC__
+# undef __GNUC__
+#endif
+#define __USE_ISOC99
+#include <limits.h>
+#define DATA "conftest.llminmax"
+#define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a))
+
+/*
+ * printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so
+ * we do this the hard way.
+ */
+static int
+fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int l[sizeof(long long) * 8];
+
+	if (n < 0)
+		if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0)
+			return -1;
+	for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) {
+		l[i] = my_abs(n % 10);
+		n /= 10;
+	}
+	do {
+		if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0)
+			return -1;
+	} while (i != 0);
+	if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0)
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	FILE *f;
+	long long i, llmin, llmax = 0;
+
+	if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL)
+		exit(1);
+
+#if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX)
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
+	llmin = LLONG_MIN;
+	llmax = LLONG_MAX;
+#else
+	fprintf(stderr, "Calculating  LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
+	/* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */
+	for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++)
+		llmax = i;
+	llmin = llmax + 1LL;	/* wrap */
+#endif
+
+	/* Sanity check */
+	if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax
+	    || llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0
+	    || llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) {
+		fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n");
+		exit(2);
+	}
+
+	if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0)
+		exit(3);
+	if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0)
+		exit(4);
+	if (fclose(f) < 0)
+		exit(5);
+	exit(0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax`
+			llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax`
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $llong_max" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$llong_max" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define LLONG_MAX ${llong_max}LL" >>confdefs.h
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for min value of long long" >&5
+printf %s "checking for min value of long long... " >&6; }
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $llong_min" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$llong_min" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define LLONG_MIN ${llong_min}LL" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+else $as_nop
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "not found" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "UINT32_MAX" "ac_cv_have_decl_UINT32_MAX" "
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_LIMITS_H
+# include <sys/limits.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+# include <limits.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_UINT32_MAX" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+# More checks for data types
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_int type" >&5
+printf %s "checking for u_int type... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_u_int+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ u_int a; a = 1;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_u_int="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_u_int="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_int" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_u_int" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_U_INT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	have_u_int=1
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for intXX_t types" >&5
+printf %s "checking for intXX_t types... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_intxx_t+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_intxx_t" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	have_intxx_t=1
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
+	   test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
+then
+    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for intXX_t types in stdint.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for intXX_t types in stdint.h... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <stdint.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for int64_t type" >&5
+printf %s "checking for int64_t type... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_int64_t+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+# include <sys/bitypes.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+int64_t a; a = 1;
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_int64_t="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_int64_t" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_int64_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_intXX_t types" >&5
+printf %s "checking for u_intXX_t types... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	have_u_intxx_t=1
+fi
+
+if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
+    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <sys/socket.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_int64_t types" >&5
+printf %s "checking for u_int64_t types... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_u_int64_t+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ u_int64_t a; a = 1;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	have_u_int64_t=1
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \
+	   test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
+then
+    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <sys/bitypes.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ u_int64_t a; a = 1
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for uintXX_t types" >&5
+printf %s "checking for uintXX_t types... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_uintxx_t+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	uint8_t a;
+	uint16_t b;
+	uint32_t c;
+	a = b = c = 1;
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" >&6; }
+	if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	fi
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
+	   test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
+then
+    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for uintXX_t types in stdint.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for uintXX_t types in stdint.h... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <stdint.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
+	   test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes")
+then
+    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <inttypes.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
+	   test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
+then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/bitypes.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+			int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c;
+			u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g;
+			a = b = c = e = f = g = 1;
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+			printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_char" >&5
+printf %s "checking for u_char... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_u_char+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ u_char foo; foo = 125;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_u_char="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_u_char="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_char" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_u_char" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_U_CHAR 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "intmax_t" "ac_cv_type_intmax_t" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_type_intmax_t" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_INTMAX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "uintmax_t" "ac_cv_type_uintmax_t" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_type_uintmax_t" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_UINTMAX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+   ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "socklen_t" "ac_cv_type_socklen_t" "#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_type_socklen_t" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+
+      { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for socklen_t equivalent" >&5
+printf %s "checking for socklen_t equivalent... " >&6; }
+      if test ${curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	 # Systems have either "struct sockaddr *" or
+	 # "void *" as the second argument to getpeername
+	 curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv=
+	 for arg2 in "struct sockaddr" void; do
+	    for t in int size_t unsigned long "unsigned long"; do
+	       cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+
+		    #include <sys/types.h>
+		    #include <sys/socket.h>
+		    int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *);
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+		    $t len;
+		    getpeername(0,0,&len);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+		  curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv="$t"
+		  break
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+	    done
+	 done
+
+	 if test "x$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" = x; then
+	    as_fn_error $? "Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t" "$LINENO" 5
+	 fi
+
+fi
+
+      { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define socklen_t $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+
+ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "sig_atomic_t" "ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" "#include <signal.h>
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "sighandler_t" "ac_cv_type_sighandler_t" "#include <signal.h>
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_type_sighandler_t" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SIGHANDLER_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fsblkcnt_t" "ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+#include <sys/bitypes.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
+#include <sys/statfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fsfilcnt_t" "ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+#include <sys/bitypes.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
+#include <sys/statfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_FSFILCNT_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+
+ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct statfs" "f_files" "ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_files" "
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+#include <sys/bitypes.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
+#include <sys/statfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H
+#include <sys/vfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_files" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FILES 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct statfs" "f_flags" "ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_flags" "
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+#include <sys/bitypes.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
+#include <sys/statfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H
+#include <sys/vfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_flags" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "in_addr_t" "ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" "#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_IN_ADDR_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "in_port_t" "ac_cv_type_in_port_t" "#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_type_in_port_t" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_IN_PORT_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for size_t" >&5
+printf %s "checking for size_t... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_size_t+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ size_t foo; foo = 1235;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_size_t="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_size_t="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_size_t" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_size_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SIZE_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ssize_t" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ssize_t... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_ssize_t+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ ssize_t foo; foo = 1235;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_ssize_t" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SSIZE_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for clock_t" >&5
+printf %s "checking for clock_t... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_clock_t+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <time.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ clock_t foo; foo = 1235;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_clock_t="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_clock_t" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_clock_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_CLOCK_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for sa_family_t" >&5
+printf %s "checking for sa_family_t... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_sa_family_t+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pid_t" >&5
+printf %s "checking for pid_t... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_pid_t+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ pid_t foo; foo = 1235;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_pid_t="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_pid_t" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_pid_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PID_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for mode_t" >&5
+printf %s "checking for mode_t... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_mode_t+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ mode_t foo; foo = 1235;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_mode_t="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_mode_t" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_mode_t" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_MODE_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct sockaddr_storage" >&5
+printf %s "checking for struct sockaddr_storage... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage s;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct sockaddr_in6" >&5
+printf %s "checking for struct sockaddr_in6... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct in6_addr" >&5
+printf %s "checking for struct in6_addr... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+	ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct sockaddr_in6" "sin6_scope_id" "ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" "
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct addrinfo" >&5
+printf %s "checking for struct addrinfo... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct timeval" >&5
+printf %s "checking for struct timeval... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_struct_timeval+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <sys/time.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	have_struct_timeval=1
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct timespec" >&5
+printf %s "checking for struct timespec... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_struct_timespec+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+    #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+    # include <sys/time.h>
+    #endif
+    #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+    # include <time.h>
+    #endif
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ struct timespec ts; ts.tv_sec = 1;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	have_struct_timespec=1
+fi
+
+# We need int64_t or else certain parts of the compile will fail.
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \
+	test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \
+	test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then
+	echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support.  Contact your vendor or install"
+	echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing."
+	echo ""
+	exit 1;
+else
+	if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;}
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+int main(void)
+{
+	char buf[50];
+	char expected_out[50];
+	int mazsize = 50 ;
+#if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
+	long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff;
+#else
+	long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll;
+#endif
+	strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807");
+	snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num);
+	if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0)
+		exit(1);
+	exit(0);
+}
+#else
+int main(void) { exit(0); }
+#endif
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+   true
+else $as_nop
+   printf "%s\n" "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_host' in header 'utmp.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_host
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_host field in utmp.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ut_host field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "ut_host" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_host' in header 'utmpx.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_host
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_host field in utmpx.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ut_host field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "ut_host" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+# look for field 'syslen' in header 'utmpx.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"syslen
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for syslen field in utmpx.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for syslen field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "syslen" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_pid' in header 'utmp.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_pid
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_pid field in utmp.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ut_pid field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "ut_pid" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_type' in header 'utmp.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_type
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_type field in utmp.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ut_type field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "ut_type" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_type' in header 'utmpx.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_type
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_type field in utmpx.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ut_type field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "ut_type" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_tv' in header 'utmp.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_tv
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_tv field in utmp.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ut_tv field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "ut_tv" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_id' in header 'utmp.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_id
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_id field in utmp.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ut_id field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "ut_id" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_id' in header 'utmpx.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_id
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "ut_id" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_addr' in header 'utmp.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr field in utmp.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ut_addr field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "ut_addr" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_addr' in header 'utmpx.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "ut_addr" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_addr_v6' in header 'utmp.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr_v6
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmp.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "ut_addr_v6" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_addr_v6' in header 'utmpx.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr_v6
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmpx.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "ut_addr_v6" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_exit' in header 'utmp.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_exit
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_exit field in utmp.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ut_exit field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "ut_exit" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_time' in header 'utmp.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_time
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_time field in utmp.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ut_time field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmp.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "ut_time" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_time' in header 'utmpx.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_time
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_time field in utmpx.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ut_time field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "ut_time" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_tv' in header 'utmpx.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_tv
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_tv field in utmpx.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ut_tv field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "ut_tv" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+# look for field 'ut_ss' in header 'utmpx.h'
+		ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+		ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_ss
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_ss field in utmpx.h" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ut_ss field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
+	if eval test \${$ossh_varname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+#include <utmpx.h>
+
+_ACEOF
+if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
+  $EGREP "ut_ss" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
+else $as_nop
+   			eval "$ossh_varname=no"
+fi
+rm -rf conftest*
+
+fi
+
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ossh_result" >&6; }
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SS_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+
+
+ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct stat" "st_blksize" "ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_blksize" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_blksize" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct stat" "st_mtim" "ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtim" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtim" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct stat" "st_mtime" "ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtime" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtime" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_gecos" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_class" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_class" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_class" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_change" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_change" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_change" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_expire" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_expire" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_expire" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+
+ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct __res_state" "retrans" "ac_cv_member_struct___res_state_retrans" "
+#include <stdio.h>
+#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct___res_state_retrans" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define __res_state state" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct sockaddr_in" "sin_len" "ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in_sin_len" "
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in_sin_len" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SOCK_HAS_LEN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage" >&5
+printf %s "checking for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no"
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage" >&5
+printf %s "checking for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr" >&5
+printf %s "checking for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+#ifdef msg_accrights
+#error "msg_accrights is a macro"
+exit(1);
+#endif
+struct msghdr m;
+m.msg_accrights = 0;
+exit(0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type" >&5
+printf %s "checking if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type... " >&6; }
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if fsid_t has member val" >&5
+printf %s "checking if fsid_t has member val... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define FSID_HAS_VAL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if f_fsid has member __val" >&5
+printf %s "checking if f_fsid has member __val... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define FSID_HAS___VAL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for msg_control field in struct msghdr" >&5
+printf %s "checking for msg_control field in struct msghdr... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+#ifdef msg_control
+#error "msg_control is a macro"
+exit(1);
+#endif
+struct msghdr m;
+m.msg_control = 0;
+exit(0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libc defines __progname" >&5
+printf %s "checking if libc defines __progname... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_libc_defines___progname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <stdio.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE___PROGNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <stdio.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ printf("%s", __FUNCTION__);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE___FUNCTION__ 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether $CC implements __func__" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether $CC implements __func__... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_cc_implements___func__+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <stdio.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ printf("%s", __func__);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE___func__ 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether va_copy exists" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether va_copy exists... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_va_copy+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+va_list x,y;
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ va_copy(x,y);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_va_copy="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_va_copy" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_va_copy" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_VA_COPY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether __va_copy exists" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether __va_copy exists... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have___va_copy+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+va_list x,y;
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ __va_copy(x,y);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have___va_copy="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have___va_copy" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have___va_copy" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE___VA_COPY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether getopt has optreset support" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether getopt has optreset support... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <getopt.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ extern int optreset; optreset = 0;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libc defines sys_errlist" >&5
+printf %s "checking if libc defines sys_errlist... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <stdio.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libc defines sys_nerr" >&5
+printf %s "checking if libc defines sys_nerr... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <stdio.h>
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+   ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes"
+else $as_nop
+   ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_SYS_NERR 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+# Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing getrrsetbyname" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing getrrsetbyname... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char getrrsetbyname ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return getrrsetbyname ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' resolv
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+
+		# Needed by our getrrsetbyname()
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing res_query" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing res_query... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_res_query+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char res_query ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return res_query ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' resolv
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_res_query=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_res_query+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_res_query+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_res_query=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_res_query" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_res_query" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_res_query
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing dn_expand" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing dn_expand... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char dn_expand ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return dn_expand ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' resolv
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_dn_expand=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_dn_expand=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dn_expand
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if res_query will link" >&5
+printf %s "checking if res_query will link... " >&6; }
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		    saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+		    LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
+		    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for res_query in -lresolv" >&5
+printf %s "checking for res_query in -lresolv... " >&6; }
+		    cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+  LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+			 { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+		ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "_getshort" "ac_cv_func__getshort"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func__getshort" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE__GETSHORT 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "_getlong" "ac_cv_func__getlong"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func__getlong" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE__GETLONG 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+		ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "_getshort" "ac_cv_have_decl__getshort" "#include <sys/types.h>
+		    #include <arpa/nameser.h>
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl__getshort" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "_getlong" "ac_cv_have_decl__getlong" "#include <sys/types.h>
+		    #include <arpa/nameser.h>
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl__getlong" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL__GETLONG $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+
+		ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "HEADER" "ad" "ac_cv_member_HEADER_ad" "#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_member_HEADER_ad" = xyes
+then :
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_HEADER_AD 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if struct __res_state _res is an extern" >&5
+printf %s "checking if struct __res_state _res is an extern... " >&6; }
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+extern struct __res_state _res;
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+struct __res_state *volatile p = &_res;  /* force resolution of _res */
+return 0;
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE__RES_EXTERN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+
+# Check whether user wants SELinux support
+SELINUX_MSG="no"
+LIBSELINUX=""
+
+# Check whether --with-selinux was given.
+if test ${with_selinux+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_selinux;  if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		save_LIBS="$LIBS"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define WITH_SELINUX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		SELINUX_MSG="yes"
+		ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "selinux/selinux.h" "ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_error $? "SELinux support requires selinux.h header" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for setexeccon in -lselinux" >&5
+printf %s "checking for setexeccon in -lselinux... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lselinux  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char setexeccon ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return setexeccon ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" = xyes
+then :
+   LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
+			  LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux"
+
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_error $? "SELinux support requires libselinux library" "$LINENO" 5
+fi
+
+		ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getseuserbyname" "ac_cv_func_getseuserbyname"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getseuserbyname" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "get_default_context_with_level" "ac_cv_func_get_default_context_with_level"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_get_default_context_with_level" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+		LIBS="$save_LIBS $LIBSELINUX"
+	fi
+
+fi
+
+
+
+# Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
+KRB5_MSG="no"
+
+# Check whether --with-kerberos5 was given.
+if test ${with_kerberos5+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_kerberos5;  if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+			KRB5ROOT="/usr/local"
+		else
+			KRB5ROOT=${withval}
+		fi
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define KRB5 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		KRB5_MSG="yes"
+
+		use_pkgconfig_for_krb5=
+		if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about kerberos5" >&5
+printf %s "checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about kerberos5... " >&6; }
+			if "$PKGCONFIG" krb5; then
+				{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+				use_pkgconfig_for_krb5=yes
+			else
+				{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+			fi
+		fi
+		if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_krb5" = "xyes"; then
+			K5CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags krb5`
+			K5LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs krb5`
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS"
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gssapi support" >&5
+printf %s "checking for gssapi support... " >&6; }
+			if "$PKGCONFIG" krb5-gssapi; then
+				{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+				GSSCFLAGS="`$PKGCONFIG --cflags krb5-gssapi`"
+				GSSLIBS="`$PKGCONFIG --libs krb5-gssapi`"
+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS"
+			else
+				{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+			fi
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are using Heimdal" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether we are using Heimdal... " >&6; }
+			cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <krb5.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ char *tmp = heimdal_version;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HEIMDAL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+		else
+			if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
+  # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}krb5-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}krb5-config; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $KRB5CONF in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF="$KRB5CONF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+as_dummy="$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH"
+for as_dir in $as_dummy
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+KRB5CONF=$ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF
+if test -n "$KRB5CONF"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $KRB5CONF" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$KRB5CONF" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+fi
+if test -z "$ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF"; then
+  ac_pt_KRB5CONF=$KRB5CONF
+  # Extract the first word of "krb5-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy krb5-config; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_KRB5CONF+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $ac_pt_KRB5CONF in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_ac_pt_KRB5CONF="$ac_pt_KRB5CONF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+as_dummy="$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH"
+for as_dir in $as_dummy
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_ac_pt_KRB5CONF="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+ac_pt_KRB5CONF=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_KRB5CONF
+if test -n "$ac_pt_KRB5CONF"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_KRB5CONF" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_pt_KRB5CONF" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+  if test "x$ac_pt_KRB5CONF" = x; then
+    KRB5CONF="$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config"
+  else
+    case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
+yes:)
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
+ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
+esac
+    KRB5CONF=$ac_pt_KRB5CONF
+  fi
+else
+  KRB5CONF="$ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF"
+fi
+
+			if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then
+				K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`"
+				K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`"
+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS"
+
+				{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gssapi support" >&5
+printf %s "checking for gssapi support... " >&6; }
+				if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then
+					{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+					GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`"
+					GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`"
+					CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS"
+				else
+					{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+				fi
+				{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are using Heimdal" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether we are using Heimdal... " >&6; }
+				cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <krb5.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ char *tmp = heimdal_version;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HEIMDAL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+			else
+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include"
+				LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
+				{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are using Heimdal" >&5
+printf %s "checking whether we are using Heimdal... " >&6; }
+				cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+ #include <krb5.h>
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ char *tmp = heimdal_version;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+						 printf "%s\n" "#define HEIMDAL 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+						 K5LIBS="-lkrb5"
+						 K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1"
+						 { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for net_write in -lroken" >&5
+printf %s "checking for net_write in -lroken... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lroken  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char net_write ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return net_write ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write" = xyes
+then :
+  K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"
+fi
+
+						 { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for des_cbc_encrypt in -ldes" >&5
+printf %s "checking for des_cbc_encrypt in -ldes... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-ldes  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char des_cbc_encrypt ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return des_cbc_encrypt ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" = xyes
+then :
+  K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"
+fi
+
+
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+						 K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+				{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing dn_expand" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing dn_expand... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char dn_expand ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return dn_expand ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' resolv
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_dn_expand=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_dn_expand=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dn_expand
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+fi
+
+
+				{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi_krb5" >&5
+printf %s "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi_krb5... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lgssapi_krb5  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char gss_init_sec_context ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return gss_init_sec_context ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes
+then :
+   printf "%s\n" "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+					  GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5"
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi" >&5
+printf %s "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lgssapi  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char gss_init_sec_context ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return gss_init_sec_context ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes
+then :
+   printf "%s\n" "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+						  GSSLIBS="-lgssapi"
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgss" >&5
+printf %s "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgss... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lgss  $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char gss_init_sec_context ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return gss_init_sec_context ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context=yes
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes
+then :
+   printf "%s\n" "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+							  GSSLIBS="-lgss"
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail" >&2;}
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+				ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "gssapi.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+   unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h
+					  CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
+					         for ac_header in gssapi.h
+do :
+  ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "gssapi.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GSSAPI_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else $as_nop
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail" >&2;}
+
+fi
+
+done
+
+
+fi
+
+
+				oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS"
+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
+				ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "gssapi_krb5.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+   CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP"
+fi
+
+
+			fi
+		fi
+		if test -n "${rpath_opt}" ; then
+			LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS ${rpath_opt}${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
+		fi
+		if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
+			blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
+		fi
+
+		ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "gssapi.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GSSAPI_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "gssapi/gssapi.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_gssapi_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_gssapi_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+		ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "gssapi_krb5.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_gssapi_krb5_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_gssapi_krb5_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+		ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "gssapi_generic.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_generic_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_generic_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "gssapi/gssapi_generic.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_gssapi_generic_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_gssapi_generic_h" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing k_hasafs" >&5
+printf %s "checking for library containing k_hasafs... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+   Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+   builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply.  */
+char k_hasafs ();
+int
+main (void)
+{
+return k_hasafs ();
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+for ac_lib in '' kafs
+do
+  if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
+    ac_res="none required"
+  else
+    ac_res=-l$ac_lib
+    LIBS="-l$ac_lib  $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
+  fi
+  if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"
+then :
+  ac_cv_search_k_hasafs=$ac_res
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam \
+    conftest$ac_exeext
+  if test ${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+y}
+then :
+  break
+fi
+done
+if test ${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+y}
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+  ac_cv_search_k_hasafs=no
+fi
+rm conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_k_hasafs" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_cv_search_k_hasafs" >&6; }
+ac_res=$ac_cv_search_k_hasafs
+if test "$ac_res" != no
+then :
+  test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define USE_AFS 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+		ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE" "ac_cv_have_decl_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE" "
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
+# include <gssapi.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
+# include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+# include <gssapi_generic.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H)
+# include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
+#endif
+
+" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE" = xyes
+then :
+  ac_have_decl=1
+else $as_nop
+  ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE $ac_have_decl" >>confdefs.h
+
+		saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+		LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS"
+		ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "krb5_cc_new_unique" "ac_cv_func_krb5_cc_new_unique"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_krb5_cc_new_unique" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "krb5_get_error_message" "ac_cv_func_krb5_get_error_message"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_krb5_get_error_message" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "krb5_free_error_message" "ac_cv_func_krb5_free_error_message"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_krb5_free_error_message" = xyes
+then :
+  printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+		LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+	fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+
+
+# Looking for programs, paths and files
+
+PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+
+# Check whether --with-privsep-path was given.
+if test ${with_privsep_path+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_privsep_path;
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+
+# Check whether --with-xauth was given.
+if test ${with_xauth+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_xauth;
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			xauth_path=$withval
+		fi
+
+else $as_nop
+
+		TestPath="$PATH"
+		TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin"
+		TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11"
+		TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin"
+		TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin"
+		# Extract the first word of "xauth", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy xauth; ac_word=$2
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+printf %s "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if test ${ac_cv_path_xauth_path+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  case $xauth_path in
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+  ac_cv_path_xauth_path="$xauth_path" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+  ;;
+  *)
+  as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $TestPath
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+  if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+    ac_cv_path_xauth_path="$as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+    break 2
+  fi
+done
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+  ;;
+esac
+fi
+xauth_path=$ac_cv_path_xauth_path
+if test -n "$xauth_path"; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $xauth_path" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$xauth_path" >&6; }
+else
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+		if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then
+			xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth"
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+STRIP_OPT=-s
+# Check whether --enable-strip was given.
+if test ${enable_strip+y}
+then :
+  enableval=$enable_strip;
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			STRIP_OPT=
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then
+	XAUTH_PATH="undefined"
+
+else
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define XAUTH_PATH \"$xauth_path\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+	XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path
+
+fi
+
+# Check for mail directory
+
+# Check whether --with-maildir was given.
+if test ${with_maildir+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_maildir;
+	if test "X$withval" != X  &&  test "x$withval" != xno  &&  \
+	    test "x${withval}" != xyes; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define MAIL_DIRECTORY \"$withval\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+	    fi
+
+else $as_nop
+
+	if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then
+	    printf "%s\n" "#define MAIL_DIRECTORY \"$maildir\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+	else
+	    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking Discovering system mail directory" >&5
+printf %s "checking Discovering system mail directory... " >&6; }
+	    if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail" >&2;}
+
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
+#include <maillock.h>
+#endif
+#define DATA "conftest.maildir"
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	FILE *fd;
+	int rc;
+
+	fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+	if(fd == NULL)
+		exit(1);
+
+#if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR)
+	if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0)
+		exit(1);
+#elif defined (MAILDIR)
+	if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0)
+		exit(1);
+#elif defined (_PATH_MAIL)
+	if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0)
+		exit(1);
+#else
+	exit (2);
+#endif
+
+	exit(0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+
+		    maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir`
+		    maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \
+			| sed 's|/$||'`
+		    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Using: $maildir from $maildir_what" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "Using: $maildir from $maildir_what" >&6; }
+		    if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then
+			printf "%s\n" "#define MAIL_DIRECTORY \"$maildir\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+		    fi
+
+else $as_nop
+
+		    if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then
+# our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Using: default value of /var/spool/mail" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "Using: default value of /var/spool/mail" >&6; }
+			printf "%s\n" "#define MAIL_DIRECTORY \"/var/spool/mail\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+		     else
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: *** not found ***" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "*** not found ***" >&6; }
+		     fi
+
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+	fi
+
+
+fi
+ # maildir
+
+if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test" >&2;}
+	disable_ptmx_check=yes
+fi
+if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then
+	if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then
+		as_ac_File=`printf "%s\n" "ac_cv_file_"/dev/ptmx"" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for \"/dev/ptmx\"" >&5
+printf %s "checking for \"/dev/ptmx\"... " >&6; }
+if eval test \${$as_ac_File+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  test "$cross_compiling" = yes &&
+  as_fn_error $? "cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" "$LINENO" 5
+if test -r ""/dev/ptmx""; then
+  eval "$as_ac_File=yes"
+else
+  eval "$as_ac_File=no"
+fi
+fi
+eval ac_res=\$$as_ac_File
+	       { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_res" >&6; }
+if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_File"\" = x"yes"
+then :
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DEV_PTMX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+				have_dev_ptmx=1
+
+
+fi
+
+	fi
+fi
+
+if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then
+	as_ac_File=`printf "%s\n" "ac_cv_file_"/dev/ptc"" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for \"/dev/ptc\"" >&5
+printf %s "checking for \"/dev/ptc\"... " >&6; }
+if eval test \${$as_ac_File+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  test "$cross_compiling" = yes &&
+  as_fn_error $? "cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" "$LINENO" 5
+if test -r ""/dev/ptc""; then
+  eval "$as_ac_File=yes"
+else
+  eval "$as_ac_File=no"
+fi
+fi
+eval ac_res=\$$as_ac_File
+	       { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_res" >&6; }
+if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_File"\" = x"yes"
+then :
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			have_dev_ptc=1
+
+
+fi
+
+else
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test" >&2;}
+fi
+
+# Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above
+
+# Check whether --with-mantype was given.
+if test ${with_mantype+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_mantype;
+		case "$withval" in
+		man|cat|doc)
+			MANTYPE=$withval
+			;;
+		*)
+			as_fn_error $? "invalid man type: $withval" "$LINENO" 5
+			;;
+		esac
+
+
+fi
+
+if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then
+	if ${MANDOC} ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		MANTYPE=doc
+	elif ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		MANTYPE=doc
+	elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		MANTYPE=man
+	else
+		MANTYPE=cat
+	fi
+fi
+
+if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then
+	mansubdir=man;
+else
+	mansubdir=$MANTYPE;
+fi
+
+
+# Whether to disable shadow password support
+
+# Check whether --with-shadow was given.
+if test ${with_shadow+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_shadow;
+		if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+			printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			disable_shadow=yes
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if the systems has expire shadow information" >&5
+printf %s "checking if the systems has expire shadow information... " >&6; }
+	cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+struct spwd sp;
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   sp_expire_available=yes
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+	if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	else
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	fi
+fi
+
+# Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY
+if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then
+	DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+else
+	DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no"
+
+# Check whether --with-ipaddr-display was given.
+if test ${with_ipaddr_display+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_ipaddr_display;
+			if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+				printf "%s\n" "#define IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+				DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
+			fi
+
+
+fi
+
+fi
+
+# check for /etc/default/login and use it if present.
+# Check whether --enable-etc-default-login was given.
+if test ${enable_etc_default_login+y}
+then :
+  enableval=$enable_etc_default_login;  if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: /etc/default/login handling disabled" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: /etc/default/login handling disabled" >&6;}
+		etc_default_login=no
+	  else
+		etc_default_login=yes
+	  fi
+else $as_nop
+   if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes";
+	  then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login" >&2;}
+		etc_default_login=no
+	  else
+		etc_default_login=yes
+	  fi
+
+fi
+
+
+if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then
+	as_ac_File=`printf "%s\n" "ac_cv_file_"/etc/default/login"" | $as_tr_sh`
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for \"/etc/default/login\"" >&5
+printf %s "checking for \"/etc/default/login\"... " >&6; }
+if eval test \${$as_ac_File+y}
+then :
+  printf %s "(cached) " >&6
+else $as_nop
+  test "$cross_compiling" = yes &&
+  as_fn_error $? "cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" "$LINENO" 5
+if test -r ""/etc/default/login""; then
+  eval "$as_ac_File=yes"
+else
+  eval "$as_ac_File=no"
+fi
+fi
+eval ac_res=\$$as_ac_File
+	       { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$ac_res" >&6; }
+if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_File"\" = x"yes"
+then :
+   external_path_file=/etc/default/login
+fi
+
+	if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	fi
+fi
+
+if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \
+	test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then
+	external_path_file=/etc/login.conf
+fi
+
+# Whether to mess with the default path
+SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)"
+
+# Check whether --with-default-path was given.
+if test ${with_default_path+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_default_path;
+		if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING:
+--with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system.
+Edit /etc/login.conf instead." >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING:
+--with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system.
+Edit /etc/login.conf instead." >&2;}
+		elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
+				{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING:
+--with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in
+$external_path_file ." >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING:
+--with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in
+$external_path_file ." >&2;}
+			fi
+			user_path="$withval"
+			SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval"
+		fi
+
+else $as_nop
+   if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf" >&2;}
+	else
+		if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING:
+If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included,
+otherwise scp will not work." >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING:
+If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included,
+otherwise scp will not work." >&2;}
+		fi
+		if test "$cross_compiling" = yes
+then :
+   user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
+
+else $as_nop
+  cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+/* find out what STDPATH is */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
+# ifdef _PATH_USERPATH	/* Irix */
+#  define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH
+# else
+#  define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
+# endif
+#endif
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#define DATA "conftest.stdpath"
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+
+	FILE *fd;
+	int rc;
+
+	fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+	if(fd == NULL)
+		exit(1);
+
+	if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0)
+		exit(1);
+
+	exit(0);
+
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"
+then :
+   user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath`
+else $as_nop
+   user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
+fi
+rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
+  conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+
+# make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work
+		t_bindir="${bindir}"
+		while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do
+			t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}`
+			case $t_bindir in
+				NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;;
+			esac
+			case $t_bindir in
+				NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
+			esac
+		done
+		echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir"  > /dev/null 2>&1
+		if test $? -ne 0  ; then
+			echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir"  > /dev/null 2>&1
+			if test $? -ne 0  ; then
+				user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir
+				{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work" >&6; }
+			fi
+		fi
+	fi
+
+fi
+
+if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define USER_PATH \"$user_path\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+# Set superuser path separately to user path
+
+# Check whether --with-superuser-path was given.
+if test ${with_superuser_path+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_superuser_path;
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define SUPERUSER_PATH \"$withval\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+			superuser_path=$withval
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses" >&5
+printf %s "checking if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses... " >&6; }
+IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no"
+
+# Check whether --with-4in6 was given.
+if test ${with_4in6+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_4in6;
+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define IPV4_IN_IPV6 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
+		else
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		fi
+
+else $as_nop
+
+		if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes (default)" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes (default)" >&6; }
+			printf "%s\n" "#define IPV4_IN_IPV6 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
+		else
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no (default)" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no (default)" >&6; }
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Whether to enable BSD auth support
+BSD_AUTH_MSG=no
+
+# Check whether --with-bsd-auth was given.
+if test ${with_bsd_auth+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_bsd_auth;
+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define BSD_AUTH 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+			BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Where to place sshd.pid
+piddir=/var/run
+# make sure the directory exists
+if test ! -d $piddir ; then
+	piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}`
+	case $piddir in
+		NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
+	esac
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-pid-dir was given.
+if test ${with_pid_dir+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_pid_dir;
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			piddir=$withval
+			if test ! -d $piddir ; then
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ** no $piddir directory on this system **" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: ** no $piddir directory on this system **" >&2;}
+			fi
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR \"$piddir\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+
+# Check whether --enable-lastlog was given.
+if test ${enable_lastlog+y}
+then :
+  enableval=$enable_lastlog;
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+# Check whether --enable-utmp was given.
+if test ${enable_utmp+y}
+then :
+  enableval=$enable_utmp;
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+# Check whether --enable-utmpx was given.
+if test ${enable_utmpx+y}
+then :
+  enableval=$enable_utmpx;
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+# Check whether --enable-wtmp was given.
+if test ${enable_wtmp+y}
+then :
+  enableval=$enable_wtmp;
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+# Check whether --enable-wtmpx was given.
+if test ${enable_wtmpx+y}
+then :
+  enableval=$enable_wtmpx;
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_WTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+# Check whether --enable-libutil was given.
+if test ${enable_libutil+y}
+then :
+  enableval=$enable_libutil;
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_LOGIN 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+# Check whether --enable-pututline was given.
+if test ${enable_pututline+y}
+then :
+  enableval=$enable_pututline;
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_PUTUTLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+# Check whether --enable-pututxline was given.
+if test ${enable_pututxline+y}
+then :
+  enableval=$enable_pututxline;
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+# Check whether --with-lastlog was given.
+if test ${with_lastlog+y}
+then :
+  withval=$with_lastlog;
+		if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+			printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		elif test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			conf_lastlog_location=$withval
+		fi
+
+
+fi
+
+
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE" >&5
+printf %s "checking if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE... " >&6; }
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#  include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#  include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+# include <login.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+		{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG" >&5
+printf %s "checking if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG... " >&6; }
+		cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#  include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#  include <paths.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+			system_lastlog_path=no
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+
+if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
+	if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then
+		for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do
+				if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then
+					conf_lastlog_location=$f
+				fi
+		done
+		if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
+			{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ** Cannot find lastlog **" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: ** Cannot find lastlog **" >&2;}
+					fi
+	fi
+fi
+
+if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define CONF_LASTLOG_FILE \"$conf_lastlog_location\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines UTMP_FILE" >&5
+printf %s "checking if your system defines UTMP_FILE... " >&6; }
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#  include <paths.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ char *utmp = UTMP_FILE;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	  system_utmp_path=no
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
+	if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then
+		for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do
+			if test -f $f ; then
+				conf_utmp_location=$f
+			fi
+		done
+		if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
+			printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	fi
+fi
+if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define CONF_UTMP_FILE \"$conf_utmp_location\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines WTMP_FILE" >&5
+printf %s "checking if your system defines WTMP_FILE... " >&6; }
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#  include <paths.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	  system_wtmp_path=no
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
+	if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then
+		for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do
+			if test -f $f ; then
+				conf_wtmp_location=$f
+			fi
+		done
+		if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
+			printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+		fi
+	fi
+fi
+if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define CONF_WTMP_FILE \"$conf_wtmp_location\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines WTMPX_FILE" >&5
+printf %s "checking if your system defines WTMPX_FILE... " >&6; }
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h.  */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#  include <paths.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+main (void)
+{
+ char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE;
+  ;
+  return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"
+then :
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "yes" >&6; }
+else $as_nop
+   { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "no" >&6; }
+	  system_wtmpx_path=no
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
+if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then
+	if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then
+		printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_WTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	fi
+else
+
+printf "%s\n" "#define CONF_WTMPX_FILE \"$conf_wtmpx_location\"" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
+if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
+	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath"
+	{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile" >&2;}
+fi
+
+ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct lastlog" "ll_line" "ac_cv_member_struct_lastlog_ll_line" "
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
+#include <utmp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_lastlog_ll_line" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+
+    if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then
+	printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+    fi
+
+fi
+
+
+ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct utmp" "ut_line" "ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_line" "
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
+#include <utmp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_line" = xyes
+then :
+
+else $as_nop
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+	printf "%s\n" "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+
+fi
+
+
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then
+	TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
+else
+	TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes
+fi
+ac_fn_check_decl "$LINENO" "BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" "ac_cv_have_decl_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" "$ac_includes_default" "$ac_c_undeclared_builtin_options" "CFLAGS"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" = xyes
+then :
+  TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
+fi
+TEST_SSH_IPV6=$TEST_SSH_IPV6
+
+TEST_SSH_UTF8=$TEST_SSH_UTF8
+
+TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS=$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS
+
+UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS=$unsupported_algorithms
+
+DEPEND=$(cat $srcdir/.depend)
+
+
+CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} ${CFLAGS_AFTER}"
+LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} ${LDFLAGS_AFTER}"
+
+# Make a copy of CFLAGS/LDFLAGS without PIE options.
+LDFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$LDFLAGS" | sed 's/ -pie//'`
+CFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$CFLAGS" | sed 's/ -fPIE//'`
+
+
+
+
+ac_config_files="$ac_config_files Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile survey.sh"
+
+cat >confcache <<\_ACEOF
+# This file is a shell script that caches the results of configure
+# tests run on this system so they can be shared between configure
+# scripts and configure runs, see configure's option --config-cache.
+# It is not useful on other systems.  If it contains results you don't
+# want to keep, you may remove or edit it.
+#
+# config.status only pays attention to the cache file if you give it
+# the --recheck option to rerun configure.
+#
+# `ac_cv_env_foo' variables (set or unset) will be overridden when
+# loading this file, other *unset* `ac_cv_foo' will be assigned the
+# following values.
+
+_ACEOF
+
+# The following way of writing the cache mishandles newlines in values,
+# but we know of no workaround that is simple, portable, and efficient.
+# So, we kill variables containing newlines.
+# Ultrix sh set writes to stderr and can't be redirected directly,
+# and sets the high bit in the cache file unless we assign to the vars.
+(
+  for ac_var in `(set) 2>&1 | sed -n 's/^\([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)=.*/\1/p'`; do
+    eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
+    case $ac_val in #(
+    *${as_nl}*)
+      case $ac_var in #(
+      *_cv_*) { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cache variable $ac_var contains a newline" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: cache variable $ac_var contains a newline" >&2;} ;;
+      esac
+      case $ac_var in #(
+      _ | IFS | as_nl) ;; #(
+      BASH_ARGV | BASH_SOURCE) eval $ac_var= ;; #(
+      *) { eval $ac_var=; unset $ac_var;} ;;
+      esac ;;
+    esac
+  done
+
+  (set) 2>&1 |
+    case $as_nl`(ac_space=' '; set) 2>&1` in #(
+    *${as_nl}ac_space=\ *)
+      # `set' does not quote correctly, so add quotes: double-quote
+      # substitution turns \\\\ into \\, and sed turns \\ into \.
+      sed -n \
+	"s/'/'\\\\''/g;
+	  s/^\\([_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*\\)=\\(.*\\)/\\1='\\2'/p"
+      ;; #(
+    *)
+      # `set' quotes correctly as required by POSIX, so do not add quotes.
+      sed -n "/^[_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*=/p"
+      ;;
+    esac |
+    sort
+) |
+  sed '
+     /^ac_cv_env_/b end
+     t clear
+     :clear
+     s/^\([^=]*\)=\(.*[{}].*\)$/test ${\1+y} || &/
+     t end
+     s/^\([^=]*\)=\(.*\)$/\1=${\1=\2}/
+     :end' >>confcache
+if diff "$cache_file" confcache >/dev/null 2>&1; then :; else
+  if test -w "$cache_file"; then
+    if test "x$cache_file" != "x/dev/null"; then
+      { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: updating cache $cache_file" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: updating cache $cache_file" >&6;}
+      if test ! -f "$cache_file" || test -h "$cache_file"; then
+	cat confcache >"$cache_file"
+      else
+        case $cache_file in #(
+        */* | ?:*)
+	  mv -f confcache "$cache_file"$$ &&
+	  mv -f "$cache_file"$$ "$cache_file" ;; #(
+        *)
+	  mv -f confcache "$cache_file" ;;
+	esac
+      fi
+    fi
+  else
+    { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: not updating unwritable cache $cache_file" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: not updating unwritable cache $cache_file" >&6;}
+  fi
+fi
+rm -f confcache
+
+test "x$prefix" = xNONE && prefix=$ac_default_prefix
+# Let make expand exec_prefix.
+test "x$exec_prefix" = xNONE && exec_prefix='${prefix}'
+
+DEFS=-DHAVE_CONFIG_H
+
+ac_libobjs=
+ac_ltlibobjs=
+U=
+for ac_i in : $LIBOBJS; do test "x$ac_i" = x: && continue
+  # 1. Remove the extension, and $U if already installed.
+  ac_script='s/\$U\././;s/\.o$//;s/\.obj$//'
+  ac_i=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_i" | sed "$ac_script"`
+  # 2. Prepend LIBOBJDIR.  When used with automake>=1.10 LIBOBJDIR
+  #    will be set to the directory where LIBOBJS objects are built.
+  as_fn_append ac_libobjs " \${LIBOBJDIR}$ac_i\$U.$ac_objext"
+  as_fn_append ac_ltlibobjs " \${LIBOBJDIR}$ac_i"'$U.lo'
+done
+LIBOBJS=$ac_libobjs
+
+LTLIBOBJS=$ac_ltlibobjs
+
+
+
+
+: "${CONFIG_STATUS=./config.status}"
+ac_write_fail=0
+ac_clean_files_save=$ac_clean_files
+ac_clean_files="$ac_clean_files $CONFIG_STATUS"
+{ printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: creating $CONFIG_STATUS" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: creating $CONFIG_STATUS" >&6;}
+as_write_fail=0
+cat >$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ASEOF || as_write_fail=1
+#! $SHELL
+# Generated by $as_me.
+# Run this file to recreate the current configuration.
+# Compiler output produced by configure, useful for debugging
+# configure, is in config.log if it exists.
+
+debug=false
+ac_cs_recheck=false
+ac_cs_silent=false
+
+SHELL=\${CONFIG_SHELL-$SHELL}
+export SHELL
+_ASEOF
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ASEOF || as_write_fail=1
+## -------------------- ##
+## M4sh Initialization. ##
+## -------------------- ##
+
+# Be more Bourne compatible
+DUALCASE=1; export DUALCASE # for MKS sh
+as_nop=:
+if test ${ZSH_VERSION+y} && (emulate sh) >/dev/null 2>&1
+then :
+  emulate sh
+  NULLCMD=:
+  # Pre-4.2 versions of Zsh do word splitting on ${1+"$@"}, which
+  # is contrary to our usage.  Disable this feature.
+  alias -g '${1+"$@"}'='"$@"'
+  setopt NO_GLOB_SUBST
+else $as_nop
+  case `(set -o) 2>/dev/null` in #(
+  *posix*) :
+    set -o posix ;; #(
+  *) :
+     ;;
+esac
+fi
+
+
+
+# Reset variables that may have inherited troublesome values from
+# the environment.
+
+# IFS needs to be set, to space, tab, and newline, in precisely that order.
+# (If _AS_PATH_WALK were called with IFS unset, it would have the
+# side effect of setting IFS to empty, thus disabling word splitting.)
+# Quoting is to prevent editors from complaining about space-tab.
+as_nl='
+'
+export as_nl
+IFS=" ""	$as_nl"
+
+PS1='$ '
+PS2='> '
+PS4='+ '
+
+# Ensure predictable behavior from utilities with locale-dependent output.
+LC_ALL=C
+export LC_ALL
+LANGUAGE=C
+export LANGUAGE
+
+# We cannot yet rely on "unset" to work, but we need these variables
+# to be unset--not just set to an empty or harmless value--now, to
+# avoid bugs in old shells (e.g. pre-3.0 UWIN ksh).  This construct
+# also avoids known problems related to "unset" and subshell syntax
+# in other old shells (e.g. bash 2.01 and pdksh 5.2.14).
+for as_var in BASH_ENV ENV MAIL MAILPATH CDPATH
+do eval test \${$as_var+y} \
+  && ( (unset $as_var) || exit 1) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset $as_var || :
+done
+
+# Ensure that fds 0, 1, and 2 are open.
+if (exec 3>&0) 2>/dev/null; then :; else exec 0</dev/null; fi
+if (exec 3>&1) 2>/dev/null; then :; else exec 1>/dev/null; fi
+if (exec 3>&2)            ; then :; else exec 2>/dev/null; fi
+
+# The user is always right.
+if ${PATH_SEPARATOR+false} :; then
+  PATH_SEPARATOR=:
+  (PATH='/bin;/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 && {
+    (PATH='/bin:/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
+      PATH_SEPARATOR=';'
+  }
+fi
+
+
+# Find who we are.  Look in the path if we contain no directory separator.
+as_myself=
+case $0 in #((
+  *[\\/]* ) as_myself=$0 ;;
+  *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+  IFS=$as_save_IFS
+  case $as_dir in #(((
+    '') as_dir=./ ;;
+    */) ;;
+    *) as_dir=$as_dir/ ;;
+  esac
+    test -r "$as_dir$0" && as_myself=$as_dir$0 && break
+  done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+     ;;
+esac
+# We did not find ourselves, most probably we were run as `sh COMMAND'
+# in which case we are not to be found in the path.
+if test "x$as_myself" = x; then
+  as_myself=$0
+fi
+if test ! -f "$as_myself"; then
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_myself: error: cannot find myself; rerun with an absolute file name" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+
+
+# as_fn_error STATUS ERROR [LINENO LOG_FD]
+# ----------------------------------------
+# Output "`basename $0`: error: ERROR" to stderr. If LINENO and LOG_FD are
+# provided, also output the error to LOG_FD, referencing LINENO. Then exit the
+# script with STATUS, using 1 if that was 0.
+as_fn_error ()
+{
+  as_status=$1; test $as_status -eq 0 && as_status=1
+  if test "$4"; then
+    as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$3"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
+    printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: $2" >&$4
+  fi
+  printf "%s\n" "$as_me: error: $2" >&2
+  as_fn_exit $as_status
+} # as_fn_error
+
+
+
+# as_fn_set_status STATUS
+# -----------------------
+# Set $? to STATUS, without forking.
+as_fn_set_status ()
+{
+  return $1
+} # as_fn_set_status
+
+# as_fn_exit STATUS
+# -----------------
+# Exit the shell with STATUS, even in a "trap 0" or "set -e" context.
+as_fn_exit ()
+{
+  set +e
+  as_fn_set_status $1
+  exit $1
+} # as_fn_exit
+
+# as_fn_unset VAR
+# ---------------
+# Portably unset VAR.
+as_fn_unset ()
+{
+  { eval $1=; unset $1;}
+}
+as_unset=as_fn_unset
+
+# as_fn_append VAR VALUE
+# ----------------------
+# Append the text in VALUE to the end of the definition contained in VAR. Take
+# advantage of any shell optimizations that allow amortized linear growth over
+# repeated appends, instead of the typical quadratic growth present in naive
+# implementations.
+if (eval "as_var=1; as_var+=2; test x\$as_var = x12") 2>/dev/null
+then :
+  eval 'as_fn_append ()
+  {
+    eval $1+=\$2
+  }'
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_append ()
+  {
+    eval $1=\$$1\$2
+  }
+fi # as_fn_append
+
+# as_fn_arith ARG...
+# ------------------
+# Perform arithmetic evaluation on the ARGs, and store the result in the
+# global $as_val. Take advantage of shells that can avoid forks. The arguments
+# must be portable across $(()) and expr.
+if (eval "test \$(( 1 + 1 )) = 2") 2>/dev/null
+then :
+  eval 'as_fn_arith ()
+  {
+    as_val=$(( $* ))
+  }'
+else $as_nop
+  as_fn_arith ()
+  {
+    as_val=`expr "$@" || test $? -eq 1`
+  }
+fi # as_fn_arith
+
+
+if expr a : '\(a\)' >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
+   test "X`expr 00001 : '.*\(...\)'`" = X001; then
+  as_expr=expr
+else
+  as_expr=false
+fi
+
+if (basename -- /) >/dev/null 2>&1 && test "X`basename -- / 2>&1`" = "X/"; then
+  as_basename=basename
+else
+  as_basename=false
+fi
+
+if (as_dir=`dirname -- /` && test "X$as_dir" = X/) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+  as_dirname=dirname
+else
+  as_dirname=false
+fi
+
+as_me=`$as_basename -- "$0" ||
+$as_expr X/"$0" : '.*/\([^/][^/]*\)/*$' \| \
+	 X"$0" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
+	 X"$0" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
+printf "%s\n" X/"$0" |
+    sed '/^.*\/\([^/][^/]*\)\/*$/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  /^X\/\(\/\/\)$/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  /^X\/\(\/\).*/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  s/.*/./; q'`
+
+# Avoid depending upon Character Ranges.
+as_cr_letters='abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'
+as_cr_LETTERS='ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'
+as_cr_Letters=$as_cr_letters$as_cr_LETTERS
+as_cr_digits='0123456789'
+as_cr_alnum=$as_cr_Letters$as_cr_digits
+
+
+# Determine whether it's possible to make 'echo' print without a newline.
+# These variables are no longer used directly by Autoconf, but are AC_SUBSTed
+# for compatibility with existing Makefiles.
+ECHO_C= ECHO_N= ECHO_T=
+case `echo -n x` in #(((((
+-n*)
+  case `echo 'xy\c'` in
+  *c*) ECHO_T='	';;	# ECHO_T is single tab character.
+  xy)  ECHO_C='\c';;
+  *)   echo `echo ksh88 bug on AIX 6.1` > /dev/null
+       ECHO_T='	';;
+  esac;;
+*)
+  ECHO_N='-n';;
+esac
+
+# For backward compatibility with old third-party macros, we provide
+# the shell variables $as_echo and $as_echo_n.  New code should use
+# AS_ECHO(["message"]) and AS_ECHO_N(["message"]), respectively.
+as_echo='printf %s\n'
+as_echo_n='printf %s'
+
+rm -f conf$$ conf$$.exe conf$$.file
+if test -d conf$$.dir; then
+  rm -f conf$$.dir/conf$$.file
+else
+  rm -f conf$$.dir
+  mkdir conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null
+fi
+if (echo >conf$$.file) 2>/dev/null; then
+  if ln -s conf$$.file conf$$ 2>/dev/null; then
+    as_ln_s='ln -s'
+    # ... but there are two gotchas:
+    # 1) On MSYS, both `ln -s file dir' and `ln file dir' fail.
+    # 2) DJGPP < 2.04 has no symlinks; `ln -s' creates a wrapper executable.
+    # In both cases, we have to default to `cp -pR'.
+    ln -s conf$$.file conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null && test ! -f conf$$.exe ||
+      as_ln_s='cp -pR'
+  elif ln conf$$.file conf$$ 2>/dev/null; then
+    as_ln_s=ln
+  else
+    as_ln_s='cp -pR'
+  fi
+else
+  as_ln_s='cp -pR'
+fi
+rm -f conf$$ conf$$.exe conf$$.dir/conf$$.file conf$$.file
+rmdir conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null
+
+
+# as_fn_mkdir_p
+# -------------
+# Create "$as_dir" as a directory, including parents if necessary.
+as_fn_mkdir_p ()
+{
+
+  case $as_dir in #(
+  -*) as_dir=./$as_dir;;
+  esac
+  test -d "$as_dir" || eval $as_mkdir_p || {
+    as_dirs=
+    while :; do
+      case $as_dir in #(
+      *\'*) as_qdir=`printf "%s\n" "$as_dir" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"`;; #'(
+      *) as_qdir=$as_dir;;
+      esac
+      as_dirs="'$as_qdir' $as_dirs"
+      as_dir=`$as_dirname -- "$as_dir" ||
+$as_expr X"$as_dir" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)//*[^/][^/]*/*$' \| \
+	 X"$as_dir" : 'X\(//\)[^/]' \| \
+	 X"$as_dir" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
+	 X"$as_dir" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
+printf "%s\n" X"$as_dir" |
+    sed '/^X\(.*[^/]\)\/\/*[^/][^/]*\/*$/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  /^X\(\/\/\)[^/].*/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  /^X\(\/\/\)$/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  /^X\(\/\).*/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  s/.*/./; q'`
+      test -d "$as_dir" && break
+    done
+    test -z "$as_dirs" || eval "mkdir $as_dirs"
+  } || test -d "$as_dir" || as_fn_error $? "cannot create directory $as_dir"
+
+
+} # as_fn_mkdir_p
+if mkdir -p . 2>/dev/null; then
+  as_mkdir_p='mkdir -p "$as_dir"'
+else
+  test -d ./-p && rmdir ./-p
+  as_mkdir_p=false
+fi
+
+
+# as_fn_executable_p FILE
+# -----------------------
+# Test if FILE is an executable regular file.
+as_fn_executable_p ()
+{
+  test -f "$1" && test -x "$1"
+} # as_fn_executable_p
+as_test_x='test -x'
+as_executable_p=as_fn_executable_p
+
+# Sed expression to map a string onto a valid CPP name.
+as_tr_cpp="eval sed 'y%*$as_cr_letters%P$as_cr_LETTERS%;s%[^_$as_cr_alnum]%_%g'"
+
+# Sed expression to map a string onto a valid variable name.
+as_tr_sh="eval sed 'y%*+%pp%;s%[^_$as_cr_alnum]%_%g'"
+
+
+exec 6>&1
+## ----------------------------------- ##
+## Main body of $CONFIG_STATUS script. ##
+## ----------------------------------- ##
+_ASEOF
+test $as_write_fail = 0 && chmod +x $CONFIG_STATUS || ac_write_fail=1
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+# Save the log message, to keep $0 and so on meaningful, and to
+# report actual input values of CONFIG_FILES etc. instead of their
+# values after options handling.
+ac_log="
+This file was extended by OpenSSH $as_me Portable, which was
+generated by GNU Autoconf 2.71.  Invocation command line was
+
+  CONFIG_FILES    = $CONFIG_FILES
+  CONFIG_HEADERS  = $CONFIG_HEADERS
+  CONFIG_LINKS    = $CONFIG_LINKS
+  CONFIG_COMMANDS = $CONFIG_COMMANDS
+  $ $0 $@
+
+on `(hostname || uname -n) 2>/dev/null | sed 1q`
+"
+
+_ACEOF
+
+case $ac_config_files in *"
+"*) set x $ac_config_files; shift; ac_config_files=$*;;
+esac
+
+case $ac_config_headers in *"
+"*) set x $ac_config_headers; shift; ac_config_headers=$*;;
+esac
+
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+# Files that config.status was made for.
+config_files="$ac_config_files"
+config_headers="$ac_config_headers"
+
+_ACEOF
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+ac_cs_usage="\
+\`$as_me' instantiates files and other configuration actions
+from templates according to the current configuration.  Unless the files
+and actions are specified as TAGs, all are instantiated by default.
+
+Usage: $0 [OPTION]... [TAG]...
+
+  -h, --help       print this help, then exit
+  -V, --version    print version number and configuration settings, then exit
+      --config     print configuration, then exit
+  -q, --quiet, --silent
+                   do not print progress messages
+  -d, --debug      don't remove temporary files
+      --recheck    update $as_me by reconfiguring in the same conditions
+      --file=FILE[:TEMPLATE]
+                   instantiate the configuration file FILE
+      --header=FILE[:TEMPLATE]
+                   instantiate the configuration header FILE
+
+Configuration files:
+$config_files
+
+Configuration headers:
+$config_headers
+
+Report bugs to <openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org>."
+
+_ACEOF
+ac_cs_config=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_configure_args" | sed "$ac_safe_unquote"`
+ac_cs_config_escaped=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_cs_config" | sed "s/^ //; s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"`
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+ac_cs_config='$ac_cs_config_escaped'
+ac_cs_version="\\
+OpenSSH config.status Portable
+configured by $0, generated by GNU Autoconf 2.71,
+  with options \\"\$ac_cs_config\\"
+
+Copyright (C) 2021 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+This config.status script is free software; the Free Software Foundation
+gives unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it."
+
+ac_pwd='$ac_pwd'
+srcdir='$srcdir'
+INSTALL='$INSTALL'
+MKDIR_P='$MKDIR_P'
+AWK='$AWK'
+test -n "\$AWK" || AWK=awk
+_ACEOF
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+# The default lists apply if the user does not specify any file.
+ac_need_defaults=:
+while test $# != 0
+do
+  case $1 in
+  --*=?*)
+    ac_option=`expr "X$1" : 'X\([^=]*\)='`
+    ac_optarg=`expr "X$1" : 'X[^=]*=\(.*\)'`
+    ac_shift=:
+    ;;
+  --*=)
+    ac_option=`expr "X$1" : 'X\([^=]*\)='`
+    ac_optarg=
+    ac_shift=:
+    ;;
+  *)
+    ac_option=$1
+    ac_optarg=$2
+    ac_shift=shift
+    ;;
+  esac
+
+  case $ac_option in
+  # Handling of the options.
+  -recheck | --recheck | --rechec | --reche | --rech | --rec | --re | --r)
+    ac_cs_recheck=: ;;
+  --version | --versio | --versi | --vers | --ver | --ve | --v | -V )
+    printf "%s\n" "$ac_cs_version"; exit ;;
+  --config | --confi | --conf | --con | --co | --c )
+    printf "%s\n" "$ac_cs_config"; exit ;;
+  --debug | --debu | --deb | --de | --d | -d )
+    debug=: ;;
+  --file | --fil | --fi | --f )
+    $ac_shift
+    case $ac_optarg in
+    *\'*) ac_optarg=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_optarg" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"` ;;
+    '') as_fn_error $? "missing file argument" ;;
+    esac
+    as_fn_append CONFIG_FILES " '$ac_optarg'"
+    ac_need_defaults=false;;
+  --header | --heade | --head | --hea )
+    $ac_shift
+    case $ac_optarg in
+    *\'*) ac_optarg=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_optarg" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"` ;;
+    esac
+    as_fn_append CONFIG_HEADERS " '$ac_optarg'"
+    ac_need_defaults=false;;
+  --he | --h)
+    # Conflict between --help and --header
+    as_fn_error $? "ambiguous option: \`$1'
+Try \`$0 --help' for more information.";;
+  --help | --hel | -h )
+    printf "%s\n" "$ac_cs_usage"; exit ;;
+  -q | -quiet | --quiet | --quie | --qui | --qu | --q \
+  | -silent | --silent | --silen | --sile | --sil | --si | --s)
+    ac_cs_silent=: ;;
+
+  # This is an error.
+  -*) as_fn_error $? "unrecognized option: \`$1'
+Try \`$0 --help' for more information." ;;
+
+  *) as_fn_append ac_config_targets " $1"
+     ac_need_defaults=false ;;
+
+  esac
+  shift
+done
+
+ac_configure_extra_args=
+
+if $ac_cs_silent; then
+  exec 6>/dev/null
+  ac_configure_extra_args="$ac_configure_extra_args --silent"
+fi
+
+_ACEOF
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+if \$ac_cs_recheck; then
+  set X $SHELL '$0' $ac_configure_args \$ac_configure_extra_args --no-create --no-recursion
+  shift
+  \printf "%s\n" "running CONFIG_SHELL=$SHELL \$*" >&6
+  CONFIG_SHELL='$SHELL'
+  export CONFIG_SHELL
+  exec "\$@"
+fi
+
+_ACEOF
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+exec 5>>config.log
+{
+  echo
+  sed 'h;s/./-/g;s/^.../## /;s/...$/ ##/;p;x;p;x' <<_ASBOX
+## Running $as_me. ##
+_ASBOX
+  printf "%s\n" "$ac_log"
+} >&5
+
+_ACEOF
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+_ACEOF
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+
+# Handling of arguments.
+for ac_config_target in $ac_config_targets
+do
+  case $ac_config_target in
+    "config.h") CONFIG_HEADERS="$CONFIG_HEADERS config.h" ;;
+    "Makefile") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES Makefile" ;;
+    "buildpkg.sh") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES buildpkg.sh" ;;
+    "opensshd.init") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES opensshd.init" ;;
+    "openssh.xml") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES openssh.xml" ;;
+    "openbsd-compat/Makefile") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES openbsd-compat/Makefile" ;;
+    "openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile" ;;
+    "survey.sh") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES survey.sh" ;;
+
+  *) as_fn_error $? "invalid argument: \`$ac_config_target'" "$LINENO" 5;;
+  esac
+done
+
+
+# If the user did not use the arguments to specify the items to instantiate,
+# then the envvar interface is used.  Set only those that are not.
+# We use the long form for the default assignment because of an extremely
+# bizarre bug on SunOS 4.1.3.
+if $ac_need_defaults; then
+  test ${CONFIG_FILES+y} || CONFIG_FILES=$config_files
+  test ${CONFIG_HEADERS+y} || CONFIG_HEADERS=$config_headers
+fi
+
+# Have a temporary directory for convenience.  Make it in the build tree
+# simply because there is no reason against having it here, and in addition,
+# creating and moving files from /tmp can sometimes cause problems.
+# Hook for its removal unless debugging.
+# Note that there is a small window in which the directory will not be cleaned:
+# after its creation but before its name has been assigned to `$tmp'.
+$debug ||
+{
+  tmp= ac_tmp=
+  trap 'exit_status=$?
+  : "${ac_tmp:=$tmp}"
+  { test ! -d "$ac_tmp" || rm -fr "$ac_tmp"; } && exit $exit_status
+' 0
+  trap 'as_fn_exit 1' 1 2 13 15
+}
+# Create a (secure) tmp directory for tmp files.
+
+{
+  tmp=`(umask 077 && mktemp -d "./confXXXXXX") 2>/dev/null` &&
+  test -d "$tmp"
+}  ||
+{
+  tmp=./conf$$-$RANDOM
+  (umask 077 && mkdir "$tmp")
+} || as_fn_error $? "cannot create a temporary directory in ." "$LINENO" 5
+ac_tmp=$tmp
+
+# Set up the scripts for CONFIG_FILES section.
+# No need to generate them if there are no CONFIG_FILES.
+# This happens for instance with `./config.status config.h'.
+if test -n "$CONFIG_FILES"; then
+
+
+ac_cr=`echo X | tr X '\015'`
+# On cygwin, bash can eat \r inside `` if the user requested igncr.
+# But we know of no other shell where ac_cr would be empty at this
+# point, so we can use a bashism as a fallback.
+if test "x$ac_cr" = x; then
+  eval ac_cr=\$\'\\r\'
+fi
+ac_cs_awk_cr=`$AWK 'BEGIN { print "a\rb" }' </dev/null 2>/dev/null`
+if test "$ac_cs_awk_cr" = "a${ac_cr}b"; then
+  ac_cs_awk_cr='\\r'
+else
+  ac_cs_awk_cr=$ac_cr
+fi
+
+echo 'BEGIN {' >"$ac_tmp/subs1.awk" &&
+_ACEOF
+
+
+{
+  echo "cat >conf$$subs.awk <<_ACEOF" &&
+  echo "$ac_subst_vars" | sed 's/.*/&!$&$ac_delim/' &&
+  echo "_ACEOF"
+} >conf$$subs.sh ||
+  as_fn_error $? "could not make $CONFIG_STATUS" "$LINENO" 5
+ac_delim_num=`echo "$ac_subst_vars" | grep -c '^'`
+ac_delim='%!_!# '
+for ac_last_try in false false false false false :; do
+  . ./conf$$subs.sh ||
+    as_fn_error $? "could not make $CONFIG_STATUS" "$LINENO" 5
+
+  ac_delim_n=`sed -n "s/.*$ac_delim\$/X/p" conf$$subs.awk | grep -c X`
+  if test $ac_delim_n = $ac_delim_num; then
+    break
+  elif $ac_last_try; then
+    as_fn_error $? "could not make $CONFIG_STATUS" "$LINENO" 5
+  else
+    ac_delim="$ac_delim!$ac_delim _$ac_delim!! "
+  fi
+done
+rm -f conf$$subs.sh
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+cat >>"\$ac_tmp/subs1.awk" <<\\_ACAWK &&
+_ACEOF
+sed -n '
+h
+s/^/S["/; s/!.*/"]=/
+p
+g
+s/^[^!]*!//
+:repl
+t repl
+s/'"$ac_delim"'$//
+t delim
+:nl
+h
+s/\(.\{148\}\)..*/\1/
+t more1
+s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/\\n"\\/
+p
+n
+b repl
+:more1
+s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/"\\/
+p
+g
+s/.\{148\}//
+t nl
+:delim
+h
+s/\(.\{148\}\)..*/\1/
+t more2
+s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/"/
+p
+b
+:more2
+s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/"\\/
+p
+g
+s/.\{148\}//
+t delim
+' <conf$$subs.awk | sed '
+/^[^""]/{
+  N
+  s/\n//
+}
+' >>$CONFIG_STATUS || ac_write_fail=1
+rm -f conf$$subs.awk
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+_ACAWK
+cat >>"\$ac_tmp/subs1.awk" <<_ACAWK &&
+  for (key in S) S_is_set[key] = 1
+  FS = ""
+
+}
+{
+  line = $ 0
+  nfields = split(line, field, "@")
+  substed = 0
+  len = length(field[1])
+  for (i = 2; i < nfields; i++) {
+    key = field[i]
+    keylen = length(key)
+    if (S_is_set[key]) {
+      value = S[key]
+      line = substr(line, 1, len) "" value "" substr(line, len + keylen + 3)
+      len += length(value) + length(field[++i])
+      substed = 1
+    } else
+      len += 1 + keylen
+  }
+
+  print line
+}
+
+_ACAWK
+_ACEOF
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+if sed "s/$ac_cr//" < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1; then
+  sed "s/$ac_cr\$//; s/$ac_cr/$ac_cs_awk_cr/g"
+else
+  cat
+fi < "$ac_tmp/subs1.awk" > "$ac_tmp/subs.awk" \
+  || as_fn_error $? "could not setup config files machinery" "$LINENO" 5
+_ACEOF
+
+# VPATH may cause trouble with some makes, so we remove sole $(srcdir),
+# ${srcdir} and @srcdir@ entries from VPATH if srcdir is ".", strip leading and
+# trailing colons and then remove the whole line if VPATH becomes empty
+# (actually we leave an empty line to preserve line numbers).
+if test "x$srcdir" = x.; then
+  ac_vpsub='/^[	 ]*VPATH[	 ]*=[	 ]*/{
+h
+s///
+s/^/:/
+s/[	 ]*$/:/
+s/:\$(srcdir):/:/g
+s/:\${srcdir}:/:/g
+s/:@srcdir@:/:/g
+s/^:*//
+s/:*$//
+x
+s/\(=[	 ]*\).*/\1/
+G
+s/\n//
+s/^[^=]*=[	 ]*$//
+}'
+fi
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+fi # test -n "$CONFIG_FILES"
+
+# Set up the scripts for CONFIG_HEADERS section.
+# No need to generate them if there are no CONFIG_HEADERS.
+# This happens for instance with `./config.status Makefile'.
+if test -n "$CONFIG_HEADERS"; then
+cat >"$ac_tmp/defines.awk" <<\_ACAWK ||
+BEGIN {
+_ACEOF
+
+# Transform confdefs.h into an awk script `defines.awk', embedded as
+# here-document in config.status, that substitutes the proper values into
+# config.h.in to produce config.h.
+
+# Create a delimiter string that does not exist in confdefs.h, to ease
+# handling of long lines.
+ac_delim='%!_!# '
+for ac_last_try in false false :; do
+  ac_tt=`sed -n "/$ac_delim/p" confdefs.h`
+  if test -z "$ac_tt"; then
+    break
+  elif $ac_last_try; then
+    as_fn_error $? "could not make $CONFIG_HEADERS" "$LINENO" 5
+  else
+    ac_delim="$ac_delim!$ac_delim _$ac_delim!! "
+  fi
+done
+
+# For the awk script, D is an array of macro values keyed by name,
+# likewise P contains macro parameters if any.  Preserve backslash
+# newline sequences.
+
+ac_word_re=[_$as_cr_Letters][_$as_cr_alnum]*
+sed -n '
+s/.\{148\}/&'"$ac_delim"'/g
+t rset
+:rset
+s/^[	 ]*#[	 ]*define[	 ][	 ]*/ /
+t def
+d
+:def
+s/\\$//
+t bsnl
+s/["\\]/\\&/g
+s/^ \('"$ac_word_re"'\)\(([^()]*)\)[	 ]*\(.*\)/P["\1"]="\2"\
+D["\1"]=" \3"/p
+s/^ \('"$ac_word_re"'\)[	 ]*\(.*\)/D["\1"]=" \2"/p
+d
+:bsnl
+s/["\\]/\\&/g
+s/^ \('"$ac_word_re"'\)\(([^()]*)\)[	 ]*\(.*\)/P["\1"]="\2"\
+D["\1"]=" \3\\\\\\n"\\/p
+t cont
+s/^ \('"$ac_word_re"'\)[	 ]*\(.*\)/D["\1"]=" \2\\\\\\n"\\/p
+t cont
+d
+:cont
+n
+s/.\{148\}/&'"$ac_delim"'/g
+t clear
+:clear
+s/\\$//
+t bsnlc
+s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/"/p
+d
+:bsnlc
+s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/\\\\\\n"\\/p
+b cont
+' <confdefs.h | sed '
+s/'"$ac_delim"'/"\\\
+"/g' >>$CONFIG_STATUS || ac_write_fail=1
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+  for (key in D) D_is_set[key] = 1
+  FS = ""
+}
+/^[\t ]*#[\t ]*(define|undef)[\t ]+$ac_word_re([\t (]|\$)/ {
+  line = \$ 0
+  split(line, arg, " ")
+  if (arg[1] == "#") {
+    defundef = arg[2]
+    mac1 = arg[3]
+  } else {
+    defundef = substr(arg[1], 2)
+    mac1 = arg[2]
+  }
+  split(mac1, mac2, "(") #)
+  macro = mac2[1]
+  prefix = substr(line, 1, index(line, defundef) - 1)
+  if (D_is_set[macro]) {
+    # Preserve the white space surrounding the "#".
+    print prefix "define", macro P[macro] D[macro]
+    next
+  } else {
+    # Replace #undef with comments.  This is necessary, for example,
+    # in the case of _POSIX_SOURCE, which is predefined and required
+    # on some systems where configure will not decide to define it.
+    if (defundef == "undef") {
+      print "/*", prefix defundef, macro, "*/"
+      next
+    }
+  }
+}
+{ print }
+_ACAWK
+_ACEOF
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+  as_fn_error $? "could not setup config headers machinery" "$LINENO" 5
+fi # test -n "$CONFIG_HEADERS"
+
+
+eval set X "  :F $CONFIG_FILES  :H $CONFIG_HEADERS    "
+shift
+for ac_tag
+do
+  case $ac_tag in
+  :[FHLC]) ac_mode=$ac_tag; continue;;
+  esac
+  case $ac_mode$ac_tag in
+  :[FHL]*:*);;
+  :L* | :C*:*) as_fn_error $? "invalid tag \`$ac_tag'" "$LINENO" 5;;
+  :[FH]-) ac_tag=-:-;;
+  :[FH]*) ac_tag=$ac_tag:$ac_tag.in;;
+  esac
+  ac_save_IFS=$IFS
+  IFS=:
+  set x $ac_tag
+  IFS=$ac_save_IFS
+  shift
+  ac_file=$1
+  shift
+
+  case $ac_mode in
+  :L) ac_source=$1;;
+  :[FH])
+    ac_file_inputs=
+    for ac_f
+    do
+      case $ac_f in
+      -) ac_f="$ac_tmp/stdin";;
+      *) # Look for the file first in the build tree, then in the source tree
+	 # (if the path is not absolute).  The absolute path cannot be DOS-style,
+	 # because $ac_f cannot contain `:'.
+	 test -f "$ac_f" ||
+	   case $ac_f in
+	   [\\/$]*) false;;
+	   *) test -f "$srcdir/$ac_f" && ac_f="$srcdir/$ac_f";;
+	   esac ||
+	   as_fn_error 1 "cannot find input file: \`$ac_f'" "$LINENO" 5;;
+      esac
+      case $ac_f in *\'*) ac_f=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_f" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"`;; esac
+      as_fn_append ac_file_inputs " '$ac_f'"
+    done
+
+    # Let's still pretend it is `configure' which instantiates (i.e., don't
+    # use $as_me), people would be surprised to read:
+    #    /* config.h.  Generated by config.status.  */
+    configure_input='Generated from '`
+	  printf "%s\n" "$*" | sed 's|^[^:]*/||;s|:[^:]*/|, |g'
+	`' by configure.'
+    if test x"$ac_file" != x-; then
+      configure_input="$ac_file.  $configure_input"
+      { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: creating $ac_file" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: creating $ac_file" >&6;}
+    fi
+    # Neutralize special characters interpreted by sed in replacement strings.
+    case $configure_input in #(
+    *\&* | *\|* | *\\* )
+       ac_sed_conf_input=`printf "%s\n" "$configure_input" |
+       sed 's/[\\\\&|]/\\\\&/g'`;; #(
+    *) ac_sed_conf_input=$configure_input;;
+    esac
+
+    case $ac_tag in
+    *:-:* | *:-) cat >"$ac_tmp/stdin" \
+      || as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5 ;;
+    esac
+    ;;
+  esac
+
+  ac_dir=`$as_dirname -- "$ac_file" ||
+$as_expr X"$ac_file" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)//*[^/][^/]*/*$' \| \
+	 X"$ac_file" : 'X\(//\)[^/]' \| \
+	 X"$ac_file" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
+	 X"$ac_file" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
+printf "%s\n" X"$ac_file" |
+    sed '/^X\(.*[^/]\)\/\/*[^/][^/]*\/*$/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  /^X\(\/\/\)[^/].*/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  /^X\(\/\/\)$/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  /^X\(\/\).*/{
+	    s//\1/
+	    q
+	  }
+	  s/.*/./; q'`
+  as_dir="$ac_dir"; as_fn_mkdir_p
+  ac_builddir=.
+
+case "$ac_dir" in
+.) ac_dir_suffix= ac_top_builddir_sub=. ac_top_build_prefix= ;;
+*)
+  ac_dir_suffix=/`printf "%s\n" "$ac_dir" | sed 's|^\.[\\/]||'`
+  # A ".." for each directory in $ac_dir_suffix.
+  ac_top_builddir_sub=`printf "%s\n" "$ac_dir_suffix" | sed 's|/[^\\/]*|/..|g;s|/||'`
+  case $ac_top_builddir_sub in
+  "") ac_top_builddir_sub=. ac_top_build_prefix= ;;
+  *)  ac_top_build_prefix=$ac_top_builddir_sub/ ;;
+  esac ;;
+esac
+ac_abs_top_builddir=$ac_pwd
+ac_abs_builddir=$ac_pwd$ac_dir_suffix
+# for backward compatibility:
+ac_top_builddir=$ac_top_build_prefix
+
+case $srcdir in
+  .)  # We are building in place.
+    ac_srcdir=.
+    ac_top_srcdir=$ac_top_builddir_sub
+    ac_abs_top_srcdir=$ac_pwd ;;
+  [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]* )  # Absolute name.
+    ac_srcdir=$srcdir$ac_dir_suffix;
+    ac_top_srcdir=$srcdir
+    ac_abs_top_srcdir=$srcdir ;;
+  *) # Relative name.
+    ac_srcdir=$ac_top_build_prefix$srcdir$ac_dir_suffix
+    ac_top_srcdir=$ac_top_build_prefix$srcdir
+    ac_abs_top_srcdir=$ac_pwd/$srcdir ;;
+esac
+ac_abs_srcdir=$ac_abs_top_srcdir$ac_dir_suffix
+
+
+  case $ac_mode in
+  :F)
+  #
+  # CONFIG_FILE
+  #
+
+  case $INSTALL in
+  [\\/$]* | ?:[\\/]* ) ac_INSTALL=$INSTALL ;;
+  *) ac_INSTALL=$ac_top_build_prefix$INSTALL ;;
+  esac
+  ac_MKDIR_P=$MKDIR_P
+  case $MKDIR_P in
+  [\\/$]* | ?:[\\/]* ) ;;
+  */*) ac_MKDIR_P=$ac_top_build_prefix$MKDIR_P ;;
+  esac
+_ACEOF
+
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+# If the template does not know about datarootdir, expand it.
+# FIXME: This hack should be removed a few years after 2.60.
+ac_datarootdir_hack=; ac_datarootdir_seen=
+ac_sed_dataroot='
+/datarootdir/ {
+  p
+  q
+}
+/@datadir@/p
+/@docdir@/p
+/@infodir@/p
+/@localedir@/p
+/@mandir@/p'
+case `eval "sed -n \"\$ac_sed_dataroot\" $ac_file_inputs"` in
+*datarootdir*) ac_datarootdir_seen=yes;;
+*@datadir@*|*@docdir@*|*@infodir@*|*@localedir@*|*@mandir@*)
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: $ac_file_inputs seems to ignore the --datarootdir setting" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_file_inputs seems to ignore the --datarootdir setting" >&2;}
+_ACEOF
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+  ac_datarootdir_hack='
+  s&@datadir@&$datadir&g
+  s&@docdir@&$docdir&g
+  s&@infodir@&$infodir&g
+  s&@localedir@&$localedir&g
+  s&@mandir@&$mandir&g
+  s&\\\${datarootdir}&$datarootdir&g' ;;
+esac
+_ACEOF
+
+# Neutralize VPATH when `$srcdir' = `.'.
+# Shell code in configure.ac might set extrasub.
+# FIXME: do we really want to maintain this feature?
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+ac_sed_extra="$ac_vpsub
+$extrasub
+_ACEOF
+cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
+:t
+/@[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z_0-9]*@/!b
+s|@configure_input@|$ac_sed_conf_input|;t t
+s&@top_builddir@&$ac_top_builddir_sub&;t t
+s&@top_build_prefix@&$ac_top_build_prefix&;t t
+s&@srcdir@&$ac_srcdir&;t t
+s&@abs_srcdir@&$ac_abs_srcdir&;t t
+s&@top_srcdir@&$ac_top_srcdir&;t t
+s&@abs_top_srcdir@&$ac_abs_top_srcdir&;t t
+s&@builddir@&$ac_builddir&;t t
+s&@abs_builddir@&$ac_abs_builddir&;t t
+s&@abs_top_builddir@&$ac_abs_top_builddir&;t t
+s&@INSTALL@&$ac_INSTALL&;t t
+s&@MKDIR_P@&$ac_MKDIR_P&;t t
+$ac_datarootdir_hack
+"
+eval sed \"\$ac_sed_extra\" "$ac_file_inputs" | $AWK -f "$ac_tmp/subs.awk" \
+  >$ac_tmp/out || as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5
+
+test -z "$ac_datarootdir_hack$ac_datarootdir_seen" &&
+  { ac_out=`sed -n '/\${datarootdir}/p' "$ac_tmp/out"`; test -n "$ac_out"; } &&
+  { ac_out=`sed -n '/^[	 ]*datarootdir[	 ]*:*=/p' \
+      "$ac_tmp/out"`; test -z "$ac_out"; } &&
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: $ac_file contains a reference to the variable \`datarootdir'
+which seems to be undefined.  Please make sure it is defined" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_file contains a reference to the variable \`datarootdir'
+which seems to be undefined.  Please make sure it is defined" >&2;}
+
+  rm -f "$ac_tmp/stdin"
+  case $ac_file in
+  -) cat "$ac_tmp/out" && rm -f "$ac_tmp/out";;
+  *) rm -f "$ac_file" && mv "$ac_tmp/out" "$ac_file";;
+  esac \
+  || as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5
+ ;;
+  :H)
+  #
+  # CONFIG_HEADER
+  #
+  if test x"$ac_file" != x-; then
+    {
+      printf "%s\n" "/* $configure_input  */" >&1 \
+      && eval '$AWK -f "$ac_tmp/defines.awk"' "$ac_file_inputs"
+    } >"$ac_tmp/config.h" \
+      || as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5
+    if diff "$ac_file" "$ac_tmp/config.h" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+      { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_file is unchanged" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: $ac_file is unchanged" >&6;}
+    else
+      rm -f "$ac_file"
+      mv "$ac_tmp/config.h" "$ac_file" \
+	|| as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5
+    fi
+  else
+    printf "%s\n" "/* $configure_input  */" >&1 \
+      && eval '$AWK -f "$ac_tmp/defines.awk"' "$ac_file_inputs" \
+      || as_fn_error $? "could not create -" "$LINENO" 5
+  fi
+ ;;
+
+
+  esac
+
+done # for ac_tag
+
+
+as_fn_exit 0
+_ACEOF
+ac_clean_files=$ac_clean_files_save
+
+test $ac_write_fail = 0 ||
+  as_fn_error $? "write failure creating $CONFIG_STATUS" "$LINENO" 5
+
+
+# configure is writing to config.log, and then calls config.status.
+# config.status does its own redirection, appending to config.log.
+# Unfortunately, on DOS this fails, as config.log is still kept open
+# by configure, so config.status won't be able to write to it; its
+# output is simply discarded.  So we exec the FD to /dev/null,
+# effectively closing config.log, so it can be properly (re)opened and
+# appended to by config.status.  When coming back to configure, we
+# need to make the FD available again.
+if test "$no_create" != yes; then
+  ac_cs_success=:
+  ac_config_status_args=
+  test "$silent" = yes &&
+    ac_config_status_args="$ac_config_status_args --quiet"
+  exec 5>/dev/null
+  $SHELL $CONFIG_STATUS $ac_config_status_args || ac_cs_success=false
+  exec 5>>config.log
+  # Use ||, not &&, to avoid exiting from the if with $? = 1, which
+  # would make configure fail if this is the last instruction.
+  $ac_cs_success || as_fn_exit 1
+fi
+if test -n "$ac_unrecognized_opts" && test "$enable_option_checking" != no; then
+  { printf "%s\n" "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: unrecognized options: $ac_unrecognized_opts" >&5
+printf "%s\n" "$as_me: WARNING: unrecognized options: $ac_unrecognized_opts" >&2;}
+fi
+
+
+# Print summary of options
+
+# Someone please show me a better way :)
+A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}`
+B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}`
+C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}`
+D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}`
+E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}`
+F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}`
+G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}`
+H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}`
+I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}`
+J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}`
+
+echo ""
+echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:"
+echo "                     User binaries: $B"
+echo "                   System binaries: $C"
+echo "               Configuration files: $D"
+echo "                   Askpass program: $E"
+echo "                      Manual pages: $F"
+echo "                          PID file: $G"
+echo "  Privilege separation chroot path: $H"
+if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+echo "   At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file"
+echo "   Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work"
+else
+echo "            sshd default user PATH: $I"
+	if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then
+echo "   (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If"
+echo "   used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)"
+	fi
+fi
+if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then
+echo "          sshd superuser user PATH: $J"
+fi
+echo "                    Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
+echo "                       PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
+echo "                   OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
+echo "                 KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
+echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
+echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+echo "                   libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
+echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
+echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
+echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
+echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
+echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+echo "              Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
+echo "             Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
+echo "                   PKCS#11 support: $enable_pkcs11"
+echo "                  U2F/FIDO support: $enable_sk"
+
+echo ""
+
+echo "              Host: ${host}"
+echo "          Compiler: ${CC}"
+echo "    Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}"
+echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}"
+echo "      Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}"
+echo "         Libraries: ${LIBS}"
+if test ! -z "${CHANNELLIBS}"; then
+echo "     +for channels: ${CHANNELLIBS}"
+fi
+if test ! -z "${LIBFIDO2}"; then
+echo "        +for FIDO2: ${LIBFIDO2}"
+fi
+if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
+echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
+fi
+
+echo ""
+
+if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then
+	echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\""
+	echo ""
+fi
+
+if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
+	echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file "
+	echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. "
+	echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ "
+	echo "subdirectory"
+	echo ""
+fi
+
+if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then
+	echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not"
+	echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the"
+	echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to"
+	echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to"
+	echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious"
+	echo "user can connect to your agent."
+	echo ""
+fi
+
+if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then
+	echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL."
+	echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details."
+fi
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22fee70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -0,0 +1,5691 @@
+#
+# Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
+#
+# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+#
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+# WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+# ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+# WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+# ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+
+AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
+AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4])
+AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
+
+# Check for stale configure as early as possible.
+for i in $srcdir/configure.ac $srcdir/m4/*.m4; do
+	if test "$i" -nt "$srcdir/configure"; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([$i newer than configure, run autoreconf])
+	fi
+done
+
+AC_LANG([C])
+
+AC_CONFIG_HEADERS([config.h])
+AC_PROG_CC([cc gcc clang])
+
+# XXX relax this after reimplementing logit() etc.
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports C99-style variadic macros])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+int f(int a, int b, int c) { return a + b + c; }
+#define F(a, ...) f(a, __VA_ARGS__)
+]], [[return F(1, 2, -3);]])],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+	[ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** OpenSSH requires support for C99-style variadic macros]) ]
+)
+
+AC_CANONICAL_HOST
+AC_C_BIGENDIAN
+
+# Checks for programs.
+AC_PROG_AWK
+AC_PROG_CPP
+AC_PROG_RANLIB
+AC_PROG_INSTALL
+AC_PROG_EGREP
+AC_PROG_MKDIR_P
+AC_CHECK_TOOLS([AR], [ar])
+AC_PATH_PROG([CAT], [cat])
+AC_PATH_PROG([KILL], [kill])
+AC_PATH_PROG([SED], [sed])
+AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [bash])
+AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [ksh])
+AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [sh])
+AC_PATH_PROG([SH], [bash])
+AC_PATH_PROG([SH], [ksh])
+AC_PATH_PROG([SH], [sh])
+AC_PATH_PROG([GROFF], [groff])
+AC_PATH_PROG([NROFF], [nroff awf])
+AC_PATH_PROG([MANDOC], [mandoc])
+AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
+AC_SUBST([TEST_SHELL], [sh])
+
+dnl select manpage formatter to be used to build "cat" format pages.
+if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then
+	MANFMT="$MANDOC"
+elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then
+	MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc"
+elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then
+	MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii"
+else
+	AC_MSG_WARN([no manpage formatter found])
+	MANFMT="false"
+fi
+AC_SUBST([MANFMT])
+
+dnl for buildpkg.sh
+AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_GROUPADD_PROG], [groupadd], [groupadd],
+	[/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc])
+AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_USERADD_PROG], [useradd], [useradd],
+	[/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc])
+AC_CHECK_PROG([MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED], [pkgmk], [yes], [no])
+if test -x /sbin/sh; then
+	AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/sbin/sh])
+else
+	AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/bin/sh])
+fi
+
+# System features
+AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
+
+if test -z "$AR" ; then
+	AC_MSG_ERROR([*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***])
+fi
+
+AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_PASSWD_PROG], [passwd])
+if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_PASSWD_PROG], ["$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"],
+		[Full path of your "passwd" program])
+fi
+
+dnl Since autoconf doesn't support it very well,  we no longer allow users to
+dnl override LD, however keeping the hook here for now in case there's a use
+dnl use case we overlooked and someone needs to re-enable it.  Unless a good
+dnl reason is found we'll be removing this in future.
+LD="$CC"
+AC_SUBST([LD])
+
+AC_C_INLINE
+
+AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], , [#include <limits.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECL([LONG_LONG_MAX], [have_long_long_max=1], , [#include <limits.h>])
+AC_CHECK_DECL([SYSTR_POLICY_KILL], [have_systr_policy_kill=1], , [
+	#include <sys/types.h>
+	#include <sys/param.h>
+	#include <dev/systrace.h>
+])
+AC_CHECK_DECL([RLIMIT_NPROC],
+    [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC], [], [sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC])], , [
+	#include <sys/types.h>
+	#include <sys/resource.h>
+])
+AC_CHECK_DECL([PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS], [have_linux_no_new_privs=1], , [
+	#include <sys/types.h>
+	#include <linux/prctl.h>
+])
+
+openssl=yes
+openssl_bin=openssl
+AC_ARG_WITH([openssl],
+	[  --without-openssl       Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL** ],
+	[  if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+		openssl=no
+		openssl_bin=""
+	   fi
+	]
+)
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography])
+if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_OPENSSL], [1], [use libcrypto for cryptography])
+else
+	AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+fi
+
+use_stack_protector=1
+use_toolchain_hardening=1
+AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect],
+    [  --without-stackprotect  Don't use compiler's stack protection], [
+    if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
+	use_stack_protector=0
+    fi ])
+AC_ARG_WITH([hardening],
+    [  --without-hardening     Don't use toolchain hardening flags], [
+    if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
+	use_toolchain_hardening=0
+    fi ])
+
+# We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is
+# on by default" for things like -fPIE.
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports -Werror])
+saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror"
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[int main(void) { return 0; }]])],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+	  WERROR="-Werror"],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	  WERROR="" ]
+)
+CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([gcc version])
+	GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'`
+	case "$GCC_VER" in
+		1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
+		2.8* | 2.9*)
+		     no_attrib_nonnull=1
+		     ;;
+		2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
+		*) ;;
+	esac
+	AC_MSG_RESULT([$GCC_VER])
+
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([clang version])
+	CLANG_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/clang version /{print $3}'`
+	AC_MSG_RESULT([$CLANG_VER])
+
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-pipe])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunknown-warning-option])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-error=format-truncation])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Qunused-arguments])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wall])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wextra])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-arith])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wuninitialized])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsign-compare])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wformat-security])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-sign], [-Wno-pointer-sign])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunused-parameter], [-Wno-unused-parameter])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunused-result], [-Wno-unused-result])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wimplicit-fallthrough])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wmisleading-indentation])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wbitwise-instead-of-logical])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fno-strict-aliasing])
+    if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-mretpoline]) # clang
+	OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,retpolineplt])
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2])
+	OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,relro])
+	OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,now])
+	OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,noexecstack])
+	# NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in
+	# the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations
+	# that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it
+	# actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number
+	# of integer operations that should exercise this.
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK([-ftrapv])
+	# clang 15 seems to have a bug in -fzero-call-used-regs=all.  See
+	# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3475 and
+	# https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/59242
+	case "$CLANG_VER" in
+	15.*) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fzero-call-used-regs=used]) ;;
+	*)    OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fzero-call-used-regs=all]) ;;
+	esac
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-ftrivial-auto-var-init=zero])
+    fi
+
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset])
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset"
+	AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <string.h> ]],
+			[[ char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b)); ]])],
+		[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+		[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
+	)
+
+	# -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions
+	# and/or platforms, so we test if we can.  If it's not supported
+	# on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror.
+	if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then
+	    for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \
+		    -fstack-protector; do
+		AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports $t])
+		saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+		saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+		CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror"
+		LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror"
+		AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+			[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+	#include <stdio.h>
+	int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;}
+			 ]],
+			[[
+	char x[256];
+	snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1));
+			 ]])],
+		    [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		      CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t"
+		      LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t"
+		      AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $t works])
+		      AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+			[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+	#include <stdio.h>
+	int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;}
+			]],
+			[[
+	char x[256];
+	snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1));
+			]])],
+			[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+			  break ],
+			[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ],
+			[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: cannot test])
+			  break ]
+		      )
+		    ],
+		    [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
+		)
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+		LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+	    done
+	fi
+
+	if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
+		# retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes
+		unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX
+		saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+		CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99"
+		AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX],
+		    [have_llong_max=1],
+		    [CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"],
+		    [#include <limits.h>]
+		)
+	fi
+fi
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+    [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdlib.h>
+__attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}]],
+    [[ exit(0); ]])],
+    [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+    [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+      AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE, 1,
+	 [compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types]) ]
+)
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ prototype args])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+    [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdlib.h>
+typedef void foo(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));]],
+    [[ exit(0); ]])],
+    [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+    [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+      AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS, 1,
+	 [compiler does not accept __attribute__ on prototype args]) ]
+)
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler supports variable length arrays])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+    [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[#include <stdlib.h>]],
+    [[ int i; for (i=0; i<3; i++){int a[i]; a[i-1]=0;} exit(0); ]])],
+    [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+      AC_DEFINE(VARIABLE_LENGTH_ARRAYS, [1],
+	 [compiler supports variable length arrays]) ],
+    [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
+)
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler accepts variable declarations after code])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+    [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[#include <stdlib.h>]],
+    [[ int a; a = 1; int b = 1; exit(a-b); ]])],
+    [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+      AC_DEFINE(VARIABLE_DECLARATION_AFTER_CODE, [1],
+	 [compiler variable declarations after code]) ],
+    [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
+)
+
+if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__], [1], [Have attribute nonnull])
+fi
+
+AC_ARG_WITH([rpath],
+	[  --without-rpath         Disable auto-added -R linker paths],
+	[
+		if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+			rpath_opt=""
+		elif test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+			rpath_opt="-R"
+		else
+			rpath_opt="$withval"
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+# Allow user to specify flags
+AC_ARG_WITH([cflags],
+	[  --with-cflags           Specify additional flags to pass to compiler],
+	[
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval"
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_WITH([cflags-after],
+	[  --with-cflags-after     Specify additional flags to pass to compiler after configure],
+	[
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			CFLAGS_AFTER="$withval"
+		fi
+	]
+)
+AC_ARG_WITH([cppflags],
+	[  --with-cppflags         Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor] ,
+	[
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval"
+		fi
+	]
+)
+AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags],
+	[  --with-ldflags          Specify additional flags to pass to linker],
+	[
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval"
+		fi
+	]
+)
+AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags-after],
+	[  --with-ldflags-after    Specify additional flags to pass to linker after configure],
+	[
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			LDFLAGS_AFTER="$withval"
+		fi
+	]
+)
+AC_ARG_WITH([libs],
+	[  --with-libs             Specify additional libraries to link with],
+	[
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			LIBS="$LIBS $withval"
+		fi
+	]
+)
+AC_ARG_WITH([Werror],
+	[  --with-Werror           Build main code with -Werror],
+	[
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"; then
+			werror_flags="-Werror"
+			if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+				werror_flags="$withval"
+			fi
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+dnl On some old platforms, sys/stat.h requires sys/types.h, but autoconf-2.71's
+dnl AC_CHECK_INCLUDES_DEFAULT checks for them in the opposite order.  If we
+dnl haven't detected it, recheck.
+if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_stat_h" != "xyes"; then
+	unset ac_cv_header_sys_stat_h
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/stat.h])
+fi
+
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \
+	blf.h \
+	bstring.h \
+	crypt.h \
+	crypto/sha2.h \
+	dirent.h \
+	endian.h \
+	elf.h \
+	err.h \
+	features.h \
+	fcntl.h \
+	floatingpoint.h \
+	fnmatch.h \
+	getopt.h \
+	glob.h \
+	ia.h \
+	iaf.h \
+	ifaddrs.h \
+	inttypes.h \
+	langinfo.h \
+	limits.h \
+	locale.h \
+	login.h \
+	maillock.h \
+	ndir.h \
+	net/if_tun.h \
+	netdb.h \
+	netgroup.h \
+	pam/pam_appl.h \
+	paths.h \
+	poll.h \
+	pty.h \
+	readpassphrase.h \
+	rpc/types.h \
+	security/pam_appl.h \
+	sha2.h \
+	shadow.h \
+	stddef.h \
+	stdint.h \
+	string.h \
+	strings.h \
+	sys/bitypes.h \
+	sys/byteorder.h \
+	sys/bsdtty.h \
+	sys/cdefs.h \
+	sys/dir.h \
+	sys/file.h \
+	sys/mman.h \
+	sys/label.h \
+	sys/ndir.h \
+	sys/param.h \
+	sys/poll.h \
+	sys/prctl.h \
+	sys/procctl.h \
+	sys/pstat.h \
+	sys/ptrace.h \
+	sys/random.h \
+	sys/select.h \
+	sys/stream.h \
+	sys/stropts.h \
+	sys/strtio.h \
+	sys/statvfs.h \
+	sys/sysmacros.h \
+	sys/time.h \
+	sys/timers.h \
+	sys/vfs.h \
+	time.h \
+	tmpdir.h \
+	ttyent.h \
+	ucred.h \
+	unistd.h \
+	usersec.h \
+	util.h \
+	utime.h \
+	utmp.h \
+	utmpx.h \
+	vis.h \
+	wchar.h \
+])
+
+# On some platforms (eg SunOS4) sys/audit.h requires sys/[time|types|label.h]
+# to be included first.
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/audit.h], [], [], [
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H
+# include <sys/label.h>
+#endif
+])
+
+# sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/capsicum.h capsicum_helpers.h], [], [], [
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+])
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for caph_cache_tzdata])
+AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+    [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <capsicum_helpers.h> ]],
+	[[caph_cache_tzdata();]])],
+    [
+	AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CAPH_CACHE_TZDATA], [1],
+	    [Define if you have caph_cache_tzdata])
+    ],
+    [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
+)
+
+# net/route.h requires sys/socket.h and sys/types.h.
+# sys/sysctl.h also requires sys/param.h
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([net/route.h sys/sysctl.h], [], [], [
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+])
+
+# lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([lastlog.h], [], [], [
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+])
+
+# sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/ptms.h], [], [], [
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
+# include <sys/stream.h>
+#endif
+])
+
+# login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([login_cap.h], [], [], [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+])
+
+# older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/mount.h], [], [], [
+#include <sys/param.h>
+])
+
+# Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/un.h], [], [], [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+])
+
+# Messages for features tested for in target-specific section
+SIA_MSG="no"
+SPC_MSG="no"
+SP_MSG="no"
+SPP_MSG="no"
+
+# Support for Solaris/Illumos privileges (this test is used by both
+# the --with-solaris-privs option and --with-sandbox=solaris).
+SOLARIS_PRIVS="no"
+
+# Check for some target-specific stuff
+case "$host" in
+*-*-aix*)
+	# Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at
+	# -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that
+	# particularly with older versions of vac or xlc.
+	# It also throws errors about null macro arguments, but these are
+	# not fatal.
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows macro redefinitions])
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+	    [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#define testmacro foo
+#define testmacro bar]],
+	    [[ exit(0); ]])],
+	    [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+	    [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	      CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+	      CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+	      CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
+	    ]
+	)
+
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)])
+	if (test -z "$blibpath"); then
+		blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib"
+	fi
+	saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+	if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then
+		flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:"
+	else
+		flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath,"
+	fi
+	for tryflags in $flags ;do
+		if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
+			LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath"
+			AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[]])],
+			[blibflags=$tryflags], [])
+		fi
+	done
+	if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log])
+	else
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([$blibflags])
+	fi
+	LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+	dnl Check for authenticate.  Might be in libs.a on older AIXes
+	AC_CHECK_FUNC([authenticate], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE], [1],
+		[Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function])],
+		[AC_CHECK_LIB([s], [authenticate],
+			[ AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE])
+				LIBS="$LIBS -ls"
+			])
+		])
+	dnl Check for various auth function declarations in headers.
+	AC_CHECK_DECLS([authenticate, loginrestrictions, loginsuccess,
+	    passwdexpired, setauthdb], , , [#include <usersec.h>])
+	dnl Check if loginfailed is declared and takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)
+	AC_CHECK_DECLS([loginfailed],
+	    [AC_MSG_CHECKING([if loginfailed takes 4 arguments])
+	    AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <usersec.h> ]],
+		[[ (void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0); ]])],
+		[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		AC_DEFINE([AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG], [1],
+			[Define if your AIX loginfailed() function
+			takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	    ])],
+	    [],
+	    [#include <usersec.h>]
+	)
+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getgrset setauthdb])
+	AC_CHECK_DECL([F_CLOSEM],
+	    AC_DEFINE([HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM], [1], [Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom]),
+	    [],
+	    [ #include <limits.h>
+	      #include <fcntl.h> ]
+	)
+	check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1
+	AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID], [1],
+	    [Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID], [1], [Define if your setreuid() is broken])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID], [1], [Define if your setregid() is broken])
+	dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG], [1], [Define if you don't want to use lastlog])
+	AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX], [1],
+		[Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work])
+	AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV],
+		[Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is
+		supported by bsd-setproctitle.c])
+	AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1],
+	    [AIX 5.2 and 5.3 (and presumably newer) require this])
+	AC_DEFINE([PTY_ZEROREAD], [1], [read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd])
+	AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNDUP], 1, [strndup broken, see APAR IY61211])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNLEN], 1, [strnlen broken, see APAR IY62551])
+	;;
+*-*-android*)
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmp])
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmp])
+	;;
+*-*-cygwin*)
+	LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o"
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CYGWIN], [1], [Define if you are on Cygwin])
+	AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES], [1], [Use PIPES instead of a socketpair()])
+	AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1],
+		[Define to disable UID restoration test])
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW], [1],
+		[Define if you want to disable shadow passwords])
+	AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS], [1],
+		[Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system])
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1],
+		[Define if your platform needs to skip post auth
+		file descriptor passing])
+	AC_DEFINE([SSH_IOBUFSZ], [65535], [Windows is sensitive to read buffer size])
+	AC_DEFINE([FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH], [1], [File names may not contain backslash characters])
+	# Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical
+	# reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings.
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-attributes])
+	;;
+*-*-dgux*)
+	AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN], [1],
+		[Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting])
+	AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+	;;
+*-*-darwin*)
+	use_pie=auto
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have working getaddrinfo])
+	AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <mach-o/dyld.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+int main(void) { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
+		exit(0);
+	else
+		exit(1);
+}
+			]])],
+	[AC_MSG_RESULT([working])],
+	[AC_MSG_RESULT([buggy])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [1],
+		[getaddrinfo is broken (if present)])
+	],
+	[AC_MSG_RESULT([assume it is working])])
+	AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [OS X glob does not do what we expect])
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([BIND_8_COMPAT], [1],
+		[Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname])
+	AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
+	AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1],
+	    [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+	AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
+	    [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
+	m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
+	AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
+	    AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
+	    [#include <bsm/audit.h>]
+	AC_DEFINE([LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE], [1],
+	    [Define if pututxline updates lastlog too])
+	)
+	AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV],
+		[Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is
+		supported by bsd-setproctitle.c])
+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([sandbox_init])
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sandbox.h])
+	AC_CHECK_LIB([sandbox], [sandbox_apply], [
+	    SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lsandbox"
+	])
+	# proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() replacement.
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libproc.h])
+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([proc_pidinfo])
+	# poll(2) is broken for character-special devices (at least).
+	# cf. Apple bug 3710161 (not public, but searchable)
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_POLL], [1],
+	    [System poll(2) implementation is broken])
+	;;
+*-*-dragonfly*)
+	SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS"
+	TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
+	;;
+*-*-haiku*)
+	LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd "
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D_BSD_SOURCE"
+	AC_CHECK_LIB([network], [socket])
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T])
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [no utmpx])
+	MANTYPE=man
+	;;
+*-*-hpux*)
+	# first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases
+	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1"
+	IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
+	AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+	AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX])
+	AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*"],
+		[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
+	AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_PSTAT])
+	AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)])
+	maildir="/var/mail"
+	LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
+	AC_CHECK_LIB([xnet], [t_error], ,
+	    [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***])])
+
+	# next, we define all of the options specific to major releases
+	case "$host" in
+	*-*-hpux10*)
+		if test -z "$GCC"; then
+			CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae"
+		fi
+		AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETLINE], [1], [getline is not what we expect])
+		;;
+	*-*-hpux11*)
+		AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE], [1],
+			[Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which
+			passes pam_messages to the conversation function
+			with an extra level of indirection])
+		AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1],
+			[Define if you don't want to use utmp])
+		AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
+		check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1
+		check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1
+		;;
+	esac
+
+	# lastly, we define options specific to minor releases
+	case "$host" in
+	*-*-hpux10.26)
+		AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE], [1],
+			[Define if you have SecureWare-based
+			protected password database])
+		disable_ptmx_check=yes
+		LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw"
+		;;
+	esac
+	;;
+*-*-irix5*)
+	PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA], [1],
+		[Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted
+		(e.g. Irix gcc issue)])
+	AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+	AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY], [1],
+		[Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your
+		ttyname in [uw]tmp])
+	AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
+	;;
+*-*-irix6*)
+	PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
+	AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_ARRAY], [1],
+		[Define if you have/want arrays
+		(cluster-wide session management, not C arrays)])
+	AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_PROJECT], [1],
+		[Define if you want IRIX project management])
+	AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_AUDIT], [1],
+		[Define if you want IRIX audit trails])
+	AC_CHECK_FUNC([jlimit_startjob], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_JOBS], [1],
+		[Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs])])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA])
+	AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX], [1], [updwtmpx is broken (if present)])
+	AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY])
+	AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
+	;;
+*-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu)
+	AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE])
+	AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"])
+	AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
+	AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
+	AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
+	;;
+*-*-linux*)
+	no_dev_ptmx=1
+	use_pie=auto
+	check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
+	dnl Target SUSv3/POSIX.1-2001 plus BSD specifics.
+	dnl _DEFAULT_SOURCE is the new name for _BSD_SOURCE
+	dnl _GNU_SOURCE is needed for setres*id prototypes.
+	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE -D_GNU_SOURCE"
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_CLOSEFROM], [1], [broken in chroots on older kernels])
+	AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1],
+		[Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY])
+	AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"],
+		[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
+	AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
+	AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM],
+		[Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported"
+		if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.])
+	AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
+	AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP])
+	AC_DEFINE([LINUX_OOM_ADJUST], [1], [Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer])
+	inet6_default_4in6=yes
+	case `uname -r` in
+	1.*|2.0.*)
+		AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE], [1],
+			[Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly])
+		;;
+	esac
+	# tun(4) forwarding compat code
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/if_tun.h])
+	if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then
+		AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_LINUX], [1],
+		    [Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way])
+		AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1],
+		    [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
+		AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
+		    [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
+	fi
+	AC_CHECK_HEADER([linux/if.h],
+	    AC_DEFINE([SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX], [1],
+		[Support routing domains using Linux VRF]), [], [
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+	    ])
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h], [],
+	    [], [#include <linux/types.h>])
+	# Obtain MIPS ABI
+	case "$host" in
+	mips*)
+		AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIO32
+#error
+#endif
+			]])],[mips_abi="o32"],[AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIN32
+#error
+#endif
+				]])],[mips_abi="n32"],[AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABI64
+#error
+#endif
+					]])],[mips_abi="n64"],[AC_MSG_ERROR([unknown MIPS ABI])
+				])
+			])
+		])
+		;;
+	esac
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([for seccomp architecture])
+	seccomp_audit_arch=
+	case "$host" in
+	x86_64-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
+		;;
+	i*86-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
+		;;
+	arm*-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
+		;;
+	aarch64*-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
+		;;
+	s390x-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X
+		;;
+	s390-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390
+		;;
+	powerpc-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC
+		;;
+	powerpc64-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64
+		;;
+	powerpc64le-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE
+		;;
+	mips-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS
+		;;
+	mipsel-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL
+		;;
+	mips64-*)
+		case "$mips_abi" in
+		"n32")
+			seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32
+			;;
+		"n64")
+			seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64
+			;;
+		esac
+		;;
+	mips64el-*)
+		case "$mips_abi" in
+		"n32")
+			seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32
+			;;
+		"n64")
+			seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64
+			;;
+		esac
+		;;
+	riscv64-*)
+		seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_RISCV64
+		;;
+	esac
+	if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"])
+		AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch],
+		    [Specify the system call convention in use])
+	else
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported])
+	fi
+	;;
+*-*-minix)
+	AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+	# poll(2) seems to choke on /dev/null; "Bad file descriptor"
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_POLL], [1],
+	    [System poll(2) implementation is broken])
+	;;
+mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
+	AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty])
+	SONY=1
+	;;
+*-*-netbsd*)
+	if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		rpath_opt="-R"
+	fi
+	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_OPENBSD_SOURCE"
+	AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
+	AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], ,
+	    AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support]))
+	AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
+	    [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
+	TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON], [1],
+	    [NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons against it])
+	;;
+*-*-freebsd*)
+	AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["*LOCKED*"], [Account locked with pw(1)])
+	AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
+	AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], ,
+	    AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support]))
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [FreeBSD glob does not do what we need])
+	TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
+	# Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload
+	# and will crash if they cannot be opened.
+	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE], [1],
+	    [define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things])
+	case "$host" in
+	*-*-freebsd9.*|*-*-freebsd10.*)
+		# Capsicum on 9 and 10 do not allow ppoll() so don't auto-enable.
+		disable_capsicum=yes
+	esac
+	;;
+*-*-bsdi*)
+	AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+	;;
+*-next-*)
+	conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog"
+	conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
+	conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp
+	maildir=/usr/spool/mail
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NEXT], [1], [Define if you are on NeXT])
+	AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS], [1], [Needed for NeXT])
+	;;
+*-*-openbsd*)
+	use_pie=auto
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel])
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has bounded])
+	AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_OPENBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way])
+	AC_DEFINE([SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND], [1],
+	    [syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler])
+	TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
+	;;
+*-*-solaris*)
+	if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		rpath_opt="-R"
+	fi
+	AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE])
+	AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX])
+	AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE])
+	AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1],
+		[Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set
+		to the unpriv'ed user])
+	AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
+	# Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty.
+	AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY], [1],
+		[Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY
+		after setsid()])
+	AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd
+		in case the name is longer than 8 chars])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON], [1], [tcgetattr with ICANON may hang])
+	external_path_file=/etc/default/login
+	# hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions)
+	conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog"
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x])
+	sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[[0-9]]\.//'`
+	if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
+		AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1],
+			[Define if you don't want to use wtmp])
+	else
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	fi
+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setpflags])
+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setppriv])
+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([priv_basicset])
+	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([priv.h])
+	AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-contracts],
+		[  --with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)],
+		[
+		AC_CHECK_LIB([contract], [ct_tmpl_activate],
+			[ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS], [1],
+				[Define if you have Solaris process contracts])
+			  LIBS="$LIBS -lcontract"
+			  SPC_MSG="yes" ], )
+		],
+	)
+	AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-projects],
+		[  --with-solaris-projects Enable Solaris projects (experimental)],
+		[
+		AC_CHECK_LIB([project], [setproject],
+			[ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS], [1],
+				[Define if you have Solaris projects])
+			LIBS="$LIBS -lproject"
+			SP_MSG="yes" ], )
+		],
+	)
+	AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-privs],
+		[  --with-solaris-privs    Enable Solaris/Illumos privileges (experimental)],
+		[
+		AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Solaris/Illumos privilege support])
+		if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = "xyes" -a \
+			"x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = "xyes" ; then
+			SOLARIS_PRIVS=yes
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([found])
+			AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1],
+				[Define to disable UID restoration test])
+			AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS], [1],
+				[Define if you have Solaris privileges])
+			SPP_MSG="yes"
+		else
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must have support for Solaris privileges to use --with-solaris-privs])
+		fi
+		],
+	)
+	TEST_SHELL=$SHELL	# let configure find us a capable shell
+	;;
+*-*-sunos4*)
+	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4"
+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpwanam])
+	AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE])
+	conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
+	conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp
+	conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog
+	AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [no utmpx])
+	;;
+*-ncr-sysv*)
+	LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
+	AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+	AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
+	AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+	;;
+*-sni-sysv*)
+	# /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX
+	AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlsym], ,)
+	# -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break
+	AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [res_query], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" ])
+	IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
+	AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+	AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN])
+	AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+	AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
+	external_path_file=/etc/default/login
+	# /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX
+	# Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc,
+	# otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog
+	;;
+# UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel.
+*-*-sysv4.2*)
+	AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+	AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+	AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd])
+	AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
+	TEST_SHELL=$SHELL	# let configure find us a capable shell
+	;;
+# UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8
+*-*-sysv5*)
+	CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf"
+	AC_DEFINE([UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS], [1], [Support passwords > 8 chars])
+	AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+	AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+	AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON])
+	TEST_SHELL=$SHELL	# let configure find us a capable shell
+	case "$host" in
+	*-*-sysv5SCO_SV*)	# SCO OpenServer 6.x
+		maildir=/var/spool/mail
+		AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX])
+		AC_CHECK_LIB([prot], [getluid], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lprot"
+			AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid], , , [-lprot])
+			], , )
+		;;
+	*)	AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
+		;;
+	esac
+	;;
+*-*-sysv*)
+	;;
+# SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX
+*-*-sco3.2v4*)
+	AC_MSG_ERROR("This Platform is no longer supported.")
+	;;
+# SCO OpenServer 5.x
+*-*-sco3.2v5*)
+	if test -z "$GCC"; then
+		CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf"
+	fi
+	LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm"
+	no_dev_ptmx=1
+	AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE])
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW])
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
+	AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+	AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX])
+	AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME])
+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid])
+	MANTYPE=man
+	TEST_SHELL=$SHELL	# let configure find us a capable shell
+	SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes
+	;;
+*-dec-osf*)
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Digital Unix SIA])
+	no_osfsia=""
+	AC_ARG_WITH([osfsia],
+		[  --with-osfsia           Enable Digital Unix SIA],
+		[
+			if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+				AC_MSG_RESULT([disabled])
+				no_osfsia=1
+			fi
+		],
+	)
+	if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then
+		if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+			AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OSF_SIA], [1],
+				[Define if you have Digital Unix Security
+				Integration Architecture])
+			AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN], [1],
+				[Define if you don't want to use your
+				system's login() call])
+			AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
+			LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud"
+			SIA_MSG="yes"
+		else
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+			AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR], ["Nologin"],
+			  [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
+		fi
+	fi
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
+	AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON], [1], [Can't do comparisons on readv])
+	;;
+
+*-*-nto-qnx*)
+	AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
+	AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS])
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
+	AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], [QNX shadow support is broken])
+	enable_etc_default_login=no	# has incompatible /etc/default/login
+	case "$host" in
+	*-*-nto-qnx6*)
+		AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
+		;;
+	esac
+	;;
+
+*-*-ultrix*)
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETGROUPS], [1], [getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1])
+	AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to for controlling tty])
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H], [1], [Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix])
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [Disable utmpx])
+	# DISABLE_FD_PASSING so that we call setpgrp as root, otherwise we
+	# don't get a controlling tty.
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1], [Need to call setpgrp as root])
+	# On Ultrix some headers are not protected against multiple includes,
+	# so we create wrappers and put it where the compiler will find it.
+	AC_MSG_WARN([creating compat wrappers for headers])
+	mkdir -p netinet
+	for header in netinet/ip.h netdb.h resolv.h; do
+		name=`echo $header | tr 'a-z/.' 'A-Z__'`
+		cat >$header <<EOD
+#ifndef _SSH_COMPAT_${name}
+#define _SSH_COMPAT_${name}
+#include "/usr/include/${header}"
+#endif
+EOD
+	done
+	;;
+
+*-*-lynxos)
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D__NO_INCLUDE_WARN__"
+	AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETVBUF], [1],
+	    [LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation])
+	;;
+esac
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([compiler and flags for sanity])
+AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdlib.h> ]], [[ exit(0); ]])],
+	[	AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+	[
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***])
+	],
+	[	AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity]) ]
+)
+
+dnl Checks for header files.
+# Checks for libraries.
+AC_CHECK_FUNC([setsockopt], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([socket], [setsockopt])])
+
+dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dirname], [AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])] , [
+	AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [dirname], [
+		AC_CACHE_CHECK([for broken dirname],
+			ac_cv_have_broken_dirname, [
+			save_LIBS="$LIBS"
+			LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
+			AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+				[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+    char *s, buf[32];
+
+    strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32);
+    s = dirname(buf);
+    if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) {
+	exit(1);
+    } else {
+	exit(0);
+    }
+}
+				]])],
+				[ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ],
+				[ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes" ],
+				[ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ],
+			)
+			LIBS="$save_LIBS"
+		])
+		if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then
+			LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
+			AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DIRNAME])
+			AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])
+		fi
+	])
+])
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNC([getspnam], ,
+	[AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [getspnam], [LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"])])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([basename], [gen], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BASENAME], [1],
+	[Define if you have the basename function.])])
+
+dnl zlib defaults to enabled
+zlib=yes
+AC_ARG_WITH([zlib],
+	[  --with-zlib=PATH        Use zlib in PATH],
+	[ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+		zlib=no
+	  elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then
+		if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
+			if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
+				LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+			else
+				LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+			fi
+		else
+			if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
+				LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${rpath_opt}${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+			else
+				LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
+			fi
+		fi
+		if test -d "$withval/include"; then
+			CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
+		else
+			CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
+		fi
+	fi ]
+)
+
+# These libraries are needed for anything that links in the channel code.
+CHANNELLIBS=""
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for zlib])
+if test "x${zlib}" = "xno"; then
+	AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+else
+    saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+    CHANNELLIBS="$CHANNELLIBS -lz"
+    AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+    AC_DEFINE([WITH_ZLIB], [1], [Enable zlib])
+    AC_CHECK_HEADER([zlib.h], ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***])])
+    AC_CHECK_LIB([z], [deflate], [],
+	[
+		saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
+		saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+		dnl Check default zlib install dir
+		if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
+			LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${rpath_opt}/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
+		else
+			LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
+		fi
+		CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}"
+		AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([deflate], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBZ])],
+			[
+				AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***])
+			]
+		)
+	]
+    )
+
+    AC_ARG_WITH([zlib-version-check],
+	[  --without-zlib-version-check Disable zlib version check],
+	[  if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+		zlib_check_nonfatal=1
+	   fi
+	]
+    )
+
+    AC_MSG_CHECKING([for possibly buggy zlib])
+    AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <zlib.h>
+	]],
+	[[
+	int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v;
+	n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d);
+	if (n != 3 && n != 4)
+		exit(1);
+	v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d;
+	fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v);
+
+	/* 1.1.4 is OK */
+	if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4)
+		exit(0);
+
+	/* 1.2.3 and up are OK */
+	if (v >= 1020300)
+		exit(0);
+
+	exit(2);
+	]])],
+	AC_MSG_RESULT([no]),
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+	  if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib too old - check config.log ***
+Your reported zlib version has known security problems.  It's possible your
+vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number.  If you
+are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running
+"./configure --without-zlib-version-check".
+If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater.
+See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details.])
+	  else
+		AC_MSG_WARN([zlib version may have security problems])
+	  fi
+	],
+	[	AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking zlib version]) ]
+    )
+    LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+fi
+
+dnl UnixWare 2.x
+AC_CHECK_FUNC([strcasecmp],
+	[], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [strcasecmp], [LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"]) ]
+)
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utimes],
+	[], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([c89], [utimes], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UTIMES])
+					LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"]) ]
+)
+
+dnl    Checks for libutil functions
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsd/libutil.h libutil.h])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([fmt_scaled], [util bsd])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([scan_scaled], [util bsd])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([login], [util bsd])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logout], [util bsd])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logwtmp], [util bsd])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([openpty], [util bsd])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([updwtmp], [util bsd])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp])
+
+# On some platforms, inet_ntop and gethostbyname may be found in libresolv
+# or libnsl.
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([inet_ntop], [resolv nsl])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([gethostbyname], [resolv nsl])
+
+# Some Linux distribtions ship the BSD libc hashing functions in
+# separate libraries.
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([SHA256Update], [md bsd])
+
+# "Particular Function Checks"
+# see https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/manual/autoconf-2.69/html_node/Particular-Functions.html
+AC_FUNC_STRFTIME
+AC_FUNC_MALLOC
+AC_FUNC_REALLOC
+# autoconf doesn't have AC_FUNC_CALLOC so fake it if malloc returns NULL;
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if calloc(0, N) returns non-null])
+AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+	[AC_LANG_PROGRAM(
+		[[ #include <stdlib.h> ]],
+		[[ void *p = calloc(0, 1); exit(p == NULL); ]]
+	)],
+	[ func_calloc_0_nonnull=yes ],
+	[ func_calloc_0_nonnull=no ],
+	[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming same as malloc])
+	  func_calloc_0_nonnull="$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull"]
+)
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$func_calloc_0_nonnull])
+
+if test "x$func_calloc_0_nonnull" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CALLOC, 1, [calloc(0, x) returns non-null])
+else
+	AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CALLOC, 0, [calloc(0, x) returns NULL])
+	AC_DEFINE(calloc, rpl_calloc,
+	    [Define to rpl_calloc if the replacement function should be used.])
+fi
+
+# Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support])
+AC_EGREP_CPP([FOUNDIT],
+	[
+		#include <glob.h>
+		#ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC
+		FOUNDIT
+		#endif
+	],
+	[
+		AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC], [1],
+			[Define if your system glob() function has
+			the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension])
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+	],
+	[
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	]
+)
+
+# Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_matchc field in glob_t])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <glob.h> ]],
+	[[ glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1; ]])],
+	[
+		AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC], [1],
+			[Define if your system glob() function has
+			gl_matchc options in glob_t])
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+	], [
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+])
+
+# Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <glob.h> ]], [[
+#ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT
+#error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension"
+#endif
+glob_t g;
+g.gl_statv = NULL;
+]])],
+	[
+		AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV], [1],
+			[Define if your system glob() function has
+			gl_statv options in glob_t])
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+	], [
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+
+])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([GLOB_NOMATCH], , , [#include <glob.h>])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECL([VIS_ALL], ,
+    AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_STRNVIS, 1, [missing VIS_ALL]), [#include <vis.h>])
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name])
+AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+	[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+	]],
+	[[
+	struct dirent d;
+	exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));
+	]])],
+	[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+	[
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME], [1],
+			[Define if your struct dirent expects you to
+			allocate extra space for d_name])
+	],
+	[
+		AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME])
+		AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME])
+	]
+)
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for /proc/pid/fd directory])
+if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PROC_PID], [1], [Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd])
+	AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+else
+	AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+fi
+
+# Check whether user wants to use ldns
+LDNS_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
+	[  --with-ldns[[=PATH]]      Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)],
+	[
+	ldns=""
+	if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+		AC_PATH_TOOL([LDNSCONFIG], [ldns-config], [no])
+		if test "x$LDNSCONFIG" = "xno"; then
+			LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
+			ldns=yes
+		else
+			LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`"
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`"
+			ldns=yes
+		fi
+	elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+			LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
+			LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
+			ldns=yes
+	fi
+
+	# Verify that it works.
+	if test "x$ldns" = "xyes" ; then
+		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support])
+		LDNS_MSG="yes"
+		AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support])
+		AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+			[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <ldns/ldns.h>
+int main(void) { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); }
+			]])
+		],
+			[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
+				[
+					AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+					AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries.])
+				])
+	fi
+])
+
+# Check whether user wants libedit support
+LIBEDIT_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH([libedit],
+	[  --with-libedit[[=PATH]]   Enable libedit support for sftp],
+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+			if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
+				AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit])
+				if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then
+					AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+					use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes
+				else
+					AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+				fi
+			fi
+		else
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
+			if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
+				LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+			else
+				LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
+			fi
+		fi
+		if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then
+			LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit`
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`"
+		else
+			LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses"
+		fi
+		OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'`
+		AC_CHECK_LIB([edit], [el_init],
+			[ AC_DEFINE([USE_LIBEDIT], [1], [Use libedit for sftp])
+			  LIBEDIT_MSG="yes"
+			  AC_SUBST([LIBEDIT])
+			],
+			[ AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit not found]) ],
+			[ $OTHERLIBS ]
+		)
+		AC_MSG_CHECKING([if libedit version is compatible])
+		AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+		    [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <histedit.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+		    ]],
+		    [[
+	int i = H_SETSIZE;
+	el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	exit(0);
+		    ]])],
+		    [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+		    [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		      AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit version is not compatible]) ]
+		)
+	fi ]
+)
+
+AUDIT_MODULE=none
+AC_ARG_WITH([audit],
+	[  --with-audit=module     Enable audit support (modules=debug,bsm,linux)],
+	[
+	  AC_MSG_CHECKING([for supported audit module])
+	  case "$withval" in
+	  bsm)
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([bsm])
+		AUDIT_MODULE=bsm
+		dnl    Checks for headers, libs and functions
+		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsm/audit.h], [],
+		    [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found])],
+		    [
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+# include <time.h>
+#endif
+		    ]
+)
+		AC_CHECK_LIB([bsm], [getaudit], [],
+		    [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required library not found])])
+		AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit], [],
+		    [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required function not found])])
+		# These are optional
+		AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit_addr aug_get_machine])
+		AC_DEFINE([USE_BSM_AUDIT], [1], [Use BSM audit module])
+		if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then
+			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf"
+			AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_BSM_API], [1],
+				[The system has incomplete BSM API])
+		fi
+		;;
+	  linux)
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([linux])
+		AUDIT_MODULE=linux
+		dnl    Checks for headers, libs and functions
+		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libaudit.h])
+		SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit"
+		AC_DEFINE([USE_LINUX_AUDIT], [1], [Use Linux audit module])
+		;;
+	  debug)
+		AUDIT_MODULE=debug
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([debug])
+		AC_DEFINE([SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS], [1], [Use audit debugging module])
+		;;
+	  no)
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		;;
+	  *)
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown audit module $withval])
+		;;
+	esac ]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_WITH([pie],
+    [  --with-pie              Build Position Independent Executables if possible], [
+	if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
+		use_pie=no
+	fi
+	if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then
+		use_pie=yes
+	fi
+    ]
+)
+if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then
+	use_pie=no
+fi
+if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
+	# Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off.
+	use_pie=no
+fi
+if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
+	# Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gcc >= 4.x])
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4
+#error gcc is too old
+#endif
+]])],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	  use_pie=no ]
+)
+fi
+if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then
+	SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+	OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fPIE])
+	OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-pie])
+	# We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither.
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported])
+	if echo "x $CFLAGS"  | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+	   echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie'  >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+	else
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
+		LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS"
+	fi
+fi
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether -fPIC is accepted])
+SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fPIC"
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+	[AC_LANG_PROGRAM( [[ #include <stdlib.h> ]], [[ exit(0); ]] )],
+   [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+    PICFLAG="-fPIC"; ],
+   [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+    PICFLAG=""; ])
+CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
+AC_SUBST([PICFLAG])
+
+dnl    Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
+	Blowfish_initstate \
+	Blowfish_expandstate \
+	Blowfish_expand0state \
+	Blowfish_stream2word \
+	SHA256Update \
+	SHA384Update \
+	SHA512Update \
+	asprintf \
+	b64_ntop \
+	__b64_ntop \
+	b64_pton \
+	__b64_pton \
+	bcopy \
+	bcrypt_pbkdf \
+	bindresvport_sa \
+	blf_enc \
+	bzero \
+	cap_rights_limit \
+	clock \
+	closefrom \
+	close_range \
+	dirfd \
+	endgrent \
+	err \
+	errx \
+	explicit_bzero \
+	explicit_memset \
+	fchmod \
+	fchmodat \
+	fchown \
+	fchownat \
+	flock \
+	fnmatch \
+	freeaddrinfo \
+	freezero \
+	fstatfs \
+	fstatvfs \
+	futimes \
+	getaddrinfo \
+	getcwd \
+	getentropy \
+	getgrouplist \
+	getline \
+	getnameinfo \
+	getopt \
+	getpagesize \
+	getpeereid \
+	getpeerucred \
+	getpgid \
+	_getpty \
+	getrlimit \
+	getrandom \
+	getsid \
+	getttyent \
+	glob \
+	group_from_gid \
+	inet_aton \
+	inet_ntoa \
+	inet_ntop \
+	innetgr \
+	killpg \
+	llabs \
+	localtime_r \
+	login_getcapbool \
+	login_getpwclass \
+	memmem \
+	memmove \
+	memset_s \
+	mkdtemp \
+	ngetaddrinfo \
+	nsleep \
+	ogetaddrinfo \
+	openlog_r \
+	pledge \
+	poll \
+	ppoll \
+	prctl \
+	procctl \
+	pselect \
+	pstat \
+	raise \
+	readpassphrase \
+	reallocarray \
+	realpath \
+	recvmsg \
+	recallocarray \
+	rresvport_af \
+	sendmsg \
+	setdtablesize \
+	setegid \
+	setenv \
+	seteuid \
+	setgroupent \
+	setgroups \
+	setlinebuf \
+	setlogin \
+	setpassent\
+	setpcred \
+	setproctitle \
+	setregid \
+	setreuid \
+	setrlimit \
+	setsid \
+	setvbuf \
+	sigaction \
+	sigvec \
+	snprintf \
+	socketpair \
+	statfs \
+	statvfs \
+	strcasestr \
+	strdup \
+	strerror \
+	strlcat \
+	strlcpy \
+	strmode \
+	strndup \
+	strnlen \
+	strnvis \
+	strptime \
+	strsignal \
+	strtonum \
+	strtoll \
+	strtoul \
+	strtoull \
+	swap32 \
+	sysconf \
+	tcgetpgrp \
+	timegm \
+	timingsafe_bcmp \
+	truncate \
+	unsetenv \
+	updwtmpx \
+	utimensat \
+	user_from_uid \
+	usleep \
+	vasprintf \
+	vsnprintf \
+	waitpid \
+	warn \
+])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([bzero, memmem])
+
+dnl Wide character support.
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mblen mbtowc nl_langinfo wcwidth])
+
+TEST_SSH_UTF8=${TEST_SSH_UTF8:=yes}
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for utf8 locale support])
+AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+	[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <locale.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+	]], [[
+	char *loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "en_US.UTF-8");
+	if (loc != NULL)
+		exit(0);
+	exit(1);
+	]])],
+	AC_MSG_RESULT(yes),
+	[AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+	 TEST_SSH_UTF8=no],
+	AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
+)
+
+AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+        [AC_LANG_PROGRAM(
+           [[ #include <ctype.h> ]],
+           [[ return (isblank('a')); ]])],
+	[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).])
+])
+
+disable_pkcs11=
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([pkcs11],
+	[  --disable-pkcs11        disable PKCS#11 support code [no]],
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			disable_pkcs11=1
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+disable_sk=
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([security-key],
+	[  --disable-security-key  disable U2F/FIDO support code [no]],
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			disable_sk=1
+		fi
+	]
+)
+enable_sk_internal=
+AC_ARG_WITH([security-key-builtin],
+	[  --with-security-key-builtin include builtin U2F/FIDO support],
+	[ enable_sk_internal=$withval ]
+)
+
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dlopen])
+AC_CHECK_DECL([RTLD_NOW], [], [], [#include <dlfcn.h>])
+
+# IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror()
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR])
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+
+const char *gai_strerror(int);
+			]], [[
+	char *str;
+	str = gai_strerror(0);
+			]])], [
+		AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO], [1],
+		[Define if gai_strerror() returns const char *])], [])])
+
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([nanosleep], [rt posix4], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NANOSLEEP], [1],
+	[Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc])])
+
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime], [rt],
+	[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME], [1], [Have clock_gettime])])
+
+dnl check if we need -D_REENTRANT for localtime_r declaration.
+AC_CHECK_DECL([localtime_r], [],
+	[ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
+	  CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_REENTRANT"
+	  unset ac_cv_have_decl_localtime_r
+	  AC_CHECK_DECL([localtime_r], [],
+		[ CPPFLAGS="$saved_CPPFLAGS" ],
+		[ #include <time.h> ]
+	  )
+	],
+	[ #include <time.h> ]
+)
+
+dnl Make sure prototypes are defined for these before using them.
+AC_CHECK_DECL([strsep],
+	[AC_CHECK_FUNCS([strsep])],
+	[],
+	[
+#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
+# include <string.h>
+#endif
+	])
+
+dnl tcsendbreak might be a macro
+AC_CHECK_DECL([tcsendbreak],
+	[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_TCSENDBREAK])],
+	[AC_CHECK_FUNCS([tcsendbreak])],
+	[#include <termios.h>]
+)
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([h_errno], , ,[#include <netdb.h>])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([SHUT_RD, getpeereid], , ,
+	[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+	])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([O_NONBLOCK], , ,
+	[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+	])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([ftruncate, getentropy], , ,
+	[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+	])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([readv, writev], , , [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+	])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([MAXSYMLINKS], , , [
+#include <sys/param.h>
+	])
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([offsetof], , , [
+#include <stddef.h>
+	])
+
+# extra bits for select(2)
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([howmany, NFDBITS], [], [], [[
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+#include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+	]])
+AC_CHECK_TYPES([fd_mask], [], [], [[
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+#include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+	]])
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresuid], [
+	dnl Some platorms have setresuid that isn't implemented, test for this
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresuid seems to work])
+	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+		]], [[
+	errno=0;
+	setresuid(0,0,0);
+	if (errno==ENOSYS)
+		exit(1);
+	else
+		exit(0);
+		]])],
+		[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+		[AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESUID], [1],
+			[Define if your setresuid() is broken])
+		 AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])],
+		[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])]
+	)
+])
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresgid], [
+	dnl Some platorms have setresgid that isn't implemented, test for this
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresgid seems to work])
+	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+		]], [[
+	errno=0;
+	setresgid(0,0,0);
+	if (errno==ENOSYS)
+		exit(1);
+	else
+		exit(0);
+		]])],
+		[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+		[AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESGID], [1],
+			[Define if your setresgid() is broken])
+		 AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])],
+		[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])]
+	)
+])
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working fflush(NULL)])
+AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+	[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+	]],
+	[[fflush(NULL); exit(0);]])],
+	AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]),
+	[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	 AC_DEFINE([FFLUSH_NULL_BUG], [1],
+	    [define if fflush(NULL) does not work])],
+	AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming working])
+)
+
+dnl    Checks for time functions
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gettimeofday time])
+dnl    Checks for utmp functions
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utmpname])
+dnl    Checks for utmpx functions
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline getutxuser pututxline])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setutxdb setutxent utmpxname])
+dnl    Checks for lastlog functions
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getlastlogxbyname])
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNC([daemon],
+	[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON], [1], [Define if your libraries define daemon()])],
+	[AC_CHECK_LIB([bsd], [daemon],
+		[LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON])])]
+)
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNC([getpagesize],
+	[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE], [1],
+		[Define if your libraries define getpagesize()])],
+	[AC_CHECK_LIB([ucb], [getpagesize],
+		[LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE])])]
+)
+
+# Check for broken snprintf
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings])
+	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+		]],
+		[[
+	char b[5];
+	snprintf(b,5,"123456789");
+	exit(b[4]!='\0');
+		]])],
+		[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+			AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1],
+				[Define if your snprintf is busted])
+			AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor])
+		],
+		[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ]
+	)
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf understands %zu])
+	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+		]],
+		[[
+	size_t a = 1, b = 2;
+	char z[128];
+	snprintf(z, sizeof z, "%zu%zu", a, b);
+	exit(strcmp(z, "12"));
+		]])],
+		[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+			AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1],
+				[snprintf does not understand %zu])
+		],
+		[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ]
+	)
+fi
+
+# We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the
+# number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3)
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow])
+	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	size_t ret;
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	return ret;
+}
+		]], [[
+char x[1];
+if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
+	return 1;
+if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
+	return 1;
+return 0;
+		]])],
+		[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+			AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1],
+				[Define if your snprintf is busted])
+			AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor])
+		],
+		[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()]) ]
+	)
+fi
+
+# On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio,
+# check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *.
+# This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; }
+		]], [[
+	snprintf(0, 0, 0);
+		]])],
+   [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+    AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [const],
+              [Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt])],
+   [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+    AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [/* not const */])])
+
+# Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support
+NO_PEERCHECK=""
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt])
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>]], [[int i = SO_PEERCRED;]])],
+		[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		  AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SO_PEERCRED], [1], [Have PEERCRED socket option])
+		], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		NO_PEERCHECK=1
+        ])
+fi
+
+dnl make sure that openpty does not reacquire controlling terminal
+if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if openpty correctly handles controlling tty])
+	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H
+# include <pty.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+		]], [[
+	pid_t pid;
+	int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status;
+
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid < 0) {		/* failed */
+		exit(1);
+	} else if (pid > 0) {	/* parent */
+		waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
+		if (WIFEXITED(status))
+			exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
+		else
+			exit(2);
+	} else {		/* child */
+		close(0); close(1); close(2);
+		setsid();
+		openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+		if (fd >= 0)
+			exit(3);	/* Acquired ctty: broken */
+		else
+			exit(0);	/* Did not acquire ctty: OK */
+	}
+		]])],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+			AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes])
+		]
+	)
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
+    test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work])
+	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#define TEST_PORT "2222"
+		]], [[
+	int err, sock;
+	struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
+
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+
+	err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
+	if (err != 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+			continue;
+
+		err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
+		    sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+		    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
+
+		if (err != 0) {
+			if (err == EAI_SYSTEM)
+				perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM");
+			else
+				fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n",
+				    gai_strerror(err));
+			exit(2);
+		}
+
+		sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+		if (sock < 0)
+			perror("socket");
+		if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+			if (errno == EBADF)
+				exit(3);
+		}
+	}
+	exit(0);
+		]])],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+			AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes])
+		]
+	)
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
+    test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work])
+	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#define TEST_PORT "2222"
+		]], [[
+	int err, sock;
+	struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
+
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+
+	err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
+	if (err != 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+			continue;
+
+		err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
+		    sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+		    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
+
+		if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) {
+			perror("getnameinfo");
+			exit(2);
+		}
+	}
+	exit(0);
+		]])],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+			AC_DEFINE([AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK], [1],
+				[Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails
+				for the all-zeros IPv6 address])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+			AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming no])
+		]
+	)
+fi
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_CHECK_DECLS(AI_NUMERICSERV, , ,
+	    [#include <sys/types.h>
+	     #include <sys/socket.h>
+	     #include <netdb.h>])
+fi
+
+if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h])
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+		]],
+		[[ exit(0); ]])],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+			AC_DEFINE([GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS], [1],
+			    [Conflicting defs for getspnam])
+		]
+	)
+fi
+
+dnl NetBSD added an strnvis and unfortunately made it incompatible with the
+dnl existing one in OpenBSD and Linux's libbsd (the former having existed
+dnl for over ten years). Despite this incompatibility being reported during
+dnl development (see http://gnats.netbsd.org/44977) they still shipped it.
+dnl Even more unfortunately FreeBSD and later MacOS picked up this incompatible
+dnl implementation.  Try to detect this mess, and assume the only safe option
+dnl if we're cross compiling.
+dnl
+dnl OpenBSD, 2001: strnvis(char *dst, const char *src, size_t dlen, int flag);
+dnl NetBSD: 2012,  strnvis(char *dst, size_t dlen, const char *src, int flag);
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_strnvis" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working strnvis])
+	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <vis.h>
+static void sighandler(int sig) { _exit(1); }
+		]], [[
+	char dst[16];
+
+	signal(SIGSEGV, sighandler);
+	if (strnvis(dst, "src", 4, 0) && strcmp(dst, "src") == 0)
+		exit(0);
+	exit(1)
+		]])],
+		[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+		[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		 AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [strnvis detected broken])],
+		[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming broken])
+		 AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [strnvis assumed broken])]
+	)
+fi
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if SA_RESTARTed signals interrupt select()])
+AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+	[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+static void sighandler(int sig) { }
+		]], [[
+	int r;
+	pid_t pid;
+	struct sigaction sa;
+
+	sa.sa_handler = sighandler;
+	sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, NULL);
+	if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { /* child */
+		pid = getppid();
+		sleep(1);
+		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+		sleep(1);
+		if (getppid() == pid) /* if parent did not exit, shoot it */
+			kill(pid, SIGKILL);
+		exit(0);
+	} else { /* parent */
+		r = select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	}
+	exit(r == -1 ? 0 : 1);
+	]])],
+	[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+	[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	 AC_DEFINE([NO_SA_RESTART], [1],
+	    [SA_RESTARTed signals do no interrupt select])],
+	[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
+)
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpgrp],[
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getpgrp accepts zero args])
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[$ac_includes_default]], [[ getpgrp(); ]])],
+		[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		  AC_DEFINE([GETPGRP_VOID], [1], [getpgrp takes zero args])],
+		[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		  AC_DEFINE([GETPGRP_VOID], [0], [getpgrp takes one arg])]
+	)
+])
+
+# Search for OpenSSL
+saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
+saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+openssl_bin_PATH="$PATH"
+AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-dir],
+	[  --with-ssl-dir=PATH     Specify path to OpenSSL installation ],
+	[
+		if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-dir when OpenSSL disabled])
+		fi
+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			case "$withval" in
+				# Relative paths
+				./*|../*)	withval="`pwd`/$withval"
+			esac
+			if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
+				libcrypto_path="${withval}/lib"
+			elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then
+				libcrypto_path="$withval/lib64"
+			else
+				# Built but not installed
+				libcrypto_path="${withval}"
+			fi
+			if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
+				LDFLAGS="-L${libcrypto_path} ${rpath_opt}${libcrypto_path} ${LDFLAGS}"
+			else
+				LDFLAGS="-L${libcrypto_path} ${LDFLAGS}"
+			fi
+			if test -d "$withval/include"; then
+				CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
+			else
+				CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
+			fi
+			openssl_bin_PATH="${PATH}${PATH_SEPARATOR}${withval}/bin${PATH_SEPARATOR}${withval}/apps"
+		fi
+	]
+)
+AC_PATH_PROGS([openssl_bin], openssl, [], [$openssl_bin_PATH])
+AC_SUBST(OPENSSL_BIN, [${openssl_bin}])
+
+AC_ARG_WITH([openssl-header-check],
+	[  --without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check],
+	[
+		if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+			openssl_check_nonfatal=1
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+openssl_engine=no
+AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-engine],
+	[  --with-ssl-engine       Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support ],
+	[
+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+				AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-engine when OpenSSL disabled])
+			fi
+			openssl_engine=yes
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+nocrypto_saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+	LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS"
+	CHANNELLIBS="-lcrypto $CHANNELLIBS"
+	AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], ,
+	    [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** working libcrypto not found, check config.log])])
+	AC_CHECK_HEADER([openssl/opensslv.h], ,
+	    [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***])])
+
+	# Determine OpenSSL header version
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL header version])
+	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+	#include <stdlib.h>
+	#include <stdio.h>
+	#include <string.h>
+	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+	#define DATA "conftest.sslincver"
+		]], [[
+		FILE *fd;
+		int rc;
+
+		fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+		if(fd == NULL)
+			exit(1);
+
+		if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n",
+		    (unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
+		     OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) < 0)
+			exit(1);
+
+		exit(0);
+		]])],
+		[
+			ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver`
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_header_ver])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL version header not found.])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
+		]
+	)
+
+	# Determining OpenSSL library version is version dependent.
+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([OpenSSL_version OpenSSL_version_num])
+
+	# Determine OpenSSL library version
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL library version])
+	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+	#include <stdio.h>
+	#include <stdlib.h>
+	#include <string.h>
+	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+	#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+	#define DATA "conftest.ssllibver"
+		]], [[
+		FILE *fd;
+		int rc;
+
+		fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+		if(fd == NULL)
+			exit(1);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
+# define OpenSSL_version	SSLeay_version
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
+# define OpenSSL_version_num	SSLeay
+#endif
+		if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n",
+		    (unsigned long)OpenSSL_version_num(),
+		    OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION))) < 0)
+			exit(1);
+
+		exit(0);
+		]])],
+		[
+			ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver`
+			# Check version is supported.
+			case "$ssl_library_ver" in
+			10000*|0*)
+				AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have "$ssl_library_ver")])
+		                ;;
+			100*)   ;; # 1.0.x
+			101000[[0123456]]*)
+				# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613
+				AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL 1.1.x versions prior to 1.1.0g have a bug that breaks their use with OpenSSH (have "$ssl_library_ver")])
+				;;
+			101*)   ;; # 1.1.x
+			200*)   ;; # LibreSSL
+			300*)
+				# OpenSSL 3; we use the 1.1x API
+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L"
+				;;
+			301*|302*)
+				# OpenSSL development branch; request 1.1x API
+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L"
+				;;
+		        *)
+				AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown/unsupported OpenSSL version ("$ssl_library_ver")])
+		                ;;
+			esac
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_library_ver])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL library not found.])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
+		]
+	)
+
+	case "$host" in
+	x86_64-*)
+		case "$ssl_library_ver" in
+		3000004*)
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL 3.0.4 has a potential RCE in its RSA implementation (CVE-2022-2274)])
+			;;
+		esac
+	esac
+
+	# Sanity check OpenSSL headers
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's headers match the library])
+	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+	#include <stdlib.h>
+	#include <string.h>
+	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+	#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+		]], [[
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
+# define OpenSSL_version_num	SSLeay
+#endif
+		exit(OpenSSL_version_num() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1);
+		]])],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+			if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then
+				AC_MSG_ERROR([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
+	library. Check config.log for details.
+	If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check
+	by running "./configure --without-openssl-header-check".
+	Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.
+	])
+			else
+				AC_MSG_WARN([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
+	library. Check config.log for details.
+	Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.])
+			fi
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
+		]
+	)
+
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL functions will link])
+	AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <openssl/err.h> ]],
+		[[ ERR_load_crypto_strings(); ]])],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+			LIBS="$LIBS -ldl"
+			AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl])
+			AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+				[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <openssl/err.h> ]],
+				[[ ERR_load_crypto_strings(); ]])],
+				[
+					AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+					CHANNELLIBS="$CHANNELLIBS -ldl"
+				],
+				[
+					AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+				]
+			)
+		]
+	)
+
+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
+		BN_is_prime_ex \
+		DES_crypt \
+		DSA_generate_parameters_ex \
+		EVP_DigestFinal_ex \
+		EVP_DigestInit_ex \
+		EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \
+		EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \
+		EVP_MD_CTX_init \
+		HMAC_CTX_init \
+		RSA_generate_key_ex \
+		RSA_get_default_method \
+	])
+
+	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
+	AC_CHECK_FUNC(OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms,
+	    AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS, 1, [as a function]),
+	    AC_CHECK_DECL(OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms,
+		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS, 1, [as a macro]), ,
+		[[#include <openssl/evp.h>]]
+	    )
+	)
+
+	# LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API
+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
+		OPENSSL_init_crypto \
+		DH_get0_key \
+		DH_get0_pqg \
+		DH_set0_key \
+		DH_set_length \
+		DH_set0_pqg \
+		DSA_get0_key \
+		DSA_get0_pqg \
+		DSA_set0_key \
+		DSA_set0_pqg \
+		DSA_SIG_get0 \
+		DSA_SIG_set0 \
+		ECDSA_SIG_get0 \
+		ECDSA_SIG_set0 \
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv \
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst \
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv \
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_updated_iv \
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv \
+		RSA_get0_crt_params \
+		RSA_get0_factors \
+		RSA_get0_key \
+		RSA_set0_crt_params \
+		RSA_set0_factors \
+		RSA_set0_key \
+		RSA_meth_free \
+		RSA_meth_dup \
+		RSA_meth_set1_name \
+		RSA_meth_get_finish \
+		RSA_meth_set_priv_enc \
+		RSA_meth_set_priv_dec \
+		RSA_meth_set_finish \
+		EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA \
+		EVP_MD_CTX_new \
+		EVP_MD_CTX_free \
+		EVP_chacha20 \
+	])
+
+	if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_CHECKING([for OpenSSL ENGINE support])
+		AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+	#include <openssl/engine.h>
+			]], [[
+				ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+				ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+			]])],
+			[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+			  AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE], [1],
+			     [Enable OpenSSL engine support])
+			], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL ENGINE support not found])
+		])
+	fi
+
+	# Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support])
+	AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+	#include <stdlib.h>
+	#include <string.h>
+	#include <openssl/evp.h>
+		]], [[
+		exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
+		]])],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+			AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES], [1],
+			    [libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions])
+		]
+	)
+
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int])
+	AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+	#include <stdlib.h>
+	#include <string.h>
+	#include <openssl/evp.h>
+		]], [[
+		if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0))
+			exit(0);
+		]])],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+			AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID], [1],
+			    [Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void])
+		]
+	)
+
+	# Check for SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 support in OpenSSL
+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EVP_sha256 EVP_sha384 EVP_sha512])
+
+	# Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1])
+	AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+	#include <openssl/ec.h>
+	#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+	#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+	#include <openssl/evp.h>
+	#include <openssl/objects.h>
+	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+		]], [[
+		EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+		const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */
+		]])],
+		[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		  enable_nistp256=1 ],
+		[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
+	)
+
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1])
+	AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+	#include <openssl/ec.h>
+	#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+	#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+	#include <openssl/evp.h>
+	#include <openssl/objects.h>
+	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+		]], [[
+		EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1);
+		const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */
+		]])],
+		[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		  enable_nistp384=1 ],
+		[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
+	)
+
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1])
+	AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+	#include <openssl/ec.h>
+	#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+	#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+	#include <openssl/evp.h>
+	#include <openssl/objects.h>
+	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+		]], [[
+		EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
+		const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
+		]])],
+		[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		  AC_MSG_CHECKING([if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional])
+		  AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+			[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+	#include <stdlib.h>
+	#include <openssl/ec.h>
+	#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+	#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+	#include <openssl/evp.h>
+	#include <openssl/objects.h>
+	#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+			]],[[
+			EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
+			const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
+			exit(e == NULL || m == NULL);
+			]])],
+			[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+			  enable_nistp521=1 ],
+			[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ],
+			[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross-compiling: assuming yes])
+			  enable_nistp521=1 ]
+		  )],
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	)
+
+	if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \
+	    test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
+		AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC, [1], [OpenSSL has ECC])
+		AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EC_KEY_METHOD_new])
+		openssl_ecc=yes
+	else
+		openssl_ecc=no
+	fi
+	if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then
+		AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256], [1],
+		    [libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1])
+	else
+		unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
+			ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \
+			ecdh-sha2-nistp256 \
+			ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+	fi
+	if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then
+		AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp384r1])
+	else
+		unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
+			ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \
+			ecdh-sha2-nistp384 \
+			ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+	fi
+	if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
+		AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp521r1])
+	else
+		unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
+			ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \
+			ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 \
+			ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+	fi
+fi
+
+# PKCS11/U2F depend on OpenSSL and dlopen().
+enable_pkcs11=yes
+enable_sk=yes
+if test "x$openssl" != "xyes" ; then
+	enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing libcrypto"
+fi
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_dlopen" != "xyes" ; then
+	enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing dlopen(3)"
+	enable_sk="disabled; missing dlopen(3)"
+fi
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" != "xyes" ; then
+	enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW"
+	enable_sk="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW"
+fi
+if test ! -z "$disable_pkcs11" ; then
+	enable_pkcs11="disabled by user"
+fi
+if test ! -z "$disable_sk" ; then
+	enable_sk="disabled by user"
+fi
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable PKCS11])
+if test "x$enable_pkcs11" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PKCS11], [], [Enable for PKCS#11 support])
+fi
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$enable_pkcs11])
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable U2F])
+if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_SK], [], [Enable for U2F/FIDO support])
+	AC_SUBST(SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY, [regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so])
+else
+	# Do not try to build sk-dummy library.
+	AC_SUBST(SK_DUMMY_LIBRARY, [""])
+fi
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$enable_sk])
+
+# Now check for built-in security key support.
+if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" -a "x$enable_sk_internal" != "xno" ; then
+	use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2=
+	if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
+		AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libfido2])
+		if "$PKGCONFIG" libfido2; then
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+			use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2=yes
+		else
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		fi
+	fi
+	if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2" = "xyes"; then
+		LIBFIDO2=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libfido2`
+		CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libfido2`"
+	else
+		LIBFIDO2="-lfido2 -lcbor"
+	fi
+	OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBFIDO2 | sed 's/-lfido2//'`
+	fido2_error=
+	AC_CHECK_LIB([fido2], [fido_init],
+		[ ],
+		[ fido2_error="missing/unusable libfido2" ],
+		[ $OTHERLIBS ]
+	)
+	AC_CHECK_HEADER([fido.h], [],
+		[ fido2_error="missing fido.h from libfido2" ])
+	AC_CHECK_HEADER([fido/credman.h], [],
+		[ fido2_error="missing fido/credman.h from libfido2" ],
+		[ #include <fido.h> ]
+	)
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([for usable libfido2 installation])
+	if test ! -z "$fido2_error" ; then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([$fido2_error])
+		if test "x$enable_sk_internal" = "xyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([No usable libfido2 library/headers found])
+		fi
+		LIBFIDO2=""
+	else
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		AC_SUBST([LIBFIDO2])
+		AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL], [],
+		    [Enable for built-in U2F/FIDO support])
+		enable_sk="built-in"
+		saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+		LIBS="$LIBFIDO2 $LIBS"
+		AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
+			fido_assert_set_clientdata \
+			fido_cred_prot \
+			fido_cred_set_prot \
+			fido_cred_set_clientdata \
+			fido_dev_get_touch_begin \
+			fido_dev_get_touch_status \
+			fido_dev_supports_cred_prot \
+			fido_dev_is_winhello \
+		])
+		LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+	fi
+fi
+
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
+	arc4random \
+	arc4random_buf \
+	arc4random_stir \
+	arc4random_uniform \
+])
+### Configure cryptographic random number support
+
+# Check whether OpenSSL seeds itself
+if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded])
+	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+	#include <stdlib.h>
+	#include <string.h>
+	#include <openssl/rand.h>
+		]], [[
+		exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1);
+		]])],
+		[
+			OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
+			# This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if
+			# OpenSSL is not seeded correctly.
+			OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
+		]
+	)
+fi
+
+# PRNGD TCP socket
+AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-port],
+	[  --with-prngd-port=PORT  read entropy from PRNGD/EGD TCP localhost:PORT],
+	[
+		case "$withval" in
+		no)
+			withval=""
+			;;
+		[[0-9]]*)
+			;;
+		*)
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port])
+			;;
+		esac
+		if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
+			PRNGD_PORT="$withval"
+			AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_PORT], [$PRNGD_PORT],
+				[Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket])
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+# PRNGD Unix domain socket
+AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-socket],
+	[  --with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)],
+	[
+		case "$withval" in
+		yes)
+			withval="/var/run/egd-pool"
+			;;
+		no)
+			withval=""
+			;;
+		/*)
+			;;
+		*)
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket])
+			;;
+		esac
+
+		if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
+			if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
+				AC_MSG_ERROR([You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket])
+			fi
+			if test ! -r "$withval" ; then
+				AC_MSG_WARN([Entropy socket is not readable])
+			fi
+			PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval"
+			AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"],
+				[Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket])
+		fi
+	],
+	[
+		# Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already
+		if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then
+			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for PRNGD/EGD socket])
+			# Insert other locations here
+			for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do
+				if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then
+					PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock"
+					AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"])
+					break;
+				fi
+			done
+			if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
+				AC_MSG_RESULT([$PRNGD_SOCKET])
+			else
+				AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
+			fi
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+# Which randomness source do we use?
+if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
+	RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT"
+elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
+	RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET"
+elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY], [1],
+		[Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only])
+	RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY"
+elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
+	AC_MSG_WARN([OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible])
+else
+	AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options])
+fi
+LIBS="$nocrypto_saved_LIBS"
+
+saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+AC_CHECK_LIB([iaf], [ia_openinfo], [
+	LIBS="$LIBS -liaf"
+	AC_CHECK_FUNCS([set_id], [SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf"
+				AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBIAF], [1],
+			[Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id])
+				])
+])
+LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+# Check for crypt() in libcrypt.  If we have it, we only need it for sshd.
+saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [
+	LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS"
+	SSHDLIBS="-lcrypt $SSHDLIBS"
+])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt])
+LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+# Check for PAM libs
+PAM_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
+	[  --with-pam              Enable PAM support ],
+	[
+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \
+			   test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then
+				AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found])
+			fi
+
+			saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+			AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlopen], , )
+			AC_CHECK_LIB([pam], [pam_set_item], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing])])
+			AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_getenvlist])
+			AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_putenv])
+			LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+			PAM_MSG="yes"
+
+			SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
+			AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
+				[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
+
+			if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then
+				case "$LIBS" in
+				*-ldl*)
+					# libdl already in LIBS
+					;;
+				*)
+					SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
+					;;
+				esac
+			fi
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+AC_ARG_WITH([pam-service],
+	[  --with-pam-service=name Specify PAM service name ],
+	[
+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
+		   test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSHD_PAM_SERVICE],
+				["$withval"], [sshd PAM service name])
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+# Check for older PAM
+if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
+	# Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM)
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument])
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
+#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
+#endif
+		]], [[
+(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1);
+		]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])], [
+			AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OLD_PAM], [1],
+				[Define if you have an old version of PAM
+				which takes only one argument to pam_strerror])
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+			PAM_MSG="yes (old library)"
+
+	])
+fi
+
+case "$host" in
+*-*-cygwin*)
+	SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+	;;
+*)
+	SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
+	;;
+esac
+AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-user],
+	[  --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation],
+	[
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval
+		fi
+	]
+)
+if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], [CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER],
+		[Cygwin function to fetch non-privileged user for privilege separation])
+else
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"],
+		[non-privileged user for privilege separation])
+fi
+AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER])
+
+if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then
+AC_CHECK_DECL([SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER], [have_seccomp_filter=1], , [
+	#include <sys/types.h>
+	#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+])
+fi
+if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([kernel for seccomp_filter support])
+AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+		#include <errno.h>
+		#include <elf.h>
+		#include <linux/audit.h>
+		#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+		#include <stdlib.h>
+		#include <sys/prctl.h>
+	]],
+	[[ int i = $seccomp_audit_arch;
+	   errno = 0;
+	   prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0);
+	   exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1); ]])],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		# Disable seccomp filter as a target
+		have_seccomp_filter=0
+	]
+)
+fi
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct pollfd.fd], [], [], [[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+#include <sys/poll.h>
+#endif
+]])
+
+AC_CHECK_TYPES([nfds_t], , , [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+#include <sys/poll.h>
+#endif
+])
+
+# Decide which sandbox style to use
+sandbox_arg=""
+AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox],
+	[  --with-sandbox=style    Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, capsicum, darwin, rlimit, seccomp_filter, systrace, pledge)],
+	[
+		if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+			sandbox_arg=""
+		else
+			sandbox_arg="$withval"
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+if test "x$sandbox_arg" != "xno"; then
+# POSIX specifies that poll() "shall fail with EINVAL if the nfds argument
+# is greater than OPEN_MAX".  On some platforms that includes implementions
+# of select in userspace on top of poll() so check both work with rlimit
+# NOFILES so check that both work before enabling the rlimit sandbox.
+    AC_MSG_CHECKING([if select and/or poll works with descriptor rlimit])
+    AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+	[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+# include <poll.h>
+#elif HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+# include <sys/poll.h>
+#endif
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+	]],[[
+	struct rlimit rl_zero;
+	int fd, r;
+	fd_set fds;
+	struct timeval tv;
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+#endif
+
+	fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
+	FD_ZERO(&fds);
+	FD_SET(fd, &fds);
+	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+	setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero);
+	setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
+	tv.tv_sec = 1;
+	tv.tv_usec = 0;
+	r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
+	if (r == -1)
+		exit(1);
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL
+	pfd.fd = fd;
+	pfd.events = POLLIN;
+	r = poll(&pfd, 1, 1);
+	if (r == -1)
+		exit(2);
+#endif
+	exit(0);
+	]])],
+	[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+	 select_works_with_rlimit=yes],
+	[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	 select_works_with_rlimit=no],
+	[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming no])
+	 select_works_with_rlimit=no]
+    )
+
+    AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works])
+    AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+	[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+	]],[[
+	struct rlimit rl_zero;
+	int r;
+
+	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+	r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
+	exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
+	]])],
+	[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+	 rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes],
+	[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	 rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no],
+	[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
+	 rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes]
+    )
+
+    AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])
+    AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+	[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+	]],[[
+		struct rlimit rl_zero;
+
+		rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+		exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0);
+	]])],
+	[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+	[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	 AC_DEFINE(SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE, 1,
+	    [setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])],
+	[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
+    )
+fi
+
+if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xpledge" || \
+   ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" = "xyes" ) ; then
+	test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" != "xyes" && \
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([pledge sandbox requires pledge(2) support])
+	SANDBOX_STYLE="pledge"
+	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_PLEDGE], [1], [Sandbox using pledge(2)])
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \
+   ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then
+	test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support])
+	SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace"
+	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SYSTRACE], [1], [Sandbox using systrace(4)])
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \
+     ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \
+       test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then
+	test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \
+	     "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function])
+	SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin"
+	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_DARWIN], [1], [Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3)])
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \
+     ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
+       test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \
+       test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \
+       test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \
+       test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \
+       test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \
+       test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \
+       test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then
+	test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host])
+	test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS])
+	test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers])
+	test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function])
+	SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter"
+	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER], [1], [Sandbox using seccomp filter])
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \
+     ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
+       test "x$disable_capsicum" != "xyes" && \
+       test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \
+       test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then
+       test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header])
+       test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function])
+       SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum"
+       AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_CAPSICUM], [1], [Sandbox using capsicum])
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \
+     ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \
+       test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \
+       test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then
+	test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function])
+	test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \
+		AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit])
+	SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit"
+	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_RLIMIT], [1], [Sandbox using setrlimit(2)])
+elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsolaris" || \
+   ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$SOLARIS_PRIVS" = "xyes" ) ; then
+	SANDBOX_STYLE="solaris"
+	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SOLARIS], [1], [Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges])
+elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \
+     test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then
+	SANDBOX_STYLE="none"
+	AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_NULL], [1], [no privsep sandboxing])
+else
+	AC_MSG_ERROR([unsupported --with-sandbox])
+fi
+
+# Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right.
+if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then
+  LIBS="$LIBS -liberty";
+fi
+
+# Check for long long datatypes
+AC_CHECK_TYPES([long long, unsigned long long, long double])
+
+# Check datatype sizes
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([short int])
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([int])
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long int])
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long long int])
+AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([time_t], [], [[
+    #include <sys/types.h>
+    #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+    # include <sys/time.h>
+    #endif
+    #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+    # include <time.h>
+    #endif
+	]]
+)
+
+# Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX)
+if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then
+	ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0
+fi
+
+# compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them.
+if test -z "$have_llong_max" && test -z "$have_long_long_max"; then
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([for max value of long long])
+	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+/* Why is this so damn hard? */
+#ifdef __GNUC__
+# undef __GNUC__
+#endif
+#define __USE_ISOC99
+#include <limits.h>
+#define DATA "conftest.llminmax"
+#define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a))
+
+/*
+ * printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so
+ * we do this the hard way.
+ */
+static int
+fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n)
+{
+	unsigned int i;
+	int l[sizeof(long long) * 8];
+
+	if (n < 0)
+		if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0)
+			return -1;
+	for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) {
+		l[i] = my_abs(n % 10);
+		n /= 10;
+	}
+	do {
+		if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0)
+			return -1;
+	} while (i != 0);
+	if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0)
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+		]], [[
+	FILE *f;
+	long long i, llmin, llmax = 0;
+
+	if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL)
+		exit(1);
+
+#if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX)
+	fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
+	llmin = LLONG_MIN;
+	llmax = LLONG_MAX;
+#else
+	fprintf(stderr, "Calculating  LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
+	/* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */
+	for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++)
+		llmax = i;
+	llmin = llmax + 1LL;	/* wrap */
+#endif
+
+	/* Sanity check */
+	if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax
+	    || llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0
+	    || llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) {
+		fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n");
+		exit(2);
+	}
+
+	if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0)
+		exit(3);
+	if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0)
+		exit(4);
+	if (fclose(f) < 0)
+		exit(5);
+	exit(0);
+		]])],
+		[
+			llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax`
+			llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax`
+
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_max])
+			AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MAX], [${llong_max}LL],
+			    [max value of long long calculated by configure])
+			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for min value of long long])
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_min])
+			AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MIN], [${llong_min}LL],
+			    [min value of long long calculated by configure])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
+		]
+	)
+fi
+
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([UINT32_MAX], , , [[
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_LIMITS_H
+# include <sys/limits.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+# include <limits.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+]])
+
+# More checks for data types
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int type], ac_cv_have_u_int, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+	[[ u_int a; a = 1;]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_u_int="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT], [1], [define if you have u_int data type])
+	have_u_int=1
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_intxx_t, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+	[[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have intxx_t data type])
+	have_intxx_t=1
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
+	   test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
+then
+    AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t types in stdint.h])
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdint.h> ]],
+	[[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
+		[
+			AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T])
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for int64_t type], ac_cv_have_int64_t, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+# include <sys/bitypes.h>
+#endif
+		]], [[
+int64_t a; a = 1;
+		]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have int64_t data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+	[[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have u_intxx_t data type])
+	have_u_intxx_t=1
+fi
+
+if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
+    AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h])
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/socket.h> ]],
+	[[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
+		[
+			AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T])
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int64_t types], ac_cv_have_u_int64_t, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+	[[ u_int64_t a; a = 1;]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have u_int64_t data type])
+	have_u_int64_t=1
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \
+	   test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
+then
+    AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h])
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/bitypes.h> ]],
+	[[ u_int64_t a; a = 1]])],
+		[
+			AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T])
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	])
+fi
+
+if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
+	AC_CACHE_CHECK([for uintXX_t types], ac_cv_have_uintxx_t, [
+		AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+			]], [[
+	uint8_t a;
+	uint16_t b;
+	uint32_t c;
+	a = b = c = 1;
+			]])],
+		[ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no"
+		])
+	])
+	if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
+		AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T], [1],
+			[define if you have uintxx_t data type])
+	fi
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
+	   test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
+then
+    AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in stdint.h])
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdint.h> ]],
+	[[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
+		[
+			AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T])
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	])
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
+	   test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes")
+then
+    AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h])
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <inttypes.h> ]],
+	[[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
+		[
+			AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T])
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	])
+fi
+
+if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
+	   test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
+then
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h])
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/bitypes.h>
+		]], [[
+			int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c;
+			u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g;
+			a = b = c = e = f = g = 1;
+		]])],
+		[
+			AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T])
+			AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T])
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	])
+fi
+
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_char], ac_cv_have_u_char, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+	[[ u_char foo; foo = 125; ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_u_char="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_char="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_CHAR], [1], [define if you have u_char data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CHECK_TYPES([intmax_t, uintmax_t], , , [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+])
+
+TYPE_SOCKLEN_T
+
+AC_CHECK_TYPES([sig_atomic_t, sighandler_t], , , [#include <signal.h>])
+AC_CHECK_TYPES([fsblkcnt_t, fsfilcnt_t], , , [
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+#include <sys/bitypes.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
+#include <sys/statfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+])
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct statfs.f_files, struct statfs.f_flags], [], [], [[
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+#include <sys/bitypes.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
+#include <sys/statfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H
+#include <sys/vfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
+]])
+
+
+AC_CHECK_TYPES([in_addr_t, in_port_t], , ,
+[#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>])
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for size_t], ac_cv_have_size_t, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+	[[ size_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_size_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_size_t="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SIZE_T], [1], [define if you have size_t data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ssize_t], ac_cv_have_ssize_t, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+	[[ ssize_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SSIZE_T], [1], [define if you have ssize_t data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for clock_t], ac_cv_have_clock_t, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <time.h> ]],
+	[[ clock_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_T], [1], [define if you have clock_t data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for sa_family_t], ac_cv_have_sa_family_t, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+		]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ],
+	[ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+		]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
+		[ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ],
+		[ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no" ]
+	)
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T], [1],
+		[define if you have sa_family_t data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pid_t], ac_cv_have_pid_t, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+	[[ pid_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PID_T], [1], [define if you have pid_t data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for mode_t], ac_cv_have_mode_t, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
+	[[ mode_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MODE_T], [1], [define if you have mode_t data type])
+fi
+
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+		]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes" ],
+	[ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE], [1],
+		[define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_in6], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+		]], [[ struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0; ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes" ],
+	[ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6], [1],
+		[define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct in6_addr], ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+		]], [[ struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0; ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes" ],
+	[ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR], [1],
+		[define if you have struct in6_addr data type])
+
+dnl Now check for sin6_scope_id
+	AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct sockaddr_in6.sin6_scope_id], , ,
+		[
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+		])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct addrinfo], ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+		]], [[ struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes" ],
+	[ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO], [1],
+		[define if you have struct addrinfo data type])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timeval], ac_cv_have_struct_timeval, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/time.h> ]],
+	[[ struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes" ],
+	[ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL], [1], [define if you have struct timeval])
+	have_struct_timeval=1
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timespec], ac_cv_have_struct_timespec, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+    #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+    # include <sys/time.h>
+    #endif
+    #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+    # include <time.h>
+    #endif
+	]],
+	[[ struct timespec ts; ts.tv_sec = 1;]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="yes" ],
+	[ ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC], [1], [define if you have struct timespec])
+	have_struct_timespec=1
+fi
+
+# We need int64_t or else certain parts of the compile will fail.
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \
+	test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \
+	test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then
+	echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support.  Contact your vendor or install"
+	echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing."
+	echo ""
+	exit 1;
+else
+dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc)
+	AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+int main(void)
+{
+	char buf[50];
+	char expected_out[50];
+	int mazsize = 50 ;
+#if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
+	long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff;
+#else
+	long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll;
+#endif
+	strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807");
+	snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num);
+	if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0)
+		exit(1);
+	exit(0);
+}
+#else
+int main(void) { exit(0); }
+#endif
+		]])], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF]) ],
+		AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()])
+	)
+fi
+
+dnl Checks for structure members
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmp.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([syslen], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_pid], [utmp.h], [HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_exit], [utmp.h], [HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX])
+OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_ss], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_SS_IN_UTMPX])
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_blksize])
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtim])
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtime])
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct passwd.pw_gecos, struct passwd.pw_class,
+struct passwd.pw_change, struct passwd.pw_expire],
+[], [], [[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+]])
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct __res_state.retrans], [], [AC_DEFINE([__res_state], [state],
+	[Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h])],
+[[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+]])
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct sockaddr_in.sin_len],
+    [AC_DEFINE([SOCK_HAS_LEN], [1], [sockaddr_in has sin_len])],
+    [],
+    [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+    ]])]
+)
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage],
+		ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+		]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1; ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ],
+	[ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage],
+		ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+		]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1; ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ],
+	[ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1],
+		[Fields in struct sockaddr_storage])
+fi
+
+dnl make sure we're using the real structure members and not defines
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr],
+		ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+		]], [[
+#ifdef msg_accrights
+#error "msg_accrights is a macro"
+exit(1);
+#endif
+struct msghdr m;
+m.msg_accrights = 0;
+exit(0);
+		]])],
+		[ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" ],
+		[ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no" ]
+	)
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR], [1],
+		[Define if your system uses access rights style
+		file descriptor passing])
+fi
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+	]], [[ struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0; ]])],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if fsid_t has member val])
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+	]], [[ fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0; ]])],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+	  AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS_VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member val]) ],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ])
+
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if f_fsid has member __val])
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+	]], [[ fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0; ]])],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+	  AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS___VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member __val]) ],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ])
+])
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_control field in struct msghdr],
+		ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr, [
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+		]], [[
+#ifdef msg_control
+#error "msg_control is a macro"
+exit(1);
+#endif
+struct msghdr m;
+m.msg_control = 0;
+exit(0);
+		]])],
+		[ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes" ],
+		[ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no" ]
+	)
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR], [1],
+		[Define if your system uses ancillary data style
+		file descriptor passing])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [
+	AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
+		[[ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" ],
+	[ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE___PROGNAME], [1], [Define if libc defines __progname])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__], ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__, [
+	AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
+		[[ printf("%s", __FUNCTION__); ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes" ],
+	[ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE___FUNCTION__], [1],
+		[Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __func__], ac_cv_cc_implements___func__, [
+	AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
+		[[ printf("%s", __func__); ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes" ],
+	[ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE___func__], [1], [Define if compiler implements __func__])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether va_copy exists], ac_cv_have_va_copy, [
+	AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdarg.h>
+va_list x,y;
+		]], [[ va_copy(x,y); ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes" ],
+	[ ac_cv_have_va_copy="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_VA_COPY], [1], [Define if va_copy exists])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether __va_copy exists], ac_cv_have___va_copy, [
+	AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdarg.h>
+va_list x,y;
+		]], [[ __va_copy(x,y); ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE___VA_COPY], [1], [Define if __va_copy exists])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether getopt has optreset support],
+		ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset, [
+	AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <getopt.h> ]],
+		[[ extern int optreset; optreset = 0; ]])],
+	[ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes" ],
+	[ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET], [1],
+		[Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset])
+fi
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_errlist], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist, [
+	AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
+[[ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);]])],
+	[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" ],
+	[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST], [1],
+		[Define if your system defines sys_errlist[]])
+fi
+
+
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_nerr], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr, [
+	AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
+[[ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);]])],
+	[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" ],
+	[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no"
+	])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_NERR], [1], [Define if your system defines sys_nerr])
+fi
+
+# Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([getrrsetbyname], [resolv],
+	[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME], [1],
+		[Define if getrrsetbyname() exists])],
+	[
+		# Needed by our getrrsetbyname()
+		AC_SEARCH_LIBS([res_query], [resolv])
+		AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv])
+		AC_MSG_CHECKING([if res_query will link])
+		AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+				]], [[
+	res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+				]])],
+		    AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]),
+		   [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		    saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+		    LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
+		    AC_MSG_CHECKING([for res_query in -lresolv])
+		    AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+				]], [[
+	res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+				]])],
+			[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
+			[LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+			 AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
+		    ])
+		AC_CHECK_FUNCS([_getshort _getlong])
+		AC_CHECK_DECLS([_getshort, _getlong], , ,
+		    [#include <sys/types.h>
+		    #include <arpa/nameser.h>])
+		AC_CHECK_MEMBER([HEADER.ad],
+			[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_HEADER_AD], [1],
+			    [Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h])], ,
+			[#include <arpa/nameser.h>])
+	])
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct __res_state _res is an extern])
+AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+# include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+extern struct __res_state _res;
+		]], [[
+struct __res_state *volatile p = &_res;  /* force resolution of _res */
+return 0;
+		]],)],
+		[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		 AC_DEFINE([HAVE__RES_EXTERN], [1],
+		    [Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern])
+		],
+		[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
+)
+
+# Check whether user wants SELinux support
+SELINUX_MSG="no"
+LIBSELINUX=""
+AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
+	[  --with-selinux          Enable SELinux support],
+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		save_LIBS="$LIBS"
+		AC_DEFINE([WITH_SELINUX], [1],
+			[Define if you want SELinux support.])
+		SELINUX_MSG="yes"
+		AC_CHECK_HEADER([selinux/selinux.h], ,
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires selinux.h header]))
+		AC_CHECK_LIB([selinux], [setexeccon],
+			[ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
+			  LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux"
+			],
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires libselinux library]))
+		AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level])
+		LIBS="$save_LIBS $LIBSELINUX"
+	fi ]
+)
+AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
+
+# Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
+KRB5_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+	[  --with-kerberos5=PATH   Enable Kerberos 5 support],
+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+		if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
+			KRB5ROOT="/usr/local"
+		else
+			KRB5ROOT=${withval}
+		fi
+
+		AC_DEFINE([KRB5], [1], [Define if you want Kerberos 5 support])
+		KRB5_MSG="yes"
+
+		use_pkgconfig_for_krb5=
+		if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
+			AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about kerberos5])
+			if "$PKGCONFIG" krb5; then
+				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+				use_pkgconfig_for_krb5=yes
+			else
+				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+			fi
+		fi
+		if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_krb5" = "xyes"; then
+			K5CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags krb5`
+			K5LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs krb5`
+			CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS"
+
+			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gssapi support])
+			if "$PKGCONFIG" krb5-gssapi; then
+				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+				AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1],
+					[Define this if you want GSSAPI
+					support in the version 2 protocol])
+				GSSCFLAGS="`$PKGCONFIG --cflags krb5-gssapi`"
+				GSSLIBS="`$PKGCONFIG --libs krb5-gssapi`"
+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS"
+			else
+				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+			fi
+			AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal])
+			AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <krb5.h>
+				]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])],
+				[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+				AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL], [1],
+				[Define this if you are using the Heimdal
+				version of Kerberos V5]) ],
+				[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+			])
+		else
+			AC_PATH_TOOL([KRB5CONF], [krb5-config],
+				     [$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config],
+				     [$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH])
+			if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then
+				K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`"
+				K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`"
+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS"
+
+				AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gssapi support])
+				if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then
+					AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+					AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1],
+						[Define this if you want GSSAPI
+						support in the version 2 protocol])
+					GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`"
+					GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`"
+					CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS"
+				else
+					AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+				fi
+				AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal])
+				AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <krb5.h>
+					]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])],
+					[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+					AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL], [1],
+					[Define this if you are using the Heimdal
+					version of Kerberos V5]) ],
+					[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+				])
+			else
+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include"
+				LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
+				AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal])
+				AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <krb5.h>
+					]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])],
+						[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+						 AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL])
+						 K5LIBS="-lkrb5"
+						 K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1"
+						 AC_CHECK_LIB([roken], [net_write],
+						   [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"])
+						 AC_CHECK_LIB([des], [des_cbc_encrypt],
+						   [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"])
+					       ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+						 K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err"
+				])
+				AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv])
+
+				AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi_krb5], [gss_init_sec_context],
+					[ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
+					  GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5" ],
+					[ AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi], [gss_init_sec_context],
+						[ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
+						  GSSLIBS="-lgssapi" ],
+						[ AC_CHECK_LIB([gss], [gss_init_sec_context],
+							[ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
+							  GSSLIBS="-lgss" ],
+							AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail]))
+						])
+					])
+
+				AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi.h], ,
+					[ unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h
+					  CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
+					  AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h], ,
+						AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail])
+					  )
+					]
+				)
+
+				oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS"
+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
+				AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], ,
+						[ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ])
+
+			fi
+		fi
+		if test -n "${rpath_opt}" ; then
+			LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS ${rpath_opt}${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
+		fi
+		if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
+			blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
+		fi
+
+		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h])
+		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h])
+		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h])
+
+		AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1],
+			[Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])])
+
+		AC_CHECK_DECLS([GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE], [], [], [[
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
+# include <gssapi.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
+# include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+# include <gssapi_generic.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H)
+# include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
+#endif
+		]])
+		saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
+		LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS"
+		AC_CHECK_FUNCS([krb5_cc_new_unique krb5_get_error_message krb5_free_error_message])
+		LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
+
+	fi
+	]
+)
+AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
+AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
+AC_SUBST([CHANNELLIBS])
+
+# Looking for programs, paths and files
+
+PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-path],
+	[  --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)],
+	[
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval
+		fi
+	]
+)
+AC_SUBST([PRIVSEP_PATH])
+
+AC_ARG_WITH([xauth],
+	[  --with-xauth=PATH       Specify path to xauth program ],
+	[
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			xauth_path=$withval
+		fi
+	],
+	[
+		TestPath="$PATH"
+		TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin"
+		TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11"
+		TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin"
+		TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin"
+		AC_PATH_PROG([xauth_path], [xauth], , [$TestPath])
+		if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then
+			xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth"
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+STRIP_OPT=-s
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([strip],
+	[  --disable-strip         Disable calling strip(1) on install],
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			STRIP_OPT=
+		fi
+	]
+)
+AC_SUBST([STRIP_OPT])
+
+if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then
+	XAUTH_PATH="undefined"
+	AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH])
+else
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([XAUTH_PATH], ["$xauth_path"],
+		[Define if xauth is found in your path])
+	XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path
+	AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH])
+fi
+
+dnl # --with-maildir=/path/to/mail gets top priority.
+dnl # if maildir is set in the platform case statement above we use that.
+dnl # Otherwise we run a program to get the dir from system headers.
+dnl # We first look for _PATH_MAILDIR then MAILDIR then _PATH_MAIL
+dnl # If we find _PATH_MAILDIR we do nothing because that is what
+dnl # session.c expects anyway. Otherwise we set to the value found
+dnl # stripping any trailing slash. If for some strage reason our program
+dnl # does not find what it needs, we default to /var/spool/mail.
+# Check for mail directory
+AC_ARG_WITH([maildir],
+    [  --with-maildir=/path/to/mail    Specify your system mail directory],
+    [
+	if test "X$withval" != X  &&  test "x$withval" != xno  &&  \
+	    test "x${withval}" != xyes; then
+		AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$withval"],
+            [Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR])
+	    fi
+     ],[
+	if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then
+	    AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"])
+	else
+	    AC_MSG_CHECKING([Discovering system mail directory])
+	    AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+		[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
+#include <maillock.h>
+#endif
+#define DATA "conftest.maildir"
+	]], [[
+	FILE *fd;
+	int rc;
+
+	fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+	if(fd == NULL)
+		exit(1);
+
+#if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR)
+	if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0)
+		exit(1);
+#elif defined (MAILDIR)
+	if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0)
+		exit(1);
+#elif defined (_PATH_MAIL)
+	if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0)
+		exit(1);
+#else
+	exit (2);
+#endif
+
+	exit(0);
+		]])],
+		[
+		    maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir`
+		    maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \
+			| sed 's|/$||'`
+		    AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: $maildir from $maildir_what])
+		    if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then
+			AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"])
+		    fi
+		],
+		[
+		    if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then
+# our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: default value of /var/spool/mail])
+			AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["/var/spool/mail"])
+		     else
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([*** not found ***])
+		     fi
+		],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail])
+		]
+	    )
+	fi
+    ]
+) # maildir
+
+if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then
+	AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test])
+	disable_ptmx_check=yes
+fi
+if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then
+	if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then
+		AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptmx"],
+			[
+				AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTMX], [1],
+					[Define if you have /dev/ptmx])
+				have_dev_ptmx=1
+			]
+		)
+	fi
+fi
+
+if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then
+	AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptc"],
+		[
+			AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC], [1],
+				[Define if you have /dev/ptc])
+			have_dev_ptc=1
+		]
+	)
+else
+	AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test])
+fi
+
+# Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above
+AC_ARG_WITH([mantype],
+	[  --with-mantype=man|cat|doc  Set man page type],
+	[
+		case "$withval" in
+		man|cat|doc)
+			MANTYPE=$withval
+			;;
+		*)
+			AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid man type: $withval])
+			;;
+		esac
+	]
+)
+if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then
+	if ${MANDOC} ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		MANTYPE=doc
+	elif ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		MANTYPE=doc
+	elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		MANTYPE=man
+	else
+		MANTYPE=cat
+	fi
+fi
+AC_SUBST([MANTYPE])
+if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then
+	mansubdir=man;
+else
+	mansubdir=$MANTYPE;
+fi
+AC_SUBST([mansubdir])
+
+# Whether to disable shadow password support
+AC_ARG_WITH([shadow],
+	[  --without-shadow        Disable shadow password support],
+	[
+		if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW])
+			disable_shadow=yes
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if the systems has expire shadow information])
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+struct spwd sp;
+		]], [[ sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0; ]])],
+		[ sp_expire_available=yes ], [
+	])
+
+	if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		AC_DEFINE([HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1],
+		    [Define if you want to use shadow password expire field])
+	else
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	fi
+fi
+
+# Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY
+if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then
+	DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
+	AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY], [1],
+		[Define if you need to use IP address
+		instead of hostname in $DISPLAY])
+else
+	DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no"
+	AC_ARG_WITH([ipaddr-display],
+		[  --with-ipaddr-display   Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY],
+		[
+			if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+				AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY])
+				DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
+			fi
+		]
+	)
+fi
+
+# check for /etc/default/login and use it if present.
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([etc-default-login],
+	[  --disable-etc-default-login Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login [no]],
+	[ if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then
+		AC_MSG_NOTICE([/etc/default/login handling disabled])
+		etc_default_login=no
+	  else
+		etc_default_login=yes
+	  fi ],
+	[ if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes";
+	  then
+		AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login])
+		etc_default_login=no
+	  else
+		etc_default_login=yes
+	  fi ]
+)
+
+if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then
+	AC_CHECK_FILE(["/etc/default/login"],
+	    [ external_path_file=/etc/default/login ])
+	if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then
+		AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN], [1],
+			[Define if your system has /etc/default/login])
+	fi
+fi
+
+dnl BSD systems use /etc/login.conf so --with-default-path= has no effect
+if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \
+	test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then
+	external_path_file=/etc/login.conf
+fi
+
+# Whether to mess with the default path
+SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)"
+AC_ARG_WITH([default-path],
+	[  --with-default-path=    Specify default $PATH environment for server],
+	[
+		if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+			AC_MSG_WARN([
+--with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system.
+Edit /etc/login.conf instead.])
+		elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
+				AC_MSG_WARN([
+--with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in
+$external_path_file .])
+			fi
+			user_path="$withval"
+			SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval"
+		fi
+	],
+	[ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+		AC_MSG_WARN([Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf])
+	else
+		if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
+			AC_MSG_WARN([
+If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included,
+otherwise scp will not work.])
+		fi
+		AC_RUN_IFELSE(
+			[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+/* find out what STDPATH is */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
+# ifdef _PATH_USERPATH	/* Irix */
+#  define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH
+# else
+#  define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
+# endif
+#endif
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#define DATA "conftest.stdpath"
+			]], [[
+	FILE *fd;
+	int rc;
+
+	fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
+	if(fd == NULL)
+		exit(1);
+
+	if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0)
+		exit(1);
+
+	exit(0);
+		]])],
+		[ user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath` ],
+		[ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ],
+		[ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ]
+	)
+# make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work
+		t_bindir="${bindir}"
+		while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do
+			t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}`
+			case $t_bindir in
+				NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;;
+			esac
+			case $t_bindir in
+				NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
+			esac
+		done
+		echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir"  > /dev/null 2>&1
+		if test $? -ne 0  ; then
+			echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir"  > /dev/null 2>&1
+			if test $? -ne 0  ; then
+				user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir
+				AC_MSG_RESULT([Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work])
+			fi
+		fi
+	fi ]
+)
+if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([USER_PATH], ["$user_path"], [Specify default $PATH])
+	AC_SUBST([user_path])
+fi
+
+# Set superuser path separately to user path
+AC_ARG_WITH([superuser-path],
+	[  --with-superuser-path=  Specify different path for super-user],
+	[
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SUPERUSER_PATH], ["$withval"],
+				[Define if you want a different $PATH
+				for the superuser])
+			superuser_path=$withval
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses])
+IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(4in6,
+	[  --with-4in6             Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses],
+	[
+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+			AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6], [1],
+				[Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses
+				and treat as IPv4])
+			IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
+		else
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		fi
+	], [
+		if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([yes (default)])
+			AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6])
+			IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
+		else
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([no (default)])
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+# Whether to enable BSD auth support
+BSD_AUTH_MSG=no
+AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth],
+	[  --with-bsd-auth         Enable BSD auth support],
+	[
+		if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1],
+				[Define if you have BSD auth support])
+			BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+# Where to place sshd.pid
+piddir=/var/run
+# make sure the directory exists
+if test ! -d $piddir ; then
+	piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}`
+	case $piddir in
+		NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
+	esac
+fi
+
+AC_ARG_WITH([pid-dir],
+	[  --with-pid-dir=PATH     Specify location of sshd.pid file],
+	[
+		if test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x$withval" != "xno"  &&  \
+		    test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			piddir=$withval
+			if test ! -d $piddir ; then
+			AC_MSG_WARN([** no $piddir directory on this system **])
+			fi
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR], ["$piddir"],
+	[Specify location of ssh.pid])
+AC_SUBST([piddir])
+
+dnl allow user to disable some login recording features
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([lastlog],
+	[  --disable-lastlog       disable use of lastlog even if detected [no]],
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
+		fi
+	]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmp],
+	[  --disable-utmp          disable use of utmp even if detected [no]],
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
+		fi
+	]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmpx],
+	[  --disable-utmpx         disable use of utmpx even if detected [no]],
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1],
+				[Define if you don't want to use utmpx])
+		fi
+	]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmp],
+	[  --disable-wtmp          disable use of wtmp even if detected [no]],
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
+		fi
+	]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmpx],
+	[  --disable-wtmpx         disable use of wtmpx even if detected [no]],
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX], [1],
+				[Define if you don't want to use wtmpx])
+		fi
+	]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([libutil],
+	[  --disable-libutil       disable use of libutil (login() etc.) [no]],
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN])
+		fi
+	]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututline],
+	[  --disable-pututline     disable use of pututline() etc. ([uw]tmp) [no]],
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTLINE], [1],
+				[Define if you don't want to use pututline()
+				etc. to write [uw]tmp])
+		fi
+	]
+)
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututxline],
+	[  --disable-pututxline    disable use of pututxline() etc. ([uw]tmpx) [no]],
+	[
+		if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE], [1],
+				[Define if you don't want to use pututxline()
+				etc. to write [uw]tmpx])
+		fi
+	]
+)
+AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog],
+  [  --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location [common locations]],
+	[
+		if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
+			AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
+		elif test -n "$withval"  &&  test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
+			conf_lastlog_location=$withval
+		fi
+	]
+)
+
+dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection
+dnl  NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the
+dnl   need for command-line parameters
+dnl lastlog and [uw]tmp are subject to a file search if all else fails
+
+dnl lastlog detection
+dnl  NOTE: the code itself will detect if lastlog is a directory
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#  include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#  include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+# include <login.h>
+#endif
+	]], [[ char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE; ]])],
+		[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+		[
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG])
+		AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#  include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#  include <paths.h>
+#endif
+		]], [[ char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG; ]])],
+		[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+		[
+			AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+			system_lastlog_path=no
+		])
+])
+
+if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
+	if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then
+		for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do
+				if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then
+					conf_lastlog_location=$f
+				fi
+		done
+		if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
+			AC_MSG_WARN([** Cannot find lastlog **])
+			dnl Don't define DISABLE_LASTLOG - that means we don't try wtmp/wtmpx
+		fi
+	fi
+fi
+
+if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_LASTLOG_FILE], ["$conf_lastlog_location"],
+		[Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file])
+fi
+
+dnl utmp detection
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines UTMP_FILE])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#  include <paths.h>
+#endif
+	]], [[ char *utmp = UTMP_FILE; ]])],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	  system_utmp_path=no
+])
+if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
+	if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then
+		for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do
+			if test -f $f ; then
+				conf_utmp_location=$f
+			fi
+		done
+		if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
+			AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
+		fi
+	fi
+fi
+if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_UTMP_FILE], ["$conf_utmp_location"],
+		[Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file])
+fi
+
+dnl wtmp detection
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMP_FILE])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#  include <paths.h>
+#endif
+	]], [[ char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE; ]])],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	  system_wtmp_path=no
+])
+if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
+	if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then
+		for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do
+			if test -f $f ; then
+				conf_wtmp_location=$f
+			fi
+		done
+		if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
+			AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
+		fi
+	fi
+fi
+if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMP_FILE], ["$conf_wtmp_location"],
+		[Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file])
+fi
+
+dnl wtmpx detection
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMPX_FILE])
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#  include <paths.h>
+#endif
+	]], [[ char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE; ]])],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
+	[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+	  system_wtmpx_path=no
+])
+if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then
+	if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then
+		AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX])
+	fi
+else
+	AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMPX_FILE], ["$conf_wtmpx_location"],
+		[Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file])
+fi
+
+
+if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
+	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath"
+	AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile])
+fi
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct lastlog.ll_line], [], [
+    if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
+    fi
+	], [
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
+#include <utmp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+	])
+
+AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct utmp.ut_line], [], [
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
+	AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
+	], [
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
+#include <utmp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+	])
+
+dnl Adding -Werror to CFLAGS early prevents configure tests from running.
+dnl Add now.
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then
+	TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
+else
+	TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes
+fi
+AC_CHECK_DECL([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO],  [TEST_SSH_IPV6=no])
+AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_IPV6], [$TEST_SSH_IPV6])
+AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_UTF8], [$TEST_SSH_UTF8])
+AC_SUBST([TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS], [$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS])
+AC_SUBST([UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS], [$unsupported_algorithms])
+AC_SUBST([DEPEND], [$(cat $srcdir/.depend)])
+
+CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} ${CFLAGS_AFTER}"
+LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} ${LDFLAGS_AFTER}"
+
+# Make a copy of CFLAGS/LDFLAGS without PIE options.
+LDFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$LDFLAGS" | sed 's/ -pie//'`
+CFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$CFLAGS" | sed 's/ -fPIE//'`
+AC_SUBST([LDFLAGS_NOPIE])
+AC_SUBST([CFLAGS_NOPIE])
+
+AC_EXEEXT
+AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \
+	openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile \
+	survey.sh])
+AC_OUTPUT
+
+# Print summary of options
+
+# Someone please show me a better way :)
+A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}`
+B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}`
+C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}`
+D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}`
+E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}`
+F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}`
+G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}`
+H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}`
+I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}`
+J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}`
+
+echo ""
+echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:"
+echo "                     User binaries: $B"
+echo "                   System binaries: $C"
+echo "               Configuration files: $D"
+echo "                   Askpass program: $E"
+echo "                      Manual pages: $F"
+echo "                          PID file: $G"
+echo "  Privilege separation chroot path: $H"
+if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
+echo "   At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file"
+echo "   Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work"
+else
+echo "            sshd default user PATH: $I"
+	if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then
+echo "   (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If"
+echo "   used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)"
+	fi
+fi
+if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then
+echo "          sshd superuser user PATH: $J"
+fi
+echo "                    Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
+echo "                       PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
+echo "                   OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
+echo "                 KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
+echo "                   SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
+echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
+echo "                   libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
+echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
+echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
+echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
+echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
+echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
+echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
+echo "              Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
+echo "             Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
+echo "                   PKCS#11 support: $enable_pkcs11"
+echo "                  U2F/FIDO support: $enable_sk"
+
+echo ""
+
+echo "              Host: ${host}"
+echo "          Compiler: ${CC}"
+echo "    Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}"
+echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}"
+echo "      Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}"
+echo "         Libraries: ${LIBS}"
+if test ! -z "${CHANNELLIBS}"; then
+echo "     +for channels: ${CHANNELLIBS}"
+fi
+if test ! -z "${LIBFIDO2}"; then
+echo "        +for FIDO2: ${LIBFIDO2}"
+fi
+if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
+echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
+fi
+
+echo ""
+
+if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then
+	echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\""
+	echo ""
+fi
+
+if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
+	echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file "
+	echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. "
+	echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ "
+	echo "subdirectory"
+	echo ""
+fi
+
+if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then
+	echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not"
+	echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the"
+	echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to"
+	echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to"
+	echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious"
+	echo "user can connect to your agent."
+	echo ""
+fi
+
+if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then
+	echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL."
+	echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details."
+fi
diff --git a/contrib/Makefile b/contrib/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45d878b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+PKG_CONFIG = pkg-config
+
+all:
+	@echo "Valid targets: gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssk-askpass3"
+
+gnome-ssh-askpass1: gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
+		gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass1 \
+		`gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
+
+gnome-ssh-askpass2: gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
+		gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass2 \
+		`$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-2.0 x11`
+
+gnome-ssh-askpass3: gnome-ssh-askpass3.c
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) `$(PKG_CONFIG) --cflags gtk+-3.0` \
+		gnome-ssh-askpass3.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass3 \
+		`$(PKG_CONFIG) --libs gtk+-3.0 x11`
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *.o gnome-ssh-askpass gnome-ssh-askpass[123]
diff --git a/contrib/README b/contrib/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60e19ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/README
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+Other patches and addons for OpenSSH. Please send submissions to
+djm@mindrot.org
+
+Externally maintained
+---------------------
+
+SSH Proxy Command -- connect.c
+
+Shun-ichi GOTO <gotoh@imasy.or.jp> has written a very useful ProxyCommand
+which allows the use of outbound SSH from behind a SOCKS4, SOCKS5 or
+https CONNECT style proxy server. His page for connect.c has extensive
+documentation on its use as well as compiled versions for Win32.
+
+https://bitbucket.org/gotoh/connect/wiki/Home
+
+
+X11 SSH Askpass:
+
+Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com> has written an excellent X11
+passphrase requester. This is highly recommended:
+
+http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/
+
+
+In this directory
+-----------------
+
+ssh-copy-id:
+
+Phil Hands' <phil@hands.com> shell script to automate the process of adding
+your public key to a remote machine's ~/.ssh/authorized_keys file.
+
+gnome-ssh-askpass[12]:
+
+A GNOME and Gtk2 passphrase requesters. Use "make gnome-ssh-askpass1" or
+"make gnome-ssh-askpass2" to build.
+
+sshd.pam.generic:
+
+A generic PAM config file which may be useful on your system. YMMV
+
+sshd.pam.freebsd:
+
+A PAM config file which works with FreeBSD's PAM port. Contributed by
+Dominik Brettnacher <domi@saargate.de>
+
+findssl.sh:
+
+Search for all instances of OpenSSL headers and libraries and print their 
+versions.  This is intended to help diagnose OpenSSH's "OpenSSL headers do not
+match your library" errors. 
+
+aix:
+    Files to build an AIX native (installp or SMIT installable) package.
+
+caldera:
+    RPM spec file and scripts for building Caldera OpenLinuix packages
+
+cygwin:
+    Support files for Cygwin
+
+hpux:
+    Support files for HP-UX
+
+redhat:
+    RPM spec file and scripts for building Redhat packages
+
+suse:
+    RPM spec file and scripts for building SuSE packages
+
diff --git a/contrib/aix/README b/contrib/aix/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1aa5919
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/aix/README
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+Overview:
+
+This directory contains files to build an AIX native (installp or SMIT
+installable) openssh package.
+
+
+Directions:
+
+(optional) create config.local in your build dir
+./configure [options]
+contrib/aix/buildbff.sh
+
+The file config.local or the environment is read to set the following options
+(default first):
+PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN=[no|yes]
+X11_FORWARDING=[no|yes]
+AIX_SRC=[no|yes]
+
+Acknowledgements:
+
+The contents of this directory are based on Ben Lindstrom's Solaris
+buildpkg.sh. Ben also supplied inventory.sh.
+
+Jim Abbey's (GPL'ed) lppbuild-2.1 was used to learn how to build .bff's
+and for comparison with the output from this script, however no code
+from lppbuild is included and it is not required for operation.
+
+SRC support based on examples provided by Sandor Sklar and Maarten Kreuger.
+PrivSep account handling fixes contributed by W. Earl Allen.
+
+
+Other notes:
+
+The script treats all packages as USR packages (not ROOT+USR when
+appropriate).  It seems to work, though......
+
+If there are any patches to this that have not yet been integrated they
+may be found at http://www.dtucker.net/openssh/.
+
+
+Disclaimer:
+
+It is hoped that it is useful but there is no warranty. If it breaks
+you get to keep both pieces.
+
+
+	- Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip dot com dot au)
+	  2002/03/01
+
diff --git a/contrib/aix/buildbff.sh b/contrib/aix/buildbff.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..55113d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/aix/buildbff.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,366 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# buildbff.sh: Create AIX SMIT-installable OpenSSH packages
+#
+# Author: Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip dot com dot au)
+# This file is placed in the public domain and comes with absolutely
+# no warranty.
+#
+# Based originally on Ben Lindstrom's buildpkg.sh for Solaris
+#
+
+#
+# Tunable configuration settings
+# 	create a "config.local" in your build directory or set
+#	environment variables to override these.
+#
+[ -z "$PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN" ] && PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN=no
+[ -z "$X11_FORWARDING" ] && X11_FORWARDING=no
+[ -z "$AIX_SRC" ] && AIX_SRC=no
+
+umask 022
+
+startdir=`pwd`
+
+perl -v >/dev/null || (echo perl required; exit 1)
+
+# Path to inventory.sh: same place as buildbff.sh
+if  echo $0 | egrep '^/'
+then
+	inventory=`dirname $0`/inventory.sh		# absolute path
+else
+	inventory=`pwd`/`dirname $0`/inventory.sh	# relative path
+fi
+
+#
+# We still support running from contrib/aix, but this is deprecated
+#
+if pwd | egrep 'contrib/aix$'
+then
+	echo "Changing directory to `pwd`/../.."
+	echo "Please run buildbff.sh from your build directory in future."
+	cd ../..
+	contribaix=1
+fi
+
+if [ ! -f Makefile ]
+then
+	echo "Makefile not found (did you run configure?)"
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+#
+# Directories used during build:
+# current dir = $objdir		directory you ran ./configure in.
+# $objdir/$PKGDIR/ 		directory package files are constructed in
+# $objdir/$PKGDIR/root/		package root ($FAKE_ROOT)
+#
+objdir=`pwd`
+PKGNAME=openssh
+PKGDIR=package
+
+#
+# Collect local configuration settings to override defaults
+#
+if [ -s ./config.local ]
+then
+	echo Reading local settings from config.local
+	. ./config.local
+fi
+
+#
+# Fill in some details from Makefile, like prefix and sysconfdir
+#	the eval also expands variables like sysconfdir=${prefix}/etc
+#	provided they are eval'ed in the correct order
+#
+for confvar in prefix exec_prefix bindir sbindir libexecdir datadir mandir mansubdir sysconfdir piddir srcdir
+do
+	eval $confvar=`grep "^$confvar=" $objdir/Makefile | cut -d = -f 2`
+done
+
+#
+# Collect values of privsep user and privsep path
+#	currently only found in config.h
+#
+for confvar in SSH_PRIVSEP_USER PRIVSEP_PATH
+do
+	eval $confvar=`awk '/#define[ \t]'$confvar'/{print $3}' $objdir/config.h`
+done
+
+# Set privsep defaults if not defined
+if [ -z "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ]
+then
+	SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
+fi
+if [ -z "$PRIVSEP_PATH" ]
+then
+	PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+fi
+
+# Clean package build directory
+rm -rf $objdir/$PKGDIR
+FAKE_ROOT=$objdir/$PKGDIR/root
+mkdir -p $FAKE_ROOT
+
+# Start by faking root install
+echo "Faking root install..."
+cd $objdir
+make install-nokeys DESTDIR=$FAKE_ROOT
+
+if [ $? -gt 0 ]
+then
+	echo "Fake root install failed, stopping."
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+#
+# Copy informational files to include in package
+#
+cp $srcdir/LICENCE $objdir/$PKGDIR/
+cp $srcdir/README* $objdir/$PKGDIR/
+
+#
+# Extract common info requires for the 'info' part of the package.
+#	AIX requires 4-part version numbers
+#
+VERSION=`./ssh -V 2>&1 | cut -f 1 -d , | cut -f 2 -d _`
+MAJOR=`echo $VERSION | cut -f 1 -d p | cut -f 1 -d .`
+MINOR=`echo $VERSION | cut -f 1 -d p | cut -f 2 -d .`
+PATCH=`echo $VERSION | cut -f 1 -d p | cut -f 3 -d .`
+PORTABLE=`echo $VERSION | awk 'BEGIN{FS="p"}{print $2}'`
+[ "$PATCH" = "" ] && PATCH=0
+[ "$PORTABLE" = "" ] && PORTABLE=0
+BFFVERSION=`printf "%d.%d.%d.%d" $MAJOR $MINOR $PATCH $PORTABLE`
+
+echo "Building BFF for $PKGNAME $VERSION (package version $BFFVERSION)"
+
+#
+# Set ssh and sshd parameters as per config.local
+#
+if [ "${PERMIT_ROOT_LOGIN}" = no ]
+then
+	perl -p -i -e "s/#PermitRootLogin yes/PermitRootLogin no/" \
+		$FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
+fi
+if [ "${X11_FORWARDING}" = yes ]
+then
+	perl -p -i -e "s/#X11Forwarding no/X11Forwarding yes/" \
+		$FAKE_ROOT/${sysconfdir}/sshd_config
+fi
+
+
+# Rename config files; postinstall script will copy them if necessary
+for cfgfile in ssh_config sshd_config
+do
+	mv $FAKE_ROOT/$sysconfdir/$cfgfile $FAKE_ROOT/$sysconfdir/$cfgfile.default
+done
+
+#
+# Generate lpp control files.
+#	working dir is $FAKE_ROOT but files are generated in dir above
+#	and moved into place just before creation of .bff
+#
+cd $FAKE_ROOT
+echo Generating LPP control files
+find . ! -name . -print >../openssh.al
+$inventory >../openssh.inventory
+
+cat <<EOD >../openssh.copyright
+This software is distributed under a BSD-style license.
+For the full text of the license, see /usr/lpp/openssh/LICENCE
+EOD
+
+#
+# openssh.size file allows filesystem expansion as required
+# generate list of directories containing files
+# then calculate disk usage for each directory and store in openssh.size
+#
+files=`find . -type f -print`
+dirs=`for file in $files; do dirname $file; done | sort -u`
+for dir in $dirs
+do
+	du $dir
+done > ../openssh.size
+
+#
+# Create postinstall script
+#
+cat <<EOF >>../openssh.post_i
+#!/bin/sh
+
+echo Creating configs from defaults if necessary.
+for cfgfile in ssh_config sshd_config
+do
+	if [ ! -f $sysconfdir/\$cfgfile ]
+	then
+		echo "Creating \$cfgfile from default"
+		cp $sysconfdir/\$cfgfile.default $sysconfdir/\$cfgfile
+	else
+		echo "\$cfgfile already exists."
+	fi
+done
+echo
+
+# Create PrivilegeSeparation user and group if not present
+echo Checking for PrivilegeSeparation user and group.
+if cut -f1 -d: /etc/group | egrep '^'$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER'\$' >/dev/null
+then
+	echo "PrivSep group $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER already exists."
+else
+	echo "Creating PrivSep group $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER."
+	mkgroup -A $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+fi
+
+# Create user if required
+if lsuser "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" >/dev/null
+then
+	echo "PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER already exists."
+else
+	echo "Creating PrivSep user $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER."
+	mkuser gecos='SSHD PrivSep User' login=false rlogin=false account_locked=true pgrp=$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER $SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+fi
+
+if egrep '^[ \t]*UsePrivilegeSeparation[ \t]+no' $sysconfdir/sshd_config >/dev/null
+then
+	echo UsePrivilegeSeparation not enabled, privsep directory not required.
+else
+	# create chroot directory if required
+	if [ -d $PRIVSEP_PATH ]
+	then
+		echo "PrivSep chroot directory $PRIVSEP_PATH already exists."
+	else
+		echo "Creating PrivSep chroot directory $PRIVSEP_PATH."
+		mkdir $PRIVSEP_PATH
+		chown 0 $PRIVSEP_PATH
+		chgrp 0 $PRIVSEP_PATH
+		chmod 755 $PRIVSEP_PATH
+	fi
+fi
+echo
+
+# Generate keys unless they already exist
+echo Creating host keys if required.
+$bindir/ssh-keygen -A
+echo
+
+# Set startup command depending on SRC support
+if [ "$AIX_SRC" = "yes" ]
+then
+	echo Creating SRC sshd subsystem.
+	rmssys -s sshd 2>&1 >/dev/null
+	mkssys -s sshd -p "$sbindir/sshd" -a '-D' -u 0 -S -n 15 -f 9 -R -G tcpip
+	startupcmd="start $sbindir/sshd \\\"\\\$src_running\\\""
+	oldstartcmd="$sbindir/sshd"
+else
+	startupcmd="$sbindir/sshd"
+	oldstartcmd="start $sbindir/sshd \\\"$src_running\\\""
+fi
+
+# If migrating to or from SRC, change previous startup command
+# otherwise add to rc.tcpip
+if egrep "^\$oldstartcmd" /etc/rc.tcpip >/dev/null
+then
+	if sed "s|^\$oldstartcmd|\$startupcmd|g" /etc/rc.tcpip >/etc/rc.tcpip.new
+	then
+		chmod 0755 /etc/rc.tcpip.new
+		mv /etc/rc.tcpip /etc/rc.tcpip.old && \
+		mv /etc/rc.tcpip.new /etc/rc.tcpip
+	else
+		echo "Updating /etc/rc.tcpip failed, please check."
+	fi
+else
+	# Add to system startup if required
+	if grep "^\$startupcmd" /etc/rc.tcpip >/dev/null
+	then
+		echo "sshd found in rc.tcpip, not adding."
+	else
+		echo "Adding sshd to rc.tcpip"
+		echo >>/etc/rc.tcpip
+		echo "# Start sshd" >>/etc/rc.tcpip
+		echo "\$startupcmd" >>/etc/rc.tcpip
+	fi
+fi
+EOF
+
+#
+# Create liblpp.a and move control files into it
+#
+echo Creating liblpp.a
+(
+	cd ..
+	for i in openssh.al openssh.copyright openssh.inventory openssh.post_i openssh.size LICENCE README*
+	do
+		ar -r liblpp.a $i
+		rm $i
+	done
+)
+
+#
+# Create lpp_name
+#
+# This will end up looking something like:
+# 4 R I OpenSSH {
+# OpenSSH 3.0.2.1 1 N U en_US OpenSSH 3.0.2p1 Portable for AIX
+# [
+# %
+# /usr/local/bin 8073
+# /usr/local/etc 189
+# /usr/local/libexec 185
+# /usr/local/man/man1 145
+# /usr/local/man/man8 83
+# /usr/local/sbin 2105
+# /usr/local/share 3
+# %
+# ]
+# }
+
+echo Creating lpp_name
+cat <<EOF >../lpp_name
+4 R I $PKGNAME {
+$PKGNAME $BFFVERSION 1 N U en_US OpenSSH $VERSION Portable for AIX
+[
+%
+EOF
+
+for i in $bindir $sysconfdir $libexecdir $mandir/${mansubdir}1 $mandir/${mansubdir}8 $sbindir $datadir /usr/lpp/openssh
+do
+	# get size in 512 byte blocks
+	if [ -d $FAKE_ROOT/$i ]
+	then
+		size=`du $FAKE_ROOT/$i | awk '{print $1}'`
+		echo "$i $size" >>../lpp_name
+	fi
+done
+
+echo '%' >>../lpp_name
+echo ']' >>../lpp_name
+echo '}' >>../lpp_name
+
+#
+# Move pieces into place
+#
+mkdir -p usr/lpp/openssh
+mv ../liblpp.a usr/lpp/openssh
+mv ../lpp_name .
+
+#
+# Now invoke backup to create .bff file
+#	note: lpp_name needs to be the first file so we generate the
+#	file list on the fly and feed it to backup using -i
+#
+echo Creating $PKGNAME-$VERSION.bff with backup...
+rm -f $PKGNAME-$VERSION.bff
+(
+	echo "./lpp_name"
+	find . ! -name lpp_name -a ! -name . -print
+) | backup  -i -q -f ../$PKGNAME-$VERSION.bff $filelist
+
+#
+# Move package into final location and clean up
+#
+mv ../$PKGNAME-$VERSION.bff $startdir
+cd $startdir
+rm -rf $objdir/$PKGDIR
+
+echo $0: done.
+
diff --git a/contrib/aix/inventory.sh b/contrib/aix/inventory.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..7d76f49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/aix/inventory.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# inventory.sh
+#
+# Originally written by Ben Lindstrom, modified by Darren Tucker to use perl
+# This file is placed into the public domain.
+#
+# This will produce an AIX package inventory file, which looks like:
+#
+# /usr/local/bin:
+#          class=apply,inventory,openssh
+#          owner=root
+#          group=system
+#          mode=755
+#          type=DIRECTORY
+# /usr/local/bin/slogin:
+#          class=apply,inventory,openssh
+#          owner=root
+#          group=system
+#          mode=777
+#          type=SYMLINK
+#          target=ssh
+# /usr/local/share/Ssh.bin:
+#          class=apply,inventory,openssh
+#          owner=root
+#          group=system
+#          mode=644
+#          type=FILE
+#          size=VOLATILE
+#          checksum=VOLATILE
+
+find . ! -name . -print | perl -ne '{
+	chomp;
+	if ( -l $_ ) {
+		($dev,$ino,$mod,$nl,$uid,$gid,$rdev,$sz,$at,$mt,$ct,$bsz,$blk)=lstat;
+	} else {
+		($dev,$ino,$mod,$nl,$uid,$gid,$rdev,$sz,$at,$mt,$ct,$bsz,$blk)=stat;
+	}
+
+	# Start to display inventory information
+	$name = $_;
+	$name =~ s|^.||;	# Strip leading dot from path
+	print "$name:\n";
+	print "\tclass=apply,inventory,openssh\n";
+	print "\towner=root\n";
+	print "\tgroup=system\n";
+	printf "\tmode=%lo\n", $mod & 07777;	# Mask perm bits
+	
+	if ( -l $_ ) {
+		# Entry is SymLink
+		print "\ttype=SYMLINK\n";
+		printf "\ttarget=%s\n", readlink($_);
+	} elsif ( -f $_ ) {
+		# Entry is File
+		print "\ttype=FILE\n";
+		print "\tsize=$sz\n";
+		print "\tchecksum=VOLATILE\n";
+	} elsif ( -d $_ ) {
+		# Entry is Directory
+		print "\ttype=DIRECTORY\n";
+	}
+}'
diff --git a/contrib/aix/pam.conf b/contrib/aix/pam.conf
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1528b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/aix/pam.conf
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+#
+# PAM configuration file /etc/pam.conf
+# Example for OpenSSH on AIX 5.2
+#
+
+# Authentication Management
+sshd    auth            required        /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
+OTHER   auth            required        /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
+
+# Account Management
+sshd    account         required        /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
+OTHER   account         required        /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
+
+# Password Management
+sshd    password        required        /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
+OTHER   password        required        /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
+
+# Session Management
+sshd    session         required        /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
+OTHER   session         required        /usr/lib/security/pam_aix
diff --git a/contrib/cygwin/Makefile b/contrib/cygwin/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b78cd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/cygwin/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+srcdir=../..
+copyidsrcdir=..
+prefix=/usr
+exec_prefix=$(prefix)
+bindir=$(prefix)/bin
+datadir=$(prefix)/share
+mandir=$(datadir)/man
+docdir=$(datadir)/doc
+sshdocdir=$(docdir)/openssh
+cygdocdir=$(docdir)/Cygwin
+sysconfdir=/etc
+defaultsdir=$(sysconfdir)/defaults/etc
+inetdefdir=$(defaultsdir)/inetd.d
+PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
+INSTALL=/usr/bin/install -c
+MKDIR_P=$(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs
+
+DESTDIR=
+
+all:
+	@echo
+	@echo "Use \`make cygwin-postinstall DESTDIR=[package directory]'"
+	@echo "Be sure having DESTDIR set correctly!"
+	@echo
+
+move-config-files: $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config
+	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(defaultsdir)
+	mv $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config $(DESTDIR)$(defaultsdir)
+	mv $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config $(DESTDIR)$(defaultsdir)
+
+remove-empty-dir:
+	rm -rf $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH)
+
+install-inetd-config:
+	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(inetdefdir)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd-inetd  $(DESTDIR)$(inetdefdir)/sshd-inetd
+
+install-sshdoc:
+	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/CREDITS $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/CREDITS
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/ChangeLog $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/ChangeLog
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/LICENCE $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/LICENCE
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/OVERVIEW $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/OVERVIEW
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL.agent $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL.agent
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL.certkeys $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL.certkeys
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/PROTOCOL.mux $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/PROTOCOL.mux
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.dns $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.dns
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.platform $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.platform
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.privsep $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.privsep
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/README.tun $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/README.tun
+	-$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(srcdir)/TODO $(DESTDIR)$(sshdocdir)/TODO
+
+install-cygwindoc: README
+	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(cygdocdir)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 README $(DESTDIR)$(cygdocdir)/openssh.README
+
+install-doc: install-sshdoc install-cygwindoc
+
+install-scripts: ssh-host-config ssh-user-config
+	$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
+	$(INSTALL) -m 755 ssh-host-config $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-host-config
+	$(INSTALL) -m 755 ssh-user-config $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-user-config
+
+install-copy-id: $(copyidsrcdir)/ssh-copy-id $(copyidsrcdir)/ssh-copy-id.1
+	$(INSTALL) -m 755 $(copyidsrcdir)/ssh-copy-id $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-copy-id
+	$(INSTALL) -m 644 $(copyidsrcdir)/ssh-copy-id.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1/ssh-copy-id.1
+
+gzip-man-pages:
+	rm $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1/slogin.1
+	gzip $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1/*.1
+	gzip $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man5/*.5
+	gzip $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man8/*.8
+	cd $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/man1 && ln -s ssh.1.gz slogin.1.gz
+
+cygwin-postinstall: move-config-files remove-empty-dir install-inetd-config install-doc install-scripts install-copy-id gzip-man-pages
+	@echo "Cygwin specific configuration finished."
diff --git a/contrib/cygwin/README b/contrib/cygwin/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3745051
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/cygwin/README
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+This package describes important Cygwin specific stuff concerning OpenSSH.
+
+The binary package is usually built for recent Cygwin versions and might
+not run on older versions.  Please check http://cygwin.com/ for information
+about current Cygwin releases.
+
+==================
+Host configuration
+==================
+
+If you are installing OpenSSH the first time, you can generate global config
+files and server keys, as well as installing sshd as a service, by running
+
+   /usr/bin/ssh-host-config
+
+Note that this binary archive doesn't contain default config files in /etc.
+That files are only created if ssh-host-config is started.
+
+To support testing and unattended installation ssh-host-config got
+some options:
+
+usage: ssh-host-config [OPTION]...
+Options:
+    --debug  -d            Enable shell's debug output.
+    --yes    -y            Answer all questions with "yes" automatically.
+    --no     -n            Answer all questions with "no" automatically.
+    --cygwin -c <options>  Use "options" as value for CYGWIN environment var.
+    --name   -N <name>     sshd windows service name.
+    --port   -p <n>        sshd listens on port n.
+    --user   -u <account>  privileged user for service, default 'cyg_server'.
+    --pwd    -w <passwd>   Use "pwd" as password for privileged user.
+    --privileged           On Windows XP, require privileged user
+                           instead of LocalSystem for sshd service.
+
+Installing sshd as daemon via ssh-host-config is recommended.
+
+Alternatively you can start sshd via inetd, if you have the inetutils
+package installed.  Just run ssh-host-config, but answer "no" when asked
+to install sshd as service.  The ssh-host-config script also adds the
+required lines to /etc/inetd.conf and /etc/services.
+
+==================
+User configuration
+==================
+
+Any user can simplify creating the own private and public keys by running
+
+  /usr/bin/ssh-user-config
+
+To support testing and unattended installation ssh-user-config got
+some options as well:
+
+usage: ssh-user-config [OPTION]...
+Options:
+    --debug      -d        Enable shell's debug output.
+    --yes        -y        Answer all questions with "yes" automatically.
+    --no         -n        Answer all questions with "no" automatically.
+    --passphrase -p word   Use "word" as passphrase automatically.
+
+Please note that OpenSSH does never use the value of $HOME to
+search for the users configuration files! It always uses the
+value of the pw_dir field in /etc/passwd as the home directory.
+If no home directory is set in /etc/passwd, the root directory
+is used instead!
+
+================
+Building OpenSSH
+================
+
+Building from source is easy.  Just unpack the source archive, cd to that
+directory, and call cygport:
+
+	cygport openssh.cygport all
+
+You must have installed the following packages to be able to build OpenSSH
+with the aforementioned cygport script:
+
+  zlib
+  crypt
+  libssl-devel
+  libedit-devel
+  libkrb5-devel
+
+Please send requests, error reports etc. to cygwin@cygwin.com.
+
+
+Have fun,
+
+Corinna Vinschen
+Cygwin Developer
+Red Hat Inc.
diff --git a/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config b/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a8572e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config
@@ -0,0 +1,714 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# ssh-host-config, Copyright 2000-2014 Red Hat Inc.
+#
+# This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH.
+#
+# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+#
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS  
+# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF               
+# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.   
+# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,   
+# DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR    
+# OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR    
+# THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.                               
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Initialization
+# ======================================================================
+
+CSIH_SCRIPT=/usr/share/csih/cygwin-service-installation-helper.sh
+
+# List of apps used.  This is checkad for existence in csih_sanity_check
+# Don't use *any* transient commands before sourcing the csih helper script,
+# otherwise the sanity checks are short-circuited.
+declare -a csih_required_commands=(
+  /usr/bin/basename coreutils
+  /usr/bin/cat coreutils
+  /usr/bin/chmod coreutils
+  /usr/bin/dirname coreutils
+  /usr/bin/id coreutils
+  /usr/bin/mv coreutils
+  /usr/bin/rm coreutils
+  /usr/bin/cygpath cygwin
+  /usr/bin/mkpasswd cygwin
+  /usr/bin/mount cygwin
+  /usr/bin/ps cygwin
+  /usr/bin/umount cygwin
+  /usr/bin/cmp diffutils
+  /usr/bin/grep grep
+  /usr/bin/awk gawk
+  /usr/bin/ssh-keygen openssh
+  /usr/sbin/sshd openssh
+  /usr/bin/sed sed
+)
+csih_sanity_check_server=yes
+source ${CSIH_SCRIPT}
+
+PROGNAME=$(/usr/bin/basename $0)
+_tdir=$(/usr/bin/dirname $0)
+PROGDIR=$(cd $_tdir && pwd)
+
+# Subdirectory where the new package is being installed
+PREFIX=/usr
+
+# Directory where the config files are stored
+SYSCONFDIR=/etc
+LOCALSTATEDIR=/var
+
+sshd_config_configured=no
+port_number=22
+service_name=cygsshd
+strictmodes=yes
+cygwin_value=""
+user_account=
+password_value=
+opt_force=no
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: update_services_file
+# ======================================================================
+update_services_file() {
+  local _my_etcdir="/ssh-host-config.$$"
+  local _win_etcdir
+  local _services
+  local _spaces
+  local _serv_tmp
+  local _wservices
+  local ret=0
+
+  _win_etcdir="${SYSTEMROOT}\\system32\\drivers\\etc"
+  _services="${_my_etcdir}/services"
+  _spaces="                           #"
+  _serv_tmp="${_my_etcdir}/srv.out.$$"
+
+  /usr/bin/mount -o text,posix=0,noacl -f "${_win_etcdir}" "${_my_etcdir}"
+
+  # Depends on the above mount
+  _wservices=`cygpath -w "${_services}"`
+
+  # Add ssh 22/tcp  and ssh 22/udp to services
+  if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q 'ssh[[:space:]][[:space:]]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ]
+  then
+    if /usr/bin/awk '{ if ( $2 ~ /^23\/tcp/ ) print "ssh                22/tcp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol\nssh                22/udp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol"; print $0; }' < "${_services}" > "${_serv_tmp}"
+    then
+      if /usr/bin/mv "${_serv_tmp}" "${_services}"
+      then
+	csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_wservices}"
+      else
+	csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!"
+	let ++ret
+      fi
+      /usr/bin/rm -f "${_serv_tmp}"
+    else
+      csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!"
+      let ++ret
+    fi
+  fi
+  /usr/bin/umount "${_my_etcdir}"
+  return $ret
+} # --- End of update_services_file --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: sshd_strictmodes
+#  MODIFIES: strictmodes
+# ======================================================================
+sshd_strictmodes() {
+  if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
+  then
+    echo
+    csih_inform "StrictModes is set to 'yes' by default."
+    csih_inform "This is the recommended setting, but it requires that the POSIX"
+    csih_inform "permissions of the user's home directory, the user's .ssh"
+    csih_inform "directory, and the user's ssh key files are tight so that"
+    csih_inform "only the user has write permissions."
+    csih_inform "On the other hand, StrictModes don't work well with default"
+    csih_inform "Windows permissions of a home directory mounted with the"
+    csih_inform "'noacl' option, and they don't work at all if the home"
+    csih_inform "directory is on a FAT or FAT32 partition."
+    if ! csih_request "Should StrictModes be used?"
+    then
+      strictmodes=no
+    fi
+  fi
+  return 0
+}
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: sshd_privsep
+# Try to create ssshd user account
+# ======================================================================
+sshd_privsep() {
+  local ret=0
+
+  if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ]
+  then
+    if ! csih_create_unprivileged_user sshd
+    then
+      csih_error_recoverable "Could not create user 'sshd'!"
+      csih_error_recoverable "You will not be able to run an sshd service"
+      csih_error_recoverable "under a privileged account successfully."
+      csih_error_recoverable "Make sure to create a non-privileged user 'sshd'"
+      csih_error_recoverable "manually before trying to run the service!"
+      let ++ret
+    fi
+  fi
+  return $ret
+} # --- End of sshd_privsep --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: sshd_config_tweak
+# ======================================================================
+sshd_config_tweak() {
+  local ret=0
+
+  # Modify sshd_config
+  csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file"
+  if [ "${port_number}" -ne 22 ]
+  then
+    /usr/bin/sed -i -e "s/^#\?[[:space:]]*Port[[:space:]].*/Port ${port_number}/" \
+      ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
+    if [ $? -ne 0 ]
+    then
+      csih_warning "Setting listening port to ${port_number} failed!"
+      csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
+      let ++ret
+    fi
+  fi
+  if [ "${strictmodes}" = "no" ]
+  then
+    /usr/bin/sed -i -e "s/^#\?[[:space:]]*StrictModes[[:space:]].*/StrictModes no/" \
+      ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config
+    if [ $? -ne 0 ]
+    then
+      csih_warning "Setting StrictModes to 'no' failed!"
+      csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!"
+      let ++ret
+    fi
+  fi
+  return $ret
+} # --- End of sshd_config_tweak --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: update_inetd_conf
+# ======================================================================
+update_inetd_conf() {
+  local _inetcnf="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.conf"
+  local _inetcnf_tmp="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.conf.$$"
+  local _inetcnf_dir="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.d"
+  local _sshd_inetd_conf="${_inetcnf_dir}/sshd-inetd"
+  local _sshd_inetd_conf_tmp="${_inetcnf_dir}/sshd-inetd.$$"
+  local _with_comment=1
+  local ret=0
+
+  if [ -d "${_inetcnf_dir}" ]
+  then
+    # we have inetutils-1.5 inetd.d support
+    if [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ]
+    then
+      /usr/bin/grep -q '^[[:space:]]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0
+
+      # check for sshd OR ssh in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove
+      # will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/
+      if [ $(/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?) -eq 0 ]
+      then
+	/usr/bin/grep -v '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
+	if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ]
+	then
+	  if /usr/bin/mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}"
+	  then
+  	    csih_inform "Removed ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf}"
+	  else
+  	    csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
+	    let ++ret
+	  fi
+	  /usr/bin/rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
+	else
+	  csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
+	  let ++ret
+	fi
+      fi
+    fi
+
+    csih_install_config "${_sshd_inetd_conf}"   "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults"
+    if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults${_sshd_inetd_conf}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" >/dev/null 2>&1
+    then
+      if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ]
+      then
+	/usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[[:space:]]*//' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
+      else
+	/usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[[:space:]]*/# /' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}"
+      fi
+      if /usr/bin/mv "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}"
+      then
+	csih_inform "Updated ${_sshd_inetd_conf}"
+      else
+	csih_warning "Updating ${_sshd_inetd_conf} failed!"
+	let ++ret
+      fi
+    fi
+
+  elif [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ]
+  then
+    /usr/bin/grep -q '^[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0
+
+    # check for sshd in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove
+    # will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/
+    if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^#\?[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ]
+    then
+      /usr/bin/grep -v '^#\?[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
+      if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ]
+      then
+	if /usr/bin/mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}"
+	then
+	    csih_inform "Removed sshd from ${_inetcnf}"
+	else
+	    csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
+	    let ++ret
+	fi
+	/usr/bin/rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}"
+      else
+	csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!"
+	let ++ret
+      fi
+    fi
+
+    # Add ssh line to inetd.conf
+    if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ]
+    then
+      if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ]
+      then
+	echo 'ssh  stream  tcp     nowait  root    /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}"
+      else
+	echo '# ssh  stream  tcp     nowait  root    /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}"
+      fi
+      if [ $? -eq 0 ]
+      then
+	csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_inetcnf}"
+      else
+	csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_inetcnf} failed!"
+	let ++ret
+      fi
+    fi
+  fi
+  return $ret
+} # --- End of update_inetd_conf --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: check_service_files_ownership
+#   Checks that the files in /etc and /var belong to the right owner
+# ======================================================================
+check_service_files_ownership() {
+  local run_service_as=$1
+  local ret=0
+
+  if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ]
+  then
+    accnt_name=$(/usr/bin/cygrunsrv -VQ "${service_name}" |
+    		 /usr/bin/sed -ne 's/^Account *: *//gp')
+    if [ "${accnt_name}" = "LocalSystem" ]
+    then
+      # Convert "LocalSystem" to "SYSTEM" as is the correct account name
+      run_service_as="SYSTEM"
+    else
+      dom="${accnt_name%%\\*}"
+      accnt_name="${accnt_name#*\\}"
+      if [ "${dom}" = '.' ]
+      then
+	# Check local account
+	run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/mkpasswd -l -u "${accnt_name}" |
+			 /usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}')
+      else
+      	# Check domain
+	run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/mkpasswd -d "${dom}" -u "${accnt_name}" |
+			 /usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}')
+      fi
+    fi
+    if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ]
+    then
+      csih_warning "Couldn't determine name of user running ${service_name} service from account database!"
+      csih_warning "As a result, this script cannot make sure that the files used"
+      csih_warning "by the ${service_name} service belong to the user running the service."
+      return 1
+    fi
+  fi
+  for i in "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_config "${SYSCONFDIR}"/sshd_config "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_host_*key "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_host_*key.pub
+  do
+    if [ -f "$i" ]
+    then
+      if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 "$i" >/dev/null 2>&1
+      then
+	csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of $i!"
+	let ++ret
+      fi
+    fi
+  done
+  if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty >/dev/null 2>&1
+  then
+    csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!"
+    let ++ret
+  fi
+  if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog >/dev/null 2>&1
+  then
+    csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog!"
+    let ++ret
+  fi
+  if [ -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log ]
+  then
+    if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log >/dev/null 2>&1
+    then
+      csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log!"
+      let ++ret
+    fi
+  fi
+  if [ $ret -ne 0 ]
+  then
+    csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of important files to ${run_service_as}!"
+    csih_warning "This may cause the ${service_name} service to fail!  Please make sure that"
+    csih_warning "you have sufficient permissions to change the ownership of files"
+    csih_warning "and try to run the ssh-host-config script again."
+  fi
+  return $ret
+} # --- End of check_service_files_ownership --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: install_service
+#   Install sshd as a service
+# ======================================================================
+install_service() {
+  local run_service_as
+  local password
+  local ret=0
+
+  echo
+  if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q ${service_name} >/dev/null 2>&1
+  then
+    csih_inform "Sshd service is already installed."
+    check_service_files_ownership "" || let ret+=$?
+  else
+    echo -e "${_csih_QUERY_STR} Do you want to install sshd as a service?"
+    if csih_request "(Say \"no\" if it is already installed as a service)"
+    then
+      csih_get_cygenv "${cygwin_value}"
+
+      if ( [ "$csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER" != "yes" ] )
+      then
+	# Enforce using privileged user on 64 bit Vista or W7 under WOW64
+	is_wow64=$(/usr/bin/uname | /usr/bin/grep -q 'WOW' && echo 1 || echo 0)
+
+	if ( csih_is_nt2003 && ! csih_is_windows8 && [ "${is_wow64}" = "1" ] )
+	then
+	  csih_inform "Running 32 bit Cygwin on 64 bit Windows Vista or Windows 7"
+	  csih_inform "the SYSTEM account is not sufficient to setuid to a local"
+	  csih_inform "user account.  You need to have or to create a privileged"
+	  csih_inform "account.  This script will help you do so."
+	  echo
+	  csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER=yes
+	fi
+      fi
+
+      if ( [ "$csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER" = "yes" ] )
+      then
+	[ "${opt_force}" = "yes" ] && opt_f=-f
+	[ -n "${user_account}" ] && opt_u="-u ""${user_account}"""
+	csih_select_privileged_username ${opt_f} ${opt_u} sshd
+
+	if ! csih_create_privileged_user "${password_value}"
+	then
+	  csih_error_recoverable "There was a serious problem creating a privileged user."
+	  csih_request "Do you want to proceed anyway?" || exit 1
+	  let ++ret
+	fi
+	# Never returns empty if NT or above
+	run_service_as=$(csih_service_should_run_as)
+      else
+	run_service_as="SYSTEM"
+      fi
+
+      if [ "${run_service_as}" = "${csih_PRIVILEGED_USERNAME}" ]
+      then
+	password="${csih_PRIVILEGED_PASSWORD}"
+	if [ -z "${password}" ]
+	then
+	  csih_get_value "Please enter the password for user '${run_service_as}':" "-s"
+	  password="${csih_value}"
+	fi
+      fi
+
+      # At this point, we either have $run_service_as = "system" and
+      # $password is empty, or $run_service_as is some privileged user and
+      # (hopefully) $password contains the correct password.  So, from here
+      # out, we use '-z "${password}"' to discriminate the two cases.
+
+      csih_check_user "${run_service_as}"
+
+      if [ -n "${csih_cygenv}" ]
+      then
+	cygwin_env=( -e "CYGWIN=${csih_cygenv}" )
+      fi
+      if [ -z "${password}" ]
+      then
+	if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I ${service_name} -d "CYGWIN ${service_name}" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \
+			      -a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}"
+	then
+	  echo
+	  csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the LocalSystem"
+	  csih_inform "account (also known as SYSTEM). To start the service now, call"
+	  csih_inform "\`net start ${service_name}' or \`cygrunsrv -S ${service_name}'.  Otherwise, it"
+	  csih_inform "will start automatically after the next reboot."
+	fi
+      else
+	if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I ${service_name} -d "CYGWIN ${service_name}" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \
+			      -a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}" \
+			      -u "${run_service_as}" -w "${password}"
+	then
+	  /usr/bin/editrights -u "${run_service_as}" -a SeServiceLogonRight
+	  echo
+	  csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the '${run_service_as}'"
+	  csih_inform "account.  To start the service now, call \`net start ${service_name}' or"
+	  csih_inform "\`cygrunsrv -S ${service_name}'.  Otherwise, it will start automatically"
+	  csih_inform "after the next reboot."
+	fi
+      fi
+
+      if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q ${service_name} >/dev/null 2>&1
+      then
+	check_service_files_ownership "${run_service_as}" || let ret+=$?
+      else
+	csih_error_recoverable "Installing sshd as a service failed!"
+	let ++ret
+      fi
+    fi # user allowed us to install as service
+  fi # service not yet installed
+  return $ret
+} # --- End of install_service --- #
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Main Entry Point
+# ======================================================================
+
+# Check how the script has been started.  If
+#   (1) it has been started by giving the full path and
+#       that path is /etc/postinstall, OR
+#   (2) Otherwise, if the environment variable
+#       SSH_HOST_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO is set
+# then set auto_answer to "no".  This allows automatic
+# creation of the config files in /etc w/o overwriting
+# them if they already exist.  In both cases, color
+# escape sequences are suppressed, so as to prevent
+# cluttering setup's logfiles.
+if [ "$PROGDIR" = "/etc/postinstall" ]
+then
+  csih_auto_answer="no"
+  csih_disable_color
+  opt_force=yes
+fi
+if [ -n "${SSH_HOST_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO}" ]
+then
+  csih_auto_answer="no"
+  csih_disable_color
+  opt_force=yes
+fi
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Parse options
+# ======================================================================
+while :
+do
+  case $# in
+  0)
+    break
+    ;;
+  esac
+
+  option=$1
+  shift
+
+  case "${option}" in
+  -d | --debug )
+    set -x
+    csih_trace_on
+    ;;
+
+  -y | --yes )
+    csih_auto_answer=yes
+    opt_force=yes
+    ;;
+
+  -n | --no )
+    csih_auto_answer=no
+    opt_force=yes
+    ;;
+
+  -c | --cygwin )
+    cygwin_value="$1"
+    shift
+    ;;
+
+  -N | --name )
+    service_name=$1
+    shift
+    ;;
+
+  -p | --port )
+    port_number=$1
+    shift
+    ;;
+
+  -u | --user )
+    user_account="$1"
+    shift
+    ;;
+    
+  -w | --pwd )
+    password_value="$1"
+    shift
+    ;;
+
+  --privileged )
+    csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER=yes
+    ;;
+
+  *)
+    echo "usage: ${progname} [OPTION]..."
+    echo
+    echo "This script creates an OpenSSH host configuration."
+    echo
+    echo "Options:"
+    echo "  --debug  -d            Enable shell's debug output."
+    echo "  --yes    -y            Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically."
+    echo "  --no     -n            Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically."
+    echo "  --cygwin -c <options>  Use \"options\" as value for CYGWIN environment var."
+    echo "  --name   -N <name>     sshd windows service name."
+    echo "  --port   -p <n>        sshd listens on port n."
+    echo "  --user   -u <account>  privileged user for service, default 'cyg_server'."
+    echo "  --pwd    -w <passwd>   Use \"pwd\" as password for privileged user."
+    echo "  --privileged           On Windows XP, require privileged user"
+    echo "                         instead of LocalSystem for sshd service."
+    echo
+    exit 1
+    ;;
+
+  esac
+done
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Action!
+# ======================================================================
+
+# Check for running ssh/sshd processes first. Refuse to do anything while
+# some ssh processes are still running
+if /usr/bin/ps -ef | /usr/bin/grep -q '/sshd\?$'
+then
+  echo
+  csih_error "There are still ssh processes running. Please shut them down first."
+fi
+
+# Make sure the user is running in an administrative context
+admin=$(/usr/bin/id -G | /usr/bin/grep -Eq '\<544\>' && echo yes || echo no)
+if [ "${admin}" != "yes" ]
+then
+  echo
+  csih_warning "Running this script typically requires administrator privileges!"
+  csih_warning "However, it seems your account does not have these privileges."
+  csih_warning "Here's the list of groups in your user token:"
+  echo
+  /usr/bin/id -Gnz | xargs -0n1 echo "   "
+  echo
+  csih_warning "This usually means you're running this script from a non-admin"
+  csih_warning "desktop session, or in a non-elevated shell under UAC control."
+  echo
+  csih_warning "Make sure you have the appropriate privileges right now,"
+  csih_warning "otherwise parts of this script will probably fail!"
+  echo
+  echo -e "${_csih_QUERY_STR} Are you sure you want to continue?  (Say \"no\" if you're not sure"
+  if ! csih_request "you have the required privileges)"
+  then
+    echo
+    csih_inform "Ok.  Exiting.  Make sure to switch to an administrative account"
+    csih_inform "or to start this script from an elevated shell."
+    exit 1
+  fi
+fi
+
+echo
+
+warning_cnt=0
+
+# Create /var/log/lastlog if not already exists
+if [ -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog -a ! -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ]
+then
+  echo
+  csih_error_multi "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog exists, but is not a file." \
+		   "Cannot create ssh host configuration."
+fi
+if [ ! -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ]
+then
+  /usr/bin/cat /dev/null > ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog
+  if ! /usr/bin/chmod 644 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog >/dev/null 2>&1
+  then
+    csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog!"
+    let ++warning_cnt
+  fi
+fi
+
+# Create /var/empty file used as chroot jail for privilege separation
+csih_make_dir "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" "Cannot create ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty directory."
+if ! /usr/bin/chmod 755 "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then
+  csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!"
+  let ++warning_cnt
+fi
+
+# generate missing host keys
+csih_inform "Generating missing SSH host keys"
+/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A || let warning_cnt+=$?
+
+# handle ssh_config
+csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt
+if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then
+  if [ "${port_number}" != "22" ]
+  then
+    csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config file with requested port"
+    echo "Host localhost" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config
+    echo "    Port ${port_number}" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config
+  fi
+fi
+
+# handle sshd_config
+# make sure not to change the existing file
+mod_before=""
+if [ -e "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" ]
+then
+  mod_before=$(stat "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" | grep '^Modify:')
+fi
+csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt
+mod_now=$(stat "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" | grep '^Modify:')
+if ! /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" >/dev/null 2>&1
+then
+  sshd_config_configured=yes
+fi
+if [ "${mod_before}" != "${mod_now}" ]
+then
+  sshd_strictmodes || let warning_cnt+=$?
+  sshd_config_tweak || let warning_cnt+=$?
+fi
+#sshd_privsep || let warning_cnt+=$?
+update_services_file || let warning_cnt+=$?
+update_inetd_conf || let warning_cnt+=$?
+install_service || let warning_cnt+=$?
+
+echo
+if [ $warning_cnt -eq 0 ]
+then
+  csih_inform "Host configuration finished. Have fun!"
+else
+  csih_warning "Host configuration exited with ${warning_cnt} errors or warnings!"
+  csih_warning "Make sure that all problems reported are fixed,"
+  csih_warning "then re-run ssh-host-config."
+fi
+exit $warning_cnt
diff --git a/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config b/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fa4bb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config
@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# ssh-user-config, Copyright 2000-2014 Red Hat Inc.
+#
+# This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH.
+#
+# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+#
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS  
+# OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF               
+# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.   
+# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,   
+# DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR    
+# OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR    
+# THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.                               
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Initialization
+# ======================================================================
+PROGNAME=$(basename -- $0)
+_tdir=$(dirname -- $0)
+PROGDIR=$(cd $_tdir && pwd)
+
+CSIH_SCRIPT=/usr/share/csih/cygwin-service-installation-helper.sh
+
+# Subdirectory where the new package is being installed
+PREFIX=/usr
+
+# Directory where the config files are stored
+SYSCONFDIR=/etc
+
+source ${CSIH_SCRIPT}
+
+auto_passphrase="no"
+passphrase=""
+pwdhome=
+with_passphrase=
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: create_identity
+#   optionally create identity of type argument in ~/.ssh
+#   optionally add result to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+# ======================================================================
+create_identity() {
+  local file="$1"
+  local type="$2"
+  local name="$3"
+  if [ ! -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" ]
+  then
+    if csih_request "Shall I create a ${name} identity file for you?"
+    then
+      csih_inform "Generating ${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}"
+      if [ "${with_passphrase}" = "yes" ]
+      then
+        ssh-keygen -t "${type}" -N "${passphrase}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" > /dev/null
+      else
+        ssh-keygen -t "${type}" -f "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}" > /dev/null
+      fi
+      if csih_request "Do you want to use this identity to login to this machine?"
+      then
+        csih_inform "Adding to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+        cat "${pwdhome}/.ssh/${file}.pub" >> "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+      fi
+    fi
+  fi
+} # === End of create_ssh1_identity() === #
+readonly -f create_identity
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: check_user_homedir
+#   Perform various checks on the user's home directory
+# SETS GLOBAL VARIABLE:
+#   pwdhome
+# ======================================================================
+check_user_homedir() {
+  pwdhome=$(getent passwd $UID | awk -F: '{ print $6; }')
+  if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X" ]
+  then
+    csih_error_multi \
+      "There is no home directory set for you in the account database." \
+      'Setting $HOME is not sufficient!'
+  fi
+  
+  if [ ! -d "${pwdhome}" ]
+  then
+    csih_error_multi \
+      "${pwdhome} is set in the account database as your home directory" \
+      'but it is not a valid directory. Cannot create user identity files.'
+  fi
+  
+  # If home is the root dir, set home to empty string to avoid error messages
+  # in subsequent parts of that script.
+  if [ "X${pwdhome}" = "X/" ]
+  then
+    # But first raise a warning!
+    csih_warning "Your home directory in the account database is set to root (/). This is not recommended!"
+    if csih_request "Would you like to proceed anyway?"
+    then
+      pwdhome=''
+    else
+      csih_warning "Exiting. Configuration is not complete"
+      exit 1
+    fi
+  fi
+  
+  if [ -d "${pwdhome}" -a -n "`chmod -c g-w,o-w "${pwdhome}"`" ]
+  then
+    echo
+    csih_warning 'group and other have been revoked write permission to your home'
+    csih_warning "directory ${pwdhome}."
+    csih_warning 'This is required by OpenSSH to allow public key authentication using'
+    csih_warning 'the key files stored in your .ssh subdirectory.'
+    csih_warning 'Revert this change ONLY if you know what you are doing!'
+    echo
+  fi
+} # === End of check_user_homedir() === #
+readonly -f check_user_homedir
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: check_user_dot_ssh_dir
+#   Perform various checks on the ~/.ssh directory
+# PREREQUISITE:
+#   pwdhome -- check_user_homedir()
+# ======================================================================
+check_user_dot_ssh_dir() {
+  if [ -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" -a ! -d "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ]
+  then
+    csih_error "${pwdhome}/.ssh is existent but not a directory. Cannot create user identity files."
+  fi
+  
+  if [ ! -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ]
+  then
+    mkdir "${pwdhome}/.ssh"
+    if [ ! -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh" ]
+    then
+      csih_error "Creating users ${pwdhome}/.ssh directory failed"
+    fi
+  fi
+} # === End of check_user_dot_ssh_dir() === #
+readonly -f check_user_dot_ssh_dir
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Routine: fix_authorized_keys_perms
+#   Corrects the permissions of ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+# PREREQUISITE:
+#   pwdhome   -- check_user_homedir()
+# ======================================================================
+fix_authorized_keys_perms() {
+  if [ -e "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" ]
+  then
+    setfacl -b "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys" 2>/dev/null || echo -n
+    if ! chmod u-x,g-wx,o-wx "${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+    then
+      csih_warning "Setting correct permissions to ${pwdhome}/.ssh/authorized_keys"
+      csih_warning "failed.  Please care for the correct permissions.  The minimum requirement"
+      csih_warning "is, the owner needs read permissions."
+      echo
+    fi
+  fi
+} # === End of fix_authorized_keys_perms() === #
+readonly -f fix_authorized_keys_perms
+
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Main Entry Point
+# ======================================================================
+
+# Check how the script has been started.  If
+#   (1) it has been started by giving the full path and
+#       that path is /etc/postinstall, OR
+#   (2) Otherwise, if the environment variable
+#       SSH_USER_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO is set
+# then set auto_answer to "no".  This allows automatic
+# creation of the config files in /etc w/o overwriting
+# them if they already exist.  In both cases, color
+# escape sequences are suppressed, so as to prevent
+# cluttering setup's logfiles.
+if [ "$PROGDIR" = "/etc/postinstall" ]
+then
+  csih_auto_answer="no"
+  csih_disable_color
+fi
+if [ -n "${SSH_USER_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO}" ]
+then
+  csih_auto_answer="no"
+  csih_disable_color
+fi
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Parse options
+# ======================================================================
+while :
+do
+  case $# in
+  0)
+    break
+    ;;
+  esac
+
+  option=$1
+  shift
+
+  case "$option" in
+  -d | --debug )
+    set -x
+    csih_trace_on
+    ;;
+
+  -y | --yes )
+    csih_auto_answer=yes
+    ;;
+
+  -n | --no )
+    csih_auto_answer=no
+    ;;
+
+  -p | --passphrase )
+    with_passphrase="yes"
+    passphrase=$1
+    shift
+    ;;
+
+  *)
+    echo "usage: ${PROGNAME} [OPTION]..."
+    echo
+    echo "This script creates an OpenSSH user configuration."
+    echo
+    echo "Options:"
+    echo "    --debug      -d        Enable shell's debug output."
+    echo "    --yes        -y        Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically."
+    echo "    --no         -n        Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically."
+    echo "    --passphrase -p word   Use \"word\" as passphrase automatically."
+    echo
+    exit 1
+    ;;
+
+  esac
+done
+
+# ======================================================================
+# Action!
+# ======================================================================
+
+check_user_homedir
+check_user_dot_ssh_dir
+create_identity id_rsa rsa "SSH2 RSA"
+create_identity id_dsa dsa "SSH2 DSA"
+create_identity id_ecdsa ecdsa "SSH2 ECDSA"
+create_identity identity rsa1 "(deprecated) SSH1 RSA"
+fix_authorized_keys_perms
+
+echo
+csih_inform "Configuration finished. Have fun!"
+
+
diff --git a/contrib/cygwin/sshd-inetd b/contrib/cygwin/sshd-inetd
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aa6bf07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/cygwin/sshd-inetd
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# This file can be used to enable sshd as a slave of the inetd service
+# To do so, the line below should be uncommented.
+@COMMENT@ ssh  stream  tcp     nowait  root    /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i
+
diff --git a/contrib/findssl.sh b/contrib/findssl.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..95a0d66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/findssl.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# findssl.sh
+#	Search for all instances of OpenSSL headers and libraries
+#	and print their versions.
+#	Intended to help diagnose OpenSSH's "OpenSSL headers do not
+#	match your library" errors.
+#
+#	Written by Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip dot com dot au)
+#	This file is placed in the public domain.
+#
+#	Release history:
+#	2002-07-27: Initial release.
+#	2002-08-04: Added public domain notice.
+#	2003-06-24: Incorporated readme, set library paths. First cvs version.
+#	2004-12-13: Add traps to cleanup temp files, from Amarendra Godbole.
+#
+# "OpenSSL headers do not match your library" are usually caused by
+# OpenSSH's configure picking up an older version of OpenSSL headers
+# or libraries.  You can use the following # procedure to help identify
+# the cause.
+#
+# The  output  of  configure  will  tell you the versions of the OpenSSL
+# headers and libraries that were picked up, for example:
+#
+# checking OpenSSL header version... 90604f (OpenSSL 0.9.6d 9 May 2002)
+# checking OpenSSL library version... 90602f (OpenSSL 0.9.6b [engine] 9 Jul 2001)
+# checking whether OpenSSL's headers match the library... no
+# configure: error: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library
+#
+# Now run findssl.sh. This should identify the headers and libraries
+# present  and  their  versions.  You  should  be  able  to identify the
+# libraries  and headers used and adjust your CFLAGS or remove incorrect
+# versions.  The  output will show OpenSSL's internal version identifier
+# and should look something like:
+
+# $ ./findssl.sh
+# Searching for OpenSSL header files.
+# 0x0090604fL /usr/include/openssl/opensslv.h
+# 0x0090604fL /usr/local/ssl/include/openssl/opensslv.h
+#
+# Searching for OpenSSL shared library files.
+# 0x0090602fL /lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.6b
+# 0x0090602fL /lib/libcrypto.so.2
+# 0x0090581fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0
+# 0x0090602fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so
+# 0x0090581fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.5a
+# 0x0090600fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so.0.9.6
+# 0x0090600fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.so.1
+#
+# Searching for OpenSSL static library files.
+# 0x0090602fL /usr/lib/libcrypto.a
+# 0x0090604fL /usr/local/ssl/lib/libcrypto.a
+#
+# In  this  example, I gave configure no extra flags, so it's picking up
+# the  OpenSSL header from /usr/include/openssl (90604f) and the library
+# from /usr/lib/ (90602f).
+
+#
+# Adjust these to suit your compiler.
+# You may also need to set the *LIB*PATH environment variables if
+# DEFAULT_LIBPATH is not correct for your system.
+#
+CC=gcc
+STATIC=-static
+
+#
+# Cleanup on interrupt
+#
+trap 'rm -f conftest.c' INT HUP TERM
+
+#
+# Set up conftest C source
+#
+rm -f findssl.log
+cat >conftest.c <<EOD
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(){printf("0x%08xL\n", SSLeay());}
+EOD
+
+#
+# Set default library paths if not already set
+#
+DEFAULT_LIBPATH=/usr/lib:/usr/local/lib
+LIBPATH=${LIBPATH:=$DEFAULT_LIBPATH}
+LD_LIBRARY_PATH=${LD_LIBRARY_PATH:=$DEFAULT_LIBPATH}
+LIBRARY_PATH=${LIBRARY_PATH:=$DEFAULT_LIBPATH}
+export LIBPATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH LIBRARY_PATH
+
+# not all platforms have a 'which' command
+if which ls >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then
+    : which is defined
+else
+    which () {
+	saveIFS="$IFS"
+	IFS=:
+	for p in $PATH; do
+	    if test -x "$p/$1" -a -f "$p/$1"; then
+		IFS="$saveIFS"
+		echo "$p/$1"
+		return 0
+	    fi
+	done
+	IFS="$saveIFS"
+	return 1
+    }
+fi
+
+#
+# Search for OpenSSL headers and print versions
+#
+echo Searching for OpenSSL header files.
+if [ -x "`which locate`" ]
+then
+	headers=`locate opensslv.h`
+else
+	headers=`find / -name opensslv.h -print 2>/dev/null`
+fi
+
+for header in $headers
+do
+	ver=`awk '/OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER/{printf \$3}' $header`
+	echo "$ver $header"
+done
+echo
+
+#
+# Search for shared libraries.
+# Relies on shared libraries looking like "libcrypto.s*"
+#
+echo Searching for OpenSSL shared library files.
+if [ -x "`which locate`" ]
+then
+	libraries=`locate libcrypto.s`
+else
+	libraries=`find / -name 'libcrypto.s*' -print 2>/dev/null`
+fi
+
+for lib in $libraries
+do
+	(echo "Trying libcrypto $lib" >>findssl.log
+	dir=`dirname $lib`
+	LIBPATH="$dir:$LIBPATH"
+	LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$dir:$LIBPATH"
+	LIBRARY_PATH="$dir:$LIBPATH"
+	export LIBPATH LD_LIBRARY_PATH LIBRARY_PATH
+	${CC} -o conftest conftest.c $lib 2>>findssl.log
+	if [ -x ./conftest ]
+	then
+		ver=`./conftest 2>/dev/null`
+		rm -f ./conftest
+		echo "$ver $lib"
+	fi)
+done
+echo
+
+#
+# Search for static OpenSSL libraries and print versions
+#
+echo Searching for OpenSSL static library files.
+if [ -x "`which locate`" ]
+then
+	libraries=`locate libcrypto.a`
+else
+	libraries=`find / -name libcrypto.a -print 2>/dev/null`
+fi
+
+for lib in $libraries
+do
+	libdir=`dirname $lib`
+	echo "Trying libcrypto $lib" >>findssl.log
+	${CC} ${STATIC} -o conftest conftest.c -L${libdir} -lcrypto 2>>findssl.log
+	if [ -x ./conftest ]
+	then
+		ver=`./conftest 2>/dev/null`
+		rm -f ./conftest
+		echo "$ver $lib"
+	fi
+done
+
+#
+# Clean up
+#
+rm -f conftest.c
diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass1.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c92c17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This is a simple GNOME SSH passphrase grabber. To use it, set the
+ * environment variable SSH_ASKPASS to point to the location of
+ * gnome-ssh-askpass before calling "ssh-add < /dev/null".
+ *
+ * There is only two run-time options: if you set the environment variable
+ * "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER=true" then gnome-ssh-askpass will grab
+ * the X server. If you set "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER=true", then the
+ * pointer will be grabbed too. These may have some benefit to security if
+ * you don't trust your X server. We grab the keyboard always.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Compile with:
+ *
+ * cc `gnome-config --cflags gnome gnomeui` \
+ *    gnome-ssh-askpass1.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \
+ *    `gnome-config --libs gnome gnomeui`
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <gnome.h>
+#include <X11/Xlib.h>
+#include <gdk/gdkx.h>
+
+void
+report_failed_grab (void)
+{
+	GtkWidget *err;
+
+	err = gnome_message_box_new("Could not grab keyboard or mouse.\n"
+		"A malicious client may be eavesdropping on your session.",
+				    GNOME_MESSAGE_BOX_ERROR, "EXIT", NULL);
+	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+	gtk_object_set(GTK_OBJECT(err), "type", GTK_WINDOW_POPUP, NULL);
+
+	gnome_dialog_run_and_close(GNOME_DIALOG(err));
+}
+
+int
+passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+{
+	char *passphrase;
+	char **messages;
+	int result, i, grab_server, grab_pointer;
+	GtkWidget *dialog, *entry, *label;
+
+	grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
+	grab_pointer = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER") != NULL);
+
+	dialog = gnome_dialog_new("OpenSSH", GNOME_STOCK_BUTTON_OK,
+	    GNOME_STOCK_BUTTON_CANCEL, NULL);
+
+	messages = g_strsplit(message, "\\n", 0);
+	if (messages)
+		for(i = 0; messages[i]; i++) {
+			label = gtk_label_new(messages[i]);
+			gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
+			    label, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
+		}
+
+	entry = gtk_entry_new();
+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), entry, FALSE,
+	    FALSE, 0);
+	gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+	gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+
+	/* Center window and prepare for grab */
+	gtk_object_set(GTK_OBJECT(dialog), "type", GTK_WINDOW_POPUP, NULL);
+	gnome_dialog_set_default(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), 0);
+	gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+	gtk_window_set_policy(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), FALSE, FALSE, TRUE);
+	gnome_dialog_close_hides(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), TRUE);
+	gtk_container_set_border_width(GTK_CONTAINER(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
+	    GNOME_PAD);
+	gtk_widget_show_all(dialog);
+
+	/* Grab focus */
+	if (grab_server)
+		XGrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY());
+	if (grab_pointer && gdk_pointer_grab(dialog->window, TRUE, 0,
+	    NULL, NULL, GDK_CURRENT_TIME))
+		goto nograb;
+	if (gdk_keyboard_grab(dialog->window, FALSE, GDK_CURRENT_TIME))
+		goto nograbkb;
+
+	/* Make <enter> close dialog */
+	gnome_dialog_editable_enters(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_EDITABLE(entry));
+
+	/* Run dialog */
+	result = gnome_dialog_run(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog));
+
+	/* Ungrab */
+	if (grab_server)
+		XUngrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY());
+	if (grab_pointer)
+		gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+	gdk_keyboard_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+	gdk_flush();
+
+	/* Report passphrase if user selected OK */
+	passphrase = gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry));
+	if (result == 0)
+		puts(passphrase);
+		
+	/* Zero passphrase in memory */
+	memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase));
+	gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase);
+			
+	gnome_dialog_close(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog));
+	return (result == 0 ? 0 : -1);
+
+	/*
+	 * At least one grab failed - ungrab what we got, and report the
+	 * failure to the user. Note that XGrabServer() cannot fail.
+	 */
+ nograbkb:
+	gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+ nograb:
+	if (grab_server)
+		XUngrabServer(GDK_DISPLAY());
+	gnome_dialog_close(GNOME_DIALOG(dialog));
+	
+	report_failed_grab();
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	char *message;
+	int result;
+
+	gnome_init("GNOME ssh-askpass", "0.1", argc, argv);
+
+	if (argc == 2)
+		message = argv[1];
+	else
+		message = "Enter your OpenSSH passphrase:";
+
+	setvbuf(stdout, 0, _IONBF, 0);
+	result = passphrase_dialog(message);
+
+	return (result);
+}
diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a62f981
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* GTK2 support by Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> */
+
+/*
+ * This is a simple GNOME SSH passphrase grabber. To use it, set the
+ * environment variable SSH_ASKPASS to point to the location of
+ * gnome-ssh-askpass before calling "ssh-add < /dev/null".
+ *
+ * There is only two run-time options: if you set the environment variable
+ * "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER=true" then gnome-ssh-askpass will grab
+ * the X server. If you set "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER=true", then the
+ * pointer will be grabbed too. These may have some benefit to security if
+ * you don't trust your X server. We grab the keyboard always.
+ */
+
+#define GRAB_TRIES	16
+#define GRAB_WAIT	250 /* milliseconds */
+
+#define PROMPT_ENTRY	0
+#define PROMPT_CONFIRM	1
+#define PROMPT_NONE	2
+
+/*
+ * Compile with:
+ *
+ * cc -Wall `pkg-config --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
+ *    gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \
+ *    `pkg-config --libs gtk+-2.0`
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <X11/Xlib.h>
+#include <gtk/gtk.h>
+#include <gdk/gdkx.h>
+#include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
+
+static void
+report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_window, const char *what)
+{
+	GtkWidget *err;
+
+	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
+	    GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
+	    "Could not grab %s. A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
+	    "on your session.", what);
+	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+
+	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
+
+	gtk_widget_destroy(err);
+}
+
+static void
+ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dialog)
+{
+	g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_DIALOG(dialog));
+	gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
+}
+
+static gboolean
+check_none(GtkWidget *widget, GdkEventKey *event, gpointer dialog)
+{
+	switch (event->keyval) {
+	case GDK_KEY_Escape:
+		/* esc -> close dialog */
+		gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE);
+		return TRUE;
+	case GDK_KEY_Tab:
+		/* tab -> focus close button */
+		gtk_widget_grab_focus(gtk_dialog_get_widget_for_response(
+		    dialog, GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE));
+		return TRUE;
+	default:
+		/* eat all other key events */
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+parse_env_hex_color(const char *env, GdkColor *c)
+{
+	const char *s;
+	unsigned long ul;
+	char *ep;
+	size_t n;
+
+	if ((s = getenv(env)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+
+	/* Permit hex rgb or rrggbb optionally prefixed by '#' or '0x' */
+	if (*s == '#')
+		s++;
+	else if (strncmp(s, "0x", 2) == 0)
+		s += 2;
+	n = strlen(s);
+	if (n != 3 && n != 6)
+		goto bad;
+	ul = strtoul(s, &ep, 16);
+	if (*ep != '\0' || ul > 0xffffff) {
+ bad:
+		fprintf(stderr, "Invalid $%s - invalid hex color code\n", env);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Valid hex sequence; expand into a GdkColor */
+	if (n == 3) {
+		/* 4-bit RGB */
+		c->red = ((ul >> 8) & 0xf) << 12;
+		c->green = ((ul >> 4) & 0xf) << 12;
+		c->blue = (ul & 0xf) << 12;
+	} else {
+		/* 8-bit RGB */
+		c->red = ((ul >> 16) & 0xff) << 8;
+		c->green = ((ul >> 8) & 0xff) << 8;
+		c->blue = (ul & 0xff) << 8;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
+{
+	const char *failed;
+	char *passphrase, *local;
+	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
+	int buttons, default_response;
+	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
+	GdkGrabStatus status;
+	GdkColor fg, bg;
+	int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
+
+	grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
+	grab_pointer = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER") != NULL);
+	grab_tries = 0;
+
+	fg_set = parse_env_hex_color("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_FG_COLOR", &fg);
+	bg_set = parse_env_hex_color("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_BG_COLOR", &bg);
+
+	/* Create an invisible parent window so that GtkDialog doesn't
+	 * complain.  */
+	parent_window = gtk_window_new(GTK_WINDOW_TOPLEVEL);
+
+	switch (prompt_type) {
+	case PROMPT_CONFIRM:
+		buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_YES_NO;
+		default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_YES;
+		break;
+	case PROMPT_NONE:
+		buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE;
+		default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE;
+		break;
+	default:
+		buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_OK_CANCEL;
+		default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_OK;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	dialog = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
+	    GTK_MESSAGE_QUESTION, buttons, "%s", message);
+
+	gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
+	gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+	gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), default_response);
+	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+
+	if (fg_set)
+		gtk_widget_modify_fg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+	if (bg_set)
+		gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+
+	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
+		entry = gtk_entry_new();
+		if (fg_set)
+			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+		if (bg_set)
+			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+		gtk_box_pack_start(
+		    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
+		    entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
+		gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+		gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+		if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
+			gtk_widget_show(entry);
+			/* Make <enter> close dialog */
+			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
+					 G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * Ensure the 'close' button is not focused by default
+			 * but is still reachable via tab. This is a bit of a
+			 * hack - it uses a hidden entry that responds to a
+			 * couple of keypress events (escape and tab only).
+			 */
+			gtk_widget_realize(entry);
+			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
+			    G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Grab focus */
+	gtk_widget_show_now(dialog);
+	if (grab_pointer) {
+		for(;;) {
+			status = gdk_pointer_grab(
+			    (gtk_widget_get_window(GTK_WIDGET(dialog))), TRUE,
+			    0, NULL, NULL, GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+			if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS)
+				break;
+			usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000);
+			if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES) {
+				failed = "mouse";
+				goto nograb;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	for(;;) {
+		status = gdk_keyboard_grab(
+		    gtk_widget_get_window(GTK_WIDGET(dialog)), FALSE,
+		    GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+		if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS)
+			break;
+		usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000);
+		if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES) {
+			failed = "keyboard";
+			goto nograbkb;
+		}
+	}
+	if (grab_server) {
+		gdk_x11_grab_server();
+	}
+
+	result = gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(dialog));
+
+	/* Ungrab */
+	if (grab_server)
+		XUngrabServer(gdk_x11_get_default_xdisplay());
+	if (grab_pointer)
+		gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+	gdk_keyboard_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+	gdk_flush();
+
+	/* Report passphrase if user selected OK */
+	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
+		passphrase = g_strdup(gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry)));
+		if (result == GTK_RESPONSE_OK) {
+			local = g_locale_from_utf8(passphrase,
+			    strlen(passphrase), NULL, NULL, NULL);
+			if (local != NULL) {
+				puts(local);
+				memset(local, '\0', strlen(local));
+				g_free(local);
+			} else {
+				puts(passphrase);
+			}
+		}
+		/* Zero passphrase in memory */
+		memset(passphrase, '\b', strlen(passphrase));
+		gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase);
+		memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase));
+		g_free(passphrase);
+	}
+
+	gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
+	if (result != GTK_RESPONSE_OK && result != GTK_RESPONSE_YES)
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+
+ nograbkb:
+	/*
+	 * At least one grab failed - ungrab what we got, and report
+	 * the failure to the user.  Note that XGrabServer() cannot
+	 * fail.
+	 */
+	gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
+ nograb:
+	if (grab_server)
+		XUngrabServer(gdk_x11_get_default_xdisplay());
+	gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
+	
+	report_failed_grab(parent_window, failed);
+
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	char *message, *prompt_mode;
+	int result, prompt_type = PROMPT_ENTRY;
+
+	gtk_init(&argc, &argv);
+
+	if (argc > 1) {
+		message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1);
+	} else {
+		message = g_strdup("Enter your OpenSSH passphrase:");
+	}
+
+	if ((prompt_mode = getenv("SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT")) != NULL) {
+		if (strcasecmp(prompt_mode, "confirm") == 0)
+			prompt_type = PROMPT_CONFIRM;
+		else if (strcasecmp(prompt_mode, "none") == 0)
+			prompt_type = PROMPT_NONE;
+	}
+
+	setvbuf(stdout, 0, _IONBF, 0);
+	result = passphrase_dialog(message, prompt_type);
+	g_free(message);
+
+	return (result);
+}
diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass3.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass3.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1a0533
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass3.c
@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* GTK2 support by Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> */
+
+/*
+ * This is a simple GNOME SSH passphrase grabber. To use it, set the
+ * environment variable SSH_ASKPASS to point to the location of
+ * gnome-ssh-askpass before calling "ssh-add < /dev/null".
+ *
+ * There is only two run-time options: if you set the environment variable
+ * "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER=true" then gnome-ssh-askpass will grab
+ * the X server. If you set "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER=true", then the
+ * pointer will be grabbed too. These may have some benefit to security if
+ * you don't trust your X server. We grab the keyboard always.
+ */
+
+#define GRAB_TRIES	16
+#define GRAB_WAIT	250 /* milliseconds */
+
+#define PROMPT_ENTRY	0
+#define PROMPT_CONFIRM	1
+#define PROMPT_NONE	2
+
+/*
+ * Compile with:
+ *
+ * cc -Wall `pkg-config --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
+ *    gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \
+ *    `pkg-config --libs gtk+-2.0`
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <X11/Xlib.h>
+#include <gtk/gtk.h>
+#include <gdk/gdkx.h>
+#include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
+
+static void
+ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dialog)
+{
+	g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_DIALOG(dialog));
+	gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
+}
+
+static gboolean
+check_none(GtkWidget *widget, GdkEventKey *event, gpointer dialog)
+{
+	switch (event->keyval) {
+	case GDK_KEY_Escape:
+		/* esc -> close dialog */
+		gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE);
+		return TRUE;
+	case GDK_KEY_Tab:
+		/* tab -> focus close button */
+		gtk_widget_grab_focus(gtk_dialog_get_widget_for_response(
+		    dialog, GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE));
+		return TRUE;
+	default:
+		/* eat all other key events */
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+parse_env_hex_color(const char *env, GdkColor *c)
+{
+	const char *s;
+	unsigned long ul;
+	char *ep;
+	size_t n;
+
+	if ((s = getenv(env)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
+
+	/* Permit hex rgb or rrggbb optionally prefixed by '#' or '0x' */
+	if (*s == '#')
+		s++;
+	else if (strncmp(s, "0x", 2) == 0)
+		s += 2;
+	n = strlen(s);
+	if (n != 3 && n != 6)
+		goto bad;
+	ul = strtoul(s, &ep, 16);
+	if (*ep != '\0' || ul > 0xffffff) {
+ bad:
+		fprintf(stderr, "Invalid $%s - invalid hex color code\n", env);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Valid hex sequence; expand into a GdkColor */
+	if (n == 3) {
+		/* 4-bit RGB */
+		c->red = ((ul >> 8) & 0xf) << 12;
+		c->green = ((ul >> 4) & 0xf) << 12;
+		c->blue = (ul & 0xf) << 12;
+	} else {
+		/* 8-bit RGB */
+		c->red = ((ul >> 16) & 0xff) << 8;
+		c->green = ((ul >> 8) & 0xff) << 8;
+		c->blue = (ul & 0xff) << 8;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
+{
+	const char *failed;
+	char *passphrase, *local;
+	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
+	int buttons, default_response;
+	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *err;
+	GdkGrabStatus status;
+	GdkColor fg, bg;
+	GdkSeat *seat;
+	GdkDisplay *display;
+	GdkSeatCapabilities caps;
+	int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
+
+	grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
+	grab_pointer = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER") != NULL);
+	grab_tries = 0;
+
+	fg_set = parse_env_hex_color("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_FG_COLOR", &fg);
+	bg_set = parse_env_hex_color("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_BG_COLOR", &bg);
+
+	/* Create an invisible parent window so that GtkDialog doesn't
+	 * complain.  */
+	parent_window = gtk_window_new(GTK_WINDOW_TOPLEVEL);
+
+	switch (prompt_type) {
+	case PROMPT_CONFIRM:
+		buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_YES_NO;
+		default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_YES;
+		break;
+	case PROMPT_NONE:
+		buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE;
+		default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE;
+		break;
+	default:
+		buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_OK_CANCEL;
+		default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_OK;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	dialog = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
+	    GTK_MESSAGE_QUESTION, buttons, "%s", message);
+
+	gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
+	gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+	gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), default_response);
+	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+
+	if (fg_set)
+		gtk_widget_modify_fg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+	if (bg_set)
+		gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+
+	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
+		entry = gtk_entry_new();
+		if (fg_set)
+			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+		if (bg_set)
+			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+		gtk_box_pack_start(
+		    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
+		    entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
+		gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+		gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+		if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
+			gtk_widget_show(entry);
+			/* Make <enter> close dialog */
+			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
+					 G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
+		} else {
+			/*
+			 * Ensure the 'close' button is not focused by default
+			 * but is still reachable via tab. This is a bit of a
+			 * hack - it uses a hidden entry that responds to a
+			 * couple of keypress events (escape and tab only).
+			 */
+			gtk_widget_realize(entry);
+			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
+			    G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
+		}
+	}
+	/* Grab focus */
+	gtk_widget_show_now(dialog);
+	display = gtk_widget_get_display(GTK_WIDGET(dialog));
+	seat = gdk_display_get_default_seat(display);
+	caps = GDK_SEAT_CAPABILITY_KEYBOARD;
+	if (grab_pointer)
+		caps |= GDK_SEAT_CAPABILITY_ALL_POINTING;
+	if (grab_server)
+		caps = GDK_SEAT_CAPABILITY_ALL;
+	for (;;) {
+		status = gdk_seat_grab(seat, gtk_widget_get_window(dialog),
+		    caps, TRUE, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS)
+			break;
+		usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000);
+		if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES)
+			goto nograb;
+	}
+
+	result = gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(dialog));
+
+	/* Ungrab */
+	gdk_seat_ungrab(seat);
+	gdk_display_flush(display);
+
+	/* Report passphrase if user selected OK */
+	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
+		passphrase = g_strdup(gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry)));
+		if (result == GTK_RESPONSE_OK) {
+			local = g_locale_from_utf8(passphrase,
+			    strlen(passphrase), NULL, NULL, NULL);
+			if (local != NULL) {
+				puts(local);
+				memset(local, '\0', strlen(local));
+				g_free(local);
+			} else {
+				puts(passphrase);
+			}
+		}
+		/* Zero passphrase in memory */
+		memset(passphrase, '\b', strlen(passphrase));
+		gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase);
+		memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase));
+		g_free(passphrase);
+	}
+
+	gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
+	if (result != GTK_RESPONSE_OK && result != GTK_RESPONSE_YES)
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+
+ nograb:
+	gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
+	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
+	    GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
+	    "Could not grab input. A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
+	    "on your session.");
+	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
+	gtk_widget_destroy(err);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	char *message, *prompt_mode;
+	int result, prompt_type = PROMPT_ENTRY;
+
+	gtk_init(&argc, &argv);
+
+	if (argc > 1) {
+		message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1);
+	} else {
+		message = g_strdup("Enter your OpenSSH passphrase:");
+	}
+
+	if ((prompt_mode = getenv("SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT")) != NULL) {
+		if (strcasecmp(prompt_mode, "confirm") == 0)
+			prompt_type = PROMPT_CONFIRM;
+		else if (strcasecmp(prompt_mode, "none") == 0)
+			prompt_type = PROMPT_NONE;
+	}
+
+	setvbuf(stdout, 0, _IONBF, 0);
+	result = passphrase_dialog(message, prompt_type);
+	g_free(message);
+
+	return (result);
+}
diff --git a/contrib/hpux/README b/contrib/hpux/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f8bfa84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/hpux/README
@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+README for OpenSSH HP-UX contrib files
+Kevin Steves <stevesk@pobox.com>
+
+sshd:		configuration file for sshd.rc
+sshd.rc:	SSH startup script
+egd:		configuration file for egd.rc
+egd.rc:		EGD (entropy gathering daemon) startup script
+
+To install:
+
+sshd.rc:
+
+o Verify paths in sshd.rc match your local installation
+  (WHAT_PATH and WHAT_PID)
+o Customize sshd if needed (SSHD_ARGS)
+o Install:
+
+  # cp sshd /etc/rc.config.d
+  # chmod 444 /etc/rc.config.d/sshd
+  # cp sshd.rc /sbin/init.d
+  # chmod 555 /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc
+  # ln -s /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc /sbin/rc1.d/K100sshd
+  # ln -s /sbin/init.d/sshd.rc /sbin/rc2.d/S900sshd
+
+egd.rc:
+
+o Verify egd.pl path in egd.rc matches your local installation
+  (WHAT_PATH)
+o Customize egd if needed (EGD_ARGS and EGD_LOG)
+o Add pseudo account:
+
+  # groupadd egd
+  # useradd -g egd egd
+  # mkdir -p /etc/opt/egd
+  # chown egd:egd /etc/opt/egd
+  # chmod 711 /etc/opt/egd
+
+o Install:
+
+  # cp egd /etc/rc.config.d
+  # chmod 444 /etc/rc.config.d/egd
+  # cp egd.rc /sbin/init.d
+  # chmod 555 /sbin/init.d/egd.rc
+  # ln -s /sbin/init.d/egd.rc /sbin/rc1.d/K600egd
+  # ln -s /sbin/init.d/egd.rc /sbin/rc2.d/S400egd
diff --git a/contrib/hpux/egd b/contrib/hpux/egd
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..21af0bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/hpux/egd
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+# EGD_START:		Set to 1 to start entropy gathering daemon
+# EGD_ARGS:		Command line arguments to pass to egd
+# EGD_LOG:		EGD stdout and stderr log file (default /etc/opt/egd/egd.log)
+#
+# To configure the egd environment:
+
+# groupadd egd
+# useradd -g egd egd
+# mkdir -p /etc/opt/egd
+# chown egd:egd /etc/opt/egd
+# chmod 711 /etc/opt/egd
+
+EGD_START=1
+EGD_ARGS='/etc/opt/egd/entropy'
+EGD_LOG=
diff --git a/contrib/hpux/egd.rc b/contrib/hpux/egd.rc
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..919dea7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/hpux/egd.rc
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+#!/sbin/sh
+
+#
+# egd.rc: EGD start-up and shutdown script
+#
+
+# Allowed exit values:
+#       0 = success; causes "OK" to show up in checklist.
+#       1 = failure; causes "FAIL" to show up in checklist.
+#       2 = skip; causes "N/A" to show up in the checklist.
+#           Use this value if execution of this script is overridden
+#           by the use of a control variable, or if this script is not
+#           appropriate to execute for some other reason.
+#       3 = reboot; causes the system to be rebooted after execution.
+
+# Input and output:
+#       stdin is redirected from /dev/null
+#
+#       stdout and stderr are redirected to the /etc/rc.log file
+#       during checklist mode, or to the console in raw mode.
+
+umask 022
+
+PATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin
+export PATH
+
+WHAT='EGD (entropy gathering daemon)'
+WHAT_PATH=/opt/perl/bin/egd.pl
+WHAT_CONFIG=/etc/rc.config.d/egd
+WHAT_LOG=/etc/opt/egd/egd.log
+
+# NOTE: If your script executes in run state 0 or state 1, then /usr might
+#       not be available.  Do not attempt to access commands or files in
+#       /usr unless your script executes in run state 2 or greater.  Other
+#       file systems typically not mounted until run state 2 include /var
+#       and /opt.
+
+rval=0
+
+# Check the exit value of a command run by this script.  If non-zero, the
+# exit code is echoed to the log file and the return value of this script
+# is set to indicate failure.
+
+set_return() {
+	x=$?
+	if [ $x -ne 0 ]; then
+		echo "EXIT CODE: $x"
+		rval=1	# script FAILed
+	fi
+}
+
+case $1 in
+'start_msg')
+	echo "Starting $WHAT"
+	;;
+
+'stop_msg')
+	echo "Stopping $WHAT"
+	;;
+
+'start')
+	if [ -f $WHAT_CONFIG ] ; then
+		. $WHAT_CONFIG
+	else
+		echo "ERROR: $WHAT_CONFIG defaults file MISSING"
+	fi
+	
+
+	if [ "$EGD_START" -eq 1 -a -x $WHAT_PATH ]; then
+		EGD_LOG=${EGD_LOG:-$WHAT_LOG}
+		su egd -c "nohup $WHAT_PATH $EGD_ARGS >$EGD_LOG 2>&1" &&
+			echo $WHAT started
+		set_return
+	else
+		rval=2
+	fi
+	;;
+
+'stop')
+	pid=`ps -fuegd | awk '$1 == "egd" { print $2 }'`
+	if [ "X$pid" != "X" ]; then
+		if kill "$pid"; then
+			echo "$WHAT stopped"
+		else
+			rval=1
+			echo "Unable to stop $WHAT"
+		fi
+	fi
+	set_return
+	;;
+
+*)
+	echo "usage: $0 {start|stop|start_msg|stop_msg}"
+	rval=1
+	;;
+esac
+
+exit $rval
diff --git a/contrib/hpux/sshd b/contrib/hpux/sshd
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8eb5e92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/hpux/sshd
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+# SSHD_START:		Set to 1 to start SSH daemon
+# SSHD_ARGS:		Command line arguments to pass to sshd
+#
+SSHD_START=1
+SSHD_ARGS=
diff --git a/contrib/hpux/sshd.rc b/contrib/hpux/sshd.rc
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..f9a1099
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/hpux/sshd.rc
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+#!/sbin/sh
+
+#
+# sshd.rc: SSH daemon start-up and shutdown script
+#
+
+# Allowed exit values:
+#	0 = success; causes "OK" to show up in checklist.
+#	1 = failure; causes "FAIL" to show up in checklist.
+#	2 = skip; causes "N/A" to show up in the checklist.
+#           Use this value if execution of this script is overridden
+#	    by the use of a control variable, or if this script is not
+#	    appropriate to execute for some other reason.
+#       3 = reboot; causes the system to be rebooted after execution.
+
+# Input and output:
+#	stdin is redirected from /dev/null
+#
+#	stdout and stderr are redirected to the /etc/rc.log file
+#	during checklist mode, or to the console in raw mode.
+
+PATH=/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin
+export PATH
+
+WHAT='OpenSSH'
+WHAT_PATH=/opt/openssh/sbin/sshd
+WHAT_PID=/var/run/sshd.pid
+WHAT_CONFIG=/etc/rc.config.d/sshd
+
+# NOTE: If your script executes in run state 0 or state 1, then /usr might
+#	not be available.  Do not attempt to access commands or files in
+#	/usr unless your script executes in run state 2 or greater.  Other
+#	file systems typically not mounted until run state 2 include /var
+#	and /opt.
+
+rval=0
+
+# Check the exit value of a command run by this script.  If non-zero, the
+# exit code is echoed to the log file and the return value of this script
+# is set to indicate failure.
+
+set_return() {
+	x=$?
+	if [ $x -ne 0 ]; then
+		echo "EXIT CODE: $x"
+		rval=1	# script FAILed
+	fi
+}
+
+case $1 in
+'start_msg')
+	echo "Starting $WHAT"
+	;;
+
+'stop_msg')
+	echo "Stopping $WHAT"
+	;;
+
+'start')
+	if [ -f $WHAT_CONFIG ] ; then
+		. $WHAT_CONFIG
+	else
+		echo "ERROR: $WHAT_CONFIG defaults file MISSING"
+	fi
+	
+	if [ "$SSHD_START" -eq 1 -a -x "$WHAT_PATH" ]; then
+		$WHAT_PATH $SSHD_ARGS && echo "$WHAT started"
+		set_return
+	else
+		rval=2
+	fi
+	;;
+
+'stop')
+	if kill `cat $WHAT_PID`; then
+		echo "$WHAT stopped"
+	else
+		rval=1
+		echo "Unable to stop $WHAT"
+	fi
+	set_return
+	;;
+
+*)
+	echo "usage: $0 {start|stop|start_msg|stop_msg}"
+	rval=1
+	;;
+esac
+
+exit $rval
diff --git a/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh b/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd77712
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+setenv SSH_ASKPASS /usr/libexec/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
diff --git a/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh b/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..355189f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+SSH_ASKPASS=/usr/libexec/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+export SSH_ASKPASS
diff --git a/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec b/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..423079a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
@@ -0,0 +1,850 @@
+%global ver 9.2p1
+%global rel 1%{?dist}
+
+# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
+%global sshd_uid    74
+%global sshd_gid    74
+
+# Version of ssh-askpass
+%global aversion 1.2.4.1
+
+# Do we want to disable building of x11-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
+%global no_x11_askpass 0
+
+# Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
+%global no_gnome_askpass 0
+
+# Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no)
+%global static_libcrypto 0
+
+# Do we want smartcard support (1=yes 0=no)
+%global scard 0
+
+# Use GTK2 instead of GNOME in gnome-ssh-askpass
+%global gtk2 1
+
+# Use build6x options for older RHEL builds
+# RHEL 7 not yet supported
+%if 0%{?rhel} > 6
+%global build6x 0
+%else
+%global build6x 1
+%endif
+
+%if 0%{?fedora} >= 26
+%global compat_openssl 1
+%else
+%global compat_openssl 0
+%endif
+
+# Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no)
+%global kerberos5 1
+
+# Reserve options to override askpass settings with:
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1'
+%{?skip_x11_askpass:%global no_x11_askpass 1}
+%{?skip_gnome_askpass:%global no_gnome_askpass 1}
+
+# Add option to build without GTK2 for older platforms with only GTK+.
+# RedHat <= 7.2 and Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1 are examples.
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'no_gtk2 1'
+%{?no_gtk2:%global gtk2 0}
+
+# Is this a build for RHL 6.x or earlier?
+%{?build_6x:%global build6x 1}
+
+# If this is RHL 6.x, the default configuration has sysconfdir in /usr/etc.
+%if %{build6x}
+%global _sysconfdir /etc
+%endif
+
+# Options for static OpenSSL link:
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1"
+%{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1}
+
+# Options for Smartcard support: (needs libsectok and openssl-engine)
+# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "smartcard 1"
+%{?smartcard:%global scard 1}
+
+# Is this a build for the rescue CD (without PAM)? (1=yes 0=no)
+%global rescue 0
+%{?build_rescue:%global rescue 1}
+
+# Turn off some stuff for resuce builds
+%if %{rescue}
+%global kerberos5 0
+%endif
+
+Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol version 2.
+Name: openssh
+Version: %{ver}
+%if %{rescue}
+Release: %{rel}rescue
+%else
+Release: %{rel}
+%endif
+URL: https://www.openssh.com/portable.html
+Source0: https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
+Source1: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}.tar.gz
+License: BSD
+Group: Applications/Internet
+BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-buildroot
+Obsoletes: ssh
+%if %{build6x}
+PreReq: initscripts >= 5.00
+%else
+Requires: initscripts >= 5.20
+%endif
+BuildRequires: perl
+%if %{compat_openssl}
+BuildRequires: compat-openssl10-devel
+%else
+BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 1.0.1
+BuildRequires: openssl-devel < 1.1
+%endif
+BuildRequires: /bin/login
+%if ! %{build6x}
+BuildRequires: glibc-devel, pam
+%else
+BuildRequires: /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h
+%endif
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+BuildRequires: /usr/include/X11/Xlib.h
+# Xt development tools
+BuildRequires: libXt-devel
+# Provides xmkmf
+BuildRequires: imake
+# Rely on relatively recent gtk
+BuildRequires: gtk2-devel
+%endif
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig
+%endif
+%if %{kerberos5}
+BuildRequires: krb5-devel
+BuildRequires: krb5-libs
+%endif
+
+%package clients
+Summary: OpenSSH clients.
+Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
+Group: Applications/Internet
+Obsoletes: ssh-clients
+
+%package server
+Summary: The OpenSSH server daemon.
+Group: System Environment/Daemons
+Obsoletes: ssh-server
+Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}, chkconfig >= 0.9
+%if ! %{build6x}
+Requires: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
+%endif
+
+%package askpass
+Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X.
+Group: Applications/Internet
+Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
+Obsoletes: ssh-extras
+
+%package askpass-gnome
+Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH, X, and GNOME.
+Group: Applications/Internet
+Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
+Obsoletes: ssh-extras
+
+%description
+SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing
+commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and
+rsh, and to provide secure encrypted communications between two
+untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
+arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+
+OpenSSH is OpenBSD's version of the last free version of SSH, bringing
+it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing
+all patented algorithms to separate libraries.
+
+This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH
+client and server. To make this package useful, you should also
+install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both.
+
+%description clients
+OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
+into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes
+the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers.
+You'll also need to install the openssh package on OpenSSH clients.
+
+%description server
+OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
+into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
+the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon allows SSH clients to
+securely connect to your SSH server. You also need to have the openssh
+package installed.
+
+%description askpass
+OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
+into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
+an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
+
+%description askpass-gnome
+OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
+into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
+an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the GNOME GUI desktop
+environment.
+
+%prep
+
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+%setup -q -a 1
+%else
+%setup -q
+%endif
+
+%build
+%if %{rescue}
+CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -Os"; export CFLAGS
+%endif
+
+%configure \
+	--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
+	--libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \
+	--datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \
+	--with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin \
+	--with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \
+	--with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \
+	--mandir=%{_mandir} \
+	--with-mantype=man \
+	--disable-strip \
+%if %{scard}
+	--with-smartcard \
+%endif
+%if %{rescue}
+	--without-pam \
+%else
+	--with-pam \
+%endif
+%if %{kerberos5}
+	 --with-kerberos5=$K5DIR \
+%endif
+
+
+%if %{static_libcrypto}
+perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|%{_libdir}/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile
+%endif
+
+make
+
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+pushd x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}
+%configure --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh
+xmkmf -a
+make
+popd
+%endif
+
+# Define a variable to toggle gnome1/gtk2 building.  This is necessary
+# because RPM doesn't handle nested %if statements.
+%if %{gtk2}
+	gtk2=yes
+%else
+	gtk2=no
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+pushd contrib
+if [ $gtk2 = yes ] ; then
+	make gnome-ssh-askpass2
+	mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass
+else
+	make gnome-ssh-askpass1
+	mv gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass
+fi
+popd
+%endif
+
+%install
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh
+mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
+mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/sshd
+
+make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
+%if %{build6x}
+install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
+%else
+install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam     $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
+%endif
+install -m755 contrib/redhat/sshd.init $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
+
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+install x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass
+ln -s x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{scard}
+	 rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/openssh/Ssh.bin
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
+install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
+install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
+%endif
+
+perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/*
+
+%clean
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+
+%triggerun server -- ssh-server
+if [ "$1" != 0 -a -r /var/run/sshd.pid ] ; then
+	touch /var/run/sshd.restart
+fi
+
+%triggerun server -- openssh-server < 2.5.0p1
+# Count the number of HostKey and HostDsaKey statements we have.
+gawk	'BEGIN {IGNORECASE=1}
+	 /^hostkey/ || /^hostdsakey/ {sawhostkey = sawhostkey + 1}
+	 END {exit sawhostkey}' /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+# And if we only found one, we know the client was relying on the old default
+# behavior, which loaded the the SSH2 DSA host key when HostDsaKey wasn't
+# specified.  Now that HostKey is used for both SSH1 and SSH2 keys, specifying
+# one nullifies the default, which would have loaded both.
+if [ $? -eq 1 ] ; then
+	echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+	echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+fi
+
+%triggerpostun server -- ssh-server
+if [ "$1" != 0 ] ; then
+	/sbin/chkconfig --add sshd
+	if test -f /var/run/sshd.restart ; then
+		rm -f /var/run/sshd.restart
+		/sbin/service sshd start > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
+	fi
+fi
+
+%pre server
+%{_sbindir}/groupadd -r -g %{sshd_gid} sshd 2>/dev/null || :
+%{_sbindir}/useradd -d /var/empty/sshd -s /bin/false -u %{sshd_uid} \
+	-g sshd -M -r sshd 2>/dev/null || :
+
+%post server
+/sbin/chkconfig --add sshd
+
+%postun server
+/sbin/service sshd condrestart > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
+
+%preun server
+if [ "$1" = 0 ]
+then
+	/sbin/service sshd stop > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
+	/sbin/chkconfig --del sshd
+fi
+
+%files
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* TODO
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
+%if ! %{rescue}
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh
+%attr(4711,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-sk-helper
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-sk-helper.8*
+%endif
+%if %{scard}
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_datadir}/openssh
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_datadir}/openssh/Ssh.bin
+%endif
+
+%files clients
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
+%if ! %{rescue}
+%attr(2755,root,nobody) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1*
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{rescue}
+%files server
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%dir %attr(0111,root,root) %{_var}/empty/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
+%files askpass
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/README
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/ChangeLog
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/SshAskpass*.ad
+%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass
+%endif
+
+%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
+%files askpass-gnome
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.*
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
+%endif
+
+%changelog
+* Thu Oct 28 2021 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Remove remaining traces of --with-md5-passwords
+
+* Mon Jul 20 2020 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Add ssh-sk-helper and corresponding manual page.
+
+* Sat Feb 10 2018 Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+- Update openssl-devel dependency to match current requirements.
+- Handle Fedora >=6 openssl 1.0 compat libs.
+- Remove SSH1 from description.
+- Don't strip binaries at build time so that debuginfo package can be
+  created.
+
+* Sun Nov 16 2014 Nico Kadel-Garcia <nakdel@gmail.com>
+- Add '--mandir' and '--with-mantype' for RHEL 5 compatibility
+- Add 'dist' option to 'ver' so package names reflect OS at build time
+- Always include x11-ssh-askpass tarball in SRPM
+- Add openssh-x11-aspass BuildRequires for libXT-devel, imake, gtk2-devel
+- Discard 'K5DIR' reporting, not usable inside 'mock' for RHEL 5 compatibility
+- Discard obsolete '--with-rsh' configure option
+- Update openssl-devel dependency to 0.9.8f, as found in autoconf
+
+* Wed Jul 14 2010 Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+- test for skip_x11_askpass (line 77) should have been for no_x11_askpass
+
+* Mon Jun 2 2003 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Remove noip6 option. This may be controlled at run-time in client config
+  file using new AddressFamily directive
+
+* Mon May 12 2003 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Don't install profile.d scripts when not building with GNOME/GTK askpass
+  (patch from bet@rahul.net)
+
+* Tue Oct 01 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Install ssh-agent setgid nobody to prevent ptrace() key theft attacks
+
+* Mon Sep 30 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Use contrib/ Makefile for building askpass programs
+
+* Fri Jun 21 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Merge in spec changes from seba@iq.pl (Sebastian Pachuta)
+- Add new {ssh,sshd}_config.5 manpages
+- Add new ssh-keysign program and remove setuid from ssh client
+
+* Fri May 10 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Merge in spec changes from RedHat, reorgansie a little
+- Add Privsep user, group and directory
+
+* Thu Mar  7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.1p1-2
+- bump and grind (through the build system)
+
+* Thu Mar  7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.1p1-1
+- require sharutils for building (mindrot #137)
+- require db1-devel only when building for 6.x (#55105), which probably won't
+  work anyway (3.1 requires OpenSSL 0.9.6 to build), but what the heck
+- require pam-devel by file (not by package name) again
+- add Markus's patch to compile with OpenSSL 0.9.5a (from
+  http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=141) and apply it if we're
+  building for 6.x
+
+* Thu Mar  7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.1p1-0
+- update to 3.1p1
+
+* Tue Mar  5 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> SNAP-20020305
+- update to SNAP-20020305
+- drop debug patch, fixed upstream
+
+* Wed Feb 20 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> SNAP-20020220
+- update to SNAP-20020220 for testing purposes (you've been warned, if there's
+  anything to be warned about, gss patches won't apply, I don't mind)
+
+* Wed Feb 13 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-3
+- add patches from Simon Wilkinson and Nicolas Williams for GSSAPI key
+  exchange, authentication, and named key support
+
+* Wed Jan 23 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-2
+- remove dependency on db1-devel, which has just been swallowed up whole
+  by gnome-libs-devel
+
+* Sat Dec 29 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- adjust build dependencies so that build6x actually works right (fix
+  from Hugo van der Kooij)
+
+* Tue Dec  4 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-1
+- update to 3.0.2p1
+
+* Fri Nov 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.1p1-1
+- update to 3.0.1p1
+
+* Tue Nov 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- update to current CVS (not for use in distribution)
+
+* Thu Nov  8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0p1-1
+- merge some of Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> changes from the upstream
+  3.0p1 spec file and init script
+
+* Wed Nov  7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- update to 3.0p1
+- update to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.4.1
+- change build dependency on a file from pam-devel to the pam-devel package
+- replace primes with moduli
+
+* Thu Sep 27 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 2.9p2-9
+- incorporate fix from Markus Friedl's advisory for IP-based authorization bugs
+
+* Thu Sep 13 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com> 2.9p2-8
+- Merge changes to rescue build from current sysadmin survival cd
+
+* Thu Sep  6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 2.9p2-7
+- fix scp's server's reporting of file sizes, and build with the proper
+  preprocessor define to get large-file capable open(), stat(), etc.
+  (sftp has been doing this correctly all along) (#51827)
+- configure without --with-ipv4-default on RHL 7.x and newer (#45987,#52247)
+- pull cvs patch to fix support for /etc/nologin for non-PAM logins (#47298)
+- mark profile.d scriptlets as config files (#42337)
+- refer to Jason Stone's mail for zsh workaround for exit-hanging quasi-bug
+- change a couple of log() statements to debug() statements (#50751)
+- pull cvs patch to add -t flag to sshd (#28611)
+- clear fd_sets correctly (one bit per FD, not one byte per FD) (#43221)
+
+* Mon Aug 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 2.9p2-6
+- add db1-devel as a BuildPrerequisite (noted by Hans Ecke)
+
+* Thu Aug 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- pull cvs patch to fix remote port forwarding with protocol 2
+
+* Thu Aug  9 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- pull cvs patch to add session initialization to no-pty sessions
+- pull cvs patch to not cut off challengeresponse auth needlessly
+- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable
+  it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed (#49263)
+
+* Wed Aug  8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- don't apply patches to code we don't intend to build (spotted by Matt Galgoci)
+
+* Mon Aug  6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- pass OPTIONS correctly to initlog (#50151)
+
+* Wed Jul 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- switch to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.2
+
+* Wed Jul 11 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- rebuild in new environment
+
+* Mon Jun 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- disable the gssapi patch
+
+* Mon Jun 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- update to 2.9p2
+- refresh to a new version of the gssapi patch
+
+* Thu Jun  7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- change Copyright: BSD to License: BSD
+- add Markus Friedl's unverified patch for the cookie file deletion problem
+  so that we can verify it
+- drop patch to check if xauth is present (was folded into cookie patch)
+- don't apply gssapi patches for the errata candidate
+- clear supplemental groups list at startup
+
+* Fri May 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- fix an error parsing the new default sshd_config
+- add a fix from Markus Friedl (via openssh-unix-dev) for ssh-keygen not
+  dealing with comments right
+
+* Thu May 24 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- add in Simon Wilkinson's GSSAPI patch to give it some testing in-house,
+  to be removed before the next beta cycle because it's a big departure
+  from the upstream version
+
+* Thu May  3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- finish marking strings in the init script for translation
+- modify init script to source /etc/sysconfig/sshd and pass $OPTIONS to sshd
+  at startup (change merged from openssh.com init script, originally by
+  Pekka Savola)
+- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable
+  it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed
+
+* Wed May  2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- update to 2.9
+- drop various patches that came from or went upstream or to or from CVS
+
+* Wed Apr 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- only require initscripts 5.00 on 6.2 (reported by Peter Bieringer)
+
+* Sun Apr  8 2001 Preston Brown <pbrown@redhat.com>
+- remove explicit openssl requirement, fixes builddistro issue
+- make initscript stop() function wait until sshd really dead to avoid
+  races in condrestart
+
+* Mon Apr  2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- mention that challengereponse supports PAM, so disabling password doesn't
+  limit users to pubkey and rsa auth (#34378)
+- bypass the daemon() function in the init script and call initlog directly,
+  because daemon() won't start a daemon it detects is already running (like
+  open connections)
+- require the version of openssl we had when we were built
+
+* Fri Mar 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- make do_pam_setcred() smart enough to know when to establish creds and
+  when to reinitialize them
+- add in a couple of other fixes from Damien for inclusion in the errata
+
+* Thu Mar 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- update to 2.5.2p2
+- call setcred() again after initgroups, because the "creds" could actually
+  be group memberships
+
+* Tue Mar 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- update to 2.5.2p1 (includes endianness fixes in the rijndael implementation)
+- don't enable challenge-response by default until we find a way to not
+  have too many userauth requests (we may make up to six pubkey and up to
+  three password attempts as it is)
+- remove build dependency on rsh to match openssh.com's packages more closely
+
+* Sat Mar  3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- remove dependency on openssl -- would need to be too precise
+
+* Fri Mar  2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- rebuild in new environment
+
+* Mon Feb 26 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Revert the patch to move pam_open_session.
+- Init script and spec file changes from Pekka Savola. (#28750)
+- Patch sftp to recognize '-o protocol' arguments. (#29540)
+
+* Thu Feb 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Chuck the closing patch.
+- Add a trigger to add host keys for protocol 2 to the config file, now that
+  configuration file syntax requires us to specify it with HostKey if we
+  specify any other HostKey values, which we do.
+
+* Tue Feb 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Redo patch to move pam_open_session after the server setuid()s to the user.
+- Rework the nopam patch to use be picked up by autoconf.
+
+* Mon Feb 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update for 2.5.1p1.
+- Add init script mods from Pekka Savola.
+- Tweak the init script to match the CVS contrib script more closely.
+- Redo patch to ssh-add to try to adding both identity and id_dsa to also try
+  adding id_rsa.
+
+* Fri Feb 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update for 2.5.0p1.
+- Use $RPM_OPT_FLAGS instead of -O when building gnome-ssh-askpass
+- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS, including
+  update of x11 askpass to 1.2.0.
+- Only require openssl (don't prereq) because we generate keys in the init
+  script now.
+
+* Tue Feb 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Don't open a PAM session until we've forked and become the user (#25690).
+- Apply Andrew Bartlett's patch for letting pam_authenticate() know which
+  host the user is attempting a login from.
+- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS.
+- Don't expose KbdInt responses in debug messages (from CVS).
+- Detect and handle errors in rsa_{public,private}_decrypt (from CVS).
+
+* Wed Feb  7 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd <teg@redhat.com>
+- i18n-tweak to initscript.
+
+* Tue Jan 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- More gettextizing.
+- Close all files after going into daemon mode (needs more testing).
+- Extract patch from CVS to handle auth banners (in the client).
+- Extract patch from CVS to handle compat weirdness.
+
+* Fri Jan 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Finish with the gettextizing.
+
+* Thu Jan 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Fix a bug in auth2-pam.c (#23877)
+- Gettextize the init script.
+
+* Wed Dec 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Incorporate a switch for using PAM configs for 6.x, just in case.
+
+* Tue Dec  5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Incorporate Bero's changes for a build specifically for rescue CDs.
+
+* Wed Nov 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Don't treat pam_setcred() failure as fatal unless pam_authenticate() has
+  succeeded, to allow public-key authentication after a failure with "none"
+  authentication.  (#21268)
+
+* Tue Nov 28 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.1. (#21301)
+- Don't second-guess fixpaths, which causes paths to get fixed twice. (#21290)
+
+* Mon Nov 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Merge multiple PAM text messages into subsequent prompts when possible when
+  doing keyboard-interactive authentication.
+
+* Sun Nov 26 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Disable the built-in MD5 password support.  We're using PAM.
+- Take a crack at doing keyboard-interactive authentication with PAM, and
+  enable use of it in the default client configuration so that the client
+  will try it when the server disallows password authentication.
+- Build with debugging flags.  Build root policies strip all binaries anyway.
+
+* Tue Nov 21 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Use DESTDIR instead of %%makeinstall.
+- Remove /usr/X11R6/bin from the path-fixing patch.
+
+* Mon Nov 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Add the primes file from the latest snapshot to the main package (#20884).
+- Add the dev package to the prereq list (#19984).
+- Remove the default path and mimic login's behavior in the server itself.
+
+* Fri Nov 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Resync with conditional options in Damien Miller's .spec file for an errata.
+- Change libexecdir from %%{_libexecdir}/ssh to %%{_libexecdir}/openssh.
+
+* Tue Nov  7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to OpenSSH 2.3.0p1.
+- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.0.
+- Enable keyboard-interactive authentication.
+
+* Mon Oct 30 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to ssh-askpass-x11 1.0.3.
+- Change authentication related messages to be private (#19966).
+
+* Tue Oct 10 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Patch ssh-keygen to be able to list signatures for DSA public key files
+  it generates.
+
+* Thu Oct  5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Add BuildRequires on /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h to be sure we always
+  build PAM authentication in.
+- Try setting SSH_ASKPASS if gnome-ssh-askpass is installed.
+- Clean out no-longer-used patches.
+- Patch ssh-add to try to add both identity and id_dsa, and to error only
+  when neither exists.
+
+* Mon Oct  2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update x11-askpass to 1.0.2. (#17835)
+- Add BuildRequiress for /bin/login and /usr/bin/rsh so that configure will
+  always find them in the right place. (#17909)
+- Set the default path to be the same as the one supplied by /bin/login, but
+  add /usr/X11R6/bin. (#17909)
+- Try to handle obsoletion of ssh-server more cleanly.  Package names
+  are different, but init script name isn't. (#17865)
+
+* Wed Sep  6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to 2.2.0p1. (#17835)
+- Tweak the init script to allow proper restarting. (#18023)
+
+* Wed Aug 23 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to 20000823 snapshot.
+- Change subpackage requirements from %%{version} to %%{version}-%%{release}
+- Back out the pipe patch.
+
+* Mon Jul 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to 2.1.1p4, which includes fixes for config file parsing problems.
+- Move the init script back.
+- Add Damien's quick fix for wackiness.
+
+* Wed Jul 12 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to 2.1.1p3, which includes fixes for X11 forwarding and strtok().
+
+* Thu Jul  6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Move condrestart to server postun.
+- Move key generation to init script.
+- Actually use the right patch for moving the key generation to the init script.
+- Clean up the init script a bit.
+
+* Wed Jul  5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Fix X11 forwarding, from mail post by Chan Shih-Ping Richard.
+
+* Sun Jul  2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to 2.1.1p2.
+- Use of strtok() considered harmful.
+
+* Sat Jul  1 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Get the build root out of the man pages.
+
+* Thu Jun 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Add and use condrestart support in the init script.
+- Add newer initscripts as a prereq.
+
+* Tue Jun 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Build in new environment (release 2)
+- Move -clients subpackage to Applications/Internet group
+
+* Fri Jun  9 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Update to 2.2.1p1
+
+* Sat Jun  3 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
+- Patch to build with neither RSA nor RSAref.
+- Miscellaneous FHS-compliance tweaks.
+- Fix for possibly-compressed man pages.
+
+* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Updated for new location
+- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build
+
+* Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Added Jim Knoble's <jmknoble@pobox.com> askpass
+
+* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com>
+
+* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Added 'Obsoletes' directives
+
+* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Use make install
+- Subpackages
+
+* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Added links for slogin
+- Fixed perms on manpages
+
+* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Renamed init script
+
+* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Back to old binary names
+
+* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Use autoconf
+- New binary names
+
+* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's <kas@fi.muni.cz> spec.
diff --git a/contrib/redhat/sshd.init b/contrib/redhat/sshd.init
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..8ee5fcd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/redhat/sshd.init
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+#
+# Init file for OpenSSH server daemon
+#
+# chkconfig: 2345 55 25
+# description: OpenSSH server daemon
+#
+# processname: sshd
+# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub
+# config: /etc/ssh/ssh_random_seed
+# config: /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+# pidfile: /var/run/sshd.pid
+
+# source function library
+. /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions
+
+# pull in sysconfig settings
+[ -f /etc/sysconfig/sshd ] && . /etc/sysconfig/sshd
+
+RETVAL=0
+prog="sshd"
+
+# Some functions to make the below more readable
+SSHD=/usr/sbin/sshd
+PID_FILE=/var/run/sshd.pid
+
+do_restart_sanity_check()
+{
+	$SSHD -t
+	RETVAL=$?
+	if [ $RETVAL -ne 0 ]; then
+		failure $"Configuration file or keys are invalid"
+		echo
+	fi
+}
+
+start()
+{
+	# Create keys if necessary
+	/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A
+	if [ -x /sbin/restorecon ]; then
+		/sbin/restorecon /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
+		/sbin/restorecon /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub
+		/sbin/restorecon /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
+	fi
+
+	echo -n $"Starting $prog:"
+	$SSHD $OPTIONS && success || failure
+	RETVAL=$?
+	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && touch /var/lock/subsys/sshd
+	echo
+}
+
+stop()
+{
+	echo -n $"Stopping $prog:"
+	killproc $SSHD -TERM
+	RETVAL=$?
+	[ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] && rm -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd
+	echo
+}
+
+reload()
+{
+	echo -n $"Reloading $prog:"
+	killproc $SSHD -HUP
+	RETVAL=$?
+	echo
+}
+
+case "$1" in
+	start)
+		start
+		;;
+	stop)
+		stop
+		;;
+	restart)
+		stop
+		start
+		;;
+	reload)
+		reload
+		;;
+	condrestart)
+		if [ -f /var/lock/subsys/sshd ] ; then
+			do_restart_sanity_check
+			if [ $RETVAL -eq 0 ] ; then
+				stop
+				# avoid race
+				sleep 3
+				start
+			fi
+		fi
+		;;
+	status)
+		status $SSHD
+		RETVAL=$?
+		;;
+	*)
+		echo $"Usage: $0 {start|stop|restart|reload|condrestart|status}"
+		RETVAL=1
+esac
+exit $RETVAL
diff --git a/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam b/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ffa5adb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/redhat/sshd.pam
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+#%PAM-1.0
+auth       required     pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+account    required     pam_nologin.so
+account    required     pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+password   required     pam_stack.so service=system-auth
+session    required     pam_stack.so service=system-auth
diff --git a/contrib/solaris/README b/contrib/solaris/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cabecaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/solaris/README
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+The following is a new package build script for Solaris.   This is being
+introduced into OpenSSH 3.0 and above in hopes of simplifying the build
+process.  As of 3.1p2 the script should work on all platforms that have
+SVR4 style package tools.
+
+The build process is called a 'dummy install'.. Which means the software does
+a  "make install-nokeys DESTDIR=[fakeroot]".  This way all manpages should
+be handled correctly and key are deferred until the first time the sshd
+is started.
+
+Directions:
+
+1. make -F Makefile.in distprep  (Only if you are getting from the CVS tree)
+2. ./configure --with-pam [..any other options you want..]
+3. look at the top of buildpkg.sh for the configurable options and put
+   any changes you want in openssh-config.local. Additional customizations
+   can be done to the build process by creating one or more of the following
+   scripts that will be sourced by buildpkg.sh.
+	pkg_post_make_install_fixes.sh pkg-post-prototype-edit.sh
+	pkg-preinstall.local pkg-postinstall.local pkg-preremove.local
+	pkg-postremove.local pkg-request.local
+4. Run "make package"
+
+If all goes well you should have a solaris package ready to be installed.
+
+If you have any problems with this script please post them to
+openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org and I will try to assist you as best as I can.
+
+- Ben Lindstrom
+
diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd122de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id
@@ -0,0 +1,377 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Copyright (c) 1999-2020 Philip Hands <phil@hands.com>
+#               2020 Matthias Blümel <blaimi@blaimi.de>
+#               2017 Sebastien Boyron <seb@boyron.eu>
+#               2013 Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
+#               2010 Adeodato =?iso-8859-1?Q?Sim=F3?= <asp16@alu.ua.es>
+#               2010 Eric Moret <eric.moret@gmail.com>
+#               2009 Xr <xr@i-jeuxvideo.com>
+#               2007 Justin Pryzby <justinpryzby@users.sourceforge.net>
+#               2004 Reini Urban <rurban@x-ray.at>
+#               2003 Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+# All rights reserved.
+#
+# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+# are met:
+# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+#    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+#
+# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+# IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+# OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+# IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+# INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+# NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+# DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+# THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+# (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+# THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+
+# Shell script to install your public key(s) on a remote machine
+# See the ssh-copy-id(1) man page for details
+
+# shellcheck shell=dash
+
+# check that we have something mildly sane as our shell, or try to find something better
+if false ^ printf "%s: WARNING: ancient shell, hunting for a more modern one... " "$0"
+then
+  SANE_SH=${SANE_SH:-/usr/bin/ksh}
+  if printf 'true ^ false\n' | "$SANE_SH"
+  then
+    printf "'%s' seems viable.\\n" "$SANE_SH"
+    exec "$SANE_SH" "$0" "$@"
+  else
+    cat <<-EOF
+	oh dear.
+
+	  If you have a more recent shell available, that supports \$(...) etc.
+	  please try setting the environment variable SANE_SH to the path of that
+	  shell, and then retry running this script. If that works, please report
+	  a bug describing your setup, and the shell you used to make it work.
+
+	EOF
+    printf '%s: ERROR: Less dimwitted shell required.\n' "$0"
+    exit 1
+  fi
+fi
+
+# shellcheck disable=SC2010
+DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE=$(ls -t "${HOME}"/.ssh/id*.pub 2>/dev/null | grep -v -- '-cert.pub$' | head -n 1)
+SSH="ssh -a -x"
+umask 0177
+
+usage () {
+  printf 'Usage: %s [-h|-?|-f|-n|-s] [-i [identity_file]] [-p port] [-F alternative ssh_config file] [[-o <ssh -o options>] ...] [user@]hostname\n' "$0" >&2
+  printf '\t-f: force mode -- copy keys without trying to check if they are already installed\n' >&2
+  printf '\t-n: dry run    -- no keys are actually copied\n' >&2
+  printf '\t-s: use sftp   -- use sftp instead of executing remote-commands. Can be useful if the remote only allows sftp\n' >&2
+  printf '\t-h|-?: print this help\n' >&2
+  exit 1
+}
+
+# escape any single quotes in an argument
+quote() {
+  printf '%s\n' "$1" | sed -e "s/'/'\\\\''/g"
+}
+
+use_id_file() {
+  L_ID_FILE="$1"
+
+  if [ -z "$L_ID_FILE" ] ; then
+    printf '%s: ERROR: no ID file found\n' "$0"
+    exit 1
+  fi
+
+  if expr "$L_ID_FILE" : '.*\.pub$' >/dev/null ; then
+    PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE"
+  else
+    PUB_ID_FILE="$L_ID_FILE.pub"
+  fi
+
+  [ "$FORCED" ] || PRIV_ID_FILE=$(dirname "$PUB_ID_FILE")/$(basename "$PUB_ID_FILE" .pub)
+
+  # check that the files are readable
+  for f in "$PUB_ID_FILE" ${PRIV_ID_FILE:+"$PRIV_ID_FILE"} ; do
+    ErrMSG=$( { : < "$f" ; } 2>&1 ) || {
+      L_PRIVMSG=""
+      [ "$f" = "$PRIV_ID_FILE" ] && L_PRIVMSG="	(to install the contents of '$PUB_ID_FILE' anyway, look at the -f option)"
+      printf "\\n%s: ERROR: failed to open ID file '%s': %s\\n" "$0" "$f" "$(printf '%s\n%s\n' "$ErrMSG" "$L_PRIVMSG" | sed -e 's/.*: *//')"
+      exit 1
+    }
+  done
+  printf '%s: INFO: Source of key(s) to be installed: "%s"\n' "$0" "$PUB_ID_FILE" >&2
+  GET_ID="cat \"$PUB_ID_FILE\""
+}
+
+if [ -n "$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" ] && ssh-add -L >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+  GET_ID="ssh-add -L"
+fi
+
+while getopts "i:o:p:F:fnsh?" OPT
+do
+  case "$OPT" in
+    i)
+      [ "${SEEN_OPT_I}" ] && {
+        printf '\n%s: ERROR: -i option must not be specified more than once\n\n' "$0"
+        usage
+      }
+      SEEN_OPT_I="yes"
+      use_id_file "${OPTARG:-$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}"
+      ;;
+    o|p|F)
+      SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }-$OPT '$(quote "${OPTARG}")'"
+      ;;
+    f)
+      FORCED=1
+      ;;
+    n)
+      DRY_RUN=1
+      ;;
+    s)
+      SFTP=sftp
+      ;;
+    h|\?)
+      usage
+      ;;
+  esac
+done 
+#shift all args to keep only USER_HOST
+shift $((OPTIND-1))
+
+if [ $# = 0 ] ; then
+  usage
+fi
+if [ $# != 1 ] ; then
+  printf '%s: ERROR: Too many arguments.  Expecting a target hostname, got: %s\n\n' "$0" "$SAVEARGS" >&2
+  usage
+fi
+
+# drop trailing colon
+USER_HOST="$*"
+# tack the hostname onto SSH_OPTS
+SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }'$(quote "$USER_HOST")'"
+# and populate "$@" for later use (only way to get proper quoting of options)
+eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
+
+# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] && [ -r "${PUB_ID_FILE:=$DEFAULT_PUB_ID_FILE}" ] ; then
+  use_id_file "$PUB_ID_FILE"
+fi
+
+# shellcheck disable=SC2086
+if [ -z "$(eval $GET_ID)" ] ; then
+  printf '%s: ERROR: No identities found\n' "$0" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+# filter_ids()
+# tries to log in using the keys piped to it, and filters out any that work
+filter_ids() {
+  L_SUCCESS="$1"
+  L_TMP_ID_FILE="$SCRATCH_DIR"/popids_tmp_id
+  L_OUTPUT_FILE="$SCRATCH_DIR"/popids_output
+
+  # repopulate "$@" inside this function
+  eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
+
+  while read -r ID || [ "$ID" ] ; do
+    printf '%s\n' "$ID" > "$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
+
+    # the next line assumes $PRIV_ID_FILE only set if using a single id file - this
+    # assumption will break if we implement the possibility of multiple -i options.
+    # The point being that if file based, ssh needs the private key, which it cannot
+    # find if only given the contents of the .pub file in an unrelated tmpfile
+    $SSH -i "${PRIV_ID_FILE:-$L_TMP_ID_FILE}" \
+      -o ControlPath=none \
+      -o LogLevel=INFO \
+      -o PreferredAuthentications=publickey \
+      -o IdentitiesOnly=yes "$@" exit >"$L_OUTPUT_FILE" 2>&1 </dev/null
+    if [ "$?" = "$L_SUCCESS" ] || {
+         [ "$SFTP" ] && grep 'allows sftp connections only' "$L_OUTPUT_FILE" >/dev/null
+         # this error counts as a success if we're setting up an sftp connection
+       }
+    then
+      : > "$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
+    else
+      grep 'Permission denied' "$L_OUTPUT_FILE" >/dev/null || {
+        sed -e 's/^/ERROR: /' <"$L_OUTPUT_FILE" >"$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
+        cat >/dev/null #consume the other keys, causing loop to end
+      }
+    fi
+
+    cat "$L_TMP_ID_FILE"
+  done
+}
+
+# populate_new_ids() uses several global variables ($USER_HOST, $SSH_OPTS ...)
+# and has the side effect of setting $NEW_IDS
+populate_new_ids() {
+  if [ "$FORCED" ] ; then
+    # shellcheck disable=SC2086
+    NEW_IDS=$(eval $GET_ID)
+    return
+  fi
+
+  printf '%s: INFO: attempting to log in with the new key(s), to filter out any that are already installed\n' "$0" >&2
+  # shellcheck disable=SC2086
+  NEW_IDS=$(eval $GET_ID | filter_ids $1)
+
+  if expr "$NEW_IDS" : "^ERROR: " >/dev/null ; then
+    printf '\n%s: %s\n\n' "$0" "$NEW_IDS" >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  if [ -z "$NEW_IDS" ] ; then
+    printf '\n%s: WARNING: All keys were skipped because they already exist on the remote system.\n' "$0" >&2
+    printf '\t\t(if you think this is a mistake, you may want to use -f option)\n\n' >&2
+    exit 0
+  fi
+  printf '%s: INFO: %d key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys\n' "$0" "$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)" >&2
+}
+
+# installkey_sh [target_path]
+#    produce a one-liner to add the keys to remote authorized_keys file
+#    optionally takes an alternative path for authorized_keys
+installkeys_sh() {
+  AUTH_KEY_FILE=${1:-.ssh/authorized_keys}
+  AUTH_KEY_DIR=$(dirname "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}")
+
+  # In setting INSTALLKEYS_SH:
+  #    the tr puts it all on one line (to placate tcsh)
+  #      (hence the excessive use of semi-colons (;) )
+  # then in the command:
+  #    cd to be at $HOME, just in case;
+  #    the -z `tail ...` checks for a trailing newline. The echo adds one if was missing
+  #    the cat adds the keys we're getting via STDIN
+  #    and if available restorecon is used to restore the SELinux context
+  INSTALLKEYS_SH=$(tr '\t\n' ' ' <<-EOF
+	cd;
+	umask 077;
+	mkdir -p "${AUTH_KEY_DIR}" &&
+		{ [ -z \`tail -1c ${AUTH_KEY_FILE} 2>/dev/null\` ] ||
+			echo >> "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}" || exit 1; } &&
+		cat >> "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}" || exit 1;
+	if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+		restorecon -F "${AUTH_KEY_DIR}" "${AUTH_KEY_FILE}";
+	fi
+	EOF
+  )
+
+  # to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX;
+  printf "exec sh -c '%s'" "${INSTALLKEYS_SH}"
+}
+
+#shellcheck disable=SC2120 # the 'eval set' confuses this
+installkeys_via_sftp() {
+
+  # repopulate "$@" inside this function
+  eval set -- "$SSH_OPTS"
+
+  L_KEYS=$SCRATCH_DIR/authorized_keys
+  L_SHARED_CON=$SCRATCH_DIR/master-conn
+  $SSH -f -N -M -S "$L_SHARED_CON" "$@"
+  L_CLEANUP="$SSH -S $L_SHARED_CON -O exit 'ignored' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; $SCRATCH_CLEANUP"
+  #shellcheck disable=SC2064
+  trap "$L_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
+  sftp -b - -o "ControlPath=$L_SHARED_CON" "ignored" <<-EOF || return 1
+	-get .ssh/authorized_keys $L_KEYS
+	EOF
+  # add a newline or create file if it's missing, same like above
+  [ -z "$(tail -1c "$L_KEYS" 2>/dev/null)" ] || echo >> "$L_KEYS"
+  # append the keys being piped in here
+  cat >> "$L_KEYS"
+  sftp -b - -o "ControlPath=$L_SHARED_CON" "ignored" <<-EOF || return 1
+	-mkdir .ssh
+	chmod 700 .ssh
+	put $L_KEYS .ssh/authorized_keys
+	chmod 600 .ssh/authorized_keys
+	EOF
+  #shellcheck disable=SC2064
+  eval "$L_CLEANUP" && trap "$SCRATCH_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
+}
+
+
+# create a scratch dir for any temporary files needed
+if SCRATCH_DIR=$(mktemp -d ~/.ssh/ssh-copy-id.XXXXXXXXXX) &&
+    [ "$SCRATCH_DIR" ] && [ -d "$SCRATCH_DIR" ]
+then
+  chmod 0700 "$SCRATCH_DIR"
+  SCRATCH_CLEANUP="rm -rf \"$SCRATCH_DIR\""
+  #shellcheck disable=SC2064
+  trap "$SCRATCH_CLEANUP" EXIT TERM INT QUIT
+else
+  printf '%s: ERROR: failed to create required temporary directory under ~/.ssh\n' "$0" >&2
+  exit 1
+fi
+
+REMOTE_VERSION=$($SSH -v -o PreferredAuthentications=',' -o ControlPath=none "$@" 2>&1 |
+                 sed -ne 's/.*remote software version //p')
+
+# shellcheck disable=SC2029
+case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
+  NetScreen*)
+    populate_new_ids 1
+    for KEY in $(printf "%s" "$NEW_IDS" | cut -d' ' -f2) ; do
+      KEY_NO=$((KEY_NO + 1))
+      printf '%s\n' "$KEY" | grep ssh-dss >/dev/null || {
+         printf '%s: WARNING: Non-dsa key (#%d) skipped (NetScreen only supports DSA keys)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2
+         continue
+      }
+      [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf 'set ssh pka-dsa key %s\nsave\nexit\n' "$KEY" | $SSH -T "$@" >/dev/null 2>&1
+      if [ $? = 255 ] ; then
+        printf '%s: ERROR: installation of key #%d failed (please report a bug describing what caused this, so that we can make this message useful)\n' "$0" "$KEY_NO" >&2
+      else
+        ADDED=$((ADDED + 1))
+      fi
+    done
+    if [ -z "$ADDED" ] ; then
+      exit 1
+    fi
+    ;;
+  dropbear*)
+    populate_new_ids 0
+    [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | \
+      $SSH "$@" "$(installkeys_sh /etc/dropbear/authorized_keys)" \
+      || exit 1
+    ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)
+    ;;
+  *)
+    # Assuming that the remote host treats ~/.ssh/authorized_keys as one might expect
+    populate_new_ids 0
+    if ! [ "$DRY_RUN" ] ; then
+      printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | \
+        if [ "$SFTP" ] ; then
+          #shellcheck disable=SC2119
+          installkeys_via_sftp
+        else
+          $SSH "$@" "$(installkeys_sh)"
+        fi || exit 1
+    fi
+    ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)
+    ;;
+esac
+
+if [ "$DRY_RUN" ] ; then
+  cat <<-EOF
+	=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
+	Would have added the following key(s):
+
+	$NEW_IDS
+	=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=
+	EOF
+else
+  cat <<-EOF
+
+	Number of key(s) added: $ADDED
+
+	Now try logging into the machine, with:   "${SFTP:-ssh} $SSH_OPTS"
+	and check to make sure that only the key(s) you wanted were added.
+
+	EOF
+fi
+
+# =-=-=-=
diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 b/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c141a29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+.ig \"  -*- nroff -*-
+Copyright (c) 1999-2020 hands.com Ltd. <http://hands.com/>
+
+Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+are met:
+1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+   documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+
+THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+..
+.Dd $Mdocdate: June 17 2010 $
+.Dt SSH-COPY-ID 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-copy-id
+.Nd use locally available keys to authorise logins on a remote machine
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm
+.Op Fl f
+.Op Fl n
+.Op Fl s
+.Op Fl i Op Ar identity_file
+.Op Fl p Ar port
+.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
+.Op Ar user Ns @ Ns
+.Ar hostname
+.Nm
+.Fl h | Fl ?
+.br
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a script that uses
+.Xr ssh 1
+to log into a remote machine (presumably using a login password,
+so password authentication should be enabled, unless you've done some
+clever use of multiple identities).  It assembles a list of one or more
+fingerprints (as described below) and tries to log in with each key, to
+see if any of them are already installed (of course, if you are not using
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+this may result in you being repeatedly prompted for pass-phrases).
+It then assembles a list of those that failed to log in, and using ssh,
+enables logins with those keys on the remote server.  By default it adds
+the keys by appending them to the remote user's
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+(creating the file, and directory, if necessary).  It is also capable
+of detecting if the remote system is a NetScreen, and using its
+.Ql set ssh pka-dsa key ...
+command instead.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl i Ar identity_file
+Use only the key(s) contained in
+.Ar identity_file
+(rather than looking for identities via
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+or in the
+.Ic default_ID_file ) .
+If the filename does not end in
+.Pa .pub
+this is added.  If the filename is omitted, the 
+.Ic default_ID_file
+is used.
+.Pp
+Note that this can be used to ensure that the keys copied have the
+comment one prefers and/or extra options applied, by ensuring that the
+key file has these set as preferred before the copy is attempted.
+.It Fl f
+Forced mode: doesn't check if the keys are present on the remote server.
+This means that it does not need the private key.  Of course, this can result
+in more than one copy of the key being installed on the remote system.
+.It Fl n
+do a dry-run.  Instead of installing keys on the remote system simply
+prints the key(s) that would have been installed.
+.It Fl s
+SFTP mode: usually the public keys are installed by executing commands on the remote side.
+With this option the user's
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+file will be downloaded, modified locally and uploaded with sftp.
+This option is useful if the server has restrictions on commands which can be used on the remote side.
+.It Fl h , Fl ?
+Print Usage summary
+.It Fl p Ar port , Fl o Ar ssh_option
+These two options are simply passed through untouched, along with their
+argument, to allow one to set the port or other
+.Xr ssh 1
+options, respectively.
+.Pp
+Rather than specifying these as command line options, it is often better to use (per-host) settings in
+.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's
+configuration file:
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.El
+.Pp
+Default behaviour without
+.Fl i ,
+is to check if
+.Ql ssh-add -L
+provides any output, and if so those keys are used.  Note that this results in
+the comment on the key being the filename that was given to
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+when the key was loaded into your
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+rather than the comment contained in that file, which is a bit of a shame.
+Otherwise, if
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+provides no keys contents of the 
+.Ic default_ID_file
+will be used.
+.Pp
+The
+.Ic default_ID_file
+is the most recent file that matches:
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id*.pub ,
+(excluding those that match
+.Pa ~/.ssh/*-cert.pub )
+so if you create a key that is not the one you want
+.Nm
+to use, just use
+.Xr touch 1
+on your preferred key's 
+.Pa .pub
+file to reinstate it as the most recent.
+.Pp
+.Sh EXAMPLES
+If you have already installed keys from one system on a lot of remote
+hosts, and you then create a new key, on a new client machine, say,
+it can be difficult to keep track of which systems on which you've
+installed the new key.  One way of dealing with this is to load both
+the new key and old key(s) into your
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+Load the new key first, without the
+.Fl c
+option, then load one or more old keys into the agent, possibly by
+ssh-ing to the client machine that has that old key, using the
+.Fl A
+option to allow agent forwarding:
+.Pp
+.D1 user@newclient$ ssh-add
+.D1 user@newclient$ ssh -A old.client
+.D1 user@oldl$ ssh-add -c
+.D1 No   ... prompt for pass-phrase ...
+.D1 user@old$ logoff
+.D1 user@newclient$ ssh someserver
+.Pp
+now, if the new key is installed on the server, you'll be allowed in
+unprompted, whereas if you only have the old key(s) enabled, you'll be
+asked for confirmation, which is your cue to log back out and run
+.Pp
+.D1 user@newclient$ ssh-copy-id -i someserver
+.Pp
+The reason you might want to specify the -i option in this case is to
+ensure that the comment on the installed key is the one from the
+.Pa .pub
+file, rather than just the filename that was loaded into your agent.
+It also ensures that only the id you intended is installed, rather than
+all the keys that you have in your
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+Of course, you can specify another id, or use the contents of the
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+as you prefer.
+.Pp
+Having mentioned
+.Xr ssh-add 1 Ns 's
+.Fl c
+option, you might consider using this whenever using agent forwarding
+to avoid your key being hijacked, but it is much better to instead use
+.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's
+.Ar ProxyCommand
+and 
+.Fl W
+option,
+to bounce through remote servers while always doing direct end-to-end
+authentication. This way the middle hop(s) don't get access to your
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+A web search for
+.Ql ssh proxycommand nc
+should prove enlightening (N.B. the modern approach is to use the
+.Fl W
+option, rather than
+.Xr nc 1 ) .
+.Sh "SEE ALSO"
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
diff --git a/contrib/sshd.pam.freebsd b/contrib/sshd.pam.freebsd
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0bc364
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/sshd.pam.freebsd
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+sshd    auth      required  pam_unix.so    try_first_pass
+sshd    account   required  pam_unix.so
+sshd    password  required  pam_permit.so
+sshd    session   required  pam_permit.so
+
diff --git a/contrib/sshd.pam.generic b/contrib/sshd.pam.generic
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..215f0fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/sshd.pam.generic
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+#%PAM-1.0
+auth       required     /lib/security/pam_unix.so shadow nodelay
+account    required     /lib/security/pam_nologin.so
+account    required     /lib/security/pam_unix.so
+password   required     /lib/security/pam_cracklib.so
+password   required     /lib/security/pam_unix.so shadow nullok use_authtok
+session    required     /lib/security/pam_unix.so
+session    required     /lib/security/pam_limits.so
diff --git a/contrib/suse/openssh.spec b/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e533ed5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+# Default values for additional components
+%define build_x11_askpass	1
+
+# Define the UID/GID to use for privilege separation
+%define sshd_gid	65
+%define sshd_uid	71
+
+# The version of x11-ssh-askpass to use
+%define xversion	1.2.4.1
+
+# Allow the ability to override defaults with -D skip_xxx=1
+%{?skip_x11_askpass:%define build_x11_askpass 0}
+
+Summary:	OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
+Name:		openssh
+Version:	9.2p1
+URL:		https://www.openssh.com/
+Release:	1
+Source0:	openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
+Source1:	x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}.tar.gz
+License:	BSD
+Group:		Productivity/Networking/SSH
+BuildRoot:	%{_tmppath}/openssh-%{version}-buildroot
+PreReq:		openssl
+Obsoletes:	ssh
+Provides:	ssh
+#
+# (Build[ing] Prereq[uisites] only work for RPM 2.95 and newer.)
+# building prerequisites -- stuff for
+#   OpenSSL (openssl-devel),
+#   and Gnome (glibdev, gtkdev, and gnlibsd)
+#
+BuildPrereq:	openssl
+BuildPrereq:	zlib-devel
+#BuildPrereq:	glibdev
+#BuildPrereq:	gtkdev
+#BuildPrereq:	gnlibsd
+
+%package	askpass
+Summary:	A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the X window System.
+Group:		Productivity/Networking/SSH
+Requires:	openssh = %{version}
+Obsoletes:	ssh-extras
+Provides:	openssh:${_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
+
+%if %{build_x11_askpass}
+BuildPrereq:	XFree86-devel
+%endif
+
+%description
+Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
+executing commands in a remote machine.  It is intended to replace
+rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
+two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.  X11 connections and
+arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+
+OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it
+up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all
+patented algorithms to separate libraries (OpenSSL).
+
+This package includes all files necessary for both the OpenSSH
+client and server.
+
+%description askpass
+Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
+executing commands in a remote machine.  It is intended to replace
+rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
+two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.  X11 connections and
+arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+
+OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it
+up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all
+patented algorithms to separate libraries (OpenSSL).
+
+This package contains an X Window System passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
+
+%changelog
+* Mon Jul 20 2020 Damien Miller <djm@mindrto.org>
+- Add ssh-sk-helper and corresponding manual page.
+* Wed Oct 26 2005 Iain Morgan <imorgan@nas.nasa.gov>
+- Removed accidental inclusion of --without-zlib-version-check
+* Tue Oct 25 2005 Iain Morgan <imorgan@nas.nasa.gov>
+- Overhaul to deal with newer versions of SuSE and OpenSSH
+* Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Glob manpages to catch compressed files
+* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Updated for new location
+- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build
+* Sun Dec 26 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
+- Made symlink to gnome-ssh-askpass called ssh-askpass
+* Wed Nov 24 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
+- Removed patches that included /etc/pam.d/sshd, /sbin/init.d/rc.sshd, and
+  /var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd, since Damien merged these into
+  his released tarfile
+- Changed permissions on ssh_config in the install procedure to 644 from 600
+  even though it was correct in the %files section and thus right in the RPMs
+- Postinstall script for the server now only prints "Generating SSH host
+  key..." if we need to actually do this, in order to eliminate a confusing
+  message if an SSH host key is already in place
+- Marked all manual pages as %doc(umentation)
+* Mon Nov 22 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
+- Added flag to configure daemon with TCP Wrappers support
+- Added building prerequisites (works in RPM 3.0 and newer)
+* Thu Nov 18 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
+- Made this package correct for SuSE.
+- Changed instances of pam_pwdb.so to pam_unix.so, since it works more properly
+  with SuSE, and lib_pwdb.so isn't installed by default.
+* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com>
+* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+- Added 'Obsoletes' directives
+* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Use make install
+- Subpackages
+* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Added links for slogin
+- Fixed perms on manpages
+* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Renamed init script
+* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Back to old binary names
+* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Use autoconf
+- New binary names
+* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
+- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's <kas@fi.muni.cz> spec.
+
+%prep
+
+%if %{build_x11_askpass}
+%setup -q -a 1
+%else
+%setup -q
+%endif
+
+%build
+CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \
+%configure	--prefix=/usr \
+		--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
+		--mandir=%{_mandir} \
+		--with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \
+		--with-pam \
+		--libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh
+make
+
+%if %{build_x11_askpass}
+cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}
+%configure	--mandir=/usr/X11R6/man \
+		--libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh
+xmkmf -a
+make
+cd ..
+%endif
+
+%install
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/
+install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates
+install -m644 contrib/sshd.pam.generic $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
+install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/sshd
+install -m744 contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh \
+   $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates
+
+%if %{build_x11_askpass}
+cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}
+make install install.man BINDIR=%{_libdir}/ssh DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/
+rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/Ssh.bin
+%endif
+
+%clean
+rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
+
+%pre
+/usr/sbin/groupadd -g %{sshd_gid} -o -r sshd 2> /dev/null || :
+/usr/sbin/useradd -r -o -g sshd -u %{sshd_uid} -s /bin/false -c "SSH Privilege Separation User" -d /var/lib/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || :
+
+%post
+/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A
+%{fillup_and_insserv -n -y ssh sshd}
+%run_permissions
+
+%verifyscript
+%verify_permissions -e /etc/ssh/sshd_config -e /etc/ssh/ssh_config -e /usr/bin/ssh
+
+%preun
+%stop_on_removal sshd
+
+%postun
+%restart_on_update sshd
+%{insserv_cleanup}
+
+%files
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL*
+%doc TODO CREDITS LICENCE
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
+%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/init.d/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libdir}/ssh
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/sftp-server
+%attr(4711,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-keysign
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-sk-helper
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-sk-helper.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh
+
+%if %{build_x11_askpass}
+%files askpass
+%defattr(-,root,root)
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/README
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/ChangeLog
+%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/SshAskpass*.ad
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/ssh-askpass.1x*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/x11-ssh-askpass.1x*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %config /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/app-defaults/SshAskpass
+%endif
diff --git a/contrib/suse/rc.config.sshd b/contrib/suse/rc.config.sshd
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..baaa7a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/suse/rc.config.sshd
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#
+# Start the Secure Shell (SSH) Daemon?
+#
+START_SSHD="yes"
+
diff --git a/contrib/suse/rc.sshd b/contrib/suse/rc.sshd
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..28f28e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/suse/rc.sshd
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# Copyright (c) 1995-2000 SuSE GmbH Nuernberg, Germany.
+#
+# Author: Jiri Smid <feedback@suse.de>
+#
+# /etc/init.d/sshd
+#
+#   and symbolic its link
+#
+# /usr/sbin/rcsshd
+#
+### BEGIN INIT INFO
+# Provides: sshd
+# Required-Start: $network $remote_fs
+# Required-Stop: $network $remote_fs
+# Default-Start: 3 5
+# Default-Stop: 0 1 2 6
+# Description: Start the sshd daemon
+### END INIT INFO
+
+SSHD_BIN=/usr/sbin/sshd
+test -x $SSHD_BIN || exit 5
+
+SSHD_SYSCONFIG=/etc/sysconfig/ssh
+test -r $SSHD_SYSCONFIG || exit 6
+. $SSHD_SYSCONFIG
+
+SSHD_PIDFILE=/var/run/sshd.init.pid
+
+. /etc/rc.status
+
+# Shell functions sourced from /etc/rc.status:
+#      rc_check         check and set local and overall rc status
+#      rc_status        check and set local and overall rc status
+#      rc_status -v     ditto but be verbose in local rc status
+#      rc_status -v -r  ditto and clear the local rc status
+#      rc_failed        set local and overall rc status to failed
+#      rc_reset         clear local rc status (overall remains)
+#      rc_exit          exit appropriate to overall rc status
+
+# First reset status of this service
+rc_reset
+
+case "$1" in
+    start)
+	# Generate any missing host keys
+	ssh-keygen -A
+	echo -n "Starting SSH daemon"
+	## Start daemon with startproc(8). If this fails
+	## the echo return value is set appropriate.
+
+	startproc -f -p $SSHD_PIDFILE $SSHD_BIN $SSHD_OPTS -o "PidFile=$SSHD_PIDFILE" 
+
+	# Remember status and be verbose
+	rc_status -v
+	;;
+    stop)
+	echo -n "Shutting down SSH daemon"
+	## Stop daemon with killproc(8) and if this fails
+	## set echo the echo return value.
+
+	killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -TERM $SSHD_BIN
+
+	# Remember status and be verbose
+	rc_status -v
+	;;
+    try-restart)
+        ## Stop the service and if this succeeds (i.e. the 
+        ## service was running before), start it again.
+        $0 status >/dev/null &&  $0 restart
+
+        # Remember status and be quiet
+        rc_status
+        ;;
+    restart)
+        ## Stop the service and regardless of whether it was
+        ## running or not, start it again.
+        $0 stop
+        $0 start
+
+        # Remember status and be quiet
+        rc_status
+        ;;
+    force-reload|reload)
+	## Signal the daemon to reload its config. Most daemons
+	## do this on signal 1 (SIGHUP).
+
+	echo -n "Reload service sshd"
+
+	killproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE -HUP $SSHD_BIN
+
+        rc_status -v
+
+        ;;
+    status)
+	echo -n "Checking for service sshd "
+        ## Check status with checkproc(8), if process is running
+        ## checkproc will return with exit status 0.
+
+        # Status has a slightly different for the status command:
+        # 0 - service running
+        # 1 - service dead, but /var/run/  pid  file exists
+        # 2 - service dead, but /var/lock/ lock file exists
+        # 3 - service not running
+
+	checkproc -p $SSHD_PIDFILE $SSHD_BIN
+
+	rc_status -v
+	;;
+    probe)
+	## Optional: Probe for the necessity of a reload,
+	## give out the argument which is required for a reload.
+
+        test /etc/ssh/sshd_config -nt $SSHD_PIDFILE && echo reload
+	;;
+    *)
+	echo "Usage: $0 {start|stop|status|try-restart|restart|force-reload|reload|probe}"
+	exit 1
+	;;
+esac
+rc_exit
diff --git a/contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh b/contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6a37e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+## Path:	Network/Remote access/SSH
+## Description:	SSH server settings
+## Type:	string
+## Default:	""
+## ServiceRestart: sshd
+#
+# Options for sshd
+#
+SSHD_OPTS=""
diff --git a/crypto_api.h b/crypto_api.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5d552ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto_api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: crypto_api.h,v 1.8 2023/01/15 23:05:32 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Assembled from generated headers and source files by Markus Friedl.
+ * Placed in the public domain.
+ */
+
+#ifndef crypto_api_h
+#define crypto_api_h
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+typedef int8_t crypto_int8;
+typedef uint8_t crypto_uint8;
+typedef int16_t crypto_int16;
+typedef uint16_t crypto_uint16;
+typedef int32_t crypto_int32;
+typedef uint32_t crypto_uint32;
+typedef int64_t crypto_int64;
+typedef uint64_t crypto_uint64;
+
+#define randombytes(buf, buf_len) arc4random_buf((buf), (buf_len))
+#define small_random32() arc4random()
+
+#define crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES 64U
+
+int	crypto_hash_sha512(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *,
+    unsigned long long);
+
+#define crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES 64U
+#define crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES 32U
+#define crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES 64U
+
+int	crypto_sign_ed25519(unsigned char *, unsigned long long *,
+    const unsigned char *, unsigned long long, const unsigned char *);
+int	crypto_sign_ed25519_open(unsigned char *, unsigned long long *,
+    const unsigned char *, unsigned long long, const unsigned char *);
+int	crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(unsigned char *, unsigned char *);
+
+#define crypto_kem_sntrup761_PUBLICKEYBYTES 1158
+#define crypto_kem_sntrup761_SECRETKEYBYTES 1763
+#define crypto_kem_sntrup761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES 1039
+#define crypto_kem_sntrup761_BYTES 32
+
+int	crypto_kem_sntrup761_enc(unsigned char *cstr, unsigned char *k,
+    const unsigned char *pk);
+int	crypto_kem_sntrup761_dec(unsigned char *k,
+    const unsigned char *cstr, const unsigned char *sk);
+int	crypto_kem_sntrup761_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk);
+
+#endif /* crypto_api_h */
diff --git a/defines.h b/defines.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..279e509
--- /dev/null
+++ b/defines.h
@@ -0,0 +1,945 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _DEFINES_H
+#define _DEFINES_H
+
+/* Constants */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD) && HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD == 0
+enum
+{
+  SHUT_RD = 0,		/* No more receptions.  */
+  SHUT_WR,			/* No more transmissions.  */
+  SHUT_RDWR			/* No more receptions or transmissions.  */
+};
+# define SHUT_RD   SHUT_RD
+# define SHUT_WR   SHUT_WR
+# define SHUT_RDWR SHUT_RDWR
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Cygwin doesn't really have a notion of reserved ports.  It is still
+ * is useful on the client side so for compatibility it defines as 1024 via
+ * netinet/in.h inside an enum.  We * don't actually want that restriction
+ * so we want to set that to zero, but we can't do it direct in config.h
+ * because it'll cause a conflicting definition the first time we include
+ * netinet/in.h.
+ */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+#define IPPORT_RESERVED 0
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Definitions for IP type of service (ip_tos)
+ */
+#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+#ifndef IPTOS_LOWDELAY
+# define IPTOS_LOWDELAY          0x10
+# define IPTOS_THROUGHPUT        0x08
+# define IPTOS_RELIABILITY       0x04
+# define IPTOS_LOWCOST           0x02
+# define IPTOS_MINCOST           IPTOS_LOWCOST
+#endif /* IPTOS_LOWDELAY */
+
+/*
+ * Definitions for DiffServ Codepoints as per RFCs 2474, 3246, 4594 & 8622.
+ * These are the 6 most significant bits as they appear on the wire, so the
+ * two least significant bits must be zero.
+ */
+#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_AF11
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF11		0x28
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF12		0x30
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF13		0x38
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF21		0x48
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF22		0x50
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF23		0x58
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF31		0x68
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF32		0x70
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF33		0x78
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF41		0x88
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF42		0x90
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_AF43		0x98
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_EF		0xb8
+#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 */
+#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_CS0
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_CS0		0x00
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_CS1		0x20
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_CS2		0x40
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_CS3		0x60
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_CS4		0x80
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_CS5		0xa0
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_CS6		0xc0
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_CS7		0xe0
+#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 */
+#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_EF
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_EF		0xb8
+#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_EF */
+#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_LE
+# define	IPTOS_DSCP_LE		0x04
+#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_LE */
+#ifndef IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP
+# define IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP		0xa0
+#endif
+#ifndef IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL
+# define IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL	0xc0
+#endif
+#ifndef IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL
+# define IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL		0xe0
+#endif
+
+#ifndef PATH_MAX
+# ifdef _POSIX_PATH_MAX
+# define PATH_MAX _POSIX_PATH_MAX
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAXPATHLEN
+# ifdef PATH_MAX
+#  define MAXPATHLEN PATH_MAX
+# else /* PATH_MAX */
+#  define MAXPATHLEN 64
+# endif /* PATH_MAX */
+#endif /* MAXPATHLEN */
+
+#ifndef HOST_NAME_MAX
+# include "netdb.h" /* for MAXHOSTNAMELEN */
+# if defined(_POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX)
+#  define HOST_NAME_MAX _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX
+# elif defined(MAXHOSTNAMELEN)
+#  define HOST_NAME_MAX MAXHOSTNAMELEN
+# else
+#  define HOST_NAME_MAX	255
+# endif
+#endif /* HOST_NAME_MAX */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS) && HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS == 0
+# define MAXSYMLINKS 5
+#endif
+
+#ifndef STDIN_FILENO
+# define STDIN_FILENO    0
+#endif
+#ifndef STDOUT_FILENO
+# define STDOUT_FILENO   1
+#endif
+#ifndef STDERR_FILENO
+# define STDERR_FILENO   2
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NGROUPS_MAX	/* Disable groupaccess if NGROUP_MAX is not set */
+#ifdef NGROUPS
+#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS
+#else
+#define NGROUPS_MAX 0
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK) && HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK == 0
+# define O_NONBLOCK      00004	/* Non Blocking Open */
+#endif
+
+#ifndef S_IFSOCK
+# define S_IFSOCK 0
+#endif /* S_IFSOCK */
+
+#ifndef S_ISDIR
+# define S_ISDIR(mode)	(((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFDIR))
+#endif /* S_ISDIR */
+
+#ifndef S_ISREG
+# define S_ISREG(mode)	(((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFREG))
+#endif /* S_ISREG */
+
+#ifndef S_ISLNK
+# define S_ISLNK(mode)	(((mode) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK)
+#endif /* S_ISLNK */
+
+#ifndef S_IXUSR
+# define S_IXUSR			0000100	/* execute/search permission, */
+# define S_IXGRP			0000010	/* execute/search permission, */
+# define S_IXOTH			0000001	/* execute/search permission, */
+# define _S_IWUSR			0000200	/* write permission, */
+# define S_IWUSR			_S_IWUSR	/* write permission, owner */
+# define S_IWGRP			0000020	/* write permission, group */
+# define S_IWOTH			0000002	/* write permission, other */
+# define S_IRUSR			0000400	/* read permission, owner */
+# define S_IRGRP			0000040	/* read permission, group */
+# define S_IROTH			0000004	/* read permission, other */
+# define S_IRWXU			0000700	/* read, write, execute */
+# define S_IRWXG			0000070	/* read, write, execute */
+# define S_IRWXO			0000007	/* read, write, execute */
+#endif /* S_IXUSR */
+
+#if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS)
+#define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAP_FAILED
+# define MAP_FAILED ((void *)-1)
+#endif
+
+/*
+SCO Open Server 3 has INADDR_LOOPBACK defined in rpc/rpc.h but
+including rpc/rpc.h breaks Solaris 6
+*/
+#ifndef INADDR_LOOPBACK
+#define INADDR_LOOPBACK ((u_long)0x7f000001)
+#endif
+
+/* Types */
+
+/* If sys/types.h does not supply intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
+/* (or die trying) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_U_INT
+typedef unsigned int u_int;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INTXX_T
+typedef signed char int8_t;
+# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
+typedef short int int16_t;
+# else
+#   error "16 bit int type not found."
+# endif
+# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
+typedef int int32_t;
+# else
+#   error "32 bit int type not found."
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* If sys/types.h does not supply u_intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
+#ifndef HAVE_U_INTXX_T
+# ifdef HAVE_UINTXX_T
+typedef uint8_t u_int8_t;
+typedef uint16_t u_int16_t;
+typedef uint32_t u_int32_t;
+# define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1
+# else
+typedef unsigned char u_int8_t;
+#  if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
+typedef unsigned short int u_int16_t;
+#  else
+#    error "16 bit int type not found."
+#  endif
+#  if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
+typedef unsigned int u_int32_t;
+#  else
+#    error "32 bit int type not found."
+#  endif
+# endif
+#define __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LONG_LONG_MIN)
+#define LLONG_MIN LONG_LONG_MIN
+#endif
+#if !defined(LLONG_MAX) && defined(LONG_LONG_MAX)
+#define LLONG_MAX LONG_LONG_MAX
+#endif
+
+#ifndef UINT32_MAX
+# if defined(HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX) && (HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX == 0)
+#  if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
+#    define UINT32_MAX	UINT_MAX
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* 64-bit types */
+#ifndef HAVE_INT64_T
+# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef long int int64_t;
+# else
+#  if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef long long int int64_t;
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_U_INT64_T
+# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef unsigned long int u_int64_t;
+# else
+#  if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
+typedef unsigned long long int u_int64_t;
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UINTXX_T
+typedef u_int8_t uint8_t;
+typedef u_int16_t uint16_t;
+typedef u_int32_t uint32_t;
+typedef u_int64_t uint64_t;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INTMAX_T
+typedef long long intmax_t;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UINTMAX_T
+typedef unsigned long long uintmax_t;
+#endif
+
+#if SIZEOF_TIME_T == SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT
+# define SSH_TIME_T_MAX LLONG_MAX
+#else
+# define SSH_TIME_T_MAX INT_MAX
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_U_CHAR
+typedef unsigned char u_char;
+# define HAVE_U_CHAR
+#endif /* HAVE_U_CHAR */
+
+#ifndef ULLONG_MAX
+# define ULLONG_MAX ((unsigned long long)-1)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX
+#define SIZE_T_MAX ULONG_MAX
+#endif /* SIZE_T_MAX */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SIZE_T
+typedef unsigned int size_t;
+# define HAVE_SIZE_T
+# define SIZE_T_MAX UINT_MAX
+#endif /* HAVE_SIZE_T */
+
+#ifndef SIZE_MAX
+#define SIZE_MAX SIZE_T_MAX
+#endif
+
+#ifndef INT32_MAX
+# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
+#  define INT32_MAX INT_MAX
+# elif (SIZEOF_LONG == 4)
+#  define INT32_MAX LONG_MAX
+# else
+#  error "need INT32_MAX"
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef INT64_MAX
+# if (SIZEOF_INT == 8)
+#  define INT64_MAX INT_MAX
+# elif (SIZEOF_LONG == 8)
+#  define INT64_MAX LONG_MAX
+# elif (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
+#  define INT64_MAX LLONG_MAX
+# else
+#  error "need INT64_MAX"
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SSIZE_T
+typedef int ssize_t;
+#define SSIZE_MAX INT_MAX
+# define HAVE_SSIZE_T
+#endif /* HAVE_SSIZE_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CLOCK_T
+typedef long clock_t;
+# define HAVE_CLOCK_T
+#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
+typedef int sa_family_t;
+# define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
+#endif /* HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_PID_T
+typedef int pid_t;
+# define HAVE_PID_T
+#endif /* HAVE_PID_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
+typedef int sig_atomic_t;
+# define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
+#endif /* HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_MODE_T
+typedef int mode_t;
+# define HAVE_MODE_T
+#endif /* HAVE_MODE_T */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS)
+# define ss_family __ss_family
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE_SA_FAMILY_IN_SS) */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+struct	sockaddr_un {
+	short	sun_family;		/* AF_UNIX */
+	char	sun_path[108];		/* path name (gag) */
+};
+#endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T
+typedef u_int32_t	in_addr_t;
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_IN_PORT_T
+typedef u_int16_t	in_port_t;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(_STRUCT_WINSIZE)
+#define _STRUCT_WINSIZE
+struct winsize {
+      unsigned short ws_row;          /* rows, in characters */
+      unsigned short ws_col;          /* columns, in character */
+      unsigned short ws_xpixel;       /* horizontal size, pixels */
+      unsigned short ws_ypixel;       /* vertical size, pixels */
+};
+#endif
+
+/* bits needed for select that may not be in the system headers */
+#ifndef HAVE_FD_MASK
+ typedef unsigned long int	fd_mask;
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS) && HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS == 0
+# define	NFDBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long))
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY) && HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY == 0
+# define howmany(x,y)	(((x)+((y)-1))/(y))
+#endif
+
+/* Paths */
+
+#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL
+# define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USER_PATH
+# ifdef _PATH_STDPATH
+#  undef _PATH_STDPATH
+# endif
+# define _PATH_STDPATH USER_PATH
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
+# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SUPERUSER_PATH
+# define SUPERUSER_PATH	_PATH_STDPATH
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL
+# define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null"
+#endif
+
+/* user may have set a different path */
+#if defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY)
+# undef _PATH_MAILDIR
+#endif /* defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY) */
+
+#ifdef MAIL_DIRECTORY
+# define _PATH_MAILDIR MAIL_DIRECTORY
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN
+# define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin"
+#endif
+
+/* Define this to be the path of the xauth program. */
+#ifdef XAUTH_PATH
+#define _PATH_XAUTH XAUTH_PATH
+#endif /* XAUTH_PATH */
+
+/* derived from XF4/xc/lib/dps/Xlibnet.h */
+#ifndef X_UNIX_PATH
+#  ifdef __hpux
+#    define X_UNIX_PATH "/var/spool/sockets/X11/%u"
+#  else
+#    define X_UNIX_PATH "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u"
+#  endif
+#endif /* X_UNIX_PATH */
+#define _PATH_UNIX_X X_UNIX_PATH
+
+#ifndef _PATH_TTY
+# define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty"
+#endif
+
+/* Macros */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL) && defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H)
+# define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAX
+# define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
+# define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef roundup
+# define roundup(x, y)   ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef timersub
+#define timersub(a, b, result)					\
+   do {								\
+      (result)->tv_sec = (a)->tv_sec - (b)->tv_sec;		\
+      (result)->tv_usec = (a)->tv_usec - (b)->tv_usec;		\
+      if ((result)->tv_usec < 0) {				\
+	 --(result)->tv_sec;					\
+	 (result)->tv_usec += 1000000;				\
+      }								\
+   } while (0)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC
+#define	TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(tv, ts) {					\
+	(ts)->tv_sec = (tv)->tv_sec;					\
+	(ts)->tv_nsec = (tv)->tv_usec * 1000;				\
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL
+#define	TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(tv, ts) {					\
+	(tv)->tv_sec = (ts)->tv_sec;					\
+	(tv)->tv_usec = (ts)->tv_nsec / 1000;				\
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef timespeccmp
+#define timespeccmp(tsp, usp, cmp)					\
+	(((tsp)->tv_sec == (usp)->tv_sec) ?				\
+	    ((tsp)->tv_nsec cmp (usp)->tv_nsec) :			\
+	    ((tsp)->tv_sec cmp (usp)->tv_sec))
+#endif
+
+/* Operations on timespecs. */
+#ifndef timespecclear
+#define	timespecclear(tsp)		(tsp)->tv_sec = (tsp)->tv_nsec = 0
+#endif
+#ifndef timespeccmp
+#define	timespeccmp(tsp, usp, cmp)					\
+	(((tsp)->tv_sec == (usp)->tv_sec) ?				\
+	    ((tsp)->tv_nsec cmp (usp)->tv_nsec) :			\
+	    ((tsp)->tv_sec cmp (usp)->tv_sec))
+#endif
+#ifndef timespecadd
+#define	timespecadd(tsp, usp, vsp)					\
+	do {								\
+		(vsp)->tv_sec = (tsp)->tv_sec + (usp)->tv_sec;		\
+		(vsp)->tv_nsec = (tsp)->tv_nsec + (usp)->tv_nsec;	\
+		if ((vsp)->tv_nsec >= 1000000000L) {			\
+			(vsp)->tv_sec++;				\
+			(vsp)->tv_nsec -= 1000000000L;			\
+		}							\
+	} while (0)
+#endif
+#ifndef timespecsub
+#define	timespecsub(tsp, usp, vsp)					\
+	do {								\
+		(vsp)->tv_sec = (tsp)->tv_sec - (usp)->tv_sec;		\
+		(vsp)->tv_nsec = (tsp)->tv_nsec - (usp)->tv_nsec;	\
+		if ((vsp)->tv_nsec < 0) {				\
+			(vsp)->tv_sec--;				\
+			(vsp)->tv_nsec += 1000000000L;			\
+		}							\
+	} while (0)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __P
+# define __P(x) x
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED)
+# define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \
+	((((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0) && (((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0) && \
+	 (((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == htonl (0xffff)))
+#endif /* !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) */
+
+#if !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2)
+# define __attribute__(x)
+#endif /* !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__) && !defined(__sentinel__)
+# define __sentinel__
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__) && !defined(__bounded__)
+# define __bounded__(x, y, z)
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__) && !defined(__nonnull__)
+# define __nonnull__(x)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OSSH_ALIGNBYTES
+#define OSSH_ALIGNBYTES	(sizeof(int) - 1)
+#endif
+#ifndef __CMSG_ALIGN
+#define	__CMSG_ALIGN(p) (((u_int)(p) + OSSH_ALIGNBYTES) &~ OSSH_ALIGNBYTES)
+#endif
+
+/* Length of the contents of a control message of length len */
+#ifndef CMSG_LEN
+#define	CMSG_LEN(len)	(__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + (len))
+#endif
+
+/* Length of the space taken up by a padded control message of length len */
+#ifndef CMSG_SPACE
+#define	CMSG_SPACE(len)	(__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + __CMSG_ALIGN(len))
+#endif
+
+/* given pointer to struct cmsghdr, return pointer to data */
+#ifndef CMSG_DATA
+#define CMSG_DATA(cmsg) ((u_char *)(cmsg) + __CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)))
+#endif /* CMSG_DATA */
+
+/*
+ * RFC 2292 requires to check msg_controllen, in case that the kernel returns
+ * an empty list for some reasons.
+ */
+#ifndef CMSG_FIRSTHDR
+#define CMSG_FIRSTHDR(mhdr) \
+	((mhdr)->msg_controllen >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) ? \
+	 (struct cmsghdr *)(mhdr)->msg_control : \
+	 (struct cmsghdr *)NULL)
+#endif /* CMSG_FIRSTHDR */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF) && HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF == 0
+# define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member)
+#endif
+
+/* Set up BSD-style BYTE_ORDER definition if it isn't there already */
+/* XXX: doesn't try to cope with strange byte orders (PDP_ENDIAN) */
+#ifndef BYTE_ORDER
+# ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#  define LITTLE_ENDIAN  1234
+# endif /* LITTLE_ENDIAN */
+# ifndef BIG_ENDIAN
+#  define BIG_ENDIAN     4321
+# endif /* BIG_ENDIAN */
+# ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
+#  define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
+# else /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
+#  define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN
+# endif /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
+#endif /* BYTE_ORDER */
+
+/* Function replacement / compatibility hacks */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) && (defined(HAVE_OGETADDRINFO) || defined(HAVE_NGETADDRINFO))
+# define HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
+# undef getopt
+# undef opterr
+# undef optind
+# undef optopt
+# undef optreset
+# undef optarg
+# define getopt(ac, av, o)  BSDgetopt(ac, av, o)
+# define opterr             BSDopterr
+# define optind             BSDoptind
+# define optopt             BSDoptopt
+# define optreset           BSDoptreset
+# define optarg             BSDoptarg
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
+# undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+#endif
+#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_FREEADDRINFO)
+# undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
+#endif
+#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR)
+# undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
+# if defined(HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV) && HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV == 0
+#   define AI_NUMERICSERV	0
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_UPDWTMPX) && defined(HAVE_UPDWTMPX)
+# undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
+# undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) && \
+    defined(SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND)
+# define DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY)
+# define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n))
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */
+
+#ifndef GETPGRP_VOID
+# include <unistd.h>
+# define getpgrp() getpgrp(0)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_BSM_AUDIT
+# define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+# define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_LINUX_AUDIT
+# define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+# define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE___func__) && defined(HAVE___FUNCTION__)
+#  define __func__ __FUNCTION__
+#elif !defined(HAVE___func__)
+#  define __func__ ""
+#endif
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+#  define krb5_get_err_text(context,code) error_message(code)
+#endif
+
+/* Maximum number of file descriptors available */
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
+# define SSH_SYSFDMAX sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX)
+#else
+# define SSH_SYSFDMAX 10000
+#endif
+
+#ifdef FSID_HAS_VAL
+/* encode f_fsid into a 64 bit value  */
+#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
+	((((u_int64_t)(f).val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
+	    ((f).val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
+#elif defined(FSID_HAS___VAL)
+#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
+	((((u_int64_t)(f).__val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
+	    ((f).__val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
+#else
+# define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) ((f))
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__Lynx__)
+ /*
+  * LynxOS defines these in param.h which we do not want to include since
+  * it will also pull in a bunch of kernel definitions.
+  */
+# define ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1)
+# define ALIGN(p) (((unsigned)p + ALIGNBYTES) & ~ALIGNBYTES)
+  /* Missing prototypes on LynxOS */
+  int snprintf (char *, size_t, const char *, ...);
+  int mkstemp (char *);
+  char *crypt (const char *, const char *);
+  int seteuid (uid_t);
+  int setegid (gid_t);
+  char *mkdtemp (char *);
+  int rresvport_af (int *, sa_family_t);
+  int innetgr (const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Define this to use pipes instead of socketpairs for communicating with the
+ * client program.  Socketpairs do not seem to work on all systems.
+ *
+ * configure.ac sets this for a few OS's which are known to have problems
+ * but you may need to set it yourself
+ */
+/* #define USE_PIPES 1 */
+
+/**
+ ** login recorder definitions
+ **/
+
+/* FIXME: put default paths back in */
+#ifndef UTMP_FILE
+#  ifdef _PATH_UTMP
+#    define UTMP_FILE _PATH_UTMP
+#  else
+#    ifdef CONF_UTMP_FILE
+#      define UTMP_FILE CONF_UTMP_FILE
+#    endif
+#  endif
+#endif
+#ifndef WTMP_FILE
+#  ifdef _PATH_WTMP
+#    define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP
+#  else
+#    ifdef CONF_WTMP_FILE
+#      define WTMP_FILE CONF_WTMP_FILE
+#    endif
+#  endif
+#endif
+/* pick up the user's location for lastlog if given */
+#ifndef LASTLOG_FILE
+#  ifdef _PATH_LASTLOG
+#    define LASTLOG_FILE _PATH_LASTLOG
+#  else
+#    ifdef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
+#      define LASTLOG_FILE CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
+#    endif
+#  endif
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+# define USE_SHADOW
+#endif
+
+/* The login() library function in libutil is first choice */
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN) && !defined(DISABLE_LOGIN)
+#  define USE_LOGIN
+
+#else
+/* Simply select your favourite login types. */
+/* Can't do if-else because some systems use several... <sigh> */
+#  if !defined(DISABLE_UTMPX)
+#    define USE_UTMPX
+#  endif
+#  if defined(UTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMP)
+#    define USE_UTMP
+#  endif
+#  if defined(WTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMPX)
+#    define USE_WTMPX
+#  endif
+#  if defined(WTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMP)
+#    define USE_WTMP
+#  endif
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef UT_LINESIZE
+# define UT_LINESIZE 8
+#endif
+
+/* I hope that the presence of LASTLOG_FILE is enough to detect this */
+#if defined(LASTLOG_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
+#  define USE_LASTLOG
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+# ifdef USE_SHADOW
+#  undef USE_SHADOW
+# endif
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
+# define USE_LIBIAF
+#endif
+
+/* HP-UX 11.11 */
+#ifdef BTMP_FILE
+# define _PATH_BTMP BTMP_FILE
+#endif
+
+#if defined(USE_BTMP) && defined(_PATH_BTMP)
+# define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
+#endif
+
+/** end of login recorder definitions */
+
+#ifdef BROKEN_GETGROUPS
+# define getgroups(a,b) ((a)==0 && (b)==NULL ? NGROUPS_MAX : getgroups((a),(b)))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef IOV_MAX
+# if defined(_XOPEN_IOV_MAX)
+#  define	IOV_MAX		_XOPEN_IOV_MAX
+# elif defined(DEF_IOV_MAX)
+#  define	IOV_MAX		DEF_IOV_MAX
+# else
+#  define	IOV_MAX		16
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef EWOULDBLOCK
+# define EWOULDBLOCK EAGAIN
+#endif
+
+#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN	/* for non IPv6 machines */
+#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ
+# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * We want functions in openbsd-compat, if enabled, to override system ones.
+ * We no-op out the weak symbol definition rather than remove it to reduce
+ * future sync problems.  Some compilers (eg Unixware) do not allow an
+ * empty statement, so we use a bogus function declaration.
+ */
+#define DEF_WEAK(x)	void __ssh_compat_weak_##x(void)
+
+/*
+ * Platforms that have arc4random_uniform() and not arc4random_stir()
+ * shouldn't need the latter.
+ */
+#if defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM) && \
+    !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR)
+# define arc4random_stir()
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_VA_COPY
+# ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
+#  define va_copy(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
+# else
+#  define va_copy(dest, src) (dest) = (src)
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef __predict_true
+# if defined(__GNUC__) && \
+     ((__GNUC__ > (2)) || (__GNUC__ == (2) && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= (96)))
+#  define __predict_true(exp)     __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 1)
+#  define __predict_false(exp)    __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 0)
+# else
+#  define __predict_true(exp)     ((exp) != 0)
+#  define __predict_false(exp)    ((exp) != 0)
+# endif /* gcc version */
+#endif /* __predict_true */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) && defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) && \
+    defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) && defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) && \
+    defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) &&  HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH != 0 && \
+    !defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
+# define USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * sntrup761 uses variable length arrays and c99-style declarations after code,
+ * so only enable if the compiler supports them.
+ */
+#if defined(VARIABLE_LENGTH_ARRAYS) && defined(VARIABLE_DECLARATION_AFTER_CODE)
+# define USE_SNTRUP761X25519 1
+#endif
+#endif /* _DEFINES_H */
diff --git a/dh.c b/dh.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce2eb47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,505 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.74 2021/04/03 06:18:40 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+static const char *moduli_filename;
+
+void dh_set_moduli_file(const char *filename)
+{
+	moduli_filename = filename;
+}
+
+static const char * get_moduli_filename(void)
+{
+	return moduli_filename ? moduli_filename : _PATH_DH_MODULI;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg)
+{
+	char *cp, *arg;
+	char *strsize, *gen, *prime;
+	const char *errstr = NULL;
+	long long n;
+
+	dhg->p = dhg->g = NULL;
+	cp = line;
+	if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	/* Ignore leading whitespace */
+	if (*arg == '\0')
+		arg = strdelim(&cp);
+	if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#')
+		return 0;
+
+	/* time */
+	if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+		goto truncated;
+	arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* type */
+	if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+		goto truncated;
+	/* Ensure this is a safe prime */
+	n = strtonum(arg, 0, 5, &errstr);
+	if (errstr != NULL || n != MODULI_TYPE_SAFE) {
+		error("moduli:%d: type is not %d", linenum, MODULI_TYPE_SAFE);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tests */
+	if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+		goto truncated;
+	/* Ensure prime has been tested and is not composite */
+	n = strtonum(arg, 0, 0x1f, &errstr);
+	if (errstr != NULL ||
+	    (n & MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE) || !(n & ~MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE)) {
+		error("moduli:%d: invalid moduli tests flag", linenum);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tries */
+	if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+		goto truncated;
+	n = strtonum(arg, 0, 1<<30, &errstr);
+	if (errstr != NULL || n == 0) {
+		error("moduli:%d: invalid primality trial count", linenum);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	strsize = strsep(&cp, " "); /* size */
+	if (cp == NULL || *strsize == '\0' ||
+	    (dhg->size = (int)strtonum(strsize, 0, 64*1024, &errstr)) == 0 ||
+	    errstr) {
+		error("moduli:%d: invalid prime length", linenum);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	/* The whole group is one bit larger */
+	dhg->size++;
+	gen = strsep(&cp, " "); /* gen */
+	if (cp == NULL || *gen == '\0')
+		goto truncated;
+	prime = strsep(&cp, " "); /* prime */
+	if (cp != NULL || *prime == '\0') {
+ truncated:
+		error("moduli:%d: truncated", linenum);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if ((dhg->g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (dhg->p = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("parse_prime: BN_new failed");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->g, gen) == 0) {
+		error("moduli:%d: could not parse generator value", linenum);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->p, prime) == 0) {
+		error("moduli:%d: could not parse prime value", linenum);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (BN_num_bits(dhg->p) != dhg->size) {
+		error("moduli:%d: prime has wrong size: actual %d listed %d",
+		    linenum, BN_num_bits(dhg->p), dhg->size - 1);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (BN_cmp(dhg->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0) {
+		error("moduli:%d: generator is invalid", linenum);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	return 1;
+
+ fail:
+	BN_clear_free(dhg->g);
+	BN_clear_free(dhg->p);
+	dhg->g = dhg->p = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DH *
+choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	char *line = NULL;
+	size_t linesize = 0;
+	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
+	struct dhgroup dhg;
+
+	if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) {
+		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
+		    get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno));
+		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
+	}
+
+	linenum = 0;
+	best = bestcount = 0;
+	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+		linenum++;
+		if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg))
+			continue;
+		BN_clear_free(dhg.g);
+		BN_clear_free(dhg.p);
+
+		if (dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min)
+			continue;
+
+		if ((dhg.size > wantbits && dhg.size < best) ||
+		    (dhg.size > best && best < wantbits)) {
+			best = dhg.size;
+			bestcount = 0;
+		}
+		if (dhg.size == best)
+			bestcount++;
+	}
+	free(line);
+	line = NULL;
+	linesize = 0;
+	rewind(f);
+
+	if (bestcount == 0) {
+		fclose(f);
+		logit("WARNING: no suitable primes in %s",
+		    get_moduli_filename());
+		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
+	}
+	which = arc4random_uniform(bestcount);
+
+	linenum = 0;
+	bestcount = 0;
+	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+		linenum++;
+		if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg))
+			continue;
+		if ((dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min) ||
+		    dhg.size != best ||
+		    bestcount++ != which) {
+			BN_clear_free(dhg.g);
+			BN_clear_free(dhg.p);
+			continue;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+	free(line);
+	line = NULL;
+	fclose(f);
+	if (bestcount != which + 1) {
+		logit("WARNING: selected prime disappeared in %s, giving up",
+		    get_moduli_filename());
+		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
+	}
+
+	return (dh_new_group(dhg.g, dhg.p));
+}
+
+/* diffie-hellman-groupN-sha1 */
+
+int
+dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *dh_pub)
+{
+	int i;
+	int n = BN_num_bits(dh_pub);
+	int bits_set = 0;
+	BIGNUM *tmp;
+	const BIGNUM *dh_p;
+
+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
+
+	if (BN_is_negative(dh_pub)) {
+		logit("invalid public DH value: negative");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (BN_cmp(dh_pub, BN_value_one()) != 1) {	/* pub_exp <= 1 */
+		logit("invalid public DH value: <= 1");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		error_f("BN_new failed");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (!BN_sub(tmp, dh_p, BN_value_one()) ||
+	    BN_cmp(dh_pub, tmp) != -1) {		/* pub_exp > p-2 */
+		BN_clear_free(tmp);
+		logit("invalid public DH value: >= p-1");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	BN_clear_free(tmp);
+
+	for (i = 0; i <= n; i++)
+		if (BN_is_bit_set(dh_pub, i))
+			bits_set++;
+	debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh_p));
+
+	/*
+	 * if g==2 and bits_set==1 then computing log_g(dh_pub) is trivial
+	 */
+	if (bits_set < 4) {
+		logit("invalid public DH value (%d/%d)",
+		    bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh_p));
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+int
+dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
+{
+	int pbits;
+	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key;
+
+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
+
+	if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL ||
+	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 ||
+	    need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need > pbits)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (need < 256)
+		need = 256;
+	/*
+	 * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
+	 * so double requested need here.
+	 */
+	if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)))
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+
+	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key))
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+DH *
+dh_new_group_asc(const char *gen, const char *modulus)
+{
+	DH *dh;
+	BIGNUM *dh_p = NULL, *dh_g = NULL;
+
+	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	if (BN_hex2bn(&dh_p, modulus) == 0 ||
+	    BN_hex2bn(&dh_g, gen) == 0)
+		goto fail;
+	if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, dh_p, NULL, dh_g))
+		goto fail;
+	return dh;
+ fail:
+	DH_free(dh);
+	BN_clear_free(dh_p);
+	BN_clear_free(dh_g);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This just returns the group, we still need to generate the exchange
+ * value.
+ */
+DH *
+dh_new_group(BIGNUM *gen, BIGNUM *modulus)
+{
+	DH *dh;
+
+	if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, modulus, NULL, gen)) {
+		DH_free(dh);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return dh;
+}
+
+/* rfc2409 "Second Oakley Group" (1024 bits) */
+DH *
+dh_new_group1(void)
+{
+	static char *gen = "2", *group1 =
+	    "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
+	    "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
+	    "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
+	    "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
+	    "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE65381"
+	    "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
+
+	return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group1));
+}
+
+/* rfc3526 group 14 "2048-bit MODP Group" */
+DH *
+dh_new_group14(void)
+{
+	static char *gen = "2", *group14 =
+	    "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
+	    "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
+	    "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
+	    "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
+	    "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D"
+	    "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F"
+	    "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D"
+	    "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B"
+	    "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9"
+	    "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510"
+	    "15728E5A" "8AACAA68" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
+
+	return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group14));
+}
+
+/* rfc3526 group 16 "4096-bit MODP Group" */
+DH *
+dh_new_group16(void)
+{
+	static char *gen = "2", *group16 =
+	    "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
+	    "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
+	    "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
+	    "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
+	    "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D"
+	    "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F"
+	    "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D"
+	    "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B"
+	    "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9"
+	    "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510"
+	    "15728E5A" "8AAAC42D" "AD33170D" "04507A33" "A85521AB" "DF1CBA64"
+	    "ECFB8504" "58DBEF0A" "8AEA7157" "5D060C7D" "B3970F85" "A6E1E4C7"
+	    "ABF5AE8C" "DB0933D7" "1E8C94E0" "4A25619D" "CEE3D226" "1AD2EE6B"
+	    "F12FFA06" "D98A0864" "D8760273" "3EC86A64" "521F2B18" "177B200C"
+	    "BBE11757" "7A615D6C" "770988C0" "BAD946E2" "08E24FA0" "74E5AB31"
+	    "43DB5BFC" "E0FD108E" "4B82D120" "A9210801" "1A723C12" "A787E6D7"
+	    "88719A10" "BDBA5B26" "99C32718" "6AF4E23C" "1A946834" "B6150BDA"
+	    "2583E9CA" "2AD44CE8" "DBBBC2DB" "04DE8EF9" "2E8EFC14" "1FBECAA6"
+	    "287C5947" "4E6BC05D" "99B2964F" "A090C3A2" "233BA186" "515BE7ED"
+	    "1F612970" "CEE2D7AF" "B81BDD76" "2170481C" "D0069127" "D5B05AA9"
+	    "93B4EA98" "8D8FDDC1" "86FFB7DC" "90A6C08F" "4DF435C9" "34063199"
+	    "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
+
+	return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group16));
+}
+
+/* rfc3526 group 18 "8192-bit MODP Group" */
+DH *
+dh_new_group18(void)
+{
+	static char *gen = "2", *group18 =
+	    "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1"
+	    "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD"
+	    "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245"
+	    "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED"
+	    "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D"
+	    "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F"
+	    "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D"
+	    "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B"
+	    "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9"
+	    "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510"
+	    "15728E5A" "8AAAC42D" "AD33170D" "04507A33" "A85521AB" "DF1CBA64"
+	    "ECFB8504" "58DBEF0A" "8AEA7157" "5D060C7D" "B3970F85" "A6E1E4C7"
+	    "ABF5AE8C" "DB0933D7" "1E8C94E0" "4A25619D" "CEE3D226" "1AD2EE6B"
+	    "F12FFA06" "D98A0864" "D8760273" "3EC86A64" "521F2B18" "177B200C"
+	    "BBE11757" "7A615D6C" "770988C0" "BAD946E2" "08E24FA0" "74E5AB31"
+	    "43DB5BFC" "E0FD108E" "4B82D120" "A9210801" "1A723C12" "A787E6D7"
+	    "88719A10" "BDBA5B26" "99C32718" "6AF4E23C" "1A946834" "B6150BDA"
+	    "2583E9CA" "2AD44CE8" "DBBBC2DB" "04DE8EF9" "2E8EFC14" "1FBECAA6"
+	    "287C5947" "4E6BC05D" "99B2964F" "A090C3A2" "233BA186" "515BE7ED"
+	    "1F612970" "CEE2D7AF" "B81BDD76" "2170481C" "D0069127" "D5B05AA9"
+	    "93B4EA98" "8D8FDDC1" "86FFB7DC" "90A6C08F" "4DF435C9" "34028492"
+	    "36C3FAB4" "D27C7026" "C1D4DCB2" "602646DE" "C9751E76" "3DBA37BD"
+	    "F8FF9406" "AD9E530E" "E5DB382F" "413001AE" "B06A53ED" "9027D831"
+	    "179727B0" "865A8918" "DA3EDBEB" "CF9B14ED" "44CE6CBA" "CED4BB1B"
+	    "DB7F1447" "E6CC254B" "33205151" "2BD7AF42" "6FB8F401" "378CD2BF"
+	    "5983CA01" "C64B92EC" "F032EA15" "D1721D03" "F482D7CE" "6E74FEF6"
+	    "D55E702F" "46980C82" "B5A84031" "900B1C9E" "59E7C97F" "BEC7E8F3"
+	    "23A97A7E" "36CC88BE" "0F1D45B7" "FF585AC5" "4BD407B2" "2B4154AA"
+	    "CC8F6D7E" "BF48E1D8" "14CC5ED2" "0F8037E0" "A79715EE" "F29BE328"
+	    "06A1D58B" "B7C5DA76" "F550AA3D" "8A1FBFF0" "EB19CCB1" "A313D55C"
+	    "DA56C9EC" "2EF29632" "387FE8D7" "6E3C0468" "043E8F66" "3F4860EE"
+	    "12BF2D5B" "0B7474D6" "E694F91E" "6DBE1159" "74A3926F" "12FEE5E4"
+	    "38777CB6" "A932DF8C" "D8BEC4D0" "73B931BA" "3BC832B6" "8D9DD300"
+	    "741FA7BF" "8AFC47ED" "2576F693" "6BA42466" "3AAB639C" "5AE4F568"
+	    "3423B474" "2BF1C978" "238F16CB" "E39D652D" "E3FDB8BE" "FC848AD9"
+	    "22222E04" "A4037C07" "13EB57A8" "1A23F0C7" "3473FC64" "6CEA306B"
+	    "4BCBC886" "2F8385DD" "FA9D4B7F" "A2C087E8" "79683303" "ED5BDD3A"
+	    "062B3CF5" "B3A278A6" "6D2A13F8" "3F44F82D" "DF310EE0" "74AB6A36"
+	    "4597E899" "A0255DC1" "64F31CC5" "0846851D" "F9AB4819" "5DED7EA1"
+	    "B1D510BD" "7EE74D73" "FAF36BC3" "1ECFA268" "359046F4" "EB879F92"
+	    "4009438B" "481C6CD7" "889A002E" "D5EE382B" "C9190DA6" "FC026E47"
+	    "9558E447" "5677E9AA" "9E3050E2" "765694DF" "C81F56E8" "80B96E71"
+	    "60C980DD" "98EDD3DF" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF";
+
+	return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group18));
+}
+
+/* Select fallback group used by DH-GEX if moduli file cannot be read. */
+DH *
+dh_new_group_fallback(int max)
+{
+	debug3_f("requested max size %d", max);
+	if (max < 3072) {
+		debug3("using 2k bit group 14");
+		return dh_new_group14();
+	} else if (max < 6144) {
+		debug3("using 4k bit group 16");
+		return dh_new_group16();
+	}
+	debug3("using 8k bit group 18");
+	return dh_new_group18();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Estimates the group order for a Diffie-Hellman group that has an
+ * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits).
+ * Values from NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key
+ * Management Part 1 (rev 3) limited by the recommended maximum value
+ * from RFC4419 section 3.
+ */
+u_int
+dh_estimate(int bits)
+{
+	if (bits <= 112)
+		return 2048;
+	if (bits <= 128)
+		return 3072;
+	if (bits <= 192)
+		return 7680;
+	return 8192;
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/dh.h b/dh.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6326a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dh.h
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.19 2021/03/12 04:08:19 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef DH_H
+#define DH_H
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+struct dhgroup {
+	int size;
+	BIGNUM *g;
+	BIGNUM *p;
+};
+
+DH	*choose_dh(int, int, int);
+DH	*dh_new_group_asc(const char *, const char *);
+DH	*dh_new_group(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *);
+DH	*dh_new_group1(void);
+DH	*dh_new_group14(void);
+DH	*dh_new_group16(void);
+DH	*dh_new_group18(void);
+DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
+
+int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
+int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
+
+u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
+void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
+
+/*
+ * Max value from RFC4419.
+ * Min value from RFC8270.
+ */
+#define DH_GRP_MIN	2048
+#define DH_GRP_MAX	8192
+
+/*
+ * Values for "type" field of moduli(5)
+ * Specifies the internal structure of the prime modulus.
+ */
+#define MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN		(0)
+#define MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED	(1)
+#define MODULI_TYPE_SAFE		(2)
+#define MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR		(3)
+#define MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN	(4)
+#define MODULI_TYPE_STRONG		(5)
+
+/*
+ * Values for "tests" field of moduli(5)
+ * Specifies the methods used in checking for primality.
+ * Usually, more than one test is used.
+ */
+#define MODULI_TESTS_UNTESTED		(0x00)
+#define MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE		(0x01)
+#define MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE		(0x02)
+#define MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN	(0x04)
+#define MODULI_TESTS_JACOBI		(0x08)
+#define MODULI_TESTS_ELLIPTIC		(0x10)
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#endif /* DH_H */
diff --git a/digest-libc.c b/digest-libc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e77a44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/digest-libc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,267 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.7 2020/02/26 13:40:09 jsg Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#if 0
+#include <md5.h>
+#include <rmd160.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SHA1_H
+#include <sha1.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H
+#include <sha2.h>
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) && defined(SHA256_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE)
+#define SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH SHA256_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE
+#endif
+#if !defined(SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH) && defined(SHA512_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE)
+#define SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH SHA512_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE
+#endif
+#if !defined(SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) && defined(SHA512_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE)
+#define SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH SHA512_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE
+#endif
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+typedef void md_init_fn(void *mdctx);
+typedef void md_update_fn(void *mdctx, const u_int8_t *m, size_t mlen);
+typedef void md_final_fn(u_int8_t[], void *mdctx);
+
+struct ssh_digest_ctx {
+	int alg;
+	void *mdctx;
+};
+
+struct ssh_digest {
+	int id;
+	const char *name;
+	size_t block_len;
+	size_t digest_len;
+	size_t ctx_len;
+	md_init_fn *md_init;
+	md_update_fn *md_update;
+	md_final_fn *md_final;
+};
+
+/* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */
+const struct ssh_digest digests[SSH_DIGEST_MAX] = {
+	{
+		SSH_DIGEST_MD5,
+		"MD5",
+		MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+		MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+		sizeof(MD5_CTX),
+		(md_init_fn *) MD5Init,
+		(md_update_fn *) MD5Update,
+		(md_final_fn *) MD5Final
+	},
+	{
+		SSH_DIGEST_SHA1,
+		"SHA1",
+		SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+		SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+		sizeof(SHA1_CTX),
+		(md_init_fn *) SHA1Init,
+		(md_update_fn *) SHA1Update,
+		(md_final_fn *) SHA1Final
+	},
+	{
+		SSH_DIGEST_SHA256,
+		"SHA256",
+		SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+		SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+		sizeof(SHA2_CTX),
+		(md_init_fn *) SHA256Init,
+		(md_update_fn *) SHA256Update,
+		(md_final_fn *) SHA256Final
+	},
+	{
+		SSH_DIGEST_SHA384,
+		"SHA384",
+		SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+		SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+		sizeof(SHA2_CTX),
+		(md_init_fn *) SHA384Init,
+		(md_update_fn *) SHA384Update,
+		(md_final_fn *) SHA384Final
+	},
+	{
+		SSH_DIGEST_SHA512,
+		"SHA512",
+		SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH,
+		SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
+		sizeof(SHA2_CTX),
+		(md_init_fn *) SHA512Init,
+		(md_update_fn *) SHA512Update,
+		(md_final_fn *) SHA512Final
+	}
+};
+
+static const struct ssh_digest *
+ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
+{
+	if (alg < 0 || alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX)
+		return NULL;
+	if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */
+		return NULL;
+	return &(digests[alg]);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+	int alg;
+
+	for (alg = 0; alg < SSH_DIGEST_MAX; alg++) {
+		if (strcasecmp(name, digests[alg].name) == 0)
+			return digests[alg].id;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+const char *
+ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+
+	return digest == NULL ? NULL : digest->name;
+}
+
+size_t
+ssh_digest_bytes(int alg)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+
+	return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len;
+}
+
+size_t
+ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
+
+	return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->block_len;
+}
+
+struct ssh_digest_ctx *
+ssh_digest_start(int alg)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx *ret;
+
+	if (digest == NULL || (ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	if ((ret->mdctx = calloc(1, digest->ctx_len)) == NULL) {
+		free(ret);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	ret->alg = alg;
+	digest->md_init(ret->mdctx);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(from->alg);
+
+	if (digest == NULL || from->alg != to->alg)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	memcpy(to->mdctx, from->mdctx, digest->ctx_len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
+
+	if (digest == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	digest->md_update(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	return ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b));
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
+
+	if (digest == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	digest->md_final(d, ctx->mdctx);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest;
+
+	if (ctx != NULL) {
+		digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
+		if (digest) {
+			explicit_bzero(ctx->mdctx, digest->ctx_len);
+			free(ctx->mdctx);
+			freezero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg);
+
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, m, mlen) != 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_final(ctx, d, dlen) != 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	ssh_digest_free(ctx);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+	return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen);
+}
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e073a80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/digest-openssl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.9 2020/10/29 02:52:43 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+# define EVP_sha256 NULL
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_SHA384
+# define EVP_sha384 NULL
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_SHA512
+# define EVP_sha512 NULL
+#endif
+
+struct ssh_digest_ctx {
+	int alg;
+	EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
+};
+
+struct ssh_digest {
+	int id;
+	const char *name;
+	size_t digest_len;
+	const EVP_MD *(*mdfunc)(void);
+};
+
+/* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */
+const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
+	{ SSH_DIGEST_MD5,	"MD5",		16,	EVP_md5 },
+	{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA1,	"SHA1",		20,	EVP_sha1 },
+	{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA256,	"SHA256",	32,	EVP_sha256 },
+	{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA384,	"SHA384",	48,	EVP_sha384 },
+	{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA512,	"SHA512",	64,	EVP_sha512 },
+	{ -1,			NULL,		0,	NULL },
+};
+
+static const struct ssh_digest *
+ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
+{
+	if (alg < 0 || alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX)
+		return NULL;
+	if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */
+		return NULL;
+	if (digests[alg].mdfunc == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	return &(digests[alg]);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+	int alg;
+
+	for (alg = 0; digests[alg].id != -1; alg++) {
+		if (strcasecmp(name, digests[alg].name) == 0)
+			return digests[alg].id;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+const char *
+ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+
+	return digest == NULL ? NULL : digest->name;
+}
+
+size_t
+ssh_digest_bytes(int alg)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+
+	return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len;
+}
+
+size_t
+ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	return EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(ctx->mdctx);
+}
+
+struct ssh_digest_ctx *
+ssh_digest_start(int alg)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx *ret;
+
+	if (digest == NULL || ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL))
+		return NULL;
+	ret->alg = alg;
+	if ((ret->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+		free(ret);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ret->mdctx, digest->mdfunc(), NULL) != 1) {
+		ssh_digest_free(ret);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to)
+{
+	if (from->alg != to->alg)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	/* we have bcopy-style order while openssl has memcpy-style */
+	if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(to->mdctx, from->mdctx))
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
+{
+	if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1)
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	return ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b));
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
+	u_int l = dlen;
+
+	if (digest == NULL || dlen > UINT_MAX)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->mdctx, d, &l) != 1)
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	if (l != digest->digest_len) /* sanity */
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		return;
+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
+	freezero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+	const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
+	u_int mdlen;
+
+	if (digest == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (dlen < digest->digest_len)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	mdlen = dlen;
+	if (!EVP_Digest(m, mlen, d, &mdlen, digest->mdfunc(), NULL))
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+	return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/digest.h b/digest.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..274574d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/digest.h
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: digest.h,v 1.8 2017/05/08 22:57:38 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _DIGEST_H
+#define _DIGEST_H
+
+/* Maximum digest output length */
+#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH	64
+
+/* Digest algorithms */
+#define SSH_DIGEST_MD5		0
+#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA1		1
+#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA256	2
+#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA384	3
+#define SSH_DIGEST_SHA512	4
+#define SSH_DIGEST_MAX		5
+
+struct sshbuf;
+struct ssh_digest_ctx;
+
+/* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
+int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
+
+/* Returns the algorithm name for a digest identifier */
+const char *ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg);
+
+/* Returns the algorithm's digest length in bytes or 0 for invalid algorithm */
+size_t ssh_digest_bytes(int alg);
+
+/* Returns the block size of the digest, e.g. for implementing HMAC */
+size_t ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx);
+
+/* Copies internal state of digest of 'from' to 'to' */
+int ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from,
+    struct ssh_digest_ctx *to);
+
+/* One-shot API */
+int ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen,
+    u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 4, 5)));
+int ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 3, 4)));
+
+/* Update API */
+struct ssh_digest_ctx *ssh_digest_start(int alg);
+int ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
+int ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx,
+    const struct sshbuf *b);
+int ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
+void ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx);
+
+#endif /* _DIGEST_H */
+
diff --git a/dispatch.c b/dispatch.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e4c501
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dispatch.c
@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.32 2019/01/19 21:33:13 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+int
+dispatch_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	logit("dispatch_protocol_error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+dispatch_protocol_ignore(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	logit("dispatch_protocol_ignore: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_dispatch_init(struct ssh *ssh, dispatch_fn *dflt)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < DISPATCH_MAX; i++)
+		ssh->dispatch[i] = dflt;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_dispatch_range(struct ssh *ssh, u_int from, u_int to, dispatch_fn *fn)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = from; i <= to; i++) {
+		if (i >= DISPATCH_MAX)
+			break;
+		ssh->dispatch[i] = fn;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+ssh_dispatch_set(struct ssh *ssh, int type, dispatch_fn *fn)
+{
+	ssh->dispatch[type] = fn;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done)
+{
+	int r;
+	u_char type;
+	u_int32_t seqnr;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		if (mode == DISPATCH_BLOCK) {
+			r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, &seqnr);
+			if (r != 0)
+				return r;
+		} else {
+			r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, &type, &seqnr);
+			if (r != 0)
+				return r;
+			if (type == SSH_MSG_NONE)
+				return 0;
+		}
+		if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX &&
+		    ssh->dispatch[type] != NULL) {
+			if (ssh->dispatch_skip_packets) {
+				debug2("skipped packet (type %u)", type);
+				ssh->dispatch_skip_packets--;
+				continue;
+			}
+			r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ssh);
+			if (r != 0)
+				return r;
+		} else {
+			r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
+			    "protocol error: rcvd type %d", type);
+			if (r != 0)
+				return r;
+			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+		}
+		if (done != NULL && *done)
+			return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, mode, done)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__);
+}
diff --git a/dispatch.h b/dispatch.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a22d774
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dispatch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.h,v 1.15 2019/01/19 21:45:31 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef DISPATCH_H
+#define DISPATCH_H
+
+#define DISPATCH_MAX	255
+
+enum {
+	DISPATCH_BLOCK,
+	DISPATCH_NONBLOCK
+};
+
+struct ssh;
+
+typedef int dispatch_fn(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+
+int	dispatch_protocol_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+int	dispatch_protocol_ignore(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+void	ssh_dispatch_init(struct ssh *, dispatch_fn *);
+void	ssh_dispatch_set(struct ssh *, int, dispatch_fn *);
+void	ssh_dispatch_range(struct ssh *, u_int, u_int, dispatch_fn *);
+int	ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *, int, volatile sig_atomic_t *);
+void	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *, int, volatile sig_atomic_t *);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/dns.c b/dns.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2310be
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dns.c
@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.42 2022/02/01 23:32:51 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "dns.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+static const char * const errset_text[] = {
+	"success",		/* 0 ERRSET_SUCCESS */
+	"out of memory",	/* 1 ERRSET_NOMEMORY */
+	"general failure",	/* 2 ERRSET_FAIL */
+	"invalid parameter",	/* 3 ERRSET_INVAL */
+	"name does not exist",	/* 4 ERRSET_NONAME */
+	"data does not exist",	/* 5 ERRSET_NODATA */
+};
+
+static const char *
+dns_result_totext(unsigned int res)
+{
+	switch (res) {
+	case ERRSET_SUCCESS:
+		return errset_text[ERRSET_SUCCESS];
+	case ERRSET_NOMEMORY:
+		return errset_text[ERRSET_NOMEMORY];
+	case ERRSET_FAIL:
+		return errset_text[ERRSET_FAIL];
+	case ERRSET_INVAL:
+		return errset_text[ERRSET_INVAL];
+	case ERRSET_NONAME:
+		return errset_text[ERRSET_NONAME];
+	case ERRSET_NODATA:
+		return errset_text[ERRSET_NODATA];
+	default:
+		return "unknown error";
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read SSHFP parameters from key buffer.
+ * Caller must free digest which is allocated by sshkey_fingerprint_raw().
+ */
+static int
+dns_read_key(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
+    u_char **digest, size_t *digest_len, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	int r, success = 0;
+	int fp_alg = -1;
+
+	switch (key->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RSA;
+		break;
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_DSA;
+		break;
+	case KEY_ECDSA:
+		*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA;
+		break;
+	case KEY_ED25519:
+		*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ED25519;
+		break;
+	case KEY_XMSS:
+		*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_XMSS;
+		break;
+	default:
+		*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED; /* 0 */
+	}
+
+	switch (*digest_type) {
+	case SSHFP_HASH_SHA1:
+		fp_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
+		break;
+	case SSHFP_HASH_SHA256:
+		fp_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
+		break;
+	default:
+		*digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */
+	}
+
+	if (*algorithm && *digest_type) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, fp_alg, digest,
+		    digest_len)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_fingerprint_raw");
+		success = 1;
+	} else {
+		*digest = NULL;
+		*digest_len = 0;
+	}
+
+	return success;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read SSHFP parameters from rdata buffer.
+ */
+static int
+dns_read_rdata(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type,
+    u_char **digest, size_t *digest_len, u_char *rdata, int rdata_len)
+{
+	int success = 0;
+
+	*algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED;
+	*digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED;
+
+	if (rdata_len >= 2) {
+		*algorithm = rdata[0];
+		*digest_type = rdata[1];
+		*digest_len = rdata_len - 2;
+
+		if (*digest_len > 0) {
+			*digest = xmalloc(*digest_len);
+			memcpy(*digest, rdata + 2, *digest_len);
+		} else {
+			*digest = (u_char *)xstrdup("");
+		}
+
+		success = 1;
+	}
+
+	return success;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if hostname is numerical.
+ * Returns -1 if hostname is numeric, 0 otherwise
+ */
+static int
+is_numeric_hostname(const char *hostname)
+{
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai;
+
+	/*
+	 * We shouldn't ever get a null host but if we do then log an error
+	 * and return -1 which stops DNS key fingerprint processing.
+	 */
+	if (hostname == NULL) {
+		error("is_numeric_hostname called with NULL hostname");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
+
+	if (getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify the given hostname, address and host key using DNS.
+ * Returns 0 if lookup succeeds, -1 otherwise
+ */
+int
+verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address,
+    struct sshkey *hostkey, int *flags)
+{
+	u_int counter;
+	int result;
+	struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL;
+
+	u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm;
+	u_char *hostkey_digest;
+	size_t hostkey_digest_len;
+
+	u_int8_t dnskey_algorithm;
+	u_int8_t dnskey_digest_type;
+	u_char *dnskey_digest;
+	size_t dnskey_digest_len;
+
+	*flags = 0;
+
+	debug3("verify_host_key_dns");
+	if (hostkey == NULL)
+		fatal("No key to look up!");
+
+	if (is_numeric_hostname(hostname)) {
+		debug("skipped DNS lookup for numerical hostname");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN,
+	    DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints);
+	if (result) {
+		verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (fingerprints->rri_flags & RRSET_VALIDATED) {
+		*flags |= DNS_VERIFY_SECURE;
+		debug("found %d secure fingerprints in DNS",
+		    fingerprints->rri_nrdatas);
+	} else {
+		debug("found %d insecure fingerprints in DNS",
+		    fingerprints->rri_nrdatas);
+	}
+
+	if (fingerprints->rri_nrdatas)
+		*flags |= DNS_VERIFY_FOUND;
+
+	for (counter = 0; counter < fingerprints->rri_nrdatas; counter++) {
+		/*
+		 * Extract the key from the answer. Ignore any badly
+		 * formatted fingerprints.
+		 */
+		if (!dns_read_rdata(&dnskey_algorithm, &dnskey_digest_type,
+		    &dnskey_digest, &dnskey_digest_len,
+		    fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_data,
+		    fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_length)) {
+			verbose("Error parsing fingerprint from DNS.");
+			continue;
+		}
+		debug3_f("checking SSHFP type %d fptype %d", dnskey_algorithm,
+		    dnskey_digest_type);
+
+		/* Calculate host key fingerprint. */
+		if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm, &dnskey_digest_type,
+		    &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
+			error("Error calculating key fingerprint.");
+			freerrset(fingerprints);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/* Check if the current key is the same as the given key */
+		if (hostkey_algorithm == dnskey_algorithm &&
+		    hostkey_digest_len == dnskey_digest_len) {
+			if (timingsafe_bcmp(hostkey_digest, dnskey_digest,
+			    hostkey_digest_len) == 0) {
+				debug_f("matched SSHFP type %d fptype %d",
+				    dnskey_algorithm, dnskey_digest_type);
+				*flags |= DNS_VERIFY_MATCH;
+			} else {
+				debug_f("failed SSHFP type %d fptype %d",
+				    dnskey_algorithm, dnskey_digest_type);
+				*flags |= DNS_VERIFY_FAILED;
+			}
+		}
+		free(dnskey_digest);
+		free(hostkey_digest); /* from sshkey_fingerprint_raw() */
+	}
+
+	freerrset(fingerprints);
+
+	/* If any fingerprint failed to validate, return failure. */
+	if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_FAILED)
+		*flags &= ~DNS_VERIFY_MATCH;
+
+	if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND)
+		if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH)
+			debug("matching host key fingerprint found in DNS");
+		else
+			debug("mismatching host key fingerprint found in DNS");
+	else
+		debug("no host key fingerprint found in DNS");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Export the fingerprint of a key as a DNS resource record
+ */
+int
+export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, struct sshkey *key, FILE *f, int generic)
+{
+	u_int8_t rdata_pubkey_algorithm = 0;
+	u_int8_t rdata_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED;
+	u_int8_t dtype;
+	u_char *rdata_digest;
+	size_t i, rdata_digest_len;
+	int success = 0;
+
+	for (dtype = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; dtype < SSHFP_HASH_MAX; dtype++) {
+		rdata_digest_type = dtype;
+		if (dns_read_key(&rdata_pubkey_algorithm, &rdata_digest_type,
+		    &rdata_digest, &rdata_digest_len, key)) {
+			if (generic) {
+				fprintf(f, "%s IN TYPE%d \\# %zu %02x %02x ",
+				    hostname, DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP,
+				    2 + rdata_digest_len,
+				    rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type);
+			} else {
+				fprintf(f, "%s IN SSHFP %d %d ", hostname,
+				    rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type);
+			}
+			for (i = 0; i < rdata_digest_len; i++)
+				fprintf(f, "%02x", rdata_digest[i]);
+			fprintf(f, "\n");
+			free(rdata_digest); /* from sshkey_fingerprint_raw() */
+			success = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* No SSHFP record was generated at all */
+	if (success == 0) {
+		error_f("unsupported algorithm and/or digest_type");
+	}
+
+	return success;
+}
diff --git a/dns.h b/dns.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c9b61c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/dns.h
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.19 2021/07/19 03:13:28 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef DNS_H
+#define DNS_H
+
+enum sshfp_types {
+	SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED = 0,
+	SSHFP_KEY_RSA = 1,
+	SSHFP_KEY_DSA = 2,
+	SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA = 3,
+	SSHFP_KEY_ED25519 = 4,
+	SSHFP_KEY_XMSS = 5
+};
+
+enum sshfp_hashes {
+	SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED = 0,
+	SSHFP_HASH_SHA1 = 1,
+	SSHFP_HASH_SHA256 = 2,
+	SSHFP_HASH_MAX = 3
+};
+
+#define DNS_RDATACLASS_IN	1
+#define DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP	44
+
+#define DNS_VERIFY_FOUND	0x00000001
+#define DNS_VERIFY_MATCH	0x00000002
+#define DNS_VERIFY_SECURE	0x00000004
+#define DNS_VERIFY_FAILED	0x00000008
+
+int	verify_host_key_dns(const char *, struct sockaddr *,
+    struct sshkey *, int *);
+int	export_dns_rr(const char *, struct sshkey *, FILE *, int);
+
+#endif /* DNS_H */
diff --git a/ed25519.c b/ed25519.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e167ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ed25519.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2030 @@
+/*  $OpenBSD: ed25519.c,v 1.4 2023/01/15 23:05:32 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Public Domain, Authors:
+ * - Daniel J. Bernstein
+ * - Niels Duif
+ * - Tanja Lange
+ * - lead: Peter Schwabe
+ * - Bo-Yin Yang
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+
+#define int8 crypto_int8
+#define uint8 crypto_uint8
+#define int16 crypto_int16
+#define uint16 crypto_uint16
+#define int32 crypto_int32
+#define uint32 crypto_uint32
+#define int64 crypto_int64
+#define uint64 crypto_uint64
+
+/* from supercop-20221122/crypto_verify/32/ref/verify.c */
+
+static int crypto_verify_32(const unsigned char *x,const unsigned char *y)
+{
+  unsigned int differentbits = 0;
+#define F(i) differentbits |= x[i] ^ y[i];
+  F(0)
+  F(1)
+  F(2)
+  F(3)
+  F(4)
+  F(5)
+  F(6)
+  F(7)
+  F(8)
+  F(9)
+  F(10)
+  F(11)
+  F(12)
+  F(13)
+  F(14)
+  F(15)
+  F(16)
+  F(17)
+  F(18)
+  F(19)
+  F(20)
+  F(21)
+  F(22)
+  F(23)
+  F(24)
+  F(25)
+  F(26)
+  F(27)
+  F(28)
+  F(29)
+  F(30)
+  F(31)
+  return (1 & ((differentbits - 1) >> 8)) - 1;
+}
+/* from supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/fe25519.h */
+#ifndef FE25519_H
+#define FE25519_H
+
+
+#define fe25519              crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519
+#define fe25519_freeze       crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_freeze
+#define fe25519_unpack       crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_unpack
+#define fe25519_pack         crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pack
+#define fe25519_iszero       crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iszero
+#define fe25519_iseq_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iseq_vartime
+#define fe25519_cmov         crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_cmov
+#define fe25519_setone       crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setone
+#define fe25519_setzero      crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setzero
+#define fe25519_neg          crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_neg
+#define fe25519_getparity    crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_getparity
+#define fe25519_add          crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_add
+#define fe25519_sub          crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_sub
+#define fe25519_mul          crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_mul
+#define fe25519_square       crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_square
+#define fe25519_invert       crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_invert
+#define fe25519_pow2523      crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pow2523
+
+typedef struct
+{
+  crypto_uint32 v[32];
+}
+fe25519;
+
+static void fe25519_freeze(fe25519 *r);
+
+static void fe25519_unpack(fe25519 *r, const unsigned char x[32]);
+
+static void fe25519_pack(unsigned char r[32], const fe25519 *x);
+
+static int fe25519_iszero(const fe25519 *x);
+
+static int fe25519_iseq_vartime(const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y);
+
+static void fe25519_cmov(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, unsigned char b);
+
+static void fe25519_setone(fe25519 *r);
+
+static void fe25519_setzero(fe25519 *r);
+
+static void fe25519_neg(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x);
+
+unsigned char fe25519_getparity(const fe25519 *x);
+
+static void fe25519_add(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y);
+
+static void fe25519_sub(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y);
+
+static void fe25519_mul(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y);
+
+static void fe25519_square(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x);
+
+static void fe25519_invert(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x);
+
+static void fe25519_pow2523(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x);
+
+#endif
+/* from supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/fe25519.c */
+#define WINDOWSIZE 1 /* Should be 1,2, or 4 */
+#define WINDOWMASK ((1<<WINDOWSIZE)-1)
+
+
+static crypto_uint32 fe25519_equal(crypto_uint32 a,crypto_uint32 b) /* 16-bit inputs */
+{
+  crypto_uint32 x = a ^ b; /* 0: yes; 1..65535: no */
+  x -= 1; /* 4294967295: yes; 0..65534: no */
+  x >>= 31; /* 1: yes; 0: no */
+  return x;
+}
+
+static crypto_uint32 ge(crypto_uint32 a,crypto_uint32 b) /* 16-bit inputs */
+{
+  unsigned int x = a;
+  x -= (unsigned int) b; /* 0..65535: yes; 4294901761..4294967295: no */
+  x >>= 31; /* 0: yes; 1: no */
+  x ^= 1; /* 1: yes; 0: no */
+  return x;
+}
+
+static crypto_uint32 times19(crypto_uint32 a)
+{
+  return (a << 4) + (a << 1) + a;
+}
+
+static crypto_uint32 times38(crypto_uint32 a)
+{
+  return (a << 5) + (a << 2) + (a << 1);
+}
+
+static void fe25519_reduce_add_sub(fe25519 *r)
+{
+  crypto_uint32 t;
+  int i,rep;
+
+  for(rep=0;rep<4;rep++)
+  {
+    t = r->v[31] >> 7;
+    r->v[31] &= 127;
+    t = times19(t);
+    r->v[0] += t;
+    for(i=0;i<31;i++)
+    {
+      t = r->v[i] >> 8;
+      r->v[i+1] += t;
+      r->v[i] &= 255;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+static void reduce_mul(fe25519 *r)
+{
+  crypto_uint32 t;
+  int i,rep;
+
+  for(rep=0;rep<2;rep++)
+  {
+    t = r->v[31] >> 7;
+    r->v[31] &= 127;
+    t = times19(t);
+    r->v[0] += t;
+    for(i=0;i<31;i++)
+    {
+      t = r->v[i] >> 8;
+      r->v[i+1] += t;
+      r->v[i] &= 255;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/* reduction modulo 2^255-19 */
+static void fe25519_freeze(fe25519 *r)
+{
+  int i;
+  crypto_uint32 m = fe25519_equal(r->v[31],127);
+  for(i=30;i>0;i--)
+    m &= fe25519_equal(r->v[i],255);
+  m &= ge(r->v[0],237);
+
+  m = -m;
+
+  r->v[31] -= m&127;
+  for(i=30;i>0;i--)
+    r->v[i] -= m&255;
+  r->v[0] -= m&237;
+}
+
+static void fe25519_unpack(fe25519 *r, const unsigned char x[32])
+{
+  int i;
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i] = x[i];
+  r->v[31] &= 127;
+}
+
+/* Assumes input x being reduced below 2^255 */
+static void fe25519_pack(unsigned char r[32], const fe25519 *x)
+{
+  int i;
+  fe25519 y = *x;
+  fe25519_freeze(&y);
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++)
+    r[i] = y.v[i];
+}
+
+static int fe25519_iszero(const fe25519 *x)
+{
+  int i;
+  int r;
+  fe25519 t = *x;
+  fe25519_freeze(&t);
+  r = fe25519_equal(t.v[0],0);
+  for(i=1;i<32;i++)
+    r &= fe25519_equal(t.v[i],0);
+  return r;
+}
+
+static int fe25519_iseq_vartime(const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y)
+{
+  int i;
+  fe25519 t1 = *x;
+  fe25519 t2 = *y;
+  fe25519_freeze(&t1);
+  fe25519_freeze(&t2);
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++)
+    if(t1.v[i] != t2.v[i]) return 0;
+  return 1;
+}
+
+static void fe25519_cmov(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, unsigned char b)
+{
+  int i;
+  crypto_uint32 mask = b;
+  mask = -mask;
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i] ^= mask & (x->v[i] ^ r->v[i]);
+}
+
+unsigned char fe25519_getparity(const fe25519 *x)
+{
+  fe25519 t = *x;
+  fe25519_freeze(&t);
+  return t.v[0] & 1;
+}
+
+static void fe25519_setone(fe25519 *r)
+{
+  int i;
+  r->v[0] = 1;
+  for(i=1;i<32;i++) r->v[i]=0;
+}
+
+static void fe25519_setzero(fe25519 *r)
+{
+  int i;
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i]=0;
+}
+
+static void fe25519_neg(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x)
+{
+  fe25519 t;
+  int i;
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++) t.v[i]=x->v[i];
+  fe25519_setzero(r);
+  fe25519_sub(r, r, &t);
+}
+
+static void fe25519_add(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y)
+{
+  int i;
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i] = x->v[i] + y->v[i];
+  fe25519_reduce_add_sub(r);
+}
+
+static void fe25519_sub(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y)
+{
+  int i;
+  crypto_uint32 t[32];
+  t[0] = x->v[0] + 0x1da;
+  t[31] = x->v[31] + 0xfe;
+  for(i=1;i<31;i++) t[i] = x->v[i] + 0x1fe;
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i] = t[i] - y->v[i];
+  fe25519_reduce_add_sub(r);
+}
+
+static void fe25519_mul(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x, const fe25519 *y)
+{
+  int i,j;
+  crypto_uint32 t[63];
+  for(i=0;i<63;i++)t[i] = 0;
+
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++)
+    for(j=0;j<32;j++)
+      t[i+j] += x->v[i] * y->v[j];
+
+  for(i=32;i<63;i++)
+    r->v[i-32] = t[i-32] + times38(t[i]);
+  r->v[31] = t[31]; /* result now in r[0]...r[31] */
+
+  reduce_mul(r);
+}
+
+static void fe25519_square(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x)
+{
+  fe25519_mul(r, x, x);
+}
+
+static void fe25519_invert(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x)
+{
+	fe25519 z2;
+	fe25519 z9;
+	fe25519 z11;
+	fe25519 z2_5_0;
+	fe25519 z2_10_0;
+	fe25519 z2_20_0;
+	fe25519 z2_50_0;
+	fe25519 z2_100_0;
+	fe25519 t0;
+	fe25519 t1;
+	int i;
+
+	/* 2 */ fe25519_square(&z2,x);
+	/* 4 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&z2);
+	/* 8 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1);
+	/* 9 */ fe25519_mul(&z9,&t0,x);
+	/* 11 */ fe25519_mul(&z11,&z9,&z2);
+	/* 22 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&z11);
+	/* 2^5 - 2^0 = 31 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_5_0,&t0,&z9);
+
+	/* 2^6 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&z2_5_0);
+	/* 2^7 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0);
+	/* 2^8 - 2^3 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1);
+	/* 2^9 - 2^4 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0);
+	/* 2^10 - 2^5 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1);
+	/* 2^10 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_10_0,&t0,&z2_5_0);
+
+	/* 2^11 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&z2_10_0);
+	/* 2^12 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0);
+	/* 2^20 - 2^10 */ for (i = 2;i < 10;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); }
+	/* 2^20 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_20_0,&t1,&z2_10_0);
+
+	/* 2^21 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&z2_20_0);
+	/* 2^22 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0);
+	/* 2^40 - 2^20 */ for (i = 2;i < 20;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); }
+	/* 2^40 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t0,&t1,&z2_20_0);
+
+	/* 2^41 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0);
+	/* 2^42 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1);
+	/* 2^50 - 2^10 */ for (i = 2;i < 10;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); }
+	/* 2^50 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_50_0,&t0,&z2_10_0);
+
+	/* 2^51 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&z2_50_0);
+	/* 2^52 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0);
+	/* 2^100 - 2^50 */ for (i = 2;i < 50;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); }
+	/* 2^100 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_100_0,&t1,&z2_50_0);
+
+	/* 2^101 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&z2_100_0);
+	/* 2^102 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1);
+	/* 2^200 - 2^100 */ for (i = 2;i < 100;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); }
+	/* 2^200 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t1,&t0,&z2_100_0);
+
+	/* 2^201 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1);
+	/* 2^202 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0);
+	/* 2^250 - 2^50 */ for (i = 2;i < 50;i += 2) { fe25519_square(&t0,&t1); fe25519_square(&t1,&t0); }
+	/* 2^250 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t0,&t1,&z2_50_0);
+
+	/* 2^251 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0);
+	/* 2^252 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1);
+	/* 2^253 - 2^3 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0);
+	/* 2^254 - 2^4 */ fe25519_square(&t0,&t1);
+	/* 2^255 - 2^5 */ fe25519_square(&t1,&t0);
+	/* 2^255 - 21 */ fe25519_mul(r,&t1,&z11);
+}
+
+static void fe25519_pow2523(fe25519 *r, const fe25519 *x)
+{
+	fe25519 z2;
+	fe25519 z9;
+	fe25519 z11;
+	fe25519 z2_5_0;
+	fe25519 z2_10_0;
+	fe25519 z2_20_0;
+	fe25519 z2_50_0;
+	fe25519 z2_100_0;
+	fe25519 t;
+	int i;
+
+	/* 2 */ fe25519_square(&z2,x);
+	/* 4 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2);
+	/* 8 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t);
+	/* 9 */ fe25519_mul(&z9,&t,x);
+	/* 11 */ fe25519_mul(&z11,&z9,&z2);
+	/* 22 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z11);
+	/* 2^5 - 2^0 = 31 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_5_0,&t,&z9);
+
+	/* 2^6 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_5_0);
+	/* 2^10 - 2^5 */ for (i = 1;i < 5;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); }
+	/* 2^10 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_10_0,&t,&z2_5_0);
+
+	/* 2^11 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_10_0);
+	/* 2^20 - 2^10 */ for (i = 1;i < 10;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); }
+	/* 2^20 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_20_0,&t,&z2_10_0);
+
+	/* 2^21 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_20_0);
+	/* 2^40 - 2^20 */ for (i = 1;i < 20;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); }
+	/* 2^40 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t,&t,&z2_20_0);
+
+	/* 2^41 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t);
+	/* 2^50 - 2^10 */ for (i = 1;i < 10;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); }
+	/* 2^50 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_50_0,&t,&z2_10_0);
+
+	/* 2^51 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_50_0);
+	/* 2^100 - 2^50 */ for (i = 1;i < 50;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); }
+	/* 2^100 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&z2_100_0,&t,&z2_50_0);
+
+	/* 2^101 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&z2_100_0);
+	/* 2^200 - 2^100 */ for (i = 1;i < 100;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); }
+	/* 2^200 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t,&t,&z2_100_0);
+
+	/* 2^201 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t);
+	/* 2^250 - 2^50 */ for (i = 1;i < 50;i++) { fe25519_square(&t,&t); }
+	/* 2^250 - 2^0 */ fe25519_mul(&t,&t,&z2_50_0);
+
+	/* 2^251 - 2^1 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t);
+	/* 2^252 - 2^2 */ fe25519_square(&t,&t);
+	/* 2^252 - 3 */ fe25519_mul(r,&t,x);
+}
+/* from supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/sc25519.h */
+#ifndef SC25519_H
+#define SC25519_H
+
+
+#define sc25519                  crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519
+#define shortsc25519             crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_shortsc25519
+#define sc25519_from32bytes      crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from32bytes
+#define sc25519_from64bytes      crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from64bytes
+#define sc25519_to32bytes        crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_to32bytes
+#define sc25519_add              crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_add
+#define sc25519_mul              crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul
+#define sc25519_window3          crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window3
+#define sc25519_2interleave2     crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_2interleave2
+
+typedef struct
+{
+  crypto_uint32 v[32];
+}
+sc25519;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+  crypto_uint32 v[16];
+}
+shortsc25519;
+
+static void sc25519_from32bytes(sc25519 *r, const unsigned char x[32]);
+
+
+static void sc25519_from64bytes(sc25519 *r, const unsigned char x[64]);
+
+
+static void sc25519_to32bytes(unsigned char r[32], const sc25519 *x);
+
+
+
+
+static void sc25519_add(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y);
+
+
+static void sc25519_mul(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y);
+
+
+/* Convert s into a representation of the form \sum_{i=0}^{84}r[i]2^3
+ * with r[i] in {-4,...,3}
+ */
+static void sc25519_window3(signed char r[85], const sc25519 *s);
+
+/* Convert s into a representation of the form \sum_{i=0}^{50}r[i]2^5
+ * with r[i] in {-16,...,15}
+ */
+
+static void sc25519_2interleave2(unsigned char r[127], const sc25519 *s1, const sc25519 *s2);
+
+#endif
+/* from supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/sc25519.c */
+
+/*Arithmetic modulo the group order m = 2^252 +  27742317777372353535851937790883648493 = 7237005577332262213973186563042994240857116359379907606001950938285454250989 */
+
+static const crypto_uint32 sc25519_m[32] = {0xED, 0xD3, 0xF5, 0x5C, 0x1A, 0x63, 0x12, 0x58, 0xD6, 0x9C, 0xF7, 0xA2, 0xDE, 0xF9, 0xDE, 0x14,
+                                    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10};
+
+static const crypto_uint32 sc25519_mu[33] = {0x1B, 0x13, 0x2C, 0x0A, 0xA3, 0xE5, 0x9C, 0xED, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x63, 0x08, 0x5D, 0x21, 0x06, 0x21,
+                                     0xEB, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x0F};
+
+static crypto_uint32 lt(crypto_uint32 a,crypto_uint32 b) /* 16-bit inputs */
+{
+  unsigned int x = a;
+  x -= (unsigned int) b; /* 0..65535: no; 4294901761..4294967295: yes */
+  x >>= 31; /* 0: no; 1: yes */
+  return x;
+}
+
+/* Reduce coefficients of r before calling sc25519_reduce_add_sub */
+static void sc25519_reduce_add_sub(sc25519 *r)
+{
+  crypto_uint32 pb = 0;
+  crypto_uint32 b;
+  crypto_uint32 mask;
+  int i;
+  unsigned char t[32];
+
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++)
+  {
+    pb += sc25519_m[i];
+    b = lt(r->v[i],pb);
+    t[i] = r->v[i]-pb+(b<<8);
+    pb = b;
+  }
+  mask = b - 1;
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++)
+    r->v[i] ^= mask & (r->v[i] ^ t[i]);
+}
+
+/* Reduce coefficients of x before calling barrett_reduce */
+static void barrett_reduce(sc25519 *r, const crypto_uint32 x[64])
+{
+  /* See HAC, Alg. 14.42 */
+  int i,j;
+  crypto_uint32 q2[66];
+  crypto_uint32 *q3 = q2 + 33;
+  crypto_uint32 r1[33];
+  crypto_uint32 r2[33];
+  crypto_uint32 carry;
+  crypto_uint32 pb = 0;
+  crypto_uint32 b;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < 66;++i) q2[i] = 0;
+  for (i = 0;i < 33;++i) r2[i] = 0;
+
+  for(i=0;i<33;i++)
+    for(j=0;j<33;j++)
+      if(i+j >= 31) q2[i+j] += sc25519_mu[i]*x[j+31];
+  carry = q2[31] >> 8;
+  q2[32] += carry;
+  carry = q2[32] >> 8;
+  q2[33] += carry;
+
+  for(i=0;i<33;i++)r1[i] = x[i];
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++)
+    for(j=0;j<33;j++)
+      if(i+j < 33) r2[i+j] += sc25519_m[i]*q3[j];
+
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++)
+  {
+    carry = r2[i] >> 8;
+    r2[i+1] += carry;
+    r2[i] &= 0xff;
+  }
+
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++)
+  {
+    pb += r2[i];
+    b = lt(r1[i],pb);
+    r->v[i] = r1[i]-pb+(b<<8);
+    pb = b;
+  }
+
+  /* XXX: Can it really happen that r<0?, See HAC, Alg 14.42, Step 3
+   * If so: Handle  it here!
+   */
+
+  sc25519_reduce_add_sub(r);
+  sc25519_reduce_add_sub(r);
+}
+
+static void sc25519_from32bytes(sc25519 *r, const unsigned char x[32])
+{
+  int i;
+  crypto_uint32 t[64];
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++) t[i] = x[i];
+  for(i=32;i<64;++i) t[i] = 0;
+  barrett_reduce(r, t);
+}
+
+
+static void sc25519_from64bytes(sc25519 *r, const unsigned char x[64])
+{
+  int i;
+  crypto_uint32 t[64];
+  for(i=0;i<64;i++) t[i] = x[i];
+  barrett_reduce(r, t);
+}
+
+
+static void sc25519_to32bytes(unsigned char r[32], const sc25519 *x)
+{
+  int i;
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++) r[i] = x->v[i];
+}
+
+
+
+
+static void sc25519_add(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y)
+{
+  int i, carry;
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++) r->v[i] = x->v[i] + y->v[i];
+  for(i=0;i<31;i++)
+  {
+    carry = r->v[i] >> 8;
+    r->v[i+1] += carry;
+    r->v[i] &= 0xff;
+  }
+  sc25519_reduce_add_sub(r);
+}
+
+
+static void sc25519_mul(sc25519 *r, const sc25519 *x, const sc25519 *y)
+{
+  int i,j,carry;
+  crypto_uint32 t[64];
+  for(i=0;i<64;i++)t[i] = 0;
+
+  for(i=0;i<32;i++)
+    for(j=0;j<32;j++)
+      t[i+j] += x->v[i] * y->v[j];
+
+  /* Reduce coefficients */
+  for(i=0;i<63;i++)
+  {
+    carry = t[i] >> 8;
+    t[i+1] += carry;
+    t[i] &= 0xff;
+  }
+
+  barrett_reduce(r, t);
+}
+
+
+static void sc25519_window3(signed char r[85], const sc25519 *s)
+{
+  char carry;
+  int i;
+  for(i=0;i<10;i++)
+  {
+    r[8*i+0]  =  s->v[3*i+0]       & 7;
+    r[8*i+1]  = (s->v[3*i+0] >> 3) & 7;
+    r[8*i+2]  = (s->v[3*i+0] >> 6) & 7;
+    r[8*i+2] ^= (s->v[3*i+1] << 2) & 7;
+    r[8*i+3]  = (s->v[3*i+1] >> 1) & 7;
+    r[8*i+4]  = (s->v[3*i+1] >> 4) & 7;
+    r[8*i+5]  = (s->v[3*i+1] >> 7) & 7;
+    r[8*i+5] ^= (s->v[3*i+2] << 1) & 7;
+    r[8*i+6]  = (s->v[3*i+2] >> 2) & 7;
+    r[8*i+7]  = (s->v[3*i+2] >> 5) & 7;
+  }
+  r[8*i+0]  =  s->v[3*i+0]       & 7;
+  r[8*i+1]  = (s->v[3*i+0] >> 3) & 7;
+  r[8*i+2]  = (s->v[3*i+0] >> 6) & 7;
+  r[8*i+2] ^= (s->v[3*i+1] << 2) & 7;
+  r[8*i+3]  = (s->v[3*i+1] >> 1) & 7;
+  r[8*i+4]  = (s->v[3*i+1] >> 4) & 7;
+
+  /* Making it signed */
+  carry = 0;
+  for(i=0;i<84;i++)
+  {
+    r[i] += carry;
+    r[i+1] += r[i] >> 3;
+    r[i] &= 7;
+    carry = r[i] >> 2;
+    r[i] -= carry<<3;
+  }
+  r[84] += carry;
+}
+
+
+static void sc25519_2interleave2(unsigned char r[127], const sc25519 *s1, const sc25519 *s2)
+{
+  int i;
+  for(i=0;i<31;i++)
+  {
+    r[4*i]   = ( s1->v[i]       & 3) ^ (( s2->v[i]       & 3) << 2);
+    r[4*i+1] = ((s1->v[i] >> 2) & 3) ^ (((s2->v[i] >> 2) & 3) << 2);
+    r[4*i+2] = ((s1->v[i] >> 4) & 3) ^ (((s2->v[i] >> 4) & 3) << 2);
+    r[4*i+3] = ((s1->v[i] >> 6) & 3) ^ (((s2->v[i] >> 6) & 3) << 2);
+  }
+  r[124] = ( s1->v[31]       & 3) ^ (( s2->v[31]       & 3) << 2);
+  r[125] = ((s1->v[31] >> 2) & 3) ^ (((s2->v[31] >> 2) & 3) << 2);
+  r[126] = ((s1->v[31] >> 4) & 3) ^ (((s2->v[31] >> 4) & 3) << 2);
+}
+/* from supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/ge25519.h */
+#ifndef GE25519_H
+#define GE25519_H
+
+
+#define ge25519                           crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_ge25519
+#define ge25519_base                      crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_ge25519_base
+#define ge25519_unpackneg_vartime         crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime
+#define ge25519_pack                      crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_pack
+#define ge25519_isneutral_vartime         crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_isneutral_vartime
+#define ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_double_scalarmult_vartime
+#define ge25519_scalarmult_base           crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_scalarmult_base
+
+typedef struct
+{
+  fe25519 x;
+  fe25519 y;
+  fe25519 z;
+  fe25519 t;
+} ge25519;
+
+const ge25519 ge25519_base;
+
+int ge25519_unpackneg_vartime(ge25519 *r, const unsigned char p[32]);
+
+static void ge25519_pack(unsigned char r[32], const ge25519 *p);
+
+int ge25519_isneutral_vartime(const ge25519 *p);
+
+static void ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime(ge25519 *r, const ge25519 *p1, const sc25519 *s1, const ge25519 *p2, const sc25519 *s2);
+
+static void ge25519_scalarmult_base(ge25519 *r, const sc25519 *s);
+
+#endif
+/* from supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/ge25519.c */
+
+/*
+ * Arithmetic on the twisted Edwards curve -x^2 + y^2 = 1 + dx^2y^2
+ * with d = -(121665/121666) = 37095705934669439343138083508754565189542113879843219016388785533085940283555
+ * Base point: (15112221349535400772501151409588531511454012693041857206046113283949847762202,46316835694926478169428394003475163141307993866256225615783033603165251855960);
+ */
+
+/* d */
+static const fe25519 ge25519_ecd = {{0xA3, 0x78, 0x59, 0x13, 0xCA, 0x4D, 0xEB, 0x75, 0xAB, 0xD8, 0x41, 0x41, 0x4D, 0x0A, 0x70, 0x00,
+                      0x98, 0xE8, 0x79, 0x77, 0x79, 0x40, 0xC7, 0x8C, 0x73, 0xFE, 0x6F, 0x2B, 0xEE, 0x6C, 0x03, 0x52}};
+/* 2*d */
+static const fe25519 ge25519_ec2d = {{0x59, 0xF1, 0xB2, 0x26, 0x94, 0x9B, 0xD6, 0xEB, 0x56, 0xB1, 0x83, 0x82, 0x9A, 0x14, 0xE0, 0x00,
+                       0x30, 0xD1, 0xF3, 0xEE, 0xF2, 0x80, 0x8E, 0x19, 0xE7, 0xFC, 0xDF, 0x56, 0xDC, 0xD9, 0x06, 0x24}};
+/* sqrt(-1) */
+static const fe25519 ge25519_sqrtm1 = {{0xB0, 0xA0, 0x0E, 0x4A, 0x27, 0x1B, 0xEE, 0xC4, 0x78, 0xE4, 0x2F, 0xAD, 0x06, 0x18, 0x43, 0x2F,
+                         0xA7, 0xD7, 0xFB, 0x3D, 0x99, 0x00, 0x4D, 0x2B, 0x0B, 0xDF, 0xC1, 0x4F, 0x80, 0x24, 0x83, 0x2B}};
+
+#define ge25519_p3 ge25519
+
+typedef struct
+{
+  fe25519 x;
+  fe25519 z;
+  fe25519 y;
+  fe25519 t;
+} ge25519_p1p1;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+  fe25519 x;
+  fe25519 y;
+  fe25519 z;
+} ge25519_p2;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+  fe25519 x;
+  fe25519 y;
+} ge25519_aff;
+
+
+/* Packed coordinates of the base point */
+const ge25519 ge25519_base = {{{0x1A, 0xD5, 0x25, 0x8F, 0x60, 0x2D, 0x56, 0xC9, 0xB2, 0xA7, 0x25, 0x95, 0x60, 0xC7, 0x2C, 0x69,
+                                0x5C, 0xDC, 0xD6, 0xFD, 0x31, 0xE2, 0xA4, 0xC0, 0xFE, 0x53, 0x6E, 0xCD, 0xD3, 0x36, 0x69, 0x21}},
+                              {{0x58, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66,
+                                0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66}},
+                              {{0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+                                0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}},
+                              {{0xA3, 0xDD, 0xB7, 0xA5, 0xB3, 0x8A, 0xDE, 0x6D, 0xF5, 0x52, 0x51, 0x77, 0x80, 0x9F, 0xF0, 0x20,
+                                0x7D, 0xE3, 0xAB, 0x64, 0x8E, 0x4E, 0xEA, 0x66, 0x65, 0x76, 0x8B, 0xD7, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0x87, 0x67}}};
+
+/* Multiples of the base point in affine representation */
+static const ge25519_aff ge25519_base_multiples_affine[425] = {
+{{{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}},
+ {{0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}},
+{{{0x1a, 0xd5, 0x25, 0x8f, 0x60, 0x2d, 0x56, 0xc9, 0xb2, 0xa7, 0x25, 0x95, 0x60, 0xc7, 0x2c, 0x69, 0x5c, 0xdc, 0xd6, 0xfd, 0x31, 0xe2, 0xa4, 0xc0, 0xfe, 0x53, 0x6e, 0xcd, 0xd3, 0x36, 0x69, 0x21}} ,
+ {{0x58, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66, 0x66}}},
+{{{0x0e, 0xce, 0x43, 0x28, 0x4e, 0xa1, 0xc5, 0x83, 0x5f, 0xa4, 0xd7, 0x15, 0x45, 0x8e, 0x0d, 0x08, 0xac, 0xe7, 0x33, 0x18, 0x7d, 0x3b, 0x04, 0x3d, 0x6c, 0x04, 0x5a, 0x9f, 0x4c, 0x38, 0xab, 0x36}} ,
+ {{0xc9, 0xa3, 0xf8, 0x6a, 0xae, 0x46, 0x5f, 0x0e, 0x56, 0x51, 0x38, 0x64, 0x51, 0x0f, 0x39, 0x97, 0x56, 0x1f, 0xa2, 0xc9, 0xe8, 0x5e, 0xa2, 0x1d, 0xc2, 0x29, 0x23, 0x09, 0xf3, 0xcd, 0x60, 0x22}}},
+{{{0x5c, 0xe2, 0xf8, 0xd3, 0x5f, 0x48, 0x62, 0xac, 0x86, 0x48, 0x62, 0x81, 0x19, 0x98, 0x43, 0x63, 0x3a, 0xc8, 0xda, 0x3e, 0x74, 0xae, 0xf4, 0x1f, 0x49, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x22, 0x4a, 0x9c, 0xae, 0x67}} ,
+ {{0xd4, 0xb4, 0xf5, 0x78, 0x48, 0x68, 0xc3, 0x02, 0x04, 0x03, 0x24, 0x67, 0x17, 0xec, 0x16, 0x9f, 0xf7, 0x9e, 0x26, 0x60, 0x8e, 0xa1, 0x26, 0xa1, 0xab, 0x69, 0xee, 0x77, 0xd1, 0xb1, 0x67, 0x12}}},
+{{{0x70, 0xf8, 0xc9, 0xc4, 0x57, 0xa6, 0x3a, 0x49, 0x47, 0x15, 0xce, 0x93, 0xc1, 0x9e, 0x73, 0x1a, 0xf9, 0x20, 0x35, 0x7a, 0xb8, 0xd4, 0x25, 0x83, 0x46, 0xf1, 0xcf, 0x56, 0xdb, 0xa8, 0x3d, 0x20}} ,
+ {{0x2f, 0x11, 0x32, 0xca, 0x61, 0xab, 0x38, 0xdf, 0xf0, 0x0f, 0x2f, 0xea, 0x32, 0x28, 0xf2, 0x4c, 0x6c, 0x71, 0xd5, 0x80, 0x85, 0xb8, 0x0e, 0x47, 0xe1, 0x95, 0x15, 0xcb, 0x27, 0xe8, 0xd0, 0x47}}},
+{{{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}},
+ {{0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}},
+{{{0xc8, 0x84, 0xa5, 0x08, 0xbc, 0xfd, 0x87, 0x3b, 0x99, 0x8b, 0x69, 0x80, 0x7b, 0xc6, 0x3a, 0xeb, 0x93, 0xcf, 0x4e, 0xf8, 0x5c, 0x2d, 0x86, 0x42, 0xb6, 0x71, 0xd7, 0x97, 0x5f, 0xe1, 0x42, 0x67}} ,
+ {{0xb4, 0xb9, 0x37, 0xfc, 0xa9, 0x5b, 0x2f, 0x1e, 0x93, 0xe4, 0x1e, 0x62, 0xfc, 0x3c, 0x78, 0x81, 0x8f, 0xf3, 0x8a, 0x66, 0x09, 0x6f, 0xad, 0x6e, 0x79, 0x73, 0xe5, 0xc9, 0x00, 0x06, 0xd3, 0x21}}},
+{{{0xf8, 0xf9, 0x28, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x59, 0xb2, 0x59, 0x74, 0x23, 0xbf, 0xe7, 0x33, 0x8d, 0x57, 0x09, 0x91, 0x9c, 0x24, 0x08, 0x15, 0x2b, 0xe2, 0xb8, 0xee, 0x3a, 0xe5, 0x27, 0x06, 0x86, 0xa4, 0x23}} ,
+ {{0xeb, 0x27, 0x67, 0xc1, 0x37, 0xab, 0x7a, 0xd8, 0x27, 0x9c, 0x07, 0x8e, 0xff, 0x11, 0x6a, 0xb0, 0x78, 0x6e, 0xad, 0x3a, 0x2e, 0x0f, 0x98, 0x9f, 0x72, 0xc3, 0x7f, 0x82, 0xf2, 0x96, 0x96, 0x70}}},
+{{{0x81, 0x6b, 0x88, 0xe8, 0x1e, 0xc7, 0x77, 0x96, 0x0e, 0xa1, 0xa9, 0x52, 0xe0, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0x61, 0x9e, 0x79, 0x2d, 0x95, 0x9c, 0x8d, 0x96, 0xe0, 0x06, 0x40, 0x5d, 0x87, 0x28, 0x5f, 0x98, 0x70}} ,
+ {{0xf1, 0x79, 0x7b, 0xed, 0x4f, 0x44, 0xb2, 0xe7, 0x08, 0x0d, 0xc2, 0x08, 0x12, 0xd2, 0x9f, 0xdf, 0xcd, 0x93, 0x20, 0x8a, 0xcf, 0x33, 0xca, 0x6d, 0x89, 0xb9, 0x77, 0xc8, 0x93, 0x1b, 0x4e, 0x60}}},
+{{{0x26, 0x4f, 0x7e, 0x97, 0xf6, 0x40, 0xdd, 0x4f, 0xfc, 0x52, 0x78, 0xf9, 0x90, 0x31, 0x03, 0xe6, 0x7d, 0x56, 0x39, 0x0b, 0x1d, 0x56, 0x82, 0x85, 0xf9, 0x1a, 0x42, 0x17, 0x69, 0x6c, 0xcf, 0x39}} ,
+ {{0x69, 0xd2, 0x06, 0x3a, 0x4f, 0x39, 0x2d, 0xf9, 0x38, 0x40, 0x8c, 0x4c, 0xe7, 0x05, 0x12, 0xb4, 0x78, 0x8b, 0xf8, 0xc0, 0xec, 0x93, 0xde, 0x7a, 0x6b, 0xce, 0x2c, 0xe1, 0x0e, 0xa9, 0x34, 0x44}}},
+{{{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}},
+ {{0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}},
+{{{0x0b, 0xa4, 0x3c, 0xb0, 0x0f, 0x7a, 0x51, 0xf1, 0x78, 0xd6, 0xd9, 0x6a, 0xfd, 0x46, 0xe8, 0xb8, 0xa8, 0x79, 0x1d, 0x87, 0xf9, 0x90, 0xf2, 0x9c, 0x13, 0x29, 0xf8, 0x0b, 0x20, 0x64, 0xfa, 0x05}} ,
+ {{0x26, 0x09, 0xda, 0x17, 0xaf, 0x95, 0xd6, 0xfb, 0x6a, 0x19, 0x0d, 0x6e, 0x5e, 0x12, 0xf1, 0x99, 0x4c, 0xaa, 0xa8, 0x6f, 0x79, 0x86, 0xf4, 0x72, 0x28, 0x00, 0x26, 0xf9, 0xea, 0x9e, 0x19, 0x3d}}},
+{{{0x87, 0xdd, 0xcf, 0xf0, 0x5b, 0x49, 0xa2, 0x5d, 0x40, 0x7a, 0x23, 0x26, 0xa4, 0x7a, 0x83, 0x8a, 0xb7, 0x8b, 0xd2, 0x1a, 0xbf, 0xea, 0x02, 0x24, 0x08, 0x5f, 0x7b, 0xa9, 0xb1, 0xbe, 0x9d, 0x37}} ,
+ {{0xfc, 0x86, 0x4b, 0x08, 0xee, 0xe7, 0xa0, 0xfd, 0x21, 0x45, 0x09, 0x34, 0xc1, 0x61, 0x32, 0x23, 0xfc, 0x9b, 0x55, 0x48, 0x53, 0x99, 0xf7, 0x63, 0xd0, 0x99, 0xce, 0x01, 0xe0, 0x9f, 0xeb, 0x28}}},
+{{{0x47, 0xfc, 0xab, 0x5a, 0x17, 0xf0, 0x85, 0x56, 0x3a, 0x30, 0x86, 0x20, 0x28, 0x4b, 0x8e, 0x44, 0x74, 0x3a, 0x6e, 0x02, 0xf1, 0x32, 0x8f, 0x9f, 0x3f, 0x08, 0x35, 0xe9, 0xca, 0x16, 0x5f, 0x6e}} ,
+ {{0x1c, 0x59, 0x1c, 0x65, 0x5d, 0x34, 0xa4, 0x09, 0xcd, 0x13, 0x9c, 0x70, 0x7d, 0xb1, 0x2a, 0xc5, 0x88, 0xaf, 0x0b, 0x60, 0xc7, 0x9f, 0x34, 0x8d, 0xd6, 0xb7, 0x7f, 0xea, 0x78, 0x65, 0x8d, 0x77}}},
+{{{0x56, 0xa5, 0xc2, 0x0c, 0xdd, 0xbc, 0xb8, 0x20, 0x6d, 0x57, 0x61, 0xb5, 0xfb, 0x78, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0x49, 0x54, 0x90, 0x26, 0xc1, 0xcb, 0xe9, 0xe6, 0xbf, 0xec, 0x1d, 0x4e, 0xed, 0x07, 0x7e, 0x5e}} ,
+ {{0xc7, 0xf6, 0x6c, 0x56, 0x31, 0x20, 0x14, 0x0e, 0xa8, 0xd9, 0x27, 0xc1, 0x9a, 0x3d, 0x1b, 0x7d, 0x0e, 0x26, 0xd3, 0x81, 0xaa, 0xeb, 0xf5, 0x6b, 0x79, 0x02, 0xf1, 0x51, 0x5c, 0x75, 0x55, 0x0f}}},
+{{{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}},
+ {{0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}},
+{{{0x0a, 0x34, 0xcd, 0x82, 0x3c, 0x33, 0x09, 0x54, 0xd2, 0x61, 0x39, 0x30, 0x9b, 0xfd, 0xef, 0x21, 0x26, 0xd4, 0x70, 0xfa, 0xee, 0xf9, 0x31, 0x33, 0x73, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xb3, 0x81, 0xbf, 0xec, 0x2e}} ,
+ {{0xe8, 0x93, 0x8b, 0x00, 0x64, 0xf7, 0x9c, 0xb8, 0x74, 0xe0, 0xe6, 0x49, 0x48, 0x4d, 0x4d, 0x48, 0xb6, 0x19, 0xa1, 0x40, 0xb7, 0xd9, 0x32, 0x41, 0x7c, 0x82, 0x37, 0xa1, 0x2d, 0xdc, 0xd2, 0x54}}},
+{{{0x68, 0x2b, 0x4a, 0x5b, 0xd5, 0xc7, 0x51, 0x91, 0x1d, 0xe1, 0x2a, 0x4b, 0xc4, 0x47, 0xf1, 0xbc, 0x7a, 0xb3, 0xcb, 0xc8, 0xb6, 0x7c, 0xac, 0x90, 0x05, 0xfd, 0xf3, 0xf9, 0x52, 0x3a, 0x11, 0x6b}} ,
+ {{0x3d, 0xc1, 0x27, 0xf3, 0x59, 0x43, 0x95, 0x90, 0xc5, 0x96, 0x79, 0xf5, 0xf4, 0x95, 0x65, 0x29, 0x06, 0x9c, 0x51, 0x05, 0x18, 0xda, 0xb8, 0x2e, 0x79, 0x7e, 0x69, 0x59, 0x71, 0x01, 0xeb, 0x1a}}},
+{{{0x15, 0x06, 0x49, 0xb6, 0x8a, 0x3c, 0xea, 0x2f, 0x34, 0x20, 0x14, 0xc3, 0xaa, 0xd6, 0xaf, 0x2c, 0x3e, 0xbd, 0x65, 0x20, 0xe2, 0x4d, 0x4b, 0x3b, 0xeb, 0x9f, 0x4a, 0xc3, 0xad, 0xa4, 0x3b, 0x60}} ,
+ {{0xbc, 0x58, 0xe6, 0xc0, 0x95, 0x2a, 0x2a, 0x81, 0x9a, 0x7a, 0xf3, 0xd2, 0x06, 0xbe, 0x48, 0xbc, 0x0c, 0xc5, 0x46, 0xe0, 0x6a, 0xd4, 0xac, 0x0f, 0xd9, 0xcc, 0x82, 0x34, 0x2c, 0xaf, 0xdb, 0x1f}}},
+{{{0xf7, 0x17, 0x13, 0xbd, 0xfb, 0xbc, 0xd2, 0xec, 0x45, 0xb3, 0x15, 0x31, 0xe9, 0xaf, 0x82, 0x84, 0x3d, 0x28, 0xc6, 0xfc, 0x11, 0xf5, 0x41, 0xb5, 0x8b, 0xd3, 0x12, 0x76, 0x52, 0xe7, 0x1a, 0x3c}} ,
+ {{0x4e, 0x36, 0x11, 0x07, 0xa2, 0x15, 0x20, 0x51, 0xc4, 0x2a, 0xc3, 0x62, 0x8b, 0x5e, 0x7f, 0xa6, 0x0f, 0xf9, 0x45, 0x85, 0x6c, 0x11, 0x86, 0xb7, 0x7e, 0xe5, 0xd7, 0xf9, 0xc3, 0x91, 0x1c, 0x05}}},
+{{{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}},
+ {{0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}},
+{{{0xea, 0xd6, 0xde, 0x29, 0x3a, 0x00, 0xb9, 0x02, 0x59, 0xcb, 0x26, 0xc4, 0xba, 0x99, 0xb1, 0x97, 0x2f, 0x8e, 0x00, 0x92, 0x26, 0x4f, 0x52, 0xeb, 0x47, 0x1b, 0x89, 0x8b, 0x24, 0xc0, 0x13, 0x7d}} ,
+ {{0xd5, 0x20, 0x5b, 0x80, 0xa6, 0x80, 0x20, 0x95, 0xc3, 0xe9, 0x9f, 0x8e, 0x87, 0x9e, 0x1e, 0x9e, 0x7a, 0xc7, 0xcc, 0x75, 0x6c, 0xa5, 0xf1, 0x91, 0x1a, 0xa8, 0x01, 0x2c, 0xab, 0x76, 0xa9, 0x59}}},
+{{{0xde, 0xc9, 0xb1, 0x31, 0x10, 0x16, 0xaa, 0x35, 0x14, 0x6a, 0xd4, 0xb5, 0x34, 0x82, 0x71, 0xd2, 0x4a, 0x5d, 0x9a, 0x1f, 0x53, 0x26, 0x3c, 0xe5, 0x8e, 0x8d, 0x33, 0x7f, 0xff, 0xa9, 0xd5, 0x17}} ,
+ {{0x89, 0xaf, 0xf6, 0xa4, 0x64, 0xd5, 0x10, 0xe0, 0x1d, 0xad, 0xef, 0x44, 0xbd, 0xda, 0x83, 0xac, 0x7a, 0xa8, 0xf0, 0x1c, 0x07, 0xf9, 0xc3, 0x43, 0x6c, 0x3f, 0xb7, 0xd3, 0x87, 0x22, 0x02, 0x73}}},
+{{{0x64, 0x1d, 0x49, 0x13, 0x2f, 0x71, 0xec, 0x69, 0x87, 0xd0, 0x42, 0xee, 0x13, 0xec, 0xe3, 0xed, 0x56, 0x7b, 0xbf, 0xbd, 0x8c, 0x2f, 0x7d, 0x7b, 0x9d, 0x28, 0xec, 0x8e, 0x76, 0x2f, 0x6f, 0x08}} ,
+ {{0x22, 0xf5, 0x5f, 0x4d, 0x15, 0xef, 0xfc, 0x4e, 0x57, 0x03, 0x36, 0x89, 0xf0, 0xeb, 0x5b, 0x91, 0xd6, 0xe2, 0xca, 0x01, 0xa5, 0xee, 0x52, 0xec, 0xa0, 0x3c, 0x8f, 0x33, 0x90, 0x5a, 0x94, 0x72}}},
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+{{{0x2b, 0x06, 0xd9, 0xa1, 0x5d, 0xe1, 0xf4, 0xd1, 0x1e, 0x3c, 0x9a, 0xc6, 0x29, 0x2b, 0x13, 0x13, 0x78, 0xc0, 0xd8, 0x16, 0x17, 0x2d, 0x9e, 0xa9, 0xc9, 0x79, 0x57, 0xab, 0x24, 0x91, 0x92, 0x19}} ,
+ {{0x69, 0xfb, 0xa1, 0x9c, 0xa6, 0x75, 0x49, 0x7d, 0x60, 0x73, 0x40, 0x42, 0xc4, 0x13, 0x0a, 0x95, 0x79, 0x1e, 0x04, 0x83, 0x94, 0x99, 0x9b, 0x1e, 0x0c, 0xe8, 0x1f, 0x54, 0xef, 0xcb, 0xc0, 0x52}}},
+{{{0x14, 0x89, 0x73, 0xa1, 0x37, 0x87, 0x6a, 0x7a, 0xcf, 0x1d, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0x1a, 0x67, 0xed, 0x74, 0xc0, 0xf0, 0x9c, 0x33, 0xdd, 0xdf, 0x08, 0xbf, 0x7b, 0xd1, 0x66, 0xda, 0xe6, 0xc9, 0x49, 0x08}} ,
+ {{0xe9, 0xdd, 0x5e, 0x55, 0xb0, 0x0a, 0xde, 0x21, 0x4c, 0x5a, 0x2e, 0xd4, 0x80, 0x3a, 0x57, 0x92, 0x7a, 0xf1, 0xc4, 0x2c, 0x40, 0xaf, 0x2f, 0xc9, 0x92, 0x03, 0xe5, 0x5a, 0xbc, 0xdc, 0xf4, 0x09}}},
+{{{0xf3, 0xe1, 0x2b, 0x7c, 0x05, 0x86, 0x80, 0x93, 0x4a, 0xad, 0xb4, 0x8f, 0x7e, 0x99, 0x0c, 0xfd, 0xcd, 0xef, 0xd1, 0xff, 0x2c, 0x69, 0x34, 0x13, 0x41, 0x64, 0xcf, 0x3b, 0xd0, 0x90, 0x09, 0x1e}} ,
+ {{0x9d, 0x45, 0xd6, 0x80, 0xe6, 0x45, 0xaa, 0xf4, 0x15, 0xaa, 0x5c, 0x34, 0x87, 0x99, 0xa2, 0x8c, 0x26, 0x84, 0x62, 0x7d, 0xb6, 0x29, 0xc0, 0x52, 0xea, 0xf5, 0x81, 0x18, 0x0f, 0x35, 0xa9, 0x0e}}},
+{{{0xe7, 0x20, 0x72, 0x7c, 0x6d, 0x94, 0x5f, 0x52, 0x44, 0x54, 0xe3, 0xf1, 0xb2, 0xb0, 0x36, 0x46, 0x0f, 0xae, 0x92, 0xe8, 0x70, 0x9d, 0x6e, 0x79, 0xb1, 0xad, 0x37, 0xa9, 0x5f, 0xc0, 0xde, 0x03}} ,
+ {{0x15, 0x55, 0x37, 0xc6, 0x1c, 0x27, 0x1c, 0x6d, 0x14, 0x4f, 0xca, 0xa4, 0xc4, 0x88, 0x25, 0x46, 0x39, 0xfc, 0x5a, 0xe5, 0xfe, 0x29, 0x11, 0x69, 0xf5, 0x72, 0x84, 0x4d, 0x78, 0x9f, 0x94, 0x15}}},
+{{{0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}},
+ {{0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00}}},
+{{{0xec, 0xd3, 0xff, 0x57, 0x0b, 0xb0, 0xb2, 0xdc, 0xf8, 0x4f, 0xe2, 0x12, 0xd5, 0x36, 0xbe, 0x6b, 0x09, 0x43, 0x6d, 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x90, 0x2d, 0xb8, 0x74, 0xe8, 0x71, 0x45, 0x19, 0x8b, 0x0c, 0x6a}} ,
+ {{0xb8, 0x42, 0x1c, 0x03, 0xad, 0x2c, 0x03, 0x8e, 0xac, 0xd7, 0x98, 0x29, 0x13, 0xc6, 0x02, 0x29, 0xb5, 0xd4, 0xe7, 0xcf, 0xcc, 0x8b, 0x83, 0xec, 0x35, 0xc7, 0x9c, 0x74, 0xb7, 0xad, 0x85, 0x5f}}},
+{{{0x78, 0x84, 0xe1, 0x56, 0x45, 0x69, 0x68, 0x5a, 0x4f, 0xb8, 0xb1, 0x29, 0xff, 0x33, 0x03, 0x31, 0xb7, 0xcb, 0x96, 0x25, 0xe6, 0xe6, 0x41, 0x98, 0x1a, 0xbb, 0x03, 0x56, 0xf2, 0xb2, 0x91, 0x34}} ,
+ {{0x2c, 0x6c, 0xf7, 0x66, 0xa4, 0x62, 0x6b, 0x39, 0xb3, 0xba, 0x65, 0xd3, 0x1c, 0xf8, 0x11, 0xaa, 0xbe, 0xdc, 0x80, 0x59, 0x87, 0xf5, 0x7b, 0xe5, 0xe3, 0xb3, 0x3e, 0x39, 0xda, 0xbe, 0x88, 0x09}}},
+{{{0x8b, 0xf1, 0xa0, 0xf5, 0xdc, 0x29, 0xb4, 0xe2, 0x07, 0xc6, 0x7a, 0x00, 0xd0, 0x89, 0x17, 0x51, 0xd4, 0xbb, 0xd4, 0x22, 0xea, 0x7e, 0x7d, 0x7c, 0x24, 0xea, 0xf2, 0xe8, 0x22, 0x12, 0x95, 0x06}} ,
+ {{0xda, 0x7c, 0xa4, 0x0c, 0xf4, 0xba, 0x6e, 0xe1, 0x89, 0xb5, 0x59, 0xca, 0xf1, 0xc0, 0x29, 0x36, 0x09, 0x44, 0xe2, 0x7f, 0xd1, 0x63, 0x15, 0x99, 0xea, 0x25, 0xcf, 0x0c, 0x9d, 0xc0, 0x44, 0x6f}}},
+{{{0x1d, 0x86, 0x4e, 0xcf, 0xf7, 0x37, 0x10, 0x25, 0x8f, 0x12, 0xfb, 0x19, 0xfb, 0xe0, 0xed, 0x10, 0xc8, 0xe2, 0xf5, 0x75, 0xb1, 0x33, 0xc0, 0x96, 0x0d, 0xfb, 0x15, 0x6c, 0x0d, 0x07, 0x5f, 0x05}} ,
+ {{0x69, 0x3e, 0x47, 0x97, 0x2c, 0xaf, 0x52, 0x7c, 0x78, 0x83, 0xad, 0x1b, 0x39, 0x82, 0x2f, 0x02, 0x6f, 0x47, 0xdb, 0x2a, 0xb0, 0xe1, 0x91, 0x99, 0x55, 0xb8, 0x99, 0x3a, 0xa0, 0x44, 0x11, 0x51}}}
+};
+
+static void p1p1_to_p2(ge25519_p2 *r, const ge25519_p1p1 *p)
+{
+  fe25519_mul(&r->x, &p->x, &p->t);
+  fe25519_mul(&r->y, &p->y, &p->z);
+  fe25519_mul(&r->z, &p->z, &p->t);
+}
+
+static void p1p1_to_p3(ge25519_p3 *r, const ge25519_p1p1 *p)
+{
+  p1p1_to_p2((ge25519_p2 *)r, p);
+  fe25519_mul(&r->t, &p->x, &p->y);
+}
+
+static void ge25519_mixadd2(ge25519_p3 *r, const ge25519_aff *q)
+{
+  fe25519 a,b,t1,t2,c,d,e,f,g,h,qt;
+  fe25519_mul(&qt, &q->x, &q->y);
+  fe25519_sub(&a, &r->y, &r->x); /* A = (Y1-X1)*(Y2-X2) */
+  fe25519_add(&b, &r->y, &r->x); /* B = (Y1+X1)*(Y2+X2) */
+  fe25519_sub(&t1, &q->y, &q->x);
+  fe25519_add(&t2, &q->y, &q->x);
+  fe25519_mul(&a, &a, &t1);
+  fe25519_mul(&b, &b, &t2);
+  fe25519_sub(&e, &b, &a); /* E = B-A */
+  fe25519_add(&h, &b, &a); /* H = B+A */
+  fe25519_mul(&c, &r->t, &qt); /* C = T1*k*T2 */
+  fe25519_mul(&c, &c, &ge25519_ec2d);
+  fe25519_add(&d, &r->z, &r->z); /* D = Z1*2 */
+  fe25519_sub(&f, &d, &c); /* F = D-C */
+  fe25519_add(&g, &d, &c); /* G = D+C */
+  fe25519_mul(&r->x, &e, &f);
+  fe25519_mul(&r->y, &h, &g);
+  fe25519_mul(&r->z, &g, &f);
+  fe25519_mul(&r->t, &e, &h);
+}
+
+static void add_p1p1(ge25519_p1p1 *r, const ge25519_p3 *p, const ge25519_p3 *q)
+{
+  fe25519 a, b, c, d, t;
+
+  fe25519_sub(&a, &p->y, &p->x); /* A = (Y1-X1)*(Y2-X2) */
+  fe25519_sub(&t, &q->y, &q->x);
+  fe25519_mul(&a, &a, &t);
+  fe25519_add(&b, &p->x, &p->y); /* B = (Y1+X1)*(Y2+X2) */
+  fe25519_add(&t, &q->x, &q->y);
+  fe25519_mul(&b, &b, &t);
+  fe25519_mul(&c, &p->t, &q->t); /* C = T1*k*T2 */
+  fe25519_mul(&c, &c, &ge25519_ec2d);
+  fe25519_mul(&d, &p->z, &q->z); /* D = Z1*2*Z2 */
+  fe25519_add(&d, &d, &d);
+  fe25519_sub(&r->x, &b, &a); /* E = B-A */
+  fe25519_sub(&r->t, &d, &c); /* F = D-C */
+  fe25519_add(&r->z, &d, &c); /* G = D+C */
+  fe25519_add(&r->y, &b, &a); /* H = B+A */
+}
+
+/* See http://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-twisted-extended-1.html#doubling-dbl-2008-hwcd */
+static void dbl_p1p1(ge25519_p1p1 *r, const ge25519_p2 *p)
+{
+  fe25519 a,b,c,d;
+  fe25519_square(&a, &p->x);
+  fe25519_square(&b, &p->y);
+  fe25519_square(&c, &p->z);
+  fe25519_add(&c, &c, &c);
+  fe25519_neg(&d, &a);
+
+  fe25519_add(&r->x, &p->x, &p->y);
+  fe25519_square(&r->x, &r->x);
+  fe25519_sub(&r->x, &r->x, &a);
+  fe25519_sub(&r->x, &r->x, &b);
+  fe25519_add(&r->z, &d, &b);
+  fe25519_sub(&r->t, &r->z, &c);
+  fe25519_sub(&r->y, &d, &b);
+}
+
+/* Constant-time version of: if(b) r = p */
+static void cmov_aff(ge25519_aff *r, const ge25519_aff *p, unsigned char b)
+{
+  fe25519_cmov(&r->x, &p->x, b);
+  fe25519_cmov(&r->y, &p->y, b);
+}
+
+static unsigned char equal(signed char b,signed char c)
+{
+  unsigned char ub = b;
+  unsigned char uc = c;
+  unsigned char x = ub ^ uc; /* 0: yes; 1..255: no */
+  crypto_uint32 y = x; /* 0: yes; 1..255: no */
+  y -= 1; /* 4294967295: yes; 0..254: no */
+  y >>= 31; /* 1: yes; 0: no */
+  return y;
+}
+
+static unsigned char negative(signed char b)
+{
+  unsigned long long x = b; /* 18446744073709551361..18446744073709551615: yes; 0..255: no */
+  x >>= 63; /* 1: yes; 0: no */
+  return x;
+}
+
+static void choose_t(ge25519_aff *t, unsigned long long pos, signed char b)
+{
+  /* constant time */
+  fe25519 v;
+  *t = ge25519_base_multiples_affine[5*pos+0];
+  cmov_aff(t, &ge25519_base_multiples_affine[5*pos+1],equal(b,1) | equal(b,-1));
+  cmov_aff(t, &ge25519_base_multiples_affine[5*pos+2],equal(b,2) | equal(b,-2));
+  cmov_aff(t, &ge25519_base_multiples_affine[5*pos+3],equal(b,3) | equal(b,-3));
+  cmov_aff(t, &ge25519_base_multiples_affine[5*pos+4],equal(b,-4));
+  fe25519_neg(&v, &t->x);
+  fe25519_cmov(&t->x, &v, negative(b));
+}
+
+static void setneutral(ge25519 *r)
+{
+  fe25519_setzero(&r->x);
+  fe25519_setone(&r->y);
+  fe25519_setone(&r->z);
+  fe25519_setzero(&r->t);
+}
+
+/* ********************************************************************
+ *                    EXPORTED FUNCTIONS
+ ******************************************************************** */
+
+/* return 0 on success, -1 otherwise */
+int ge25519_unpackneg_vartime(ge25519_p3 *r, const unsigned char p[32])
+{
+  unsigned char par;
+  fe25519 t, chk, num, den, den2, den4, den6;
+  fe25519_setone(&r->z);
+  par = p[31] >> 7;
+  fe25519_unpack(&r->y, p);
+  fe25519_square(&num, &r->y); /* x = y^2 */
+  fe25519_mul(&den, &num, &ge25519_ecd); /* den = dy^2 */
+  fe25519_sub(&num, &num, &r->z); /* x = y^2-1 */
+  fe25519_add(&den, &r->z, &den); /* den = dy^2+1 */
+
+  /* Computation of sqrt(num/den) */
+  /* 1.: computation of num^((p-5)/8)*den^((7p-35)/8) = (num*den^7)^((p-5)/8) */
+  fe25519_square(&den2, &den);
+  fe25519_square(&den4, &den2);
+  fe25519_mul(&den6, &den4, &den2);
+  fe25519_mul(&t, &den6, &num);
+  fe25519_mul(&t, &t, &den);
+
+  fe25519_pow2523(&t, &t);
+  /* 2. computation of r->x = t * num * den^3 */
+  fe25519_mul(&t, &t, &num);
+  fe25519_mul(&t, &t, &den);
+  fe25519_mul(&t, &t, &den);
+  fe25519_mul(&r->x, &t, &den);
+
+  /* 3. Check whether sqrt computation gave correct result, multiply by sqrt(-1) if not: */
+  fe25519_square(&chk, &r->x);
+  fe25519_mul(&chk, &chk, &den);
+  if (!fe25519_iseq_vartime(&chk, &num))
+    fe25519_mul(&r->x, &r->x, &ge25519_sqrtm1);
+
+  /* 4. Now we have one of the two square roots, except if input was not a square */
+  fe25519_square(&chk, &r->x);
+  fe25519_mul(&chk, &chk, &den);
+  if (!fe25519_iseq_vartime(&chk, &num))
+    return -1;
+
+  /* 5. Choose the desired square root according to parity: */
+  if(fe25519_getparity(&r->x) != (1-par))
+    fe25519_neg(&r->x, &r->x);
+
+  fe25519_mul(&r->t, &r->x, &r->y);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+static void ge25519_pack(unsigned char r[32], const ge25519_p3 *p)
+{
+  fe25519 tx, ty, zi;
+  fe25519_invert(&zi, &p->z);
+  fe25519_mul(&tx, &p->x, &zi);
+  fe25519_mul(&ty, &p->y, &zi);
+  fe25519_pack(r, &ty);
+  r[31] ^= fe25519_getparity(&tx) << 7;
+}
+
+int ge25519_isneutral_vartime(const ge25519_p3 *p)
+{
+  int ret = 1;
+  if(!fe25519_iszero(&p->x)) ret = 0;
+  if(!fe25519_iseq_vartime(&p->y, &p->z)) ret = 0;
+  return ret;
+}
+
+/* computes [s1]p1 + [s2]p2 */
+static void ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime(ge25519_p3 *r, const ge25519_p3 *p1, const sc25519 *s1, const ge25519_p3 *p2, const sc25519 *s2)
+{
+  ge25519_p1p1 tp1p1;
+  ge25519_p3 pre[16];
+  unsigned char b[127];
+  int i;
+
+  /* precomputation                                                        s2 s1 */
+  setneutral(pre);                                                      /* 00 00 */
+  pre[1] = *p1;                                                         /* 00 01 */
+  dbl_p1p1(&tp1p1,(ge25519_p2 *)p1);      p1p1_to_p3( &pre[2], &tp1p1); /* 00 10 */
+  add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[1], &pre[2]);      p1p1_to_p3( &pre[3], &tp1p1); /* 00 11 */
+  pre[4] = *p2;                                                         /* 01 00 */
+  add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[1], &pre[4]);      p1p1_to_p3( &pre[5], &tp1p1); /* 01 01 */
+  add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[2], &pre[4]);      p1p1_to_p3( &pre[6], &tp1p1); /* 01 10 */
+  add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[3], &pre[4]);      p1p1_to_p3( &pre[7], &tp1p1); /* 01 11 */
+  dbl_p1p1(&tp1p1,(ge25519_p2 *)p2);      p1p1_to_p3( &pre[8], &tp1p1); /* 10 00 */
+  add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[1], &pre[8]);      p1p1_to_p3( &pre[9], &tp1p1); /* 10 01 */
+  dbl_p1p1(&tp1p1,(ge25519_p2 *)&pre[5]); p1p1_to_p3(&pre[10], &tp1p1); /* 10 10 */
+  add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[3], &pre[8]);      p1p1_to_p3(&pre[11], &tp1p1); /* 10 11 */
+  add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[4], &pre[8]);      p1p1_to_p3(&pre[12], &tp1p1); /* 11 00 */
+  add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[1],&pre[12]);      p1p1_to_p3(&pre[13], &tp1p1); /* 11 01 */
+  add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[2],&pre[12]);      p1p1_to_p3(&pre[14], &tp1p1); /* 11 10 */
+  add_p1p1(&tp1p1,&pre[3],&pre[12]);      p1p1_to_p3(&pre[15], &tp1p1); /* 11 11 */
+
+  sc25519_2interleave2(b,s1,s2);
+
+  /* scalar multiplication */
+  *r = pre[b[126]];
+  for(i=125;i>=0;i--)
+  {
+    dbl_p1p1(&tp1p1, (ge25519_p2 *)r);
+    p1p1_to_p2((ge25519_p2 *) r, &tp1p1);
+    dbl_p1p1(&tp1p1, (ge25519_p2 *)r);
+    if(b[i]!=0)
+    {
+      p1p1_to_p3(r, &tp1p1);
+      add_p1p1(&tp1p1, r, &pre[b[i]]);
+    }
+    if(i != 0) p1p1_to_p2((ge25519_p2 *)r, &tp1p1);
+    else p1p1_to_p3(r, &tp1p1);
+  }
+}
+
+static void ge25519_scalarmult_base(ge25519_p3 *r, const sc25519 *s)
+{
+  signed char b[85];
+  int i;
+  ge25519_aff t;
+  sc25519_window3(b,s);
+
+  choose_t((ge25519_aff *)r, 0, b[0]);
+  fe25519_setone(&r->z);
+  fe25519_mul(&r->t, &r->x, &r->y);
+  for(i=1;i<85;i++)
+  {
+    choose_t(&t, (unsigned long long) i, b[i]);
+    ge25519_mixadd2(r, &t);
+  }
+}
+/* from supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/keypair.c */
+
+int crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(unsigned char *pk,unsigned char *sk)
+{
+  unsigned char az[64];
+  sc25519 scsk;
+  ge25519 gepk;
+
+  randombytes(sk,32);
+  crypto_hash_sha512(az,sk,32);
+  az[0] &= 248;
+  az[31] &= 127;
+  az[31] |= 64;
+
+  sc25519_from32bytes(&scsk,az);
+
+  ge25519_scalarmult_base(&gepk, &scsk);
+  ge25519_pack(pk, &gepk);
+  memmove(sk + 32,pk,32);
+  return 0;
+}
+/* from supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/sign.c */
+
+int crypto_sign_ed25519(
+    unsigned char *sm,unsigned long long *smlen,
+    const unsigned char *m,unsigned long long mlen,
+    const unsigned char *sk
+    )
+{
+  unsigned char pk[32];
+  unsigned char az[64];
+  unsigned char nonce[64];
+  unsigned char hram[64];
+  sc25519 sck, scs, scsk;
+  ge25519 ger;
+
+  memmove(pk,sk + 32,32);
+  /* pk: 32-byte public key A */
+
+  crypto_hash_sha512(az,sk,32);
+  az[0] &= 248;
+  az[31] &= 127;
+  az[31] |= 64;
+  /* az: 32-byte scalar a, 32-byte randomizer z */
+
+  *smlen = mlen + 64;
+  memmove(sm + 64,m,mlen);
+  memmove(sm + 32,az + 32,32);
+  /* sm: 32-byte uninit, 32-byte z, mlen-byte m */
+
+  crypto_hash_sha512(nonce, sm+32, mlen+32);
+  /* nonce: 64-byte H(z,m) */
+
+  sc25519_from64bytes(&sck, nonce);
+  ge25519_scalarmult_base(&ger, &sck);
+  ge25519_pack(sm, &ger);
+  /* sm: 32-byte R, 32-byte z, mlen-byte m */
+
+  memmove(sm + 32,pk,32);
+  /* sm: 32-byte R, 32-byte A, mlen-byte m */
+
+  crypto_hash_sha512(hram,sm,mlen + 64);
+  /* hram: 64-byte H(R,A,m) */
+
+  sc25519_from64bytes(&scs, hram);
+  sc25519_from32bytes(&scsk, az);
+  sc25519_mul(&scs, &scs, &scsk);
+  sc25519_add(&scs, &scs, &sck);
+  /* scs: S = nonce + H(R,A,m)a */
+
+  sc25519_to32bytes(sm + 32,&scs);
+  /* sm: 32-byte R, 32-byte S, mlen-byte m */
+
+  return 0;
+}
+/* from supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/open.c */
+
+int crypto_sign_ed25519_open(
+    unsigned char *m,unsigned long long *mlen,
+    const unsigned char *sm,unsigned long long smlen,
+    const unsigned char *pk
+    )
+{
+  unsigned char pkcopy[32];
+  unsigned char rcopy[32];
+  unsigned char hram[64];
+  unsigned char rcheck[32];
+  ge25519 get1, get2;
+  sc25519 schram, scs;
+
+  if (smlen < 64) goto badsig;
+  if (sm[63] & 224) goto badsig;
+  if (ge25519_unpackneg_vartime(&get1,pk)) goto badsig;
+
+  memmove(pkcopy,pk,32);
+  memmove(rcopy,sm,32);
+
+  sc25519_from32bytes(&scs, sm+32);
+
+  memmove(m,sm,smlen);
+  memmove(m + 32,pkcopy,32);
+  crypto_hash_sha512(hram,m,smlen);
+
+  sc25519_from64bytes(&schram, hram);
+
+  ge25519_double_scalarmult_vartime(&get2, &get1, &schram, &ge25519_base, &scs);
+  ge25519_pack(rcheck, &get2);
+
+  if (crypto_verify_32(rcopy,rcheck) == 0) {
+    memmove(m,m + 64,smlen - 64);
+    memset(m + smlen - 64,0,64);
+    *mlen = smlen - 64;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+badsig:
+  *mlen = (unsigned long long) -1;
+  memset(m,0,smlen);
+  return -1;
+}
diff --git a/ed25519.sh b/ed25519.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8722338
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ed25519.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#       $OpenBSD: ed25519.sh,v 1.1 2023/01/15 23:05:32 djm Exp $
+#       Placed in the Public Domain.
+#
+AUTHOR="supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/implementors"
+FILES="
+	supercop-20221122/crypto_verify/32/ref/verify.c
+	supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/fe25519.h
+	supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/fe25519.c
+	supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/sc25519.h
+	supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/sc25519.c
+	supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/ge25519.h
+	supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/ge25519.c
+	supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/keypair.c
+	supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/sign.c
+	supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/open.c
+"
+###
+
+DATA="supercop-20221122/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/ge25519_base.data"
+
+set -e
+cd $1
+echo -n '/*  $'
+echo 'OpenBSD: $ */'
+echo
+echo '/*'
+echo ' * Public Domain, Authors:'
+sed -e '/Alphabetical order:/d' -e 's/^/ * - /' < $AUTHOR
+echo ' */'
+echo
+echo '#include <string.h>'
+echo
+echo '#include "crypto_api.h"'
+echo
+# Map the types used in this code to the ones in crypto_api.h.  We use #define
+# instead of typedef since some systems have existing intXX types and do not
+# permit multiple typedefs even if they do not conflict.
+for t in int8 uint8 int16 uint16 int32 uint32 int64 uint64; do
+	echo "#define $t crypto_${t}"
+done
+echo
+for i in $FILES; do
+	echo "/* from $i */"
+	# Changes to all files:
+	#  - inline ge25519_base.data where it is included
+	#  - expand CRYPTO_NAMESPACE() namespacing define
+	#  - remove all includes, we inline everything required.
+	#  - make functions not required elsewhere static.
+	#  - rename the functions we do use.
+	sed \
+	    -e "/#include \"ge25519_base.data\"/r $DATA" \
+	    -e "/#include/d" \
+	    -e "s/^void /static void /g" \
+	    -e 's/CRYPTO_NAMESPACE[(]\([a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)[)]/crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_\1/g' \
+	    $i | \
+	case "$i" in
+	*/crypto_verify/32/ref/verify.c)
+	    # rename crypto_verify() to the name that the ed25519 code expects.
+	    sed -e "/^#include.*/d" \
+	        -e "s/crypto_verify/crypto_verify_32/g" \
+	        -e "s/^int /static int /g"
+	    ;;
+	*/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/sign.c)
+	    # rename signing function to the name OpenSSH expects
+	    sed -e "s/crypto_sign/crypto_sign_ed25519/g"
+	    ;;
+	*/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/keypair.c)
+	    # rename key generation function to the name OpenSSH expects
+	    sed -e "s/crypto_sign_keypair/crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair/g"
+	    ;;
+	*/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/open.c)
+	    # rename verification function to the name OpenSSH expects
+	    sed -e "s/crypto_sign_open/crypto_sign_ed25519_open/g"
+	    ;;
+	*/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/fe25519.*)
+	    # avoid a couple of name collions with other files
+	    sed -e "s/reduce_add_sub/fe25519_reduce_add_sub/g" \
+	        -e "s/ equal[(]/ fe25519_equal(/g" \
+	        -e "s/^int /static int /g"
+	    ;;
+	*/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/sc25519.h)
+	    # Lots of unused prototypes to remove
+	    sed -e "s/^int /static int /g" \
+	        -e '/shortsc25519_from16bytes/d' \
+	        -e '/sc25519_iszero_vartime/d' \
+	        -e '/sc25519_isshort_vartime/d' \
+	        -e '/sc25519_lt_vartime/d' \
+	        -e '/sc25519_sub_nored/d' \
+	        -e '/sc25519_mul_shortsc/d' \
+	        -e '/sc25519_from_shortsc/d' \
+	        -e '/sc25519_window5/d'
+	    ;;
+	*/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref/sc25519.c)
+	    # Lots of unused code to remove, some name collisions to avoid
+	    sed -e "s/reduce_add_sub/sc25519_reduce_add_sub/g" \
+	        -e "s/ equal[(]/ sc25519_equal(/g" \
+	        -e "s/^int /static int /g" \
+	        -e "s/m[[]/sc25519_m[/g" \
+	        -e "s/mu[[]/sc25519_mu[/g" \
+	        -e '/shortsc25519_from16bytes/,/^}$/d' \
+	        -e '/sc25519_iszero_vartime/,/^}$/d' \
+	        -e '/sc25519_isshort_vartime/,/^}$/d' \
+	        -e '/sc25519_lt_vartime/,/^}$/d' \
+	        -e '/sc25519_sub_nored/,/^}$/d' \
+	        -e '/sc25519_mul_shortsc/,/^}$/d' \
+	        -e '/sc25519_from_shortsc/,/^}$/d' \
+	        -e '/sc25519_window5/,/^}$/d'
+	    ;;
+	*/crypto_sign/ed25519/ref//ge25519.*)
+	    sed -e "s/^int /static int /g"
+	    ;;
+	# Default: pass through.
+	*)
+	    cat
+	    ;;
+	esac | \
+	sed -e 's/[	 ]*$//'
+done
diff --git a/entropy.c b/entropy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..842c66f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/entropy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#define RANDOM_SEED_SIZE 48
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+/*
+ * Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding:
+ * If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from
+ * /dev/random), then collect RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes of randomness from
+ * PRNGd.
+ */
+
+void
+seed_rng(void)
+{
+	unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
+
+	/* Initialise libcrypto */
+	ssh_libcrypto_init();
+
+	if (!ssh_compatible_openssl(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
+	    OpenSSL_version_num()))
+		fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
+		    "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
+		    OpenSSL_version_num());
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
+	if (RAND_status() == 1)
+		debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
+	else {
+		if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
+			fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");
+		RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
+	}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
+
+	if (RAND_status() != 1)
+		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
+
+	/* Ensure arc4random() is primed */
+	arc4random_buf(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+}
+
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* Actual initialisation is handled in arc4random() */
+void
+seed_rng(void)
+{
+	unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
+
+	/* Ensure arc4random() is primed */
+	arc4random_buf(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/entropy.h b/entropy.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..870164d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/entropy.h
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2000 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _RANDOMS_H
+#define _RANDOMS_H
+
+struct sshbuf;
+
+void seed_rng(void);
+void rexec_send_rng_seed(struct sshbuf *);
+void rexec_recv_rng_seed(struct sshbuf *);
+
+#endif /* _RANDOMS_H */
diff --git a/fatal.c b/fatal.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16fbd32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fatal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: fatal.c,v 1.11 2020/10/19 08:07:08 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+/* Fatal messages.  This function never returns. */
+
+void
+sshfatal(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+    LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, level, suffix, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	cleanup_exit(255);
+}
diff --git a/fixalgorithms b/fixalgorithms
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..115dce8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fixalgorithms
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# fixciphers - remove unsupported ciphers from man pages.
+# Usage: fixpaths /path/to/sed cipher1 [cipher2] <infile >outfile 
+#
+# Author: Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com.au).  Placed in the public domain.
+
+die() {
+	echo $*
+	exit -1
+}
+
+SED=$1
+shift
+
+for c in $*; do
+	subs="$subs -e /.Dq.$c.*$/d"
+	subs="$subs -e s/$c,//g"
+done
+
+# now remove any entirely empty lines
+subs="$subs -e /^$/d"
+
+${SED} $subs
+
+exit 0
diff --git a/fixpaths b/fixpaths
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..60a6799
--- /dev/null
+++ b/fixpaths
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# fixpaths  - substitute makefile variables into text files
+# Usage: fixpaths -Dsomething=somethingelse ...
+
+die() {
+	echo $*
+	exit -1
+}
+
+test -n "`echo $1|grep -- -D`" || \
+	die $0: nothing to do - no substitutions listed!
+
+test -n "`echo $1|grep -- '-D[^=]\+=[^ ]\+'`" || \
+	die $0: error in command line arguments.
+
+test -n "`echo $*|grep -- ' [^-]'`" || \
+	die Usage: $0 '[-Dstring=replacement] [[infile] ...]'
+
+sed `echo $*|sed -e 's/-D\([^=]\+\)=\([^ ]*\)/-e s=\1=\2=g/g'`
+
+exit 0
diff --git a/groupaccess.c b/groupaccess.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..80d3019
--- /dev/null
+++ b/groupaccess.c
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.17 2019/03/06 22:14:23 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "groupaccess.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+static int ngroups;
+static char **groups_byname;
+
+/*
+ * Initialize group access list for user with primary (base) and
+ * supplementary groups.  Return the number of groups in the list.
+ */
+int
+ga_init(const char *user, gid_t base)
+{
+	gid_t *groups_bygid;
+	int i, j, retry = 0;
+	struct group *gr;
+
+	if (ngroups > 0)
+		ga_free();
+
+	ngroups = NGROUPS_MAX;
+#if defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX)
+	ngroups = MAX(NGROUPS_MAX, sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX));
+#endif
+
+	groups_bygid = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_bygid));
+	while (getgrouplist(user, base, groups_bygid, &ngroups) == -1) {
+		if (retry++ > 0)
+			fatal("getgrouplist: groups list too small");
+		groups_bygid = xreallocarray(groups_bygid, ngroups,
+		    sizeof(*groups_bygid));
+	}
+	groups_byname = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_byname));
+
+	for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
+		if ((gr = getgrgid(groups_bygid[i])) != NULL)
+			groups_byname[j++] = xstrdup(gr->gr_name);
+	free(groups_bygid);
+	return (ngroups = j);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if one of user's groups is contained in groups.
+ * Return 0 otherwise.  Use match_pattern() for string comparison.
+ */
+int
+ga_match(char * const *groups, int n)
+{
+	int i, j;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
+		for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
+			if (match_pattern(groups_byname[i], groups[j]))
+				return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return 1 if one of user's groups matches group_pattern list.
+ * Return 0 on negated or no match.
+ */
+int
+ga_match_pattern_list(const char *group_pattern)
+{
+	int i, found = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
+		switch (match_usergroup_pattern_list(groups_byname[i],
+		    group_pattern)) {
+		case -1:
+			return 0;	/* Negated match wins */
+		case 0:
+			continue;
+		case 1:
+			found = 1;
+		}
+	}
+	return found;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free memory allocated for group access list.
+ */
+void
+ga_free(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (ngroups > 0) {
+		for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++)
+			free(groups_byname[i]);
+		ngroups = 0;
+		free(groups_byname);
+		groups_byname = NULL;
+	}
+}
diff --git a/groupaccess.h b/groupaccess.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..000578e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/groupaccess.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.h,v 1.8 2008/07/04 03:44:59 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef GROUPACCESS_H
+#define GROUPACCESS_H
+
+int	 ga_init(const char *, gid_t);
+int	 ga_match(char * const *, int);
+int	 ga_match_pattern_list(const char *);
+void	 ga_free(void);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2cd695e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gss-genr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.28 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+/* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */
+int
+ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
+{
+	int r;
+	u_char *p;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	g->value = p;
+	g->length = len;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
+int
+ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	return (ctx != NULL && ctx->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID &&
+	    ctx->oid->length == len &&
+	    memcmp(ctx->oid->elements, data, len) == 0);
+}
+
+/* Set the contexts OID from a data stream */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
+{
+	if (ctx->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
+		free(ctx->oid->elements);
+		free(ctx->oid);
+	}
+	ctx->oid = xcalloc(1, sizeof(gss_OID_desc));
+	ctx->oid->length = len;
+	ctx->oid->elements = xmalloc(len);
+	memcpy(ctx->oid->elements, data, len);
+}
+
+/* Set the contexts OID */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_OID oid)
+{
+	ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(ctx, oid->elements, oid->length);
+}
+
+/* All this effort to report an error ... */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *ctxt)
+{
+	char *s;
+
+	s = ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, NULL, NULL);
+	debug("%s", s);
+	free(s);
+}
+
+char *
+ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, OM_uint32 *major_status,
+    OM_uint32 *minor_status)
+{
+	OM_uint32 lmin;
+	gss_buffer_desc msg = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	OM_uint32 ctx;
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	char *ret;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	if (major_status != NULL)
+		*major_status = ctxt->major;
+	if (minor_status != NULL)
+		*minor_status = ctxt->minor;
+
+	ctx = 0;
+	/* The GSSAPI error */
+	do {
+		gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->major,
+		    GSS_C_GSS_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg);
+
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, msg.value, msg.length)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '\n')) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "assemble GSS_CODE");
+
+		gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &msg);
+	} while (ctx != 0);
+
+	/* The mechanism specific error */
+	do {
+		gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->minor,
+		    GSS_C_MECH_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg);
+
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, msg.value, msg.length)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '\n')) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "assemble MECH_CODE");
+
+		gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &msg);
+	} while (ctx != 0);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, '\n')) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble newline");
+	ret = xstrdup((const char *)sshbuf_ptr(b));
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialise our GSSAPI context. We use this opaque structure to contain all
+ * of the data which both the client and server need to persist across
+ * {accept,init}_sec_context calls, so that when we do it from the userauth
+ * stuff life is a little easier
+ */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
+{
+	*ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof (Gssctxt));
+	(*ctx)->context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT;
+	(*ctx)->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+	(*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+	(*ctx)->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+	(*ctx)->client = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+	(*ctx)->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+}
+
+/* Delete our context, providing it has been built correctly */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
+{
+	OM_uint32 ms;
+
+	if ((*ctx) == NULL)
+		return;
+	if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+		gss_delete_sec_context(&ms, &(*ctx)->context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+	if ((*ctx)->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+		gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->name);
+	if ((*ctx)->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID) {
+		free((*ctx)->oid->elements);
+		free((*ctx)->oid);
+		(*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID;
+	}
+	if ((*ctx)->creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+		gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->creds);
+	if ((*ctx)->client != GSS_C_NO_NAME)
+		gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->client);
+	if ((*ctx)->client_creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+		gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->client_creds);
+
+	free(*ctx);
+	*ctx = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wrapper to init_sec_context
+ * Requires that the context contains:
+ *	oid
+ *	server name (from ssh_gssapi_import_name)
+ */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
+    gss_buffer_desc* send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags)
+{
+	int deleg_flag = 0;
+
+	if (deleg_creds) {
+		deleg_flag = GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG;
+		debug("Delegating credentials");
+	}
+
+	ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
+	    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid,
+	    GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
+	    0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
+
+	if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major))
+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+	return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+/* Create a service name for the given host */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
+{
+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+	char *val;
+
+	xasprintf(&val, "host@%s", host);
+	gssbuf.value = val;
+	gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value);
+
+	if ((ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor,
+	    &gssbuf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &ctx->name)))
+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+	free(gssbuf.value);
+	return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+{
+	if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+	    GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+	return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+    const char *context, const struct sshbuf *session_id)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	sshbuf_reset(b);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, session_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, user)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, service)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, context)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble buildmic");
+}
+
+int
+ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+{
+	gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	OM_uint32 major, minor;
+	gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"};
+
+	/* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
+	if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && 
+	    (memcmp(oid->elements, spnego_oid.elements, oid->length) == 0))
+		return 0; /* false */
+
+	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+	ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+	major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
+	if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
+		major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, 
+		    NULL);
+		gss_release_buffer(&minor, &token);
+		if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT)
+			gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &(*ctx)->context,
+			    GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
+	}
+
+	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) 
+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+
+	return (!GSS_ERROR(major));
+}
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a151bc1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.9 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#ifdef KRB5
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+#ifdef HEIMDAL
+# include <krb5.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
+# include <gssapi_krb5.h>
+#elif HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
+# include <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h>
+#endif
+
+static krb5_context krb_context = NULL;
+
+/* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */
+
+static int
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+{
+	krb5_error_code problem;
+
+	if (krb_context != NULL)
+		return 1;
+
+	problem = krb5_init_context(&krb_context);
+	if (problem) {
+		logit("Cannot initialize krb5 context");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other
+ * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own.
+ * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
+ */
+
+static int
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+{
+	krb5_principal princ;
+	int retval;
+	const char *errmsg;
+
+	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if ((retval = krb5_parse_name(krb_context, client->exportedname.value,
+	    &princ))) {
+		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, retval);
+		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
+		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name)) {
+		retval = 1;
+		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+	} else
+		retval = 0;
+
+	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+	return retval;
+}
+
+
+/* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
+ * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
+
+static void
+ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+{
+	krb5_ccache ccache;
+	krb5_error_code problem;
+	krb5_principal princ;
+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
+	int len;
+	const char *errmsg;
+
+	if (client->creds == NULL) {
+		debug("No credentials stored");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0)
+		return;
+
+#ifdef HEIMDAL
+# ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
+	if ((problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(krb_context, krb5_fcc_ops.prefix,
+	    NULL, &ccache)) != 0) {
+		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
+		logit("krb5_cc_new_unique(): %.100s", errmsg);
+# else
+	if ((problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(krb_context, &krb5_fcc_ops, &ccache))) {
+	    logit("krb5_cc_gen_new(): %.100s",
+		krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem));
+# endif
+		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+		return;
+	}
+#else
+	if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) {
+		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
+		logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s", errmsg);
+		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+		return;
+	}
+#endif	/* #ifdef HEIMDAL */
+
+	if ((problem = krb5_parse_name(krb_context,
+	    client->exportedname.value, &princ))) {
+		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
+		logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg);
+		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) {
+		errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem);
+		logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", errmsg);
+		krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg);
+		krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+
+	if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status,
+	    client->creds, ccache))) {
+		logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed");
+		krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache));
+	client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME";
+	len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6;
+	client->store.envval = xmalloc(len);
+	snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam)
+		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
+#endif
+
+	krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
+
+	return;
+}
+
+ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = {
+	"toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==",
+	"Kerberos",
+	{9, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x12\x01\x02\x02"},
+	NULL,
+	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok,
+	NULL,
+	&ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds
+};
+
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b5d4bb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gss-serv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,404 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.32 2020/03/13 03:17:07 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+    { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
+
+ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
+#endif
+
+ssh_gssapi_mech* supported_mechs[]= {
+#ifdef KRB5
+	&gssapi_kerberos_mech,
+#endif
+	&gssapi_null_mech,
+};
+
+/*
+ * ssh_gssapi_supported_oids() can cause sandbox violations, so prepare the
+ * list of supported mechanisms before privsep is set up.
+ */
+static gss_OID_set supported_oids;
+
+void
+ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(void)
+{
+	ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported_oids);
+}
+
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *ms, gss_OID member, int *present)
+{
+	if (supported_oids == NULL)
+		ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
+	return gss_test_oid_set_member(ms, member, supported_oids, present);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Acquire credentials for a server running on the current host.
+ * Requires that the context structure contains a valid OID
+ */
+
+/* Returns a GSSAPI error code */
+/* Privileged (called from ssh_gssapi_server_ctx) */
+static OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx)
+{
+	OM_uint32 status;
+	char lname[NI_MAXHOST];
+	gss_OID_set oidset;
+
+	if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) {
+		gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+		gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset);
+
+		if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) {
+			gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+			return (-1);
+		}
+
+		if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) {
+			gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+			return (ctx->major);
+		}
+
+		if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor,
+		    ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds,
+		    NULL, NULL)))
+			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+		gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset);
+		return (ctx->major);
+	} else {
+		ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+		ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+	}
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/* Privileged */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
+{
+	if (*ctx)
+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
+	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
+	ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
+	return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
+}
+
+/* Unprivileged */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+	OM_uint32 min_status;
+	int present;
+	gss_OID_set supported;
+
+	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
+	gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
+
+	while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+		if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+		    &supported_mechs[i]->oid, supported, &present)))
+			present = 0;
+		if (present)
+			gss_add_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+			    &supported_mechs[i]->oid, oidset);
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	gss_release_oid_set(&min_status, &supported);
+}
+
+
+/* Wrapper around accept_sec_context
+ * Requires that the context contains:
+ *    oid
+ *    credentials	(from ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred)
+ */
+/* Privileged */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
+    gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags)
+{
+	OM_uint32 status;
+	gss_OID mech;
+
+	ctx->major = gss_accept_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
+	    &ctx->context, ctx->creds, recv_tok,
+	    GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, &ctx->client, &mech,
+	    send_tok, flags, NULL, &ctx->client_creds);
+
+	if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major))
+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+
+	if (ctx->client_creds)
+		debug("Received some client credentials");
+	else
+		debug("Got no client credentials");
+
+	status = ctx->major;
+
+	/* Now, if we're complete and we have the right flags, then
+	 * we flag the user as also having been authenticated
+	 */
+
+	if (((flags == NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) &&
+	    (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)) {
+		if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client))
+			fatal("Couldn't convert client name");
+	}
+
+	return (status);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This parses an exported name, extracting the mechanism specific portion
+ * to use for ACL checking. It verifies that the name belongs the mechanism
+ * originally selected.
+ */
+static OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
+{
+	u_char *tok;
+	OM_uint32 offset;
+	OM_uint32 oidl;
+
+	tok = ename->value;
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that ename is long enough for all of the fixed length
+	 * header, and that the initial ID bytes are correct
+	 */
+
+	if (ename->length < 6 || memcmp(tok, "\x04\x01", 2) != 0)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	/*
+	 * Extract the OID, and check it. Here GSSAPI breaks with tradition
+	 * and does use the OID type and length bytes. To confuse things
+	 * there are two lengths - the first including these, and the
+	 * second without.
+	 */
+
+	oidl = get_u16(tok+2); /* length including next two bytes */
+	oidl = oidl-2; /* turn it into the _real_ length of the variable OID */
+
+	/*
+	 * Check the BER encoding for correct type and length, that the
+	 * string is long enough and that the OID matches that in our context
+	 */
+	if (tok[4] != 0x06 || tok[5] != oidl ||
+	    ename->length < oidl+6 ||
+	    !ssh_gssapi_check_oid(ctx, tok+6, oidl))
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	offset = oidl+6;
+
+	if (ename->length < offset+4)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	name->length = get_u32(tok+offset);
+	offset += 4;
+
+	if (UINT_MAX - offset < name->length)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+	if (ename->length < offset+name->length)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	name->value = xmalloc(name->length+1);
+	memcpy(name->value, tok+offset, name->length);
+	((char *)name->value)[name->length] = 0;
+
+	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+}
+
+/* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably
+ * be called once for a context */
+
+/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+{
+	int i = 0;
+
+	gss_buffer_desc ename;
+
+	client->mech = NULL;
+
+	while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+		if (supported_mechs[i]->oid.length == ctx->oid->length &&
+		    (memcmp(supported_mechs[i]->oid.elements,
+		    ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) == 0))
+			client->mech = supported_mechs[i];
+		i++;
+	}
+
+	if (client->mech == NULL)
+		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+
+	if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+	    &client->displayname, NULL))) {
+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+		return (ctx->major);
+	}
+
+	if ((ctx->major = gss_export_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+	    &ename))) {
+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+		return (ctx->major);
+	}
+
+	if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(ctx,&ename,
+	    &client->exportedname))) {
+		return (ctx->major);
+	}
+
+	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+	ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+	return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+/* As user - called on fatal/exit */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+{
+	if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
+		/* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
+		debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
+		    gssapi_client.store.filename);
+		unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
+	}
+}
+
+/* As user */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
+{
+	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
+		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+	} else
+		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
+}
+
+/* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
+ * on the passed authentication process and credentials.
+ */
+/* As user */
+void
+ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
+{
+
+	if (gssapi_client.store.envvar != NULL &&
+	    gssapi_client.store.envval != NULL) {
+		debug("Setting %s to %s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
+		    gssapi_client.store.envval);
+		child_set_env(envp, envsizep, gssapi_client.store.envvar,
+		    gssapi_client.store.envval);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Privileged */
+int
+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+{
+	OM_uint32 lmin;
+
+	if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 ||
+	    gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) {
+		debug("No suitable client data");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
+		if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
+			return 1;
+		else {
+			/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
+			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+			gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
+			explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
+			    sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
+			return 0;
+		}
+	else
+		debug("ssh_gssapi_userok: Unknown GSSAPI mechanism");
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/* Privileged */
+OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+{
+	ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+	    gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
+
+	return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+/* Privileged */
+const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void)
+{
+	if (gssapi_client.displayname.length == 0 ||
+	    gssapi_client.displayname.value == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	return (char *)gssapi_client.displayname.value;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/hash.c b/hash.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b4f8f6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/hash.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: hash.c,v 1.6 2019/11/29 00:11:21 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Public domain. Author: Christian Weisgerber <naddy@openbsd.org>
+ * API compatible reimplementation of function from nacl
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+int
+crypto_hash_sha512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+    unsigned long long inlen)
+{
+
+	if (!EVP_Digest(in, inlen, out, NULL, EVP_sha512(), NULL))
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H
+#  include <sha2.h>
+# endif
+
+int
+crypto_hash_sha512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+    unsigned long long inlen)
+{
+
+	SHA2_CTX ctx;
+
+	SHA512Init(&ctx);
+	SHA512Update(&ctx, in, inlen);
+	SHA512Final(out, &ctx);
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/hmac.c b/hmac.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7b58801
--- /dev/null
+++ b/hmac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: hmac.c,v 1.14 2020/02/26 13:40:09 jsg Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "hmac.h"
+
+struct ssh_hmac_ctx {
+	int			 alg;
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx	*ictx;
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx	*octx;
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx	*digest;
+	u_char			*buf;
+	size_t			 buf_len;
+};
+
+size_t
+ssh_hmac_bytes(int alg)
+{
+	return ssh_digest_bytes(alg);
+}
+
+struct ssh_hmac_ctx *
+ssh_hmac_start(int alg)
+{
+	struct ssh_hmac_ctx	*ret;
+
+	if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	ret->alg = alg;
+	if ((ret->ictx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL ||
+	    (ret->octx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL ||
+	    (ret->digest = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL)
+		goto fail;
+	ret->buf_len = ssh_digest_blocksize(ret->ictx);
+	if ((ret->buf = calloc(1, ret->buf_len)) == NULL)
+		goto fail;
+	return ret;
+fail:
+	ssh_hmac_free(ret);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_hmac_init(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *key, size_t klen)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	/* reset ictx and octx if no is key given */
+	if (key != NULL) {
+		/* truncate long keys */
+		if (klen <= ctx->buf_len)
+			memcpy(ctx->buf, key, klen);
+		else if (ssh_digest_memory(ctx->alg, key, klen, ctx->buf,
+		    ctx->buf_len) < 0)
+			return -1;
+		for (i = 0; i < ctx->buf_len; i++)
+			ctx->buf[i] ^= 0x36;
+		if (ssh_digest_update(ctx->ictx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0)
+			return -1;
+		for (i = 0; i < ctx->buf_len; i++)
+			ctx->buf[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c;
+		if (ssh_digest_update(ctx->octx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0)
+			return -1;
+		explicit_bzero(ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len);
+	}
+	/* start with ictx */
+	if (ssh_digest_copy_state(ctx->ictx, ctx->digest) < 0)
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_hmac_update(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
+{
+	return ssh_digest_update(ctx->digest, m, mlen);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	return ssh_digest_update_buffer(ctx->digest, b);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_hmac_final(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+	size_t len;
+
+	len = ssh_digest_bytes(ctx->alg);
+	if (dlen < len ||
+	    ssh_digest_final(ctx->digest, ctx->buf, len))
+		return -1;
+	/* switch to octx */
+	if (ssh_digest_copy_state(ctx->octx, ctx->digest) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_update(ctx->digest, ctx->buf, len) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_final(ctx->digest, d, dlen) < 0)
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_hmac_free(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx != NULL) {
+		ssh_digest_free(ctx->ictx);
+		ssh_digest_free(ctx->octx);
+		ssh_digest_free(ctx->digest);
+		if (ctx->buf) {
+			explicit_bzero(ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len);
+			free(ctx->buf);
+		}
+		freezero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
+	}
+}
+
+#ifdef TEST
+
+/* cc -DTEST hmac.c digest.c buffer.c cleanup.c fatal.c log.c xmalloc.c -lcrypto */
+static void
+hmac_test(void *key, size_t klen, void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *e, size_t elen)
+{
+	struct ssh_hmac_ctx	*ctx;
+	size_t			 i;
+	u_char			 digest[16];
+
+	if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL)
+		printf("ssh_hmac_start failed");
+	if (ssh_hmac_init(ctx, key, klen) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_hmac_update(ctx, m, mlen) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_hmac_final(ctx, digest, sizeof(digest)) < 0)
+		printf("ssh_hmac_xxx failed");
+	ssh_hmac_free(ctx);
+
+	if (memcmp(e, digest, elen)) {
+		for (i = 0; i < elen; i++)
+			printf("[%zu] %2.2x %2.2x\n", i, e[i], digest[i]);
+		printf("mismatch\n");
+	} else
+		printf("ok\n");
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	/* try test vectors from RFC 2104 */
+
+	u_char key1[16] = {
+	    0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb,
+	    0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb };
+	u_char *data1 = "Hi There";
+	u_char dig1[16] = {
+	    0x92, 0x94, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x36, 0x38, 0xbb, 0x1c,
+	    0x13, 0xf4, 0x8e, 0xf8, 0x15, 0x8b, 0xfc, 0x9d };
+
+	u_char *key2 = "Jefe";
+	u_char *data2 = "what do ya want for nothing?";
+	u_char dig2[16] = {
+	    0x75, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x3e, 0x6a, 0xb0, 0xb5, 0x03,
+	    0xea, 0xa8, 0x6e, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x5d, 0xb7, 0x38 };
+
+	u_char key3[16];
+	u_char data3[50];
+	u_char dig3[16] = {
+	    0x56, 0xbe, 0x34, 0x52, 0x1d, 0x14, 0x4c, 0x88,
+	    0xdb, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x33, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0xf6 };
+	memset(key3, 0xaa, sizeof(key3));
+	memset(data3, 0xdd, sizeof(data3));
+
+	hmac_test(key1, sizeof(key1), data1, strlen(data1), dig1, sizeof(dig1));
+	hmac_test(key2, strlen(key2), data2, strlen(data2), dig2, sizeof(dig2));
+	hmac_test(key3, sizeof(key3), data3, sizeof(data3), dig3, sizeof(dig3));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/hmac.h b/hmac.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..42b33d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/hmac.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: hmac.h,v 1.9 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _HMAC_H
+#define _HMAC_H
+
+/* Returns the algorithm's digest length in bytes or 0 for invalid algorithm */
+size_t ssh_hmac_bytes(int alg);
+
+struct sshbuf;
+struct ssh_hmac_ctx;
+struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ssh_hmac_start(int alg);
+
+/* Sets the state of the HMAC or resets the state if key == NULL */
+int ssh_hmac_init(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *key, size_t klen)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
+int ssh_hmac_update(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
+int ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b);
+int ssh_hmac_final(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)));
+void ssh_hmac_free(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx);
+
+#endif /* _HMAC_H */
diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd49e3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/hostfile.c
@@ -0,0 +1,937 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.93 2022/01/06 22:02:52 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Functions for manipulating the known hosts files.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "hmac.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+/* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */
+
+static int
+extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, u_char *salt, size_t salt_len)
+{
+	char *p, *b64salt;
+	u_int b64len;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (l < sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: string too short");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (strncmp(s, HASH_MAGIC, sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: invalid magic identifier");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	s += sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1;
+	l -= sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1;
+	if ((p = memchr(s, HASH_DELIM, l)) == NULL) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: missing salt termination character");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	b64len = p - s;
+	/* Sanity check */
+	if (b64len == 0 || b64len > 1024) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: bad encoded salt length %u", b64len);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	b64salt = xmalloc(1 + b64len);
+	memcpy(b64salt, s, b64len);
+	b64salt[b64len] = '\0';
+
+	ret = __b64_pton(b64salt, salt, salt_len);
+	free(b64salt);
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: salt decode error");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (ret != (int)ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) {
+		debug2("extract_salt: expected salt len %zd, got %d",
+		    ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1), ret);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+char *
+host_hash(const char *host, const char *name_from_hostfile, u_int src_len)
+{
+	struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx;
+	u_char salt[256], result[256];
+	char uu_salt[512], uu_result[512];
+	char *encoded = NULL;
+	u_int len;
+
+	len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
+
+	if (name_from_hostfile == NULL) {
+		/* Create new salt */
+		arc4random_buf(salt, len);
+	} else {
+		/* Extract salt from known host entry */
+		if (extract_salt(name_from_hostfile, src_len, salt,
+		    sizeof(salt)) == -1)
+			return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL ||
+	    ssh_hmac_init(ctx, salt, len) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_hmac_update(ctx, host, strlen(host)) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_hmac_final(ctx, result, sizeof(result)))
+		fatal_f("ssh_hmac failed");
+	ssh_hmac_free(ctx);
+
+	if (__b64_ntop(salt, len, uu_salt, sizeof(uu_salt)) == -1 ||
+	    __b64_ntop(result, len, uu_result, sizeof(uu_result)) == -1)
+		fatal_f("__b64_ntop failed");
+	xasprintf(&encoded, "%s%s%c%s", HASH_MAGIC, uu_salt, HASH_DELIM,
+	    uu_result);
+
+	return (encoded);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parses an RSA (number of bits, e, n) or DSA key from a string.  Moves the
+ * pointer over the key.  Skips any whitespace at the beginning and at end.
+ */
+
+int
+hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, u_int *bitsp, struct sshkey *ret)
+{
+	char *cp;
+
+	/* Skip leading whitespace. */
+	for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+		;
+
+	if (sshkey_read(ret, &cp) != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Skip trailing whitespace. */
+	for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+		;
+
+	/* Return results. */
+	*cpp = cp;
+	if (bitsp != NULL)
+		*bitsp = sshkey_size(ret);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static HostkeyMarker
+check_markers(char **cpp)
+{
+	char marker[32], *sp, *cp = *cpp;
+	int ret = MRK_NONE;
+
+	while (*cp == '@') {
+		/* Only one marker is allowed */
+		if (ret != MRK_NONE)
+			return MRK_ERROR;
+		/* Markers are terminated by whitespace */
+		if ((sp = strchr(cp, ' ')) == NULL &&
+		    (sp = strchr(cp, '\t')) == NULL)
+			return MRK_ERROR;
+		/* Extract marker for comparison */
+		if (sp <= cp + 1 || sp >= cp + sizeof(marker))
+			return MRK_ERROR;
+		memcpy(marker, cp, sp - cp);
+		marker[sp - cp] = '\0';
+		if (strcmp(marker, CA_MARKER) == 0)
+			ret = MRK_CA;
+		else if (strcmp(marker, REVOKE_MARKER) == 0)
+			ret = MRK_REVOKE;
+		else
+			return MRK_ERROR;
+
+		/* Skip past marker and any whitespace that follows it */
+		cp = sp;
+		for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+			;
+	}
+	*cpp = cp;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+struct hostkeys *
+init_hostkeys(void)
+{
+	struct hostkeys *ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
+
+	ret->entries = NULL;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+struct load_callback_ctx {
+	const char *host;
+	u_long num_loaded;
+	struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
+};
+
+static int
+record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+	struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx;
+	struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys;
+	struct hostkey_entry *tmp;
+
+	if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
+		/* XXX make this verbose() in the future */
+		debug("%s:%ld: parse error in hostkeys file",
+		    l->path, l->linenum);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	debug3_f("found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu",
+	    l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" :
+	    (l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "),
+	    sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
+	if ((tmp = recallocarray(hostkeys->entries, hostkeys->num_entries,
+	    hostkeys->num_entries + 1, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries))) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	hostkeys->entries = tmp;
+	hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].host = xstrdup(ctx->host);
+	hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].file = xstrdup(l->path);
+	hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].line = l->linenum;
+	hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].key = l->key;
+	l->key = NULL; /* steal it */
+	hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].marker = l->marker;
+	hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].note = l->note;
+	hostkeys->num_entries++;
+	ctx->num_loaded++;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+load_hostkeys_file(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host,
+    const char *path, FILE *f, u_int note)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct load_callback_ctx ctx;
+
+	ctx.host = host;
+	ctx.num_loaded = 0;
+	ctx.hostkeys = hostkeys;
+
+	if ((r = hostkeys_foreach_file(path, f, record_hostkey, &ctx, host,
+	    NULL, HKF_WANT_MATCH|HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY, note)) != 0) {
+		if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno != ENOENT)
+			debug_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach failed for %s", path);
+	}
+	if (ctx.num_loaded != 0)
+		debug3_f("loaded %lu keys from %s", ctx.num_loaded, host);
+}
+
+void
+load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host, const char *path,
+    u_int note)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+
+	if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) {
+		debug_f("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, host, path, f, note);
+	fclose(f);
+}
+
+void
+free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
+		free(hostkeys->entries[i].host);
+		free(hostkeys->entries[i].file);
+		sshkey_free(hostkeys->entries[i].key);
+		explicit_bzero(hostkeys->entries + i, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries));
+	}
+	free(hostkeys->entries);
+	freezero(hostkeys, sizeof(*hostkeys));
+}
+
+static int
+check_key_not_revoked(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	int is_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k);
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
+		if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != MRK_REVOKE)
+			continue;
+		if (sshkey_equal_public(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key))
+			return -1;
+		if (is_cert && k != NULL &&
+		    sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
+		    hostkeys->entries[i].key))
+			return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Match keys against a specified key, or look one up by key type.
+ *
+ * If looking for a keytype (key == NULL) and one is found then return
+ * HOST_FOUND, otherwise HOST_NEW.
+ *
+ * If looking for a key (key != NULL):
+ *  1. If the key is a cert and a matching CA is found, return HOST_OK
+ *  2. If the key is not a cert and a matching key is found, return HOST_OK
+ *  3. If no key matches but a key with a different type is found, then
+ *     return HOST_CHANGED
+ *  4. If no matching keys are found, then return HOST_NEW.
+ *
+ * Finally, check any found key is not revoked.
+ */
+static HostStatus
+check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys,
+    struct sshkey *k, int keytype, int nid, const struct hostkey_entry **found)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	HostStatus end_return = HOST_NEW;
+	int want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k);
+	HostkeyMarker want_marker = want_cert ? MRK_CA : MRK_NONE;
+
+	if (found != NULL)
+		*found = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
+		if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != want_marker)
+			continue;
+		if (k == NULL) {
+			if (hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != keytype)
+				continue;
+			if (nid != -1 &&
+			    sshkey_type_plain(keytype) == KEY_ECDSA &&
+			    hostkeys->entries[i].key->ecdsa_nid != nid)
+				continue;
+			end_return = HOST_FOUND;
+			if (found != NULL)
+				*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
+			k = hostkeys->entries[i].key;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (want_cert) {
+			if (sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
+			    hostkeys->entries[i].key)) {
+				/* A matching CA exists */
+				end_return = HOST_OK;
+				if (found != NULL)
+					*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
+				break;
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (sshkey_equal(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) {
+				end_return = HOST_OK;
+				if (found != NULL)
+					*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
+				break;
+			}
+			/* A non-matching key exists */
+			end_return = HOST_CHANGED;
+			if (found != NULL)
+				*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
+		}
+	}
+	if (check_key_not_revoked(hostkeys, k) != 0) {
+		end_return = HOST_REVOKED;
+		if (found != NULL)
+			*found = NULL;
+	}
+	return end_return;
+}
+
+HostStatus
+check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key,
+    const struct hostkey_entry **found)
+{
+	if (key == NULL)
+		fatal("no key to look up");
+	return check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, key, 0, -1, found);
+}
+
+int
+lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int keytype, int nid,
+    const struct hostkey_entry **found)
+{
+	return (check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, NULL, keytype, nid,
+	    found) == HOST_FOUND);
+}
+
+int
+lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int want_marker)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
+		if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker == (HostkeyMarker)want_marker)
+			return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+write_host_entry(FILE *f, const char *host, const char *ip,
+    const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
+{
+	int r, success = 0;
+	char *hashed_host = NULL, *lhost;
+
+	lhost = xstrdup(host);
+	lowercase(lhost);
+
+	if (store_hash) {
+		if ((hashed_host = host_hash(lhost, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
+			error_f("host_hash failed");
+			free(lhost);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		fprintf(f, "%s ", hashed_host);
+	} else if (ip != NULL)
+		fprintf(f, "%s,%s ", lhost, ip);
+	else {
+		fprintf(f, "%s ", lhost);
+	}
+	free(hashed_host);
+	free(lhost);
+	if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) == 0)
+		success = 1;
+	else
+		error_fr(r, "sshkey_write");
+	fputc('\n', f);
+	/* If hashing is enabled, the IP address needs to go on its own line */
+	if (success && store_hash && ip != NULL)
+		success = write_host_entry(f, ip, NULL, key, 1);
+	return success;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create user ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't exist and we want to write to it.
+ * If notify is set, a message will be emitted if the directory is created.
+ */
+void
+hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(const char *filename, int notify)
+{
+	char *dotsshdir = NULL, *p;
+	size_t len;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if ((p = strrchr(filename, '/')) == NULL)
+		return;
+	len = p - filename;
+	dotsshdir = tilde_expand_filename("~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR, getuid());
+	if (strlen(dotsshdir) > len || strncmp(filename, dotsshdir, len) != 0)
+		goto out; /* not ~/.ssh prefixed */
+	if (stat(dotsshdir, &st) == 0)
+		goto out; /* dir already exists */
+	else if (errno != ENOENT)
+		error("Could not stat %s: %s", dotsshdir, strerror(errno));
+	else {
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+		ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(dotsshdir);
+#endif
+		if (mkdir(dotsshdir, 0700) == -1)
+			error("Could not create directory '%.200s' (%s).",
+			    dotsshdir, strerror(errno));
+		else if (notify)
+			logit("Created directory '%s'.", dotsshdir);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+		ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(NULL);
+#endif
+	}
+ out:
+	free(dotsshdir);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Appends an entry to the host file.  Returns false if the entry could not
+ * be appended.
+ */
+int
+add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host,
+    const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	int success;
+
+	if (key == NULL)
+		return 1;	/* XXX ? */
+	hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(filename, 0);
+	f = fopen(filename, "a");
+	if (!f)
+		return 0;
+	success = write_host_entry(f, host, NULL, key, store_hash);
+	fclose(f);
+	return success;
+}
+
+struct host_delete_ctx {
+	FILE *out;
+	int quiet;
+	const char *host, *ip;
+	u_int *match_keys;	/* mask of HKF_MATCH_* for this key */
+	struct sshkey * const *keys;
+	size_t nkeys;
+	int modified;
+};
+
+static int
+host_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+	struct host_delete_ctx *ctx = (struct host_delete_ctx *)_ctx;
+	int loglevel = ctx->quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
+	size_t i;
+
+	/* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */
+	if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED && l->marker == MRK_NONE) {
+		/*
+		 * If this line contains one of the keys that we will be
+		 * adding later, then don't change it and mark the key for
+		 * skipping.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+			if (!sshkey_equal(ctx->keys[i], l->key))
+				continue;
+			ctx->match_keys[i] |= l->match;
+			fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+			debug3_f("%s key already at %s:%ld",
+			    sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
+			return 0;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke marker, delete it
+		 * by *not* writing the line to ctx->out.
+		 */
+		do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: Removed %s key for host %s",
+		    ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "",
+		    l->path, l->linenum, sshkey_type(l->key), ctx->host);
+		ctx->modified = 1;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Retain non-matching hosts and invalid lines when deleting */
+	if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
+		do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: invalid known_hosts entry",
+		    ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "",
+		    l->path, l->linenum);
+	}
+	fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename, const char *host, const char *ip,
+    struct sshkey **keys, size_t nkeys, int store_hash, int quiet, int hash_alg)
+{
+	int r, fd, oerrno = 0;
+	int loglevel = quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
+	struct host_delete_ctx ctx;
+	char *fp, *temp = NULL, *back = NULL;
+	const char *what;
+	mode_t omask;
+	size_t i;
+	u_int want;
+
+	omask = umask(077);
+
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.host = host;
+	ctx.ip = ip;
+	ctx.quiet = quiet;
+
+	if ((ctx.match_keys = calloc(nkeys, sizeof(*ctx.match_keys))) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	ctx.keys = keys;
+	ctx.nkeys = nkeys;
+	ctx.modified = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare temporary file for in-place deletion.
+	 */
+	if ((r = asprintf(&temp, "%s.XXXXXXXXXXX", filename)) == -1 ||
+	    (r = asprintf(&back, "%s.old", filename)) == -1) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if ((fd = mkstemp(temp)) == -1) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		error_f("mkstemp: %s", strerror(oerrno));
+		r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		close(fd);
+		error_f("fdopen: %s", strerror(oerrno));
+		r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* Remove stale/mismatching entries for the specified host */
+	if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(filename, host_delete, &ctx, host, ip,
+	    HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY, 0)) != 0) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		error_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* Re-add the requested keys */
+	want = HKF_MATCH_HOST | (ip == NULL ? 0 : HKF_MATCH_IP);
+	for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+		if (keys[i] == NULL || (want & ctx.match_keys[i]) == want)
+			continue;
+		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], hash_alg,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		/* write host/ip */
+		what = "";
+		if (ctx.match_keys[i] == 0) {
+			what = "Adding new key";
+			if (!write_host_entry(ctx.out, host, ip,
+			    keys[i], store_hash)) {
+				r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+				goto fail;
+			}
+		} else if ((want & ~ctx.match_keys[i]) == HKF_MATCH_HOST) {
+			what = "Fixing match (hostname)";
+			if (!write_host_entry(ctx.out, host, NULL,
+			    keys[i], store_hash)) {
+				r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+				goto fail;
+			}
+		} else if ((want & ~ctx.match_keys[i]) == HKF_MATCH_IP) {
+			what = "Fixing match (address)";
+			if (!write_host_entry(ctx.out, ip, NULL,
+			    keys[i], store_hash)) {
+				r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+				goto fail;
+			}
+		}
+		do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s for %s%s%s to %s: %s %s",
+		    quiet ? __func__ : "", quiet ? ": " : "", what,
+		    host, ip == NULL ? "" : ",", ip == NULL ? "" : ip, filename,
+		    sshkey_ssh_name(keys[i]), fp);
+		free(fp);
+		ctx.modified = 1;
+	}
+	fclose(ctx.out);
+	ctx.out = NULL;
+
+	if (ctx.modified) {
+		/* Backup the original file and replace it with the temporary */
+		if (unlink(back) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) {
+			oerrno = errno;
+			error_f("unlink %.100s: %s", back, strerror(errno));
+			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		if (link(filename, back) == -1) {
+			oerrno = errno;
+			error_f("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", filename,
+			    back, strerror(errno));
+			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		if (rename(temp, filename) == -1) {
+			oerrno = errno;
+			error_f("rename \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", temp,
+			    filename, strerror(errno));
+			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* No changes made; just delete the temporary file */
+		if (unlink(temp) != 0)
+			error_f("unlink \"%s\": %s", temp, strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ fail:
+	if (temp != NULL && r != 0)
+		unlink(temp);
+	free(temp);
+	free(back);
+	if (ctx.out != NULL)
+		fclose(ctx.out);
+	free(ctx.match_keys);
+	umask(omask);
+	if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
+		errno = oerrno;
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+match_maybe_hashed(const char *host, const char *names, int *was_hashed)
+{
+	int hashed = *names == HASH_DELIM, ret;
+	char *hashed_host = NULL;
+	size_t nlen = strlen(names);
+
+	if (was_hashed != NULL)
+		*was_hashed = hashed;
+	if (hashed) {
+		if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, names, nlen)) == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		ret = (nlen == strlen(hashed_host) &&
+		    strncmp(hashed_host, names, nlen) == 0);
+		free(hashed_host);
+		return ret;
+	}
+	return match_hostname(host, names) == 1;
+}
+
+int
+hostkeys_foreach_file(const char *path, FILE *f, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback,
+    void *ctx, const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note)
+{
+	char *line = NULL, ktype[128];
+	u_long linenum = 0;
+	char *cp, *cp2;
+	u_int kbits;
+	int hashed;
+	int s, r = 0;
+	struct hostkey_foreach_line lineinfo;
+	size_t linesize = 0, l;
+
+	memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo));
+	if (host == NULL && (options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+		linenum++;
+		line[strcspn(line, "\n")] = '\0';
+
+		free(lineinfo.line);
+		sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
+		memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo));
+		lineinfo.path = path;
+		lineinfo.linenum = linenum;
+		lineinfo.line = xstrdup(line);
+		lineinfo.marker = MRK_NONE;
+		lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_OK;
+		lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC;
+		lineinfo.note = note;
+
+		/* Skip any leading whitespace, comments and empty lines. */
+		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+			;
+		if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') {
+			if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0) {
+				lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_COMMENT;
+				if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
+					break;
+			}
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if ((lineinfo.marker = check_markers(&cp)) == MRK_ERROR) {
+			verbose_f("invalid marker at %s:%lu", path, linenum);
+			if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0)
+				goto bad;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Find the end of the host name portion. */
+		for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++)
+			;
+		lineinfo.hosts = cp;
+		*cp2++ = '\0';
+
+		/* Check if the host name matches. */
+		if (host != NULL) {
+			if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(host, lineinfo.hosts,
+			    &hashed)) == -1) {
+				debug2_f("%s:%ld: bad host hash \"%.32s\"",
+				    path, linenum, lineinfo.hosts);
+				goto bad;
+			}
+			if (s == 1) {
+				lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED;
+				lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_HOST |
+				    (hashed ? HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED : 0);
+			}
+			/* Try matching IP address if supplied */
+			if (ip != NULL) {
+				if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(ip, lineinfo.hosts,
+				    &hashed)) == -1) {
+					debug2_f("%s:%ld: bad ip hash "
+					    "\"%.32s\"", path, linenum,
+					    lineinfo.hosts);
+					goto bad;
+				}
+				if (s == 1) {
+					lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED;
+					lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_IP |
+					    (hashed ? HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED : 0);
+				}
+			}
+			/*
+			 * Skip this line if host matching requested and
+			 * neither host nor address matched.
+			 */
+			if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0 &&
+			    lineinfo.status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED)
+				continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Got a match.  Skip host name and any following whitespace */
+		for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++)
+			;
+		if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') {
+			debug2("%s:%ld: truncated before key type",
+			    path, linenum);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		lineinfo.rawkey = cp = cp2;
+
+		if ((options & HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY) != 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Extract the key from the line.  This will skip
+			 * any leading whitespace.  Ignore badly formatted
+			 * lines.
+			 */
+			if ((lineinfo.key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+				error_f("sshkey_new failed");
+				r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, lineinfo.key)) {
+				goto bad;
+			}
+			lineinfo.keytype = lineinfo.key->type;
+			lineinfo.comment = cp;
+		} else {
+			/* Extract and parse key type */
+			l = strcspn(lineinfo.rawkey, " \t");
+			if (l <= 1 || l >= sizeof(ktype) ||
+			    lineinfo.rawkey[l] == '\0')
+				goto bad;
+			memcpy(ktype, lineinfo.rawkey, l);
+			ktype[l] = '\0';
+			lineinfo.keytype = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype);
+
+			/*
+			 * Assume legacy RSA1 if the first component is a short
+			 * decimal number.
+			 */
+			if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC && l < 8 &&
+			    strspn(ktype, "0123456789") == l)
+				goto bad;
+
+			/*
+			 * Check that something other than whitespace follows
+			 * the key type. This won't catch all corruption, but
+			 * it does catch trivial truncation.
+			 */
+			cp2 += l; /* Skip past key type */
+			for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++)
+				;
+			if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') {
+				debug2("%s:%ld: truncated after key type",
+				    path, linenum);
+				lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC;
+			}
+			if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+ bad:
+				sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
+				lineinfo.key = NULL;
+				lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID;
+				if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
+					break;
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
+		if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
+	free(lineinfo.line);
+	free(line);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx,
+    const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	int r, oerrno;
+
+	if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+
+	debug3_f("reading file \"%s\"", path);
+	r = hostkeys_foreach_file(path, f, callback, ctx, host, ip,
+	    options, note);
+	oerrno = errno;
+	fclose(f);
+	errno = oerrno;
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/hostfile.h b/hostfile.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a24a4e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/hostfile.h
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.h,v 1.29 2021/01/26 00:51:30 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+#ifndef HOSTFILE_H
+#define HOSTFILE_H
+
+typedef enum {
+	HOST_OK, HOST_NEW, HOST_CHANGED, HOST_REVOKED, HOST_FOUND
+}       HostStatus;
+
+typedef enum {
+	MRK_ERROR, MRK_NONE, MRK_REVOKE, MRK_CA
+}	HostkeyMarker;
+
+struct hostkey_entry {
+	char *host;
+	char *file;
+	u_long line;
+	struct sshkey *key;
+	HostkeyMarker marker;
+	u_int note; /* caller-specific note/flag */
+};
+struct hostkeys {
+	struct hostkey_entry *entries;
+	u_int num_entries;
+};
+
+struct hostkeys *init_hostkeys(void);
+void	 load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, const char *,
+    const char *, u_int);
+void	 load_hostkeys_file(struct hostkeys *, const char *,
+    const char *, FILE *, u_int note);
+void	 free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *);
+
+HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *,
+    const struct hostkey_entry **);
+int	 lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *, int, int,
+    const struct hostkey_entry **);
+int	 lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, int);
+
+int	 hostfile_read_key(char **, u_int *, struct sshkey *);
+int	 add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *,
+    const struct sshkey *, int);
+
+int	 hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename,
+    const char *host, const char *ip, struct sshkey **keys, size_t nkeys,
+    int store_hash, int quiet, int hash_alg);
+
+#define HASH_MAGIC	"|1|"
+#define HASH_DELIM	'|'
+
+#define CA_MARKER	"@cert-authority"
+#define REVOKE_MARKER	"@revoked"
+
+char	*host_hash(const char *, const char *, u_int);
+
+/*
+ * Iterate through a hostkeys file, optionally parsing keys and matching
+ * hostnames. Allows access to the raw keyfile lines to allow
+ * streaming edits to the file to take place.
+ */
+#define HKF_WANT_MATCH		(1)	/* return only matching hosts/addrs */
+#define HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY	(1<<1)	/* need key parsed */
+
+#define HKF_STATUS_OK		0	/* Line parsed, didn't match host */
+#define HKF_STATUS_INVALID	1	/* line had parse error */
+#define HKF_STATUS_COMMENT	2	/* valid line contained no key */
+#define HKF_STATUS_MATCHED	3	/* hostname or IP matched */
+
+#define HKF_MATCH_HOST		(1)	/* hostname matched */
+#define HKF_MATCH_IP		(1<<1)	/* address matched */
+#define HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED	(1<<2)	/* hostname was hashed */
+#define HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED	(1<<3)	/* address was hashed */
+/* XXX HKF_MATCH_KEY_TYPE? */
+
+/*
+ * The callback function receives this as an argument for each matching 
+ * hostkey line. The callback may "steal" the 'key' field by setting it to NULL.
+ * If a parse error occurred, then "hosts" and subsequent options may be NULL.
+ */
+struct hostkey_foreach_line {
+	const char *path; /* Path of file */
+	u_long linenum;	/* Line number */
+	u_int status;	/* One of HKF_STATUS_* */
+	u_int match;	/* Zero or more of HKF_MATCH_* OR'd together */
+	char *line;	/* Entire key line; mutable by callback */
+	int marker;	/* CA/revocation markers; indicated by MRK_* value */
+	const char *hosts; /* Raw hosts text, may be hashed or list multiple */
+	const char *rawkey; /* Text of key and any comment following it */
+	int keytype;	/* Type of key; KEY_UNSPEC for invalid/comment lines */
+	struct sshkey *key; /* Key, if parsed ok and HKF_WANT_MATCH_HOST set */
+	const char *comment; /* Any comment following the key */
+	u_int note;	/* caller-specified note copied from arguments */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Callback fires for each line (or matching line if a HKF_WANT_* option
+ * is set). The foreach loop will terminate if the callback returns a non-
+ * zero exit status.
+ */
+typedef int hostkeys_foreach_fn(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *ctx);
+
+/* Iterate over a hostkeys file */
+int hostkeys_foreach(const char *path,
+    hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx,
+    const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note);
+int hostkeys_foreach_file(const char *path, FILE *f,
+    hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx,
+    const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note);
+
+void hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(const char *, int);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/includes.h b/includes.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6d17ef6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/includes.h
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: includes.h,v 1.54 2006/07/22 20:48:23 stevesk Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * This file includes most of the needed system headers.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef INCLUDES_H
+#define INCLUDES_H
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
+#define _GNU_SOURCE /* activate extra prototypes for glibc */
+#endif
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h> /* For CMSG_* */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+# include <limits.h> /* For PATH_MAX, _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_BSTRING_H
+# include <bstring.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
+# include <endian.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_TTYENT_H
+# include <ttyent.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIME_H
+# include <utime.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
+# include <maillock.h> /* For _PATH_MAILDIR */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_NEXT
+# include <libc.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ *-*-nto-qnx needs these headers for strcasecmp and LASTLOG_FILE respectively
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
+# include <strings.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+# include <login.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
+#  include <utmp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+#  include <utmpx.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
+#  include <lastlog.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H
+# include <sys/bsdtty.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <termios.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+# include <sys/bitypes.h> /* For u_intXX_t */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H
+# include <sys/cdefs.h> /* For __P() */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h> /* For S_* constants and macros */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
+# include <sys/sysmacros.h> /* For MIN, MAX, etc */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h> /* for timespeccmp if present */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
+#include <sys/mman.h> /* for MAP_ANONYMOUS */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H
+#include <sys/strtio.h>	/* for TIOCCBRK on HP-UX */
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H) && defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX)
+# if defined(HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H)
+#  include <sys/stream.h>	/* reqd for queue_t on Solaris 2.5.1 */
+# endif
+#include <sys/ptms.h>	/* for grantpt() and friends */
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/in_systm.h> /* For typedefs */
+#ifdef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H
+# include <rpc/types.h> /* For INADDR_LOOPBACK */
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
+# include <security/pam_appl.h>
+#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
+# include <pam/pam_appl.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H
+# include <readpassphrase.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IA_H
+# include <ia.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IAF_H
+# include <iaf.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_TMPDIR_H
+# include <tmpdir.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H)
+# include <bsd/libutil.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_LIBUTIL_H)
+# include <libutil.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
+# include <krb5.h>
+# include <kafs.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H)
+# include <sys/syslog.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+
+/*
+ * On HP-UX 11.11, shadow.h and prot.h provide conflicting declarations
+ * of getspnam when _INCLUDE__STDC__ is defined, so we unset it here.
+ */
+#ifdef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS
+# ifdef _INCLUDE__STDC__
+#  undef _INCLUDE__STDC__
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h> /* For OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER */
+#endif
+
+#include "defines.h"
+
+#include "platform.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h"
+
+#include "entropy.h"
+
+#endif /* INCLUDES_H */
diff --git a/install-sh b/install-sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..ec298b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/install-sh
@@ -0,0 +1,541 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# install - install a program, script, or datafile
+
+scriptversion=2020-11-14.01; # UTC
+
+# This originates from X11R5 (mit/util/scripts/install.sh), which was
+# later released in X11R6 (xc/config/util/install.sh) with the
+# following copyright and license.
+#
+# Copyright (C) 1994 X Consortium
+#
+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
+# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
+# deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the
+# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
+# sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
+# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
+#
+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
+# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+#
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
+# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
+# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+# X CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+# AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNEC-
+# TION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
+#
+# Except as contained in this notice, the name of the X Consortium shall not
+# be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the sale, use or other deal-
+# ings in this Software without prior written authorization from the X Consor-
+# tium.
+#
+#
+# FSF changes to this file are in the public domain.
+#
+# Calling this script install-sh is preferred over install.sh, to prevent
+# 'make' implicit rules from creating a file called install from it
+# when there is no Makefile.
+#
+# This script is compatible with the BSD install script, but was written
+# from scratch.
+
+tab='	'
+nl='
+'
+IFS=" $tab$nl"
+
+# Set DOITPROG to "echo" to test this script.
+
+doit=${DOITPROG-}
+doit_exec=${doit:-exec}
+
+# Put in absolute file names if you don't have them in your path;
+# or use environment vars.
+
+chgrpprog=${CHGRPPROG-chgrp}
+chmodprog=${CHMODPROG-chmod}
+chownprog=${CHOWNPROG-chown}
+cmpprog=${CMPPROG-cmp}
+cpprog=${CPPROG-cp}
+mkdirprog=${MKDIRPROG-mkdir}
+mvprog=${MVPROG-mv}
+rmprog=${RMPROG-rm}
+stripprog=${STRIPPROG-strip}
+
+posix_mkdir=
+
+# Desired mode of installed file.
+mode=0755
+
+# Create dirs (including intermediate dirs) using mode 755.
+# This is like GNU 'install' as of coreutils 8.32 (2020).
+mkdir_umask=22
+
+backupsuffix=
+chgrpcmd=
+chmodcmd=$chmodprog
+chowncmd=
+mvcmd=$mvprog
+rmcmd="$rmprog -f"
+stripcmd=
+
+src=
+dst=
+dir_arg=
+dst_arg=
+
+copy_on_change=false
+is_target_a_directory=possibly
+
+usage="\
+Usage: $0 [OPTION]... [-T] SRCFILE DSTFILE
+   or: $0 [OPTION]... SRCFILES... DIRECTORY
+   or: $0 [OPTION]... -t DIRECTORY SRCFILES...
+   or: $0 [OPTION]... -d DIRECTORIES...
+
+In the 1st form, copy SRCFILE to DSTFILE.
+In the 2nd and 3rd, copy all SRCFILES to DIRECTORY.
+In the 4th, create DIRECTORIES.
+
+Options:
+     --help     display this help and exit.
+     --version  display version info and exit.
+
+  -c            (ignored)
+  -C            install only if different (preserve data modification time)
+  -d            create directories instead of installing files.
+  -g GROUP      $chgrpprog installed files to GROUP.
+  -m MODE       $chmodprog installed files to MODE.
+  -o USER       $chownprog installed files to USER.
+  -p            pass -p to $cpprog.
+  -s            $stripprog installed files.
+  -S SUFFIX     attempt to back up existing files, with suffix SUFFIX.
+  -t DIRECTORY  install into DIRECTORY.
+  -T            report an error if DSTFILE is a directory.
+
+Environment variables override the default commands:
+  CHGRPPROG CHMODPROG CHOWNPROG CMPPROG CPPROG MKDIRPROG MVPROG
+  RMPROG STRIPPROG
+
+By default, rm is invoked with -f; when overridden with RMPROG,
+it's up to you to specify -f if you want it.
+
+If -S is not specified, no backups are attempted.
+
+Email bug reports to bug-automake@gnu.org.
+Automake home page: https://www.gnu.org/software/automake/
+"
+
+while test $# -ne 0; do
+  case $1 in
+    -c) ;;
+
+    -C) copy_on_change=true;;
+
+    -d) dir_arg=true;;
+
+    -g) chgrpcmd="$chgrpprog $2"
+        shift;;
+
+    --help) echo "$usage"; exit $?;;
+
+    -m) mode=$2
+        case $mode in
+          *' '* | *"$tab"* | *"$nl"* | *'*'* | *'?'* | *'['*)
+            echo "$0: invalid mode: $mode" >&2
+            exit 1;;
+        esac
+        shift;;
+
+    -o) chowncmd="$chownprog $2"
+        shift;;
+
+    -p) cpprog="$cpprog -p";;
+
+    -s) stripcmd=$stripprog;;
+
+    -S) backupsuffix="$2"
+        shift;;
+
+    -t)
+        is_target_a_directory=always
+        dst_arg=$2
+        # Protect names problematic for 'test' and other utilities.
+        case $dst_arg in
+          -* | [=\(\)!]) dst_arg=./$dst_arg;;
+        esac
+        shift;;
+
+    -T) is_target_a_directory=never;;
+
+    --version) echo "$0 $scriptversion"; exit $?;;
+
+    --) shift
+        break;;
+
+    -*) echo "$0: invalid option: $1" >&2
+        exit 1;;
+
+    *)  break;;
+  esac
+  shift
+done
+
+# We allow the use of options -d and -T together, by making -d
+# take the precedence; this is for compatibility with GNU install.
+
+if test -n "$dir_arg"; then
+  if test -n "$dst_arg"; then
+    echo "$0: target directory not allowed when installing a directory." >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+fi
+
+if test $# -ne 0 && test -z "$dir_arg$dst_arg"; then
+  # When -d is used, all remaining arguments are directories to create.
+  # When -t is used, the destination is already specified.
+  # Otherwise, the last argument is the destination.  Remove it from $@.
+  for arg
+  do
+    if test -n "$dst_arg"; then
+      # $@ is not empty: it contains at least $arg.
+      set fnord "$@" "$dst_arg"
+      shift # fnord
+    fi
+    shift # arg
+    dst_arg=$arg
+    # Protect names problematic for 'test' and other utilities.
+    case $dst_arg in
+      -* | [=\(\)!]) dst_arg=./$dst_arg;;
+    esac
+  done
+fi
+
+if test $# -eq 0; then
+  if test -z "$dir_arg"; then
+    echo "$0: no input file specified." >&2
+    exit 1
+  fi
+  # It's OK to call 'install-sh -d' without argument.
+  # This can happen when creating conditional directories.
+  exit 0
+fi
+
+if test -z "$dir_arg"; then
+  if test $# -gt 1 || test "$is_target_a_directory" = always; then
+    if test ! -d "$dst_arg"; then
+      echo "$0: $dst_arg: Is not a directory." >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+  fi
+fi
+
+if test -z "$dir_arg"; then
+  do_exit='(exit $ret); exit $ret'
+  trap "ret=129; $do_exit" 1
+  trap "ret=130; $do_exit" 2
+  trap "ret=141; $do_exit" 13
+  trap "ret=143; $do_exit" 15
+
+  # Set umask so as not to create temps with too-generous modes.
+  # However, 'strip' requires both read and write access to temps.
+  case $mode in
+    # Optimize common cases.
+    *644) cp_umask=133;;
+    *755) cp_umask=22;;
+
+    *[0-7])
+      if test -z "$stripcmd"; then
+        u_plus_rw=
+      else
+        u_plus_rw='% 200'
+      fi
+      cp_umask=`expr '(' 777 - $mode % 1000 ')' $u_plus_rw`;;
+    *)
+      if test -z "$stripcmd"; then
+        u_plus_rw=
+      else
+        u_plus_rw=,u+rw
+      fi
+      cp_umask=$mode$u_plus_rw;;
+  esac
+fi
+
+for src
+do
+  # Protect names problematic for 'test' and other utilities.
+  case $src in
+    -* | [=\(\)!]) src=./$src;;
+  esac
+
+  if test -n "$dir_arg"; then
+    dst=$src
+    dstdir=$dst
+    test -d "$dstdir"
+    dstdir_status=$?
+    # Don't chown directories that already exist.
+    if test $dstdir_status = 0; then
+      chowncmd=""
+    fi
+  else
+
+    # Waiting for this to be detected by the "$cpprog $src $dsttmp" command
+    # might cause directories to be created, which would be especially bad
+    # if $src (and thus $dsttmp) contains '*'.
+    if test ! -f "$src" && test ! -d "$src"; then
+      echo "$0: $src does not exist." >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+
+    if test -z "$dst_arg"; then
+      echo "$0: no destination specified." >&2
+      exit 1
+    fi
+    dst=$dst_arg
+
+    # If destination is a directory, append the input filename.
+    if test -d "$dst"; then
+      if test "$is_target_a_directory" = never; then
+        echo "$0: $dst_arg: Is a directory" >&2
+        exit 1
+      fi
+      dstdir=$dst
+      dstbase=`basename "$src"`
+      case $dst in
+	*/) dst=$dst$dstbase;;
+	*)  dst=$dst/$dstbase;;
+      esac
+      dstdir_status=0
+    else
+      dstdir=`dirname "$dst"`
+      test -d "$dstdir"
+      dstdir_status=$?
+    fi
+  fi
+
+  case $dstdir in
+    */) dstdirslash=$dstdir;;
+    *)  dstdirslash=$dstdir/;;
+  esac
+
+  obsolete_mkdir_used=false
+
+  if test $dstdir_status != 0; then
+    case $posix_mkdir in
+      '')
+        # With -d, create the new directory with the user-specified mode.
+        # Otherwise, rely on $mkdir_umask.
+        if test -n "$dir_arg"; then
+          mkdir_mode=-m$mode
+        else
+          mkdir_mode=
+        fi
+
+        posix_mkdir=false
+	# The $RANDOM variable is not portable (e.g., dash).  Use it
+	# here however when possible just to lower collision chance.
+	tmpdir=${TMPDIR-/tmp}/ins$RANDOM-$$
+
+	trap '
+	  ret=$?
+	  rmdir "$tmpdir/a/b" "$tmpdir/a" "$tmpdir" 2>/dev/null
+	  exit $ret
+	' 0
+
+	# Because "mkdir -p" follows existing symlinks and we likely work
+	# directly in world-writeable /tmp, make sure that the '$tmpdir'
+	# directory is successfully created first before we actually test
+	# 'mkdir -p'.
+	if (umask $mkdir_umask &&
+	    $mkdirprog $mkdir_mode "$tmpdir" &&
+	    exec $mkdirprog $mkdir_mode -p -- "$tmpdir/a/b") >/dev/null 2>&1
+	then
+	  if test -z "$dir_arg" || {
+	       # Check for POSIX incompatibilities with -m.
+	       # HP-UX 11.23 and IRIX 6.5 mkdir -m -p sets group- or
+	       # other-writable bit of parent directory when it shouldn't.
+	       # FreeBSD 6.1 mkdir -m -p sets mode of existing directory.
+	       test_tmpdir="$tmpdir/a"
+	       ls_ld_tmpdir=`ls -ld "$test_tmpdir"`
+	       case $ls_ld_tmpdir in
+		 d????-?r-*) different_mode=700;;
+		 d????-?--*) different_mode=755;;
+		 *) false;;
+	       esac &&
+	       $mkdirprog -m$different_mode -p -- "$test_tmpdir" && {
+		 ls_ld_tmpdir_1=`ls -ld "$test_tmpdir"`
+		 test "$ls_ld_tmpdir" = "$ls_ld_tmpdir_1"
+	       }
+	     }
+	  then posix_mkdir=:
+	  fi
+	  rmdir "$tmpdir/a/b" "$tmpdir/a" "$tmpdir"
+	else
+	  # Remove any dirs left behind by ancient mkdir implementations.
+	  rmdir ./$mkdir_mode ./-p ./-- "$tmpdir" 2>/dev/null
+	fi
+	trap '' 0;;
+    esac
+
+    if
+      $posix_mkdir && (
+        umask $mkdir_umask &&
+        $doit_exec $mkdirprog $mkdir_mode -p -- "$dstdir"
+      )
+    then :
+    else
+
+      # mkdir does not conform to POSIX,
+      # or it failed possibly due to a race condition.  Create the
+      # directory the slow way, step by step, checking for races as we go.
+
+      case $dstdir in
+        /*) prefix='/';;
+        [-=\(\)!]*) prefix='./';;
+        *)  prefix='';;
+      esac
+
+      oIFS=$IFS
+      IFS=/
+      set -f
+      set fnord $dstdir
+      shift
+      set +f
+      IFS=$oIFS
+
+      prefixes=
+
+      for d
+      do
+        test X"$d" = X && continue
+
+        prefix=$prefix$d
+        if test -d "$prefix"; then
+          prefixes=
+        else
+          if $posix_mkdir; then
+            (umask $mkdir_umask &&
+             $doit_exec $mkdirprog $mkdir_mode -p -- "$dstdir") && break
+            # Don't fail if two instances are running concurrently.
+            test -d "$prefix" || exit 1
+          else
+            case $prefix in
+              *\'*) qprefix=`echo "$prefix" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"`;;
+              *) qprefix=$prefix;;
+            esac
+            prefixes="$prefixes '$qprefix'"
+          fi
+        fi
+        prefix=$prefix/
+      done
+
+      if test -n "$prefixes"; then
+        # Don't fail if two instances are running concurrently.
+        (umask $mkdir_umask &&
+         eval "\$doit_exec \$mkdirprog $prefixes") ||
+          test -d "$dstdir" || exit 1
+        obsolete_mkdir_used=true
+      fi
+    fi
+  fi
+
+  if test -n "$dir_arg"; then
+    { test -z "$chowncmd" || $doit $chowncmd "$dst"; } &&
+    { test -z "$chgrpcmd" || $doit $chgrpcmd "$dst"; } &&
+    { test "$obsolete_mkdir_used$chowncmd$chgrpcmd" = false ||
+      test -z "$chmodcmd" || $doit $chmodcmd $mode "$dst"; } || exit 1
+  else
+
+    # Make a couple of temp file names in the proper directory.
+    dsttmp=${dstdirslash}_inst.$$_
+    rmtmp=${dstdirslash}_rm.$$_
+
+    # Trap to clean up those temp files at exit.
+    trap 'ret=$?; rm -f "$dsttmp" "$rmtmp" && exit $ret' 0
+
+    # Copy the file name to the temp name.
+    (umask $cp_umask &&
+     { test -z "$stripcmd" || {
+	 # Create $dsttmp read-write so that cp doesn't create it read-only,
+	 # which would cause strip to fail.
+	 if test -z "$doit"; then
+	   : >"$dsttmp" # No need to fork-exec 'touch'.
+	 else
+	   $doit touch "$dsttmp"
+	 fi
+       }
+     } &&
+     $doit_exec $cpprog "$src" "$dsttmp") &&
+
+    # and set any options; do chmod last to preserve setuid bits.
+    #
+    # If any of these fail, we abort the whole thing.  If we want to
+    # ignore errors from any of these, just make sure not to ignore
+    # errors from the above "$doit $cpprog $src $dsttmp" command.
+    #
+    { test -z "$chowncmd" || $doit $chowncmd "$dsttmp"; } &&
+    { test -z "$chgrpcmd" || $doit $chgrpcmd "$dsttmp"; } &&
+    { test -z "$stripcmd" || $doit $stripcmd "$dsttmp"; } &&
+    { test -z "$chmodcmd" || $doit $chmodcmd $mode "$dsttmp"; } &&
+
+    # If -C, don't bother to copy if it wouldn't change the file.
+    if $copy_on_change &&
+       old=`LC_ALL=C ls -dlL "$dst"     2>/dev/null` &&
+       new=`LC_ALL=C ls -dlL "$dsttmp"  2>/dev/null` &&
+       set -f &&
+       set X $old && old=:$2:$4:$5:$6 &&
+       set X $new && new=:$2:$4:$5:$6 &&
+       set +f &&
+       test "$old" = "$new" &&
+       $cmpprog "$dst" "$dsttmp" >/dev/null 2>&1
+    then
+      rm -f "$dsttmp"
+    else
+      # If $backupsuffix is set, and the file being installed
+      # already exists, attempt a backup.  Don't worry if it fails,
+      # e.g., if mv doesn't support -f.
+      if test -n "$backupsuffix" && test -f "$dst"; then
+        $doit $mvcmd -f "$dst" "$dst$backupsuffix" 2>/dev/null
+      fi
+
+      # Rename the file to the real destination.
+      $doit $mvcmd -f "$dsttmp" "$dst" 2>/dev/null ||
+
+      # The rename failed, perhaps because mv can't rename something else
+      # to itself, or perhaps because mv is so ancient that it does not
+      # support -f.
+      {
+        # Now remove or move aside any old file at destination location.
+        # We try this two ways since rm can't unlink itself on some
+        # systems and the destination file might be busy for other
+        # reasons.  In this case, the final cleanup might fail but the new
+        # file should still install successfully.
+        {
+          test ! -f "$dst" ||
+          $doit $rmcmd "$dst" 2>/dev/null ||
+          { $doit $mvcmd -f "$dst" "$rmtmp" 2>/dev/null &&
+            { $doit $rmcmd "$rmtmp" 2>/dev/null; :; }
+          } ||
+          { echo "$0: cannot unlink or rename $dst" >&2
+            (exit 1); exit 1
+          }
+        } &&
+
+        # Now rename the file to the real destination.
+        $doit $mvcmd "$dsttmp" "$dst"
+      }
+    fi || exit 1
+
+    trap '' 0
+  fi
+done
+
+# Local variables:
+# eval: (add-hook 'before-save-hook 'time-stamp)
+# time-stamp-start: "scriptversion="
+# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d.%02H"
+# time-stamp-time-zone: "UTC0"
+# time-stamp-end: "; # UTC"
+# End:
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8cdefcf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1421 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.173 2022/11/07 10:05:38 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "version.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+/* prototype */
+static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
+static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+
+static const char * const proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
+	"KEX algorithms",
+	"host key algorithms",
+	"ciphers ctos",
+	"ciphers stoc",
+	"MACs ctos",
+	"MACs stoc",
+	"compression ctos",
+	"compression stoc",
+	"languages ctos",
+	"languages stoc",
+};
+
+struct kexalg {
+	char *name;
+	u_int type;
+	int ec_nid;
+	int hash_alg;
+};
+static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	{ KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
+	{ KEX_DH14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
+	{ KEX_DH14_SHA256, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+	{ KEX_DH16_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
+	{ KEX_DH18_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
+	{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
+	{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
+	    NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+	{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1,
+	    SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 },
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+	{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1,
+	    SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+#if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) || !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+	{ KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+	{ KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_OLD, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
+#ifdef USE_SNTRUP761X25519
+	{ KEX_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512, KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512, 0,
+	    SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
+#endif
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
+	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
+};
+
+char *
+kex_alg_list(char sep)
+{
+	char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
+	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
+	const struct kexalg *k;
+
+	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+		if (ret != NULL)
+			ret[rlen++] = sep;
+		nlen = strlen(k->name);
+		if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
+			free(ret);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		ret = tmp;
+		memcpy(ret + rlen, k->name, nlen + 1);
+		rlen += nlen;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct kexalg *
+kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+	const struct kexalg *k;
+
+	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
+			return k;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Validate KEX method name list */
+int
+kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+{
+	char *s, *cp, *p;
+
+	if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+		return 0;
+	if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
+			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+			free(s);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	debug3("kex names ok: [%s]", names);
+	free(s);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+char *
+kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+{
+	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
+		return strdup(b);
+	if (b == NULL || *b == '\0')
+		return strdup(a);
+	if (strlen(b) > 1024*1024)
+		return NULL;
+	len = strlen(a) + strlen(b) + 2;
+	if ((tmp = cp = strdup(b)) == NULL ||
+	    (ret = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
+		free(tmp);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	strlcpy(ret, a, len);
+	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+		if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
+			free(m);
+			continue; /* Algorithm already present */
+		}
+		if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
+		    strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
+			free(tmp);
+			free(ret);
+			return NULL; /* Shouldn't happen */
+		}
+	}
+	free(tmp);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Assemble a list of algorithms from a default list and a string from a
+ * configuration file. The user-provided string may begin with '+' to
+ * indicate that it should be appended to the default, '-' that the
+ * specified names should be removed, or '^' that they should be placed
+ * at the head.
+ */
+int
+kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all)
+{
+	char *cp, *tmp, *patterns;
+	char *list = NULL, *ret = NULL, *matching = NULL, *opatterns = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (listp == NULL || def == NULL || all == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	if (*listp == NULL || **listp == '\0') {
+		if ((*listp = strdup(def)) == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	list = *listp;
+	*listp = NULL;
+	if (*list == '+') {
+		/* Append names to default list */
+		if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(def, list + 1)) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		free(list);
+		list = tmp;
+	} else if (*list == '-') {
+		/* Remove names from default list */
+		if ((*listp = match_filter_denylist(def, list + 1)) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		free(list);
+		/* filtering has already been done */
+		return 0;
+	} else if (*list == '^') {
+		/* Place names at head of default list */
+		if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(list + 1, def)) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		free(list);
+		list = tmp;
+	} else {
+		/* Explicit list, overrides default - just use "list" as is */
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The supplied names may be a pattern-list. For the -list case,
+	 * the patterns are applied above. For the +list and explicit list
+	 * cases we need to do it now.
+	 */
+	ret = NULL;
+	if ((patterns = opatterns = strdup(list)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	/* Apply positive (i.e. non-negated) patterns from the list */
+	while ((cp = strsep(&patterns, ",")) != NULL) {
+		if (*cp == '!') {
+			/* negated matches are not supported here */
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		free(matching);
+		if ((matching = match_filter_allowlist(all, cp)) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(ret, matching)) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		free(ret);
+		ret = tmp;
+	}
+	if (ret == NULL || *ret == '\0') {
+		/* An empty name-list is an error */
+		/* XXX better error code? */
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* success */
+	*listp = ret;
+	ret = NULL;
+	r = 0;
+
+ fail:
+	free(matching);
+	free(opatterns);
+	free(list);
+	free(ret);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
+int
+kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+{
+	u_int i;
+	int r;
+
+	sshbuf_reset(b);
+
+	/*
+	 * add a dummy cookie, the cookie will be overwritten by
+	 * kex_send_kexinit(), each time a kexinit is set
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, proposal[i])) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 ||	/* first_kex_packet_follows */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, 0)) != 0)	/* uint32 reserved */
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* parse buffer and return algorithm proposal */
+int
+kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *raw, int *first_kex_follows, char ***propp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	u_char v;
+	u_int i;
+	char **proposal = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	*propp = NULL;
+	if ((proposal = calloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *))) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(raw)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, KEX_COOKIE_LEN)) != 0) { /* skip cookie */
+		error_fr(r, "consume cookie");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* extract kex init proposal strings */
+	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(proposal[i]), NULL)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "parse proposal %u", i);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		debug2("%s: %s", proposal_names[i], proposal[i]);
+	}
+	/* first kex follows / reserved */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &v)) != 0 ||	/* first_kex_follows */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i)) != 0) {	/* reserved */
+		error_fr(r, "parse");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (first_kex_follows != NULL)
+		*first_kex_follows = v;
+	debug2("first_kex_follows %d ", v);
+	debug2("reserved %u ", i);
+	r = 0;
+	*propp = proposal;
+ out:
+	if (r != 0 && proposal != NULL)
+		kex_prop_free(proposal);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
+}
+
+void
+kex_prop_free(char **proposal)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (proposal == NULL)
+		return;
+	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
+		free(proposal[i]);
+	free(proposal);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+kex_reset_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN,
+	    SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error);
+}
+
+static int
+kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	int r;
+	char *algs;
+
+	debug("Sending SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO");
+	if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	/* XXX filter algs list by allowed pubkey/hostbased types */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 2)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, algs)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
+	    "publickey-hostbound@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "0")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "compose");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(algs);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_input_newkeys);
+	if (ssh->kex->ext_info_c && (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0)
+		if ((r = kex_send_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	u_int32_t i, ninfo;
+	char *name;
+	u_char *val;
+	size_t vlen;
+	int r;
+
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO received");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &val, &vlen)) != 0) {
+			free(name);
+			return r;
+		}
+		if (strcmp(name, "server-sig-algs") == 0) {
+			/* Ensure no \0 lurking in value */
+			if (memchr(val, '\0', vlen) != NULL) {
+				error_f("nul byte in %s", name);
+				return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			}
+			debug_f("%s=<%s>", name, val);
+			kex->server_sig_algs = val;
+			val = NULL;
+		} else if (strcmp(name,
+		    "publickey-hostbound@openssh.com") == 0) {
+			/* XXX refactor */
+			/* Ensure no \0 lurking in value */
+			if (memchr(val, '\0', vlen) != NULL) {
+				error_f("nul byte in %s", name);
+				return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			}
+			debug_f("%s=<%s>", name, val);
+			if (strcmp(val, "0") == 0)
+				kex->flags |= KEX_HAS_PUBKEY_HOSTBOUND;
+			else {
+				debug_f("unsupported version of %s extension",
+				    name);
+			}
+		} else
+			debug_f("%s (unrecognised)", name);
+		free(name);
+		free(val);
+	}
+	return sshpkt_get_end(ssh);
+}
+
+static int
+kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	int r;
+
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	kex->done = 1;
+	kex->flags &= ~KEX_INITIAL;
+	sshbuf_reset(kex->peer);
+	/* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */
+	kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT;
+	free(kex->name);
+	kex->name = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	u_char *cookie;
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	int r;
+
+	if (kex == NULL) {
+		error_f("no kex");
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)
+		return 0;
+	kex->done = 0;
+
+	/* generate a random cookie */
+	if (sshbuf_len(kex->my) < KEX_COOKIE_LEN) {
+		error_f("bad kex length: %zu < %d",
+		    sshbuf_len(kex->my), KEX_COOKIE_LEN);
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	}
+	if ((cookie = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(kex->my)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("buffer error");
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	arc4random_buf(cookie, KEX_COOKIE_LEN);
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "compose reply");
+		return r;
+	}
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent");
+	kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	const u_char *ptr;
+	u_int i;
+	size_t dlen;
+	int r;
+
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
+	if (kex == NULL) {
+		error_f("no kex");
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
+	ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* discard packet */
+	for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "discard cookie");
+			return r;
+		}
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "discard proposal");
+			return r;
+		}
+	}
+	/*
+	 * XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported
+	 * KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using
+	 * a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should
+	 * be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a
+	 * packet later.
+	 * XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means
+	 * for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should
+	 * ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now.
+	 */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 ||	/* first_kex_follows */
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 ||	/* reserved */
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+			return r;
+
+	if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
+		if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
+		return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh);
+
+	error_f("unknown kex type %u", kex->kex_type);
+	return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+
+struct kex *
+kex_new(void)
+{
+	struct kex *kex;
+
+	if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(*kex))) == NULL ||
+	    (kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (kex->client_version = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (kex->server_version = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (kex->session_id = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		kex_free(kex);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return kex;
+}
+
+void
+kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *newkeys)
+{
+	if (newkeys == NULL)
+		return;
+	if (newkeys->enc.key) {
+		explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.key, newkeys->enc.key_len);
+		free(newkeys->enc.key);
+		newkeys->enc.key = NULL;
+	}
+	if (newkeys->enc.iv) {
+		explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.iv, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
+		free(newkeys->enc.iv);
+		newkeys->enc.iv = NULL;
+	}
+	free(newkeys->enc.name);
+	explicit_bzero(&newkeys->enc, sizeof(newkeys->enc));
+	free(newkeys->comp.name);
+	explicit_bzero(&newkeys->comp, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
+	mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
+	if (newkeys->mac.key) {
+		explicit_bzero(newkeys->mac.key, newkeys->mac.key_len);
+		free(newkeys->mac.key);
+		newkeys->mac.key = NULL;
+	}
+	free(newkeys->mac.name);
+	explicit_bzero(&newkeys->mac, sizeof(newkeys->mac));
+	freezero(newkeys, sizeof(*newkeys));
+}
+
+void
+kex_free(struct kex *kex)
+{
+	u_int mode;
+
+	if (kex == NULL)
+		return;
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	DH_free(kex->dh);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+		kex_free_newkeys(kex->newkeys[mode]);
+		kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
+	sshbuf_free(kex->my);
+	sshbuf_free(kex->client_version);
+	sshbuf_free(kex->server_version);
+	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
+	sshbuf_free(kex->session_id);
+	sshbuf_free(kex->initial_sig);
+	sshkey_free(kex->initial_hostkey);
+	free(kex->failed_choice);
+	free(kex->hostkey_alg);
+	free(kex->name);
+	free(kex);
+}
+
+int
+kex_ready(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, proposal)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	ssh->kex->flags = KEX_INITIAL;
+	kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+kex_setup(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = kex_ready(ssh, proposal)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) {		/* we start */
+		kex_free(ssh->kex);
+		ssh->kex = NULL;
+		return r;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Request key re-exchange, returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error
+ * code otherwise. Must not be called if KEX is incomplete or in-progress.
+ */
+int
+kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	if (ssh->kex == NULL) {
+		error_f("no kex");
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	if (ssh->kex->done == 0) {
+		error_f("requested twice");
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	ssh->kex->done = 0;
+	return kex_send_kexinit(ssh);
+}
+
+static int
+choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server)
+{
+	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
+	if (name == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH;
+	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("unsupported cipher %s", name);
+		free(name);
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	enc->name = name;
+	enc->enabled = 0;
+	enc->iv = NULL;
+	enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher);
+	enc->key = NULL;
+	enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher);
+	enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server)
+{
+	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
+	if (name == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH;
+	if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) {
+		error_f("unsupported MAC %s", name);
+		free(name);
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	mac->name = name;
+	mac->key = NULL;
+	mac->enabled = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
+{
+	char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
+	if (name == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH;
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+	if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
+		comp->type = COMP_ZLIB;
+	} else
+#endif	/* WITH_ZLIB */
+	if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
+		comp->type = COMP_NONE;
+	} else {
+		error_f("unsupported compression scheme %s", name);
+		free(name);
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	comp->name = name;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+choose_kex(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server)
+{
+	const struct kexalg *kexalg;
+
+	k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
+	debug("kex: algorithm: %s", k->name ? k->name : "(no match)");
+	if (k->name == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH;
+	if ((kexalg = kex_alg_by_name(k->name)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("unsupported KEX method %s", k->name);
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	k->kex_type = kexalg->type;
+	k->hash_alg = kexalg->hash_alg;
+	k->ec_nid = kexalg->ec_nid;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+choose_hostkeyalg(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server)
+{
+	free(k->hostkey_alg);
+	k->hostkey_alg = match_list(client, server, NULL);
+
+	debug("kex: host key algorithm: %s",
+	    k->hostkey_alg ? k->hostkey_alg : "(no match)");
+	if (k->hostkey_alg == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH;
+	k->hostkey_type = sshkey_type_from_name(k->hostkey_alg);
+	if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+		error_f("unsupported hostkey algorithm %s", k->hostkey_alg);
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	k->hostkey_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(k->hostkey_alg);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+{
+	static int check[] = {
+		PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, -1
+	};
+	int *idx;
+	char *p;
+
+	for (idx = &check[0]; *idx != -1; idx++) {
+		if ((p = strchr(my[*idx], ',')) != NULL)
+			*p = '\0';
+		if ((p = strchr(peer[*idx], ',')) != NULL)
+			*p = '\0';
+		if (strcmp(my[*idx], peer[*idx]) != 0) {
+			debug2("proposal mismatch: my %s peer %s",
+			    my[*idx], peer[*idx]);
+			return (0);
+		}
+	}
+	debug2("proposals match");
+	return (1);
+}
+
+/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
+static int
+has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
+{
+	char *cp;
+
+	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	free(cp);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	struct newkeys *newkeys;
+	char **my = NULL, **peer = NULL;
+	char **cprop, **sprop;
+	int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
+	u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen;
+	int r, first_kex_follows;
+
+	debug2("local %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "server" : "client");
+	if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	debug2("peer %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "client" : "server");
+	if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->peer, &first_kex_follows, &peer)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (kex->server) {
+		cprop=peer;
+		sprop=my;
+	} else {
+		cprop=my;
+		sprop=peer;
+	}
+
+	/* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
+	if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
+		char *ext;
+
+		ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
+		kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
+		free(ext);
+	}
+
+	/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
+	if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
+		if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+		    "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
+			kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED;
+		if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+		    "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
+			kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED;
+	}
+
+	/* Algorithm Negotiation */
+	if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+	    sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) {
+		kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+		peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+	    sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) != 0) {
+		kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+		peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+		if ((newkeys = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys))) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys;
+		ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
+		    (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
+		nenc  = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS  : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
+		nmac  = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS  : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC;
+		ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC;
+		if ((r = choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc],
+		    sprop[nenc])) != 0) {
+			kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc];
+			peer[nenc] = NULL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		authlen = cipher_authlen(newkeys->enc.cipher);
+		/* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */
+		if (authlen == 0 &&
+		    (r = choose_mac(ssh, &newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac],
+		    sprop[nmac])) != 0) {
+			kex->failed_choice = peer[nmac];
+			peer[nmac] = NULL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp],
+		    sprop[ncomp])) != 0) {
+			kex->failed_choice = peer[ncomp];
+			peer[ncomp] = NULL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		debug("kex: %s cipher: %s MAC: %s compression: %s",
+		    ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
+		    newkeys->enc.name,
+		    authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
+		    newkeys->comp.name);
+	}
+	need = dh_need = 0;
+	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+		newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode];
+		need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.key_len);
+		need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
+		need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
+		need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
+		dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, cipher_seclen(newkeys->enc.cipher));
+		dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
+		dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
+		dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
+	}
+	/* XXX need runden? */
+	kex->we_need = need;
+	kex->dh_need = dh_need;
+
+	/* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */
+	if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer))
+		ssh->dispatch_skip_packets = 1;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	kex_prop_free(my);
+	kex_prop_free(peer);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL;
+	char c = id;
+	u_int have;
+	size_t mdsz;
+	u_char *digest;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((mdsz = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((digest = calloc(1, ROUNDUP(need, mdsz))) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */
+	if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL ||
+	    ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_update(hashctx, &c, 1) != 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, kex->session_id) != 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest, mdsz) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		error_f("KEX hash failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+	hashctx = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * expand key:
+	 * Kn = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2 || ... || Kn-1)
+	 * Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn
+	 */
+	for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) {
+		if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL ||
+		    ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 ||
+		    ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 ||
+		    ssh_digest_update(hashctx, digest, have) != 0 ||
+		    ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest + have, mdsz) != 0) {
+			error_f("KDF failed");
+			r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+		hashctx = NULL;
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+	fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", c);
+	dump_digest("key", digest, need);
+#endif
+	*keyp = digest;
+	digest = NULL;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(digest);
+	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
+	return r;
+}
+
+#define NKEYS	6
+int
+kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
+    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	u_char *keys[NKEYS];
+	u_int i, j, mode, ctos;
+	int r;
+
+	/* save initial hash as session id */
+	if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+		if (sshbuf_len(kex->session_id) != 0) {
+			error_f("already have session ID at kex");
+			return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->session_id, hash, hashlen)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	} else if (sshbuf_len(kex->session_id) == 0) {
+		error_f("no session ID in rekex");
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++) {
+		if ((r = derive_key(ssh, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, hashlen,
+		    shared_secret, &keys[i])) != 0) {
+			for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+				free(keys[j]);
+			return r;
+		}
+	}
+	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+		ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
+		    (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
+		kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.iv  = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1];
+		kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3];
+		kex->newkeys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5];
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+kex_load_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey **prvp, struct sshkey **pubp)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+
+	*pubp = NULL;
+	*prvp = NULL;
+	if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
+	    kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
+		error_f("missing hostkey loader");
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	}
+	*pubp = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+	    kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+	*prvp = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type,
+	    kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
+	if (*pubp == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+kex_verify_host_key(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *server_host_key)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+
+	if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
+		error_f("missing hostkey verifier");
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	}
+	if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
+	    (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
+	    server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid))
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+	if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1)
+		return  SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
+void
+dump_digest(const char *msg, const u_char *digest, int len)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg);
+	sshbuf_dump_data(digest, len, stderr);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Send a plaintext error message to the peer, suffixed by \r\n.
+ * Only used during banner exchange, and there only for the server.
+ */
+static void
+send_error(struct ssh *ssh, char *msg)
+{
+	char *crnl = "\r\n";
+
+	if (!ssh->kex->server)
+		return;
+
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh),
+	    msg, strlen(msg)) != strlen(msg) ||
+	    atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh),
+	    crnl, strlen(crnl)) != strlen(crnl))
+		error_f("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sends our identification string and waits for the peer's. Will block for
+ * up to timeout_ms (or indefinitely if timeout_ms <= 0).
+ * Returns on 0 success or a ssherr.h code on failure.
+ */
+int
+kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout_ms,
+    const char *version_addendum)
+{
+	int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch, oerrno = 0;
+	size_t len, n;
+	int r, expect_nl;
+	u_char c;
+	struct sshbuf *our_version = ssh->kex->server ?
+	    ssh->kex->server_version : ssh->kex->client_version;
+	struct sshbuf *peer_version = ssh->kex->server ?
+	    ssh->kex->client_version : ssh->kex->server_version;
+	char *our_version_string = NULL, *peer_version_string = NULL;
+	char *cp, *remote_version = NULL;
+
+	/* Prepare and send our banner */
+	sshbuf_reset(our_version);
+	if (version_addendum != NULL && *version_addendum == '\0')
+		version_addendum = NULL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(our_version, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
+	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
+	    version_addendum == NULL ? "" : " ",
+	    version_addendum == NULL ? "" : version_addendum)) != 0) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		error_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh),
+	    sshbuf_mutable_ptr(our_version),
+	    sshbuf_len(our_version)) != sshbuf_len(our_version)) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		debug_f("write: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(our_version, 2)) != 0) { /* trim \r\n */
+		oerrno = errno;
+		error_fr(r, "sshbuf_consume_end");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	our_version_string = sshbuf_dup_string(our_version);
+	if (our_version_string == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	debug("Local version string %.100s", our_version_string);
+
+	/* Read other side's version identification. */
+	for (n = 0; ; n++) {
+		if (n >= SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES) {
+			send_error(ssh, "No SSH identification string "
+			    "received.");
+			error_f("No SSH version received in first %u lines "
+			    "from server", SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES);
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		sshbuf_reset(peer_version);
+		expect_nl = 0;
+		for (;;) {
+			if (timeout_ms > 0) {
+				r = waitrfd(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+				    &timeout_ms);
+				if (r == -1 && errno == ETIMEDOUT) {
+					send_error(ssh, "Timed out waiting "
+					    "for SSH identification string.");
+					error("Connection timed out during "
+					    "banner exchange");
+					r = SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
+					goto out;
+				} else if (r == -1) {
+					oerrno = errno;
+					error_f("%s", strerror(errno));
+					r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+					goto out;
+				}
+			}
+
+			len = atomicio(read, ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+			    &c, 1);
+			if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE) {
+				error_f("Connection closed by remote host");
+				r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
+				goto out;
+			} else if (len != 1) {
+				oerrno = errno;
+				error_f("read: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+				r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (c == '\r') {
+				expect_nl = 1;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (c == '\n')
+				break;
+			if (c == '\0' || expect_nl) {
+				error_f("banner line contains invalid "
+				    "characters");
+				goto invalid;
+			}
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(peer_version, c)) != 0) {
+				oerrno = errno;
+				error_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (sshbuf_len(peer_version) > SSH_MAX_BANNER_LEN) {
+				error_f("banner line too long");
+				goto invalid;
+			}
+		}
+		/* Is this an actual protocol banner? */
+		if (sshbuf_len(peer_version) > 4 &&
+		    memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(peer_version), "SSH-", 4) == 0)
+			break;
+		/* If not, then just log the line and continue */
+		if ((cp = sshbuf_dup_string(peer_version)) == NULL) {
+			error_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/* Do not accept lines before the SSH ident from a client */
+		if (ssh->kex->server) {
+			error_f("client sent invalid protocol identifier "
+			    "\"%.256s\"", cp);
+			free(cp);
+			goto invalid;
+		}
+		debug_f("banner line %zu: %s", n, cp);
+		free(cp);
+	}
+	peer_version_string = sshbuf_dup_string(peer_version);
+	if (peer_version_string == NULL)
+		error_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+	/* XXX must be same size for sscanf */
+	if ((remote_version = calloc(1, sshbuf_len(peer_version))) == NULL) {
+		error_f("calloc failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that the versions match.  In future this might accept
+	 * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
+	 */
+	if (sscanf(peer_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
+	    &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
+		error("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'",
+		    peer_version_string);
+ invalid:
+		send_error(ssh, "Invalid SSH identification string.");
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
+	    remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
+	compat_banner(ssh, remote_version);
+
+	mismatch = 0;
+	switch (remote_major) {
+	case 2:
+		break;
+	case 1:
+		if (remote_minor != 99)
+			mismatch = 1;
+		break;
+	default:
+		mismatch = 1;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (mismatch) {
+		error("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d",
+		    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, remote_major);
+		send_error(ssh, "Protocol major versions differ.");
+		r = SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (ssh->kex->server && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) {
+		logit("probed from %s port %d with %s.  Don't panic.",
+		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+		    peer_version_string);
+		r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; /* XXX */
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (ssh->kex->server && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) {
+		logit("scanned from %s port %d with %s.  Don't panic.",
+		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+		    peer_version_string);
+		r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; /* XXX */
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
+		logit("Remote version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature "
+		    "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version);
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(our_version_string);
+	free(peer_version_string);
+	free(remote_version);
+	if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
+		errno = oerrno;
+	return r;
+}
+
diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c353295
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kex.h
@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.117 2022/01/06 21:55:23 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef KEX_H
+#define KEX_H
+
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/dh.h>
+# include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+#  include <openssl/ec.h>
+# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#  define EC_KEY	void
+#  define EC_GROUP	void
+#  define EC_POINT	void
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+# define DH		void
+# define BIGNUM		void
+# define EC_KEY		void
+# define EC_GROUP	void
+# define EC_POINT	void
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#define KEX_COOKIE_LEN	16
+
+#define	KEX_DH1				"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1"
+#define	KEX_DH14_SHA1			"diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
+#define	KEX_DH14_SHA256			"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
+#define	KEX_DH16_SHA512			"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512"
+#define	KEX_DH18_SHA512			"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512"
+#define	KEX_DHGEX_SHA1			"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
+#define	KEX_DHGEX_SHA256		"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"
+#define	KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256		"ecdh-sha2-nistp256"
+#define	KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384		"ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
+#define	KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521		"ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
+#define	KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256		"curve25519-sha256"
+#define	KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_OLD	"curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"
+#define	KEX_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512	"sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com"
+
+#define COMP_NONE	0
+/* pre-auth compression (COMP_ZLIB) is only supported in the client */
+#define COMP_ZLIB	1
+#define COMP_DELAYED	2
+
+#define CURVE25519_SIZE 32
+
+enum kex_init_proposals {
+	PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS,
+	PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS,
+	PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS,
+	PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC,
+	PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS,
+	PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC,
+	PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS,
+	PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC,
+	PROPOSAL_LANG_CTOS,
+	PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC,
+	PROPOSAL_MAX
+};
+
+enum kex_modes {
+	MODE_IN,
+	MODE_OUT,
+	MODE_MAX
+};
+
+enum kex_exchange {
+	KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1,
+	KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1,
+	KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256,
+	KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512,
+	KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512,
+	KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1,
+	KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256,
+	KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
+	KEX_C25519_SHA256,
+	KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512,
+	KEX_MAX
+};
+
+/* kex->flags */
+#define KEX_INIT_SENT			0x0001
+#define KEX_INITIAL			0x0002
+#define KEX_HAS_PUBKEY_HOSTBOUND	0x0004
+#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED 	0x0008 /* only set in server for now */
+#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED 	0x0010 /* only set in server for now */
+
+struct sshenc {
+	char	*name;
+	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+	int	enabled;
+	u_int	key_len;
+	u_int	iv_len;
+	u_int	block_size;
+	u_char	*key;
+	u_char	*iv;
+};
+struct sshcomp {
+	u_int	type;
+	int	enabled;
+	char	*name;
+};
+struct newkeys {
+	struct sshenc	enc;
+	struct sshmac	mac;
+	struct sshcomp  comp;
+};
+
+struct ssh;
+struct sshbuf;
+
+struct kex {
+	struct newkeys	*newkeys[MODE_MAX];
+	u_int	we_need;
+	u_int	dh_need;
+	int	server;
+	char	*name;
+	char	*hostkey_alg;
+	int	hostkey_type;
+	int	hostkey_nid;
+	u_int	kex_type;
+	char	*server_sig_algs;
+	int	ext_info_c;
+	struct sshbuf *my;
+	struct sshbuf *peer;
+	struct sshbuf *client_version;
+	struct sshbuf *server_version;
+	struct sshbuf *session_id;
+	struct sshbuf *initial_sig;
+	struct sshkey *initial_hostkey;
+	sig_atomic_t done;
+	u_int	flags;
+	int	hash_alg;
+	int	ec_nid;
+	char	*failed_choice;
+	int	(*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
+	struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *);
+	struct sshkey *(*load_host_private_key)(int, int, struct ssh *);
+	int	(*host_key_index)(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *);
+	int	(*sign)(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
+	    u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
+	int	(*kex[KEX_MAX])(struct ssh *);
+	/* kex specific state */
+	DH	*dh;			/* DH */
+	u_int	min, max, nbits;	/* GEX */
+	EC_KEY	*ec_client_key;		/* ECDH */
+	const EC_GROUP *ec_group;	/* ECDH */
+	u_char c25519_client_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; /* 25519 + KEM */
+	u_char c25519_client_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE]; /* 25519 */
+	u_char sntrup761_client_key[crypto_kem_sntrup761_SECRETKEYBYTES]; /* KEM */
+	struct sshbuf *client_pub;
+};
+
+int	 kex_names_valid(const char *);
+char	*kex_alg_list(char);
+char	*kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *);
+int	 kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *);
+
+int	 kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
+
+struct kex *kex_new(void);
+int	 kex_ready(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
+int	 kex_setup(struct ssh *, char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
+void	 kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *);
+void	 kex_free(struct kex *);
+
+int	 kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *, int *, char ***);
+int	 kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]);
+void	 kex_prop_free(char **);
+int	 kex_load_hostkey(struct ssh *, struct sshkey **, struct sshkey **);
+int	 kex_verify_host_key(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *);
+
+int	 kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *);
+int	 kex_input_kexinit(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+int	 kex_input_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+int	 kex_protocol_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+int	 kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int, const struct sshbuf *);
+int	 kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *);
+int	 kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *);
+
+int	 kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
+int	 kexgex_server(struct ssh *);
+int	 kex_gen_client(struct ssh *);
+int	 kex_gen_server(struct ssh *);
+
+int	 kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *);
+int	 kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **,
+    struct sshbuf **);
+int	 kex_dh_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **);
+
+int	 kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *);
+int	 kex_ecdh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **,
+    struct sshbuf **);
+int	 kex_ecdh_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **);
+
+int	 kex_c25519_keypair(struct kex *);
+int	 kex_c25519_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **,
+    struct sshbuf **);
+int	 kex_c25519_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **);
+
+int	 kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(struct kex *);
+int	 kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
+    struct sshbuf **, struct sshbuf **);
+int	 kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *,
+    struct sshbuf **);
+
+int	 kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *);
+int	 kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *, BIGNUM *, struct sshbuf *);
+
+int	 kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *,
+    const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *,
+    int, int, int,
+    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+    const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, size_t,
+    u_char *, size_t *);
+
+void	kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE])
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
+int	kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+    const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
+int	kexc25519_shared_key_ext(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+    const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
+
+#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
+void	dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) || !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+# undef EC_KEY
+# undef EC_GROUP
+# undef EC_POINT
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/kexc25519.c b/kexc25519.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f13d766
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexc25519.c
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.17 2019/01/21 10:40:11 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+
+extern int crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(u_char a[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+    const u_char b[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char c[CURVE25519_SIZE])
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 3, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
+
+void
+kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE])
+{
+	static const u_char basepoint[CURVE25519_SIZE] = {9};
+
+	arc4random_buf(key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+	crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(pub, key, basepoint);
+}
+
+int
+kexc25519_shared_key_ext(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+    const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int raw)
+{
+	u_char shared_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
+	u_char zero[CURVE25519_SIZE];
+	int r;
+
+	crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(shared_key, key, pub);
+
+	/* Check for all-zero shared secret */
+	explicit_bzero(zero, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+	if (timingsafe_bcmp(zero, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE) == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("shared secret", shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+	if (raw)
+		r = sshbuf_put(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+	else
+		r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+	explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE],
+    const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out)
+{
+	return kexc25519_shared_key_ext(key, pub, out, 0);
+}
+
+int
+kex_c25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	u_char *cp = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, CURVE25519_SIZE, &cp)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, cp);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("client public key c25519:", cp, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+	kex->client_pub = buf;
+	buf = NULL;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_c25519_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
+   struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	const u_char *client_pub;
+	u_char *server_pub;
+	u_char server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
+	int r;
+
+	*server_blobp = NULL;
+	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+	if (sshbuf_len(client_blob) != CURVE25519_SIZE) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("client public key 25519:", client_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+	/* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */
+	if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(server_blob, CURVE25519_SIZE, &server_pub)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pub);
+	/* allocate shared secret */
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, buf, 0)) < 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("server public key 25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+	*server_blobp = server_blob;
+	*shared_secretp = buf;
+	server_blob = NULL;
+	buf = NULL;
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
+	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_c25519_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *server_blob,
+    struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	const u_char *server_pub;
+	int r;
+
+	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+	if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != CURVE25519_SIZE) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	server_pub = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("server public key c25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+	/* shared secret */
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pub,
+	    buf, 0)) < 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+	*shared_secretp = buf;
+	buf = NULL;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1084f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexdh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexdh.c,v 1.34 2020/12/04 02:29:25 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+int
+kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex)
+{
+	switch (kex->kex_type) {
+	case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
+		kex->dh = dh_new_group1();
+		break;
+	case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
+	case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
+		kex->dh = dh_new_group14();
+		break;
+	case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
+		kex->dh = dh_new_group16();
+		break;
+	case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
+		kex->dh = dh_new_group18();
+		break;
+	default:
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	}
+	if (kex->dh == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	return (dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8));
+}
+
+int
+kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
+{
+	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+	size_t klen = 0;
+	int kout, r;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_pub);
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+	debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_pub));
+	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#endif
+
+	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_pub)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
+	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
+#endif
+	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret);
+ out:
+	freezero(kbuf, klen);
+	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key;
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = kex_dh_keygen(kex)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, pub_key)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
+	fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key);
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#endif
+	kex->client_pub = buf;
+	buf = NULL;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_dh_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
+    struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key;
+	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	*server_blobp = NULL;
+	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+	if ((r = kex_dh_keygen(kex)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+	if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(server_blob, pub_key)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(server_blob, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = kex_dh_dec(kex, client_blob, shared_secretp)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	*server_blobp = server_blob;
+	server_blob = NULL;
+ out:
+	DH_free(kex->dh);
+	kex->dh = NULL;
+	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_dh_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *dh_blob,
+    struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *dh_pub = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, dh_blob)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_pub)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	sshbuf_reset(buf);
+	if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_pub, buf)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	*shared_secretp = buf;
+	buf = NULL;
+ out:
+	BN_free(dh_pub);
+	DH_free(kex->dh);
+	kex->dh = NULL;
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/kexecdh.c b/kexecdh.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..efb2e55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexecdh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexecdh.c,v 1.10 2019/01/21 10:40:11 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+static int
+kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
+    const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
+
+int
+kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+{
+	EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
+	const EC_GROUP *group;
+	const EC_POINT *public_key;
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	group = EC_KEY_get0_group(client_key);
+	public_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(client_key);
+
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_ec(buf, public_key, group)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	fputs("client private key:\n", stderr);
+	sshkey_dump_ec_key(client_key);
+#endif
+	kex->ec_client_key = client_key;
+	kex->ec_group = group;
+	client_key = NULL;	/* owned by the kex */
+	kex->client_pub = buf;
+	buf = NULL;
+ out:
+	EC_KEY_free(client_key);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_ecdh_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
+    struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+	const EC_GROUP *group;
+	const EC_POINT *pub_key;
+	EC_KEY *server_key = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	*server_blobp = NULL;
+	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	group = EC_KEY_get0_group(server_key);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	fputs("server private key:\n", stderr);
+	sshkey_dump_ec_key(server_key);
+#endif
+	pub_key = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(server_key);
+	if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_ec(server_blob, pub_key, group)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(server_blob, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(kex, client_blob, server_key, group,
+	    shared_secretp)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	*server_blobp = server_blob;
+	server_blob = NULL;
+ out:
+	EC_KEY_free(server_key);
+	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *ec_blob,
+    EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+	EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
+	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+	size_t klen = 0;
+	int r;
+
+	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
+		goto out;
+	}
+	sshbuf_reset(buf);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
+	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
+#endif
+	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+#endif
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	*shared_secretp = buf;
+	buf = NULL;
+ out:
+	EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
+	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+	freezero(kbuf, klen);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_ecdh_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *server_blob,
+    struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	r = kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(kex, server_blob, kex->ec_client_key,
+	    kex->ec_group, shared_secretp);
+	EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
+	kex->ec_client_key = NULL;
+	return r;
+}
+
+#else
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+struct kex;
+struct sshbuf;
+struct sshkey;
+
+int
+kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+{
+	return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int
+kex_ecdh_enc(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *client_blob,
+    struct sshbuf **server_blobp, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+	return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int
+kex_ecdh_dec(struct kex *kex, const struct sshbuf *server_blob,
+    struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+	return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */
diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20f3c57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexgen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,371 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgen.c,v 1.8 2021/12/19 22:08:06 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+static int input_kex_gen_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh);
+
+static int
+kex_gen_hash(
+    int hash_alg,
+    const struct sshbuf *client_version,
+    const struct sshbuf *server_version,
+    const struct sshbuf *client_kexinit,
+    const struct sshbuf *server_kexinit,
+    const struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob,
+    const struct sshbuf *client_pub,
+    const struct sshbuf *server_pub,
+    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret,
+    u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	int r;
+
+	if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg))
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, client_version)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_version)) != 0 ||
+	    /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sshbuf_len(client_kexinit) + 1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_putb(b, client_kexinit)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sshbuf_len(server_kexinit) + 1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_putb(b, server_kexinit)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_host_key_blob)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, client_pub)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_pub)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_putb(b, shared_secret)) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(b);
+		return r;
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+	sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+#endif
+	if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(b);
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	*hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
+	dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen);
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	int r;
+
+	switch (kex->kex_type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
+	case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
+	case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
+	case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
+	case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
+		r = kex_dh_keypair(kex);
+		break;
+	case KEX_ECDH_SHA2:
+		r = kex_ecdh_keypair(kex);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+		r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
+		break;
+	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
+		break;
+	default:
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (r != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY, &input_kex_gen_reply);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *tmp = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+	u_char *signature = NULL;
+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	size_t slen, hashlen;
+	int r;
+
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY received");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY, &kex_protocol_error);
+
+	/* hostkey */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* sshkey_fromb() consumes its buffer, so make a copy */
+	if ((tmp = sshbuf_fromb(server_host_key_blob)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_fromb(tmp, &server_host_key)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = kex_verify_host_key(ssh, server_host_key)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Q_S, server public key */
+	/* signed H */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* compute shared secret */
+	switch (kex->kex_type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
+	case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
+	case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
+	case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
+	case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
+		r = kex_dh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
+		break;
+	case KEX_ECDH_SHA2:
+		r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
+		break;
+	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+		    &shared_secret);
+		break;
+	default:
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (r !=0 )
+		goto out;
+
+	/* calc and verify H */
+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+	if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
+	    kex->hash_alg,
+	    kex->client_version,
+	    kex->server_version,
+	    kex->my,
+	    kex->peer,
+	    server_host_key_blob,
+	    kex->client_pub,
+	    server_blob,
+	    shared_secret,
+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen,
+	    kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* save initial signature and hostkey */
+	if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+		if (kex->initial_hostkey != NULL || kex->initial_sig != NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((kex->initial_sig = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->initial_sig, signature, slen)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		kex->initial_hostkey = server_host_key;
+		server_host_key = NULL;
+	}
+	/* success */
+out:
+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key));
+	explicit_bzero(kex->sntrup761_client_key,
+	    sizeof(kex->sntrup761_client_key));
+	sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
+	free(signature);
+	sshbuf_free(tmp);
+	sshkey_free(server_host_key);
+	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
+	kex->client_pub = NULL;
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_gen_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, &input_kex_gen_init);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	struct sshkey *server_host_private, *server_host_public;
+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *server_pubkey = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+	u_char *signature = NULL, hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	size_t slen, hashlen;
+	int r;
+
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT received");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, &kex_protocol_error);
+
+	if ((r = kex_load_hostkey(ssh, &server_host_private,
+	    &server_host_public)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* compute shared secret */
+	switch (kex->kex_type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
+	case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
+	case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
+	case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
+	case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
+		r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+		    &shared_secret);
+		break;
+	case KEX_ECDH_SHA2:
+		r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+		    &shared_secret);
+		break;
+#endif
+	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+		r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+		    &shared_secret);
+		break;
+	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
+		break;
+	default:
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (r !=0 )
+		goto out;
+
+	/* calc H */
+	if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_putb(server_host_public, server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+	if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
+	    kex->hash_alg,
+	    kex->client_version,
+	    kex->server_version,
+	    kex->peer,
+	    kex->my,
+	    server_host_key_blob,
+	    client_pubkey,
+	    server_pubkey,
+	    shared_secret,
+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* sign H */
+	if ((r = kex->sign(ssh, server_host_private, server_host_public,
+	    &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_host_key_blob)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_pubkey)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* retain copy of hostkey used at initial KEX */
+	if (kex->initial_hostkey == NULL &&
+	    (r = sshkey_from_private(server_host_public,
+	    &kex->initial_hostkey)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+out:
+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
+	free(signature);
+	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+	sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
+	sshbuf_free(server_pubkey);
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/kexgex.c b/kexgex.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8040a13
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexgex.c
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgex.c,v 1.32 2019/01/23 00:30:41 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+int
+kexgex_hash(
+    int hash_alg,
+    const struct sshbuf *client_version,
+    const struct sshbuf *server_version,
+    const struct sshbuf *client_kexinit,
+    const struct sshbuf *server_kexinit,
+    const struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob,
+    int min, int wantbits, int max,
+    const BIGNUM *prime,
+    const BIGNUM *gen,
+    const BIGNUM *client_dh_pub,
+    const BIGNUM *server_dh_pub,
+    const u_char *shared_secret, size_t secretlen,
+    u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	int r;
+
+	if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1))
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, client_version)) < 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_version)) < 0 ||
+	    /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sshbuf_len(client_kexinit) + 1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_putb(b, client_kexinit)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sshbuf_len(server_kexinit) + 1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_putb(b, server_kexinit)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_host_key_blob)) != 0 ||
+	    (min != -1 && (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, min)) != 0) ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, wantbits)) != 0 ||
+	    (max != -1 && (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, max)) != 0) ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, prime)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, gen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, client_dh_pub)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, server_dh_pub)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(b, shared_secret, secretlen)) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(b);
+		return r;
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+#endif
+	if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(b);
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	*hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen);
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/kexgexc.c b/kexgexc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e99e0cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexgexc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.38 2021/12/19 22:08:06 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+
+int
+kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	int r;
+	u_int nbits;
+
+	nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
+
+	kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
+	kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
+	kex->nbits = nbits;
+	if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE)
+		kex->nbits = MINIMUM(kex->nbits, 4096);
+	/* New GEX request */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(%u<%u<%u) sent",
+	    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	fprintf(stderr, "\nmin = %d, nbits = %d, max = %d\n",
+	    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max);
+#endif
+	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP,
+	    &input_kex_dh_gex_group);
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL;
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key;
+	int r, bits;
+
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP received");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, &kex_protocol_error);
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &p)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &g)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((bits = BN_num_bits(p)) < 0 ||
+	    (u_int)bits < kex->min || (u_int)bits > kex->max) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
+
+	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
+	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent");
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
+	fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key);
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+#endif
+	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, &input_kex_dh_gex_reply);
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	BN_clear_free(p);
+	BN_clear_free(g);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *tmp = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
+	u_char *signature = NULL;
+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	size_t slen, hashlen;
+	int r;
+
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY received");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, &kex_protocol_error);
+
+	/* key, cert */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* sshkey_fromb() consumes its buffer, so make a copy */
+	if ((tmp = sshbuf_fromb(server_host_key_blob)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_fromb(tmp, &server_host_key)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = kex_verify_host_key(ssh, server_host_key)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* DH parameter f, server public DH key, signed H */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &dh_server_pub)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX)
+		kex->min = kex->max = -1;
+
+	/* calc and verify H */
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+	if ((r = kexgex_hash(
+	    kex->hash_alg,
+	    kex->client_version,
+	    kex->server_version,
+	    kex->my,
+	    kex->peer,
+	    server_host_key_blob,
+	    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
+	    dh_p, dh_g,
+	    pub_key,
+	    dh_server_pub,
+	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash,
+	    hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* save initial signature and hostkey */
+	if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+		if (kex->initial_hostkey != NULL || kex->initial_sig != NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((kex->initial_sig = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->initial_sig, signature, slen)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		kex->initial_hostkey = server_host_key;
+		server_host_key = NULL;
+	}
+	/* success */
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	DH_free(kex->dh);
+	kex->dh = NULL;
+	BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
+	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+	sshkey_free(server_host_key);
+	sshbuf_free(tmp);
+	sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
+	free(signature);
+	return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/kexgexs.c b/kexgexs.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72b444f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexgexs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.44 2021/12/19 22:08:06 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+
+int
+kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST,
+	    &input_kex_dh_gex_request);
+	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	int r;
+	u_int min = 0, max = 0, nbits = 0;
+	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
+
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, &kex_protocol_error);
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	kex->nbits = nbits;
+	kex->min = min;
+	kex->max = max;
+	min = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, min);
+	max = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, max);
+	nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
+	nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
+
+	if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min ||
+	    kex->max < kex->nbits || kex->max < DH_GRP_MIN) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Contact privileged parent */
+	kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
+	if (kex->dh == NULL) {
+		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "no matching DH grp found");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP sent");
+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_p)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, dh_g)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */
+	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &input_kex_dh_gex_init);
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *server_host_public, *server_host_private;
+	u_char *signature = NULL;
+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	size_t slen, hashlen;
+	int r;
+
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT received");
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &kex_protocol_error);
+
+	if ((r = kex_load_hostkey(ssh, &server_host_private,
+	    &server_host_public)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* key, cert */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &dh_client_pub)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_putb(server_host_public, server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* calc H */
+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+	if ((r = kexgex_hash(
+	    kex->hash_alg,
+	    kex->client_version,
+	    kex->server_version,
+	    kex->peer,
+	    kex->my,
+	    server_host_key_blob,
+	    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
+	    dh_p, dh_g,
+	    dh_client_pub,
+	    pub_key,
+	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* sign H */
+	if ((r = kex->sign(ssh, server_host_private, server_host_public,
+	    &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg)) < 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and signed H */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_host_key_blob)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||     /* f */
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* retain copy of hostkey used at initial KEX */
+	if (kex->initial_hostkey == NULL &&
+	    (r = sshkey_from_private(server_host_public,
+	    &kex->initial_hostkey)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	DH_free(kex->dh);
+	kex->dh = NULL;
+	BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
+	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
+	sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
+	free(signature);
+	return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/kexsntrup761x25519.c b/kexsntrup761x25519.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6afb1ba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kexsntrup761x25519.c
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: kexsntrup761x25519.c,v 1.2 2021/12/05 12:28:27 jsg Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_SNTRUP761X25519
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+int
+kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	u_char *cp = NULL;
+	size_t need;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	need = crypto_kem_sntrup761_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, need, &cp)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	crypto_kem_sntrup761_keypair(cp, kex->sntrup761_client_key);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("client public key sntrup761:", cp,
+	    crypto_kem_sntrup761_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
+#endif
+	cp += crypto_kem_sntrup761_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+	kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, cp);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("client public key c25519:", cp, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+	kex->client_pub = buf;
+	buf = NULL;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
+   const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp,
+   struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	const u_char *client_pub;
+	u_char *kem_key, *ciphertext, *server_pub;
+	u_char server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	size_t need;
+	int r;
+
+	*server_blobp = NULL;
+	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+	/* client_blob contains both KEM and ECDH client pubkeys */
+	need = crypto_kem_sntrup761_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
+	if (sshbuf_len(client_blob) != need) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("client public key sntrup761:", client_pub,
+	    crypto_kem_sntrup761_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
+	dump_digest("client public key 25519:",
+	    client_pub + crypto_kem_sntrup761_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
+	    CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+	/* allocate buffer for concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
+	/* the buffer will be hashed and the result is the shared secret */
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, crypto_kem_sntrup761_BYTES,
+	    &kem_key)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */
+	if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	need = crypto_kem_sntrup761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(server_blob, need, &ciphertext)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* generate and encrypt KEM key with client key */
+	crypto_kem_sntrup761_enc(ciphertext, kem_key, client_pub);
+	/* generate ECDH key pair, store server pubkey after ciphertext */
+	server_pub = ciphertext + crypto_kem_sntrup761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
+	kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pub);
+	/* append ECDH shared key */
+	client_pub += crypto_kem_sntrup761_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, buf, 1)) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("server public key 25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+	dump_digest("server cipher text:", ciphertext,
+	    crypto_kem_sntrup761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES);
+	dump_digest("server kem key:", kem_key, crypto_kem_sntrup761_BYTES);
+	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
+	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+	/* string-encoded hash is resulting shared secret */
+	sshbuf_reset(buf);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
+	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+	*server_blobp = server_blob;
+	*shared_secretp = buf;
+	server_blob = NULL;
+	buf = NULL;
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
+	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
+    const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	u_char *kem_key = NULL;
+	const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	size_t need;
+	int r, decoded;
+
+	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+	need = crypto_kem_sntrup761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
+	if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != need) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ciphertext = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob);
+	server_pub = ciphertext + crypto_kem_sntrup761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("server cipher text:", ciphertext,
+	    crypto_kem_sntrup761_CIPHERTEXTBYTES);
+	dump_digest("server public key c25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+	/* hash concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, crypto_kem_sntrup761_BYTES,
+	    &kem_key)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	decoded = crypto_kem_sntrup761_dec(kem_key, ciphertext,
+	    kex->sntrup761_client_key);
+	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pub,
+	    buf, 1)) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("client kem key:", kem_key, crypto_kem_sntrup761_BYTES);
+	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
+	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+	sshbuf_reset(buf);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
+	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+	if (decoded != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*shared_secretp = buf;
+	buf = NULL;
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+#else
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+struct kex;
+struct sshbuf;
+struct sshkey;
+
+int
+kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+{
+	return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int
+kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
+   const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp,
+   struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+	return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int
+kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
+    const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+{
+	return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+#endif /* USE_SNTRUP761X25519 */
diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..473a9d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/krl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1447 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.54 2022/04/28 02:53:31 djm Exp $ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h>
+#include <openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "bitmap.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
+
+#include "krl.h"
+
+/* #define DEBUG_KRL */
+#ifdef DEBUG_KRL
+# define KRL_DBG(x) debug3_f x
+#else
+# define KRL_DBG(x)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Trees of revoked serial numbers, key IDs and keys. This allows
+ * quick searching, querying and producing lists in canonical order.
+ */
+
+/* Tree of serial numbers. XXX make smarter: really need a real sparse bitmap */
+struct revoked_serial {
+	u_int64_t lo, hi;
+	RB_ENTRY(revoked_serial) tree_entry;
+};
+static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b);
+RB_HEAD(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial);
+RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp)
+
+/* Tree of key IDs */
+struct revoked_key_id {
+	char *key_id;
+	RB_ENTRY(revoked_key_id) tree_entry;
+};
+static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b);
+RB_HEAD(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id);
+RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp)
+
+/* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */
+struct revoked_blob {
+	u_char *blob;
+	size_t len;
+	RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry;
+};
+static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b);
+RB_HEAD(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob);
+RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp)
+
+/* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */
+struct revoked_certs {
+	struct sshkey *ca_key;
+	struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials;
+	struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids;
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(revoked_certs_list, revoked_certs);
+
+struct ssh_krl {
+	u_int64_t krl_version;
+	u_int64_t generated_date;
+	u_int64_t flags;
+	char *comment;
+	struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_keys;
+	struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha1s;
+	struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha256s;
+	struct revoked_certs_list revoked_certs;
+};
+
+/* Return equal if a and b overlap */
+static int
+serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b)
+{
+	if (a->hi >= b->lo && a->lo <= b->hi)
+		return 0;
+	return a->lo < b->lo ? -1 : 1;
+}
+
+static int
+key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b)
+{
+	return strcmp(a->key_id, b->key_id);
+}
+
+static int
+blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (a->len != b->len) {
+		if ((r = memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, MINIMUM(a->len, b->len))) != 0)
+			return r;
+		return a->len > b->len ? 1 : -1;
+	} else
+		return memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, a->len);
+}
+
+struct ssh_krl *
+ssh_krl_init(void)
+{
+	struct ssh_krl *krl;
+
+	if ((krl = calloc(1, sizeof(*krl))) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_keys);
+	RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha1s);
+	RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha256s);
+	TAILQ_INIT(&krl->revoked_certs);
+	return krl;
+}
+
+static void
+revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc)
+{
+	struct revoked_serial *rs, *trs;
+	struct revoked_key_id *rki, *trki;
+
+	RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, trs) {
+		RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs);
+		free(rs);
+	}
+	RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, trki) {
+		RB_REMOVE(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki);
+		free(rki->key_id);
+		free(rki);
+	}
+	sshkey_free(rc->ca_key);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl)
+{
+	struct revoked_blob *rb, *trb;
+	struct revoked_certs *rc, *trc;
+
+	if (krl == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	free(krl->comment);
+	RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, trb) {
+		RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, rb);
+		free(rb->blob);
+		free(rb);
+	}
+	RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, trb) {
+		RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, rb);
+		free(rb->blob);
+		free(rb);
+	}
+	RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, trb) {
+		RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, rb);
+		free(rb->blob);
+		free(rb);
+	}
+	TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry, trc) {
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry);
+		revoked_certs_free(rc);
+	}
+}
+
+void
+ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version)
+{
+	krl->krl_version = version;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment)
+{
+	free(krl->comment);
+	if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find the revoked_certs struct for a CA key. If allow_create is set then
+ * create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already.
+ */
+static int
+revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
+    struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create)
+{
+	struct revoked_certs *rc;
+	int r;
+
+	*rcp = NULL;
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
+		if ((ca_key == NULL && rc->ca_key == NULL) ||
+		    sshkey_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) {
+			*rcp = rc;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!allow_create)
+		return 0;
+	/* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */
+	if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if (ca_key == NULL)
+		rc->ca_key = NULL;
+	else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca_key, &rc->ca_key)) != 0) {
+		free(rc);
+		return r;
+	}
+	RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials);
+	RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids);
+	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry);
+	KRL_DBG(("new CA %s", ca_key == NULL ? "*" : sshkey_type(ca_key)));
+	*rcp = rc;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
+{
+	struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs;
+
+	KRL_DBG(("insert %llu:%llu", lo, hi));
+	memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
+	rs.lo = lo;
+	rs.hi = hi;
+	ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs);
+	if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) {
+		/* No entry matches. Just insert */
+		if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs));
+		ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs);
+		if (ers != NULL) {
+			KRL_DBG(("bad: ers != NULL"));
+			/* Shouldn't happen */
+			free(irs);
+			return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
+		ers = irs;
+	} else {
+		KRL_DBG(("overlap found %llu:%llu", ers->lo, ers->hi));
+		/*
+		 * The inserted entry overlaps an existing one. Grow the
+		 * existing entry.
+		 */
+		if (ers->lo > lo)
+			ers->lo = lo;
+		if (ers->hi < hi)
+			ers->hi = hi;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones;
+	 * coalesce as necessary.
+	 */
+
+	/* Check predecessors */
+	while ((crs = RB_PREV(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) {
+		KRL_DBG(("pred %llu:%llu", crs->lo, crs->hi));
+		if (ers->lo != 0 && crs->hi < ers->lo - 1)
+			break;
+		/* This entry overlaps. */
+		if (crs->lo < ers->lo) {
+			ers->lo = crs->lo;
+			KRL_DBG(("pred extend %llu:%llu", ers->lo, ers->hi));
+		}
+		RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs);
+		free(crs);
+	}
+	/* Check successors */
+	while ((crs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) {
+		KRL_DBG(("succ %llu:%llu", crs->lo, crs->hi));
+		if (ers->hi != (u_int64_t)-1 && crs->lo > ers->hi + 1)
+			break;
+		/* This entry overlaps. */
+		if (crs->hi > ers->hi) {
+			ers->hi = crs->hi;
+			KRL_DBG(("succ extend %llu:%llu", ers->lo, ers->hi));
+		}
+		RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs);
+		free(crs);
+	}
+	KRL_DBG(("done, final %llu:%llu", ers->lo, ers->hi));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
+    u_int64_t serial)
+{
+	return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl,
+    const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
+{
+	struct revoked_certs *rc;
+	int r;
+
+	if (lo > hi || lo == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
+    const char *key_id)
+{
+	struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki;
+	struct revoked_certs *rc;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	KRL_DBG(("revoke %s", key_id));
+	if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL ||
+	    (rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) {
+		free(rki);
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+	erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki);
+	if (erki != NULL) {
+		free(rki->key_id);
+		free(rki);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */
+static int
+plain_key_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blob, size_t *blen)
+{
+	struct sshkey *kcopy;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &kcopy)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(kcopy)) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(kcopy)) != 0) {
+			sshkey_free(kcopy);
+			return r;
+		}
+	}
+	r = sshkey_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen);
+	sshkey_free(kcopy);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */
+static int
+revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, size_t len)
+{
+	struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb;
+
+	if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	rb->blob = blob;
+	rb->len = len;
+	erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb);
+	if (erb != NULL) {
+		free(rb->blob);
+		free(rb);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	u_char *blob;
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("revoke type %s", sshkey_type(key));
+	if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len);
+}
+
+static int
+revoke_by_hash(struct revoked_blob_tree *target, const u_char *p, size_t len)
+{
+	u_char *blob;
+	int r;
+
+	/* need to copy hash, as revoke_blob steals ownership */
+	if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	memcpy(blob, p, len);
+	if ((r = revoke_blob(target, blob, len)) != 0) {
+		free(blob);
+		return r;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len)
+{
+	debug3_f("revoke by sha1");
+	if (len != 20)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha1s, p, len);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len)
+{
+	debug3_f("revoke by sha256");
+	if (len != 32)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha256s, p, len);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	/* XXX replace with SHA256? */
+	if (!sshkey_is_cert(key))
+		return ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key);
+
+	if (key->cert->serial == 0) {
+		return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl,
+		    key->cert->signature_key,
+		    key->cert->key_id);
+	} else {
+		return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
+		    key->cert->signature_key,
+		    key->cert->serial);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Select the most compact section type to emit next in a KRL based on
+ * the current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial
+ * numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial.
+ * Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type
+ * that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL.
+ */
+static int
+choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final,
+    u_int64_t last_gap, u_int64_t next_gap, int *force_new_section)
+{
+	int new_state;
+	u_int64_t cost, cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart;
+
+	/*
+	 * Avoid unsigned overflows.
+	 * The limits are high enough to avoid confusing the calculations.
+	 */
+	contig = MINIMUM(contig, 1ULL<<31);
+	last_gap = MINIMUM(last_gap, 1ULL<<31);
+	next_gap = MINIMUM(next_gap, 1ULL<<31);
+
+	/*
+	 * Calculate the cost to switch from the current state to candidates.
+	 * NB. range sections only ever contain a single range, so their
+	 * switching cost is independent of the current_state.
+	 */
+	cost_list = cost_bitmap = cost_bitmap_restart = 0;
+	cost_range = 8;
+	switch (current_state) {
+	case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+		cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64;
+		break;
+	case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+		cost_list = 8;
+		cost_bitmap_restart = 8 + 64;
+		break;
+	case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+	case 0:
+		cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64;
+		cost_list = 8;
+	}
+
+	/* Estimate base cost in bits of each section type */
+	cost_list += 64 * contig + (final ? 0 : 8+64);
+	cost_range += (2 * 64) + (final ? 0 : 8+64);
+	cost_bitmap += last_gap + contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64));
+	cost_bitmap_restart += contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64));
+
+	/* Convert to byte costs for actual comparison */
+	cost_list = (cost_list + 7) / 8;
+	cost_bitmap = (cost_bitmap + 7) / 8;
+	cost_bitmap_restart = (cost_bitmap_restart + 7) / 8;
+	cost_range = (cost_range + 7) / 8;
+
+	/* Now pick the best choice */
+	*force_new_section = 0;
+	new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP;
+	cost = cost_bitmap;
+	if (cost_range < cost) {
+		new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE;
+		cost = cost_range;
+	}
+	if (cost_list < cost) {
+		new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST;
+		cost = cost_list;
+	}
+	if (cost_bitmap_restart < cost) {
+		new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP;
+		*force_new_section = 1;
+		cost = cost_bitmap_restart;
+	}
+	KRL_DBG(("contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:"
+	    "list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, "
+	    "selected 0x%02x%s", (long long unsigned)contig,
+	    (long long unsigned)last_gap, (long long unsigned)next_gap, final,
+	    (long long unsigned)cost_list, (long long unsigned)cost_range,
+	    (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap,
+	    (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap_restart, new_state,
+	    *force_new_section ? " restart" : ""));
+	return new_state;
+}
+
+static int
+put_bitmap(struct sshbuf *buf, struct bitmap *bitmap)
+{
+	size_t len;
+	u_char *blob;
+	int r;
+
+	len = bitmap_nbytes(bitmap);
+	if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if (bitmap_to_string(bitmap, blob, len) != 0) {
+		free(blob);
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buf, blob, len);
+	free(blob);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */
+static int
+revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+	int final, force_new_sect, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0;
+	struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs;
+	struct revoked_key_id *rki;
+	int next_state, state = 0;
+	struct sshbuf *sect;
+	struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
+
+	if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+	/* Store the header: optional CA scope key, reserved */
+	if (rc->ca_key == NULL) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	} else {
+		if ((r = sshkey_puts(rc->ca_key, buf)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Store the revoked serials.  */
+	for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials);
+	     rs != NULL;
+	     rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) {
+		KRL_DBG(("serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x",
+		    (long long unsigned)rs->lo, (long long unsigned)rs->hi,
+		    state));
+
+		/* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */
+		nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs);
+		final = nrs == NULL;
+		gap = nrs == NULL ? 0 : nrs->lo - rs->hi;
+		contig = 1 + (rs->hi - rs->lo);
+
+		/* Choose next state based on these */
+		next_state = choose_next_state(state, contig, final,
+		    state == 0 ? 0 : rs->lo - last, gap, &force_new_sect);
+
+		/*
+		 * If the current section is a range section or has a different
+		 * type to the next section, then finish it off now.
+		 */
+		if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state ||
+		    state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) {
+			KRL_DBG(("finish state 0x%02x", state));
+			switch (state) {
+			case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+			case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+				break;
+			case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+				if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
+					goto out;
+				bitmap_free(bitmap);
+				bitmap = NULL;
+				break;
+			}
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+			sshbuf_reset(sect);
+		}
+
+		/* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */
+		if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) {
+			KRL_DBG(("start state 0x%02x",
+			    next_state));
+			state = next_state;
+			sshbuf_reset(sect);
+			switch (state) {
+			case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+			case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+				break;
+			case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+				if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) {
+					r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+					goto out;
+				}
+				bitmap_start = rs->lo;
+				if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect,
+				    bitmap_start)) != 0)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* Perform section-specific processing */
+		switch (state) {
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+			for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) {
+				if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo + i)) != 0)
+					goto out;
+			}
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->hi)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+			if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) {
+				error_f("insane bitmap gap");
+				goto out;
+			}
+			for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) {
+				if (bitmap_set_bit(bitmap,
+				    rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 0) {
+					r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+					goto out;
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+		last = rs->hi;
+	}
+	/* Flush the remaining section, if any */
+	if (state != 0) {
+		KRL_DBG(("serial final flush for state 0x%02x", state));
+		switch (state) {
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+			if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+			bitmap_free(bitmap);
+			bitmap = NULL;
+			break;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	KRL_DBG(("serial done "));
+
+	/* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */
+	sshbuf_reset(sect);
+	RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) {
+		KRL_DBG(("key ID %s", rki->key_id));
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, rki->key_id)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	bitmap_free(bitmap);
+	sshbuf_free(sect);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf,
+    struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct revoked_certs *rc;
+	struct revoked_blob *rb;
+	struct sshbuf *sect;
+	u_char *sblob = NULL;
+	size_t slen, i;
+
+	if (krl->generated_date == 0)
+		krl->generated_date = time(NULL);
+
+	if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+	/* Store the header */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->krl_version)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->generated_date)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->flags)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Store sections for revoked certificates */
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
+		sshbuf_reset(sect);
+		if ((r = revoked_certs_generate(rc, sect)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */
+	sshbuf_reset(sect);
+	RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) {
+		KRL_DBG(("key len %zu ", rb->len));
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	sshbuf_reset(sect);
+	RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) {
+		KRL_DBG(("hash len %zu ", rb->len));
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf,
+		    KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	sshbuf_reset(sect);
+	RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s) {
+		KRL_DBG(("hash len %zu ", rb->len));
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf,
+		    KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) {
+		KRL_DBG(("sig key %s", sshkey_ssh_name(sign_keys[i])));
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshkey_puts(sign_keys[i], buf)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		/* XXX support sk-* keys */
+		if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen,
+		    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), NULL, NULL,
+		    NULL, 0)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		KRL_DBG(("signature sig len %zu", slen));
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, sblob, slen)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(sblob);
+	sshbuf_free(sect);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void
+format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts)
+{
+	time_t t;
+	struct tm *tm;
+
+	t = timestamp;
+	tm = localtime(&t);
+	if (tm == NULL)
+		strlcpy(ts, "<INVALID>", nts);
+	else {
+		*ts = '\0';
+		strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm);
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+parse_revoked_certs(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	u_char type;
+	const u_char *blob;
+	size_t blen, nbits;
+	struct sshbuf *subsect = NULL;
+	u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi;
+	struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
+	char *key_id = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *ca_key = NULL;
+
+	if ((subsect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+	/* Header: key, reserved */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (blen != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &ca_key)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(subsect);
+		subsect = NULL;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &type)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &subsect)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		KRL_DBG(("subsection type 0x%02x", type));
+		/* sshbuf_dump(subsect, stderr); */
+
+		switch (type) {
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
+			while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
+				if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial)) != 0)
+					goto out;
+				if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
+				    ca_key, serial)) != 0)
+					goto out;
+			}
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_hi)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+			if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl,
+			    ca_key, serial_lo, serial_hi)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
+			if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) {
+				r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(subsect,
+			    &blob, &blen)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+			if (bitmap_from_string(bitmap, blob, blen) != 0) {
+				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			nbits = bitmap_nbits(bitmap);
+			for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int64_t)nbits; serial++) {
+				if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) {
+					error_f("bitmap wraps u64");
+					r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+					goto out;
+				}
+				if (!bitmap_test_bit(bitmap, serial))
+					continue;
+				if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
+				    ca_key, serial_lo + serial)) != 0)
+					goto out;
+			}
+			bitmap_free(bitmap);
+			bitmap = NULL;
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID:
+			while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
+				if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(subsect,
+				    &key_id, NULL)) != 0)
+					goto out;
+				if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl,
+				    ca_key, key_id)) != 0)
+					goto out;
+				free(key_id);
+				key_id = NULL;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type);
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
+			error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data");
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if (bitmap != NULL)
+		bitmap_free(bitmap);
+	free(key_id);
+	sshkey_free(ca_key);
+	sshbuf_free(subsect);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+blob_section(struct sshbuf *sect, struct revoked_blob_tree *target_tree,
+    size_t expected_len)
+{
+	u_char *rdata = NULL;
+	size_t rlen = 0;
+	int r;
+
+	while (sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(sect, &rdata, &rlen)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		if (expected_len != 0 && rlen != expected_len) {
+			error_f("bad length");
+			free(rdata);
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		}
+		if ((r = revoke_blob(target_tree, rdata, rlen)) != 0) {
+			free(rdata);
+			return r;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */
+int
+ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
+    const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *sect = NULL;
+	struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL;
+	char timestamp[64];
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, sig_seen;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL, **tmp_ca_used;
+	u_char type;
+	const u_char *blob;
+	size_t i, j, sig_off, sects_off, blen, nca_used;
+	u_int format_version;
+
+	nca_used = 0;
+	*krlp = NULL;
+	if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 ||
+	    memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
+		debug3_f("not a KRL");
+		return SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC;
+	}
+
+	/* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */
+	if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) {
+		error_f("alloc failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, &format_version)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->krl_version)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->generated_date)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->flags)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &krl->comment, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
+	debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s",
+	    (long long unsigned)krl->krl_version, timestamp,
+	    *krl->comment ? ": " : "", krl->comment);
+
+	/*
+	 * 1st pass: verify signatures, if any. This is done to avoid
+	 * detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified.
+	 */
+	sig_seen = 0;
+	if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) {
+		/* Shouldn't happen */
+		r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	sects_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy);
+	while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		KRL_DBG(("first pass, section 0x%02x", type));
+		if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) {
+			if (sig_seen) {
+				error("KRL contains non-signature section "
+				    "after signature");
+				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			/* Not interested for now. */
+			continue;
+		}
+		sig_seen = 1;
+		/* First string component is the signing key */
+		if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) {
+			/* Shouldn't happen */
+			r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		sig_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy);
+		/* Second string component is the signature itself */
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */
+		if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, blob, blen,
+		    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sig_off, NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		/* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */
+		for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
+			if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[i], key)) {
+				error("KRL signed more than once with "
+				    "the same key");
+				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		/* Record keys used to sign the KRL */
+		tmp_ca_used = recallocarray(ca_used, nca_used, nca_used + 1,
+		    sizeof(*ca_used));
+		if (tmp_ca_used == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		ca_used = tmp_ca_used;
+		ca_used[nca_used++] = key;
+		key = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (sshbuf_len(copy) != 0) {
+		/* Shouldn't happen */
+		r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point
+	 * where the section start.
+	 */
+	sshbuf_free(copy);
+	if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sects_off)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(sect);
+		sect = NULL;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_froms(copy, &sect)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		KRL_DBG(("second pass, section 0x%02x", type));
+
+		switch (type) {
+		case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES:
+			if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(sect, krl)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY:
+			if ((r = blob_section(sect,
+			    &krl->revoked_keys, 0)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1:
+			if ((r = blob_section(sect,
+			    &krl->revoked_sha1s, 20)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256:
+			if ((r = blob_section(sect,
+			    &krl->revoked_sha256s, 32)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+			break;
+		case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
+			/* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */
+			sshbuf_free(sect);
+			sect = NULL;
+			if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type);
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (sect != NULL && sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) {
+			error("KRL section contains unparsed data");
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Check that the key(s) used to sign the KRL weren't revoked */
+	sig_seen = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
+		if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0)
+			sig_seen = 1;
+		else {
+			sshkey_free(ca_used[i]);
+			ca_used[i] = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	if (nca_used && !sig_seen) {
+		error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked");
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* If we have CA keys, then verify that one was used to sign the KRL */
+	if (sig_seen && nsign_ca_keys != 0) {
+		sig_seen = 0;
+		for (i = 0; !sig_seen && i < nsign_ca_keys; i++) {
+			for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) {
+				if (ca_used[j] == NULL)
+					continue;
+				if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) {
+					sig_seen = 1;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if (!sig_seen) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+			error("KRL not signed with any trusted key");
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	*krlp = krl;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if (r != 0)
+		ssh_krl_free(krl);
+	for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++)
+		sshkey_free(ca_used[i]);
+	free(ca_used);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	sshbuf_free(copy);
+	sshbuf_free(sect);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Checks certificate serial number and key ID revocation */
+static int
+is_cert_revoked(const struct sshkey *key, struct revoked_certs *rc)
+{
+	struct revoked_serial rs, *ers;
+	struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki;
+
+	/* Check revocation by cert key ID */
+	memset(&rki, 0, sizeof(rki));
+	rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id;
+	erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki);
+	if (erki != NULL) {
+		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key ID"));
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Zero serials numbers are ignored (it's the default when the
+	 * CA doesn't specify one).
+	 */
+	if (key->cert->serial == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
+	rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial;
+	ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs);
+	if (ers != NULL) {
+		KRL_DBG(("revoked serial %llu matched %llu:%llu",
+		    key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi));
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */
+static int
+is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	struct revoked_blob rb, *erb;
+	struct revoked_certs *rc;
+	int r;
+
+	/* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */
+	memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
+	if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1,
+	    &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
+	free(rb.blob);
+	if (erb != NULL) {
+		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+	}
+	memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
+	if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256,
+	    &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
+	free(rb.blob);
+	if (erb != NULL) {
+		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+	}
+
+	/* Next, explicit keys */
+	memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
+	if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
+	free(rb.blob);
+	if (erb != NULL) {
+		KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+	}
+
+	if (!sshkey_is_cert(key))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Check cert revocation for the specified CA */
+	if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key,
+	    &rc, 0)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (rc != NULL) {
+		if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	/* Check cert revocation for the wildcard CA */
+	if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, NULL, &rc, 0)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (rc != NULL) {
+		if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	KRL_DBG(("%llu no match", key->cert->serial));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	KRL_DBG(("checking key"));
+	if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+		debug2_f("checking CA key");
+		if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	KRL_DBG(("key okay"));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *krlbuf = NULL;
+	struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL;
+	int oerrno = 0, r;
+
+	if (path == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(path, &krlbuf)) != 0) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	debug2_f("checking KRL %s", path);
+	r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key);
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
+	ssh_krl_free(krl);
+	if (r != 0)
+		errno = oerrno;
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+krl_dump(struct ssh_krl *krl, FILE *f)
+{
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	struct revoked_blob *rb;
+	struct revoked_certs *rc;
+	struct revoked_serial *rs;
+	struct revoked_key_id *rki;
+	int r, ret = 0;
+	char *fp, timestamp[64];
+
+	/* Try to print in a KRL spec-compatible format */
+	format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
+	fprintf(f, "# KRL version %llu\n",
+	    (unsigned long long)krl->krl_version);
+	fprintf(f, "# Generated at %s\n", timestamp);
+	if (krl->comment != NULL && *krl->comment != '\0') {
+		r = INT_MAX;
+		asmprintf(&fp, INT_MAX, &r, "%s", krl->comment);
+		fprintf(f, "# Comment: %s\n", fp);
+		free(fp);
+	}
+	fputc('\n', f);
+
+	RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(rb->blob, rb->len, &key)) != 0) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			error_r(r, "parse KRL key");
+			continue;
+		}
+		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			error("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+			continue;
+		}
+		fprintf(f, "hash: %s # %s\n", fp, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+		free(fp);
+		free(key);
+	}
+	RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s) {
+		fp = tohex(rb->blob, rb->len);
+		fprintf(f, "hash: SHA256:%s\n", fp);
+		free(fp);
+	}
+	RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) {
+		/*
+		 * There is not KRL spec keyword for raw SHA1 hashes, so
+		 * print them as comments.
+		 */
+		fp = tohex(rb->blob, rb->len);
+		fprintf(f, "# hash SHA1:%s\n", fp);
+		free(fp);
+	}
+
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
+		fputc('\n', f);
+		if (rc->ca_key == NULL)
+			fprintf(f, "# Wildcard CA\n");
+		else {
+			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(rc->ca_key,
+			    SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+				ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+				error("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+				continue;
+			}
+			fprintf(f, "# CA key %s %s\n",
+			    sshkey_ssh_name(rc->ca_key), fp);
+			free(fp);
+		}
+		RB_FOREACH(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials) {
+			if (rs->lo == rs->hi) {
+				fprintf(f, "serial: %llu\n",
+				    (unsigned long long)rs->lo);
+			} else {
+				fprintf(f, "serial: %llu-%llu\n",
+				    (unsigned long long)rs->lo,
+				    (unsigned long long)rs->hi);
+			}
+		}
+		RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) {
+			/*
+			 * We don't want key IDs with embedded newlines to
+			 * mess up the display.
+			 */
+			r = INT_MAX;
+			asmprintf(&fp, INT_MAX, &r, "%s", rki->key_id);
+			fprintf(f, "id: %s\n", fp);
+			free(fp);
+		}
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/krl.h b/krl.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca6d3f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/krl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.h,v 1.8 2020/04/03 02:26:56 djm Exp $ */
+
+#ifndef _KRL_H
+#define _KRL_H
+
+/* Functions to manage key revocation lists */
+
+#define KRL_MAGIC		"SSHKRL\n\0"
+#define KRL_FORMAT_VERSION	1
+
+/* KRL section types */
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES	1
+#define KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY	2
+#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1	3
+#define KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE		4
+#define KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256	5
+
+/* KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES subsection types */
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST	0x20
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE	0x21
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP	0x22
+#define KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID		0x23
+
+struct sshkey;
+struct sshbuf;
+struct ssh_krl;
+
+struct ssh_krl *ssh_krl_init(void);
+void ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl);
+void ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version);
+int ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl,
+    const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t serial);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl,
+    const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl,
+    const struct sshkey *ca_key, const char *key_id);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len);
+int ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key);
+int ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf,
+    struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys);
+int ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
+    const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys);
+int ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key);
+int ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key);
+int krl_dump(struct ssh_krl *krl, FILE *f);
+
+#endif /* _KRL_H */
+
diff --git a/log.c b/log.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99bf046
--- /dev/null
+++ b/log.c
@@ -0,0 +1,500 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: log.c,v 1.60 2021/09/16 15:11:19 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+# include <vis.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "match.h"
+
+static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+static int log_on_stderr = 1;
+static int log_stderr_fd = STDERR_FILENO;
+static int log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
+static const char *argv0;
+static log_handler_fn *log_handler;
+static void *log_handler_ctx;
+static char **log_verbose;
+static size_t nlog_verbose;
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+#define LOG_SYSLOG_VIS	(VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL)
+#define LOG_STDERR_VIS	(VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL)
+
+/* textual representation of log-facilities/levels */
+
+static struct {
+	const char *name;
+	SyslogFacility val;
+} log_facilities[] = {
+	{ "DAEMON",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON },
+	{ "USER",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER },
+	{ "AUTH",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH },
+#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
+	{ "AUTHPRIV",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV },
+#endif
+	{ "LOCAL0",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0 },
+	{ "LOCAL1",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1 },
+	{ "LOCAL2",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2 },
+	{ "LOCAL3",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3 },
+	{ "LOCAL4",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4 },
+	{ "LOCAL5",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5 },
+	{ "LOCAL6",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6 },
+	{ "LOCAL7",	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7 },
+	{ NULL,		SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET }
+};
+
+static struct {
+	const char *name;
+	LogLevel val;
+} log_levels[] =
+{
+	{ "QUIET",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET },
+	{ "FATAL",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL },
+	{ "ERROR",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR },
+	{ "INFO",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO },
+	{ "VERBOSE",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE },
+	{ "DEBUG",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 },
+	{ "DEBUG1",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 },
+	{ "DEBUG2",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 },
+	{ "DEBUG3",	SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 },
+	{ NULL,		SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET }
+};
+
+LogLevel
+log_level_get(void)
+{
+	return log_level;
+}
+
+SyslogFacility
+log_facility_number(char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (name != NULL)
+		for (i = 0; log_facilities[i].name; i++)
+			if (strcasecmp(log_facilities[i].name, name) == 0)
+				return log_facilities[i].val;
+	return SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
+}
+
+const char *
+log_facility_name(SyslogFacility facility)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0;  log_facilities[i].name; i++)
+		if (log_facilities[i].val == facility)
+			return log_facilities[i].name;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+LogLevel
+log_level_number(char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (name != NULL)
+		for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name; i++)
+			if (strcasecmp(log_levels[i].name, name) == 0)
+				return log_levels[i].val;
+	return SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
+}
+
+const char *
+log_level_name(LogLevel level)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; log_levels[i].name != NULL; i++)
+		if (log_levels[i].val == level)
+			return log_levels[i].name;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+log_verbose_add(const char *s)
+{
+	char **tmp;
+
+	/* Ignore failures here */
+	if ((tmp = recallocarray(log_verbose, nlog_verbose, nlog_verbose + 1,
+	    sizeof(*log_verbose))) != NULL) {
+		log_verbose = tmp;
+		if ((log_verbose[nlog_verbose] = strdup(s)) != NULL)
+			nlog_verbose++;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+log_verbose_reset(void)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nlog_verbose; i++)
+		free(log_verbose[i]);
+	free(log_verbose);
+	log_verbose = NULL;
+	nlog_verbose = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the log.
+ */
+
+void
+log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
+    int on_stderr)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
+#endif
+
+	argv0 = av0;
+
+	if (log_change_level(level) != 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognized internal syslog level code %d\n",
+		    (int) level);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	log_handler = NULL;
+	log_handler_ctx = NULL;
+
+	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
+	if (on_stderr)
+		return;
+
+	switch (facility) {
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON:
+		log_facility = LOG_DAEMON;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER:
+		log_facility = LOG_USER;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH:
+		log_facility = LOG_AUTH;
+		break;
+#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV:
+		log_facility = LOG_AUTHPRIV;
+		break;
+#endif
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0:
+		log_facility = LOG_LOCAL0;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1:
+		log_facility = LOG_LOCAL1;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2:
+		log_facility = LOG_LOCAL2;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3:
+		log_facility = LOG_LOCAL3;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4:
+		log_facility = LOG_LOCAL4;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5:
+		log_facility = LOG_LOCAL5;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6:
+		log_facility = LOG_LOCAL6;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7:
+		log_facility = LOG_LOCAL7;
+		break;
+	default:
+		fprintf(stderr,
+		    "Unrecognized internal syslog facility code %d\n",
+		    (int) facility);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If an external library (eg libwrap) attempts to use syslog
+	 * immediately after reexec, syslog may be pointing to the wrong
+	 * facility, so we force an open/close of syslog here.
+	 */
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+	openlog_r(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata);
+	closelog_r(&sdata);
+#else
+	openlog(argv0 ? argv0 : __progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
+	closelog();
+#endif
+}
+
+int
+log_change_level(LogLevel new_log_level)
+{
+	/* no-op if log_init has not been called */
+	if (argv0 == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	switch (new_log_level) {
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET:
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR:
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO:
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE:
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1:
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2:
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3:
+		log_level = new_log_level;
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+int
+log_is_on_stderr(void)
+{
+	return log_on_stderr && log_stderr_fd == STDERR_FILENO;
+}
+
+/* redirect what would usually get written to stderr to specified file */
+void
+log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *logfile)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	if (logfile == NULL) {
+		if (log_stderr_fd != STDERR_FILENO) {
+			close(log_stderr_fd);
+			log_stderr_fd = STDERR_FILENO;
+		}
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if ((fd = open(logfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_APPEND, 0600)) == -1) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open logfile %s: %s\n", logfile,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	log_stderr_fd = fd;
+}
+
+#define MSGBUFSIZ 1024
+
+void
+set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *handler, void *ctx)
+{
+	log_handler = handler;
+	log_handler_ctx = ctx;
+}
+
+static void
+do_log(LogLevel level, int force, const char *suffix, const char *fmt,
+    va_list args)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
+#endif
+	char msgbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
+	char fmtbuf[MSGBUFSIZ];
+	char *txt = NULL;
+	int pri = LOG_INFO;
+	int saved_errno = errno;
+	log_handler_fn *tmp_handler;
+	const char *progname = argv0 != NULL ? argv0 : __progname;
+
+	if (!force && level > log_level)
+		return;
+
+	switch (level) {
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL:
+		if (!log_on_stderr)
+			txt = "fatal";
+		pri = LOG_CRIT;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR:
+		if (!log_on_stderr)
+			txt = "error";
+		pri = LOG_ERR;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO:
+		pri = LOG_INFO;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE:
+		pri = LOG_INFO;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1:
+		txt = "debug1";
+		pri = LOG_DEBUG;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2:
+		txt = "debug2";
+		pri = LOG_DEBUG;
+		break;
+	case SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3:
+		txt = "debug3";
+		pri = LOG_DEBUG;
+		break;
+	default:
+		txt = "internal error";
+		pri = LOG_ERR;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (txt != NULL && log_handler == NULL) {
+		snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), "%s: %s", txt, fmt);
+		vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmtbuf, args);
+	} else {
+		vsnprintf(msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf), fmt, args);
+	}
+	if (suffix != NULL) {
+		snprintf(fmtbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf), "%s: %s", msgbuf, suffix);
+		strlcpy(msgbuf, fmtbuf, sizeof(msgbuf));
+	}
+	strnvis(fmtbuf, msgbuf, sizeof(fmtbuf),
+	    log_on_stderr ? LOG_STDERR_VIS : LOG_SYSLOG_VIS);
+	if (log_handler != NULL) {
+		/* Avoid recursion */
+		tmp_handler = log_handler;
+		log_handler = NULL;
+		tmp_handler(level, force, fmtbuf, log_handler_ctx);
+		log_handler = tmp_handler;
+	} else if (log_on_stderr) {
+		snprintf(msgbuf, sizeof msgbuf, "%s%s%.*s\r\n",
+		    (log_on_stderr > 1) ? progname : "",
+		    (log_on_stderr > 1) ? ": " : "",
+		    (int)sizeof msgbuf - 3, fmtbuf);
+		(void)write(log_stderr_fd, msgbuf, strlen(msgbuf));
+	} else {
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
+		openlog_r(progname, LOG_PID, log_facility, &sdata);
+		syslog_r(pri, &sdata, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
+		closelog_r(&sdata);
+#else
+		openlog(progname, LOG_PID, log_facility);
+		syslog(pri, "%.500s", fmtbuf);
+		closelog();
+#endif
+	}
+	errno = saved_errno;
+}
+
+void
+sshlog(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+    LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, level, suffix, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+}
+
+void
+sshlogdie(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+    LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
+	    suffix, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	cleanup_exit(255);
+}
+
+void
+sshsigdie(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+    LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
+	    suffix, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	_exit(1);
+}
+
+void
+sshlogv(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+    LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, va_list args)
+{
+	char tag[128], fmt2[MSGBUFSIZ + 128];
+	int forced = 0;
+	const char *cp;
+	size_t i;
+
+	snprintf(tag, sizeof(tag), "%.48s:%.48s():%d (pid=%ld)",
+	    (cp = strrchr(file, '/')) == NULL ? file : cp + 1, func, line,
+	    (long)getpid());
+	for (i = 0; i < nlog_verbose; i++) {
+		if (match_pattern_list(tag, log_verbose[i], 0) == 1) {
+			forced = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (forced)
+		snprintf(fmt2, sizeof(fmt2), "%s: %s", tag, fmt);
+	else if (showfunc)
+		snprintf(fmt2, sizeof(fmt2), "%s: %s", func, fmt);
+	else
+		strlcpy(fmt2, fmt, sizeof(fmt2));
+
+	do_log(level, forced, suffix, fmt2, args);
+}
+
+void
+sshlogdirect(LogLevel level, int forced, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	do_log(level, forced, NULL, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+}
diff --git a/log.h b/log.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6218b41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/log.h
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: log.h,v 1.33 2021/04/15 16:24:31 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef SSH_LOG_H
+#define SSH_LOG_H
+
+#include <stdarg.h> /* va_list */
+#include "ssherr.h" /* ssh_err() */
+
+/* Supported syslog facilities and levels. */
+typedef enum {
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_DAEMON,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH,
+#ifdef LOG_AUTHPRIV
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTHPRIV,
+#endif
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL0,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL1,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL2,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL3,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL4,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL5,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL6,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_LOCAL7,
+	SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET = -1
+}       SyslogFacility;
+
+typedef enum {
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET,
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE,
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1,
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2,
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3,
+	SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET = -1
+}       LogLevel;
+
+typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
+
+void     log_init(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
+LogLevel log_level_get(void);
+int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
+int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
+void     log_redirect_stderr_to(const char *);
+void	 log_verbose_add(const char *);
+void	 log_verbose_reset(void);
+
+SyslogFacility	log_facility_number(char *);
+const char *	log_facility_name(SyslogFacility);
+LogLevel	log_level_number(char *);
+const char *	log_level_name(LogLevel);
+
+void	 set_log_handler(log_handler_fn *, void *);
+void	 cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
+
+void	 sshlog(const char *, const char *, int, int,
+    LogLevel, const char *, const char *, ...)
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 7, 8)));
+void	 sshlogv(const char *, const char *, int, int,
+    LogLevel, const char *, const char *, va_list);
+void	 sshsigdie(const char *, const char *, int, int,
+    LogLevel, const char *, const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn))
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 7, 8)));
+void	 sshlogdie(const char *, const char *, int, int,
+    LogLevel, const char *, const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn))
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 7, 8)));
+void	 sshfatal(const char *, const char *, int, int,
+    LogLevel, const char *, const char *, ...) __attribute__((noreturn))
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 7, 8)));
+void	 sshlogdirect(LogLevel, int, const char *, ...)
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)));
+
+#define do_log2(level, ...)	sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, level, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug3(...)		sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug2(...)		sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug(...)		sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define verbose(...)		sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define logit(...)		sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define error(...)		sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define fatal(...)		sshfatal(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define logdie(...)		sshlogdie(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define sigdie(...)		sshsigdie(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+
+/* Variants that prepend the caller's function */
+#define do_log2_f(level, ...)	sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, level, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug3_f(...)		sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug2_f(...)		sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug_f(...)		sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define verbose_f(...)		sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define logit_f(...)		sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define error_f(...)		sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define fatal_f(...)		sshfatal(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define logdie_f(...)		sshlogdie(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define sigdie_f(...)		sshsigdie(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, NULL, __VA_ARGS__)
+
+/* Variants that appends a ssh_err message */
+#define do_log2_r(r, level, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, level, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug3_r(r, ...)	sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug2_r(r, ...)	sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug_r(r, ...)		sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define verbose_r(r, ...)	sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define logit_r(r, ...)		sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define error_r(r, ...)		sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define fatal_r(r, ...)		sshfatal(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define logdie_r(r, ...)	sshlogdie(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define sigdie_r(r, ...)	sshsigdie(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define do_log2_fr(r, level, ...) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, level, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug3_fr(r, ...)	sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug2_fr(r, ...)	sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define debug_fr(r, ...)	sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define verbose_fr(r, ...)	sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define logit_fr(r, ...)	sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define error_fr(r, ...)	sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define fatal_fr(r, ...)	sshfatal(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define logdie_fr(r, ...)	sshlogdie(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+#define sigdie_fr(r, ...)	sshsigdie(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, 1, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, ssh_err(r), __VA_ARGS__)
+
+#endif
diff --git a/loginrec.c b/loginrec.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f21499
--- /dev/null
+++ b/loginrec.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1730 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas.  All rights reserved.
+ * Portions copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller
+ * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Jason Downs
+ * Portions copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The btmp logging code is derived from login.c from util-linux and is under
+ * the the following license:
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1980, 1987, 1988 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms are permitted
+ * provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
+ * duplicated in all such forms and that any documentation,
+ * advertising materials, and other materials related to such
+ * distribution and use acknowledge that the software was developed
+ * by the University of California, Berkeley.  The name of the
+ * University may not be used to endorse or promote products derived
+ * from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND WITHOUT ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTIBILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+ */
+
+
+/**
+ ** loginrec.c:  platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval
+ **/
+
+/*
+ *  The new login code explained
+ *  ============================
+ *
+ *  This code attempts to provide a common interface to login recording
+ *  (utmp and friends) and last login time retrieval.
+ *
+ *  Its primary means of achieving this is to use 'struct logininfo', a
+ *  union of all the useful fields in the various different types of
+ *  system login record structures one finds on UNIX variants.
+ *
+ *  We depend on autoconf to define which recording methods are to be
+ *  used, and which fields are contained in the relevant data structures
+ *  on the local system. Many C preprocessor symbols affect which code
+ *  gets compiled here.
+ *
+ *  The code is designed to make it easy to modify a particular
+ *  recording method, without affecting other methods nor requiring so
+ *  many nested conditional compilation blocks as were commonplace in
+ *  the old code.
+ *
+ *  For login recording, we try to use the local system's libraries as
+ *  these are clearly most likely to work correctly. For utmp systems
+ *  this usually means login() and logout() or setutent() etc., probably
+ *  in libutil, along with logwtmp() etc. On these systems, we fall back
+ *  to writing the files directly if we have to, though this method
+ *  requires very thorough testing so we do not corrupt local auditing
+ *  information. These files and their access methods are very system
+ *  specific indeed.
+ *
+ *  For utmpx systems, the corresponding library functions are
+ *  setutxent() etc. To the author's knowledge, all utmpx systems have
+ *  these library functions and so no direct write is attempted. If such
+ *  a system exists and needs support, direct analogues of the [uw]tmp
+ *  code should suffice.
+ *
+ *  Retrieving the time of last login ('lastlog') is in some ways even
+ *  more problemmatic than login recording. Some systems provide a
+ *  simple table of all users which we seek based on uid and retrieve a
+ *  relatively standard structure. Others record the same information in
+ *  a directory with a separate file, and others don't record the
+ *  information separately at all. For systems in the latter category,
+ *  we look backwards in the wtmp or wtmpx file for the last login entry
+ *  for our user. Naturally this is slower and on busy systems could
+ *  incur a significant performance penalty.
+ *
+ *  Calling the new code
+ *  --------------------
+ *
+ *  In OpenSSH all login recording and retrieval is performed in
+ *  login.c. Here you'll find working examples. Also, in the logintest.c
+ *  program there are more examples.
+ *
+ *  Internal handler calling method
+ *  -------------------------------
+ *
+ *  When a call is made to login_login() or login_logout(), both
+ *  routines set a struct logininfo flag defining which action (log in,
+ *  or log out) is to be taken. They both then call login_write(), which
+ *  calls whichever of the many structure-specific handlers autoconf
+ *  selects for the local system.
+ *
+ *  The handlers themselves handle system data structure specifics. Both
+ *  struct utmp and struct utmpx have utility functions (see
+ *  construct_utmp*()) to try to make it simpler to add extra systems
+ *  that introduce new features to either structure.
+ *
+ *  While it may seem terribly wasteful to replicate so much similar
+ *  code for each method, experience has shown that maintaining code to
+ *  write both struct utmp and utmpx in one function, whilst maintaining
+ *  support for all systems whether they have library support or not, is
+ *  a difficult and time-consuming task.
+ *
+ *  Lastlog support proceeds similarly. Functions login_get_lastlog()
+ *  (and its OpenSSH-tuned friend login_get_lastlog_time()) call
+ *  getlast_entry(), which tries one of three methods to find the last
+ *  login time. It uses local system lastlog support if it can,
+ *  otherwise it tries wtmp or wtmpx before giving up and returning 0,
+ *  meaning "tilt".
+ *
+ *  Maintenance
+ *  -----------
+ *
+ *  In many cases it's possible to tweak autoconf to select the correct
+ *  methods for a particular platform, either by improving the detection
+ *  code (best), or by presetting DISABLE_<method> or CONF_<method>_FILE
+ *  symbols for the platform.
+ *
+ *  Use logintest to check which symbols are defined before modifying
+ *  configure.ac and loginrec.c. (You have to build logintest yourself
+ *  with 'make logintest' as it's not built by default.)
+ *
+ *  Otherwise, patches to the specific method(s) are very helpful!
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "loginrec.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
+
+/**
+ ** prototypes for helper functions in this file
+ **/
+
+#if HAVE_UTMP_H
+void set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut);
+void construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
+void set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut);
+void construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *ut);
+#endif
+
+int utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+
+int getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+int wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+
+extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+
+/* pick the shortest string */
+#define MIN_SIZEOF(s1,s2) (sizeof(s1) < sizeof(s2) ? sizeof(s1) : sizeof(s2))
+
+/**
+ ** platform-independent login functions
+ **/
+
+/*
+ * login_login(struct logininfo *) - Record a login
+ *
+ * Call with a pointer to a struct logininfo initialised with
+ * login_init_entry() or login_alloc_entry()
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *  >0 if successful
+ *  0  on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
+ */
+int
+login_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN;
+	return (login_write(li));
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * login_logout(struct logininfo *) - Record a logout
+ *
+ * Call as with login_login()
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *  >0 if successful
+ *  0  on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
+ */
+int
+login_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	li->type = LTYPE_LOGOUT;
+	return (login_write(li));
+}
+
+/*
+ * login_get_lastlog_time(int) - Retrieve the last login time
+ *
+ * Retrieve the last login time for the given uid. Will try to use the
+ * system lastlog facilities if they are available, but will fall back
+ * to looking in wtmp/wtmpx if necessary
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *   0 on failure, or if user has never logged in
+ *   Time in seconds from the epoch if successful
+ *
+ * Useful preprocessor symbols:
+ *   DISABLE_LASTLOG: If set, *never* even try to retrieve lastlog
+ *                    info
+ *   USE_LASTLOG: If set, indicates the presence of system lastlog
+ *                facilities. If this and DISABLE_LASTLOG are not set,
+ *                try to retrieve lastlog information from wtmp/wtmpx.
+ */
+unsigned int
+login_get_lastlog_time(const uid_t uid)
+{
+	struct logininfo li;
+
+	if (login_get_lastlog(&li, uid))
+		return (li.tv_sec);
+	else
+		return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *, int)   - Retrieve a lastlog entry
+ *
+ * Retrieve a logininfo structure populated (only partially) with
+ * information from the system lastlog data, or from wtmp/wtmpx if no
+ * system lastlog information exists.
+ *
+ * Note this routine must be given a pre-allocated logininfo.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *  >0: A pointer to your struct logininfo if successful
+ *  0  on failure (will use OpenSSH's logging facilities for diagnostics)
+ */
+struct logininfo *
+login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const uid_t uid)
+{
+	struct passwd *pw;
+
+	memset(li, '\0', sizeof(*li));
+	li->uid = uid;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we don't have a 'real' lastlog, we need the username to
+	 * reliably search wtmp(x) for the last login (see
+	 * wtmp_get_entry().)
+	 */
+	pw = getpwuid(uid);
+	if (pw == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: Cannot find account for uid %ld", __func__,
+		    (long)uid);
+
+	if (strlcpy(li->username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(li->username)) >=
+	    sizeof(li->username)) {
+		error("%s: username too long (%lu > max %lu)", __func__,
+		    (unsigned long)strlen(pw->pw_name),
+		    (unsigned long)sizeof(li->username) - 1);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (getlast_entry(li))
+		return (li);
+	else
+		return (NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * login_alloc_entry(int, char*, char*, char*)    - Allocate and initialise
+ *                                                  a logininfo structure
+ *
+ * This function creates a new struct logininfo, a data structure
+ * meant to carry the information required to portably record login info.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a newly created struct logininfo. If memory
+ * allocation fails, the program halts.
+ */
+struct
+logininfo *login_alloc_entry(pid_t pid, const char *username,
+    const char *hostname, const char *line)
+{
+	struct logininfo *newli;
+
+	newli = xmalloc(sizeof(*newli));
+	login_init_entry(newli, pid, username, hostname, line);
+	return (newli);
+}
+
+
+/* login_free_entry(struct logininfo *)    - free struct memory */
+void
+login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	free(li);
+}
+
+
+/* login_init_entry(struct logininfo *, int, char*, char*, char*)
+ *                                        - initialise a struct logininfo
+ *
+ * Populates a new struct logininfo, a data structure meant to carry
+ * the information required to portably record login info.
+ *
+ * Returns: 1
+ */
+int
+login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, pid_t pid, const char *username,
+    const char *hostname, const char *line)
+{
+	struct passwd *pw;
+
+	memset(li, 0, sizeof(*li));
+
+	li->pid = pid;
+
+	/* set the line information */
+	if (line)
+		line_fullname(li->line, line, sizeof(li->line));
+
+	if (username) {
+		strlcpy(li->username, username, sizeof(li->username));
+		pw = getpwnam(li->username);
+		if (pw == NULL) {
+			fatal("%s: Cannot find user \"%s\"", __func__,
+			    li->username);
+		}
+		li->uid = pw->pw_uid;
+	}
+
+	if (hostname)
+		strlcpy(li->hostname, hostname, sizeof(li->hostname));
+
+	return (1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *)    - set the current time
+ *
+ * Set the current time in a logininfo structure. This function is
+ * meant to eliminate the need to deal with system dependencies for
+ * time handling.
+ */
+void
+login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct timeval tv;
+
+	gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+
+	li->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
+	li->tv_usec = tv.tv_usec;
+}
+
+/* copy a sockaddr_* into our logininfo */
+void
+login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa,
+    const unsigned int sa_size)
+{
+	unsigned int bufsize = sa_size;
+
+	/* make sure we don't overrun our union */
+	if (sizeof(li->hostaddr) < sa_size)
+		bufsize = sizeof(li->hostaddr);
+
+	memcpy(&li->hostaddr.sa, sa, bufsize);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ ** login_write: Call low-level recording functions based on autoconf
+ ** results
+ **/
+int
+login_write(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	if (geteuid() != 0) {
+		logit("Attempt to write login records by non-root user (aborting)");
+		return (1);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* set the timestamp */
+	login_set_current_time(li);
+#ifdef USE_LOGIN
+	syslogin_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
+		lastlog_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMP
+	utmp_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMP
+	wtmp_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+	utmpx_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMPX
+	wtmpx_write_entry(li);
+#endif
+#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN &&
+	    !sys_auth_record_login(li->username,li->hostname,li->line,
+	    loginmsg))
+		logit("Writing login record failed for %s", li->username);
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGIN)
+		audit_session_open(li);
+	else if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
+		audit_session_close(li);
+#endif
+	return (0);
+}
+
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+int
+login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	li->type = LTYPE_LOGIN;
+	login_set_current_time(li);
+# ifdef USE_UTMP
+	utmp_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+# ifdef USE_WTMP
+	wtmp_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+# ifdef USE_UTMPX
+	utmpx_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+# ifdef USE_WTMPX
+	wtmpx_write_entry(li);
+# endif
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif
+
+/**
+ ** getlast_entry: Call low-level functions to retrieve the last login
+ **                time.
+ **/
+
+/* take the uid in li and return the last login time */
+int
+getlast_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+	return(lastlog_get_entry(li));
+#else /* !USE_LASTLOG */
+#if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \
+    defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER)
+	return (utmpx_get_entry(li));
+#endif
+
+#if defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
+	/* On some systems we shouldn't even try to obtain last login
+	 * time, e.g. AIX */
+	return (0);
+# elif defined(USE_WTMP) && \
+    (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP))
+	/* retrieve last login time from utmp */
+	return (wtmp_get_entry(li));
+# elif defined(USE_WTMPX) && \
+    (defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX) || defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX))
+	/* If wtmp isn't available, try wtmpx */
+	return (wtmpx_get_entry(li));
+# else
+	/* Give up: No means of retrieving last login time */
+	return (0);
+# endif /* DISABLE_LASTLOG */
+#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * 'line' string utility functions
+ *
+ * These functions process the 'line' string into one of three forms:
+ *
+ * 1. The full filename (including '/dev')
+ * 2. The stripped name (excluding '/dev')
+ * 3. The abbreviated name (e.g. /dev/ttyp00 -> yp00
+ *                               /dev/pts/1  -> ts/1 )
+ *
+ * Form 3 is used on some systems to identify a .tmp.? entry when
+ * attempting to remove it. Typically both addition and removal is
+ * performed by one application - say, sshd - so as long as the choice
+ * uniquely identifies a terminal it's ok.
+ */
+
+
+/*
+ * line_fullname(): add the leading '/dev/' if it doesn't exist make
+ * sure dst has enough space, if not just copy src (ugh)
+ */
+char *
+line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize)
+{
+	memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
+	if ((strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0) || (dstsize < (strlen(src) + 5)))
+		strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize);
+	else {
+		strlcpy(dst, "/dev/", dstsize);
+		strlcat(dst, src, dstsize);
+	}
+	return (dst);
+}
+
+/* line_stripname(): strip the leading '/dev' if it exists, return dst */
+char *
+line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
+{
+	memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
+	if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+		strlcpy(dst, src + 5, dstsize);
+	else
+		strlcpy(dst, src, dstsize);
+	return (dst);
+}
+
+/*
+ * line_abbrevname(): Return the abbreviated (usually four-character)
+ * form of the line (Just use the last <dstsize> characters of the
+ * full name.)
+ *
+ * NOTE: use strncpy because we do NOT necessarily want zero
+ * termination
+ */
+char *
+line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize)
+{
+	size_t len;
+
+	memset(dst, '\0', dstsize);
+
+	/* Always skip prefix if present */
+	if (strncmp(src, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+		src += 5;
+
+#ifdef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY
+	if (strncmp(src, "tty", 3) == 0)
+		src += 3;
+#endif
+
+	len = strlen(src);
+
+	if (len > 0) {
+		if (((int)len - dstsize) > 0)
+			src +=  ((int)len - dstsize);
+
+		/* note: _don't_ change this to strlcpy */
+		strncpy(dst, src, (size_t)dstsize);
+	}
+
+	return (dst);
+}
+
+/**
+ ** utmp utility functions
+ **
+ ** These functions manipulate struct utmp, taking system differences
+ ** into account.
+ **/
+
+#if defined(USE_UTMP) || defined (USE_WTMP) || defined (USE_LOGIN)
+
+/* build the utmp structure */
+void
+set_utmp_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP)
+	ut->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec;
+	ut->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec;
+# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP)
+	ut->ut_time = li->tv_sec;
+# endif
+}
+
+void
+construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
+		    struct utmp *ut)
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
+# endif
+
+	memset(ut, '\0', sizeof(*ut));
+
+	/* First fill out fields used for both logins and logouts */
+
+# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP
+	line_abbrevname(ut->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_id));
+# endif
+
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
+	/* This is done here to keep utmp constants out of struct logininfo */
+	switch (li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		ut->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
+		break;
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		ut->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
+		break;
+	}
+# endif
+	set_utmp_time(li, ut);
+
+	line_stripname(ut->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(ut->ut_line));
+
+# ifdef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP
+	ut->ut_pid = li->pid;
+# endif
+
+	/* If we're logging out, leave all other fields blank */
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank
+	 * for logouts.
+	 */
+
+	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
+	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
+# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
+	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP
+	/* this is just a 32-bit IP address */
+	if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+		ut->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+	/* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */
+	if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+		sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa);
+		memcpy(ut->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16);
+		if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) {
+			ut->ut_addr_v6[0] = ut->ut_addr_v6[3];
+			ut->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0;
+			ut->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0;
+			ut->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0;
+		}
+	}
+# endif
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMP || USE_WTMP || USE_LOGIN */
+
+/**
+ ** utmpx utility functions
+ **
+ ** These functions manipulate struct utmpx, accounting for system
+ ** variations.
+ **/
+
+#if defined(USE_UTMPX) || defined (USE_WTMPX)
+/* build the utmpx structure */
+void
+set_utmpx_time(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)
+	utx->ut_tv.tv_sec = li->tv_sec;
+	utx->ut_tv.tv_usec = li->tv_usec;
+# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX)
+	utx->ut_time = li->tv_sec;
+# endif
+}
+
+void
+construct_utmpx(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
+#  endif
+	memset(utx, '\0', sizeof(*utx));
+
+# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
+	line_abbrevname(utx->ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_id));
+# endif
+
+	/* this is done here to keep utmp constants out of loginrec.h */
+	switch (li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		utx->ut_type = USER_PROCESS;
+		break;
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		utx->ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
+		break;
+	}
+	line_stripname(utx->ut_line, li->line, sizeof(utx->ut_line));
+	set_utmpx_time(li, utx);
+	utx->ut_pid = li->pid;
+
+	/* strncpy(): Don't necessarily want null termination */
+	strncpy(utx->ut_user, li->username,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_user, li->username));
+
+	if (li->type == LTYPE_LOGOUT)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * These fields are only used when logging in, and are blank
+	 * for logouts.
+	 */
+
+# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX
+	strncpy(utx->ut_host, li->hostname,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(utx->ut_host, li->hostname));
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_SS_IN_UTMPX
+	utx->ut_ss = li->hostaddr.sa_storage;
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX
+	/* this is just a 32-bit IP address */
+	if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET)
+		utx->ut_addr = li->hostaddr.sa_in.sin_addr.s_addr;
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+	/* this is just a 128-bit IPv6 address */
+	if (li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+		sa6 = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&li->hostaddr.sa);
+		memcpy(utx->ut_addr_v6, sa6->sin6_addr.s6_addr, 16);
+		if (IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&sa6->sin6_addr)) {
+			utx->ut_addr_v6[0] = utx->ut_addr_v6[3];
+			utx->ut_addr_v6[1] = 0;
+			utx->ut_addr_v6[2] = 0;
+			utx->ut_addr_v6[3] = 0;
+		}
+	}
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX
+	/* ut_syslen is the length of the utx_host string */
+	utx->ut_syslen = MINIMUM(strlen(li->hostname), sizeof(utx->ut_host));
+# endif
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMPX || USE_WTMPX */
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level utmp functions
+ **/
+
+/* FIXME: (ATL) utmp_write_direct needs testing */
+#ifdef USE_UTMP
+
+/* if we can, use pututline() etc. */
+# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTENT) && \
+	defined(HAVE_PUTUTLINE)
+#  define UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+# endif
+
+
+/* write a utmp entry with the system's help (pututline() and pals) */
+# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+static int
+utmp_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+	setutent();
+	pututline(ut);
+#  ifdef HAVE_ENDUTENT
+	endutent();
+#  endif
+	return (1);
+}
+# else /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+/*
+ * Write a utmp entry direct to the file
+ * This is a slightly modification of code in OpenBSD's login.c
+ */
+static int
+utmp_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+	struct utmp old_ut;
+	register int fd;
+	int tty;
+
+	/* FIXME: (ATL) ttyslot() needs local implementation */
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETTTYENT)
+	struct ttyent *ty;
+
+	tty=0;
+	setttyent();
+	while (NULL != (ty = getttyent())) {
+		tty++;
+		if (!strncmp(ty->ty_name, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)))
+			break;
+	}
+	endttyent();
+
+	if (NULL == ty) {
+		logit("%s: tty not found", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+#else /* FIXME */
+
+	tty = ttyslot(); /* seems only to work for /dev/ttyp? style names */
+
+#endif /* HAVE_GETTTYENT */
+
+	if (tty > 0 && (fd = open(UTMP_FILE, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0644)) >= 0) {
+		off_t pos, ret;
+
+		pos = (off_t)tty * sizeof(struct utmp);
+		if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) {
+			logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+			close(fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+		if (ret != pos) {
+			logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s",
+			    __func__, tty, UTMP_FILE);
+			close(fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Prevent luser from zero'ing out ut_host.
+		 * If the new ut_line is empty but the old one is not
+		 * and ut_line and ut_name match, preserve the old ut_line.
+		 */
+		if (atomicio(read, fd, &old_ut, sizeof(old_ut)) == sizeof(old_ut) &&
+		    (ut->ut_host[0] == '\0') && (old_ut.ut_host[0] != '\0') &&
+		    (strncmp(old_ut.ut_line, ut->ut_line, sizeof(ut->ut_line)) == 0) &&
+		    (strncmp(old_ut.ut_name, ut->ut_name, sizeof(ut->ut_name)) == 0))
+			memcpy(ut->ut_host, old_ut.ut_host, sizeof(ut->ut_host));
+
+		if ((ret = lseek(fd, pos, SEEK_SET)) == -1) {
+			logit("%s: lseek: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+			close(fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+		if (ret != pos) {
+			logit("%s: Couldn't seek to tty %d slot in %s",
+			    __func__, tty, UTMP_FILE);
+			close(fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) {
+			logit("%s: error writing %s: %s", __func__,
+			    UTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			close(fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+
+		close(fd);
+		return (1);
+	} else {
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+# endif /* UTMP_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+static int
+utmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmp ut;
+
+	construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+	if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# else
+	if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+
+static int
+utmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmp ut;
+
+	construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+# ifdef UTMP_USE_LIBRARY
+	if (!utmp_write_library(li, &ut)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# else
+	if (!utmp_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+
+int
+utmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return (utmp_perform_login(li));
+
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		return (utmp_perform_logout(li));
+
+	default:
+		logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMP */
+
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level utmpx functions
+ **/
+
+/* not much point if we don't want utmpx entries */
+#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+
+/* if we have the wherewithall, use pututxline etc. */
+# if !defined(DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXENT) && \
+	defined(HAVE_PUTUTXLINE)
+#  define UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+# endif
+
+
+/* write a utmpx entry with the system's help (pututxline() and pals) */
+# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+static int
+utmpx_write_library(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+	setutxent();
+	pututxline(utx);
+
+#  ifdef HAVE_ENDUTXENT
+	endutxent();
+#  endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+# else /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+/* write a utmp entry direct to the file */
+static int
+utmpx_write_direct(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+	logit("%s: not implemented!", __func__);
+	return (0);
+}
+# endif /* UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY */
+
+static int
+utmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmpx utx;
+
+	construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+	if (!utmpx_write_library(li, &utx)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_library() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# else
+	if (!utmpx_write_direct(li, &ut)) {
+		logit("%s: utmp_write_direct() failed", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+# endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+
+static int
+utmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmpx utx;
+
+	construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+# ifdef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
+	line_abbrevname(utx.ut_id, li->line, sizeof(utx.ut_id));
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
+	utx.ut_type = DEAD_PROCESS;
+# endif
+
+# ifdef UTMPX_USE_LIBRARY
+	utmpx_write_library(li, &utx);
+# else
+	utmpx_write_direct(li, &utx);
+# endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+int
+utmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return (utmpx_perform_login(li));
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		return (utmpx_perform_logout(li));
+	default:
+		logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMPX */
+
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level wtmp functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_WTMP
+
+/*
+ * Write a wtmp entry direct to the end of the file
+ * This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c
+ */
+static int
+wtmp_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+	struct stat buf;
+	int fd, ret = 1;
+
+	if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, ut, sizeof(*ut)) != sizeof(*ut)) {
+			ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
+			logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
+			    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			ret = 0;
+		}
+	close(fd);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+wtmp_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmp ut;
+
+	construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+	return (wtmp_write(li, &ut));
+}
+
+
+static int
+wtmp_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmp ut;
+
+	construct_utmp(li, &ut);
+	return (wtmp_write(li, &ut));
+}
+
+
+int
+wtmp_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return (wtmp_perform_login(li));
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		return (wtmp_perform_logout(li));
+	default:
+		logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Notes on fetching login data from wtmp/wtmpx
+ *
+ * Logouts are usually recorded with (amongst other things) a blank
+ * username on a given tty line.  However, some systems (HP-UX is one)
+ * leave all fields set, but change the ut_type field to DEAD_PROCESS.
+ *
+ * Since we're only looking for logins here, we know that the username
+ * must be set correctly. On systems that leave it in, we check for
+ * ut_type==USER_PROCESS (indicating a login.)
+ *
+ * Portability: Some systems may set something other than USER_PROCESS
+ * to indicate a login process. I don't know of any as I write. Also,
+ * it's possible that some systems may both leave the username in
+ * place and not have ut_type.
+ */
+
+/* return true if this wtmp entry indicates a login */
+static int
+wtmp_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmp *ut)
+{
+	if (strncmp(li->username, ut->ut_name,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, ut->ut_name)) == 0) {
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
+		if (ut->ut_type & USER_PROCESS)
+			return (1);
+# else
+		return (1);
+# endif
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+wtmp_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	struct utmp ut;
+	int fd, found = 0;
+
+	/* Clear the time entries in our logininfo */
+	li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
+
+	if ((fd = open(WTMP_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
+		logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		close(fd);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* Seek to the start of the last struct utmp */
+	if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmp), SEEK_END) == -1) {
+		/* Looks like we've got a fresh wtmp file */
+		close(fd);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	while (!found) {
+		if (atomicio(read, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut)) {
+			logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__,
+			    WTMP_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			close (fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+		if (wtmp_islogin(li, &ut) ) {
+			found = 1;
+			/*
+			 * We've already checked for a time in struct
+			 * utmp, in login_getlast()
+			 */
+# ifdef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP
+			li->tv_sec = ut.ut_time;
+# else
+#  if HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP
+			li->tv_sec = ut.ut_tv.tv_sec;
+#  endif
+# endif
+			line_fullname(li->line, ut.ut_line,
+			    MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, ut.ut_line));
+# ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
+			strlcpy(li->hostname, ut.ut_host,
+			    MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ut.ut_host));
+# endif
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Seek back 2 x struct utmp */
+		if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmp)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
+			/* We've found the start of the file, so quit */
+			close(fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* We found an entry. Tidy up and return */
+	close(fd);
+	return (1);
+}
+# endif /* USE_WTMP */
+
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level wtmpx functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_WTMPX
+/*
+ * Write a wtmpx entry direct to the end of the file
+ * This is a slight modification of code in OpenBSD's logwtmp.c
+ */
+static int
+wtmpx_write(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+#ifndef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
+	struct stat buf;
+	int fd, ret = 1;
+
+	if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_WRONLY|O_APPEND, 0)) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if (fstat(fd, &buf) == 0)
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, utx, sizeof(*utx)) != sizeof(*utx)) {
+			ftruncate(fd, buf.st_size);
+			logit("%s: problem writing %s: %s", __func__,
+			    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			ret = 0;
+		}
+	close(fd);
+
+	return (ret);
+#else
+	updwtmpx(WTMPX_FILE, utx);
+	return (1);
+#endif
+}
+
+
+static int
+wtmpx_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmpx utx;
+
+	construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+	return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx));
+}
+
+
+static int
+wtmpx_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmpx utx;
+
+	construct_utmpx(li, &utx);
+	return (wtmpx_write(li, &utx));
+}
+
+
+int
+wtmpx_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return (wtmpx_perform_login(li));
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		return (wtmpx_perform_logout(li));
+	default:
+		logit("%s: invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Please see the notes above wtmp_islogin() for information about the
+   next two functions */
+
+/* Return true if this wtmpx entry indicates a login */
+static int
+wtmpx_islogin(struct logininfo *li, struct utmpx *utx)
+{
+	if (strncmp(li->username, utx->ut_user,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(li->username, utx->ut_user)) == 0 ) {
+# ifdef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
+		if (utx->ut_type == USER_PROCESS)
+			return (1);
+# else
+		return (1);
+# endif
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+
+int
+wtmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	struct utmpx utx;
+	int fd, found=0;
+
+	/* Clear the time entries */
+	li->tv_sec = li->tv_usec = 0;
+
+	if ((fd = open(WTMPX_FILE, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: problem opening %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) != 0) {
+		logit("%s: couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
+		    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		close(fd);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* Seek to the start of the last struct utmpx */
+	if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)sizeof(struct utmpx), SEEK_END) == -1 ) {
+		/* probably a newly rotated wtmpx file */
+		close(fd);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	while (!found) {
+		if (atomicio(read, fd, &utx, sizeof(utx)) != sizeof(utx)) {
+			logit("%s: read of %s failed: %s", __func__,
+			    WTMPX_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			close (fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Logouts are recorded as a blank username on a particular
+		 * line. So, we just need to find the username in struct utmpx
+		 */
+		if (wtmpx_islogin(li, &utx)) {
+			found = 1;
+# if defined(HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX)
+			li->tv_sec = utx.ut_tv.tv_sec;
+# elif defined(HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX)
+			li->tv_sec = utx.ut_time;
+# endif
+			line_fullname(li->line, utx.ut_line, sizeof(li->line));
+# if defined(HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX)
+			strlcpy(li->hostname, utx.ut_host,
+			    MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx.ut_host));
+# endif
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (lseek(fd, -(off_t)(2 * sizeof(struct utmpx)), SEEK_CUR) == -1) {
+			close(fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	close(fd);
+	return (1);
+}
+#endif /* USE_WTMPX */
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level libutil login() functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_LOGIN
+static int
+syslogin_perform_login(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmp *ut;
+
+	ut = xmalloc(sizeof(*ut));
+	construct_utmp(li, ut);
+	login(ut);
+	free(ut);
+
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static int
+syslogin_perform_logout(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+# ifdef HAVE_LOGOUT
+	char line[UT_LINESIZE];
+
+	(void)line_stripname(line, li->line, sizeof(line));
+
+	if (!logout(line))
+		logit("%s: logout() returned an error", __func__);
+#  ifdef HAVE_LOGWTMP
+	else
+		logwtmp(line, "", "");
+#  endif
+	/* FIXME: (ATL - if the need arises) What to do if we have
+	 * login, but no logout?  what if logout but no logwtmp? All
+	 * routines are in libutil so they should all be there,
+	 * but... */
+# endif
+	return (1);
+}
+
+int
+syslogin_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch (li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return (syslogin_perform_login(li));
+	case LTYPE_LOGOUT:
+		return (syslogin_perform_logout(li));
+	default:
+		logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* USE_LOGIN */
+
+/* end of file log-syslogin.c */
+
+/**
+ ** Low-level lastlog functions
+ **/
+
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+
+#if !defined(LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE) || !defined(HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME)
+/* open the file (using filemode) and seek to the login entry */
+static int
+lastlog_openseek(struct logininfo *li, int *fd, int filemode)
+{
+	off_t offset;
+	char lastlog_file[1024];
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (stat(LASTLOG_FILE, &st) != 0) {
+		logit("%s: Couldn't stat %s: %s", __func__,
+		    LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) {
+		snprintf(lastlog_file, sizeof(lastlog_file), "%s/%s",
+		    LASTLOG_FILE, li->username);
+	} else if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+		strlcpy(lastlog_file, LASTLOG_FILE, sizeof(lastlog_file));
+	} else {
+		logit("%s: %.100s is not a file or directory!", __func__,
+		    LASTLOG_FILE);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	*fd = open(lastlog_file, filemode, 0600);
+	if (*fd < 0) {
+		debug("%s: Couldn't open %s: %s", __func__,
+		    lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
+		/* find this uid's offset in the lastlog file */
+		offset = (off_t) ((u_long)li->uid * sizeof(struct lastlog));
+
+		if (lseek(*fd, offset, SEEK_SET) != offset) {
+			logit("%s: %s->lseek(): %s", __func__,
+			    lastlog_file, strerror(errno));
+			close(*fd);
+			return (0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return (1);
+}
+#endif /* !LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE || !HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
+
+#ifdef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE
+int
+lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		return 1; /* lastlog written by pututxline */
+	default:
+		logit("lastlog_write_entry: Invalid type field");
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+#else /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
+int
+lastlog_write_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct lastlog last;
+	int fd;
+
+	switch(li->type) {
+	case LTYPE_LOGIN:
+		/* create our struct lastlog */
+		memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last));
+		line_stripname(last.ll_line, li->line, sizeof(last.ll_line));
+		strlcpy(last.ll_host, li->hostname,
+		    MIN_SIZEOF(last.ll_host, li->hostname));
+		last.ll_time = li->tv_sec;
+	
+		if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDWR|O_CREAT))
+			return (0);
+	
+		/* write the entry */
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &last, sizeof(last)) != sizeof(last)) {
+			close(fd);
+			logit("%s: Error writing to %s: %s", __func__,
+			    LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
+			return (0);
+		}
+	
+		close(fd);
+		return (1);
+	default:
+		logit("%s: Invalid type field", __func__);
+		return (0);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME
+int
+lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct lastlogx l, *ll;
+
+	if ((ll = getlastlogxbyname(li->username, &l)) == NULL) {
+		memset(&l, '\0', sizeof(l));
+		ll = &l;
+	}
+	line_fullname(li->line, ll->ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
+	strlcpy(li->hostname, ll->ll_host,
+		MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, ll->ll_host));
+	li->tv_sec = ll->ll_tv.tv_sec;
+	li->tv_usec = ll->ll_tv.tv_usec;
+	return (1);
+}
+#else /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
+int
+lastlog_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct lastlog last;
+	int fd, ret;
+
+	if (!lastlog_openseek(li, &fd, O_RDONLY))
+		return (0);
+
+	ret = atomicio(read, fd, &last, sizeof(last));
+	close(fd);
+
+	switch (ret) {
+	case 0:
+		memset(&last, '\0', sizeof(last));
+		/* FALLTHRU */
+	case sizeof(last):
+		line_fullname(li->line, last.ll_line, sizeof(li->line));
+		strlcpy(li->hostname, last.ll_host,
+		    MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, last.ll_host));
+		li->tv_sec = last.ll_time;
+		return (1);
+	case -1:
+		error("%s: Error reading from %s: %s", __func__,
+		    LASTLOG_FILE, strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	default:
+		error("%s: Error reading from %s: Expecting %d, got %d",
+		    __func__, LASTLOG_FILE, (int)sizeof(last), ret);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME */
+#endif /* USE_LASTLOG */
+
+#if defined(USE_UTMPX) && defined(HAVE_SETUTXDB) && \
+    defined(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN) && defined(HAVE_GETUTXUSER)
+int
+utmpx_get_entry(struct logininfo *li)
+{
+	struct utmpx *utx;
+
+	if (setutxdb(UTXDB_LASTLOGIN, NULL) != 0)
+		return (0);
+	utx = getutxuser(li->username);
+	if (utx == NULL) {
+		endutxent();
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	line_fullname(li->line, utx->ut_line,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(li->line, utx->ut_line));
+	strlcpy(li->hostname, utx->ut_host,
+	    MIN_SIZEOF(li->hostname, utx->ut_host));
+	li->tv_sec = utx->ut_tv.tv_sec;
+	li->tv_usec = utx->ut_tv.tv_usec;
+	endutxent();
+	return (1);
+}
+#endif /* USE_UTMPX && HAVE_SETUTXDB && UTXDB_LASTLOGIN && HAVE_GETUTXUSER */
+
+#ifdef USE_BTMP
+  /*
+   * Logs failed login attempts in _PATH_BTMP if that exists.
+   * The most common login failure is to give password instead of username.
+   * So the _PATH_BTMP file checked for the correct permission, so that
+   * only root can read it.
+   */
+
+void
+record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, const char *username, const char *hostname,
+    const char *ttyn)
+{
+	int fd;
+	struct utmp ut;
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+	socklen_t fromlen = sizeof(from);
+	struct sockaddr_in *a4;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *a6;
+	time_t t;
+	struct stat fst;
+
+	if (geteuid() != 0)
+		return;
+	if ((fd = open(_PATH_BTMP, O_WRONLY | O_APPEND)) < 0) {
+		debug("Unable to open the btmp file %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+	if (fstat(fd, &fst) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: fstat of %s failed: %s", __func__, _PATH_BTMP,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if((fst.st_mode & (S_IXGRP | S_IRWXO)) || (fst.st_uid != 0)){
+		logit("Excess permission or bad ownership on file %s",
+		    _PATH_BTMP);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
+	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
+	strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
+	strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
+
+	time(&t);
+	ut.ut_time = t;     /* ut_time is not always a time_t */
+	ut.ut_type = LOGIN_PROCESS;
+	ut.ut_pid = getpid();
+
+	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
+	strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
+
+	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
+	    getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == 0) {
+		ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
+		if (from.ss_family == AF_INET) {
+			a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&from;
+			memcpy(&ut.ut_addr, &(a4->sin_addr),
+			    MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr, a4->sin_addr));
+		}
+#ifdef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
+		if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) {
+			a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&from;
+			memcpy(&ut.ut_addr_v6, &(a6->sin6_addr),
+			    MIN_SIZEOF(ut.ut_addr_v6, a6->sin6_addr));
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, &ut, sizeof(ut)) != sizeof(ut))
+		error("Failed to write to %s: %s", _PATH_BTMP,
+		    strerror(errno));
+
+out:
+	close(fd);
+}
+#endif	/* USE_BTMP */
diff --git a/loginrec.h b/loginrec.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02bceb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/loginrec.h
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+#ifndef _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_
+#define _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/**
+ ** loginrec.h:  platform-independent login recording and lastlog retrieval
+ **/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+struct ssh;
+
+/**
+ ** you should use the login_* calls to work around platform dependencies
+ **/
+
+/*
+ * login_netinfo structure
+ */
+
+union login_netinfo {
+	struct sockaddr sa;
+	struct sockaddr_in sa_in;
+	struct sockaddr_storage sa_storage;
+};
+
+/*
+ *   * logininfo structure  *
+ */
+/* types - different to utmp.h 'type' macros */
+/* (though set to the same value as linux, openbsd and others...) */
+#define LTYPE_LOGIN    7
+#define LTYPE_LOGOUT   8
+
+/* string lengths - set very long */
+#define LINFO_PROGSIZE 64
+#define LINFO_LINESIZE 64
+#define LINFO_NAMESIZE 512
+#define LINFO_HOSTSIZE 256
+
+struct logininfo {
+	char       progname[LINFO_PROGSIZE];     /* name of program (for PAM) */
+	int        progname_null;
+	short int  type;                         /* type of login (LTYPE_*) */
+	pid_t      pid;                          /* PID of login process */
+	uid_t      uid;                          /* UID of this user */
+	char       line[LINFO_LINESIZE];         /* tty/pty name */
+	char       username[LINFO_NAMESIZE];     /* login username */
+	char       hostname[LINFO_HOSTSIZE];     /* remote hostname */
+	/* 'exit_status' structure components */
+	int        exit;                        /* process exit status */
+	int        termination;                 /* process termination status */
+	/* struct timeval (sys/time.h) isn't always available, if it isn't we'll
+	 * use time_t's value as tv_sec and set tv_usec to 0
+	 */
+	unsigned int tv_sec;
+	unsigned int tv_usec;
+	union login_netinfo hostaddr;       /* caller's host address(es) */
+}; /* struct logininfo */
+
+/*
+ * login recording functions
+ */
+
+/** 'public' functions */
+
+/* construct a new login entry */
+struct logininfo *login_alloc_entry(pid_t pid, const char *username,
+				    const char *hostname, const char *line);
+/* free a structure */
+void login_free_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+/* fill out a pre-allocated structure with useful information */
+int login_init_entry(struct logininfo *li, pid_t pid, const char *username,
+    const char *hostname, const char *line);
+/* place the current time in a logininfo struct */
+void login_set_current_time(struct logininfo *li);
+
+/* record the entry */
+int login_login (struct logininfo *li);
+int login_logout(struct logininfo *li);
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+int login_utmp_only(struct logininfo *li);
+#endif
+
+/** End of public functions */
+
+/* record the entry */
+int login_write (struct logininfo *li);
+int login_log_entry(struct logininfo *li);
+
+/* set the network address based on network address type */
+void login_set_addr(struct logininfo *li, const struct sockaddr *sa,
+		    const unsigned int sa_size);
+
+/*
+ * lastlog retrieval functions
+ */
+/* lastlog *entry* functions fill out a logininfo */
+struct logininfo *login_get_lastlog(struct logininfo *li, const uid_t uid);
+/* lastlog *time* functions return time_t equivalent (uint) */
+unsigned int login_get_lastlog_time(const uid_t uid);
+
+/* produce various forms of the line filename */
+char *line_fullname(char *dst, const char *src, u_int dstsize);
+char *line_stripname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
+char *line_abbrevname(char *dst, const char *src, int dstsize);
+
+void record_failed_login(struct ssh *, const char *, const char *,
+    const char *);
+
+#endif /* _HAVE_LOGINREC_H_ */
diff --git a/logintest.c b/logintest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ee1cdc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/logintest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Andre Lucas.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/**
+ ** logintest.c:  simple test driver for platform-independent login recording
+ **               and lastlog retrieval
+ **/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+#include <time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "loginrec.h"
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+#define PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT 3
+
+int nologtest = 0;
+int compile_opts_only = 0;
+int be_verbose = 0;
+
+
+/* Dump a logininfo to stdout. Assumes a tab size of 8 chars. */
+void
+dump_logininfo(struct logininfo *li, char *descname)
+{
+	/* yes I know how nasty this is */
+	printf("struct logininfo %s = {\n\t"
+	    "progname\t'%s'\n\ttype\t\t%d\n\t"
+	    "pid\t\t%d\n\tuid\t\t%d\n\t"
+	    "line\t\t'%s'\n\tusername\t'%s'\n\t"
+	    "hostname\t'%s'\n\texit\t\t%d\n\ttermination\t%d\n\t"
+	    "tv_sec\t%d\n\ttv_usec\t%d\n\t"
+	    "struct login_netinfo hostaddr {\n\t\t"
+	    "struct sockaddr sa {\n"
+	    "\t\t\tfamily\t%d\n\t\t}\n"
+	    "\t}\n"
+	    "}\n",
+	    descname, li->progname, li->type,
+	    li->pid, li->uid, li->line,
+	    li->username, li->hostname, li->exit,
+	    li->termination, li->tv_sec, li->tv_usec,
+	    li->hostaddr.sa.sa_family);
+}
+
+
+int
+testAPI()
+{
+	struct logininfo *li1;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	struct hostent *he;
+	struct sockaddr_in sa_in4;
+	char cmdstring[256], stripline[8];
+	char username[32];
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+	time_t t0, t1, t2, logintime, logouttime;
+	char s_t0[64],s_t1[64],s_t2[64];
+	char s_logintime[64], s_logouttime[64]; /* ctime() strings */
+#endif
+
+	printf("**\n** Testing the API...\n**\n");
+
+	pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+	strlcpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(username));
+
+	/* gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)); */
+
+	printf("login_alloc_entry test (no host info):\n");
+
+	/* FIXME fake tty more effectively - this could upset some platforms */
+	li1 = login_alloc_entry((int)getpid(), username, NULL, ttyname(0));
+	strlcpy(li1->progname, "OpenSSH-logintest", sizeof(li1->progname));
+
+	if (be_verbose)
+		dump_logininfo(li1, "li1");
+
+	printf("Setting host address info for 'localhost' (may call out):\n");
+	if (! (he = gethostbyname("localhost"))) {
+		printf("Couldn't set hostname(lookup failed)\n");
+	} else {
+		/* NOTE: this is messy, but typically a program wouldn't have to set
+		 *  any of this, a sockaddr_in* would be already prepared */
+		memcpy((void *)&(sa_in4.sin_addr), (void *)&(he->h_addr_list[0][0]),
+		    sizeof(struct in_addr));
+		login_set_addr(li1, (struct sockaddr *) &sa_in4, sizeof(sa_in4));
+		strlcpy(li1->hostname, "localhost", sizeof(li1->hostname));
+	}
+	if (be_verbose)
+		dump_logininfo(li1, "li1");
+
+	if ((int)geteuid() != 0) {
+		printf("NOT RUNNING LOGIN TESTS - you are not root!\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	if (nologtest)
+		return 1;
+
+	line_stripname(stripline, li1->line, sizeof(stripline));
+
+	printf("Performing an invalid login attempt (no type field)\n--\n");
+	login_write(li1);
+	printf("--\n(Should have written errors to stderr)\n");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+	(void)time(&t0);
+	strlcpy(s_t0, ctime(&t0), sizeof(s_t0));
+	t1 = login_get_lastlog_time(getuid());
+	strlcpy(s_t1, ctime(&t1), sizeof(s_t1));
+	printf("Before logging in:\n\tcurrent time is %d - %s\t"
+	    "lastlog time is %d - %s\n",
+	    (int)t0, s_t0, (int)t1, s_t1);
+#endif
+
+	printf("Performing a login on line %s ", stripline);
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+	(void)time(&logintime);
+	strlcpy(s_logintime, ctime(&logintime), sizeof(s_logintime));
+	printf("at %d - %s", (int)logintime, s_logintime);
+#endif
+	printf("--\n");
+	login_login(li1);
+
+	snprintf(cmdstring, sizeof(cmdstring), "who | grep '%s '",
+		 stripline);
+	system(cmdstring);
+
+	printf("--\nPausing for %d second(s)...\n", PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT);
+	sleep(PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT);
+
+	printf("Performing a logout ");
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+	(void)time(&logouttime);
+	strlcpy(s_logouttime, ctime(&logouttime), sizeof(s_logouttime));
+	printf("at %d - %s", (int)logouttime, s_logouttime);
+#endif
+	printf("\nThe root login shown above should be gone.\n"
+	    "If the root login hasn't gone, but another user on the same\n"
+	    "pty has, this is OK - we're hacking it here, and there\n"
+	    "shouldn't be two users on one pty in reality...\n"
+	    "-- ('who' output follows)\n");
+	login_logout(li1);
+
+	system(cmdstring);
+	printf("-- ('who' output ends)\n");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
+	t2 = login_get_lastlog_time(getuid());
+	strlcpy(s_t2, ctime(&t2), sizeof(s_t2));
+	printf("After logging in, lastlog time is %d - %s\n", (int)t2, s_t2);
+	if (t1 == t2)
+		printf("The lastlog times before and after logging in are the "
+		    "same.\nThis indicates that lastlog is ** NOT WORKING "
+		    "CORRECTLY **\n");
+	else if (t0 != t2)
+		/* We can be off by a second or so, even when recording works fine.
+		 * I'm not 100% sure why, but it's true. */
+		printf("** The login time and the lastlog time differ.\n"
+		    "** This indicates that lastlog is either recording the "
+		    "wrong time,\n** or retrieving the wrong entry.\n"
+		    "If it's off by less than %d second(s) "
+		    "run the test again.\n", PAUSE_BEFORE_LOGOUT);
+	else
+		printf("lastlog agrees with the login time. This is a good thing.\n");
+
+#endif
+
+	printf("--\nThe output of 'last' shown next should have "
+	    "an entry for root \n  on %s for the time shown above:\n--\n",
+	    stripline);
+	snprintf(cmdstring, sizeof(cmdstring), "last | grep '%s ' | head -3",
+		 stripline);
+	system(cmdstring);
+
+	printf("--\nEnd of login test.\n");
+
+	login_free_entry(li1);
+
+	return 1;
+} /* testAPI() */
+
+
+void
+testLineName(char *line)
+{
+	/* have to null-terminate - these functions are designed for
+	 * structures with fixed-length char arrays, and don't null-term.*/
+	char full[17], strip[9], abbrev[5];
+
+	memset(full, '\0', sizeof(full));
+	memset(strip, '\0', sizeof(strip));
+	memset(abbrev, '\0', sizeof(abbrev));
+
+	line_fullname(full, line, sizeof(full)-1);
+	line_stripname(strip, full, sizeof(strip)-1);
+	line_abbrevname(abbrev, full, sizeof(abbrev)-1);
+	printf("%s: %s, %s, %s\n", line, full, strip, abbrev);
+
+} /* testLineName() */
+
+
+int
+testOutput()
+{
+	printf("**\n** Testing linename functions\n**\n");
+	testLineName("/dev/pts/1");
+	testLineName("pts/1");
+	testLineName("pts/999");
+	testLineName("/dev/ttyp00");
+	testLineName("ttyp00");
+
+	return 1;
+} /* testOutput() */
+
+
+/* show which options got compiled in */
+void
+showOptions(void)
+{
+	printf("**\n** Compile-time options\n**\n");
+
+	printf("login recording methods selected:\n");
+#ifdef USE_LOGIN
+	printf("\tUSE_LOGIN\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMP
+	printf("\tUSE_UTMP (UTMP_FILE=%s)\n", UTMP_FILE);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_UTMPX
+	printf("\tUSE_UTMPX\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMP
+	printf("\tUSE_WTMP (WTMP_FILE=%s)\n", WTMP_FILE);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_WTMPX
+	printf("\tUSE_WTMPX (WTMPX_FILE=%s)\n", WTMPX_FILE);
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_LASTLOG
+	printf("\tUSE_LASTLOG (LASTLOG_FILE=%s)\n", LASTLOG_FILE);
+#endif
+	printf("\n");
+
+} /* showOptions() */
+
+
+int
+main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	printf("Platform-independent login recording test driver\n");
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+	if (argc == 2) {
+		if (strncmp(argv[1], "-i", 3) == 0)
+			compile_opts_only = 1;
+		else if (strncmp(argv[1], "-v", 3) == 0)
+			be_verbose=1;
+	}
+
+	if (!compile_opts_only) {
+		if (be_verbose && !testOutput())
+			return 1;
+
+		if (!testAPI())
+			return 1;
+	}
+
+	showOptions();
+
+	return 0;
+} /* main() */
+
diff --git a/m4/openssh.m4 b/m4/openssh.m4
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c33c70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/m4/openssh.m4
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+dnl OpenSSH-specific autoconf macros
+dnl
+
+dnl OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE(check_flag[, define_flag])
+dnl Check that $CC accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
+dnl 'define_flag' to $CFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
+dnl 'check_flag'.
+AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE], [{
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports compile flag $1])
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR $1"
+	_define_flag="$2"
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
+	AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+/* Trivial function to help test for -fzero-call-used-regs */
+void f(int n) {}
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	f(0);
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+	/*
+	 * Test fallthrough behaviour.  clang 10's -Wimplicit-fallthrough does
+	 * not understand comments and we don't use the "fallthrough" attribute
+	 * that it's looking for.
+	 */
+	switch(i){
+	case 0: j += i;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default: j += k;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+	]])],
+		[
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi],
+		[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
+	)
+}])
+
+dnl OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK(check_flag[, define_flag])
+dnl Check that $CC accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
+dnl 'define_flag' to $CFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
+dnl 'check_flag'.
+AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK], [{
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports compile flag $1 and linking succeeds])
+	saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+	CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR $1"
+	_define_flag="$2"
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
+	AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	long long int p = n * o;
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
+	exit(0);
+}
+	]])],
+		[
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+		AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		 CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi],
+		[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		  CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
+	)
+}])
+
+dnl OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK(check_flag[, define_flag])
+dnl Check that $LD accepts a flag 'check_flag'. If it is supported append
+dnl 'define_flag' to $LDFLAGS. If 'define_flag' is not specified, then append
+dnl 'check_flag'.
+AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK], [{
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $LD supports link flag $1])
+	saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
+	LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR $1"
+	_define_flag="$2"
+	test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="$1"
+	AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+	(void)argv;
+	/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+	int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+	float l = i * 2.1;
+	double m = l / 0.5;
+	long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+	long long p = n * o;
+	printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
+	exit(0);
+}
+		]])],
+		[
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+		  AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
+else
+		  AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi		],
+		[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+		  LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" ]
+	)
+}])
+
+dnl OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD(field, header, symbol)
+dnl Does AC_EGREP_HEADER on 'header' for the string 'field'
+dnl If found, set 'symbol' to be defined. Cache the result.
+dnl TODO: This is not foolproof, better to compile and read from there
+AC_DEFUN([OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD], [
+# look for field '$1' in header '$2'
+	dnl This strips characters illegal to m4 from the header filename
+	ossh_safe=`echo "$2" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
+	dnl
+	ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"$1
+	AC_MSG_CHECKING(for $1 field in $2)
+	AC_CACHE_VAL($ossh_varname, [
+		AC_EGREP_HEADER($1, $2, [ dnl
+			eval "$ossh_varname=yes" dnl
+		], [ dnl
+			eval "$ossh_varname=no" dnl
+		]) dnl
+	])
+	ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
+	if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
+		AC_MSG_RESULT($ossh_result)
+		if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
+			AC_DEFINE($3, 1, [Define if you have $1 in $2])
+		fi
+	else
+		AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
+	fi
+])
+
+dnl Check for socklen_t: historically on BSD it is an int, and in
+dnl POSIX 1g it is a type of its own, but some platforms use different
+dnl types for the argument to getsockopt, getpeername, etc.  So we
+dnl have to test to find something that will work.
+AC_DEFUN([TYPE_SOCKLEN_T],
+[
+   AC_CHECK_TYPE([socklen_t], ,[
+      AC_MSG_CHECKING([for socklen_t equivalent])
+      AC_CACHE_VAL([curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv],
+      [
+	 # Systems have either "struct sockaddr *" or
+	 # "void *" as the second argument to getpeername
+	 curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv=
+	 for arg2 in "struct sockaddr" void; do
+	    for t in int size_t unsigned long "unsigned long"; do
+	       AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([
+		  AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+		    #include <sys/types.h>
+		    #include <sys/socket.h>
+		    int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *);
+		  ]], [[
+		    $t len;
+		    getpeername(0,0,&len);
+		  ]])
+	       ],[
+		  curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv="$t"
+		  break
+	       ])
+	    done
+	 done
+
+	 if test "x$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" = x; then
+	    AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t])
+	 fi
+      ])
+      AC_MSG_RESULT($curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv)
+      AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(socklen_t, $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv,
+			[type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined])],
+      [#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>])
+])
+
diff --git a/mac.c b/mac.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3dda66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.35 2019/09/06 04:53:27 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "hmac.h"
+#include "umac.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#define SSH_DIGEST	1	/* SSH_DIGEST_XXX */
+#define SSH_UMAC	2	/* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */
+#define SSH_UMAC128	3
+
+struct macalg {
+	char		*name;
+	int		type;
+	int		alg;
+	int		truncatebits;	/* truncate digest if != 0 */
+	int		key_len;	/* just for UMAC */
+	int		len;		/* just for UMAC */
+	int		etm;		/* Encrypt-then-MAC */
+};
+
+static const struct macalg macs[] = {
+	/* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */
+	{ "hmac-sha1",				SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-sha1-96",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-sha2-256",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-sha2-512",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-md5",				SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "hmac-md5-96",			SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 0 },
+	{ "umac-64@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 0 },
+	{ "umac-128@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 0 },
+
+	/* Encrypt-then-MAC variants */
+	{ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com",	SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 1 },
+	{ "umac-64-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 1 },
+	{ "umac-128-etm@openssh.com",		SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 1 },
+
+	{ NULL,					0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
+};
+
+/* Returns a list of supported MACs separated by the specified char. */
+char *
+mac_alg_list(char sep)
+{
+	char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
+	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
+	const struct macalg *m;
+
+	for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
+		if (ret != NULL)
+			ret[rlen++] = sep;
+		nlen = strlen(m->name);
+		if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
+			free(ret);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		ret = tmp;
+		memcpy(ret + rlen, m->name, nlen + 1);
+		rlen += nlen;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+mac_setup_by_alg(struct sshmac *mac, const struct macalg *macalg)
+{
+	mac->type = macalg->type;
+	if (mac->type == SSH_DIGEST) {
+		if ((mac->hmac_ctx = ssh_hmac_start(macalg->alg)) == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = ssh_hmac_bytes(macalg->alg);
+	} else {
+		mac->mac_len = macalg->len / 8;
+		mac->key_len = macalg->key_len / 8;
+		mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
+	}
+	if (macalg->truncatebits != 0)
+		mac->mac_len = macalg->truncatebits / 8;
+	mac->etm = macalg->etm;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mac_setup(struct sshmac *mac, char *name)
+{
+	const struct macalg *m;
+
+	for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) {
+		if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0)
+			continue;
+		if (mac != NULL)
+			return mac_setup_by_alg(mac, m);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+}
+
+int
+mac_init(struct sshmac *mac)
+{
+	if (mac->key == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	switch (mac->type) {
+	case SSH_DIGEST:
+		if (mac->hmac_ctx == NULL ||
+		    ssh_hmac_init(mac->hmac_ctx, mac->key, mac->key_len) < 0)
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		return 0;
+	case SSH_UMAC:
+		if ((mac->umac_ctx = umac_new(mac->key)) == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		return 0;
+	case SSH_UMAC128:
+		if ((mac->umac_ctx = umac128_new(mac->key)) == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	}
+}
+
+int
+mac_compute(struct sshmac *mac, u_int32_t seqno,
+    const u_char *data, int datalen,
+    u_char *digest, size_t dlen)
+{
+	static union {
+		u_char m[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+		u_int64_t for_align;
+	} u;
+	u_char b[4];
+	u_char nonce[8];
+
+	if (mac->mac_len > sizeof(u))
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	switch (mac->type) {
+	case SSH_DIGEST:
+		put_u32(b, seqno);
+		/* reset HMAC context */
+		if (ssh_hmac_init(mac->hmac_ctx, NULL, 0) < 0 ||
+		    ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, b, sizeof(b)) < 0 ||
+		    ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, data, datalen) < 0 ||
+		    ssh_hmac_final(mac->hmac_ctx, u.m, sizeof(u.m)) < 0)
+			return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		break;
+	case SSH_UMAC:
+		POKE_U64(nonce, seqno);
+		umac_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen);
+		umac_final(mac->umac_ctx, u.m, nonce);
+		break;
+	case SSH_UMAC128:
+		put_u64(nonce, seqno);
+		umac128_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen);
+		umac128_final(mac->umac_ctx, u.m, nonce);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	}
+	if (digest != NULL) {
+		if (dlen > mac->mac_len)
+			dlen = mac->mac_len;
+		memcpy(digest, u.m, dlen);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+mac_check(struct sshmac *mac, u_int32_t seqno,
+    const u_char *data, size_t dlen,
+    const u_char *theirmac, size_t mlen)
+{
+	u_char ourmac[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	int r;
+
+	if (mac->mac_len > mlen)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((r = mac_compute(mac, seqno, data, dlen,
+	    ourmac, sizeof(ourmac))) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (timingsafe_bcmp(ourmac, theirmac, mac->mac_len) != 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac)
+{
+	if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC) {
+		if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
+			umac_delete(mac->umac_ctx);
+	} else if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC128) {
+		if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL)
+			umac128_delete(mac->umac_ctx);
+	} else if (mac->hmac_ctx != NULL)
+		ssh_hmac_free(mac->hmac_ctx);
+	mac->hmac_ctx = NULL;
+	mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
+}
+
+/* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
+#define	MAC_SEP	","
+int
+mac_valid(const char *names)
+{
+	char *maclist, *cp, *p;
+
+	if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+		return 0;
+	if ((maclist = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	for ((p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
+	    (p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP))) {
+		if (mac_setup(NULL, p) < 0) {
+			free(maclist);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	free(maclist);
+	return 1;
+}
diff --git a/mac.h b/mac.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b119d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mac.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: mac.h,v 1.10 2016/07/08 03:44:42 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SSHMAC_H
+#define SSHMAC_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+struct sshmac {
+	char	*name;
+	int	enabled;
+	u_int	mac_len;
+	u_char	*key;
+	u_int	key_len;
+	int	type;
+	int	etm;		/* Encrypt-then-MAC */
+	struct ssh_hmac_ctx	*hmac_ctx;
+	struct umac_ctx		*umac_ctx;
+};
+
+int	 mac_valid(const char *);
+char	*mac_alg_list(char);
+int	 mac_setup(struct sshmac *, char *);
+int	 mac_init(struct sshmac *);
+int	 mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, int,
+    u_char *, size_t);
+int	 mac_check(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, size_t,
+    const u_char *, size_t);
+void	 mac_clear(struct sshmac *);
+
+#endif /* SSHMAC_H */
diff --git a/match.c b/match.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3ac854d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/match.c
@@ -0,0 +1,364 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.43 2020/11/03 22:53:12 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Simple pattern matching, with '*' and '?' as wildcards.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
+ * and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match.
+ */
+int
+match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern)
+{
+	for (;;) {
+		/* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */
+		if (!*pattern)
+			return !*s;
+
+		if (*pattern == '*') {
+			/* Skip this and any consecutive asterisks. */
+			while (*pattern == '*')
+				pattern++;
+
+			/* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */
+			if (!*pattern)
+				return 1;
+
+			/* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */
+			if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') {
+				/*
+				 * Look instances of the next character in
+				 * pattern, and try to match starting from
+				 * those.
+				 */
+				for (; *s; s++)
+					if (*s == *pattern &&
+					    match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1))
+						return 1;
+				/* Failed. */
+				return 0;
+			}
+			/*
+			 * Move ahead one character at a time and try to
+			 * match at each position.
+			 */
+			for (; *s; s++)
+				if (match_pattern(s, pattern))
+					return 1;
+			/* Failed. */
+			return 0;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * There must be at least one more character in the string.
+		 * If we are at the end, fail.
+		 */
+		if (!*s)
+			return 0;
+
+		/* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */
+		if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != *s)
+			return 0;
+
+		/* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */
+		s++;
+		pattern++;
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to match the string against the
+ * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
+ * indicate negation).  Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
+ * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
+ */
+int
+match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, int dolower)
+{
+	char sub[1024];
+	int negated;
+	int got_positive;
+	u_int i, subi, len = strlen(pattern);
+
+	got_positive = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < len;) {
+		/* Check if the subpattern is negated. */
+		if (pattern[i] == '!') {
+			negated = 1;
+			i++;
+		} else
+			negated = 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end.  Convert the
+		 * subpattern to lowercase.
+		 */
+		for (subi = 0;
+		    i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ',';
+		    subi++, i++)
+			sub[subi] = dolower && isupper((u_char)pattern[i]) ?
+			    tolower((u_char)pattern[i]) : pattern[i];
+		/* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */
+		if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1)
+			return 0;
+
+		/* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, then skip it. */
+		if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',')
+			i++;
+
+		/* Null-terminate the subpattern. */
+		sub[subi] = '\0';
+
+		/* Try to match the subpattern against the string. */
+		if (match_pattern(string, sub)) {
+			if (negated)
+				return -1;		/* Negative */
+			else
+				got_positive = 1;	/* Positive */
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Return success if got a positive match.  If there was a negative
+	 * match, we have already returned -1 and never get here.
+	 */
+	return got_positive;
+}
+
+/* Match a list representing users or groups. */
+int
+match_usergroup_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	/* Windows usernames may be Unicode and are not case sensitive */
+	return cygwin_ug_match_pattern_list(string, pattern);
+#else
+	/* Case sensitive match */
+	return match_pattern_list(string, pattern, 0);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to match the host name (which must be in all lowercase) against the
+ * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
+ * indicate negation).  Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
+ * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
+ */
+int
+match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern)
+{
+	char *hostcopy = xstrdup(host);
+	int r;
+
+	lowercase(hostcopy);
+	r = match_pattern_list(hostcopy, pattern, 1);
+	free(hostcopy);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns 0 if we get a negative match for the hostname or the ip
+ * or if we get no match at all.  returns -1 on error, or 1 on
+ * successful match.
+ */
+int
+match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
+    const char *patterns)
+{
+	int mhost, mip;
+
+	if ((mip = addr_match_list(ipaddr, patterns)) == -2)
+		return -1; /* error in ipaddr match */
+	else if (host == NULL || ipaddr == NULL || mip == -1)
+		return 0; /* negative ip address match, or testing pattern */
+
+	/* negative hostname match */
+	if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns)) == -1)
+		return 0;
+	/* no match at all */
+	if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern.
+ * If user, host and ipaddr are all NULL then validate pattern/
+ * Returns -1 on invalid pattern, 0 on no match, 1 on match.
+ */
+int
+match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
+    const char *pattern)
+{
+	char *p, *pat;
+	int ret;
+
+	/* test mode */
+	if (user == NULL && host == NULL && ipaddr == NULL) {
+		if ((p = strchr(pattern, '@')) != NULL &&
+		    match_host_and_ip(NULL, NULL, p + 1) < 0)
+			return -1;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if ((p = strchr(pattern, '@')) == NULL)
+		return match_pattern(user, pattern);
+
+	pat = xstrdup(pattern);
+	p = strchr(pat, '@');
+	*p++ = '\0';
+
+	if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1)
+		ret = match_host_and_ip(host, ipaddr, p);
+	free(pat);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns first item from client-list that is also supported by server-list,
+ * caller must free the returned string.
+ */
+#define	MAX_PROP	40
+#define	SEP	","
+char *
+match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next)
+{
+	char *sproposals[MAX_PROP];
+	char *c, *s, *p, *ret, *cp, *sp;
+	int i, j, nproposals;
+
+	c = cp = xstrdup(client);
+	s = sp = xstrdup(server);
+
+	for ((p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
+	    (p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i++) {
+		if (i < MAX_PROP)
+			sproposals[i] = p;
+		else
+			break;
+	}
+	nproposals = i;
+
+	for ((p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
+	    (p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i++) {
+		for (j = 0; j < nproposals; j++) {
+			if (strcmp(p, sproposals[j]) == 0) {
+				ret = xstrdup(p);
+				if (next != NULL)
+					*next = (cp == NULL) ?
+					    strlen(c) : (u_int)(cp - c);
+				free(c);
+				free(s);
+				return ret;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (next != NULL)
+		*next = strlen(c);
+	free(c);
+	free(s);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Filter proposal using pattern-list filter.
+ * "denylist" determines sense of filter:
+ * non-zero indicates that items matching filter should be excluded.
+ * zero indicates that only items matching filter should be included.
+ * returns NULL on allocation error, otherwise caller must free result.
+ */
+static char *
+filter_list(const char *proposal, const char *filter, int denylist)
+{
+	size_t len = strlen(proposal) + 1;
+	char *fix_prop = malloc(len);
+	char *orig_prop = strdup(proposal);
+	char *cp, *tmp;
+	int r;
+
+	if (fix_prop == NULL || orig_prop == NULL) {
+		free(orig_prop);
+		free(fix_prop);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	tmp = orig_prop;
+	*fix_prop = '\0';
+	while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) {
+		r = match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0);
+		if ((denylist && r != 1) || (!denylist && r == 1)) {
+			if (*fix_prop != '\0')
+				strlcat(fix_prop, ",", len);
+			strlcat(fix_prop, cp, len);
+		}
+	}
+	free(orig_prop);
+	return fix_prop;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Filters a comma-separated list of strings, excluding any entry matching
+ * the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+char *
+match_filter_denylist(const char *proposal, const char *filter)
+{
+	return filter_list(proposal, filter, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Filters a comma-separated list of strings, including only entries matching
+ * the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+char *
+match_filter_allowlist(const char *proposal, const char *filter)
+{
+	return filter_list(proposal, filter, 0);
+}
diff --git a/match.h b/match.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..312ca6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/match.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.20 2020/07/05 23:59:45 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+#ifndef MATCH_H
+#define MATCH_H
+
+int	 match_pattern(const char *, const char *);
+int	 match_pattern_list(const char *, const char *, int);
+int	 match_usergroup_pattern_list(const char *, const char *);
+int	 match_hostname(const char *, const char *);
+int	 match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+int	 match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+char	*match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *);
+char	*match_filter_denylist(const char *, const char *);
+char	*match_filter_allowlist(const char *, const char *);
+
+/* addrmatch.c */
+int	 addr_match_list(const char *, const char *);
+int	 addr_match_cidr_list(const char *, const char *);
+#endif
diff --git a/mdoc2man.awk b/mdoc2man.awk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d393ae6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mdoc2man.awk
@@ -0,0 +1,370 @@
+#!/usr/bin/awk
+#
+# Version history:
+#  v4+ Adapted for OpenSSH Portable (see cvs Id and history)
+#  v3, I put the program under a proper license
+#      Dan Nelson <dnelson@allantgroup.com> added .An, .Aq and fixed a typo
+#  v2, fixed to work on GNU awk --posix and MacOS X
+#  v1, first attempt, didn't work on MacOS X
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2003 Peter Stuge <stuge-mdoc2man@cdy.org>
+#
+# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+#
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+# WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+# ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+# WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+# ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+
+
+BEGIN {
+  optlist=0
+  oldoptlist=0
+  nospace=0
+  synopsis=0
+  reference=0
+  block=0
+  ext=0
+  extopt=0
+  literal=0
+  prenl=0
+  breakw=0
+  line=""
+}
+
+function wtail() {
+  retval=""
+  while(w<nwords) {
+    if(length(retval))
+      retval=retval OFS
+    retval=retval words[++w]
+  }
+  return retval
+}
+
+function add(str) {
+  for(;prenl;prenl--)
+    line=line "\n"
+  line=line str
+}
+
+! /^\./ {
+  for(;prenl;prenl--)
+    print ""
+  print
+  if(literal)
+    print ".br"
+  next
+}
+
+/^\.\\"/ { next }
+
+{
+  option=0
+  parens=0
+  angles=0
+  sub("^\\.","")
+  nwords=split($0,words)
+  for(w=1;w<=nwords;w++) {
+    skip=0
+    if(match(words[w],"^Li|Pf$")) {
+      skip=1
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Xo$")) {
+      skip=1
+      ext=1
+      if(length(line)&&!(match(line," $")||prenl))
+	add(OFS)
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Xc$")) {
+      skip=1
+      ext=0
+      if(!extopt)
+	prenl++
+      w=nwords
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Bd$")) {
+      skip=1
+      if(match(words[w+1],"-literal")) {
+	literal=1
+	prenl++
+	w=nwords
+      }
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Ed$")) {
+      skip=1
+      literal=0
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Ns$")) {
+      skip=1
+      if(!nospace)
+	nospace=1
+      sub(" $","",line)
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^No$")) {
+      skip=1
+      sub(" $","",line)
+      add(words[++w])
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Dq$")) {
+      skip=1
+      add("``")
+      add(words[++w])
+      while(w<nwords&&!match(words[w+1],"^[\\.,]"))
+	add(OFS words[++w])
+      add("''")
+      if(!nospace&&match(words[w+1],"^[\\.,]"))
+	nospace=1
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Sq|Ql$")) {
+      skip=1
+      add("`" words[++w] "'")
+      if(!nospace&&match(words[w+1],"^[\\.,]"))
+	nospace=1
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Oo$")) {
+      skip=1
+      extopt=1
+      if(!nospace)
+	nospace=1
+      add("[")
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Oc$")) {
+      skip=1
+      extopt=0
+      add("]")
+    }
+    if(!skip) {
+      if(!nospace&&length(line)&&!(match(line," $")||prenl))
+	add(OFS)
+      if(nospace==1)
+	nospace=0
+    }
+    if(match(words[w],"^Dd$")) {
+      if(match(words[w+1],"^\\$Mdocdate:")) {
+        w++;
+        if(match(words[w+4],"^\\$$")) {
+          words[w+4] = ""
+        }
+      }
+      date=wtail()
+      next
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Dt$")) {
+      id=wtail()
+      next
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Ux$")) {
+      add("UNIX")
+      skip=1
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Ox$")) {
+      add("OpenBSD")
+      skip=1
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Os$")) {
+      add(".TH " id " \"" date "\" \"" wtail() "\"")
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Sh$")) {
+      add(".SH")
+      synopsis=match(words[w+1],"SYNOPSIS")
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Xr$")) {
+      add("\\fB" words[++w] "\\fP(" words[++w] ")" words[++w])
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Rs$")) {
+      split("",refauthors)
+      nrefauthors=0
+      reftitle=""
+      refissue=""
+      refdate=""
+      refopt=""
+      refreport=""
+      reference=1
+      next
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Re$")) {
+      prenl++
+      for(i=nrefauthors-1;i>0;i--) {
+	add(refauthors[i])
+	if(i>1)
+	  add(", ")
+      }
+      if(nrefauthors>1)
+	add(" and ")
+      if(nrefauthors>0)
+        add(refauthors[0] ", ")
+      add("\\fI" reftitle "\\fP")
+      if(length(refissue))
+	add(", " refissue)
+      if(length(refreport)) {
+	add(", " refreport)
+      }
+      if(length(refdate))
+	add(", " refdate)
+      if(length(refopt))
+	add(", " refopt)
+      add(".")
+      reference=0
+    } else if(reference) {
+      if(match(words[w],"^%A$")) { refauthors[nrefauthors++]=wtail() }
+      if(match(words[w],"^%T$")) {
+	reftitle=wtail()
+	sub("^\"","",reftitle)
+	sub("\"$","",reftitle)
+      }
+      if(match(words[w],"^%N$")) { refissue=wtail() }
+      if(match(words[w],"^%D$")) { refdate=wtail() }
+      if(match(words[w],"^%O$")) { refopt=wtail() }
+      if(match(words[w],"^%R$")) { refreport=wtail() }
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Nm$")) {
+      if(synopsis) {
+	add(".br")
+	prenl++
+      }
+      n=words[++w]
+      if(!length(name))
+	name=n
+      if(!length(n))
+	n=name
+      add("\\fB" n "\\fP")
+      if(!nospace&&match(words[w+1],"^[\\.,]"))
+	nospace=1
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Nd$")) {
+      add("\\- " wtail())
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Fl$")) {
+      add("\\fB\\-" words[++w] "\\fP")
+      if(!nospace&&match(words[w+1],"^[\\.,]"))
+	nospace=1
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Ar$")) {
+      add("\\fI")
+      if(w==nwords)
+	add("file ...\\fP")
+      else {
+	add(words[++w] "\\fP")
+	while(match(words[w+1],"^\\|$"))
+	  add(OFS words[++w] " \\fI" words[++w] "\\fP")
+      }
+      if(!nospace&&match(words[w+1],"^[\\.,]"))
+	nospace=1
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Cm$")) {
+      add("\\fB" words[++w] "\\fP")
+      while(w<nwords&&match(words[w+1],"^[\\.,:;)]"))
+	add(words[++w])
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Op$")) {
+      option=1
+      if(!nospace)
+	nospace=1
+      add("[")
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Pp$")) {
+      prenl++
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^An$")) {
+      prenl++
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Ss$")) {
+      add(".SS")
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Pa$")&&!option) {
+      add("\\fI")
+      w++
+      if(match(words[w],"^\\."))
+	add("\\&")
+      add(words[w] "\\fP")
+      while(w<nwords&&match(words[w+1],"^[\\.,:;)]"))
+	add(words[++w])
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Dv$")) {
+      add(".BR")
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Em|Ev$")) {
+      add(".IR")
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Pq$")) {
+      add("(")
+      nospace=1
+      parens=1
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Aq$")) {
+      add("<")
+      nospace=1
+      angles=1
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^S[xy]$")) {
+      add(".B " wtail())
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Ic$")) {
+      plain=1
+      add("\\fB")
+      while(w<nwords) {
+	w++
+	if(match(words[w],"^Op$")) {
+	  w++
+	  add("[")
+	  words[nwords]=words[nwords] "]"
+	}
+	if(match(words[w],"^Ar$")) {
+	  add("\\fI" words[++w] "\\fP")
+	} else if(match(words[w],"^[\\.,]")) {
+	  sub(" $","",line)
+	  if(plain) {
+	    add("\\fP")
+	    plain=0
+	  }
+	  add(words[w])
+	} else {
+	  if(!plain) {
+	    add("\\fB")
+	    plain=1
+	  }
+	  add(words[w])
+	}
+	if(!nospace)
+	  add(OFS)
+      }
+      sub(" $","",line)
+      if(plain)
+	add("\\fP")
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Bl$")) {
+      oldoptlist=optlist
+      if(match(words[w+1],"-bullet"))
+	optlist=1
+      else if(match(words[w+1],"-enum")) {
+	optlist=2
+	enum=0
+      } else if(match(words[w+1],"-tag"))
+	optlist=3
+      else if(match(words[w+1],"-item"))
+	optlist=4
+      else if(match(words[w+1],"-bullet"))
+	optlist=1
+      w=nwords
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^El$")) {
+      optlist=oldoptlist
+      if(!optlist)
+        add(".PP")
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Bk$")) {
+      if(match(words[w+1],"-words")) {
+	w++
+	breakw=1
+      }
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Ek$")) {
+      breakw=0
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^It$")&&optlist) {
+      if(optlist==1)
+	add(".IP \\(bu")
+      else if(optlist==2)
+	add(".IP " ++enum ".")
+      else if(optlist==3) {
+	add(".TP")
+	prenl++
+	if(match(words[w+1],"^Pa$|^Ev$")) {
+	  add(".B")
+	  w++
+	}
+      } else if(optlist==4)
+	add(".IP")
+    } else if(match(words[w],"^Sm$")) {
+      if(match(words[w+1],"off"))
+	nospace=2
+      else if(match(words[w+1],"on"))
+	nospace=0
+      w++
+    } else if(!skip) {
+      add(words[w])
+    }
+  }
+  if(match(line,"^\\.[^a-zA-Z]"))
+    sub("^\\.","",line)
+  if(parens)
+    add(")")
+  if(angles)
+    add(">")
+  if(option)
+    add("]")
+  if(ext&&!extopt&&!match(line," $"))
+    add(OFS)
+  if(!ext&&!extopt&&length(line)) {
+    print line
+    prenl=0
+    line=""
+  }
+}
diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c098dc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2917 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.180 2023/01/06 02:37:04 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2020 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Henning Brauer <henning@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
+# include <libgen.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+#include <netinet/tcp.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
+#include <net/if.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "platform.h"
+
+/* remove newline at end of string */
+char *
+chop(char *s)
+{
+	char *t = s;
+	while (*t) {
+		if (*t == '\n' || *t == '\r') {
+			*t = '\0';
+			return s;
+		}
+		t++;
+	}
+	return s;
+
+}
+
+/* remove whitespace from end of string */
+void
+rtrim(char *s)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if ((i = strlen(s)) == 0)
+		return;
+	for (i--; i > 0; i--) {
+		if (isspace((unsigned char)s[i]))
+			s[i] = '\0';
+	}
+}
+
+/* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */
+int
+set_nonblock(int fd)
+{
+	int val;
+
+	val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
+	if (val == -1) {
+		error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (val & O_NONBLOCK) {
+		debug3("fd %d is O_NONBLOCK", fd);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	debug2("fd %d setting O_NONBLOCK", fd);
+	val |= O_NONBLOCK;
+	if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) {
+		debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+unset_nonblock(int fd)
+{
+	int val;
+
+	val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
+	if (val == -1) {
+		error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (!(val & O_NONBLOCK)) {
+		debug3("fd %d is not O_NONBLOCK", fd);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	debug("fd %d clearing O_NONBLOCK", fd);
+	val &= ~O_NONBLOCK;
+	if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) {
+		debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, ~O_NONBLOCK): %s",
+		    fd, strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+const char *
+ssh_gai_strerror(int gaierr)
+{
+	if (gaierr == EAI_SYSTEM && errno != 0)
+		return strerror(errno);
+	return gai_strerror(gaierr);
+}
+
+/* disable nagle on socket */
+void
+set_nodelay(int fd)
+{
+	int opt;
+	socklen_t optlen;
+
+	optlen = sizeof opt;
+	if (getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, &optlen) == -1) {
+		debug("getsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+	if (opt == 1) {
+		debug2("fd %d is TCP_NODELAY", fd);
+		return;
+	}
+	opt = 1;
+	debug2("fd %d setting TCP_NODELAY", fd);
+	if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, sizeof opt) == -1)
+		error("setsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+}
+
+/* Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT */
+int
+set_reuseaddr(int fd)
+{
+	int on = 1;
+
+	if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) {
+		error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Get/set routing domain */
+char *
+get_rdomain(int fd)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_GET_RDOMAIN)
+	return sys_get_rdomain(fd);
+#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
+	int rtable;
+	char *ret;
+	socklen_t len = sizeof(rtable);
+
+	if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE, &rtable, &len) == -1) {
+		error("Failed to get routing domain for fd %d: %s",
+		    fd, strerror(errno));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	xasprintf(&ret, "%d", rtable);
+	return ret;
+#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
+	return NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+int
+set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_RDOMAIN)
+	return sys_set_rdomain(fd, name);
+#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
+	int rtable;
+	const char *errstr;
+
+	if (name == NULL)
+		return 0; /* default table */
+
+	rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr);
+	if (errstr != NULL) {
+		/* Shouldn't happen */
+		error("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE,
+	    &rtable, sizeof(rtable)) == -1) {
+		error("Failed to set routing domain %d on fd %d: %s",
+		    rtable, fd, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
+	error("Setting routing domain is not supported on this platform");
+	return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+int
+get_sock_af(int fd)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_storage to;
+	socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to);
+
+	memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
+	if (getsockname(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) == -1)
+		return -1;
+#ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6
+	if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 &&
+	    IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr))
+		return AF_INET;
+#endif
+	return to.ss_family;
+}
+
+void
+set_sock_tos(int fd, int tos)
+{
+#ifndef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN
+	int af;
+
+	switch ((af = get_sock_af(fd))) {
+	case -1:
+		/* assume not a socket */
+		break;
+	case AF_INET:
+# ifdef IP_TOS
+		debug3_f("set socket %d IP_TOS 0x%02x", fd, tos);
+		if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS,
+		    &tos, sizeof(tos)) == -1) {
+			error("setsockopt socket %d IP_TOS %d: %s",
+			    fd, tos, strerror(errno));
+		}
+# endif /* IP_TOS */
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+# ifdef IPV6_TCLASS
+		debug3_f("set socket %d IPV6_TCLASS 0x%02x", fd, tos);
+		if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS,
+		    &tos, sizeof(tos)) == -1) {
+			error("setsockopt socket %d IPV6_TCLASS %d: %s",
+			    fd, tos, strerror(errno));
+		}
+# endif /* IPV6_TCLASS */
+		break;
+	default:
+		debug2_f("unsupported socket family %d", af);
+		break;
+	}
+#endif /* IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wait up to *timeoutp milliseconds for events on fd. Updates
+ * *timeoutp with time remaining.
+ * Returns 0 if fd ready or -1 on timeout or error (see errno).
+ */
+static int
+waitfd(int fd, int *timeoutp, short events)
+{
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+	struct timeval t_start;
+	int oerrno, r;
+
+	pfd.fd = fd;
+	pfd.events = events;
+	for (; *timeoutp >= 0;) {
+		monotime_tv(&t_start);
+		r = poll(&pfd, 1, *timeoutp);
+		oerrno = errno;
+		ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp);
+		errno = oerrno;
+		if (r > 0)
+			return 0;
+		else if (r == -1 && errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR)
+			return -1;
+		else if (r == 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	/* timeout */
+	errno = ETIMEDOUT;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Wait up to *timeoutp milliseconds for fd to be readable. Updates
+ * *timeoutp with time remaining.
+ * Returns 0 if fd ready or -1 on timeout or error (see errno).
+ */
+int
+waitrfd(int fd, int *timeoutp) {
+	return waitfd(fd, timeoutp, POLLIN);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt a non-blocking connect(2) to the specified address, waiting up to
+ * *timeoutp milliseconds for the connection to complete. If the timeout is
+ * <=0, then wait indefinitely.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
+    socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp)
+{
+	int optval = 0;
+	socklen_t optlen = sizeof(optval);
+
+	/* No timeout: just do a blocking connect() */
+	if (timeoutp == NULL || *timeoutp <= 0)
+		return connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen);
+
+	set_nonblock(sockfd);
+	for (;;) {
+		if (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen) == 0) {
+			/* Succeeded already? */
+			unset_nonblock(sockfd);
+			return 0;
+		} else if (errno == EINTR)
+			continue;
+		else if (errno != EINPROGRESS)
+			return -1;
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (waitfd(sockfd, timeoutp, POLLIN | POLLOUT) == -1)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Completed or failed */
+	if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, &optlen) == -1) {
+		debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (optval != 0) {
+		errno = optval;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	unset_nonblock(sockfd);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+#define QUOTE	"\""
+
+/* return next token in configuration line */
+static char *
+strdelim_internal(char **s, int split_equals)
+{
+	char *old;
+	int wspace = 0;
+
+	if (*s == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	old = *s;
+
+	*s = strpbrk(*s,
+	    split_equals ? WHITESPACE QUOTE "=" : WHITESPACE QUOTE);
+	if (*s == NULL)
+		return (old);
+
+	if (*s[0] == '\"') {
+		memmove(*s, *s + 1, strlen(*s)); /* move nul too */
+		/* Find matching quote */
+		if ((*s = strpbrk(*s, QUOTE)) == NULL) {
+			return (NULL);		/* no matching quote */
+		} else {
+			*s[0] = '\0';
+			*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
+			return (old);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Allow only one '=' to be skipped */
+	if (split_equals && *s[0] == '=')
+		wspace = 1;
+	*s[0] = '\0';
+
+	/* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */
+	*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
+	if (split_equals && *s[0] == '=' && !wspace)
+		*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
+
+	return (old);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return next token in configuration line; splts on whitespace or a
+ * single '=' character.
+ */
+char *
+strdelim(char **s)
+{
+	return strdelim_internal(s, 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return next token in configuration line; splts on whitespace only.
+ */
+char *
+strdelimw(char **s)
+{
+	return strdelim_internal(s, 0);
+}
+
+struct passwd *
+pwcopy(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	struct passwd *copy = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*copy));
+
+	copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+	copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd == NULL ? "*" : pw->pw_passwd);
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
+	copy->pw_gecos = xstrdup(pw->pw_gecos);
+#endif
+	copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid;
+	copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid;
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
+	copy->pw_expire = pw->pw_expire;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE
+	copy->pw_change = pw->pw_change;
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
+	copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class);
+#endif
+	copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
+	copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
+	return copy;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number.
+ * Port must be >=0 and <=65535.
+ * Return -1 if invalid.
+ */
+int
+a2port(const char *s)
+{
+	struct servent *se;
+	long long port;
+	const char *errstr;
+
+	port = strtonum(s, 0, 65535, &errstr);
+	if (errstr == NULL)
+		return (int)port;
+	if ((se = getservbyname(s, "tcp")) != NULL)
+		return ntohs(se->s_port);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+int
+a2tun(const char *s, int *remote)
+{
+	const char *errstr = NULL;
+	char *sp, *ep;
+	int tun;
+
+	if (remote != NULL) {
+		*remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
+		sp = xstrdup(s);
+		if ((ep = strchr(sp, ':')) == NULL) {
+			free(sp);
+			return (a2tun(s, NULL));
+		}
+		ep[0] = '\0'; ep++;
+		*remote = a2tun(ep, NULL);
+		tun = a2tun(sp, NULL);
+		free(sp);
+		return (*remote == SSH_TUNID_ERR ? *remote : tun);
+	}
+
+	if (strcasecmp(s, "any") == 0)
+		return (SSH_TUNID_ANY);
+
+	tun = strtonum(s, 0, SSH_TUNID_MAX, &errstr);
+	if (errstr != NULL)
+		return (SSH_TUNID_ERR);
+
+	return (tun);
+}
+
+#define SECONDS		1
+#define MINUTES		(SECONDS * 60)
+#define HOURS		(MINUTES * 60)
+#define DAYS		(HOURS * 24)
+#define WEEKS		(DAYS * 7)
+
+/*
+ * Convert a time string into seconds; format is
+ * a sequence of:
+ *      time[qualifier]
+ *
+ * Valid time qualifiers are:
+ *      <none>  seconds
+ *      s|S     seconds
+ *      m|M     minutes
+ *      h|H     hours
+ *      d|D     days
+ *      w|W     weeks
+ *
+ * Examples:
+ *      90m     90 minutes
+ *      1h30m   90 minutes
+ *      2d      2 days
+ *      1w      1 week
+ *
+ * Return -1 if time string is invalid.
+ */
+int
+convtime(const char *s)
+{
+	long total, secs, multiplier;
+	const char *p;
+	char *endp;
+
+	errno = 0;
+	total = 0;
+	p = s;
+
+	if (p == NULL || *p == '\0')
+		return -1;
+
+	while (*p) {
+		secs = strtol(p, &endp, 10);
+		if (p == endp ||
+		    (errno == ERANGE && (secs == INT_MIN || secs == INT_MAX)) ||
+		    secs < 0)
+			return -1;
+
+		multiplier = 1;
+		switch (*endp++) {
+		case '\0':
+			endp--;
+			break;
+		case 's':
+		case 'S':
+			break;
+		case 'm':
+		case 'M':
+			multiplier = MINUTES;
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+		case 'H':
+			multiplier = HOURS;
+			break;
+		case 'd':
+		case 'D':
+			multiplier = DAYS;
+			break;
+		case 'w':
+		case 'W':
+			multiplier = WEEKS;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return -1;
+		}
+		if (secs > INT_MAX / multiplier)
+			return -1;
+		secs *= multiplier;
+		if  (total > INT_MAX - secs)
+			return -1;
+		total += secs;
+		if (total < 0)
+			return -1;
+		p = endp;
+	}
+
+	return total;
+}
+
+#define TF_BUFS	8
+#define TF_LEN	9
+
+const char *
+fmt_timeframe(time_t t)
+{
+	char		*buf;
+	static char	 tfbuf[TF_BUFS][TF_LEN];	/* ring buffer */
+	static int	 idx = 0;
+	unsigned int	 sec, min, hrs, day;
+	unsigned long long	week;
+
+	buf = tfbuf[idx++];
+	if (idx == TF_BUFS)
+		idx = 0;
+
+	week = t;
+
+	sec = week % 60;
+	week /= 60;
+	min = week % 60;
+	week /= 60;
+	hrs = week % 24;
+	week /= 24;
+	day = week % 7;
+	week /= 7;
+
+	if (week > 0)
+		snprintf(buf, TF_LEN, "%02lluw%01ud%02uh", week, day, hrs);
+	else if (day > 0)
+		snprintf(buf, TF_LEN, "%01ud%02uh%02um", day, hrs, min);
+	else
+		snprintf(buf, TF_LEN, "%02u:%02u:%02u", hrs, min, sec);
+
+	return (buf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns a standardized host+port identifier string.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+char *
+put_host_port(const char *host, u_short port)
+{
+	char *hoststr;
+
+	if (port == 0 || port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)
+		return(xstrdup(host));
+	if (asprintf(&hoststr, "[%s]:%d", host, (int)port) == -1)
+		fatal("put_host_port: asprintf: %s", strerror(errno));
+	debug3("put_host_port: %s", hoststr);
+	return hoststr;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search for next delimiter between hostnames/addresses and ports.
+ * Argument may be modified (for termination).
+ * Returns *cp if parsing succeeds.
+ * *cp is set to the start of the next field, if one was found.
+ * The delimiter char, if present, is stored in delim.
+ * If this is the last field, *cp is set to NULL.
+ */
+char *
+hpdelim2(char **cp, char *delim)
+{
+	char *s, *old;
+
+	if (cp == NULL || *cp == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	old = s = *cp;
+	if (*s == '[') {
+		if ((s = strchr(s, ']')) == NULL)
+			return NULL;
+		else
+			s++;
+	} else if ((s = strpbrk(s, ":/")) == NULL)
+		s = *cp + strlen(*cp); /* skip to end (see first case below) */
+
+	switch (*s) {
+	case '\0':
+		*cp = NULL;	/* no more fields*/
+		break;
+
+	case ':':
+	case '/':
+		if (delim != NULL)
+			*delim = *s;
+		*s = '\0';	/* terminate */
+		*cp = s + 1;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return old;
+}
+
+/* The common case: only accept colon as delimiter. */
+char *
+hpdelim(char **cp)
+{
+	char *r, delim = '\0';
+
+	r =  hpdelim2(cp, &delim);
+	if (delim == '/')
+		return NULL;
+	return r;
+}
+
+char *
+cleanhostname(char *host)
+{
+	if (*host == '[' && host[strlen(host) - 1] == ']') {
+		host[strlen(host) - 1] = '\0';
+		return (host + 1);
+	} else
+		return host;
+}
+
+char *
+colon(char *cp)
+{
+	int flag = 0;
+
+	if (*cp == ':')		/* Leading colon is part of file name. */
+		return NULL;
+	if (*cp == '[')
+		flag = 1;
+
+	for (; *cp; ++cp) {
+		if (*cp == '@' && *(cp+1) == '[')
+			flag = 1;
+		if (*cp == ']' && *(cp+1) == ':' && flag)
+			return (cp+1);
+		if (*cp == ':' && !flag)
+			return (cp);
+		if (*cp == '/')
+			return NULL;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a [user@]host:[path] string.
+ * Caller must free returned user, host and path.
+ * Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking).
+ * If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL.
+ * If host was not specified then *hostp will be set to NULL.
+ * If path was not specified then *pathp will be set to ".".
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+parse_user_host_path(const char *s, char **userp, char **hostp, char **pathp)
+{
+	char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL;
+	char *sdup, *tmp;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	if (userp != NULL)
+		*userp = NULL;
+	if (hostp != NULL)
+		*hostp = NULL;
+	if (pathp != NULL)
+		*pathp = NULL;
+
+	sdup = xstrdup(s);
+
+	/* Check for remote syntax: [user@]host:[path] */
+	if ((tmp = colon(sdup)) == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Extract optional path */
+	*tmp++ = '\0';
+	if (*tmp == '\0')
+		tmp = ".";
+	path = xstrdup(tmp);
+
+	/* Extract optional user and mandatory host */
+	tmp = strrchr(sdup, '@');
+	if (tmp != NULL) {
+		*tmp++ = '\0';
+		host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(tmp));
+		if (*sdup != '\0')
+			user = xstrdup(sdup);
+	} else {
+		host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(sdup));
+		user = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Success */
+	if (userp != NULL) {
+		*userp = user;
+		user = NULL;
+	}
+	if (hostp != NULL) {
+		*hostp = host;
+		host = NULL;
+	}
+	if (pathp != NULL) {
+		*pathp = path;
+		path = NULL;
+	}
+	ret = 0;
+out:
+	free(sdup);
+	free(user);
+	free(host);
+	free(path);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a [user@]host[:port] string.
+ * Caller must free returned user and host.
+ * Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking).
+ * If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL.
+ * If port was not specified then *portp will be -1.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+parse_user_host_port(const char *s, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp)
+{
+	char *sdup, *cp, *tmp;
+	char *user = NULL, *host = NULL;
+	int port = -1, ret = -1;
+
+	if (userp != NULL)
+		*userp = NULL;
+	if (hostp != NULL)
+		*hostp = NULL;
+	if (portp != NULL)
+		*portp = -1;
+
+	if ((sdup = tmp = strdup(s)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	/* Extract optional username */
+	if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '@')) != NULL) {
+		*cp = '\0';
+		if (*tmp == '\0')
+			goto out;
+		if ((user = strdup(tmp)) == NULL)
+			goto out;
+		tmp = cp + 1;
+	}
+	/* Extract mandatory hostname */
+	if ((cp = hpdelim(&tmp)) == NULL || *cp == '\0')
+		goto out;
+	host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(cp));
+	/* Convert and verify optional port */
+	if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') {
+		if ((port = a2port(tmp)) <= 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	/* Success */
+	if (userp != NULL) {
+		*userp = user;
+		user = NULL;
+	}
+	if (hostp != NULL) {
+		*hostp = host;
+		host = NULL;
+	}
+	if (portp != NULL)
+		*portp = port;
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	free(sdup);
+	free(user);
+	free(host);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Converts a two-byte hex string to decimal.
+ * Returns the decimal value or -1 for invalid input.
+ */
+static int
+hexchar(const char *s)
+{
+	unsigned char result[2];
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+		if (s[i] >= '0' && s[i] <= '9')
+			result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - '0');
+		else if (s[i] >= 'a' && s[i] <= 'f')
+			result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - 'a') + 10;
+		else if (s[i] >= 'A' && s[i] <= 'F')
+			result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - 'A') + 10;
+		else
+			return -1;
+	}
+	return (result[0] << 4) | result[1];
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode an url-encoded string.
+ * Returns a newly allocated string on success or NULL on failure.
+ */
+static char *
+urldecode(const char *src)
+{
+	char *ret, *dst;
+	int ch;
+
+	ret = xmalloc(strlen(src) + 1);
+	for (dst = ret; *src != '\0'; src++) {
+		switch (*src) {
+		case '+':
+			*dst++ = ' ';
+			break;
+		case '%':
+			if (!isxdigit((unsigned char)src[1]) ||
+			    !isxdigit((unsigned char)src[2]) ||
+			    (ch = hexchar(src + 1)) == -1) {
+				free(ret);
+				return NULL;
+			}
+			*dst++ = ch;
+			src += 2;
+			break;
+		default:
+			*dst++ = *src;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	*dst = '\0';
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse an (scp|ssh|sftp)://[user@]host[:port][/path] URI.
+ * See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-secsh-scp-sftp-ssh-uri-04
+ * Either user or path may be url-encoded (but not host or port).
+ * Caller must free returned user, host and path.
+ * Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking)
+ * but the scheme must always be specified.
+ * If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL.
+ * If port was not specified then *portp will be -1.
+ * If path was not specified then *pathp will be set to NULL.
+ * Returns 0 on success, 1 if non-uri/wrong scheme, -1 on error/invalid uri.
+ */
+int
+parse_uri(const char *scheme, const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp,
+    int *portp, char **pathp)
+{
+	char *uridup, *cp, *tmp, ch;
+	char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL;
+	int port = -1, ret = -1;
+	size_t len;
+
+	len = strlen(scheme);
+	if (strncmp(uri, scheme, len) != 0 || strncmp(uri + len, "://", 3) != 0)
+		return 1;
+	uri += len + 3;
+
+	if (userp != NULL)
+		*userp = NULL;
+	if (hostp != NULL)
+		*hostp = NULL;
+	if (portp != NULL)
+		*portp = -1;
+	if (pathp != NULL)
+		*pathp = NULL;
+
+	uridup = tmp = xstrdup(uri);
+
+	/* Extract optional ssh-info (username + connection params) */
+	if ((cp = strchr(tmp, '@')) != NULL) {
+		char *delim;
+
+		*cp = '\0';
+		/* Extract username and connection params */
+		if ((delim = strchr(tmp, ';')) != NULL) {
+			/* Just ignore connection params for now */
+			*delim = '\0';
+		}
+		if (*tmp == '\0') {
+			/* Empty username */
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((user = urldecode(tmp)) == NULL)
+			goto out;
+		tmp = cp + 1;
+	}
+
+	/* Extract mandatory hostname */
+	if ((cp = hpdelim2(&tmp, &ch)) == NULL || *cp == '\0')
+		goto out;
+	host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(cp));
+	if (!valid_domain(host, 0, NULL))
+		goto out;
+
+	if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') {
+		if (ch == ':') {
+			/* Convert and verify port. */
+			if ((cp = strchr(tmp, '/')) != NULL)
+				*cp = '\0';
+			if ((port = a2port(tmp)) <= 0)
+				goto out;
+			tmp = cp ? cp + 1 : NULL;
+		}
+		if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') {
+			/* Extract optional path */
+			if ((path = urldecode(tmp)) == NULL)
+				goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Success */
+	if (userp != NULL) {
+		*userp = user;
+		user = NULL;
+	}
+	if (hostp != NULL) {
+		*hostp = host;
+		host = NULL;
+	}
+	if (portp != NULL)
+		*portp = port;
+	if (pathp != NULL) {
+		*pathp = path;
+		path = NULL;
+	}
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	free(uridup);
+	free(user);
+	free(host);
+	free(path);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* function to assist building execv() arguments */
+void
+addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+	char *cp;
+	u_int nalloc;
+	int r;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	if (r == -1)
+		fatal_f("argument too long");
+
+	nalloc = args->nalloc;
+	if (args->list == NULL) {
+		nalloc = 32;
+		args->num = 0;
+	} else if (args->num > (256 * 1024))
+		fatal_f("too many arguments");
+	else if (args->num >= args->nalloc)
+		fatal_f("arglist corrupt");
+	else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc)
+		nalloc *= 2;
+
+	args->list = xrecallocarray(args->list, args->nalloc,
+	    nalloc, sizeof(char *));
+	args->nalloc = nalloc;
+	args->list[args->num++] = cp;
+	args->list[args->num] = NULL;
+}
+
+void
+replacearg(arglist *args, u_int which, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+	char *cp;
+	int r;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	if (r == -1)
+		fatal_f("argument too long");
+	if (args->list == NULL || args->num >= args->nalloc)
+		fatal_f("arglist corrupt");
+
+	if (which >= args->num)
+		fatal_f("tried to replace invalid arg %d >= %d",
+		    which, args->num);
+	free(args->list[which]);
+	args->list[which] = cp;
+}
+
+void
+freeargs(arglist *args)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (args == NULL)
+		return;
+	if (args->list != NULL && args->num < args->nalloc) {
+		for (i = 0; i < args->num; i++)
+			free(args->list[i]);
+		free(args->list);
+	}
+	args->nalloc = args->num = 0;
+	args->list = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expands tildes in the file name.  Returns data allocated by xmalloc.
+ * Warning: this calls getpw*.
+ */
+int
+tilde_expand(const char *filename, uid_t uid, char **retp)
+{
+	char *ocopy = NULL, *copy, *s = NULL;
+	const char *path = NULL, *user = NULL;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	size_t len;
+	int ret = -1, r, slash;
+
+	*retp = NULL;
+	if (*filename != '~') {
+		*retp = xstrdup(filename);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	ocopy = copy = xstrdup(filename + 1);
+
+	if (*copy == '\0')				/* ~ */
+		path = NULL;
+	else if (*copy == '/') {
+		copy += strspn(copy, "/");
+		if (*copy == '\0')
+			path = NULL;			/* ~/ */
+		else
+			path = copy;			/* ~/path */
+	} else {
+		user = copy;
+		if ((path = strchr(copy, '/')) != NULL) {
+			copy[path - copy] = '\0';
+			path++;
+			path += strspn(path, "/");
+			if (*path == '\0')		/* ~user/ */
+				path = NULL;
+			/* else				 ~user/path */
+		}
+		/* else					~user */
+	}
+	if (user != NULL) {
+		if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
+			error_f("No such user %s", user);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	} else if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("No such uid %ld", (long)uid);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Make sure directory has a trailing '/' */
+	slash = (len = strlen(pw->pw_dir)) == 0 || pw->pw_dir[len - 1] != '/';
+
+	if ((r = xasprintf(&s, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir,
+	    slash ? "/" : "", path != NULL ? path : "")) <= 0) {
+		error_f("xasprintf failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (r >= PATH_MAX) {
+		error_f("Path too long");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	ret = 0;
+	*retp = s;
+	s = NULL;
+ out:
+	free(s);
+	free(ocopy);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+char *
+tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t uid)
+{
+	char *ret;
+
+	if (tilde_expand(filename, uid, &ret) != 0)
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expand a string with a set of %[char] escapes and/or ${ENVIRONMENT}
+ * substitutions.  A number of escapes may be specified as
+ * (char *escape_chars, char *replacement) pairs. The list must be terminated
+ * by a NULL escape_char. Returns replaced string in memory allocated by
+ * xmalloc which the caller must free.
+ */
+static char *
+vdollar_percent_expand(int *parseerror, int dollar, int percent,
+    const char *string, va_list ap)
+{
+#define EXPAND_MAX_KEYS	16
+	u_int num_keys = 0, i;
+	struct {
+		const char *key;
+		const char *repl;
+	} keys[EXPAND_MAX_KEYS];
+	struct sshbuf *buf;
+	int r, missingvar = 0;
+	char *ret = NULL, *var, *varend, *val;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if (parseerror == NULL)
+		fatal_f("null parseerror arg");
+	*parseerror = 1;
+
+	/* Gather keys if we're doing percent expansion. */
+	if (percent) {
+		for (num_keys = 0; num_keys < EXPAND_MAX_KEYS; num_keys++) {
+			keys[num_keys].key = va_arg(ap, char *);
+			if (keys[num_keys].key == NULL)
+				break;
+			keys[num_keys].repl = va_arg(ap, char *);
+			if (keys[num_keys].repl == NULL) {
+				fatal_f("NULL replacement for token %s",
+				    keys[num_keys].key);
+			}
+		}
+		if (num_keys == EXPAND_MAX_KEYS && va_arg(ap, char *) != NULL)
+			fatal_f("too many keys");
+		if (num_keys == 0)
+			fatal_f("percent expansion without token list");
+	}
+
+	/* Expand string */
+	for (i = 0; *string != '\0'; string++) {
+		/* Optionally process ${ENVIRONMENT} expansions. */
+		if (dollar && string[0] == '$' && string[1] == '{') {
+			string += 2;  /* skip over '${' */
+			if ((varend = strchr(string, '}')) == NULL) {
+				error_f("environment variable '%s' missing "
+				    "closing '}'", string);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			len = varend - string;
+			if (len == 0) {
+				error_f("zero-length environment variable");
+				goto out;
+			}
+			var = xmalloc(len + 1);
+			(void)strlcpy(var, string, len + 1);
+			if ((val = getenv(var)) == NULL) {
+				error_f("env var ${%s} has no value", var);
+				missingvar = 1;
+			} else {
+				debug3_f("expand ${%s} -> '%s'", var, val);
+				if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, val, strlen(val))) !=0)
+					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put ${}");
+			}
+			free(var);
+			string += len;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Process percent expansions if we have a list of TOKENs.
+		 * If we're not doing percent expansion everything just gets
+		 * appended here.
+		 */
+		if (*string != '%' || !percent) {
+ append:
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, *string)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8 %%");
+			continue;
+		}
+		string++;
+		/* %% case */
+		if (*string == '%')
+			goto append;
+		if (*string == '\0') {
+			error_f("invalid format");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < num_keys; i++) {
+			if (strchr(keys[i].key, *string) != NULL) {
+				if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, keys[i].repl,
+				    strlen(keys[i].repl))) != 0)
+					fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put %%-repl");
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (i >= num_keys) {
+			error_f("unknown key %%%c", *string);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!missingvar && (ret = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+	*parseerror = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return *parseerror ? NULL : ret;
+#undef EXPAND_MAX_KEYS
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expand only environment variables.
+ * Note that although this function is variadic like the other similar
+ * functions, any such arguments will be unused.
+ */
+
+char *
+dollar_expand(int *parseerr, const char *string, ...)
+{
+	char *ret;
+	int err;
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, string);
+	ret = vdollar_percent_expand(&err, 1, 0, string, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	if (parseerr != NULL)
+		*parseerr = err;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns expanded string or NULL if a specified environment variable is
+ * not defined, or calls fatal if the string is invalid.
+ */
+char *
+percent_expand(const char *string, ...)
+{
+	char *ret;
+	int err;
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, string);
+	ret = vdollar_percent_expand(&err, 0, 1, string, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	if (err)
+		fatal_f("failed");
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns expanded string or NULL if a specified environment variable is
+ * not defined, or calls fatal if the string is invalid.
+ */
+char *
+percent_dollar_expand(const char *string, ...)
+{
+	char *ret;
+	int err;
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, string);
+	ret = vdollar_percent_expand(&err, 1, 1, string, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	if (err)
+		fatal_f("failed");
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname)
+{
+#if defined(CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN)
+	return (sys_tun_open(tun, mode, ifname));
+#elif defined(SSH_TUN_OPENBSD)
+	struct ifreq ifr;
+	char name[100];
+	int fd = -1, sock;
+	const char *tunbase = "tun";
+
+	if (ifname != NULL)
+		*ifname = NULL;
+
+	if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET)
+		tunbase = "tap";
+
+	/* Open the tunnel device */
+	if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
+		snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun);
+		fd = open(name, O_RDWR);
+	} else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
+		for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) {
+			snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d",
+			    tunbase, tun);
+			if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0)
+				break;
+		}
+	} else {
+		debug_f("invalid tunnel %u", tun);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		debug_f("%s open: %s", name, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	debug_f("%s mode %d fd %d", name, mode, fd);
+
+	/* Bring interface up if it is not already */
+	snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun);
+	if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
+		goto failed;
+
+	if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) {
+		debug_f("get interface %s flags: %s", ifr.ifr_name,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		goto failed;
+	}
+
+	if (!(ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP)) {
+		ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
+		if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) {
+			debug_f("activate interface %s: %s", ifr.ifr_name,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			goto failed;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ifname != NULL)
+		*ifname = xstrdup(ifr.ifr_name);
+
+	close(sock);
+	return fd;
+
+ failed:
+	if (fd >= 0)
+		close(fd);
+	if (sock >= 0)
+		close(sock);
+	return -1;
+#else
+	error("Tunnel interfaces are not supported on this platform");
+	return (-1);
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+sanitise_stdfd(void)
+{
+	int nullfd, dupfd;
+
+	if ((nullfd = dupfd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open /dev/null: %s\n",
+		    strerror(errno));
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	while (++dupfd <= STDERR_FILENO) {
+		/* Only populate closed fds. */
+		if (fcntl(dupfd, F_GETFL) == -1 && errno == EBADF) {
+			if (dup2(nullfd, dupfd) == -1) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+				exit(1);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
+		close(nullfd);
+}
+
+char *
+tohex(const void *vp, size_t l)
+{
+	const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+	char b[3], *r;
+	size_t i, hl;
+
+	if (l > 65536)
+		return xstrdup("tohex: length > 65536");
+
+	hl = l * 2 + 1;
+	r = xcalloc(1, hl);
+	for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+		snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", p[i]);
+		strlcat(r, b, hl);
+	}
+	return (r);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Extend string *sp by the specified format. If *sp is not NULL (or empty),
+ * then the separator 'sep' will be prepended before the formatted arguments.
+ * Extended strings are heap allocated.
+ */
+void
+xextendf(char **sp, const char *sep, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+	char *tmp1, *tmp2;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	xvasprintf(&tmp1, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+
+	if (*sp == NULL || **sp == '\0') {
+		free(*sp);
+		*sp = tmp1;
+		return;
+	}
+	xasprintf(&tmp2, "%s%s%s", *sp, sep == NULL ? "" : sep, tmp1);
+	free(tmp1);
+	free(*sp);
+	*sp = tmp2;
+}
+
+
+u_int64_t
+get_u64(const void *vp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+	u_int64_t v;
+
+	v  = (u_int64_t)p[0] << 56;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[1] << 48;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[2] << 40;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[3] << 32;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[4] << 24;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[5] << 16;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[6] << 8;
+	v |= (u_int64_t)p[7];
+
+	return (v);
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+get_u32(const void *vp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+	u_int32_t v;
+
+	v  = (u_int32_t)p[0] << 24;
+	v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 16;
+	v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 8;
+	v |= (u_int32_t)p[3];
+
+	return (v);
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+get_u32_le(const void *vp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+	u_int32_t v;
+
+	v  = (u_int32_t)p[0];
+	v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 8;
+	v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 16;
+	v |= (u_int32_t)p[3] << 24;
+
+	return (v);
+}
+
+u_int16_t
+get_u16(const void *vp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
+	u_int16_t v;
+
+	v  = (u_int16_t)p[0] << 8;
+	v |= (u_int16_t)p[1];
+
+	return (v);
+}
+
+void
+put_u64(void *vp, u_int64_t v)
+{
+	u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+
+	p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 56) & 0xff;
+	p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 48) & 0xff;
+	p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 40) & 0xff;
+	p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 32) & 0xff;
+	p[4] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
+	p[5] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
+	p[6] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+	p[7] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+}
+
+void
+put_u32(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
+{
+	u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+
+	p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
+	p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
+	p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+	p[3] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+}
+
+void
+put_u32_le(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
+{
+	u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+
+	p[0] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+	p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+	p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
+	p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
+}
+
+void
+put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v)
+{
+	u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
+
+	p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
+	p[1] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
+}
+
+void
+ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *start, int *ms)
+{
+	struct timeval diff, finish;
+
+	monotime_tv(&finish);
+	timersub(&finish, start, &diff);
+	*ms -= (diff.tv_sec * 1000) + (diff.tv_usec / 1000);
+}
+
+void
+ms_to_timespec(struct timespec *ts, int ms)
+{
+	if (ms < 0)
+		ms = 0;
+	ts->tv_sec = ms / 1000;
+	ts->tv_nsec = (ms % 1000) * 1000 * 1000;
+}
+
+void
+monotime_ts(struct timespec *ts)
+{
+	struct timeval tv;
+#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && (defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME) || \
+    defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) || defined(CLOCK_REALTIME))
+	static int gettime_failed = 0;
+
+	if (!gettime_failed) {
+# ifdef CLOCK_BOOTTIME
+		if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, ts) == 0)
+			return;
+# endif /* CLOCK_BOOTTIME */
+# ifdef CLOCK_MONOTONIC
+		if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, ts) == 0)
+			return;
+# endif /* CLOCK_MONOTONIC */
+# ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME
+		/* Not monotonic, but we're almost out of options here. */
+		if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, ts) == 0)
+			return;
+# endif /* CLOCK_REALTIME */
+		debug3("clock_gettime: %s", strerror(errno));
+		gettime_failed = 1;
+	}
+#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && (BOOTTIME || MONOTONIC || REALTIME) */
+	gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+	ts->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
+	ts->tv_nsec = (long)tv.tv_usec * 1000;
+}
+
+void
+monotime_tv(struct timeval *tv)
+{
+	struct timespec ts;
+
+	monotime_ts(&ts);
+	tv->tv_sec = ts.tv_sec;
+	tv->tv_usec = ts.tv_nsec / 1000;
+}
+
+time_t
+monotime(void)
+{
+	struct timespec ts;
+
+	monotime_ts(&ts);
+	return ts.tv_sec;
+}
+
+double
+monotime_double(void)
+{
+	struct timespec ts;
+
+	monotime_ts(&ts);
+	return ts.tv_sec + ((double)ts.tv_nsec / 1000000000);
+}
+
+void
+bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *bw, u_int64_t kbps, size_t buflen)
+{
+	bw->buflen = buflen;
+	bw->rate = kbps;
+	bw->thresh = buflen;
+	bw->lamt = 0;
+	timerclear(&bw->bwstart);
+	timerclear(&bw->bwend);
+}
+
+/* Callback from read/write loop to insert bandwidth-limiting delays */
+void
+bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *bw, size_t read_len)
+{
+	u_int64_t waitlen;
+	struct timespec ts, rm;
+
+	bw->lamt += read_len;
+	if (!timerisset(&bw->bwstart)) {
+		monotime_tv(&bw->bwstart);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (bw->lamt < bw->thresh)
+		return;
+
+	monotime_tv(&bw->bwend);
+	timersub(&bw->bwend, &bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend);
+	if (!timerisset(&bw->bwend))
+		return;
+
+	bw->lamt *= 8;
+	waitlen = (double)1000000L * bw->lamt / bw->rate;
+
+	bw->bwstart.tv_sec = waitlen / 1000000L;
+	bw->bwstart.tv_usec = waitlen % 1000000L;
+
+	if (timercmp(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, >)) {
+		timersub(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, &bw->bwend);
+
+		/* Adjust the wait time */
+		if (bw->bwend.tv_sec) {
+			bw->thresh /= 2;
+			if (bw->thresh < bw->buflen / 4)
+				bw->thresh = bw->buflen / 4;
+		} else if (bw->bwend.tv_usec < 10000) {
+			bw->thresh *= 2;
+			if (bw->thresh > bw->buflen * 8)
+				bw->thresh = bw->buflen * 8;
+		}
+
+		TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&bw->bwend, &ts);
+		while (nanosleep(&ts, &rm) == -1) {
+			if (errno != EINTR)
+				break;
+			ts = rm;
+		}
+	}
+
+	bw->lamt = 0;
+	monotime_tv(&bw->bwstart);
+}
+
+/* Make a template filename for mk[sd]temp() */
+void
+mktemp_proto(char *s, size_t len)
+{
+	const char *tmpdir;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR")) != NULL) {
+		r = snprintf(s, len, "%s/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX", tmpdir);
+		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < len)
+			return;
+	}
+	r = snprintf(s, len, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX");
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= len)
+		fatal_f("template string too short");
+}
+
+static const struct {
+	const char *name;
+	int value;
+} ipqos[] = {
+	{ "none", INT_MAX },		/* can't use 0 here; that's CS0 */
+	{ "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 },
+	{ "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 },
+	{ "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 },
+	{ "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 },
+	{ "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 },
+	{ "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 },
+	{ "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 },
+	{ "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 },
+	{ "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 },
+	{ "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 },
+	{ "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 },
+	{ "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 },
+	{ "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 },
+	{ "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 },
+	{ "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 },
+	{ "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 },
+	{ "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 },
+	{ "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 },
+	{ "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 },
+	{ "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 },
+	{ "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF },
+	{ "le", IPTOS_DSCP_LE },
+	{ "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY },
+	{ "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT },
+	{ "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+
+int
+parse_ipqos(const char *cp)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	char *ep;
+	long val;
+
+	if (cp == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) {
+		if (strcasecmp(cp, ipqos[i].name) == 0)
+			return ipqos[i].value;
+	}
+	/* Try parsing as an integer */
+	val = strtol(cp, &ep, 0);
+	if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0' || val < 0 || val > 255)
+		return -1;
+	return val;
+}
+
+const char *
+iptos2str(int iptos)
+{
+	int i;
+	static char iptos_str[sizeof "0xff"];
+
+	for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) {
+		if (ipqos[i].value == iptos)
+			return ipqos[i].name;
+	}
+	snprintf(iptos_str, sizeof iptos_str, "0x%02x", iptos);
+	return iptos_str;
+}
+
+void
+lowercase(char *s)
+{
+	for (; *s; s++)
+		*s = tolower((u_char)*s);
+}
+
+int
+unix_listener(const char *path, int backlog, int unlink_first)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+	int saved_errno, sock;
+
+	memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
+	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+	if (strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, path,
+	    sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) {
+		error_f("path \"%s\" too long for Unix domain socket", path);
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (sock == -1) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error_f("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (unlink_first == 1) {
+		if (unlink(path) != 0 && errno != ENOENT)
+			error("unlink(%s): %.100s", path, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) == -1) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error_f("cannot bind to path %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+		close(sock);
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (listen(sock, backlog) == -1) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error_f("cannot listen on path %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+		close(sock);
+		unlink(path);
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return sock;
+}
+
+void
+sock_set_v6only(int s)
+{
+#if defined(IPV6_V6ONLY) && !defined(__OpenBSD__)
+	int on = 1;
+
+	debug3("%s: set socket %d IPV6_V6ONLY", __func__, s);
+	if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
+		error("setsockopt IPV6_V6ONLY: %s", strerror(errno));
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compares two strings that maybe be NULL. Returns non-zero if strings
+ * are both NULL or are identical, returns zero otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+strcmp_maybe_null(const char *a, const char *b)
+{
+	if ((a == NULL && b != NULL) || (a != NULL && b == NULL))
+		return 0;
+	if (a != NULL && strcmp(a, b) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare two forwards, returning non-zero if they are identical or
+ * zero otherwise.
+ */
+int
+forward_equals(const struct Forward *a, const struct Forward *b)
+{
+	if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->listen_host, b->listen_host) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port)
+		return 0;
+	if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->listen_path, b->listen_path) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->connect_host, b->connect_host) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port)
+		return 0;
+	if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->connect_path, b->connect_path) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	/* allocated_port and handle are not checked */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* returns 1 if process is already daemonized, 0 otherwise */
+int
+daemonized(void)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDONLY | O_NOCTTY)) >= 0) {
+		close(fd);
+		return 0;	/* have controlling terminal */
+	}
+	if (getppid() != 1)
+		return 0;	/* parent is not init */
+	if (getsid(0) != getpid())
+		return 0;	/* not session leader */
+	debug3("already daemonized");
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic
+ * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector
+ * and its members.
+ */
+int
+argv_split(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp, int terminate_on_comment)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	int argc = 0, quote, i, j;
+	char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv));
+
+	*argvp = NULL;
+	*argcp = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+		/* Skip leading whitespace */
+		if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')
+			continue;
+		if (terminate_on_comment && s[i] == '#')
+			break;
+		/* Start of a token */
+		quote = 0;
+
+		argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv));
+		arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1);
+		argv[argc] = NULL;
+
+		/* Copy the token in, removing escapes */
+		for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+			if (s[i] == '\\') {
+				if (s[i + 1] == '\'' ||
+				    s[i + 1] == '\"' ||
+				    s[i + 1] == '\\' ||
+				    (quote == 0 && s[i + 1] == ' ')) {
+					i++; /* Skip '\' */
+					arg[j++] = s[i];
+				} else {
+					/* Unrecognised escape */
+					arg[j++] = s[i];
+				}
+			} else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t'))
+				break; /* done */
+			else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == '\"' || s[i] == '\''))
+				quote = s[i]; /* quote start */
+			else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote)
+				quote = 0; /* quote end */
+			else
+				arg[j++] = s[i];
+		}
+		if (s[i] == '\0') {
+			if (quote != 0) {
+				/* Ran out of string looking for close quote */
+				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	/* Success */
+	*argcp = argc;
+	*argvp = argv;
+	argc = 0;
+	argv = NULL;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
+			free(argv[i]);
+		free(argv);
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as
+ * necessary. Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+char *
+argv_assemble(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int i, j, ws, r;
+	char c, *ret;
+	struct sshbuf *buf, *arg;
+
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+		ws = 0;
+		sshbuf_reset(arg);
+		for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) {
+			r = 0;
+			c = argv[i][j];
+			switch (c) {
+			case ' ':
+			case '\t':
+				ws = 1;
+				r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
+				break;
+			case '\\':
+			case '\'':
+			case '"':
+				if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0)
+					break;
+				/* FALLTHROUGH */
+			default:
+				r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
+				break;
+			}
+			if (r != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8");
+		}
+		if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) ||
+		    (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 ||
+		    (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0))
+			fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+	}
+	if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("malloc failed");
+	memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0';
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	sshbuf_free(arg);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+char *
+argv_next(int *argcp, char ***argvp)
+{
+	char *ret = (*argvp)[0];
+
+	if (*argcp > 0 && ret != NULL) {
+		(*argcp)--;
+		(*argvp)++;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+argv_consume(int *argcp)
+{
+	*argcp = 0;
+}
+
+void
+argv_free(char **av, int ac)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (av == NULL)
+		return;
+	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+		free(av[i]);
+	free(av);
+}
+
+/* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */
+int
+exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd, int quiet)
+{
+	int status;
+
+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+		if (errno != EINTR) {
+			error("%s waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+		error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status));
+		return -1;
+	} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+		do_log2(quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
+		    "%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
+ * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
+ * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
+ *
+ * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
+ *
+ * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
+ * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
+ * error buffer plus max size as arguments.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
+ */
+int
+safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
+    uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
+{
+	char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX];
+	char *cp;
+	int comparehome = 0;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
+		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
+		comparehome = 1;
+
+	if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
+		snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
+	    (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+		snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
+		    buf);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
+	for (;;) {
+		if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
+			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
+			return -1;
+		}
+		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
+
+		if (stat(buf, &st) == -1 ||
+		    (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+			snprintf(err, errlen,
+			    "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
+		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
+		 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
+		 */
+		if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
+			break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Version of safe_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
+ * avoid races.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
+ */
+int
+safe_path_fd(int fd, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
+    char *err, size_t errlen)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+
+	/* check the open file to avoid races */
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
+		snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
+		    file, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return safe_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment.  If the variable
+ * already exists, its value is overridden.
+ */
+void
+child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
+	const char *value)
+{
+	char **env;
+	u_int envsize;
+	u_int i, namelen;
+
+	if (strchr(name, '=') != NULL) {
+		error("Invalid environment variable \"%.100s\"", name);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null
+	 * entry before continuing.
+	 */
+	if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) {
+		*envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
+		*envp[0] = NULL;
+		*envsizep = 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Find the slot where the value should be stored.  If the variable
+	 * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot
+	 * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary.
+	 */
+	env = *envp;
+	namelen = strlen(name);
+	for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
+		if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=')
+			break;
+	if (env[i]) {
+		/* Reuse the slot. */
+		free(env[i]);
+	} else {
+		/* New variable.  Expand if necessary. */
+		envsize = *envsizep;
+		if (i >= envsize - 1) {
+			if (envsize >= 1000)
+				fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars");
+			envsize += 50;
+			env = (*envp) = xreallocarray(env, envsize, sizeof(char *));
+			*envsizep = envsize;
+		}
+		/* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */
+		env[i + 1] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */
+	/* XXX xasprintf */
+	env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1);
+	snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check and optionally lowercase a domain name, also removes trailing '.'
+ * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure, storing an error message in errstr.
+ */
+int
+valid_domain(char *name, int makelower, const char **errstr)
+{
+	size_t i, l = strlen(name);
+	u_char c, last = '\0';
+	static char errbuf[256];
+
+	if (l == 0) {
+		strlcpy(errbuf, "empty domain name", sizeof(errbuf));
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	if (!isalpha((u_char)name[0]) && !isdigit((u_char)name[0])) {
+		snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name \"%.100s\" "
+		    "starts with invalid character", name);
+		goto bad;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+		c = tolower((u_char)name[i]);
+		if (makelower)
+			name[i] = (char)c;
+		if (last == '.' && c == '.') {
+			snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name "
+			    "\"%.100s\" contains consecutive separators", name);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		if (c != '.' && c != '-' && !isalnum(c) &&
+		    c != '_') /* technically invalid, but common */ {
+			snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name "
+			    "\"%.100s\" contains invalid characters", name);
+			goto bad;
+		}
+		last = c;
+	}
+	if (name[l - 1] == '.')
+		name[l - 1] = '\0';
+	if (errstr != NULL)
+		*errstr = NULL;
+	return 1;
+bad:
+	if (errstr != NULL)
+		*errstr = errbuf;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify that a environment variable name (not including initial '$') is
+ * valid; consisting of one or more alphanumeric or underscore characters only.
+ * Returns 1 on valid, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int
+valid_env_name(const char *name)
+{
+	const char *cp;
+
+	if (name[0] == '\0')
+		return 0;
+	for (cp = name; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
+		if (!isalnum((u_char)*cp) && *cp != '_')
+			return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+const char *
+atoi_err(const char *nptr, int *val)
+{
+	const char *errstr = NULL;
+	long long num;
+
+	if (nptr == NULL || *nptr == '\0')
+		return "missing";
+	num = strtonum(nptr, 0, INT_MAX, &errstr);
+	if (errstr == NULL)
+		*val = (int)num;
+	return errstr;
+}
+
+int
+parse_absolute_time(const char *s, uint64_t *tp)
+{
+	struct tm tm;
+	time_t tt;
+	char buf[32], *fmt;
+	const char *cp;
+	size_t l;
+	int is_utc = 0;
+
+	*tp = 0;
+
+	l = strlen(s);
+	if (l > 1 && strcasecmp(s + l - 1, "Z") == 0) {
+		is_utc = 1;
+		l--;
+	} else if (l > 3 && strcasecmp(s + l - 3, "UTC") == 0) {
+		is_utc = 1;
+		l -= 3;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * POSIX strptime says "The application shall ensure that there
+	 * is white-space or other non-alphanumeric characters between
+	 * any two conversion specifications" so arrange things this way.
+	 */
+	switch (l) {
+	case 8: /* YYYYMMDD */
+		fmt = "%Y-%m-%d";
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6);
+		break;
+	case 12: /* YYYYMMDDHHMM */
+		fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M";
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s",
+		    s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10);
+		break;
+	case 14: /* YYYYMMDDHHMMSS */
+		fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S";
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s:%.2s",
+		    s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10, s + 12);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	}
+
+	memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm));
+	if ((cp = strptime(buf, fmt, &tm)) == NULL || *cp != '\0')
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	if (is_utc) {
+		if ((tt = timegm(&tm)) < 0)
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	} else {
+		if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0)
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	*tp = (uint64_t)tt;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* On OpenBSD time_t is int64_t which is long long. */
+/* #define SSH_TIME_T_MAX LLONG_MAX */
+
+void
+format_absolute_time(uint64_t t, char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	time_t tt = t > SSH_TIME_T_MAX ? SSH_TIME_T_MAX : t;
+	struct tm tm;
+
+	localtime_r(&tt, &tm);
+	strftime(buf, len, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", &tm);
+}
+
+/* check if path is absolute */
+int
+path_absolute(const char *path)
+{
+	return (*path == '/') ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+void
+skip_space(char **cpp)
+{
+	char *cp;
+
+	for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+		;
+	*cpp = cp;
+}
+
+/* authorized_key-style options parsing helpers */
+
+/*
+ * Match flag 'opt' in *optsp, and if allow_negate is set then also match
+ * 'no-opt'. Returns -1 if option not matched, 1 if option matches or 0
+ * if negated option matches.
+ * If the option or negated option matches, then *optsp is updated to
+ * point to the first character after the option.
+ */
+int
+opt_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, const char **optsp)
+{
+	size_t opt_len = strlen(opt);
+	const char *opts = *optsp;
+	int negate = 0;
+
+	if (allow_negate && strncasecmp(opts, "no-", 3) == 0) {
+		opts += 3;
+		negate = 1;
+	}
+	if (strncasecmp(opts, opt, opt_len) == 0) {
+		*optsp = opts + opt_len;
+		return negate ? 0 : 1;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+char *
+opt_dequote(const char **sp, const char **errstrp)
+{
+	const char *s = *sp;
+	char *ret;
+	size_t i;
+
+	*errstrp = NULL;
+	if (*s != '"') {
+		*errstrp = "missing start quote";
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	s++;
+	if ((ret = malloc(strlen((s)) + 1)) == NULL) {
+		*errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; *s != '\0' && *s != '"';) {
+		if (s[0] == '\\' && s[1] == '"')
+			s++;
+		ret[i++] = *s++;
+	}
+	if (*s == '\0') {
+		*errstrp = "missing end quote";
+		free(ret);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	ret[i] = '\0';
+	s++;
+	*sp = s;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+opt_match(const char **opts, const char *term)
+{
+	if (strncasecmp((*opts), term, strlen(term)) == 0 &&
+	    (*opts)[strlen(term)] == '=') {
+		*opts += strlen(term) + 1;
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+opt_array_append2(const char *file, const int line, const char *directive,
+    char ***array, int **iarray, u_int *lp, const char *s, int i)
+{
+
+	if (*lp >= INT_MAX)
+		fatal("%s line %d: Too many %s entries", file, line, directive);
+
+	if (iarray != NULL) {
+		*iarray = xrecallocarray(*iarray, *lp, *lp + 1,
+		    sizeof(**iarray));
+		(*iarray)[*lp] = i;
+	}
+
+	*array = xrecallocarray(*array, *lp, *lp + 1, sizeof(**array));
+	(*array)[*lp] = xstrdup(s);
+	(*lp)++;
+}
+
+void
+opt_array_append(const char *file, const int line, const char *directive,
+    char ***array, u_int *lp, const char *s)
+{
+	opt_array_append2(file, line, directive, array, NULL, lp, s, 0);
+}
+
+sshsig_t
+ssh_signal(int signum, sshsig_t handler)
+{
+	struct sigaction sa, osa;
+
+	/* mask all other signals while in handler */
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	sa.sa_handler = handler;
+	sigfillset(&sa.sa_mask);
+#if defined(SA_RESTART) && !defined(NO_SA_RESTART)
+	if (signum != SIGALRM)
+		sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
+#endif
+	if (sigaction(signum, &sa, &osa) == -1) {
+		debug3("sigaction(%s): %s", strsignal(signum), strerror(errno));
+		return SIG_ERR;
+	}
+	return osa.sa_handler;
+}
+
+int
+stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdout, int do_stderr)
+{
+	int devnull, ret = 0;
+
+	if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+		error_f("open %s: %s", _PATH_DEVNULL,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((do_stdin && dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
+	    (do_stdout && dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) ||
+	    (do_stderr && dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1)) {
+		error_f("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+	if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+		close(devnull);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Runs command in a subprocess with a minimal environment.
+ * Returns pid on success, 0 on failure.
+ * The child stdout and stderr maybe captured, left attached or sent to
+ * /dev/null depending on the contents of flags.
+ * "tag" is prepended to log messages.
+ * NB. "command" is only used for logging; the actual command executed is
+ * av[0].
+ */
+pid_t
+subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags,
+    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs, privrestore_fn *restore_privs)
+{
+	FILE *f = NULL;
+	struct stat st;
+	int fd, devnull, p[2], i;
+	pid_t pid;
+	char *cp, errmsg[512];
+	u_int nenv = 0;
+	char **env = NULL;
+
+	/* If dropping privs, then must specify user and restore function */
+	if (drop_privs != NULL && (pw == NULL || restore_privs == NULL)) {
+		error("%s: inconsistent arguments", tag); /* XXX fatal? */
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (pw == NULL && (pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: no user for current uid", tag);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (child != NULL)
+		*child = NULL;
+
+	debug3_f("%s command \"%s\" running as %s (flags 0x%x)",
+	    tag, command, pw->pw_name, flags);
+
+	/* Check consistency */
+	if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 &&
+	    (flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0) {
+		error_f("inconsistent flags");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0) != (child == NULL)) {
+		error_f("inconsistent flags/output");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If executing an explicit binary, then verify the it exists
+	 * and appears safe-ish to execute
+	 */
+	if (!path_absolute(av[0])) {
+		error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (drop_privs != NULL)
+		drop_privs(pw);
+	if (stat(av[0], &st) == -1) {
+		error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
+		    av[0], strerror(errno));
+		goto restore_return;
+	}
+	if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH) == 0 &&
+	    safe_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
+		error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg);
+		goto restore_return;
+	}
+	/* Prepare to keep the child's stdout if requested */
+	if (pipe(p) == -1) {
+		error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+ restore_return:
+		if (restore_privs != NULL)
+			restore_privs();
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (restore_privs != NULL)
+		restore_privs();
+
+	switch ((pid = fork())) {
+	case -1: /* error */
+		error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+		close(p[0]);
+		close(p[1]);
+		return 0;
+	case 0: /* child */
+		/* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
+		if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV) == 0) {
+			nenv = 5;
+			env = xcalloc(sizeof(*env), nenv);
+			child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
+			child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "USER", pw->pw_name);
+			child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
+			child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
+			if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
+				child_set_env(&env, &nenv, "LANG", cp);
+		}
+
+		for (i = 1; i < NSIG; i++)
+			ssh_signal(i, SIG_DFL);
+
+		if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+			error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) {
+			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+
+		/* Set up stdout as requested; leave stderr in place for now. */
+		fd = -1;
+		if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0)
+			fd = p[1];
+		else if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0)
+			fd = devnull;
+		if (fd != -1 && dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
+			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+		if (geteuid() == 0 &&
+		    initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
+			error("%s: initgroups(%s, %u): %s", tag,
+			    pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
+			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) == -1) {
+			error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		/* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
+		if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 &&
+		    dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
+			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		if (env != NULL)
+			execve(av[0], av, env);
+		else
+			execv(av[0], av);
+		error("%s %s \"%s\": %s", tag, env == NULL ? "execv" : "execve",
+		    command, strerror(errno));
+		_exit(127);
+	default: /* parent */
+		break;
+	}
+
+	close(p[1]);
+	if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0)
+		close(p[0]);
+	else if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
+		error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
+		close(p[0]);
+		/* Don't leave zombie child */
+		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+		while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+			;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* Success */
+	debug3_f("%s pid %ld", tag, (long)pid);
+	if (child != NULL)
+		*child = f;
+	return pid;
+}
+
+const char *
+lookup_env_in_list(const char *env, char * const *envs, size_t nenvs)
+{
+	size_t i, envlen;
+
+	envlen = strlen(env);
+	for (i = 0; i < nenvs; i++) {
+		if (strncmp(envs[i], env, envlen) == 0 &&
+		    envs[i][envlen] == '=') {
+			return envs[i] + envlen + 1;
+		}
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+const char *
+lookup_setenv_in_list(const char *env, char * const *envs, size_t nenvs)
+{
+	char *name, *cp;
+	const char *ret;
+
+	name = xstrdup(env);
+	if ((cp = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) {
+		free(name);
+		return NULL; /* not env=val */
+	}
+	*cp = '\0';
+	ret = lookup_env_in_list(name, envs, nenvs);
+	free(name);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Helpers for managing poll(2)/ppoll(2) timeouts
+ * Will remember the earliest deadline and return it for use in poll/ppoll.
+ */
+
+/* Initialise a poll/ppoll timeout with an indefinite deadline */
+void
+ptimeout_init(struct timespec *pt)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Deliberately invalid for ppoll(2).
+	 * Will be converted to NULL in ptimeout_get_tspec() later.
+	 */
+	pt->tv_sec = -1;
+	pt->tv_nsec = 0;
+}
+
+/* Specify a poll/ppoll deadline of at most 'sec' seconds */
+void
+ptimeout_deadline_sec(struct timespec *pt, long sec)
+{
+	if (pt->tv_sec == -1 || pt->tv_sec >= sec) {
+		pt->tv_sec = sec;
+		pt->tv_nsec = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Specify a poll/ppoll deadline of at most 'p' (timespec) */
+static void
+ptimeout_deadline_tsp(struct timespec *pt, struct timespec *p)
+{
+	if (pt->tv_sec == -1 || timespeccmp(pt, p, >=))
+		*pt = *p;
+}
+
+/* Specify a poll/ppoll deadline of at most 'ms' milliseconds */
+void
+ptimeout_deadline_ms(struct timespec *pt, long ms)
+{
+	struct timespec p;
+
+	p.tv_sec = ms / 1000;
+	p.tv_nsec = (ms % 1000) * 1000000;
+	ptimeout_deadline_tsp(pt, &p);
+}
+
+/* Specify a poll/ppoll deadline at wall clock monotime 'when' */
+void
+ptimeout_deadline_monotime(struct timespec *pt, time_t when)
+{
+	struct timespec now, t;
+
+	t.tv_sec = when;
+	t.tv_nsec = 0;
+	monotime_ts(&now);
+
+	if (timespeccmp(&now, &t, >=))
+		ptimeout_deadline_sec(pt, 0);
+	else {
+		timespecsub(&t, &now, &t);
+		ptimeout_deadline_tsp(pt, &t);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Get a poll(2) timeout value in milliseconds */
+int
+ptimeout_get_ms(struct timespec *pt)
+{
+	if (pt->tv_sec == -1)
+		return -1;
+	if (pt->tv_sec >= (INT_MAX - (pt->tv_nsec / 1000000)) / 1000)
+		return INT_MAX;
+	return (pt->tv_sec * 1000) + (pt->tv_nsec / 1000000);
+}
+
+/* Get a ppoll(2) timeout value as a timespec pointer */
+struct timespec *
+ptimeout_get_tsp(struct timespec *pt)
+{
+	return pt->tv_sec == -1 ? NULL : pt;
+}
+
+/* Returns non-zero if a timeout has been set (i.e. is not indefinite) */
+int
+ptimeout_isset(struct timespec *pt)
+{
+	return pt->tv_sec != -1;
+}
diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..84d93e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/misc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.101 2023/01/06 02:37:04 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MISC_H
+#define _MISC_H
+
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+/* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */
+struct Forward {
+	char	 *listen_host;		/* Host (address) to listen on. */
+	int	  listen_port;		/* Port to forward. */
+	char	 *listen_path;		/* Path to bind domain socket. */
+	char	 *connect_host;		/* Host to connect. */
+	int	  connect_port;		/* Port to connect on connect_host. */
+	char	 *connect_path;		/* Path to connect domain socket. */
+	int	  allocated_port;	/* Dynamically allocated listen port */
+	int	  handle;		/* Handle for dynamic listen ports */
+};
+
+int forward_equals(const struct Forward *, const struct Forward *);
+int daemonized(void);
+
+/* Common server and client forwarding options. */
+struct ForwardOptions {
+	int	 gateway_ports; /* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
+	mode_t	 streamlocal_bind_mask; /* umask for streamlocal binds */
+	int	 streamlocal_bind_unlink; /* unlink socket before bind */
+};
+
+/* misc.c */
+
+char	*chop(char *);
+void	 rtrim(char *);
+void	skip_space(char **);
+char	*strdelim(char **);
+char	*strdelimw(char **);
+int	 set_nonblock(int);
+int	 unset_nonblock(int);
+void	 set_nodelay(int);
+int	 set_reuseaddr(int);
+char	*get_rdomain(int);
+int	 set_rdomain(int, const char *);
+int	 get_sock_af(int);
+void	 set_sock_tos(int, int);
+int	 waitrfd(int, int *);
+int	 timeout_connect(int, const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t, int *);
+int	 a2port(const char *);
+int	 a2tun(const char *, int *);
+char	*put_host_port(const char *, u_short);
+char	*hpdelim2(char **, char *);
+char	*hpdelim(char **);
+char	*cleanhostname(char *);
+char	*colon(char *);
+int	 parse_user_host_path(const char *, char **, char **, char **);
+int	 parse_user_host_port(const char *, char **, char **, int *);
+int	 parse_uri(const char *, const char *, char **, char **, int *, char **);
+int	 convtime(const char *);
+const char *fmt_timeframe(time_t t);
+int	 tilde_expand(const char *, uid_t, char **);
+char	*tilde_expand_filename(const char *, uid_t);
+
+char	*dollar_expand(int *, const char *string, ...);
+char	*percent_expand(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__sentinel__));
+char	*percent_dollar_expand(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__sentinel__));
+char	*tohex(const void *, size_t);
+void	 xextendf(char **s, const char *sep, const char *fmt, ...)
+    __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 3, 4))) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (3)));
+void	 sanitise_stdfd(void);
+void	 ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *, int *);
+void	 ms_to_timespec(struct timespec *, int);
+void	 monotime_ts(struct timespec *);
+void	 monotime_tv(struct timeval *);
+time_t	 monotime(void);
+double	 monotime_double(void);
+void	 lowercase(char *s);
+int	 unix_listener(const char *, int, int);
+int	 valid_domain(char *, int, const char **);
+int	 valid_env_name(const char *);
+const char *atoi_err(const char *, int *);
+int	 parse_absolute_time(const char *, uint64_t *);
+void	 format_absolute_time(uint64_t, char *, size_t);
+int	 path_absolute(const char *);
+int	 stdfd_devnull(int, int, int);
+
+void	 sock_set_v6only(int);
+
+struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *);
+const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int);
+
+typedef void privdrop_fn(struct passwd *);
+typedef void privrestore_fn(void);
+#define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD	(1)     /* Discard stdout */
+#define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE	(1<<1)  /* Redirect stdout */
+#define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD	(1<<2)  /* Discard stderr */
+#define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH	(1<<3)	/* Don't check for safe cmd */
+#define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV	(1<<4)	/* Keep parent environment */
+pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int,
+    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *);
+
+typedef struct arglist arglist;
+struct arglist {
+	char    **list;
+	u_int   num;
+	u_int   nalloc;
+};
+void	 addargs(arglist *, char *, ...)
+	    __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+void	 replacearg(arglist *, u_int, char *, ...)
+	    __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)));
+void	 freeargs(arglist *);
+
+int	 tun_open(int, int, char **);
+
+/* Common definitions for ssh tunnel device forwarding */
+#define SSH_TUNMODE_NO		0x00
+#define SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT	0x01
+#define SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET	0x02
+#define SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT	SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT
+#define SSH_TUNMODE_YES		(SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT|SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET)
+
+#define SSH_TUNID_ANY		0x7fffffff
+#define SSH_TUNID_ERR		(SSH_TUNID_ANY - 1)
+#define SSH_TUNID_MAX		(SSH_TUNID_ANY - 2)
+
+/* Fake port to indicate that host field is really a path. */
+#define PORT_STREAMLOCAL	-2
+
+/* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */
+u_int64_t	get_u64(const void *)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8)));
+u_int32_t	get_u32(const void *)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4)));
+u_int16_t	get_u16(const void *)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
+void		put_u64(void *, u_int64_t)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8)));
+void		put_u32(void *, u_int32_t)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4)));
+void		put_u16(void *, u_int16_t)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
+
+/* Little-endian store/load, used by umac.c */
+u_int32_t	get_u32_le(const void *)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4)));
+void		put_u32_le(void *, u_int32_t)
+    __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4)));
+
+struct bwlimit {
+	size_t buflen;
+	u_int64_t rate;		/* desired rate in kbit/s */
+	u_int64_t thresh;	/* threshold after which we'll check timers */
+	u_int64_t lamt;		/* amount written in last timer interval */
+	struct timeval bwstart, bwend;
+};
+
+void bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *, u_int64_t, size_t);
+void bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *, size_t);
+
+int parse_ipqos(const char *);
+const char *iptos2str(int);
+void mktemp_proto(char *, size_t);
+
+void	 child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
+	    const char *value);
+const char *lookup_env_in_list(const char *env,
+	    char * const *envs, size_t nenvs);
+const char *lookup_setenv_in_list(const char *env,
+	    char * const *envs, size_t nenvs);
+
+int	 argv_split(const char *, int *, char ***, int);
+char	*argv_assemble(int, char **argv);
+char	*argv_next(int *, char ***);
+void	 argv_consume(int *);
+void	 argv_free(char **, int);
+
+int	 exited_cleanly(pid_t, const char *, const char *, int);
+
+struct stat;
+int	 safe_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t,
+	    char *, size_t);
+int	 safe_path_fd(int, const char *, struct passwd *,
+	    char *err, size_t errlen);
+
+/* authorized_key-style options parsing helpers */
+int	opt_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, const char **optsp);
+char	*opt_dequote(const char **sp, const char **errstrp);
+int	opt_match(const char **opts, const char *term);
+
+/* readconf/servconf option lists */
+void	opt_array_append(const char *file, const int line,
+	    const char *directive, char ***array, u_int *lp, const char *s);
+void	opt_array_append2(const char *file, const int line,
+	    const char *directive, char ***array, int **iarray, u_int *lp,
+	    const char *s, int i);
+
+struct timespec;
+void ptimeout_init(struct timespec *pt);
+void ptimeout_deadline_sec(struct timespec *pt, long sec);
+void ptimeout_deadline_ms(struct timespec *pt, long ms);
+void ptimeout_deadline_monotime(struct timespec *pt, time_t when);
+int ptimeout_get_ms(struct timespec *pt);
+struct timespec *ptimeout_get_tsp(struct timespec *pt);
+int ptimeout_isset(struct timespec *pt);
+
+/* readpass.c */
+
+#define RP_ECHO			0x0001
+#define RP_ALLOW_STDIN		0x0002
+#define RP_ALLOW_EOF		0x0004
+#define RP_USE_ASKPASS		0x0008
+
+struct notifier_ctx;
+
+char	*read_passphrase(const char *, int);
+int	 ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+struct notifier_ctx *notify_start(int, const char *, ...)
+	__attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+void	notify_complete(struct notifier_ctx *, const char *, ...)
+	__attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+
+#define MINIMUM(a, b)	(((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
+#define MAXIMUM(a, b)	(((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b))
+#define ROUNDUP(x, y)   ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
+
+typedef void (*sshsig_t)(int);
+sshsig_t ssh_signal(int, sshsig_t);
+
+#endif /* _MISC_H */
diff --git a/mkinstalldirs b/mkinstalldirs
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..399f409
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mkinstalldirs
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#! /bin/sh
+# mkinstalldirs --- make directory hierarchy
+# Author: Noah Friedman <friedman@prep.ai.mit.edu>
+# Created: 1993-05-16
+# Public domain
+
+errstatus=0
+
+for file
+do
+   set fnord `echo ":$file" | sed -ne 's/^:\//#/;s/^://;s/\// /g;s/^#/\//;p'`
+   shift
+
+   pathcomp=
+   for d
+   do
+     pathcomp="$pathcomp$d"
+     case "$pathcomp" in
+       -* ) pathcomp=./$pathcomp ;;
+     esac
+
+     if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then
+	echo "mkdir $pathcomp"
+
+	mkdir "$pathcomp" || lasterr=$?
+
+	if test ! -d "$pathcomp"; then
+	  errstatus=$lasterr
+	fi
+     fi
+
+     pathcomp="$pathcomp/"
+   done
+done
+
+exit $errstatus
+
+# mkinstalldirs ends here
diff --git a/moduli b/moduli
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..099fc42
--- /dev/null
+++ b/moduli
@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+#    $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.33 2022/11/07 02:21:21 dtucker Exp $
+# Time Type Tests Tries Size Generator Modulus
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
+20220714110421 2 6 100 2047 5 E98F2A209BA9F4C8C1FFB02490E599A99FBE28F6A053E240A4BD5FEDE80B23FEA8A1476E9EF6605A4B4B41CC74CB945C7E168A91DB112424480A85CBF5853234B9B1F60F030D38F678BA80AE1461F716C463D7396151EB5F037CC88690FEEF8D16A1B67F56C11874DB5AA3D541BEFF390077C79C86434EDBC2B46821D2AE5D2FA4FFF1B086B07669B09498EA11B0FE26C773F79ACA044E085E0BA43BBE1EBE954AA1EC7A465A3232699E54958B1760AB7A04D9627EC1810970706C96B58BF84999EBED8846D8B384CB945BF782141B1BE2B7C0E04D531A2334DB41BBFD1BEA428C5FD22F50BABDBDFCC5B848F64CBA8D039636311F8D844DFFFBD77A436AA537
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diff --git a/moduli.0 b/moduli.0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..75d5326
--- /dev/null
+++ b/moduli.0
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+MODULI(5)                     File Formats Manual                    MODULI(5)
+
+NAME
+     moduli M-bM-^@M-^S Diffie-Hellman moduli
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     The /etc/moduli file contains prime numbers and generators for use by
+     sshd(8) in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method.
+
+     New moduli may be generated with ssh-keygen(1) using a two-step process.
+     An initial candidate generation pass, using ssh-keygen -M generate,
+     calculates numbers that are likely to be useful.  A second primality
+     testing pass, using ssh-keygen -M screen, provides a high degree of
+     assurance that the numbers are prime and are safe for use in Diffie-
+     Hellman operations by sshd(8).  This moduli format is used as the output
+     from each pass.
+
+     The file consists of newline-separated records, one per modulus,
+     containing seven space-separated fields.  These fields are as follows:
+
+           timestamp    The time that the modulus was last processed as
+                        YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.
+
+           type         Decimal number specifying the internal structure of
+                        the prime modulus.  Supported types are:
+
+                        0     Unknown, not tested.
+                        2     "Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime.
+                        4     Sophie Germain; 2p+1 is also prime.
+
+                        Moduli candidates initially produced by ssh-keygen(1)
+                        are Sophie Germain primes (type 4).  Further primality
+                        testing with ssh-keygen(1) produces safe prime moduli
+                        (type 2) that are ready for use in sshd(8).  Other
+                        types are not used by OpenSSH.
+
+           tests        Decimal number indicating the type of primality tests
+                        that the number has been subjected to represented as a
+                        bitmask of the following values:
+
+                        0x00  Not tested.
+                        0x01  Composite number M-bM-^@M-^S not prime.
+                        0x02  Sieve of Eratosthenes.
+                        0x04  Probabilistic Miller-Rabin primality tests.
+
+                        The ssh-keygen(1) moduli candidate generation uses the
+                        Sieve of Eratosthenes (flag 0x02).  Subsequent
+                        ssh-keygen(1) primality tests are Miller-Rabin tests
+                        (flag 0x04).
+
+           trials       Decimal number indicating the number of primality
+                        trials that have been performed on the modulus.
+
+           size         Decimal number indicating the size of the prime in
+                        bits.
+
+           generator    The recommended generator for use with this modulus
+                        (hexadecimal).
+
+           modulus      The modulus itself in hexadecimal.
+
+     When performing Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange, sshd(8) first estimates
+     the size of the modulus required to produce enough Diffie-Hellman output
+     to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher.  sshd(8) then randomly
+     selects a modulus from /etc/moduli that best meets the size requirement.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
+
+STANDARDS
+     M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for
+     the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006.
+
+OpenBSD 7.2                     April 16, 2022                     OpenBSD 7.2
diff --git a/moduli.5 b/moduli.5
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5086a6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/moduli.5
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+.\"	$OpenBSD: moduli.5,v 1.19 2022/04/16 04:30:10 dtucker Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+.\"
+.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+.\"
+.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+.Dd $Mdocdate: April 16 2022 $
+.Dt MODULI 5
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm moduli
+.Nd Diffie-Hellman moduli
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+The
+.Pa /etc/moduli
+file contains prime numbers and generators for use by
+.Xr sshd 8
+in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method.
+.Pp
+New moduli may be generated with
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+using a two-step process.
+An initial
+.Em candidate generation
+pass, using
+.Ic ssh-keygen -M generate ,
+calculates numbers that are likely to be useful.
+A second
+.Em primality testing
+pass, using
+.Ic ssh-keygen -M screen ,
+provides a high degree of assurance that the numbers are prime and are
+safe for use in Diffie-Hellman operations by
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+This
+.Nm
+format is used as the output from each pass.
+.Pp
+The file consists of newline-separated records, one per modulus,
+containing seven space-separated fields.
+These fields are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Description -offset indent
+.It timestamp
+The time that the modulus was last processed as YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.
+.It type
+Decimal number specifying the internal structure of the prime modulus.
+Supported types are:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width 0x00 -compact
+.It 0
+Unknown, not tested.
+.It 2
+"Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime.
+.It 4
+Sophie Germain; 2p+1 is also prime.
+.El
+.Pp
+Moduli candidates initially produced by
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+are Sophie Germain primes (type 4).
+Further primality testing with
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+produces safe prime moduli (type 2) that are ready for use in
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+Other types are not used by OpenSSH.
+.It tests
+Decimal number indicating the type of primality tests that the number
+has been subjected to represented as a bitmask of the following values:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width 0x00 -compact
+.It 0x00
+Not tested.
+.It 0x01
+Composite number \(en not prime.
+.It 0x02
+Sieve of Eratosthenes.
+.It 0x04
+Probabilistic Miller-Rabin primality tests.
+.El
+.Pp
+The
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+moduli candidate generation uses the Sieve of Eratosthenes (flag 0x02).
+Subsequent
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+primality tests are Miller-Rabin tests (flag 0x04).
+.It trials
+Decimal number indicating the number of primality trials
+that have been performed on the modulus.
+.It size
+Decimal number indicating the size of the prime in bits.
+.It generator
+The recommended generator for use with this modulus (hexadecimal).
+.It modulus
+The modulus itself in hexadecimal.
+.El
+.Pp
+When performing Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange,
+.Xr sshd 8
+first estimates the size of the modulus required to produce enough
+Diffie-Hellman output to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher.
+.Xr sshd 8
+then randomly selects a modulus from
+.Fa /etc/moduli
+that best meets the size requirement.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh STANDARDS
+.Rs
+.%A M. Friedl
+.%A N. Provos
+.%A W. Simpson
+.%D March 2006
+.%R RFC 4419
+.%T Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
+.Re
diff --git a/moduli.c b/moduli.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f660ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/moduli.c
@@ -0,0 +1,813 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.38 2022/05/01 23:20:30 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 1994 Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com>
+ * Copyright 1996-1998, 2003 William Allen Simpson <wsimpson@greendragon.com>
+ * Copyright 2000 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Two-step process to generate safe primes for DHGEX
+ *
+ *  Sieve candidates for "safe" primes,
+ *  suitable for use as Diffie-Hellman moduli;
+ *  that is, where q = (p-1)/2 is also prime.
+ *
+ * First step: generate candidate primes (memory intensive)
+ * Second step: test primes' safety (processor intensive)
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+/*
+ * File output defines
+ */
+
+/* need line long enough for largest moduli plus headers */
+#define QLINESIZE		(100+8192)
+
+/*
+ * Size: decimal.
+ * Specifies the number of the most significant bit (0 to M).
+ * WARNING: internally, usually 1 to N.
+ */
+#define QSIZE_MINIMUM		(511)
+
+/*
+ * Prime sieving defines
+ */
+
+/* Constant: assuming 8 bit bytes and 32 bit words */
+#define SHIFT_BIT	(3)
+#define SHIFT_BYTE	(2)
+#define SHIFT_WORD	(SHIFT_BIT+SHIFT_BYTE)
+#define SHIFT_MEGABYTE	(20)
+#define SHIFT_MEGAWORD	(SHIFT_MEGABYTE-SHIFT_BYTE)
+
+/*
+ * Using virtual memory can cause thrashing.  This should be the largest
+ * number that is supported without a large amount of disk activity --
+ * that would increase the run time from hours to days or weeks!
+ */
+#define LARGE_MINIMUM	(8UL)	/* megabytes */
+
+/*
+ * Do not increase this number beyond the unsigned integer bit size.
+ * Due to a multiple of 4, it must be LESS than 128 (yielding 2**30 bits).
+ */
+#define LARGE_MAXIMUM	(127UL)	/* megabytes */
+
+/*
+ * Constant: when used with 32-bit integers, the largest sieve prime
+ * has to be less than 2**32.
+ */
+#define SMALL_MAXIMUM	(0xffffffffUL)
+
+/* Constant: can sieve all primes less than 2**32, as 65537**2 > 2**32-1. */
+#define TINY_NUMBER	(1UL<<16)
+
+/* Ensure enough bit space for testing 2*q. */
+#define TEST_MAXIMUM	(1UL<<16)
+#define TEST_MINIMUM	(QSIZE_MINIMUM + 1)
+/* real TEST_MINIMUM	(1UL << (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER)) */
+#define TEST_POWER	(3)	/* 2**n, n < SHIFT_WORD */
+
+/* bit operations on 32-bit words */
+#define BIT_CLEAR(a,n)	((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] &= ~(1L << ((n) & 31)))
+#define BIT_SET(a,n)	((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] |= (1L << ((n) & 31)))
+#define BIT_TEST(a,n)	((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] & (1L << ((n) & 31)))
+
+/*
+ * Prime testing defines
+ */
+
+/* Minimum number of primality tests to perform */
+#define TRIAL_MINIMUM	(4)
+
+/*
+ * Sieving data (XXX - move to struct)
+ */
+
+/* sieve 2**16 */
+static u_int32_t *TinySieve, tinybits;
+
+/* sieve 2**30 in 2**16 parts */
+static u_int32_t *SmallSieve, smallbits, smallbase;
+
+/* sieve relative to the initial value */
+static u_int32_t *LargeSieve, largewords, largetries, largenumbers;
+static u_int32_t largebits, largememory;	/* megabytes */
+static BIGNUM *largebase;
+
+int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
+int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long,
+    unsigned long);
+
+/*
+ * print moduli out in consistent form,
+ */
+static int
+qfileout(FILE * ofile, u_int32_t otype, u_int32_t otests, u_int32_t otries,
+    u_int32_t osize, u_int32_t ogenerator, BIGNUM * omodulus)
+{
+	struct tm *gtm;
+	time_t time_now;
+	int res;
+
+	time(&time_now);
+	gtm = gmtime(&time_now);
+	if (gtm == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	res = fprintf(ofile, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d %u %u %u %u %x ",
+	    gtm->tm_year + 1900, gtm->tm_mon + 1, gtm->tm_mday,
+	    gtm->tm_hour, gtm->tm_min, gtm->tm_sec,
+	    otype, otests, otries, osize, ogenerator);
+
+	if (res < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if (BN_print_fp(ofile, omodulus) < 1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	res = fprintf(ofile, "\n");
+	fflush(ofile);
+
+	return (res > 0 ? 0 : -1);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ ** Sieve p's and q's with small factors
+ */
+static void
+sieve_large(u_int32_t s32)
+{
+	u_int64_t r, u, s = s32;
+
+	debug3("sieve_large %u", s32);
+	largetries++;
+	/* r = largebase mod s */
+	r = BN_mod_word(largebase, s32);
+	if (r == 0)
+		u = 0; /* s divides into largebase exactly */
+	else
+		u = s - r; /* largebase+u is first entry divisible by s */
+
+	if (u < largebits * 2ULL) {
+		/*
+		 * The sieve omits p's and q's divisible by 2, so ensure that
+		 * largebase+u is odd. Then, step through the sieve in
+		 * increments of 2*s
+		 */
+		if (u & 0x1)
+			u += s; /* Make largebase+u odd, and u even */
+
+		/* Mark all multiples of 2*s */
+		for (u /= 2; u < largebits; u += s)
+			BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u);
+	}
+
+	/* r = p mod s */
+	r = (2 * r + 1) % s;
+	if (r == 0)
+		u = 0; /* s divides p exactly */
+	else
+		u = s - r; /* p+u is first entry divisible by s */
+
+	if (u < largebits * 4ULL) {
+		/*
+		 * The sieve omits p's divisible by 4, so ensure that
+		 * largebase+u is not. Then, step through the sieve in
+		 * increments of 4*s
+		 */
+		while (u & 0x3) {
+			if (SMALL_MAXIMUM - u < s)
+				return;
+			u += s;
+		}
+
+		/* Mark all multiples of 4*s */
+		for (u /= 4; u < largebits; u += s)
+			BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * list candidates for Sophie-Germain primes (where q = (p-1)/2)
+ * to standard output.
+ * The list is checked against small known primes (less than 2**30).
+ */
+int
+gen_candidates(FILE *out, u_int32_t memory, u_int32_t power, BIGNUM *start)
+{
+	BIGNUM *q;
+	u_int32_t j, r, s, t;
+	u_int32_t smallwords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6;
+	u_int32_t tinywords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6;
+	time_t time_start, time_stop;
+	u_int32_t i;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	largememory = memory;
+
+	if (memory != 0 &&
+	    (memory < LARGE_MINIMUM || memory > LARGE_MAXIMUM)) {
+		error("Invalid memory amount (min %ld, max %ld)",
+		    LARGE_MINIMUM, LARGE_MAXIMUM);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Set power to the length in bits of the prime to be generated.
+	 * This is changed to 1 less than the desired safe prime moduli p.
+	 */
+	if (power > TEST_MAXIMUM) {
+		error("Too many bits: %u > %lu", power, TEST_MAXIMUM);
+		return (-1);
+	} else if (power < TEST_MINIMUM) {
+		error("Too few bits: %u < %u", power, TEST_MINIMUM);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	power--; /* decrement before squaring */
+
+	/*
+	 * The density of ordinary primes is on the order of 1/bits, so the
+	 * density of safe primes should be about (1/bits)**2. Set test range
+	 * to something well above bits**2 to be reasonably sure (but not
+	 * guaranteed) of catching at least one safe prime.
+	 */
+	largewords = ((power * power) >> (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER));
+
+	/*
+	 * Need idea of how much memory is available. We don't have to use all
+	 * of it.
+	 */
+	if (largememory > LARGE_MAXIMUM) {
+		logit("Limited memory: %u MB; limit %lu MB",
+		    largememory, LARGE_MAXIMUM);
+		largememory = LARGE_MAXIMUM;
+	}
+
+	if (largewords <= (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD)) {
+		logit("Increased memory: %u MB; need %u bytes",
+		    largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE));
+		largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD);
+	} else if (largememory > 0) {
+		logit("Decreased memory: %u MB; want %u bytes",
+		    largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE));
+		largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD);
+	}
+
+	TinySieve = xcalloc(tinywords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
+	tinybits = tinywords << SHIFT_WORD;
+
+	SmallSieve = xcalloc(smallwords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
+	smallbits = smallwords << SHIFT_WORD;
+
+	/*
+	 * dynamically determine available memory
+	 */
+	while ((LargeSieve = calloc(largewords, sizeof(u_int32_t))) == NULL)
+		largewords -= (1L << (SHIFT_MEGAWORD - 2)); /* 1/4 MB chunks */
+
+	largebits = largewords << SHIFT_WORD;
+	largenumbers = largebits * 2;	/* even numbers excluded */
+
+	/* validation check: count the number of primes tried */
+	largetries = 0;
+	if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("BN_new failed");
+
+	/*
+	 * Generate random starting point for subprime search, or use
+	 * specified parameter.
+	 */
+	if ((largebase = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("BN_new failed");
+	if (start == NULL) {
+		if (BN_rand(largebase, power, 1, 1) == 0)
+			fatal("BN_rand failed");
+	} else {
+		if (BN_copy(largebase, start) == NULL)
+			fatal("BN_copy: failed");
+	}
+
+	/* ensure odd */
+	if (BN_set_bit(largebase, 0) == 0)
+		fatal("BN_set_bit: failed");
+
+	time(&time_start);
+
+	logit("%.24s Sieve next %u plus %u-bit", ctime(&time_start),
+	    largenumbers, power);
+	debug2("start point: 0x%s", BN_bn2hex(largebase));
+
+	/*
+	 * TinySieve
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) {
+		if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i))
+			continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */
+
+		/* The next tiny prime */
+		t = 2 * i + 3;
+
+		/* Mark all multiples of t */
+		for (j = i + t; j < tinybits; j += t)
+			BIT_SET(TinySieve, j);
+
+		sieve_large(t);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Start the small block search at the next possible prime. To avoid
+	 * fencepost errors, the last pass is skipped.
+	 */
+	for (smallbase = TINY_NUMBER + 3;
+	    smallbase < (SMALL_MAXIMUM - TINY_NUMBER);
+	    smallbase += TINY_NUMBER) {
+		for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) {
+			if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i))
+				continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */
+
+			/* The next tiny prime */
+			t = 2 * i + 3;
+			r = smallbase % t;
+
+			if (r == 0) {
+				s = 0; /* t divides into smallbase exactly */
+			} else {
+				/* smallbase+s is first entry divisible by t */
+				s = t - r;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * The sieve omits even numbers, so ensure that
+			 * smallbase+s is odd. Then, step through the sieve
+			 * in increments of 2*t
+			 */
+			if (s & 1)
+				s += t; /* Make smallbase+s odd, and s even */
+
+			/* Mark all multiples of 2*t */
+			for (s /= 2; s < smallbits; s += t)
+				BIT_SET(SmallSieve, s);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * SmallSieve
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < smallbits; i++) {
+			if (BIT_TEST(SmallSieve, i))
+				continue; /* 2*i+smallbase is composite */
+
+			/* The next small prime */
+			sieve_large((2 * i) + smallbase);
+		}
+
+		memset(SmallSieve, 0, smallwords << SHIFT_BYTE);
+	}
+
+	time(&time_stop);
+
+	logit("%.24s Sieved with %u small primes in %lld seconds",
+	    ctime(&time_stop), largetries, (long long)(time_stop - time_start));
+
+	for (j = r = 0; j < largebits; j++) {
+		if (BIT_TEST(LargeSieve, j))
+			continue; /* Definitely composite, skip */
+
+		debug2("test q = largebase+%u", 2 * j);
+		if (BN_set_word(q, 2 * j) == 0)
+			fatal("BN_set_word failed");
+		if (BN_add(q, q, largebase) == 0)
+			fatal("BN_add failed");
+		if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN,
+		    MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE, largetries,
+		    (power - 1) /* MSB */, (0), q) == -1) {
+			ret = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		r++; /* count q */
+	}
+
+	time(&time_stop);
+
+	free(LargeSieve);
+	free(SmallSieve);
+	free(TinySieve);
+
+	logit("%.24s Found %u candidates", ctime(&time_stop), r);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static void
+write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t lineno)
+{
+	FILE *fp;
+	char tmp[PATH_MAX];
+	int r;
+
+	r = snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%s.XXXXXXXXXX", cpfile);
+	if (r < 0 || r >= PATH_MAX) {
+		logit("write_checkpoint: temp pathname too long");
+		return;
+	}
+	if ((r = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1) {
+		logit("mkstemp(%s): %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+	if ((fp = fdopen(r, "w")) == NULL) {
+		logit("write_checkpoint: fdopen: %s", strerror(errno));
+		unlink(tmp);
+		close(r);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (fprintf(fp, "%lu\n", (unsigned long)lineno) > 0 && fclose(fp) == 0
+	    && rename(tmp, cpfile) == 0)
+		debug3("wrote checkpoint line %lu to '%s'",
+		    (unsigned long)lineno, cpfile);
+	else
+		logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile,
+		    strerror(errno));
+}
+
+static unsigned long
+read_checkpoint(char *cpfile)
+{
+	FILE *fp;
+	unsigned long lineno = 0;
+
+	if ((fp = fopen(cpfile, "r")) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (fscanf(fp, "%lu\n", &lineno) < 1)
+		logit("Failed to load checkpoint from '%s'", cpfile);
+	else
+		logit("Loaded checkpoint from '%s' line %lu", cpfile, lineno);
+	fclose(fp);
+	return lineno;
+}
+
+static unsigned long
+count_lines(FILE *f)
+{
+	unsigned long count = 0;
+	char lp[QLINESIZE + 1];
+
+	if (fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET) != 0) {
+		debug("input file is not seekable");
+		return ULONG_MAX;
+	}
+	while (fgets(lp, QLINESIZE + 1, f) != NULL)
+		count++;
+	rewind(f);
+	debug("input file has %lu lines", count);
+	return count;
+}
+
+static char *
+fmt_time(time_t seconds)
+{
+	int day, hr, min;
+	static char buf[128];
+
+	min = (seconds / 60) % 60;
+	hr = (seconds / 60 / 60) % 24;
+	day = seconds / 60 / 60 / 24;
+	if (day > 0)
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%dd %d:%02d", day, hr, min);
+	else
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%d:%02d", hr, min);
+	return buf;
+}
+
+static void
+print_progress(unsigned long start_lineno, unsigned long current_lineno,
+    unsigned long end_lineno)
+{
+	static time_t time_start, time_prev;
+	time_t time_now, elapsed;
+	unsigned long num_to_process, processed, remaining, percent, eta;
+	double time_per_line;
+	char *eta_str;
+
+	time_now = monotime();
+	if (time_start == 0) {
+		time_start = time_prev = time_now;
+		return;
+	}
+	/* print progress after 1m then once per 5m */
+	if (time_now - time_prev < 5 * 60)
+		return;
+	time_prev = time_now;
+	elapsed = time_now - time_start;
+	processed = current_lineno - start_lineno;
+	remaining = end_lineno - current_lineno;
+	num_to_process = end_lineno - start_lineno;
+	time_per_line = (double)elapsed / processed;
+	/* if we don't know how many we're processing just report count+time */
+	time(&time_now);
+	if (end_lineno == ULONG_MAX) {
+		logit("%.24s processed %lu in %s", ctime(&time_now),
+		    processed, fmt_time(elapsed));
+		return;
+	}
+	percent = 100 * processed / num_to_process;
+	eta = time_per_line * remaining;
+	eta_str = xstrdup(fmt_time(eta));
+	logit("%.24s processed %lu of %lu (%lu%%) in %s, ETA %s",
+	    ctime(&time_now), processed, num_to_process, percent,
+	    fmt_time(elapsed), eta_str);
+	free(eta_str);
+}
+
+/*
+ * perform a Miller-Rabin primality test
+ * on the list of candidates
+ * (checking both q and p)
+ * The result is a list of so-call "safe" primes
+ */
+int
+prime_test(FILE *in, FILE *out, u_int32_t trials, u_int32_t generator_wanted,
+    char *checkpoint_file, unsigned long start_lineno, unsigned long num_lines)
+{
+	BIGNUM *q, *p, *a;
+	char *cp, *lp;
+	u_int32_t count_in = 0, count_out = 0, count_possible = 0;
+	u_int32_t generator_known, in_tests, in_tries, in_type, in_size;
+	unsigned long last_processed = 0, end_lineno;
+	time_t time_start, time_stop;
+	int res, is_prime;
+
+	if (trials < TRIAL_MINIMUM) {
+		error("Minimum primality trials is %d", TRIAL_MINIMUM);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	if (num_lines == 0)
+		end_lineno = count_lines(in);
+	else
+		end_lineno = start_lineno + num_lines;
+
+	time(&time_start);
+
+	if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("BN_new failed");
+	if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("BN_new failed");
+
+	debug2("%.24s Final %u Miller-Rabin trials (%x generator)",
+	    ctime(&time_start), trials, generator_wanted);
+
+	if (checkpoint_file != NULL)
+		last_processed = read_checkpoint(checkpoint_file);
+	last_processed = start_lineno = MAXIMUM(last_processed, start_lineno);
+	if (end_lineno == ULONG_MAX)
+		debug("process from line %lu from pipe", last_processed);
+	else
+		debug("process from line %lu to line %lu", last_processed,
+		    end_lineno);
+
+	res = 0;
+	lp = xmalloc(QLINESIZE + 1);
+	while (fgets(lp, QLINESIZE + 1, in) != NULL && count_in < end_lineno) {
+		count_in++;
+		if (count_in <= last_processed) {
+			debug3("skipping line %u, before checkpoint or "
+			    "specified start line", count_in);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (checkpoint_file != NULL)
+			write_checkpoint(checkpoint_file, count_in);
+		print_progress(start_lineno, count_in, end_lineno);
+		if (strlen(lp) < 14 || *lp == '!' || *lp == '#') {
+			debug2("%10u: comment or short line", count_in);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* XXX - fragile parser */
+		/* time */
+		cp = &lp[14];	/* (skip) */
+
+		/* type */
+		in_type = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
+
+		/* tests */
+		in_tests = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
+
+		if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE) {
+			debug2("%10u: known composite", count_in);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* tries */
+		in_tries = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
+
+		/* size (most significant bit) */
+		in_size = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
+
+		/* generator (hex) */
+		generator_known = strtoul(cp, &cp, 16);
+
+		/* Skip white space */
+		cp += strspn(cp, " ");
+
+		/* modulus (hex) */
+		switch (in_type) {
+		case MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN:
+			debug2("%10u: (%u) Sophie-Germain", count_in, in_type);
+			a = q;
+			if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0)
+				fatal("BN_hex2bn failed");
+			/* p = 2*q + 1 */
+			if (BN_lshift(p, q, 1) == 0)
+				fatal("BN_lshift failed");
+			if (BN_add_word(p, 1) == 0)
+				fatal("BN_add_word failed");
+			in_size += 1;
+			generator_known = 0;
+			break;
+		case MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED:
+		case MODULI_TYPE_SAFE:
+		case MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR:
+		case MODULI_TYPE_STRONG:
+		case MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN:
+			debug2("%10u: (%u)", count_in, in_type);
+			a = p;
+			if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0)
+				fatal("BN_hex2bn failed");
+			/* q = (p-1) / 2 */
+			if (BN_rshift(q, p, 1) == 0)
+				fatal("BN_rshift failed");
+			break;
+		default:
+			debug2("Unknown prime type");
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * due to earlier inconsistencies in interpretation, check
+		 * the proposed bit size.
+		 */
+		if ((u_int32_t)BN_num_bits(p) != (in_size + 1)) {
+			debug2("%10u: bit size %u mismatch", count_in, in_size);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (in_size < QSIZE_MINIMUM) {
+			debug2("%10u: bit size %u too short", count_in, in_size);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN)
+			in_tries += trials;
+		else
+			in_tries = trials;
+
+		/*
+		 * guess unknown generator
+		 */
+		if (generator_known == 0) {
+			if (BN_mod_word(p, 24) == 11)
+				generator_known = 2;
+			else {
+				u_int32_t r = BN_mod_word(p, 10);
+
+				if (r == 3 || r == 7)
+					generator_known = 5;
+			}
+		}
+		/*
+		 * skip tests when desired generator doesn't match
+		 */
+		if (generator_wanted > 0 &&
+		    generator_wanted != generator_known) {
+			debug2("%10u: generator %d != %d",
+			    count_in, generator_known, generator_wanted);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Primes with no known generator are useless for DH, so
+		 * skip those.
+		 */
+		if (generator_known == 0) {
+			debug2("%10u: no known generator", count_in);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		count_possible++;
+
+		/*
+		 * The (1/4)^N performance bound on Miller-Rabin is
+		 * extremely pessimistic, so don't spend a lot of time
+		 * really verifying that q is prime until after we know
+		 * that p is also prime. A single pass will weed out the
+		 * vast majority of composite q's.
+		 */
+		is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(q, 1, NULL, NULL);
+		if (is_prime < 0)
+			fatal("BN_is_prime_ex failed");
+		if (is_prime == 0) {
+			debug("%10u: q failed first possible prime test",
+			    count_in);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * q is possibly prime, so go ahead and really make sure
+		 * that p is prime. If it is, then we can go back and do
+		 * the same for q. If p is composite, chances are that
+		 * will show up on the first Rabin-Miller iteration so it
+		 * doesn't hurt to specify a high iteration count.
+		 */
+		is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(p, trials, NULL, NULL);
+		if (is_prime < 0)
+			fatal("BN_is_prime_ex failed");
+		if (is_prime == 0) {
+			debug("%10u: p is not prime", count_in);
+			continue;
+		}
+		debug("%10u: p is almost certainly prime", count_in);
+
+		/* recheck q more rigorously */
+		is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(q, trials - 1, NULL, NULL);
+		if (is_prime < 0)
+			fatal("BN_is_prime_ex failed");
+		if (is_prime == 0) {
+			debug("%10u: q is not prime", count_in);
+			continue;
+		}
+		debug("%10u: q is almost certainly prime", count_in);
+
+		if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SAFE,
+		    in_tests | MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN,
+		    in_tries, in_size, generator_known, p)) {
+			res = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		count_out++;
+	}
+
+	time(&time_stop);
+	free(lp);
+	BN_free(p);
+	BN_free(q);
+
+	if (checkpoint_file != NULL)
+		unlink(checkpoint_file);
+
+	logit("%.24s Found %u safe primes of %u candidates in %ld seconds",
+	    ctime(&time_stop), count_out, count_possible,
+	    (long) (time_stop - time_start));
+
+	return (res);
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..91e0e62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1955 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.234 2022/06/15 16:08:25 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+#  include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "sshlogin.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
+#endif
+
+/* Imports */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
+extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
+
+/* State exported from the child */
+static struct sshbuf *child_state;
+
+/* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
+
+int mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_term(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_rsa_response(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_sesskey(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_sessid(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+int mm_answer_pam_start(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pam_account(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pam_query(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pam_respond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+int mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+int mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+#endif
+
+static Authctxt *authctxt;
+
+/* local state for key verify */
+static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
+static size_t key_bloblen = 0;
+static u_int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+static struct sshauthopt *key_opts = NULL;
+static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
+static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
+static char *auth_method = "unknown";
+static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
+static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
+static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
+static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
+
+struct mon_table {
+	enum monitor_reqtype type;
+	int flags;
+	int (*f)(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+};
+
+#define MON_ISAUTH	0x0004	/* Required for Authentication */
+#define MON_AUTHDECIDE	0x0008	/* Decides Authentication */
+#define MON_ONCE	0x0010	/* Disable after calling */
+#define MON_ALOG	0x0020	/* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
+
+#define MON_AUTH	(MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
+
+#define MON_PERMIT	0x1000	/* Request is permitted */
+
+static int monitor_read(struct ssh *, struct monitor *, struct mon_table *,
+    struct mon_table **);
+static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+    {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
+#endif
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 0, mm_answer_pam_query},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_respond},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
+#endif
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+#endif
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
+#endif
+    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
+#endif
+    {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+    {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
+#endif
+    {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
+#endif
+    {0, 0, NULL}
+};
+
+struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
+
+/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
+static void
+monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
+{
+	while (ent->f != NULL) {
+		if (ent->type == type) {
+			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
+			return;
+		}
+		ent++;
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
+{
+	struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
+
+	while (ent->f != NULL) {
+		if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
+			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+			ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
+		}
+		ent++;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+	struct mon_table *ent;
+	int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
+
+	debug3("preauth child monitor started");
+
+	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
+		close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+	if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
+		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
+	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+
+	authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
+	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
+
+	authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg;
+
+	mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
+	/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+
+	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
+	while (!authenticated) {
+		partial = 0;
+		auth_method = "unknown";
+		auth_submethod = NULL;
+		auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt);
+
+		authenticated = (monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor,
+		    mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
+
+		/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
+		if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
+			if (authenticated &&
+			    !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
+			    auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
+				debug3_f("method %s: partial", auth_method);
+				authenticated = 0;
+				partial = 1;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (authenticated) {
+			if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
+				fatal_f("unexpected authentication from %d",
+				    ent->type);
+			if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
+			    !auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method))
+				authenticated = 0;
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+			/* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */
+			if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
+				struct sshbuf *m;
+
+				if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+					fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed",
+					    __func__);
+				mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
+				    MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
+				authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(
+				    ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
+				sshbuf_free(m);
+			}
+#endif
+		}
+		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
+			auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
+			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
+			if (!partial && !authenticated)
+				authctxt->failures++;
+			if (authenticated || partial) {
+				auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
+				    auth_method, auth_submethod);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!authctxt->valid)
+		fatal_f("authenticated invalid user");
+	if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
+		fatal_f("authentication method name unknown");
+
+	debug_f("user %s authenticated by privileged process", authctxt->user);
+	ssh->authctxt = NULL;
+	ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
+
+	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+
+	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+		;
+
+	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
+		close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+	if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
+		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
+	pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
+{
+	monitor_child_pid = pid;
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_child_handler(int sig)
+{
+	kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
+}
+
+void
+monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
+	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
+
+	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
+	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+	ssh_signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
+#ifdef SIGXFSZ
+	ssh_signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
+#endif
+
+	mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
+
+	/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
+
+	if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
+	}
+
+	for (;;)
+		monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
+}
+
+static int
+monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *logmsg;
+	u_int len, level, forced;
+	char *msg;
+	u_char *p;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((logmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+
+	/* Read length */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, 4, &p)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "reserve len");
+	if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, 4) != 4) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE) {
+			sshbuf_free(logmsg);
+			debug_f("child log fd closed");
+			close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
+			pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
+			return -1;
+		}
+		fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse len");
+	if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
+		fatal_f("invalid log message length %u", len);
+
+	/* Read severity, message */
+	sshbuf_reset(logmsg);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, len, &p)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "reserve msg");
+	if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, len) != len)
+		fatal_f("log fd read: %s", strerror(errno));
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &level)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &forced)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	/* Log it */
+	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
+	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
+
+	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
+	free(msg);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
+    struct mon_table **pent)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	int r, ret;
+	u_char type;
+	struct pollfd pfd[2];
+
+	for (;;) {
+		memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
+		pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
+		pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
+		pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
+		pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
+		if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
+			if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
+				continue;
+			fatal_f("poll: %s", strerror(errno));
+		}
+		if (pfd[1].revents) {
+			/*
+			 * Drain all log messages before processing next
+			 * monitor request.
+			 */
+			monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (pfd[0].revents)
+			break;  /* Continues below */
+	}
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+
+	mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &type)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
+
+	debug3_f("checking request %d", type);
+
+	while (ent->f != NULL) {
+		if (ent->type == type)
+			break;
+		ent++;
+	}
+
+	if (ent->f != NULL) {
+		if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
+			fatal_f("unpermitted request %d", type);
+		ret = (*ent->f)(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
+		sshbuf_free(m);
+
+		/* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
+		if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
+			debug2_f("%d used once, disabling now", type);
+			ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
+		}
+
+		if (pent != NULL)
+			*pent = ent;
+
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	fatal_f("unsupported request: %d", type);
+
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+/* allowed key state */
+static int
+monitor_allowed_key(const u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
+{
+	/* make sure key is allowed */
+	if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
+	    timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
+		return (0);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static void
+monitor_reset_key_state(void)
+{
+	/* reset state */
+	free(key_blob);
+	free(hostbased_cuser);
+	free(hostbased_chost);
+	sshauthopt_free(key_opts);
+	key_blob = NULL;
+	key_bloblen = 0;
+	key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
+	key_opts = NULL;
+	hostbased_cuser = NULL;
+	hostbased_chost = NULL;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+int
+mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	DH *dh;
+	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
+	int r;
+	u_int min, want, max;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &want)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &max)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug3_f("got parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
+	/* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
+	if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
+		fatal_f("bad parameters: %d %d %d", min, want, max);
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+
+	dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
+	if (dh == NULL) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "assemble empty");
+		return (0);
+	} else {
+		/* Send first bignum */
+		DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_p)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_g)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+
+		DH_free(dh);
+	}
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	extern int auth_sock;			/* XXX move to state struct? */
+	struct sshkey *key;
+	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
+	u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+	char *alg = NULL;
+	size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
+	int r, is_proof = 0;
+	u_int keyid, compat;
+	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &compat)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	if (keyid > INT_MAX)
+		fatal_f("invalid key ID");
+
+	/*
+	 * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
+	 * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
+	 *
+	 * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
+	 * proof.
+	 *
+	 * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
+	 * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
+	 * than the full kex structure...
+	 */
+	if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
+		/*
+		 * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
+		 * the client sent us.
+		 */
+		if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
+			fatal_f("bad data length: %zu", datlen);
+		if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("no hostkey for index %d", keyid);
+		if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
+		    session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "assemble private key proof");
+		if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
+		    memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
+			fatal_f("bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
+			    datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
+		sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+		is_proof = 1;
+	}
+
+	/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
+	if (session_id2_len == 0) {
+		session_id2_len = datlen;
+		session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
+		memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
+	}
+
+	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
+		    options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "sign");
+	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
+	    auth_sock > 0) {
+		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
+		    p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
+	} else
+		fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
+
+	debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
+	    is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+
+	free(alg);
+	free(p);
+	free(signature);
+
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
+
+	/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+#define PUTPW(b, id) \
+	do { \
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, \
+		    &pwent->id, sizeof(pwent->id))) != 0) \
+			fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #id); \
+	} while (0)
+
+/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
+int
+mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	struct passwd *pwent;
+	int r, allowed = 0;
+	u_int i;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
+		fatal_f("multiple attempts for getpwnam");
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->user, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, authctxt->user);
+
+	setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? authctxt->user : "unknown");
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+
+	if (pwent == NULL) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "assemble fakepw");
+		authctxt->pw = fakepw();
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	allowed = 1;
+	authctxt->pw = pwent;
+	authctxt->valid = 1;
+
+	/* XXX send fake class/dir/shell, etc. */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble ok");
+	PUTPW(m, pw_uid);
+	PUTPW(m, pw_gid);
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE
+	PUTPW(m, pw_change);
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
+	PUTPW(m, pw_expire);
+#endif
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "*")) != 0 ||
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos)) != 0 ||
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class)) != 0 ||
+#endif
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble pw");
+
+ out:
+	ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
+	    authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble options");
+
+#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
+		if (options.x != NULL && \
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \
+			fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
+	} while (0)
+#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
+		for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \
+				fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s", #x); \
+		} \
+	} while (0)
+	/* See comment in servconf.h */
+	COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
+#undef M_CP_STROPT
+#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
+
+	/* Create valid auth method lists */
+	if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
+		 * run to its packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
+		 * authentication to succeed.
+		 */
+		debug_f("no valid authentication method lists");
+	}
+
+	debug3_f("sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", allowed);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
+
+	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam)
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
+#endif
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	char *banner;
+	int r;
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	banner = auth2_read_banner();
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "")) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
+	free(banner);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->service, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	debug3_f("service=%s, style=%s", authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
+
+	if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
+		free(authctxt->style);
+		authctxt->style = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check that the key type appears in the supplied pattern list, ignoring
+ * mismatches in the signature algorithm. (Signature algorithm checks are
+ * performed in the unprivileged authentication code).
+ * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key,
+    const char *list)
+{
+	char *s, *l, *ol = xstrdup(list);
+	int found = 0;
+
+	l = ol;
+	for ((s = strsep(&l, ",")); s && *s != '\0'; (s = strsep(&l, ","))) {
+		if (sshkey_type_from_name(s) == key->type) {
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!found) {
+		error("%s key type %s is not in permitted list %s", method,
+		    sshkey_ssh_name(key), list);
+	}
+
+	free(ol);
+	return found;
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	static int call_count;
+	char *passwd;
+	int r, authenticated;
+	size_t plen;
+
+	if (!options.password_authentication)
+		fatal_f("password authentication not enabled");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &passwd, &plen)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
+	authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
+	    auth_password(ssh, passwd);
+	freezero(passwd, plen);
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble PAM");
+#endif
+
+	debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
+	debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
+
+	call_count++;
+	if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
+		auth_method = "none";
+	else
+		auth_method = "password";
+
+	/* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+
+#ifdef BSD_AUTH
+int
+mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	char *name, *infotxt;
+	u_int numprompts, *echo_on, success;
+	char **prompts;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
+		fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
+	success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
+	    &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, success)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+	if (success) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[0])) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "assemble prompt");
+	}
+
+	debug3_f("sending challenge success: %u", success);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
+
+	if (success) {
+		free(name);
+		free(infotxt);
+		free(prompts);
+		free(echo_on);
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	char *response;
+	int r, authok;
+
+	if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
+		fatal_f("kbd-int authentication not enabled");
+	if (authctxt->as == NULL)
+		fatal_f("no bsd auth session");
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &response, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	authok = options.kbd_interactive_authentication &&
+	    auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
+	authctxt->as = NULL;
+	debug3_f("<%s> = <%d>", response, authok);
+	free(response);
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authok)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+
+	debug3_f("sending authenticated: %d", authok);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
+
+	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+	auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
+
+	return (authok != 0);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+int
+mm_answer_pam_start(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+
+	start_pam(ssh);
+
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1);
+	if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_account(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	u_int ret;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		fatal("%s: PAM not enabled", __func__);
+
+	ret = do_pam_account();
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok;
+extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	u_int ok = 0;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
+		fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
+	if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL)
+		fatal("%s: already called", __func__);
+	sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
+	sshpam_authok = NULL;
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 1);
+		ok = 1;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_query(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL;
+	u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0;
+	int r, ret;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	sshpam_authok = NULL;
+	if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
+	ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info,
+	    &num, &prompts, &echo_on);
+	if (ret == 0 && num == 0)
+		sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
+	if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL)
+		fatal("sshpam_device.query failed");
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, 1);
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, info)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, num)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	free(name);
+	free(info);
+	for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[i])) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, echo_on[i])) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		free(prompts[i]);
+	}
+	free(prompts);
+	free(echo_on);
+	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+	auth_submethod = "pam";
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_respond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	char **resp;
+	u_int i, num;
+	int r, ret;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
+	sshpam_authok = NULL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &num)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	if (num > 0) {
+		resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *));
+		for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &(resp[i]), NULL)) != 0)
+				fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		}
+		ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
+		for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
+			free(resp[i]);
+		free(resp);
+	} else {
+		ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL);
+	}
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
+	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+	auth_submethod = "pam";
+	if (ret == 0)
+		sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
+	(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
+	sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL;
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
+	/* Allow another attempt */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1);
+	auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
+	auth_submethod = "pam";
+	return r;
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	char *cuser, *chost;
+	u_int pubkey_auth_attempt;
+	u_int type = 0;
+	int r, allowed = 0;
+	struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_froms(m, &key)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
+		/* These should not make it past the privsep child */
+		if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
+		    (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
+			fatal_f("passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key");
+
+		switch (type) {
+		case MM_USERKEY:
+			auth_method = "publickey";
+			if (!options.pubkey_authentication)
+				break;
+			if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
+				break;
+			if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
+			    options.pubkey_accepted_algos))
+				break;
+			allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key,
+			    pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts);
+			break;
+		case MM_HOSTKEY:
+			auth_method = "hostbased";
+			if (!options.hostbased_authentication)
+				break;
+			if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
+				break;
+			if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
+			    options.hostbased_accepted_algos))
+				break;
+			allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw,
+			    cuser, chost, key);
+			auth2_record_info(authctxt,
+			    "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
+			    cuser, chost);
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal_f("unknown key type %u", type);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	debug3_f("%s authentication%s: %s key is %s", auth_method,
+	    pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test",
+	    (key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key),
+	    allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
+
+	auth2_record_key(authctxt, 0, key);
+
+	/* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
+	monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+	if (allowed) {
+		/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
+		if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &key_blob, &key_bloblen)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_to_blob");
+		key_blobtype = type;
+		key_opts = opts;
+		hostbased_cuser = cuser;
+		hostbased_chost = chost;
+	} else {
+		/* Log failed attempt */
+		auth_log(ssh, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
+		free(cuser);
+		free(chost);
+	}
+	sshkey_free(key);
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, allowed)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+	if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "sshauthopt_serialise");
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
+
+	if (!allowed)
+		sshauthopt_free(opts);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
+	const u_char *p;
+	char *userstyle, *cp;
+	size_t len;
+	u_char type;
+	int hostbound = 0, r, fail = 0;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_from");
+
+	if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+		p = sshbuf_ptr(b);
+		len = sshbuf_len(b);
+		if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
+		    (len < session_id2_len) ||
+		    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
+			fail++;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, session_id2_len)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "consume");
+	} else {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
+		if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
+		    (len != session_id2_len) ||
+		    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
+			fail++;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
+	if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+		fail++;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
+	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+	if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
+		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
+		    "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
+		fail++;
+	}
+	free(userstyle);
+	free(cp);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 ||	/* service */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
+	if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0) {
+		if (strcmp("publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com", cp) == 0)
+			hostbound = 1;
+		else
+			fail++;
+	}
+	free(cp);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse pktype");
+	if (type == 0)
+		fail++;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 ||	/* pkalg */
+	    (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 ||	/* pkblob */
+	    (hostbound && (r = sshkey_froms(b, &hostkey)) != 0))
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
+	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	if (hostkey != NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * Ensure this is actually one of our hostkeys; unfortunately
+		 * can't check ssh->kex->initial_hostkey directly at this point
+		 * as packet state has not yet been exported to monitor.
+		 */
+		if (get_hostkey_index(hostkey, 1, ssh) == -1)
+			fatal_f("hostbound hostkey does not match");
+		sshkey_free(hostkey);
+	}
+	return (fail == 0);
+}
+
+static int
+monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
+    const char *cuser, const char *chost)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	const u_char *p;
+	char *cp, *userstyle;
+	size_t len;
+	int r, fail = 0;
+	u_char type;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse sessionid");
+
+	if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
+	    (len != session_id2_len) ||
+	    (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
+		fail++;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
+	if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+		fail++;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
+	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
+	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
+	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
+	if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
+		logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
+		    "expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
+		fail++;
+	}
+	free(userstyle);
+	free(cp);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 ||	/* service */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
+	if (strcmp(cp, "hostbased") != 0)
+		fail++;
+	free(cp);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 ||	/* pkalg */
+	    (r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0)	/* pkblob */
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
+
+	/* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse host");
+	if (((len = strlen(cp)) > 0) && cp[len - 1] == '.')
+		cp[len - 1] = '\0';
+	if (strcmp(cp, chost) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	free(cp);
+
+	/* verify client user */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse ruser");
+	if (strcmp(cp, cuser) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	free(cp);
+
+	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return (fail == 0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	struct sshkey *key;
+	const u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
+	char *sigalg = NULL, *fp = NULL;
+	size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
+	int r, ret, req_presence = 0, req_verify = 0, valid_data = 0;
+	int encoded_ret;
+	struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
+	  !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
+		fatal_f("bad key, not previously allowed");
+
+	/* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */
+	if (*sigalg == '\0') {
+		free(sigalg);
+		sigalg = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */
+	if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse key");
+
+	switch (key_blobtype) {
+	case MM_USERKEY:
+		valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(ssh, data, datalen);
+		auth_method = "publickey";
+		break;
+	case MM_HOSTKEY:
+		valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
+		    hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
+		auth_method = "hostbased";
+		break;
+	default:
+		valid_data = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (!valid_data)
+		fatal_f("bad %s signature data blob",
+		    key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "userkey" :
+		    (key_blobtype == MM_HOSTKEY ? "hostkey" : "unknown"));
+
+	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+
+	ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
+	    sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
+	debug3_f("%s %s signature using %s %s%s%s", auth_method,
+	    sshkey_type(key), sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg,
+	    (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
+	    (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
+
+	if (ret == 0 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY && sig_details != NULL) {
+		req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
+		    PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) ||
+		    !key_opts->no_require_user_presence;
+		if (req_presence &&
+		    (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) {
+			error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
+			    "port %d rejected: user presence "
+			    "(authenticator touch) requirement not met ",
+			    sshkey_type(key), fp,
+			    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+			    authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+			    ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		}
+		req_verify = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
+		    PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED) || key_opts->require_verify;
+		if (req_verify &&
+		    (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD) == 0) {
+			error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
+			    "port %d rejected: user verification requirement "
+			    "not met ", sshkey_type(key), fp,
+			    authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+			    authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+			    ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		}
+	}
+	auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key);
+
+	if (key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
+		auth_activate_options(ssh, key_opts);
+	monitor_reset_key_state();
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+
+	/* encode ret != 0 as positive integer, since we're sending u32 */
+	encoded_ret = (ret != 0);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details != NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+	if (sig_details != NULL) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sig_details->sk_counter)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details->sk_flags)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "assemble sk");
+	}
+	sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
+
+	free(sigalg);
+	free(fp);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+
+	return ret == 0;
+}
+
+static void
+mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	socklen_t fromlen;
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+
+	/*
+	 * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
+	 * the address be 0.0.0.0.
+	 */
+	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
+		if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+		    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
+			debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+	}
+	/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
+	record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
+	    session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
+	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
+}
+
+static void
+mm_session_close(Session *s)
+{
+	debug3_f("session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid);
+	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+		debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ptyfd);
+		session_pty_cleanup2(s);
+	}
+	session_unused(s->self);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+	Session *s;
+	int r, res, fd0;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	s = session_new();
+	if (s == NULL)
+		goto error;
+	s->authctxt = authctxt;
+	s->pw = authctxt->pw;
+	s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
+	res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
+	if (res == 0)
+		goto error;
+	pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+
+	/* We need to trick ttyslot */
+	if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
+		fatal_f("dup2");
+
+	mm_record_login(ssh, s, authctxt->pw);
+
+	/* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
+	close(0);
+
+	/* send messages generated by record_login */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble loginmsg");
+	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
+
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+
+	if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
+	    mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
+		fatal_f("send fds failed");
+
+	/* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
+	if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+		fatal_f("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
+	if (fd0 != 0)
+		error_f("fd0 %d != 0", fd0);
+
+	/* slave side of pty is not needed */
+	close(s->ttyfd);
+	s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
+	/* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
+	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
+
+	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+
+	return (0);
+
+ error:
+	if (s != NULL)
+		mm_session_close(s);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble 0");
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	Session *s;
+	char *tty;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse tty");
+	if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
+		mm_session_close(s);
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	free(tty);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req)
+{
+	extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+	int res, status;
+
+	debug3_f("tearing down sessions");
+
+	/* The child is terminating */
+	session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam)
+		sshpam_cleanup();
+#endif
+
+	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			exit(1);
+
+	res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
+
+	/* Terminate process */
+	exit(res);
+}
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+/* Report that an audit event occurred */
+int
+mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	u_int n;
+	ssh_audit_event_t event;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	event = (ssh_audit_event_t)n;
+	switch (event) {
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
+	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
+	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
+	case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
+	case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
+	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
+		audit_event(ssh, event);
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	char *cmd;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	/* sanity check command, if so how? */
+	audit_run_command(cmd);
+	free(cmd);
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
+void
+monitor_clear_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+	ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN);
+	ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
+	sshbuf_free(child_state);
+	child_state = NULL;
+}
+
+void
+monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+	struct kex *kex;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("packet_set_state");
+	if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "packet_set_state");
+	sshbuf_free(child_state);
+	child_state = NULL;
+	if ((kex = ssh->kex) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("internal error: ssh->kex == NULL");
+	if (session_id2_len != sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->session_id)) {
+		fatal_f("incorrect session id length %zu (expected %u)",
+		    sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->session_id), session_id2_len);
+	}
+	if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(ssh->kex->session_id), session_id2,
+	    session_id2_len) != 0)
+		fatal_f("session ID mismatch");
+	/* XXX set callbacks */
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
+# endif
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+	kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+	kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
+	kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+	kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
+}
+
+/* This function requires careful sanity checking */
+
+void
+mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+{
+	debug3_f("Waiting for new keys");
+
+	if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
+	    child_state);
+	debug3_f("GOT new keys");
+}
+
+
+/* XXX */
+
+#define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
+	if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
+		fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
+} while (0)
+
+static void
+monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
+{
+	int pair[2];
+#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
+	int on = 1;
+#endif
+
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
+		fatal_f("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
+#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
+	if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
+		error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	if (setsockopt(pair[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
+		error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(1): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#endif
+	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
+	FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
+	mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
+	mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
+
+	if (do_logfds) {
+		if (pipe(pair) == -1)
+			fatal_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+		FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
+		FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
+		mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
+		mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
+	} else
+		mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
+}
+
+#define MM_MEMSIZE	65536
+
+struct monitor *
+monitor_init(void)
+{
+	struct monitor *mon;
+
+	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
+	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
+
+	return mon;
+}
+
+void
+monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
+{
+	monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
+}
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+int
+mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	gss_OID_desc goid;
+	OM_uint32 major;
+	size_t len;
+	u_char *p;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!options.gss_authentication)
+		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	goid.elements = p;
+	goid.length = len;
+
+	major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
+
+	free(goid.elements);
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
+
+	/* Now we have a context, enable the step */
+	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	gss_buffer_desc in;
+	gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	OM_uint32 major, minor;
+	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
+	int r;
+
+	if (!options.gss_authentication)
+		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
+
+	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
+	major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
+	free(in.value);
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, out.value, out.length)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, flags)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
+
+	gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
+
+	if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
+	OM_uint32 ret;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!options.gss_authentication)
+		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
+
+	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
+
+	ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
+
+	free(gssbuf.value);
+	free(mic.value);
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
+
+	if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
+		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	int r, authenticated;
+	const char *displayname;
+
+	if (!options.gss_authentication)
+		fatal_f("GSSAPI authentication not enabled");
+
+	authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+
+	debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
+
+	auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
+
+	if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
+		auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
+
+	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..683e5e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/monitor.h
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.h,v 1.23 2019/01/19 21:43:56 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MONITOR_H_
+#define _MONITOR_H_
+
+/* Please keep *_REQ_* values on even numbers and *_ANS_* on odd numbers */
+enum monitor_reqtype {
+	MONITOR_REQ_MODULI = 0, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI = 1,
+	MONITOR_REQ_FREE = 2,
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV = 4,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SIGN = 6, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN = 7,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM = 8, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM = 9,
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER = 10, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER = 11,
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD = 12, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD = 13,
+	MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY = 14, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY = 15,
+	MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND = 16, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND = 17,
+	MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED = 22, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED = 23,
+	MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY = 24, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY = 25,
+	MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT = 26,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PTY = 28, MONITOR_ANS_PTY = 29,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP = 30,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY = 32, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY = 33,
+	MONITOR_REQ_SESSID = 34,
+	MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED = 36, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED = 37,
+	MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE = 38, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE = 39,
+	MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE = 40, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE = 41,
+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP = 42, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP = 43,
+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP = 44, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP = 45,
+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK = 46, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK = 47,
+	MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC = 48, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC = 49,
+	MONITOR_REQ_TERM = 50,
+
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START = 100,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT = 102, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT = 103,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX = 104, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX = 105,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
+	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
+
+};
+
+struct ssh;
+
+struct monitor {
+	int			 m_recvfd;
+	int			 m_sendfd;
+	int			 m_log_recvfd;
+	int			 m_log_sendfd;
+	struct kex		**m_pkex;
+	pid_t			 m_pid;
+};
+
+struct monitor *monitor_init(void);
+void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *);
+
+struct Authctxt;
+void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
+void monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
+
+void monitor_clear_keystate(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
+void monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
+
+/* Prototypes for request sending and receiving */
+void mm_request_send(int, enum monitor_reqtype, struct sshbuf *);
+void mm_request_receive(int, struct sshbuf *);
+void mm_request_receive_expect(int, enum monitor_reqtype, struct sshbuf *);
+void mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
+
+#endif /* _MONITOR_H_ */
diff --git a/monitor_fdpass.c b/monitor_fdpass.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a07727a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/monitor_fdpass.c
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.22 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2001 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+# include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+#  include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+
+int
+mm_send_fd(int sock, int fd)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
+	struct msghdr msg;
+#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+	union {
+		struct cmsghdr hdr;
+		char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
+	} cmsgbuf;
+	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+#endif
+	struct iovec vec;
+	char ch = '\0';
+	ssize_t n;
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+
+	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+	msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&fd;
+	msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(fd);
+#else
+	memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf));
+	msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)&cmsgbuf.buf;
+	msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
+	cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+	cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
+	cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
+	cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
+	*(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = fd;
+#endif
+
+	vec.iov_base = &ch;
+	vec.iov_len = 1;
+	msg.msg_iov = &vec;
+	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+
+	pfd.fd = sock;
+	pfd.events = POLLOUT;
+	while ((n = sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 &&
+	    (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) {
+		debug3_f("sendmsg(%d): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
+		(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+	}
+	if (n == -1) {
+		error_f("sendmsg(%d): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (n != 1) {
+		error_f("sendmsg: expected sent 1 got %zd", n);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+#else
+	error("%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__);
+	return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+int
+mm_receive_fd(int sock)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_RECVMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
+	struct msghdr msg;
+#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+	union {
+		struct cmsghdr hdr;
+		char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
+	} cmsgbuf;
+	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+#endif
+	struct iovec vec;
+	ssize_t n;
+	char ch;
+	int fd;
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+
+	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+	vec.iov_base = &ch;
+	vec.iov_len = 1;
+	msg.msg_iov = &vec;
+	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+	msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&fd;
+	msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(fd);
+#else
+	memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf));
+	msg.msg_control = &cmsgbuf.buf;
+	msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
+#endif
+
+	pfd.fd = sock;
+	pfd.events = POLLIN;
+	while ((n = recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 &&
+	    (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) {
+		debug3_f("recvmsg: %s", strerror(errno));
+		(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+	}
+	if (n == -1) {
+		error_f("recvmsg: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (n != 1) {
+		error_f("recvmsg: expected received 1 got %zd", n);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+	if (msg.msg_accrightslen != sizeof(fd)) {
+		error_f("no fd");
+		return -1;
+	}
+#else
+	cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+	if (cmsg == NULL) {
+		error_f("no message header");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+#ifndef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE
+	if (cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS) {
+		error_f("expected %d got %d", SCM_RIGHTS, cmsg->cmsg_type);
+		return -1;
+	}
+#endif
+	fd = (*(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg));
+#endif
+	return fd;
+#else
+	error_f("file descriptor passing not supported");
+	return -1;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/monitor_fdpass.h b/monitor_fdpass.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a4b1f63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/monitor_fdpass.h
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.h,v 1.4 2007/09/04 03:21:03 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MM_FDPASS_H_
+#define _MM_FDPASS_H_
+
+int mm_send_fd(int, int);
+int mm_receive_fd(int);
+
+#endif /* _MM_FDPASS_H_ */
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e379a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1022 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.126 2023/01/06 02:47:18 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include "dh.h"
+#endif
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+/* Imports */
+extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+void
+mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, int forced, const char *msg, void *ctx)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *log_msg;
+	struct monitor *mon = (struct monitor *)ctx;
+	int r;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (mon->m_log_sendfd == -1)
+		fatal_f("no log channel");
+
+	if ((log_msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(log_msg, 0)) != 0 || /* length; filled below */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(log_msg, level)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(log_msg, forced)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(log_msg, msg)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+	if ((len = sshbuf_len(log_msg)) < 4 || len > 0xffffffff)
+		fatal_f("bad length %zu", len);
+	POKE_U32(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(log_msg), len - 4);
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, mon->m_log_sendfd,
+	    sshbuf_mutable_ptr(log_msg), len) != len)
+		fatal_f("write: %s", strerror(errno));
+	sshbuf_free(log_msg);
+}
+
+int
+mm_is_monitor(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * m_pid is only set in the privileged part, and
+	 * points to the unprivileged child.
+	 */
+	return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0);
+}
+
+void
+mm_request_send(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	size_t mlen = sshbuf_len(m);
+	u_char buf[5];
+
+	debug3_f("entering, type %d", type);
+
+	if (mlen >= 0xffffffff)
+		fatal_f("bad length %zu", mlen);
+	POKE_U32(buf, mlen + 1);
+	buf[4] = (u_char) type;		/* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
+		fatal_f("write: %s", strerror(errno));
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen)
+		fatal_f("write: %s", strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+mm_request_receive(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	u_char buf[4], *p = NULL;
+	u_int msg_len;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE)
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		fatal_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+	msg_len = PEEK_U32(buf);
+	if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
+		fatal_f("read: bad msg_len %d", msg_len);
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
+	if (atomicio(read, sock, p, msg_len) != msg_len)
+		fatal_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+mm_request_receive_expect(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	u_char rtype;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("entering, type %d", type);
+
+	mm_request_receive(sock, m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &rtype)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	if (rtype != type)
+		fatal_f("read: rtype %d != type %d", rtype, type);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+DH *
+mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
+{
+	BIGNUM *p, *g;
+	int r;
+	u_char success = 0;
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, min)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, nbits)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, max)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, m);
+
+	debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI");
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &success)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse success");
+	if (success == 0)
+		fatal_f("MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed");
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(m, &p)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(m, &g)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse group");
+
+	debug3_f("remaining %zu", sshbuf_len(m));
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+
+	return (dh_new_group(g, p));
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *hostkey_alg,
+    const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex;
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	u_int ndx = kex->host_key_index(key, 0, ssh);
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ndx)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, hostkey_alg)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, compat)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, m);
+
+	debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN");
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, sigp, lenp)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+#define GETPW(b, id) \
+	do { \
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0) \
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse pw %s", #id); \
+		if (len != sizeof(pw->id)) \
+			fatal_fr(r, "bad length for %s", #id); \
+		memcpy(&pw->id, p, len); \
+	} while (0)
+
+struct passwd *
+mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *username)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	size_t len;
+	u_int i;
+	ServerOptions *newopts;
+	int r;
+	u_char ok;
+	const u_char *p;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, username)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, m);
+
+	debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM");
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ok)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse success");
+	if (ok == 0) {
+		pw = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* XXX don't like passing struct passwd like this */
+	pw = xcalloc(sizeof(*pw), 1);
+	GETPW(m, pw_uid);
+	GETPW(m, pw_gid);
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE
+	GETPW(m, pw_change);
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
+	GETPW(m, pw_expire);
+#endif
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_passwd, NULL)) != 0 ||
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_gecos, NULL)) != 0 ||
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_class, NULL)) != 0 ||
+#endif
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_dir, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_shell, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse pw");
+
+out:
+	/* copy options block as a Match directive may have changed some */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse opts");
+	if (len != sizeof(*newopts))
+		fatal_f("option block size mismatch");
+	newopts = xcalloc(sizeof(*newopts), 1);
+	memcpy(newopts, p, sizeof(*newopts));
+
+#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
+		if (newopts->x != NULL && \
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &newopts->x, NULL)) != 0) \
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse %s", #x); \
+	} while (0)
+#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
+		newopts->x = newopts->nx == 0 ? \
+		    NULL : xcalloc(newopts->nx, sizeof(*newopts->x)); \
+		for (i = 0; i < newopts->nx; i++) { \
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, \
+			    &newopts->x[i], NULL)) != 0) \
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse %s", #x); \
+		} \
+	} while (0)
+	/* See comment in servconf.h */
+	COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
+#undef M_CP_STROPT
+#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
+
+	copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1);
+	log_change_level(options.log_level);
+	log_verbose_reset();
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++)
+		log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]);
+	process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
+	process_channel_timeouts(ssh, &options);
+	free(newopts);
+
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+
+	return (pw);
+}
+
+char *
+mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	char *banner;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &banner, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+
+	/* treat empty banner as missing banner */
+	if (strlen(banner) == 0) {
+		free(banner);
+		banner = NULL;
+	}
+	return (banner);
+}
+
+/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
+
+void
+mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, service)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, style ? style : "")) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, m);
+
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+}
+
+/* Do the password authentication */
+int
+mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	int r, authenticated = 0;
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	u_int maxtries = 0;
+#endif
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, password)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
+
+	debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD");
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authenticated)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &maxtries)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse PAM");
+	if (maxtries > INT_MAX)
+		fatal_fr(r, "bad maxtries");
+	sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(maxtries);
+#endif
+
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+
+	debug3_f("user %sauthenticated", authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+
+int
+mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
+    int pubkey_auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptp)
+{
+	return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key,
+	    pubkey_auth_attempt, authoptp));
+}
+
+int
+mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
+    const char *user, const char *host, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0, NULL));
+}
+
+int
+mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host,
+    struct sshkey *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	int r, allowed = 0;
+	struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	if (authoptp != NULL)
+		*authoptp = NULL;
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, user ? user : "")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, host ? host : "")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, m);
+
+	debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED");
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &allowed)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	if (allowed && type == MM_USERKEY &&
+	    (r = sshauthopt_deserialise(m, &opts)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "sshauthopt_deserialise");
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+
+	if (authoptp != NULL) {
+		*authoptp = opts;
+		opts = NULL;
+	}
+	sshauthopt_free(opts);
+
+	return allowed;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the
+ * privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed
+ * for authentication.
+ */
+
+int
+mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *sigalg, u_int compat,
+    struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_detailsp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	u_int encoded_ret = 0;
+	int r;
+	u_char sig_details_present, flags;
+	u_int counter;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	if (sig_detailsp != NULL)
+		*sig_detailsp = NULL;
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, sig, siglen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, sigalg == NULL ? "" : sigalg)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, m);
+
+	debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY");
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &encoded_ret)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &sig_details_present)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	if (sig_details_present && encoded_ret == 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &counter)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &flags)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse sig_details");
+		if (sig_detailsp != NULL) {
+			*sig_detailsp = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**sig_detailsp));
+			(*sig_detailsp)->sk_counter = counter;
+			(*sig_detailsp)->sk_flags = flags;
+		}
+	}
+
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+
+	if (encoded_ret != 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = ssh_packet_get_state(ssh, m)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "ssh_packet_get_state");
+	mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, m);
+	debug3_f("Finished sending state");
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+}
+
+int
+mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	char *p, *msg;
+	int success = 0, tmp1 = -1, tmp2 = -1, r;
+
+	/* Kludge: ensure there are fds free to receive the pty/tty */
+	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
+	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
+		error_f("cannot allocate fds for pty");
+		if (tmp1 > 0)
+			close(tmp1);
+		if (tmp2 > 0)
+			close(tmp2);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	close(tmp1);
+	close(tmp2);
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, m);
+
+	debug3_f("waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY");
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse success");
+	if (success == 0) {
+		debug3_f("pty alloc failed");
+		sshbuf_free(m);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &p, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+
+	strlcpy(namebuf, p, namebuflen); /* Possible truncation */
+	free(p);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg))) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "put loginmsg");
+	free(msg);
+
+	if ((*ptyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
+	    (*ttyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1)
+		fatal_f("receive fds failed");
+
+	/* Success */
+	return (1);
+}
+
+void
+mm_session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	int r;
+
+	if (s->ttyfd == -1)
+		return;
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assmble");
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, m);
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+
+	/* closed dup'ed master */
+	if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) == -1)
+		error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
+		    s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
+
+	/* unlink pty from session */
+	s->ttyfd = -1;
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+void
+mm_start_pam(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, m);
+
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+}
+
+u_int
+mm_do_pam_account(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	u_int ret;
+	char *msg;
+	size_t msglen;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
+
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ret)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &msg, &msglen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, msglen)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+	free(msg);
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+
+	debug3("%s returning %d", __func__, ret);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+void *
+mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	int r, success;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	if (success == 0) {
+		debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__);
+		sshbuf_free(m);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+	return (authctxt);
+}
+
+int
+mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
+    u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	u_int i, n;
+	int r, ret;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, m);
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ret)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, info, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, num)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	debug3("%s: pam_query returned %d", __func__, ret);
+	sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(n);
+	if (*num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
+		fatal("%s: received %u PAM messages, expected <= %u",
+		    __func__, *num, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG);
+	*prompts = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(char *));
+	*echo_on = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(u_int));
+	for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &((*prompts)[i]), NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &((*echo_on)[i]))) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+int
+mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	u_int n, i;
+	int r, ret;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, num)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, resp[i])) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	}
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, m);
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	ret = (int)n; /* XXX */
+	debug3("%s: pam_respond returned %d", __func__, ret);
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+void
+mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
+	debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX", __func__);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+}
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+/* Request process termination */
+
+void
+mm_terminate(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, m);
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+}
+
+static void
+mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts,
+    char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+	*name = xstrdup("");
+	*infotxt = xstrdup("");
+	*numprompts = 1;
+	*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
+	*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
+	(*echo_on)[0] = 0;
+}
+
+int
+mm_bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
+   u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	u_int success;
+	char *challenge;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
+
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse success");
+	if (success == 0) {
+		debug3_f("no challenge");
+		sshbuf_free(m);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/* Get the challenge, and format the response */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &challenge, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse challenge");
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+
+	mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on);
+	(*prompts)[0] = challenge;
+
+	debug3_f("received challenge: %s", challenge);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+mm_bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	int r, authok;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+	if (numresponses != 1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, responses[0])) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
+
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authok)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+
+	return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0);
+}
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+void
+mm_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, event)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, m);
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+}
+
+void
+mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, command)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	OM_uint32 major;
+	int r;
+
+	/* Client doesn't get to see the context */
+	*ctx = NULL;
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, goid->elements, goid->length)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+	return (major);
+}
+
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *in,
+    gss_buffer_desc *out, OM_uint32 *flagsp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	OM_uint32 major;
+	u_int flags;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, in->value, in->length)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, out)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	if (flagsp != NULL) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &flags)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse flags");
+		*flagsp = flags;
+	}
+
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+
+	return (major);
+}
+
+OM_uint32
+mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	OM_uint32 major;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, gssbuf->value, gssbuf->length)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, gssmic->value, gssmic->length)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+	return(major);
+}
+
+int
+mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	int r, authenticated = 0;
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
+	    MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authenticated)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+	debug3_f("user %sauthenticated", authenticated ? "" : "not ");
+	return (authenticated);
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0df49c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,102 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.49 2022/06/15 16:08:25 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_
+#define _MM_WRAP_H_
+
+extern int use_privsep;
+#define PRIVSEP(x)	(use_privsep ? mm_##x : x)
+
+enum mm_keytype { MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY };
+
+struct ssh;
+struct monitor;
+struct Authctxt;
+struct sshkey;
+struct sshauthopt;
+struct sshkey_sig_details;
+
+void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
+int mm_is_monitor(void);
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+#endif
+int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
+    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
+    const char *, u_int compat);
+void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
+struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *);
+char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
+int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
+int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, const char *, const char *, struct sshkey *,
+    int, struct sshauthopt **);
+int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int,
+    struct sshauthopt **);
+int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, const char *,
+    const char *, struct sshkey *);
+int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
+    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+   gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
+OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+void mm_start_pam(struct ssh *ssh);
+u_int mm_do_pam_account(void);
+void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt *);
+int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+#include "audit.h"
+void mm_audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
+void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
+#endif
+
+struct Session;
+void mm_terminate(void);
+int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
+void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
+
+/* Key export functions */
+struct newkeys *mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *, int);
+int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int, u_char **, u_int *);
+
+void mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *, struct monitor*);
+
+/* bsdauth */
+int mm_bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
+int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
+
+#endif /* _MM_WRAP_H_ */
diff --git a/msg.c b/msg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d22c4e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/msg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.20 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+int
+ssh_msg_send(int fd, u_char type, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	u_char buf[5];
+	u_int mlen = sshbuf_len(m);
+
+	debug3_f("type %u", (unsigned int)type & 0xff);
+
+	put_u32(buf, mlen + 1);
+	buf[4] = type;		/* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
+		error_f("write: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen) {
+		error_f("write: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_msg_recv(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	u_char buf[4], *p;
+	u_int msg_len;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3("ssh_msg_recv entering");
+
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
+		if (errno != EPIPE)
+			error_f("read header: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	msg_len = get_u32(buf);
+	if (msg_len > sshbuf_max_size(m)) {
+		error_f("read: bad msg_len %u", msg_len);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "reserve");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, p, msg_len) != msg_len) {
+		error_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
diff --git a/msg.h b/msg.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dfb3424
--- /dev/null
+++ b/msg.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: msg.h,v 1.5 2015/01/15 09:40:00 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef SSH_MSG_H
+#define SSH_MSG_H
+
+struct sshbuf;
+int	 ssh_msg_send(int, u_char, struct sshbuf *);
+int	 ssh_msg_recv(int, struct sshbuf *);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/mux.c b/mux.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e7580ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mux.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2344 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.95 2023/01/06 02:39:59 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* ssh session multiplexing support */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+#  include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "clientloop.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+/* from ssh.c */
+extern int tty_flag;
+extern Options options;
+extern char *host;
+extern struct sshbuf *command;
+extern volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending;
+
+/* Context for session open confirmation callback */
+struct mux_session_confirm_ctx {
+	u_int want_tty;
+	u_int want_subsys;
+	u_int want_x_fwd;
+	u_int want_agent_fwd;
+	struct sshbuf *cmd;
+	char *term;
+	struct termios tio;
+	char **env;
+	u_int rid;
+};
+
+/* Context for stdio fwd open confirmation callback */
+struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx {
+	u_int rid;
+};
+
+/* Context for global channel callback */
+struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx {
+	u_int cid;	/* channel id */
+	u_int rid;	/* request id */
+	int fid;	/* forward id */
+};
+
+/* fd to control socket */
+int muxserver_sock = -1;
+
+/* client request id */
+u_int muxclient_request_id = 0;
+
+/* Multiplexing control command */
+u_int muxclient_command = 0;
+
+/* Set when signalled. */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t muxclient_terminate = 0;
+
+/* PID of multiplex server */
+static u_int muxserver_pid = 0;
+
+static Channel *mux_listener_channel = NULL;
+
+struct mux_master_state {
+	int hello_rcvd;
+};
+
+/* mux protocol messages */
+#define MUX_MSG_HELLO		0x00000001
+#define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION	0x10000002
+#define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK	0x10000004
+#define MUX_C_TERMINATE		0x10000005
+#define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD		0x10000006
+#define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD		0x10000007
+#define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD	0x10000008
+#define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING	0x10000009
+#define MUX_C_PROXY		0x1000000f
+#define MUX_S_OK		0x80000001
+#define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED	0x80000002
+#define MUX_S_FAILURE		0x80000003
+#define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE	0x80000004
+#define MUX_S_ALIVE		0x80000005
+#define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED	0x80000006
+#define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT	0x80000007
+#define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL	0x80000008
+#define MUX_S_PROXY		0x8000000f
+
+/* type codes for MUX_C_OPEN_FWD and MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD */
+#define MUX_FWD_LOCAL   1
+#define MUX_FWD_REMOTE  2
+#define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3
+
+static void mux_session_confirm(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
+static void mux_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
+
+static int mux_master_process_hello(struct ssh *, u_int,
+	    Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
+static int mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *, u_int,
+	    Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
+static int mux_master_process_alive_check(struct ssh *, u_int,
+	    Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
+static int mux_master_process_terminate(struct ssh *, u_int,
+	    Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
+static int mux_master_process_open_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int,
+	    Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
+static int mux_master_process_close_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int,
+	    Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
+static int mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int,
+	    Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
+static int mux_master_process_stop_listening(struct ssh *, u_int,
+	    Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
+static int mux_master_process_proxy(struct ssh *, u_int,
+	    Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
+
+static const struct {
+	u_int type;
+	int (*handler)(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *,
+	    struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
+} mux_master_handlers[] = {
+	{ MUX_MSG_HELLO, mux_master_process_hello },
+	{ MUX_C_NEW_SESSION, mux_master_process_new_session },
+	{ MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK, mux_master_process_alive_check },
+	{ MUX_C_TERMINATE, mux_master_process_terminate },
+	{ MUX_C_OPEN_FWD, mux_master_process_open_fwd },
+	{ MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD, mux_master_process_close_fwd },
+	{ MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD, mux_master_process_stdio_fwd },
+	{ MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING, mux_master_process_stop_listening },
+	{ MUX_C_PROXY, mux_master_process_proxy },
+	{ 0, NULL }
+};
+
+/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux client _session_ channel */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, int force, void *unused)
+{
+	Channel *cc, *c = channel_by_id(ssh, cid);
+
+	debug3_f("entering for channel %d", cid);
+	if (c == NULL)
+		fatal_f("channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", cid);
+	if (c->ctl_chan != -1) {
+		if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("channel %d missing control channel %d",
+			    c->self, c->ctl_chan);
+		c->ctl_chan = -1;
+		cc->remote_id = 0;
+		cc->have_remote_id = 0;
+		chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, cc);
+	}
+	channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, c->self);
+}
+
+/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux client _control_ channel */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+mux_master_control_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, int force, void *unused)
+{
+	Channel *sc, *c = channel_by_id(ssh, cid);
+
+	debug3_f("entering for channel %d", cid);
+	if (c == NULL)
+		fatal_f("channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", cid);
+	if (c->have_remote_id) {
+		if ((sc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->remote_id)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("channel %d missing session channel %u",
+			    c->self, c->remote_id);
+		c->remote_id = 0;
+		c->have_remote_id = 0;
+		sc->ctl_chan = -1;
+		if (sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
+		    sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) {
+			debug2_f("channel %d: not open", sc->self);
+			chan_mark_dead(ssh, sc);
+		} else {
+			if (sc->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN)
+				chan_read_failed(ssh, sc);
+			if (sc->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN)
+				chan_write_failed(ssh, sc);
+		}
+	}
+	channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, c->self);
+}
+
+/* Check mux client environment variables before passing them to mux master. */
+static int
+env_permitted(const char *env)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	int ret;
+	char name[1024], *cp;
+
+	if ((cp = strchr(env, '=')) == NULL || cp == env)
+		return 0;
+	ret = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%.*s", (int)(cp - env), env);
+	if (ret <= 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(name)) {
+		error_f("name '%.100s...' too long", env);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_send_env; i++)
+		if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[i]))
+			return 1;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Mux master protocol message handlers */
+
+static int
+mux_master_process_hello(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
+    Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
+{
+	u_int ver;
+	struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx;
+	int r;
+
+	if (state == NULL)
+		fatal_f("channel %d: c->mux_ctx == NULL", c->self);
+	if (state->hello_rcvd) {
+		error_f("HELLO received twice");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ver)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) {
+		error_f("unsupported multiplexing protocol version %u "
+		    "(expected %u)", ver, SSHMUX_VER);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	debug2_f("channel %d client version %u", c->self, ver);
+
+	/* No extensions are presently defined */
+	while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) {
+		char *name = NULL;
+		size_t value_len = 0;
+
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, NULL, &value_len)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "parse extension");
+			return -1;
+		}
+		debug2_f("Unrecognised extension \"%s\" length %zu",
+		    name, value_len);
+		free(name);
+	}
+	state->hello_rcvd = 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Enqueue a "ok" response to the reply buffer */
+static void
+reply_ok(struct sshbuf *reply, u_int rid)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_OK)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "reply");
+}
+
+/* Enqueue an error response to the reply buffer */
+static void
+reply_error(struct sshbuf *reply, u_int type, u_int rid, const char *msg)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(reply, msg)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "reply");
+}
+
+static int
+mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
+    Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
+{
+	Channel *nc;
+	struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx;
+	char *cmd, *cp;
+	u_int i, j, env_len, escape_char, window, packetmax;
+	int r, new_fd[3];
+
+	/* Reply for SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN */
+	cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx));
+	cctx->term = NULL;
+	cctx->rid = rid;
+	cmd = NULL;
+	cctx->env = NULL;
+	env_len = 0;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0 || /* reserved */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_tty)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_x_fwd)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_agent_fwd)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_subsys)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &escape_char)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cctx->term, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0) {
+ malf:
+		free(cmd);
+		for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++)
+			free(cctx->env[j]);
+		free(cctx->env);
+		free(cctx->term);
+		free(cctx);
+		error_f("malformed message");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+#define MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS	4096
+	while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
+			goto malf;
+		if (!env_permitted(cp)) {
+			free(cp);
+			continue;
+		}
+		cctx->env = xreallocarray(cctx->env, env_len + 2,
+		    sizeof(*cctx->env));
+		cctx->env[env_len++] = cp;
+		cctx->env[env_len] = NULL;
+		if (env_len > MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS) {
+			error_f(">%d environment variables received, "
+			    "ignoring additional", MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	debug2_f("channel %d: request tty %d, X %d, agent %d, subsys %d, "
+	    "term \"%s\", cmd \"%s\", env %u", c->self,
+	    cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_x_fwd, cctx->want_agent_fwd,
+	    cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, cmd, env_len);
+
+	if ((cctx->cmd = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(cctx->cmd, cmd, strlen(cmd))) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+	free(cmd);
+	cmd = NULL;
+
+	/* Gather fds from client */
+	for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
+		if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) {
+			error_f("failed to receive fd %d from client", i);
+			for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+				close(new_fd[j]);
+			for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++)
+				free(cctx->env[j]);
+			free(cctx->env);
+			free(cctx->term);
+			sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd);
+			free(cctx);
+			reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
+			    "did not receive file descriptors");
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	debug3_f("got fds stdin %d, stdout %d, stderr %d",
+	    new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2]);
+
+	/* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */
+	if (c->have_remote_id) {
+		debug2_f("session already open");
+		reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
+		    "Multiple sessions not supported");
+ cleanup:
+		close(new_fd[0]);
+		close(new_fd[1]);
+		close(new_fd[2]);
+		free(cctx->term);
+		if (env_len != 0) {
+			for (i = 0; i < env_len; i++)
+				free(cctx->env[i]);
+			free(cctx->env);
+		}
+		sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd);
+		free(cctx);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
+	    options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
+		if (!ask_permission("Allow shared connection to %s? ", host)) {
+			debug2_f("session refused by user");
+			reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
+			    "Permission denied");
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Try to pick up ttymodes from client before it goes raw */
+	if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1)
+		error_f("tcgetattr: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
+	packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
+	if (cctx->want_tty) {
+		window >>= 1;
+		packetmax >>= 1;
+	}
+
+	nc = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING,
+	    new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax,
+	    CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
+
+	nc->ctl_chan = c->self;		/* link session -> control channel */
+	c->remote_id = nc->self;	/* link control -> session channel */
+	c->have_remote_id = 1;
+
+	if (cctx->want_tty && escape_char != 0xffffffff) {
+		channel_register_filter(ssh, nc->self,
+		    client_simple_escape_filter, NULL,
+		    client_filter_cleanup,
+		    client_new_escape_filter_ctx((int)escape_char));
+	}
+
+	debug2_f("channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d",
+	    nc->self, nc->ctl_chan);
+
+	channel_send_open(ssh, nc->self);
+	channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, nc->self, mux_session_confirm, cctx);
+	c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */
+	channel_register_cleanup(ssh, nc->self,
+	    mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1);
+
+	/* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_master_process_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
+    Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	debug2_f("channel %d: alive check", c->self);
+
+	/* prepare reply */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_ALIVE)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, (u_int)getpid())) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "reply");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_master_process_terminate(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
+    Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
+{
+	debug2_f("channel %d: terminate request", c->self);
+
+	if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
+	    options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
+		if (!ask_permission("Terminate shared connection to %s? ",
+		    host)) {
+			debug2_f("termination refused by user");
+			reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
+			    "Permission denied");
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	quit_pending = 1;
+	reply_ok(reply, rid);
+	/* XXX exit happens too soon - message never makes it to client */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static char *
+format_forward(u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd)
+{
+	char *ret;
+
+	switch (ftype) {
+	case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
+		xasprintf(&ret, "local forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d",
+		    (fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path :
+		    (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
+		    (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
+		    fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port,
+		    (fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path :
+		    fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
+		break;
+	case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
+		xasprintf(&ret, "dynamic forward %.200s:%d -> *",
+		    (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
+		    (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
+		    fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
+		break;
+	case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
+		xasprintf(&ret, "remote forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d",
+		    (fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path :
+		    (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
+		    "LOCALHOST" : fwd->listen_host,
+		    fwd->listen_port,
+		    (fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path :
+		    fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal_f("unknown forward type %u", ftype);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+compare_host(const char *a, const char *b)
+{
+	if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
+		return 1;
+	if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	return strcmp(a, b) == 0;
+}
+
+static int
+compare_forward(struct Forward *a, struct Forward *b)
+{
+	if (!compare_host(a->listen_host, b->listen_host))
+		return 0;
+	if (!compare_host(a->listen_path, b->listen_path))
+		return 0;
+	if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port)
+		return 0;
+	if (!compare_host(a->connect_host, b->connect_host))
+		return 0;
+	if (!compare_host(a->connect_path, b->connect_path))
+		return 0;
+	if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+mux_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx = ctxt;
+	char *failmsg = NULL;
+	struct Forward *rfwd;
+	Channel *c;
+	struct sshbuf *out;
+	u_int port;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, fctx->cid)) == NULL) {
+		/* no channel for reply */
+		error_f("unknown channel");
+		return;
+	}
+	if ((out = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards ||
+	    (options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_path == NULL &&
+	    options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_host == NULL)) {
+		xasprintf(&failmsg, "unknown forwarding id %d", fctx->fid);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	rfwd = &options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid];
+	debug_f("%s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d",
+	    type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
+	    rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
+	    rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
+		if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
+			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse port");
+			if (port > 65535) {
+				fatal("Invalid allocated port %u for "
+				    "mux remote forward to %s:%d", port,
+				    rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+			}
+			rfwd->allocated_port = (int)port;
+			debug("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward"
+			    " to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port,
+			    rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(out,
+			    MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, fctx->rid)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(out,
+			    rfwd->allocated_port)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "reply");
+			channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle,
+			    rfwd->allocated_port);
+		} else {
+			reply_ok(out, fctx->rid);
+		}
+		goto out;
+	} else {
+		if (rfwd->listen_port == 0)
+			channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1);
+		if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
+			xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for "
+			    "listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
+		else
+			xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for "
+			    "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
+
+		debug2_f("clearing registered forwarding for listen %d, "
+		    "connect %s:%d", rfwd->listen_port,
+		    rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
+		    rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+
+		free(rfwd->listen_host);
+		free(rfwd->listen_path);
+		free(rfwd->connect_host);
+		free(rfwd->connect_path);
+		memset(rfwd, 0, sizeof(*rfwd));
+	}
+ fail:
+	error_f("%s", failmsg);
+	reply_error(out, MUX_S_FAILURE, fctx->rid, failmsg);
+	free(failmsg);
+ out:
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
+	sshbuf_free(out);
+	if (c->mux_pause <= 0)
+		fatal_f("mux_pause %d", c->mux_pause);
+	c->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
+}
+
+static int
+mux_master_process_open_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
+    Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
+{
+	struct Forward fwd;
+	char *fwd_desc = NULL;
+	char *listen_addr, *connect_addr;
+	u_int ftype;
+	u_int lport, cport;
+	int r, i, ret = 0, freefwd = 1;
+
+	memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+
+	/* XXX - lport/cport check redundant */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ftype)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &listen_addr, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &lport)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &connect_addr, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0 ||
+	    (lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) ||
+	    (cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) {
+		error_f("malformed message");
+		ret = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (*listen_addr == '\0') {
+		free(listen_addr);
+		listen_addr = NULL;
+	}
+	if (*connect_addr == '\0') {
+		free(connect_addr);
+		connect_addr = NULL;
+	}
+
+	memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+	fwd.listen_port = lport;
+	if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
+		fwd.listen_path = listen_addr;
+	else
+		fwd.listen_host = listen_addr;
+	fwd.connect_port = cport;
+	if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
+		fwd.connect_path = connect_addr;
+	else
+		fwd.connect_host = connect_addr;
+
+	debug2_f("channel %d: request %s", c->self,
+	    (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd)));
+
+	if (ftype != MUX_FWD_LOCAL && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE &&
+	    ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
+		logit_f("invalid forwarding type %u", ftype);
+ invalid:
+		free(listen_addr);
+		free(connect_addr);
+		reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
+		    "Invalid forwarding request");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.listen_path) {
+		logit_f("streamlocal and dynamic forwards "
+		    "are mutually exclusive");
+		goto invalid;
+	}
+	if (fwd.listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.listen_port >= 65536) {
+		logit_f("invalid listen port %u", fwd.listen_port);
+		goto invalid;
+	}
+	if ((fwd.connect_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL &&
+	    fwd.connect_port >= 65536) ||
+	    (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE &&
+	    fwd.connect_port == 0)) {
+		logit_f("invalid connect port %u",
+		    fwd.connect_port);
+		goto invalid;
+	}
+	if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL &&
+	    fwd.connect_path == NULL) {
+		logit_f("missing connect host");
+		goto invalid;
+	}
+
+	/* Skip forwards that have already been requested */
+	switch (ftype) {
+	case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
+	case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
+		for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
+			if (compare_forward(&fwd,
+			    options.local_forwards + i)) {
+ exists:
+				debug2_f("found existing forwarding");
+				reply_ok(reply, rid);
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
+		for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+			if (!compare_forward(&fwd, options.remote_forwards + i))
+				continue;
+			if (fwd.listen_port != 0)
+				goto exists;
+			debug2_f("found allocated port");
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply,
+			    MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply,
+			    options.remote_forwards[i].allocated_port)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "reply FWD_REMOTE");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
+	    options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
+		if (!ask_permission("Open %s on %s?", fwd_desc, host)) {
+			debug2_f("forwarding refused by user");
+			reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
+			    "Permission denied");
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
+		if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd,
+		    &options.fwd_opts)) {
+ fail:
+			logit_f("requested %s failed", fwd_desc);
+			reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
+			    "Port forwarding failed");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
+		freefwd = 0;
+	} else {
+		struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx;
+
+		fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd);
+		if (fwd.handle < 0)
+			goto fail;
+		add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
+		fctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*fctx));
+		fctx->cid = c->self;
+		fctx->rid = rid;
+		fctx->fid = options.num_remote_forwards - 1;
+		client_register_global_confirm(mux_confirm_remote_forward,
+		    fctx);
+		freefwd = 0;
+		c->mux_pause = 1; /* wait for mux_confirm_remote_forward */
+		/* delayed reply in mux_confirm_remote_forward */
+		goto out;
+	}
+	reply_ok(reply, rid);
+ out:
+	free(fwd_desc);
+	if (freefwd) {
+		free(fwd.listen_host);
+		free(fwd.listen_path);
+		free(fwd.connect_host);
+		free(fwd.connect_path);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_master_process_close_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
+    Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
+{
+	struct Forward fwd, *found_fwd;
+	char *fwd_desc = NULL;
+	const char *error_reason = NULL;
+	char *listen_addr = NULL, *connect_addr = NULL;
+	u_int ftype;
+	int r, i, ret = 0;
+	u_int lport, cport;
+
+	memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ftype)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &listen_addr, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &lport)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &connect_addr, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0 ||
+	    (lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) ||
+	    (cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) {
+		error_f("malformed message");
+		ret = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (*listen_addr == '\0') {
+		free(listen_addr);
+		listen_addr = NULL;
+	}
+	if (*connect_addr == '\0') {
+		free(connect_addr);
+		connect_addr = NULL;
+	}
+
+	memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+	fwd.listen_port = lport;
+	if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
+		fwd.listen_path = listen_addr;
+	else
+		fwd.listen_host = listen_addr;
+	fwd.connect_port = cport;
+	if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
+		fwd.connect_path = connect_addr;
+	else
+		fwd.connect_host = connect_addr;
+
+	debug2_f("channel %d: request cancel %s", c->self,
+	    (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd)));
+
+	/* make sure this has been requested */
+	found_fwd = NULL;
+	switch (ftype) {
+	case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
+	case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
+		for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
+			if (compare_forward(&fwd,
+			    options.local_forwards + i)) {
+				found_fwd = options.local_forwards + i;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
+		for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+			if (compare_forward(&fwd,
+			    options.remote_forwards + i)) {
+				found_fwd = options.remote_forwards + i;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (found_fwd == NULL)
+		error_reason = "port not forwarded";
+	else if (ftype == MUX_FWD_REMOTE) {
+		/*
+		 * This shouldn't fail unless we confused the host/port
+		 * between options.remote_forwards and permitted_opens.
+		 * However, for dynamic allocated listen ports we need
+		 * to use the actual listen port.
+		 */
+		if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, found_fwd) == -1)
+			error_reason = "port not in permitted opens";
+	} else {	/* local and dynamic forwards */
+		/* Ditto */
+		if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, fwd.connect_port,
+		    &options.fwd_opts) == -1)
+			error_reason = "port not found";
+	}
+
+	if (error_reason != NULL)
+		reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, error_reason);
+	else {
+		reply_ok(reply, rid);
+		free(found_fwd->listen_host);
+		free(found_fwd->listen_path);
+		free(found_fwd->connect_host);
+		free(found_fwd->connect_path);
+		found_fwd->listen_host = found_fwd->connect_host = NULL;
+		found_fwd->listen_path = found_fwd->connect_path = NULL;
+		found_fwd->listen_port = found_fwd->connect_port = 0;
+	}
+ out:
+	free(fwd_desc);
+	free(listen_addr);
+	free(connect_addr);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
+    Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
+{
+	Channel *nc;
+	char *chost = NULL;
+	u_int cport, i, j;
+	int r, new_fd[2];
+	struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0 || /* reserved */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0) {
+		free(chost);
+		error_f("malformed message");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	debug2_f("channel %d: stdio fwd to %s:%u", c->self, chost, cport);
+
+	/* Gather fds from client */
+	for(i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+		if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) {
+			error_f("failed to receive fd %d from client", i);
+			for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
+				close(new_fd[j]);
+			free(chost);
+
+			/* prepare reply */
+			reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
+			    "did not receive file descriptors");
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	debug3_f("got fds stdin %d, stdout %d", new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
+
+	/* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */
+	if (c->have_remote_id) {
+		debug2_f("session already open");
+		reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
+		    "Multiple sessions not supported");
+ cleanup:
+		close(new_fd[0]);
+		close(new_fd[1]);
+		free(chost);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
+	    options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
+		if (!ask_permission("Allow forward to %s:%u? ",
+		    chost, cport)) {
+			debug2_f("stdio fwd refused by user");
+			reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
+			    "Permission denied");
+			goto cleanup;
+		}
+	}
+
+	nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1],
+	    CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
+	free(chost);
+
+	nc->ctl_chan = c->self;		/* link session -> control channel */
+	c->remote_id = nc->self;	/* link control -> session channel */
+	c->have_remote_id = 1;
+
+	debug2_f("channel_new: %d control %d", nc->self, nc->ctl_chan);
+
+	channel_register_cleanup(ssh, nc->self,
+	    mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1);
+
+	cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx));
+	cctx->rid = rid;
+	channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, nc->self, mux_stdio_confirm, cctx);
+	c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */
+
+	/* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux stdio fwd session. */
+static void
+mux_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
+{
+	struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg;
+	Channel *c, *cc;
+	struct sshbuf *reply;
+	int r;
+
+	if (cctx == NULL)
+		fatal_f("cctx == NULL");
+	if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("no channel for id %d", id);
+	if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("channel %d lacks control channel %d",
+		    id, c->ctl_chan);
+	if ((reply = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+
+	if (!success) {
+		debug3_f("sending failure reply");
+		reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, cctx->rid,
+		    "Session open refused by peer");
+		/* prepare reply */
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	debug3_f("sending success reply");
+	/* prepare reply */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, cctx->rid)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, c->self)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "reply");
+
+ done:
+	/* Send reply */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(cc->output, reply)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
+	sshbuf_free(reply);
+
+	if (cc->mux_pause <= 0)
+		fatal_f("mux_pause %d", cc->mux_pause);
+	cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
+	c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
+	free(cctx);
+}
+
+static int
+mux_master_process_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
+    Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
+{
+	debug_f("channel %d: stop listening", c->self);
+
+	if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
+	    options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
+		if (!ask_permission("Disable further multiplexing on shared "
+		    "connection to %s? ", host)) {
+			debug2_f("stop listen refused by user");
+			reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
+			    "Permission denied");
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (mux_listener_channel != NULL) {
+		channel_free(ssh, mux_listener_channel);
+		client_stop_mux();
+		free(options.control_path);
+		options.control_path = NULL;
+		mux_listener_channel = NULL;
+		muxserver_sock = -1;
+	}
+
+	reply_ok(reply, rid);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_master_process_proxy(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
+    Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	debug_f("channel %d: proxy request", c->self);
+
+	c->mux_rcb = channel_proxy_downstream;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_PROXY)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "reply");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Channel callbacks fired on read/write from mux client fd */
+static int
+mux_master_read_cb(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx;
+	struct sshbuf *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
+	u_int type, rid, i;
+	int r, ret = -1;
+
+	if ((out = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+
+	/* Setup ctx and  */
+	if (c->mux_ctx == NULL) {
+		state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*state));
+		c->mux_ctx = state;
+		channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self,
+		    mux_master_control_cleanup_cb, 0);
+
+		/* Send hello */
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, MUX_MSG_HELLO)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, SSHMUX_VER)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "reply");
+		/* no extensions */
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
+		debug3_f("channel %d: hello sent", c->self);
+		ret = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Channel code ensures that we receive whole packets */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_froms(c->input, &in)) != 0) {
+ malf:
+		error_f("malformed message");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(in, &type)) != 0)
+		goto malf;
+	debug3_f("channel %d packet type 0x%08x len %zu", c->self,
+	    type, sshbuf_len(in));
+
+	if (type == MUX_MSG_HELLO)
+		rid = 0;
+	else {
+		if (!state->hello_rcvd) {
+			error_f("expected MUX_MSG_HELLO(0x%08x), "
+			    "received 0x%08x", MUX_MSG_HELLO, type);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(in, &rid)) != 0)
+			goto malf;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; mux_master_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
+		if (type == mux_master_handlers[i].type) {
+			ret = mux_master_handlers[i].handler(ssh, rid,
+			    c, in, out);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (mux_master_handlers[i].handler == NULL) {
+		error_f("unsupported mux message 0x%08x", type);
+		reply_error(out, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "unsupported request");
+		ret = 0;
+	}
+	/* Enqueue reply packet */
+	if (sshbuf_len(out) != 0 &&
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(in);
+	sshbuf_free(out);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+mux_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int exitval)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	Channel *mux_chan;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("channel %d: exit message, exitval %d", c->self, exitval);
+
+	if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("channel %d missing mux %d", c->self, c->ctl_chan);
+
+	/* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, c->self)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, exitval)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(mux_chan->output, m)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "reply");
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+}
+
+void
+mux_tty_alloc_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	Channel *mux_chan;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("channel %d: TTY alloc failed", c->self);
+
+	if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("channel %d missing mux %d", c->self, c->ctl_chan);
+
+	/* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, c->self)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(mux_chan->output, m)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "reply");
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+}
+
+/* Prepare a mux master to listen on a Unix domain socket. */
+void
+muxserver_listen(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	mode_t old_umask;
+	char *orig_control_path = options.control_path;
+	char rbuf[16+1];
+	u_int i, r;
+	int oerrno;
+
+	if (options.control_path == NULL ||
+	    options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO)
+		return;
+
+	debug("setting up multiplex master socket");
+
+	/*
+	 * Use a temporary path before listen so we can pseudo-atomically
+	 * establish the listening socket in its final location to avoid
+	 * other processes racing in between bind() and listen() and hitting
+	 * an unready socket.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rbuf) - 1; i++) {
+		r = arc4random_uniform(26+26+10);
+		rbuf[i] = (r < 26) ? 'a' + r :
+		    (r < 26*2) ? 'A' + r - 26 :
+		    '0' + r - 26 - 26;
+	}
+	rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] = '\0';
+	options.control_path = NULL;
+	xasprintf(&options.control_path, "%s.%s", orig_control_path, rbuf);
+	debug3_f("temporary control path %s", options.control_path);
+
+	old_umask = umask(0177);
+	muxserver_sock = unix_listener(options.control_path, 64, 0);
+	oerrno = errno;
+	umask(old_umask);
+	if (muxserver_sock < 0) {
+		if (oerrno == EINVAL || oerrno == EADDRINUSE) {
+			error("ControlSocket %s already exists, "
+			    "disabling multiplexing", options.control_path);
+ disable_mux_master:
+			if (muxserver_sock != -1) {
+				close(muxserver_sock);
+				muxserver_sock = -1;
+			}
+			free(orig_control_path);
+			free(options.control_path);
+			options.control_path = NULL;
+			options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
+			return;
+		} else {
+			/* unix_listener() logs the error */
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Now atomically "move" the mux socket into position */
+	if (link(options.control_path, orig_control_path) != 0) {
+		if (errno != EEXIST) {
+			fatal_f("link mux listener %s => %s: %s",
+			    options.control_path, orig_control_path,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		}
+		error("ControlSocket %s already exists, disabling multiplexing",
+		    orig_control_path);
+		unlink(options.control_path);
+		goto disable_mux_master;
+	}
+	unlink(options.control_path);
+	free(options.control_path);
+	options.control_path = orig_control_path;
+
+	set_nonblock(muxserver_sock);
+
+	mux_listener_channel = channel_new(ssh, "mux listener",
+	    SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER, muxserver_sock, muxserver_sock, -1,
+	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+	    0, options.control_path, 1);
+	mux_listener_channel->mux_rcb = mux_master_read_cb;
+	debug3_f("mux listener channel %d fd %d",
+	    mux_listener_channel->self, mux_listener_channel->sock);
+}
+
+/* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux client session. */
+static void
+mux_session_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
+{
+	struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg;
+	const char *display;
+	Channel *c, *cc;
+	int i, r;
+	struct sshbuf *reply;
+
+	if (cctx == NULL)
+		fatal_f("cctx == NULL");
+	if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("no channel for id %d", id);
+	if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("channel %d lacks control channel %d",
+		    id, c->ctl_chan);
+	if ((reply = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+
+	if (!success) {
+		debug3_f("sending failure reply");
+		reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, cctx->rid,
+		    "Session open refused by peer");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+	if (cctx->want_x_fwd && options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
+		char *proto, *data;
+
+		/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
+		if (client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display, options.xauth_location,
+		    options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout,
+		    &proto, &data) == 0) {
+			/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+			debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+			    "spoofing.");
+			x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id,
+			    display, proto, data, 1);
+			/* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
+			client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding",
+			    CONFIRM_WARN);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) {
+		debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
+		channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "send");
+	}
+
+	client_session2_setup(ssh, id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys,
+	    cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, cctx->cmd, cctx->env);
+
+	debug3_f("sending success reply");
+	/* prepare reply */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, cctx->rid)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, c->self)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "reply");
+
+ done:
+	/* Send reply */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(cc->output, reply)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
+	sshbuf_free(reply);
+
+	if (cc->mux_pause <= 0)
+		fatal_f("mux_pause %d", cc->mux_pause);
+	cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
+	c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
+	sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd);
+	free(cctx->term);
+	if (cctx->env != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; cctx->env[i] != NULL; i++)
+			free(cctx->env[i]);
+		free(cctx->env);
+	}
+	free(cctx);
+}
+
+/* ** Multiplexing client support */
+
+/* Exit signal handler */
+static void
+control_client_sighandler(int signo)
+{
+	muxclient_terminate = signo;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Relay signal handler - used to pass some signals from mux client to
+ * mux master.
+ */
+static void
+control_client_sigrelay(int signo)
+{
+	int save_errno = errno;
+
+	if (muxserver_pid > 1)
+		kill(muxserver_pid, signo);
+
+	errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_client_read(int fd, struct sshbuf *b, size_t need)
+{
+	size_t have;
+	ssize_t len;
+	u_char *p;
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+	int r;
+
+	pfd.fd = fd;
+	pfd.events = POLLIN;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(b, need, &p)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
+	for (have = 0; have < need; ) {
+		if (muxclient_terminate) {
+			errno = EINTR;
+			return -1;
+		}
+		len = read(fd, p + have, need - have);
+		if (len == -1) {
+			switch (errno) {
+#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN)
+			case EWOULDBLOCK:
+#endif
+			case EAGAIN:
+				(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+				/* FALLTHROUGH */
+			case EINTR:
+				continue;
+			default:
+				return -1;
+			}
+		}
+		if (len == 0) {
+			errno = EPIPE;
+			return -1;
+		}
+		have += (size_t)len;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_client_write_packet(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *queue;
+	u_int have, need;
+	int r, oerrno, len;
+	const u_char *ptr;
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+
+	pfd.fd = fd;
+	pfd.events = POLLOUT;
+	if ((queue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(queue, m)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
+
+	need = sshbuf_len(queue);
+	ptr = sshbuf_ptr(queue);
+
+	for (have = 0; have < need; ) {
+		if (muxclient_terminate) {
+			sshbuf_free(queue);
+			errno = EINTR;
+			return -1;
+		}
+		len = write(fd, ptr + have, need - have);
+		if (len == -1) {
+			switch (errno) {
+#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN)
+			case EWOULDBLOCK:
+#endif
+			case EAGAIN:
+				(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
+				/* FALLTHROUGH */
+			case EINTR:
+				continue;
+			default:
+				oerrno = errno;
+				sshbuf_free(queue);
+				errno = oerrno;
+				return -1;
+			}
+		}
+		if (len == 0) {
+			sshbuf_free(queue);
+			errno = EPIPE;
+			return -1;
+		}
+		have += (u_int)len;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(queue);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_client_read_packet(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *queue;
+	size_t need, have;
+	const u_char *ptr;
+	int r, oerrno;
+
+	if ((queue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if (mux_client_read(fd, queue, 4) != 0) {
+		if ((oerrno = errno) == EPIPE)
+			debug3_f("read header failed: %s",
+			    strerror(errno));
+		sshbuf_free(queue);
+		errno = oerrno;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	need = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(queue));
+	if (mux_client_read(fd, queue, need) != 0) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		debug3_f("read body failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+		sshbuf_free(queue);
+		errno = oerrno;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(queue, &ptr, &have)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(m, ptr, have)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "dequeue");
+	sshbuf_free(queue);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_client_hello_exchange(int fd)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	u_int type, ver;
+	int r, ret = -1;
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_MSG_HELLO)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, SSHMUX_VER)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble hello");
+	/* no extensions */
+
+	if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
+		debug_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+
+	/* Read their HELLO */
+	if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
+		debug_f("read packet failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
+	if (type != MUX_MSG_HELLO) {
+		error_f("expected HELLO (%u) got %u", MUX_MSG_HELLO, type);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ver)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse version");
+	if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) {
+		error("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d "
+		    "(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	debug2_f("master version %u", ver);
+	/* No extensions are presently defined */
+	while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) {
+		char *name = NULL;
+
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0) { /* value */
+			error_fr(r, "parse extension");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		debug2("Unrecognised master extension \"%s\"", name);
+		free(name);
+	}
+	/* success */
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static u_int
+mux_client_request_alive(int fd)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	char *e;
+	u_int pid, type, rid;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "assemble");
+
+	if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
+		fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+
+	/* Read their reply */
+	if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(m);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
+	if (type != MUX_S_ALIVE) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+		fatal_f("master returned error: %s", e);
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse remote ID");
+	if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
+		fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+		    muxclient_request_id, rid);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pid)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse PID");
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+
+	debug3_f("done pid = %u", pid);
+
+	muxclient_request_id++;
+
+	return pid;
+}
+
+static void
+mux_client_request_terminate(int fd)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	char *e;
+	u_int type, rid;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_TERMINATE)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "request");
+
+	if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
+		fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+
+	/* Read their reply */
+	if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
+		/* Remote end exited already */
+		if (errno == EPIPE) {
+			sshbuf_free(m);
+			return;
+		}
+		fatal_f("read from master failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
+		fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+		    muxclient_request_id, rid);
+	switch (type) {
+	case MUX_S_OK:
+		break;
+	case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+		fatal("Master refused termination request: %s", e);
+	case MUX_S_FAILURE:
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+		fatal_f("termination request failed: %s", e);
+	default:
+		fatal_f("unexpected response from master 0x%08x", type);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+	muxclient_request_id++;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	char *e, *fwd_desc;
+	const char *lhost, *chost;
+	u_int type, rid;
+	int r;
+
+	fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, fwd);
+	debug("Requesting %s %s",
+	    cancel_flag ? "cancellation of" : "forwarding of", fwd_desc);
+	free(fwd_desc);
+
+	type = cancel_flag ? MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD : MUX_C_OPEN_FWD;
+	if (fwd->listen_path != NULL)
+		lhost = fwd->listen_path;
+	else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL)
+		lhost = "";
+	else if (*fwd->listen_host == '\0')
+		lhost = "*";
+	else
+		lhost = fwd->listen_host;
+
+	if (fwd->connect_path != NULL)
+		chost = fwd->connect_path;
+	else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL)
+		chost = "";
+	else
+		chost = fwd->connect_host;
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ftype)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, lhost)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, fwd->listen_port)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, chost)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, fwd->connect_port)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "request");
+
+	if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
+		fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+
+	/* Read their reply */
+	if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(m);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
+		fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+		    muxclient_request_id, rid);
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case MUX_S_OK:
+		break;
+	case MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT:
+		if (cancel_flag)
+			fatal_f("got MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT for cancel");
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &fwd->allocated_port)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse port");
+		verbose("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d",
+		    fwd->allocated_port,
+		    fwd->connect_host ? fwd->connect_host : "",
+		    fwd->connect_port);
+		if (muxclient_command == SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD)
+			fprintf(stdout, "%i\n", fwd->allocated_port);
+		break;
+	case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+		sshbuf_free(m);
+		error("Master refused forwarding request: %s", e);
+		return -1;
+	case MUX_S_FAILURE:
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+		sshbuf_free(m);
+		error_f("forwarding request failed: %s", e);
+		return -1;
+	default:
+		fatal_f("unexpected response from master 0x%08x", type);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+
+	muxclient_request_id++;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_client_forwards(int fd, int cancel_flag)
+{
+	int i, ret = 0;
+
+	debug3_f("%s forwardings: %d local, %d remote",
+	    cancel_flag ? "cancel" : "request",
+	    options.num_local_forwards, options.num_remote_forwards);
+
+	/* XXX ExitOnForwardingFailure */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
+		if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].connect_port == 0 ?
+		    MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC : MUX_FWD_LOCAL,
+		    options.local_forwards + i) != 0)
+			ret = -1;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+		if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, MUX_FWD_REMOTE,
+		    options.remote_forwards + i) != 0)
+			ret = -1;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_client_request_session(int fd)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	char *e;
+	const char *term = NULL;
+	u_int i, echar, rid, sid, esid, exitval, type, exitval_seen;
+	extern char **environ;
+	int r, rawmode;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) {
+		error_f("master alive request failed");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+	if (options.stdin_null && stdfd_devnull(1, 0, 0) == -1)
+		fatal_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+
+	if ((term = lookup_env_in_list("TERM", options.setenv,
+	    options.num_setenv)) == NULL || *term == '\0')
+		term = getenv("TERM");
+
+	echar = 0xffffffff;
+	if (options.escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE)
+	    echar = (u_int)options.escape_char;
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_NEW_SESSION)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, tty_flag)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.forward_x11)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.forward_agent)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, echar)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, term == NULL ? "" : term)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, command)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "request");
+
+	/* Pass environment */
+	if (options.num_send_env > 0 && environ != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
+			if (!env_permitted(environ[i]))
+				continue;
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, environ[i])) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "request sendenv");
+		}
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.setenv[i])) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "request setenv");
+	}
+
+	if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
+		fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Send the stdio file descriptors */
+	if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
+	    mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 ||
+	    mm_send_fd(fd, STDERR_FILENO) == -1)
+		fatal_f("send fds failed");
+
+	debug3_f("session request sent");
+
+	/* Read their reply */
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
+		error_f("read from master failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+		sshbuf_free(m);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
+		fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+		    muxclient_request_id, rid);
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED:
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &sid)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse session ID");
+		debug_f("master session id: %u", sid);
+		break;
+	case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+		error("Master refused session request: %s", e);
+		sshbuf_free(m);
+		return -1;
+	case MUX_S_FAILURE:
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+		error_f("session request failed: %s", e);
+		sshbuf_free(m);
+		return -1;
+	default:
+		sshbuf_free(m);
+		error_f("unexpected response from master 0x%08x", type);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	muxclient_request_id++;
+
+	if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1)
+		fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
+	platform_pledge_mux();
+
+	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
+	ssh_signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
+	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
+	ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
+
+	rawmode = tty_flag;
+	if (tty_flag)
+		enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd.
+	 * Before it does, it is expected to write an exit message.
+	 * This process must read the value and wait for the closure of
+	 * the client_fd; if this one closes early, the multiplex master will
+	 * terminate early too (possibly losing data).
+	 */
+	for (exitval = 255, exitval_seen = 0;;) {
+		sshbuf_reset(m);
+		if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0)
+			break;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
+		switch (type) {
+		case MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL:
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &esid)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse session ID");
+			if (esid != sid)
+				fatal_f("tty alloc fail on unknown session: "
+				    "my id %u theirs %u", sid, esid);
+			leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty ==
+			    REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+			rawmode = 0;
+			continue;
+		case MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE:
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &esid)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse session ID");
+			if (esid != sid)
+				fatal_f("exit on unknown session: "
+				    "my id %u theirs %u", sid, esid);
+			if (exitval_seen)
+				fatal_f("exitval sent twice");
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &exitval)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse exitval");
+			exitval_seen = 1;
+			continue;
+		default:
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+			fatal_f("master returned error: %s", e);
+		}
+	}
+
+	close(fd);
+	if (rawmode)
+		leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
+
+	if (muxclient_terminate) {
+		debug2("Exiting on signal: %s", strsignal(muxclient_terminate));
+		exitval = 255;
+	} else if (!exitval_seen) {
+		debug2("Control master terminated unexpectedly");
+		exitval = 255;
+	} else
+		debug2("Received exit status from master %d", exitval);
+
+	if (tty_flag && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
+		fprintf(stderr, "Shared connection to %s closed.\r\n", host);
+
+	exit(exitval);
+}
+
+static int
+mux_client_proxy(int fd)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	char *e;
+	u_int type, rid;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_PROXY)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "request");
+	if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
+		fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+
+	/* Read their reply */
+	if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(m);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
+		fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+		    muxclient_request_id, rid);
+	if (type != MUX_S_PROXY) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+		fatal_f("master returned error: %s", e);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+
+	debug3_f("done");
+	muxclient_request_id++;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(int fd)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	char *e;
+	u_int type, rid, sid;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) {
+		error_f("master alive request failed");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+	if (options.stdin_null && stdfd_devnull(1, 0, 0) == -1)
+		fatal_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.stdio_forward_host)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.stdio_forward_port)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "request");
+
+	if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
+		fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Send the stdio file descriptors */
+	if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
+	    mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
+		fatal_f("send fds failed");
+
+	if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1)
+		fatal_f("pledge(): %s", strerror(errno));
+	platform_pledge_mux();
+
+	debug3_f("stdio forward request sent");
+
+	/* Read their reply */
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+
+	if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
+		error_f("read from master failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+		sshbuf_free(m);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
+		fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+		    muxclient_request_id, rid);
+	switch (type) {
+	case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED:
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &sid)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse session ID");
+		debug_f("master session id: %u", sid);
+		break;
+	case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+		sshbuf_free(m);
+		fatal("Master refused stdio forwarding request: %s", e);
+	case MUX_S_FAILURE:
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+		sshbuf_free(m);
+		fatal("Stdio forwarding request failed: %s", e);
+	default:
+		sshbuf_free(m);
+		error_f("unexpected response from master 0x%08x", type);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	muxclient_request_id++;
+
+	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
+	ssh_signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
+	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
+	ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
+
+	/*
+	 * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd.
+	 */
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE ||
+		    (errno == EINTR && muxclient_terminate != 0))
+			return 0;
+		fatal_f("mux_client_read_packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+	fatal_f("master returned unexpected message %u", type);
+}
+
+static void
+mux_client_request_stop_listening(int fd)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m;
+	char *e;
+	u_int type, rid;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "request");
+
+	if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
+		fatal_f("write packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+
+	/* Read their reply */
+	if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0)
+		fatal_f("read from master failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
+		fatal_f("out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
+		    muxclient_request_id, rid);
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case MUX_S_OK:
+		break;
+	case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+		fatal("Master refused stop listening request: %s", e);
+	case MUX_S_FAILURE:
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse error message");
+		fatal_f("stop listening request failed: %s", e);
+	default:
+		fatal_f("unexpected response from master 0x%08x", type);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+	muxclient_request_id++;
+}
+
+/* Multiplex client main loop. */
+int
+muxclient(const char *path)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_un addr;
+	int sock;
+	u_int pid;
+
+	if (muxclient_command == 0) {
+		if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)
+			muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD;
+		else
+			muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN;
+	}
+
+	switch (options.control_master) {
+	case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO:
+	case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK:
+		debug("auto-mux: Trying existing master");
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	case SSHCTL_MASTER_NO:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
+	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+
+	if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path,
+	    sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
+		fatal("ControlPath too long ('%s' >= %u bytes)", path,
+		    (unsigned int)sizeof(addr.sun_path));
+
+	if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
+		fatal_f("socket(): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1) {
+		switch (muxclient_command) {
+		case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
+		case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD:
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		}
+		if (errno == ECONNREFUSED &&
+		    options.control_master != SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) {
+			debug("Stale control socket %.100s, unlinking", path);
+			unlink(path);
+		} else if (errno == ENOENT) {
+			debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path);
+		} else {
+			error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		}
+		close(sock);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	set_nonblock(sock);
+
+	if (mux_client_hello_exchange(sock) != 0) {
+		error_f("master hello exchange failed");
+		close(sock);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	switch (muxclient_command) {
+	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK:
+		if ((pid = mux_client_request_alive(sock)) == 0)
+			fatal_f("master alive check failed");
+		fprintf(stderr, "Master running (pid=%u)\r\n", pid);
+		exit(0);
+	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE:
+		mux_client_request_terminate(sock);
+		if (options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
+			fprintf(stderr, "Exit request sent.\r\n");
+		exit(0);
+	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD:
+		if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0)
+			fatal_f("master forward request failed");
+		exit(0);
+	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
+		if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) {
+			error_f("master forward request failed");
+			return -1;
+		}
+		mux_client_request_session(sock);
+		return -1;
+	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD:
+		mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(sock);
+		exit(0);
+	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP:
+		mux_client_request_stop_listening(sock);
+		if (options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
+			fprintf(stderr, "Stop listening request sent.\r\n");
+		exit(0);
+	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD:
+		if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 1) != 0)
+			error_f("master cancel forward request failed");
+		exit(0);
+	case SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY:
+		mux_client_proxy(sock);
+		return (sock);
+	default:
+		fatal("unrecognised muxclient_command %d", muxclient_command);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee6e9f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/myproposal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.71 2022/03/30 21:13:23 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#define KEX_SERVER_KEX	\
+	"sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com," \
+	"curve25519-sha256," \
+	"curve25519-sha256@libssh.org," \
+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
+	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
+	"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
+	"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
+	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
+
+#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX
+
+#define	KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG	\
+	"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+	"sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+	"sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+	"ssh-ed25519," \
+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
+	"sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com," \
+	"sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com," \
+	"rsa-sha2-512," \
+	"rsa-sha2-256"
+
+#define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
+	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
+	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
+
+#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT
+
+#define	KEX_SERVER_MAC \
+	"umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \
+	"umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \
+	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
+	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \
+	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
+	"umac-64@openssh.com," \
+	"umac-128@openssh.com," \
+	"hmac-sha2-256," \
+	"hmac-sha2-512," \
+	"hmac-sha1"
+
+#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
+
+/* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
+#define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
+	"ssh-ed25519," \
+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
+	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
+	"sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com," \
+	"sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com," \
+	"rsa-sha2-512," \
+	"rsa-sha2-256"
+
+#define	KEX_DEFAULT_COMP	"none,zlib@openssh.com"
+#define	KEX_DEFAULT_LANG	""
+
+#define KEX_CLIENT \
+	KEX_CLIENT_KEX, \
+	KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \
+	KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \
+	KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \
+	KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \
+	KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \
+	KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
+	KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
+	KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \
+	KEX_DEFAULT_LANG
+
+#define KEX_SERVER \
+	KEX_SERVER_KEX, \
+	KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \
+	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \
+	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \
+	KEX_SERVER_MAC, \
+	KEX_SERVER_MAC, \
+	KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
+	KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
+	KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \
+	KEX_DEFAULT_LANG
diff --git a/nchan.c b/nchan.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d33426f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nchan.c
@@ -0,0 +1,443 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: nchan.c,v 1.74 2022/02/01 23:32:51 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+/*
+ * SSH Protocol 1.5 aka New Channel Protocol
+ * Thanks to Martina, Axel and everyone who left Erlangen, leaving me bored.
+ * Written by Markus Friedl in October 1999
+ *
+ * Protocol versions 1.3 and 1.5 differ in the handshake protocol used for the
+ * tear down of channels:
+ *
+ * 1.3:	strict request-ack-protocol:
+ *	CLOSE	->
+ *		<-  CLOSE_CONFIRM
+ *
+ * 1.5:	uses variations of:
+ *	IEOF	->
+ *		<-  OCLOSE
+ *		<-  IEOF
+ *	OCLOSE	->
+ *	i.e. both sides have to close the channel
+ *
+ * 2.0: the EOF messages are optional
+ *
+ * See the debugging output from 'ssh -v' and 'sshd -d' of
+ * ssh-1.2.27 as an example.
+ *
+ */
+
+/* functions manipulating channel states */
+/*
+ * EVENTS update channel input/output states execute ACTIONS
+ */
+/*
+ * ACTIONS: should never update the channel states
+ */
+static void	chan_send_eof2(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+static void	chan_send_eow2(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+
+/* helper */
+static void	chan_shutdown_write(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+static void	chan_shutdown_read(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+static void	chan_shutdown_extended_read(struct ssh *, Channel *);
+
+static const char * const ostates[] = {
+	"open", "drain", "wait_ieof", "closed",
+};
+static const char * const istates[] = {
+	"open", "drain", "wait_oclose", "closed",
+};
+
+static void
+chan_set_istate(Channel *c, u_int next)
+{
+	if (c->istate > CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED || next > CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED)
+		fatal("chan_set_istate: bad state %d -> %d", c->istate, next);
+	debug2("channel %d: input %s -> %s", c->self, istates[c->istate],
+	    istates[next]);
+	c->istate = next;
+}
+
+static void
+chan_set_ostate(Channel *c, u_int next)
+{
+	if (c->ostate > CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED || next > CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+		fatal("chan_set_ostate: bad state %d -> %d", c->ostate, next);
+	debug2("channel %d: output %s -> %s", c->self, ostates[c->ostate],
+	    ostates[next]);
+	c->ostate = next;
+}
+
+void
+chan_read_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: read failed", c->self);
+	switch (c->istate) {
+	case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN:
+		chan_shutdown_read(ssh, c);
+		chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN);
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("channel %d: chan_read_failed for istate %d",
+		    c->self, c->istate);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+chan_ibuf_empty(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: ibuf empty", c->self);
+	if (sshbuf_len(c->input)) {
+		error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for non empty buffer",
+		    c->self);
+		return;
+	}
+	switch (c->istate) {
+	case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+		if (!(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_LOCAL)))
+			chan_send_eof2(ssh, c);
+		chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("channel %d: chan_ibuf_empty for istate %d",
+		    c->self, c->istate);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: obuf empty", c->self);
+	if (sshbuf_len(c->output)) {
+		error("channel %d: chan_obuf_empty for non empty buffer",
+		    c->self);
+		return;
+	}
+	switch (c->ostate) {
+	case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+		chan_shutdown_write(ssh, c);
+		chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED);
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("channel %d: internal error: obuf_empty for ostate %d",
+		    c->self, c->ostate);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+chan_rcvd_eow(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: rcvd eow", c->self);
+	switch (c->istate) {
+	case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN:
+		chan_shutdown_read(ssh, c);
+		chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+chan_send_eof2(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	debug2("channel %d: send eof", c->self);
+	switch (c->istate) {
+	case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+		if (!c->have_remote_id)
+			fatal_f("channel %d: no remote_id", c->self);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "send CHANNEL_EOF");
+		c->flags |= CHAN_EOF_SENT;
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("channel %d: cannot send eof for istate %d",
+		    c->self, c->istate);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+chan_send_close2(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	debug2("channel %d: send close", c->self);
+	if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED ||
+	    c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED) {
+		error("channel %d: cannot send close for istate/ostate %d/%d",
+		    c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
+	} else if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) {
+		error("channel %d: already sent close", c->self);
+	} else {
+		if (!c->have_remote_id)
+			fatal_f("channel %d: no remote_id", c->self);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "send CHANNEL_EOF");
+		c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT;
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+chan_send_eow2(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	debug2("channel %d: send eow", c->self);
+	if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) {
+		error("channel %d: must not sent eow on closed output",
+		    c->self);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH))
+		return;
+	if (!c->have_remote_id)
+		fatal_f("channel %d: no remote_id", c->self);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "eow@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send CHANNEL_EOF");
+}
+
+/* shared */
+
+void
+chan_rcvd_ieof(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: rcvd eof", c->self);
+	c->flags |= CHAN_EOF_RCVD;
+	if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN)
+		chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN);
+	if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN &&
+	    sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0 &&
+	    !CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c))
+		chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c);
+}
+
+void
+chan_rcvd_oclose(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: rcvd close", c->self);
+	if (!(c->flags & CHAN_LOCAL)) {
+		if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)
+			error("channel %d: protocol error: close rcvd twice",
+			    c->self);
+		c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD;
+	}
+	if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) {
+		/* tear down larval channels immediately */
+		chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED);
+		chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
+		return;
+	}
+	switch (c->ostate) {
+	case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN:
+		/*
+		 * wait until a data from the channel is consumed if a CLOSE
+		 * is received
+		 */
+		chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN);
+		break;
+	}
+	switch (c->istate) {
+	case CHAN_INPUT_OPEN:
+		chan_shutdown_read(ssh, c);
+		chan_shutdown_extended_read(ssh, c);
+		chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
+		break;
+	case CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+		if (!(c->flags & CHAN_LOCAL))
+			chan_send_eof2(ssh, c);
+		chan_shutdown_extended_read(ssh, c);
+		chan_set_istate(c, CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+chan_write_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	debug2("channel %d: write failed", c->self);
+	switch (c->ostate) {
+	case CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN:
+	case CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN:
+		chan_shutdown_write(ssh, c);
+		if (strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0)
+			chan_send_eow2(ssh, c);
+		chan_set_ostate(c, CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED);
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("channel %d: chan_write_failed for ostate %d",
+		    c->self, c->ostate);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+chan_mark_dead(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE;
+}
+
+int
+chan_is_dead(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int do_send)
+{
+	if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE) {
+		debug2("channel %d: zombie", c->self);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	if (c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED || c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+		return 0;
+	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF) &&
+	    c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE &&
+	    c->efd != -1 &&
+	    sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0) {
+		debug2("channel %d: active efd: %d len %zu",
+		    c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended));
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (c->flags & CHAN_LOCAL) {
+		debug2("channel %d: is dead (local)", c->self);
+		return 1;
+	}		
+	if (!(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
+		if (do_send) {
+			chan_send_close2(ssh, c);
+		} else {
+			/* channel would be dead if we sent a close */
+			if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD) {
+				debug2("channel %d: almost dead",
+				    c->self);
+				return 1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if ((c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT) &&
+	    (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) {
+		debug2("channel %d: is dead", c->self);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* helper */
+static void
+chan_shutdown_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	sshbuf_reset(c->output);
+	if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)
+		return;
+	/* shutdown failure is allowed if write failed already */
+	debug2_f("channel %d: (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])",
+	    c->self, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->wfd, c->efd,
+	    channel_format_extended_usage(c));
+	if (c->sock != -1) {
+		if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_WR) == -1) {
+			debug2_f("channel %d: shutdown() failed for "
+			    "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, c->sock,
+			    c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno));
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd) < 0) {
+			logit_f("channel %d: close() failed for "
+			    "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, c->wfd,
+			    c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno));
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+chan_shutdown_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)
+		return;
+	debug2_f("channel %d: (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])",
+	    c->self, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->rfd, c->efd,
+	    channel_format_extended_usage(c));
+	if (c->sock != -1) {
+		/*
+		 * shutdown(sock, SHUT_READ) may return ENOTCONN if the
+		 * write side has been closed already. (bug on Linux)
+		 * HP-UX may return ENOTCONN also.
+		 */
+		if (shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RD) == -1 && errno != ENOTCONN) {
+			error_f("channel %d: shutdown() failed for "
+			    "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, c->sock,
+			    c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno));
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd) < 0) {
+			logit_f("channel %d: close() failed for "
+			    "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, c->rfd,
+			    c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno));
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+chan_shutdown_extended_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
+{
+	if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL || c->efd == -1)
+		return;
+	if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_READ &&
+	    c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE)
+		return;
+	debug_f("channel %d: (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])",
+	    c->self, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->rfd, c->efd,
+	    channel_format_extended_usage(c));
+	if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd) < 0) {
+		logit_f("channel %d: close() failed for "
+		    "extended fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s", c->self, c->efd,
+		    c->istate, c->ostate, strerror(errno));
+	}
+}
diff --git a/nchan.ms b/nchan.ms
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5757601
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nchan.ms
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+.\"	$OpenBSD: nchan.ms,v 1.8 2003/11/21 11:57:03 djm Exp $
+.\"
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.TL
+OpenSSH Channel Close Protocol 1.5 Implementation
+.SH
+Channel Input State Diagram
+.PS
+reset
+l=1
+s=1.2
+ellipsewid=s*ellipsewid
+boxwid=s*boxwid
+ellipseht=s*ellipseht
+S1: ellipse "INPUT" "OPEN"
+move right 2*l from last ellipse.e
+S4: ellipse "INPUT" "CLOSED"
+move down l from last ellipse.s
+S3: ellipse "INPUT" "WAIT" "OCLOSED"
+move down l from 1st ellipse.s
+S2: ellipse "INPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN"
+arrow "" "rcvd OCLOSE/" "shutdown_read" "send IEOF" from S1.e to S4.w
+arrow "ibuf_empty/" "send IEOF" from S2.e to S3.w
+arrow from S1.s to S2.n
+box invis "read_failed/" "shutdown_read" with .e at last arrow.c
+arrow  from S3.n to S4.s
+box invis "rcvd OCLOSE/" "-" with .w at last arrow.c
+ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4
+arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w
+arrow from S2.ne to S4.sw
+box invis "rcvd OCLOSE/     " with .e at last arrow.c
+box invis " send IEOF" with .w at last arrow.c
+.PE
+.SH
+Channel Output State Diagram
+.PS
+S1: ellipse "OUTPUT" "OPEN"
+move right 2*l from last ellipse.e
+S3: ellipse "OUTPUT" "WAIT" "IEOF"
+move down l from last ellipse.s
+S4: ellipse "OUTPUT" "CLOSED"
+move down l from 1st ellipse.s
+S2: ellipse "OUTPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN"
+arrow "" "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "send OCLOSE" from S1.e to S3.w
+arrow "obuf_empty ||" "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "send OCLOSE" from S2.e to S4.w
+arrow from S1.s to S2.n
+box invis "rcvd IEOF/" "-" with .e at last arrow.c
+arrow from S3.s to S4.n
+box invis "rcvd IEOF/" "-" with .w at last arrow.c
+ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4
+arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w
+.PE
+.SH
+Notes
+.PP
+The input buffer is filled with data from the socket
+(the socket represents the local consumer/producer of the
+forwarded channel).
+The data is then sent over the INPUT-end (transmit-end) of the channel to the
+remote peer.
+Data sent by the peer is received on the OUTPUT-end (receive-end),
+saved in the output buffer and written to the socket.
+.PP
+If the local protocol instance has forwarded all data on the
+INPUT-end of the channel, it sends an IEOF message to the peer.
+If the peer receives the IEOF and has consumed all
+data he replies with an OCLOSE.
+When the local instance receives the OCLOSE
+he considers the INPUT-half of the channel closed.
+The peer has his OUTOUT-half closed.
+.PP
+A channel can be deallocated by a protocol instance
+if both the INPUT- and the OUTOUT-half on his
+side of the channel are closed.
+Note that when an instance is unable to consume the
+received data, he is permitted to send an OCLOSE
+before the matching IEOF is received.
diff --git a/nchan2.ms b/nchan2.ms
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7001504
--- /dev/null
+++ b/nchan2.ms
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+.\"	$OpenBSD: nchan2.ms,v 1.4 2008/05/15 23:52:24 djm Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.TL
+OpenSSH Channel Close Protocol 2.0 Implementation
+.SH
+Channel Input State Diagram
+.PS
+reset
+l=1
+s=1.2
+ellipsewid=s*ellipsewid
+boxwid=s*boxwid
+ellipseht=s*ellipseht
+S1: ellipse "INPUT" "OPEN"
+move right 2*l from last ellipse.e
+S3: ellipse invis
+move down l from last ellipse.s
+S4: ellipse "INPUT" "CLOSED"
+move down l from 1st ellipse.s
+S2: ellipse "INPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN"
+arrow from S1.e to S4.n
+box invis "rcvd CLOSE/" "shutdown_read" with .sw at last arrow.c
+arrow "ibuf_empty ||" "rcvd CLOSE/" "send EOF" "" from S2.e to S4.w
+arrow from S1.s to S2.n
+box invis "read_failed ||" "rcvd EOW/" "shutdown_read" with .e at last arrow.c
+ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4
+arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w
+.PE
+.SH
+Channel Output State Diagram
+.PS
+S1: ellipse "OUTPUT" "OPEN"
+move right 2*l from last ellipse.e
+S3: ellipse invis
+move down l from last ellipse.s
+S4: ellipse "OUTPUT" "CLOSED"
+move down l from 1st ellipse.s
+S2: ellipse "OUTPUT" "WAIT" "DRAIN"
+arrow from S1.e to S4.n
+box invis "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "send EOW" with .sw at last arrow.c
+arrow "obuf_empty ||" "write_failed/" "shutdown_write" "" from S2.e to S4.w
+arrow from S1.s to S2.n
+box invis "rcvd EOF ||" "rcvd CLOSE/" "-" with .e at last arrow.c
+ellipse wid .9*ellipsewid ht .9*ellipseht at S4
+arrow "start" "" from S1.w+(-0.5,0) to S1.w
+.PE
+.SH
+Notes
+.PP
+The input buffer is filled with data from the socket
+(the socket represents the local consumer/producer of the
+forwarded channel).
+The data is then sent over the INPUT-end (transmit-end) of the channel to the
+remote peer.
+Data sent by the peer is received on the OUTPUT-end (receive-end),
+saved in the output buffer and written to the socket.
+.PP
+If the local protocol instance has forwarded all data on the
+INPUT-end of the channel, it sends an EOF message to the peer.
+.PP
+A CLOSE message is sent to the peer if
+both the INPUT- and the OUTOUT-half of the local
+end of the channel are closed.
+.PP
+The channel can be deallocated by a protocol instance
+if a CLOSE message he been both sent and received.
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d54995
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
+piddir=@piddir@
+srcdir=@srcdir@
+top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+
+VPATH=@srcdir@
+CC=@CC@
+LD=@LD@
+CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+CFLAGS_NOPIE=@CFLAGS_NOPIE@
+CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@
+PICFLAG=@PICFLAG@
+LIBS=@LIBS@
+AR=@AR@
+RANLIB=@RANLIB@
+INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
+LDFLAGS_NOPIE=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS_NOPIE@
+
+OPENBSD=arc4random.o \
+	arc4random_uniform.o \
+	base64.o \
+	basename.o \
+	bcrypt_pbkdf.o \
+	bindresvport.o \
+	blowfish.o \
+	daemon.o \
+	dirname.o \
+	explicit_bzero.o \
+	fmt_scaled.o \
+	freezero.o \
+	fnmatch.o \
+	getcwd.o \
+	getgrouplist.o \
+	getopt_long.o \
+	getrrsetbyname.o \
+	glob.o \
+	inet_aton.o \
+	inet_ntoa.o \
+	inet_ntop.o \
+	md5.o \
+	memmem.o \
+	mktemp.o \
+	pwcache.o \
+	readpassphrase.o \
+	reallocarray.o \
+	recallocarray.o \
+	rresvport.o \
+	setenv.o \
+	setproctitle.o \
+	sha1.o \
+	sha2.o \
+	sigact.o \
+	strcasestr.o \
+	strlcat.o \
+	strlcpy.o \
+	strmode.o \
+	strndup.o \
+	strnlen.o \
+	strptime.o \
+	strsep.o \
+	strtoll.o \
+	strtonum.o \
+	strtoull.o \
+	strtoul.o \
+	timingsafe_bcmp.o \
+	vis.o
+
+COMPAT= bsd-asprintf.o \
+	bsd-closefrom.o \
+	bsd-cygwin_util.o \
+	bsd-err.o \
+	bsd-flock.o \
+	bsd-getentropy.o \
+	bsd-getline.o \
+	bsd-getpagesize.o \
+	bsd-getpeereid.o \
+	bsd-malloc.o \
+	bsd-misc.o \
+	bsd-nextstep.o \
+	bsd-openpty.o \
+	bsd-poll.o \
+	bsd-pselect.o \
+	bsd-setres_id.o \
+	bsd-signal.o \
+	bsd-snprintf.o \
+	bsd-statvfs.o \
+	bsd-timegm.o \
+	bsd-waitpid.o \
+	fake-rfc2553.o \
+	getrrsetbyname-ldns.o \
+	kludge-fd_set.o \
+	openssl-compat.o \
+	libressl-api-compat.o \
+	xcrypt.o
+
+PORTS=	port-aix.o \
+	port-irix.o \
+	port-linux.o \
+	port-prngd.o \
+	port-solaris.o \
+	port-net.o \
+	port-uw.o
+
+.c.o:
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+
+all: libopenbsd-compat.a
+
+$(COMPAT): ../config.h
+$(OPENBSD): ../config.h
+$(PORTS): ../config.h
+
+libopenbsd-compat.a:  $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS)
+	$(AR) rv $@ $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS)
+	$(RANLIB) $@
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *.o *.a core
+
+distclean: clean
+	rm -f Makefile *~
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c b/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ffd3373
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c
@@ -0,0 +1,254 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: arc4random.c,v 1.58 2022/07/31 13:41:45 tb Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm@uun.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2013, Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2014, Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * ChaCha based random number generator for OpenBSD.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/crypt/arc4random.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
+
+/*
+ * Always use the getentropy implementation from bsd-getentropy.c, which
+ * will call a native getentropy if available then fall back as required.
+ * We use a different name so that OpenSSL cannot call the wrong getentropy.
+ */
+int _ssh_compat_getentropy(void *, size_t);
+#ifdef getentropy
+# undef getentropy
+#endif
+#define getentropy(x, y) (_ssh_compat_getentropy((x), (y)))
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+#define KEYSTREAM_ONLY
+#include "chacha_private.h"
+
+#define minimum(a, b) ((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b))
+
+#if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(_MSC_VER)
+#define inline __inline
+#else				/* __GNUC__ || _MSC_VER */
+#define inline
+#endif				/* !__GNUC__ && !_MSC_VER */
+
+#define KEYSZ	32
+#define IVSZ	8
+#define BLOCKSZ	64
+#define RSBUFSZ	(16*BLOCKSZ)
+
+#define REKEY_BASE	(1024*1024) /* NB. should be a power of 2 */
+
+/* Marked MAP_INHERIT_ZERO, so zero'd out in fork children. */
+static struct _rs {
+	size_t		rs_have;	/* valid bytes at end of rs_buf */
+	size_t		rs_count;	/* bytes till reseed */
+} *rs;
+
+/* Maybe be preserved in fork children, if _rs_allocate() decides. */
+static struct _rsx {
+	chacha_ctx	rs_chacha;	/* chacha context for random keystream */
+	u_char		rs_buf[RSBUFSZ];	/* keystream blocks */
+} *rsx;
+
+static inline int _rs_allocate(struct _rs **, struct _rsx **);
+static inline void _rs_forkdetect(void);
+#include "arc4random.h"
+
+static inline void _rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen);
+
+static inline void
+_rs_init(u_char *buf, size_t n)
+{
+	if (n < KEYSZ + IVSZ)
+		return;
+
+	if (rs == NULL) {
+		if (_rs_allocate(&rs, &rsx) == -1)
+			_exit(1);
+	}
+
+	chacha_keysetup(&rsx->rs_chacha, buf, KEYSZ * 8);
+	chacha_ivsetup(&rsx->rs_chacha, buf + KEYSZ);
+}
+
+static void
+_rs_stir(void)
+{
+	u_char rnd[KEYSZ + IVSZ];
+	uint32_t rekey_fuzz = 0;
+
+	if (getentropy(rnd, sizeof rnd) == -1)
+		_getentropy_fail();
+
+	if (!rs)
+		_rs_init(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+	else
+		_rs_rekey(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+	explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));	/* discard source seed */
+
+	/* invalidate rs_buf */
+	rs->rs_have = 0;
+	memset(rsx->rs_buf, 0, sizeof(rsx->rs_buf));
+
+	/* rekey interval should not be predictable */
+	chacha_encrypt_bytes(&rsx->rs_chacha, (uint8_t *)&rekey_fuzz,
+	    (uint8_t *)&rekey_fuzz, sizeof(rekey_fuzz));
+	rs->rs_count = REKEY_BASE + (rekey_fuzz % REKEY_BASE);
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_stir_if_needed(size_t len)
+{
+	_rs_forkdetect();
+	if (!rs || rs->rs_count <= len)
+		_rs_stir();
+	if (rs->rs_count <= len)
+		rs->rs_count = 0;
+	else
+		rs->rs_count -= len;
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen)
+{
+#ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY
+	memset(rsx->rs_buf, 0, sizeof(rsx->rs_buf));
+#endif
+	/* fill rs_buf with the keystream */
+	chacha_encrypt_bytes(&rsx->rs_chacha, rsx->rs_buf,
+	    rsx->rs_buf, sizeof(rsx->rs_buf));
+	/* mix in optional user provided data */
+	if (dat) {
+		size_t i, m;
+
+		m = minimum(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
+		for (i = 0; i < m; i++)
+			rsx->rs_buf[i] ^= dat[i];
+	}
+	/* immediately reinit for backtracking resistance */
+	_rs_init(rsx->rs_buf, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
+	memset(rsx->rs_buf, 0, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
+	rs->rs_have = sizeof(rsx->rs_buf) - KEYSZ - IVSZ;
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
+{
+	u_char *buf = (u_char *)_buf;
+	u_char *keystream;
+	size_t m;
+
+	_rs_stir_if_needed(n);
+	while (n > 0) {
+		if (rs->rs_have > 0) {
+			m = minimum(n, rs->rs_have);
+			keystream = rsx->rs_buf + sizeof(rsx->rs_buf)
+			    - rs->rs_have;
+			memcpy(buf, keystream, m);
+			memset(keystream, 0, m);
+			buf += m;
+			n -= m;
+			rs->rs_have -= m;
+		}
+		if (rs->rs_have == 0)
+			_rs_rekey(NULL, 0);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_random_u32(uint32_t *val)
+{
+	u_char *keystream;
+
+	_rs_stir_if_needed(sizeof(*val));
+	if (rs->rs_have < sizeof(*val))
+		_rs_rekey(NULL, 0);
+	keystream = rsx->rs_buf + sizeof(rsx->rs_buf) - rs->rs_have;
+	memcpy(val, keystream, sizeof(*val));
+	memset(keystream, 0, sizeof(*val));
+	rs->rs_have -= sizeof(*val);
+}
+
+uint32_t
+arc4random(void)
+{
+	uint32_t val;
+
+	_ARC4_LOCK();
+	_rs_random_u32(&val);
+	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
+	return val;
+}
+DEF_WEAK(arc4random);
+
+/*
+ * If we are providing arc4random, then we can provide a more efficient
+ * arc4random_buf().
+ */
+# ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
+void
+arc4random_buf(void *buf, size_t n)
+{
+	_ARC4_LOCK();
+	_rs_random_buf(buf, n);
+	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
+}
+DEF_WEAK(arc4random_buf);
+# endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF */
+#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
+
+/* arc4random_buf() that uses platform arc4random() */
+#if !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM)
+void
+arc4random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
+{
+	size_t i;
+	u_int32_t r = 0;
+	char *buf = (char *)_buf;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		if (i % 4 == 0)
+			r = arc4random();
+		buf[i] = r & 0xff;
+		r >>= 8;
+	}
+	explicit_bzero(&r, sizeof(r));
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) */
+
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/arc4random.h b/openbsd-compat/arc4random.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5af3a44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/arc4random.h
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: arc4random_linux.h,v 1.12 2019/07/11 10:37:28 inoguchi Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm@uun.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2013, Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2014, Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Stub functions for portability.  From LibreSSL with some adaptations.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
+
+/* OpenSSH isn't multithreaded */
+#define _ARC4_LOCK()
+#define _ARC4_UNLOCK()
+#define _ARC4_ATFORK(f)
+
+static inline void
+_getentropy_fail(void)
+{
+	fatal("getentropy failed");
+}
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t _rs_forked;
+
+static inline void
+_rs_forkhandler(void)
+{
+	_rs_forked = 1;
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_forkdetect(void)
+{
+	static pid_t _rs_pid = 0;
+	pid_t pid = getpid();
+
+	if (_rs_pid == 0 || _rs_pid == 1 || _rs_pid != pid || _rs_forked) {
+		_rs_pid = pid;
+		_rs_forked = 0;
+		if (rs)
+			memset(rs, 0, sizeof(*rs));
+	}
+}
+
+static inline int
+_rs_allocate(struct _rs **rsp, struct _rsx **rsxp)
+{
+#if defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_PRIVATE)
+	if ((*rsp = mmap(NULL, sizeof(**rsp), PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
+	    MAP_ANON|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0)) == MAP_FAILED)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if ((*rsxp = mmap(NULL, sizeof(**rsxp), PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
+	    MAP_ANON|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0)) == MAP_FAILED) {
+		munmap(*rsp, sizeof(**rsp));
+		*rsp = NULL;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+#else
+	if ((*rsp = calloc(1, sizeof(**rsp))) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	if ((*rsxp = calloc(1, sizeof(**rsxp))) == NULL) {
+		free(*rsp);
+		*rsp = NULL;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	_ARC4_ATFORK(_rs_forkhandler);
+	return (0);
+}
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/arc4random_uniform.c b/openbsd-compat/arc4random_uniform.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..591f92d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/arc4random_uniform.c
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: arc4random_uniform.c,v 1.3 2019/01/20 02:59:07 bcook Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/crypto/arc4random_uniform.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
+/*
+ * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound
+ * avoiding "modulo bias".
+ *
+ * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one
+ * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound).  This
+ * guarantees the selected random number will be inside
+ * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound)
+ * after reduction modulo upper_bound.
+ */
+uint32_t
+arc4random_uniform(uint32_t upper_bound)
+{
+	uint32_t r, min;
+
+	if (upper_bound < 2)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* 2**32 % x == (2**32 - x) % x */
+	min = -upper_bound % upper_bound;
+
+	/*
+	 * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has
+	 * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a
+	 * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need
+	 * to re-roll.
+	 */
+	for (;;) {
+		r = arc4random();
+		if (r >= min)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return r % upper_bound;
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/base64.c b/openbsd-compat/base64.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e5faba3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/base64.c
@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: base64.c,v 1.5 2006/10/21 09:55:03 otto Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS
+ * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE
+ * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
+ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
+ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1995 by International Business Machines, Inc.
+ *
+ * International Business Machines, Inc. (hereinafter called IBM) grants
+ * permission under its copyrights to use, copy, modify, and distribute this
+ * Software with or without fee, provided that the above copyright notice and
+ * all paragraphs of this notice appear in all copies, and that the name of IBM
+ * not be used in connection with the marketing of any product incorporating
+ * the Software or modifications thereof, without specific, written prior
+ * permission.
+ *
+ * To the extent it has a right to do so, IBM grants an immunity from suit
+ * under its patents, if any, for the use, sale or manufacture of products to
+ * the extent that such products are used for performing Domain Name System
+ * dynamic updates in TCP/IP networks by means of the Software.  No immunity is
+ * granted for any product per se or for any other function of any product.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", AND IBM DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES,
+ * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  IN NO EVENT SHALL IBM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL,
+ * DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN
+ * IF IBM IS APPRISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/base64.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if (!defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP)) || (!defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON))
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "base64.h"
+
+static const char Base64[] =
+	"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+static const char Pad64 = '=';
+
+/* (From RFC1521 and draft-ietf-dnssec-secext-03.txt)
+   The following encoding technique is taken from RFC 1521 by Borenstein
+   and Freed.  It is reproduced here in a slightly edited form for
+   convenience.
+
+   A 65-character subset of US-ASCII is used, enabling 6 bits to be
+   represented per printable character. (The extra 65th character, "=",
+   is used to signify a special processing function.)
+
+   The encoding process represents 24-bit groups of input bits as output
+   strings of 4 encoded characters. Proceeding from left to right, a
+   24-bit input group is formed by concatenating 3 8-bit input groups.
+   These 24 bits are then treated as 4 concatenated 6-bit groups, each
+   of which is translated into a single digit in the base64 alphabet.
+
+   Each 6-bit group is used as an index into an array of 64 printable
+   characters. The character referenced by the index is placed in the
+   output string.
+
+                         Table 1: The Base64 Alphabet
+
+      Value Encoding  Value Encoding  Value Encoding  Value Encoding
+          0 A            17 R            34 i            51 z
+          1 B            18 S            35 j            52 0
+          2 C            19 T            36 k            53 1
+          3 D            20 U            37 l            54 2
+          4 E            21 V            38 m            55 3
+          5 F            22 W            39 n            56 4
+          6 G            23 X            40 o            57 5
+          7 H            24 Y            41 p            58 6
+          8 I            25 Z            42 q            59 7
+          9 J            26 a            43 r            60 8
+         10 K            27 b            44 s            61 9
+         11 L            28 c            45 t            62 +
+         12 M            29 d            46 u            63 /
+         13 N            30 e            47 v
+         14 O            31 f            48 w         (pad) =
+         15 P            32 g            49 x
+         16 Q            33 h            50 y
+
+   Special processing is performed if fewer than 24 bits are available
+   at the end of the data being encoded.  A full encoding quantum is
+   always completed at the end of a quantity.  When fewer than 24 input
+   bits are available in an input group, zero bits are added (on the
+   right) to form an integral number of 6-bit groups.  Padding at the
+   end of the data is performed using the '=' character.
+
+   Since all base64 input is an integral number of octets, only the
+         -------------------------------------------------                       
+   following cases can arise:
+   
+       (1) the final quantum of encoding input is an integral
+           multiple of 24 bits; here, the final unit of encoded
+	   output will be an integral multiple of 4 characters
+	   with no "=" padding,
+       (2) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 8 bits;
+           here, the final unit of encoded output will be two
+	   characters followed by two "=" padding characters, or
+       (3) the final quantum of encoding input is exactly 16 bits;
+           here, the final unit of encoded output will be three
+	   characters followed by one "=" padding character.
+   */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP) 
+int
+b64_ntop(u_char const *src, size_t srclength, char *target, size_t targsize)
+{
+	size_t datalength = 0;
+	u_char input[3];
+	u_char output[4];
+	u_int i;
+
+	while (2 < srclength) {
+		input[0] = *src++;
+		input[1] = *src++;
+		input[2] = *src++;
+		srclength -= 3;
+
+		output[0] = input[0] >> 2;
+		output[1] = ((input[0] & 0x03) << 4) + (input[1] >> 4);
+		output[2] = ((input[1] & 0x0f) << 2) + (input[2] >> 6);
+		output[3] = input[2] & 0x3f;
+
+		if (datalength + 4 > targsize)
+			return (-1);
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[0]];
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[1]];
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[2]];
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[3]];
+	}
+    
+	/* Now we worry about padding. */
+	if (0 != srclength) {
+		/* Get what's left. */
+		input[0] = input[1] = input[2] = '\0';
+		for (i = 0; i < srclength; i++)
+			input[i] = *src++;
+	
+		output[0] = input[0] >> 2;
+		output[1] = ((input[0] & 0x03) << 4) + (input[1] >> 4);
+		output[2] = ((input[1] & 0x0f) << 2) + (input[2] >> 6);
+
+		if (datalength + 4 > targsize)
+			return (-1);
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[0]];
+		target[datalength++] = Base64[output[1]];
+		if (srclength == 1)
+			target[datalength++] = Pad64;
+		else
+			target[datalength++] = Base64[output[2]];
+		target[datalength++] = Pad64;
+	}
+	if (datalength >= targsize)
+		return (-1);
+	target[datalength] = '\0';	/* Returned value doesn't count \0. */
+	return (datalength);
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_B64_NTOP) && !defined(HAVE___B64_NTOP) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON)
+
+/* skips all whitespace anywhere.
+   converts characters, four at a time, starting at (or after)
+   src from base - 64 numbers into three 8 bit bytes in the target area.
+   it returns the number of data bytes stored at the target, or -1 on error.
+ */
+
+int
+b64_pton(char const *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize)
+{
+	u_int tarindex, state;
+	int ch;
+	char *pos;
+
+	state = 0;
+	tarindex = 0;
+
+	while ((ch = *src++) != '\0') {
+		if (isspace(ch))	/* Skip whitespace anywhere. */
+			continue;
+
+		if (ch == Pad64)
+			break;
+
+		pos = strchr(Base64, ch);
+		if (pos == 0)		/* A non-base64 character. */
+			return (-1);
+
+		switch (state) {
+		case 0:
+			if (target) {
+				if (tarindex >= targsize)
+					return (-1);
+				target[tarindex] = (pos - Base64) << 2;
+			}
+			state = 1;
+			break;
+		case 1:
+			if (target) {
+				if (tarindex + 1 >= targsize)
+					return (-1);
+				target[tarindex]   |=  (pos - Base64) >> 4;
+				target[tarindex+1]  = ((pos - Base64) & 0x0f)
+							<< 4 ;
+			}
+			tarindex++;
+			state = 2;
+			break;
+		case 2:
+			if (target) {
+				if (tarindex + 1 >= targsize)
+					return (-1);
+				target[tarindex]   |=  (pos - Base64) >> 2;
+				target[tarindex+1]  = ((pos - Base64) & 0x03)
+							<< 6;
+			}
+			tarindex++;
+			state = 3;
+			break;
+		case 3:
+			if (target) {
+				if (tarindex >= targsize)
+					return (-1);
+				target[tarindex] |= (pos - Base64);
+			}
+			tarindex++;
+			state = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We are done decoding Base-64 chars.  Let's see if we ended
+	 * on a byte boundary, and/or with erroneous trailing characters.
+	 */
+
+	if (ch == Pad64) {		/* We got a pad char. */
+		ch = *src++;		/* Skip it, get next. */
+		switch (state) {
+		case 0:		/* Invalid = in first position */
+		case 1:		/* Invalid = in second position */
+			return (-1);
+
+		case 2:		/* Valid, means one byte of info */
+			/* Skip any number of spaces. */
+			for (; ch != '\0'; ch = *src++)
+				if (!isspace(ch))
+					break;
+			/* Make sure there is another trailing = sign. */
+			if (ch != Pad64)
+				return (-1);
+			ch = *src++;		/* Skip the = */
+			/* Fall through to "single trailing =" case. */
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+
+		case 3:		/* Valid, means two bytes of info */
+			/*
+			 * We know this char is an =.  Is there anything but
+			 * whitespace after it?
+			 */
+			for (; ch != '\0'; ch = *src++)
+				if (!isspace(ch))
+					return (-1);
+
+			/*
+			 * Now make sure for cases 2 and 3 that the "extra"
+			 * bits that slopped past the last full byte were
+			 * zeros.  If we don't check them, they become a
+			 * subliminal channel.
+			 */
+			if (target && target[tarindex] != 0)
+				return (-1);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * We ended by seeing the end of the string.  Make sure we
+		 * have no partial bytes lying around.
+		 */
+		if (state != 0)
+			return (-1);
+	}
+
+	return (tarindex);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_B64_PTON) && !defined(HAVE___B64_PTON) */
+#endif 
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/base64.h b/openbsd-compat/base64.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd77293
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/base64.h
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS
+ * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE
+ * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
+ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
+ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1995 by International Business Machines, Inc.
+ *
+ * International Business Machines, Inc. (hereinafter called IBM) grants
+ * permission under its copyrights to use, copy, modify, and distribute this
+ * Software with or without fee, provided that the above copyright notice and
+ * all paragraphs of this notice appear in all copies, and that the name of IBM
+ * not be used in connection with the marketing of any product incorporating
+ * the Software or modifications thereof, without specific, written prior
+ * permission.
+ *
+ * To the extent it has a right to do so, IBM grants an immunity from suit
+ * under its patents, if any, for the use, sale or manufacture of products to
+ * the extent that such products are used for performing Domain Name System
+ * dynamic updates in TCP/IP networks by means of the Software.  No immunity is
+ * granted for any product per se or for any other function of any product.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", AND IBM DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES,
+ * INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+ * PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  IN NO EVENT SHALL IBM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL,
+ * DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN
+ * IF IBM IS APPRISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_BASE64_H
+#define _BSD_BASE64_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE___B64_NTOP
+# ifndef HAVE_B64_NTOP
+int b64_ntop(u_char const *src, size_t srclength, char *target,
+    size_t targsize);
+# endif /* !HAVE_B64_NTOP */
+# define __b64_ntop(a,b,c,d) b64_ntop(a,b,c,d)
+#endif /* HAVE___B64_NTOP */
+
+#ifndef HAVE___B64_PTON
+# ifndef HAVE_B64_PTON
+int b64_pton(char const *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize);
+# endif /* !HAVE_B64_PTON */
+# define __b64_pton(a,b,c) b64_pton(a,b,c)
+#endif /* HAVE___B64_PTON */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_BASE64_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/basename.c b/openbsd-compat/basename.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ffa5c89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/basename.c
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: basename.c,v 1.14 2005/08/08 08:05:33 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1997, 2004 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/basename.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_BASENAME
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+char *
+basename(const char *path)
+{
+	static char bname[MAXPATHLEN];
+	size_t len;
+	const char *endp, *startp;
+
+	/* Empty or NULL string gets treated as "." */
+	if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
+		bname[0] = '.';
+		bname[1] = '\0';
+		return (bname);
+	}
+
+	/* Strip any trailing slashes */
+	endp = path + strlen(path) - 1;
+	while (endp > path && *endp == '/')
+		endp--;
+
+	/* All slashes becomes "/" */
+	if (endp == path && *endp == '/') {
+		bname[0] = '/';
+		bname[1] = '\0';
+		return (bname);
+	}
+
+	/* Find the start of the base */
+	startp = endp;
+	while (startp > path && *(startp - 1) != '/')
+		startp--;
+
+	len = endp - startp + 1;
+	if (len >= sizeof(bname)) {
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	memcpy(bname, startp, len);
+	bname[len] = '\0';
+	return (bname);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_BASENAME) */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c b/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a22ba3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.16 2020/08/02 18:35:48 tb Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Ted Unangst <tedu@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libutil/bcrypt_pbkdf.c */
+
+/* This version has been modified to use SHA512 from SUPERCOP */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H
+# include <stdlib.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_BLF_H
+# include <blf.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+#ifdef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
+# undef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH
+#endif
+#define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES
+
+#define	MINIMUM(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
+
+/*
+ * pkcs #5 pbkdf2 implementation using the "bcrypt" hash
+ *
+ * The bcrypt hash function is derived from the bcrypt password hashing
+ * function with the following modifications:
+ * 1. The input password and salt are preprocessed with SHA512.
+ * 2. The output length is expanded to 256 bits.
+ * 3. Subsequently the magic string to be encrypted is lengthened and modifed
+ *    to "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite"
+ * 4. The hash function is defined to perform 64 rounds of initial state
+ *    expansion. (More rounds are performed by iterating the hash.)
+ *
+ * Note that this implementation pulls the SHA512 operations into the caller
+ * as a performance optimization.
+ *
+ * One modification from official pbkdf2. Instead of outputting key material
+ * linearly, we mix it. pbkdf2 has a known weakness where if one uses it to
+ * generate (e.g.) 512 bits of key material for use as two 256 bit keys, an
+ * attacker can merely run once through the outer loop, but the user
+ * always runs it twice. Shuffling output bytes requires computing the
+ * entirety of the key material to assemble any subkey. This is something a
+ * wise caller could do; we just do it for you.
+ */
+
+#define BCRYPT_WORDS 8
+#define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE (BCRYPT_WORDS * 4)
+
+static void
+bcrypt_hash(uint8_t *sha2pass, uint8_t *sha2salt, uint8_t *out)
+{
+	blf_ctx state;
+	uint8_t ciphertext[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE] =
+	    "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite";
+	uint32_t cdata[BCRYPT_WORDS];
+	int i;
+	uint16_t j;
+	size_t shalen = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+	/* key expansion */
+	Blowfish_initstate(&state);
+	Blowfish_expandstate(&state, sha2salt, shalen, sha2pass, shalen);
+	for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) {
+		Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2salt, shalen);
+		Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2pass, shalen);
+	}
+
+	/* encryption */
+	j = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++)
+		cdata[i] = Blowfish_stream2word(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext),
+		    &j);
+	for (i = 0; i < 64; i++)
+		blf_enc(&state, cdata, BCRYPT_WORDS / 2);
+
+	/* copy out */
+	for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++) {
+		out[4 * i + 3] = (cdata[i] >> 24) & 0xff;
+		out[4 * i + 2] = (cdata[i] >> 16) & 0xff;
+		out[4 * i + 1] = (cdata[i] >> 8) & 0xff;
+		out[4 * i + 0] = cdata[i] & 0xff;
+	}
+
+	/* zap */
+	explicit_bzero(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext));
+	explicit_bzero(cdata, sizeof(cdata));
+	explicit_bzero(&state, sizeof(state));
+}
+
+int
+bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const uint8_t *salt, size_t saltlen,
+    uint8_t *key, size_t keylen, unsigned int rounds)
+{
+	uint8_t sha2pass[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	uint8_t sha2salt[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	uint8_t out[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
+	uint8_t tmpout[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE];
+	uint8_t *countsalt;
+	size_t i, j, amt, stride;
+	uint32_t count;
+	size_t origkeylen = keylen;
+
+	/* nothing crazy */
+	if (rounds < 1)
+		goto bad;
+	if (passlen == 0 || saltlen == 0 || keylen == 0 ||
+	    keylen > sizeof(out) * sizeof(out) || saltlen > 1<<20)
+		goto bad;
+	if ((countsalt = calloc(1, saltlen + 4)) == NULL)
+		goto bad;
+	stride = (keylen + sizeof(out) - 1) / sizeof(out);
+	amt = (keylen + stride - 1) / stride;
+
+	memcpy(countsalt, salt, saltlen);
+
+	/* collapse password */
+	crypto_hash_sha512(sha2pass, pass, passlen);
+
+	/* generate key, sizeof(out) at a time */
+	for (count = 1; keylen > 0; count++) {
+		countsalt[saltlen + 0] = (count >> 24) & 0xff;
+		countsalt[saltlen + 1] = (count >> 16) & 0xff;
+		countsalt[saltlen + 2] = (count >> 8) & 0xff;
+		countsalt[saltlen + 3] = count & 0xff;
+
+		/* first round, salt is salt */
+		crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, countsalt, saltlen + 4);
+
+		bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout);
+		memcpy(out, tmpout, sizeof(out));
+
+		for (i = 1; i < rounds; i++) {
+			/* subsequent rounds, salt is previous output */
+			crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, tmpout, sizeof(tmpout));
+			bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout);
+			for (j = 0; j < sizeof(out); j++)
+				out[j] ^= tmpout[j];
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * pbkdf2 deviation: output the key material non-linearly.
+		 */
+		amt = MINIMUM(amt, keylen);
+		for (i = 0; i < amt; i++) {
+			size_t dest = i * stride + (count - 1);
+			if (dest >= origkeylen)
+				break;
+			key[dest] = out[i];
+		}
+		keylen -= i;
+	}
+
+	/* zap */
+	freezero(countsalt, saltlen + 4);
+	explicit_bzero(out, sizeof(out));
+	explicit_bzero(tmpout, sizeof(tmpout));
+
+	return 0;
+
+bad:
+	/* overwrite with random in case caller doesn't check return code */
+	arc4random_buf(key, keylen);
+	return -1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..346c7fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+/* This file has be substantially modified from the original OpenBSD source */
+
+/*	$OpenBSD: bindresvport.c,v 1.17 2005/12/21 01:40:22 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 1996, Jason Downs.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 1998, Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright 2000, Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/rpc/bindresvport.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define STARTPORT 600
+#define ENDPORT (IPPORT_RESERVED - 1)
+#define NPORTS	(ENDPORT - STARTPORT + 1)
+
+/*
+ * Bind a socket to a privileged IP port
+ */
+int
+bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa)
+{
+	int error, af;
+	struct sockaddr_storage myaddr;
+	struct sockaddr_in *in;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+	u_int16_t *portp;
+	u_int16_t port;
+	socklen_t salen;
+	int i;
+
+	if (sa == NULL) {
+		memset(&myaddr, 0, sizeof(myaddr));
+		sa = (struct sockaddr *)&myaddr;
+		salen = sizeof(myaddr);
+
+		if (getsockname(sd, sa, &salen) == -1)
+			return -1;	/* errno is correctly set */
+
+		af = sa->sa_family;
+		memset(&myaddr, 0, salen);
+	} else
+		af = sa->sa_family;
+
+	if (af == AF_INET) {
+		in = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
+		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+		portp = &in->sin_port;
+	} else if (af == AF_INET6) {
+		in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
+		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+		portp = &in6->sin6_port;
+	} else {
+		errno = EPFNOSUPPORT;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	sa->sa_family = af;
+
+	port = ntohs(*portp);
+	if (port == 0)
+		port = arc4random_uniform(NPORTS) + STARTPORT;
+
+	/* Avoid warning */
+	error = -1;
+
+	for(i = 0; i < NPORTS; i++) {
+		*portp = htons(port);
+		
+		error = bind(sd, sa, salen);
+
+		/* Terminate on success */
+		if (error == 0)
+			break;
+			
+		/* Terminate on errors, except "address already in use" */
+		if ((error < 0) && !((errno == EADDRINUSE) || (errno == EINVAL)))
+			break;
+			
+		port++;
+		if (port > ENDPORT)
+			port = STARTPORT;
+	}
+
+	return (error);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/blf.h b/openbsd-compat/blf.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b8a73e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/blf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: blf.h,v 1.8 2021/11/29 01:04:45 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Blowfish - a fast block cipher designed by Bruce Schneier
+ *
+ * Copyright 1997 Niels Provos <provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ *    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BLF_H_
+#define _BLF_H_
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && !defined(HAVE_BLH_H)
+
+/* Schneier specifies a maximum key length of 56 bytes.
+ * This ensures that every key bit affects every cipher
+ * bit.  However, the subkeys can hold up to 72 bytes.
+ * Warning: For normal blowfish encryption only 56 bytes
+ * of the key affect all cipherbits.
+ */
+
+#define BLF_N	16			/* Number of Subkeys */
+#define BLF_MAXKEYLEN ((BLF_N-2)*4)	/* 448 bits */
+#define BLF_MAXUTILIZED ((BLF_N+2)*4)	/* 576 bits */
+
+/* Blowfish context */
+typedef struct BlowfishContext {
+	u_int32_t S[4][256];	/* S-Boxes */
+	u_int32_t P[BLF_N + 2];	/* Subkeys */
+} blf_ctx;
+
+/* Raw access to customized Blowfish
+ *	blf_key is just:
+ *	Blowfish_initstate( state )
+ *	Blowfish_expand0state( state, key, keylen )
+ */
+
+void Blowfish_encipher(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *);
+void Blowfish_decipher(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int32_t *);
+void Blowfish_initstate(blf_ctx *);
+void Blowfish_expand0state(blf_ctx *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t);
+void Blowfish_expandstate
+(blf_ctx *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t);
+
+/* Standard Blowfish */
+
+void blf_key(blf_ctx *, const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t);
+void blf_enc(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int16_t);
+void blf_dec(blf_ctx *, u_int32_t *, u_int16_t);
+
+void blf_ecb_encrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t);
+void blf_ecb_decrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t);
+
+void blf_cbc_encrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t);
+void blf_cbc_decrypt(blf_ctx *, u_int8_t *, u_int8_t *, u_int32_t);
+
+/* Converts u_int8_t to u_int32_t */
+u_int32_t Blowfish_stream2word(const u_int8_t *, u_int16_t , u_int16_t *);
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && !defined(HAVE_BLH_H) */
+#endif /* _BLF_H */
+
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c b/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bfeba47
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/blowfish.c
@@ -0,0 +1,693 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: blowfish.c,v 1.20 2021/11/29 01:04:45 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Blowfish block cipher for OpenBSD
+ * Copyright 1997 Niels Provos <provos@physnet.uni-hamburg.de>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Implementation advice by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ *    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This code is derived from section 14.3 and the given source
+ * in section V of Applied Cryptography, second edition.
+ * Blowfish is an unpatented fast block cipher designed by
+ * Bruce Schneier.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && (!defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE) || \
+    !defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE) || !defined(HAVE_BLF_ENC))
+
+#if 0
+#include <stdio.h>		/* used for debugging */
+#include <string.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_BLF_H
+#include <blf.h>
+#endif
+
+#undef inline
+#ifdef __GNUC__
+#define inline __inline
+#else				/* !__GNUC__ */
+#define inline
+#endif				/* !__GNUC__ */
+
+/* Function for Feistel Networks */
+
+#define F(s, x) ((((s)[        (((x)>>24)&0xFF)]  \
+		 + (s)[0x100 + (((x)>>16)&0xFF)]) \
+		 ^ (s)[0x200 + (((x)>> 8)&0xFF)]) \
+		 + (s)[0x300 + ( (x)     &0xFF)])
+
+#define BLFRND(s,p,i,j,n) (i ^= F(s,j) ^ (p)[n])
+
+void
+Blowfish_encipher(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *xl, u_int32_t *xr)
+{
+	u_int32_t Xl;
+	u_int32_t Xr;
+	u_int32_t *s = c->S[0];
+	u_int32_t *p = c->P;
+
+	Xl = *xl;
+	Xr = *xr;
+
+	Xl ^= p[0];
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 1); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 2);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 3); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 4);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 5); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 6);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 7); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 8);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 9); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 10);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 11); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 12);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 13); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 14);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 15); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 16);
+
+	*xl = Xr ^ p[17];
+	*xr = Xl;
+}
+
+void
+Blowfish_decipher(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *xl, u_int32_t *xr)
+{
+	u_int32_t Xl;
+	u_int32_t Xr;
+	u_int32_t *s = c->S[0];
+	u_int32_t *p = c->P;
+
+	Xl = *xl;
+	Xr = *xr;
+
+	Xl ^= p[17];
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 16); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 15);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 14); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 13);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 12); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 11);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 10); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 9);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 8); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 7);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 6); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 5);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 4); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 3);
+	BLFRND(s, p, Xr, Xl, 2); BLFRND(s, p, Xl, Xr, 1);
+
+	*xl = Xr ^ p[0];
+	*xr = Xl;
+}
+
+void
+Blowfish_initstate(blf_ctx *c)
+{
+	/* P-box and S-box tables initialized with digits of Pi */
+
+	static const blf_ctx initstate =
+	{ {
+		{
+			0xd1310ba6, 0x98dfb5ac, 0x2ffd72db, 0xd01adfb7,
+			0xb8e1afed, 0x6a267e96, 0xba7c9045, 0xf12c7f99,
+			0x24a19947, 0xb3916cf7, 0x0801f2e2, 0x858efc16,
+			0x636920d8, 0x71574e69, 0xa458fea3, 0xf4933d7e,
+			0x0d95748f, 0x728eb658, 0x718bcd58, 0x82154aee,
+			0x7b54a41d, 0xc25a59b5, 0x9c30d539, 0x2af26013,
+			0xc5d1b023, 0x286085f0, 0xca417918, 0xb8db38ef,
+			0x8e79dcb0, 0x603a180e, 0x6c9e0e8b, 0xb01e8a3e,
+			0xd71577c1, 0xbd314b27, 0x78af2fda, 0x55605c60,
+			0xe65525f3, 0xaa55ab94, 0x57489862, 0x63e81440,
+			0x55ca396a, 0x2aab10b6, 0xb4cc5c34, 0x1141e8ce,
+			0xa15486af, 0x7c72e993, 0xb3ee1411, 0x636fbc2a,
+			0x2ba9c55d, 0x741831f6, 0xce5c3e16, 0x9b87931e,
+			0xafd6ba33, 0x6c24cf5c, 0x7a325381, 0x28958677,
+			0x3b8f4898, 0x6b4bb9af, 0xc4bfe81b, 0x66282193,
+			0x61d809cc, 0xfb21a991, 0x487cac60, 0x5dec8032,
+			0xef845d5d, 0xe98575b1, 0xdc262302, 0xeb651b88,
+			0x23893e81, 0xd396acc5, 0x0f6d6ff3, 0x83f44239,
+			0x2e0b4482, 0xa4842004, 0x69c8f04a, 0x9e1f9b5e,
+			0x21c66842, 0xf6e96c9a, 0x670c9c61, 0xabd388f0,
+			0x6a51a0d2, 0xd8542f68, 0x960fa728, 0xab5133a3,
+			0x6eef0b6c, 0x137a3be4, 0xba3bf050, 0x7efb2a98,
+			0xa1f1651d, 0x39af0176, 0x66ca593e, 0x82430e88,
+			0x8cee8619, 0x456f9fb4, 0x7d84a5c3, 0x3b8b5ebe,
+			0xe06f75d8, 0x85c12073, 0x401a449f, 0x56c16aa6,
+			0x4ed3aa62, 0x363f7706, 0x1bfedf72, 0x429b023d,
+			0x37d0d724, 0xd00a1248, 0xdb0fead3, 0x49f1c09b,
+			0x075372c9, 0x80991b7b, 0x25d479d8, 0xf6e8def7,
+			0xe3fe501a, 0xb6794c3b, 0x976ce0bd, 0x04c006ba,
+			0xc1a94fb6, 0x409f60c4, 0x5e5c9ec2, 0x196a2463,
+			0x68fb6faf, 0x3e6c53b5, 0x1339b2eb, 0x3b52ec6f,
+			0x6dfc511f, 0x9b30952c, 0xcc814544, 0xaf5ebd09,
+			0xbee3d004, 0xde334afd, 0x660f2807, 0x192e4bb3,
+			0xc0cba857, 0x45c8740f, 0xd20b5f39, 0xb9d3fbdb,
+			0x5579c0bd, 0x1a60320a, 0xd6a100c6, 0x402c7279,
+			0x679f25fe, 0xfb1fa3cc, 0x8ea5e9f8, 0xdb3222f8,
+			0x3c7516df, 0xfd616b15, 0x2f501ec8, 0xad0552ab,
+			0x323db5fa, 0xfd238760, 0x53317b48, 0x3e00df82,
+			0x9e5c57bb, 0xca6f8ca0, 0x1a87562e, 0xdf1769db,
+			0xd542a8f6, 0x287effc3, 0xac6732c6, 0x8c4f5573,
+			0x695b27b0, 0xbbca58c8, 0xe1ffa35d, 0xb8f011a0,
+			0x10fa3d98, 0xfd2183b8, 0x4afcb56c, 0x2dd1d35b,
+			0x9a53e479, 0xb6f84565, 0xd28e49bc, 0x4bfb9790,
+			0xe1ddf2da, 0xa4cb7e33, 0x62fb1341, 0xcee4c6e8,
+			0xef20cada, 0x36774c01, 0xd07e9efe, 0x2bf11fb4,
+			0x95dbda4d, 0xae909198, 0xeaad8e71, 0x6b93d5a0,
+			0xd08ed1d0, 0xafc725e0, 0x8e3c5b2f, 0x8e7594b7,
+			0x8ff6e2fb, 0xf2122b64, 0x8888b812, 0x900df01c,
+			0x4fad5ea0, 0x688fc31c, 0xd1cff191, 0xb3a8c1ad,
+			0x2f2f2218, 0xbe0e1777, 0xea752dfe, 0x8b021fa1,
+			0xe5a0cc0f, 0xb56f74e8, 0x18acf3d6, 0xce89e299,
+			0xb4a84fe0, 0xfd13e0b7, 0x7cc43b81, 0xd2ada8d9,
+			0x165fa266, 0x80957705, 0x93cc7314, 0x211a1477,
+			0xe6ad2065, 0x77b5fa86, 0xc75442f5, 0xfb9d35cf,
+			0xebcdaf0c, 0x7b3e89a0, 0xd6411bd3, 0xae1e7e49,
+			0x00250e2d, 0x2071b35e, 0x226800bb, 0x57b8e0af,
+			0x2464369b, 0xf009b91e, 0x5563911d, 0x59dfa6aa,
+			0x78c14389, 0xd95a537f, 0x207d5ba2, 0x02e5b9c5,
+			0x83260376, 0x6295cfa9, 0x11c81968, 0x4e734a41,
+			0xb3472dca, 0x7b14a94a, 0x1b510052, 0x9a532915,
+			0xd60f573f, 0xbc9bc6e4, 0x2b60a476, 0x81e67400,
+			0x08ba6fb5, 0x571be91f, 0xf296ec6b, 0x2a0dd915,
+			0xb6636521, 0xe7b9f9b6, 0xff34052e, 0xc5855664,
+		0x53b02d5d, 0xa99f8fa1, 0x08ba4799, 0x6e85076a},
+		{
+			0x4b7a70e9, 0xb5b32944, 0xdb75092e, 0xc4192623,
+			0xad6ea6b0, 0x49a7df7d, 0x9cee60b8, 0x8fedb266,
+			0xecaa8c71, 0x699a17ff, 0x5664526c, 0xc2b19ee1,
+			0x193602a5, 0x75094c29, 0xa0591340, 0xe4183a3e,
+			0x3f54989a, 0x5b429d65, 0x6b8fe4d6, 0x99f73fd6,
+			0xa1d29c07, 0xefe830f5, 0x4d2d38e6, 0xf0255dc1,
+			0x4cdd2086, 0x8470eb26, 0x6382e9c6, 0x021ecc5e,
+			0x09686b3f, 0x3ebaefc9, 0x3c971814, 0x6b6a70a1,
+			0x687f3584, 0x52a0e286, 0xb79c5305, 0xaa500737,
+			0x3e07841c, 0x7fdeae5c, 0x8e7d44ec, 0x5716f2b8,
+			0xb03ada37, 0xf0500c0d, 0xf01c1f04, 0x0200b3ff,
+			0xae0cf51a, 0x3cb574b2, 0x25837a58, 0xdc0921bd,
+			0xd19113f9, 0x7ca92ff6, 0x94324773, 0x22f54701,
+			0x3ae5e581, 0x37c2dadc, 0xc8b57634, 0x9af3dda7,
+			0xa9446146, 0x0fd0030e, 0xecc8c73e, 0xa4751e41,
+			0xe238cd99, 0x3bea0e2f, 0x3280bba1, 0x183eb331,
+			0x4e548b38, 0x4f6db908, 0x6f420d03, 0xf60a04bf,
+			0x2cb81290, 0x24977c79, 0x5679b072, 0xbcaf89af,
+			0xde9a771f, 0xd9930810, 0xb38bae12, 0xdccf3f2e,
+			0x5512721f, 0x2e6b7124, 0x501adde6, 0x9f84cd87,
+			0x7a584718, 0x7408da17, 0xbc9f9abc, 0xe94b7d8c,
+			0xec7aec3a, 0xdb851dfa, 0x63094366, 0xc464c3d2,
+			0xef1c1847, 0x3215d908, 0xdd433b37, 0x24c2ba16,
+			0x12a14d43, 0x2a65c451, 0x50940002, 0x133ae4dd,
+			0x71dff89e, 0x10314e55, 0x81ac77d6, 0x5f11199b,
+			0x043556f1, 0xd7a3c76b, 0x3c11183b, 0x5924a509,
+			0xf28fe6ed, 0x97f1fbfa, 0x9ebabf2c, 0x1e153c6e,
+			0x86e34570, 0xeae96fb1, 0x860e5e0a, 0x5a3e2ab3,
+			0x771fe71c, 0x4e3d06fa, 0x2965dcb9, 0x99e71d0f,
+			0x803e89d6, 0x5266c825, 0x2e4cc978, 0x9c10b36a,
+			0xc6150eba, 0x94e2ea78, 0xa5fc3c53, 0x1e0a2df4,
+			0xf2f74ea7, 0x361d2b3d, 0x1939260f, 0x19c27960,
+			0x5223a708, 0xf71312b6, 0xebadfe6e, 0xeac31f66,
+			0xe3bc4595, 0xa67bc883, 0xb17f37d1, 0x018cff28,
+			0xc332ddef, 0xbe6c5aa5, 0x65582185, 0x68ab9802,
+			0xeecea50f, 0xdb2f953b, 0x2aef7dad, 0x5b6e2f84,
+			0x1521b628, 0x29076170, 0xecdd4775, 0x619f1510,
+			0x13cca830, 0xeb61bd96, 0x0334fe1e, 0xaa0363cf,
+			0xb5735c90, 0x4c70a239, 0xd59e9e0b, 0xcbaade14,
+			0xeecc86bc, 0x60622ca7, 0x9cab5cab, 0xb2f3846e,
+			0x648b1eaf, 0x19bdf0ca, 0xa02369b9, 0x655abb50,
+			0x40685a32, 0x3c2ab4b3, 0x319ee9d5, 0xc021b8f7,
+			0x9b540b19, 0x875fa099, 0x95f7997e, 0x623d7da8,
+			0xf837889a, 0x97e32d77, 0x11ed935f, 0x16681281,
+			0x0e358829, 0xc7e61fd6, 0x96dedfa1, 0x7858ba99,
+			0x57f584a5, 0x1b227263, 0x9b83c3ff, 0x1ac24696,
+			0xcdb30aeb, 0x532e3054, 0x8fd948e4, 0x6dbc3128,
+			0x58ebf2ef, 0x34c6ffea, 0xfe28ed61, 0xee7c3c73,
+			0x5d4a14d9, 0xe864b7e3, 0x42105d14, 0x203e13e0,
+			0x45eee2b6, 0xa3aaabea, 0xdb6c4f15, 0xfacb4fd0,
+			0xc742f442, 0xef6abbb5, 0x654f3b1d, 0x41cd2105,
+			0xd81e799e, 0x86854dc7, 0xe44b476a, 0x3d816250,
+			0xcf62a1f2, 0x5b8d2646, 0xfc8883a0, 0xc1c7b6a3,
+			0x7f1524c3, 0x69cb7492, 0x47848a0b, 0x5692b285,
+			0x095bbf00, 0xad19489d, 0x1462b174, 0x23820e00,
+			0x58428d2a, 0x0c55f5ea, 0x1dadf43e, 0x233f7061,
+			0x3372f092, 0x8d937e41, 0xd65fecf1, 0x6c223bdb,
+			0x7cde3759, 0xcbee7460, 0x4085f2a7, 0xce77326e,
+			0xa6078084, 0x19f8509e, 0xe8efd855, 0x61d99735,
+			0xa969a7aa, 0xc50c06c2, 0x5a04abfc, 0x800bcadc,
+			0x9e447a2e, 0xc3453484, 0xfdd56705, 0x0e1e9ec9,
+			0xdb73dbd3, 0x105588cd, 0x675fda79, 0xe3674340,
+			0xc5c43465, 0x713e38d8, 0x3d28f89e, 0xf16dff20,
+		0x153e21e7, 0x8fb03d4a, 0xe6e39f2b, 0xdb83adf7},
+		{
+			0xe93d5a68, 0x948140f7, 0xf64c261c, 0x94692934,
+			0x411520f7, 0x7602d4f7, 0xbcf46b2e, 0xd4a20068,
+			0xd4082471, 0x3320f46a, 0x43b7d4b7, 0x500061af,
+			0x1e39f62e, 0x97244546, 0x14214f74, 0xbf8b8840,
+			0x4d95fc1d, 0x96b591af, 0x70f4ddd3, 0x66a02f45,
+			0xbfbc09ec, 0x03bd9785, 0x7fac6dd0, 0x31cb8504,
+			0x96eb27b3, 0x55fd3941, 0xda2547e6, 0xabca0a9a,
+			0x28507825, 0x530429f4, 0x0a2c86da, 0xe9b66dfb,
+			0x68dc1462, 0xd7486900, 0x680ec0a4, 0x27a18dee,
+			0x4f3ffea2, 0xe887ad8c, 0xb58ce006, 0x7af4d6b6,
+			0xaace1e7c, 0xd3375fec, 0xce78a399, 0x406b2a42,
+			0x20fe9e35, 0xd9f385b9, 0xee39d7ab, 0x3b124e8b,
+			0x1dc9faf7, 0x4b6d1856, 0x26a36631, 0xeae397b2,
+			0x3a6efa74, 0xdd5b4332, 0x6841e7f7, 0xca7820fb,
+			0xfb0af54e, 0xd8feb397, 0x454056ac, 0xba489527,
+			0x55533a3a, 0x20838d87, 0xfe6ba9b7, 0xd096954b,
+			0x55a867bc, 0xa1159a58, 0xcca92963, 0x99e1db33,
+			0xa62a4a56, 0x3f3125f9, 0x5ef47e1c, 0x9029317c,
+			0xfdf8e802, 0x04272f70, 0x80bb155c, 0x05282ce3,
+			0x95c11548, 0xe4c66d22, 0x48c1133f, 0xc70f86dc,
+			0x07f9c9ee, 0x41041f0f, 0x404779a4, 0x5d886e17,
+			0x325f51eb, 0xd59bc0d1, 0xf2bcc18f, 0x41113564,
+			0x257b7834, 0x602a9c60, 0xdff8e8a3, 0x1f636c1b,
+			0x0e12b4c2, 0x02e1329e, 0xaf664fd1, 0xcad18115,
+			0x6b2395e0, 0x333e92e1, 0x3b240b62, 0xeebeb922,
+			0x85b2a20e, 0xe6ba0d99, 0xde720c8c, 0x2da2f728,
+			0xd0127845, 0x95b794fd, 0x647d0862, 0xe7ccf5f0,
+			0x5449a36f, 0x877d48fa, 0xc39dfd27, 0xf33e8d1e,
+			0x0a476341, 0x992eff74, 0x3a6f6eab, 0xf4f8fd37,
+			0xa812dc60, 0xa1ebddf8, 0x991be14c, 0xdb6e6b0d,
+			0xc67b5510, 0x6d672c37, 0x2765d43b, 0xdcd0e804,
+			0xf1290dc7, 0xcc00ffa3, 0xb5390f92, 0x690fed0b,
+			0x667b9ffb, 0xcedb7d9c, 0xa091cf0b, 0xd9155ea3,
+			0xbb132f88, 0x515bad24, 0x7b9479bf, 0x763bd6eb,
+			0x37392eb3, 0xcc115979, 0x8026e297, 0xf42e312d,
+			0x6842ada7, 0xc66a2b3b, 0x12754ccc, 0x782ef11c,
+			0x6a124237, 0xb79251e7, 0x06a1bbe6, 0x4bfb6350,
+			0x1a6b1018, 0x11caedfa, 0x3d25bdd8, 0xe2e1c3c9,
+			0x44421659, 0x0a121386, 0xd90cec6e, 0xd5abea2a,
+			0x64af674e, 0xda86a85f, 0xbebfe988, 0x64e4c3fe,
+			0x9dbc8057, 0xf0f7c086, 0x60787bf8, 0x6003604d,
+			0xd1fd8346, 0xf6381fb0, 0x7745ae04, 0xd736fccc,
+			0x83426b33, 0xf01eab71, 0xb0804187, 0x3c005e5f,
+			0x77a057be, 0xbde8ae24, 0x55464299, 0xbf582e61,
+			0x4e58f48f, 0xf2ddfda2, 0xf474ef38, 0x8789bdc2,
+			0x5366f9c3, 0xc8b38e74, 0xb475f255, 0x46fcd9b9,
+			0x7aeb2661, 0x8b1ddf84, 0x846a0e79, 0x915f95e2,
+			0x466e598e, 0x20b45770, 0x8cd55591, 0xc902de4c,
+			0xb90bace1, 0xbb8205d0, 0x11a86248, 0x7574a99e,
+			0xb77f19b6, 0xe0a9dc09, 0x662d09a1, 0xc4324633,
+			0xe85a1f02, 0x09f0be8c, 0x4a99a025, 0x1d6efe10,
+			0x1ab93d1d, 0x0ba5a4df, 0xa186f20f, 0x2868f169,
+			0xdcb7da83, 0x573906fe, 0xa1e2ce9b, 0x4fcd7f52,
+			0x50115e01, 0xa70683fa, 0xa002b5c4, 0x0de6d027,
+			0x9af88c27, 0x773f8641, 0xc3604c06, 0x61a806b5,
+			0xf0177a28, 0xc0f586e0, 0x006058aa, 0x30dc7d62,
+			0x11e69ed7, 0x2338ea63, 0x53c2dd94, 0xc2c21634,
+			0xbbcbee56, 0x90bcb6de, 0xebfc7da1, 0xce591d76,
+			0x6f05e409, 0x4b7c0188, 0x39720a3d, 0x7c927c24,
+			0x86e3725f, 0x724d9db9, 0x1ac15bb4, 0xd39eb8fc,
+			0xed545578, 0x08fca5b5, 0xd83d7cd3, 0x4dad0fc4,
+			0x1e50ef5e, 0xb161e6f8, 0xa28514d9, 0x6c51133c,
+			0x6fd5c7e7, 0x56e14ec4, 0x362abfce, 0xddc6c837,
+		0xd79a3234, 0x92638212, 0x670efa8e, 0x406000e0},
+		{
+			0x3a39ce37, 0xd3faf5cf, 0xabc27737, 0x5ac52d1b,
+			0x5cb0679e, 0x4fa33742, 0xd3822740, 0x99bc9bbe,
+			0xd5118e9d, 0xbf0f7315, 0xd62d1c7e, 0xc700c47b,
+			0xb78c1b6b, 0x21a19045, 0xb26eb1be, 0x6a366eb4,
+			0x5748ab2f, 0xbc946e79, 0xc6a376d2, 0x6549c2c8,
+			0x530ff8ee, 0x468dde7d, 0xd5730a1d, 0x4cd04dc6,
+			0x2939bbdb, 0xa9ba4650, 0xac9526e8, 0xbe5ee304,
+			0xa1fad5f0, 0x6a2d519a, 0x63ef8ce2, 0x9a86ee22,
+			0xc089c2b8, 0x43242ef6, 0xa51e03aa, 0x9cf2d0a4,
+			0x83c061ba, 0x9be96a4d, 0x8fe51550, 0xba645bd6,
+			0x2826a2f9, 0xa73a3ae1, 0x4ba99586, 0xef5562e9,
+			0xc72fefd3, 0xf752f7da, 0x3f046f69, 0x77fa0a59,
+			0x80e4a915, 0x87b08601, 0x9b09e6ad, 0x3b3ee593,
+			0xe990fd5a, 0x9e34d797, 0x2cf0b7d9, 0x022b8b51,
+			0x96d5ac3a, 0x017da67d, 0xd1cf3ed6, 0x7c7d2d28,
+			0x1f9f25cf, 0xadf2b89b, 0x5ad6b472, 0x5a88f54c,
+			0xe029ac71, 0xe019a5e6, 0x47b0acfd, 0xed93fa9b,
+			0xe8d3c48d, 0x283b57cc, 0xf8d56629, 0x79132e28,
+			0x785f0191, 0xed756055, 0xf7960e44, 0xe3d35e8c,
+			0x15056dd4, 0x88f46dba, 0x03a16125, 0x0564f0bd,
+			0xc3eb9e15, 0x3c9057a2, 0x97271aec, 0xa93a072a,
+			0x1b3f6d9b, 0x1e6321f5, 0xf59c66fb, 0x26dcf319,
+			0x7533d928, 0xb155fdf5, 0x03563482, 0x8aba3cbb,
+			0x28517711, 0xc20ad9f8, 0xabcc5167, 0xccad925f,
+			0x4de81751, 0x3830dc8e, 0x379d5862, 0x9320f991,
+			0xea7a90c2, 0xfb3e7bce, 0x5121ce64, 0x774fbe32,
+			0xa8b6e37e, 0xc3293d46, 0x48de5369, 0x6413e680,
+			0xa2ae0810, 0xdd6db224, 0x69852dfd, 0x09072166,
+			0xb39a460a, 0x6445c0dd, 0x586cdecf, 0x1c20c8ae,
+			0x5bbef7dd, 0x1b588d40, 0xccd2017f, 0x6bb4e3bb,
+			0xdda26a7e, 0x3a59ff45, 0x3e350a44, 0xbcb4cdd5,
+			0x72eacea8, 0xfa6484bb, 0x8d6612ae, 0xbf3c6f47,
+			0xd29be463, 0x542f5d9e, 0xaec2771b, 0xf64e6370,
+			0x740e0d8d, 0xe75b1357, 0xf8721671, 0xaf537d5d,
+			0x4040cb08, 0x4eb4e2cc, 0x34d2466a, 0x0115af84,
+			0xe1b00428, 0x95983a1d, 0x06b89fb4, 0xce6ea048,
+			0x6f3f3b82, 0x3520ab82, 0x011a1d4b, 0x277227f8,
+			0x611560b1, 0xe7933fdc, 0xbb3a792b, 0x344525bd,
+			0xa08839e1, 0x51ce794b, 0x2f32c9b7, 0xa01fbac9,
+			0xe01cc87e, 0xbcc7d1f6, 0xcf0111c3, 0xa1e8aac7,
+			0x1a908749, 0xd44fbd9a, 0xd0dadecb, 0xd50ada38,
+			0x0339c32a, 0xc6913667, 0x8df9317c, 0xe0b12b4f,
+			0xf79e59b7, 0x43f5bb3a, 0xf2d519ff, 0x27d9459c,
+			0xbf97222c, 0x15e6fc2a, 0x0f91fc71, 0x9b941525,
+			0xfae59361, 0xceb69ceb, 0xc2a86459, 0x12baa8d1,
+			0xb6c1075e, 0xe3056a0c, 0x10d25065, 0xcb03a442,
+			0xe0ec6e0e, 0x1698db3b, 0x4c98a0be, 0x3278e964,
+			0x9f1f9532, 0xe0d392df, 0xd3a0342b, 0x8971f21e,
+			0x1b0a7441, 0x4ba3348c, 0xc5be7120, 0xc37632d8,
+			0xdf359f8d, 0x9b992f2e, 0xe60b6f47, 0x0fe3f11d,
+			0xe54cda54, 0x1edad891, 0xce6279cf, 0xcd3e7e6f,
+			0x1618b166, 0xfd2c1d05, 0x848fd2c5, 0xf6fb2299,
+			0xf523f357, 0xa6327623, 0x93a83531, 0x56cccd02,
+			0xacf08162, 0x5a75ebb5, 0x6e163697, 0x88d273cc,
+			0xde966292, 0x81b949d0, 0x4c50901b, 0x71c65614,
+			0xe6c6c7bd, 0x327a140a, 0x45e1d006, 0xc3f27b9a,
+			0xc9aa53fd, 0x62a80f00, 0xbb25bfe2, 0x35bdd2f6,
+			0x71126905, 0xb2040222, 0xb6cbcf7c, 0xcd769c2b,
+			0x53113ec0, 0x1640e3d3, 0x38abbd60, 0x2547adf0,
+			0xba38209c, 0xf746ce76, 0x77afa1c5, 0x20756060,
+			0x85cbfe4e, 0x8ae88dd8, 0x7aaaf9b0, 0x4cf9aa7e,
+			0x1948c25c, 0x02fb8a8c, 0x01c36ae4, 0xd6ebe1f9,
+			0x90d4f869, 0xa65cdea0, 0x3f09252d, 0xc208e69f,
+		0xb74e6132, 0xce77e25b, 0x578fdfe3, 0x3ac372e6}
+	},
+	{
+		0x243f6a88, 0x85a308d3, 0x13198a2e, 0x03707344,
+		0xa4093822, 0x299f31d0, 0x082efa98, 0xec4e6c89,
+		0x452821e6, 0x38d01377, 0xbe5466cf, 0x34e90c6c,
+		0xc0ac29b7, 0xc97c50dd, 0x3f84d5b5, 0xb5470917,
+		0x9216d5d9, 0x8979fb1b
+	} };
+
+	*c = initstate;
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+Blowfish_stream2word(const u_int8_t *data, u_int16_t databytes,
+    u_int16_t *current)
+{
+	u_int8_t i;
+	u_int16_t j;
+	u_int32_t temp;
+
+	temp = 0x00000000;
+	j = *current;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++, j++) {
+		if (j >= databytes)
+			j = 0;
+		temp = (temp << 8) | data[j];
+	}
+
+	*current = j;
+	return temp;
+}
+
+void
+Blowfish_expand0state(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *key, u_int16_t keybytes)
+{
+	u_int16_t i;
+	u_int16_t j;
+	u_int16_t k;
+	u_int32_t temp;
+	u_int32_t datal;
+	u_int32_t datar;
+
+	j = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i++) {
+		/* Extract 4 int8 to 1 int32 from keystream */
+		temp = Blowfish_stream2word(key, keybytes, &j);
+		c->P[i] = c->P[i] ^ temp;
+	}
+
+	j = 0;
+	datal = 0x00000000;
+	datar = 0x00000000;
+	for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i += 2) {
+		Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar);
+
+		c->P[i] = datal;
+		c->P[i + 1] = datar;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+		for (k = 0; k < 256; k += 2) {
+			Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar);
+
+			c->S[i][k] = datal;
+			c->S[i][k + 1] = datar;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+
+void
+Blowfish_expandstate(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *data, u_int16_t databytes,
+    const u_int8_t *key, u_int16_t keybytes)
+{
+	u_int16_t i;
+	u_int16_t j;
+	u_int16_t k;
+	u_int32_t temp;
+	u_int32_t datal;
+	u_int32_t datar;
+
+	j = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i++) {
+		/* Extract 4 int8 to 1 int32 from keystream */
+		temp = Blowfish_stream2word(key, keybytes, &j);
+		c->P[i] = c->P[i] ^ temp;
+	}
+
+	j = 0;
+	datal = 0x00000000;
+	datar = 0x00000000;
+	for (i = 0; i < BLF_N + 2; i += 2) {
+		datal ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j);
+		datar ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j);
+		Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar);
+
+		c->P[i] = datal;
+		c->P[i + 1] = datar;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) {
+		for (k = 0; k < 256; k += 2) {
+			datal ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j);
+			datar ^= Blowfish_stream2word(data, databytes, &j);
+			Blowfish_encipher(c, &datal, &datar);
+
+			c->S[i][k] = datal;
+			c->S[i][k + 1] = datar;
+		}
+	}
+
+}
+
+void
+blf_key(blf_ctx *c, const u_int8_t *k, u_int16_t len)
+{
+	/* Initialize S-boxes and subkeys with Pi */
+	Blowfish_initstate(c);
+
+	/* Transform S-boxes and subkeys with key */
+	Blowfish_expand0state(c, k, len);
+}
+
+void
+blf_enc(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *data, u_int16_t blocks)
+{
+	u_int32_t *d;
+	u_int16_t i;
+
+	d = data;
+	for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++) {
+		Blowfish_encipher(c, d, d + 1);
+		d += 2;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+blf_dec(blf_ctx *c, u_int32_t *data, u_int16_t blocks)
+{
+	u_int32_t *d;
+	u_int16_t i;
+
+	d = data;
+	for (i = 0; i < blocks; i++) {
+		Blowfish_decipher(c, d, d + 1);
+		d += 2;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+blf_ecb_encrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len)
+{
+	u_int32_t l, r;
+	u_int32_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
+		l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
+		r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
+		Blowfish_encipher(c, &l, &r);
+		data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
+		data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
+		data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
+		data[3] = l & 0xff;
+		data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
+		data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
+		data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
+		data[7] = r & 0xff;
+		data += 8;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+blf_ecb_decrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len)
+{
+	u_int32_t l, r;
+	u_int32_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
+		l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
+		r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
+		Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r);
+		data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
+		data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
+		data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
+		data[3] = l & 0xff;
+		data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
+		data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
+		data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
+		data[7] = r & 0xff;
+		data += 8;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+blf_cbc_encrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *iv, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len)
+{
+	u_int32_t l, r;
+	u_int32_t i, j;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i += 8) {
+		for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
+			data[j] ^= iv[j];
+		l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
+		r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
+		Blowfish_encipher(c, &l, &r);
+		data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
+		data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
+		data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
+		data[3] = l & 0xff;
+		data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
+		data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
+		data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
+		data[7] = r & 0xff;
+		iv = data;
+		data += 8;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+blf_cbc_decrypt(blf_ctx *c, u_int8_t *iva, u_int8_t *data, u_int32_t len)
+{
+	u_int32_t l, r;
+	u_int8_t *iv;
+	u_int32_t i, j;
+
+	iv = data + len - 16;
+	data = data + len - 8;
+	for (i = len - 8; i >= 8; i -= 8) {
+		l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
+		r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
+		Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r);
+		data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
+		data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
+		data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
+		data[3] = l & 0xff;
+		data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
+		data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
+		data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
+		data[7] = r & 0xff;
+		for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
+			data[j] ^= iv[j];
+		iv -= 8;
+		data -= 8;
+	}
+	l = data[0] << 24 | data[1] << 16 | data[2] << 8 | data[3];
+	r = data[4] << 24 | data[5] << 16 | data[6] << 8 | data[7];
+	Blowfish_decipher(c, &l, &r);
+	data[0] = l >> 24 & 0xff;
+	data[1] = l >> 16 & 0xff;
+	data[2] = l >> 8 & 0xff;
+	data[3] = l & 0xff;
+	data[4] = r >> 24 & 0xff;
+	data[5] = r >> 16 & 0xff;
+	data[6] = r >> 8 & 0xff;
+	data[7] = r & 0xff;
+	for (j = 0; j < 8; j++)
+		data[j] ^= iva[j];
+}
+
+#if 0
+void
+report(u_int32_t data[], u_int16_t len)
+{
+	u_int16_t i;
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i += 2)
+		printf("Block %0hd: %08lx %08lx.\n",
+		    i / 2, data[i], data[i + 1]);
+}
+void
+main(void)
+{
+
+	blf_ctx c;
+	char    key[] = "AAAAA";
+	char    key2[] = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
+
+	u_int32_t data[10];
+	u_int32_t data2[] =
+	{0x424c4f57l, 0x46495348l};
+
+	u_int16_t i;
+
+	/* First test */
+	for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
+		data[i] = i;
+
+	blf_key(&c, (u_int8_t *) key, 5);
+	blf_enc(&c, data, 5);
+	blf_dec(&c, data, 1);
+	blf_dec(&c, data + 2, 4);
+	printf("Should read as 0 - 9.\n");
+	report(data, 10);
+
+	/* Second test */
+	blf_key(&c, (u_int8_t *) key2, strlen(key2));
+	blf_enc(&c, data2, 1);
+	printf("\nShould read as: 0x324ed0fe 0xf413a203.\n");
+	report(data2, 2);
+	blf_dec(&c, data2, 1);
+	report(data2, 2);
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF) && (!defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE) || \
+    !defined(HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE) || !defined(HAVE_BLF_ENC)) */
+
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..511c817
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Darren Tucker.
+ *
+ * Based originally on asprintf.c from OpenBSD:
+ * Copyright (c) 1997 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+/*
+ * Don't let systems with broken printf(3) avoid our replacements
+ * via asprintf(3)/vasprintf(3) calling libc internally.
+ */
+#if defined(BROKEN_SNPRINTF)
+# undef HAVE_VASPRINTF
+# undef HAVE_ASPRINTF
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#define INIT_SZ	128
+
+int
+vasprintf(char **str, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+	int ret = -1;
+	va_list ap2;
+	char *string, *newstr;
+	size_t len;
+
+	VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
+	if ((string = malloc(INIT_SZ)) == NULL)
+		goto fail;
+
+	ret = vsnprintf(string, INIT_SZ, fmt, ap2);
+	if (ret >= 0 && ret < INIT_SZ) { /* succeeded with initial alloc */
+		*str = string;
+	} else if (ret == INT_MAX || ret < 0) { /* Bad length */
+		free(string);
+		goto fail;
+	} else {	/* bigger than initial, realloc allowing for nul */
+		len = (size_t)ret + 1;
+		if ((newstr = realloc(string, len)) == NULL) {
+			free(string);
+			goto fail;
+		} else {
+			va_end(ap2);
+			VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
+			ret = vsnprintf(newstr, len, fmt, ap2);
+			if (ret >= 0 && (size_t)ret < len) {
+				*str = newstr;
+			} else { /* failed with realloc'ed string, give up */
+				free(newstr);
+				goto fail;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	va_end(ap2);
+	return (ret);
+
+fail:
+	*str = NULL;
+	errno = ENOMEM;
+	va_end(ap2);
+	return (-1);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF
+int asprintf(char **str, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+	int ret;
+
+	*str = NULL;
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	ret = vasprintf(str, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..704da53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2005 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_DIRENT_H
+# include <dirent.h>
+# define NAMLEN(dirent) strlen((dirent)->d_name)
+#else
+# define dirent direct
+# define NAMLEN(dirent) (dirent)->d_namlen
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H
+#  include <sys/ndir.h>
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_DIR_H
+#  include <sys/dir.h>
+# endif
+# ifdef HAVE_NDIR_H
+#  include <ndir.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBPROC_H)
+# include <libproc.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPEN_MAX
+# define OPEN_MAX	256
+#endif
+
+#if 0
+__unused static const char rcsid[] = "$Sudo: closefrom.c,v 1.11 2006/08/17 15:26:54 millert Exp $";
+#endif /* lint */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM
+/*
+ * Close all file descriptors greater than or equal to lowfd.
+ */
+static void
+closefrom_fallback(int lowfd)
+{
+	long fd, maxfd;
+
+	/*
+	 * Fall back on sysconf() or getdtablesize().  We avoid checking
+	 * resource limits since it is possible to open a file descriptor
+	 * and then drop the rlimit such that it is below the open fd.
+	 */
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
+	maxfd = sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX);
+#else
+	maxfd = getdtablesize();
+#endif /* HAVE_SYSCONF */
+	if (maxfd < 0)
+		maxfd = OPEN_MAX;
+
+	for (fd = lowfd; fd < maxfd; fd++)
+		(void) close((int) fd);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM
+void
+closefrom(int lowfd)
+{
+    (void) fcntl(lowfd, F_CLOSEM, 0);
+}
+#elif defined(HAVE_LIBPROC_H) && defined(HAVE_PROC_PIDINFO)
+void
+closefrom(int lowfd)
+{
+	int i, r, sz;
+	pid_t pid = getpid();
+	struct proc_fdinfo *fdinfo_buf = NULL;
+
+	sz = proc_pidinfo(pid, PROC_PIDLISTFDS, 0, NULL, 0);
+	if (sz == 0)
+		return; /* no fds, really? */
+	else if (sz == -1)
+		goto fallback;
+	if ((fdinfo_buf = malloc(sz)) == NULL)
+		goto fallback;
+	r = proc_pidinfo(pid, PROC_PIDLISTFDS, 0, fdinfo_buf, sz);
+	if (r < 0 || r > sz)
+		goto fallback;
+	for (i = 0; i < r / (int)PROC_PIDLISTFD_SIZE; i++) {
+		if (fdinfo_buf[i].proc_fd >= lowfd)
+			close(fdinfo_buf[i].proc_fd);
+	}
+	free(fdinfo_buf);
+	return;
+ fallback:
+	free(fdinfo_buf);
+	closefrom_fallback(lowfd);
+	return;
+}
+#elif defined(HAVE_DIRFD) && defined(HAVE_PROC_PID)
+void
+closefrom(int lowfd)
+{
+    long fd;
+    char fdpath[PATH_MAX], *endp;
+    struct dirent *dent;
+    DIR *dirp;
+    int len;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CLOSE_RANGE
+	if (close_range(lowfd, INT_MAX, 0) == 0)
+		return;
+#endif
+
+    /* Check for a /proc/$$/fd directory. */
+    len = snprintf(fdpath, sizeof(fdpath), "/proc/%ld/fd", (long)getpid());
+    if (len > 0 && (size_t)len < sizeof(fdpath) && (dirp = opendir(fdpath))) {
+	while ((dent = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
+	    fd = strtol(dent->d_name, &endp, 10);
+	    if (dent->d_name != endp && *endp == '\0' &&
+		fd >= 0 && fd < INT_MAX && fd >= lowfd && fd != dirfd(dirp))
+		(void) close((int) fd);
+	}
+	(void) closedir(dirp);
+	return;
+    }
+    /* /proc/$$/fd strategy failed, fall back to brute force closure */
+    closefrom_fallback(lowfd);
+}
+#else
+void
+closefrom(int lowfd)
+{
+	closefrom_fallback(lowfd);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM */
+#endif /* HAVE_CLOSEFROM */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ede21d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c
@@ -0,0 +1,269 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv
+ *
+ * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to
+ * binary mode on Windows systems.
+ */
+
+#define NO_BINARY_OPEN	/* Avoid redefining open to binary_open for this file */
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <wchar.h>
+#include <wctype.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+int
+binary_open(const char *filename, int flags, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+	mode_t mode;
+
+	va_start(ap, flags);
+	mode = va_arg(ap, mode_t);
+	va_end(ap);
+	return (open(filename, flags | O_BINARY, mode));
+}
+
+int
+check_ntsec(const char *filename)
+{
+	return (pathconf(filename, _PC_POSIX_PERMISSIONS));
+}
+
+const char *
+cygwin_ssh_privsep_user()
+{
+  static char cyg_privsep_user[DNLEN + UNLEN + 2];
+
+  if (!cyg_privsep_user[0])
+    {
+#ifdef CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME
+      if (cygwin_internal (CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME, "sshd", cyg_privsep_user,
+			   sizeof cyg_privsep_user) != 0)
+#endif
+	strlcpy(cyg_privsep_user, "sshd", sizeof(cyg_privsep_user));
+    }
+  return cyg_privsep_user;
+}
+
+#define NL(x) x, (sizeof (x) - 1)
+#define WENV_SIZ (sizeof (wenv_arr) / sizeof (wenv_arr[0]))
+
+static struct wenv {
+	const char *name;
+	size_t namelen;
+} wenv_arr[] = {
+	{ NL("ALLUSERSPROFILE=") },
+	{ NL("COMPUTERNAME=") },
+	{ NL("COMSPEC=") },
+	{ NL("CYGWIN=") },
+	{ NL("OS=") },
+	{ NL("PATH=") },
+	{ NL("PATHEXT=") },
+	{ NL("PROGRAMFILES=") },
+	{ NL("SYSTEMDRIVE=") },
+	{ NL("SYSTEMROOT=") },
+	{ NL("WINDIR=") }
+};
+
+char **
+fetch_windows_environment(void)
+{
+	char **e, **p;
+	unsigned int i, idx = 0;
+
+	p = xcalloc(WENV_SIZ + 1, sizeof(char *));
+	for (e = environ; *e != NULL; ++e) {
+		for (i = 0; i < WENV_SIZ; ++i) {
+			if (!strncmp(*e, wenv_arr[i].name, wenv_arr[i].namelen))
+				p[idx++] = *e;
+		}
+	}
+	p[idx] = NULL;
+	return p;
+}
+
+void
+free_windows_environment(char **p)
+{
+	free(p);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
+ * and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match.
+ *
+ * The Cygwin version of this function must be case-insensitive and take
+ * Unicode characters into account.
+ */
+
+static int
+__match_pattern (const wchar_t *s, const wchar_t *pattern)
+{
+	for (;;) {
+		/* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */
+		if (!*pattern)
+			return !*s;
+
+		if (*pattern == '*') {
+			/* Skip the asterisk. */
+			pattern++;
+
+			/* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */
+			if (!*pattern)
+				return 1;
+
+			/* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */
+			if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') {
+				/*
+				 * Look instances of the next character in
+				 * pattern, and try to match starting from
+				 * those.
+				 */
+				for (; *s; s++)
+					if (*s == *pattern &&
+					    __match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1))
+						return 1;
+				/* Failed. */
+				return 0;
+			}
+			/*
+			 * Move ahead one character at a time and try to
+			 * match at each position.
+			 */
+			for (; *s; s++)
+				if (__match_pattern(s, pattern))
+					return 1;
+			/* Failed. */
+			return 0;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * There must be at least one more character in the string.
+		 * If we are at the end, fail.
+		 */
+		if (!*s)
+			return 0;
+
+		/* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */
+		if (*pattern != '?' && towlower(*pattern) != towlower(*s))
+			return 0;
+
+		/* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */
+		s++;
+		pattern++;
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+static int
+_match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern)
+{
+	wchar_t *ws;
+	wchar_t *wpattern;
+	size_t len;
+	int ret;
+
+	if ((len = mbstowcs(NULL, s, 0)) == (size_t) -1)
+		return 0;
+	ws = (wchar_t *) xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof (wchar_t));
+	mbstowcs(ws, s, len + 1);
+	if ((len = mbstowcs(NULL, pattern, 0)) == (size_t) -1)
+		return 0;
+	wpattern = (wchar_t *) xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof (wchar_t));
+	mbstowcs(wpattern, pattern, len + 1);
+	ret = __match_pattern (ws, wpattern);
+	free(ws);
+	free(wpattern);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tries to match the string against the
+ * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
+ * indicate negation).  Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
+ * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
+ */
+int
+cygwin_ug_match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern)
+{
+	char sub[1024];
+	int negated;
+	int got_positive;
+	u_int i, subi, len = strlen(pattern);
+
+	got_positive = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < len;) {
+		/* Check if the subpattern is negated. */
+		if (pattern[i] == '!') {
+			negated = 1;
+			i++;
+		} else
+			negated = 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end.  Convert the
+		 * subpattern to lowercase.
+		 */
+		for (subi = 0;
+		    i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ',';
+		    subi++, i++)
+			sub[subi] = pattern[i];
+		/* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */
+		if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1)
+			return 0;
+
+		/* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, then skip it. */
+		if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',')
+			i++;
+
+		/* Null-terminate the subpattern. */
+		sub[subi] = '\0';
+
+		/* Try to match the subpattern against the string. */
+		if (_match_pattern(string, sub)) {
+			if (negated)
+				return -1;		/* Negative */
+			else
+				got_positive = 1;	/* Positive */
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Return success if got a positive match.  If there was a negative
+	 * match, we have already returned -1 and never get here.
+	 */
+	return got_positive;
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55c5a5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv
+ *
+ * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to
+ * binary mode on Windows systems.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H
+#define _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+
+#undef ERROR
+
+/* Avoid including windows headers. */
+typedef void *HANDLE;
+#define INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ((HANDLE) -1)
+#define DNLEN 16
+#define UNLEN 256
+
+/* Cygwin functions for which declarations are only available when including
+   windows headers, so we have to define them here explicitly. */
+extern HANDLE cygwin_logon_user (const struct passwd *, const char *);
+extern void cygwin_set_impersonation_token (const HANDLE);
+
+#include <sys/cygwin.h>
+#include <io.h>
+
+#define CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER (cygwin_ssh_privsep_user())
+const char *cygwin_ssh_privsep_user();
+
+int binary_open(const char *, int , ...);
+int check_ntsec(const char *);
+char **fetch_windows_environment(void);
+void free_windows_environment(char **);
+int cygwin_ug_match_pattern_list(const char *, const char *);
+
+#ifndef NO_BINARY_OPEN
+#define open binary_open
+#endif
+
+#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+
+#endif /* _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e4ed22b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-err.c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *   documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ *   derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ERR
+void
+err(int r, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", strerror(errno));
+	vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
+	fputc('\n', stderr);
+	va_end(args);
+	exit(r);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ERRX
+void
+errx(int r, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
+	fputc('\n', stderr);
+	va_end(args);
+	exit(r);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_WARN
+void
+warn(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", strerror(errno));
+	vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
+	fputc('\n', stderr);
+	va_end(args);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-flock.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-flock.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b15d1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-flock.c
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/*	$NetBSD: flock.c,v 1.6 2008/04/28 20:24:12 martin Exp $	*/
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
+ * by Todd Vierling.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
+ * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Emulate flock() with fcntl(), where available.
+ * Otherwise, don't do locking; just pretend success.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FLOCK
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+
+int
+flock(int fd, int op)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+
+#if defined(F_SETLK) && defined(F_SETLKW)
+	struct flock fl = {0};
+
+	switch (op & (LOCK_EX|LOCK_SH|LOCK_UN)) {
+	case LOCK_EX:
+		fl.l_type = F_WRLCK;
+		break;
+
+	case LOCK_SH:
+		fl.l_type = F_RDLCK;
+		break;
+
+	case LOCK_UN:
+		fl.l_type = F_UNLCK;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	fl.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
+	rc = fcntl(fd, op & LOCK_NB ? F_SETLK : F_SETLKW, &fl);
+
+	if (rc && (errno == EAGAIN))
+		errno = EWOULDBLOCK;
+#else
+	rc = -1;
+	errno = ENOSYS;
+#endif
+
+	return rc;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-getentropy.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-getentropy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..554dfad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-getentropy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm@uun.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2013, Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef SSH_RANDOM_DEV
+# define SSH_RANDOM_DEV "/dev/urandom"
+#endif /* SSH_RANDOM_DEV */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H
+# include <sys/random.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+int
+_ssh_compat_getentropy(void *s, size_t len)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	if (RAND_bytes(s, len) <= 0)
+		fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error 0x%lx)",
+		    (unsigned long)ERR_get_error());
+#else
+	int fd, save_errno;
+	ssize_t r;
+	size_t o = 0;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETENTROPY
+	if (r = getentropy(s, len) == 0)
+		return 0;
+#endif /* HAVE_GETENTROPY */
+#ifdef HAVE_GETRANDOM
+	if ((r = getrandom(s, len, 0)) > 0 && (size_t)r == len)
+		return 0;
+#endif /* HAVE_GETRANDOM */
+
+	if ((fd = open(SSH_RANDOM_DEV, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
+		save_errno = errno;
+		/* Try egd/prngd before giving up. */
+		if (seed_from_prngd(s, len) == 0)
+			return 0;
+		fatal("Couldn't open %s: %s", SSH_RANDOM_DEV,
+		    strerror(save_errno));
+	}
+	while (o < len) {
+		r = read(fd, (u_char *)s + o, len - o);
+		if (r < 0) {
+			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR ||
+			    errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+				continue;
+			fatal("read %s: %s", SSH_RANDOM_DEV, strerror(errno));
+		}
+		o += r;
+	}
+	close(fd);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-getline.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-getline.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e51bd7a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-getline.c
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+/*	$NetBSD: getline.c,v 1.1.1.6 2015/01/02 20:34:27 christos Exp $	*/
+
+/*	NetBSD: getline.c,v 1.2 2014/09/16 17:23:50 christos Exp 	*/
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
+ * by Christos Zoulas.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
+ * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* NETBSD ORIGINAL: external/bsd/file/dist/src/getline.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if 0
+#include "file.h"
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETLINE) || defined(BROKEN_GETLINE)
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+static ssize_t
+getdelim(char **buf, size_t *bufsiz, int delimiter, FILE *fp)
+{
+	char *ptr, *eptr;
+
+
+	if (*buf == NULL || *bufsiz == 0) {
+		if ((*buf = malloc(BUFSIZ)) == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		*bufsiz = BUFSIZ;
+	}
+
+	for (ptr = *buf, eptr = *buf + *bufsiz;;) {
+		int c = fgetc(fp);
+		if (c == -1) {
+			if (feof(fp)) {
+				ssize_t diff = (ssize_t)(ptr - *buf);
+				if (diff != 0) {
+					*ptr = '\0';
+					return diff;
+				}
+			}
+			return -1;
+		}
+		*ptr++ = c;
+		if (c == delimiter) {
+			*ptr = '\0';
+			return ptr - *buf;
+		}
+		if (ptr + 2 >= eptr) {
+			char *nbuf;
+			size_t nbufsiz = *bufsiz * 2;
+			ssize_t d = ptr - *buf;
+			if ((nbuf = realloc(*buf, nbufsiz)) == NULL)
+				return -1;
+			*buf = nbuf;
+			*bufsiz = nbufsiz;
+			eptr = nbuf + nbufsiz;
+			ptr = nbuf + d;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+ssize_t
+getline(char **buf, size_t *bufsiz, FILE *fp)
+{
+	return getdelim(buf, bufsiz, '\n', fp);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef TEST
+int
+main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	char *p = NULL;
+	ssize_t len;
+	size_t n = 0;
+
+	while ((len = getline(&p, &n, stdin)) != -1)
+		(void)printf("%" SIZE_T_FORMAT "d %s", len, p);
+	free(p);
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpagesize.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpagesize.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..416a8d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpagesize.c
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/* Placed in the public domain */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+int
+getpagesize(void)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_PAGESIZE)
+	long r = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
+	if (r > 0 && r < INT_MAX)
+		return (int)r;
+#endif
+	/*
+	 * This is at the lower end of common values and appropriate for
+	 * our current use of getpagesize() in recallocarray().
+	 */
+	return 4096;
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_GETPAGESIZE */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f7e677
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002,2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#if defined(SO_PEERCRED)
+int
+getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid)
+{
+	struct ucred cred;
+	socklen_t len = sizeof(cred);
+
+	if (getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PEERCRED, &cred, &len) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+	*euid = cred.uid;
+	*gid = cred.gid;
+
+	return (0);
+}
+#elif defined(HAVE_GETPEERUCRED)
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UCRED_H
+# include <ucred.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid)
+{
+	ucred_t *ucred = NULL;
+
+	if (getpeerucred(s, &ucred) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	if ((*euid = ucred_geteuid(ucred)) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	if ((*gid = ucred_getrgid(ucred)) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	ucred_free(ucred);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+#else
+int
+getpeereid(int s, uid_t *euid, gid_t *gid)
+{
+	*euid = geteuid();
+	*gid = getgid();
+
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* defined(SO_PEERCRED) */
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETPEEREID) */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-malloc.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-malloc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..482facd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-malloc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au).
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+#undef malloc
+#undef calloc
+#undef realloc
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#if defined(HAVE_MALLOC) && HAVE_MALLOC == 0
+void *
+rpl_malloc(size_t size)
+{
+	if (size == 0)
+		size = 1;
+	return malloc(size);
+}
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_CALLOC) && HAVE_CALLOC == 0
+void *
+rpl_calloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size)
+{
+	if (nmemb == 0)
+		nmemb = 1;
+	if (size == 0)
+		size = 1;
+	return calloc(nmemb, size);
+}
+#endif
+
+#if defined (HAVE_REALLOC) && HAVE_REALLOC == 0
+void *
+rpl_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
+{
+	if (size == 0)
+		size = 1;
+	if (ptr == 0)
+		return malloc(size);
+	return realloc(ptr, size);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..226a591
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,460 @@
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME
+char *__progname;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * NB. duplicate __progname in case it is an alias for argv[0]
+ * Otherwise it may get clobbered by setproctitle()
+ */
+char *ssh_get_progname(char *argv0)
+{
+	char *p, *q;
+#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
+	extern char *__progname;
+
+	p = __progname;
+#else
+	if (argv0 == NULL)
+		return ("unknown");	/* XXX */
+	p = strrchr(argv0, '/');
+	if (p == NULL)
+		p = argv0;
+	else
+		p++;
+#endif
+	if ((q = strdup(p)) == NULL) {
+		perror("strdup");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	return q;
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN
+int setlogin(const char *name)
+{
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR
+int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *host,
+	    const char *user, const char *domain)
+{
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
+int seteuid(uid_t euid)
+{
+	return (setreuid(-1, euid));
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID)
+int setegid(uid_t egid)
+{
+	return(setresgid(-1, egid, -1));
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR)
+const char *strerror(int e)
+{
+	extern int sys_nerr;
+	extern char *sys_errlist[];
+
+	if ((e >= 0) && (e < sys_nerr))
+		return (sys_errlist[e]);
+
+	return ("unlisted error");
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES
+int utimes(const char *filename, struct timeval *tvp)
+{
+	struct utimbuf ub;
+
+	ub.actime = tvp[0].tv_sec;
+	ub.modtime = tvp[1].tv_sec;
+
+	return (utime(filename, &ub));
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UTIMENSAT
+/*
+ * A limited implementation of utimensat() that only implements the
+ * functionality used by OpenSSH, currently only AT_FDCWD and
+ * AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW.
+ */
+int
+utimensat(int fd, const char *path, const struct timespec times[2],
+    int flag)
+{
+	struct timeval tv[2];
+# ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES
+	int ret, oflags = O_WRONLY;
+# endif
+
+	tv[0].tv_sec = times[0].tv_sec;
+	tv[0].tv_usec = times[0].tv_nsec / 1000;
+	tv[1].tv_sec = times[1].tv_sec;
+	tv[1].tv_usec = times[1].tv_nsec / 1000;
+
+	if (fd != AT_FDCWD) {
+		errno = ENOSYS;
+		return -1;
+	}
+# ifndef HAVE_FUTIMES
+	return utimes(path, tv);
+# else
+#  ifdef O_NOFOLLOW
+	if (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
+		oflags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+#  endif /* O_NOFOLLOW */
+	if ((fd = open(path, oflags)) == -1)
+		return -1;
+	ret = futimes(fd, tv);
+	close(fd);
+	return ret;
+# endif
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FCHOWNAT
+/*
+ * A limited implementation of fchownat() that only implements the
+ * functionality used by OpenSSH, currently only AT_FDCWD and
+ * AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW.
+ */
+int
+fchownat(int fd, const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group, int flag)
+{
+	int ret, oflags = O_WRONLY;
+
+	if (fd != AT_FDCWD) {
+		errno = ENOSYS;
+		return -1;
+	}
+# ifndef HAVE_FCHOWN
+	return chown(path, owner, group);
+# else
+#  ifdef O_NOFOLLOW
+	if (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
+		oflags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+#  endif /* O_NOFOLLOW */
+	if ((fd = open(path, oflags)) == -1)
+		return -1;
+	ret = fchown(fd, owner, group);
+	close(fd);
+	return ret;
+# endif
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FCHMODAT
+/*
+ * A limited implementation of fchmodat() that only implements the
+ * functionality used by OpenSSH, currently only AT_FDCWD and
+ * AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW.
+ */
+int
+fchmodat(int fd, const char *path, mode_t mode, int flag)
+{
+	int ret, oflags = O_WRONLY;
+
+	if (fd != AT_FDCWD) {
+		errno = ENOSYS;
+		return -1;
+	}
+# ifndef HAVE_FCHMOD
+	return chmod(path, mode);
+# else
+#  ifdef O_NOFOLLOW
+	if (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
+		oflags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+#  endif /* O_NOFOLLOW */
+	if ((fd = open(path, oflags)) == -1)
+		return -1;
+	ret = fchmod(fd, mode);
+	close(fd);
+	return ret;
+# endif
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE
+int truncate(const char *path, off_t length)
+{
+	int fd, ret, saverrno;
+
+	fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	ret = ftruncate(fd, length);
+	saverrno = errno;
+	close(fd);
+	if (ret == -1)
+		errno = saverrno;
+
+	return(ret);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
+int nanosleep(const struct timespec *req, struct timespec *rem)
+{
+	int rc, saverrno;
+	extern int errno;
+	struct timeval tstart, tstop, tremain, time2wait;
+
+	TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(&time2wait, req)
+	(void) gettimeofday(&tstart, NULL);
+	rc = select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &time2wait);
+	if (rc == -1) {
+		saverrno = errno;
+		(void) gettimeofday (&tstop, NULL);
+		errno = saverrno;
+		tremain.tv_sec = time2wait.tv_sec -
+			(tstop.tv_sec - tstart.tv_sec);
+		tremain.tv_usec = time2wait.tv_usec -
+			(tstop.tv_usec - tstart.tv_usec);
+		tremain.tv_sec += tremain.tv_usec / 1000000L;
+		tremain.tv_usec %= 1000000L;
+	} else {
+		tremain.tv_sec = 0;
+		tremain.tv_usec = 0;
+	}
+	if (rem != NULL)
+		TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tremain, rem)
+
+	return(rc);
+}
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_USLEEP)
+int usleep(unsigned int useconds)
+{
+	struct timespec ts;
+
+	ts.tv_sec = useconds / 1000000;
+	ts.tv_nsec = (useconds % 1000000) * 1000;
+	return nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
+pid_t
+tcgetpgrp(int fd)
+{
+	int ctty_pgrp;
+
+	if (ioctl(fd, TIOCGPGRP, &ctty_pgrp) == -1)
+		return(-1);
+	else
+		return(ctty_pgrp);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_TCGETPGRP */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
+int
+tcsendbreak(int fd, int duration)
+{
+# if defined(TIOCSBRK) && defined(TIOCCBRK)
+	struct timeval sleepytime;
+
+	sleepytime.tv_sec = 0;
+	sleepytime.tv_usec = 400000;
+	if (ioctl(fd, TIOCSBRK, 0) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	(void)select(0, 0, 0, 0, &sleepytime);
+	if (ioctl(fd, TIOCCBRK, 0) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	return (0);
+# else
+	return -1;
+# endif
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_TCSENDBREAK */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRDUP
+char *
+strdup(const char *str)
+{
+	size_t len;
+	char *cp;
+
+	len = strlen(str) + 1;
+	cp = malloc(len);
+	if (cp != NULL)
+		return(memcpy(cp, str, len));
+	return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK
+int
+isblank(int c)
+{
+	return (c == ' ' || c == '\t');
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETPGID
+pid_t
+getpgid(pid_t pid)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_GETPGRP) && !defined(GETPGRP_VOID) && GETPGRP_VOID == 0
+	return getpgrp(pid);
+#elif defined(HAVE_GETPGRP)
+	if (pid == 0)
+		return getpgrp();
+#endif
+
+	errno = ESRCH;
+	return -1;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_PLEDGE
+int
+pledge(const char *promises, const char *paths[])
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_MBTOWC
+/* a mbtowc that only supports ASCII */
+int
+mbtowc(wchar_t *pwc, const char *s, size_t n)
+{
+	if (s == NULL || *s == '\0')
+		return 0;	/* ASCII is not state-dependent */
+	if (*s < 0 || *s > 0x7f || n < 1) {
+		errno = EOPNOTSUPP;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (pwc != NULL)
+		*pwc = *s;
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_LLABS
+long long
+llabs(long long j)
+{
+	return (j < 0 ? -j : j);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BZERO
+void
+bzero(void *b, size_t n)
+{
+	(void)memset(b, 0, n);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RAISE
+int
+raise(int sig)
+{
+	kill(getpid(), sig);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETSID
+pid_t
+getsid(pid_t pid)
+{
+	errno = ENOSYS;
+	return -1;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_KILLPG
+int
+killpg(pid_t pgrp, int sig)
+{
+	return kill(pgrp, sig);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef FFLUSH_NULL_BUG
+#undef fflush
+int _ssh_compat_fflush(FILE *f)
+{
+	int r1, r2;
+
+	if (f == NULL) {
+		r1 = fflush(stdout);
+		r2 = fflush(stderr);
+		if (r1 == -1 || r2 == -1)
+			return -1;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return fflush(f);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R
+struct tm *
+localtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result)
+{
+	struct tm *tm = localtime(timep);
+	*result = *tm;
+	return result;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef ASAN_OPTIONS
+const char *__asan_default_options(void) {
+	return ASAN_OPTIONS;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef MSAN_OPTIONS
+const char *__msan_default_options(void) {
+	return MSAN_OPTIONS;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61ead1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_MISC_H
+#define _BSD_MISC_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+char *ssh_get_progname(char *);
+int seed_from_prngd(unsigned char *, size_t);
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETSID
+#define setsid() setpgrp(0, getpid())
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETSID */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
+int setenv(const char *, const char *, int);
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETENV */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN
+int setlogin(const char *);
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR
+int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
+int seteuid(uid_t);
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID)
+int setegid(uid_t);
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR)
+const char *strerror(int);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETLINEBUF)
+#define setlinebuf(a)	(setvbuf((a), NULL, _IOLBF, 0))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL
+struct timeval {
+	long tv_sec;
+	long tv_usec;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL */
+
+int utimes(const char *, struct timeval *);
+#endif /* HAVE_UTIMES */
+
+#ifndef AT_FDCWD
+# define AT_FDCWD (-2)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FCHMODAT
+int fchmodat(int, const char *, mode_t, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FCHOWNAT
+int fchownat(int, const char *, uid_t, gid_t, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE
+int truncate (const char *, off_t);
+#endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC
+struct timespec {
+	time_t	tv_sec;
+	long	tv_nsec;
+};
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
+# include <time.h>
+int nanosleep(const struct timespec *, struct timespec *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UTIMENSAT
+# include <time.h>
+/* start with the high bits and work down to minimise risk of overlap */
+# ifndef AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
+#  define AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW 0x80000000
+# endif
+int utimensat(int, const char *, const struct timespec[2], int);
+#endif /* !HAVE_UTIMENSAT */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_USLEEP
+int usleep(unsigned int useconds);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
+pid_t tcgetpgrp(int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
+int tcsendbreak(int, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UNSETENV
+int unsetenv(const char *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK
+int	isblank(int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETPGID
+pid_t getpgid(pid_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_PSELECT
+int pselect(int, fd_set *, fd_set *, fd_set *, const struct timespec *,
+    const sigset_t *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ENDGRENT
+# define endgrent() do { } while(0)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE
+# define krb5_get_error_message krb5_get_err_text
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE
+# define krb5_free_error_message(a,b) do { } while(0)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_PLEDGE
+int pledge(const char *promises, const char *paths[]);
+#endif
+
+/* bsd-err.h */
+#ifndef HAVE_ERR
+void err(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_ERRX
+void errx(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_WARN
+void warn(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_LLABS
+long long llabs(long long);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_BZERO) && HAVE_DECL_BZERO == 0
+void bzero(void *, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RAISE
+int raise(int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETSID
+pid_t getsid(pid_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FLOCK
+# define LOCK_SH		0x01
+# define LOCK_EX		0x02
+# define LOCK_NB		0x04
+# define LOCK_UN		0x08
+int flock(int, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef FFLUSH_NULL_BUG
+# define fflush(x)	(_ssh_compat_fflush(x))
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R
+struct tm *localtime_r(const time_t *, struct tm *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_REALPATH
+#define realpath(x, y)	(sftp_realpath((x), (y)))
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d52443f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000,2001 Ben Lindstrom.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NEXT
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include "bsd-nextstep.h"
+
+pid_t
+posix_wait(int *status)
+{
+	union wait statusp;
+	pid_t wait_pid;
+
+	#undef wait			/* Use NeXT's wait() function */
+	wait_pid = wait(&statusp);
+	if (status)
+		*status = (int) statusp.w_status;
+
+	return (wait_pid);
+}
+
+int
+tcgetattr(int fd, struct termios *t)
+{
+	return (ioctl(fd, TIOCGETA, t));
+}
+
+int
+tcsetattr(int fd, int opt, const struct termios *t)
+{
+	struct termios localterm;
+
+	if (opt & TCSASOFT) {
+		localterm = *t;
+		localterm.c_cflag |= CIGNORE;
+		t = &localterm;
+	}
+	switch (opt & ~TCSASOFT) {
+	case TCSANOW:
+		return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETA, t));
+	case TCSADRAIN:
+		return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETAW, t));
+	case TCSAFLUSH:
+		return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSETAF, t));
+	default:
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+}
+
+int tcsetpgrp(int fd, pid_t pgrp)
+{
+	return (ioctl(fd, TIOCSPGRP, &pgrp));
+}
+
+speed_t cfgetospeed(const struct termios *t)
+{
+	return (t->c_ospeed);
+}
+
+speed_t cfgetispeed(const struct termios *t)
+{
+	return (t->c_ispeed);
+}
+
+int
+cfsetospeed(struct termios *t,int speed)
+{
+	t->c_ospeed = speed;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+cfsetispeed(struct termios *t, int speed)
+{
+	t->c_ispeed = speed;
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_NEXT */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a45b15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000,2001 Ben Lindstrom.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _NEXT_POSIX_H
+#define _NEXT_POSIX_H
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NEXT
+#include <sys/dir.h>
+
+/* NGROUPS_MAX is behind -lposix.  Use the BSD version which is NGROUPS */
+#undef NGROUPS_MAX
+#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS
+
+/* NeXT's readdir() is BSD (struct direct) not POSIX (struct dirent) */
+#define dirent direct
+
+/* Swap out NeXT's BSD wait() for a more POSIX compliant one */
+pid_t posix_wait(int *);
+#define wait(a) posix_wait(a)
+
+/* #ifdef wrapped functions that need defining for clean compiling */
+pid_t getppid(void);
+void vhangup(void);
+int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+
+/* TERMCAP */
+int tcgetattr(int, struct termios *);
+int tcsetattr(int, int, const struct termios *);
+int tcsetpgrp(int, pid_t);
+speed_t cfgetospeed(const struct termios *);
+speed_t cfgetispeed(const struct termios *);
+int cfsetospeed(struct termios *, int);
+int cfsetispeed(struct termios *, int);
+#endif /* HAVE_NEXT */
+#endif /* _NEXT_POSIX_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f550700
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+/*
+ * Please note: this implementation of openpty() is far from complete.
+ * it is just enough for portable OpenSSH's needs.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H
+# include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H
+# include <pty.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) && defined(HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H)
+# include <sys/stropts.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#ifndef O_NOCTTY
+#define O_NOCTTY 0
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) && !defined(HAVE__GETPTY)
+static int
+openpty_streams(int *amaster, int *aslave)
+{
+	/*
+	 * This code is used e.g. on Solaris 2.x.  (Note that Solaris 2.3
+	 * also has bsd-style ptys, but they simply do not work.)
+	 */
+	int ptm;
+	char *pts;
+	sshsig_t old_signal;
+
+	if ((ptm = open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* XXX: need to close ptm on error? */
+	old_signal = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+	if (grantpt(ptm) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, old_signal);
+
+	if (unlockpt(ptm) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if ((pts = ptsname(ptm)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	*amaster = ptm;
+
+	/* Open the slave side. */
+	if ((*aslave = open(pts, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+		close(*amaster);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+# if defined(I_FIND) && defined(__SVR4)
+	/*
+	 * If the streams modules have already been pushed then there
+	 * is no more work to do here.
+	 */
+	if (ioctl(*aslave, I_FIND, "ptem") != 0)
+		return 0;
+# endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Try to push the appropriate streams modules, as described
+	 * in Solaris pts(7).
+	 */
+	ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ptem");
+	ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ldterm");
+# ifndef __hpux
+	ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ttcompat");
+# endif /* __hpux */
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+openpty(int *amaster, int *aslave, char *name, struct termios *termp,
+   struct winsize *winp)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE__GETPTY)
+	/*
+	 * _getpty(3) exists in SGI Irix 4.x, 5.x & 6.x -- it generates more
+	 * pty's automagically when needed
+	 */
+	char *slave;
+
+	if ((slave = _getpty(amaster, O_RDWR, 0622, 0)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/* Open the slave side. */
+	if ((*aslave = open(slave, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+		close(*amaster);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX)
+
+#ifdef SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY
+	/*
+	 * On some (most? all?) SysV based systems with STREAMS based terminals,
+	 * sshd will acquire a controlling terminal when it pushes the "ptem"
+	 * module.  On such platforms, first allocate a sacrificial pty so
+	 * that sshd already has a controlling terminal before allocating the
+	 * one that will be passed back to the user process.  This ensures
+	 * the second pty is not already the controlling terminal for a
+	 * different session and is available to become controlling terminal
+	 * for the client's subprocess.  See bugzilla #245 for details.
+	 */
+	int r, fd;
+	static int junk_ptyfd = -1, junk_ttyfd;
+
+	r = openpty_streams(amaster, aslave);
+	if (junk_ptyfd == -1 && (fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY)) >= 0) {
+		close(fd);
+		junk_ptyfd = *amaster;
+		junk_ttyfd = *aslave;
+		debug("STREAMS bug workaround pty %d tty %d name %s",
+		    junk_ptyfd, junk_ttyfd, ttyname(junk_ttyfd));
+        } else
+		return r;
+#endif
+
+	return openpty_streams(amaster, aslave);
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC)
+	/* AIX-style pty code. */
+	const char *ttname;
+
+	if ((*amaster = open("/dev/ptc", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	if ((ttname = ttyname(*amaster)) == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	if ((*aslave = open(ttname, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+		close(*amaster);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+
+#else
+	/* BSD-style pty code. */
+	char ptbuf[64], ttbuf[64];
+	int i;
+	const char *ptymajors = "pqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmno"
+	    "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ";
+	const char *ptyminors = "0123456789abcdef";
+	int num_minors = strlen(ptyminors);
+	int num_ptys = strlen(ptymajors) * num_minors;
+	struct termios tio;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_ptys; i++) {
+		snprintf(ptbuf, sizeof(ptbuf), "/dev/pty%c%c",
+		    ptymajors[i / num_minors], ptyminors[i % num_minors]);
+		snprintf(ttbuf, sizeof(ttbuf), "/dev/tty%c%c",
+		    ptymajors[i / num_minors], ptyminors[i % num_minors]);
+
+		if ((*amaster = open(ptbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+			/* Try SCO style naming */
+			snprintf(ptbuf, sizeof(ptbuf), "/dev/ptyp%d", i);
+			snprintf(ttbuf, sizeof(ttbuf), "/dev/ttyp%d", i);
+			if ((*amaster = open(ptbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
+				continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Open the slave side. */
+		if ((*aslave = open(ttbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
+			close(*amaster);
+			return (-1);
+		}
+		/* set tty modes to a sane state for broken clients */
+		if (tcgetattr(*amaster, &tio) != -1) {
+			tio.c_lflag |= (ECHO | ISIG | ICANON);
+			tio.c_oflag |= (OPOST | ONLCR);
+			tio.c_iflag |= ICRNL;
+			tcsetattr(*amaster, TCSANOW, &tio);
+		}
+
+		return (0);
+	}
+	return (-1);
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY) */
+
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..967f947
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005, 2007 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au).
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_PPOLL) || !defined(HAVE_POLL) || defined(BROKEN_POLL)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PARAM_H
+# include <sys/param.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include "bsd-poll.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_PPOLL) || defined(BROKEN_POLL)
+/*
+ * A minimal implementation of ppoll(2), built on top of pselect(2).
+ *
+ * Only supports POLLIN, POLLOUT and POLLPRI flags in pfd.events and
+ * revents. Notably POLLERR, POLLHUP and POLLNVAL are not supported.
+ *
+ * Supports pfd.fd = -1 meaning "unused" although it's not standard.
+ */
+
+int
+ppoll(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds, const struct timespec *tmoutp,
+    const sigset_t *sigmask)
+{
+	nfds_t i;
+	int ret, fd, maxfd = 0;
+	fd_set readfds, writefds, exceptfds;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) {
+		fd = fds[i].fd;
+		if (fd != -1 && fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+			errno = EINVAL;
+			return -1;
+		}
+		maxfd = MAX(maxfd, fd);
+	}
+
+	/* populate event bit vectors for the events we're interested in */
+	FD_ZERO(&readfds);
+	FD_ZERO(&writefds);
+	FD_ZERO(&exceptfds);
+	for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) {
+		fd = fds[i].fd;
+		if (fd == -1)
+			continue;
+		if (fds[i].events & POLLIN)
+			FD_SET(fd, &readfds);
+		if (fds[i].events & POLLOUT)
+			FD_SET(fd, &writefds);
+		if (fds[i].events & POLLPRI)
+			FD_SET(fd, &exceptfds);
+	}
+
+	ret = pselect(maxfd + 1, &readfds, &writefds, &exceptfds, tmoutp, sigmask);
+
+	/* scan through select results and set poll() flags */
+	for (i = 0; i < nfds; i++) {
+		fd = fds[i].fd;
+		fds[i].revents = 0;
+		if (fd == -1)
+			continue;
+		if ((fds[i].events & POLLIN) && FD_ISSET(fd, &readfds))
+			fds[i].revents |= POLLIN;
+		if ((fds[i].events & POLLOUT) && FD_ISSET(fd, &writefds))
+			fds[i].revents |= POLLOUT;
+		if ((fds[i].events & POLLPRI) && FD_ISSET(fd, &exceptfds))
+			fds[i].revents |= POLLPRI;
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_PPOLL || BROKEN_POLL */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_POLL) || defined(BROKEN_POLL)
+int
+poll(struct pollfd *fds, nfds_t nfds, int timeout)
+{
+	struct timespec ts, *tsp = NULL;
+
+	/* poll timeout is msec, ppoll is timespec (sec + nsec) */
+	if (timeout >= 0) {
+		ts.tv_sec = timeout / 1000;
+		ts.tv_nsec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000000;
+		tsp = &ts;
+	}
+
+	return ppoll(fds, nfds, tsp, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_POLL || BROKEN_POLL */
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_PPOLL || !HAVE_POLL || BROKEN_POLL */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae865a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: poll.h,v 1.11 2003/12/10 23:10:08 millert Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996 Theo de Raadt
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/poll.h */
+
+#ifndef	_COMPAT_POLL_H_
+#define	_COMPAT_POLL_H_
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+# include <poll.h>
+#elif HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+# include <sys/poll.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_POLLFD_FD
+typedef struct pollfd {
+	int	fd;
+	short	events;
+	short	revents;
+} pollfd_t;
+
+#ifndef POLLIN
+# define POLLIN		0x0001
+#endif
+#ifndef POLLPRI
+# define POLLPRI	0x0002
+#endif
+#ifndef POLLOUT
+# define POLLOUT	0x0004
+#endif
+#ifndef POLLERR
+# define POLLERR	0x0008
+#endif
+#ifndef POLLHUP
+# define POLLHUP	0x0010
+#endif
+#ifndef POLLNVAL
+# define POLLNVAL	0x0020
+#endif
+
+#if 0
+/* the following are currently not implemented */
+#define	POLLRDNORM	0x0040
+#define POLLNORM	POLLRDNORM
+#define POLLWRNORM      POLLOUT
+#define	POLLRDBAND	0x0080
+#define	POLLWRBAND	0x0100
+#endif
+
+#define INFTIM		(-1)	/* not standard */
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_POLLFD_FD */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_NFDS_T
+typedef unsigned int	nfds_t;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_POLL
+int   poll(struct pollfd *, nfds_t, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_PPOLL
+int   ppoll(struct pollfd *, nfds_t, const struct timespec *, const sigset_t *);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !_COMPAT_POLL_H_ */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b363208
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2021 Darren Tucker (dtucker at dtucker net).
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_PSELECT
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
+# include <sys/select.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"      /* for set_nonblock */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SIGHANDLER_T
+typedef void (*sighandler_t)(int);
+#endif
+
+static sighandler_t saved_sighandler[_NSIG];
+
+/*
+ * Set up the descriptors.  Because they are close-on-exec, in the case
+ * where sshd's re-exec fails notify_pipe will still point to a descriptor
+ * that was closed by the exec attempt but if that descriptor has been
+ * reopened then we'll attempt to use that.  Ensure that notify_pipe is
+ * outside of the range used by sshd re-exec but within NFDBITS (so we don't
+ * need to expand the fd_sets).
+ */
+#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)
+static int
+pselect_notify_setup_fd(int *fd)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = fcntl(*fd, F_DUPFD, REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD)) < 0 ||
+	    fcntl(r, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) < 0 || r >= FD_SETSIZE)
+		return -1;
+	(void)close(*fd);
+	return (*fd = r);
+}
+
+/*
+ * we write to this pipe if a SIGCHLD is caught in order to avoid
+ * the race between select() and child_terminated
+ */
+static pid_t notify_pid;
+static int notify_pipe[2];
+static void
+pselect_notify_setup(void)
+{
+	static int initialized;
+
+	if (initialized && notify_pid == getpid())
+		return;
+	if (notify_pid == 0)
+		debug3_f("initializing");
+	else {
+		debug3_f("pid changed, reinitializing");
+		if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
+			close(notify_pipe[0]);
+		if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
+			close(notify_pipe[1]);
+	}
+	if (pipe(notify_pipe) == -1) {
+		error("pipe(notify_pipe) failed %s", strerror(errno));
+	} else if (pselect_notify_setup_fd(&notify_pipe[0]) == -1 ||
+	    pselect_notify_setup_fd(&notify_pipe[1]) == -1) {
+		error("fcntl(notify_pipe, ...) failed %s", strerror(errno));
+		close(notify_pipe[0]);
+		close(notify_pipe[1]);
+	} else {
+		set_nonblock(notify_pipe[0]);
+		set_nonblock(notify_pipe[1]);
+		notify_pid = getpid();
+		debug3_f("pid %d saved %d pipe0 %d pipe1 %d", getpid(),
+		    notify_pid, notify_pipe[0], notify_pipe[1]);
+		initialized = 1;
+		return;
+	}
+	notify_pipe[0] = -1;    /* read end */
+	notify_pipe[1] = -1;    /* write end */
+}
+static void
+pselect_notify_parent(void)
+{
+	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
+		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+}
+static void
+pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+{
+	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
+		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+}
+static void
+pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+{
+	char c;
+
+	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
+		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
+			debug2_f("reading");
+		FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+	}
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+pselect_sig_handler(int sig)
+{
+	int save_errno = errno;
+
+	pselect_notify_parent();
+	if (saved_sighandler[sig] != NULL)
+		(*saved_sighandler[sig])(sig);  /* call original handler */
+	errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+/*
+ * A minimal implementation of pselect(2), built on top of select(2).
+ */
+
+int
+pselect(int nfds, fd_set *readfds, fd_set *writefds, fd_set *exceptfds,
+    const struct timespec *timeout, const sigset_t *mask)
+{
+	int ret, sig, saved_errno, unmasked = 0;
+	sigset_t osig;
+	struct sigaction sa, osa;
+	struct timeval tv, *tvp = NULL;
+
+	if (timeout != NULL) {
+		tv.tv_sec = timeout->tv_sec;
+		tv.tv_usec = timeout->tv_nsec / 1000;
+		tvp = &tv;
+	}
+	if (mask == NULL)  /* no signal mask, just call select */
+		return select(nfds, readfds, writefds, exceptfds, tvp);
+
+	/* For each signal we're unmasking, install our handler if needed. */
+	for (sig = 0; sig < _NSIG; sig++) {
+		if (sig == SIGKILL || sig == SIGSTOP || sigismember(mask, sig))
+			continue;
+		if (sigaction(sig, NULL, &sa) == 0 &&
+		    sa.sa_handler != SIG_IGN && sa.sa_handler != SIG_DFL) {
+			unmasked = 1;
+			if (sa.sa_handler == pselect_sig_handler)
+				continue;
+			sa.sa_handler = pselect_sig_handler;
+			if (sigaction(sig, &sa, &osa) == 0) {
+				debug3_f("installing signal handler for %s, "
+				    "previous %p", strsignal(sig),
+				     osa.sa_handler);
+				saved_sighandler[sig] = osa.sa_handler;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (unmasked) {
+		pselect_notify_setup();
+		pselect_notify_prepare(readfds);
+		nfds = MAX(nfds, notify_pipe[0] + 1);
+	}
+
+	/* Unmask signals, call select then restore signal mask. */
+	sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, mask, &osig);
+	ret = select(nfds, readfds, writefds, exceptfds, tvp);
+	saved_errno = errno;
+	sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &osig, NULL);
+
+	if (unmasked)
+		pselect_notify_done(readfds);
+	errno = saved_errno;
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..04752d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au).
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) || defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
+int
+setresgid(gid_t rgid, gid_t egid, gid_t sgid)
+{
+	int ret = 0, saved_errno;
+
+	if (rgid != sgid) {
+		errno = ENOSYS;
+		return -1;
+	}
+#if defined(HAVE_SETREGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREGID)
+	if (setregid(rgid, egid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("setregid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)rgid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+#else
+	if (setegid(egid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("setegid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)egid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+	if (setgid(rgid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("setgid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)rgid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+#endif
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETRESUID) || defined(BROKEN_SETRESUID)
+int
+setresuid(uid_t ruid, uid_t euid, uid_t suid)
+{
+	int ret = 0, saved_errno;
+
+	if (ruid != suid) {
+		errno = ENOSYS;
+		return -1;
+	}
+#if defined(HAVE_SETREUID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETREUID)
+	if (setreuid(ruid, euid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("setreuid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)ruid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+#else
+
+# ifndef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID
+	if (seteuid(euid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("seteuid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)euid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+# endif
+	if (setuid(ruid) < 0) {
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		error("setuid %lu: %.100s", (u_long)ruid, strerror(errno));
+		errno = saved_errno;
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+#endif
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0350a59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip com au).
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETRESGID
+int	setresgid(gid_t, gid_t, gid_t);
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_SETRESUID
+int	setresuid(uid_t, uid_t, uid_t);
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38d5e97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRSIGNAL)
+char *strsignal(int sig)
+{
+	static char buf[16];
+
+	(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", sig);
+	return buf;
+}
+#endif
+
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d8c444
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_SIGNAL_H
+#define _BSD_SIGNAL_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#ifndef _NSIG
+# ifdef NSIG
+#  define _NSIG NSIG
+# else
+#  define _NSIG 128
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRSIGNAL)
+char *strsignal(int);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _BSD_SIGNAL_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9eaee1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,880 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright Patrick Powell 1995
+ * This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell (papowell@astart.com)
+ * It may be used for any purpose as long as this notice remains intact
+ * on all source code distributions
+ */
+
+/**************************************************************
+ * Original:
+ * Patrick Powell Tue Apr 11 09:48:21 PDT 1995
+ * A bombproof version of doprnt (dopr) included.
+ * Sigh.  This sort of thing is always nasty do deal with.  Note that
+ * the version here does not include floating point...
+ *
+ * snprintf() is used instead of sprintf() as it does limit checks
+ * for string length.  This covers a nasty loophole.
+ *
+ * The other functions are there to prevent NULL pointers from
+ * causing nast effects.
+ *
+ * More Recently:
+ *  Brandon Long <blong@fiction.net> 9/15/96 for mutt 0.43
+ *  This was ugly.  It is still ugly.  I opted out of floating point
+ *  numbers, but the formatter understands just about everything
+ *  from the normal C string format, at least as far as I can tell from
+ *  the Solaris 2.5 printf(3S) man page.
+ *
+ *  Brandon Long <blong@fiction.net> 10/22/97 for mutt 0.87.1
+ *    Ok, added some minimal floating point support, which means this
+ *    probably requires libm on most operating systems.  Don't yet
+ *    support the exponent (e,E) and sigfig (g,G).  Also, fmtint()
+ *    was pretty badly broken, it just wasn't being exercised in ways
+ *    which showed it, so that's been fixed.  Also, formatted the code
+ *    to mutt conventions, and removed dead code left over from the
+ *    original.  Also, there is now a builtin-test, just compile with:
+ *           gcc -DTEST_SNPRINTF -o snprintf snprintf.c -lm
+ *    and run snprintf for results.
+ * 
+ *  Thomas Roessler <roessler@guug.de> 01/27/98 for mutt 0.89i
+ *    The PGP code was using unsigned hexadecimal formats. 
+ *    Unfortunately, unsigned formats simply didn't work.
+ *
+ *  Michael Elkins <me@cs.hmc.edu> 03/05/98 for mutt 0.90.8
+ *    The original code assumed that both snprintf() and vsnprintf() were
+ *    missing.  Some systems only have snprintf() but not vsnprintf(), so
+ *    the code is now broken down under HAVE_SNPRINTF and HAVE_VSNPRINTF.
+ *
+ *  Andrew Tridgell (tridge@samba.org) Oct 1998
+ *    fixed handling of %.0f
+ *    added test for HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
+ *
+ * tridge@samba.org, idra@samba.org, April 2001
+ *    got rid of fcvt code (twas buggy and made testing harder)
+ *    added C99 semantics
+ *
+ * date: 2002/12/19 19:56:31;  author: herb;  state: Exp;  lines: +2 -0
+ * actually print args for %g and %e
+ * 
+ * date: 2002/06/03 13:37:52;  author: jmcd;  state: Exp;  lines: +8 -0
+ * Since includes.h isn't included here, VA_COPY has to be defined here.  I don't
+ * see any include file that is guaranteed to be here, so I'm defining it
+ * locally.  Fixes AIX and Solaris builds.
+ * 
+ * date: 2002/06/03 03:07:24;  author: tridge;  state: Exp;  lines: +5 -13
+ * put the ifdef for HAVE_VA_COPY in one place rather than in lots of
+ * functions
+ * 
+ * date: 2002/05/17 14:51:22;  author: jmcd;  state: Exp;  lines: +21 -4
+ * Fix usage of va_list passed as an arg.  Use __va_copy before using it
+ * when it exists.
+ * 
+ * date: 2002/04/16 22:38:04;  author: idra;  state: Exp;  lines: +20 -14
+ * Fix incorrect zpadlen handling in fmtfp.
+ * Thanks to Ollie Oldham <ollie.oldham@metro-optix.com> for spotting it.
+ * few mods to make it easier to compile the tests.
+ * added the "Ollie" test to the floating point ones.
+ *
+ * Martin Pool (mbp@samba.org) April 2003
+ *    Remove NO_CONFIG_H so that the test case can be built within a source
+ *    tree with less trouble.
+ *    Remove unnecessary SAFE_FREE() definition.
+ *
+ * Martin Pool (mbp@samba.org) May 2003
+ *    Put in a prototype for dummy_snprintf() to quiet compiler warnings.
+ *
+ *    Move #endif to make sure VA_COPY, LDOUBLE, etc are defined even
+ *    if the C library has some snprintf functions already.
+ *
+ * Damien Miller (djm@mindrot.org) Jan 2007
+ *    Fix integer overflows in return value.
+ *    Make formatting quite a bit faster by inlining dopr_outch()
+ *
+ **************************************************************/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_SNPRINTF)		/* For those with broken snprintf() */
+# undef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+# undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
+# define LDOUBLE long double
+#else
+# define LDOUBLE double
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG
+# define LLONG long long
+#else
+# define LLONG long
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * dopr(): poor man's version of doprintf
+ */
+
+/* format read states */
+#define DP_S_DEFAULT 0
+#define DP_S_FLAGS   1
+#define DP_S_MIN     2
+#define DP_S_DOT     3
+#define DP_S_MAX     4
+#define DP_S_MOD     5
+#define DP_S_CONV    6
+#define DP_S_DONE    7
+
+/* format flags - Bits */
+#define DP_F_MINUS	(1 << 0)
+#define DP_F_PLUS	(1 << 1)
+#define DP_F_SPACE	(1 << 2)
+#define DP_F_NUM	(1 << 3)
+#define DP_F_ZERO	(1 << 4)
+#define DP_F_UP		(1 << 5)
+#define DP_F_UNSIGNED	(1 << 6)
+
+/* Conversion Flags */
+#define DP_C_SHORT   1
+#define DP_C_LONG    2
+#define DP_C_LDOUBLE 3
+#define DP_C_LLONG   4
+#define DP_C_SIZE    5
+#define DP_C_INTMAX  6
+
+#define char_to_int(p) ((p)- '0')
+#ifndef MAX
+# define MAX(p,q) (((p) >= (q)) ? (p) : (q))
+#endif
+
+#define DOPR_OUTCH(buf, pos, buflen, thechar) \
+	do { \
+		if (pos + 1 >= INT_MAX) { \
+			errno = ERANGE; \
+			return -1; \
+		} \
+		if (pos < buflen) \
+			buf[pos] = thechar; \
+		(pos)++; \
+	} while (0)
+
+static int dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, 
+    va_list args_in);
+static int fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+    char *value, int flags, int min, int max);
+static int fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+    intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags);
+static int fmtfp(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+    LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags);
+
+static int
+dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, va_list args_in)
+{
+	char ch;
+	intmax_t value;
+	LDOUBLE fvalue;
+	char *strvalue;
+	int min;
+	int max;
+	int state;
+	int flags;
+	int cflags;
+	size_t currlen;
+	va_list args;
+
+	VA_COPY(args, args_in);
+	
+	state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
+	currlen = flags = cflags = min = 0;
+	max = -1;
+	ch = *format++;
+	
+	while (state != DP_S_DONE) {
+		if (ch == '\0') 
+			state = DP_S_DONE;
+
+		switch(state) {
+		case DP_S_DEFAULT:
+			if (ch == '%') 
+				state = DP_S_FLAGS;
+			else
+				DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch);
+			ch = *format++;
+			break;
+		case DP_S_FLAGS:
+			switch (ch) {
+			case '-':
+				flags |= DP_F_MINUS;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case '+':
+				flags |= DP_F_PLUS;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case ' ':
+				flags |= DP_F_SPACE;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case '#':
+				flags |= DP_F_NUM;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case '0':
+				flags |= DP_F_ZERO;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			default:
+				state = DP_S_MIN;
+				break;
+			}
+			break;
+		case DP_S_MIN:
+			if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
+				min = 10*min + char_to_int (ch);
+				ch = *format++;
+			} else if (ch == '*') {
+				min = va_arg (args, int);
+				ch = *format++;
+				state = DP_S_DOT;
+			} else {
+				state = DP_S_DOT;
+			}
+			break;
+		case DP_S_DOT:
+			if (ch == '.') {
+				state = DP_S_MAX;
+				ch = *format++;
+			} else { 
+				state = DP_S_MOD;
+			}
+			break;
+		case DP_S_MAX:
+			if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) {
+				if (max < 0)
+					max = 0;
+				max = 10*max + char_to_int (ch);
+				ch = *format++;
+			} else if (ch == '*') {
+				max = va_arg (args, int);
+				ch = *format++;
+				state = DP_S_MOD;
+			} else {
+				state = DP_S_MOD;
+			}
+			break;
+		case DP_S_MOD:
+			switch (ch) {
+			case 'h':
+				cflags = DP_C_SHORT;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case 'j':
+				cflags = DP_C_INTMAX;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case 'l':
+				cflags = DP_C_LONG;
+				ch = *format++;
+				if (ch == 'l') {	/* It's a long long */
+					cflags = DP_C_LLONG;
+					ch = *format++;
+				}
+				break;
+			case 'L':
+				cflags = DP_C_LDOUBLE;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			case 'z':
+				cflags = DP_C_SIZE;
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			default:
+				break;
+			}
+			state = DP_S_CONV;
+			break;
+		case DP_S_CONV:
+			switch (ch) {
+			case 'd':
+			case 'i':
+				if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) 
+					value = va_arg (args, int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+					value = va_arg (args, long int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
+					value = va_arg (args, LLONG);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
+					value = va_arg (args, ssize_t);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
+					value = va_arg (args, intmax_t);
+				else
+					value = va_arg (args, int);
+				if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+				    value, 10, min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'o':
+				flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
+				if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
+					value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
+					value = va_arg (args, size_t);
+#ifdef notyet
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
+					value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t);
+#endif
+				else
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
+				    8, min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'u':
+				flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
+				if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
+					value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
+					value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
+					value = va_arg (args, size_t);
+#ifdef notyet
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
+					value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t);
+#endif
+				else
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
+				    10, min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'X':
+				flags |= DP_F_UP;
+			case 'x':
+				flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED;
+				if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT)
+					value = va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG)
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG)
+					value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG);
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE)
+					value = va_arg (args, size_t);
+#ifdef notyet
+				else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX)
+					value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t);
+#endif
+				else
+					value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int);
+				if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value,
+				    16, min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'f':
+				if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
+				else
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
+				if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
+				    min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'E':
+				flags |= DP_F_UP;
+			case 'e':
+				if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
+				else
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
+				if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
+				    min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'G':
+				flags |= DP_F_UP;
+			case 'g':
+				if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE)
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE);
+				else
+					fvalue = va_arg (args, double);
+				if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue,
+				    min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'c':
+				DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen,
+				    va_arg (args, int));
+				break;
+			case 's':
+				strvalue = va_arg (args, char *);
+				if (!strvalue) strvalue = "(NULL)";
+				if (max == -1) {
+					max = strlen(strvalue);
+				}
+				if (min > 0 && max >= 0 && min > max) max = min;
+				if (fmtstr(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+				    strvalue, flags, min, max) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+			case 'p':
+				strvalue = va_arg (args, void *);
+				if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen,
+				    (long) strvalue, 16, min, max, flags) == -1)
+					return -1;
+				break;
+#if we_dont_want_this_in_openssh
+			case 'n':
+				if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) {
+					short int *num;
+					num = va_arg (args, short int *);
+					*num = currlen;
+				} else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) {
+					long int *num;
+					num = va_arg (args, long int *);
+					*num = (long int)currlen;
+				} else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) {
+					LLONG *num;
+					num = va_arg (args, LLONG *);
+					*num = (LLONG)currlen;
+				} else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) {
+					ssize_t *num;
+					num = va_arg (args, ssize_t *);
+					*num = (ssize_t)currlen;
+				} else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) {
+					intmax_t *num;
+					num = va_arg (args, intmax_t *);
+					*num = (intmax_t)currlen;
+				} else {
+					int *num;
+					num = va_arg (args, int *);
+					*num = currlen;
+				}
+				break;
+#endif
+			case '%':
+				DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch);
+				break;
+			case 'w':
+				/* not supported yet, treat as next char */
+				ch = *format++;
+				break;
+			default:
+				/* Unknown, skip */
+				break;
+			}
+			ch = *format++;
+			state = DP_S_DEFAULT;
+			flags = cflags = min = 0;
+			max = -1;
+			break;
+		case DP_S_DONE:
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* hmm? */
+			break; /* some picky compilers need this */
+		}
+	}
+	if (maxlen != 0) {
+		if (currlen < maxlen - 1) 
+			buffer[currlen] = '\0';
+		else if (maxlen > 0) 
+			buffer[maxlen - 1] = '\0';
+	}
+	
+	return currlen < INT_MAX ? (int)currlen : -1;
+}
+
+static int
+fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+    char *value, int flags, int min, int max)
+{
+	int padlen, strln;     /* amount to pad */
+	int cnt = 0;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
+	printf("fmtstr min=%d max=%d s=[%s]\n", min, max, value);
+#endif
+	if (value == 0) {
+		value = "<NULL>";
+	}
+
+	for (strln = 0; strln < max && value[strln]; ++strln); /* strlen */
+	padlen = min - strln;
+	if (padlen < 0) 
+		padlen = 0;
+	if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) 
+		padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justify */
+	
+	while ((padlen > 0) && (cnt < max)) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		--padlen;
+		++cnt;
+	}
+	while (*value && (cnt < max)) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, *value);
+		value++;
+		++cnt;
+	}
+	while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		++padlen;
+		++cnt;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Have to handle DP_F_NUM (ie 0x and 0 alternates) */
+
+static int
+fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+    intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags)
+{
+	int signvalue = 0;
+	unsigned LLONG uvalue;
+	char convert[20];
+	int place = 0;
+	int spadlen = 0; /* amount to space pad */
+	int zpadlen = 0; /* amount to zero pad */
+	int caps = 0;
+	
+	if (max < 0)
+		max = 0;
+	
+	uvalue = value;
+	
+	if(!(flags & DP_F_UNSIGNED)) {
+		if( value < 0 ) {
+			signvalue = '-';
+			uvalue = -value;
+		} else {
+			if (flags & DP_F_PLUS)  /* Do a sign (+/i) */
+				signvalue = '+';
+			else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
+				signvalue = ' ';
+		}
+	}
+  
+	if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */
+
+	do {
+		convert[place++] =
+			(caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")
+			[uvalue % (unsigned)base  ];
+		uvalue = (uvalue / (unsigned)base );
+	} while(uvalue && (place < 20));
+	if (place == 20) place--;
+	convert[place] = 0;
+
+	zpadlen = max - place;
+	spadlen = min - MAX (max, place) - (signvalue ? 1 : 0);
+	if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0;
+	if (spadlen < 0) spadlen = 0;
+	if (flags & DP_F_ZERO) {
+		zpadlen = MAX(zpadlen, spadlen);
+		spadlen = 0;
+	}
+	if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) 
+		spadlen = -spadlen; /* Left Justifty */
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
+	printf("zpad: %d, spad: %d, min: %d, max: %d, place: %d\n",
+	    zpadlen, spadlen, min, max, place);
+#endif
+
+	/* Spaces */
+	while (spadlen > 0) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		--spadlen;
+	}
+
+	/* Sign */
+	if (signvalue) 
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+
+	/* Zeros */
+	if (zpadlen > 0) {
+		while (zpadlen > 0) {
+			DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
+			--zpadlen;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Digits */
+	while (place > 0) {
+		--place;
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, convert[place]);
+	}
+  
+	/* Left Justified spaces */
+	while (spadlen < 0) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		++spadlen;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static LDOUBLE abs_val(LDOUBLE value)
+{
+	LDOUBLE result = value;
+
+	if (value < 0)
+		result = -value;
+	
+	return result;
+}
+
+static LDOUBLE POW10(int val)
+{
+	LDOUBLE result = 1;
+	
+	while (val) {
+		result *= 10;
+		val--;
+	}
+  
+	return result;
+}
+
+static LLONG ROUND(LDOUBLE value)
+{
+	LLONG intpart;
+
+	intpart = (LLONG)value;
+	value = value - intpart;
+	if (value >= 0.5) intpart++;
+	
+	return intpart;
+}
+
+/* a replacement for modf that doesn't need the math library. Should
+   be portable, but slow */
+static double my_modf(double x0, double *iptr)
+{
+	int i;
+	long l;
+	double x = x0;
+	double f = 1.0;
+
+	for (i=0;i<100;i++) {
+		l = (long)x;
+		if (l <= (x+1) && l >= (x-1)) break;
+		x *= 0.1;
+		f *= 10.0;
+	}
+
+	if (i == 100) {
+		/*
+		 * yikes! the number is beyond what we can handle.
+		 * What do we do?
+		 */
+		(*iptr) = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (i != 0) {
+		double i2;
+		double ret;
+
+		ret = my_modf(x0-l*f, &i2);
+		(*iptr) = l*f + i2;
+		return ret;
+	} 
+
+	(*iptr) = l;
+	return x - (*iptr);
+}
+
+
+static int
+fmtfp (char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen,
+    LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags)
+{
+	int signvalue = 0;
+	double ufvalue;
+	char iconvert[311];
+	char fconvert[311];
+	int iplace = 0;
+	int fplace = 0;
+	int padlen = 0; /* amount to pad */
+	int zpadlen = 0; 
+	int caps = 0;
+	int idx;
+	double intpart;
+	double fracpart;
+	double temp;
+  
+	/* 
+	 * AIX manpage says the default is 0, but Solaris says the default
+	 * is 6, and sprintf on AIX defaults to 6
+	 */
+	if (max < 0)
+		max = 6;
+
+	ufvalue = abs_val (fvalue);
+
+	if (fvalue < 0) {
+		signvalue = '-';
+	} else {
+		if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) { /* Do a sign (+/i) */
+			signvalue = '+';
+		} else {
+			if (flags & DP_F_SPACE)
+				signvalue = ' ';
+		}
+	}
+
+#if 0
+	if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */
+#endif
+
+#if 0
+	 if (max == 0) ufvalue += 0.5; /* if max = 0 we must round */
+#endif
+
+	/* 
+	 * Sorry, we only support 16 digits past the decimal because of our 
+	 * conversion method
+	 */
+	if (max > 16)
+		max = 16;
+
+	/* We "cheat" by converting the fractional part to integer by
+	 * multiplying by a factor of 10
+	 */
+
+	temp = ufvalue;
+	my_modf(temp, &intpart);
+
+	fracpart = ROUND((POW10(max)) * (ufvalue - intpart));
+	
+	if (fracpart >= POW10(max)) {
+		intpart++;
+		fracpart -= POW10(max);
+	}
+
+	/* Convert integer part */
+	do {
+		temp = intpart*0.1;
+		my_modf(temp, &intpart);
+		idx = (int) ((temp -intpart +0.05)* 10.0);
+		/* idx = (int) (((double)(temp*0.1) -intpart +0.05) *10.0); */
+		/* printf ("%llf, %f, %x\n", temp, intpart, idx); */
+		iconvert[iplace++] =
+			(caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx];
+	} while (intpart && (iplace < 311));
+	if (iplace == 311) iplace--;
+	iconvert[iplace] = 0;
+
+	/* Convert fractional part */
+	if (fracpart)
+	{
+		do {
+			temp = fracpart*0.1;
+			my_modf(temp, &fracpart);
+			idx = (int) ((temp -fracpart +0.05)* 10.0);
+			/* idx = (int) ((((temp/10) -fracpart) +0.05) *10); */
+			/* printf ("%lf, %lf, %ld\n", temp, fracpart, idx ); */
+			fconvert[fplace++] =
+			(caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx];
+		} while(fracpart && (fplace < 311));
+		if (fplace == 311) fplace--;
+	}
+	fconvert[fplace] = 0;
+  
+	/* -1 for decimal point, another -1 if we are printing a sign */
+	padlen = min - iplace - max - 1 - ((signvalue) ? 1 : 0); 
+	zpadlen = max - fplace;
+	if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0;
+	if (padlen < 0) 
+		padlen = 0;
+	if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) 
+		padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justifty */
+	
+	if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) {
+		if (signvalue) {
+			DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+			--padlen;
+			signvalue = 0;
+		}
+		while (padlen > 0) {
+			DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
+			--padlen;
+		}
+	}
+	while (padlen > 0) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		--padlen;
+	}
+	if (signvalue) 
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue);
+	
+	while (iplace > 0) {
+		--iplace;
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, iconvert[iplace]);
+	}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF
+	printf("fmtfp: fplace=%d zpadlen=%d\n", fplace, zpadlen);
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Decimal point.  This should probably use locale to find the correct
+	 * char to print out.
+	 */
+	if (max > 0) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '.');
+		
+		while (zpadlen > 0) {
+			DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0');
+			--zpadlen;
+		}
+
+		while (fplace > 0) {
+			--fplace;
+			DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, fconvert[fplace]);
+		}
+	}
+
+	while (padlen < 0) {
+		DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' ');
+		++padlen;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
+int
+vsnprintf (char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, va_list args)
+{
+	return dopr(str, count, fmt, args);
+}
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF)
+int
+snprintf(char *str, size_t count, SNPRINTF_CONST char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	size_t ret;
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18ca726
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008,2014 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
+ * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STATVFS) || !defined(HAVE_FSTATVFS)
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+# include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#ifndef MNAMELEN
+# define MNAMELEN 32
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FILES
+# define HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS
+static void
+copy_statfs_to_statvfs(struct statvfs *to, struct statfs *from)
+{
+	to->f_bsize = from->f_bsize;
+	to->f_frsize = from->f_bsize;	/* no exact equivalent */
+	to->f_blocks = from->f_blocks;
+	to->f_bfree = from->f_bfree;
+	to->f_bavail = from->f_bavail;
+	to->f_files = from->f_files;
+	to->f_ffree = from->f_ffree;
+	to->f_favail = from->f_ffree;	/* no exact equivalent */
+	to->f_fsid = 0;			/* XXX fix me */
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS
+	to->f_flag = from->f_flags;
+#else
+	to->f_flag = 0;
+#endif
+	to->f_namemax = MNAMELEN;
+}
+#endif
+
+# ifndef HAVE_STATVFS
+int statvfs(const char *path, struct statvfs *buf)
+{
+#  if defined(HAVE_STATFS) && defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS)
+	struct statfs fs;
+
+	memset(&fs, 0, sizeof(fs));
+	if (statfs(path, &fs) == -1)
+		return -1;
+	copy_statfs_to_statvfs(buf, &fs);
+	return 0;
+#  else
+	errno = ENOSYS;
+	return -1;
+#  endif
+}
+# endif
+
+# ifndef HAVE_FSTATVFS
+int fstatvfs(int fd, struct statvfs *buf)
+{
+#  if defined(HAVE_FSTATFS) && defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS)
+	struct statfs fs;
+
+	memset(&fs, 0, sizeof(fs));
+	if (fstatfs(fd, &fs) == -1)
+		return -1;
+	copy_statfs_to_statvfs(buf, &fs);
+	return 0;
+#  else
+	errno = ENOSYS;
+	return -1;
+#  endif
+}
+# endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e2a4c15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008,2014 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
+ * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STATVFS) || !defined(HAVE_FSTATVFS)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
+#include <sys/statfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H
+#include <sys/vfs.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T
+typedef unsigned long fsblkcnt_t;
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_FSFILCNT_T
+typedef unsigned long fsfilcnt_t;
+#endif
+
+#ifndef ST_RDONLY
+#define ST_RDONLY	1
+#endif
+#ifndef ST_NOSUID
+#define ST_NOSUID	2
+#endif
+
+	/* as defined in IEEE Std 1003.1, 2004 Edition */
+struct statvfs {
+	unsigned long f_bsize;	/* File system block size. */
+	unsigned long f_frsize;	/* Fundamental file system block size. */
+	fsblkcnt_t f_blocks;	/* Total number of blocks on file system in */
+				/* units of f_frsize. */
+	fsblkcnt_t    f_bfree;	/* Total number of free blocks. */
+	fsblkcnt_t    f_bavail;	/* Number of free blocks available to  */
+				/* non-privileged process.  */
+	fsfilcnt_t    f_files;	/* Total number of file serial numbers. */
+	fsfilcnt_t    f_ffree;	/* Total number of free file serial numbers. */
+	fsfilcnt_t    f_favail;	/* Number of file serial numbers available to */
+				/* non-privileged process. */
+	unsigned long f_fsid;	/* File system ID. */
+	unsigned long f_flag;	/* BBit mask of f_flag values. */
+	unsigned long f_namemax;/*  Maximum filename length. */
+};
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STATVFS
+int statvfs(const char *, struct statvfs *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FSTATVFS
+int fstatvfs(int, struct statvfs *);
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-timegm.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-timegm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..246724b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-timegm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1997 Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan
+ * (Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden).
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. Neither the name of the Institute nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE INSTITUTE AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE INSTITUTE OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+  adapted for Samba4 by Andrew Tridgell
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <time.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TIMEGM
+
+static int is_leap(unsigned y)
+{
+	y += 1900;
+	return (y % 4) == 0 && ((y % 100) != 0 || (y % 400) == 0);
+}
+
+time_t timegm(struct tm *tm)
+{
+	static const unsigned ndays[2][12] ={
+		{31, 28, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31},
+		{31, 29, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31, 31, 30, 31, 30, 31}};
+	time_t res = 0;
+	unsigned i;
+
+	if (tm->tm_mon > 12 ||
+	    tm->tm_mon < 0 ||
+	    tm->tm_mday > 31 ||
+	    tm->tm_min > 60 ||
+	    tm->tm_sec > 60 ||
+	    tm->tm_hour > 24) {
+		/* invalid tm structure */
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 70; i < tm->tm_year; ++i)
+		res += is_leap(i) ? 366 : 365;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < tm->tm_mon; ++i)
+		res += ndays[is_leap(tm->tm_year)][i];
+	res += tm->tm_mday - 1;
+	res *= 24;
+	res += tm->tm_hour;
+	res *= 60;
+	res += tm->tm_min;
+	res *= 60;
+	res += tm->tm_sec;
+	return res;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_TIMEGM */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..113fb1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Ben Lindstrom.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_WAITPID
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include "bsd-waitpid.h"
+
+pid_t
+waitpid(int pid, int *stat_loc, int options)
+{
+	union wait statusp;
+	pid_t wait_pid;
+
+	if (pid <= 0) {
+		if (pid != -1) {
+			errno = EINVAL;
+			return (-1);
+		}
+		/* wait4() wants pid=0 for indiscriminate wait. */
+		pid = 0;
+	}
+	wait_pid = wait4(pid, &statusp, options, NULL);
+	if (stat_loc)
+		*stat_loc = (int) statusp.w_status;
+
+	return (wait_pid);
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_WAITPID */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd61b69
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Ben Lindstrom.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _BSD_WAITPID_H
+#define _BSD_WAITPID_H
+
+#ifndef HAVE_WAITPID
+/* Clean out any potential issues */
+#undef WIFEXITED
+#undef WIFSTOPPED
+#undef WIFSIGNALED
+
+/* Define required functions to mimic a POSIX look and feel */
+#define _W_INT(w)	(*(int*)&(w))	/* convert union wait to int */
+#define WIFEXITED(w)	(!((_W_INT(w)) & 0377))
+#define WIFSTOPPED(w)	((_W_INT(w)) & 0100)
+#define WIFSIGNALED(w)	(!WIFEXITED(w) && !WIFSTOPPED(w))
+#define WEXITSTATUS(w)	(int)(WIFEXITED(w) ? ((_W_INT(w) >> 8) & 0377) : -1)
+#define WTERMSIG(w)	(int)(WIFSIGNALED(w) ? (_W_INT(w) & 0177) : -1)
+#define WCOREFLAG	0x80
+#define WCOREDUMP(w)	((_W_INT(w)) & WCOREFLAG)
+
+/* Prototype */
+pid_t waitpid(int, int *, int);
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_WAITPID */
+#endif /* _BSD_WAITPID_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/chacha_private.h b/openbsd-compat/chacha_private.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cdcb785
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/chacha_private.h
@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/crypt/chacha_private.h */
+
+/*
+chacha-merged.c version 20080118
+D. J. Bernstein
+Public domain.
+*/
+
+/* $OpenBSD: chacha_private.h,v 1.3 2022/02/28 21:56:29 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+typedef unsigned char u8;
+typedef unsigned int u32;
+
+typedef struct
+{
+  u32 input[16]; /* could be compressed */
+} chacha_ctx;
+
+#define U8C(v) (v##U)
+#define U32C(v) (v##U)
+
+#define U8V(v) ((u8)(v) & U8C(0xFF))
+#define U32V(v) ((u32)(v) & U32C(0xFFFFFFFF))
+
+#define ROTL32(v, n) \
+  (U32V((v) << (n)) | ((v) >> (32 - (n))))
+
+#define U8TO32_LITTLE(p) \
+  (((u32)((p)[0])      ) | \
+   ((u32)((p)[1]) <<  8) | \
+   ((u32)((p)[2]) << 16) | \
+   ((u32)((p)[3]) << 24))
+
+#define U32TO8_LITTLE(p, v) \
+  do { \
+    (p)[0] = U8V((v)      ); \
+    (p)[1] = U8V((v) >>  8); \
+    (p)[2] = U8V((v) >> 16); \
+    (p)[3] = U8V((v) >> 24); \
+  } while (0)
+
+#define ROTATE(v,c) (ROTL32(v,c))
+#define XOR(v,w) ((v) ^ (w))
+#define PLUS(v,w) (U32V((v) + (w)))
+#define PLUSONE(v) (PLUS((v),1))
+
+#define QUARTERROUND(a,b,c,d) \
+  a = PLUS(a,b); d = ROTATE(XOR(d,a),16); \
+  c = PLUS(c,d); b = ROTATE(XOR(b,c),12); \
+  a = PLUS(a,b); d = ROTATE(XOR(d,a), 8); \
+  c = PLUS(c,d); b = ROTATE(XOR(b,c), 7);
+
+static const char sigma[16] = "expand 32-byte k";
+static const char tau[16] = "expand 16-byte k";
+
+static void
+chacha_keysetup(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits)
+{
+  const char *constants;
+
+  x->input[4] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 0);
+  x->input[5] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 4);
+  x->input[6] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 8);
+  x->input[7] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 12);
+  if (kbits == 256) { /* recommended */
+    k += 16;
+    constants = sigma;
+  } else { /* kbits == 128 */
+    constants = tau;
+  }
+  x->input[8] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 0);
+  x->input[9] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 4);
+  x->input[10] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 8);
+  x->input[11] = U8TO32_LITTLE(k + 12);
+  x->input[0] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 0);
+  x->input[1] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 4);
+  x->input[2] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 8);
+  x->input[3] = U8TO32_LITTLE(constants + 12);
+}
+
+static void
+chacha_ivsetup(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *iv)
+{
+  x->input[12] = 0;
+  x->input[13] = 0;
+  x->input[14] = U8TO32_LITTLE(iv + 0);
+  x->input[15] = U8TO32_LITTLE(iv + 4);
+}
+
+static void
+chacha_encrypt_bytes(chacha_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes)
+{
+  u32 x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9, x10, x11, x12, x13, x14, x15;
+  u32 j0, j1, j2, j3, j4, j5, j6, j7, j8, j9, j10, j11, j12, j13, j14, j15;
+  u8 *ctarget = NULL;
+  u8 tmp[64];
+  u_int i;
+
+  if (!bytes) return;
+
+  j0 = x->input[0];
+  j1 = x->input[1];
+  j2 = x->input[2];
+  j3 = x->input[3];
+  j4 = x->input[4];
+  j5 = x->input[5];
+  j6 = x->input[6];
+  j7 = x->input[7];
+  j8 = x->input[8];
+  j9 = x->input[9];
+  j10 = x->input[10];
+  j11 = x->input[11];
+  j12 = x->input[12];
+  j13 = x->input[13];
+  j14 = x->input[14];
+  j15 = x->input[15];
+
+  for (;;) {
+    if (bytes < 64) {
+      for (i = 0;i < bytes;++i) tmp[i] = m[i];
+      m = tmp;
+      ctarget = c;
+      c = tmp;
+    }
+    x0 = j0;
+    x1 = j1;
+    x2 = j2;
+    x3 = j3;
+    x4 = j4;
+    x5 = j5;
+    x6 = j6;
+    x7 = j7;
+    x8 = j8;
+    x9 = j9;
+    x10 = j10;
+    x11 = j11;
+    x12 = j12;
+    x13 = j13;
+    x14 = j14;
+    x15 = j15;
+    for (i = 20;i > 0;i -= 2) {
+      QUARTERROUND( x0, x4, x8,x12)
+      QUARTERROUND( x1, x5, x9,x13)
+      QUARTERROUND( x2, x6,x10,x14)
+      QUARTERROUND( x3, x7,x11,x15)
+      QUARTERROUND( x0, x5,x10,x15)
+      QUARTERROUND( x1, x6,x11,x12)
+      QUARTERROUND( x2, x7, x8,x13)
+      QUARTERROUND( x3, x4, x9,x14)
+    }
+    x0 = PLUS(x0,j0);
+    x1 = PLUS(x1,j1);
+    x2 = PLUS(x2,j2);
+    x3 = PLUS(x3,j3);
+    x4 = PLUS(x4,j4);
+    x5 = PLUS(x5,j5);
+    x6 = PLUS(x6,j6);
+    x7 = PLUS(x7,j7);
+    x8 = PLUS(x8,j8);
+    x9 = PLUS(x9,j9);
+    x10 = PLUS(x10,j10);
+    x11 = PLUS(x11,j11);
+    x12 = PLUS(x12,j12);
+    x13 = PLUS(x13,j13);
+    x14 = PLUS(x14,j14);
+    x15 = PLUS(x15,j15);
+
+#ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY
+    x0 = XOR(x0,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 0));
+    x1 = XOR(x1,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 4));
+    x2 = XOR(x2,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 8));
+    x3 = XOR(x3,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 12));
+    x4 = XOR(x4,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 16));
+    x5 = XOR(x5,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 20));
+    x6 = XOR(x6,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 24));
+    x7 = XOR(x7,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 28));
+    x8 = XOR(x8,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 32));
+    x9 = XOR(x9,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 36));
+    x10 = XOR(x10,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 40));
+    x11 = XOR(x11,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 44));
+    x12 = XOR(x12,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 48));
+    x13 = XOR(x13,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 52));
+    x14 = XOR(x14,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 56));
+    x15 = XOR(x15,U8TO32_LITTLE(m + 60));
+#endif
+
+    j12 = PLUSONE(j12);
+    if (!j12) {
+      j13 = PLUSONE(j13);
+      /* stopping at 2^70 bytes per nonce is user's responsibility */
+    }
+
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 0,x0);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 4,x1);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 8,x2);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 12,x3);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 16,x4);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 20,x5);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 24,x6);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 28,x7);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 32,x8);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 36,x9);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 40,x10);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 44,x11);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 48,x12);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 52,x13);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 56,x14);
+    U32TO8_LITTLE(c + 60,x15);
+
+    if (bytes <= 64) {
+      if (bytes < 64) {
+        for (i = 0;i < bytes;++i) ctarget[i] = c[i];
+      }
+      x->input[12] = j12;
+      x->input[13] = j13;
+      return;
+    }
+    bytes -= 64;
+    c += 64;
+#ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY
+    m += 64;
+#endif
+  }
+}
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/charclass.h b/openbsd-compat/charclass.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..91f5174
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/charclass.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/*
+ * Public domain, 2008, Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * $OpenBSD: charclass.h,v 1.1 2008/10/01 23:04:13 millert Exp $
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/charclass.h */
+
+/*
+ * POSIX character class support for fnmatch() and glob().
+ */
+static struct cclass {
+	const char *name;
+	int (*isctype)(int);
+} cclasses[] = {
+	{ "alnum",	isalnum },
+	{ "alpha",	isalpha },
+	{ "blank",	isblank },
+	{ "cntrl",	iscntrl },
+	{ "digit",	isdigit },
+	{ "graph",	isgraph },
+	{ "lower",	islower },
+	{ "print",	isprint },
+	{ "punct",	ispunct },
+	{ "space",	isspace },
+	{ "upper",	isupper },
+	{ "xdigit",	isxdigit },
+	{ NULL,		NULL }
+};
+
+#define NCCLASSES	(sizeof(cclasses) / sizeof(cclasses[0]) - 1)
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/daemon.c b/openbsd-compat/daemon.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3efe14c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/daemon.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: daemon.c,v 1.6 2005/08/08 08:05:33 espie Exp $ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/daemon.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+# include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+daemon(int nochdir, int noclose)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	switch (fork()) {
+	case -1:
+		return (-1);
+	case 0:
+		break;
+	default:
+		_exit(0);
+	}
+
+	if (setsid() == -1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if (!nochdir)
+		(void)chdir("/");
+
+	if (!noclose && (fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
+		(void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
+		(void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
+		(void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
+		if (fd > 2)
+			(void)close (fd);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_DAEMON */
+
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/dirname.c b/openbsd-compat/dirname.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..127bc2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/dirname.c
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: dirname.c,v 1.13 2005/08/08 08:05:33 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1997, 2004 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/dirname.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+char *
+dirname(const char *path)
+{
+	static char dname[MAXPATHLEN];
+	size_t len;
+	const char *endp;
+
+	/* Empty or NULL string gets treated as "." */
+	if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
+		dname[0] = '.';
+		dname[1] = '\0';
+		return (dname);
+	}
+
+	/* Strip any trailing slashes */
+	endp = path + strlen(path) - 1;
+	while (endp > path && *endp == '/')
+		endp--;
+
+	/* Find the start of the dir */
+	while (endp > path && *endp != '/')
+		endp--;
+
+	/* Either the dir is "/" or there are no slashes */
+	if (endp == path) {
+		dname[0] = *endp == '/' ? '/' : '.';
+		dname[1] = '\0';
+		return (dname);
+	} else {
+		/* Move forward past the separating slashes */
+		do {
+			endp--;
+		} while (endp > path && *endp == '/');
+	}
+
+	len = endp - path + 1;
+	if (len >= sizeof(dname)) {
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	memcpy(dname, path, len);
+	dname[len] = '\0';
+	return (dname);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c b/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..68cd2c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/explicit_bzero.c */
+/*	$OpenBSD: explicit_bzero.c,v 1.1 2014/01/22 21:06:45 tedu Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Public domain.
+ * Written by Ted Unangst
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * explicit_bzero - don't let the compiler optimize away bzero
+ */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
+
+#ifdef HAVE_EXPLICIT_MEMSET
+
+void
+explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n)
+{
+	(void)explicit_memset(p, 0, n);
+}
+
+#elif defined(HAVE_MEMSET_S)
+
+void
+explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n)
+{
+	if (n == 0)
+		return;
+	(void)memset_s(p, n, 0, n);
+}
+
+#else /* HAVE_MEMSET_S */
+
+/*
+ * Indirect bzero through a volatile pointer to hopefully avoid
+ * dead-store optimisation eliminating the call.
+ */
+static void (* volatile ssh_bzero)(void *, size_t) = bzero;
+
+void
+explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n)
+{
+	if (n == 0)
+		return;
+	/*
+	 * clang -fsanitize=memory needs to intercept memset-like functions
+	 * to correctly detect memory initialisation. Make sure one is called
+	 * directly since our indirection trick above successfully confuses it.
+	 */
+#if defined(__has_feature)
+# if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer)
+	memset(p, 0, n);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+	ssh_bzero(p, n);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_MEMSET_S */
+
+#endif /* HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c b/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d5a6297
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c
@@ -0,0 +1,235 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Pseudo-implementation of RFC2553 name / address resolution functions
+ *
+ * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset
+ * is implemented for ssh use only. For example, this routine assumes
+ * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
+int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host,
+		size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in *sin = (struct sockaddr_in *)sa;
+	struct hostent *hp;
+	char tmpserv[16];
+
+	if (sa->sa_family != AF_UNSPEC && sa->sa_family != AF_INET)
+		return (EAI_FAMILY);
+	if (serv != NULL) {
+		snprintf(tmpserv, sizeof(tmpserv), "%d", ntohs(sin->sin_port));
+		if (strlcpy(serv, tmpserv, servlen) >= servlen)
+			return (EAI_MEMORY);
+	}
+
+	if (host != NULL) {
+		if (flags & NI_NUMERICHOST) {
+			if (strlcpy(host, inet_ntoa(sin->sin_addr),
+			    hostlen) >= hostlen)
+				return (EAI_MEMORY);
+			else
+				return (0);
+		} else {
+			hp = gethostbyaddr((char *)&sin->sin_addr,
+			    sizeof(struct in_addr), AF_INET);
+			if (hp == NULL)
+				return (EAI_NODATA);
+
+			if (strlcpy(host, hp->h_name, hostlen) >= hostlen)
+				return (EAI_MEMORY);
+			else
+				return (0);
+		}
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
+#ifdef HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO
+const char *
+#else
+char *
+#endif
+gai_strerror(int err)
+{
+	switch (err) {
+	case EAI_NODATA:
+		return ("no address associated with name");
+	case EAI_MEMORY:
+		return ("memory allocation failure.");
+	case EAI_NONAME:
+		return ("nodename nor servname provided, or not known");
+	case EAI_FAMILY:
+		return ("ai_family not supported");
+	default:
+		return ("unknown/invalid error.");
+	}
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
+void
+freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *ai)
+{
+	struct addrinfo *next;
+
+	for(; ai != NULL;) {
+		next = ai->ai_next;
+		free(ai);
+		ai = next;
+	}
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+static struct
+addrinfo *malloc_ai(int port, u_long addr, const struct addrinfo *hints)
+{
+	struct addrinfo *ai;
+
+	ai = malloc(sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
+	if (ai == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	memset(ai, '\0', sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(struct sockaddr_in));
+
+	ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1);
+	/* XXX -- ssh doesn't use sa_len */
+	ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+	ai->ai_addr->sa_family = ai->ai_family = AF_INET;
+
+	((struct sockaddr_in *)(ai)->ai_addr)->sin_port = port;
+	((struct sockaddr_in *)(ai)->ai_addr)->sin_addr.s_addr = addr;
+
+	/* XXX: the following is not generally correct, but does what we want */
+	if (hints->ai_socktype)
+		ai->ai_socktype = hints->ai_socktype;
+	else
+		ai->ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+
+	if (hints->ai_protocol)
+		ai->ai_protocol = hints->ai_protocol;
+
+	return (ai);
+}
+
+int
+getaddrinfo(const char *hostname, const char *servname,
+    const struct addrinfo *hints, struct addrinfo **res)
+{
+	struct hostent *hp;
+	struct servent *sp;
+	struct in_addr in;
+	int i;
+	long int port;
+	u_long addr;
+
+	port = 0;
+	if (hints && hints->ai_family != AF_UNSPEC &&
+	    hints->ai_family != AF_INET)
+		return (EAI_FAMILY);
+	if (servname != NULL) {
+		char *cp;
+
+		port = strtol(servname, &cp, 10);
+		if (port > 0 && port <= 65535 && *cp == '\0')
+			port = htons(port);
+		else if ((sp = getservbyname(servname, NULL)) != NULL)
+			port = sp->s_port;
+		else
+			port = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (hints && hints->ai_flags & AI_PASSIVE) {
+		addr = htonl(0x00000000);
+		if (hostname && inet_aton(hostname, &in) != 0)
+			addr = in.s_addr;
+		*res = malloc_ai(port, addr, hints);
+		if (*res == NULL)
+			return (EAI_MEMORY);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if (!hostname) {
+		*res = malloc_ai(port, htonl(0x7f000001), hints);
+		if (*res == NULL)
+			return (EAI_MEMORY);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if (inet_aton(hostname, &in)) {
+		*res = malloc_ai(port, in.s_addr, hints);
+		if (*res == NULL)
+			return (EAI_MEMORY);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* Don't try DNS if AI_NUMERICHOST is set */
+	if (hints && hints->ai_flags & AI_NUMERICHOST)
+		return (EAI_NONAME);
+
+	hp = gethostbyname(hostname);
+	if (hp && hp->h_name && hp->h_name[0] && hp->h_addr_list[0]) {
+		struct addrinfo *cur, *prev;
+
+		cur = prev = *res = NULL;
+		for (i = 0; hp->h_addr_list[i]; i++) {
+			struct in_addr *in = (struct in_addr *)hp->h_addr_list[i];
+
+			cur = malloc_ai(port, in->s_addr, hints);
+			if (cur == NULL) {
+				if (*res != NULL)
+					freeaddrinfo(*res);
+				return (EAI_MEMORY);
+			}
+			if (prev)
+				prev->ai_next = cur;
+			else
+				*res = cur;
+
+			prev = cur;
+		}
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	return (EAI_NODATA);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h b/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f913617
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h
@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (C) 1999 WIDE Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the project nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE PROJECT AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE PROJECT OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Pseudo-implementation of RFC2553 name / address resolution functions
+ *
+ * But these functions are not implemented correctly. The minimum subset
+ * is implemented for ssh use only. For example, this routine assumes
+ * that ai_family is AF_INET. Don't use it for another purpose.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _FAKE_RFC2553_H
+#define _FAKE_RFC2553_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
+# include <netdb.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * First, socket and INET6 related definitions
+ */
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE
+# define	_SS_MAXSIZE	128	/* Implementation specific max size */
+# define       _SS_PADSIZE     (_SS_MAXSIZE - sizeof (struct sockaddr))
+struct sockaddr_storage {
+	struct sockaddr	ss_sa;
+	char		__ss_pad2[_SS_PADSIZE];
+};
+# define ss_family ss_sa.sa_family
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE */
+
+#ifndef IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK
+# define IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(a) \
+	(((u_int32_t *)(a))[0] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *)(a))[1] == 0 && \
+	 ((u_int32_t *)(a))[2] == 0 && ((u_int32_t *)(a))[3] == htonl(1))
+#endif /* !IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR
+struct in6_addr {
+	u_int8_t	s6_addr[16];
+};
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
+struct sockaddr_in6 {
+	unsigned short	sin6_family;
+	u_int16_t	sin6_port;
+	u_int32_t	sin6_flowinfo;
+	struct in6_addr	sin6_addr;
+	u_int32_t	sin6_scope_id;
+};
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 */
+
+#ifndef AF_INET6
+/* Define it to something that should never appear */
+#define AF_INET6 AF_MAX
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Next, RFC2553 name / address resolution API
+ */
+
+#ifndef NI_NUMERICHOST
+# define NI_NUMERICHOST    (1)
+#endif
+#ifndef NI_NAMEREQD
+# define NI_NAMEREQD       (1<<1)
+#endif
+#ifndef NI_NUMERICSERV
+# define NI_NUMERICSERV    (1<<2)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef AI_PASSIVE
+# define AI_PASSIVE		(1)
+#endif
+#ifndef AI_CANONNAME
+# define AI_CANONNAME		(1<<1)
+#endif
+#ifndef AI_NUMERICHOST
+# define AI_NUMERICHOST		(1<<2)
+#endif
+#ifndef AI_NUMERICSERV
+# define AI_NUMERICSERV		(1<<3)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NI_MAXSERV
+# define NI_MAXSERV 32
+#endif /* !NI_MAXSERV */
+#ifndef NI_MAXHOST
+# define NI_MAXHOST 1025
+#endif /* !NI_MAXHOST */
+
+#ifndef EAI_NODATA
+# define EAI_NODATA	(INT_MAX - 1)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_MEMORY
+# define EAI_MEMORY	(INT_MAX - 2)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_NONAME
+# define EAI_NONAME	(INT_MAX - 3)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_SYSTEM
+# define EAI_SYSTEM	(INT_MAX - 4)
+#endif
+#ifndef EAI_FAMILY
+# define EAI_FAMILY	(INT_MAX - 5)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO
+struct addrinfo {
+	int	ai_flags;	/* AI_PASSIVE, AI_CANONNAME */
+	int	ai_family;	/* PF_xxx */
+	int	ai_socktype;	/* SOCK_xxx */
+	int	ai_protocol;	/* 0 or IPPROTO_xxx for IPv4 and IPv6 */
+	size_t	ai_addrlen;	/* length of ai_addr */
+	char	*ai_canonname;	/* canonical name for hostname */
+	struct sockaddr *ai_addr;	/* binary address */
+	struct addrinfo *ai_next;	/* next structure in linked list */
+};
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
+#ifdef getaddrinfo
+# undef getaddrinfo
+#endif
+#define getaddrinfo(a,b,c,d)	(ssh_getaddrinfo(a,b,c,d))
+int getaddrinfo(const char *, const char *,
+    const struct addrinfo *, struct addrinfo **);
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETADDRINFO */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR) && !defined(HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO)
+#define gai_strerror(a)		(_ssh_compat_gai_strerror(a))
+char *gai_strerror(int);
+#endif /* !HAVE_GAI_STRERROR */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
+#define freeaddrinfo(a)		(ssh_freeaddrinfo(a))
+void freeaddrinfo(struct addrinfo *);
+#endif /* !HAVE_FREEADDRINFO */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
+#define getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) (ssh_getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g))
+int getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *, size_t, char *, size_t,
+    char *, size_t, int);
+#endif /* !HAVE_GETNAMEINFO */
+
+#endif /* !_FAKE_RFC2553_H */
+
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c b/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..87d40d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/fmt_scaled.c
@@ -0,0 +1,309 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: fmt_scaled.c,v 1.21 2022/03/11 07:29:53 dtucker Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001, 2002, 2003 Ian F. Darwin.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ *    derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libutil/fmt_scaled.c */
+
+/*
+ * fmt_scaled: Format numbers scaled for human comprehension
+ * scan_scaled: Scan numbers in this format.
+ *
+ * "Human-readable" output uses 4 digits max, and puts a unit suffix at
+ * the end.  Makes output compact and easy-to-read esp. on huge disks.
+ * Formatting code was originally in OpenBSD "df", converted to library routine.
+ * Scanning code written for OpenBSD libutil.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+typedef enum {
+	NONE = 0, KILO = 1, MEGA = 2, GIGA = 3, TERA = 4, PETA = 5, EXA = 6
+} unit_type;
+
+/* These three arrays MUST be in sync!  XXX make a struct */
+static const unit_type units[] = { NONE, KILO, MEGA, GIGA, TERA, PETA, EXA };
+static const char scale_chars[] = "BKMGTPE";
+static const long long scale_factors[] = {
+	1LL,
+	1024LL,
+	1024LL*1024,
+	1024LL*1024*1024,
+	1024LL*1024*1024*1024,
+	1024LL*1024*1024*1024*1024,
+	1024LL*1024*1024*1024*1024*1024,
+};
+#define	SCALE_LENGTH (sizeof(units)/sizeof(units[0]))
+
+#define MAX_DIGITS (SCALE_LENGTH * 3)	/* XXX strlen(sprintf("%lld", -1)? */
+
+/* Convert the given input string "scaled" into numeric in "result".
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 and errno set on error.
+ */
+int
+scan_scaled(char *scaled, long long *result)
+{
+	char *p = scaled;
+	int sign = 0;
+	unsigned int i, ndigits = 0, fract_digits = 0;
+	long long scale_fact = 1, whole = 0, fpart = 0;
+
+	/* Skip leading whitespace */
+	while (isascii((unsigned char)*p) && isspace((unsigned char)*p))
+		++p;
+
+	/* Then at most one leading + or - */
+	while (*p == '-' || *p == '+') {
+		if (*p == '-') {
+			if (sign) {
+				errno = EINVAL;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			sign = -1;
+			++p;
+		} else if (*p == '+') {
+			if (sign) {
+				errno = EINVAL;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			sign = +1;
+			++p;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Main loop: Scan digits, find decimal point, if present.
+	 * We don't allow exponentials, so no scientific notation
+	 * (but note that E for Exa might look like e to some!).
+	 * Advance 'p' to end, to get scale factor.
+	 */
+	for (; isascii((unsigned char)*p) &&
+	    (isdigit((unsigned char)*p) || *p=='.'); ++p) {
+		if (*p == '.') {
+			if (fract_digits > 0) {	/* oops, more than one '.' */
+				errno = EINVAL;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			fract_digits = 1;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		i = (*p) - '0';			/* whew! finally a digit we can use */
+		if (fract_digits > 0) {
+			if (fract_digits >= MAX_DIGITS-1)
+				/* ignore extra fractional digits */
+				continue;
+			fract_digits++;		/* for later scaling */
+			if (fpart > LLONG_MAX / 10) {
+				errno = ERANGE;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			fpart *= 10;
+			if (i > LLONG_MAX - fpart) {
+				errno = ERANGE;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			fpart += i;
+		} else {				/* normal digit */
+			if (++ndigits >= MAX_DIGITS) {
+				errno = ERANGE;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			if (whole > LLONG_MAX / 10) {
+				errno = ERANGE;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			whole *= 10;
+			if (i > LLONG_MAX - whole) {
+				errno = ERANGE;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			whole += i;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (sign)
+		whole *= sign;
+
+	/* If no scale factor given, we're done. fraction is discarded. */
+	if (!*p) {
+		*result = whole;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Validate scale factor, and scale whole and fraction by it. */
+	for (i = 0; i < SCALE_LENGTH; i++) {
+
+		/* Are we there yet? */
+		if (*p == scale_chars[i] ||
+			*p == tolower((unsigned char)scale_chars[i])) {
+
+			/* If it ends with alphanumerics after the scale char, bad. */
+			if (isalnum((unsigned char)*(p+1))) {
+				errno = EINVAL;
+				return -1;
+			}
+			scale_fact = scale_factors[i];
+
+			/* check for overflow and underflow after scaling */
+			if (whole > LLONG_MAX / scale_fact ||
+			    whole < LLONG_MIN / scale_fact) {
+				errno = ERANGE;
+				return -1;
+			}
+
+			/* scale whole part */
+			whole *= scale_fact;
+
+			/* truncate fpart so it doesn't overflow.
+			 * then scale fractional part.
+			 */
+			while (fpart >= LLONG_MAX / scale_fact ||
+			    fpart <= LLONG_MIN / scale_fact) {
+				fpart /= 10;
+				fract_digits--;
+			}
+			fpart *= scale_fact;
+			if (fract_digits > 0) {
+				for (i = 0; i < fract_digits -1; i++)
+					fpart /= 10;
+			}
+			if (sign == -1)
+				whole -= fpart;
+			else
+				whole += fpart;
+			*result = whole;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Invalid unit or character */
+	errno = EINVAL;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/* Format the given "number" into human-readable form in "result".
+ * Result must point to an allocated buffer of length FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE.
+ * Return 0 on success, -1 and errno set if error.
+ */
+int
+fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result)
+{
+	long long abval, fract = 0;
+	unsigned int i;
+	unit_type unit = NONE;
+
+	/* Not every negative long long has a positive representation. */
+	if (number == LLONG_MIN) {
+		errno = ERANGE;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	abval = llabs(number);
+
+	/* Also check for numbers that are just too darned big to format. */
+	if (abval / 1024 >= scale_factors[SCALE_LENGTH-1]) {
+		errno = ERANGE;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* scale whole part; get unscaled fraction */
+	for (i = 0; i < SCALE_LENGTH; i++) {
+		if (abval/1024 < scale_factors[i]) {
+			unit = units[i];
+			fract = (i == 0) ? 0 : abval % scale_factors[i];
+			number /= scale_factors[i];
+			if (i > 0)
+				fract /= scale_factors[i - 1];
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	fract = (10 * fract + 512) / 1024;
+	/* if the result would be >= 10, round main number */
+	if (fract >= 10) {
+		if (number >= 0)
+			number++;
+		else
+			number--;
+		fract = 0;
+	} else if (fract < 0) {
+		/* shouldn't happen */
+		fract = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (number == 0)
+		strlcpy(result, "0B", FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE);
+	else if (unit == NONE || number >= 100 || number <= -100) {
+		if (fract >= 5) {
+			if (number >= 0)
+				number++;
+			else
+				number--;
+		}
+		(void)snprintf(result, FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE, "%lld%c",
+			number, scale_chars[unit]);
+	} else
+		(void)snprintf(result, FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE, "%lld.%1lld%c",
+			number, fract, scale_chars[unit]);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef	MAIN
+/*
+ * This is the original version of the program in the man page.
+ * Copy-and-paste whatever you need from it.
+ */
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	char *cinput = "1.5K", buf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+	long long ninput = 10483892, result;
+
+	if (scan_scaled(cinput, &result) == 0)
+		printf("\"%s\" -> %lld\n", cinput, result);
+	else
+		perror(cinput);
+
+	if (fmt_scaled(ninput, buf) == 0)
+		printf("%lld -> \"%s\"\n", ninput, buf);
+	else
+		fprintf(stderr, "%lld invalid (%s)\n", ninput, strerror(errno));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* HAVE_FMT_SCALED */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.c b/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b5641a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.c
@@ -0,0 +1,495 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: fnmatch.c,v 1.22 2020/03/13 03:25:45 djm Exp $	*/
+
+/* Copyright (c) 2011, VMware, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ *     * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *       notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *     * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *       notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *       documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *     * Neither the name of the VMware, Inc. nor the names of its contributors
+ *       may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *       without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL VMWARE, INC. OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND
+ * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, 2016 Todd C. Miller <millert@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Authored by William A. Rowe Jr. <wrowe; apache.org, vmware.com>, April 2011
+ *
+ * Derived from The Open Group Base Specifications Issue 7, IEEE Std 1003.1-2008
+ * as described in;
+ *   http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/fnmatch.html
+ *
+ * Filename pattern matches defined in section 2.13, "Pattern Matching Notation"
+ * from chapter 2. "Shell Command Language"
+ *   http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/utilities/V3_chap02.html#tag_18_13
+ * where; 1. A bracket expression starting with an unquoted <circumflex> '^'
+ * character CONTINUES to specify a non-matching list; 2. an explicit <period> '.'
+ * in a bracket expression matching list, e.g. "[.abc]" does NOT match a leading
+ * <period> in a filename; 3. a <left-square-bracket> '[' which does not introduce
+ * a valid bracket expression is treated as an ordinary character; 4. a differing
+ * number of consecutive slashes within pattern and string will NOT match;
+ * 5. a trailing '\' in FNM_ESCAPE mode is treated as an ordinary '\' character.
+ *
+ * Bracket expansion defined in section 9.3.5, "RE Bracket Expression",
+ * from chapter 9, "Regular Expressions"
+ *   http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/V1_chap09.html#tag_09_03_05
+ * with no support for collating symbols, equivalence class expressions or
+ * character class expressions.  A partial range expression with a leading
+ * hyphen following a valid range expression will match only the ordinary
+ * <hyphen> and the ending character (e.g. "[a-m-z]" will match characters
+ * 'a' through 'm', a <hyphen> '-', or a 'z').
+ *
+ * Supports BSD extensions FNM_LEADING_DIR to match pattern to the end of one
+ * path segment of string, and FNM_CASEFOLD to ignore alpha case.
+ *
+ * NOTE: Only POSIX/C single byte locales are correctly supported at this time.
+ * Notably, non-POSIX locales with FNM_CASEFOLD produce undefined results,
+ * particularly in ranges of mixed case (e.g. "[A-z]") or spanning alpha and
+ * nonalpha characters within a range.
+ *
+ * XXX comments below indicate porting required for multi-byte character sets
+ * and non-POSIX locale collation orders; requires mbr* APIs to track shift
+ * state of pattern and string (rewinding pattern and string repeatedly).
+ *
+ * Certain parts of the code assume 0x00-0x3F are unique with any MBCS (e.g.
+ * UTF-8, SHIFT-JIS, etc).  Any implementation allowing '\' as an alternate
+ * path delimiter must be aware that 0x5C is NOT unique within SHIFT-JIS.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/fnmatch.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_FNMATCH
+
+#include <fnmatch.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "charclass.h"
+
+#define	RANGE_MATCH	1
+#define	RANGE_NOMATCH	0
+#define	RANGE_ERROR	(-1)
+
+static int
+classmatch(const char *pattern, char test, int foldcase, const char **ep)
+{
+	const char * const mismatch = pattern;
+	const char *colon;
+	struct cclass *cc;
+	int rval = RANGE_NOMATCH;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (pattern[0] != '[' || pattern[1] != ':') {
+		*ep = mismatch;
+		return RANGE_ERROR;
+	}
+	pattern += 2;
+
+	if ((colon = strchr(pattern, ':')) == NULL || colon[1] != ']') {
+		*ep = mismatch;
+		return RANGE_ERROR;
+	}
+	*ep = colon + 2;
+	len = (size_t)(colon - pattern);
+
+	if (foldcase && strncmp(pattern, "upper:]", 7) == 0)
+		pattern = "lower:]";
+	for (cc = cclasses; cc->name != NULL; cc++) {
+		if (!strncmp(pattern, cc->name, len) && cc->name[len] == '\0') {
+			if (cc->isctype((unsigned char)test))
+				rval = RANGE_MATCH;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (cc->name == NULL) {
+		/* invalid character class, treat as normal text */
+		*ep = mismatch;
+		rval = RANGE_ERROR;
+	}
+	return rval;
+}
+
+/* Most MBCS/collation/case issues handled here.  Wildcard '*' is not handled.
+ * EOS '\0' and the FNM_PATHNAME '/' delimiters are not advanced over,
+ * however the "\/" sequence is advanced to '/'.
+ *
+ * Both pattern and string are **char to support pointer increment of arbitrary
+ * multibyte characters for the given locale, in a later iteration of this code
+ */
+static int fnmatch_ch(const char **pattern, const char **string, int flags)
+{
+	const char * const mismatch = *pattern;
+	const int nocase = !!(flags & FNM_CASEFOLD);
+	const int escape = !(flags & FNM_NOESCAPE);
+	const int slash = !!(flags & FNM_PATHNAME);
+	int result = FNM_NOMATCH;
+	const char *startch;
+	int negate;
+
+	if (**pattern == '[') {
+		++*pattern;
+
+		/* Handle negation, either leading ! or ^ operators */
+		negate = (**pattern == '!') || (**pattern == '^');
+		if (negate)
+			++*pattern;
+
+		/* ']' is an ordinary char at the start of the range pattern */
+		if (**pattern == ']')
+			goto leadingclosebrace;
+
+		while (**pattern) {
+			if (**pattern == ']') {
+				++*pattern;
+				/* XXX: Fix for MBCS character width */
+				++*string;
+				return (result ^ negate);
+			}
+
+			if (escape && (**pattern == '\\')) {
+				++*pattern;
+
+				/* Patterns must terminate with ']', not EOS */
+				if (!**pattern)
+					break;
+			}
+
+			/* Patterns must terminate with ']' not '/' */
+			if (slash && (**pattern == '/'))
+				break;
+
+			/* Match character classes. */
+			switch (classmatch(*pattern, **string, nocase, pattern)) {
+			case RANGE_MATCH:
+				result = 0;
+				continue;
+			case RANGE_NOMATCH:
+				/* Valid character class but no match. */
+				continue;
+			default:
+				/* Not a valid character class. */
+				break;
+			}
+			if (!**pattern)
+				break;
+
+leadingclosebrace:
+			/* Look at only well-formed range patterns;
+			 * "x-]" is not allowed unless escaped ("x-\]")
+			 * XXX: Fix for locale/MBCS character width
+			 */
+			if (((*pattern)[1] == '-') && ((*pattern)[2] != ']')) {
+				startch = *pattern;
+				*pattern += (escape && ((*pattern)[2] == '\\')) ? 3 : 2;
+
+				/*
+				 * NOT a properly balanced [expr] pattern, EOS
+				 * terminated or ranges containing a slash in
+				 * FNM_PATHNAME mode pattern fall out to to the
+				 * rewind and test '[' literal code path.
+				 */
+				if (!**pattern || (slash && (**pattern == '/')))
+					break;
+
+				/* XXX: handle locale/MBCS comparison, advance by MBCS char width */
+				if ((**string >= *startch) && (**string <= **pattern))
+					result = 0;
+				else if (nocase &&
+				    (isupper((unsigned char)**string) ||
+				     isupper((unsigned char)*startch) ||
+				     isupper((unsigned char)**pattern)) &&
+				    (tolower((unsigned char)**string) >=
+				     tolower((unsigned char)*startch)) &&
+				    (tolower((unsigned char)**string) <=
+				     tolower((unsigned char)**pattern)))
+					result = 0;
+
+				++*pattern;
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			/* XXX: handle locale/MBCS comparison, advance by MBCS char width */
+			if ((**string == **pattern))
+				result = 0;
+			else if (nocase && (isupper((unsigned char)**string) ||
+			    isupper((unsigned char)**pattern)) &&
+			    (tolower((unsigned char)**string) ==
+			    tolower((unsigned char)**pattern)))
+				result = 0;
+
+			++*pattern;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * NOT a properly balanced [expr] pattern;
+		 * Rewind and reset result to test '[' literal
+		 */
+		*pattern = mismatch;
+		result = FNM_NOMATCH;
+	} else if (**pattern == '?') {
+		/* Optimize '?' match before unescaping **pattern */
+		if (!**string || (slash && (**string == '/')))
+			return FNM_NOMATCH;
+		result = 0;
+		goto fnmatch_ch_success;
+	} else if (escape && (**pattern == '\\') && (*pattern)[1]) {
+		++*pattern;
+	}
+
+	/* XXX: handle locale/MBCS comparison, advance by the MBCS char width */
+	if (**string == **pattern)
+		result = 0;
+	else if (nocase && (isupper((unsigned char)**string) ||
+	    isupper((unsigned char)**pattern)) &&
+	    (tolower((unsigned char)**string) ==
+	    tolower((unsigned char)**pattern)))
+		result = 0;
+
+	/* Refuse to advance over trailing slash or NULs */
+	if (**string == '\0' || **pattern == '\0' ||
+	    (slash && ((**string == '/') || (**pattern == '/'))))
+		return result;
+
+fnmatch_ch_success:
+	++*pattern;
+	++*string;
+	return result;
+}
+
+
+int fnmatch(const char *pattern, const char *string, int flags)
+{
+	static const char dummystring[2] = {' ', 0};
+	const int escape = !(flags & FNM_NOESCAPE);
+	const int slash = !!(flags & FNM_PATHNAME);
+	const int leading_dir = !!(flags & FNM_LEADING_DIR);
+	const char *dummyptr, *matchptr, *strendseg;
+	int wild;
+	/* For '*' wild processing only; suppress 'used before initialization'
+	 * warnings with dummy initialization values;
+	 */
+	const char *strstartseg = NULL;
+	const char *mismatch = NULL;
+	int matchlen = 0;
+
+	if (*pattern == '*')
+		goto firstsegment;
+
+	while (*pattern && *string) {
+		/*
+		 * Pre-decode "\/" which has no special significance, and
+		 * match balanced slashes, starting a new segment pattern.
+		 */
+		if (slash && escape && (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '/'))
+			++pattern;
+		if (slash && (*pattern == '/') && (*string == '/')) {
+			++pattern;
+			++string;
+		}
+
+firstsegment:
+		/*
+		 * At the beginning of each segment, validate leading period
+		 * behavior.
+		 */
+		if ((flags & FNM_PERIOD) && (*string == '.')) {
+		    if (*pattern == '.')
+			    ++pattern;
+		    else if (escape && (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '.'))
+			    pattern += 2;
+		    else
+			    return FNM_NOMATCH;
+		    ++string;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Determine the end of string segment.  Presumes '/'
+		 * character is unique, not composite in any MBCS encoding
+		 */
+		if (slash) {
+			strendseg = strchr(string, '/');
+			if (!strendseg)
+				strendseg = strchr(string, '\0');
+		} else {
+			strendseg = strchr(string, '\0');
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Allow pattern '*' to be consumed even with no remaining
+		 * string to match.
+		 */
+		while (*pattern) {
+			if ((string > strendseg) ||
+			    ((string == strendseg) && (*pattern != '*')))
+				break;
+
+			if (slash && ((*pattern == '/') ||
+			    (escape && (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '/'))))
+				break;
+
+			/*
+			 * Reduce groups of '*' and '?' to n '?' matches
+			 * followed by one '*' test for simplicity.
+			 */
+			for (wild = 0; (*pattern == '*') || (*pattern == '?'); ++pattern) {
+				if (*pattern == '*') {
+					wild = 1;
+				} else if (string < strendseg) {  /* && (*pattern == '?') */
+					/* XXX: Advance 1 char for MBCS locale */
+					++string;
+				}
+				else {  /* (string >= strendseg) && (*pattern == '?') */
+					return FNM_NOMATCH;
+				}
+			}
+
+			if (wild) {
+				strstartseg = string;
+				mismatch = pattern;
+
+				/*
+				 * Count fixed (non '*') char matches remaining
+				 * in pattern * excluding '/' (or "\/") and '*'.
+				 */
+				for (matchptr = pattern, matchlen = 0; 1; ++matchlen) {
+					if ((*matchptr == '\0') ||
+					    (slash && ((*matchptr == '/') ||
+					    (escape && (*matchptr == '\\') &&
+					    (matchptr[1] == '/'))))) {
+						/* Compare precisely this many
+						 * trailing string chars, the
+						 * resulting match needs no
+						 * wildcard loop.
+						 */
+						/* XXX: Adjust for MBCS */
+						if (string + matchlen > strendseg)
+							return FNM_NOMATCH;
+
+						string = strendseg - matchlen;
+						wild = 0;
+						break;
+					}
+
+					if (*matchptr == '*') {
+						/*
+						 * Ensure at least this many
+						 * trailing string chars remain
+						 * for the first comparison.
+						 */
+						/* XXX: Adjust for MBCS */
+						if (string + matchlen > strendseg)
+							return FNM_NOMATCH;
+
+						/*
+						 * Begin first wild comparison
+						 * at the current position.
+						 */
+						break;
+					}
+
+					/*
+					 * Skip forward in pattern by a single
+					 * character match Use a dummy
+					 * fnmatch_ch() test to count one
+					 * "[range]" escape.
+					 */
+					/* XXX: Adjust for MBCS */
+					if (escape && (*matchptr == '\\') &&
+					    matchptr[1]) {
+						matchptr += 2;
+					} else if (*matchptr == '[') {
+						dummyptr = dummystring;
+						fnmatch_ch(&matchptr, &dummyptr,
+						    flags);
+					} else {
+						++matchptr;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+
+			/* Incrementally match string against the pattern. */
+			while (*pattern && (string < strendseg)) {
+				/* Success; begin a new wild pattern search. */
+				if (*pattern == '*')
+					break;
+
+				if (slash && ((*string == '/') ||
+				    (*pattern == '/') || (escape &&
+				    (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '/'))))
+					break;
+
+				/*
+				 * Compare ch's (the pattern is advanced over
+				 * "\/" to the '/', but slashes will mismatch,
+				 * and are not consumed).
+				 */
+				if (!fnmatch_ch(&pattern, &string, flags))
+					continue;
+
+				/*
+				 * Failed to match, loop against next char
+				 * offset of string segment until not enough
+				 * string chars remain to match the fixed
+				 * pattern.
+				 */
+				if (wild) {
+					/* XXX: Advance 1 char for MBCS locale */
+					string = ++strstartseg;
+					if (string + matchlen > strendseg)
+						return FNM_NOMATCH;
+
+					pattern = mismatch;
+					continue;
+				} else
+					return FNM_NOMATCH;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (*string && !((slash || leading_dir) && (*string == '/')))
+			return FNM_NOMATCH;
+
+		if (*pattern && !(slash && ((*pattern == '/') ||
+		    (escape && (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '/')))))
+			return FNM_NOMATCH;
+
+		if (leading_dir && !*pattern && *string == '/')
+			return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Where both pattern and string are at EOS, declare success.  */
+	if (!*string && !*pattern)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Pattern didn't match to the end of string. */
+	return FNM_NOMATCH;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_FNMATCH */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h b/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d3bc4a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: fnmatch.h,v 1.8 2005/12/13 00:35:22 millert Exp $	*/
+/*	$NetBSD: fnmatch.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:53 cgd Exp $	*/
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *	@(#)fnmatch.h	8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/fnmatch.h */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FNMATCH_H
+/* Ensure we define FNM_CASEFOLD */
+#define __BSD_VISIBLE 1
+
+#ifndef	_FNMATCH_H_
+#define	_FNMATCH_H_
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+#endif
+
+#define	FNM_NOMATCH	1	/* Match failed. */
+#define	FNM_NOSYS	2	/* Function not supported (unused). */
+
+#define	FNM_NOESCAPE	0x01	/* Disable backslash escaping. */
+#define	FNM_PATHNAME	0x02	/* Slash must be matched by slash. */
+#define	FNM_PERIOD	0x04	/* Period must be matched by period. */
+#if __BSD_VISIBLE
+#define	FNM_LEADING_DIR	0x08	/* Ignore /<tail> after Imatch. */
+#define	FNM_CASEFOLD	0x10	/* Case insensitive search. */
+#define	FNM_IGNORECASE	FNM_CASEFOLD
+#define	FNM_FILE_NAME	FNM_PATHNAME
+#endif
+
+/* __BEGIN_DECLS */
+int	 fnmatch(const char *, const char *, int);
+/* __END_DECLS */
+
+#endif /* !_FNMATCH_H_ */
+#endif /* ! HAVE_FNMATCH_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/freezero.c b/openbsd-compat/freezero.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bad018f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/freezero.c
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, 2010, 2011, 2016 Otto Moerbeek <otto@drijf.net>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FREEZERO
+
+void
+freezero(void *ptr, size_t sz)
+{
+	if (ptr == NULL)
+		return;
+	explicit_bzero(ptr, sz);
+	free(ptr);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_FREEZERO */
+
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c b/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a904291
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/getcwd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,242 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: getcwd.c,v 1.14 2005/08/08 08:05:34 espie Exp */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1991, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/getcwd.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETCWD)
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <sys/dir.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#define	ISDOT(dp) \
+	(dp->d_name[0] == '.' && (dp->d_name[1] == '\0' || \
+	    (dp->d_name[1] == '.' && dp->d_name[2] == '\0')))
+
+char *
+getcwd(char *pt, size_t size)
+{
+	struct dirent *dp;
+	DIR *dir = NULL;
+	dev_t dev;
+	ino_t ino;
+	int first;
+	char *bpt, *bup;
+	struct stat s;
+	dev_t root_dev;
+	ino_t root_ino;
+	size_t ptsize, upsize;
+	int save_errno;
+	char *ept, *eup, *up;
+
+	/*
+	 * If no buffer specified by the user, allocate one as necessary.
+	 * If a buffer is specified, the size has to be non-zero.  The path
+	 * is built from the end of the buffer backwards.
+	 */
+	if (pt) {
+		ptsize = 0;
+		if (size == 0) {
+			errno = EINVAL;
+			return (NULL);
+		} else if (size == 1) {
+			errno = ERANGE;
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		ept = pt + size;
+	} else {
+		if ((pt = malloc(ptsize = MAXPATHLEN)) == NULL)
+			return (NULL);
+		ept = pt + ptsize;
+	}
+	bpt = ept - 1;
+	*bpt = '\0';
+
+	/*
+	 * Allocate bytes for the string of "../"'s.
+	 * Should always be enough (it's 340 levels).  If it's not, allocate
+	 * as necessary.  Special * case the first stat, it's ".", not "..".
+	 */
+	if ((up = malloc(upsize = MAXPATHLEN)) == NULL)
+		goto err;
+	eup = up + upsize;
+	bup = up;
+	up[0] = '.';
+	up[1] = '\0';
+
+	/* Save root values, so know when to stop. */
+	if (stat("/", &s))
+		goto err;
+	root_dev = s.st_dev;
+	root_ino = s.st_ino;
+
+	errno = 0;			/* XXX readdir has no error return. */
+
+	for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
+		/* Stat the current level. */
+		if (lstat(up, &s))
+			goto err;
+
+		/* Save current node values. */
+		ino = s.st_ino;
+		dev = s.st_dev;
+
+		/* Check for reaching root. */
+		if (root_dev == dev && root_ino == ino) {
+			*--bpt = '/';
+			/*
+			 * It's unclear that it's a requirement to copy the
+			 * path to the beginning of the buffer, but it's always
+			 * been that way and stuff would probably break.
+			 */
+			memmove(pt, bpt, ept - bpt);
+			free(up);
+			return (pt);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Build pointer to the parent directory, allocating memory
+		 * as necessary.  Max length is 3 for "../", the largest
+		 * possible component name, plus a trailing NUL.
+		 */
+		if (bup + 3  + MAXNAMLEN + 1 >= eup) {
+			char *nup;
+
+			if ((nup = realloc(up, upsize *= 2)) == NULL)
+				goto err;
+			bup = nup + (bup - up);
+			up = nup;
+			eup = up + upsize;
+		}
+		*bup++ = '.';
+		*bup++ = '.';
+		*bup = '\0';
+
+		/* Open and stat parent directory. */
+		if (!(dir = opendir(up)) || fstat(dirfd(dir), &s))
+			goto err;
+
+		/* Add trailing slash for next directory. */
+		*bup++ = '/';
+
+		/*
+		 * If it's a mount point, have to stat each element because
+		 * the inode number in the directory is for the entry in the
+		 * parent directory, not the inode number of the mounted file.
+		 */
+		save_errno = 0;
+		if (s.st_dev == dev) {
+			for (;;) {
+				if (!(dp = readdir(dir)))
+					goto notfound;
+				if (dp->d_fileno == ino)
+					break;
+			}
+		} else
+			for (;;) {
+				if (!(dp = readdir(dir)))
+					goto notfound;
+				if (ISDOT(dp))
+					continue;
+				memcpy(bup, dp->d_name, dp->d_namlen + 1);
+
+				/* Save the first error for later. */
+				if (lstat(up, &s)) {
+					if (!save_errno)
+						save_errno = errno;
+					errno = 0;
+					continue;
+				}
+				if (s.st_dev == dev && s.st_ino == ino)
+					break;
+			}
+
+		/*
+		 * Check for length of the current name, preceding slash,
+		 * leading slash.
+		 */
+		if (bpt - pt < dp->d_namlen + (first ? 1 : 2)) {
+			size_t len;
+			char *npt;
+
+			if (!ptsize) {
+				errno = ERANGE;
+				goto err;
+			}
+			len = ept - bpt;
+			if ((npt = realloc(pt, ptsize *= 2)) == NULL)
+				goto err;
+			bpt = npt + (bpt - pt);
+			pt = npt;
+			ept = pt + ptsize;
+			memmove(ept - len, bpt, len);
+			bpt = ept - len;
+		}
+		if (!first)
+			*--bpt = '/';
+		bpt -= dp->d_namlen;
+		memcpy(bpt, dp->d_name, dp->d_namlen);
+		(void)closedir(dir);
+
+		/* Truncate any file name. */
+		*bup = '\0';
+	}
+
+notfound:
+	/*
+	 * If readdir set errno, use it, not any saved error; otherwise,
+	 * didn't find the current directory in its parent directory, set
+	 * errno to ENOENT.
+	 */
+	if (!errno)
+		errno = save_errno ? save_errno : ENOENT;
+	/* FALLTHROUGH */
+err:
+	save_errno = errno;
+
+	if (ptsize)
+		free(pt);
+	free(up);
+	if (dir)
+		(void)closedir(dir);
+
+	errno = save_errno;
+
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETCWD) */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.c b/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3906cd6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/getgrouplist.c
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: getgrouplist.c,v 1.12 2005/08/08 08:05:34 espie Exp */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/getgrouplist.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
+
+/*
+ * get credential
+ */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+
+int
+getgrouplist(const char *uname, gid_t agroup, gid_t *groups, int *grpcnt)
+{
+	struct group *grp;
+	int i, ngroups;
+	int ret, maxgroups;
+	int bail;
+
+	ret = 0;
+	ngroups = 0;
+	maxgroups = *grpcnt;
+
+	/*
+	 * install primary group
+	 */
+	if (ngroups >= maxgroups) {
+		*grpcnt = ngroups;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	groups[ngroups++] = agroup;
+
+	/*
+	 * Scan the group file to find additional groups.
+	 */
+	setgrent();
+	while ((grp = getgrent())) {
+		if (grp->gr_gid == agroup)
+			continue;
+		for (bail = 0, i = 0; bail == 0 && i < ngroups; i++)
+			if (groups[i] == grp->gr_gid)
+				bail = 1;
+		if (bail)
+			continue;
+		for (i = 0; grp->gr_mem[i]; i++) {
+			if (!strcmp(grp->gr_mem[i], uname)) {
+				if (ngroups >= maxgroups) {
+					ret = -1;
+					goto out;
+				}
+				groups[ngroups++] = grp->gr_gid;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	endgrent();
+	*grpcnt = ngroups;
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_GETGROUPLIST */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getopt.h b/openbsd-compat/getopt.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8eb1244
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/getopt.h
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: getopt.h,v 1.2 2008/06/26 05:42:04 ray Exp $	*/
+/*	$NetBSD: getopt.h,v 1.4 2000/07/07 10:43:54 ad Exp $	*/
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
+ * by Dieter Baron and Thomas Klausner.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
+ * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _GETOPT_H_
+#define _GETOPT_H_
+
+/*
+ * GNU-like getopt_long() and 4.4BSD getsubopt()/optreset extensions
+ */
+#define no_argument        0
+#define required_argument  1
+#define optional_argument  2
+
+struct option {
+	/* name of long option */
+	const char *name;
+	/*
+	 * one of no_argument, required_argument, and optional_argument:
+	 * whether option takes an argument
+	 */
+	int has_arg;
+	/* if not NULL, set *flag to val when option found */
+	int *flag;
+	/* if flag not NULL, value to set *flag to; else return value */
+	int val;
+};
+
+int	 getopt_long(int, char * const *, const char *,
+	    const struct option *, int *);
+int	 getopt_long_only(int, char * const *, const char *,
+	    const struct option *, int *);
+#ifndef _GETOPT_DEFINED_
+#define _GETOPT_DEFINED_
+int	 getopt(int, char * const *, const char *);
+int	 getsubopt(char **, char * const *, char **);
+
+extern   char *optarg;                  /* getopt(3) external variables */
+extern   int opterr;
+extern   int optind;
+extern   int optopt;
+extern   int optreset;
+extern   char *suboptarg;               /* getsubopt(3) external variable */
+#endif
+ 
+#endif /* !_GETOPT_H_ */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c b/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a5001f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c
@@ -0,0 +1,532 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: getopt_long.c,v 1.25 2011/03/05 22:10:11 guenther Exp $	*/
+/*	$NetBSD: getopt_long.c,v 1.15 2002/01/31 22:43:40 tv Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
+ * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
+ * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
+ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to The NetBSD Foundation
+ * by Dieter Baron and Thomas Klausner.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
+ * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/getopt_long.c */
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET)
+
+/*
+ * Some defines to make it easier to keep the code in sync with upstream.
+ * getopt opterr optind optopt optreset optarg are all in defines.h which is
+ * pulled in by includes.h.
+ */
+#define warnx		logit
+
+#if 0
+#include <err.h>
+#include <getopt.h>
+#endif
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+int	opterr = 1;		/* if error message should be printed */
+int	optind = 1;		/* index into parent argv vector */
+int	optopt = '?';		/* character checked for validity */
+int	optreset;		/* reset getopt */
+char    *optarg;		/* argument associated with option */
+
+#define PRINT_ERROR	((opterr) && (*options != ':'))
+
+#define FLAG_PERMUTE	0x01	/* permute non-options to the end of argv */
+#define FLAG_ALLARGS	0x02	/* treat non-options as args to option "-1" */
+#define FLAG_LONGONLY	0x04	/* operate as getopt_long_only */
+
+/* return values */
+#define	BADCH		(int)'?'
+#define	BADARG		((*options == ':') ? (int)':' : (int)'?')
+#define	INORDER		(int)1
+
+#define	EMSG		""
+
+static int getopt_internal(int, char * const *, const char *,
+			   const struct option *, int *, int);
+static int parse_long_options(char * const *, const char *,
+			      const struct option *, int *, int);
+static int gcd(int, int);
+static void permute_args(int, int, int, char * const *);
+
+static char *place = EMSG; /* option letter processing */
+
+/* XXX: set optreset to 1 rather than these two */
+static int nonopt_start = -1; /* first non option argument (for permute) */
+static int nonopt_end = -1;   /* first option after non options (for permute) */
+
+/* Error messages */
+static const char recargchar[] = "option requires an argument -- %c";
+static const char recargstring[] = "option requires an argument -- %s";
+static const char ambig[] = "ambiguous option -- %.*s";
+static const char noarg[] = "option doesn't take an argument -- %.*s";
+static const char illoptchar[] = "unknown option -- %c";
+static const char illoptstring[] = "unknown option -- %s";
+
+/*
+ * Compute the greatest common divisor of a and b.
+ */
+static int
+gcd(int a, int b)
+{
+	int c;
+
+	c = a % b;
+	while (c != 0) {
+		a = b;
+		b = c;
+		c = a % b;
+	}
+
+	return (b);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exchange the block from nonopt_start to nonopt_end with the block
+ * from nonopt_end to opt_end (keeping the same order of arguments
+ * in each block).
+ */
+static void
+permute_args(int panonopt_start, int panonopt_end, int opt_end,
+	char * const *nargv)
+{
+	int cstart, cyclelen, i, j, ncycle, nnonopts, nopts, pos;
+	char *swap;
+
+	/*
+	 * compute lengths of blocks and number and size of cycles
+	 */
+	nnonopts = panonopt_end - panonopt_start;
+	nopts = opt_end - panonopt_end;
+	ncycle = gcd(nnonopts, nopts);
+	cyclelen = (opt_end - panonopt_start) / ncycle;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ncycle; i++) {
+		cstart = panonopt_end+i;
+		pos = cstart;
+		for (j = 0; j < cyclelen; j++) {
+			if (pos >= panonopt_end)
+				pos -= nnonopts;
+			else
+				pos += nopts;
+			swap = nargv[pos];
+			/* LINTED const cast */
+			((char **) nargv)[pos] = nargv[cstart];
+			/* LINTED const cast */
+			((char **)nargv)[cstart] = swap;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse_long_options --
+ *	Parse long options in argc/argv argument vector.
+ * Returns -1 if short_too is set and the option does not match long_options.
+ */
+static int
+parse_long_options(char * const *nargv, const char *options,
+	const struct option *long_options, int *idx, int short_too)
+{
+	char *current_argv, *has_equal;
+	size_t current_argv_len;
+	int i, match;
+
+	current_argv = place;
+	match = -1;
+
+	optind++;
+
+	if ((has_equal = strchr(current_argv, '=')) != NULL) {
+		/* argument found (--option=arg) */
+		current_argv_len = has_equal - current_argv;
+		has_equal++;
+	} else
+		current_argv_len = strlen(current_argv);
+
+	for (i = 0; long_options[i].name; i++) {
+		/* find matching long option */
+		if (strncmp(current_argv, long_options[i].name,
+		    current_argv_len))
+			continue;
+
+		if (strlen(long_options[i].name) == current_argv_len) {
+			/* exact match */
+			match = i;
+			break;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * If this is a known short option, don't allow
+		 * a partial match of a single character.
+		 */
+		if (short_too && current_argv_len == 1)
+			continue;
+
+		if (match == -1)	/* partial match */
+			match = i;
+		else {
+			/* ambiguous abbreviation */
+			if (PRINT_ERROR)
+				warnx(ambig, (int)current_argv_len,
+				     current_argv);
+			optopt = 0;
+			return (BADCH);
+		}
+	}
+	if (match != -1) {		/* option found */
+		if (long_options[match].has_arg == no_argument
+		    && has_equal) {
+			if (PRINT_ERROR)
+				warnx(noarg, (int)current_argv_len,
+				     current_argv);
+			/*
+			 * XXX: GNU sets optopt to val regardless of flag
+			 */
+			if (long_options[match].flag == NULL)
+				optopt = long_options[match].val;
+			else
+				optopt = 0;
+			return (BADARG);
+		}
+		if (long_options[match].has_arg == required_argument ||
+		    long_options[match].has_arg == optional_argument) {
+			if (has_equal)
+				optarg = has_equal;
+			else if (long_options[match].has_arg ==
+			    required_argument) {
+				/*
+				 * optional argument doesn't use next nargv
+				 */
+				optarg = nargv[optind++];
+			}
+		}
+		if ((long_options[match].has_arg == required_argument)
+		    && (optarg == NULL)) {
+			/*
+			 * Missing argument; leading ':' indicates no error
+			 * should be generated.
+			 */
+			if (PRINT_ERROR)
+				warnx(recargstring,
+				    current_argv);
+			/*
+			 * XXX: GNU sets optopt to val regardless of flag
+			 */
+			if (long_options[match].flag == NULL)
+				optopt = long_options[match].val;
+			else
+				optopt = 0;
+			--optind;
+			return (BADARG);
+		}
+	} else {			/* unknown option */
+		if (short_too) {
+			--optind;
+			return (-1);
+		}
+		if (PRINT_ERROR)
+			warnx(illoptstring, current_argv);
+		optopt = 0;
+		return (BADCH);
+	}
+	if (idx)
+		*idx = match;
+	if (long_options[match].flag) {
+		*long_options[match].flag = long_options[match].val;
+		return (0);
+	} else
+		return (long_options[match].val);
+}
+
+/*
+ * getopt_internal --
+ *	Parse argc/argv argument vector.  Called by user level routines.
+ */
+static int
+getopt_internal(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options,
+	const struct option *long_options, int *idx, int flags)
+{
+	char *oli;				/* option letter list index */
+	int optchar, short_too;
+	static int posixly_correct = -1;
+
+	if (options == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+
+	/*
+	 * XXX Some GNU programs (like cvs) set optind to 0 instead of
+	 * XXX using optreset.  Work around this braindamage.
+	 */
+	if (optind == 0)
+		optind = optreset = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Disable GNU extensions if POSIXLY_CORRECT is set or options
+	 * string begins with a '+'.
+	 */
+	if (posixly_correct == -1 || optreset)
+		posixly_correct = (getenv("POSIXLY_CORRECT") != NULL);
+	if (*options == '-')
+		flags |= FLAG_ALLARGS;
+	else if (posixly_correct || *options == '+')
+		flags &= ~FLAG_PERMUTE;
+	if (*options == '+' || *options == '-')
+		options++;
+
+	optarg = NULL;
+	if (optreset)
+		nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1;
+start:
+	if (optreset || !*place) {		/* update scanning pointer */
+		optreset = 0;
+		if (optind >= nargc) {          /* end of argument vector */
+			place = EMSG;
+			if (nonopt_end != -1) {
+				/* do permutation, if we have to */
+				permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end,
+				    optind, nargv);
+				optind -= nonopt_end - nonopt_start;
+			}
+			else if (nonopt_start != -1) {
+				/*
+				 * If we skipped non-options, set optind
+				 * to the first of them.
+				 */
+				optind = nonopt_start;
+			}
+			nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1;
+			return (-1);
+		}
+		if (*(place = nargv[optind]) != '-' ||
+		    (place[1] == '\0' && strchr(options, '-') == NULL)) {
+			place = EMSG;		/* found non-option */
+			if (flags & FLAG_ALLARGS) {
+				/*
+				 * GNU extension:
+				 * return non-option as argument to option 1
+				 */
+				optarg = nargv[optind++];
+				return (INORDER);
+			}
+			if (!(flags & FLAG_PERMUTE)) {
+				/*
+				 * If no permutation wanted, stop parsing
+				 * at first non-option.
+				 */
+				return (-1);
+			}
+			/* do permutation */
+			if (nonopt_start == -1)
+				nonopt_start = optind;
+			else if (nonopt_end != -1) {
+				permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end,
+				    optind, nargv);
+				nonopt_start = optind -
+				    (nonopt_end - nonopt_start);
+				nonopt_end = -1;
+			}
+			optind++;
+			/* process next argument */
+			goto start;
+		}
+		if (nonopt_start != -1 && nonopt_end == -1)
+			nonopt_end = optind;
+
+		/*
+		 * If we have "-" do nothing, if "--" we are done.
+		 */
+		if (place[1] != '\0' && *++place == '-' && place[1] == '\0') {
+			optind++;
+			place = EMSG;
+			/*
+			 * We found an option (--), so if we skipped
+			 * non-options, we have to permute.
+			 */
+			if (nonopt_end != -1) {
+				permute_args(nonopt_start, nonopt_end,
+				    optind, nargv);
+				optind -= nonopt_end - nonopt_start;
+			}
+			nonopt_start = nonopt_end = -1;
+			return (-1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check long options if:
+	 *  1) we were passed some
+	 *  2) the arg is not just "-"
+	 *  3) either the arg starts with -- we are getopt_long_only()
+	 */
+	if (long_options != NULL && place != nargv[optind] &&
+	    (*place == '-' || (flags & FLAG_LONGONLY))) {
+		short_too = 0;
+		if (*place == '-')
+			place++;		/* --foo long option */
+		else if (*place != ':' && strchr(options, *place) != NULL)
+			short_too = 1;		/* could be short option too */
+
+		optchar = parse_long_options(nargv, options, long_options,
+		    idx, short_too);
+		if (optchar != -1) {
+			place = EMSG;
+			return (optchar);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((optchar = (int)*place++) == (int)':' ||
+	    (optchar == (int)'-' && *place != '\0') ||
+	    (oli = strchr(options, optchar)) == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * If the user specified "-" and  '-' isn't listed in
+		 * options, return -1 (non-option) as per POSIX.
+		 * Otherwise, it is an unknown option character (or ':').
+		 */
+		if (optchar == (int)'-' && *place == '\0')
+			return (-1);
+		if (!*place)
+			++optind;
+		if (PRINT_ERROR)
+			warnx(illoptchar, optchar);
+		optopt = optchar;
+		return (BADCH);
+	}
+	if (long_options != NULL && optchar == 'W' && oli[1] == ';') {
+		/* -W long-option */
+		if (*place)			/* no space */
+			/* NOTHING */;
+		else if (++optind >= nargc) {	/* no arg */
+			place = EMSG;
+			if (PRINT_ERROR)
+				warnx(recargchar, optchar);
+			optopt = optchar;
+			return (BADARG);
+		} else				/* white space */
+			place = nargv[optind];
+		optchar = parse_long_options(nargv, options, long_options,
+		    idx, 0);
+		place = EMSG;
+		return (optchar);
+	}
+	if (*++oli != ':') {			/* doesn't take argument */
+		if (!*place)
+			++optind;
+	} else {				/* takes (optional) argument */
+		optarg = NULL;
+		if (*place)			/* no white space */
+			optarg = place;
+		else if (oli[1] != ':') {	/* arg not optional */
+			if (++optind >= nargc) {	/* no arg */
+				place = EMSG;
+				if (PRINT_ERROR)
+					warnx(recargchar, optchar);
+				optopt = optchar;
+				return (BADARG);
+			} else
+				optarg = nargv[optind];
+		}
+		place = EMSG;
+		++optind;
+	}
+	/* dump back option letter */
+	return (optchar);
+}
+
+/*
+ * getopt --
+ *	Parse argc/argv argument vector.
+ *
+ * [eventually this will replace the BSD getopt]
+ */
+int
+getopt(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options)
+{
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't pass FLAG_PERMUTE to getopt_internal() since
+	 * the BSD getopt(3) (unlike GNU) has never done this.
+	 *
+	 * Furthermore, since many privileged programs call getopt()
+	 * before dropping privileges it makes sense to keep things
+	 * as simple (and bug-free) as possible.
+	 */
+	return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, NULL, NULL, 0));
+}
+
+#if 0
+/*
+ * getopt_long --
+ *	Parse argc/argv argument vector.
+ */
+int
+getopt_long(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options,
+    const struct option *long_options, int *idx)
+{
+
+	return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, long_options, idx,
+	    FLAG_PERMUTE));
+}
+
+/*
+ * getopt_long_only --
+ *	Parse argc/argv argument vector.
+ */
+int
+getopt_long_only(int nargc, char * const *nargv, const char *options,
+    const struct option *long_options, int *idx)
+{
+
+	return (getopt_internal(nargc, nargv, options, long_options, idx,
+	    FLAG_PERMUTE|FLAG_LONGONLY));
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_OPTRESET) */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4647b62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c
@@ -0,0 +1,284 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: getrrsetbyname.c,v 1.10 2005/03/30 02:58:28 tedu Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2007 Simon Vallet / Genoscope <svallet@genoscope.cns.fr>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM
+ * DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING
+ * FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT,
+ * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
+ * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && defined (HAVE_LDNS)
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <ldns/ldns.h>
+
+#include "getrrsetbyname.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+#define malloc(x)	(xmalloc(x))
+#define calloc(x, y)	(xcalloc((x),(y)))
+
+int
+getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
+	       unsigned int rdtype, unsigned int flags,
+	       struct rrsetinfo **res)
+{
+	int result;
+	unsigned int i, j, index_ans, index_sig;
+	struct rrsetinfo *rrset = NULL;
+	struct rdatainfo *rdata;
+	size_t len;
+	ldns_resolver *ldns_res = NULL;
+	ldns_rdf *domain = NULL;
+	ldns_pkt *pkt = NULL;
+	ldns_rr_list *rrsigs = NULL, *rrdata = NULL;
+	ldns_status err;
+	ldns_rr *rr;
+
+	/* check for invalid class and type */
+	if (rdclass > 0xffff || rdtype > 0xffff) {
+		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* don't allow queries of class or type ANY */
+	if (rdclass == 0xff || rdtype == 0xff) {
+		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
+	if (flags) {
+		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* Initialize resolver from resolv.conf */
+	domain = ldns_dname_new_frm_str(hostname);
+	if ((err = ldns_resolver_new_frm_file(&ldns_res, NULL)) != \
+	    LDNS_STATUS_OK) {
+		result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+#ifdef LDNS_DEBUG
+	ldns_resolver_set_debug(ldns_res, true);
+#endif /* LDNS_DEBUG */
+
+	ldns_resolver_set_dnssec(ldns_res, true); /* Use DNSSEC */
+
+	/* make query */
+	pkt = ldns_resolver_query(ldns_res, domain, rdtype, rdclass, LDNS_RD);
+
+	/*** TODO: finer errcodes -- see original **/
+	if (!pkt || ldns_pkt_ancount(pkt) < 1) {
+		result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* initialize rrset */
+	rrset = calloc(1, sizeof(struct rrsetinfo));
+	if (rrset == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	rrdata = ldns_pkt_rr_list_by_type(pkt, rdtype, LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER);
+	rrset->rri_nrdatas = ldns_rr_list_rr_count(rrdata);
+	if (!rrset->rri_nrdatas) {
+		result = ERRSET_NODATA;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* copy name from answer section */
+	len = ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_owner(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0)));
+	if ((rrset->rri_name = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	memcpy(rrset->rri_name,
+	    ldns_rdf_data(ldns_rr_owner(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0))), len);
+
+	rrset->rri_rdclass = ldns_rr_get_class(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0));
+	rrset->rri_rdtype = ldns_rr_get_type(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0));
+	rrset->rri_ttl = ldns_rr_ttl(ldns_rr_list_rr(rrdata, 0));
+
+	debug2("ldns: got %u answers from DNS", rrset->rri_nrdatas);
+
+	/* Check for authenticated data */
+	if (ldns_pkt_ad(pkt)) {
+		rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED;
+	} else { /* AD is not set, try autonomous validation */
+		ldns_rr_list * trusted_keys = ldns_rr_list_new();
+
+		debug2("ldns: trying to validate RRset");
+		/* Get eventual sigs */
+		rrsigs = ldns_pkt_rr_list_by_type(pkt, LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG,
+		    LDNS_SECTION_ANSWER);
+
+		rrset->rri_nsigs = ldns_rr_list_rr_count(rrsigs);
+		debug2("ldns: got %u signature(s) (RRTYPE %u) from DNS",
+		       rrset->rri_nsigs, LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG);
+
+		if ((err = ldns_verify_trusted(ldns_res, rrdata, rrsigs,
+		     trusted_keys)) == LDNS_STATUS_OK) {
+			rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED;
+			debug2("ldns: RRset is signed with a valid key");
+		} else {
+			debug2("ldns: RRset validation failed: %s",
+			    ldns_get_errorstr_by_id(err));
+		}
+
+		ldns_rr_list_deep_free(trusted_keys);
+	}
+
+	/* allocate memory for answers */
+	rrset->rri_rdatas = calloc(rrset->rri_nrdatas,
+	   sizeof(struct rdatainfo));
+
+	if (rrset->rri_rdatas == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* allocate memory for signatures */
+	if (rrset->rri_nsigs > 0) {
+		rrset->rri_sigs = calloc(rrset->rri_nsigs,
+		    sizeof(struct rdatainfo));
+
+		if (rrset->rri_sigs == NULL) {
+			result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* copy answers & signatures */
+	for (i=0, index_ans=0, index_sig=0; i< pkt->_header->_ancount; i++) {
+		rdata = NULL;
+		rr = ldns_rr_list_rr(ldns_pkt_answer(pkt), i);
+
+		if (ldns_rr_get_class(rr) == rrset->rri_rdclass &&
+		    ldns_rr_get_type(rr) == rrset->rri_rdtype) {
+			rdata = &rrset->rri_rdatas[index_ans++];
+		}
+
+		if (rr->_rr_class == rrset->rri_rdclass &&
+		    rr->_rr_type == LDNS_RR_TYPE_RRSIG &&
+		    rrset->rri_sigs) {
+			rdata = &rrset->rri_sigs[index_sig++];
+		}
+
+		if (rdata) {
+			size_t rdata_offset = 0;
+
+			rdata->rdi_length = 0;
+			for (j=0; j< rr->_rd_count; j++) {
+				rdata->rdi_length +=
+				    ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j));
+			}
+
+			rdata->rdi_data = malloc(rdata->rdi_length);
+			if (rdata->rdi_data == NULL) {
+				result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+				goto fail;
+			}
+
+			/* Re-create the raw DNS RDATA */
+			for (j=0; j< rr->_rd_count; j++) {
+				len = ldns_rdf_size(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j));
+				memcpy(rdata->rdi_data + rdata_offset,
+				       ldns_rdf_data(ldns_rr_rdf(rr, j)), len);
+				rdata_offset += len;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	*res = rrset;
+	result = ERRSET_SUCCESS;
+
+fail:
+	/* freerrset(rrset); */
+	ldns_rdf_deep_free(domain);
+	ldns_pkt_free(pkt);
+	ldns_rr_list_deep_free(rrsigs);
+	ldns_rr_list_deep_free(rrdata);
+	ldns_resolver_deep_free(ldns_res);
+
+	return result;
+}
+
+
+void
+freerrset(struct rrsetinfo *rrset)
+{
+	u_int16_t i;
+
+	if (rrset == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (rrset->rri_rdatas) {
+		for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nrdatas; i++) {
+			if (rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data == NULL)
+				break;
+			free(rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data);
+		}
+		free(rrset->rri_rdatas);
+	}
+
+	if (rrset->rri_sigs) {
+		for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nsigs; i++) {
+			if (rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data == NULL)
+				break;
+			free(rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data);
+		}
+		free(rrset->rri_sigs);
+	}
+
+	if (rrset->rri_name)
+		free(rrset->rri_name);
+	free(rrset);
+}
+
+
+#endif /* !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && defined (HAVE_LDNS) */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73de5e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.c
@@ -0,0 +1,615 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: getrrsetbyname.c,v 1.11 2007/10/11 18:36:41 jakob Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM
+ * DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING
+ * FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT,
+ * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
+ * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/getrrsetbyname.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && !defined (HAVE_LDNS)
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include "getrrsetbyname.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO) && !HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
+extern int h_errno;
+#endif
+
+/* We don't need multithread support here */
+#ifdef _THREAD_PRIVATE
+# undef _THREAD_PRIVATE
+#endif
+#define _THREAD_PRIVATE(a,b,c) (c)
+
+#ifndef HAVE__RES_EXTERN
+struct __res_state _res;
+#endif
+
+/* Necessary functions and macros */
+
+/*
+ * Inline versions of get/put short/long.  Pointer is advanced.
+ *
+ * These macros demonstrate the property of C whereby it can be
+ * portable or it can be elegant but rarely both.
+ */
+
+#ifndef INT32SZ
+# define INT32SZ	4
+#endif
+#ifndef INT16SZ
+# define INT16SZ	2
+#endif
+
+#ifndef GETSHORT
+#define GETSHORT(s, cp) { \
+	u_char *t_cp = (u_char *)(cp); \
+	(s) = ((u_int16_t)t_cp[0] << 8) \
+	    | ((u_int16_t)t_cp[1]) \
+	    ; \
+	(cp) += INT16SZ; \
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef GETLONG
+#define GETLONG(l, cp) { \
+	u_char *t_cp = (u_char *)(cp); \
+	(l) = ((u_int32_t)t_cp[0] << 24) \
+	    | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[1] << 16) \
+	    | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[2] << 8) \
+	    | ((u_int32_t)t_cp[3]) \
+	    ; \
+	(cp) += INT32SZ; \
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * If the system doesn't have _getshort/_getlong or that are not exactly what
+ * we need then use local replacements, avoiding name collisions.
+ */
+#if !defined(HAVE__GETSHORT) || !defined(HAVE__GETLONG) || \
+    !defined(HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT) || HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT == 0 || \
+    !defined(HAVE_DECL__GETLONG) || HAVE_DECL__GETLONG == 0
+# ifdef _getshort
+#  undef _getshort
+# endif
+# ifdef _getlong
+#  undef _getlong
+# endif
+# define _getshort(x) (_ssh_compat_getshort(x))
+# define _getlong(x) (_ssh_compat_getlong(x))
+/*
+ * Routines to insert/extract short/long's.
+ */
+static u_int16_t
+_getshort(const u_char *msgp)
+{
+	u_int16_t u;
+
+	GETSHORT(u, msgp);
+	return (u);
+}
+
+static u_int32_t
+_getlong(const u_char *msgp)
+{
+	u_int32_t u;
+
+	GETLONG(u, msgp);
+	return (u);
+}
+#endif /* missing _getshort/_getlong */
+
+/* ************** */
+
+#define ANSWER_BUFFER_SIZE 0xffff
+
+struct dns_query {
+	char			*name;
+	u_int16_t		type;
+	u_int16_t		class;
+	struct dns_query	*next;
+};
+
+struct dns_rr {
+	char			*name;
+	u_int16_t		type;
+	u_int16_t		class;
+	u_int16_t		ttl;
+	u_int16_t		size;
+	void			*rdata;
+	struct dns_rr		*next;
+};
+
+struct dns_response {
+	HEADER			header;
+	struct dns_query	*query;
+	struct dns_rr		*answer;
+	struct dns_rr		*authority;
+	struct dns_rr		*additional;
+};
+
+static struct dns_response *parse_dns_response(const u_char *, int);
+static struct dns_query *parse_dns_qsection(const u_char *, int,
+    const u_char **, int);
+static struct dns_rr *parse_dns_rrsection(const u_char *, int, const u_char **,
+    int);
+
+static void free_dns_query(struct dns_query *);
+static void free_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *);
+static void free_dns_response(struct dns_response *);
+
+static int count_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *, u_int16_t, u_int16_t);
+
+int
+getrrsetbyname(const char *hostname, unsigned int rdclass,
+    unsigned int rdtype, unsigned int flags,
+    struct rrsetinfo **res)
+{
+	struct __res_state *_resp = _THREAD_PRIVATE(_res, _res, &_res);
+	int result;
+	struct rrsetinfo *rrset = NULL;
+	struct dns_response *response = NULL;
+	struct dns_rr *rr;
+	struct rdatainfo *rdata;
+	int length;
+	unsigned int index_ans, index_sig;
+	u_char answer[ANSWER_BUFFER_SIZE];
+
+	/* check for invalid class and type */
+	if (rdclass > 0xffff || rdtype > 0xffff) {
+		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* don't allow queries of class or type ANY */
+	if (rdclass == 0xff || rdtype == 0xff) {
+		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* don't allow flags yet, unimplemented */
+	if (flags) {
+		result = ERRSET_INVAL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* initialize resolver */
+	if ((_resp->options & RES_INIT) == 0 && res_init() == -1) {
+		result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	_resp->options |= RES_DEBUG;
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+#ifdef RES_USE_DNSSEC
+	/* turn on DNSSEC if EDNS0 is configured */
+	if (_resp->options & RES_USE_EDNS0)
+		_resp->options |= RES_USE_DNSSEC;
+#endif /* RES_USE_DNSEC */
+
+	/* make query */
+	length = res_query(hostname, (signed int) rdclass, (signed int) rdtype,
+	    answer, sizeof(answer));
+	if (length < 0) {
+		switch(h_errno) {
+		case HOST_NOT_FOUND:
+			result = ERRSET_NONAME;
+			goto fail;
+		case NO_DATA:
+			result = ERRSET_NODATA;
+			goto fail;
+		default:
+			result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* parse result */
+	response = parse_dns_response(answer, length);
+	if (response == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if (response->header.qdcount != 1) {
+		result = ERRSET_FAIL;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* initialize rrset */
+	rrset = calloc(1, sizeof(struct rrsetinfo));
+	if (rrset == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	rrset->rri_rdclass = response->query->class;
+	rrset->rri_rdtype = response->query->type;
+	rrset->rri_ttl = response->answer->ttl;
+	rrset->rri_nrdatas = response->header.ancount;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_HEADER_AD
+	/* check for authenticated data */
+	if (response->header.ad == 1)
+		rrset->rri_flags |= RRSET_VALIDATED;
+#endif
+
+	/* copy name from answer section */
+	rrset->rri_name = strdup(response->answer->name);
+	if (rrset->rri_name == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* count answers */
+	rrset->rri_nrdatas = count_dns_rr(response->answer, rrset->rri_rdclass,
+	    rrset->rri_rdtype);
+	rrset->rri_nsigs = count_dns_rr(response->answer, rrset->rri_rdclass,
+	    T_RRSIG);
+
+	/* allocate memory for answers */
+	rrset->rri_rdatas = calloc(rrset->rri_nrdatas,
+	    sizeof(struct rdatainfo));
+	if (rrset->rri_rdatas == NULL) {
+		result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* allocate memory for signatures */
+	if (rrset->rri_nsigs > 0) {
+		rrset->rri_sigs = calloc(rrset->rri_nsigs, sizeof(struct rdatainfo));
+		if (rrset->rri_sigs == NULL) {
+			result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* copy answers & signatures */
+	for (rr = response->answer, index_ans = 0, index_sig = 0;
+	    rr; rr = rr->next) {
+
+		rdata = NULL;
+
+		if (rr->class == rrset->rri_rdclass &&
+		    rr->type  == rrset->rri_rdtype)
+			rdata = &rrset->rri_rdatas[index_ans++];
+
+		if (rr->class == rrset->rri_rdclass &&
+		    rr->type  == T_RRSIG)
+			rdata = &rrset->rri_sigs[index_sig++];
+
+		if (rdata) {
+			rdata->rdi_length = rr->size;
+			rdata->rdi_data   = malloc(rr->size);
+
+			if (rdata->rdi_data == NULL) {
+				result = ERRSET_NOMEMORY;
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			memcpy(rdata->rdi_data, rr->rdata, rr->size);
+		}
+	}
+	free_dns_response(response);
+
+	*res = rrset;
+	return (ERRSET_SUCCESS);
+
+fail:
+	if (rrset != NULL)
+		freerrset(rrset);
+	if (response != NULL)
+		free_dns_response(response);
+	return (result);
+}
+
+void
+freerrset(struct rrsetinfo *rrset)
+{
+	u_int16_t i;
+
+	if (rrset == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (rrset->rri_rdatas) {
+		for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nrdatas; i++) {
+			if (rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data == NULL)
+				break;
+			free(rrset->rri_rdatas[i].rdi_data);
+		}
+		free(rrset->rri_rdatas);
+	}
+
+	if (rrset->rri_sigs) {
+		for (i = 0; i < rrset->rri_nsigs; i++) {
+			if (rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data == NULL)
+				break;
+			free(rrset->rri_sigs[i].rdi_data);
+		}
+		free(rrset->rri_sigs);
+	}
+
+	if (rrset->rri_name)
+		free(rrset->rri_name);
+	free(rrset);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DNS response parsing routines
+ */
+static struct dns_response *
+parse_dns_response(const u_char *answer, int size)
+{
+	struct dns_response *resp;
+	const u_char *cp;
+
+	/* allocate memory for the response */
+	resp = calloc(1, sizeof(*resp));
+	if (resp == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	/* initialize current pointer */
+	cp = answer;
+
+	/* copy header */
+	memcpy(&resp->header, cp, HFIXEDSZ);
+	cp += HFIXEDSZ;
+
+	/* fix header byte order */
+	resp->header.qdcount = ntohs(resp->header.qdcount);
+	resp->header.ancount = ntohs(resp->header.ancount);
+	resp->header.nscount = ntohs(resp->header.nscount);
+	resp->header.arcount = ntohs(resp->header.arcount);
+
+	/* there must be at least one query */
+	if (resp->header.qdcount < 1) {
+		free_dns_response(resp);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* parse query section */
+	resp->query = parse_dns_qsection(answer, size, &cp,
+	    resp->header.qdcount);
+	if (resp->header.qdcount && resp->query == NULL) {
+		free_dns_response(resp);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* parse answer section */
+	resp->answer = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp,
+	    resp->header.ancount);
+	if (resp->header.ancount && resp->answer == NULL) {
+		free_dns_response(resp);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* parse authority section */
+	resp->authority = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp,
+	    resp->header.nscount);
+	if (resp->header.nscount && resp->authority == NULL) {
+		free_dns_response(resp);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* parse additional section */
+	resp->additional = parse_dns_rrsection(answer, size, &cp,
+	    resp->header.arcount);
+	if (resp->header.arcount && resp->additional == NULL) {
+		free_dns_response(resp);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	return (resp);
+}
+
+static struct dns_query *
+parse_dns_qsection(const u_char *answer, int size, const u_char **cp, int count)
+{
+	struct dns_query *head, *curr, *prev;
+	int i, length;
+	char name[MAXDNAME];
+
+	for (i = 1, head = NULL, prev = NULL; i <= count; i++, prev = curr) {
+
+		/* allocate and initialize struct */
+		curr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct dns_query));
+		if (curr == NULL) {
+			free_dns_query(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		if (head == NULL)
+			head = curr;
+		if (prev != NULL)
+			prev->next = curr;
+
+		/* name */
+		length = dn_expand(answer, answer + size, *cp, name,
+		    sizeof(name));
+		if (length < 0) {
+			free_dns_query(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		curr->name = strdup(name);
+		if (curr->name == NULL) {
+			free_dns_query(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		*cp += length;
+
+		/* type */
+		curr->type = _getshort(*cp);
+		*cp += INT16SZ;
+
+		/* class */
+		curr->class = _getshort(*cp);
+		*cp += INT16SZ;
+	}
+
+	return (head);
+}
+
+static struct dns_rr *
+parse_dns_rrsection(const u_char *answer, int size, const u_char **cp,
+    int count)
+{
+	struct dns_rr *head, *curr, *prev;
+	int i, length;
+	char name[MAXDNAME];
+
+	for (i = 1, head = NULL, prev = NULL; i <= count; i++, prev = curr) {
+
+		/* allocate and initialize struct */
+		curr = calloc(1, sizeof(struct dns_rr));
+		if (curr == NULL) {
+			free_dns_rr(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		if (head == NULL)
+			head = curr;
+		if (prev != NULL)
+			prev->next = curr;
+
+		/* name */
+		length = dn_expand(answer, answer + size, *cp, name,
+		    sizeof(name));
+		if (length < 0) {
+			free_dns_rr(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		curr->name = strdup(name);
+		if (curr->name == NULL) {
+			free_dns_rr(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		*cp += length;
+
+		/* type */
+		curr->type = _getshort(*cp);
+		*cp += INT16SZ;
+
+		/* class */
+		curr->class = _getshort(*cp);
+		*cp += INT16SZ;
+
+		/* ttl */
+		curr->ttl = _getlong(*cp);
+		*cp += INT32SZ;
+
+		/* rdata size */
+		curr->size = _getshort(*cp);
+		*cp += INT16SZ;
+
+		/* rdata itself */
+		curr->rdata = malloc(curr->size);
+		if (curr->rdata == NULL) {
+			free_dns_rr(head);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		memcpy(curr->rdata, *cp, curr->size);
+		*cp += curr->size;
+	}
+
+	return (head);
+}
+
+static void
+free_dns_query(struct dns_query *p)
+{
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (p->name)
+		free(p->name);
+	free_dns_query(p->next);
+	free(p);
+}
+
+static void
+free_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *p)
+{
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (p->name)
+		free(p->name);
+	if (p->rdata)
+		free(p->rdata);
+	free_dns_rr(p->next);
+	free(p);
+}
+
+static void
+free_dns_response(struct dns_response *p)
+{
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	free_dns_query(p->query);
+	free_dns_rr(p->answer);
+	free_dns_rr(p->authority);
+	free_dns_rr(p->additional);
+	free(p);
+}
+
+static int
+count_dns_rr(struct dns_rr *p, u_int16_t class, u_int16_t type)
+{
+	int n = 0;
+
+	while(p) {
+		if (p->class == class && p->type == type)
+			n++;
+		p = p->next;
+	}
+
+	return (n);
+}
+
+#endif /*  !defined (HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) && !defined (HAVE_LDNS) */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1283f55
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/* OPENBSD BASED ON : include/netdb.h */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: getrrsetbyname.c,v 1.4 2001/08/16 18:16:43 ho Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT 
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1999-2001 Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM
+ * DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL
+ * INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING
+ * FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT,
+ * NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION
+ * WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _GETRRSETBYNAME_H
+#define _GETRRSETBYNAME_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+
+#ifndef HFIXEDSZ
+#define HFIXEDSZ 12
+#endif
+
+#ifndef T_RRSIG
+#define T_RRSIG 46
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Flags for getrrsetbyname()
+ */
+#ifndef RRSET_VALIDATED
+# define RRSET_VALIDATED	1
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Return codes for getrrsetbyname()
+ */
+#ifndef ERRSET_SUCCESS
+# define ERRSET_SUCCESS		0
+# define ERRSET_NOMEMORY	1
+# define ERRSET_FAIL		2
+# define ERRSET_INVAL		3
+# define ERRSET_NONAME		4
+# define ERRSET_NODATA		5
+#endif
+
+struct rdatainfo {
+	unsigned int		rdi_length;	/* length of data */
+	unsigned char		*rdi_data;	/* record data */
+};
+
+struct rrsetinfo {
+	unsigned int		rri_flags;	/* RRSET_VALIDATED ... */
+	unsigned int		rri_rdclass;	/* class number */
+	unsigned int		rri_rdtype;	/* RR type number */
+	unsigned int		rri_ttl;	/* time to live */
+	unsigned int		rri_nrdatas;	/* size of rdatas array */
+	unsigned int		rri_nsigs;	/* size of sigs array */
+	char			*rri_name;	/* canonical name */
+	struct rdatainfo	*rri_rdatas;	/* individual records */
+	struct rdatainfo	*rri_sigs;	/* individual signatures */
+};
+
+int		getrrsetbyname(const char *, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int, struct rrsetinfo **);
+void		freerrset(struct rrsetinfo *);
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME) */
+
+#endif /* _GETRRSETBYNAME_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/glob.c b/openbsd-compat/glob.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e891517
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/glob.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1079 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: glob.c,v 1.49 2020/04/21 08:25:22 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
+ * Guido van Rossum.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/glob.c */
+
+/*
+ * glob(3) -- a superset of the one defined in POSIX 1003.2.
+ *
+ * The [!...] convention to negate a range is supported (SysV, Posix, ksh).
+ *
+ * Optional extra services, controlled by flags not defined by POSIX:
+ *
+ * GLOB_QUOTE:
+ *	Escaping convention: \ inhibits any special meaning the following
+ *	character might have (except \ at end of string is retained).
+ * GLOB_MAGCHAR:
+ *	Set in gl_flags if pattern contained a globbing character.
+ * GLOB_NOMAGIC:
+ *	Same as GLOB_NOCHECK, but it will only append pattern if it did
+ *	not contain any magic characters.  [Used in csh style globbing]
+ * GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC:
+ *	Use alternately specified directory access functions.
+ * GLOB_TILDE:
+ *	expand ~user/foo to the /home/dir/of/user/foo
+ * GLOB_BRACE:
+ *	expand {1,2}{a,b} to 1a 1b 2a 2b
+ * gl_matchc:
+ *	Number of matches in the current invocation of glob.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "glob.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
+    !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \
+    !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \
+    defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
+
+#include "charclass.h"
+
+#ifdef TILDE
+# undef TILDE
+#endif
+
+#define	DOLLAR		'$'
+#define	DOT		'.'
+#define	EOS		'\0'
+#define	LBRACKET	'['
+#define	NOT		'!'
+#define	QUESTION	'?'
+#define	QUOTE		'\\'
+#define	RANGE		'-'
+#define	RBRACKET	']'
+#define	SEP		'/'
+#define	STAR		'*'
+#define	TILDE		'~'
+#define	UNDERSCORE	'_'
+#define	LBRACE		'{'
+#define	RBRACE		'}'
+#define	SLASH		'/'
+#define	COMMA		','
+
+#ifndef DEBUG
+
+#define	M_QUOTE		0x8000
+#define	M_PROTECT	0x4000
+#define	M_MASK		0xffff
+#define	M_ASCII		0x00ff
+
+typedef u_short Char;
+
+#else
+
+#define	M_QUOTE		0x80
+#define	M_PROTECT	0x40
+#define	M_MASK		0xff
+#define	M_ASCII		0x7f
+
+typedef char Char;
+
+#endif
+
+
+#define	CHAR(c)		((Char)((c)&M_ASCII))
+#define	META(c)		((Char)((c)|M_QUOTE))
+#define	M_ALL		META('*')
+#define	M_END		META(']')
+#define	M_NOT		META('!')
+#define	M_ONE		META('?')
+#define	M_RNG		META('-')
+#define	M_SET		META('[')
+#define	M_CLASS		META(':')
+#define	ismeta(c)	(((c)&M_QUOTE) != 0)
+
+#define	GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC	65536
+#define	GLOB_LIMIT_STAT		2048
+#define	GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR	16384
+
+struct glob_lim {
+	size_t	glim_malloc;
+	size_t	glim_stat;
+	size_t	glim_readdir;
+};
+
+struct glob_path_stat {
+	char		*gps_path;
+	struct stat	*gps_stat;
+};
+
+static int	 compare(const void *, const void *);
+static int	 compare_gps(const void *, const void *);
+static int	 g_Ctoc(const Char *, char *, size_t);
+static int	 g_lstat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *);
+static DIR	*g_opendir(Char *, glob_t *);
+static Char	*g_strchr(const Char *, int);
+static int	 g_strncmp(const Char *, const char *, size_t);
+static int	 g_stat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *);
+static int	 glob0(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
+static int	 glob1(Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
+static int	 glob2(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *,
+		    glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
+static int	 glob3(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *,
+		    Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
+static int	 globextend(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *,
+		    struct stat *);
+static const Char *
+		 globtilde(const Char *, Char *, size_t, glob_t *);
+static int	 globexp1(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
+static int	 globexp2(const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *,
+		    struct glob_lim *);
+static int	 match(Char *, Char *, Char *);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+static void	 qprintf(const char *, Char *);
+#endif
+
+int
+glob(const char *pattern, int flags, int (*errfunc)(const char *, int),
+    glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	const u_char *patnext;
+	int c;
+	Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[PATH_MAX];
+	struct glob_lim limit = { 0, 0, 0 };
+
+	patnext = (u_char *) pattern;
+	if (!(flags & GLOB_APPEND)) {
+		pglob->gl_pathc = 0;
+		pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
+		pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
+		if (!(flags & GLOB_DOOFFS))
+			pglob->gl_offs = 0;
+	}
+	pglob->gl_flags = flags & ~GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+	pglob->gl_errfunc = errfunc;
+	pglob->gl_matchc = 0;
+
+	if (strnlen(pattern, PATH_MAX) == PATH_MAX)
+		return(GLOB_NOMATCH);
+
+	if (pglob->gl_offs >= SSIZE_MAX || pglob->gl_pathc >= SSIZE_MAX ||
+	    pglob->gl_pathc >= SSIZE_MAX - pglob->gl_offs - 1)
+		return GLOB_NOSPACE;
+
+	bufnext = patbuf;
+	bufend = bufnext + PATH_MAX - 1;
+	if (flags & GLOB_NOESCAPE)
+		while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS)
+			*bufnext++ = c;
+	else {
+		/* Protect the quoted characters. */
+		while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS)
+			if (c == QUOTE) {
+				if ((c = *patnext++) == EOS) {
+					c = QUOTE;
+					--patnext;
+				}
+				*bufnext++ = c | M_PROTECT;
+			} else
+				*bufnext++ = c;
+	}
+	*bufnext = EOS;
+
+	if (flags & GLOB_BRACE)
+		return globexp1(patbuf, pglob, &limit);
+	else
+		return glob0(patbuf, pglob, &limit);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expand recursively a glob {} pattern. When there is no more expansion
+ * invoke the standard globbing routine to glob the rest of the magic
+ * characters
+ */
+static int
+globexp1(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+	const Char* ptr = pattern;
+
+	/* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */
+	if (pattern[0] == LBRACE && pattern[1] == RBRACE && pattern[2] == EOS)
+		return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp);
+
+	if ((ptr = (const Char *) g_strchr(ptr, LBRACE)) != NULL)
+		return globexp2(ptr, pattern, pglob, limitp);
+
+	return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Recursive brace globbing helper. Tries to expand a single brace.
+ * If it succeeds then it invokes globexp1 with the new pattern.
+ * If it fails then it tries to glob the rest of the pattern and returns.
+ */
+static int
+globexp2(const Char *ptr, const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob,
+    struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+	int     i, rv;
+	Char   *lm, *ls;
+	const Char *pe, *pm, *pl;
+	Char    patbuf[PATH_MAX];
+
+	/* copy part up to the brace */
+	for (lm = patbuf, pm = pattern; pm != ptr; *lm++ = *pm++)
+		;
+	*lm = EOS;
+	ls = lm;
+
+	/* Find the balanced brace */
+	for (i = 0, pe = ++ptr; *pe; pe++)
+		if (*pe == LBRACKET) {
+			/* Ignore everything between [] */
+			for (pm = pe++; *pe != RBRACKET && *pe != EOS; pe++)
+				;
+			if (*pe == EOS) {
+				/*
+				 * We could not find a matching RBRACKET.
+				 * Ignore and just look for RBRACE
+				 */
+				pe = pm;
+			}
+		} else if (*pe == LBRACE)
+			i++;
+		else if (*pe == RBRACE) {
+			if (i == 0)
+				break;
+			i--;
+		}
+
+	/* Non matching braces; just glob the pattern */
+	if (i != 0 || *pe == EOS)
+		return glob0(patbuf, pglob, limitp);
+
+	for (i = 0, pl = pm = ptr; pm <= pe; pm++) {
+		switch (*pm) {
+		case LBRACKET:
+			/* Ignore everything between [] */
+			for (pl = pm++; *pm != RBRACKET && *pm != EOS; pm++)
+				;
+			if (*pm == EOS) {
+				/*
+				 * We could not find a matching RBRACKET.
+				 * Ignore and just look for RBRACE
+				 */
+				pm = pl;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case LBRACE:
+			i++;
+			break;
+
+		case RBRACE:
+			if (i) {
+				i--;
+				break;
+			}
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case COMMA:
+			if (i && *pm == COMMA)
+				break;
+			else {
+				/* Append the current string */
+				for (lm = ls; (pl < pm); *lm++ = *pl++)
+					;
+
+				/*
+				 * Append the rest of the pattern after the
+				 * closing brace
+				 */
+				for (pl = pe + 1; (*lm++ = *pl++) != EOS; )
+					;
+
+				/* Expand the current pattern */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+				qprintf("globexp2:", patbuf);
+#endif
+				rv = globexp1(patbuf, pglob, limitp);
+				if (rv && rv != GLOB_NOMATCH)
+					return rv;
+
+				/* move after the comma, to the next string */
+				pl = pm + 1;
+			}
+			break;
+
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+/*
+ * expand tilde from the passwd file.
+ */
+static const Char *
+globtilde(const Char *pattern, Char *patbuf, size_t patbuf_len, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	struct passwd *pwd;
+	char *h;
+	const Char *p;
+	Char *b, *eb;
+
+	if (*pattern != TILDE || !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_TILDE))
+		return pattern;
+
+	/* Copy up to the end of the string or / */
+	eb = &patbuf[patbuf_len - 1];
+	for (p = pattern + 1, h = (char *) patbuf;
+	    h < (char *)eb && *p && *p != SLASH; *h++ = *p++)
+		;
+
+	*h = EOS;
+
+#if 0
+	if (h == (char *)eb)
+		return what;
+#endif
+
+	if (((char *) patbuf)[0] == EOS) {
+		/*
+		 * handle a plain ~ or ~/ by expanding $HOME
+		 * first and then trying the password file
+		 */
+#if 0
+		if (issetugid() != 0 || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) {
+#endif
+		if ((getuid() != geteuid()) || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) {
+			if ((pwd = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL)
+				return pattern;
+			else
+				h = pwd->pw_dir;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * Expand a ~user
+		 */
+		if ((pwd = getpwnam((char*) patbuf)) == NULL)
+			return pattern;
+		else
+			h = pwd->pw_dir;
+	}
+
+	/* Copy the home directory */
+	for (b = patbuf; b < eb && *h; *b++ = *h++)
+		;
+
+	/* Append the rest of the pattern */
+	while (b < eb && (*b++ = *p++) != EOS)
+		;
+	*b = EOS;
+
+	return patbuf;
+}
+
+static int
+g_strncmp(const Char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
+{
+	int rv = 0;
+
+	while (n--) {
+		rv = *(Char *)s1 - *(const unsigned char *)s2++;
+		if (rv)
+			break;
+		if (*s1++ == '\0')
+			break;
+	}
+	return rv;
+}
+
+static int
+g_charclass(const Char **patternp, Char **bufnextp)
+{
+	const Char *pattern = *patternp + 1;
+	Char *bufnext = *bufnextp;
+	const Char *colon;
+	struct cclass *cc;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if ((colon = g_strchr(pattern, ':')) == NULL || colon[1] != ']')
+		return 1;	/* not a character class */
+
+	len = (size_t)(colon - pattern);
+	for (cc = cclasses; cc->name != NULL; cc++) {
+		if (!g_strncmp(pattern, cc->name, len) && cc->name[len] == '\0')
+			break;
+	}
+	if (cc->name == NULL)
+		return -1;	/* invalid character class */
+	*bufnext++ = M_CLASS;
+	*bufnext++ = (Char)(cc - &cclasses[0]);
+	*bufnextp = bufnext;
+	*patternp += len + 3;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The main glob() routine: compiles the pattern (optionally processing
+ * quotes), calls glob1() to do the real pattern matching, and finally
+ * sorts the list (unless unsorted operation is requested).  Returns 0
+ * if things went well, nonzero if errors occurred.  It is not an error
+ * to find no matches.
+ */
+static int
+glob0(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+	const Char *qpatnext;
+	int c, err;
+	size_t oldpathc;
+	Char *bufnext, patbuf[PATH_MAX];
+
+	qpatnext = globtilde(pattern, patbuf, PATH_MAX, pglob);
+	oldpathc = pglob->gl_pathc;
+	bufnext = patbuf;
+
+	/* We don't need to check for buffer overflow any more. */
+	while ((c = *qpatnext++) != EOS) {
+		switch (c) {
+		case LBRACKET:
+			c = *qpatnext;
+			if (c == NOT)
+				++qpatnext;
+			if (*qpatnext == EOS ||
+			    g_strchr(qpatnext+1, RBRACKET) == NULL) {
+				*bufnext++ = LBRACKET;
+				if (c == NOT)
+					--qpatnext;
+				break;
+			}
+			*bufnext++ = M_SET;
+			if (c == NOT)
+				*bufnext++ = M_NOT;
+			c = *qpatnext++;
+			do {
+				if (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':') {
+					do {
+						err = g_charclass(&qpatnext,
+						    &bufnext);
+						if (err)
+							break;
+						c = *qpatnext++;
+					} while (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':');
+					if (err == -1 &&
+					    !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK))
+						return GLOB_NOMATCH;
+					if (c == RBRACKET)
+						break;
+				}
+				*bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
+				if (*qpatnext == RANGE &&
+				    (c = qpatnext[1]) != RBRACKET) {
+					*bufnext++ = M_RNG;
+					*bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
+					qpatnext += 2;
+				}
+			} while ((c = *qpatnext++) != RBRACKET);
+			pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+			*bufnext++ = M_END;
+			break;
+		case QUESTION:
+			pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+			*bufnext++ = M_ONE;
+			break;
+		case STAR:
+			pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
+			/* collapse adjacent stars to one,
+			 * to avoid exponential behavior
+			 */
+			if (bufnext == patbuf || bufnext[-1] != M_ALL)
+				*bufnext++ = M_ALL;
+			break;
+		default:
+			*bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	*bufnext = EOS;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	qprintf("glob0:", patbuf);
+#endif
+
+	if ((err = glob1(patbuf, patbuf+PATH_MAX-1, pglob, limitp)) != 0)
+		return(err);
+
+	/*
+	 * If there was no match we are going to append the pattern
+	 * if GLOB_NOCHECK was specified or if GLOB_NOMAGIC was specified
+	 * and the pattern did not contain any magic characters
+	 * GLOB_NOMAGIC is there just for compatibility with csh.
+	 */
+	if (pglob->gl_pathc == oldpathc) {
+		if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK) ||
+		    ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOMAGIC) &&
+		    !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MAGCHAR)))
+			return(globextend(pattern, pglob, limitp, NULL));
+		else
+			return(GLOB_NOMATCH);
+	}
+	if (!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOSORT)) {
+		if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT)) {
+			/* Keep the paths and stat info synced during sort */
+			struct glob_path_stat *path_stat;
+			size_t i;
+			size_t n = pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc;
+			size_t o = pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc;
+
+			if ((path_stat = calloc(n, sizeof(*path_stat))) == NULL)
+				return GLOB_NOSPACE;
+			for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+				path_stat[i].gps_path = pglob->gl_pathv[o + i];
+				path_stat[i].gps_stat = pglob->gl_statv[o + i];
+			}
+			qsort(path_stat, n, sizeof(*path_stat), compare_gps);
+			for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+				pglob->gl_pathv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_path;
+				pglob->gl_statv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_stat;
+			}
+			free(path_stat);
+		} else {
+			qsort(pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc,
+			    pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc, sizeof(char *),
+			    compare);
+		}
+	}
+	return(0);
+}
+
+static int
+compare(const void *p, const void *q)
+{
+	return(strcmp(*(char **)p, *(char **)q));
+}
+
+static int
+compare_gps(const void *_p, const void *_q)
+{
+	const struct glob_path_stat *p = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_p;
+	const struct glob_path_stat *q = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_q;
+
+	return(strcmp(p->gps_path, q->gps_path));
+}
+
+static int
+glob1(Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+	Char pathbuf[PATH_MAX];
+
+	/* A null pathname is invalid -- POSIX 1003.1 sect. 2.4. */
+	if (*pattern == EOS)
+		return(0);
+	return(glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf+PATH_MAX-1,
+	    pathbuf, pathbuf+PATH_MAX-1,
+	    pattern, pattern_last, pglob, limitp));
+}
+
+/*
+ * The functions glob2 and glob3 are mutually recursive; there is one level
+ * of recursion for each segment in the pattern that contains one or more
+ * meta characters.
+ */
+static int
+glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last,
+    Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+	struct stat sb;
+	Char *p, *q;
+	int anymeta;
+
+	/*
+	 * Loop over pattern segments until end of pattern or until
+	 * segment with meta character found.
+	 */
+	for (anymeta = 0;;) {
+		if (*pattern == EOS) {		/* End of pattern? */
+			*pathend = EOS;
+
+			if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
+			    limitp->glim_stat++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_STAT) {
+				errno = 0;
+				*pathend++ = SEP;
+				*pathend = EOS;
+				return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+			}
+			if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob))
+				return(0);
+
+			if (((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MARK) &&
+			    pathend[-1] != SEP) && (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) ||
+			    (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode) &&
+			    (g_stat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob) == 0) &&
+			    S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)))) {
+				if (pathend+1 > pathend_last)
+					return (1);
+				*pathend++ = SEP;
+				*pathend = EOS;
+			}
+			++pglob->gl_matchc;
+			return(globextend(pathbuf, pglob, limitp, &sb));
+		}
+
+		/* Find end of next segment, copy tentatively to pathend. */
+		q = pathend;
+		p = pattern;
+		while (*p != EOS && *p != SEP) {
+			if (ismeta(*p))
+				anymeta = 1;
+			if (q+1 > pathend_last)
+				return (1);
+			*q++ = *p++;
+		}
+
+		if (!anymeta) {		/* No expansion, do next segment. */
+			pathend = q;
+			pattern = p;
+			while (*pattern == SEP) {
+				if (pathend+1 > pathend_last)
+					return (1);
+				*pathend++ = *pattern++;
+			}
+		} else
+			/* Need expansion, recurse. */
+			return(glob3(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, pathend,
+			    pathend_last, pattern, p, pattern_last,
+			    pglob, limitp));
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+static int
+glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last,
+    Char *pattern, Char *restpattern, Char *restpattern_last, glob_t *pglob,
+    struct glob_lim *limitp)
+{
+	struct dirent *dp;
+	DIR *dirp;
+	int err;
+	char buf[PATH_MAX];
+
+	/*
+	 * The readdirfunc declaration can't be prototyped, because it is
+	 * assigned, below, to two functions which are prototyped in glob.h
+	 * and dirent.h as taking pointers to differently typed opaque
+	 * structures.
+	 */
+	struct dirent *(*readdirfunc)(void *);
+
+	if (pathend > pathend_last)
+		return (1);
+	*pathend = EOS;
+	errno = 0;
+
+	if ((dirp = g_opendir(pathbuf, pglob)) == NULL) {
+		/* TODO: don't call for ENOENT or ENOTDIR? */
+		if (pglob->gl_errfunc) {
+			if (g_Ctoc(pathbuf, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+				return(GLOB_ABORTED);
+			if (pglob->gl_errfunc(buf, errno) ||
+			    pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ERR)
+				return(GLOB_ABORTED);
+		}
+		return(0);
+	}
+
+	err = 0;
+
+	/* Search directory for matching names. */
+	if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+		readdirfunc = pglob->gl_readdir;
+	else
+		readdirfunc = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))readdir;
+	while ((dp = (*readdirfunc)(dirp))) {
+		u_char *sc;
+		Char *dc;
+
+		if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
+		    limitp->glim_readdir++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR) {
+			errno = 0;
+			*pathend++ = SEP;
+			*pathend = EOS;
+			err = GLOB_NOSPACE;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* Initial DOT must be matched literally. */
+		if (dp->d_name[0] == DOT && *pattern != DOT)
+			continue;
+		dc = pathend;
+		sc = (u_char *) dp->d_name;
+		while (dc < pathend_last && (*dc++ = *sc++) != EOS)
+			;
+		if (dc >= pathend_last) {
+			*dc = EOS;
+			err = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (!match(pathend, pattern, restpattern)) {
+			*pathend = EOS;
+			continue;
+		}
+		err = glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, --dc, pathend_last,
+		    restpattern, restpattern_last, pglob, limitp);
+		if (err)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+		(*pglob->gl_closedir)(dirp);
+	else
+		closedir(dirp);
+	return(err);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Extend the gl_pathv member of a glob_t structure to accommodate a new item,
+ * add the new item, and update gl_pathc.
+ *
+ * This assumes the BSD realloc, which only copies the block when its size
+ * crosses a power-of-two boundary; for v7 realloc, this would cause quadratic
+ * behavior.
+ *
+ * Return 0 if new item added, error code if memory couldn't be allocated.
+ *
+ * Invariant of the glob_t structure:
+ *	Either gl_pathc is zero and gl_pathv is NULL; or gl_pathc > 0 and
+ *	gl_pathv points to (gl_offs + gl_pathc + 1) items.
+ */
+static int
+globextend(const Char *path, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp,
+    struct stat *sb)
+{
+	char **pathv;
+	size_t i, newn, len;
+	char *copy = NULL;
+	const Char *p;
+	struct stat **statv;
+
+	newn = 2 + pglob->gl_pathc + pglob->gl_offs;
+	if (pglob->gl_offs >= SSIZE_MAX ||
+	    pglob->gl_pathc >= SSIZE_MAX ||
+	    newn >= SSIZE_MAX ||
+	    SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*pathv) <= newn ||
+	    SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*statv) <= newn) {
+ nospace:
+		for (i = pglob->gl_offs; i < newn - 2; i++) {
+			if (pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i])
+				free(pglob->gl_pathv[i]);
+			if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0 &&
+			    pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i])
+				free(pglob->gl_statv[i]);
+		}
+		free(pglob->gl_pathv);
+		pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
+		free(pglob->gl_statv);
+		pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
+		return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+	}
+
+	pathv = reallocarray(pglob->gl_pathv, newn, sizeof(*pathv));
+	if (pathv == NULL)
+		goto nospace;
+	if (pglob->gl_pathv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) {
+		/* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */
+		pathv += pglob->gl_offs;
+		for (i = pglob->gl_offs; i > 0; i--)
+			*--pathv = NULL;
+	}
+	pglob->gl_pathv = pathv;
+
+	if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0) {
+		statv = reallocarray(pglob->gl_statv, newn, sizeof(*statv));
+		if (statv == NULL)
+			goto nospace;
+		if (pglob->gl_statv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) {
+			/* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */
+			statv += pglob->gl_offs;
+			for (i = pglob->gl_offs; i > 0; i--)
+				*--statv = NULL;
+		}
+		pglob->gl_statv = statv;
+		if (sb == NULL)
+			statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL;
+		else {
+			limitp->glim_malloc += sizeof(**statv);
+			if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
+			    limitp->glim_malloc >= GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) {
+				errno = 0;
+				return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+			}
+			if ((statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] =
+			    malloc(sizeof(**statv))) == NULL)
+				goto copy_error;
+			memcpy(statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc], sb,
+			    sizeof(*sb));
+		}
+		statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc + 1] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	for (p = path; *p++;)
+		;
+	len = (size_t)(p - path);
+	limitp->glim_malloc += len;
+	if ((copy = malloc(len)) != NULL) {
+		if (g_Ctoc(path, copy, len)) {
+			free(copy);
+			return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+		}
+		pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc++] = copy;
+	}
+	pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL;
+
+	if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
+	    (newn * sizeof(*pathv)) + limitp->glim_malloc >
+	    GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) {
+		errno = 0;
+		return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
+	}
+ copy_error:
+	return(copy == NULL ? GLOB_NOSPACE : 0);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * pattern matching function for filenames.  Each occurrence of the *
+ * pattern causes an iteration.
+ *
+ * Note, this function differs from the original as per the discussion
+ * here: https://research.swtch.com/glob
+ *
+ * Basically we removed the recursion and made it use the algorithm
+ * from Russ Cox to not go quadratic on cases like a file called
+ * ("a" x 100) . "x" matched against a pattern like "a*a*a*a*a*a*a*y".
+ */
+static int
+match(Char *name, Char *pat, Char *patend)
+{
+	int ok, negate_range;
+	Char c, k;
+	Char *nextp = NULL;
+	Char *nextn = NULL;
+
+loop:
+	while (pat < patend) {
+		c = *pat++;
+		switch (c & M_MASK) {
+		case M_ALL:
+			while (pat < patend && (*pat & M_MASK) == M_ALL)
+				pat++;	/* eat consecutive '*' */
+			if (pat == patend)
+				return(1);
+			if (*name == EOS)
+				return(0);
+			nextn = name + 1;
+			nextp = pat - 1;
+			break;
+		case M_ONE:
+			if (*name++ == EOS)
+				goto fail;
+			break;
+		case M_SET:
+			ok = 0;
+			if ((k = *name++) == EOS)
+				goto fail;
+			if ((negate_range = ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_NOT)) != EOS)
+				++pat;
+			while (((c = *pat++) & M_MASK) != M_END) {
+				if ((c & M_MASK) == M_CLASS) {
+					Char idx = *pat & M_MASK;
+					if (idx < NCCLASSES &&
+					    cclasses[idx].isctype(k))
+						ok = 1;
+					++pat;
+				}
+				if ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_RNG) {
+					if (c <= k && k <= pat[1])
+						ok = 1;
+					pat += 2;
+				} else if (c == k)
+					ok = 1;
+			}
+			if (ok == negate_range)
+				goto fail;
+			break;
+		default:
+			if (*name++ != c)
+				goto fail;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (*name == EOS)
+		return(1);
+
+fail:
+	if (nextn) {
+		pat = nextp;
+		name = nextn;
+		goto loop;
+	}
+	return(0);
+}
+
+/* Free allocated data belonging to a glob_t structure. */
+void
+globfree(glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	size_t i;
+	char **pp;
+
+	if (pglob->gl_pathv != NULL) {
+		pp = pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs;
+		for (i = pglob->gl_pathc; i--; ++pp)
+			free(*pp);
+		free(pglob->gl_pathv);
+		pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
+	}
+	if (pglob->gl_statv != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; i < pglob->gl_pathc; i++) {
+			free(pglob->gl_statv[i]);
+		}
+		free(pglob->gl_statv);
+		pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static DIR *
+g_opendir(Char *str, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	char buf[PATH_MAX];
+
+	if (!*str)
+		strlcpy(buf, ".", sizeof buf);
+	else {
+		if (g_Ctoc(str, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+			return(NULL);
+	}
+
+	if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+		return((*pglob->gl_opendir)(buf));
+
+	return(opendir(buf));
+}
+
+static int
+g_lstat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	char buf[PATH_MAX];
+
+	if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+		return(-1);
+	if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+		return((*pglob->gl_lstat)(buf, sb));
+	return(lstat(buf, sb));
+}
+
+static int
+g_stat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	char buf[PATH_MAX];
+
+	if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf)))
+		return(-1);
+	if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
+		return((*pglob->gl_stat)(buf, sb));
+	return(stat(buf, sb));
+}
+
+static Char *
+g_strchr(const Char *str, int ch)
+{
+	do {
+		if (*str == ch)
+			return ((Char *)str);
+	} while (*str++);
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+static int
+g_Ctoc(const Char *str, char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+
+	while (len--) {
+		if ((*buf++ = *str++) == EOS)
+			return (0);
+	}
+	return (1);
+}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+static void
+qprintf(const char *str, Char *s)
+{
+	Char *p;
+
+	(void)printf("%s:\n", str);
+	for (p = s; *p; p++)
+		(void)printf("%c", CHAR(*p));
+	(void)printf("\n");
+	for (p = s; *p; p++)
+		(void)printf("%c", *p & M_PROTECT ? '"' : ' ');
+	(void)printf("\n");
+	for (p = s; *p; p++)
+		(void)printf("%c", ismeta(*p) ? '_' : ' ');
+	(void)printf("\n");
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) ||
+          !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/glob.h b/openbsd-compat/glob.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1692d36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/glob.h
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: glob.h,v 1.14 2019/02/04 16:45:40 millert Exp $	*/
+/*	$NetBSD: glob.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:56 cgd Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
+ * Guido van Rossum.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *	@(#)glob.h	8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/glob.h */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
+    !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \
+    !defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \
+    defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
+
+#ifndef _COMPAT_GLOB_H_
+#define	_COMPAT_GLOB_H_
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+# define glob_t _ssh_compat_glob_t
+# define glob(a, b, c, d)  _ssh__compat_glob(a, b, c, d)
+# define globfree(a)  _ssh__compat_globfree(a)
+
+struct stat;
+typedef struct {
+	size_t gl_pathc;	/* Count of total paths so far. */
+	size_t gl_matchc;	/* Count of paths matching pattern. */
+	size_t gl_offs;		/* Reserved at beginning of gl_pathv. */
+	int gl_flags;		/* Copy of flags parameter to glob. */
+	char **gl_pathv;	/* List of paths matching pattern. */
+	struct stat **gl_statv;	/* Stat entries corresponding to gl_pathv */
+				/* Copy of errfunc parameter to glob. */
+	int (*gl_errfunc)(const char *, int);
+
+	/*
+	 * Alternate filesystem access methods for glob; replacement
+	 * versions of closedir(3), readdir(3), opendir(3), stat(2)
+	 * and lstat(2).
+	 */
+	void (*gl_closedir)(void *);
+	struct dirent *(*gl_readdir)(void *);	
+	void *(*gl_opendir)(const char *);
+	int (*gl_lstat)(const char *, struct stat *);
+	int (*gl_stat)(const char *, struct stat *);
+} glob_t;
+
+#define	GLOB_APPEND	0x0001	/* Append to output from previous call. */
+#define	GLOB_DOOFFS	0x0002	/* Use gl_offs. */
+#define	GLOB_ERR	0x0004	/* Return on error. */
+#define	GLOB_MARK	0x0008	/* Append / to matching directories. */
+#define	GLOB_NOCHECK	0x0010	/* Return pattern itself if nothing matches. */
+#define	GLOB_NOSORT	0x0020	/* Don't sort. */
+#define	GLOB_NOESCAPE	0x1000	/* Disable backslash escaping. */
+
+#define	GLOB_NOSPACE	(-1)	/* Malloc call failed. */
+#define	GLOB_ABORTED	(-2)	/* Unignored error. */
+#define	GLOB_NOMATCH	(-3)	/* No match and GLOB_NOCHECK not set. */
+#define	GLOB_NOSYS	(-4)	/* Function not supported. */
+
+#define	GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC	0x0040	/* Use alternately specified directory funcs. */
+#define	GLOB_BRACE	0x0080	/* Expand braces ala csh. */
+#define	GLOB_MAGCHAR	0x0100	/* Pattern had globbing characters. */
+#define	GLOB_NOMAGIC	0x0200	/* GLOB_NOCHECK without magic chars (csh). */
+#define	GLOB_QUOTE	0x0400	/* Quote special chars with \. */
+#define	GLOB_TILDE	0x0800	/* Expand tilde names from the passwd file. */
+#define GLOB_LIMIT	0x2000	/* Limit pattern match output to ARG_MAX */
+#define	GLOB_KEEPSTAT	0x4000	/* Retain stat data for paths in gl_statv. */
+#define GLOB_ABEND	GLOB_ABORTED /* backward compatibility */
+
+int	glob(const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *);
+void	globfree(glob_t *);
+
+#endif /* !_GLOB_H_ */
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC)  ||
+	  !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOH_HAS_GL_STATV) */
+
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c b/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5efcc5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/inet_aton.c
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: inet_addr.c,v 1.9 2005/08/06 20:30:03 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1993
+ *    The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * -
+ * Portions Copyright (c) 1993 by Digital Equipment Corporation.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies, and that
+ * the name of Digital Equipment Corporation not be used in advertising or
+ * publicity pertaining to distribution of the document or software without
+ * specific, written prior permission.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP. DISCLAIMS ALL
+ * WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE, INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS.   IN NO EVENT SHALL DIGITAL EQUIPMENT
+ * CORPORATION BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
+ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
+ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ * -
+ * --Copyright--
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/inet_addr.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#if 0
+/*
+ * Ascii internet address interpretation routine.
+ * The value returned is in network order.
+ */
+in_addr_t
+inet_addr(const char *cp)
+{
+	struct in_addr val;
+
+	if (inet_aton(cp, &val))
+		return (val.s_addr);
+	return (INADDR_NONE);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Check whether "cp" is a valid ascii representation
+ * of an Internet address and convert to a binary address.
+ * Returns 1 if the address is valid, 0 if not.
+ * This replaces inet_addr, the return value from which
+ * cannot distinguish between failure and a local broadcast address.
+ */
+int
+inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr)
+{
+	u_int32_t val;
+	int base, n;
+	char c;
+	u_int parts[4];
+	u_int *pp = parts;
+
+	c = *cp;
+	for (;;) {
+		/*
+		 * Collect number up to ``.''.
+		 * Values are specified as for C:
+		 * 0x=hex, 0=octal, isdigit=decimal.
+		 */
+		if (!isdigit(c))
+			return (0);
+		val = 0; base = 10;
+		if (c == '0') {
+			c = *++cp;
+			if (c == 'x' || c == 'X')
+				base = 16, c = *++cp;
+			else
+				base = 8;
+		}
+		for (;;) {
+			if (isascii(c) && isdigit(c)) {
+				val = (val * base) + (c - '0');
+				c = *++cp;
+			} else if (base == 16 && isascii(c) && isxdigit(c)) {
+				val = (val << 4) |
+					(c + 10 - (islower(c) ? 'a' : 'A'));
+				c = *++cp;
+			} else
+				break;
+		}
+		if (c == '.') {
+			/*
+			 * Internet format:
+			 *	a.b.c.d
+			 *	a.b.c	(with c treated as 16 bits)
+			 *	a.b	(with b treated as 24 bits)
+			 */
+			if (pp >= parts + 3)
+				return (0);
+			*pp++ = val;
+			c = *++cp;
+		} else
+			break;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Check for trailing characters.
+	 */
+	if (c != '\0' && (!isascii(c) || !isspace(c)))
+		return (0);
+	/*
+	 * Concoct the address according to
+	 * the number of parts specified.
+	 */
+	n = pp - parts + 1;
+	switch (n) {
+
+	case 0:
+		return (0);		/* initial nondigit */
+
+	case 1:				/* a -- 32 bits */
+		break;
+
+	case 2:				/* a.b -- 8.24 bits */
+		if ((val > 0xffffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff))
+			return (0);
+		val |= parts[0] << 24;
+		break;
+
+	case 3:				/* a.b.c -- 8.8.16 bits */
+		if ((val > 0xffff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff))
+			return (0);
+		val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16);
+		break;
+
+	case 4:				/* a.b.c.d -- 8.8.8.8 bits */
+		if ((val > 0xff) || (parts[0] > 0xff) || (parts[1] > 0xff) || (parts[2] > 0xff))
+			return (0);
+		val |= (parts[0] << 24) | (parts[1] << 16) | (parts[2] << 8);
+		break;
+	}
+	if (addr)
+		addr->s_addr = htonl(val);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_INET_ATON) */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c b/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0eb7b3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/inet_ntoa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: inet_ntoa.c,v 1.6 2005/08/06 20:30:03 espie Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/inet_ntoa.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA)
+
+/*
+ * Convert network-format internet address
+ * to base 256 d.d.d.d representation.
+ */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+char *
+inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in)
+{
+	static char b[18];
+	char *p;
+
+	p = (char *)&in;
+#define	UC(b)	(((int)b)&0xff)
+	(void)snprintf(b, sizeof(b),
+	    "%u.%u.%u.%u", UC(p[0]), UC(p[1]), UC(p[2]), UC(p[3]));
+	return (b);
+}
+
+#endif /* defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c b/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c037f08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/inet_ntop.c
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: inet_ntop.c,v 1.8 2008/12/09 19:38:38 otto Exp $	*/
+
+/* Copyright (c) 1996 by Internet Software Consortium.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND INTERNET SOFTWARE CONSORTIUM DISCLAIMS
+ * ALL WARRANTIES WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL INTERNET SOFTWARE
+ * CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR
+ * PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS
+ * ACTION, ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS
+ * SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/inet_ntop.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#ifndef IN6ADDRSZ
+#define IN6ADDRSZ   16   /* IPv6 T_AAAA */                 
+#endif
+
+#ifndef INT16SZ
+#define INT16SZ     2    /* for systems without 16-bit ints */
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * WARNING: Don't even consider trying to compile this on a system where
+ * sizeof(int) < 4.  sizeof(int) > 4 is fine; all the world's not a VAX.
+ */
+
+static const char *inet_ntop4(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size);
+static const char *inet_ntop6(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size);
+
+/* char *
+ * inet_ntop(af, src, dst, size)
+ *	convert a network format address to presentation format.
+ * return:
+ *	pointer to presentation format address (`dst'), or NULL (see errno).
+ * author:
+ *	Paul Vixie, 1996.
+ */
+const char *
+inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size)
+{
+	switch (af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		return (inet_ntop4(src, dst, (size_t)size));
+	case AF_INET6:
+		return (inet_ntop6(src, dst, (size_t)size));
+	default:
+		errno = EAFNOSUPPORT;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+/* const char *
+ * inet_ntop4(src, dst, size)
+ *	format an IPv4 address, more or less like inet_ntoa()
+ * return:
+ *	`dst' (as a const)
+ * notes:
+ *	(1) uses no statics
+ *	(2) takes a u_char* not an in_addr as input
+ * author:
+ *	Paul Vixie, 1996.
+ */
+static const char *
+inet_ntop4(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size)
+{
+	static const char fmt[] = "%u.%u.%u.%u";
+	char tmp[sizeof "255.255.255.255"];
+	int l;
+
+	l = snprintf(tmp, size, fmt, src[0], src[1], src[2], src[3]);
+	if (l <= 0 || l >= size) {
+		errno = ENOSPC;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	strlcpy(dst, tmp, size);
+	return (dst);
+}
+
+/* const char *
+ * inet_ntop6(src, dst, size)
+ *	convert IPv6 binary address into presentation (printable) format
+ * author:
+ *	Paul Vixie, 1996.
+ */
+static const char *
+inet_ntop6(const u_char *src, char *dst, size_t size)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Note that int32_t and int16_t need only be "at least" large enough
+	 * to contain a value of the specified size.  On some systems, like
+	 * Crays, there is no such thing as an integer variable with 16 bits.
+	 * Keep this in mind if you think this function should have been coded
+	 * to use pointer overlays.  All the world's not a VAX.
+	 */
+	char tmp[sizeof "ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:255.255.255.255"];
+	char *tp, *ep;
+	struct { int base, len; } best, cur;
+	u_int words[IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ];
+	int i;
+	int advance;
+
+	/*
+	 * Preprocess:
+	 *	Copy the input (bytewise) array into a wordwise array.
+	 *	Find the longest run of 0x00's in src[] for :: shorthanding.
+	 */
+	memset(words, '\0', sizeof words);
+	for (i = 0; i < IN6ADDRSZ; i++)
+		words[i / 2] |= (src[i] << ((1 - (i % 2)) << 3));
+	best.base = -1;
+	cur.base = -1;
+	for (i = 0; i < (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ); i++) {
+		if (words[i] == 0) {
+			if (cur.base == -1)
+				cur.base = i, cur.len = 1;
+			else
+				cur.len++;
+		} else {
+			if (cur.base != -1) {
+				if (best.base == -1 || cur.len > best.len)
+					best = cur;
+				cur.base = -1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (cur.base != -1) {
+		if (best.base == -1 || cur.len > best.len)
+			best = cur;
+	}
+	if (best.base != -1 && best.len < 2)
+		best.base = -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Format the result.
+	 */
+	tp = tmp;
+	ep = tmp + sizeof(tmp);
+	for (i = 0; i < (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ) && tp < ep; i++) {
+		/* Are we inside the best run of 0x00's? */
+		if (best.base != -1 && i >= best.base &&
+		    i < (best.base + best.len)) {
+			if (i == best.base) {
+				if (tp + 1 >= ep)
+					return (NULL);
+				*tp++ = ':';
+			}
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Are we following an initial run of 0x00s or any real hex? */
+		if (i != 0) {
+			if (tp + 1 >= ep)
+				return (NULL);
+			*tp++ = ':';
+		}
+		/* Is this address an encapsulated IPv4? */
+		if (i == 6 && best.base == 0 &&
+		    (best.len == 6 || (best.len == 5 && words[5] == 0xffff))) {
+			if (!inet_ntop4(src+12, tp, (size_t)(ep - tp)))
+				return (NULL);
+			tp += strlen(tp);
+			break;
+		}
+		advance = snprintf(tp, ep - tp, "%x", words[i]);
+		if (advance <= 0 || advance >= ep - tp)
+			return (NULL);
+		tp += advance;
+	}
+	/* Was it a trailing run of 0x00's? */
+	if (best.base != -1 && (best.base + best.len) == (IN6ADDRSZ / INT16SZ)) {
+		if (tp + 1 >= ep)
+			return (NULL);
+		*tp++ = ':';
+	}
+	if (tp + 1 >= ep)
+		return (NULL);
+	*tp++ = '\0';
+
+	/*
+	 * Check for overflow, copy, and we're done.
+	 */
+	if ((size_t)(tp - tmp) > size) {
+		errno = ENOSPC;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+	strlcpy(dst, tmp, size);
+	return (dst);
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_INET_NTOP */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c b/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c2ffb6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* Placed in the public domain.  */
+
+/*
+ * _FORTIFY_SOURCE includes a misguided check for FD_SET(n)/FD_ISSET(b)
+ * where n > FD_SETSIZE. This breaks OpenSSH and other programs that
+ * explicitly allocate fd_sets. To avoid this, we wrap FD_SET in a
+ * function compiled without _FORTIFY_SOURCE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
+# include <features.h>
+# if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
+#  if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0)
+#   undef _FORTIFY_SOURCE
+#   undef __USE_FORTIFY_LEVEL
+#   include <sys/socket.h>
+void kludge_FD_SET(int n, fd_set *set) {
+	FD_SET(n, set);
+}
+int kludge_FD_ISSET(int n, fd_set *set) {
+	return FD_ISSET(n, set);
+}
+#  endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */
+# endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */
+#endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */
+
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c b/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..801a2e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/libressl-api-compat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,640 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: dsa_lib.c,v 1.29 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: rsa_lib.c,v 1.37 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: evp_lib.c,v 1.17 2018/09/12 06:35:38 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: dh_lib.c,v 1.32 2018/05/02 15:48:38 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: p_lib.c,v 1.24 2018/05/30 15:40:50 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: digest.c,v 1.30 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ * 
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ * 
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ * 
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from 
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * 
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: dsa_asn1.c,v 1.22 2018/06/14 17:03:19 jsing Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ecs_asn1.c,v 1.9 2018/03/17 15:24:44 tb Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: digest.c,v 1.30 2018/04/14 07:09:21 tb Exp $ */
+/* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL
+ * project 2000.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2005 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+/*	$OpenBSD: rsa_meth.c,v 1.2 2018/09/12 06:35:38 djm Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2018 Theo Buehler <tb@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG
+void
+DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g)
+{
+	if (p != NULL)
+		*p = d->p;
+	if (q != NULL)
+		*q = d->q;
+	if (g != NULL)
+		*g = d->g;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG
+int
+DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
+{
+	if ((d->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (d->q == NULL && q == NULL) ||
+	    (d->g == NULL && g == NULL))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (p != NULL) {
+		BN_free(d->p);
+		d->p = p;
+	}
+	if (q != NULL) {
+		BN_free(d->q);
+		d->q = q;
+	}
+	if (g != NULL) {
+		BN_free(d->g);
+		d->g = g;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY
+void
+DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key)
+{
+	if (pub_key != NULL)
+		*pub_key = d->pub_key;
+	if (priv_key != NULL)
+		*priv_key = d->priv_key;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY
+int
+DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key)
+{
+	if (d->pub_key == NULL && pub_key == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (pub_key != NULL) {
+		BN_free(d->pub_key);
+		d->pub_key = pub_key;
+	}
+	if (priv_key != NULL) {
+		BN_free(d->priv_key);
+		d->priv_key = priv_key;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY
+void
+RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
+{
+	if (n != NULL)
+		*n = r->n;
+	if (e != NULL)
+		*e = r->e;
+	if (d != NULL)
+		*d = r->d;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY
+int
+RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
+{
+	if ((r->n == NULL && n == NULL) || (r->e == NULL && e == NULL))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (n != NULL) {
+		BN_free(r->n);
+		r->n = n;
+	}
+	if (e != NULL) {
+		BN_free(r->e);
+		r->e = e;
+	}
+	if (d != NULL) {
+		BN_free(r->d);
+		r->d = d;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS
+void
+RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
+    const BIGNUM **iqmp)
+{
+	if (dmp1 != NULL)
+		*dmp1 = r->dmp1;
+	if (dmq1 != NULL)
+		*dmq1 = r->dmq1;
+	if (iqmp != NULL)
+		*iqmp = r->iqmp;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS
+int
+RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
+{
+	if ((r->dmp1 == NULL && dmp1 == NULL) ||
+	    (r->dmq1 == NULL && dmq1 == NULL) ||
+	    (r->iqmp == NULL && iqmp == NULL))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (dmp1 != NULL) {
+		BN_free(r->dmp1);
+		r->dmp1 = dmp1;
+	}
+	if (dmq1 != NULL) {
+		BN_free(r->dmq1);
+		r->dmq1 = dmq1;
+	}
+	if (iqmp != NULL) {
+		BN_free(r->iqmp);
+		r->iqmp = iqmp;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS
+void
+RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
+{
+	if (p != NULL)
+		*p = r->p;
+	if (q != NULL)
+		*q = r->q;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS
+int
+RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q)
+{
+	if ((r->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (r->q == NULL && q == NULL))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (p != NULL) {
+		BN_free(r->p);
+		r->p = p;
+	}
+	if (q != NULL) {
+		BN_free(r->q);
+		r->q = q;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV
+int
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *iv, size_t len)
+{
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) < 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (len != (size_t)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx))
+		return 0;
+	if (len > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH)
+		return 0; /* sanity check; shouldn't happen */
+	/*
+	 * Skip the memcpy entirely when the requested IV length is zero,
+	 * since the iv pointer may be NULL or invalid.
+	 */
+	if (len != 0) {
+		if (iv == NULL)
+			return 0;
+# ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV
+		memcpy(iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(ctx), len);
+# else
+		memcpy(iv, ctx->iv, len);
+# endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV */
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV
+int
+EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *iv, size_t len)
+{
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) < 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (len != (size_t)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx))
+		return 0;
+	if (len > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH)
+		return 0; /* sanity check; shouldn't happen */
+	/*
+	 * Skip the memcpy entirely when the requested IV length is zero,
+	 * since the iv pointer may be NULL or invalid.
+	 */
+	if (len != 0) {
+		if (iv == NULL)
+			return 0;
+# ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST
+		memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), iv, len);
+# else
+		memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, len);
+# endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST */
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0
+void
+DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
+{
+	if (pr != NULL)
+		*pr = sig->r;
+	if (ps != NULL)
+		*ps = sig->s;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0 */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0
+int
+DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
+{
+	if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	BN_clear_free(sig->r);
+	sig->r = r;
+	BN_clear_free(sig->s);
+	sig->s = s;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0 */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+#ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0
+void
+ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps)
+{
+	if (pr != NULL)
+		*pr = sig->r;
+	if (ps != NULL)
+		*ps = sig->s;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0
+int
+ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s)
+{
+	if (r == NULL || s == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	BN_clear_free(sig->r);
+	BN_clear_free(sig->s);
+	sig->r = r;
+	sig->s = s;
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG
+void
+DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q, const BIGNUM **g)
+{
+	if (p != NULL)
+		*p = dh->p;
+	if (q != NULL)
+		*q = dh->q;
+	if (g != NULL)
+		*g = dh->g;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG
+int
+DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g)
+{
+	if ((dh->p == NULL && p == NULL) || (dh->g == NULL && g == NULL))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (p != NULL) {
+		BN_free(dh->p);
+		dh->p = p;
+	}
+	if (q != NULL) {
+		BN_free(dh->q);
+		dh->q = q;
+	}
+	if (g != NULL) {
+		BN_free(dh->g);
+		dh->g = g;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY
+void
+DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key)
+{
+	if (pub_key != NULL)
+		*pub_key = dh->pub_key;
+	if (priv_key != NULL)
+		*priv_key = dh->priv_key;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY
+int
+DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key)
+{
+	if (pub_key != NULL) {
+		BN_free(dh->pub_key);
+		dh->pub_key = pub_key;
+	}
+	if (priv_key != NULL) {
+		BN_free(dh->priv_key);
+		dh->priv_key = priv_key;
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH
+int
+DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length)
+{
+	if (length < 0 || length > INT_MAX)
+		return 0;
+
+	dh->length = length;
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE
+void
+RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+	if (meth != NULL) {
+		free((char *)meth->name);
+		free(meth);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP
+RSA_METHOD *
+RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth)
+{
+	RSA_METHOD *copy;
+
+	if ((copy = calloc(1, sizeof(*copy))) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	memcpy(copy, meth, sizeof(*copy));
+	if ((copy->name = strdup(meth->name)) == NULL) {
+		free(copy);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return copy;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME
+int
+RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name)
+{
+	char *copy;
+
+	if ((copy = strdup(name)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	free((char *)meth->name);
+	meth->name = copy;
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH
+int
+(*RSA_meth_get_finish(const RSA_METHOD *meth))(RSA *rsa)
+{
+	return meth->finish;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC
+int
+RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_enc)(int flen,
+    const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding))
+{
+	meth->rsa_priv_enc = priv_enc;
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC
+int
+RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_dec)(int flen,
+    const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding))
+{
+	meth->rsa_priv_dec = priv_dec;
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH
+int
+RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish)(RSA *rsa))
+{
+	meth->finish = finish;
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA
+RSA *
+EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+	if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+		/* EVPerror(EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY); */
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return pkey->pkey.rsa;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW
+EVP_MD_CTX *
+EVP_MD_CTX_new(void)
+{
+	return calloc(1, sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX));
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE
+void
+EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+
+	free(ctx);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE */
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/md5.c b/openbsd-compat/md5.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..195ab51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/md5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: md5.c,v 1.9 2014/01/08 06:14:57 tedu Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * This code implements the MD5 message-digest algorithm.
+ * The algorithm is due to Ron Rivest.	This code was
+ * written by Colin Plumb in 1993, no copyright is claimed.
+ * This code is in the public domain; do with it what you wish.
+ *
+ * Equivalent code is available from RSA Data Security, Inc.
+ * This code has been tested against that, and is equivalent,
+ * except that you don't need to include two pages of legalese
+ * with every copy.
+ *
+ * To compute the message digest of a chunk of bytes, declare an
+ * MD5Context structure, pass it to MD5Init, call MD5Update as
+ * needed on buffers full of bytes, and then call MD5Final, which
+ * will fill a supplied 16-byte array with the digest.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "md5.h"
+
+#define PUT_64BIT_LE(cp, value) do {					\
+	(cp)[7] = (value) >> 56;					\
+	(cp)[6] = (value) >> 48;					\
+	(cp)[5] = (value) >> 40;					\
+	(cp)[4] = (value) >> 32;					\
+	(cp)[3] = (value) >> 24;					\
+	(cp)[2] = (value) >> 16;					\
+	(cp)[1] = (value) >> 8;						\
+	(cp)[0] = (value); } while (0)
+
+#define PUT_32BIT_LE(cp, value) do {					\
+	(cp)[3] = (value) >> 24;					\
+	(cp)[2] = (value) >> 16;					\
+	(cp)[1] = (value) >> 8;						\
+	(cp)[0] = (value); } while (0)
+
+static u_int8_t PADDING[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH] = {
+	0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+	0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+};
+
+/*
+ * Start MD5 accumulation.  Set bit count to 0 and buffer to mysterious
+ * initialization constants.
+ */
+void
+MD5Init(MD5_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	ctx->count = 0;
+	ctx->state[0] = 0x67452301;
+	ctx->state[1] = 0xefcdab89;
+	ctx->state[2] = 0x98badcfe;
+	ctx->state[3] = 0x10325476;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update context to reflect the concatenation of another buffer full
+ * of bytes.
+ */
+void
+MD5Update(MD5_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *input, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t have, need;
+
+	/* Check how many bytes we already have and how many more we need. */
+	have = (size_t)((ctx->count >> 3) & (MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH - 1));
+	need = MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH - have;
+
+	/* Update bitcount */
+	ctx->count += (u_int64_t)len << 3;
+
+	if (len >= need) {
+		if (have != 0) {
+			memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input, need);
+			MD5Transform(ctx->state, ctx->buffer);
+			input += need;
+			len -= need;
+			have = 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Process data in MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH-byte chunks. */
+		while (len >= MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+			MD5Transform(ctx->state, input);
+			input += MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+			len -= MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Handle any remaining bytes of data. */
+	if (len != 0)
+		memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pad pad to 64-byte boundary with the bit pattern
+ * 1 0* (64-bit count of bits processed, MSB-first)
+ */
+void
+MD5Pad(MD5_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	u_int8_t count[8];
+	size_t padlen;
+
+	/* Convert count to 8 bytes in little endian order. */
+	PUT_64BIT_LE(count, ctx->count);
+
+	/* Pad out to 56 mod 64. */
+	padlen = MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH -
+	    ((ctx->count >> 3) & (MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH - 1));
+	if (padlen < 1 + 8)
+		padlen += MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	MD5Update(ctx, PADDING, padlen - 8);		/* padlen - 8 <= 64 */
+	MD5Update(ctx, count, 8);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Final wrapup--call MD5Pad, fill in digest and zero out ctx.
+ */
+void
+MD5Final(unsigned char digest[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], MD5_CTX *ctx)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	MD5Pad(ctx);
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+		PUT_32BIT_LE(digest + i * 4, ctx->state[i]);
+	memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+
+/* The four core functions - F1 is optimized somewhat */
+
+/* #define F1(x, y, z) (x & y | ~x & z) */
+#define F1(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
+#define F2(x, y, z) F1(z, x, y)
+#define F3(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z)
+#define F4(x, y, z) (y ^ (x | ~z))
+
+/* This is the central step in the MD5 algorithm. */
+#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, data, s) \
+	( w += f(x, y, z) + data,  w = w<<s | w>>(32-s),  w += x )
+
+/*
+ * The core of the MD5 algorithm, this alters an existing MD5 hash to
+ * reflect the addition of 16 longwords of new data.  MD5Update blocks
+ * the data and converts bytes into longwords for this routine.
+ */
+void
+MD5Transform(u_int32_t state[4], const u_int8_t block[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int32_t a, b, c, d, in[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH / 4];
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+	memcpy(in, block, sizeof(in));
+#else
+	for (a = 0; a < MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH / 4; a++) {
+		in[a] = (u_int32_t)(
+		    (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 0]) |
+		    (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 1]) <<  8 |
+		    (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 2]) << 16 |
+		    (u_int32_t)(block[a * 4 + 3]) << 24);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+
+	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + 0xd76aa478,  7);
+	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 1] + 0xe8c7b756, 12);
+	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[ 2] + 0x242070db, 17);
+	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[ 3] + 0xc1bdceee, 22);
+	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 4] + 0xf57c0faf,  7);
+	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 5] + 0x4787c62a, 12);
+	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[ 6] + 0xa8304613, 17);
+	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[ 7] + 0xfd469501, 22);
+	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[ 8] + 0x698098d8,  7);
+	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[ 9] + 0x8b44f7af, 12);
+	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1, 17);
+	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7be, 22);
+	MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122,  7);
+	MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193, 12);
+	MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438e, 17);
+	MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821, 22);
+
+	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + 0xf61e2562,  5);
+	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[ 6] + 0xc040b340,  9);
+	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51, 14);
+	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 0] + 0xe9b6c7aa, 20);
+	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 5] + 0xd62f105d,  5);
+	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453,  9);
+	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681, 14);
+	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 4] + 0xe7d3fbc8, 20);
+	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + 0x21e1cde6,  5);
+	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6,  9);
+	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[ 3] + 0xf4d50d87, 14);
+	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[ 8] + 0x455a14ed, 20);
+	MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905,  5);
+	MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[ 2] + 0xfcefa3f8,  9);
+	MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[ 7] + 0x676f02d9, 14);
+	MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8a, 20);
+
+	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 5] + 0xfffa3942,  4);
+	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 8] + 0x8771f681, 11);
+	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122, 16);
+	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380c, 23);
+	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 1] + 0xa4beea44,  4);
+	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 4] + 0x4bdecfa9, 11);
+	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[ 7] + 0xf6bb4b60, 16);
+	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70, 23);
+	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6,  4);
+	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[ 0] + 0xeaa127fa, 11);
+	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[ 3] + 0xd4ef3085, 16);
+	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[ 6] + 0x04881d05, 23);
+	MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[ 9] + 0xd9d4d039,  4);
+	MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5, 11);
+	MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8, 16);
+	MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2 ] + 0xc4ac5665, 23);
+
+	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[ 0] + 0xf4292244,  6);
+	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7 ] + 0x432aff97, 10);
+	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7, 15);
+	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5 ] + 0xfc93a039, 21);
+	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3,  6);
+	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3 ] + 0x8f0ccc92, 10);
+	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47d, 15);
+	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1 ] + 0x85845dd1, 21);
+	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8 ] + 0x6fa87e4f,  6);
+	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0, 10);
+	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6 ] + 0xa3014314, 15);
+	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1, 21);
+	MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4 ] + 0xf7537e82,  6);
+	MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235, 10);
+	MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2 ] + 0x2ad7d2bb, 15);
+	MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9 ] + 0xeb86d391, 21);
+
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+}
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/md5.h b/openbsd-compat/md5.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c83c19d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/md5.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: md5.h,v 1.17 2012/12/05 23:19:57 deraadt Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * This code implements the MD5 message-digest algorithm.
+ * The algorithm is due to Ron Rivest.  This code was
+ * written by Colin Plumb in 1993, no copyright is claimed.
+ * This code is in the public domain; do with it what you wish.
+ *
+ * Equivalent code is available from RSA Data Security, Inc.
+ * This code has been tested against that, and is equivalent,
+ * except that you don't need to include two pages of legalese
+ * with every copy.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MD5_H_
+#define _MD5_H_
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#define	MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH		64
+#define	MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH		16
+#define	MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+
+typedef struct MD5Context {
+	u_int32_t state[4];			/* state */
+	u_int64_t count;			/* number of bits, mod 2^64 */
+	u_int8_t buffer[MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH];	/* input buffer */
+} MD5_CTX;
+
+void	 MD5Init(MD5_CTX *);
+void	 MD5Update(MD5_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void	 MD5Pad(MD5_CTX *);
+void	 MD5Final(u_int8_t [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH], MD5_CTX *)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+void	 MD5Transform(u_int32_t [4], const u_int8_t [MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,4)))
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH)));
+char	*MD5End(MD5_CTX *, char *)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char	*MD5File(const char *, char *)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char	*MD5FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char	*MD5Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+		__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,MD5_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#endif /* _MD5_H_ */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/memmem.c b/openbsd-compat/memmem.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2637401
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/memmem.c
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: memmem.c,v 1.5 2020/04/16 12:39:28 claudio Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005-2020 Rich Felker, et al.
+ *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining
+ * a copy of this software and associated documentation files (the
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,
+ * distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies of the Software, and to
+ * permit persons to whom the Software is furnished to do so, subject to
+ * the following conditions:
+ *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be
+ * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+ * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY
+ * CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT,
+ * TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE
+ * SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/memmem.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_MEMMEM
+
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+static char *
+twobyte_memmem(const unsigned char *h, size_t k, const unsigned char *n)
+{
+	uint16_t nw = n[0]<<8 | n[1], hw = h[0]<<8 | h[1];
+	for (h+=2, k-=2; k; k--, hw = hw<<8 | *h++)
+		if (hw == nw) return (char *)h-2;
+	return hw == nw ? (char *)h-2 : 0;
+}
+
+static char *
+threebyte_memmem(const unsigned char *h, size_t k, const unsigned char *n)
+{
+	uint32_t nw = n[0]<<24 | n[1]<<16 | n[2]<<8;
+	uint32_t hw = h[0]<<24 | h[1]<<16 | h[2]<<8;
+	for (h+=3, k-=3; k; k--, hw = (hw|*h++)<<8)
+		if (hw == nw) return (char *)h-3;
+	return hw == nw ? (char *)h-3 : 0;
+}
+
+static char *
+fourbyte_memmem(const unsigned char *h, size_t k, const unsigned char *n)
+{
+	uint32_t nw = n[0]<<24 | n[1]<<16 | n[2]<<8 | n[3];
+	uint32_t hw = h[0]<<24 | h[1]<<16 | h[2]<<8 | h[3];
+	for (h+=4, k-=4; k; k--, hw = hw<<8 | *h++)
+		if (hw == nw) return (char *)h-4;
+	return hw == nw ? (char *)h-4 : 0;
+}
+
+#if 0
+/* In -portable, defines.h ensures that these are already defined. */
+#define MAX(a,b) ((a)>(b)?(a):(b))
+#define MIN(a,b) ((a)<(b)?(a):(b))
+#endif
+
+#define BITOP(a,b,op) \
+ ((a)[(size_t)(b)/(8*sizeof *(a))] op (size_t)1<<((size_t)(b)%(8*sizeof *(a))))
+
+/*
+ * Maxime Crochemore and Dominique Perrin, Two-way string-matching,
+ * Journal of the ACM, 38(3):651-675, July 1991.
+ */
+static char *
+twoway_memmem(const unsigned char *h, const unsigned char *z,
+    const unsigned char *n, size_t l)
+{
+	size_t i, ip, jp, k, p, ms, p0, mem, mem0;
+	size_t byteset[32 / sizeof(size_t)] = { 0 };
+	size_t shift[256];
+
+	/* Computing length of needle and fill shift table */
+	for (i=0; i<l; i++)
+		BITOP(byteset, n[i], |=), shift[n[i]] = i+1;
+
+	/* Compute maximal suffix */
+	ip = -1; jp = 0; k = p = 1;
+	while (jp+k<l) {
+		if (n[ip+k] == n[jp+k]) {
+			if (k == p) {
+				jp += p;
+				k = 1;
+			} else k++;
+		} else if (n[ip+k] > n[jp+k]) {
+			jp += k;
+			k = 1;
+			p = jp - ip;
+		} else {
+			ip = jp++;
+			k = p = 1;
+		}
+	}
+	ms = ip;
+	p0 = p;
+
+	/* And with the opposite comparison */
+	ip = -1; jp = 0; k = p = 1;
+	while (jp+k<l) {
+		if (n[ip+k] == n[jp+k]) {
+			if (k == p) {
+				jp += p;
+				k = 1;
+			} else k++;
+		} else if (n[ip+k] < n[jp+k]) {
+			jp += k;
+			k = 1;
+			p = jp - ip;
+		} else {
+			ip = jp++;
+			k = p = 1;
+		}
+	}
+	if (ip+1 > ms+1) ms = ip;
+	else p = p0;
+
+	/* Periodic needle? */
+	if (memcmp(n, n+p, ms+1)) {
+		mem0 = 0;
+		p = MAX(ms, l-ms-1) + 1;
+	} else mem0 = l-p;
+	mem = 0;
+
+	/* Search loop */
+	for (;;) {
+		/* If remainder of haystack is shorter than needle, done */
+		if (z-h < l) return 0;
+
+		/* Check last byte first; advance by shift on mismatch */
+		if (BITOP(byteset, h[l-1], &)) {
+			k = l-shift[h[l-1]];
+			if (k) {
+				if (k < mem) k = mem;
+				h += k;
+				mem = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+		} else {
+			h += l;
+			mem = 0;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Compare right half */
+		for (k=MAX(ms+1,mem); k<l && n[k] == h[k]; k++);
+		if (k < l) {
+			h += k-ms;
+			mem = 0;
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Compare left half */
+		for (k=ms+1; k>mem && n[k-1] == h[k-1]; k--);
+		if (k <= mem) return (char *)h;
+		h += p;
+		mem = mem0;
+	}
+}
+
+void *
+memmem(const void *h0, size_t k, const void *n0, size_t l)
+{
+	const unsigned char *h = h0, *n = n0;
+
+	/* Return immediately on empty needle */
+	if (!l) return (void *)h;
+
+	/* Return immediately when needle is longer than haystack */
+	if (k<l) return 0;
+
+	/* Use faster algorithms for short needles */
+	h = memchr(h0, *n, k);
+	if (!h || l==1) return (void *)h;
+	k -= h - (const unsigned char *)h0;
+	if (k<l) return 0;
+	if (l==2) return twobyte_memmem(h, k, n);
+	if (l==3) return threebyte_memmem(h, k, n);
+	if (l==4) return fourbyte_memmem(h, k, n);
+
+	return twoway_memmem(h, h+k, n, l);
+}
+DEF_WEAK(memmem);
+#endif /* HAVE_MEMMEM */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c b/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac922c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/mktemp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/* THIS FILE HAS BEEN MODIFIED FROM THE ORIGINAL OPENBSD SOURCE */
+/* Changes: Removed mktemp */
+
+/*	$OpenBSD: mktemp.c,v 1.30 2010/03/21 23:09:30 schwarze Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996-1998, 2008 Theo de Raadt
+ * Copyright (c) 1997, 2008-2009 Todd C. Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdio/mktemp.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP)
+
+#define MKTEMP_NAME	0
+#define MKTEMP_FILE	1
+#define MKTEMP_DIR	2
+
+#define TEMPCHARS	"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"
+#define NUM_CHARS	(sizeof(TEMPCHARS) - 1)
+
+static int
+mktemp_internal(char *path, int slen, int mode)
+{
+	char *start, *cp, *ep;
+	const char *tempchars = TEMPCHARS;
+	unsigned int r, tries;
+	struct stat sb;
+	size_t len;
+	int fd;
+
+	len = strlen(path);
+	if (len == 0 || slen < 0 || (size_t)slen >= len) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return(-1);
+	}
+	ep = path + len - slen;
+
+	tries = 1;
+	for (start = ep; start > path && start[-1] == 'X'; start--) {
+		if (tries < INT_MAX / NUM_CHARS)
+			tries *= NUM_CHARS;
+	}
+	tries *= 2;
+
+	do {
+		for (cp = start; cp != ep; cp++) {
+			r = arc4random_uniform(NUM_CHARS);
+			*cp = tempchars[r];
+		}
+
+		switch (mode) {
+		case MKTEMP_NAME:
+			if (lstat(path, &sb) != 0)
+				return(errno == ENOENT ? 0 : -1);
+			break;
+		case MKTEMP_FILE:
+			fd = open(path, O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDWR, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
+			if (fd != -1 || errno != EEXIST)
+				return(fd);
+			break;
+		case MKTEMP_DIR:
+			if (mkdir(path, S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR) == 0)
+				return(0);
+			if (errno != EEXIST)
+				return(-1);
+			break;
+		}
+	} while (--tries);
+
+	errno = EEXIST;
+	return(-1);
+}
+
+#if 0
+char *_mktemp(char *);
+
+char *
+_mktemp(char *path)
+{
+	if (mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_NAME) == -1)
+		return(NULL);
+	return(path);
+}
+
+__warn_references(mktemp,
+    "warning: mktemp() possibly used unsafely; consider using mkstemp()");
+
+char *
+mktemp(char *path)
+{
+	return(_mktemp(path));
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+mkstemp(char *path)
+{
+	return(mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_FILE));
+}
+
+int
+mkstemps(char *path, int slen)
+{
+	return(mktemp_internal(path, slen, MKTEMP_FILE));
+}
+
+char *
+mkdtemp(char *path)
+{
+	int error;
+
+	error = mktemp_internal(path, 0, MKTEMP_DIR);
+	return(error ? NULL : path);
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..895ecf9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Tim Rice.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H
+#define _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <stddef.h>  /* for wchar_t */
+
+/* OpenBSD function replacements */
+#include "base64.h"
+#include "sigact.h"
+#include "readpassphrase.h"
+#include "vis.h"
+#include "getrrsetbyname.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "sha2.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "blf.h"
+#include "fnmatch.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETPWCLASS)
+# include <login_cap.h>
+# define login_getpwclass(pw) login_getclass(pw->pw_class)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BASENAME
+char *basename(const char *path);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
+int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
+void closefrom(int);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_FTRUNCATE) && HAVE_DECL_FTRUNCATE == 0
+int ftruncate(int filedes, off_t length);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETLINE
+#include <stdio.h>
+ssize_t getline(char **, size_t *, FILE *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE
+int getpagesize(void);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETCWD
+char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_KILLPG
+int killpg(pid_t, int);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM) && HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM == 0
+void *memmem(const void *, size_t, const void *, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY
+void *reallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY
+void *recallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
+int rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY
+size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT
+size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRCASESTR
+char *strcasestr(const char *, const char *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRNLEN
+size_t strnlen(const char *, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRNDUP
+char *strndup(const char *s, size_t n);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
+int setenv(register const char *name, register const char *value, int rewrite);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRMODE
+void strmode(int mode, char *p);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME
+#include  <time.h>
+char *strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP)
+int mkstemps(char *path, int slen);
+int mkstemp(char *path);
+char *mkdtemp(char *path);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON
+int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME
+char *dirname(const char *path);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED
+#define	FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE	7
+int	fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED
+int	scan_scaled(char *, long long *);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA)
+char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP
+const char *inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON
+int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRSEP
+char *strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...);
+void compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[]);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
+int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET)
+int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts);
+#include "openbsd-compat/getopt.h"
+#endif
+
+#if ((defined(HAVE_DECL_READV) && HAVE_DECL_READV == 0) || \
+    (defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0))
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/uio.h>
+
+# if defined(HAVE_DECL_READV) && HAVE_DECL_READV == 0
+int readv(int, struct iovec *, int);
+# endif
+
+# if defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0
+int writev(int, struct iovec *, int);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* Home grown routines */
+#include "bsd-signal.h"
+#include "bsd-misc.h"
+#include "bsd-setres_id.h"
+#include "bsd-statvfs.h"
+#include "bsd-waitpid.h"
+#include "bsd-poll.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_GETPEEREID) && HAVE_DECL_GETPEEREID == 0
+int getpeereid(int , uid_t *, gid_t *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
+uint32_t arc4random(void);
+#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
+void arc4random_buf(void *, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR
+# define arc4random_stir()
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
+uint32_t arc4random_uniform(uint32_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF
+int asprintf(char **, const char *, ...);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENPTY
+# include <sys/ioctl.h>	/* for struct winsize */
+int openpty(int *, int *, char *, struct termios *, struct winsize *);
+#endif /* HAVE_OPENPTY */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF
+int snprintf(char *, size_t, SNPRINTF_CONST char *, ...);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL
+long long strtoll(const char *, char **, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL
+unsigned long strtoul(const char *, char **, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL
+unsigned long long strtoull(const char *, char **, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM
+long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **);
+#endif
+
+/* multibyte character support */
+#ifndef HAVE_MBLEN
+# define mblen(x, y)	(1)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_WCWIDTH
+# define wcwidth(x)	(((x) >= 0x20 && (x) <= 0x7e) ? 1 : -1)
+/* force our no-op nl_langinfo and mbtowc */
+# undef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO
+# undef HAVE_MBTOWC
+# undef HAVE_LANGINFO_H
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO
+# define nl_langinfo(x)	""
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_MBTOWC
+int mbtowc(wchar_t *, const char*, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
+# include <stdarg.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Some platforms unconditionally undefine va_copy() so we define VA_COPY()
+ * instead.  This is known to be the case on at least some configurations of
+ * AIX with the xlc compiler.
+ */
+#ifndef VA_COPY
+# ifdef HAVE_VA_COPY
+#  define VA_COPY(dest, src) va_copy(dest, src)
+# else
+#  ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
+#   define VA_COPY(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
+#  else
+#   define VA_COPY(dest, src) (dest) = (src)
+#  endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF
+int vasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
+int vsnprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, va_list);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID
+char *user_from_uid(uid_t, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID
+char *group_from_gid(gid_t, int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP
+int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF
+int	bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *, size_t, const uint8_t *, size_t,
+    uint8_t *, size_t, unsigned int);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
+void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FREEZERO
+void freezero(void *, size_t);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R
+struct tm *localtime_r(const time_t *, struct tm *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_TIMEGM
+#include <time.h>
+time_t timegm(struct tm *);
+#endif
+
+char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt);
+char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw);
+
+/* rfc2553 socket API replacements */
+#include "fake-rfc2553.h"
+
+/* Routines for a single OS platform */
+#include "bsd-cygwin_util.h"
+
+#include "port-aix.h"
+#include "port-irix.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+#include "port-solaris.h"
+#include "port-net.h"
+#include "port-uw.h"
+
+/* _FORTIFY_SOURCE breaks FD_ISSET(n)/FD_SET(n) for n > FD_SETSIZE. Avoid. */
+#if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
+# include <features.h>
+# if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
+#  if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0)
+#   include <sys/socket.h>  /* Ensure include guard is defined */
+#   undef FD_SET
+#   undef FD_ISSET
+#   define FD_SET(n, set)	kludge_FD_SET(n, set)
+#   define FD_ISSET(n, set)	kludge_FD_ISSET(n, set)
+void kludge_FD_SET(int, fd_set *);
+int kludge_FD_ISSET(int, fd_set *);
+#  endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */
+# endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */
+#endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */
+
+#endif /* _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a37ca61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
+ * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
+# include <openssl/conf.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "openssl-compat.h"
+
+/*
+ * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
+ * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
+ * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
+ * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
+ * within a patch series.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver)
+{
+	long mask, hfix, lfix;
+
+	/* exact match is always OK */
+	if (headerver == libver)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */
+	if (headerver < 0x1000000f) {
+		mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */
+		return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
+	 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
+	 */
+	mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
+	hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+	lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+	if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix)
+		return 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_libcrypto_init(void)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO) && \
+      defined(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS) && \
+      defined(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS)
+	OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS |
+	    OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL);
+#elif defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS)
+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+#endif
+
+#ifdef	USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
+	/* Enable use of crypto hardware */
+	ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
+	ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+
+	/* Load the libcrypto config file to pick up engines defined there */
+# if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO) && defined(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG)
+	OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS |
+	    OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL);
+# else
+	OPENSSL_config(NULL);
+# endif
+#endif /* USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE */
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61a69dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
+ * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
+ * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
+#define _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#endif
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+
+int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long);
+void ssh_libcrypto_init(void);
+
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1000100fL)
+# error OpenSSL 1.0.1 or greater is required
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION
+# define OPENSSL_VERSION	SSLEAY_VERSION
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
+# define OpenSSL_version(x)	SSLeay_version(x)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
+# define OpenSSL_version_num	SSLeay
+#endif
+
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000001L
+# define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE unsigned int
+#else
+# define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE size_t
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS	16384
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
+# define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS	10000
+#endif
+
+#ifdef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
+# if LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x3010000fL
+#  define HAVE_BROKEN_CHACHA20
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/* LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API compat */
+#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG
+void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q,
+    const BIGNUM **g);
+#endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG
+int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY
+void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key,
+    const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+#endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY
+int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV
+# ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_UPDATED_IV
+#  define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_updated_iv
+# else /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_UPDATED_IV */
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+    unsigned char *iv, size_t len);
+# endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_UPDATED_IV */
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV
+int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
+    const unsigned char *iv, size_t len);
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY
+void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e,
+    const BIGNUM **d);
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY
+int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d);
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS
+void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
+    const BIGNUM **iqmp);
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS
+int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp);
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS
+void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q);
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS
+int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q);
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS */
+
+#ifndef DSA_SIG_GET0
+void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
+#endif /* DSA_SIG_GET0 */
+
+#ifndef DSA_SIG_SET0
+int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
+#endif /* DSA_SIG_SET0 */
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+#ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0
+void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
+#endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0
+int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
+#endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG
+void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q,
+    const BIGNUM **g);
+#endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG
+int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
+#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY
+void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
+#endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY
+int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
+#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH
+int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length);
+#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE
+void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth);
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP
+RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME
+int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name);
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH
+int (*RSA_meth_get_finish(const RSA_METHOD *meth))(RSA *rsa);
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_enc)(int flen,
+    const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding));
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC
+int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_dec)(int flen,
+    const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding));
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH
+int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish)(RSA *rsa));
+#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA
+RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_new
+EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void);
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_new */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_free
+void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
+#endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_free */
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+#endif /* _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ac9bad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
@@ -0,0 +1,483 @@
+/*
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2003,2004,2005,2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh_api.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
+# include <netdb.h>
+#endif
+#include <uinfo.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+# include <login.h>
+# include <userpw.h>
+# if defined(HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H) && defined(AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG)
+#  include <sys/audit.h>
+# endif
+# include <usersec.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "port-aix.h"
+
+static char *lastlogin_msg = NULL;
+
+# ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
+static char old_registry[REGISTRY_SIZE] = "";
+# endif
+
+/*
+ * AIX has a "usrinfo" area where logname and other stuff is stored -
+ * a few applications actually use this and die if it's not set
+ *
+ * NOTE: TTY= should be set, but since no one uses it and it's hard to
+ * acquire due to privsep code.  We will just drop support.
+ */
+void
+aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	size_t len;
+	char *cp;
+
+	len = sizeof("LOGNAME= NAME= ") + (2 * strlen(pw->pw_name));
+	cp = xmalloc(len);
+
+	i = snprintf(cp, len, "LOGNAME=%s%cNAME=%s%c", pw->pw_name, '\0',
+	    pw->pw_name, '\0');
+	if (usrinfo(SETUINFO, cp, i) == -1)
+		fatal("Couldn't set usrinfo: %s", strerror(errno));
+	debug3("AIX/UsrInfo: set len %d", i);
+
+	free(cp);
+}
+
+# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+/*
+ * Remove embedded newlines in string (if any).
+ * Used before logging messages returned by AIX authentication functions
+ * so the message is logged on one line.
+ */
+void
+aix_remove_embedded_newlines(char *p)
+{
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	for (; *p; p++) {
+		if (*p == '\n')
+			*p = ' ';
+	}
+	/* Remove trailing whitespace */
+	if (*--p == ' ')
+		*p = '\0';
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test specifically for the case where SYSTEM == NONE and AUTH1 contains
+ * anything other than NONE or SYSTEM, which indicates that the admin has
+ * configured the account for purely AUTH1-type authentication.
+ *
+ * Since authenticate() doesn't check AUTH1, and sshd can't sanely support
+ * AUTH1 itself, in such a case authenticate() will allow access without
+ * authentation, which is almost certainly not what the admin intends.
+ *
+ * (The native tools, eg login, will process the AUTH1 list in addition to
+ * the SYSTEM list by using ckuserID(), however ckuserID() and AUTH1 methods
+ * have been deprecated since AIX 4.2.x and would be very difficult for sshd
+ * to support.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if an unsupportable combination is found, 1 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+aix_valid_authentications(const char *user)
+{
+	char *auth1, *sys, *p;
+	int valid = 1;
+
+	if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_AUTHSYSTEM, &sys, SEC_CHAR) != 0) {
+		logit("Can't retrieve attribute SYSTEM for %s: %.100s",
+		    user, strerror(errno));
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	debug3("AIX SYSTEM attribute %s", sys);
+	if (strcmp(sys, "NONE") != 0)
+		return 1;	/* not "NONE", so is OK */
+
+	if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_AUTH1, &auth1, SEC_LIST) != 0) {
+		logit("Can't retrieve attribute auth1 for %s: %.100s",
+		    user, strerror(errno));
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	p = auth1;
+	/* A SEC_LIST is concatenated strings, ending with two NULs. */
+	while (p[0] != '\0' && p[1] != '\0') {
+		debug3("AIX auth1 attribute list member %s", p);
+		if (strcmp(p, "NONE") != 0 && strcmp(p, "SYSTEM")) {
+			logit("Account %s has unsupported auth1 value '%s'",
+			    user, p);
+			valid = 0;
+		}
+		p += strlen(p) + 1;
+	}
+
+	return (valid);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Do authentication via AIX's authenticate routine.  We loop until the
+ * reenter parameter is 0, but normally authenticate is called only once.
+ *
+ * Note: this function returns 1 on success, whereas AIX's authenticate()
+ * returns 0.
+ */
+int
+sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password)
+{
+	Authctxt *ctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	char *authmsg = NULL, *msg = NULL, *name = ctxt->pw->pw_name;
+	int r, authsuccess = 0, expired, reenter, result;
+
+	do {
+		result = authenticate((char *)name, (char *)password, &reenter,
+		    &authmsg);
+		aix_remove_embedded_newlines(authmsg);
+		debug3("AIX/authenticate result %d, authmsg %.100s", result,
+		    authmsg);
+	} while (reenter);
+
+	if (!aix_valid_authentications(name))
+		result = -1;
+
+	if (result == 0) {
+		authsuccess = 1;
+
+		/*
+		 * Record successful login.  We don't have a pty yet, so just
+		 * label the line as "ssh"
+		 */
+		aix_setauthdb(name);
+
+		/*
+		 * Check if the user's password is expired.
+		 */
+		expired = passwdexpired(name, &msg);
+		if (msg && *msg) {
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put(ctxt->loginmsg,
+			    msg, strlen(msg))) != 0)
+				fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
+				    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+			aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg);
+		}
+		debug3("AIX/passwdexpired returned %d msg %.100s", expired, msg);
+
+		switch (expired) {
+		case 0: /* password not expired */
+			break;
+		case 1: /* expired, password change required */
+			ctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
+			break;
+		default: /* user can't change(2) or other error (-1) */
+			logit("Password can't be changed for user %s: %.100s",
+			    name, msg);
+			free(msg);
+			authsuccess = 0;
+		}
+
+		aix_restoreauthdb();
+	}
+
+	free(authmsg);
+
+	return authsuccess;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check if specified account is permitted to log in.
+ * Returns 1 if login is allowed, 0 if not allowed.
+ */
+int
+sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *pw, struct sshbuf *loginmsg)
+{
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	int r, result, permitted = 0;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't perform checks for root account (PermitRootLogin controls
+	 * logins via ssh) or if running as non-root user (since
+	 * loginrestrictions will always fail due to insufficient privilege).
+	 */
+	if (pw->pw_uid == 0 || geteuid() != 0) {
+		debug3("%s: not checking", __func__);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	result = loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &msg);
+	if (result == 0)
+		permitted = 1;
+	/*
+	 * If restricted because /etc/nologin exists, the login will be denied
+	 * in session.c after the nologin message is sent, so allow for now
+	 * and do not append the returned message.
+	 */
+	if (result == -1 && errno == EPERM && stat(_PATH_NOLOGIN, &st) == 0)
+		permitted = 1;
+	else if (msg != NULL) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg))) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	}
+	if (msg == NULL)
+		msg = xstrdup("(none)");
+	aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg);
+	debug3("AIX/loginrestrictions returned %d msg %.100s", result, msg);
+
+	if (!permitted)
+		logit("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, msg);
+	free(msg);
+	return permitted;
+}
+
+int
+sys_auth_record_login(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ttynm,
+    struct sshbuf *loginmsg)
+{
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	int success = 0;
+
+	aix_setauthdb(user);
+	if (loginsuccess((char *)user, (char *)host, (char *)ttynm, &msg) == 0) {
+		success = 1;
+		if (msg != NULL) {
+			debug("AIX/loginsuccess: msg %s", msg);
+			if (lastlogin_msg == NULL)
+				lastlogin_msg = msg;
+		}
+	}
+	aix_restoreauthdb();
+	return (success);
+}
+
+char *
+sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(const char *user, uid_t uid)
+{
+	char *msg = lastlogin_msg;
+
+	lastlogin_msg = NULL;
+	return msg;
+}
+
+#  ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
+/*
+ * record_failed_login: generic "login failed" interface function
+ */
+void
+record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user, const char *hostname,
+    const char *ttyname)
+{
+	if (geteuid() != 0)
+		return;
+
+	aix_setauthdb(user);
+#   ifdef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG
+	loginfailed((char *)user, (char *)hostname, (char *)ttyname,
+	    AUDIT_FAIL_AUTH);
+#   else
+	loginfailed((char *)user, (char *)hostname, (char *)ttyname);
+#   endif
+	aix_restoreauthdb();
+}
+#  endif /* CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN */
+
+/*
+ * If we have setauthdb, retrieve the password registry for the user's
+ * account then feed it to setauthdb.  This will mean that subsequent AIX auth
+ * functions will only use the specified loadable module.  If we don't have
+ * setauthdb this is a no-op.
+ */
+void
+aix_setauthdb(const char *user)
+{
+#  ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
+	char *registry;
+
+	if (setuserdb(S_READ) == -1) {
+		debug3("%s: Could not open userdb to read", __func__);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_REGISTRY, &registry, SEC_CHAR) == 0) {
+		if (setauthdb(registry, old_registry) == 0)
+			debug3("AIX/setauthdb set registry '%s'", registry);
+		else
+			debug3("AIX/setauthdb set registry '%s' failed: %s",
+			    registry, strerror(errno));
+	} else
+		debug3("%s: Could not read S_REGISTRY for user: %s", __func__,
+		    strerror(errno));
+	enduserdb();
+#  endif /* HAVE_SETAUTHDB */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restore the user's registry settings from old_registry.
+ * Note that if the first aix_setauthdb fails, setauthdb("") is still safe
+ * (it restores the system default behaviour).  If we don't have setauthdb,
+ * this is a no-op.
+ */
+void
+aix_restoreauthdb(void)
+{
+#  ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
+	if (setauthdb(old_registry, NULL) == 0)
+		debug3("%s: restoring old registry '%s'", __func__,
+		    old_registry);
+	else
+		debug3("%s: failed to restore old registry %s", __func__,
+		    old_registry);
+#  endif /* HAVE_SETAUTHDB */
+}
+
+# endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
+
+# ifdef USE_AIX_KRB_NAME
+/*
+ * aix_krb5_get_principal_name: returns the user's kerberos client principal
+ * name if configured, otherwise NULL.  Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+char *
+aix_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *const_pw_name)
+{
+	char *pw_name = (char *)const_pw_name;
+	char *authname = NULL, *authdomain = NULL, *principal = NULL;
+
+	setuserdb(S_READ);
+	if (getuserattr(pw_name, S_AUTHDOMAIN, &authdomain, SEC_CHAR) != 0)
+		debug("AIX getuserattr S_AUTHDOMAIN: %s", strerror(errno));
+	if (getuserattr(pw_name, S_AUTHNAME, &authname, SEC_CHAR) != 0)
+		debug("AIX getuserattr S_AUTHNAME: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (authdomain != NULL)
+		xasprintf(&principal, "%s@%s", authname ? authname : pw_name,
+		    authdomain);
+	else if (authname != NULL)
+		principal = xstrdup(authname);
+	enduserdb();
+	return principal;
+}
+# endif /* USE_AIX_KRB_NAME */
+
+# if defined(AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK) && !defined(BROKEN_ADDRINFO)
+# undef getnameinfo
+/*
+ * For some reason, AIX's getnameinfo will refuse to resolve the all-zeros
+ * IPv6 address into its textual representation ("::"), so we wrap it
+ * with a function that will.
+ */
+int
+sshaix_getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host,
+    size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
+	u_int32_t *a6;
+
+	if (flags & (NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) &&
+	    sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
+		sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
+		a6 = sa6->sin6_addr.u6_addr.u6_addr32;
+
+		if (a6[0] == 0 && a6[1] == 0 && a6[2] == 0 && a6[3] == 0) {
+			strlcpy(host, "::", hostlen);
+			snprintf(serv, servlen, "%d", sa6->sin6_port);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	return getnameinfo(sa, salen, host, hostlen, serv, servlen, flags);
+}
+# endif /* AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK */
+
+# if defined(USE_GETGRSET)
+#  include <stdlib.h>
+int
+getgrouplist(const char *user, gid_t pgid, gid_t *groups, int *grpcnt)
+{
+	char *cp, *grplist, *grp;
+	gid_t gid;
+	int ret = 0, ngroups = 0, maxgroups;
+	long long ll;
+
+	maxgroups = *grpcnt;
+
+	if ((cp = grplist = getgrset(user)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* handle zero-length case */
+	if (maxgroups <= 0) {
+		*grpcnt = 0;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* copy primary group */
+	groups[ngroups++] = pgid;
+
+	/* copy each entry from getgrset into group list */
+	while ((grp = strsep(&grplist, ",")) != NULL) {
+		ll = strtoll(grp, NULL, 10);
+		if (ngroups >= maxgroups || ll < 0 || ll > UID_MAX) {
+			ret = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		gid = (gid_t)ll;
+		if (gid == pgid)
+			continue;	/* we have already added primary gid */
+		groups[ngroups++] = gid;
+	}
+out:
+	free(cp);
+	*grpcnt = ngroups;
+	return ret;
+}
+# endif	/* USE_GETGRSET */
+
+#endif /* _AIX */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ee3661
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.h
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+/*
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004,2005,2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H
+# include <sys/socket.h>
+#endif
+
+struct ssh;
+struct sshbuf;
+
+/* These should be in the system headers but are not. */
+int usrinfo(int, char *, int);
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB) && (HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB == 0)
+int setauthdb(const char *, char *);
+#endif
+/* these may or may not be in the headers depending on the version */
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE) && (HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE == 0)
+int authenticate(char *, char *, int *, char **);
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED == 0)
+int loginfailed(char *, char *, char *);
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS == 0)
+int loginrestrictions(char *, int, char *, char **);
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS) && (HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS == 0)
+int loginsuccess(char *, char *, char *, char **);
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED) && (HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED == 0)
+int passwdexpired(char *, char **);
+#endif
+
+/* Some versions define r_type in the above headers, which causes a conflict */
+#ifdef r_type
+# undef r_type
+#endif
+
+/* AIX 4.2.x doesn't have nanosleep but does have nsleep which is equivalent */
+#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
+# define nanosleep(a,b) nsleep(a,b)
+#endif
+
+/* For struct timespec on AIX 4.2.x */
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H
+# include <sys/timers.h>
+#endif
+
+/* for setpcred and friends */
+#ifdef HAVE_USERSEC_H
+# include <usersec.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * According to the setauthdb man page, AIX password registries must be 15
+ * chars or less plus terminating NUL.
+ */
+#ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
+# define REGISTRY_SIZE	16
+#endif
+
+void aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *);
+
+#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER 1
+int sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *, struct sshbuf *);
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_RECORD_LOGIN 1
+int sys_auth_record_login(const char *, const char *, const char *,
+    struct sshbuf *);
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG
+char *sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(const char *, uid_t);
+# define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN 1
+# if defined(S_AUTHDOMAIN)  && defined (S_AUTHNAME)
+# define USE_AIX_KRB_NAME
+char *aix_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *);
+# endif
+#endif
+
+void aix_setauthdb(const char *);
+void aix_restoreauthdb(void);
+void aix_remove_embedded_newlines(char *);
+
+#if defined(AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK) && !defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO)
+# ifdef getnameinfo
+#  undef getnameinfo
+# endif
+int sshaix_getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *, size_t, char *, size_t,
+    char *, size_t, int);
+# define getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g) (sshaix_getnameinfo(a,b,c,d,e,f,g))
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * We use getgrset in preference to multiple getgrent calls for efficiency
+ * plus it supports NIS and LDAP groups.
+ */
+#if !defined(HAVE_GETGROUPLIST) && defined(HAVE_GETGRSET)
+# define HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
+# define USE_GETGRSET
+int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _AIX */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c b/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aebffb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-irix.c
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Denis Parker.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Michael Stone.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \
+    defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || \
+    defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
+# include <proj.h>
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
+# include <sys/resource.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT
+# include <sat.h>
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+void
+irix_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
+	prid_t projid;
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
+	jid_t jid = 0;
+#elif defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
+	int jid = 0;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
+	jid = jlimit_startjob(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, "interactive");
+	if (jid == -1)
+		fatal("Failed to create job container: %.100s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_JOBS */
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY
+	/* initialize array session */
+	if (jid == 0  && newarraysess() != 0)
+		fatal("Failed to set up new array session: %.100s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_ARRAY */
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
+	/* initialize irix project info */
+	if ((projid = getdfltprojuser(pw->pw_name)) == -1) {
+		debug("Failed to get project id, using projid 0");
+		projid = 0;
+	}
+	if (setprid(projid))
+		fatal("Failed to initialize project %d for %s: %.100s",
+		    (int)projid, pw->pw_name, strerror(errno));
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_PROJECT */
+#ifdef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT
+	if (sysconf(_SC_AUDIT)) {
+		debug("Setting sat id to %d", (int) pw->pw_uid);
+		if (satsetid(pw->pw_uid))
+			debug("error setting satid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+#endif /* WITH_IRIX_AUDIT */
+}
+
+
+#endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-irix.h b/openbsd-compat/port-irix.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc8cc44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-irix.h
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Denis Parker.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Michael Stone.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PORT_IRIX_H
+#define _PORT_IRIX_H
+
+#if defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \
+    defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || \
+    defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)
+
+void irix_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw);
+
+#endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */
+
+#endif /* ! _PORT_IRIX_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77cb821
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
@@ -0,0 +1,310 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Linux-specific portability code - just SELinux support at present
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_SELINUX) || defined(LINUX_OOM_ADJUST)
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "port-linux.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
+
+#ifndef SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE
+# define SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE ":unconfined_t:"
+#endif
+
+/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+int
+ssh_selinux_enabled(void)
+{
+	static int enabled = -1;
+
+	if (enabled == -1) {
+		enabled = (is_selinux_enabled() == 1);
+		debug("SELinux support %s", enabled ? "enabled" : "disabled");
+	}
+
+	return (enabled);
+}
+
+/* Return the default security context for the given username */
+static char *
+ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(char *pwname)
+{
+	char *sc = NULL, *sename = NULL, *lvl = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+	if (getseuserbyname(pwname, &sename, &lvl) != 0)
+		return NULL;
+#else
+	sename = pwname;
+	lvl = NULL;
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
+	r = get_default_context_with_level(sename, lvl, NULL, &sc);
+#else
+	r = get_default_context(sename, NULL, &sc);
+#endif
+
+	if (r != 0) {
+		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+		case -1:
+			fatal("%s: ssh_selinux_getctxbyname: "
+			    "security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+		case 0:
+			error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+			sc = NULL;
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+			    "context for %s (in enforcing mode)",
+			    __func__, pwname);
+		}
+	}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
+	free(sename);
+	free(lvl);
+#endif
+
+	return sc;
+}
+
+/* Set the execution context to the default for the specified user */
+void
+ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
+{
+	char *user_ctx = NULL;
+
+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+
+	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+	if (setexeccon(user_ctx) != 0) {
+		switch (security_getenforce()) {
+		case -1:
+			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+		case 0:
+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution "
+			    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context "
+			    "for %s (in enforcing mode)", __func__, pwname);
+		}
+	}
+	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(user_ctx);
+
+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+
+/* Set the TTY context for the specified user */
+void
+ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *pwname, const char *tty)
+{
+	char *new_tty_ctx = NULL, *user_ctx = NULL, *old_tty_ctx = NULL;
+	security_class_t chrclass;
+
+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	debug3("%s: setting TTY context on %s", __func__, tty);
+
+	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
+
+	/* XXX: should these calls fatal() upon failure in enforcing mode? */
+
+	if (getfilecon(tty, &old_tty_ctx) == -1) {
+		error("%s: getfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((chrclass = string_to_security_class("chr_file")) == 0) {
+		error("%s: couldn't get security class for chr_file", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (security_compute_relabel(user_ctx, old_tty_ctx,
+	    chrclass, &new_tty_ctx) != 0) {
+		error("%s: security_compute_relabel: %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (setfilecon(tty, new_tty_ctx) != 0)
+		error("%s: setfilecon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ out:
+	if (new_tty_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(new_tty_ctx);
+	if (old_tty_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(old_tty_ctx);
+	if (user_ctx != NULL)
+		freecon(user_ctx);
+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
+{
+	int len, newlen;
+	char *oldctx, *newctx, *cx;
+	LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+
+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+		return;
+
+	if (getcon(&oldctx) < 0) {
+		logit("%s: getcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+	if ((cx = index(oldctx, ':')) == NULL || (cx = index(cx + 1, ':')) ==
+	    NULL) {
+		logit("%s: unparsable context %s", __func__, oldctx);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check whether we are attempting to switch away from an unconfined
+	 * security context.
+	 */
+	if (strncmp(cx, SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE,
+	    sizeof(SSH_SELINUX_UNCONFINED_TYPE) - 1) == 0)
+		log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3;
+
+	newlen = strlen(oldctx) + strlen(newname) + 1;
+	newctx = xmalloc(newlen);
+	len = cx - oldctx + 1;
+	memcpy(newctx, oldctx, len);
+	strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
+	if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
+		strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
+	debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
+	    oldctx, newctx);
+	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
+		do_log2(log_level, "%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
+		    __func__, newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
+	free(oldctx);
+	free(newctx);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *path)
+{
+	char *context;
+
+	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
+		return;
+	if (path == NULL) {
+		setfscreatecon(NULL);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (matchpathcon(path, 0700, &context) == 0)
+		setfscreatecon(context);
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
+
+#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+/*
+ * The magic "don't kill me" values, old and new, as documented in eg:
+ * http://lxr.linux.no/#linux+v2.6.32/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
+ * http://lxr.linux.no/#linux+v2.6.36/Documentation/filesystems/proc.txt
+ */
+
+static int oom_adj_save = INT_MIN;
+static char *oom_adj_path = NULL;
+struct {
+	char *path;
+	int value;
+} oom_adjust[] = {
+	{"/proc/self/oom_score_adj", -1000},	/* kernels >= 2.6.36 */
+	{"/proc/self/oom_adj", -17},		/* kernels <= 2.6.35 */
+	{NULL, 0},
+};
+
+/*
+ * Tell the kernel's out-of-memory killer to avoid sshd.
+ * Returns the previous oom_adj value or zero.
+ */
+void
+oom_adjust_setup(void)
+{
+	int i, value;
+	FILE *fp;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	 for (i = 0; oom_adjust[i].path != NULL; i++) {
+		oom_adj_path = oom_adjust[i].path;
+		value = oom_adjust[i].value;
+		if ((fp = fopen(oom_adj_path, "r+")) != NULL) {
+			if (fscanf(fp, "%d", &oom_adj_save) != 1)
+				verbose("error reading %s: %s", oom_adj_path,
+				    strerror(errno));
+			else {
+				rewind(fp);
+				if (fprintf(fp, "%d\n", value) <= 0)
+					verbose("error writing %s: %s",
+					   oom_adj_path, strerror(errno));
+				else
+					debug("Set %s from %d to %d",
+					   oom_adj_path, oom_adj_save, value);
+			}
+			fclose(fp);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+	oom_adj_path = NULL;
+}
+
+/* Restore the saved OOM adjustment */
+void
+oom_adjust_restore(void)
+{
+	FILE *fp;
+
+	debug3("%s", __func__);
+	if (oom_adj_save == INT_MIN || oom_adj_path == NULL ||
+	    (fp = fopen(oom_adj_path, "w")) == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (fprintf(fp, "%d\n", oom_adj_save) <= 0)
+		verbose("error writing %s: %s", oom_adj_path, strerror(errno));
+	else
+		debug("Set %s to %d", oom_adj_path, oom_adj_save);
+
+	fclose(fp);
+	return;
+}
+#endif /* LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX || LINUX_OOM_ADJUST */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c22a85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PORT_LINUX_H
+#define _PORT_LINUX_H
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+int ssh_selinux_enabled(void);
+void ssh_selinux_setup_pty(char *, const char *);
+void ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *);
+void ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *);
+void ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(const char *);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+void oom_adjust_restore(void);
+void oom_adjust_setup(void);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ! _PORT_LINUX_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-net.c b/openbsd-compat/port-net.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..198e73f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-net.c
@@ -0,0 +1,378 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Reyk Floeter <reyk@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+/*
+ * This file contains various portability code for network support,
+ * including tun/tap forwarding and routing domains.
+ */
+
+#if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX) || defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX)
+#include <linux/if.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX)
+char *
+sys_get_rdomain(int fd)
+{
+	char dev[IFNAMSIZ + 1];
+	socklen_t len = sizeof(dev) - 1;
+
+	if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE, dev, &len) == -1) {
+		error("%s: cannot determine VRF for fd=%d : %s",
+		    __func__, fd, strerror(errno));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	dev[len] = '\0';
+	return strdup(dev);
+}
+
+int
+sys_set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name)
+{
+	if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE,
+	    name, strlen(name)) == -1) {
+		error("%s: setsockopt(%d, SO_BINDTODEVICE, %s): %s",
+		    __func__, fd, name, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sys_valid_rdomain(const char *name)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	/*
+	 * This is a pretty crappy way to test. It would be better to
+	 * check whether "name" represents a VRF device, but apparently
+	 * that requires an rtnetlink transaction.
+	 */
+	if ((fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
+		return 0;
+	if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE,
+	    name, strlen(name)) == -1) {
+		close(fd);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	close(fd);
+	return 1;
+}
+#elif defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_XXX)
+/* XXX examples */
+char *
+sys_get_rdomain(int fd)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+int
+sys_set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name)
+{
+	return -1;
+}
+
+int
+valid_rdomain(const char *name)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+sys_set_process_rdomain(const char *name)
+{
+	fatal("%s: not supported", __func__);
+}
+#endif /* defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_XXX) */
+
+/*
+ * This is the portable version of the SSH tunnel forwarding, it
+ * uses some preprocessor definitions for various platform-specific
+ * settings.
+ *
+ * SSH_TUN_LINUX	Use the (newer) Linux tun/tap device
+ * SSH_TUN_FREEBSD	Use the FreeBSD tun/tap device
+ * SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF	Translate the OpenBSD address family
+ * SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF	Prepend/remove the address family
+ */
+
+/*
+ * System-specific tunnel open function
+ */
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX)
+#include <linux/if_tun.h>
+#define TUN_CTRL_DEV "/dev/net/tun"
+
+int
+sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname)
+{
+	struct ifreq ifr;
+	int fd = -1;
+	const char *name = NULL;
+
+	if (ifname != NULL)
+		*ifname = NULL;
+	if ((fd = open(TUN_CTRL_DEV, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+		debug("%s: failed to open tunnel control device \"%s\": %s",
+		    __func__, TUN_CTRL_DEV, strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	bzero(&ifr, sizeof(ifr));
+
+	if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) {
+		ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TAP;
+		name = "tap%d";
+	} else {
+		ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TUN;
+		name = "tun%d";
+	}
+	ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_NO_PI;
+
+	if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
+		if (tun > SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
+			debug("%s: invalid tunnel id %x: %s", __func__,
+			    tun, strerror(errno));
+			goto failed;
+		}
+		snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), name, tun);
+	}
+
+	if (ioctl(fd, TUNSETIFF, &ifr) == -1) {
+		debug("%s: failed to configure tunnel (mode %d): %s", __func__,
+		    mode, strerror(errno));
+		goto failed;
+	}
+
+	if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
+		debug("%s: tunnel mode %d fd %d", __func__, mode, fd);
+	else
+		debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, ifr.ifr_name, mode, fd);
+
+	if (ifname != NULL && (*ifname = strdup(ifr.ifr_name)) == NULL)
+		goto failed;
+
+	return (fd);
+
+ failed:
+	close(fd);
+	return (-1);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_TUN_LINUX */
+
+#ifdef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <net/if.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H
+#include <net/if_tun.h>
+#endif
+
+int
+sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname)
+{
+	struct ifreq ifr;
+	char name[100];
+	int fd = -1, sock;
+	const char *tunbase = "tun";
+#if defined(TUNSIFHEAD) && !defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+	int flag;
+#endif
+
+	if (ifname != NULL)
+		*ifname = NULL;
+
+	if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) {
+#ifdef SSH_TUN_NO_L2
+		debug("%s: no layer 2 tunnelling support", __func__);
+		return (-1);
+#else
+		tunbase = "tap";
+#endif
+	}
+
+	/* Open the tunnel device */
+	if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
+		snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun);
+		fd = open(name, O_RDWR);
+	} else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
+		for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) {
+			snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d",
+			    tunbase, tun);
+			if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0)
+				break;
+		}
+	} else {
+		debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u\n", __func__, tun);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	if (fd < 0) {
+		debug("%s: %s open failed: %s", __func__, name,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	/* Turn on tunnel headers */
+#if defined(TUNSIFHEAD) && !defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+	flag = 1;
+	if (mode != SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET &&
+	    ioctl(fd, TUNSIFHEAD, &flag) == -1) {
+		debug("%s: ioctl(%d, TUNSIFHEAD, 1): %s", __func__, fd,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		close(fd);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd);
+
+	/* Set the tunnel device operation mode */
+	snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun);
+	if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
+		goto failed;
+
+	if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
+		goto failed;
+	if ((ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP) == 0) {
+		ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
+		if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
+			goto failed;
+	}
+
+	if (ifname != NULL && (*ifname = strdup(ifr.ifr_name)) == NULL)
+		goto failed;
+
+	close(sock);
+	return (fd);
+
+ failed:
+	if (fd >= 0)
+		close(fd);
+	if (sock >= 0)
+		close(sock);
+	debug("%s: failed to set %s mode %d: %s", __func__, name,
+	    mode, strerror(errno));
+	return (-1);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_TUN_FREEBSD */
+
+/*
+ * System-specific channel filters
+ */
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
+/*
+ * The tunnel forwarding protocol prepends the address family of forwarded
+ * IP packets using OpenBSD's numbers.
+ */
+#define OPENBSD_AF_INET		2
+#define OPENBSD_AF_INET6	24
+
+int
+sys_tun_infilter(struct ssh *ssh, struct Channel *c, char *buf, int _len)
+{
+	int r;
+	size_t len;
+	char *ptr = buf;
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+	char rbuf[CHAN_RBUF];
+	struct ip iph;
+#endif
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) || defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
+	u_int32_t af;
+#endif
+
+	/* XXX update channel input filter API to use unsigned length */
+	if (_len < 0)
+		return -1;
+	len = _len;
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+	if (len <= sizeof(iph) || len > sizeof(rbuf) - 4)
+		return -1;
+	/* Determine address family from packet IP header. */
+	memcpy(&iph, buf, sizeof(iph));
+	af = iph.ip_v == 6 ? OPENBSD_AF_INET6 : OPENBSD_AF_INET;
+	/* Prepend address family to packet using OpenBSD constants */
+	memcpy(rbuf + 4, buf, len);
+	len += 4;
+	POKE_U32(rbuf, af);
+	ptr = rbuf;
+#elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
+	/* Convert existing address family header to OpenBSD value */
+	if (len <= 4)
+		return -1;
+	af = PEEK_U32(buf);
+	/* Put it back */
+	POKE_U32(buf, af == AF_INET6 ? OPENBSD_AF_INET6 : OPENBSD_AF_INET);
+#endif
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->input, ptr, len)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	return (0);
+}
+
+u_char *
+sys_tun_outfilter(struct ssh *ssh, struct Channel *c,
+    u_char **data, size_t *dlen)
+{
+	u_char *buf;
+	u_int32_t af;
+	int r;
+
+	/* XXX new API is incompatible with this signature. */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(c->output, data, dlen)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	if (*dlen < sizeof(af))
+		return (NULL);
+	buf = *data;
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+	/* skip address family */
+	*dlen -= sizeof(af);
+	buf = *data + sizeof(af);
+#elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
+	/* translate address family */
+	af = (PEEK_U32(buf) == OPENBSD_AF_INET6) ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET;
+	POKE_U32(buf, af);
+#endif
+	return (buf);
+}
+#endif /* SSH_TUN_FILTER */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-net.h b/openbsd-compat/port-net.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a0d110
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-net.h
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Reyk Floeter <reyk@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PORT_TUN_H
+#define _PORT_TUN_H
+
+struct Channel;
+struct ssh;
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX) || defined(SSH_TUN_FREEBSD)
+# define CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN
+int	  sys_tun_open(int, int, char **);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF) || defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
+# define SSH_TUN_FILTER
+int	 sys_tun_infilter(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, char *, int);
+u_char	*sys_tun_outfilter(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, u_char **, size_t *);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX)
+# define HAVE_SYS_GET_RDOMAIN
+# define HAVE_SYS_SET_RDOMAIN
+# define HAVE_SYS_VALID_RDOMAIN
+char *sys_get_rdomain(int fd);
+int sys_set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name);
+int sys_valid_rdomain(const char *name);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_XXX)
+# define HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN
+void sys_set_process_rdomain(const char *name);
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-prngd.c b/openbsd-compat/port-prngd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6afa8f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-prngd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+# include <sys/un.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stddef.h> /* for offsetof */
+
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#if defined(PRNGD_PORT) || defined(PRNGD_SOCKET)
+/*
+ * EGD/PRNGD interface.
+ *
+ * Collect 'len' bytes of entropy into 'buf' from PRNGD/EGD daemon
+ * listening either on 'tcp_port', or via Unix domain socket at *
+ * 'socket_path'.
+ * Either a non-zero tcp_port or a non-null socket_path must be
+ * supplied.
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on error
+ */
+static int
+get_random_bytes_prngd(unsigned char *buf, int len,
+    unsigned short tcp_port, char *socket_path)
+{
+	int fd, addr_len, rval, errors;
+	u_char msg[2];
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+	struct sockaddr_in *addr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr;
+	struct sockaddr_un *addr_un = (struct sockaddr_un *)&addr;
+	sshsig_t old_sigpipe;
+
+	/* Sanity checks */
+	if (socket_path == NULL && tcp_port == 0)
+		fatal("You must specify a port or a socket");
+	if (socket_path != NULL &&
+	    strlen(socket_path) >= sizeof(addr_un->sun_path))
+		fatal("Random pool path is too long");
+	if (len <= 0 || len > 255)
+		fatal("Too many bytes (%d) to read from PRNGD", len);
+
+	memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
+
+	if (tcp_port != 0) {
+		addr_in->sin_family = AF_INET;
+		addr_in->sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
+		addr_in->sin_port = htons(tcp_port);
+		addr_len = sizeof(*addr_in);
+	} else {
+		addr_un->sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+		strlcpy(addr_un->sun_path, socket_path,
+		    sizeof(addr_un->sun_path));
+		addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
+		    strlen(socket_path) + 1;
+	}
+
+	old_sigpipe = ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+	errors = 0;
+	rval = -1;
+reopen:
+	fd = socket(addr.ss_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		error("Couldn't create socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
+		if (tcp_port != 0) {
+			error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD port %d: %s",
+			    tcp_port, strerror(errno));
+		} else {
+			error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD socket \"%s\": %s",
+			    addr_un->sun_path, strerror(errno));
+		}
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* Send blocking read request to PRNGD */
+	msg[0] = 0x02;
+	msg[1] = len;
+
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, msg, sizeof(msg)) != sizeof(msg)) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
+			close(fd);
+			errors++;
+			goto reopen;
+		}
+		error("Couldn't write to PRNGD socket: %s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, len) != (size_t)len) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
+			close(fd);
+			errors++;
+			goto reopen;
+		}
+		error("Couldn't read from PRNGD socket: %s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	rval = 0;
+done:
+	ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, old_sigpipe);
+	if (fd != -1)
+		close(fd);
+	return rval;
+}
+#endif /* PRNGD_PORT || PRNGD_SOCKET */
+
+int
+seed_from_prngd(unsigned char *buf, size_t bytes)
+{
+#ifdef PRNGD_PORT
+	debug("trying egd/prngd port %d", PRNGD_PORT);
+	if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, PRNGD_PORT, NULL) == 0)
+		return 0;
+#endif
+#ifdef PRNGD_SOCKET
+	debug("trying egd/prngd socket %s", PRNGD_SOCKET);
+	if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, 0, PRNGD_SOCKET) == 0)
+		return 0;
+#endif
+	return -1;
+}
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c b/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..10c2d6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c
@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
+# include <fcntl.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+
+#include <libcontract.h>
+#include <sys/contract/process.h>
+#include <sys/ctfs.h>
+
+#define CT_TEMPLATE	CTFS_ROOT "/process/template"
+#define CT_LATEST	CTFS_ROOT "/process/latest"
+
+static int tmpl_fd = -1;
+
+/* Lookup the latest process contract */
+static ctid_t
+get_active_process_contract_id(void)
+{
+	int stat_fd;
+	ctid_t ctid = -1;
+	ct_stathdl_t stathdl;
+
+	if ((stat_fd = open64(CT_LATEST, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
+		error("%s: Error opening 'latest' process "
+		    "contract: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (ct_status_read(stat_fd, CTD_COMMON, &stathdl) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error reading process contract "
+		    "status: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ctid = ct_status_get_id(stathdl)) < 0) {
+		error("%s: Error getting process contract id: %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ct_status_free(stathdl);
+ out:
+	close(stat_fd);
+	return ctid;
+}
+
+void
+solaris_contract_pre_fork(void)
+{
+	if ((tmpl_fd = open64(CT_TEMPLATE, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+		error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__,
+		    CT_TEMPLATE, strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	debug2("%s: setting up process contract template on fd %d",
+	    __func__, tmpl_fd);
+
+	/* First we set the template parameters and event sets. */
+	if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_param(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_PGRPONLY) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error setting process contract parameter set "
+		    "(pgrponly): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (ct_pr_tmpl_set_fatal(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
+		    "fatal events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (ct_tmpl_set_critical(tmpl_fd, 0) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
+		    "critical events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (ct_tmpl_set_informative(tmpl_fd, CT_PR_EV_HWERR) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error setting process contract template "
+		    "informative events: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	/* Now make this the active template for this process. */
+	if (ct_tmpl_activate(tmpl_fd) != 0) {
+		error("%s: Error activating process contract "
+		    "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	return;
+
+ fail:
+	if (tmpl_fd != -1) {
+		close(tmpl_fd);
+		tmpl_fd = -1;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+solaris_contract_post_fork_child()
+{
+	debug2("%s: clearing process contract template on fd %d",
+	    __func__, tmpl_fd);
+
+	/* Clear the active template. */
+	if (ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd) != 0)
+		error("%s: Error clearing active process contract "
+		    "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+	close(tmpl_fd);
+	tmpl_fd = -1;
+}
+
+void
+solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid)
+{
+	ctid_t ctid;
+	char ctl_path[256];
+	int r, ctl_fd = -1, stat_fd = -1;
+
+	debug2("%s: clearing template (fd %d)", __func__, tmpl_fd);
+
+	if (tmpl_fd == -1)
+		return;
+
+	/* First clear the active template. */
+	if ((r = ct_tmpl_clear(tmpl_fd)) != 0)
+		error("%s: Error clearing active process contract "
+		    "template: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+
+	close(tmpl_fd);
+	tmpl_fd = -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * If either the fork didn't succeed (pid < 0), or clearing
+	 * th active contract failed (r != 0), then we have nothing
+	 * more do.
+	 */
+	if (r != 0 || pid <= 0)
+		return;
+
+	/* Now lookup and abandon the contract we've created. */
+	ctid = get_active_process_contract_id();
+
+	debug2("%s: abandoning contract id %ld", __func__, ctid);
+
+	snprintf(ctl_path, sizeof(ctl_path),
+	    CTFS_ROOT "/process/%ld/ctl", ctid);
+	if ((ctl_fd = open64(ctl_path, O_WRONLY)) < 0) {
+		error("%s: Error opening process contract "
+		    "ctl file: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (ct_ctl_abandon(ctl_fd) < 0) {
+		error("%s: Error abandoning process contract: %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	close(ctl_fd);
+	return;
+
+ fail:
+	if (tmpl_fd != -1) {
+		close(tmpl_fd);
+		tmpl_fd = -1;
+	}
+	if (stat_fd != -1)
+		close(stat_fd);
+	if (ctl_fd != -1)
+		close(ctl_fd);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
+#include <sys/task.h>
+#include <project.h>
+
+/*
+ * Get/set solaris default project.
+ * If we fail, just run along gracefully.
+ */
+void
+solaris_set_default_project(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	struct project  *defaultproject;
+	struct project   tempproject;
+	char buf[1024];
+
+	/* get default project, if we fail just return gracefully  */
+	if ((defaultproject = getdefaultproj(pw->pw_name, &tempproject, &buf,
+	    sizeof(buf))) != NULL) {
+		/* set default project */
+		if (setproject(defaultproject->pj_name, pw->pw_name,
+		    TASK_NORMAL) != 0)
+			debug("setproject(%s): %s", defaultproject->pj_name,
+			    strerror(errno));
+	} else {
+		/* debug on getdefaultproj() error */
+		debug("getdefaultproj(%s): %s", pw->pw_name, strerror(errno));
+	}
+}
+#endif /* USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS */
+
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
+# ifdef HAVE_PRIV_H
+#  include <priv.h>
+# endif
+
+priv_set_t *
+solaris_basic_privset(void)
+{
+	priv_set_t *pset;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET
+	if ((pset = priv_allocset()) == NULL) {
+		error("priv_allocset: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	priv_basicset(pset);
+#else
+	if ((pset = priv_str_to_set("basic", ",", NULL)) == NULL) {
+		error("priv_str_to_set: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+#endif
+	return pset;
+}
+
+void
+solaris_drop_privs_pinfo_net_fork_exec(void)
+{
+	priv_set_t *pset = NULL, *npset = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note: this variant avoids dropping DAC filesystem rights, in case
+	 * the process calling it is running as root and should have the
+	 * ability to read/write/chown any file on the system.
+	 *
+	 * We start with the basic set, then *add* the DAC rights to it while
+	 * taking away other parts of BASIC we don't need. Then we intersect
+	 * this with our existing PERMITTED set. In this way we keep any
+	 * DAC rights we had before, while otherwise reducing ourselves to
+	 * the minimum set of privileges we need to proceed.
+	 *
+	 * This also means we drop any other parts of "root" that we don't
+	 * need (e.g. the ability to kill any process, create new device nodes
+	 * etc etc).
+	 */
+
+	if ((pset = priv_allocset()) == NULL)
+		fatal("priv_allocset: %s", strerror(errno));
+	if ((npset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL)
+		fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_CHOWN) != 0 ||
+	    priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_READ) != 0 ||
+	    priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_SEARCH) != 0 ||
+	    priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_DAC_WRITE) != 0 ||
+	    priv_addset(npset, PRIV_FILE_OWNER) != 0)
+		fatal("priv_addset: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 ||
+#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS
+	    priv_delset(npset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 ||
+#endif
+	    priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_FORK) != 0 ||
+	    priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 ||
+	    priv_delset(npset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0)
+		fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (getppriv(PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0)
+		fatal("getppriv: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	priv_intersect(pset, npset);
+
+	if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, npset) != 0 ||
+	    setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, npset) != 0 ||
+	    setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, npset) != 0)
+		fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	priv_freeset(pset);
+	priv_freeset(npset);
+}
+
+void
+solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net(void)
+{
+	priv_set_t *pset = NULL;
+
+	/* Start with "basic" and drop everything we don't need. */
+	if ((pset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL)
+		fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (priv_delset(pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 ||
+#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS
+	    priv_delset(pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 ||
+#endif
+	    priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 ||
+	    priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0)
+		fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0 ||
+	    setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, pset) != 0 ||
+	    setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, pset) != 0)
+		fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	priv_freeset(pset);
+}
+
+void
+solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net_exec(void)
+{
+	priv_set_t *pset = NULL;
+
+
+	/* Start with "basic" and drop everything we don't need. */
+	if ((pset = solaris_basic_privset()) == NULL)
+		fatal("solaris_basic_privset: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (priv_delset(pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 ||
+#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS
+	    priv_delset(pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 ||
+#endif
+	    priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 ||
+	    priv_delset(pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0)
+		fatal("priv_delset: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, pset) != 0 ||
+	    setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, pset) != 0 ||
+	    setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, pset) != 0)
+		fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	priv_freeset(pset);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h b/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dde1a5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PORT_SOLARIS_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+void solaris_contract_pre_fork(void);
+void solaris_contract_post_fork_child(void);
+void solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(pid_t pid);
+void solaris_set_default_project(struct passwd *);
+# ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
+#include <priv.h>
+priv_set_t *solaris_basic_privset(void);
+void solaris_drop_privs_pinfo_net_fork_exec(void);
+void solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net(void);
+void solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net_exec(void);
+# endif /* USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS */
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c b/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..074f80c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
@@ -0,0 +1,153 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 The SCO Group. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Tim Rice. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF)  &&  !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
+# include <crypt.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"	/* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh_api.h"
+
+int nischeck(char *);
+
+int
+sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
+	char *salt;
+	int result;
+
+	/* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */
+	char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd;
+
+	if (pw_password == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Check for users with no password. */
+	if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0)
+		return (1);
+
+	/* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */
+	salt = (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx";
+
+	/*
+	 * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords
+	 * are identical.
+	 */
+#ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
+	if (!nischeck(pw->pw_name)) {
+		result = ((strcmp(bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0)
+		||  (strcmp(osr5bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0));
+	}
+	else
+#endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */
+		result = (strcmp(xcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0);
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+	if (authctxt->valid)
+		free(pw_password);
+#endif
+	return(result);
+}
+
+#ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
+int
+nischeck(char *namep)
+{
+	char password_file[] = "/etc/passwd";
+	FILE *fd;
+	struct passwd *ent = NULL;
+
+	if ((fd = fopen (password_file, "r")) == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * If the passwd file has disappeared we are in a bad state.
+		 * However, returning 0 will send us back through the
+		 * authentication scheme that has checked the ia database for
+		 * passwords earlier.
+		 */
+		return(0);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * fgetpwent() only reads from password file, so we know for certain
+	 * that the user is local.
+	 */
+	while (ent = fgetpwent(fd)) {
+		if (strcmp (ent->pw_name, namep) == 0) {
+			/* Local user */
+			fclose (fd);
+			return(0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	fclose (fd);
+	return (1);
+}
+
+#endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */
+
+/*
+	NOTE: ia_get_logpwd() allocates memory for arg 2
+	functions that call shadow_pw() will need to free
+ */
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+char *
+get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	char *pw_password = NULL;
+
+	uinfo_t uinfo;
+	if (!ia_openinfo(pw->pw_name,&uinfo)) {
+		ia_get_logpwd(uinfo, &pw_password);
+		if (pw_password == NULL)
+			fatal("ia_get_logpwd: Unable to get the shadow passwd");
+		ia_closeinfo(uinfo);
+		return pw_password;
+	}
+	else
+		fatal("ia_openinfo: Unable to open the shadow passwd file");
+}
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
+#endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF and not HAVE_SECUREWARE */
+
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-uw.h b/openbsd-compat/port-uw.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..263d8b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-uw.h
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Tim Rice.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+char * get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw);
+#endif
+
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/pwcache.c b/openbsd-compat/pwcache.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..826c237
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/pwcache.c
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: pwcache.c,v 1.9 2005/08/08 08:05:34 espie Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/pwcache.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define	NCACHE	64			/* power of 2 */
+#define	MASK	(NCACHE - 1)		/* bits to store with */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID
+char *
+user_from_uid(uid_t uid, int nouser)
+{
+	static struct ncache {
+		uid_t	uid;
+		char	*name;
+	} c_uid[NCACHE];
+	static int pwopen;
+	static char nbuf[15];		/* 32 bits == 10 digits */
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	struct ncache *cp;
+
+	cp = c_uid + (uid & MASK);
+	if (cp->uid != uid || cp->name == NULL) {
+		if (pwopen == 0) {
+#ifdef HAVE_SETPASSENT
+			setpassent(1);
+#endif
+			pwopen = 1;
+		}
+		if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) {
+			if (nouser)
+				return (NULL);
+			(void)snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%lu", (u_long)uid);
+		}
+		cp->uid = uid;
+		if (cp->name != NULL)
+			free(cp->name);
+		cp->name = strdup(pw ? pw->pw_name : nbuf);
+	}
+	return (cp->name);
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID
+char *
+group_from_gid(gid_t gid, int nogroup)
+{
+	static struct ncache {
+		gid_t	gid;
+		char	*name;
+	} c_gid[NCACHE];
+	static int gropen;
+	static char nbuf[15];		/* 32 bits == 10 digits */
+	struct group *gr;
+	struct ncache *cp;
+
+	cp = c_gid + (gid & MASK);
+	if (cp->gid != gid || cp->name == NULL) {
+		if (gropen == 0) {
+#ifdef HAVE_SETGROUPENT
+			setgroupent(1);
+#endif
+			gropen = 1;
+		}
+		if ((gr = getgrgid(gid)) == NULL) {
+			if (nogroup)
+				return (NULL);
+			(void)snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%lu", (u_long)gid);
+		}
+		cp->gid = gid;
+		if (cp->name != NULL)
+			free(cp->name);
+		cp->name = strdup(gr ? gr->gr_name : nbuf);
+	}
+	return (cp->name);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c b/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff8ff3d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.c
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: readpassphrase.c,v 1.26 2016/10/18 12:47:18 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2002, 2007, 2010
+ *	Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
+ * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
+ * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/readpassphrase.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE
+
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <readpassphrase.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifndef TCSASOFT
+/* If we don't have TCSASOFT define it so that ORing it it below is a no-op. */
+# define TCSASOFT 0
+#endif
+
+/* SunOS 4.x which lacks _POSIX_VDISABLE, but has VDISABLE */
+#if !defined(_POSIX_VDISABLE) && defined(VDISABLE)
+#  define _POSIX_VDISABLE       VDISABLE
+#endif
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t signo[_NSIG];
+
+static void handler(int);
+
+char *
+readpassphrase(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t bufsiz, int flags)
+{
+	ssize_t nr;
+	int input, output, save_errno, i, need_restart;
+	char ch, *p, *end;
+	struct termios term, oterm;
+	struct sigaction sa, savealrm, saveint, savehup, savequit, saveterm;
+	struct sigaction savetstp, savettin, savettou, savepipe;
+
+	/* I suppose we could alloc on demand in this case (XXX). */
+	if (bufsiz == 0) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return(NULL);
+	}
+
+restart:
+	for (i = 0; i < _NSIG; i++)
+		signo[i] = 0;
+	nr = -1;
+	save_errno = 0;
+	need_restart = 0;
+	/*
+	 * Read and write to /dev/tty if available.  If not, read from
+	 * stdin and write to stderr unless a tty is required.
+	 */
+	if ((flags & RPP_STDIN) ||
+	    (input = output = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+		if (flags & RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) {
+			errno = ENOTTY;
+			return(NULL);
+		}
+		input = STDIN_FILENO;
+		output = STDERR_FILENO;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Turn off echo if possible.
+	 * If we are using a tty but are not the foreground pgrp this will
+	 * generate SIGTTOU, so do it *before* installing the signal handlers.
+	 */
+	if (input != STDIN_FILENO && tcgetattr(input, &oterm) == 0) {
+		memcpy(&term, &oterm, sizeof(term));
+		if (!(flags & RPP_ECHO_ON))
+			term.c_lflag &= ~(ECHO | ECHONL);
+#ifdef VSTATUS
+		if (term.c_cc[VSTATUS] != _POSIX_VDISABLE)
+			term.c_cc[VSTATUS] = _POSIX_VDISABLE;
+#endif
+		(void)tcsetattr(input, TCSAFLUSH|TCSASOFT, &term);
+	} else {
+		memset(&term, 0, sizeof(term));
+		term.c_lflag |= ECHO;
+		memset(&oterm, 0, sizeof(oterm));
+		oterm.c_lflag |= ECHO;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Catch signals that would otherwise cause the user to end
+	 * up with echo turned off in the shell.  Don't worry about
+	 * things like SIGXCPU and SIGVTALRM for now.
+	 */
+	sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+	sa.sa_flags = 0;		/* don't restart system calls */
+	sa.sa_handler = handler;
+	(void)sigaction(SIGALRM, &sa, &savealrm);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGHUP, &sa, &savehup);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, &saveint);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGPIPE, &sa, &savepipe);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGQUIT, &sa, &savequit);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &sa, &saveterm);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, &savetstp);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTTIN, &sa, &savettin);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTTOU, &sa, &savettou);
+
+	if (!(flags & RPP_STDIN))
+		(void)write(output, prompt, strlen(prompt));
+	end = buf + bufsiz - 1;
+	p = buf;
+	while ((nr = read(input, &ch, 1)) == 1 && ch != '\n' && ch != '\r') {
+		if (p < end) {
+			if ((flags & RPP_SEVENBIT))
+				ch &= 0x7f;
+			if (isalpha((unsigned char)ch)) {
+				if ((flags & RPP_FORCELOWER))
+					ch = (char)tolower((unsigned char)ch);
+				if ((flags & RPP_FORCEUPPER))
+					ch = (char)toupper((unsigned char)ch);
+			}
+			*p++ = ch;
+		}
+	}
+	*p = '\0';
+	save_errno = errno;
+	if (!(term.c_lflag & ECHO))
+		(void)write(output, "\n", 1);
+
+	/* Restore old terminal settings and signals. */
+	if (memcmp(&term, &oterm, sizeof(term)) != 0) {
+		const int sigttou = signo[SIGTTOU];
+
+		/* Ignore SIGTTOU generated when we are not the fg pgrp. */
+		while (tcsetattr(input, TCSAFLUSH|TCSASOFT, &oterm) == -1 &&
+		    errno == EINTR && !signo[SIGTTOU])
+			continue;
+		signo[SIGTTOU] = sigttou;
+	}
+	(void)sigaction(SIGALRM, &savealrm, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGHUP, &savehup, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGINT, &saveint, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGQUIT, &savequit, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGPIPE, &savepipe, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTERM, &saveterm, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTSTP, &savetstp, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTTIN, &savettin, NULL);
+	(void)sigaction(SIGTTOU, &savettou, NULL);
+	if (input != STDIN_FILENO)
+		(void)close(input);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we were interrupted by a signal, resend it to ourselves
+	 * now that we have restored the signal handlers.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < _NSIG; i++) {
+		if (signo[i]) {
+			kill(getpid(), i);
+			switch (i) {
+			case SIGTSTP:
+			case SIGTTIN:
+			case SIGTTOU:
+				need_restart = 1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (need_restart)
+		goto restart;
+
+	if (save_errno)
+		errno = save_errno;
+	return(nr == -1 ? NULL : buf);
+}
+DEF_WEAK(readpassphrase);
+
+#if 0
+char *
+getpass(const char *prompt)
+{
+	static char buf[_PASSWORD_LEN + 1];
+
+	return(readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof(buf), RPP_ECHO_OFF));
+}
+#endif
+
+static void handler(int s)
+{
+
+	signo[s] = 1;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h b/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5fd7c5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: readpassphrase.h,v 1.5 2003/06/17 21:56:23 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2002 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Sponsored in part by the Defense Advanced Research Projects
+ * Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force
+ * Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F39502-99-1-0512.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/readpassphrase.h */
+
+#ifndef _READPASSPHRASE_H_
+#define _READPASSPHRASE_H_
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE
+
+#define RPP_ECHO_OFF    0x00		/* Turn off echo (default). */
+#define RPP_ECHO_ON     0x01		/* Leave echo on. */
+#define RPP_REQUIRE_TTY 0x02		/* Fail if there is no tty. */
+#define RPP_FORCELOWER  0x04		/* Force input to lower case. */
+#define RPP_FORCEUPPER  0x08		/* Force input to upper case. */
+#define RPP_SEVENBIT    0x10		/* Strip the high bit from input. */
+#define RPP_STDIN       0x20		/* Read from stdin, not /dev/tty */
+
+char * readpassphrase(const char *, char *, size_t, int);
+
+#endif /* HAVE_READPASSPHRASE */
+
+#endif /* !_READPASSPHRASE_H_ */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/reallocarray.c b/openbsd-compat/reallocarray.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1a52acc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/reallocarray.c
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: reallocarray.c,v 1.2 2014/12/08 03:45:00 bcook Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Otto Moerbeek <otto@drijf.net>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/reallocarray.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/*
+ * This is sqrt(SIZE_MAX+1), as s1*s2 <= SIZE_MAX
+ * if both s1 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW and s2 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW
+ */
+#define MUL_NO_OVERFLOW	((size_t)1 << (sizeof(size_t) * 4))
+
+void *
+reallocarray(void *optr, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
+{
+	if ((nmemb >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW || size >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW) &&
+	    nmemb > 0 && SIZE_MAX / nmemb < size) {
+		errno = ENOMEM;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return realloc(optr, size * nmemb);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_REALLOCARRAY */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/recallocarray.c b/openbsd-compat/recallocarray.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e1156c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/recallocarray.c
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: recallocarray.c,v 1.1 2017/03/06 18:44:21 otto Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, 2017 Otto Moerbeek <otto@drijf.net>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/recallocarray.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+/*
+ * This is sqrt(SIZE_MAX+1), as s1*s2 <= SIZE_MAX
+ * if both s1 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW and s2 < MUL_NO_OVERFLOW
+ */
+#define MUL_NO_OVERFLOW ((size_t)1 << (sizeof(size_t) * 4))
+
+void *
+recallocarray(void *ptr, size_t oldnmemb, size_t newnmemb, size_t size)
+{
+	size_t oldsize, newsize;
+	void *newptr;
+
+	if (ptr == NULL)
+		return calloc(newnmemb, size);
+
+	if ((newnmemb >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW || size >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW) &&
+	    newnmemb > 0 && SIZE_MAX / newnmemb < size) {
+		errno = ENOMEM;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	newsize = newnmemb * size;
+
+	if ((oldnmemb >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW || size >= MUL_NO_OVERFLOW) &&
+	    oldnmemb > 0 && SIZE_MAX / oldnmemb < size) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	oldsize = oldnmemb * size;
+	
+	/*
+	 * Don't bother too much if we're shrinking just a bit,
+	 * we do not shrink for series of small steps, oh well.
+	 */
+	if (newsize <= oldsize) {
+		size_t d = oldsize - newsize;
+
+		if (d < oldsize / 2 && d < (size_t)getpagesize()) {
+			memset((char *)ptr + newsize, 0, d);
+			return ptr;
+		}
+	}
+
+	newptr = malloc(newsize);
+	if (newptr == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (newsize > oldsize) {
+		memcpy(newptr, ptr, oldsize);
+		memset((char *)newptr + oldsize, 0, newsize - oldsize);
+	} else
+		memcpy(newptr, ptr, newsize);
+
+	explicit_bzero(ptr, oldsize);
+	free(ptr);
+
+	return newptr;
+}
+/* DEF_WEAK(recallocarray); */
+
+#endif /* HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fabca8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
+piddir=@piddir@
+srcdir=@srcdir@
+top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
+
+VPATH=@srcdir@
+CC=@CC@
+LD=@LD@
+CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I../.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. -I$(srcdir)/../.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@
+EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
+LIBCOMPAT=../libopenbsd-compat.a
+LIBSSH=../../libssh.a
+LIBS=@LIBS@ @CHANNELLIBS@
+LDFLAGS=@LDFLAGS@ $(LIBCOMPAT)
+
+TESTPROGS=closefromtest$(EXEEXT) snprintftest$(EXEEXT) strduptest$(EXEEXT) \
+	strtonumtest$(EXEEXT) opensslvertest$(EXEEXT) utimensattest$(EXEEXT)
+
+all:	t-exec ${OTHERTESTS}
+
+.c:	$(LIBCOMPAT) $(LIBSSH)
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LIBCOMPAT) $(LIBSSH) $(LIBS)
+
+t-exec:	$(TESTPROGS)
+	@echo running compat regress tests
+	@for TEST in ""$?; do \
+		echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
+		./$${TEST}$(EXEEXT) || exit $$? ; \
+	done
+	@echo finished compat regress tests
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *.o *.a core $(TESTPROGS) valid.out
+
+distclean: clean
+	rm -f Makefile *~
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a69fb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/closefromtest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#define NUM_OPENS 10
+
+void
+fail(char *msg)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "closefrom: %s\n", msg);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(void)
+{
+	int i, max, fds[NUM_OPENS];
+	char buf[512];
+
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_OPENS; i++)
+		if ((fds[i] = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+			exit(0);	/* can't test */
+	max = i - 1;
+
+	/* should close last fd only */
+	closefrom(fds[max]);
+	if (close(fds[max]) != -1)
+		fail("failed to close highest fd");
+
+	/* make sure we can still use remaining descriptors */
+	for (i = 0; i < max; i++)
+		if (read(fds[i], buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
+			fail("closed descriptors it should not have");
+
+	/* should close all fds */
+	closefrom(fds[0]);
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_OPENS; i++)
+		if (close(fds[i]) != -1)
+			fail("failed to close from lowest fd");
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d500666
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,73 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Darren Tucker
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long);
+
+struct version_test {
+	long headerver;
+	long libver;
+	int result;
+} version_tests[] = {
+	/* built with 0.9.8b release headers */
+	{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090802fL, 1},	/* exact match */
+	{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090804fL, 1},	/* newer library fix version: ok */
+	{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090801fL, 1},	/* older library fix version: ok */
+	{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090702fL, 0},	/* older library minor version: NO */
+	{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0090902fL, 0},	/* newer library minor version: NO */
+	{ 0x0090802fL, 0x0080802fL, 0},	/* older library major version: NO */
+	{ 0x0090802fL, 0x1000100fL, 0},	/* newer library major version: NO */
+
+	/* built with 1.0.1b release headers */
+	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000101fL, 1},/* exact match */
+	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000102fL, 1},	/* newer library patch version: ok */
+	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000100fL, 1},	/* older library patch version: ok */
+	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000201fL, 1},	/* newer library fix version: ok */
+	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1000001fL, 0},	/* older library fix version: NO */
+	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x1010101fL, 0},	/* newer library minor version: NO */
+	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x0000101fL, 0},	/* older library major version: NO */
+	{ 0x1000101fL, 0x2000101fL, 0},	/* newer library major version: NO */
+};
+
+void
+fail(long hver, long lver, int result)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "opensslver: header %lx library %lx != %d \n", hver, lver, result);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(void)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	unsigned int i;
+	int res;
+	long hver, lver;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(version_tests) / sizeof(version_tests[0]); i++) {
+		hver = version_tests[i].headerver;
+		lver = version_tests[i].libver;
+		res = version_tests[i].result;
+		if (ssh_compatible_openssl(hver, lver) != res)
+			fail(hver, lver, res);
+	}
+#endif
+	exit(0);
+}
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3134db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/snprintftest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define BUFSZ 2048
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+static int failed = 0;
+
+static void
+fail(const char *m)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "snprintftest: %s\n", m);
+	failed = 1;
+}
+
+int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	size_t ret;
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+main(void)
+{
+	char b[5];
+	char *src = NULL;
+
+	snprintf(b,5,"123456789");
+	if (b[4] != '\0')
+		fail("snprintf does not correctly terminate long strings");
+
+	/* check for read overrun on unterminated string */
+	if ((src = malloc(BUFSZ)) == NULL) {
+		fail("malloc failed");
+	} else {
+		memset(src, 'a', BUFSZ);
+		snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%.*s", 1, src);
+		if (strcmp(b, "a") != 0)
+			fail("failed with length limit '%%.s'");
+	}
+
+	/* check that snprintf and vsnprintf return sane values */
+	if (snprintf(b, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
+		fail("snprintf does not return required length");
+	if (x_snprintf(b, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
+		fail("vsnprintf does not return required length");
+
+	free(src);
+	return failed;
+}
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a3ccf7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/strduptest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+static int fail = 0;
+
+void
+test(const char *a)
+{
+	char *b;
+
+	b = strdup(a);
+	if (b == 0) {
+		fail = 1;
+		return;
+	}
+	if (strcmp(a, b) != 0)
+		fail = 1;
+	free(b);
+}
+
+int
+main(void)
+{
+	test("");
+	test("a");
+	test("\0");
+	test("abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz");
+	return fail;
+}
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/strtonumtest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/strtonumtest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46bd2b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/strtonumtest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strtonumtest.c,v 1.1 2004/08/03 20:38:36 otto Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Otto Moerbeek <otto@drijf.net>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: regress/lib/libc/strtonum/strtonumtest.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/* LLONG_MAX is known as LONGLONG_MAX on AIX */
+#if defined(LONGLONG_MAX) && !defined(LLONG_MAX)
+# define LLONG_MAX LONGLONG_MAX
+# define LLONG_MIN LONGLONG_MIN
+#endif
+
+/* LLONG_MAX is known as LONG_LONG_MAX on HP-UX */
+#if defined(LONG_LONG_MAX) && !defined(LLONG_MAX)
+# define LLONG_MAX LONG_LONG_MAX
+# define LLONG_MIN LONG_LONG_MIN
+#endif
+
+long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **);
+
+int fail;
+
+void
+test(const char *p, long long lb, long long ub, int ok)
+{
+	long long val;
+	const char *q;
+
+	val = strtonum(p, lb, ub, &q);
+	if (ok && q != NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s [%lld-%lld] ", p, lb, ub);
+		fprintf(stderr, "NUMBER NOT ACCEPTED %s\n", q);
+		fail = 1;
+	} else if (!ok && q == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s [%lld-%lld] %lld ", p, lb, ub, val);
+		fprintf(stderr, "NUMBER ACCEPTED\n");
+		fail = 1;
+	}
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	test("1", 0, 10, 1);
+	test("0", -2, 5, 1);
+	test("0", 2, 5, 0);
+	test("0", 2, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("-2", 0, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("0", -5, LLONG_MAX, 1);
+	test("-3", -3, LLONG_MAX, 1);
+	test("-9223372036854775808", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 1);
+	test("9223372036854775807", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 1);
+	test("-9223372036854775809", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("9223372036854775808", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("1000000000000000000000000", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("-1000000000000000000000000", LLONG_MIN, LLONG_MAX, 0);
+	test("-2", 10, -1, 0);
+	test("-2", -10, -1, 1);
+	test("-20", -10, -1, 0);
+	test("20", -10, -1, 0);
+
+	return (fail);
+}
+
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/regress/utimensattest.c b/openbsd-compat/regress/utimensattest.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bbc66c4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/regress/utimensattest.c
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Darren Tucker
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#define TMPFILE "utimensat.tmp"
+#define TMPFILE2 "utimensat.tmp2"
+
+#ifndef AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
+# define AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW 0x80000000
+#endif
+
+int utimensat(int, const char *, const struct timespec[2], int);
+
+static void
+cleanup(void)
+{
+	(void)unlink(TMPFILE);
+	(void)unlink(TMPFILE2);
+}
+
+static void
+fail(char *msg, long expect, long got)
+{
+	int saved_errno = errno;
+
+	if (expect == got && got == 0)
+		fprintf(stderr, "utimensat: %s: %s\n", msg,
+		     strerror(saved_errno));
+	else
+		fprintf(stderr, "utimensat: %s: expected %ld got %ld\n",
+		     msg, expect, got);
+	cleanup();
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(void)
+{
+	int fd;
+	struct stat sb;
+	struct timespec ts[2];
+
+	cleanup();
+	if ((fd = open(TMPFILE, O_CREAT, 0600)) == -1)
+		fail("open", 0, 0);
+	close(fd);
+
+	ts[0].tv_sec = 12345678;
+	ts[0].tv_nsec = 23456789;
+	ts[1].tv_sec = 34567890;
+	ts[1].tv_nsec = 45678901;
+	if (utimensat(AT_FDCWD, TMPFILE, ts, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW) == -1)
+		fail("utimensat", 0, 0);
+
+	if (stat(TMPFILE, &sb) == -1)
+		fail("stat", 0, 0 );
+	if (sb.st_atime != 12345678)
+		fail("st_atime", 0, 0 );
+	if (sb.st_mtime != 34567890)
+		fail("st_mtime", 0, 0 );
+#if 0
+	/*
+	 * Results expected to be rounded to the nearest microsecond.
+	 * Depends on timestamp precision in kernel and filesystem so
+	 * disabled by default.
+	 */
+	if (sb.st_atim.tv_nsec != 23456000)
+		fail("atim.tv_nsec", 23456000, sb.st_atim.tv_nsec);
+	if (sb.st_mtim.tv_nsec != 45678000)
+		fail("mtim.tv_nsec", 45678000, sb.st_mtim.tv_nsec);
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * POSIX specifies that when given a symlink, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
+	 * should update the symlink and not the destination.  The compat
+	 * code doesn't have a way to do this, so where possible it fails
+	 * with instead of following a symlink when explicitly asked not to.
+	 * Here we just test that it does not update the destination.
+	 */
+	if (rename(TMPFILE, TMPFILE2) == -1)
+		fail("rename", 0, 0);
+	if (symlink(TMPFILE2, TMPFILE) == -1)
+		fail("symlink", 0, 0);
+	ts[0].tv_sec = 11223344;
+	ts[1].tv_sec = 55667788;
+	(void)utimensat(AT_FDCWD, TMPFILE, ts, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
+	if (stat(TMPFILE2, &sb) == -1)
+		fail("stat", 0, 0 );
+	if (sb.st_atime == 11223344)
+		fail("utimensat symlink st_atime", 0, 0 );
+	if (sb.st_mtime == 55667788)
+		fail("utimensat symlink st_mtime", 0, 0 );
+
+	cleanup();
+	exit(0);
+}
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c b/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1cd61e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/rresvport.c
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: rresvport.c,v 1.9 2005/11/10 10:00:17 espie Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995, 1996, 1998 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1993, 1994
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/net/rresvport.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#if 0
+int
+rresvport(int *alport)
+{
+	return rresvport_af(alport, AF_INET);
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_storage ss;
+	struct sockaddr *sa;
+	u_int16_t *portp;
+	int s;
+	socklen_t salen;
+
+	memset(&ss, '\0', sizeof ss);
+	sa = (struct sockaddr *)&ss;
+
+	switch (af) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+		portp = &((struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_port;
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+		portp = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa)->sin6_port;
+		break;
+	default:
+		errno = EPFNOSUPPORT;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	sa->sa_family = af;
+	
+	s = socket(af, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (s < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	*portp = htons(*alport);
+	if (*alport < IPPORT_RESERVED - 1) {
+		if (bind(s, sa, salen) >= 0)
+			return (s);
+		if (errno != EADDRINUSE) {
+			(void)close(s);
+			return (-1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	*portp = 0;
+	sa->sa_family = af;
+	if (bindresvport_sa(s, sa) == -1) {
+		(void)close(s);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	*alport = ntohs(*portp);
+	return (s);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/setenv.c b/openbsd-compat/setenv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86954c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/setenv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: setenv.c,v 1.13 2010/08/23 22:31:50 millert Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1987 Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/setenv.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETENV) || !defined(HAVE_UNSETENV)
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+extern char **environ;
+#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
+static char **lastenv;				/* last value of environ */
+#endif
+
+/* OpenSSH Portable: __findenv is from getenv.c rev 1.8, made static */
+/*
+ * __findenv --
+ *	Returns pointer to value associated with name, if any, else NULL.
+ *	Starts searching within the environmental array at offset.
+ *	Sets offset to be the offset of the name/value combination in the
+ *	environmental array, for use by putenv(3), setenv(3) and unsetenv(3).
+ *	Explicitly removes '=' in argument name.
+ *
+ *	This routine *should* be a static; don't use it.
+ */
+static char *
+__findenv(const char *name, int len, int *offset)
+{
+	extern char **environ;
+	int i;
+	const char *np;
+	char **p, *cp;
+
+	if (name == NULL || environ == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+	for (p = environ + *offset; (cp = *p) != NULL; ++p) {
+		for (np = name, i = len; i && *cp; i--)
+			if (*cp++ != *np++)
+				break;
+		if (i == 0 && *cp++ == '=') {
+			*offset = p - environ;
+			return (cp);
+		}
+	}
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+#if 0 /* nothing uses putenv */
+/*
+ * putenv --
+ *	Add a name=value string directly to the environmental, replacing
+ *	any current value.
+ */
+int
+putenv(char *str)
+{
+	char **P, *cp;
+	size_t cnt;
+	int offset = 0;
+
+	for (cp = str; *cp && *cp != '='; ++cp)
+		;
+	if (*cp != '=') {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return (-1);			/* missing `=' in string */
+	}
+
+	if (__findenv(str, (int)(cp - str), &offset) != NULL) {
+		environ[offset++] = str;
+		/* could be set multiple times */
+		while (__findenv(str, (int)(cp - str), &offset)) {
+			for (P = &environ[offset];; ++P)
+				if (!(*P = *(P + 1)))
+					break;
+		}
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	/* create new slot for string */
+	for (P = environ; *P != NULL; P++)
+		;
+	cnt = P - environ;
+	P = (char **)realloc(lastenv, sizeof(char *) * (cnt + 2));
+	if (!P)
+		return (-1);
+	if (lastenv != environ)
+		memcpy(P, environ, cnt * sizeof(char *));
+	lastenv = environ = P;
+	environ[cnt] = str;
+	environ[cnt + 1] = NULL;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
+/*
+ * setenv --
+ *	Set the value of the environmental variable "name" to be
+ *	"value".  If rewrite is set, replace any current value.
+ */
+int
+setenv(const char *name, const char *value, int rewrite)
+{
+	char *C, **P;
+	const char *np;
+	int l_value, offset = 0;
+
+	for (np = name; *np && *np != '='; ++np)
+		;
+#ifdef notyet
+	if (*np) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return (-1);			/* has `=' in name */
+	}
+#endif
+
+	l_value = strlen(value);
+	if ((C = __findenv(name, (int)(np - name), &offset)) != NULL) {
+		int tmpoff = offset + 1;
+		if (!rewrite)
+			return (0);
+#if 0 /* XXX - existing entry may not be writable */
+		if (strlen(C) >= l_value) {	/* old larger; copy over */
+			while ((*C++ = *value++))
+				;
+			return (0);
+		}
+#endif
+		/* could be set multiple times */
+		while (__findenv(name, (int)(np - name), &tmpoff)) {
+			for (P = &environ[tmpoff];; ++P)
+				if (!(*P = *(P + 1)))
+					break;
+		}
+	} else {					/* create new slot */
+		size_t cnt;
+
+		for (P = environ; *P != NULL; P++)
+			;
+		cnt = P - environ;
+		P = (char **)realloc(lastenv, sizeof(char *) * (cnt + 2));
+		if (!P)
+			return (-1);
+		if (lastenv != environ)
+			memcpy(P, environ, cnt * sizeof(char *));
+		lastenv = environ = P;
+		offset = cnt;
+		environ[cnt + 1] = NULL;
+	}
+	if (!(environ[offset] =			/* name + `=' + value */
+	    malloc((size_t)((int)(np - name) + l_value + 2))))
+		return (-1);
+	for (C = environ[offset]; (*C = *name++) && *C != '='; ++C)
+		;
+	for (*C++ = '='; (*C++ = *value++); )
+		;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_SETENV */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_UNSETENV
+/*
+ * unsetenv(name) --
+ *	Delete environmental variable "name".
+ */
+int
+unsetenv(const char *name)
+{
+	char **P;
+	const char *np;
+	int offset = 0;
+
+	if (!name || !*name) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	for (np = name; *np && *np != '='; ++np)
+		;
+	if (*np) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return (-1);			/* has `=' in name */
+	}
+
+	/* could be set multiple times */
+	while (__findenv(name, (int)(np - name), &offset)) {
+		for (P = &environ[offset];; ++P)
+			if (!(*P = *(P + 1)))
+				break;
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_UNSETENV */
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETENV) || !defined(HAVE_UNSETENV) */
+
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c b/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e406432
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+/* Based on conf.c from UCB sendmail 8.8.8 */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright 2003 Damien Miller
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1995-1997 Eric P. Allman
+ * Copyright (c) 1988, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H
+#include <sys/pstat.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <vis.h>
+
+#define SPT_NONE	0	/* don't use it at all */
+#define SPT_PSTAT	1	/* use pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD, ...) */
+#define SPT_REUSEARGV	2	/* cover argv with title information */
+
+#ifndef SPT_TYPE
+# define SPT_TYPE	SPT_NONE
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SPT_PADCHAR
+# define SPT_PADCHAR	'\0'
+#endif
+
+#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV
+static char *argv_start = NULL;
+static size_t argv_env_len = 0;
+#endif
+
+#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */
+
+void
+compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+#if !defined(HAVE_SETPROCTITLE) && \
+    defined(SPT_TYPE) && SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV
+	extern char **environ;
+	char *lastargv = NULL;
+	char **envp = environ;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * NB: This assumes that argv has already been copied out of the
+	 * way. This is true for sshd, but may not be true for other
+	 * programs. Beware.
+	 */
+
+	if (argc == 0 || argv[0] == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/* Fail if we can't allocate room for the new environment */
+	for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++)
+		;
+	if ((environ = calloc(i + 1, sizeof(*environ))) == NULL) {
+		environ = envp;	/* put it back */
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Find the last argv string or environment variable within
+	 * our process memory area.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+		if (lastargv == NULL || lastargv + 1 == argv[i])
+			lastargv = argv[i] + strlen(argv[i]);
+	}
+	for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if (lastargv + 1 == envp[i])
+			lastargv = envp[i] + strlen(envp[i]);
+	}
+
+	argv[1] = NULL;
+	argv_start = argv[0];
+	argv_env_len = lastargv - argv[0] - 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy environment
+	 * XXX - will truncate env on strdup fail
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; envp[i] != NULL; i++)
+		environ[i] = strdup(envp[i]);
+	environ[i] = NULL;
+#endif /* SPT_REUSEARGV */
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+void
+setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+#if SPT_TYPE != SPT_NONE
+	va_list ap;
+	char buf[1024], ptitle[1024];
+	size_t len = 0;
+	int r;
+	extern char *__progname;
+#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT
+	union pstun pst;
+#endif
+
+#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV
+	if (argv_env_len <= 0)
+		return;
+#endif
+
+	strlcpy(buf, __progname, sizeof(buf));
+
+	r = -1;
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	if (fmt != NULL) {
+		len = strlcat(buf, ": ", sizeof(buf));
+		if (len < sizeof(buf))
+			r = vsnprintf(buf + len, sizeof(buf) - len , fmt, ap);
+	}
+	va_end(ap);
+	if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf) - len)
+		return;
+	strnvis(ptitle, buf, sizeof(ptitle),
+	    VIS_CSTYLE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL);
+
+#if SPT_TYPE == SPT_PSTAT
+	pst.pst_command = ptitle;
+	pstat(PSTAT_SETCMD, pst, strlen(ptitle), 0, 0);
+#elif SPT_TYPE == SPT_REUSEARGV
+/*	debug("setproctitle: copy \"%s\" into len %d",
+	    buf, argv_env_len); */
+	len = strlcpy(argv_start, ptitle, argv_env_len);
+	for(; len < argv_env_len; len++)
+		argv_start[len] = SPT_PADCHAR;
+#endif
+
+#endif /* SPT_NONE */
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_SETPROCTITLE */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sha1.c b/openbsd-compat/sha1.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73f8974
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/sha1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sha1.c,v 1.27 2019/06/07 22:56:36 dtucker Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * SHA-1 in C
+ * By Steve Reid <steve@edmweb.com>
+ * 100% Public Domain
+ *
+ * Test Vectors (from FIPS PUB 180-1)
+ * "abc"
+ *   A9993E36 4706816A BA3E2571 7850C26C 9CD0D89D
+ * "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq"
+ *   84983E44 1C3BD26E BAAE4AA1 F95129E5 E54670F1
+ * A million repetitions of "a"
+ *   34AA973C D4C4DAA4 F61EEB2B DBAD2731 6534016F
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#define rol(value, bits) (((value) << (bits)) | ((value) >> (32 - (bits))))
+
+/*
+ * blk0() and blk() perform the initial expand.
+ * I got the idea of expanding during the round function from SSLeay
+ */
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+# define blk0(i) (block->l[i] = (rol(block->l[i],24)&0xFF00FF00) \
+    |(rol(block->l[i],8)&0x00FF00FF))
+#else
+# define blk0(i) block->l[i]
+#endif
+#define blk(i) (block->l[i&15] = rol(block->l[(i+13)&15]^block->l[(i+8)&15] \
+    ^block->l[(i+2)&15]^block->l[i&15],1))
+
+/*
+ * (R0+R1), R2, R3, R4 are the different operations (rounds) used in SHA1
+ */
+#define R0(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk0(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R1(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R2(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0x6ED9EBA1+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R3(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(((w|x)&y)|(w&x))+blk(i)+0x8F1BBCDC+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R4(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0xCA62C1D6+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+
+typedef union {
+	u_int8_t c[64];
+	u_int32_t l[16];
+} CHAR64LONG16;
+
+/*
+ * Hash a single 512-bit block. This is the core of the algorithm.
+ */
+void
+SHA1Transform(u_int32_t state[5], const u_int8_t buffer[SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e;
+	u_int8_t workspace[SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+	CHAR64LONG16 *block = (CHAR64LONG16 *)workspace;
+
+	(void)memcpy(block, buffer, SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+	/* Copy context->state[] to working vars */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+
+	/* 4 rounds of 20 operations each. Loop unrolled. */
+	R0(a,b,c,d,e, 0); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 1); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 2); R0(c,d,e,a,b, 3);
+	R0(b,c,d,e,a, 4); R0(a,b,c,d,e, 5); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 6); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 7);
+	R0(c,d,e,a,b, 8); R0(b,c,d,e,a, 9); R0(a,b,c,d,e,10); R0(e,a,b,c,d,11);
+	R0(d,e,a,b,c,12); R0(c,d,e,a,b,13); R0(b,c,d,e,a,14); R0(a,b,c,d,e,15);
+	R1(e,a,b,c,d,16); R1(d,e,a,b,c,17); R1(c,d,e,a,b,18); R1(b,c,d,e,a,19);
+	R2(a,b,c,d,e,20); R2(e,a,b,c,d,21); R2(d,e,a,b,c,22); R2(c,d,e,a,b,23);
+	R2(b,c,d,e,a,24); R2(a,b,c,d,e,25); R2(e,a,b,c,d,26); R2(d,e,a,b,c,27);
+	R2(c,d,e,a,b,28); R2(b,c,d,e,a,29); R2(a,b,c,d,e,30); R2(e,a,b,c,d,31);
+	R2(d,e,a,b,c,32); R2(c,d,e,a,b,33); R2(b,c,d,e,a,34); R2(a,b,c,d,e,35);
+	R2(e,a,b,c,d,36); R2(d,e,a,b,c,37); R2(c,d,e,a,b,38); R2(b,c,d,e,a,39);
+	R3(a,b,c,d,e,40); R3(e,a,b,c,d,41); R3(d,e,a,b,c,42); R3(c,d,e,a,b,43);
+	R3(b,c,d,e,a,44); R3(a,b,c,d,e,45); R3(e,a,b,c,d,46); R3(d,e,a,b,c,47);
+	R3(c,d,e,a,b,48); R3(b,c,d,e,a,49); R3(a,b,c,d,e,50); R3(e,a,b,c,d,51);
+	R3(d,e,a,b,c,52); R3(c,d,e,a,b,53); R3(b,c,d,e,a,54); R3(a,b,c,d,e,55);
+	R3(e,a,b,c,d,56); R3(d,e,a,b,c,57); R3(c,d,e,a,b,58); R3(b,c,d,e,a,59);
+	R4(a,b,c,d,e,60); R4(e,a,b,c,d,61); R4(d,e,a,b,c,62); R4(c,d,e,a,b,63);
+	R4(b,c,d,e,a,64); R4(a,b,c,d,e,65); R4(e,a,b,c,d,66); R4(d,e,a,b,c,67);
+	R4(c,d,e,a,b,68); R4(b,c,d,e,a,69); R4(a,b,c,d,e,70); R4(e,a,b,c,d,71);
+	R4(d,e,a,b,c,72); R4(c,d,e,a,b,73); R4(b,c,d,e,a,74); R4(a,b,c,d,e,75);
+	R4(e,a,b,c,d,76); R4(d,e,a,b,c,77); R4(c,d,e,a,b,78); R4(b,c,d,e,a,79);
+
+	/* Add the working vars back into context.state[] */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+
+	/* Wipe variables */
+	a = b = c = d = e = 0;
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA1Transform);
+
+
+/*
+ * SHA1Init - Initialize new context
+ */
+void
+SHA1Init(SHA1_CTX *context)
+{
+
+	/* SHA1 initialization constants */
+	context->count = 0;
+	context->state[0] = 0x67452301;
+	context->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89;
+	context->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE;
+	context->state[3] = 0x10325476;
+	context->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0;
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA1Init);
+
+
+/*
+ * Run your data through this.
+ */
+void
+SHA1Update(SHA1_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t i, j;
+
+	j = (size_t)((context->count >> 3) & 63);
+	context->count += ((u_int64_t)len << 3);
+	if ((j + len) > 63) {
+		(void)memcpy(&context->buffer[j], data, (i = 64-j));
+		SHA1Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+		for ( ; i + 63 < len; i += 64)
+			SHA1Transform(context->state, (u_int8_t *)&data[i]);
+		j = 0;
+	} else {
+		i = 0;
+	}
+	(void)memcpy(&context->buffer[j], &data[i], len - i);
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA1Update);
+
+
+/*
+ * Add padding and return the message digest.
+ */
+void
+SHA1Pad(SHA1_CTX *context)
+{
+	u_int8_t finalcount[8];
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+		finalcount[i] = (u_int8_t)((context->count >>
+		    ((7 - (i & 7)) * 8)) & 255);	/* Endian independent */
+	}
+	SHA1Update(context, (u_int8_t *)"\200", 1);
+	while ((context->count & 504) != 448)
+		SHA1Update(context, (u_int8_t *)"\0", 1);
+	SHA1Update(context, finalcount, 8); /* Should cause a SHA1Transform() */
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA1Pad);
+
+void
+SHA1Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA1_CTX *context)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	SHA1Pad(context);
+	for (i = 0; i < SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) {
+		digest[i] = (u_int8_t)
+		   ((context->state[i>>2] >> ((3-(i & 3)) * 8) ) & 255);
+	}
+	explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context));
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA1Final);
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sha1.h b/openbsd-compat/sha1.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..327d94c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/sha1.h
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sha1.h,v 1.24 2012/12/05 23:19:57 deraadt Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * SHA-1 in C
+ * By Steve Reid <steve@edmweb.com>
+ * 100% Public Domain
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SHA1_H
+#define _SHA1_H
+
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#define	SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH		64
+#define	SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH		20
+#define	SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+
+typedef struct {
+    u_int32_t state[5];
+    u_int64_t count;
+    u_int8_t buffer[SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+} SHA1_CTX;
+
+void SHA1Init(SHA1_CTX *);
+void SHA1Pad(SHA1_CTX *);
+void SHA1Transform(u_int32_t [5], const u_int8_t [SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,5)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH)));
+void SHA1Update(SHA1_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA1Final(u_int8_t [SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA1_CTX *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA1End(SHA1_CTX *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA1File(const char *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA1FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA1Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA1_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+
+#define HTONDIGEST(x) do {                                              \
+        x[0] = htonl(x[0]);                                             \
+        x[1] = htonl(x[1]);                                             \
+        x[2] = htonl(x[2]);                                             \
+        x[3] = htonl(x[3]);                                             \
+        x[4] = htonl(x[4]); } while (0)
+
+#define NTOHDIGEST(x) do {                                              \
+        x[0] = ntohl(x[0]);                                             \
+        x[1] = ntohl(x[1]);                                             \
+        x[2] = ntohl(x[2]);                                             \
+        x[3] = ntohl(x[3]);                                             \
+        x[4] = ntohl(x[4]); } while (0)
+
+#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
+#endif /* _SHA1_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sha2.c b/openbsd-compat/sha2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f2ad8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/sha2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1010 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sha2.c,v 1.28 2019/07/23 12:35:22 dtucker Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * FILE:	sha2.c
+ * AUTHOR:	Aaron D. Gifford <me@aarongifford.com>
+ * 
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $From: sha2.c,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:01:51 adg Exp adg $
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/hash/sha2.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SHA256UPDATE) || !defined(HAVE_SHA384UPDATE) || \
+    !defined(HAVE_SHA512UPDATE)
+
+/* no-op out, similar to DEF_WEAK but only needed here */
+#define MAKE_CLONE(x, y)	void __ssh_compat_make_clone_##x_##y(void)
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sha2.h"
+
+/*
+ * UNROLLED TRANSFORM LOOP NOTE:
+ * You can define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM to use the unrolled transform
+ * loop version for the hash transform rounds (defined using macros
+ * later in this file).  Either define on the command line, for example:
+ *
+ *   cc -DSHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM -o sha2 sha2.c sha2prog.c
+ *
+ * or define below:
+ *
+ *   #define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef SHA2_SMALL
+#if defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__)
+#define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*** SHA-224/256/384/512 Machine Architecture Definitions *****************/
+/*
+ * BYTE_ORDER NOTE:
+ *
+ * Please make sure that your system defines BYTE_ORDER.  If your
+ * architecture is little-endian, make sure it also defines
+ * LITTLE_ENDIAN and that the two (BYTE_ORDER and LITTLE_ENDIAN) are
+ * equivalent.
+ *
+ * If your system does not define the above, then you can do so by
+ * hand like this:
+ *
+ *   #define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234
+ *   #define BIG_ENDIAN    4321
+ *
+ * And for little-endian machines, add:
+ *
+ *   #define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN 
+ *
+ * Or for big-endian machines:
+ *
+ *   #define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
+ *
+ * The FreeBSD machine this was written on defines BYTE_ORDER
+ * appropriately by including <sys/types.h> (which in turn includes
+ * <machine/endian.h> where the appropriate definitions are actually
+ * made).
+ */
+#if !defined(BYTE_ORDER) || (BYTE_ORDER != LITTLE_ENDIAN && BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN)
+#error Define BYTE_ORDER to be equal to either LITTLE_ENDIAN or BIG_ENDIAN
+#endif
+
+
+/*** SHA-224/256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/
+/* NOTE: Most of these are in sha2.h */
+#define SHA224_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH	(SHA224_BLOCK_LENGTH - 8)
+#define SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH	(SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - 8)
+#define SHA384_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH	(SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16)
+#define SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH	(SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16)
+
+/*** ENDIAN SPECIFIC COPY MACROS **************************************/
+#define BE_8_TO_32(dst, cp) do {					\
+	(dst) = (u_int32_t)(cp)[3] | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[2] << 8) |	\
+	    ((u_int32_t)(cp)[1] << 16) | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[0] << 24);	\
+} while(0)
+
+#define BE_8_TO_64(dst, cp) do {					\
+	(dst) = (u_int64_t)(cp)[7] | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[6] << 8) |	\
+	    ((u_int64_t)(cp)[5] << 16) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[4] << 24) |	\
+	    ((u_int64_t)(cp)[3] << 32) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[2] << 40) |	\
+	    ((u_int64_t)(cp)[1] << 48) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[0] << 56);	\
+} while (0)
+
+#define BE_64_TO_8(cp, src) do {					\
+	(cp)[0] = (src) >> 56;						\
+        (cp)[1] = (src) >> 48;						\
+	(cp)[2] = (src) >> 40;						\
+	(cp)[3] = (src) >> 32;						\
+	(cp)[4] = (src) >> 24;						\
+	(cp)[5] = (src) >> 16;						\
+	(cp)[6] = (src) >> 8;						\
+	(cp)[7] = (src);						\
+} while (0)
+
+#define BE_32_TO_8(cp, src) do {					\
+	(cp)[0] = (src) >> 24;						\
+	(cp)[1] = (src) >> 16;						\
+	(cp)[2] = (src) >> 8;						\
+	(cp)[3] = (src);						\
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Macro for incrementally adding the unsigned 64-bit integer n to the
+ * unsigned 128-bit integer (represented using a two-element array of
+ * 64-bit words):
+ */
+#define ADDINC128(w,n) do {						\
+	(w)[0] += (u_int64_t)(n);					\
+	if ((w)[0] < (n)) {						\
+		(w)[1]++;						\
+	}								\
+} while (0)
+
+/*** THE SIX LOGICAL FUNCTIONS ****************************************/
+/*
+ * Bit shifting and rotation (used by the six SHA-XYZ logical functions:
+ *
+ *   NOTE:  The naming of R and S appears backwards here (R is a SHIFT and
+ *   S is a ROTATION) because the SHA-224/256/384/512 description document
+ *   (see http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/shs/sha256-384-512.pdf) uses this
+ *   same "backwards" definition.
+ */
+/* Shift-right (used in SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512): */
+#define R(b,x)		((x) >> (b))
+/* 32-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-224 and SHA-256): */
+#define S32(b,x)	(((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (32 - (b))))
+/* 64-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-384 and SHA-512): */
+#define S64(b,x)	(((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (64 - (b))))
+
+/* Two of six logical functions used in SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512: */
+#define Ch(x,y,z)	(((x) & (y)) ^ ((~(x)) & (z)))
+#define Maj(x,y,z)	(((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z)))
+
+/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-224 and SHA-256: */
+#define Sigma0_256(x)	(S32(2,  (x)) ^ S32(13, (x)) ^ S32(22, (x)))
+#define Sigma1_256(x)	(S32(6,  (x)) ^ S32(11, (x)) ^ S32(25, (x)))
+#define sigma0_256(x)	(S32(7,  (x)) ^ S32(18, (x)) ^ R(3 ,   (x)))
+#define sigma1_256(x)	(S32(17, (x)) ^ S32(19, (x)) ^ R(10,   (x)))
+
+/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-384 and SHA-512: */
+#define Sigma0_512(x)	(S64(28, (x)) ^ S64(34, (x)) ^ S64(39, (x)))
+#define Sigma1_512(x)	(S64(14, (x)) ^ S64(18, (x)) ^ S64(41, (x)))
+#define sigma0_512(x)	(S64( 1, (x)) ^ S64( 8, (x)) ^ R( 7,   (x)))
+#define sigma1_512(x)	(S64(19, (x)) ^ S64(61, (x)) ^ R( 6,   (x)))
+
+
+/*** SHA-XYZ INITIAL HASH VALUES AND CONSTANTS ************************/
+/* Hash constant words K for SHA-224 and SHA-256: */
+static const u_int32_t K256[64] = {
+	0x428a2f98UL, 0x71374491UL, 0xb5c0fbcfUL, 0xe9b5dba5UL,
+	0x3956c25bUL, 0x59f111f1UL, 0x923f82a4UL, 0xab1c5ed5UL,
+	0xd807aa98UL, 0x12835b01UL, 0x243185beUL, 0x550c7dc3UL,
+	0x72be5d74UL, 0x80deb1feUL, 0x9bdc06a7UL, 0xc19bf174UL,
+	0xe49b69c1UL, 0xefbe4786UL, 0x0fc19dc6UL, 0x240ca1ccUL,
+	0x2de92c6fUL, 0x4a7484aaUL, 0x5cb0a9dcUL, 0x76f988daUL,
+	0x983e5152UL, 0xa831c66dUL, 0xb00327c8UL, 0xbf597fc7UL,
+	0xc6e00bf3UL, 0xd5a79147UL, 0x06ca6351UL, 0x14292967UL,
+	0x27b70a85UL, 0x2e1b2138UL, 0x4d2c6dfcUL, 0x53380d13UL,
+	0x650a7354UL, 0x766a0abbUL, 0x81c2c92eUL, 0x92722c85UL,
+	0xa2bfe8a1UL, 0xa81a664bUL, 0xc24b8b70UL, 0xc76c51a3UL,
+	0xd192e819UL, 0xd6990624UL, 0xf40e3585UL, 0x106aa070UL,
+	0x19a4c116UL, 0x1e376c08UL, 0x2748774cUL, 0x34b0bcb5UL,
+	0x391c0cb3UL, 0x4ed8aa4aUL, 0x5b9cca4fUL, 0x682e6ff3UL,
+	0x748f82eeUL, 0x78a5636fUL, 0x84c87814UL, 0x8cc70208UL,
+	0x90befffaUL, 0xa4506cebUL, 0xbef9a3f7UL, 0xc67178f2UL
+};
+
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-256: */
+static const u_int32_t sha256_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+	0x6a09e667UL,
+	0xbb67ae85UL,
+	0x3c6ef372UL,
+	0xa54ff53aUL,
+	0x510e527fUL,
+	0x9b05688cUL,
+	0x1f83d9abUL,
+	0x5be0cd19UL
+};
+
+/* Hash constant words K for SHA-384 and SHA-512: */
+static const u_int64_t K512[80] = {
+	0x428a2f98d728ae22ULL, 0x7137449123ef65cdULL,
+	0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2fULL, 0xe9b5dba58189dbbcULL,
+	0x3956c25bf348b538ULL, 0x59f111f1b605d019ULL,
+	0x923f82a4af194f9bULL, 0xab1c5ed5da6d8118ULL,
+	0xd807aa98a3030242ULL, 0x12835b0145706fbeULL,
+	0x243185be4ee4b28cULL, 0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2ULL,
+	0x72be5d74f27b896fULL, 0x80deb1fe3b1696b1ULL,
+	0x9bdc06a725c71235ULL, 0xc19bf174cf692694ULL,
+	0xe49b69c19ef14ad2ULL, 0xefbe4786384f25e3ULL,
+	0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5ULL, 0x240ca1cc77ac9c65ULL,
+	0x2de92c6f592b0275ULL, 0x4a7484aa6ea6e483ULL,
+	0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4ULL, 0x76f988da831153b5ULL,
+	0x983e5152ee66dfabULL, 0xa831c66d2db43210ULL,
+	0xb00327c898fb213fULL, 0xbf597fc7beef0ee4ULL,
+	0xc6e00bf33da88fc2ULL, 0xd5a79147930aa725ULL,
+	0x06ca6351e003826fULL, 0x142929670a0e6e70ULL,
+	0x27b70a8546d22ffcULL, 0x2e1b21385c26c926ULL,
+	0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aedULL, 0x53380d139d95b3dfULL,
+	0x650a73548baf63deULL, 0x766a0abb3c77b2a8ULL,
+	0x81c2c92e47edaee6ULL, 0x92722c851482353bULL,
+	0xa2bfe8a14cf10364ULL, 0xa81a664bbc423001ULL,
+	0xc24b8b70d0f89791ULL, 0xc76c51a30654be30ULL,
+	0xd192e819d6ef5218ULL, 0xd69906245565a910ULL,
+	0xf40e35855771202aULL, 0x106aa07032bbd1b8ULL,
+	0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8ULL, 0x1e376c085141ab53ULL,
+	0x2748774cdf8eeb99ULL, 0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8ULL,
+	0x391c0cb3c5c95a63ULL, 0x4ed8aa4ae3418acbULL,
+	0x5b9cca4f7763e373ULL, 0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3ULL,
+	0x748f82ee5defb2fcULL, 0x78a5636f43172f60ULL,
+	0x84c87814a1f0ab72ULL, 0x8cc702081a6439ecULL,
+	0x90befffa23631e28ULL, 0xa4506cebde82bde9ULL,
+	0xbef9a3f7b2c67915ULL, 0xc67178f2e372532bULL,
+	0xca273eceea26619cULL, 0xd186b8c721c0c207ULL,
+	0xeada7dd6cde0eb1eULL, 0xf57d4f7fee6ed178ULL,
+	0x06f067aa72176fbaULL, 0x0a637dc5a2c898a6ULL,
+	0x113f9804bef90daeULL, 0x1b710b35131c471bULL,
+	0x28db77f523047d84ULL, 0x32caab7b40c72493ULL,
+	0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebcULL, 0x431d67c49c100d4cULL,
+	0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6ULL, 0x597f299cfc657e2aULL,
+	0x5fcb6fab3ad6faecULL, 0x6c44198c4a475817ULL
+};
+
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-512 */
+static const u_int64_t sha512_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+	0x6a09e667f3bcc908ULL,
+	0xbb67ae8584caa73bULL,
+	0x3c6ef372fe94f82bULL,
+	0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1ULL,
+	0x510e527fade682d1ULL,
+	0x9b05688c2b3e6c1fULL,
+	0x1f83d9abfb41bd6bULL,
+	0x5be0cd19137e2179ULL
+};
+
+#if !defined(SHA2_SMALL)
+#if 0
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-224: */
+static const u_int32_t sha224_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+	0xc1059ed8UL,
+	0x367cd507UL,
+	0x3070dd17UL,
+	0xf70e5939UL,
+	0xffc00b31UL,
+	0x68581511UL,
+	0x64f98fa7UL,
+	0xbefa4fa4UL
+};
+#endif /* 0 */
+
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-384 */
+static const u_int64_t sha384_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+	0xcbbb9d5dc1059ed8ULL,
+	0x629a292a367cd507ULL,
+	0x9159015a3070dd17ULL,
+	0x152fecd8f70e5939ULL,
+	0x67332667ffc00b31ULL,
+	0x8eb44a8768581511ULL,
+	0xdb0c2e0d64f98fa7ULL,
+	0x47b5481dbefa4fa4ULL
+};
+
+#if 0
+/* Initial hash value H for SHA-512-256 */
+static const u_int64_t sha512_256_initial_hash_value[8] = {
+	0x22312194fc2bf72cULL,
+	0x9f555fa3c84c64c2ULL,
+	0x2393b86b6f53b151ULL,
+	0x963877195940eabdULL,
+	0x96283ee2a88effe3ULL,
+	0xbe5e1e2553863992ULL,
+	0x2b0199fc2c85b8aaULL,
+	0x0eb72ddc81c52ca2ULL
+};
+
+/*** SHA-224: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA224Init(SHA2_CTX *context)
+{
+	memcpy(context->state.st32, sha224_initial_hash_value,
+	    sizeof(sha224_initial_hash_value));
+	memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+	context->bitcount[0] = 0;
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA224Init);
+
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA224Transform, SHA256Transform);
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA224Update, SHA256Update);
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA224Pad, SHA256Pad);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA224Transform);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA224Update);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA224Pad);
+
+void
+SHA224Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context)
+{
+	SHA224Pad(context);
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+	int	i;
+
+	/* Convert TO host byte order */
+	for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
+		BE_32_TO_8(digest + i * 4, context->state.st32[i]);
+#else
+	memcpy(digest, context->state.st32, SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+	explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context));
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA224Final);
+#endif /* !defined(SHA2_SMALL) */
+#endif /* 0 */
+
+/*** SHA-256: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA256Init(SHA2_CTX *context)
+{
+	memcpy(context->state.st32, sha256_initial_hash_value,
+	    sizeof(sha256_initial_hash_value));
+	memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+	context->bitcount[0] = 0;
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA256Init);
+
+#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
+
+/* Unrolled SHA-256 round macros: */
+
+#define ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do {				    \
+	BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data);					    \
+	data += 4;							    \
+	T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] + W256[j]; \
+	(d) += T1;							    \
+	(h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c));		    \
+	j++;								    \
+} while(0)
+
+#define ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do {					    \
+	s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f];						    \
+	s0 = sigma0_256(s0);						    \
+	s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f];						    \
+	s1 = sigma1_256(s1);						    \
+	T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] +	    \
+	     (W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);		    \
+	(d) += T1;							    \
+	(h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c));		    \
+	j++;								    \
+} while(0)
+
+void
+SHA256Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int32_t	a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+	u_int32_t	T1, W256[16];
+	int		j;
+
+	/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+	f = state[5];
+	g = state[6];
+	h = state[7];
+
+	j = 0;
+	do {
+		/* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+		ROUND256_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+	} while (j < 16);
+
+	/* Now for the remaining rounds up to 63: */
+	do {
+		ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+		ROUND256(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+		ROUND256(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+		ROUND256(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+		ROUND256(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+		ROUND256(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+		ROUND256(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+		ROUND256(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+	} while (j < 64);
+
+	/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+	state[5] += f;
+	state[6] += g;
+	state[7] += h;
+
+	/* Clean up */
+	a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0;
+}
+
+#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA256Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int32_t	a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+	u_int32_t	T1, T2, W256[16];
+	int		j;
+
+	/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+	f = state[5];
+	g = state[6];
+	h = state[7];
+
+	j = 0;
+	do {
+		BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data);
+		data += 4;
+		/* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */
+		T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] + W256[j];
+		T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+		h = g;
+		g = f;
+		f = e;
+		e = d + T1;
+		d = c;
+		c = b;
+		b = a;
+		a = T1 + T2;
+
+		j++;
+	} while (j < 16);
+
+	do {
+		/* Part of the message block expansion: */
+		s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f];
+		s0 = sigma0_256(s0);
+		s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f];	
+		s1 = sigma1_256(s1);
+
+		/* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */
+		T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] + 
+		     (W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);
+		T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+		h = g;
+		g = f;
+		f = e;
+		e = d + T1;
+		d = c;
+		c = b;
+		b = a;
+		a = T1 + T2;
+
+		j++;
+	} while (j < 64);
+
+	/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+	state[5] += f;
+	state[6] += g;
+	state[7] += h;
+
+	/* Clean up */
+	a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+DEF_WEAK(SHA256Transform);
+
+void
+SHA256Update(SHA2_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+	u_int64_t	freespace, usedspace;
+
+	/* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */
+	if (len == 0)
+		return;
+
+	usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	if (usedspace > 0) {
+		/* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */
+		freespace = SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace;
+
+		if (len >= freespace) {
+			/* Fill the buffer completely and process it */
+			memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace);
+			context->bitcount[0] += freespace << 3;
+			len -= freespace;
+			data += freespace;
+			SHA256Transform(context->state.st32, context->buffer);
+		} else {
+			/* The buffer is not yet full */
+			memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len);
+			context->bitcount[0] += (u_int64_t)len << 3;
+			/* Clean up: */
+			usedspace = freespace = 0;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+	while (len >= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+		/* Process as many complete blocks as we can */
+		SHA256Transform(context->state.st32, data);
+		context->bitcount[0] += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3;
+		len -= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+		data += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	}
+	if (len > 0) {
+		/* There's left-overs, so save 'em */
+		memcpy(context->buffer, data, len);
+		context->bitcount[0] += len << 3;
+	}
+	/* Clean up: */
+	usedspace = freespace = 0;
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA256Update);
+
+void
+SHA256Pad(SHA2_CTX *context)
+{
+	unsigned int	usedspace;
+
+	usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	if (usedspace > 0) {
+		/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+		context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80;
+
+		if (usedspace <= SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+			/* Set-up for the last transform: */
+			memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0,
+			    SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+		} else {
+			if (usedspace < SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+				memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0,
+				    SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+			}
+			/* Do second-to-last transform: */
+			SHA256Transform(context->state.st32, context->buffer);
+
+			/* Prepare for last transform: */
+			memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Set-up for the last transform: */
+		memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+		/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+		*context->buffer = 0x80;
+	}
+	/* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */
+	BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH],
+	    context->bitcount[0]);
+
+	/* Final transform: */
+	SHA256Transform(context->state.st32, context->buffer);
+
+	/* Clean up: */
+	usedspace = 0;
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA256Pad);
+
+void
+SHA256Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context)
+{
+	SHA256Pad(context);
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+	int	i;
+
+	/* Convert TO host byte order */
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+		BE_32_TO_8(digest + i * 4, context->state.st32[i]);
+#else
+	memcpy(digest, context->state.st32, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+	explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context));
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA256Final);
+
+
+/*** SHA-512: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA512Init(SHA2_CTX *context)
+{
+	memcpy(context->state.st64, sha512_initial_hash_value,
+	    sizeof(sha512_initial_hash_value));
+	memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+	context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] =  0;
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512Init);
+
+#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
+
+/* Unrolled SHA-512 round macros: */
+
+#define ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do {				    \
+	BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data);					    \
+	data += 8;							    \
+	T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] + W512[j]; \
+	(d) += T1;							    \
+	(h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c));		    \
+	j++;								    \
+} while(0)
+
+
+#define ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do {					    \
+	s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f];						    \
+	s0 = sigma0_512(s0);						    \
+	s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f];						    \
+	s1 = sigma1_512(s1);						    \
+	T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] +	    \
+             (W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);		    \
+	(d) += T1;							    \
+	(h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c));		    \
+	j++;								    \
+} while(0)
+
+void
+SHA512Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int64_t	a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+	u_int64_t	T1, W512[16];
+	int		j;
+
+	/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+	f = state[5];
+	g = state[6];
+	h = state[7];
+
+	j = 0;
+	do {
+		/* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+		ROUND512_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+	} while (j < 16);
+
+	/* Now for the remaining rounds up to 79: */
+	do {
+		ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
+		ROUND512(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
+		ROUND512(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
+		ROUND512(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
+		ROUND512(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
+		ROUND512(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
+		ROUND512(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
+		ROUND512(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
+	} while (j < 80);
+
+	/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+	state[5] += f;
+	state[6] += g;
+	state[7] += h;
+
+	/* Clean up */
+	a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0;
+}
+
+#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+
+void
+SHA512Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	u_int64_t	a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
+	u_int64_t	T1, T2, W512[16];
+	int		j;
+
+	/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
+	a = state[0];
+	b = state[1];
+	c = state[2];
+	d = state[3];
+	e = state[4];
+	f = state[5];
+	g = state[6];
+	h = state[7];
+
+	j = 0;
+	do {
+		BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data);
+		data += 8;
+		/* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */
+		T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] + W512[j];
+		T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+		h = g;
+		g = f;
+		f = e;
+		e = d + T1;
+		d = c;
+		c = b;
+		b = a;
+		a = T1 + T2;
+
+		j++;
+	} while (j < 16);
+
+	do {
+		/* Part of the message block expansion: */
+		s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f];
+		s0 = sigma0_512(s0);
+		s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f];
+		s1 =  sigma1_512(s1);
+
+		/* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */
+		T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] +
+		     (W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);
+		T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
+		h = g;
+		g = f;
+		f = e;
+		e = d + T1;
+		d = c;
+		c = b;
+		b = a;
+		a = T1 + T2;
+
+		j++;
+	} while (j < 80);
+
+	/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
+	state[0] += a;
+	state[1] += b;
+	state[2] += c;
+	state[3] += d;
+	state[4] += e;
+	state[5] += f;
+	state[6] += g;
+	state[7] += h;
+
+	/* Clean up */
+	a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512Transform);
+
+void
+SHA512Update(SHA2_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t	freespace, usedspace;
+
+	/* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */
+	if (len == 0)
+		return;
+
+	usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	if (usedspace > 0) {
+		/* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */
+		freespace = SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace;
+
+		if (len >= freespace) {
+			/* Fill the buffer completely and process it */
+			memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace);
+			ADDINC128(context->bitcount, freespace << 3);
+			len -= freespace;
+			data += freespace;
+			SHA512Transform(context->state.st64, context->buffer);
+		} else {
+			/* The buffer is not yet full */
+			memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len);
+			ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3);
+			/* Clean up: */
+			usedspace = freespace = 0;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+	while (len >= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+		/* Process as many complete blocks as we can */
+		SHA512Transform(context->state.st64, data);
+		ADDINC128(context->bitcount, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3);
+		len -= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+		data += SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	}
+	if (len > 0) {
+		/* There's left-overs, so save 'em */
+		memcpy(context->buffer, data, len);
+		ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3);
+	}
+	/* Clean up: */
+	usedspace = freespace = 0;
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512Update);
+
+void
+SHA512Pad(SHA2_CTX *context)
+{
+	unsigned int	usedspace;
+
+	usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
+	if (usedspace > 0) {
+		/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+		context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80;
+
+		if (usedspace <= SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+			/* Set-up for the last transform: */
+			memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+		} else {
+			if (usedspace < SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
+				memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
+			}
+			/* Do second-to-last transform: */
+			SHA512Transform(context->state.st64, context->buffer);
+
+			/* And set-up for the last transform: */
+			memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 2);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Prepare for final transform: */
+		memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
+
+		/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
+		*context->buffer = 0x80;
+	}
+	/* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */
+	BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH],
+	    context->bitcount[1]);
+	BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH + 8],
+	    context->bitcount[0]);
+
+	/* Final transform: */
+	SHA512Transform(context->state.st64, context->buffer);
+
+	/* Clean up: */
+	usedspace = 0;
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512Pad);
+
+void
+SHA512Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context)
+{
+	SHA512Pad(context);
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+	int	i;
+
+	/* Convert TO host byte order */
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+		BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state.st64[i]);
+#else
+	memcpy(digest, context->state.st64, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+	explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context));
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512Final);
+
+#if !defined(SHA2_SMALL)
+
+/*** SHA-384: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA384Init(SHA2_CTX *context)
+{
+	memcpy(context->state.st64, sha384_initial_hash_value,
+	    sizeof(sha384_initial_hash_value));
+	memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+	context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0;
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA384Init);
+
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA384Transform, SHA512Transform);
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA384Update, SHA512Update);
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA384Pad, SHA512Pad);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA384Transform);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA384Update);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA384Pad);
+
+/* Equivalent of MAKE_CLONE (which is a no-op) for SHA384 funcs */
+void
+SHA384Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
+{
+	SHA512Transform(state, data);
+}
+
+void
+SHA384Update(SHA2_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
+{
+	SHA512Update(context, data, len);
+}
+
+void
+SHA384Pad(SHA2_CTX *context)
+{
+	SHA512Pad(context);
+}
+
+void
+SHA384Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context)
+{
+	SHA384Pad(context);
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+	int	i;
+
+	/* Convert TO host byte order */
+	for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
+		BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state.st64[i]);
+#else
+	memcpy(digest, context->state.st64, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+	/* Zero out state data */
+	explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context));
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA384Final);
+
+#if 0
+/*** SHA-512/256: *********************************************************/
+void
+SHA512_256Init(SHA2_CTX *context)
+{
+	memcpy(context->state.st64, sha512_256_initial_hash_value,
+	    sizeof(sha512_256_initial_hash_value));
+	memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
+	context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0;
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Init);
+
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA512_256Transform, SHA512Transform);
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA512_256Update, SHA512Update);
+MAKE_CLONE(SHA512_256Pad, SHA512Pad);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Transform);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Update);
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Pad);
+
+void
+SHA512_256Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context)
+{
+	SHA512_256Pad(context);
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+	int	i;
+
+	/* Convert TO host byte order */
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
+		BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state.st64[i]);
+#else
+	memcpy(digest, context->state.st64, SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+#endif
+	/* Zero out state data */
+	explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context));
+}
+DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Final);
+#endif /* !defined(SHA2_SMALL) */
+#endif /* 0 */
+
+#endif /* HAVE_SHA{256,384,512}UPDATE */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sha2.h b/openbsd-compat/sha2.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d051e96
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/sha2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sha2.h,v 1.10 2016/09/03 17:00:29 tedu Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * FILE:	sha2.h
+ * AUTHOR:	Aaron D. Gifford <me@aarongifford.com>
+ * 
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ * 
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * $From: sha2.h,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:02:01 adg Exp adg $
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/sha2.h */
+
+#ifndef _SSHSHA2_H
+#define _SSHSHA2_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SHA256UPDATE) || !defined(HAVE_SHA384UPDATE) || \
+    !defined(HAVE_SHA512UPDATE)
+
+/*** SHA-256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/
+#define SHA224_BLOCK_LENGTH		64
+#define SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH		28
+#define SHA224_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+#define SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH		64
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH		32
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+#define SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH		128
+#define SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH		48
+#define SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+#define SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH		128
+#define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH		64
+#define SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+#define SHA512_256_BLOCK_LENGTH		128
+#define SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH	32
+#define SHA512_256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH	(SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
+
+
+/*** SHA-224/256/384/512 Context Structure *******************************/
+typedef struct _SHA2_CTX {
+	union {
+		u_int32_t	st32[8];
+		u_int64_t	st64[8];
+	} state;
+	u_int64_t	bitcount[2];
+	u_int8_t	buffer[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH];
+} SHA2_CTX;
+
+#if 0
+__BEGIN_DECLS
+void SHA224Init(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA224Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA224_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA224Update(SHA2_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA224Pad(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA224Final(u_int8_t [SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA224End(SHA2_CTX *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA224_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA224File(const char *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA224_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA224FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA224_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA224Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA224_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+#endif /* 0 */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SHA256UPDATE
+void SHA256Init(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA256Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA256Update(SHA2_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA256Pad(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA256Final(u_int8_t [SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256End(SHA2_CTX *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256File(const char *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA256Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+#endif /* HAVE_SHA256UPDATE */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SHA384UPDATE
+void SHA384Init(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA384Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA384Update(SHA2_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA384Pad(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA384Final(u_int8_t [SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384End(SHA2_CTX *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384File(const char *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA384Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA384_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+#endif /* HAVE_SHA384UPDATE */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SHA512UPDATE
+void SHA512Init(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA512Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA512Update(SHA2_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA512Pad(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA512Final(u_int8_t [SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512End(SHA2_CTX *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512File(const char *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA512_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+#endif /* HAVE_SHA512UPDATE */
+
+#if 0
+void SHA512_256Init(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA512_256Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t [SHA512_256_BLOCK_LENGTH]);
+void SHA512_256Update(SHA2_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
+void SHA512_256Pad(SHA2_CTX *);
+void SHA512_256Final(u_int8_t [SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_256End(SHA2_CTX *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_256File(const char *, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_256FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,SHA512_256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+char *SHA512_256Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
+	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,SHA512_256_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
+__END_DECLS
+#endif /* 0 */
+
+#endif /* HAVE_SHA{256,384,512}UPDATE */
+
+#endif /* _SSHSHA2_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sigact.c b/openbsd-compat/sigact.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d67845c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/sigact.c
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sigaction.c,v 1.4 2001/01/22 18:01:48 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 1998,2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc.                   *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a  *
+ * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the            *
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including      *
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,      *
+ * distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell       *
+ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is    *
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:                 *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included  *
+ * in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.                   *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS  *
+ * OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF               *
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.   *
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,   *
+ * DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR    *
+ * OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR    *
+ * THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.                               *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright   *
+ * holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the     *
+ * sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written       *
+ * authorization.                                                           *
+ ****************************************************************************/
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ *  Author: Zeyd M. Ben-Halim <zmbenhal@netcom.com> 1992,1995               *
+ *     and: Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>                         *
+ ****************************************************************************/
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libcurses/base/sigaction.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include "sigact.h"
+
+/* This file provides sigaction() emulation using sigvec() */
+/* Use only if this is non POSIX system */
+
+#if !HAVE_SIGACTION && HAVE_SIGVEC
+
+int
+sigaction(int sig, struct sigaction *sigact, struct sigaction *osigact)
+{
+	return sigvec(sig, sigact ? &sigact->sv : NULL,
+	    osigact ? &osigact->sv : NULL);
+}
+
+int
+sigemptyset (sigset_t *mask)
+{
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	*mask = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sigprocmask (int mode, sigset_t *mask, sigset_t *omask)
+{
+	sigset_t current = sigsetmask(0);
+
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (omask)
+		*omask = current;
+
+	if (mode == SIG_BLOCK)
+		current |= *mask;
+	else if (mode == SIG_UNBLOCK)
+		current &= ~*mask;
+	else if (mode == SIG_SETMASK)
+	current = *mask;
+
+	sigsetmask(current);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sigsuspend (sigset_t *mask)
+{
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return sigpause(*mask);
+}
+
+int
+sigdelset (sigset_t *mask, int sig)
+{
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	*mask &= ~sigmask(sig);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sigaddset (sigset_t *mask, int sig)
+{
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	*mask |= sigmask(sig);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sigismember (sigset_t *mask, int sig)
+{
+	if (!mask) {
+		errno = EINVAL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return (*mask & sigmask(sig)) != 0;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sigact.h b/openbsd-compat/sigact.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db96d0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/sigact.h
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: SigAction.h,v 1.3 2001/01/22 18:01:32 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ * Copyright (c) 1998,2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc.                   *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a  *
+ * copy of this software and associated documentation files (the            *
+ * "Software"), to deal in the Software without restriction, including      *
+ * without limitation the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish,      *
+ * distribute, distribute with modifications, sublicense, and/or sell       *
+ * copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is    *
+ * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:                 *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included  *
+ * in all copies or substantial portions of the Software.                   *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS  *
+ * OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF               *
+ * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT.   *
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM,   *
+ * DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR    *
+ * OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR    *
+ * THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.                               *
+ *                                                                          *
+ * Except as contained in this notice, the name(s) of the above copyright   *
+ * holders shall not be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the     *
+ * sale, use or other dealings in this Software without prior written       *
+ * authorization.                                                           *
+ ****************************************************************************/
+
+/****************************************************************************
+ *  Author: Zeyd M. Ben-Halim <zmbenhal@netcom.com> 1992,1995               *
+ *     and: Eric S. Raymond <esr@snark.thyrsus.com>                         *
+ ****************************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * $From: SigAction.h,v 1.6 2000/12/10 02:36:10 tom Exp $
+ *
+ * This file exists to handle non-POSIX systems which don't have <unistd.h>,
+ * and usually no sigaction() nor <termios.h>
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libcurses/SigAction.h */
+
+#ifndef _SIGACTION_H
+#define _SIGACTION_H
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_SIGACTION) && defined(HAVE_SIGVEC)
+
+#undef  SIG_BLOCK
+#define SIG_BLOCK       00
+
+#undef  SIG_UNBLOCK
+#define SIG_UNBLOCK     01
+
+#undef  SIG_SETMASK
+#define SIG_SETMASK     02
+
+/*
+ * <bsd/signal.h> is in the Linux 1.2.8 + gcc 2.7.0 configuration,
+ * and is useful for testing this header file.
+ */
+#if HAVE_BSD_SIGNAL_H
+# include <bsd/signal.h>
+#endif
+
+struct sigaction
+{
+	struct sigvec sv;
+};
+
+typedef unsigned long sigset_t;
+
+#undef  sa_mask
+#define sa_mask sv.sv_mask
+#undef  sa_handler
+#define sa_handler sv.sv_handler
+#undef  sa_flags
+#define sa_flags sv.sv_flags
+
+int sigaction(int sig, struct sigaction *sigact, struct sigaction *osigact);
+int sigprocmask (int how, sigset_t *mask, sigset_t *omask);
+int sigemptyset (sigset_t *mask);
+int sigsuspend (sigset_t *mask);
+int sigdelset (sigset_t *mask, int sig);
+int sigaddset (sigset_t *mask, int sig);
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SIGACTION) && defined(HAVE_SIGVEC) */
+
+#endif /* !defined(_SIGACTION_H) */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strcasestr.c b/openbsd-compat/strcasestr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4c4d147
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/strcasestr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strcasestr.c,v 1.4 2015/08/31 02:53:57 guenther Exp $	*/
+/*	$NetBSD: strcasestr.c,v 1.2 2005/02/09 21:35:47 kleink Exp $	*/
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
+ * Chris Torek.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strcasestr.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRCASESTR
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * Find the first occurrence of find in s, ignore case.
+ */
+char *
+strcasestr(const char *s, const char *find)
+{
+	char c, sc;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if ((c = *find++) != 0) {
+		c = (char)tolower((unsigned char)c);
+		len = strlen(find);
+		do {
+			do {
+				if ((sc = *s++) == 0)
+					return (NULL);
+			} while ((char)tolower((unsigned char)sc) != c);
+		} while (strncasecmp(s, find, len) != 0);
+		s--;
+	}
+	return ((char *)s);
+}
+DEF_WEAK(strcasestr);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c b/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bcc1b61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/strlcat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strlcat.c,v 1.13 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strlcat.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * Appends src to string dst of size siz (unlike strncat, siz is the
+ * full size of dst, not space left).  At most siz-1 characters
+ * will be copied.  Always NUL terminates (unless siz <= strlen(dst)).
+ * Returns strlen(src) + MIN(siz, strlen(initial dst)).
+ * If retval >= siz, truncation occurred.
+ */
+size_t
+strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz)
+{
+	char *d = dst;
+	const char *s = src;
+	size_t n = siz;
+	size_t dlen;
+
+	/* Find the end of dst and adjust bytes left but don't go past end */
+	while (n-- != 0 && *d != '\0')
+		d++;
+	dlen = d - dst;
+	n = siz - dlen;
+
+	if (n == 0)
+		return(dlen + strlen(s));
+	while (*s != '\0') {
+		if (n != 1) {
+			*d++ = *s;
+			n--;
+		}
+		s++;
+	}
+	*d = '\0';
+
+	return(dlen + (s - src));	/* count does not include NUL */
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCAT */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c b/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b4b1b60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/strlcpy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strlcpy.c,v 1.11 2006/05/05 15:27:38 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1998 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strlcpy.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/*
+ * Copy src to string dst of size siz.  At most siz-1 characters
+ * will be copied.  Always NUL terminates (unless siz == 0).
+ * Returns strlen(src); if retval >= siz, truncation occurred.
+ */
+size_t
+strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz)
+{
+	char *d = dst;
+	const char *s = src;
+	size_t n = siz;
+
+	/* Copy as many bytes as will fit */
+	if (n != 0) {
+		while (--n != 0) {
+			if ((*d++ = *s++) == '\0')
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Not enough room in dst, add NUL and traverse rest of src */
+	if (n == 0) {
+		if (siz != 0)
+			*d = '\0';		/* NUL-terminate dst */
+		while (*s++)
+			;
+	}
+
+	return(s - src - 1);	/* count does not include NUL */
+}
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRLCPY */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strmode.c b/openbsd-compat/strmode.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a81614
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/strmode.c
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strmode.c,v 1.7 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1990 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strmode.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRMODE
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* XXX mode should be mode_t */
+
+void
+strmode(int mode, char *p)
+{
+	 /* print type */
+	switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+	case S_IFDIR:			/* directory */
+		*p++ = 'd';
+		break;
+	case S_IFCHR:			/* character special */
+		*p++ = 'c';
+		break;
+	case S_IFBLK:			/* block special */
+		*p++ = 'b';
+		break;
+	case S_IFREG:			/* regular */
+		*p++ = '-';
+		break;
+	case S_IFLNK:			/* symbolic link */
+		*p++ = 'l';
+		break;
+#ifdef S_IFSOCK
+	case S_IFSOCK:			/* socket */
+		*p++ = 's';
+		break;
+#endif
+#ifdef S_IFIFO
+	case S_IFIFO:			/* fifo */
+		*p++ = 'p';
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:			/* unknown */
+		*p++ = '?';
+		break;
+	}
+	/* usr */
+	if (mode & S_IRUSR)
+		*p++ = 'r';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	if (mode & S_IWUSR)
+		*p++ = 'w';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	switch (mode & (S_IXUSR | S_ISUID)) {
+	case 0:
+		*p++ = '-';
+		break;
+	case S_IXUSR:
+		*p++ = 'x';
+		break;
+	case S_ISUID:
+		*p++ = 'S';
+		break;
+	case S_IXUSR | S_ISUID:
+		*p++ = 's';
+		break;
+	}
+	/* group */
+	if (mode & S_IRGRP)
+		*p++ = 'r';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	if (mode & S_IWGRP)
+		*p++ = 'w';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	switch (mode & (S_IXGRP | S_ISGID)) {
+	case 0:
+		*p++ = '-';
+		break;
+	case S_IXGRP:
+		*p++ = 'x';
+		break;
+	case S_ISGID:
+		*p++ = 'S';
+		break;
+	case S_IXGRP | S_ISGID:
+		*p++ = 's';
+		break;
+	}
+	/* other */
+	if (mode & S_IROTH)
+		*p++ = 'r';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	if (mode & S_IWOTH)
+		*p++ = 'w';
+	else
+		*p++ = '-';
+	switch (mode & (S_IXOTH | S_ISVTX)) {
+	case 0:
+		*p++ = '-';
+		break;
+	case S_IXOTH:
+		*p++ = 'x';
+		break;
+	case S_ISVTX:
+		*p++ = 'T';
+		break;
+	case S_IXOTH | S_ISVTX:
+		*p++ = 't';
+		break;
+	}
+	*p++ = ' ';		/* will be a '+' if ACL's implemented */
+	*p = '\0';
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strndup.c b/openbsd-compat/strndup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..30ac6f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/strndup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strndup.c,v 1.2 2015/08/31 02:53:57 guenther Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRNDUP) || defined(BROKEN_STRNDUP)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+char *
+strndup(const char *str, size_t maxlen)
+{
+	char *copy;
+	size_t len;
+
+	len = strnlen(str, maxlen);
+	copy = malloc(len + 1);
+	if (copy != NULL) {
+		(void)memcpy(copy, str, len);
+		copy[len] = '\0';
+	}
+
+	return copy;
+}
+DEF_WEAK(strndup);
+#endif  /* HAVE_STRNDUP */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strnlen.c b/openbsd-compat/strnlen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ad3573
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/strnlen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strnlen.c,v 1.3 2010/06/02 12:58:12 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@courtesan.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strnlen.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRNLEN) || defined(BROKEN_STRNLEN)
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+size_t
+strnlen(const char *str, size_t maxlen)
+{
+	const char *cp;
+
+	for (cp = str; maxlen != 0 && *cp != '\0'; cp++, maxlen--)
+		;
+
+	return (size_t)(cp - str);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strptime.c b/openbsd-compat/strptime.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8d83d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/strptime.c
@@ -0,0 +1,401 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strptime.c,v 1.12 2008/06/26 05:42:05 ray Exp $ */
+/*	$NetBSD: strptime.c,v 1.12 1998/01/20 21:39:40 mycroft Exp $	*/
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1997, 1998 The NetBSD Foundation, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This code was contributed to The NetBSD Foundation by Klaus Klein.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE NETBSD FOUNDATION, INC. AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED
+ * TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE FOUNDATION OR CONTRIBUTORS
+ * BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
+ * INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
+ * CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+ * POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/time/strptime.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME
+
+#define TM_YEAR_BASE 1900	/* from tzfile.h */
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <locale.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+/* #define	_ctloc(x)		(_CurrentTimeLocale->x) */
+
+/*
+ * We do not implement alternate representations. However, we always
+ * check whether a given modifier is allowed for a certain conversion.
+ */
+#define _ALT_E			0x01
+#define _ALT_O			0x02
+#define	_LEGAL_ALT(x)		{ if (alt_format & ~(x)) return (0); }
+
+
+static	int _conv_num(const unsigned char **, int *, int, int);
+static	char *_strptime(const char *, const char *, struct tm *, int);
+
+
+char *
+strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm)
+{
+	return(_strptime(buf, fmt, tm, 1));
+}
+
+static char *
+_strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm, int initialize)
+{
+	unsigned char c;
+	const unsigned char *bp;
+	size_t len;
+	int alt_format, i;
+	static int century, relyear;
+
+	if (initialize) {
+		century = TM_YEAR_BASE;
+		relyear = -1;
+	}
+
+	bp = (unsigned char *)buf;
+	while ((c = *fmt) != '\0') {
+		/* Clear `alternate' modifier prior to new conversion. */
+		alt_format = 0;
+
+		/* Eat up white-space. */
+		if (isspace(c)) {
+			while (isspace(*bp))
+				bp++;
+
+			fmt++;
+			continue;
+		}
+				
+		if ((c = *fmt++) != '%')
+			goto literal;
+
+
+again:		switch (c = *fmt++) {
+		case '%':	/* "%%" is converted to "%". */
+literal:
+		if (c != *bp++)
+			return (NULL);
+
+		break;
+
+		/*
+		 * "Alternative" modifiers. Just set the appropriate flag
+		 * and start over again.
+		 */
+		case 'E':	/* "%E?" alternative conversion modifier. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			alt_format |= _ALT_E;
+			goto again;
+
+		case 'O':	/* "%O?" alternative conversion modifier. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			alt_format |= _ALT_O;
+			goto again;
+			
+		/*
+		 * "Complex" conversion rules, implemented through recursion.
+		 */
+#if 0
+		case 'c':	/* Date and time, using the locale's format. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E);
+			if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, _ctloc(d_t_fmt), tm, 0)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+#endif
+		case 'D':	/* The date as "%m/%d/%y". */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%m/%d/%y", tm, 0)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+	
+		case 'R':	/* The time as "%H:%M". */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%H:%M", tm, 0)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'r':	/* The time as "%I:%M:%S %p". */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%I:%M:%S %p", tm, 0)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'T':	/* The time as "%H:%M:%S". */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, "%H:%M:%S", tm, 0)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+#if 0
+		case 'X':	/* The time, using the locale's format. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E);
+			if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, _ctloc(t_fmt), tm, 0)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'x':	/* The date, using the locale's format. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E);
+			if (!(bp = _strptime(bp, _ctloc(d_fmt), tm, 0)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+#endif
+		/*
+		 * "Elementary" conversion rules.
+		 */
+#if 0
+		case 'A':	/* The day of week, using the locale's form. */
+		case 'a':
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			for (i = 0; i < 7; i++) {
+				/* Full name. */
+				len = strlen(_ctloc(day[i]));
+				if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(day[i]), bp, len) == 0)
+					break;
+
+				/* Abbreviated name. */
+				len = strlen(_ctloc(abday[i]));
+				if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(abday[i]), bp, len) == 0)
+					break;
+			}
+
+			/* Nothing matched. */
+			if (i == 7)
+				return (NULL);
+
+			tm->tm_wday = i;
+			bp += len;
+			break;
+
+		case 'B':	/* The month, using the locale's form. */
+		case 'b':
+		case 'h':
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
+				/* Full name. */
+				len = strlen(_ctloc(mon[i]));
+				if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(mon[i]), bp, len) == 0)
+					break;
+
+				/* Abbreviated name. */
+				len = strlen(_ctloc(abmon[i]));
+				if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(abmon[i]), bp, len) == 0)
+					break;
+			}
+
+			/* Nothing matched. */
+			if (i == 12)
+				return (NULL);
+
+			tm->tm_mon = i;
+			bp += len;
+			break;
+#endif
+
+		case 'C':	/* The century number. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &i, 0, 99)))
+				return (NULL);
+
+			century = i * 100;
+			break;
+
+		case 'd':	/* The day of month. */
+		case 'e':
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_mday, 1, 31)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'k':	/* The hour (24-hour clock representation). */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case 'H':
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_hour, 0, 23)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'l':	/* The hour (12-hour clock representation). */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case 'I':
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_hour, 1, 12)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'j':	/* The day of year. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_yday, 1, 366)))
+				return (NULL);
+			tm->tm_yday--;
+			break;
+
+		case 'M':	/* The minute. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_min, 0, 59)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'm':	/* The month. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_mon, 1, 12)))
+				return (NULL);
+			tm->tm_mon--;
+			break;
+
+#if 0
+		case 'p':	/* The locale's equivalent of AM/PM. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			/* AM? */
+			len = strlen(_ctloc(am_pm[0]));
+			if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(am_pm[0]), bp, len) == 0) {
+				if (tm->tm_hour > 12)	/* i.e., 13:00 AM ?! */
+					return (NULL);
+				else if (tm->tm_hour == 12)
+					tm->tm_hour = 0;
+
+				bp += len;
+				break;
+			}
+			/* PM? */
+			len = strlen(_ctloc(am_pm[1]));
+			if (strncasecmp(_ctloc(am_pm[1]), bp, len) == 0) {
+				if (tm->tm_hour > 12)	/* i.e., 13:00 PM ?! */
+					return (NULL);
+				else if (tm->tm_hour < 12)
+					tm->tm_hour += 12;
+
+				bp += len;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			/* Nothing matched. */
+			return (NULL);
+#endif
+		case 'S':	/* The seconds. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_sec, 0, 61)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'U':	/* The week of year, beginning on sunday. */
+		case 'W':	/* The week of year, beginning on monday. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
+			/*
+			 * XXX This is bogus, as we can not assume any valid
+			 * information present in the tm structure at this
+			 * point to calculate a real value, so just check the
+			 * range for now.
+			 */
+			 if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &i, 0, 53)))
+				return (NULL);
+			 break;
+
+		case 'w':	/* The day of week, beginning on sunday. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_O);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &tm->tm_wday, 0, 6)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		case 'Y':	/* The year. */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &i, 0, 9999)))
+				return (NULL);
+
+			relyear = -1;
+			tm->tm_year = i - TM_YEAR_BASE;
+			break;
+
+		case 'y':	/* The year within the century (2 digits). */
+			_LEGAL_ALT(_ALT_E | _ALT_O);
+			if (!(_conv_num(&bp, &relyear, 0, 99)))
+				return (NULL);
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * Miscellaneous conversions.
+		 */
+		case 'n':	/* Any kind of white-space. */
+		case 't':
+			_LEGAL_ALT(0);
+			while (isspace(*bp))
+				bp++;
+			break;
+
+
+		default:	/* Unknown/unsupported conversion. */
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+
+
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We need to evaluate the two digit year spec (%y)
+	 * last as we can get a century spec (%C) at any time.
+	 */
+	if (relyear != -1) {
+		if (century == TM_YEAR_BASE) {
+			if (relyear <= 68)
+				tm->tm_year = relyear + 2000 - TM_YEAR_BASE;
+			else
+				tm->tm_year = relyear + 1900 - TM_YEAR_BASE;
+		} else {
+			tm->tm_year = relyear + century - TM_YEAR_BASE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return ((char *)bp);
+}
+
+
+static int
+_conv_num(const unsigned char **buf, int *dest, int llim, int ulim)
+{
+	int result = 0;
+	int rulim = ulim;
+
+	if (**buf < '0' || **buf > '9')
+		return (0);
+
+	/* we use rulim to break out of the loop when we run out of digits */
+	do {
+		result *= 10;
+		result += *(*buf)++ - '0';
+		rulim /= 10;
+	} while ((result * 10 <= ulim) && rulim && **buf >= '0' && **buf <= '9');
+
+	if (result < llim || result > ulim)
+		return (0);
+
+	*dest = result;
+	return (1);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_STRPTIME */
+
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strsep.c b/openbsd-compat/strsep.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b36eb8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/strsep.c
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strsep.c,v 1.6 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1990, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/strsep.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRSEP)
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+/*
+ * Get next token from string *stringp, where tokens are possibly-empty
+ * strings separated by characters from delim.  
+ *
+ * Writes NULs into the string at *stringp to end tokens.
+ * delim need not remain constant from call to call.
+ * On return, *stringp points past the last NUL written (if there might
+ * be further tokens), or is NULL (if there are definitely no more tokens).
+ *
+ * If *stringp is NULL, strsep returns NULL.
+ */
+char *
+strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim)
+{
+	char *s;
+	const char *spanp;
+	int c, sc;
+	char *tok;
+
+	if ((s = *stringp) == NULL)
+		return (NULL);
+	for (tok = s;;) {
+		c = *s++;
+		spanp = delim;
+		do {
+			if ((sc = *spanp++) == c) {
+				if (c == 0)
+					s = NULL;
+				else
+					s[-1] = 0;
+				*stringp = s;
+				return (tok);
+			}
+		} while (sc != 0);
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(HAVE_STRSEP) */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strtoll.c b/openbsd-compat/strtoll.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f629303
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/strtoll.c
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: strtoll.c,v 1.6 2005/11/10 10:00:17 espie Exp $ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1992 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtoll.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/*
+ * Convert a string to a long long.
+ *
+ * Ignores `locale' stuff.  Assumes that the upper and lower case
+ * alphabets and digits are each contiguous.
+ */
+long long
+strtoll(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base)
+{
+	const char *s;
+	long long acc, cutoff;
+	int c;
+	int neg, any, cutlim;
+
+	/*
+	 * Skip white space and pick up leading +/- sign if any.
+	 * If base is 0, allow 0x for hex and 0 for octal, else
+	 * assume decimal; if base is already 16, allow 0x.
+	 */
+	s = nptr;
+	do {
+		c = (unsigned char) *s++;
+	} while (isspace(c));
+	if (c == '-') {
+		neg = 1;
+		c = *s++;
+	} else {
+		neg = 0;
+		if (c == '+')
+			c = *s++;
+	}
+	if ((base == 0 || base == 16) &&
+	    c == '0' && (*s == 'x' || *s == 'X')) {
+		c = s[1];
+		s += 2;
+		base = 16;
+	}
+	if (base == 0)
+		base = c == '0' ? 8 : 10;
+
+	/*
+	 * Compute the cutoff value between legal numbers and illegal
+	 * numbers.  That is the largest legal value, divided by the
+	 * base.  An input number that is greater than this value, if
+	 * followed by a legal input character, is too big.  One that
+	 * is equal to this value may be valid or not; the limit
+	 * between valid and invalid numbers is then based on the last
+	 * digit.  For instance, if the range for long longs is
+	 * [-9223372036854775808..9223372036854775807] and the input base
+	 * is 10, cutoff will be set to 922337203685477580 and cutlim to
+	 * either 7 (neg==0) or 8 (neg==1), meaning that if we have
+	 * accumulated a value > 922337203685477580, or equal but the
+	 * next digit is > 7 (or 8), the number is too big, and we will
+	 * return a range error.
+	 *
+	 * Set any if any `digits' consumed; make it negative to indicate
+	 * overflow.
+	 */
+	cutoff = neg ? LLONG_MIN : LLONG_MAX;
+	cutlim = cutoff % base;
+	cutoff /= base;
+	if (neg) {
+		if (cutlim > 0) {
+			cutlim -= base;
+			cutoff += 1;
+		}
+		cutlim = -cutlim;
+	}
+	for (acc = 0, any = 0;; c = (unsigned char) *s++) {
+		if (isdigit(c))
+			c -= '0';
+		else if (isalpha(c))
+			c -= isupper(c) ? 'A' - 10 : 'a' - 10;
+		else
+			break;
+		if (c >= base)
+			break;
+		if (any < 0)
+			continue;
+		if (neg) {
+			if (acc < cutoff || (acc == cutoff && c > cutlim)) {
+				any = -1;
+				acc = LLONG_MIN;
+				errno = ERANGE;
+			} else {
+				any = 1;
+				acc *= base;
+				acc -= c;
+			}
+		} else {
+			if (acc > cutoff || (acc == cutoff && c > cutlim)) {
+				any = -1;
+				acc = LLONG_MAX;
+				errno = ERANGE;
+			} else {
+				any = 1;
+				acc *= base;
+				acc += c;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (endptr != 0)
+		*endptr = (char *) (any ? s - 1 : nptr);
+	return (acc);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_STRTOLL */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c b/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..130d896
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/strtonum.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strtonum.c,v 1.6 2004/08/03 19:38:01 millert Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 Ted Unangst and Todd Miller
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtonum.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#define INVALID		1
+#define TOOSMALL	2
+#define TOOLARGE	3
+
+long long
+strtonum(const char *numstr, long long minval, long long maxval,
+    const char **errstrp)
+{
+	long long ll = 0;
+	char *ep;
+	int error = 0;
+	struct errval {
+		const char *errstr;
+		int err;
+	} ev[4] = {
+		{ NULL,		0 },
+		{ "invalid",	EINVAL },
+		{ "too small",	ERANGE },
+		{ "too large",	ERANGE },
+	};
+
+	ev[0].err = errno;
+	errno = 0;
+	if (minval > maxval)
+		error = INVALID;
+	else {
+		ll = strtoll(numstr, &ep, 10);
+		if (numstr == ep || *ep != '\0')
+			error = INVALID;
+		else if ((ll == LLONG_MIN && errno == ERANGE) || ll < minval)
+			error = TOOSMALL;
+		else if ((ll == LLONG_MAX && errno == ERANGE) || ll > maxval)
+			error = TOOLARGE;
+	}
+	if (errstrp != NULL)
+		*errstrp = ev[error].errstr;
+	errno = ev[error].err;
+	if (error)
+		ll = 0;
+
+	return (ll);
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_STRTONUM */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strtoul.c b/openbsd-compat/strtoul.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8219c83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/strtoul.c
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strtoul.c,v 1.7 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1990 Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtoul.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/*
+ * Convert a string to an unsigned long integer.
+ *
+ * Ignores `locale' stuff.  Assumes that the upper and lower case
+ * alphabets and digits are each contiguous.
+ */
+unsigned long
+strtoul(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base)
+{
+	const char *s;
+	unsigned long acc, cutoff;
+	int c;
+	int neg, any, cutlim;
+
+	/*
+	 * See strtol for comments as to the logic used.
+	 */
+	s = nptr;
+	do {
+		c = (unsigned char) *s++;
+	} while (isspace(c));
+	if (c == '-') {
+		neg = 1;
+		c = *s++;
+	} else {
+		neg = 0;
+		if (c == '+')
+			c = *s++;
+	}
+	if ((base == 0 || base == 16) &&
+	    c == '0' && (*s == 'x' || *s == 'X')) {
+		c = s[1];
+		s += 2;
+		base = 16;
+	}
+	if (base == 0)
+		base = c == '0' ? 8 : 10;
+
+	cutoff = ULONG_MAX / (unsigned long)base;
+	cutlim = ULONG_MAX % (unsigned long)base;
+	for (acc = 0, any = 0;; c = (unsigned char) *s++) {
+		if (isdigit(c))
+			c -= '0';
+		else if (isalpha(c))
+			c -= isupper(c) ? 'A' - 10 : 'a' - 10;
+		else
+			break;
+		if (c >= base)
+			break;
+		if (any < 0)
+			continue;
+		if (acc > cutoff || acc == cutoff && c > cutlim) {
+			any = -1;
+			acc = ULONG_MAX;
+			errno = ERANGE;
+		} else {
+			any = 1;
+			acc *= (unsigned long)base;
+			acc += c;
+		}
+	}
+	if (neg && any > 0)
+		acc = -acc;
+	if (endptr != 0)
+		*endptr = (char *) (any ? s - 1 : nptr);
+	return (acc);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRTOUL */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/strtoull.c b/openbsd-compat/strtoull.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7c818c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/strtoull.c
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: strtoull.c,v 1.5 2005/08/08 08:05:37 espie Exp $ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1992 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/stdlib/strtoull.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/*
+ * Convert a string to an unsigned long long.
+ *
+ * Ignores `locale' stuff.  Assumes that the upper and lower case
+ * alphabets and digits are each contiguous.
+ */
+unsigned long long
+strtoull(const char *nptr, char **endptr, int base)
+{
+	const char *s;
+	unsigned long long acc, cutoff;
+	int c;
+	int neg, any, cutlim;
+
+	/*
+	 * See strtoq for comments as to the logic used.
+	 */
+	s = nptr;
+	do {
+		c = (unsigned char) *s++;
+	} while (isspace(c));
+	if (c == '-') {
+		neg = 1;
+		c = *s++;
+	} else { 
+		neg = 0;
+		if (c == '+')
+			c = *s++;
+	}
+	if ((base == 0 || base == 16) &&
+	    c == '0' && (*s == 'x' || *s == 'X')) {
+		c = s[1];
+		s += 2;
+		base = 16;
+	}
+	if (base == 0)
+		base = c == '0' ? 8 : 10;
+
+	cutoff = ULLONG_MAX / (unsigned long long)base;
+	cutlim = ULLONG_MAX % (unsigned long long)base;
+	for (acc = 0, any = 0;; c = (unsigned char) *s++) {
+		if (isdigit(c))
+			c -= '0';
+		else if (isalpha(c))
+			c -= isupper(c) ? 'A' - 10 : 'a' - 10;
+		else
+			break;
+		if (c >= base)
+			break;
+		if (any < 0)
+			continue;
+		if (acc > cutoff || (acc == cutoff && c > cutlim)) {
+			any = -1;
+			acc = ULLONG_MAX;
+			errno = ERANGE;
+		} else {
+			any = 1;
+			acc *= (unsigned long long)base;
+			acc += c;
+		}
+	}
+	if (neg && any > 0)
+		acc = -acc;
+	if (endptr != 0)
+		*endptr = (char *) (any ? s - 1 : nptr);
+	return (acc);
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRTOULL */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h b/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..816c15c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
@@ -0,0 +1,628 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: queue.h,v 1.45 2018/07/12 14:22:54 sashan Exp $	*/
+/*	$NetBSD: queue.h,v 1.11 1996/05/16 05:17:14 mycroft Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *	@(#)queue.h	8.5 (Berkeley) 8/20/94
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/queue.h */
+
+#ifndef	_FAKE_QUEUE_H_
+#define	_FAKE_QUEUE_H_
+
+/*
+ * Require for OS/X and other platforms that have old/broken/incomplete
+ * <sys/queue.h>.
+ */
+#undef CIRCLEQ_EMPTY
+#undef CIRCLEQ_END
+#undef CIRCLEQ_ENTRY
+#undef CIRCLEQ_FIRST
+#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH
+#undef CIRCLEQ_FOREACH_REVERSE
+#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD
+#undef CIRCLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INIT
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_BEFORE
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef CIRCLEQ_INSERT_TAIL
+#undef CIRCLEQ_LAST
+#undef CIRCLEQ_NEXT
+#undef CIRCLEQ_PREV
+#undef CIRCLEQ_REMOVE
+#undef CIRCLEQ_REPLACE
+#undef LIST_EMPTY
+#undef LIST_END
+#undef LIST_ENTRY
+#undef LIST_FIRST
+#undef LIST_FOREACH
+#undef LIST_FOREACH_SAFE
+#undef LIST_HEAD
+#undef LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef LIST_INIT
+#undef LIST_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef LIST_INSERT_BEFORE
+#undef LIST_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef LIST_NEXT
+#undef LIST_REMOVE
+#undef LIST_REPLACE
+#undef SIMPLEQ_CONCAT
+#undef SIMPLEQ_EMPTY
+#undef SIMPLEQ_END
+#undef SIMPLEQ_ENTRY
+#undef SIMPLEQ_FIRST
+#undef SIMPLEQ_FOREACH
+#undef SIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE
+#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD
+#undef SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef SIMPLEQ_INIT
+#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL
+#undef SIMPLEQ_NEXT
+#undef SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_AFTER
+#undef SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD
+#undef SLIST_EMPTY
+#undef SLIST_END
+#undef SLIST_ENTRY
+#undef SLIST_FIRST
+#undef SLIST_FOREACH
+#undef SLIST_FOREACH_PREVPTR
+#undef SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE
+#undef SLIST_HEAD
+#undef SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef SLIST_INIT
+#undef SLIST_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef SLIST_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef SLIST_NEXT
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE_AFTER
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD
+#undef SLIST_REMOVE_NEXT
+#undef TAILQ_CONCAT
+#undef TAILQ_EMPTY
+#undef TAILQ_END
+#undef TAILQ_ENTRY
+#undef TAILQ_FIRST
+#undef TAILQ_FOREACH
+#undef TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE
+#undef TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE
+#undef TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE
+#undef TAILQ_HEAD
+#undef TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER
+#undef TAILQ_INIT
+#undef TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER
+#undef TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE
+#undef TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD
+#undef TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL
+#undef TAILQ_LAST
+#undef TAILQ_NEXT
+#undef TAILQ_PREV
+#undef TAILQ_REMOVE
+#undef TAILQ_REPLACE
+
+/*
+ * This file defines five types of data structures: singly-linked lists,
+ * lists, simple queues, tail queues and XOR simple queues.
+ *
+ *
+ * A singly-linked list is headed by a single forward pointer. The elements
+ * are singly linked for minimum space and pointer manipulation overhead at
+ * the expense of O(n) removal for arbitrary elements. New elements can be
+ * added to the list after an existing element or at the head of the list.
+ * Elements being removed from the head of the list should use the explicit
+ * macro for this purpose for optimum efficiency. A singly-linked list may
+ * only be traversed in the forward direction.  Singly-linked lists are ideal
+ * for applications with large datasets and few or no removals or for
+ * implementing a LIFO queue.
+ *
+ * A list is headed by a single forward pointer (or an array of forward
+ * pointers for a hash table header). The elements are doubly linked
+ * so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to
+ * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before
+ * or after an existing element or at the head of the list. A list
+ * may only be traversed in the forward direction.
+ *
+ * A simple queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the
+ * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are singly
+ * linked to save space, so elements can only be removed from the
+ * head of the list. New elements can be added to the list before or after
+ * an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of the
+ * list. A simple queue may only be traversed in the forward direction.
+ *
+ * A tail queue is headed by a pair of pointers, one to the head of the
+ * list and the other to the tail of the list. The elements are doubly
+ * linked so that an arbitrary element can be removed without a need to
+ * traverse the list. New elements can be added to the list before or
+ * after an existing element, at the head of the list, or at the end of
+ * the list. A tail queue may be traversed in either direction.
+ *
+ * An XOR simple queue is used in the same way as a regular simple queue.
+ * The difference is that the head structure also includes a "cookie" that
+ * is XOR'd with the queue pointer (first, last or next) to generate the
+ * real pointer value.
+ *
+ * For details on the use of these macros, see the queue(3) manual page.
+ */
+
+#if defined(QUEUE_MACRO_DEBUG) || (defined(_KERNEL) && defined(DIAGNOSTIC))
+#define _Q_INVALID ((void *)-1)
+#define _Q_INVALIDATE(a) (a) = _Q_INVALID
+#else
+#define _Q_INVALIDATE(a)
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Singly-linked List definitions.
+ */
+#define SLIST_HEAD(name, type)						\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *slh_first;	/* first element */			\
+}
+
+#define	SLIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head)					\
+	{ NULL }
+
+#define SLIST_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *sle_next;	/* next element */			\
+}
+
+/*
+ * Singly-linked List access methods.
+ */
+#define	SLIST_FIRST(head)	((head)->slh_first)
+#define	SLIST_END(head)		NULL
+#define	SLIST_EMPTY(head)	(SLIST_FIRST(head) == SLIST_END(head))
+#define	SLIST_NEXT(elm, field)	((elm)->field.sle_next)
+
+#define	SLIST_FOREACH(var, head, field)					\
+	for((var) = SLIST_FIRST(head);					\
+	    (var) != SLIST_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field))
+
+#define	SLIST_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar)			\
+	for ((var) = SLIST_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) && ((tvar) = SLIST_NEXT(var, field), 1);		\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
+/*
+ * Singly-linked List functions.
+ */
+#define	SLIST_INIT(head) {						\
+	SLIST_FIRST(head) = SLIST_END(head);				\
+}
+
+#define	SLIST_INSERT_AFTER(slistelm, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.sle_next = (slistelm)->field.sle_next;		\
+	(slistelm)->field.sle_next = (elm);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define	SLIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.sle_next = (head)->slh_first;			\
+	(head)->slh_first = (elm);					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define	SLIST_REMOVE_AFTER(elm, field) do {				\
+	(elm)->field.sle_next = (elm)->field.sle_next->field.sle_next;	\
+} while (0)
+
+#define	SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do {				\
+	(head)->slh_first = (head)->slh_first->field.sle_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SLIST_REMOVE(head, elm, type, field) do {			\
+	if ((head)->slh_first == (elm)) {				\
+		SLIST_REMOVE_HEAD((head), field);			\
+	} else {							\
+		struct type *curelm = (head)->slh_first;		\
+									\
+		while (curelm->field.sle_next != (elm))			\
+			curelm = curelm->field.sle_next;		\
+		curelm->field.sle_next =				\
+		    curelm->field.sle_next->field.sle_next;		\
+	}								\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.sle_next);				\
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * List definitions.
+ */
+#define LIST_HEAD(name, type)						\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *lh_first;	/* first element */			\
+}
+
+#define LIST_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head)					\
+	{ NULL }
+
+#define LIST_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *le_next;	/* next element */			\
+	struct type **le_prev;	/* address of previous next element */	\
+}
+
+/*
+ * List access methods.
+ */
+#define	LIST_FIRST(head)		((head)->lh_first)
+#define	LIST_END(head)			NULL
+#define	LIST_EMPTY(head)		(LIST_FIRST(head) == LIST_END(head))
+#define	LIST_NEXT(elm, field)		((elm)->field.le_next)
+
+#define LIST_FOREACH(var, head, field)					\
+	for((var) = LIST_FIRST(head);					\
+	    (var)!= LIST_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = LIST_NEXT(var, field))
+
+#define	LIST_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar)			\
+	for ((var) = LIST_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) && ((tvar) = LIST_NEXT(var, field), 1);		\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
+/*
+ * List functions.
+ */
+#define	LIST_INIT(head) do {						\
+	LIST_FIRST(head) = LIST_END(head);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define LIST_INSERT_AFTER(listelm, elm, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm)->field.le_next = (listelm)->field.le_next) != NULL)	\
+		(listelm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev =		\
+		    &(elm)->field.le_next;				\
+	(listelm)->field.le_next = (elm);				\
+	(elm)->field.le_prev = &(listelm)->field.le_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define	LIST_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.le_prev = (listelm)->field.le_prev;		\
+	(elm)->field.le_next = (listelm);				\
+	*(listelm)->field.le_prev = (elm);				\
+	(listelm)->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define LIST_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do {				\
+	if (((elm)->field.le_next = (head)->lh_first) != NULL)		\
+		(head)->lh_first->field.le_prev = &(elm)->field.le_next;\
+	(head)->lh_first = (elm);					\
+	(elm)->field.le_prev = &(head)->lh_first;			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define LIST_REMOVE(elm, field) do {					\
+	if ((elm)->field.le_next != NULL)				\
+		(elm)->field.le_next->field.le_prev =			\
+		    (elm)->field.le_prev;				\
+	*(elm)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_next;			\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_prev);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_next);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define LIST_REPLACE(elm, elm2, field) do {				\
+	if (((elm2)->field.le_next = (elm)->field.le_next) != NULL)	\
+		(elm2)->field.le_next->field.le_prev =			\
+		    &(elm2)->field.le_next;				\
+	(elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm)->field.le_prev;			\
+	*(elm2)->field.le_prev = (elm2);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_prev);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.le_next);				\
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * Simple queue definitions.
+ */
+#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD(name, type)					\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *sqh_first;	/* first element */			\
+	struct type **sqh_last;	/* addr of last next element */		\
+}
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head)					\
+	{ NULL, &(head).sqh_first }
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *sqe_next;	/* next element */			\
+}
+
+/*
+ * Simple queue access methods.
+ */
+#define	SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head)	    ((head)->sqh_first)
+#define	SIMPLEQ_END(head)	    NULL
+#define	SIMPLEQ_EMPTY(head)	    (SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) == SIMPLEQ_END(head))
+#define	SIMPLEQ_NEXT(elm, field)    ((elm)->field.sqe_next)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field)				\
+	for((var) = SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) != SIMPLEQ_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field))
+
+#define	SIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar)			\
+	for ((var) = SIMPLEQ_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) && ((tvar) = SIMPLEQ_NEXT(var, field), 1);		\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
+/*
+ * Simple queue functions.
+ */
+#define	SIMPLEQ_INIT(head) do {						\
+	(head)->sqh_first = NULL;					\
+	(head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first;				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (head)->sqh_first) == NULL)	\
+		(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next;		\
+	(head)->sqh_first = (elm);					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.sqe_next = NULL;					\
+	*(head)->sqh_last = (elm);					\
+	(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next;			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do {		\
+	if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (listelm)->field.sqe_next) == NULL)\
+		(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next;		\
+	(listelm)->field.sqe_next = (elm);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do {			\
+	if (((head)->sqh_first = (head)->sqh_first->field.sqe_next) == NULL) \
+		(head)->sqh_last = &(head)->sqh_first;			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_REMOVE_AFTER(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm)->field.sqe_next = (elm)->field.sqe_next->field.sqe_next) \
+	    == NULL)							\
+		(head)->sqh_last = &(elm)->field.sqe_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SIMPLEQ_CONCAT(head1, head2) do {				\
+	if (!SIMPLEQ_EMPTY((head2))) {					\
+		*(head1)->sqh_last = (head2)->sqh_first;		\
+		(head1)->sqh_last = (head2)->sqh_last;			\
+		SIMPLEQ_INIT((head2));					\
+	}								\
+} while (0)
+
+/*
+ * XOR Simple queue definitions.
+ */
+#define XSIMPLEQ_HEAD(name, type)					\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *sqx_first;	/* first element */			\
+	struct type **sqx_last;	/* addr of last next element */		\
+	unsigned long sqx_cookie;					\
+}
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *sqx_next;	/* next element */			\
+}
+
+/*
+ * XOR Simple queue access methods.
+ */
+#define XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, ptr)	    ((__typeof(ptr))((head)->sqx_cookie ^ \
+					(unsigned long)(ptr)))
+#define	XSIMPLEQ_FIRST(head)	    XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, ((head)->sqx_first))
+#define	XSIMPLEQ_END(head)	    NULL
+#define	XSIMPLEQ_EMPTY(head)	    (XSIMPLEQ_FIRST(head) == XSIMPLEQ_END(head))
+#define	XSIMPLEQ_NEXT(head, elm, field)    XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, ((elm)->field.sqx_next))
+
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_FOREACH(var, head, field)				\
+	for ((var) = XSIMPLEQ_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) != XSIMPLEQ_END(head);				\
+	    (var) = XSIMPLEQ_NEXT(head, var, field))
+
+#define	XSIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar)			\
+	for ((var) = XSIMPLEQ_FIRST(head);				\
+	    (var) && ((tvar) = XSIMPLEQ_NEXT(head, var, field), 1);	\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
+/*
+ * XOR Simple queue functions.
+ */
+#define	XSIMPLEQ_INIT(head) do {					\
+	arc4random_buf(&(head)->sqx_cookie, sizeof((head)->sqx_cookie)); \
+	(head)->sqx_first = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL);			\
+	(head)->sqx_last = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(head)->sqx_first);	\
+} while (0)
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm)->field.sqx_next = (head)->sqx_first) ==		\
+	    XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL))					\
+		(head)->sqx_last = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(elm)->field.sqx_next); \
+	(head)->sqx_first = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, (elm));			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.sqx_next = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL);		\
+	*(XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, (head)->sqx_last)) = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, (elm)); \
+	(head)->sqx_last = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(elm)->field.sqx_next);	\
+} while (0)
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do {		\
+	if (((elm)->field.sqx_next = (listelm)->field.sqx_next) ==	\
+	    XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL))					\
+		(head)->sqx_last = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(elm)->field.sqx_next); \
+	(listelm)->field.sqx_next = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, (elm));		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_REMOVE_HEAD(head, field) do {				\
+	if (((head)->sqx_first = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head,			\
+	    (head)->sqx_first)->field.sqx_next) == XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL)) \
+		(head)->sqx_last = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(head)->sqx_first); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define XSIMPLEQ_REMOVE_AFTER(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm)->field.sqx_next = XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head,			\
+	    (elm)->field.sqx_next)->field.sqx_next)			\
+	    == XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, NULL))				\
+		(head)->sqx_last = 					\
+		    XSIMPLEQ_XOR(head, &(elm)->field.sqx_next);		\
+} while (0)
+
+
+/*
+ * Tail queue definitions.
+ */
+#define TAILQ_HEAD(name, type)						\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *tqh_first;	/* first element */			\
+	struct type **tqh_last;	/* addr of last next element */		\
+}
+
+#define TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(head)					\
+	{ NULL, &(head).tqh_first }
+
+#define TAILQ_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *tqe_next;	/* next element */			\
+	struct type **tqe_prev;	/* address of previous next element */	\
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tail queue access methods.
+ */
+#define	TAILQ_FIRST(head)		((head)->tqh_first)
+#define	TAILQ_END(head)			NULL
+#define	TAILQ_NEXT(elm, field)		((elm)->field.tqe_next)
+#define TAILQ_LAST(head, headname)					\
+	(*(((struct headname *)((head)->tqh_last))->tqh_last))
+/* XXX */
+#define TAILQ_PREV(elm, headname, field)				\
+	(*(((struct headname *)((elm)->field.tqe_prev))->tqh_last))
+#define	TAILQ_EMPTY(head)						\
+	(TAILQ_FIRST(head) == TAILQ_END(head))
+
+#define TAILQ_FOREACH(var, head, field)					\
+	for((var) = TAILQ_FIRST(head);					\
+	    (var) != TAILQ_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field))
+
+#define	TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(var, head, field, tvar)			\
+	for ((var) = TAILQ_FIRST(head);					\
+	    (var) != TAILQ_END(head) &&					\
+	    ((tvar) = TAILQ_NEXT(var, field), 1);			\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
+
+#define TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(var, head, headname, field)		\
+	for((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname);				\
+	    (var) != TAILQ_END(head);					\
+	    (var) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field))
+
+#define	TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(var, head, headname, field, tvar)	\
+	for ((var) = TAILQ_LAST(head, headname);			\
+	    (var) != TAILQ_END(head) &&					\
+	    ((tvar) = TAILQ_PREV(var, headname, field), 1);		\
+	    (var) = (tvar))
+
+/*
+ * Tail queue functions.
+ */
+#define	TAILQ_INIT(head) do {						\
+	(head)->tqh_first = NULL;					\
+	(head)->tqh_last = &(head)->tqh_first;				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (head)->tqh_first) != NULL)	\
+		(head)->tqh_first->field.tqe_prev =			\
+		    &(elm)->field.tqe_next;				\
+	else								\
+		(head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next;		\
+	(head)->tqh_first = (elm);					\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(head)->tqh_first;			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(head, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_next = NULL;					\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (head)->tqh_last;			\
+	*(head)->tqh_last = (elm);					\
+	(head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next;			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_INSERT_AFTER(head, listelm, elm, field) do {		\
+	if (((elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL)\
+		(elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev =			\
+		    &(elm)->field.tqe_next;				\
+	else								\
+		(head)->tqh_last = &(elm)->field.tqe_next;		\
+	(listelm)->field.tqe_next = (elm);				\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_prev = &(listelm)->field.tqe_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define	TAILQ_INSERT_BEFORE(listelm, elm, field) do {			\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (listelm)->field.tqe_prev;		\
+	(elm)->field.tqe_next = (listelm);				\
+	*(listelm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm);				\
+	(listelm)->field.tqe_prev = &(elm)->field.tqe_next;		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_REMOVE(head, elm, field) do {				\
+	if (((elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL)				\
+		(elm)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev =			\
+		    (elm)->field.tqe_prev;				\
+	else								\
+		(head)->tqh_last = (elm)->field.tqe_prev;		\
+	*(elm)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_next;			\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_prev);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_next);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_REPLACE(head, elm, elm2, field) do {			\
+	if (((elm2)->field.tqe_next = (elm)->field.tqe_next) != NULL)	\
+		(elm2)->field.tqe_next->field.tqe_prev =		\
+		    &(elm2)->field.tqe_next;				\
+	else								\
+		(head)->tqh_last = &(elm2)->field.tqe_next;		\
+	(elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm)->field.tqe_prev;			\
+	*(elm2)->field.tqe_prev = (elm2);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_prev);				\
+	_Q_INVALIDATE((elm)->field.tqe_next);				\
+} while (0)
+
+#define TAILQ_CONCAT(head1, head2, field) do {				\
+	if (!TAILQ_EMPTY(head2)) {					\
+		*(head1)->tqh_last = (head2)->tqh_first;		\
+		(head2)->tqh_first->field.tqe_prev = (head1)->tqh_last;	\
+		(head1)->tqh_last = (head2)->tqh_last;			\
+		TAILQ_INIT((head2));					\
+	}								\
+} while (0)
+
+#endif	/* !_SYS_QUEUE_H_ */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h b/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f7546e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h
@@ -0,0 +1,755 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: tree.h,v 1.13 2011/07/09 00:19:45 pirofti Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: sys/sys/tree.h */
+
+#include "config.h"
+#ifdef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE
+# define __attribute__(x)
+#endif
+
+#ifndef	_SYS_TREE_H_
+#define	_SYS_TREE_H_
+
+/*
+ * This file defines data structures for different types of trees:
+ * splay trees and red-black trees.
+ *
+ * A splay tree is a self-organizing data structure.  Every operation
+ * on the tree causes a splay to happen.  The splay moves the requested
+ * node to the root of the tree and partly rebalances it.
+ *
+ * This has the benefit that request locality causes faster lookups as
+ * the requested nodes move to the top of the tree.  On the other hand,
+ * every lookup causes memory writes.
+ *
+ * The Balance Theorem bounds the total access time for m operations
+ * and n inserts on an initially empty tree as O((m + n)lg n).  The
+ * amortized cost for a sequence of m accesses to a splay tree is O(lg n);
+ *
+ * A red-black tree is a binary search tree with the node color as an
+ * extra attribute.  It fulfills a set of conditions:
+ *	- every search path from the root to a leaf consists of the
+ *	  same number of black nodes,
+ *	- each red node (except for the root) has a black parent,
+ *	- each leaf node is black.
+ *
+ * Every operation on a red-black tree is bounded as O(lg n).
+ * The maximum height of a red-black tree is 2lg (n+1).
+ */
+
+#define SPLAY_HEAD(name, type)						\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *sph_root; /* root of the tree */			\
+}
+
+#define SPLAY_INITIALIZER(root)						\
+	{ NULL }
+
+#define SPLAY_INIT(root) do {						\
+	(root)->sph_root = NULL;					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SPLAY_ENTRY(type)						\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *spe_left; /* left element */			\
+	struct type *spe_right; /* right element */			\
+}
+
+#define SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field)		(elm)->field.spe_left
+#define SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field)		(elm)->field.spe_right
+#define SPLAY_ROOT(head)		(head)->sph_root
+#define SPLAY_EMPTY(head)		(SPLAY_ROOT(head) == NULL)
+
+/* SPLAY_ROTATE_{LEFT,RIGHT} expect that tmp hold SPLAY_{RIGHT,LEFT} */
+#define SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, tmp, field) do {			\
+	SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field);	\
+	SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root;			\
+	(head)->sph_root = tmp;						\
+} while (0)
+	
+#define SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, tmp, field) do {			\
+	SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field);	\
+	SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root;			\
+	(head)->sph_root = tmp;						\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, tmp, field) do {				\
+	SPLAY_LEFT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root;			\
+	tmp = (head)->sph_root;						\
+	(head)->sph_root = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);		\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, tmp, field) do {				\
+	SPLAY_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (head)->sph_root;			\
+	tmp = (head)->sph_root;						\
+	(head)->sph_root = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+} while (0)
+
+#define SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, node, left, right, field) do {		\
+	SPLAY_RIGHT(left, field) = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+	SPLAY_LEFT(right, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\
+	SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(node, field);	\
+	SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = SPLAY_LEFT(node, field);	\
+} while (0)
+
+/* Generates prototypes and inline functions */
+
+#define SPLAY_PROTOTYPE(name, type, field, cmp)				\
+void name##_SPLAY(struct name *, struct type *);			\
+void name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(struct name *, int);				\
+struct type *name##_SPLAY_INSERT(struct name *, struct type *);		\
+struct type *name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(struct name *, struct type *);		\
+									\
+/* Finds the node with the same key as elm */				\
+static __inline struct type *						\
+name##_SPLAY_FIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head))						\
+		return(NULL);						\
+	name##_SPLAY(head, elm);					\
+	if ((cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root) == 0)				\
+		return (head->sph_root);				\
+	return (NULL);							\
+}									\
+									\
+static __inline struct type *						\
+name##_SPLAY_NEXT(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	name##_SPLAY(head, elm);					\
+	if (SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) != NULL) {				\
+		elm = SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field);				\
+		while (SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) != NULL) {		\
+			elm = SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field);			\
+		}							\
+	} else								\
+		elm = NULL;						\
+	return (elm);							\
+}									\
+									\
+static __inline struct type *						\
+name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(struct name *head, int val)			\
+{									\
+	name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(head, val);					\
+        return (SPLAY_ROOT(head));					\
+}
+
+/* Main splay operation.
+ * Moves node close to the key of elm to top
+ */
+#define SPLAY_GENERATE(name, type, field, cmp)				\
+struct type *								\
+name##_SPLAY_INSERT(struct name *head, struct type *elm)		\
+{									\
+    if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head)) {						\
+	    SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = NULL;	\
+    } else {								\
+	    int __comp;							\
+	    name##_SPLAY(head, elm);					\
+	    __comp = (cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root);			\
+	    if(__comp < 0) {						\
+		    SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);\
+		    SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = (head)->sph_root;		\
+		    SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) = NULL;		\
+	    } else if (__comp > 0) {					\
+		    SPLAY_RIGHT(elm, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\
+		    SPLAY_LEFT(elm, field) = (head)->sph_root;		\
+		    SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = NULL;	\
+	    } else							\
+		    return ((head)->sph_root);				\
+    }									\
+    (head)->sph_root = (elm);						\
+    return (NULL);							\
+}									\
+									\
+struct type *								\
+name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(struct name *head, struct type *elm)		\
+{									\
+	struct type *__tmp;						\
+	if (SPLAY_EMPTY(head))						\
+		return (NULL);						\
+	name##_SPLAY(head, elm);					\
+	if ((cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root) == 0) {			\
+		if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL) {	\
+			(head)->sph_root = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);\
+		} else {						\
+			__tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+			(head)->sph_root = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);\
+			name##_SPLAY(head, elm);			\
+			SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) = __tmp;	\
+		}							\
+		return (elm);						\
+	}								\
+	return (NULL);							\
+}									\
+									\
+void									\
+name##_SPLAY(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	struct type __node, *__left, *__right, *__tmp;			\
+	int __comp;							\
+\
+	SPLAY_LEFT(&__node, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(&__node, field) = NULL;\
+	__left = __right = &__node;					\
+\
+	while ((__comp = (cmp)(elm, (head)->sph_root))) {		\
+		if (__comp < 0) {					\
+			__tmp = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+			if (__tmp == NULL)				\
+				break;					\
+			if ((cmp)(elm, __tmp) < 0){			\
+				SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, __tmp, field);	\
+				if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\
+					break;				\
+			}						\
+			SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, __right, field);		\
+		} else if (__comp > 0) {				\
+			__tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+			if (__tmp == NULL)				\
+				break;					\
+			if ((cmp)(elm, __tmp) > 0){			\
+				SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, __tmp, field);	\
+				if (SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\
+					break;				\
+			}						\
+			SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, __left, field);		\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, &__node, __left, __right, field);		\
+}									\
+									\
+/* Splay with either the minimum or the maximum element			\
+ * Used to find minimum or maximum element in tree.			\
+ */									\
+void name##_SPLAY_MINMAX(struct name *head, int __comp) \
+{									\
+	struct type __node, *__left, *__right, *__tmp;			\
+\
+	SPLAY_LEFT(&__node, field) = SPLAY_RIGHT(&__node, field) = NULL;\
+	__left = __right = &__node;					\
+\
+	while (1) {							\
+		if (__comp < 0) {					\
+			__tmp = SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+			if (__tmp == NULL)				\
+				break;					\
+			if (__comp < 0){				\
+				SPLAY_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, __tmp, field);	\
+				if (SPLAY_LEFT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\
+					break;				\
+			}						\
+			SPLAY_LINKLEFT(head, __right, field);		\
+		} else if (__comp > 0) {				\
+			__tmp = SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field);	\
+			if (__tmp == NULL)				\
+				break;					\
+			if (__comp > 0) {				\
+				SPLAY_ROTATE_LEFT(head, __tmp, field);	\
+				if (SPLAY_RIGHT((head)->sph_root, field) == NULL)\
+					break;				\
+			}						\
+			SPLAY_LINKRIGHT(head, __left, field);		\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	SPLAY_ASSEMBLE(head, &__node, __left, __right, field);		\
+}
+
+#define SPLAY_NEGINF	-1
+#define SPLAY_INF	1
+
+#define SPLAY_INSERT(name, x, y)	name##_SPLAY_INSERT(x, y)
+#define SPLAY_REMOVE(name, x, y)	name##_SPLAY_REMOVE(x, y)
+#define SPLAY_FIND(name, x, y)		name##_SPLAY_FIND(x, y)
+#define SPLAY_NEXT(name, x, y)		name##_SPLAY_NEXT(x, y)
+#define SPLAY_MIN(name, x)		(SPLAY_EMPTY(x) ? NULL	\
+					: name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(x, SPLAY_NEGINF))
+#define SPLAY_MAX(name, x)		(SPLAY_EMPTY(x) ? NULL	\
+					: name##_SPLAY_MIN_MAX(x, SPLAY_INF))
+
+#define SPLAY_FOREACH(x, name, head)					\
+	for ((x) = SPLAY_MIN(name, head);				\
+	     (x) != NULL;						\
+	     (x) = SPLAY_NEXT(name, head, x))
+
+/* Macros that define a red-black tree */
+#define RB_HEAD(name, type)						\
+struct name {								\
+	struct type *rbh_root; /* root of the tree */			\
+}
+
+#define RB_INITIALIZER(root)						\
+	{ NULL }
+
+#define RB_INIT(root) do {						\
+	(root)->rbh_root = NULL;					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define RB_BLACK	0
+#define RB_RED		1
+#define RB_ENTRY(type)							\
+struct {								\
+	struct type *rbe_left;		/* left element */		\
+	struct type *rbe_right;		/* right element */		\
+	struct type *rbe_parent;	/* parent element */		\
+	int rbe_color;			/* node color */		\
+}
+
+#define RB_LEFT(elm, field)		(elm)->field.rbe_left
+#define RB_RIGHT(elm, field)		(elm)->field.rbe_right
+#define RB_PARENT(elm, field)		(elm)->field.rbe_parent
+#define RB_COLOR(elm, field)		(elm)->field.rbe_color
+#define RB_ROOT(head)			(head)->rbh_root
+#define RB_EMPTY(head)			(RB_ROOT(head) == NULL)
+
+#define RB_SET(elm, parent, field) do {					\
+	RB_PARENT(elm, field) = parent;					\
+	RB_LEFT(elm, field) = RB_RIGHT(elm, field) = NULL;		\
+	RB_COLOR(elm, field) = RB_RED;					\
+} while (0)
+
+#define RB_SET_BLACKRED(black, red, field) do {				\
+	RB_COLOR(black, field) = RB_BLACK;				\
+	RB_COLOR(red, field) = RB_RED;					\
+} while (0)
+
+#ifndef RB_AUGMENT
+#define RB_AUGMENT(x)	do {} while (0)
+#endif
+
+#define RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, elm, tmp, field) do {			\
+	(tmp) = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);					\
+	if ((RB_RIGHT(elm, field) = RB_LEFT(tmp, field))) {		\
+		RB_PARENT(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) = (elm);		\
+	}								\
+	RB_AUGMENT(elm);						\
+	if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field) = RB_PARENT(elm, field))) {		\
+		if ((elm) == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field))	\
+			RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp);	\
+		else							\
+			RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp);	\
+	} else								\
+		(head)->rbh_root = (tmp);				\
+	RB_LEFT(tmp, field) = (elm);					\
+	RB_PARENT(elm, field) = (tmp);					\
+	RB_AUGMENT(tmp);						\
+	if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field)))					\
+		RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(tmp, field));			\
+} while (0)
+
+#define RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, elm, tmp, field) do {			\
+	(tmp) = RB_LEFT(elm, field);					\
+	if ((RB_LEFT(elm, field) = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field))) {		\
+		RB_PARENT(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) = (elm);		\
+	}								\
+	RB_AUGMENT(elm);						\
+	if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field) = RB_PARENT(elm, field))) {		\
+		if ((elm) == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field))	\
+			RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp);	\
+		else							\
+			RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field) = (tmp);	\
+	} else								\
+		(head)->rbh_root = (tmp);				\
+	RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) = (elm);					\
+	RB_PARENT(elm, field) = (tmp);					\
+	RB_AUGMENT(tmp);						\
+	if ((RB_PARENT(tmp, field)))					\
+		RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(tmp, field));			\
+} while (0)
+
+/* Generates prototypes and inline functions */
+#define	RB_PROTOTYPE(name, type, field, cmp)				\
+	RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp,)
+#define	RB_PROTOTYPE_STATIC(name, type, field, cmp)			\
+	RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, __attribute__((__unused__)) static)
+#define RB_PROTOTYPE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, attr)		\
+attr void name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *, struct type *);		\
+attr void name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *, struct type *, struct type *);\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_REMOVE(struct name *, struct type *);	\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *, struct type *);	\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_FIND(struct name *, struct type *);		\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_NFIND(struct name *, struct type *);	\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_NEXT(struct type *);			\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_PREV(struct type *);			\
+attr struct type *name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *, int);			\
+									\
+
+/* Main rb operation.
+ * Moves node close to the key of elm to top
+ */
+#define	RB_GENERATE(name, type, field, cmp)				\
+	RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp,)
+#define	RB_GENERATE_STATIC(name, type, field, cmp)			\
+	RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, __attribute__((__unused__)) static)
+#define RB_GENERATE_INTERNAL(name, type, field, cmp, attr)		\
+attr void								\
+name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(struct name *head, struct type *elm)		\
+{									\
+	struct type *parent, *gparent, *tmp;				\
+	while ((parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field)) &&			\
+	    RB_COLOR(parent, field) == RB_RED) {			\
+		gparent = RB_PARENT(parent, field);			\
+		if (parent == RB_LEFT(gparent, field)) {		\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(gparent, field);			\
+			if (tmp && RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) {	\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_BLACK;	\
+				RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);\
+				elm = gparent;				\
+				continue;				\
+			}						\
+			if (RB_RIGHT(parent, field) == elm) {		\
+				RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				tmp = parent;				\
+				parent = elm;				\
+				elm = tmp;				\
+			}						\
+			RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);	\
+			RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, gparent, tmp, field);	\
+		} else {						\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(gparent, field);			\
+			if (tmp && RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) {	\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_BLACK;	\
+				RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);\
+				elm = gparent;				\
+				continue;				\
+			}						\
+			if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) {		\
+				RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				tmp = parent;				\
+				parent = elm;				\
+				elm = tmp;				\
+			}						\
+			RB_SET_BLACKRED(parent, gparent, field);	\
+			RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, gparent, tmp, field);	\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	RB_COLOR(head->rbh_root, field) = RB_BLACK;			\
+}									\
+									\
+attr void								\
+name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(struct name *head, struct type *parent, struct type *elm) \
+{									\
+	struct type *tmp;						\
+	while ((elm == NULL || RB_COLOR(elm, field) == RB_BLACK) &&	\
+	    elm != RB_ROOT(head)) {					\
+		if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm) {			\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field);			\
+			if (RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) {		\
+				RB_SET_BLACKRED(tmp, parent, field);	\
+				RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field);		\
+			}						\
+			if ((RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL ||		\
+			    RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) &&\
+			    (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL ||		\
+			    RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK)) {\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED;		\
+				elm = parent;				\
+				parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field);		\
+			} else {					\
+				if (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL ||	\
+				    RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) {\
+					struct type *oleft;		\
+					if ((oleft = RB_LEFT(tmp, field)))\
+						RB_COLOR(oleft, field) = RB_BLACK;\
+					RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED;	\
+					RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, tmp, oleft, field);\
+					tmp = RB_RIGHT(parent, field);	\
+				}					\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_COLOR(parent, field);\
+				RB_COLOR(parent, field) = RB_BLACK;	\
+				if (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field))		\
+					RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) = RB_BLACK;\
+				RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				elm = RB_ROOT(head);			\
+				break;					\
+			}						\
+		} else {						\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field);			\
+			if (RB_COLOR(tmp, field) == RB_RED) {		\
+				RB_SET_BLACKRED(tmp, parent, field);	\
+				RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field);		\
+			}						\
+			if ((RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL ||		\
+			    RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) &&\
+			    (RB_RIGHT(tmp, field) == NULL ||		\
+			    RB_COLOR(RB_RIGHT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK)) {\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED;		\
+				elm = parent;				\
+				parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field);		\
+			} else {					\
+				if (RB_LEFT(tmp, field) == NULL ||	\
+				    RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) == RB_BLACK) {\
+					struct type *oright;		\
+					if ((oright = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field)))\
+						RB_COLOR(oright, field) = RB_BLACK;\
+					RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_RED;	\
+					RB_ROTATE_LEFT(head, tmp, oright, field);\
+					tmp = RB_LEFT(parent, field);	\
+				}					\
+				RB_COLOR(tmp, field) = RB_COLOR(parent, field);\
+				RB_COLOR(parent, field) = RB_BLACK;	\
+				if (RB_LEFT(tmp, field))		\
+					RB_COLOR(RB_LEFT(tmp, field), field) = RB_BLACK;\
+				RB_ROTATE_RIGHT(head, parent, tmp, field);\
+				elm = RB_ROOT(head);			\
+				break;					\
+			}						\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	if (elm)							\
+		RB_COLOR(elm, field) = RB_BLACK;			\
+}									\
+									\
+attr struct type *							\
+name##_RB_REMOVE(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	struct type *child, *parent, *old = elm;			\
+	int color;							\
+	if (RB_LEFT(elm, field) == NULL)				\
+		child = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);				\
+	else if (RB_RIGHT(elm, field) == NULL)				\
+		child = RB_LEFT(elm, field);				\
+	else {								\
+		struct type *left;					\
+		elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);				\
+		while ((left = RB_LEFT(elm, field)))			\
+			elm = left;					\
+		child = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);				\
+		parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field);				\
+		color = RB_COLOR(elm, field);				\
+		if (child)						\
+			RB_PARENT(child, field) = parent;		\
+		if (parent) {						\
+			if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm)		\
+				RB_LEFT(parent, field) = child;		\
+			else						\
+				RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = child;	\
+			RB_AUGMENT(parent);				\
+		} else							\
+			RB_ROOT(head) = child;				\
+		if (RB_PARENT(elm, field) == old)			\
+			parent = elm;					\
+		(elm)->field = (old)->field;				\
+		if (RB_PARENT(old, field)) {				\
+			if (RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) == old)\
+				RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) = elm;\
+			else						\
+				RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(old, field), field) = elm;\
+			RB_AUGMENT(RB_PARENT(old, field));		\
+		} else							\
+			RB_ROOT(head) = elm;				\
+		RB_PARENT(RB_LEFT(old, field), field) = elm;		\
+		if (RB_RIGHT(old, field))				\
+			RB_PARENT(RB_RIGHT(old, field), field) = elm;	\
+		if (parent) {						\
+			left = parent;					\
+			do {						\
+				RB_AUGMENT(left);			\
+			} while ((left = RB_PARENT(left, field)));	\
+		}							\
+		goto color;						\
+	}								\
+	parent = RB_PARENT(elm, field);					\
+	color = RB_COLOR(elm, field);					\
+	if (child)							\
+		RB_PARENT(child, field) = parent;			\
+	if (parent) {							\
+		if (RB_LEFT(parent, field) == elm)			\
+			RB_LEFT(parent, field) = child;			\
+		else							\
+			RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = child;		\
+		RB_AUGMENT(parent);					\
+	} else								\
+		RB_ROOT(head) = child;					\
+color:									\
+	if (color == RB_BLACK)						\
+		name##_RB_REMOVE_COLOR(head, parent, child);		\
+	return (old);							\
+}									\
+									\
+/* Inserts a node into the RB tree */					\
+attr struct type *							\
+name##_RB_INSERT(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	struct type *tmp;						\
+	struct type *parent = NULL;					\
+	int comp = 0;							\
+	tmp = RB_ROOT(head);						\
+	while (tmp) {							\
+		parent = tmp;						\
+		comp = (cmp)(elm, parent);				\
+		if (comp < 0)						\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field);			\
+		else if (comp > 0)					\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field);			\
+		else							\
+			return (tmp);					\
+	}								\
+	RB_SET(elm, parent, field);					\
+	if (parent != NULL) {						\
+		if (comp < 0)						\
+			RB_LEFT(parent, field) = elm;			\
+		else							\
+			RB_RIGHT(parent, field) = elm;			\
+		RB_AUGMENT(parent);					\
+	} else								\
+		RB_ROOT(head) = elm;					\
+	name##_RB_INSERT_COLOR(head, elm);				\
+	return (NULL);							\
+}									\
+									\
+/* Finds the node with the same key as elm */				\
+attr struct type *							\
+name##_RB_FIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head);				\
+	int comp;							\
+	while (tmp) {							\
+		comp = cmp(elm, tmp);					\
+		if (comp < 0)						\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field);			\
+		else if (comp > 0)					\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field);			\
+		else							\
+			return (tmp);					\
+	}								\
+	return (NULL);							\
+}									\
+									\
+/* Finds the first node greater than or equal to the search key */	\
+attr struct type *							\
+name##_RB_NFIND(struct name *head, struct type *elm)			\
+{									\
+	struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head);				\
+	struct type *res = NULL;					\
+	int comp;							\
+	while (tmp) {							\
+		comp = cmp(elm, tmp);					\
+		if (comp < 0) {						\
+			res = tmp;					\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field);			\
+		}							\
+		else if (comp > 0)					\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field);			\
+		else							\
+			return (tmp);					\
+	}								\
+	return (res);							\
+}									\
+									\
+/* ARGSUSED */								\
+attr struct type *							\
+name##_RB_NEXT(struct type *elm)					\
+{									\
+	if (RB_RIGHT(elm, field)) {					\
+		elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);				\
+		while (RB_LEFT(elm, field))				\
+			elm = RB_LEFT(elm, field);			\
+	} else {							\
+		if (RB_PARENT(elm, field) &&				\
+		    (elm == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)))	\
+			elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);			\
+		else {							\
+			while (RB_PARENT(elm, field) &&			\
+			    (elm == RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)))\
+				elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);		\
+			elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);			\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	return (elm);							\
+}									\
+									\
+/* ARGSUSED */								\
+attr struct type *							\
+name##_RB_PREV(struct type *elm)					\
+{									\
+	if (RB_LEFT(elm, field)) {					\
+		elm = RB_LEFT(elm, field);				\
+		while (RB_RIGHT(elm, field))				\
+			elm = RB_RIGHT(elm, field);			\
+	} else {							\
+		if (RB_PARENT(elm, field) &&				\
+		    (elm == RB_RIGHT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)))	\
+			elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);			\
+		else {							\
+			while (RB_PARENT(elm, field) &&			\
+			    (elm == RB_LEFT(RB_PARENT(elm, field), field)))\
+				elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);		\
+			elm = RB_PARENT(elm, field);			\
+		}							\
+	}								\
+	return (elm);							\
+}									\
+									\
+attr struct type *							\
+name##_RB_MINMAX(struct name *head, int val)				\
+{									\
+	struct type *tmp = RB_ROOT(head);				\
+	struct type *parent = NULL;					\
+	while (tmp) {							\
+		parent = tmp;						\
+		if (val < 0)						\
+			tmp = RB_LEFT(tmp, field);			\
+		else							\
+			tmp = RB_RIGHT(tmp, field);			\
+	}								\
+	return (parent);						\
+}
+
+#define RB_NEGINF	-1
+#define RB_INF	1
+
+#define RB_INSERT(name, x, y)	name##_RB_INSERT(x, y)
+#define RB_REMOVE(name, x, y)	name##_RB_REMOVE(x, y)
+#define RB_FIND(name, x, y)	name##_RB_FIND(x, y)
+#define RB_NFIND(name, x, y)	name##_RB_NFIND(x, y)
+#define RB_NEXT(name, x, y)	name##_RB_NEXT(y)
+#define RB_PREV(name, x, y)	name##_RB_PREV(y)
+#define RB_MIN(name, x)		name##_RB_MINMAX(x, RB_NEGINF)
+#define RB_MAX(name, x)		name##_RB_MINMAX(x, RB_INF)
+
+#define RB_FOREACH(x, name, head)					\
+	for ((x) = RB_MIN(name, head);					\
+	     (x) != NULL;						\
+	     (x) = name##_RB_NEXT(x))
+
+#define RB_FOREACH_SAFE(x, name, head, y)				\
+	for ((x) = RB_MIN(name, head);					\
+	    ((x) != NULL) && ((y) = name##_RB_NEXT(x), 1);		\
+	     (x) = (y))
+
+#define RB_FOREACH_REVERSE(x, name, head)				\
+	for ((x) = RB_MAX(name, head);					\
+	     (x) != NULL;						\
+	     (x) = name##_RB_PREV(x))
+
+#define RB_FOREACH_REVERSE_SAFE(x, name, head, y)			\
+	for ((x) = RB_MAX(name, head);					\
+	    ((x) != NULL) && ((y) = name##_RB_PREV(x), 1);		\
+	     (x) = (y))
+
+#endif	/* _SYS_TREE_H_ */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/timingsafe_bcmp.c b/openbsd-compat/timingsafe_bcmp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7e28c0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/timingsafe_bcmp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: timingsafe_bcmp.c,v 1.1 2010/09/24 13:33:00 matthew Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/timingsafe_bcmp.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP
+
+int
+timingsafe_bcmp(const void *b1, const void *b2, size_t n)
+{
+	const unsigned char *p1 = b1, *p2 = b2;
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	for (; n > 0; n--)
+		ret |= *p1++ ^ *p2++;
+	return (ret != 0);
+}
+
+#endif /* TIMINGSAFE_BCMP */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/vis.c b/openbsd-compat/vis.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0e04ed0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/vis.c
@@ -0,0 +1,251 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: vis.c,v 1.25 2015/09/13 11:32:51 guenther Exp $ */
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/vis.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) || defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "vis.h"
+
+#define	isoctal(c)	(((u_char)(c)) >= '0' && ((u_char)(c)) <= '7')
+#define	isvisible(c,flag)						\
+	(((c) == '\\' || (flag & VIS_ALL) == 0) &&			\
+	(((u_int)(c) <= UCHAR_MAX && isascii((u_char)(c)) &&		\
+	(((c) != '*' && (c) != '?' && (c) != '[' && (c) != '#') ||	\
+		(flag & VIS_GLOB) == 0) && isgraph((u_char)(c))) ||	\
+	((flag & VIS_SP) == 0 && (c) == ' ') ||				\
+	((flag & VIS_TAB) == 0 && (c) == '\t') ||			\
+	((flag & VIS_NL) == 0 && (c) == '\n') ||			\
+	((flag & VIS_SAFE) && ((c) == '\b' ||				\
+		(c) == '\007' || (c) == '\r' ||				\
+		isgraph((u_char)(c))))))
+
+/*
+ * vis - visually encode characters
+ */
+char *
+vis(char *dst, int c, int flag, int nextc)
+{
+	if (isvisible(c, flag)) {
+		if ((c == '"' && (flag & VIS_DQ) != 0) ||
+		    (c == '\\' && (flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0))
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+		*dst++ = c;
+		*dst = '\0';
+		return (dst);
+	}
+
+	if (flag & VIS_CSTYLE) {
+		switch(c) {
+		case '\n':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'n';
+			goto done;
+		case '\r':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'r';
+			goto done;
+		case '\b':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'b';
+			goto done;
+		case '\a':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'a';
+			goto done;
+		case '\v':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'v';
+			goto done;
+		case '\t':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 't';
+			goto done;
+		case '\f':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 'f';
+			goto done;
+		case ' ':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = 's';
+			goto done;
+		case '\0':
+			*dst++ = '\\';
+			*dst++ = '0';
+			if (isoctal(nextc)) {
+				*dst++ = '0';
+				*dst++ = '0';
+			}
+			goto done;
+		}
+	}
+	if (((c & 0177) == ' ') || (flag & VIS_OCTAL) ||
+	    ((flag & VIS_GLOB) && (c == '*' || c == '?' || c == '[' || c == '#'))) {
+		*dst++ = '\\';
+		*dst++ = ((u_char)c >> 6 & 07) + '0';
+		*dst++ = ((u_char)c >> 3 & 07) + '0';
+		*dst++ = ((u_char)c & 07) + '0';
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0)
+		*dst++ = '\\';
+	if (c & 0200) {
+		c &= 0177;
+		*dst++ = 'M';
+	}
+	if (iscntrl((u_char)c)) {
+		*dst++ = '^';
+		if (c == 0177)
+			*dst++ = '?';
+		else
+			*dst++ = c + '@';
+	} else {
+		*dst++ = '-';
+		*dst++ = c;
+	}
+done:
+	*dst = '\0';
+	return (dst);
+}
+DEF_WEAK(vis);
+
+/*
+ * strvis, strnvis, strvisx - visually encode characters from src into dst
+ *	
+ *	Dst must be 4 times the size of src to account for possible
+ *	expansion.  The length of dst, not including the trailing NULL,
+ *	is returned. 
+ *
+ *	Strnvis will write no more than siz-1 bytes (and will NULL terminate).
+ *	The number of bytes needed to fully encode the string is returned.
+ *
+ *	Strvisx encodes exactly len bytes from src into dst.
+ *	This is useful for encoding a block of data.
+ */
+int
+strvis(char *dst, const char *src, int flag)
+{
+	char c;
+	char *start;
+
+	for (start = dst; (c = *src);)
+		dst = vis(dst, c, flag, *++src);
+	*dst = '\0';
+	return (dst - start);
+}
+DEF_WEAK(strvis);
+
+int
+strnvis(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz, int flag)
+{
+	char *start, *end;
+	char tbuf[5];
+	int c, i;
+
+	i = 0;
+	for (start = dst, end = start + siz - 1; (c = *src) && dst < end; ) {
+		if (isvisible(c, flag)) {
+			if ((c == '"' && (flag & VIS_DQ) != 0) ||
+			    (c == '\\' && (flag & VIS_NOSLASH) == 0)) {
+				/* need space for the extra '\\' */
+				if (dst + 1 >= end) {
+					i = 2;
+					break;
+				}
+				*dst++ = '\\';
+			}
+			i = 1;
+			*dst++ = c;
+			src++;
+		} else {
+			i = vis(tbuf, c, flag, *++src) - tbuf;
+			if (dst + i <= end) {
+				memcpy(dst, tbuf, i);
+				dst += i;
+			} else {
+				src--;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (siz > 0)
+		*dst = '\0';
+	if (dst + i > end) {
+		/* adjust return value for truncation */
+		while ((c = *src))
+			dst += vis(tbuf, c, flag, *++src) - tbuf;
+	}
+	return (dst - start);
+}
+
+int
+stravis(char **outp, const char *src, int flag)
+{
+	char *buf;
+	int len, serrno;
+
+	buf = reallocarray(NULL, 4, strlen(src) + 1);
+	if (buf == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	len = strvis(buf, src, flag);
+	serrno = errno;
+	*outp = realloc(buf, len + 1);
+	if (*outp == NULL) {
+		*outp = buf;
+		errno = serrno;
+	}
+	return (len);
+}
+
+int
+strvisx(char *dst, const char *src, size_t len, int flag)
+{
+	char c;
+	char *start;
+
+	for (start = dst; len > 1; len--) {
+		c = *src;
+		dst = vis(dst, c, flag, *++src);
+	}
+	if (len)
+		dst = vis(dst, *src, flag, '\0');
+	*dst = '\0';
+	return (dst - start);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/vis.h b/openbsd-compat/vis.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2cdfd36
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/vis.h
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: vis.h,v 1.15 2015/07/20 01:52:27 millert Exp $	*/
+/*	$NetBSD: vis.h,v 1.4 1994/10/26 00:56:41 cgd Exp $	*/
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1990 The Regents of the University of California.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ *	@(#)vis.h	5.9 (Berkeley) 4/3/91
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/vis.h */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#if !defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) || defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+
+#ifndef _VIS_H_
+#define	_VIS_H_
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+/*
+ * to select alternate encoding format
+ */
+#define	VIS_OCTAL	0x01	/* use octal \ddd format */
+#define	VIS_CSTYLE	0x02	/* use \[nrft0..] where appropriate */
+
+/*
+ * to alter set of characters encoded (default is to encode all
+ * non-graphic except space, tab, and newline).
+ */
+#define	VIS_SP		0x04	/* also encode space */
+#define	VIS_TAB		0x08	/* also encode tab */
+#define	VIS_NL		0x10	/* also encode newline */
+#define	VIS_WHITE	(VIS_SP | VIS_TAB | VIS_NL)
+#define	VIS_SAFE	0x20	/* only encode "unsafe" characters */
+#define	VIS_DQ		0x200	/* backslash-escape double quotes */
+#define	VIS_ALL		0x400	/* encode all characters */
+
+/*
+ * other
+ */
+#define	VIS_NOSLASH	0x40	/* inhibit printing '\' */
+#define	VIS_GLOB	0x100	/* encode glob(3) magics and '#' */
+
+/*
+ * unvis return codes
+ */
+#define	UNVIS_VALID	 1	/* character valid */
+#define	UNVIS_VALIDPUSH	 2	/* character valid, push back passed char */
+#define	UNVIS_NOCHAR	 3	/* valid sequence, no character produced */
+#define	UNVIS_SYNBAD	-1	/* unrecognized escape sequence */
+#define	UNVIS_ERROR	-2	/* decoder in unknown state (unrecoverable) */
+
+/*
+ * unvis flags
+ */
+#define	UNVIS_END	1	/* no more characters */
+
+char	*vis(char *, int, int, int);
+int	strvis(char *, const char *, int);
+int	stravis(char **, const char *, int);
+int	strnvis(char *, const char *, size_t, int)
+		__attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3)));
+int	strvisx(char *, const char *, size_t, int)
+		__attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3)));
+int	strunvis(char *, const char *);
+int	unvis(char *, char, int *, int);
+ssize_t strnunvis(char *, const char *, size_t)
+		__attribute__ ((__bounded__(__string__,1,3)));
+
+#endif /* !_VIS_H_ */
+
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRNVIS || BROKEN_STRNVIS */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c b/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9cded66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+# if defined(HAVE_CRYPT_H) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+#  include <crypt.h>
+# endif
+
+# ifdef __hpux
+#  include <hpsecurity.h>
+#  include <prot.h>
+# endif
+
+# ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+#  include <sys/security.h>
+#  include <sys/audit.h>
+#  include <prot.h>
+# endif
+
+# if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+#  include <shadow.h>
+# endif
+
+# if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+#  include <sys/label.h>
+#  include <sys/audit.h>
+#  include <pwdadj.h>
+# endif
+
+# if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(HAVE_CRYPT) && defined(HAVE_DES_CRYPT)
+#  include <openssl/des.h>
+#  define crypt DES_crypt
+# endif
+
+#define MINIMUM(a, b)	(((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
+
+/*
+ * Pick an appropriate password encryption type and salt for the running
+ * system by searching through accounts until we find one that has a valid
+ * salt.  Usually this will be root unless the root account is locked out.
+ * If we don't find one we return a traditional DES-based salt.
+ */
+static const char *
+pick_salt(void)
+{
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	char *passwd, *p;
+	size_t typelen;
+	static char salt[32];
+
+	if (salt[0] != '\0')
+		return salt;
+	strlcpy(salt, "xx", sizeof(salt));
+	setpwent();
+	while ((pw = getpwent()) != NULL) {
+		if ((passwd = shadow_pw(pw)) == NULL)
+			continue;
+		if (passwd[0] == '$' && (p = strrchr(passwd+1, '$')) != NULL) {
+			typelen = p - passwd + 1;
+			strlcpy(salt, passwd, MINIMUM(typelen, sizeof(salt)));
+			explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd));
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+ out:
+	endpwent();
+	return salt;
+}
+
+char *
+xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt)
+{
+	char *crypted;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we don't have a salt we are encrypting a fake password for
+	 * for timing purposes.  Pick an appropriate salt.
+	 */
+	if (salt == NULL)
+		salt = pick_salt();
+
+#if defined(__hpux) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+	if (iscomsec())
+		crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt);
+	else
+		crypted = crypt(password, salt);
+# elif defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+	crypted = bigcrypt(password, salt);
+# else
+	crypted = crypt(password, salt);
+#endif
+
+	return crypted;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle shadowed password systems in a cleaner way for portable
+ * version.
+ */
+
+char *
+shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	char *pw_password = pw->pw_passwd;
+
+# if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+	struct spwd *spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
+
+	if (spw != NULL)
+		pw_password = spw->sp_pwdp;
+# endif
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+	return(get_iaf_password(pw));
+#endif
+
+# if defined(HAVE_GETPWANAM) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
+	struct passwd_adjunct *spw;
+	if (issecure() && (spw = getpwanam(pw->pw_name)) != NULL)
+		pw_password = spw->pwa_passwd;
+# elif defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
+	struct pr_passwd *spw = getprpwnam(pw->pw_name);
+
+	if (spw != NULL)
+		pw_password = spw->ufld.fd_encrypt;
+# endif
+
+	return pw_password;
+}
diff --git a/openssh.xml.in b/openssh.xml.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8afe1d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openssh.xml.in
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+<?xml version='1.0'?>
+<!DOCTYPE service_bundle SYSTEM '/usr/share/lib/xml/dtd/service_bundle.dtd.1'>
+<!--
+    Copyright (c) 2006 Chad Mynhier.
+
+    Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+    purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+    copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+
+    THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+    WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+    ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+    WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+    ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+    OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+-->
+
+<service_bundle type='manifest' name='OpenSSH server'>
+
+    <service
+        name='site/__SYSVINIT_NAME__'
+        type='service'
+        version='1'>
+
+<!--
+	We default to disabled so administrator can decide to enable or not.
+-->
+        <create_default_instance enabled='false'/>
+
+        <single_instance/>
+
+        <dependency
+            name='filesystem-local'
+            grouping='require_all'
+            restart_on='none'
+            type='service'>
+            <service_fmri value='svc:/system/filesystem/local'/>
+        </dependency>
+
+        <dependency
+            name='network'
+            grouping='require_all'
+            restart_on='none'
+            type='service'>
+            <service_fmri value='svc:/milestone/network'/>
+        </dependency>
+
+        <dependent
+            name='multi-user-server'
+            restart_on='none'
+            grouping='optional_all'>
+            <service_fmri value='svc:/milestone/multi-user-server'/>
+        </dependent>
+
+        <exec_method
+            name='start'
+            type='method'
+            exec='__SMF_METHOD_DIR__/__SYSVINIT_NAME__ start'
+            timeout_seconds='60'>
+            <method_context/>
+        </exec_method>
+
+        <exec_method
+            name='stop'
+            type='method'
+            exec=':kill'
+            timeout_seconds='60'>
+            <method_context/>
+        </exec_method>
+
+        <property_group
+            name='startd'
+            type='framework'>
+            <propval name='ignore_error' type='astring' value='core,signal'/>
+        </property_group>
+
+        <template>
+            <common_name>
+                <loctext xml:lang='C'>OpenSSH server</loctext>
+            </common_name>
+            <documentation>
+                <manpage
+                    title='sshd'
+                    section='1M'
+                    manpath='@prefix@/man'/>
+            </documentation>
+        </template>
+    </service>
+</service_bundle>
diff --git a/opensshd.init.in b/opensshd.init.in
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..2517248
--- /dev/null
+++ b/opensshd.init.in
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#!@STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL@
+# Donated code that was put under PD license.
+#
+# Stripped PRNGd out of it for the time being.
+
+umask 022
+
+CAT=@CAT@
+KILL=@KILL@
+
+prefix=@prefix@
+sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
+piddir=@piddir@
+
+SSHD=$prefix/sbin/sshd
+PIDFILE=$piddir/sshd.pid
+PidFile=`grep "^PidFile" ${sysconfdir}/sshd_config | tr "=" " " | awk '{print $2}'`
+[ X$PidFile = X ]  ||  PIDFILE=$PidFile
+SSH_KEYGEN=$prefix/bin/ssh-keygen
+
+stop_service() {
+    if [  -r $PIDFILE  -a  ! -z ${PIDFILE}  ]; then
+	PID=`${CAT} ${PIDFILE}`
+    fi
+    if [  ${PID:=0} -gt 1 -a  ! "X$PID" = "X "  ]; then
+	${KILL} ${PID}
+    else
+	echo "Unable to read PID file"
+    fi
+}
+
+start_service() {
+    # XXX We really should check if the service is already going, but
+    # XXX we will opt out at this time. - Bal
+
+    # Check to see if we have keys that need to be made
+    ${SSH_KEYGEN} -A
+
+    # Start SSHD
+    echo "starting $SSHD... \c"         ; $SSHD
+
+    sshd_rc=$?
+    if [ $sshd_rc -ne 0 ]; then
+	echo "$0: Error ${sshd_rc} starting ${SSHD}... bailing."
+	exit $sshd_rc
+    fi
+    echo done.
+}
+
+case $1 in
+
+'start')
+    start_service
+    ;;
+
+'stop')
+    stop_service
+    ;;
+
+'restart')
+    stop_service
+    start_service
+    ;;
+
+*)
+    echo "$0:  usage:  $0 {start|stop|restart}"
+    ;;
+esac
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f64d2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2719 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.308 2022/08/31 02:56:40 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication
+ * with the other side.  This same code is used both on client and server side.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ *
+ * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+/*
+ * Explicitly include OpenSSL before zlib as some versions of OpenSSL have
+ * "free_func" in their headers, which zlib typedefs.
+ */
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+#  include <openssl/ec.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+#include <zlib.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+#define DBG(x) x
+#else
+#define DBG(x)
+#endif
+
+#define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024)
+
+struct packet_state {
+	u_int32_t seqnr;
+	u_int32_t packets;
+	u_int64_t blocks;
+	u_int64_t bytes;
+};
+
+struct packet {
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next;
+	u_char type;
+	struct sshbuf *payload;
+};
+
+struct session_state {
+	/*
+	 * This variable contains the file descriptors used for
+	 * communicating with the other side.  connection_in is used for
+	 * reading; connection_out for writing.  These can be the same
+	 * descriptor, in which case it is assumed to be a socket.
+	 */
+	int connection_in;
+	int connection_out;
+
+	/* Protocol flags for the remote side. */
+	u_int remote_protocol_flags;
+
+	/* Encryption context for receiving data.  Only used for decryption. */
+	struct sshcipher_ctx *receive_context;
+
+	/* Encryption context for sending data.  Only used for encryption. */
+	struct sshcipher_ctx *send_context;
+
+	/* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */
+	struct sshbuf *input;
+
+	/* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */
+	struct sshbuf *output;
+
+	/* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */
+	struct sshbuf *outgoing_packet;
+
+	/* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */
+	struct sshbuf *incoming_packet;
+
+	/* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */
+	struct sshbuf *compression_buffer;
+
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+	/* Incoming/outgoing compression dictionaries */
+	z_stream compression_in_stream;
+	z_stream compression_out_stream;
+#endif
+	int compression_in_started;
+	int compression_out_started;
+	int compression_in_failures;
+	int compression_out_failures;
+
+	/* default maximum packet size */
+	u_int max_packet_size;
+
+	/* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */
+	int initialized;
+
+	/* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
+	int interactive_mode;
+
+	/* Set to true if we are the server side. */
+	int server_side;
+
+	/* Set to true if we are authenticated. */
+	int after_authentication;
+
+	int keep_alive_timeouts;
+
+	/* The maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */
+	int packet_timeout_ms;
+
+	/* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
+	struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
+	struct packet_state p_read, p_send;
+
+	/* Volume-based rekeying */
+	u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out, rekey_limit;
+
+	/* Time-based rekeying */
+	u_int32_t rekey_interval;	/* how often in seconds */
+	time_t rekey_time;	/* time of last rekeying */
+
+	/* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
+	u_char extra_pad;
+
+	/* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */
+	u_int packet_discard;
+	size_t packet_discard_mac_already;
+	struct sshmac *packet_discard_mac;
+
+	/* Used in packet_read_poll2() */
+	u_int packlen;
+
+	/* Used in packet_send2 */
+	int rekeying;
+
+	/* Used in ssh_packet_send_mux() */
+	int mux;
+
+	/* Used in packet_set_interactive */
+	int set_interactive_called;
+
+	/* Used in packet_set_maxsize */
+	int set_maxsize_called;
+
+	/* One-off warning about weak ciphers */
+	int cipher_warning_done;
+
+	/* Hook for fuzzing inbound packets */
+	ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook_in;
+	void *hook_in_ctx;
+
+	TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
+};
+
+struct ssh *
+ssh_alloc_session_state(void)
+{
+	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
+	struct session_state *state = NULL;
+
+	if ((ssh = calloc(1, sizeof(*ssh))) == NULL ||
+	    (state = calloc(1, sizeof(*state))) == NULL ||
+	    (ssh->kex = kex_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (state->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (state->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (state->incoming_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		goto fail;
+	TAILQ_INIT(&state->outgoing);
+	TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->private_keys);
+	TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->public_keys);
+	state->connection_in = -1;
+	state->connection_out = -1;
+	state->max_packet_size = 32768;
+	state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
+	state->p_send.packets = state->p_read.packets = 0;
+	state->initialized = 1;
+	/*
+	 * ssh_packet_send2() needs to queue packets until
+	 * we've done the initial key exchange.
+	 */
+	state->rekeying = 1;
+	ssh->state = state;
+	return ssh;
+ fail:
+	if (ssh) {
+		kex_free(ssh->kex);
+		free(ssh);
+	}
+	if (state) {
+		sshbuf_free(state->input);
+		sshbuf_free(state->output);
+		sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
+		sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
+		free(state);
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_input_hook(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook, void *ctx)
+{
+	ssh->state->hook_in = hook;
+	ssh->state->hook_in_ctx = ctx;
+}
+
+/* Returns nonzero if rekeying is in progress */
+int
+ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return ssh->state->rekeying ||
+	    (ssh->kex != NULL && ssh->kex->done == 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sets the descriptors used for communication.
+ */
+struct ssh *
+ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out)
+{
+	struct session_state *state;
+	const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
+	int r;
+
+	if (none == NULL) {
+		error_f("cannot load cipher 'none'");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (ssh == NULL)
+		ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state();
+	if (ssh == NULL) {
+		error_f("could not allocate state");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	state = ssh->state;
+	state->connection_in = fd_in;
+	state->connection_out = fd_out;
+	if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, none,
+	    (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, none,
+	    (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "cipher_init failed");
+		free(ssh); /* XXX need ssh_free_session_state? */
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
+	/*
+	 * Cache the IP address of the remote connection for use in error
+	 * messages that might be generated after the connection has closed.
+	 */
+	(void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+	return ssh;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout, int count)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+
+	if (timeout <= 0 || count <= 0) {
+		state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
+		return;
+	}
+	if ((INT_MAX / 1000) / count < timeout)
+		state->packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX;
+	else
+		state->packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	ssh->state->mux = 1;
+	ssh->state->rekeying = 0;
+	kex_free(ssh->kex);
+	ssh->kex = NULL;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return ssh->state->mux;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+	int r;
+
+	free(ssh->log_preamble);
+	if (fmt == NULL)
+		ssh->log_preamble = NULL;
+	else {
+		va_start(args, fmt);
+		r = vasprintf(&ssh->log_preamble, fmt, args);
+		va_end(args);
+		if (r < 0 || ssh->log_preamble == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	int r;
+
+	if (state->packet_discard_mac) {
+		char buf[1024];
+		size_t dlen = PACKET_MAX_SIZE;
+
+		if (dlen > state->packet_discard_mac_already)
+			dlen -= state->packet_discard_mac_already;
+		memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf));
+		while (sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) < dlen)
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, buf,
+			    sizeof(buf))) != 0)
+				return r;
+		(void) mac_compute(state->packet_discard_mac,
+		    state->p_read.seqnr,
+		    sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), dlen,
+		    NULL, 0);
+	}
+	logit("Finished discarding for %.200s port %d",
+	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+	return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_packet_start_discard(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshenc *enc,
+    struct sshmac *mac, size_t mac_already, u_int discard)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	int r;
+
+	if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher) || (mac && mac->etm)) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0)
+			return r;
+		return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Record number of bytes over which the mac has already
+	 * been computed in order to minimize timing attacks.
+	 */
+	if (mac && mac->enabled) {
+		state->packet_discard_mac = mac;
+		state->packet_discard_mac_already = mac_already;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(state->input) >= discard)
+		return ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh);
+	state->packet_discard = discard - sshbuf_len(state->input);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct session_state *state;
+	struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
+	socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
+
+	if (ssh == NULL || ssh->state == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	state = ssh->state;
+	if (state->connection_in == -1 || state->connection_out == -1)
+		return 0;
+	/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
+	if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out)
+		return 1;
+	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+	if (getpeername(state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
+	    &fromlen) == -1)
+		return 0;
+	tolen = sizeof(to);
+	memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
+	if (getpeername(state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
+	    &tolen) == -1)
+		return 0;
+	if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *ibytes, u_int64_t *obytes)
+{
+	if (ibytes)
+		*ibytes = ssh->state->p_read.bytes;
+	if (obytes)
+		*obytes = ssh->state->p_send.bytes;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return get_sock_af(ssh->state->connection_out);
+}
+
+/* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	/* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */
+	set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_in);
+
+	if (ssh->state->connection_out != ssh->state->connection_in)
+		set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_out);
+}
+
+/* Returns the socket used for reading. */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return ssh->state->connection_in;
+}
+
+/* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return ssh->state->connection_out;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string.  The returned
+ * string must not be freed.
+ */
+
+const char *
+ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	int sock;
+
+	/* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */
+	if (ssh->remote_ipaddr == NULL) {
+		if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
+			sock = ssh->state->connection_in;
+			ssh->remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(sock);
+			ssh->remote_port = get_peer_port(sock);
+			ssh->local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock);
+			ssh->local_port = get_local_port(sock);
+		} else {
+			ssh->remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+			ssh->remote_port = 65535;
+			ssh->local_ipaddr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+			ssh->local_port = 65535;
+		}
+	}
+	return ssh->remote_ipaddr;
+}
+
+/* Returns the port number of the remote host. */
+
+int
+ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	(void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
+	return ssh->remote_port;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the IP-address of the local host as a string.  The returned
+ * string must not be freed.
+ */
+
+const char *
+ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	(void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
+	return ssh->local_ipaddr;
+}
+
+/* Returns the port number of the local host. */
+
+int
+ssh_local_port(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	(void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
+	return ssh->local_port;
+}
+
+/* Returns the routing domain of the input socket, or NULL if unavailable */
+const char *
+ssh_packet_rdomain_in(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	if (ssh->rdomain_in != NULL)
+		return ssh->rdomain_in;
+	if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
+		return NULL;
+	ssh->rdomain_in = get_rdomain(ssh->state->connection_in);
+	return ssh->rdomain_in;
+}
+
+/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
+
+static void
+ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ssh, int do_close)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	u_int mode;
+
+	if (!state->initialized)
+		return;
+	state->initialized = 0;
+	if (do_close) {
+		if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) {
+			close(state->connection_out);
+		} else {
+			close(state->connection_in);
+			close(state->connection_out);
+		}
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(state->input);
+	sshbuf_free(state->output);
+	sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
+	sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
+	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+		kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]);	/* current keys */
+		state->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
+		ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, mode);		/* next keys */
+	}
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+	/* compression state is in shared mem, so we can only release it once */
+	if (do_close && state->compression_buffer) {
+		sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer);
+		if (state->compression_out_started) {
+			z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream;
+			debug("compress outgoing: "
+			    "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
+				(unsigned long long)stream->total_in,
+				(unsigned long long)stream->total_out,
+				stream->total_in == 0 ? 0.0 :
+				(double) stream->total_out / stream->total_in);
+			if (state->compression_out_failures == 0)
+				deflateEnd(stream);
+		}
+		if (state->compression_in_started) {
+			z_streamp stream = &state->compression_in_stream;
+			debug("compress incoming: "
+			    "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
+			    (unsigned long long)stream->total_out,
+			    (unsigned long long)stream->total_in,
+			    stream->total_out == 0 ? 0.0 :
+			    (double) stream->total_in / stream->total_out);
+			if (state->compression_in_failures == 0)
+				inflateEnd(stream);
+		}
+	}
+#endif	/* WITH_ZLIB */
+	cipher_free(state->send_context);
+	cipher_free(state->receive_context);
+	state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL;
+	if (do_close) {
+		free(ssh->local_ipaddr);
+		ssh->local_ipaddr = NULL;
+		free(ssh->remote_ipaddr);
+		ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL;
+		free(ssh->state);
+		ssh->state = NULL;
+		kex_free(ssh->kex);
+		ssh->kex = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 1);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_clear_keys(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 0);
+}
+
+/* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh, u_int protocol_flags)
+{
+	ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
+}
+
+/* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */
+
+u_int
+ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions.
+ * Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip.
+ */
+
+static int
+ssh_packet_init_compression(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	if (!ssh->state->compression_buffer &&
+	    ((ssh->state->compression_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL))
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+static int
+start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level)
+{
+	if (level < 1 || level > 9)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level);
+	if (ssh->state->compression_out_started == 1)
+		deflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream);
+	switch (deflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, level)) {
+	case Z_OK:
+		ssh->state->compression_out_started = 1;
+		break;
+	case Z_MEM_ERROR:
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	default:
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	if (ssh->state->compression_in_started == 1)
+		inflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream);
+	switch (inflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream)) {
+	case Z_OK:
+		ssh->state->compression_in_started = 1;
+		break;
+	case Z_MEM_ERROR:
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	default:
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* XXX remove need for separate compression buffer */
+static int
+compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
+{
+	u_char buf[4096];
+	int r, status;
+
+	if (ssh->state->compression_out_started != 1)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	/* This case is not handled below. */
+	if (sshbuf_len(in) == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Input is the contents of the input buffer. */
+	if ((ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_in =
+	    sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in);
+
+	/* Loop compressing until deflate() returns with avail_out != 0. */
+	do {
+		/* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
+		ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_out = buf;
+		ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
+
+		/* Compress as much data into the buffer as possible. */
+		status = deflate(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream,
+		    Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
+		switch (status) {
+		case Z_MEM_ERROR:
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		case Z_OK:
+			/* Append compressed data to output_buffer. */
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) -
+			    ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out)) != 0)
+				return r;
+			break;
+		case Z_STREAM_ERROR:
+		default:
+			ssh->state->compression_out_failures++;
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		}
+	} while (ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out == 0);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
+{
+	u_char buf[4096];
+	int r, status;
+
+	if (ssh->state->compression_in_started != 1)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if ((ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_in =
+	    sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in);
+
+	for (;;) {
+		/* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
+		ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_out = buf;
+		ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
+
+		status = inflate(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream,
+		    Z_SYNC_FLUSH);
+		switch (status) {
+		case Z_OK:
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) -
+			    ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out)) != 0)
+				return r;
+			break;
+		case Z_BUF_ERROR:
+			/*
+			 * Comments in zlib.h say that we should keep calling
+			 * inflate() until we get an error.  This appears to
+			 * be the error that we get.
+			 */
+			return 0;
+		case Z_DATA_ERROR:
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		case Z_MEM_ERROR:
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		case Z_STREAM_ERROR:
+		default:
+			ssh->state->compression_in_failures++;
+			return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+#else	/* WITH_ZLIB */
+
+static int
+start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level)
+{
+	return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+
+static int
+start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+
+static int
+compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
+{
+	return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+
+static int
+uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
+{
+	return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+#endif	/* WITH_ZLIB */
+
+void
+ssh_clear_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
+{
+	if (ssh->kex && ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) {
+		kex_free_newkeys(ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]);
+		ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+int
+ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	struct sshenc *enc;
+	struct sshmac *mac;
+	struct sshcomp *comp;
+	struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp;
+	struct packet_state *ps;
+	u_int64_t *max_blocks;
+	const char *wmsg;
+	int r, crypt_type;
+	const char *dir = mode == MODE_OUT ? "out" : "in";
+
+	debug2_f("mode %d", mode);
+
+	if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
+		ccp = &state->send_context;
+		crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT;
+		ps = &state->p_send;
+		max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_out;
+	} else {
+		ccp = &state->receive_context;
+		crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
+		ps = &state->p_read;
+		max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_in;
+	}
+	if (state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
+		debug_f("rekeying %s, input %llu bytes %llu blocks, "
+		    "output %llu bytes %llu blocks", dir,
+		    (unsigned long long)state->p_read.bytes,
+		    (unsigned long long)state->p_read.blocks,
+		    (unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes,
+		    (unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks);
+		kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]);
+		state->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
+	}
+	/* note that both bytes and the seqnr are not reset */
+	ps->packets = ps->blocks = 0;
+	/* move newkeys from kex to state */
+	if ((state->newkeys[mode] = ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
+	enc  = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
+	mac  = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
+	comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
+	if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
+		if ((r = mac_init(mac)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	mac->enabled = 1;
+	DBG(debug_f("cipher_init: %s", dir));
+	cipher_free(*ccp);
+	*ccp = NULL;
+	if ((r = cipher_init(ccp, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
+	    enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (!state->cipher_warning_done &&
+	    (wmsg = cipher_warning_message(*ccp)) != NULL) {
+		error("Warning: %s", wmsg);
+		state->cipher_warning_done = 1;
+	}
+	/* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
+	/* explicit_bzero(enc->iv,  enc->block_size);
+	   explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
+	   explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); */
+	if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB ||
+	    (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED &&
+	    state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) {
+		if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) < 0)
+			return r;
+		if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
+			if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0)
+				return r;
+		} else {
+			if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0)
+				return r;
+		}
+		comp->enabled = 1;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES,
+	 * so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes.
+	 * See RFC4344 section 3.2.
+	 */
+	if (enc->block_size >= 16)
+		*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
+	else
+		*max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
+	if (state->rekey_limit)
+		*max_blocks = MINIMUM(*max_blocks,
+		    state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
+	debug("rekey %s after %llu blocks", dir,
+	    (unsigned long long)*max_blocks);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#define MAX_PACKETS	(1U<<31)
+static int
+ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	u_int32_t out_blocks;
+
+	/* XXX client can't cope with rekeying pre-auth */
+	if (!state->after_authentication)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Haven't keyed yet or KEX in progress. */
+	if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Peer can't rekey */
+	if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Permit one packet in or out per rekey - this allows us to
+	 * make progress when rekey limits are very small.
+	 */
+	if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Time-based rekeying */
+	if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
+	    (int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction
+	 * As per RFC4344 section 3.1 we do this after 2^31 packets.
+	 */
+	if (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS ||
+	    state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* Rekey after (cipher-specific) maximum blocks */
+	out_blocks = ROUNDUP(outbound_packet_len,
+	    state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc.block_size);
+	return (state->max_blocks_out &&
+	    (state->p_send.blocks + out_blocks > state->max_blocks_out)) ||
+	    (state->max_blocks_in &&
+	    (state->p_read.blocks > state->max_blocks_in));
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_check_rekey(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	if (!ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0))
+		return 0;
+	debug3_f("rekex triggered");
+	return kex_start_rekex(ssh);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication:
+ * This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent,
+ * and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received.
+ */
+static int
+ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
+	int r, mode;
+
+	/*
+	 * Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying
+	 * with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately.
+	 */
+	state->after_authentication = 1;
+	for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
+		/* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */
+		if (state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
+			continue;
+		comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
+		if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) {
+			if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0)
+				return r;
+			if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
+				if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0)
+					return r;
+			} else {
+				if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0)
+					return r;
+			}
+			comp->enabled = 1;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Used to mute debug logging for noisy packet types */
+int
+ssh_packet_log_type(u_char type)
+{
+	switch (type) {
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA:
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA:
+	case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST:
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return 1;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue)
+ */
+int
+ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	u_char type, *cp, macbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	u_char tmp, padlen, pad = 0;
+	u_int authlen = 0, aadlen = 0;
+	u_int len;
+	struct sshenc *enc   = NULL;
+	struct sshmac *mac   = NULL;
+	struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
+	int r, block_size;
+
+	if (state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) {
+		enc  = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc;
+		mac  = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac;
+		comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
+		/* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
+		if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
+			mac = NULL;
+	}
+	block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
+	aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
+
+	type = (sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet))[5];
+	if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
+		debug3("send packet: type %u", type);
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr, "plain:     ");
+	sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr);
+#endif
+
+	if (comp && comp->enabled) {
+		len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
+		/* skip header, compress only payload */
+		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 5)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
+		if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet,
+		    state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet,
+		    "\0\0\0\0\0", 5)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet,
+		    state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %zd", len,
+		    sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet)));
+	}
+
+	/* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */
+	len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
+
+	/*
+	 * calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data,
+	 * minimum padding is 4 bytes
+	 */
+	len -= aadlen; /* packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes */
+	padlen = block_size - (len % block_size);
+	if (padlen < 4)
+		padlen += block_size;
+	if (state->extra_pad) {
+		tmp = state->extra_pad;
+		state->extra_pad =
+		    ROUNDUP(state->extra_pad, block_size);
+		/* check if roundup overflowed */
+		if (state->extra_pad < tmp)
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		tmp = (len + padlen) % state->extra_pad;
+		/* Check whether pad calculation below will underflow */
+		if (tmp > state->extra_pad)
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		pad = state->extra_pad - tmp;
+		DBG(debug3_f("adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
+		    pad, len, padlen, state->extra_pad));
+		tmp = padlen;
+		padlen += pad;
+		/* Check whether padlen calculation overflowed */
+		if (padlen < tmp)
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* overflow */
+		state->extra_pad = 0;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->outgoing_packet, padlen, &cp)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (enc && !cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(state->send_context)) {
+		/* random padding */
+		arc4random_buf(cp, padlen);
+	} else {
+		/* clear padding */
+		explicit_bzero(cp, padlen);
+	}
+	/* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload + padding) */
+	len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
+	cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet);
+	if (cp == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
+	POKE_U32(cp, len - 4);
+	cp[4] = padlen;
+	DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d, aadlen %d)",
+	    len, padlen, aadlen));
+
+	/* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */
+	if (mac && mac->enabled && !mac->etm) {
+		if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr,
+		    sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), len,
+		    macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", state->p_send.seqnr));
+	}
+	/* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output,
+	    sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + authlen, &cp)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->send_context, state->p_send.seqnr, cp,
+	    sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet),
+	    len - aadlen, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* append unencrypted MAC */
+	if (mac && mac->enabled) {
+		if (mac->etm) {
+			/* EtM: compute mac over aadlen + cipher text */
+			if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr,
+			    cp, len, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
+				goto out;
+			DBG(debug("done calc MAC(EtM) out #%d",
+			    state->p_send.seqnr));
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
+	sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
+#endif
+	/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
+	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
+		logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
+	if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
+		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+	state->p_send.blocks += len / block_size;
+	state->p_send.bytes += len;
+	sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
+
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
+		r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
+	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
+		r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh);
+	else
+		r = 0;
+ out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* returns non-zero if the specified packet type is usec by KEX */
+static int
+ssh_packet_type_is_kex(u_char type)
+{
+	return
+	    type >= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN &&
+	    type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX &&
+	    type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST &&
+	    type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT &&
+	    type != SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	struct packet *p;
+	u_char type;
+	int r, need_rekey;
+
+	if (sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) < 6)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	type = sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet)[5];
+	need_rekey = !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type) &&
+	    ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet));
+
+	/*
+	 * During rekeying we can only send key exchange messages.
+	 * Queue everything else.
+	 */
+	if ((need_rekey || state->rekeying) && !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type)) {
+		if (need_rekey)
+			debug3_f("rekex triggered");
+		debug("enqueue packet: %u", type);
+		p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p));
+		if (p == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		p->type = type;
+		p->payload = state->outgoing_packet;
+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&state->outgoing, p, next);
+		state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new();
+		if (state->outgoing_packet == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		if (need_rekey) {
+			/*
+			 * This packet triggered a rekey, so send the
+			 * KEXINIT now.
+			 * NB. reenters this function via kex_start_rekex().
+			 */
+			return kex_start_rekex(ssh);
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)
+		state->rekeying = 1;
+
+	if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* after a NEWKEYS message we can send the complete queue */
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
+		state->rekeying = 0;
+		state->rekey_time = monotime();
+		while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&state->outgoing))) {
+			type = p->type;
+			/*
+			 * If this packet triggers a rekex, then skip the
+			 * remaining packets in the queue for now.
+			 * NB. re-enters this function via kex_start_rekex.
+			 */
+			if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh,
+			    sshbuf_len(p->payload))) {
+				debug3_f("queued packet triggered rekex");
+				return kex_start_rekex(ssh);
+			}
+			debug("dequeue packet: %u", type);
+			sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
+			state->outgoing_packet = p->payload;
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(&state->outgoing, p, next);
+			memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
+			free(p);
+			if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0)
+				return r;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type.  Note that
+ * no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not
+ * be used during the interactive session.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	int len, r, ms_remain;
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+	char buf[8192];
+	struct timeval start;
+	struct timespec timespec, *timespecp = NULL;
+
+	DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have
+	 * been sent.
+	 */
+	if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
+	for (;;) {
+		/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
+		r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+		if (r != 0)
+			break;
+		/* If we got a packet, return it. */
+		if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
+			break;
+		/*
+		 * Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the
+		 * buffer, and try again.
+		 */
+		pfd.fd = state->connection_in;
+		pfd.events = POLLIN;
+
+		if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
+			ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
+			timespecp = &timespec;
+		}
+		/* Wait for some data to arrive. */
+		for (;;) {
+			if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
+				ms_to_timespec(&timespec, ms_remain);
+				monotime_tv(&start);
+			}
+			if ((r = ppoll(&pfd, 1, timespecp, NULL)) >= 0)
+				break;
+			if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
+			    errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
+				r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (state->packet_timeout_ms <= 0)
+				continue;
+			ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
+			if (ms_remain <= 0) {
+				r = 0;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (r == 0) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/* Read data from the socket. */
+		len = read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		if (len == 0) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (len == -1) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		/* Append it to the buffer. */
+		if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+ out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	u_char type;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "read");
+	return type;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches
+ * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch.
+ */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *ssh, u_int expected_type)
+{
+	int r;
+	u_char type;
+
+	if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (type != expected_type) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
+		    "Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d",
+		    expected_type, type)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	const u_char *cp;
+	size_t need;
+	int r;
+
+	if (ssh->kex)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	*typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
+	cp = sshbuf_ptr(state->input);
+	if (state->packlen == 0) {
+		if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + 1)
+			return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
+		state->packlen = PEEK_U32(cp);
+		if (state->packlen < 4 + 1 ||
+		    state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
+			return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+	}
+	need = state->packlen + 4;
+	if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < need)
+		return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
+	sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, cp + 4,
+	    state->packlen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, need)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep))
+		debug3_f("type %u", *typep);
+	/* sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); */
+	/* reset for next packet */
+	state->packlen = 0;
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	u_int padlen, need;
+	u_char *cp;
+	u_int maclen, aadlen = 0, authlen = 0, block_size;
+	struct sshenc *enc   = NULL;
+	struct sshmac *mac   = NULL;
+	struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (state->mux)
+		return ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+
+	*typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
+
+	if (state->packet_discard)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
+		enc  = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
+		mac  = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
+		comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
+		/* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
+		if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
+			mac = NULL;
+	}
+	maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
+	block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
+	aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
+
+	if (aadlen && state->packlen == 0) {
+		if (cipher_get_length(state->receive_context,
+		    &state->packlen, state->p_read.seqnr,
+		    sshbuf_ptr(state->input), sshbuf_len(state->input)) != 0)
+			return 0;
+		if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
+		    state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+			sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
+#endif
+			logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
+			if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0)
+				return r;
+			return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
+		}
+		sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
+	} else if (state->packlen == 0) {
+		/*
+		 * check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
+		 * decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet
+		 */
+		if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < block_size)
+			return 0;
+		sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, block_size,
+		    &cp)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context,
+		    state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input),
+		    block_size, 0, 0)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		state->packlen = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet));
+		if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
+		    state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+			fprintf(stderr, "input: \n");
+			sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
+			fprintf(stderr, "incoming_packet: \n");
+			sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
+#endif
+			logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
+			return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0,
+			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, block_size)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", state->packlen+4));
+
+	if (aadlen) {
+		/* only the payload is encrypted */
+		need = state->packlen;
+	} else {
+		/*
+		 * the payload size and the payload are encrypted, but we
+		 * have a partial packet of block_size bytes
+		 */
+		need = 4 + state->packlen - block_size;
+	}
+	DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, authlen %d,"
+	    " aadlen %d", block_size, need, maclen, authlen, aadlen));
+	if (need % block_size != 0) {
+		logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
+		    need, block_size, need % block_size);
+		return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0,
+		    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * check if the entire packet has been received and
+	 * decrypt into incoming_packet:
+	 * 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated.
+	 * 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by either
+	 * 'authlen' bytes of authentication tag or
+	 * 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code.
+	 */
+	if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < aadlen + need + authlen + maclen)
+		return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: ");
+	sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
+#endif
+	/* EtM: check mac over encrypted input */
+	if (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) {
+		if ((r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
+		    sshbuf_ptr(state->input), aadlen + need,
+		    sshbuf_ptr(state->input) + aadlen + need + authlen,
+		    maclen)) != 0) {
+			if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
+				logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need,
+	    &cp)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context, state->p_read.seqnr, cp,
+	    sshbuf_ptr(state->input), need, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, aadlen + need + authlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (mac && mac->enabled) {
+		/* Not EtM: check MAC over cleartext */
+		if (!mac->etm && (r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
+		    sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet),
+		    sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
+		    sshbuf_ptr(state->input), maclen)) != 0) {
+			if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
+				goto out;
+			logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
+			if (need + block_size > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
+				return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
+			    sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
+			    PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need - block_size);
+		}
+		/* Remove MAC from input buffer */
+		DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr));
+		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if (seqnr_p != NULL)
+		*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
+	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
+		logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
+	if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
+		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+	state->p_read.blocks += (state->packlen + 4) / block_size;
+	state->p_read.bytes += state->packlen + 4;
+
+	/* get padlen */
+	padlen = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)[4];
+	DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen));
+	if (padlen < 4)	{
+		if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
+		    "Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
+	}
+
+	/* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1)) != 0 ||
+	    ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, padlen)) != 0))
+		goto out;
+
+	DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %zd",
+	    sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
+	if (comp && comp->enabled) {
+		sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
+		if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet,
+		    state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet,
+		    state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %zd",
+		    sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
+	}
+	/*
+	 * get packet type, implies consume.
+	 * return length of payload (without type field)
+	 */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep))
+		debug3("receive packet: type %u", *typep);
+	if (*typep < SSH2_MSG_MIN || *typep >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
+		    "Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", *typep)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+	}
+	if (state->hook_in != NULL &&
+	    (r = state->hook_in(ssh, state->incoming_packet, typep,
+	    state->hook_in_ctx)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !state->server_side)
+		r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh);
+	else
+		r = 0;
+#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
+	fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", *typep);
+	sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
+#endif
+	/* reset for next packet */
+	state->packlen = 0;
+
+	if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0)
+		return r;
+ out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	u_int reason, seqnr;
+	int r;
+	u_char *msg;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		msg = NULL;
+		r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+		if (r != 0)
+			return r;
+		if (*typep) {
+			state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+			DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
+		}
+		switch (*typep) {
+		case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
+			debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
+			break;
+		case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG:
+			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+				free(msg);
+				return r;
+			}
+			debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
+			free(msg);
+			break;
+		case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
+			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+				return r;
+			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
+			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
+			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
+			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
+			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
+			free(msg);
+			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+		case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
+			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
+				return r;
+			debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u",
+			    seqnr);
+			break;
+		default:
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Buffers the supplied input data. This is intended to be used together
+ * with packet_read_poll().
+ */
+int
+ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *ssh, const char *buf, u_int len)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	int r;
+
+	if (state->packet_discard) {
+		state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */
+		if (len >= state->packet_discard) {
+			if ((r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0)
+				return r;
+		}
+		state->packet_discard -= len;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->input, buf, len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Reads and buffers data from the specified fd */
+int
+ssh_packet_process_read(struct ssh *ssh, int fd)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	int r;
+	size_t rlen;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_read(fd, state->input, PACKET_MAX_SIZE, &rlen)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (state->packet_discard) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->input, rlen)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */
+		if (rlen >= state->packet_discard) {
+			if ((r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0)
+				return r;
+		}
+		state->packet_discard -= rlen;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client.  This message
+ * can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The
+ * message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed
+ * in verbose mode.  These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging
+ * authentication problems.   The length of the formatted message must not
+ * exceed 1024 bytes.  This will automatically call ssh_packet_write_wait.
+ */
+void
+ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+	va_list args;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DEBUG))
+		return;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+
+	debug3("sending debug message: %s", buf);
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* always display */
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send DEBUG");
+}
+
+void
+sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(struct ssh *ssh, char *s, size_t l)
+{
+	snprintf(s, l, "%.200s%s%s port %d",
+	    ssh->log_preamble ? ssh->log_preamble : "",
+	    ssh->log_preamble ? " " : "",
+	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Pretty-print connection-terminating errors and exit.
+ */
+static void
+sshpkt_vfatal(struct ssh *ssh, int r, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+	char *tag = NULL, remote_id[512];
+	int oerrno = errno;
+
+	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
+
+	switch (r) {
+	case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
+		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+		logdie("Connection closed by %s", remote_id);
+	case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
+		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+		logdie("Connection %s %s timed out",
+		    ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id);
+	case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
+		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+		logdie("Disconnected from %s", remote_id);
+	case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
+		if (errno == ECONNRESET) {
+			ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+			logdie("Connection reset by %s", remote_id);
+		}
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH:
+	case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH:
+	case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH:
+	case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH:
+	case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH:
+		if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) {
+			ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+			errno = oerrno;
+			logdie("Unable to negotiate with %s: %s. "
+			    "Their offer: %s", remote_id, ssh_err(r),
+			    ssh->kex->failed_choice);
+		}
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default:
+		if (vasprintf(&tag, fmt, ap) == -1) {
+			ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+			logdie_f("could not allocate failure message");
+		}
+		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+		errno = oerrno;
+		logdie_r(r, "%s%sConnection %s %s",
+		    tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "",
+		    ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id);
+	}
+}
+
+void
+sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int r, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	sshpkt_vfatal(ssh, r, fmt, ap);
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+	va_end(ap);
+	logdie_f("should have exited");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the
+ * connection, and exits.  This function never returns. The error message
+ * should not contain a newline.  The length of the formatted message must
+ * not exceed 1024 bytes.
+ */
+void
+ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	char buf[1024], remote_id[512];
+	va_list args;
+	static int disconnecting = 0;
+	int r;
+
+	if (disconnecting)	/* Guard against recursive invocations. */
+		fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively.");
+	disconnecting = 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Format the message.  Note that the caller must make sure the
+	 * message is of limited size.
+	 */
+	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+
+	/* Display the error locally */
+	logit("Disconnecting %s: %.100s", remote_id, buf);
+
+	/*
+	 * Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait
+	 * for it to get sent.
+	 */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", buf)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__);
+
+	if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__);
+
+	/* Close the connection. */
+	ssh_packet_close(ssh);
+	cleanup_exit(255);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of
+ * the output.
+ */
+int
+ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	int len = sshbuf_len(state->output);
+	int r;
+
+	if (len > 0) {
+		len = write(state->connection_out,
+		    sshbuf_ptr(state->output), len);
+		if (len == -1) {
+			if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
+			    errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+				return 0;
+			return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		}
+		if (len == 0)
+			return SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->output, len)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been
+ * written.
+ */
+int
+ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	int ret, r, ms_remain = 0;
+	struct timeval start;
+	struct timespec timespec, *timespecp = NULL;
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+
+	if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	while (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) {
+		pfd.fd = state->connection_out;
+		pfd.events = POLLOUT;
+
+		if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
+			ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
+			timespecp = &timespec;
+		}
+		for (;;) {
+			if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
+				ms_to_timespec(&timespec, ms_remain);
+				monotime_tv(&start);
+			}
+			if ((ret = ppoll(&pfd, 1, timespecp, NULL)) >= 0)
+				break;
+			if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
+			    errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
+				break;
+			if (state->packet_timeout_ms <= 0)
+				continue;
+			ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
+			if (ms_remain <= 0) {
+				ret = 0;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (ret == 0)
+			return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
+		if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) != 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	if (ssh->state->interactive_mode)
+		return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 16384;
+	else
+		return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 128 * 1024;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *ssh, int tos)
+{
+	if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) || tos == INT_MAX)
+		return;
+	set_sock_tos(ssh->state->connection_in, tos);
+}
+
+/* Informs that the current session is interactive.  Sets IP flags for that. */
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *ssh, int interactive, int qos_interactive, int qos_bulk)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+
+	if (state->set_interactive_called)
+		return;
+	state->set_interactive_called = 1;
+
+	/* Record that we are in interactive mode. */
+	state->interactive_mode = interactive;
+
+	/* Only set socket options if using a socket.  */
+	if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
+		return;
+	set_nodelay(state->connection_in);
+	ssh_packet_set_tos(ssh, interactive ? qos_interactive : qos_bulk);
+}
+
+/* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */
+
+int
+ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return ssh->state->interactive_mode;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh, u_int s)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+
+	if (state->set_maxsize_called) {
+		logit_f("called twice: old %d new %d",
+		    state->max_packet_size, s);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) {
+		logit_f("bad size %d", s);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	state->set_maxsize_called = 1;
+	debug_f("setting to %d", s);
+	state->max_packet_size = s;
+	return s;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return ++ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, int ka)
+{
+	ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka;
+}
+
+u_int
+ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return ssh->state->max_packet_size;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, u_int32_t seconds)
+{
+	debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %u seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes,
+	    (unsigned int)seconds);
+	ssh->state->rekey_limit = bytes;
+	ssh->state->rekey_interval = seconds;
+}
+
+time_t
+ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	time_t seconds;
+
+	seconds = ssh->state->rekey_time + ssh->state->rekey_interval -
+	    monotime();
+	return (seconds <= 0 ? 1 : seconds);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	ssh->state->server_side = 1;
+	ssh->kex->server = 1; /* XXX unify? */
+}
+
+void
+ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
+}
+
+void *
+ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return (void *)ssh->state->input;
+}
+
+void *
+ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return (void *)ssh->state->output;
+}
+
+/* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */
+static int
+ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	debug_f("called");
+	/* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */
+	ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
+	ssh->state->rekeying = 0;
+	if ((r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Packet state (de-)serialization for privsep */
+
+/* turn kex into a blob for packet state serialization */
+static int
+kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->we_need)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->hostkey_alg)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->server_version)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->flags)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* turn key exchange results into a blob for packet state serialization */
+static int
+newkeys_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
+	struct sshcomp *comp;
+	struct sshenc *enc;
+	struct sshmac *mac;
+	struct newkeys *newkey;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((newkey = ssh->state->newkeys[mode]) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	enc = &newkey->enc;
+	mac = &newkey->mac;
+	comp = &newkey->comp;
+	cc = (mode == MODE_OUT) ? ssh->state->send_context :
+	    ssh->state->receive_context;
+	if ((r = cipher_get_keyiv(cc, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, enc->name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->key, enc->key_len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, mac->name)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, mac->key, mac->key_len)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comp->name)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b);
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* serialize packet state into a blob */
+int
+ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = kex_to_blob(m, ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.bytes)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->input)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->output)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* restore key exchange results from blob for packet state de-serialization */
+static int
+newkeys_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	struct sshcomp *comp;
+	struct sshenc *enc;
+	struct sshmac *mac;
+	struct newkeys *newkey = NULL;
+	size_t keylen, ivlen, maclen;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((newkey = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkey))) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+#endif
+	enc = &newkey->enc;
+	mac = &newkey->mac;
+	comp = &newkey->comp;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &enc->name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->key, &keylen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->iv, &ivlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(enc->name)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &mac->name, NULL)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if ((r = mac_setup(mac, mac->name)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &mac->key, &maclen)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if (maclen > mac->key_len) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		mac->key_len = maclen;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &comp->type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &comp->name, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	enc->key_len = keylen;
+	enc->iv_len = ivlen;
+	ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = newkey;
+	newkey = NULL;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(newkey);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* restore kex from blob for packet state de-serialization */
+static int
+kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
+{
+	struct kex *kex;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((kex = kex_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->we_need)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->hostkey_alg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->server_version)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->flags)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	kex->server = 1;
+	kex->done = 1;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if (r != 0 || kexp == NULL) {
+		kex_free(kex);
+		if (kexp != NULL)
+			*kexp = NULL;
+	} else {
+		kex_free(*kexp);
+		*kexp = kex;
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restore packet state from content of blob 'm' (de-serialization).
+ * Note that 'm' will be partially consumed on parsing or any other errors.
+ */
+int
+ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	const u_char *input, *output;
+	size_t ilen, olen;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = kex_from_blob(m, &ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.bytes)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	/*
+	 * We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep child we
+	 * count from the completion of the authentication.
+	 */
+	state->rekey_time = monotime();
+	/* XXX ssh_set_newkeys overrides p_read.packets? XXX */
+	if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if ((r = ssh_packet_set_postauth(ssh)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	sshbuf_reset(state->input);
+	sshbuf_reset(state->output);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &input, &ilen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &output, &olen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(state->input, input, ilen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(state->output, output, olen)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if (sshbuf_len(m))
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	debug3_f("done");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* NEW API */
+
+/* put data to the outgoing packet */
+
+int
+sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len)
+{
+	return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	return sshbuf_putb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, b);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val)
+{
+	return sshbuf_put_u8(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val)
+{
+	return sshbuf_put_u32(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val)
+{
+	return sshbuf_put_u64(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len)
+{
+	return sshbuf_put_string(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v)
+{
+	return sshbuf_put_cstring(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v)
+{
+	return sshbuf_put_stringb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_getb_froms(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **valp)
+{
+	return sshbuf_froms(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+int
+sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
+{
+	return sshbuf_put_ec(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, g);
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+
+int
+sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v)
+{
+	return sshbuf_put_bignum2(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+/* fetch data from the incoming packet */
+
+int
+sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len)
+{
+	return sshbuf_get(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, len);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp)
+{
+	return sshbuf_get_u8(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp)
+{
+	return sshbuf_get_u32(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp)
+{
+	return sshbuf_get_u64(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+	return sshbuf_get_string(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+	return sshbuf_get_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_peek_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+	return sshbuf_peek_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+	return sshbuf_get_cstring(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+int
+sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
+{
+	return sshbuf_get_ec(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v, g);
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+int
+sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM **valp)
+{
+	return sshbuf_get_bignum2(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+int
+sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	if (sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet) > 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+const u_char *
+sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp)
+{
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
+	return sshbuf_ptr(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
+}
+
+/* start a new packet */
+
+int
+sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type)
+{
+	u_char buf[6]; /* u32 packet length, u8 pad len, u8 type */
+
+	DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type));
+	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+	buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = type;
+	sshbuf_reset(ssh->state->outgoing_packet);
+	return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, buf, sizeof(buf));
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_packet_send_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
+	u_char type, *cp;
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	if (ssh->kex)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
+	if (len < 6)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet);
+	type = cp[5];
+	if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
+		debug3_f("type %u", type);
+	/* drop everything, but the connection protocol */
+	if (type >= SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MIN &&
+	    type <= SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MAX) {
+		POKE_U32(cp, len - 4);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->output,
+		    state->outgoing_packet)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		/* sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); */
+	}
+	sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * 9.2.  Ignored Data Message
+ *
+ *   byte      SSH_MSG_IGNORE
+ *   string    data
+ *
+ * All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any
+ * time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is
+ * required to send them. This message can be used as an additional
+ * protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques.
+ */
+int
+sshpkt_msg_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, u_int nbytes)
+{
+	u_int32_t rnd = 0;
+	int r;
+	u_int i;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbytes)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) {
+		if (i % 4 == 0)
+			rnd = arc4random();
+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, (u_char)rnd & 0xff)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		rnd >>= 8;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* send it */
+
+int
+sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	if (ssh->state && ssh->state->mux)
+		return ssh_packet_send_mux(ssh);
+	return ssh_packet_send2(ssh);
+}
+
+int
+sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+	va_list args;
+	int r;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* roundup current message to pad bytes */
+int
+sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *ssh, u_char pad)
+{
+	ssh->state->extra_pad = pad;
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/packet.h b/packet.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..176488b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/packet.h
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.94 2022/01/22 00:49:34 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Interface for the packet protocol functions.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef PACKET_H
+#define PACKET_H
+
+#include <termios.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+#  include <openssl/ec.h>
+# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#  define EC_KEY	void
+#  define EC_GROUP	void
+#  define EC_POINT	void
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+# define BIGNUM		void
+# define EC_KEY		void
+# define EC_GROUP	void
+# define EC_POINT	void
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+struct kex;
+struct sshkey;
+struct sshbuf;
+struct session_state;	/* private session data */
+
+#include "dispatch.h"	/* typedef, DISPATCH_MAX */
+
+struct key_entry {
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(key_entry) next;
+	struct sshkey *key;
+};
+
+struct ssh {
+	/* Session state */
+	struct session_state *state;
+
+	/* Key exchange */
+	struct kex *kex;
+
+	/* cached local and remote ip addresses and ports */
+	char *remote_ipaddr;
+	int remote_port;
+	char *local_ipaddr;
+	int local_port;
+	char *rdomain_in;
+
+	/* Optional preamble for log messages (e.g. username) */
+	char *log_preamble;
+
+	/* Dispatcher table */
+	dispatch_fn *dispatch[DISPATCH_MAX];
+	/* number of packets to ignore in the dispatcher */
+	int dispatch_skip_packets;
+
+	/* datafellows */
+	int compat;
+
+	/* Lists for private and public keys */
+	TAILQ_HEAD(, key_entry) private_keys;
+	TAILQ_HEAD(, key_entry) public_keys;
+
+	/* Client/Server authentication context */
+	void *authctxt;
+
+	/* Channels context */
+	struct ssh_channels *chanctxt;
+
+	/* APP data */
+	void *app_data;
+};
+
+typedef int (ssh_packet_hook_fn)(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *,
+    u_char *, void *);
+
+struct ssh *ssh_alloc_session_state(void);
+struct ssh *ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *, int, int);
+void     ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *, int, int);
+int	 ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *);
+int	 ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *);
+void     ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *);
+int      ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *);
+int      ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *);
+void     ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *);
+void	 ssh_packet_set_input_hook(struct ssh *, ssh_packet_hook_fn *, void *);
+void	 ssh_packet_clear_keys(struct ssh *);
+void	 ssh_clear_newkeys(struct ssh *, int);
+
+int	 ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *);
+int	 ssh_packet_check_rekey(struct ssh *);
+void     ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *, u_int);
+u_int	 ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *);
+void	 ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *, int);
+void     ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *, int, int, int);
+int      ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *);
+void     ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *);
+void     ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *);
+void     ssh_packet_set_mux(struct ssh *);
+int	 ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *);
+int	 ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *, const char *, ...)
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+
+int	 ssh_packet_log_type(u_char);
+
+int	 ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *);
+int	 ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *);
+
+int      ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *);
+int	 ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *, u_int type);
+int      ssh_packet_read_poll(struct ssh *);
+int ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p);
+int	 ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *, const char *buf, u_int len);
+int	 ssh_packet_process_read(struct ssh *, int);
+int      ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p);
+int      ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *, u_char *, u_int32_t *seqnr_p);
+
+const void *ssh_packet_get_string_ptr(struct ssh *, u_int *length_ptr);
+void     ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...)
+	__attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)))
+	__attribute__((noreturn));
+void     ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+
+int	 ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *, int mode);
+void	 ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *, u_int64_t *, u_int64_t *);
+
+int	 ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *);
+int	 ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *);
+int      ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *);
+int      ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *);
+
+int	 ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *);
+int	 ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *);
+
+void	 ssh_tty_make_modes(struct ssh *, int, struct termios *);
+void	 ssh_tty_parse_modes(struct ssh *, int);
+
+void	 ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *, int);
+int	 ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *);
+int	 ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *, u_int);
+u_int	 ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *);
+
+int	 ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
+int	 ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
+
+const char *ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *);
+int	 ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *);
+const char *ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *);
+int	 ssh_local_port(struct ssh *);
+const char *ssh_packet_rdomain_in(struct ssh *);
+
+void	 ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *, u_int64_t, u_int32_t);
+time_t	 ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *);
+
+void	*ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *);
+void	*ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *);
+
+/* new API */
+int	sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type);
+int	sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh);
+int     sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *, const char *fmt, ...)
+	    __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+int	sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *, u_char);
+void	sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int r, const char *fmt, ...)
+	    __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)))
+	    __attribute__((noreturn));
+int	sshpkt_msg_ignore(struct ssh *, u_int);
+
+int	sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len);
+int	sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b);
+int	sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val);
+int	sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val);
+int	sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val);
+int	sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len);
+int	sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v);
+int	sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v);
+int	sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g);
+int	sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v);
+
+int	sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len);
+int	sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp);
+int	sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp);
+int	sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp);
+int	sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
+int	sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
+int	sshpkt_peek_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
+int	sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp);
+int	sshpkt_getb_froms(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **valp);
+int	sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g);
+int	sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM **valp);
+int	sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh);
+void	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(struct ssh *ssh, char *s, size_t l);
+const u_char	*sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, size_t *lenp);
+
+#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+# undef BIGNUM
+# undef EC_KEY
+# undef EC_GROUP
+# undef EC_POINT
+#elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+# undef EC_KEY
+# undef EC_GROUP
+# undef EC_POINT
+#endif
+
+#endif				/* PACKET_H */
diff --git a/pathnames.h b/pathnames.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7ca5a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pathnames.h
@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.31 2019/11/12 19:33:08 markus Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#define ETCDIR				"/etc"
+
+#ifndef SSHDIR
+#define SSHDIR				ETCDIR "/ssh"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR
+#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR		"/var/run"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * System-wide file containing host keys of known hosts.  This file should be
+ * world-readable.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE	SSHDIR "/ssh_known_hosts"
+/* backward compat for protocol 2 */
+#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2	SSHDIR "/ssh_known_hosts2"
+
+/*
+ * Of these, ssh_host_key must be readable only by root, whereas ssh_config
+ * should be world-readable.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE	SSHDIR "/sshd_config"
+#define _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE		SSHDIR "/ssh_config"
+#define _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE		SSHDIR "/ssh_host_dsa_key"
+#define _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE	SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ecdsa_key"
+#define _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE	SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ed25519_key"
+#define _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE	SSHDIR "/ssh_host_xmss_key"
+#define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE		SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
+#define _PATH_DH_MODULI			SSHDIR "/moduli"
+
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
+#define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM		"/usr/bin/ssh"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * The process id of the daemon listening for connections is saved here to
+ * make it easier to kill the correct daemon when necessary.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE	_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/sshd.pid"
+
+/*
+ * The directory in user's home directory in which the files reside. The
+ * directory should be world-readable (though not all files are).
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR		".ssh"
+
+/*
+ * Per-user file containing host keys of known hosts.  This file need not be
+ * readable by anyone except the user him/herself, though this does not
+ * contain anything particularly secret.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE		"~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/known_hosts"
+/* backward compat for protocol 2 */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2	"~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/known_hosts2"
+
+/*
+ * Name of the default file containing client-side authentication key. This
+ * file should only be readable by the user him/herself.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA		_PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_dsa"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA	_PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ecdsa"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA		_PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_rsa"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519	_PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ed25519"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS	_PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_xmss"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK	_PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ecdsa_sk"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK	_PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ed25519_sk"
+
+/*
+ * Configuration file in user's home directory.  This file need not be
+ * readable by anyone but the user him/herself, but does not contain anything
+ * particularly secret.  If the user's home directory resides on an NFS
+ * volume where root is mapped to nobody, this may need to be world-readable.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE		_PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/config"
+
+/*
+ * File containing a list of those rsa keys that permit logging in as this
+ * user.  This file need not be readable by anyone but the user him/herself,
+ * but does not contain anything particularly secret.  If the user's home
+ * directory resides on an NFS volume where root is mapped to nobody, this
+ * may need to be world-readable.  (This file is read by the daemon which is
+ * running as root.)
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS	_PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/authorized_keys"
+
+/* backward compat for protocol v2 */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2	_PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/authorized_keys2"
+
+/*
+ * Per-user and system-wide ssh "rc" files.  These files are executed with
+ * /bin/sh before starting the shell or command if they exist.  They will be
+ * passed "proto cookie" as arguments if X11 forwarding with spoofing is in
+ * use.  xauth will be run if neither of these exists.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_USER_RC		_PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/rc"
+#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC		SSHDIR "/sshrc"
+
+/*
+ * Ssh-only version of /etc/hosts.equiv.  Additionally, the daemon may use
+ * ~/.rhosts and /etc/hosts.equiv if rhosts authentication is enabled.
+ */
+#define _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV		SSHDIR "/shosts.equiv"
+#define _PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV		"/etc/hosts.equiv"
+
+/*
+ * Default location of askpass
+ */
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT
+#define _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT	"/usr/X11R6/bin/ssh-askpass"
+#endif
+
+/* Location of ssh-keysign for hostbased authentication */
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN
+#define _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN		"/usr/libexec/ssh-keysign"
+#endif
+
+/* Location of ssh-pkcs11-helper to support keys in tokens */
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER
+#define _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER		"/usr/libexec/ssh-pkcs11-helper"
+#endif
+
+/* Location of ssh-sk-helper to support keys in security keys */
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER
+#define _PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER		"/usr/libexec/ssh-sk-helper"
+#endif
+
+/* xauth for X11 forwarding */
+#ifndef _PATH_XAUTH
+#define _PATH_XAUTH			"/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth"
+#endif
+
+/* UNIX domain socket for X11 server; displaynum will replace %u */
+#ifndef _PATH_UNIX_X
+#define _PATH_UNIX_X "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u"
+#endif
+
+/* for scp */
+#ifndef _PATH_CP
+#define _PATH_CP			"cp"
+#endif
+
+/* for sftp */
+#ifndef _PATH_SFTP_SERVER
+#define _PATH_SFTP_SERVER		"/usr/libexec/sftp-server"
+#endif
+
+/* chroot directory for unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes */
+#ifndef _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR
+#define _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR	"/var/empty"
+#endif
+
+/* for passwd change */
+#ifndef _PATH_PASSWD_PROG
+#define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG             "/usr/bin/passwd"
+#endif
+
+#ifndef _PATH_LS
+#define _PATH_LS			"ls"
+#endif
+
+/* Askpass program define */
+#ifndef ASKPASS_PROGRAM
+#define ASKPASS_PROGRAM         "/usr/lib/ssh/ssh-askpass"
+#endif /* ASKPASS_PROGRAM */
diff --git a/pkcs11.h b/pkcs11.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b01d58f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/pkcs11.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1357 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: pkcs11.h,v 1.3 2013/11/26 19:15:09 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* pkcs11.h
+   Copyright 2006, 2007 g10 Code GmbH
+   Copyright 2006 Andreas Jellinghaus
+
+   This file is free software; as a special exception the author gives
+   unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it, with or without
+   modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
+
+   This file is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+   WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without even
+   the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+   PURPOSE.  */
+
+/* Please submit changes back to the Scute project at
+   http://www.scute.org/ (or send them to marcus@g10code.com), so that
+   they can be picked up by other projects from there as well.  */
+
+/* This file is a modified implementation of the PKCS #11 standard by
+   RSA Security Inc.  It is mostly a drop-in replacement, with the
+   following change:
+
+   This header file does not require any macro definitions by the user
+   (like CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION etc).  In fact, it defines those macros
+   for you (if useful, some are missing, let me know if you need
+   more).
+
+   There is an additional API available that does comply better to the
+   GNU coding standard.  It can be switched on by defining
+   CRYPTOKI_GNU before including this header file.  For this, the
+   following changes are made to the specification:
+
+   All structure types are changed to a "struct ck_foo" where CK_FOO
+   is the type name in PKCS #11.
+
+   All non-structure types are changed to ck_foo_t where CK_FOO is the
+   lowercase version of the type name in PKCS #11.  The basic types
+   (CK_ULONG et al.) are removed without substitute.
+
+   All members of structures are modified in the following way: Type
+   indication prefixes are removed, and underscore characters are
+   inserted before words.  Then the result is lowercased.
+
+   Note that function names are still in the original case, as they
+   need for ABI compatibility.
+
+   CK_FALSE, CK_TRUE and NULL_PTR are removed without substitute.  Use
+   <stdbool.h>.
+
+   If CRYPTOKI_COMPAT is defined before including this header file,
+   then none of the API changes above take place, and the API is the
+   one defined by the PKCS #11 standard.  */
+
+#ifndef PKCS11_H
+#define PKCS11_H 1
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+
+/* The version of cryptoki we implement.  The revision is changed with
+   each modification of this file.  If you do not use the "official"
+   version of this file, please consider deleting the revision macro
+   (you may use a macro with a different name to keep track of your
+   versions).  */
+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR		2
+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR		20
+#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_REVISION	6
+
+
+/* Compatibility interface is default, unless CRYPTOKI_GNU is
+   given.  */
+#ifndef CRYPTOKI_GNU
+#ifndef CRYPTOKI_COMPAT
+#define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/* System dependencies.  */
+
+#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(CRYPTOKI_FORCE_WIN32)
+
+/* There is a matching pop below.  */
+#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
+
+#ifdef CRYPTOKI_EXPORTS
+#define CK_SPEC __declspec(dllexport)
+#else
+#define CK_SPEC __declspec(dllimport)
+#endif
+
+#else
+
+#define CK_SPEC
+
+#endif
+
+
+#ifdef CRYPTOKI_COMPAT
+  /* If we are in compatibility mode, switch all exposed names to the
+     PKCS #11 variant.  There are corresponding #undefs below.  */
+
+#define ck_flags_t CK_FLAGS
+#define ck_version _CK_VERSION
+
+#define ck_info _CK_INFO
+#define cryptoki_version cryptokiVersion
+#define manufacturer_id manufacturerID
+#define library_description libraryDescription
+#define library_version libraryVersion
+
+#define ck_notification_t CK_NOTIFICATION
+#define ck_slot_id_t CK_SLOT_ID
+
+#define ck_slot_info _CK_SLOT_INFO
+#define slot_description slotDescription
+#define hardware_version hardwareVersion
+#define firmware_version firmwareVersion
+
+#define ck_token_info _CK_TOKEN_INFO
+#define serial_number serialNumber
+#define max_session_count ulMaxSessionCount
+#define session_count ulSessionCount
+#define max_rw_session_count ulMaxRwSessionCount
+#define rw_session_count ulRwSessionCount
+#define max_pin_len ulMaxPinLen
+#define min_pin_len ulMinPinLen
+#define total_public_memory ulTotalPublicMemory
+#define free_public_memory ulFreePublicMemory
+#define total_private_memory ulTotalPrivateMemory
+#define free_private_memory ulFreePrivateMemory
+#define utc_time utcTime
+
+#define ck_session_handle_t CK_SESSION_HANDLE
+#define ck_user_type_t CK_USER_TYPE
+#define ck_state_t CK_STATE
+
+#define ck_session_info _CK_SESSION_INFO
+#define slot_id slotID
+#define device_error ulDeviceError
+
+#define ck_object_handle_t CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
+#define ck_object_class_t CK_OBJECT_CLASS
+#define ck_hw_feature_type_t CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE
+#define ck_key_type_t CK_KEY_TYPE
+#define ck_certificate_type_t CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE
+#define ck_attribute_type_t CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE
+
+#define ck_attribute _CK_ATTRIBUTE
+#define value pValue
+#define value_len ulValueLen
+
+#define ck_date _CK_DATE
+
+#define ck_mechanism_type_t CK_MECHANISM_TYPE
+
+#define ck_mechanism _CK_MECHANISM
+#define parameter pParameter
+#define parameter_len ulParameterLen
+
+#define ck_mechanism_info _CK_MECHANISM_INFO
+#define min_key_size ulMinKeySize
+#define max_key_size ulMaxKeySize
+
+#define ck_rv_t CK_RV
+#define ck_notify_t CK_NOTIFY
+
+#define ck_function_list _CK_FUNCTION_LIST
+
+#define ck_createmutex_t CK_CREATEMUTEX
+#define ck_destroymutex_t CK_DESTROYMUTEX
+#define ck_lockmutex_t CK_LOCKMUTEX
+#define ck_unlockmutex_t CK_UNLOCKMUTEX
+
+#define ck_c_initialize_args _CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS
+#define create_mutex CreateMutex
+#define destroy_mutex DestroyMutex
+#define lock_mutex LockMutex
+#define unlock_mutex UnlockMutex
+#define reserved pReserved
+
+#endif	/* CRYPTOKI_COMPAT */
+
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_flags_t;
+
+struct ck_version
+{
+  unsigned char major;
+  unsigned char minor;
+};
+
+
+struct ck_info
+{
+  struct ck_version cryptoki_version;
+  unsigned char manufacturer_id[32];
+  ck_flags_t flags;
+  unsigned char library_description[32];
+  struct ck_version library_version;
+};
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_notification_t;
+
+#define CKN_SURRENDER	(0)
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_slot_id_t;
+
+
+struct ck_slot_info
+{
+  unsigned char slot_description[64];
+  unsigned char manufacturer_id[32];
+  ck_flags_t flags;
+  struct ck_version hardware_version;
+  struct ck_version firmware_version;
+};
+
+
+#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT	(1 << 0)
+#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE	(1 << 1)
+#define CKF_HW_SLOT		(1 << 2)
+#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE	(1 << 30)
+
+
+struct ck_token_info
+{
+  unsigned char label[32];
+  unsigned char manufacturer_id[32];
+  unsigned char model[16];
+  unsigned char serial_number[16];
+  ck_flags_t flags;
+  unsigned long max_session_count;
+  unsigned long session_count;
+  unsigned long max_rw_session_count;
+  unsigned long rw_session_count;
+  unsigned long max_pin_len;
+  unsigned long min_pin_len;
+  unsigned long total_public_memory;
+  unsigned long free_public_memory;
+  unsigned long total_private_memory;
+  unsigned long free_private_memory;
+  struct ck_version hardware_version;
+  struct ck_version firmware_version;
+  unsigned char utc_time[16];
+};
+
+
+#define CKF_RNG					(1 << 0)
+#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED			(1 << 1)
+#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED			(1 << 2)
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED		(1 << 3)
+#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED		(1 << 5)
+#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN			(1 << 6)
+#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH	(1 << 8)
+#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS		(1 << 9)
+#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED			(1 << 10)
+#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION		(1 << 11)
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW			(1 << 16)
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY			(1 << 17)
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED			(1 << 18)
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED		(1 << 19)
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW			(1 << 20)
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY			(1 << 21)
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED			(1 << 22)
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED		(1 << 23)
+
+#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION	((unsigned long) -1)
+#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE		(0)
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_session_handle_t;
+
+#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE	(0)
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_user_type_t;
+
+#define CKU_SO			(0)
+#define CKU_USER		(1)
+#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC	(2)
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_state_t;
+
+#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION	(0)
+#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS	(1)
+#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION	(2)
+#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS	(3)
+#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS	(4)
+
+
+struct ck_session_info
+{
+  ck_slot_id_t slot_id;
+  ck_state_t state;
+  ck_flags_t flags;
+  unsigned long device_error;
+};
+
+#define CKF_RW_SESSION		(1 << 1)
+#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION	(1 << 2)
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_object_handle_t;
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_object_class_t;
+
+#define CKO_DATA		(0)
+#define CKO_CERTIFICATE		(1)
+#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY		(2)
+#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY		(3)
+#define CKO_SECRET_KEY		(4)
+#define CKO_HW_FEATURE		(5)
+#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS	(6)
+#define CKO_MECHANISM		(7)
+#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED	(1U << 31)
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_hw_feature_type_t;
+
+#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER	(1)
+#define CKH_CLOCK		(2)
+#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE	(3)
+#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED	(1U << 31)
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_key_type_t;
+
+#define CKK_RSA			(0)
+#define CKK_DSA			(1)
+#define CKK_DH			(2)
+#define CKK_ECDSA		(3)
+#define CKK_EC			(3)
+#define CKK_X9_42_DH		(4)
+#define CKK_KEA			(5)
+#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET	(0x10)
+#define CKK_RC2			(0x11)
+#define CKK_RC4			(0x12)
+#define CKK_DES			(0x13)
+#define CKK_DES2		(0x14)
+#define CKK_DES3		(0x15)
+#define CKK_CAST		(0x16)
+#define CKK_CAST3		(0x17)
+#define CKK_CAST128		(0x18)
+#define CKK_RC5			(0x19)
+#define CKK_IDEA		(0x1a)
+#define CKK_SKIPJACK		(0x1b)
+#define CKK_BATON		(0x1c)
+#define CKK_JUNIPER		(0x1d)
+#define CKK_CDMF		(0x1e)
+#define CKK_AES			(0x1f)
+#define CKK_BLOWFISH		(0x20)
+#define CKK_TWOFISH		(0x21)
+#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED	(1U << 31)
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_certificate_type_t;
+
+#define CKC_X_509		(0)
+#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT	(1)
+#define CKC_WTLS		(2)
+#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED	(1U << 31)
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_attribute_type_t;
+
+#define CKA_CLASS			(0)
+#define CKA_TOKEN			(1)
+#define CKA_PRIVATE			(2)
+#define CKA_LABEL			(3)
+#define CKA_APPLICATION			(0x10)
+#define CKA_VALUE			(0x11)
+#define CKA_OBJECT_ID			(0x12)
+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE		(0x80)
+#define CKA_ISSUER			(0x81)
+#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER		(0x82)
+#define CKA_AC_ISSUER			(0x83)
+#define CKA_OWNER			(0x84)
+#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES			(0x85)
+#define CKA_TRUSTED			(0x86)
+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY	(0x87)
+#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN	(0x88)
+#define CKA_URL				(0x89)
+#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY	(0x8a)
+#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY	(0x8b)
+#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE			(0x90)
+#define CKA_KEY_TYPE			(0x100)
+#define CKA_SUBJECT			(0x101)
+#define CKA_ID				(0x102)
+#define CKA_SENSITIVE			(0x103)
+#define CKA_ENCRYPT			(0x104)
+#define CKA_DECRYPT			(0x105)
+#define CKA_WRAP			(0x106)
+#define CKA_UNWRAP			(0x107)
+#define CKA_SIGN			(0x108)
+#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER		(0x109)
+#define CKA_VERIFY			(0x10a)
+#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER		(0x10b)
+#define CKA_DERIVE			(0x10c)
+#define CKA_START_DATE			(0x110)
+#define CKA_END_DATE			(0x111)
+#define CKA_MODULUS			(0x120)
+#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS		(0x121)
+#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT		(0x122)
+#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT		(0x123)
+#define CKA_PRIME_1			(0x124)
+#define CKA_PRIME_2			(0x125)
+#define CKA_EXPONENT_1			(0x126)
+#define CKA_EXPONENT_2			(0x127)
+#define CKA_COEFFICIENT			(0x128)
+#define CKA_PRIME			(0x130)
+#define CKA_SUBPRIME			(0x131)
+#define CKA_BASE			(0x132)
+#define CKA_PRIME_BITS			(0x133)
+#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS		(0x134)
+#define CKA_VALUE_BITS			(0x160)
+#define CKA_VALUE_LEN			(0x161)
+#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE			(0x162)
+#define CKA_LOCAL			(0x163)
+#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE		(0x164)
+#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE		(0x165)
+#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM		(0x166)
+#define CKA_MODIFIABLE			(0x170)
+#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS		(0x180)
+#define CKA_EC_PARAMS			(0x180)
+#define CKA_EC_POINT			(0x181)
+#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH		(0x200)
+#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS		(0x201)
+#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE		(0x202)
+#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED		(0x210)
+#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE		(0x300)
+#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT		(0x301)
+#define CKA_HAS_RESET			(0x302)
+#define CKA_PIXEL_X			(0x400)
+#define CKA_PIXEL_Y			(0x401)
+#define CKA_RESOLUTION			(0x402)
+#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS			(0x403)
+#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS		(0x404)
+#define CKA_COLOR			(0x405)
+#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL		(0x406)
+#define CKA_CHAR_SETS			(0x480)
+#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS		(0x481)
+#define CKA_MIME_TYPES			(0x482)
+#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE		(0x500)
+#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES	(0x501)
+#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES	(0x502)
+#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES	(0x503)
+#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE		(CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x211)
+#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE		(CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x212)
+#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS		(CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE | 0x600)
+#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED		(1U << 31)
+
+
+struct ck_attribute
+{
+  ck_attribute_type_t type;
+  void *value;
+  unsigned long value_len;
+};
+
+
+struct ck_date
+{
+  unsigned char year[4];
+  unsigned char month[2];
+  unsigned char day[2];
+};
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_mechanism_type_t;
+
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN	(0)
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS			(1)
+#define CKM_RSA_9796			(2)
+#define CKM_RSA_X_509			(3)
+#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS		(4)
+#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS		(5)
+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS		(6)
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS		(7)
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS		(8)
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP		(9)
+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN	(0xa)
+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31			(0xb)
+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31		(0xc)
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS		(0xd)
+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS		(0xe)
+#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN		(0x10)
+#define	CKM_DSA				(0x11)
+#define CKM_DSA_SHA1			(0x12)
+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN	(0x20)
+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE		(0x21)
+#define	CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN	(0x30)
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE		(0x31)
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE	(0x32)
+#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE		(0x33)
+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS		(0x40)
+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS		(0x41)
+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS		(0x42)
+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS		(0x43)
+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS		(0x44)
+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS		(0x45)
+#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN			(0x100)
+#define CKM_RC2_ECB			(0x101)
+#define	CKM_RC2_CBC			(0x102)
+#define	CKM_RC2_MAC			(0x103)
+#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL		(0x104)
+#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD			(0x105)
+#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN			(0x110)
+#define CKM_RC4				(0x111)
+#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN			(0x120)
+#define CKM_DES_ECB			(0x121)
+#define CKM_DES_CBC			(0x122)
+#define CKM_DES_MAC			(0x123)
+#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL		(0x124)
+#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD			(0x125)
+#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN		(0x130)
+#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN		(0x131)
+#define CKM_DES3_ECB			(0x132)
+#define CKM_DES3_CBC			(0x133)
+#define CKM_DES3_MAC			(0x134)
+#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL		(0x135)
+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD		(0x136)
+#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN		(0x140)
+#define CKM_CDMF_ECB			(0x141)
+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC			(0x142)
+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC			(0x143)
+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL		(0x144)
+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD		(0x145)
+#define CKM_MD2				(0x200)
+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC			(0x201)
+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL		(0x202)
+#define CKM_MD5				(0x210)
+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC			(0x211)
+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL		(0x212)
+#define CKM_SHA_1			(0x220)
+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC			(0x221)
+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL		(0x222)
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128			(0x230)
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC		(0x231)
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL	(0x232)
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160			(0x240)
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC		(0x241)
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL	(0x242)
+#define CKM_SHA256			(0x250)
+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC			(0x251)
+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL		(0x252)
+#define CKM_SHA384			(0x260)
+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC			(0x261)
+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL		(0x262)
+#define CKM_SHA512			(0x270)
+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC			(0x271)
+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL		(0x272)
+#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN		(0x300)
+#define CKM_CAST_ECB			(0x301)
+#define CKM_CAST_CBC			(0x302)
+#define CKM_CAST_MAC			(0x303)
+#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL		(0x304)
+#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD		(0x305)
+#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN		(0x310)
+#define CKM_CAST3_ECB			(0x311)
+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC			(0x312)
+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC			(0x313)
+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL		(0x314)
+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD		(0x315)
+#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN		(0x320)
+#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN		(0x320)
+#define CKM_CAST5_ECB			(0x321)
+#define CKM_CAST128_ECB			(0x321)
+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC			(0x322)
+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC			(0x322)
+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC			(0x323)
+#define	CKM_CAST128_MAC			(0x323)
+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL		(0x324)
+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL		(0x324)
+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD		(0x325)
+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD		(0x325)
+#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN			(0x330)
+#define CKM_RC5_ECB			(0x331)
+#define CKM_RC5_CBC			(0x332)
+#define CKM_RC5_MAC			(0x333)
+#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL		(0x334)
+#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD			(0x335)
+#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN		(0x340)
+#define CKM_IDEA_ECB			(0x341)
+#define	CKM_IDEA_CBC			(0x342)
+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC			(0x343)
+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL		(0x344)
+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD		(0x345)
+#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN	(0x350)
+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY	(0x360)
+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA	(0x362)
+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE	(0x363)
+#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA		(0x364)
+#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY	(0x365)
+#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN	(0x370)
+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE	(0x371)
+#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE	(0x372)
+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH	(0x373)
+#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN	(0x374)
+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE	(0x375)
+#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE	(0x376)
+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH	(0x377)
+#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC		(0x380)
+#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC		(0x381)
+#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION		(0x390)
+#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION		(0x391)
+#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION		(0x392)
+#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC		(0x3a0)
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC		(0x3a1)
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC		(0x3a2)
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC		(0x3a3)
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC		(0x3a4)
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC		(0x3a4)
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC		(0x3a5)
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC	(0x3a5)
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128		(0x3a6)
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40		(0x3a7)
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC	(0x3a8)
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC	(0x3a9)
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC	(0x3aa)
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC		(0x3ab)
+#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2			(0x3b0)
+#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC	(0x3c0)
+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS		(0x400)
+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP		(0x401)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN		(0x1000)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64		(0x1001)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64		(0x1002)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64		(0x1003)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64		(0x1004)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32		(0x1005)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16		(0x1006)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8		(0x1007)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP		(0x1008)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP	(0x1009)
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX		(0x100a)
+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN		(0x1010)
+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE		(0x1011)
+#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP		(0x1020)
+#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN		(0x1030)
+#define CKM_BATON_ECB128		(0x1031)
+#define CKM_BATON_ECB96			(0x1032)
+#define CKM_BATON_CBC128		(0x1033)
+#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER		(0x1034)
+#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE		(0x1035)
+#define CKM_BATON_WRAP			(0x1036)
+#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN		(0x1040)
+#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN		(0x1040)
+#define CKM_ECDSA			(0x1041)
+#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1			(0x1042)
+#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE		(0x1050)
+#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE	(0x1051)
+#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE		(0x1052)
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN		(0x1060)
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128		(0x1061)
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128		(0x1062)
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER		(0x1063)
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE		(0x1064)
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP		(0x1065)
+#define CKM_FASTHASH			(0x1070)
+#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN			(0x1080)
+#define CKM_AES_ECB			(0x1081)
+#define CKM_AES_CBC			(0x1082)
+#define CKM_AES_MAC			(0x1083)
+#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL		(0x1084)
+#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD			(0x1085)
+#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN		(0x2000)
+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN	(0x2001)
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN	(0x2002)
+#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED		(1U << 31)
+
+
+struct ck_mechanism
+{
+  ck_mechanism_type_t mechanism;
+  void *parameter;
+  unsigned long parameter_len;
+};
+
+
+struct ck_mechanism_info
+{
+  unsigned long min_key_size;
+  unsigned long max_key_size;
+  ck_flags_t flags;
+};
+
+#define CKF_HW			(1 << 0)
+#define CKF_ENCRYPT		(1 << 8)
+#define CKF_DECRYPT		(1 << 9)
+#define CKF_DIGEST		(1 << 10)
+#define CKF_SIGN		(1 << 11)
+#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER	(1 << 12)
+#define CKF_VERIFY		(1 << 13)
+#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER	(1 << 14)
+#define CKF_GENERATE		(1 << 15)
+#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR	(1 << 16)
+#define CKF_WRAP		(1 << 17)
+#define CKF_UNWRAP		(1 << 18)
+#define CKF_DERIVE		(1 << 19)
+#define CKF_EXTENSION		(1U << 31)
+
+
+/* Flags for C_WaitForSlotEvent.  */
+#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK				(1)
+
+
+typedef unsigned long ck_rv_t;
+
+
+typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_notify_t) (ck_session_handle_t session,
+				ck_notification_t event, void *application);
+
+/* Forward reference.  */
+struct ck_function_list;
+
+#define _CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(name, args)	\
+typedef ck_rv_t (*CK_ ## name) args;		\
+ck_rv_t CK_SPEC name args
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Initialize, (void *init_args));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Finalize, (void *reserved));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetInfo, (struct ck_info *info));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetFunctionList,
+		      (struct ck_function_list **function_list));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetSlotList,
+		      (unsigned char token_present, ck_slot_id_t *slot_list,
+		       unsigned long *count));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetSlotInfo,
+		      (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, struct ck_slot_info *info));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetTokenInfo,
+		      (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, struct ck_token_info *info));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_WaitForSlotEvent,
+		      (ck_flags_t flags, ck_slot_id_t *slot, void *reserved));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetMechanismList,
+		      (ck_slot_id_t slot_id,
+		       ck_mechanism_type_t *mechanism_list,
+		       unsigned long *count));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetMechanismInfo,
+		      (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, ck_mechanism_type_t type,
+		       struct ck_mechanism_info *info));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_InitToken,
+		      (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, unsigned char *pin,
+		       unsigned long pin_len, unsigned char *label));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_InitPIN,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *pin,
+		       unsigned long pin_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SetPIN,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *old_pin,
+		       unsigned long old_len, unsigned char *new_pin,
+		       unsigned long new_len));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_OpenSession,
+		      (ck_slot_id_t slot_id, ck_flags_t flags,
+		       void *application, ck_notify_t notify,
+		       ck_session_handle_t *session));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CloseSession, (ck_session_handle_t session));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CloseAllSessions, (ck_slot_id_t slot_id));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetSessionInfo,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       struct ck_session_info *info));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetOperationState,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *operation_state,
+		       unsigned long *operation_state_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SetOperationState,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *operation_state,
+		       unsigned long operation_state_len,
+		       ck_object_handle_t encryption_key,
+		       ck_object_handle_t authentiation_key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Login,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_user_type_t user_type,
+		       unsigned char *pin, unsigned long pin_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Logout, (ck_session_handle_t session));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CreateObject,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       struct ck_attribute *templ,
+		       unsigned long count, ck_object_handle_t *object));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CopyObject,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_object_handle_t object,
+		       struct ck_attribute *templ, unsigned long count,
+		       ck_object_handle_t *new_object));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DestroyObject,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       ck_object_handle_t object));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetObjectSize,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       ck_object_handle_t object,
+		       unsigned long *size));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetAttributeValue,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       ck_object_handle_t object,
+		       struct ck_attribute *templ,
+		       unsigned long count));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SetAttributeValue,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       ck_object_handle_t object,
+		       struct ck_attribute *templ,
+		       unsigned long count));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_FindObjectsInit,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       struct ck_attribute *templ,
+		       unsigned long count));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_FindObjects,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       ck_object_handle_t *object,
+		       unsigned long max_object_count,
+		       unsigned long *object_count));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_FindObjectsFinal,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_EncryptInit,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+		       ck_object_handle_t key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Encrypt,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len,
+		       unsigned char *encrypted_data,
+		       unsigned long *encrypted_data_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_EncryptUpdate,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len,
+		       unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+		       unsigned long *encrypted_part_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_EncryptFinal,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *last_encrypted_part,
+		       unsigned long *last_encrypted_part_len));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptInit,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+		       ck_object_handle_t key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Decrypt,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *encrypted_data,
+		       unsigned long encrypted_data_len,
+		       unsigned char *data, unsigned long *data_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptUpdate,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+		       unsigned long encrypted_part_len,
+		       unsigned char *part, unsigned long *part_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptFinal,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *last_part,
+		       unsigned long *last_part_len));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestInit,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       struct ck_mechanism *mechanism));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Digest,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len,
+		       unsigned char *digest,
+		       unsigned long *digest_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestUpdate,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestKey,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session, ck_object_handle_t key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestFinal,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *digest,
+		       unsigned long *digest_len));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignInit,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+		       ck_object_handle_t key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Sign,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len,
+		       unsigned char *signature,
+		       unsigned long *signature_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignUpdate,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignFinal,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *signature,
+		       unsigned long *signature_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignRecoverInit,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+		       ck_object_handle_t key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignRecover,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len,
+		       unsigned char *signature,
+		       unsigned long *signature_len));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyInit,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+		       ck_object_handle_t key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_Verify,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *data, unsigned long data_len,
+		       unsigned char *signature,
+		       unsigned long signature_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyUpdate,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyFinal,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *signature,
+		       unsigned long signature_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyRecoverInit,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+		       ck_object_handle_t key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_VerifyRecover,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *signature,
+		       unsigned long signature_len,
+		       unsigned char *data,
+		       unsigned long *data_len));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DigestEncryptUpdate,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len,
+		       unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+		       unsigned long *encrypted_part_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptDigestUpdate,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+		       unsigned long encrypted_part_len,
+		       unsigned char *part,
+		       unsigned long *part_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SignEncryptUpdate,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *part, unsigned long part_len,
+		       unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+		       unsigned long *encrypted_part_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DecryptVerifyUpdate,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *encrypted_part,
+		       unsigned long encrypted_part_len,
+		       unsigned char *part,
+		       unsigned long *part_len));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GenerateKey,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+		       struct ck_attribute *templ,
+		       unsigned long count,
+		       ck_object_handle_t *key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GenerateKeyPair,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+		       struct ck_attribute *public_key_template,
+		       unsigned long public_key_attribute_count,
+		       struct ck_attribute *private_key_template,
+		       unsigned long private_key_attribute_count,
+		       ck_object_handle_t *public_key,
+		       ck_object_handle_t *private_key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_WrapKey,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+		       ck_object_handle_t wrapping_key,
+		       ck_object_handle_t key,
+		       unsigned char *wrapped_key,
+		       unsigned long *wrapped_key_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_UnwrapKey,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+		       ck_object_handle_t unwrapping_key,
+		       unsigned char *wrapped_key,
+		       unsigned long wrapped_key_len,
+		       struct ck_attribute *templ,
+		       unsigned long attribute_count,
+		       ck_object_handle_t *key));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_DeriveKey,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       struct ck_mechanism *mechanism,
+		       ck_object_handle_t base_key,
+		       struct ck_attribute *templ,
+		       unsigned long attribute_count,
+		       ck_object_handle_t *key));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_SeedRandom,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session, unsigned char *seed,
+		       unsigned long seed_len));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GenerateRandom,
+		      (ck_session_handle_t session,
+		       unsigned char *random_data,
+		       unsigned long random_len));
+
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_GetFunctionStatus, (ck_session_handle_t session));
+_CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION (C_CancelFunction, (ck_session_handle_t session));
+
+
+struct ck_function_list
+{
+  struct ck_version version;
+  CK_C_Initialize C_Initialize;
+  CK_C_Finalize C_Finalize;
+  CK_C_GetInfo C_GetInfo;
+  CK_C_GetFunctionList C_GetFunctionList;
+  CK_C_GetSlotList C_GetSlotList;
+  CK_C_GetSlotInfo C_GetSlotInfo;
+  CK_C_GetTokenInfo C_GetTokenInfo;
+  CK_C_GetMechanismList C_GetMechanismList;
+  CK_C_GetMechanismInfo C_GetMechanismInfo;
+  CK_C_InitToken C_InitToken;
+  CK_C_InitPIN C_InitPIN;
+  CK_C_SetPIN C_SetPIN;
+  CK_C_OpenSession C_OpenSession;
+  CK_C_CloseSession C_CloseSession;
+  CK_C_CloseAllSessions C_CloseAllSessions;
+  CK_C_GetSessionInfo C_GetSessionInfo;
+  CK_C_GetOperationState C_GetOperationState;
+  CK_C_SetOperationState C_SetOperationState;
+  CK_C_Login C_Login;
+  CK_C_Logout C_Logout;
+  CK_C_CreateObject C_CreateObject;
+  CK_C_CopyObject C_CopyObject;
+  CK_C_DestroyObject C_DestroyObject;
+  CK_C_GetObjectSize C_GetObjectSize;
+  CK_C_GetAttributeValue C_GetAttributeValue;
+  CK_C_SetAttributeValue C_SetAttributeValue;
+  CK_C_FindObjectsInit C_FindObjectsInit;
+  CK_C_FindObjects C_FindObjects;
+  CK_C_FindObjectsFinal C_FindObjectsFinal;
+  CK_C_EncryptInit C_EncryptInit;
+  CK_C_Encrypt C_Encrypt;
+  CK_C_EncryptUpdate C_EncryptUpdate;
+  CK_C_EncryptFinal C_EncryptFinal;
+  CK_C_DecryptInit C_DecryptInit;
+  CK_C_Decrypt C_Decrypt;
+  CK_C_DecryptUpdate C_DecryptUpdate;
+  CK_C_DecryptFinal C_DecryptFinal;
+  CK_C_DigestInit C_DigestInit;
+  CK_C_Digest C_Digest;
+  CK_C_DigestUpdate C_DigestUpdate;
+  CK_C_DigestKey C_DigestKey;
+  CK_C_DigestFinal C_DigestFinal;
+  CK_C_SignInit C_SignInit;
+  CK_C_Sign C_Sign;
+  CK_C_SignUpdate C_SignUpdate;
+  CK_C_SignFinal C_SignFinal;
+  CK_C_SignRecoverInit C_SignRecoverInit;
+  CK_C_SignRecover C_SignRecover;
+  CK_C_VerifyInit C_VerifyInit;
+  CK_C_Verify C_Verify;
+  CK_C_VerifyUpdate C_VerifyUpdate;
+  CK_C_VerifyFinal C_VerifyFinal;
+  CK_C_VerifyRecoverInit C_VerifyRecoverInit;
+  CK_C_VerifyRecover C_VerifyRecover;
+  CK_C_DigestEncryptUpdate C_DigestEncryptUpdate;
+  CK_C_DecryptDigestUpdate C_DecryptDigestUpdate;
+  CK_C_SignEncryptUpdate C_SignEncryptUpdate;
+  CK_C_DecryptVerifyUpdate C_DecryptVerifyUpdate;
+  CK_C_GenerateKey C_GenerateKey;
+  CK_C_GenerateKeyPair C_GenerateKeyPair;
+  CK_C_WrapKey C_WrapKey;
+  CK_C_UnwrapKey C_UnwrapKey;
+  CK_C_DeriveKey C_DeriveKey;
+  CK_C_SeedRandom C_SeedRandom;
+  CK_C_GenerateRandom C_GenerateRandom;
+  CK_C_GetFunctionStatus C_GetFunctionStatus;
+  CK_C_CancelFunction C_CancelFunction;
+  CK_C_WaitForSlotEvent C_WaitForSlotEvent;
+};
+
+
+typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_createmutex_t) (void **mutex);
+typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_destroymutex_t) (void *mutex);
+typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_lockmutex_t) (void *mutex);
+typedef ck_rv_t (*ck_unlockmutex_t) (void *mutex);
+
+
+struct ck_c_initialize_args
+{
+  ck_createmutex_t create_mutex;
+  ck_destroymutex_t destroy_mutex;
+  ck_lockmutex_t lock_mutex;
+  ck_unlockmutex_t unlock_mutex;
+  ck_flags_t flags;
+  void *reserved;
+};
+
+
+#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS	(1 << 0)
+#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK			(1 << 1)
+
+#define CKR_OK					(0)
+#define CKR_CANCEL				(1)
+#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY				(2)
+#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID			(3)
+#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR			(5)
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED			(6)
+#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD			(7)
+#define CKR_NO_EVENT				(8)
+#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS		(9)
+#define CKR_CANT_LOCK				(0xa)
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY			(0x10)
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE			(0x11)
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID		(0x12)
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID		(0x13)
+#define CKR_DATA_INVALID			(0x20)
+#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE			(0x21)
+#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR			(0x30)
+#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY			(0x31)
+#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED			(0x32)
+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID		(0x40)
+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE		(0x41)
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED			(0x50)
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL		(0x51)
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED		(0x54)
+#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID			(0x60)
+#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE			(0x62)
+#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT		(0x63)
+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED			(0x64)
+#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED				(0x65)
+#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED				(0x66)
+#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE			(0x67)
+#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED		(0x68)
+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE			(0x69)
+#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE			(0x6a)
+#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID			(0x70)
+#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID		(0x71)
+#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID		(0x82)
+#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE			(0x90)
+#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED		(0x91)
+#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT			(0xa0)
+#define CKR_PIN_INVALID				(0xa1)
+#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE			(0xa2)
+#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED				(0xa3)
+#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED				(0xa4)
+#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED			(0xb0)
+#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT			(0xb1)
+#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID		(0xb3)
+#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED	(0xb4)
+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY			(0xb5)
+#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS			(0xb6)
+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS		(0xb7)
+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS	(0xb8)
+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID			(0xc0)
+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE			(0xc1)
+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE			(0xd0)
+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT		(0xd1)
+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT			(0xe0)
+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED		(0xe1)
+#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED		(0xe2)
+#define	CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID	(0xf0)
+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE		(0xf1)
+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT	(0xf2)
+#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN		(0x100)
+#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN			(0x101)
+#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED		(0x102)
+#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID			(0x103)
+#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN	(0x104)
+#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES			(0x105)
+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID			(0x110)
+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE		(0x112)
+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID		(0x113)
+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE		(0x114)
+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT	(0x115)
+#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED		(0x120)
+#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG			(0x121)
+#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID		(0x130)
+#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL			(0x150)
+#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID			(0x160)
+#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE		(0x170)
+#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE			(0x180)
+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED		(0x190)
+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED	(0x191)
+#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD				(0x1a0)
+#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED			(0x1a1)
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED			(0x200)
+#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED			(1U << 31)
+
+
+
+/* Compatibility layer.  */
+
+#ifdef CRYPTOKI_COMPAT
+
+#undef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION
+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(retval, name) retval CK_SPEC name
+
+/* For NULL.  */
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+typedef unsigned char CK_BYTE;
+typedef unsigned char CK_CHAR;
+typedef unsigned char CK_UTF8CHAR;
+typedef unsigned char CK_BBOOL;
+typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG;
+typedef long int CK_LONG;
+typedef CK_BYTE *CK_BYTE_PTR;
+typedef CK_CHAR *CK_CHAR_PTR;
+typedef CK_UTF8CHAR *CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR;
+typedef CK_ULONG *CK_ULONG_PTR;
+typedef void *CK_VOID_PTR;
+typedef void **CK_VOID_PTR_PTR;
+#define CK_FALSE 0
+#define CK_TRUE 1
+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
+#ifndef FALSE
+#define FALSE 0
+#endif
+#ifndef TRUE
+#define TRUE 1
+#endif
+#endif
+
+typedef struct ck_version CK_VERSION;
+typedef struct ck_version *CK_VERSION_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_info CK_INFO;
+typedef struct ck_info *CK_INFO_PTR;
+
+typedef ck_slot_id_t *CK_SLOT_ID_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_slot_info CK_SLOT_INFO;
+typedef struct ck_slot_info *CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_token_info CK_TOKEN_INFO;
+typedef struct ck_token_info *CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR;
+
+typedef ck_session_handle_t *CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_session_info CK_SESSION_INFO;
+typedef struct ck_session_info *CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR;
+
+typedef ck_object_handle_t *CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR;
+
+typedef ck_object_class_t *CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_attribute CK_ATTRIBUTE;
+typedef struct ck_attribute *CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_date CK_DATE;
+typedef struct ck_date *CK_DATE_PTR;
+
+typedef ck_mechanism_type_t *CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_mechanism CK_MECHANISM;
+typedef struct ck_mechanism *CK_MECHANISM_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_mechanism_info CK_MECHANISM_INFO;
+typedef struct ck_mechanism_info *CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_function_list CK_FUNCTION_LIST;
+typedef struct ck_function_list *CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR;
+typedef struct ck_function_list **CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR;
+
+typedef struct ck_c_initialize_args CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS;
+typedef struct ck_c_initialize_args *CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR;
+
+#define NULL_PTR NULL
+
+/* Delete the helper macros defined at the top of the file.  */
+#undef ck_flags_t
+#undef ck_version
+
+#undef ck_info
+#undef cryptoki_version
+#undef manufacturer_id
+#undef library_description
+#undef library_version
+
+#undef ck_notification_t
+#undef ck_slot_id_t
+
+#undef ck_slot_info
+#undef slot_description
+#undef hardware_version
+#undef firmware_version
+
+#undef ck_token_info
+#undef serial_number
+#undef max_session_count
+#undef session_count
+#undef max_rw_session_count
+#undef rw_session_count
+#undef max_pin_len
+#undef min_pin_len
+#undef total_public_memory
+#undef free_public_memory
+#undef total_private_memory
+#undef free_private_memory
+#undef utc_time
+
+#undef ck_session_handle_t
+#undef ck_user_type_t
+#undef ck_state_t
+
+#undef ck_session_info
+#undef slot_id
+#undef device_error
+
+#undef ck_object_handle_t
+#undef ck_object_class_t
+#undef ck_hw_feature_type_t
+#undef ck_key_type_t
+#undef ck_certificate_type_t
+#undef ck_attribute_type_t
+
+#undef ck_attribute
+#undef value
+#undef value_len
+
+#undef ck_date
+
+#undef ck_mechanism_type_t
+
+#undef ck_mechanism
+#undef parameter
+#undef parameter_len
+
+#undef ck_mechanism_info
+#undef min_key_size
+#undef max_key_size
+
+#undef ck_rv_t
+#undef ck_notify_t
+
+#undef ck_function_list
+
+#undef ck_createmutex_t
+#undef ck_destroymutex_t
+#undef ck_lockmutex_t
+#undef ck_unlockmutex_t
+
+#undef ck_c_initialize_args
+#undef create_mutex
+#undef destroy_mutex
+#undef lock_mutex
+#undef unlock_mutex
+#undef reserved
+
+#endif	/* CRYPTOKI_COMPAT */
+
+
+/* System dependencies.  */
+#if defined(_WIN32) || defined(CRYPTOKI_FORCE_WIN32)
+#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
+#endif
+
+#if defined(__cplusplus)
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif	/* PKCS11_H */
diff --git a/platform-misc.c b/platform-misc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f39670
--- /dev/null
+++ b/platform-misc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
+
+/*
+ * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory
+ * otherwise 0.
+ */
+int
+platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
+{
+	if (uid == 0)
+		return 1;
+#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
+	if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
+		return 1;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/platform-pledge.c b/platform-pledge.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4a6ec15
--- /dev/null
+++ b/platform-pledge.c
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Joyent, Inc
+ * Author: Alex Wilson <alex.wilson@joyent.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "platform.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
+
+/*
+ * Drop any fine-grained privileges that are not needed for post-startup
+ * operation of ssh-agent
+ *
+ * Should be as close as possible to pledge("stdio cpath unix id proc exec", ...)
+ */
+void
+platform_pledge_agent(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
+	/*
+	 * Note: Solaris priv dropping is closer to tame() than pledge(), but
+	 * we will use what we have.
+	 */
+	solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net();
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Drop any fine-grained privileges that are not needed for post-startup
+ * operation of sftp-server
+ */
+void
+platform_pledge_sftp_server(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
+	solaris_drop_privs_pinfo_net_fork_exec();
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Drop any fine-grained privileges that are not needed for the post-startup
+ * operation of the SSH client mux
+ *
+ * Should be as close as possible to pledge("stdio proc tty", ...)
+ */
+void
+platform_pledge_mux(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
+	solaris_drop_privs_root_pinfo_net_exec();
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/platform-tracing.c b/platform-tracing.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..650c7e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/platform-tracing.c
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PROCCTL_H
+#include <sys/procctl.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H)
+#include <sys/prctl.h>	/* For prctl() and PR_SET_DUMPABLE */
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H
+#include <sys/ptrace.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PRIV_H
+#include <priv.h> /* For setpflags() and __PROC_PROTECT  */
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+void
+platform_disable_tracing(int strict)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_PROCCTL) && defined(PROC_TRACE_CTL)
+	/* On FreeBSD, we should make this process untraceable */
+	int disable_trace = PROC_TRACE_CTL_DISABLE;
+
+	/*
+	 * On FreeBSD, we should make this process untraceable.
+	 * pid=0 means "this process" but some older kernels do not
+	 * understand that so retry with our own pid before failing.
+	 */
+	if (procctl(P_PID, 0, PROC_TRACE_CTL, &disable_trace) == 0)
+		return;
+	if (procctl(P_PID, getpid(), PROC_TRACE_CTL, &disable_trace) == 0)
+		return;
+	if (strict)
+		fatal("unable to make the process untraceable: %s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)
+	/* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */
+	if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) != 0 && strict)
+		fatal("unable to make the process undumpable: %s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_SETPFLAGS) && defined(__PROC_PROTECT)
+	/* On Solaris, we should make this process untraceable */
+	if (setpflags(__PROC_PROTECT, 1) != 0 && strict)
+		fatal("unable to make the process untraceable: %s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+#endif
+#ifdef PT_DENY_ATTACH
+	/* Mac OS X */
+	if (ptrace(PT_DENY_ATTACH, 0, 0, 0) == -1 && strict)
+		fatal("unable to set PT_DENY_ATTACH: %s", strerror(errno));
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/platform.c b/platform.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4fe8744
--- /dev/null
+++ b/platform.c
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-pam.h"
+#include "platform.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
+
+extern int use_privsep;
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+void
+platform_pre_listen(void)
+{
+#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+	/* Adjust out-of-memory killer so listening process is not killed */
+	oom_adjust_setup();
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+platform_pre_fork(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+	solaris_contract_pre_fork();
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+platform_pre_restart(void)
+{
+#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+	oom_adjust_restore();
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+	solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(child_pid);
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+platform_post_fork_child(void)
+{
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
+	solaris_contract_post_fork_child();
+#endif
+#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
+	oom_adjust_restore();
+#endif
+}
+
+/* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
+int
+platform_privileged_uidswap(void)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	/* uid 0 is not special on Cygwin so always try */
+	return 1;
+#else
+	return (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0);
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * This gets called before switching UIDs, and is called even when sshd is
+ * not running as root.
+ */
+void
+platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	/* Cache selinux status for later use */
+	(void)ssh_selinux_enabled();
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
+	/*
+	 * If solaris projects were detected, set the default now, unless
+	 * we are using PAM in which case it is the responsibility of the
+	 * PAM stack.
+	 */
+	if (!options.use_pam && (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0))
+		solaris_set_default_project(pw);
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined (__bsdi__)
+	if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0)
+		setpgid(0, 0);
+# endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
+	/*
+	 * If we have both LOGIN_CAP and PAM, we want to establish creds
+	 * before calling setusercontext (in session.c:do_setusercontext).
+	 */
+	if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+		if (options.use_pam) {
+			do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
+		}
+	}
+# endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID)
+	if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) {
+		/* Sets login uid for accounting */
+		if (getluid() == -1 && setluid(pw->pw_uid) == -1)
+			error("setluid: %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * This gets called after we've established the user's groups, and is only
+ * called if sshd is running as root.
+ */
+void
+platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM)
+	/*
+	 * PAM credentials may take the form of supplementary groups.
+	 * These will have been wiped by the above initgroups() call.
+	 * Reestablish them here.
+	 */
+	if (options.use_pam) {
+		do_pam_setcred(use_privsep);
+	}
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && (defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \
+    defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY))
+	irix_setusercontext(pw);
+#endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+	aix_usrinfo(pw);
+#endif /* _AIX */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED
+	/*
+	 * If we have a chroot directory, we set all creds except real
+	 * uid which we will need for chroot.  If we don't have a
+	 * chroot directory, we don't override anything.
+	 */
+	{
+		char **creds = NULL, *chroot_creds[] =
+		    { "REAL_USER=root", NULL };
+
+		if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+		    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0)
+			creds = chroot_creds;
+
+		if (setpcred(pw->pw_name, creds) == -1)
+			fatal("Failed to set process credentials");
+	}
+#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+#endif
+}
+
+char *
+platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *pw_name)
+{
+#ifdef USE_AIX_KRB_NAME
+	return aix_krb5_get_principal_name(pw_name);
+#else
+	return NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* returns 1 if account is locked */
+int
+platform_locked_account(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	int locked = 0;
+	char *passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
+#ifdef USE_SHADOW
+	struct spwd *spw = NULL;
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+	char *iaf_passwd = NULL;
+#endif
+
+	spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
+#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
+	if (spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
+		return 1;
+#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
+
+	if (spw != NULL)
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+		iaf_passwd = passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
+#else
+		passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
+#endif
+
+	/* check for locked account */
+	if (passwd && *passwd) {
+#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
+		if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
+			locked = 1;
+#endif
+#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
+		if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
+		    strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
+			locked = 1;
+#endif
+#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
+		if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
+			locked = 1;
+#endif
+	}
+#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+	if (iaf_passwd != NULL)
+		freezero(iaf_passwd, strlen(iaf_passwd));
+#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
+
+	return locked;
+}
diff --git a/platform.h b/platform.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7fef8c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/platform.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+void platform_pre_listen(void);
+void platform_pre_fork(void);
+void platform_pre_restart(void);
+void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid);
+void platform_post_fork_child(void);
+int  platform_privileged_uidswap(void);
+void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
+void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *);
+char *platform_get_krb5_client(const char *);
+char *platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *);
+int platform_locked_account(struct passwd *);
+int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t);
+void platform_disable_tracing(int);
+
+/* in platform-pledge.c */
+void platform_pledge_agent(void);
+void platform_pledge_sftp_server(void);
+void platform_pledge_mux(void);
diff --git a/poly1305.c b/poly1305.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fd1fc8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poly1305.c
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+/* 
+ * Public Domain poly1305 from Andrew Moon
+ * poly1305-donna-unrolled.c from https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: poly1305.c,v 1.3 2013/12/19 22:57:13 djm Exp $ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "poly1305.h"
+
+#define mul32x32_64(a,b) ((uint64_t)(a) * (b))
+
+#define U8TO32_LE(p) \
+	(((uint32_t)((p)[0])) | \
+	 ((uint32_t)((p)[1]) <<  8) | \
+	 ((uint32_t)((p)[2]) << 16) | \
+	 ((uint32_t)((p)[3]) << 24))
+
+#define U32TO8_LE(p, v) \
+	do { \
+		(p)[0] = (uint8_t)((v)); \
+		(p)[1] = (uint8_t)((v) >>  8); \
+		(p)[2] = (uint8_t)((v) >> 16); \
+		(p)[3] = (uint8_t)((v) >> 24); \
+	} while (0)
+
+void
+poly1305_auth(unsigned char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const unsigned char *m, size_t inlen, const unsigned char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]) {
+	uint32_t t0,t1,t2,t3;
+	uint32_t h0,h1,h2,h3,h4;
+	uint32_t r0,r1,r2,r3,r4;
+	uint32_t s1,s2,s3,s4;
+	uint32_t b, nb;
+	size_t j;
+	uint64_t t[5];
+	uint64_t f0,f1,f2,f3;
+	uint32_t g0,g1,g2,g3,g4;
+	uint64_t c;
+	unsigned char mp[16];
+
+	/* clamp key */
+	t0 = U8TO32_LE(key+0);
+	t1 = U8TO32_LE(key+4);
+	t2 = U8TO32_LE(key+8);
+	t3 = U8TO32_LE(key+12);
+
+	/* precompute multipliers */
+	r0 = t0 & 0x3ffffff; t0 >>= 26; t0 |= t1 << 6;
+	r1 = t0 & 0x3ffff03; t1 >>= 20; t1 |= t2 << 12;
+	r2 = t1 & 0x3ffc0ff; t2 >>= 14; t2 |= t3 << 18;
+	r3 = t2 & 0x3f03fff; t3 >>= 8;
+	r4 = t3 & 0x00fffff;
+
+	s1 = r1 * 5;
+	s2 = r2 * 5;
+	s3 = r3 * 5;
+	s4 = r4 * 5;
+
+	/* init state */
+	h0 = 0;
+	h1 = 0;
+	h2 = 0;
+	h3 = 0;
+	h4 = 0;
+
+	/* full blocks */
+	if (inlen < 16) goto poly1305_donna_atmost15bytes;
+poly1305_donna_16bytes:
+	m += 16;
+	inlen -= 16;
+
+	t0 = U8TO32_LE(m-16);
+	t1 = U8TO32_LE(m-12);
+	t2 = U8TO32_LE(m-8);
+	t3 = U8TO32_LE(m-4);
+
+	h0 += t0 & 0x3ffffff;
+	h1 += ((((uint64_t)t1 << 32) | t0) >> 26) & 0x3ffffff;
+	h2 += ((((uint64_t)t2 << 32) | t1) >> 20) & 0x3ffffff;
+	h3 += ((((uint64_t)t3 << 32) | t2) >> 14) & 0x3ffffff;
+	h4 += (t3 >> 8) | (1 << 24);
+
+
+poly1305_donna_mul:
+	t[0]  = mul32x32_64(h0,r0) + mul32x32_64(h1,s4) + mul32x32_64(h2,s3) + mul32x32_64(h3,s2) + mul32x32_64(h4,s1);
+	t[1]  = mul32x32_64(h0,r1) + mul32x32_64(h1,r0) + mul32x32_64(h2,s4) + mul32x32_64(h3,s3) + mul32x32_64(h4,s2);
+	t[2]  = mul32x32_64(h0,r2) + mul32x32_64(h1,r1) + mul32x32_64(h2,r0) + mul32x32_64(h3,s4) + mul32x32_64(h4,s3);
+	t[3]  = mul32x32_64(h0,r3) + mul32x32_64(h1,r2) + mul32x32_64(h2,r1) + mul32x32_64(h3,r0) + mul32x32_64(h4,s4);
+	t[4]  = mul32x32_64(h0,r4) + mul32x32_64(h1,r3) + mul32x32_64(h2,r2) + mul32x32_64(h3,r1) + mul32x32_64(h4,r0);
+
+	                h0 = (uint32_t)t[0] & 0x3ffffff; c =           (t[0] >> 26);
+	t[1] += c;      h1 = (uint32_t)t[1] & 0x3ffffff; b = (uint32_t)(t[1] >> 26);
+	t[2] += b;      h2 = (uint32_t)t[2] & 0x3ffffff; b = (uint32_t)(t[2] >> 26);
+	t[3] += b;      h3 = (uint32_t)t[3] & 0x3ffffff; b = (uint32_t)(t[3] >> 26);
+	t[4] += b;      h4 = (uint32_t)t[4] & 0x3ffffff; b = (uint32_t)(t[4] >> 26);
+	h0 += b * 5;
+
+	if (inlen >= 16) goto poly1305_donna_16bytes;
+
+	/* final bytes */
+poly1305_donna_atmost15bytes:
+	if (!inlen) goto poly1305_donna_finish;
+
+	for (j = 0; j < inlen; j++) mp[j] = m[j];
+	mp[j++] = 1;
+	for (; j < 16; j++)	mp[j] = 0;
+	inlen = 0;
+
+	t0 = U8TO32_LE(mp+0);
+	t1 = U8TO32_LE(mp+4);
+	t2 = U8TO32_LE(mp+8);
+	t3 = U8TO32_LE(mp+12);
+
+	h0 += t0 & 0x3ffffff;
+	h1 += ((((uint64_t)t1 << 32) | t0) >> 26) & 0x3ffffff;
+	h2 += ((((uint64_t)t2 << 32) | t1) >> 20) & 0x3ffffff;
+	h3 += ((((uint64_t)t3 << 32) | t2) >> 14) & 0x3ffffff;
+	h4 += (t3 >> 8);
+
+	goto poly1305_donna_mul;
+
+poly1305_donna_finish:
+	             b = h0 >> 26; h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff;
+	h1 +=     b; b = h1 >> 26; h1 = h1 & 0x3ffffff;
+	h2 +=     b; b = h2 >> 26; h2 = h2 & 0x3ffffff;
+	h3 +=     b; b = h3 >> 26; h3 = h3 & 0x3ffffff;
+	h4 +=     b; b = h4 >> 26; h4 = h4 & 0x3ffffff;
+	h0 += b * 5; b = h0 >> 26; h0 = h0 & 0x3ffffff;
+	h1 +=     b;
+
+	g0 = h0 + 5; b = g0 >> 26; g0 &= 0x3ffffff;
+	g1 = h1 + b; b = g1 >> 26; g1 &= 0x3ffffff;
+	g2 = h2 + b; b = g2 >> 26; g2 &= 0x3ffffff;
+	g3 = h3 + b; b = g3 >> 26; g3 &= 0x3ffffff;
+	g4 = h4 + b - (1 << 26);
+
+	b = (g4 >> 31) - 1;
+	nb = ~b;
+	h0 = (h0 & nb) | (g0 & b);
+	h1 = (h1 & nb) | (g1 & b);
+	h2 = (h2 & nb) | (g2 & b);
+	h3 = (h3 & nb) | (g3 & b);
+	h4 = (h4 & nb) | (g4 & b);
+
+	f0 = ((h0      ) | (h1 << 26)) + (uint64_t)U8TO32_LE(&key[16]);
+	f1 = ((h1 >>  6) | (h2 << 20)) + (uint64_t)U8TO32_LE(&key[20]);
+	f2 = ((h2 >> 12) | (h3 << 14)) + (uint64_t)U8TO32_LE(&key[24]);
+	f3 = ((h3 >> 18) | (h4 <<  8)) + (uint64_t)U8TO32_LE(&key[28]);
+
+	U32TO8_LE(&out[ 0], f0); f1 += (f0 >> 32);
+	U32TO8_LE(&out[ 4], f1); f2 += (f1 >> 32);
+	U32TO8_LE(&out[ 8], f2); f3 += (f2 >> 32);
+	U32TO8_LE(&out[12], f3);
+}
diff --git a/poly1305.h b/poly1305.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7db5f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/poly1305.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: poly1305.h,v 1.4 2014/05/02 03:27:54 djm Exp $ */
+
+/* 
+ * Public Domain poly1305 from Andrew Moon
+ * poly1305-donna-unrolled.c from https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna
+ */
+
+#ifndef POLY1305_H
+#define POLY1305_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#define POLY1305_KEYLEN		32
+#define POLY1305_TAGLEN		16
+
+void poly1305_auth(u_char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const u_char *m, size_t inlen,
+    const u_char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN])
+    __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, POLY1305_TAGLEN)))
+    __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3)))
+    __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 4, POLY1305_KEYLEN)));
+
+#endif	/* POLY1305_H */
diff --git a/progressmeter.c b/progressmeter.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8baf798
--- /dev/null
+++ b/progressmeter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,296 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.50 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Nils Nordman.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "progressmeter.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
+
+#define DEFAULT_WINSIZE 80
+#define MAX_WINSIZE 512
+#define PADDING 1		/* padding between the progress indicators */
+#define UPDATE_INTERVAL 1	/* update the progress meter every second */
+#define STALL_TIME 5		/* we're stalled after this many seconds */
+
+/* determines whether we can output to the terminal */
+static int can_output(void);
+
+/* formats and inserts the specified size into the given buffer */
+static void format_size(char *, int, off_t);
+static void format_rate(char *, int, off_t);
+
+/* window resizing */
+static void sig_winch(int);
+static void setscreensize(void);
+
+/* signal handler for updating the progress meter */
+static void sig_alarm(int);
+
+static double start;		/* start progress */
+static double last_update;	/* last progress update */
+static const char *file;	/* name of the file being transferred */
+static off_t start_pos;		/* initial position of transfer */
+static off_t end_pos;		/* ending position of transfer */
+static off_t cur_pos;		/* transfer position as of last refresh */
+static volatile off_t *counter;	/* progress counter */
+static long stalled;		/* how long we have been stalled */
+static int bytes_per_second;	/* current speed in bytes per second */
+static int win_size;		/* terminal window size */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t win_resized; /* for window resizing */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t alarm_fired;
+
+/* units for format_size */
+static const char unit[] = " KMGT";
+
+static int
+can_output(void)
+{
+	return (getpgrp() == tcgetpgrp(STDOUT_FILENO));
+}
+
+static void
+format_rate(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	bytes *= 100;
+	for (i = 0; bytes >= 100*1000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++)
+		bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
+	if (i == 0) {
+		i++;
+		bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
+	}
+	snprintf(buf, size, "%3lld.%1lld%c%s",
+	    (long long) (bytes + 5) / 100,
+	    (long long) (bytes + 5) / 10 % 10,
+	    unit[i],
+	    i ? "B" : " ");
+}
+
+static void
+format_size(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; bytes >= 10000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++)
+		bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
+	snprintf(buf, size, "%4lld%c%s",
+	    (long long) bytes,
+	    unit[i],
+	    i ? "B" : " ");
+}
+
+void
+refresh_progress_meter(int force_update)
+{
+	char buf[MAX_WINSIZE + 1];
+	off_t transferred;
+	double elapsed, now;
+	int percent;
+	off_t bytes_left;
+	int cur_speed;
+	int hours, minutes, seconds;
+	int file_len;
+
+	if ((!force_update && !alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output())
+		return;
+	alarm_fired = 0;
+
+	if (win_resized) {
+		setscreensize();
+		win_resized = 0;
+	}
+
+	transferred = *counter - (cur_pos ? cur_pos : start_pos);
+	cur_pos = *counter;
+	now = monotime_double();
+	bytes_left = end_pos - cur_pos;
+
+	if (bytes_left > 0)
+		elapsed = now - last_update;
+	else {
+		elapsed = now - start;
+		/* Calculate true total speed when done */
+		transferred = end_pos - start_pos;
+		bytes_per_second = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* calculate speed */
+	if (elapsed != 0)
+		cur_speed = (transferred / elapsed);
+	else
+		cur_speed = transferred;
+
+#define AGE_FACTOR 0.9
+	if (bytes_per_second != 0) {
+		bytes_per_second = (bytes_per_second * AGE_FACTOR) +
+		    (cur_speed * (1.0 - AGE_FACTOR));
+	} else
+		bytes_per_second = cur_speed;
+
+	/* filename */
+	buf[0] = '\0';
+	file_len = win_size - 36;
+	if (file_len > 0) {
+		buf[0] = '\r';
+		snmprintf(buf+1, sizeof(buf)-1, &file_len, "%-*s",
+		    file_len, file);
+	}
+
+	/* percent of transfer done */
+	if (end_pos == 0 || cur_pos == end_pos)
+		percent = 100;
+	else
+		percent = ((float)cur_pos / end_pos) * 100;
+	snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
+	    " %3d%% ", percent);
+
+	/* amount transferred */
+	format_size(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
+	    cur_pos);
+	strlcat(buf, " ", win_size);
+
+	/* bandwidth usage */
+	format_rate(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
+	    (off_t)bytes_per_second);
+	strlcat(buf, "/s ", win_size);
+
+	/* ETA */
+	if (!transferred)
+		stalled += elapsed;
+	else
+		stalled = 0;
+
+	if (stalled >= STALL_TIME)
+		strlcat(buf, "- stalled -", win_size);
+	else if (bytes_per_second == 0 && bytes_left)
+		strlcat(buf, "  --:-- ETA", win_size);
+	else {
+		if (bytes_left > 0)
+			seconds = bytes_left / bytes_per_second;
+		else
+			seconds = elapsed;
+
+		hours = seconds / 3600;
+		seconds -= hours * 3600;
+		minutes = seconds / 60;
+		seconds -= minutes * 60;
+
+		if (hours != 0)
+			snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
+			    "%d:%02d:%02d", hours, minutes, seconds);
+		else
+			snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
+			    "  %02d:%02d", minutes, seconds);
+
+		if (bytes_left > 0)
+			strlcat(buf, " ETA", win_size);
+		else
+			strlcat(buf, "    ", win_size);
+	}
+
+	atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, buf, win_size - 1);
+	last_update = now;
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+sig_alarm(int ignore)
+{
+	alarm_fired = 1;
+	alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
+}
+
+void
+start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
+{
+	start = last_update = monotime_double();
+	file = f;
+	start_pos = *ctr;
+	end_pos = filesize;
+	cur_pos = 0;
+	counter = ctr;
+	stalled = 0;
+	bytes_per_second = 0;
+
+	setscreensize();
+	refresh_progress_meter(1);
+
+	ssh_signal(SIGALRM, sig_alarm);
+	ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
+	alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
+}
+
+void
+stop_progress_meter(void)
+{
+	alarm(0);
+
+	if (!can_output())
+		return;
+
+	/* Ensure we complete the progress */
+	if (cur_pos != end_pos)
+		refresh_progress_meter(1);
+
+	atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+sig_winch(int sig)
+{
+	win_resized = 1;
+}
+
+static void
+setscreensize(void)
+{
+	struct winsize winsize;
+
+	if (ioctl(STDOUT_FILENO, TIOCGWINSZ, &winsize) != -1 &&
+	    winsize.ws_col != 0) {
+		if (winsize.ws_col > MAX_WINSIZE)
+			win_size = MAX_WINSIZE;
+		else
+			win_size = winsize.ws_col;
+	} else
+		win_size = DEFAULT_WINSIZE;
+	win_size += 1;					/* trailing \0 */
+}
diff --git a/progressmeter.h b/progressmeter.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1703ea7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/progressmeter.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.h,v 1.5 2019/01/24 16:52:17 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Nils Nordman.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+void	start_progress_meter(const char *, off_t, off_t *);
+void	refresh_progress_meter(int);
+void	stop_progress_meter(void);
diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf79498
--- /dev/null
+++ b/readconf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3486 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.372 2023/01/13 02:58:20 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Functions for reading the configuration files.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+# include <glob.h>
+#else
+# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+#include <util.h>
+#endif
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+# include <vis.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+/* Format of the configuration file:
+
+   # Configuration data is parsed as follows:
+   #  1. command line options
+   #  2. user-specific file
+   #  3. system-wide file
+   # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
+   # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
+   # configuration file, and defaults at the end.
+
+   # Host-specific declarations.  These may override anything above.  A single
+   # host may match multiple declarations; these are processed in the order
+   # that they are given in.
+
+   Host *.ngs.fi ngs.fi
+     User foo
+
+   Host fake.com
+     Hostname another.host.name.real.org
+     User blaah
+     Port 34289
+     ForwardX11 no
+     ForwardAgent no
+
+   Host books.com
+     RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999
+     Ciphers 3des-cbc
+
+   Host fascist.blob.com
+     Port 23123
+     User tylonen
+     PasswordAuthentication no
+
+   Host puukko.hut.fi
+     User t35124p
+     ProxyCommand ssh-proxy %h %p
+
+   Host *.fr
+     PublicKeyAuthentication no
+
+   Host *.su
+     Ciphers aes128-ctr
+     PasswordAuthentication no
+
+   Host vpn.fake.com
+     Tunnel yes
+     TunnelDevice 3
+
+   # Defaults for various options
+   Host *
+     ForwardAgent no
+     ForwardX11 no
+     PasswordAuthentication yes
+     StrictHostKeyChecking yes
+     TcpKeepAlive no
+     IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
+     Port 22
+     EscapeChar ~
+
+*/
+
+static int read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
+    const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options,
+    int flags, int *activep, int *want_final_pass, int depth);
+static int process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw,
+    const char *host, const char *original_host, char *line,
+    const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags,
+    int *want_final_pass, int depth);
+
+/* Keyword tokens. */
+
+typedef enum {
+	oBadOption,
+	oHost, oMatch, oInclude,
+	oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oForwardX11Timeout,
+	oGatewayPorts, oExitOnForwardFailure,
+	oPasswordAuthentication,
+	oXAuthLocation,
+	oIdentityFile, oHostname, oPort, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward,
+	oPermitRemoteOpen,
+	oCertificateFile, oAddKeysToAgent, oIdentityAgent,
+	oUser, oEscapeChar, oProxyCommand,
+	oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts,
+	oBatchMode, oCheckHostIP, oStrictHostKeyChecking, oCompression,
+	oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts,
+	oLogFacility, oLogLevel, oLogVerbose, oCiphers, oMacs,
+	oPubkeyAuthentication,
+	oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias,
+	oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication,
+	oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oBindInterface, oPKCS11Provider,
+	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
+	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
+	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
+	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
+	oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
+	oHashKnownHosts,
+	oTunnel, oTunnelDevice,
+	oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand,
+	oVisualHostKey,
+	oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oSessionType, oStdinNull,
+	oForkAfterAuthentication, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
+	oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
+	oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
+	oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
+	oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+	oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump,
+	oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand, oRequiredRSASize,
+	oEnableEscapeCommandline,
+	oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
+} OpCodes;
+
+/* Textual representations of the tokens. */
+
+static struct {
+	const char *name;
+	OpCodes opcode;
+} keywords[] = {
+	/* Deprecated options */
+	{ "protocol", oIgnore }, /* NB. silently ignored */
+	{ "cipher", oDeprecated },
+	{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
+	{ "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
+	{ "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
+	{ "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
+	{ "useroaming", oDeprecated },
+	{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
+	{ "useprivilegedport", oDeprecated },
+
+	/* Unsupported options */
+	{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
+	{ "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported },
+	{ "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported },
+	{ "rsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
+	{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
+	{ "compressionlevel", oUnsupported },
+
+	/* Sometimes-unsupported options */
+#if defined(GSSAPI)
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
+	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
+# else
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
+	{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
+#endif
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
+	{ "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
+# else
+	{ "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported },
+	{ "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported },
+#endif
+
+	{ "forwardagent", oForwardAgent },
+	{ "forwardx11", oForwardX11 },
+	{ "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted },
+	{ "forwardx11timeout", oForwardX11Timeout },
+	{ "exitonforwardfailure", oExitOnForwardFailure },
+	{ "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation },
+	{ "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts },
+	{ "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication },
+	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
+	{ "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices },
+	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, /* alias */
+	{ "skeyauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, /* alias */
+	{ "tisauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },  /* alias */
+	{ "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },
+	{ "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },		    /* alias */
+	{ "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication },
+	{ "identityfile", oIdentityFile },
+	{ "identityfile2", oIdentityFile },			/* obsolete */
+	{ "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly },
+	{ "certificatefile", oCertificateFile },
+	{ "addkeystoagent", oAddKeysToAgent },
+	{ "identityagent", oIdentityAgent },
+	{ "hostname", oHostname },
+	{ "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias },
+	{ "proxycommand", oProxyCommand },
+	{ "port", oPort },
+	{ "ciphers", oCiphers },
+	{ "macs", oMacs },
+	{ "remoteforward", oRemoteForward },
+	{ "localforward", oLocalForward },
+	{ "permitremoteopen", oPermitRemoteOpen },
+	{ "user", oUser },
+	{ "host", oHost },
+	{ "match", oMatch },
+	{ "escapechar", oEscapeChar },
+	{ "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile },
+	{ "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile },
+	{ "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts },
+	{ "batchmode", oBatchMode },
+	{ "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP },
+	{ "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking },
+	{ "compression", oCompression },
+	{ "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive },
+	{ "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive },				/* obsolete */
+	{ "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts },
+	{ "syslogfacility", oLogFacility },
+	{ "loglevel", oLogLevel },
+	{ "logverbose", oLogVerbose },
+	{ "dynamicforward", oDynamicForward },
+	{ "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications },
+	{ "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms },
+	{ "casignaturealgorithms", oCASignatureAlgorithms },
+	{ "bindaddress", oBindAddress },
+	{ "bindinterface", oBindInterface },
+	{ "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings },
+	{ "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign },
+	{ "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS },
+	{ "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost },
+	{ "rekeylimit", oRekeyLimit },
+	{ "connecttimeout", oConnectTimeout },
+	{ "addressfamily", oAddressFamily },
+	{ "serveraliveinterval", oServerAliveInterval },
+	{ "serveralivecountmax", oServerAliveCountMax },
+	{ "sendenv", oSendEnv },
+	{ "setenv", oSetEnv },
+	{ "controlpath", oControlPath },
+	{ "controlmaster", oControlMaster },
+	{ "controlpersist", oControlPersist },
+	{ "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts },
+	{ "include", oInclude },
+	{ "tunnel", oTunnel },
+	{ "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice },
+	{ "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
+	{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
+	{ "remotecommand", oRemoteCommand },
+	{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
+	{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
+	{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
+	{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
+	{ "sessiontype", oSessionType },
+	{ "stdinnull", oStdinNull },
+	{ "forkafterauthentication", oForkAfterAuthentication },
+	{ "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass },
+	{ "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains },
+	{ "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal },
+	{ "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname },
+	{ "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots },
+	{ "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs },
+	{ "streamlocalbindmask", oStreamLocalBindMask },
+	{ "streamlocalbindunlink", oStreamLocalBindUnlink },
+	{ "revokedhostkeys", oRevokedHostKeys },
+	{ "fingerprinthash", oFingerprintHash },
+	{ "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys },
+	{ "hostbasedacceptedalgorithms", oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms },
+	{ "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms }, /* obsolete */
+	{ "pubkeyacceptedalgorithms", oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms },
+	{ "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms }, /* obsolete */
+	{ "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
+	{ "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
+	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
+	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
+	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
+	{ "enableescapecommandline", oEnableEscapeCommandline },
+
+	{ NULL, oBadOption }
+};
+
+static const char *lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code);
+
+const char *
+kex_default_pk_alg(void)
+{
+	static char *pkalgs;
+
+	if (pkalgs == NULL) {
+		char *all_key;
+
+		all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+		pkalgs = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+		free(all_key);
+	}
+	return pkalgs;
+}
+
+char *
+ssh_connection_hash(const char *thishost, const char *host, const char *portstr,
+    const char *user)
+{
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
+	u_char conn_hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+
+	if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL ||
+	    ssh_digest_update(md, thishost, strlen(thishost)) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_update(md, host, strlen(host)) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_update(md, portstr, strlen(portstr)) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_update(md, user, strlen(user)) < 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_final(md, conn_hash, sizeof(conn_hash)) < 0)
+		fatal_f("mux digest failed");
+	ssh_digest_free(md);
+	return tohex(conn_hash, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options.  Never returns if there is an
+ * error.
+ */
+
+void
+add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd)
+{
+	struct Forward *fwd;
+	int i;
+
+	/* Don't add duplicates */
+	for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) {
+		if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->local_forwards + i))
+			return;
+	}
+	options->local_forwards = xreallocarray(options->local_forwards,
+	    options->num_local_forwards + 1,
+	    sizeof(*options->local_forwards));
+	fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++];
+
+	fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
+	fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
+	fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path;
+	fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host;
+	fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
+	fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Adds a remote TCP/IP port forward to options.  Never returns if there is
+ * an error.
+ */
+
+void
+add_remote_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd)
+{
+	struct Forward *fwd;
+	int i;
+
+	/* Don't add duplicates */
+	for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+		if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->remote_forwards + i))
+			return;
+	}
+	options->remote_forwards = xreallocarray(options->remote_forwards,
+	    options->num_remote_forwards + 1,
+	    sizeof(*options->remote_forwards));
+	fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++];
+
+	fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
+	fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
+	fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path;
+	fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host;
+	fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
+	fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path;
+	fwd->handle = newfwd->handle;
+	fwd->allocated_port = 0;
+}
+
+static void
+clear_forwardings(Options *options)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) {
+		free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_host);
+		free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_path);
+		free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_host);
+		free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_path);
+	}
+	if (options->num_local_forwards > 0) {
+		free(options->local_forwards);
+		options->local_forwards = NULL;
+	}
+	options->num_local_forwards = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+		free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host);
+		free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_path);
+		free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_host);
+		free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_path);
+	}
+	if (options->num_remote_forwards > 0) {
+		free(options->remote_forwards);
+		options->remote_forwards = NULL;
+	}
+	options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
+	options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+}
+
+void
+add_certificate_file(Options *options, const char *path, int userprovided)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (options->num_certificate_files >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES)
+		fatal("Too many certificate files specified (max %d)",
+		    SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES);
+
+	/* Avoid registering duplicates */
+	for (i = 0; i < options->num_certificate_files; i++) {
+		if (options->certificate_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided &&
+		    strcmp(options->certificate_files[i], path) == 0) {
+			debug2_f("ignoring duplicate key %s", path);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+
+	options->certificate_file_userprovided[options->num_certificate_files] =
+	    userprovided;
+	options->certificate_files[options->num_certificate_files++] =
+	    xstrdup(path);
+}
+
+void
+add_identity_file(Options *options, const char *dir, const char *filename,
+    int userprovided)
+{
+	char *path;
+	int i;
+
+	if (options->num_identity_files >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
+		fatal("Too many identity files specified (max %d)",
+		    SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
+
+	if (dir == NULL) /* no dir, filename is absolute */
+		path = xstrdup(filename);
+	else if (xasprintf(&path, "%s%s", dir, filename) >= PATH_MAX)
+		fatal("Identity file path %s too long", path);
+
+	/* Avoid registering duplicates */
+	for (i = 0; i < options->num_identity_files; i++) {
+		if (options->identity_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided &&
+		    strcmp(options->identity_files[i], path) == 0) {
+			debug2_f("ignoring duplicate key %s", path);
+			free(path);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+
+	options->identity_file_userprovided[options->num_identity_files] =
+	    userprovided;
+	options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++] = path;
+}
+
+int
+default_ssh_port(void)
+{
+	static int port;
+	struct servent *sp;
+
+	if (port == 0) {
+		sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp");
+		port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+	}
+	return port;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Execute a command in a shell.
+ * Return its exit status or -1 on abnormal exit.
+ */
+static int
+execute_in_shell(const char *cmd)
+{
+	char *shell;
+	pid_t pid;
+	int status;
+
+	if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
+		shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
+
+	if (access(shell, X_OK) == -1) {
+		fatal("Shell \"%s\" is not executable: %s",
+		    shell, strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	debug("Executing command: '%.500s'", cmd);
+
+	/* Fork and execute the command. */
+	if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+		char *argv[4];
+
+		if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 0) == -1)
+			fatal_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+		argv[0] = shell;
+		argv[1] = "-c";
+		argv[2] = xstrdup(cmd);
+		argv[3] = NULL;
+
+		execv(argv[0], argv);
+		error("Unable to execute '%.100s': %s", cmd, strerror(errno));
+		/* Die with signal to make this error apparent to parent. */
+		ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+		kill(getpid(), SIGTERM);
+		_exit(1);
+	}
+	/* Parent. */
+	if (pid == -1)
+		fatal_f("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+		if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN)
+			fatal_f("waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+	if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+		error("command '%.100s' exited abnormally", cmd);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	debug3("command returned status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
+	return WEXITSTATUS(status);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse and execute a Match directive.
+ */
+static int
+match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw,
+    const char *host_arg, const char *original_host, int final_pass,
+    int *want_final_pass, const char *filename, int linenum)
+{
+	char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host, *criteria;
+	const char *ruser;
+	int r, port, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate;
+	char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
+	char uidstr[32];
+
+	/*
+	 * Configuration is likely to be incomplete at this point so we
+	 * must be prepared to use default values.
+	 */
+	port = options->port <= 0 ? default_ssh_port() : options->port;
+	ruser = options->user == NULL ? pw->pw_name : options->user;
+	if (final_pass) {
+		host = xstrdup(options->hostname);
+	} else if (options->hostname != NULL) {
+		/* NB. Please keep in sync with ssh.c:main() */
+		host = percent_expand(options->hostname,
+		    "h", host_arg, (char *)NULL);
+	} else {
+		host = xstrdup(host_arg);
+	}
+
+	debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s",
+	    cp, host, original_host);
+	while ((oattrib = attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
+		/* Terminate on comment */
+		if (*attrib == '#') {
+			cp = NULL; /* mark all arguments consumed */
+			break;
+		}
+		arg = criteria = NULL;
+		this_result = 1;
+		if ((negate = attrib[0] == '!'))
+			attrib++;
+		/* Criterion "all" has no argument and must appear alone */
+		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) {
+			if (attributes > 1 || ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL &&
+			    *arg != '\0' && *arg != '#')) {
+				error("%.200s line %d: '%s' cannot be combined "
+				    "with other Match attributes",
+				    filename, linenum, oattrib);
+				result = -1;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (arg != NULL && *arg == '#')
+				cp = NULL; /* mark all arguments consumed */
+			if (result)
+				result = negate ? 0 : 1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		attributes++;
+		/* criteria "final" and "canonical" have no argument */
+		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "canonical") == 0 ||
+		    strcasecmp(attrib, "final") == 0) {
+			/*
+			 * If the config requests "Match final" then remember
+			 * this so we can perform a second pass later.
+			 */
+			if (strcasecmp(attrib, "final") == 0 &&
+			    want_final_pass != NULL)
+				*want_final_pass = 1;
+			r = !!final_pass;  /* force bitmask member to boolean */
+			if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
+				this_result = result = 0;
+			debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s'",
+			    filename, linenum,
+			    this_result ? "" : "not ", oattrib);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* All other criteria require an argument */
+		if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL ||
+		    *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') {
+			error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
+			result = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
+			criteria = xstrdup(host);
+			r = match_hostname(host, arg) == 1;
+			if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
+				this_result = result = 0;
+		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) {
+			criteria = xstrdup(original_host);
+			r = match_hostname(original_host, arg) == 1;
+			if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
+				this_result = result = 0;
+		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
+			criteria = xstrdup(ruser);
+			r = match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, 0) == 1;
+			if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
+				this_result = result = 0;
+		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localuser") == 0) {
+			criteria = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+			r = match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, 0) == 1;
+			if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
+				this_result = result = 0;
+		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "exec") == 0) {
+			char *conn_hash_hex, *keyalias;
+
+			if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
+				fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
+			strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost));
+			shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0';
+			snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", port);
+			snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
+			    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
+			conn_hash_hex = ssh_connection_hash(thishost, host,
+			    portstr, ruser);
+			keyalias = options->host_key_alias ?
+			    options->host_key_alias : host;
+
+			cmd = percent_expand(arg,
+			    "C", conn_hash_hex,
+			    "L", shorthost,
+			    "d", pw->pw_dir,
+			    "h", host,
+			    "k", keyalias,
+			    "l", thishost,
+			    "n", original_host,
+			    "p", portstr,
+			    "r", ruser,
+			    "u", pw->pw_name,
+			    "i", uidstr,
+			    (char *)NULL);
+			free(conn_hash_hex);
+			if (result != 1) {
+				/* skip execution if prior predicate failed */
+				debug3("%.200s line %d: skipped exec "
+				    "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, cmd);
+				free(cmd);
+				continue;
+			}
+			r = execute_in_shell(cmd);
+			if (r == -1) {
+				fatal("%.200s line %d: match exec "
+				    "'%.100s' error", filename,
+				    linenum, cmd);
+			}
+			criteria = xstrdup(cmd);
+			free(cmd);
+			/* Force exit status to boolean */
+			r = r == 0;
+			if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
+				this_result = result = 0;
+		} else {
+			error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
+			result = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s \"%.100s\"' ",
+		    filename, linenum, this_result ? "": "not ",
+		    oattrib, criteria);
+		free(criteria);
+	}
+	if (attributes == 0) {
+		error("One or more attributes required for Match");
+		result = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+ out:
+	if (result != -1)
+		debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
+	*condition = cp;
+	free(host);
+	return result;
+}
+
+/* Remove environment variable by pattern */
+static void
+rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum)
+{
+	u_int i, j, onum_send_env = options->num_send_env;
+
+	/* Remove an environment variable */
+	for (i = 0; i < options->num_send_env; ) {
+		if (!match_pattern(options->send_env[i], arg + 1)) {
+			i++;
+			continue;
+		}
+		debug3("%s line %d: removing environment %s",
+		    filename, linenum, options->send_env[i]);
+		free(options->send_env[i]);
+		options->send_env[i] = NULL;
+		for (j = i; j < options->num_send_env - 1; j++) {
+			options->send_env[j] = options->send_env[j + 1];
+			options->send_env[j + 1] = NULL;
+		}
+		options->num_send_env--;
+		/* NB. don't increment i */
+	}
+	if (onum_send_env != options->num_send_env) {
+		options->send_env = xrecallocarray(options->send_env,
+		    onum_send_env, options->num_send_env,
+		    sizeof(*options->send_env));
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption.
+ */
+static OpCodes
+parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum,
+    const char *ignored_unknown)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
+		if (strcmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0)
+			return keywords[i].opcode;
+	if (ignored_unknown != NULL &&
+	    match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown, 1) == 1)
+		return oIgnoredUnknownOption;
+	error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
+	    filename, linenum, cp);
+	return oBadOption;
+}
+
+/* Multistate option parsing */
+struct multistate {
+	char *key;
+	int value;
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = {
+	{ "true",			1 },
+	{ "false",			0 },
+	{ "yes",			1 },
+	{ "no",				0 },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoask[] = {
+	{ "true",			1 },
+	{ "false",			0 },
+	{ "yes",			1 },
+	{ "no",				0 },
+	{ "ask",			2 },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_strict_hostkey[] = {
+	{ "true",			SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES },
+	{ "false",			SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF },
+	{ "yes",			SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES },
+	{ "no",				SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF },
+	{ "ask",			SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK },
+	{ "off",			SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF },
+	{ "accept-new",			SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_NEW },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoaskconfirm[] = {
+	{ "true",			1 },
+	{ "false",			0 },
+	{ "yes",			1 },
+	{ "no",				0 },
+	{ "ask",			2 },
+	{ "confirm",			3 },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = {
+	{ "inet",			AF_INET },
+	{ "inet6",			AF_INET6 },
+	{ "any",			AF_UNSPEC },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_controlmaster[] = {
+	{ "true",			SSHCTL_MASTER_YES },
+	{ "yes",			SSHCTL_MASTER_YES },
+	{ "false",			SSHCTL_MASTER_NO },
+	{ "no",				SSHCTL_MASTER_NO },
+	{ "auto",			SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO },
+	{ "ask",			SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK },
+	{ "autoask",			SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_tunnel[] = {
+	{ "ethernet",			SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET },
+	{ "point-to-point",		SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT },
+	{ "true",			SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT },
+	{ "yes",			SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT },
+	{ "false",			SSH_TUNMODE_NO },
+	{ "no",				SSH_TUNMODE_NO },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_requesttty[] = {
+	{ "true",			REQUEST_TTY_YES },
+	{ "yes",			REQUEST_TTY_YES },
+	{ "false",			REQUEST_TTY_NO },
+	{ "no",				REQUEST_TTY_NO },
+	{ "force",			REQUEST_TTY_FORCE },
+	{ "auto",			REQUEST_TTY_AUTO },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_sessiontype[] = {
+	{ "none",			SESSION_TYPE_NONE },
+	{ "subsystem",			SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM },
+	{ "default",			SESSION_TYPE_DEFAULT },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_canonicalizehostname[] = {
+	{ "true",			SSH_CANONICALISE_YES },
+	{ "false",			SSH_CANONICALISE_NO },
+	{ "yes",			SSH_CANONICALISE_YES },
+	{ "no",				SSH_CANONICALISE_NO },
+	{ "always",			SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_pubkey_auth[] = {
+	{ "true",			SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_ALL },
+	{ "false",			SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_NO },
+	{ "yes",			SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_ALL },
+	{ "no",				SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_NO },
+	{ "unbound",			SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_UNBOUND },
+	{ "host-bound",			SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_HBOUND },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+	{ "yes",			COMP_ZLIB },
+#endif
+	{ "no",				COMP_NONE },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+
+static int
+parse_multistate_value(const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum,
+    const struct multistate *multistate_ptr)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+		error("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
+		if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0)
+			return multistate_ptr[i].value;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This
+ * only sets those values that have not already been set.
+ */
+int
+process_config_line(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
+    const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename,
+    int linenum, int *activep, int flags)
+{
+	return process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host,
+	    line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+static int
+process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
+    const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename,
+    int linenum, int *activep, int flags, int *want_final_pass, int depth)
+{
+	char *str, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2, *p;
+	char **cpptr, ***cppptr, fwdarg[256];
+	u_int i, *uintptr, uvalue, max_entries = 0;
+	int r, oactive, negated, opcode, *intptr, value, value2, cmdline = 0;
+	int remotefwd, dynamicfwd;
+	LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
+	SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
+	long long val64;
+	size_t len;
+	struct Forward fwd;
+	const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
+	struct allowed_cname *cname;
+	glob_t gl;
+	const char *errstr;
+	char **oav = NULL, **av;
+	int oac = 0, ac;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */
+		cmdline = 1;
+		activep = &cmdline;
+	}
+
+	/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
+	if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	for (len--; len > 0; len--) {
+		if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL)
+			break;
+		line[len] = '\0';
+	}
+
+	str = line;
+	/* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */
+	if ((keyword = strdelim(&str)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	/* Ignore leading whitespace. */
+	if (*keyword == '\0')
+		keyword = strdelim(&str);
+	if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#')
+		return 0;
+	/* Match lowercase keyword */
+	lowercase(keyword);
+
+	/* Prepare to parse remainder of line */
+	if (str != NULL)
+		str += strspn(str, WHITESPACE);
+	if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') {
+		error("%s line %d: no argument after keyword \"%s\"",
+		    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum,
+	    options->ignored_unknown);
+	if (argv_split(str, &oac, &oav, 1) != 0) {
+		error("%s line %d: invalid quotes", filename, linenum);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	ac = oac;
+	av = oav;
+
+	switch (opcode) {
+	case oBadOption:
+		/* don't panic, but count bad options */
+		goto out;
+	case oIgnore:
+		argv_consume(&ac);
+		break;
+	case oIgnoredUnknownOption:
+		debug("%s line %d: Ignored unknown option \"%s\"",
+		    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		argv_consume(&ac);
+		break;
+	case oConnectTimeout:
+		intptr = &options->connection_timeout;
+parse_time:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%s line %d: missing time value.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0)
+			value = -1;
+		else if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) {
+			error("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case oForwardAgent:
+		intptr = &options->forward_agent;
+
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%s line %d: missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		value = -1;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
+		for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
+			if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) {
+				value = multistate_ptr[i].value;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (value != -1) {
+			if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+				*intptr = value;
+			break;
+		}
+		/* ForwardAgent wasn't 'yes' or 'no', assume a path */
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = 1;
+
+		charptr = &options->forward_agent_sock_path;
+		goto parse_agent_path;
+
+	case oForwardX11:
+		intptr = &options->forward_x11;
+ parse_flag:
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
+ parse_multistate:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if ((value = parse_multistate_value(arg, filename, linenum,
+		    multistate_ptr)) == -1) {
+			error("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".",
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case oForwardX11Trusted:
+		intptr = &options->forward_x11_trusted;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oForwardX11Timeout:
+		intptr = &options->forward_x11_timeout;
+		goto parse_time;
+
+	case oGatewayPorts:
+		intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oExitOnForwardFailure:
+		intptr = &options->exit_on_forward_failure;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oPasswordAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oKbdInteractiveDevices:
+		charptr = &options->kbd_interactive_devices;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oPubkeyAuthentication:
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_pubkey_auth;
+		intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case oHostbasedAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oGssAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oGssDelegateCreds:
+		intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oBatchMode:
+		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oCheckHostIP:
+		intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
+		intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case oStrictHostKeyChecking:
+		intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_strict_hostkey;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case oCompression:
+		intptr = &options->compression;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_compression;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case oTCPKeepAlive:
+		intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost:
+		intptr = &options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oNumberOfPasswordPrompts:
+		intptr = &options->number_of_password_prompts;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+	case oRekeyLimit:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
+			    linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) {
+			val64 = 0;
+		} else {
+			if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1) {
+				error("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s",
+				    filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno));
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16) {
+				error("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small",
+				    filename, linenum);
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1)
+			options->rekey_limit = val64;
+		if (ac != 0) { /* optional rekey interval present */
+			if (strcmp(av[0], "none") == 0) {
+				(void)argv_next(&ac, &av);	/* discard */
+				break;
+			}
+			intptr = &options->rekey_interval;
+			goto parse_time;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oIdentityFile:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep) {
+			intptr = &options->num_identity_files;
+			if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) {
+				error("%.200s line %d: Too many identity files "
+				    "specified (max %d).", filename, linenum,
+				    SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			add_identity_file(options, NULL,
+			    arg, flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oCertificateFile:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep) {
+			intptr = &options->num_certificate_files;
+			if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) {
+				error("%.200s line %d: Too many certificate "
+				    "files specified (max %d).",
+				    filename, linenum,
+				    SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			add_certificate_file(options, arg,
+			    flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oXAuthLocation:
+		charptr=&options->xauth_location;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oUser:
+		charptr = &options->user;
+parse_string:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case oGlobalKnownHostsFile:
+		cpptr = (char **)&options->system_hostfiles;
+		uintptr = &options->num_system_hostfiles;
+		max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES;
+parse_char_array:
+		i = 0;
+		value = *uintptr == 0; /* was array empty when we started? */
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			if (*arg == '\0') {
+				error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument",
+				    filename, linenum, keyword);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			/* Allow "none" only in first position */
+			if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
+				if (i > 0 || ac > 0) {
+					error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" "
+					    "argument must appear alone.",
+					    filename, linenum, keyword);
+					goto out;
+				}
+			}
+			i++;
+			if (*activep && value) {
+				if ((*uintptr) >= max_entries) {
+					error("%s line %d: too many %s "
+					    "entries.", filename, linenum,
+					    keyword);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				cpptr[(*uintptr)++] = xstrdup(arg);
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oUserKnownHostsFile:
+		cpptr = (char **)&options->user_hostfiles;
+		uintptr = &options->num_user_hostfiles;
+		max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES;
+		goto parse_char_array;
+
+	case oHostname:
+		charptr = &options->hostname;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oHostKeyAlias:
+		charptr = &options->host_key_alias;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oPreferredAuthentications:
+		charptr = &options->preferred_authentications;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oBindAddress:
+		charptr = &options->bind_address;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oBindInterface:
+		charptr = &options->bind_interface;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oPKCS11Provider:
+		charptr = &options->pkcs11_provider;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oSecurityKeyProvider:
+		charptr = &options->sk_provider;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oKnownHostsCommand:
+		charptr = &options->known_hosts_command;
+		goto parse_command;
+
+	case oProxyCommand:
+		charptr = &options->proxy_command;
+		/* Ignore ProxyCommand if ProxyJump already specified */
+		if (options->jump_host != NULL)
+			charptr = &options->jump_host; /* Skip below */
+parse_command:
+		if (str == NULL) {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE "=");
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+			*charptr = xstrdup(str + len);
+		argv_consume(&ac);
+		break;
+
+	case oProxyJump:
+		if (str == NULL) {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE "=");
+		/* XXX use argv? */
+		if (parse_jump(str + len, options, *activep) == -1) {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Invalid ProxyJump \"%s\"",
+			    filename, linenum, str + len);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		argv_consume(&ac);
+		break;
+
+	case oPort:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		value = a2port(arg);
+		if (value <= 0) {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Bad port '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep && options->port == -1)
+			options->port = value;
+		break;
+
+	case oConnectionAttempts:
+		intptr = &options->connection_attempts;
+parse_int:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL) {
+			error("%s line %d: integer value %s.",
+			    filename, linenum, errstr);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case oCiphers:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*arg != '-' &&
+		    !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)){
+			error("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL)
+			options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case oMacs:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*arg != '-' &&
+		    !mac_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg)) {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 MAC spec '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep && options->macs == NULL)
+			options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case oKexAlgorithms:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*arg != '-' &&
+		    !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ?
+		    arg + 1 : arg)) {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
+			options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case oHostKeyAlgorithms:
+		charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms;
+parse_pubkey_algos:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*arg != '-' &&
+		    !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ?
+		    arg + 1 : arg, 1)) {
+			error("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case oCASignatureAlgorithms:
+		charptr = &options->ca_sign_algorithms;
+		goto parse_pubkey_algos;
+
+	case oLogLevel:
+		log_level_ptr = &options->log_level;
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		value = log_level_number(arg);
+		if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) {
+			error("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+			*log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value;
+		break;
+
+	case oLogFacility:
+		log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility;
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		value = log_facility_number(arg);
+		if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) {
+			error("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*log_facility_ptr == -1)
+			*log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value;
+		break;
+
+	case oLogVerbose:
+		cppptr = &options->log_verbose;
+		uintptr = &options->num_log_verbose;
+		i = 0;
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			if (*arg == '\0') {
+				error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument",
+				    filename, linenum, keyword);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			/* Allow "none" only in first position */
+			if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
+				if (i > 0 || ac > 0) {
+					error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" "
+					    "argument must appear alone.",
+					    filename, linenum, keyword);
+					goto out;
+				}
+			}
+			i++;
+			if (*activep && *uintptr == 0) {
+				*cppptr = xrecallocarray(*cppptr, *uintptr,
+				    *uintptr + 1, sizeof(**cppptr));
+				(*cppptr)[(*uintptr)++] = xstrdup(arg);
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oLocalForward:
+	case oRemoteForward:
+	case oDynamicForward:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		remotefwd = (opcode == oRemoteForward);
+		dynamicfwd = (opcode == oDynamicForward);
+
+		if (!dynamicfwd) {
+			arg2 = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+			if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0') {
+				if (remotefwd)
+					dynamicfwd = 1;
+				else {
+					error("%.200s line %d: Missing target "
+					    "argument.", filename, linenum);
+					goto out;
+				}
+			} else {
+				/* construct a string for parse_forward */
+				snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg,
+				    arg2);
+			}
+		}
+		if (dynamicfwd)
+			strlcpy(fwdarg, arg, sizeof(fwdarg));
+
+		if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg, dynamicfwd, remotefwd) == 0) {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (*activep) {
+			if (remotefwd) {
+				add_remote_forward(options, &fwd);
+			} else {
+				add_local_forward(options, &fwd);
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oPermitRemoteOpen:
+		uintptr = &options->num_permitted_remote_opens;
+		cppptr = &options->permitted_remote_opens;
+		uvalue = *uintptr;	/* modified later */
+		i = 0;
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			arg2 = xstrdup(arg);
+			/* Allow any/none only in first position */
+			if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0 ||
+			    strcasecmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
+				if (i > 0 || ac > 0) {
+					error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"%s\" "
+					    "argument must appear alone.",
+					    filename, linenum, keyword, arg);
+					goto out;
+				}
+			} else {
+				p = hpdelim(&arg);
+				if (p == NULL) {
+					fatal("%s line %d: missing host in %s",
+					    filename, linenum,
+					    lookup_opcode_name(opcode));
+				}
+				p = cleanhostname(p);
+				/*
+				 * don't want to use permitopen_port to avoid
+				 * dependency on channels.[ch] here.
+				 */
+				if (arg == NULL || (strcmp(arg, "*") != 0 &&
+				    a2port(arg) <= 0)) {
+					fatal("%s line %d: bad port number "
+					    "in %s", filename, linenum,
+					    lookup_opcode_name(opcode));
+				}
+			}
+			if (*activep && uvalue == 0) {
+				opt_array_append(filename, linenum,
+				    lookup_opcode_name(opcode),
+				    cppptr, uintptr, arg2);
+			}
+			free(arg2);
+			i++;
+		}
+		if (i == 0)
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing %s specification",
+			    filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode));
+		break;
+
+	case oClearAllForwardings:
+		intptr = &options->clear_forwardings;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oHost:
+		if (cmdline) {
+			error("Host directive not supported as a command-line "
+			    "option");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		*activep = 0;
+		arg2 = NULL;
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			if (*arg == '\0') {
+				error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument",
+				    filename, linenum, keyword);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if ((flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) != 0) {
+				argv_consume(&ac);
+				break;
+			}
+			negated = *arg == '!';
+			if (negated)
+				arg++;
+			if (match_pattern(host, arg)) {
+				if (negated) {
+					debug("%.200s line %d: Skipping Host "
+					    "block because of negated match "
+					    "for %.100s", filename, linenum,
+					    arg);
+					*activep = 0;
+					argv_consume(&ac);
+					break;
+				}
+				if (!*activep)
+					arg2 = arg; /* logged below */
+				*activep = 1;
+			}
+		}
+		if (*activep)
+			debug("%.200s line %d: Applying options for %.100s",
+			    filename, linenum, arg2);
+		break;
+
+	case oMatch:
+		if (cmdline) {
+			error("Host directive not supported as a command-line "
+			    "option");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		value = match_cfg_line(options, &str, pw, host, original_host,
+		    flags & SSHCONF_FINAL, want_final_pass,
+		    filename, linenum);
+		if (value < 0) {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
+			    linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		*activep = (flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value;
+		/*
+		 * If match_cfg_line() didn't consume all its arguments then
+		 * arrange for the extra arguments check below to fail.
+		 */
+
+		if (str == NULL || *str == '\0')
+			argv_consume(&ac);
+		break;
+
+	case oEscapeChar:
+		intptr = &options->escape_char;
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0)
+			value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
+		else if (arg[1] == '\0')
+			value = (u_char) arg[0];
+		else if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 &&
+		    (u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128)
+			value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31;
+		else {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case oAddressFamily:
+		intptr = &options->address_family;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case oEnableSSHKeysign:
+		intptr = &options->enable_ssh_keysign;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oIdentitiesOnly:
+		intptr = &options->identities_only;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oServerAliveInterval:
+		intptr = &options->server_alive_interval;
+		goto parse_time;
+
+	case oServerAliveCountMax:
+		intptr = &options->server_alive_count_max;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+	case oSendEnv:
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			if (*arg == '\0' || strchr(arg, '=') != NULL) {
+				error("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (!*activep)
+				continue;
+			if (*arg == '-') {
+				/* Removing an env var */
+				rm_env(options, arg, filename, linenum);
+				continue;
+			}
+			opt_array_append(filename, linenum,
+			    lookup_opcode_name(opcode),
+			    &options->send_env, &options->num_send_env, arg);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oSetEnv:
+		value = options->num_setenv;
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			if (strchr(arg, '=') == NULL) {
+				error("%s line %d: Invalid SetEnv.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (!*activep || value != 0)
+				continue;
+			if (lookup_setenv_in_list(arg, options->setenv,
+			    options->num_setenv) != NULL) {
+				debug2("%s line %d: ignoring duplicate env "
+				    "name \"%.64s\"", filename, linenum, arg);
+				continue;
+			}
+			opt_array_append(filename, linenum,
+			    lookup_opcode_name(opcode),
+			    &options->setenv, &options->num_setenv, arg);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oControlPath:
+		charptr = &options->control_path;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oControlMaster:
+		intptr = &options->control_master;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_controlmaster;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case oControlPersist:
+		/* no/false/yes/true, or a time spec */
+		intptr = &options->control_persist;
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlPersist"
+			    " argument.", filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		value = 0;
+		value2 = 0;	/* timeout */
+		if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0)
+			value = 0;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0)
+			value = 1;
+		else if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) >= 0)
+			value = 1;
+		else {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlPersist argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1) {
+			*intptr = value;
+			options->control_persist_timeout = value2;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oHashKnownHosts:
+		intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oTunnel:
+		intptr = &options->tun_open;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_tunnel;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case oTunnelDevice:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		value = a2tun(arg, &value2);
+		if (value == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Bad tun device.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep && options->tun_local == -1) {
+			options->tun_local = value;
+			options->tun_remote = value2;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oLocalCommand:
+		charptr = &options->local_command;
+		goto parse_command;
+
+	case oPermitLocalCommand:
+		intptr = &options->permit_local_command;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oRemoteCommand:
+		charptr = &options->remote_command;
+		goto parse_command;
+
+	case oVisualHostKey:
+		intptr = &options->visual_host_key;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oInclude:
+		if (cmdline) {
+			error("Include directive not supported as a "
+			    "command-line option");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		value = 0;
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			if (*arg == '\0') {
+				error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument",
+				    filename, linenum, keyword);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			/*
+			 * Ensure all paths are anchored. User configuration
+			 * files may begin with '~/' but system configurations
+			 * must not. If the path is relative, then treat it
+			 * as living in ~/.ssh for user configurations or
+			 * /etc/ssh for system ones.
+			 */
+			if (*arg == '~' && (flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) == 0) {
+				error("%.200s line %d: bad include path %s.",
+				    filename, linenum, arg);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (!path_absolute(arg) && *arg != '~') {
+				xasprintf(&arg2, "%s/%s",
+				    (flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) ?
+				    "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR : SSHDIR, arg);
+			} else
+				arg2 = xstrdup(arg);
+			memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl));
+			r = glob(arg2, GLOB_TILDE, NULL, &gl);
+			if (r == GLOB_NOMATCH) {
+				debug("%.200s line %d: include %s matched no "
+				    "files",filename, linenum, arg2);
+				free(arg2);
+				continue;
+			} else if (r != 0) {
+				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
+				    filename, linenum, arg2);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			free(arg2);
+			oactive = *activep;
+			for (i = 0; i < gl.gl_pathc; i++) {
+				debug3("%.200s line %d: Including file %s "
+				    "depth %d%s", filename, linenum,
+				    gl.gl_pathv[i], depth,
+				    oactive ? "" : " (parse only)");
+				r = read_config_file_depth(gl.gl_pathv[i],
+				    pw, host, original_host, options,
+				    flags | SSHCONF_CHECKPERM |
+				    (oactive ? 0 : SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH),
+				    activep, want_final_pass, depth + 1);
+				if (r != 1 && errno != ENOENT) {
+					error("Can't open user config file "
+					    "%.100s: %.100s", gl.gl_pathv[i],
+					    strerror(errno));
+					globfree(&gl);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				/*
+				 * don't let Match in includes clobber the
+				 * containing file's Match state.
+				 */
+				*activep = oactive;
+				if (r != 1)
+					value = -1;
+			}
+			globfree(&gl);
+		}
+		if (value != 0)
+			ret = value;
+		break;
+
+	case oIPQoS:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) {
+			error("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (arg == NULL)
+			value2 = value;
+		else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) {
+			error("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep && options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) {
+			options->ip_qos_interactive = value;
+			options->ip_qos_bulk = value2;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oRequestTTY:
+		intptr = &options->request_tty;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_requesttty;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case oSessionType:
+		intptr = &options->session_type;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_sessiontype;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case oStdinNull:
+		intptr = &options->stdin_null;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oForkAfterAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->fork_after_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oIgnoreUnknown:
+		charptr = &options->ignored_unknown;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oProxyUseFdpass:
+		intptr = &options->proxy_use_fdpass;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oCanonicalDomains:
+		value = options->num_canonical_domains != 0;
+		i = 0;
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			if (*arg == '\0') {
+				error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument",
+				    filename, linenum, keyword);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			/* Allow "none" only in first position */
+			if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
+				if (i > 0 || ac > 0) {
+					error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" "
+					    "argument must appear alone.",
+					    filename, linenum, keyword);
+					goto out;
+				}
+			}
+			i++;
+			if (!valid_domain(arg, 1, &errstr)) {
+				error("%s line %d: %s", filename, linenum,
+				    errstr);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (!*activep || value)
+				continue;
+			if (options->num_canonical_domains >=
+			    MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) {
+				error("%s line %d: too many hostname suffixes.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			options->canonical_domains[
+			    options->num_canonical_domains++] = xstrdup(arg);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs:
+		value = options->num_permitted_cnames != 0;
+		i = 0;
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			/*
+			 * Either 'none' (only in first position), '*' for
+			 * everything or 'list:list'
+			 */
+			if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
+				if (i > 0 || ac > 0) {
+					error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" "
+					    "argument must appear alone.",
+					    filename, linenum, keyword);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				arg2 = "";
+			} else if (strcmp(arg, "*") == 0) {
+				arg2 = arg;
+			} else {
+				lowercase(arg);
+				if ((arg2 = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL ||
+				    arg2[1] == '\0') {
+					error("%s line %d: "
+					    "Invalid permitted CNAME \"%s\"",
+					    filename, linenum, arg);
+					goto out;
+				}
+				*arg2 = '\0';
+				arg2++;
+			}
+			i++;
+			if (!*activep || value)
+				continue;
+			if (options->num_permitted_cnames >=
+			    MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) {
+				error("%s line %d: too many permitted CNAMEs.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			cname = options->permitted_cnames +
+			    options->num_permitted_cnames++;
+			cname->source_list = xstrdup(arg);
+			cname->target_list = xstrdup(arg2);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oCanonicalizeHostname:
+		intptr = &options->canonicalize_hostname;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_canonicalizehostname;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case oCanonicalizeMaxDots:
+		intptr = &options->canonicalize_max_dots;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+	case oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal:
+		intptr = &options->canonicalize_fallback_local;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oStreamLocalBindMask:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing StreamLocalBindMask "
+			    "argument.", filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/* Parse mode in octal format */
+		value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 8);
+		if (arg == endofnumber || value < 0 || value > 0777) {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value;
+		break;
+
+	case oStreamLocalBindUnlink:
+		intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oRevokedHostKeys:
+		charptr = &options->revoked_host_keys;
+		goto parse_string;
+
+	case oFingerprintHash:
+		intptr = &options->fingerprint_hash;
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1) {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".",
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case oUpdateHostkeys:
+		intptr = &options->update_hostkeys;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms:
+		charptr = &options->hostbased_accepted_algos;
+		goto parse_pubkey_algos;
+
+	case oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms:
+		charptr = &options->pubkey_accepted_algos;
+		goto parse_pubkey_algos;
+
+	case oAddKeysToAgent:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		arg2 = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		value = parse_multistate_value(arg, filename, linenum,
+		    multistate_yesnoaskconfirm);
+		value2 = 0; /* unlimited lifespan by default */
+		if (value == 3 && arg2 != NULL) {
+			/* allow "AddKeysToAgent confirm 5m" */
+			if ((value2 = convtime(arg2)) == -1 ||
+			    value2 > INT_MAX) {
+				error("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+				goto out;
+			}
+		} else if (value == -1 && arg2 == NULL) {
+			if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) == -1 ||
+			    value2 > INT_MAX) {
+				error("%s line %d: unsupported option",
+				    filename, linenum);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			value = 1; /* yes */
+		} else if (value == -1 || arg2 != NULL) {
+			error("%s line %d: unsupported option",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep && options->add_keys_to_agent == -1) {
+			options->add_keys_to_agent = value;
+			options->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan = value2;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case oIdentityAgent:
+		charptr = &options->identity_agent;
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+			goto out;
+		}
+  parse_agent_path:
+		/* Extra validation if the string represents an env var. */
+		if ((arg2 = dollar_expand(&r, arg)) == NULL || r) {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Invalid environment expansion "
+			    "%s.", filename, linenum, arg);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		free(arg2);
+		/* check for legacy environment format */
+		if (arg[0] == '$' && arg[1] != '{' &&
+		    !valid_env_name(arg + 1)) {
+			error("%.200s line %d: Invalid environment name %s.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case oEnableEscapeCommandline:
+		intptr = &options->enable_escape_commandline;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case oRequiredRSASize:
+		intptr = &options->required_rsa_size;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+	case oDeprecated:
+		debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
+		    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		argv_consume(&ac);
+		break;
+
+	case oUnsupported:
+		error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"",
+		    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		argv_consume(&ac);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		error("%s line %d: Unimplemented opcode %d",
+		    filename, linenum, opcode);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */
+	if (ac > 0) {
+		error("%.200s line %d: keyword %s extra arguments "
+		    "at end of line", filename, linenum, keyword);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* success */
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	argv_free(oav, oac);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly.  Options
+ * should already be initialized before this call.  This never returns if
+ * there is an error.  If the file does not exist, this returns 0.
+ */
+int
+read_config_file(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
+    const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags,
+    int *want_final_pass)
+{
+	int active = 1;
+
+	return read_config_file_depth(filename, pw, host, original_host,
+	    options, flags, &active, want_final_pass, 0);
+}
+
+#define READCONF_MAX_DEPTH	16
+static int
+read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
+    const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options,
+    int flags, int *activep, int *want_final_pass, int depth)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	char *line = NULL;
+	size_t linesize = 0;
+	int linenum;
+	int bad_options = 0;
+
+	if (depth < 0 || depth > READCONF_MAX_DEPTH)
+		fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes");
+
+	if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (flags & SSHCONF_CHECKPERM) {
+		struct stat sb;
+
+		if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1)
+			fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
+		if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) ||
+		    (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0))
+			fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename);
+	}
+
+	debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename);
+
+	/*
+	 * Mark that we are now processing the options.  This flag is turned
+	 * on/off by Host specifications.
+	 */
+	linenum = 0;
+	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+		/* Update line number counter. */
+		linenum++;
+		/*
+		 * Trim out comments and strip whitespace.
+		 * NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce
+		 * line numbers later for error messages.
+		 */
+		if (process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host,
+		    line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, want_final_pass,
+		    depth) != 0)
+			bad_options++;
+	}
+	free(line);
+	fclose(f);
+	if (bad_options > 0)
+		fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
+		    filename, bad_options);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
+int
+option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
+{
+	return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns 1 if CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified, 0 otherwise.
+ * Allowed to be called on non-final configuration.
+ */
+int
+config_has_permitted_cnames(Options *options)
+{
+	if (options->num_permitted_cnames == 1 &&
+	    strcasecmp(options->permitted_cnames[0].source_list, "none") == 0 &&
+	    strcmp(options->permitted_cnames[0].target_list, "") == 0)
+		return 0;
+	return options->num_permitted_cnames > 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet
+ * been set.  Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options
+ * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file,
+ * system config file.  Last, fill_default_options is called.
+ */
+
+void
+initialize_options(Options * options)
+{
+	memset(options, 'X', sizeof(*options));
+	options->host_arg = NULL;
+	options->forward_agent = -1;
+	options->forward_agent_sock_path = NULL;
+	options->forward_x11 = -1;
+	options->forward_x11_trusted = -1;
+	options->forward_x11_timeout = -1;
+	options->stdio_forward_host = NULL;
+	options->stdio_forward_port = 0;
+	options->clear_forwardings = -1;
+	options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1;
+	options->xauth_location = NULL;
+	options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1;
+	options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1;
+	options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
+	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+	options->gss_authentication = -1;
+	options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
+	options->password_authentication = -1;
+	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
+	options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
+	options->batch_mode = -1;
+	options->check_host_ip = -1;
+	options->strict_host_key_checking = -1;
+	options->compression = -1;
+	options->tcp_keep_alive = -1;
+	options->port = -1;
+	options->address_family = -1;
+	options->connection_attempts = -1;
+	options->connection_timeout = -1;
+	options->number_of_password_prompts = -1;
+	options->ciphers = NULL;
+	options->macs = NULL;
+	options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
+	options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
+	options->ca_sign_algorithms = NULL;
+	options->num_identity_files = 0;
+	memset(options->identity_keys, 0, sizeof(options->identity_keys));
+	options->num_certificate_files = 0;
+	memset(options->certificates, 0, sizeof(options->certificates));
+	options->hostname = NULL;
+	options->host_key_alias = NULL;
+	options->proxy_command = NULL;
+	options->jump_user = NULL;
+	options->jump_host = NULL;
+	options->jump_port = -1;
+	options->jump_extra = NULL;
+	options->user = NULL;
+	options->escape_char = -1;
+	options->num_system_hostfiles = 0;
+	options->num_user_hostfiles = 0;
+	options->local_forwards = NULL;
+	options->num_local_forwards = 0;
+	options->remote_forwards = NULL;
+	options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
+	options->permitted_remote_opens = NULL;
+	options->num_permitted_remote_opens = 0;
+	options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
+	options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
+	options->num_log_verbose = 0;
+	options->log_verbose = NULL;
+	options->preferred_authentications = NULL;
+	options->bind_address = NULL;
+	options->bind_interface = NULL;
+	options->pkcs11_provider = NULL;
+	options->sk_provider = NULL;
+	options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1;
+	options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1;
+	options->identities_only = - 1;
+	options->rekey_limit = - 1;
+	options->rekey_interval = -1;
+	options->verify_host_key_dns = -1;
+	options->server_alive_interval = -1;
+	options->server_alive_count_max = -1;
+	options->send_env = NULL;
+	options->num_send_env = 0;
+	options->setenv = NULL;
+	options->num_setenv = 0;
+	options->control_path = NULL;
+	options->control_master = -1;
+	options->control_persist = -1;
+	options->control_persist_timeout = 0;
+	options->hash_known_hosts = -1;
+	options->tun_open = -1;
+	options->tun_local = -1;
+	options->tun_remote = -1;
+	options->local_command = NULL;
+	options->permit_local_command = -1;
+	options->remote_command = NULL;
+	options->add_keys_to_agent = -1;
+	options->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan = -1;
+	options->identity_agent = NULL;
+	options->visual_host_key = -1;
+	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+	options->request_tty = -1;
+	options->session_type = -1;
+	options->stdin_null = -1;
+	options->fork_after_authentication = -1;
+	options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1;
+	options->ignored_unknown = NULL;
+	options->num_canonical_domains = 0;
+	options->num_permitted_cnames = 0;
+	options->canonicalize_max_dots = -1;
+	options->canonicalize_fallback_local = -1;
+	options->canonicalize_hostname = -1;
+	options->revoked_host_keys = NULL;
+	options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
+	options->update_hostkeys = -1;
+	options->hostbased_accepted_algos = NULL;
+	options->pubkey_accepted_algos = NULL;
+	options->known_hosts_command = NULL;
+	options->required_rsa_size = -1;
+	options->enable_escape_commandline = -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * A petite version of fill_default_options() that just fills the options
+ * needed for hostname canonicalization to proceed.
+ */
+void
+fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *options)
+{
+	if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1)
+		options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1;
+	if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1)
+		options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1;
+	if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1)
+		options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those
+ * options for which no value has been specified with their default values.
+ */
+int
+fill_default_options(Options * options)
+{
+	char *all_cipher, *all_mac, *all_kex, *all_key, *all_sig;
+	char *def_cipher, *def_mac, *def_kex, *def_key, *def_sig;
+	int ret = 0, r;
+
+	if (options->forward_agent == -1)
+		options->forward_agent = 0;
+	if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
+		options->forward_x11 = 0;
+	if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
+		options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
+	if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1)
+		options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200;
+	/*
+	 * stdio forwarding (-W) changes the default for these but we defer
+	 * setting the values so they can be overridden.
+	 */
+	if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1)
+		options->exit_on_forward_failure =
+		    options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0;
+	if (options->clear_forwardings == -1)
+		options->clear_forwardings =
+		    options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0;
+	if (options->clear_forwardings == 1)
+		clear_forwardings(options);
+
+	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
+		options->xauth_location = xstrdup(_PATH_XAUTH);
+	if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1)
+		options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0;
+	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
+		options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
+	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
+		options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
+	if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
+		options->pubkey_authentication = SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_ALL;
+	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+	if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
+		options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
+	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+		options->password_authentication = 1;
+	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+		options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+	if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
+		options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
+	if (options->batch_mode == -1)
+		options->batch_mode = 0;
+	if (options->check_host_ip == -1)
+		options->check_host_ip = 0;
+	if (options->strict_host_key_checking == -1)
+		options->strict_host_key_checking = SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK;
+	if (options->compression == -1)
+		options->compression = 0;
+	if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1)
+		options->tcp_keep_alive = 1;
+	if (options->port == -1)
+		options->port = 0;	/* Filled in ssh_connect. */
+	if (options->address_family == -1)
+		options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+	if (options->connection_attempts == -1)
+		options->connection_attempts = 1;
+	if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1)
+		options->number_of_password_prompts = 3;
+	/* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */
+	if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1) {
+		options->add_keys_to_agent = 0;
+		options->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan = 0;
+	}
+	if (options->num_identity_files == 0) {
+		add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, 0);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+		add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, 0);
+		add_identity_file(options, "~/",
+		    _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK, 0);
+#endif
+		add_identity_file(options, "~/",
+		    _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, 0);
+		add_identity_file(options, "~/",
+		    _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK, 0);
+		add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS, 0);
+		add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, 0);
+	}
+	if (options->escape_char == -1)
+		options->escape_char = '~';
+	if (options->num_system_hostfiles == 0) {
+		options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] =
+		    xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE);
+		options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] =
+		    xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2);
+	}
+	if (options->update_hostkeys == -1) {
+		if (options->verify_host_key_dns <= 0 &&
+		    (options->num_user_hostfiles == 0 ||
+		    (options->num_user_hostfiles == 1 && strcmp(options->
+		    user_hostfiles[0], _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE) == 0)))
+			options->update_hostkeys = SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_YES;
+		else
+			options->update_hostkeys = SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO;
+	}
+	if (options->num_user_hostfiles == 0) {
+		options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] =
+		    xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
+		options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] =
+		    xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
+	}
+	if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+		options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+	if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
+		options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER;
+	if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1)
+		options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0;
+	if (options->identities_only == -1)
+		options->identities_only = 0;
+	if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1)
+		options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0;
+	if (options->rekey_limit == -1)
+		options->rekey_limit = 0;
+	if (options->rekey_interval == -1)
+		options->rekey_interval = 0;
+	if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
+		options->verify_host_key_dns = 0;
+	if (options->server_alive_interval == -1)
+		options->server_alive_interval = 0;
+	if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
+		options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
+	if (options->control_master == -1)
+		options->control_master = 0;
+	if (options->control_persist == -1) {
+		options->control_persist = 0;
+		options->control_persist_timeout = 0;
+	}
+	if (options->hash_known_hosts == -1)
+		options->hash_known_hosts = 0;
+	if (options->tun_open == -1)
+		options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+	if (options->tun_local == -1)
+		options->tun_local = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
+	if (options->tun_remote == -1)
+		options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
+	if (options->permit_local_command == -1)
+		options->permit_local_command = 0;
+	if (options->visual_host_key == -1)
+		options->visual_host_key = 0;
+	if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
+		options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21;
+	if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
+		options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1;
+	if (options->request_tty == -1)
+		options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO;
+	if (options->session_type == -1)
+		options->session_type = SESSION_TYPE_DEFAULT;
+	if (options->stdin_null == -1)
+		options->stdin_null = 0;
+	if (options->fork_after_authentication == -1)
+		options->fork_after_authentication = 0;
+	if (options->proxy_use_fdpass == -1)
+		options->proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
+	if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1)
+		options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1;
+	if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1)
+		options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1;
+	if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1)
+		options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
+	if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
+		options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+	if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
+		options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
+#else
+	if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
+		options->sk_provider = xstrdup("$SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
+#endif
+	if (options->required_rsa_size == -1)
+		options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
+	if (options->enable_escape_commandline == -1)
+		options->enable_escape_commandline = 0;
+
+	/* Expand KEX name lists */
+	all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0);
+	all_mac = mac_alg_list(',');
+	all_kex = kex_alg_list(',');
+	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
+	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
+	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
+#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+	do { \
+		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
+		    defaults, all)) != 0) { \
+			error_fr(r, "%s", #what); \
+			goto fail; \
+		} \
+	} while (0)
+	ASSEMBLE(ciphers, def_cipher, all_cipher);
+	ASSEMBLE(macs, def_mac, all_mac);
+	ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, def_kex, all_kex);
+	ASSEMBLE(hostbased_accepted_algos, def_key, all_key);
+	ASSEMBLE(pubkey_accepted_algos, def_key, all_key);
+	ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, def_sig, all_sig);
+#undef ASSEMBLE
+
+#define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
+	do { \
+		if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \
+			free(v); \
+			v = NULL; \
+		} \
+	} while(0)
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->local_command);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->remote_command);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->proxy_command);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->control_path);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_host_keys);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pkcs11_provider);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->sk_provider);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->known_hosts_command);
+	if (options->jump_host != NULL &&
+	    strcmp(options->jump_host, "none") == 0 &&
+	    options->jump_port == 0 && options->jump_user == NULL) {
+		free(options->jump_host);
+		options->jump_host = NULL;
+	}
+	if (options->num_permitted_cnames == 1 &&
+	    !config_has_permitted_cnames(options)) {
+		/* clean up CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs=none */
+		free(options->permitted_cnames[0].source_list);
+		free(options->permitted_cnames[0].target_list);
+		memset(options->permitted_cnames, '\0',
+		    sizeof(*options->permitted_cnames));
+		options->num_permitted_cnames = 0;
+	}
+	/* options->identity_agent distinguishes NULL from 'none' */
+	/* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */
+	/* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */
+	/* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */
+	/* options->preferred_authentications will be set in ssh */
+
+	/* success */
+	ret = 0;
+ fail:
+	free(all_cipher);
+	free(all_mac);
+	free(all_kex);
+	free(all_key);
+	free(all_sig);
+	free(def_cipher);
+	free(def_mac);
+	free(def_kex);
+	free(def_key);
+	free(def_sig);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+free_options(Options *o)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (o == NULL)
+		return;
+
+#define FREE_ARRAY(type, n, a) \
+	do { \
+		type _i; \
+		for (_i = 0; _i < (n); _i++) \
+			free((a)[_i]); \
+	} while (0)
+
+	free(o->forward_agent_sock_path);
+	free(o->xauth_location);
+	FREE_ARRAY(u_int, o->num_log_verbose, o->log_verbose);
+	free(o->log_verbose);
+	free(o->ciphers);
+	free(o->macs);
+	free(o->hostkeyalgorithms);
+	free(o->kex_algorithms);
+	free(o->ca_sign_algorithms);
+	free(o->hostname);
+	free(o->host_key_alias);
+	free(o->proxy_command);
+	free(o->user);
+	FREE_ARRAY(u_int, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles);
+	FREE_ARRAY(u_int, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles);
+	free(o->preferred_authentications);
+	free(o->bind_address);
+	free(o->bind_interface);
+	free(o->pkcs11_provider);
+	free(o->sk_provider);
+	for (i = 0; i < o->num_identity_files; i++) {
+		free(o->identity_files[i]);
+		sshkey_free(o->identity_keys[i]);
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < o->num_certificate_files; i++) {
+		free(o->certificate_files[i]);
+		sshkey_free(o->certificates[i]);
+	}
+	free(o->identity_agent);
+	for (i = 0; i < o->num_local_forwards; i++) {
+		free(o->local_forwards[i].listen_host);
+		free(o->local_forwards[i].listen_path);
+		free(o->local_forwards[i].connect_host);
+		free(o->local_forwards[i].connect_path);
+	}
+	free(o->local_forwards);
+	for (i = 0; i < o->num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+		free(o->remote_forwards[i].listen_host);
+		free(o->remote_forwards[i].listen_path);
+		free(o->remote_forwards[i].connect_host);
+		free(o->remote_forwards[i].connect_path);
+	}
+	free(o->remote_forwards);
+	free(o->stdio_forward_host);
+	FREE_ARRAY(u_int, o->num_send_env, o->send_env);
+	free(o->send_env);
+	FREE_ARRAY(u_int, o->num_setenv, o->setenv);
+	free(o->setenv);
+	free(o->control_path);
+	free(o->local_command);
+	free(o->remote_command);
+	FREE_ARRAY(int, o->num_canonical_domains, o->canonical_domains);
+	for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_cnames; i++) {
+		free(o->permitted_cnames[i].source_list);
+		free(o->permitted_cnames[i].target_list);
+	}
+	free(o->revoked_host_keys);
+	free(o->hostbased_accepted_algos);
+	free(o->pubkey_accepted_algos);
+	free(o->jump_user);
+	free(o->jump_host);
+	free(o->jump_extra);
+	free(o->ignored_unknown);
+	explicit_bzero(o, sizeof(*o));
+#undef FREE_ARRAY
+}
+
+struct fwdarg {
+	char *arg;
+	int ispath;
+};
+
+/*
+ * parse_fwd_field
+ * parses the next field in a port forwarding specification.
+ * sets fwd to the parsed field and advances p past the colon
+ * or sets it to NULL at end of string.
+ * returns 0 on success, else non-zero.
+ */
+static int
+parse_fwd_field(char **p, struct fwdarg *fwd)
+{
+	char *ep, *cp = *p;
+	int ispath = 0;
+
+	if (*cp == '\0') {
+		*p = NULL;
+		return -1;	/* end of string */
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * A field escaped with square brackets is used literally.
+	 * XXX - allow ']' to be escaped via backslash?
+	 */
+	if (*cp == '[') {
+		/* find matching ']' */
+		for (ep = cp + 1; *ep != ']' && *ep != '\0'; ep++) {
+			if (*ep == '/')
+				ispath = 1;
+		}
+		/* no matching ']' or not at end of field. */
+		if (ep[0] != ']' || (ep[1] != ':' && ep[1] != '\0'))
+			return -1;
+		/* NUL terminate the field and advance p past the colon */
+		*ep++ = '\0';
+		if (*ep != '\0')
+			*ep++ = '\0';
+		fwd->arg = cp + 1;
+		fwd->ispath = ispath;
+		*p = ep;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	for (cp = *p; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
+		switch (*cp) {
+		case '\\':
+			memmove(cp, cp + 1, strlen(cp + 1) + 1);
+			if (*cp == '\0')
+				return -1;
+			break;
+		case '/':
+			ispath = 1;
+			break;
+		case ':':
+			*cp++ = '\0';
+			goto done;
+		}
+	}
+done:
+	fwd->arg = *p;
+	fwd->ispath = ispath;
+	*p = cp;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse_forward
+ * parses a string containing a port forwarding specification of the form:
+ *   dynamicfwd == 0
+ *	[listenhost:]listenport|listenpath:connecthost:connectport|connectpath
+ *	listenpath:connectpath
+ *   dynamicfwd == 1
+ *	[listenhost:]listenport
+ * returns number of arguments parsed or zero on error
+ */
+int
+parse_forward(struct Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec, int dynamicfwd, int remotefwd)
+{
+	struct fwdarg fwdargs[4];
+	char *p, *cp;
+	int i, err;
+
+	memset(fwd, 0, sizeof(*fwd));
+	memset(fwdargs, 0, sizeof(fwdargs));
+
+	/*
+	 * We expand environment variables before checking if we think they're
+	 * paths so that if ${VAR} expands to a fully qualified path it is
+	 * treated as a path.
+	 */
+	cp = p = dollar_expand(&err, fwdspec);
+	if (p == NULL || err)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* skip leading spaces */
+	while (isspace((u_char)*cp))
+		cp++;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
+		if (parse_fwd_field(&cp, &fwdargs[i]) != 0)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	/* Check for trailing garbage */
+	if (cp != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
+		i = 0;	/* failure */
+	}
+
+	switch (i) {
+	case 1:
+		if (fwdargs[0].ispath) {
+			fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
+			fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+		} else {
+			fwd->listen_host = NULL;
+			fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg);
+		}
+		fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks");
+		break;
+
+	case 2:
+		if (fwdargs[0].ispath && fwdargs[1].ispath) {
+			fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
+			fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+			fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
+			fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+		} else if (fwdargs[1].ispath) {
+			fwd->listen_host = NULL;
+			fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg);
+			fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
+			fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+		} else {
+			fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
+			fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg);
+			fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks");
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case 3:
+		if (fwdargs[0].ispath) {
+			fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
+			fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+			fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
+			fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg);
+		} else if (fwdargs[2].ispath) {
+			fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
+			fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg);
+			fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg);
+			fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
+		} else {
+			fwd->listen_host = NULL;
+			fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg);
+			fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
+			fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case 4:
+		fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
+		fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg);
+		fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg);
+		fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[3].arg);
+		break;
+	default:
+		i = 0; /* failure */
+	}
+
+	free(p);
+
+	if (dynamicfwd) {
+		if (!(i == 1 || i == 2))
+			goto fail_free;
+	} else {
+		if (!(i == 3 || i == 4)) {
+			if (fwd->connect_path == NULL &&
+			    fwd->listen_path == NULL)
+				goto fail_free;
+		}
+		if (fwd->connect_port <= 0 && fwd->connect_path == NULL)
+			goto fail_free;
+	}
+
+	if ((fwd->listen_port < 0 && fwd->listen_path == NULL) ||
+	    (!remotefwd && fwd->listen_port == 0))
+		goto fail_free;
+	if (fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
+	    strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
+		goto fail_free;
+	/*
+	 * XXX - if connecting to a remote socket, max sun len may not
+	 * match this host
+	 */
+	if (fwd->connect_path != NULL &&
+	    strlen(fwd->connect_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN)
+		goto fail_free;
+	if (fwd->listen_host != NULL &&
+	    strlen(fwd->listen_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
+		goto fail_free;
+	if (fwd->listen_path != NULL &&
+	    strlen(fwd->listen_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN)
+		goto fail_free;
+
+	return (i);
+
+ fail_free:
+	free(fwd->connect_host);
+	fwd->connect_host = NULL;
+	free(fwd->connect_path);
+	fwd->connect_path = NULL;
+	free(fwd->listen_host);
+	fwd->listen_host = NULL;
+	free(fwd->listen_path);
+	fwd->listen_path = NULL;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+parse_jump(const char *s, Options *o, int active)
+{
+	char *orig, *sdup, *cp;
+	char *host = NULL, *user = NULL;
+	int r, ret = -1, port = -1, first;
+
+	active &= o->proxy_command == NULL && o->jump_host == NULL;
+
+	orig = sdup = xstrdup(s);
+
+	/* Remove comment and trailing whitespace */
+	if ((cp = strchr(orig, '#')) != NULL)
+		*cp = '\0';
+	rtrim(orig);
+
+	first = active;
+	do {
+		if (strcasecmp(s, "none") == 0)
+			break;
+		if ((cp = strrchr(sdup, ',')) == NULL)
+			cp = sdup; /* last */
+		else
+			*cp++ = '\0';
+
+		if (first) {
+			/* First argument and configuration is active */
+			r = parse_ssh_uri(cp, &user, &host, &port);
+			if (r == -1 || (r == 1 &&
+			    parse_user_host_port(cp, &user, &host, &port) != 0))
+				goto out;
+		} else {
+			/* Subsequent argument or inactive configuration */
+			r = parse_ssh_uri(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+			if (r == -1 || (r == 1 &&
+			    parse_user_host_port(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0))
+				goto out;
+		}
+		first = 0; /* only check syntax for subsequent hosts */
+	} while (cp != sdup);
+	/* success */
+	if (active) {
+		if (strcasecmp(s, "none") == 0) {
+			o->jump_host = xstrdup("none");
+			o->jump_port = 0;
+		} else {
+			o->jump_user = user;
+			o->jump_host = host;
+			o->jump_port = port;
+			o->proxy_command = xstrdup("none");
+			user = host = NULL;
+			if ((cp = strrchr(s, ',')) != NULL && cp != s) {
+				o->jump_extra = xstrdup(s);
+				o->jump_extra[cp - s] = '\0';
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	free(orig);
+	free(user);
+	free(host);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+parse_ssh_uri(const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp)
+{
+	char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL;
+	int r, port;
+
+	r = parse_uri("ssh", uri, &user, &host, &port, &path);
+	if (r == 0 && path != NULL)
+		r = -1;		/* path not allowed */
+	if (r == 0) {
+		if (userp != NULL) {
+			*userp = user;
+			user = NULL;
+		}
+		if (hostp != NULL) {
+			*hostp = host;
+			host = NULL;
+		}
+		if (portp != NULL)
+			*portp = port;
+	}
+	free(user);
+	free(host);
+	free(path);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* XXX the following is a near-vebatim copy from servconf.c; refactor */
+static const char *
+fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) {
+		if (m[i].value == val)
+			return m[i].key;
+	}
+	return "UNKNOWN";
+}
+
+static const char *
+fmt_intarg(OpCodes code, int val)
+{
+	if (val == -1)
+		return "unset";
+	switch (code) {
+	case oAddressFamily:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily);
+	case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
+	case oUpdateHostkeys:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoask);
+	case oStrictHostKeyChecking:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_strict_hostkey);
+	case oControlMaster:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_controlmaster);
+	case oTunnel:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tunnel);
+	case oRequestTTY:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_requesttty);
+	case oSessionType:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_sessiontype);
+	case oCanonicalizeHostname:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_canonicalizehostname);
+	case oAddKeysToAgent:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoaskconfirm);
+	case oPubkeyAuthentication:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_pubkey_auth);
+	case oFingerprintHash:
+		return ssh_digest_alg_name(val);
+	default:
+		switch (val) {
+		case 0:
+			return "no";
+		case 1:
+			return "yes";
+		default:
+			return "UNKNOWN";
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static const char *
+lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++)
+		if (keywords[i].opcode == code)
+			return(keywords[i].name);
+	return "UNKNOWN";
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_int(OpCodes code, int val)
+{
+	printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_fmtint(OpCodes code, int val)
+{
+	printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val));
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_string(OpCodes code, const char *val)
+{
+	if (val == NULL)
+		return;
+	printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_strarray(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+		printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]);
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
+	if (count == 0)
+		printf(" none");
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+		printf(" %s",  vals[i]);
+	printf("\n");
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_forwards(OpCodes code, u_int count, const struct Forward *fwds)
+{
+	const struct Forward *fwd;
+	u_int i;
+
+	/* oDynamicForward */
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		fwd = &fwds[i];
+		if (code == oDynamicForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
+		    strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") != 0)
+			continue;
+		if (code == oLocalForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
+		    strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") == 0)
+			continue;
+		printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
+		if (fwd->listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
+			printf(" %s", fwd->listen_path);
+		else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL)
+			printf(" %d", fwd->listen_port);
+		else {
+			printf(" [%s]:%d",
+			    fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
+		}
+		if (code != oDynamicForward) {
+			if (fwd->connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
+				printf(" %s", fwd->connect_path);
+			else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL)
+				printf(" %d", fwd->connect_port);
+			else {
+				printf(" [%s]:%d",
+				    fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
+			}
+		}
+		printf("\n");
+	}
+}
+
+void
+dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
+{
+	int i, r;
+	char buf[8], *all_key;
+
+	/*
+	 * Expand HostKeyAlgorithms name lists. This isn't handled in
+	 * fill_default_options() like the other algorithm lists because
+	 * the host key algorithms are by default dynamically chosen based
+	 * on the host's keys found in known_hosts.
+	 */
+	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+	if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->hostkeyalgorithms, kex_default_pk_alg(),
+	    all_key)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "expand HostKeyAlgorithms");
+	free(all_key);
+
+	/* Most interesting options first: user, host, port */
+	dump_cfg_string(oHost, o->host_arg);
+	dump_cfg_string(oUser, o->user);
+	dump_cfg_string(oHostname, host);
+	dump_cfg_int(oPort, o->port);
+
+	/* Flag options */
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddressFamily, o->address_family);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oBatchMode, o->batch_mode);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, o->canonicalize_fallback_local);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeHostname, o->canonicalize_hostname);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oCheckHostIP, o->check_host_ip);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oCompression, o->compression);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlMaster, o->control_master);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableSSHKeysign, o->enable_ssh_keysign);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oClearAllForwardings, o->clear_forwardings);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oExitOnForwardFailure, o->exit_on_forward_failure);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11, o->forward_x11);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11Trusted, o->forward_x11_trusted);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds);
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oIdentitiesOnly, o->identities_only);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, o->no_host_authentication_for_localhost);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oPermitLocalCommand, o->permit_local_command);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oProxyUseFdpass, o->proxy_use_fdpass);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oRequestTTY, o->request_tty);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oSessionType, o->session_type);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oStdinNull, o->stdin_null);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oForkAfterAuthentication, o->fork_after_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oStrictHostKeyChecking, o->strict_host_key_checking);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oTunnel, o->tun_open);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oVerifyHostKeyDNS, o->verify_host_key_dns);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oVisualHostKey, o->visual_host_key);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oUpdateHostkeys, o->update_hostkeys);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableEscapeCommandline, o->enable_escape_commandline);
+
+	/* Integer options */
+	dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots);
+	dump_cfg_int(oConnectionAttempts, o->connection_attempts);
+	dump_cfg_int(oForwardX11Timeout, o->forward_x11_timeout);
+	dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts);
+	dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max);
+	dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval);
+	dump_cfg_int(oRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size);
+
+	/* String options */
+	dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address);
+	dump_cfg_string(oBindInterface, o->bind_interface);
+	dump_cfg_string(oCiphers, o->ciphers);
+	dump_cfg_string(oControlPath, o->control_path);
+	dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms);
+	dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlias, o->host_key_alias);
+	dump_cfg_string(oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, o->hostbased_accepted_algos);
+	dump_cfg_string(oIdentityAgent, o->identity_agent);
+	dump_cfg_string(oIgnoreUnknown, o->ignored_unknown);
+	dump_cfg_string(oKbdInteractiveDevices, o->kbd_interactive_devices);
+	dump_cfg_string(oKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms);
+	dump_cfg_string(oCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms);
+	dump_cfg_string(oLocalCommand, o->local_command);
+	dump_cfg_string(oRemoteCommand, o->remote_command);
+	dump_cfg_string(oLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
+	dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs);
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	dump_cfg_string(oPKCS11Provider, o->pkcs11_provider);
+#endif
+	dump_cfg_string(oSecurityKeyProvider, o->sk_provider);
+	dump_cfg_string(oPreferredAuthentications, o->preferred_authentications);
+	dump_cfg_string(oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, o->pubkey_accepted_algos);
+	dump_cfg_string(oRevokedHostKeys, o->revoked_host_keys);
+	dump_cfg_string(oXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+	dump_cfg_string(oKnownHostsCommand, o->known_hosts_command);
+
+	/* Forwards */
+	dump_cfg_forwards(oDynamicForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards);
+	dump_cfg_forwards(oLocalForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards);
+	dump_cfg_forwards(oRemoteForward, o->num_remote_forwards, o->remote_forwards);
+
+	/* String array options */
+	dump_cfg_strarray(oIdentityFile, o->num_identity_files, o->identity_files);
+	dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oCanonicalDomains, o->num_canonical_domains, o->canonical_domains);
+	dump_cfg_strarray(oCertificateFile, o->num_certificate_files, o->certificate_files);
+	dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oGlobalKnownHostsFile, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles);
+	dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oUserKnownHostsFile, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles);
+	dump_cfg_strarray(oSendEnv, o->num_send_env, o->send_env);
+	dump_cfg_strarray(oSetEnv, o->num_setenv, o->setenv);
+	dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oLogVerbose,
+	    o->num_log_verbose, o->log_verbose);
+
+	/* Special cases */
+
+	/* PermitRemoteOpen */
+	if (o->num_permitted_remote_opens == 0)
+		printf("%s any\n", lookup_opcode_name(oPermitRemoteOpen));
+	else
+		dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oPermitRemoteOpen,
+		    o->num_permitted_remote_opens, o->permitted_remote_opens);
+
+	/* AddKeysToAgent */
+	if (o->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan <= 0)
+		dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddKeysToAgent, o->add_keys_to_agent);
+	else {
+		printf("addkeystoagent%s %d\n",
+		    o->add_keys_to_agent == 3 ? " confirm" : "",
+		    o->add_keys_to_agent_lifespan);
+	}
+
+	/* oForwardAgent */
+	if (o->forward_agent_sock_path == NULL)
+		dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent);
+	else
+		dump_cfg_string(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent_sock_path);
+
+	/* oConnectTimeout */
+	if (o->connection_timeout == -1)
+		printf("connecttimeout none\n");
+	else
+		dump_cfg_int(oConnectTimeout, o->connection_timeout);
+
+	/* oTunnelDevice */
+	printf("tunneldevice");
+	if (o->tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
+		printf(" any");
+	else
+		printf(" %d", o->tun_local);
+	if (o->tun_remote == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
+		printf(":any");
+	else
+		printf(":%d", o->tun_remote);
+	printf("\n");
+
+	/* oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs */
+	printf("canonicalizePermittedcnames");
+	if (o->num_permitted_cnames == 0)
+		printf(" none");
+	for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_cnames; i++) {
+		printf(" %s:%s", o->permitted_cnames[i].source_list,
+		    o->permitted_cnames[i].target_list);
+	}
+	printf("\n");
+
+	/* oControlPersist */
+	if (o->control_persist == 0 || o->control_persist_timeout == 0)
+		dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlPersist, o->control_persist);
+	else
+		dump_cfg_int(oControlPersist, o->control_persist_timeout);
+
+	/* oEscapeChar */
+	if (o->escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE)
+		printf("escapechar none\n");
+	else {
+		vis(buf, o->escape_char, VIS_WHITE, 0);
+		printf("escapechar %s\n", buf);
+	}
+
+	/* oIPQoS */
+	printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive));
+	printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk));
+
+	/* oRekeyLimit */
+	printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n",
+	    (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval);
+
+	/* oStreamLocalBindMask */
+	printf("streamlocalbindmask 0%o\n",
+	    o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
+
+	/* oLogFacility */
+	printf("syslogfacility %s\n", log_facility_name(o->log_facility));
+
+	/* oProxyCommand / oProxyJump */
+	if (o->jump_host == NULL)
+		dump_cfg_string(oProxyCommand, o->proxy_command);
+	else {
+		/* Check for numeric addresses */
+		i = strchr(o->jump_host, ':') != NULL ||
+		    strspn(o->jump_host, "1234567890.") == strlen(o->jump_host);
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", o->jump_port);
+		printf("proxyjump %s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
+		    /* optional additional jump spec */
+		    o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : o->jump_extra,
+		    o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : ",",
+		    /* optional user */
+		    o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : o->jump_user,
+		    o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : "@",
+		    /* opening [ if hostname is numeric */
+		    i ? "[" : "",
+		    /* mandatory hostname */
+		    o->jump_host,
+		    /* closing ] if hostname is numeric */
+		    i ? "]" : "",
+		    /* optional port number */
+		    o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : ":",
+		    o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : buf);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ce1b4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/readconf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.150 2023/01/13 02:58:20 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Functions for reading the configuration file.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef READCONF_H
+#define READCONF_H
+
+/* Data structure for representing option data. */
+
+#define SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES	32
+#define MAX_CANON_DOMAINS	32
+#define PATH_MAX_SUN		(sizeof((struct sockaddr_un *)0)->sun_path)
+
+struct allowed_cname {
+	char *source_list;
+	char *target_list;
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+	char   *host_arg;	/* Host arg as specified on command line. */
+	int     forward_agent;	/* Forward authentication agent. */
+	char   *forward_agent_sock_path; /* Optional path of the agent. */
+	int     forward_x11;	/* Forward X11 display. */
+	int     forward_x11_timeout;	/* Expiration for Cookies */
+	int     forward_x11_trusted;	/* Trust Forward X11 display. */
+	int     exit_on_forward_failure;	/* Exit if bind(2) fails for -L/-R */
+	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location for xauth program */
+	struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts;	/* forwarding options */
+	int     pubkey_authentication;	/* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
+	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
+	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
+	int     gss_deleg_creds;	/* Delegate GSS credentials */
+	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
+						 * authentication. */
+	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
+	char	*kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */
+	int     batch_mode;	/* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */
+	int     check_host_ip;	/* Also keep track of keys for IP address */
+	int     strict_host_key_checking;	/* Strict host key checking. */
+	int     compression;	/* Compress packets in both directions. */
+	int     tcp_keep_alive;	/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
+	int	ip_qos_interactive;	/* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */
+	int	ip_qos_bulk;		/* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
+	SyslogFacility log_facility;	/* Facility for system logging. */
+	LogLevel log_level;	/* Level for logging. */
+	u_int	num_log_verbose;	/* Verbose log overrides */
+	char   **log_verbose;
+	int     port;		/* Port to connect. */
+	int     address_family;
+	int     connection_attempts;	/* Max attempts (seconds) before
+					 * giving up */
+	int     connection_timeout;	/* Max time (seconds) before
+					 * aborting connection attempt */
+	int     number_of_password_prompts;	/* Max number of password
+						 * prompts. */
+	char   *ciphers;	/* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */
+	char   *macs;		/* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */
+	char   *hostkeyalgorithms;	/* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */
+	char   *kex_algorithms;	/* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
+	char   *ca_sign_algorithms;	/* Allowed CA signature algorithms */
+	char   *hostname;	/* Real host to connect. */
+	char   *host_key_alias;	/* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
+	char   *proxy_command;	/* Proxy command for connecting the host. */
+	char   *user;		/* User to log in as. */
+	int     escape_char;	/* Escape character; -2 = none */
+
+	u_int	num_system_hostfiles;	/* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */
+	char   *system_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES];
+	u_int	num_user_hostfiles;	/* Path for $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts */
+	char   *user_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES];
+	char   *preferred_authentications;
+	char   *bind_address;	/* local socket address for connection to sshd */
+	char   *bind_interface;	/* local interface for bind address */
+	char   *pkcs11_provider; /* PKCS#11 provider */
+	char   *sk_provider; /* Security key provider */
+	int	verify_host_key_dns;	/* Verify host key using DNS */
+
+	int     num_identity_files;	/* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */
+	char   *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+	int    identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+	struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+
+	int	num_certificate_files; /* Number of extra certificates for ssh. */
+	char	*certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+	int	certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+	struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+
+	int	add_keys_to_agent;
+	int	add_keys_to_agent_lifespan;
+	char   *identity_agent;		/* Optional path to ssh-agent socket */
+
+	/* Local TCP/IP forward requests. */
+	int     num_local_forwards;
+	struct Forward *local_forwards;
+
+	/* Remote TCP/IP forward requests. */
+	int     num_remote_forwards;
+	struct Forward *remote_forwards;
+	int	clear_forwardings;
+
+	/* Restrict remote dynamic forwarding */
+	char  **permitted_remote_opens;
+	u_int	num_permitted_remote_opens;
+
+	/* stdio forwarding (-W) host and port */
+	char   *stdio_forward_host;
+	int	stdio_forward_port;
+
+	int	enable_ssh_keysign;
+	int64_t rekey_limit;
+	int	rekey_interval;
+	int	no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
+	int	identities_only;
+	int	server_alive_interval;
+	int	server_alive_count_max;
+
+	u_int	num_send_env;
+	char	**send_env;
+	u_int	num_setenv;
+	char	**setenv;
+
+	char	*control_path;
+	int	control_master;
+	int     control_persist; /* ControlPersist flag */
+	int     control_persist_timeout; /* ControlPersist timeout (seconds) */
+
+	int	hash_known_hosts;
+
+	int	tun_open;	/* tun(4) */
+	int     tun_local;	/* force tun device (optional) */
+	int     tun_remote;	/* force tun device (optional) */
+
+	char	*local_command;
+	int	permit_local_command;
+	char	*remote_command;
+	int	visual_host_key;
+
+	int	request_tty;
+	int	session_type;
+	int	stdin_null;
+	int	fork_after_authentication;
+
+	int	proxy_use_fdpass;
+
+	int	num_canonical_domains;
+	char	*canonical_domains[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS];
+	int	canonicalize_hostname;
+	int	canonicalize_max_dots;
+	int	canonicalize_fallback_local;
+	int	num_permitted_cnames;
+	struct allowed_cname permitted_cnames[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS];
+
+	char	*revoked_host_keys;
+
+	int	 fingerprint_hash;
+
+	int	 update_hostkeys; /* one of SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_* */
+
+	char   *hostbased_accepted_algos;
+	char   *pubkey_accepted_algos;
+
+	char   *jump_user;
+	char   *jump_host;
+	int	jump_port;
+	char   *jump_extra;
+
+	char   *known_hosts_command;
+
+	int	required_rsa_size;	/* minimum size of RSA keys */
+	int	enable_escape_commandline;	/* ~C commandline */
+
+	char	*ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */
+}       Options;
+
+#define SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_NO	0x00
+#define SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_UNBOUND	0x01
+#define SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_HBOUND	0x02
+#define SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_ALL	0x03
+
+#define SSH_CANONICALISE_NO	0
+#define SSH_CANONICALISE_YES	1
+#define SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS	2
+
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO	0
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_YES	1
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO	2
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK	3
+#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK	4
+
+#define REQUEST_TTY_AUTO	0
+#define REQUEST_TTY_NO		1
+#define REQUEST_TTY_YES		2
+#define REQUEST_TTY_FORCE	3
+
+#define SESSION_TYPE_NONE	0
+#define SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM	1
+#define SESSION_TYPE_DEFAULT	2
+
+#define SSHCONF_CHECKPERM	1  /* check permissions on config file */
+#define SSHCONF_USERCONF	2  /* user provided config file not system */
+#define SSHCONF_FINAL		4  /* Final pass over config, after canon. */
+#define SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH	8  /* Match/Host never matches; internal only */
+
+#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO	0
+#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_YES	1
+#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK	2
+
+#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF	0
+#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_NEW	1
+#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES	2
+#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK	3
+
+const char *kex_default_pk_alg(void);
+char	*ssh_connection_hash(const char *thishost, const char *host,
+    const char *portstr, const char *user);
+void     initialize_options(Options *);
+int      fill_default_options(Options *);
+void	 fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *);
+void	 free_options(Options *o);
+int	 process_config_line(Options *, struct passwd *, const char *,
+    const char *, char *, const char *, int, int *, int);
+int	 read_config_file(const char *, struct passwd *, const char *,
+    const char *, Options *, int, int *);
+int	 parse_forward(struct Forward *, const char *, int, int);
+int	 parse_jump(const char *, Options *, int);
+int	 parse_ssh_uri(const char *, char **, char **, int *);
+int	 default_ssh_port(void);
+int	 option_clear_or_none(const char *);
+int	 config_has_permitted_cnames(Options *);
+void	 dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host);
+
+void	 add_local_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *);
+void	 add_remote_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *);
+void	 add_identity_file(Options *, const char *, const char *, int);
+void	 add_certificate_file(Options *, const char *, int);
+
+#endif				/* READCONF_H */
diff --git a/readpass.c b/readpass.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b52f3d6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/readpass.c
@@ -0,0 +1,332 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.70 2022/05/27 04:27:49 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+
+static char *
+ssh_askpass(char *askpass, const char *msg, const char *env_hint)
+{
+	pid_t pid, ret;
+	size_t len;
+	char *pass;
+	int p[2], status;
+	char buf[1024];
+	void (*osigchld)(int);
+
+	if (fflush(stdout) != 0)
+		error_f("fflush: %s", strerror(errno));
+	if (askpass == NULL)
+		fatal("internal error: askpass undefined");
+	if (pipe(p) == -1) {
+		error_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+	if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
+		error_f("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+		ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		close(p[0]);
+		if (dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
+			fatal_f("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+		if (env_hint != NULL)
+			setenv("SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT", env_hint, 1);
+		execlp(askpass, askpass, msg, (char *)NULL);
+		fatal_f("exec(%s): %s", askpass, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	close(p[1]);
+
+	len = 0;
+	do {
+		ssize_t r = read(p[0], buf + len, sizeof(buf) - 1 - len);
+
+		if (r == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+			continue;
+		if (r <= 0)
+			break;
+		len += r;
+	} while (sizeof(buf) - 1 - len > 0);
+	buf[len] = '\0';
+
+	close(p[0]);
+	while ((ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) == -1)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			break;
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+	if (ret == -1 || !WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+		explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0';
+	pass = xstrdup(buf);
+	explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	return pass;
+}
+
+/* private/internal read_passphrase flags */
+#define RP_ASK_PERMISSION	0x8000 /* pass hint to askpass for confirm UI */
+
+/*
+ * Reads a passphrase from /dev/tty with echo turned off/on.  Returns the
+ * passphrase (allocated with xmalloc).  Exits if EOF is encountered. If
+ * RP_ALLOW_STDIN is set, the passphrase will be read from stdin if no
+ * tty is or askpass program is available
+ */
+char *
+read_passphrase(const char *prompt, int flags)
+{
+	char cr = '\r', *askpass = NULL, *ret, buf[1024];
+	int rppflags, ttyfd, use_askpass = 0, allow_askpass = 0;
+	const char *askpass_hint = NULL;
+	const char *s;
+
+	if ((s = getenv("DISPLAY")) != NULL)
+		allow_askpass = *s != '\0';
+	if ((s = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE_ENV)) != NULL) {
+		if (strcasecmp(s, "force") == 0) {
+			use_askpass = 1;
+			allow_askpass = 1;
+		} else if (strcasecmp(s, "prefer") == 0)
+			use_askpass = allow_askpass;
+		else if (strcasecmp(s, "never") == 0)
+			allow_askpass = 0;
+	}
+
+	rppflags = (flags & RP_ECHO) ? RPP_ECHO_ON : RPP_ECHO_OFF;
+	if (use_askpass)
+		debug_f("requested to askpass");
+	else if (flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS)
+		use_askpass = 1;
+	else if (flags & RP_ALLOW_STDIN) {
+		if (!isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
+			debug_f("stdin is not a tty");
+			use_askpass = 1;
+		}
+	} else {
+		rppflags |= RPP_REQUIRE_TTY;
+		ttyfd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR);
+		if (ttyfd >= 0) {
+			/*
+			 * If we're on a tty, ensure that show the prompt at
+			 * the beginning of the line. This will hopefully
+			 * clobber any password characters the user has
+			 * optimistically typed before echo is disabled.
+			 */
+			(void)write(ttyfd, &cr, 1);
+			close(ttyfd);
+		} else {
+			debug_f("can't open %s: %s", _PATH_TTY,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			use_askpass = 1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS) && !allow_askpass)
+		return (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF) ? NULL : xstrdup("");
+
+	if (use_askpass && allow_askpass) {
+		if (getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV))
+			askpass = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV);
+		else
+			askpass = _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT;
+		if ((flags & RP_ASK_PERMISSION) != 0)
+			askpass_hint = "confirm";
+		if ((ret = ssh_askpass(askpass, prompt, askpass_hint)) == NULL)
+			if (!(flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF))
+				return xstrdup("");
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	if (readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof buf, rppflags) == NULL) {
+		if (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF)
+			return NULL;
+		return xstrdup("");
+	}
+
+	ret = xstrdup(buf);
+	explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+ask_permission(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+	char *p, prompt[1024];
+	int allowed = 0;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vsnprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+
+	p = read_passphrase(prompt,
+	    RP_USE_ASKPASS|RP_ALLOW_EOF|RP_ASK_PERMISSION);
+	if (p != NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * Accept empty responses and responses consisting
+		 * of the word "yes" as affirmative.
+		 */
+		if (*p == '\0' || *p == '\n' ||
+		    strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0)
+			allowed = 1;
+		free(p);
+	}
+
+	return (allowed);
+}
+
+static void
+writemsg(const char *msg)
+{
+	(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "\r", 1);
+	(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, strlen(msg));
+	(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "\r\n", 2);
+}
+
+struct notifier_ctx {
+	pid_t pid;
+	void (*osigchld)(int);
+};
+
+struct notifier_ctx *
+notify_start(int force_askpass, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+	char *prompt = NULL;
+	pid_t pid = -1;
+	void (*osigchld)(int) = NULL;
+	const char *askpass, *s;
+	struct notifier_ctx *ret = NULL;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	xvasprintf(&prompt, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+
+	if (fflush(NULL) != 0)
+		error_f("fflush: %s", strerror(errno));
+	if (!force_askpass && isatty(STDERR_FILENO)) {
+		writemsg(prompt);
+		goto out_ctx;
+	}
+	if ((askpass = getenv("SSH_ASKPASS")) == NULL)
+		askpass = _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT;
+	if (*askpass == '\0') {
+		debug3_f("cannot notify: no askpass");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (getenv("DISPLAY") == NULL &&
+	    ((s = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE_ENV)) == NULL ||
+	    strcmp(s, "force") != 0)) {
+		debug3_f("cannot notify: no display");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+	if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
+		error_f("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+		ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+		free(prompt);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 0) == -1)
+			fatal_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+		setenv("SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT", "none", 1); /* hint to UI */
+		execlp(askpass, askpass, prompt, (char *)NULL);
+		error_f("exec(%s): %s", askpass, strerror(errno));
+		_exit(1);
+		/* NOTREACHED */
+	}
+ out_ctx:
+	if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
+		if (pid != -1)
+			kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+		fatal_f("calloc failed");
+	}
+	ret->pid = pid;
+	ret->osigchld = osigchld;
+ out:
+	free(prompt);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+notify_complete(struct notifier_ctx *ctx, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	int ret;
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	va_list args;
+
+	if (ctx != NULL && fmt != NULL && ctx->pid == -1) {
+		/*
+		 * notify_start wrote to stderr, so send conclusion message
+		 * there too
+		*/
+		va_start(args, fmt);
+		xvasprintf(&msg, fmt, args);
+		va_end(args);
+		writemsg(msg);
+		free(msg);
+	}
+
+	if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pid <= 0) {
+		free(ctx);
+		return;
+	}
+	kill(ctx->pid, SIGTERM);
+	while ((ret = waitpid(ctx->pid, NULL, 0)) == -1) {
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			break;
+	}
+	if (ret == -1)
+		fatal_f("waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, ctx->osigchld);
+	free(ctx);
+}
diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bf1d057
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.122 2023/01/06 08:07:39 djm Exp $
+
+tests:		prep file-tests t-exec unit
+
+REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
+
+# File based tests
+file-tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
+
+# Interop tests are not run by default
+interop interop-tests: t-exec-interop
+
+prep:
+	test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || mkdir -p $(OBJ)/valgrind-out
+
+clean:
+	for F in $(CLEANFILES); do rm -f $(OBJ)$$F; done
+	rm -rf $(OBJ).putty
+
+distclean:	clean
+
+LTESTS= 	connect \
+		proxy-connect \
+		sshfp-connect \
+		connect-privsep \
+		connect-uri \
+		proto-version \
+		proto-mismatch \
+		exit-status \
+		exit-status-signal \
+		envpass \
+		transfer \
+		banner \
+		rekey \
+		dhgex \
+		stderr-data \
+		stderr-after-eof \
+		broken-pipe \
+		try-ciphers \
+		yes-head \
+		login-timeout \
+		agent \
+		agent-getpeereid \
+		agent-timeout \
+		agent-ptrace \
+		agent-subprocess \
+		keyscan \
+		keygen-change \
+		keygen-comment \
+		keygen-convert \
+		keygen-knownhosts \
+		keygen-moduli \
+		keygen-sshfp \
+		key-options \
+		scp \
+		scp3 \
+		scp-uri \
+		sftp \
+		sftp-chroot \
+		sftp-cmds \
+		sftp-badcmds \
+		sftp-batch \
+		sftp-glob \
+		sftp-perm \
+		sftp-uri \
+		reconfigure \
+		dynamic-forward \
+		forwarding \
+		multiplex \
+		reexec \
+		brokenkeys \
+		sshcfgparse \
+		cfgparse \
+		cfgmatch \
+		cfgmatchlisten \
+		percent \
+		addrmatch \
+		localcommand \
+		forcecommand \
+		portnum \
+		keytype \
+		kextype \
+		cert-hostkey \
+		cert-userkey \
+		host-expand \
+		keys-command \
+		forward-control \
+		integrity \
+		krl \
+		multipubkey \
+		limit-keytype \
+		hostkey-agent \
+		hostkey-rotate \
+		principals-command \
+		cert-file \
+		cfginclude \
+		servcfginclude \
+		allow-deny-users \
+		authinfo \
+		sshsig \
+		knownhosts \
+		knownhosts-command \
+		agent-restrict \
+		hostbased \
+		channel-timeout \
+		connection-timeout
+
+INTEROP_TESTS=	putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers
+#INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp
+
+EXTRA_TESTS=	agent-pkcs11
+#EXTRA_TESTS+= 	cipher-speed
+
+USERNAME=		${LOGNAME}
+CLEANFILES=	*.core actual agent-key.* authorized_keys_${USERNAME} \
+		authorized_keys_${USERNAME}.* \
+		authorized_principals_${USERNAME} \
+		banner.in banner.out cert_host_key* cert_user_key* \
+		copy.1 copy.2 data ed25519-agent ed25519-agent* \
+		ed25519-agent.pub ed25519 ed25519.pub empty.in \
+		expect failed-regress.log failed-ssh.log failed-sshd.log \
+		hkr.* host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \
+		host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 host.ssh-dss host.ssh-ed25519 \
+		host.ssh-rsa host_ca_key* host_krl_* host_revoked_* key.* \
+		key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* key.ed25519-512 \
+		key.ed25519-512.pub key.rsa-* keys-command-args kh.* askpass \
+		known_hosts known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy \
+		modpipe netcat no_identity_config \
+		pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log remote_pid \
+		revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv \
+		rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \
+		scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \
+		sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \
+		ssh-agent.log ssh-add.log slow-sftp-server.sh \
+		ssh-rsa_oldfmt knownhosts_command \
+		ssh_config ssh_config.* ssh_proxy ssh_proxy_bak \
+		ssh_proxy_* sshd.log sshd_config sshd_config.* \
+		sshd_config.* sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \
+		sshd_proxy_orig t10.out t10.out.pub t12.out t12.out.pub \
+		t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub \
+		t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub testdata \
+		user_*key* user_ca* user_key*
+
+# Enable all malloc(3) randomisations and checks
+TEST_ENV=      "MALLOC_OPTIONS=CFGJRSUX"
+
+TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN?=ssh-keygen
+
+CPPFLAGS=-I..
+
+t1:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
+	tr '\n' '\r' <${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
+	awk '{print $$0 "\r"}' ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
+
+t2:
+	cat ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv > $(OBJ)/t2.out
+	chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t2.out
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t2.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub
+
+t3:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -ef ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub >$(OBJ)/t3.out
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if $(OBJ)/t3.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub
+
+t4:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E md5 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
+		awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t4.ok
+
+t5:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
+		awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t5.ok
+
+t6:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.prv > $(OBJ)/t6.out1
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.pub > $(OBJ)/t6.out2
+	chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t6.out1
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t6.out1 | diff - $(OBJ)/t6.out2
+
+$(OBJ)/t7.out:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t rsa -N '' -f $@
+
+t7: $(OBJ)/t7.out
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null
+
+$(OBJ)/t8.out:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t dsa -N '' -f $@
+
+t8: $(OBJ)/t8.out
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null
+
+$(OBJ)/t9.out:
+	! ${TEST_SSH_SSH} -Q key-plain | grep ecdsa >/dev/null || \
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ecdsa -N '' -f $@
+
+t9: $(OBJ)/t9.out
+	! ${TEST_SSH_SSH} -Q key-plain | grep ecdsa >/dev/null || \
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null
+	! ${TEST_SSH_SSH} -Q key-plain | grep ecdsa >/dev/null || \
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null
+
+
+$(OBJ)/t10.out:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -f $@
+
+t10: $(OBJ)/t10.out
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null
+
+t11:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E sha256 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
+		awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t11.ok
+
+$(OBJ)/t12.out:
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C 'test-comment-1234' -f $@
+
+t12: $(OBJ)/t12.out
+	${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t12.out.pub | grep test-comment-1234 >/dev/null
+
+t-exec:	${LTESTS:=.sh}
+	@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
+	for TEST in ""$?; do \
+		skip=no; \
+		for t in ""$${SKIP_LTESTS}; do \
+			if [ "x$${t}.sh" = "x$${TEST}" ]; then skip=yes; fi; \
+		done; \
+		if [ "x$${skip}" = "xno" ]; then \
+			echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
+			(env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
+		else \
+			echo skip test $${TEST} 1>&2; \
+		fi; \
+	done
+
+t-exec-interop:	${INTEROP_TESTS:=.sh}
+	@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
+	for TEST in ""$?; do \
+		echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
+		(env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
+	done
+
+t-extra:	${EXTRA_TESTS:=.sh}
+	@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
+	for TEST in ""$?; do \
+		echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
+		(env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
+	done
+
+# Not run by default
+interop: ${INTEROP_TARGETS}
+
+# Unit tests, built by top-level Makefile
+unit:
+	set -e ; if test -z "${SKIP_UNIT}" ; then \
+		V="" ; \
+		test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \
+		    V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \
+		 $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \
+		 $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \
+			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \
+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig \
+			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshsig/testdata ; \
+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/authopt/test_authopt \
+			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/authopt/testdata ; \
+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap ; \
+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/conversion/test_conversion ; \
+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/kex/test_kex ; \
+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys \
+			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/testdata ; \
+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/match/test_match ; \
+		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/misc/test_misc ; \
+		if test "x${TEST_SSH_UTF8}" = "xyes"  ; then \
+			$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/utf8/test_utf8 ; \
+		fi \
+	fi
diff --git a/regress/README.regress b/regress/README.regress
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac2e848
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/README.regress
@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
+Overview.
+
+$ ./configure && make tests
+
+You'll see some progress info. A failure will cause either the make to
+abort or the driver script to report a "FATAL" failure.
+
+The test consists of 2 parts. The first is the file-based tests which is
+driven by the Makefile, and the second is a set of network or proxycommand
+based tests, which are driven by a driver script (test-exec.sh) which is
+called multiple times by the Makefile.
+
+Failures in the first part will cause the Makefile to return an error.
+Failures in the second part will print a "FATAL" message for the failed
+test and continue.
+
+OpenBSD has a system-wide regression test suite. OpenSSH Portable's test
+suite is based on OpenBSD's with modifications.
+
+
+Environment variables.
+
+SKIP_UNIT: Skip unit tests.
+SUDO: path to sudo/doas command, if desired. Note that some systems
+	(notably systems using PAM) require sudo to execute some tests.
+LTESTS: Whitespace separated list of tests (filenames without the .sh
+	extension) to run.
+SKIP_LTESTS: Whitespace separated list of tests to skip.
+OBJ: used by test scripts to access build dir.
+TEST_SHELL: shell used for running the test scripts.
+TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL: set to "yes" to make any failure abort the test
+	currently in progress.
+TEST_SSH_PORT: TCP port to be used for the listening tests.
+TEST_SSH_QUIET: set to "yes" to suppress non-fatal output.
+TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to sshd_config
+	before running each test.
+TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to
+	ssh_config before running each test.
+TEST_SSH_TRACE: set to "yes" for verbose output from tests 
+TEST_SSH_x: path to "ssh" command under test, where x is one of
+	SSH, SSHD, SSHAGENT, SSHADD, SSHKEYGEN, SSHKEYSCAN, SFTP or
+	SFTPSERVER
+USE_VALGRIND: Run the tests under valgrind memory checker.
+
+
+Individual tests.
+
+You can run an individual test from the top-level Makefile, eg:
+$ make tests LTESTS=agent-timeout
+
+If you need to manipulate the environment more you can invoke test-exec.sh
+directly if you set up the path to find the binaries under test and the
+test scripts themselves, for example:
+
+$ cd regress
+$ PATH=`pwd`/..:$PATH:. TEST_SHELL=/bin/sh sh test-exec.sh `pwd` \
+    agent-timeout.sh
+ok agent timeout test
+
+
+Files.
+
+test-exec.sh: the main test driver. Sets environment, creates config files
+and keys and runs the specified test.
+
+At the time of writing, the individual tests are:
+connect.sh:		simple connect
+proxy-connect.sh:	proxy connect
+connect-privsep.sh:	proxy connect with privsep
+connect-uri.sh:		uri connect
+proto-version.sh:	sshd version with different protocol combinations
+proto-mismatch.sh:	protocol version mismatch
+exit-status.sh:		remote exit status
+envpass.sh:		environment passing
+transfer.sh:		transfer data
+banner.sh:		banner
+rekey.sh:		rekey
+stderr-data.sh:		stderr data transfer
+stderr-after-eof.sh:	stderr data after eof
+broken-pipe.sh:		broken pipe test
+try-ciphers.sh:		try ciphers
+yes-head.sh:		yes pipe head
+login-timeout.sh:	connect after login grace timeout
+agent.sh:		simple connect via agent
+agent-getpeereid.sh:	disallow agent attach from other uid
+agent-timeout.sh:	agent timeout test
+agent-ptrace.sh:	disallow agent ptrace attach
+keyscan.sh:		keyscan
+keygen-change.sh:	change passphrase for key
+keygen-convert.sh:	convert keys
+keygen-moduli.sh:	keygen moduli
+key-options.sh:		key options
+scp.sh:			scp
+scp-uri.sh:		scp-uri
+sftp.sh:		basic sftp put/get
+sftp-chroot.sh:		sftp in chroot
+sftp-cmds.sh:		sftp command
+sftp-badcmds.sh:	sftp invalid commands
+sftp-batch.sh:		sftp batchfile
+sftp-glob.sh:		sftp glob
+sftp-perm.sh:		sftp permissions
+sftp-uri.sh:		sftp-uri
+ssh-com-client.sh:	connect with ssh.com client
+ssh-com-keygen.sh:	ssh.com key import
+ssh-com-sftp.sh:	basic sftp put/get with ssh.com server
+ssh-com.sh:		connect to ssh.com server
+reconfigure.sh:		simple connect after reconfigure
+dynamic-forward.sh:	dynamic forwarding
+forwarding.sh:		local and remote forwarding
+multiplex.sh:		connection multiplexing
+reexec.sh:		reexec tests
+brokenkeys.sh:		broken keys
+sshcfgparse.sh:		ssh config parse
+cfgparse.sh:		sshd config parse
+cfgmatch.sh:		sshd_config match
+cfgmatchlisten.sh:	sshd_config matchlisten
+addrmatch.sh:		address match
+localcommand.sh:	localcommand
+forcecommand.sh:	forced command
+portnum.sh:		port number parsing
+keytype.sh:		login with different key types
+kextype.sh:		login with different key exchange algorithms
+cert-hostkey.sh		certified host keys
+cert-userkey.sh:	certified user keys
+host-expand.sh:		expand %h and %n
+keys-command.sh:	authorized keys from command
+forward-control.sh:	sshd control of local and remote forwarding
+integrity.sh:		integrity
+krl.sh:			key revocation lists
+multipubkey.sh:		multiple pubkey
+limit-keytype.sh:	restrict pubkey type
+hostkey-agent.sh:	hostkey agent
+keygen-knownhosts.sh:	ssh-keygen known_hosts
+hostkey-rotate.sh:	hostkey rotate
+principals-command.sh:	authorized principals command
+cert-file.sh:		ssh with certificates
+cfginclude.sh:		config include
+allow-deny-users.sh:	AllowUsers/DenyUsers
+authinfo.sh:		authinfo
+
+
+Problems?
+
+Run the failing test with shell tracing (-x) turned on:
+$ PATH=`pwd`/..:$PATH:. sh -x test-exec.sh `pwd` agent-timeout.sh
+
+Failed tests can be difficult to diagnose. Suggestions:
+- run the individual test via ./test-exec.sh `pwd` [testname]
+- set LogLevel to VERBOSE in test-exec.sh and enable syslogging of
+  auth.debug (eg to /var/log/authlog).
+
+
+Known Issues.
+
+- Similarly, if you do not have "scp" in your system's $PATH then the
+  multiplex scp tests will fail (since the system's shell startup scripts
+  will determine where the shell started by sshd will look for scp).
+
+- Recent GNU coreutils deprecate "head -[n]": this will cause the yes-head
+  test to fail.  The old behaviour can be restored by setting (and
+  exporting) _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 before running the tests.
diff --git a/regress/addrmatch.sh b/regress/addrmatch.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26e0c99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/addrmatch.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: addrmatch.sh,v 1.6 2020/08/28 03:17:13 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="address match"
+
+mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+run_trial()
+{
+	user="$1"; addr="$2"; host="$3"; laddr="$4"; lport="$5"
+	expected="$6"; descr="$7"
+
+	verbose "test $descr for $user $addr $host"
+	result=`${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy -T \
+	    -C user=${user},addr=${addr},host=${host},laddr=${laddr},lport=${lport} | \
+	    awk '/^forcecommand/ {print $2}'`
+	if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then
+		fail "failed '$descr' expected $expected got $result"
+	fi
+}
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+cat >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy <<EOD
+ForceCommand nomatch
+Match Address 192.168.0.0/16,!192.168.30.0/24,10.0.0.0/8,host.example.com
+	ForceCommand match1
+Match Address 1.1.1.1,::1,!::3,2000::/16
+	ForceCommand match2
+Match LocalAddress 127.0.0.1,::1
+	ForceCommand match3
+Match LocalPort 5678
+	ForceCommand match4
+EOD
+
+run_trial user 192.168.0.1 somehost 1.2.3.4 1234 match1 "first entry"
+run_trial user 192.168.30.1 somehost 1.2.3.4 1234 nomatch "negative match"
+run_trial user 19.0.0.1 somehost 1.2.3.4 1234 nomatch "no match"
+run_trial user 10.255.255.254 somehost 1.2.3.4 1234 match1 "list middle"
+run_trial user 192.168.30.1 192.168.0.1 1.2.3.4 1234 nomatch "faked IP in hostname"
+run_trial user 1.1.1.1 somehost.example.com 1.2.3.4 1234 match2 "bare IP4 address"
+run_trial user 19.0.0.1 somehost 127.0.0.1 1234 match3 "localaddress"
+run_trial user 19.0.0.1 somehost 1.2.3.4 5678 match4 "localport"
+
+if test "$TEST_SSH_IPV6" != "no"; then
+run_trial user ::1 somehost.example.com ::2 1234 match2 "bare IP6 address"
+run_trial user ::2 somehost.example.com ::2 1234 nomatch "deny IPv6"
+run_trial user ::3 somehost ::2 1234 nomatch "IP6 negated"
+run_trial user ::4 somehost ::2 1234 nomatch "IP6 no match"
+run_trial user 2000::1 somehost ::2 1234 match2 "IP6 network"
+run_trial user 2001::1 somehost ::2 1234 nomatch "IP6 network"
+run_trial user ::5 somehost ::1 1234 match3 "IP6 localaddress"
+run_trial user ::5 somehost ::2 5678 match4 "IP6 localport"
+fi
+
+#
+# Check that we catch invalid address/mask in Match Address/Localaddress
+#
+for i in 10.0.1.0/8 10.0.0.1/24 2000:aa:bb:01::/56; do
+    for a in address localaddress; do
+	verbose "test invalid Match $a $i"
+	echo "Match $a $i" > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy -t >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+	    fail "accepted invalid match $a $i"
+    done
+done
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+rm $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
diff --git a/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh b/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79e9c7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.13 2021/09/01 00:50:27 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="disallow agent attach from other uid"
+
+UNPRIV=nobody
+ASOCK=${OBJ}/agent
+SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent
+>$OBJ/ssh-agent.log
+>$OBJ/ssh-add.log
+
+if config_defined HAVE_GETPEEREID HAVE_GETPEERUCRED HAVE_SO_PEERCRED ; then
+	:
+else
+	skip "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
+fi
+if test "x$USER" = "xroot"; then
+	skip "skipped (running as root)"
+fi
+case "x$SUDO" in
+	xsudo) sudo=1;;
+	xdoas|xdoas\ *) ;;
+	x)
+		skip "need SUDO to switch to uid $UNPRIV" ;;
+	*)
+		skip "unsupported $SUDO - "doas" and "sudo" are allowed" ;;
+esac
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s -a ${ASOCK}` >$OBJ/ssh-agent.log 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+else
+	chmod 644 ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}
+
+	${SSHADD} -vvv -l >>$OBJ/ssh-add.log 2>&1
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add failed with $r != 1"
+	fi
+	if test -z "$sudo" ; then
+		# doas
+		${SUDO} -n -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null
+	else
+		# sudo
+		< /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -vvv -l >>$OBJ/ssh-add.log 2>&1
+	fi
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -lt 2 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add did not fail for ${UNPRIV}: $r < 2"
+		cat $OBJ/ssh-add.log
+	fi
+
+	trace "kill agent"
+	${SSHAGENT} -vvv -k >>$OBJ/ssh-agent.log 2>&1
+fi
+
+rm -f ${OBJ}/agent
diff --git a/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh b/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..268a70d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: agent-pkcs11.sh,v 1.9 2021/07/25 12:13:03 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="pkcs11 agent test"
+
+try_token_libs() {
+	for _lib in "$@" ; do
+		if test -f "$_lib" ; then
+			verbose "Using token library $_lib"
+			TEST_SSH_PKCS11="$_lib"
+			return
+		fi
+	done
+	echo "skipped: Unable to find PKCS#11 token library"
+	exit 0
+}
+
+try_token_libs \
+	/usr/local/lib/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so \
+	/usr/lib64/pkcs11/libsofthsm2.so \
+	/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so
+
+TEST_SSH_PIN=1234
+TEST_SSH_SOPIN=12345678
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER" != "x" ]; then
+	SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER}"
+	export SSH_PKCS11_HELPER
+fi
+
+test -f "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11" || fatal "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11 does not exist"
+
+# setup environment for softhsm2 token
+DIR=$OBJ/SOFTHSM
+rm -rf $DIR
+TOKEN=$DIR/tokendir
+mkdir -p $TOKEN
+SOFTHSM2_CONF=$DIR/softhsm2.conf
+export SOFTHSM2_CONF
+cat > $SOFTHSM2_CONF << EOF
+# SoftHSM v2 configuration file
+directories.tokendir = ${TOKEN}
+objectstore.backend = file
+# ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG
+log.level = DEBUG
+# If CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE flag should be set
+slots.removable = false
+EOF
+out=$(softhsm2-util --init-token --free --label token-slot-0 --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --so-pin "$TEST_SSH_SOPIN")
+slot=$(echo -- $out | sed 's/.* //')
+
+# prevent ssh-agent from calling ssh-askpass
+SSH_ASKPASS=/usr/bin/true
+export SSH_ASKPASS
+unset DISPLAY
+
+# start command w/o tty, so ssh-add accepts pin from stdin
+notty() {
+	perl -e 'use POSIX; POSIX::setsid(); 
+	    if (fork) { wait; exit($? >> 8); } else { exec(@ARGV) }' "$@"
+}
+
+trace "generating keys"
+RSA=${DIR}/RSA
+EC=${DIR}/EC
+$OPENSSL_BIN genpkey -algorithm rsa > $RSA
+$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs8 -nocrypt -in $RSA |\
+    softhsm2-util --slot "$slot" --label 01 --id 01 --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --import /dev/stdin
+$OPENSSL_BIN genpkey \
+    -genparam \
+    -algorithm ec \
+    -pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1 |\
+    $OPENSSL_BIN genpkey \
+    -paramfile /dev/stdin > $EC
+$OPENSSL_BIN pkcs8 -nocrypt -in $EC |\
+    softhsm2-util --slot "$slot" --label 02 --id 02 --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --import /dev/stdin
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+else
+	trace "add pkcs11 key to agent"
+	echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -s ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add -s failed: exit code $r"
+	fi
+
+	trace "pkcs11 list via agent"
+	${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r"
+	fi
+
+	for k in $RSA $EC; do
+		trace "testing $k"
+		chmod 600 $k
+		ssh-keygen -y -f $k > $k.pub
+		pub=$(cat $k.pub)
+		${SSHADD} -L | grep -q "$pub" || fail "key $k missing in ssh-add -L"
+		${SSHADD} -T $k.pub || fail "ssh-add -T with $k failed"
+
+		# add to authorized keys
+		cat $k.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+		trace "pkcs11 connect via agent ($k)"
+		${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5
+		r=$?
+		if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then
+			fail "ssh connect failed (exit code $r)"
+		fi
+	done
+
+	trace "remove pkcs11 keys"
+	echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add -e failed: exit code $r"
+	fi
+
+	trace "kill agent"
+	${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+fi
diff --git a/regress/agent-ptrace.sh b/regress/agent-ptrace.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df55b34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/agent-ptrace.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: agent-ptrace.sh,v 1.5 2022/04/22 05:08:43 anton Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="disallow agent ptrace attach"
+
+if have_prog uname ; then
+	case `uname` in
+	AIX|CYGWIN*|OSF1)
+		echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
+		exit 0
+		;;
+	esac
+fi
+
+if [ "x$USER" = "xroot" ]; then
+	echo "Skipped: running as root"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+if have_prog gdb ; then
+	: ok
+else
+	echo "skipped (gdb not found)"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+if $OBJ/setuid-allowed ${SSHAGENT} ; then
+	: ok
+else
+	echo "skipped (${SSHAGENT} is mounted on a no-setuid filesystem)"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+if test -z "$SUDO" ; then
+	echo "skipped (SUDO not set)"
+	exit 0
+else
+	$SUDO chown 0 ${SSHAGENT}
+	$SUDO chgrp 0 ${SSHAGENT}
+	$SUDO chmod 2755 ${SSHAGENT}
+	trap "$SUDO chown ${USER} ${SSHAGENT}; $SUDO chmod 755 ${SSHAGENT}" 0
+fi
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+else
+	# ls -l ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}
+	gdb ${SSHAGENT} ${SSH_AGENT_PID} > ${OBJ}/gdb.out 2>&1 << EOF
+		quit
+EOF
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "gdb failed: exit code $r"
+	fi
+	egrep 'ptrace: Operation not permitted.|procfs:.*Permission denied.|ttrace.*Permission denied.|procfs:.*: Invalid argument.|Unable to access task ' >/dev/null ${OBJ}/gdb.out
+	r=$?
+	rm -f ${OBJ}/gdb.out
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ptrace succeeded?: exit code $r"
+	fi
+
+	trace "kill agent"
+	${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+fi
diff --git a/regress/agent-restrict.sh b/regress/agent-restrict.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a30aed7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/agent-restrict.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,495 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: agent-restrict.sh,v 1.5 2022/01/13 04:53:16 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="agent restrictions"
+
+SSH_AUTH_SOCK="$OBJ/agent.sock"
+export SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+rm -f $SSH_AUTH_SOCK $OBJ/agent.log $OBJ/host_[abcdex]* $OBJ/user_[abcdex]*
+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy_host* $OBJ/ssh_output* $OBJ/expect_*
+rm -f $OBJ/ssh_proxy[._]* $OBJ/command
+
+verbose "generate keys"
+for h in a b c d e x ca ; do
+	$SSHKEYGEN -q -t ed25519 -C host_$h -N '' -f $OBJ/host_$h || \
+		fatal "ssh-keygen hostkey failed"
+	$SSHKEYGEN -q -t ed25519 -C user_$h -N '' -f $OBJ/user_$h || \
+		fatal "ssh-keygen userkey failed"
+done
+
+# Make some hostcerts
+for h in d e ; do
+	id="host_$h"
+	$SSHKEYGEN -q -s $OBJ/host_ca -I $id -n $id -h $OBJ/host_${h}.pub || \
+		fatal "ssh-keygen certify failed"
+done
+
+verbose "prepare client config"
+egrep -vi '(identityfile|hostname|hostkeyalias|proxycommand)' \
+	$OBJ/ssh_proxy > $OBJ/ssh_proxy.bak
+cat << _EOF > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+IdentitiesOnly yes
+ForwardAgent yes
+ExitOnForwardFailure yes
+_EOF
+cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_noid
+for h in a b c d e ; do
+	cat << _EOF >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+Host host_$h
+	Hostname host_$h
+	HostkeyAlias host_$h
+	IdentityFile $OBJ/user_$h
+	ProxyCommand ${SUDO} env SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$SSH_SK_HELPER\" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy_host_$h
+_EOF
+	# Variant with no specified keys.
+	cat << _EOF >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy_noid
+Host host_$h
+	Hostname host_$h
+	HostkeyAlias host_$h
+	ProxyCommand ${SUDO} env SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$SSH_SK_HELPER\" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy_host_$h
+_EOF
+done
+cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy.bak >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy.bak >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy_noid
+
+LC_ALL=C
+export LC_ALL
+echo "SetEnv LC_ALL=${LC_ALL}" >> sshd_proxy
+
+verbose "prepare known_hosts"
+rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts
+for h in a b c x ; do
+	(printf "host_$h " ; cat $OBJ/host_${h}.pub) >> $OBJ/known_hosts
+done
+(printf "@cert-authority host_* " ; cat $OBJ/host_ca.pub) >> $OBJ/known_hosts
+
+verbose "prepare server configs"
+egrep -vi '(hostkey|pidfile)' $OBJ/sshd_proxy \
+	> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
+for h in a b c d e; do
+	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy_host_$h
+	cat << _EOF >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy_host_$h
+ExposeAuthInfo yes
+PidFile none
+Hostkey $OBJ/host_$h
+_EOF
+done
+for h in d e ; do
+	echo "HostCertificate $OBJ/host_${h}-cert.pub" \
+		>> $OBJ/sshd_proxy_host_$h
+done
+# Create authorized_keys with canned command.
+reset_keys() {
+	_whichcmd="$1"
+	_command=""
+	case "$_whichcmd" in
+	authinfo)	_command="cat \$SSH_USER_AUTH" ;;
+	keylist)		_command="$SSHADD -L | cut -d' ' -f-2 | sort" ;;
+	*)		fatal "unsupported command $_whichcmd" ;;
+	esac
+	trace "reset keys"
+	>$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	for h in e d c b a; do
+		(printf "%s" "restrict,agent-forwarding,command=\"$_command\" ";
+		 cat $OBJ/user_$h.pub) >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	done
+}
+# Prepare a key for comparison with ExposeAuthInfo/$SSH_USER_AUTH.
+expect_key() {
+	_key="$OBJ/${1}.pub"
+	_file="$OBJ/$2"
+	(printf "publickey " ; cut -d' ' -f-2 $_key) > $_file
+}
+# Prepare expect_* files to compare against authinfo forced command to ensure
+# keys used for authentication match.
+reset_expect_keys() {
+	for u in a b c d e; do
+		expect_key user_$u expect_$u
+	done
+}
+# ssh to host, expecting success and that output matched expectation for
+# that host (expect_$h file).
+expect_succeed() {
+	_id="$1"
+	_case="$2"
+	shift; shift; _extra="$@"
+	_host="host_$_id"
+	trace "connect $_host expect success"
+	rm -f $OBJ/ssh_output
+	${SSH} $_extra -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy $_host true > $OBJ/ssh_output
+	_s=$?
+	test $_s -eq 0 || fail "host $_host $_case fail, exit status $_s"
+	diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_${_id} ||
+		fail "unexpected ssh output"
+}
+# ssh to host using explicit key, expecting success and that the key was
+# actually used for authentication.
+expect_succeed_key() {
+	_id="$1"
+	_key="$2"
+	_case="$3"
+	shift; shift; shift; _extra="$@"
+	_host="host_$_id"
+	trace "connect $_host expect success, with key $_key"
+	_keyfile="$OBJ/$_key"
+	rm -f $OBJ/ssh_output
+	${SSH} $_extra -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_noid \
+	    -oIdentityFile=$_keyfile $_host true > $OBJ/ssh_output
+	_s=$?
+	test $_s -eq 0 || fail "host $_host $_key $_case fail, exit status $_s"
+	expect_key $_key expect_key
+	diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_key ||
+		fail "incorrect key used for authentication"
+}
+# ssh to a host, expecting it to fail.
+expect_fail() {
+	_host="$1"
+	_case="$2"
+	shift; shift; _extra="$@"
+	trace "connect $_host expect failure"
+	${SSH} $_extra -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy $_host true >/dev/null && \
+		fail "host $_host $_case succeeded unexpectedly"
+}
+# ssh to a host using an explicit key, expecting it to fail.
+expect_fail_key() {
+	_id="$1"
+	_key="$2"
+	_case="$3"
+	shift; shift; shift; _extra="$@"
+	_host="host_$_id"
+	trace "connect $_host expect failure, with key $_key"
+	_keyfile="$OBJ/$_key"
+	${SSH} $_extra -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_noid -oIdentityFile=$_keyfile \
+	    $_host true > $OBJ/ssh_output && \
+		fail "host $_host $_key $_case succeeded unexpectedly"
+}
+# Move the private key files out of the way to force use of agent-hosted keys.
+hide_privatekeys() {
+	trace "hide private keys"
+	for u in a b c d e x; do
+		mv $OBJ/user_$u $OBJ/user_x$u || fatal "hide privkey $u"
+	done
+}
+# Put the private key files back.
+restore_privatekeys() {
+	trace "restore private keys"
+	for u in a b c d e x; do
+		mv $OBJ/user_x$u $OBJ/user_$u || fatal "restore privkey $u"
+	done
+}
+clear_agent() {
+	${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1 || fatal "clear agent failed"
+}
+
+reset_keys authinfo
+reset_expect_keys
+
+verbose "authentication w/o agent"
+for h in a b c d e ; do
+	expect_succeed $h "w/o agent"
+	wrongkey=user_e
+	test "$h" = "e" && wrongkey=user_a
+	expect_succeed_key $h $wrongkey "\"wrong\" key w/o agent"
+done
+hide_privatekeys
+for h in a b c d e ; do
+	expect_fail $h "w/o agent"
+done
+restore_privatekeys
+
+verbose "start agent"
+${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -d -a $SSH_AUTH_SOCK > $OBJ/agent.log 2>&1 &
+AGENT_PID=$!
+trap "kill $AGENT_PID" EXIT
+sleep 4 # Give it a chance to start
+# Check that it's running.
+${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -ne 1 ]; then
+	fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 1"
+fi
+
+verbose "authentication with agent (no restrict)"
+for u in a b c d e x; do
+	$SSHADD -q $OBJ/user_$u || fatal "add key $u unrestricted"
+done
+hide_privatekeys
+for h in a b c d e ; do
+	expect_succeed $h "with agent"
+	wrongkey=user_e
+	test "$h" = "e" && wrongkey=user_a
+	expect_succeed_key $h $wrongkey "\"wrong\" key with agent"
+done
+
+verbose "unrestricted keylist"
+reset_keys keylist
+rm -f $OBJ/expect_list.pre
+# List of keys from agent should contain everything.
+for u in a b c d e x; do
+	cut -d " " -f-2 $OBJ/user_${u}.pub >> $OBJ/expect_list.pre
+done
+sort $OBJ/expect_list.pre > $OBJ/expect_list
+for h in a b c d e; do
+	cp $OBJ/expect_list $OBJ/expect_$h
+	expect_succeed $h "unrestricted keylist"
+done
+restore_privatekeys
+
+verbose "authentication with agent (basic restrict)"
+reset_keys authinfo
+reset_expect_keys
+for h in a b c d e; do
+	$SSHADD -h host_$h -H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_$h \
+		|| fatal "add key $u basic restrict"
+done
+# One more, unrestricted
+$SSHADD -q $OBJ/user_x || fatal "add unrestricted key"
+hide_privatekeys
+# Authentication to host with expected key should work.
+for h in a b c d e ; do
+	expect_succeed $h "with agent"
+done
+# Authentication to host with incorrect key should fail.
+verbose "authentication with agent incorrect key (basic restrict)"
+for h in a b c d e ; do
+	wrongkey=user_e
+	test "$h" = "e" && wrongkey=user_a
+	expect_fail_key $h $wrongkey "wrong key with agent (basic restrict)"
+done
+
+verbose "keylist (basic restrict)"
+reset_keys keylist
+# List from forwarded agent should contain only user_x - the unrestricted key.
+cut -d " " -f-2 $OBJ/user_x.pub > $OBJ/expect_list
+for h in a b c d e; do
+	cp $OBJ/expect_list $OBJ/expect_$h
+	expect_succeed $h "keylist (basic restrict)"
+done
+restore_privatekeys
+
+verbose "username"
+reset_keys authinfo
+reset_expect_keys
+for h in a b c d e; do
+	$SSHADD -h "${USER}@host_$h" -H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_$h \
+		|| fatal "add key $u basic restrict"
+done
+hide_privatekeys
+for h in a b c d e ; do
+	expect_succeed $h "wildcard user"
+done
+restore_privatekeys
+
+verbose "username wildcard"
+reset_keys authinfo
+reset_expect_keys
+for h in a b c d e; do
+	$SSHADD -h "*@host_$h" -H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_$h \
+		|| fatal "add key $u basic restrict"
+done
+hide_privatekeys
+for h in a b c d e ; do
+	expect_succeed $h "wildcard user"
+done
+restore_privatekeys
+
+verbose "username incorrect"
+reset_keys authinfo
+reset_expect_keys
+for h in a b c d e; do
+	$SSHADD -h "--BADUSER@host_$h" -H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_$h \
+		|| fatal "add key $u basic restrict"
+done
+hide_privatekeys
+for h in a b c d e ; do
+	expect_fail $h "incorrect user"
+done
+restore_privatekeys
+
+
+verbose "agent restriction honours certificate principal"
+reset_keys authinfo
+reset_expect_keys
+clear_agent
+$SSHADD -h host_e -H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_d || fatal "add key"
+hide_privatekeys
+expect_fail d "restricted agent w/ incorrect cert principal"
+restore_privatekeys
+
+# Prepares the script used to drive chained ssh connections for the
+# multihop tests. Believe me, this is easier than getting the escaping
+# right for 5 hops on the command-line...
+prepare_multihop_script() {
+	MULTIHOP_RUN=$OBJ/command
+	cat << _EOF > $MULTIHOP_RUN
+#!/bin/sh
+#set -x
+me="\$1" ; shift
+next="\$1"
+if test ! -z "\$me" ; then 
+	rm -f $OBJ/done
+	echo "HOSTNAME host_\$me"
+	echo "AUTHINFO"
+	cat \$SSH_USER_AUTH
+fi
+echo AGENT
+$SSHADD -L | egrep "^ssh" | cut -d" " -f-2 | sort
+if test -z "\$next" ; then 
+	touch $OBJ/done
+	echo "FINISH"
+	e=0
+else
+	echo NEXT
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_noid -oIdentityFile=$OBJ/user_a \
+		host_\$next $MULTIHOP_RUN "\$@"
+	e=\$?
+fi
+echo "COMPLETE \"\$me\""
+if test ! -z "\$me" ; then 
+	if test ! -f $OBJ/done ; then
+		echo "DONE MARKER MISSING"
+		test \$e -eq 0 && e=63
+	fi
+fi
+exit \$e
+_EOF
+	chmod u+x $MULTIHOP_RUN
+}
+
+# Prepare expected output for multihop tests at expect_a
+prepare_multihop_expected() {
+	_keys="$1"
+	_hops="a b c d e"
+	test -z "$2" || _hops="$2"
+	_revhops=$(echo "$_hops" | rev)
+	_lasthop=$(echo "$_hops" | sed 's/.* //')
+
+	rm -f $OBJ/expect_keys
+	for h in a b c d e; do
+		cut -d" " -f-2 $OBJ/user_${h}.pub >> $OBJ/expect_keys
+	done
+	rm -f $OBJ/expect_a
+	echo "AGENT" >> $OBJ/expect_a
+	test "x$_keys" = "xnone" || sort $OBJ/expect_keys >> $OBJ/expect_a
+	echo "NEXT" >> $OBJ/expect_a
+	for h in $_hops ; do 
+		echo "HOSTNAME host_$h" >> $OBJ/expect_a
+		echo "AUTHINFO" >> $OBJ/expect_a
+		(printf "publickey " ; cut -d" " -f-2 $OBJ/user_a.pub) >> $OBJ/expect_a
+		echo "AGENT" >> $OBJ/expect_a
+		if test "x$_keys" = "xall" ; then
+			sort $OBJ/expect_keys >> $OBJ/expect_a
+		fi
+		if test "x$h" != "x$_lasthop" ; then
+			if test "x$_keys" = "xfiltered" ; then
+				cut -d" " -f-2 $OBJ/user_a.pub >> $OBJ/expect_a
+			fi
+			echo "NEXT" >> $OBJ/expect_a
+		fi
+	done
+	echo "FINISH" >> $OBJ/expect_a
+	for h in $_revhops "" ; do 
+		echo "COMPLETE \"$h\"" >> $OBJ/expect_a
+	done
+}
+
+prepare_multihop_script
+cp $OBJ/user_a.pub $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER # only one key used.
+
+verbose "multihop without agent"
+clear_agent
+prepare_multihop_expected none
+$MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output || fail "multihop no agent ssh failed"
+diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_a || fail "unexpected ssh output"
+
+verbose "multihop agent unrestricted"
+clear_agent
+$SSHADD -q $OBJ/user_[abcde]
+prepare_multihop_expected all
+$MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output || fail "multihop no agent ssh failed"
+diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_a || fail "unexpected ssh output"
+
+verbose "multihop restricted"
+clear_agent
+prepare_multihop_expected filtered
+# Add user_a, with permission to connect through the whole chain.
+$SSHADD -h host_a -h "host_a>host_b" -h "host_b>host_c" \
+	-h "host_c>host_d" -h "host_d>host_e" \
+	-H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_a \
+	|| fatal "add key user_a multihop"
+# Add the other keys, bound to a unused host.
+$SSHADD -q -h host_x -H $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/user_[bcde] || fail "add keys"
+hide_privatekeys
+$MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output || fail "multihop ssh failed"
+diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_a || fail "unexpected ssh output"
+restore_privatekeys
+
+verbose "multihop username"
+$SSHADD -h host_a -h "host_a>${USER}@host_b" -h "host_b>${USER}@host_c" \
+	-h "host_c>${USER}@host_d"  -h "host_d>${USER}@host_e" \
+	-H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_a || fatal "add key user_a multihop"
+hide_privatekeys
+$MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output || fail "multihop w/ user ssh failed"
+diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_a || fail "unexpected ssh output"
+restore_privatekeys
+
+verbose "multihop wildcard username"
+$SSHADD -h host_a -h "host_a>*@host_b" -h "host_b>*@host_c" \
+	-h "host_c>*@host_d"  -h "host_d>*@host_e" \
+	-H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_a || fatal "add key user_a multihop"
+hide_privatekeys
+$MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output || fail "multihop w/ user ssh failed"
+diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_a || fail "unexpected ssh output"
+restore_privatekeys
+
+verbose "multihop wrong username"
+$SSHADD -h host_a -h "host_a>*@host_b" -h "host_b>*@host_c" \
+	-h "host_c>--BADUSER@host_d"  -h "host_d>*@host_e" \
+	-H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_a || fatal "add key user_a multihop"
+hide_privatekeys
+$MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output && \
+	fail "multihop with wrong user succeeded unexpectedly"
+restore_privatekeys
+
+verbose "multihop cycle no agent"
+clear_agent
+prepare_multihop_expected none "a b a a c d e"
+$MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b a a c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output || \
+	fail "multihop cycle no-agent fail"
+diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_a || fail "unexpected ssh output"
+
+verbose "multihop cycle agent unrestricted"
+clear_agent
+$SSHADD -q $OBJ/user_[abcde] || fail "add keys"
+prepare_multihop_expected all "a b a a c d e"
+$MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b a a c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output || \
+	fail "multihop cycle agent ssh failed"
+diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_a || fail "unexpected ssh output"
+
+verbose "multihop cycle restricted deny"
+clear_agent
+$SSHADD -q -h host_x -H $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/user_[bcde] || fail "add keys"
+$SSHADD -h host_a -h "host_a>host_b" -h "host_b>host_c" \
+	-h "host_c>host_d" -h "host_d>host_e" \
+	-H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_a \
+	|| fatal "add key user_a multihop"
+prepare_multihop_expected filtered "a b a a c d e"
+hide_privatekeys
+$MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b a a c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output && \
+	fail "multihop cycle restricted deny succeded unexpectedly"
+restore_privatekeys
+
+verbose "multihop cycle restricted allow"
+clear_agent
+$SSHADD -q -h host_x -H $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/user_[bcde] || fail "add keys"
+$SSHADD -h host_a -h "host_a>host_b" -h "host_b>host_c" \
+	-h "host_c>host_d" -h "host_d>host_e" \
+	-h "host_b>host_a" -h "host_a>host_a" -h "host_a>host_c" \
+	-H $OBJ/known_hosts -q $OBJ/user_a \
+	|| fatal "add key user_a multihop"
+prepare_multihop_expected filtered "a b a a c d e"
+hide_privatekeys
+$MULTIHOP_RUN "" a b a a c d e > $OBJ/ssh_output || \
+	fail "multihop cycle restricted allow failed"
+diff $OBJ/ssh_output $OBJ/expect_a || fail "unexpected ssh output"
+restore_privatekeys
+
diff --git a/regress/agent-subprocess.sh b/regress/agent-subprocess.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f36d70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/agent-subprocess.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: agent-subprocess.sh,v 1.1 2020/06/19 05:07:09 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="agent subprocess"
+
+trace "ensure agent exits when run as subprocess"
+${SSHAGENT} sh -c "echo \$SSH_AGENT_PID >$OBJ/pidfile; sleep 1"
+
+pid=`cat $OBJ/pidfile`
+
+# Currently ssh-agent polls every 10s so we need to wait at least that long.
+n=12
+while kill -0 $pid >/dev/null 2>&1 && test "$n" -gt "0"; do
+	n=$(($n - 1))
+	sleep 1
+done
+
+if test "$n" -eq "0"; then
+	fail "agent still running"
+fi
+
+rm -f $OBJ/pidfile
diff --git a/regress/agent-timeout.sh b/regress/agent-timeout.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6dec092
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/agent-timeout.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: agent-timeout.sh,v 1.6 2019/11/26 23:43:10 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="agent timeout test"
+
+SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT=10
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS}` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+else
+	trace "add keys with timeout"
+	keys=0
+	for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+		${SSHADD} -kt ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} $OBJ/$t > /dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh-add did succeed exit code 0"
+		fi
+		keys=$((${keys} + 1))
+	done
+	n=`${SSHADD} -l 2> /dev/null | wc -l`
+	trace "agent has $n keys"
+	if [ $n -ne $keys ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add -l did not return $keys keys: $n"
+	fi
+	trace "sleeping 2*${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} seconds"
+	sleep ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT}
+	sleep ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT}
+	${SSHADD} -l 2> /dev/null | grep 'The agent has no identities.' >/dev/null
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add -l still returns keys after timeout"
+	fi
+
+	trace "kill agent"
+	${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+fi
diff --git a/regress/agent.sh b/regress/agent.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f187b67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/agent.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,227 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.20 2021/02/25 03:27:34 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="simple agent test"
+
+SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -ne 2 ]; then
+	fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 2"
+fi
+
+trace "start agent, args ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+fi
+
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s | sed 's/SSH_/FW_SSH_/g'` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fatal "could not start second ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+fi
+
+${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -ne 1 ]; then
+	fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 1"
+fi
+
+rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key \
+	|| fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+
+trace "overwrite authorized keys"
+printf '' > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	# generate user key for agent
+	rm -f $OBJ/$t-agent $OBJ/$t-agent.pub*
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-agent ||\
+		 fatal "ssh-keygen for $t-agent failed"
+	# Make a certificate for each too.
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -qs $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "$t cert" \
+		-n estragon $OBJ/$t-agent.pub || fatal "ca sign failed"
+
+	# add to authorized keys
+	cat $OBJ/$t-agent.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	# add private key to agent
+	${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent > /dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?"
+	fi
+	# add private key to second agent
+	SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent > /dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?"
+	fi
+	# Move private key to ensure that we aren't accidentally using it.
+	# Keep the corresponding public keys/certs around for later use.
+	mv -f $OBJ/$t-agent $OBJ/$t-agent-private
+	cp -f $OBJ/$t-agent.pub $OBJ/$t-agent-private.pub
+	cp -f $OBJ/$t-agent-cert.pub $OBJ/$t-agent-private-cert.pub
+done
+
+# Remove explicit identity directives from ssh_proxy
+mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+grep -vi identityfile $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r"
+fi
+# the same for full pubkey output
+${SSHADD} -L > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh-add -L failed: exit code $r"
+fi
+
+trace "simple connect via agent"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 52
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
+	fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)"
+fi
+
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	trace "connect via agent using $t key"
+	if [ "$t" = "ssh-dss" ]; then
+		echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms +ssh-dss" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+		echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms +ssh-dss" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	fi
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i $OBJ/$t-agent.pub -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \
+		somehost exit 52
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
+		fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)"
+	fi
+done
+
+trace "agent forwarding"
+${SSH} -A -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh-add -l via agent fwd failed (exit code $r)"
+fi
+${SSH} "-oForwardAgent=$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh-add -l via agent path fwd failed (exit code $r)"
+fi
+${SSH} -A -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost \
+	"${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 52"
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
+	fail "agent fwd failed (exit code $r)"
+fi
+
+trace "agent forwarding different agent"
+${SSH} "-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh-add -l via agent path fwd of different agent failed (exit code $r)"
+fi
+${SSH} '-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK' -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh-add -l via agent path env fwd of different agent failed (exit code $r)"
+fi
+
+# Remove keys from forwarded agent, ssh-add on remote machine should now fail.
+SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK ${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh-add -D failed: exit code $r"
+fi
+${SSH} '-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK' -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then
+	fail "ssh-add -l with different agent did not fail with exit code 1 (exit code $r)"
+fi
+
+(printf 'cert-authority,principals="estragon" '; cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub) \
+	> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+    if [ "$t" != "ssh-dss" ]; then
+	trace "connect via agent using $t key"
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i $OBJ/$t-agent.pub \
+		-oCertificateFile=$OBJ/$t-agent-cert.pub \
+		-oIdentitiesOnly=yes somehost exit 52
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
+		fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)"
+	fi
+    fi
+done
+
+## Deletion tests.
+
+trace "delete all agent keys"
+${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh-add -D failed: exit code $r"
+fi
+# make sure they're gone
+${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then
+	fail "ssh-add -l returned unexpected exit code: $r"
+fi
+trace "readd keys"
+# re-add keys/certs to agent
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent-private >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?"
+done
+# make sure they are there
+${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r"
+fi
+
+check_key_absent() {
+	${SSHADD} -L | grep "^$1 " >/dev/null
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "$1 key unexpectedly present"
+	fi
+}
+check_key_present() {
+	${SSHADD} -L | grep "^$1 " >/dev/null
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "$1 key missing from agent"
+	fi
+}
+
+# delete the ed25519 key
+trace "delete single key by file"
+${SSHADD} -qdk $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent || fail "ssh-add -d ed25519 failed"
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519
+check_key_present ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
+# Put key/cert back.
+${SSHADD} $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent-private >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+	fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?"
+check_key_present ssh-ed25519
+# Delete both key and certificate.
+trace "delete key/cert by file"
+${SSHADD} -qd $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent || fail "ssh-add -d ed25519 failed"
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
+# Put key/cert back.
+${SSHADD} $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent-private >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+	fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?"
+check_key_present ssh-ed25519
+# Delete certificate via stdin
+${SSHADD} -qd - < $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent-cert.pub || fail "ssh-add -d - failed"
+check_key_present ssh-ed25519
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
+# Delete key via stdin
+${SSHADD} -qd - < $OBJ/ssh-ed25519-agent.pub || fail "ssh-add -d - failed"
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519
+check_key_absent ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
+
+trace "kill agent"
+${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+SSH_AGENT_PID=$FW_SSH_AGENT_PID ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
diff --git a/regress/allow-deny-users.sh b/regress/allow-deny-users.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c053ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/allow-deny-users.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+# Public Domain
+# Zev Weiss, 2016
+# $OpenBSD: allow-deny-users.sh,v 1.6 2021/06/07 00:00:50 djm Exp $
+
+tid="AllowUsers/DenyUsers"
+
+me="$LOGNAME"
+if [ "x$me" = "x" ]; then
+	me=`whoami`
+fi
+other="nobody"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+
+test_auth()
+{
+	deny="$1"
+	allow="$2"
+	should_succeed="$3"
+	failmsg="$4"
+
+	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	test -z "$deny" || echo DenyUsers="$deny" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	test -z "$allow" || echo AllowUsers="$allow" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy "$me@somehost" true
+	status=$?
+
+	if (test $status -eq 0 && ! $should_succeed) \
+	    || (test $status -ne 0 && $should_succeed); then
+		fail "$failmsg"
+	fi
+}
+
+#         DenyUsers     AllowUsers    should_succeed  failure_message
+test_auth ""            ""            true            "user in neither DenyUsers nor AllowUsers denied"
+test_auth "$other $me"  ""            false           "user in DenyUsers allowed"
+test_auth "$me $other"  ""            false           "user in DenyUsers allowed"
+test_auth ""            "$other"      false           "user not in AllowUsers allowed"
+test_auth ""            "$other $me"  true            "user in AllowUsers denied"
+test_auth ""            "$me $other"  true            "user in AllowUsers denied"
+test_auth "$me $other"  "$me $other"  false           "user in both DenyUsers and AllowUsers allowed"
+test_auth "$other $me"  "$other $me"  false           "user in both DenyUsers and AllowUsers allowed"
diff --git a/regress/authinfo.sh b/regress/authinfo.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..693424a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/authinfo.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: authinfo.sh,v 1.3 2018/04/10 00:13:27 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="authinfo"
+
+# Ensure the environment variable doesn't leak when ExposeAuthInfo=no.
+verbose "ExposeAuthInfo=no"
+env SSH_USER_AUTH=blah ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy x \
+	'env | grep SSH_USER_AUTH >/dev/null' && fail "SSH_USER_AUTH present"
+
+verbose "ExposeAuthInfo=yes"
+echo ExposeAuthInfo=yes >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy x \
+	'grep ^publickey "$SSH_USER_AUTH" /dev/null >/dev/null' ||
+	fail "ssh with ExposeAuthInfo failed"
+
+# XXX test multiple auth and key contents
diff --git a/regress/banner.sh b/regress/banner.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a84feb5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/banner.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: banner.sh,v 1.4 2021/08/08 06:38:33 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="banner"
+echo "Banner $OBJ/banner.in" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+rm -f $OBJ/banner.out $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/empty.in
+touch $OBJ/empty.in
+
+trace "test missing banner file"
+verbose "test $tid: missing banner file"
+( ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \
+	cmp $OBJ/empty.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \
+	fail "missing banner file"
+
+for s in 0 10 100 1000 10000 100000 ; do
+	if [ "$s" = "0" ]; then
+		# create empty banner
+		touch $OBJ/banner.in
+	elif [ "$s" = "10" ]; then
+		# create 10-byte banner file
+		echo "abcdefghi" >$OBJ/banner.in
+	else
+		# increase size 10x
+		cp $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/banner.out
+		for i in 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ; do
+			cat $OBJ/banner.out >> $OBJ/banner.in
+		done
+	fi
+
+	trace "test banner size $s"
+	verbose "test $tid: size $s"
+	( ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \
+		cmp $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \
+		fail "banner size $s mismatch"
+done
+
+trace "test suppress banner (-q)"
+verbose "test $tid: suppress banner (-q)"
+# ssh-log-wrapper drops "-q" to preserve debug output so use ssh directly
+# for just this test.
+( ${REAL_SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost true 2>$OBJ/banner.out && \
+	cmp $OBJ/empty.in $OBJ/banner.out ) || \
+	fail "suppress banner (-q)"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/banner.out $OBJ/banner.in $OBJ/empty.in
diff --git a/regress/broken-pipe.sh b/regress/broken-pipe.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c69276e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/broken-pipe.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: broken-pipe.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="broken pipe test"
+
+for i in 1 2 3 4; do
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config_config nexthost echo $i 2> /dev/null | true
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "broken pipe returns $r"
+	fi
+done
diff --git a/regress/brokenkeys.sh b/regress/brokenkeys.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9d5a54f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/brokenkeys.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: brokenkeys.sh,v 1.2 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="broken keys"
+
+KEYS="$OBJ/authorized_keys_${USER}"
+
+start_sshd
+
+mv ${KEYS} ${KEYS}.bak
+
+# Truncated key
+echo "ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAIEABTM= bad key" > $KEYS
+cat ${KEYS}.bak >> ${KEYS}
+cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh connect with failed"
+fi
+
+mv ${KEYS}.bak ${KEYS}
+
diff --git a/regress/cert-file.sh b/regress/cert-file.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94e672a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/cert-file.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: cert-file.sh,v 1.8 2019/11/26 23:43:10 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="ssh with certificates"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
+rm -f $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+
+# Create a CA key
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key1 ||\
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519  -f $OBJ/user_ca_key2 ||\
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+
+# Make some keys and certificates.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key3 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key4 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key5 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+
+# Move the certificate to a different address to better control
+# when it is offered.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+	-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 ||
+		fatal "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key1"
+mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key2 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+	-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 ||
+		fatal "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key2"
+mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+	-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key3 ||
+		fatal "couldn't sign user_key3 with user_ca_key1"
+rm $OBJ/user_key3.pub # to test use of private key w/o public half.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+	-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key4 ||
+		fatal "couldn't sign user_key4 with user_ca_key1"
+rm $OBJ/user_key4 $OBJ/user_key4.pub # to test no matching pub/private key case.
+
+trace 'try with identity files'
+opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes"
+opts2="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2"
+echo "cert-authority $(cat $OBJ/user_ca_key1.pub)" > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+# Make a clean config that doesn't have any pre-added identities.
+cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy | grep -v IdentityFile > $OBJ/no_identity_config
+
+# XXX: verify that certificate used was what we expect. Needs exposure of
+# keys via environment variable or similar.
+
+	# Key with no .pub should work - finding the equivalent *-cert.pub.
+verbose "identity cert with no plain public file"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \
+    -i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 52
+[ $? -ne 52 ] && fail "ssh failed"
+
+# CertificateFile matching private key with no .pub file should work.
+verbose "CertificateFile with no plain public file"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \
+    -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub \
+    -i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 52
+[ $? -ne 52 ] && fail "ssh failed"
+
+# Just keys should fail
+verbose "plain keys"
+${SSH} $opts2 somehost exit 52
+r=$?
+if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then
+	fail "ssh succeeded with no certs"
+fi
+
+# Keys with untrusted cert should fail.
+verbose "untrusted cert"
+opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
+${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52
+r=$?
+if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then
+	fail "ssh succeeded with bad cert"
+fi
+
+# Good cert with bad key should fail.
+verbose "good cert, bad key"
+opts3="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key2"
+opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
+${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52
+r=$?
+if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then
+	fail "ssh succeeded with no matching key"
+fi
+
+# Keys with one trusted cert, should succeed.
+verbose "single trusted"
+opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
+${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
+	fail "ssh failed with trusted cert and key"
+fi
+
+# Multiple certs and keys, with one trusted cert, should succeed.
+verbose "multiple trusted"
+opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
+opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
+${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
+	fail "ssh failed with multiple certs"
+fi
+
+#next, using an agent in combination with the keys
+SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -ne 2 ]; then
+	fatal "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 2"
+fi
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+fi
+
+# add private keys to agent
+${SSHADD} -k $OBJ/user_key2 > /dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fatal "ssh-add did not succeed with exit code 0"
+fi
+${SSHADD} -k $OBJ/user_key1 > /dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fatal "ssh-add did not succeed with exit code 0"
+fi
+
+# try ssh with the agent and certificates
+opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+# with no certificates, should fail
+${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52
+if [ $? -eq 52 ]; then
+	fail "ssh connect with agent in succeeded with no cert"
+fi
+
+#with an untrusted certificate, should fail
+opts="$opts -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
+${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52
+if [ $? -eq 52 ]; then
+	fail "ssh connect with agent in succeeded with bad cert"
+fi
+
+#with an additional trusted certificate, should succeed
+opts="$opts -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
+${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52
+if [ $? -ne 52 ]; then
+	fail "ssh connect with agent in failed with good cert"
+fi
+
+trace "kill agent"
+${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+
+#cleanup
+rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
+rm -f $OBJ/cert_user_key*
diff --git a/regress/cert-hostkey.sh b/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3414e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: cert-hostkey.sh,v 1.27 2021/09/30 05:26:26 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="certified host keys"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert* $OBJ/host_ca_key* $OBJ/host_revoked_*
+rm -f $OBJ/cert_host_key* $OBJ/host_krl_*
+
+# Allow all hostkey/pubkey types, prefer certs for the client
+rsa=0
+types=""
+for i in `$SSH -Q key | maybe_filter_sk`; do
+	if [ -z "$types" ]; then
+		types="$i"
+		continue
+	fi
+	case "$i" in
+	# Special treatment for RSA keys.
+	*rsa*cert*)
+		types="rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,$i,$types"
+		types="rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,$types";;
+	*rsa*)
+		rsa=1
+		types="$types,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,$i";;
+	# Prefer certificate to plain keys.
+	*cert*)	types="$i,$types";;
+	*)	types="$types,$i";;
+	esac
+done
+(
+	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms ${types}"
+	echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms *"
+) >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+(
+	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms *"
+	echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms *"
+) >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+HOSTS='localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1'
+
+kh_ca() {
+	for k in "$@" ; do
+		printf "@cert-authority $HOSTS "
+		cat $OBJ/$k || fatal "couldn't cat $k"
+	done
+}
+kh_revoke() {
+	for k in "$@" ; do
+		printf "@revoked * "
+		cat $OBJ/$k || fatal "couldn't cat $k"
+	done
+}
+
+# Create a CA key and add it to known hosts. Ed25519 chosen for speed.
+# RSA for testing RSA/SHA2 signatures if supported.
+ktype2=ed25519
+[ "x$rsa" = "x1" ] && ktype2=rsa
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519  -f $OBJ/host_ca_key ||\
+	fail "ssh-keygen of host_ca_key failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype2  -f $OBJ/host_ca_key2 ||\
+	fail "ssh-keygen of host_ca_key failed"
+
+kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+
+# Plain text revocation files
+touch $OBJ/host_revoked_empty
+touch $OBJ/host_revoked_plain
+touch $OBJ/host_revoked_cert
+cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub $OBJ/host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/host_revoked_ca
+
+PLAIN_TYPES=`echo "$SSH_KEYTYPES" | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'`
+
+if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+	PLAIN_TYPES="$PLAIN_TYPES rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512"
+fi
+
+# Prepare certificate, plain key and CA KRLs
+${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_empty || fatal "KRL init failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_plain || fatal "KRL init failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_cert || fatal "KRL init failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_ca $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub $OBJ/host_ca_key2.pub \
+	|| fatal "KRL init failed"
+
+# Generate and sign host keys
+serial=1
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+	verbose "$tid: sign host ${ktype} cert"
+	# Generate and sign a host key
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \
+	    -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \
+		fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed"
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -ukf $OBJ/host_krl_plain \
+	    $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub || fatal "KRL update failed"
+	cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub >> $OBJ/host_revoked_plain
+	case $ktype in
+	rsa-sha2-*)	tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;;
+	*)		tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;;
+	esac
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -h -q -s $ca -z $serial $tflag \
+	    -I "regress host key for $USER" \
+	    -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} ||
+		fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}"
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -ukf $OBJ/host_krl_cert \
+	    $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub || \
+		fatal "KRL update failed"
+	cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub >> $OBJ/host_revoked_cert
+	serial=`expr $serial + 1`
+done
+
+attempt_connect() {
+	_ident="$1"
+	_expect_success="$2"
+	shift; shift
+	verbose "$tid: $_ident expect success $_expect_success"
+	cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+	${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+	    -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+	    "$@" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	_r=$?
+	if [ "x$_expect_success" = "xyes" ] ; then
+		if [ $_r -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect $_ident failed"
+		fi
+	else
+		if [ $_r -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect $_ident succeeded unexpectedly"
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+# Basic connect and revocation tests.
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+	verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} cert connect"
+	(
+		cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+		echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
+		echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+	#               test name                         expect success
+	attempt_connect "$ktype basic connect"			"yes"
+	attempt_connect "$ktype empty KRL"			"yes" \
+	    -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_empty
+	attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ plain key revoked"	"no" \
+	    -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_plain
+	attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ cert revoked"		"no" \
+	    -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_cert
+	attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ CA revoked"		"no" \
+	    -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_ca
+	attempt_connect "$ktype empty plaintext revocation"	"yes" \
+	    -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_empty
+	attempt_connect "$ktype plain key plaintext revocation"	"no" \
+	    -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_plain
+	attempt_connect "$ktype cert plaintext revocation"	"no" \
+	    -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_cert
+	attempt_connect "$ktype CA plaintext revocation"	"no" \
+	    -oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_ca
+done
+
+# Revoked certificates with key present
+kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+	test -f "$OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub" || fatal "no pubkey"
+	kh_revoke cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub >> $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+done
+cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+	verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert"
+	(
+		cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+		echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
+		echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+	cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+	${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+	    -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+		-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+done
+
+# Revoked CA
+kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+kh_revoke host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub >> $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+	verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert"
+	(
+		cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+		echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
+		echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+	${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+	    -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+		-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+done
+
+# Create a CA key and add it to known hosts
+kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+
+test_one() {
+	ident=$1
+	result=$2
+	sign_opts=$3
+
+	for kt in $PLAIN_TYPES; do
+		case $ktype in
+		rsa-sha2-*)	tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;;
+		*)		tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;;
+		esac
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $ca $tflag -I "regress host key for $USER" \
+		    $sign_opts $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} ||
+			fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}"
+		(
+			cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+			echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}
+			echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub
+		) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+		cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+		${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+		    -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		rc=$?
+		if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then
+			if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
+				fail "ssh cert connect $ident failed unexpectedly"
+			fi
+		else
+			if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then
+				fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
+			fi
+		fi
+	done
+}
+
+test_one "user-certificate"	failure "-n $HOSTS"
+test_one "empty principals"	success "-h"
+test_one "wrong principals"	failure "-h -n foo"
+test_one "cert not yet valid"	failure "-h -V20300101:20320101"
+test_one "cert expired"		failure "-h -V19800101:19900101"
+test_one "cert valid interval"	success "-h -V-1w:+2w"
+test_one "cert has constraints"	failure "-h -Oforce-command=false"
+
+# Check downgrade of cert to raw key when no CA found
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+	rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert $OBJ/cert_host_key*
+	verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} ${v} cert downgrade to raw key"
+	# Generate and sign a host key
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \
+		fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed"
+	case $ktype in
+	rsa-sha2-*)	tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;;
+	*)		tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;;
+	esac
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -h -q $tflag -s $ca $tflag \
+	    -I "regress host key for $USER" \
+	    -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} ||
+		fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}"
+	(
+		printf "$HOSTS "
+		cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub
+	) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+	(
+		cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+		echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
+		echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+	${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+	    -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=none -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+	fi
+	# Also check that it works when the known_hosts file is not in the
+	# first array position.
+	${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile="/dev/null $OBJ/known_hosts-cert" \
+	    -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=none -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect failed known_hosts 2nd"
+	fi
+done
+
+# Wrong certificate
+kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
+cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+for kt in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+	verbose "$tid: host ${kt} connect wrong cert"
+	rm -f $OBJ/cert_host_key*
+	# Self-sign key
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${kt} -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} || \
+		fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${kt} failed"
+	case $kt in
+	rsa-sha2-*)	tflag="-t $kt" ;;
+	*)		tflag="" ;;
+	esac
+	${SSHKEYGEN} $tflag -h -q -s $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} \
+	    -I "regress host key for $USER" \
+	    -n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} ||
+		fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}"
+	(
+		cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+		echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}
+		echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+	cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
+	${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+	    -oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
+		-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -q somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+done
+
+rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert* $OBJ/host_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_host_key*
diff --git a/regress/cert-userkey.sh b/regress/cert-userkey.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ea29b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/cert-userkey.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.28 2021/09/30 05:26:26 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="certified user keys"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+
+PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
+EXTRA_TYPES=""
+rsa=""
+
+if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+	rsa=rsa
+	PLAIN_TYPES="$PLAIN_TYPES rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512"
+fi
+
+kname() {
+	case $1 in
+	rsa-sha2-*) n="$1" ;;
+	sk-ecdsa-*) n="sk-ecdsa" ;;
+	sk-ssh-ed25519*) n="sk-ssh-ed25519" ;;
+	# subshell because some seds will add a newline
+	*) n=$(echo $1 | sed 's/^dsa/ssh-dss/;s/^rsa/ssh-rsa/;s/^ed/ssh-ed/') ;;
+	esac
+	if [ -z "$rsa" ]; then
+		echo "$n*,ssh-ed25519*"
+	else
+		echo "$n*,ssh-rsa*,ssh-ed25519*"
+	fi
+}
+
+# Create a CA key
+if [ ! -z "$rsa" ]; then
+	catype=rsa
+else
+	catype=ed25519
+fi
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $catype  -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
+	fail "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed"
+
+# Generate and sign user keys
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES $EXTRA_TYPES ; do
+	verbose "$tid: sign user ${ktype} cert"
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \
+	    -f $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || \
+		fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key_${ktype} failed"
+	# Generate RSA/SHA2 certs for rsa-sha2* keys.
+	case $ktype in
+	rsa-sha2-*)	tflag="-t $ktype" ;;
+	*)		tflag="" ;;
+	esac
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -z $$ \
+	    -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+	    -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $tflag $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || \
+		fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
+done
+
+# Test explicitly-specified principals
+for ktype in $EXTRA_TYPES $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+	t=$(kname $ktype)
+	_prefix="${ktype}"
+
+	# Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+	rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	(
+		cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+		echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile " \
+		    "$OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
+		echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+		echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	(
+		cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+		echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
+	) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+	# Missing authorized_principals
+	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} missing authorized_principals"
+	rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+
+	# Empty authorized_principals
+	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals"
+	echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+
+	# Wrong authorized_principals
+	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals"
+	echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+
+	# Correct authorized_principals
+	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals"
+	echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+	fi
+
+	# authorized_principals with bad key option
+	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt"
+	echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+
+	# authorized_principals with command=false
+	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false"
+	echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \
+	    $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+
+
+	# authorized_principals with command=true
+	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true"
+	echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \
+	    $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+	fi
+
+	# Setup for principals= key option
+	rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	(
+		cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+		echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	(
+		cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+		echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
+	) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+	# Wrong principals list
+	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option"
+	(
+		printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" '
+		cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+	) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+
+	# Correct principals list
+	verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option"
+	(
+		printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" '
+		cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+	) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+	fi
+done
+
+basic_tests() {
+	auth=$1
+	if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then
+		# Add CA to authorized_keys
+		(
+			printf 'cert-authority '
+			cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+		) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	else
+		echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+		extra_sshd="TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+	fi
+
+	for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+		t=$(kname $ktype)
+		_prefix="${ktype} $auth"
+		# Simple connect
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} connect"
+		(
+			cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+			echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
+			echo "$extra_sshd"
+		) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		(
+			cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+			echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
+		) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+		${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+		fi
+
+		# Revoked keys
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} revoked key"
+		(
+			cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+			echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked"
+			echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
+			echo "$extra_sshd"
+		) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		cp $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub \
+		    $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
+		${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
+		fi
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} revoked via KRL"
+		rm $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked \
+		    $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub
+		${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
+		fi
+		verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty KRL"
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
+		${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+		    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+		fi
+	done
+
+	# Revoked CA
+	verbose "$tid: ${ktype} $auth revoked CA key"
+	(
+		cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+		echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+		echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
+		echo "$extra_sshd"
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
+	    somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
+	fi
+
+	verbose "$tid: $auth CA does not authenticate"
+	(
+		cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+		echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}"
+		echo "$extra_sshd"
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	verbose "$tid: ensure CA key does not authenticate user"
+	${SSH} -i $OBJ/user_ca_key \
+	    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect with CA key succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+}
+
+basic_tests authorized_keys
+basic_tests TrustedUserCAKeys
+
+test_one() {
+	ident=$1
+	result=$2
+	sign_opts=$3
+	auth_choice=$4
+	auth_opt=$5
+
+	if test "x$auth_choice" = "x" ; then
+		auth_choice="authorized_keys TrustedUserCAKeys"
+	fi
+
+	for auth in $auth_choice ; do
+		for ktype in $rsa ed25519 ; do
+			cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+			if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then
+				# Add CA to authorized_keys
+				(
+					printf "cert-authority${auth_opt} "
+					cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+				) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+			else
+				echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+				echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" \
+				    >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+				echo "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ${t}*" \
+				    >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+				if test "x$auth_opt" != "x" ; then
+					echo $auth_opt >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+				fi
+			fi
+
+			verbose "$tid: $ident auth $auth expect $result $ktype"
+			${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key \
+			    -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+			    $sign_opts $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
+				fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
+
+			${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
+			    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+			rc=$?
+			if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then
+				if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
+					fail "$ident failed unexpectedly"
+				fi
+			else
+				if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then
+					fail "$ident succeeded unexpectedly"
+				fi
+			fi
+		done
+	done
+}
+
+test_one "correct principal"	success "-n ${USER}"
+test_one "host-certificate"	failure "-n ${USER} -h"
+test_one "wrong principals"	failure "-n foo"
+test_one "cert not yet valid"	failure "-n ${USER} -V20300101:20320101"
+test_one "cert expired"		failure "-n ${USER} -V19800101:19900101"
+test_one "cert valid interval"	success "-n ${USER} -V-1w:+2w"
+test_one "wrong source-address"	failure "-n ${USER} -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8"
+test_one "force-command"	failure "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false"
+
+# Behaviour is different here: TrustedUserCAKeys doesn't allow empty principals
+test_one "empty principals"	success "" authorized_keys
+test_one "empty principals"	failure "" TrustedUserCAKeys
+
+# Check explicitly-specified principals: an empty principals list in the cert
+# should always be refused.
+
+# AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \
+    TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
+test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile no principals" failure "" \
+    TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
+
+# principals= key option
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+test_one "principals key option principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \
+    authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"'
+test_one "principals key option no principals" failure "" \
+    authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"'
+
+# command= options vs. force-command in key
+test_one "force-command match true" success \
+    "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=true" \
+    authorized_keys ',command="true"'
+test_one "force-command match true" failure \
+    "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false" \
+    authorized_keys ',command="false"'
+test_one "force-command mismatch 1" failure \
+    "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false" \
+    authorized_keys ',command="true"'
+test_one "force-command mismatch 2" failure \
+    "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=true" \
+    authorized_keys ',command="false"'
+
+# Wrong certificate
+cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
+	t=$(kname $ktype)
+	# Self-sign
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -I \
+	    "regress user key for $USER" \
+	    -n $USER $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
+		fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
+	verbose "$tid: user ${ktype} connect wrong cert"
+	${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
+	    somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
+	fi
+done
+
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+
diff --git a/regress/cfginclude.sh b/regress/cfginclude.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f5b492f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/cfginclude.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,293 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.3 2021/06/08 06:52:43 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="config include"
+
+# to appease StrictModes
+umask 022
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
+Match host a
+	Hostname aa
+
+Match host b # comment
+	Hostname bb
+	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+
+Match host c
+	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+	Hostname cc
+
+Match host m
+	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* # comment
+
+Host d
+	Hostname dd # comment
+
+Host e
+	Hostname ee
+	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+
+Host f
+	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+	Hostname ff
+
+Host n
+	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.0 << _EOF
+Match host xxxxxx
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.1 << _EOF
+Match host a
+	Hostname aaa
+
+Match host b
+	Hostname bbb
+
+Match host c # comment
+	Hostname ccc
+
+Host d # comment
+	Hostname ddd
+
+Host e
+	Hostname eee
+
+Host f
+	Hostname fff # comment
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.2 << _EOF
+Match host a
+	Hostname aaaa
+
+Match host b
+	Hostname bbbb
+
+Match host c
+	Hostname cccc
+
+Host d
+	Hostname dddd
+
+Host e
+	Hostname eeee
+
+Host f
+	Hostname ffff
+
+Match all
+	Hostname xxxx
+_EOF
+
+trial() {
+	_host="$1"
+	_exp="$2"
+	${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G "$_host" > $OBJ/ssh_config.out ||
+		fatal "ssh config parse failed"
+	_got=`grep -i '^hostname ' $OBJ/ssh_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
+	if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then
+		fail "host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got"
+	fi
+}
+
+trial a aa
+trial b bb
+trial c ccc
+trial d dd
+trial e ee
+trial f fff
+trial m xxxx
+trial n xxxx
+trial x x
+
+# Prepare an included config with an error.
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.3 << _EOF
+Hostname xxxx
+	Junk
+_EOF
+
+${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G a 2>/dev/null && \
+	fail "ssh include allowed invalid config"
+
+${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G x 2>/dev/null && \
+	fail "ssh include allowed invalid config"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+
+# Ensure that a missing include is not fatal.
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
+Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+Hostname aa
+_EOF
+
+trial a aa
+
+# Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent.
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF
+Match host x
+_EOF
+
+trial a aa
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF
+Host x
+_EOF
+
+trial a aa
+
+# cleanup
+rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* $OBJ/ssh_config.out
+#	$OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.3 2021/06/08 06:52:43 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="config include"
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
+Match host a
+	Hostname aa
+
+Match host b
+	Hostname bb
+	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+
+Match host c
+	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+	Hostname cc
+
+Match host m
+	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+
+Host d
+	Hostname dd
+
+Host e
+	Hostname ee
+	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+
+Host f
+	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+	Hostname ff
+
+Host n
+	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.0 << _EOF
+Match host xxxxxx
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.1 << _EOF
+Match host a
+	Hostname aaa
+
+Match host b # comment
+	Hostname bbb
+
+Match host c
+	Hostname ccc # comment
+
+Host d
+	Hostname ddd
+
+Host e
+	Hostname eee
+
+Host f
+	Hostname fff
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.2 << _EOF
+Match host a
+	Hostname aaaa
+
+Match host b
+	Hostname bbbb
+
+Match host c
+	Hostname cccc
+
+Host d
+	Hostname dddd
+
+Host e
+	Hostname eeee
+
+Host f
+	Hostname ffff
+
+Match all # comment
+	Hostname xxxx # comment
+_EOF
+
+trial() {
+	_host="$1"
+	_exp="$2"
+	${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G "$_host" > $OBJ/ssh_config.out ||
+		fatal "ssh config parse failed"
+	_got=`grep -i '^hostname ' $OBJ/ssh_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
+	if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then
+		fail "host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got"
+	fi
+}
+
+trial a aa
+trial b bb
+trial c ccc
+trial d dd
+trial e ee
+trial f fff
+trial m xxxx
+trial n xxxx
+trial x x
+
+# Prepare an included config with an error.
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.3 << _EOF
+Hostname xxxx
+	Junk
+_EOF
+
+${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G a 2>/dev/null && \
+	fail "ssh include allowed invalid config"
+
+${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G x 2>/dev/null && \
+	fail "ssh include allowed invalid config"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+
+# Ensure that a missing include is not fatal.
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
+Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+Hostname aa
+_EOF
+
+trial a aa
+
+# Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent.
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF
+Match host x
+_EOF
+
+trial a aa
+
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.x << _EOF
+Host x
+_EOF
+
+trial a aa
+
+# Ensure that recursive includes are bounded.
+cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
+Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i
+_EOF
+
+${REAL_SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config.i -G a 2>/dev/null && \
+	fail "ssh include allowed infinite recursion?" # or hang...
+
+# cleanup
+rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* $OBJ/ssh_config.out
diff --git a/regress/cfgmatch.sh b/regress/cfgmatch.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05a6668
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/cfgmatch.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.13 2021/06/08 06:52:43 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sshd_config match"
+
+pidfile=$OBJ/remote_pid
+fwdport=3301
+fwd="-L $fwdport:127.0.0.1:$PORT"
+
+echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+start_client()
+{
+	rm -f $pidfile
+	${SSH} -q $fwd "$@" somehost \
+	    exec sh -c \'"echo \$\$ > $pidfile; exec sleep 100"\' \
+	    >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
+	client_pid=$!
+	# Wait for remote end
+	n=0
+	while test ! -f $pidfile ; do
+		sleep 1
+		n=`expr $n + 1`
+		if test $n -gt 60; then
+			kill $client_pid
+			fatal "timeout waiting for background ssh"
+		fi
+	done	
+}
+
+stop_client()
+{
+	pid=`cat $pidfile`
+	if [ ! -z "$pid" ]; then
+		kill $pid
+	fi
+	wait
+}
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 # comment" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:2 127.0.0.1:3 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+
+grep -v AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null # comment" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match user $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1 # comment" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:2 127.0.0.1:3 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T >/dev/null || \
+    fail "config w/match fails config test"
+
+start_sshd
+
+# Test Match + PermitOpen in sshd_config.  This should be permitted
+trace "match permitopen localhost"
+start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config
+${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
+    fail "match permitopen permit"
+stop_client
+
+# Same but from different source.  This should not be permitted
+trace "match permitopen proxy"
+start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
+    fail "match permitopen deny"
+stop_client
+
+# Retry previous with key option, should also be denied.
+cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	printf 'permitopen="127.0.0.1:'$PORT'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+done
+trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts"
+start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
+    fail "match permitopen deny w/key opt"
+stop_client
+
+# Test both sshd_config and key options permitting the same dst/port pair.
+# Should be permitted.
+trace "match permitopen localhost"
+start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_config
+${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
+    fail "match permitopen permit"
+stop_client
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:$PORT 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match User $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# Test that a Match overrides a PermitOpen in the global section
+trace "match permitopen proxy w/key opts"
+start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true && \
+    fail "match override permitopen"
+stop_client
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:$PORT 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match User NoSuchUser" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitOpen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# Test that a rule that doesn't match doesn't override, plus test a
+# PermitOpen entry that's not at the start of the list
+trace "nomatch permitopen proxy w/key opts"
+start_client -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
+    fail "nomatch override permitopen"
+stop_client
+
+# Test parsing of available Match criteria (with the exception of Group which
+# requires knowledge of actual group memberships user running the test).
+params="user:user:u1 host:host:h1 address:addr:1.2.3.4 \
+    localaddress:laddr:5.6.7.8 rdomain:rdomain:rdom1"
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_config
+echo 'Banner /nomatch' >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+for i in $params; do
+	config=`echo $i | cut -f1 -d:`
+	criteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:`
+	value=`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:`
+	cat >>$OBJ/sshd_config <<EOD
+	    Match $config $value
+	      Banner /$value
+EOD
+done
+
+${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T >/dev/null || \
+    fail "validate config for w/out spec"
+
+# Test matching each criteria.
+for i in $params; do
+	testcriteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:`
+	expected=/`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:`
+	spec=""
+	for j in $params; do
+		config=`echo $j | cut -f1 -d:`
+		criteria=`echo $j | cut -f2 -d:`
+		value=`echo $j | cut -f3 -d:`
+		if [ "$criteria" = "$testcriteria" ]; then
+			spec="$criteria=$value,$spec"
+		else
+			spec="$criteria=1$value,$spec"
+		fi
+	done
+	trace "test spec $spec"
+	result=`${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T -C "$spec" | \
+	    awk '$1=="banner"{print $2}'`
+	if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then
+		fail "match $config expected $expected got $result"
+	fi
+done
diff --git a/regress/cfgmatchlisten.sh b/regress/cfgmatchlisten.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a4fd66b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/cfgmatchlisten.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: cfgmatchlisten.sh,v 1.3 2018/07/02 14:13:30 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sshd_config matchlisten"
+
+pidfile=$OBJ/remote_pid
+fwdport=3301
+fwdspec="localhost:${fwdport}"
+fwd="-R $fwdport:127.0.0.1:$PORT"
+
+echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+echo "ExitOnForwardFailure=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+start_client()
+{
+	rm -f $pidfile
+	${SSH} -vvv $fwd "$@" somehost true >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		return $r
+	fi
+	${SSH} -vvv $fwd "$@" somehost \
+	    exec sh -c \'"echo \$\$ > $pidfile; exec sleep 100"\' \
+	    >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
+	client_pid=$!
+	# Wait for remote end
+	n=0
+	while test ! -f $pidfile ; do
+		sleep 1
+		n=`expr $n + 1`
+		if test $n -gt 60; then
+			kill $client_pid
+			fatal "timeout waiting for background ssh"
+		fi
+	done
+	return $r
+}
+
+expect_client_ok()
+{
+	start_client "$@" ||
+	    fail "client did not start"
+}
+
+expect_client_fail()
+{
+	local failmsg="$1"
+	shift
+	start_client "$@" &&
+	    fail $failmsg
+}
+
+stop_client()
+{
+	pid=`cat $pidfile`
+	if [ ! -z "$pid" ]; then
+		kill $pid
+	fi
+	wait
+}
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:2 127.0.0.1:3 $fwdspec" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+
+grep -v AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match user $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "AuthorizedKeysFile /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match Address 127.0.0.1" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:2 127.0.0.1:3 $fwdspec" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+start_sshd
+
+#set -x
+
+# Test Match + PermitListen in sshd_config.  This should be permitted
+trace "match permitlisten localhost"
+expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_config
+${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
+    fail "match permitlisten permit"
+stop_client
+
+# Same but from different source.  This should not be permitted
+trace "match permitlisten proxy"
+expect_client_fail "match permitlisten deny" \
+    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+# Retry previous with key option, should also be denied.
+cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	printf 'permitlisten="'$fwdspec'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+done
+trace "match permitlisten proxy w/key opts"
+expect_client_fail "match permitlisten deny w/key opt"\
+    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+# Test both sshd_config and key options permitting the same dst/port pair.
+# Should be permitted.
+trace "match permitlisten localhost"
+expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_config
+${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
+    fail "match permitlisten permit"
+stop_client
+
+# Test that a bare port number is accepted in PermitListen
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 $fwdport 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+trace "match permitlisten bare"
+expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_config
+${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
+    fail "match permitlisten bare"
+stop_client
+
+# Test that an incorrect bare port number is denied as expected
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitListen 1 2 99" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+trace "match permitlisten bare"
+expect_client_fail -F $OBJ/ssh_config
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 $fwdspec 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match User $USER" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# Test that a Match overrides a PermitListen in the global section
+trace "match permitlisten proxy w/key opts"
+expect_client_fail "match override permitlisten" \
+    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 $fwdspec 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match User NoSuchUser" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 127.0.0.1:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# Test that a rule that doesn't match doesn't override, plus test a
+# PermitListen entry that's not at the start of the list
+trace "nomatch permitlisten proxy w/key opts"
+expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
+    fail "nomatch override permitlisten"
+stop_client
+
+# bind to 127.0.0.1 instead of default localhost
+fwdspec2="127.0.0.1:${fwdport}"
+fwd="-R ${fwdspec2}:127.0.0.1:$PORT"
+
+# first try w/ old fwdspec both in server config and key opts
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 $fwdspec 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	printf 'permitlisten="'$fwdspec'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+done
+trace "nomatch permitlisten 127.0.0.1 server config and userkey"
+expect_client_fail "nomatch 127.0.0.1 server config and userkey" \
+    -F $OBJ/ssh_config
+
+# correct server config, denied by key opts
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "PermitListen 127.0.0.1:1 ${fwdspec2} 127.0.0.2:2" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+trace "nomatch permitlisten 127.0.0.1 w/key opts"
+expect_client_fail "nomatch 127.0.0.1 w/key opts" \
+    -F $OBJ/ssh_config
+
+# fix key opts
+cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	printf 'permitlisten="'$fwdspec2'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+done
+trace "match permitlisten 127.0.0.1 server config w/key opts"
+expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
+    fail "match 127.0.0.1 server config w/key opts"
+stop_client
+
+# key opts with bare port number
+cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	printf 'permitlisten="'$fwdport'" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+done
+trace "match permitlisten 127.0.0.1 server config w/key opts (bare)"
+expect_client_ok -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+${SSH} -q -p $fwdport -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true || \
+    fail "match 127.0.0.1 server config w/key opts (bare)"
+stop_client
+
+# key opts with incorrect bare port number
+cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	printf 'permitlisten="99" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+done
+trace "match permitlisten 127.0.0.1 server config w/key opts (wrong bare)"
+expect_client_fail "nomatch 127.0.0.1 w/key opts (wrong bare)" \
+    -F $OBJ/ssh_config
diff --git a/regress/cfgparse.sh b/regress/cfgparse.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a9e5c6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/cfgparse.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: cfgparse.sh,v 1.7 2018/05/11 03:51:06 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sshd config parse"
+
+# This is a reasonable proxy for IPv6 support.
+if ! config_defined HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR ; then
+	SKIP_IPV6=yes
+fi
+
+# We need to use the keys generated for the regression test because sshd -T
+# will fail if we're not running with SUDO (no permissions for real keys) or
+# if we are running tests on a system that has never had sshd installed
+# because the keys won't exist.
+
+grep "HostKey " $OBJ/sshd_config > $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal
+SSHD_KEYS="`cat $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal`"
+
+verbose "reparse minimal config"
+($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal >$OBJ/sshd_config.1 &&
+ $SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/sshd_config.1 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || fail "reparse minimal config"
+
+verbose "reparse regress config"
+($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config >$OBJ/sshd_config.1 &&
+ $SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/sshd_config.1 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || fail "reparse regress config"
+
+verbose "listenaddress order"
+# expected output
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.0 <<EOD
+listenaddress 1.2.3.4:1234
+listenaddress 1.2.3.4:5678
+EOD
+[ X${SKIP_IPV6} = Xyes ] || cat >> $OBJ/sshd_config.0 <<EOD
+listenaddress [::1]:1234
+listenaddress [::1]:5678
+EOD
+
+# test input sets.  should all result in the output above.
+# test 1: addressfamily and port first
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD
+${SSHD_KEYS}
+addressfamily any
+port 1234
+port 5678
+listenaddress 1.2.3.4
+EOD
+[ X${SKIP_IPV6} = Xyes ] || cat >> $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD
+listenaddress ::1
+EOD
+
+($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 | \
+ grep 'listenaddress ' >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \
+ fail "listenaddress order 1"
+# test 2: listenaddress first
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD
+${SSHD_KEYS}
+listenaddress 1.2.3.4
+port 1234
+port 5678
+addressfamily any
+EOD
+[ X${SKIP_IPV6} = Xyes ] || cat >> $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <<EOD
+listenaddress ::1
+EOD
+
+($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 | \
+ grep 'listenaddress ' >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \
+ fail "listenaddress order 2"
+
+# cleanup
+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.[012]
diff --git a/regress/channel-timeout.sh b/regress/channel-timeout.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c42e83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/channel-timeout.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: channel-timeout.sh,v 1.1 2023/01/06 08:07:39 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="channel timeout"
+
+# XXX not comprehensive. Still need -R -L agent X11 forwarding + interactive
+
+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig 
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+
+verbose "no timeout"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep 5 ; exit 23"
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 23 ]; then
+	fail "ssh failed"
+fi
+
+verbose "command timeout"
+(cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig ; echo "ChannelTimeout session:command=1") \
+	> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep 5 ; exit 23"
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 255 ]; then
+	fail "ssh returned unexpected error code $r"
+fi
+
+verbose "command wildcard timeout"
+(cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig ; echo "ChannelTimeout session:*=1") \
+	> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep 5 ; exit 23"
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 255 ]; then
+	fail "ssh returned unexpected error code $r"
+fi
+
+verbose "command irrelevant timeout"
+(cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig ; echo "ChannelTimeout session:shell=1") \
+	> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep 5 ; exit 23"
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 23 ]; then
+	fail "ssh failed"
+fi
+
+# Set up a "slow sftp server" that sleeps before executing the real one.
+cat > $OBJ/slow-sftp-server.sh << _EOF
+#!/bin/sh
+
+sleep 5
+$SFTPSERVER
+_EOF
+chmod a+x $OBJ/slow-sftp-server.sh
+
+verbose "sftp no timeout"
+(grep -vi subsystem.*sftp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig;
+ echo "Subsystem sftp $OBJ/slow-sftp-server.sh" ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+$SFTP -qS $SSH -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost:$DATA $COPY
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "sftp failed"
+fi
+cmp $DATA $COPY || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+verbose "sftp timeout"
+(grep -vi subsystem.*sftp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig;
+ echo "ChannelTimeout session:subsystem:sftp=1" ;
+ echo "Subsystem sftp $OBJ/slow-sftp-server.sh" ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+$SFTP -qS $SSH -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost:$DATA $COPY
+r=$?
+if [ $r -eq 0 ]; then
+	fail "sftp succeeded unexpectedly"
+fi
+test -f $COPY && cmp $DATA $COPY && fail "intact copy"
+
+verbose "sftp irrelevant timeout"
+(grep -vi subsystem.*sftp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig;
+ echo "ChannelTimeout session:subsystem:command=1" ;
+ echo "Subsystem sftp $OBJ/slow-sftp-server.sh" ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+$SFTP -qS $SSH -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost:$DATA $COPY
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "sftp failed"
+fi
+cmp $DATA $COPY || fail "corrupted copy"
+
diff --git a/regress/check-perm.c b/regress/check-perm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dac307d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/check-perm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
+/*
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: modpipe.c,v 1.6 2013/11/21 03:16:47 djm Exp $ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
+#include <libgen.h>
+#endif
+
+static void
+fatal(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
+	fputc('\n', stderr);
+	va_end(args);
+	exit(1);
+}
+/* Based on session.c. NB. keep tests in sync */
+static void
+safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
+{
+	const char *cp;
+	char component[PATH_MAX];
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (*path != '/')
+		fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
+	if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
+		fatal("chroot path too long");
+
+	/*
+	 * Descend the path, checking that each component is a
+	 * root-owned directory with strict permissions.
+	 */
+	for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
+		if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
+			strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
+		else {
+			cp++;
+			memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
+			component[cp - path] = '\0';
+		}
+
+		/* debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component); */
+
+		if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
+			    component, strerror(errno));
+		if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
+			fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
+			    "directory %s\"%s\"",
+			    cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
+		if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
+			fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
+			    cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
+
+	}
+
+	if (chdir(path) == -1)
+		fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
+		    "%s", path, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+/* from platform.c */
+int
+platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid)
+{
+	if (uid == 0)
+		return 1;
+#ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
+	if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID)
+		return 1;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* from auth.c */
+int
+auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
+    uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
+{
+	char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX];
+	char *cp;
+	int comparehome = 0;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
+		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
+		comparehome = 1;
+
+	if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
+		snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
+	    (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+		snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
+		    buf);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
+	for (;;) {
+		if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
+			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
+			return -1;
+		}
+		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
+
+		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
+		    (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
+		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
+			snprintf(err, errlen,
+			    "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		/* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
+		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
+			break;
+
+		/*
+		 * dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
+		 * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
+		 */
+		if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
+			break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "check-perm -m [chroot | keys-command] [path]\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	const char *path = ".";
+	char errmsg[256];
+	int ch, mode = -1;
+	extern char *optarg;
+	extern int optind;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hm:")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'm':
+			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "chroot") == 0)
+				mode = 1;
+			else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "keys-command") == 0)
+				mode = 2;
+			else {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid -m option\n"),
+				usage();
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			usage();
+		}
+	}
+	argc -= optind;
+	argv += optind;
+
+	if (argc > 1)
+		usage();
+	else if (argc == 1)
+		path = argv[0];
+
+	if (mode == 1)
+		safely_chroot(path, getuid());
+	else if (mode == 2) {
+		if (stat(path, &st) < 0)
+			fatal("Could not stat %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+		if (auth_secure_path(path, &st, NULL, 0,
+		    errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0)
+			fatal("Unsafe %s: %s", path, errmsg);
+	} else {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Invalid mode\n");
+		usage();
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/regress/cipher-speed.sh b/regress/cipher-speed.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1340bd1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/cipher-speed.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.14 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="cipher speed"
+
+# Enable all supported ciphers and macs.
+ciphers=`${SSH} -Q Ciphers | tr '\n' , | sed 's/,$//'`
+macs=`${SSH} -Q MACs | tr '\n' , | sed 's/,$//'`
+cat >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy <<EOD
+Ciphers $ciphers
+MACs $macs
+EOD
+
+increase_datafile_size 10000 # 10MB
+
+getbytes ()
+{
+	sed -n -e '/transferred/s/.*secs (\(.* bytes.sec\).*/\1/p' \
+	    -e '/copied/s/.*s, \(.* MB.s\).*/\1/p'
+}
+
+tries="1 2"
+
+for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do n=0; for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do
+	trace "cipher $c mac $m"
+	for x in $tries; do
+		printf "%-60s" "$c/$m:"
+		( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \
+			-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -m $m -c $c somehost \
+			exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \
+		< ${DATA} ) 2>&1 | getbytes
+
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh failed with mac $m cipher $c"
+		fi
+	done
+	# No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they are ignored.
+	if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+		break
+	fi
+	n=`expr $n + 1`
+done; done
diff --git a/regress/conch-ciphers.sh b/regress/conch-ciphers.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6678813
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/conch-ciphers.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: conch-ciphers.sh,v 1.4 2019/07/05 04:12:46 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="conch ciphers"
+
+if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH" != "xyes" ; then
+	echo "conch interop tests not enabled"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+start_sshd
+
+for c in aes256-ctr aes256-cbc aes192-ctr aes192-cbc aes128-ctr aes128-cbc \
+         cast128-cbc blowfish 3des-cbc ; do
+	verbose "$tid: cipher $c"
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+	# XXX the 2nd "cat" seems to be needed because of buggy FD handling
+	# in conch
+	${CONCH} --identity $OBJ/ssh-rsa --port $PORT --user $USER -e none \
+	    --known-hosts $OBJ/known_hosts --notty --noagent --nox11 -n \
+	    127.0.0.1 "cat ${DATA}" 2>/dev/null | cat > ${COPY}
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+	fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy"
+done
+rm -f ${COPY}
+
diff --git a/regress/connect-privsep.sh b/regress/connect-privsep.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8970340
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/connect-privsep.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: connect-privsep.sh,v 1.9 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="proxy connect with privsep"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation yes' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh privsep+proxyconnect failed"
+fi
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect failed"
+fi
+
+# Because sandbox is sensitive to changes in libc, especially malloc, retest
+# with every malloc.conf option (and none).
+if [ -z "$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS" ]; then
+	mopts="C F G J R S U X < >"
+else
+	mopts=`echo $TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS | sed 's/./& /g'`
+fi
+for m in '' $mopts ; do
+	env MALLOC_OPTIONS="$m" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect mopt '$m' failed"
+	fi
+done
diff --git a/regress/connect-uri.sh b/regress/connect-uri.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f13f15e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/connect-uri.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: connect-uri.sh,v 1.1 2017/10/24 19:33:32 millert Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="uri connect"
+
+# Remove Port and User from ssh_config, we want to rely on the URI
+cp $OBJ/ssh_config $OBJ/ssh_config.orig
+egrep -v '^	+(Port|User)	+.*$' $OBJ/ssh_config.orig > $OBJ/ssh_config
+
+start_sshd
+
+verbose "$tid: no trailing slash"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config "ssh://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}" true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh connection failed"
+fi
+
+verbose "$tid: trailing slash"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config "ssh://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/" true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh connection failed"
+fi
+
+verbose "$tid: with path name"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config "ssh://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DATA}" true \
+    > /dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh connection succeeded, expected failure"
+fi
diff --git a/regress/connect.sh b/regress/connect.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46f12b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/connect.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: connect.sh,v 1.8 2020/01/25 02:57:53 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="simple connect"
+
+start_sshd
+
+trace "direct connect"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh direct connect failed"
+fi
+
+trace "proxy connect"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -o "proxycommand $NC %h %p" somehost true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh proxycommand connect failed"
+fi
diff --git a/regress/connection-timeout.sh b/regress/connection-timeout.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c77abb3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/connection-timeout.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: connection-timeout.sh,v 1.2 2023/01/17 10:15:10 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="unused connection timeout"
+if config_defined DISABLE_FD_PASSING ; then
+       skip "not supported on this platform"
+fi
+
+CTL=$OBJ/ctl-sock
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+
+check_ssh() {
+	test -S $CTL || return 1
+	if ! ${REAL_SSH} -qF$OBJ/ssh_proxy -O check \
+	     -oControlPath=$CTL somehost >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+		return 1
+	fi
+	return 0
+}
+
+start_ssh() {
+	trace "start ssh"
+	${SSH} -nNfF $OBJ/ssh_proxy "$@" -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes \
+	    -oControlMaster=yes -oControlPath=$CTL somehost
+	r=$?
+	test $r -eq 0 || fatal "failed to start ssh $r"
+	check_ssh || fatal "ssh process unresponsive"
+}
+
+stop_ssh() {
+	test -S $CTL || return
+	check_ssh || fatal "ssh process is unresponsive: cannot close"
+	if ! ${REAL_SSH} -qF$OBJ/ssh_proxy -O exit \
+	     -oControlPath=$CTL >/dev/null somehost >/dev/null ; then
+		fatal "ssh process did not respond to close"
+	fi
+	n=0
+	while [ "$n" -lt 20 ] ; do
+		test -S $CTL || break
+		sleep 1
+		n=`expr $n + 1`
+	done
+	if test -S $CTL ; then
+		fatal "ssh process did not exit"
+	fi
+}
+
+trap "stop_ssh" EXIT
+
+verbose "no timeout"
+start_ssh
+sleep 5
+check_ssh || fatal "ssh unexpectedly missing"
+stop_ssh
+
+(cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig ; echo "UnusedConnectionTimeout 2") > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+verbose "timeout"
+start_ssh
+sleep 8
+check_ssh && fail "ssh unexpectedly present"
+stop_ssh
+
+verbose "session inhibits timeout"
+rm -f $OBJ/copy.1
+start_ssh
+${REAL_SSH} -qoControlPath=$CTL -oControlMaster=no -Fnone somehost \
+	"sleep 8; touch $OBJ/copy.1" &
+check_ssh || fail "ssh unexpectedly missing"
+wait
+test -f $OBJ/copy.1 || fail "missing result file"
+
+verbose "timeout after session"
+# Session should still be running from previous
+sleep 8
+check_ssh && fail "ssh unexpectedly present"
+stop_ssh
+
+LPORT=`expr $PORT + 1`
+RPORT=`expr $LPORT + 1`
+DPORT=`expr $RPORT + 1`
+RDPORT=`expr $DPORT + 1`
+verbose "timeout with listeners"
+start_ssh -L$LPORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT -R$RPORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT -D$DPORT -R$RDPORT
+sleep 8
+check_ssh && fail "ssh unexpectedly present"
+stop_ssh
diff --git a/regress/dhgex.sh b/regress/dhgex.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6dd4cfe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/dhgex.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: dhgex.sh,v 1.7 2020/12/21 22:48:41 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="dhgex"
+
+LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
+rm -f ${LOG}
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+kexs=`${SSH} -Q kex | grep diffie-hellman-group-exchange`
+
+ssh_test_dhgex()
+{
+	bits="$1"; shift
+	cipher="$1"; shift
+	kex="$1"; shift
+
+	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	echo "KexAlgorithms=$kex" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	echo "Ciphers=$cipher" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	rm -f ${LOG}
+	opts="-oKexAlgorithms=$kex -oCiphers=$cipher"
+	min=2048
+	max=8192
+	groupsz="$min<$bits<$max"
+	verbose "$tid bits $bits $kex $cipher"
+	${SSH} ${opts} $@ -vvv -F ${OBJ}/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh failed ($@)"
+	fi
+	# check what we request
+	grep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST($groupsz) sent" ${LOG} >/dev/null
+	if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+		got=`egrep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(.*) sent" ${LOG}`
+		fail "$tid unexpected GEX sizes, expected $groupsz, got $got"
+	fi
+	# check what we got.
+	gotbits="`awk 'BEGIN{FS="/"}/bits set:/{print $2}' ${LOG} |
+	    head -1 | tr -d '\r\n'`"
+	trace "expected '$bits' got '$gotbits'"
+	if [ -z "$gotbits" ] || [ "$gotbits" -lt "$bits" ]; then
+		fatal "$tid expected $bits bit group, got $gotbits"
+	fi
+}
+
+check()
+{
+	bits="$1"; shift
+
+	for c in $@; do
+		for k in $kexs; do
+			ssh_test_dhgex $bits $c $k
+		done
+	done
+}
+
+check 3072 3des-cbc  # 112 bits.
+check 3072 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 128`
+check 7680 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 192`
+check 8192 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 256`
+check 8192 chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
diff --git a/regress/dsa_ssh2.prv b/regress/dsa_ssh2.prv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c93b403
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/dsa_ssh2.prv
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----
+Subject: ssh-keygen test
+Comment: "1024-bit dsa, Tue Jan 08 2002 22:00:23 +0100"
+P2/56wAAAgIAAAAmZGwtbW9kcHtzaWdue2RzYS1uaXN0LXNoYTF9LGRoe3BsYWlufX0AAA
+AEbm9uZQAAAcQAAAHAAAAAAAAABACwUfm3AxZTut3icBmwCcD48nY64HzuELlQ+vEqjIcR
+Lo49es/DQTeLNQ+kdKRCfouosGNv0WqxRtF0tUsWdXxS37oHGa4QPugBdHRd7YlZGZv8kg
+x7FsoepY7v7E683/97dv2zxL3AGagTEzWr7fl0yPexAaZoDvtQrrjX44BLmwAABACWQkvv
+MxnD8eFkS1konFfMJ1CkuRfTN34CBZ6dY7VTSGemy4QwtFdMKmoufD0eKgy3p5WOeWCYKt
+F4FhjHKZk/aaxFjjIbtkrnlvXg64QI11dSZyBN6/ViQkHPSkUDF+A6AAEhrNbQbAFSvao1
+kTvNtPCtL0AkUIduEMzGQfLCTAAAAKDeC043YVo9Zo0zAEeIA4uZh4LBCQAAA/9aj7Y5ik
+ehygJ4qTDSlVypsPuV+n59tMS0e2pfrSG87yf5r94AKBmJeho5OO6wYaXCxsVB7AFbSUD6
+75AK8mHF4v1/+7SWKk5f8xlMCMSPZ9K0+j/W1d/q2qkhnnDZolOHDomLA+U00i5ya/jnTV
+zyDPWLFpWK8u3xGBPAYX324gAAAKDHFvooRnaXdZbeWGTTqmgHB1GU9A==
+---- END SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----
diff --git a/regress/dsa_ssh2.pub b/regress/dsa_ssh2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..215d73b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/dsa_ssh2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----
+Subject: ssh-keygen test
+Comment: "1024-bit dsa, Tue Jan 08 2002 22:00:23 +0100"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+---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----
diff --git a/regress/dynamic-forward.sh b/regress/dynamic-forward.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a4aa6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/dynamic-forward.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: dynamic-forward.sh,v 1.15 2023/01/06 08:50:33 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="dynamic forwarding"
+
+# This is a reasonable proxy for IPv6 support.
+if ! config_defined HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR ; then
+	SKIP_IPV6=yes
+fi
+
+FWDPORT=`expr $PORT + 1`
+make_tmpdir
+CTL=${SSH_REGRESS_TMP}/ctl-sock
+cp $OBJ/ssh_config $OBJ/ssh_config.orig
+proxycmd="$OBJ/netcat -x 127.0.0.1:$FWDPORT -X"
+trace "will use ProxyCommand $proxycmd"
+
+start_ssh() {
+	direction="$1"
+	arg="$2"
+	n=0
+	error="1"
+	trace "start dynamic -$direction forwarding, fork to background"
+	(cat $OBJ/ssh_config.orig ; echo "$arg") > $OBJ/ssh_config
+	${REAL_SSH} -vvvnNfF $OBJ/ssh_config -E$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE \
+	    -$direction $FWDPORT -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes \
+	    -oControlMaster=yes -oControlPath=$CTL somehost
+	r=$?
+	test $r -eq 0 || fatal "failed to start dynamic forwarding $r"
+	if ! ${REAL_SSH} -qF$OBJ/ssh_config -O check \
+	     -oControlPath=$CTL somehost >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+		fatal "forwarding ssh process unresponsive"
+	fi
+}
+
+stop_ssh() {
+	test -S $CTL || return
+	if ! ${REAL_SSH} -qF$OBJ/ssh_config -O exit \
+	     -oControlPath=$CTL >/dev/null somehost >/dev/null ; then
+		fatal "forwarding ssh process did not respond to close"
+	fi
+	n=0
+	while [ "$n" -lt 20 ] ; do
+		test -S $CTL || break
+		sleep 1
+		n=`expr $n + 1`
+	done
+	if test -S $CTL ; then
+		fatal "forwarding ssh process did not exit"
+	fi
+}
+
+check_socks() {
+	direction=$1
+	expect_success=$2
+	for s in 4 5; do
+	    for h in 127.0.0.1 localhost; do
+		trace "testing ssh socks version $s host $h (-$direction)"
+		${REAL_SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
+			-o "ProxyCommand ${proxycmd}${s} $h $PORT 2>/dev/null" \
+			somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+		r=$?
+		if [ "x$expect_success" = "xY" ] ; then
+			if [ $r -ne 0 ] ; then
+				fail "ssh failed with exit status $r"
+			fi
+			test -f ${COPY}	 || fail "failed copy ${DATA}"
+			cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+		elif [ $r -eq 0 ] ; then
+			fail "ssh unexpectedly succeeded"
+		fi
+	    done
+	done
+}
+
+start_sshd
+trap "stop_ssh" EXIT
+
+for d in D R; do
+	verbose "test -$d forwarding"
+	start_ssh $d
+	check_socks $d Y
+	stop_ssh
+	test "x$d" = "xR" || continue
+	
+	# Test PermitRemoteOpen
+	verbose "PermitRemoteOpen=any"
+	start_ssh $d PermitRemoteOpen=any
+	check_socks $d Y
+	stop_ssh
+
+	verbose "PermitRemoteOpen=none"
+	start_ssh $d PermitRemoteOpen=none
+	check_socks $d N
+	stop_ssh
+
+	verbose "PermitRemoteOpen=explicit"
+	permit="127.0.0.1:$PORT [::1]:$PORT localhost:$PORT"
+	test -z "$SKIP_IPV6" || permit="127.0.0.1:$PORT localhost:$PORT"
+	start_ssh $d PermitRemoteOpen="$permit"
+	check_socks $d Y
+	stop_ssh
+
+	verbose "PermitRemoteOpen=disallowed"
+	permit="127.0.0.1:1 [::1]:1 localhost:1"
+	test -z "$SKIP_IPV6" || permit="127.0.0.1:1 localhost:1"
+	start_ssh $d PermitRemoteOpen="$permit"
+	check_socks $d N
+	stop_ssh
+done
diff --git a/regress/ed25519_openssh.prv b/regress/ed25519_openssh.prv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f191b7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/ed25519_openssh.prv
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
+QyNTUxOQAAACDE8/0FM7Yw6xc53QpiZUQAh/LK2mEAwNDNYdSR6GIGIwAAAKC+Cfdzvgn3
+cwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACDE8/0FM7Yw6xc53QpiZUQAh/LK2mEAwNDNYdSR6GIGIw
+AAAEBm+60DgH0WMW7Z5oyvu1dxo7MaXe5RRMWTMJCfLkHexMTz/QUztjDrFzndCmJlRACH
+8sraYQDA0M1h1JHoYgYjAAAAGWR0dWNrZXJAcXVvbGwuZHR1Y2tlci5uZXQBAgME
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/ed25519_openssh.pub b/regress/ed25519_openssh.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9103631
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/ed25519_openssh.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIMTz/QUztjDrFzndCmJlRACH8sraYQDA0M1h1JHoYgYj
diff --git a/regress/envpass.sh b/regress/envpass.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb10468
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/envpass.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: envpass.sh,v 1.5 2022/06/03 04:31:54 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="environment passing"
+
+# NB accepted env vars are in test-exec.sh (_XXX_TEST_* and _XXX_TEST)
+
+# Prepare a custom config to test for a configuration parsing bug fixed in 4.0
+cat << EOF > $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass
+Host test-sendenv-confparse-bug
+	SendEnv *
+EOF
+cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+trace "pass env, don't accept"
+verbose "test $tid: pass env, don't accept"
+_TEST_ENV=blah ${SSH} -oSendEnv="*" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass otherhost \
+	sh << 'EOF'
+	test -z "$_TEST_ENV"
+EOF
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "environment found"
+fi
+
+trace "setenv, don't accept"
+verbose "test $tid: setenv, don't accept"
+${SSH} -oSendEnv="*" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass -oSetEnv="_TEST_ENV=blah" \
+    otherhost \
+	sh << 'EOF'
+	test -z "$_TEST_ENV"
+EOF
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "environment found"
+fi
+
+trace "don't pass env, accept"
+verbose "test $tid: don't pass env, accept"
+_XXX_TEST_A=1 _XXX_TEST_B=2 ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass otherhost \
+	sh << 'EOF'
+	test -z "$_XXX_TEST_A" && test -z "$_XXX_TEST_B"
+EOF
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "environment found"
+fi
+
+trace "pass single env, accept single env"
+verbose "test $tid: pass single env, accept single env"
+_XXX_TEST=blah ${SSH} -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass \
+    otherhost sh << 'EOF'
+	test X"$_XXX_TEST" = X"blah"
+EOF
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "environment not found"
+fi
+
+trace "pass multiple env, accept multiple env"
+verbose "test $tid: pass multiple env, accept multiple env"
+_XXX_TEST_A=1 _XXX_TEST_B=2 ${SSH} -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST_*" \
+    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass otherhost \
+	sh << 'EOF'
+	test X"$_XXX_TEST_A" = X"1" -a X"$_XXX_TEST_B" = X"2"
+EOF
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "environment not found"
+fi
+
+trace "setenv, accept"
+verbose "test $tid: setenv, accept"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass \
+    -oSetEnv="_XXX_TEST_A=1 _XXX_TEST_B=2" otherhost \
+	sh << 'EOF'
+	test X"$_XXX_TEST_A" = X"1" -a X"$_XXX_TEST_B" = X"2"
+EOF
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "environment not found"
+fi
+trace "setenv, first match wins"
+verbose "test $tid: setenv, first match wins"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass \
+    -oSetEnv="_XXX_TEST_A=1 _XXX_TEST_A=11 _XXX_TEST_B=2" otherhost \
+	sh << 'EOF'
+	test X"$_XXX_TEST_A" = X"1" -a X"$_XXX_TEST_B" = X"2"
+EOF
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "environment not found"
+fi
+
+trace "server setenv wins"
+verbose "test $tid: server setenv wins"
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "SetEnv _XXX_TEST_A=23" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass \
+    -oSetEnv="_XXX_TEST_A=1 _XXX_TEST_B=2" otherhost \
+	sh << 'EOF'
+	test X"$_XXX_TEST_A" = X"23" -a X"$_XXX_TEST_B" = X"2"
+EOF
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "environment not found"
+fi
+
+trace "server setenv first match wins"
+verbose "test $tid: server setenv wins"
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "SetEnv _XXX_TEST_A=23 _XXX_TEST_A=42" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass \
+    -oSetEnv="_XXX_TEST_A=1 _XXX_TEST_B=2" otherhost \
+	sh << 'EOF'
+	test X"$_XXX_TEST_A" = X"23" -a X"$_XXX_TEST_B" = X"2"
+EOF
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "environment not found"
+fi
+
+
+rm -f $OBJ/ssh_proxy_envpass
diff --git a/regress/exit-status-signal.sh b/regress/exit-status-signal.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b3af0d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/exit-status-signal.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+# This test performs validation that ssh client is not successive on being terminated
+
+tid="exit status on signal"
+
+# spawn client in background
+rm -f $OBJ/remote_pid
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo $$ >'$OBJ'/remote_pid; sleep 444' &
+ssh_pid=$!
+
+# wait for it to start
+n=20
+while [ ! -f $OBJ/remote_pid ] && [ $n -gt 0 ]; do
+	n=$(($n - 1))
+	sleep 1
+done
+
+kill $ssh_pid
+wait $ssh_pid
+exit_code=$?
+
+if [ $exit_code -eq 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh client should fail on signal"
+fi
+
diff --git a/regress/exit-status.sh b/regress/exit-status.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aadf99f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/exit-status.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: exit-status.sh,v 1.8 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="remote exit status"
+
+for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do
+	trace "status $s"
+	verbose "test $tid: status $s"
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost exit $s
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
+		fail "exit code mismatch for: $r != $s"
+	fi
+
+	# same with early close of stdout/err
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -n otherhost exec \
+	    sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\'
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
+		fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch for: $r != $s"
+	fi
+done
diff --git a/regress/forcecommand.sh b/regress/forcecommand.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e059f1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/forcecommand.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: forcecommand.sh,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="forced command"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	printf 'command="true" ' >>$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+done
+
+trace "forced command in key option"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false || fail "forced command in key"
+
+cp /dev/null $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	printf 'command="false" ' >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+done
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "ForceCommand true" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+trace "forced command in sshd_config overrides key option"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false || fail "forced command in key"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "ForceCommand false" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "Match User $USER" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+echo "    ForceCommand true" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+trace "forced command with match"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false || fail "forced command in key"
diff --git a/regress/forward-control.sh b/regress/forward-control.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..63bbdeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/forward-control.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: forward-control.sh,v 1.11 2022/04/21 01:36:46 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sshd control of local and remote forwarding"
+
+LFWD_PORT=3320
+RFWD_PORT=3321
+CTL=$OBJ/ctl-sock
+WAIT_SECONDS=20
+
+wait_for_process_to_exit() {
+	_pid=$1
+	_n=0
+	while kill -0 $_pid 2>/dev/null ; do
+		test $_n -eq 1 && trace "waiting for $_pid to exit"
+		_n=`expr $_n + 1`
+		test $_n -ge $WAIT_SECONDS && return 1
+		sleep 1
+	done
+	return 0
+}
+
+mux_cmd() {
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -S $CTL -O $1 host 2>&1
+}
+
+controlmaster_pid() {
+	mux_cmd check | cut -f2 -d= | cut -f1 -d')'
+}
+
+# usage: check_lfwd Y|N message
+check_lfwd() {
+	_expected=$1
+	_message=$2
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
+	    -L$LFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \
+	    -MS $CTL -o ControlPersist=yes \
+	    -f host true
+	mux_cmd check >/dev/null || fatal "check_lfwd ssh fail: $_message"
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p $LFWD_PORT \
+	    -oConnectionAttempts=10 host true >/dev/null 2>&1
+	_result=$?
+	_sshpid=`controlmaster_pid`
+	mux_cmd exit >/dev/null
+	wait_for_process_to_exit $_sshpid
+	if test "x$_expected" = "xY" -a $_result -ne 0 ; then
+		fail "check_lfwd failed (expecting success): $_message"
+	elif test "x$_expected" = "xN" -a $_result -eq 0 ; then
+		fail "check_lfwd succeeded (expecting failure): $_message"
+	elif test "x$_expected" != "xY" -a "x$_expected" != "xN" ; then
+		fatal "check_lfwd invalid argument \"$_expected\""
+	else
+		verbose "check_lfwd done (expecting $_expected): $_message"
+	fi
+}
+
+# usage: check_rfwd Y|N message
+check_rfwd() {
+	_expected=$1
+	_message=$2
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
+	    -R127.0.0.1:$RFWD_PORT:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -o ExitOnForwardFailure=yes \
+	    -MS $CTL -o ControlPersist=yes \
+	    -f host true
+	mux_cmd check >/dev/null
+	_result=$?
+	_sshpid=`controlmaster_pid`
+	if test $_result -eq 0; then
+		${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p $RFWD_PORT \
+		    -oConnectionAttempts=10 host true >/dev/null 2>&1
+		_result=$?
+		mux_cmd exit >/dev/null
+		wait_for_process_to_exit $_sshpid
+	fi
+	if test "x$_expected" = "xY" -a $_result -ne 0 ; then
+		fail "check_rfwd failed (expecting success): $_message"
+	elif test "x$_expected" = "xN" -a $_result -eq 0 ; then
+		fail "check_rfwd succeeded (expecting failure): $_message"
+	elif test "x$_expected" != "xY" -a "x$_expected" != "xN" ; then
+		fatal "check_rfwd invalid argument \"$_expected\""
+	else
+		verbose "check_rfwd done (expecting $_expected): $_message"
+	fi
+}
+
+start_sshd
+cp ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak
+cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak
+
+# Sanity check: ensure the default config allows forwarding
+check_lfwd Y "default configuration"
+check_rfwd Y "default configuration"
+
+# Usage: lperm_tests yes|local|remote|no Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N
+lperm_tests() {
+	_tcpfwd=$1
+	_plain_lfwd=$2
+	_plain_rfwd=$3
+	_nopermit_lfwd=$4
+	_nopermit_rfwd=$5
+	_permit_lfwd=$6
+	_permit_rfwd=$7
+	_badfwd1=127.0.0.1:22
+	_badfwd2=127.0.0.2:22
+	_goodfwd=127.0.0.1:${PORT}
+	cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak  ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}
+	_prefix="AllowTcpForwarding=$_tcpfwd"
+
+	# No PermitOpen
+	( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+	  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
+	    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+	check_lfwd $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix"
+	check_rfwd $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix"
+
+	# PermitOpen via sshd_config that doesn't match
+	( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+	  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ;
+	  echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd1 $_badfwd2" ) \
+	    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+	check_lfwd $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen"
+	check_rfwd $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !PermitOpen"
+	# PermitOpen via sshd_config that does match
+	( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+	  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ;
+	  echo "PermitOpen $_badfwd1 $_goodfwd $_badfwd2" ) \
+	    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+	check_lfwd $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix, PermitOpen"
+	check_rfwd $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix, PermitOpen"
+
+	# permitopen keys option.
+	# NB. permitopen via authorized_keys should have same
+	# success/fail as via sshd_config
+	# permitopen via authorized_keys that doesn't match
+	sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd1\",permitopen=\"$_badfwd2\" /" \
+	    < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
+	    > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 1 fail"
+	( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+	  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
+	    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+	check_lfwd $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen"
+	check_rfwd $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !permitopen"
+	# permitopen via authorized_keys that does match
+	sed "s/^/permitopen=\"$_badfwd1\",permitopen=\"$_goodfwd\" /" \
+	    < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
+	    > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 2 fail"
+	( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+	  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
+	    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+	check_lfwd $_permit_lfwd "$_prefix, permitopen"
+	check_rfwd $_permit_rfwd "$_prefix, permitopen"
+
+	# Check port-forwarding flags in authorized_keys.
+	# These two should refuse all.
+	sed "s/^/no-port-forwarding /" \
+	    < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
+	    > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 3 fail"
+	( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+	  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
+	    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+	check_lfwd N "$_prefix, no-port-forwarding"
+	check_rfwd N "$_prefix, no-port-forwarding"
+	sed "s/^/restrict /" \
+	    < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
+	    > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 4 fail"
+	( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+	  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
+	    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+	check_lfwd N "$_prefix, restrict"
+	check_rfwd N "$_prefix, restrict"
+	# This should pass the same cases as _nopermit*
+	sed "s/^/restrict,port-forwarding /" \
+	    < ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak \
+	    > ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER} || fatal "sed 5 fail"
+	( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+	  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ) \
+	    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+	check_lfwd $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix, restrict,port-forwarding"
+	check_rfwd $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix, restrict,port-forwarding"
+}
+
+#          permit-open      none          mismatch         match
+#   AllowTcpForwarding  local remote    local remote    local remote
+lperm_tests     yes     Y     Y         N     Y         Y     Y
+lperm_tests   local     Y     N         N     N         Y     N
+lperm_tests  remote     N     Y         N     Y         N     Y
+lperm_tests      no     N     N         N     N         N     N
+
+# Usage: rperm_tests yes|local|remote|no Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N Y|N
+rperm_tests() {
+	_tcpfwd=$1
+	_plain_lfwd=$2
+	_plain_rfwd=$3
+	_nopermit_lfwd=$4
+	_nopermit_rfwd=$5
+	_permit_lfwd=$6
+	_permit_rfwd=$7
+	_badfwd1=127.0.0.1:22
+	_badfwd2=127.0.0.2:${RFWD_PORT}
+	_goodfwd=127.0.0.1:${RFWD_PORT}
+	cp ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}.bak  ${OBJ}/authorized_keys_${USER}
+	_prefix="AllowTcpForwarding=$_tcpfwd"
+
+	# PermitListen via sshd_config that doesn't match
+	( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+	  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ;
+	  echo "PermitListen $_badfwd1 $_badfwd2" ) \
+	    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+	check_lfwd $_nopermit_lfwd "$_prefix, !PermitListen"
+	check_rfwd $_nopermit_rfwd "$_prefix, !PermitListen"
+	# PermitListen via sshd_config that does match
+	( cat ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy.bak ;
+	  echo "AllowTcpForwarding $_tcpfwd" ;
+	  echo "PermitListen $_badfwd1 $_goodfwd $_badfwd2" ) \
+	    > ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+	check_lfwd $_plain_lfwd "$_prefix, PermitListen"
+	check_rfwd $_plain_rfwd "$_prefix, PermitListen"
+}
+
+#   permit-remote-open      none          mismatch         match
+#   AllowTcpForwarding  local remote    local remote    local remote
+rperm_tests     yes     Y     Y         Y     N         Y     Y
+rperm_tests   local     Y     N         Y     N         Y     N
+rperm_tests  remote     N     Y         N     N         N     Y
+rperm_tests      no     N     N         N     N         N     N
+
diff --git a/regress/forwarding.sh b/regress/forwarding.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a72bd3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/forwarding.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.24 2021/05/07 09:23:40 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="local and remote forwarding"
+
+DATA=/bin/ls${EXEEXT}
+
+start_sshd
+
+base=33
+last=$PORT
+fwd=""
+make_tmpdir
+CTL=${SSH_REGRESS_TMP}/ctl-sock
+
+for j in 0 1 2; do
+	for i in 0 1 2; do
+		a=$base$j$i
+		b=`expr $a + 50`
+		c=$last
+		# fwd chain: $a -> $b -> $c
+		fwd="$fwd -L$a:127.0.0.1:$b -R$b:127.0.0.1:$c"
+		last=$a
+	done
+done
+
+trace "start forwarding, fork to background"
+rm -f $CTL
+${SSH} -S $CTL -N -M -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost
+
+trace "transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$last -o 'ConnectionAttempts=10' \
+	somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+test -s ${COPY}		|| fail "failed copy of ${DATA}"
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null
+
+for d in L R; do
+	trace "exit on -$d forward failure"
+
+	# this one should succeed
+	${SSH}  -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
+	    -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+	    -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true
+	if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+		fatal "connection failed, should not"
+	else
+		# this one should fail
+		${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_config \
+		    -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+		    -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+		    -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+		    -$d ${base}01:localhost:$PORT \
+		    -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+		    -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true
+		r=$?
+		if [ $r != 255 ]; then
+			fail "connection not termintated, but should ($r)"
+		fi
+	fi
+done
+
+trace "simple clear forwarding"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost true
+
+trace "clear local forward"
+rm -f $CTL
+${SSH} -S $CTL -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+    -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost
+if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+	fail "connection failed with cleared local forwarding"
+else
+	# this one should fail
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \
+	     >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
+		fail "local forwarding not cleared"
+fi
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null
+
+trace "clear remote forward"
+rm -f $CTL
+${SSH} -S $CTL -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \
+    -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost
+if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+	fail "connection failed with cleared remote forwarding"
+else
+	# this one should fail
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 somehost true \
+	     >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \
+		fail "remote forwarding not cleared"
+fi
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null
+
+trace "stdio forwarding"
+cmd="${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config"
+$cmd -o "ProxyCommand $cmd -q -W localhost:$PORT somehost" somehost true
+if [ $? != 0 ]; then
+	fail "stdio forwarding"
+fi
+
+echo "LocalForward ${base}01 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+echo "RemoteForward ${base}02 127.0.0.1:${base}01" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+
+trace "config file: start forwarding, fork to background"
+rm -f $CTL
+${SSH} -S $CTL -N -M -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost
+
+trace "config file: transfer over forwarded channels and check result"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}02 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=10' \
+	somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+test -s ${COPY}		|| fail "failed copy of ${DATA}"
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null
+
+trace "transfer over chained unix domain socket forwards and check result"
+rm -f $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
+rm -f $CTL $CTL.[123]
+${SSH} -S $CTL -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost
+${SSH} -S $CTL.1 -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost
+${SSH} -S $CTL.2 -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost
+${SSH} -S $CTL.3 -N -M -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}01 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=10' \
+	somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+test -s ${COPY}			|| fail "failed copy ${DATA}"
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.1 -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.2 -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL.3 -O exit somehost 2>/dev/null
+
diff --git a/regress/host-expand.sh b/regress/host-expand.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9444f7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/host-expand.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: host-expand.sh,v 1.5 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="expand %h and %n"
+
+echo 'PermitLocalCommand yes' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+printf 'LocalCommand printf "%%%%s\\n" "%%n" "%%h"\n' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+cat >$OBJ/expect <<EOE
+somehost
+127.0.0.1
+EOE
+
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >$OBJ/actual
+diff $OBJ/expect $OBJ/actual || fail "$tid"
+
diff --git a/regress/hostbased.sh b/regress/hostbased.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb9cf27
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/hostbased.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: hostbased.sh,v 1.4 2022/12/07 11:45:43 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+# This test requires external setup and thus is skipped unless
+# TEST_SSH_HOSTBASED_AUTH and SUDO are set to "yes".
+# Since ssh-keysign has key paths hard coded, unlike the other tests it
+# needs to use the real host keys. It requires:
+# - ssh-keysign must be installed and setuid.
+# - "EnableSSHKeysign yes" must be in the system ssh_config.
+# - the system's own real FQDN the system-wide shosts.equiv.
+# - the system's real public key fingerprints must be in global ssh_known_hosts.
+#
+tid="hostbased"
+
+if [ -z "${TEST_SSH_HOSTBASED_AUTH}" ]; then
+	skip "TEST_SSH_HOSTBASED_AUTH not set."
+elif [ -z "${SUDO}" ]; then
+	skip "SUDO not set"
+fi
+
+# Enable all supported hostkey algos (but no others)
+hostkeyalgos=`${SSH} -Q HostKeyAlgorithms | tr '\n' , | sed 's/,$//'`
+
+cat >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy <<EOD
+HostbasedAuthentication yes
+HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms $hostkeyalgos
+HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly yes
+HostKeyAlgorithms $hostkeyalgos
+EOD
+
+cat >>$OBJ/ssh_proxy <<EOD
+HostbasedAuthentication yes
+HostKeyAlgorithms $hostkeyalgos
+HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms $hostkeyalgos
+PreferredAuthentications hostbased
+EOD
+
+algos=""
+for key in `${SUDO} ${SSHD} -T | awk '$1=="hostkey"{print $2}'`; do
+	case "`$SSHKEYGEN -l -f ${key}.pub`" in
+	256*ECDSA*)	algos="$algos ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" ;;
+	384*ECDSA*)	algos="$algos ecdsa-sha2-nistp384" ;;
+	521*ECDSA*)	algos="$algos ecdsa-sha2-nistp521" ;;
+	*RSA*)		algos="$algos ssh-rsa rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512" ;;
+	*ED25519*)	algos="$algos ssh-ed25519" ;;
+	*DSA*)		algos="$algos ssh-dss" ;;
+	*) verbose "unknown host key type $key" ;;
+	esac
+done
+
+for algo in $algos; do
+	trace "hostbased algo $algo"
+	opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+	if [ "x$algo" != "xdefault" ]; then
+		opts="$opts -oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms=$algo"
+	fi
+	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts localhost 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "connect failed, hostbased algo $algo"
+	elif [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then
+		fail "hostbased algo $algo bad SSH_CONNECTION" \
+		    "$SSH_CONNECTION"
+	else
+		verbose "ok hostbased algo $algo"
+	fi
+done
diff --git a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..222d424
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: hostkey-agent.sh,v 1.13 2021/09/30 05:20:08 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="hostkey agent"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/agent-key.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/agent-ca*
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+[ $r -ne 0 ] && fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+
+grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+echo "HostKeyAgent $SSH_AUTH_SOCK" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+
+trace "make CA key"
+
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/agent-ca -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen CA"
+
+trace "load hostkeys"
+for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -s $OBJ/agent-ca -qh -n localhost-with-alias \
+		-I localhost-with-alias $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub || \
+		fatal "sign $k"
+	${SSHADD} -k $OBJ/agent-key.$k >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fatal "couldn't load key $OBJ/agent-key.$k"
+	# Remove private key so the server can't use it.
+	rm $OBJ/agent-key.$k || fatal "couldn't rm $OBJ/agent-key.$k"
+done
+rm $OBJ/agent-ca # Don't need CA private any more either
+
+unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+
+for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+	verbose "key type $k"
+	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+	( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' ;
+	  cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
+	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "keytype $k failed"
+	fi
+	if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then
+		fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION key type $k"
+	fi
+done
+
+SSH_CERTTYPES=`ssh -Q key-sig | grep 'cert-v01@openssh.com'`
+
+# Prepare sshd_proxy for certificates.
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+HOSTKEYALGS=""
+for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
+	test -z "$HOSTKEYALGS" || HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS},"
+	HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS}${k}"
+done
+for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	echo "HostCertificate $OBJ/agent-key.${k}-cert.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	test -f $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub || fatal "no $k key"
+	test -f $OBJ/agent-key.${k}-cert.pub || fatal "no $k cert"
+done
+echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $HOSTKEYALGS" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# Add only CA trust anchor to known_hosts.
+( printf '@cert-authority localhost-with-alias ' ;
+  cat $OBJ/agent-ca.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
+
+for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
+	verbose "cert type $k"
+	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "cert type $k failed"
+	fi
+	if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then
+		fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION key type $k"
+	fi
+done
+
+trace "kill agent"
+${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+
diff --git a/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh b/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5898cbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.10 2022/01/05 08:25:05 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="hostkey rotate"
+
+#
+# GNU (f)grep <=2.18, as shipped by FreeBSD<=12 and NetBSD<=9 will occasionally
+# fail to find ssh host keys in the hostkey-rotate test.  If we have those
+# versions, use awk instead.
+# See # https://bugs.freebsd.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=258616
+#
+case `grep --version 2>&1 | awk '/GNU grep/{print $4}'` in
+2.19)			fgrep=good ;;
+1.*|2.?|2.?.?|2.1?)	fgrep=bad ;;	# stock GNU grep
+2.5.1*)			fgrep=bad ;;	# FreeBSD and NetBSD
+*)			fgrep=good ;;
+esac
+if test "x$fgrep" = "xbad"; then
+	fgrep()
+{
+	awk 'BEGIN{e=1} {if (index($0,"'$1'")>0){e=0;print}} END{exit e}' $2
+}
+fi
+
+rm -f $OBJ/hkr.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
+
+grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
+grep -vi 'globalknownhostsfile' $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+echo "UpdateHostkeys=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+echo "GlobalKnownHostsFile=none" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+rm $OBJ/known_hosts
+
+# The "primary" key type is ed25519 since it's supported even when built
+# without OpenSSL.  The secondary is RSA if it's supported.
+primary="ssh-ed25519"
+secondary="$primary"
+
+trace "prepare hostkeys"
+nkeys=0
+all_algs=""
+for k in $SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES; do
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/hkr.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
+	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/hkr.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+	nkeys=`expr $nkeys + 1`
+	test "x$all_algs" = "x" || all_algs="${all_algs},"
+	case "$k" in
+	ssh-rsa)
+		secondary="ssh-rsa"
+		all_algs="${all_algs}rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512,$k"
+		;;
+	*)
+		all_algs="${all_algs}$k"
+		;;
+	esac
+done
+
+dossh() {
+	# All ssh should succeed in this test
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy "$@" x true || fail "ssh $@ failed"
+}
+
+expect_nkeys() {
+	_expected=$1
+	_message=$2
+	_n=`wc -l $OBJ/known_hosts | awk '{ print $1 }'` || fatal "wc failed"
+	[ "x$_n" = "x$_expected" ] || fail "$_message (got $_n wanted $_expected)"
+}
+
+check_key_present() {
+	_type=$1
+	_kfile=$2
+	test "x$_kfile" = "x" && _kfile="$OBJ/hkr.${_type}.pub"
+	_kpub=`awk "/$_type /"' { print $2 }' < $_kfile` || \
+		fatal "awk failed"
+	fgrep "$_kpub" $OBJ/known_hosts > /dev/null
+}
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# Connect to sshd with StrictHostkeyChecking=no
+verbose "learn hostkey with StrictHostKeyChecking=no"
+>$OBJ/known_hosts
+dossh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$primary -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no
+# Verify no additional keys learned
+expect_nkeys 1 "unstrict connect keys"
+check_key_present $primary || fail "unstrict didn't learn key"
+
+# Connect to sshd as usual
+verbose "learn additional hostkeys"
+dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs
+# Check that other keys learned
+expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys"
+for k in $SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES; do
+	check_key_present $k || fail "didn't learn keytype $k"
+done
+
+# Check each key type
+for k in $SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES; do
+	case "$k" in
+	ssh-rsa) alg="rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512,ssh-rsa" ;;
+	*) alg="$k" ;;
+	esac
+	verbose "learn additional hostkeys, type=$k"
+	dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$alg,$all_algs
+	expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys $k"
+	check_key_present $k || fail "didn't learn $k correctly"
+done
+
+# Change one hostkey (non primary) and relearn
+if [ "$primary" != "$secondary" ]; then
+	verbose "learn changed non-primary hostkey type=${secondary}"
+	mv $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}.pub $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}.pub.old
+	rm -f $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ${secondary} -f $OBJ/hkr.${secondary} -N '' || \
+	    fatal "ssh-keygen $secondary"
+	dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs
+	# Check that the key was replaced
+	expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys"
+	check_key_present ${secondary} $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}.pub.old && \
+	    fail "old key present"
+	check_key_present ${secondary} || fail "didn't learn changed key"
+fi
+
+# Add new hostkey (primary type) to sshd and connect
+verbose "learn new primary hostkey"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ${primary} -f $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen ed25519"
+( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig ; echo HostKey $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new ) \
+    > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+# Check new hostkey added
+dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=${primary},$all_algs
+expect_nkeys `expr $nkeys + 1` "learn hostkeys"
+check_key_present ${primary} || fail "current key missing"
+check_key_present ${primary} $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new.pub || fail "new key missing"
+
+# Remove old hostkey (primary type) from sshd
+verbose "rotate primary hostkey"
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+mv $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub.old
+mv $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new.pub $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub
+mv $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new $OBJ/hkr.${primary}
+# Check old hostkey removed
+dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=${primary},$all_algs
+expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys"
+check_key_present ${primary} $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub.old && fail "old key present"
+check_key_present ${primary} || fail "didn't learn changed key"
+
+# Connect again, forcing rotated key
+verbose "check rotate primary hostkey"
+dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=${primary}
+expect_nkeys 1 "learn hostkeys"
+check_key_present ${primary} || fail "didn't learn changed key"
diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc030cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,76 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.24 2020/01/21 08:06:27 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="integrity"
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+# start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
+tries=10
+startoffset=2900
+macs=`${SSH} -Q mac`
+# The following are not MACs, but ciphers with integrated integrity. They are
+# handled specially below.
+macs="$macs `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`"
+
+# avoid DH group exchange as the extra traffic makes it harder to get the
+# offset into the stream right.
+#echo "KexAlgorithms -diffie-hellman-group*" \
+#	>> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+# sshd-command for proxy (see test-exec.sh)
+cmd="$SUDO env SSH_SK_HELPER="$SSH_SK_HELPER" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
+
+for m in $macs; do
+	trace "test $tid: mac $m"
+	elen=0
+	epad=0
+	emac=0
+	etmo=0
+	ecnt=0
+	skip=0
+	for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do
+		skip=`expr $skip - 1`
+		if [ $skip -gt 0 ]; then
+			# avoid modifying the high bytes of the length
+			continue
+		fi
+		cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		# modify output from sshd at offset $off
+		pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -wm xor:$off:1"
+		if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${m}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+			echo "Ciphers=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+			macopt="-c $m"
+		else
+			echo "Ciphers=aes128-ctr" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+			echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+			macopt="-m $m -c aes128-ctr"
+		fi
+		verbose "test $tid: $m @$off"
+		${SSH} $macopt -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \
+		    -oServerAliveInterval=1 -oServerAliveCountMax=30 \
+		    999.999.999.999 'printf "%4096s" " "' >/dev/null
+		if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh -m $m succeeds with bit-flip at $off"
+		fi
+		ecnt=`expr $ecnt + 1`
+		out=$(egrep -v "^debug" $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE | tail -2 | \
+		     tr -s '\r\n' '.')
+		case "$out" in
+		Bad?packet*)	elen=`expr $elen + 1`; skip=3;;
+		Corrupted?MAC* | *message?authentication?code?incorrect*)
+				emac=`expr $emac + 1`; skip=0;;
+		padding*)	epad=`expr $epad + 1`; skip=0;;
+		*Timeout,?server*)
+				etmo=`expr $etmo + 1`; skip=0;;
+		*)		fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off: $out";;
+		esac
+	done
+	verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen timeout $etmo"
+	if [ $emac -eq 0 ]; then
+		fail "$m: no mac errors"
+	fi
+	expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen - $etmo`
+	if [ $emac -ne $expect ]; then
+		fail "$m: expected $expect mac errors, got $emac"
+	fi
+done
diff --git a/regress/kextype.sh b/regress/kextype.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e271899
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/kextype.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: kextype.sh,v 1.6 2015/03/24 20:19:15 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="login with different key exchange algorithms"
+
+TIME=/usr/bin/time
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+
+# Make server accept all key exchanges.
+ALLKEX=`${SSH} -Q kex`
+KEXOPT=`echo $ALLKEX | tr ' ' ,`
+echo "KexAlgorithms=$KEXOPT" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+tries="1 2 3 4"
+for k in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
+	verbose "kex $k"
+	for i in $tries; do
+		${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o KexAlgorithms=$k x true
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh kex $k"
+		fi
+	done
+done
+
diff --git a/regress/key-options.sh b/regress/key-options.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f3d66e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/key-options.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: key-options.sh,v 1.9 2018/07/03 13:53:26 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="key options"
+
+origkeys="$OBJ/authkeys_orig"
+authkeys="$OBJ/authorized_keys_${USER}"
+cp $authkeys $origkeys
+
+# Allocating ptys can require privileges on some platforms.
+skip_pty=""
+if ! config_defined HAVE_OPENPTY && [ "x$SUDO" = "x" ]; then
+	skip_pty="no openpty(3) and SUDO not set"
+fi
+
+# Test command= forced command
+for c in 'command="echo bar"' 'no-pty,command="echo bar"'; do
+	sed "s/.*/$c &/" $origkeys >$authkeys
+	verbose "key option $c"
+	r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost echo foo`
+	if [ "$r" = "foo" ]; then
+		fail "key option forced command not restricted"
+	fi
+	if [ "$r" != "bar" ]; then
+		fail "key option forced command not executed"
+	fi
+done
+
+# Test no-pty
+expect_pty_succeed() {
+	which=$1
+	opts=$2
+	rm -f $OBJ/data
+	sed "s/.*/$opts &/" $origkeys >$authkeys
+	verbose "key option pty $which"
+	[ "x$skip_pty" != "x" ] && verbose "skipped because $skip_pty" && return
+	${SSH} -ttq -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "tty > $OBJ/data; exit 0"
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ] ; then
+		fail "key option failed $which"
+	else
+		r=`cat $OBJ/data`
+		case "$r" in
+		/dev/*) ;;
+		*)	fail "key option failed $which (pty $r)" ;;
+		esac
+	fi
+}
+expect_pty_fail() {
+	which=$1
+	opts=$2
+	rm -f $OBJ/data
+	sed "s/.*/$opts &/" $origkeys >$authkeys
+	verbose "key option pty $which"
+	[ "x$skip_pty" != "x" ] && verbose "skipped because $skip_pty" && return
+	${SSH} -ttq -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "tty > $OBJ/data; exit 0"
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		r=`cat $OBJ/data`
+		if [ -e "$r" ]; then
+			fail "key option failed $which (pty $r)"
+		fi
+		case "$r" in
+		/dev/*)	fail "key option failed $which (pty $r)" ;;
+		*)	;;
+		esac
+	fi
+}
+# First ensure that we can allocate a pty by default.
+expect_pty_succeed "default" ""
+expect_pty_fail "no-pty" "no-pty"
+expect_pty_fail "restrict" "restrict"
+expect_pty_succeed "restrict,pty" "restrict,pty"
+
+# Test environment=
+# XXX this can fail if ~/.ssh/environment exists for the user running the test
+echo 'PermitUserEnvironment yes' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+sed 's/.*/environment="FOO=bar" &/' $origkeys >$authkeys
+verbose "key option environment"
+r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo $FOO'`
+if [ "$r" != "bar" ]; then
+	fail "key option environment not set"
+fi
+
+# Test from= restriction
+start_sshd
+for f in 127.0.0.1 '127.0.0.0\/8'; do
+	cat  $origkeys >$authkeys
+	${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "key option failed without restriction"
+	fi
+
+	sed 's/.*/from="'"$f"'" &/' $origkeys >$authkeys
+	from=`head -1 $authkeys | cut -f1 -d ' '`
+	verbose "key option $from"
+	r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost 'echo true'`
+	if [ "$r" = "true" ]; then
+		fail "key option $from not restricted"
+	fi
+
+	r=`${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost 'echo true'`
+	if [ "$r" != "true" ]; then
+		fail "key option $from not allowed but should be"
+	fi
+done
+
+check_valid_before() {
+	which=$1
+	opts=$2
+	expect=$3
+	sed "s/.*/$opts &/" $origkeys >$authkeys
+	verbose "key option expiry-time $which"
+	${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	r=$?
+	case "$expect" in
+	fail)	test $r -eq 0 && fail "key option succeeded $which" ;;
+	pass)	test $r -ne 0 && fail "key option failed $which" ;;
+	*)	fatal "unknown expectation $expect" ;;
+	esac
+}
+check_valid_before "default"	""				"pass"
+check_valid_before "invalid"	'expiry-time="INVALID"'		"fail"
+check_valid_before "expired"	'expiry-time="19990101"'	"fail"
+check_valid_before "valid"	'expiry-time="20380101"'	"pass"
+
diff --git a/regress/keygen-change.sh b/regress/keygen-change.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3863e33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/keygen-change.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: keygen-change.sh,v 1.9 2019/12/16 02:39:05 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="change passphrase for key"
+
+S1="secret1"
+S2="2secret"
+
+for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do
+	trace "generating $t key"
+	rm -f $OBJ/$t-key
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N ${S1} -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-key
+	if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -p -P ${S1} -N ${S2} -f $OBJ/$t-key > /dev/null
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh-keygen -p failed for $t-key"
+		fi
+	else
+		fail "ssh-keygen for $t-key failed"
+	fi
+	rm -f $OBJ/$t-key $OBJ/$t-key.pub
+done
diff --git a/regress/keygen-comment.sh b/regress/keygen-comment.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af571d3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/keygen-comment.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#    Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="Comment extraction from private key"
+
+S1="secret1"
+
+check_fingerprint () {
+	file="$1"
+	comment="$2"
+	trace "fingerprinting $file"
+	if ! ${SSHKEYGEN} -l -E sha256 -f $file > $OBJ/$t-fgp ; then
+		fail "ssh-keygen -l failed for $t-key"
+	fi
+	if ! egrep "^([0-9]+) SHA256:(.){43} ${comment} \(.*\)\$" \
+	    $OBJ/$t-fgp >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+		fail "comment is not correctly recovered for $t-key"
+	fi
+	rm -f $OBJ/$t-fgp
+}
+
+for fmt in '' RFC4716 PKCS8 PEM; do
+	for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do
+		trace "generating $t key in '$fmt' format"
+		rm -f $OBJ/$t-key*
+		oldfmt=""
+		case "$fmt" in
+		PKCS8|PEM) oldfmt=1 ;;
+		esac
+		# Some key types like ssh-ed25519 and *@openssh.com are never
+		# stored in old formats.
+		case "$t" in
+		ssh-ed25519|*openssh.com) test -z "$oldfmt" || continue ;;
+		esac
+		comment="foo bar"
+		fmtarg=""
+		test -z "$fmt" || fmtarg="-m $fmt"
+		${SSHKEYGEN} $fmtarg -N '' -C "${comment}" \
+		    -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-key >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+			fatal "keygen of $t in format $fmt failed"
+		check_fingerprint $OBJ/$t-key "${comment}"
+		check_fingerprint $OBJ/$t-key.pub "${comment}"
+		# Output fingerprint using only private file
+		trace "fingerprinting $t key using private key file"
+		rm -f $OBJ/$t-key.pub
+		if [ ! -z "$oldfmt" ] ; then
+			# Comment cannot be recovered from old format keys.
+			comment="no comment"
+		fi
+		check_fingerprint $OBJ/$t-key "${comment}"
+		rm -f $OBJ/$t-key*
+	done
+done
diff --git a/regress/keygen-convert.sh b/regress/keygen-convert.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9565658
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/keygen-convert.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: keygen-convert.sh,v 1.6 2021/07/24 02:57:28 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="convert keys"
+
+cat > $OBJ/askpass <<EOD
+#!/bin/sh
+echo hunter2
+EOD
+chmod u+x $OBJ/askpass
+
+if ${SSHKEYGEN} -? 2>&1 | grep "ssh-keygen -e" >/dev/null; then
+	test_import_export=1
+fi
+
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	# generate user key for agent
+	trace "generating $t key"
+	rm -f $OBJ/$t-key
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N "" -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-key
+
+	if test "x$test_import_export" = "x1"; then
+		trace "export $t private to rfc4716 public"
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -q -e -f $OBJ/$t-key >$OBJ/$t-key-rfc || \
+		    fail "export $t private to rfc4716 public"
+
+		trace "export $t public to rfc4716 public"
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -q -e -f $OBJ/$t-key.pub >$OBJ/$t-key-rfc.pub || \
+		    fail "$t public to rfc4716 public"
+
+		cmp $OBJ/$t-key-rfc $OBJ/$t-key-rfc.pub || \
+		    fail "$t rfc4716 exports differ between public and private"
+
+		trace "import $t rfc4716 public"
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -q -i -f $OBJ/$t-key-rfc >$OBJ/$t-rfc-imported || \
+		    fail "$t import rfc4716 public"
+
+		cut -f1,2 -d " " $OBJ/$t-key.pub >$OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub
+		cmp $OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub $OBJ/$t-rfc-imported || \
+		    fail "$t imported differs from original"
+	fi
+
+	trace "set passphrase $t"
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -p -P '' -N 'hunter2' -f $OBJ/$t-key >/dev/null || \
+	    fail "$t set passphrase failed"
+
+	trace "export $t to public with passphrase"
+	SSH_ASKPASS=$OBJ/askpass SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE=force \
+	    ${SSHKEYGEN} -y -f $OBJ/$t-key >$OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub
+	cmp $OBJ/$t-key.pub $OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub || \
+	    fail "$t exported pubkey differs from generated"
+
+	rm -f $OBJ/$t-key $OBJ/$t-key.pub $OBJ/$t-key-rfc $OBJ/$t-key-rfc.pub \
+	    $OBJ/$t-rfc-imported $OBJ/$t-key-nocomment.pub
+done
diff --git a/regress/keygen-knownhosts.sh b/regress/keygen-knownhosts.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..37af347
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/keygen-knownhosts.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: keygen-knownhosts.sh,v 1.4 2018/06/01 03:52:37 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="ssh-keygen known_hosts"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.*
+
+# Generate some keys for testing (just ed25519 for speed) and make a hosts file.
+for x in host-a host-b host-c host-d host-e host-f host-a2 host-b2; do
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/kh.$x -C "$x" -N "" || \
+		fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+	# Add a comment that we expect should be preserved.
+	echo "# $x" >> $OBJ/kh.hosts
+	(
+		case "$x" in
+		host-a|host-b)	printf "$x " ;;
+		host-c)		printf "@cert-authority $x " ;;
+		host-d)		printf "@revoked $x " ;;
+		host-e)		printf "host-e* " ;;
+		host-f)		printf "host-f,host-g,host-h " ;;
+		host-a2)	printf "host-a " ;;
+		host-b2)	printf "host-b " ;;
+		esac
+		cat $OBJ/kh.${x}.pub
+		# Blank line should be preserved.
+		echo "" >> $OBJ/kh.hosts
+	) >> $OBJ/kh.hosts
+done
+
+# Generate a variant with an invalid line. We'll use this for most tests,
+# because keygen should be able to cope and it should be preserved in any
+# output file.
+cat $OBJ/kh.hosts >> $OBJ/kh.invalid
+echo "host-i " >> $OBJ/kh.invalid
+
+cp $OBJ/kh.invalid $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig
+
+expect_key() {
+	_host=$1
+	_hosts=$2
+	_key=$3
+	_line=$4
+	_mark=$5
+	_marker=""
+	test "x$_mark" = "xCA" && _marker="@cert-authority "
+	test "x$_mark" = "xREVOKED" && _marker="@revoked "
+	test "x$_line" != "x" &&
+	    echo "# Host $_host found: line $_line $_mark" >> $OBJ/kh.expect
+	printf "${_marker}$_hosts " >> $OBJ/kh.expect
+	cat $OBJ/kh.${_key}.pub >> $OBJ/kh.expect ||
+	    fatal "${_key}.pub missing"
+}
+
+check_find() {
+	_host=$1
+	_name=$2
+	shift; shift
+	${SSHKEYGEN} "$@" -f $OBJ/kh.invalid -F $_host > $OBJ/kh.result
+	if ! diff -w $OBJ/kh.expect $OBJ/kh.result ; then
+		fail "didn't find $_name"
+	fi
+}
+
+check_find_exit_code() {
+	_host=$1
+	_name=$2
+	_keygenopt=$3
+	_exp_exit_code=$4
+	${SSHKEYGEN} $_keygenopt -f $OBJ/kh.invalid -F $_host > /dev/null
+	if [ "$?" != "$_exp_exit_code" ] ; then
+	    fail "Unexpected exit code $_name"
+	fi
+}
+
+# Find key
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a 2
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a2 20
+check_find host-a "simple find"
+
+# find CA key
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-c host-c host-c 8 CA
+check_find host-c "find CA key"
+
+# find revoked key
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-d host-d host-d 11 REVOKED
+check_find host-d "find revoked key"
+
+# find key with wildcard
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-e.somedomain "host-e*" host-e 14
+check_find host-e.somedomain "find wildcard key"
+
+# find key among multiple hosts
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-h "host-f,host-g,host-h " host-f 17
+check_find host-h "find multiple hosts"
+
+# Check exit code, known host
+check_find_exit_code host-a "known host" "-q" "0"
+
+# Check exit code, unknown host
+check_find_exit_code host-aa "unknown host" "-q" "1"
+
+# Check exit code, the hash mode, known host
+check_find_exit_code host-a "known host" "-q -H" "0"
+
+# Check exit code, the hash mode, unknown host
+check_find_exit_code host-aa "unknown host" "-q -H" "1"
+
+check_hashed_find() {
+	_host=$1
+	_name=$2
+	_file=$3
+	test "x$_file" = "x" && _file=$OBJ/kh.invalid
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -f $_file -HF $_host | grep '|1|' | \
+	    sed "s/^[^ ]*/$_host/" > $OBJ/kh.result
+	if ! diff -w $OBJ/kh.expect $OBJ/kh.result ; then
+		fail "didn't find $_name"
+	fi
+}
+
+# Find key and hash
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a2
+check_hashed_find host-a "find simple and hash"
+
+# Find CA key and hash
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-c host-c host-c "" CA
+# CA key output is not hashed.
+check_find host-c "find simple and hash" -Hq
+
+# Find revoked key and hash
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-d host-d host-d "" REVOKED
+# Revoked key output is not hashed.
+check_find host-d "find simple and hash" -Hq
+
+# find key with wildcard and hash
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-e "host-e*" host-e ""
+# Key with wildcard hostname should not be hashed.
+check_find host-e "find wildcard key" -Hq
+
+# find key among multiple hosts
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+# Comma-separated hostnames should be expanded and hashed.
+expect_key host-f "host-h " host-f
+expect_key host-g "host-h " host-f
+expect_key host-h "host-h " host-f
+check_hashed_find host-h "find multiple hosts"
+
+# Attempt remove key on invalid file.
+cp $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig $OBJ/kh.invalid
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.invalid -R host-a 2>/dev/null
+diff $OBJ/kh.invalid $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig || fail "remove on invalid succeeded"
+
+# Remove key
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-a 2>/dev/null
+grep -v "^host-a " $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig > $OBJ/kh.expect
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.expect || fail "remove simple"
+
+# Remove CA key
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-c 2>/dev/null
+# CA key should not be removed.
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig || fail "remove CA"
+
+# Remove revoked key
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-d 2>/dev/null
+# revoked key should not be removed.
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig || fail "remove revoked"
+
+# Remove wildcard
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-e.blahblah 2>/dev/null
+grep -v "^host-e[*] " $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig > $OBJ/kh.expect
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.expect || fail "remove wildcard"
+
+# Remove multiple
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -R host-h 2>/dev/null
+grep -v "^host-f," $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig > $OBJ/kh.expect
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.expect || fail "remove wildcard"
+
+# Attempt hash on invalid file
+cp $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig $OBJ/kh.invalid
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.invalid -H 2>/dev/null && fail "hash invalid succeeded"
+diff $OBJ/kh.invalid $OBJ/kh.invalid.orig || fail "invalid file modified"
+
+# Hash valid file
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig $OBJ/kh.hosts
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hosts -H 2>/dev/null || fail "hash failed"
+diff $OBJ/kh.hosts.old $OBJ/kh.hosts.orig || fail "backup differs"
+grep "^host-[abfgh]" $OBJ/kh.hosts && fail "original hostnames persist"
+
+cp $OBJ/kh.hosts $OBJ/kh.hashed.orig
+
+# Test lookup
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a
+expect_key host-a host-a host-a2
+check_hashed_find host-a "find simple in hashed" $OBJ/kh.hosts
+
+# Test multiple expanded
+rm -f $OBJ/kh.expect
+expect_key host-h host-h host-f
+check_hashed_find host-h "find simple in hashed" $OBJ/kh.hosts
+
+# Test remove
+cp $OBJ/kh.hashed.orig $OBJ/kh.hashed
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hashed -R host-a 2>/dev/null
+${SSHKEYGEN} -qf $OBJ/kh.hashed -F host-a && fail "found key after hashed remove"
diff --git a/regress/keygen-moduli.sh b/regress/keygen-moduli.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8be53f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/keygen-moduli.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: keygen-moduli.sh,v 1.4 2020/01/02 13:25:38 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="keygen moduli"
+
+dhgex=0
+for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
+	case $kex in
+		diffie-hellman-group*)	dhgex=1 ;;
+	esac
+done
+
+# Try "start at the beginning and stop after 1", "skip 1 then stop after 1"
+# and "skip 2 and run to the end with checkpointing".  Since our test data
+# file has 3 lines, these should always result in 1 line of output.
+if [ "x$dhgex" = "x1" ]; then
+    for i in "-O lines=1" "-O start-line=1 -O lines=1" "-O start-line=2 -O checkpoint=$OBJ/moduli.ckpt"; do
+	trace "keygen $i"
+	rm -f $OBJ/moduli.out $OBJ/moduli.ckpt
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -M screen -f ${SRC}/moduli.in $i $OBJ/moduli.out 2>/dev/null || \
+	    fail "keygen screen failed $i"
+	lines=`wc -l <$OBJ/moduli.out`
+	test "$lines" -eq "1" || fail "expected 1 line, got $lines"
+    done
+fi
+
+rm -f $OBJ/moduli.out $OBJ/moduli.ckpt
diff --git a/regress/keygen-sshfp.sh b/regress/keygen-sshfp.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2abf9ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/keygen-sshfp.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: keygen-sshfp.sh,v 1.2 2021/07/19 02:29:28 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="keygen-sshfp"
+
+trace "keygen fingerprints"
+fp=`${SSHKEYGEN} -r test -f ${SRC}/ed25519_openssh.pub | \
+    awk '$5=="1"{print $6}'`
+if [ "$fp" != "8a8647a7567e202ce317e62606c799c53d4c121f" ]; then
+	fail "keygen fingerprint sha1"
+fi
+fp=`${SSHKEYGEN} -r test -f ${SRC}/ed25519_openssh.pub | \
+    awk '$5=="2"{print $6}'`
+if [ "$fp" != \
+    "54a506fb849aafb9f229cf78a94436c281efcb4ae67c8a430e8c06afcb5ee18f" ]; then
+	fail "keygen fingerprint sha256"
+fi
+
+if ${SSH} -Q key-plain | grep ssh-rsa >/dev/null; then
+	fp=`${SSHKEYGEN} -r test -f ${SRC}/rsa_openssh.pub | awk '$5=="1"{print $6}'`
+	if [ "$fp" != "99c79cc09f5f81069cc017cdf9552cfc94b3b929" ]; then
+		fail "keygen fingerprint sha1"
+	fi
+	fp=`${SSHKEYGEN} -r test -f ${SRC}/rsa_openssh.pub | awk '$5=="2"{print $6}'`
+	if [ "$fp" != \
+	    "e30d6b9eb7a4de495324e4d5870b8220577993ea6af417e8e4a4f1c5bf01a9b6" ]; then
+		fail "keygen fingerprint sha256"
+	fi
+fi
diff --git a/regress/keys-command.sh b/regress/keys-command.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5feec17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/keys-command.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.8 2021/09/30 04:22:50 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="authorized keys from command"
+
+if [ -z "$SUDO" -a ! -w /var/run ]; then
+	skip "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without"
+fi
+
+rm -f $OBJ/keys-command-args
+
+touch $OBJ/keys-command-args
+chmod a+rw $OBJ/keys-command-args
+
+expected_key_text=`awk '{ print $2 }' < $OBJ/ssh-ed25519.pub`
+expected_key_fp=`$SSHKEYGEN -lf $OBJ/ssh-ed25519.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
+
+# Establish a AuthorizedKeysCommand in /var/run where it will have
+# acceptable directory permissions.
+KEY_COMMAND="/var/run/keycommand_${LOGNAME}.$$"
+trap "${SUDO} rm -f ${KEY_COMMAND}" 0
+cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "rm -f '$KEY_COMMAND' ; cat > '$KEY_COMMAND'"
+#!/bin/sh
+echo args: "\$@" >> $OBJ/keys-command-args
+echo "$PATH" | grep -q mekmitasdigoat && exit 7
+test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1
+if test $# -eq 6 ; then
+	test "x\$2" != "xblah" && exit 2
+	test "x\$3" != "x${expected_key_text}" && exit 3
+	test "x\$4" != "xssh-rsa" && exit 4
+	test "x\$5" != "x${expected_key_fp}" && exit 5
+	test "x\$6" != "xblah" && exit 6
+fi
+exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_keys_${LOGNAME}"
+_EOF
+$SUDO chmod 0755 "$KEY_COMMAND"
+
+if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m keys-command $KEY_COMMAND ; then
+	echo "skipping: $KEY_COMMAND is unsuitable as AuthorizedKeysCommand"
+	$SUDO rm -f $KEY_COMMAND
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+if [ -x $KEY_COMMAND ]; then
+	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
+
+	verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand with arguments"
+	(
+		grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
+		echo AuthorizedKeysFile none
+		echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND %u blah %k %t %f blah
+		echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME}
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+	# Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd
+	env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \
+	    ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "connect failed"
+	fi
+
+	verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand without arguments"
+	# Check legacy behavior of no-args resulting in username being passed.
+	(
+		grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak
+		echo AuthorizedKeysFile none
+		echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND
+		echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME}
+	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+	# Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd
+	env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \
+	    ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "connect failed"
+	fi
+else
+	skip "$KEY_COMMAND not executable (/var/run mounted noexec?)"
+fi
diff --git a/regress/keyscan.sh b/regress/keyscan.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..75a14ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/keyscan.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: keyscan.sh,v 1.13 2020/01/22 07:31:27 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="keyscan"
+
+for i in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do
+	if [ -z "$algs" ]; then
+		algs="$i"
+	else
+		algs="$algs,$i"
+	fi
+done
+echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $algs" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+
+start_sshd
+
+for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do
+	trace "keyscan type $t"
+	${SSHKEYSCAN} -t $t -T 15 -p $PORT 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 \
+		> /dev/null 2>&1
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh-keyscan -t $t failed with: $r"
+	fi
+done
diff --git a/regress/keytype.sh b/regress/keytype.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1c0451
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/keytype.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: keytype.sh,v 1.11 2021/02/25 03:27:34 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="login with different key types"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+
+# Construct list of key types based on what the built binaries support.
+ktypes=""
+for i in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	case "$i" in
+		ssh-dss)		ktypes="$ktypes dsa-1024" ;;
+		ssh-rsa)		ktypes="$ktypes rsa-2048 rsa-3072" ;;
+		ssh-ed25519)		ktypes="$ktypes ed25519-512" ;;
+		ecdsa-sha2-nistp256)	ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-256" ;;
+		ecdsa-sha2-nistp384)	ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-384" ;;
+		ecdsa-sha2-nistp521)	ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-521" ;;
+		sk-ssh-ed25519*)	ktypes="$ktypes ed25519-sk" ;;
+		sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256*) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-sk" ;;
+	esac
+done
+
+for kt in $ktypes; do
+	rm -f $OBJ/key.$kt
+	xbits=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $2}'`
+	xtype=`echo ${kt}  | awk -F- '{print $1}'`
+	case "$kt" in
+	*sk)	type="$kt"; bits="n/a"; bits_arg="";;
+	*)	type=$xtype; bits=$xbits; bits_arg="-b $bits";;
+	esac
+	verbose "keygen $type, $bits bits"
+	${SSHKEYGEN} $bits_arg -q -N '' -t $type  -f $OBJ/key.$kt || \
+		fail "ssh-keygen for type $type, $bits bits failed"
+done
+
+kname_to_ktype() {
+	case $1 in
+	dsa-1024)	echo ssh-dss;;
+	ecdsa-256)	echo ecdsa-sha2-nistp256;;
+	ecdsa-384)	echo ecdsa-sha2-nistp384;;
+	ecdsa-521)	echo ecdsa-sha2-nistp521;;
+	ed25519-512)	echo ssh-ed25519;;
+	rsa-*)		echo rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa;;
+	ed25519-sk)	echo sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com;;
+	ecdsa-sk)	echo sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com;;
+	esac
+}
+
+tries="1 2 3"
+for ut in $ktypes; do
+	user_type=`kname_to_ktype "$ut"`
+	htypes="$ut"
+	#htypes=$ktypes
+	for ht in $htypes; do
+		host_type=`kname_to_ktype "$ht"`
+		trace "ssh connect, userkey $ut, hostkey $ht"
+		(
+			grep -v HostKey $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+			echo HostKey $OBJ/key.$ht
+			echo PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms $user_type
+			echo HostKeyAlgorithms $host_type
+		) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		(
+			grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+			echo IdentityFile $OBJ/key.$ut
+			echo PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms $user_type
+			echo HostKeyAlgorithms $host_type
+		) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+		(
+			printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
+			cat $OBJ/key.$ht.pub
+		) > $OBJ/known_hosts
+		cat $OBJ/key.$ut.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+		for i in $tries; do
+			verbose "userkey $ut, hostkey ${ht}"
+			${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
+			if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+				fail "ssh userkey $ut, hostkey $ht failed"
+			fi
+		done
+	done
+done
diff --git a/regress/knownhosts-command.sh b/regress/knownhosts-command.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8472ec8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/knownhosts-command.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: knownhosts-command.sh,v 1.3 2021/08/30 01:15:45 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="known hosts command "
+
+rm -f $OBJ/knownhosts_command $OBJ/ssh_proxy_khc
+cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_orig
+
+( grep -vi GlobalKnownHostsFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy_orig | \
+    grep -vi UserKnownHostsFile;
+  echo "GlobalKnownHostsFile none" ;
+  echo "UserKnownHostsFile none" ;
+  echo "KnownHostsCommand $OBJ/knownhosts_command '%t' '%K' '%u'" ;
+) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+verbose "simple connection"
+cat > $OBJ/knownhosts_command << _EOF
+#!/bin/sh
+cat $OBJ/known_hosts
+_EOF
+chmod a+x $OBJ/knownhosts_command
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy x true || fail "ssh connect failed"
+
+verbose "no keys"
+cat > $OBJ/knownhosts_command << _EOF
+#!/bin/sh
+exit 0
+_EOF
+chmod a+x $OBJ/knownhosts_command
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy x true && fail "ssh connect succeeded with no keys"
+
+verbose "bad exit status"
+cat > $OBJ/knownhosts_command << _EOF
+#!/bin/sh
+cat $OBJ/known_hosts
+exit 1
+_EOF
+chmod a+x $OBJ/knownhosts_command
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy x true && fail "ssh connect succeeded with bad exit"
+
+for keytype in ${SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES} ; do
+	algs=$keytype
+	test "x$keytype" = "xssh-dss" && continue
+	test "x$keytype" = "xssh-rsa" && algs=ssh-rsa,rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512
+	verbose "keytype $keytype"
+	cat > $OBJ/knownhosts_command << _EOF
+#!/bin/sh
+die() { echo "\$@" 1>&2 ; exit 1; }
+test "x\$1" = "x$keytype" || die "wrong keytype \$1 (expected $keytype)"
+test "x\$3" = "x$LOGNAME" || die "wrong username \$3 (expected $LOGNAME)"
+grep -- "\$1.*\$2" $OBJ/known_hosts
+_EOF
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$algs x true ||
+	    fail "ssh connect failed for keytype $x"
+done
diff --git a/regress/knownhosts.sh b/regress/knownhosts.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dfc768a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/knownhosts.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: knownhosts.sh,v 1.1 2021/10/01 05:20:20 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="known hosts"
+
+opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+
+trace "test initial connection"
+${SSH} $opts somehost true || fail "initial connection"
+
+trace "learn hashed known host"
+>$OBJ/known_hosts
+${SSH} -ohashknownhosts=yes -o stricthostkeychecking=no $opts somehost true \
+   || fail "learn hashed known_hosts"
+
+trace "test hashed known hosts"
+${SSH} $opts somehost true || fail "reconnect with hashed known hosts"
diff --git a/regress/krl.sh b/regress/krl.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d560d61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/krl.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: krl.sh,v 1.12 2023/01/16 04:11:29 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="key revocation lists"
+
+# Use ed25519 by default since it's fast and it's supported when building
+# w/out OpenSSL.  Populate ktype[2-4] with the other types if supported.
+ktype1=ed25519; ktype2=ed25519; ktype3=ed25519;
+ktype4=ed25519; ktype5=ed25519; ktype6=ed25519;
+for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do
+	case "$t" in
+		ecdsa*)		ktype2=ecdsa ;;
+		ssh-rsa)	ktype3=rsa ;;
+		ssh-dss)	ktype4=dsa ;;
+		sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com)		ktype5=ed25519-sk ;;
+		sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com)	ktype6=ecdsa-sk ;;
+	esac
+done
+
+# Do most testing with ssh-keygen; it uses the same verification code as sshd.
+
+# Old keys will interfere with ssh-keygen.
+rm -f $OBJ/revoked-* $OBJ/krl-*
+
+# Generate a CA key
+$SSHKEYGEN -t $ktype1 -f $OBJ/revoked-ca  -C "" -N "" > /dev/null ||
+	fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN -t $ktype2 -f $OBJ/revoked-ca2  -C "" -N "" > /dev/null ||
+	fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA2 failed"
+
+# A specification that revokes some certificates by serial numbers
+# The serial pattern is chosen to ensure the KRL includes list, range and
+# bitmap sections.
+cat << EOF >> $OBJ/revoked-serials
+serial: 1-4
+serial: 10
+serial: 15
+serial: 30
+serial: 50
+serial: 90
+serial: 999
+# The following sum to 500-799
+serial: 500
+serial: 501
+serial: 502
+serial: 503-600
+serial: 700-797
+serial: 798
+serial: 799
+serial: 599-701
+# Some multiple consecutive serial number ranges
+serial: 10000-20000
+serial: 30000-40000
+EOF
+
+# A specification that revokes some certificated by key ID.
+touch $OBJ/revoked-keyid
+for n in 1 2 3 4 10 15 30 50 90 `jot 500 300` 999 1000 1001 1002; do
+	test "x$n" = "x499" && continue
+	# Fill in by-ID revocation spec.
+	echo "id: revoked $n" >> $OBJ/revoked-keyid
+done
+
+keygen() {
+	N=$1
+	f=$OBJ/revoked-`printf "%04d" $N`
+	# Vary the keytype. We use mostly ed25519 since this is fast and well
+	# supported.
+	keytype=$ktype1
+	case $N in
+	2  | 10 | 510 | 1001)	keytype=$ktype2 ;;
+	4  | 30 | 520 | 1002)	keytype=$ktype3 ;;
+	8  | 50 | 530 | 1003)	keytype=$ktype4 ;;
+	16 | 70 | 540 | 1004)	keytype=$ktype5 ;;
+	32 | 90 | 550 | 1005)	keytype=$ktype6 ;;
+	esac
+	$SSHKEYGEN -t $keytype -f $f -C "" -N "" > /dev/null \
+		|| fatal "$SSHKEYGEN failed"
+	# Sign cert
+	$SSHKEYGEN -s $OBJ/revoked-ca -z $n -I "revoked $N" $f >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+		|| fatal "$SSHKEYGEN sign failed"
+	echo $f
+}
+
+# Generate some keys.
+verbose "$tid: generating test keys"
+REVOKED_SERIALS="1 4 10 50 90 500 510 520 550 799 999"
+for n in $REVOKED_SERIALS ; do
+	f=`keygen $n`
+	RKEYS="$RKEYS ${f}.pub"
+	RCERTS="$RCERTS ${f}-cert.pub"
+done
+UNREVOKED_SERIALS="5 9 14 16 29 49 51 499 800 1010 1011"
+UNREVOKED=""
+for n in $UNREVOKED_SERIALS ; do
+	f=`keygen $n`
+	UKEYS="$UKEYS ${f}.pub"
+	UCERTS="$UCERTS ${f}-cert.pub"
+done
+
+# Specifications that revoke keys by hash.
+touch $OBJ/revoked-sha1 $OBJ/revoked-sha256 $OBJ/revoked-hash
+for rkey in $RKEYS; do
+	(printf "sha1: "; cat $rkey) >> $OBJ/revoked-sha1
+	(printf "sha256: "; cat $rkey) >> $OBJ/revoked-sha256
+	(printf "hash: "; $SSHKEYGEN -lf $rkey | \
+		awk '{ print $2 }') >> $OBJ/revoked-hash
+done
+
+genkrls() {
+	OPTS=$1
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-empty - </dev/null \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keys $RKEYS \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-cert $RCERTS \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-all $RKEYS $RCERTS \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-sha1 $OBJ/revoked-sha1 \
+	>/dev/null 2>&1 || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-sha256 $OBJ/revoked-sha256 \
+	>/dev/null 2>&1 || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-hash $OBJ/revoked-hash \
+	>/dev/null 2>&1 || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+# This should fail as KRLs from serial/key-id spec need the CA specified.
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/revoked-serials \
+	>/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid $OBJ/revoked-keyid \
+	>/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly"
+# These should succeed; they specify an explicit CA key.
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial -s $OBJ/revoked-ca \
+	$OBJ/revoked-serials >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid -s $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub \
+	$OBJ/revoked-keyid >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+# These should succeed; they specify an wildcard CA key.
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial-wild -s NONE $OBJ/revoked-serials \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild -s NONE $OBJ/revoked-keyid \
+	>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+# Revoke the same serials with the second CA key to ensure a multi-CA
+# KRL is generated.
+$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial -u -s $OBJ/revoked-ca2 \
+	$OBJ/revoked-serials >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
+}
+
+## XXX dump with trace and grep for set cert serials
+## XXX test ranges near (u64)-1, etc.
+
+verbose "$tid: generating KRLs"
+genkrls
+
+check_krl() {
+	KEY=$1
+	KRL=$2
+	EXPECT_REVOKED=$3
+	TAG=$4
+	$SSHKEYGEN -Qf $KRL $KEY >/dev/null
+	result=$?
+	if test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xy" -a $result -eq 0 ; then
+		fatal "key $KEY not revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG"
+	elif test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xn" -a $result -ne 0 ; then
+		fatal "key $KEY unexpectedly revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG"
+	fi
+}
+test_rev() {
+	FILES=$1
+	TAG=$2
+	KEYS_RESULT=$3
+	ALL_RESULT=$4
+	HASH_RESULT=$5
+	SERIAL_RESULT=$6
+	KEYID_RESULT=$7
+	CERTS_RESULT=$8
+	CA_RESULT=$9
+	SERIAL_WRESULT=${10}
+	KEYID_WRESULT=${11}
+	verbose "$tid: checking revocations for $TAG"
+	for f in $FILES ; do
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-empty		no		"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keys		$KEYS_RESULT	"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-all		$ALL_RESULT	"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-sha1		$HASH_RESULT	"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-sha256		$HASH_RESULT	"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-hash		$HASH_RESULT	"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-serial		$SERIAL_RESULT	"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keyid		$KEYID_RESULT	"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-cert		$CERTS_RESULT	"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-ca		$CA_RESULT	"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-serial-wild	$SERIAL_WRESULT	"$TAG"
+		check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild	$KEYID_WRESULT	"$TAG"
+	done
+}
+
+test_all() {
+	#                                                           wildcard
+	#                                 keys all hash sr# ID cert  CA srl ID
+	test_rev "$RKEYS"     "revoked keys" y   y    y   n  n    n   n   n  n
+	test_rev "$UKEYS"   "unrevoked keys" n   n    n   n  n    n   n   n  n
+	test_rev "$RCERTS"   "revoked certs" y   y    y   y  y    y   y   y  y
+	test_rev "$UCERTS" "unrevoked certs" n   n    n   n  n    n   y   n  n
+}
+
+test_all
+
+# Check update. Results should be identical.
+verbose "$tid: testing KRL update"
+for f in $OBJ/krl-keys $OBJ/krl-cert $OBJ/krl-all \
+    $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/krl-keyid \
+    $OBJ/krl-serial-wild $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild; do
+	cp -f $OBJ/krl-empty $f
+	genkrls -u
+done
+
+test_all
diff --git a/regress/limit-keytype.sh b/regress/limit-keytype.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7127de0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/limit-keytype.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: limit-keytype.sh,v 1.10 2021/02/25 03:27:34 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="restrict pubkey type"
+
+# XXX sk-* keys aren't actually tested ATM.
+
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+
+mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
+
+ktype1=ed25519; ktype2=ed25519; ktype3=ed25519;
+ktype4=ed25519; ktype5=ed25519; ktype6=ed25519;
+for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do 
+	case "$t" in
+		ssh-rsa)	ktype2=rsa ;;
+		ecdsa*)		ktype3=ecdsa ;;  # unused
+		ssh-dss)	ktype4=dsa ;;
+		sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com)		ktype5=ed25519-sk ;;
+		sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com)	ktype6=ecdsa-sk ;;
+	esac
+done
+
+# Create a CA key
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype1 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+
+# Make some keys and a certificate.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype1 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype2 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype2 -f $OBJ/user_key3 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype4 -f $OBJ/user_key4 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype5 -f $OBJ/user_key5 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype6 -f $OBJ/user_key6 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+	-z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/user_key3 ||
+		fatal "couldn't sign user_key1"
+# Copy the private key alongside the cert to allow better control of when
+# it is offered.
+mv $OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key3.pub
+
+grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+opts="-oProtocol=2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes"
+certopts="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key3.pub"
+
+echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+cat $OBJ/user_key2.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+prepare_config() {
+	(
+		grep -v "Protocol"  $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+		echo "Protocol 2"
+		echo "AuthenticationMethods publickey"
+		echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+		echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
+		for x in "$@" ; do
+			echo "$x"
+		done
+ 	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+}
+
+# Return the required parameter for PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms corresponding to
+# the supplied key type.
+keytype() {
+	case "$1" in
+		ecdsa)		printf "ecdsa-sha2-*" ;;
+		ed25519)	printf "ssh-ed25519" ;;
+		dsa)		printf "ssh-dss" ;;
+		rsa)		printf "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512,ssh-rsa" ;;
+		sk-ecdsa)	printf "sk-ecdsa-*" ;;
+		sk-ssh-ed25519)	printf "sk-ssh-ed25519-*" ;;
+	esac
+}
+
+prepare_config
+
+# Check we can log in with all key types.
+${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed"
+
+# Allow plain Ed25519 and RSA. The certificate should fail.
+verbose "allow $ktype2,$ktype1"
+prepare_config \
+	"PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms `keytype $ktype2`,`keytype $ktype1`"
+${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed"
+
+# Allow Ed25519 only.
+verbose "allow $ktype1"
+prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms `keytype $ktype1`"
+${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
+if [ "$ktype1" != "$ktype2" ]; then
+	${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true && fatal "key2 succeeded"
+fi
+
+# Allow all certs. Plain keys should fail.
+verbose "allow cert only"
+prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms *-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true && fatal "key1 succeeded"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true && fatal "key2 succeeded"
+
+# Allow RSA in main config, Ed25519 for non-existent user.
+verbose "match w/ no match"
+prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms `keytype $ktype2`" \
+	"Match user x$USER" "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms +`keytype $ktype1`"
+${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded"
+if [ "$ktype1" != "$ktype2" ]; then
+	${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true && fatal "key1 succeeded"
+fi
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed"
+
+# Allow only DSA in main config, Ed25519 for user.
+verbose "match w/ matching"
+prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms `keytype $ktype4`" \
+	"Match user $USER" "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms +`keytype $ktype1`"
+${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
+${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key4 proxy true && fatal "key4 succeeded"
+
diff --git a/regress/localcommand.sh b/regress/localcommand.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5224a16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/localcommand.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: localcommand.sh,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="localcommand"
+
+echo 'PermitLocalCommand yes' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+echo 'LocalCommand echo foo' >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+verbose "test $tid: proto $p localcommand"
+a=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true`
+if [ "$a" != "foo" ] ; then
+	fail "$tid proto $p"
+fi
diff --git a/regress/login-timeout.sh b/regress/login-timeout.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1577da1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/login-timeout.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: login-timeout.sh,v 1.10 2021/09/30 05:20:08 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="connect after login grace timeout"
+
+trace "test login grace time"
+cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_config.orig
+grep -vi LoginGraceTime $OBJ/sshd_config.orig > $OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "LoginGraceTime 10s" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+echo "MaxStartups 1" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+start_sshd
+
+(echo SSH-2.0-fake; sleep 60) | telnet 127.0.0.1 ${PORT} >/dev/null 2>&1 &
+sleep 15
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh connect after login grace timeout failed"
+fi
diff --git a/regress/misc/Makefile b/regress/misc/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9149f2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+SUBDIR=		sk-dummy
+
+.include <bsd.subdir.mk>
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b4238f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+# NB. libssh and libopenbsd-compat should be built with the same sanitizer opts.
+CC=clang-11
+CXX=clang++-11
+FUZZ_FLAGS=-fsanitize=address,fuzzer -fno-omit-frame-pointer
+FUZZ_LIBS=-lFuzzer
+
+CXXFLAGS=-O2 -g -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -I ../../.. $(FUZZ_FLAGS)
+CFLAGS=$(CXXFLAGS)
+LDFLAGS=-L ../../.. -L ../../../openbsd-compat -g $(FUZZ_FLAGS)
+LIBS=-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lmd -lcrypto -lfido2 -lcbor $(FUZZ_LIBS)
+SK_NULL_OBJS=ssh-sk-null.o
+COMMON_DEPS=../../../libssh.a
+
+TARGETS=pubkey_fuzz sig_fuzz authopt_fuzz authkeys_fuzz sshsig_fuzz \
+	sshsigopt_fuzz privkey_fuzz kex_fuzz agent_fuzz
+
+all: $(TARGETS)
+
+.cc.o:
+	$(CXX) $(CXXFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+
+pubkey_fuzz: pubkey_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(COMMON_DEPS)
+	$(CXX) -o $@ pubkey_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+
+sig_fuzz: sig_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(COMMON_DEPS)
+	$(CXX) -o $@ sig_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+
+authopt_fuzz: authopt_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(COMMON_DEPS)
+	$(CXX) -o $@ authopt_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) ../../../auth-options.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+
+authkeys_fuzz: authkeys_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(COMMON_DEPS)
+	$(CXX) -o $@ authkeys_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) ../../../auth-options.o ../../../auth2-pubkeyfile.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+
+sshsig_fuzz: sshsig_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(COMMON_DEPS)
+	$(CXX) -o $@ sshsig_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) ../../../sshsig.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+
+sshsigopt_fuzz: sshsigopt_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(COMMON_DEPS)
+	$(CXX) -o $@ sshsigopt_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) ../../../sshsig.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+
+privkey_fuzz: privkey_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(COMMON_DEPS)
+	$(CXX) -o $@ privkey_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+
+kex_fuzz: kex_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(COMMON_DEPS)
+	$(CXX) -o $@ kex_fuzz.o $(SK_NULL_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) -lz
+
+agent_fuzz: agent_fuzz.o agent_fuzz_helper.o sk-dummy.o ../../../ssh-sk.o $(COMMON_DEPS)
+	$(CXX) -o $@ agent_fuzz.o agent_fuzz_helper.o sk-dummy.o ../../../ssh-sk.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) -lz
+
+agent_fuzz_helper.o: agent_fuzz_helper.c ../../../ssh-agent.c
+
+sk-dummy.o: ../sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
+	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ ../sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c -DSK_DUMMY_INTEGRATE=1 $(LDFLAGS)
+
+clean:
+	-rm -f *.o $(TARGETS)
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/README b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae6fbe7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/README
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+This directory contains fuzzing harnesses for use with clang's libfuzzer.
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad85b2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+// cc_fuzz_target test for ssh-agent.
+extern "C" {
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+extern void test_one(const uint8_t* s, size_t slen);
+
+int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* s, size_t slen)
+{
+	test_one(s, slen);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+} // extern
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz_helper.c b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz_helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d41982
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/agent_fuzz_helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
+#include "fixed-keys.h"
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#define main(ac, av) xxxmain(ac, av)
+#include "../../../ssh-agent.c"
+
+void test_one(const uint8_t* s, size_t slen);
+
+static int
+devnull_or_die(void)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	if ((fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+		error_f("open /dev/null: %s", strerror(errno));
+		abort();
+	}
+	return fd;
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+pubkey_or_die(const char *s)
+{
+	char *tmp, *cp;
+	struct sshkey *pubkey;
+	int r;
+
+	tmp = cp = xstrdup(s);
+	if ((pubkey = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+		abort();
+	if ((r = sshkey_read(pubkey, &cp)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse");
+		abort();
+	}
+	free(tmp);
+	return pubkey;
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+privkey_or_die(const char *s)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	struct sshkey *privkey;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_from(s, strlen(s))) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshbuf_from failed");
+		abort();
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(b, "", &privkey, NULL)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse");
+		abort();
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return privkey;
+}
+
+static void
+add_key(const char *privkey, const char *certpath)
+{
+	Identity *id;
+	int r;
+	struct sshkey *cert;
+
+	id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
+	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
+	idtab->nentries++;
+	id->key = privkey_or_die(privkey);
+	id->comment = xstrdup("rhododaktulos Eos");
+	if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key))
+		id->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
+
+	/* Now the cert too */
+	id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
+	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
+	idtab->nentries++;
+	id->key = privkey_or_die(privkey);
+	cert = pubkey_or_die(certpath);
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(id->key)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_certified");
+		abort();
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, id->key)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshkey_cert_copy");
+		abort();
+	}
+	sshkey_free(cert);
+	id->comment = xstrdup("outis");
+	if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key))
+		id->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
+}
+
+static void
+cleanup_idtab(void)
+{
+	Identity *id;
+
+	if (idtab == NULL) return;
+	for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id;
+	    id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist)) {
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
+		free_identity(id);
+	}
+	free(idtab);
+	idtab = NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+reset_idtab(void)
+{
+	cleanup_idtab();
+	idtab_init();
+	// Load keys.
+	add_key(PRIV_RSA, CERT_RSA);
+	add_key(PRIV_DSA, CERT_DSA);
+	add_key(PRIV_ECDSA, CERT_ECDSA);
+	add_key(PRIV_ED25519, CERT_ED25519);
+	add_key(PRIV_ECDSA_SK, CERT_ECDSA_SK);
+	add_key(PRIV_ED25519_SK, CERT_ED25519_SK);
+}
+
+static void
+cleanup_sockettab(void)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
+		if (sockets[i].type != AUTH_UNUSED)
+			close_socket(sockets + i);
+	}
+	free(sockets);
+	sockets = NULL;
+	sockets_alloc = 0;
+}
+
+static void
+reset_sockettab(int devnull)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	cleanup_sockettab();
+	if ((fd = dup(devnull)) == -1) {
+		error_f("dup: %s", strerror(errno));
+		abort();
+	}
+	new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, fd);
+	assert(sockets[0].type == AUTH_CONNECTION);
+	assert(sockets[0].fd == fd);
+}
+
+#define MAX_MESSAGES 256
+void
+test_one(const uint8_t* s, size_t slen)
+{
+	static int devnull = -1;
+	size_t i, olen, nlen;
+
+	if (devnull == -1) {
+		log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3,
+		    SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+		devnull = devnull_or_die();
+		allowed_providers = xstrdup("");
+		setenv("DISPLAY", "", 1); /* ban askpass */
+	}
+
+	reset_idtab();
+	reset_sockettab(devnull);
+	(void)sshbuf_put(sockets[0].input, s, slen);
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_MESSAGES; i++) {
+		olen = sshbuf_len(sockets[0].input);
+		process_message(0);
+		nlen = sshbuf_len(sockets[0].input);
+		if (nlen == 0 || nlen == olen)
+			break;
+	}
+	cleanup_idtab();
+	cleanup_sockettab();
+}
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/authkeys_fuzz.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/authkeys_fuzz.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b3e54e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/authkeys_fuzz.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+
+// testdata/id_ed25519.pub and testdata/id_ed25519-cert.pub
+const char *pubkey = "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDPQXmEVMVLmeFRyafKMVWgPDkv8/uRBTwmcEDatZzMD"; 
+const char *certtext = "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIMDQjYH6XRzH3j3MW1DdjCoAfvrHfgjnVGF+sLK0pBfqAAAAIDPQXmEVMVLmeFRyafKMVWgPDkv8/uRBTwmcEDatZzMDAAAAAAAAA+sAAAABAAAAB3VseXNzZXMAAAAXAAAAB3VseXNzZXMAAAAIb2R5c3NldXMAAAAAAAAAAP//////////AAAAAAAAAIIAAAAVcGVybWl0LVgxMS1mb3J3YXJkaW5nAAAAAAAAABdwZXJtaXQtYWdlbnQtZm9yd2FyZGluZwAAAAAAAAAWcGVybWl0LXBvcnQtZm9yd2FyZGluZwAAAAAAAAAKcGVybWl0LXB0eQAAAAAAAAAOcGVybWl0LXVzZXItcmMAAAAAAAAAAAAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgM9BeYRUxUuZ4VHJp8oxVaA8OS/z+5EFPCZwQNq1nMwMAAABTAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAQBj0og+s09/HpwdHZbzN0twooKPDWWrxGfnP1Joy6cDnY2BCSQ7zg9vbq11kLF8H/sKOTZWAQrUZ7LlChOu9Ogw= id_ed25519.pub";
+
+// stubs
+void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+}
+
+void
+auth_log_authopts(const char *loc, const struct sshauthopt *opts, int do_remote)
+{
+}
+
+int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size)
+{
+	char *tmp, *o, *cp = (char *)malloc(size + 1 + strlen(pubkey) + 1);
+	struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
+	struct passwd *pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+	static struct sshkey *key, *cert;
+
+	if (key == NULL) {
+		if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL ||
+		    (cert = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+			abort();
+		if ((o = tmp = strdup(pubkey)) == NULL ||
+		    sshkey_read(key, &tmp) != 0)
+			abort();
+		free(o);
+		if ((o = tmp = strdup(certtext)) == NULL ||
+		    sshkey_read(cert, &tmp) != 0)
+			abort();
+		free(o);
+	}
+	if (cp == NULL || pw == NULL || key == NULL || cert == NULL)
+		abort();
+
+	// Cleanup whitespace at input EOL.
+	for (; size > 0 && strchr(" \t\r\n", data[size - 1]) != NULL; size--) ;
+
+	// Append a pubkey that will match.
+	memcpy(cp, data, size);
+	cp[size] = ' ';
+	memcpy(cp + size + 1, pubkey, strlen(pubkey) + 1);
+
+	// Try key.
+	if ((tmp = strdup(cp)) == NULL)
+		abort();
+	(void) auth_check_authkey_line(pw, key, tmp, "127.0.0.1", "localhost",
+	    "fuzz", &opts);
+	free(tmp);
+	sshauthopt_free(opts);
+
+	// Try cert.
+	if ((tmp = strdup(cp)) == NULL)
+		abort();
+	(void) auth_check_authkey_line(pw, cert, tmp, "127.0.0.1", "localhost",
+	    "fuzz", &opts);
+	free(tmp);
+	sshauthopt_free(opts);
+
+	free(cp);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+} // extern "C"
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/authopt_fuzz.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/authopt_fuzz.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a76d5a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/authopt_fuzz.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+
+#include "auth-options.h"
+
+int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size)
+{
+	char *cp = (char *)malloc(size + 1);
+	struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL, *merge = NULL, *add = sshauthopt_new();
+
+	if (cp == NULL || add == NULL)
+		goto out;
+	memcpy(cp, data, size);
+	cp[size] = '\0';
+	if ((opts = sshauthopt_parse(cp, NULL)) == NULL)
+		goto out;
+	if ((merge = sshauthopt_merge(opts, add, NULL)) == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+ out:
+	free(cp);
+	sshauthopt_free(add);
+	sshauthopt_free(opts);
+	sshauthopt_free(merge);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+} // extern "C"
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/fixed-keys.h b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/fixed-keys.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6e7c6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/fixed-keys.h
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+/*
+ * Some keys used by fuzzers
+ */
+
+#define PRIV_RSA \
+"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"\
+"b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAABFwAAAAdzc2gtcn\n"\
+"NhAAAAAwEAAQAAAQEA3+epf+VGKoGPaAZXrf6S0cyumQnddkGBnVFX0A5eh37RtLug0qY5\n"\
+"thxsBUbGGVr9mTd2QXwLujBwYg5l1MP/Fmg+5312Zgx9pHmS+qKULbar0hlNgptNEb+aNU\n"\
+"d3o9qg3aXqXm7+ZnjAV05ef/mxNRN2ZvuEkw7cRppTJcbBI+vF3lXuCXnX2klDI95Gl2AW\n"\
+"3WHRtanqLHZXuBkjjRBDKc7MUq/GP1hmLiAd95dvU7fZjRlIEsP84zGEI1Fb0L/kmPHcOt\n"\
+"iVfHft8CtmC9v6+94JrOiPBBNScV+dyrgAGPsdKdr/1vIpQmCNiI8s3PCiD8J7ZiBaYm0I\n"\
+"8fq5G/qnUwAAA7ggw2dXIMNnVwAAAAdzc2gtcnNhAAABAQDf56l/5UYqgY9oBlet/pLRzK\n"\
+"6ZCd12QYGdUVfQDl6HftG0u6DSpjm2HGwFRsYZWv2ZN3ZBfAu6MHBiDmXUw/8WaD7nfXZm\n"\
+"DH2keZL6opQttqvSGU2Cm00Rv5o1R3ej2qDdpepebv5meMBXTl5/+bE1E3Zm+4STDtxGml\n"\
+"MlxsEj68XeVe4JedfaSUMj3kaXYBbdYdG1qeosdle4GSONEEMpzsxSr8Y/WGYuIB33l29T\n"\
+"t9mNGUgSw/zjMYQjUVvQv+SY8dw62JV8d+3wK2YL2/r73gms6I8EE1JxX53KuAAY+x0p2v\n"\
+"/W8ilCYI2Ijyzc8KIPwntmIFpibQjx+rkb+qdTAAAAAwEAAQAAAQEArWm5B4tFasppjUHM\n"\
+"SsAuajtCxtizI1Hc10EW59cZM4vvUzE2f6+qZvdgWj3UU/L7Et23w0QVuSCnCerox379ZB\n"\
+"ddEOFFAAiQjwBx65hbd4RRUymxtIQfjq18++LcMJW1nbVQ7c69ThQbtALIggmbS+ZE/8Gx\n"\
+"jkwmIrCH0Ww8TlpsPe+mNHuyNk7UEZoXLm22lNLqq5qkIL5JgT6M2iNJpMOJy9/CKi6kO4\n"\
+"JPuVwjdG4C5pBPaMN3KJ1IvAlSlLGNaXnfXcn85gWfsCjsZmH3liey2NJamqp/w83BrKUg\n"\
+"YZvMR2qeWZaKkFTahpzN5KRK1BFeB37O0P84Dzh1biDX8QAAAIEAiWXW8ePYFwLpa2mFIh\n"\
+"VvRTdcrN70rVK5eWVaL3pyS4vGA56Jixq86dHveOnbSY+iNb1jQidtXc8SWUt2wtHqZ32h\n"\
+"Lji9/hMSKqe9SEP3xvDRDmUJqsVw0ySyrFrzm4160QY6RKU3CIQCVFslMZ9fxmrfZ/hxoU\n"\
+"0X3FVsxmC4+kwAAACBAPOc1YERpV6PjANBrGR+1o1RCdACbm5myc42QzSNIaOZmgrYs+Gt\n"\
+"7+EcoqSdbJzHJNCNQfF+A+vjbIkFiuZqq/5wwr59qXx5OAlijLB/ywwKmTWq6lp//Zxny+\n"\
+"ka3sIGNO14eQvmxNDnlLL+RIZleCTEKBXSW6CZhr+uHMZFKKMtAAAAgQDrSkm+LbILB7H9\n"\
+"jxEBZLhv53aAn4u81kFKQOJ7PzzpBGSoD12i7oIJu5siSD5EKDNVEr+SvCf0ISU3BuMpzl\n"\
+"t3YrPrHRheOFhn5e3j0e//zB8rBC0DGB4CtTDdeh7rOXUL4K0pz+8wEpNkV62SWxhC6NRW\n"\
+"I79JhtGkh+GtcnkEfwAAAAAB\n"\
+"-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define PUB_RSA \
+"ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDf56l/5UYqgY9oBlet/pLRzK6ZCd12QYGdUVfQDl6HftG0u6DSpjm2HGwFRsYZWv2ZN3ZBfAu6MHBiDmXUw/8WaD7nfXZmDH2keZL6opQttqvSGU2Cm00Rv5o1R3ej2qDdpepebv5meMBXTl5/+bE1E3Zm+4STDtxGmlMlxsEj68XeVe4JedfaSUMj3kaXYBbdYdG1qeosdle4GSONEEMpzsxSr8Y/WGYuIB33l29Tt9mNGUgSw/zjMYQjUVvQv+SY8dw62JV8d+3wK2YL2/r73gms6I8EE1JxX53KuAAY+x0p2v/W8ilCYI2Ijyzc8KIPwntmIFpibQjx+rkb+qdT"
+#define CERT_RSA \
+"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 id_rsa.pub"
+#define PRIV_DSA \
+"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"\
+"b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAABsgAAAAdzc2gtZH\n"\
+"NzAAAAgQCsGTfjpQ465EOkfQXJM9BOvfRQE0fqlykAls+ncz+T7hrbeScRu8xpwzsznJNm\n"\
+"xlW8o6cUDiHmBJ5OHgamUC9N7YJeU/6fnOAZifgN8mqK6k8pKHuje8ANOiYgHLl0yiASQA\n"\
+"3//qMyzZ+W/hemoLSmLAbEqlfWVeyYx+wta1Vm+QAAABUAvWyehvUvdHvQxavYgS5p0t5Q\n"\
+"d7UAAACBAIRA9Yy+f4Kzqpv/qICPO3zk42UuP7WAhSW2nCbQdLlCiSTxcjKgcvXNRckwJP\n"\
+"44JjSHOtJy/AMtJrPIbLYG6KuWTdBlEHFiG6DafvLG+qPMSL2bPjXTOhuOMbCHIZ+5WBkW\n"\
+"THeG/Nv11iI01Of9V6tXkig23K370flkRkXFi9MdAAAAgCt6YUcQkNwG7B/e5M1FZsLP9O\n"\
+"kVB3BwLAOjmWdHpyhu3HpwSJa3XLEvhXN0i6IVI2KgPo/2GtYA6rHt14L+6u1pmhh8sAvQ\n"\
+"ksp3qZB+xh/NP+hBqf0sbHX0yYbzKOvI5SCc/kKK6yagcBZOsubM/KC8TxyVgmD5c6WzYs\n"\
+"h5TEpvAAAB2PHjRbbx40W2AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBAKwZN+OlDjrkQ6R9Bckz0E699FAT\n"\
+"R+qXKQCWz6dzP5PuGtt5JxG7zGnDOzOck2bGVbyjpxQOIeYEnk4eBqZQL03tgl5T/p+c4B\n"\
+"mJ+A3yaorqTykoe6N7wA06JiAcuXTKIBJADf/+ozLNn5b+F6agtKYsBsSqV9ZV7JjH7C1r\n"\
+"VWb5AAAAFQC9bJ6G9S90e9DFq9iBLmnS3lB3tQAAAIEAhED1jL5/grOqm/+ogI87fOTjZS\n"\
+"4/tYCFJbacJtB0uUKJJPFyMqBy9c1FyTAk/jgmNIc60nL8Ay0ms8hstgboq5ZN0GUQcWIb\n"\
+"oNp+8sb6o8xIvZs+NdM6G44xsIchn7lYGRZMd4b82/XWIjTU5/1Xq1eSKDbcrfvR+WRGRc\n"\
+"WL0x0AAACAK3phRxCQ3AbsH97kzUVmws/06RUHcHAsA6OZZ0enKG7cenBIlrdcsS+Fc3SL\n"\
+"ohUjYqA+j/Ya1gDqse3Xgv7q7WmaGHywC9CSynepkH7GH80/6EGp/SxsdfTJhvMo68jlIJ\n"\
+"z+QorrJqBwFk6y5sz8oLxPHJWCYPlzpbNiyHlMSm8AAAAUUA+OGldMi76ClO/sstpdbBUE\n"\
+"lq8AAAAAAQI=\n"\
+"-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define PUB_DSA \
+"ssh-dss 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"
+#define CERT_DSA \
+"ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 id_dsa.pub"
+#define PRIV_ECDSA \
+"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"\
+"b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAaAAAABNlY2RzYS\n"\
+"1zaGEyLW5pc3RwMjU2AAAACG5pc3RwMjU2AAAAQQTDJ0VlMv+0rguNzaJ1DF2KueHaxRSQ\n"\
+"6LpIxGbulrg1a8RPbnMXwag5GcDiDllD2lDUJUuBEWyjXA0rZoZX35ELAAAAoE/Bbr5PwW\n"\
+"6+AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBMMnRWUy/7SuC43N\n"\
+"onUMXYq54drFFJDoukjEZu6WuDVrxE9ucxfBqDkZwOIOWUPaUNQlS4ERbKNcDStmhlffkQ\n"\
+"sAAAAhAIhE6hCID5oOm1TDktc++KFKyScjLifcZ6Cgv5xSSyLOAAAAAAECAwQFBgc=\n"\
+"-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define PUB_ECDSA \
+"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBMMnRWUy/7SuC43NonUMXYq54drFFJDoukjEZu6WuDVrxE9ucxfBqDkZwOIOWUPaUNQlS4ERbKNcDStmhlffkQs="
+#define CERT_ECDSA \
+"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 id_ecdsa.pub"
+#define PRIV_ED25519 \
+"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"\
+"b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW\n"\
+"QyNTUxOQAAACAz0F5hFTFS5nhUcmnyjFVoDw5L/P7kQU8JnBA2rWczAwAAAIhWlP99VpT/\n"\
+"fQAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACAz0F5hFTFS5nhUcmnyjFVoDw5L/P7kQU8JnBA2rWczAw\n"\
+"AAAEDE1rlcMC0s0X3TKVZAOVavZOywwkXw8tO5dLObxaCMEDPQXmEVMVLmeFRyafKMVWgP\n"\
+"Dkv8/uRBTwmcEDatZzMDAAAAAAECAwQF\n"\
+"-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define PUB_ED25519 \
+"ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDPQXmEVMVLmeFRyafKMVWgPDkv8/uRBTwmcEDatZzMD"
+#define CERT_ED25519 \
+"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 id_ed25519.pub"
+#define PRIV_ECDSA_SK \
+"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"\
+"b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAfwAAACJzay1lY2\n"\
+"RzYS1zaGEyLW5pc3RwMjU2QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAACG5pc3RwMjU2AAAAQQTYyU76zop1\n"\
+"VOb4DfKWYnR5b0TOC3zw8DzObAfHWB5o6xls+tOYiEleXvIEi00Da2iCK47habZTOhLyeB\n"\
+"X2Avu5AAAABHNzaDoAAAGYqUAQSKlAEEgAAAAic2stZWNkc2Etc2hhMi1uaXN0cDI1NkBv\n"\
+"cGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAAAhuaXN0cDI1NgAAAEEE2MlO+s6KdVTm+A3ylmJ0eW9Ezgt88PA8zm\n"\
+"wHx1geaOsZbPrTmIhJXl7yBItNA2togiuO4Wm2UzoS8ngV9gL7uQAAAARzc2g6AQAAAOMt\n"\
+"LS0tLUJFR0lOIEVDIFBSSVZBVEUgS0VZLS0tLS0KTUhjQ0FRRUVJSHFsZjNsWTkxZFhwUn\n"\
+"dYZDBrS0lYWmNpeDRRcDBNSU15Ny9JMUxXSTFuWG9Bb0dDQ3FHU000OQpBd0VIb1VRRFFn\n"\
+"QUUyTWxPK3M2S2RWVG0rQTN5bG1KMGVXOUV6Z3Q4OFBBOHptd0h4MWdlYU9zWmJQclRtSW\n"\
+"hKClhsN3lCSXROQTJ0b2dpdU80V20yVXpvUzhuZ1Y5Z0w3dVE9PQotLS0tLUVORCBFQyBQ\n"\
+"UklWQVRFIEtFWS0tLS0tCgAAAAAAAAAbZGptQGRqbS5zeWQuY29ycC5nb29nbGUuY29tAQ\n"\
+"IDBAUG\n"\
+"-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define PUB_ECDSA_SK \
+"sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBNjJTvrOinVU5vgN8pZidHlvRM4LfPDwPM5sB8dYHmjrGWz605iISV5e8gSLTQNraIIrjuFptlM6EvJ4FfYC+7kAAAAEc3NoOg=="
+#define CERT_ECDSA_SK \
+"sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com 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"
+#define PRIV_ED25519_SK \
+"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"\
+"b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAASgAAABpzay1zc2\n"\
+"gtZWQyNTUxOUBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAACCTJtH10vWhIDxd62edvMLg9u2cwYKyqa7332je\n"\
+"RArHjAAAAARzc2g6AAAAwN7vvE3e77xNAAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY2\n"\
+"9tAAAAIJMm0fXS9aEgPF3rZ528wuD27ZzBgrKprvffaN5ECseMAAAABHNzaDoBAAAAQEsS\n"\
+"xLFiVzfpH2mt9xh8i/zmHV646Hud4QruNBAGNl8gkybR9dL1oSA8XetnnbzC4PbtnMGCsq\n"\
+"mu999o3kQKx4wAAAAAAAAAG2RqbUBkam0uc3lkLmNvcnAuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbQECAwQFBg==\n"\
+"-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define PUB_ED25519_SK \
+"sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIJMm0fXS9aEgPF3rZ528wuD27ZzBgrKprvffaN5ECseMAAAABHNzaDo="
+#define CERT_ED25519_SK \
+"sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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"
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/kex_fuzz.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/kex_fuzz.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d38ca85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/kex_fuzz.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,460 @@
+// libfuzzer driver for key exchange fuzzing.
+
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh_api.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "fixed-keys.h"
+
+// Define if you want to generate traces.
+/* #define STANDALONE 1 */
+
+static int prepare_key(struct shared_state *st, int keytype, int bits);
+
+struct shared_state {
+	size_t nkeys;
+	struct sshkey **privkeys, **pubkeys;
+};
+
+struct test_state {
+	struct sshbuf *smsgs, *cmsgs; /* output, for standalone mode */
+	struct sshbuf *sin, *cin; /* input; setup per-test in do_kex_with_key */
+	struct sshbuf *s_template, *c_template; /* main copy of input */
+};
+
+static int
+do_send_and_receive(struct ssh *from, struct ssh *to,
+    struct sshbuf *store, int clobber, size_t *n)
+{
+	u_char type;
+	size_t len;
+	const u_char *buf;
+	int r;
+
+	for (*n = 0;; (*n)++) {
+		if ((r = ssh_packet_next(from, &type)) != 0) {
+			debug_fr(r, "ssh_packet_next");
+			return r;
+		}
+		if (type != 0)
+			return 0;
+		buf = ssh_output_ptr(from, &len);
+		debug_f("%zu%s", len, clobber ? " ignore" : "");
+		if (len == 0)
+			return 0;
+		if ((r = ssh_output_consume(from, len)) != 0) {
+			debug_fr(r, "ssh_output_consume");
+			return r;
+		}
+		if (store != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(store, buf, len)) != 0) {
+			debug_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+			return r;
+		}
+		if (!clobber && (r = ssh_input_append(to, buf, len)) != 0) {
+			debug_fr(r, "ssh_input_append");
+			return r;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+run_kex(struct test_state *ts, struct ssh *client, struct ssh *server)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+	size_t cn, sn;
+
+	/* If fuzzing, replace server/client input */
+	if (ts->sin != NULL) {
+		if ((r = ssh_input_append(server, sshbuf_ptr(ts->sin),
+		    sshbuf_len(ts->sin))) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "ssh_input_append");
+			return r;
+		}
+		sshbuf_reset(ts->sin);
+	}
+	if (ts->cin != NULL) {
+		if ((r = ssh_input_append(client, sshbuf_ptr(ts->cin),
+		    sshbuf_len(ts->cin))) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "ssh_input_append");
+			return r;
+		}
+		sshbuf_reset(ts->cin);
+	}
+	while (!server->kex->done || !client->kex->done) {
+		cn = sn = 0;
+		debug_f("S:");
+		if ((r = do_send_and_receive(server, client,
+		    ts->smsgs, ts->cin != NULL, &sn)) != 0) {
+			debug_fr(r, "S->C");
+			break;
+		}
+		debug_f("C:");
+		if ((r = do_send_and_receive(client, server,
+		    ts->cmsgs, ts->sin != NULL, &cn)) != 0) {
+			debug_fr(r, "C->S");
+			break;
+		}
+		if (cn == 0 && sn == 0) {
+			debug_f("kex stalled");
+			r = SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	debug_fr(r, "done");
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void
+store_key(struct shared_state *st, struct sshkey *pubkey,
+    struct sshkey *privkey)
+{
+	if (st == NULL || pubkey->type < 0 || pubkey->type > INT_MAX ||
+	    privkey->type != pubkey->type ||
+	    ((size_t)pubkey->type < st->nkeys &&
+	     st->pubkeys[pubkey->type] != NULL))
+		abort();
+	if ((size_t)pubkey->type >= st->nkeys) {
+		st->pubkeys = (struct sshkey **)xrecallocarray(st->pubkeys,
+		    st->nkeys, pubkey->type + 1, sizeof(*st->pubkeys));
+		st->privkeys = (struct sshkey **)xrecallocarray(st->privkeys,
+		    st->nkeys, privkey->type + 1, sizeof(*st->privkeys));
+		st->nkeys = privkey->type + 1;
+	}
+	debug_f("store %s at %d", sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), pubkey->type);
+	st->pubkeys[pubkey->type] = pubkey;
+	st->privkeys[privkey->type] = privkey;
+}
+
+static int
+prepare_keys(struct shared_state *st)
+{
+	if (prepare_key(st, KEY_RSA, 2048) != 0 ||
+	    prepare_key(st, KEY_DSA, 1024) != 0 ||
+	    prepare_key(st, KEY_ECDSA, 256) != 0 ||
+	    prepare_key(st, KEY_ED25519, 256) != 0) {
+		error_f("key prepare failed");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+get_pubkey(struct shared_state *st, int keytype)
+{
+	if (st == NULL || keytype < 0 || (size_t)keytype >= st->nkeys ||
+	    st->pubkeys == NULL || st->pubkeys[keytype] == NULL)
+		abort();
+	return st->pubkeys[keytype];
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+get_privkey(struct shared_state *st, int keytype)
+{
+	if (st == NULL || keytype < 0 || (size_t)keytype >= st->nkeys ||
+	    st->privkeys == NULL || st->privkeys[keytype] == NULL)
+		abort();
+	return st->privkeys[keytype];
+}
+
+static int
+do_kex_with_key(struct shared_state *st, struct test_state *ts,
+    const char *kex, int keytype)
+{
+	struct ssh *client = NULL, *server = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *privkey = NULL, *pubkey = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *state = NULL;
+	struct kex_params kex_params;
+	const char *ccp, *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {0}, *keyname = NULL;
+	int i, r;
+
+	ts->cin = ts->sin = NULL;
+	if (ts->c_template != NULL &&
+	    (ts->cin = sshbuf_fromb(ts->c_template)) == NULL)
+		abort();
+	if (ts->s_template != NULL &&
+	    (ts->sin = sshbuf_fromb(ts->s_template)) == NULL)
+		abort();
+
+	pubkey = get_pubkey(st, keytype);
+	privkey = get_privkey(st, keytype);
+	keyname = xstrdup(sshkey_ssh_name(privkey));
+	if (ts->cin != NULL) {
+		debug_f("%s %s clobber client %zu", kex, keyname,
+		    sshbuf_len(ts->cin));
+	} else if (ts->sin != NULL) {
+		debug_f("%s %s clobber server %zu", kex, keyname,
+		    sshbuf_len(ts->sin));
+	} else
+		debug_f("%s %s noclobber", kex, keyname);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
+		ccp = proposal[i];
+#ifdef CIPHER_NONE_AVAIL
+		if (i == PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS || i == PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC)
+			ccp = "none";
+#endif
+		if (i == PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS)
+			ccp = keyname;
+		else if (i == PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS && kex != NULL)
+			ccp = kex;
+		if ((myproposal[i] = strdup(ccp)) == NULL) {
+			error_f("strdup prop %d", i);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+	memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal));
+	if ((r = ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "init client");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((r = ssh_init(&server, 1, &kex_params)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "init server");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((r = ssh_add_hostkey(server, privkey)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = ssh_add_hostkey(client, pubkey)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "add hostkeys");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((r = run_kex(ts, client, server)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "kex");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	/* XXX rekex, set_state, etc */
+ fail:
+	for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
+		free(myproposal[i]);
+	sshbuf_free(ts->sin);
+	sshbuf_free(ts->cin);
+	sshbuf_free(state);
+	ssh_free(client);
+	ssh_free(server);
+	free(keyname);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+prepare_key(struct shared_state *st, int kt, int bits)
+{
+	const char *pubstr = NULL;
+	const char *privstr = NULL;
+	char *tmp, *cp;
+	struct sshkey *privkey = NULL, *pubkey = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	switch (kt) {
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		pubstr = PUB_RSA;
+		privstr = PRIV_RSA;
+		break;
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		pubstr = PUB_DSA;
+		privstr = PRIV_DSA;
+		break;
+	case KEY_ECDSA:
+		pubstr = PUB_ECDSA;
+		privstr = PRIV_ECDSA;
+		break;
+	case KEY_ED25519:
+		pubstr = PUB_ED25519;
+		privstr = PRIV_ED25519;
+		break;
+	default:
+		abort();
+	}
+	if ((b = sshbuf_from(privstr, strlen(privstr))) == NULL)
+		abort();
+	if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(b, "", &privkey, NULL)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "priv %d", kt);
+		abort();
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	tmp = cp = xstrdup(pubstr);
+	if ((pubkey = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+		abort();
+	if ((r = sshkey_read(pubkey, &cp)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "pub %d", kt);
+		abort();
+	}
+	free(tmp);
+
+	store_key(st, pubkey, privkey);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#if defined(STANDALONE)
+
+#if 0 /* use this if generating new keys to embed above */
+static int
+prepare_key(struct shared_state *st, int keytype, int bits)
+{
+	struct sshkey *privkey = NULL, *pubkey = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_generate(keytype, bits, &privkey)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "generate");
+		abort();
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_from_private(privkey, &pubkey)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "make pubkey");
+		abort();
+	}
+	store_key(st, pubkey, privkey);
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+int main(void)
+{
+	static struct shared_state *st;
+	struct test_state *ts;
+	const int keytypes[] = { KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, KEY_ECDSA, KEY_ED25519, -1 };
+	static const char * const kextypes[] = {
+		"sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com",
+		"curve25519-sha256@libssh.org",
+		"ecdh-sha2-nistp256",
+		"diffie-hellman-group1-sha1",
+		"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1",
+		NULL,
+	};
+	int i, j;
+	char *path;
+	FILE *f;
+
+	log_init("kex_fuzz", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+
+	if (st == NULL) {
+		st = (struct shared_state *)xcalloc(1, sizeof(*st));
+		prepare_keys(st);
+	}
+	/* Run each kex method for each key and save client/server packets */
+	for (i = 0; keytypes[i] != -1; i++) {
+		for (j = 0; kextypes[j] != NULL; j++) {
+			ts = (struct test_state *)xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ts));
+			ts->smsgs = sshbuf_new();
+			ts->cmsgs = sshbuf_new();
+			do_kex_with_key(st, ts, kextypes[j], keytypes[i]);
+			xasprintf(&path, "S2C-%s-%s",
+			    kextypes[j], sshkey_type(st->pubkeys[keytypes[i]]));
+			debug_f("%s", path);
+			if ((f = fopen(path, "wb+")) == NULL)
+				abort();
+			if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(ts->smsgs), 1,
+			    sshbuf_len(ts->smsgs), f) != sshbuf_len(ts->smsgs))
+				abort();
+			fclose(f);
+			free(path);
+			//sshbuf_dump(ts->smsgs, stderr);
+			xasprintf(&path, "C2S-%s-%s",
+			    kextypes[j], sshkey_type(st->pubkeys[keytypes[i]]));
+			debug_f("%s", path);
+			if ((f = fopen(path, "wb+")) == NULL)
+				abort();
+			if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(ts->cmsgs), 1,
+			    sshbuf_len(ts->cmsgs), f) != sshbuf_len(ts->cmsgs))
+				abort();
+			fclose(f);
+			free(path);
+			//sshbuf_dump(ts->cmsgs, stderr);
+			sshbuf_free(ts->smsgs);
+			sshbuf_free(ts->cmsgs);
+			free(ts);
+		}
+	}
+	for (i = 0; keytypes[i] != -1; i++) {
+		xasprintf(&path, "%s.priv",
+		    sshkey_type(st->privkeys[keytypes[i]]));
+		debug_f("%s", path);
+		if (sshkey_save_private(st->privkeys[keytypes[i]], path,
+		    "", "", SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH, NULL, 0) != 0)
+			abort();
+		free(path);
+		xasprintf(&path, "%s.pub",
+		    sshkey_type(st->pubkeys[keytypes[i]]));
+		debug_f("%s", path);
+		if (sshkey_save_public(st->pubkeys[keytypes[i]], path, "") != 0)
+			abort();
+		free(path);
+	}
+}
+#else /* !STANDALONE */
+static void
+do_kex(struct shared_state *st, struct test_state *ts, const char *kex)
+{
+	do_kex_with_key(st, ts, kex, KEY_RSA);
+	do_kex_with_key(st, ts, kex, KEY_DSA);
+	do_kex_with_key(st, ts, kex, KEY_ECDSA);
+	do_kex_with_key(st, ts, kex, KEY_ED25519);
+}
+
+static void
+kex_tests(struct shared_state *st, struct test_state *ts)
+{
+	do_kex(st, ts, "sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com");
+	do_kex(st, ts, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org");
+	do_kex(st, ts, "ecdh-sha2-nistp256");
+	do_kex(st, ts, "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1");
+	do_kex(st, ts, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1");
+}
+
+int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size)
+{
+	static struct shared_state *st;
+	struct test_state *ts;
+	u_char crbuf[SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES * 4];
+	u_char zbuf[4096] = {0};
+	static LogLevel loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+
+	if (st == NULL) {
+		if (getenv("DEBUG") != NULL || getenv("KEX_FUZZ_DEBUG") != NULL)
+			loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3;
+		log_init("kex_fuzz",
+		    loglevel, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+		st = (struct shared_state *)xcalloc(1, sizeof(*st));
+		prepare_keys(st);
+	}
+
+	/* Ensure that we can complete (fail) banner exchange at least */
+	memset(crbuf, '\n', sizeof(crbuf));
+
+	ts = (struct test_state *)xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ts));
+	if ((ts->s_template = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    sshbuf_put(ts->s_template, data, size) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_put(ts->s_template, crbuf, sizeof(crbuf)) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_put(ts->s_template, zbuf, sizeof(zbuf)) != 0)
+		abort();
+	kex_tests(st, ts);
+	sshbuf_free(ts->s_template);
+	free(ts);
+
+	ts = (struct test_state *)xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ts));
+	if ((ts->c_template = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    sshbuf_put(ts->c_template, data, size) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_put(ts->c_template, crbuf, sizeof(crbuf)) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_put(ts->c_template, zbuf, sizeof(zbuf)) != 0)
+		abort();
+	kex_tests(st, ts);
+	sshbuf_free(ts->c_template);
+	free(ts);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* STANDALONE */
+} /* extern "C" */
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/privkey_fuzz.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/privkey_fuzz.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff0b0f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/privkey_fuzz.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size)
+{
+	struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *b = sshbuf_from(data, size);
+	int r = sshkey_private_deserialize(b, &k);
+	if (r == 0) sshkey_free(k);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+} // extern
+
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/pubkey_fuzz.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/pubkey_fuzz.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8bbc110
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/pubkey_fuzz.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+
+int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size)
+{
+	struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+	int r = sshkey_from_blob(data, size, &k);
+	if (r == 0) sshkey_free(k);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+} // extern
+
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b32502b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+// cc_fuzz_target test for public key parsing.
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+static struct sshkey *generate_or_die(int type, unsigned bits) {
+  int r;
+  struct sshkey *ret;
+  if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &ret)) != 0) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "generate(%d, %u): %s", type, bits, ssh_err(r));
+    abort();
+  }
+  return ret;
+}
+
+int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* sig, size_t slen)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+  static struct sshkey *rsa = generate_or_die(KEY_RSA, 2048);
+  static struct sshkey *dsa = generate_or_die(KEY_DSA, 1024);
+  static struct sshkey *ecdsa256 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 256);
+  static struct sshkey *ecdsa384 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 384);
+  static struct sshkey *ecdsa521 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 521);
+#endif
+  struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL;
+  static struct sshkey *ed25519 = generate_or_die(KEY_ED25519, 0);
+  static const char *data = "If everyone started announcing his nose had "
+      "run away, I don’t know how it would all end";
+  static const size_t dlen = strlen(data);
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+  sshkey_verify(rsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+  sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+  details = NULL;
+  sshkey_verify(dsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+  sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+  details = NULL;
+  sshkey_verify(ecdsa256, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+  sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+  details = NULL;
+  sshkey_verify(ecdsa384, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+  sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+  details = NULL;
+  sshkey_verify(ecdsa521, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+  sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+  details = NULL;
+#endif
+  sshkey_verify(ed25519, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+  sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+} // extern
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/ssh-sk-null.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/ssh-sk-null.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..948c3d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/ssh-sk-null.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/* $OpenBSD$ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+extern "C" {
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+
+int
+sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+    const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags,
+    const char *pin, struct sshbuf *challenge_buf,
+    struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshbuf *attest)
+{
+	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_sign(const char *provider_path, struct sshkey *key,
+    u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+    u_int compat, const char *pin)
+{
+	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+    const char *pin, u_int flags, struct sshsk_resident_key ***srksp,
+    size_t *nsrksp)
+{
+	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+};
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsig_fuzz.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsig_fuzz.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..02211a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsig_fuzz.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+// cc_fuzz_target test for sshsig verification.
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshsig.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* sig, size_t slen)
+{
+  static const char *data = "If everyone started announcing his nose had "
+      "run away, I don’t know how it would all end";
+  struct sshbuf *signature = sshbuf_from(sig, slen);
+  struct sshbuf *message = sshbuf_from(data, strlen(data));
+  struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+  struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL;
+  extern char *__progname;
+
+  log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+  sshsig_verifyb(signature, message, "castle", &k, &details);
+  sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+  sshkey_free(k);
+  sshbuf_free(signature);
+  sshbuf_free(message);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+} // extern
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsigopt_fuzz.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsigopt_fuzz.cc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7424fcb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsigopt_fuzz.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+
+#include "sshsig.h"
+
+int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size)
+{
+	char *cp = (char *)malloc(size + 1);
+	struct sshsigopt *opts = NULL;
+
+	if (cp == NULL)
+		goto out;
+	memcpy(cp, data, size);
+	cp[size] = '\0';
+	if ((opts = sshsigopt_parse(cp, "libfuzzer", 0, NULL)) == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+ out:
+	free(cp);
+	sshsigopt_free(opts);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+} // extern "C"
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/README b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7520530
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/README
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+This is preparatory data for fuzzing testing including scripts and test keys,
+corresponding to ../fixed-keys that are used in the fuzz tests and consequent
+fuzzing seed corpora. They should not be changed unless the affected seed
+corpora are also regenerated.
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/create-agent-corpus.sh b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/create-agent-corpus.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..1043b9f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/create-agent-corpus.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+# Exercise ssh-agent to generate fuzzing corpus
+
+# XXX assumes agent hacked up with sk-dummy.o and ssh-sk.o linked directly
+#     and dumping of e->request for each message.
+
+set -xe
+SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$PWD/sock
+rm -f agent-[0-9]* $SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+export SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+../../../../ssh-agent -D -a $SSH_AUTH_SOCK &
+sleep 1
+AGENT_PID=$!
+trap "kill $AGENT_PID" EXIT
+
+PRIV="id_dsa id_ecdsa id_ecdsa_sk id_ed25519 id_ed25519_sk id_rsa"
+
+# add keys
+ssh-add $PRIV
+
+# sign
+ssh-add -T *.pub
+
+# list
+ssh-add -l
+
+# remove individually
+ssh-add -d $PRIV
+
+# re-add with constraints
+ssh-add -c -t 3h $PRIV
+
+# delete all
+ssh-add -D
+
+# attempt to add a PKCS#11 token
+ssh-add -s /fake || :
+
+# attempt to delete PKCS#11
+ssh-add -e /fake || :
+
+ssh-add -L
+
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..88bf556
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa-cert.pub b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3afb87f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 id_dsa.pub
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa.pub b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f91c4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_dsa.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c1a96c6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAaAAAABNlY2RzYS
+1zaGEyLW5pc3RwMjU2AAAACG5pc3RwMjU2AAAAQQTDJ0VlMv+0rguNzaJ1DF2KueHaxRSQ
+6LpIxGbulrg1a8RPbnMXwag5GcDiDllD2lDUJUuBEWyjXA0rZoZX35ELAAAAoE/Bbr5PwW
+6+AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBMMnRWUy/7SuC43N
+onUMXYq54drFFJDoukjEZu6WuDVrxE9ucxfBqDkZwOIOWUPaUNQlS4ERbKNcDStmhlffkQ
+sAAAAhAIhE6hCID5oOm1TDktc++KFKyScjLifcZ6Cgv5xSSyLOAAAAAAECAwQFBgc=
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa-cert.pub b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9de5999
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 id_ecdsa.pub
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa.pub b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..30a7cc2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBMMnRWUy/7SuC43NonUMXYq54drFFJDoukjEZu6WuDVrxE9ucxfBqDkZwOIOWUPaUNQlS4ERbKNcDStmhlffkQs=
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a364ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk-cert.pub b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14040fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 djm@djm.syd.corp.google.com
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk.pub b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1b5e829
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBNjJTvrOinVU5vgN8pZidHlvRM4LfPDwPM5sB8dYHmjrGWz605iISV5e8gSLTQNraIIrjuFptlM6EvJ4FfYC+7kAAAAEc3NoOg== djm@djm.syd.corp.google.com
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519 b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6a7fbac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
+QyNTUxOQAAACAz0F5hFTFS5nhUcmnyjFVoDw5L/P7kQU8JnBA2rWczAwAAAIhWlP99VpT/
+fQAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACAz0F5hFTFS5nhUcmnyjFVoDw5L/P7kQU8JnBA2rWczAw
+AAAEDE1rlcMC0s0X3TKVZAOVavZOywwkXw8tO5dLObxaCMEDPQXmEVMVLmeFRyafKMVWgP
+Dkv8/uRBTwmcEDatZzMDAAAAAAECAwQF
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519-cert.pub b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6a95fed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIMDQjYH6XRzH3j3MW1DdjCoAfvrHfgjnVGF+sLK0pBfqAAAAIDPQXmEVMVLmeFRyafKMVWgPDkv8/uRBTwmcEDatZzMDAAAAAAAAA+sAAAABAAAAB3VseXNzZXMAAAAXAAAAB3VseXNzZXMAAAAIb2R5c3NldXMAAAAAAAAAAP//////////AAAAAAAAAIIAAAAVcGVybWl0LVgxMS1mb3J3YXJkaW5nAAAAAAAAABdwZXJtaXQtYWdlbnQtZm9yd2FyZGluZwAAAAAAAAAWcGVybWl0LXBvcnQtZm9yd2FyZGluZwAAAAAAAAAKcGVybWl0LXB0eQAAAAAAAAAOcGVybWl0LXVzZXItcmMAAAAAAAAAAAAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgM9BeYRUxUuZ4VHJp8oxVaA8OS/z+5EFPCZwQNq1nMwMAAABTAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAQBj0og+s09/HpwdHZbzN0twooKPDWWrxGfnP1Joy6cDnY2BCSQ7zg9vbq11kLF8H/sKOTZWAQrUZ7LlChOu9Ogw= id_ed25519.pub
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519.pub b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..87b6174
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519.pub
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDPQXmEVMVLmeFRyafKMVWgPDkv8/uRBTwmcEDatZzMD
+
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9dcda6c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAASgAAABpzay1zc2
+gtZWQyNTUxOUBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAACCTJtH10vWhIDxd62edvMLg9u2cwYKyqa7332je
+RArHjAAAAARzc2g6AAAAwN7vvE3e77xNAAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY2
+9tAAAAIJMm0fXS9aEgPF3rZ528wuD27ZzBgrKprvffaN5ECseMAAAABHNzaDoBAAAAQEsS
+xLFiVzfpH2mt9xh8i/zmHV646Hud4QruNBAGNl8gkybR9dL1oSA8XetnnbzC4PbtnMGCsq
+mu999o3kQKx4wAAAAAAAAAG2RqbUBkam0uc3lkLmNvcnAuZ29vZ2xlLmNvbQECAwQFBg==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk-cert.pub b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9e41eec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 djm@djm.syd.corp.google.com
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk.pub b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38d1984
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_ed25519_sk.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIJMm0fXS9aEgPF3rZ528wuD27ZzBgrKprvffaN5ECseMAAAABHNzaDo= djm@djm.syd.corp.google.com
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..574fecf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa-cert.pub b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..01761a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAHHNzaC1yc2EtY2VydC12MDFAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAg89JX6OBMYDSxER8fnU5y8xxeMCHR/hI0uVqdEhNyCpcAAAADAQABAAABAQDf56l/5UYqgY9oBlet/pLRzK6ZCd12QYGdUVfQDl6HftG0u6DSpjm2HGwFRsYZWv2ZN3ZBfAu6MHBiDmXUw/8WaD7nfXZmDH2keZL6opQttqvSGU2Cm00Rv5o1R3ej2qDdpepebv5meMBXTl5/+bE1E3Zm+4STDtxGmlMlxsEj68XeVe4JedfaSUMj3kaXYBbdYdG1qeosdle4GSONEEMpzsxSr8Y/WGYuIB33l29Tt9mNGUgSw/zjMYQjUVvQv+SY8dw62JV8d+3wK2YL2/r73gms6I8EE1JxX53KuAAY+x0p2v/W8ilCYI2Ijyzc8KIPwntmIFpibQjx+rkb+qdTAAAAAAAAA+0AAAABAAAAB3VseXNzZXMAAAAXAAAAB3VseXNzZXMAAAAIb2R5c3NldXMAAAAAAAAAAP//////////AAAAAAAAAIIAAAAVcGVybWl0LVgxMS1mb3J3YXJkaW5nAAAAAAAAABdwZXJtaXQtYWdlbnQtZm9yd2FyZGluZwAAAAAAAAAWcGVybWl0LXBvcnQtZm9yd2FyZGluZwAAAAAAAAAKcGVybWl0LXB0eQAAAAAAAAAOcGVybWl0LXVzZXItcmMAAAAAAAAAAAAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgM9BeYRUxUuZ4VHJp8oxVaA8OS/z+5EFPCZwQNq1nMwMAAABTAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAQGCDA6PWw4x9bHQl0w7NqifHepumqD3dmyMx+hZGuPRon+TsyCjfytu7hWmV7l9XUF0fPQNFQ7FGat5e+7YUNgE= id_rsa.pub
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa.pub b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05015e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/testdata/id_rsa.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDf56l/5UYqgY9oBlet/pLRzK6ZCd12QYGdUVfQDl6HftG0u6DSpjm2HGwFRsYZWv2ZN3ZBfAu6MHBiDmXUw/8WaD7nfXZmDH2keZL6opQttqvSGU2Cm00Rv5o1R3ej2qDdpepebv5meMBXTl5/+bE1E3Zm+4STDtxGmlMlxsEj68XeVe4JedfaSUMj3kaXYBbdYdG1qeosdle4GSONEEMpzsxSr8Y/WGYuIB33l29Tt9mNGUgSw/zjMYQjUVvQv+SY8dw62JV8d+3wK2YL2/r73gms6I8EE1JxX53KuAAY+x0p2v/W8ilCYI2Ijyzc8KIPwntmIFpibQjx+rkb+qdT
diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/Makefile b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18b0a24
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.3 2023/01/15 23:35:10 djm Exp $
+
+.include <bsd.own.mk>
+.include <bsd.obj.mk>
+
+PROG=	sk-dummy.so
+NOMAN=
+
+SSHREL=../../../../../usr.bin/ssh
+.PATH: ${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}
+
+SRCS=sk-dummy.c
+# From usr.bin/ssh
+SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c
+OPENSSL?=	yes
+
+CFLAGS+=	-fPIC
+
+.if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes")
+CFLAGS+=	-DWITH_OPENSSL
+.endif
+
+# enable warnings
+WARNINGS=Yes
+
+DEBUG=-g
+CFLAGS+=	-fstack-protector-all
+CDIAGFLAGS=	-Wall
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wextra
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Werror
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wchar-subscripts
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wcomment
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wformat
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wformat-security
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wimplicit
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Winline
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wmissing-declarations
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wmissing-prototypes
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wparentheses
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wpointer-arith
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wreturn-type
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wshadow
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wsign-compare
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wstrict-aliasing
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wstrict-prototypes
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wswitch
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wtrigraphs
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wuninitialized
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wunused
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wno-unused-parameter
+.if ${COMPILER_VERSION:L} != "gcc3"
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wold-style-definition
+.endif
+
+CFLAGS+=-I${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}
+
+.if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes")
+LDADD+= -lcrypto
+DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPTO}
+.endif
+
+$(PROG): $(OBJS)
+	$(CC) $(LDFLAGS) -shared -o $@ $(OBJS) $(LDADD)
+
+.include <bsd.prog.mk>
+
diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6e4b5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* public domain */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+void
+sshfatal(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+    LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+
+	if (showfunc)
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", func);
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	if (suffix != NULL)
+		fprintf(stderr, ": %s", suffix);
+	fputc('\n', stderr);
+	_exit(1);
+}
diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad5e474
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,552 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H
+#include <sha2.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+# undef WITH_OPENSSL
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/* We don't use sha2 from OpenSSL and they can conflict with system sha2.h */
+#define OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+#define USE_LIBC_SHA2	/* NetBSD 9 */
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+/* Compatibility with OpenSSH 1.0.x */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
+#define ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, pr, ps) \
+	do { \
+		(*pr) = sig->r; \
+		(*ps) = sig->s; \
+	} while (0)
+#endif
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+/* #define SK_DEBUG 1 */
+
+#if SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR != 0x000a0000
+# error SK API has changed, sk-dummy.c needs an update
+#endif
+
+#ifdef SK_DUMMY_INTEGRATE
+# define sk_api_version		ssh_sk_api_version
+# define sk_enroll		ssh_sk_enroll
+# define sk_sign		ssh_sk_sign
+# define sk_load_resident_keys	ssh_sk_load_resident_keys
+#endif /* !SK_STANDALONE */
+
+static void skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+    __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)));
+
+static void
+skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+#if defined(SK_DEBUG)
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	fprintf(stderr, "sk-dummy %s: ", func);
+	vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
+	fputc('\n', stderr);
+	va_end(ap);
+#else
+	(void)func; /* XXX */
+	(void)fmt; /* XXX */
+#endif
+}
+
+uint32_t
+sk_api_version(void)
+{
+	return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
+}
+
+static int
+pack_key_ecdsa(struct sk_enroll_response *response)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	EC_KEY *key = NULL;
+	const EC_GROUP *g;
+	const EC_POINT *q;
+	int ret = -1;
+	long privlen;
+	BIO *bio = NULL;
+	char *privptr;
+
+	response->public_key = NULL;
+	response->public_key_len = 0;
+	response->key_handle = NULL;
+	response->key_handle_len = 0;
+
+	if ((key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(key) != 1) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "EC_KEY_generate_key");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(key, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
+	if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL ||
+	    (g = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL ||
+	    (q = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "couldn't get key parameters");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	response->public_key_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q,
+	    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
+	if (response->public_key_len == 0 || response->public_key_len > 2048) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "bad pubkey length %zu",
+		    response->public_key_len);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+	    response->public_key, response->public_key_len, NULL) == 0) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "EC_POINT_point2oct failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* Key handle contains PEM encoded private key */
+	if (!PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((privlen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &privptr)) <= 0) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "BIO_get_mem_data failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((response->key_handle = malloc(privlen)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "malloc key_handle failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	response->key_handle_len = (size_t)privlen;
+	memcpy(response->key_handle, privptr, response->key_handle_len);
+	/* success */
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		if (response->public_key != NULL) {
+			memset(response->public_key, 0,
+			    response->public_key_len);
+			free(response->public_key);
+			response->public_key = NULL;
+		}
+		if (response->key_handle != NULL) {
+			memset(response->key_handle, 0,
+			    response->key_handle_len);
+			free(response->key_handle);
+			response->key_handle = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	BIO_free(bio);
+	EC_KEY_free(key);
+	return ret;
+#else
+	return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int
+pack_key_ed25519(struct sk_enroll_response *response)
+{
+	int ret = -1;
+	u_char pk[crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES];
+	u_char sk[crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES];
+
+	response->public_key = NULL;
+	response->public_key_len = 0;
+	response->key_handle = NULL;
+	response->key_handle_len = 0;
+
+	memset(pk, 0, sizeof(pk));
+	memset(sk, 0, sizeof(sk));
+	crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(pk, sk);
+
+	response->public_key_len = sizeof(pk);
+	if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memcpy(response->public_key, pk, sizeof(pk));
+	/* Key handle contains sk */
+	response->key_handle_len = sizeof(sk);
+	if ((response->key_handle = malloc(response->key_handle_len)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "malloc key_handle failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memcpy(response->key_handle, sk, sizeof(sk));
+	/* success */
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	if (ret != 0)
+		free(response->public_key);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+check_options(struct sk_option **options)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (options == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	for (i = 0; options[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "requested unsupported option %s",
+		    options[i]->name);
+		if (options[i]->required) {
+			skdebug(__func__, "unknown required option");
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+    const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+    struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
+{
+	struct sk_enroll_response *response = NULL;
+	int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL;
+
+	(void)flags; /* XXX; unused */
+
+	if (enroll_response == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "enroll_response == NULL");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*enroll_response = NULL;
+	if (check_options(options) != 0)
+		goto out; /* error already logged */
+	if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	response->flags = flags;
+	switch(alg) {
+	case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+		if (pack_key_ecdsa(response) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		break;
+	case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+		if (pack_key_ed25519(response) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		break;
+	default:
+		skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d", alg);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* Have to return something here */
+	if ((response->signature = calloc(1, 1)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	response->signature_len = 0;
+
+	*enroll_response = response;
+	response = NULL;
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	if (response != NULL) {
+		free(response->public_key);
+		free(response->key_handle);
+		free(response->signature);
+		free(response->attestation_cert);
+		free(response);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+dump(const char *preamble, const void *sv, size_t l)
+{
+#ifdef SK_DEBUG
+	const u_char *s = (const u_char *)sv;
+	size_t i;
+
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s (len %zu):\n", preamble, l);
+	for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+		if (i % 16 == 0)
+			fprintf(stderr, "%04zu: ", i);
+		fprintf(stderr, "%02x", s[i]);
+		if (i % 16 == 15 || i == l - 1)
+			fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+	}
+#endif
+}
+
+static int
+sig_ecdsa(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+    const char *application, uint32_t counter, uint8_t flags,
+    const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+    struct sk_sign_response *response)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
+	int ret = -1;
+	BIO *bio = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+	EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
+	SHA2_CTX ctx;
+	uint8_t	apphash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	uint8_t	sighash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	uint8_t countbuf[4];
+
+	/* Decode EC_KEY from key handle */
+	if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL ||
+	    BIO_write(bio, key_handle, key_handle_len) != (int)key_handle_len) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "BIO setup failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, "")) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "Not an EC key: %d", EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* Expect message to be pre-hashed */
+	if (message_len != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "bad message len %zu", message_len);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* Prepare data to be signed */
+	dump("message", message, message_len);
+	SHA256Init(&ctx);
+	SHA256Update(&ctx, (const u_char *)application, strlen(application));
+	SHA256Final(apphash, &ctx);
+	dump("apphash", apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+	countbuf[0] = (counter >> 24) & 0xff;
+	countbuf[1] = (counter >> 16) & 0xff;
+	countbuf[2] = (counter >> 8) & 0xff;
+	countbuf[3] = counter & 0xff;
+	dump("countbuf", countbuf, sizeof(countbuf));
+	dump("flags", &flags, sizeof(flags));
+	SHA256Init(&ctx);
+	SHA256Update(&ctx, apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+	SHA256Update(&ctx, &flags, sizeof(flags));
+	SHA256Update(&ctx, countbuf, sizeof(countbuf));
+	SHA256Update(&ctx, message, message_len);
+	SHA256Final(sighash, &ctx);
+	dump("sighash", sighash, sizeof(sighash));
+	/* create and encode signature */
+	if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(sighash, sizeof(sighash), ec)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "ECDSA_do_sign failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
+	response->sig_r_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
+	response->sig_s_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_s);
+	if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL ||
+	    (response->sig_s = calloc(1, response->sig_s_len)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	BN_bn2bin(sig_r, response->sig_r);
+	BN_bn2bin(sig_s, response->sig_s);
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
+	explicit_bzero(&apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+	explicit_bzero(&sighash, sizeof(sighash));
+	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		free(response->sig_r);
+		free(response->sig_s);
+		response->sig_r = NULL;
+		response->sig_s = NULL;
+	}
+	BIO_free(bio);
+	EC_KEY_free(ec);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+	return ret;
+#else
+	return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int
+sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+    const char *application, uint32_t counter, uint8_t flags,
+    const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+    struct sk_sign_response *response)
+{
+	size_t o;
+	int ret = -1;
+	SHA2_CTX ctx;
+	uint8_t	apphash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	uint8_t signbuf[sizeof(apphash) + sizeof(flags) +
+	    sizeof(counter) + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	uint8_t sig[crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES + sizeof(signbuf)];
+	unsigned long long smlen;
+
+	if (key_handle_len != crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "bad key handle length %zu", key_handle_len);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* Expect message to be pre-hashed */
+	if (message_len != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "bad message len %zu", message_len);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* Prepare data to be signed */
+	dump("message", message, message_len);
+	SHA256Init(&ctx);
+	SHA256Update(&ctx, (const u_char *)application, strlen(application));
+	SHA256Final(apphash, &ctx);
+	dump("apphash", apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+
+	memcpy(signbuf, apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+	o = sizeof(apphash);
+	signbuf[o++] = flags;
+	signbuf[o++] = (counter >> 24) & 0xff;
+	signbuf[o++] = (counter >> 16) & 0xff;
+	signbuf[o++] = (counter >> 8) & 0xff;
+	signbuf[o++] = counter & 0xff;
+	memcpy(signbuf + o, message, message_len);
+	o += message_len;
+	if (o != sizeof(signbuf)) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "bad sign buf len %zu, expected %zu",
+		    o, sizeof(signbuf));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	dump("signbuf", signbuf, sizeof(signbuf));
+	/* create and encode signature */
+	smlen = sizeof(signbuf);
+	if (crypto_sign_ed25519(sig, &smlen, signbuf, sizeof(signbuf),
+	    key_handle) != 0) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "crypto_sign_ed25519 failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (smlen <= sizeof(signbuf)) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "bad sign smlen %llu, expected min %zu",
+		    smlen, sizeof(signbuf) + 1);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	response->sig_r_len = (size_t)(smlen - sizeof(signbuf));
+	if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memcpy(response->sig_r, sig, response->sig_r_len);
+	dump("sig_r", response->sig_r, response->sig_r_len);
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
+	explicit_bzero(&apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+	explicit_bzero(&signbuf, sizeof(signbuf));
+	explicit_bzero(&sig, sizeof(sig));
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		free(response->sig_r);
+		response->sig_r = NULL;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
+    const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+    uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+    struct sk_sign_response **sign_response)
+{
+	struct sk_sign_response *response = NULL;
+	int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL;
+	SHA2_CTX ctx;
+	uint8_t message[32];
+
+	if (sign_response == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "sign_response == NULL");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*sign_response = NULL;
+	if (check_options(options) != 0)
+		goto out; /* error already logged */
+	if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	SHA256Init(&ctx);
+	SHA256Update(&ctx, data, datalen);
+	SHA256Final(message, &ctx);
+	response->flags = flags;
+	response->counter = 0x12345678;
+	switch(alg) {
+	case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+		if (sig_ecdsa(message, sizeof(message), application,
+		    response->counter, flags, key_handle, key_handle_len,
+		    response) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		break;
+	case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+		if (sig_ed25519(message, sizeof(message), application,
+		    response->counter, flags, key_handle, key_handle_len,
+		    response) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		break;
+	default:
+		skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d", alg);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	*sign_response = response;
+	response = NULL;
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(message, sizeof(message));
+	if (response != NULL) {
+		free(response->sig_r);
+		free(response->sig_s);
+		free(response);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+    struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
+{
+	return SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
diff --git a/regress/mkdtemp.c b/regress/mkdtemp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a7be1bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/mkdtemp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Colin Watson <cjwatson@debian.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Roughly equivalent to "mktemp -d -t TEMPLATE", but portable. */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "mkdtemp template\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	const char *base;
+	const char *tmpdir;
+	char template[PATH_MAX];
+	int r;
+	char *dir;
+
+	if (argc != 2)
+		usage();
+	base = argv[1];
+
+	if ((tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR")) == NULL)
+		tmpdir = "/tmp";
+	r = snprintf(template, sizeof(template), "%s/%s", tmpdir, base);
+	if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(template))
+		fatal("template string too long");
+	dir = mkdtemp(template);
+	if (dir == NULL) {
+		perror("mkdtemp");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	puts(dir);
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/regress/modpipe.c b/regress/modpipe.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f4824b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/modpipe.c
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD: modpipe.c,v 1.6 2013/11/21 03:16:47 djm Exp $ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H
+# include <err.h>
+#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c"
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: modpipe -w [-m modspec ...] < in > out\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "modspec is one of:\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "    xor:offset:value       - XOR \"value\" at \"offset\"\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "    andor:offset:val1:val2 - AND \"val1\" then OR \"val2\" at \"offset\"\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+#define MAX_MODIFICATIONS 256
+struct modification {
+	enum { MOD_XOR, MOD_AND_OR } what;
+	unsigned long long offset;
+	u_int8_t m1, m2;
+};
+
+static void
+parse_modification(const char *s, struct modification *m)
+{
+	char what[16+1];
+	int n, m1, m2;
+
+	bzero(m, sizeof(*m));
+	if ((n = sscanf(s, "%16[^:]%*[:]%llu%*[:]%i%*[:]%i",
+	    what, &m->offset, &m1, &m2)) < 3)
+		errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
+	if (strcasecmp(what, "xor") == 0) {
+		if (n > 3)
+			errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
+		if (m1 < 0 || m1 > 0xff)
+			errx(1, "Invalid XOR modification value");
+		m->what = MOD_XOR;
+		m->m1 = m1;
+	} else if (strcasecmp(what, "andor") == 0) {
+		if (n != 4)
+			errx(1, "Invalid modification spec \"%s\"", s);
+		if (m1 < 0 || m1 > 0xff)
+			errx(1, "Invalid AND modification value");
+		if (m2 < 0 || m2 > 0xff)
+			errx(1, "Invalid OR modification value");
+		m->what = MOD_AND_OR;
+		m->m1 = m1;
+		m->m2 = m2;
+	} else
+		errx(1, "Invalid modification type \"%s\"", what);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int ch;
+	u_char buf[8192];
+	size_t total;
+	ssize_t r, s, o;
+	struct modification mods[MAX_MODIFICATIONS];
+	u_int i, wflag = 0, num_mods = 0;
+
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "wm:")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'm':
+			if (num_mods >= MAX_MODIFICATIONS)
+				errx(1, "Too many modifications");
+			parse_modification(optarg, &(mods[num_mods++]));
+			break;
+		case 'w':
+			wflag = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			usage();
+			/* NOTREACHED */
+		}
+	}
+	for (total = 0;;) {
+		r = s = read(STDIN_FILENO, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		if (r == 0)
+			break;
+		if (r < 0) {
+			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+			err(1, "read");
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < num_mods; i++) {
+			if (mods[i].offset < total ||
+			    mods[i].offset >= total + s)
+				continue;
+			switch (mods[i].what) {
+			case MOD_XOR:
+				buf[mods[i].offset - total] ^= mods[i].m1;
+				break;
+			case MOD_AND_OR:
+				buf[mods[i].offset - total] &= mods[i].m1;
+				buf[mods[i].offset - total] |= mods[i].m2;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		for (o = 0; o < s; o += r) {
+			r = write(STDOUT_FILENO, buf, s - o);
+			if (r == 0)
+				break;
+			if (r < 0) {
+				if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
+					continue;
+				err(1, "write");
+			}
+		}
+		total += s;
+	}
+	/* Warn if modifications not reached in input stream */
+	r = 0;
+	for (i = 0; wflag && i < num_mods; i++) {
+		if (mods[i].offset < total)
+			continue;
+		r = 1;
+		fprintf(stderr, "modpipe: warning - mod %u not reached\n", i);
+	}
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/regress/moduli.in b/regress/moduli.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e69c902
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/moduli.in
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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
diff --git a/regress/multiplex.sh b/regress/multiplex.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f9c8fc1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/multiplex.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.35 2023/01/13 04:47:34 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+make_tmpdir
+CTL=${SSH_REGRESS_TMP}/ctl-sock
+
+tid="connection multiplexing"
+
+trace "will use ProxyCommand $proxycmd"
+if config_defined DISABLE_FD_PASSING ; then
+	echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+P=3301  # test port
+
+wait_for_mux_master_ready()
+{
+	for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9; do
+		${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost \
+		    >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0
+		sleep $i
+	done
+	fatal "mux master never becomes ready"
+}
+
+maybe_add_scp_path_to_sshd
+start_sshd
+
+start_mux_master()
+{
+	trace "start master, fork to background"
+	${SSH} -Nn2 -MS$CTL -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" somehost \
+	    -E $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
+	# NB. $SSH_PID will be killed by test-exec.sh:cleanup on fatal errors.
+	SSH_PID=$!
+	wait_for_mux_master_ready
+}
+
+start_mux_master
+
+verbose "test $tid: setenv"
+trace "setenv over multiplexed connection"
+_XXX_TEST=blah ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" -S$CTL otherhost sh << 'EOF'
+	test X"$_XXX_TEST" = X"blah"
+EOF
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "environment not found"
+fi
+
+verbose "test $tid: envpass"
+trace "env passing over multiplexed connection"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSetEnv="_XXX_TEST=foo" -S$CTL otherhost sh << 'EOF'
+	test X"$_XXX_TEST" = X"foo"
+EOF
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "environment not found"
+fi
+
+
+verbose "test $tid: transfer"
+rm -f ${COPY}
+trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S$CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+test -f ${COPY}			|| fail "ssh -Sctl: failed copy ${DATA}" 
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "ssh -Sctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+test -f ${COPY}			|| fail "ssh -S ctl: failed copy ${DATA}" 
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "ssh -S ctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+trace "sftp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
+echo "get ${DATA} ${COPY}" | \
+	${SFTP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1
+test -f ${COPY}			|| fail "sftp: failed copy ${DATA}" 
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "sftp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+trace "scp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
+${SCP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost:${DATA} ${COPY} >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1
+test -f ${COPY}			|| fail "scp: failed copy ${DATA}" 
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "scp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+verbose "test $tid: forward"
+trace "forward over TCP/IP and check result"
+$NC -N -l 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 1)) < ${DATA} > /dev/null &
+netcat_pid=$!
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 2)):127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 1)) otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
+sleep 1  # XXX remove once race fixed
+$NC 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 2)) < /dev/null > ${COPY}
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null
+rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
+
+trace "forward over UNIX and check result"
+$NC -N -Ul $OBJ/unix-1.fwd < ${DATA} > /dev/null &
+netcat_pid=$!
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L$OBJ/unix-2.fwd:$OBJ/unix-1.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R$OBJ/unix-3.fwd:$OBJ/unix-2.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
+sleep 1  # XXX remove once race fixed
+$NC -U $OBJ/unix-3.fwd < /dev/null > ${COPY}
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
+kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null
+rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
+
+for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do
+   for mode in "" "-Oproxy"; do
+	trace "exit status $s over multiplexed connection ($mode)"
+	verbose "test $tid: status $s ($mode)"
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL $mode otherhost exit $s
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
+		fail "exit code mismatch: $r != $s"
+	fi
+
+	# same with early close of stdout/err
+	trace "exit status $s with early close over multiplexed connection ($mode)"
+	${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -n $mode otherhost \
+                exec sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\'
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
+		fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch: $r != $s"
+	fi
+   done
+done
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd check"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
+    || fail "check command failed" 
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (TCP)"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+     || fail "request local forward failed"
+sleep 1  # XXX remove once race fixed
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
+     || fail "connect to local forward port failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+     || fail "cancel local forward failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
+     && fail "local forward port still listening"
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (TCP)"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+     || fail "request remote forward failed"
+sleep 1  # XXX remove once race fixed
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
+     || fail "connect to remote forwarded port failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+     || fail "cancel remote forward failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
+     && fail "remote forward port still listening"
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (UNIX)"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+     || fail "request local forward failed"
+sleep 1  # XXX remove once race fixed
+echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | \
+    grep "Invalid SSH identification string" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+     || fail "connect to local forward path failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+     || fail "cancel local forward failed"
+N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l)
+test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "local forward path still listening"
+rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (UNIX)"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+     || fail "request remote forward failed"
+sleep 1  # XXX remove once race fixed
+echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | \
+    grep "Invalid SSH identification string" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+     || fail "connect to remote forwarded path failed"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
+     || fail "cancel remote forward failed"
+N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l)
+test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "remote forward path still listening"
+rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd
+
+verbose "test $tid: cmd exit"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oexit otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
+    || fail "send exit command failed" 
+
+# Wait for master to exit
+wait $SSH_PID
+kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "exit command failed"
+
+# Restart master and test -O stop command with master using -N
+verbose "test $tid: cmd stop"
+trace "restart master, fork to background"
+start_mux_master
+
+# start a long-running command then immediately request a stop
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost "sleep 10; exit 0" \
+     >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
+SLEEP_PID=$!
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ostop otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
+    || fail "send stop command failed"
+
+# wait until both long-running command and master have exited.
+wait $SLEEP_PID
+[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for concurrent command"
+wait $SSH_PID
+[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for master stop"
+kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "stop command failed"
+SSH_PID="" # Already gone, so don't kill in cleanup
+
diff --git a/regress/multipubkey.sh b/regress/multipubkey.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8cdda1a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/multipubkey.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: multipubkey.sh,v 1.4 2021/06/07 01:16:34 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="multiple pubkey"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+
+mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
+
+# Create a CA key
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519  -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+
+# Make some keys and a certificate.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \
+	-z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/user_key1 ||
+		fail "couldn't sign user_key1"
+# Copy the private key alongside the cert to allow better control of when
+# it is offered.
+mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1.pub
+cp -p $OBJ/user_key1 $OBJ/cert_user_key1
+
+grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+opts="-oProtocol=2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes"
+opts="$opts -i $OBJ/cert_user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2"
+
+for match in no yes ; do
+	(
+		cat  $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+		echo "Protocol 2"
+		echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+		echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
+ 	) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	if test "$match" = "yes" ; then
+		echo "AuthenticationMethods none" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		echo "PubkeyAuthentication no" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		echo "Match all" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		echo "PubkeyAuthentication yes" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	fi
+	echo "AuthenticationMethods publickey,publickey" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+	# Single key should fail.
+	trace "match $match single key"
+	rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	${SSH} $opts proxy true && fail "ssh succeeded with key"
+
+	# Single key with same-public cert should fail.
+	trace "match $match pubkey + identical cert"
+	echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	${SSH} $opts proxy true && fail "ssh succeeded with key+cert"
+
+	# Multiple plain keys should succeed.
+	trace "match $match multiple public"
+	rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub $OBJ/user_key2.pub > \
+	    $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	${SSH} $opts proxy true || fail "ssh failed with multiple keys"
+	# Cert and different key should succeed
+
+	# Key and different-public cert should succeed.
+	trace "match $match pubkey + different cert"
+	echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+	cat $OBJ/user_key2.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	${SSH} $opts proxy true || fail "ssh failed with key/cert"
+done
+
diff --git a/regress/netcat.c b/regress/netcat.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..20ec3f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/netcat.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1686 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: netcat.c,v 1.131 2015/09/03 23:06:28 sobrado Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Eric Jackson <ericj@monkey.org>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *   notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *   documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
+ *   derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Re-written nc(1) for OpenBSD. Original implementation by
+ * *Hobbit* <hobbit@avian.org>.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/tcp.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+#  include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H
+# include <err.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BYTEORDER_H
+# include <sys/byteorder.h>
+#endif
+
+/* rename to avoid collision in libssh */
+#define timeout_connect netcat_timeout_connect
+
+/* Telnet options from arpa/telnet.h */
+#define IAC	255
+#define DONT	254
+#define DO	253
+#define WONT	252
+#define WILL	251
+
+#ifndef SUN_LEN
+#define SUN_LEN(su) \
+	(sizeof(*(su)) - sizeof((su)->sun_path) + strlen((su)->sun_path))
+#endif
+
+#define PORT_MAX	65535
+#define PORT_MAX_LEN	6
+#define UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE	19
+
+#define POLL_STDIN 0
+#define POLL_NETOUT 1
+#define POLL_NETIN 2
+#define POLL_STDOUT 3
+#define BUFSIZE 16384
+
+/* Command Line Options */
+int	dflag;					/* detached, no stdin */
+int	Fflag;					/* fdpass sock to stdout */
+unsigned int iflag;				/* Interval Flag */
+int	kflag;					/* More than one connect */
+int	lflag;					/* Bind to local port */
+int	Nflag;					/* shutdown() network socket */
+int	nflag;					/* Don't do name look up */
+char   *Pflag;					/* Proxy username */
+char   *pflag;					/* Localport flag */
+int	rflag;					/* Random ports flag */
+char   *sflag;					/* Source Address */
+int	tflag;					/* Telnet Emulation */
+int	uflag;					/* UDP - Default to TCP */
+int	vflag;					/* Verbosity */
+int	xflag;					/* Socks proxy */
+int	zflag;					/* Port Scan Flag */
+int	Dflag;					/* sodebug */
+int	Iflag;					/* TCP receive buffer size */
+int	Oflag;					/* TCP send buffer size */
+int	Sflag;					/* TCP MD5 signature option */
+int	Tflag = -1;				/* IP Type of Service */
+int	rtableid = -1;
+
+int timeout = -1;
+int family = AF_UNSPEC;
+char *portlist[PORT_MAX+1];
+char *unix_dg_tmp_socket;
+
+void	atelnet(int, unsigned char *, unsigned int);
+void	build_ports(char *);
+void	help(void);
+int	local_listen(char *, char *, struct addrinfo);
+void	readwrite(int);
+void	fdpass(int nfd) __attribute__((noreturn));
+int	remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo);
+int	timeout_connect(int, const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
+int	socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo,
+	    const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int, const char *);
+int	udptest(int);
+int	unix_bind(char *);
+int	unix_connect(char *);
+int	unix_listen(char *);
+void	set_common_sockopts(int, int);
+int	map_tos(char *, int *);
+void	report_connect(const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
+void	usage(int);
+ssize_t drainbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *);
+ssize_t fillbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *);
+
+
+int
+main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+	int ch, s, ret, socksv;
+	char *host, *uport;
+	struct addrinfo hints;
+	struct servent *sv;
+	socklen_t len;
+	struct sockaddr_storage cliaddr;
+	char *proxy = NULL;
+	const char *errstr, *proxyhost = "", *proxyport = NULL;
+	struct addrinfo proxyhints;
+	char unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf[UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE];
+
+	ret = 1;
+	s = 0;
+	socksv = 5;
+	host = NULL;
+	uport = NULL;
+	sv = NULL;
+
+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+	    "46DdFhI:i:klNnO:P:p:rSs:tT:UuV:vw:X:x:z")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case '4':
+			family = AF_INET;
+			break;
+		case '6':
+			family = AF_INET6;
+			break;
+		case 'U':
+			family = AF_UNIX;
+			break;
+		case 'X':
+			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "connect") == 0)
+				socksv = -1; /* HTTP proxy CONNECT */
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "4") == 0)
+				socksv = 4; /* SOCKS v.4 */
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "5") == 0)
+				socksv = 5; /* SOCKS v.5 */
+			else
+				errx(1, "unsupported proxy protocol");
+			break;
+		case 'd':
+			dflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'F':
+			Fflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+			help();
+			break;
+		case 'i':
+			iflag = strtonum(optarg, 0, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+			if (errstr)
+				errx(1, "interval %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'k':
+			kflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			lflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'N':
+			Nflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'n':
+			nflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'P':
+			Pflag = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'p':
+			pflag = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'r':
+			rflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 's':
+			sflag = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			tflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'u':
+			uflag = 1;
+			break;
+#ifdef SO_RTABLE
+		case 'V':
+			rtableid = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0,
+			    RT_TABLEID_MAX, &errstr);
+			if (errstr)
+				errx(1, "rtable %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
+			break;
+#endif
+		case 'v':
+			vflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'w':
+			timeout = strtonum(optarg, 0, INT_MAX / 1000, &errstr);
+			if (errstr)
+				errx(1, "timeout %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
+			timeout *= 1000;
+			break;
+		case 'x':
+			xflag = 1;
+			if ((proxy = strdup(optarg)) == NULL)
+				errx(1, "strdup");
+			break;
+		case 'z':
+			zflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'D':
+			Dflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'I':
+			Iflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr);
+			if (errstr != NULL)
+				errx(1, "TCP receive window %s: %s",
+				    errstr, optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'O':
+			Oflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr);
+			if (errstr != NULL)
+				errx(1, "TCP send window %s: %s",
+				    errstr, optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'S':
+			Sflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'T':
+			errstr = NULL;
+			errno = 0;
+			if (map_tos(optarg, &Tflag))
+				break;
+			if (strlen(optarg) > 1 && optarg[0] == '0' &&
+			    optarg[1] == 'x')
+				Tflag = (int)strtol(optarg, NULL, 16);
+			else
+				Tflag = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0, 255,
+				    &errstr);
+			if (Tflag < 0 || Tflag > 255 || errstr || errno)
+				errx(1, "illegal tos value %s", optarg);
+			break;
+		default:
+			usage(1);
+		}
+	}
+	argc -= optind;
+	argv += optind;
+
+	/* Cruft to make sure options are clean, and used properly. */
+	if (argv[0] && !argv[1] && family == AF_UNIX) {
+		host = argv[0];
+		uport = NULL;
+	} else if (argv[0] && !argv[1]) {
+		if  (!lflag)
+			usage(1);
+		uport = argv[0];
+		host = NULL;
+	} else if (argv[0] && argv[1]) {
+		host = argv[0];
+		uport = argv[1];
+	} else
+		usage(1);
+
+	if (lflag && sflag)
+		errx(1, "cannot use -s and -l");
+	if (lflag && pflag)
+		errx(1, "cannot use -p and -l");
+	if (lflag && zflag)
+		errx(1, "cannot use -z and -l");
+	if (!lflag && kflag)
+		errx(1, "must use -l with -k");
+
+	/* Get name of temporary socket for unix datagram client */
+	if ((family == AF_UNIX) && uflag && !lflag) {
+		if (sflag) {
+			unix_dg_tmp_socket = sflag;
+		} else {
+			strlcpy(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf, "/tmp/nc.XXXXXXXXXX",
+				UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE);
+			if (mktemp(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf) == NULL)
+				err(1, "mktemp");
+			unix_dg_tmp_socket = unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Initialize addrinfo structure. */
+	if (family != AF_UNIX) {
+		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
+		hints.ai_family = family;
+		hints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM;
+		hints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP;
+		if (nflag)
+			hints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST;
+	}
+
+	if (xflag) {
+		if (uflag)
+			errx(1, "no proxy support for UDP mode");
+
+		if (lflag)
+			errx(1, "no proxy support for listen");
+
+		if (family == AF_UNIX)
+			errx(1, "no proxy support for unix sockets");
+
+		/* XXX IPv6 transport to proxy would probably work */
+		if (family == AF_INET6)
+			errx(1, "no proxy support for IPv6");
+
+		if (sflag)
+			errx(1, "no proxy support for local source address");
+
+		proxyhost = strsep(&proxy, ":");
+		proxyport = proxy;
+
+		memset(&proxyhints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
+		proxyhints.ai_family = family;
+		proxyhints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+		proxyhints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
+		if (nflag)
+			proxyhints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST;
+	}
+
+	if (lflag) {
+		int connfd;
+		ret = 0;
+
+		if (family == AF_UNIX) {
+			if (uflag)
+				s = unix_bind(host);
+			else
+				s = unix_listen(host);
+		}
+
+		/* Allow only one connection at a time, but stay alive. */
+		for (;;) {
+			if (family != AF_UNIX)
+				s = local_listen(host, uport, hints);
+			if (s < 0)
+				err(1, "local_listen");
+			/*
+			 * For UDP and -k, don't connect the socket, let it
+			 * receive datagrams from multiple socket pairs.
+			 */
+			if (uflag && kflag)
+				readwrite(s);
+			/*
+			 * For UDP and not -k, we will use recvfrom() initially
+			 * to wait for a caller, then use the regular functions
+			 * to talk to the caller.
+			 */
+			else if (uflag && !kflag) {
+				int rv, plen;
+				char buf[16384];
+				struct sockaddr_storage z;
+
+				len = sizeof(z);
+				plen = 2048;
+				rv = recvfrom(s, buf, plen, MSG_PEEK,
+				    (struct sockaddr *)&z, &len);
+				if (rv < 0)
+					err(1, "recvfrom");
+
+				rv = connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&z, len);
+				if (rv < 0)
+					err(1, "connect");
+
+				if (vflag)
+					report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&z, len);
+
+				readwrite(s);
+			} else {
+				len = sizeof(cliaddr);
+				connfd = accept(s, (struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr,
+				    &len);
+				if (connfd == -1) {
+					/* For now, all errnos are fatal */
+					err(1, "accept");
+				}
+				if (vflag)
+					report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr, len);
+
+				readwrite(connfd);
+				close(connfd);
+			}
+
+			if (family != AF_UNIX)
+				close(s);
+			else if (uflag) {
+				if (connect(s, NULL, 0) < 0)
+					err(1, "connect");
+			}
+
+			if (!kflag)
+				break;
+		}
+	} else if (family == AF_UNIX) {
+		ret = 0;
+
+		if ((s = unix_connect(host)) > 0 && !zflag) {
+			readwrite(s);
+			close(s);
+		} else
+			ret = 1;
+
+		if (uflag)
+			unlink(unix_dg_tmp_socket);
+		exit(ret);
+
+	} else {
+		int i = 0;
+
+		/* Construct the portlist[] array. */
+		build_ports(uport);
+
+		/* Cycle through portlist, connecting to each port. */
+		for (i = 0; portlist[i] != NULL; i++) {
+			if (s)
+				close(s);
+
+			if (xflag)
+				s = socks_connect(host, portlist[i], hints,
+				    proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints, socksv,
+				    Pflag);
+			else
+				s = remote_connect(host, portlist[i], hints);
+
+			if (s < 0)
+				continue;
+
+			ret = 0;
+			if (vflag || zflag) {
+				/* For UDP, make sure we are connected. */
+				if (uflag) {
+					if (udptest(s) == -1) {
+						ret = 1;
+						continue;
+					}
+				}
+
+				/* Don't look up port if -n. */
+				if (nflag)
+					sv = NULL;
+				else {
+					sv = getservbyport(
+					    ntohs(atoi(portlist[i])),
+					    uflag ? "udp" : "tcp");
+				}
+
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Connection to %s %s port [%s/%s] "
+				    "succeeded!\n", host, portlist[i],
+				    uflag ? "udp" : "tcp",
+				    sv ? sv->s_name : "*");
+			}
+			if (Fflag)
+				fdpass(s);
+			else if (!zflag)
+				readwrite(s);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (s)
+		close(s);
+
+	exit(ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * unix_bind()
+ * Returns a unix socket bound to the given path
+ */
+int
+unix_bind(char *path)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_un sun_sa;
+	int s;
+
+	/* Create unix domain socket. */
+	if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM,
+	     0)) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un));
+	sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+
+	if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >=
+	    sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) {
+		close(s);
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) {
+		close(s);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * unix_connect()
+ * Returns a socket connected to a local unix socket. Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+unix_connect(char *path)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_un sun_sa;
+	int s;
+
+	if (uflag) {
+		if ((s = unix_bind(unix_dg_tmp_socket)) < 0)
+			return (-1);
+	} else {
+		if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
+			return (-1);
+	}
+	(void)fcntl(s, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+
+	memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un));
+	sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+
+	if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >=
+	    sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) {
+		close(s);
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) {
+		close(s);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (s);
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * unix_listen()
+ * Create a unix domain socket, and listen on it.
+ */
+int
+unix_listen(char *path)
+{
+	int s;
+	if ((s = unix_bind(path)) < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if (listen(s, 5) < 0) {
+		close(s);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * remote_connect()
+ * Returns a socket connected to a remote host. Properly binds to a local
+ * port or source address if needed. Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+remote_connect(const char *host, const char *port, struct addrinfo hints)
+{
+	struct addrinfo *res, *res0;
+	int s, error;
+#if defined(SO_RTABLE) || defined(SO_BINDANY)
+	int on = 1;
+#endif
+
+	if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res)))
+		errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
+
+	res0 = res;
+	do {
+		if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype,
+		    res0->ai_protocol)) < 0)
+			continue;
+
+#ifdef SO_RTABLE
+		if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE,
+		    &rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1))
+			err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE");
+#endif
+		/* Bind to a local port or source address if specified. */
+		if (sflag || pflag) {
+			struct addrinfo ahints, *ares;
+
+#ifdef SO_BINDANY
+			/* try SO_BINDANY, but don't insist */
+			setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDANY, &on, sizeof(on));
+#endif
+			memset(&ahints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
+			ahints.ai_family = res0->ai_family;
+			ahints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM;
+			ahints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP;
+			ahints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+			if ((error = getaddrinfo(sflag, pflag, &ahints, &ares)))
+				errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
+
+			if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)ares->ai_addr,
+			    ares->ai_addrlen) < 0)
+				err(1, "bind failed");
+			freeaddrinfo(ares);
+		}
+
+		set_common_sockopts(s, res0->ai_family);
+
+		if (timeout_connect(s, res0->ai_addr, res0->ai_addrlen) == 0)
+			break;
+		else if (vflag)
+			warn("connect to %s port %s (%s) failed", host, port,
+			    uflag ? "udp" : "tcp");
+
+		close(s);
+		s = -1;
+	} while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL);
+
+	freeaddrinfo(res);
+
+	return (s);
+}
+
+int
+timeout_connect(int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen)
+{
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+	socklen_t optlen;
+	int flags = 0, optval;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (timeout != -1) {
+		flags = fcntl(s, F_GETFL, 0);
+		if (fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) == -1)
+			err(1, "set non-blocking mode");
+	}
+
+	if ((ret = connect(s, name, namelen)) != 0 && errno == EINPROGRESS) {
+		pfd.fd = s;
+		pfd.events = POLLOUT;
+		if ((ret = poll(&pfd, 1, timeout)) == 1) {
+			optlen = sizeof(optval);
+			if ((ret = getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR,
+			    &optval, &optlen)) == 0) {
+				errno = optval;
+				ret = optval == 0 ? 0 : -1;
+			}
+		} else if (ret == 0) {
+			errno = ETIMEDOUT;
+			ret = -1;
+		} else
+			err(1, "poll failed");
+	}
+
+	if (timeout != -1 && fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags) == -1)
+		err(1, "restoring flags");
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * local_listen()
+ * Returns a socket listening on a local port, binds to specified source
+ * address. Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+int
+local_listen(char *host, char *port, struct addrinfo hints)
+{
+	struct addrinfo *res, *res0;
+	int s, ret, x = 1;
+	int error;
+
+	/* Allow nodename to be null. */
+	hints.ai_flags |= AI_PASSIVE;
+
+	/*
+	 * In the case of binding to a wildcard address
+	 * default to binding to an ipv4 address.
+	 */
+	if (host == NULL && hints.ai_family == AF_UNSPEC)
+		hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
+
+	if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res)))
+		errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
+
+	res0 = res;
+	do {
+		if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype,
+		    res0->ai_protocol)) < 0)
+			continue;
+
+#ifdef SO_RTABLE
+		if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE,
+		    &rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1))
+			err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE");
+#endif
+#ifdef SO_REUSEPORT
+		ret = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEPORT, &x, sizeof(x));
+		if (ret == -1)
+			err(1, "setsockopt SO_REUSEPORT");
+#endif
+#ifdef SO_REUSEADDR
+		ret = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &x, sizeof(x));
+		if (ret == -1)
+			err(1, "setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR");
+#endif
+		set_common_sockopts(s, res0->ai_family);
+
+		if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)res0->ai_addr,
+		    res0->ai_addrlen) == 0)
+			break;
+
+		close(s);
+		s = -1;
+	} while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL);
+
+	if (!uflag && s != -1) {
+		if (listen(s, 1) < 0)
+			err(1, "listen");
+	}
+
+	freeaddrinfo(res);
+
+	return (s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * readwrite()
+ * Loop that polls on the network file descriptor and stdin.
+ */
+void
+readwrite(int net_fd)
+{
+	struct pollfd pfd[4];
+	int stdin_fd = STDIN_FILENO;
+	int stdout_fd = STDOUT_FILENO;
+	unsigned char netinbuf[BUFSIZE];
+	size_t netinbufpos = 0;
+	unsigned char stdinbuf[BUFSIZE];
+	size_t stdinbufpos = 0;
+	int n, num_fds;
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	/* don't read from stdin if requested */
+	if (dflag)
+		stdin_fd = -1;
+
+	/* stdin */
+	pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = stdin_fd;
+	pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN;
+
+	/* network out */
+	pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = net_fd;
+	pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0;
+
+	/* network in */
+	pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = net_fd;
+	pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN;
+
+	/* stdout */
+	pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = stdout_fd;
+	pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0;
+
+	while (1) {
+		/* both inputs are gone, buffers are empty, we are done */
+		if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1
+		    && stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) {
+			close(net_fd);
+			return;
+		}
+		/* both outputs are gone, we can't continue */
+		if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) {
+			close(net_fd);
+			return;
+		}
+		/* listen and net in gone, queues empty, done */
+		if (lflag && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1
+		    && stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) {
+			close(net_fd);
+			return;
+		}
+
+		/* help says -i is for "wait between lines sent". We read and
+		 * write arbitrary amounts of data, and we don't want to start
+		 * scanning for newlines, so this is as good as it gets */
+		if (iflag)
+			sleep(iflag);
+
+		/* poll */
+		num_fds = poll(pfd, 4, timeout);
+
+		/* treat poll errors */
+		if (num_fds == -1) {
+			close(net_fd);
+			err(1, "polling error");
+		}
+
+		/* timeout happened */
+		if (num_fds == 0)
+			return;
+
+		/* treat socket error conditions */
+		for (n = 0; n < 4; n++) {
+			if (pfd[n].revents & (POLLERR|POLLNVAL)) {
+				pfd[n].fd = -1;
+			}
+		}
+		/* reading is possible after HUP */
+		if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].events & POLLIN &&
+		    pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLHUP &&
+		    ! (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN))
+				pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
+
+		if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].events & POLLIN &&
+		    pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLHUP &&
+		    ! (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN))
+				pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
+
+		if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLHUP) {
+			if (Nflag)
+				shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR);
+			pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
+		}
+		/* if HUP, stop watching stdout */
+		if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLHUP)
+			pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
+		/* if no net out, stop watching stdin */
+		if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1)
+			pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
+		/* if no stdout, stop watching net in */
+		if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) {
+			if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd != -1)
+				shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD);
+			pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
+		}
+
+		/* try to read from stdin */
+		if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN && stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE) {
+			ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd, stdinbuf,
+			    &stdinbufpos);
+			/* error or eof on stdin - remove from pfd */
+			if (ret == 0 || ret == -1)
+				pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
+			/* read something - poll net out */
+			if (stdinbufpos > 0)
+				pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = POLLOUT;
+			/* filled buffer - remove self from polling */
+			if (stdinbufpos == BUFSIZE)
+				pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = 0;
+		}
+		/* try to write to network */
+		if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLOUT && stdinbufpos > 0) {
+			ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, stdinbuf,
+			    &stdinbufpos);
+			if (ret == -1)
+				pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
+			/* buffer empty - remove self from polling */
+			if (stdinbufpos == 0)
+				pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0;
+			/* buffer no longer full - poll stdin again */
+			if (stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE)
+				pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN;
+		}
+		/* try to read from network */
+		if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN && netinbufpos < BUFSIZE) {
+			ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf,
+			    &netinbufpos);
+			if (ret == -1)
+				pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
+			/* eof on net in - remove from pfd */
+			if (ret == 0) {
+				shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD);
+				pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
+			}
+			/* read something - poll stdout */
+			if (netinbufpos > 0)
+				pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = POLLOUT;
+			/* filled buffer - remove self from polling */
+			if (netinbufpos == BUFSIZE)
+				pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = 0;
+			/* handle telnet */
+			if (tflag)
+				atelnet(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf,
+				    netinbufpos);
+		}
+		/* try to write to stdout */
+		if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLOUT && netinbufpos > 0) {
+			ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd, netinbuf,
+			    &netinbufpos);
+			if (ret == -1)
+				pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
+			/* buffer empty - remove self from polling */
+			if (netinbufpos == 0)
+				pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0;
+			/* buffer no longer full - poll net in again */
+			if (netinbufpos < BUFSIZE)
+				pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN;
+		}
+
+		/* stdin gone and queue empty? */
+		if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && stdinbufpos == 0) {
+			if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd != -1 && Nflag)
+				shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR);
+			pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
+		}
+		/* net in gone and queue empty? */
+		if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1 && netinbufpos == 0) {
+			pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+ssize_t
+drainbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos)
+{
+	ssize_t n;
+	ssize_t adjust;
+
+	n = write(fd, buf, *bufpos);
+	/* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */
+	if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
+		n = -2;
+	if (n <= 0)
+		return n;
+	/* adjust buffer */
+	adjust = *bufpos - n;
+	if (adjust > 0)
+		memmove(buf, buf + n, adjust);
+	*bufpos -= n;
+	return n;
+}
+
+
+ssize_t
+fillbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos)
+{
+	size_t num = BUFSIZE - *bufpos;
+	ssize_t n;
+
+	n = read(fd, buf + *bufpos, num);
+	/* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */
+	if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
+		n = -2;
+	if (n <= 0)
+		return n;
+	*bufpos += n;
+	return n;
+}
+
+/*
+ * fdpass()
+ * Pass the connected file descriptor to stdout and exit.
+ */
+void
+fdpass(int nfd)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
+	struct msghdr msg;
+#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+	union {
+		struct cmsghdr hdr;
+		char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
+	} cmsgbuf;
+	struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+#endif
+	struct iovec vec;
+	char ch = '\0';
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+	ssize_t r;
+
+	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
+#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
+	msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&nfd;
+	msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(nfd);
+#else
+	memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf));
+	msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)&cmsgbuf.buf;
+	msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
+	cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
+	cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
+	cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
+	cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
+	*(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = nfd;
+#endif
+
+	vec.iov_base = &ch;
+	vec.iov_len = 1;
+	msg.msg_iov = &vec;
+	msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
+
+	bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd));
+	pfd.fd = STDOUT_FILENO;
+	pfd.events = POLLOUT;
+	for (;;) {
+		r = sendmsg(STDOUT_FILENO, &msg, 0);
+		if (r == -1) {
+			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) {
+				if (poll(&pfd, 1, -1) == -1)
+					err(1, "poll");
+				continue;
+			}
+			err(1, "sendmsg");
+		} else if (r != 1)
+			errx(1, "sendmsg: unexpected return value %zd", r);
+		else
+			break;
+	}
+	exit(0);
+#else
+	errx(1, "%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Deal with RFC 854 WILL/WONT DO/DONT negotiation. */
+void
+atelnet(int nfd, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int size)
+{
+	unsigned char *p, *end;
+	unsigned char obuf[4];
+
+	if (size < 3)
+		return;
+	end = buf + size - 2;
+
+	for (p = buf; p < end; p++) {
+		if (*p != IAC)
+			continue;
+
+		obuf[0] = IAC;
+		p++;
+		if ((*p == WILL) || (*p == WONT))
+			obuf[1] = DONT;
+		else if ((*p == DO) || (*p == DONT))
+			obuf[1] = WONT;
+		else
+			continue;
+
+		p++;
+		obuf[2] = *p;
+		if (atomicio(vwrite, nfd, obuf, 3) != 3)
+			warn("Write Error!");
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * build_ports()
+ * Build an array of ports in portlist[], listing each port
+ * that we should try to connect to.
+ */
+void
+build_ports(char *p)
+{
+	const char *errstr;
+	char *n;
+	int hi, lo, cp;
+	int x = 0;
+
+	if ((n = strchr(p, '-')) != NULL) {
+		*n = '\0';
+		n++;
+
+		/* Make sure the ports are in order: lowest->highest. */
+		hi = strtonum(n, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
+		if (errstr)
+			errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, n);
+		lo = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
+		if (errstr)
+			errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p);
+
+		if (lo > hi) {
+			cp = hi;
+			hi = lo;
+			lo = cp;
+		}
+
+		/* Load ports sequentially. */
+		for (cp = lo; cp <= hi; cp++) {
+			portlist[x] = calloc(1, PORT_MAX_LEN);
+			if (portlist[x] == NULL)
+				errx(1, "calloc");
+			snprintf(portlist[x], PORT_MAX_LEN, "%d", cp);
+			x++;
+		}
+
+		/* Randomly swap ports. */
+		if (rflag) {
+			int y;
+			char *c;
+
+			for (x = 0; x <= (hi - lo); x++) {
+				y = (arc4random() & 0xFFFF) % (hi - lo);
+				c = portlist[x];
+				portlist[x] = portlist[y];
+				portlist[y] = c;
+			}
+		}
+	} else {
+		hi = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
+		if (errstr)
+			errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p);
+		portlist[0] = strdup(p);
+		if (portlist[0] == NULL)
+			errx(1, "strdup");
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * udptest()
+ * Do a few writes to see if the UDP port is there.
+ * Fails once PF state table is full.
+ */
+int
+udptest(int s)
+{
+	int i, ret;
+
+	for (i = 0; i <= 3; i++) {
+		if (write(s, "X", 1) == 1)
+			ret = 1;
+		else
+			ret = -1;
+	}
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+void
+set_common_sockopts(int s, int af)
+{
+	int x = 1;
+
+#ifdef TCP_MD5SIG
+	if (Sflag) {
+		if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_MD5SIG,
+			&x, sizeof(x)) == -1)
+			err(1, "setsockopt");
+	}
+#endif
+	if (Dflag) {
+		if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG,
+			&x, sizeof(x)) == -1)
+			err(1, "setsockopt");
+	}
+#if defined(IP_TOS) && defined(IPV6_TCLASS)
+	if (Tflag != -1) {
+		int proto, option;
+
+		if (af == AF_INET6) {
+			proto = IPPROTO_IPV6;
+			option = IPV6_TCLASS;
+		} else {
+			proto = IPPROTO_IP;
+			option = IP_TOS;
+		}
+
+		if (setsockopt(s, proto, option, &Tflag, sizeof(Tflag)) == -1)
+			err(1, "set IP ToS");
+	}
+#endif
+	if (Iflag) {
+		if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
+		    &Iflag, sizeof(Iflag)) == -1)
+			err(1, "set TCP receive buffer size");
+	}
+	if (Oflag) {
+		if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF,
+		    &Oflag, sizeof(Oflag)) == -1)
+			err(1, "set TCP send buffer size");
+	}
+}
+
+int
+map_tos(char *s, int *val)
+{
+#ifdef IP_TOS
+	/* DiffServ Codepoints and other TOS mappings */
+	const struct toskeywords {
+		const char	*keyword;
+		int		 val;
+	} *t, toskeywords[] = {
+		{ "af11",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 },
+		{ "af12",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 },
+		{ "af13",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 },
+		{ "af21",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 },
+		{ "af22",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 },
+		{ "af23",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 },
+		{ "af31",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 },
+		{ "af32",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 },
+		{ "af33",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 },
+		{ "af41",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 },
+		{ "af42",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 },
+		{ "af43",		IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 },
+		{ "critical",		IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP },
+		{ "cs0",		IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 },
+		{ "cs1",		IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 },
+		{ "cs2",		IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 },
+		{ "cs3",		IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 },
+		{ "cs4",		IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 },
+		{ "cs5",		IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 },
+		{ "cs6",		IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 },
+		{ "cs7",		IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 },
+		{ "ef",			IPTOS_DSCP_EF },
+		{ "inetcontrol",	IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL },
+		{ "lowdelay",		IPTOS_LOWDELAY },
+		{ "netcontrol",		IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL },
+		{ "reliability",	IPTOS_RELIABILITY },
+		{ "throughput",		IPTOS_THROUGHPUT },
+		{ NULL, 		-1 },
+	};
+
+	for (t = toskeywords; t->keyword != NULL; t++) {
+		if (strcmp(s, t->keyword) == 0) {
+			*val = t->val;
+			return (1);
+		}
+	}
+#endif
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+report_connect(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen)
+{
+	char remote_host[NI_MAXHOST];
+	char remote_port[NI_MAXSERV];
+	int herr;
+	int flags = NI_NUMERICSERV;
+	
+	if (nflag)
+		flags |= NI_NUMERICHOST;
+	
+	if ((herr = getnameinfo(sa, salen,
+	    remote_host, sizeof(remote_host),
+	    remote_port, sizeof(remote_port),
+	    flags)) != 0) {
+		if (herr == EAI_SYSTEM)
+			err(1, "getnameinfo");
+		else
+			errx(1, "getnameinfo: %s", gai_strerror(herr));
+	}
+	
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "Connection from %s %s "
+	    "received!\n", remote_host, remote_port);
+}
+
+void
+help(void)
+{
+	usage(0);
+	fprintf(stderr, "\tCommand Summary:\n\
+	\t-4		Use IPv4\n\
+	\t-6		Use IPv6\n\
+	\t-D		Enable the debug socket option\n\
+	\t-d		Detach from stdin\n\
+	\t-F		Pass socket fd\n\
+	\t-h		This help text\n\
+	\t-I length	TCP receive buffer length\n\
+	\t-i secs\t	Delay interval for lines sent, ports scanned\n\
+	\t-k		Keep inbound sockets open for multiple connects\n\
+	\t-l		Listen mode, for inbound connects\n\
+	\t-N		Shutdown the network socket after EOF on stdin\n\
+	\t-n		Suppress name/port resolutions\n\
+	\t-O length	TCP send buffer length\n\
+	\t-P proxyuser\tUsername for proxy authentication\n\
+	\t-p port\t	Specify local port for remote connects\n\
+	\t-r		Randomize remote ports\n\
+	\t-S		Enable the TCP MD5 signature option\n\
+	\t-s addr\t	Local source address\n\
+	\t-T toskeyword\tSet IP Type of Service\n\
+	\t-t		Answer TELNET negotiation\n\
+	\t-U		Use UNIX domain socket\n\
+	\t-u		UDP mode\n\
+	\t-V rtable	Specify alternate routing table\n\
+	\t-v		Verbose\n\
+	\t-w secs\t	Timeout for connects and final net reads\n\
+	\t-X proto	Proxy protocol: \"4\", \"5\" (SOCKS) or \"connect\"\n\
+	\t-x addr[:port]\tSpecify proxy address and port\n\
+	\t-z		Zero-I/O mode [used for scanning]\n\
+	Port numbers can be individual or ranges: lo-hi [inclusive]\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+void
+usage(int ret)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "usage: nc [-46DdFhklNnrStUuvz] [-I length] [-i interval] [-O length]\n"
+	    "\t  [-P proxy_username] [-p source_port] [-s source] [-T toskeyword]\n"
+	    "\t  [-V rtable] [-w timeout] [-X proxy_protocol]\n"
+	    "\t  [-x proxy_address[:port]] [destination] [port]\n");
+	if (ret)
+		exit(1);
+}
+
+/* *** src/usr.bin/nc/socks.c *** */
+
+
+/*	$OpenBSD: socks.c,v 1.20 2012/03/08 09:56:28 espie Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+
+#define SOCKS_PORT	"1080"
+#define HTTP_PROXY_PORT	"3128"
+#define HTTP_MAXHDRS	64
+#define SOCKS_V5	5
+#define SOCKS_V4	4
+#define SOCKS_NOAUTH	0
+#define SOCKS_NOMETHOD	0xff
+#define SOCKS_CONNECT	1
+#define SOCKS_IPV4	1
+#define SOCKS_DOMAIN	3
+#define SOCKS_IPV6	4
+
+int	remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo);
+int	socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo,
+	    const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int,
+	    const char *);
+
+static int
+decode_addrport(const char *h, const char *p, struct sockaddr *addr,
+    socklen_t addrlen, int v4only, int numeric)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+
+	bzero(&hints, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = v4only ? PF_INET : PF_UNSPEC;
+	hints.ai_flags = numeric ? AI_NUMERICHOST : 0;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	r = getaddrinfo(h, p, &hints, &res);
+	/* Don't fatal when attempting to convert a numeric address */
+	if (r != 0) {
+		if (!numeric) {
+			errx(1, "getaddrinfo(\"%.64s\", \"%.64s\"): %s", h, p,
+			    gai_strerror(r));
+		}
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (addrlen < res->ai_addrlen) {
+		freeaddrinfo(res);
+		errx(1, "internal error: addrlen < res->ai_addrlen");
+	}
+	memcpy(addr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen);
+	freeaddrinfo(res);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+proxy_read_line(int fd, char *buf, size_t bufsz)
+{
+	size_t off;
+
+	for(off = 0;;) {
+		if (off >= bufsz)
+			errx(1, "proxy read too long");
+		if (atomicio(read, fd, buf + off, 1) != 1)
+			err(1, "proxy read");
+		/* Skip CR */
+		if (buf[off] == '\r')
+			continue;
+		if (buf[off] == '\n') {
+			buf[off] = '\0';
+			break;
+		}
+		off++;
+	}
+	return (off);
+}
+
+static const char *
+getproxypass(const char *proxyuser, const char *proxyhost)
+{
+	char prompt[512];
+	static char pw[256];
+
+	snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Proxy password for %s@%s: ",
+	   proxyuser, proxyhost);
+	if (readpassphrase(prompt, pw, sizeof(pw), RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) == NULL)
+		errx(1, "Unable to read proxy passphrase");
+	return (pw);
+}
+
+int
+socks_connect(const char *host, const char *port,
+    struct addrinfo hints __attribute__ ((__unused__)),
+    const char *proxyhost, const char *proxyport, struct addrinfo proxyhints,
+    int socksv, const char *proxyuser)
+{
+	int proxyfd, r, authretry = 0;
+	size_t hlen, wlen = 0;
+	unsigned char buf[1024];
+	size_t cnt;
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+	struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addr;
+	in_port_t serverport;
+	const char *proxypass = NULL;
+
+	if (proxyport == NULL)
+		proxyport = (socksv == -1) ? HTTP_PROXY_PORT : SOCKS_PORT;
+
+	/* Abuse API to lookup port */
+	if (decode_addrport("0.0.0.0", port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
+	    sizeof(addr), 1, 1) == -1)
+		errx(1, "unknown port \"%.64s\"", port);
+	serverport = in4->sin_port;
+
+ again:
+	if (authretry++ > 3)
+		errx(1, "Too many authentication failures");
+
+	proxyfd = remote_connect(proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints);
+
+	if (proxyfd < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if (socksv == 5) {
+		if (decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
+		    sizeof(addr), 0, 1) == -1)
+			addr.ss_family = 0; /* used in switch below */
+
+		/* Version 5, one method: no authentication */
+		buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
+		buf[1] = 1;
+		buf[2] = SOCKS_NOAUTH;
+		cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, 3);
+		if (cnt != 3)
+			err(1, "write failed (%zu/3)", cnt);
+
+		cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 2);
+		if (cnt != 2)
+			err(1, "read failed (%zu/3)", cnt);
+
+		if (buf[1] == SOCKS_NOMETHOD)
+			errx(1, "authentication method negotiation failed");
+
+		switch (addr.ss_family) {
+		case 0:
+			/* Version 5, connect: domain name */
+
+			/* Max domain name length is 255 bytes */
+			hlen = strlen(host);
+			if (hlen > 255)
+				errx(1, "host name too long for SOCKS5");
+			buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
+			buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
+			buf[2] = 0;
+			buf[3] = SOCKS_DOMAIN;
+			buf[4] = hlen;
+			memcpy(buf + 5, host, hlen);			
+			memcpy(buf + 5 + hlen, &serverport, sizeof serverport);
+			wlen = 7 + hlen;
+			break;
+		case AF_INET:
+			/* Version 5, connect: IPv4 address */
+			buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
+			buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
+			buf[2] = 0;
+			buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV4;
+			memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr);
+			memcpy(buf + 8, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port);
+			wlen = 10;
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			/* Version 5, connect: IPv6 address */
+			buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
+			buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
+			buf[2] = 0;
+			buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV6;
+			memcpy(buf + 4, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof in6->sin6_addr);
+			memcpy(buf + 20, &in6->sin6_port,
+			    sizeof in6->sin6_port);
+			wlen = 22;
+			break;
+		default:
+			errx(1, "internal error: silly AF");
+		}
+
+		cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen);
+		if (cnt != wlen)
+			err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen);
+
+		cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 4);
+		if (cnt != 4)
+			err(1, "read failed (%zu/4)", cnt);
+		if (buf[1] != 0)
+			errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]);
+		switch (buf[3]) {
+		case SOCKS_IPV4:
+			cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 6);
+			if (cnt != 6)
+				err(1, "read failed (%zu/6)", cnt);
+			break;
+		case SOCKS_IPV6:
+			cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 18);
+			if (cnt != 18)
+				err(1, "read failed (%zu/18)", cnt);
+			break;
+		default:
+			errx(1, "connection failed, unsupported address type");
+		}
+	} else if (socksv == 4) {
+		/* This will exit on lookup failure */
+		decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
+		    sizeof(addr), 1, 0);
+
+		/* Version 4 */
+		buf[0] = SOCKS_V4;
+		buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;	/* connect */
+		memcpy(buf + 2, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port);
+		memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr);
+		buf[8] = 0;	/* empty username */
+		wlen = 9;
+
+		cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen);
+		if (cnt != wlen)
+			err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen);
+
+		cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 8);
+		if (cnt != 8)
+			err(1, "read failed (%zu/8)", cnt);
+		if (buf[1] != 90)
+			errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]);
+	} else if (socksv == -1) {
+		/* HTTP proxy CONNECT */
+
+		/* Disallow bad chars in hostname */
+		if (strcspn(host, "\r\n\t []:") != strlen(host))
+			errx(1, "Invalid hostname");
+
+		/* Try to be sane about numeric IPv6 addresses */
+		if (strchr(host, ':') != NULL) {
+			r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+			    "CONNECT [%s]:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n",
+			    host, ntohs(serverport));
+		} else {
+			r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+			    "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n",
+			    host, ntohs(serverport));
+		}
+		if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf))
+			errx(1, "hostname too long");
+		r = strlen(buf);
+
+		cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r);
+		if (cnt != (size_t)r)
+			err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r);
+
+		if (authretry > 1) {
+			char resp[1024];
+
+			proxypass = getproxypass(proxyuser, proxyhost);
+			r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s:%s",
+			    proxyuser, proxypass);
+			if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf) ||
+			    b64_ntop(buf, strlen(buf), resp,
+			    sizeof(resp)) == -1)
+				errx(1, "Proxy username/password too long");
+			r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Authorization: "
+			    "Basic %s\r\n", resp);
+			if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf))
+				errx(1, "Proxy auth response too long");
+			r = strlen(buf);
+			if ((cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r)) != (size_t)r)
+				err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r);
+		}
+
+		/* Terminate headers */
+		if ((r = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, "\r\n", 2)) != 2)
+			err(1, "write failed (2/%d)", r);
+
+		/* Read status reply */
+		proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		if (proxyuser != NULL &&
+		    strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 407 ", 12) == 0) {
+			if (authretry > 1) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Proxy authentication "
+				    "failed\n");
+			}
+			close(proxyfd);
+			goto again;
+		} else if (strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 200 ", 12) != 0 &&
+		    strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.1 200 ", 12) != 0)
+			errx(1, "Proxy error: \"%s\"", buf);
+
+		/* Headers continue until we hit an empty line */
+		for (r = 0; r < HTTP_MAXHDRS; r++) {
+			proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+			if (*buf == '\0')
+				break;
+		}
+		if (*buf != '\0')
+			errx(1, "Too many proxy headers received");
+	} else
+		errx(1, "Unknown proxy protocol %d", socksv);
+
+	return (proxyfd);
+}
+
diff --git a/regress/percent.sh b/regress/percent.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3dfa8d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/percent.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: percent.sh,v 1.16 2023/01/14 09:57:08 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="percent expansions"
+
+if [ -x "/usr/xpg4/bin/id" ]; then
+	PATH=/usr/xpg4/bin:$PATH
+	export PATH
+fi
+
+USER=`id -u -n`
+USERID=`id -u`
+HOST=`hostname | cut -f1 -d.`
+HOSTNAME=`hostname`
+HASH=""
+
+# Localcommand is evaluated after connection because %T is not available
+# until then.  Because of this we use a different method of exercising it,
+# and we can't override the remote user otherwise authentication will fail.
+# We also have to explicitly enable it.
+echo "permitlocalcommand yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+trial()
+{
+	opt="$1"; arg="$2"
+	expect=`echo "$3" | sed 's|^//|/|'` # approximate realpath
+
+	trace "test $opt=$arg $expect"
+	rm -f $OBJ/actual
+	got=""
+	case "$opt" in
+	localcommand)
+		${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o $opt="echo '$arg' >$OBJ/actual" \
+		    somehost true
+		got=`cat $OBJ/actual`
+		;;
+	userknownhostsfile)
+		# Move the userknownhosts file to what the expansion says,
+		# make sure ssh works then put it back.
+		mv "$OBJ/known_hosts" "$OBJ/$expect"
+		${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o $opt="$OBJ/$arg" somehost true && \
+			got="$expect"
+		mv "$OBJ/$expect" "$OBJ/known_hosts"
+		;;
+	matchexec)
+		(cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy && \
+		 echo "Match Exec \"echo '$arg' >$OBJ/actual\"") \
+		    >$OBJ/ssh_proxy_match
+		${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy_match remuser@somehost true || true
+		got=`cat $OBJ/actual`
+		;;
+	*forward)
+		# LocalForward and RemoteForward take two args and only
+		# operate on Unix domain socket paths
+		got=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o $opt="/$arg /$arg" -G \
+		    remuser@somehost | awk '$1=="'$opt'"{print $2" "$3}'`
+		expect="/$expect /$expect"
+		;;
+	*)
+		got=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o $opt="$arg" -G \
+		    remuser@somehost | awk '$1=="'$opt'"{print $2}'`
+	esac
+	if [ "$got" != "$expect" ]; then
+		fail "$opt=$arg expect $expect got $got"
+	fi
+}
+
+for i in matchexec localcommand remotecommand controlpath identityagent \
+    forwardagent localforward remoteforward userknownhostsfile; do
+	verbose $tid $i percent
+	case "$i" in
+	localcommand|userknownhostsfile)
+		# Any test that's going to actually make a connection needs
+		# to use the real username.
+		REMUSER=$USER ;;
+	*)
+		REMUSER=remuser ;;
+	esac
+	if [ "$i" = "$localcommand" ]; then
+		trial $i '%T' NONE
+	fi
+	# Matches implementation in readconf.c:ssh_connection_hash()
+	if [ ! -z "${OPENSSL_BIN}" ]; then
+		HASH=`printf "${HOSTNAME}127.0.0.1${PORT}$REMUSER" |
+		    $OPENSSL_BIN sha1 | cut -f2 -d' '`
+		trial $i '%C' $HASH
+	fi
+	trial $i '%%' '%'
+	trial $i '%i' $USERID
+	trial $i '%h' 127.0.0.1
+	trial $i '%L' $HOST
+	trial $i '%l' $HOSTNAME
+	trial $i '%n' somehost
+	trial $i '%k' localhost-with-alias
+	trial $i '%p' $PORT
+	trial $i '%r' $REMUSER
+	trial $i '%u' $USER
+	# We can't specify a full path outside the regress dir, so skip tests
+	# containing %d for UserKnownHostsFile
+	if [ "$i" != "userknownhostsfile" ]; then
+		trial $i '%d' $HOME
+		in='%%/%i/%h/%d/%L/%l/%n/%p/%r/%u'
+		out="%/$USERID/127.0.0.1/$HOME/$HOST/$HOSTNAME/somehost/$PORT/$REMUSER/$USER"
+		if [ ! -z "${HASH}" ]; then
+			in="$in/%C"
+			out="$out/$HASH"
+		fi
+		trial $i "$in" "$out"
+	fi
+done
+
+# Subset of above since we don't expand shell-style variables on anything that
+# runs a command because the shell will expand those.
+for i in controlpath identityagent forwardagent localforward remoteforward \
+    userknownhostsfile; do
+	verbose $tid $i dollar
+	FOO=bar
+	export FOO
+	trial $i '${FOO}' $FOO
+done
+
+
+# A subset of options support tilde expansion
+for i in controlpath identityagent forwardagent; do
+	verbose $tid $i tilde
+	trial $i '~' $HOME/
+	trial $i '~/.ssh' $HOME/.ssh
+done
diff --git a/regress/portnum.sh b/regress/portnum.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c56b869
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/portnum.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: portnum.sh,v 1.2 2013/05/17 10:34:30 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="port number parsing"
+
+badport() {
+	port=$1
+	verbose "$tid: invalid port $port"
+	if ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -p $port somehost true 2>/dev/null ; then
+		fail "$tid accepted invalid port $port"
+	fi
+}
+goodport() {
+	port=$1
+	verbose "$tid: valid port $port"
+	if ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -p $port somehost true 2>/dev/null ; then
+		:
+	else
+		fail "$tid rejected valid port $port"
+	fi
+}
+
+badport 0
+badport 65536
+badport 131073
+badport 2000blah
+badport blah2000
+
+goodport 1
+goodport 22
+goodport 2222
+goodport 22222
+goodport 65535
+
diff --git a/regress/principals-command.sh b/regress/principals-command.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8278711
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/principals-command.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,168 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: principals-command.sh,v 1.14 2021/09/30 05:26:26 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="authorized principals command"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+if [ -z "$SUDO" -a ! -w /var/run ]; then
+	skip "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without"
+fi
+
+case "$SSH_KEYTYPES" in
+	*ssh-rsa*)	userkeytype=rsa ;;
+	*)		userkeytype=ed25519 ;;
+esac
+
+SERIAL=$$
+
+# Create a CA key and a user certificate.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519  -f $OBJ/user_ca_key || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${userkeytype} -f $OBJ/cert_user_key || \
+	fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "Joanne User" \
+    -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key || \
+	fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key"
+
+CERT_BODY=`cat $OBJ/cert_user_key-cert.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
+CA_BODY=`cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
+CERT_FP=`${SSHKEYGEN} -lf $OBJ/cert_user_key-cert.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
+CA_FP=`${SSHKEYGEN} -lf $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
+
+# Establish a AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand in /var/run where it will have
+# acceptable directory permissions.
+PRINCIPALS_COMMAND="/var/run/principals_command_${LOGNAME}.$$"
+trap "$SUDO rm -f ${PRINCIPALS_COMMAND}" 0
+cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND'"
+#!/bin/sh
+test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1
+test "x\$2" != "xssh-${userkeytype}-cert-v01@openssh.com" && exit 1
+test "x\$3" != "xssh-ed25519" && exit 1
+test "x\$4" != "xJoanne User" && exit 1
+test "x\$5" != "x${SERIAL}" && exit 1
+test "x\$6" != "x${CA_FP}" && exit 1
+test "x\$7" != "x${CERT_FP}" && exit 1
+test "x\$8" != "x${CERT_BODY}" && exit 1
+test "x\$9" != "x${CA_BODY}" && exit 1
+test -f "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}" &&
+	exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}"
+_EOF
+test $? -eq 0 || fatal "couldn't prepare principals command"
+$SUDO chmod 0755 "$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND"
+
+if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m keys-command $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ; then
+	echo "skipping: $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND is unsuitable as " \
+	    "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand"
+	$SUDO rm -f $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND
+	exit 0
+fi
+
+if [ ! -x $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ]; then
+	skip "$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND not executable " \
+	    "(/var/run mounted noexec?)"
+fi
+
+# Test explicitly-specified principals
+# Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+(
+	cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+	echo "AuthorizedKeysFile none"
+	echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND" \
+	    "%u %t %T %i %s %F %f %k %K"
+	echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ${LOGNAME}"
+	echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
+) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# XXX test missing command
+# XXX test failing command
+
+# Empty authorized_principals
+verbose "$tid: empty authorized_principals"
+echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+fi
+
+# Wrong authorized_principals
+verbose "$tid: wrong authorized_principals"
+echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+fi
+
+# Correct authorized_principals
+verbose "$tid: correct authorized_principals"
+echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+fi
+
+# authorized_principals with bad key option
+verbose "$tid: authorized_principals bad key opt"
+echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+fi
+
+# authorized_principals with command=false
+verbose "$tid: authorized_principals command=false"
+echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \
+    $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+fi
+
+
+# authorized_principals with command=true
+verbose "$tid: authorized_principals command=true"
+echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \
+    $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+fi
+
+# Setup for principals= key option
+# TODO: remove?
+rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
+(
+	cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# Wrong principals list
+verbose "$tid: wrong principals key option"
+(
+	printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" '
+	cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
+fi
+
+# Correct principals list
+verbose "$tid: correct principals key option"
+(
+	printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" '
+	cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
+) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
+    -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh cert connect failed"
+fi
diff --git a/regress/proto-mismatch.sh b/regress/proto-mismatch.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ab28c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/proto-mismatch.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: proto-mismatch.sh,v 1.5 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="protocol version mismatch"
+
+mismatch ()
+{
+	client=$2
+	banner=`echo ${client} | ${SSHD} -i -f ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy`
+	r=$?
+	trace "sshd prints ${banner}"
+	if [ $r -ne 255 ]; then
+		fail "sshd prints ${banner} but accepts version ${client}"
+	fi
+}
+
+mismatch	SSH-1.5-HALLO
diff --git a/regress/proto-version.sh b/regress/proto-version.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f33b1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/proto-version.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: proto-version.sh,v 1.7 2017/06/07 01:48:15 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sshd version with different protocol combinations"
+
+# we just start sshd in inetd mode and check the banner
+check_version ()
+{
+	expect=$1
+	banner=`printf '' | ${SSHD} -i -f ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy`
+	case ${banner} in
+	SSH-1.99-*)
+		proto=199
+		;;
+	SSH-2.0-*)
+		proto=20
+		;;
+	SSH-1.5-*)
+		proto=15
+		;;
+	*)
+		proto=0
+		;;
+	esac
+	if [ ${expect} -ne ${proto} ]; then
+		fail "wrong protocol version ${banner}"
+	fi
+}
+
+check_version	20
diff --git a/regress/proxy-connect.sh b/regress/proxy-connect.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8847fe0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/proxy-connect.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: proxy-connect.sh,v 1.12 2020/01/23 11:19:12 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="proxy connect"
+
+if [ "`${SSH} -Q compression`" = "none" ]; then
+	comp="no"
+else
+	comp="no yes"
+fi
+
+for c in $comp; do
+	verbose "plain username comp=$c"
+	opts="-oCompression=$c -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts 999.999.999.999 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh proxyconnect comp=$c failed"
+	fi
+	if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then
+		fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION comp=$c: " \
+		    "$SSH_CONNECTION"
+	fi
+done
+
+verbose "username with style"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${USER}:style@999.999.999.999 true || \
+	fail "ssh proxyconnect failed"
diff --git a/regress/putty-ciphers.sh b/regress/putty-ciphers.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b8e25a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/putty-ciphers.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: putty-ciphers.sh,v 1.11 2021/09/01 03:16:06 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="putty ciphers"
+
+if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then
+	skip "putty interop tests not enabled"
+fi
+
+# Re-enable ssh-rsa on older PuTTY versions.
+oldver="`${PLINK} --version | awk '/plink: Release/{if ($3<0.76)print "yes"}'`"
+if [ "x$oldver" = "xyes" ]; then
+	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms +ssh-rsa" >> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+	echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-rsa" >> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+fi
+
+for c in aes 3des aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr chacha20 ; do
+	verbose "$tid: cipher $c"
+	cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \
+	    ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c
+	echo "Cipher=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c
+
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+	env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load cipher_$c -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
+	    cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+	fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy"
+done
+rm -f ${COPY}
+
diff --git a/regress/putty-kex.sh b/regress/putty-kex.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c75802a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/putty-kex.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: putty-kex.sh,v 1.9 2021/09/01 03:16:06 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="putty KEX"
+
+if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then
+	skip "putty interop tests not enabled"
+fi
+
+# Re-enable ssh-rsa on older PuTTY versions.
+oldver="`${PLINK} --version | awk '/plink: Release/{if ($3<0.76)print "yes"}'`"
+if [ "x$oldver" = "xyes" ]; then
+	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms +ssh-rsa" >> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+	echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-rsa" >> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+fi
+
+for k in dh-gex-sha1 dh-group1-sha1 dh-group14-sha1 ecdh ; do
+	verbose "$tid: kex $k"
+	cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \
+	    ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k
+	echo "KEX=$k" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k
+
+	env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load kex_$k -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 true
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "KEX $k failed"
+	fi
+done
+
diff --git a/regress/putty-transfer.sh b/regress/putty-transfer.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6864f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/putty-transfer.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: putty-transfer.sh,v 1.11 2021/09/01 03:16:06 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="putty transfer data"
+
+if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then
+	skip "putty interop tests not enabled"
+fi
+
+# Re-enable ssh-rsa on older PuTTY versions.
+oldver="`${PLINK} --version | awk '/plink: Release/{if ($3<0.76)print "yes"}'`"
+if [ "x$oldver" = "xyes" ]; then
+	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms +ssh-rsa" >> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+	echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-rsa" >> ${OBJ}/sshd_proxy
+fi
+
+if [ "`${SSH} -Q compression`" = "none" ]; then
+	comp="0"
+else
+	comp="0 1"
+fi
+
+for c in $comp; do 
+	verbose "$tid: compression $c"
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+	cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \
+	    ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/compression_$c
+	echo "Compression=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k
+	env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c -batch \
+	    -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+	fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do
+		trace "compression $c dd-size ${s}"
+		rm -f ${COPY}
+		dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \
+			env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c \
+			    -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
+			    "cat > ${COPY}"
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+		fi
+		cmp $DATA ${COPY}	|| fail "corrupted copy"
+	done
+done
+rm -f ${COPY}
+
diff --git a/regress/reconfigure.sh b/regress/reconfigure.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d5b4e98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/reconfigure.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: reconfigure.sh,v 1.9 2021/06/10 09:46:28 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="simple connect after reconfigure"
+
+# we need the full path to sshd for -HUP
+if test "x$USE_VALGRIND" = "x" ; then
+	case $SSHD in
+	/*)
+		# full path is OK
+		;;
+	*)
+		# otherwise make fully qualified
+		SSHD=$OBJ/$SSHD
+	esac
+fi
+
+start_sshd
+
+trace "connect before restart"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh connect with failed before reconfigure"
+fi
+
+PID=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
+rm -f $PIDFILE
+$SUDO kill -HUP $PID
+
+trace "wait for sshd to restart"
+i=0;
+while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do
+	i=`expr $i + 1`
+	sleep $i
+done
+
+test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "sshd did not restart"
+
+trace "connect after restart"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh connect with failed after reconfigure"
+fi
+
+trace "reconfigure with active clients"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost sleep 10  # authenticated client
+${NC} -d 127.0.0.1 $PORT >/dev/null &  # unauthenticated client
+PID=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
+rm -f $PIDFILE
+$SUDO kill -HUP $PID
+
+trace "wait for sshd to restart"
+i=0;
+while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do
+	i=`expr $i + 1`
+	sleep $i
+done
+
+test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "sshd did not restart"
+
+trace "connect after restart with active clients"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh connect with failed after reconfigure"
+fi
diff --git a/regress/reexec.sh b/regress/reexec.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f88d41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/reexec.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: reexec.sh,v 1.13 2023/01/19 07:53:45 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="reexec tests"
+
+SSHD_ORIG=$SSHD
+SSHD_COPY=$OBJ/sshd
+
+# Start a sshd and then delete it
+start_sshd_copy ()
+{
+	# NB. prefer ln to cp here. On some OSX 19.4 configurations,
+	# djm has seen failure after fork() when the executable image
+	# has been removed from the filesystem.
+	ln $SSHD_ORIG $SSHD_COPY || cp $SSHD_ORIG $SSHD_COPY
+	SSHD=$SSHD_COPY
+	start_sshd
+	SSHD=$SSHD_ORIG
+}
+
+# Do basic copy tests
+copy_tests ()
+{
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+	${SSH} -nq -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost \
+	    cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+	fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy"
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+}
+
+verbose "test config passing"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_config.orig
+start_sshd
+echo "InvalidXXX=no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+
+copy_tests
+
+stop_sshd
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_config.orig $OBJ/sshd_config
+
+# cygwin can't fork a deleted binary
+if [ "$os" != "cygwin" ]; then
+
+verbose "test reexec fallback"
+
+start_sshd_copy
+$SUDO rm -f $SSHD_COPY
+
+copy_tests
+
+stop_sshd
+fi
diff --git a/regress/rekey.sh b/regress/rekey.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..61723cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/rekey.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: rekey.sh,v 1.19 2021/07/19 05:08:54 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="rekey"
+
+LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
+
+rm -f ${LOG}
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+# Test rekeying based on data volume only.
+# Arguments will be passed to ssh.
+ssh_data_rekeying()
+{
+	_kexopt=$1 ; shift
+	_opts="$@"
+	if ! test -z "$_kexopts" ; then
+		cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		echo "$_kexopt" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		_opts="$_opts -o$_kexopt"
+	fi
+	rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
+	_opts="$_opts -oCompression=no"
+	${SSH} <${DATA} $_opts -v -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}"
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh failed ($@)"
+	fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy ($@)"
+	n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
+	n=`expr $n - 1`
+	trace "$n rekeying(s)"
+	if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
+		fail "no rekeying occurred ($@)"
+	fi
+}
+
+increase_datafile_size 300
+
+opts=""
+for i in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
+	opts="$opts KexAlgorithms=$i"
+done
+for i in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do
+	opts="$opts Ciphers=$i"
+done
+for i in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do
+	opts="$opts MACs=$i"
+done
+
+for opt in $opts; do
+	verbose "client rekey $opt"
+	ssh_data_rekeying "$opt" -oRekeyLimit=256k
+done
+
+# AEAD ciphers are magical so test with all KexAlgorithms
+if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+  for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do
+    for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
+	verbose "client rekey $c $kex"
+	ssh_data_rekeying "KexAlgorithms=$kex" -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c
+    done
+  done
+fi
+
+for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do
+	verbose "client rekeylimit ${s}"
+	ssh_data_rekeying "" -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit=$s
+done
+
+for s in 5 10; do
+	verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s}"
+	rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
+	${SSH} < ${DATA} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \
+		$OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat >${COPY};sleep $s;sleep 10"
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh failed"
+	fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy"
+	n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
+	n=`expr $n - 1`
+	trace "$n rekeying(s)"
+	if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
+		fail "no rekeying occurred"
+	fi
+done
+
+for s in 5 10; do
+	verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s} no data"
+	rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
+	${SSH} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \
+		$OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 10"
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh failed"
+	fi
+	n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
+	n=`expr $n - 1`
+	trace "$n rekeying(s)"
+	if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
+		fail "no rekeying occurred"
+	fi
+done
+
+for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do
+	verbose "server rekeylimit ${s}"
+	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	echo "rekeylimit ${s}" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
+	${SSH} -oCompression=no -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat ${DATA}" \
+	    > ${COPY}
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh failed"
+	fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy"
+	n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
+	n=`expr $n - 1`
+	trace "$n rekeying(s)"
+	if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
+		fail "no rekeying occurred"
+	fi
+done
+
+for s in 5 10; do
+	verbose "server rekeylimit default ${s} no data"
+	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	echo "rekeylimit default ${s}" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy
+	rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG}
+	${SSH} -oCompression=no -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 10"
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh failed"
+	fi
+	n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l`
+	n=`expr $n - 1`
+	trace "$n rekeying(s)"
+	if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then
+		fail "no rekeying occurred"
+	fi
+done
+
+verbose "rekeylimit parsing"
+for size in 16 1k 1K 1m 1M 1g 1G 4G 8G; do
+    for time in 1 1m 1M 1h 1H 1d 1D 1w 1W; do
+	case $size in
+		16)	bytes=16 ;;
+		1k|1K)	bytes=1024 ;;
+		1m|1M)	bytes=1048576 ;;
+		1g|1G)	bytes=1073741824 ;;
+		4g|4G)	bytes=4294967296 ;;
+		8g|8G)	bytes=8589934592 ;;
+	esac
+	case $time in
+		1)	seconds=1 ;;
+		1m|1M)	seconds=60 ;;
+		1h|1H)	seconds=3600 ;;
+		1d|1D)	seconds=86400 ;;
+		1w|1W)	seconds=604800 ;;
+	esac
+
+	b=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \
+	    awk '/rekeylimit/{print $2}'`
+	s=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \
+	    awk '/rekeylimit/{print $3}'`
+
+	if [ "$bytes" != "$b" ]; then
+		fatal "rekeylimit size: expected $bytes bytes got $b"
+	fi
+	if [ "$seconds" != "$s" ]; then
+		fatal "rekeylimit time: expected $time seconds got $s"
+	fi
+    done
+done
+
+rm -f ${COPY} ${DATA}
diff --git a/regress/rsa_openssh.prv b/regress/rsa_openssh.prv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2675555
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/rsa_openssh.prv
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIICWgIBAAKBgQDsilwKcaKN6wSMNd1WgQ9+HRqQEkD0kCTVttrazGu0OhBU3Uko
++dFD1Ip0CxdXmN25JQWxOYF7h/Ocu8P3jzv3RTX87xKR0YzlXTLX+SLtF/ySebS3
+xWPrlfRUDhh03hR5V+8xxvvy9widPYKw/oItwGSueOsEq1LTczCDv2dAjQIDAQAB
+An8nH5VzvHkMbSqJ6eOYDsVwomRvYbH5IEaYl1x6VATITNvAu9kUdQ4NsSpuMc+7
+Jj9gKZvmO1y2YCKc0P/iO+i/eV0L+yQh1Rw18jQZll+12T+LZrKRav03YNvMx0gN
+wqWY48Kt6hv2/N/ebQzKRe79+D0t2cTh92hT7xENFLIBAkEBGnoGKFjAUkJCwO1V
+mzpUqMHpRZVOrqP9hUmPjzNJ5oBPFGe4+h1hoSRFOAzaNuZt8ssbqaLCkzB8bfzj
+qhZqAQJBANZekuUpp8iBLeLSagw5FkcPwPzq6zfExbhvsZXb8Bo/4SflNs4JHXwI
+7SD9Z8aJLvM4uQ/5M70lblDMQ40i3o0CQQDIJvBYBFL5tlOgakq/O7yi+wt0L5BZ
+9H79w5rCSAA0IHRoK/qI1urHiHC3f3vbbLk5UStfrqEaND/mm0shyNIBAkBLsYdC
+/ctt5Bc0wUGK4Vl5bBmj9LtrrMJ4FpBpLwj/69BwCuKoK9XKZ0h73p6XHveCEGRg
+PIlFX4MtaoLrwgU9AkBV2k4dgIws+X8YX65EsyyFjnlDqX4x0nSOjQB1msIKfHBr
+dh5XLDBTTCxnKhMJ0Yx/opgOvf09XHBFwaQntR5i
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/rsa_openssh.pub b/regress/rsa_openssh.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b504730
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/rsa_openssh.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDsilwKcaKN6wSMNd1WgQ9+HRqQEkD0kCTVttrazGu0OhBU3Uko+dFD1Ip0CxdXmN25JQWxOYF7h/Ocu8P3jzv3RTX87xKR0YzlXTLX+SLtF/ySebS3xWPrlfRUDhh03hR5V+8xxvvy9widPYKw/oItwGSueOsEq1LTczCDv2dAjQ==
diff --git a/regress/rsa_ssh2.prv b/regress/rsa_ssh2.prv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1ece3d7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/rsa_ssh2.prv
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----
+Subject: ssh-keygen test
+Comment: "1024-bit rsa, Sat Jun 23 2001 12:21:26 -0400"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+---- END SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----
+---
diff --git a/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh b/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7fb21f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#       $OpenBSD: scp-ssh-wrapper.sh,v 1.4 2019/07/19 03:45:44 djm Exp $
+#       Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+printname () {
+	NAME=$1
+	save_IFS=$IFS
+	IFS=/
+	set -- `echo "$NAME"`
+	IFS="$save_IFS"
+	while [ $# -ge 1 ] ; do
+		if [ "x$1" != "x" ]; then
+			echo "D0755 0 $1"
+		fi
+		shift;
+	done
+}
+
+# Discard all but last argument.  We use arg later.
+while test "x$1" != "x"; do
+	arg="$1"
+	shift
+done
+
+BAD="../../../../../../../../../../../../../${DIR}/dotpathdir"
+
+case "$SCPTESTMODE" in
+badserver_0)
+	echo "D0755 0 /${DIR}/rootpathdir"
+	echo "C755 2 rootpathfile"
+	echo "X"
+	;;
+badserver_1)
+	echo "D0755 0 $BAD"
+	echo "C755 2 file"
+	echo "X"
+	;;
+badserver_2)
+	echo "D0755 0 $BAD"
+	echo "C755 2 file"
+	echo "X"
+	;;
+badserver_3)
+	printname $BAD
+	echo "C755 2 file"
+	echo "X"
+	;;
+badserver_4)
+	printname $BAD
+	echo "D0755 0 .."
+	echo "C755 2 file"
+	echo "X"
+	;;
+badserver_5)
+	echo "D0555 0 "
+	echo "X"
+	;;
+badserver_6)
+	echo "D0555 0 ."
+	echo "X"
+	;;
+badserver_7)
+	echo "C0755 2 extrafile"
+	echo "X"
+	;;
+*)
+	set -- $arg
+	shift
+	exec $SCP "$@"
+	;;
+esac
diff --git a/regress/scp-uri.sh b/regress/scp-uri.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eacbd45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/scp-uri.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: scp-uri.sh,v 1.5 2023/01/13 04:47:34 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="scp-uri"
+
+#set -x
+
+COPY2=${OBJ}/copy2
+DIR=${COPY}.dd
+DIR2=${COPY}.dd2
+
+maybe_add_scp_path_to_sshd
+
+SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
+cp ${SRC}/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
+chmod 755 ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
+export SCP # used in scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
+
+scpclean() {
+	rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2}
+	mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2}
+}
+
+# Remove Port and User from ssh_config, we want to rely on the URI
+cp $OBJ/ssh_config $OBJ/ssh_config.orig
+egrep -v '^	+(Port|User)	+.*$' $OBJ/ssh_config.orig > $OBJ/ssh_config
+
+for mode in scp sftp ; do
+	tag="$tid: $mode mode"
+	if test $mode = scp ; then
+		scpopts="-O -q -S ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp"
+	else
+		scpopts="-s -D ${SFTPSERVER}"
+	fi
+	verbose "$tag: simple copy local file to remote file"
+	scpclean
+	$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${COPY}" || fail "copy failed"
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: simple copy remote file to local file"
+	scpclean
+	$SCP $scpopts "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DATA}" ${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: simple copy local file to remote dir"
+	scpclean
+	cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+	$SCP $scpopts ${COPY} "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR}" || fail "copy failed"
+	cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: simple copy remote file to local dir"
+	scpclean
+	cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+	$SCP $scpopts "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${COPY}" ${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
+	cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: recursive local dir to remote dir"
+	scpclean
+	rm -rf ${DIR2}
+	cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+	$SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR2}" || fail "copy failed"
+	for i in $(cd ${DIR} && echo *); do
+		cmp ${DIR}/$i ${DIR2}/$i || fail "corrupted copy"
+	done
+
+	verbose "$tag: recursive remote dir to local dir"
+	scpclean
+	rm -rf ${DIR2}
+	cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+	$SCP $scpopts -r "scp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR}" ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+	for i in $(cd ${DIR} && echo *); do
+		cmp ${DIR}/$i ${DIR2}/$i || fail "corrupted copy"
+	done
+
+	# TODO: scp -3
+done
+
+scpclean
+rm -f ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.exe
diff --git a/regress/scp.sh b/regress/scp.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..76c2b2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/scp.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: scp.sh,v 1.18 2023/01/13 04:47:34 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="scp"
+
+#set -x
+
+COPY2=${OBJ}/copy2
+DIR=${COPY}.dd
+DIR2=${COPY}.dd2
+COPY3=${OBJ}/copy.glob[123]
+DIR3=${COPY}.dd.glob[456]
+DIFFOPT="-rN"
+
+# Figure out if diff does not understand "-N"
+if ! diff -N ${SRC}/scp.sh ${SRC}/scp.sh 2>/dev/null; then
+	DIFFOPT="-r"
+fi
+
+maybe_add_scp_path_to_sshd
+
+SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
+cp ${SRC}/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
+chmod 755 ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
+export SCP # used in scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
+
+scpclean() {
+	rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2} ${COPY3} ${DIR3}
+	mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2} ${DIR3}
+	chmod 755 ${DIR} ${DIR2} ${DIR3}
+}
+
+for mode in scp sftp ; do
+	tag="$tid: $mode mode"
+	if test $mode = scp ; then
+		scpopts="-O -q -S ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp"
+	else
+		scpopts="-s -D ${SFTPSERVER}"
+	fi
+	verbose "$tag: simple copy local file to local file"
+	scpclean
+	$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: simple copy local file to remote file"
+	scpclean
+	$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} somehost:${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: simple copy remote file to local file"
+	scpclean
+	$SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: copy local file to remote file in place"
+	scpclean
+	cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+	$SCP $scpopts ${COPY} somehost:${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: copy remote file to local file in place"
+	scpclean
+	cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+	$SCP $scpopts somehost:${COPY} ${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: copy local file to remote file clobber"
+	scpclean
+	cat ${DATA} ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+	$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} somehost:${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+	ls -l $DATA $COPY
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: copy remote file to local file clobber"
+	scpclean
+	cat ${DATA} ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+	$SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: simple copy local file to remote dir"
+	scpclean
+	cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+	$SCP $scpopts ${COPY} somehost:${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
+	cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: simple copy local file to local dir"
+	scpclean
+	cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+	$SCP $scpopts ${COPY} ${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
+	cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: simple copy remote file to local dir"
+	scpclean
+	cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+	$SCP $scpopts somehost:${COPY} ${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
+	cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: recursive local dir to remote dir"
+	scpclean
+	rm -rf ${DIR2}
+	cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+	$SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} somehost:${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+	diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: recursive local dir to local dir"
+	scpclean
+	rm -rf ${DIR2}
+	cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+	$SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+	diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: recursive remote dir to local dir"
+	scpclean
+	rm -rf ${DIR2}
+	cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+	$SCP $scpopts -r somehost:${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+	diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: unmatched glob file local->remote"
+	scpclean
+	$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} somehost:${COPY3} || fail "copy failed"
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY3} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: unmatched glob file remote->local"
+	# NB. no clean
+	$SCP $scpopts somehost:${COPY3} ${COPY2} || fail "copy failed"
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: unmatched glob dir recursive local->remote"
+	scpclean
+	rm -rf ${DIR3}
+	cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+	cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy.glob[1234]
+	$SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR} somehost:${DIR3} || fail "copy failed"
+	diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR3} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: unmatched glob dir recursive remote->local"
+	# NB. no clean
+	rm -rf ${DIR2}
+	$SCP $scpopts -r somehost:${DIR3} ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+	diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: shell metacharacters"
+	scpclean
+	(cd ${DIR} && \
+	 touch '`touch metachartest`' && \
+	 $SCP $scpopts *metachar* ${DIR2} 2>/dev/null; \
+	 [ ! -f metachartest ] ) || fail "shell metacharacters"
+
+	if [ ! -z "$SUDO" ]; then
+		verbose "$tag: skipped file after scp -p with failed chown+utimes"
+		scpclean
+		cp -p ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+		cp -p ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy2
+		cp ${DATA} ${DIR2}/copy
+		chmod 660 ${DIR2}/copy
+		$SUDO chown root ${DIR2}/copy
+		$SCP -p $scpopts somehost:${DIR}/\* ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>&1
+		$SUDO diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+		$SUDO rm ${DIR2}/copy
+	fi
+
+	for i in 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7; do
+		verbose "$tag: disallow bad server #$i"
+		SCPTESTMODE=badserver_$i
+		export DIR SCPTESTMODE
+		scpclean
+		$SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
+		[ -d {$DIR}/rootpathdir ] && fail "allows dir relative to root dir"
+		[ -d ${DIR}/dotpathdir ] && fail "allows dir creation in non-recursive mode"
+
+		scpclean
+		$SCP -r $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
+		[ -d ${DIR}/dotpathdir ] && fail "allows dir creation outside of subdir"
+
+		scpclean
+		$SCP -pr $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
+		[ ! -w ${DIR2} ] && fail "allows target root attribute change"
+
+		scpclean
+		$SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
+		[ -e ${DIR2}/extrafile ] && fail "allows unauth object creation"
+		rm -f ${DIR2}/extrafile
+	done
+
+	verbose "$tag: detect non-directory target"
+	scpclean
+	echo a > ${COPY}
+	echo b > ${COPY2}
+	$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} ${COPY} ${COPY2}
+	cmp ${COPY} ${COPY2} >/dev/null && fail "corrupt target"
+done
+
+scpclean
+rm -f ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
diff --git a/regress/scp3.sh b/regress/scp3.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..383121f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/scp3.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: scp3.sh,v 1.4 2023/01/13 04:47:34 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="scp3"
+
+set -x
+
+COPY2=${OBJ}/copy2
+DIR=${COPY}.dd
+DIR2=${COPY}.dd2
+
+maybe_add_scp_path_to_sshd
+
+SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
+cp ${SRC}/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
+chmod 755 ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
+export SCP # used in scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
+
+scpclean() {
+	rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2}
+	mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2}
+	chmod 755 ${DIR} ${DIR2}
+}
+
+for mode in scp sftp ; do
+	scpopts="-F${OBJ}/ssh_proxy -S ${SSH} -q"
+	tag="$tid: $mode mode"
+	if test $mode = scp ; then
+		scpopts="$scpopts -O"
+	else
+		scpopts="-s -D ${SFTPSERVER}"
+	fi
+
+	verbose "$tag: simple copy remote file to remote file"
+	scpclean
+	$SCP $scpopts -3 hostA:${DATA} hostB:${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: simple copy remote file to remote dir"
+	scpclean
+	cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+	$SCP $scpopts -3 hostA:${COPY} hostB:${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
+	cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: recursive remote dir to remote dir"
+	scpclean
+	rm -rf ${DIR2}
+	cp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy
+	$SCP $scpopts -3r hostA:${DIR} hostB:${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+	diff -r ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+	diff -r ${DIR2} ${DIR} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+	verbose "$tag: detect non-directory target"
+	scpclean
+	echo a > ${COPY}
+	echo b > ${COPY2}
+	$SCP $scpopts -3 hostA:${DATA} hostA:${COPY} hostB:${COPY2}
+	cmp ${COPY} ${COPY2} >/dev/null && fail "corrupt target"
+done
+
+scpclean
+rm -f ${OBJ}/scp-ssh-wrapper.exe
diff --git a/regress/servcfginclude.sh b/regress/servcfginclude.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..518a703
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/servcfginclude.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="server config include"
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+Match host a
+	Banner /aa
+
+Match host b
+	Banner /bb
+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* # comment
+
+Match host c
+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* # comment
+	Banner /cc
+
+Match host m
+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+Match Host d
+	Banner /dd # comment
+
+Match Host e
+	Banner /ee
+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+Match Host f
+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+	Banner /ff
+
+Match Host n
+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.0 << _EOF
+Match host xxxxxx
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.1 << _EOF
+Match host a
+	Banner /aaa
+
+Match host b
+	Banner /bbb
+
+Match host c
+	Banner /ccc
+
+Match Host d
+	Banner /ddd
+
+Match Host e
+	Banner /eee
+
+Match Host f
+	Banner /fff
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
+Match host a
+	Banner /aaaa
+
+Match host b
+	Banner /bbbb
+
+Match host c # comment
+	Banner /cccc
+
+Match Host d
+	Banner /dddd
+
+Match Host e
+	Banner /eeee
+
+Match Host f
+	Banner /ffff
+
+Match all
+	Banner /xxxx
+_EOF
+
+trial() {
+	_host="$1"
+	_exp="$2"
+	_desc="$3"
+	test -z "$_desc" && _desc="test match"
+	trace "$_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
+	${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \
+	    -C "host=$_host,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out ||
+		fatal "ssh config parse failed: $_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
+	_got=`grep -i '^banner ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
+	if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then
+		fail "$desc_ host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got"
+	fi
+}
+
+trial a /aa
+trial b /bb
+trial c /ccc
+trial d /dd
+trial e /ee
+trial f /fff
+trial m /xxxx
+trial n /xxxx
+trial x none
+
+# Prepare an included config with an error.
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.3 << _EOF
+Banner xxxx
+	Junk
+_EOF
+
+trace "disallow invalid config host=a"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
+    -C "host=a,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
+	fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
+
+trace "disallow invalid config host=x"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
+    -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
+	fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+# Ensure that a missing include is not fatal.
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+Banner /aa
+_EOF
+
+trial a /aa "missing include non-fatal"
+
+# Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent.
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
+Match host x
+_EOF
+
+trial a /aa "included file does not affect match state"
+
+# Ensure the empty include directive is not accepted
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
+Include
+_EOF
+
+trace "disallow invalid with no argument"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x -T \
+    -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
+	fail "sshd allowed Include with no argument"
+
+# Ensure the Include before any Match block works as expected (bug #3122)
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+Banner /xx
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2
+Match host a
+	Banner /aaaa
+_EOF
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
+Match host a
+	Banner /aa
+_EOF
+
+trace "Include before match blocks"
+trial a /aa "included file before match blocks is properly evaluated"
+
+# Port in included file is correctly interpretted (bug #3169)
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2
+Port 7722
+_EOF
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+_EOF
+
+trace "Port after included files"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \
+    -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out || \
+	fail "failed to parse Port after included files"
+_port=`grep -i '^port ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
+if test "x7722" != "x$_port" ; then
+	fail "The Port in included file was intertepretted wrongly. Expected 7722, got $_port"
+fi
+
+# cleanup
+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* $OBJ/sshd_config.out
diff --git a/regress/setuid-allowed.c b/regress/setuid-allowed.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d91d9f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/setuid-allowed.c
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* $OpenBSD$ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+# include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "check-setuid [path]\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	const char *path = ".";
+	struct statvfs sb;
+
+	if (argc > 2)
+		usage();
+	else if (argc == 2)
+		path = argv[1];
+
+	if (statvfs(path, &sb) != 0) {
+		/* Don't return an error if the host doesn't support statvfs */
+		if (errno == ENOSYS)
+			return 0;
+		fprintf(stderr, "statvfs for \"%s\" failed: %s\n",
+		     path, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	return (sb.f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+
diff --git a/regress/sftp-badcmds.sh b/regress/sftp-badcmds.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b016d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/sftp-badcmds.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sftp-badcmds.sh,v 1.7 2020/03/13 03:18:45 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sftp invalid commands"
+
+DATA2=/bin/sh${EXEEXT}
+NONEXIST=/NONEXIST.$$
+GLOBFILES=`(cd /bin;echo l*)`
+
+rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+verbose "$tid: get nonexistent"
+echo "get $NONEXIST $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "get nonexistent failed"
+test -f ${COPY} && fail "existing copy after get nonexistent"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: glob get to nonexistent directory"
+echo "get /bin/l* $NONEXIST" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+        || fail "get nonexistent failed"
+for x in $GLOBFILES; do
+        test -f ${COPY}.dd/$x && fail "existing copy after get nonexistent"
+done
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+verbose "$tid: put nonexistent"
+echo "put $NONEXIST $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "put nonexistent failed"
+test -f ${COPY} && fail "existing copy after put nonexistent"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: glob put to nonexistent directory"
+echo "put /bin/l* ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+        || fail "put nonexistent failed"
+for x in $GLOBFILES; do
+        test -f ${COPY}.dd/$x && fail "existing copy after nonexistent"
+done
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+verbose "$tid: rename nonexistent"
+echo "rename $NONEXIST ${COPY}.1" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "rename nonexist failed"
+test -f ${COPY}.1 && fail "file exists after rename nonexistent"
+
+rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.dd
+cp $DATA $COPY
+mkdir ${COPY}.dd
+verbose "$tid: rename target exists (directory)"
+echo "rename $COPY ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "rename target exists (directory) failed"
+test -f ${COPY} || fail "oldname missing after rename target exists (directory)"
+test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "newname missing after rename target exists (directory)"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "corrupted oldname after rename target exists (directory)"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}
+cp ${DATA2} ${COPY}
+verbose "$tid: glob put files to local file"
+echo "put /bin/l* $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 
+cmp ${DATA2} ${COPY} || fail "put succeeded when it should have failed"
+
+rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd
+
+
diff --git a/regress/sftp-batch.sh b/regress/sftp-batch.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4101154
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/sftp-batch.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sftp-batch.sh,v 1.5 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sftp batchfile"
+
+BATCH=${OBJ}/sftp.bb
+
+rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${BATCH}.*
+
+cat << EOF > ${BATCH}.pass.1
+	get $DATA $COPY
+	put ${COPY} ${COPY}.1
+	rm ${COPY}
+	-put ${COPY} ${COPY}.2
+EOF
+
+cat << EOF > ${BATCH}.pass.2
+	# This is a comment
+
+	# That was a blank line
+	ls
+EOF
+
+cat << EOF > ${BATCH}.fail.1
+	get $DATA $COPY
+	put ${COPY} ${COPY}.3
+	rm ${COPY}.*
+	# The next command should fail
+	put ${COPY}.3 ${COPY}.4
+EOF
+
+cat << EOF > ${BATCH}.fail.2
+	# The next command should fail
+	jajajajaja
+EOF
+
+verbose "$tid: good commands"
+${SFTP} -b ${BATCH}.pass.1 -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "good commands failed"
+
+verbose "$tid: bad commands"
+${SFTP} -b ${BATCH}.fail.1 -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	&& fail "bad commands succeeded"
+
+verbose "$tid: comments and blanks"
+${SFTP} -b ${BATCH}.pass.2 -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "comments & blanks failed"
+
+verbose "$tid: junk command"
+${SFTP} -b ${BATCH}.fail.2 -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	&& fail "junk command succeeded"
+
+rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${BATCH}.*
+
+
diff --git a/regress/sftp-chroot.sh b/regress/sftp-chroot.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a7766fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/sftp-chroot.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sftp-chroot.sh,v 1.8 2021/09/01 00:50:27 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sftp in chroot"
+
+CHROOT=/var/run
+FILENAME=testdata_${USER}.$$
+PRIVDATA=${CHROOT}/${FILENAME}
+trap "${SUDO} rm -f ${PRIVDATA}" 0
+
+if [ -z "$SUDO" -a ! -w /var/run ]; then
+	skip "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without"
+fi
+
+if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m chroot "$CHROOT" ; then
+  skip "$CHROOT is unsuitable as ChrootDirectory"
+fi
+
+$SUDO sh -c "echo mekmitastdigoat > $PRIVDATA" || \
+	fatal "create $PRIVDATA failed"
+
+start_sshd -oChrootDirectory=$CHROOT -oForceCommand="internal-sftp -d /"
+
+verbose "test $tid: get"
+${SFTP} -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config host:/${FILENAME} $COPY \
+    >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 || \
+	fatal "Fetch ${FILENAME} failed"
+cmp $PRIVDATA $COPY || fail "$PRIVDATA $COPY differ"
diff --git a/regress/sftp-cmds.sh b/regress/sftp-cmds.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85f0e97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/sftp-cmds.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sftp-cmds.sh,v 1.15 2022/03/31 03:07:33 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+# XXX - TODO: 
+# - chmod / chown / chgrp
+# - -p flag for get & put
+
+tid="sftp commands"
+
+# test that these files are readable!
+for i in `(cd /bin;echo l*)`
+do
+	if [ -r $i ]; then
+		GLOBFILES="$GLOBFILES $i"
+	fi
+done
+
+# Path with embedded quote
+QUOTECOPY=${COPY}".\"blah\""
+QUOTECOPY_ARG=${COPY}'.\"blah\"'
+# File with spaces
+SPACECOPY="${COPY} this has spaces.txt"
+SPACECOPY_ARG="${COPY}\ this\ has\ spaces.txt"
+# File with glob metacharacters
+GLOBMETACOPY="${COPY} [metachar].txt"
+
+rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2
+mkdir ${COPY}.dd
+
+verbose "$tid: lls"
+(echo "lcd ${OBJ}" ; echo "lls") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \
+	grep copy.dd >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "lls failed"
+
+verbose "$tid: lls w/path"
+echo "lls ${OBJ}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \
+	grep copy.dd >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "lls w/path failed"
+
+verbose "$tid: ls"
+echo "ls ${OBJ}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "ls failed"
+# XXX always successful
+
+verbose "$tid: shell"
+echo "!echo hi there" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "shell failed"
+# XXX always successful
+
+verbose "$tid: pwd"
+echo "pwd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "pwd failed"
+# XXX always successful
+
+verbose "$tid: lpwd"
+echo "lpwd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "lpwd failed"
+# XXX always successful
+
+verbose "$tid: quit"
+echo "quit" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "quit failed"
+# XXX always successful
+
+verbose "$tid: help"
+echo "help" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "help failed"
+# XXX always successful
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+verbose "$tid: get"
+echo "get $DATA $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "get failed"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+verbose "$tid: get quoted"
+echo "get \"$DATA\" $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "get failed"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+
+rm -f ${QUOTECOPY}
+cp $DATA ${QUOTECOPY}
+verbose "$tid: get filename with quotes"
+echo "get \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\" ${COPY}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "get failed"
+cmp ${COPY} ${QUOTECOPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get with quotes"
+rm -f ${QUOTECOPY} ${COPY}
+
+rm -f "$SPACECOPY" ${COPY}
+cp $DATA "$SPACECOPY"
+verbose "$tid: get filename with spaces"
+echo "get ${SPACECOPY_ARG} ${COPY}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+        || fail "get failed"
+cmp ${COPY} "$SPACECOPY" || fail "corrupted copy after get with spaces"
+
+rm -f "$GLOBMETACOPY" ${COPY}
+cp $DATA "$GLOBMETACOPY"
+verbose "$tid: get filename with glob metacharacters"
+echo "get \"${GLOBMETACOPY}\" ${COPY}" | \
+	${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "get failed"
+cmp ${COPY} "$GLOBMETACOPY" || \
+	fail "corrupted copy after get with glob metacharacters"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: get to directory"
+echo "get $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+        || fail "get failed"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: glob get to directory"
+echo "get /bin/l* ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+        || fail "get failed"
+for x in $GLOBFILES; do
+        cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+done
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: get to local dir"
+(echo "lcd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "get $DATA" ) | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+        || fail "get failed"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: glob get to local dir"
+(echo "lcd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "get /bin/l*") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+        || fail "get failed"
+for x in $GLOBFILES; do
+        cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+done
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+verbose "$tid: put"
+echo "put $DATA $COPY" | \
+	${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+
+rm -f ${QUOTECOPY}
+verbose "$tid: put filename with quotes"
+echo "put $DATA \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\"" | \
+	${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
+cmp $DATA ${QUOTECOPY} || fail "corrupted copy after put with quotes"
+
+rm -f "$SPACECOPY"
+verbose "$tid: put filename with spaces"
+echo "put $DATA ${SPACECOPY_ARG}" | \
+	${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
+cmp $DATA "$SPACECOPY" || fail "corrupted copy after put with spaces"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: put to directory"
+echo "put $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "put failed"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: glob put to directory"
+echo "put /bin/l? ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "put failed"
+for x in $GLOBFILES; do
+	cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+done
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: put to local dir"
+(echo "cd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "put $DATA") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "put failed"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/$DATANAME || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+verbose "$tid: glob put to local dir"
+(echo "cd ${COPY}.dd"; echo "put /bin/l?") | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "put failed"
+for x in $GLOBFILES; do
+        cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+done
+
+verbose "$tid: rename"
+echo "rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "rename failed"
+test -f ${COPY}.1 || fail "missing file after rename"
+cmp $DATA ${COPY}.1 >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "corrupted copy after rename"
+
+verbose "$tid: rename directory"
+echo "rename ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2" | \
+	${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+	fail "rename directory failed"
+test -d ${COPY}.dd && fail "oldname exists after rename directory"
+test -d ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "missing newname after rename directory"
+
+verbose "$tid: ln"
+echo "ln ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ln failed"
+test -f ${COPY}.2 || fail "missing file after ln"
+cmp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 || fail "created file is not equal after ln"
+
+verbose "$tid: ln -s"
+rm -f ${COPY}.2
+echo "ln -s ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ln -s failed"
+test -h ${COPY}.2 || fail "missing file after ln -s"
+
+verbose "$tid: cp"
+rm -f ${COPY}.2
+echo "cp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "cp failed"
+cmp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 || fail "created file is not equal after cp"
+
+verbose "$tid: mkdir"
+echo "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "mkdir failed"
+test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "missing directory after mkdir"
+
+# XXX do more here
+verbose "$tid: chdir"
+echo "chdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "chdir failed"
+
+verbose "$tid: rmdir"
+echo "rmdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "rmdir failed"
+test -d ${COPY}.1 && fail "present directory after rmdir"
+
+verbose "$tid: lmkdir"
+echo "lmkdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "lmkdir failed"
+test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "missing directory after lmkdir"
+
+# XXX do more here
+verbose "$tid: lchdir"
+echo "lchdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+	|| fail "lchdir failed"
+
+rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2
+rm -rf ${QUOTECOPY} "$SPACECOPY" "$GLOBMETACOPY"
+
+
diff --git a/regress/sftp-glob.sh b/regress/sftp-glob.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d4df2c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/sftp-glob.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sftp-glob.sh,v 1.4 2009/08/13 01:11:55 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sftp glob"
+
+config_defined FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH && nobs="not supported on this platform"
+
+sftp_ls() {
+	target=$1
+	errtag=$2
+	expected=$3
+	unexpected=$4
+	skip=$5
+	if test "x$skip" != "x" ; then
+		verbose "$tid: $errtag (skipped: $skip)"
+		return
+	fi
+	verbose "$tid: $errtag"
+	printf "ls -l %s" "${target}" | \
+		${SFTP} -b - -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>/dev/null | \
+		grep -v "^sftp>" > ${RESULTS}
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "$errtag failed"
+	fi
+	if test "x$expected" != "x" ; then
+	    if fgrep "$expected" ${RESULTS} >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+		:
+	    else
+		fail "$expected missing from $errtag results"
+	    fi
+	fi
+	if test "x$unexpected" != "x" && \
+	   fgrep "$unexpected" ${RESULTS} >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+		fail "$unexpected present in $errtag results"
+	fi
+	rm -f ${RESULTS}
+}
+
+BASE=${OBJ}/glob
+RESULTS=${OBJ}/results
+DIR=${BASE}/dir
+DATA=${DIR}/file
+
+GLOB1="${DIR}/g-wild*"
+GLOB2="${DIR}/g-wildx"
+QUOTE="${DIR}/g-quote\""
+SLASH="${DIR}/g-sl\\ash"
+ESLASH="${DIR}/g-slash\\"
+QSLASH="${DIR}/g-qs\\\""
+SPACE="${DIR}/g-q space"
+
+rm -rf ${BASE}
+mkdir -p ${DIR}
+touch "${DATA}" "${GLOB1}" "${GLOB2}" "${QUOTE}" "${SPACE}"
+test "x$nobs" = "x" && touch "${QSLASH}" "${ESLASH}" "${SLASH}"
+
+#       target                   message                expected     unexpected
+sftp_ls "${DIR}/fil*"            "file glob"            "${DATA}"    ""
+sftp_ls "${BASE}/d*"             "dir glob"             "`basename ${DATA}`" ""
+sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-wild\"*\""     "quoted glob"          "g-wild*"    "g-wildx"
+sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-wild\*"        "escaped glob"         "g-wild*"    "g-wildx"
+sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-quote\\\""     "escaped quote"        "g-quote\""  ""
+sftp_ls "\"${DIR}/g-quote\\\"\"" "quoted quote"         "g-quote\""  ""
+sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-quote\"'"     "single-quoted quote"  "g-quote\""  ""
+sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-q\\ space"     "escaped space"        "g-q space"  ""
+sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-q space'"     "quoted space"         "g-q space"  ""
+sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-sl\\\\ash"     "escaped slash"        "g-sl\\ash"  "" "$nobs"
+sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-sl\\\\ash'"   "quoted slash"         "g-sl\\ash"  "" "$nobs"
+sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-slash\\\\"     "escaped slash at EOL" "g-slash\\"  "" "$nobs"
+sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-slash\\\\'"   "quoted slash at EOL"  "g-slash\\"  "" "$nobs"
+sftp_ls "${DIR}/g-qs\\\\\\\""    "escaped slash+quote"  "g-qs\\\""   "" "$nobs"
+sftp_ls "'${DIR}/g-qs\\\\\"'"    "quoted slash+quote"   "g-qs\\\""   "" "$nobs"
+
+rm -rf ${BASE}
+
diff --git a/regress/sftp-perm.sh b/regress/sftp-perm.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..de96a14
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/sftp-perm.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,271 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sftp-perm.sh,v 1.3 2021/03/31 21:59:26 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sftp permissions"
+
+SERVER_LOG=${OBJ}/sftp-server.log
+CLIENT_LOG=${OBJ}/sftp.log
+TEST_SFTP_SERVER=${OBJ}/sftp-server.sh
+
+prepare_server() {
+	printf "#!/bin/sh\nexec $SFTPSERVER -el debug3 $* 2>$SERVER_LOG\n" \
+	> $TEST_SFTP_SERVER
+	chmod a+x $TEST_SFTP_SERVER
+}
+
+run_client() {
+	echo "$@" | ${SFTP} -D ${TEST_SFTP_SERVER} -vvvb - >$CLIENT_LOG 2>&1
+}
+
+prepare_files() {
+	_prep="$1"
+	rm -f ${COPY} ${COPY}.1
+	test -d ${COPY}.dd && { rmdir ${COPY}.dd || fatal "rmdir ${COPY}.dd"; }
+	test -z "$_prep" && return
+	sh -c "$_prep" || fail "preparation failed: \"$_prep\""
+}
+
+postcondition() {
+	_title="$1"
+	_check="$2"
+	test -z "$_check" && return
+	${TEST_SHELL} -c "$_check" || fail "postcondition check failed: $_title"
+}
+
+ro_test() {
+	_desc=$1
+	_cmd="$2"
+	_prep="$3"
+	_expect_success_post="$4"
+	_expect_fail_post="$5"
+	verbose "$tid: read-only $_desc"
+	# Plain (no options, mostly to test that _cmd is good)
+	prepare_files "$_prep"
+	prepare_server
+	run_client "$_cmd" || fail "plain $_desc failed"
+	postcondition "$_desc no-readonly" "$_expect_success_post"
+	# Read-only enabled
+	prepare_files "$_prep"
+	prepare_server -R
+	run_client "$_cmd" && fail "read-only $_desc succeeded"
+	postcondition "$_desc readonly" "$_expect_fail_post"
+}
+
+perm_test() {
+	_op=$1
+	_whitelist_ops=$2
+	_cmd="$3"
+	_prep="$4"
+	_expect_success_post="$5"
+	_expect_fail_post="$6"
+	verbose "$tid: explicit $_op"
+	# Plain (no options, mostly to test that _cmd is good)
+	prepare_files "$_prep"
+	prepare_server
+	run_client "$_cmd" || fail "plain $_op failed"
+	postcondition "$_op no white/blacklists" "$_expect_success_post"
+	# Whitelist
+	prepare_files "$_prep"
+	prepare_server -p $_op,$_whitelist_ops
+	run_client "$_cmd" || fail "whitelisted $_op failed"
+	postcondition "$_op whitelisted" "$_expect_success_post"
+	# Blacklist
+	prepare_files "$_prep"
+	prepare_server -P $_op
+	run_client "$_cmd" && fail "blacklisted $_op succeeded"
+	postcondition "$_op blacklisted" "$_expect_fail_post"
+	# Whitelist with op missing.
+	prepare_files "$_prep"
+	prepare_server -p $_whitelist_ops
+	run_client "$_cmd" && fail "no whitelist $_op succeeded"
+	postcondition "$_op not in whitelist" "$_expect_fail_post"
+}
+
+ro_test \
+	"upload" \
+	"put $DATA $COPY" \
+	"" \
+	"cmp $DATA $COPY" \
+	"test ! -f $COPY"
+
+ro_test \
+	"setstat" \
+	"chmod 0700 $COPY" \
+	"touch $COPY; chmod 0400 $COPY" \
+	"test -x $COPY" \
+	"test ! -x $COPY"
+
+ro_test \
+	"rm" \
+	"rm $COPY" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test ! -f $COPY" \
+	"test -f $COPY"
+
+ro_test \
+	"mkdir" \
+	"mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"" \
+	"test -d ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"test ! -d ${COPY}.dd"
+
+ro_test \
+	"rmdir" \
+	"rmdir ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"test ! -d ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"test -d ${COPY}.dd"
+
+ro_test \
+	"posix-rename" \
+	"rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \
+	"test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1"
+
+ro_test \
+	"oldrename" \
+	"rename -l $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \
+	"test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1"
+
+ro_test \
+	"symlink" \
+	"ln -s $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test -h ${COPY}.1" \
+	"test ! -h ${COPY}.1"
+
+ro_test \
+	"hardlink" \
+	"ln $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test -f ${COPY}.1" \
+	"test ! -f ${COPY}.1"
+
+# Test explicit permissions
+
+perm_test \
+	"open" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat,read,close" \
+	"get $DATA $COPY" \
+	"" \
+	"cmp $DATA $COPY" \
+	"! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null"
+
+perm_test \
+	"read" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat,open,close" \
+	"get $DATA $COPY" \
+	"" \
+	"cmp $DATA $COPY" \
+	"! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null"
+
+perm_test \
+	"write" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat,open,close" \
+	"put $DATA $COPY" \
+	"" \
+	"cmp $DATA $COPY" \
+	"! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null"
+
+perm_test \
+	"lstat" \
+	"realpath,stat,open,read,close" \
+	"get $DATA $COPY" \
+	"" \
+	"cmp $DATA $COPY" \
+	"! cmp $DATA $COPY 2>/dev/null"
+
+perm_test \
+	"opendir" \
+	"realpath,readdir,stat,lstat" \
+	"ls -ln $OBJ"
+
+perm_test \
+	"readdir" \
+	"realpath,opendir,stat,lstat" \
+	"ls -ln $OBJ"
+
+perm_test \
+	"setstat" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+	"chmod 0700 $COPY" \
+	"touch $COPY; chmod 0400 $COPY" \
+	"test -x $COPY" \
+	"test ! -x $COPY"
+
+perm_test \
+	"remove" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+	"rm $COPY" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test ! -f $COPY" \
+	"test -f $COPY"
+
+perm_test \
+	"mkdir" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+	"mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"" \
+	"test -d ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"test ! -d ${COPY}.dd"
+
+perm_test \
+	"rmdir" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+	"rmdir ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"mkdir ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"test ! -d ${COPY}.dd" \
+	"test -d ${COPY}.dd"
+
+# Can't readily test this because the client falls back to traditional rename.
+# XXX maybe there is a behaviorial difference we can test for?
+#perm_test \
+#	"posix-rename" \
+#	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+#	"rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
+#	"touch $COPY" \
+#	"test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \
+#	"test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1"
+
+perm_test \
+	"rename" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+	"rename -l $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test -f ${COPY}.1 -a ! -f $COPY" \
+	"test -f $COPY -a ! -f ${COPY}.1"
+
+perm_test \
+	"symlink" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+	"ln -s $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test -h ${COPY}.1" \
+	"test ! -h ${COPY}.1"
+
+perm_test \
+	"hardlink" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+	"ln $COPY ${COPY}.1" \
+	"touch $COPY" \
+	"test -f ${COPY}.1" \
+	"test ! -f ${COPY}.1"
+
+perm_test \
+	"statvfs" \
+	"realpath,stat,lstat" \
+	"df /"
+
+# XXX need good tests for:
+# fstat
+# fsetstat
+# realpath
+# stat
+# readlink
+# fstatvfs
+
+rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.dd
+
diff --git a/regress/sftp-uri.sh b/regress/sftp-uri.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7be104d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/sftp-uri.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sftp-uri.sh,v 1.1 2017/10/24 19:33:32 millert Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sftp-uri"
+
+#set -x
+
+COPY2=${OBJ}/copy2
+DIR=${COPY}.dd
+DIR2=${COPY}.dd2
+SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
+
+sftpclean() {
+	rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2}
+	mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2}
+}
+
+start_sshd -oForceCommand="internal-sftp -d /"
+
+# Remove Port and User from ssh_config, we want to rely on the URI
+cp $OBJ/ssh_config $OBJ/ssh_config.orig
+egrep -v '^	+(Port|User)	+.*$' $OBJ/ssh_config.orig > $OBJ/ssh_config
+
+verbose "$tid: non-interactive fetch to local file"
+sftpclean
+${SFTP} -q -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config "sftp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DATA}" ${COPY} || fail "copy failed"
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+verbose "$tid: non-interactive fetch to local dir"
+sftpclean
+cp ${DATA} ${COPY}
+${SFTP} -q -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config "sftp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${COPY}" ${DIR} || fail "copy failed"
+cmp ${COPY} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+verbose "$tid: put to remote directory (trailing slash)"
+sftpclean
+${SFTP} -q -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config -b - \
+    "sftp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR}/" > /dev/null 2>&1 << EOF
+	version
+	put ${DATA} copy
+EOF
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "sftp failed with $r"
+else
+	cmp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+fi
+
+verbose "$tid: put to remote directory (no slash)"
+sftpclean
+${SFTP} -q -S "$SSH" -F $OBJ/ssh_config -b - \
+    "sftp://${USER}@somehost:${PORT}/${DIR}" > /dev/null 2>&1 << EOF
+	version
+	put ${DATA} copy
+EOF
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "sftp failed with $r"
+else
+	cmp ${DATA} ${DIR}/copy || fail "corrupted copy"
+fi
+
+sftpclean
diff --git a/regress/sftp.sh b/regress/sftp.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a5c88f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/sftp.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sftp.sh,v 1.6 2017/10/30 21:59:43 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="basic sftp put/get"
+
+SFTPCMDFILE=${OBJ}/batch
+cat >$SFTPCMDFILE <<EOF
+version
+get $DATA ${COPY}.1
+put $DATA ${COPY}.2
+EOF
+
+BUFFERSIZE="5 1000 32000 64000"
+REQUESTS="1 2 10"
+
+for B in ${BUFFERSIZE}; do
+	for R in ${REQUESTS}; do
+                verbose "test $tid: buffer_size $B num_requests $R"
+		rm -f ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2
+		${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} -B $B -R $R -b $SFTPCMDFILE \
+		> /dev/null 2>&1
+		r=$?
+		if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "sftp failed with $r"
+		else
+			cmp $DATA ${COPY}.1 || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+			cmp $DATA ${COPY}.2 || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+		fi
+	done
+done
+rm -f ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2
+rm -f $SFTPCMDFILE
diff --git a/regress/ssh-com-client.sh b/regress/ssh-com-client.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e4f80cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/ssh-com-client.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh-com-client.sh,v 1.7 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="connect with ssh.com client"
+
+#TEST_COMBASE=/path/to/ssh/com/binaries
+if [ "X${TEST_COMBASE}" = "X" ]; then
+	fatal '$TEST_COMBASE is not set'
+fi
+
+VERSIONS="
+	2.1.0
+	2.2.0
+	2.3.0
+	2.3.1
+	2.4.0
+	3.0.0
+	3.1.0
+	3.2.0
+	3.2.2
+	3.2.3
+	3.2.5
+	3.2.9
+	3.2.9.1
+	3.3.0"
+
+# 2.0.10 2.0.12 2.0.13 don't like the test setup
+
+# setup authorized keys
+SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
+cp ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.prv ${OBJ}/id.com
+chmod 600 ${OBJ}/id.com
+${SSHKEYGEN} -i -f ${OBJ}/id.com	> $OBJ/id.openssh
+chmod 600 ${OBJ}/id.openssh
+${SSHKEYGEN} -y -f ${OBJ}/id.openssh	> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/id.openssh	> $OBJ/id.com.pub
+echo IdKey ${OBJ}/id.com > ${OBJ}/id.list
+
+# we need a DSA host key
+t=dsa
+rm -f                             ${OBJ}/$t ${OBJ}/$t.pub
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f	  ${OBJ}/$t
+$SUDO cp $OBJ/$t $OBJ/host.$t
+echo HostKey $OBJ/host.$t >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+
+# add hostkeys to known hosts
+mkdir -p ${OBJ}/${USER}/hostkeys
+HK=${OBJ}/${USER}/hostkeys/key_${PORT}_127.0.0.1
+${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/rsa.pub > ${HK}.ssh-rsa.pub
+${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/dsa.pub > ${HK}.ssh-dss.pub
+
+cat > ${OBJ}/ssh2_config << EOF
+*:
+	QuietMode			yes
+	StrictHostKeyChecking		yes
+	Port				${PORT}
+	User				${USER}
+	Host				127.0.0.1
+	IdentityFile			${OBJ}/id.list
+	RandomSeedFile			${OBJ}/random_seed
+        UserConfigDirectory             ${OBJ}/%U
+	AuthenticationSuccessMsg	no
+	BatchMode			yes
+	ForwardX11			no
+EOF
+
+# we need a real server (no ProxyConnect option)
+start_sshd
+
+# go for it
+for v in ${VERSIONS}; do
+	ssh2=${TEST_COMBASE}/${v}/ssh2
+	if [ ! -x ${ssh2} ]; then
+		continue
+	fi
+	verbose "ssh2 ${v}"
+	key=ssh-dss
+	skipcat=0
+        case $v in
+        2.1.*|2.3.0)
+                skipcat=1
+                ;;
+        3.0.*)
+                key=ssh-rsa
+                ;;
+        esac
+	cp ${HK}.$key.pub ${HK}.pub
+
+	# check exit status
+	${ssh2} -q -F ${OBJ}/ssh2_config somehost exit 42
+	r=$?
+        if [ $r -ne 42 ]; then
+                fail "ssh2 ${v} exit code test failed (got $r, expected 42)"
+        fi
+
+	# data transfer
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+	${ssh2} -F ${OBJ}/ssh2_config somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+        if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+                fail "ssh2 ${v} cat test (receive) failed"
+        fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| fail "ssh2 ${v} cat test (receive) data mismatch"
+
+	# data transfer, again
+	if [ $skipcat -eq 0 ]; then
+		rm -f ${COPY}
+		cat ${DATA} | \
+			${ssh2} -F ${OBJ}/ssh2_config host "cat > ${COPY}"
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh2 ${v} cat test (send) failed"
+		fi
+		cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| \
+			fail "ssh2 ${v} cat test (send) data mismatch"
+	fi
+
+	# no stderr after eof
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+	${ssh2} -F ${OBJ}/ssh2_config somehost \
+		exec sh -c \'"exec > /dev/null; sleep 1; echo bla 1>&2; exit 0"\' \
+		2> /dev/null
+        if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+                fail "ssh2 ${v} stderr test failed"
+        fi
+done
+
+rm -rf ${OBJ}/${USER}
+for i in ssh2_config random_seed dsa.pub dsa host.dsa \
+    id.list id.com id.com.pub id.openssh; do
+	rm -f ${OBJ}/$i
+done
diff --git a/regress/ssh-com-keygen.sh b/regress/ssh-com-keygen.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29b02d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/ssh-com-keygen.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh-com-keygen.sh,v 1.4 2004/02/24 17:06:52 markus Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="ssh.com key import"
+
+#TEST_COMBASE=/path/to/ssh/com/binaries
+if [ "X${TEST_COMBASE}" = "X" ]; then
+	fatal '$TEST_COMBASE is not set'
+fi
+
+VERSIONS="
+	2.0.10
+	2.0.12
+	2.0.13
+	2.1.0
+	2.2.0
+	2.3.0
+	2.3.1
+	2.4.0
+	3.0.0
+	3.1.0
+	3.2.0
+	3.2.2
+	3.2.3
+	3.2.5
+	3.2.9
+	3.2.9.1
+	3.3.0"
+
+COMPRV=${OBJ}/comkey
+COMPUB=${COMPRV}.pub
+OPENSSHPRV=${OBJ}/opensshkey
+OPENSSHPUB=${OPENSSHPRV}.pub
+
+# go for it
+for v in ${VERSIONS}; do
+	keygen=${TEST_COMBASE}/${v}/ssh-keygen2
+	if [ ! -x ${keygen} ]; then
+		continue
+	fi
+	types="dss"
+        case $v in
+        2.3.1|3.*)
+                types="$types rsa"
+                ;;
+        esac
+	for t in $types; do
+		verbose "ssh-keygen $v/$t"
+		rm -f $COMPRV $COMPUB $OPENSSHPRV $OPENSSHPUB
+		${keygen} -q -P -t $t ${COMPRV} > /dev/null 2>&1
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "${keygen} -t $t failed"
+			continue
+		fi
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -if ${COMPUB} > ${OPENSSHPUB}
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "import public key ($v/$t) failed"
+			continue
+		fi
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -if ${COMPRV} > ${OPENSSHPRV}
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "import private key ($v/$t) failed"
+			continue
+		fi
+		chmod 600 ${OPENSSHPRV}
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -yf ${OPENSSHPRV} |\
+			diff - ${OPENSSHPUB}
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "public keys ($v/$t) differ"
+		fi
+	done
+done
+
+rm -f $COMPRV $COMPUB $OPENSSHPRV $OPENSSHPUB
diff --git a/regress/ssh-com-sftp.sh b/regress/ssh-com-sftp.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fabfa49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/ssh-com-sftp.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh-com-sftp.sh,v 1.7 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="basic sftp put/get with ssh.com server"
+
+SFTPCMDFILE=${OBJ}/batch
+
+cat >$SFTPCMDFILE <<EOF
+version
+get $DATA ${COPY}.1
+put $DATA ${COPY}.2
+EOF
+
+BUFFERSIZE="5 1000 32000 64000"
+REQUESTS="1 2 10"
+
+#TEST_COMBASE=/path/to/ssh/com/binaries
+if [ "X${TEST_COMBASE}" = "X" ]; then
+	fatal '$TEST_COMBASE is not set'
+fi
+
+VERSIONS="
+	2.0.10
+	2.0.12
+	2.0.13
+	2.1.0
+	2.2.0
+	2.3.0
+	2.3.1
+	2.4.0
+	3.0.0
+	3.1.0
+	3.2.0
+	3.2.2
+	3.2.3
+	3.2.5
+	3.2.9
+	3.2.9.1
+	3.3.0"
+
+# go for it
+for v in ${VERSIONS}; do
+	server=${TEST_COMBASE}/${v}/sftp-server2
+	if [ ! -x ${server} ]; then
+		continue
+	fi
+	verbose "sftp-server $v"
+	for B in ${BUFFERSIZE}; do
+		for R in ${REQUESTS}; do
+			verbose "test $tid: buffer_size $B num_requests $R"
+			rm -f ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2
+			${SFTP} -D ${server} -B $B -R $R -b $SFTPCMDFILE \
+			> /dev/null 2>&1
+			r=$?
+			if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+				fail "sftp failed with $r"
+			else                                
+				cmp $DATA ${COPY}.1 || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+				cmp $DATA ${COPY}.2 || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+			fi
+		done
+	done
+done
+rm -f ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2                
+rm -f $SFTPCMDFILE
diff --git a/regress/ssh-com.sh b/regress/ssh-com.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1a2505
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/ssh-com.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh-com.sh,v 1.10 2017/05/08 01:52:49 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="connect to ssh.com server"
+
+#TEST_COMBASE=/path/to/ssh/com/binaries
+if [ "X${TEST_COMBASE}" = "X" ]; then
+	fatal '$TEST_COMBASE is not set'
+fi
+
+VERSIONS="
+	2.0.12
+	2.0.13
+	2.1.0
+	2.2.0
+	2.3.0
+	2.4.0
+	3.0.0
+	3.1.0
+	3.2.0
+	3.2.2
+	3.2.3
+	3.2.5
+	3.2.9
+	3.2.9.1
+	3.3.0"
+# 2.0.10 does not support UserConfigDirectory
+# 2.3.1 requires a config in $HOME/.ssh2
+
+SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
+
+# ssh.com
+cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd2_config
+#*:
+	# Port and ListenAddress are not used.
+	QuietMode			yes
+	Port				4343
+	ListenAddress			127.0.0.1
+	UserConfigDirectory		${OBJ}/%U
+	Ciphers				AnyCipher
+	PubKeyAuthentication		yes
+	#AllowedAuthentications		publickey
+	AuthorizationFile		authorization
+	HostKeyFile			${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.prv
+	PublicHostKeyFile		${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.pub
+	RandomSeedFile			${OBJ}/random_seed
+	MaxConnections			0
+	PermitRootLogin			yes
+	VerboseMode			no
+	CheckMail			no
+	Ssh1Compatibility		no
+EOF
+
+# create client config
+sed "s/HostKeyAlias.*/HostKeyAlias ssh2-localhost-with-alias/" \
+	< $OBJ/ssh_config > $OBJ/ssh_config_com
+
+# we need a DSA key for
+rm -f                             ${OBJ}/dsa ${OBJ}/dsa.pub
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t dsa -f	  ${OBJ}/dsa
+
+# setup userdir, try rsa first
+mkdir -p ${OBJ}/${USER}
+cp /dev/null ${OBJ}/${USER}/authorization
+for t in rsa dsa; do
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/$t.pub	>  ${OBJ}/${USER}/$t.com
+	echo Key $t.com			>> ${OBJ}/${USER}/authorization
+	echo IdentityFile ${OBJ}/$t	>> ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com
+done
+
+# convert and append DSA hostkey
+(
+	printf 'ssh2-localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -if ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.pub
+) >> $OBJ/known_hosts
+
+# go for it
+for v in ${VERSIONS}; do
+	sshd2=${TEST_COMBASE}/${v}/sshd2
+	if [ ! -x ${sshd2} ]; then
+		continue
+	fi
+	trace "sshd2 ${v}"
+	PROXY="proxycommand ${sshd2} -qif ${OBJ}/sshd2_config 2> /dev/null"
+	${SSH} -qF ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com -o "${PROXY}" dummy exit 0
+        if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+                fail "ssh connect to sshd2 ${v} failed"
+        fi
+
+	ciphers="3des-cbc"
+	macs="hmac-md5"
+	case $v in
+	2.4.*)
+		ciphers="$ciphers cast128-cbc"
+		macs="$macs hmac-sha1 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96"
+		;;
+	3.*)
+		ciphers="$ciphers aes128-cbc cast128-cbc"
+		macs="$macs hmac-sha1 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96"
+		;;
+	esac
+	#ciphers="3des-cbc"
+	for m in $macs; do
+	for c in $ciphers; do
+		trace "sshd2 ${v} cipher $c mac $m"
+		verbose "test ${tid}: sshd2 ${v} cipher $c mac $m"
+		${SSH} -c $c -m $m -qF ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com -o "${PROXY}" dummy exit 0
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh connect to sshd2 ${v} with $c/$m failed"
+		fi
+	done
+	done
+done
+
+rm -rf ${OBJ}/${USER}
+for i in sshd_config_proxy ssh_config_proxy random_seed \
+	sshd2_config dsa.pub dsa ssh_config_com; do
+	rm -f ${OBJ}/$i
+done
diff --git a/regress/ssh2putty.sh b/regress/ssh2putty.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..9b08310
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/ssh2putty.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh2putty.sh,v 1.9 2021/07/25 12:13:03 dtucker Exp $
+
+if test "x$1" = "x" -o "x$2" = "x" -o "x$3" = "x" ; then
+	echo "Usage: ssh2putty hostname port ssh-private-key"
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+HOST=$1
+PORT=$2
+KEYFILE=$3
+
+OPENSSL_BIN="${OPENSSL_BIN:-openssl}"
+
+# XXX - support DSA keys too
+if grep "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY" $KEYFILE >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+	:
+else
+	echo "Unsupported private key format"
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+public_exponent=`
+	$OPENSSL_BIN rsa -noout -text -in $KEYFILE | grep ^publicExponent |
+	sed 's/.*(//;s/).*//'
+`
+test $? -ne 0 && exit 1
+
+modulus=`
+	$OPENSSL_BIN rsa -noout -modulus -in $KEYFILE | grep ^Modulus= |
+	sed 's/^Modulus=/0x/' | tr A-Z a-z
+`
+test $? -ne 0 && exit 1
+
+echo "rsa2@$PORT:$HOST $public_exponent,$modulus"
+
diff --git a/regress/sshcfgparse.sh b/regress/sshcfgparse.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..504853d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/sshcfgparse.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sshcfgparse.sh,v 1.9 2021/06/08 07:05:27 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="ssh config parse"
+
+dsa=0
+for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do
+	case "$t" in
+		ssh-dss)	dsa=1 ;;
+	esac
+done
+
+expect_result_present() {
+	_str="$1" ; shift
+	for _expect in "$@" ; do
+		echo "$f" | tr ',' '\n' | grep "^$_expect\$" >/dev/null
+		if test $? -ne 0 ; then
+			fail "missing expected \"$_expect\" from \"$_str\""
+		fi
+	done
+}
+expect_result_absent() {
+	_str="$1" ; shift
+	for _expect in "$@" ; do
+		echo "$f" | tr ',' '\n' | grep "^$_expect\$" >/dev/null
+		if test $? -eq 0 ; then
+			fail "unexpected \"$_expect\" present in \"$_str\""
+		fi
+	done
+}
+
+verbose "reparse minimal config"
+(${SSH} -G -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost >$OBJ/ssh_config.1 &&
+ ${SSH} -G -F $OBJ/ssh_config.1 somehost >$OBJ/ssh_config.2 &&
+ diff $OBJ/ssh_config.1 $OBJ/ssh_config.2) || fail "failed to reparse minimal"
+
+verbose "ssh -W opts"
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config host | awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'`
+test "$f" = "no" || fail "exitonforwardfailure default"
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 h | awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'`
+test "$f" = "yes" || fail "exitonforwardfailure enable"
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 -o exitonforwardfailure=no h | \
+    awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'`
+test "$f" = "no" || fail "exitonforwardfailure override"
+
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config host | awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'`
+test "$f" = "no" || fail "clearallforwardings default"
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 h | awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'`
+test "$f" = "yes" || fail "clearallforwardings enable"
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 -o clearallforwardings=no h | \
+    awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'`
+test "$f" = "no" || fail "clearallforwardings override"
+
+verbose "user first match"
+user=`awk '$1=="User" {print $2}' $OBJ/ssh_config`
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'`
+test "$f" = "$user" || fail "user from config, expected '$user' got '$f'"
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -o user=foo -l bar baz@host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'`
+test "$f" = "foo" || fail "user first match -oUser, expected 'foo' got '$f' "
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -lbar baz@host user=foo baz@host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'`
+test "$f" = "bar" || fail "user first match -l, expected 'bar' got '$f'"
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config baz@host -o user=foo -l bar baz@host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'`
+test "$f" = "baz" || fail "user first match user@host, expected 'baz' got '$f'"
+
+verbose "pubkeyacceptedalgorithms"
+# Default set
+f=`${SSH} -GF none host | awk '/^pubkeyacceptedalgorithms /{print $2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*"
+expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-dss"
+# Explicit override
+f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedalgorithms=ssh-ed25519 host | \
+    awk '/^pubkeyacceptedalgorithms /{print $2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519"
+expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" "ssh-dss"
+# Removal from default set
+f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedalgorithms=-ssh-ed25519-cert* host | \
+    awk '/^pubkeyacceptedalgorithms /{print $2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519"
+expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" "ssh-dss"
+f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedalgorithms=-ssh-ed25519 host | \
+    awk '/^pubkeyacceptedalgorithms /{print $2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*"
+expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-dss"
+# Append to default set.
+# This is not tested when built !WITH_OPENSSL
+if [ "$dsa" = "1" ]; then
+	f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedalgorithms=+ssh-dss-cert* host | \
+	    awk '/^pubkeyacceptedalgorithms /{print $2}'`
+	expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-dss-cert-v01.*"
+	expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-dss"
+	f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedalgorithms=+ssh-dss host | \
+	    awk '/^pubkeyacceptedalgorithms /{print $2}'`
+	expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" "ssh-dss"
+	expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-dss-cert-v01.*"
+fi
+
+verbose "agentforwarding"
+f=`${SSH} -GF none host | awk '/^forwardagent /{print$2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "no"
+f=`${SSH} -GF none -oforwardagent=no host | awk '/^forwardagent /{print$2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "no"
+f=`${SSH} -GF none -oforwardagent=yes host | awk '/^forwardagent /{print$2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "yes"
+f=`${SSH} -GF none '-oforwardagent=SSH_AUTH_SOCK.forward' host | awk '/^forwardagent /{print$2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "SSH_AUTH_SOCK.forward"
+
+verbose "command line override"
+cat >$OBJ/ssh_config.0 <<EOD
+Host *
+    IPQoS af21 cs1
+    TunnelDevice 1:2
+EOD
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config.0 -oipqos=cs1 host | awk '/^ipqos /{print$2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "cs1"
+f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config.0 -otunneldevice=3:4 host | awk '/^tunneldevice /{print$2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "3:4"
+
+# cleanup
+rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.[012]
diff --git a/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh b/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b3c911
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#       $OpenBSD: sshd-log-wrapper.sh,v 1.5 2022/01/04 08:38:53 dtucker Exp $
+#       Placed in the Public Domain.
+#
+# simple wrapper for sshd proxy mode to catch stderr output
+# sh sshd-log-wrapper.sh /path/to/logfile /path/to/sshd [args...]
+
+log=$1
+shift
+
+echo "Executing: $@" >>$log
+exec "$@" -E$log
diff --git a/regress/sshfp-connect.sh b/regress/sshfp-connect.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f786469
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/sshfp-connect.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sshfp-connect.sh,v 1.4 2021/09/01 00:50:27 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+# This test requires external setup and thus is skipped unless
+# TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN is set.  It requires:
+# 1) A DNSSEC-enabled domain, which TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN points to.
+# 2) A DNSSEC-validating resolver such as unwind(8).
+# 3) The following SSHFP records with fingerprints from rsa_openssh.pub
+#    in that domain that are expected to succeed:
+#      sshtest: valid sha1 and sha256 fingerprints.
+#      sshtest-sha{1,256}, : valid fingerprints for that type only.
+#    and the following records that are expected to fail:
+#      sshtest-bad: invalid sha1 fingerprint and good sha256 fingerprint
+#      sshtest-sha{1,256}-bad: invalid fingerprints for that type only.
+#
+# sshtest IN SSHFP 1 1 99C79CC09F5F81069CC017CDF9552CFC94B3B929
+# sshtest IN SSHFP 1 2 E30D6B9EB7A4DE495324E4D5870B8220577993EA6AF417E8E4A4F1C5 BF01A9B6
+# sshtest-sha1 IN SSHFP 1 1 99C79CC09F5F81069CC017CDF9552CFC94B3B929
+# sshtest-sha256 IN SSHFP 1 2 E30D6B9EB7A4DE495324E4D5870B8220577993EA6AF417E8E4A4F1C5 BF01A9B6
+# sshtest-bad IN SSHFP 1 2 E30D6B9EB7A4DE495324E4D5870B8220577993EA6AF417E8E4A4F1C5 BF01A9B6
+# sshtest-bad IN SSHFP 1 1 99C79CC09F5F81069CC017CDF9552CFC94B3B928
+# sshtest-sha1-bad IN SSHFP 1 1 99D79CC09F5F81069CC017CDF9552CFC94B3B929
+# sshtest-sha256-bad IN SSHFP 1 2 E30D6B9EB7A4DE495324E4D5870B8220577993EA6AF417E8E4A4F1C5 BF01A9B5
+
+tid="sshfp connect"
+
+if ! $SSH -Q key-plain | grep ssh-rsa >/dev/null; then
+	skip "RSA keys not supported."
+elif [ -z "${TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN}" ]; then
+	skip "TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN not set."
+else
+	# Set RSA host key to match fingerprints above.
+	mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+	$SUDO cp $SRC/rsa_openssh.prv $OBJ/host.ssh-rsa
+	$SUDO chmod 600 $OBJ/host.ssh-rsa
+	sed -e "s|$OBJ/ssh-rsa|$OBJ/host.ssh-rsa|" \
+	    $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+	# Zero out known hosts and key aliases to force use of SSHFP records.
+	> $OBJ/known_hosts
+	mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
+	sed -e "/HostKeyAlias.*localhost-with-alias/d" \
+	    -e "/Hostname.*127.0.0.1/d" \
+	    $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+	for n in sshtest sshtest-sha1 sshtest-sha256; do
+		trace "sshfp connect $n good fingerprint"
+		host="${n}.dtucker.net"
+		opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o VerifyHostKeyDNS=yes "
+		opts="$opts -o HostKeyAlgorithms=rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256"
+		host="${n}.${TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN}"
+		SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts $host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh sshfp connect failed"
+		fi
+		if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then
+			fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION: $SSH_CONNECTION"
+		fi
+
+		trace "sshfp connect $n bad fingerprint"
+		host="${n}-bad.${TEST_SSH_SSHFP_DOMAIN}"
+		if ${SSH} $opts ${host} true; then
+			fail "sshfp-connect succeeded with bad SSHFP record"
+		fi
+	done
+fi
diff --git a/regress/sshsig.sh b/regress/sshsig.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4daa5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/sshsig.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,476 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sshsig.sh,v 1.14 2022/02/01 23:37:15 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="sshsig"
+
+DATA2=$OBJ/${DATANAME}.2
+cat ${DATA} ${DATA} > ${DATA2}
+
+rm -f $OBJ/sshsig-*.sig $OBJ/wrong-key* $OBJ/sigca-key*
+
+sig_namespace="test-$$"
+sig_principal="user-$$@example.com"
+
+# Make a "wrong key"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/wrong-key \
+	-C "wrong trousers, Grommit" -N '' \
+	|| fatal "couldn't generate key"
+WRONG=$OBJ/wrong-key.pub
+
+# Make a CA key.
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/sigca-key -C "CA" -N '' \
+	|| fatal "couldn't generate key"
+CA_PRIV=$OBJ/sigca-key
+CA_PUB=$OBJ/sigca-key.pub
+
+trace "start agent"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+fi
+
+SIGNKEYS="$SSH_KEYTYPES"
+verbose "$tid: make certificates"
+for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $CA_PRIV -z $$ \
+	    -I "regress signature key for $USER" \
+		-V "19840101:19860101" \
+	    -n $sig_principal $OBJ/${t} || \
+		fatal "couldn't sign ${t}"
+	SIGNKEYS="$SIGNKEYS ${t}-cert.pub"
+done
+
+for t in $SIGNKEYS; do
+	verbose "$tid: check signature for $t"
+	keybase=`basename $t .pub`
+	privkey=${OBJ}/`basename $t -cert.pub`
+	sigfile=${OBJ}/sshsig-${keybase}.sig
+	sigfile_agent=${OBJ}/sshsig-agent-${keybase}.sig
+	pubkey=${OBJ}/${keybase}.pub
+	cert=${OBJ}/${keybase}-cert.pub
+	sigfile_cert=${OBJ}/sshsig-${keybase}-cert.sig
+
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y sign -f ${OBJ}/$t -n $sig_namespace \
+	    -Ohashalg=sha1 < $DATA > $sigfile 2>/dev/null && \
+		fail "sign using $t with bad hash algorithm succeeded"
+
+	for h in default sha256 sha512 ; do
+		case "$h" in
+		default) hashalg_arg="" ;;
+		*) hashalg_arg="-Ohashalg=$h" ;;
+		esac
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y sign -f ${OBJ}/$t -n $sig_namespace \
+		    $hashalg_arg < $DATA > $sigfile 2>/dev/null || \
+			fail "sign using $t / $h failed"
+		(printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		    -I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		    < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+			fail "failed signature for $t / $h key"
+	done
+
+	(printf "$sig_principal namespaces=\"$sig_namespace,whatever\" ";
+	 cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed signature for $t key w/ limited namespace"
+
+	(printf "$sig_principal namespaces=\"$sig_namespace,whatever\" ";
+	 cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -q -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		-O print-pubkey \
+		< $DATA | cut -d' ' -f1-2 > ${OBJ}/${keybase}-fromsig.pub || \
+		fail "failed signature for $t key w/ print-pubkey"
+	cut -d' ' -f1-2 ${OBJ}/${keybase}.pub > ${OBJ}/${keybase}-strip.pub
+	diff -r ${OBJ}/${keybase}-strip.pub ${OBJ}/${keybase}-fromsig.pub || \
+		fail "print-pubkey differs from signature key"
+
+	# Invalid option
+	(printf "$sig_principal octopus " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "accepted signature for $t key with bad signers option"
+
+	# Wrong key trusted.
+	(printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $WRONG) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "accepted signature for $t key with wrong key trusted"
+
+	# incorrect data
+	(printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		< $DATA2 >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "passed signature for wrong data with $t key"
+
+	# wrong principal in signers
+	(printf "josef.k@example.com " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "accepted signature for $t key with wrong principal"
+
+	# wrong namespace
+	(printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n COWS_COWS_COWS \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "accepted signature for $t key with wrong namespace"
+
+	# namespace excluded by option
+	(printf "$sig_principal namespaces=\"whatever\" " ;
+	 cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "accepted signature for $t key with excluded namespace"
+
+	( printf "$sig_principal " ;
+	  printf "valid-after=\"19800101\",valid-before=\"19900101\" " ;
+	  cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+
+	# key lifespan valid
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		-Overify-time=19850101 \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed signature for $t key with valid expiry interval"
+	# key not yet valid
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		-Overify-time=19790101 \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "failed signature for $t not-yet-valid key"
+	# key expired
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		-Overify-time=19910101 \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "failed signature for $t with expired key"
+	# NB. assumes we're not running this test in the 1980s
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "failed signature for $t with expired key"
+
+	# key lifespan valid
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y find-principals -s $sigfile \
+		-Overify-time="19850101" \
+		-f $OBJ/allowed_signers >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed find-principals for $t key with valid expiry interval"
+	# key not yet valid
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y find-principals -s $sigfile \
+		-Overify-time="19790101" \
+		-f $OBJ/allowed_signers >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "failed find-principals for $t not-yet-valid key"
+	# key expired
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y find-principals -s $sigfile \
+		-Overify-time="19990101" \
+		-f $OBJ/allowed_signers >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "failed find-principals for $t with expired key"
+	# NB. assumes we're not running this test in the 1980s
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y find-principals -s $sigfile \
+		-f $OBJ/allowed_signers >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "failed find-principals for $t with expired key"
+
+	# public key in revoked keys file
+	cat $pubkey > $OBJ/revoked_keys
+	(printf "$sig_principal namespaces=\"whatever\" " ;
+	 cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		-r $OBJ/revoked_keys \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "accepted signature for $t key, but key is in revoked_keys"
+
+	# public key not revoked, but others are present in revoked_keysfile
+	cat $WRONG > $OBJ/revoked_keys
+	(printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		-r $OBJ/revoked_keys \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "couldn't verify signature for $t key, but key not in revoked_keys"
+
+	# check-novalidate with valid data
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y check-novalidate -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed to check valid signature for $t key"
+
+	# check-novalidate with invalid data
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y check-novalidate -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		< $DATA2 >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "succeeded checking signature for $t key with invalid data"
+
+	# find-principals with valid public key
+	(printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y find-principals -s $sigfile -f $OBJ/allowed_signers >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed to find valid principals in allowed_signers"
+
+	# find-principals with wrong key not in allowed_signers
+	(printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $WRONG) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y find-principals -s $sigfile -f $OBJ/allowed_signers >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "succeeded finding principal with invalid signers file"
+
+	# find-principals with a configured namespace but none on command-line
+	(printf "$sig_principal " ;
+	 printf "namespaces=\"test1,test2\" ";
+	 cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y find-principals -s $sigfile \
+	    -f $OBJ/allowed_signers >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed finding principal when namespaces are configured"
+
+	# Check signing keys using ssh-agent.
+	${SSHADD} -D >/dev/null 2>&1 # Remove all previously-loaded keys.
+	${SSHADD} ${privkey} > /dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ssh-add failed"
+
+	# Move private key to ensure agent key is used
+	mv ${privkey} ${privkey}.tmp
+
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y sign -f $pubkey -n $sig_namespace \
+		< $DATA > $sigfile_agent 2>/dev/null || \
+		fail "ssh-agent based sign using $pubkey failed"
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y check-novalidate -s $sigfile_agent \
+		-n $sig_namespace < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed to check valid signature for $t key"
+
+	# Move private key back
+	mv ${privkey}.tmp ${privkey}
+
+	# Duplicate principals & keys in allowed_signers but with different validities
+	( printf "$sig_principal " ;
+	  printf "valid-after=\"19800101\",valid-before=\"19900101\" " ;
+	  cat $pubkey;
+	  printf "${sig_principal} " ;
+	  printf "valid-after=\"19850101\",valid-before=\"20000101\" " ;
+	  cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+
+	# find-principals outside of any validity lifespan
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y find-principals -s $sigfile \
+		-Overify-time="20100101" \
+		-f $OBJ/allowed_signers >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "succeeded find-principals for $t verify-time outside of validity"
+	# find-principals matching only the first lifespan
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y find-principals -s $sigfile \
+		-Overify-time="19830101" \
+		-f $OBJ/allowed_signers >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed find-principals for $t verify-time within first span"
+	# find-principals matching both lifespans
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y find-principals -s $sigfile \
+		-Overify-time="19880101" \
+		-f $OBJ/allowed_signers >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed find-principals for $t verify-time within both spans"
+	# find-principals matching only the second lifespan
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y find-principals -s $sigfile \
+		-Overify-time="19950101" \
+		-f $OBJ/allowed_signers >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed find-principals for $t verify-time within second span"
+
+	# verify outside of any validity lifespan
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-Overify-time="20100101" -I $sig_principal \
+		-r $OBJ/revoked_keys -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "succeeded verify for $t verify-time outside of validity"
+	# verify matching only the first lifespan
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-Overify-time="19830101" -I $sig_principal \
+		-r $OBJ/revoked_keys -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed verify for $t verify-time within first span"
+	# verify matching both lifespans
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-Overify-time="19880101" -I $sig_principal \
+		-r $OBJ/revoked_keys -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed verify for $t verify-time within both spans"
+	# verify matching only the second lifespan
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-Overify-time="19950101" -I $sig_principal \
+		-r $OBJ/revoked_keys -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed verify for $t verify-time within second span"
+
+	# Remaining tests are for certificates only.
+	case "$keybase" in
+		*-cert) ;;
+		*) continue ;;
+	esac
+
+	# Check key lifespan on find-principals when using the CA
+	( printf "$sig_principal " ;
+	  printf "cert-authority,valid-after=\"19800101\",valid-before=\"19900101\" ";
+	  cat $CA_PUB) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	# key lifespan valid
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y find-principals -s $sigfile \
+		-Overify-time="19850101" \
+		-f $OBJ/allowed_signers >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed find-principals for $t key with valid expiry interval"
+	# key not yet valid
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y find-principals -s $sigfile \
+		-Overify-time="19790101" \
+		-f $OBJ/allowed_signers >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "failed find-principals for $t not-yet-valid key"
+	# key expired
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y find-principals -s $sigfile \
+		-Overify-time="19990101" \
+		-f $OBJ/allowed_signers >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "failed find-principals for $t with expired key"
+	# NB. assumes we're not running this test in the 1980s
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y find-principals -s $sigfile \
+		-f $OBJ/allowed_signers >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "failed find-principals for $t with expired key"
+
+	# correct CA key
+	(printf "$sig_principal cert-authority " ;
+	 cat $CA_PUB) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		-Overify-time=19850101 \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed signature for $t cert"
+
+	# find-principals
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y find-principals -s $sigfile \
+		-Overify-time=19850101 \
+		-f $OBJ/allowed_signers >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed find-principals for $t with ca key"
+
+	# CA with wildcard principal
+	(printf "*@example.com cert-authority " ;
+	 cat $CA_PUB) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	# find-principals CA with wildcard principal
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y find-principals -s $sigfile \
+		-Overify-time=19850101 \
+		-f $OBJ/allowed_signers 2>/dev/null | \
+		fgrep "$sig_principal" >/dev/null || \
+		fail "failed find-principals for $t with ca key using wildcard principal"
+
+	# verify CA with wildcard principal
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		-Overify-time=19850101 \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed signature for $t cert using wildcard principal"
+
+	# signing key listed as cert-authority
+	(printf "$sig_principal cert-authority " ;
+	 cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "accepted signature with $t key listed as CA"
+
+	# CA key not flagged cert-authority
+	(printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $CA_PUB) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "accepted signature for $t cert with CA not marked"
+
+	# mismatch between cert principal and file
+	(printf "josef.k@example.com cert-authority " ;
+	 cat $CA_PUB) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "accepted signature for $t cert with wrong principal"
+
+	# Cert valid but CA revoked
+	cat $CA_PUB > $OBJ/revoked_keys
+	(printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		-r $OBJ/revoked_keys \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "accepted signature for $t key, but CA key in revoked_keys"
+
+	# Set lifespan of CA key and verify signed user certs behave accordingly
+	( printf "$sig_principal " ;
+	  printf "cert-authority,valid-after=\"19800101\",valid-before=\"19900101\" " ;
+	  cat $CA_PUB) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+
+	# CA key lifespan valid
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		-Overify-time=19850101 \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+		fail "failed signature for $t key with valid CA expiry interval"
+	# CA lifespan is valid but user key not yet valid
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		-Overify-time=19810101 \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "accepted signature for $t key with valid CA expiry interval but not yet valid cert"
+	# CA lifespan is valid but user key expired
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		-Overify-time=19890101 \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "accepted signature for $t key with valid CA expiry interval but expired cert"
+	# CA key not yet valid
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		-Overify-time=19790101 \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "accepted signature for $t not-yet-valid CA key"
+	# CA key expired
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		-Overify-time=19910101 \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "accepted signature for $t with expired CA key"
+	# NB. assumes we're not running this test in the 1980s
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "accepted signature for $t with expired CA key"
+
+	# Set lifespan of CA outside of the cert validity
+	( printf "$sig_principal " ;
+	  printf "cert-authority,valid-after=\"19800101\",valid-before=\"19820101\" " ;
+	  cat $CA_PUB) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+	# valid cert validity but expired CA
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
+		-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+		-Overify-time=19840101 \
+		< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "accepted signature for $t key with expired CA but valid cert"
+
+done
+
+# Test key independant match-principals
+(
+	printf "principal1 " ; cat $pubkey;
+	printf "princi* " ; cat $pubkey;
+	printf "unique " ; cat $pubkey;
+) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
+
+verbose "$tid: match principals"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -Y match-principals -f $OBJ/allowed_signers -I "unique" | \
+    fgrep "unique" >/dev/null || \
+	fail "faild to match static principal"
+
+${SSHKEYGEN} -Y match-principals -f $OBJ/allowed_signers -I "princip" | \
+    fgrep "princi*" >/dev/null || \
+	fail "faild to match wildcard principal"
+
+${SSHKEYGEN} -Y match-principals -f $OBJ/allowed_signers -I "principal1" | \
+    fgrep -e "principal1" -e "princi*" >/dev/null || \
+	fail "faild to match static and wildcard principal"
+verbose "$tid: nomatch principals"
+for x in princ prince unknown ; do
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -Y match-principals -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
+	    -I $x >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
+		fail "succeeded to match unknown principal \"$x\""
+done
+
+trace "kill agent"
+${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+
diff --git a/regress/stderr-after-eof.sh b/regress/stderr-after-eof.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9065245
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/stderr-after-eof.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: stderr-after-eof.sh,v 1.3 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="stderr data after eof"
+
+# setup data
+rm -f ${DATA} ${COPY}
+cp /dev/null ${DATA}
+for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6; do
+	(date;echo $i) | md5 >> ${DATA}
+done
+
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost \
+	exec sh -c \'"exec > /dev/null; sleep 2; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \
+	2> ${COPY}
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh failed with exit code $r"
+fi
+egrep 'Disconnecting: Received extended_data after EOF' ${COPY} &&
+	fail "ext data received after eof"
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| fail "stderr corrupt"
+
+rm -f ${DATA} ${COPY}
diff --git a/regress/stderr-data.sh b/regress/stderr-data.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0ceb72b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/stderr-data.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: stderr-data.sh,v 1.5 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="stderr data transfer"
+
+for n in '' -n; do
+	verbose "test $tid: ($n)"
+	${SSH} $n -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost exec \
+	    sh -c \'"exec > /dev/null; sleep 3; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \
+		2> ${COPY}
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh failed with exit code $r"
+	fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| fail "stderr corrupt"
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+
+	${SSH} $n -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy otherhost exec \
+	    sh -c \'"echo a; exec > /dev/null; sleep 3; cat ${DATA} 1>&2 $s"\' \
+		> /dev/null 2> ${COPY}
+	r=$?
+	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh failed with exit code $r"
+	fi
+	cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}	|| fail "stderr corrupt"
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+done
diff --git a/regress/t11.ok b/regress/t11.ok
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1925bb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/t11.ok
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:4w1rnrek3klTJOTVhwuCIFd5k+pq9Bfo5KTxxb8BqbY
diff --git a/regress/t4.ok b/regress/t4.ok
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4631ea8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/t4.ok
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+MD5:3b:dd:44:e9:49:18:84:95:f1:e7:33:6b:9d:93:b1:36
diff --git a/regress/t5.ok b/regress/t5.ok
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd622f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/t5.ok
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xokes-lylis-byleh-zebib-kalus-bihas-tevah-haroz-suhar-foved-noxex
diff --git a/regress/test-exec.sh b/regress/test-exec.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..df43f02
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/test-exec.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,816 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.94 2023/01/13 04:47:34 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+#SUDO=sudo
+
+if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES" ]; then
+	STARTTIME=`date '+%s'`
+fi
+
+if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_PORT" ]; then
+	PORT="$TEST_SSH_PORT"
+else
+	PORT=4242
+fi
+
+OBJ=$1
+if [ "x$OBJ" = "x" ]; then
+	echo '$OBJ not defined'
+	exit 2
+fi
+if [ ! -d $OBJ ]; then
+	echo "not a directory: $OBJ"
+	exit 2
+fi
+SCRIPT=$2
+if [ "x$SCRIPT" = "x" ]; then
+	echo '$SCRIPT not defined'
+	exit 2
+fi
+if [ ! -f $SCRIPT ]; then
+	echo "not a file: $SCRIPT"
+	exit 2
+fi
+if $TEST_SHELL -n $SCRIPT; then
+	true
+else
+	echo "syntax error in $SCRIPT"
+	exit 2
+fi
+unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+
+# Portable-specific settings.
+
+if [ -x /usr/ucb/whoami ]; then
+	USER=`/usr/ucb/whoami`
+elif whoami >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+	USER=`whoami`
+elif logname >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+	USER=`logname`
+else
+	USER=`id -un`
+fi
+if test -z "$LOGNAME"; then
+	LOGNAME="${USER}"
+	export LOGNAME
+fi
+
+# Unbreak GNU head(1)
+_POSIX2_VERSION=199209
+export _POSIX2_VERSION
+
+case `uname -s 2>/dev/null` in
+OSF1*)
+	BIN_SH=xpg4
+	export BIN_SH
+	;;
+CYGWIN*)
+	os=cygwin
+	;;
+esac
+
+# If configure tells us to use a different egrep, create a wrapper function
+# to call it.  This means we don't need to change all the tests that depend
+# on a good implementation.
+if test "x${EGREP}" != "x"; then
+	egrep ()
+{
+	 ${EGREP} "$@"
+}
+fi
+
+SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
+
+# defaults
+SSH=ssh
+SSHD=sshd
+SSHAGENT=ssh-agent
+SSHADD=ssh-add
+SSHKEYGEN=ssh-keygen
+SSHKEYSCAN=ssh-keyscan
+SFTP=sftp
+SFTPSERVER=/usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server
+SCP=scp
+
+# Set by make_tmpdir() on demand (below).
+SSH_REGRESS_TMP=
+
+# Interop testing
+PLINK=plink
+PUTTYGEN=puttygen
+CONCH=conch
+
+# Tools used by multiple tests
+NC=$OBJ/netcat
+OPENSSL_BIN="${OPENSSL_BIN:-openssl}"
+
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSH" != "x" ]; then
+	SSH="${TEST_SSH_SSH}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHD" != "x" ]; then
+	SSHD="${TEST_SSH_SSHD}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT" != "x" ]; then
+	SSHAGENT="${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHADD" != "x" ]; then
+	SSHADD="${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN" != "x" ]; then
+	SSHKEYGEN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN" != "x" ]; then
+	SSHKEYSCAN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTP" != "x" ]; then
+	SFTP="${TEST_SSH_SFTP}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER" != "x" ]; then
+	SFTPSERVER="${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SCP" != "x" ]; then
+	SCP="${TEST_SSH_SCP}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PLINK" != "x" ]; then
+	# Find real binary, if it exists
+	case "${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" in
+	/*) PLINK="${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" ;;
+	*) PLINK=`which ${TEST_SSH_PLINK} 2>/dev/null` ;;
+	esac
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN" != "x" ]; then
+	# Find real binary, if it exists
+	case "${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" in
+	/*) PUTTYGEN="${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" ;;
+	*) PUTTYGEN=`which ${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN} 2>/dev/null` ;;
+	esac
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_CONCH" != "x" ]; then
+	# Find real binary, if it exists
+	case "${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" in
+	/*) CONCH="${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" ;;
+	*) CONCH=`which ${TEST_SSH_CONCH} 2>/dev/null` ;;
+	esac
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER" != "x" ]; then
+	SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER" != "x" ]; then
+	SSH_SK_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_OPENSSL" != "x" ]; then
+	OPENSSL_BIN="${TEST_SSH_OPENSSL}"
+fi
+
+# Path to sshd must be absolute for rexec
+case "$SSHD" in
+/*) ;;
+*) SSHD=`which $SSHD` ;;
+esac
+
+case "$SSHAGENT" in
+/*) ;;
+*) SSHAGENT=`which $SSHAGENT` ;;
+esac
+
+# Record the actual binaries used.
+SSH_BIN=${SSH}
+SSHD_BIN=${SSHD}
+SSHAGENT_BIN=${SSHAGENT}
+SSHADD_BIN=${SSHADD}
+SSHKEYGEN_BIN=${SSHKEYGEN}
+SSHKEYSCAN_BIN=${SSHKEYSCAN}
+SFTP_BIN=${SFTP}
+SFTPSERVER_BIN=${SFTPSERVER}
+SCP_BIN=${SCP}
+
+if [ "x$USE_VALGRIND" != "x" ]; then
+	rm -rf $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb
+	mkdir -p $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb
+	# When using sudo ensure low-priv tests can write pipes and logs.
+	if [ "x$SUDO" != "x" ]; then
+		chmod 777 $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb
+	fi
+	VG_TEST=`basename $SCRIPT .sh`
+
+	# Some tests are difficult to fix.
+	case "$VG_TEST" in
+	reexec)
+		VG_SKIP=1 ;;
+	sftp-chroot)
+		if [ "x${SUDO}" != "x" ]; then
+			VG_SKIP=1
+		fi ;;
+	esac
+
+	if [ x"$VG_SKIP" = "x" ]; then
+		VG_LEAK="--leak-check=no"
+		if [ x"$VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS" != "x" ]; then
+			VG_LEAK="--leak-check=full"
+		fi
+		VG_IGNORE="/bin/*,/sbin/*,/usr/*,/var/*"
+		VG_LOG="$OBJ/valgrind-out/${VG_TEST}."
+		VG_OPTS="--track-origins=yes $VG_LEAK"
+		VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children=yes"
+		VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children-skip=${VG_IGNORE}"
+		VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --vgdb-prefix=$OBJ/valgrind-vgdb/"
+		VG_PATH="valgrind"
+		if [ "x$VALGRIND_PATH" != "x" ]; then
+			VG_PATH="$VALGRIND_PATH"
+		fi
+		VG="$VG_PATH $VG_OPTS"
+		SSH="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh.%p $SSH"
+		SSHD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sshd.%p $SSHD"
+		SSHAGENT="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-agent.%p $SSHAGENT"
+		SSHADD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-add.%p $SSHADD"
+		SSHKEYGEN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keygen.%p $SSHKEYGEN"
+		SSHKEYSCAN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keyscan.%p $SSHKEYSCAN"
+		SFTP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp.%p ${SFTP}"
+		SCP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}scp.%p $SCP"
+		cat > $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh << EOF
+#!/bin/sh
+exec $VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp-server.%p $SFTPSERVER "\$@"
+EOF
+		chmod a+rx $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh
+		SFTPSERVER="$OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh"
+	fi
+fi
+
+# Logfiles.
+# SSH_LOGFILE should be the debug output of ssh(1) only
+# SSHD_LOGFILE should be the debug output of sshd(8) only
+# REGRESS_LOGFILE is the output of the test itself stdout and stderr
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
+	TEST_SSH_LOGFILE=$OBJ/ssh.log
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
+	TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE=$OBJ/sshd.log
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
+	TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE=$OBJ/regress.log
+fi
+
+# If set, keep track of successful tests and skip them them if we've
+# previously completed that test.
+if [ "x$TEST_REGRESS_CACHE_DIR" != "x" ]; then
+	if [ ! -d "$TEST_REGRESS_CACHE_DIR" ]; then
+		mkdir -p "$TEST_REGRESS_CACHE_DIR"
+	fi
+	TEST="`basename $SCRIPT .sh`"
+	CACHE="${TEST_REGRESS_CACHE_DIR}/${TEST}.cache"
+	for i in ${SSH} ${SSHD} ${SSHAGENT} ${SSHADD} ${SSHKEYGEN} ${SCP} \
+	    ${SFTP} ${SFTPSERVER} ${SSHKEYSCAN}; do
+		case $i in
+		/*)	bin="$i" ;;
+		*)	bin="`which $i`" ;;
+		esac
+		if [ "$bin" -nt "$CACHE" ]; then
+			rm -f "$CACHE"
+		fi
+	done
+	if [ -f "$CACHE" ]; then
+		echo ok cached $CACHE
+		exit 0
+	fi
+fi
+
+# truncate logfiles
+>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
+>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
+>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
+
+# Create wrapper ssh with logging.  We can't just specify "SSH=ssh -E..."
+# because sftp and scp don't handle spaces in arguments.  scp and sftp like
+# to use -q so we remove those to preserve our debug logging.  In the rare
+# instance where -q is desirable -qq is equivalent and is not removed.
+SSHLOGWRAP=$OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh
+cat >$SSHLOGWRAP <<EOD
+#!/bin/sh
+echo "Executing: ${SSH} \$@" >>${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
+for i in "\$@";do shift;case "\$i" in -q):;; *) set -- "\$@" "\$i";;esac;done
+exec ${SSH} -E${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} "\$@"
+EOD
+
+chmod a+rx $OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh
+REAL_SSH="$SSH"
+REAL_SSHD="$SSHD"
+SSH="$SSHLOGWRAP"
+
+# Some test data.  We make a copy because some tests will overwrite it.
+# The tests may assume that $DATA exists and is writable and $COPY does
+# not exist.  Tests requiring larger data files can call increase_datafile_size
+# [kbytes] to ensure the file is at least that large.
+DATANAME=data
+DATA=$OBJ/${DATANAME}
+cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >${DATA}
+chmod u+w ${DATA}
+COPY=$OBJ/copy
+rm -f ${COPY}
+
+increase_datafile_size()
+{
+	while [ `du -k ${DATA} | cut -f1` -lt $1 ]; do
+		cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >>${DATA}
+	done
+}
+
+# these should be used in tests
+export SSH SSHD SSHAGENT SSHADD SSHKEYGEN SSHKEYSCAN SFTP SFTPSERVER SCP
+export SSH_PKCS11_HELPER SSH_SK_HELPER
+#echo $SSH $SSHD $SSHAGENT $SSHADD $SSHKEYGEN $SSHKEYSCAN $SFTP $SFTPSERVER $SCP
+
+# Portable specific functions
+which()
+{
+	saved_IFS="$IFS"
+	IFS=":"
+	for i in $PATH
+	do
+		if [ -x $i/$1 ]; then
+			IFS="$saved_IFS"
+			echo "$i/$1"
+			return 0
+		fi
+	done
+	IFS="$saved_IFS"
+	echo "$i/$1"
+	return 1
+}
+
+have_prog()
+{
+	which "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1
+	return $?
+}
+
+jot() {
+	awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } exit }"
+}
+if [ ! -x "`which rev`" ]; then
+rev()
+{
+	awk '{for (i=length; i>0; i--) printf "%s", substr($0, i, 1); print ""}'
+}
+fi
+
+# Check whether preprocessor symbols are defined in config.h.
+config_defined ()
+{
+	str=$1
+	while test "x$2" != "x" ; do
+		str="$str|$2"
+		shift
+	done
+	egrep "^#define.*($str)" ${BUILDDIR}/config.h >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+md5 () {
+	if have_prog md5sum; then
+		md5sum
+	elif have_prog openssl; then
+		openssl md5
+	elif have_prog cksum; then
+		cksum
+	elif have_prog sum; then
+		sum
+	elif [ -x ${OPENSSL_BIN} ]; then
+		${OPENSSL_BIN} md5
+	else
+		wc -c
+	fi
+}
+
+# Some platforms don't have hostname at all, but on others uname -n doesn't
+# provide the fully qualified name we need, so in the former case we create
+# our own hostname function.
+if ! have_prog hostname; then
+	hostname() {
+		uname -n
+	}
+fi
+
+make_tmpdir ()
+{
+	SSH_REGRESS_TMP="$($OBJ/mkdtemp openssh-XXXXXXXX)" || \
+	    fatal "failed to create temporary directory"
+}
+# End of portable specific functions
+
+stop_sshd ()
+{
+	if [ -f $PIDFILE ]; then
+		pid=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
+		if [ "X$pid" = "X" ]; then
+			echo no sshd running
+		else
+			if [ $pid -lt 2 ]; then
+				echo bad pid for sshd: $pid
+			else
+				$SUDO kill $pid
+				trace "wait for sshd to exit"
+				i=0;
+				while [ -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 5 ]; do
+					i=`expr $i + 1`
+					sleep $i
+				done
+				if test -f $PIDFILE; then
+					if $SUDO kill -0 $pid; then
+						echo "sshd didn't exit " \
+						    "port $PORT pid $pid"
+					else
+						echo "sshd died without cleanup"
+					fi
+					exit 1
+				fi
+			fi
+		fi
+	fi
+}
+
+# helper
+cleanup ()
+{
+	if [ "x$SSH_PID" != "x" ]; then
+		if [ $SSH_PID -lt 2 ]; then
+			echo bad pid for ssh: $SSH_PID
+		else
+			kill $SSH_PID
+		fi
+	fi
+	if [ "x$SSH_REGRESS_TMP" != "x" ]; then
+		rm -rf "$SSH_REGRESS_TMP"
+	fi
+	stop_sshd
+	if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_ELAPSED_TIMES" ]; then
+		now=`date '+%s'`
+		elapsed=$(($now - $STARTTIME))
+		echo elapsed $elapsed `basename $SCRIPT .sh`
+	fi
+}
+
+start_debug_log ()
+{
+	echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
+	echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
+	echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
+}
+
+save_debug_log ()
+{
+	echo $@ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
+	echo $@ >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
+	echo $@ >>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
+	(cat $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-regress.log
+	(cat $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-ssh.log
+	(cat $TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-sshd.log
+}
+
+trace ()
+{
+	start_debug_log $@
+	if [ "X$TEST_SSH_TRACE" = "Xyes" ]; then
+		echo "$@"
+	fi
+}
+
+verbose ()
+{
+	start_debug_log $@
+	if [ "X$TEST_SSH_QUIET" != "Xyes" ]; then
+		echo "$@"
+	fi
+}
+
+fail ()
+{
+	save_debug_log "FAIL: $@"
+	RESULT=1
+	echo "$@"
+	if test "x$TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL" != "x" ; then
+		cleanup
+		exit $RESULT
+	fi
+}
+
+fatal ()
+{
+	save_debug_log "FATAL: $@"
+	printf "FATAL: "
+	fail "$@"
+	cleanup
+	exit $RESULT
+}
+
+# Skip remaining tests in script.
+skip ()
+{
+	echo "SKIPPED: $@"
+	cleanup
+	exit $RESULT
+}
+
+maybe_add_scp_path_to_sshd ()
+{
+	# If we're testing a non-installed scp, add its directory to sshd's
+	# PATH so we can test it.  We don't do this for all tests as it
+	# breaks the SetEnv tests.
+	case "$SCP" in
+	/*)	PATH_WITH_SCP="`dirname $SCP`:$PATH"
+		echo "	SetEnv PATH='$PATH_WITH_SCP'" >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+		echo "	SetEnv PATH='$PATH_WITH_SCP'" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy ;;
+	esac
+}
+
+RESULT=0
+PIDFILE=$OBJ/pidfile
+
+trap fatal 3 2
+
+# create server config
+cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd_config
+	StrictModes		no
+	Port			$PORT
+	AddressFamily		inet
+	ListenAddress		127.0.0.1
+	#ListenAddress		::1
+	PidFile			$PIDFILE
+	AuthorizedKeysFile	$OBJ/authorized_keys_%u
+	LogLevel		DEBUG3
+	AcceptEnv		_XXX_TEST_*
+	AcceptEnv		_XXX_TEST
+	Subsystem	sftp	$SFTPSERVER
+EOF
+
+# This may be necessary if /usr/src and/or /usr/obj are group-writable,
+# but if you aren't careful with permissions then the unit tests could
+# be abused to locally escalate privileges.
+if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS" ]; then
+	echo "	StrictModes no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+else
+	# check and warn if excessive permissions are likely to cause failures.
+	unsafe=""
+	dir="${OBJ}"
+	while test ${dir} != "/"; do
+		if test -d "${dir}" && ! test -h "${dir}"; then
+			perms=`ls -ld ${dir}`
+			case "${perms}" in
+			?????w????*|????????w?*) unsafe="${unsafe} ${dir}" ;;
+			esac
+		fi
+		dir=`dirname ${dir}`
+	done
+	if ! test  -z "${unsafe}"; then
+		cat <<EOD
+
+WARNING: Unsafe (group or world writable) directory permissions found:
+${unsafe}
+
+These could be abused to locally escalate privileges.  If you are
+sure that this is not a risk (eg there are no other users), you can
+bypass this check by setting TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS=1
+
+EOD
+	fi
+fi
+
+if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE" ]; then
+	trace "adding modulifile='$TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE' to sshd_config"
+	echo "	ModuliFile '$TEST_SSH_MODULI_FILE'" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+fi
+
+if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" ]; then
+	trace "adding sshd_config option $TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS"
+	echo "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+fi
+
+# server config for proxy connects
+cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# allow group-writable directories in proxy-mode
+echo 'StrictModes no' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+
+# create client config
+cat << EOF > $OBJ/ssh_config
+Host *
+	Hostname		127.0.0.1
+	HostKeyAlias		localhost-with-alias
+	Port			$PORT
+	User			$USER
+	GlobalKnownHostsFile	$OBJ/known_hosts
+	UserKnownHostsFile	$OBJ/known_hosts
+	PubkeyAuthentication	yes
+	ChallengeResponseAuthentication	no
+	PasswordAuthentication	no
+	BatchMode		yes
+	StrictHostKeyChecking	yes
+	LogLevel		DEBUG3
+EOF
+
+if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" ]; then
+	trace "adding ssh_config option $TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS"
+	echo "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+fi
+
+rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+SSH_SK_PROVIDER=
+if ! config_defined ENABLE_SK; then
+	trace skipping sk-dummy
+elif [ -f "${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so" ] ; then
+	SSH_SK_PROVIDER="${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so"
+elif [ -f "${OBJ}/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so" ] ; then
+	SSH_SK_PROVIDER="${OBJ}/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so"
+elif [ -f "${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so" ] ; then
+	SSH_SK_PROVIDER="${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so"
+fi
+export SSH_SK_PROVIDER
+
+if ! test -z "$SSH_SK_PROVIDER"; then
+	EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS='-P/*' # XXX want realpath(1)...
+	echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+	echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+	echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+fi
+export EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS
+
+maybe_filter_sk() {
+	if test -z "$SSH_SK_PROVIDER" ; then
+		grep -v ^sk
+	else
+		cat
+	fi
+}
+
+SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
+SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
+
+for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+	# generate user key
+	if [ ! -f $OBJ/$t ] || [ ${SSHKEYGEN_BIN} -nt $OBJ/$t ]; then
+		trace "generating key type $t"
+		rm -f $OBJ/$t
+		${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t  -f $OBJ/$t ||\
+			fail "ssh-keygen for $t failed"
+	else
+		trace "using cached key type $t"
+	fi
+
+	# setup authorized keys
+	cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+	echo IdentityFile $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+done
+
+for t in ${SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES}; do
+	# known hosts file for client
+	(
+		printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
+		cat $OBJ/$t.pub
+	) >> $OBJ/known_hosts
+
+	# use key as host key, too
+	(umask 077; $SUDO cp $OBJ/$t $OBJ/host.$t)
+	echo HostKey $OBJ/host.$t >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+
+	# don't use SUDO for proxy connect
+	echo HostKey $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+done
+chmod 644 $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+# Activate Twisted Conch tests if the binary is present
+REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=no
+if test -x "$CONCH" ; then
+	REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=yes
+fi
+
+# If PuTTY is present, new enough and we are running a PuTTY test, prepare
+# keys and configuration.
+REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no
+if test -x "$PUTTYGEN" -a -x "$PLINK" &&
+    "$PUTTYGEN" --help 2>&1 | grep -- --new-passphrase >/dev/null; then
+	REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes
+fi
+case "$SCRIPT" in
+*putty*)	;;
+*)		REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no ;;
+esac
+
+if test "$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" = "yes" ; then
+	mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty
+
+	# Add a PuTTY key to authorized_keys
+	rm -f ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2
+	if ! "$PUTTYGEN" -t rsa -o ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
+	    --random-device=/dev/urandom \
+	    --new-passphrase /dev/null < /dev/null > /dev/null; then
+		echo "Your installed version of PuTTY is too old to support --new-passphrase, skipping test" >&2
+		exit 1
+	fi
+	"$PUTTYGEN" -O public-openssh ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
+	    >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+
+	# Convert rsa2 host key to PuTTY format
+	cp $OBJ/ssh-rsa $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt
+	${SSHKEYGEN} -p -N '' -m PEM -f $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt >/dev/null
+	${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 $PORT $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt > \
+	    ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys
+	${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 22 $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt >> \
+	    ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys
+	rm -f $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt
+
+	# Setup proxied session
+	mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions
+	rm -f ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
+	echo "Protocol=ssh" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
+	echo "HostName=127.0.0.1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
+	echo "PortNumber=$PORT" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
+	echo "ProxyMethod=5" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
+	echo "ProxyTelnetCommand=sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
+	echo "ProxyLocalhost=1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
+
+	PUTTYDIR=${OBJ}/.putty
+	export PUTTYDIR
+fi
+
+# create a proxy version of the client config
+(
+	cat $OBJ/ssh_config
+	echo proxycommand ${SUDO} env SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$SSH_SK_HELPER\" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
+
+# check proxy config
+${SSHD} -t -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy	|| fatal "sshd_proxy broken"
+
+start_sshd ()
+{
+	# start sshd
+	$SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -t || fatal "sshd_config broken"
+	$SUDO env SSH_SK_HELPER="$SSH_SK_HELPER" \
+	    ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -E$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
+
+	trace "wait for sshd"
+	i=0;
+	while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do
+		i=`expr $i + 1`
+		sleep $i
+	done
+
+	test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "no sshd running on port $PORT"
+}
+
+# source test body
+. $SCRIPT
+
+# kill sshd
+cleanup
+
+if [ "x$USE_VALGRIND" != "x" ]; then
+	# If there is an EXIT trap handler, invoke it now.
+	# Some tests set these to clean up processes such as ssh-agent.  We
+	# need to wait for all valgrind processes to complete so we can check
+	# their logs, but since the EXIT traps are not invoked until
+	# test-exec.sh exits, waiting here will deadlock.
+	# This is not very portable but then neither is valgrind itself.
+	# As a bonus, dash (as used on the runners) has a "trap" that doesn't
+	# work in a pipeline (hence the temp file) or a subshell.
+	exithandler=""
+	trap >/tmp/trap.$$ && exithandler=$(cat /tmp/trap.$$ | \
+	    awk -F "'" '/EXIT$/{print $2}')
+	rm -f /tmp/trap.$$
+	if [ "x${exithandler}" != "x" ]; then
+		verbose invoking EXIT trap handler early: ${exithandler}
+		eval "${exithandler}"
+		trap '' EXIT
+	fi
+
+	# wait for any running process to complete
+	wait; sleep 1
+	VG_RESULTS=$(find $OBJ/valgrind-out -type f -print)
+	VG_RESULT_COUNT=0
+	VG_FAIL_COUNT=0
+	for i in $VG_RESULTS; do
+		if grep "ERROR SUMMARY" $i >/dev/null; then
+			VG_RESULT_COUNT=$(($VG_RESULT_COUNT + 1))
+			if ! grep "ERROR SUMMARY: 0 errors" $i >/dev/null; then
+				VG_FAIL_COUNT=$(($VG_FAIL_COUNT + 1))
+				RESULT=1
+				verbose valgrind failure $i
+				cat $i
+			fi
+		fi
+	done
+	if [ x"$VG_SKIP" != "x" ]; then
+		verbose valgrind skipped
+	else
+		verbose valgrind results $VG_RESULT_COUNT failures $VG_FAIL_COUNT
+	fi
+fi
+
+if [ $RESULT -eq 0 ]; then
+	verbose ok $tid
+	if [ "x$CACHE" != "x" ]; then
+		touch "$CACHE"
+	fi
+else
+	echo failed $tid
+fi
+exit $RESULT
diff --git a/regress/transfer.sh b/regress/transfer.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf174a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/transfer.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: transfer.sh,v 1.4 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="transfer data"
+
+rm -f ${COPY}
+${SSH} -n -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+fi
+cmp ${DATA} ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy"
+
+for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do
+	trace "dd-size ${s}"
+	rm -f ${COPY}
+	dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \
+		${SSH} -q -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}"
+	if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+		fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
+	fi
+	cmp $DATA ${COPY}		|| fail "corrupted copy"
+done
+rm -f ${COPY}
diff --git a/regress/try-ciphers.sh b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e04268b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/try-ciphers.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.26 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="try ciphers"
+
+cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+
+for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do
+	n=0
+	for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do
+		trace "cipher $c mac $m"
+		verbose "test $tid: cipher $c mac $m"
+		cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		echo "Ciphers=$c" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+		${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -m $m -c $c somehost true
+		if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+			fail "ssh failed with mac $m cipher $c"
+		fi
+		# No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they
+		# are ignored.
+		if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
+			break
+		fi
+		n=`expr $n + 1`
+	done
+done
+
diff --git a/regress/unittests/Makefile b/regress/unittests/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d26b74
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.12 2020/06/19 04:34:21 djm Exp $
+
+REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?=	yes
+SUBDIR=	test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys utf8 match conversion
+SUBDIR+=authopt misc sshsig
+
+.include <bsd.subdir.mk>
diff --git a/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc b/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..370224a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.14 2019/11/25 10:32:35 djm Exp $
+
+REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?=	yes
+
+.include <bsd.own.mk>
+.include <bsd.obj.mk>
+
+# User-settable options
+UNITTEST_FAST?= no	# Skip slow tests (e.g. less intensive fuzzing).
+UNITTEST_SLOW?= no	# Include slower tests (e.g. more intensive fuzzing).
+UNITTEST_VERBOSE?= no	# Verbose test output (inc. per-test names).
+
+MALLOC_OPTIONS?=	CFGJRSUX
+TEST_ENV?=		MALLOC_OPTIONS=${MALLOC_OPTIONS}
+
+# XXX detect from ssh binary?
+OPENSSL?=	yes
+
+.if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes")
+CFLAGS+=	-DWITH_OPENSSL
+.endif
+
+# enable warnings
+WARNINGS=Yes
+
+DEBUG=-g
+CFLAGS+=	-fstack-protector-all
+CDIAGFLAGS=	-Wall
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wextra
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Werror
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wchar-subscripts
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wcomment
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wformat
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wformat-security
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wimplicit
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Winline
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wmissing-declarations
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wmissing-prototypes
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wparentheses
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wpointer-arith
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wreturn-type
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wshadow
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wsign-compare
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wstrict-aliasing
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wstrict-prototypes
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wswitch
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wtrigraphs
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wuninitialized
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wunused
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wno-unused-parameter
+.if ${COMPILER_VERSION:L} != "gcc3"
+CDIAGFLAGS+=	-Wold-style-definition
+.endif
+
+SSHREL=../../../../../usr.bin/ssh
+
+CFLAGS+=-I${.CURDIR}/../test_helper -I${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}
+
+.if exists(${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir})
+LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir} -ltest_helper
+DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir}/libtest_helper.a
+.else
+LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/../test_helper -ltest_helper
+DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/libtest_helper.a
+.endif
+
+.PATH: ${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}
+
+LDADD+= -lutil
+DPADD+= ${LIBUTIL}
+
+.if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes")
+LDADD+= -lcrypto
+DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPTO}
+.endif
+
+LDADD+= -lfido2 -lcbor -lusbhid
+DPADD+= ${LIBFIDO2} ${LIBCBOR} ${LIBUSBHID}
+
+UNITTEST_ARGS?=
+
+.if (${UNITTEST_VERBOSE:L} != "no")
+UNITTEST_ARGS+= -v
+.endif
+.if (${UNITTEST_FAST:L} != "no")
+UNITTEST_ARGS+= -f
+.elif (${UNITTEST_SLOW:L} != "no")
+UNITTEST_ARGS+= -F
+.endif
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/Makefile b/regress/unittests/authopt/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3045ec7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.7 2023/01/15 23:35:10 djm Exp $
+
+PROG=test_authopt
+SRCS=tests.c
+
+SRCS+=auth-options.c
+
+# From usr.bin/ssh
+SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
+SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c
+SRCS+=ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
+SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c
+SRCS+=addr.c addrmatch.c bitmap.c
+SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c
+SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-sk.c
+SRCS+=ssh-ed25519-sk.c sk-usbhid.c
+
+SRCS+=digest-openssl.c
+#SRCS+=digest-libc.c
+SRCS+=utf8.c
+
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+	env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/all_permit.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/all_permit.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..38ac573
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/all_permit.cert
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/bad_sourceaddr.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/bad_sourceaddr.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9732745
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/bad_sourceaddr.cert
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/force_command.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/force_command.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7af27e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/force_command.cert
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/host.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/host.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6326d04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/host.cert
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIFWMw3ftP29RSefnxQwdvK1KiE2G9Y7rPRrJ7ZsrDiOeAAAAICeF4LbtRqwIRhewXifa5PKpbSU9P/K8CzeVYj8J/iBoAAAAAAAAAAEAAAACAAAABHVzZXIAAAAIAAAABHVzZXIAAAAANouDYAAAAAA4a2VgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACAoVYLMLNBOH1SSgemFuDBprzpDXop6ufRSOo6vtD4mTwAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAKTMqwPkaBg23RS7/aj347dc2kY4bWt/sHwzREYSrKRqZ5RNBnSvZOQ8m5euMCEuf92bZ8VJEdF653jRiW6VoBA== user key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/mktestdata.sh b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/mktestdata.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06a24e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/mktestdata.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+#/bin/sh
+
+set -xe
+
+rm -f ca_key ca_key.pub
+rm -f user_key user_key.pub
+rm -f *.cert
+
+ssh-keygen -q -f ca_key -t ed25519 -C CA -N ''
+ssh-keygen -q -f user_key -t ed25519 -C "user key" -N ''
+
+sign() {
+	output=$1
+	shift
+	set -xe
+	ssh-keygen -q -s ca_key -I user -n user \
+	    -V 19990101:19991231 -z 1 "$@" user_key.pub
+	mv user_key-cert.pub "$output"
+}
+
+sign all_permit.cert -Opermit-agent-forwarding -Opermit-port-forwarding \
+    -Opermit-pty -Opermit-user-rc -Opermit-X11-forwarding
+sign no_permit.cert -Oclear
+
+sign no_agentfwd.cert -Ono-agent-forwarding
+sign no_portfwd.cert -Ono-port-forwarding
+sign no_pty.cert -Ono-pty
+sign no_user_rc.cert -Ono-user-rc
+sign no_x11fwd.cert -Ono-X11-forwarding
+
+sign only_agentfwd.cert -Oclear -Opermit-agent-forwarding
+sign only_portfwd.cert -Oclear -Opermit-port-forwarding
+sign only_pty.cert -Oclear -Opermit-pty
+sign only_user_rc.cert -Oclear -Opermit-user-rc
+sign only_x11fwd.cert -Oclear -Opermit-X11-forwarding
+
+sign force_command.cert -Oforce-command="foo"
+sign sourceaddr.cert -Osource-address="127.0.0.1/32,::1/128"
+
+# ssh-keygen won't permit generation of certs with invalid source-address
+# values, so we do it as a custom extension.
+sign bad_sourceaddr.cert -Ocritical:source-address=xxxxx
+
+sign unknown_critical.cert -Ocritical:blah=foo
+
+sign host.cert -h
+
+rm -f user_key ca_key user_key.pub ca_key.pub
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_agentfwd.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_agentfwd.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bfa5c2e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_agentfwd.cert
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_permit.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_permit.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..351e138
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_permit.cert
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIGVQtVgp9sD4sc8esIhVWbZaM8d0NxpX3UbEVzTHm9feAAAAICeF4LbtRqwIRhewXifa5PKpbSU9P/K8CzeVYj8J/iBoAAAAAAAAAAEAAAABAAAABHVzZXIAAAAIAAAABHVzZXIAAAAANouDYAAAAAA4a2VgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACAoVYLMLNBOH1SSgemFuDBprzpDXop6ufRSOo6vtD4mTwAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAIKlI0TqqraKjYTjIuKhwoxAV/XnzWRJHq8lNs4aj5yDb84un2xXDF/0vXoLjPgVcLgEbksBKKn0i4whp+xn9Ag== user key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_portfwd.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_portfwd.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9457dc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_portfwd.cert
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_pty.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_pty.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e8154ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_pty.cert
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_user_rc.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_user_rc.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6676a0c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_user_rc.cert
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_x11fwd.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_x11fwd.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0aff9e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/no_x11fwd.cert
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_agentfwd.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_agentfwd.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3cf64b0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_agentfwd.cert
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIOvJ28yW5uvA7yxE3ySuyFvPjcRYKAr03CYr4okGTNIFAAAAICeF4LbtRqwIRhewXifa5PKpbSU9P/K8CzeVYj8J/iBoAAAAAAAAAAEAAAABAAAABHVzZXIAAAAIAAAABHVzZXIAAAAANouDYAAAAAA4a2VgAAAAAAAAAB8AAAAXcGVybWl0LWFnZW50LWZvcndhcmRpbmcAAAAAAAAAAAAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgKFWCzCzQTh9UkoHphbgwaa86Q16Kern0UjqOr7Q+Jk8AAABTAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAQEG2uTgmOSk9dJ0s/Ol1EIERXFP9PF6AauF9t5jBMSthNyvSANSrC/1EIaf4TV5kMYfhZxJXoS0XHQjGndcq2AE= user key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_portfwd.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_portfwd.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb09c3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_portfwd.cert
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIGPoYoExiSyHMyDEvOFgoNZXk5z91u7xq/7357X23TotAAAAICeF4LbtRqwIRhewXifa5PKpbSU9P/K8CzeVYj8J/iBoAAAAAAAAAAEAAAABAAAABHVzZXIAAAAIAAAABHVzZXIAAAAANouDYAAAAAA4a2VgAAAAAAAAAB4AAAAWcGVybWl0LXBvcnQtZm9yd2FyZGluZwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACAoVYLMLNBOH1SSgemFuDBprzpDXop6ufRSOo6vtD4mTwAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAHN3YnwipcbDKVn+PObGSoaT9rwlau+yrPYZ50oetvCKng3RMjGaV+roqlv0vjjLcxE9J4Y0ti+9MXtQ0D7beBA== user key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_pty.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_pty.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..520c89f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_pty.cert
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAILvocWYto5Lg7P46YLbe7U4/b2h9Lr5rWqMZ4Cj4ra7RAAAAICeF4LbtRqwIRhewXifa5PKpbSU9P/K8CzeVYj8J/iBoAAAAAAAAAAEAAAABAAAABHVzZXIAAAAIAAAABHVzZXIAAAAANouDYAAAAAA4a2VgAAAAAAAAABIAAAAKcGVybWl0LXB0eQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACAoVYLMLNBOH1SSgemFuDBprzpDXop6ufRSOo6vtD4mTwAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABASv2xQvp+Y6E8dCf5pzg3MZaan5bl1ToYXNcmQ3ysGrk9Djkcu8m3TytDpF471KmUejxy/iF4xjs9CDpk7h+SBQ== user key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_user_rc.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_user_rc.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb49c35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_user_rc.cert
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIJwsRZQ7kx4A8AQ0q/G/3i6sHM48kr4TxJtTcyy3lZAPAAAAICeF4LbtRqwIRhewXifa5PKpbSU9P/K8CzeVYj8J/iBoAAAAAAAAAAEAAAABAAAABHVzZXIAAAAIAAAABHVzZXIAAAAANouDYAAAAAA4a2VgAAAAAAAAABYAAAAOcGVybWl0LXVzZXItcmMAAAAAAAAAAAAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgKFWCzCzQTh9UkoHphbgwaa86Q16Kern0UjqOr7Q+Jk8AAABTAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAQDhgEXsvoHr21XrxmiZq/sIjWeYapp11XvEVkkTBPVhBnPwtrrUeJbPmGs3gmJkQdv8BYajYpT7TXEX8GvEeLwU= user key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_x11fwd.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_x11fwd.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6715585
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/only_x11fwd.cert
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIDAhZFZBl3eu8Qa8I5BaHCz/mpH8xCjaPusBwo1eJ9OGAAAAICeF4LbtRqwIRhewXifa5PKpbSU9P/K8CzeVYj8J/iBoAAAAAAAAAAEAAAABAAAABHVzZXIAAAAIAAAABHVzZXIAAAAANouDYAAAAAA4a2VgAAAAAAAAAB0AAAAVcGVybWl0LVgxMS1mb3J3YXJkaW5nAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAzAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIChVgsws0E4fVJKB6YW4MGmvOkNeinq59FI6jq+0PiZPAAAAUwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAAEDysfgbhniX/zdA8576rrDJpaO2D7QtQse2KWIM9XmREPkLKeP6FKiXKKFcPQiMyV28rptfvK8bBXAiOvITSUgL user key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/sourceaddr.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/sourceaddr.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0fcf7b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/sourceaddr.cert
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/unknown_critical.cert b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/unknown_critical.cert
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..216960a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/testdata/unknown_critical.cert
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 user key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/authopt/tests.c b/regress/unittests/authopt/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d9e1903
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/authopt/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,578 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.3 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Regress test for keys options functions.
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+static struct sshkey *
+load_key(const char *name)
+{
+	struct sshkey *ret;
+	int r;
+
+	r = sshkey_load_public(test_data_file(name), &ret, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct sshauthopt *
+default_authkey_opts(void)
+{
+	struct sshauthopt *ret = sshauthopt_new();
+
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL);
+	ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
+	ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
+	ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
+	ret->permit_pty_flag = 1;
+	ret->permit_user_rc = 1;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct sshauthopt *
+default_authkey_restrict_opts(void)
+{
+	struct sshauthopt *ret = sshauthopt_new();
+
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL);
+	ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
+	ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
+	ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
+	ret->permit_pty_flag = 0;
+	ret->permit_user_rc = 0;
+	ret->restricted = 1;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static char **
+commasplit(const char *s, size_t *np)
+{
+	char *ocp, *cp, *cp2, **ret = NULL;
+	size_t n;
+
+	ocp = cp = strdup(s);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	for (n = 0; (cp2 = strsep(&cp, ",")) != NULL;) {
+		ret = recallocarray(ret, n, n + 1, sizeof(*ret));
+		ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL);
+		cp2 = strdup(cp2);
+		ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp2, NULL);
+		ret[n++] = cp2;
+	}
+	free(ocp);
+	*np = n;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+compare_opts(const struct sshauthopt *opts,
+    const struct sshauthopt *expected)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(opts, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, opts); /* bozo :) */
+
+#define FLAG_EQ(x) ASSERT_INT_EQ(opts->x, expected->x)
+	FLAG_EQ(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
+	FLAG_EQ(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
+	FLAG_EQ(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
+	FLAG_EQ(permit_pty_flag);
+	FLAG_EQ(permit_user_rc);
+	FLAG_EQ(restricted);
+	FLAG_EQ(cert_authority);
+#undef FLAG_EQ
+
+#define STR_EQ(x) \
+	do { \
+		if (expected->x == NULL) \
+			ASSERT_PTR_EQ(opts->x, expected->x); \
+		else \
+			ASSERT_STRING_EQ(opts->x, expected->x); \
+	} while (0)
+	STR_EQ(cert_principals);
+	STR_EQ(force_command);
+	STR_EQ(required_from_host_cert);
+	STR_EQ(required_from_host_keys);
+#undef STR_EQ
+
+#define ARRAY_EQ(nx, x) \
+	do { \
+		ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(opts->nx, expected->nx); \
+		if (expected->nx == 0) \
+			break; \
+		for (i = 0; i < expected->nx; i++) \
+			ASSERT_STRING_EQ(opts->x[i], expected->x[i]); \
+	} while (0)
+	ARRAY_EQ(nenv, env);
+	ARRAY_EQ(npermitopen, permitopen);
+#undef ARRAY_EQ
+}
+
+static void
+test_authkeys_parse(void)
+{
+	struct sshauthopt *opts, *expected;
+	const char *errstr;
+
+#define FAIL_TEST(label, keywords) \
+	do { \
+		TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse invalid " label); \
+		opts = sshauthopt_parse(keywords, &errstr); \
+		ASSERT_PTR_EQ(opts, NULL); \
+		ASSERT_PTR_NE(errstr, NULL); \
+		TEST_DONE(); \
+	} while (0) 
+#define CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP() \
+	do { \
+		if (errstr != NULL) \
+			ASSERT_STRING_EQ(errstr, ""); \
+		compare_opts(opts, expected); \
+		sshauthopt_free(expected); \
+		sshauthopt_free(opts); \
+	} while (0)
+
+	/* Basic tests */
+	TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse empty");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	opts = sshauthopt_parse("", &errstr);
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse trailing whitespace");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	opts = sshauthopt_parse(" ", &errstr);
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse restrict");
+	expected = default_authkey_restrict_opts();
+	opts = sshauthopt_parse("restrict", &errstr);
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	/* Invalid syntax */
+	FAIL_TEST("trailing comma", "restrict,");
+	FAIL_TEST("bare comma", ",");
+	FAIL_TEST("unknown option", "BLAH");
+	FAIL_TEST("unknown option with trailing comma", "BLAH,");
+	FAIL_TEST("unknown option with trailing whitespace", "BLAH ");
+
+	/* force_tun_device */
+	TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse tunnel explicit");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	expected->force_tun_device = 1;
+	opts = sshauthopt_parse("tunnel=\"1\"", &errstr);
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse tunnel any");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	expected->force_tun_device = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
+	opts = sshauthopt_parse("tunnel=\"any\"", &errstr);
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	FAIL_TEST("tunnel", "tunnel=\"blah\"");
+
+	/* Flag options */
+#define FLAG_TEST(keyword, var, val) \
+	do { \
+		TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse " keyword); \
+		expected = default_authkey_opts(); \
+		expected->var = val; \
+		opts = sshauthopt_parse(keyword, &errstr); \
+		CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
+		expected = default_authkey_restrict_opts(); \
+		expected->var = val; \
+		opts = sshauthopt_parse("restrict,"keyword, &errstr); \
+		CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
+		TEST_DONE(); \
+	} while (0)
+	/* Positive flags */
+	FLAG_TEST("cert-authority", cert_authority, 1);
+	FLAG_TEST("port-forwarding", permit_port_forwarding_flag, 1);
+	FLAG_TEST("agent-forwarding", permit_agent_forwarding_flag, 1);
+	FLAG_TEST("x11-forwarding", permit_x11_forwarding_flag, 1);
+	FLAG_TEST("pty", permit_pty_flag, 1);
+	FLAG_TEST("user-rc", permit_user_rc, 1);
+	/* Negative flags */
+	FLAG_TEST("no-port-forwarding", permit_port_forwarding_flag, 0);
+	FLAG_TEST("no-agent-forwarding", permit_agent_forwarding_flag, 0);
+	FLAG_TEST("no-x11-forwarding", permit_x11_forwarding_flag, 0);
+	FLAG_TEST("no-pty", permit_pty_flag, 0);
+	FLAG_TEST("no-user-rc", permit_user_rc, 0);
+#undef FLAG_TEST
+	FAIL_TEST("no-cert-authority", "no-cert-authority");
+
+	/* String options */
+#define STRING_TEST(keyword, var, val) \
+	do { \
+		TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse " keyword); \
+		expected = default_authkey_opts(); \
+		expected->var = strdup(val); \
+		ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->var, NULL); \
+		opts = sshauthopt_parse(keyword "=" #val, &errstr); \
+		CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
+		expected = default_authkey_restrict_opts(); \
+		expected->var = strdup(val); \
+		ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->var, NULL); \
+		opts = sshauthopt_parse( \
+		    "restrict," keyword "=" #val ",restrict", &errstr); \
+		CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
+		TEST_DONE(); \
+	} while (0)
+	STRING_TEST("command", force_command, "/bin/true");
+	STRING_TEST("principals", cert_principals, "gregor,josef,K");
+	STRING_TEST("from", required_from_host_keys, "127.0.0.0/8");
+#undef STRING_TEST
+	FAIL_TEST("unquoted command", "command=oops");
+	FAIL_TEST("unquoted principals", "principals=estragon");
+	FAIL_TEST("unquoted from", "from=127.0.0.1");
+
+	/* String array option tests */
+#define ARRAY_TEST(label, keywords, var, nvar, val) \
+	do { \
+		TEST_START("sshauthopt_parse " label); \
+		expected = default_authkey_opts(); \
+		expected->var = commasplit(val, &expected->nvar); \
+		ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->var, NULL); \
+		opts = sshauthopt_parse(keywords, &errstr); \
+		CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
+		expected = default_authkey_restrict_opts(); \
+		expected->var = commasplit(val, &expected->nvar); \
+		ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->var, NULL); \
+		opts = sshauthopt_parse( \
+		    "restrict," keywords ",restrict", &errstr); \
+		CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
+		TEST_DONE(); \
+	} while (0)
+	ARRAY_TEST("environment", "environment=\"foo=1\",environment=\"bar=2\"",
+	    env, nenv, "foo=1,bar=2");
+	ARRAY_TEST("environment", "environment=\"foo=1\",environment=\"foo=2\"",
+	    env, nenv, "foo=1");
+	ARRAY_TEST("permitopen", "permitopen=\"foo:123\",permitopen=\"bar:*\"",
+	    permitopen, npermitopen, "foo:123,bar:*");
+#undef ARRAY_TEST
+	FAIL_TEST("environment", "environment=\",=bah\"");
+	FAIL_TEST("permitopen port", "foo:bar");
+	FAIL_TEST("permitopen missing port", "foo:");
+	FAIL_TEST("permitopen missing port specification", "foo");
+	FAIL_TEST("permitopen invalid host", "[:");
+
+#undef CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP
+#undef FAIL_TEST
+}
+
+static void
+test_cert_parse(void)
+{
+	struct sshkey *cert;
+	struct sshauthopt *opts, *expected;
+
+#define CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP() \
+	do { \
+		compare_opts(opts, expected); \
+		sshauthopt_free(expected); \
+		sshauthopt_free(opts); \
+		sshkey_free(cert); \
+	} while (0)
+#define FLAG_TEST(keybase, var) \
+	do { \
+		TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert no_" keybase); \
+		cert = load_key("no_" keybase ".cert"); \
+		expected = default_authkey_opts(); \
+		expected->var = 0; \
+		opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); \
+		CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
+		TEST_DONE(); \
+		TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert only_" keybase); \
+		cert = load_key("only_" keybase ".cert"); \
+		expected = sshauthopt_new(); \
+		ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, NULL); \
+		expected->var = 1; \
+		opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); \
+		CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
+		TEST_DONE(); \
+	} while (0)
+	FLAG_TEST("agentfwd", permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
+	FLAG_TEST("portfwd", permit_port_forwarding_flag);
+	FLAG_TEST("pty", permit_pty_flag);
+	FLAG_TEST("user_rc", permit_user_rc);
+	FLAG_TEST("x11fwd", permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
+#undef FLAG_TEST
+
+	TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert all permitted");
+	cert = load_key("all_permit.cert");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert);
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert nothing permitted");
+	cert = load_key("no_permit.cert");
+	expected = sshauthopt_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, NULL);
+	opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert);
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert force-command");
+	cert = load_key("force_command.cert");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	expected->force_command = strdup("foo");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->force_command, NULL);
+	opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert);
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert source-address");
+	cert = load_key("sourceaddr.cert");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	expected->required_from_host_cert = strdup("127.0.0.1/32,::1/128");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_cert, NULL);
+	opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert);
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+#undef CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP
+
+#define FAIL_TEST(keybase) \
+	do { \
+		TEST_START("sshauthopt_from_cert " keybase); \
+		cert = load_key(keybase ".cert"); \
+		opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); \
+		ASSERT_PTR_EQ(opts, NULL); \
+		sshkey_free(cert); \
+		TEST_DONE(); \
+	} while (0)
+	FAIL_TEST("host");
+	FAIL_TEST("bad_sourceaddr");
+	FAIL_TEST("unknown_critical");
+#undef FAIL_TEST
+}
+
+static void
+test_merge(void)
+{
+	struct sshkey *cert;
+	struct sshauthopt *key_opts, *cert_opts, *merge_opts, *expected;
+	const char *errstr;
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare for a test by making some key and cert options and
+	 * attempting to merge them.
+	 */
+#define PREPARE(label, keyname, keywords) \
+	do { \
+		expected = NULL; \
+		TEST_START("sshauthopt_merge " label); \
+		cert = load_key(keyname ".cert"); \
+		cert_opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(cert); \
+		ASSERT_PTR_NE(cert_opts, NULL); \
+		key_opts = sshauthopt_parse(keywords, &errstr); \
+		if (errstr != NULL) \
+			ASSERT_STRING_EQ(errstr, ""); \
+		ASSERT_PTR_NE(key_opts, NULL); \
+		merge_opts = sshauthopt_merge(key_opts, \
+		    cert_opts, &errstr); \
+	} while (0)
+
+	/* Cleanup stuff allocated by PREPARE() */
+#define CLEANUP() \
+	do { \
+		sshauthopt_free(expected); \
+		sshauthopt_free(merge_opts); \
+		sshauthopt_free(key_opts); \
+		sshauthopt_free(cert_opts); \
+		sshkey_free(cert); \
+	} while (0)
+
+	/* Check the results of PREPARE() against expectation; calls CLEANUP */
+#define CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP() \
+	do { \
+		if (errstr != NULL) \
+			ASSERT_STRING_EQ(errstr, ""); \
+		compare_opts(merge_opts, expected); \
+		CLEANUP(); \
+	} while (0)
+
+	/* Check a single case of merging of flag options */
+#define FLAG_CASE(keybase, label, keyname, keywords, mostly_off, var, val) \
+	do { \
+		PREPARE(keybase " " label, keyname, keywords); \
+		expected = mostly_off ? \
+		    sshauthopt_new() : default_authkey_opts(); \
+		expected->var = val; \
+		ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected, NULL); \
+		CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP(); \
+		TEST_DONE(); \
+	} while (0)
+
+	/*
+	 * Fairly exhaustive exercise of a flag option. Tests
+	 * option both set and clear in certificate, set and clear in
+	 * authorized_keys and set and cleared via restrict keyword.
+	 */
+#define FLAG_TEST(keybase, keyword, var) \
+	do { \
+		FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,yes cert:default,no", \
+		    "no_" keybase, keyword, 0, var, 0); \
+		FLAG_CASE(keybase,"keys:-*,yes cert:default,no", \
+		    "no_" keybase, "restrict," keyword, 1, var, 0); \
+		FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,no cert:default,no", \
+		    "no_" keybase, "no-" keyword, 0, var, 0); \
+		FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:-*,no cert:default,no", \
+		    "no_" keybase, "restrict,no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \
+		\
+		FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,yes cert:-*,yes", \
+		    "only_" keybase, keyword, 1, var, 1); \
+		FLAG_CASE(keybase,"keys:-*,yes cert:-*,yes", \
+		    "only_" keybase, "restrict," keyword, 1, var, 1); \
+		FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,no cert:-*,yes", \
+		    "only_" keybase, "no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \
+		FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:-*,no cert:-*,yes", \
+		    "only_" keybase, "restrict,no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \
+		\
+		FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,yes cert:-*", \
+		    "no_permit", keyword, 1, var, 0); \
+		FLAG_CASE(keybase,"keys:-*,yes cert:-*", \
+		    "no_permit", "restrict," keyword, 1, var, 0); \
+		FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,no cert:-*", \
+		    "no_permit", "no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \
+		FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:-*,no cert:-*", \
+		    "no_permit", "restrict,no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \
+		\
+		FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,yes cert:*", \
+		    "all_permit", keyword, 0, var, 1); \
+		FLAG_CASE(keybase,"keys:-*,yes cert:*", \
+		    "all_permit", "restrict," keyword, 1, var, 1); \
+		FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:default,no cert:*", \
+		    "all_permit", "no-" keyword, 0, var, 0); \
+		FLAG_CASE(keybase, "keys:-*,no cert:*", \
+		    "all_permit", "restrict,no-" keyword, 1, var, 0); \
+		\
+	} while (0)
+	FLAG_TEST("portfwd", "port-forwarding", permit_port_forwarding_flag);
+	FLAG_TEST("agentfwd", "agent-forwarding", permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
+	FLAG_TEST("pty", "pty", permit_pty_flag);
+	FLAG_TEST("user_rc", "user-rc", permit_user_rc);
+	FLAG_TEST("x11fwd", "x11-forwarding", permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
+#undef FLAG_TEST
+
+	PREPARE("source-address both", "sourceaddr", "from=\"127.0.0.1\"");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	expected->required_from_host_cert = strdup("127.0.0.1/32,::1/128");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_cert, NULL);
+	expected->required_from_host_keys = strdup("127.0.0.1");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_keys, NULL);
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	PREPARE("source-address none", "all_permit", "");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	PREPARE("source-address keys", "all_permit", "from=\"127.0.0.1\"");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	expected->required_from_host_keys = strdup("127.0.0.1");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_keys, NULL);
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	PREPARE("source-address cert", "sourceaddr", "");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	expected->required_from_host_cert = strdup("127.0.0.1/32,::1/128");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->required_from_host_cert, NULL);
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	PREPARE("force-command both", "force_command", "command=\"foo\"");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	expected->force_command = strdup("foo");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->force_command, NULL);
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	PREPARE("force-command none", "all_permit", "");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	PREPARE("force-command keys", "all_permit", "command=\"bar\"");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	expected->force_command = strdup("bar");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->force_command, NULL);
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	PREPARE("force-command cert", "force_command", "");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	expected->force_command = strdup("foo");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(expected->force_command, NULL);
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	PREPARE("force-command mismatch", "force_command", "command=\"bar\"");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(merge_opts, NULL);
+	CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	PREPARE("tunnel", "all_permit", "tunnel=\"6\"");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	expected->force_tun_device = 6;
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	PREPARE("permitopen", "all_permit",
+	    "permitopen=\"127.0.0.1:*\",permitopen=\"127.0.0.1:123\"");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	expected->permitopen = commasplit("127.0.0.1:*,127.0.0.1:123",
+	    &expected->npermitopen);
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	PREPARE("environment", "all_permit",
+	    "environment=\"foo=a\",environment=\"bar=b\"");
+	expected = default_authkey_opts();
+	expected->env = commasplit("foo=a,bar=b", &expected->nenv);
+	CHECK_SUCCESS_AND_CLEANUP();
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+	extern char *__progname;
+	LogLevel ll = test_is_verbose() ?
+	    SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
+
+	/* test_cert_parse() are a bit spammy to error() by default... */
+	log_init(__progname, ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+	test_authkeys_parse();
+	test_cert_parse();
+	test_merge();
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/bitmap/Makefile b/regress/unittests/bitmap/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe30acc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/bitmap/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.4 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $
+
+PROG=test_bitmap
+SRCS=tests.c
+
+# From usr.sbin/ssh
+SRCS+=bitmap.c atomicio.c
+
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+	env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG}
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.c b/regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..576b863
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.2 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for bitmap.h bitmap API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "bitmap.h"
+
+#define NTESTS 131
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	struct bitmap *b;
+	BIGNUM *bn;
+	size_t len;
+	int i, j, k, n;
+	u_char bbuf[1024], bnbuf[1024];
+	int r;
+
+	TEST_START("bitmap_new");
+	b = bitmap_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(b, NULL);
+	bn = BN_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(bn, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("bitmap_set_bit / bitmap_test_bit");
+	for (i = -1; i < NTESTS; i++) {
+		for (j = -1; j < NTESTS; j++) {
+			for (k = -1; k < NTESTS; k++) {
+				bitmap_zero(b);
+				BN_clear(bn);
+
+				test_subtest_info("set %d/%d/%d", i, j, k);
+				/* Set bits */
+				if (i >= 0) {
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, i), 0);
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, i), 1);
+				}
+				if (j >= 0) {
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, j), 0);
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, j), 1);
+				}
+				if (k >= 0) {
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, k), 0);
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, k), 1);
+				}
+
+				/* Check perfect match between bitmap and bn */
+				test_subtest_info("match %d/%d/%d", i, j, k);
+				for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) {
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_is_bit_set(bn, n),
+					    bitmap_test_bit(b, n));
+				}
+
+				/* Test length calculations */
+				test_subtest_info("length %d/%d/%d", i, j, k);
+				ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(bn),
+				    (int)bitmap_nbits(b));
+				ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bytes(bn),
+				    (int)bitmap_nbytes(b));
+
+				/* Test serialisation */
+				test_subtest_info("serialise %d/%d/%d",
+				    i, j, k);
+				len = bitmap_nbytes(b);
+				memset(bbuf, 0xfc, sizeof(bbuf));
+				ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_to_string(b, bbuf,
+				    sizeof(bbuf)), 0);
+				for (n = len; n < (int)sizeof(bbuf); n++)
+					ASSERT_U8_EQ(bbuf[n], 0xfc);
+				r = BN_bn2bin(bn, bnbuf);
+				ASSERT_INT_GE(r, 0);
+				ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, (int)len);
+				ASSERT_MEM_EQ(bbuf, bnbuf, len);
+
+				/* Test deserialisation */
+				test_subtest_info("deserialise %d/%d/%d",
+				    i, j, k);
+				bitmap_zero(b);
+				ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_from_string(b, bnbuf,
+				    len), 0);
+				for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) {
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_is_bit_set(bn, n),
+					    bitmap_test_bit(b, n));
+				}
+
+				/* Test clearing bits */
+				test_subtest_info("clear %d/%d/%d",
+				    i, j, k);
+				for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) {
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(bitmap_set_bit(b, n), 0);
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_set_bit(bn, n), 1);
+				}
+				if (i >= 0) {
+					bitmap_clear_bit(b, i);
+					BN_clear_bit(bn, i);
+				}
+				if (j >= 0) {
+					bitmap_clear_bit(b, j);
+					BN_clear_bit(bn, j);
+				}
+				if (k >= 0) {
+					bitmap_clear_bit(b, k);
+					BN_clear_bit(bn, k);
+				}
+				for (n = 0; n < NTESTS; n++) {
+					ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_is_bit_set(bn, n),
+					    bitmap_test_bit(b, n));
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	bitmap_free(b);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+}
+
diff --git a/regress/unittests/conversion/Makefile b/regress/unittests/conversion/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5793c49
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/conversion/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.4 2021/01/09 12:24:30 dtucker Exp $
+
+PROG=test_conversion
+SRCS=tests.c
+
+# From usr.bin/ssh
+SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
+SRCS+=atomicio.c misc.c xmalloc.c log.c uidswap.c cleanup.c fatal.c ssherr.c
+SRCS+=match.c addr.c addrmatch.c
+
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+	env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG}
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/regress/unittests/conversion/tests.c b/regress/unittests/conversion/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b526f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/conversion/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.4 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for conversions
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "misc.h"
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+
+	TEST_START("conversion_convtime");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("0"), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1"), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1S"), 1);
+	/* from the examples in the comment above the function */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("90m"), 5400);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1h30m"), 5400);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("2d"), 172800);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1w"), 604800);
+
+	/* negative time is not allowed */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("-7"), -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("-9d"), -1);
+	
+	/* overflow */
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%llu", (unsigned long long)INT_MAX);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime(buf), INT_MAX);
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%llu", (unsigned long long)INT_MAX + 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime(buf), -1);
+
+	/* overflow with multiplier */
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%lluM", (unsigned long long)INT_MAX/60 + 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime(buf), -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1000000000000000000000w"), -1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..04d9335
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.10 2023/01/15 23:35:10 djm Exp $
+
+PROG=test_hostkeys
+SRCS=tests.c test_iterate.c
+
+# From usr.bin/ssh
+SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
+SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c
+SRCS+=ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
+SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c
+SRCS+=addr.c addrmatch.c bitmap.c hostfile.c
+SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c
+SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-sk.c
+SRCS+=ssh-ed25519-sk.c sk-usbhid.c
+
+SRCS+=digest-openssl.c
+#SRCS+=digest-libc.c
+SRCS+=utf8.c
+
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+	env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/mktestdata.sh b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/mktestdata.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5a46de9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/mktestdata.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.2 2017/04/30 23:33:48 djm Exp $
+
+set -ex
+
+cd testdata
+
+rm -f rsa* dsa* ecdsa* ed25519*
+rm -f known_hosts*
+
+gen_all() {
+	_n=$1
+	_ecdsa_bits=256
+	test "x$_n" = "x1" && _ecdsa_bits=384
+	test "x$_n" = "x2" && _ecdsa_bits=521
+	ssh-keygen -qt rsa -b 1024 -C "RSA #$_n" -N "" -f rsa_$_n
+	ssh-keygen -qt dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA #$_n" -N "" -f dsa_$_n
+	ssh-keygen -qt ecdsa -b $_ecdsa_bits -C "ECDSA #$_n" -N "" -f ecdsa_$_n
+	ssh-keygen -qt ed25519 -C "ED25519 #$_n" -N "" -f ed25519_$_n
+	# Don't need private keys
+	rm -f rsa_$_n dsa_$_n ecdsa_$_n ed25519_$_n
+}
+
+hentries() {
+	_preamble=$1
+	_kspec=$2
+	for k in `ls -1 $_kspec | sort` ; do
+		printf "$_preamble "
+		cat $k
+	done
+	echo
+}
+
+gen_all 1
+gen_all 2
+gen_all 3
+gen_all 4
+gen_all 5
+gen_all 6
+
+# A section of known_hosts with hashed hostnames.
+(
+	hentries "sisyphus.example.com" "*_5.pub"
+	hentries "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1" "*_6.pub"
+) > known_hosts_hash_frag
+ssh-keygen -Hf known_hosts_hash_frag
+rm -f known_hosts_hash_frag.old
+
+# Populated known_hosts, including comments, hashed names and invalid lines
+(
+	echo "# Plain host keys, plain host names"
+	hentries "sisyphus.example.com" "*_1.pub"
+
+	echo "# Plain host keys, hostnames + addresses"
+	hentries "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1" "*_2.pub"
+
+	echo "# Some hosts with wildcard names / IPs"
+	hentries "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*" "*_3.pub"
+
+	echo "# Hashed hostname and address entries"
+	cat known_hosts_hash_frag
+	rm -f known_hosts_hash_frag
+	echo
+
+	echo "# Revoked and CA keys"
+	printf "@revoked sisyphus.example.com " ; cat ed25519_4.pub
+	printf "@cert-authority prometheus.example.com " ; cat ecdsa_4.pub
+	printf "@cert-authority *.example.com " ; cat dsa_4.pub
+
+	printf "\n"
+	echo "# Some invalid lines"
+	# Invalid marker
+	printf "@what sisyphus.example.com " ; cat dsa_1.pub
+	# Key missing
+	echo "sisyphus.example.com      "
+	# Key blob missing
+	echo "prometheus.example.com ssh-ed25519 "
+	# Key blob truncated
+	echo "sisyphus.example.com ssh-dsa AAAATgAAAAdz"
+	# Invalid type
+	echo "sisyphus.example.com ssh-XXX AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg=="
+	# Type mismatch with blob
+	echo "prometheus.example.com ssh-rsa AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg=="
+) > known_hosts
+
+echo OK
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..84f26b5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1117 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_iterate.c,v 1.8 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for hostfile.h hostkeys_foreach()
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+
+struct expected {
+	const char *key_file;		/* Path for key, NULL for none */
+	int no_parse_status;		/* Expected status w/o key parsing */
+	int no_parse_keytype;		/* Expected keytype w/o key parsing */
+	int match_host_p;		/* Match 'prometheus.example.com' */
+	int match_host_s;		/* Match 'sisyphus.example.com' */
+	int match_ipv4;			/* Match '192.0.2.1' */
+	int match_ipv6;			/* Match '2001:db8::1' */
+	int match_flags;		/* Expected flags from match */
+	struct hostkey_foreach_line l;	/* Expected line contents */
+};
+
+struct cbctx {
+	const struct expected *expected;
+	size_t nexpected;
+	size_t i;
+	int flags;
+	int match_host_p;
+	int match_host_s;
+	int match_ipv4;
+	int match_ipv6;
+};
+
+/*
+ * hostkeys_foreach() iterator callback that verifies the line passed
+ * against an array of expected entries.
+ */
+static int
+check(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+	struct cbctx *ctx = (struct cbctx *)_ctx;
+	const struct expected *expected;
+	int parse_key = (ctx->flags & HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY) != 0;
+	const int matching = (ctx->flags & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0;
+	u_int expected_status, expected_match;
+	int expected_keytype, skip = 0;
+
+	test_subtest_info("entry %zu/%zu, file line %ld",
+	    ctx->i + 1, ctx->nexpected, l->linenum);
+
+	for (;;) {
+		ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(ctx->i, ctx->nexpected);
+		expected = ctx->expected + ctx->i++;
+		/* If we are matching host/IP then skip entries that don't */
+		if (!matching)
+			break;
+		if (ctx->match_host_p && expected->match_host_p)
+			break;
+		if (ctx->match_host_s && expected->match_host_s)
+			break;
+		if (ctx->match_ipv4 && expected->match_ipv4)
+			break;
+		if (ctx->match_ipv6 && expected->match_ipv6)
+			break;
+	}
+	expected_status = (parse_key || expected->no_parse_status < 0) ?
+	    expected->l.status : (u_int)expected->no_parse_status;
+	expected_match = expected->l.match;
+#define UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(x) do { \
+		if (ctx->x && expected->x) { \
+			expected_match |= expected->x; \
+			if (expected_status == HKF_STATUS_OK) \
+				expected_status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED; \
+		} \
+	} while (0)
+	expected_keytype = (parse_key || expected->no_parse_keytype < 0) ?
+	    expected->l.keytype : expected->no_parse_keytype;
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	if (expected->l.keytype == KEY_ECDSA ||
+	    expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_ECDSA)
+		skip = 1;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+	if (expected->l.keytype == KEY_DSA ||
+	    expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_DSA ||
+	    expected->l.keytype == KEY_RSA ||
+	    expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_RSA ||
+	    expected->l.keytype == KEY_ECDSA ||
+	    expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_ECDSA)
+		skip = 1;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	if (skip) {
+		expected_status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID;
+		expected_keytype = KEY_UNSPEC;
+		parse_key = 0;
+	}
+	UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_host_p);
+	UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_host_s);
+	UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_ipv4);
+	UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_ipv6);
+
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(l->path, NULL); /* Don't care about path */
+	ASSERT_LONG_LONG_EQ(l->linenum, expected->l.linenum);
+	ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(l->status, expected_status);
+	ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(l->match, expected_match);
+	/* Not all test entries contain fulltext */
+	if (expected->l.line != NULL)
+		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->line, expected->l.line);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(l->marker, expected->l.marker);
+	/* XXX we skip hashed hostnames for now; implement checking */
+	if (expected->l.hosts != NULL)
+		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->hosts, expected->l.hosts);
+	/* Not all test entries contain raw keys */
+	if (expected->l.rawkey != NULL)
+		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->rawkey, expected->l.rawkey);
+	/* XXX synthesise raw key for cases lacking and compare */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(l->keytype, expected_keytype);
+	if (parse_key) {
+		if (expected->l.key == NULL)
+			ASSERT_PTR_EQ(l->key, NULL);
+		if (expected->l.key != NULL) {
+			ASSERT_PTR_NE(l->key, NULL);
+			ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(l->key, expected->l.key), 1);
+		}
+	}
+	if (parse_key && !(l->comment == NULL && expected->l.comment == NULL))
+		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->comment, expected->l.comment);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Loads public keys for a set of expected results */
+static void
+prepare_expected(struct expected *expected, size_t n)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		if (expected[i].key_file == NULL)
+			continue;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+		if (expected[i].l.keytype == KEY_ECDSA)
+			continue;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
+		switch (expected[i].l.keytype) {
+		case KEY_RSA:
+		case KEY_DSA:
+		case KEY_ECDSA:
+			continue;
+		}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(
+		    test_data_file(expected[i].key_file), &expected[i].l.key,
+		    NULL), 0);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+cleanup_expected(struct expected *expected, size_t n)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		sshkey_free(expected[i].l.key);
+		expected[i].l.key = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+struct expected expected_full[] = {
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,				/* path, don't care */
+		1,				/* line number */
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,		/* status */
+		0,				/* match flags */
+		"# Plain host keys, plain host names", /* full line, optional */
+		MRK_NONE,			/* marker (CA / revoked) */
+		NULL,				/* hosts text */
+		NULL,				/* raw key, optional */
+		KEY_UNSPEC,			/* key type */
+		NULL,				/* deserialised key */
+		NULL,				/* comment */
+		0,				/* note */
+	} },
+	{ "dsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		2,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_DSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"DSA #1",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "ecdsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		3,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ECDSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ECDSA #1",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "ed25519_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		4,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ED25519,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ED25519 #1",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "rsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		5,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA #1",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		6,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		7,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"# Plain host keys, hostnames + addresses",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "dsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		8,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_DSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"DSA #2",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "ecdsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		9,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ECDSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ECDSA #2",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "ed25519_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		10,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ED25519,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ED25519 #2",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "rsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		11,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA #2",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		12,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		13,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"# Some hosts with wildcard names / IPs",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "dsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		14,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_DSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"DSA #3",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "ecdsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		15,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ECDSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ECDSA #3",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "ed25519_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		16,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ED25519,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ED25519 #3",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "rsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		17,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA #3",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		18,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		19,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"# Hashed hostname and address entries",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "dsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		20,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_DSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"DSA #5",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "ecdsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		21,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ECDSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ECDSA #5",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "ed25519_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		22,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ED25519,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ED25519 #5",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "rsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		23,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA #5",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		24,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+	/*
+	 * The next series have each key listed multiple times, as the
+	 * hostname and addresses in the pre-hashed known_hosts are split
+	 * to separate lines.
+	 */
+	{ "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		25,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_DSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"DSA #6",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		26,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_DSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"DSA #6",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		27,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_DSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"DSA #6",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		28,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ECDSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ECDSA #6",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		29,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ECDSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ECDSA #6",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		30,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ECDSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ECDSA #6",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		31,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ED25519,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ED25519 #6",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		32,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ED25519,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ED25519 #6",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		33,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ED25519,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ED25519 #6",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		34,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA #6",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		35,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA #6",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		36,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_RSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"RSA #6",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		37,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		38,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		39,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"# Revoked and CA keys",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "ed25519_4.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		40,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_REVOKE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ED25519,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ED25519 #4",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "ecdsa_4.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		41,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_CA,
+		"prometheus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_ECDSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"ECDSA #4",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ "dsa_4.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		42,
+		HKF_STATUS_OK,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_CA,
+		"*.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_DSA,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		"DSA #4",
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		43,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		44,
+		HKF_STATUS_COMMENT,
+		0,
+		"# Some invalid lines",
+		MRK_NONE,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		45,
+		HKF_STATUS_INVALID,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_ERROR,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		46,
+		HKF_STATUS_INVALID,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		47,
+		HKF_STATUS_INVALID,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"prometheus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		48,
+		HKF_STATUS_INVALID,	/* Would be ok if key not parsed */
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		49,
+		HKF_STATUS_INVALID,
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"sisyphus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+	{ NULL, HKF_STATUS_OK, KEY_RSA, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, {
+		NULL,
+		50,
+		HKF_STATUS_INVALID,	/* Would be ok if key not parsed */
+		0,
+		NULL,
+		MRK_NONE,
+		"prometheus.example.com",
+		NULL,
+		KEY_UNSPEC,
+		NULL,	/* filled at runtime */
+		NULL,
+		0,
+	} },
+};
+
+void test_iterate(void);
+
+void
+test_iterate(void)
+{
+	struct cbctx ctx;
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate all with key parse");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, NULL, NULL, ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate all without key parse");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = 0;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, NULL, NULL, ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 1");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = 0;
+	ctx.match_host_p = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = 0;
+	ctx.match_host_s = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
+	ctx.match_host_p = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 2");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
+	ctx.match_host_s = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host missing");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = 0;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "actaeon.example.org", NULL, ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host missing");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "actaeon.example.org", NULL, ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify IPv4");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = 0;
+	ctx.match_ipv4 = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify IPv6");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = 0;
+	ctx.match_ipv6 = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "2001:db8::1",
+	    ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match IPv4");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
+	ctx.match_ipv4 = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match IPv6");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
+	ctx.match_ipv6 = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "2001:db8::1",
+	    ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify addr missing");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = 0;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.168.0.1",
+	    ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match addr missing");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "::1", ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2 and IPv4");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = 0;
+	ctx.match_host_s = 1;
+	ctx.match_ipv4 = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1 and IPv6");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH;
+	ctx.match_host_p = 1;
+	ctx.match_ipv6 = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com",
+	    "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2 and IPv4 w/ key parse");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY;
+	ctx.match_host_s = 1;
+	ctx.match_ipv4 = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1 and IPv6 w/ key parse");
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.expected = expected_full;
+	ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full);
+	ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH|HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY;
+	ctx.match_host_p = 1;
+	ctx.match_ipv6 = 1;
+	prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"),
+	    check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com",
+	    "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags, 0), 0);
+	cleanup_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
+
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_1.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..56e1e37
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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 DSA #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_2.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..394e0bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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 DSA #2
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_3.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_3.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e506ea4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_3.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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 DSA #3
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_4.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_4.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8552c38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_4.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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 DSA #4
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_5.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_5.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..149e1ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_5.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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 DSA #5
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_6.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_6.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..edbb976
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/dsa_6.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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 DSA #6
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..16a535b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAzODQAAAAIbmlzdHAzODQAAABhBF6yQEtD9yBw9gmDRf477WBBzvWhAa0ioBI3nbA4emKykj0RbuQd5C4XdQAEOZGzE7v//FcCjwB2wi+JH5eKkxCtN6CjohDASZ1huoIV2UVyYIicZJEEOg1IWjjphvaxtw== ECDSA #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d2bad11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBAB8qVcXwgBM92NCmReQlPrZAoui4Bz/mW0VUBFOpHXXW1n+15b/Y7Pc6UBd/ITTZmaBciXY+PWaSBGdwc5GdqGdLgFyJ/QAGrFMPNpVutm/82gNQzlxpNwjbMcKyiZEXzSgnjS6DzMQ0WuSMdzIBXq8OW/Kafxg4ZkU6YqALUXxlQMZuQ== ECDSA #2
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_3.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_3.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e3ea925
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_3.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBIb3BhJZk+vUQPg5TQc1koIzuGqloCq7wjr9LjlhG24IBeiFHLsdWw74HDlH4DrOmlxToVYk2lTdnjARleRByjk= ECDSA #3
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_4.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_4.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2d616f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_4.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBHZd0OXHIWwK3xnjAdMZ1tojxWycdu38pORO/UX5cqsKMgGCKQVBWWO3TFk1ePkGIE9VMWT1hCGqWRRwYlH+dSE= ECDSA #4
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_5.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_5.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3df9b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_5.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBPIudcagzq4QPtP1jkpje34+0POLB0jwT64hqrbCqhTH2T800KDZ0h2vwlJYa3OP3Oqru9AB5pnuHsKw7mAhUGY= ECDSA #5
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_6.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_6.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..139f5a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ecdsa_6.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_1.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b12efe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIK9ks7jkua5YWIwByRnnnc6UPJQWI75O0e/UJdPYU1JI ED25519 #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_2.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78e262b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIIBp6PVW0z2o9C4Ukv/JOgmK7QMFe1pD1s3ADFF7IQob ED25519 #2
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_3.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_3.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..64e5f12
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_3.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBlYfExtYZAPqYvYdrlpGlSWhh/XNHcH3v3c2JzsVNbB ED25519 #3
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_4.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_4.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..47b6724
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_4.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDFP8L9REfN/iYy1KIRtFqSCn3V2+vOCpoZYENFGLdOF ED25519 #4
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_5.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_5.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72ccae6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_5.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINf63qSV8rD57N+digID8t28WVhd3Yf2K2UhaoG8TsWQ ED25519 #5
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_6.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_6.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f71973
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/ed25519_6.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/known_hosts b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/known_hosts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4446f45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/known_hosts
@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+# Plain host keys, plain host names
+sisyphus.example.com ssh-dss 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 DSA #1
+sisyphus.example.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAzODQAAAAIbmlzdHAzODQAAABhBF6yQEtD9yBw9gmDRf477WBBzvWhAa0ioBI3nbA4emKykj0RbuQd5C4XdQAEOZGzE7v//FcCjwB2wi+JH5eKkxCtN6CjohDASZ1huoIV2UVyYIicZJEEOg1IWjjphvaxtw== ECDSA #1
+sisyphus.example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIK9ks7jkua5YWIwByRnnnc6UPJQWI75O0e/UJdPYU1JI ED25519 #1
+sisyphus.example.com ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDg4hB4vAZHJ0PVRiJajOv/GlytFWNpv5/9xgB9+5BIbvp8LOrFZ5D9K0Gsmwpd4G4rfaAz8j896DhMArg0vtkilIPPGt/6VzWMERgvaIQPJ/IE99X3+fjcAG56oAWwy29JX10lQMzBPU6XJIaN/zqpkb6qUBiAHBdLpxrFBBU0/w== RSA #1
+
+# Plain host keys, hostnames + addresses
+prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ssh-dss 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 DSA #2
+prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBAB8qVcXwgBM92NCmReQlPrZAoui4Bz/mW0VUBFOpHXXW1n+15b/Y7Pc6UBd/ITTZmaBciXY+PWaSBGdwc5GdqGdLgFyJ/QAGrFMPNpVutm/82gNQzlxpNwjbMcKyiZEXzSgnjS6DzMQ0WuSMdzIBXq8OW/Kafxg4ZkU6YqALUXxlQMZuQ== ECDSA #2
+prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIIBp6PVW0z2o9C4Ukv/JOgmK7QMFe1pD1s3ADFF7IQob ED25519 #2
+prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1 ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDmbUhNabB5AmBDX6GNHZ3lbn7pRxqfpW+f53QqNGlK0sLV+0gkMIrOfUp1kdE2ZLE6tfzdicatj/RlH6/wuo4yyYb+Pyx3G0vxdmAIiA4aANq38XweDucBC0TZkRWVHK+Gs5V/uV0z7N0axJvkkJujMLvST3CRiiWwlficBc6yVQ== RSA #2
+
+# Some hosts with wildcard names / IPs
+*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ssh-dss 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 DSA #3
+*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBIb3BhJZk+vUQPg5TQc1koIzuGqloCq7wjr9LjlhG24IBeiFHLsdWw74HDlH4DrOmlxToVYk2lTdnjARleRByjk= ECDSA #3
+*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIBlYfExtYZAPqYvYdrlpGlSWhh/XNHcH3v3c2JzsVNbB ED25519 #3
+*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:* ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDX8F93W3SH4ZSus4XUQ2cw9dqcuyUETTlKEeGv3zlknV3YCoe2Mp04naDhiuwj8sOsytrZSESzLY1ZEyzrjxE6ZFVv8NKgck/AbRjcwlRFOcx9oKUxOrXRa0IoXlTq0kyjKCJfaHBKnGitZThknCPTbVmpATkm5xx6J0WEDozfoQ== RSA #3
+
+# Hashed hostname and address entries
+|1|z3xOIdT5ue3Vuf3MzT67kaioqjw=|GZhhe5uwDOBQrC9N4cCjpbLpSn4= ssh-dss AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBALrFy7w5ihlaOG+qR+6fj+vm5EQaO3qwxgACLcgH+VfShuOG4mkx8qFJmf+OZ3fh5iKngjNZfKtfcqI7zHWdk6378TQfQC52/kbZukjNXOLCpyNkogahcjA00onIoTK1RUDuMW28edAHwPFbpttXDTaqis+8JPMY8hZwsZGENCzTAAAAFQD6+It5vozwGgaN9ROYPMlByhi6jwAAAIBz2mcAC694vNzz9b6614gkX9d9E99PzJYfU1MPkXDziKg7MrjBw7Opd5y1jL09S3iL6lSTlHkKwVKvQ3pOwWRwXXRrKVus4I0STveoApm526jmp6mY0YEtqR98vMJ0v97h1ydt8FikKlihefCsnXVicb8887PXs2Y8C6GuFT3tfQAAAIBbmHtV5tPcrMRDkULhaQ/Whap2VKvT2DUhIHA7lx6oy/KpkltOpxDZOIGUHKqffGbiR7Jh01/y090AY5L2eCf0S2Ytx93+eADwVVpJbFJo6zSwfeey2Gm6L2oA+rCz9zTdmtZoekpD3/RAOQjnJIAPwbs7mXwabZTw4xRtiYIRrw== DSA #5
+|1|B7t/AYabn8zgwU47Cb4A/Nqt3eI=|arQPZyRphkzisr7w6wwikvhaOyE= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBPIudcagzq4QPtP1jkpje34+0POLB0jwT64hqrbCqhTH2T800KDZ0h2vwlJYa3OP3Oqru9AB5pnuHsKw7mAhUGY= ECDSA #5
+|1|JR81WxEocTP5d7goIRkl8fHBbno=|l6sj6FOsoXxgEZMzn/BnOfPKN68= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAINf63qSV8rD57N+digID8t28WVhd3Yf2K2UhaoG8TsWQ ED25519 #5
+|1|W7x4zY6KtTZJgsopyOusJqvVPag=|QauLt7hKezBZFZi2i4Xopho7Nsk= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQC/C15Q4sfnk7BZff1er8bscay+5s51oD4eWArlHWMK/ZfYeeTAccTy+7B7Jv+MS4nKCpflrvJI2RQz4kS8vF0ATdBbi4jeWefStlHNg0HLhnCY7NAfDIlRdaN9lm3Pqm2vmr+CkqwcJaSpycDg8nPN9yNAuD6pv7NDuUnECezojQ== RSA #5
+
+|1|mxnU8luzqWLvfVi5qBm5xVIyCRM=|9Epopft7LBd80Bf6RmWPIpwa8yU= ssh-dss AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBAIutigAse65TCW6hHDOEGXenE9L4L0talHbs65hj3UUNtWflKdQeXLofqXgW8AwaDKmnuRPrxRoxVNXj84n45wtBEdt4ztmdAZteAbXSnHqpcxME3jDxh3EtxzGPXLs+RUmKPVguraSgo7W2oN7KFx6VM+AcAtxANSTlvDid3s47AAAAFQCd9Q3kkHSLWe77sW0eRaayI45ovwAAAIAw6srGF6xvFasI44Y3r9JJ2K+3ezozl3ldL3p2+p2HG3iWafC4SdV8pB6ZIxKlYAywiiFb3LzH/JweGFq1jtoFDRM3MlYORBevydU4zPz7b5QLDVB0sY4evYtWmg2BFJvoWRfhLnlZVW7h5N8v4fNIwdVmVsw4Ljes7iF2HRGhHgAAAIBDFT3fww2Oby1xUA6G9pDAcVikrQFqp1sJRylNTUyeyQ37SNAGzYxwHJFgQr8gZLdRQ1UW+idYpqVbVNcYFMOiw/zSqK2OfVwPZ9U+TTKdc992ChSup6vJEKM/ZVIyDWDbJr7igQ4ahy7jo9mFvm8ljN926EnspQzCvs0Dxk6tHA== DSA #6
+|1|klvLmvh2vCpkNMDEjVvrE8SJWTg=|e/dqEEBLnbgqmwEesl4cDRu/7TM= ssh-dss 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 DSA #6
+|1|wsk3ddB3UjuxEsoeNCeZjZ6NvZs=|O3O/q2Z/u7DrxoTiIq6kzCevQT0= ssh-dss AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBAIutigAse65TCW6hHDOEGXenE9L4L0talHbs65hj3UUNtWflKdQeXLofqXgW8AwaDKmnuRPrxRoxVNXj84n45wtBEdt4ztmdAZteAbXSnHqpcxME3jDxh3EtxzGPXLs+RUmKPVguraSgo7W2oN7KFx6VM+AcAtxANSTlvDid3s47AAAAFQCd9Q3kkHSLWe77sW0eRaayI45ovwAAAIAw6srGF6xvFasI44Y3r9JJ2K+3ezozl3ldL3p2+p2HG3iWafC4SdV8pB6ZIxKlYAywiiFb3LzH/JweGFq1jtoFDRM3MlYORBevydU4zPz7b5QLDVB0sY4evYtWmg2BFJvoWRfhLnlZVW7h5N8v4fNIwdVmVsw4Ljes7iF2HRGhHgAAAIBDFT3fww2Oby1xUA6G9pDAcVikrQFqp1sJRylNTUyeyQ37SNAGzYxwHJFgQr8gZLdRQ1UW+idYpqVbVNcYFMOiw/zSqK2OfVwPZ9U+TTKdc992ChSup6vJEKM/ZVIyDWDbJr7igQ4ahy7jo9mFvm8ljN926EnspQzCvs0Dxk6tHA== DSA #6
+|1|B8epmkLSni+vGZDijr/EwxeR2k4=|7ct8yzNOVJhKm3ZD2w0XIT7df8E= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6
+|1|JojD885UhYhbCu571rgyM/5PpYU=|BJaU2aE1FebQZy3B5tzTDRWFRG0= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6
+|1|5t7UDHDybVrDZVQPCpwdnr6nk4k=|EqJ73W/veIL3H2x+YWHcJxI5ETA= ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBK1wRLyKtvK3Mmhd0XPkKwW4ev1KBVf8J4aG8lESq1TsaqqfOXYGyxMq5pN8fCGiD5UPOqyTYz/ZNzClRhJRHao= ECDSA #6
+|1|OCcBfGc/b9+ip+W6Gp+3ftdluO4=|VbrKUdzOOtIBOOmEE+jlK4SD3Xc= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6
+|1|9fLN0YdP+BJ25lKuKvYuOdUo93w=|vZyr0rOiX01hv5XbghhHMW+Zb3U= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6
+|1|nc9RoaaQ0s5jdPxwlUmluGHU3uk=|un6OsJajokKQ3MgyS9mfDNeyP6U= ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPLW0ZwCkRQldpLa4I5BpwGa/om+WE6OgC8jdVqakt0Z ED25519 #6
+|1|rsHB6juT9q6GOY91qOeOwL6TSJE=|ps/vXF9Izuues5PbOn887Gw/2Dg= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6
+|1|BsckdLH2aRyWQooRmv+Yo3t4dKg=|Lf3tJc5Iyx0KxNwAG89FsImsfEE= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6
+|1|plqkBA4hq7UATyd5+/Xl+zL7ghw=|stacofaUed46666mfqxp9gJFjt4= ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6
+
+
+# Revoked and CA keys
+@revoked sisyphus.example.com ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDFP8L9REfN/iYy1KIRtFqSCn3V2+vOCpoZYENFGLdOF ED25519 #4
+@cert-authority prometheus.example.com ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBHZd0OXHIWwK3xnjAdMZ1tojxWycdu38pORO/UX5cqsKMgGCKQVBWWO3TFk1ePkGIE9VMWT1hCGqWRRwYlH+dSE= ECDSA #4
+@cert-authority *.example.com ssh-dss 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 DSA #4
+
+# Some invalid lines
+@what sisyphus.example.com ssh-dss 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 DSA #1
+sisyphus.example.com      
+prometheus.example.com ssh-ed25519 
+sisyphus.example.com ssh-dsa AAAATgAAAAdz
+sisyphus.example.com ssh-XXX AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg==
+prometheus.example.com ssh-rsa AAAATgAAAAdzc2gtWFhYAAAAP0ZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRkZVQ0tPRkZGVUNLT0ZGRlVDS09GRg==
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_1.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..772ce9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1024 65537 153895431603677073925890314548566704948446776958334195280085080329934839226701954473292358821568047724356487621573742372399387931887004184139835510820577359977148363519970774657801798872789118894962853659233045778161859413980935372685480527355016624825696983269800574755126132814333241868538220824608980319407 RSA1 #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_2.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78794b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1024 65537 135970715082947442639683969597180728933388298633245835186618852623800675939308729462220235058285909679252157995530180587329132927339620517781785310829060832352381015614725360278571924286986474946772141568893116432268565829418506866604294073334978275702221949783314402806080929601995102334442541344606109853641 RSA1 #2
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_3.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_3.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0c035fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_3.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1024 65537 125895605498029643697051635076028105429632810811904702876152645261610759866299221305725069141163240694267669117205342283569102183636228981857946763978553664895308762890072813014496700601576921921752482059207749978374872713540759920335553799711267170948655579130584031555334229966603000896364091459595522912269 RSA1 #3
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_4.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_4.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0006442
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_4.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1024 65537 174143366122697048196335388217056770310345753698079464367148030836533360510864881734142526411160017107552815906024399248049666856133771656680462456979369587903909343046704480897527203474513676654933090991684252819423129896444427656841613263783484827101210734799449281639493127615902427443211183258155381810593 RSA1 #4
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_5.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_5.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb53c26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_5.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1024 65537 127931411493401587586867047972295564331543694182352197506125410692673654572057908999642645524647232712160516076508316152810117209181150078352725299319149726341058893406440426414316276977768958023952319602422835879783057966985348561111880658922724668687074412548487722084792283453716871417610020757212399252171 RSA1 #5
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_6.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_6.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..85d6576
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa1_6.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1024 65537 140883028436203600354693376066567741282115117509696517282419557936340193768851493584179972504103033755515036493433917203732876685813283050574208967197963391667532902202382549275760997891673884333346000558018002659506756213191532156293935482587878596032743105911487673274674568768638010598205190227631909167257 RSA1 #6
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_1.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2b87885
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDg4hB4vAZHJ0PVRiJajOv/GlytFWNpv5/9xgB9+5BIbvp8LOrFZ5D9K0Gsmwpd4G4rfaAz8j896DhMArg0vtkilIPPGt/6VzWMERgvaIQPJ/IE99X3+fjcAG56oAWwy29JX10lQMzBPU6XJIaN/zqpkb6qUBiAHBdLpxrFBBU0/w== RSA #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_2.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33f1fd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDmbUhNabB5AmBDX6GNHZ3lbn7pRxqfpW+f53QqNGlK0sLV+0gkMIrOfUp1kdE2ZLE6tfzdicatj/RlH6/wuo4yyYb+Pyx3G0vxdmAIiA4aANq38XweDucBC0TZkRWVHK+Gs5V/uV0z7N0axJvkkJujMLvST3CRiiWwlficBc6yVQ== RSA #2
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_3.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_3.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c2f6b20
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_3.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDX8F93W3SH4ZSus4XUQ2cw9dqcuyUETTlKEeGv3zlknV3YCoe2Mp04naDhiuwj8sOsytrZSESzLY1ZEyzrjxE6ZFVv8NKgck/AbRjcwlRFOcx9oKUxOrXRa0IoXlTq0kyjKCJfaHBKnGitZThknCPTbVmpATkm5xx6J0WEDozfoQ== RSA #3
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_4.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_4.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..35545a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_4.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDI8AdjBAozcdRnIikVlt69iyDHKyrtxmpdkbRy9bWaL86OH+PTmLUk5e+T/ufiakpeE2pm0hkE3e4Sh/FsY+rsQdRoraWVNFfchcMeVlKvuy5RZN0ElvmaQebOJUeNeBn2LLw8aL8bJ4CP/bQRKrmrSSqjz3+4H9YNVyyk1OGBPQ== RSA #4
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_5.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_5.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..befbaa7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_5.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQC/C15Q4sfnk7BZff1er8bscay+5s51oD4eWArlHWMK/ZfYeeTAccTy+7B7Jv+MS4nKCpflrvJI2RQz4kS8vF0ATdBbi4jeWefStlHNg0HLhnCY7NAfDIlRdaN9lm3Pqm2vmr+CkqwcJaSpycDg8nPN9yNAuD6pv7NDuUnECezojQ== RSA #5
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_6.pub b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_6.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..393e116
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/testdata/rsa_6.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQClu/3I6GG1Ai89Imnw0vXmWJ2OW0ftQwRrsbIAD0qzLFYpkJ76QWnzpCehvK9u0L5hcw7z2Y6mRLcSBsqONc+HVU73Qi7M4zHRvtjprPs3SOyLpf0J9sL1WiHBDwg2P0miHMCdqHDd5nVXkJB2d4eeecmgezGLa29NOHZjbza5yw== RSA #6
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.c b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..92c7646
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2015/02/16 22:18:34 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for known_hosts-related API.
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+void tests(void);
+void test_iterate(void); /* test_iterate.c */
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+	test_iterate();
+}
+
diff --git a/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile b/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..981affe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.14 2023/02/02 12:12:52 djm Exp $
+
+PROG=test_kex
+SRCS=tests.c test_kex.c test_proposal.c
+
+# From usr.bin/ssh
+SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
+SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c
+SRCS+=ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
+SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c
+SRCS+=addr.c addrmatch.c bitmap.c packet.c dispatch.c canohost.c ssh_api.c
+SRCS+=compat.c ed25519.c hash.c
+SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-sk.c
+SRCS+=ssh-ed25519-sk.c sk-usbhid.c
+
+SRCS+=	kex.c
+SRCS+=	dh.c
+SRCS+=	kexdh.c
+SRCS+=	kexecdh.c
+SRCS+=	kexgex.c
+SRCS+=	kexgexc.c
+SRCS+=	kexgexs.c
+SRCS+=	kexc25519.c
+SRCS+=	smult_curve25519_ref.c
+SRCS+=	kexgen.c
+SRCS+=	kexsntrup761x25519.c
+SRCS+=	sntrup761.c
+SRCS+=	utf8.c
+
+SRCS+=digest-openssl.c
+#SRCS+=digest-libc.c
+
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+	env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG}
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
+
+LDADD+=-lz
diff --git a/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c26761e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
@@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_kex.c,v 1.6 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test KEX
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh_api.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+
+void kex_tests(void);
+static int do_debug = 0;
+
+static int
+do_send_and_receive(struct ssh *from, struct ssh *to)
+{
+	u_char type;
+	size_t len;
+	const u_char *buf;
+	int r;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		if ((r = ssh_packet_next(from, &type)) != 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "ssh_packet_next: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
+			return r;
+		}
+		if (type != 0)
+			return 0;
+		buf = ssh_output_ptr(from, &len);
+		if (do_debug)
+			printf("%zu", len);
+		if (len == 0)
+			return 0;
+		if ((r = ssh_output_consume(from, len)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = ssh_input_append(to, buf, len)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+run_kex(struct ssh *client, struct ssh *server)
+{
+	int r = 0;
+
+	while (!server->kex->done || !client->kex->done) {
+		if (do_debug)
+			printf(" S:");
+		if ((r = do_send_and_receive(server, client)))
+			break;
+		if (do_debug)
+			printf(" C:");
+		if ((r = do_send_and_receive(client, server)))
+			break;
+	}
+	if (do_debug)
+		printf("done: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(server->kex->done, 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(client->kex->done, 1);
+}
+
+static void
+do_kex_with_key(char *kex, int keytype, int bits)
+{
+	struct ssh *client = NULL, *server = NULL, *server2 = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *private, *public;
+	struct sshbuf *state;
+	struct kex_params kex_params;
+	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+	char *keyname = NULL;
+
+	TEST_START("sshkey_generate");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(keytype, bits, &private), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshkey_from_private");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(private, &public), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ssh_init");
+	memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal));
+	if (kex != NULL)
+		kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = kex;
+	keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private));
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
+	kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server, 1, &kex_params), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(client, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(server, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ssh_add_hostkey");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server, private), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(client, public), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("kex");
+	run_kex(client, server);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("rekeying client");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0);
+	run_kex(client, server);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("rekeying server");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server), 0);
+	run_kex(client, server);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ssh_packet_get_state");
+	state = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(state, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_get_state(server, state), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_GE(sshbuf_len(state), 1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ssh_packet_set_state");
+	server2 = NULL;
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server2, 1, NULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server2, private), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_set_state(server2, state), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_len(state), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(state);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2->kex, NULL);
+	/* XXX we need to set the callbacks */
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+	server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+	server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+	server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	server2->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	server2->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+	server2->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+	server2->kex->load_host_public_key = server->kex->load_host_public_key;
+	server2->kex->load_host_private_key = server->kex->load_host_private_key;
+	server2->kex->sign = server->kex->sign;
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("rekeying server2");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server2), 0);
+	run_kex(client, server2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0);
+	run_kex(client, server2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("cleanup");
+	sshkey_free(private);
+	sshkey_free(public);
+	ssh_free(client);
+	ssh_free(server);
+	ssh_free(server2);
+	free(keyname);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
+
+static void
+do_kex(char *kex)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_RSA, 2048);
+	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_ECDSA, 256);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_ED25519, 256);
+}
+
+void
+kex_tests(void)
+{
+	do_kex("curve25519-sha256@libssh.org");
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	do_kex("ecdh-sha2-nistp256");
+	do_kex("ecdh-sha2-nistp384");
+	do_kex("ecdh-sha2-nistp521");
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+	do_kex("diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256");
+	do_kex("diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1");
+	do_kex("diffie-hellman-group14-sha1");
+	do_kex("diffie-hellman-group1-sha1");
+# ifdef USE_SNTRUP761X25519
+	do_kex("sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com");
+# endif /* USE_SNTRUP761X25519 */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/kex/test_proposal.c b/regress/unittests/kex/test_proposal.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d6cf0f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/kex/test_proposal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_proposal.c,v 1.1 2023/02/02 12:12:52 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test KEX
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+void kex_proposal(void);
+
+#define CURVE25519 "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"
+#define DHGEX1 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"
+#define DHGEX256 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"
+#define KEXALGOS CURVE25519","DHGEX256","DHGEX1
+void
+kex_proposal(void)
+{
+	size_t i;
+	struct ssh ssh;
+	char *result, *out, *in;
+	struct {
+		char *in;	/* TODO: make this const */
+		char *out;
+		int compat;
+	} tests[] = {
+		{ KEXALGOS, KEXALGOS, 0},
+		{ KEXALGOS, DHGEX256","DHGEX1, SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD },
+		{ KEXALGOS, CURVE25519, SSH_OLD_DHGEX },
+		{ "a,"KEXALGOS, "a", SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX },
+		/* TODO: enable once compat_kex_proposal doesn't fatal() */
+		/* { KEXALGOS, "", SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, */
+	};
+
+	TEST_START("compat_kex_proposal");
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tests) / sizeof(*tests); i++) {
+		ssh.compat = tests[i].compat;
+		/* match entire string */
+		result = compat_kex_proposal(&ssh, tests[i].in);
+		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(result, tests[i].out);
+		free(result);
+		/* match at end */
+		in = kex_names_cat("a", tests[i].in);
+		out = kex_names_cat("a", tests[i].out);
+		result = compat_kex_proposal(&ssh, in);
+		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(result, out);
+		free(result); free(in); free(out);
+		/* match at start */
+		in = kex_names_cat(tests[i].in, "a");
+		out = kex_names_cat(tests[i].out, "a");
+		result = compat_kex_proposal(&ssh, in);
+		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(result, out);
+		free(result); free(in); free(out);
+		/* match in middle */
+		xasprintf(&in, "a,%s,b", tests[i].in);
+		if (*(tests[i].out) == '\0')
+			out = xstrdup("a,b");
+		else
+			xasprintf(&out, "a,%s,b", tests[i].out);
+		result = compat_kex_proposal(&ssh, in);
+		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(result, out);
+		free(result); free(in); free(out);
+	}
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/kex/tests.c b/regress/unittests/kex/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a83daf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/kex/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.2 2023/02/02 12:12:52 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+void kex_tests(void);
+void kex_proposal(void);
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+	kex_tests();
+	kex_proposal();
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/match/Makefile b/regress/unittests/match/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..939163d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/match/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.5 2021/01/09 12:24:31 dtucker Exp $
+
+PROG=test_match
+SRCS=tests.c
+
+# From usr.bin/ssh
+SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
+SRCS+=match.c misc.c log.c uidswap.c fatal.c ssherr.c addrmatch.c xmalloc.c
+SRCS+=cleanup.c atomicio.c addr.c
+
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+	env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG}
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/regress/unittests/match/tests.c b/regress/unittests/match/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f00d1f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/match/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.8 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for matching functions
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "match.h"
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+	TEST_START("match_pattern");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("", ""), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("", "aaa"), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aaa", ""), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aaa", "aaaa"), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aaaa", "aaa"), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("match_pattern wildcard");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("", "*"), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("a", "?"), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "a?"), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("a", "*"), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "a*"), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "?*"), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "**"), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "?a"), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("aa", "*a"), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ba", "a?"), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ba", "a*"), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ab", "?a"), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern("ab", "*a"), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("match_pattern_list");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "", 0), 0); /* no patterns */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "*", 0), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "!*", 0), -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "!a,*", 0), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "*,!a", 0), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "a,!*", 0), -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("", "!*,a", 0), -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "", 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "*", 0), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!*", 0), -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!a", 0), -1);
+	/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!b", 0), 1); */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!a,*", 0), -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "!a,*", 0), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "*,!a", 0), -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "*,!a", 0), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "a,!*", 0), -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "a,!*", 0), -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "a,!a", 0), -1);
+	/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "a,!a", 0), 1); */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("a", "!*,a", 0), -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("b", "!*,a", 0), -1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("match_pattern_list lowercase");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("abc", "ABC", 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("ABC", "abc", 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("abc", "ABC", 1), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(match_pattern_list("ABC", "abc", 1), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("addr_match_list");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1/44"), -2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list(NULL, "127.0.0.1/44"), -2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("a", "*"), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "*"), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list(NULL, "*"), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.1"), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.2"), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.1"), -1);
+	/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.2"), 1); */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.255", "127.0.0.0/24"), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.1.1", "127.0.0.0/24"), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.0/24"), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.1.0/24"), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.0/24"), -1);
+	/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.1.0/24"), 1); */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1,!127.0.0.1"), -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.1,10.0.0.1"), -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1,127.0.0.2"), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "127.0.0.2,10.0.0.1"), 0);
+	/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1,!127.0.0.2"), 1); */
+	/* XXX negated ASSERT_INT_EQ(addr_match_list("127.0.0.1", "!127.0.0.2,10.0.0.1"), 1); */
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#define CHECK_FILTER(string,filter,expected) \
+	do { \
+		char *result = match_filter_denylist((string), (filter)); \
+		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(result, expected); \
+		free(result); \
+	} while (0)
+
+	TEST_START("match_filter_list");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "", "a,b,c");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a", "b,c");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b", "a,c");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "c", "a,b");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b", "c");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,c", "b");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "a,b,c", "");
+	CHECK_FILTER("a,b,c", "b,c", "a");
+	CHECK_FILTER("", "a,b,c", "");
+	TEST_DONE();
+/*
+ * XXX TODO
+ * int      match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *);
+ * int      match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+ * char    *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *);
+ * int      addr_match_cidr_list(const char *, const char *);
+ */
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/misc/Makefile b/regress/unittests/misc/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d2be393
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/misc/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.9 2023/01/06 02:59:50 djm Exp $
+
+PROG=test_misc
+SRCS=tests.c
+SRCS+=	test_convtime.c
+SRCS+=	test_expand.c
+SRCS+=	test_parse.c
+SRCS+=	test_argv.c
+SRCS+=	test_strdelim.c
+SRCS+=	test_hpdelim.c
+SRCS+=	test_ptimeout.c
+
+# From usr.bin/ssh/Makefile.inc
+SRCS+=	sshbuf.c
+SRCS+=	sshbuf-getput-basic.c
+SRCS+=	sshbuf-misc.c
+SRCS+=	ssherr.c
+SRCS+=	log.c
+SRCS+=	xmalloc.c
+SRCS+=	misc.c
+SRCS+=	match.c
+SRCS+=	addr.c
+SRCS+=	addrmatch.c
+
+# From usr.bin/ssh/sshd/Makefile
+SRCS+=	atomicio.c cleanup.c fatal.c
+
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+	env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG}
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/regress/unittests/misc/test_argv.c b/regress/unittests/misc/test_argv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..682863e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/misc/test_argv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,186 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_argv.c,v 1.4 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for misc argv handling functions.
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+void test_argv(void);
+
+void
+test_argv(void)
+{
+	char **av = NULL;
+	int ac = 0;
+
+#define RESET_ARGV() \
+	do { \
+		argv_free(av, ac); \
+		av = NULL; \
+		ac = -1; \
+	} while (0)
+
+	TEST_START("empty args");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[0], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("    ", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[0], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("trivial args");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("leamas", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "leamas");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("smiley leamas", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 2);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "smiley");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[1], "leamas");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[2], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("quoted");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("\"smiley\"", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "smiley");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("leamas \" smiley \"", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 2);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "leamas");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[1], " smiley ");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[2], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("\"smiley leamas\"", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "smiley leamas");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("smiley\" leamas\" liz", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 2);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "smiley leamas");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[1], "liz");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[2], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("escaped");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("\\\"smiley\\'", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "\"smiley'");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("'\\'smiley\\\"'", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "'smiley\"");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("smiley\\'s leamas\\'", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 2);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "smiley's");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[1], "leamas'");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[2], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("leamas\\\\smiley", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "leamas\\smiley");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("leamas\\\\ \\\\smiley", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 2);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "leamas\\");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[1], "\\smiley");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[2], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("smiley\\ leamas", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "smiley leamas");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("quoted escaped");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("'smiley\\ leamas'", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "smiley\\ leamas");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("\"smiley\\ leamas\"", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "smiley\\ leamas");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("comments");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("# gold", &ac, &av, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 2);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "#");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[1], "gold");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[2], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("# gold", &ac, &av, 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[0], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("leamas#gold", &ac, &av, 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "leamas#gold");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("\"leamas # gold\"", &ac, &av, 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "leamas # gold");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(argv_split("\"leamas\"#gold", &ac, &av, 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ac, 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(av, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(av[0], "leamas#gold");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(av[1], NULL);
+	RESET_ARGV();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	/* XXX test char *argv_assemble(int argc, char **argv) */
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c b/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4794dbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_convtime.c,v 1.3 2022/08/11 01:57:50 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for misc time conversion functions.
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+void test_convtime(void);
+
+void
+test_convtime(void)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+	uint64_t t;
+
+	TEST_START("misc_convtime");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("0"), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1"), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("2s"), 2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("3m"), 180);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1m30"), 90);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1m30s"), 90);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1h1s"), 3601);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1h30m"), 90 * 60);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1d"), 24 * 60 * 60);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1w"), 7 * 24 * 60 * 60);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1w2d3h4m5"), 788645);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("1w2d3h4m5s"), 788645);
+	/* any negative number or error returns -1 */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("-1"),  -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime(""),  -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("trout"),  -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("-77"),  -1);
+	/* boundary conditions */
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%llu", (long long unsigned)INT_MAX);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime(buf), INT_MAX);
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%llu", (long long unsigned)INT_MAX + 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime(buf), -1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("3550w5d3h14m7s"), 2147483647);
+#if INT_MAX == 2147483647
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("3550w5d3h14m8s"), -1);
+#endif
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	/* XXX timezones/DST make verification of this tricky */
+	/* XXX maybe setenv TZ and tzset() to make it unambiguous? */
+	TEST_START("misc_parse_absolute_time");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101", &t), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001011223", &t), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101122345", &t), 0);
+
+	/* forced UTC TZ */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101Z", &t), 0);
+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946684800);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001011223Z", &t), 0);
+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946729380);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101122345Z", &t), 0);
+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946729425);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101UTC", &t), 0);
+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946684800);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001011223UTC", &t), 0);
+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946729380);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101122345UTC", &t), 0);
+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946729425);
+
+	/* Bad month */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20001301", &t),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000001", &t),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	/* Incomplete */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("2", &t),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("2000", &t),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000", &t),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001", &t),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("2000010", &t),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001010", &t),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	/* Bad day, hour, minute, second */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000199", &t),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001019900", &t),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001010099", &t),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101000099", &t),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	/* Invalid TZ specifier */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101ZZ", &t),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101PDT", &t),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101U", &t),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101UTCUTC", &t),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/misc/test_expand.c b/regress/unittests/misc/test_expand.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f2cd8a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/misc/test_expand.c
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_expand.c,v 1.3 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for misc string expansion functions.
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+void test_expand(void);
+
+void
+test_expand(void)
+{
+	int parseerr;
+	char *ret;
+
+	TEST_START("dollar_expand");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(setenv("FOO", "bar", 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(setenv("BAR", "baz", 1), 0);
+	(void)unsetenv("BAZ");
+#define ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(x, y) do { \
+	char *str = dollar_expand(NULL, (x)); \
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, (y)); \
+	free(str); \
+} while(0)
+	ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("${FOO}", "bar");
+	ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(" ${FOO}", " bar");
+	ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("${FOO} ", "bar ");
+	ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(" ${FOO} ", " bar ");
+	ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("${FOO}${BAR}", "barbaz");
+	ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(" ${FOO} ${BAR}", " bar baz");
+	ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("${FOO}${BAR} ", "barbaz ");
+	ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(" ${FOO} ${BAR} ", " bar baz ");
+	ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("$", "$");
+	ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ(" $", " $");
+	ASSERT_DOLLAR_EQ("$ ", "$ ");
+
+	/* suppress error messages for error handing tests */
+	log_init("test_misc", SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+	/* error checking, non existent variable */
+	ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "a${BAZ}");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 0);
+	ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "${BAZ}b");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 0);
+	ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "a${BAZ}b");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 0);
+	/* invalid format */
+	ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "${");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 1);
+	ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "${F");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 1);
+	ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "${FO");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 1);
+	/* empty variable name */
+	ret = dollar_expand(&parseerr, "${}");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ret, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(parseerr, 1);
+	/* restore loglevel to default */
+	log_init("test_misc", SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("percent_expand");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand("%%", "%h", "foo", NULL), "%");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand("%h", "h", "foo", NULL), "foo");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand("%h ", "h", "foo", NULL), "foo ");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand(" %h", "h", "foo", NULL), " foo");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand(" %h ", "h", "foo", NULL), " foo ");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_expand(" %a%b ", "a", "foo", "b", "bar", NULL),
+	    " foobar ");
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("percent_dollar_expand");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(percent_dollar_expand("%h${FOO}", "h", "foo", NULL),
+	    "foobar");
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/misc/test_hpdelim.c b/regress/unittests/misc/test_hpdelim.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d423023
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/misc/test_hpdelim.c
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_hpdelim.c,v 1.2 2022/02/06 22:58:33 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for misc hpdelim() and co
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+void test_hpdelim(void);
+
+void
+test_hpdelim(void)
+{
+	char *orig, *str, *cp, *port;
+
+#define START_STRING(x)	orig = str = xstrdup(x)
+#define DONE_STRING()	free(orig)
+
+	TEST_START("hpdelim host only");
+	START_STRING("host");
+	cp = hpdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "host");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hpdelim :port");
+	START_STRING(":1234");
+	cp = hpdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(str, NULL);
+	port = hpdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(port, "1234");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hpdelim host:port");
+	START_STRING("host:1234");
+	cp = hpdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "host");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(str, NULL);
+	port = hpdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(port, "1234");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hpdelim [host]:port");
+	START_STRING("[::1]:1234");
+	cp = hpdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "[::1]");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(str, NULL);
+	port = hpdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(port, "1234");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("hpdelim missing ] error");
+	START_STRING("[::1:1234");
+	cp = hpdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(cp, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/misc/test_parse.c b/regress/unittests/misc/test_parse.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1f1ea31
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/misc/test_parse.c
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_parse.c,v 1.2 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for misc user/host/URI parsing functions.
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+void test_parse(void);
+
+void
+test_parse(void)
+{
+	int port;
+	char *user, *host, *path;
+
+	TEST_START("misc_parse_user_host_path");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@some.host:some/path",
+	    &user, &host, &path), 0);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "some.host");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
+	free(user); free(host); free(path);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("misc_parse_user_ipv4_path");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@1.22.33.144:some/path",
+	    &user, &host, &path), 0);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "1.22.33.144");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
+	free(user); free(host); free(path);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("misc_parse_user_[ipv4]_path");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@[1.22.33.144]:some/path",
+	    &user, &host, &path), 0);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "1.22.33.144");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
+	free(user); free(host); free(path);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("misc_parse_user_[ipv4]_nopath");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@[1.22.33.144]:",
+	    &user, &host, &path), 0);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "1.22.33.144");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, ".");
+	free(user); free(host); free(path);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("misc_parse_user_ipv6_path");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@[::1]:some/path",
+	    &user, &host, &path), 0);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "::1");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
+	free(user); free(host); free(path);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("misc_parse_uri");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_uri("ssh", "ssh://someuser@some.host:22/some/path",
+	    &user, &host, &port, &path), 0);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "some.host");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(port, 22);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
+	free(user); free(host); free(path);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/misc/test_ptimeout.c b/regress/unittests/misc/test_ptimeout.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7adc590
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/misc/test_ptimeout.c
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_ptimeout.c,v 1.1 2023/01/06 02:59:50 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for misc poll/ppoll timeout helpers.
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <poll.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+void test_ptimeout(void);
+
+void
+test_ptimeout(void)
+{
+	struct timespec pt, *ts;
+
+	TEST_START("ptimeout_init");
+	ptimeout_init(&pt);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(ptimeout_get_tsp(&pt), NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ptimeout_get_ms(&pt), -1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ptimeout_deadline_sec");
+	ptimeout_deadline_sec(&pt, 100);
+	ptimeout_deadline_sec(&pt, 200);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ptimeout_get_ms(&pt), 100 * 1000);
+	ts = ptimeout_get_tsp(&pt);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ts, NULL);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(ts->tv_nsec, 0);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(ts->tv_sec, 100);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ptimeout_deadline_ms");
+	ptimeout_deadline_ms(&pt, 50123);
+	ptimeout_deadline_ms(&pt, 50500);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ptimeout_get_ms(&pt), 50123);
+	ts = ptimeout_get_tsp(&pt);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ts, NULL);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(ts->tv_nsec, 123 * 1000000);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(ts->tv_sec, 50);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ptimeout zero");
+	ptimeout_init(&pt);
+	ptimeout_deadline_ms(&pt, 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ptimeout_get_ms(&pt), 0);
+	ts = ptimeout_get_tsp(&pt);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ts, NULL);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(ts->tv_nsec, 0);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(ts->tv_sec, 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ptimeout_deadline_monotime");
+	ptimeout_init(&pt);
+	ptimeout_deadline_monotime(&pt, monotime() + 100);
+	ASSERT_INT_GT(ptimeout_get_ms(&pt), 50000);
+	ASSERT_INT_LT(ptimeout_get_ms(&pt), 200000);
+	ts = ptimeout_get_tsp(&pt);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ts, NULL);
+	ASSERT_LONG_GT(ts->tv_sec, 50);
+	ASSERT_LONG_LT(ts->tv_sec, 200);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ptimeout_deadline_monotime past");
+	ptimeout_init(&pt);
+	ptimeout_deadline_monotime(&pt, monotime() + 100);
+	ptimeout_deadline_monotime(&pt, monotime() - 100);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ptimeout_get_ms(&pt), 0);
+	ts = ptimeout_get_tsp(&pt);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ts, NULL);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(ts->tv_nsec, 0);
+	ASSERT_LONG_EQ(ts->tv_sec, 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/misc/test_strdelim.c b/regress/unittests/misc/test_strdelim.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f7bea4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/misc/test_strdelim.c
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_strdelim.c,v 1.3 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for misc strdelim() and co
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+void test_strdelim(void);
+
+void
+test_strdelim(void)
+{
+	char *orig, *str, *cp;
+
+#define START_STRING(x)	orig = str = xstrdup(x)
+#define DONE_STRING()	free(orig)
+
+	TEST_START("empty");
+	START_STRING("");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "");	/* XXX arguable */
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(cp, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("whitespace");
+	START_STRING("	");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "");	/* XXX better as NULL */
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "");
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("trivial");
+	START_STRING("blob");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("trivial whitespace");
+	START_STRING("blob   ");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "");	/* XXX better as NULL */
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("multi");
+	START_STRING("blob1 blob2");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob1");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "blob2");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob2");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(cp, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("multi whitespace");
+	START_STRING("blob1	 	blob2  	 	");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob1");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "blob2  	 	");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob2");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "");	/* XXX better as NULL */
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("multi equals");
+	START_STRING("blob1=blob2");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob1");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "blob2");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob2");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(cp, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("multi too many equals");
+	START_STRING("blob1==blob2");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob1");	/* XXX better returning NULL early */
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "=blob2");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "blob2");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob2");	/* XXX should (but can't) reject */
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("multi equals strdelimw");
+	START_STRING("blob1=blob2");
+	cp = strdelimw(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob1=blob2");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+	cp = strdelimw(&str);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(cp, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("quoted");
+	START_STRING("\"blob\"");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "");	/* XXX better as NULL */
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("quoted multi");
+	START_STRING("\"blob1\" blob2");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob1");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "blob2");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob2");
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(cp, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("quoted multi reverse");
+	START_STRING("blob1 \"blob2\"");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob1");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "\"blob2\"");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob2");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(str, "");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "");	/* XXX better as NULL */
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(str, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("quoted multi middle");
+	START_STRING("blob1 \"blob2\" blob3");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob1");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob2");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob3");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(cp, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("badquote");
+	START_STRING("\"blob");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(cp, NULL);
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("oops quote");
+	START_STRING("\"blob\\\"");
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "blob\\");	/* XXX wrong */
+	cp = strdelim(&str);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, "");
+	DONE_STRING();
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/misc/tests.c b/regress/unittests/misc/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3269954
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/misc/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.10 2023/01/06 02:59:50 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for misc helper functions.
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+void test_parse(void);
+void test_convtime(void);
+void test_expand(void);
+void test_argv(void);
+void test_strdelim(void);
+void test_hpdelim(void);
+void test_ptimeout(void);
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+	test_parse();
+	test_convtime();
+	test_expand();
+	test_argv();
+	test_strdelim();
+	test_hpdelim();
+	test_ptimeout();
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a8ddfaf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.10 2021/01/09 12:24:31 dtucker Exp $
+
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.8 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $
+
+PROG=test_sshbuf
+SRCS=tests.c
+SRCS+=test_sshbuf.c
+SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c
+SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c
+SRCS+=test_sshbuf_misc.c
+SRCS+=test_sshbuf_fuzz.c
+SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c
+SRCS+=test_sshbuf_fixed.c
+
+# From usr.bin/ssh
+SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
+SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c misc.c xmalloc.c log.c fatal.c ssherr.c cleanup.c
+SRCS+=match.c addr.c addrmatch.c
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+	env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} ${UNITTEST_ARGS}
+
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e22b390
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshbuf.c,v 1.2 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1	/* access internals for testing */
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+void sshbuf_tests(void);
+
+#ifndef roundup
+#define roundup(x, y)   ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
+#endif
+
+void
+sshbuf_tests(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *p1;
+	const u_char *cdp;
+	u_char *dp;
+	size_t sz;
+	int r;
+
+	TEST_START("allocate sshbuf");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("max size on fresh buffer");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("available on fresh buffer");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(sshbuf_avail(p1), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("len = 0 on empty buffer");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("set valid max size");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 65536), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 65536);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("available on limited buffer");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 65536);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("free");
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("consume on empty buffer");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 1), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("consume_end on empty buffer");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 1), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("reserve space");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL);
+	*dp = 0x11;
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 3, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL);
+	*dp++ = 0x22;
+	*dp++ = 0x33;
+	*dp++ = 0x44;
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_len on filled buffer");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_ptr on filled buffer");
+	cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[0], 0x11);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[1], 0x22);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[2], 0x33);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[3], 0x44);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("consume on filled buffer");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	r = sshbuf_consume(p1, 64);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 3);
+	cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[0], 0x22);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 2), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[0], 0x44);
+	r = sshbuf_consume(p1, 2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_consume(p1, 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("consume_end on filled buffer");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 4, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL);
+	*dp++ = 0x11;
+	*dp++ = 0x22;
+	*dp++ = 0x33;
+	*dp++ = 0x44;
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	r = sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 5);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 3), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(*cdp, 0x11);
+	r = sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fill limited buffer");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1223), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 1223);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 1223);
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1223, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL);
+	memset(dp, 0xd7, 1223);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1223);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dp, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("consume and force compaction");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 223), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1000);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 223);
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 224, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1000);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 223);
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 223, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL);
+	memset(dp, 0x7d, 223);
+	cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp, 0xd7, 1000);
+	ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp + 1000, 0x7d, 223);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("resize full buffer");
+	r = sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1000);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	sz = roundup(1223 + SSHBUF_SIZE_INC * 3, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sz), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), sz);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz - 1223);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1223);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	/* NB. uses sshbuf internals */
+	TEST_START("alloc chunking");
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL);
+	*dp = 0xff;
+	cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp, 0xd7, 1000);
+	ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp + 1000, 0x7d, 223);
+	ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp + 1223, 0xff, 1);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_alloc(p1) % SSHBUF_SIZE_INC, 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("reset buffer");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1223), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 1223);
+	r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1223, &dp);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL);
+	memset(dp, 0xd7, 1223);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1223);
+	sshbuf_reset(p1);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 1223);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 1223);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dff77f0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_fixed.c,v 1.2 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1  /* access internals for testing */
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+void sshbuf_fixed(void);
+
+const u_char test_buf[] = "\x01\x12\x34\x56\x78\x00\x00\x00\x05hello";
+
+void
+sshbuf_fixed(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *p1, *p2, *p3;
+	u_char c;
+	char *s;
+	u_int i;
+	size_t l;
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_from");
+	p1 = sshbuf_from(test_buf, sizeof(test_buf));
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p1), NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_check_reserve(p1, 1), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, NULL), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 200), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_from data");
+	p1 = sshbuf_from(test_buf, sizeof(test_buf) - 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &c), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf + 1);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(c, 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &i), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf + 5);
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(i, 0x12345678);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s, &l), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s, "hello");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(l, 5);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	free(s);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_fromb ");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(sshbuf_refcount(p1), 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_parent(p1), NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, test_buf, sizeof(test_buf) - 1), 0);
+	p2 = sshbuf_fromb(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(sshbuf_refcount(p1), 2);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_parent(p1), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_parent(p2), p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), sshbuf_ptr(p1));
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p2), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p1), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p2), NULL);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sshbuf_len(p2));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p2, &c), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 1);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(c, 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p2, &i), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 5);
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(i, 0x12345678);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_cstring(p2, &s, &l), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), 0);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s, "hello");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(l, 5);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(sshbuf_refcount(p1), 1);
+	sshbuf_free(p2);
+	free(s);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_froms");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x01), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(p1, "hello"), 0);
+	p2 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(test_buf) - 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(p2, p1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), sizeof(test_buf) + 4 - 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_froms(p2, &p3), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p3, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p3), NULL);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p3), sizeof(test_buf) - 1);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p3), test_buf, sizeof(test_buf) - 1);
+	sshbuf_free(p3);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(p2, p1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p2, 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_froms(p2, &p3), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(p3, NULL);
+	sshbuf_free(p2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0b809d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_fuzz.c,v 1.4 2021/12/18 06:53:59 anton Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+#define NUM_FUZZ_TESTS (1 << 18)
+
+void sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void);
+
+void
+sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *p1;
+	u_char *dp;
+	size_t sz, sz2, i, ntests = NUM_FUZZ_TESTS;
+	u_int32_t r;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (test_is_fast())
+		ntests >>= 2;
+	if (test_is_slow())
+		ntests <<= 2;
+
+	/* NB. uses sshbuf internals */
+	TEST_START("fuzz alloc/dealloc");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 16 * 1024), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL);
+	ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1));
+	for (i = 0; i < ntests; i++) {
+		r = arc4random_uniform(10);
+		if (r == 0) {
+			/* 10% chance: small reserve */
+			r = arc4random_uniform(10);
+ fuzz_reserve:
+			sz = sshbuf_avail(p1);
+			sz2 = sshbuf_len(p1);
+			ret = sshbuf_reserve(p1, r, &dp);
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dp, NULL);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(sz, r);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2);
+			} else {
+				ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(sz, r);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz - r);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2 + r);
+				memset(dp, arc4random_uniform(255) + 1, r);
+			}
+		} else if (r < 3) {
+			/* 20% chance: big reserve */
+			r = arc4random_uniform(8 * 1024);
+			goto fuzz_reserve;
+		} else if (r == 3) {
+			/* 10% chance: small consume */
+			r = arc4random_uniform(10);
+ fuzz_consume:
+			sz = sshbuf_avail(p1);
+			sz2 = sshbuf_len(p1);
+			/* 50% change consume from end, otherwise start */
+			ret = ((arc4random() & 1) ?
+			    sshbuf_consume : sshbuf_consume_end)(p1, r);
+			if (ret < 0) {
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(sz2, r);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2);
+			} else {
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(sz2, r);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz + r);
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2 - r);
+			}
+		} else if (r < 8) {
+			/* 40% chance: big consume */
+			r = arc4random_uniform(2 * 1024);
+			goto fuzz_consume;
+		} else if (r == 8) {
+			/* 10% chance: reset max size */
+			r = arc4random_uniform(16 * 1024);
+			sz = sshbuf_max_size(p1);
+			if (sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, r) < 0)
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), sz);
+			else
+				ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), r);
+		} else {
+			if (arc4random_uniform(8192) == 0) {
+				/* tiny chance: new buffer */
+				ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL);
+				ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1));
+				sshbuf_free(p1);
+				p1 = sshbuf_new();
+				ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+				ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1,
+				    16 * 1024), 0);
+			} else {
+				/* Almost 10%: giant reserve */
+				/* use arc4random_buf for r > 2^32 on 64 bit */
+				arc4random_buf(&r, sizeof(r));
+				while (r < SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX / 2) {
+					r <<= 1;
+					r |= arc4random() & 1;
+				}
+				goto fuzz_reserve;
+			}
+		}
+		ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL);
+		ASSERT_SIZE_T_LE(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 16 * 1024);
+	}
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL);
+	ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3da413e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,712 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c,v 1.3 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+void sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void);
+
+void
+sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *p1, *p2;
+	const u_char *cd;
+	u_char *d, d2[32], x[] = {
+		0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x00, 0x99
+	};
+	u_int64_t v64;
+	u_int32_t v32;
+	u_int16_t v16;
+	u_char v8;
+	size_t s;
+	char *s2;
+	int r;
+	u_char bn1[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
+	u_char bn2[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02 };
+	u_char bn3[] = { 0x00, 0x80, 0x09 };
+	u_char bn_exp1[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 };
+	u_char bn_exp2[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02 };
+	u_char bn_exp3[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x80, 0x09 };
+
+	TEST_START("PEEK_U64");
+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(PEEK_U64(x), 0x1122334455667788ULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("PEEK_U32");
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(x), 0x11223344);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("PEEK_U16");
+	ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(x), 0x1122);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("POKE_U64");
+	bzero(d2, sizeof(d2));
+	POKE_U64(d2, 0x1122334455667788ULL);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 8);
+	TEST_DONE();
+	
+	TEST_START("POKE_U32");
+	bzero(d2, sizeof(d2));
+	POKE_U32(d2, 0x11223344);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 4);
+	TEST_DONE();
+	
+	TEST_START("POKE_U16");
+	bzero(d2, sizeof(d2));
+	POKE_U16(d2, 0x1122);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 5), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 5);
+	cd = sshbuf_ptr(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cd, NULL);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[0], 0x11);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[1], 0x22);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[2], 0x33);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[3], 0x44);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[4], 0x55);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get(p1, d2, 4), 0);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 4);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0x55);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get truncated");
+	r = sshbuf_get(p1, d2, 4);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0x55);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put truncated");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 4), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_put(p1, x, 5);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u64");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 10), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 10);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &v64), 0);
+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(v64, 0x1122334455667788ULL);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u64 truncated");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	r = sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &v64);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u32");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 10), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 10);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32), 0);
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x11223344);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 6);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32), 0);
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x55667788);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u32 truncated");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	r = sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u16");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 9), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 9);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0);
+	ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x1122);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 7);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0);
+	ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x3344);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 5);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0);
+	ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x5566);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 3);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0);
+	ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x7788);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u16 truncated");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	r = sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u8");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 2), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8), 0);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x11);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8), 0);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x22);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u8 truncated");
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 8);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 8);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64 exact");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 8), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 8);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 8);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64 limited");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 7), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+	
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 4);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32 exact");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 4), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 4);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32 limited");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 3), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+	
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 2), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16 limited");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4 + 4);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, x, sizeof(x));
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	free(d);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string exact");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(x) + 4), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, x, sizeof(x));
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	free(d);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string truncated");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 3);
+	r = sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 3);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string giant");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0xffffffff), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
+	r = sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring giant");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0xffffffff), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
+	r = sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, &s);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring embedded \\0");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
+	r = sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring trailing \\0");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x) - 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x) - 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4 - 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, &s), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x) - 1);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(s2, x, s);
+	free(s2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4);
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), sizeof(x));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4, x, sizeof(x));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string limited");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(x) + 4 - 1), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_put_string(p1, x, sizeof(x));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string giant");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	r = sshbuf_put_string(p1, (void *)0x01, 0xfffffffc);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_putf");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	r = sshbuf_putf(p1, "%s %d %x", "hello", 23, 0x5f);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 11);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), "hello 23 5f", 11);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_putb");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	p2 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "blahblahblah", 12), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_putb(p2, p1), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), 12);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), "blahblahblah", 12);
+	sshbuf_free(p2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes empty buf");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, NULL, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp1));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp1, sizeof(bn_exp1));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes all zeroes");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn1, sizeof(bn1)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp1));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp1, sizeof(bn_exp1));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes simple");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn2+2, sizeof(bn2)-2), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp2));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp2, sizeof(bn_exp2));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes leading zero");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn2, sizeof(bn2)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp2));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp2, sizeof(bn_exp2));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes neg");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn3+1, sizeof(bn3)-1), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp3));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp3, sizeof(bn_exp3));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes neg and leading zero");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn3, sizeof(bn3)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp3));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp3, sizeof(bn_exp3));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_peek_u64");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u64(p1, 0, &v64), 0);
+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(v64, 0x1122334455667788ULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u64(p1, 2, &v64), 0);
+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(v64, 0x3344556677880099ULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u64(p1, 3, &v64), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u64(p1, sizeof(x), &v64),
+	    SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u64(p1, 1000, &v64),
+	    SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_peek_u32");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u32(p1, 0, &v32), 0);
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x11223344);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u32(p1, 6, &v32), 0);
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x77880099);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u32(p1, 7, &v32), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u32(p1, sizeof(x), &v32),
+	    SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u32(p1, 1000, &v32),
+	    SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_peek_u16");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u16(p1, 0, &v16), 0);
+	ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x1122);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u16(p1, 8, &v16), 0);
+	ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x99);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u16(p1, 9, &v16), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u16(p1, sizeof(x), &v16),
+	    SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u16(p1, 1000, &v16),
+	    SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_peek_u8");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u8(p1, 0, &v8), 0);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x11);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u8(p1, 9, &v8), 0);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x99);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u8(p1, sizeof(x), &v8),
+	    SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_peek_u8(p1, 1000, &v8),
+	    SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_poke_u64");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+	/* poke at start of buffer */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u64(p1, 0, 0xa1b2c3d4e5f60718ULL), 0);
+	s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "a1b2c3d4e5f607180000");
+	free(s2);
+	sshbuf_reset(p1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+	/* poke aligned with end of buffer */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u64(p1, 2, 0xa1b2c3d4e5f60718ULL), 0);
+	s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "0000a1b2c3d4e5f60718");
+	free(s2);
+	sshbuf_reset(p1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+	/* poke past end of buffer */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u64(p1, 3, 0xa1b2c3d4e5f60718ULL),
+	    SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u64(p1, 10, 0xa1b2c3d4e5f60718ULL),
+	    SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u64(p1, 1000, 0xa1b2c3d4e5f60718ULL),
+	    SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	/* ensure failed pokes do not modify buffer */
+	s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "00000000000000000000");
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_poke_u32");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+	/* poke at start of buffer */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u32(p1, 0, 0xa1b2c3d4), 0);
+	s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "a1b2c3d4000000000000");
+	free(s2);
+	sshbuf_reset(p1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+	/* poke aligned with end of buffer */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u32(p1, 6, 0xa1b2c3d4), 0);
+	s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "000000000000a1b2c3d4");
+	free(s2);
+	sshbuf_reset(p1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+	/* poke past end of buffer */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u32(p1, 7, 0xa1b2c3d4),
+	    SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u32(p1, 10, 0xa1b2c3d4),
+	    SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u32(p1, 1000, 0xa1b2c3d4),
+	    SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	/* ensure failed pokes do not modify buffer */
+	s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "00000000000000000000");
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_poke_u16");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+	/* poke at start of buffer */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u16(p1, 0, 0xa1b2), 0);
+	s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "a1b20000000000000000");
+	free(s2);
+	sshbuf_reset(p1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+	/* poke aligned with end of buffer */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u16(p1, 8, 0xa1b2), 0);
+	s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "0000000000000000a1b2");
+	free(s2);
+	sshbuf_reset(p1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+	/* poke past end of buffer */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u16(p1, 9, 0xa1b2),
+	    SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u16(p1, 10, 0xa1b2),
+	    SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u16(p1, 1000, 0xa1b2),
+	    SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	/* ensure failed pokes do not modify buffer */
+	s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "00000000000000000000");
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_poke_u8");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+	/* poke at start of buffer */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u8(p1, 0, 0xa1), 0);
+	s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "a1000000000000000000");
+	free(s2);
+	sshbuf_reset(p1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+	/* poke aligned with end of buffer */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u8(p1, 9, 0xa1), 0);
+	s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "000000000000000000a1");
+	free(s2);
+	sshbuf_reset(p1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+	/* poke past end of buffer */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u8(p1, 10, 0xa1), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke_u8(p1, 1000, 0xa1), SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	/* ensure failed pokes do not modify buffer */
+	s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "00000000000000000000");
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_poke");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+	/* poke at start of buffer */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke(p1, 0, "hello!", 6), 0);
+	s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "68656c6c6f2100000000");
+	free(s2);
+	sshbuf_reset(p1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+	/* poke aligned with end of buffer */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke(p1, 4, "hello!", 6), 0);
+	s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "0000000068656c6c6f21");
+	free(s2);
+	sshbuf_reset(p1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 10, NULL), 0);
+	/* poke past end of buffer */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke(p1, 7, "hello!", 6),
+	    SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke(p1, 10, "hello!", 6),
+	    SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_poke(p1, 1000, "hello!", 6),
+	    SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	/* ensure failed pokes do not modify buffer */
+	s2 = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(s2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s2, "00000000000000000000");
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e3620e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c,v 1.3 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+void sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void);
+
+void
+sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *p1;
+	BIGNUM *bn, *bn2;
+	const char *hexbn1 = "0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10";
+	/* This one has MSB set to test bignum2 encoding negative-avoidance */
+	const char *hexbn2 = "f0e0d0c0b0a0908070605040302010007fff11";
+	u_char expbn1[] = {
+		0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
+		0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10,
+	};
+	u_char expbn2[] = {
+		0xf0, 0xe0, 0xd0, 0xc0, 0xb0, 0xa0, 0x90, 0x80,
+		0x70, 0x60, 0x50, 0x40, 0x30, 0x20, 0x10, 0x00,
+		0x7f, 0xff, 0x11
+	};
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256)
+	const u_char *d;
+	size_t s;
+	BIGNUM *bn_x, *bn_y;
+	int ec256_nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+	char *ec256_x = "0C828004839D0106AA59575216191357"
+		        "34B451459DADB586677EF9DF55784999";
+	char *ec256_y = "4D196B50F0B4E94B3C73E3A9D4CD9DF2"
+	                "C8F9A35E42BDD047550F69D80EC23CD4";
+	u_char expec256[] = {
+		0x04,
+		0x0c, 0x82, 0x80, 0x04, 0x83, 0x9d, 0x01, 0x06,
+		0xaa, 0x59, 0x57, 0x52, 0x16, 0x19, 0x13, 0x57,
+		0x34, 0xb4, 0x51, 0x45, 0x9d, 0xad, 0xb5, 0x86,
+		0x67, 0x7e, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0x55, 0x78, 0x49, 0x99,
+		0x4d, 0x19, 0x6b, 0x50, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe9, 0x4b,
+		0x3c, 0x73, 0xe3, 0xa9, 0xd4, 0xcd, 0x9d, 0xf2,
+		0xc8, 0xf9, 0xa3, 0x5e, 0x42, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0x47,
+		0x55, 0x0f, 0x69, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0x3c, 0xd4
+	};
+	EC_KEY *eck;
+	EC_POINT *ecp;
+#endif
+	int r;
+
+#define MKBN(b, bnn) \
+	do { \
+		bnn = NULL; \
+		ASSERT_INT_GT(BN_hex2bn(&bnn, b), 0); \
+	} while (0)
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2");
+	MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn1) + 4);
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int32_t)BN_num_bytes(bn));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1));
+	BN_free(bn);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 limited");
+	MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn1) + 3), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 bn2");
+	MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 4 + 1); /* MSB */
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int32_t)BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4), 0x00);
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 5, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2));
+	BN_free(bn);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 bn2 limited");
+	MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn2) + 3), 0);
+	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2");
+	MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4 + sizeof(expbn1));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0);
+	bn2 = NULL;
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2), 0);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 truncated");
+	MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1) - 1), 0);
+	bn2 = NULL;
+	r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn1) + 3);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 giant");
+	MKBN(hexbn1, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 65536), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 65536, NULL), 0);
+	bn2 = NULL;
+	r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 65536 + 4);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2");
+	MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1), 0); /* MSB */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4 + 1 + sizeof(expbn2));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0);
+	bn2 = NULL;
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2), 0);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2 truncated");
+	MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2) - 1), 0);
+	bn2 = NULL;
+	r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 1 + 4 - 1);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2 negative");
+	MKBN(hexbn2, bn);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)), 0);
+	bn2 = NULL;
+	r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 4);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256)
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_put_ec");
+	eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(ec256_nid);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL);
+	ecp = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(eck));
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ecp, NULL);
+	MKBN(ec256_x, bn_x);
+	MKBN(ec256_y, bn_y);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(
+	    EC_KEY_get0_group(eck), ecp, bn_x, bn_y, NULL), 1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_KEY_set_public_key(eck, ecp), 1);
+	BN_free(bn_x);
+	BN_free(bn_y);
+	EC_POINT_free(ecp);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_eckey(p1, eck), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string_direct(p1, &d, &s), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(expec256));
+	ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, expec256, sizeof(expec256));
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	EC_KEY_free(eck);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_get_ec");
+	eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(ec256_nid);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(p1, expec256, sizeof(expec256)), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expec256) + 4);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_eckey(p1, eck), 0);
+	bn_x = BN_new();
+	bn_y = BN_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(bn_x, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(bn_y, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(
+	    EC_KEY_get0_group(eck), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eck),
+	    bn_x, bn_y, NULL), 1);
+	MKBN(ec256_x, bn);
+	MKBN(ec256_y, bn2);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_cmp(bn_x, bn), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_cmp(bn_y, bn2), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	EC_KEY_free(eck);
+	BN_free(bn_x);
+	BN_free(bn_y);
+	BN_free(bn);
+	BN_free(bn2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3b48958
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c,v 1.5 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+void sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void);
+
+static void
+attempt_parse_blob(u_char *blob, size_t len)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *p1;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	BIGNUM *bn;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256)
+	EC_KEY *eck;
+#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	u_char *s;
+	size_t l;
+	u_int8_t u8;
+	u_int16_t u16;
+	u_int32_t u32;
+	u_int64_t u64;
+
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, blob, len), 0);
+	sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &u8);
+	sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &u16);
+	sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &u32);
+	sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &u64);
+	if (sshbuf_get_string(p1, &s, &l) == 0) {
+		bzero(s, l);
+		free(s);
+	}
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	bn = NULL;
+	sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, &bn);
+	BN_clear_free(bn);
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256)
+	eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL);
+	sshbuf_get_eckey(p1, eck);
+	EC_KEY_free(eck);
+#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+}
+
+
+static void
+onerror(void *fuzz)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "Failed during fuzz:\n");
+	fuzz_dump((struct fuzz *)fuzz);
+}
+
+void
+sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void)
+{
+	u_char blob[] = {
+		/* u8 */
+		0xd0,
+		/* u16 */
+		0xc0, 0xde,
+		/* u32 */
+		0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad,
+		/* u64 */
+		0xfe, 0xed, 0xac, 0x1d, 0x1f, 0x1c, 0xbe, 0xef,
+		/* string */
+		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09,
+		'O', ' ', 'G', 'o', 'r', 'g', 'o', 'n', '!',
+		/* bignum2 */
+		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14,
+		0x00,
+		0xf0, 0xe0, 0xd0, 0xc0, 0xb0, 0xa0, 0x90, 0x80,
+		0x70, 0x60, 0x50, 0x40, 0x30, 0x20, 0x10, 0x00,
+		0x7f, 0xff, 0x11,
+		/* EC point (NIST-256 curve) */
+		0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41,
+		0x04,
+		0x0c, 0x82, 0x80, 0x04, 0x83, 0x9d, 0x01, 0x06,
+		0xaa, 0x59, 0x57, 0x52, 0x16, 0x19, 0x13, 0x57,
+		0x34, 0xb4, 0x51, 0x45, 0x9d, 0xad, 0xb5, 0x86,
+		0x67, 0x7e, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0x55, 0x78, 0x49, 0x99,
+		0x4d, 0x19, 0x6b, 0x50, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe9, 0x4b,
+		0x3c, 0x73, 0xe3, 0xa9, 0xd4, 0xcd, 0x9d, 0xf2,
+		0xc8, 0xf9, 0xa3, 0x5e, 0x42, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0x47,
+		0x55, 0x0f, 0x69, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0x3c, 0xd4,
+	};
+	struct fuzz *fuzz;
+	u_int fuzzers = FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP |
+	    FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP |
+	    FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END;
+
+	if (test_is_fast())
+		fuzzers &= ~(FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP|FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP);
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz blob parsing");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(fuzzers, blob, sizeof(blob));
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz))
+		attempt_parse_blob(blob, sizeof(blob));
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+	TEST_ONERROR(NULL, NULL);
+}
+
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..249ecf2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_misc.c,v 1.5 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+void sshbuf_misc_tests(void);
+
+void
+sshbuf_misc_tests(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *p1;
+	char tmp[512], msg[] = "imploring ping silence ping over", *p;
+	FILE *out;
+	size_t sz;
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_dump");
+	out = tmpfile();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(out, NULL);
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), 0);
+	sshbuf_dump(p1, out);
+	fflush(out);
+	rewind(out);
+	sz = fread(tmp, 1, sizeof(tmp), out);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ferror(out), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_NE(feof(out), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(sz, 0);
+	tmp[sz] = '\0';
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(strstr(tmp, "12 34 56 78"), NULL);
+	fclose(out);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob16");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), 0);
+	p = sshbuf_dtob16(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "12345678");
+	free(p);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64_string len 1");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0);
+	p = sshbuf_dtob64_string(p1, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "EQ==");
+	free(p);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64_string len 2");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x22), 0);
+	p = sshbuf_dtob64_string(p1, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "ESI=");
+	free(p);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64_string len 3");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x22), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x33), 0);
+	p = sshbuf_dtob64_string(p1, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "ESIz");
+	free(p);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64_string len 8191");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 8192, NULL), 0);
+	bzero(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p1), 8192);
+	p = sshbuf_dtob64_string(p1, 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), ((8191 + 2) / 3) * 4);
+	free(p);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 1");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A=="), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1);
+	ASSERT_U8_EQ(*sshbuf_ptr(p1), 0xd0);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 2");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A8="), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2);
+	ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0xd00f);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 4");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A/QDw=="), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4);
+	ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0xd00fd00f);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_dup_string");
+	p1 = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	/* Check empty buffer */
+	p = sshbuf_dup_string(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), 0);
+	free(p);
+	/* Check buffer with string */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "quad1", strlen("quad1")), 0);
+	p = sshbuf_dup_string(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), strlen("quad1"));
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "quad1");
+	free(p);
+	/* Check buffer with terminating nul */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "\0", 1), 0);
+	p = sshbuf_dup_string(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), strlen("quad1"));
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "quad1");
+	free(p);
+	/* Check buffer with data after nul (expect failure) */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "quad2", strlen("quad2")), 0);
+	p = sshbuf_dup_string(p1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(p, NULL);
+	sshbuf_free(p1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_cmp");
+	p1 = sshbuf_from(msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 0, "i", 1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 0, "j", 1), SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 0, "imploring", 9), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 0, "implored", 9), SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 10, "ping", 4), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 10, "ring", 4), SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 28, "over", 4), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 28, "rove", 4), SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 28, "overt", 5),
+	    SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 32, "ping", 4),
+	    SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 1000, "silence", 7),
+	    SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_cmp(p1, 0, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sshbuf_find");
+	p1 = sshbuf_from(msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 0, "i", 1, &sz), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 0, "j", 1, &sz), SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 0, "imploring", 9, &sz), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 0, "implored", 9, &sz),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 3, "ping", 4, &sz), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 10);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 11, "ping", 4, &sz), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 23);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 20, "over", 4, &sz), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 28);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 28, "over", 4, &sz), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 28);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 28, "rove", 4, &sz),
+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 28, "overt", 5, &sz),
+	    SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 32, "ping", 4, &sz),
+	    SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 1000, "silence", 7, &sz),
+	    SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_find(p1, 0, msg + 1, sizeof(msg) - 2, &sz), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sz, 1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
+
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..29916a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+void sshbuf_tests(void);
+void sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void);
+void sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void);
+void sshbuf_misc_tests(void);
+void sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void);
+void sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void);
+void sshbuf_fixed(void);
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+	sshbuf_tests();
+	sshbuf_getput_basic_tests();
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests();
+#endif
+	sshbuf_misc_tests();
+	sshbuf_fuzz_tests();
+	sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests();
+	sshbuf_fixed();
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile b/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cd0f44d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.12 2023/01/15 23:35:10 djm Exp $
+
+PROG=test_sshkey
+SRCS=tests.c test_sshkey.c test_file.c test_fuzz.c common.c
+
+# From usr.bin/ssh
+SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
+SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c
+SRCS+=ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
+SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c
+SRCS+=addr.c addrmatch.c bitmap.c
+SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c
+SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-sk.c
+SRCS+=ssh-ed25519-sk.c sk-usbhid.c
+
+SRCS+=digest-openssl.c
+#SRCS+=digest-libc.c
+SRCS+=utf8.c
+
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+	env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} ${UNITTEST_ARGS} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
+
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..51b0d92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: common.c,v 1.5 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Helpers for key API tests
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+struct sshbuf *
+load_file(const char *name)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *ret = NULL;
+
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_load_file(test_data_file(name), &ret), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+struct sshbuf *
+load_text_file(const char *name)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *ret = load_file(name);
+	const u_char *p;
+
+	/* Trim whitespace at EOL */
+	for (p = sshbuf_ptr(ret); sshbuf_len(ret) > 0;) {
+		if (p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\r' ||
+		    p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\t' ||
+		    p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == ' ' ||
+		    p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\n')
+			ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(ret, 1), 0);
+		else
+			break;
+	}
+	/* \0 terminate */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(ret, 0), 0);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+BIGNUM *
+load_bignum(const char *name)
+{
+	BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *buf;
+
+	buf = load_text_file(name);
+	ASSERT_INT_NE(BN_hex2bn(&ret, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *
+rsa_n(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *n = NULL;
+
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL);
+	RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
+	return n;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *
+rsa_e(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *e = NULL;
+
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL);
+	RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, NULL, &e, NULL);
+	return e;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *
+rsa_p(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *p = NULL;
+
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL);
+	RSA_get0_factors(k->rsa, &p, NULL);
+	return p;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *
+rsa_q(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *q = NULL;
+
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL);
+	RSA_get0_factors(k->rsa, NULL, &q);
+	return q;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *
+dsa_g(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *g = NULL;
+
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->dsa, NULL);
+	DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, NULL, NULL, &g);
+	return g;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *
+dsa_pub_key(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL;
+
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->dsa, NULL);
+	DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &pub_key, NULL);
+	return pub_key;
+}
+
+const BIGNUM *
+dsa_priv_key(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
+
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->dsa, NULL);
+	DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
+	return priv_key;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h b/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a514fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: common.h,v 1.2 2018/09/13 09:03:20 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Helpers for key API tests
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+/* Load a binary file into a buffer */
+struct sshbuf *load_file(const char *name);
+
+/* Load a text file into a buffer */
+struct sshbuf *load_text_file(const char *name);
+
+/* Load a bignum from a file */
+BIGNUM *load_bignum(const char *name);
+
+/* Accessors for key components */
+const BIGNUM *rsa_n(struct sshkey *k);
+const BIGNUM *rsa_e(struct sshkey *k);
+const BIGNUM *rsa_p(struct sshkey *k);
+const BIGNUM *rsa_q(struct sshkey *k);
+const BIGNUM *dsa_g(struct sshkey *k);
+const BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key(struct sshkey *k);
+const BIGNUM *dsa_priv_key(struct sshkey *k);
+
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh b/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..fcd78e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.11 2020/06/19 03:48:49 djm Exp $
+
+PW=mekmitasdigoat
+
+rsa_params() {
+	_in="$1"
+	_outbase="$2"
+	set -e
+	openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    awk '/^modulus:$/,/^publicExponent:/' | \
+	    grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.n
+	openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    awk '/^prime1:$/,/^prime2:/' | \
+	    grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.p
+	openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    awk '/^prime2:$/,/^exponent1:/' | \
+	    grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.q
+	for x in n p q ; do
+		echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x
+		echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x
+		cat ${_outbase}.$x
+		echo ============
+	done
+}
+
+dsa_params() {
+	_in="$1"
+	_outbase="$2"
+	set -e
+	openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    awk '/^priv:$/,/^pub:/' | \
+	    grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.priv
+	openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    awk '/^pub:/,/^P:/' | #\
+	    grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.pub
+	openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    awk '/^G:/,0' | \
+	    grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.g
+	for x in priv pub g ; do
+		echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x
+		echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x
+		cat ${_outbase}.$x
+		echo ============
+	done
+}
+
+ecdsa_params() {
+	_in="$1"
+	_outbase="$2"
+	set -e
+	openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    awk '/^priv:$/,/^pub:/' | \
+	    grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.priv
+	openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    awk '/^pub:/,/^ASN1 OID:/' | #\
+	    grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.pub
+	openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \
+	    grep "ASN1 OID:" | \
+	    sed 's/.*: //;s/ *$//' | tr -d '\n' > ${_outbase}.curve
+	for x in priv pub curve ; do
+		echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x
+		echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x
+		cat ${_outbase}.$x
+		echo ============
+	done
+}
+
+set -ex
+
+cd testdata
+
+if [ -f ../../../misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so ] ; then
+	SK_DUMMY=../../../misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
+elif [ -f ../../../misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so ] ; then
+	SK_DUMMY=../../../misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so
+else
+	echo "Can't find sk-dummy.so" 1>&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+rm -f rsa_1 dsa_1 ecdsa_1 ed25519_1
+rm -f rsa_2 dsa_2 ecdsa_2 ed25519_2
+rm -f rsa_n dsa_n ecdsa_n # new-format keys
+rm -f rsa_1_pw dsa_1_pw ecdsa_1_pw ed25519_1_pw
+rm -f rsa_n_pw dsa_n_pw ecdsa_n_pw
+rm -f pw *.pub *.bn.* *.param.* *.fp *.fp.bb
+
+ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 1024 -C "RSA test key #1" -N "" -f rsa_1 -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #1" -N "" -f dsa_1 -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 256 -C "ECDSA test key #1" -N "" -f ecdsa_1 -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key #1" -N "" -f ed25519_1
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ecdsa-sk -C "ECDSA-SK test key #1" \
+    -N "" -f ecdsa_sk1
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ed25519-sk -C "ED25519-SK test key #1" \
+    -N "" -f ed25519_sk1
+
+
+ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -C "RSA test key #2" -N "" -f rsa_2 -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #2" -N "" -f dsa_2 -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 521 -C "ECDSA test key #2" -N "" -f ecdsa_2 -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key #2" -N "" -f ed25519_2
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ecdsa-sk -C "ECDSA-SK test key #2" \
+    -N "" -f ecdsa_sk2
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ed25519-sk -C "ED25519-SK test key #2" \
+    -N "" -f ed25519_sk2
+
+cp rsa_1 rsa_n
+cp dsa_1 dsa_n
+cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_n
+
+ssh-keygen -pf rsa_n -N ""
+ssh-keygen -pf dsa_n -N ""
+ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_n -N ""
+
+cp rsa_1 rsa_1_pw
+cp dsa_1 dsa_1_pw
+cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_1_pw
+cp ed25519_1 ed25519_1_pw
+cp ecdsa_sk1 ecdsa_sk1_pw
+cp ed25519_sk1 ed25519_sk1_pw
+cp rsa_1 rsa_n_pw
+cp dsa_1 dsa_n_pw
+cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_n_pw
+
+ssh-keygen -pf rsa_1_pw -m PEM -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf dsa_1_pw -m PEM -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_1_pw -m PEM -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf ed25519_1_pw -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_sk1_pw -m PEM -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf ed25519_sk1_pw -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf rsa_n_pw -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf dsa_n_pw -N "$PW"
+ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_n_pw -N "$PW"
+
+rsa_params rsa_1 rsa_1.param
+rsa_params rsa_2 rsa_2.param
+dsa_params dsa_1 dsa_1.param
+dsa_params dsa_1 dsa_1.param
+ecdsa_params ecdsa_1 ecdsa_1.param
+ecdsa_params ecdsa_2 ecdsa_2.param
+# XXX ed25519, *sk params
+
+ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
+    -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 1 rsa_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
+    -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 2 dsa_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
+    -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 3 ecdsa_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
+    -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 4 ed25519_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
+    -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 4 ecdsa_sk1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \
+    -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 4 ed25519_sk1.pub
+
+
+# Make a few RSA variant signature too.
+cp rsa_1 rsa_1_sha1
+cp rsa_1 rsa_1_sha512
+cp rsa_1.pub rsa_1_sha1.pub
+cp rsa_1.pub rsa_1_sha512.pub
+ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 -t ssh-rsa \
+    -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 1 rsa_1_sha1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 -t rsa-sha2-512 \
+    -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 1 rsa_1_sha512.pub
+
+ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 5 rsa_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 6 dsa_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s ecdsa_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 7 ecdsa_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 8 ed25519_1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s ecdsa_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 7 ecdsa_sk1.pub
+ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \
+    -V 19990101:20110101 -z 8 ed25519_sk1.pub
+
+ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf dsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_sk1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_sk1.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_sk1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_sk1.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf rsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_2.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf dsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_2.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_2.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_2.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_sk2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_sk2.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_sk2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_sk2.fp
+
+ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1-cert.pub  | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1-cert.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf dsa_1-cert.pub  | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1-cert.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_1-cert.pub  | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1-cert.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_1-cert.pub  | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1-cert.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_sk1-cert.pub  | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_sk1-cert.fp
+ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_sk1-cert.pub  | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_sk1-cert.fp
+
+ssh-keygen -Bf rsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf dsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_sk1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_sk1.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_sk1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_sk1.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf rsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_2.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf dsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_2.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_2.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_2.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_sk2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_sk2.fp.bb
+ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_sk2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_sk2.fp.bb
+
+echo "$PW" > pw
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..497ab6d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
@@ -0,0 +1,559 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_file.c,v 1.10 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshkey.h key management API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+void sshkey_file_tests(void);
+
+void
+sshkey_file_tests(void)
+{
+	struct sshkey *k1, *k2;
+	struct sshbuf *buf, *pw;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	BIGNUM *a, *b, *c;
+#endif
+	char *cp;
+
+	TEST_START("load passphrase");
+	pw = load_text_file("pw");
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	TEST_START("parse RSA from private");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	a = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.n");
+	b = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.p");
+	c = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.q");
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(rsa_n(k1), a);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(rsa_p(k1), b);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(rsa_q(k1), c);
+	BN_free(a);
+	BN_free(b);
+	BN_free(c);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse RSA from private w/ passphrase");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_1_pw");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse RSA from new-format");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_n");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse RSA from new-format w/ passphrase");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_n_pw");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load RSA from public");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa");
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "rsa-sha2-512");
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load RSA cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("RSA key hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("rsa_1.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("RSA cert hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("rsa_1-cert.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("RSA key bubblebabble fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("rsa_1.fp.bb");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+
+	TEST_START("parse DSA from private");
+	buf = load_file("dsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	a = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.g");
+	b = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.priv");
+	c = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.pub");
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(dsa_g(k1), a);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(dsa_priv_key(k1), b);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(dsa_pub_key(k1), c);
+	BN_free(a);
+	BN_free(b);
+	BN_free(c);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse DSA from private w/ passphrase");
+	buf = load_file("dsa_1_pw");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse DSA from new-format");
+	buf = load_file("dsa_n");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse DSA from new-format w/ passphrase");
+	buf = load_file("dsa_n_pw");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load DSA from public");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("dsa_1.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load DSA cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("dsa_1"), &k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_DSA_CERT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("DSA key hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("dsa_1.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("DSA cert hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("dsa_1-cert.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("DSA key bubblebabble fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("dsa_1.fp.bb");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("parse ECDSA from private");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.param.curve");
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ((const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf),
+	    OBJ_nid2sn(k1->ecdsa_nid));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	a = load_bignum("ecdsa_1.param.priv");
+	b = load_bignum("ecdsa_1.param.pub");
+	c = EC_POINT_point2bn(EC_KEY_get0_group(k1->ecdsa),
+	    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k1->ecdsa), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+	    NULL, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(c, NULL);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), a);
+	ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(b, c);
+	BN_free(a);
+	BN_free(b);
+	BN_free(c);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse ECDSA from private w/ passphrase");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_1_pw");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse ECDSA from new-format");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_n");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse ECDSA from new-format w/ passphrase");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_n_pw");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load ECDSA from public");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_1.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load ECDSA cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_1"), &k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ECDSA_CERT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ECDSA key hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ECDSA cert hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1-cert.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ECDSA key bubblebabble fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.fp.bb");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+	TEST_START("parse Ed25519 from private");
+	buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519);
+	/* XXX check key contents */
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse Ed25519 from private w/ passphrase");
+	buf = load_file("ed25519_1_pw");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load Ed25519 from public");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_1.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load Ed25519 cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_1"), &k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ED25519_CERT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("Ed25519 key hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("Ed25519 cert hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1-cert.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("Ed25519 key bubblebabble fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1.fp.bb");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+	TEST_START("parse ECDSA-SK from private");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_sk1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ECDSA_SK);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse ECDSA-SK from private w/ passphrase");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_sk1_pw");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load ECDSA-SK from public");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_sk1.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load ECDSA-SK cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_sk1"), &k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ECDSA-SK key hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_sk1.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ECDSA-SK cert hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_sk1-cert.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("ECDSA-SK key bubblebabble fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_sk1.fp.bb");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+#endif
+
+	TEST_START("parse Ed25519-SK from private");
+	buf = load_file("ed25519_sk1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519_SK);
+	/* XXX check key contents */
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("parse Ed25519-SK from private w/ passphrase");
+	buf = load_file("ed25519_sk1_pw");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf,
+	    (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), &k2, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load Ed25519-SK from public");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_sk1.pub"),
+	    &k2, NULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("load Ed25519-SK cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_sk1"), &k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("Ed25519-SK key hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ed25519_sk1.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("Ed25519-SK cert hex fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ed25519_sk1-cert.fp");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("Ed25519-SK key bubblebabble fingerprint");
+	buf = load_text_file("ed25519_sk1.fp.bb");
+	cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	free(cp);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+#endif /* ENABLE_SK */
+
+	sshbuf_free(pw);
+
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2fae19d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_fuzz.c,v 1.13 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Fuzz tests for key parsing
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+void sshkey_fuzz_tests(void);
+
+static void
+onerror(void *fuzz)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "Failed during fuzz:\n");
+	fuzz_dump((struct fuzz *)fuzz);
+}
+
+static void
+public_fuzz(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	struct sshkey *k1;
+	struct sshbuf *buf;
+	struct fuzz *fuzz;
+	u_int fuzzers = FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP |
+	    FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END;
+
+	if (test_is_fast())
+		fuzzers &= ~FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP;
+	if (test_is_slow())
+		fuzzers |= FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP;
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(buf = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(k, buf), 0);
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(fuzzers, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf),
+	    &k1), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		if (sshkey_from_blob(fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz), &k1) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+	}
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+}
+
+static void
+sig_fuzz(struct sshkey *k, const char *sig_alg)
+{
+	struct fuzz *fuzz;
+	u_char *sig, c[] = "some junk to be signed";
+	size_t l;
+	u_int fuzzers = FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP |
+	    FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END;
+
+	if (test_is_fast())
+		fuzzers &= ~FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP;
+	if (test_is_slow())
+		fuzzers |= FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP;
+
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &l, c, sizeof(c),
+	    sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(l, 0);
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(fuzzers, sig, l);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, l, c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+	free(sig);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		/* Ensure 1-bit difference at least */
+		if (fuzz_matches_original(fuzz))
+			continue;
+		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz),
+		    c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+	}
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+}
+
+#define NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS	1024
+
+void
+sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
+{
+	struct sshkey *k1;
+	struct sshbuf *buf, *fuzzed;
+	struct fuzz *fuzz;
+	int r, i;
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	TEST_START("fuzz RSA private");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
+	    sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+		if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+		sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+		if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
+			break;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz RSA new-format private");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_n");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
+	    sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+		if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+		sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+		if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
+			break;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz DSA private");
+	buf = load_file("dsa_1");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
+	    sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+		if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+		sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+		if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
+			break;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz DSA new-format private");
+	buf = load_file("dsa_n");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
+	    sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+		if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+		sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+		if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
+			break;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA private");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
+	    sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+		if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+		sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+		if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
+			break;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA new-format private");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_n");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
+	    sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+		if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+		sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+		if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
+			break;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 private");
+	buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
+	fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
+	    sshbuf_len(buf));
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
+	TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
+	for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
+		r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
+		if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
+			sshkey_free(k1);
+		sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
+		if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
+			break;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
+	fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	TEST_START("fuzz RSA public");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	public_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz RSA cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0);
+	public_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz DSA public");
+	buf = load_file("dsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	public_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz DSA cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("dsa_1"), &k1), 0);
+	public_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA public");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	public_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_1"), &k1), 0);
+	public_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 public");
+	buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	public_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 cert");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_1"), &k1), 0);
+	public_fuzz(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa");
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	sig_fuzz(k1, "rsa-sha2-256");
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA512 sig");
+	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	sig_fuzz(k1, "rsa-sha2-512");
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz DSA sig");
+	buf = load_file("dsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA sig");
+	buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+	TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 sig");
+	buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+/* XXX fuzz decoded new-format blobs too */
+/* XXX fuzz XMSS too */
+
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc359ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,528 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.23 2023/01/04 22:48:57 tb Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshkey.h key management API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256)
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1	/* access internals for testing */
+#include "sshkey.h"
+
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "common.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+
+void sshkey_tests(void);
+
+static void
+put_opt(struct sshbuf *b, const char *name, const char *value)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *sect;
+
+	sect = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sect, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, name), 0);
+	if (value != NULL)
+		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, value), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, sect), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(sect);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+static void
+build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
+    struct sshkey *sign_key, struct sshkey *ca_key,
+    const char *sig_alg)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *ca_buf, *pk, *principals, *critopts, *exts;
+	u_char *sigblob;
+	size_t siglen;
+
+	ca_buf = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Get the public key serialisation by rendering the key and skipping
+	 * the type string. This is a bit of a hack :/
+	 */
+	pk = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(pk, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb_plain(k, pk), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_skip_string(pk), 0);
+
+	principals = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(principals, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gsamsa"), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gregor"), 0);
+
+	critopts = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(critopts, NULL);
+	put_opt(critopts, "force-command", "/usr/local/bin/nethack");
+	put_opt(critopts, "source-address", "192.168.0.0/24,127.0.0.1,::1");
+
+	exts = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(exts, NULL);
+	put_opt(critopts, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL);
+
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, type), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "noncenoncenonce!"), 0); /* nonce */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_putb(b, pk), 0); /* public key serialisation */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 1234), 0); /* serial */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(b, SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER), 0); /* type */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "gregor"), 0); /* key ID */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, principals), 0); /* principals */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0), 0); /* start */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0xffffffffffffffffULL), 0); /* end */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, critopts), 0); /* options */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, exts), 0); /* extensions */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen,
+	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
+
+	free(sigblob);
+	sshbuf_free(ca_buf);
+	sshbuf_free(exts);
+	sshbuf_free(critopts);
+	sshbuf_free(principals);
+	sshbuf_free(pk);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+static void
+signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg,
+    const u_char *d, size_t l)
+{
+	size_t len;
+	u_char *sig;
+
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
+	    NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+	/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
+	sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
+	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+	free(sig);
+}
+
+static void
+banana(u_char *s, size_t l)
+{
+	size_t o;
+	const u_char the_banana[] = { 'b', 'a', 'n', 'a', 'n', 'a' };
+
+	for (o = 0; o < l; o += sizeof(the_banana)) {
+		if (l - o < sizeof(the_banana)) {
+			memcpy(s + o, "nanananana", l - o);
+			break;
+		}
+		memcpy(s + o, the_banana, sizeof(the_banana));
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+signature_tests(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg)
+{
+	u_char i, buf[2049];
+	size_t lens[] = {
+		1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 31, 32, 33, 127, 128, 129,
+		255, 256, 257, 1023, 1024, 1025, 2047, 2048, 2049
+	};
+
+	for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(lens)/sizeof(lens[0])); i++) {
+		test_subtest_info("%s key, banana length %zu",
+		    sshkey_type(k), lens[i]);
+		banana(buf, lens[i]);
+		signature_test(k, bad, sig_alg, buf, lens[i]);
+	}
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+get_private(const char *n)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	struct sshkey *ret;
+
+	b = load_file(n);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(b, "", &ret, NULL), 0);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+sshkey_tests(void)
+{
+	struct sshkey *k1, *k2, *k3, *kf;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	struct sshkey *k4, *kr, *kd;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	struct sshkey *ke;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+
+	TEST_START("new invalid");
+	k1 = sshkey_new(-42);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("new/free KEY_UNSPEC");
+	k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	TEST_START("new/free KEY_RSA");
+	k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("new/free KEY_DSA");
+	k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_DSA);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("new/free KEY_ECDSA");
+	k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ECDSA);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ecdsa, NULL);  /* Can't allocate without NID */
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+
+	TEST_START("new/free KEY_ED25519");
+	k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ED25519);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	/* These should be blank until key loaded or generated */
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too small modulus");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 128, &k1),
+	    SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too large modulus");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1 << 20, &k1),
+	    SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA wrong bits");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 2048, &k1),
+	    SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA wrong bits");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 42, &k1),
+	    SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+
+	TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 767, &kr),
+	    SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &kr), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_n(kr), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_e(kr), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_p(kr), NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(rsa_n(kr)), 1024);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &kd), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_g(kd), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_priv_key(kd), NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &ke), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke->ecdsa, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+	TEST_START("generate KEY_ED25519");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &kf), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(kf->type, KEY_ED25519);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_pk, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_sk, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	TEST_START("demote KEY_RSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kr, &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, k1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_RSA);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_n(k1), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_e(k1), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(rsa_p(k1), NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("equal KEY_RSA/demoted KEY_RSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("demote KEY_DSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kd, &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, k1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_DSA);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_g(k1), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dsa_priv_key(k1), NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("equal KEY_DSA/demoted KEY_DSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("demote KEY_ECDSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(ke, &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, k1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ECDSA);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ecdsa, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->ecdsa_nid, ke->ecdsa_nid);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("equal KEY_ECDSA/demoted KEY_ECDSA");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+	TEST_START("demote KEY_ED25519");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kf, &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, k1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("equal KEY_ED25519/demoted KEY_ED25519");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	TEST_START("equal mismatched key types");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kr), 0);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, ke), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, ke), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, kf), 0);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kf), 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+	TEST_START("equal different keys");
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 0);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	sshkey_free(kr);
+	sshkey_free(kd);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	sshkey_free(ke);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	sshkey_free(kf);
+
+	TEST_START("certify key");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_1.pub"),
+	    &k1, NULL), 0);
+	k2 = get_private("ed25519_2");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_to_certified(k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert, NULL);
+	k1->cert->type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER;
+	k1->cert->serial = 1234;
+	k1->cert->key_id = strdup("estragon");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->key_id, NULL);
+	k1->cert->principals = calloc(4, sizeof(*k1->cert->principals));
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals, NULL);
+	k1->cert->principals[0] = strdup("estragon");
+	k1->cert->principals[1] = strdup("vladimir");
+	k1->cert->principals[2] = strdup("pozzo");
+	k1->cert->principals[3] = strdup("lucky");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[0], NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[1], NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[2], NULL);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[3], NULL);
+	k1->cert->nprincipals = 4;
+	k1->cert->valid_after = 0;
+	k1->cert->valid_before = (u_int64_t)-1;
+	sshbuf_free(k1->cert->critical);
+	k1->cert->critical = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->critical, NULL);
+	sshbuf_free(k1->cert->extensions);
+	k1->cert->extensions = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->extensions, NULL);
+	put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "force-command", "/usr/bin/true");
+	put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "source-address", "127.0.0.1");
+	put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL);
+	put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-agent-forwarding", NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(k2, &k1->cert->signature_key), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_certify(k1, k2, NULL, NULL, NULL), 0);
+	b = sshbuf_new();
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(b, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(k1, b), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k3), 0);
+
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	sshkey_free(k3);
+	sshbuf_reset(b);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	TEST_START("sign and verify RSA");
+	k1 = get_private("rsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	signature_tests(k1, k2, "ssh-rsa");
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sign and verify RSA-SHA256");
+	k1 = get_private("rsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	signature_tests(k1, k2, "rsa-sha2-256");
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sign and verify RSA-SHA512");
+	k1 = get_private("rsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	signature_tests(k1, k2, "rsa-sha2-512");
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("sign and verify DSA");
+	k1 = get_private("dsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("dsa_2.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("sign and verify ECDSA");
+	k1 = get_private("ecdsa_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_2.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+	TEST_START("sign and verify ED25519");
+	k1 = get_private("ed25519_1");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_2.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	TEST_START("nested certificate");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
+	    NULL), 0);
+	k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
+	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
+	    SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
+	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
+	sshkey_free(k1);
+	sshkey_free(k2);
+	sshkey_free(k3);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d3f2482
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..75ff0e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:kOLgXSoAT8O5T6r36n5NJUYigbux1d7gdH/rmWiJm6s
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e768db1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 DSA test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..75ff0e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:kOLgXSoAT8O5T6r36n5NJUYigbux1d7gdH/rmWiJm6s
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba37776
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xetag-todiz-mifah-torec-mynyv-cyvit-gopon-pygag-rupic-cenav-bexax
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e51c3f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+00eee5f505556d24a8cb996ae9c3adbe97fc525c0e6bafb30706e5a3882615dd51c17d725a403c910ed1ae109283c1dcea62069ca460291962ff72e06d27d9d286c525e86446d116b4de0f87c7d551e4bbe2241b23015078a9581c894d4d1a06b406dd8b79c7755f81064110735577ae3a98aa18cea33ff236c8332cd0f6e87add
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4f74331
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+5821b43929f5ec66e04fb967b9149cf795d68483
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba0313b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+00e757a727e6a1b10168ea9902ebe08f53f4ba18c6d8fdf551fbabbf6d8558f054dc0f6aae4c5b397c04d0bc2f8c2bebb1057f96b621273fed8b2b38d1579a86e956644e520073171887fde4b88b4a0697323928ee3a28b7e2caf3896d2f29b067840c9d88e765249c95fd54bb240c714b5bdf8f88d2ef58727ca1a7699216c42d
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..41cae2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBAPqS600VGwdPAQC/p3f0uGyrLVql0cFn1zYd/JGvtabKnIYjLaYprje/NcjwI3CZFJiz4Dp3S8kLs+X5/1DMn/Tg1Y4D4yLB+6vCtHcJF7rVBFhvw/KZwc7G54ez3khyOtsg82fzpyOc8/mq+/+C5TMKO7DDjMF0k5emWKCsa3ZfAAAAFQCjA/+dKkMu4/CWjJPtfl7YNaStNQAAAIEA7uX1BVVtJKjLmWrpw62+l/xSXA5rr7MHBuWjiCYV3VHBfXJaQDyRDtGuEJKDwdzqYgacpGApGWL/cuBtJ9nShsUl6GRG0Ra03g+Hx9VR5LviJBsjAVB4qVgciU1NGga0Bt2Lecd1X4EGQRBzVXeuOpiqGM6jP/I2yDMs0Pboet0AAACBAOdXpyfmobEBaOqZAuvgj1P0uhjG2P31Ufurv22FWPBU3A9qrkxbOXwE0LwvjCvrsQV/lrYhJz/tiys40VeahulWZE5SAHMXGIf95LiLSgaXMjko7joot+LK84ltLymwZ4QMnYjnZSSclf1UuyQMcUtb34+I0u9Ycnyhp2mSFsQt DSA test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24c7303
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,BC8386C373B22EB7F00ADC821D5D8BE9
+
++HDV2DQ09sxrIAeXTz9r3YFuPRa2hk1+NGcr3ETkXbC6KiZ14wpTnGTloKwaQjIW
+eXTa9mpCOWAoohgvsVb+hOuOlP7AfeHu1IXV4EAS+GDpkiV5UxlCXXwqlD75Buu4
+wwDd/p4SWzILH3WGjDk5JIXoxWNY13LHwC7Q6gtGJx4AicUG7YBRTXMIBDa/Kh77
+6o2rFETKmp4VHBvHbakmiETfptdM8bbWxKWeY2vakThyESgeofsLoTOQCIwlEfJC
+s2D/KYL65C8VbHYgIoSLTQnooO45DDyxIuhCqP+H23mhv9vB1Od3nc2atgHj/XFs
+dcOPFkF/msDRYqxY3V0AS6+jpKwFodZ7g/hyGcyPxOkzlJVuKoKuH6P5PyQ69Gx0
+iqri0xEPyABr7kGlXNrjjctojX+B4WwSnjg/2euXXWFXCRalIdA7ErATTiQbGOx7
+Vd6Gn8PZbSy1MkqEDrZRip0pfAFJYI/8GXPC75BpnRsrVlfhtrngbW+kBP35LzaN
+l2K+RQ3gSB3iFoqNb1Kuu6T5MZlyVl5H2dVlJSeb1euQ2OycXdDoFTyJ4AiyWS7w
+Vlh8zeJnso5QRDjMwx99pZilbbuFGSLsahiGEveFc6o=
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3cc9631
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBvQIBAAKBgQCbyPXNdHeLsjpobPVCMkfagBkt15Zsltqf/PGNP1y1cuz7rsTX
+ZekQwUkSTNm5coqXe+ZOw2O4tjobJDd60I1/VPgaB0NYlQR9Hn87M284WD4f6VY+
+aunHmP134a8ybG5G4NqVNF3ihvxAR2pVITqb7kE46r2uYZNcNlHI8voRCwIVAMcP
+bwqFNsQbH5pJyZW30wj4KVZ3AoGBAIK98BVeKQVf8qDFqx9ovMuNgVSxpd+N0Yta
+5ZEy1OI2ziu5RhjueIM2K7Gq2Mnp38ob1AM53BUxqlcBJaHEDa6rj6yvuMgW9oCJ
+dImBM8sIFxfBbXNbpJiMaDwa6WyT84OkpDE6uuAepTMnWOUWkUVkAiyokHDUGXkG
+GyoQblbXAoGBAIsf7TaZ804sUWwRV0wI8DYx+hxD5QdrfYPYMtL2fHn3lICimGt0
+FTtUZ25jKg0E0DMBPdET6ZEHB3ZZkR8hFoUzZhdnyJMu3UjVtgaV88Ue3PrXxchk
+0W2jHPaAgQU3JIWzo8HFIFqvC/HEL+EyW3rBTY2uXM3XGI+YcWSA4ZrZAhUAsY2f
+bDFNzgZ4DaZ9wLRzTgOswPU=
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..51fbeb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:ecwhWcXgpdBxZ2e+OjpRRY7dqXHHCD62BGtoVQQBwCk
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4d908ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xeser-megad-pocan-rozit-belup-tapoh-fapif-kyvit-vonav-cehab-naxax
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77bb555
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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 DSA test key #2
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..657624e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24ac299
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..80382b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHcCAQEEIPPNyUAnjvFr+eT/7t/IyjuQQd/aLFiTY92LB9gIjyrMoAoGCCqGSM49
+AwEHoUQDQgAEDFlblkOrW9ydKVhtM+9AY3c9saBE7SG3lFx38nBavkADDaI9jh3/
+kvG/Jt9vpm22qwoklTCGDfzCkXkIKaWlBw==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e48304f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:8ty77fOpABat1y88aNdclQTfU+lVvWe7jYZGw8VYtfg
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55e2a25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 ECDSA test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e48304f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:8ty77fOpABat1y88aNdclQTfU+lVvWe7jYZGw8VYtfg
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa23c33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xibah-vocun-sogyn-byhen-rivem-hegyh-luneh-dozyr-vatyf-dufid-myxyx
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fa04004
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+prime256v1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc908ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+00f3cdc940278ef16bf9e4ffeedfc8ca3b9041dfda2c589363dd8b07d8088f2acc
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..71c9584
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+040c595b9643ab5bdc9d29586d33ef4063773db1a044ed21b7945c77f2705abe40030da23d8e1dff92f1bf26df6fa66db6ab0a249530860dfcc291790829a5a507
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..84a71f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBAxZW5ZDq1vcnSlYbTPvQGN3PbGgRO0ht5Rcd/JwWr5AAw2iPY4d/5Lxvybfb6ZttqsKJJUwhg38wpF5CCmlpQc= ECDSA test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c83a65
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,7BA38DE00F67851E4207216809C3BB15
+
+8QkFoZHQkj9a2mt032sp+WKaJ1fwteqWDd4RpAW9OzDgqzMx1QO43qJgBDTfhzjt
+M2Q8YfiGjfBEYpg4kCbacfcV68DEV4z6Ll7rIzzzO7OfWUNL++brD64vKx4z6f46
++sn4nbZTXilpkzi/nmPDVzrNmTSywA8T7Yf0QcBUxks=
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0f4e844
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIHcAgEBBEIBqBtN7e6Essd3dlsgISViPCXXC0atlNkGtoMgSQdBTKVUfeJOi4lc
+RZaXJdXnqWUqI/KEsH8h8QN4YcB8ugmAcc+gBwYFK4EEACOhgYkDgYYABAHZ2VNy
+oDedBwqsdzY+kkNptc9DrtRCVmO6cULLj+691MhItqVqTMJbTFlI4MnAg9PoGTF/
+0KmLJfy8vSffXGKqqwGKcFNtd1XCo+7Qu9tXbxron9g6Dmu7y8jaLkixcwZwnwLs
+6GmA9qZGuiAfOGV0Gf9/u98sr+vikOa4Ow5JFDTw5g==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..581e48a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:ed8YniRHA6qCrErCRnzrWxPHxYuA62a+CAFYUVxJgaI
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e1cc664
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xufag-danul-putub-mokin-pugaz-covid-dofag-nihuz-sysab-genar-zaxyx
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..617ea2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+secp521r1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dd898d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+01a81b4dedee84b2c777765b202125623c25d70b46ad94d906b683204907414ca5547de24e8b895c45969725d5e7a9652a23f284b07f21f1037861c07cba098071cf
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94301c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+0401d9d95372a0379d070aac77363e924369b5cf43aed4425663ba7142cb8feebdd4c848b6a56a4cc25b4c5948e0c9c083d3e819317fd0a98b25fcbcbd27df5c62aaab018a70536d7755c2a3eed0bbdb576f1ae89fd83a0e6bbbcbc8da2e48b17306709f02ece86980f6a646ba201f38657419ff7fbbdf2cafebe290e6b83b0e491434f0e6
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..be9d84b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBAHZ2VNyoDedBwqsdzY+kkNptc9DrtRCVmO6cULLj+691MhItqVqTMJbTFlI4MnAg9PoGTF/0KmLJfy8vSffXGKqqwGKcFNtd1XCo+7Qu9tXbxron9g6Dmu7y8jaLkixcwZwnwLs6GmA9qZGuiAfOGV0Gf9/u98sr+vikOa4Ow5JFDTw5g== ECDSA test key #2
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9694f32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAaAAAABNlY2RzYS
+1zaGEyLW5pc3RwMjU2AAAACG5pc3RwMjU2AAAAQQQMWVuWQ6tb3J0pWG0z70Bjdz2xoETt
+IbeUXHfycFq+QAMNoj2OHf+S8b8m32+mbbarCiSVMIYN/MKReQgppaUHAAAAoFrmmZBa5p
+mQAAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBAxZW5ZDq1vcnSlY
+bTPvQGN3PbGgRO0ht5Rcd/JwWr5AAw2iPY4d/5Lxvybfb6ZttqsKJJUwhg38wpF5CCmlpQ
+cAAAAhAPPNyUAnjvFr+eT/7t/IyjuQQd/aLFiTY92LB9gIjyrMAAAAAAECAwQFBgc=
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36b7fa7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jYmMAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABC4UwEov5
+z0RrCm7AMCxbuiAAAAEAAAAAEAAABoAAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlz
+dHAyNTYAAABBBAxZW5ZDq1vcnSlYbTPvQGN3PbGgRO0ht5Rcd/JwWr5AAw2iPY4d/5Lxvy
+bfb6ZttqsKJJUwhg38wpF5CCmlpQcAAACgbCnAklQTHrf5qiHiMxKYwQJ7k/X9mp4fXD4v
+xUbgNZiXSxN26mn8mC2rH+WA6Lk3CexR/hrtLI2ndpBsYu1h6HhVkOwwm3Kd/PMKArCupW
+l6sYEabrT0EghXR/3aDEZvj79hgKSdu3RpayLvMdbCR8k1cg0/mDmR9hicWfeJ61n/IH05
+tUR268+0BVRW9kDhh/cuv8tVY4L09jCCQ6CpsA==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b51fb73
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d192145
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:Go7HO0CVPYG+BSDSk9ZUJBKGSrtBExp6obTa9iqzIUo
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9586c61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 ECDSA-SK test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d192145
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:Go7HO0CVPYG+BSDSk9ZUJBKGSrtBExp6obTa9iqzIUo
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cb9f4dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xovem-sacac-dageg-vovoc-symyz-bozal-cibiv-cyvat-vylyn-romib-hoxax
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3b21e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBGdVPkKOLUMZ7b6rZfS8BOHotic4NX4MmuyEmiuvkaeKlbb1F+5oNezRYHpcF6P104trNVEONCu1XX1CA7px+QUAAAAEc3NoOg== ECDSA-SK test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1_pw
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4fa23a7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk1_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19db5a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1bc99ea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:pz8VkgtRY3r50F4zSuzRlmq9c6vPTpJXLKKOgkyUcKE
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bfee765
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xobel-gavur-gorym-pedop-rarob-bunek-gucer-lofeg-syhaf-fylur-zoxix
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2629d95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_sk2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBJOX5JHqtOCU5mZxCQK0nc936VaKd7Oj+AeTihl1lxNCyYRizvroGVYa4HYHPepBEtrpxew/7gr2QCMAnvN2gVQAAAAEc3NoOg== ECDSA-SK test key #2
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b0ae01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
+QyNTUxOQAAACBThupGO0X+FLQhbz8CoKPwc7V3JNsQuGtlsgN+F7SMGQAAAJjnj4Ao54+A
+KAAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACBThupGO0X+FLQhbz8CoKPwc7V3JNsQuGtlsgN+F7SMGQ
+AAAED3KgoDbjR54V7bdNpfKlQY5m20UK1QaHytkCR+6rZEDFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFvPwKgo/Bz
+tXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZAAAAE0VEMjU1MTkgdGVzdCBrZXkgIzEBAg==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a9674e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:L3k/oJubblSY0lB9Ulsl7emDMnRPKm/8udf2ccwk560
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..649b4e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIIxzuxl4z3uwAIslne8Huft+1n1IhHAlNbWZkQyyECCGAAAAIFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFvPwKgo/BztXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZAAAAAAAAAAgAAAACAAAABmp1bGl1cwAAABIAAAAFaG9zdDEAAAAFaG9zdDIAAAAANowB8AAAAABNHmBwAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACBThupGO0X+FLQhbz8CoKPwc7V3JNsQuGtlsgN+F7SMGQAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABABGTn+Bmz86Ajk+iqKCSdP5NClsYzn4alJd0V5bizhP0Kumc/HbqQfSt684J1WdSzih+EjvnTgBhK9jTBKb90AQ== ED25519 test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a9674e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:L3k/oJubblSY0lB9Ulsl7emDMnRPKm/8udf2ccwk560
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..309f2da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xubop-rekyd-bakal-nubuf-pahaf-gicuh-logeb-gocif-petod-galip-fuxux
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e533059
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFvPwKgo/BztXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZ ED25519 test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da94d2b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jdHIAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABDKT56mBA
+tXIMsWqmuuA2gdAAAAEAAAAAEAAAAzAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFOG6kY7Rf4UtCFv
+PwKgo/BztXck2xC4a2WyA34XtIwZAAAAoC13U47yfUOSZJePNUAwWXuFOk3aOKwPM5PMvK
+0zwRnMZZjgn+tsMAYPwhsT3Mx3h5QzvVGFyFEqsiK7j4vAotD+LVQeBN5TwWbUBx4lnoGs
+3iAfYVDakO/gNvVBDDGOqv5kdCc4cgn5HacjHQLKOAx6KzHe7JFn7uCywMdVVQjlpI6LHb
+mHkaKiVX/C2oiRnsoe17HZ8Fxyt3vd1qNM8BE=
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e4aed63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
+QyNTUxOQAAACDPVKyLnm3eZE0lm0IfM3Uy9AsdGSBtozcoCt21blYBCwAAAJix1mBGsdZg
+RgAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACDPVKyLnm3eZE0lm0IfM3Uy9AsdGSBtozcoCt21blYBCw
+AAAECZEQHXs18o3DKjhUYaTyt+bUbhqfMeqmsKjYyFvzGVgs9UrIuebd5kTSWbQh8zdTL0
+Cx0ZIG2jNygK3bVuVgELAAAAE0VEMjU1MTkgdGVzdCBrZXkgIzEBAg==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0496626
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:vMbaARqVciRgXyZPNHDo+P5p5WK5yWG1Oo6VC35Bomw
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..abba789
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xuces-bapyb-vikob-zesyv-budod-nupip-kebon-tacyc-fofed-lezic-soxax
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..af34236
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIM9UrIuebd5kTSWbQh8zdTL0Cx0ZIG2jNygK3bVuVgEL ED25519 test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4196d9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAASgAAABpzay1zc2
+gtZWQyNTUxOUBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAACAhaP5OS1PPOt7uumAvXlDtte9EHbqIT1EZEJ2y
+2v3XMwAAAARzc2g6AAAAuBocY6UaHGOlAAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY2
+9tAAAAICFo/k5LU8863u66YC9eUO2170QduohPURkQnbLa/dczAAAABHNzaDoBAAAAQJYq
+lGHhFoA25/q8X/rdTqDAb7dhqs4ehhd/w8x99CwiIWj+TktTzzre7rpgL15Q7bXvRB26iE
+9RGRCdstr91zMAAAAAAAAAFkVEMjU1MTktU0sgdGVzdCBrZXkgIzEBAgM=
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6bb1a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:6WZVJ44bqhAWLVP4Ns0TDkoSQSsZo/h2K+mEvOaNFbw
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3c72c26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAI3NrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIJr7CuMntQKvHoUshx374fJLFEkyxKsEOBA1H6hk5scoAAAAICFo/k5LU8863u66YC9eUO2170QduohPURkQnbLa/dczAAAABHNzaDoAAAAAAAAACAAAAAIAAAAGanVsaXVzAAAAEgAAAAVob3N0MQAAAAVob3N0MgAAAAA2i4NgAAAAAE0d4eAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAzAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIOo/0xneV3iM2qWEo5RUwvUYa2bjff292T5vvuXRomGQAAAAUwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAAECgsRGLDh1SI3m66MRp9D2iLP4wabQ0OrDgGidk7LsVn2XZHV5jBZN1RtNfe6PBMeVzfRtGUzOg18sO7H7uU+EC ED25519-SK test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6bb1a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:6WZVJ44bqhAWLVP4Ns0TDkoSQSsZo/h2K+mEvOaNFbw
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1bfe20a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xucac-vusip-tydoz-dudad-nerif-raran-tezun-cogyd-pamoh-bahef-ruxix
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..60fe00c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAICFo/k5LU8863u66YC9eUO2170QduohPURkQnbLa/dczAAAABHNzaDo= ED25519-SK test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1_pw
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c29ff0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk1_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jdHIAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABDr5R9Yf/
+ucEh0Ns6c34tcIAAAAEAAAAAEAAABKAAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29t
+AAAAICFo/k5LU8863u66YC9eUO2170QduohPURkQnbLa/dczAAAABHNzaDoAAADA2T6owx
+OSgKz4DvLnS3UJ/renbuew5mbkIWB1/y8xd3y5Usm08iUCAlKxep9dVRQvmyoTrc/7rHOM
+DkokNw+WgKambnlYT/9QfqViZ9iCBtbdmhLM6ksUCgQefvquRyXoJxlWstjXUll6Ru+ZbT
+H//Ss8C1bYtAiXR68OQ+rhDrvQxA9P8J1sGIlkuV3h8YXddSpyBW2Sn0LTHHBXYZo86cXZ
+G4Lnc8aGYm65eqdHgkfRmht3eS8DTdzEBfBNH5Ml
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b9b7489
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAASgAAABpzay1zc2
+gtZWQyNTUxOUBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAACAV8fu1Sc31QLK2R/zGPdN3ve5xuFvDc7mEAWxb
+aI+YcwAAAARzc2g6AAAAuJCMX5uQjF+bAAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY2
+9tAAAAIBXx+7VJzfVAsrZH/MY903e97nG4W8NzuYQBbFtoj5hzAAAABHNzaDoBAAAAQObE
+PajcKI1W30EKOhBb6u+Fgx464kf7EjnqDSg4l7gAFfH7tUnN9UCytkf8xj3Td73ucbhbw3
+O5hAFsW2iPmHMAAAAAAAAAFkVEMjU1MTktU0sgdGVzdCBrZXkgIzIBAgM=
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1c4369a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:b9BVPS5vuU4yu/FgweojLLg6zbfmBBoWLUgibdxxsoo
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f5fd9ef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xemac-tizim-dihep-supar-zupib-cukak-pasis-febeg-dyguv-hutec-dyxox
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c7ed9f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_sk2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIBXx+7VJzfVAsrZH/MY903e97nG4W8NzuYQBbFtoj5hzAAAABHNzaDo= ED25519-SK test key #2
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8a1dff9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+mekmitasdigoat
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5de3f84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIICXAIBAAKBgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18u
+d6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKd
+NSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+wIDAQAB
+AoGAXyj5mpjmbD+YlxGIWz/zrM4hGsWgd4VteKEJxT6MMI4uzCRpkMd0ck8oHiwZ
+GAI/SwUzIsgtONQuH3AXVsUgghW4Ynn+8ksEv0IZ918WDMDwqvqkyrVzsOsZzqYj
+Pf8DUDKCpwFjnlknJ04yvWBZvVhWtY4OiZ8GV0Ttsu3k+GECQQD1YHfvBb5FdJBv
+Uhde2Il+jaFia8mwVVNNaiD2ECxXx6CzGz54ZLEB9NPVfDUZK8lJ4UJDqelWNh3i
+PF3RefWDAkEA1CVBzAFL4mNwpleVPzrfy69xP3gWOa26MxM/GE6zx9jC7HgQ3KPa
+WKdG/FuHs085aTRDaDLmGcZ8IvMuu7NgKQJAcIOKmxR0Gd8IN7NZugjqixggb0Pj
+mLKXXwESGiJyYtHL0zTj4Uqyi6Ya2GJ66o7UXscmnmYz828fJtTtZBdbRwJBALfi
+C2QvA32Zv/0PEXibKXy996WSC4G3ShwXZKtHHKHvCxY5BDSbehk59VesZrVPyG2e
+NYdOBxD0cIlCzJE56/ECQAndVkxvO8hwyEFGGwF3faHIAe/OxVb+MjaU25//Pe1/
+h/e6tlCk4w9CODpyV685gV394eYwMcGDcIkipTNUDZs=
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79f380a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:l6itGumSMcRBBAFteCgmjQBIXqLK/jFGUH3viHX1RmE
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3bacf3c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAHHNzaC1yc2EtY2VydC12MDFAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAg98LhS2EHxLOWCLopZPwHdg/RJXusnkOqQXSc9R7aITkAAAADAQABAAAAgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18ud6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKdNSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+wAAAAAAAAAFAAAAAgAAAAZqdWxpdXMAAAASAAAABWhvc3QxAAAABWhvc3QyAAAAADaMAfAAAAAATR5gcAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgU4bqRjtF/hS0IW8/AqCj8HO1dyTbELhrZbIDfhe0jBkAAABTAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAQI3QGlUCzC07KorupxpDkkGy6tniaZ8EvBflzvv+itXWNchGvfUeHmVT6aX0sRqehdz/lR+GmXRoZBhofwh0qAM= RSA test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..79f380a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:l6itGumSMcRBBAFteCgmjQBIXqLK/jFGUH3viHX1RmE
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45bacd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xosis-fodod-votot-dibum-ryvac-rediz-naruf-votun-kevis-halis-gexux
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4933712
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+00cb5799544edec5ac00ec781fc21a1119ce9a288e3116e72f3e78fbcba6998adcc98c235f2e77abf1ce92b76f064b624552c9f2582341e622e1a176eef232b5bac1bf3881babc0b7d57a1ef4439170852e192bc329d3523354a39610eab916e50c507c913a2a5f2c7596aad779c5f297121438bd2313ebb4ad4d7debba43271fb
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4783d21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+00f56077ef05be4574906f52175ed8897e8da1626bc9b055534d6a20f6102c57c7a0b31b3e7864b101f4d3d57c35192bc949e14243a9e956361de23c5dd179f583
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..00fc8a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+00d42541cc014be26370a657953f3adfcbaf713f781639adba33133f184eb3c7d8c2ec7810dca3da58a746fc5b87b34f396934436832e619c67c22f32ebbb36029
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..23ef872
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18ud6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKdNSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+w== RSA test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b4c0674
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED
+DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,0C3F819F6EEA66A471BAEEDDA8171606
+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-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha1 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5de3f84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha1
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha1-cert.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha1-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff49d75
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha1-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAHHNzaC1yc2EtY2VydC12MDFAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAgy5PGFfSaEuSuXsjvKlMZGXYD0xlnqdZftuW9tMkUYz4AAAADAQABAAAAgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18ud6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKdNSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+wAAAAAAAAABAAAAAQAAAARodWdvAAAAEgAAAAV1c2VyMQAAAAV1c2VyMgAAAAA2i4NgAAAAAE0d4eAAAABEAAAADWZvcmNlLWNvbW1hbmQAAAALAAAABy9iaW4vbHMAAAAOc291cmNlLWFkZHJlc3MAAAAOAAAACjEwLjAuMC4wLzgAAABkAAAAFXBlcm1pdC1YMTEtZm9yd2FyZGluZwAAAAAAAAAXcGVybWl0LWFnZW50LWZvcndhcmRpbmcAAAAAAAAACnBlcm1pdC1wdHkAAAAAAAAADnBlcm1pdC11c2VyLXJjAAAAAAAAAAAAAAEXAAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQD00RRenvxICSYvj54CPiYHM86OT5xwI9XORNH6Zkl3JPCQkAEdQ3hyfhraROaHsSv43wJcKyKrEg5XUZ8fZ/BoKIGU4Rd5AmL9wyPGv2RVY7gWELqXVSpu89R2tQJRmMVMD38CH0wqCTuoZirlKMTen6yfgYuFEpuqar0uOIeAyaQG6/9rVKWK36tcfM7YXx8fmGSN4eK/JhWDDjlo28YJ7ZFF9umh5baZG2Ai/vL3BJ7C3pqaEQNdKj8XqaSoDvFWKfOujk1620Rcuj3W0D0dvp/rH8xz8YkM1dMqGlYIZ4nrF5acB58Nk5FYBjtj1hu4DGEQlWL1Avk1agU4DQLrAAABDwAAAAdzc2gtcnNhAAABAF5BtPY8FbmIekK/zNq6/Lp5agKT5zEVxqAyZKhp75bLRP+kOMZBVB9ZWrekZk6IAVAOCZGQzTsD4mxIQsxBLl8k5hvEWb90/+w9/BzW9ScOGQe+y0COa0QWWR7L3k1S8WX2oAGvtDWOj7Md85nij4ZSU9/QQQFVDF8VilWPSMxUf/3I1fqyDq7AWcZkGk/bFUN6K6RsCSxIPlGmKt0IauyvSMI2IT0XeRT242RngeeUW8vFrn9TXy9YxJRW+cSeLKCuu8agBYyQMXWQ+q39eZZqVYSoo7nFEEhtaLs8d6jzgGkcE9wGJ9KLgfY/mG2vX3gI4IzncKkVJRoeiDzXFIk= RSA test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha1.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha1.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..23ef872
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha1.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18ud6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKdNSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+w== RSA test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5de3f84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512-cert.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512-cert.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4745196
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512-cert.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 RSA test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..23ef872
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_sha512.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDLV5lUTt7FrADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18ud6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKdNSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylxIUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+w== RSA test key #1
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2 b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2441d52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4659639
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA256:NoQh0XBUuYUSWqnzOzOBnfpgJTRWLMj7BlWAb8IbjeE
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e9d1e4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+xogit-gupof-mydon-hocep-zuval-feson-rarif-cefar-tobar-ryvap-kuxex
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a669dbf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..be7c1c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+00fb82dee3474e88898acebcf23b8a970737490ea07abe5f7c0837c9a36111ca4792f3ad759945fc27d7f78c5accca2ffd8a85c24be949274ab17f8f797b9aaa76f584f28d617e6de3953d46307fa31ec12108ffdab3f105fb3df54156f4728fe07b1598bbb5c5e260d4f73d8b29532bfc6b9f07d8899f87ec819571c8b38e7a87
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f2c542
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+00f92f9f57e501dc41cc91ff3b4ad7a2283612d66c0d130f639d4c18376a54e5b5e1939f4d5966bb43929e448a426dadc1fae84cf0d56f64d8df04d1badcfc1fdc8e156d5cd4dcf860ec936fc166261136156010f6df10a70525867d7989fef6752fd8db6faf3fe018bbbc1fa862fb4155445e1a398468d78b4e77884bdf5c197d
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3322fbc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQD00RRenvxICSYvj54CPiYHM86OT5xwI9XORNH6Zkl3JPCQkAEdQ3hyfhraROaHsSv43wJcKyKrEg5XUZ8fZ/BoKIGU4Rd5AmL9wyPGv2RVY7gWELqXVSpu89R2tQJRmMVMD38CH0wqCTuoZirlKMTen6yfgYuFEpuqar0uOIeAyaQG6/9rVKWK36tcfM7YXx8fmGSN4eK/JhWDDjlo28YJ7ZFF9umh5baZG2Ai/vL3BJ7C3pqaEQNdKj8XqaSoDvFWKfOujk1620Rcuj3W0D0dvp/rH8xz8YkM1dMqGlYIZ4nrF5acB58Nk5FYBjtj1hu4DGEQlWL1Avk1agU4DQLr RSA test key #2
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b8e585e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----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+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..dc18373
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jYmMAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABAFw/Wg/V
+I5SAXWj/HJr9qeAAAAEAAAAAEAAACXAAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAgQDLV5lUTt7F
+rADseB/CGhEZzpoojjEW5y8+ePvLppmK3MmMI18ud6vxzpK3bwZLYkVSyfJYI0HmIuGhdu
+7yMrW6wb84gbq8C31Xoe9EORcIUuGSvDKdNSM1SjlhDquRblDFB8kToqXyx1lqrXecXylx
+IUOL0jE+u0rU1967pDJx+wAAAgD1iSGiMlMJt2VH4kx5yr0wCJS+4UOmX0bxKO7UH5Jcul
+K5eaSe5ZoKE7hTYBaz0K5dRF/0fqLsvVZlE4quDjFLN6Hyavgn2W/QM7SUqBHgRMal9pgH
+LnxX6mFNWJ+4yb7f3bcbVIdgmMm3sT9Xjwaf5xgzNlR2mkUWtFwjyQh6FxUo5apNzqNBwO
+l2Q4xfmyZTp1s++pStQ/su6obXpxnE2Nx5G/D84ZL5iWl+njUy/MvJTazHRbiTSyihU+UA
+mUr5ZNuP3WUYY+h3KVlHpYHJYB7l3AMTKuPMFLhY9V7BJ+DuKPaqBgX4hvRzY0eVQiFr61
+ovjWjvfu1ulx550JqdYCgH2PpP0E89OQne35Cxs9QPThfe8DKojC9YquYh9zmVTvr7kNiE
+Soluk/7oKpQIDaC+/SRk7AJ2e3Cbt1lXyGNn37PuqaaC/apaF/DOD6Yig9aClS7jOUrT96
+56trFAYfHEIKbRCUSMCiM1+x6HOLYf5ROrGE9KxT3kUD9XMsMpTva+cPpHUpbGpXcYE10N
+MyYDz+V5M2/ZoIdEhscJNQ3UnhaZpeEaqcOyNyo90n3Dnaw/WpMDD/kNMGfm8daTaYInnQ
+QnwA2gwlYfpTAqxE71oXgOuGmtA0yqJB4778Xq26Pb+B7/mZZZe6n0FVmiNC+ZG37ZGOw/
+iGL9e2Sxzw==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78aa922
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2014/06/24 01:14:18 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+void sshkey_tests(void);
+void sshkey_file_tests(void);
+void sshkey_fuzz_tests(void);
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+	sshkey_tests();
+	sshkey_file_tests();
+	sshkey_fuzz_tests();
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/Makefile b/regress/unittests/sshsig/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc3c6c7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.3 2023/01/15 23:35:10 djm Exp $
+
+PROG=test_sshsig
+SRCS=tests.c
+
+# From usr.bin/ssh
+SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
+SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c
+SRCS+=ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
+SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c
+SRCS+=addr.c addrmatch.c bitmap.c sshsig.c
+SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c
+SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-sk.c
+SRCS+=ssh-ed25519-sk.c sk-usbhid.c
+
+SRCS+=digest-openssl.c
+#SRCS+=digest-libc.c
+SRCS+=utf8.c
+
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+	env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} ${UNITTEST_ARGS} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/mktestdata.sh b/regress/unittests/sshsig/mktestdata.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..d2300f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/mktestdata.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.1 2020/06/19 04:32:09 djm Exp $
+
+NAMESPACE=unittest
+
+set -ex
+
+cd testdata
+
+if [ -f ../../../misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so ] ; then
+	SK_DUMMY=../../../misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
+elif [ -f ../../../misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so ] ; then
+	SK_DUMMY=../../../misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so
+else
+	echo "Can't find sk-dummy.so" 1>&2
+	exit 1
+fi
+
+rm -f signed-data namespace
+rm -f rsa dsa ecdsa ed25519 ecdsa_sk ed25519_sk
+rm -f rsa.sig dsa.sig ecdsa.sig ed25519.sig ecdsa_sk.sig ed25519_sk.sig
+
+printf "This is a test, this is only a test" > signed-data
+printf "$NAMESPACE" > namespace
+
+ssh-keygen -t rsa -C "RSA test" -N "" -f rsa -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t dsa -C "DSA test" -N "" -f dsa -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -C "ECDSA test" -N "" -f ecdsa -m PEM
+ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key" -N "" -f ed25519
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ecdsa-sk -C "ECDSA-SK test key" \
+    -N "" -f ecdsa_sk
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" -t ed25519-sk -C "ED25519-SK test key" \
+    -N "" -f ed25519_sk
+
+ssh-keygen -Y sign -f rsa -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > rsa.sig
+ssh-keygen -Y sign -f dsa -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > dsa.sig
+ssh-keygen -Y sign -f ecdsa -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > ecdsa.sig
+ssh-keygen -Y sign -f ed25519 -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > ed25519.sig
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" \
+	-Y sign -f ecdsa_sk -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > ecdsa_sk.sig
+ssh-keygen -w "$SK_DUMMY" \
+	-Y sign -f ed25519_sk -n $NAMESPACE - < signed-data > ed25519_sk.sig
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7c0063e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIBuwIBAAKBgQCXpndQdz2mQVnk+lYOF3nxDT+h6SiJmUvBFhnFWBv8tG4pTOkb
+EwGufLEzGpzjTj+3bjVau7LFt37AFrqs4Num272BWNsYNIjOlGPgq7Xjv32FN00x
+JYh1DoRs1cGGnvohlsWEamGGhTHD1a9ipctPEBV+NrxtZMrl+pO/ZZg8vQIVAKJB
+P3iNYSpSuW74+q4WxLCuK8O3AoGAQldE+BIuxlvoG1IFiWesx0CU+H2KO0SEZc9A
+SX/qjOabh0Fb78ofTlEf9gWHFfat8SvSJQIOPMVlb76Lio8AAMT8Eaa/qQKKYmQL
+dNq4MLhhjxx5KLGt6J2JyFPExCv+qnHYHD59ngtLwKyqGjpSC8LPLktdXn8W/Aad
+Ly1K7+MCgYBsMHBczhSeUh8w7i20CVg4OlNTmfJRVU2tO6OpMxZ/quitRm3hLKSN
+u4xRkvHJwi4LhQtv1SXvLI5gs5P3gCG8tsIAiyCqLinHha63iBdJpqhnV/x/j7dB
+yJr3xJbnmLdWLkkCtNk1Ir1/CuEz+ufAyLGdKWksEAu1UUlb501BkwIVAILIa3Rg
+0h7J9lQpHJphvF3K0M1T
+-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.pub b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e77aa7e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-dss 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 DSA test
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.sig b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.sig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b14ad6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/dsa.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----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+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55fb440
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----
+MHcCAQEEIFg0ZCSEB5LNeLsXYL25g3kqEWsqh52DR+yNOjyQJqyZoAoGCCqGSM49
+AwEHoUQDQgAE3sud88FV0N8FPspZSV7LWqj6uPPLRZiSsenNuEYAteWPyDgrZsWb
+LzXBuUJucepaCNuW/QWgHBRbrjWj3ERm3A==
+-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.pub b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..14ec6cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBN7LnfPBVdDfBT7KWUley1qo+rjzy0WYkrHpzbhGALXlj8g4K2bFmy81wblCbnHqWgjblv0FoBwUW641o9xEZtw= ECDSA test
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.sig b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.sig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7978157
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAAGgAAAATZWNkc2Etc2hhMi1uaXN0cDI1NgAAAAhuaXN0cDI1NgAAAE
+EE3sud88FV0N8FPspZSV7LWqj6uPPLRZiSsenNuEYAteWPyDgrZsWbLzXBuUJucepaCNuW
+/QWgHBRbrjWj3ERm3AAAAAh1bml0dGVzdAAAAAAAAAAGc2hhNTEyAAAAZQAAABNlY2RzYS
+1zaGEyLW5pc3RwMjU2AAAASgAAACEAycVNsTlE+XEZYyYiDxWZlliruf/pPMhEEMR/XLdQ
+a4MAAAAhALQt+5gES7L3uKGptHB6UZQMuZ2WyI0C6FJs4v6AtMIU
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..62ae44c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAfwAAACJzay1lY2
+RzYS1zaGEyLW5pc3RwMjU2QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAACG5pc3RwMjU2AAAAQQSg1WuY0XE+
+VexOsrJsFYuxyVoe6eQ/oXmyz2pEHKZw9moyWehv+Fs7oZWFp3JVmOtybKQ6dvfUZYauQE
+/Ov4PAAAAABHNzaDoAAAGI6iV41+oleNcAAAAic2stZWNkc2Etc2hhMi1uaXN0cDI1NkBv
+cGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAAAhuaXN0cDI1NgAAAEEEoNVrmNFxPlXsTrKybBWLsclaHunkP6F5ss
+9qRBymcPZqMlnob/hbO6GVhadyVZjrcmykOnb31GWGrkBPzr+DwAAAAARzc2g6AQAAAOMt
+LS0tLUJFR0lOIEVDIFBSSVZBVEUgS0VZLS0tLS0KTUhjQ0FRRUVJQm9oeW54M2tpTFVEeS
+t5UjU3WXBXSU5KektnU1p6WnV2VTljYXFla3JGcW9Bb0dDQ3FHU000OQpBd0VIb1VRRFFn
+QUVvTlZybU5GeFBsWHNUckt5YkJXTHNjbGFIdW5rUDZGNXNzOXFSQnltY1BacU1sbm9iL2
+hiCk82R1ZoYWR5VlpqcmNteWtPbmIzMUdXR3JrQlB6citEd0E9PQotLS0tLUVORCBFQyBQ
+UklWQVRFIEtFWS0tLS0tCgAAAAAAAAARRUNEU0EtU0sgdGVzdCBrZXk=
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.pub b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..385ebf1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBKDVa5jRcT5V7E6ysmwVi7HJWh7p5D+hebLPakQcpnD2ajJZ6G/4WzuhlYWnclWY63JspDp299Rlhq5AT86/g8AAAAAEc3NoOg== ECDSA-SK test key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.sig b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.sig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..86de360
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAAH8AAAAic2stZWNkc2Etc2hhMi1uaXN0cDI1NkBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQ
+AAAAhuaXN0cDI1NgAAAEEEoNVrmNFxPlXsTrKybBWLsclaHunkP6F5ss9qRBymcPZqMlno
+b/hbO6GVhadyVZjrcmykOnb31GWGrkBPzr+DwAAAAARzc2g6AAAACHVuaXR0ZXN0AAAAAA
+AAAAZzaGE1MTIAAAB3AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20A
+AABIAAAAIHohGwyy8iKT3zwd1TYA9V/Ioo7h/3zCJUtyq/Qigt/HAAAAIGzidTwq7D/kFa
+7Xjcp/KkdbIs4MfQpfAW/0OciajlpzARI0Vng=
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.pub b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1597302
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInNrLWVjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTZAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBBRGwDjs4HhJFcn4tJ5Gr72KcmRmCS1OirETxaXvnsNApgoOLF1a/7rxldfSMHm73eT1nhHe97W8qicPPEAKDJQAAAALbWluZHJvdC5vcmc=
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.sig b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.sig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4bdd8ed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ecdsa_sk_webauthn.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAAIYAAAAic2stZWNkc2Etc2hhMi1uaXN0cDI1NkBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQ
+AAAAhuaXN0cDI1NgAAAEEEFEbAOOzgeEkVyfi0nkavvYpyZGYJLU6KsRPFpe+ew0CmCg4s
+XVr/uvGV19Iwebvd5PWeEd73tbyqJw88QAoMlAAAAAttaW5kcm90Lm9yZwAAAAh1bml0dG
+VzdAAAAAAAAAAGc2hhNTEyAAABhwAAACt3ZWJhdXRobi1zay1lY2RzYS1zaGEyLW5pc3Rw
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+czovL3d3dy5taW5kcm90Lm9yZwAAAON7InR5cGUiOiJ3ZWJhdXRobi5nZXQiLCJjaGFsbG
+VuZ2UiOiJVMU5JVTBsSEFBQUFDSFZ1YVhSMFpYTjBBQUFBQUFBQUFBWnphR0UxTVRJQUFB
+QkFMTHU4WmdjU3h0Nk1zRlV6dWlaZ0c2R3dNZEo5ZDd4ZUU3WW9SSXcwZzlpSEpfd3NGRD
+cxbzRXbHllenZGV0VqYnFRMHFDN0Z3R3Bqa2pVUVAtTmQ2dyIsIm9yaWdpbiI6Imh0dHBz
+Oi8vd3d3Lm1pbmRyb3Qub3JnIiwiY3Jvc3NPcmlnaW4iOmZhbHNlfQAAAAA=
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519 b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b44a63d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW
+QyNTUxOQAAACCJYs0iDdw0Fe/FTzY1b78I4H/j+R6mz2AmLtwTjHYwBAAAAJjpGas/6Rmr
+PwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACCJYs0iDdw0Fe/FTzY1b78I4H/j+R6mz2AmLtwTjHYwBA
+AAAEDpSKRA1QKW6kYiQftGRWh+H0fNekzYLG6c3bzseoCpEolizSIN3DQV78VPNjVvvwjg
+f+P5HqbPYCYu3BOMdjAEAAAAEEVEMjU1MTkgdGVzdCBrZXkBAgMEBQ==
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.pub b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b078e45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIIlizSIN3DQV78VPNjVvvwjgf+P5HqbPYCYu3BOMdjAE ED25519 test key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.sig b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.sig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8e8ff2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgiWLNIg3cNBXvxU82NW+/COB/4/
+keps9gJi7cE4x2MAQAAAAIdW5pdHRlc3QAAAAAAAAABnNoYTUxMgAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVk
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+DNg4vBWp1j1gLRiBMOF+gwYNegDg==
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3a434ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
+b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAASgAAABpzay1zc2
+gtZWQyNTUxOUBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAACCbGg2F0GK7nOm4pQmAyCuGEjnhvs5q0TtjPbdN
+//+yxwAAAARzc2g6AAAAuBw56jAcOeowAAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY2
+9tAAAAIJsaDYXQYruc6bilCYDIK4YSOeG+zmrRO2M9t03//7LHAAAABHNzaDoBAAAAQFXc
+6dCwWewIk1EBofAouGZApW8+s0XekXenxtb78+x0mxoNhdBiu5zpuKUJgMgrhhI54b7Oat
+E7Yz23Tf//sscAAAAAAAAAE0VEMjU1MTktU0sgdGVzdCBrZXkBAgMEBQY=
+-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.pub b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..71051ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com AAAAGnNrLXNzaC1lZDI1NTE5QG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIJsaDYXQYruc6bilCYDIK4YSOeG+zmrRO2M9t03//7LHAAAABHNzaDo= ED25519-SK test key
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.sig b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.sig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..49b6818
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/ed25519_sk.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAAEoAAAAac2stc3NoLWVkMjU1MTlAb3BlbnNzaC5jb20AAAAgmxoNhd
+Biu5zpuKUJgMgrhhI54b7OatE7Yz23Tf//sscAAAAEc3NoOgAAAAh1bml0dGVzdAAAAAAA
+AAAGc2hhNTEyAAAAZwAAABpzay1zc2gtZWQyNTUxOUBvcGVuc3NoLmNvbQAAAEAi+7eTjW
+/+LQ2M+sCD+KFtH1n7VFFJon/SZFsxODyV8cWTlFKj617Ys1Ur5TV6uaEXQhck8rBA2oQI
+HTPANLIPARI0Vng=
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/namespace b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/namespace
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1570cd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/namespace
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+unittest
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..228fad7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
+MIIG4wIBAAKCAYEA386lmjRHtJpyj87BrS+ssMmtvc/1SPN0gXTPs9jZ1hYAq98P
+ca3/RYVM4HaSu6COztQJ2ZnZD3Te/XeBnIU2mfuvQEl+DiwisGeNglVyRCi7787f
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+DrLlD7FYUPPnhd24Dw6HnW4WcSwFv1uryv2cjgS6T6ueuB0Xe/AvmW2p/Y1ZHz9N
+6baWLwUKQXCg4S3FXui0CVd6yoi+mgBUTSveYguG29WbziDde7YMs+xtXtravhrJ
+m6C3Jql5LQSt2uqvH6KdC3ewxLKGzcZot7f+d5MtSj6216ECgcEA9PGmWeUkhVuW
+Xz2c9iBeHwCtmDso7gVwxNnHqdqirB4f1nDCGbrJS7hz5Ss7/wfzekP2W5if2P6U
+JPUdfykAQgALNn1twAtj1a+UAp31ZWu8JK/Qzt4hLJPBxzMo7MenJq189JmYmDnm
+6D5d9vDLCW15gCZua89GZa8K8V50lYyeHBOHAyzNTfNlnMBkHyP645+nqpuEWzIT
+3mCe2OAbl60o8VvvVUlAQyQ/ObLq37HHEoDu0U/YAnP157cxpa84
+-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.pub b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.pub
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..30142ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.pub
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ssh-rsa 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 RSA test
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.sig b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.sig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..15a032e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/rsa.sig
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----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+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/signed-data b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/signed-data
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7df4bed
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/testdata/signed-data
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+This is a test, this is only a test
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c b/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fdc3bae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/* 	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.3 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshsig.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+static struct sshbuf *
+load_file(const char *name)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *ret = NULL;
+
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_load_file(test_data_file(name), &ret), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+load_key(const char *name)
+{
+	struct sshkey *ret = NULL;
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file(name), &ret, NULL), 0);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+check_sig(const char *keyname, const char *signame, const struct sshbuf *msg,
+    const char *namespace)
+{
+	struct sshkey *k, *sign_key;
+	struct sshbuf *sig, *rawsig;
+	struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details;
+
+	k = load_key(keyname);
+	sig = load_file(signame);
+	sign_key = NULL;
+	sig_details = NULL;
+	rawsig = NULL;
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshsig_dearmor(sig, &rawsig), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshsig_verifyb(rawsig, msg, namespace,
+	    &sign_key, &sig_details), 0);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k, sign_key), 1);
+	sshkey_free(k);
+	sshkey_free(sign_key);
+	sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
+	sshbuf_free(sig);
+	sshbuf_free(rawsig);
+}
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	char *namespace;
+
+#if 0
+        log_init("test_sshsig", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
+	ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings();
+#endif
+
+	TEST_START("load data");
+	msg = load_file("namespace");
+	namespace = sshbuf_dup_string(msg);
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(namespace, NULL);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	msg = load_file("signed-data");
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	TEST_START("check RSA signature");
+	check_sig("rsa.pub", "rsa.sig", msg, namespace);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	TEST_START("check DSA signature");
+	check_sig("dsa.pub", "dsa.sig", msg, namespace);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	TEST_START("check ECDSA signature");
+	check_sig("ecdsa.pub", "ecdsa.sig", msg, namespace);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+#endif
+
+	TEST_START("check ED25519 signature");
+	check_sig("ed25519.pub", "ed25519.sig", msg, namespace);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+	TEST_START("check ECDSA-SK signature");
+	check_sig("ecdsa_sk.pub", "ecdsa_sk.sig", msg, namespace);
+	TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+
+	TEST_START("check ED25519-SK signature");
+	check_sig("ed25519_sk.pub", "ed25519_sk.sig", msg, namespace);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+	TEST_START("check ECDSA-SK webauthn signature");
+	check_sig("ecdsa_sk_webauthn.pub", "ecdsa_sk_webauthn.sig",
+	    msg, namespace);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+#endif
+#endif /* ENABLE_SK */
+
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	free(namespace);
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshsig/webauthn.html b/regress/unittests/sshsig/webauthn.html
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c9a32e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshsig/webauthn.html
@@ -0,0 +1,766 @@
+<html>
+<head>
+<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"/>
+<title>webauthn test</title>
+</head>
+<body onload="init()">
+<h1>webauthn test</h1>
+<p>
+This is a demo/test page for generating FIDO keys and signatures in SSH
+formats. The page initially displays a form to generate a FIDO key and
+convert it to a SSH public key.
+</p>
+<p>
+Once a key has been generated, an additional form will be displayed to
+allow signing of data using the just-generated key. The data may be signed
+as either a raw SSH signature or wrapped in a sshsig message (the latter is
+easier to test using command-line tools.
+</p>
+<p>
+Lots of debugging is printed along the way.
+</p>
+<h2>Enroll</h2>
+<span id="error" style="color: #800; font-weight: bold; font-size: 150%;"></span>
+<form id="enrollform">
+<table>
+<tr>
+<td><b>Username:</b></td>
+<td><input id="username" type="text" size="20" name="user" value="test" /></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td></td><td><input id="assertsubmit" type="submit" value="submit" /></td></tr>
+</table>
+</form>
+<span id="enrollresult" style="visibility: hidden;">
+<h2>clientData</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultjson" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>attestationObject raw</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultraw" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>attestationObject</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultattestobj" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>key handle</h2>
+<pre id="keyhandle" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>authData raw</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultauthdataraw" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>authData</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultauthdata" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>SSH pubkey blob</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultpkblob" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>SSH pubkey string</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultpk" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>SSH private key string</h2>
+<pre id="enrollresultprivkey" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+</span>
+<span id="assertsection" style="visibility: hidden;">
+<h2>Assert</h2>
+<form id="assertform">
+<span id="asserterror" style="color: #800; font-weight: bold;"></span>
+<table>
+<tr>
+<td><b>Data to sign:</b></td>
+<td><input id="message" type="text" size="20" name="message" value="test" /></td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><input id="message_sshsig" type="checkbox" checked /> use sshsig format</td>
+</tr>
+<tr>
+<td><b>Signature namespace:</b></td>
+<td><input id="message_namespace" type="text" size="20" name="namespace" value="test" /></td>
+</tr>
+<tr><td></td><td><input type="submit" value="submit" /></td></tr>
+</table>
+</form>
+</span>
+<span id="assertresult" style="visibility: hidden;">
+<h2>clientData</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultjson" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>signature raw</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultsigraw" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>authenticatorData raw</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultauthdataraw" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>authenticatorData</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultauthdata" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>signature in SSH format</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultsshsigraw" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+<h2>signature in SSH format (base64 encoded)</h2>
+<pre id="assertresultsshsigb64" style="color: #008; font-family: monospace;"></pre>
+</span>
+</body>
+<script>
+// ------------------------------------------------------------------
+// a crappy CBOR decoder - 20200401 djm@openbsd.org
+
+var CBORDecode = function(buffer) {
+	this.buf = buffer
+	this.v = new DataView(buffer)
+	this.offset = 0
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.empty = function() {
+	return this.offset >= this.buf.byteLength
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.getU8 = function() {
+	let r = this.v.getUint8(this.offset)
+	this.offset += 1
+	return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.getU16 = function() {
+	let r = this.v.getUint16(this.offset)
+	this.offset += 2
+	return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.getU32 = function() {
+	let r = this.v.getUint32(this.offset)
+	this.offset += 4
+	return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.getU64 = function() {
+	let r = this.v.getUint64(this.offset)
+	this.offset += 8
+	return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.getCBORTypeLen = function() {
+	let tl, t, l
+	tl = this.getU8()
+	t = (tl & 0xe0) >> 5
+	l = tl & 0x1f
+	return [t, this.decodeInteger(l)]
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeInteger = function(len) {
+	switch (len) {
+	case 0x18: return this.getU8()
+	case 0x19: return this.getU16()
+	case 0x20: return this.getU32()
+	case 0x21: return this.getU64()
+	default:
+		if (len <= 23) {
+			return len
+		}
+		throw new Error("Unsupported int type 0x" + len.toString(16))
+	}
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeNegint = function(len) {
+	let r = -(this.decodeInteger(len) + 1)
+	return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeByteString = function(len) {
+	let r = this.buf.slice(this.offset, this.offset + len)
+	this.offset += len
+	return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeTextString = function(len) {
+	let u8dec = new TextDecoder('utf-8')
+	r = u8dec.decode(this.decodeByteString(len))
+	return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeArray = function(len, level) {
+	let r = []
+	for (let i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		let v = this.decodeInternal(level)
+		r.push(v)
+		// console.log("decodeArray level " + level.toString() + " index " + i.toString() + " value " + JSON.stringify(v))
+	}
+	return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeMap = function(len, level) {
+	let r = {}
+	for (let i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		let k = this.decodeInternal(level)
+		let v = this.decodeInternal(level)
+		r[k] = v
+		// console.log("decodeMap level " + level.toString() + " key " + k.toString() + " value " + JSON.stringify(v))
+		// XXX check string keys, duplicates
+	}
+	return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodePrimitive = function(t) {
+	switch (t) {
+	case 20: return false
+	case 21: return true
+	case 22: return null
+	case 23: return undefined
+	default:
+		throw new Error("Unsupported primitive 0x" + t.toString(2))
+	}
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decodeInternal = function(level) {
+	if (level > 256) {
+		throw new Error("CBOR nesting too deep")
+	}
+	let t, l, r
+	[t, l] = this.getCBORTypeLen()
+	// console.log("decode level " + level.toString() + " type " + t.toString() + " len " + l.toString())
+	switch (t) {
+		case 0:
+			r = this.decodeInteger(l)
+			break
+		case 1:
+			r = this.decodeNegint(l)
+			break
+		case 2:
+			r = this.decodeByteString(l)
+			break
+		case 3:
+			r = this.decodeTextString(l)
+			break
+		case 4:
+			r = this.decodeArray(l, level + 1)
+			break
+		case 5:
+			r = this.decodeMap(l, level + 1)
+			break
+		case 6:
+			console.log("XXX ignored semantic tag " + this.decodeInteger(l).toString())
+			break;
+		case 7:
+			r = this.decodePrimitive(l)
+			break
+		default:
+			throw new Error("Unsupported type 0x" + t.toString(2) + " len " + l.toString())
+	}
+	// console.log("decode level " + level.toString() + " value " + JSON.stringify(r))
+	return r
+}
+
+CBORDecode.prototype.decode = function() {
+	return this.decodeInternal(0)
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------------
+// a crappy SSH message packer - 20200401 djm@openbsd.org
+
+var SSHMSG = function() {
+	this.r = []
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.length = function() {
+	let len = 0
+	for (buf of this.r) {
+		len += buf.length
+	}
+	return len
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.serialise = function() {
+	let r = new ArrayBuffer(this.length())
+	let v = new Uint8Array(r)
+	let offset = 0
+	for (buf of this.r) {
+		v.set(buf, offset)
+		offset += buf.length
+	}
+	if (offset != r.byteLength) {
+		throw new Error("djm can't count")
+	}
+	return r
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.serialiseBase64 = function(v) {
+	let b = this.serialise()
+	return btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(b)));
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putU8 = function(v) {
+	this.r.push(new Uint8Array([v]))
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putU32 = function(v) {
+	this.r.push(new Uint8Array([
+		(v >> 24) & 0xff,
+		(v >> 16) & 0xff,
+		(v >> 8) & 0xff,
+		(v & 0xff)
+	]))
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.put = function(v) {
+	this.r.push(new Uint8Array(v))
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putStringRaw = function(v) {
+	let enc = new TextEncoder();
+	let venc = enc.encode(v)
+	this.put(venc)
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putString = function(v) {
+	let enc = new TextEncoder();
+	let venc = enc.encode(v)
+	this.putU32(venc.length)
+	this.put(venc)
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putSSHMSG = function(v) {
+	let msg = v.serialise()
+	this.putU32(msg.byteLength)
+	this.put(msg)
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putBytes = function(v) {
+	this.putU32(v.byteLength)
+	this.put(v)
+}
+
+SSHMSG.prototype.putECPoint = function(x, y) {
+	let x8 = new Uint8Array(x)
+	let y8 = new Uint8Array(y)
+	this.putU32(1 + x8.length + y8.length)
+	this.putU8(0x04) // Uncompressed point format.
+	this.put(x8)
+	this.put(y8)
+}
+
+// ------------------------------------------------------------------
+// webauthn to SSH glue - djm@openbsd.org 20200408
+
+function error(msg, ...args) {
+	document.getElementById("error").innerText = msg
+	console.log(msg)
+	for (const arg of args) {
+		console.dir(arg)
+	}
+}
+function hexdump(buf) {
+	const hex = Array.from(new Uint8Array(buf)).map(
+		b => b.toString(16).padStart(2, "0"))
+	const fmt = new Array()
+	for (let i = 0; i < hex.length; i++) {
+		if ((i % 16) == 0) {
+			// Prepend length every 16 bytes.
+			fmt.push(i.toString(16).padStart(4, "0"))
+			fmt.push("  ")
+		}
+		fmt.push(hex[i])
+		fmt.push(" ")
+		if ((i % 16) == 15) {
+			fmt.push("\n")
+		}
+	}
+	return fmt.join("")
+}
+function enrollform_submit(event) {
+	event.preventDefault();
+	console.log("submitted")
+	username = event.target.elements.username.value
+	if (username === "") {
+		error("no username specified")
+		return false
+	}
+	enrollStart(username)
+}
+function enrollStart(username) {
+	let challenge = new Uint8Array(32)
+	window.crypto.getRandomValues(challenge)
+	let userid = new Uint8Array(8)
+	window.crypto.getRandomValues(userid)
+
+	console.log("challenge:" + btoa(challenge))
+	console.log("userid:" + btoa(userid))
+
+	let pkopts = {
+		challenge: challenge,
+		rp: {
+			name: window.location.host,
+			id: window.location.host,
+		},
+		user: {
+			id: userid,
+			name: username,
+			displayName: username,
+		},
+		authenticatorSelection: {
+			authenticatorAttachment: "cross-platform",
+			userVerification: "discouraged",
+		},
+		pubKeyCredParams: [{alg: -7, type: "public-key"}], // ES256
+		timeout: 30 * 1000,
+	};
+	console.dir(pkopts)
+	window.enrollOpts = pkopts
+	let credpromise = navigator.credentials.create({ publicKey: pkopts });
+	credpromise.then(enrollSuccess, enrollFailure)
+}
+function enrollFailure(result) {
+	error("Enroll failed", result)
+}
+function enrollSuccess(result) {
+	console.log("Enroll succeeded")
+	console.dir(result)
+	window.enrollResult = result
+	document.getElementById("enrollresult").style.visibility = "visible"
+
+	// Show the clientData
+	let u8dec = new TextDecoder('utf-8')
+	clientData = u8dec.decode(result.response.clientDataJSON)
+	document.getElementById("enrollresultjson").innerText = clientData
+
+	// Show the raw key handle.
+	document.getElementById("keyhandle").innerText = hexdump(result.rawId)
+
+	// Decode and show the attestationObject
+	document.getElementById("enrollresultraw").innerText = hexdump(result.response.attestationObject)
+	let aod = new CBORDecode(result.response.attestationObject)
+	let attestationObject = aod.decode()
+	console.log("attestationObject")
+	console.dir(attestationObject)
+	document.getElementById("enrollresultattestobj").innerText = JSON.stringify(attestationObject)
+
+	// Decode and show the authData
+	document.getElementById("enrollresultauthdataraw").innerText = hexdump(attestationObject.authData)
+	let authData = decodeAuthenticatorData(attestationObject.authData, true)
+	console.log("authData")
+	console.dir(authData)
+	window.enrollAuthData = authData
+	document.getElementById("enrollresultauthdata").innerText = JSON.stringify(authData)
+
+	// Reformat the pubkey as a SSH key for easy verification
+	window.rawKey = reformatPubkey(authData.attestedCredentialData.credentialPublicKey, window.enrollOpts.rp.id)
+	console.log("SSH pubkey blob")
+	console.dir(window.rawKey)
+	document.getElementById("enrollresultpkblob").innerText = hexdump(window.rawKey)
+	let pk64 = btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(window.rawKey)));
+	let pk = "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com " + pk64
+	document.getElementById("enrollresultpk").innerText = pk
+
+	// Format a private key too.
+	flags = 0x01 // SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD
+	window.rawPrivkey = reformatPrivkey(authData.attestedCredentialData.credentialPublicKey, window.enrollOpts.rp.id, result.rawId, flags)
+	let privkeyFileBlob = privkeyFile(window.rawKey, window.rawPrivkey, window.enrollOpts.user.name, window.enrollOpts.rp.id)
+	let privk64 = btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(privkeyFileBlob)));
+	let privkey = "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n" + wrapString(privk64, 70) + "-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+	document.getElementById("enrollresultprivkey").innerText = privkey
+
+	// Success: show the assertion form.
+	document.getElementById("assertsection").style.visibility = "visible"
+}
+
+function decodeAuthenticatorData(authData, expectCred) {
+	let r = new Object()
+	let v = new DataView(authData)
+
+	r.rpIdHash = authData.slice(0, 32)
+	r.flags = v.getUint8(32)
+	r.signCount = v.getUint32(33)
+
+	// Decode attestedCredentialData if present.
+	let offset = 37
+	let acd = new Object()
+	if (expectCred) {
+		acd.aaguid = authData.slice(offset, offset+16)
+		offset += 16
+		let credentialIdLength = v.getUint16(offset)     
+		offset += 2
+		acd.credentialIdLength = credentialIdLength
+		acd.credentialId = authData.slice(offset, offset+credentialIdLength)
+		offset += credentialIdLength
+		r.attestedCredentialData = acd
+	}
+	console.log("XXXXX " + offset.toString())
+	let pubkeyrest = authData.slice(offset, authData.byteLength)
+	let pkdecode = new CBORDecode(pubkeyrest)
+	if (expectCred) {
+		// XXX unsafe: doesn't mandate COSE canonical format.
+		acd.credentialPublicKey = pkdecode.decode()
+	}
+	if (!pkdecode.empty()) {
+		// Decode extensions if present.
+		r.extensions = pkdecode.decode()
+	}
+	return r
+}
+
+function wrapString(s, l) {
+	ret = ""
+	for (i = 0; i < s.length; i += l) {
+		ret += s.slice(i, i + l) + "\n"
+	}
+	return ret
+}
+
+function checkPubkey(pk) {
+	// pk is in COSE format. We only care about a tiny subset.
+	if (pk[1] != 2) {
+		console.dir(pk)
+		throw new Error("pubkey is not EC")
+	}
+	if (pk[-1] != 1) {
+		throw new Error("pubkey is not in P256")
+	}
+	if (pk[3] != -7) {
+		throw new Error("pubkey is not ES256")
+	}
+	if (pk[-2].byteLength != 32 || pk[-3].byteLength != 32) {
+		throw new Error("pubkey EC coords have bad length")
+	}
+}
+
+function reformatPubkey(pk, rpid) {
+	checkPubkey(pk)
+	let msg = new SSHMSG()
+	msg.putString("sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com")	// Key type
+	msg.putString("nistp256")				// Key curve
+	msg.putECPoint(pk[-2], pk[-3])				// EC key
+	msg.putString(rpid)					// RP ID
+	return msg.serialise()
+}
+
+function reformatPrivkey(pk, rpid, kh, flags) {
+	checkPubkey(pk)
+	let msg = new SSHMSG()
+	msg.putString("sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com")	// Key type
+	msg.putString("nistp256")				// Key curve
+	msg.putECPoint(pk[-2], pk[-3])				// EC key
+	msg.putString(rpid)					// RP ID
+	msg.putU8(flags)					// flags
+	msg.putBytes(kh)					// handle
+	msg.putString("")					// reserved
+	return msg.serialise()
+}
+
+function privkeyFile(pub, priv, user, rp) {
+	let innerMsg = new SSHMSG()
+	innerMsg.putU32(0xdeadbeef)				// check byte
+	innerMsg.putU32(0xdeadbeef)				// check byte
+	innerMsg.put(priv)					// privkey
+	innerMsg.putString("webauthn.html " + user + "@" + rp)	// comment
+	// Pad to cipher blocksize (8).
+	p = 1
+	while (innerMsg.length() % 8 != 0) {
+		innerMsg.putU8(p++)
+	}
+	let msg = new SSHMSG()
+	msg.putStringRaw("openssh-key-v1")			// Magic
+	msg.putU8(0)						// \0 terminate
+	msg.putString("none")					// cipher
+	msg.putString("none")					// KDF
+	msg.putString("")					// KDF options
+	msg.putU32(1)						// nkeys
+	msg.putBytes(pub)					// pubkey
+	msg.putSSHMSG(innerMsg)					// inner
+	//msg.put(innerMsg.serialise())				// inner
+	return msg.serialise()
+}
+
+async function assertform_submit(event) {
+	event.preventDefault();
+	console.log("submitted")
+	message = event.target.elements.message.value
+	if (message === "") {
+		error("no message specified")
+		return false
+	}
+	let enc = new TextEncoder()
+	let encmsg = enc.encode(message)
+	window.assertSignRaw = !event.target.elements.message_sshsig.checked
+	console.log("using sshsig ", !window.assertSignRaw)
+	if (window.assertSignRaw) {
+		assertStart(encmsg)
+		return
+	}
+	// Format a sshsig-style message.
+	window.sigHashAlg = "sha512"
+	let msghash = await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-512", encmsg);
+	console.log("raw message hash")
+	console.dir(msghash)
+	window.sigNamespace = event.target.elements.message_namespace.value
+	let sigbuf = new SSHMSG()
+	sigbuf.put(enc.encode("SSHSIG"))
+	sigbuf.putString(window.sigNamespace)
+	sigbuf.putU32(0) // Reserved string
+	sigbuf.putString(window.sigHashAlg)
+	sigbuf.putBytes(msghash)
+	let msg = sigbuf.serialise()
+	console.log("sigbuf")
+	console.dir(msg)
+	assertStart(msg)
+}
+
+function assertStart(message) {
+	let assertReqOpts = {
+		challenge: message,
+		rpId: window.location.host,
+		allowCredentials: [{
+			type: 'public-key',
+			id: window.enrollResult.rawId,
+		}],
+		userVerification: "discouraged",
+		timeout: (30 * 1000),
+	}
+	console.log("assertReqOpts")
+	console.dir(assertReqOpts)
+	window.assertReqOpts = assertReqOpts
+	let assertpromise = navigator.credentials.get({
+		publicKey: assertReqOpts
+	});
+	assertpromise.then(assertSuccess, assertFailure)
+}
+function assertFailure(result) {
+	error("Assertion failed", result)
+}
+function linewrap(s) {
+	const linelen = 70
+	let ret = ""
+	for (let i = 0; i < s.length; i += linelen) {
+		end = i + linelen
+		if (end > s.length) {
+			end = s.length
+		}
+		if (i > 0) {
+			ret += "\n"
+		}
+		ret += s.slice(i, end)
+	}
+	return ret + "\n"
+}
+function assertSuccess(result) {
+	console.log("Assertion succeeded")
+	console.dir(result)
+	window.assertResult = result
+	document.getElementById("assertresult").style.visibility = "visible"
+
+	// show the clientData.
+	let u8dec = new TextDecoder('utf-8')
+	clientData = u8dec.decode(result.response.clientDataJSON)
+	document.getElementById("assertresultjson").innerText = clientData
+
+	// show the signature.
+	document.getElementById("assertresultsigraw").innerText = hexdump(result.response.signature)
+	
+	// decode and show the authData.
+	document.getElementById("assertresultauthdataraw").innerText = hexdump(result.response.authenticatorData)
+	authData = decodeAuthenticatorData(result.response.authenticatorData, false)
+	document.getElementById("assertresultauthdata").innerText = JSON.stringify(authData)
+
+	// Parse and reformat the signature to an SSH style signature.
+	let sshsig = reformatSignature(result.response.signature, clientData, authData)
+	document.getElementById("assertresultsshsigraw").innerText = hexdump(sshsig)
+	let sig64 = btoa(String.fromCharCode(...new Uint8Array(sshsig)));
+	if (window.assertSignRaw) {
+		document.getElementById("assertresultsshsigb64").innerText = sig64
+	} else {
+		document.getElementById("assertresultsshsigb64").innerText =
+		    "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----\n" + linewrap(sig64) +
+		    "-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----\n";
+	}
+}
+
+function reformatSignature(sig, clientData, authData) {
+	if (sig.byteLength < 2) {
+		throw new Error("signature is too short")
+	}
+	let offset = 0
+	let v = new DataView(sig)
+	// Expect an ASN.1 SEQUENCE that exactly spans the signature.
+	if (v.getUint8(offset) != 0x30) {
+		throw new Error("signature not an ASN.1 sequence")
+	}
+	offset++
+	let seqlen = v.getUint8(offset)
+	offset++
+	if ((seqlen & 0x80) != 0 || seqlen != sig.byteLength - offset) {
+		throw new Error("signature has unexpected length " + seqlen.toString() + " vs expected " + (sig.byteLength - offset).toString())
+	}
+
+	// Parse 'r' INTEGER value.
+	if (v.getUint8(offset) != 0x02) {
+		throw new Error("signature r not an ASN.1 integer")
+	}
+	offset++
+	let rlen = v.getUint8(offset)
+	offset++
+	if ((rlen & 0x80) != 0 || rlen > sig.byteLength - offset) {
+		throw new Error("signature r has unexpected length " + rlen.toString() + " vs buffer " + (sig.byteLength - offset).toString())
+	}
+	let r = sig.slice(offset, offset + rlen)
+	offset += rlen
+	console.log("sig_r")
+	console.dir(r)
+
+	// Parse 's' INTEGER value.
+	if (v.getUint8(offset) != 0x02) {
+		throw new Error("signature r not an ASN.1 integer")
+	}
+	offset++
+	let slen = v.getUint8(offset)
+	offset++
+	if ((slen & 0x80) != 0 || slen > sig.byteLength - offset) {
+		throw new Error("signature s has unexpected length " + slen.toString() + " vs buffer " + (sig.byteLength - offset).toString())
+	}
+	let s = sig.slice(offset, offset + slen)
+	console.log("sig_s")
+	console.dir(s)
+	offset += slen
+
+	if (offset != sig.byteLength) {
+		throw new Error("unexpected final offset during signature parsing " + offset.toString() + " expected " + sig.byteLength.toString())
+	}
+	
+	// Reformat as an SSH signature.
+	let clientDataParsed = JSON.parse(clientData)
+	let innersig = new SSHMSG()
+	innersig.putBytes(r)
+	innersig.putBytes(s)
+
+	let rawsshsig = new SSHMSG()
+	rawsshsig.putString("webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com")
+	rawsshsig.putSSHMSG(innersig)
+	rawsshsig.putU8(authData.flags)
+	rawsshsig.putU32(authData.signCount)
+	rawsshsig.putString(clientDataParsed.origin)
+	rawsshsig.putString(clientData)
+	if (authData.extensions == undefined) {
+		rawsshsig.putU32(0)
+	} else {
+		rawsshsig.putBytes(authData.extensions)
+	}
+
+	if (window.assertSignRaw) {
+		return rawsshsig.serialise()
+	}
+	// Format as SSHSIG.
+	let enc = new TextEncoder()
+	let sshsig = new SSHMSG()
+	sshsig.put(enc.encode("SSHSIG"))
+	sshsig.putU32(0x01) // Signature version.
+	sshsig.putBytes(window.rawKey)
+	sshsig.putString(window.sigNamespace)
+	sshsig.putU32(0) // Reserved string
+	sshsig.putString(window.sigHashAlg)
+	sshsig.putBytes(rawsshsig.serialise())
+	return sshsig.serialise()
+}
+
+function toggleNamespaceVisibility() {
+	const assertsigtype = document.getElementById('message_sshsig');
+	const assertsignamespace = document.getElementById('message_namespace');
+	assertsignamespace.disabled = !assertsigtype.checked;
+}
+
+function init() {
+	if (document.location.protocol != "https:") {
+		error("This page must be loaded via https")
+		const assertsubmit = document.getElementById('assertsubmit')
+		assertsubmit.disabled = true
+	}
+	const enrollform = document.getElementById('enrollform');
+	enrollform.addEventListener('submit', enrollform_submit);
+	const assertform = document.getElementById('assertform');
+	assertform.addEventListener('submit', assertform_submit);
+	const assertsigtype = document.getElementById('message_sshsig');
+	assertsigtype.onclick = toggleNamespaceVisibility;
+}
+</script>
+
+</html>
diff --git a/regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile b/regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78026e6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.3 2016/07/04 18:01:44 guenther Exp $
+
+LIB=	test_helper
+SRCS=	test_helper.c fuzz.c
+
+NOPROFILE= yes
+NOPIC=	yes
+
+# Hack to allow building with SUBDIR in ../../Makefile
+regress: all
+
+install:
+	@echo -n
+
+.include <bsd.lib.mk>
diff --git a/regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..78b3665
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c
@@ -0,0 +1,438 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: fuzz.c,v 1.8 2015/03/03 20:42:49 djm Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Utility functions/framework for fuzz tests */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "test_helper.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+/* #define FUZZ_DEBUG */
+
+#ifdef FUZZ_DEBUG
+# define FUZZ_DBG(x) do { \
+		printf("%s:%d %s: ", __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); \
+		printf x; \
+		printf("\n"); \
+		fflush(stdout); \
+	} while (0)
+#else
+# define FUZZ_DBG(x)
+#endif
+
+/* For brevity later */
+typedef unsigned long long fuzz_ullong;
+
+/* For base-64 fuzzing */
+static const char fuzz_b64chars[] =
+    "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
+
+struct fuzz {
+	/* Fuzz method currently in use */
+	int strategy;
+
+	/* Fuzz methods remaining */
+	int strategies;
+
+	/* Original seed data blob */
+	void *seed;
+	size_t slen;
+
+	/* Current working copy of seed with fuzz mutations applied */
+	u_char *fuzzed;
+
+	/* Used by fuzz methods */
+	size_t o1, o2;
+};
+
+static const char *
+fuzz_ntop(u_int n)
+{
+	switch (n) {
+	case 0:
+		return "NONE";
+	case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP:
+		return "FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP";
+	case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP:
+		return "FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP";
+	case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP:
+		return "FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP";
+	case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP:
+		return "FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP";
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START:
+		return "FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START";
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END:
+		return "FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END";
+	case FUZZ_BASE64:
+		return "FUZZ_BASE64";
+	default:
+		abort();
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+fuzz_fmt(struct fuzz *fuzz, char *s, size_t n)
+{
+	if (fuzz == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	switch (fuzz->strategy) {
+	case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP:
+		snprintf(s, n, "%s case %zu of %zu (bit: %zu)\n",
+		    fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+		    fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen * 8, fuzz->o1);
+		return 0;
+	case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP:
+		snprintf(s, n, "%s case %llu of %llu (bits: %zu, %zu)\n",
+		    fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+		    (((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->o2) * fuzz->slen * 8) + fuzz->o1,
+		    ((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->slen * 8) * fuzz->slen * 8,
+		    fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2);
+		return 0;
+	case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP:
+		snprintf(s, n, "%s case %zu of %zu (byte: %zu)\n",
+		    fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+		    fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen, fuzz->o1);
+		return 0;
+	case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP:
+		snprintf(s, n, "%s case %llu of %llu (bytes: %zu, %zu)\n",
+		    fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+		    (((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->o2) * fuzz->slen) + fuzz->o1,
+		    ((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->slen) * fuzz->slen,
+		    fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2);
+		return 0;
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START:
+		snprintf(s, n, "%s case %zu of %zu (offset: %zu)\n",
+		    fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+		    fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen, fuzz->o1);
+		return 0;
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END:
+		snprintf(s, n, "%s case %zu of %zu (offset: %zu)\n",
+		    fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+		    fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen, fuzz->o1);
+		return 0;
+	case FUZZ_BASE64:
+		assert(fuzz->o2 < sizeof(fuzz_b64chars) - 1);
+		snprintf(s, n, "%s case %llu of %llu (offset: %zu char: %c)\n",
+		    fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+		    (fuzz->o1 * (fuzz_ullong)64) + fuzz->o2,
+		    fuzz->slen * (fuzz_ullong)64, fuzz->o1,
+		    fuzz_b64chars[fuzz->o2]);
+		return 0;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+		abort();
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+dump(u_char *p, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t i, j;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%.4zd: ", i);
+		for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) {
+			if (j < len)
+				fprintf(stderr, "%02x ", p[j]);
+			else
+				fprintf(stderr, "   ");
+		}
+		fprintf(stderr, " ");
+		for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) {
+			if (j < len) {
+				if  (isascii(p[j]) && isprint(p[j]))
+					fprintf(stderr, "%c", p[j]);
+				else
+					fprintf(stderr, ".");
+			}
+		}
+		fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+	}
+}
+
+void
+fuzz_dump(struct fuzz *fuzz)
+{
+	char buf[256];
+
+	if (fuzz_fmt(fuzz, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: fuzz invalid\n", __func__);
+		abort();
+	}
+	fputs(buf, stderr);
+	fprintf(stderr, "fuzz original %p len = %zu\n", fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen);
+	dump(fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen);
+	fprintf(stderr, "fuzz context %p len = %zu\n", fuzz, fuzz_len(fuzz));
+	dump(fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
+}
+
+static struct fuzz *last_fuzz;
+
+static void
+siginfo(int unused __attribute__((__unused__)))
+{
+	char buf[256];
+
+	test_info(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, buf, strlen(buf));
+	if (last_fuzz != NULL) {
+		fuzz_fmt(last_fuzz, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, buf, strlen(buf));
+	}
+}
+
+struct fuzz *
+fuzz_begin(u_int strategies, const void *p, size_t l)
+{
+	struct fuzz *ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1);
+
+	assert(p != NULL);
+	assert(ret != NULL);
+	ret->seed = malloc(l);
+	assert(ret->seed != NULL);
+	memcpy(ret->seed, p, l);
+	ret->slen = l;
+	ret->strategies = strategies;
+
+	assert(ret->slen < SIZE_MAX / 8);
+	assert(ret->strategies <= (FUZZ_MAX|(FUZZ_MAX-1)));
+
+	FUZZ_DBG(("begin, ret = %p", ret));
+
+	fuzz_next(ret);
+
+	last_fuzz = ret;
+#ifdef SIGINFO
+	signal(SIGINFO, siginfo);
+#endif
+	signal(SIGUSR1, siginfo);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+fuzz_cleanup(struct fuzz *fuzz)
+{
+	FUZZ_DBG(("cleanup, fuzz = %p", fuzz));
+	last_fuzz = NULL;
+#ifdef SIGINFO
+	signal(SIGINFO, SIG_DFL);
+#endif
+	signal(SIGUSR1, SIG_DFL);
+	assert(fuzz != NULL);
+	assert(fuzz->seed != NULL);
+	assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL);
+	free(fuzz->seed);
+	free(fuzz->fuzzed);
+	free(fuzz);
+}
+
+static int
+fuzz_strategy_done(struct fuzz *fuzz)
+{
+	FUZZ_DBG(("fuzz = %p, strategy = %s, o1 = %zu, o2 = %zu, slen = %zu",
+	    fuzz, fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2, fuzz->slen));
+
+	switch (fuzz->strategy) {
+	case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP:
+		return fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen * 8;
+	case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP:
+		return fuzz->o2 >= fuzz->slen * 8;
+	case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP:
+		return fuzz->o2 >= fuzz->slen;
+	case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START:
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END:
+	case FUZZ_BASE64:
+		return fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen;
+	default:
+		abort();
+	}
+}
+
+void
+fuzz_next(struct fuzz *fuzz)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	FUZZ_DBG(("start, fuzz = %p, strategy = %s, strategies = 0x%lx, "
+	    "o1 = %zu, o2 = %zu, slen = %zu", fuzz, fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+	    (u_long)fuzz->strategies, fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2, fuzz->slen));
+
+	if (fuzz->strategy == 0 || fuzz_strategy_done(fuzz)) {
+		/* If we are just starting out, we need to allocate too */
+		if (fuzz->fuzzed == NULL) {
+			FUZZ_DBG(("alloc"));
+			fuzz->fuzzed = calloc(fuzz->slen, 1);
+		}
+		/* Pick next strategy */
+		FUZZ_DBG(("advance"));
+		for (i = 1; i <= FUZZ_MAX; i <<= 1) {
+			if ((fuzz->strategies & i) != 0) {
+				fuzz->strategy = i;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		FUZZ_DBG(("selected = %u", fuzz->strategy));
+		if (fuzz->strategy == 0) {
+			FUZZ_DBG(("done, no more strategies"));
+			return;
+		}
+		fuzz->strategies &= ~(fuzz->strategy);
+		fuzz->o1 = fuzz->o2 = 0;
+	}
+
+	assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL);
+
+	switch (fuzz->strategy) {
+	case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 / 8 < fuzz->slen);
+		memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen);
+		fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1 / 8] ^= 1 << (fuzz->o1 % 8);
+		fuzz->o1++;
+		break;
+	case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 / 8 < fuzz->slen);
+		assert(fuzz->o2 / 8 < fuzz->slen);
+		memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen);
+		fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1 / 8] ^= 1 << (fuzz->o1 % 8);
+		fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o2 / 8] ^= 1 << (fuzz->o2 % 8);
+		fuzz->o1++;
+		if (fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen * 8) {
+			fuzz->o1 = 0;
+			fuzz->o2++;
+		}
+		break;
+	case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen);
+		memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen);
+		fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1] ^= 0xff;
+		fuzz->o1++;
+		break;
+	case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen);
+		assert(fuzz->o2 < fuzz->slen);
+		memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen);
+		fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1] ^= 0xff;
+		fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o2] ^= 0xff;
+		fuzz->o1++;
+		if (fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen) {
+			fuzz->o1 = 0;
+			fuzz->o2++;
+		}
+		break;
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START:
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen);
+		memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen);
+		fuzz->o1++;
+		break;
+	case FUZZ_BASE64:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen);
+		assert(fuzz->o2 < sizeof(fuzz_b64chars) - 1);
+		memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen);
+		fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1] = fuzz_b64chars[fuzz->o2];
+		fuzz->o2++;
+		if (fuzz->o2 >= sizeof(fuzz_b64chars) - 1) {
+			fuzz->o2 = 0;
+			fuzz->o1++;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		abort();
+	}
+
+	FUZZ_DBG(("done, fuzz = %p, strategy = %s, strategies = 0x%lx, "
+	    "o1 = %zu, o2 = %zu, slen = %zu", fuzz, fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy),
+	    (u_long)fuzz->strategies, fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2, fuzz->slen));
+}
+
+int
+fuzz_matches_original(struct fuzz *fuzz)
+{
+	if (fuzz_len(fuzz) != fuzz->slen)
+		return 0;
+	return memcmp(fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen) == 0;
+}
+
+int
+fuzz_done(struct fuzz *fuzz)
+{
+	FUZZ_DBG(("fuzz = %p, strategies = 0x%lx", fuzz,
+	    (u_long)fuzz->strategies));
+
+	return fuzz_strategy_done(fuzz) && fuzz->strategies == 0;
+}
+
+size_t
+fuzz_len(struct fuzz *fuzz)
+{
+	assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL);
+	switch (fuzz->strategy) {
+	case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_BASE64:
+		return fuzz->slen;
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START:
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 <= fuzz->slen);
+		return fuzz->slen - fuzz->o1;
+	default:
+		abort();
+	}
+}
+
+u_char *
+fuzz_ptr(struct fuzz *fuzz)
+{
+	assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL);
+	switch (fuzz->strategy) {
+	case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP:
+	case FUZZ_BASE64:
+		return fuzz->fuzzed;
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 <= fuzz->slen);
+		return fuzz->fuzzed + fuzz->o1;
+	case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END:
+		assert(fuzz->o1 <= fuzz->slen);
+		return fuzz->fuzzed;
+	default:
+		abort();
+	}
+}
+
diff --git a/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c b/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6461d7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,595 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: test_helper.c,v 1.13 2021/12/14 21:25:27 deraadt Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Utility functions/framework for regress tests */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+# include <vis.h>
+#endif
+
+#define MINIMUM(a, b)    (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
+
+#include "entropy.h"
+#include "test_helper.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+#define TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred) do {		\
+		switch (pred) {			\
+		case TEST_EQ:			\
+			if (r == 0)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_NE:			\
+			if (r != 0)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_LT:			\
+			if (r < 0)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_LE:			\
+			if (r <= 0)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_GT:			\
+			if (r > 0)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_GE:			\
+			if (r >= 0)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		default:			\
+			abort();		\
+		}				\
+	} while (0)
+
+#define TEST_CHECK(x1, x2, pred) do {		\
+		switch (pred) {			\
+		case TEST_EQ:			\
+			if (x1 == x2)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_NE:			\
+			if (x1 != x2)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_LT:			\
+			if (x1 < x2)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_LE:			\
+			if (x1 <= x2)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_GT:			\
+			if (x1 > x2)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		case TEST_GE:			\
+			if (x1 >= x2)		\
+				return;		\
+			break;			\
+		default:			\
+			abort();		\
+		}				\
+	} while (0)
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+static int verbose_mode = 0;
+static int quiet_mode = 0;
+static char *active_test_name = NULL;
+static u_int test_number = 0;
+static test_onerror_func_t *test_onerror = NULL;
+static void *onerror_ctx = NULL;
+static const char *data_dir = NULL;
+static char subtest_info[512];
+static int fast = 0;
+static int slow = 0;
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int ch;
+
+	seed_rng();
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings();
+#endif
+
+	/* Handle systems without __progname */
+	if (__progname == NULL) {
+		__progname = strrchr(argv[0], '/');
+		if (__progname == NULL || __progname[1] == '\0')
+			__progname = argv[0];	
+		else
+			__progname++;
+		if ((__progname = strdup(__progname)) == NULL) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "strdup failed\n");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "Ffvqd:")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'F':
+			slow = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+			fast = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'd':
+			data_dir = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'q':
+			verbose_mode = 0;
+			quiet_mode = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'v':
+			verbose_mode = 1;
+			quiet_mode = 0;
+			break;
+		default:
+			fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognised command line option\n");
+			fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [-v]\n", __progname);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+	}
+	setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
+	if (!quiet_mode)
+		printf("%s: ", __progname);
+	if (verbose_mode)
+		printf("\n");
+
+	tests();
+
+	if (!quiet_mode)
+		printf(" %u tests ok\n", test_number);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+test_is_verbose(void)
+{
+	return verbose_mode;
+}
+
+int
+test_is_quiet(void)
+{
+	return quiet_mode;
+}
+
+int
+test_is_fast(void)
+{
+	return fast;
+}
+
+int
+test_is_slow(void)
+{
+	return slow;
+}
+
+const char *
+test_data_file(const char *name)
+{
+	static char ret[PATH_MAX];
+
+	if (data_dir != NULL)
+		snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", data_dir, name);
+	else
+		strlcpy(ret, name, sizeof(ret));
+	if (access(ret, F_OK) != 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Cannot access data file %s: %s\n",
+		    ret, strerror(errno));
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+test_info(char *s, size_t len)
+{
+	snprintf(s, len, "In test %u: \"%s\"%s%s\n", test_number,
+	    active_test_name == NULL ? "<none>" : active_test_name,
+	    *subtest_info != '\0' ? " - " : "", subtest_info);
+}
+
+static void
+siginfo(int unused __attribute__((__unused__)))
+{
+	char buf[256];
+
+	test_info(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, buf, strlen(buf));
+}
+
+void
+test_start(const char *n)
+{
+	assert(active_test_name == NULL);
+	assert((active_test_name = strdup(n)) != NULL);
+	*subtest_info = '\0';
+	if (verbose_mode)
+		printf("test %u - \"%s\": ", test_number, active_test_name);
+	test_number++;
+#ifdef SIGINFO
+	signal(SIGINFO, siginfo);
+#endif
+	signal(SIGUSR1, siginfo);
+}
+
+void
+set_onerror_func(test_onerror_func_t *f, void *ctx)
+{
+	test_onerror = f;
+	onerror_ctx = ctx;
+}
+
+void
+test_done(void)
+{
+	*subtest_info = '\0';
+	assert(active_test_name != NULL);
+	free(active_test_name);
+	active_test_name = NULL;
+	if (verbose_mode)
+		printf("OK\n");
+	else if (!quiet_mode) {
+		printf(".");
+		fflush(stdout);
+	}
+}
+
+void
+test_subtest_info(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	vsnprintf(subtest_info, sizeof(subtest_info), fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+}
+
+void
+ssl_err_check(const char *file, int line)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	long openssl_error = ERR_get_error();
+
+	if (openssl_error == 0)
+		return;
+
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n%s:%d: uncaught OpenSSL error: %s",
+	    file, line, ERR_error_string(openssl_error, NULL));
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n%s:%d: uncaught OpenSSL error ",
+	    file, line);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	abort();
+}
+
+static const char *
+pred_name(enum test_predicate p)
+{
+	switch (p) {
+	case TEST_EQ:
+		return "EQ";
+	case TEST_NE:
+		return "NE";
+	case TEST_LT:
+		return "LT";
+	case TEST_LE:
+		return "LE";
+	case TEST_GT:
+		return "GT";
+	case TEST_GE:
+		return "GE";
+	default:
+		return "UNKNOWN";
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+test_die(void)
+{
+	if (test_onerror != NULL)
+		test_onerror(onerror_ctx);
+	abort();
+}
+
+static void
+test_header(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const char *name, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "\n%s:%d test #%u \"%s\"%s%s\n", 
+	    file, line, test_number, active_test_name,
+	    *subtest_info != '\0' ? " - " : "", subtest_info);
+	fprintf(stderr, "ASSERT_%s_%s(%s%s%s) failed:\n",
+	    name, pred_name(pred), a1,
+	    a2 != NULL ? ", " : "", a2 != NULL ? a2 : "");
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+void
+assert_bignum(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const BIGNUM *aa1, const BIGNUM *aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	int r = BN_cmp(aa1, aa2);
+
+	TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "BIGNUM", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%s\n", a1, BN_bn2hex(aa1));
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%s\n", a2, BN_bn2hex(aa2));
+	test_die();
+}
+#endif
+
+void
+assert_string(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const char *aa1, const char *aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	/* Verify pointers are not NULL */
+	assert_ptr(file, line, a1, "NULL", aa1, NULL, TEST_NE);
+	assert_ptr(file, line, a2, "NULL", aa2, NULL, TEST_NE);
+
+	r = strcmp(aa1, aa2);
+	TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "STRING", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a1, aa1, strlen(aa1));
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a2, aa2, strlen(aa2));
+	test_die();
+}
+
+static char *
+tohex(const void *_s, size_t l)
+{
+	u_int8_t *s = (u_int8_t *)_s;
+	size_t i, j;
+	const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef";
+	char *r = malloc((l * 2) + 1);
+
+	assert(r != NULL);
+	for (i = j = 0; i < l; i++) {
+		r[j++] = hex[(s[i] >> 4) & 0xf];
+		r[j++] = hex[s[i] & 0xf];
+	}
+	r[j] = '\0';
+	return r;
+}
+
+void
+assert_mem(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const void *aa1, const void *aa2, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	int r;
+	char *aa1_tohex = NULL;
+	char *aa2_tohex = NULL;
+
+	if (l == 0)
+		return;
+	/* If length is >0, then verify pointers are not NULL */
+	assert_ptr(file, line, a1, "NULL", aa1, NULL, TEST_NE);
+	assert_ptr(file, line, a2, "NULL", aa2, NULL, TEST_NE);
+
+	r = memcmp(aa1, aa2, l);
+	TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "STRING", pred);
+	aa1_tohex = tohex(aa1, MINIMUM(l, 256));
+	aa2_tohex = tohex(aa2, MINIMUM(l, 256));
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a1, aa1_tohex, l);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a2, aa2_tohex, l);
+	free(aa1_tohex);
+	free(aa2_tohex);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+static int
+memvalcmp(const u_int8_t *s, u_char v, size_t l, size_t *where)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+		if (s[i] != v) {
+			*where = i;
+			return 1;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+assert_mem_filled(const char *file, int line, const char *a1,
+    const void *aa1, u_char v, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	size_t where = -1;
+	int r;
+	char tmp[64];
+	char *aa1_tohex = NULL;
+
+	if (l == 0)
+		return;
+	/* If length is >0, then verify the pointer is not NULL */
+	assert_ptr(file, line, a1, "NULL", aa1, NULL, TEST_NE);
+
+	r = memvalcmp(aa1, v, l, &where);
+	TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, NULL, "MEM_ZERO", pred);
+	aa1_tohex = tohex(aa1, MINIMUM(l, 20));
+	fprintf(stderr, "%20s = %s%s (len %zu)\n", a1,
+	    aa1_tohex, l > 20 ? "..." : "", l);
+	free(aa1_tohex);
+	snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "(%s)[%zu]", a1, where);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%20s = 0x%02x (expected 0x%02x)\n", tmp,
+	    ((u_char *)aa1)[where], v);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_int(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    int aa1, int aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "INT", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %d\n", a1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %d\n", a2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_size_t(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    size_t aa1, size_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "SIZE_T", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %zu\n", a1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %zu\n", a2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_u_int(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int aa1, u_int aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U_INT", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %u / 0x%x\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %u / 0x%x\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    long aa1, long aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "LONG", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %ld / 0x%lx\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %ld / 0x%lx\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_long_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "LONG LONG", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %lld / 0x%llx\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %lld / 0x%llx\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_char(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    char aa1, char aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	char buf[8];
+
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "CHAR", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = '%s' / 0x02%x\n", a1,
+	    vis(buf, aa1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL, 0), aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = '%s' / 0x02%x\n", a1,
+	    vis(buf, aa2, VIS_SAFE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL, 0), aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_u8(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int8_t aa1, u_int8_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U8", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%02x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%02x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_u16(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int16_t aa1, u_int16_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U16", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%04x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%04x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_u32(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int32_t aa1, u_int32_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U32", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%08x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%08x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_u64(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int64_t aa1, u_int64_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U64", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%016llx %llu\n", a1,
+	    (unsigned long long)aa1, (unsigned long long)aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%016llx %llu\n", a2,
+	    (unsigned long long)aa2, (unsigned long long)aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
+void
+assert_ptr(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const void *aa1, const void *aa2, enum test_predicate pred)
+{
+	TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred);
+	test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "PTR", pred);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %p\n", a1, aa1);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %p\n", a2, aa2);
+	test_die();
+}
+
diff --git a/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h b/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6630220
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h
@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: test_helper.h,v 1.9 2018/10/17 23:28:05 djm Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Utility functions/framework for regress tests */
+
+#ifndef _TEST_HELPER_H
+#define _TEST_HELPER_H
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#endif
+
+enum test_predicate {
+	TEST_EQ, TEST_NE, TEST_LT, TEST_LE, TEST_GT, TEST_GE
+};
+typedef void (test_onerror_func_t)(void *);
+
+/* Supplied by test suite */
+void tests(void);
+
+const char *test_data_file(const char *name);
+void test_start(const char *n);
+void test_info(char *s, size_t len);
+void set_onerror_func(test_onerror_func_t *f, void *ctx);
+void test_done(void);
+int test_is_verbose(void);
+int test_is_quiet(void);
+int test_is_fast(void);
+int test_is_slow(void);
+void test_subtest_info(const char *fmt, ...)
+    __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+void ssl_err_check(const char *file, int line);
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+void assert_bignum(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const BIGNUM *aa1, const BIGNUM *aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+#endif
+void assert_string(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const char *aa1, const char *aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_mem(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const void *aa1, const void *aa2, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_mem_filled(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1,
+    const void *aa1, u_char v, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_int(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    int aa1, int aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_size_t(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    size_t aa1, size_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_u_int(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int aa1, u_int aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_long(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    long aa1, long aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_long_long(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_char(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    char aa1, char aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_ptr(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    const void *aa1, const void *aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_u8(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int8_t aa1, u_int8_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_u16(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int16_t aa1, u_int16_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_u32(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int32_t aa1, u_int32_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+void assert_u64(const char *file, int line,
+    const char *a1, const char *a2,
+    u_int64_t aa1, u_int64_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred);
+
+#define TEST_START(n)			test_start(n)
+#define TEST_DONE()			test_done()
+#define TEST_ONERROR(f, c)		set_onerror_func(f, c)
+#define SSL_ERR_CHECK() 		ssl_err_check(__FILE__, __LINE__)
+
+#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_EQ(a1, a2, l) \
+	assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(a1, c, l) \
+	assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, c, l, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_EQ(a1, l) \
+	assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, '\0', l, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_INT_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_CHAR_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_U8_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_U16_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_U32_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+#define ASSERT_U64_EQ(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ)
+
+#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_STRING_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_NE(a1, a2, l) \
+	assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(a1, l) \
+	assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, '\0', l, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_INT_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_U_INT_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_CHAR_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_PTR_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_U8_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_U16_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_U32_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+#define ASSERT_U64_NE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE)
+
+#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_STRING_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_LT(a1, a2, l) \
+	assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_INT_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_U_INT_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_CHAR_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_PTR_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_U8_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_U16_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_U32_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+#define ASSERT_U64_LT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT)
+
+#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_STRING_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_LE(a1, a2, l) \
+	assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_INT_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_U_INT_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_CHAR_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_PTR_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_U8_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_U16_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_U32_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+#define ASSERT_U64_LE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE)
+
+#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_STRING_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_GT(a1, a2, l) \
+	assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_INT_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_U_INT_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_CHAR_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_PTR_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_U8_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_U16_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_U32_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+#define ASSERT_U64_GT(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT)
+
+#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_STRING_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_MEM_GE(a1, a2, l) \
+	assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_INT_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_U_INT_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_CHAR_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_PTR_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_U8_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_U16_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_U32_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+#define ASSERT_U64_GE(a1, a2) \
+	assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE)
+
+/* Fuzzing support */
+
+struct fuzz;
+#define FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP		0x00000001	/* Flip one bit at a time */
+#define FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP		0x00000002	/* Flip two bits at a time */
+#define FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP	0x00000004	/* Flip one byte at a time */
+#define FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP	0x00000008	/* Flip two bytes at a time */
+#define FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START	0x00000010	/* Truncate from beginning */
+#define FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END	0x00000020	/* Truncate from end */
+#define FUZZ_BASE64		0x00000040	/* Try all base64 chars */
+#define FUZZ_MAX		FUZZ_BASE64
+
+/* Start fuzzing a blob of data with selected strategies (bitmask) */
+struct fuzz *fuzz_begin(u_int strategies, const void *p, size_t l);
+
+/* Free a fuzz context */
+void fuzz_cleanup(struct fuzz *fuzz);
+
+/* Prepare the next fuzz case in the series */
+void fuzz_next(struct fuzz *fuzz);
+
+/*
+ * Check whether this fuzz case is identical to the original
+ * This is slow, but useful if the caller needs to ensure that all tests
+ * generated change the input (e.g. when fuzzing signatures).
+ */
+int fuzz_matches_original(struct fuzz *fuzz);
+
+/* Determine whether the current fuzz sequence is exhausted (nonzero = yes) */
+int fuzz_done(struct fuzz *fuzz);
+
+/* Return the length and a pointer to the current fuzzed case */
+size_t fuzz_len(struct fuzz *fuzz);
+u_char *fuzz_ptr(struct fuzz *fuzz);
+
+/* Dump the current fuzz case to stderr */
+void fuzz_dump(struct fuzz *fuzz);
+
+#endif /* _TEST_HELPER_H */
diff --git a/regress/unittests/utf8/Makefile b/regress/unittests/utf8/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f8eec04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/utf8/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.5 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $
+
+PROG=test_utf8
+SRCS=tests.c
+
+# From usr.bin/ssh
+SRCS+=utf8.c atomicio.c
+
+REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
+
+run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
+	env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG}
+
+.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/regress/unittests/utf8/tests.c b/regress/unittests/utf8/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8cf524d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/utf8/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.4 2017/02/19 00:11:29 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for the utf8.h *mprintf() API
+ *
+ * Written by Ingo Schwarze <schwarze@openbsd.org> in 2016
+ * and placed in the public domain.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <locale.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
+
+#include "utf8.h"
+
+static void
+badarg(void)
+{
+	char	 buf[16];
+	int	 len, width;
+
+	width = 1;
+	TEST_START("utf8_badarg");
+	len = snmprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), &width, "\377");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(len, -1);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(buf, "");
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(width, 0);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
+
+static void
+one(int utf8, const char *name, const char *mbs, int width,
+    int wantwidth, int wantlen, const char *wants)
+{
+	char	 buf[16];
+	int	*wp;
+	int	 len;
+
+	if (wantlen == -2)
+		wantlen = strlen(wants);
+	(void)strlcpy(buf, utf8 ? "utf8_" : "c_", sizeof(buf));
+	(void)strlcat(buf, name, sizeof(buf));
+	TEST_START(buf);
+	wp = wantwidth == -2 ? NULL : &width;
+	len = snmprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), wp, "%s", mbs);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(len, wantlen);
+	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(buf, wants);
+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(width, wantwidth);
+	TEST_DONE();
+}
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+	char	*loc;
+
+	TEST_START("utf8_setlocale");
+	loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "en_US.UTF-8");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(loc, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	badarg();
+	one(1, "empty", "", 2, 0, 0, "");
+	one(1, "ascii", "x", -2, -2, -2, "x");
+	one(1, "newline", "a\nb", -2, -2, -2, "a\nb");
+	one(1, "cr", "a\rb", -2, -2, -2, "a\rb");
+	one(1, "tab", "a\tb", -2, -2, -2, "a\tb");
+	one(1, "esc", "\033x", -2, -2, -2, "\\033x");
+	one(1, "inv_badbyte", "\377x", -2, -2, -2, "\\377x");
+	one(1, "inv_nocont", "\341x", -2, -2, -2, "\\341x");
+	one(1, "inv_nolead", "a\200b", -2, -2, -2, "a\\200b");
+	one(1, "sz_ascii", "1234567890123456", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012345");
+	one(1, "sz_esc", "123456789012\033", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012");
+	one(1, "width_ascii", "123", 2, 2, -1, "12");
+	one(1, "width_double", "a\343\201\201", 2, 1, -1, "a");
+	one(1, "double_fit", "a\343\201\201", 3, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201");
+	one(1, "double_spc", "a\343\201\201", 4, 3, 4, "a\343\201\201");
+
+	TEST_START("C_setlocale");
+	loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C");
+	ASSERT_PTR_NE(loc, NULL);
+	TEST_DONE();
+
+	badarg();
+	one(0, "empty", "", 2, 0, 0, "");
+	one(0, "ascii", "x", -2, -2, -2, "x");
+	one(0, "newline", "a\nb", -2, -2, -2, "a\nb");
+	one(0, "cr", "a\rb", -2, -2, -2, "a\rb");
+	one(0, "tab", "a\tb", -2, -2, -2, "a\tb");
+	one(0, "esc", "\033x", -2, -2, -2, "\\033x");
+	one(0, "inv_badbyte", "\377x", -2, -2, -2, "\\377x");
+	one(0, "inv_nocont", "\341x", -2, -2, -2, "\\341x");
+	one(0, "inv_nolead", "a\200b", -2, -2, -2, "a\\200b");
+	one(0, "sz_ascii", "1234567890123456", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012345");
+	one(0, "sz_esc", "123456789012\033", -2, -2, 16, "123456789012");
+	one(0, "width_ascii", "123", 2, 2, -1, "12");
+	one(0, "width_double", "a\343\201\201", 2, 1, -1, "a");
+	one(0, "double_fit", "a\343\201\201", 7, 5, -1, "a\\343");
+	one(0, "double_spc", "a\343\201\201", 13, 13, 13, "a\\343\\201\\201");
+}
diff --git a/regress/valgrind-unit.sh b/regress/valgrind-unit.sh
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..193289e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/valgrind-unit.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+
+UNIT_BINARY="$1"
+shift
+UNIT_ARGS="$@"
+
+test "x$OBJ" = "x" && OBJ=$PWD
+
+# This mostly replicates the logic in test-exec.sh for running the
+# regress tests under valgrind, except that we unconditionally enable
+# leak checking because the unit tests should be clean.
+VG_LEAK="--leak-check=full"
+VG_TEST=`basename $UNIT_BINARY`
+VG_LOG="$OBJ/valgrind-out/${VG_TEST}.%p"
+VG_OPTS="--track-origins=yes $VG_LEAK --log-file=${VG_LOG}"
+VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children=yes"
+VG_PATH="valgrind"
+if [ "x$VALGRIND_PATH" != "x" ]; then
+	VG_PATH="$VALGRIND_PATH"
+fi
+
+mkdir -p "$OBJ/valgrind-out"
+
+exec $VG_PATH $VG_OPTS $UNIT_BINARY $UNIT_ARGS
diff --git a/regress/yes-head.sh b/regress/yes-head.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1bde504
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/yes-head.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: yes-head.sh,v 1.7 2023/01/14 10:05:54 dtucker Exp $
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="yes pipe head"
+
+lines=`${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy thishost 'sh -c "while true;do echo yes;done | _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 head -2000"' | (sleep 3 ; wc -l)`
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+	fail "yes|head test failed"
++	lines=0
+fi
+if [ $lines -ne 2000 ]; then
+	fail "yes|head returns $lines lines instead of 2000"
+fi
diff --git a/rijndael.c b/rijndael.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..40ab7b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rijndael.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1129 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.20 2015/03/16 11:09:52 djm Exp $ */
+
+/**
+ * rijndael-alg-fst.c
+ *
+ * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
+ *
+ * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
+ *
+ * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br>
+ *
+ * This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
+ * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
+ * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "rijndael.h"
+
+#undef FULL_UNROLL
+
+/*
+Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03];
+Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01];
+Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01];
+Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02];
+
+Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b];
+Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d];
+Td2[x] = Si[x].[0d, 0b, 0e, 09];
+Td3[x] = Si[x].[09, 0d, 0b, 0e];
+Td4[x] = Si[x].[01];
+*/
+
+static const u32 Te0[256] = {
+    0xc66363a5U, 0xf87c7c84U, 0xee777799U, 0xf67b7b8dU,
+    0xfff2f20dU, 0xd66b6bbdU, 0xde6f6fb1U, 0x91c5c554U,
+    0x60303050U, 0x02010103U, 0xce6767a9U, 0x562b2b7dU,
+    0xe7fefe19U, 0xb5d7d762U, 0x4dababe6U, 0xec76769aU,
+    0x8fcaca45U, 0x1f82829dU, 0x89c9c940U, 0xfa7d7d87U,
+    0xeffafa15U, 0xb25959ebU, 0x8e4747c9U, 0xfbf0f00bU,
+    0x41adadecU, 0xb3d4d467U, 0x5fa2a2fdU, 0x45afafeaU,
+    0x239c9cbfU, 0x53a4a4f7U, 0xe4727296U, 0x9bc0c05bU,
+    0x75b7b7c2U, 0xe1fdfd1cU, 0x3d9393aeU, 0x4c26266aU,
+    0x6c36365aU, 0x7e3f3f41U, 0xf5f7f702U, 0x83cccc4fU,
+    0x6834345cU, 0x51a5a5f4U, 0xd1e5e534U, 0xf9f1f108U,
+    0xe2717193U, 0xabd8d873U, 0x62313153U, 0x2a15153fU,
+    0x0804040cU, 0x95c7c752U, 0x46232365U, 0x9dc3c35eU,
+    0x30181828U, 0x379696a1U, 0x0a05050fU, 0x2f9a9ab5U,
+    0x0e070709U, 0x24121236U, 0x1b80809bU, 0xdfe2e23dU,
+    0xcdebeb26U, 0x4e272769U, 0x7fb2b2cdU, 0xea75759fU,
+    0x1209091bU, 0x1d83839eU, 0x582c2c74U, 0x341a1a2eU,
+    0x361b1b2dU, 0xdc6e6eb2U, 0xb45a5aeeU, 0x5ba0a0fbU,
+    0xa45252f6U, 0x763b3b4dU, 0xb7d6d661U, 0x7db3b3ceU,
+    0x5229297bU, 0xdde3e33eU, 0x5e2f2f71U, 0x13848497U,
+    0xa65353f5U, 0xb9d1d168U, 0x00000000U, 0xc1eded2cU,
+    0x40202060U, 0xe3fcfc1fU, 0x79b1b1c8U, 0xb65b5bedU,
+    0xd46a6abeU, 0x8dcbcb46U, 0x67bebed9U, 0x7239394bU,
+    0x944a4adeU, 0x984c4cd4U, 0xb05858e8U, 0x85cfcf4aU,
+    0xbbd0d06bU, 0xc5efef2aU, 0x4faaaae5U, 0xedfbfb16U,
+    0x864343c5U, 0x9a4d4dd7U, 0x66333355U, 0x11858594U,
+    0x8a4545cfU, 0xe9f9f910U, 0x04020206U, 0xfe7f7f81U,
+    0xa05050f0U, 0x783c3c44U, 0x259f9fbaU, 0x4ba8a8e3U,
+    0xa25151f3U, 0x5da3a3feU, 0x804040c0U, 0x058f8f8aU,
+    0x3f9292adU, 0x219d9dbcU, 0x70383848U, 0xf1f5f504U,
+    0x63bcbcdfU, 0x77b6b6c1U, 0xafdada75U, 0x42212163U,
+    0x20101030U, 0xe5ffff1aU, 0xfdf3f30eU, 0xbfd2d26dU,
+    0x81cdcd4cU, 0x180c0c14U, 0x26131335U, 0xc3ecec2fU,
+    0xbe5f5fe1U, 0x359797a2U, 0x884444ccU, 0x2e171739U,
+    0x93c4c457U, 0x55a7a7f2U, 0xfc7e7e82U, 0x7a3d3d47U,
+    0xc86464acU, 0xba5d5de7U, 0x3219192bU, 0xe6737395U,
+    0xc06060a0U, 0x19818198U, 0x9e4f4fd1U, 0xa3dcdc7fU,
+    0x44222266U, 0x542a2a7eU, 0x3b9090abU, 0x0b888883U,
+    0x8c4646caU, 0xc7eeee29U, 0x6bb8b8d3U, 0x2814143cU,
+    0xa7dede79U, 0xbc5e5ee2U, 0x160b0b1dU, 0xaddbdb76U,
+    0xdbe0e03bU, 0x64323256U, 0x743a3a4eU, 0x140a0a1eU,
+    0x924949dbU, 0x0c06060aU, 0x4824246cU, 0xb85c5ce4U,
+    0x9fc2c25dU, 0xbdd3d36eU, 0x43acacefU, 0xc46262a6U,
+    0x399191a8U, 0x319595a4U, 0xd3e4e437U, 0xf279798bU,
+    0xd5e7e732U, 0x8bc8c843U, 0x6e373759U, 0xda6d6db7U,
+    0x018d8d8cU, 0xb1d5d564U, 0x9c4e4ed2U, 0x49a9a9e0U,
+    0xd86c6cb4U, 0xac5656faU, 0xf3f4f407U, 0xcfeaea25U,
+    0xca6565afU, 0xf47a7a8eU, 0x47aeaee9U, 0x10080818U,
+    0x6fbabad5U, 0xf0787888U, 0x4a25256fU, 0x5c2e2e72U,
+    0x381c1c24U, 0x57a6a6f1U, 0x73b4b4c7U, 0x97c6c651U,
+    0xcbe8e823U, 0xa1dddd7cU, 0xe874749cU, 0x3e1f1f21U,
+    0x964b4bddU, 0x61bdbddcU, 0x0d8b8b86U, 0x0f8a8a85U,
+    0xe0707090U, 0x7c3e3e42U, 0x71b5b5c4U, 0xcc6666aaU,
+    0x904848d8U, 0x06030305U, 0xf7f6f601U, 0x1c0e0e12U,
+    0xc26161a3U, 0x6a35355fU, 0xae5757f9U, 0x69b9b9d0U,
+    0x17868691U, 0x99c1c158U, 0x3a1d1d27U, 0x279e9eb9U,
+    0xd9e1e138U, 0xebf8f813U, 0x2b9898b3U, 0x22111133U,
+    0xd26969bbU, 0xa9d9d970U, 0x078e8e89U, 0x339494a7U,
+    0x2d9b9bb6U, 0x3c1e1e22U, 0x15878792U, 0xc9e9e920U,
+    0x87cece49U, 0xaa5555ffU, 0x50282878U, 0xa5dfdf7aU,
+    0x038c8c8fU, 0x59a1a1f8U, 0x09898980U, 0x1a0d0d17U,
+    0x65bfbfdaU, 0xd7e6e631U, 0x844242c6U, 0xd06868b8U,
+    0x824141c3U, 0x299999b0U, 0x5a2d2d77U, 0x1e0f0f11U,
+    0x7bb0b0cbU, 0xa85454fcU, 0x6dbbbbd6U, 0x2c16163aU,
+};
+static const u32 Te1[256] = {
+    0xa5c66363U, 0x84f87c7cU, 0x99ee7777U, 0x8df67b7bU,
+    0x0dfff2f2U, 0xbdd66b6bU, 0xb1de6f6fU, 0x5491c5c5U,
+    0x50603030U, 0x03020101U, 0xa9ce6767U, 0x7d562b2bU,
+    0x19e7fefeU, 0x62b5d7d7U, 0xe64dababU, 0x9aec7676U,
+    0x458fcacaU, 0x9d1f8282U, 0x4089c9c9U, 0x87fa7d7dU,
+    0x15effafaU, 0xebb25959U, 0xc98e4747U, 0x0bfbf0f0U,
+    0xec41adadU, 0x67b3d4d4U, 0xfd5fa2a2U, 0xea45afafU,
+    0xbf239c9cU, 0xf753a4a4U, 0x96e47272U, 0x5b9bc0c0U,
+    0xc275b7b7U, 0x1ce1fdfdU, 0xae3d9393U, 0x6a4c2626U,
+    0x5a6c3636U, 0x417e3f3fU, 0x02f5f7f7U, 0x4f83ccccU,
+    0x5c683434U, 0xf451a5a5U, 0x34d1e5e5U, 0x08f9f1f1U,
+    0x93e27171U, 0x73abd8d8U, 0x53623131U, 0x3f2a1515U,
+    0x0c080404U, 0x5295c7c7U, 0x65462323U, 0x5e9dc3c3U,
+    0x28301818U, 0xa1379696U, 0x0f0a0505U, 0xb52f9a9aU,
+    0x090e0707U, 0x36241212U, 0x9b1b8080U, 0x3ddfe2e2U,
+    0x26cdebebU, 0x694e2727U, 0xcd7fb2b2U, 0x9fea7575U,
+    0x1b120909U, 0x9e1d8383U, 0x74582c2cU, 0x2e341a1aU,
+    0x2d361b1bU, 0xb2dc6e6eU, 0xeeb45a5aU, 0xfb5ba0a0U,
+    0xf6a45252U, 0x4d763b3bU, 0x61b7d6d6U, 0xce7db3b3U,
+    0x7b522929U, 0x3edde3e3U, 0x715e2f2fU, 0x97138484U,
+    0xf5a65353U, 0x68b9d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0x2cc1ededU,
+    0x60402020U, 0x1fe3fcfcU, 0xc879b1b1U, 0xedb65b5bU,
+    0xbed46a6aU, 0x468dcbcbU, 0xd967bebeU, 0x4b723939U,
+    0xde944a4aU, 0xd4984c4cU, 0xe8b05858U, 0x4a85cfcfU,
+    0x6bbbd0d0U, 0x2ac5efefU, 0xe54faaaaU, 0x16edfbfbU,
+    0xc5864343U, 0xd79a4d4dU, 0x55663333U, 0x94118585U,
+    0xcf8a4545U, 0x10e9f9f9U, 0x06040202U, 0x81fe7f7fU,
+    0xf0a05050U, 0x44783c3cU, 0xba259f9fU, 0xe34ba8a8U,
+    0xf3a25151U, 0xfe5da3a3U, 0xc0804040U, 0x8a058f8fU,
+    0xad3f9292U, 0xbc219d9dU, 0x48703838U, 0x04f1f5f5U,
+    0xdf63bcbcU, 0xc177b6b6U, 0x75afdadaU, 0x63422121U,
+    0x30201010U, 0x1ae5ffffU, 0x0efdf3f3U, 0x6dbfd2d2U,
+    0x4c81cdcdU, 0x14180c0cU, 0x35261313U, 0x2fc3ececU,
+    0xe1be5f5fU, 0xa2359797U, 0xcc884444U, 0x392e1717U,
+    0x5793c4c4U, 0xf255a7a7U, 0x82fc7e7eU, 0x477a3d3dU,
+    0xacc86464U, 0xe7ba5d5dU, 0x2b321919U, 0x95e67373U,
+    0xa0c06060U, 0x98198181U, 0xd19e4f4fU, 0x7fa3dcdcU,
+    0x66442222U, 0x7e542a2aU, 0xab3b9090U, 0x830b8888U,
+    0xca8c4646U, 0x29c7eeeeU, 0xd36bb8b8U, 0x3c281414U,
+    0x79a7dedeU, 0xe2bc5e5eU, 0x1d160b0bU, 0x76addbdbU,
+    0x3bdbe0e0U, 0x56643232U, 0x4e743a3aU, 0x1e140a0aU,
+    0xdb924949U, 0x0a0c0606U, 0x6c482424U, 0xe4b85c5cU,
+    0x5d9fc2c2U, 0x6ebdd3d3U, 0xef43acacU, 0xa6c46262U,
+    0xa8399191U, 0xa4319595U, 0x37d3e4e4U, 0x8bf27979U,
+    0x32d5e7e7U, 0x438bc8c8U, 0x596e3737U, 0xb7da6d6dU,
+    0x8c018d8dU, 0x64b1d5d5U, 0xd29c4e4eU, 0xe049a9a9U,
+    0xb4d86c6cU, 0xfaac5656U, 0x07f3f4f4U, 0x25cfeaeaU,
+    0xafca6565U, 0x8ef47a7aU, 0xe947aeaeU, 0x18100808U,
+    0xd56fbabaU, 0x88f07878U, 0x6f4a2525U, 0x725c2e2eU,
+    0x24381c1cU, 0xf157a6a6U, 0xc773b4b4U, 0x5197c6c6U,
+    0x23cbe8e8U, 0x7ca1ddddU, 0x9ce87474U, 0x213e1f1fU,
+    0xdd964b4bU, 0xdc61bdbdU, 0x860d8b8bU, 0x850f8a8aU,
+    0x90e07070U, 0x427c3e3eU, 0xc471b5b5U, 0xaacc6666U,
+    0xd8904848U, 0x05060303U, 0x01f7f6f6U, 0x121c0e0eU,
+    0xa3c26161U, 0x5f6a3535U, 0xf9ae5757U, 0xd069b9b9U,
+    0x91178686U, 0x5899c1c1U, 0x273a1d1dU, 0xb9279e9eU,
+    0x38d9e1e1U, 0x13ebf8f8U, 0xb32b9898U, 0x33221111U,
+    0xbbd26969U, 0x70a9d9d9U, 0x89078e8eU, 0xa7339494U,
+    0xb62d9b9bU, 0x223c1e1eU, 0x92158787U, 0x20c9e9e9U,
+    0x4987ceceU, 0xffaa5555U, 0x78502828U, 0x7aa5dfdfU,
+    0x8f038c8cU, 0xf859a1a1U, 0x80098989U, 0x171a0d0dU,
+    0xda65bfbfU, 0x31d7e6e6U, 0xc6844242U, 0xb8d06868U,
+    0xc3824141U, 0xb0299999U, 0x775a2d2dU, 0x111e0f0fU,
+    0xcb7bb0b0U, 0xfca85454U, 0xd66dbbbbU, 0x3a2c1616U,
+};
+static const u32 Te2[256] = {
+    0x63a5c663U, 0x7c84f87cU, 0x7799ee77U, 0x7b8df67bU,
+    0xf20dfff2U, 0x6bbdd66bU, 0x6fb1de6fU, 0xc55491c5U,
+    0x30506030U, 0x01030201U, 0x67a9ce67U, 0x2b7d562bU,
+    0xfe19e7feU, 0xd762b5d7U, 0xabe64dabU, 0x769aec76U,
+    0xca458fcaU, 0x829d1f82U, 0xc94089c9U, 0x7d87fa7dU,
+    0xfa15effaU, 0x59ebb259U, 0x47c98e47U, 0xf00bfbf0U,
+    0xadec41adU, 0xd467b3d4U, 0xa2fd5fa2U, 0xafea45afU,
+    0x9cbf239cU, 0xa4f753a4U, 0x7296e472U, 0xc05b9bc0U,
+    0xb7c275b7U, 0xfd1ce1fdU, 0x93ae3d93U, 0x266a4c26U,
+    0x365a6c36U, 0x3f417e3fU, 0xf702f5f7U, 0xcc4f83ccU,
+    0x345c6834U, 0xa5f451a5U, 0xe534d1e5U, 0xf108f9f1U,
+    0x7193e271U, 0xd873abd8U, 0x31536231U, 0x153f2a15U,
+    0x040c0804U, 0xc75295c7U, 0x23654623U, 0xc35e9dc3U,
+    0x18283018U, 0x96a13796U, 0x050f0a05U, 0x9ab52f9aU,
+    0x07090e07U, 0x12362412U, 0x809b1b80U, 0xe23ddfe2U,
+    0xeb26cdebU, 0x27694e27U, 0xb2cd7fb2U, 0x759fea75U,
+    0x091b1209U, 0x839e1d83U, 0x2c74582cU, 0x1a2e341aU,
+    0x1b2d361bU, 0x6eb2dc6eU, 0x5aeeb45aU, 0xa0fb5ba0U,
+    0x52f6a452U, 0x3b4d763bU, 0xd661b7d6U, 0xb3ce7db3U,
+    0x297b5229U, 0xe33edde3U, 0x2f715e2fU, 0x84971384U,
+    0x53f5a653U, 0xd168b9d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xed2cc1edU,
+    0x20604020U, 0xfc1fe3fcU, 0xb1c879b1U, 0x5bedb65bU,
+    0x6abed46aU, 0xcb468dcbU, 0xbed967beU, 0x394b7239U,
+    0x4ade944aU, 0x4cd4984cU, 0x58e8b058U, 0xcf4a85cfU,
+    0xd06bbbd0U, 0xef2ac5efU, 0xaae54faaU, 0xfb16edfbU,
+    0x43c58643U, 0x4dd79a4dU, 0x33556633U, 0x85941185U,
+    0x45cf8a45U, 0xf910e9f9U, 0x02060402U, 0x7f81fe7fU,
+    0x50f0a050U, 0x3c44783cU, 0x9fba259fU, 0xa8e34ba8U,
+    0x51f3a251U, 0xa3fe5da3U, 0x40c08040U, 0x8f8a058fU,
+    0x92ad3f92U, 0x9dbc219dU, 0x38487038U, 0xf504f1f5U,
+    0xbcdf63bcU, 0xb6c177b6U, 0xda75afdaU, 0x21634221U,
+    0x10302010U, 0xff1ae5ffU, 0xf30efdf3U, 0xd26dbfd2U,
+    0xcd4c81cdU, 0x0c14180cU, 0x13352613U, 0xec2fc3ecU,
+    0x5fe1be5fU, 0x97a23597U, 0x44cc8844U, 0x17392e17U,
+    0xc45793c4U, 0xa7f255a7U, 0x7e82fc7eU, 0x3d477a3dU,
+    0x64acc864U, 0x5de7ba5dU, 0x192b3219U, 0x7395e673U,
+    0x60a0c060U, 0x81981981U, 0x4fd19e4fU, 0xdc7fa3dcU,
+    0x22664422U, 0x2a7e542aU, 0x90ab3b90U, 0x88830b88U,
+    0x46ca8c46U, 0xee29c7eeU, 0xb8d36bb8U, 0x143c2814U,
+    0xde79a7deU, 0x5ee2bc5eU, 0x0b1d160bU, 0xdb76addbU,
+    0xe03bdbe0U, 0x32566432U, 0x3a4e743aU, 0x0a1e140aU,
+    0x49db9249U, 0x060a0c06U, 0x246c4824U, 0x5ce4b85cU,
+    0xc25d9fc2U, 0xd36ebdd3U, 0xacef43acU, 0x62a6c462U,
+    0x91a83991U, 0x95a43195U, 0xe437d3e4U, 0x798bf279U,
+    0xe732d5e7U, 0xc8438bc8U, 0x37596e37U, 0x6db7da6dU,
+    0x8d8c018dU, 0xd564b1d5U, 0x4ed29c4eU, 0xa9e049a9U,
+    0x6cb4d86cU, 0x56faac56U, 0xf407f3f4U, 0xea25cfeaU,
+    0x65afca65U, 0x7a8ef47aU, 0xaee947aeU, 0x08181008U,
+    0xbad56fbaU, 0x7888f078U, 0x256f4a25U, 0x2e725c2eU,
+    0x1c24381cU, 0xa6f157a6U, 0xb4c773b4U, 0xc65197c6U,
+    0xe823cbe8U, 0xdd7ca1ddU, 0x749ce874U, 0x1f213e1fU,
+    0x4bdd964bU, 0xbddc61bdU, 0x8b860d8bU, 0x8a850f8aU,
+    0x7090e070U, 0x3e427c3eU, 0xb5c471b5U, 0x66aacc66U,
+    0x48d89048U, 0x03050603U, 0xf601f7f6U, 0x0e121c0eU,
+    0x61a3c261U, 0x355f6a35U, 0x57f9ae57U, 0xb9d069b9U,
+    0x86911786U, 0xc15899c1U, 0x1d273a1dU, 0x9eb9279eU,
+    0xe138d9e1U, 0xf813ebf8U, 0x98b32b98U, 0x11332211U,
+    0x69bbd269U, 0xd970a9d9U, 0x8e89078eU, 0x94a73394U,
+    0x9bb62d9bU, 0x1e223c1eU, 0x87921587U, 0xe920c9e9U,
+    0xce4987ceU, 0x55ffaa55U, 0x28785028U, 0xdf7aa5dfU,
+    0x8c8f038cU, 0xa1f859a1U, 0x89800989U, 0x0d171a0dU,
+    0xbfda65bfU, 0xe631d7e6U, 0x42c68442U, 0x68b8d068U,
+    0x41c38241U, 0x99b02999U, 0x2d775a2dU, 0x0f111e0fU,
+    0xb0cb7bb0U, 0x54fca854U, 0xbbd66dbbU, 0x163a2c16U,
+};
+static const u32 Te3[256] = {
+    0x6363a5c6U, 0x7c7c84f8U, 0x777799eeU, 0x7b7b8df6U,
+    0xf2f20dffU, 0x6b6bbdd6U, 0x6f6fb1deU, 0xc5c55491U,
+    0x30305060U, 0x01010302U, 0x6767a9ceU, 0x2b2b7d56U,
+    0xfefe19e7U, 0xd7d762b5U, 0xababe64dU, 0x76769aecU,
+    0xcaca458fU, 0x82829d1fU, 0xc9c94089U, 0x7d7d87faU,
+    0xfafa15efU, 0x5959ebb2U, 0x4747c98eU, 0xf0f00bfbU,
+    0xadadec41U, 0xd4d467b3U, 0xa2a2fd5fU, 0xafafea45U,
+    0x9c9cbf23U, 0xa4a4f753U, 0x727296e4U, 0xc0c05b9bU,
+    0xb7b7c275U, 0xfdfd1ce1U, 0x9393ae3dU, 0x26266a4cU,
+    0x36365a6cU, 0x3f3f417eU, 0xf7f702f5U, 0xcccc4f83U,
+    0x34345c68U, 0xa5a5f451U, 0xe5e534d1U, 0xf1f108f9U,
+    0x717193e2U, 0xd8d873abU, 0x31315362U, 0x15153f2aU,
+    0x04040c08U, 0xc7c75295U, 0x23236546U, 0xc3c35e9dU,
+    0x18182830U, 0x9696a137U, 0x05050f0aU, 0x9a9ab52fU,
+    0x0707090eU, 0x12123624U, 0x80809b1bU, 0xe2e23ddfU,
+    0xebeb26cdU, 0x2727694eU, 0xb2b2cd7fU, 0x75759feaU,
+    0x09091b12U, 0x83839e1dU, 0x2c2c7458U, 0x1a1a2e34U,
+    0x1b1b2d36U, 0x6e6eb2dcU, 0x5a5aeeb4U, 0xa0a0fb5bU,
+    0x5252f6a4U, 0x3b3b4d76U, 0xd6d661b7U, 0xb3b3ce7dU,
+    0x29297b52U, 0xe3e33eddU, 0x2f2f715eU, 0x84849713U,
+    0x5353f5a6U, 0xd1d168b9U, 0x00000000U, 0xeded2cc1U,
+    0x20206040U, 0xfcfc1fe3U, 0xb1b1c879U, 0x5b5bedb6U,
+    0x6a6abed4U, 0xcbcb468dU, 0xbebed967U, 0x39394b72U,
+    0x4a4ade94U, 0x4c4cd498U, 0x5858e8b0U, 0xcfcf4a85U,
+    0xd0d06bbbU, 0xefef2ac5U, 0xaaaae54fU, 0xfbfb16edU,
+    0x4343c586U, 0x4d4dd79aU, 0x33335566U, 0x85859411U,
+    0x4545cf8aU, 0xf9f910e9U, 0x02020604U, 0x7f7f81feU,
+    0x5050f0a0U, 0x3c3c4478U, 0x9f9fba25U, 0xa8a8e34bU,
+    0x5151f3a2U, 0xa3a3fe5dU, 0x4040c080U, 0x8f8f8a05U,
+    0x9292ad3fU, 0x9d9dbc21U, 0x38384870U, 0xf5f504f1U,
+    0xbcbcdf63U, 0xb6b6c177U, 0xdada75afU, 0x21216342U,
+    0x10103020U, 0xffff1ae5U, 0xf3f30efdU, 0xd2d26dbfU,
+    0xcdcd4c81U, 0x0c0c1418U, 0x13133526U, 0xecec2fc3U,
+    0x5f5fe1beU, 0x9797a235U, 0x4444cc88U, 0x1717392eU,
+    0xc4c45793U, 0xa7a7f255U, 0x7e7e82fcU, 0x3d3d477aU,
+    0x6464acc8U, 0x5d5de7baU, 0x19192b32U, 0x737395e6U,
+    0x6060a0c0U, 0x81819819U, 0x4f4fd19eU, 0xdcdc7fa3U,
+    0x22226644U, 0x2a2a7e54U, 0x9090ab3bU, 0x8888830bU,
+    0x4646ca8cU, 0xeeee29c7U, 0xb8b8d36bU, 0x14143c28U,
+    0xdede79a7U, 0x5e5ee2bcU, 0x0b0b1d16U, 0xdbdb76adU,
+    0xe0e03bdbU, 0x32325664U, 0x3a3a4e74U, 0x0a0a1e14U,
+    0x4949db92U, 0x06060a0cU, 0x24246c48U, 0x5c5ce4b8U,
+    0xc2c25d9fU, 0xd3d36ebdU, 0xacacef43U, 0x6262a6c4U,
+    0x9191a839U, 0x9595a431U, 0xe4e437d3U, 0x79798bf2U,
+    0xe7e732d5U, 0xc8c8438bU, 0x3737596eU, 0x6d6db7daU,
+    0x8d8d8c01U, 0xd5d564b1U, 0x4e4ed29cU, 0xa9a9e049U,
+    0x6c6cb4d8U, 0x5656faacU, 0xf4f407f3U, 0xeaea25cfU,
+    0x6565afcaU, 0x7a7a8ef4U, 0xaeaee947U, 0x08081810U,
+    0xbabad56fU, 0x787888f0U, 0x25256f4aU, 0x2e2e725cU,
+    0x1c1c2438U, 0xa6a6f157U, 0xb4b4c773U, 0xc6c65197U,
+    0xe8e823cbU, 0xdddd7ca1U, 0x74749ce8U, 0x1f1f213eU,
+    0x4b4bdd96U, 0xbdbddc61U, 0x8b8b860dU, 0x8a8a850fU,
+    0x707090e0U, 0x3e3e427cU, 0xb5b5c471U, 0x6666aaccU,
+    0x4848d890U, 0x03030506U, 0xf6f601f7U, 0x0e0e121cU,
+    0x6161a3c2U, 0x35355f6aU, 0x5757f9aeU, 0xb9b9d069U,
+    0x86869117U, 0xc1c15899U, 0x1d1d273aU, 0x9e9eb927U,
+    0xe1e138d9U, 0xf8f813ebU, 0x9898b32bU, 0x11113322U,
+    0x6969bbd2U, 0xd9d970a9U, 0x8e8e8907U, 0x9494a733U,
+    0x9b9bb62dU, 0x1e1e223cU, 0x87879215U, 0xe9e920c9U,
+    0xcece4987U, 0x5555ffaaU, 0x28287850U, 0xdfdf7aa5U,
+    0x8c8c8f03U, 0xa1a1f859U, 0x89898009U, 0x0d0d171aU,
+    0xbfbfda65U, 0xe6e631d7U, 0x4242c684U, 0x6868b8d0U,
+    0x4141c382U, 0x9999b029U, 0x2d2d775aU, 0x0f0f111eU,
+    0xb0b0cb7bU, 0x5454fca8U, 0xbbbbd66dU, 0x16163a2cU,
+};
+#if 0
+static const u32 Td0[256] = {
+    0x51f4a750U, 0x7e416553U, 0x1a17a4c3U, 0x3a275e96U,
+    0x3bab6bcbU, 0x1f9d45f1U, 0xacfa58abU, 0x4be30393U,
+    0x2030fa55U, 0xad766df6U, 0x88cc7691U, 0xf5024c25U,
+    0x4fe5d7fcU, 0xc52acbd7U, 0x26354480U, 0xb562a38fU,
+    0xdeb15a49U, 0x25ba1b67U, 0x45ea0e98U, 0x5dfec0e1U,
+    0xc32f7502U, 0x814cf012U, 0x8d4697a3U, 0x6bd3f9c6U,
+    0x038f5fe7U, 0x15929c95U, 0xbf6d7aebU, 0x955259daU,
+    0xd4be832dU, 0x587421d3U, 0x49e06929U, 0x8ec9c844U,
+    0x75c2896aU, 0xf48e7978U, 0x99583e6bU, 0x27b971ddU,
+    0xbee14fb6U, 0xf088ad17U, 0xc920ac66U, 0x7dce3ab4U,
+    0x63df4a18U, 0xe51a3182U, 0x97513360U, 0x62537f45U,
+    0xb16477e0U, 0xbb6bae84U, 0xfe81a01cU, 0xf9082b94U,
+    0x70486858U, 0x8f45fd19U, 0x94de6c87U, 0x527bf8b7U,
+    0xab73d323U, 0x724b02e2U, 0xe31f8f57U, 0x6655ab2aU,
+    0xb2eb2807U, 0x2fb5c203U, 0x86c57b9aU, 0xd33708a5U,
+    0x302887f2U, 0x23bfa5b2U, 0x02036abaU, 0xed16825cU,
+    0x8acf1c2bU, 0xa779b492U, 0xf307f2f0U, 0x4e69e2a1U,
+    0x65daf4cdU, 0x0605bed5U, 0xd134621fU, 0xc4a6fe8aU,
+    0x342e539dU, 0xa2f355a0U, 0x058ae132U, 0xa4f6eb75U,
+    0x0b83ec39U, 0x4060efaaU, 0x5e719f06U, 0xbd6e1051U,
+    0x3e218af9U, 0x96dd063dU, 0xdd3e05aeU, 0x4de6bd46U,
+    0x91548db5U, 0x71c45d05U, 0x0406d46fU, 0x605015ffU,
+    0x1998fb24U, 0xd6bde997U, 0x894043ccU, 0x67d99e77U,
+    0xb0e842bdU, 0x07898b88U, 0xe7195b38U, 0x79c8eedbU,
+    0xa17c0a47U, 0x7c420fe9U, 0xf8841ec9U, 0x00000000U,
+    0x09808683U, 0x322bed48U, 0x1e1170acU, 0x6c5a724eU,
+    0xfd0efffbU, 0x0f853856U, 0x3daed51eU, 0x362d3927U,
+    0x0a0fd964U, 0x685ca621U, 0x9b5b54d1U, 0x24362e3aU,
+    0x0c0a67b1U, 0x9357e70fU, 0xb4ee96d2U, 0x1b9b919eU,
+    0x80c0c54fU, 0x61dc20a2U, 0x5a774b69U, 0x1c121a16U,
+    0xe293ba0aU, 0xc0a02ae5U, 0x3c22e043U, 0x121b171dU,
+    0x0e090d0bU, 0xf28bc7adU, 0x2db6a8b9U, 0x141ea9c8U,
+    0x57f11985U, 0xaf75074cU, 0xee99ddbbU, 0xa37f60fdU,
+    0xf701269fU, 0x5c72f5bcU, 0x44663bc5U, 0x5bfb7e34U,
+    0x8b432976U, 0xcb23c6dcU, 0xb6edfc68U, 0xb8e4f163U,
+    0xd731dccaU, 0x42638510U, 0x13972240U, 0x84c61120U,
+    0x854a247dU, 0xd2bb3df8U, 0xaef93211U, 0xc729a16dU,
+    0x1d9e2f4bU, 0xdcb230f3U, 0x0d8652ecU, 0x77c1e3d0U,
+    0x2bb3166cU, 0xa970b999U, 0x119448faU, 0x47e96422U,
+    0xa8fc8cc4U, 0xa0f03f1aU, 0x567d2cd8U, 0x223390efU,
+    0x87494ec7U, 0xd938d1c1U, 0x8ccaa2feU, 0x98d40b36U,
+    0xa6f581cfU, 0xa57ade28U, 0xdab78e26U, 0x3fadbfa4U,
+    0x2c3a9de4U, 0x5078920dU, 0x6a5fcc9bU, 0x547e4662U,
+    0xf68d13c2U, 0x90d8b8e8U, 0x2e39f75eU, 0x82c3aff5U,
+    0x9f5d80beU, 0x69d0937cU, 0x6fd52da9U, 0xcf2512b3U,
+    0xc8ac993bU, 0x10187da7U, 0xe89c636eU, 0xdb3bbb7bU,
+    0xcd267809U, 0x6e5918f4U, 0xec9ab701U, 0x834f9aa8U,
+    0xe6956e65U, 0xaaffe67eU, 0x21bccf08U, 0xef15e8e6U,
+    0xbae79bd9U, 0x4a6f36ceU, 0xea9f09d4U, 0x29b07cd6U,
+    0x31a4b2afU, 0x2a3f2331U, 0xc6a59430U, 0x35a266c0U,
+    0x744ebc37U, 0xfc82caa6U, 0xe090d0b0U, 0x33a7d815U,
+    0xf104984aU, 0x41ecdaf7U, 0x7fcd500eU, 0x1791f62fU,
+    0x764dd68dU, 0x43efb04dU, 0xccaa4d54U, 0xe49604dfU,
+    0x9ed1b5e3U, 0x4c6a881bU, 0xc12c1fb8U, 0x4665517fU,
+    0x9d5eea04U, 0x018c355dU, 0xfa877473U, 0xfb0b412eU,
+    0xb3671d5aU, 0x92dbd252U, 0xe9105633U, 0x6dd64713U,
+    0x9ad7618cU, 0x37a10c7aU, 0x59f8148eU, 0xeb133c89U,
+    0xcea927eeU, 0xb761c935U, 0xe11ce5edU, 0x7a47b13cU,
+    0x9cd2df59U, 0x55f2733fU, 0x1814ce79U, 0x73c737bfU,
+    0x53f7cdeaU, 0x5ffdaa5bU, 0xdf3d6f14U, 0x7844db86U,
+    0xcaaff381U, 0xb968c43eU, 0x3824342cU, 0xc2a3405fU,
+    0x161dc372U, 0xbce2250cU, 0x283c498bU, 0xff0d9541U,
+    0x39a80171U, 0x080cb3deU, 0xd8b4e49cU, 0x6456c190U,
+    0x7bcb8461U, 0xd532b670U, 0x486c5c74U, 0xd0b85742U,
+};
+static const u32 Td1[256] = {
+    0x5051f4a7U, 0x537e4165U, 0xc31a17a4U, 0x963a275eU,
+    0xcb3bab6bU, 0xf11f9d45U, 0xabacfa58U, 0x934be303U,
+    0x552030faU, 0xf6ad766dU, 0x9188cc76U, 0x25f5024cU,
+    0xfc4fe5d7U, 0xd7c52acbU, 0x80263544U, 0x8fb562a3U,
+    0x49deb15aU, 0x6725ba1bU, 0x9845ea0eU, 0xe15dfec0U,
+    0x02c32f75U, 0x12814cf0U, 0xa38d4697U, 0xc66bd3f9U,
+    0xe7038f5fU, 0x9515929cU, 0xebbf6d7aU, 0xda955259U,
+    0x2dd4be83U, 0xd3587421U, 0x2949e069U, 0x448ec9c8U,
+    0x6a75c289U, 0x78f48e79U, 0x6b99583eU, 0xdd27b971U,
+    0xb6bee14fU, 0x17f088adU, 0x66c920acU, 0xb47dce3aU,
+    0x1863df4aU, 0x82e51a31U, 0x60975133U, 0x4562537fU,
+    0xe0b16477U, 0x84bb6baeU, 0x1cfe81a0U, 0x94f9082bU,
+    0x58704868U, 0x198f45fdU, 0x8794de6cU, 0xb7527bf8U,
+    0x23ab73d3U, 0xe2724b02U, 0x57e31f8fU, 0x2a6655abU,
+    0x07b2eb28U, 0x032fb5c2U, 0x9a86c57bU, 0xa5d33708U,
+    0xf2302887U, 0xb223bfa5U, 0xba02036aU, 0x5ced1682U,
+    0x2b8acf1cU, 0x92a779b4U, 0xf0f307f2U, 0xa14e69e2U,
+    0xcd65daf4U, 0xd50605beU, 0x1fd13462U, 0x8ac4a6feU,
+    0x9d342e53U, 0xa0a2f355U, 0x32058ae1U, 0x75a4f6ebU,
+    0x390b83ecU, 0xaa4060efU, 0x065e719fU, 0x51bd6e10U,
+    0xf93e218aU, 0x3d96dd06U, 0xaedd3e05U, 0x464de6bdU,
+    0xb591548dU, 0x0571c45dU, 0x6f0406d4U, 0xff605015U,
+    0x241998fbU, 0x97d6bde9U, 0xcc894043U, 0x7767d99eU,
+    0xbdb0e842U, 0x8807898bU, 0x38e7195bU, 0xdb79c8eeU,
+    0x47a17c0aU, 0xe97c420fU, 0xc9f8841eU, 0x00000000U,
+    0x83098086U, 0x48322bedU, 0xac1e1170U, 0x4e6c5a72U,
+    0xfbfd0effU, 0x560f8538U, 0x1e3daed5U, 0x27362d39U,
+    0x640a0fd9U, 0x21685ca6U, 0xd19b5b54U, 0x3a24362eU,
+    0xb10c0a67U, 0x0f9357e7U, 0xd2b4ee96U, 0x9e1b9b91U,
+    0x4f80c0c5U, 0xa261dc20U, 0x695a774bU, 0x161c121aU,
+    0x0ae293baU, 0xe5c0a02aU, 0x433c22e0U, 0x1d121b17U,
+    0x0b0e090dU, 0xadf28bc7U, 0xb92db6a8U, 0xc8141ea9U,
+    0x8557f119U, 0x4caf7507U, 0xbbee99ddU, 0xfda37f60U,
+    0x9ff70126U, 0xbc5c72f5U, 0xc544663bU, 0x345bfb7eU,
+    0x768b4329U, 0xdccb23c6U, 0x68b6edfcU, 0x63b8e4f1U,
+    0xcad731dcU, 0x10426385U, 0x40139722U, 0x2084c611U,
+    0x7d854a24U, 0xf8d2bb3dU, 0x11aef932U, 0x6dc729a1U,
+    0x4b1d9e2fU, 0xf3dcb230U, 0xec0d8652U, 0xd077c1e3U,
+    0x6c2bb316U, 0x99a970b9U, 0xfa119448U, 0x2247e964U,
+    0xc4a8fc8cU, 0x1aa0f03fU, 0xd8567d2cU, 0xef223390U,
+    0xc787494eU, 0xc1d938d1U, 0xfe8ccaa2U, 0x3698d40bU,
+    0xcfa6f581U, 0x28a57adeU, 0x26dab78eU, 0xa43fadbfU,
+    0xe42c3a9dU, 0x0d507892U, 0x9b6a5fccU, 0x62547e46U,
+    0xc2f68d13U, 0xe890d8b8U, 0x5e2e39f7U, 0xf582c3afU,
+    0xbe9f5d80U, 0x7c69d093U, 0xa96fd52dU, 0xb3cf2512U,
+    0x3bc8ac99U, 0xa710187dU, 0x6ee89c63U, 0x7bdb3bbbU,
+    0x09cd2678U, 0xf46e5918U, 0x01ec9ab7U, 0xa8834f9aU,
+    0x65e6956eU, 0x7eaaffe6U, 0x0821bccfU, 0xe6ef15e8U,
+    0xd9bae79bU, 0xce4a6f36U, 0xd4ea9f09U, 0xd629b07cU,
+    0xaf31a4b2U, 0x312a3f23U, 0x30c6a594U, 0xc035a266U,
+    0x37744ebcU, 0xa6fc82caU, 0xb0e090d0U, 0x1533a7d8U,
+    0x4af10498U, 0xf741ecdaU, 0x0e7fcd50U, 0x2f1791f6U,
+    0x8d764dd6U, 0x4d43efb0U, 0x54ccaa4dU, 0xdfe49604U,
+    0xe39ed1b5U, 0x1b4c6a88U, 0xb8c12c1fU, 0x7f466551U,
+    0x049d5eeaU, 0x5d018c35U, 0x73fa8774U, 0x2efb0b41U,
+    0x5ab3671dU, 0x5292dbd2U, 0x33e91056U, 0x136dd647U,
+    0x8c9ad761U, 0x7a37a10cU, 0x8e59f814U, 0x89eb133cU,
+    0xeecea927U, 0x35b761c9U, 0xede11ce5U, 0x3c7a47b1U,
+    0x599cd2dfU, 0x3f55f273U, 0x791814ceU, 0xbf73c737U,
+    0xea53f7cdU, 0x5b5ffdaaU, 0x14df3d6fU, 0x867844dbU,
+    0x81caaff3U, 0x3eb968c4U, 0x2c382434U, 0x5fc2a340U,
+    0x72161dc3U, 0x0cbce225U, 0x8b283c49U, 0x41ff0d95U,
+    0x7139a801U, 0xde080cb3U, 0x9cd8b4e4U, 0x906456c1U,
+    0x617bcb84U, 0x70d532b6U, 0x74486c5cU, 0x42d0b857U,
+};
+static const u32 Td2[256] = {
+    0xa75051f4U, 0x65537e41U, 0xa4c31a17U, 0x5e963a27U,
+    0x6bcb3babU, 0x45f11f9dU, 0x58abacfaU, 0x03934be3U,
+    0xfa552030U, 0x6df6ad76U, 0x769188ccU, 0x4c25f502U,
+    0xd7fc4fe5U, 0xcbd7c52aU, 0x44802635U, 0xa38fb562U,
+    0x5a49deb1U, 0x1b6725baU, 0x0e9845eaU, 0xc0e15dfeU,
+    0x7502c32fU, 0xf012814cU, 0x97a38d46U, 0xf9c66bd3U,
+    0x5fe7038fU, 0x9c951592U, 0x7aebbf6dU, 0x59da9552U,
+    0x832dd4beU, 0x21d35874U, 0x692949e0U, 0xc8448ec9U,
+    0x896a75c2U, 0x7978f48eU, 0x3e6b9958U, 0x71dd27b9U,
+    0x4fb6bee1U, 0xad17f088U, 0xac66c920U, 0x3ab47dceU,
+    0x4a1863dfU, 0x3182e51aU, 0x33609751U, 0x7f456253U,
+    0x77e0b164U, 0xae84bb6bU, 0xa01cfe81U, 0x2b94f908U,
+    0x68587048U, 0xfd198f45U, 0x6c8794deU, 0xf8b7527bU,
+    0xd323ab73U, 0x02e2724bU, 0x8f57e31fU, 0xab2a6655U,
+    0x2807b2ebU, 0xc2032fb5U, 0x7b9a86c5U, 0x08a5d337U,
+    0x87f23028U, 0xa5b223bfU, 0x6aba0203U, 0x825ced16U,
+    0x1c2b8acfU, 0xb492a779U, 0xf2f0f307U, 0xe2a14e69U,
+    0xf4cd65daU, 0xbed50605U, 0x621fd134U, 0xfe8ac4a6U,
+    0x539d342eU, 0x55a0a2f3U, 0xe132058aU, 0xeb75a4f6U,
+    0xec390b83U, 0xefaa4060U, 0x9f065e71U, 0x1051bd6eU,
+    0x8af93e21U, 0x063d96ddU, 0x05aedd3eU, 0xbd464de6U,
+    0x8db59154U, 0x5d0571c4U, 0xd46f0406U, 0x15ff6050U,
+    0xfb241998U, 0xe997d6bdU, 0x43cc8940U, 0x9e7767d9U,
+    0x42bdb0e8U, 0x8b880789U, 0x5b38e719U, 0xeedb79c8U,
+    0x0a47a17cU, 0x0fe97c42U, 0x1ec9f884U, 0x00000000U,
+    0x86830980U, 0xed48322bU, 0x70ac1e11U, 0x724e6c5aU,
+    0xfffbfd0eU, 0x38560f85U, 0xd51e3daeU, 0x3927362dU,
+    0xd9640a0fU, 0xa621685cU, 0x54d19b5bU, 0x2e3a2436U,
+    0x67b10c0aU, 0xe70f9357U, 0x96d2b4eeU, 0x919e1b9bU,
+    0xc54f80c0U, 0x20a261dcU, 0x4b695a77U, 0x1a161c12U,
+    0xba0ae293U, 0x2ae5c0a0U, 0xe0433c22U, 0x171d121bU,
+    0x0d0b0e09U, 0xc7adf28bU, 0xa8b92db6U, 0xa9c8141eU,
+    0x198557f1U, 0x074caf75U, 0xddbbee99U, 0x60fda37fU,
+    0x269ff701U, 0xf5bc5c72U, 0x3bc54466U, 0x7e345bfbU,
+    0x29768b43U, 0xc6dccb23U, 0xfc68b6edU, 0xf163b8e4U,
+    0xdccad731U, 0x85104263U, 0x22401397U, 0x112084c6U,
+    0x247d854aU, 0x3df8d2bbU, 0x3211aef9U, 0xa16dc729U,
+    0x2f4b1d9eU, 0x30f3dcb2U, 0x52ec0d86U, 0xe3d077c1U,
+    0x166c2bb3U, 0xb999a970U, 0x48fa1194U, 0x642247e9U,
+    0x8cc4a8fcU, 0x3f1aa0f0U, 0x2cd8567dU, 0x90ef2233U,
+    0x4ec78749U, 0xd1c1d938U, 0xa2fe8ccaU, 0x0b3698d4U,
+    0x81cfa6f5U, 0xde28a57aU, 0x8e26dab7U, 0xbfa43fadU,
+    0x9de42c3aU, 0x920d5078U, 0xcc9b6a5fU, 0x4662547eU,
+    0x13c2f68dU, 0xb8e890d8U, 0xf75e2e39U, 0xaff582c3U,
+    0x80be9f5dU, 0x937c69d0U, 0x2da96fd5U, 0x12b3cf25U,
+    0x993bc8acU, 0x7da71018U, 0x636ee89cU, 0xbb7bdb3bU,
+    0x7809cd26U, 0x18f46e59U, 0xb701ec9aU, 0x9aa8834fU,
+    0x6e65e695U, 0xe67eaaffU, 0xcf0821bcU, 0xe8e6ef15U,
+    0x9bd9bae7U, 0x36ce4a6fU, 0x09d4ea9fU, 0x7cd629b0U,
+    0xb2af31a4U, 0x23312a3fU, 0x9430c6a5U, 0x66c035a2U,
+    0xbc37744eU, 0xcaa6fc82U, 0xd0b0e090U, 0xd81533a7U,
+    0x984af104U, 0xdaf741ecU, 0x500e7fcdU, 0xf62f1791U,
+    0xd68d764dU, 0xb04d43efU, 0x4d54ccaaU, 0x04dfe496U,
+    0xb5e39ed1U, 0x881b4c6aU, 0x1fb8c12cU, 0x517f4665U,
+    0xea049d5eU, 0x355d018cU, 0x7473fa87U, 0x412efb0bU,
+    0x1d5ab367U, 0xd25292dbU, 0x5633e910U, 0x47136dd6U,
+    0x618c9ad7U, 0x0c7a37a1U, 0x148e59f8U, 0x3c89eb13U,
+    0x27eecea9U, 0xc935b761U, 0xe5ede11cU, 0xb13c7a47U,
+    0xdf599cd2U, 0x733f55f2U, 0xce791814U, 0x37bf73c7U,
+    0xcdea53f7U, 0xaa5b5ffdU, 0x6f14df3dU, 0xdb867844U,
+    0xf381caafU, 0xc43eb968U, 0x342c3824U, 0x405fc2a3U,
+    0xc372161dU, 0x250cbce2U, 0x498b283cU, 0x9541ff0dU,
+    0x017139a8U, 0xb3de080cU, 0xe49cd8b4U, 0xc1906456U,
+    0x84617bcbU, 0xb670d532U, 0x5c74486cU, 0x5742d0b8U,
+};
+static const u32 Td3[256] = {
+    0xf4a75051U, 0x4165537eU, 0x17a4c31aU, 0x275e963aU,
+    0xab6bcb3bU, 0x9d45f11fU, 0xfa58abacU, 0xe303934bU,
+    0x30fa5520U, 0x766df6adU, 0xcc769188U, 0x024c25f5U,
+    0xe5d7fc4fU, 0x2acbd7c5U, 0x35448026U, 0x62a38fb5U,
+    0xb15a49deU, 0xba1b6725U, 0xea0e9845U, 0xfec0e15dU,
+    0x2f7502c3U, 0x4cf01281U, 0x4697a38dU, 0xd3f9c66bU,
+    0x8f5fe703U, 0x929c9515U, 0x6d7aebbfU, 0x5259da95U,
+    0xbe832dd4U, 0x7421d358U, 0xe0692949U, 0xc9c8448eU,
+    0xc2896a75U, 0x8e7978f4U, 0x583e6b99U, 0xb971dd27U,
+    0xe14fb6beU, 0x88ad17f0U, 0x20ac66c9U, 0xce3ab47dU,
+    0xdf4a1863U, 0x1a3182e5U, 0x51336097U, 0x537f4562U,
+    0x6477e0b1U, 0x6bae84bbU, 0x81a01cfeU, 0x082b94f9U,
+    0x48685870U, 0x45fd198fU, 0xde6c8794U, 0x7bf8b752U,
+    0x73d323abU, 0x4b02e272U, 0x1f8f57e3U, 0x55ab2a66U,
+    0xeb2807b2U, 0xb5c2032fU, 0xc57b9a86U, 0x3708a5d3U,
+    0x2887f230U, 0xbfa5b223U, 0x036aba02U, 0x16825cedU,
+    0xcf1c2b8aU, 0x79b492a7U, 0x07f2f0f3U, 0x69e2a14eU,
+    0xdaf4cd65U, 0x05bed506U, 0x34621fd1U, 0xa6fe8ac4U,
+    0x2e539d34U, 0xf355a0a2U, 0x8ae13205U, 0xf6eb75a4U,
+    0x83ec390bU, 0x60efaa40U, 0x719f065eU, 0x6e1051bdU,
+    0x218af93eU, 0xdd063d96U, 0x3e05aeddU, 0xe6bd464dU,
+    0x548db591U, 0xc45d0571U, 0x06d46f04U, 0x5015ff60U,
+    0x98fb2419U, 0xbde997d6U, 0x4043cc89U, 0xd99e7767U,
+    0xe842bdb0U, 0x898b8807U, 0x195b38e7U, 0xc8eedb79U,
+    0x7c0a47a1U, 0x420fe97cU, 0x841ec9f8U, 0x00000000U,
+    0x80868309U, 0x2bed4832U, 0x1170ac1eU, 0x5a724e6cU,
+    0x0efffbfdU, 0x8538560fU, 0xaed51e3dU, 0x2d392736U,
+    0x0fd9640aU, 0x5ca62168U, 0x5b54d19bU, 0x362e3a24U,
+    0x0a67b10cU, 0x57e70f93U, 0xee96d2b4U, 0x9b919e1bU,
+    0xc0c54f80U, 0xdc20a261U, 0x774b695aU, 0x121a161cU,
+    0x93ba0ae2U, 0xa02ae5c0U, 0x22e0433cU, 0x1b171d12U,
+    0x090d0b0eU, 0x8bc7adf2U, 0xb6a8b92dU, 0x1ea9c814U,
+    0xf1198557U, 0x75074cafU, 0x99ddbbeeU, 0x7f60fda3U,
+    0x01269ff7U, 0x72f5bc5cU, 0x663bc544U, 0xfb7e345bU,
+    0x4329768bU, 0x23c6dccbU, 0xedfc68b6U, 0xe4f163b8U,
+    0x31dccad7U, 0x63851042U, 0x97224013U, 0xc6112084U,
+    0x4a247d85U, 0xbb3df8d2U, 0xf93211aeU, 0x29a16dc7U,
+    0x9e2f4b1dU, 0xb230f3dcU, 0x8652ec0dU, 0xc1e3d077U,
+    0xb3166c2bU, 0x70b999a9U, 0x9448fa11U, 0xe9642247U,
+    0xfc8cc4a8U, 0xf03f1aa0U, 0x7d2cd856U, 0x3390ef22U,
+    0x494ec787U, 0x38d1c1d9U, 0xcaa2fe8cU, 0xd40b3698U,
+    0xf581cfa6U, 0x7ade28a5U, 0xb78e26daU, 0xadbfa43fU,
+    0x3a9de42cU, 0x78920d50U, 0x5fcc9b6aU, 0x7e466254U,
+    0x8d13c2f6U, 0xd8b8e890U, 0x39f75e2eU, 0xc3aff582U,
+    0x5d80be9fU, 0xd0937c69U, 0xd52da96fU, 0x2512b3cfU,
+    0xac993bc8U, 0x187da710U, 0x9c636ee8U, 0x3bbb7bdbU,
+    0x267809cdU, 0x5918f46eU, 0x9ab701ecU, 0x4f9aa883U,
+    0x956e65e6U, 0xffe67eaaU, 0xbccf0821U, 0x15e8e6efU,
+    0xe79bd9baU, 0x6f36ce4aU, 0x9f09d4eaU, 0xb07cd629U,
+    0xa4b2af31U, 0x3f23312aU, 0xa59430c6U, 0xa266c035U,
+    0x4ebc3774U, 0x82caa6fcU, 0x90d0b0e0U, 0xa7d81533U,
+    0x04984af1U, 0xecdaf741U, 0xcd500e7fU, 0x91f62f17U,
+    0x4dd68d76U, 0xefb04d43U, 0xaa4d54ccU, 0x9604dfe4U,
+    0xd1b5e39eU, 0x6a881b4cU, 0x2c1fb8c1U, 0x65517f46U,
+    0x5eea049dU, 0x8c355d01U, 0x877473faU, 0x0b412efbU,
+    0x671d5ab3U, 0xdbd25292U, 0x105633e9U, 0xd647136dU,
+    0xd7618c9aU, 0xa10c7a37U, 0xf8148e59U, 0x133c89ebU,
+    0xa927eeceU, 0x61c935b7U, 0x1ce5ede1U, 0x47b13c7aU,
+    0xd2df599cU, 0xf2733f55U, 0x14ce7918U, 0xc737bf73U,
+    0xf7cdea53U, 0xfdaa5b5fU, 0x3d6f14dfU, 0x44db8678U,
+    0xaff381caU, 0x68c43eb9U, 0x24342c38U, 0xa3405fc2U,
+    0x1dc37216U, 0xe2250cbcU, 0x3c498b28U, 0x0d9541ffU,
+    0xa8017139U, 0x0cb3de08U, 0xb4e49cd8U, 0x56c19064U,
+    0xcb84617bU, 0x32b670d5U, 0x6c5c7448U, 0xb85742d0U,
+};
+static const u8 Td4[256] = {
+    0x52U, 0x09U, 0x6aU, 0xd5U, 0x30U, 0x36U, 0xa5U, 0x38U,
+    0xbfU, 0x40U, 0xa3U, 0x9eU, 0x81U, 0xf3U, 0xd7U, 0xfbU,
+    0x7cU, 0xe3U, 0x39U, 0x82U, 0x9bU, 0x2fU, 0xffU, 0x87U,
+    0x34U, 0x8eU, 0x43U, 0x44U, 0xc4U, 0xdeU, 0xe9U, 0xcbU,
+    0x54U, 0x7bU, 0x94U, 0x32U, 0xa6U, 0xc2U, 0x23U, 0x3dU,
+    0xeeU, 0x4cU, 0x95U, 0x0bU, 0x42U, 0xfaU, 0xc3U, 0x4eU,
+    0x08U, 0x2eU, 0xa1U, 0x66U, 0x28U, 0xd9U, 0x24U, 0xb2U,
+    0x76U, 0x5bU, 0xa2U, 0x49U, 0x6dU, 0x8bU, 0xd1U, 0x25U,
+    0x72U, 0xf8U, 0xf6U, 0x64U, 0x86U, 0x68U, 0x98U, 0x16U,
+    0xd4U, 0xa4U, 0x5cU, 0xccU, 0x5dU, 0x65U, 0xb6U, 0x92U,
+    0x6cU, 0x70U, 0x48U, 0x50U, 0xfdU, 0xedU, 0xb9U, 0xdaU,
+    0x5eU, 0x15U, 0x46U, 0x57U, 0xa7U, 0x8dU, 0x9dU, 0x84U,
+    0x90U, 0xd8U, 0xabU, 0x00U, 0x8cU, 0xbcU, 0xd3U, 0x0aU,
+    0xf7U, 0xe4U, 0x58U, 0x05U, 0xb8U, 0xb3U, 0x45U, 0x06U,
+    0xd0U, 0x2cU, 0x1eU, 0x8fU, 0xcaU, 0x3fU, 0x0fU, 0x02U,
+    0xc1U, 0xafU, 0xbdU, 0x03U, 0x01U, 0x13U, 0x8aU, 0x6bU,
+    0x3aU, 0x91U, 0x11U, 0x41U, 0x4fU, 0x67U, 0xdcU, 0xeaU,
+    0x97U, 0xf2U, 0xcfU, 0xceU, 0xf0U, 0xb4U, 0xe6U, 0x73U,
+    0x96U, 0xacU, 0x74U, 0x22U, 0xe7U, 0xadU, 0x35U, 0x85U,
+    0xe2U, 0xf9U, 0x37U, 0xe8U, 0x1cU, 0x75U, 0xdfU, 0x6eU,
+    0x47U, 0xf1U, 0x1aU, 0x71U, 0x1dU, 0x29U, 0xc5U, 0x89U,
+    0x6fU, 0xb7U, 0x62U, 0x0eU, 0xaaU, 0x18U, 0xbeU, 0x1bU,
+    0xfcU, 0x56U, 0x3eU, 0x4bU, 0xc6U, 0xd2U, 0x79U, 0x20U,
+    0x9aU, 0xdbU, 0xc0U, 0xfeU, 0x78U, 0xcdU, 0x5aU, 0xf4U,
+    0x1fU, 0xddU, 0xa8U, 0x33U, 0x88U, 0x07U, 0xc7U, 0x31U,
+    0xb1U, 0x12U, 0x10U, 0x59U, 0x27U, 0x80U, 0xecU, 0x5fU,
+    0x60U, 0x51U, 0x7fU, 0xa9U, 0x19U, 0xb5U, 0x4aU, 0x0dU,
+    0x2dU, 0xe5U, 0x7aU, 0x9fU, 0x93U, 0xc9U, 0x9cU, 0xefU,
+    0xa0U, 0xe0U, 0x3bU, 0x4dU, 0xaeU, 0x2aU, 0xf5U, 0xb0U,
+    0xc8U, 0xebU, 0xbbU, 0x3cU, 0x83U, 0x53U, 0x99U, 0x61U,
+    0x17U, 0x2bU, 0x04U, 0x7eU, 0xbaU, 0x77U, 0xd6U, 0x26U,
+    0xe1U, 0x69U, 0x14U, 0x63U, 0x55U, 0x21U, 0x0cU, 0x7dU,
+};
+#endif
+static const u32 rcon[] = {
+	0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000,
+	0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000,
+	0x1B000000, 0x36000000, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10 rcon values */
+};
+
+#define GETU32(pt) (((u32)(pt)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(pt)[1] << 16) ^ ((u32)(pt)[2] <<  8) ^ ((u32)(pt)[3]))
+#define PUTU32(ct, st) { (ct)[0] = (u8)((st) >> 24); (ct)[1] = (u8)((st) >> 16); (ct)[2] = (u8)((st) >>  8); (ct)[3] = (u8)(st); }
+
+/**
+ * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule.
+ *
+ * @return	the number of rounds for the given cipher key size.
+ */
+int
+rijndaelKeySetupEnc(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits)
+{
+   	int i = 0;
+	u32 temp;
+
+	rk[0] = GETU32(cipherKey     );
+	rk[1] = GETU32(cipherKey +  4);
+	rk[2] = GETU32(cipherKey +  8);
+	rk[3] = GETU32(cipherKey + 12);
+	if (keyBits == 128) {
+		for (;;) {
+			temp  = rk[3];
+			rk[4] = rk[0] ^
+				(Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
+				(Te3[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+				(Te0[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+				(Te1[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0x000000ff) ^
+				rcon[i];
+			rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4];
+			rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5];
+			rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6];
+			if (++i == 10) {
+				return 10;
+			}
+			rk += 4;
+		}
+	}
+	rk[4] = GETU32(cipherKey + 16);
+	rk[5] = GETU32(cipherKey + 20);
+	if (keyBits == 192) {
+		for (;;) {
+			temp = rk[ 5];
+			rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^
+				(Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
+				(Te3[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+				(Te0[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+				(Te1[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0x000000ff) ^
+				rcon[i];
+			rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6];
+			rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7];
+			rk[ 9] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[ 8];
+			if (++i == 8) {
+				return 12;
+			}
+			rk[10] = rk[ 4] ^ rk[ 9];
+			rk[11] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[10];
+			rk += 6;
+		}
+	}
+	rk[6] = GETU32(cipherKey + 24);
+	rk[7] = GETU32(cipherKey + 28);
+	if (keyBits == 256) {
+		for (;;) {
+			temp = rk[ 7];
+			rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^
+				(Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^
+				(Te3[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+				(Te0[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+				(Te1[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0x000000ff) ^
+				rcon[i];
+			rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8];
+			rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9];
+			rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10];
+			if (++i == 7) {
+				return 14;
+			}
+			temp = rk[11];
+			rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^
+				(Te2[(temp >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+				(Te3[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+				(Te0[(temp >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+				(Te1[(temp      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff);
+			rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12];
+			rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13];
+		     	rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14];
+			rk += 8;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#if 0
+/**
+ * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule.
+ *
+ * @return	the number of rounds for the given cipher key size.
+ */
+int
+rijndaelKeySetupDec(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits)
+{
+	int Nr, i, j;
+	u32 temp;
+
+	/* expand the cipher key: */
+	Nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(rk, cipherKey, keyBits);
+
+	/* invert the order of the round keys: */
+	for (i = 0, j = 4*Nr; i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) {
+		temp = rk[i    ]; rk[i    ] = rk[j    ]; rk[j    ] = temp;
+		temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp;
+		temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp;
+		temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp;
+	}
+	/* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and the last: */
+	for (i = 1; i < Nr; i++) {
+		rk += 4;
+		rk[0] =
+			Td0[Te1[(rk[0] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
+			Td1[Te1[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+			Td2[Te1[(rk[0] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+			Td3[Te1[(rk[0]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+		rk[1] =
+			Td0[Te1[(rk[1] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
+			Td1[Te1[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+			Td2[Te1[(rk[1] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+			Td3[Te1[(rk[1]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+		rk[2] =
+			Td0[Te1[(rk[2] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
+			Td1[Te1[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+			Td2[Te1[(rk[2] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+			Td3[Te1[(rk[2]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+		rk[3] =
+			Td0[Te1[(rk[3] >> 24)       ] & 0xff] ^
+			Td1[Te1[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+			Td2[Te1[(rk[3] >>  8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^
+			Td3[Te1[(rk[3]      ) & 0xff] & 0xff];
+	}
+	return Nr;
+}
+#endif
+
+void
+rijndaelEncrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 pt[16],
+    u8 ct[16])
+{
+	u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3;
+#ifndef FULL_UNROLL
+    int r;
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+
+    /*
+	 * map byte array block to cipher state
+	 * and add initial round key:
+	 */
+	s0 = GETU32(pt     ) ^ rk[0];
+	s1 = GETU32(pt +  4) ^ rk[1];
+	s2 = GETU32(pt +  8) ^ rk[2];
+	s3 = GETU32(pt + 12) ^ rk[3];
+#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
+    /* round 1: */
+   	t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4];
+   	t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5];
+   	t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6];
+   	t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7];
+   	/* round 2: */
+   	s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8];
+   	s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9];
+   	s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[10];
+   	s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[11];
+    /* round 3: */
+   	t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[12];
+   	t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[13];
+   	t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[14];
+   	t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[15];
+   	/* round 4: */
+   	s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[16];
+   	s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[17];
+   	s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[18];
+   	s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[19];
+    /* round 5: */
+   	t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[20];
+   	t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[21];
+   	t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[22];
+   	t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[23];
+   	/* round 6: */
+   	s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[24];
+   	s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[25];
+   	s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[26];
+   	s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[27];
+    /* round 7: */
+   	t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[28];
+   	t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[29];
+   	t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[30];
+   	t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[31];
+   	/* round 8: */
+   	s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[32];
+   	s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[33];
+   	s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[34];
+   	s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[35];
+    /* round 9: */
+   	t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[36];
+   	t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[37];
+   	t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[38];
+   	t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[39];
+    if (Nr > 10) {
+	/* round 10: */
+	s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[40];
+	s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[41];
+	s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[42];
+	s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[43];
+	/* round 11: */
+	t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[44];
+	t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[45];
+	t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[46];
+	t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[47];
+	if (Nr > 12) {
+	    /* round 12: */
+	    s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[48];
+	    s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[49];
+	    s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[50];
+	    s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[51];
+	    /* round 13: */
+	    t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[52];
+	    t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[53];
+	    t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[54];
+	    t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[55];
+	}
+    }
+    rk += Nr << 2;
+#else  /* !FULL_UNROLL */
+    /*
+	 * Nr - 1 full rounds:
+	 */
+    r = Nr >> 1;
+    for (;;) {
+	t0 =
+	    Te0[(s0 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te3[(s3      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[4];
+	t1 =
+	    Te0[(s1 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te3[(s0      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[5];
+	t2 =
+	    Te0[(s2 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te3[(s1      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[6];
+	t3 =
+	    Te0[(s3 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te3[(s2      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[7];
+
+	rk += 8;
+	if (--r == 0) {
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	s0 =
+	    Te0[(t0 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te3[(t3      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[0];
+	s1 =
+	    Te0[(t1 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te3[(t0      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[1];
+	s2 =
+	    Te0[(t2 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te3[(t1      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[2];
+	s3 =
+	    Te0[(t3 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Te3[(t2      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[3];
+    }
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+    /*
+	 * apply last round and
+	 * map cipher state to byte array block:
+	 */
+	s0 =
+		(Te2[(t0 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+		(Te3[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+		(Te0[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+		(Te1[(t3      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+		rk[0];
+	PUTU32(ct     , s0);
+	s1 =
+		(Te2[(t1 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+		(Te3[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+		(Te0[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+		(Te1[(t0      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+		rk[1];
+	PUTU32(ct +  4, s1);
+	s2 =
+		(Te2[(t2 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+		(Te3[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+		(Te0[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+		(Te1[(t1      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+		rk[2];
+	PUTU32(ct +  8, s2);
+	s3 =
+		(Te2[(t3 >> 24)       ] & 0xff000000) ^
+		(Te3[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^
+		(Te0[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^
+		(Te1[(t2      ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^
+		rk[3];
+	PUTU32(ct + 12, s3);
+}
+
+#if 0
+static void
+rijndaelDecrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 ct[16],
+    u8 pt[16])
+{
+	u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3;
+#ifndef FULL_UNROLL
+    int r;
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+
+    /*
+	 * map byte array block to cipher state
+	 * and add initial round key:
+	 */
+    s0 = GETU32(ct     ) ^ rk[0];
+    s1 = GETU32(ct +  4) ^ rk[1];
+    s2 = GETU32(ct +  8) ^ rk[2];
+    s3 = GETU32(ct + 12) ^ rk[3];
+#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
+    /* round 1: */
+    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4];
+    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5];
+    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6];
+    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7];
+    /* round 2: */
+    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8];
+    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9];
+    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[10];
+    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[11];
+    /* round 3: */
+    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[12];
+    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[13];
+    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[14];
+    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[15];
+    /* round 4: */
+    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[16];
+    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[17];
+    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[18];
+    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[19];
+    /* round 5: */
+    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[20];
+    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[21];
+    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[22];
+    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[23];
+    /* round 6: */
+    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[24];
+    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[25];
+    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[26];
+    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[27];
+    /* round 7: */
+    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[28];
+    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[29];
+    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[30];
+    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[31];
+    /* round 8: */
+    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[32];
+    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[33];
+    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[34];
+    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[35];
+    /* round 9: */
+    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[36];
+    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[37];
+    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[38];
+    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[39];
+    if (Nr > 10) {
+	/* round 10: */
+	s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[40];
+	s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[41];
+	s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[42];
+	s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[43];
+	/* round 11: */
+	t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[44];
+	t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[45];
+	t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[46];
+	t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[47];
+	if (Nr > 12) {
+	    /* round 12: */
+	    s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[48];
+	    s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[49];
+	    s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[50];
+	    s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[51];
+	    /* round 13: */
+	    t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[52];
+	    t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[53];
+	    t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[54];
+	    t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[55];
+	}
+    }
+	rk += Nr << 2;
+#else  /* !FULL_UNROLL */
+    /*
+     * Nr - 1 full rounds:
+     */
+    r = Nr >> 1;
+    for (;;) {
+	t0 =
+	    Td0[(s0 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td2[(s2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td3[(s1      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[4];
+	t1 =
+	    Td0[(s1 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td2[(s3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td3[(s2      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[5];
+	t2 =
+	    Td0[(s2 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td2[(s0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td3[(s3      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[6];
+	t3 =
+	    Td0[(s3 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td2[(s1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td3[(s0      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[7];
+
+	rk += 8;
+	if (--r == 0) {
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	s0 =
+	    Td0[(t0 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td2[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td3[(t1      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[0];
+	s1 =
+	    Td0[(t1 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td2[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td3[(t2      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[1];
+	s2 =
+	    Td0[(t2 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td2[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td3[(t3      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[2];
+	s3 =
+	    Td0[(t3 >> 24)       ] ^
+	    Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td2[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] ^
+	    Td3[(t0      ) & 0xff] ^
+	    rk[3];
+    }
+#endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */
+    /*
+	 * apply last round and
+	 * map cipher state to byte array block:
+	 */
+   	s0 =
+   		(Td4[(t0 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+   		(Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+   		(Td4[(t2 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+   		(Td4[(t1      ) & 0xff])       ^
+   		rk[0];
+	PUTU32(pt     , s0);
+   	s1 =
+   		(Td4[(t1 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+   		(Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+   		(Td4[(t3 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+   		(Td4[(t2      ) & 0xff])       ^
+   		rk[1];
+	PUTU32(pt +  4, s1);
+   	s2 =
+   		(Td4[(t2 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+   		(Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+   		(Td4[(t0 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+   		(Td4[(t3      ) & 0xff])       ^
+   		rk[2];
+	PUTU32(pt +  8, s2);
+   	s3 =
+   		(Td4[(t3 >> 24)       ] << 24) ^
+   		(Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^
+   		(Td4[(t1 >>  8) & 0xff] <<  8) ^
+   		(Td4[(t0      ) & 0xff])       ^
+   		rk[3];
+	PUTU32(pt + 12, s3);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/rijndael.h b/rijndael.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e04324b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rijndael.h
@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: rijndael.h,v 1.15 2021/09/28 11:14:50 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/**
+ * rijndael-alg-fst.h
+ *
+ * @version 3.0 (December 2000)
+ *
+ * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES)
+ *
+ * @author Vincent Rijmen <vincent.rijmen@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Antoon Bosselaers <antoon.bosselaers@esat.kuleuven.ac.be>
+ * @author Paulo Barreto <paulo.barreto@terra.com.br>
+ *
+ * This code is hereby placed in the public domain.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS
+ * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
+ * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY,
+ * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE
+ * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE,
+ * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef _PRIVATE_RIJNDAEL_H
+#define _PRIVATE_RIJNDAEL_H
+
+#define AES_MAXKEYBITS	(256)
+#define AES_MAXKEYBYTES	(AES_MAXKEYBITS/8)
+/* for 256-bit keys, fewer for less */
+#define AES_MAXROUNDS	14
+
+typedef unsigned char	u8;
+typedef unsigned short	u16;
+typedef unsigned int	u32;
+
+int	rijndaelKeySetupEnc(unsigned int [], const unsigned char [], int);
+void	rijndaelEncrypt(const unsigned int [], int, const u8 [16], u8 [16]);
+
+/*  The structure for key information */
+typedef struct {
+	int	decrypt;
+	int	Nr;		/* key-length-dependent number of rounds */
+	u32	ek[4*(AES_MAXROUNDS + 1)];	/* encrypt key schedule */
+	u32	dk[4*(AES_MAXROUNDS + 1)];	/* decrypt key schedule */
+} rijndael_ctx;
+
+void	 rijndael_set_key(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, int, int);
+void	 rijndael_decrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *);
+void	 rijndael_encrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *);
+
+#endif /* _PRIVATE_RIJNDAEL_H */
diff --git a/sandbox-capsicum.c b/sandbox-capsicum.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1104525
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox-capsicum.c
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Dag-Erling Smorgrav
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_CAPSICUM
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/capsicum.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_CAPSICUM_HELPERS_H
+#include <capsicum_helpers.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/*
+ * Capsicum sandbox that sets zero nfiles, nprocs and filesize rlimits,
+ * limits rights on stdout, stdin, stderr, monitor and switches to
+ * capability mode.
+ */
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+	struct monitor *monitor;
+	pid_t child_pid;
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	struct ssh_sandbox *box;
+
+	/*
+	 * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
+	 * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
+	 */
+	debug3("%s: preparing capsicum sandbox", __func__);
+	box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+	box->monitor = monitor;
+	box->child_pid = 0;
+
+	return box;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	struct rlimit rl_zero;
+	cap_rights_t rights;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CAPH_CACHE_TZDATA
+	caph_cache_tzdata();
+#endif
+
+	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+#ifndef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+#endif
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+
+	cap_rights_init(&rights);
+
+	if (cap_rights_limit(STDIN_FILENO, &rights) < 0 && errno != ENOSYS)
+		fatal("can't limit stdin: %m");
+	if (cap_rights_limit(STDOUT_FILENO, &rights) < 0 && errno != ENOSYS)
+		fatal("can't limit stdout: %m");
+	if (cap_rights_limit(STDERR_FILENO, &rights) < 0 && errno != ENOSYS)
+		fatal("can't limit stderr: %m");
+
+	cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_READ, CAP_WRITE);
+	if (cap_rights_limit(box->monitor->m_recvfd, &rights) < 0 &&
+	    errno != ENOSYS)
+		fatal("%s: failed to limit the network socket", __func__);
+	cap_rights_init(&rights, CAP_WRITE);
+	if (cap_rights_limit(box->monitor->m_log_sendfd, &rights) < 0 &&
+	    errno != ENOSYS)
+		fatal("%s: failed to limit the logging socket", __func__);
+	if (cap_enter() < 0 && errno != ENOSYS)
+		fatal("%s: failed to enter capability mode", __func__);
+
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	free(box);
+	debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+	box->child_pid = child_pid;
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_CAPSICUM */
diff --git a/sandbox-darwin.c b/sandbox-darwin.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..59b4d28
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox-darwin.c
@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_DARWIN
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <sandbox.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/* Darwin/OS X sandbox */
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+	pid_t child_pid;
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	struct ssh_sandbox *box;
+
+	/*
+	 * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
+	 * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
+	 */
+	debug3("%s: preparing Darwin sandbox", __func__);
+	box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+	box->child_pid = 0;
+
+	return box;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	char *errmsg;
+	struct rlimit rl_zero;
+
+	debug3("%s: starting Darwin sandbox", __func__);
+	if (sandbox_init(kSBXProfilePureComputation, SANDBOX_NAMED,
+	    &errmsg) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: sandbox_init: %s", __func__, errmsg);
+
+	/*
+	 * The kSBXProfilePureComputation still allows sockets, so
+	 * we must disable these using rlimit.
+	 */
+	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	free(box);
+	debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+	box->child_pid = child_pid;
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_DARWIN */
diff --git a/sandbox-null.c b/sandbox-null.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4cb918
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox-null.c
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/* $OpenBSD$ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_NULL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/* dummy sandbox */
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+	int junk;
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	struct ssh_sandbox *box;
+
+	/*
+	 * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
+	 * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
+	 */
+	box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+	return box;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do here */
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	free(box);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do here */
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_NULL */
diff --git a/sandbox-pledge.c b/sandbox-pledge.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..302f1cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox-pledge.c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-pledge.c,v 1.2 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_PLEDGE
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+	pid_t child_pid;
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *m)
+{
+	struct ssh_sandbox *box;
+
+	debug3_f("preparing pledge sandbox");
+	box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+	box->child_pid = 0;
+
+	return box;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	if (pledge("stdio", NULL) == -1)
+		fatal_f("pledge()");
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	free(box);
+	debug3_f("finished");
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+	box->child_pid = child_pid;
+	/* Nothing to do here */
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_PLEDGE */
diff --git a/sandbox-rlimit.c b/sandbox-rlimit.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..26c61d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox-rlimit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-rlimit.c,v 1.5 2020/10/18 11:32:01 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_RLIMIT
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/* Minimal sandbox that sets zero nfiles, nprocs and filesize rlimits */
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+	pid_t child_pid;
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	struct ssh_sandbox *box;
+
+	/*
+	 * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
+	 * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
+	 */
+	debug3_f("preparing rlimit sandbox");
+	box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+	box->child_pid = 0;
+
+	return box;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	struct rlimit rl_zero;
+
+	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+
+#ifndef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal_f("setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			strerror(errno));
+#endif
+#ifndef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal_f("setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			strerror(errno));
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal_f("setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			strerror(errno));
+#endif
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	free(box);
+	debug3_f("finished");
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+	box->child_pid = child_pid;
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_RLIMIT */
diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ab49eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,460 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Will Drewry <wad@dataspill.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Uncomment the SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG macro below to help diagnose
+ * filter breakage during development. *Do not* use this in production,
+ * as it relies on making library calls that are unsafe in signal context.
+ *
+ * Instead, live systems the auditctl(8) may be used to monitor failures.
+ * E.g.
+ *   auditctl -a task,always -F uid=<privsep uid>
+ */
+/* #define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 1 */
+
+#if 0
+/*
+ * For older toolchains, it may be necessary to use the kernel
+ * headers directly.
+ */
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+# include <asm/siginfo.h>
+# define __have_siginfo_t 1
+# define __have_sigval_t 1
+# define __have_sigevent_t 1
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
+#endif
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/filter.h>
+#include <linux/seccomp.h>
+#include <elf.h>
+
+#include <asm/unistd.h>
+#ifdef __s390__
+#include <asm/zcrypt.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>  /* for offsetof */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */
+#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL
+
+/* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+# undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL
+# define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
+
+#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
+# define ARG_LO_OFFSET  0
+# define ARG_HI_OFFSET  sizeof(uint32_t)
+#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
+# define ARG_LO_OFFSET  sizeof(uint32_t)
+# define ARG_HI_OFFSET  0
+#else
+#error "Unknown endianness"
+#endif
+
+/* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */
+#define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno))
+#define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
+#define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 6), \
+	/* load and test syscall argument, low word */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
+	    ((_arg_val) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 3), \
+	/* load and test syscall argument, high word */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
+	    (((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_val) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 1), \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
+	/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
+/* Allow if syscall argument contains only values in mask */
+#define SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_mask) \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 8), \
+	/* load, mask and test syscall argument, low word */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, ~((_arg_mask) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 4), \
+	/* load, mask and test syscall argument, high word */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+	    offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, \
+	    ~(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_mask) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 1), \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
+	/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
+		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
+
+/* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */
+static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
+	/* Ensure the syscall arch convention is as expected. */
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
+		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)),
+	BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0),
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
+	/* Load the syscall number for checking. */
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
+		offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
+
+	/* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */
+#ifdef __NR_lstat
+	SC_DENY(__NR_lstat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_lstat64
+	SC_DENY(__NR_lstat64, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_fstat
+	SC_DENY(__NR_fstat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_fstat64
+	SC_DENY(__NR_fstat64, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_fstatat64
+	SC_DENY(__NR_fstatat64, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_open
+	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_openat
+	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_newfstatat
+	SC_DENY(__NR_newfstatat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_stat
+	SC_DENY(__NR_stat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_stat64
+	SC_DENY(__NR_stat64, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_shmget
+	SC_DENY(__NR_shmget, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_shmat
+	SC_DENY(__NR_shmat, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_shmdt
+	SC_DENY(__NR_shmdt, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_ipc
+	SC_DENY(__NR_ipc, EACCES),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_statx
+	SC_DENY(__NR_statx, EACCES),
+#endif
+
+	/* Syscalls to permit */
+#ifdef __NR_brk
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_brk),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_close
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_close),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_exit
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_exit_group
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_futex
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_futex_time64
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex_time64),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_geteuid
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getpgid
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getpid
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getrandom
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_gettid
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getuid
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_madvise
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_mmap
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mmap, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_mmap2
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mmap2, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_mprotect
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mprotect, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_mremap
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_mremap),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_munmap
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_munmap),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_nanosleep
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_nanosleep),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep_time64
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep_time64),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR__newselect
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR__newselect),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_ppoll
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ppoll),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_ppoll_time64
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_ppoll_time64),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_poll
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_poll),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_pselect6
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_pselect6_time64
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6_time64),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_read
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_read),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_rt_sigprocmask),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_select
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_select),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_shutdown
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_shutdown),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_time
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_time),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_write
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_write),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_writev
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_writev),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_socketcall
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
+	SC_DENY(__NR_socketcall, EACCES),
+#endif
+#if defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__)
+	/* Allow ioctls for ICA crypto card on s390 */
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSECSENDCPRB),
+	/* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
+#endif
+#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
+	/*
+	 * On Linux x32, the clock_gettime VDSO falls back to the
+	 * x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g.
+	 * https://bugs.debian.org/849923
+	 */
+	SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT),
+#endif
+
+	/* Default deny */
+	BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
+};
+
+static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = {
+	.len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])),
+	.filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns,
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+	pid_t child_pid;
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	struct ssh_sandbox *box;
+
+	/*
+	 * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
+	 * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
+	 */
+	debug3("%s: preparing seccomp filter sandbox", __func__);
+	box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+	box->child_pid = 0;
+
+	return box;
+}
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
+void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, int forced, const char *msg, void *ctx);
+
+static void
+ssh_sandbox_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
+{
+	char msg[256];
+
+	snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+	    "%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)",
+	    __func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr);
+	mm_log_handler(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, 0, msg, pmonitor);
+	_exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(void)
+{
+	struct sigaction act;
+	sigset_t mask;
+
+	debug3("%s: installing SIGSYS handler", __func__);
+	memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
+	sigemptyset(&mask);
+	sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
+
+	act.sa_sigaction = &ssh_sandbox_violation;
+	act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+	if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+}
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	struct rlimit rl_zero, rl_one = {.rlim_cur = 1, .rlim_max = 1};
+	int nnp_failed = 0;
+
+	/* Set rlimits for completeness if possible. */
+	rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+	/*
+	 * Cannot use zero for nfds, because poll(2) will fail with
+	 * errno=EINVAL if npfds>RLIMIT_NOFILE.
+	 */
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_one) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
+			__func__, strerror(errno));
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
+	ssh_sandbox_child_debugging();
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
+
+	debug3("%s: setting PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS", __func__);
+	if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) {
+		debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+		nnp_failed = 1;
+	}
+	debug3("%s: attaching seccomp filter program", __func__);
+	if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &preauth_program) == -1)
+		debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s",
+		    __func__, strerror(errno));
+	else if (nnp_failed)
+		fatal("%s: SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER activated but "
+		    "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	free(box);
+	debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+	box->child_pid = child_pid;
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */
diff --git a/sandbox-solaris.c b/sandbox-solaris.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..56ddb9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox-solaris.c
@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015 Joyent, Inc
+ * Author: Alex Wilson <alex.wilson@joyent.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SOLARIS
+#ifndef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
+# error "--with-solaris-privs must be used with the Solaris sandbox"
+#endif
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PRIV_H
+# include <priv.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+	priv_set_t *pset;
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL;
+
+	box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+
+	/* Start with "basic" and drop everything we don't need. */
+	box->pset = solaris_basic_privset();
+
+	if (box->pset == NULL) {
+		free(box);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Drop everything except the ability to use already-opened files */
+	if (priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY) != 0 ||
+#ifdef PRIV_NET_ACCESS
+	    priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_NET_ACCESS) != 0 ||
+#endif
+#ifdef PRIV_DAX_ACCESS
+	    priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_DAX_ACCESS) != 0 ||
+#endif
+#ifdef PRIV_SYS_IB_INFO
+	    priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_SYS_IB_INFO) != 0 ||
+#endif
+	    priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_EXEC) != 0 ||
+	    priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_FORK) != 0 ||
+	    priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_INFO) != 0 ||
+	    priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_PROC_SESSION) != 0) {
+		free(box);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* These may not be available on older Solaris-es */
+# if defined(PRIV_FILE_READ) && defined(PRIV_FILE_WRITE)
+	if (priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_FILE_READ) != 0 ||
+	    priv_delset(box->pset, PRIV_FILE_WRITE) != 0) {
+		free(box);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+# endif
+
+	return box;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, box->pset) != 0 ||
+	    setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, box->pset) != 0 ||
+	    setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, box->pset) != 0)
+		fatal("setppriv: %s", strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	priv_freeset(box->pset);
+	box->pset = NULL;
+	free(box);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+	/* Nothing to do here */
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SOLARIS */
diff --git a/sandbox-systrace.c b/sandbox-systrace.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e61d581
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sandbox-systrace.c
@@ -0,0 +1,218 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.18 2015/10/02 01:39:26 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <dev/systrace.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+struct sandbox_policy {
+	int syscall;
+	int action;
+};
+
+/* Permitted syscalls in preauth. Unlisted syscalls get SYSTR_POLICY_KILL */
+static const struct sandbox_policy preauth_policy[] = {
+	{ SYS_exit, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+#ifdef SYS_kbind
+	{ SYS_kbind, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+#endif
+
+	{ SYS_getpid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_getpgid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_clock_gettime, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_gettimeofday, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_nanosleep, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_sigprocmask, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+
+#ifdef SYS_getentropy
+	/* OpenBSD 5.6 and newer use getentropy(2) to seed arc4random(3). */
+	{ SYS_getentropy, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+#else
+	/* Previous releases used sysctl(3)'s kern.arnd variable. */
+	{ SYS___sysctl, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+#endif
+#ifdef SYS_sendsyslog
+	{ SYS_sendsyslog, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+#endif
+
+	{ SYS_madvise, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_mmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_mprotect, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_mquery, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_munmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+
+	{ SYS_poll, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_select, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_read, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_write, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_shutdown, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+	{ SYS_close, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
+
+	{ SYS_open, SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER },
+
+	{ -1, -1 }
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox {
+	int systrace_fd;
+	pid_t child_pid;
+	void (*osigchld)(int);
+};
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *
+ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
+{
+	struct ssh_sandbox *box;
+
+	debug3("%s: preparing systrace sandbox", __func__);
+	box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
+	box->systrace_fd = -1;
+	box->child_pid = 0;
+	box->osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN);
+
+	return box;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	debug3("%s: ready", __func__);
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld);
+	if (kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGSTOP)", __func__, getpid());
+	debug3("%s: started", __func__);
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_sandbox_parent(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid,
+    const struct sandbox_policy *allowed_syscalls)
+{
+	int dev_systrace, i, j, found, status;
+	pid_t pid;
+	struct systrace_policy policy;
+
+	/* Wait for the child to send itself a SIGSTOP */
+	debug3("%s: wait for child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid);
+	do {
+		pid = waitpid(child_pid, &status, WUNTRACED);
+	} while (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld);
+	if (!WIFSTOPPED(status)) {
+		if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
+			fatal("%s: child terminated with signal %d",
+			    __func__, WTERMSIG(status));
+		if (WIFEXITED(status))
+			fatal("%s: child exited with status %d",
+			    __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+		fatal("%s: child not stopped", __func__);
+	}
+	debug3("%s: child %ld stopped", __func__, (long)child_pid);
+	box->child_pid = child_pid;
+
+	/* Set up systracing of child */
+	if ((dev_systrace = open("/dev/systrace", O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: open(\"/dev/systrace\"): %s", __func__,
+		    strerror(errno));
+	if (ioctl(dev_systrace, STRIOCCLONE, &box->systrace_fd) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: ioctl(STRIOCCLONE, %d): %s", __func__,
+		    dev_systrace, strerror(errno));
+	close(dev_systrace);
+	debug3("%s: systrace attach, fd=%d", __func__, box->systrace_fd);
+	if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCATTACH, &child_pid) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCATTACH, %d): %s", __func__,
+		    box->systrace_fd, child_pid, strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Allocate and assign policy */
+	memset(&policy, 0, sizeof(policy));
+	policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_NEW;
+	policy.strp_maxents = SYS_MAXSYSCALL;
+	if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (new)): %s", __func__,
+		    box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
+
+	policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_ASSIGN;
+	policy.strp_pid = box->child_pid;
+	if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (assign)): %s",
+		    __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Set per-syscall policy */
+	for (i = 0; i < SYS_MAXSYSCALL; i++) {
+		found = 0;
+		for (j = 0; allowed_syscalls[j].syscall != -1; j++) {
+			if (allowed_syscalls[j].syscall == i) {
+				found = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY;
+		policy.strp_code = i;
+		policy.strp_policy = found ?
+		    allowed_syscalls[j].action : SYSTR_POLICY_KILL;
+		if (found)
+			debug3("%s: policy: enable syscall %d", __func__, i);
+		if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1)
+			fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (modify)): %s",
+			    __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	/* Signal the child to start running */
+	debug3("%s: start child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid);
+	if (kill(box->child_pid, SIGCONT) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGCONT)", __func__, box->child_pid);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
+{
+	/* Closing this before the child exits will terminate it */
+	close(box->systrace_fd);
+
+	free(box);
+	debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
+{
+	ssh_sandbox_parent(box, child_pid, preauth_policy);
+}
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_SYSTRACE */
diff --git a/scp.0 b/scp.0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ad24e57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scp.0
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+SCP(1)                      General Commands Manual                     SCP(1)
+
+NAME
+     scp M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH secure file copy
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     scp [-346ABCOpqRrsTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]
+         [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option]
+         [-P port] [-S program] [-X sftp_option] source ... target
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     scp copies files between hosts on a network.
+
+     scp uses the SFTP protocol over a ssh(1) connection for data transfer,
+     and uses the same authentication and provides the same security as a
+     login session.
+
+     scp will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for
+     authentication.
+
+     The source and target may be specified as a local pathname, a remote host
+     with optional path in the form [user@]host:[path], or a URI in the form
+     scp://[user@]host[:port][/path].  Local file names can be made explicit
+     using absolute or relative pathnames to avoid scp treating file names
+     containing M-bM-^@M-^X:M-bM-^@M-^Y as host specifiers.
+
+     When copying between two remote hosts, if the URI format is used, a port
+     cannot be specified on the target if the -R option is used.
+
+     The options are as follows:
+
+     -3      Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local
+             host.  Without this option the data is copied directly between
+             the two remote hosts.  Note that, when using the legacy SCP
+             protocol (via the -O flag), this option selects batch mode for
+             the second host as scp cannot ask for passwords or passphrases
+             for both hosts.  This mode is the default.
+
+     -4      Forces scp to use IPv4 addresses only.
+
+     -6      Forces scp to use IPv6 addresses only.
+
+     -A      Allows forwarding of ssh-agent(1) to the remote system.  The
+             default is not to forward an authentication agent.
+
+     -B      Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or
+             passphrases).
+
+     -C      Compression enable.  Passes the -C flag to ssh(1) to enable
+             compression.
+
+     -c cipher
+             Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer.  This
+             option is directly passed to ssh(1).
+
+     -D sftp_server_path
+             Connect directly to a local SFTP server program rather than a
+             remote one via ssh(1).  This option may be useful in debugging
+             the client and server.
+
+     -F ssh_config
+             Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh.
+             This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
+
+     -i identity_file
+             Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public
+             key authentication is read.  This option is directly passed to
+             ssh(1).
+
+     -J destination
+             Connect to the target host by first making an scp connection to
+             the jump host described by destination and then establishing a
+             TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there.  Multiple
+             jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters.  This
+             is a shortcut to specify a ProxyJump configuration directive.
+             This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
+
+     -l limit
+             Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
+
+     -O      Use the legacy SCP protocol for file transfers instead of the
+             SFTP protocol.  Forcing the use of the SCP protocol may be
+             necessary for servers that do not implement SFTP, for backwards-
+             compatibility for particular filename wildcard patterns and for
+             expanding paths with a M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y prefix for older SFTP servers.
+
+     -o ssh_option
+             Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in
+             ssh_config(5).  This is useful for specifying options for which
+             there is no separate scp command-line flag.  For full details of
+             the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+             ssh_config(5).
+
+                   AddressFamily
+                   BatchMode
+                   BindAddress
+                   BindInterface
+                   CanonicalDomains
+                   CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+                   CanonicalizeHostname
+                   CanonicalizeMaxDots
+                   CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+                   CASignatureAlgorithms
+                   CertificateFile
+                   CheckHostIP
+                   Ciphers
+                   Compression
+                   ConnectionAttempts
+                   ConnectTimeout
+                   ControlMaster
+                   ControlPath
+                   ControlPersist
+                   GlobalKnownHostsFile
+                   GSSAPIAuthentication
+                   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+                   HashKnownHosts
+                   Host
+                   HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+                   HostbasedAuthentication
+                   HostKeyAlgorithms
+                   HostKeyAlias
+                   Hostname
+                   IdentitiesOnly
+                   IdentityAgent
+                   IdentityFile
+                   IPQoS
+                   KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+                   KbdInteractiveDevices
+                   KexAlgorithms
+                   KnownHostsCommand
+                   LogLevel
+                   MACs
+                   NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+                   NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+                   PasswordAuthentication
+                   PKCS11Provider
+                   Port
+                   PreferredAuthentications
+                   ProxyCommand
+                   ProxyJump
+                   PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+                   PubkeyAuthentication
+                   RekeyLimit
+                   RequiredRSASize
+                   SendEnv
+                   ServerAliveInterval
+                   ServerAliveCountMax
+                   SetEnv
+                   StrictHostKeyChecking
+                   TCPKeepAlive
+                   UpdateHostKeys
+                   User
+                   UserKnownHostsFile
+                   VerifyHostKeyDNS
+
+     -P port
+             Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.  Note that
+             this option is written with a capital M-bM-^@M-^XPM-bM-^@M-^Y, because -p is already
+             reserved for preserving the times and mode bits of the file.
+
+     -p      Preserves modification times, access times, and file mode bits
+             from the source file.
+
+     -q      Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
+             diagnostic messages from ssh(1).
+
+     -R      Copies between two remote hosts are performed by connecting to
+             the origin host and executing scp there.  This requires that scp
+             running on the origin host can authenticate to the destination
+             host without requiring a password.
+
+     -r      Recursively copy entire directories.  Note that scp follows
+             symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
+
+     -S program
+             Name of program to use for the encrypted connection.  The program
+             must understand ssh(1) options.
+
+     -T      Disable strict filename checking.  By default when copying files
+             from a remote host to a local directory scp checks that the
+             received filenames match those requested on the command-line to
+             prevent the remote end from sending unexpected or unwanted files.
+             Because of differences in how various operating systems and
+             shells interpret filename wildcards, these checks may cause
+             wanted files to be rejected.  This option disables these checks
+             at the expense of fully trusting that the server will not send
+             unexpected filenames.
+
+     -v      Verbose mode.  Causes scp and ssh(1) to print debugging messages
+             about their progress.  This is helpful in debugging connection,
+             authentication, and configuration problems.
+
+     -X sftp_option
+             Specify an option that controls aspects of SFTP protocol
+             behaviour.  The valid options are:
+
+             nrequests=value
+                     Controls how many concurrent SFTP read or write requests
+                     may be in progress at any point in time during a download
+                     or upload.  By default 64 requests may be active
+                     concurrently.
+
+             buffer=value
+                     Controls the maximum buffer size for a single SFTP
+                     read/write operation used during download or upload.  By
+                     default a 32KB buffer is used.
+
+EXIT STATUS
+     The scp utility exitsM-BM- 0 on success, andM-BM- >0 if an error occurs.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5),
+     sftp-server(8), sshd(8)
+
+HISTORY
+     scp is based on the rcp program in BSD source code from the Regents of
+     the University of California.
+
+     Since OpenSSH 9.0, scp has used the SFTP protocol for transfers by
+     default.
+
+AUTHORS
+     Timo Rinne <tri@iki.fi>
+     Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+
+CAVEATS
+     The legacy SCP protocol (selected by the -O flag) requires execution of
+     the remote user's shell to perform glob(3) pattern matching.  This
+     requires careful quoting of any characters that have special meaning to
+     the remote shell, such as quote characters.
+
+OpenBSD 7.2                    December 16, 2022                   OpenBSD 7.2
diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..54c6fe3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scp.1
@@ -0,0 +1,325 @@
+.\"
+.\" scp.1
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\"                    All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" Created: Sun May  7 00:14:37 1995 ylo
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.112 2022/12/16 07:13:22 djm Exp $
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: December 16 2022 $
+.Dt SCP 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm scp
+.Nd OpenSSH secure file copy
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm scp
+.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrsTv
+.Op Fl c Ar cipher
+.Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
+.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
+.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
+.Op Fl J Ar destination
+.Op Fl l Ar limit
+.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
+.Op Fl P Ar port
+.Op Fl S Ar program
+.Op Fl X Ar sftp_option
+.Ar source ... target
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+copies files between hosts on a network.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+uses the SFTP protocol over a
+.Xr ssh 1
+connection for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides
+the same security as a login session.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for
+authentication.
+.Pp
+The
+.Ar source
+and
+.Ar target
+may be specified as a local pathname, a remote host with optional path
+in the form
+.Sm off
+.Oo user @ Oc host : Op path ,
+.Sm on
+or a URI in the form
+.Sm off
+.No scp:// Oo user @ Oc host Oo : port Oc Op / path .
+.Sm on
+Local file names can be made explicit using absolute or relative pathnames
+to avoid
+.Nm
+treating file names containing
+.Sq :\&
+as host specifiers.
+.Pp
+When copying between two remote hosts, if the URI format is used, a
+.Ar port
+cannot be specified on the
+.Ar target
+if the
+.Fl R
+option is used.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl 3
+Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host.
+Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote
+hosts.
+Note that, when using the legacy SCP protocol (via the
+.Fl O
+flag), this option
+selects batch mode for the second host as
+.Nm
+cannot ask for passwords or passphrases for both hosts.
+This mode is the default.
+.It Fl 4
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.It Fl 6
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.It Fl A
+Allows forwarding of
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+to the remote system.
+The default is not to forward an authentication agent.
+.It Fl B
+Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or passphrases).
+.It Fl C
+Compression enable.
+Passes the
+.Fl C
+flag to
+.Xr ssh 1
+to enable compression.
+.It Fl c Ar cipher
+Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer.
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
+Connect directly to a local SFTP server program rather than a
+remote one via
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+This option may be useful in debugging the client and server.
+.It Fl F Ar ssh_config
+Specifies an alternative
+per-user configuration file for
+.Nm ssh .
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl i Ar identity_file
+Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key
+authentication is read.
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl J Ar destination
+Connect to the target host by first making an
+.Nm
+connection to the jump host described by
+.Ar destination
+and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from
+there.
+Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters.
+This is a shortcut to specify a
+.Cm ProxyJump
+configuration directive.
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl l Ar limit
+Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
+.It Fl O
+Use the legacy SCP protocol for file transfers instead of the SFTP protocol.
+Forcing the use of the SCP protocol may be necessary for servers that do
+not implement SFTP, for backwards-compatibility for particular filename
+wildcard patterns and for expanding paths with a
+.Sq ~
+prefix for older SFTP servers.
+.It Fl o Ar ssh_option
+Can be used to pass options to
+.Nm ssh
+in the format used in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+This is useful for specifying options
+for which there is no separate
+.Nm scp
+command-line flag.
+For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
+.It AddressFamily
+.It BatchMode
+.It BindAddress
+.It BindInterface
+.It CanonicalDomains
+.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+.It CanonicalizeHostname
+.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
+.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+.It CASignatureAlgorithms
+.It CertificateFile
+.It CheckHostIP
+.It Ciphers
+.It Compression
+.It ConnectionAttempts
+.It ConnectTimeout
+.It ControlMaster
+.It ControlPath
+.It ControlPersist
+.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
+.It GSSAPIAuthentication
+.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+.It HashKnownHosts
+.It Host
+.It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+.It HostbasedAuthentication
+.It HostKeyAlgorithms
+.It HostKeyAlias
+.It Hostname
+.It IdentitiesOnly
+.It IdentityAgent
+.It IdentityFile
+.It IPQoS
+.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+.It KbdInteractiveDevices
+.It KexAlgorithms
+.It KnownHostsCommand
+.It LogLevel
+.It MACs
+.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+.It PasswordAuthentication
+.It PKCS11Provider
+.It Port
+.It PreferredAuthentications
+.It ProxyCommand
+.It ProxyJump
+.It PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+.It PubkeyAuthentication
+.It RekeyLimit
+.It RequiredRSASize
+.It SendEnv
+.It ServerAliveInterval
+.It ServerAliveCountMax
+.It SetEnv
+.It StrictHostKeyChecking
+.It TCPKeepAlive
+.It UpdateHostKeys
+.It User
+.It UserKnownHostsFile
+.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
+.El
+.It Fl P Ar port
+Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
+Note that this option is written with a capital
+.Sq P ,
+because
+.Fl p
+is already reserved for preserving the times and mode bits of the file.
+.It Fl p
+Preserves modification times, access times, and file mode bits from the
+source file.
+.It Fl q
+Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic
+messages from
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl R
+Copies between two remote hosts are performed by connecting to the origin
+host and executing
+.Nm
+there.
+This requires that
+.Nm
+running on the origin host can authenticate to the destination host without
+requiring a password.
+.It Fl r
+Recursively copy entire directories.
+Note that
+.Nm
+follows symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
+.It Fl S Ar program
+Name of
+.Ar program
+to use for the encrypted connection.
+The program must understand
+.Xr ssh 1
+options.
+.It Fl T
+Disable strict filename checking.
+By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory
+.Nm
+checks that the received filenames match those requested on the command-line
+to prevent the remote end from sending unexpected or unwanted files.
+Because of differences in how various operating systems and shells interpret
+filename wildcards, these checks may cause wanted files to be rejected.
+This option disables these checks at the expense of fully trusting that
+the server will not send unexpected filenames.
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+and
+.Xr ssh 1
+to print debugging messages about their progress.
+This is helpful in
+debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
+.It Fl X Ar sftp_option
+Specify an option that controls aspects of SFTP protocol behaviour.
+The valid options are:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm nrequests Ns = Ns Ar value
+Controls how many concurrent SFTP read or write requests may be in progress
+at any point in time during a download or upload.
+By default 64 requests may be active concurrently.
+.It Cm buffer Ns = Ns Ar value
+Controls the maximum buffer size for a single SFTP read/write operation used
+during download or upload.
+By default a 32KB buffer is used.
+.El
+.El
+.Sh EXIT STATUS
+.Ex -std scp
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr sftp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+.Xr sftp-server 8 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh HISTORY
+.Nm
+is based on the rcp program in
+.Bx
+source code from the Regents of the University of California.
+.Pp
+Since OpenSSH 9.0,
+.Nm
+has used the SFTP protocol for transfers by default.
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi
+.An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi
+.Sh CAVEATS
+The legacy SCP protocol (selected by the
+.Fl O
+flag) requires execution of the remote user's shell to perform
+.Xr glob 3
+pattern matching.
+This requires careful quoting of any characters that have special meaning to
+the remote shell, such as quote characters.
diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1adff5c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/scp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2254 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.252 2023/01/10 23:22:15 millert Exp $ */
+/*
+ * scp - secure remote copy.  This is basically patched BSD rcp which
+ * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
+ *
+ * NOTE: This version should NOT be suid root.  (This uses ssh to
+ * do the transfer and ssh has the necessary privileges.)
+ *
+ * 1995 Timo Rinne <tri@iki.fi>, Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Parts from:
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995
+ *	The Regents of the University of California.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ *    may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ *    without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+#  include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_FNMATCH_H
+#include <fnmatch.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+# include <glob.h>
+#else
+# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
+#include <libgen.h>
+#endif
+#include <limits.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
+#include <locale.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+#include <vis.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "progressmeter.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
+#include "sftp.h"
+
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-client.h"
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+#define COPY_BUFLEN	16384
+
+int do_cmd(char *, char *, char *, int, int, char *, int *, int *, pid_t *);
+int do_cmd2(char *, char *, int, char *, int, int);
+
+/* Struct for addargs */
+arglist args;
+arglist remote_remote_args;
+
+/* Bandwidth limit */
+long long limit_kbps = 0;
+struct bwlimit bwlimit;
+
+/* Name of current file being transferred. */
+char *curfile;
+
+/* This is set to non-zero to enable verbose mode. */
+int verbose_mode = 0;
+LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+
+/* This is set to zero if the progressmeter is not desired. */
+int showprogress = 1;
+
+/*
+ * This is set to non-zero if remote-remote copy should be piped
+ * through this process.
+ */
+int throughlocal = 1;
+
+/* Non-standard port to use for the ssh connection or -1. */
+int sshport = -1;
+
+/* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */
+char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM;
+
+/* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */
+pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1;
+pid_t do_cmd_pid2 = -1;
+
+/* SFTP copy parameters */
+size_t sftp_copy_buflen;
+size_t sftp_nrequests;
+
+/* Needed for sftp */
+volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0;
+
+int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
+    int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */
+
+static void
+killchild(int signo)
+{
+	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
+		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
+		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
+	}
+	if (do_cmd_pid2 > 1) {
+		kill(do_cmd_pid2, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
+		waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
+	}
+
+	if (signo)
+		_exit(1);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+suspone(int pid, int signo)
+{
+	int status;
+
+	if (pid > 1) {
+		kill(pid, signo);
+		while (waitpid(pid, &status, WUNTRACED) == -1 &&
+		    errno == EINTR)
+			;
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+suspchild(int signo)
+{
+	suspone(do_cmd_pid, signo);
+	suspone(do_cmd_pid2, signo);
+	kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
+}
+
+static int
+do_local_cmd(arglist *a)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	int status;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	if (a->num == 0)
+		fatal("do_local_cmd: no arguments");
+
+	if (verbose_mode) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Executing:");
+		for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++)
+			fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
+		fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+	}
+	if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
+		fatal("do_local_cmd: fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		execvp(a->list[0], a->list);
+		perror(a->list[0]);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	do_cmd_pid = pid;
+	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
+	ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild);
+	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
+
+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			fatal("do_local_cmd: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	do_cmd_pid = -1;
+
+	if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function executes the given command as the specified user on the
+ * given host.  This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This
+ * assigns the input and output file descriptors on success.
+ */
+
+int
+do_cmd(char *program, char *host, char *remuser, int port, int subsystem,
+    char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout, pid_t *pid)
+{
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+	int pin[2], pout[2];
+#else
+	int sv[2];
+#endif
+
+	if (verbose_mode)
+		fmprintf(stderr,
+		    "Executing: program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n",
+		    program, host,
+		    remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd);
+
+	if (port == -1)
+		port = sshport;
+
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+	if (pipe(pin) == -1 || pipe(pout) == -1)
+		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+#else
+	/* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sv) == -1)
+		fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
+#endif
+
+	ssh_signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild);
+	ssh_signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild);
+	ssh_signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild);
+
+	/* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
+	*pid = fork();
+	switch (*pid) {
+	case -1:
+		fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+	case 0:
+		/* Child. */
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+		if (dup2(pin[0], STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
+		    dup2(pout[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
+			error("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		close(pin[0]);
+		close(pin[1]);
+		close(pout[0]);
+		close(pout[1]);
+#else
+		if (dup2(sv[0], STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
+		    dup2(sv[0], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
+			error("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		close(sv[0]);
+		close(sv[1]);
+#endif
+		replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", program);
+		if (port != -1) {
+			addargs(&args, "-p");
+			addargs(&args, "%d", port);
+		}
+		if (remuser != NULL) {
+			addargs(&args, "-l");
+			addargs(&args, "%s", remuser);
+		}
+		if (subsystem)
+			addargs(&args, "-s");
+		addargs(&args, "--");
+		addargs(&args, "%s", host);
+		addargs(&args, "%s", cmd);
+
+		execvp(program, args.list);
+		perror(program);
+		_exit(1);
+	default:
+		/* Parent.  Close the other side, and return the local side. */
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+		close(pin[0]);
+		close(pout[1]);
+		*fdout = pin[1];
+		*fdin = pout[0];
+#else
+		close(sv[0]);
+		*fdin = sv[1];
+		*fdout = sv[1];
+#endif
+		ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
+		ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild);
+		ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function executes a command similar to do_cmd(), but expects the
+ * input and output descriptors to be setup by a previous call to do_cmd().
+ * This way the input and output of two commands can be connected.
+ */
+int
+do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd,
+    int fdin, int fdout)
+{
+	int status;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	if (verbose_mode)
+		fmprintf(stderr,
+		    "Executing: 2nd program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n",
+		    ssh_program, host,
+		    remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd);
+
+	if (port == -1)
+		port = sshport;
+
+	/* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		dup2(fdin, 0);
+		dup2(fdout, 1);
+
+		replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
+		if (port != -1) {
+			addargs(&args, "-p");
+			addargs(&args, "%d", port);
+		}
+		if (remuser != NULL) {
+			addargs(&args, "-l");
+			addargs(&args, "%s", remuser);
+		}
+		addargs(&args, "-oBatchMode=yes");
+		addargs(&args, "--");
+		addargs(&args, "%s", host);
+		addargs(&args, "%s", cmd);
+
+		execvp(ssh_program, args.list);
+		perror(ssh_program);
+		exit(1);
+	} else if (pid == -1) {
+		fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			fatal("do_cmd2: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+typedef struct {
+	size_t cnt;
+	char *buf;
+} BUF;
+
+BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int);
+void lostconn(int);
+int okname(char *);
+void run_err(const char *,...)
+    __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 1, 2)))
+    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (1)));
+int note_err(const char *,...)
+    __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 1, 2)));
+void verifydir(char *);
+
+struct passwd *pwd;
+uid_t userid;
+int errs, remin, remout, remin2, remout2;
+int Tflag, pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
+
+#define	CMDNEEDS	64
+char cmd[CMDNEEDS];		/* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */
+
+enum scp_mode_e {
+	MODE_SCP,
+	MODE_SFTP
+};
+
+int response(void);
+void rsource(char *, struct stat *);
+void sink(int, char *[], const char *);
+void source(int, char *[]);
+void tolocal(int, char *[], enum scp_mode_e, char *sftp_direct);
+void toremote(int, char *[], enum scp_mode_e, char *sftp_direct);
+void usage(void);
+
+void source_sftp(int, char *, char *, struct sftp_conn *);
+void sink_sftp(int, char *, const char *, struct sftp_conn *);
+void throughlocal_sftp(struct sftp_conn *, struct sftp_conn *,
+    char *, char *);
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int ch, fflag, tflag, status, r, n;
+	char **newargv, *argv0;
+	const char *errstr;
+	extern char *optarg;
+	extern int optind;
+	enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SFTP;
+	char *sftp_direct = NULL;
+	long long llv;
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	msetlocale();
+
+	/* Copy argv, because we modify it */
+	argv0 = argv[0];
+	newargv = xcalloc(MAXIMUM(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv));
+	for (n = 0; n < argc; n++)
+		newargv[n] = xstrdup(argv[n]);
+	argv = newargv;
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+
+	log_init(argv0, log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 2);
+
+	memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
+	memset(&remote_remote_args, '\0', sizeof(remote_remote_args));
+	args.list = remote_remote_args.list = NULL;
+	addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
+	addargs(&args, "-x");
+	addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand=no");
+	addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
+	addargs(&args, "-oRemoteCommand=none");
+	addargs(&args, "-oRequestTTY=no");
+
+	fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0;
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+	    "12346ABCTdfOpqRrstvD:F:J:M:P:S:c:i:l:o:X:")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		/* User-visible flags. */
+		case '1':
+			fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported");
+			break;
+		case '2':
+			/* Ignored */
+			break;
+		case 'A':
+		case '4':
+		case '6':
+		case 'C':
+			addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
+			addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch);
+			break;
+		case 'D':
+			sftp_direct = optarg;
+			break;
+		case '3':
+			throughlocal = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'R':
+			throughlocal = 0;
+			break;
+		case 'o':
+		case 'c':
+		case 'i':
+		case 'F':
+		case 'J':
+			addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch);
+			addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg);
+			addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
+			addargs(&args, "%s", optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'O':
+			mode = MODE_SCP;
+			break;
+		case 's':
+			mode = MODE_SFTP;
+			break;
+		case 'P':
+			sshport = a2port(optarg);
+			if (sshport <= 0)
+				fatal("bad port \"%s\"\n", optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'B':
+			addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-oBatchmode=yes");
+			addargs(&args, "-oBatchmode=yes");
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024,
+			    &errstr);
+			if (errstr != NULL)
+				usage();
+			limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */
+			bandwidth_limit_init(&bwlimit, limit_kbps, COPY_BUFLEN);
+			break;
+		case 'p':
+			pflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'r':
+			iamrecursive = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'S':
+			ssh_program = xstrdup(optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'v':
+			addargs(&args, "-v");
+			addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-v");
+			if (verbose_mode == 0)
+				log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+			else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+				log_level++;
+			verbose_mode = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'q':
+			addargs(&args, "-q");
+			addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-q");
+			showprogress = 0;
+			break;
+		case 'X':
+			/* Please keep in sync with sftp.c -X */
+			if (strncmp(optarg, "buffer=", 7) == 0) {
+				r = scan_scaled(optarg + 7, &llv);
+				if (r == 0 && (llv <= 0 || llv > 256 * 1024)) {
+					r = -1;
+					errno = EINVAL;
+				}
+				if (r == -1) {
+					fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\": %s",
+					     optarg + 7, strerror(errno));
+				}
+				sftp_copy_buflen = (size_t)llv;
+			} else if (strncmp(optarg, "nrequests=", 10) == 0) {
+				llv = strtonum(optarg + 10, 1, 256 * 1024,
+				    &errstr);
+				if (errstr != NULL) {
+					fatal("Invalid number of requests "
+					    "\"%s\": %s", optarg + 10, errstr);
+				}
+				sftp_nrequests = (size_t)llv;
+			} else {
+				fatal("Invalid -X option");
+			}
+			break;
+
+		/* Server options. */
+		case 'd':
+			targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'f':	/* "from" */
+			iamremote = 1;
+			fflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 't':	/* "to" */
+			iamremote = 1;
+			tflag = 1;
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+			setmode(0, O_BINARY);
+#endif
+			break;
+		case 'T':
+			Tflag = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			usage();
+		}
+	}
+	argc -= optind;
+	argv += optind;
+
+	log_init(argv0, log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 2);
+
+	/* Do this last because we want the user to be able to override it */
+	addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent=no");
+
+	if (iamremote)
+		mode = MODE_SCP;
+
+	if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
+		fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);
+
+	if (!isatty(STDOUT_FILENO))
+		showprogress = 0;
+
+	if (pflag) {
+		/* Cannot pledge: -p allows setuid/setgid files... */
+	} else {
+		if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath fattr tty proc exec",
+		    NULL) == -1) {
+			perror("pledge");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	remin = STDIN_FILENO;
+	remout = STDOUT_FILENO;
+
+	if (fflag) {
+		/* Follow "protocol", send data. */
+		(void) response();
+		source(argc, argv);
+		exit(errs != 0);
+	}
+	if (tflag) {
+		/* Receive data. */
+		sink(argc, argv, NULL);
+		exit(errs != 0);
+	}
+	if (argc < 2)
+		usage();
+	if (argc > 2)
+		targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
+
+	remin = remout = -1;
+	do_cmd_pid = -1;
+	/* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */
+	(void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s",
+	    verbose_mode ? " -v" : "",
+	    iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "",
+	    targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : "");
+
+	(void) ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn);
+
+	if (colon(argv[argc - 1]))	/* Dest is remote host. */
+		toremote(argc, argv, mode, sftp_direct);
+	else {
+		if (targetshouldbedirectory)
+			verifydir(argv[argc - 1]);
+		tolocal(argc, argv, mode, sftp_direct);	/* Dest is local host. */
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked
+	 * and no error has occurred yet
+	 */
+	if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && (mode == MODE_SFTP || errs == 0)) {
+		if (remin != -1)
+		    (void) close(remin);
+		if (remout != -1)
+		    (void) close(remout);
+		if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+			errs = 1;
+		else {
+			if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
+				errs = 1;
+		}
+	}
+	exit(errs != 0);
+}
+
+/* Callback from atomicio6 to update progress meter and limit bandwidth */
+static int
+scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s)
+{
+	off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt;
+
+	*cnt += s;
+	refresh_progress_meter(0);
+	if (limit_kbps > 0)
+		bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+do_times(int fd, int verb, const struct stat *sb)
+{
+	/* strlen(2^64) == 20; strlen(10^6) == 7 */
+	char buf[(20 + 7 + 2) * 2 + 2];
+
+	(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "T%llu 0 %llu 0\n",
+	    (unsigned long long) (sb->st_mtime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_mtime),
+	    (unsigned long long) (sb->st_atime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_atime));
+	if (verb) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "File mtime %lld atime %lld\n",
+		    (long long)sb->st_mtime, (long long)sb->st_atime);
+		fprintf(stderr, "Sending file timestamps: %s", buf);
+	}
+	(void) atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, strlen(buf));
+	return (response());
+}
+
+static int
+parse_scp_uri(const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp,
+    char **pathp)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	r = parse_uri("scp", uri, userp, hostp, portp, pathp);
+	if (r == 0 && *pathp == NULL)
+		*pathp = xstrdup(".");
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Appends a string to an array; returns 0 on success, -1 on alloc failure */
+static int
+append(char *cp, char ***ap, size_t *np)
+{
+	char **tmp;
+
+	if ((tmp = reallocarray(*ap, *np + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	tmp[(*np)] = cp;
+	(*np)++;
+	*ap = tmp;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Finds the start and end of the first brace pair in the pattern.
+ * returns 0 on success or -1 for invalid patterns.
+ */
+static int
+find_brace(const char *pattern, int *startp, int *endp)
+{
+	int i;
+	int in_bracket, brace_level;
+
+	*startp = *endp = -1;
+	in_bracket = brace_level = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < INT_MAX && *endp < 0 && pattern[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+		switch (pattern[i]) {
+		case '\\':
+			/* skip next character */
+			if (pattern[i + 1] != '\0')
+				i++;
+			break;
+		case '[':
+			in_bracket = 1;
+			break;
+		case ']':
+			in_bracket = 0;
+			break;
+		case '{':
+			if (in_bracket)
+				break;
+			if (pattern[i + 1] == '}') {
+				/* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */
+				i++; /* skip */
+				break;
+			}
+			if (*startp == -1)
+				*startp = i;
+			brace_level++;
+			break;
+		case '}':
+			if (in_bracket)
+				break;
+			if (*startp < 0) {
+				/* Unbalanced brace */
+				return -1;
+			}
+			if (--brace_level <= 0)
+				*endp = i;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	/* unbalanced brackets/braces */
+	if (*endp < 0 && (*startp >= 0 || in_bracket))
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Assembles and records a successfully-expanded pattern, returns -1 on
+ * alloc failure.
+ */
+static int
+emit_expansion(const char *pattern, int brace_start, int brace_end,
+    int sel_start, int sel_end, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp)
+{
+	char *cp;
+	int o = 0, tail_len = strlen(pattern + brace_end + 1);
+
+	if ((cp = malloc(brace_start + (sel_end - sel_start) +
+	    tail_len + 1)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Pattern before initial brace */
+	if (brace_start > 0) {
+		memcpy(cp, pattern, brace_start);
+		o = brace_start;
+	}
+	/* Current braced selection */
+	if (sel_end - sel_start > 0) {
+		memcpy(cp + o, pattern + sel_start,
+		    sel_end - sel_start);
+		o += sel_end - sel_start;
+	}
+	/* Remainder of pattern after closing brace */
+	if (tail_len > 0) {
+		memcpy(cp + o, pattern + brace_end + 1, tail_len);
+		o += tail_len;
+	}
+	cp[o] = '\0';
+	if (append(cp, patternsp, npatternsp) != 0) {
+		free(cp);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expand the first encountered brace in pattern, appending the expanded
+ * patterns it yielded to the *patternsp array.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -1 on allocation failure.
+ *
+ * Signals whether expansion was performed via *expanded and whether
+ * pattern was invalid via *invalid.
+ */
+static int
+brace_expand_one(const char *pattern, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp,
+    int *expanded, int *invalid)
+{
+	int i;
+	int in_bracket, brace_start, brace_end, brace_level;
+	int sel_start, sel_end;
+
+	*invalid = *expanded = 0;
+
+	if (find_brace(pattern, &brace_start, &brace_end) != 0) {
+		*invalid = 1;
+		return 0;
+	} else if (brace_start == -1)
+		return 0;
+
+	in_bracket = brace_level = 0;
+	for (i = sel_start = brace_start + 1; i < brace_end; i++) {
+		switch (pattern[i]) {
+		case '{':
+			if (in_bracket)
+				break;
+			brace_level++;
+			break;
+		case '}':
+			if (in_bracket)
+				break;
+			brace_level--;
+			break;
+		case '[':
+			in_bracket = 1;
+			break;
+		case ']':
+			in_bracket = 0;
+			break;
+		case '\\':
+			if (i < brace_end - 1)
+				i++; /* skip */
+			break;
+		}
+		if (pattern[i] == ',' || i == brace_end - 1) {
+			if (in_bracket || brace_level > 0)
+				continue;
+			/* End of a selection, emit an expanded pattern */
+
+			/* Adjust end index for last selection */
+			sel_end = (i == brace_end - 1) ? brace_end : i;
+			if (emit_expansion(pattern, brace_start, brace_end,
+			    sel_start, sel_end, patternsp, npatternsp) != 0)
+				return -1;
+			/* move on to the next selection */
+			sel_start = i + 1;
+			continue;
+		}
+	}
+	if (in_bracket || brace_level > 0) {
+		*invalid = 1;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	*expanded = 1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Expand braces from pattern. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure */
+static int
+brace_expand(const char *pattern, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp)
+{
+	char *cp, *cp2, **active = NULL, **done = NULL;
+	size_t i, nactive = 0, ndone = 0;
+	int ret = -1, invalid = 0, expanded = 0;
+
+	*patternsp = NULL;
+	*npatternsp = 0;
+
+	/* Start the worklist with the original pattern */
+	if ((cp = strdup(pattern)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	if (append(cp, &active, &nactive) != 0) {
+		free(cp);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	while (nactive > 0) {
+		cp = active[nactive - 1];
+		nactive--;
+		if (brace_expand_one(cp, &active, &nactive,
+		    &expanded, &invalid) == -1) {
+			free(cp);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		if (invalid)
+			fatal_f("invalid brace pattern \"%s\"", cp);
+		if (expanded) {
+			/*
+			 * Current entry expanded to new entries on the
+			 * active list; discard the progenitor pattern.
+			 */
+			free(cp);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Pattern did not expand; append the finename component to
+		 * the completed list
+		 */
+		if ((cp2 = strrchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
+			*cp2++ = '\0';
+		else
+			cp2 = cp;
+		if (append(xstrdup(cp2), &done, &ndone) != 0) {
+			free(cp);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		free(cp);
+	}
+	/* success */
+	*patternsp = done;
+	*npatternsp = ndone;
+	done = NULL;
+	ndone = 0;
+	ret = 0;
+ fail:
+	for (i = 0; i < nactive; i++)
+		free(active[i]);
+	free(active);
+	for (i = 0; i < ndone; i++)
+		free(done[i]);
+	free(done);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct sftp_conn *
+do_sftp_connect(char *host, char *user, int port, char *sftp_direct,
+   int *reminp, int *remoutp, int *pidp)
+{
+	if (sftp_direct == NULL) {
+		if (do_cmd(ssh_program, host, user, port, 1, "sftp",
+		    reminp, remoutp, pidp) < 0)
+			return NULL;
+
+	} else {
+		freeargs(&args);
+		addargs(&args, "sftp-server");
+		if (do_cmd(sftp_direct, host, NULL, -1, 0, "sftp",
+		    reminp, remoutp, pidp) < 0)
+			return NULL;
+	}
+	return do_init(*reminp, *remoutp,
+	    sftp_copy_buflen, sftp_nrequests, limit_kbps);
+}
+
+void
+toremote(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct)
+{
+	char *suser = NULL, *host = NULL, *src = NULL;
+	char *bp, *tuser, *thost, *targ;
+	int sport = -1, tport = -1;
+	struct sftp_conn *conn = NULL, *conn2 = NULL;
+	arglist alist;
+	int i, r, status;
+	u_int j;
+
+	memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
+	alist.list = NULL;
+
+	/* Parse target */
+	r = parse_scp_uri(argv[argc - 1], &tuser, &thost, &tport, &targ);
+	if (r == -1) {
+		fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[argc - 1]);
+		++errs;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (r != 0) {
+		if (parse_user_host_path(argv[argc - 1], &tuser, &thost,
+		    &targ) == -1) {
+			fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid target\n", argv[argc - 1]);
+			++errs;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Parse source files */
+	for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
+		free(suser);
+		free(host);
+		free(src);
+		r = parse_scp_uri(argv[i], &suser, &host, &sport, &src);
+		if (r == -1) {
+			fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[i]);
+			++errs;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (r != 0) {
+			parse_user_host_path(argv[i], &suser, &host, &src);
+		}
+		if (suser != NULL && !okname(suser)) {
+			++errs;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (host && throughlocal) {	/* extended remote to remote */
+			if (mode == MODE_SFTP) {
+				if (remin == -1) {
+					/* Connect to dest now */
+					conn = do_sftp_connect(thost, tuser,
+					    tport, sftp_direct,
+					    &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid);
+					if (conn == NULL) {
+						fatal("Unable to open "
+						    "destination connection");
+					}
+					debug3_f("origin in %d out %d pid %ld",
+					    remin, remout, (long)do_cmd_pid);
+				}
+				/*
+				 * XXX remember suser/host/sport and only
+				 * reconnect if they change between arguments.
+				 * would save reconnections for cases like
+				 * scp -3 hosta:/foo hosta:/bar hostb:
+				 */
+				/* Connect to origin now */
+				conn2 = do_sftp_connect(host, suser,
+				    sport, sftp_direct,
+				    &remin2, &remout2, &do_cmd_pid2);
+				if (conn2 == NULL) {
+					fatal("Unable to open "
+					    "source connection");
+				}
+				debug3_f("destination in %d out %d pid %ld",
+				    remin2, remout2, (long)do_cmd_pid2);
+				throughlocal_sftp(conn2, conn, src, targ);
+				(void) close(remin2);
+				(void) close(remout2);
+				remin2 = remout2 = -1;
+				if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, &status, 0) == -1)
+					++errs;
+				else if (!WIFEXITED(status) ||
+				    WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
+					++errs;
+				do_cmd_pid2 = -1;
+				continue;
+			} else {
+				xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd,
+				    *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src);
+				if (do_cmd(ssh_program, host, suser, sport, 0,
+				    bp, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid) < 0)
+					exit(1);
+				free(bp);
+				xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd,
+				    *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ);
+				if (do_cmd2(thost, tuser, tport, bp,
+				    remin, remout) < 0)
+					exit(1);
+				free(bp);
+				(void) close(remin);
+				(void) close(remout);
+				remin = remout = -1;
+			}
+		} else if (host) {	/* standard remote to remote */
+			/*
+			 * Second remote user is passed to first remote side
+			 * via scp command-line. Ensure it contains no obvious
+			 * shell characters.
+			 */
+			if (tuser != NULL && !okname(tuser)) {
+				++errs;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (tport != -1 && tport != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) {
+				/* This would require the remote support URIs */
+				fatal("target port not supported with two "
+				    "remote hosts and the -R option");
+			}
+
+			freeargs(&alist);
+			addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
+			addargs(&alist, "-x");
+			addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
+			addargs(&alist, "-n");
+			for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
+				addargs(&alist, "%s",
+				    remote_remote_args.list[j]);
+			}
+
+			if (sport != -1) {
+				addargs(&alist, "-p");
+				addargs(&alist, "%d", sport);
+			}
+			if (suser) {
+				addargs(&alist, "-l");
+				addargs(&alist, "%s", suser);
+			}
+			addargs(&alist, "--");
+			addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
+			addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
+			addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
+			addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s",
+			    tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
+			    thost, targ);
+			if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
+				errs = 1;
+		} else {	/* local to remote */
+			if (mode == MODE_SFTP) {
+				if (remin == -1) {
+					/* Connect to remote now */
+					conn = do_sftp_connect(thost, tuser,
+					    tport, sftp_direct,
+					    &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid);
+					if (conn == NULL) {
+						fatal("Unable to open sftp "
+						    "connection");
+					}
+				}
+
+				/* The protocol */
+				source_sftp(1, argv[i], targ, conn);
+				continue;
+			}
+			/* SCP */
+			if (remin == -1) {
+				xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd,
+				    *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ);
+				if (do_cmd(ssh_program, thost, tuser, tport, 0,
+				    bp, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid) < 0)
+					exit(1);
+				if (response() < 0)
+					exit(1);
+				free(bp);
+			}
+			source(1, argv + i);
+		}
+	}
+out:
+	if (mode == MODE_SFTP)
+		free(conn);
+	free(tuser);
+	free(thost);
+	free(targ);
+	free(suser);
+	free(host);
+	free(src);
+}
+
+void
+tolocal(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_mode_e mode, char *sftp_direct)
+{
+	char *bp, *host = NULL, *src = NULL, *suser = NULL;
+	arglist alist;
+	struct sftp_conn *conn = NULL;
+	int i, r, sport = -1;
+
+	memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
+	alist.list = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
+		free(suser);
+		free(host);
+		free(src);
+		r = parse_scp_uri(argv[i], &suser, &host, &sport, &src);
+		if (r == -1) {
+			fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[i]);
+			++errs;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (r != 0)
+			parse_user_host_path(argv[i], &suser, &host, &src);
+		if (suser != NULL && !okname(suser)) {
+			++errs;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (!host) {	/* Local to local. */
+			freeargs(&alist);
+			addargs(&alist, "%s", _PATH_CP);
+			if (iamrecursive)
+				addargs(&alist, "-r");
+			if (pflag)
+				addargs(&alist, "-p");
+			addargs(&alist, "--");
+			addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[i]);
+			addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[argc-1]);
+			if (do_local_cmd(&alist))
+				++errs;
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Remote to local. */
+		if (mode == MODE_SFTP) {
+			conn = do_sftp_connect(host, suser, sport,
+			    sftp_direct, &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid);
+			if (conn == NULL) {
+				error("sftp connection failed");
+				++errs;
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			/* The protocol */
+			sink_sftp(1, argv[argc - 1], src, conn);
+
+			free(conn);
+			(void) close(remin);
+			(void) close(remout);
+			remin = remout = -1;
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* SCP */
+		xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s",
+		    cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src);
+		if (do_cmd(ssh_program, host, suser, sport, 0, bp,
+		    &remin, &remout, &do_cmd_pid) < 0) {
+			free(bp);
+			++errs;
+			continue;
+		}
+		free(bp);
+		sink(1, argv + argc - 1, src);
+		(void) close(remin);
+		remin = remout = -1;
+	}
+	free(suser);
+	free(host);
+	free(src);
+}
+
+/* Prepare remote path, handling ~ by assuming cwd is the homedir */
+static char *
+prepare_remote_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+{
+	size_t nslash;
+
+	/* Handle ~ prefixed paths */
+	if (*path == '\0' || strcmp(path, "~") == 0)
+		return xstrdup(".");
+	if (*path != '~')
+		return xstrdup(path);
+	if (strncmp(path, "~/", 2) == 0) {
+		if ((nslash = strspn(path + 2, "/")) == strlen(path + 2))
+			return xstrdup(".");
+		return xstrdup(path + 2 + nslash);
+	}
+	if (can_expand_path(conn))
+		return do_expand_path(conn, path);
+	/* No protocol extension */
+	error("server expand-path extension is required "
+	    "for ~user paths in SFTP mode");
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *targ, struct sftp_conn *conn)
+{
+	char *target = NULL, *filename = NULL, *abs_dst = NULL;
+	int src_is_dir, target_is_dir;
+	Attrib a;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a));
+	if (stat(src, &st) != 0)
+		fatal("stat local \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
+	src_is_dir = S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
+	if ((filename = basename(src)) == NULL)
+		fatal("basename \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
+
+	/*
+	 * No need to glob here - the local shell already took care of
+	 * the expansions
+	 */
+	if ((target = prepare_remote_path(conn, targ)) == NULL)
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	target_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, target);
+	if (targetshouldbedirectory && !target_is_dir) {
+		debug("target directory \"%s\" does not exist", target);
+		a.flags = SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
+		a.perm = st.st_mode | 0700; /* ensure writable */
+		if (do_mkdir(conn, target, &a, 1) != 0)
+			cleanup_exit(255); /* error already logged */
+		target_is_dir = 1;
+	}
+	if (target_is_dir)
+		abs_dst = path_append(target, filename);
+	else {
+		abs_dst = target;
+		target = NULL;
+	}
+	debug3_f("copying local %s to remote %s", src, abs_dst);
+
+	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
+		if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
+		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
+			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s", src, targ);
+			errs = 1;
+		}
+	} else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0, 1) != 0) {
+		error("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, targ);
+		errs = 1;
+	}
+
+	free(abs_dst);
+	free(target);
+}
+
+void
+source(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	struct stat stb;
+	static BUF buffer;
+	BUF *bp;
+	off_t i, statbytes;
+	size_t amt, nr;
+	int fd = -1, haderr, indx;
+	char *last, *name, buf[PATH_MAX + 128], encname[PATH_MAX];
+	int len;
+
+	for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) {
+		name = argv[indx];
+		statbytes = 0;
+		len = strlen(name);
+		while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/')
+			name[--len] = '\0';
+		if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1)
+			goto syserr;
+		if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) {
+			strnvis(encname, name, sizeof(encname), VIS_NL);
+			name = encname;
+		}
+		if (fstat(fd, &stb) == -1) {
+syserr:			run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
+			goto next;
+		}
+		if (stb.st_size < 0) {
+			run_err("%s: %s", name, "Negative file size");
+			goto next;
+		}
+		unset_nonblock(fd);
+		switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) {
+		case S_IFREG:
+			break;
+		case S_IFDIR:
+			if (iamrecursive) {
+				rsource(name, &stb);
+				goto next;
+			}
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		default:
+			run_err("%s: not a regular file", name);
+			goto next;
+		}
+		if ((last = strrchr(name, '/')) == NULL)
+			last = name;
+		else
+			++last;
+		curfile = last;
+		if (pflag) {
+			if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, &stb) < 0)
+				goto next;
+		}
+#define	FILEMODEMASK	(S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n",
+		    (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK),
+		    (long long)stb.st_size, last);
+		if (verbose_mode)
+			fmprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf);
+		(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf));
+		if (response() < 0)
+			goto next;
+		if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
+next:			if (fd != -1) {
+				(void) close(fd);
+				fd = -1;
+			}
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (showprogress)
+			start_progress_meter(curfile, stb.st_size, &statbytes);
+		set_nonblock(remout);
+		for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) {
+			amt = bp->cnt;
+			if (i + (off_t)amt > stb.st_size)
+				amt = stb.st_size - i;
+			if (!haderr) {
+				if ((nr = atomicio(read, fd,
+				    bp->buf, amt)) != amt) {
+					haderr = errno;
+					memset(bp->buf + nr, 0, amt - nr);
+				}
+			}
+			/* Keep writing after error to retain sync */
+			if (haderr) {
+				(void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt);
+				memset(bp->buf, 0, amt);
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (atomicio6(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt, scpio,
+			    &statbytes) != amt)
+				haderr = errno;
+		}
+		unset_nonblock(remout);
+
+		if (fd != -1) {
+			if (close(fd) == -1 && !haderr)
+				haderr = errno;
+			fd = -1;
+		}
+		if (!haderr)
+			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+		else
+			run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr));
+		(void) response();
+		if (showprogress)
+			stop_progress_meter();
+	}
+}
+
+void
+rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp)
+{
+	DIR *dirp;
+	struct dirent *dp;
+	char *last, *vect[1], path[PATH_MAX];
+
+	if (!(dirp = opendir(name))) {
+		run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+	last = strrchr(name, '/');
+	if (last == NULL)
+		last = name;
+	else
+		last++;
+	if (pflag) {
+		if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, statp) < 0) {
+			closedir(dirp);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+	(void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "D%04o %d %.1024s\n",
+	    (u_int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last);
+	if (verbose_mode)
+		fmprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path);
+	(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, path, strlen(path));
+	if (response() < 0) {
+		closedir(dirp);
+		return;
+	}
+	while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
+		if (dp->d_ino == 0)
+			continue;
+		if (!strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dp->d_name, ".."))
+			continue;
+		if (strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(dp->d_name) >= sizeof(path) - 1) {
+			run_err("%s/%s: name too long", name, dp->d_name);
+			continue;
+		}
+		(void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s", name, dp->d_name);
+		vect[0] = path;
+		source(1, vect);
+	}
+	(void) closedir(dirp);
+	(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "E\n", 2);
+	(void) response();
+}
+
+void
+sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const char *src, struct sftp_conn *conn)
+{
+	char *abs_src = NULL;
+	char *abs_dst = NULL;
+	glob_t g;
+	char *filename, *tmp = NULL;
+	int i, r, err = 0, dst_is_dir;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+
+	/*
+	 * Here, we need remote glob as SFTP can not depend on remote shell
+	 * expansions
+	 */
+	if ((abs_src = prepare_remote_path(conn, src)) == NULL) {
+		err = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	debug3_f("copying remote %s to local %s", abs_src, dst);
+	if ((r = remote_glob(conn, abs_src, GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_MARK,
+	    NULL, &g)) != 0) {
+		if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE)
+			error("%s: too many glob matches", src);
+		else
+			error("%s: %s", src, strerror(ENOENT));
+		err = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Did we actually get any matches back from the glob? */
+	if (g.gl_matchc == 0 && g.gl_pathc == 1 && g.gl_pathv[0] != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * If nothing matched but a path returned, then it's probably
+		 * a GLOB_NOCHECK result. Check whether the unglobbed path
+		 * exists so we can give a nice error message early.
+		 */
+		if (do_stat(conn, g.gl_pathv[0], 1) == NULL) {
+			error("%s: %s", src, strerror(ENOENT));
+			err = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((r = stat(dst, &st)) != 0)
+		debug2_f("stat local \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno));
+	dst_is_dir = r == 0 && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
+
+	if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && !dst_is_dir) {
+		if (r == 0) {
+			error("Multiple files match pattern, but destination "
+			    "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst);
+			err = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		debug2_f("creating destination \"%s\"", dst);
+		if (mkdir(dst, 0777) != 0) {
+			error("local mkdir \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno));
+			err = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		dst_is_dir = 1;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+		tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]);
+		if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) {
+			error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
+			err = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (dst_is_dir)
+			abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
+		else
+			abs_dst = xstrdup(dst);
+
+		debug("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && iamrecursive) {
+			if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+			    pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) == -1)
+				err = -1;
+		} else {
+			if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+			    pflag, 0, 0, 1) == -1)
+				err = -1;
+		}
+		free(abs_dst);
+		abs_dst = NULL;
+		free(tmp);
+		tmp = NULL;
+	}
+
+out:
+	free(abs_src);
+	free(tmp);
+	globfree(&g);
+	if (err == -1)
+		errs = 1;
+}
+
+
+#define TYPE_OVERFLOW(type, val) \
+	((sizeof(type) == 4 && (val) > INT32_MAX) || \
+	 (sizeof(type) == 8 && (val) > INT64_MAX) || \
+	 (sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8))
+
+void
+sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
+{
+	static BUF buffer;
+	struct stat stb;
+	BUF *bp;
+	off_t i;
+	size_t j, count;
+	int amt, exists, first, ofd;
+	mode_t mode, omode, mask;
+	off_t size, statbytes;
+	unsigned long long ull;
+	int setimes, targisdir, wrerr;
+	char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048];
+	char **patterns = NULL;
+	size_t n, npatterns = 0;
+	struct timeval tv[2];
+
+#define	atime	tv[0]
+#define	mtime	tv[1]
+#define	SCREWUP(str)	{ why = str; goto screwup; }
+
+	if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, 0) || TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, 0))
+		SCREWUP("Unexpected off_t/time_t size");
+
+	setimes = targisdir = 0;
+	mask = umask(0);
+	if (!pflag)
+		(void) umask(mask);
+	if (argc != 1) {
+		run_err("ambiguous target");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	targ = *argv;
+	if (targetshouldbedirectory)
+		verifydir(targ);
+
+	(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+	if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
+		targisdir = 1;
+	if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) {
+		/*
+		 * Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match
+		 * the requested destination file glob.
+		 */
+		if (brace_expand(src, &patterns, &npatterns) != 0)
+			fatal_f("could not expand pattern");
+	}
+	for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
+		cp = buf;
+		if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
+			goto done;
+		if (*cp++ == '\n')
+			SCREWUP("unexpected <newline>");
+		do {
+			if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch))
+				SCREWUP("lost connection");
+			*cp++ = ch;
+		} while (cp < &buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] && ch != '\n');
+		*cp = 0;
+		if (verbose_mode)
+			fmprintf(stderr, "Sink: %s", buf);
+
+		if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') {
+			if (iamremote == 0) {
+				(void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf),
+				    NULL, "%s", buf + 1);
+				(void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO,
+				    visbuf, strlen(visbuf));
+			}
+			if (buf[0] == '\02')
+				exit(1);
+			++errs;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (buf[0] == 'E') {
+			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+			goto done;
+		}
+		if (ch == '\n')
+			*--cp = 0;
+
+		cp = buf;
+		if (*cp == 'T') {
+			setimes++;
+			cp++;
+			if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
+				SCREWUP("mtime.sec not present");
+			ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
+			if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
+				SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited");
+			if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull))
+				setimes = 0;	/* out of range */
+			mtime.tv_sec = ull;
+			mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
+			if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ' || mtime.tv_usec < 0 ||
+			    mtime.tv_usec > 999999)
+				SCREWUP("mtime.usec not delimited");
+			if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
+				SCREWUP("atime.sec not present");
+			ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
+			if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
+				SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited");
+			if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull))
+				setimes = 0;	/* out of range */
+			atime.tv_sec = ull;
+			atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
+			if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0' || atime.tv_usec < 0 ||
+			    atime.tv_usec > 999999)
+				SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited");
+			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') {
+			/*
+			 * Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar".
+			 * In this case, the line "No match." can be returned
+			 * by the shell before the rcp command on the remote is
+			 * executed so the ^Aerror_message convention isn't
+			 * followed.
+			 */
+			if (first) {
+				run_err("%s", cp);
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			SCREWUP("expected control record");
+		}
+		mode = 0;
+		for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) {
+			if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7')
+				SCREWUP("bad mode");
+			mode = (mode << 3) | (*cp - '0');
+		}
+		if (!pflag)
+			mode &= ~mask;
+		if (*cp++ != ' ')
+			SCREWUP("mode not delimited");
+
+		if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
+			SCREWUP("size not present");
+		ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
+		if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
+			SCREWUP("size not delimited");
+		if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, ull))
+			SCREWUP("size out of range");
+		size = (off_t)ull;
+
+		if (*cp == '\0' || strchr(cp, '/') != NULL ||
+		    strcmp(cp, ".") == 0 || strcmp(cp, "..") == 0) {
+			run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		if (npatterns > 0) {
+			for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++) {
+				if (strcmp(patterns[n], cp) == 0 ||
+				    fnmatch(patterns[n], cp, 0) == 0)
+					break;
+			}
+			if (n >= npatterns)
+				SCREWUP("filename does not match request");
+		}
+		if (targisdir) {
+			static char *namebuf;
+			static size_t cursize;
+			size_t need;
+
+			need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250;
+			if (need > cursize) {
+				free(namebuf);
+				namebuf = xmalloc(need);
+				cursize = need;
+			}
+			(void) snprintf(namebuf, need, "%s%s%s", targ,
+			    strcmp(targ, "/") ? "/" : "", cp);
+			np = namebuf;
+		} else
+			np = targ;
+		curfile = cp;
+		exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0;
+		if (buf[0] == 'D') {
+			int mod_flag = pflag;
+			if (!iamrecursive)
+				SCREWUP("received directory without -r");
+			if (exists) {
+				if (!S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) {
+					errno = ENOTDIR;
+					goto bad;
+				}
+				if (pflag)
+					(void) chmod(np, mode);
+			} else {
+				/* Handle copying from a read-only directory */
+				mod_flag = 1;
+				if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) == -1)
+					goto bad;
+			}
+			vect[0] = xstrdup(np);
+			sink(1, vect, src);
+			if (setimes) {
+				setimes = 0;
+				(void) utimes(vect[0], tv);
+			}
+			if (mod_flag)
+				(void) chmod(vect[0], mode);
+			free(vect[0]);
+			continue;
+		}
+		omode = mode;
+		mode |= S_IWUSR;
+		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
+bad:			run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
+			continue;
+		}
+		(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+		if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
+			(void) close(ofd);
+			continue;
+		}
+		cp = bp->buf;
+		wrerr = 0;
+
+		/*
+		 * NB. do not use run_err() unless immediately followed by
+		 * exit() below as it may send a spurious reply that might
+		 * desyncronise us from the peer. Use note_err() instead.
+		 */
+		statbytes = 0;
+		if (showprogress)
+			start_progress_meter(curfile, size, &statbytes);
+		set_nonblock(remin);
+		for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += bp->cnt) {
+			amt = bp->cnt;
+			if (i + amt > size)
+				amt = size - i;
+			count += amt;
+			do {
+				j = atomicio6(read, remin, cp, amt,
+				    scpio, &statbytes);
+				if (j == 0) {
+					run_err("%s", j != EPIPE ?
+					    strerror(errno) :
+					    "dropped connection");
+					exit(1);
+				}
+				amt -= j;
+				cp += j;
+			} while (amt > 0);
+
+			if (count == bp->cnt) {
+				/* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */
+				if (!wrerr) {
+					if (atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf,
+					    count) != count) {
+						note_err("%s: %s", np,
+						    strerror(errno));
+						wrerr = 1;
+					}
+				}
+				count = 0;
+				cp = bp->buf;
+			}
+		}
+		unset_nonblock(remin);
+		if (count != 0 && !wrerr &&
+		    atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) {
+			note_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
+			wrerr = 1;
+		}
+		if (!wrerr && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) &&
+		    ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0)
+			note_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno));
+		if (pflag) {
+			if (exists || omode != mode)
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
+				if (fchmod(ofd, omode)) {
+#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+				if (chmod(np, omode)) {
+#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+					note_err("%s: set mode: %s",
+					    np, strerror(errno));
+				}
+		} else {
+			if (!exists && omode != mode)
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
+				if (fchmod(ofd, omode & ~mask)) {
+#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+				if (chmod(np, omode & ~mask)) {
+#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+					note_err("%s: set mode: %s",
+					    np, strerror(errno));
+				}
+		}
+		if (close(ofd) == -1)
+			note_err("%s: close: %s", np, strerror(errno));
+		(void) response();
+		if (showprogress)
+			stop_progress_meter();
+		if (setimes && !wrerr) {
+			setimes = 0;
+			if (utimes(np, tv) == -1) {
+				note_err("%s: set times: %s",
+				    np, strerror(errno));
+			}
+		}
+		/* If no error was noted then signal success for this file */
+		if (note_err(NULL) == 0)
+			(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
+	}
+done:
+	for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++)
+		free(patterns[n]);
+	free(patterns);
+	return;
+screwup:
+	for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++)
+		free(patterns[n]);
+	free(patterns);
+	run_err("protocol error: %s", why);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+void
+throughlocal_sftp(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+    char *src, char *targ)
+{
+	char *target = NULL, *filename = NULL, *abs_dst = NULL;
+	char *abs_src = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
+	glob_t g;
+	int i, r, targetisdir, err = 0;
+
+	if ((filename = basename(src)) == NULL)
+		fatal("basename %s: %s", src, strerror(errno));
+
+	if ((abs_src = prepare_remote_path(from, src)) == NULL ||
+	    (target = prepare_remote_path(to, targ)) == NULL)
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+
+	targetisdir = remote_is_dir(to, target);
+	if (!targetisdir && targetshouldbedirectory) {
+		error("%s: destination is not a directory", targ);
+		err = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	debug3_f("copying remote %s to remote %s", abs_src, target);
+	if ((r = remote_glob(from, abs_src, GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_MARK,
+	    NULL, &g)) != 0) {
+		if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE)
+			error("%s: too many glob matches", src);
+		else
+			error("%s: %s", src, strerror(ENOENT));
+		err = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Did we actually get any matches back from the glob? */
+	if (g.gl_matchc == 0 && g.gl_pathc == 1 && g.gl_pathv[0] != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * If nothing matched but a path returned, then it's probably
+		 * a GLOB_NOCHECK result. Check whether the unglobbed path
+		 * exists so we can give a nice error message early.
+		 */
+		if (do_stat(from, g.gl_pathv[0], 1) == NULL) {
+			error("%s: %s", src, strerror(ENOENT));
+			err = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+		tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]);
+		if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) {
+			error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
+			err = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (targetisdir)
+			abs_dst = path_append(target, filename);
+		else
+			abs_dst = xstrdup(target);
+
+		debug("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && iamrecursive) {
+			if (crossload_dir(from, to, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+			    NULL, pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 1) == -1)
+				err = -1;
+		} else {
+			if (do_crossload(from, to, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+			    pflag) == -1)
+				err = -1;
+		}
+		free(abs_dst);
+		abs_dst = NULL;
+		free(tmp);
+		tmp = NULL;
+	}
+
+out:
+	free(abs_src);
+	free(abs_dst);
+	free(target);
+	free(tmp);
+	globfree(&g);
+	if (err == -1)
+		errs = 1;
+}
+
+int
+response(void)
+{
+	char ch, *cp, resp, rbuf[2048], visbuf[2048];
+
+	if (atomicio(read, remin, &resp, sizeof(resp)) != sizeof(resp))
+		lostconn(0);
+
+	cp = rbuf;
+	switch (resp) {
+	case 0:		/* ok */
+		return (0);
+	default:
+		*cp++ = resp;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	case 1:		/* error, followed by error msg */
+	case 2:		/* fatal error, "" */
+		do {
+			if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch))
+				lostconn(0);
+			*cp++ = ch;
+		} while (cp < &rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] && ch != '\n');
+
+		if (!iamremote) {
+			cp[-1] = '\0';
+			(void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf),
+			    NULL, "%s\n", rbuf);
+			(void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO,
+			    visbuf, strlen(visbuf));
+		}
+		++errs;
+		if (resp == 1)
+			return (-1);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+void
+usage(void)
+{
+	(void) fprintf(stderr,
+	    "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrsTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
+	    "           [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option]\n"
+	    "           [-P port] [-S program] [-X sftp_option] source ... target\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+void
+run_err(const char *fmt,...)
+{
+	static FILE *fp;
+	va_list ap;
+
+	++errs;
+	if (fp != NULL || (remout != -1 && (fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))) {
+		(void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01);
+		(void) fprintf(fp, "scp: ");
+		va_start(ap, fmt);
+		(void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap);
+		va_end(ap);
+		(void) fprintf(fp, "\n");
+		(void) fflush(fp);
+	}
+
+	if (!iamremote) {
+		va_start(ap, fmt);
+		vfmprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
+		va_end(ap);
+		fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Notes a sink error for sending at the end of a file transfer. Returns 0 if
+ * no error has been noted or -1 otherwise. Use note_err(NULL) to flush
+ * any active error at the end of the transfer.
+ */
+int
+note_err(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	static char *emsg;
+	va_list ap;
+
+	/* Replay any previously-noted error */
+	if (fmt == NULL) {
+		if (emsg == NULL)
+			return 0;
+		run_err("%s", emsg);
+		free(emsg);
+		emsg = NULL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	errs++;
+	/* Prefer first-noted error */
+	if (emsg != NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	vasnmprintf(&emsg, INT_MAX, NULL, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+void
+verifydir(char *cp)
+{
+	struct stat stb;
+
+	if (!stat(cp, &stb)) {
+		if (S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
+			return;
+		errno = ENOTDIR;
+	}
+	run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno));
+	killchild(0);
+}
+
+int
+okname(char *cp0)
+{
+	int c;
+	char *cp;
+
+	cp = cp0;
+	do {
+		c = (int)*cp;
+		if (c & 0200)
+			goto bad;
+		if (!isalpha(c) && !isdigit((unsigned char)c)) {
+			switch (c) {
+			case '\'':
+			case '"':
+			case '`':
+			case ' ':
+			case '#':
+				goto bad;
+			default:
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	} while (*++cp);
+	return (1);
+
+bad:	fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+BUF *
+allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize)
+{
+	size_t size;
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE
+	struct stat stb;
+
+	if (fstat(fd, &stb) == -1) {
+		run_err("fstat: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return (0);
+	}
+	size = ROUNDUP(stb.st_blksize, blksize);
+	if (size == 0)
+		size = blksize;
+#else /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */
+	size = blksize;
+#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */
+	if (bp->cnt >= size)
+		return (bp);
+	bp->buf = xrecallocarray(bp->buf, bp->cnt, size, 1);
+	bp->cnt = size;
+	return (bp);
+}
+
+void
+lostconn(int signo)
+{
+	if (!iamremote)
+		(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "lost connection\n", 16);
+	if (signo)
+		_exit(1);
+	else
+		exit(1);
+}
+
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+	if (remin > 0)
+		close(remin);
+	if (remout > 0)
+		close(remout);
+	if (remin2 > 0)
+		close(remin2);
+	if (remout2 > 0)
+		close(remout2);
+	if (do_cmd_pid > 0)
+		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
+	if (do_cmd_pid2 > 0)
+		waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
+	exit(i);
+}
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e039da
--- /dev/null
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3163 @@
+
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.390 2023/01/17 09:44:48 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#ifdef __OpenBSD__
+#include <sys/sysctl.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
+#include <netinet/ip.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H
+#include <net/route.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+#include <util.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+# include <glob.h>
+#else
+# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "groupaccess.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
+    const char *, int);
+static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
+    const char *, int);
+static void parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options,
+    const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
+    struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth);
+
+/* Use of privilege separation or not */
+extern int use_privsep;
+extern struct sshbuf *cfg;
+
+/* Initializes the server options to their default values. */
+
+void
+initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+{
+	memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options));
+
+	/* Portable-specific options */
+	options->use_pam = -1;
+
+	/* Standard Options */
+	options->num_ports = 0;
+	options->ports_from_cmdline = 0;
+	options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL;
+	options->num_queued_listens = 0;
+	options->listen_addrs = NULL;
+	options->num_listen_addrs = 0;
+	options->address_family = -1;
+	options->routing_domain = NULL;
+	options->num_host_key_files = 0;
+	options->num_host_cert_files = 0;
+	options->host_key_agent = NULL;
+	options->pid_file = NULL;
+	options->login_grace_time = -1;
+	options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NOT_SET;
+	options->ignore_rhosts = -1;
+	options->ignore_user_known_hosts = -1;
+	options->print_motd = -1;
+	options->print_lastlog = -1;
+	options->x11_forwarding = -1;
+	options->x11_display_offset = -1;
+	options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
+	options->permit_tty = -1;
+	options->permit_user_rc = -1;
+	options->xauth_location = NULL;
+	options->strict_modes = -1;
+	options->tcp_keep_alive = -1;
+	options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
+	options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
+	options->num_log_verbose = 0;
+	options->log_verbose = NULL;
+	options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
+	options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1;
+	options->hostbased_accepted_algos = NULL;
+	options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
+	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+	options->pubkey_auth_options = -1;
+	options->pubkey_accepted_algos = NULL;
+	options->kerberos_authentication = -1;
+	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
+	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
+	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
+	options->gss_authentication=-1;
+	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
+	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+	options->password_authentication = -1;
+	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
+	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
+	options->permit_user_env = -1;
+	options->permit_user_env_allowlist = NULL;
+	options->compression = -1;
+	options->rekey_limit = -1;
+	options->rekey_interval = -1;
+	options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1;
+	options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = -1;
+	options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1;
+	options->num_allow_users = 0;
+	options->num_deny_users = 0;
+	options->num_allow_groups = 0;
+	options->num_deny_groups = 0;
+	options->ciphers = NULL;
+	options->macs = NULL;
+	options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
+	options->ca_sign_algorithms = NULL;
+	options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1;
+	options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1;
+	options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
+	options->num_subsystems = 0;
+	options->max_startups_begin = -1;
+	options->max_startups_rate = -1;
+	options->max_startups = -1;
+	options->per_source_max_startups = -1;
+	options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 = -1;
+	options->per_source_masklen_ipv6 = -1;
+	options->max_authtries = -1;
+	options->max_sessions = -1;
+	options->banner = NULL;
+	options->use_dns = -1;
+	options->client_alive_interval = -1;
+	options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
+	options->num_authkeys_files = 0;
+	options->num_accept_env = 0;
+	options->num_setenv = 0;
+	options->permit_tun = -1;
+	options->permitted_opens = NULL;
+	options->permitted_listens = NULL;
+	options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
+	options->chroot_directory = NULL;
+	options->authorized_keys_command = NULL;
+	options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL;
+	options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
+	options->sk_provider = NULL;
+	options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
+	options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
+	options->authorized_principals_command = NULL;
+	options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL;
+	options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
+	options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
+	options->version_addendum = NULL;
+	options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
+	options->disable_forwarding = -1;
+	options->expose_userauth_info = -1;
+	options->required_rsa_size = -1;
+	options->channel_timeouts = NULL;
+	options->num_channel_timeouts = 0;
+	options->unused_connection_timeout = -1;
+}
+
+/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
+static int
+option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
+{
+	return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0;
+}
+
+static void
+assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
+{
+	char *all_cipher, *all_mac, *all_kex, *all_key, *all_sig;
+	char *def_cipher, *def_mac, *def_kex, *def_key, *def_sig;
+	int r;
+
+	all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0);
+	all_mac = mac_alg_list(',');
+	all_kex = kex_alg_list(',');
+	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
+	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
+	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
+#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+	do { \
+		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
+			fatal_fr(r, "%s", #what); \
+	} while (0)
+	ASSEMBLE(ciphers, def_cipher, all_cipher);
+	ASSEMBLE(macs, def_mac, all_mac);
+	ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, def_kex, all_kex);
+	ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, def_key, all_key);
+	ASSEMBLE(hostbased_accepted_algos, def_key, all_key);
+	ASSEMBLE(pubkey_accepted_algos, def_key, all_key);
+	ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, def_sig, all_sig);
+#undef ASSEMBLE
+	free(all_cipher);
+	free(all_mac);
+	free(all_kex);
+	free(all_key);
+	free(all_sig);
+	free(def_cipher);
+	free(def_mac);
+	free(def_kex);
+	free(def_key);
+	free(def_sig);
+}
+
+void
+servconf_add_hostkey(const char *file, const int line,
+    ServerOptions *options, const char *path, int userprovided)
+{
+	char *apath = derelativise_path(path);
+
+	opt_array_append2(file, line, "HostKey",
+	    &options->host_key_files, &options->host_key_file_userprovided,
+	    &options->num_host_key_files, apath, userprovided);
+	free(apath);
+}
+
+void
+servconf_add_hostcert(const char *file, const int line,
+    ServerOptions *options, const char *path)
+{
+	char *apath = derelativise_path(path);
+
+	opt_array_append(file, line, "HostCertificate",
+	    &options->host_cert_files, &options->num_host_cert_files, apath);
+	free(apath);
+}
+
+void
+fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	/* Portable-specific options */
+	if (options->use_pam == -1)
+		options->use_pam = 0;
+
+	/* Standard Options */
+	if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
+		/* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
+		servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options,
+		    _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 0);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+		servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options,
+		    _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 0);
+#endif
+		servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options,
+		    _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 0);
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+		servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options,
+		    _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 0);
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
+	}
+	/* No certificates by default */
+	if (options->num_ports == 0)
+		options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+	if (options->address_family == -1)
+		options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+	if (options->listen_addrs == NULL)
+		add_listen_addr(options, NULL, NULL, 0);
+	if (options->pid_file == NULL)
+		options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE);
+	if (options->moduli_file == NULL)
+		options->moduli_file = xstrdup(_PATH_DH_MODULI);
+	if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
+		options->login_grace_time = 120;
+	if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
+		options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD;
+	if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
+		options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
+	if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
+		options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
+	if (options->print_motd == -1)
+		options->print_motd = 1;
+	if (options->print_lastlog == -1)
+		options->print_lastlog = 1;
+	if (options->x11_forwarding == -1)
+		options->x11_forwarding = 0;
+	if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
+		options->x11_display_offset = 10;
+	if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
+		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
+	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
+		options->xauth_location = xstrdup(_PATH_XAUTH);
+	if (options->permit_tty == -1)
+		options->permit_tty = 1;
+	if (options->permit_user_rc == -1)
+		options->permit_user_rc = 1;
+	if (options->strict_modes == -1)
+		options->strict_modes = 1;
+	if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1)
+		options->tcp_keep_alive = 1;
+	if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
+		options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
+	if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+		options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+	if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
+		options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
+	if (options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only == -1)
+		options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = 0;
+	if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
+		options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
+	if (options->pubkey_auth_options == -1)
+		options->pubkey_auth_options = 0;
+	if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1)
+		options->kerberos_authentication = 0;
+	if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1)
+		options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1;
+	if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1)
+		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
+	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
+		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
+	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
+		options->gss_authentication = 0;
+	if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
+		options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
+	if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
+		options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
+	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
+		options->password_authentication = 1;
+	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
+		options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
+	if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1)
+		options->permit_empty_passwd = 0;
+	if (options->permit_user_env == -1) {
+		options->permit_user_env = 0;
+		options->permit_user_env_allowlist = NULL;
+	}
+	if (options->compression == -1)
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+		options->compression = COMP_DELAYED;
+#else
+		options->compression = COMP_NONE;
+#endif
+
+	if (options->rekey_limit == -1)
+		options->rekey_limit = 0;
+	if (options->rekey_interval == -1)
+		options->rekey_interval = 0;
+	if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1)
+		options->allow_tcp_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW;
+	if (options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding == -1)
+		options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW;
+	if (options->allow_agent_forwarding == -1)
+		options->allow_agent_forwarding = 1;
+	if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1)
+		options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0;
+	if (options->max_startups == -1)
+		options->max_startups = 100;
+	if (options->max_startups_rate == -1)
+		options->max_startups_rate = 30;		/* 30% */
+	if (options->max_startups_begin == -1)
+		options->max_startups_begin = 10;
+	if (options->per_source_max_startups == -1)
+		options->per_source_max_startups = INT_MAX;
+	if (options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 == -1)
+		options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 = 32;
+	if (options->per_source_masklen_ipv6 == -1)
+		options->per_source_masklen_ipv6 = 128;
+	if (options->max_authtries == -1)
+		options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX;
+	if (options->max_sessions == -1)
+		options->max_sessions = DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX;
+	if (options->use_dns == -1)
+		options->use_dns = 0;
+	if (options->client_alive_interval == -1)
+		options->client_alive_interval = 0;
+	if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1)
+		options->client_alive_count_max = 3;
+	if (options->num_authkeys_files == 0) {
+		opt_array_append("[default]", 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles",
+		    &options->authorized_keys_files,
+		    &options->num_authkeys_files,
+		    _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS);
+		opt_array_append("[default]", 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles",
+		    &options->authorized_keys_files,
+		    &options->num_authkeys_files,
+		    _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2);
+	}
+	if (options->permit_tun == -1)
+		options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+	if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
+		options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21;
+	if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
+		options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1;
+	if (options->version_addendum == NULL)
+		options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
+	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
+		options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
+	if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
+		options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
+	if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
+		options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+	if (options->disable_forwarding == -1)
+		options->disable_forwarding = 0;
+	if (options->expose_userauth_info == -1)
+		options->expose_userauth_info = 0;
+	if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
+		options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
+	if (options->required_rsa_size == -1)
+		options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
+	if (options->unused_connection_timeout == -1)
+		options->unused_connection_timeout = 0;
+
+	assemble_algorithms(options);
+
+	/* Turn privilege separation and sandboxing on by default */
+	if (use_privsep == -1)
+		use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON;
+
+#define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
+	do { \
+		if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \
+			free(v); \
+			v = NULL; \
+		} \
+	} while(0)
+#define CLEAR_ON_NONE_ARRAY(v, nv, none) \
+	do { \
+		if (options->nv == 1 && \
+		    strcasecmp(options->v[0], none) == 0) { \
+			free(options->v[0]); \
+			free(options->v); \
+			options->v = NULL; \
+			options->nv = 0; \
+		} \
+	} while (0)
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pid_file);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->xauth_location);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->banner);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->trusted_user_ca_keys);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_keys_file);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->sk_provider);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->authorized_principals_file);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->adm_forced_command);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->chroot_directory);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->routing_domain);
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_agent);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_key_files; i++)
+		CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_files[i]);
+	for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_cert_files; i++)
+		CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_cert_files[i]);
+
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE_ARRAY(channel_timeouts, num_channel_timeouts, "none");
+	CLEAR_ON_NONE_ARRAY(auth_methods, num_auth_methods, "any");
+#undef CLEAR_ON_NONE
+#undef CLEAR_ON_NONE_ARRAY
+}
+
+/* Keyword tokens. */
+typedef enum {
+	sBadOption,		/* == unknown option */
+	/* Portable-specific options */
+	sUsePAM,
+	/* Standard Options */
+	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sPasswordAuthentication,
+	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
+	sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
+	sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
+	sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sPidFile, sModuliFile,
+	sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms,
+	sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
+	sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
+	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
+	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+	sHostCertificate, sInclude,
+	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+	sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
+	sKexAlgorithms, sCASignatureAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
+	sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
+	sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
+	sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
+	sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
+	sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider,
+	sRequiredRSASize, sChannelTimeout, sUnusedConnectionTimeout,
+	sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
+} ServerOpCodes;
+
+#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL		0x01	/* allowed in main section of config */
+#define SSHCFG_MATCH		0x02	/* allowed inside a Match section */
+#define SSHCFG_ALL		(SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
+#define SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH	0x04  /* Match never matches; internal only */
+#define SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY	0x08  /* Match only in conditional blocks; internal only */
+
+/* Textual representation of the tokens. */
+static struct {
+	const char *name;
+	ServerOpCodes opcode;
+	u_int flags;
+} keywords[] = {
+	/* Portable-specific options */
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	{ "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#else
+	{ "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#endif
+	{ "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	/* Standard Options */
+	{ "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },		/* alias */
+	{ "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "modulifile", sModuliFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "serverkeybits", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "keyregenerationinterval", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "syslogfacility", sLogFacility, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "logverbose", sLogVerbose, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "hostbasedacceptedalgorithms", sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "hostbasedacceptedkeytypes", sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* obsolete */
+	{ "hostkeyalgorithms", sHostKeyAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "rsaauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "pubkeyacceptedalgorithms", sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* obsolete */
+	{ "pubkeyauthoptions", sPubkeyAuthOptions, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
+#ifdef KRB5
+	{ "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#ifdef USE_AFS
+	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#else
+	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#endif
+#else
+	{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#endif
+	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#else
+	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#endif
+	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
+	{ "skeyauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
+	{ "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "printmotd", sPrintMotd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#ifdef DISABLE_LASTLOG
+	{ "printlastlog", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#else
+	{ "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+#endif
+	{ "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "uselogin", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "rekeylimit", sRekeyLimit, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },	/* obsolete alias */
+	{ "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "allowagentforwarding", sAllowAgentForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "allowusers", sAllowUsers, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "denyusers", sDenyUsers, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "allowgroups", sAllowGroups, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "denygroups", sDenyGroups, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "ciphers", sCiphers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "macs", sMacs, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "protocol", sIgnore, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "subsystem", sSubsystem, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "persourcemaxstartups", sPerSourceMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "persourcenetblocksize", sPerSourceNetBlockSize, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "authorizedkeysfile2", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "useprivilegeseparation", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
+	{ "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "setenv", sSetEnv, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "permittty", sPermitTTY, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "permituserrc", sPermitUserRC, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "permitlisten", sPermitListen, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "exposeauthinfo", sExposeAuthInfo, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
+};
+
+static struct {
+	int val;
+	char *text;
+} tunmode_desc[] = {
+	{ SSH_TUNMODE_NO, "no" },
+	{ SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT, "point-to-point" },
+	{ SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET, "ethernet" },
+	{ SSH_TUNMODE_YES, "yes" },
+	{ -1, NULL }
+};
+
+/* Returns an opcode name from its number */
+
+static const char *
+lookup_opcode_name(ServerOpCodes code)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++)
+		if (keywords[i].opcode == code)
+			return(keywords[i].name);
+	return "UNKNOWN";
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or sBadOption.
+ */
+
+static ServerOpCodes
+parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename,
+	    int linenum, u_int *flags)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
+		if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) {
+			*flags = keywords[i].flags;
+			return keywords[i].opcode;
+		}
+
+	error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
+	    filename, linenum, cp);
+	return sBadOption;
+}
+
+char *
+derelativise_path(const char *path)
+{
+	char *expanded, *ret, cwd[PATH_MAX];
+
+	if (strcasecmp(path, "none") == 0)
+		return xstrdup("none");
+	expanded = tilde_expand_filename(path, getuid());
+	if (path_absolute(expanded))
+		return expanded;
+	if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("getcwd: %s", strerror(errno));
+	xasprintf(&ret, "%s/%s", cwd, expanded);
+	free(expanded);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr,
+    const char *rdomain, int port)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (port > 0)
+		add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, rdomain, port);
+	else {
+		for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++) {
+			add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, rdomain,
+			    options->ports[i]);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr,
+    const char *rdomain, int port)
+{
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	int gaierr;
+	u_int i;
+
+	/* Find listen_addrs entry for this rdomain */
+	for (i = 0; i < options->num_listen_addrs; i++) {
+		if (rdomain == NULL && options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain == NULL)
+			break;
+		if (rdomain == NULL || options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain == NULL)
+			continue;
+		if (strcmp(rdomain, options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain) == 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	if (i >= options->num_listen_addrs) {
+		/* No entry for this rdomain; allocate one */
+		if (i >= INT_MAX)
+			fatal_f("too many listen addresses");
+		options->listen_addrs = xrecallocarray(options->listen_addrs,
+		    options->num_listen_addrs, options->num_listen_addrs + 1,
+		    sizeof(*options->listen_addrs));
+		i = options->num_listen_addrs++;
+		if (rdomain != NULL)
+			options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain = xstrdup(rdomain);
+	}
+	/* options->listen_addrs[i] points to the addresses for this rdomain */
+
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = options->address_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
+		fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)",
+		    addr ? addr : "<NULL>",
+		    ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+	for (ai = aitop; ai->ai_next; ai = ai->ai_next)
+		;
+	ai->ai_next = options->listen_addrs[i].addrs;
+	options->listen_addrs[i].addrs = aitop;
+}
+
+/* Returns nonzero if the routing domain name is valid */
+static int
+valid_rdomain(const char *name)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_VALID_RDOMAIN)
+	return sys_valid_rdomain(name);
+#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
+	const char *errstr;
+	long long num;
+	struct rt_tableinfo info;
+	int mib[6];
+	size_t miblen = sizeof(mib);
+
+	if (name == NULL)
+		return 1;
+
+	num = strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr);
+	if (errstr != NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Check whether the table actually exists */
+	memset(mib, 0, sizeof(mib));
+	mib[0] = CTL_NET;
+	mib[1] = PF_ROUTE;
+	mib[4] = NET_RT_TABLE;
+	mib[5] = (int)num;
+	if (sysctl(mib, 6, &info, &miblen, NULL, 0) == -1)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
+	error("Routing domains are not supported on this platform");
+	return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Queue a ListenAddress to be processed once we have all of the Ports
+ * and AddressFamily options.
+ */
+static void
+queue_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr,
+    const char *rdomain, int port)
+{
+	struct queued_listenaddr *qla;
+
+	options->queued_listen_addrs = xrecallocarray(
+	    options->queued_listen_addrs,
+	    options->num_queued_listens, options->num_queued_listens + 1,
+	    sizeof(*options->queued_listen_addrs));
+	qla = &options->queued_listen_addrs[options->num_queued_listens++];
+	qla->addr = xstrdup(addr);
+	qla->port = port;
+	qla->rdomain = rdomain == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(rdomain);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Process queued (text) ListenAddress entries.
+ */
+static void
+process_queued_listen_addrs(ServerOptions *options)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	struct queued_listenaddr *qla;
+
+	if (options->num_ports == 0)
+		options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+	if (options->address_family == -1)
+		options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options->num_queued_listens; i++) {
+		qla = &options->queued_listen_addrs[i];
+		add_listen_addr(options, qla->addr, qla->rdomain, qla->port);
+		free(qla->addr);
+		free(qla->rdomain);
+	}
+	free(options->queued_listen_addrs);
+	options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL;
+	options->num_queued_listens = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Inform channels layer of permitopen options for a single forwarding
+ * direction (local/remote).
+ */
+static void
+process_permitopen_list(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOpCodes opcode,
+    char **opens, u_int num_opens)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	int port;
+	char *host, *arg, *oarg;
+	int where = opcode == sPermitOpen ? FORWARD_LOCAL : FORWARD_REMOTE;
+	const char *what = lookup_opcode_name(opcode);
+
+	channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where);
+	if (num_opens == 0)
+		return; /* permit any */
+
+	/* handle keywords: "any" / "none" */
+	if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "any") == 0)
+		return;
+	if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "none") == 0) {
+		channel_disable_admin(ssh, where);
+		return;
+	}
+	/* Otherwise treat it as a list of permitted host:port */
+	for (i = 0; i < num_opens; i++) {
+		oarg = arg = xstrdup(opens[i]);
+		host = hpdelim(&arg);
+		if (host == NULL)
+			fatal_f("missing host in %s", what);
+		host = cleanhostname(host);
+		if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0))
+			fatal_f("bad port number in %s", what);
+		/* Send it to channels layer */
+		channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM,
+		    where, host, port);
+		free(oarg);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Inform channels layer of permitopen options from configuration.
+ */
+void
+process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options)
+{
+	process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitOpen,
+	    options->permitted_opens, options->num_permitted_opens);
+	process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitListen,
+	    options->permitted_listens,
+	    options->num_permitted_listens);
+}
+
+/* Parse a ChannelTimeout clause "pattern=interval" */
+static int
+parse_timeout(const char *s, char **typep, u_int *secsp)
+{
+	char *cp, *sdup;
+	int secs;
+
+	if (typep != NULL)
+		*typep = NULL;
+	if (secsp != NULL)
+		*secsp = 0;
+	if (s == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	sdup = xstrdup(s);
+
+	if ((cp = strchr(sdup, '=')) == NULL || cp == sdup) {
+		free(sdup);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	*cp++ = '\0';
+	if ((secs = convtime(cp)) < 0) {
+		free(sdup);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	if (typep != NULL)
+		*typep = xstrdup(sdup);
+	if (secsp != NULL)
+		*secsp = (u_int)secs;
+	free(sdup);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+process_channel_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options)
+{
+	u_int i, secs;
+	char *type;
+
+	debug3_f("setting %u timeouts", options->num_channel_timeouts);
+	channel_clear_timeouts(ssh);
+	for (i = 0; i < options->num_channel_timeouts; i++) {
+		if (parse_timeout(options->channel_timeouts[i],
+		    &type, &secs) != 0) {
+			fatal_f("internal error: bad timeout %s",
+			    options->channel_timeouts[i]);
+		}
+		channel_add_timeout(ssh, type, secs);
+		free(type);
+	}
+}
+
+struct connection_info *
+get_connection_info(struct ssh *ssh, int populate, int use_dns)
+{
+	static struct connection_info ci;
+
+	if (ssh == NULL || !populate)
+		return &ci;
+	ci.host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns);
+	ci.address = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+	ci.laddress = ssh_local_ipaddr(ssh);
+	ci.lport = ssh_local_port(ssh);
+	ci.rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh);
+	return &ci;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The strategy for the Match blocks is that the config file is parsed twice.
+ *
+ * The first time is at startup.  activep is initialized to 1 and the
+ * directives in the global context are processed and acted on.  Hitting a
+ * Match directive unsets activep and the directives inside the block are
+ * checked for syntax only.
+ *
+ * The second time is after a connection has been established but before
+ * authentication.  activep is initialized to 2 and global config directives
+ * are ignored since they have already been processed.  If the criteria in a
+ * Match block is met, activep is set and the subsequent directives
+ * processed and actioned until EOF or another Match block unsets it.  Any
+ * options set are copied into the main server config.
+ *
+ * Potential additions/improvements:
+ *  - Add Match support for pre-kex directives, eg. Ciphers.
+ *
+ *  - Add a Tag directive (idea from David Leonard) ala pf, eg:
+ *	Match Address 192.168.0.*
+ *		Tag trusted
+ *	Match Group wheel
+ *		Tag trusted
+ *	Match Tag trusted
+ *		AllowTcpForwarding yes
+ *		GatewayPorts clientspecified
+ *		[...]
+ *
+ *  - Add a PermittedChannelRequests directive
+ *	Match Group shell
+ *		PermittedChannelRequests session,forwarded-tcpip
+ */
+
+static int
+match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, int line, const char *user)
+{
+	int result = 0;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+
+	if (user == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
+		debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does "
+		    "not exist", line, user);
+	} else if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
+		debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group "
+		    "at line %d", user, line);
+	} else if (ga_match_pattern_list(grps) != 1) {
+		debug("user %.100s does not match group list %.100s at line %d",
+		    user, grps, line);
+	} else {
+		debug("user %.100s matched group list %.100s at line %d", user,
+		    grps, line);
+		result = 1;
+	}
+out:
+	ga_free();
+	return result;
+}
+
+static void
+match_test_missing_fatal(const char *criteria, const char *attrib)
+{
+	fatal("'Match %s' in configuration but '%s' not in connection "
+	    "test specification.", criteria, attrib);
+}
+
+/*
+ * All of the attributes on a single Match line are ANDed together, so we need
+ * to check every attribute and set the result to zero if any attribute does
+ * not match.
+ */
+static int
+match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
+{
+	int result = 1, attributes = 0, port;
+	char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition;
+
+	if (ci == NULL)
+		debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp);
+	else
+		debug3("checking match for '%s' user %s host %s addr %s "
+		    "laddr %s lport %d", cp, ci->user ? ci->user : "(null)",
+		    ci->host ? ci->host : "(null)",
+		    ci->address ? ci->address : "(null)",
+		    ci->laddress ? ci->laddress : "(null)", ci->lport);
+
+	while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
+		/* Terminate on comment */
+		if (*attrib == '#') {
+			cp = NULL; /* mark all arguments consumed */
+			break;
+		}
+		arg = NULL;
+		attributes++;
+		/* Criterion "all" has no argument and must appear alone */
+		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) {
+			if (attributes > 1 || ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL &&
+			    *arg != '\0' && *arg != '#')) {
+				error("'all' cannot be combined with other "
+				    "Match attributes");
+				return -1;
+			}
+			if (arg != NULL && *arg == '#')
+				cp = NULL; /* mark all arguments consumed */
+			*condition = cp;
+			return 1;
+		}
+		/* All other criteria require an argument */
+		if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL ||
+		    *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') {
+			error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
+				result = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (ci->user == NULL)
+				match_test_missing_fatal("User", "user");
+			if (match_usergroup_pattern_list(ci->user, arg) != 1)
+				result = 0;
+			else
+				debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at "
+				    "line %d", ci->user, arg, line);
+		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) {
+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
+				result = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (ci->user == NULL)
+				match_test_missing_fatal("Group", "user");
+			switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, ci->user)) {
+			case -1:
+				return -1;
+			case 0:
+				result = 0;
+			}
+		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->host == NULL)) {
+				result = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (ci->host == NULL)
+				match_test_missing_fatal("Host", "host");
+			if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg) != 1)
+				result = 0;
+			else
+				debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host "
+				    "%.100s' at line %d", ci->host, arg, line);
+		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) {
+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->address == NULL)) {
+				if (addr_match_list(NULL, arg) != 0)
+					fatal("Invalid Match address argument "
+					    "'%s' at line %d", arg, line);
+				result = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (ci->address == NULL)
+				match_test_missing_fatal("Address", "addr");
+			switch (addr_match_list(ci->address, arg)) {
+			case 1:
+				debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Address "
+				    "%.100s' at line %d", ci->address, arg, line);
+				break;
+			case 0:
+			case -1:
+				result = 0;
+				break;
+			case -2:
+				return -1;
+			}
+		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){
+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->laddress == NULL)) {
+				if (addr_match_list(NULL, arg) != 0)
+					fatal("Invalid Match localaddress "
+					    "argument '%s' at line %d", arg,
+					    line);
+				result = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (ci->laddress == NULL)
+				match_test_missing_fatal("LocalAddress",
+				    "laddr");
+			switch (addr_match_list(ci->laddress, arg)) {
+			case 1:
+				debug("connection from %.100s matched "
+				    "'LocalAddress %.100s' at line %d",
+				    ci->laddress, arg, line);
+				break;
+			case 0:
+			case -1:
+				result = 0;
+				break;
+			case -2:
+				return -1;
+			}
+		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localport") == 0) {
+			if ((port = a2port(arg)) == -1) {
+				error("Invalid LocalPort '%s' on Match line",
+				    arg);
+				return -1;
+			}
+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->lport == -1)) {
+				result = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (ci->lport == 0)
+				match_test_missing_fatal("LocalPort", "lport");
+			/* TODO support port lists */
+			if (port == ci->lport)
+				debug("connection from %.100s matched "
+				    "'LocalPort %d' at line %d",
+				    ci->laddress, port, line);
+			else
+				result = 0;
+		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "rdomain") == 0) {
+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->rdomain == NULL)) {
+				result = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (ci->rdomain == NULL)
+				match_test_missing_fatal("RDomain", "rdomain");
+			if (match_pattern_list(ci->rdomain, arg, 0) != 1)
+				result = 0;
+			else
+				debug("user %.100s matched 'RDomain %.100s' at "
+				    "line %d", ci->rdomain, arg, line);
+		} else {
+			error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	if (attributes == 0) {
+		error("One or more attributes required for Match");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (ci != NULL)
+		debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
+	*condition = cp;
+	return result;
+}
+
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+
+/* Multistate option parsing */
+struct multistate {
+	char *key;
+	int value;
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = {
+	{ "yes",			1 },
+	{ "no",				0 },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_ignore_rhosts[] = {
+	{ "yes",			IGNORE_RHOSTS_YES },
+	{ "no",				IGNORE_RHOSTS_NO },
+	{ "shosts-only",		IGNORE_RHOSTS_SHOSTS },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = {
+	{ "inet",			AF_INET },
+	{ "inet6",			AF_INET6 },
+	{ "any",			AF_UNSPEC },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_permitrootlogin[] = {
+	{ "without-password",		PERMIT_NO_PASSWD },
+	{ "prohibit-password",		PERMIT_NO_PASSWD },
+	{ "forced-commands-only",	PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY },
+	{ "yes",			PERMIT_YES },
+	{ "no",				PERMIT_NO },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+	{ "yes",			COMP_DELAYED },
+	{ "delayed",			COMP_DELAYED },
+#endif
+	{ "no",				COMP_NONE },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_gatewayports[] = {
+	{ "clientspecified",		2 },
+	{ "yes",			1 },
+	{ "no",				0 },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+static const struct multistate multistate_tcpfwd[] = {
+	{ "yes",			FORWARD_ALLOW },
+	{ "all",			FORWARD_ALLOW },
+	{ "no",				FORWARD_DENY },
+	{ "remote",			FORWARD_REMOTE },
+	{ "local",			FORWARD_LOCAL },
+	{ NULL, -1 }
+};
+
+static int
+process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+    const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
+    struct connection_info *connectinfo, int *inc_flags, int depth,
+    struct include_list *includes)
+{
+	char *str, ***chararrayptr, **charptr, *arg, *arg2, *p, *keyword;
+	int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port, oactive, r, found;
+	SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
+	LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
+	ServerOpCodes opcode;
+	u_int i, *uintptr, uvalue, flags = 0;
+	size_t len;
+	long long val64;
+	const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
+	const char *errstr;
+	struct include_item *item;
+	glob_t gbuf;
+	char **oav = NULL, **av;
+	int oac = 0, ac;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
+	if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	for (len--; len > 0; len--) {
+		if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL)
+			break;
+		line[len] = '\0';
+	}
+
+	str = line;
+	if ((keyword = strdelim(&str)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	/* Ignore leading whitespace */
+	if (*keyword == '\0')
+		keyword = strdelim(&str);
+	if (!keyword || !*keyword || *keyword == '#')
+		return 0;
+	if (str == NULL || *str == '\0') {
+		error("%s line %d: no argument after keyword \"%s\"",
+		    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	intptr = NULL;
+	charptr = NULL;
+	opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum, &flags);
+
+	if (argv_split(str, &oac, &oav, 1) != 0) {
+		error("%s line %d: invalid quotes", filename, linenum);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	ac = oac;
+	av = oav;
+
+	if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */
+		cmdline = 1;
+		activep = &cmdline;
+	}
+	if (*activep && opcode != sMatch && opcode != sInclude)
+		debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, keyword, str);
+	if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) {
+		if (connectinfo == NULL) {
+			fatal("%s line %d: Directive '%s' is not allowed "
+			    "within a Match block", filename, linenum, keyword);
+		} else { /* this is a directive we have already processed */
+			ret = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	switch (opcode) {
+	/* Portable-specific options */
+	case sUsePAM:
+		intptr = &options->use_pam;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	/* Standard Options */
+	case sBadOption:
+		goto out;
+	case sPort:
+		/* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
+		if (options->ports_from_cmdline) {
+			argv_consume(&ac);
+			break;
+		}
+		if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS)
+			fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg);
+		if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] <= 0)
+			fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		break;
+
+	case sLoginGraceTime:
+		intptr = &options->login_grace_time;
+ parse_time:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1)
+			fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sListenAddress:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing address",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		/* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */
+		if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL
+		    && strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) {
+			port = 0;
+			p = arg;
+		} else {
+			arg2 = NULL;
+			p = hpdelim(&arg);
+			if (p == NULL)
+				fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage",
+				    filename, linenum);
+			p = cleanhostname(p);
+			if (arg == NULL)
+				port = 0;
+			else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0)
+				fatal("%s line %d: bad port number",
+				    filename, linenum);
+		}
+		/* Optional routing table */
+		arg2 = NULL;
+		if ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			if (strcmp(arg, "rdomain") != 0 ||
+			    (arg2 = argv_next(&ac, &av)) == NULL)
+				fatal("%s line %d: bad ListenAddress syntax",
+				    filename, linenum);
+			if (!valid_rdomain(arg2))
+				fatal("%s line %d: bad routing domain",
+				    filename, linenum);
+		}
+		queue_listen_addr(options, p, arg2, port);
+
+		break;
+
+	case sAddressFamily:
+		intptr = &options->address_family;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily;
+ parse_multistate:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		value = -1;
+		for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
+			if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) {
+				value = multistate_ptr[i].value;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (value == -1)
+			fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".",
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sHostKeyFile:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep) {
+			servconf_add_hostkey(filename, linenum,
+			    options, arg, 1);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sHostKeyAgent:
+		charptr = &options->host_key_agent;
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing socket name.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+			*charptr = !strcmp(arg, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) ?
+			    xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case sHostCertificate:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep)
+			servconf_add_hostcert(filename, linenum, options, arg);
+		break;
+
+	case sPidFile:
+		charptr = &options->pid_file;
+ parse_filename:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+			*charptr = derelativise_path(arg);
+			/* increase optional counter */
+			if (intptr != NULL)
+				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sModuliFile:
+		charptr = &options->moduli_file;
+		goto parse_filename;
+
+	case sPermitRootLogin:
+		intptr = &options->permit_root_login;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_permitrootlogin;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case sIgnoreRhosts:
+		intptr = &options->ignore_rhosts;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_ignore_rhosts;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts:
+		intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
+ parse_flag:
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case sHostbasedAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly:
+		intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms:
+		charptr = &options->hostbased_accepted_algos;
+ parse_pubkey_algos:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (*arg != '-' &&
+		    !sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ?
+		    arg + 1 : arg, 1))
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case sHostKeyAlgorithms:
+		charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms;
+		goto parse_pubkey_algos;
+
+	case sCASignatureAlgorithms:
+		charptr = &options->ca_sign_algorithms;
+		goto parse_pubkey_algos;
+
+	case sPubkeyAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms:
+		charptr = &options->pubkey_accepted_algos;
+		goto parse_pubkey_algos;
+
+	case sPubkeyAuthOptions:
+		intptr = &options->pubkey_auth_options;
+		value = 0;
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0)
+				continue;
+			if (strcasecmp(arg, "touch-required") == 0)
+				value |= PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED;
+			else if (strcasecmp(arg, "verify-required") == 0)
+				value |= PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED;
+			else {
+				error("%s line %d: unsupported %s option %s",
+				    filename, linenum, keyword, arg);
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sKerberosAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sKerberosOrLocalPasswd:
+		intptr = &options->kerberos_or_local_passwd;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sKerberosTicketCleanup:
+		intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sKerberosGetAFSToken:
+		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sGssAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sGssCleanupCreds:
+		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sGssStrictAcceptor:
+		intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sPasswordAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
+		intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sPrintMotd:
+		intptr = &options->print_motd;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sPrintLastLog:
+		intptr = &options->print_lastlog;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sX11Forwarding:
+		intptr = &options->x11_forwarding;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sX11DisplayOffset:
+		intptr = &options->x11_display_offset;
+ parse_int:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL)
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s integer value %s.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword, errstr);
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sX11UseLocalhost:
+		intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sXAuthLocation:
+		charptr = &options->xauth_location;
+		goto parse_filename;
+
+	case sPermitTTY:
+		intptr = &options->permit_tty;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sPermitUserRC:
+		intptr = &options->permit_user_rc;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sStrictModes:
+		intptr = &options->strict_modes;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sTCPKeepAlive:
+		intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sEmptyPasswd:
+		intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sPermitUserEnvironment:
+		intptr = &options->permit_user_env;
+		charptr = &options->permit_user_env_allowlist;
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		value = 0;
+		p = NULL;
+		if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0)
+			value = 1;
+		else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0)
+			value = 0;
+		else {
+			/* Pattern-list specified */
+			value = 1;
+			p = xstrdup(arg);
+		}
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1) {
+			*intptr = value;
+			*charptr = p;
+			p = NULL;
+		}
+		free(p);
+		break;
+
+	case sCompression:
+		intptr = &options->compression;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_compression;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case sRekeyLimit:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) {
+			val64 = 0;
+		} else {
+			if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1)
+				fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad %s number '%s': %s",
+				    filename, linenum, keyword,
+				    arg, strerror(errno));
+			if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16)
+				fatal("%.200s line %d: %s too small",
+				    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		}
+		if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1)
+			options->rekey_limit = val64;
+		if (ac != 0) { /* optional rekey interval present */
+			if (strcmp(av[0], "none") == 0) {
+				(void)argv_next(&ac, &av);	/* discard */
+				break;
+			}
+			intptr = &options->rekey_interval;
+			goto parse_time;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sGatewayPorts:
+		intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_gatewayports;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case sUseDNS:
+		intptr = &options->use_dns;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sLogFacility:
+		log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility;
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		value = log_facility_number(arg);
+		if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (*log_facility_ptr == -1)
+			*log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value;
+		break;
+
+	case sLogLevel:
+		log_level_ptr = &options->log_level;
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		value = log_level_number(arg);
+		if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == -1)
+			*log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value;
+		break;
+
+	case sLogVerbose:
+		found = options->num_log_verbose == 0;
+		i = 0;
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			if (*arg == '\0') {
+				error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument",
+				    filename, linenum, keyword);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			/* Allow "none" only in first position */
+			if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
+				if (i > 0 || ac > 0) {
+					error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" "
+					    "argument must appear alone.",
+					    filename, linenum, keyword);
+					goto out;
+				}
+			}
+			i++;
+			if (!found || !*activep)
+				continue;
+			opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword,
+			    &options->log_verbose, &options->num_log_verbose,
+			    arg);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sAllowTcpForwarding:
+		intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding:
+		intptr = &options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding;
+		multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd;
+		goto parse_multistate;
+
+	case sAllowAgentForwarding:
+		intptr = &options->allow_agent_forwarding;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sDisableForwarding:
+		intptr = &options->disable_forwarding;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sAllowUsers:
+		chararrayptr = &options->allow_users;
+		uintptr = &options->num_allow_users;
+ parse_allowdenyusers:
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			if (*arg == '\0' ||
+			    match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1)
+				fatal("%s line %d: invalid %s pattern: \"%s\"",
+				    filename, linenum, keyword, arg);
+			if (!*activep)
+				continue;
+			opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword,
+			    chararrayptr, uintptr, arg);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sDenyUsers:
+		chararrayptr = &options->deny_users;
+		uintptr = &options->num_deny_users;
+		goto parse_allowdenyusers;
+
+	case sAllowGroups:
+		chararrayptr = &options->allow_groups;
+		uintptr = &options->num_allow_groups;
+ parse_allowdenygroups:
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			if (*arg == '\0')
+				fatal("%s line %d: empty %s pattern",
+				    filename, linenum, keyword);
+			if (!*activep)
+				continue;
+			opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword,
+			    chararrayptr, uintptr, arg);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sDenyGroups:
+		chararrayptr = &options->deny_groups;
+		uintptr = &options->num_deny_groups;
+		goto parse_allowdenygroups;
+
+	case sCiphers:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		if (*arg != '-' &&
+		    !ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (options->ciphers == NULL)
+			options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case sMacs:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		if (*arg != '-' &&
+		    !mac_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg))
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (options->macs == NULL)
+			options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case sKexAlgorithms:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		if (*arg != '-' &&
+		    !kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ?
+		    arg + 1 : arg))
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
+			    filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
+		if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
+			options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case sSubsystem:
+		if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) {
+			fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		}
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		if (!*activep) {
+			arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+			break;
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
+			if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0)
+				fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' "
+				    "already defined.", filename, linenum, arg);
+		options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
+
+		/* Collect arguments (separate to executable) */
+		p = xstrdup(arg);
+		len = strlen(p) + 1;
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			len += 1 + strlen(arg);
+			p = xreallocarray(p, 1, len);
+			strlcat(p, " ", len);
+			strlcat(p, arg, len);
+		}
+		options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems] = p;
+		options->num_subsystems++;
+		break;
+
+	case sMaxStartups:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d",
+		    &options->max_startups_begin,
+		    &options->max_startups_rate,
+		    &options->max_startups)) == 3) {
+			if (options->max_startups_begin >
+			    options->max_startups ||
+			    options->max_startups_rate > 100 ||
+			    options->max_startups_rate < 1)
+				fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.",
+				    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		} else if (n != 1)
+			fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		else
+			options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin;
+		if (options->max_startups <= 0 ||
+		    options->max_startups_begin <= 0)
+			fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		break;
+
+	case sPerSourceNetBlockSize:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		switch (n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d", &value, &value2)) {
+		case 2:
+			if (value2 < 0 || value2 > 128)
+				n = -1;
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case 1:
+			if (value < 0 || value > 32)
+				n = -1;
+		}
+		if (n != 1 && n != 2)
+			fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s spec.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		if (*activep) {
+			options->per_source_masklen_ipv4 = value;
+			options->per_source_masklen_ipv6 = value2;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sPerSourceMaxStartups:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) { /* no limit */
+			value = INT_MAX;
+		} else {
+			if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL)
+				fatal("%s line %d: %s integer value %s.",
+				    filename, linenum, keyword, errstr);
+		}
+		if (*activep)
+			options->per_source_max_startups = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sMaxAuthTries:
+		intptr = &options->max_authtries;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+	case sMaxSessions:
+		intptr = &options->max_sessions;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+	case sBanner:
+		charptr = &options->banner;
+		goto parse_filename;
+
+	/*
+	 * These options can contain %X options expanded at
+	 * connect time, so that you can specify paths like:
+	 *
+	 * AuthorizedKeysFile	/etc/ssh_keys/%u
+	 */
+	case sAuthorizedKeysFile:
+		uvalue = options->num_authkeys_files;
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			if (*arg == '\0') {
+				error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument",
+				    filename, linenum, keyword);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			arg2 = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+			if (*activep && uvalue == 0) {
+				opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword,
+				    &options->authorized_keys_files,
+				    &options->num_authkeys_files, arg2);
+			}
+			free(arg2);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile:
+		charptr = &options->authorized_principals_file;
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+			/* increase optional counter */
+			if (intptr != NULL)
+				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sClientAliveInterval:
+		intptr = &options->client_alive_interval;
+		goto parse_time;
+
+	case sClientAliveCountMax:
+		intptr = &options->client_alive_count_max;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+	case sAcceptEnv:
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			if (*arg == '\0' || strchr(arg, '=') != NULL)
+				fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+			if (!*activep)
+				continue;
+			opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword,
+			    &options->accept_env, &options->num_accept_env,
+			    arg);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sSetEnv:
+		uvalue = options->num_setenv;
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			if (*arg == '\0' || strchr(arg, '=') == NULL)
+				fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment.",
+				    filename, linenum);
+			if (!*activep || uvalue != 0)
+				continue;
+			if (lookup_setenv_in_list(arg, options->setenv,
+			    options->num_setenv) != NULL) {
+				debug2("%s line %d: ignoring duplicate env "
+				    "name \"%.64s\"", filename, linenum, arg);
+				continue;
+			}
+			opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword,
+			    &options->setenv, &options->num_setenv, arg);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sPermitTunnel:
+		intptr = &options->permit_tun;
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		value = -1;
+		for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++)
+			if (strcmp(tunmode_desc[i].text, arg) == 0) {
+				value = tunmode_desc[i].val;
+				break;
+			}
+		if (value == -1)
+			fatal("%s line %d: bad %s argument %s",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword, arg);
+		if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+			*intptr = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sInclude:
+		if (cmdline) {
+			fatal("Include directive not supported as a "
+			    "command-line option");
+		}
+		value = 0;
+		while ((arg2 = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			if (*arg2 == '\0') {
+				error("%s line %d: keyword %s empty argument",
+				    filename, linenum, keyword);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			value++;
+			found = 0;
+			if (*arg2 != '/' && *arg2 != '~') {
+				xasprintf(&arg, "%s/%s", SSHDIR, arg2);
+			} else
+				arg = xstrdup(arg2);
+
+			/*
+			 * Don't let included files clobber the containing
+			 * file's Match state.
+			 */
+			oactive = *activep;
+
+			/* consult cache of include files */
+			TAILQ_FOREACH(item, includes, entry) {
+				if (strcmp(item->selector, arg) != 0)
+					continue;
+				if (item->filename != NULL) {
+					parse_server_config_depth(options,
+					    item->filename, item->contents,
+					    includes, connectinfo,
+					    (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY
+					        ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive
+					            ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)),
+					    activep, depth + 1);
+				}
+				found = 1;
+				*activep = oactive;
+			}
+			if (found != 0) {
+				free(arg);
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			/* requested glob was not in cache */
+			debug2("%s line %d: new include %s",
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+			if ((r = glob(arg, 0, NULL, &gbuf)) != 0) {
+				if (r != GLOB_NOMATCH) {
+					fatal("%s line %d: include \"%s\" glob "
+					    "failed", filename, linenum, arg);
+				}
+				/*
+				 * If no entry matched then record a
+				 * placeholder to skip later glob calls.
+				 */
+				debug2("%s line %d: no match for %s",
+				    filename, linenum, arg);
+				item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
+				item->selector = strdup(arg);
+				TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes,
+				    item, entry);
+			}
+			if (gbuf.gl_pathc > INT_MAX)
+				fatal_f("too many glob results");
+			for (n = 0; n < (int)gbuf.gl_pathc; n++) {
+				debug2("%s line %d: including %s",
+				    filename, linenum, gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
+				item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
+				item->selector = strdup(arg);
+				item->filename = strdup(gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
+				if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+					fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+				load_server_config(item->filename,
+				    item->contents);
+				parse_server_config_depth(options,
+				    item->filename, item->contents,
+				    includes, connectinfo,
+				    (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY
+				        ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive
+				            ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)),
+				    activep, depth + 1);
+				*activep = oactive;
+				TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes, item, entry);
+			}
+			globfree(&gbuf);
+			free(arg);
+		}
+		if (value == 0) {
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing filename argument",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sMatch:
+		if (cmdline)
+			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+			    "option");
+		value = match_cfg_line(&str, linenum,
+		    (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? NULL : connectinfo));
+		if (value < 0)
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
+			    linenum);
+		*activep = (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value;
+		/*
+		 * The MATCH_ONLY flag is applicable only until the first
+		 * match block.
+		 */
+		*inc_flags &= ~SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY;
+		/*
+		 * If match_cfg_line() didn't consume all its arguments then
+		 * arrange for the extra arguments check below to fail.
+		 */
+		if (str == NULL || *str == '\0')
+			argv_consume(&ac);
+		break;
+
+	case sPermitListen:
+	case sPermitOpen:
+		if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
+			uintptr = &options->num_permitted_listens;
+			chararrayptr = &options->permitted_listens;
+		} else {
+			uintptr = &options->num_permitted_opens;
+			chararrayptr = &options->permitted_opens;
+		}
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		uvalue = *uintptr;	/* modified later */
+		if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
+			if (*activep && uvalue == 0) {
+				*uintptr = 1;
+				*chararrayptr = xcalloc(1,
+				    sizeof(**chararrayptr));
+				(*chararrayptr)[0] = xstrdup(arg);
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+		for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) {
+			if (opcode == sPermitListen &&
+			    strchr(arg, ':') == NULL) {
+				/*
+				 * Allow bare port number for PermitListen
+				 * to indicate a wildcard listen host.
+				 */
+				xasprintf(&arg2, "*:%s", arg);
+			} else {
+				arg2 = xstrdup(arg);
+				p = hpdelim(&arg);
+				if (p == NULL) {
+					fatal("%s line %d: %s missing host",
+					    filename, linenum, keyword);
+				}
+				p = cleanhostname(p);
+			}
+			if (arg == NULL ||
+			    ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) {
+				fatal("%s line %d: %s bad port number",
+				    filename, linenum, keyword);
+			}
+			if (*activep && uvalue == 0) {
+				opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword,
+				    chararrayptr, uintptr, arg2);
+			}
+			free(arg2);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sForceCommand:
+		if (str == NULL || *str == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE);
+		if (*activep && options->adm_forced_command == NULL)
+			options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(str + len);
+		argv_consume(&ac);
+		break;
+
+	case sChrootDirectory:
+		charptr = &options->chroot_directory;
+
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case sTrustedUserCAKeys:
+		charptr = &options->trusted_user_ca_keys;
+		goto parse_filename;
+
+	case sRevokedKeys:
+		charptr = &options->revoked_keys_file;
+		goto parse_filename;
+
+	case sSecurityKeyProvider:
+		charptr = &options->sk_provider;
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+			*charptr = strcasecmp(arg, "internal") == 0 ?
+			    xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg);
+			/* increase optional counter */
+			if (intptr != NULL)
+				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sIPQoS:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad %s value: %s",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword, arg);
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (arg == NULL)
+			value2 = value;
+		else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
+			fatal("%s line %d: Bad %s value: %s",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword, arg);
+		if (*activep) {
+			options->ip_qos_interactive = value;
+			options->ip_qos_bulk = value2;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sVersionAddendum:
+		if (str == NULL || *str == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE);
+		if (strchr(str + len, '\r') != NULL) {
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid %s argument",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		}
+		if ((arg = strchr(line, '#')) != NULL) {
+			*arg = '\0';
+			rtrim(line);
+		}
+		if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) {
+			if (strcasecmp(str + len, "none") == 0)
+				options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
+			else
+				options->version_addendum = xstrdup(str + len);
+		}
+		argv_consume(&ac);
+		break;
+
+	case sAuthorizedKeysCommand:
+		charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command;
+ parse_command:
+		len = strspn(str, WHITESPACE);
+		if (str[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(str + len, "none") != 0) {
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: %s must be an absolute path",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		}
+		if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL)
+			*charptr = xstrdup(str + len);
+		argv_consume(&ac);
+		break;
+
+	case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser:
+		charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user;
+ parse_localuser:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
+			fatal("%s line %d: missing %s argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		}
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand:
+		charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command;
+		goto parse_command;
+
+	case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser:
+		charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command_user;
+		goto parse_localuser;
+
+	case sAuthenticationMethods:
+		found = options->num_auth_methods == 0;
+		value = 0; /* seen "any" pseudo-method */
+		value2 = 0; /* successfully parsed any method */
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
+				if (options->num_auth_methods > 0) {
+					fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" must "
+					    "appear alone in %s",
+					    filename, linenum, keyword);
+				}
+				value = 1;
+			} else if (value) {
+				fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" must appear "
+				    "alone in %s", filename, linenum, keyword);
+			} else if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0) {
+				fatal("%s line %d: invalid %s method list.",
+				    filename, linenum, keyword);
+			}
+			value2 = 1;
+			if (!found || !*activep)
+				continue;
+			opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword,
+			    &options->auth_methods,
+			    &options->num_auth_methods, arg);
+		}
+		if (value2 == 0) {
+			fatal("%s line %d: no %s specified",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sStreamLocalBindMask:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		/* Parse mode in octal format */
+		value = strtol(arg, &p, 8);
+		if (arg == p || value < 0 || value > 0777)
+			fatal("%s line %d: Invalid %s.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		if (*activep)
+			options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value;
+		break;
+
+	case sStreamLocalBindUnlink:
+		intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sFingerprintHash:
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1)
+			fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid %s algorithm \"%s\".",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword, arg);
+		if (*activep)
+			options->fingerprint_hash = value;
+		break;
+
+	case sExposeAuthInfo:
+		intptr = &options->expose_userauth_info;
+		goto parse_flag;
+
+	case sRDomain:
+#if !defined(__OpenBSD__) && !defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN)
+		fatal("%s line %d: setting RDomain not supported on this "
+		    "platform.", filename, linenum);
+#endif
+		charptr = &options->routing_domain;
+		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+			    filename, linenum, keyword);
+		if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") != 0 && strcmp(arg, "%D") != 0 &&
+		    !valid_rdomain(arg))
+			fatal("%s line %d: invalid routing domain",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
+			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+		break;
+
+	case sRequiredRSASize:
+		intptr = &options->required_rsa_size;
+		goto parse_int;
+
+	case sChannelTimeout:
+		uvalue = options->num_channel_timeouts;
+		i = 0;
+		while ((arg = argv_next(&ac, &av)) != NULL) {
+			/* Allow "none" only in first position */
+			if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
+				if (i > 0 || ac > 0) {
+					error("%s line %d: keyword %s \"none\" "
+					    "argument must appear alone.",
+					    filename, linenum, keyword);
+					goto out;
+				}
+			} else if (parse_timeout(arg, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+				fatal("%s line %d: invalid channel timeout %s",
+				    filename, linenum, arg);
+			}
+			if (!*activep || uvalue != 0)
+				continue;
+			opt_array_append(filename, linenum, keyword,
+			    &options->channel_timeouts,
+			    &options->num_channel_timeouts, arg);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case sUnusedConnectionTimeout:
+		intptr = &options->unused_connection_timeout;
+		/* peek at first arg for "none" so we can reuse parse_time */
+		if (av[0] != NULL && strcasecmp(av[0], "none") == 0) {
+			(void)argv_next(&ac, &av); /* consume arg */
+			if (*activep)
+				*intptr = 0;
+			break;
+		}
+		goto parse_time;
+
+	case sDeprecated:
+	case sIgnore:
+	case sUnsupported:
+		do_log2(opcode == sIgnore ?
+		    SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
+		    "%s line %d: %s option %s", filename, linenum,
+		    opcode == sUnsupported ? "Unsupported" : "Deprecated",
+		    keyword);
+		argv_consume(&ac);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		fatal("%s line %d: Missing handler for opcode %s (%d)",
+		    filename, linenum, keyword, opcode);
+	}
+	/* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */
+	if (ac > 0) {
+		error("%.200s line %d: keyword %s extra arguments "
+		    "at end of line", filename, linenum, keyword);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* success */
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	argv_free(oav, oac);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+    const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
+    struct connection_info *connectinfo, struct include_list *includes)
+{
+	int inc_flags = 0;
+
+	return process_server_config_line_depth(options, line, filename,
+	    linenum, activep, connectinfo, &inc_flags, 0, includes);
+}
+
+
+/* Reads the server configuration file. */
+
+void
+load_server_config(const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	char *line = NULL, *cp;
+	size_t linesize = 0;
+	FILE *f;
+	int r;
+
+	debug2_f("filename %s", filename);
+	if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) {
+		perror(filename);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	sshbuf_reset(conf);
+	/* grow buffer, so realloc is avoided for large config files */
+	if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) == 0 && st.st_size > 0 &&
+	    (r = sshbuf_allocate(conf, st.st_size)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "allocate");
+	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+		/*
+		 * Strip whitespace
+		 * NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce
+		 * line numbers later for error messages
+		 */
+		cp = line + strspn(line, " \t\r");
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, strlen(cp))) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+	}
+	free(line);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(conf, 0)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8");
+	fclose(f);
+	debug2_f("done config len = %zu", sshbuf_len(conf));
+}
+
+void
+parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options,
+   struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+{
+	ServerOptions mo;
+
+	initialize_server_options(&mo);
+	parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, includes,
+	    connectinfo, 0);
+	copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0);
+}
+
+int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *ci, char *spec)
+{
+	char *p;
+
+	while ((p = strsep(&spec, ",")) && *p != '\0') {
+		if (strncmp(p, "addr=", 5) == 0) {
+			ci->address = xstrdup(p + 5);
+		} else if (strncmp(p, "host=", 5) == 0) {
+			ci->host = xstrdup(p + 5);
+		} else if (strncmp(p, "user=", 5) == 0) {
+			ci->user = xstrdup(p + 5);
+		} else if (strncmp(p, "laddr=", 6) == 0) {
+			ci->laddress = xstrdup(p + 6);
+		} else if (strncmp(p, "rdomain=", 8) == 0) {
+			ci->rdomain = xstrdup(p + 8);
+		} else if (strncmp(p, "lport=", 6) == 0) {
+			ci->lport = a2port(p + 6);
+			if (ci->lport == -1) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid port '%s' in test mode"
+				    " specification %s\n", p+6, p);
+				return -1;
+			}
+		} else {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Invalid test mode specification %s\n",
+			    p);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copy any supported values that are set.
+ *
+ * If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or
+ * array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we
+ * do use must be explicitly sent in mm_getpwnamallow().
+ */
+void
+copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
+{
+#define M_CP_INTOPT(n) do {\
+	if (src->n != -1) \
+		dst->n = src->n; \
+} while (0)
+
+	M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_auth_options);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(ignore_rhosts);
+
+	M_CP_INTOPT(allow_tcp_forwarding);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(allow_agent_forwarding);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(disable_forwarding);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(expose_userauth_info);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tun);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(max_sessions);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_count_max);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(required_rsa_size);
+	M_CP_INTOPT(unused_connection_timeout);
+
+	/*
+	 * The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use
+	 * M_CP_INTOPT - it does a signed comparison that causes compiler
+	 * warnings.
+	 */
+	if (src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask != (mode_t)-1) {
+		dst->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask =
+		    src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask;
+	}
+
+	/* M_CP_STROPT and M_CP_STRARRAYOPT should not appear before here */
+#define M_CP_STROPT(n) do {\
+	if (src->n != NULL && dst->n != src->n) { \
+		free(dst->n); \
+		dst->n = src->n; \
+	} \
+} while(0)
+#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(s, num_s) do {\
+	u_int i; \
+	if (src->num_s != 0) { \
+		for (i = 0; i < dst->num_s; i++) \
+			free(dst->s[i]); \
+		free(dst->s); \
+		dst->s = xcalloc(src->num_s, sizeof(*dst->s)); \
+		for (i = 0; i < src->num_s; i++) \
+			dst->s[i] = xstrdup(src->s[i]); \
+		dst->num_s = src->num_s; \
+	} \
+} while(0)
+
+	/* See comment in servconf.h */
+	COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
+
+	/* Arguments that accept '+...' need to be expanded */
+	assemble_algorithms(dst);
+
+	/*
+	 * The only things that should be below this point are string options
+	 * which are only used after authentication.
+	 */
+	if (preauth)
+		return;
+
+	/* These options may be "none" to clear a global setting */
+	M_CP_STROPT(adm_forced_command);
+	if (option_clear_or_none(dst->adm_forced_command)) {
+		free(dst->adm_forced_command);
+		dst->adm_forced_command = NULL;
+	}
+	M_CP_STROPT(chroot_directory);
+	if (option_clear_or_none(dst->chroot_directory)) {
+		free(dst->chroot_directory);
+		dst->chroot_directory = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+#undef M_CP_INTOPT
+#undef M_CP_STROPT
+#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
+
+#define SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH	16
+static void
+parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
+    struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
+    struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth)
+{
+	int linenum, bad_options = 0;
+	char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf;
+
+	if (depth < 0 || depth > SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH)
+		fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes");
+
+	debug2_f("config %s len %zu%s", filename, sshbuf_len(conf),
+	    (flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? " [checking syntax only]" : ""));
+
+	if ((obuf = cbuf = sshbuf_dup_string(conf)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+	linenum = 1;
+	while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) {
+		if (process_server_config_line_depth(options, cp,
+		    filename, linenum++, activep, connectinfo, &flags,
+		    depth, includes) != 0)
+			bad_options++;
+	}
+	free(obuf);
+	if (bad_options > 0)
+		fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
+		    filename, bad_options);
+}
+
+void
+parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
+    struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
+    struct connection_info *connectinfo, int reexec)
+{
+	int active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
+	parse_server_config_depth(options, filename, conf, includes,
+	    connectinfo, (connectinfo ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : 0), &active, 0);
+	if (!reexec)
+		process_queued_listen_addrs(options);
+}
+
+static const char *
+fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) {
+		if (m[i].value == val)
+			return m[i].key;
+	}
+	return "UNKNOWN";
+}
+
+static const char *
+fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
+{
+	if (val == -1)
+		return "unset";
+	switch (code) {
+	case sAddressFamily:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily);
+	case sPermitRootLogin:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_permitrootlogin);
+	case sGatewayPorts:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports);
+	case sCompression:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression);
+	case sAllowTcpForwarding:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
+	case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
+	case sIgnoreRhosts:
+		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_ignore_rhosts);
+	case sFingerprintHash:
+		return ssh_digest_alg_name(val);
+	default:
+		switch (val) {
+		case 0:
+			return "no";
+		case 1:
+			return "yes";
+		default:
+			return "UNKNOWN";
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_int(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
+{
+	if (code == sUnusedConnectionTimeout && val == 0) {
+		printf("%s none\n", lookup_opcode_name(code));
+		return;
+	}
+	printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_oct(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
+{
+	printf("%s 0%o\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
+{
+	printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val));
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val)
+{
+	printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code),
+	    val == NULL ? "none" : val);
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_strarray(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+		printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]);
+}
+
+static void
+dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (count <= 0 && code != sAuthenticationMethods)
+		return;
+	printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+		printf(" %s",  vals[i]);
+	if (code == sAuthenticationMethods && count == 0)
+		printf(" any");
+	else if (code == sChannelTimeout && count == 0)
+		printf(" none");
+	printf("\n");
+}
+
+static char *
+format_listen_addrs(struct listenaddr *la)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct addrinfo *ai;
+	char addr[NI_MAXHOST], port[NI_MAXSERV];
+	char *laddr1 = xstrdup(""), *laddr2 = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * ListenAddress must be after Port.  add_one_listen_addr pushes
+	 * addresses onto a stack, so to maintain ordering we need to
+	 * print these in reverse order.
+	 */
+	for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		if ((r = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, addr,
+		    sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port),
+		    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
+			error("getnameinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+			continue;
+		}
+		laddr2 = laddr1;
+		if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
+			xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress [%s]:%s%s%s\n%s",
+			    addr, port,
+			    la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ",
+			    la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain,
+			    laddr2);
+		} else {
+			xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress %s:%s%s%s\n%s",
+			    addr, port,
+			    la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ",
+			    la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain,
+			    laddr2);
+		}
+		free(laddr2);
+	}
+	return laddr1;
+}
+
+void
+dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+{
+	char *s;
+	u_int i;
+
+	/* these are usually at the top of the config */
+	for (i = 0; i < o->num_ports; i++)
+		printf("port %d\n", o->ports[i]);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAddressFamily, o->address_family);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < o->num_listen_addrs; i++) {
+		s = format_listen_addrs(&o->listen_addrs[i]);
+		printf("%s", s);
+		free(s);
+	}
+
+	/* integer arguments */
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePAM, o->use_pam);
+#endif
+	dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
+	dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
+	dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
+	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
+	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
+	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max);
+	dump_cfg_int(sRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size);
+	dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
+	dump_cfg_int(sUnusedConnectionTimeout, o->unused_connection_timeout);
+
+	/* formatted integer arguments */
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly,
+	    o->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication);
+#ifdef KRB5
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosAuthentication, o->kerberos_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, o->kerberos_or_local_passwd);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosTicketCleanup, o->kerberos_ticket_cleanup);
+# ifdef USE_AFS
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
+#endif
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+	    o->kbd_interactive_authentication);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintMotd, o->print_motd);
+#ifndef DISABLE_LASTLOG
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintLastLog, o->print_lastlog);
+#endif
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11Forwarding, o->x11_forwarding);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11UseLocalhost, o->x11_use_localhost);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitTTY, o->permit_tty);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserRC, o->permit_user_rc);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sStrictModes, o->strict_modes);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sEmptyPasswd, o->permit_empty_passwd);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sDisableForwarding, o->disable_forwarding);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+	dump_cfg_fmtint(sExposeAuthInfo, o->expose_userauth_info);
+
+	/* string arguments */
+	dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
+	dump_cfg_string(sModuliFile, o->moduli_file);
+	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
+	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
+	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
+	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
+	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
+	dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
+	dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
+	dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file);
+	dump_cfg_string(sSecurityKeyProvider, o->sk_provider);
+	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+	    o->authorized_principals_file);
+	dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, *o->version_addendum == '\0'
+	    ? "none" : o->version_addendum);
+	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command);
+	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user);
+	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, o->authorized_principals_command);
+	dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, o->authorized_principals_command_user);
+	dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent);
+	dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms);
+	dump_cfg_string(sCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms);
+	dump_cfg_string(sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms, o->hostbased_accepted_algos);
+	dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms);
+	dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, o->pubkey_accepted_algos);
+#if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN)
+	dump_cfg_string(sRDomain, o->routing_domain);
+#endif
+
+	/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
+	dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
+	dump_cfg_string(sLogFacility, log_facility_name(o->log_facility));
+
+	/* string array arguments */
+	dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthorizedKeysFile, o->num_authkeys_files,
+	    o->authorized_keys_files);
+	dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files,
+	    o->host_key_files);
+	dump_cfg_strarray(sHostCertificate, o->num_host_cert_files,
+	    o->host_cert_files);
+	dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users);
+	dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users);
+	dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups);
+	dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups);
+	dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env);
+	dump_cfg_strarray(sSetEnv, o->num_setenv, o->setenv);
+	dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods,
+	    o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods);
+	dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sLogVerbose,
+	    o->num_log_verbose, o->log_verbose);
+	dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sChannelTimeout,
+	    o->num_channel_timeouts, o->channel_timeouts);
+
+	/* other arguments */
+	for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++)
+		printf("subsystem %s %s\n", o->subsystem_name[i],
+		    o->subsystem_args[i]);
+
+	printf("maxstartups %d:%d:%d\n", o->max_startups_begin,
+	    o->max_startups_rate, o->max_startups);
+	printf("persourcemaxstartups ");
+	if (o->per_source_max_startups == INT_MAX)
+		printf("none\n");
+	else
+		printf("%d\n", o->per_source_max_startups);
+	printf("persourcenetblocksize %d:%d\n", o->per_source_masklen_ipv4,
+	    o->per_source_masklen_ipv6);
+
+	s = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) {
+		if (tunmode_desc[i].val == o->permit_tun) {
+			s = tunmode_desc[i].text;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	dump_cfg_string(sPermitTunnel, s);
+
+	printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive));
+	printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk));
+
+	printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n", (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit,
+	    o->rekey_interval);
+
+	printf("permitopen");
+	if (o->num_permitted_opens == 0)
+		printf(" any");
+	else {
+		for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_opens; i++)
+			printf(" %s", o->permitted_opens[i]);
+	}
+	printf("\n");
+	printf("permitlisten");
+	if (o->num_permitted_listens == 0)
+		printf(" any");
+	else {
+		for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_listens; i++)
+			printf(" %s", o->permitted_listens[i]);
+	}
+	printf("\n");
+
+	if (o->permit_user_env_allowlist == NULL) {
+		dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env);
+	} else {
+		printf("permituserenvironment %s\n",
+		    o->permit_user_env_allowlist);
+	}
+
+	printf("pubkeyauthoptions");
+	if (o->pubkey_auth_options == 0)
+		printf(" none");
+	if (o->pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED)
+		printf(" touch-required");
+	if (o->pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED)
+		printf(" verify-required");
+	printf("\n");
+}
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7ad43de
--- /dev/null
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,321 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.159 2023/01/17 09:44:48 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Definitions for server configuration data and for the functions reading it.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#ifndef SERVCONF_H
+#define SERVCONF_H
+
+#include <openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h>
+
+#define MAX_PORTS		256	/* Max # ports. */
+
+#define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS		256	/* Max # subsystems. */
+
+/* permit_root_login */
+#define	PERMIT_NOT_SET		-1
+#define	PERMIT_NO		0
+#define	PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY	1
+#define	PERMIT_NO_PASSWD	2
+#define	PERMIT_YES		3
+
+/* use_privsep */
+#define PRIVSEP_OFF		0
+#define PRIVSEP_ON		1
+#define PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX	2
+
+/* PermitOpen */
+#define PERMITOPEN_ANY		0
+#define PERMITOPEN_NONE		-2
+
+/* IgnoreRhosts */
+#define IGNORE_RHOSTS_NO	0
+#define IGNORE_RHOSTS_YES	1
+#define IGNORE_RHOSTS_SHOSTS	2
+
+#define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX	6	/* Default for MaxAuthTries */
+#define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX	10	/* Default for MaxSessions */
+
+/* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
+#define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME	"internal-sftp"
+
+/* PubkeyAuthOptions flags */
+#define PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED	(1)
+#define PUBKEYAUTH_VERIFY_REQUIRED	(1<<1)
+
+struct ssh;
+struct fwd_perm_list;
+
+/*
+ * Used to store addresses from ListenAddr directives. These may be
+ * incomplete, as they may specify addresses that need to be merged
+ * with any ports requested by ListenPort.
+ */
+struct queued_listenaddr {
+	char *addr;
+	int port; /* <=0 if unspecified */
+	char *rdomain;
+};
+
+/* Resolved listen addresses, grouped by optional routing domain */
+struct listenaddr {
+	char *rdomain;
+	struct addrinfo *addrs;
+};
+
+typedef struct {
+	u_int	num_ports;
+	u_int	ports_from_cmdline;
+	int	ports[MAX_PORTS];	/* Port number to listen on. */
+	struct queued_listenaddr *queued_listen_addrs;
+	u_int	num_queued_listens;
+	struct listenaddr *listen_addrs;
+	u_int	num_listen_addrs;
+	int	address_family;		/* Address family used by the server. */
+
+	char	*routing_domain;	/* Bind session to routing domain */
+
+	char   **host_key_files;	/* Files containing host keys. */
+	int	*host_key_file_userprovided; /* Key was specified by user. */
+	u_int	num_host_key_files;     /* Number of files for host keys. */
+	char   **host_cert_files;	/* Files containing host certs. */
+	u_int	num_host_cert_files;	/* Number of files for host certs. */
+
+	char   *host_key_agent;		/* ssh-agent socket for host keys. */
+	char   *pid_file;		/* Where to put our pid */
+	char   *moduli_file;		/* moduli file for DH-GEX */
+	int     login_grace_time;	/* Disconnect if no auth in this time
+					 * (sec). */
+	int     permit_root_login;	/* PERMIT_*, see above */
+	int     ignore_rhosts;	/* Ignore .rhosts and .shosts. */
+	int     ignore_user_known_hosts;	/* Ignore ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+						 * for RhostsRsaAuth */
+	int     print_motd;	/* If true, print /etc/motd. */
+	int	print_lastlog;	/* If true, print lastlog */
+	int     x11_forwarding;	/* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
+	int     x11_display_offset;	/* What DISPLAY number to start
+					 * searching at */
+	int     x11_use_localhost;	/* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
+	char   *xauth_location;	/* Location of xauth program */
+	int	permit_tty;	/* If false, deny pty allocation */
+	int	permit_user_rc;	/* If false, deny ~/.ssh/rc execution */
+	int     strict_modes;	/* If true, require string home dir modes. */
+	int     tcp_keep_alive;	/* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
+	int	ip_qos_interactive;	/* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */
+	int	ip_qos_bulk;		/* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
+	char   *ciphers;	/* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */
+	char   *macs;		/* Supported SSH2 macs. */
+	char   *kex_algorithms;	/* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
+	struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts;	/* forwarding options */
+	SyslogFacility log_facility;	/* Facility for system logging. */
+	LogLevel log_level;	/* Level for system logging. */
+	u_int	num_log_verbose;	/* Verbose log overrides */
+	char	**log_verbose;
+	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */
+	int     hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */
+	char   *hostbased_accepted_algos; /* Algos allowed for hostbased */
+	char   *hostkeyalgorithms;	/* SSH2 server key types */
+	char   *ca_sign_algorithms;	/* Allowed CA signature algorithms */
+	int     pubkey_authentication;	/* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
+	char   *pubkey_accepted_algos;	/* Signature algos allowed for pubkey */
+	int	pubkey_auth_options;	/* -1 or mask of PUBKEYAUTH_* flags */
+	int     kerberos_authentication;	/* If true, permit Kerberos
+						 * authentication. */
+	int     kerberos_or_local_passwd;	/* If true, permit kerberos
+						 * and any other password
+						 * authentication mechanism,
+						 * such as SecurID or
+						 * /etc/passwd */
+	int     kerberos_ticket_cleanup;	/* If true, destroy ticket
+						 * file on logout. */
+	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
+						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
+	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
+	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
+	int     gss_strict_acceptor;	/* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
+	int     password_authentication;	/* If true, permit password
+						 * authentication. */
+	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
+	int     permit_empty_passwd;	/* If false, do not permit empty
+					 * passwords. */
+	int     permit_user_env;	/* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */
+	char   *permit_user_env_allowlist; /* pattern-list of allowed env names */
+	int     compression;	/* If true, compression is allowed */
+	int	allow_tcp_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */
+	int	allow_streamlocal_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */
+	int	allow_agent_forwarding;
+	int	disable_forwarding;
+	u_int num_allow_users;
+	char   **allow_users;
+	u_int num_deny_users;
+	char   **deny_users;
+	u_int num_allow_groups;
+	char   **allow_groups;
+	u_int num_deny_groups;
+	char   **deny_groups;
+
+	u_int num_subsystems;
+	char   *subsystem_name[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
+	char   *subsystem_command[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
+	char   *subsystem_args[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
+
+	u_int num_accept_env;
+	char   **accept_env;
+	u_int num_setenv;
+	char   **setenv;
+
+	int	max_startups_begin;
+	int	max_startups_rate;
+	int	max_startups;
+	int	per_source_max_startups;
+	int	per_source_masklen_ipv4;
+	int	per_source_masklen_ipv6;
+	int	max_authtries;
+	int	max_sessions;
+	char   *banner;			/* SSH-2 banner message */
+	int	use_dns;
+	int	client_alive_interval;	/*
+					 * poke the client this often to
+					 * see if it's still there
+					 */
+	int	client_alive_count_max;	/*
+					 * If the client is unresponsive
+					 * for this many intervals above,
+					 * disconnect the session
+					 */
+
+	u_int	num_authkeys_files;	/* Files containing public keys */
+	char   **authorized_keys_files;
+
+	char   *adm_forced_command;
+
+	int	use_pam;		/* Enable auth via PAM */
+
+	int	permit_tun;
+
+	char   **permitted_opens;	/* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */
+	u_int   num_permitted_opens;
+	char   **permitted_listens; /* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */
+	u_int   num_permitted_listens;
+
+	char   *chroot_directory;
+	char   *revoked_keys_file;
+	char   *trusted_user_ca_keys;
+	char   *authorized_keys_command;
+	char   *authorized_keys_command_user;
+	char   *authorized_principals_file;
+	char   *authorized_principals_command;
+	char   *authorized_principals_command_user;
+
+	int64_t rekey_limit;
+	int	rekey_interval;
+
+	char   *version_addendum;	/* Appended to SSH banner */
+
+	u_int	num_auth_methods;
+	char   **auth_methods;
+
+	int	fingerprint_hash;
+	int	expose_userauth_info;
+	u_int64_t timing_secret;
+	char   *sk_provider;
+	int	required_rsa_size;	/* minimum size of RSA keys */
+
+	char	**channel_timeouts;	/* inactivity timeout by channel type */
+	u_int	num_channel_timeouts;
+
+	int	unused_connection_timeout;
+}       ServerOptions;
+
+/* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
+struct connection_info {
+	const char *user;
+	const char *host;	/* possibly resolved hostname */
+	const char *address;	/* remote address */
+	const char *laddress;	/* local address */
+	int lport;		/* local port */
+	const char *rdomain;	/* routing domain if available */
+	int test;		/* test mode, allow some attributes to be
+				 * unspecified */
+};
+
+/* List of included files for re-exec from the parsed configuration */
+struct include_item {
+	char *selector;
+	char *filename;
+	struct sshbuf *contents;
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(include_item) entry;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
+
+
+/*
+ * These are string config options that must be copied between the
+ * Match sub-config and the main config, and must be sent from the
+ * privsep child to the privsep master. We use a macro to ensure all
+ * the options are copied and the copies are done in the correct order.
+ *
+ * NB. an option must appear in servconf.c:copy_set_server_options() or
+ * COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS here but never both.
+ */
+#define COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS() do { \
+		M_CP_STROPT(banner); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command_user); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(hostbased_accepted_algos); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_accepted_algos); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(ca_sign_algorithms); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \
+		M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_allowlist); \
+		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
+		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
+		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
+		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_groups, num_allow_groups); \
+		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_groups, num_deny_groups); \
+		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(accept_env, num_accept_env); \
+		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(setenv, num_setenv); \
+		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(auth_methods, num_auth_methods); \
+		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(permitted_opens, num_permitted_opens); \
+		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(permitted_listens, num_permitted_listens); \
+		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(channel_timeouts, num_channel_timeouts); \
+		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(log_verbose, num_log_verbose); \
+	} while (0)
+
+struct connection_info *get_connection_info(struct ssh *, int, int);
+void	 initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
+void	 fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *);
+int	 process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int,
+	    int *, struct connection_info *, struct include_list *includes);
+void	 process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options);
+void	 process_channel_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *);
+void	 load_server_config(const char *, struct sshbuf *);
+void	 parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, struct sshbuf *,
+	    struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *, int);
+void	 parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *,
+	    struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
+int	 parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *, char *);
+int	 server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *);
+void	 copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *, int);
+void	 dump_config(ServerOptions *);
+char	*derelativise_path(const char *);
+void	 servconf_add_hostkey(const char *, const int,
+	    ServerOptions *, const char *path, int);
+void	 servconf_add_hostcert(const char *, const int,
+	    ServerOptions *, const char *path);
+
+#endif				/* SERVCONF_H */
diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6db0916
--- /dev/null
+++ b/serverloop.c
@@ -0,0 +1,935 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.234 2023/01/17 09:44:48 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Server main loop for handling the interactive session.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "serverloop.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/* XXX */
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
+extern int use_privsep;
+
+static int no_more_sessions = 0; /* Disallow further sessions. */
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t child_terminated = 0;	/* The child has terminated. */
+
+/* Cleanup on signals (!use_privsep case only) */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
+
+/* prototypes */
+static void server_init_dispatch(struct ssh *);
+
+/* requested tunnel forwarding interface(s), shared with session.c */
+char *tun_fwd_ifnames = NULL;
+
+/* returns 1 if bind to specified port by specified user is permitted */
+static int
+bind_permitted(int port, uid_t uid)
+{
+	if (use_privsep)
+		return 1; /* allow system to decide */
+	if (port < IPPORT_RESERVED && uid != 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+sigchld_handler(int sig)
+{
+	child_terminated = 1;
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+sigterm_handler(int sig)
+{
+	received_sigterm = sig;
+}
+
+static void
+client_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	char remote_id[512];
+	int r, channel_id;
+
+	/* timeout, check to see how many we have had */
+	if (options.client_alive_count_max > 0 &&
+	    ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) >
+	    options.client_alive_count_max) {
+		sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
+		logit("Timeout, client not responding from %s", remote_id);
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * send a bogus global/channel request with "wantreply",
+	 * we should get back a failure
+	 */
+	if ((channel_id = channel_find_open(ssh)) == -1) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "keepalive@openssh.com"))
+		    != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* boolean: want reply */
+			fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	} else {
+		channel_request_start(ssh, channel_id,
+		    "keepalive@openssh.com", 1);
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sleep in ppoll() until we can do something.
+ * Optionally, a maximum time can be specified for the duration of
+ * the wait (0 = infinite).
+ */
+static void
+wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh,
+    int connection_in, int connection_out, struct pollfd **pfdp,
+    u_int *npfd_allocp, u_int *npfd_activep, sigset_t *sigsetp,
+    int *conn_in_readyp, int *conn_out_readyp)
+{
+	struct timespec timeout;
+	char remote_id[512];
+	int ret;
+	int client_alive_scheduled = 0;
+	u_int p;
+	time_t now;
+	static time_t last_client_time, unused_connection_expiry;
+
+	*conn_in_readyp = *conn_out_readyp = 0;
+
+	/* Prepare channel poll. First two pollfd entries are reserved */
+	ptimeout_init(&timeout);
+	channel_prepare_poll(ssh, pfdp, npfd_allocp, npfd_activep, 2, &timeout);
+	now = monotime();
+	if (*npfd_activep < 2)
+		fatal_f("bad npfd %u", *npfd_activep); /* shouldn't happen */
+	if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && !ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
+		ptimeout_deadline_sec(&timeout,
+		    ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(ssh));
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If no channels are open and UnusedConnectionTimeout is set, then
+	 * start the clock to terminate the connection.
+	 */
+	if (options.unused_connection_timeout != 0) {
+		if (channel_still_open(ssh) || unused_connection_expiry == 0) {
+			unused_connection_expiry = now +
+			    options.unused_connection_timeout;
+		}
+		ptimeout_deadline_monotime(&timeout, unused_connection_expiry);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * if using client_alive, set the max timeout accordingly,
+	 * and indicate that this particular timeout was for client
+	 * alive by setting the client_alive_scheduled flag.
+	 *
+	 * this could be randomized somewhat to make traffic
+	 * analysis more difficult, but we're not doing it yet.
+	 */
+	if (options.client_alive_interval) {
+		/* Time we last heard from the client OR sent a keepalive */
+		if (last_client_time == 0)
+			last_client_time = now;
+		ptimeout_deadline_sec(&timeout, options.client_alive_interval);
+		/* XXX ? deadline_monotime(last_client_time + alive_interval) */
+		client_alive_scheduled = 1;
+	}
+
+#if 0
+	/* wrong: bad condition XXX */
+	if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
+#endif
+	/* Monitor client connection on reserved pollfd entries */
+	(*pfdp)[0].fd = connection_in;
+	(*pfdp)[0].events = POLLIN;
+	(*pfdp)[1].fd = connection_out;
+	(*pfdp)[1].events = ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh) ? POLLOUT : 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * If child has terminated and there is enough buffer space to read
+	 * from it, then read as much as is available and exit.
+	 */
+	if (child_terminated && ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh))
+		ptimeout_deadline_ms(&timeout, 100);
+
+	/* Wait for something to happen, or the timeout to expire. */
+	ret = ppoll(*pfdp, *npfd_activep, ptimeout_get_tsp(&timeout), sigsetp);
+
+	if (ret == -1) {
+		for (p = 0; p < *npfd_activep; p++)
+			(*pfdp)[p].revents = 0;
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			fatal_f("ppoll: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	*conn_in_readyp = (*pfdp)[0].revents != 0;
+	*conn_out_readyp = (*pfdp)[1].revents != 0;
+
+	now = monotime(); /* need to reset after ppoll() */
+	/* ClientAliveInterval probing */
+	if (client_alive_scheduled) {
+		if (ret == 0 &&
+		    now > last_client_time + options.client_alive_interval) {
+			/* ppoll timed out and we're due to probe */
+			client_alive_check(ssh);
+			last_client_time = now;
+		} else if (ret != 0 && *conn_in_readyp) {
+			/* Data from peer; reset probe timer. */
+			last_client_time = now;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* UnusedConnectionTimeout handling */
+	if (unused_connection_expiry != 0 &&
+	    now > unused_connection_expiry && !channel_still_open(ssh)) {
+		sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
+		logit("terminating inactive connection from %s", remote_id);
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Processes input from the client and the program.  Input data is stored
+ * in buffers and processed later.
+ */
+static int
+process_input(struct ssh *ssh, int connection_in)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = ssh_packet_process_read(ssh, connection_in)) == 0)
+		return 0; /* success */
+	if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) {
+		if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+			return 0;
+		if (errno == EPIPE) {
+			verbose("Connection closed by %.100s port %d",
+			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+			return -1;
+		}
+		verbose("Read error from remote host %s port %d: %s",
+		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+		    strerror(errno));
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin.
+ */
+static void
+process_output(struct ssh *ssh, int connection_out)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	/* Send any buffered packet data to the client. */
+	if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: ssh_packet_write_poll",
+		    __func__);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+process_buffered_input_packets(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL);
+}
+
+static void
+collect_children(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	pid_t pid;
+	int status;
+
+	if (child_terminated) {
+		debug("Received SIGCHLD.");
+		while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
+		    (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR))
+			if (pid > 0)
+				session_close_by_pid(ssh, pid, status);
+		child_terminated = 0;
+	}
+}
+
+void
+server_loop2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	struct pollfd *pfd = NULL;
+	u_int npfd_alloc = 0, npfd_active = 0;
+	int r, conn_in_ready, conn_out_ready;
+	u_int connection_in, connection_out;
+	sigset_t bsigset, osigset;
+
+	debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2.");
+
+	if (sigemptyset(&bsigset) == -1 || sigaddset(&bsigset, SIGCHLD) == -1)
+		error_f("bsigset setup: %s", strerror(errno));
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
+	child_terminated = 0;
+	connection_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
+	connection_out = ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh);
+
+	if (!use_privsep) {
+		ssh_signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+		ssh_signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler);
+		ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+	}
+
+	server_init_dispatch(ssh);
+
+	for (;;) {
+		process_buffered_input_packets(ssh);
+
+		if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh) &&
+		    ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh))
+			channel_output_poll(ssh);
+
+		/*
+		 * Block SIGCHLD while we check for dead children, then pass
+		 * the old signal mask through to ppoll() so that it'll wake
+		 * up immediately if a child exits after we've called waitpid().
+		 */
+		if (sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &bsigset, &osigset) == -1)
+			error_f("bsigset sigprocmask: %s", strerror(errno));
+		collect_children(ssh);
+		wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, connection_in, connection_out,
+		    &pfd, &npfd_alloc, &npfd_active, &osigset,
+		    &conn_in_ready, &conn_out_ready);
+		if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &bsigset, &osigset) == -1)
+			error_f("osigset sigprocmask: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+		if (received_sigterm) {
+			logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
+			/* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+
+		channel_after_poll(ssh, pfd, npfd_active);
+		if (conn_in_ready &&
+		    process_input(ssh, connection_in) < 0)
+			break;
+		/* A timeout may have triggered rekeying */
+		if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "cannot start rekeying");
+		if (conn_out_ready)
+			process_output(ssh, connection_out);
+	}
+	collect_children(ssh);
+	free(pfd);
+
+	/* free all channels, no more reads and writes */
+	channel_free_all(ssh);
+
+	/* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */
+	session_destroy_all(ssh, NULL);
+}
+
+static int
+server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	debug("Got %d/%u for keepalive", type, seq);
+	/*
+	 * reset timeout, since we got a sane answer from the client.
+	 * even if this was generated by something other than
+	 * the bogus CHANNEL_REQUEST we send for keepalives.
+	 */
+	ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+server_request_direct_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int *reason, const char **errmsg)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	char *target = NULL, *originator = NULL;
+	u_int target_port = 0, originator_port = 0;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &target, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &target_port)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+	if (target_port > 0xFFFF) {
+		error_f("invalid target port");
+		*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (originator_port > 0xFFFF) {
+		error_f("invalid originator port");
+		*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	debug_f("originator %s port %u, target %s port %u",
+	    originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
+
+	/* XXX fine grained permissions */
+	if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
+	    auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag &&
+	    !options.disable_forwarding) {
+		c = channel_connect_to_port(ssh, target, target_port,
+		    "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip", reason, errmsg);
+	} else {
+		logit("refused local port forward: "
+		    "originator %s port %d, target %s port %d",
+		    originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
+		if (reason != NULL)
+			*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
+	}
+
+ out:
+	free(originator);
+	free(target);
+	return c;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+server_request_direct_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	char *target = NULL, *originator = NULL;
+	u_int originator_port = 0;
+	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+	int r;
+
+	if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
+		fatal_f("no/invalid user");
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &target, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+	if (originator_port > 0xFFFF) {
+		error_f("invalid originator port");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	debug_f("originator %s port %d, target %s",
+	    originator, originator_port, target);
+
+	/* XXX fine grained permissions */
+	if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
+	    auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag &&
+	    !options.disable_forwarding && (pw->pw_uid == 0 || use_privsep)) {
+		c = channel_connect_to_path(ssh, target,
+		    "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal");
+	} else {
+		logit("refused streamlocal port forward: "
+		    "originator %s port %d, target %s",
+		    originator, originator_port, target);
+	}
+
+out:
+	free(originator);
+	free(target);
+	return c;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	u_int mode, tun;
+	int r, sock;
+	char *tmp, *ifname = NULL;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &mode)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse mode", __func__);
+	switch (mode) {
+	case SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT:
+	case SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET:
+		break;
+	default:
+		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Unsupported tunnel device mode.");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0) {
+		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has rejected tunnel device "
+		    "forwarding");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &tun)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse device", __func__);
+	if (tun > INT_MAX) {
+		debug_f("invalid tun");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
+		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
+		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
+			goto done;
+		tun = auth_opts->force_tun_device;
+	}
+	sock = tun_open(tun, mode, &ifname);
+	if (sock < 0)
+		goto done;
+	debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname);
+
+	c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
+	    CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
+	c->datagram = 1;
+#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
+	if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
+		channel_register_filter(ssh, c->self, sys_tun_infilter,
+		    sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL);
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Update the list of names exposed to the session
+	 * XXX remove these if the tunnels are closed (won't matter
+	 * much if they are already in the environment though)
+	 */
+	tmp = tun_fwd_ifnames;
+	xasprintf(&tun_fwd_ifnames, "%s%s%s",
+	    tun_fwd_ifnames == NULL ? "" : tun_fwd_ifnames,
+	    tun_fwd_ifnames == NULL ? "" : ",",
+	    ifname);
+	free(tmp);
+	free(ifname);
+
+ done:
+	if (c == NULL)
+		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Failed to open the tunnel device.");
+	return c;
+}
+
+static Channel *
+server_request_session(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	int r;
+
+	debug("input_session_request");
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+	if (no_more_sessions) {
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Possible attack: attempt to open a "
+		    "session after additional sessions disabled");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * A server session has no fd to read or write until a
+	 * CHANNEL_REQUEST for a shell is made, so we set the type to
+	 * SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL.  Additionally, a callback for handling all
+	 * CHANNEL_REQUEST messages is registered.
+	 */
+	c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL,
+	    -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+	    0, "server-session", 1);
+	if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) {
+		debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self);
+		channel_free(ssh, c);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 0);
+	return c;
+}
+
+static int
+server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Channel *c = NULL;
+	char *ctype = NULL;
+	const char *errmsg = NULL;
+	int r, reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED;
+	u_int rchan = 0, rmaxpack = 0, rwindow = 0;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &ctype, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rchan)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rwindow)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rmaxpack)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+	debug_f("ctype %s rchan %u win %u max %u",
+	    ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack);
+
+	if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) {
+		c = server_request_session(ssh);
+	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) {
+		c = server_request_direct_tcpip(ssh, &reason, &errmsg);
+	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		c = server_request_direct_streamlocal(ssh);
+	} else if (strcmp(ctype, "tun@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		c = server_request_tun(ssh);
+	}
+	if (c != NULL) {
+		debug_f("confirm %s", ctype);
+		c->remote_id = rchan;
+		c->have_remote_id = 1;
+		c->remote_window = rwindow;
+		c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack;
+		if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) {
+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+				sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
+				    "%s: send open confirm", __func__);
+			}
+		}
+	} else {
+		debug_f("failure %s", ctype);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, rchan)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, reason)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, errmsg ? errmsg : "open failed")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+			sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
+			    "%s: send open failure", __func__);
+		}
+	}
+	free(ctype);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL;
+	int r, ndx, success = 0;
+	const u_char *blob;
+	const char *sigalg, *kex_rsa_sigalg = NULL;
+	u_char *sig = 0;
+	size_t blen, slen;
+
+	if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if (sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(
+	    ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)) == KEY_RSA)
+		kex_rsa_sigalg = ssh->kex->hostkey_alg;
+	while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
+		sshkey_free(key);
+		key = NULL;
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "parse key");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Better check that this is actually one of our hostkeys
+		 * before attempting to sign anything with it.
+		 */
+		if ((ndx = ssh->kex->host_key_index(key, 1, ssh)) == -1) {
+			error_f("unknown host %s key", sshkey_type(key));
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * XXX refactor: make kex->sign just use an index rather
+		 * than passing in public and private keys
+		 */
+		if ((key_prv = get_hostkey_by_index(ndx)) == NULL &&
+		    (key_pub = get_hostkey_public_by_index(ndx, ssh)) == NULL) {
+			error_f("can't retrieve hostkey %d", ndx);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		sshbuf_reset(sigbuf);
+		free(sig);
+		sig = NULL;
+		/*
+		 * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
+		 * during KEX to the default (SHA1).
+		 */
+		sigalg = NULL;
+		if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
+			if (kex_rsa_sigalg != NULL)
+				sigalg = kex_rsa_sigalg;
+			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED)
+				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
+			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
+				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
+		}
+		debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
+		    sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
+		    "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(sigbuf,
+		    ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = ssh->kex->sign(ssh, key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen,
+		    sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf), sigalg)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "assemble signature");
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	/* Success */
+	*respp = resp;
+	resp = NULL; /* don't free it */
+	success = 1;
+ out:
+	free(sig);
+	sshbuf_free(resp);
+	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	return success;
+}
+
+static int
+server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	char *rtype = NULL;
+	u_char want_reply = 0;
+	int r, success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0;
+	u_int port = 0;
+	struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
+	struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
+	struct Forward fwd;
+
+	memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
+	if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
+		fatal_f("no/invalid user");
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+	debug_f("rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply);
+
+	/* -R style forwarding */
+	if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_host, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0)
+			sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse tcpip-forward", __func__);
+		debug_f("tcpip-forward listen %s port %u",
+		    fwd.listen_host, port);
+		if (port <= INT_MAX)
+			fwd.listen_port = (int)port;
+		/* check permissions */
+		if (port > INT_MAX ||
+		    (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 ||
+		    !auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
+		    options.disable_forwarding ||
+		    (!want_reply && fwd.listen_port == 0) ||
+		    (fwd.listen_port != 0 &&
+		    !bind_permitted(fwd.listen_port, pw->pw_uid))) {
+			success = 0;
+			ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has disabled port forwarding.");
+		} else {
+			/* Start listening on the port */
+			success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd,
+			    &allocated_listen_port, &options.fwd_opts);
+		}
+		if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+		if (allocated_listen_port != 0 &&
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, allocated_listen_port)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u32");
+	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-tcpip-forward") == 0) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_host, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0)
+			sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse cancel-tcpip-forward", __func__);
+
+		debug_f("cancel-tcpip-forward addr %s port %d",
+		    fwd.listen_host, port);
+		if (port <= INT_MAX) {
+			fwd.listen_port = (int)port;
+			success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(ssh, &fwd);
+		}
+	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_path, NULL)) != 0)
+			sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", __func__);
+		debug_f("streamlocal-forward listen path %s",
+		    fwd.listen_path);
+
+		/* check permissions */
+		if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0
+		    || !auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
+		    options.disable_forwarding ||
+		    (pw->pw_uid != 0 && !use_privsep)) {
+			success = 0;
+			ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has disabled "
+			    "streamlocal forwarding.");
+		} else {
+			/* Start listening on the socket */
+			success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(ssh,
+			    &fwd, NULL, &options.fwd_opts);
+		}
+	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_path, NULL)) != 0)
+			sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", __func__);
+		debug_f("cancel-streamlocal-forward path %s",
+		    fwd.listen_path);
+
+		success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(ssh, &fwd);
+	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "no-more-sessions@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		no_more_sessions = 1;
+		success = 1;
+	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		success = server_input_hostkeys_prove(ssh, &resp);
+	}
+	/* XXX sshpkt_get_end() */
+	if (want_reply) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ?
+		    SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
+		    (success && resp != NULL && (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, resp)) != 0) ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+			sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
+	}
+	free(fwd.listen_host);
+	free(fwd.listen_path);
+	free(rtype);
+	sshbuf_free(resp);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	int r, success = 0;
+	char *rtype = NULL;
+	u_char want_reply = 0;
+	u_int id = 0;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+	debug("server_input_channel_req: channel %u request %s reply %d",
+	    id, rtype, want_reply);
+
+	if (id >= INT_MAX || (c = channel_lookup(ssh, (int)id)) == NULL) {
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "%s: unknown channel %d",
+		    __func__, id);
+	}
+	if (!strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com")) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+			sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+		chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c);
+	} else if ((c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL ||
+	    c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) && strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0)
+		success = session_input_channel_req(ssh, c, rtype);
+	if (want_reply && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
+		if (!c->have_remote_id)
+			fatal_f("channel %d: no remote_id", c->self);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ?
+		    SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
+	}
+	free(rtype);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+server_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	debug("server_init_dispatch");
+	ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &server_input_channel_open);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &server_input_channel_req);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &server_input_global_request);
+	/* client_alive */
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
+	/* rekeying */
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
+}
diff --git a/serverloop.h b/serverloop.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fd2cf63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/serverloop.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.h,v 1.8 2017/09/12 06:32:07 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Performs the interactive session.  This handles data transmission between
+ * the client and the program.  Note that the notion of stdin, stdout, and
+ * stderr in this function is sort of reversed: this function writes to stdin
+ * (of the child program), and reads from stdout and stderr (of the child
+ * program).
+ */
+#ifndef SERVERLOOP_H
+#define SERVERLOOP_H
+
+struct ssh;
+
+void    server_loop2(struct ssh *, Authctxt *);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f30d7ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/session.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2725 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.333 2023/01/06 02:42:34 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "sshlogin.h"
+#include "serverloop.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
+#include <kafs.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#endif
+
+#define IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(c) \
+	(!strncmp(c, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1) && \
+	 (c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\0' || \
+	  c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == ' ' || \
+	  c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\t'))
+
+/* func */
+
+Session *session_new(void);
+void	session_set_fds(struct ssh *, Session *, int, int, int, int, int);
+void	session_pty_cleanup(Session *);
+void	session_proctitle(Session *);
+int	session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *, Session *);
+int	do_exec_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
+int	do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
+int	do_exec(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
+void	do_login(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
+void	do_child(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
+void	do_motd(void);
+int	check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
+
+static void do_authenticated2(struct ssh *, Authctxt *);
+
+static int session_pty_req(struct ssh *, Session *);
+
+/* import */
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern char *__progname;
+extern int debug_flag;
+extern u_int utmp_len;
+extern int startup_pipe;
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
+extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */
+
+/* original command from peer. */
+const char *original_command = NULL;
+
+/* data */
+static int sessions_first_unused = -1;
+static int sessions_nalloc = 0;
+static Session *sessions = NULL;
+
+#define SUBSYSTEM_NONE			0
+#define SUBSYSTEM_EXT			1
+#define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP		2
+#define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR	3
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+login_cap_t *lc;
+#endif
+
+static int is_child = 0;
+static int in_chroot = 0;
+
+/* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
+static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
+
+/* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */
+static char *auth_sock_name = NULL;
+static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL;
+
+/* removes the agent forwarding socket */
+
+static void
+auth_sock_cleanup_proc(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
+		temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+		unlink(auth_sock_name);
+		rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
+		auth_sock_name = NULL;
+		restore_uid();
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+auth_input_request_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw)
+{
+	Channel *nc;
+	int sock = -1;
+
+	if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
+		error("authentication forwarding requested twice.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+
+	/* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */
+	auth_sock_dir = xstrdup("/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX");
+
+	/* Create private directory for socket */
+	if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) {
+		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Agent forwarding disabled: "
+		    "mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		restore_uid();
+		free(auth_sock_dir);
+		auth_sock_dir = NULL;
+		goto authsock_err;
+	}
+
+	xasprintf(&auth_sock_name, "%s/agent.%ld",
+	    auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid());
+
+	/* Start a Unix listener on auth_sock_name. */
+	sock = unix_listener(auth_sock_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
+
+	/* Restore the privileged uid. */
+	restore_uid();
+
+	/* Check for socket/bind/listen failure. */
+	if (sock < 0)
+		goto authsock_err;
+
+	/* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */
+	nc = channel_new(ssh, "auth-listener",
+	    SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
+	    CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
+	    0, "auth socket", 1);
+	nc->path = xstrdup(auth_sock_name);
+	return 1;
+
+ authsock_err:
+	free(auth_sock_name);
+	if (auth_sock_dir != NULL) {
+		temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+		rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
+		restore_uid();
+		free(auth_sock_dir);
+	}
+	if (sock != -1)
+		close(sock);
+	auth_sock_name = NULL;
+	auth_sock_dir = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+display_loginmsg(void)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (sshbuf_len(loginmsg) == 0)
+		return;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(loginmsg, 0)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_u8");
+	printf("%s", (char *)sshbuf_ptr(loginmsg));
+	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
+}
+
+static void
+prepare_auth_info_file(struct passwd *pw, struct sshbuf *info)
+{
+	int fd = -1, success = 0;
+
+	if (!options.expose_userauth_info || info == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	temporarily_use_uid(pw);
+	auth_info_file = xstrdup("/tmp/sshauth.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX");
+	if ((fd = mkstemp(auth_info_file)) == -1) {
+		error_f("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(info),
+	    sshbuf_len(info)) != sshbuf_len(info)) {
+		error_f("write: %s", strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (close(fd) != 0) {
+		error_f("close: %s", strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	success = 1;
+ out:
+	if (!success) {
+		if (fd != -1)
+			close(fd);
+		free(auth_info_file);
+		auth_info_file = NULL;
+	}
+	restore_uid();
+}
+
+static void
+set_fwdpermit_from_authopts(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshauthopt *opts)
+{
+	char *tmp, *cp, *host;
+	int port;
+	size_t i;
+
+	if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0) {
+		channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL);
+		for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitopen; i++) {
+			tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitopen[i]);
+			/* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */
+			if ((host = hpdelim2(&cp, NULL)) == NULL)
+				fatal_f("internal error: hpdelim");
+			host = cleanhostname(host);
+			if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0)
+				fatal_f("internal error: permitopen port");
+			channel_add_permission(ssh,
+			    FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, host, port);
+			free(tmp);
+		}
+	}
+	if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) != 0) {
+		channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_REMOTE);
+		for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitlisten; i++) {
+			tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitlisten[i]);
+			/* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */
+			if ((host = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
+				fatal_f("internal error: hpdelim");
+			host = cleanhostname(host);
+			if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0)
+				fatal_f("internal error: permitlisten port");
+			channel_add_permission(ssh,
+			    FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_REMOTE, host, port);
+			free(tmp);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+void
+do_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name);
+
+	auth_log_authopts("active", auth_opts, 0);
+
+	/* setup the channel layer */
+	/* XXX - streamlocal? */
+	set_fwdpermit_from_authopts(ssh, auth_opts);
+
+	if (!auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
+	    options.disable_forwarding) {
+		channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL);
+		channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE);
+	} else {
+		if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0)
+			channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL);
+		else
+			channel_permit_all(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL);
+		if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0)
+			channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE);
+		else
+			channel_permit_all(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE);
+	}
+	auth_debug_send(ssh);
+
+	prepare_auth_info_file(authctxt->pw, authctxt->session_info);
+
+	do_authenticated2(ssh, authctxt);
+
+	do_cleanup(ssh, authctxt);
+}
+
+/* Check untrusted xauth strings for metacharacters */
+static int
+xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+		if (!isalnum((u_char)s[i]) &&
+		    s[i] != '.' && s[i] != ':' && s[i] != '/' &&
+		    s[i] != '-' && s[i] != '_')
+			return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+#define USE_PIPES 1
+/*
+ * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty.  This
+ * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
+ * setting up file descriptors and such.
+ */
+int
+do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+	pid_t pid;
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+	int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2];
+
+	if (s == NULL)
+		fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
+
+	/* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */
+	if (pipe(pin) == -1) {
+		error_f("pipe in: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (pipe(pout) == -1) {
+		error_f("pipe out: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		close(pin[0]);
+		close(pin[1]);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (pipe(perr) == -1) {
+		error_f("pipe err: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		close(pin[0]);
+		close(pin[1]);
+		close(pout[0]);
+		close(pout[1]);
+		return -1;
+	}
+#else
+	int inout[2], err[2];
+
+	if (s == NULL)
+		fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
+
+	/* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1) {
+		error_f("socketpair #1: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) == -1) {
+		error_f("socketpair #2: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		close(inout[0]);
+		close(inout[1]);
+		return -1;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	session_proctitle(s);
+
+	/* Fork the child. */
+	switch ((pid = fork())) {
+	case -1:
+		error_f("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+		close(pin[0]);
+		close(pin[1]);
+		close(pout[0]);
+		close(pout[1]);
+		close(perr[0]);
+		close(perr[1]);
+#else
+		close(inout[0]);
+		close(inout[1]);
+		close(err[0]);
+		close(err[1]);
+#endif
+		return -1;
+	case 0:
+		is_child = 1;
+
+		/*
+		 * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
+		 * setlogin() affects the entire process group.
+		 */
+		if (setsid() == -1)
+			error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+		/*
+		 * Redirect stdin.  We close the parent side of the socket
+		 * pair, and make the child side the standard input.
+		 */
+		close(pin[1]);
+		if (dup2(pin[0], 0) == -1)
+			perror("dup2 stdin");
+		close(pin[0]);
+
+		/* Redirect stdout. */
+		close(pout[0]);
+		if (dup2(pout[1], 1) == -1)
+			perror("dup2 stdout");
+		close(pout[1]);
+
+		/* Redirect stderr. */
+		close(perr[0]);
+		if (dup2(perr[1], 2) == -1)
+			perror("dup2 stderr");
+		close(perr[1]);
+#else
+		/*
+		 * Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr.  Stdin and stdout will
+		 * use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist)
+		 * seem to depend on it.
+		 */
+		close(inout[1]);
+		close(err[1]);
+		if (dup2(inout[0], 0) == -1)	/* stdin */
+			perror("dup2 stdin");
+		if (dup2(inout[0], 1) == -1)	/* stdout (same as stdin) */
+			perror("dup2 stdout");
+		close(inout[0]);
+		if (dup2(err[0], 2) == -1)	/* stderr */
+			perror("dup2 stderr");
+		close(err[0]);
+#endif
+
+		/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
+		do_child(ssh, s, command);
+		/* NOTREACHED */
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
+#endif
+
+	s->pid = pid;
+	/* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */
+	ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, s->display != NULL,
+	    options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear loginmsg, since it's the child's responsibility to display
+	 * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
+	 * multiple copies of the login messages.
+	 */
+	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
+
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+	/* We are the parent.  Close the child sides of the pipes. */
+	close(pin[0]);
+	close(pout[1]);
+	close(perr[1]);
+
+	session_set_fds(ssh, s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0],
+	    s->is_subsystem, 0);
+#else
+	/* We are the parent.  Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */
+	close(inout[0]);
+	close(err[0]);
+
+	/*
+	 * Enter the interactive session.  Note: server_loop must be able to
+	 * handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same.
+	 */
+	session_set_fds(ssh, s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1],
+	    s->is_subsystem, 0);
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty.  This
+ * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
+ * setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp,
+ * lastlog, and other such operations.
+ */
+int
+do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+	int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	if (s == NULL)
+		fatal("do_exec_pty: no session");
+	ptyfd = s->ptyfd;
+	ttyfd = s->ttyfd;
+
+	/*
+	 * Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the
+	 * standard input.  We could use the original descriptor, but this
+	 * simplifies code in server_loop.  The descriptor is bidirectional.
+	 * Do this before forking (and cleanup in the child) so as to
+	 * detect and gracefully fail out-of-fd conditions.
+	 */
+	if ((fdout = dup(ptyfd)) == -1) {
+		error_f("dup #1: %s", strerror(errno));
+		close(ttyfd);
+		close(ptyfd);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* we keep a reference to the pty master */
+	if ((ptymaster = dup(ptyfd)) == -1) {
+		error_f("dup #2: %s", strerror(errno));
+		close(ttyfd);
+		close(ptyfd);
+		close(fdout);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Fork the child. */
+	switch ((pid = fork())) {
+	case -1:
+		error_f("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		close(fdout);
+		close(ptymaster);
+		close(ttyfd);
+		close(ptyfd);
+		return -1;
+	case 0:
+		is_child = 1;
+
+		close(fdout);
+		close(ptymaster);
+
+		/* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */
+		close(ptyfd);
+
+		/* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */
+		pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty);
+
+		/* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */
+		if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) == -1)
+			error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno));
+		if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) == -1)
+			error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno));
+		if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) == -1)
+			error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+		/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
+		close(ttyfd);
+
+		/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
+#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+		do_login(ssh, s, command);
+#endif
+		/*
+		 * Do common processing for the child, such as execing
+		 * the command.
+		 */
+		do_child(ssh, s, command);
+		/* NOTREACHED */
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
+#endif
+
+	s->pid = pid;
+
+	/* Parent.  Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
+	close(ttyfd);
+
+	/* Enter interactive session. */
+	s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
+	ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, 1,
+	    options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
+	session_set_fds(ssh, s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is called to fork and execute a command.  If another command is
+ * to be forced, execute that instead.
+ */
+int
+do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+	int ret;
+	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
+	char session_type[1024];
+
+	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
+		original_command = command;
+		command = options.adm_forced_command;
+		forced = "(config)";
+	} else if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) {
+		original_command = command;
+		command = auth_opts->force_command;
+		forced = "(key-option)";
+	}
+	s->forced = 0;
+	if (forced != NULL) {
+		s->forced = 1;
+		if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) {
+			s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ?
+			    SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP : SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR;
+		} else if (s->is_subsystem)
+			s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
+		snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type),
+		    "forced-command %s '%.900s'", forced, command);
+	} else if (s->is_subsystem) {
+		snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type),
+		    "subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys);
+	} else if (command == NULL) {
+		snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell");
+	} else {
+		/* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */
+		snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command");
+	}
+
+	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+		tty = s->tty;
+		if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
+			tty += 5;
+	}
+
+	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
+	    session_type,
+	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
+	    tty == NULL ? "" : tty,
+	    s->pw->pw_name,
+	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+	    ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+	    s->self);
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	if (command != NULL)
+		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
+	else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
+		char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
+
+		if (shell[0] == '\0')	/* empty shell means /bin/sh */
+			shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
+		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
+	}
+#endif
+	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
+	else
+		ret = do_exec_no_pty(ssh, s, command);
+
+	original_command = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear loginmsg: it's the child's responsibility to display
+	 * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
+	 * multiple copies of the login messages.
+	 */
+	sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* administrative, login(1)-like work */
+void
+do_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+	socklen_t fromlen;
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+	struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
+	pid_t pid = getpid();
+
+	/*
+	 * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
+	 * the address be 0.0.0.0.
+	 */
+	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+	fromlen = sizeof(from);
+	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
+		if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
+		    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
+			debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
+		    session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len,
+		    options.use_dns),
+		    (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	/*
+	 * If password change is needed, do it now.
+	 * This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check.
+	 */
+	if (options.use_pam && !use_privsep && s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+		display_loginmsg();
+		do_pam_chauthtok();
+		s->authctxt->force_pwchange = 0;
+		/* XXX - signal [net] parent to enable forwardings */
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (check_quietlogin(s, command))
+		return;
+
+	display_loginmsg();
+
+	do_motd();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Display the message of the day.
+ */
+void
+do_motd(void)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	char buf[256];
+
+	if (options.print_motd) {
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+		f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd",
+		    "/etc/motd"), "r");
+#else
+		f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r");
+#endif
+		if (f) {
+			while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
+				fputs(buf, stdout);
+			fclose(f);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given.
+ */
+int
+check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+	char buf[256];
+	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	/* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */
+	if (command != NULL)
+		return 1;
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
+		return 1;
+#else
+	if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
+		return 1;
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them
+ * into the environment.  If the file does not exist, this does nothing.
+ * Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#')
+ * and assignments of the form name=value.  No other forms are allowed.
+ * If allowlist is not NULL, then it is interpreted as a pattern list and
+ * only variable names that match it will be accepted.
+ */
+static void
+read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize,
+	const char *filename, const char *allowlist)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	char *line = NULL, *cp, *value;
+	size_t linesize = 0;
+	u_int lineno = 0;
+
+	f = fopen(filename, "r");
+	if (!f)
+		return;
+
+	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+		if (++lineno > 1000)
+			fatal("Too many lines in environment file %s", filename);
+		for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+			;
+		if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n')
+			continue;
+
+		cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
+
+		value = strchr(cp, '=');
+		if (value == NULL) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Bad line %u in %.100s\n", lineno,
+			    filename);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to
+		 * the value string.
+		 */
+		*value = '\0';
+		value++;
+		if (allowlist != NULL &&
+		    match_pattern_list(cp, allowlist, 0) != 1)
+			continue;
+		child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value);
+	}
+	free(line);
+	fclose(f);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
+/*
+ * Return named variable from specified environment, or NULL if not present.
+ */
+static char *
+child_get_env(char **env, const char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+	size_t len;
+
+	len = strlen(name);
+	for (i=0; env[i] != NULL; i++)
+		if (strncmp(name, env[i], len) == 0 && env[i][len] == '=')
+			return(env[i] + len + 1);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read /etc/default/login.
+ * We pick up the PATH (or SUPATH for root) and UMASK.
+ */
+static void
+read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid)
+{
+	char **tmpenv = NULL, *var;
+	u_int i, tmpenvsize = 0;
+	u_long mask;
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't want to copy the whole file to the child's environment,
+	 * so we use a temporary environment and copy the variables we're
+	 * interested in.
+	 */
+	read_environment_file(&tmpenv, &tmpenvsize, "/etc/default/login",
+	    options.permit_user_env_allowlist);
+
+	if (tmpenv == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (uid == 0)
+		var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH");
+	else
+		var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH");
+	if (var != NULL)
+		child_set_env(env, envsize, "PATH", var);
+
+	if ((var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "UMASK")) != NULL)
+		if (sscanf(var, "%5lo", &mask) == 1)
+			umask((mode_t)mask);
+
+	for (i = 0; tmpenv[i] != NULL; i++)
+		free(tmpenv[i]);
+	free(tmpenv);
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
+
+#if defined(USE_PAM) || defined(HAVE_CYGWIN)
+static void
+copy_environment_denylist(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize,
+    const char *denylist)
+{
+	char *var_name, *var_val;
+	int i;
+
+	if (source == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	for(i = 0; source[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		var_name = xstrdup(source[i]);
+		if ((var_val = strstr(var_name, "=")) == NULL) {
+			free(var_name);
+			continue;
+		}
+		*var_val++ = '\0';
+
+		if (denylist == NULL ||
+		    match_pattern_list(var_name, denylist, 0) != 1) {
+			debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
+			child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
+		}
+
+		free(var_name);
+	}
+}
+#endif /* defined(USE_PAM) || defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+static void
+copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize)
+{
+	copy_environment_denylist(source, env, envsize, NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+static char **
+do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+{
+	char buf[256];
+	size_t n;
+	u_int i, envsize;
+	char *ocp, *cp, *value, **env, *laddr;
+	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+#if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
+	char *path = NULL;
+#endif
+
+	/* Initialize the environment. */
+	envsize = 100;
+	env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *));
+	env[0] = NULL;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	/*
+	 * The Windows environment contains some setting which are
+	 * important for a running system. They must not be dropped.
+	 */
+	{
+		char **p;
+
+		p = fetch_windows_environment();
+		copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
+		free_windows_environment(p);
+	}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
+	 * the child's environment as they see fit
+	 */
+	ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
+#endif
+
+	/* Set basic environment. */
+	for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name, s->env[i].val);
+
+	child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
+	child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
+#ifdef _AIX
+	child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name);
+#endif
+	child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
+	else
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH"));
+#else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
+# ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	/*
+	 * There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains
+	 * important components pointing to the system directories,
+	 * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better
+	 * remains intact here.
+	 */
+#  ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
+	read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid);
+	path = child_get_env(env, "PATH");
+#  endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
+	if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH",
+		    s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ?  SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH);
+	}
+# endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
+
+	if (!options.use_pam) {
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s",
+		    _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name);
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf);
+	}
+
+	/* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */
+	child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell);
+
+	if (getenv("TZ"))
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
+	if (s->term)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term);
+	if (s->display)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display);
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it
+	 * must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or
+	 * SIA), so copy it to the child.
+	 */
+	{
+		char *cp;
+
+		if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL)
+			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
+	}
+
+#ifdef _AIX
+	{
+		char *cp;
+
+		if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL)
+			child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp);
+		read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment",
+		    options.permit_user_env_allowlist);
+	}
+#endif
+#ifdef KRB5
+	if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
+		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
+#endif
+	if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
+		    auth_sock_name);
+
+
+	/* Set custom environment options from pubkey authentication. */
+	if (options.permit_user_env) {
+		for (n = 0 ; n < auth_opts->nenv; n++) {
+			ocp = xstrdup(auth_opts->env[n]);
+			cp = strchr(ocp, '=');
+			if (cp != NULL) {
+				*cp = '\0';
+				/* Apply PermitUserEnvironment allowlist */
+				if (options.permit_user_env_allowlist == NULL ||
+				    match_pattern_list(ocp,
+				    options.permit_user_env_allowlist, 0) == 1)
+					child_set_env(&env, &envsize,
+					    ocp, cp + 1);
+			}
+			free(ocp);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */
+	if (options.permit_user_env) {
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%s/environment",
+		    pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
+		read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf,
+		    options.permit_user_env_allowlist);
+	}
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	/*
+	 * Pull in any environment variables that may have
+	 * been set by PAM.
+	 */
+	if (options.use_pam) {
+		char **p;
+
+		/*
+		 * Don't allow PAM-internal env vars to leak
+		 * back into the session environment.
+		 */
+#define PAM_ENV_DENYLIST  "SSH_AUTH_INFO*,SSH_CONNECTION*"
+		p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
+		copy_environment_denylist(p, &env, &envsize,
+		    PAM_ENV_DENYLIST);
+		free_pam_environment(p);
+
+		p = fetch_pam_environment();
+		copy_environment_denylist(p, &env, &envsize,
+		    PAM_ENV_DENYLIST);
+		free_pam_environment(p);
+	}
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+	/* Environment specified by admin */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
+		cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
+		if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) {
+			/* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */
+			fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]);
+		}
+		*value++ = '\0';
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value);
+	}
+
+	/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d",
+	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+	    ssh_local_port(ssh));
+	child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf);
+
+	laddr = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d",
+	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+	    laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
+	free(laddr);
+	child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf);
+
+	if (tun_fwd_ifnames != NULL)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TUNNEL", tun_fwd_ifnames);
+	if (auth_info_file != NULL)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_USER_AUTH", auth_info_file);
+	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty);
+	if (original_command)
+		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND",
+		    original_command);
+
+	if (debug_flag) {
+		/* dump the environment */
+		fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
+		for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
+			fprintf(stderr, "  %.200s\n", env[i]);
+	}
+	return env;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found
+ * first in this order).
+ */
+static void
+do_rc_files(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+{
+	FILE *f = NULL;
+	char *cmd = NULL, *user_rc = NULL;
+	int do_xauth;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	do_xauth =
+	    s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
+	xasprintf(&user_rc, "%s/%s", s->pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
+
+	/* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */
+	if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL &&
+	    auth_opts->permit_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc &&
+	    stat(user_rc, &st) >= 0) {
+		if (xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'", shell, _PATH_BSHELL,
+		    user_rc) == -1)
+			fatal_f("xasprintf: %s", strerror(errno));
+		if (debug_flag)
+			fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd);
+		f = popen(cmd, "w");
+		if (f) {
+			if (do_xauth)
+				fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
+				    s->auth_data);
+			pclose(f);
+		} else
+			fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+			    user_rc);
+	} else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) {
+		if (debug_flag)
+			fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL,
+			    _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
+		f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w");
+		if (f) {
+			if (do_xauth)
+				fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
+				    s->auth_data);
+			pclose(f);
+		} else
+			fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+			    _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
+	} else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) {
+		/* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */
+		if (debug_flag) {
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "Running %.500s remove %.100s\n",
+			    options.xauth_location, s->auth_display);
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
+			    options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
+			    s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
+		}
+		if (xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -q -", options.xauth_location) == -1)
+			fatal_f("xasprintf: %s", strerror(errno));
+		f = popen(cmd, "w");
+		if (f) {
+			fprintf(f, "remove %s\n",
+			    s->auth_display);
+			fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n",
+			    s->auth_display, s->auth_proto,
+			    s->auth_data);
+			pclose(f);
+		} else {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
+			    cmd);
+		}
+	}
+	free(cmd);
+	free(user_rc);
+}
+
+static void
+do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	FILE *f = NULL;
+	char buf[1024], *nl, *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN;
+	struct stat sb;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	if (login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) || pw->pw_uid == 0)
+		return;
+	nl = login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", def_nl, def_nl);
+#else
+	if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
+		return;
+	nl = def_nl;
+#endif
+	if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1)
+		return;
+
+	/* /etc/nologin exists.  Print its contents if we can and exit. */
+	logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl);
+	if ((f = fopen(nl, "r")) != NULL) {
+		while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
+			fputs(buf, stderr);
+		fclose(f);
+	}
+	exit(254);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components
+ * must be root-owned directories with strict permissions.
+ */
+static void
+safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
+{
+	const char *cp;
+	char component[PATH_MAX];
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (!path_absolute(path))
+		fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
+	if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
+		fatal("chroot path too long");
+
+	/*
+	 * Descend the path, checking that each component is a
+	 * root-owned directory with strict permissions.
+	 */
+	for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
+		if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
+			strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
+		else {
+			cp++;
+			memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
+			component[cp - path] = '\0';
+		}
+	
+		debug3_f("checking '%s'", component);
+
+		if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
+			fatal_f("stat(\"%s\"): %s",
+			    component, strerror(errno));
+		if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
+			fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
+			    "directory %s\"%s\"",
+			    cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
+		if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
+			fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
+			    cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
+
+	}
+
+	if (chdir(path) == -1)
+		fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
+		    "%s", path, strerror(errno));
+	if (chroot(path) == -1)
+		fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
+	if (chdir("/") == -1)
+		fatal_f("chdir(/) after chroot: %s", strerror(errno));
+	verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path);
+}
+
+/* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
+void
+do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	char uidstr[32], *chroot_path, *tmp;
+
+	platform_setusercontext(pw);
+
+	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
+		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
+			perror("unable to set user context");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+#else
+		if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0)
+			error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+		if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
+			perror("setgid");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		/* Initialize the group list. */
+		if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
+			perror("initgroups");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		endgrent();
+#endif
+
+		platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
+
+		if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+		    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+			tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory,
+			    pw->pw_uid);
+			snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
+			    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
+			chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
+			    "u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
+			safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
+			free(tmp);
+			free(chroot_path);
+			/* Make sure we don't attempt to chroot again */
+			free(options.chroot_directory);
+			options.chroot_directory = NULL;
+			in_chroot = 1;
+		}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUSER) < 0) {
+			perror("unable to set user context (setuser)");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		/* 
+		 * FreeBSD's setusercontext() will not apply the user's
+		 * own umask setting unless running with the user's UID.
+		 */
+		(void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUMASK);
+#else
+# ifdef USE_LIBIAF
+		/*
+		 * In a chroot environment, the set_id() will always fail;
+		 * typically because of the lack of necessary authentication
+		 * services and runtime such as ./usr/lib/libiaf.so,
+		 * ./usr/lib/libpam.so.1, and ./etc/passwd We skip it in the
+		 * internal sftp chroot case.  We'll lose auditing and ACLs but
+		 * permanently_set_uid will take care of the rest.
+		 */
+		if (!in_chroot && set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0)
+			fatal("set_id(%s) Failed", pw->pw_name);
+# endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
+		/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
+		permanently_set_uid(pw);
+#endif
+	} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
+	    strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
+		fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
+	}
+
+	if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
+		fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
+}
+
+static void
+do_pwchange(Session *s)
+{
+	fflush(NULL);
+	fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Your password has expired.\n");
+	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+		fprintf(stderr,
+		    "You must change your password now and login again!\n");
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+		setexeccon(NULL);
+#endif
+#ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
+		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
+		    (char *)NULL);
+#else
+		execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", (char *)NULL);
+#endif
+		perror("passwd");
+	} else {
+		fprintf(stderr,
+		    "Password change required but no TTY available.\n");
+	}
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	extern int auth_sock;
+
+	if (auth_sock != -1) {
+		close(auth_sock);
+		auth_sock = -1;
+	}
+
+	if (ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh) ==
+	    ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh))
+		close(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+	else {
+		close(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+		close(ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh));
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Close all descriptors related to channels.  They will still remain
+	 * open in the parent.
+	 */
+	/* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */
+	channel_close_all(ssh);
+
+	/*
+	 * Close any extra file descriptors.  Note that there may still be
+	 * descriptors left by system functions.  They will be closed later.
+	 */
+	endpwent();
+
+	/* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
+	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
+	 * hanging around in clients.  Note that we want to do this after
+	 * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
+	 * descriptors open.
+	 */
+	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
+ * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
+ * ids, and executing the command or shell.
+ */
+#define ARGV_MAX 10
+void
+do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
+{
+	extern char **environ;
+	char **env, *argv[ARGV_MAX], remote_id[512];
+	const char *shell, *shell0;
+	struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
+	int r = 0;
+
+	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
+
+	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+	destroy_sensitive_data();
+	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+
+	/* Force a password change */
+	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
+		do_setusercontext(pw);
+		child_close_fds(ssh);
+		do_pwchange(s);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h"
+	 * switch, so we let login(1) to this for us.
+	 */
+#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
+	session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty);
+	if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
+		do_motd();
+#else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
+	/* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
+	if (!options.use_pam)
+		do_nologin(pw);
+	do_setusercontext(pw);
+	/*
+	 * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
+	 * generated messages, so if this in an interactive
+	 * login then display them too.
+	 */
+	if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
+		display_loginmsg();
+#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam && !is_pam_session_open()) {
+		debug3("PAM session not opened, exiting");
+		display_loginmsg();
+		exit(254);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Get the shell from the password data.  An empty shell field is
+	 * legal, and means /bin/sh.
+	 */
+	shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file,
+	 * even if shell is overridden from login.conf
+	 */
+	env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+	shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
+	 * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
+	 * that we do not shutdown it.  Note that the descriptors cannot be
+	 * closed before building the environment, as we call
+	 * ssh_remote_ipaddr there.
+	 */
+	child_close_fds(ssh);
+
+	/*
+	 * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc,
+	 * /etc/ssh/sshrc and xauth are run in the proper environment.
+	 */
+	environ = env;
+
+#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
+	/*
+	 * At this point, we check to see if AFS is active and if we have
+	 * a valid Kerberos 5 TGT. If so, it seems like a good idea to see
+	 * if we can (and need to) extend the ticket into an AFS token. If
+	 * we don't do this, we run into potential problems if the user's
+	 * home directory is in AFS and it's not world-readable.
+	 */
+
+	if (options.kerberos_get_afs_token && k_hasafs() &&
+	    (s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) {
+		char cell[64];
+
+		debug("Getting AFS token");
+
+		k_setpag();
+
+		if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0)
+			krb5_afslog(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+			    s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, cell, NULL);
+
+		krb5_afslog_home(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+		    s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, NULL, NULL, pw->pw_dir);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* Change current directory to the user's home directory. */
+	if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) == -1) {
+		/* Suppress missing homedir warning for chroot case */
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
+		r = login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0);
+#endif
+		if (r || !in_chroot) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home "
+			    "directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		}
+		if (r)
+			exit(1);
+	}
+
+	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
+
+	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
+	ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+
+	if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) {
+		error("Connection from %s: refusing non-sftp session",
+		    remote_id);
+		printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n");
+		fflush(NULL);
+		exit(1);
+	} else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) {
+		extern int optind, optreset;
+		int i;
+		char *p, *args;
+
+		setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME);
+		args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server");
+		for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " ")))
+			if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1)
+				argv[i++] = p;
+		argv[i] = NULL;
+		optind = optreset = 1;
+		__progname = argv[0];
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+		ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
+#endif
+		exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
+	}
+
+	fflush(NULL);
+
+	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
+	if ((shell0 = strrchr(shell, '/')) != NULL)
+		shell0++;
+	else
+		shell0 = shell;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we have no command, execute the shell.  In this case, the shell
+	 * name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that
+	 * this is a login shell.
+	 */
+	if (!command) {
+		char argv0[256];
+
+		/* Start the shell.  Set initial character to '-'. */
+		argv0[0] = '-';
+
+		if (strlcpy(argv0 + 1, shell0, sizeof(argv0) - 1)
+		    >= sizeof(argv0) - 1) {
+			errno = EINVAL;
+			perror(shell);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+
+		/* Execute the shell. */
+		argv[0] = argv0;
+		argv[1] = NULL;
+		execve(shell, argv, env);
+
+		/* Executing the shell failed. */
+		perror(shell);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Execute the command using the user's shell.  This uses the -c
+	 * option to execute the command.
+	 */
+	argv[0] = (char *) shell0;
+	argv[1] = "-c";
+	argv[2] = (char *) command;
+	argv[3] = NULL;
+	execve(shell, argv, env);
+	perror(shell);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+void
+session_unused(int id)
+{
+	debug3_f("session id %d unused", id);
+	if (id >= options.max_sessions ||
+	    id >= sessions_nalloc) {
+		fatal_f("insane session id %d (max %d nalloc %d)",
+		    id, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc);
+	}
+	memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions));
+	sessions[id].self = id;
+	sessions[id].used = 0;
+	sessions[id].chanid = -1;
+	sessions[id].ptyfd = -1;
+	sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
+	sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
+	sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
+	sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
+	sessions_first_unused = id;
+}
+
+Session *
+session_new(void)
+{
+	Session *s, *tmp;
+
+	if (sessions_first_unused == -1) {
+		if (sessions_nalloc >= options.max_sessions)
+			return NULL;
+		debug2_f("allocate (allocated %d max %d)",
+		    sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions);
+		tmp = xrecallocarray(sessions, sessions_nalloc,
+		    sessions_nalloc + 1, sizeof(*sessions));
+		if (tmp == NULL) {
+			error_f("cannot allocate %d sessions",
+			    sessions_nalloc + 1);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		sessions = tmp;
+		session_unused(sessions_nalloc++);
+	}
+
+	if (sessions_first_unused >= sessions_nalloc ||
+	    sessions_first_unused < 0) {
+		fatal_f("insane first_unused %d max %d nalloc %d",
+		    sessions_first_unused, options.max_sessions,
+		    sessions_nalloc);
+	}
+
+	s = &sessions[sessions_first_unused];
+	if (s->used)
+		fatal_f("session %d already used", sessions_first_unused);
+	sessions_first_unused = s->next_unused;
+	s->used = 1;
+	s->next_unused = -1;
+	debug("session_new: session %d", s->self);
+
+	return s;
+}
+
+static void
+session_dump(void)
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+		Session *s = &sessions[i];
+
+		debug("dump: used %d next_unused %d session %d "
+		    "channel %d pid %ld",
+		    s->used,
+		    s->next_unused,
+		    s->self,
+		    s->chanid,
+		    (long)s->pid);
+	}
+}
+
+int
+session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid)
+{
+	Session *s = session_new();
+	debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid);
+	if (s == NULL) {
+		error("no more sessions");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	s->authctxt = authctxt;
+	s->pw = authctxt->pw;
+	if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid)
+		fatal("no user for session %d", s->self);
+	debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid);
+	s->chanid = chanid;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+Session *
+session_by_tty(char *tty)
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+		Session *s = &sessions[i];
+		if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) {
+			debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty);
+			return s;
+		}
+	}
+	debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty);
+	session_dump();
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static Session *
+session_by_channel(int id)
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+		Session *s = &sessions[i];
+		if (s->used && s->chanid == id) {
+			debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d",
+			    i, id);
+			return s;
+		}
+	}
+	debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
+	session_dump();
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static Session *
+session_by_x11_channel(int id)
+{
+	int i, j;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+		Session *s = &sessions[i];
+
+		if (s->x11_chanids == NULL || !s->used)
+			continue;
+		for (j = 0; s->x11_chanids[j] != -1; j++) {
+			if (s->x11_chanids[j] == id) {
+				debug("session_by_x11_channel: session %d "
+				    "channel %d", s->self, id);
+				return s;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	debug("session_by_x11_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
+	session_dump();
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static Session *
+session_by_pid(pid_t pid)
+{
+	int i;
+	debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid);
+	for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+		Session *s = &sessions[i];
+		if (s->used && s->pid == pid)
+			return s;
+	}
+	error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid);
+	session_dump();
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+session_window_change_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->col)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->row)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->xpixel)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->ypixel)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+	pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_pty_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!auth_opts->permit_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) {
+		debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this connection.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: you already have a pty.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->term, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->col)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->row)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->xpixel)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->ypixel)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+	if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) {
+		free(s->term);
+		s->term = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* Allocate a pty and open it. */
+	debug("Allocating pty.");
+	if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty,
+	    sizeof(s->tty)))) {
+		free(s->term);
+		s->term = NULL;
+		s->ptyfd = -1;
+		s->ttyfd = -1;
+		error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty);
+
+	ssh_tty_parse_modes(ssh, s->ttyfd);
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+	if (!use_privsep)
+		pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
+
+	/* Set window size from the packet. */
+	pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
+
+	session_proctitle(s);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_subsystem_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	int r, success = 0;
+	char *prog, *cmd, *type;
+	u_int i;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->subsys, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+	debug2("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s", s->subsys,
+	    s->pw->pw_name);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(s->subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
+			prog = options.subsystem_command[i];
+			cmd = options.subsystem_args[i];
+			if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, prog) == 0) {
+				s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP;
+				debug("subsystem: %s", prog);
+			} else {
+				if (stat(prog, &st) == -1)
+					debug("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s",
+					    prog, strerror(errno));
+				s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
+				debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd);
+			}
+			xasprintf(&type, "session:subsystem:%s",
+			    options.subsystem_name[i]);
+			channel_set_xtype(ssh, s->chanid, type);
+			free(type);
+			success = do_exec(ssh, s, cmd) == 0;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!success)
+		logit("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s failed, "
+		    "subsystem not found", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name);
+
+	return success;
+}
+
+static int
+session_x11_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+	int r, success;
+	u_char single_connection = 0;
+
+	if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) {
+		error("session_x11_req: session %d: "
+		    "x11 forwarding already active", s->self);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &single_connection)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->auth_proto, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->auth_data, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->screen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+	s->single_connection = single_connection;
+
+	if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) &&
+	    xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data))
+		success = session_setup_x11fwd(ssh, s);
+	else {
+		success = 0;
+		error("Invalid X11 forwarding data");
+	}
+	if (!success) {
+		free(s->auth_proto);
+		free(s->auth_data);
+		s->auth_proto = NULL;
+		s->auth_data = NULL;
+	}
+	return success;
+}
+
+static int
+session_shell_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+	channel_set_xtype(ssh, s->chanid, "session:shell");
+
+	return do_exec(ssh, s, NULL) == 0;
+}
+
+static int
+session_exec_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+	u_int success;
+	int r;
+	char *command = NULL;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &command, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+	channel_set_xtype(ssh, s->chanid, "session:command");
+
+	success = do_exec(ssh, s, command) == 0;
+	free(command);
+	return success;
+}
+
+static int
+session_break_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignore */
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+	if (s->ptymaster == -1 || tcsendbreak(s->ptymaster, 0) == -1)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_env_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+	char *name, *val;
+	u_int i;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &val, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+
+	/* Don't set too many environment variables */
+	if (s->num_env > 128) {
+		debug2("Ignoring env request %s: too many env vars", name);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) {
+		if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) {
+			debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val);
+			s->env = xrecallocarray(s->env, s->num_env,
+			    s->num_env + 1, sizeof(*s->env));
+			s->env[s->num_env].name = name;
+			s->env[s->num_env].val = val;
+			s->num_env++;
+			return (1);
+		}
+	}
+	debug2("Ignoring env request %s: disallowed name", name);
+
+ fail:
+	free(name);
+	free(val);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Conversion of signals from ssh channel request names.
+ * Subset of signals from RFC 4254 section 6.10C, with SIGINFO as
+ * local extension.
+ */
+static int
+name2sig(char *name)
+{
+#define SSH_SIG(x) if (strcmp(name, #x) == 0) return SIG ## x
+	SSH_SIG(HUP);
+	SSH_SIG(INT);
+	SSH_SIG(KILL);
+	SSH_SIG(QUIT);
+	SSH_SIG(TERM);
+	SSH_SIG(USR1);
+	SSH_SIG(USR2);
+#undef	SSH_SIG
+#ifdef SIGINFO
+	if (strcmp(name, "INFO@openssh.com") == 0)
+		return SIGINFO;
+#endif
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+session_signal_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+	char *signame = NULL;
+	int r, sig, success = 0;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &signame, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((sig = name2sig(signame)) == -1) {
+		error_f("unsupported signal \"%s\"", signame);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (s->pid <= 0) {
+		error_f("no pid for session %d", s->self);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (s->forced || s->is_subsystem) {
+		error_f("refusing to send signal %s to %s session",
+		    signame, s->forced ? "forced-command" : "subsystem");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) {
+		error_f("session signalling requires privilege separation");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	debug_f("signal %s, killpg(%ld, %d)", signame, (long)s->pid, sig);
+	temporarily_use_uid(s->pw);
+	r = killpg(s->pid, sig);
+	restore_uid();
+	if (r != 0) {
+		error_f("killpg(%ld, %d): %s", (long)s->pid,
+		    sig, strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* success */
+	success = 1;
+ out:
+	free(signame);
+	return success;
+}
+
+static int
+session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+	static int called = 0;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+	if (!auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ||
+	    !options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
+		debug_f("agent forwarding disabled");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (called) {
+		return 0;
+	} else {
+		called = 1;
+		return auth_input_request_forwarding(ssh, s->pw);
+	}
+}
+
+int
+session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, const char *rtype)
+{
+	int success = 0;
+	Session *s;
+
+	if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) {
+		logit_f("no session %d req %.100s", c->self, rtype);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	debug_f("session %d req %s", s->self, rtype);
+
+	/*
+	 * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command
+	 * or a subsystem is executed
+	 */
+	if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) {
+		if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) {
+			success = session_shell_req(ssh, s);
+		} else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) {
+			success = session_exec_req(ssh, s);
+		} else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) {
+			success = session_pty_req(ssh, s);
+		} else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) {
+			success = session_x11_req(ssh, s);
+		} else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com") == 0) {
+			success = session_auth_agent_req(ssh, s);
+		} else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) {
+			success = session_subsystem_req(ssh, s);
+		} else if (strcmp(rtype, "env") == 0) {
+			success = session_env_req(ssh, s);
+		}
+	}
+	if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) {
+		success = session_window_change_req(ssh, s);
+	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) {
+		success = session_break_req(ssh, s);
+	} else if (strcmp(rtype, "signal") == 0) {
+		success = session_signal_req(ssh, s);
+	}
+
+	return success;
+}
+
+void
+session_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s,
+    int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr, int is_tty)
+{
+	/*
+	 * now that have a child and a pipe to the child,
+	 * we can activate our channel and register the fd's
+	 */
+	if (s->chanid == -1)
+		fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self);
+	channel_set_fds(ssh, s->chanid,
+	    fdout, fdin, fderr,
+	    ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
+	    1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally
+ * (e.g., due to a dropped connection).
+ */
+void
+session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
+{
+	if (s == NULL) {
+		error_f("no session");
+		return;
+	}
+	if (s->ttyfd == -1)
+		return;
+
+	debug_f("session %d release %s", s->self, s->tty);
+
+	/* Record that the user has logged out. */
+	if (s->pid != 0)
+		record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name);
+
+	/* Release the pseudo-tty. */
+	if (getuid() == 0)
+		pty_release(s->tty);
+
+	/*
+	 * Close the server side of the socket pairs.  We must do this after
+	 * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty
+	 * while we're still cleaning up.
+	 */
+	if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) == -1)
+		error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
+		    s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
+
+	/* unlink pty from session */
+	s->ttyfd = -1;
+}
+
+void
+session_pty_cleanup(Session *s)
+{
+	PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(s));
+}
+
+static char *
+sig2name(int sig)
+{
+#define SSH_SIG(x) if (sig == SIG ## x) return #x
+	SSH_SIG(ABRT);
+	SSH_SIG(ALRM);
+	SSH_SIG(FPE);
+	SSH_SIG(HUP);
+	SSH_SIG(ILL);
+	SSH_SIG(INT);
+	SSH_SIG(KILL);
+	SSH_SIG(PIPE);
+	SSH_SIG(QUIT);
+	SSH_SIG(SEGV);
+	SSH_SIG(TERM);
+	SSH_SIG(USR1);
+	SSH_SIG(USR2);
+#undef	SSH_SIG
+	return "SIG@openssh.com";
+}
+
+static void
+session_close_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+
+	if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
+		debug_f("x11 channel %d missing", id);
+	} else {
+		/* Detach X11 listener */
+		debug_f("detach x11 channel %d", id);
+		channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id);
+		if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+			chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+session_close_single_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int force, void *arg)
+{
+	Session *s;
+	u_int i;
+
+	debug3_f("channel %d", id);
+	channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id);
+	if ((s = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("no x11 channel %d", id);
+	for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+		debug_f("session %d: closing channel %d",
+		    s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]);
+		/*
+		 * The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we
+		 * close all of its siblings.
+		 */
+		if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id)
+			session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]);
+	}
+	free(s->x11_chanids);
+	s->x11_chanids = NULL;
+	free(s->display);
+	s->display = NULL;
+	free(s->auth_proto);
+	s->auth_proto = NULL;
+	free(s->auth_data);
+	s->auth_data = NULL;
+	free(s->auth_display);
+	s->auth_display = NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, int status)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, s->chanid)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("session %d: no channel %d", s->self, s->chanid);
+	debug_f("session %d channel %d pid %ld",
+	    s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid);
+
+	if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
+		channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-status", 0);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, WEXITSTATUS(status))) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: exit reply", __func__);
+	} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
+		channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0);
+#ifndef WCOREDUMP
+# define WCOREDUMP(x) (0)
+#endif
+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, sig2name(WTERMSIG(status)))) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, WCOREDUMP(status)? 1 : 0)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: exit reply", __func__);
+	} else {
+		/* Some weird exit cause.  Just exit. */
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "wait returned status %04x.", status);
+	}
+
+	/* disconnect channel */
+	debug_f("release channel %d", s->chanid);
+
+	/*
+	 * Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when
+	 * the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed
+	 * by session_close_by_channel when the child sessions close their fds.
+	 */
+	channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be
+	 * interested in data we write.
+	 * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could
+	 * be some more data waiting in the pipe.
+	 */
+	if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
+		chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
+}
+
+void
+session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
+	    s->pw->pw_name,
+	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+	    ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+	    s->self);
+
+	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+		session_pty_cleanup(s);
+	free(s->term);
+	free(s->display);
+	free(s->x11_chanids);
+	free(s->auth_display);
+	free(s->auth_data);
+	free(s->auth_proto);
+	free(s->subsys);
+	if (s->env != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) {
+			free(s->env[i].name);
+			free(s->env[i].val);
+		}
+		free(s->env);
+	}
+	session_proctitle(s);
+	session_unused(s->self);
+}
+
+void
+session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t pid, int status)
+{
+	Session *s = session_by_pid(pid);
+	if (s == NULL) {
+		debug_f("no session for pid %ld", (long)pid);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (s->chanid != -1)
+		session_exit_message(ssh, s, status);
+	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+		session_pty_cleanup(s);
+	s->pid = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * this is called when a channel dies before
+ * the session 'child' itself dies
+ */
+void
+session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int force, void *arg)
+{
+	Session *s = session_by_channel(id);
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (s == NULL) {
+		debug_f("no session for id %d", id);
+		return;
+	}
+	debug_f("channel %d child %ld", id, (long)s->pid);
+	if (s->pid != 0) {
+		debug_f("channel %d: has child, ttyfd %d", id, s->ttyfd);
+		/*
+		 * delay detach of session (unless this is a forced close),
+		 * but release pty, since the fd's to the child are already
+		 * closed
+		 */
+		if (s->ttyfd != -1)
+			session_pty_cleanup(s);
+		if (!force)
+			return;
+	}
+	/* detach by removing callback */
+	channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, s->chanid);
+
+	/* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */
+	if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+			session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]);
+			s->x11_chanids[i] = -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	s->chanid = -1;
+	session_close(ssh, s);
+}
+
+void
+session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(Session *))
+{
+	int i;
+	for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+		Session *s = &sessions[i];
+		if (s->used) {
+			if (closefunc != NULL)
+				closefunc(s);
+			else
+				session_close(ssh, s);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static char *
+session_tty_list(void)
+{
+	static char buf[1024];
+	int i;
+	char *cp;
+
+	buf[0] = '\0';
+	for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
+		Session *s = &sessions[i];
+		if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) {
+
+			if (strncmp(s->tty, "/dev/", 5) != 0) {
+				cp = strrchr(s->tty, '/');
+				cp = (cp == NULL) ? s->tty : cp + 1;
+			} else
+				cp = s->tty + 5;
+
+			if (buf[0] != '\0')
+				strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf);
+			strlcat(buf, cp, sizeof buf);
+		}
+	}
+	if (buf[0] == '\0')
+		strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf);
+	return buf;
+}
+
+void
+session_proctitle(Session *s)
+{
+	if (s->pw == NULL)
+		error("no user for session %d", s->self);
+	else
+		setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list());
+}
+
+int
+session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	char display[512], auth_display[512];
+	char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (!auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag) {
+		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "X11 forwarding disabled by key options.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
+		debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (options.xauth_location == NULL ||
+	    (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) {
+		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "No xauth program; cannot forward X11.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (s->display != NULL) {
+		debug("X11 display already set.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
+	    options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
+	    &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
+		debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
+		channel_register_cleanup(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i],
+		    session_close_single_x11, 0);
+	}
+
+	/* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */
+	if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == -1)
+		fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	/*
+	 * auth_display must be used as the displayname when the
+	 * authorization entry is added with xauth(1).  This will be
+	 * different than the DISPLAY string for localhost displays.
+	 */
+	if (options.x11_use_localhost) {
+		snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%u.%u",
+		    s->display_number, s->screen);
+		snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%u.%u",
+		    s->display_number, s->screen);
+		s->display = xstrdup(display);
+		s->auth_display = xstrdup(auth_display);
+	} else {
+#ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY
+		struct hostent *he;
+		struct in_addr my_addr;
+
+		he = gethostbyname(hostname);
+		if (he == NULL) {
+			error("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
+			ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
+			return 0;
+		}
+		memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
+		snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%u.%u", inet_ntoa(my_addr),
+		    s->display_number, s->screen);
+#else
+		snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%u.%u", hostname,
+		    s->display_number, s->screen);
+#endif
+		s->display = xstrdup(display);
+		s->auth_display = xstrdup(display);
+	}
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	server_loop2(ssh, authctxt);
+}
+
+void
+do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	static int called = 0;
+
+	debug("do_cleanup");
+
+	/* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */
+	if (is_child)
+		return;
+
+	/* avoid double cleanup */
+	if (called)
+		return;
+	called = 1;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		return;
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam) {
+		sshpam_cleanup();
+		sshpam_thread_cleanup();
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (!authctxt->authenticated)
+		return;
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+	if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
+	    authctxt->krb5_ctx)
+		krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	if (options.gss_cleanup_creds)
+		ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds();
+#endif
+
+	/* remove agent socket */
+	auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
+
+	/* remove userauth info */
+	if (auth_info_file != NULL) {
+		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+		unlink(auth_info_file);
+		restore_uid();
+		free(auth_info_file);
+		auth_info_file = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled,
+	 * or if running in monitor.
+	 */
+	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+		session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2);
+}
+
+/* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */
+
+const char *
+session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *ssh, u_int utmp_size, int use_dns)
+{
+	const char *remote = "";
+
+	if (utmp_size > 0)
+		remote = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns);
+	if (utmp_size == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_size)
+		remote = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+	return remote;
+}
+
diff --git a/session.h b/session.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..344a1dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/session.h
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: session.h,v 1.37 2023/01/06 02:39:59 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef SESSION_H
+#define SESSION_H
+
+#define TTYSZ 64
+typedef struct Session Session;
+struct Session {
+	int	used;
+	int	self;
+	int	next_unused;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	Authctxt *authctxt;
+	pid_t	pid;
+	int	forced;
+
+	/* tty */
+	char	*term;
+	int	ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
+	u_int	row, col, xpixel, ypixel;
+	char	tty[TTYSZ];
+
+	/* X11 */
+	u_int	display_number;
+	char	*display;
+	u_int	screen;
+	char	*auth_display;
+	char	*auth_proto;
+	char	*auth_data;
+	int	single_connection;
+
+	int	chanid;
+	int	*x11_chanids;
+	int	is_subsystem;
+	char	*subsys;
+	u_int	num_env;
+	struct {
+		char	*name;
+		char	*val;
+	} *env;
+};
+
+void	 do_authenticated(struct ssh *, Authctxt *);
+void	 do_cleanup(struct ssh *, Authctxt *);
+
+int	 session_open(Authctxt *, int);
+void	 session_unused(int);
+int	 session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *, Channel *, const char *);
+void	 session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t, int);
+void	 session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
+void	 session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(Session *));
+void	 session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
+
+Session	*session_new(void);
+Session	*session_by_tty(char *);
+void	 session_close(struct ssh *, Session *);
+void	 do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
+
+const char	*session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *, u_int, int);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e014648
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sftp-client.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2947 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.168 2023/01/11 05:39:38 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* XXX: memleaks */
+/* XXX: signed vs unsigned */
+/* XXX: remove all logging, only return status codes */
+/* XXX: copy between two remote sites */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
+#  include <sys/poll.h>
+# endif
+#endif
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "progressmeter.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-client.h"
+
+extern volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted;
+extern int showprogress;
+
+/* Default size of buffer for up/download (fix sftp.1 scp.1 if changed) */
+#define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN	32768
+
+/* Default number of concurrent xfer requests (fix sftp.1 scp.1 if changed) */
+#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS	64
+
+/* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */
+#define MIN_READ_SIZE	512
+
+/* Maximum depth to descend in directory trees */
+#define MAX_DIR_DEPTH 64
+
+/* Directory separator characters */
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+# define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS      "/\\"
+#else /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+# define SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS      "/"
+#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+
+struct sftp_conn {
+	int fd_in;
+	int fd_out;
+	u_int download_buflen;
+	u_int upload_buflen;
+	u_int num_requests;
+	u_int version;
+	u_int msg_id;
+#define SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME		0x00000001
+#define SFTP_EXT_STATVFS		0x00000002
+#define SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS		0x00000004
+#define SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK		0x00000008
+#define SFTP_EXT_FSYNC			0x00000010
+#define SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT		0x00000020
+#define SFTP_EXT_LIMITS			0x00000040
+#define SFTP_EXT_PATH_EXPAND		0x00000080
+#define SFTP_EXT_COPY_DATA		0x00000100
+#define SFTP_EXT_GETUSERSGROUPS_BY_ID	0x00000200
+	u_int exts;
+	u_int64_t limit_kbps;
+	struct bwlimit bwlimit_in, bwlimit_out;
+};
+
+/* Tracks in-progress requests during file transfers */
+struct request {
+	u_int id;
+	size_t len;
+	u_int64_t offset;
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(request) tq;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(requests, request);
+
+static u_char *
+get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len,
+    const char *errfmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5)));
+
+static struct request *
+request_enqueue(struct requests *requests, u_int id, size_t len,
+    uint64_t offset)
+{
+	struct request *req;
+
+	req = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*req));
+	req->id = id;
+	req->len = len;
+	req->offset = offset;
+	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(requests, req, tq);
+	return req;
+}
+
+static struct request *
+request_find(struct requests *requests, u_int id)
+{
+	struct request *req;
+
+	for (req = TAILQ_FIRST(requests);
+	    req != NULL && req->id != id;
+	    req = TAILQ_NEXT(req, tq))
+		;
+	return req;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+sftpio(void *_bwlimit, size_t amount)
+{
+	struct bwlimit *bwlimit = (struct bwlimit *)_bwlimit;
+
+	refresh_progress_meter(0);
+	if (bwlimit != NULL)
+		bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+send_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	u_char mlen[4];
+	struct iovec iov[2];
+
+	if (sshbuf_len(m) > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)
+		fatal("Outbound message too long %zu", sshbuf_len(m));
+
+	/* Send length first */
+	put_u32(mlen, sshbuf_len(m));
+	iov[0].iov_base = mlen;
+	iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(mlen);
+	iov[1].iov_base = (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(m);
+	iov[1].iov_len = sshbuf_len(m);
+
+	if (atomiciov6(writev, conn->fd_out, iov, 2, sftpio,
+	    conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_out : NULL) !=
+	    sshbuf_len(m) + sizeof(mlen))
+		fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+}
+
+static void
+get_msg_extended(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m, int initial)
+{
+	u_int msg_len;
+	u_char *p;
+	int r;
+
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, 4, &p)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
+	if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, 4, sftpio,
+	    conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_in : NULL) != 4) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE || errno == ECONNRESET)
+			fatal("Connection closed");
+		else
+			fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &msg_len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_get_u32");
+	if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
+		do_log2(initial ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR : SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
+		    "Received message too long %u", msg_len);
+		fatal("Ensure the remote shell produces no output "
+		    "for non-interactive sessions.");
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
+	if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, msg_len, sftpio,
+	    conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? &conn->bwlimit_in : NULL)
+	    != msg_len) {
+		if (errno == EPIPE)
+			fatal("Connection closed");
+		else
+			fatal("Read packet: %s", strerror(errno));
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	get_msg_extended(conn, m, 0);
+}
+
+static void
+send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s,
+    u_int len)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+	debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static void
+send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code,
+    const void *s, u_int len, Attrib *a)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+	debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u F:0x%04x M:%05o",
+	    conn->fd_out, code, id, a->flags, a->perm);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static u_int
+get_status(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_char type;
+	u_int id, status;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	get_msg(conn, msg);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+
+	if (id != expected_id)
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+	if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS)
+		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%u) packet, got %u",
+		    SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+	debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status);
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+static u_char *
+get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len,
+    const char *errfmt, ...)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_int id, status;
+	u_char type;
+	u_char *handle;
+	char errmsg[256];
+	va_list args;
+	int r;
+
+	va_start(args, errfmt);
+	if (errfmt != NULL)
+		vsnprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), errfmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	get_msg(conn, msg);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	if (id != expected_id)
+		fatal("%s: ID mismatch (%u != %u)",
+		    errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, id, expected_id);
+	if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+		if (errfmt != NULL)
+			error("%s: %s", errmsg, fx2txt(status));
+		sshbuf_free(msg);
+		return(NULL);
+	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_HANDLE)
+		fatal("%s: Expected SSH2_FXP_HANDLE(%u) packet, got %u",
+		    errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, type);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &handle, len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse handle");
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+	return handle;
+}
+
+/* XXX returning &static is error-prone. Refactor to fill *Attrib argument */
+static Attrib *
+get_decode_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, int quiet)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_int id;
+	u_char type;
+	int r;
+	static Attrib a;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	get_msg(conn, msg);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	if (id != expected_id)
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+	if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+		u_int status;
+
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+		if (quiet)
+			debug("stat remote: %s", fx2txt(status));
+		else
+			error("stat remote: %s", fx2txt(status));
+		sshbuf_free(msg);
+		return(NULL);
+	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_ATTRS) {
+		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_ATTRS(%u) packet, got %u",
+		    SSH2_FXP_ATTRS, type);
+	}
+	if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "decode_attrib");
+		sshbuf_free(msg);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	debug3("Received stat reply T:%u I:%u F:0x%04x M:%05o",
+	    type, id, a.flags, a.perm);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+	return &a;
+}
+
+static int
+get_decode_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_statvfs *st,
+    u_int expected_id, int quiet)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_char type;
+	u_int id;
+	u_int64_t flag;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	get_msg(conn, msg);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug3("Received statvfs reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
+	if (id != expected_id)
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+	if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+		u_int status;
+
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+		if (quiet)
+			debug("remote statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status));
+		else
+			error("remote statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status));
+		sshbuf_free(msg);
+		return -1;
+	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) {
+		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u",
+		    SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type);
+	}
+
+	memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bsize)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_frsize)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_blocks)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bfree)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bavail)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_files)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_ffree)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_favail)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_fsid)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &flag)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_namemax)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse statvfs");
+
+	st->f_flag = (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY) ? ST_RDONLY : 0;
+	st->f_flag |= (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID) ? ST_NOSUID : 0;
+
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct sftp_conn *
+do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out, u_int transfer_buflen, u_int num_requests,
+    u_int64_t limit_kbps)
+{
+	u_char type;
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	struct sftp_conn *ret;
+	int r;
+
+	ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
+	ret->msg_id = 1;
+	ret->fd_in = fd_in;
+	ret->fd_out = fd_out;
+	ret->download_buflen = ret->upload_buflen =
+	    transfer_buflen ? transfer_buflen : DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN;
+	ret->num_requests =
+	    num_requests ? num_requests : DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS;
+	ret->exts = 0;
+	ret->limit_kbps = 0;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_INIT)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	send_msg(ret, msg);
+
+	get_msg_extended(ret, msg, 1);
+
+	/* Expecting a VERSION reply */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
+	if (type != SSH2_FXP_VERSION) {
+		error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %u)",
+		    type);
+		sshbuf_free(msg);
+		free(ret);
+		return(NULL);
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &ret->version)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse version");
+
+	debug2("Remote version: %u", ret->version);
+
+	/* Check for extensions */
+	while (sshbuf_len(msg) > 0) {
+		char *name;
+		u_char *value;
+		size_t vlen;
+		int known = 0;
+
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &value, &vlen)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse extension");
+		if (strcmp(name, "posix-rename@openssh.com") == 0 &&
+		    strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
+			ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME;
+			known = 1;
+		} else if (strcmp(name, "statvfs@openssh.com") == 0 &&
+		    strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) {
+			ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_STATVFS;
+			known = 1;
+		} else if (strcmp(name, "fstatvfs@openssh.com") == 0 &&
+		    strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) {
+			ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS;
+			known = 1;
+		} else if (strcmp(name, "hardlink@openssh.com") == 0 &&
+		    strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
+			ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK;
+			known = 1;
+		} else if (strcmp(name, "fsync@openssh.com") == 0 &&
+		    strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
+			ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSYNC;
+			known = 1;
+		} else if (strcmp(name, "lsetstat@openssh.com") == 0 &&
+		    strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
+			ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT;
+			known = 1;
+		} else if (strcmp(name, "limits@openssh.com") == 0 &&
+		    strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
+			ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_LIMITS;
+			known = 1;
+		} else if (strcmp(name, "expand-path@openssh.com") == 0 &&
+		    strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
+			ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_PATH_EXPAND;
+			known = 1;
+		} else if (strcmp(name, "copy-data") == 0 &&
+		    strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
+			ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_COPY_DATA;
+			known = 1;
+		} else if (strcmp(name,
+		    "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com") == 0 &&
+		    strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) {
+			ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_GETUSERSGROUPS_BY_ID;
+			known = 1;
+		}
+		if (known) {
+			debug2("Server supports extension \"%s\" revision %s",
+			    name, value);
+		} else {
+			debug2("Unrecognised server extension \"%s\"", name);
+		}
+		free(name);
+		free(value);
+	}
+
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+	/* Query the server for its limits */
+	if (ret->exts & SFTP_EXT_LIMITS) {
+		struct sftp_limits limits;
+		if (do_limits(ret, &limits) != 0)
+			fatal_f("limits failed");
+
+		/* If the caller did not specify, find a good value */
+		if (transfer_buflen == 0) {
+			ret->download_buflen = MINIMUM(limits.read_length,
+			    SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH - 1024);
+			ret->upload_buflen = MINIMUM(limits.write_length,
+			    SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH - 1024);
+			ret->download_buflen = MAXIMUM(ret->download_buflen, 64);
+			ret->upload_buflen = MAXIMUM(ret->upload_buflen, 64);
+			debug3("server upload/download buffer sizes "
+			    "%llu / %llu; using %u / %u",
+			    (unsigned long long)limits.write_length,
+			    (unsigned long long)limits.read_length,
+			    ret->upload_buflen, ret->download_buflen);
+		}
+
+		/* Use the server limit to scale down our value only */
+		if (num_requests == 0 && limits.open_handles) {
+			ret->num_requests =
+			    MINIMUM(DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS, limits.open_handles);
+			if (ret->num_requests == 0)
+				ret->num_requests = 1;
+			debug3("server handle limit %llu; using %u",
+			    (unsigned long long)limits.open_handles,
+			    ret->num_requests);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Some filexfer v.0 servers don't support large packets */
+	if (ret->version == 0) {
+		ret->download_buflen = MINIMUM(ret->download_buflen, 20480);
+		ret->upload_buflen = MINIMUM(ret->upload_buflen, 20480);
+	}
+
+	ret->limit_kbps = limit_kbps;
+	if (ret->limit_kbps > 0) {
+		bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_in, ret->limit_kbps,
+		    ret->download_buflen);
+		bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_out, ret->limit_kbps,
+		    ret->upload_buflen);
+	}
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+u_int
+sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *conn)
+{
+	return conn->version;
+}
+
+int
+do_limits(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_limits *limits)
+{
+	u_int id, msg_id;
+	u_char type;
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_LIMITS) == 0) {
+		error("Server does not support limits@openssh.com extension");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "limits@openssh.com")) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+	debug3("Sent message limits@openssh.com I:%u", id);
+
+	get_msg(conn, msg);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &msg_id)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug3("Received limits reply T:%u I:%u", type, msg_id);
+	if (id != msg_id)
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", msg_id, id);
+	if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) {
+		debug_f("expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u",
+		    SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type);
+		/* Disable the limits extension */
+		conn->exts &= ~SFTP_EXT_LIMITS;
+		sshbuf_free(msg);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	memset(limits, 0, sizeof(*limits));
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &limits->packet_length)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &limits->read_length)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &limits->write_length)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &limits->open_handles)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse limits");
+
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+{
+	u_int id, status;
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+	debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_CLOSE I:%u", id);
+
+	status = get_status(conn, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("close remote: %s", fx2txt(status));
+
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+	return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+
+static int
+do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag,
+    SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_int count, id, i, expected_id, ents = 0;
+	size_t handle_len;
+	u_char type, *handle;
+	int status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+	int r;
+
+	if (dir)
+		*dir = NULL;
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose OPENDIR");
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+
+	handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len,
+	    "remote readdir(\"%s\")", path);
+	if (handle == NULL) {
+		sshbuf_free(msg);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (dir) {
+		ents = 0;
+		*dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir));
+		(*dir)[0] = NULL;
+	}
+
+	for (; !interrupted;) {
+		id = expected_id = conn->msg_id++;
+
+		debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%u", id);
+
+		sshbuf_reset(msg);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READDIR)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "compose READDIR");
+		send_msg(conn, msg);
+
+		sshbuf_reset(msg);
+
+		get_msg(conn, msg);
+
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+		debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u", type, id);
+
+		if (id != expected_id)
+			fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+
+		if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+			u_int rstatus;
+
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rstatus)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+			debug3("Received SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", rstatus);
+			if (rstatus == SSH2_FX_EOF)
+				break;
+			error("Couldn't read directory: %s", fx2txt(rstatus));
+			goto out;
+		} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+			fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
+			    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse count");
+		if (count > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
+			fatal_f("nonsensical number of entries");
+		if (count == 0)
+			break;
+		debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count);
+		for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+			char *filename, *longname;
+			Attrib a;
+
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename,
+			    NULL)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname,
+			    NULL)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse filenames");
+			if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) {
+				error_fr(r, "couldn't decode attrib");
+				free(filename);
+				free(longname);
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			if (print_flag)
+				mprintf("%s\n", longname);
+
+			/*
+			 * Directory entries should never contain '/'
+			 * These can be used to attack recursive ops
+			 * (e.g. send '../../../../etc/passwd')
+			 */
+			if (strpbrk(filename, SFTP_DIRECTORY_CHARS) != NULL) {
+				error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" "
+				    "during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path);
+			} else if (dir) {
+				*dir = xreallocarray(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir));
+				(*dir)[ents] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(***dir));
+				(*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename);
+				(*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname);
+				memcpy(&(*dir)[ents]->a, &a, sizeof(a));
+				(*dir)[++ents] = NULL;
+			}
+			free(filename);
+			free(longname);
+		}
+	}
+	status = 0;
+
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
+	free(handle);
+
+	if (status != 0 && dir != NULL) {
+		/* Don't return results on error */
+		free_sftp_dirents(*dir);
+		*dir = NULL;
+	} else if (interrupted && dir != NULL && *dir != NULL) {
+		/* Don't return partial matches on interrupt */
+		free_sftp_dirents(*dir);
+		*dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir));
+		**dir = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int
+do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir)
+{
+	return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir));
+}
+
+void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (s == NULL)
+		return;
+	for (i = 0; s[i]; i++) {
+		free(s[i]->filename);
+		free(s[i]->longname);
+		free(s[i]);
+	}
+	free(s);
+}
+
+int
+do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+{
+	u_int status, id;
+
+	debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REMOVE \"%s\"", path);
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, path, strlen(path));
+	status = get_status(conn, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("remote delete %s: %s", path, fx2txt(status));
+	return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int
+do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag)
+{
+	u_int status, id;
+
+	debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_MKDIR \"%s\"", path);
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, path,
+	    strlen(path), a);
+
+	status = get_status(conn, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK && print_flag)
+		error("remote mkdir \"%s\": %s", path, fx2txt(status));
+
+	return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int
+do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+{
+	u_int status, id;
+
+	debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_RMDIR \"%s\"", path);
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, path,
+	    strlen(path));
+
+	status = get_status(conn, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("remote rmdir \"%s\": %s", path, fx2txt(status));
+
+	return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+Attrib *
+do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
+{
+	u_int id;
+
+	debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_STAT \"%s\"", path);
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+
+	send_string_request(conn, id,
+	    conn->version == 0 ? SSH2_FXP_STAT_VERSION_0 : SSH2_FXP_STAT,
+	    path, strlen(path));
+
+	return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet));
+}
+
+Attrib *
+do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet)
+{
+	u_int id;
+
+	if (conn->version == 0) {
+		if (quiet)
+			debug("Server version does not support lstat operation");
+		else
+			logit("Server version does not support lstat operation");
+		return(do_stat(conn, path, quiet));
+	}
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, path,
+	    strlen(path));
+
+	return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet));
+}
+
+#ifdef notyet
+Attrib *
+do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
+    int quiet)
+{
+	u_int id;
+
+	debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_FSTAT \"%s\"");
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, handle,
+	    handle_len);
+
+	return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet));
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a)
+{
+	u_int status, id;
+
+	debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT \"%s\"", path);
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, path,
+	    strlen(path), a);
+
+	status = get_status(conn, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("remote setstat \"%s\": %s", path, fx2txt(status));
+
+	return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int
+do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
+    Attrib *a)
+{
+	u_int status, id;
+
+	debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT");
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, handle,
+	    handle_len, a);
+
+	status = get_status(conn, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("remote fsetstat: %s", fx2txt(status));
+
+	return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+/* Implements both the realpath and expand-path operations */
+static char *
+do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_int expected_id, count, id;
+	char *filename, *longname;
+	Attrib a;
+	u_char type;
+	int r;
+	const char *what = "SSH2_FXP_REALPATH";
+
+	if (expand)
+		what = "expand-path@openssh.com";
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++;
+	if (expand) {
+		debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED(expand-path@openssh.com) "
+		    "\"%s\"", path);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg,
+		    "expand-path@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "compose %s", what);
+		send_msg(conn, msg);
+	} else {
+		debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REALPATH \"%s\"", path);
+		send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH,
+		    path, strlen(path));
+	}
+	get_msg(conn, msg);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	if (id != expected_id)
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+
+	if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+		u_int status;
+		char *errmsg;
+
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+		error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
+		    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
+		free(errmsg);
+		sshbuf_free(msg);
+		return NULL;
+	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
+		    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse count");
+	if (count != 1)
+		fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from %s", count, what);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse filename/attrib");
+
+	debug3("%s %s -> %s", what, path, filename);
+
+	free(longname);
+
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+	return(filename);
+}
+
+char *
+do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+{
+	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
+}
+
+int
+can_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn)
+{
+	return (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_PATH_EXPAND) != 0;
+}
+
+char *
+do_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+{
+	if (!can_expand_path(conn)) {
+		debug3_f("no server support, fallback to realpath");
+		return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
+	}
+	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1);
+}
+
+int
+do_copy(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
+{
+	Attrib junk, *a;
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_char *old_handle, *new_handle;
+	u_int mode, status, id;
+	size_t old_handle_len, new_handle_len;
+	int r;
+
+	/* Return if the extension is not supported */
+	if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_COPY_DATA) == 0) {
+		error("Server does not support copy-data extension");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Make sure the file exists, and we can copy its perms */
+	if ((a = do_stat(conn, oldpath, 0)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Do not preserve set[ug]id here, as we do not preserve ownership */
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+		mode = a->perm & 0777;
+
+		if (!S_ISREG(a->perm)) {
+			error("Cannot copy non-regular file: %s", oldpath);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* NB: The user's umask will apply to this */
+		mode = 0666;
+	}
+
+	/* Set up the new perms for the new file */
+	attrib_clear(a);
+	a->perm = mode;
+	a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+	attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */
+
+	/* Open the old file for reading */
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_READ)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = encode_attrib(msg, &junk)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+	debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, oldpath);
+
+	sshbuf_reset(msg);
+
+	old_handle = get_handle(conn, id, &old_handle_len,
+	    "remote open(\"%s\")", oldpath);
+	if (old_handle == NULL) {
+		sshbuf_free(msg);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Open the new file for writing */
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|
+	    SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+	debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, newpath);
+
+	sshbuf_reset(msg);
+
+	new_handle = get_handle(conn, id, &new_handle_len,
+	    "remote open(\"%s\")", newpath);
+	if (new_handle == NULL) {
+		sshbuf_free(msg);
+		free(old_handle);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Copy the file data */
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "copy-data")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, old_handle, old_handle_len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, 0)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, 0)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, new_handle, new_handle_len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, 0)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+	debug3("Sent message copy-data \"%s\" 0 0 -> \"%s\" 0",
+	       oldpath, newpath);
+
+	status = get_status(conn, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("Couldn't copy file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
+		    newpath, fx2txt(status));
+
+	/* Clean up everything */
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	do_close(conn, old_handle, old_handle_len);
+	do_close(conn, new_handle, new_handle_len);
+	free(old_handle);
+	free(new_handle);
+
+	return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int
+do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath,
+    int force_legacy)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_int status, id;
+	int r, use_ext = (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME) && !force_legacy;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	/* Send rename request */
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	if (use_ext) {
+		debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED(posix-rename@openssh.com) "
+		    "\"%s\" to \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg,
+		    "posix-rename@openssh.com")) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "compose posix-rename");
+	} else {
+		debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_RENAME \"%s\" to \"%s\"",
+		    oldpath, newpath);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_RENAME)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "compose rename");
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose paths");
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+	debug3("Sent message %s \"%s\" -> \"%s\"",
+	    use_ext ? "posix-rename@openssh.com" :
+	    "SSH2_FXP_RENAME", oldpath, newpath);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+	status = get_status(conn, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("remote rename \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
+		    newpath, fx2txt(status));
+
+	return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int
+do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_int status, id;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK) == 0) {
+		error("Server does not support hardlink@openssh.com extension");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED(hardlink@openssh.com) "
+	    "\"%s\" to \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	/* Send link request */
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+	debug3("Sent message hardlink@openssh.com \"%s\" -> \"%s\"",
+	    oldpath, newpath);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+	status = get_status(conn, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("remote link \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
+		    newpath, fx2txt(status));
+
+	return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int
+do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_int status, id;
+	int r;
+
+	if (conn->version < 3) {
+		error("This server does not support the symlink operation");
+		return(SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED);
+	}
+	debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK \"%s\" to \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	/* Send symlink request */
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+	debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath,
+	    newpath);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+	status = get_status(conn, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("remote symlink file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath,
+		    newpath, fx2txt(status));
+
+	return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+int
+do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_int status, id;
+	int r;
+
+	/* Silently return if the extension is not supported */
+	if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSYNC) == 0)
+		return -1;
+	debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED(fsync@openssh.com)");
+
+	/* Send fsync request */
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fsync@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+	debug3("Sent message fsync@openssh.com I:%u", id);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+	status = get_status(conn, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("remote fsync: %s", fx2txt(status));
+
+	return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+#ifdef notyet
+char *
+do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_int expected_id, count, id;
+	char *filename, *longname;
+	Attrib a;
+	u_char type;
+	int r;
+
+	debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_READLINK \"%s\"", path);
+
+	expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++;
+	send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, path, strlen(path));
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	get_msg(conn, msg);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	if (id != expected_id)
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+
+	if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+		u_int status;
+
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+		error("Couldn't readlink: %s", fx2txt(status));
+		sshbuf_free(msg);
+		return(NULL);
+	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
+		    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse count");
+	if (count != 1)
+		fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_READLINK", count);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse filenames/attrib");
+
+	debug3("SSH_FXP_READLINK %s -> %s", path, filename);
+
+	free(longname);
+
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+	return filename;
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, struct sftp_statvfs *st,
+    int quiet)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_int id;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_STATVFS) == 0) {
+		error("Server does not support statvfs@openssh.com extension");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED(statvfs@openssh.com) \"%s\"", path);
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+	return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet);
+}
+
+#ifdef notyet
+int
+do_fstatvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len,
+    struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_int id;
+
+	if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS) == 0) {
+		error("Server does not support fstatvfs@openssh.com extension");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED(fstatvfs@openssh.com)");
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+	return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet);
+}
+#endif
+
+int
+do_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_int status, id;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_LSETSTAT) == 0) {
+		error("Server does not support lsetstat@openssh.com extension");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED(lsetstat@openssh.com) \"%s\"", path);
+
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "lsetstat@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+	status = get_status(conn, id);
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		error("remote lsetstat \"%s\": %s", path, fx2txt(status));
+
+	return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+static void
+send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset,
+    u_int len, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READ)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static int
+send_open(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, const char *tag,
+    u_int openmode, Attrib *a, u_char **handlep, size_t *handle_lenp)
+{
+	Attrib junk;
+	u_char *handle;
+	size_t handle_len;
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r;
+	u_int id;
+
+	debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_OPEN \"%s\"", path);
+
+	*handlep = NULL;
+	*handle_lenp = 0;
+
+	if (a == NULL) {
+		attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */
+		a = &junk;
+	}
+	/* Send open request */
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	id = conn->msg_id++;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, openmode)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose %s open", tag);
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	debug3("Sent %s message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s M:0x%04x",
+	    tag, id, path, openmode);
+	if ((handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len,
+	    "%s open \"%s\"", tag, path)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	/* success */
+	*handlep = handle;
+	*handle_lenp = handle_len;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static const char *
+progress_meter_path(const char *path)
+{
+	const char *progresspath;
+
+	if ((progresspath = strrchr(path, '/')) == NULL)
+		return path;
+	progresspath++;
+	if (*progresspath == '\0')
+		return path;
+	return progresspath;
+}
+
+int
+do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path,
+    const char *local_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag,
+    int fsync_flag, int inplace_flag)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_char *handle;
+	int local_fd = -1, write_error;
+	int read_error, write_errno, lmodified = 0, reordered = 0, r;
+	u_int64_t offset = 0, size, highwater;
+	u_int mode, id, buflen, num_req, max_req, status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+	off_t progress_counter;
+	size_t handle_len;
+	struct stat st;
+	struct requests requests;
+	struct request *req;
+	u_char type;
+
+	debug2_f("download remote \"%s\" to local \"%s\"",
+	    remote_path, local_path);
+
+	TAILQ_INIT(&requests);
+
+	if (a == NULL && (a = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Do not preserve set[ug]id here, as we do not preserve ownership */
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
+		mode = a->perm & 0777;
+	else
+		mode = 0666;
+
+	if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) &&
+	    (!S_ISREG(a->perm))) {
+		error("download %s: not a regular file", remote_path);
+		return(-1);
+	}
+
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
+		size = a->size;
+	else
+		size = 0;
+
+	buflen = conn->download_buflen;
+
+	/* Send open request */
+	if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "remote", SSH2_FXF_READ, NULL,
+	    &handle, &handle_len) != 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	local_fd = open(local_path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT |
+	((resume_flag || inplace_flag) ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR);
+	if (local_fd == -1) {
+		error("open local \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	offset = highwater = 0;
+	if (resume_flag) {
+		if (fstat(local_fd, &st) == -1) {
+			error("stat local \"%s\": %s",
+			    local_path, strerror(errno));
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		if (st.st_size < 0) {
+			error("\"%s\" has negative size", local_path);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		if ((u_int64_t)st.st_size > size) {
+			error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": "
+			    "local file is larger than remote", local_path);
+ fail:
+			do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
+			free(handle);
+			if (local_fd != -1)
+				close(local_fd);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		offset = highwater = st.st_size;
+	}
+
+	/* Read from remote and write to local */
+	write_error = read_error = write_errno = num_req = 0;
+	max_req = 1;
+	progress_counter = offset;
+
+	if (showprogress && size != 0) {
+		start_progress_meter(progress_meter_path(remote_path),
+		    size, &progress_counter);
+	}
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	while (num_req > 0 || max_req > 0) {
+		u_char *data;
+		size_t len;
+
+		/*
+		 * Simulate EOF on interrupt: stop sending new requests and
+		 * allow outstanding requests to drain gracefully
+		 */
+		if (interrupted) {
+			if (num_req == 0) /* If we haven't started yet... */
+				break;
+			max_req = 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Send some more requests */
+		while (num_req < max_req) {
+			debug3("Request range %llu -> %llu (%d/%d)",
+			    (unsigned long long)offset,
+			    (unsigned long long)offset + buflen - 1,
+			    num_req, max_req);
+			req = request_enqueue(&requests, conn->msg_id++,
+			    buflen, offset);
+			offset += buflen;
+			num_req++;
+			send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset,
+			    req->len, handle, handle_len);
+		}
+
+		sshbuf_reset(msg);
+		get_msg(conn, msg);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+		debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u R:%d", type, id, max_req);
+
+		/* Find the request in our queue */
+		if ((req = request_find(&requests, id)) == NULL)
+			fatal("Unexpected reply %u", id);
+
+		switch (type) {
+		case SSH2_FXP_STATUS:
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+			if (status != SSH2_FX_EOF)
+				read_error = 1;
+			max_req = 0;
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq);
+			free(req);
+			num_req--;
+			break;
+		case SSH2_FXP_DATA:
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &data, &len)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse data");
+			debug3("Received data %llu -> %llu",
+			    (unsigned long long)req->offset,
+			    (unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1);
+			if (len > req->len)
+				fatal("Received more data than asked for "
+				    "%zu > %zu", len, req->len);
+			lmodified = 1;
+			if ((lseek(local_fd, req->offset, SEEK_SET) == -1 ||
+			    atomicio(vwrite, local_fd, data, len) != len) &&
+			    !write_error) {
+				write_errno = errno;
+				write_error = 1;
+				max_req = 0;
+			}
+			else if (!reordered && req->offset <= highwater)
+				highwater = req->offset + len;
+			else if (!reordered && req->offset > highwater)
+				reordered = 1;
+			progress_counter += len;
+			free(data);
+
+			if (len == req->len) {
+				TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq);
+				free(req);
+				num_req--;
+			} else {
+				/* Resend the request for the missing data */
+				debug3("Short data block, re-requesting "
+				    "%llu -> %llu (%2d)",
+				    (unsigned long long)req->offset + len,
+				    (unsigned long long)req->offset +
+				    req->len - 1, num_req);
+				req->id = conn->msg_id++;
+				req->len -= len;
+				req->offset += len;
+				send_read_request(conn, req->id,
+				    req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len);
+				/* Reduce the request size */
+				if (len < buflen)
+					buflen = MAXIMUM(MIN_READ_SIZE, len);
+			}
+			if (max_req > 0) { /* max_req = 0 iff EOF received */
+				if (size > 0 && offset > size) {
+					/* Only one request at a time
+					 * after the expected EOF */
+					debug3("Finish at %llu (%2d)",
+					    (unsigned long long)offset,
+					    num_req);
+					max_req = 1;
+				} else if (max_req < conn->num_requests) {
+					++max_req;
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u",
+			    SSH2_FXP_DATA, type);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (showprogress && size)
+		stop_progress_meter();
+
+	/* Sanity check */
+	if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL)
+		fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue");
+	/*
+	 * Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt,
+	 * or unconditionally if writing in place.
+	 */
+	if (inplace_flag || read_error || write_error || interrupted) {
+		if (reordered && resume_flag) {
+			error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": "
+			    "server reordered requests", local_path);
+		}
+		debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater);
+		if (ftruncate(local_fd, highwater) == -1)
+			error("local ftruncate \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+			    strerror(errno));
+	}
+	if (read_error) {
+		error("read remote \"%s\" : %s", remote_path, fx2txt(status));
+		status = -1;
+		do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
+	} else if (write_error) {
+		error("write local \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+		    strerror(write_errno));
+		status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+		do_close(conn, handle, handle_len);
+	} else {
+		if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0 || interrupted)
+			status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+		else
+			status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+		/* Override umask and utimes if asked */
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
+		if (preserve_flag && fchmod(local_fd, mode) == -1)
+#else
+		if (preserve_flag && chmod(local_path, mode) == -1)
+#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
+			error("local chmod \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		if (preserve_flag &&
+		    (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME)) {
+			struct timeval tv[2];
+			tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
+			tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
+			tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
+			if (utimes(local_path, tv) == -1)
+				error("local set times \"%s\": %s",
+				    local_path, strerror(errno));
+		}
+		if (resume_flag && !lmodified)
+			logit("File \"%s\" was not modified", local_path);
+		else if (fsync_flag) {
+			debug("syncing \"%s\"", local_path);
+			if (fsync(local_fd) == -1)
+				error("local sync \"%s\": %s",
+				    local_path, strerror(errno));
+		}
+	}
+	close(local_fd);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	free(handle);
+
+	return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+static int
+download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+    int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag,
+    int resume_flag, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
+{
+	int i, ret = 0;
+	SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries;
+	char *filename, *new_src = NULL, *new_dst = NULL;
+	mode_t mode = 0777, tmpmode = mode;
+
+	if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) {
+		error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	debug2_f("download dir remote \"%s\" to local \"%s\"", src, dst);
+
+	if (dirattrib == NULL &&
+	    (dirattrib = do_stat(conn, src, 1)) == NULL) {
+		error("stat remote \"%s\" directory failed", src);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) {
+		error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (print_flag && print_flag != SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY)
+		mprintf("Retrieving %s\n", src);
+
+	if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+		mode = dirattrib->perm & 01777;
+		tmpmode = mode | (S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR);
+	} else {
+		debug("download remote \"%s\": server "
+		    "did not send permissions", dst);
+	}
+
+	if (mkdir(dst, tmpmode) == -1 && errno != EEXIST) {
+		error("mkdir %s: %s", dst, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (do_readdir(conn, src, &dir_entries) == -1) {
+		error("remote readdir \"%s\" failed", src);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; dir_entries[i] != NULL && !interrupted; i++) {
+		free(new_dst);
+		free(new_src);
+
+		filename = dir_entries[i]->filename;
+		new_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
+		new_src = path_append(src, filename);
+
+		if (S_ISDIR(dir_entries[i]->a.perm)) {
+			if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 ||
+			    strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
+				continue;
+			if (download_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
+			    depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag,
+			    print_flag, resume_flag,
+			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag) == -1)
+				ret = -1;
+		} else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ||
+		    (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm))) {
+			/*
+			 * If this is a symlink then don't send the link's
+			 * Attrib. do_download() will do a FXP_STAT operation
+			 * and get the link target's attributes.
+			 */
+			if (do_download(conn, new_src, new_dst,
+			    S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ? NULL :
+			    &(dir_entries[i]->a),
+			    preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag,
+			    inplace_flag) == -1) {
+				error("Download of file %s to %s failed",
+				    new_src, new_dst);
+				ret = -1;
+			}
+		} else
+			logit("download \"%s\": not a regular file", new_src);
+
+	}
+	free(new_dst);
+	free(new_src);
+
+	if (preserve_flag) {
+		if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+			struct timeval tv[2];
+			tv[0].tv_sec = dirattrib->atime;
+			tv[1].tv_sec = dirattrib->mtime;
+			tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
+			if (utimes(dst, tv) == -1)
+				error("local set times on \"%s\": %s",
+				    dst, strerror(errno));
+		} else
+			debug("Server did not send times for directory "
+			    "\"%s\"", dst);
+	}
+
+	if (mode != tmpmode && chmod(dst, mode) == -1)
+		error("local chmod directory \"%s\": %s", dst,
+		    strerror(errno));
+
+	free_sftp_dirents(dir_entries);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+    Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag,
+    int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
+{
+	char *src_canon;
+	int ret;
+
+	if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
+		error("download \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", src);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	ret = download_dir_internal(conn, src_canon, dst, 0,
+	    dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag,
+	    follow_link_flag, inplace_flag);
+	free(src_canon);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path,
+    const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume,
+    int fsync_flag, int inplace_flag)
+{
+	int r, local_fd;
+	u_int openmode, id, status = SSH2_FX_OK, reordered = 0;
+	off_t offset, progress_counter;
+	u_char type, *handle, *data;
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	struct stat sb;
+	Attrib a, t, *c = NULL;
+	u_int32_t startid, ackid;
+	u_int64_t highwater = 0;
+	struct request *ack = NULL;
+	struct requests acks;
+	size_t handle_len;
+
+	debug2_f("upload local \"%s\" to remote \"%s\"",
+	    local_path, remote_path);
+
+	TAILQ_INIT(&acks);
+
+	if ((local_fd = open(local_path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
+		error("open local \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno));
+		return(-1);
+	}
+	if (fstat(local_fd, &sb) == -1) {
+		error("fstat local \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno));
+		close(local_fd);
+		return(-1);
+	}
+	if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
+		error("local \"%s\" is not a regular file", local_path);
+		close(local_fd);
+		return(-1);
+	}
+	stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a);
+
+	a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
+	a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+	a.perm &= 0777;
+	if (!preserve_flag)
+		a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
+
+	if (resume) {
+		/* Get remote file size if it exists */
+		if ((c = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) {
+			close(local_fd);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		if ((off_t)c->size >= sb.st_size) {
+			error("resume \"%s\": destination file "
+			    "same size or larger", local_path);
+			close(local_fd);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		if (lseek(local_fd, (off_t)c->size, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
+			close(local_fd);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	openmode = SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT;
+	if (resume)
+		openmode |= SSH2_FXF_APPEND;
+	else if (!inplace_flag)
+		openmode |= SSH2_FXF_TRUNC;
+
+	/* Send open request */
+	if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "dest", openmode, &a,
+	    &handle, &handle_len) != 0) {
+		close(local_fd);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	id = conn->msg_id;
+	startid = ackid = id + 1;
+	data = xmalloc(conn->upload_buflen);
+
+	/* Read from local and write to remote */
+	offset = progress_counter = (resume ? c->size : 0);
+	if (showprogress) {
+		start_progress_meter(progress_meter_path(local_path),
+		    sb.st_size, &progress_counter);
+	}
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	for (;;) {
+		int len;
+
+		/*
+		 * Can't use atomicio here because it returns 0 on EOF,
+		 * thus losing the last block of the file.
+		 * Simulate an EOF on interrupt, allowing ACKs from the
+		 * server to drain.
+		 */
+		if (interrupted || status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+			len = 0;
+		else do
+			len = read(local_fd, data, conn->upload_buflen);
+		while ((len == -1) &&
+		    (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK));
+
+		if (len == -1) {
+			fatal("read local \"%s\": %s",
+			    local_path, strerror(errno));
+		} else if (len != 0) {
+			ack = request_enqueue(&acks, ++id, len, offset);
+			sshbuf_reset(msg);
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, ack->id)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle,
+			    handle_len)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, len)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+			send_msg(conn, msg);
+			debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%u",
+			    id, (unsigned long long)offset, len);
+		} else if (TAILQ_FIRST(&acks) == NULL)
+			break;
+
+		if (ack == NULL)
+			fatal("Unexpected ACK %u", id);
+
+		if (id == startid || len == 0 ||
+		    id - ackid >= conn->num_requests) {
+			u_int rid;
+
+			sshbuf_reset(msg);
+			get_msg(conn, msg);
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rid)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+			if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS)
+				fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, "
+				    "got %d", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type);
+
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+			debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status);
+
+			/* Find the request in our queue */
+			if ((ack = request_find(&acks, rid)) == NULL)
+				fatal("Can't find request for ID %u", rid);
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(&acks, ack, tq);
+			debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %zu bytes at %lld",
+			    ack->id, ack->len, (unsigned long long)ack->offset);
+			++ackid;
+			progress_counter += ack->len;
+			if (!reordered && ack->offset <= highwater)
+				highwater = ack->offset + ack->len;
+			else if (!reordered && ack->offset > highwater) {
+				debug3_f("server reordered ACKs");
+				reordered = 1;
+			}
+			free(ack);
+		}
+		offset += len;
+		if (offset < 0)
+			fatal_f("offset < 0");
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+
+	if (showprogress)
+		stop_progress_meter();
+	free(data);
+
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) {
+		error("write remote \"%s\": %s", remote_path, fx2txt(status));
+		status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	if (inplace_flag || (resume && (status != SSH2_FX_OK || interrupted))) {
+		debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater);
+		attrib_clear(&t);
+		t.flags = SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
+		t.size = highwater;
+		do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &t);
+	}
+
+	if (close(local_fd) == -1) {
+		error("close local \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno));
+		status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+	}
+
+	/* Override umask and utimes if asked */
+	if (preserve_flag)
+		do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &a);
+
+	if (fsync_flag)
+		(void)do_fsync(conn, handle, handle_len);
+
+	if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0)
+		status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+	free(handle);
+
+	return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+static int
+upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+    int depth, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
+    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+	DIR *dirp;
+	struct dirent *dp;
+	char *filename, *new_src = NULL, *new_dst = NULL;
+	struct stat sb;
+	Attrib a, *dirattrib;
+	u_int32_t saved_perm;
+
+	debug2_f("upload local dir \"%s\" to remote \"%s\"", src, dst);
+
+	if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) {
+		error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (stat(src, &sb) == -1) {
+		error("stat local \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
+		error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (print_flag && print_flag != SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY)
+		mprintf("Entering %s\n", src);
+
+	stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a);
+	a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
+	a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+	a.perm &= 01777;
+	if (!preserve_flag)
+		a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
+
+	/*
+	 * sftp lacks a portable status value to match errno EEXIST,
+	 * so if we get a failure back then we must check whether
+	 * the path already existed and is a directory.  Ensure we can
+	 * write to the directory we create for the duration of the transfer.
+	 */
+	saved_perm = a.perm;
+	a.perm |= (S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR);
+	if (do_mkdir(conn, dst, &a, 0) != 0) {
+		if ((dirattrib = do_stat(conn, dst, 0)) == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) {
+			error("\"%s\" exists but is not a directory", dst);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	a.perm = saved_perm;
+
+	if ((dirp = opendir(src)) == NULL) {
+		error("local opendir \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	while (((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) && !interrupted) {
+		if (dp->d_ino == 0)
+			continue;
+		free(new_dst);
+		free(new_src);
+		filename = dp->d_name;
+		new_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
+		new_src = path_append(src, filename);
+
+		if (lstat(new_src, &sb) == -1) {
+			logit("local lstat \"%s\": %s", filename,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			ret = -1;
+		} else if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
+			if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 ||
+			    strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
+				continue;
+
+			if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
+			    depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume,
+			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag) == -1)
+				ret = -1;
+		} else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode) ||
+		    (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode))) {
+			if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst,
+			    preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag,
+			    inplace_flag) == -1) {
+				error("upload \"%s\" to \"%s\" failed",
+				    new_src, new_dst);
+				ret = -1;
+			}
+		} else
+			logit("%s: not a regular file", filename);
+	}
+	free(new_dst);
+	free(new_src);
+
+	do_setstat(conn, dst, &a);
+
+	(void) closedir(dirp);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+    int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
+    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
+{
+	char *dst_canon;
+	int ret;
+
+	if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
+		error("upload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", dst);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	ret = upload_dir_internal(conn, src, dst_canon, 0, preserve_flag,
+	    print_flag, resume, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag);
+
+	free(dst_canon);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+handle_dest_replies(struct sftp_conn *to, const char *to_path, int synchronous,
+    u_int *nreqsp, u_int *write_errorp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_char type;
+	u_int id, status;
+	int r;
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	/* Try to eat replies from the upload side */
+	while (*nreqsp > 0) {
+		debug3_f("%u outstanding replies", *nreqsp);
+		if (!synchronous) {
+			/* Bail out if no data is ready to be read */
+			pfd.fd = to->fd_in;
+			pfd.events = POLLIN;
+			if ((r = poll(&pfd, 1, 0)) == -1) {
+				if (errno == EINTR)
+					break;
+				fatal_f("poll: %s", strerror(errno));
+			} else if (r == 0)
+				break; /* fd not ready */
+		}
+		sshbuf_reset(msg);
+		get_msg(to, msg);
+
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "dest parse");
+		debug3("Received dest reply T:%u I:%u R:%u", type, id, *nreqsp);
+		if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+			fatal_f("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, got %d",
+			    SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type);
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse dest status");
+		debug3("dest SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status);
+		if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) {
+			/* record first error */
+			if (*write_errorp == 0)
+				*write_errorp = status;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * XXX this doesn't do full reply matching like do_upload and
+		 * so cannot gracefully truncate terminated uploads at a
+		 * high-water mark. ATM the only caller of this function (scp)
+		 * doesn't support transfer resumption, so this doesn't matter
+		 * a whole lot.
+		 *
+		 * To be safe, do_crossload truncates the destination file to
+		 * zero length on upload failure, since we can't trust the
+		 * server not to have reordered replies that could have
+		 * inserted holes where none existed in the source file.
+		 *
+		 * XXX we could get a more accutate progress bar if we updated
+		 * the counter based on the reply from the destination...
+		 */
+		(*nreqsp)--;
+	}
+	debug3_f("done: %u outstanding replies", *nreqsp);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+int
+do_crossload(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+    const char *from_path, const char *to_path,
+    Attrib *a, int preserve_flag)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int write_error, read_error, r;
+	u_int64_t offset = 0, size;
+	u_int id, buflen, num_req, max_req, status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+	u_int num_upload_req;
+	off_t progress_counter;
+	u_char *from_handle, *to_handle;
+	size_t from_handle_len, to_handle_len;
+	struct requests requests;
+	struct request *req;
+	u_char type;
+
+	debug2_f("crossload src \"%s\" to dst \"%s\"", from_path, to_path);
+
+	TAILQ_INIT(&requests);
+
+	if (a == NULL && (a = do_stat(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) &&
+	    (!S_ISREG(a->perm))) {
+		error("download \"%s\": not a regular file", from_path);
+		return(-1);
+	}
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
+		size = a->size;
+	else
+		size = 0;
+
+	buflen = from->download_buflen;
+	if (buflen > to->upload_buflen)
+		buflen = to->upload_buflen;
+
+	/* Send open request to read side */
+	if (send_open(from, from_path, "origin", SSH2_FXF_READ, NULL,
+	    &from_handle, &from_handle_len) != 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Send open request to write side */
+	a->flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
+	a->flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+	a->perm &= 0777;
+	if (!preserve_flag)
+		a->flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
+	if (send_open(to, to_path, "dest",
+	    SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|SSH2_FXF_TRUNC, a,
+	    &to_handle, &to_handle_len) != 0) {
+		do_close(from, from_handle, from_handle_len);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Read from remote "from" and write to remote "to" */
+	offset = 0;
+	write_error = read_error = num_req = num_upload_req = 0;
+	max_req = 1;
+	progress_counter = 0;
+
+	if (showprogress && size != 0) {
+		start_progress_meter(progress_meter_path(from_path),
+		    size, &progress_counter);
+	}
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	while (num_req > 0 || max_req > 0) {
+		u_char *data;
+		size_t len;
+
+		/*
+		 * Simulate EOF on interrupt: stop sending new requests and
+		 * allow outstanding requests to drain gracefully
+		 */
+		if (interrupted) {
+			if (num_req == 0) /* If we haven't started yet... */
+				break;
+			max_req = 0;
+		}
+
+		/* Send some more requests */
+		while (num_req < max_req) {
+			debug3("Request range %llu -> %llu (%d/%d)",
+			    (unsigned long long)offset,
+			    (unsigned long long)offset + buflen - 1,
+			    num_req, max_req);
+			req = request_enqueue(&requests, from->msg_id++,
+			    buflen, offset);
+			offset += buflen;
+			num_req++;
+			send_read_request(from, req->id, req->offset,
+			    req->len, from_handle, from_handle_len);
+		}
+
+		/* Try to eat replies from the upload side (nonblocking) */
+		handle_dest_replies(to, to_path, 0,
+		    &num_upload_req, &write_error);
+
+		sshbuf_reset(msg);
+		get_msg(from, msg);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+		debug3("Received origin reply T:%u I:%u R:%d",
+		    type, id, max_req);
+
+		/* Find the request in our queue */
+		if ((req = request_find(&requests, id)) == NULL)
+			fatal("Unexpected reply %u", id);
+
+		switch (type) {
+		case SSH2_FXP_STATUS:
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+			if (status != SSH2_FX_EOF)
+				read_error = 1;
+			max_req = 0;
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq);
+			free(req);
+			num_req--;
+			break;
+		case SSH2_FXP_DATA:
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &data, &len)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse data");
+			debug3("Received data %llu -> %llu",
+			    (unsigned long long)req->offset,
+			    (unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1);
+			if (len > req->len)
+				fatal("Received more data than asked for "
+				    "%zu > %zu", len, req->len);
+
+			/* Write this chunk out to the destination */
+			sshbuf_reset(msg);
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, to->msg_id++)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, to_handle,
+			    to_handle_len)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, req->offset)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, len)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "compose write");
+			send_msg(to, msg);
+			debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%zu",
+			    id, (unsigned long long)offset, len);
+			num_upload_req++;
+			progress_counter += len;
+			free(data);
+
+			if (len == req->len) {
+				TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq);
+				free(req);
+				num_req--;
+			} else {
+				/* Resend the request for the missing data */
+				debug3("Short data block, re-requesting "
+				    "%llu -> %llu (%2d)",
+				    (unsigned long long)req->offset + len,
+				    (unsigned long long)req->offset +
+				    req->len - 1, num_req);
+				req->id = from->msg_id++;
+				req->len -= len;
+				req->offset += len;
+				send_read_request(from, req->id,
+				    req->offset, req->len,
+				    from_handle, from_handle_len);
+				/* Reduce the request size */
+				if (len < buflen)
+					buflen = MAXIMUM(MIN_READ_SIZE, len);
+			}
+			if (max_req > 0) { /* max_req = 0 iff EOF received */
+				if (size > 0 && offset > size) {
+					/* Only one request at a time
+					 * after the expected EOF */
+					debug3("Finish at %llu (%2d)",
+					    (unsigned long long)offset,
+					    num_req);
+					max_req = 1;
+				} else if (max_req < from->num_requests) {
+					++max_req;
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u",
+			    SSH2_FXP_DATA, type);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (showprogress && size)
+		stop_progress_meter();
+
+	/* Drain replies from the server (blocking) */
+	debug3_f("waiting for %u replies from destination", num_upload_req);
+	handle_dest_replies(to, to_path, 1, &num_upload_req, &write_error);
+
+	/* Sanity check */
+	if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL)
+		fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue");
+	/* Truncate at 0 length on interrupt or error to avoid holes at dest */
+	if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) {
+		debug("truncating \"%s\" at 0", to_path);
+		do_close(to, to_handle, to_handle_len);
+		free(to_handle);
+		if (send_open(to, to_path, "dest",
+		    SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|SSH2_FXF_TRUNC, a,
+		    &to_handle, &to_handle_len) != 0) {
+			error("dest truncate \"%s\" failed", to_path);
+			to_handle = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	if (read_error) {
+		error("read origin \"%s\": %s", from_path, fx2txt(status));
+		status = -1;
+		do_close(from, from_handle, from_handle_len);
+		if (to_handle != NULL)
+			do_close(to, to_handle, to_handle_len);
+	} else if (write_error) {
+		error("write dest \"%s\": %s", to_path, fx2txt(write_error));
+		status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+		do_close(from, from_handle, from_handle_len);
+		if (to_handle != NULL)
+			do_close(to, to_handle, to_handle_len);
+	} else {
+		if (do_close(from, from_handle, from_handle_len) != 0 ||
+		    interrupted)
+			status = -1;
+		else
+			status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+		if (to_handle != NULL) {
+			/* Need to resend utimes after write */
+			if (preserve_flag)
+				do_fsetstat(to, to_handle, to_handle_len, a);
+			do_close(to, to_handle, to_handle_len);
+		}
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	free(from_handle);
+	free(to_handle);
+
+	return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+static int
+crossload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+    const char *from_path, const char *to_path,
+    int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag,
+    int follow_link_flag)
+{
+	int i, ret = 0;
+	SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries;
+	char *filename, *new_from_path = NULL, *new_to_path = NULL;
+	mode_t mode = 0777;
+	Attrib curdir;
+
+	debug2_f("crossload dir src \"%s\" to dst \"%s\"", from_path, to_path);
+
+	if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) {
+		error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (dirattrib == NULL &&
+	    (dirattrib = do_stat(from, from_path, 1)) == NULL) {
+		error("stat remote \"%s\" failed", from_path);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) {
+		error("\"%s\" is not a directory", from_path);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (print_flag && print_flag != SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY)
+		mprintf("Retrieving %s\n", from_path);
+
+	curdir = *dirattrib; /* dirattrib will be clobbered */
+	curdir.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
+	curdir.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+	if ((curdir.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) == 0) {
+		debug("Origin did not send permissions for "
+		    "directory \"%s\"", to_path);
+		curdir.perm = S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR;
+		curdir.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
+	}
+	/* We need to be able to write to the directory while we transfer it */
+	mode = curdir.perm & 01777;
+	curdir.perm = mode | (S_IWUSR|S_IXUSR);
+
+	/*
+	 * sftp lacks a portable status value to match errno EEXIST,
+	 * so if we get a failure back then we must check whether
+	 * the path already existed and is a directory.  Ensure we can
+	 * write to the directory we create for the duration of the transfer.
+	 */
+	if (do_mkdir(to, to_path, &curdir, 0) != 0) {
+		if ((dirattrib = do_stat(to, to_path, 0)) == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) {
+			error("\"%s\" exists but is not a directory", to_path);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	curdir.perm = mode;
+
+	if (do_readdir(from, from_path, &dir_entries) == -1) {
+		error("origin readdir \"%s\" failed", from_path);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; dir_entries[i] != NULL && !interrupted; i++) {
+		free(new_from_path);
+		free(new_to_path);
+
+		filename = dir_entries[i]->filename;
+		new_from_path = path_append(from_path, filename);
+		new_to_path = path_append(to_path, filename);
+
+		if (S_ISDIR(dir_entries[i]->a.perm)) {
+			if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 ||
+			    strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
+				continue;
+			if (crossload_dir_internal(from, to,
+			    new_from_path, new_to_path,
+			    depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag,
+			    print_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1)
+				ret = -1;
+		} else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ||
+		    (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm))) {
+			/*
+			 * If this is a symlink then don't send the link's
+			 * Attrib. do_download() will do a FXP_STAT operation
+			 * and get the link target's attributes.
+			 */
+			if (do_crossload(from, to, new_from_path, new_to_path,
+			    S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ? NULL :
+			    &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag) == -1) {
+				error("crossload \"%s\" to \"%s\" failed",
+				    new_from_path, new_to_path);
+				ret = -1;
+			}
+		} else {
+			logit("origin \"%s\": not a regular file",
+			    new_from_path);
+		}
+	}
+	free(new_to_path);
+	free(new_from_path);
+
+	do_setstat(to, to_path, &curdir);
+
+	free_sftp_dirents(dir_entries);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+    const char *from_path, const char *to_path,
+    Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int follow_link_flag)
+{
+	char *from_path_canon;
+	int ret;
+
+	if ((from_path_canon = do_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) {
+		error("crossload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed",
+		    from_path);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	ret = crossload_dir_internal(from, to, from_path_canon, to_path, 0,
+	    dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, follow_link_flag);
+	free(from_path_canon);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+can_get_users_groups_by_id(struct sftp_conn *conn)
+{
+	return (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_GETUSERSGROUPS_BY_ID) != 0;
+}
+
+int
+do_get_users_groups_by_id(struct sftp_conn *conn,
+    const u_int *uids, u_int nuids,
+    const u_int *gids, u_int ngids,
+    char ***usernamesp, char ***groupnamesp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg, *uidbuf, *gidbuf;
+	u_int i, expected_id, id;
+	char *name, **usernames = NULL, **groupnames = NULL;
+	u_char type;
+	int r;
+
+	*usernamesp = *groupnamesp = NULL;
+	if (!can_get_users_groups_by_id(conn))
+		return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (uidbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (gidbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++;
+	debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED(users-groups-by-id@openssh.com)");
+	for (i = 0; i < nuids; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(uidbuf, uids[i])) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "compose uids");
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < ngids; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(gidbuf, gids[i])) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "compose gids");
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg,
+	    "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(msg, uidbuf)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(msg, gidbuf)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(conn, msg);
+	get_msg(conn, msg);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	if (id != expected_id)
+		fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+	if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+		u_int status;
+		char *errmsg;
+
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+		error("users-groups-by-id %s",
+		    *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
+		free(errmsg);
+		sshbuf_free(msg);
+		sshbuf_free(uidbuf);
+		sshbuf_free(gidbuf);
+		return -1;
+	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY)
+		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u",
+		    SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type);
+
+	/* reuse */
+	sshbuf_free(uidbuf);
+	sshbuf_free(gidbuf);
+	uidbuf = gidbuf = NULL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_froms(msg, &uidbuf)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_froms(msg, &gidbuf)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse response");
+	if (nuids > 0) {
+		usernames = xcalloc(nuids, sizeof(*usernames));
+		for (i = 0; i < nuids; i++) {
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(uidbuf, &name, NULL)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse user name");
+			/* Handle unresolved names */
+			if (*name == '\0') {
+				free(name);
+				name = NULL;
+			}
+			usernames[i] = name;
+		}
+	}
+	if (ngids > 0) {
+		groupnames = xcalloc(ngids, sizeof(*groupnames));
+		for (i = 0; i < ngids; i++) {
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(gidbuf, &name, NULL)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse user name");
+			/* Handle unresolved names */
+			if (*name == '\0') {
+				free(name);
+				name = NULL;
+			}
+			groupnames[i] = name;
+		}
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(uidbuf) != 0)
+		fatal_f("unexpected extra username data");
+	if (sshbuf_len(gidbuf) != 0)
+		fatal_f("unexpected extra groupname data");
+	sshbuf_free(uidbuf);
+	sshbuf_free(gidbuf);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	/* success */
+	*usernamesp = usernames;
+	*groupnamesp = groupnames;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+char *
+path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2)
+{
+	char *ret;
+	size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2;
+
+	ret = xmalloc(len);
+	strlcpy(ret, p1, len);
+	if (p1[0] != '\0' && p1[strlen(p1) - 1] != '/')
+		strlcat(ret, "/", len);
+	strlcat(ret, p2, len);
+
+	return(ret);
+}
+
+char *
+make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd)
+{
+	char *abs_str;
+
+	/* Derelativise */
+	if (p && !path_absolute(p)) {
+		abs_str = path_append(pwd, p);
+		free(p);
+		return(abs_str);
+	} else
+		return(p);
+}
+
+int
+remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+{
+	Attrib *a;
+
+	/* XXX: report errors? */
+	if ((a = do_stat(conn, path, 1)) == NULL)
+		return(0);
+	if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS))
+		return(0);
+	return(S_ISDIR(a->perm));
+}
+
+
+int
+local_is_dir(const char *path)
+{
+	struct stat sb;
+
+	/* XXX: report errors? */
+	if (stat(path, &sb) == -1)
+		return(0);
+
+	return(S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode));
+}
+
+/* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */
+int
+globpath_is_dir(const char *pathname)
+{
+	size_t l = strlen(pathname);
+
+	return l > 0 && pathname[l - 1] == '/';
+}
+
diff --git a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d7deab1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sftp-client.h
@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.38 2022/09/19 10:43:12 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Client side of SSH2 filexfer protocol */
+
+#ifndef _SFTP_CLIENT_H
+#define _SFTP_CLIENT_H
+
+#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+# include <glob.h>
+#else
+# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
+#endif
+
+typedef struct SFTP_DIRENT SFTP_DIRENT;
+
+struct SFTP_DIRENT {
+	char *filename;
+	char *longname;
+	Attrib a;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Used for statvfs responses on the wire from the server, because the
+ * server's native format may be larger than the client's.
+ */
+struct sftp_statvfs {
+	u_int64_t f_bsize;
+	u_int64_t f_frsize;
+	u_int64_t f_blocks;
+	u_int64_t f_bfree;
+	u_int64_t f_bavail;
+	u_int64_t f_files;
+	u_int64_t f_ffree;
+	u_int64_t f_favail;
+	u_int64_t f_fsid;
+	u_int64_t f_flag;
+	u_int64_t f_namemax;
+};
+
+/* Used for limits response on the wire from the server */
+struct sftp_limits {
+	u_int64_t packet_length;
+	u_int64_t read_length;
+	u_int64_t write_length;
+	u_int64_t open_handles;
+};
+
+/* print flag values */
+#define SFTP_QUIET		0	/* be quiet during transfers */
+#define SFTP_PRINT		1	/* list files and show progress bar */
+#define SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY	2	/* progress bar only */
+
+/*
+ * Initialise a SSH filexfer connection. Returns NULL on error or
+ * a pointer to a initialized sftp_conn struct on success.
+ */
+struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_int, u_int, u_int64_t);
+
+u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *);
+
+/* Query server limits */
+int do_limits(struct sftp_conn *, struct sftp_limits *);
+
+/* Close file referred to by 'handle' */
+int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int);
+
+/* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */
+int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***);
+
+/* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */
+void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **);
+
+/* Delete file 'path' */
+int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+
+/* Create directory 'path' */
+int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *, int);
+
+/* Remove directory 'path' */
+int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+
+/* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */
+Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
+
+/* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */
+Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
+
+/* Set file attributes of 'path' */
+int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *);
+
+/* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */
+int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int, Attrib *);
+
+/* Set file attributes of 'path', not following symlinks */
+int do_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a);
+
+/* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
+char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+
+/* Canonicalisation with tilde expansion (requires server extension) */
+char *do_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+
+/* Returns non-zero if server can tilde-expand paths */
+int can_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *);
+
+/* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */
+int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int);
+
+/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
+int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int);
+
+/* Copy 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
+int do_copy(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
+
+/* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
+int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
+
+/* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */
+int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *);
+
+/* Call fsync() on open file 'handle' */
+int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *, u_int);
+
+/*
+ * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+ * if 'pflag' is set
+ */
+int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *,
+    int, int, int, int);
+
+/*
+ * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve
+ * times if 'pflag' is set
+ */
+int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *,
+    int, int, int, int, int, int);
+
+/*
+ * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+ * if 'pflag' is set
+ */
+int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+    int, int, int, int);
+
+/*
+ * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve
+ * times if 'pflag' is set
+ */
+int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+    int, int, int, int, int, int);
+
+/*
+ * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to
+ * to 'to' connection at 'to_path'.
+ */
+int
+do_crossload(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+    const char *from_path, const char *to_path,
+    Attrib *a, int preserve_flag);
+
+/*
+ * Recursively download a directory from 'from_path' from the 'from'
+ * connection and upload it to 'to' connection at 'to_path'.
+ */
+int crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, struct sftp_conn *to,
+    const char *from_path, const char *to_path,
+    Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag,
+    int follow_link_flag);
+
+/*
+ * User/group ID to name translation.
+ */
+int can_get_users_groups_by_id(struct sftp_conn *conn);
+int do_get_users_groups_by_id(struct sftp_conn *conn,
+    const u_int *uids, u_int nuids,
+    const u_int *gids, u_int ngids,
+    char ***usernamesp, char ***groupnamesp);
+
+/* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */
+char *path_append(const char *, const char *);
+
+/* Make absolute path if relative path and CWD is given. Does not modify
+ * original if the path is already absolute. */
+char *make_absolute(char *, const char *);
+
+/* Check if remote path is directory */
+int remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path);
+
+/* Check if local path is directory */
+int local_is_dir(const char *path);
+
+/* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */
+int globpath_is_dir(const char *pathname);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/sftp-common.c b/sftp-common.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..50f1bba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sftp-common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.c,v 1.33 2022/09/19 10:41:58 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+#include <util.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+
+/* Clear contents of attributes structure */
+void
+attrib_clear(Attrib *a)
+{
+	a->flags = 0;
+	a->size = 0;
+	a->uid = 0;
+	a->gid = 0;
+	a->perm = 0;
+	a->atime = 0;
+	a->mtime = 0;
+}
+
+/* Convert from struct stat to filexfer attribs */
+void
+stat_to_attrib(const struct stat *st, Attrib *a)
+{
+	attrib_clear(a);
+	a->flags = 0;
+	a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
+	a->size = st->st_size;
+	a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+	a->uid = st->st_uid;
+	a->gid = st->st_gid;
+	a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
+	a->perm = st->st_mode;
+	a->flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME;
+	a->atime = st->st_atime;
+	a->mtime = st->st_mtime;
+}
+
+/* Convert from filexfer attribs to struct stat */
+void
+attrib_to_stat(const Attrib *a, struct stat *st)
+{
+	memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st));
+
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE)
+		st->st_size = a->size;
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+		st->st_uid = a->uid;
+		st->st_gid = a->gid;
+	}
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)
+		st->st_mode = a->perm;
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+		st->st_atime = a->atime;
+		st->st_mtime = a->mtime;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Decode attributes in buffer */
+int
+decode_attrib(struct sshbuf *b, Attrib *a)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	attrib_clear(a);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->flags)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &a->size)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->uid)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->gid)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->perm)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->atime)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &a->mtime)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	/* vendor-specific extensions */
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED) {
+		char *type;
+		u_char *data;
+		size_t dlen;
+		u_int i, count;
+
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &count)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0)
+				return r;
+			debug3("Got file attribute \"%.100s\" len %zu",
+			    type, dlen);
+			free(type);
+			free(data);
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Encode attributes to buffer */
+int
+encode_attrib(struct sshbuf *b, const Attrib *a)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->flags)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(b, a->size)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->uid)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->gid)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->perm)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->atime)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, a->mtime)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Convert from SSH2_FX_ status to text error message */
+const char *
+fx2txt(int status)
+{
+	switch (status) {
+	case SSH2_FX_OK:
+		return("No error");
+	case SSH2_FX_EOF:
+		return("End of file");
+	case SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE:
+		return("No such file or directory");
+	case SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED:
+		return("Permission denied");
+	case SSH2_FX_FAILURE:
+		return("Failure");
+	case SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE:
+		return("Bad message");
+	case SSH2_FX_NO_CONNECTION:
+		return("No connection");
+	case SSH2_FX_CONNECTION_LOST:
+		return("Connection lost");
+	case SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED:
+		return("Operation unsupported");
+	default:
+		return("Unknown status");
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
+
+/*
+ * drwxr-xr-x    5 markus   markus       1024 Jan 13 18:39 .ssh
+ */
+char *
+ls_file(const char *name, const struct stat *st, int remote, int si_units,
+    const char *user, const char *group)
+{
+	int ulen, glen, sz = 0;
+	struct tm *ltime = localtime(&st->st_mtime);
+	char buf[1024], lc[8], mode[11+1], tbuf[12+1], ubuf[11+1], gbuf[11+1];
+	char sbuf[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+	time_t now;
+
+	strmode(st->st_mode, mode);
+	if (remote) {
+		if (user == NULL) {
+			snprintf(ubuf, sizeof ubuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_uid);
+			user = ubuf;
+		}
+		if (group == NULL) {
+			snprintf(gbuf, sizeof gbuf, "%u", (u_int)st->st_gid);
+			group = gbuf;
+		}
+		strlcpy(lc, "?", sizeof(lc));
+	} else {
+		user = user_from_uid(st->st_uid, 0);
+		group = group_from_gid(st->st_gid, 0);
+		snprintf(lc, sizeof(lc), "%u", (u_int)st->st_nlink);
+	}
+	if (ltime != NULL) {
+		now = time(NULL);
+		if (now - (365*24*60*60)/2 < st->st_mtime &&
+		    now >= st->st_mtime)
+			sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e %H:%M", ltime);
+		else
+			sz = strftime(tbuf, sizeof tbuf, "%b %e  %Y", ltime);
+	}
+	if (sz == 0)
+		tbuf[0] = '\0';
+	ulen = MAXIMUM(strlen(user), 8);
+	glen = MAXIMUM(strlen(group), 8);
+	if (si_units) {
+		fmt_scaled((long long)st->st_size, sbuf);
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3s %-*s %-*s %8s %s %s",
+		    mode, lc, ulen, user, glen, group,
+		    sbuf, tbuf, name);
+	} else {
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s %3s %-*s %-*s %8llu %s %s",
+		    mode, lc, ulen, user, glen, group,
+		    (unsigned long long)st->st_size, tbuf, name);
+	}
+	return xstrdup(buf);
+}
diff --git a/sftp-common.h b/sftp-common.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..421a78f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sftp-common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-common.h,v 1.13 2022/09/19 10:41:58 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* Maximum packet that we are willing to send/accept */
+#define SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH	(256 * 1024)
+
+struct sshbuf;
+typedef struct Attrib Attrib;
+
+/* File attributes */
+struct Attrib {
+	u_int32_t	flags;
+	u_int64_t	size;
+	u_int32_t	uid;
+	u_int32_t	gid;
+	u_int32_t	perm;
+	u_int32_t	atime;
+	u_int32_t	mtime;
+};
+
+void	 attrib_clear(Attrib *);
+void	 stat_to_attrib(const struct stat *, Attrib *);
+void	 attrib_to_stat(const Attrib *, struct stat *);
+int	 decode_attrib(struct sshbuf *, Attrib *);
+int	 encode_attrib(struct sshbuf *, const Attrib *);
+char	*ls_file(const char *, const struct stat *, int, int,
+    const char *, const char *);
+
+const char *fx2txt(int);
diff --git a/sftp-glob.c b/sftp-glob.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..afeb15f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sftp-glob.c
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-glob.c,v 1.31 2022/10/24 21:51:55 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-client.h"
+
+int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
+    int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *);
+
+struct SFTP_OPENDIR {
+	SFTP_DIRENT **dir;
+	int offset;
+};
+
+static struct {
+	struct sftp_conn *conn;
+} cur;
+
+static void *
+fudge_opendir(const char *path)
+{
+	struct SFTP_OPENDIR *r;
+
+	r = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*r));
+
+	if (do_readdir(cur.conn, path, &r->dir)) {
+		free(r);
+		return(NULL);
+	}
+
+	r->offset = 0;
+
+	return((void *)r);
+}
+
+static struct dirent *
+fudge_readdir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od)
+{
+	/* Solaris needs sizeof(dirent) + path length (see below) */
+	static char buf[sizeof(struct dirent) + MAXPATHLEN];
+	struct dirent *ret = (struct dirent *)buf;
+#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__
+	static int inum = 1;
+#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
+
+	if (od->dir[od->offset] == NULL)
+		return(NULL);
+
+	memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+
+	/*
+	 * Solaris defines dirent->d_name as a one byte array and expects
+	 * you to hack around it.
+	 */
+#ifdef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
+	strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename, MAXPATHLEN);
+#else
+	strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename,
+	    sizeof(ret->d_name));
+#endif
+#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__
+	/*
+	 * Idiot glibc uses extensions to struct dirent for readdir with
+	 * ALTDIRFUNCs. Not that this is documented anywhere but the
+	 * source... Fake an inode number to appease it.
+	 */
+	ret->d_ino = inum++;
+	if (!inum)
+		inum = 1;
+#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
+
+	return(ret);
+}
+
+static void
+fudge_closedir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od)
+{
+	free_sftp_dirents(od->dir);
+	free(od);
+}
+
+static int
+fudge_lstat(const char *path, struct stat *st)
+{
+	Attrib *a;
+
+	if (!(a = do_lstat(cur.conn, path, 1)))
+		return(-1);
+
+	attrib_to_stat(a, st);
+
+	return(0);
+}
+
+static int
+fudge_stat(const char *path, struct stat *st)
+{
+	Attrib *a;
+
+	if (!(a = do_stat(cur.conn, path, 1)))
+		return(-1);
+
+	attrib_to_stat(a, st);
+
+	return(0);
+}
+
+int
+remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *pattern, int flags,
+    int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), glob_t *pglob)
+{
+	int r;
+	size_t l;
+	char *s;
+	struct stat sb;
+
+	pglob->gl_opendir = fudge_opendir;
+	pglob->gl_readdir = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))fudge_readdir;
+	pglob->gl_closedir = (void (*)(void *))fudge_closedir;
+	pglob->gl_lstat = fudge_lstat;
+	pglob->gl_stat = fudge_stat;
+
+	memset(&cur, 0, sizeof(cur));
+	cur.conn = conn;
+
+	if ((r = glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	/*
+	 * When both GLOB_NOCHECK and GLOB_MARK are active, a single gl_pathv
+	 * entry has been returned and that entry has not already been marked,
+	 * then check whether it needs a '/' appended as a directory mark.
+	 *
+	 * This ensures that a NOCHECK result is annotated as a directory.
+	 * The glob(3) spec doesn't promise to mark NOCHECK entries, but doing
+	 * it simplifies our callers (sftp/scp) considerably.
+	 *
+	 * XXX doesn't try to handle gl_offs.
+	 */
+	if ((flags & (GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_MARK)) == (GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_MARK) &&
+	    pglob->gl_matchc == 0 && pglob->gl_offs == 0 &&
+	    pglob->gl_pathc == 1 && (s = pglob->gl_pathv[0]) != NULL &&
+	    (l = strlen(s)) > 0 && s[l-1] != '/') {
+		if (fudge_stat(s, &sb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) {
+			/* NOCHECK on a directory; annotate */
+			if ((s = realloc(s, l + 2)) != NULL) {
+				memcpy(s + l, "/", 2);
+				pglob->gl_pathv[0] = s;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/sftp-realpath.c b/sftp-realpath.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ec779d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sftp-realpath.c
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sftp-realpath.c,v 1.2 2021/09/02 21:03:54 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff <kostik@iclub.nsu.ru>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
+ *    permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#ifndef SYMLOOP_MAX
+# define SYMLOOP_MAX 32
+#endif
+
+/* XXX rewrite sftp-server to use POSIX realpath and remove this hack */
+
+char *sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved);
+
+/*
+ * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]);
+ *
+ * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink
+ * components.  Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure,
+ * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved).
+ */
+char *
+sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved)
+{
+	struct stat sb;
+	char *p, *q, *s;
+	size_t left_len, resolved_len;
+	unsigned symlinks;
+	int serrno, slen, mem_allocated;
+	char left[PATH_MAX], next_token[PATH_MAX], symlink[PATH_MAX];
+
+	if (path[0] == '\0') {
+		errno = ENOENT;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	serrno = errno;
+
+	if (resolved == NULL) {
+		resolved = malloc(PATH_MAX);
+		if (resolved == NULL)
+			return (NULL);
+		mem_allocated = 1;
+	} else
+		mem_allocated = 0;
+
+	symlinks = 0;
+	if (path[0] == '/') {
+		resolved[0] = '/';
+		resolved[1] = '\0';
+		if (path[1] == '\0')
+			return (resolved);
+		resolved_len = 1;
+		left_len = strlcpy(left, path + 1, sizeof(left));
+	} else {
+		if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) {
+			if (mem_allocated)
+				free(resolved);
+			else
+				strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		resolved_len = strlen(resolved);
+		left_len = strlcpy(left, path, sizeof(left));
+	}
+	if (left_len >= sizeof(left) || resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Iterate over path components in `left'.
+	 */
+	while (left_len != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * Extract the next path component and adjust `left'
+		 * and its length.
+		 */
+		p = strchr(left, '/');
+		s = p ? p : left + left_len;
+		if (s - left >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(next_token)) {
+			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+			goto err;
+		}
+		memcpy(next_token, left, s - left);
+		next_token[s - left] = '\0';
+		left_len -= s - left;
+		if (p != NULL)
+			memmove(left, s + 1, left_len + 1);
+		if (resolved[resolved_len - 1] != '/') {
+			if (resolved_len + 1 >= PATH_MAX) {
+				errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+				goto err;
+			}
+			resolved[resolved_len++] = '/';
+			resolved[resolved_len] = '\0';
+		}
+		if (next_token[0] == '\0')
+			continue;
+		else if (strcmp(next_token, ".") == 0)
+			continue;
+		else if (strcmp(next_token, "..") == 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Strip the last path component except when we have
+			 * single "/"
+			 */
+			if (resolved_len > 1) {
+				resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+				q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
+				*q = '\0';
+				resolved_len = q - resolved;
+			}
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Append the next path component and lstat() it. If
+		 * lstat() fails we still can return successfully if
+		 * there are no more path components left.
+		 */
+		resolved_len = strlcat(resolved, next_token, PATH_MAX);
+		if (resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
+			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+			goto err;
+		}
+		if (lstat(resolved, &sb) != 0) {
+			if (errno == ENOENT && p == NULL) {
+				errno = serrno;
+				return (resolved);
+			}
+			goto err;
+		}
+		if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) {
+			if (symlinks++ > SYMLOOP_MAX) {
+				errno = ELOOP;
+				goto err;
+			}
+			slen = readlink(resolved, symlink, sizeof(symlink) - 1);
+			if (slen < 0)
+				goto err;
+			symlink[slen] = '\0';
+			if (symlink[0] == '/') {
+				resolved[1] = 0;
+				resolved_len = 1;
+			} else if (resolved_len > 1) {
+				/* Strip the last path component. */
+				resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+				q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
+				*q = '\0';
+				resolved_len = q - resolved;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * If there are any path components left, then
+			 * append them to symlink. The result is placed
+			 * in `left'.
+			 */
+			if (p != NULL) {
+				if (symlink[slen - 1] != '/') {
+					if (slen + 1 >=
+					    (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(symlink)) {
+						errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+						goto err;
+					}
+					symlink[slen] = '/';
+					symlink[slen + 1] = 0;
+				}
+				left_len = strlcat(symlink, left, sizeof(symlink));
+				if (left_len >= sizeof(symlink)) {
+					errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+					goto err;
+				}
+			}
+			left_len = strlcpy(left, symlink, sizeof(left));
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Remove trailing slash except when the resolved pathname
+	 * is a single "/".
+	 */
+	if (resolved_len > 1 && resolved[resolved_len - 1] == '/')
+		resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+	return (resolved);
+
+err:
+	if (mem_allocated)
+		free(resolved);
+	return (NULL);
+}
diff --git a/sftp-server-main.c b/sftp-server-main.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c70f89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sftp-server-main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server-main.c,v 1.6 2019/06/06 05:13:13 otto Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(i);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	struct passwd *user_pw;
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	if ((user_pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "No user found for uid %lu\n",
+		    (u_long)getuid());
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
+}
diff --git a/sftp-server.0 b/sftp-server.0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b530c5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sftp-server.0
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+SFTP-SERVER(8)              System Manager's Manual             SFTP-SERVER(8)
+
+NAME
+     sftp-server M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SFTP server subsystem
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     sftp-server [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] [-l log_level]
+                 [-P denied_requests] [-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]
+     sftp-server -Q protocol_feature
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     sftp-server is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol to
+     stdout and expects client requests from stdin.  sftp-server is not
+     intended to be called directly, but from sshd(8) using the Subsystem
+     option.
+
+     Command-line flags to sftp-server should be specified in the Subsystem
+     declaration.  See sshd_config(5) for more information.
+
+     Valid options are:
+
+     -d start_directory
+             Specifies an alternate starting directory for users.  The
+             pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at
+             runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %d is replaced by the
+             home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is
+             replaced by the username of that user.  The default is to use the
+             user's home directory.  This option is useful in conjunction with
+             the sshd_config(5) ChrootDirectory option.
+
+     -e      Causes sftp-server to print logging information to stderr instead
+             of syslog for debugging.
+
+     -f log_facility
+             Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages
+             from sftp-server.  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH,
+             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+             The default is AUTH.
+
+     -h      Displays sftp-server usage information.
+
+     -l log_level
+             Specifies which messages will be logged by sftp-server.  The
+             possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG,
+             DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.  INFO and VERBOSE log transactions
+             that sftp-server performs on behalf of the client.  DEBUG and
+             DEBUG1 are equivalent.  DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher
+             levels of debugging output.  The default is ERROR.
+
+     -P denied_requests
+             Specifies a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that
+             are banned by the server.  sftp-server will reply to any denied
+             request with a failure.  The -Q flag can be used to determine the
+             supported request types.  If both denied and allowed lists are
+             specified, then the denied list is applied before the allowed
+             list.
+
+     -p allowed_requests
+             Specifies a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that
+             are permitted by the server.  All request types that are not on
+             the allowed list will be logged and replied to with a failure
+             message.
+
+             Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that
+             requests made implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted.
+
+     -Q protocol_feature
+             Queries protocol features supported by sftp-server.  At present
+             the only feature that may be queried is M-bM-^@M-^\requestsM-bM-^@M-^], which may be
+             used to deny or allow specific requests (flags -P and -p
+             respectively).
+
+     -R      Places this instance of sftp-server into a read-only mode.
+             Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations
+             that change the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
+
+     -u umask
+             Sets an explicit umask(2) to be applied to newly-created files
+             and directories, instead of the user's default mask.
+
+     On some systems, sftp-server must be able to access /dev/log for logging
+     to work, and use of sftp-server in a chroot configuration therefore
+     requires that syslogd(8) establish a logging socket inside the chroot
+     directory.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     sftp(1), ssh(1), sshd_config(5), sshd(8)
+
+     T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-
+     filexfer-02.txt, October 2001, work in progress material.
+
+HISTORY
+     sftp-server first appeared in OpenBSD 2.8.
+
+AUTHORS
+     Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+
+OpenBSD 7.2                      July 27, 2021                     OpenBSD 7.2
diff --git a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5311bf9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sftp-server.8
@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.31 2021/07/27 14:14:25 jmc Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: July 27 2021 $
+.Dt SFTP-SERVER 8
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm sftp-server
+.Nd OpenSSH SFTP server subsystem
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm sftp-server
+.Bk -words
+.Op Fl ehR
+.Op Fl d Ar start_directory
+.Op Fl f Ar log_facility
+.Op Fl l Ar log_level
+.Op Fl P Ar denied_requests
+.Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests
+.Op Fl u Ar umask
+.Ek
+.Nm
+.Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol
+to stdout and expects client requests from stdin.
+.Nm
+is not intended to be called directly, but from
+.Xr sshd 8
+using the
+.Cm Subsystem
+option.
+.Pp
+Command-line flags to
+.Nm
+should be specified in the
+.Cm Subsystem
+declaration.
+See
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+for more information.
+.Pp
+Valid options are:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl d Ar start_directory
+Specifies an alternate starting directory for users.
+The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime:
+%% is replaced by a literal '%',
+%d is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated,
+and %u is replaced by the username of that user.
+The default is to use the user's home directory.
+This option is useful in conjunction with the
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+.Cm ChrootDirectory
+option.
+.It Fl e
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print logging information to stderr instead of syslog for debugging.
+.It Fl f Ar log_facility
+Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+.Nm .
+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+The default is AUTH.
+.It Fl h
+Displays
+.Nm
+usage information.
+.It Fl l Ar log_level
+Specifies which messages will be logged by
+.Nm .
+The possible values are:
+QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
+INFO and VERBOSE log transactions that
+.Nm
+performs on behalf of the client.
+DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
+The default is ERROR.
+.It Fl P Ar denied_requests
+Specifies a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are banned by
+the server.
+.Nm
+will reply to any denied request with a failure.
+The
+.Fl Q
+flag can be used to determine the supported request types.
+If both denied and allowed lists are specified, then the denied list is
+applied before the allowed list.
+.It Fl p Ar allowed_requests
+Specifies a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are permitted
+by the server.
+All request types that are not on the allowed list will be logged and replied
+to with a failure message.
+.Pp
+Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that requests made
+implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted.
+.It Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
+Queries protocol features supported by
+.Nm .
+At present the only feature that may be queried is
+.Dq requests ,
+which may be used to deny or allow specific requests (flags
+.Fl P
+and
+.Fl p
+respectively).
+.It Fl R
+Places this instance of
+.Nm
+into a read-only mode.
+Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change
+the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
+.It Fl u Ar umask
+Sets an explicit
+.Xr umask 2
+to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
+user's default mask.
+.El
+.Pp
+On some systems,
+.Nm
+must be able to access
+.Pa /dev/log
+for logging to work, and use of
+.Nm
+in a chroot configuration therefore requires that
+.Xr syslogd 8
+establish a logging socket inside the chroot directory.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr sftp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A S. Lehtinen
+.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol"
+.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
+.%D October 2001
+.%O work in progress material
+.Re
+.Sh HISTORY
+.Nm
+first appeared in
+.Ox 2.8 .
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org
diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fe61a35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sftp-server.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2108 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.145 2022/11/09 09:04:12 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+
+char *sftp_realpath(const char *, char *); /* sftp-realpath.c */
+
+/* Maximum data read that we are willing to accept */
+#define SFTP_MAX_READ_LENGTH (SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH - 1024)
+
+/* Our verbosity */
+static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+
+/* Our client */
+static struct passwd *pw = NULL;
+static char *client_addr = NULL;
+
+/* input and output queue */
+struct sshbuf *iqueue;
+struct sshbuf *oqueue;
+
+/* Version of client */
+static u_int version;
+
+/* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
+static int init_done;
+
+/* Disable writes */
+static int readonly;
+
+/* Requests that are allowed/denied */
+static char *request_allowlist, *request_denylist;
+
+/* portable attributes, etc. */
+typedef struct Stat Stat;
+
+struct Stat {
+	char *name;
+	char *long_name;
+	Attrib attrib;
+};
+
+/* Packet handlers */
+static void process_open(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_close(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_read(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_write(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_stat(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_lstat(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_fstat(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_setstat(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_opendir(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_readdir(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_remove(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_mkdir(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_rmdir(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_realpath(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_rename(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_readlink(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_symlink(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_lsetstat(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_limits(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_expand(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_copy_data(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_home_directory(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended_get_users_groups_by_id(u_int32_t id);
+static void process_extended(u_int32_t id);
+
+struct sftp_handler {
+	const char *name;	/* user-visible name for fine-grained perms */
+	const char *ext_name;	/* extended request name */
+	u_int type;		/* packet type, for non extended packets */
+	void (*handler)(u_int32_t);
+	int does_write;		/* if nonzero, banned for readonly mode */
+};
+
+static const struct sftp_handler handlers[] = {
+	/* NB. SSH2_FXP_OPEN does the readonly check in the handler itself */
+	{ "open", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPEN, process_open, 0 },
+	{ "close", NULL, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE, process_close, 0 },
+	{ "read", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READ, process_read, 0 },
+	{ "write", NULL, SSH2_FXP_WRITE, process_write, 1 },
+	{ "lstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, process_lstat, 0 },
+	{ "fstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, process_fstat, 0 },
+	{ "setstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, process_setstat, 1 },
+	{ "fsetstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, process_fsetstat, 1 },
+	{ "opendir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR, process_opendir, 0 },
+	{ "readdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READDIR, process_readdir, 0 },
+	{ "remove", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, process_remove, 1 },
+	{ "mkdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, process_mkdir, 1 },
+	{ "rmdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, process_rmdir, 1 },
+	{ "realpath", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, process_realpath, 0 },
+	{ "stat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_STAT, process_stat, 0 },
+	{ "rename", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RENAME, process_rename, 1 },
+	{ "readlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, process_readlink, 0 },
+	{ "symlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK, process_symlink, 1 },
+	{ NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
+};
+
+/* SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED submessages */
+static const struct sftp_handler extended_handlers[] = {
+	{ "posix-rename", "posix-rename@openssh.com", 0,
+	    process_extended_posix_rename, 1 },
+	{ "statvfs", "statvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_statvfs, 0 },
+	{ "fstatvfs", "fstatvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fstatvfs, 0 },
+	{ "hardlink", "hardlink@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_hardlink, 1 },
+	{ "fsync", "fsync@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fsync, 1 },
+	{ "lsetstat", "lsetstat@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_lsetstat, 1 },
+	{ "limits", "limits@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_limits, 0 },
+	{ "expand-path", "expand-path@openssh.com", 0,
+	    process_extended_expand, 0 },
+	{ "copy-data", "copy-data", 0, process_extended_copy_data, 1 },
+	{ "home-directory", "home-directory", 0,
+	    process_extended_home_directory, 0 },
+	{ "users-groups-by-id", "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com", 0,
+	    process_extended_get_users_groups_by_id, 0 },
+	{ NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
+};
+
+static const struct sftp_handler *
+extended_handler_byname(const char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(name, extended_handlers[i].ext_name) == 0)
+			return &extended_handlers[i];
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+request_permitted(const struct sftp_handler *h)
+{
+	char *result;
+
+	if (readonly && h->does_write) {
+		verbose("Refusing %s request in read-only mode", h->name);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (request_denylist != NULL &&
+	    ((result = match_list(h->name, request_denylist, NULL))) != NULL) {
+		free(result);
+		verbose("Refusing denylisted %s request", h->name);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (request_allowlist != NULL &&
+	    ((result = match_list(h->name, request_allowlist, NULL))) != NULL) {
+		free(result);
+		debug2("Permitting allowlisted %s request", h->name);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	if (request_allowlist != NULL) {
+		verbose("Refusing non-allowlisted %s request", h->name);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+errno_to_portable(int unixerrno)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	switch (unixerrno) {
+	case 0:
+		ret = SSH2_FX_OK;
+		break;
+	case ENOENT:
+	case ENOTDIR:
+	case EBADF:
+	case ELOOP:
+		ret = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE;
+		break;
+	case EPERM:
+	case EACCES:
+	case EFAULT:
+		ret = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
+		break;
+	case ENAMETOOLONG:
+	case EINVAL:
+		ret = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE;
+		break;
+	case ENOSYS:
+		ret = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED;
+		break;
+	default:
+		ret = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+		break;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+flags_from_portable(int pflags)
+{
+	int flags = 0;
+
+	if ((pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) &&
+	    (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)) {
+		flags = O_RDWR;
+	} else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) {
+		flags = O_RDONLY;
+	} else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) {
+		flags = O_WRONLY;
+	}
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND)
+		flags |= O_APPEND;
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT)
+		flags |= O_CREAT;
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)
+		flags |= O_TRUNC;
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL)
+		flags |= O_EXCL;
+	return flags;
+}
+
+static const char *
+string_from_portable(int pflags)
+{
+	static char ret[128];
+
+	*ret = '\0';
+
+#define PAPPEND(str)	{				\
+		if (*ret != '\0')			\
+			strlcat(ret, ",", sizeof(ret));	\
+		strlcat(ret, str, sizeof(ret));		\
+	}
+
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ)
+		PAPPEND("READ")
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)
+		PAPPEND("WRITE")
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND)
+		PAPPEND("APPEND")
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT)
+		PAPPEND("CREATE")
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)
+		PAPPEND("TRUNCATE")
+	if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL)
+		PAPPEND("EXCL")
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* handle handles */
+
+typedef struct Handle Handle;
+struct Handle {
+	int use;
+	DIR *dirp;
+	int fd;
+	int flags;
+	char *name;
+	u_int64_t bytes_read, bytes_write;
+	int next_unused;
+};
+
+enum {
+	HANDLE_UNUSED,
+	HANDLE_DIR,
+	HANDLE_FILE
+};
+
+static Handle *handles = NULL;
+static u_int num_handles = 0;
+static int first_unused_handle = -1;
+
+static void handle_unused(int i)
+{
+	handles[i].use = HANDLE_UNUSED;
+	handles[i].next_unused = first_unused_handle;
+	first_unused_handle = i;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, int flags, DIR *dirp)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (first_unused_handle == -1) {
+		if (num_handles + 1 <= num_handles)
+			return -1;
+		num_handles++;
+		handles = xreallocarray(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle));
+		handle_unused(num_handles - 1);
+	}
+
+	i = first_unused_handle;
+	first_unused_handle = handles[i].next_unused;
+
+	handles[i].use = use;
+	handles[i].dirp = dirp;
+	handles[i].fd = fd;
+	handles[i].flags = flags;
+	handles[i].name = xstrdup(name);
+	handles[i].bytes_read = handles[i].bytes_write = 0;
+
+	return i;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_is_ok(int i, int type)
+{
+	return i >= 0 && (u_int)i < num_handles && handles[i].use == type;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_to_string(int handle, u_char **stringp, int *hlenp)
+{
+	if (stringp == NULL || hlenp == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	*stringp = xmalloc(sizeof(int32_t));
+	put_u32(*stringp, handle);
+	*hlenp = sizeof(int32_t);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_from_string(const u_char *handle, u_int hlen)
+{
+	int val;
+
+	if (hlen != sizeof(int32_t))
+		return -1;
+	val = get_u32(handle);
+	if (handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_FILE) ||
+	    handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_DIR))
+		return val;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static char *
+handle_to_name(int handle)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)||
+	    handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+		return handles[handle].name;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static DIR *
+handle_to_dir(int handle)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR))
+		return handles[handle].dirp;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_to_fd(int handle)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+		return handles[handle].fd;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_to_flags(int handle)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+		return handles[handle].flags;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+handle_update_read(int handle, ssize_t bytes)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0)
+		handles[handle].bytes_read += bytes;
+}
+
+static void
+handle_update_write(int handle, ssize_t bytes)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0)
+		handles[handle].bytes_write += bytes;
+}
+
+static u_int64_t
+handle_bytes_read(int handle)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+		return (handles[handle].bytes_read);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static u_int64_t
+handle_bytes_write(int handle)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE))
+		return (handles[handle].bytes_write);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_close(int handle)
+{
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
+		ret = close(handles[handle].fd);
+		free(handles[handle].name);
+		handle_unused(handle);
+	} else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) {
+		ret = closedir(handles[handle].dirp);
+		free(handles[handle].name);
+		handle_unused(handle);
+	} else {
+		errno = ENOENT;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+handle_log_close(int handle, char *emsg)
+{
+	if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
+		logit("%s%sclose \"%s\" bytes read %llu written %llu",
+		    emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ",
+		    handle_to_name(handle),
+		    (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_read(handle),
+		    (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_write(handle));
+	} else {
+		logit("%s%sclosedir \"%s\"",
+		    emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ",
+		    handle_to_name(handle));
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+handle_log_exit(void)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_handles; i++)
+		if (handles[i].use != HANDLE_UNUSED)
+			handle_log_close(i, "forced");
+}
+
+static int
+get_handle(struct sshbuf *queue, int *hp)
+{
+	u_char *handle;
+	int r;
+	size_t hlen;
+
+	*hp = -1;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(queue, &handle, &hlen)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (hlen < 256)
+		*hp = handle_from_string(handle, hlen);
+	free(handle);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* send replies */
+
+static void
+send_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(oqueue, m)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+}
+
+static const char *
+status_to_message(u_int32_t status)
+{
+	static const char * const status_messages[] = {
+		"Success",			/* SSH_FX_OK */
+		"End of file",			/* SSH_FX_EOF */
+		"No such file",			/* SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE */
+		"Permission denied",		/* SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED */
+		"Failure",			/* SSH_FX_FAILURE */
+		"Bad message",			/* SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE */
+		"No connection",		/* SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION */
+		"Connection lost",		/* SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST */
+		"Operation unsupported",	/* SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED */
+		"Unknown error"			/* Others */
+	};
+	return (status_messages[MINIMUM(status,SSH2_FX_MAX)]);
+}
+
+static void
+send_status_errmsg(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status, const char *errmsg)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3("request %u: sent status %u", id, status);
+	if (log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE ||
+	    (status != SSH2_FX_OK && status != SSH2_FX_EOF))
+		logit("sent status %s", status_to_message(status));
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_STATUS)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, status)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	if (version >= 3) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, errmsg == NULL ?
+		    status_to_message(status) : errmsg)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "")) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "compose message");
+	}
+	send_msg(msg);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static void
+send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status)
+{
+	send_status_errmsg(id, status, NULL);
+}
+
+static void
+send_data_or_handle(char type, u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, dlen)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(msg);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static void
+send_data(u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen)
+{
+	debug("request %u: sent data len %d", id, dlen);
+	send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_DATA, id, data, dlen);
+}
+
+static void
+send_handle(u_int32_t id, int handle)
+{
+	u_char *string;
+	int hlen;
+
+	handle_to_string(handle, &string, &hlen);
+	debug("request %u: sent handle handle %d", id, handle);
+	send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, id, string, hlen);
+	free(string);
+}
+
+static void
+send_names(u_int32_t id, int count, const Stat *stats)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int i, r;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_NAME)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, count)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	debug("request %u: sent names count %d", id, count);
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].name)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].long_name)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = encode_attrib(msg, &stats[i].attrib)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "compose filenames/attrib");
+	}
+	send_msg(msg);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static void
+send_attrib(u_int32_t id, const Attrib *a)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r;
+
+	debug("request %u: sent attrib have 0x%x", id, a->flags);
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_ATTRS)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(msg);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static void
+send_statvfs(u_int32_t id, struct statvfs *st)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	u_int64_t flag;
+	int r;
+
+	flag = (st->f_flag & ST_RDONLY) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY : 0;
+	flag |= (st->f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID : 0;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bsize)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_frsize)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_blocks)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bfree)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bavail)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_files)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_ffree)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_favail)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, FSID_TO_ULONG(st->f_fsid))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, flag)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_namemax)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(msg);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prepare SSH2_FXP_VERSION extension advertisement for a single extension.
+ * The extension is checked for permission prior to advertisement.
+ */
+static int
+compose_extension(struct sshbuf *msg, const char *name, const char *ver)
+{
+	int r;
+	const struct sftp_handler *exthnd;
+
+	if ((exthnd = extended_handler_byname(name)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("internal error: no handler for %s", name);
+	if (!request_permitted(exthnd)) {
+		debug2_f("refusing to advertise disallowed extension %s", name);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, ver)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose %s", name);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* parse incoming */
+
+static void
+process_init(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &version)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	verbose("received client version %u", version);
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_VERSION)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+
+	 /* extension advertisements */
+	compose_extension(msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com", "1");
+	compose_extension(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com", "2");
+	compose_extension(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com", "2");
+	compose_extension(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com", "1");
+	compose_extension(msg, "fsync@openssh.com", "1");
+	compose_extension(msg, "lsetstat@openssh.com", "1");
+	compose_extension(msg, "limits@openssh.com", "1");
+	compose_extension(msg, "expand-path@openssh.com", "1");
+	compose_extension(msg, "copy-data", "1");
+	compose_extension(msg, "home-directory", "1");
+	compose_extension(msg, "users-groups-by-id@openssh.com", "1");
+
+	send_msg(msg);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static void
+process_open(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	u_int32_t pflags;
+	Attrib a;
+	char *name;
+	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
+	    (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
+	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
+	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
+	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
+	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
+	if (readonly &&
+	    ((flags & O_ACCMODE) != O_RDONLY ||
+	    (flags & (O_CREAT|O_TRUNC)) != 0)) {
+		verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode");
+		status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED;
+	} else {
+		fd = open(name, flags, mode);
+		if (fd == -1) {
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		} else {
+			handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, name, fd, flags, NULL);
+			if (handle < 0) {
+				close(fd);
+			} else {
+				send_handle(id, handle);
+				status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		send_status(id, status);
+	free(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_close(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	int r, handle, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+	if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug3("request %u: close handle %u", id, handle);
+	handle_log_close(handle, NULL);
+	ret = handle_close(handle);
+	status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+	send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static void
+process_read(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	static u_char *buf;
+	static size_t buflen;
+	u_int32_t len;
+	int r, handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+	u_int64_t off;
+
+	if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug("request %u: read \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %u",
+	    id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len);
+	if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) == -1)
+		goto out;
+	if (len > SFTP_MAX_READ_LENGTH) {
+		debug2("read change len %u to %u", len, SFTP_MAX_READ_LENGTH);
+		len = SFTP_MAX_READ_LENGTH;
+	}
+	if (len > buflen) {
+		debug3_f("allocate %zu => %u", buflen, len);
+		if ((buf = realloc(NULL, len)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("realloc failed");
+		buflen = len;
+	}
+	if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
+		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		error_f("seek \"%.100s\": %s", handle_to_name(handle),
+		    strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (len == 0) {
+		/* weird, but not strictly disallowed */
+		ret = 0;
+	} else if ((ret = read(fd, buf, len)) == -1) {
+		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		error_f("read \"%.100s\": %s", handle_to_name(handle),
+		    strerror(errno));
+		goto out;
+	} else if (ret == 0) {
+		status = SSH2_FX_EOF;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	send_data(id, buf, ret);
+	handle_update_read(handle, ret);
+	/* success */
+	status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+ out:
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static void
+process_write(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	u_int64_t off;
+	size_t len;
+	int r, handle, fd, ret, status;
+	u_char *data;
+
+	if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &data, &len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug("request %u: write \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %zu",
+	    id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len);
+	fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
+
+	if (fd < 0)
+		status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+	else {
+		if (!(handle_to_flags(handle) & O_APPEND) &&
+		    lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+			error_f("seek \"%.100s\": %s", handle_to_name(handle),
+			    strerror(errno));
+		} else {
+/* XXX ATOMICIO ? */
+			ret = write(fd, data, len);
+			if (ret == -1) {
+				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+				error_f("write \"%.100s\": %s",
+				    handle_to_name(handle), strerror(errno));
+			} else if ((size_t)ret == len) {
+				status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+				handle_update_write(handle, ret);
+			} else {
+				debug2_f("nothing at all written");
+				status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	send_status(id, status);
+	free(data);
+}
+
+static void
+process_do_stat(u_int32_t id, int do_lstat)
+{
+	Attrib a;
+	struct stat st;
+	char *name;
+	int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug3("request %u: %sstat", id, do_lstat ? "l" : "");
+	verbose("%sstat name \"%s\"", do_lstat ? "l" : "", name);
+	r = do_lstat ? lstat(name, &st) : stat(name, &st);
+	if (r == -1) {
+		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	} else {
+		stat_to_attrib(&st, &a);
+		send_attrib(id, &a);
+		status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+	}
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		send_status(id, status);
+	free(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_stat(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	process_do_stat(id, 0);
+}
+
+static void
+process_lstat(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	process_do_stat(id, 1);
+}
+
+static void
+process_fstat(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	Attrib a;
+	struct stat st;
+	int fd, r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+	if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	debug("request %u: fstat \"%s\" (handle %u)",
+	    id, handle_to_name(handle), handle);
+	fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
+	if (fd >= 0) {
+		r = fstat(fd, &st);
+		if (r == -1) {
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		} else {
+			stat_to_attrib(&st, &a);
+			send_attrib(id, &a);
+			status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+		}
+	}
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static struct timeval *
+attrib_to_tv(const Attrib *a)
+{
+	static struct timeval tv[2];
+
+	tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
+	tv[0].tv_usec = 0;
+	tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
+	tv[1].tv_usec = 0;
+	return tv;
+}
+
+static struct timespec *
+attrib_to_ts(const Attrib *a)
+{
+	static struct timespec ts[2];
+
+	ts[0].tv_sec = a->atime;
+	ts[0].tv_nsec = 0;
+	ts[1].tv_sec = a->mtime;
+	ts[1].tv_nsec = 0;
+	return ts;
+}
+
+static void
+process_setstat(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	Attrib a;
+	char *name;
+	int r, status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug("request %u: setstat name \"%s\"", id, name);
+	if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
+		logit("set \"%s\" size %llu",
+		    name, (unsigned long long)a.size);
+		r = truncate(name, a.size);
+		if (r == -1)
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	}
+	if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+		logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm);
+		r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777);
+		if (r == -1)
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	}
+	if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+		char buf[64];
+		time_t t = a.mtime;
+
+		strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
+		    localtime(&t));
+		logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
+		r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a));
+		if (r == -1)
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	}
+	if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+		logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
+		    (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid);
+		r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid);
+		if (r == -1)
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	}
+	send_status(id, status);
+	free(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	Attrib a;
+	int handle, fd, r;
+	int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+
+	if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug("request %u: fsetstat handle %d", id, handle);
+	fd = handle_to_fd(handle);
+	if (fd < 0)
+		status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+	else {
+		char *name = handle_to_name(handle);
+
+		if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
+			logit("set \"%s\" size %llu",
+			    name, (unsigned long long)a.size);
+			r = ftruncate(fd, a.size);
+			if (r == -1)
+				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		}
+		if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+			logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm);
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
+			r = fchmod(fd, a.perm & 07777);
+#else
+			r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777);
+#endif
+			if (r == -1)
+				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		}
+		if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+			char buf[64];
+			time_t t = a.mtime;
+
+			strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
+			    localtime(&t));
+			logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
+#ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES
+			r = futimes(fd, attrib_to_tv(&a));
+#else
+			r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a));
+#endif
+			if (r == -1)
+				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		}
+		if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+			logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
+			    (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid);
+#ifdef HAVE_FCHOWN
+			r = fchown(fd, a.uid, a.gid);
+#else
+			r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid);
+#endif
+			if (r == -1)
+				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		}
+	}
+	send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static void
+process_opendir(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	DIR *dirp = NULL;
+	char *path;
+	int r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug3("request %u: opendir", id);
+	logit("opendir \"%s\"", path);
+	dirp = opendir(path);
+	if (dirp == NULL) {
+		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	} else {
+		handle = handle_new(HANDLE_DIR, path, 0, 0, dirp);
+		if (handle < 0) {
+			closedir(dirp);
+		} else {
+			send_handle(id, handle);
+			status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+		}
+
+	}
+	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
+		send_status(id, status);
+	free(path);
+}
+
+static void
+process_readdir(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	DIR *dirp;
+	struct dirent *dp;
+	char *path;
+	int r, handle;
+
+	if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug("request %u: readdir \"%s\" (handle %d)", id,
+	    handle_to_name(handle), handle);
+	dirp = handle_to_dir(handle);
+	path = handle_to_name(handle);
+	if (dirp == NULL || path == NULL) {
+		send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE);
+	} else {
+		struct stat st;
+		char pathname[PATH_MAX];
+		Stat *stats;
+		int nstats = 10, count = 0, i;
+
+		stats = xcalloc(nstats, sizeof(Stat));
+		while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
+			if (count >= nstats) {
+				nstats *= 2;
+				stats = xreallocarray(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat));
+			}
+/* XXX OVERFLOW ? */
+			snprintf(pathname, sizeof pathname, "%s%s%s", path,
+			    strcmp(path, "/") ? "/" : "", dp->d_name);
+			if (lstat(pathname, &st) == -1)
+				continue;
+			stat_to_attrib(&st, &(stats[count].attrib));
+			stats[count].name = xstrdup(dp->d_name);
+			stats[count].long_name = ls_file(dp->d_name, &st,
+			    0, 0, NULL, NULL);
+			count++;
+			/* send up to 100 entries in one message */
+			/* XXX check packet size instead */
+			if (count == 100)
+				break;
+		}
+		if (count > 0) {
+			send_names(id, count, stats);
+			for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+				free(stats[i].name);
+				free(stats[i].long_name);
+			}
+		} else {
+			send_status(id, SSH2_FX_EOF);
+		}
+		free(stats);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+process_remove(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	char *name;
+	int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug3("request %u: remove", id);
+	logit("remove name \"%s\"", name);
+	r = unlink(name);
+	status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+	send_status(id, status);
+	free(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_mkdir(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	Attrib a;
+	char *name;
+	int r, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ?
+	    a.perm & 07777 : 0777;
+	debug3("request %u: mkdir", id);
+	logit("mkdir name \"%s\" mode 0%o", name, mode);
+	r = mkdir(name, mode);
+	status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+	send_status(id, status);
+	free(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_rmdir(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	char *name;
+	int r, status;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug3("request %u: rmdir", id);
+	logit("rmdir name \"%s\"", name);
+	r = rmdir(name);
+	status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+	send_status(id, status);
+	free(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_realpath(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	char resolvedname[PATH_MAX];
+	char *path;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	if (path[0] == '\0') {
+		free(path);
+		path = xstrdup(".");
+	}
+	debug3("request %u: realpath", id);
+	verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path);
+	if (sftp_realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
+		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+	} else {
+		Stat s;
+		attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
+		s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname;
+		send_names(id, 1, &s);
+	}
+	free(path);
+}
+
+static void
+process_rename(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	char *oldpath, *newpath;
+	int r, status;
+	struct stat sb;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug3("request %u: rename", id);
+	logit("rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
+	status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+	if (lstat(oldpath, &sb) == -1)
+		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) {
+		/* Race-free rename of regular files */
+		if (link(oldpath, newpath) == -1) {
+			if (errno == EOPNOTSUPP || errno == ENOSYS
+#ifdef EXDEV
+			    || errno == EXDEV
+#endif
+#ifdef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
+			    || errno == LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
+#endif
+			    ) {
+				struct stat st;
+
+				/*
+				 * fs doesn't support links, so fall back to
+				 * stat+rename.  This is racy.
+				 */
+				if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) {
+					if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1)
+						status =
+						    errno_to_portable(errno);
+					else
+						status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+				}
+			} else {
+				status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+			}
+		} else if (unlink(oldpath) == -1) {
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+			/* clean spare link */
+			unlink(newpath);
+		} else
+			status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+	} else if (stat(newpath, &sb) == -1) {
+		if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1)
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		else
+			status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+	}
+	send_status(id, status);
+	free(oldpath);
+	free(newpath);
+}
+
+static void
+process_readlink(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	int r, len;
+	char buf[PATH_MAX];
+	char *path;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug3("request %u: readlink", id);
+	verbose("readlink \"%s\"", path);
+	if ((len = readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) == -1)
+		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+	else {
+		Stat s;
+
+		buf[len] = '\0';
+		attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
+		s.name = s.long_name = buf;
+		send_names(id, 1, &s);
+	}
+	free(path);
+}
+
+static void
+process_symlink(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	char *oldpath, *newpath;
+	int r, status;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug3("request %u: symlink", id);
+	logit("symlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
+	/* this will fail if 'newpath' exists */
+	r = symlink(oldpath, newpath);
+	status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+	send_status(id, status);
+	free(oldpath);
+	free(newpath);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	char *oldpath, *newpath;
+	int r, status;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug3("request %u: posix-rename", id);
+	logit("posix-rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
+	r = rename(oldpath, newpath);
+	status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+	send_status(id, status);
+	free(oldpath);
+	free(newpath);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	char *path;
+	struct statvfs st;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	debug3("request %u: statvfs", id);
+	logit("statvfs \"%s\"", path);
+
+	if (statvfs(path, &st) != 0)
+		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+	else
+		send_statvfs(id, &st);
+	free(path);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	int r, handle, fd;
+	struct statvfs st;
+
+	if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	debug("request %u: fstatvfs \"%s\" (handle %u)",
+	    id, handle_to_name(handle), handle);
+	if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) {
+		send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (fstatvfs(fd, &st) != 0)
+		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+	else
+		send_statvfs(id, &st);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	char *oldpath, *newpath;
+	int r, status;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug3("request %u: hardlink", id);
+	logit("hardlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath);
+	r = link(oldpath, newpath);
+	status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+	send_status(id, status);
+	free(oldpath);
+	free(newpath);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	int handle, fd, r, status = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED;
+
+	if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	debug3("request %u: fsync (handle %u)", id, handle);
+	verbose("fsync \"%s\"", handle_to_name(handle));
+	if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0)
+		status = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE;
+	else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) {
+		r = fsync(fd);
+		status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK;
+	}
+	send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_lsetstat(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	Attrib a;
+	char *name;
+	int r, status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug("request %u: lsetstat name \"%s\"", id, name);
+	if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) {
+		/* nonsensical for links */
+		status = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) {
+		logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm);
+		r = fchmodat(AT_FDCWD, name,
+		    a.perm & 07777, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
+		if (r == -1)
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	}
+	if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) {
+		char buf[64];
+		time_t t = a.mtime;
+
+		strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S",
+		    localtime(&t));
+		logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf);
+		r = utimensat(AT_FDCWD, name,
+		    attrib_to_ts(&a), AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
+		if (r == -1)
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	}
+	if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) {
+		logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name,
+		    (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid);
+		r = fchownat(AT_FDCWD, name, a.uid, a.gid,
+		    AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW);
+		if (r == -1)
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+	}
+ out:
+	send_status(id, status);
+	free(name);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_limits(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r;
+	uint64_t nfiles = 0;
+#if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
+	struct rlimit rlim;
+#endif
+
+	debug("request %u: limits", id);
+
+#if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
+	if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) != -1 && rlim.rlim_cur > 5)
+		nfiles = rlim.rlim_cur - 5; /* stdio(3) + syslog + spare */
+#endif
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    /* max-packet-length */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) != 0 ||
+	    /* max-read-length */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, SFTP_MAX_READ_LENGTH)) != 0 ||
+	    /* max-write-length */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH - 1024)) != 0 ||
+	    /* max-open-handles */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, nfiles)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(msg);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_expand(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	char cwd[PATH_MAX], resolvedname[PATH_MAX];
+	char *path, *npath;
+	int r;
+	Stat s;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL) {
+		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	debug3("request %u: expand, original \"%s\"", id, path);
+	if (path[0] == '\0') {
+		/* empty path */
+		free(path);
+		path = xstrdup(".");
+	} else if (*path == '~') {
+		/* ~ expand path */
+		/* Special-case for "~" and "~/" to respect homedir flag */
+		if (strcmp(path, "~") == 0) {
+			free(path);
+			path = xstrdup(cwd);
+		} else if (strncmp(path, "~/", 2) == 0) {
+			npath = xstrdup(path + 2);
+			free(path);
+			xasprintf(&path, "%s/%s", cwd, npath);
+			free(npath);
+		} else {
+			/* ~user expansions */
+			if (tilde_expand(path, pw->pw_uid, &npath) != 0) {
+				send_status_errmsg(id,
+				    errno_to_portable(ENOENT), "no such user");
+				goto out;
+			}
+			free(path);
+			path = npath;
+		}
+	} else if (*path != '/') {
+		/* relative path */
+		xasprintf(&npath, "%s/%s", cwd, path);
+		free(path);
+		path = npath;
+	}
+	verbose("expand \"%s\"", path);
+	if (sftp_realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
+		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
+	s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname;
+	send_names(id, 1, &s);
+ out:
+	free(path);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_copy_data(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	u_char buf[64*1024];
+	int read_handle, read_fd, write_handle, write_fd;
+	u_int64_t len, read_off, read_len, write_off;
+	int r, copy_until_eof, status = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED;
+	size_t ret;
+
+	if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &read_handle)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &read_off)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &read_len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = get_handle(iqueue, &write_handle)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &write_off)) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+	debug("request %u: copy-data from \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %llu "
+	    "to \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu",
+	    id, handle_to_name(read_handle), read_handle,
+	    (unsigned long long)read_off, (unsigned long long)read_len,
+	    handle_to_name(write_handle), write_handle,
+	    (unsigned long long)write_off);
+
+	/* For read length of 0, we read until EOF. */
+	if (read_len == 0) {
+		read_len = (u_int64_t)-1 - read_off;
+		copy_until_eof = 1;
+	} else
+		copy_until_eof = 0;
+
+	read_fd = handle_to_fd(read_handle);
+	write_fd = handle_to_fd(write_handle);
+
+	/* Disallow reading & writing to the same handle or same path or dirs */
+	if (read_handle == write_handle || read_fd < 0 || write_fd < 0 ||
+	    !strcmp(handle_to_name(read_handle), handle_to_name(write_handle))) {
+		status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (lseek(read_fd, read_off, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		error("%s: read_seek failed", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((handle_to_flags(write_handle) & O_APPEND) == 0 &&
+	    lseek(write_fd, write_off, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
+		status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+		error("%s: write_seek failed", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Process the request in chunks. */
+	while (read_len > 0 || copy_until_eof) {
+		len = MINIMUM(sizeof(buf), read_len);
+		read_len -= len;
+
+		ret = atomicio(read, read_fd, buf, len);
+		if (ret == 0 && errno == EPIPE) {
+			status = copy_until_eof ? SSH2_FX_OK : SSH2_FX_EOF;
+			break;
+		} else if (ret == 0) {
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+			error("%s: read failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+			break;
+		}
+		len = ret;
+		handle_update_read(read_handle, len);
+
+		ret = atomicio(vwrite, write_fd, buf, len);
+		if (ret != len) {
+			status = errno_to_portable(errno);
+			error("%s: write failed: %llu != %llu: %s", __func__,
+			    (unsigned long long)ret, (unsigned long long)len,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			break;
+		}
+		handle_update_write(write_handle, len);
+	}
+
+	if (read_len == 0)
+		status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+
+ out:
+	send_status(id, status);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_home_directory(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	char *username;
+	struct passwd *user_pw;
+	int r;
+	Stat s;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &username, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	debug3("request %u: home-directory \"%s\"", id, username);
+	if ((user_pw = getpwnam(username)) == NULL) {
+		send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	verbose("home-directory \"%s\"", pw->pw_dir);
+	attrib_clear(&s.attrib);
+	s.name = s.long_name = pw->pw_dir;
+	send_names(id, 1, &s);
+ out:
+	free(username);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended_get_users_groups_by_id(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	struct passwd *user_pw;
+	struct group *gr;
+	struct sshbuf *uids, *gids, *usernames, *groupnames, *msg;
+	int r;
+	u_int n, nusers = 0, ngroups = 0;
+	const char *name;
+
+	if ((usernames = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (groupnames = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_froms(iqueue, &uids)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_froms(iqueue, &gids)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	debug_f("uids len = %zu, gids len = %zu",
+	    sshbuf_len(uids), sshbuf_len(gids));
+	while (sshbuf_len(uids) != 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(uids, &n)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse inner uid");
+		user_pw = getpwuid((uid_t)n);
+		name = user_pw == NULL ? "" : user_pw->pw_name;
+		debug3_f("uid %u => \"%s\"", n, name);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(usernames, name)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "assemble uid reply");
+		nusers++;
+	}
+	while (sshbuf_len(gids) != 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(gids, &n)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse inner gid");
+		gr = getgrgid((gid_t)n);
+		name = gr == NULL ? "" : gr->gr_name;
+		debug3_f("gid %u => \"%s\"", n, name);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(groupnames, name)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "assemble gid reply");
+		nusers++;
+	}
+	verbose("users-groups-by-id: %u users, %u groups", nusers, ngroups);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(msg, usernames)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(msg, groupnames)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(msg);
+
+	sshbuf_free(uids);
+	sshbuf_free(gids);
+	sshbuf_free(usernames);
+	sshbuf_free(groupnames);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static void
+process_extended(u_int32_t id)
+{
+	char *request;
+	int r;
+	const struct sftp_handler *exthand;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &request, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	if ((exthand = extended_handler_byname(request)) == NULL) {
+		error("Unknown extended request \"%.100s\"", request);
+		send_status(id, SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED);	/* MUST */
+	} else {
+		if (!request_permitted(exthand))
+			send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED);
+		else
+			exthand->handler(id);
+	}
+	free(request);
+}
+
+/* stolen from ssh-agent */
+
+static void
+process(void)
+{
+	u_int msg_len;
+	u_int buf_len;
+	u_int consumed;
+	u_char type;
+	const u_char *cp;
+	int i, r;
+	u_int32_t id;
+
+	buf_len = sshbuf_len(iqueue);
+	if (buf_len < 5)
+		return;		/* Incomplete message. */
+	cp = sshbuf_ptr(iqueue);
+	msg_len = get_u32(cp);
+	if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
+		error("bad message from %s local user %s",
+		    client_addr, pw->pw_name);
+		sftp_server_cleanup_exit(11);
+	}
+	if (buf_len < msg_len + 4)
+		return;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, 4)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "consume");
+	buf_len -= 4;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(iqueue, &type)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case SSH2_FXP_INIT:
+		process_init();
+		init_done = 1;
+		break;
+	case SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED:
+		if (!init_done)
+			fatal("Received extended request before init");
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse extended ID");
+		process_extended(id);
+		break;
+	default:
+		if (!init_done)
+			fatal("Received %u request before init", type);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse ID");
+		for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
+			if (type == handlers[i].type) {
+				if (!request_permitted(&handlers[i])) {
+					send_status(id,
+					    SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED);
+				} else {
+					handlers[i].handler(id);
+				}
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (handlers[i].handler == NULL)
+			error("Unknown message %u", type);
+	}
+	/* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */
+	if (buf_len < sshbuf_len(iqueue)) {
+		error("iqueue grew unexpectedly");
+		sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+	consumed = buf_len - sshbuf_len(iqueue);
+	if (msg_len < consumed) {
+		error("msg_len %u < consumed %u", msg_len, consumed);
+		sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+	if (msg_len > consumed &&
+	    (r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, msg_len - consumed)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "consume");
+}
+
+/* Cleanup handler that logs active handles upon normal exit */
+void
+sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+	if (pw != NULL && client_addr != NULL) {
+		handle_log_exit();
+		logit("session closed for local user %s from [%s]",
+		    pw->pw_name, client_addr);
+	}
+	_exit(i);
+}
+
+static void
+sftp_server_usage(void)
+{
+	extern char *__progname;
+
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
+	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] "
+	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]\n"
+	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
+	    __progname, __progname);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
+{
+	int i, r, in, out, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+	ssize_t len, olen;
+	SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
+	char *cp, *homedir = NULL, uidstr[32], buf[4*4096];
+	long mask;
+
+	extern char *optarg;
+	extern char *__progname;
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
+
+	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+	    "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'Q':
+			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
+				printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name);
+			for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++)
+				printf("%s\n", extended_handlers[i].name);
+			exit(0);
+			break;
+		case 'R':
+			readonly = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'c':
+			/*
+			 * Ignore all arguments if we are invoked as a
+			 * shell using "sftp-server -c command"
+			 */
+			skipargs = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'e':
+			log_stderr = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			log_level = log_level_number(optarg);
+			if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
+				error("Invalid log level \"%s\"", optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+			log_facility = log_facility_number(optarg);
+			if (log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
+				error("Invalid log facility \"%s\"", optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'd':
+			cp = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, user_pw->pw_uid);
+			snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
+			    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
+			homedir = percent_expand(cp, "d", user_pw->pw_dir,
+			    "u", user_pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
+			free(cp);
+			break;
+		case 'p':
+			if (request_allowlist != NULL)
+				fatal("Permitted requests already set");
+			request_allowlist = xstrdup(optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'P':
+			if (request_denylist != NULL)
+				fatal("Refused requests already set");
+			request_denylist = xstrdup(optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'u':
+			errno = 0;
+			mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8);
+			if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' ||
+			    cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0))
+				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
+			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+		default:
+			sftp_server_usage();
+		}
+	}
+
+	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+	/*
+	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
+	 * available to the user so that sftp access doesn't automatically
+	 * imply arbitrary code execution access that will break
+	 * restricted configurations.
+	 */
+	platform_disable_tracing(1);	/* strict */
+
+	/* Drop any fine-grained privileges we don't need */
+	platform_pledge_sftp_server();
+
+	if ((cp = getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")) != NULL) {
+		client_addr = xstrdup(cp);
+		if ((cp = strchr(client_addr, ' ')) == NULL) {
+			error("Malformed SSH_CONNECTION variable: \"%s\"",
+			    getenv("SSH_CONNECTION"));
+			sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+		*cp = '\0';
+	} else
+		client_addr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
+
+	logit("session opened for local user %s from [%s]",
+	    pw->pw_name, client_addr);
+
+	in = STDIN_FILENO;
+	out = STDOUT_FILENO;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	setmode(in, O_BINARY);
+	setmode(out, O_BINARY);
+#endif
+
+	if ((iqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((oqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	if (homedir != NULL) {
+		if (chdir(homedir) != 0) {
+			error("chdir to \"%s\" failed: %s", homedir,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (;;) {
+		struct pollfd pfd[2];
+
+		memset(pfd, 0, sizeof pfd);
+		pfd[0].fd = pfd[1].fd = -1;
+
+		/*
+		 * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle
+		 * the worst-case length packet it can generate,
+		 * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads.
+		 */
+		if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(iqueue, sizeof(buf))) == 0 &&
+		    (r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue,
+		    SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0) {
+			pfd[0].fd = in;
+			pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
+		}
+		else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
+			fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
+
+		olen = sshbuf_len(oqueue);
+		if (olen > 0) {
+			pfd[1].fd = out;
+			pfd[1].events = POLLOUT;
+		}
+
+		if (poll(pfd, 2, -1) == -1) {
+			if (errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+			error("poll: %s", strerror(errno));
+			sftp_server_cleanup_exit(2);
+		}
+
+		/* copy stdin to iqueue */
+		if (pfd[0].revents & (POLLIN|POLLHUP)) {
+			len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf);
+			if (len == 0) {
+				debug("read eof");
+				sftp_server_cleanup_exit(0);
+			} else if (len == -1) {
+				if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR) {
+					error("read: %s", strerror(errno));
+					sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1);
+				}
+			} else if ((r = sshbuf_put(iqueue, buf, len)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+		}
+		/* send oqueue to stdout */
+		if (pfd[1].revents & (POLLOUT|POLLHUP)) {
+			len = write(out, sshbuf_ptr(oqueue), olen);
+			if (len == 0 || (len == -1 && errno == EPIPE)) {
+				debug("write eof");
+				sftp_server_cleanup_exit(0);
+			} else if (len == -1) {
+				sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1);
+				if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR) {
+					error("write: %s", strerror(errno));
+					sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1);
+				}
+			} else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(oqueue, len)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "consume");
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Process requests from client if we can fit the results
+		 * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input
+		 * and let the output queue drain.
+		 */
+		r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH);
+		if (r == 0)
+			process();
+		else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
+			fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
+	}
+}
diff --git a/sftp-usergroup.c b/sftp-usergroup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..083930a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sftp-usergroup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,239 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* sftp client user/group lookup and caching */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-client.h"
+#include "sftp-usergroup.h"
+
+/* Tree of id, name */
+struct idname {
+        u_int id;
+	char *name;
+        RB_ENTRY(idname) entry;
+	/* XXX implement bounded cache as TAILQ */
+};
+static int
+idname_cmp(struct idname *a, struct idname *b)
+{
+	if (a->id == b->id)
+		return 0;
+	return a->id > b->id ? 1 : -1;
+}
+RB_HEAD(idname_tree, idname);
+RB_GENERATE_STATIC(idname_tree, idname, entry, idname_cmp)
+
+static struct idname_tree user_idname = RB_INITIALIZER(&user_idname);
+static struct idname_tree group_idname = RB_INITIALIZER(&group_idname);
+
+static void
+idname_free(struct idname *idname)
+{
+	if (idname == NULL)
+		return;
+	free(idname->name);
+	free(idname);
+}
+
+static void
+idname_enter(struct idname_tree *tree, u_int id, const char *name)
+{
+	struct idname *idname;
+
+	if ((idname = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*idname))) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("alloc");
+	idname->id = id;
+	idname->name = xstrdup(name);
+	if (RB_INSERT(idname_tree, tree, idname) != NULL)
+		idname_free(idname);
+}
+
+static const char *
+idname_lookup(struct idname_tree *tree, u_int id)
+{
+	struct idname idname, *found;
+
+	memset(&idname, 0, sizeof(idname));
+	idname.id = id;
+	if ((found = RB_FIND(idname_tree, tree, &idname)) != NULL)
+		return found->name;
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+freenames(char **names, u_int nnames)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (names == NULL)
+		return;
+	for (i = 0; i < nnames; i++)
+		free(names[i]);
+	free(names);
+}
+
+static void
+lookup_and_record(struct sftp_conn *conn,
+    u_int *uids, u_int nuids, u_int *gids, u_int ngids)
+{
+	int r;
+	u_int i;
+	char **usernames = NULL, **groupnames = NULL;
+
+	if ((r = do_get_users_groups_by_id(conn, uids, nuids, gids, ngids,
+	    &usernames, &groupnames)) != 0) {
+		debug_fr(r, "do_get_users_groups_by_id");
+		return;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < nuids; i++) {
+		if (usernames[i] == NULL) {
+			debug3_f("uid %u not resolved", uids[i]);
+			continue;
+		}
+		debug3_f("record uid %u => \"%s\"", uids[i], usernames[i]);
+		idname_enter(&user_idname, uids[i], usernames[i]);
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < ngids; i++) {
+		if (groupnames[i] == NULL) {
+			debug3_f("gid %u not resolved", gids[i]);
+			continue;
+		}
+		debug3_f("record gid %u => \"%s\"", gids[i], groupnames[i]);
+		idname_enter(&group_idname, gids[i], groupnames[i]);
+	}
+	freenames(usernames, nuids);
+	freenames(groupnames, ngids);
+}
+
+static int
+has_id(u_int id, u_int *ids, u_int nids)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (nids == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* XXX O(N^2) */
+	for (i = 0; i < nids; i++) {
+		if (ids[i] == id)
+			break;
+	}
+	return i < nids;
+}
+
+static void
+collect_ids_from_glob(glob_t *g, int user, u_int **idsp, u_int *nidsp)
+{
+	u_int id, i, n = 0, *ids = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; g->gl_pathv[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if (user) {
+			if (ruser_name(g->gl_statv[i]->st_uid) != NULL)
+				continue; /* Already seen */
+			id = (u_int)g->gl_statv[i]->st_uid;
+		} else {
+			if (rgroup_name(g->gl_statv[i]->st_gid) != NULL)
+				continue; /* Already seen */
+			id = (u_int)g->gl_statv[i]->st_gid;
+		}
+		if (has_id(id, ids, n))
+			continue;
+		ids = xrecallocarray(ids, n, n + 1, sizeof(*ids));
+		ids[n++] = id;
+	}
+	*idsp = ids;
+	*nidsp = n;
+}
+
+void
+get_remote_user_groups_from_glob(struct sftp_conn *conn, glob_t *g)
+{
+	u_int *uids = NULL, nuids = 0, *gids = NULL, ngids = 0;
+
+	if (!can_get_users_groups_by_id(conn))
+		return;
+
+	collect_ids_from_glob(g, 1, &uids, &nuids);
+	collect_ids_from_glob(g, 0, &gids, &ngids);
+	lookup_and_record(conn, uids, nuids, gids, ngids);
+	free(uids);
+	free(gids);
+}
+
+static void
+collect_ids_from_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **d, int user, u_int **idsp, u_int *nidsp)
+{
+	u_int id, i, n = 0, *ids = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; d[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if (user) {
+			if (ruser_name((uid_t)(d[i]->a.uid)) != NULL)
+				continue; /* Already seen */
+			id = d[i]->a.uid;
+		} else {
+			if (rgroup_name((gid_t)(d[i]->a.gid)) != NULL)
+				continue; /* Already seen */
+			id = d[i]->a.gid;
+		}
+		if (has_id(id, ids, n))
+			continue;
+		ids = xrecallocarray(ids, n, n + 1, sizeof(*ids));
+		ids[n++] = id;
+	}
+	*idsp = ids;
+	*nidsp = n;
+}
+
+void
+get_remote_user_groups_from_dirents(struct sftp_conn *conn, SFTP_DIRENT **d)
+{
+	u_int *uids = NULL, nuids = 0, *gids = NULL, ngids = 0;
+
+	if (!can_get_users_groups_by_id(conn))
+		return;
+
+	collect_ids_from_dirents(d, 1, &uids, &nuids);
+	collect_ids_from_dirents(d, 0, &gids, &ngids);
+	lookup_and_record(conn, uids, nuids, gids, ngids);
+	free(uids);
+	free(gids);
+}
+
+const char *
+ruser_name(uid_t uid)
+{
+	return idname_lookup(&user_idname, (u_int)uid);
+}
+
+const char *
+rgroup_name(uid_t gid)
+{
+	return idname_lookup(&group_idname, (u_int)gid);
+}
+
diff --git a/sftp-usergroup.h b/sftp-usergroup.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2711faf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sftp-usergroup.h
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2022 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* sftp client user/group lookup and caching */
+
+/* Lookup uids/gids and populate cache */
+void get_remote_user_groups_from_glob(struct sftp_conn *conn, glob_t *g);
+void get_remote_user_groups_from_dirents(struct sftp_conn *conn, SFTP_DIRENT **d);
+
+/* Return user/group name from cache or NULL if not found */
+const char *ruser_name(uid_t uid);
+const char *rgroup_name(uid_t gid);
diff --git a/sftp.0 b/sftp.0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..35fb1cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sftp.0
@@ -0,0 +1,438 @@
+SFTP(1)                     General Commands Manual                    SFTP(1)
+
+NAME
+     sftp M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH secure file transfer
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     sftp [-46AaCfNpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]
+          [-D sftp_server_command] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]
+          [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port]
+          [-R num_requests] [-S program] [-s subsystem | sftp_server]
+          [-X sftp_option] destination
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     sftp is a file transfer program, similar to ftp(1), which performs all
+     operations over an encrypted ssh(1) transport.  It may also use many
+     features of ssh, such as public key authentication and compression.
+
+     The destination may be specified either as [user@]host[:path] or as a URI
+     in the form sftp://[user@]host[:port][/path].
+
+     If the destination includes a path and it is not a directory, sftp will
+     retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive authentication method
+     is used; otherwise it will do so after successful interactive
+     authentication.
+
+     If no path is specified, or if the path is a directory, sftp will log in
+     to the specified host and enter interactive command mode, changing to the
+     remote directory if one was specified.  An optional trailing slash can be
+     used to force the path to be interpreted as a directory.
+
+     Since the destination formats use colon characters to delimit host names
+     from path names or port numbers, IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in
+     square brackets to avoid ambiguity.
+
+     The options are as follows:
+
+     -4      Forces sftp to use IPv4 addresses only.
+
+     -6      Forces sftp to use IPv6 addresses only.
+
+     -A      Allows forwarding of ssh-agent(1) to the remote system.  The
+             default is not to forward an authentication agent.
+
+     -a      Attempt to continue interrupted transfers rather than overwriting
+             existing partial or complete copies of files.  If the partial
+             contents differ from those being transferred, then the resultant
+             file is likely to be corrupt.
+
+     -B buffer_size
+             Specify the size of the buffer that sftp uses when transferring
+             files.  Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of
+             higher memory consumption.  The default is 32768 bytes.
+
+     -b batchfile
+             Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input batchfile
+             instead of stdin.  Since it lacks user interaction, it should be
+             used in conjunction with non-interactive authentication to
+             obviate the need to enter a password at connection time (see
+             sshd(8) and ssh-keygen(1) for details).
+
+             A batchfile of M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y may be used to indicate standard input.  sftp
+             will abort if any of the following commands fail: get, put,
+             reget, reput, rename, ln, rm, mkdir, chdir, ls, lchdir, copy, cp,
+             chmod, chown, chgrp, lpwd, df, symlink, and lmkdir.
+
+             Termination on error can be suppressed on a command by command
+             basis by prefixing the command with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character (for example,
+             -rm /tmp/blah*).  Echo of the command may be suppressed by
+             prefixing the command with a M-bM-^@M-^X@M-bM-^@M-^Y character.  These two prefixes
+             may be combined in any order, for example -@ls /bsd.
+
+     -C      Enables compression (via ssh's -C flag).
+
+     -c cipher
+             Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers.
+             This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
+
+     -D sftp_server_command
+             Connect directly to a local sftp server (rather than via ssh(1)).
+             A command and arguments may be specified, for example
+             "/path/sftp-server -el debug3".  This option may be useful in
+             debugging the client and server.
+
+     -F ssh_config
+             Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh(1).
+             This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
+
+     -f      Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after
+             transfer.  When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if
+             the server implements the "fsync@openssh.com" extension.
+
+     -i identity_file
+             Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public
+             key authentication is read.  This option is directly passed to
+             ssh(1).
+
+     -J destination
+             Connect to the target host by first making an sftp connection to
+             the jump host described by destination and then establishing a
+             TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there.  Multiple
+             jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters.  This
+             is a shortcut to specify a ProxyJump configuration directive.
+             This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
+
+     -l limit
+             Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
+
+     -N      Disables quiet mode, e.g. to override the implicit quiet mode set
+             by the -b flag.
+
+     -o ssh_option
+             Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in
+             ssh_config(5).  This is useful for specifying options for which
+             there is no separate sftp command-line flag.  For example, to
+             specify an alternate port use: sftp -oPort=24.  For full details
+             of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+             ssh_config(5).
+
+                   AddressFamily
+                   BatchMode
+                   BindAddress
+                   BindInterface
+                   CanonicalDomains
+                   CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+                   CanonicalizeHostname
+                   CanonicalizeMaxDots
+                   CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+                   CASignatureAlgorithms
+                   CertificateFile
+                   CheckHostIP
+                   Ciphers
+                   Compression
+                   ConnectionAttempts
+                   ConnectTimeout
+                   ControlMaster
+                   ControlPath
+                   ControlPersist
+                   GlobalKnownHostsFile
+                   GSSAPIAuthentication
+                   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+                   HashKnownHosts
+                   Host
+                   HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+                   HostbasedAuthentication
+                   HostKeyAlgorithms
+                   HostKeyAlias
+                   Hostname
+                   IdentitiesOnly
+                   IdentityAgent
+                   IdentityFile
+                   IPQoS
+                   KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+                   KbdInteractiveDevices
+                   KexAlgorithms
+                   KnownHostsCommand
+                   LogLevel
+                   MACs
+                   NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+                   NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+                   PasswordAuthentication
+                   PKCS11Provider
+                   Port
+                   PreferredAuthentications
+                   ProxyCommand
+                   ProxyJump
+                   PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+                   PubkeyAuthentication
+                   RekeyLimit
+                   RequiredRSASize
+                   SendEnv
+                   ServerAliveInterval
+                   ServerAliveCountMax
+                   SetEnv
+                   StrictHostKeyChecking
+                   TCPKeepAlive
+                   UpdateHostKeys
+                   User
+                   UserKnownHostsFile
+                   VerifyHostKeyDNS
+
+     -P port
+             Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
+
+     -p      Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
+             original files transferred.
+
+     -q      Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
+             diagnostic messages from ssh(1).
+
+     -R num_requests
+             Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
+             Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed but will
+             increase memory usage.  The default is 64 outstanding requests.
+
+     -r      Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and
+             downloading.  Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links
+             encountered in the tree traversal.
+
+     -S program
+             Name of the program to use for the encrypted connection.  The
+             program must understand ssh(1) options.
+
+     -s subsystem | sftp_server
+             Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server on
+             the remote host.  A path is useful when the remote sshd(8) does
+             not have an sftp subsystem configured.
+
+     -v      Raise logging level.  This option is also passed to ssh.
+
+     -X sftp_option
+             Specify an option that controls aspects of SFTP protocol
+             behaviour.  The valid options are:
+
+             nrequests=value
+                     Controls how many concurrent SFTP read or write requests
+                     may be in progress at any point in time during a download
+                     or upload.  By default 64 requests may be active
+                     concurrently.
+
+             buffer=value
+                     Controls the maximum buffer size for a single SFTP
+                     read/write operation used during download or upload.  By
+                     default a 32KB buffer is used.
+
+INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
+     Once in interactive mode, sftp understands a set of commands similar to
+     those of ftp(1).  Commands are case insensitive.  Pathnames that contain
+     spaces must be enclosed in quotes.  Any special characters contained
+     within pathnames that are recognized by glob(3) must be escaped with
+     backslashes (M-bM-^@M-^X\M-bM-^@M-^Y).
+
+     bye     Quit sftp.
+
+     cd [path]
+             Change remote directory to path.  If path is not specified, then
+             change directory to the one the session started in.
+
+     chgrp [-h] grp path
+             Change group of file path to grp.  path may contain glob(7)
+             characters and may match multiple files.  grp must be a numeric
+             GID.
+
+             If the -h flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed.
+             Note that this is only supported by servers that implement the
+             "lsetstat@openssh.com" extension.
+
+     chmod [-h] mode path
+             Change permissions of file path to mode.  path may contain
+             glob(7) characters and may match multiple files.
+
+             If the -h flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed.
+             Note that this is only supported by servers that implement the
+             "lsetstat@openssh.com" extension.
+
+     chown [-h] own path
+             Change owner of file path to own.  path may contain glob(7)
+             characters and may match multiple files.  own must be a numeric
+             UID.
+
+             If the -h flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed.
+             Note that this is only supported by servers that implement the
+             "lsetstat@openssh.com" extension.
+
+     copy oldpath newpath
+             Copy remote file from oldpath to newpath.
+
+             Note that this is only supported by servers that implement the
+             "copy-data" extension.
+
+     cp oldpath newpath
+             Alias to copy command.
+
+     df [-hi] [path]
+             Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current
+             directory (or path if specified).  If the -h flag is specified,
+             the capacity information will be displayed using "human-readable"
+             suffixes.  The -i flag requests display of inode information in
+             addition to capacity information.  This command is only supported
+             on servers that implement the M-bM-^@M-^\statvfs@openssh.comM-bM-^@M-^] extension.
+
+     exit    Quit sftp.
+
+     get [-afpR] remote-path [local-path]
+             Retrieve the remote-path and store it on the local machine.  If
+             the local path name is not specified, it is given the same name
+             it has on the remote machine.  remote-path may contain glob(7)
+             characters and may match multiple files.  If it does and
+             local-path is specified, then local-path must specify a
+             directory.
+
+             If the -a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial
+             transfers of existing files.  Note that resumption assumes that
+             any partial copy of the local file matches the remote copy.  If
+             the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then
+             the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
+
+             If the -f flag is specified, then fsync(2) will be called after
+             the file transfer has completed to flush the file to disk.
+
+             If the -p flag is specified, then full file permissions and
+             access times are copied too.
+
+             If the -R flag is specified then directories will be copied
+             recursively.  Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when
+             performing recursive transfers.
+
+     help    Display help text.
+
+     lcd [path]
+             Change local directory to path.  If path is not specified, then
+             change directory to the local user's home directory.
+
+     lls [ls-options [path]]
+             Display local directory listing of either path or current
+             directory if path is not specified.  ls-options may contain any
+             flags supported by the local system's ls(1) command.  path may
+             contain glob(7) characters and may match multiple files.
+
+     lmkdir path
+             Create local directory specified by path.
+
+     ln [-s] oldpath newpath
+             Create a link from oldpath to newpath.  If the -s flag is
+             specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is a
+             hard link.
+
+     lpwd    Print local working directory.
+
+     ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path]
+             Display a remote directory listing of either path or the current
+             directory if path is not specified.  path may contain glob(7)
+             characters and may match multiple files.
+
+             The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of ls
+             accordingly:
+
+             -1      Produce single columnar output.
+
+             -a      List files beginning with a dot (M-bM-^@M-^X.M-bM-^@M-^Y).
+
+             -f      Do not sort the listing.  The default sort order is
+                     lexicographical.
+
+             -h      When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes:
+                     Byte, Kilobyte, Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte,
+                     and Exabyte in order to reduce the number of digits to
+                     four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024,
+                     M=1048576, etc.).
+
+             -l      Display additional details including permissions and
+                     ownership information.
+
+             -n      Produce a long listing with user and group information
+                     presented numerically.
+
+             -r      Reverse the sort order of the listing.
+
+             -S      Sort the listing by file size.
+
+             -t      Sort the listing by last modification time.
+
+     lumask umask
+             Set local umask to umask.
+
+     mkdir path
+             Create remote directory specified by path.
+
+     progress
+             Toggle display of progress meter.
+
+     put [-afpR] local-path [remote-path]
+             Upload local-path and store it on the remote machine.  If the
+             remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it
+             has on the local machine.  local-path may contain glob(7)
+             characters and may match multiple files.  If it does and
+             remote-path is specified, then remote-path must specify a
+             directory.
+
+             If the -a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial
+             transfers of existing files.  Note that resumption assumes that
+             any partial copy of the remote file matches the local copy.  If
+             the local file contents differ from the remote local copy then
+             the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
+
+             If the -f flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the
+             server to call fsync(2) after the file has been transferred.
+             Note that this is only supported by servers that implement the
+             "fsync@openssh.com" extension.
+
+             If the -p flag is specified, then full file permissions and
+             access times are copied too.
+
+             If the -R flag is specified then directories will be copied
+             recursively.  Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when
+             performing recursive transfers.
+
+     pwd     Display remote working directory.
+
+     quit    Quit sftp.
+
+     reget [-fpR] remote-path [local-path]
+             Resume download of remote-path.  Equivalent to get with the -a
+             flag set.
+
+     reput [-fpR] local-path [remote-path]
+             Resume upload of local-path.  Equivalent to put with the -a flag
+             set.
+
+     rename oldpath newpath
+             Rename remote file from oldpath to newpath.
+
+     rm path
+             Delete remote file specified by path.
+
+     rmdir path
+             Remove remote directory specified by path.
+
+     symlink oldpath newpath
+             Create a symbolic link from oldpath to newpath.
+
+     version
+             Display the sftp protocol version.
+
+     !command
+             Execute command in local shell.
+
+     !       Escape to local shell.
+
+     ?       Synonym for help.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     ftp(1), ls(1), scp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5),
+     glob(7), sftp-server(8), sshd(8)
+
+     T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-
+     filexfer-00.txt, January 2001, work in progress material.
+
+OpenBSD 7.2                    December 16, 2022                   OpenBSD 7.2
diff --git a/sftp.1 b/sftp.1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..68923ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sftp.1
@@ -0,0 +1,728 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.143 2022/12/16 03:40:03 djm Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: December 16 2022 $
+.Dt SFTP 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm sftp
+.Nd OpenSSH secure file transfer
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm sftp
+.Op Fl 46AaCfNpqrv
+.Op Fl B Ar buffer_size
+.Op Fl b Ar batchfile
+.Op Fl c Ar cipher
+.Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_command
+.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
+.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
+.Op Fl J Ar destination
+.Op Fl l Ar limit
+.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
+.Op Fl P Ar port
+.Op Fl R Ar num_requests
+.Op Fl S Ar program
+.Op Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server
+.Op Fl X Ar sftp_option
+.Ar destination
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a file transfer program, similar to
+.Xr ftp 1 ,
+which performs all operations over an encrypted
+.Xr ssh 1
+transport.
+It may also use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and
+compression.
+.Pp
+The
+.Ar destination
+may be specified either as
+.Sm off
+.Oo user @ Oc host Op : path
+.Sm on
+or as a URI in the form
+.Sm off
+.No sftp:// Oo user @ Oc host Oo : port Oc Op / path .
+.Sm on
+.Pp
+If the
+.Ar destination
+includes a
+.Ar path
+and it is not a directory,
+.Nm
+will retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive
+authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after
+successful interactive authentication.
+.Pp
+If no
+.Ar path
+is specified, or if the
+.Ar path
+is a directory,
+.Nm
+will log in to the specified
+.Ar host
+and enter interactive command mode, changing to the remote directory
+if one was specified.
+An optional trailing slash can be used to force the
+.Ar path
+to be interpreted as a directory.
+.Pp
+Since the destination formats use colon characters to delimit host
+names from path names or port numbers, IPv6 addresses must be
+enclosed in square brackets to avoid ambiguity.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl 4
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.It Fl 6
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.It Fl A
+Allows forwarding of
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+to the remote system.
+The default is not to forward an authentication agent.
+.It Fl a
+Attempt to continue interrupted transfers rather than overwriting
+existing partial or complete copies of files.
+If the partial contents differ from those being transferred,
+then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
+.It Fl B Ar buffer_size
+Specify the size of the buffer that
+.Nm
+uses when transferring files.
+Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of higher
+memory consumption.
+The default is 32768 bytes.
+.It Fl b Ar batchfile
+Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input
+.Ar batchfile
+instead of
+.Em stdin .
+Since it lacks user interaction, it should be used in conjunction with
+non-interactive authentication to obviate the need to enter a password
+at connection time (see
+.Xr sshd 8
+and
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+for details).
+.Pp
+A
+.Ar batchfile
+of
+.Sq \-
+may be used to indicate standard input.
+.Nm
+will abort if any of the following
+commands fail:
+.Ic get , put , reget , reput , rename , ln ,
+.Ic rm , mkdir , chdir , ls ,
+.Ic lchdir , copy , cp , chmod , chown ,
+.Ic chgrp , lpwd , df , symlink ,
+and
+.Ic lmkdir .
+.Pp
+Termination on error can be suppressed on a command by command basis by
+prefixing the command with a
+.Sq \-
+character (for example,
+.Ic -rm /tmp/blah* ) .
+Echo of the command may be suppressed by prefixing the command with a
+.Sq @
+character.
+These two prefixes may be combined in any order, for example
+.Ic -@ls /bsd .
+.It Fl C
+Enables compression (via ssh's
+.Fl C
+flag).
+.It Fl c Ar cipher
+Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers.
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl D Ar sftp_server_command
+Connect directly to a local sftp server
+(rather than via
+.Xr ssh 1 ) .
+A command and arguments may be specified, for example
+.Qq /path/sftp-server -el debug3 .
+This option may be useful in debugging the client and server.
+.It Fl F Ar ssh_config
+Specifies an alternative
+per-user configuration file for
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl f
+Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after transfer.
+When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if the server
+implements the "fsync@openssh.com" extension.
+.It Fl i Ar identity_file
+Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key
+authentication is read.
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl J Ar destination
+Connect to the target host by first making an
+.Nm
+connection to the jump host described by
+.Ar destination
+and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from
+there.
+Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters.
+This is a shortcut to specify a
+.Cm ProxyJump
+configuration directive.
+This option is directly passed to
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl l Ar limit
+Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
+.It Fl N
+Disables quiet mode, e.g. to override the implicit quiet mode set by the
+.Fl b
+flag.
+.It Fl o Ar ssh_option
+Can be used to pass options to
+.Nm ssh
+in the format used in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+This is useful for specifying options
+for which there is no separate
+.Nm sftp
+command-line flag.
+For example, to specify an alternate port use:
+.Ic sftp -oPort=24 .
+For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
+.It AddressFamily
+.It BatchMode
+.It BindAddress
+.It BindInterface
+.It CanonicalDomains
+.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+.It CanonicalizeHostname
+.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
+.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+.It CASignatureAlgorithms
+.It CertificateFile
+.It CheckHostIP
+.It Ciphers
+.It Compression
+.It ConnectionAttempts
+.It ConnectTimeout
+.It ControlMaster
+.It ControlPath
+.It ControlPersist
+.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
+.It GSSAPIAuthentication
+.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+.It HashKnownHosts
+.It Host
+.It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+.It HostbasedAuthentication
+.It HostKeyAlgorithms
+.It HostKeyAlias
+.It Hostname
+.It IdentitiesOnly
+.It IdentityAgent
+.It IdentityFile
+.It IPQoS
+.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+.It KbdInteractiveDevices
+.It KexAlgorithms
+.It KnownHostsCommand
+.It LogLevel
+.It MACs
+.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+.It PasswordAuthentication
+.It PKCS11Provider
+.It Port
+.It PreferredAuthentications
+.It ProxyCommand
+.It ProxyJump
+.It PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+.It PubkeyAuthentication
+.It RekeyLimit
+.It RequiredRSASize
+.It SendEnv
+.It ServerAliveInterval
+.It ServerAliveCountMax
+.It SetEnv
+.It StrictHostKeyChecking
+.It TCPKeepAlive
+.It UpdateHostKeys
+.It User
+.It UserKnownHostsFile
+.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
+.El
+.It Fl P Ar port
+Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
+.It Fl p
+Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
+original files transferred.
+.It Fl q
+Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
+diagnostic messages from
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Fl R Ar num_requests
+Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
+Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed
+but will increase memory usage.
+The default is 64 outstanding requests.
+.It Fl r
+Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading.
+Note that
+.Nm
+does not follow symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
+.It Fl S Ar program
+Name of the
+.Ar program
+to use for the encrypted connection.
+The program must understand
+.Xr ssh 1
+options.
+.It Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server
+Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server
+on the remote host.
+A path is useful when the remote
+.Xr sshd 8
+does not have an sftp subsystem configured.
+.It Fl v
+Raise logging level.
+This option is also passed to ssh.
+.It Fl X Ar sftp_option
+Specify an option that controls aspects of SFTP protocol behaviour.
+The valid options are:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm nrequests Ns = Ns Ar value
+Controls how many concurrent SFTP read or write requests may be in progress
+at any point in time during a download or upload.
+By default 64 requests may be active concurrently.
+.It Cm buffer Ns = Ns Ar value
+Controls the maximum buffer size for a single SFTP read/write operation used
+during download or upload.
+By default a 32KB buffer is used.
+.El
+.El
+.Sh INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
+Once in interactive mode,
+.Nm
+understands a set of commands similar to those of
+.Xr ftp 1 .
+Commands are case insensitive.
+Pathnames that contain spaces must be enclosed in quotes.
+Any special characters contained within pathnames that are recognized by
+.Xr glob 3
+must be escaped with backslashes
+.Pq Sq \e .
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ic bye
+Quit
+.Nm sftp .
+.It Ic cd Op Ar path
+Change remote directory to
+.Ar path .
+If
+.Ar path
+is not specified, then change directory to the one the session started in.
+.It Xo Ic chgrp
+.Op Fl h
+.Ar grp
+.Ar path
+.Xc
+Change group of file
+.Ar path
+to
+.Ar grp .
+.Ar path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 7
+characters and may match multiple files.
+.Ar grp
+must be a numeric GID.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl h
+flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed.
+Note that this is only supported by servers that implement
+the "lsetstat@openssh.com" extension.
+.It Xo Ic chmod
+.Op Fl h
+.Ar mode
+.Ar path
+.Xc
+Change permissions of file
+.Ar path
+to
+.Ar mode .
+.Ar path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 7
+characters and may match multiple files.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl h
+flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed.
+Note that this is only supported by servers that implement
+the "lsetstat@openssh.com" extension.
+.It Xo Ic chown
+.Op Fl h
+.Ar own
+.Ar path
+.Xc
+Change owner of file
+.Ar path
+to
+.Ar own .
+.Ar path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 7
+characters and may match multiple files.
+.Ar own
+must be a numeric UID.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl h
+flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed.
+Note that this is only supported by servers that implement
+the "lsetstat@openssh.com" extension.
+.It Ic copy Ar oldpath Ar newpath
+Copy remote file from
+.Ar oldpath
+to
+.Ar newpath .
+.Pp
+Note that this is only supported by servers that implement the "copy-data"
+extension.
+.It Ic cp Ar oldpath Ar newpath
+Alias to
+.Ic copy
+command.
+.It Xo Ic df
+.Op Fl hi
+.Op Ar path
+.Xc
+Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current directory
+(or
+.Ar path
+if specified).
+If the
+.Fl h
+flag is specified, the capacity information will be displayed using
+"human-readable" suffixes.
+The
+.Fl i
+flag requests display of inode information in addition to capacity information.
+This command is only supported on servers that implement the
+.Dq statvfs@openssh.com
+extension.
+.It Ic exit
+Quit
+.Nm sftp .
+.It Xo Ic get
+.Op Fl afpR
+.Ar remote-path
+.Op Ar local-path
+.Xc
+Retrieve the
+.Ar remote-path
+and store it on the local machine.
+If the local
+path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the
+remote machine.
+.Ar remote-path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 7
+characters and may match multiple files.
+If it does and
+.Ar local-path
+is specified, then
+.Ar local-path
+must specify a directory.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl a
+flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial transfers of existing files.
+Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the local file matches
+the remote copy.
+If the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then the
+resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl f
+flag is specified, then
+.Xr fsync 2
+will be called after the file transfer has completed to flush the file
+to disk.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl p
+.\" undocumented redundant alias
+.\" or
+.\" .Fl P
+flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are
+copied too.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl R
+.\" undocumented redundant alias
+.\" or
+.\" .Fl r
+flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively.
+Note that
+.Nm
+does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers.
+.It Ic help
+Display help text.
+.It Ic lcd Op Ar path
+Change local directory to
+.Ar path .
+If
+.Ar path
+is not specified, then change directory to the local user's home directory.
+.It Ic lls Op Ar ls-options Op Ar path
+Display local directory listing of either
+.Ar path
+or current directory if
+.Ar path
+is not specified.
+.Ar ls-options
+may contain any flags supported by the local system's
+.Xr ls 1
+command.
+.Ar path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 7
+characters and may match multiple files.
+.It Ic lmkdir Ar path
+Create local directory specified by
+.Ar path .
+.It Xo Ic ln
+.Op Fl s
+.Ar oldpath
+.Ar newpath
+.Xc
+Create a link from
+.Ar oldpath
+to
+.Ar newpath .
+If the
+.Fl s
+flag is specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is
+a hard link.
+.It Ic lpwd
+Print local working directory.
+.It Xo Ic ls
+.Op Fl 1afhlnrSt
+.Op Ar path
+.Xc
+Display a remote directory listing of either
+.Ar path
+or the current directory if
+.Ar path
+is not specified.
+.Ar path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 7
+characters and may match multiple files.
+.Pp
+The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of
+.Ic ls
+accordingly:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl 1
+Produce single columnar output.
+.It Fl a
+List files beginning with a dot
+.Pq Sq \&. .
+.It Fl f
+Do not sort the listing.
+The default sort order is lexicographical.
+.It Fl h
+When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes: Byte, Kilobyte,
+Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte, and Exabyte in order to reduce
+the number of digits to four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024,
+M=1048576, etc.).
+.It Fl l
+Display additional details including permissions
+and ownership information.
+.It Fl n
+Produce a long listing with user and group information presented
+numerically.
+.It Fl r
+Reverse the sort order of the listing.
+.It Fl S
+Sort the listing by file size.
+.It Fl t
+Sort the listing by last modification time.
+.El
+.It Ic lumask Ar umask
+Set local umask to
+.Ar umask .
+.It Ic mkdir Ar path
+Create remote directory specified by
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic progress
+Toggle display of progress meter.
+.It Xo Ic put
+.Op Fl afpR
+.Ar local-path
+.Op Ar remote-path
+.Xc
+Upload
+.Ar local-path
+and store it on the remote machine.
+If the remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has
+on the local machine.
+.Ar local-path
+may contain
+.Xr glob 7
+characters and may match multiple files.
+If it does and
+.Ar remote-path
+is specified, then
+.Ar remote-path
+must specify a directory.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl a
+flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial
+transfers of existing files.
+Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the remote file
+matches the local copy.
+If the local file contents differ from the remote local copy then
+the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl f
+flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the server to call
+.Xr fsync 2
+after the file has been transferred.
+Note that this is only supported by servers that implement
+the "fsync@openssh.com" extension.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl p
+.\" undocumented redundant alias
+.\" or
+.\" .Fl P
+flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are
+copied too.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Fl R
+.\" undocumented redundant alias
+.\" or
+.\" .Fl r
+flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively.
+Note that
+.Nm
+does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers.
+.It Ic pwd
+Display remote working directory.
+.It Ic quit
+Quit
+.Nm sftp .
+.It Xo Ic reget
+.Op Fl fpR
+.Ar remote-path
+.Op Ar local-path
+.Xc
+Resume download of
+.Ar remote-path .
+Equivalent to
+.Ic get
+with the
+.Fl a
+flag set.
+.It Xo Ic reput
+.Op Fl fpR
+.Ar local-path
+.Op Ar remote-path
+.Xc
+Resume upload of
+.Ar local-path .
+Equivalent to
+.Ic put
+with the
+.Fl a
+flag set.
+.It Ic rename Ar oldpath newpath
+Rename remote file from
+.Ar oldpath
+to
+.Ar newpath .
+.It Ic rm Ar path
+Delete remote file specified by
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic rmdir Ar path
+Remove remote directory specified by
+.Ar path .
+.It Ic symlink Ar oldpath newpath
+Create a symbolic link from
+.Ar oldpath
+to
+.Ar newpath .
+.It Ic version
+Display the
+.Nm
+protocol version.
+.It Ic \&! Ns Ar command
+Execute
+.Ar command
+in local shell.
+.It Ic \&!
+Escape to local shell.
+.It Ic \&?
+Synonym for help.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ftp 1 ,
+.Xr ls 1 ,
+.Xr scp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+.Xr glob 7 ,
+.Xr sftp-server 8 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A S. Lehtinen
+.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol"
+.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt
+.%D January 2001
+.%O work in progress material
+.Re
diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3616c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sftp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2682 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.225 2023/01/05 05:49:13 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
+#include <libgen.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H
+# include <locale.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
+#include <histedit.h>
+#else
+typedef void EditLine;
+#endif
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
+
+#include "sftp.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sftp-common.h"
+#include "sftp-client.h"
+#include "sftp-usergroup.h"
+
+/* File to read commands from */
+FILE* infile;
+
+/* Are we in batchfile mode? */
+int batchmode = 0;
+
+/* PID of ssh transport process */
+static volatile pid_t sshpid = -1;
+
+/* Suppress diagnostic messages */
+int quiet = 0;
+
+/* This is set to 0 if the progressmeter is not desired. */
+int showprogress = 1;
+
+/* When this option is set, we always recursively download/upload directories */
+int global_rflag = 0;
+
+/* When this option is set, we resume download or upload if possible */
+int global_aflag = 0;
+
+/* When this option is set, the file transfers will always preserve times */
+int global_pflag = 0;
+
+/* When this option is set, transfers will have fsync() called on each file */
+int global_fflag = 0;
+
+/* SIGINT received during command processing */
+volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0;
+
+/* I wish qsort() took a separate ctx for the comparison function...*/
+int sort_flag;
+glob_t *sort_glob;
+
+/* Context used for commandline completion */
+struct complete_ctx {
+	struct sftp_conn *conn;
+	char **remote_pathp;
+};
+
+int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
+    int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Separators for interactive commands */
+#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
+
+/* ls flags */
+#define LS_LONG_VIEW	0x0001	/* Full view ala ls -l */
+#define LS_SHORT_VIEW	0x0002	/* Single row view ala ls -1 */
+#define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW	0x0004	/* Long view with numeric uid/gid */
+#define LS_NAME_SORT	0x0008	/* Sort by name (default) */
+#define LS_TIME_SORT	0x0010	/* Sort by mtime */
+#define LS_SIZE_SORT	0x0020	/* Sort by file size */
+#define LS_REVERSE_SORT	0x0040	/* Reverse sort order */
+#define LS_SHOW_ALL	0x0080	/* Don't skip filenames starting with '.' */
+#define LS_SI_UNITS	0x0100	/* Display sizes as K, M, G, etc. */
+
+#define VIEW_FLAGS	(LS_LONG_VIEW|LS_SHORT_VIEW|LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)
+#define SORT_FLAGS	(LS_NAME_SORT|LS_TIME_SORT|LS_SIZE_SORT)
+
+/* Commands for interactive mode */
+enum sftp_command {
+	I_CHDIR = 1,
+	I_CHGRP,
+	I_CHMOD,
+	I_CHOWN,
+	I_COPY,
+	I_DF,
+	I_GET,
+	I_HELP,
+	I_LCHDIR,
+	I_LINK,
+	I_LLS,
+	I_LMKDIR,
+	I_LPWD,
+	I_LS,
+	I_LUMASK,
+	I_MKDIR,
+	I_PUT,
+	I_PWD,
+	I_QUIT,
+	I_REGET,
+	I_RENAME,
+	I_REPUT,
+	I_RM,
+	I_RMDIR,
+	I_SHELL,
+	I_SYMLINK,
+	I_VERSION,
+	I_PROGRESS,
+};
+
+struct CMD {
+	const char *c;
+	const int n;
+	const int t;	/* Completion type for the first argument */
+	const int t2;	/* completion type for the optional second argument */
+};
+
+/* Type of completion */
+#define NOARGS	0
+#define REMOTE	1
+#define LOCAL	2
+
+static const struct CMD cmds[] = {
+	{ "bye",	I_QUIT,		NOARGS, 	NOARGS	},
+	{ "cd",		I_CHDIR,	REMOTE, 	NOARGS	},
+	{ "chdir",	I_CHDIR,	REMOTE, 	NOARGS	},
+	{ "chgrp",	I_CHGRP,	REMOTE, 	NOARGS	},
+	{ "chmod",	I_CHMOD,	REMOTE, 	NOARGS	},
+	{ "chown",	I_CHOWN,	REMOTE, 	NOARGS	},
+	{ "copy",	I_COPY,		REMOTE, 	LOCAL	},
+	{ "cp",		I_COPY,		REMOTE, 	LOCAL	},
+	{ "df",		I_DF,		REMOTE, 	NOARGS	},
+	{ "dir",	I_LS,		REMOTE, 	NOARGS	},
+	{ "exit",	I_QUIT,		NOARGS, 	NOARGS	},
+	{ "get",	I_GET,		REMOTE, 	LOCAL	},
+	{ "help",	I_HELP,		NOARGS, 	NOARGS	},
+	{ "lcd",	I_LCHDIR,	LOCAL,		NOARGS	},
+	{ "lchdir",	I_LCHDIR,	LOCAL,		NOARGS	},
+	{ "lls",	I_LLS,		LOCAL,		NOARGS	},
+	{ "lmkdir",	I_LMKDIR,	LOCAL,		NOARGS	},
+	{ "ln",		I_LINK,		REMOTE, 	REMOTE	},
+	{ "lpwd",	I_LPWD,		LOCAL,		NOARGS	},
+	{ "ls",		I_LS,		REMOTE,		NOARGS	},
+	{ "lumask",	I_LUMASK,	NOARGS,		NOARGS	},
+	{ "mkdir",	I_MKDIR,	REMOTE,		NOARGS	},
+	{ "mget",	I_GET,		REMOTE,		LOCAL	},
+	{ "mput",	I_PUT,		LOCAL,		REMOTE	},
+	{ "progress",	I_PROGRESS,	NOARGS,		NOARGS	},
+	{ "put",	I_PUT,		LOCAL,		REMOTE	},
+	{ "pwd",	I_PWD,		REMOTE, 	NOARGS	},
+	{ "quit",	I_QUIT,		NOARGS, 	NOARGS	},
+	{ "reget",	I_REGET,	REMOTE, 	LOCAL	},
+	{ "rename",	I_RENAME,	REMOTE, 	REMOTE	},
+	{ "reput",	I_REPUT,	LOCAL,		REMOTE	},
+	{ "rm",		I_RM,		REMOTE,		NOARGS	},
+	{ "rmdir",	I_RMDIR,	REMOTE,		NOARGS	},
+	{ "symlink",	I_SYMLINK,	REMOTE,		REMOTE	},
+	{ "version",	I_VERSION,	NOARGS, 	NOARGS	},
+	{ "!",		I_SHELL,	NOARGS, 	NOARGS	},
+	{ "?",		I_HELP,		NOARGS, 	NOARGS	},
+	{ NULL,		-1,		-1,		-1	}
+};
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+killchild(int signo)
+{
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	pid = sshpid;
+	if (pid > 1) {
+		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+		waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
+	}
+
+	_exit(1);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+suspchild(int signo)
+{
+	if (sshpid > 1) {
+		kill(sshpid, signo);
+		while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, WUNTRACED) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+			continue;
+	}
+	kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+cmd_interrupt(int signo)
+{
+	const char msg[] = "\rInterrupt  \n";
+	int olderrno = errno;
+
+	(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
+	interrupted = 1;
+	errno = olderrno;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static void
+read_interrupt(int signo)
+{
+	interrupted = 1;
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+sigchld_handler(int sig)
+{
+	int save_errno = errno;
+	pid_t pid;
+	const char msg[] = "\rConnection closed.  \n";
+
+	/* Report if ssh transport process dies. */
+	while ((pid = waitpid(sshpid, NULL, WNOHANG)) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
+		continue;
+	if (pid == sshpid) {
+		if (!quiet)
+		    (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
+		sshpid = -1;
+	}
+
+	errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+static void
+help(void)
+{
+	printf("Available commands:\n"
+	    "bye                                Quit sftp\n"
+	    "cd path                            Change remote directory to 'path'\n"
+	    "chgrp [-h] grp path                Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n"
+	    "chmod [-h] mode path               Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n"
+	    "chown [-h] own path                Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n"
+	    "copy oldpath newpath               Copy remote file\n"
+	    "cp oldpath newpath                 Copy remote file\n"
+	    "df [-hi] [path]                    Display statistics for current directory or\n"
+	    "                                   filesystem containing 'path'\n"
+	    "exit                               Quit sftp\n"
+	    "get [-afpR] remote [local]         Download file\n"
+	    "help                               Display this help text\n"
+	    "lcd path                           Change local directory to 'path'\n"
+	    "lls [ls-options [path]]            Display local directory listing\n"
+	    "lmkdir path                        Create local directory\n"
+	    "ln [-s] oldpath newpath            Link remote file (-s for symlink)\n"
+	    "lpwd                               Print local working directory\n"
+	    "ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path]             Display remote directory listing\n"
+	    "lumask umask                       Set local umask to 'umask'\n"
+	    "mkdir path                         Create remote directory\n"
+	    "progress                           Toggle display of progress meter\n"
+	    "put [-afpR] local [remote]         Upload file\n"
+	    "pwd                                Display remote working directory\n"
+	    "quit                               Quit sftp\n"
+	    "reget [-fpR] remote [local]        Resume download file\n"
+	    "rename oldpath newpath             Rename remote file\n"
+	    "reput [-fpR] local [remote]        Resume upload file\n"
+	    "rm path                            Delete remote file\n"
+	    "rmdir path                         Remove remote directory\n"
+	    "symlink oldpath newpath            Symlink remote file\n"
+	    "version                            Show SFTP version\n"
+	    "!command                           Execute 'command' in local shell\n"
+	    "!                                  Escape to local shell\n"
+	    "?                                  Synonym for help\n");
+}
+
+static void
+local_do_shell(const char *args)
+{
+	int status;
+	char *shell;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	if (!*args)
+		args = NULL;
+
+	if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
+		shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
+
+	if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
+		fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		/* XXX: child has pipe fds to ssh subproc open - issue? */
+		if (args) {
+			debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
+			execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
+		} else {
+			debug3("Executing %s", shell);
+			execl(shell, shell, (char *)NULL);
+		}
+		fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't execute \"%s\": %s\n", shell,
+		    strerror(errno));
+		_exit(1);
+	}
+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
+	if (!WIFEXITED(status))
+		error("Shell exited abnormally");
+	else if (WEXITSTATUS(status))
+		error("Shell exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+static void
+local_do_ls(const char *args)
+{
+	if (!args || !*args)
+		local_do_shell(_PATH_LS);
+	else {
+		int len = strlen(_PATH_LS " ") + strlen(args) + 1;
+		char *buf = xmalloc(len);
+
+		/* XXX: quoting - rip quoting code from ftp? */
+		snprintf(buf, len, _PATH_LS " %s", args);
+		local_do_shell(buf);
+		free(buf);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */
+static char *
+path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip)
+{
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (strip == NULL)
+		return (xstrdup(path));
+
+	len = strlen(strip);
+	if (strncmp(path, strip, len) == 0) {
+		if (strip[len - 1] != '/' && path[len] == '/')
+			len++;
+		return (xstrdup(path + len));
+	}
+
+	return (xstrdup(path));
+}
+
+static int
+parse_getput_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc,
+    int *aflag, int *fflag, int *pflag, int *rflag)
+{
+	extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
+	int ch;
+
+	optind = optreset = 1;
+	opterr = 0;
+
+	*aflag = *fflag = *rflag = *pflag = 0;
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "afPpRr")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'a':
+			*aflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+			*fflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'p':
+		case 'P':
+			*pflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'r':
+		case 'R':
+			*rflag = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return optind;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_link_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *sflag)
+{
+	extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
+	int ch;
+
+	optind = optreset = 1;
+	opterr = 0;
+
+	*sflag = 0;
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "s")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 's':
+			*sflag = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return optind;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_rename_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *lflag)
+{
+	extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
+	int ch;
+
+	optind = optreset = 1;
+	opterr = 0;
+
+	*lflag = 0;
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "l")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'l':
+			*lflag = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return optind;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_ls_flags(char **argv, int argc, int *lflag)
+{
+	extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
+	int ch;
+
+	optind = optreset = 1;
+	opterr = 0;
+
+	*lflag = LS_NAME_SORT;
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1Safhlnrt")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case '1':
+			*lflag &= ~VIEW_FLAGS;
+			*lflag |= LS_SHORT_VIEW;
+			break;
+		case 'S':
+			*lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
+			*lflag |= LS_SIZE_SORT;
+			break;
+		case 'a':
+			*lflag |= LS_SHOW_ALL;
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+			*lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+			*lflag |= LS_SI_UNITS;
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			*lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW;
+			*lflag |= LS_LONG_VIEW;
+			break;
+		case 'n':
+			*lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW;
+			*lflag |= LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_LONG_VIEW;
+			break;
+		case 'r':
+			*lflag |= LS_REVERSE_SORT;
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			*lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
+			*lflag |= LS_TIME_SORT;
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("ls: Invalid flag -%c", optopt);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return optind;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag, int *iflag)
+{
+	extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
+	int ch;
+
+	optind = optreset = 1;
+	opterr = 0;
+
+	*hflag = *iflag = 0;
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hi")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'h':
+			*hflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'i':
+			*iflag = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return optind;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_ch_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag)
+{
+	extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
+	int ch;
+
+	optind = optreset = 1;
+	opterr = 0;
+
+	*hflag = 0;
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "h")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'h':
+			*hflag = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return optind;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_no_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc)
+{
+	extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
+	int ch;
+
+	optind = optreset = 1;
+	opterr = 0;
+
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		default:
+			error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return optind;
+}
+
+static char *
+escape_glob(const char *s)
+{
+	size_t i, o, len;
+	char *ret;
+
+	len = strlen(s);
+	ret = xcalloc(2, len + 1);
+	for (i = o = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		if (strchr("[]?*\\", s[i]) != NULL)
+			ret[o++] = '\\';
+		ret[o++] = s[i];
+	}
+	ret[o++] = '\0';
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static char *
+make_absolute_pwd_glob(const char *p, const char *pwd)
+{
+	char *ret, *escpwd;
+
+	escpwd = escape_glob(pwd);
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return escpwd;
+	ret = make_absolute(xstrdup(p), escpwd);
+	free(escpwd);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+    const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag)
+{
+	char *filename, *abs_src = NULL, *abs_dst = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
+	glob_t g;
+	int i, r, err = 0;
+
+	abs_src = make_absolute_pwd_glob(src, pwd);
+	memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+
+	debug3("Looking up %s", abs_src);
+	if ((r = remote_glob(conn, abs_src, GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) != 0) {
+		if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) {
+			error("Too many matches for \"%s\".", abs_src);
+		} else {
+			error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src);
+		}
+		err = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If multiple matches then dst must be a directory or
+	 * unspecified.
+	 */
+	if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && dst != NULL && !local_is_dir(dst)) {
+		error("Multiple source paths, but destination "
+		    "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst);
+		err = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+		tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]);
+		if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) {
+			error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
+			free(tmp);
+			err = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) {
+			if (local_is_dir(dst)) {
+				abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
+			} else {
+				abs_dst = xstrdup(dst);
+			}
+		} else if (dst) {
+			abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
+		} else {
+			abs_dst = xstrdup(filename);
+		}
+		free(tmp);
+
+		resume |= global_aflag;
+		if (!quiet && resume)
+			mprintf("Resuming %s to %s\n",
+			    g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+		else if (!quiet && !resume)
+			mprintf("Fetching %s to %s\n",
+			    g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+		/* XXX follow link flag */
+		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
+			if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
+			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
+				err = -1;
+		} else {
+			if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+			    pflag || global_pflag, resume,
+			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
+				err = -1;
+		}
+		free(abs_dst);
+		abs_dst = NULL;
+	}
+
+out:
+	free(abs_src);
+	globfree(&g);
+	return(err);
+}
+
+static int
+process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+    const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag)
+{
+	char *tmp_dst = NULL;
+	char *abs_dst = NULL;
+	char *tmp = NULL, *filename = NULL;
+	glob_t g;
+	int err = 0;
+	int i, dst_is_dir = 1;
+	struct stat sb;
+
+	if (dst) {
+		tmp_dst = xstrdup(dst);
+		tmp_dst = make_absolute(tmp_dst, pwd);
+	}
+
+	memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+	debug3("Looking up %s", src);
+	if (glob(src, GLOB_NOCHECK | GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) {
+		error("File \"%s\" not found.", src);
+		err = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* If we aren't fetching to pwd then stash this status for later */
+	if (tmp_dst != NULL)
+		dst_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, tmp_dst);
+
+	/* If multiple matches, dst may be directory or unspecified */
+	if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && tmp_dst && !dst_is_dir) {
+		error("Multiple paths match, but destination "
+		    "\"%s\" is not a directory", tmp_dst);
+		err = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+		if (stat(g.gl_pathv[i], &sb) == -1) {
+			err = -1;
+			error("stat %s: %s", g.gl_pathv[i], strerror(errno));
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]);
+		if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) {
+			error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
+			free(tmp);
+			err = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && tmp_dst) {
+			/* If directory specified, append filename */
+			if (dst_is_dir)
+				abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename);
+			else
+				abs_dst = xstrdup(tmp_dst);
+		} else if (tmp_dst) {
+			abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename);
+		} else {
+			abs_dst = make_absolute(xstrdup(filename), pwd);
+		}
+		free(tmp);
+
+		resume |= global_aflag;
+		if (!quiet && resume)
+			mprintf("Resuming upload of %s to %s\n",
+			    g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+		else if (!quiet && !resume)
+			mprintf("Uploading %s to %s\n",
+			    g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+		/* XXX follow_link_flag */
+		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
+			if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
+			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
+				err = -1;
+		} else {
+			if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+			    pflag || global_pflag, resume,
+			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
+				err = -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	free(abs_dst);
+	free(tmp_dst);
+	globfree(&g);
+	return(err);
+}
+
+static int
+sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb)
+{
+	SFTP_DIRENT *a = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)aa;
+	SFTP_DIRENT *b = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)bb;
+	int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1;
+
+#define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1))
+	if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT)
+		return (rmul * strcmp(a->filename, b->filename));
+	else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT)
+		return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.mtime, b->a.mtime));
+	else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT)
+		return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.size, b->a.size));
+
+	fatal("Unknown ls sort type");
+}
+
+/* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */
+static int
+do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path,
+    const char *strip_path, int lflag)
+{
+	int n;
+	u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
+	SFTP_DIRENT **d;
+
+	if ((n = do_readdir(conn, path, &d)) != 0)
+		return (n);
+
+	if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) {
+		u_int m = 0, width = 80;
+		struct winsize ws;
+		char *tmp;
+
+		/* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */
+		for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) {
+			if (d[n]->filename[0] != '.' || (lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL))
+				m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(d[n]->filename));
+		}
+
+		/* Add any subpath that also needs to be counted */
+		tmp = path_strip(path, strip_path);
+		m += strlen(tmp);
+		free(tmp);
+
+		if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
+			width = ws.ws_col;
+
+		columns = width / (m + 2);
+		columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1);
+		colspace = width / columns;
+		colspace = MINIMUM(colspace, width);
+	}
+
+	if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) {
+		for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++)
+			;	/* count entries */
+		sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT);
+		qsort(d, n, sizeof(*d), sdirent_comp);
+	}
+
+	get_remote_user_groups_from_dirents(conn, d);
+	for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL && !interrupted; n++) {
+		char *tmp, *fname;
+
+		if (d[n]->filename[0] == '.' && !(lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL))
+			continue;
+
+		tmp = path_append(path, d[n]->filename);
+		fname = path_strip(tmp, strip_path);
+		free(tmp);
+
+		if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
+			if ((lflag & (LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)) != 0 ||
+			    can_get_users_groups_by_id(conn)) {
+				char *lname;
+				struct stat sb;
+
+				memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
+				attrib_to_stat(&d[n]->a, &sb);
+				lname = ls_file(fname, &sb, 1,
+				    (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS),
+				    ruser_name(sb.st_uid),
+				    rgroup_name(sb.st_gid));
+				mprintf("%s\n", lname);
+				free(lname);
+			} else
+				mprintf("%s\n", d[n]->longname);
+		} else {
+			mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname);
+			if (c >= columns) {
+				printf("\n");
+				c = 1;
+			} else
+				c++;
+		}
+
+		free(fname);
+	}
+
+	if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1))
+		printf("\n");
+
+	free_sftp_dirents(d);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+sglob_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb)
+{
+	u_int a = *(const u_int *)aa;
+	u_int b = *(const u_int *)bb;
+	const char *ap = sort_glob->gl_pathv[a];
+	const char *bp = sort_glob->gl_pathv[b];
+	const struct stat *as = sort_glob->gl_statv[a];
+	const struct stat *bs = sort_glob->gl_statv[b];
+	int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1;
+
+#define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1))
+	if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT)
+		return (rmul * strcmp(ap, bp));
+	else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) {
+#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM)
+		if (timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, ==))
+			return 0;
+		return timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <) ?
+		    rmul : -rmul;
+#elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME)
+		return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_mtime, bs->st_mtime));
+#else
+	return rmul * 1;
+#endif
+	} else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT)
+		return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_size, bs->st_size));
+
+	fatal("Unknown ls sort type");
+}
+
+/* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */
+static int
+do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path,
+    const char *strip_path, int lflag)
+{
+	char *fname, *lname;
+	glob_t g;
+	int err, r;
+	struct winsize ws;
+	u_int i, j, nentries, *indices = NULL, c = 1;
+	u_int colspace = 0, columns = 1, m = 0, width = 80;
+
+	memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+
+	if ((r = remote_glob(conn, path,
+	    GLOB_MARK|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_KEEPSTAT|GLOB_NOSORT,
+	    NULL, &g)) != 0 ||
+	    (g.gl_pathc && !g.gl_matchc)) {
+		if (g.gl_pathc)
+			globfree(&g);
+		if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) {
+			error("Can't ls: Too many matches for \"%s\"", path);
+		} else {
+			error("Can't ls: \"%s\" not found", path);
+		}
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (interrupted)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the glob returns a single match and it is a directory,
+	 * then just list its contents.
+	 */
+	if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && g.gl_statv[0] != NULL &&
+	    S_ISDIR(g.gl_statv[0]->st_mode)) {
+		err = do_ls_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[0], strip_path, lflag);
+		globfree(&g);
+		return err;
+	}
+
+	if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
+		width = ws.ws_col;
+
+	if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) {
+		/* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */
+		for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++)
+			m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(g.gl_pathv[i]));
+
+		columns = width / (m + 2);
+		columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1);
+		colspace = width / columns;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Sorting: rather than mess with the contents of glob_t, prepare
+	 * an array of indices into it and sort that. For the usual
+	 * unsorted case, the indices are just the identity 1=1, 2=2, etc.
+	 */
+	for (nentries = 0; g.gl_pathv[nentries] != NULL; nentries++)
+		;	/* count entries */
+	indices = calloc(nentries, sizeof(*indices));
+	for (i = 0; i < nentries; i++)
+		indices[i] = i;
+
+	if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) {
+		sort_glob = &g;
+		sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT);
+		qsort(indices, nentries, sizeof(*indices), sglob_comp);
+		sort_glob = NULL;
+	}
+
+	get_remote_user_groups_from_glob(conn, &g);
+	for (j = 0; j < nentries && !interrupted; j++) {
+		i = indices[j];
+		fname = path_strip(g.gl_pathv[i], strip_path);
+		if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
+			if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) {
+				error("no stat information for %s", fname);
+				continue;
+			}
+			lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1,
+			    (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS),
+			    ruser_name(g.gl_statv[i]->st_uid),
+			    rgroup_name(g.gl_statv[i]->st_gid));
+			mprintf("%s\n", lname);
+			free(lname);
+		} else {
+			mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname);
+			if (c >= columns) {
+				printf("\n");
+				c = 1;
+			} else
+				c++;
+		}
+		free(fname);
+	}
+
+	if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1))
+		printf("\n");
+
+ out:
+	if (g.gl_pathc)
+		globfree(&g);
+	free(indices);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
+{
+	struct sftp_statvfs st;
+	char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+	char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
+	char s_icapacity[16], s_dcapacity[16];
+
+	if (do_statvfs(conn, path, &st, 1) == -1)
+		return -1;
+	if (st.f_files == 0)
+		strlcpy(s_icapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_icapacity));
+	else {
+		snprintf(s_icapacity, sizeof(s_icapacity), "%3llu%%",
+		    (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) /
+		    st.f_files));
+	}
+	if (st.f_blocks == 0)
+		strlcpy(s_dcapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_dcapacity));
+	else {
+		snprintf(s_dcapacity, sizeof(s_dcapacity), "%3llu%%",
+		    (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
+		    st.f_blocks));
+	}
+	if (iflag) {
+		printf("     Inodes        Used       Avail      "
+		    "(root)    %%Capacity\n");
+		printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu         %s\n",
+		    (unsigned long long)st.f_files,
+		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_files - st.f_ffree),
+		    (unsigned long long)st.f_favail,
+		    (unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, s_icapacity);
+	} else if (hflag) {
+		strlcpy(s_used, "error", sizeof(s_used));
+		strlcpy(s_avail, "error", sizeof(s_avail));
+		strlcpy(s_root, "error", sizeof(s_root));
+		strlcpy(s_total, "error", sizeof(s_total));
+		fmt_scaled((st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) * st.f_frsize, s_used);
+		fmt_scaled(st.f_bavail * st.f_frsize, s_avail);
+		fmt_scaled(st.f_bfree * st.f_frsize, s_root);
+		fmt_scaled(st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize, s_total);
+		printf("    Size     Used    Avail   (root)    %%Capacity\n");
+		printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB         %s\n",
+		    s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root, s_dcapacity);
+	} else {
+		printf("        Size         Used        Avail       "
+		    "(root)    %%Capacity\n");
+		printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu         %s\n",
+		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_blocks / 1024),
+		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize *
+		    (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / 1024),
+		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bavail / 1024),
+		    (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bfree / 1024),
+		    s_dcapacity);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Undo escaping of glob sequences in place. Used to undo extra escaping
+ * applied in makeargv() when the string is destined for a function that
+ * does not glob it.
+ */
+static void
+undo_glob_escape(char *s)
+{
+	size_t i, j;
+
+	for (i = j = 0;;) {
+		if (s[i] == '\0') {
+			s[j] = '\0';
+			return;
+		}
+		if (s[i] != '\\') {
+			s[j++] = s[i++];
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* s[i] == '\\' */
+		++i;
+		switch (s[i]) {
+		case '?':
+		case '[':
+		case '*':
+		case '\\':
+			s[j++] = s[i++];
+			break;
+		case '\0':
+			s[j++] = '\\';
+			s[j] = '\0';
+			return;
+		default:
+			s[j++] = '\\';
+			s[j++] = s[i++];
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Split a string into an argument vector using sh(1)-style quoting,
+ * comment and escaping rules, but with some tweaks to handle glob(3)
+ * wildcards.
+ * The "sloppy" flag allows for recovery from missing terminating quote, for
+ * use in parsing incomplete commandlines during tab autocompletion.
+ *
+ * Returns NULL on error or a NULL-terminated array of arguments.
+ *
+ * If "lastquote" is not NULL, the quoting character used for the last
+ * argument is placed in *lastquote ("\0", "'" or "\"").
+ *
+ * If "terminated" is not NULL, *terminated will be set to 1 when the
+ * last argument's quote has been properly terminated or 0 otherwise.
+ * This parameter is only of use if "sloppy" is set.
+ */
+#define MAXARGS		128
+#define MAXARGLEN	8192
+static char **
+makeargv(const char *arg, int *argcp, int sloppy, char *lastquote,
+    u_int *terminated)
+{
+	int argc, quot;
+	size_t i, j;
+	static char argvs[MAXARGLEN];
+	static char *argv[MAXARGS + 1];
+	enum { MA_START, MA_SQUOTE, MA_DQUOTE, MA_UNQUOTED } state, q;
+
+	*argcp = argc = 0;
+	if (strlen(arg) > sizeof(argvs) - 1) {
+ args_too_longs:
+		error("string too long");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (terminated != NULL)
+		*terminated = 1;
+	if (lastquote != NULL)
+		*lastquote = '\0';
+	state = MA_START;
+	i = j = 0;
+	for (;;) {
+		if ((size_t)argc >= sizeof(argv) / sizeof(*argv)){
+			error("Too many arguments.");
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		if (isspace((unsigned char)arg[i])) {
+			if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) {
+				/* Terminate current argument */
+				argvs[j++] = '\0';
+				argc++;
+				state = MA_START;
+			} else if (state != MA_START)
+				argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+		} else if (arg[i] == '"' || arg[i] == '\'') {
+			q = arg[i] == '"' ? MA_DQUOTE : MA_SQUOTE;
+			if (state == MA_START) {
+				argv[argc] = argvs + j;
+				state = q;
+				if (lastquote != NULL)
+					*lastquote = arg[i];
+			} else if (state == MA_UNQUOTED)
+				state = q;
+			else if (state == q)
+				state = MA_UNQUOTED;
+			else
+				argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+		} else if (arg[i] == '\\') {
+			if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) {
+				quot = state == MA_SQUOTE ? '\'' : '"';
+				/* Unescape quote we are in */
+				/* XXX support \n and friends? */
+				if (arg[i + 1] == quot) {
+					i++;
+					argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+				} else if (arg[i + 1] == '?' ||
+				    arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*') {
+					/*
+					 * Special case for sftp: append
+					 * double-escaped glob sequence -
+					 * glob will undo one level of
+					 * escaping. NB. string can grow here.
+					 */
+					if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 5)
+						goto args_too_longs;
+					argvs[j++] = '\\';
+					argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
+					argvs[j++] = '\\';
+					argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+				} else {
+					argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
+					argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+				}
+			} else {
+				if (state == MA_START) {
+					argv[argc] = argvs + j;
+					state = MA_UNQUOTED;
+					if (lastquote != NULL)
+						*lastquote = '\0';
+				}
+				if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' ||
+				    arg[i + 1] == '*' || arg[i + 1] == '\\') {
+					/*
+					 * Special case for sftp: append
+					 * escaped glob sequence -
+					 * glob will undo one level of
+					 * escaping.
+					 */
+					argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
+					argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+				} else {
+					/* Unescape everything */
+					/* XXX support \n and friends? */
+					i++;
+					argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+				}
+			}
+		} else if (arg[i] == '#') {
+			if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE)
+				argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+			else
+				goto string_done;
+		} else if (arg[i] == '\0') {
+			if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) {
+				if (sloppy) {
+					state = MA_UNQUOTED;
+					if (terminated != NULL)
+						*terminated = 0;
+					goto string_done;
+				}
+				error("Unterminated quoted argument");
+				return NULL;
+			}
+ string_done:
+			if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) {
+				argvs[j++] = '\0';
+				argc++;
+			}
+			break;
+		} else {
+			if (state == MA_START) {
+				argv[argc] = argvs + j;
+				state = MA_UNQUOTED;
+				if (lastquote != NULL)
+					*lastquote = '\0';
+			}
+			if ((state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) &&
+			    (arg[i] == '?' || arg[i] == '[' || arg[i] == '*')) {
+				/*
+				 * Special case for sftp: escape quoted
+				 * glob(3) wildcards. NB. string can grow
+				 * here.
+				 */
+				if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 3)
+					goto args_too_longs;
+				argvs[j++] = '\\';
+				argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+			} else
+				argvs[j++] = arg[i];
+		}
+		i++;
+	}
+	*argcp = argc;
+	return argv;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_args(const char **cpp, int *ignore_errors, int *disable_echo, int *aflag,
+	  int *fflag, int *hflag, int *iflag, int *lflag, int *pflag,
+	  int *rflag, int *sflag,
+    unsigned long *n_arg, char **path1, char **path2)
+{
+	const char *cmd, *cp = *cpp;
+	char *cp2, **argv;
+	int base = 0;
+	long long ll;
+	int path1_mandatory = 0, i, cmdnum, optidx, argc;
+
+	/* Skip leading whitespace */
+	cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Check for leading '-' (disable error processing) and '@' (suppress
+	 * command echo)
+	 */
+	*ignore_errors = 0;
+	*disable_echo = 0;
+	for (;*cp != '\0'; cp++) {
+		if (*cp == '-') {
+			*ignore_errors = 1;
+		} else if (*cp == '@') {
+			*disable_echo = 1;
+		} else {
+			/* all other characters terminate prefix processing */
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+
+	/* Ignore blank lines and lines which begin with comment '#' char */
+	if (*cp == '\0' || *cp == '#')
+		return (0);
+
+	if ((argv = makeargv(cp, &argc, 0, NULL, NULL)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* Figure out which command we have */
+	for (i = 0; cmds[i].c != NULL; i++) {
+		if (argv[0] != NULL && strcasecmp(cmds[i].c, argv[0]) == 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	cmdnum = cmds[i].n;
+	cmd = cmds[i].c;
+
+	/* Special case */
+	if (*cp == '!') {
+		cp++;
+		cmdnum = I_SHELL;
+	} else if (cmdnum == -1) {
+		error("Invalid command.");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* Get arguments and parse flags */
+	*aflag = *fflag = *hflag = *iflag = *lflag = *pflag = 0;
+	*rflag = *sflag = 0;
+	*path1 = *path2 = NULL;
+	optidx = 1;
+	switch (cmdnum) {
+	case I_GET:
+	case I_REGET:
+	case I_REPUT:
+	case I_PUT:
+		if ((optidx = parse_getput_flags(cmd, argv, argc,
+		    aflag, fflag, pflag, rflag)) == -1)
+			return -1;
+		/* Get first pathname (mandatory) */
+		if (argc - optidx < 1) {
+			error("You must specify at least one path after a "
+			    "%s command.", cmd);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
+		/* Get second pathname (optional) */
+		if (argc - optidx > 1) {
+			*path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
+			/* Destination is not globbed */
+			undo_glob_escape(*path2);
+		}
+		break;
+	case I_LINK:
+		if ((optidx = parse_link_flags(cmd, argv, argc, sflag)) == -1)
+			return -1;
+		goto parse_two_paths;
+	case I_COPY:
+		if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
+			return -1;
+		goto parse_two_paths;
+	case I_RENAME:
+		if ((optidx = parse_rename_flags(cmd, argv, argc, lflag)) == -1)
+			return -1;
+		goto parse_two_paths;
+	case I_SYMLINK:
+		if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
+			return -1;
+ parse_two_paths:
+		if (argc - optidx < 2) {
+			error("You must specify two paths after a %s "
+			    "command.", cmd);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
+		*path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
+		/* Paths are not globbed */
+		undo_glob_escape(*path1);
+		undo_glob_escape(*path2);
+		break;
+	case I_RM:
+	case I_MKDIR:
+	case I_RMDIR:
+	case I_LMKDIR:
+		path1_mandatory = 1;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	case I_CHDIR:
+	case I_LCHDIR:
+		if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
+			return -1;
+		/* Get pathname (mandatory) */
+		if (argc - optidx < 1) {
+			if (!path1_mandatory)
+				break; /* return a NULL path1 */
+			error("You must specify a path after a %s command.",
+			    cmd);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
+		/* Only "rm" globs */
+		if (cmdnum != I_RM)
+			undo_glob_escape(*path1);
+		break;
+	case I_DF:
+		if ((optidx = parse_df_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag,
+		    iflag)) == -1)
+			return -1;
+		/* Default to current directory if no path specified */
+		if (argc - optidx < 1)
+			*path1 = NULL;
+		else {
+			*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
+			undo_glob_escape(*path1);
+		}
+		break;
+	case I_LS:
+		if ((optidx = parse_ls_flags(argv, argc, lflag)) == -1)
+			return(-1);
+		/* Path is optional */
+		if (argc - optidx > 0)
+			*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
+		break;
+	case I_LLS:
+		/* Skip ls command and following whitespace */
+		cp = cp + strlen(cmd) + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
+	case I_SHELL:
+		/* Uses the rest of the line */
+		break;
+	case I_LUMASK:
+	case I_CHMOD:
+		base = 8;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	case I_CHOWN:
+	case I_CHGRP:
+		if ((optidx = parse_ch_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag)) == -1)
+			return -1;
+		/* Get numeric arg (mandatory) */
+		if (argc - optidx < 1)
+			goto need_num_arg;
+		errno = 0;
+		ll = strtoll(argv[optidx], &cp2, base);
+		if (cp2 == argv[optidx] || *cp2 != '\0' ||
+		    ((ll == LLONG_MIN || ll == LLONG_MAX) && errno == ERANGE) ||
+		    ll < 0 || ll > UINT32_MAX) {
+ need_num_arg:
+			error("You must supply a numeric argument "
+			    "to the %s command.", cmd);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		*n_arg = ll;
+		if (cmdnum == I_LUMASK)
+			break;
+		/* Get pathname (mandatory) */
+		if (argc - optidx < 2) {
+			error("You must specify a path after a %s command.",
+			    cmd);
+			return -1;
+		}
+		*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
+		break;
+	case I_QUIT:
+	case I_PWD:
+	case I_LPWD:
+	case I_HELP:
+	case I_VERSION:
+	case I_PROGRESS:
+		if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
+			return -1;
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("Command not implemented");
+	}
+
+	*cpp = cp;
+	return(cmdnum);
+}
+
+static int
+parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd,
+    const char *startdir, int err_abort, int echo_command)
+{
+	const char *ocmd = cmd;
+	char *path1, *path2, *tmp;
+	int ignore_errors = 0, disable_echo = 1;
+	int aflag = 0, fflag = 0, hflag = 0, iflag = 0;
+	int lflag = 0, pflag = 0, rflag = 0, sflag = 0;
+	int cmdnum, i;
+	unsigned long n_arg = 0;
+	Attrib a, *aa;
+	char path_buf[PATH_MAX];
+	int err = 0;
+	glob_t g;
+
+	path1 = path2 = NULL;
+	cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &ignore_errors, &disable_echo, &aflag, &fflag,
+	    &hflag, &iflag, &lflag, &pflag, &rflag, &sflag, &n_arg,
+	    &path1, &path2);
+	if (ignore_errors != 0)
+		err_abort = 0;
+
+	if (echo_command && !disable_echo)
+		mprintf("sftp> %s\n", ocmd);
+
+	memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+
+	/* Perform command */
+	switch (cmdnum) {
+	case 0:
+		/* Blank line */
+		break;
+	case -1:
+		/* Unrecognized command */
+		err = -1;
+		break;
+	case I_REGET:
+		aflag = 1;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	case I_GET:
+		err = process_get(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag,
+		    rflag, aflag, fflag);
+		break;
+	case I_REPUT:
+		aflag = 1;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	case I_PUT:
+		err = process_put(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag,
+		    rflag, aflag, fflag);
+		break;
+	case I_COPY:
+		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+		path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd);
+		err = do_copy(conn, path1, path2);
+		break;
+	case I_RENAME:
+		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+		path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd);
+		err = do_rename(conn, path1, path2, lflag);
+		break;
+	case I_SYMLINK:
+		sflag = 1;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	case I_LINK:
+		if (!sflag)
+			path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+		path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd);
+		err = (sflag ? do_symlink : do_hardlink)(conn, path1, path2);
+		break;
+	case I_RM:
+		path1 = make_absolute_pwd_glob(path1, *pwd);
+		remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
+		for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+			if (!quiet)
+				mprintf("Removing %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]);
+			err = do_rm(conn, g.gl_pathv[i]);
+			if (err != 0 && err_abort)
+				break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case I_MKDIR:
+		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+		attrib_clear(&a);
+		a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
+		a.perm = 0777;
+		err = do_mkdir(conn, path1, &a, 1);
+		break;
+	case I_RMDIR:
+		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+		err = do_rmdir(conn, path1);
+		break;
+	case I_CHDIR:
+		if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
+			path1 = xstrdup(startdir);
+		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+		if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
+			err = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if ((aa = do_stat(conn, tmp, 0)) == NULL) {
+			free(tmp);
+			err = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) {
+			error("Can't change directory: Can't check target");
+			free(tmp);
+			err = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (!S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) {
+			error("Can't change directory: \"%s\" is not "
+			    "a directory", tmp);
+			free(tmp);
+			err = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		free(*pwd);
+		*pwd = tmp;
+		break;
+	case I_LS:
+		if (!path1) {
+			do_ls_dir(conn, *pwd, *pwd, lflag);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* Strip pwd off beginning of non-absolute paths */
+		tmp = NULL;
+		if (!path_absolute(path1))
+			tmp = *pwd;
+
+		path1 = make_absolute_pwd_glob(path1, *pwd);
+		err = do_globbed_ls(conn, path1, tmp, lflag);
+		break;
+	case I_DF:
+		/* Default to current directory if no path specified */
+		if (path1 == NULL)
+			path1 = xstrdup(*pwd);
+		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+		err = do_df(conn, path1, hflag, iflag);
+		break;
+	case I_LCHDIR:
+		if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
+			path1 = xstrdup("~");
+		tmp = tilde_expand_filename(path1, getuid());
+		free(path1);
+		path1 = tmp;
+		if (chdir(path1) == -1) {
+			error("Couldn't change local directory to "
+			    "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno));
+			err = 1;
+		}
+		break;
+	case I_LMKDIR:
+		if (mkdir(path1, 0777) == -1) {
+			error("Couldn't create local directory "
+			    "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno));
+			err = 1;
+		}
+		break;
+	case I_LLS:
+		local_do_ls(cmd);
+		break;
+	case I_SHELL:
+		local_do_shell(cmd);
+		break;
+	case I_LUMASK:
+		umask(n_arg);
+		printf("Local umask: %03lo\n", n_arg);
+		break;
+	case I_CHMOD:
+		path1 = make_absolute_pwd_glob(path1, *pwd);
+		attrib_clear(&a);
+		a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
+		a.perm = n_arg;
+		remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
+		for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+			if (!quiet)
+				mprintf("Changing mode on %s\n",
+				    g.gl_pathv[i]);
+			err = (hflag ? do_lsetstat : do_setstat)(conn,
+			    g.gl_pathv[i], &a);
+			if (err != 0 && err_abort)
+				break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case I_CHOWN:
+	case I_CHGRP:
+		path1 = make_absolute_pwd_glob(path1, *pwd);
+		remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
+		for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+			if (!(aa = (hflag ? do_lstat : do_stat)(conn,
+			    g.gl_pathv[i], 0))) {
+				if (err_abort) {
+					err = -1;
+					break;
+				} else
+					continue;
+			}
+			if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) {
+				error("Can't get current ownership of "
+				    "remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]);
+				if (err_abort) {
+					err = -1;
+					break;
+				} else
+					continue;
+			}
+			aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
+			if (cmdnum == I_CHOWN) {
+				if (!quiet)
+					mprintf("Changing owner on %s\n",
+					    g.gl_pathv[i]);
+				aa->uid = n_arg;
+			} else {
+				if (!quiet)
+					mprintf("Changing group on %s\n",
+					    g.gl_pathv[i]);
+				aa->gid = n_arg;
+			}
+			err = (hflag ? do_lsetstat : do_setstat)(conn,
+			    g.gl_pathv[i], aa);
+			if (err != 0 && err_abort)
+				break;
+		}
+		break;
+	case I_PWD:
+		mprintf("Remote working directory: %s\n", *pwd);
+		break;
+	case I_LPWD:
+		if (!getcwd(path_buf, sizeof(path_buf))) {
+			error("Couldn't get local cwd: %s", strerror(errno));
+			err = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+		mprintf("Local working directory: %s\n", path_buf);
+		break;
+	case I_QUIT:
+		/* Processed below */
+		break;
+	case I_HELP:
+		help();
+		break;
+	case I_VERSION:
+		printf("SFTP protocol version %u\n", sftp_proto_version(conn));
+		break;
+	case I_PROGRESS:
+		showprogress = !showprogress;
+		if (showprogress)
+			printf("Progress meter enabled\n");
+		else
+			printf("Progress meter disabled\n");
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("%d is not implemented", cmdnum);
+	}
+
+	if (g.gl_pathc)
+		globfree(&g);
+	free(path1);
+	free(path2);
+
+	/* If an unignored error occurs in batch mode we should abort. */
+	if (err_abort && err != 0)
+		return (-1);
+	else if (cmdnum == I_QUIT)
+		return (1);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
+static char *
+prompt(EditLine *el)
+{
+	return ("sftp> ");
+}
+
+/* Display entries in 'list' after skipping the first 'len' chars */
+static void
+complete_display(char **list, u_int len)
+{
+	u_int y, m = 0, width = 80, columns = 1, colspace = 0, llen;
+	struct winsize ws;
+	char *tmp;
+
+	/* Count entries for sort and find longest */
+	for (y = 0; list[y]; y++)
+		m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(list[y]));
+
+	if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
+		width = ws.ws_col;
+
+	m = m > len ? m - len : 0;
+	columns = width / (m + 2);
+	columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1);
+	colspace = width / columns;
+	colspace = MINIMUM(colspace, width);
+
+	printf("\n");
+	m = 1;
+	for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) {
+		llen = strlen(list[y]);
+		tmp = llen > len ? list[y] + len : "";
+		mprintf("%-*s", colspace, tmp);
+		if (m >= columns) {
+			printf("\n");
+			m = 1;
+		} else
+			m++;
+	}
+	printf("\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Given a "list" of words that begin with a common prefix of "word",
+ * attempt to find an autocompletion to extends "word" by the next
+ * characters common to all entries in "list".
+ */
+static char *
+complete_ambiguous(const char *word, char **list, size_t count)
+{
+	if (word == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	if (count > 0) {
+		u_int y, matchlen = strlen(list[0]);
+
+		/* Find length of common stem */
+		for (y = 1; list[y]; y++) {
+			u_int x;
+
+			for (x = 0; x < matchlen; x++)
+				if (list[0][x] != list[y][x])
+					break;
+
+			matchlen = x;
+		}
+
+		if (matchlen > strlen(word)) {
+			char *tmp = xstrdup(list[0]);
+
+			tmp[matchlen] = '\0';
+			return tmp;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return xstrdup(word);
+}
+
+/* Autocomplete a sftp command */
+static int
+complete_cmd_parse(EditLine *el, char *cmd, int lastarg, char quote,
+    int terminated)
+{
+	u_int y, count = 0, cmdlen, tmplen;
+	char *tmp, **list, argterm[3];
+	const LineInfo *lf;
+
+	list = xcalloc((sizeof(cmds) / sizeof(*cmds)) + 1, sizeof(char *));
+
+	/* No command specified: display all available commands */
+	if (cmd == NULL) {
+		for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++)
+			list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c);
+
+		list[count] = NULL;
+		complete_display(list, 0);
+
+		for (y = 0; list[y] != NULL; y++)
+			free(list[y]);
+		free(list);
+		return count;
+	}
+
+	/* Prepare subset of commands that start with "cmd" */
+	cmdlen = strlen(cmd);
+	for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++)  {
+		if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[y].c, cmdlen))
+			list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c);
+	}
+	list[count] = NULL;
+
+	if (count == 0) {
+		free(list);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Complete ambiguous command */
+	tmp = complete_ambiguous(cmd, list, count);
+	if (count > 1)
+		complete_display(list, 0);
+
+	for (y = 0; list[y]; y++)
+		free(list[y]);
+	free(list);
+
+	if (tmp != NULL) {
+		tmplen = strlen(tmp);
+		cmdlen = strlen(cmd);
+		/* If cmd may be extended then do so */
+		if (tmplen > cmdlen)
+			if (el_insertstr(el, tmp + cmdlen) == -1)
+				fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
+		lf = el_line(el);
+		/* Terminate argument cleanly */
+		if (count == 1) {
+			y = 0;
+			if (!terminated)
+				argterm[y++] = quote;
+			if (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ')
+				argterm[y++] = ' ';
+			argterm[y] = '\0';
+			if (y > 0 && el_insertstr(el, argterm) == -1)
+				fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
+		}
+		free(tmp);
+	}
+
+	return count;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Determine whether a particular sftp command's arguments (if any) represent
+ * local or remote files. The "cmdarg" argument specifies the actual argument
+ * and accepts values 1 or 2.
+ */
+static int
+complete_is_remote(char *cmd, int cmdarg) {
+	int i;
+
+	if (cmd == NULL)
+		return -1;
+
+	for (i = 0; cmds[i].c; i++) {
+		if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[i].c, strlen(cmds[i].c))) {
+			if (cmdarg == 1)
+				return cmds[i].t;
+			else if (cmdarg == 2)
+				return cmds[i].t2;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/* Autocomplete a filename "file" */
+static int
+complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path,
+    char *file, int remote, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated)
+{
+	glob_t g;
+	char *tmp, *tmp2, ins[8];
+	u_int i, hadglob, pwdlen, len, tmplen, filelen, cesc, isesc, isabs;
+	int clen;
+	const LineInfo *lf;
+
+	/* Glob from "file" location */
+	if (file == NULL)
+		tmp = xstrdup("*");
+	else
+		xasprintf(&tmp, "%s*", file);
+
+	/* Check if the path is absolute. */
+	isabs = path_absolute(tmp);
+
+	memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+	if (remote != LOCAL) {
+		tmp = make_absolute_pwd_glob(tmp, remote_path);
+		remote_glob(conn, tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g);
+	} else
+		glob(tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g);
+
+	/* Determine length of pwd so we can trim completion display */
+	for (hadglob = tmplen = pwdlen = 0; tmp[tmplen] != 0; tmplen++) {
+		/* Terminate counting on first unescaped glob metacharacter */
+		if (tmp[tmplen] == '*' || tmp[tmplen] == '?') {
+			if (tmp[tmplen] != '*' || tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0')
+				hadglob = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (tmp[tmplen] == '\\' && tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0')
+			tmplen++;
+		if (tmp[tmplen] == '/')
+			pwdlen = tmplen + 1;	/* track last seen '/' */
+	}
+	free(tmp);
+	tmp = NULL;
+
+	if (g.gl_matchc == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (g.gl_matchc > 1)
+		complete_display(g.gl_pathv, pwdlen);
+
+	/* Don't try to extend globs */
+	if (file == NULL || hadglob)
+		goto out;
+
+	tmp2 = complete_ambiguous(file, g.gl_pathv, g.gl_matchc);
+	tmp = path_strip(tmp2, isabs ? NULL : remote_path);
+	free(tmp2);
+
+	if (tmp == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+	tmplen = strlen(tmp);
+	filelen = strlen(file);
+
+	/* Count the number of escaped characters in the input string. */
+	cesc = isesc = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < filelen; i++) {
+		if (!isesc && file[i] == '\\' && i + 1 < filelen){
+			isesc = 1;
+			cesc++;
+		} else
+			isesc = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (tmplen > (filelen - cesc)) {
+		tmp2 = tmp + filelen - cesc;
+		len = strlen(tmp2);
+		/* quote argument on way out */
+		for (i = 0; i < len; i += clen) {
+			if ((clen = mblen(tmp2 + i, len - i)) < 0 ||
+			    (size_t)clen > sizeof(ins) - 2)
+				fatal("invalid multibyte character");
+			ins[0] = '\\';
+			memcpy(ins + 1, tmp2 + i, clen);
+			ins[clen + 1] = '\0';
+			switch (tmp2[i]) {
+			case '\'':
+			case '"':
+			case '\\':
+			case '\t':
+			case '[':
+			case ' ':
+			case '#':
+			case '*':
+				if (quote == '\0' || tmp2[i] == quote) {
+					if (el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1)
+						fatal("el_insertstr "
+						    "failed.");
+					break;
+				}
+				/* FALLTHROUGH */
+			default:
+				if (el_insertstr(el, ins + 1) == -1)
+					fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	lf = el_line(el);
+	if (g.gl_matchc == 1) {
+		i = 0;
+		if (!terminated && quote != '\0')
+			ins[i++] = quote;
+		if (*(lf->cursor - 1) != '/' &&
+		    (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' '))
+			ins[i++] = ' ';
+		ins[i] = '\0';
+		if (i > 0 && el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1)
+			fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
+	}
+	free(tmp);
+
+ out:
+	globfree(&g);
+	return g.gl_matchc;
+}
+
+/* tab-completion hook function, called via libedit */
+static unsigned char
+complete(EditLine *el, int ch)
+{
+	char **argv, *line, quote;
+	int argc, carg;
+	u_int cursor, len, terminated, ret = CC_ERROR;
+	const LineInfo *lf;
+	struct complete_ctx *complete_ctx;
+
+	lf = el_line(el);
+	if (el_get(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void**)&complete_ctx) != 0)
+		fatal_f("el_get failed");
+
+	/* Figure out which argument the cursor points to */
+	cursor = lf->cursor - lf->buffer;
+	line = xmalloc(cursor + 1);
+	memcpy(line, lf->buffer, cursor);
+	line[cursor] = '\0';
+	argv = makeargv(line, &carg, 1, &quote, &terminated);
+	free(line);
+
+	/* Get all the arguments on the line */
+	len = lf->lastchar - lf->buffer;
+	line = xmalloc(len + 1);
+	memcpy(line, lf->buffer, len);
+	line[len] = '\0';
+	argv = makeargv(line, &argc, 1, NULL, NULL);
+
+	/* Ensure cursor is at EOL or a argument boundary */
+	if (line[cursor] != ' ' && line[cursor] != '\0' &&
+	    line[cursor] != '\n') {
+		free(line);
+		return ret;
+	}
+
+	if (carg == 0) {
+		/* Show all available commands */
+		complete_cmd_parse(el, NULL, argc == carg, '\0', 1);
+		ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
+	} else if (carg == 1 && cursor > 0 && line[cursor - 1] != ' ')  {
+		/* Handle the command parsing */
+		if (complete_cmd_parse(el, argv[0], argc == carg,
+		    quote, terminated) != 0)
+			ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
+	} else if (carg >= 1) {
+		/* Handle file parsing */
+		int remote = 0;
+		int i = 0, cmdarg = 0;
+		char *filematch = NULL;
+
+		if (carg > 1 && line[cursor-1] != ' ')
+			filematch = argv[carg - 1];
+
+		for (i = 1; i < carg; i++) {
+			/* Skip flags */
+			if (argv[i][0] != '-')
+				cmdarg++;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * If previous argument is complete, then offer completion
+		 * on the next one.
+		 */
+		if (line[cursor - 1] == ' ')
+			cmdarg++;
+
+		remote = complete_is_remote(argv[0], cmdarg);
+
+		if ((remote == REMOTE || remote == LOCAL) &&
+		    complete_match(el, complete_ctx->conn,
+		    *complete_ctx->remote_pathp, filematch,
+		    remote, carg == argc, quote, terminated) != 0)
+			ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
+	}
+
+	free(line);
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+
+static int
+interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2)
+{
+	char *remote_path;
+	char *dir = NULL, *startdir = NULL;
+	char cmd[2048];
+	int err, interactive;
+	EditLine *el = NULL;
+#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
+	History *hl = NULL;
+	HistEvent hev;
+	extern char *__progname;
+	struct complete_ctx complete_ctx;
+
+	if (!batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
+		if ((el = el_init(__progname, stdin, stdout, stderr)) == NULL)
+			fatal("Couldn't initialise editline");
+		if ((hl = history_init()) == NULL)
+			fatal("Couldn't initialise editline history");
+		history(hl, &hev, H_SETSIZE, 100);
+		el_set(el, EL_HIST, history, hl);
+
+		el_set(el, EL_PROMPT, prompt);
+		el_set(el, EL_EDITOR, "emacs");
+		el_set(el, EL_TERMINAL, NULL);
+		el_set(el, EL_SIGNAL, 1);
+		el_source(el, NULL);
+
+		/* Tab Completion */
+		el_set(el, EL_ADDFN, "ftp-complete",
+		    "Context sensitive argument completion", complete);
+		complete_ctx.conn = conn;
+		complete_ctx.remote_pathp = &remote_path;
+		el_set(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void*)&complete_ctx);
+		el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^I", "ftp-complete", NULL);
+		/* enable ctrl-left-arrow and ctrl-right-arrow */
+		el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5C", "em-next-word", NULL);
+		el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[C", "em-next-word", NULL);
+		el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5D", "ed-prev-word", NULL);
+		el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[D", "ed-prev-word", NULL);
+		/* make ^w match ksh behaviour */
+		el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^w", "ed-delete-prev-word", NULL);
+	}
+#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+
+	remote_path = do_realpath(conn, ".");
+	if (remote_path == NULL)
+		fatal("Need cwd");
+	startdir = xstrdup(remote_path);
+
+	if (file1 != NULL) {
+		dir = xstrdup(file1);
+		dir = make_absolute(dir, remote_path);
+
+		if (remote_is_dir(conn, dir) && file2 == NULL) {
+			if (!quiet)
+				mprintf("Changing to: %s\n", dir);
+			snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "cd \"%s\"", dir);
+			if (parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd,
+			    &remote_path, startdir, 1, 0) != 0) {
+				free(dir);
+				free(startdir);
+				free(remote_path);
+				free(conn);
+				return (-1);
+			}
+		} else {
+			/* XXX this is wrong wrt quoting */
+			snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get%s %s%s%s",
+			    global_aflag ? " -a" : "", dir,
+			    file2 == NULL ? "" : " ",
+			    file2 == NULL ? "" : file2);
+			err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd,
+			    &remote_path, startdir, 1, 0);
+			free(dir);
+			free(startdir);
+			free(remote_path);
+			free(conn);
+			return (err);
+		}
+		free(dir);
+	}
+
+	setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+	setvbuf(infile, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+
+	interactive = !batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO);
+	err = 0;
+	for (;;) {
+		struct sigaction sa;
+
+		interrupted = 0;
+		memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+		sa.sa_handler = interactive ? read_interrupt : killchild;
+		if (sigaction(SIGINT, &sa, NULL) == -1) {
+			debug3("sigaction(%s): %s", strsignal(SIGINT),
+			    strerror(errno));
+			break;
+		}
+		if (el == NULL) {
+			if (interactive)
+				printf("sftp> ");
+			if (fgets(cmd, sizeof(cmd), infile) == NULL) {
+				if (interactive)
+					printf("\n");
+				if (interrupted)
+					continue;
+				break;
+			}
+		} else {
+#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
+			const char *line;
+			int count = 0;
+
+			if ((line = el_gets(el, &count)) == NULL ||
+			    count <= 0) {
+				printf("\n");
+				if (interrupted)
+					continue;
+				break;
+			}
+			history(hl, &hev, H_ENTER, line);
+			if (strlcpy(cmd, line, sizeof(cmd)) >= sizeof(cmd)) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Error: input line too long\n");
+				continue;
+			}
+#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+		}
+
+		cmd[strcspn(cmd, "\n")] = '\0';
+
+		/* Handle user interrupts gracefully during commands */
+		interrupted = 0;
+		ssh_signal(SIGINT, cmd_interrupt);
+
+		err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path,
+		    startdir, batchmode, !interactive && el == NULL);
+		if (err != 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+	free(remote_path);
+	free(startdir);
+	free(conn);
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
+	if (el != NULL)
+		el_end(el);
+#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+
+	/* err == 1 signifies normal "quit" exit */
+	return (err >= 0 ? 0 : -1);
+}
+
+static void
+connect_to_server(char *path, char **args, int *in, int *out)
+{
+	int c_in, c_out;
+#ifdef USE_PIPES
+	int pin[2], pout[2];
+
+	if ((pipe(pin) == -1) || (pipe(pout) == -1))
+		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+	*in = pin[0];
+	*out = pout[1];
+	c_in = pout[0];
+	c_out = pin[1];
+#else /* USE_PIPES */
+	int inout[2];
+
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1)
+		fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
+	*in = *out = inout[0];
+	c_in = c_out = inout[1];
+#endif /* USE_PIPES */
+
+	if ((sshpid = fork()) == -1)
+		fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+	else if (sshpid == 0) {
+		if ((dup2(c_in, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
+		    (dup2(c_out, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		close(*in);
+		close(*out);
+		close(c_in);
+		close(c_out);
+
+		/*
+		 * The underlying ssh is in the same process group, so we must
+		 * ignore SIGINT if we want to gracefully abort commands,
+		 * otherwise the signal will make it to the ssh process and
+		 * kill it too.  Contrawise, since sftp sends SIGTERMs to the
+		 * underlying ssh, it must *not* ignore that signal.
+		 */
+		ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
+		ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+		execvp(path, args);
+		fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
+		_exit(1);
+	}
+
+	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
+	ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild);
+	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
+	ssh_signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild);
+	ssh_signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild);
+	ssh_signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild);
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
+	close(c_in);
+	close(c_out);
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	extern char *__progname;
+
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "usage: %s [-46AaCfNpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]\n"
+	    "          [-D sftp_server_command] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n"
+	    "          [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port]\n"
+	    "          [-R num_requests] [-S program] [-s subsystem | sftp_server]\n"
+	    "          [-X sftp_option] destination\n",
+	    __progname);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int r, in, out, ch, err, tmp, port = -1, noisy = 0;
+	char *host = NULL, *user, *cp, **cpp, *file2 = NULL;
+	int debug_level = 0;
+	char *file1 = NULL, *sftp_server = NULL;
+	char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM, *sftp_direct = NULL;
+	const char *errstr;
+	LogLevel ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+	arglist args;
+	extern int optind;
+	extern char *optarg;
+	struct sftp_conn *conn;
+	size_t copy_buffer_len = 0;
+	size_t num_requests = 0;
+	long long llv, limit_kbps = 0;
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+	msetlocale();
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+	memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
+	args.list = NULL;
+	addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
+	addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no");
+	addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no");
+	addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes");
+
+	ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+	infile = stdin;
+
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
+	    "1246AafhNpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:J:P:R:X:")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		/* Passed through to ssh(1) */
+		case 'A':
+		case '4':
+		case '6':
+		case 'C':
+			addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
+			break;
+		/* Passed through to ssh(1) with argument */
+		case 'F':
+		case 'J':
+		case 'c':
+		case 'i':
+		case 'o':
+			addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
+			addargs(&args, "%s", optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'q':
+			ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+			quiet = 1;
+			showprogress = 0;
+			addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
+			break;
+		case 'P':
+			port = a2port(optarg);
+			if (port <= 0)
+				fatal("Bad port \"%s\"\n", optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'v':
+			if (debug_level < 3) {
+				addargs(&args, "-v");
+				ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 + debug_level;
+			}
+			debug_level++;
+			break;
+		case '1':
+			fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported");
+			break;
+		case '2':
+			/* accept silently */
+			break;
+		case 'a':
+			global_aflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'B':
+			copy_buffer_len = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10);
+			if (copy_buffer_len == 0 || *cp != '\0')
+				fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\"", optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'b':
+			if (batchmode)
+				fatal("Batch file already specified.");
+
+			/* Allow "-" as stdin */
+			if (strcmp(optarg, "-") != 0 &&
+			    (infile = fopen(optarg, "r")) == NULL)
+				fatal("%s (%s).", strerror(errno), optarg);
+			showprogress = 0;
+			quiet = batchmode = 1;
+			addargs(&args, "-obatchmode yes");
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+			global_fflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'N':
+			noisy = 1; /* Used to clear quiet mode after getopt */
+			break;
+		case 'p':
+			global_pflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'D':
+			sftp_direct = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024,
+			    &errstr);
+			if (errstr != NULL)
+				usage();
+			limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */
+			break;
+		case 'r':
+			global_rflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'R':
+			num_requests = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10);
+			if (num_requests == 0 || *cp != '\0')
+				fatal("Invalid number of requests \"%s\"",
+				    optarg);
+			break;
+		case 's':
+			sftp_server = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'S':
+			ssh_program = optarg;
+			replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
+			break;
+		case 'X':
+			/* Please keep in sync with ssh.c -X */
+			if (strncmp(optarg, "buffer=", 7) == 0) {
+				r = scan_scaled(optarg + 7, &llv);
+				if (r == 0 && (llv <= 0 || llv > 256 * 1024)) {
+					r = -1;
+					errno = EINVAL;
+				}
+				if (r == -1) {
+					fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\": %s",
+					     optarg + 7, strerror(errno));
+				}
+				copy_buffer_len = (size_t)llv;
+			} else if (strncmp(optarg, "nrequests=", 10) == 0) {
+				llv = strtonum(optarg + 10, 1, 256 * 1024,
+				    &errstr);
+				if (errstr != NULL) {
+					fatal("Invalid number of requests "
+					    "\"%s\": %s", optarg + 10, errstr);
+				}
+				num_requests = (size_t)llv;
+			} else {
+				fatal("Invalid -X option");
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+		default:
+			usage();
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Do this last because we want the user to be able to override it */
+	addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no");
+
+	if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO))
+		showprogress = 0;
+
+	if (noisy)
+		quiet = 0;
+
+	log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+	if (sftp_direct == NULL) {
+		if (optind == argc || argc > (optind + 2))
+			usage();
+		argv += optind;
+
+		switch (parse_uri("sftp", *argv, &user, &host, &tmp, &file1)) {
+		case -1:
+			usage();
+			break;
+		case 0:
+			if (tmp != -1)
+				port = tmp;
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* Try with user, host and path. */
+			if (parse_user_host_path(*argv, &user, &host,
+			    &file1) == 0)
+				break;
+			/* Try with user and host. */
+			if (parse_user_host_port(*argv, &user, &host, NULL)
+			    == 0)
+				break;
+			/* Treat as a plain hostname. */
+			host = xstrdup(*argv);
+			host = cleanhostname(host);
+			break;
+		}
+		file2 = *(argv + 1);
+
+		if (!*host) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Missing hostname\n");
+			usage();
+		}
+
+		if (port != -1)
+			addargs(&args, "-oPort %d", port);
+		if (user != NULL) {
+			addargs(&args, "-l");
+			addargs(&args, "%s", user);
+		}
+
+		/* no subsystem if the server-spec contains a '/' */
+		if (sftp_server == NULL || strchr(sftp_server, '/') == NULL)
+			addargs(&args, "-s");
+
+		addargs(&args, "--");
+		addargs(&args, "%s", host);
+		addargs(&args, "%s", (sftp_server != NULL ?
+		    sftp_server : "sftp"));
+
+		connect_to_server(ssh_program, args.list, &in, &out);
+	} else {
+		if ((r = argv_split(sftp_direct, &tmp, &cpp, 1)) != 0)
+			fatal_r(r, "Parse -D arguments");
+		if (cpp[0] == 0)
+			fatal("No sftp server specified via -D");
+		connect_to_server(cpp[0], cpp, &in, &out);
+		argv_free(cpp, tmp);
+	}
+	freeargs(&args);
+
+	conn = do_init(in, out, copy_buffer_len, num_requests, limit_kbps);
+	if (conn == NULL)
+		fatal("Couldn't initialise connection to server");
+
+	if (!quiet) {
+		if (sftp_direct == NULL)
+			fprintf(stderr, "Connected to %s.\n", host);
+		else
+			fprintf(stderr, "Attached to %s.\n", sftp_direct);
+	}
+
+	err = interactive_loop(conn, file1, file2);
+
+#if !defined(USE_PIPES)
+	shutdown(in, SHUT_RDWR);
+	shutdown(out, SHUT_RDWR);
+#endif
+
+	close(in);
+	close(out);
+	if (batchmode)
+		fclose(infile);
+
+	while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0) == -1 && sshpid > 1)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh process: %s",
+			    strerror(errno));
+
+	exit(err == 0 ? 0 : 1);
+}
diff --git a/sftp.h b/sftp.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2bde8bb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sftp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.h,v 1.9 2008/06/13 00:12:02 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-01.txt
+ */
+
+/* version */
+#define	SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION		3
+
+/* client to server */
+#define SSH2_FXP_INIT			1
+#define SSH2_FXP_OPEN			3
+#define SSH2_FXP_CLOSE			4
+#define SSH2_FXP_READ			5
+#define SSH2_FXP_WRITE			6
+#define SSH2_FXP_LSTAT			7
+#define SSH2_FXP_STAT_VERSION_0		7
+#define SSH2_FXP_FSTAT			8
+#define SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT		9
+#define SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT		10
+#define SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR		11
+#define SSH2_FXP_READDIR		12
+#define SSH2_FXP_REMOVE			13
+#define SSH2_FXP_MKDIR			14
+#define SSH2_FXP_RMDIR			15
+#define SSH2_FXP_REALPATH		16
+#define SSH2_FXP_STAT			17
+#define SSH2_FXP_RENAME			18
+#define SSH2_FXP_READLINK		19
+#define SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK		20
+
+/* server to client */
+#define SSH2_FXP_VERSION		2
+#define SSH2_FXP_STATUS			101
+#define SSH2_FXP_HANDLE			102
+#define SSH2_FXP_DATA			103
+#define SSH2_FXP_NAME			104
+#define SSH2_FXP_ATTRS			105
+
+#define SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED		200
+#define SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY		201
+
+/* attributes */
+#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE		0x00000001
+#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID	0x00000002
+#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS	0x00000004
+#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME	0x00000008
+#define SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_EXTENDED	0x80000000
+
+/* portable open modes */
+#define SSH2_FXF_READ			0x00000001
+#define SSH2_FXF_WRITE			0x00000002
+#define SSH2_FXF_APPEND			0x00000004
+#define SSH2_FXF_CREAT			0x00000008
+#define SSH2_FXF_TRUNC			0x00000010
+#define SSH2_FXF_EXCL			0x00000020
+
+/* statvfs@openssh.com f_flag flags */
+#define SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY	0x00000001
+#define SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID	0x00000002
+
+/* status messages */
+#define SSH2_FX_OK			0
+#define SSH2_FX_EOF			1
+#define SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE		2
+#define SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED	3
+#define SSH2_FX_FAILURE			4
+#define SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE		5
+#define SSH2_FX_NO_CONNECTION		6
+#define SSH2_FX_CONNECTION_LOST		7
+#define SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED		8
+#define SSH2_FX_MAX			8
+
+struct passwd;
+
+int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
+void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
diff --git a/sk-api.h b/sk-api.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..08f567a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sk-api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sk-api.h,v 1.15 2022/07/20 03:29:14 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SK_API_H
+#define _SK_API_H 1
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Flags */
+#define SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD	0x01
+#define SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD	0x04
+#define SSH_SK_FORCE_OPERATION		0x10
+#define SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY		0x20
+
+/* Algs */
+#define SSH_SK_ECDSA			0x00
+#define SSH_SK_ED25519			0x01
+
+/* Error codes */
+#define SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL		-1
+#define SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED		-2
+#define SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED		-3
+#define SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND	-4
+#define SSH_SK_ERR_CREDENTIAL_EXISTS	-5
+
+struct sk_enroll_response {
+	uint8_t flags;
+	uint8_t *public_key;
+	size_t public_key_len;
+	uint8_t *key_handle;
+	size_t key_handle_len;
+	uint8_t *signature;
+	size_t signature_len;
+	uint8_t *attestation_cert;
+	size_t attestation_cert_len;
+	uint8_t *authdata;
+	size_t authdata_len;
+};
+
+struct sk_sign_response {
+	uint8_t flags;
+	uint32_t counter;
+	uint8_t *sig_r;
+	size_t sig_r_len;
+	uint8_t *sig_s;
+	size_t sig_s_len;
+};
+
+struct sk_resident_key {
+	uint32_t alg;
+	size_t slot;
+	char *application;
+	struct sk_enroll_response key;
+	uint8_t flags;
+	uint8_t *user_id;
+	size_t user_id_len;
+};
+
+struct sk_option {
+	char *name;
+	char *value;
+	uint8_t required;
+};
+
+#define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR		0x000a0000 /* current API version */
+#define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK	0xffff0000
+
+/* Return the version of the middleware API */
+uint32_t sk_api_version(void);
+
+/* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */
+int sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+    const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+    struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
+
+/* Sign a challenge */
+int sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len,
+    const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+    uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+    struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
+
+/* Enumerate all resident keys */
+int sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+    struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
+
+#endif /* _SK_API_H */
diff --git a/sk-usbhid.c b/sk-usbhid.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46e09c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sk-usbhid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1485 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sk-usbhid.c,v 1.45 2022/09/14 00:14:37 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Pedro Martelletto
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H
+#include <sha2.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Almost every use of OpenSSL in this file is for ECDSA-NISTP256.
+ * This is strictly a larger hammer than necessary, but it reduces changes
+ * with upstream.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+# undef WITH_OPENSSL
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#include <fido.h>
+#include <fido/credman.h>
+
+/* backwards compat for libfido2 */
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_CRED_PROT
+#define fido_cred_prot(x) (0)
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_CRED_SET_PROT
+#define fido_cred_set_prot(x, y) (FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION)
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_SUPPORTS_CRED_PROT
+#define fido_dev_supports_cred_prot(x) (0)
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_BEGIN
+#define fido_dev_get_touch_begin(x) (FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION)
+#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_STATUS
+#define fido_dev_get_touch_status(x, y, z) (FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION)
+#endif
+#ifndef FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_REQUIRED
+#define FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_REQUIRED 0
+#endif
+#ifndef FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_OPTIONAL_WITH_ID
+#define FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_OPTIONAL_WITH_ID 0
+#endif
+
+#ifndef SK_STANDALONE
+# include "log.h"
+# include "xmalloc.h"
+# include "misc.h"
+/*
+ * If building as part of OpenSSH, then rename exported functions.
+ * This must be done before including sk-api.h.
+ */
+# define sk_api_version		ssh_sk_api_version
+# define sk_enroll		ssh_sk_enroll
+# define sk_sign		ssh_sk_sign
+# define sk_load_resident_keys	ssh_sk_load_resident_keys
+#endif /* !SK_STANDALONE */
+
+#include "sk-api.h"
+
+/* #define SK_DEBUG 1 */
+
+#ifdef SK_DEBUG
+#define SSH_FIDO_INIT_ARG	FIDO_DEBUG
+#else
+#define SSH_FIDO_INIT_ARG	0
+#endif
+
+#define MAX_FIDO_DEVICES	8
+#define FIDO_POLL_MS		50
+#define SELECT_MS		15000
+#define POLL_SLEEP_NS		200000000
+
+/* Compatibility with OpenSSH 1.0.x */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
+#define ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, pr, ps) \
+	do { \
+		(*pr) = sig->r; \
+		(*ps) = sig->s; \
+	} while (0)
+#endif
+#ifndef FIDO_ERR_OPERATION_DENIED
+#define FIDO_ERR_OPERATION_DENIED 0x27
+#endif
+
+struct sk_usbhid {
+	fido_dev_t *dev;
+	char *path;
+};
+
+/* Return the version of the middleware API */
+uint32_t sk_api_version(void);
+
+/* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */
+int sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+    const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+    struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
+
+/* Sign a challenge */
+int sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_len,
+    const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+    uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+    struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
+
+/* Load resident keys */
+int sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+    struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
+
+static void skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+    __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)));
+
+static void
+skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+#if !defined(SK_STANDALONE)
+	char *msg;
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	xvasprintf(&msg, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	debug("%s: %s", func, msg);
+	free(msg);
+#elif defined(SK_DEBUG)
+	va_list ap;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", func);
+	vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
+	fputc('\n', stderr);
+	va_end(ap);
+#else
+	(void)func; /* XXX */
+	(void)fmt; /* XXX */
+#endif
+}
+
+uint32_t
+sk_api_version(void)
+{
+	return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
+}
+
+static struct sk_usbhid *
+sk_open(const char *path)
+{
+	struct sk_usbhid *sk;
+	int r;
+
+	if (path == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "path == NULL");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((sk = calloc(1, sizeof(*sk))) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "calloc sk failed");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((sk->path = strdup(path)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "strdup path failed");
+		free(sk);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((sk->dev = fido_dev_new()) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_new failed");
+		free(sk->path);
+		free(sk);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_dev_open(sk->dev, sk->path)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_open %s failed: %s", sk->path,
+		    fido_strerr(r));
+		fido_dev_free(&sk->dev);
+		free(sk->path);
+		free(sk);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return sk;
+}
+
+static void
+sk_close(struct sk_usbhid *sk)
+{
+	if (sk == NULL)
+		return;
+	fido_dev_cancel(sk->dev); /* cancel any pending operation */
+	fido_dev_close(sk->dev);
+	fido_dev_free(&sk->dev);
+	free(sk->path);
+	free(sk);
+}
+
+static struct sk_usbhid **
+sk_openv(const fido_dev_info_t *devlist, size_t ndevs, size_t *nopen)
+{
+	const fido_dev_info_t *di;
+	struct sk_usbhid **skv;
+	size_t i;
+
+	*nopen = 0;
+	if ((skv = calloc(ndevs, sizeof(*skv))) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "calloc skv failed");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < ndevs; i++) {
+		if ((di = fido_dev_info_ptr(devlist, i)) == NULL)
+			skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_ptr failed");
+		else if ((skv[*nopen] = sk_open(fido_dev_info_path(di))) == NULL)
+			skdebug(__func__, "sk_open failed");
+		else
+			(*nopen)++;
+	}
+	if (*nopen == 0) {
+		for (i = 0; i < ndevs; i++)
+			sk_close(skv[i]);
+		free(skv);
+		skv = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return skv;
+}
+
+static void
+sk_closev(struct sk_usbhid **skv, size_t nsk)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nsk; i++)
+		sk_close(skv[i]);
+	free(skv);
+}
+
+static int
+sk_touch_begin(struct sk_usbhid **skv, size_t nsk)
+{
+	size_t i, ok = 0;
+	int r;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nsk; i++)
+		if ((r = fido_dev_get_touch_begin(skv[i]->dev)) != FIDO_OK)
+			skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_touch_begin %s failed:"
+			    " %s", skv[i]->path, fido_strerr(r));
+		else
+			ok++;
+
+	return ok ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+static int
+sk_touch_poll(struct sk_usbhid **skv, size_t nsk, int *touch, size_t *idx)
+{
+	struct timespec ts_pause;
+	size_t npoll, i;
+	int r;
+
+	ts_pause.tv_sec = 0;
+	ts_pause.tv_nsec = POLL_SLEEP_NS;
+	nanosleep(&ts_pause, NULL);
+	npoll = nsk;
+	for (i = 0; i < nsk; i++) {
+		if (skv[i] == NULL)
+			continue; /* device discarded */
+		skdebug(__func__, "polling %s", skv[i]->path);
+		if ((r = fido_dev_get_touch_status(skv[i]->dev, touch,
+		    FIDO_POLL_MS)) != FIDO_OK) {
+			skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_touch_status %s: %s",
+			    skv[i]->path, fido_strerr(r));
+			sk_close(skv[i]); /* discard device */
+			skv[i] = NULL;
+			if (--npoll == 0) {
+				skdebug(__func__, "no device left to poll");
+				return -1;
+			}
+		} else if (*touch) {
+			*idx = i;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	*touch = 0;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_FIDO_ASSERT_SET_CLIENTDATA) || \
+    !defined(HAVE_FIDO_CRED_SET_CLIENTDATA)
+/* Calculate SHA256(m) */
+static int
+sha256_mem(const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	u_int mdlen;
+#else
+	SHA2_CTX ctx;
+#endif
+
+	if (dlen != 32)
+		return -1;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	mdlen = dlen;
+	if (!EVP_Digest(m, mlen, d, &mdlen, EVP_sha256(), NULL))
+		return -1;
+#else
+	SHA256Init(&ctx);
+	SHA256Update(&ctx, (const uint8_t *)m, mlen);
+	SHA256Final(d, &ctx);
+#endif
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* !HAVE_FIDO_ASSERT_SET_CLIENTDATA || !HAVE_FIDO_CRED_SET_CLIENTDATA */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_CRED_SET_CLIENTDATA
+static int
+fido_cred_set_clientdata(fido_cred_t *cred, const u_char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+	uint8_t d[32];
+	int r;
+
+	if (sha256_mem(ptr, len, d, sizeof(d)) != 0) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "hash challenge failed");
+		return FIDO_ERR_INTERNAL;
+	}
+	r = fido_cred_set_clientdata_hash(cred, d, sizeof(d));
+	explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d));
+	if (r != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_clientdata_hash failed: %s",
+		    fido_strerr(r));
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_FIDO_CRED_SET_CLIENTDATA */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_ASSERT_SET_CLIENTDATA
+static int
+fido_assert_set_clientdata(fido_assert_t *assert, const u_char *ptr, size_t len)
+{
+	uint8_t d[32];
+	int r;
+
+	if (sha256_mem(ptr, len, d, sizeof(d)) != 0) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "hash challenge failed");
+		return FIDO_ERR_INTERNAL;
+	}
+	r = fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash(assert, d, sizeof(d));
+	explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d));
+	if (r != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash failed: %s",
+		    fido_strerr(r));
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_FIDO_ASSERT_SET_CLIENTDATA */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_IS_WINHELLO
+static bool
+fido_dev_is_winhello(const fido_dev_t *fdev)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_FIDO_DEV_IS_WINHELLO */
+
+/* Check if the specified key handle exists on a given sk. */
+static int
+sk_try(const struct sk_usbhid *sk, const char *application,
+    const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len)
+{
+	fido_assert_t *assert = NULL;
+	int r = FIDO_ERR_INTERNAL;
+	uint8_t message[32];
+
+	memset(message, '\0', sizeof(message));
+	if ((assert = fido_assert_new()) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_new failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* generate an invalid signature on FIDO2 tokens */
+	if ((r = fido_assert_set_clientdata(assert, message,
+	    sizeof(message))) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_clientdata: %s",
+		    fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_assert_set_rp(assert, application)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_rp: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_assert_allow_cred(assert, key_handle,
+	    key_handle_len)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_allow_cred: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_assert_set_up(assert, FIDO_OPT_FALSE)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_up: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	r = fido_dev_get_assert(sk->dev, assert, NULL);
+	skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_assert: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+	if (r == FIDO_ERR_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED) {
+		/* U2F tokens may return this */
+		r = FIDO_OK;
+	}
+ out:
+	fido_assert_free(&assert);
+
+	return r != FIDO_OK ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+static int
+check_sk_options(fido_dev_t *dev, const char *opt, int *ret)
+{
+	fido_cbor_info_t *info;
+	char * const *name;
+	const bool *value;
+	size_t len, i;
+	int r;
+
+	*ret = -1;
+
+	if (!fido_dev_is_fido2(dev)) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "device is not fido2");
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if ((info = fido_cbor_info_new()) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_cbor_info_new failed");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_dev_get_cbor_info(dev, info)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_cbor_info: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+		fido_cbor_info_free(&info);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	name = fido_cbor_info_options_name_ptr(info);
+	value = fido_cbor_info_options_value_ptr(info);
+	len = fido_cbor_info_options_len(info);
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		if (!strcmp(name[i], opt)) {
+			*ret = value[i];
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	fido_cbor_info_free(&info);
+	if (*ret == -1)
+		skdebug(__func__, "option %s is unknown", opt);
+	else
+		skdebug(__func__, "option %s is %s", opt, *ret ? "on" : "off");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct sk_usbhid *
+sk_select_by_cred(const fido_dev_info_t *devlist, size_t ndevs,
+    const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len)
+{
+	struct sk_usbhid **skv, *sk;
+	size_t skvcnt, i;
+	int internal_uv;
+
+	if ((skv = sk_openv(devlist, ndevs, &skvcnt)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "sk_openv failed");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (skvcnt == 1 && check_sk_options(skv[0]->dev, "uv",
+	    &internal_uv) == 0 && internal_uv != -1) {
+		sk = skv[0];
+		skv[0] = NULL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	sk = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < skvcnt; i++) {
+		if (sk_try(skv[i], application, key_handle,
+		    key_handle_len) == 0) {
+			sk = skv[i];
+			skv[i] = NULL;
+			skdebug(__func__, "found key in %s", sk->path);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+ out:
+	sk_closev(skv, skvcnt);
+	return sk;
+}
+
+static struct sk_usbhid *
+sk_select_by_touch(const fido_dev_info_t *devlist, size_t ndevs)
+{
+	struct sk_usbhid **skv, *sk;
+	struct timeval tv_start, tv_now, tv_delta;
+	size_t skvcnt, idx;
+	int touch, ms_remain;
+
+	if ((skv = sk_openv(devlist, ndevs, &skvcnt)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "sk_openv failed");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	sk = NULL;
+	if (skvcnt < 2) {
+		if (skvcnt == 1) {
+			/* single candidate */
+			sk = skv[0];
+			skv[0] = NULL;
+		}
+		goto out;
+	}
+#ifndef HAVE_FIDO_DEV_GET_TOUCH_STATUS
+	skdebug(__func__, "libfido2 version does not support a feature needed for multiple tokens. Please upgrade to >=1.5.0");
+	goto out;
+#endif
+
+	if (sk_touch_begin(skv, skvcnt) == -1) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "sk_touch_begin failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	monotime_tv(&tv_start);
+	do {
+		if (sk_touch_poll(skv, skvcnt, &touch, &idx) == -1) {
+			skdebug(__func__, "sk_touch_poll failed");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (touch) {
+			sk = skv[idx];
+			skv[idx] = NULL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		monotime_tv(&tv_now);
+		timersub(&tv_now, &tv_start, &tv_delta);
+		ms_remain = SELECT_MS - tv_delta.tv_sec * 1000 -
+		    tv_delta.tv_usec / 1000;
+	} while (ms_remain >= FIDO_POLL_MS);
+	skdebug(__func__, "timeout");
+out:
+	sk_closev(skv, skvcnt);
+	return sk;
+}
+
+static struct sk_usbhid *
+sk_probe(const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle,
+    size_t key_handle_len, int probe_resident)
+{
+	struct sk_usbhid *sk;
+	fido_dev_info_t *devlist;
+	size_t ndevs;
+	int r;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	if (!probe_resident && (sk = sk_open("windows://hello")) != NULL)
+		return sk;
+#endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
+	if ((devlist = fido_dev_info_new(MAX_FIDO_DEVICES)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_new failed");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_dev_info_manifest(devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES,
+	    &ndevs)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_manifest failed: %s",
+		    fido_strerr(r));
+		fido_dev_info_free(&devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	skdebug(__func__, "%zu device(s) detected", ndevs);
+	if (ndevs == 0) {
+		sk = NULL;
+	} else if (application != NULL && key_handle != NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "selecting sk by cred");
+		sk = sk_select_by_cred(devlist, ndevs, application, key_handle,
+		    key_handle_len);
+	} else {
+		skdebug(__func__, "selecting sk by touch");
+		sk = sk_select_by_touch(devlist, ndevs);
+	}
+	fido_dev_info_free(&devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES);
+	return sk;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/*
+ * The key returned via fido_cred_pubkey_ptr() is in affine coordinates,
+ * but the API expects a SEC1 octet string.
+ */
+static int
+pack_public_key_ecdsa(const fido_cred_t *cred,
+    struct sk_enroll_response *response)
+{
+	const uint8_t *ptr;
+	BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
+	EC_POINT *q = NULL;
+	EC_GROUP *g = NULL;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	response->public_key = NULL;
+	response->public_key_len = 0;
+
+	if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (y = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (g = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1)) == NULL ||
+	    (q = EC_POINT_new(g)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "libcrypto setup failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ptr = fido_cred_pubkey_ptr(cred)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_pubkey_ptr failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (fido_cred_pubkey_len(cred) != 64) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "bad fido_cred_pubkey_len %zu",
+		    fido_cred_pubkey_len(cred));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (BN_bin2bn(ptr, 32, x) == NULL ||
+	    BN_bin2bn(ptr + 32, 32, y) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "BN_bin2bn failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(g, q, x, y, NULL) != 1) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	response->public_key_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q,
+	    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
+	if (response->public_key_len == 0 || response->public_key_len > 2048) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "bad pubkey length %zu",
+		    response->public_key_len);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+	    response->public_key, response->public_key_len, NULL) == 0) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "EC_POINT_point2oct failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	if (ret != 0 && response->public_key != NULL) {
+		memset(response->public_key, 0, response->public_key_len);
+		free(response->public_key);
+		response->public_key = NULL;
+	}
+	EC_POINT_free(q);
+	EC_GROUP_free(g);
+	BN_clear_free(x);
+	BN_clear_free(y);
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+static int
+pack_public_key_ed25519(const fido_cred_t *cred,
+    struct sk_enroll_response *response)
+{
+	const uint8_t *ptr;
+	size_t len;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	response->public_key = NULL;
+	response->public_key_len = 0;
+
+	if ((len = fido_cred_pubkey_len(cred)) != 32) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "bad fido_cred_pubkey_len len %zu", len);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ptr = fido_cred_pubkey_ptr(cred)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_pubkey_ptr failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	response->public_key_len = len;
+	if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memcpy(response->public_key, ptr, len);
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	if (ret != 0)
+		free(response->public_key);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+pack_public_key(uint32_t alg, const fido_cred_t *cred,
+    struct sk_enroll_response *response)
+{
+	switch(alg) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+		return pack_public_key_ecdsa(cred, response);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+		return pack_public_key_ed25519(cred, response);
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+fidoerr_to_skerr(int fidoerr)
+{
+	switch (fidoerr) {
+	case FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION:
+	case FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM:
+		return SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
+	case FIDO_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED:
+	case FIDO_ERR_PIN_INVALID:
+	case FIDO_ERR_OPERATION_DENIED:
+		return SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+check_enroll_options(struct sk_option **options, char **devicep,
+    uint8_t *user_id, size_t user_id_len)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (options == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	for (i = 0; options[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(options[i]->name, "device") == 0) {
+			if ((*devicep = strdup(options[i]->value)) == NULL) {
+				skdebug(__func__, "strdup device failed");
+				return -1;
+			}
+			skdebug(__func__, "requested device %s", *devicep);
+		} else if (strcmp(options[i]->name, "user") == 0) {
+			if (strlcpy(user_id, options[i]->value, user_id_len) >=
+			    user_id_len) {
+				skdebug(__func__, "user too long");
+				return -1;
+			}
+			skdebug(__func__, "requested user %s",
+			    (char *)user_id);
+		} else {
+			skdebug(__func__, "requested unsupported option %s",
+			    options[i]->name);
+			if (options[i]->required) {
+				skdebug(__func__, "unknown required option");
+				return -1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+key_lookup(fido_dev_t *dev, const char *application, const uint8_t *user_id,
+    size_t user_id_len, const char *pin)
+{
+	fido_assert_t *assert = NULL;
+	uint8_t message[32];
+	int r = FIDO_ERR_INTERNAL;
+	int sk_supports_uv, uv;
+	size_t i;
+
+	memset(message, '\0', sizeof(message));
+	if ((assert = fido_assert_new()) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_new failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* generate an invalid signature on FIDO2 tokens */
+	if ((r = fido_assert_set_clientdata(assert, message,
+	    sizeof(message))) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_clientdata: %s",
+		    fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_assert_set_rp(assert, application)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_rp: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_assert_set_up(assert, FIDO_OPT_FALSE)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_up: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	uv = FIDO_OPT_OMIT;
+	if (pin == NULL && check_sk_options(dev, "uv", &sk_supports_uv) == 0 &&
+	    sk_supports_uv != -1)
+		uv = FIDO_OPT_TRUE;
+	if ((r = fido_assert_set_uv(assert, uv)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_uv: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_dev_get_assert(dev, assert, pin)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_assert: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	r = FIDO_ERR_NO_CREDENTIALS;
+	skdebug(__func__, "%zu signatures returned", fido_assert_count(assert));
+	for (i = 0; i < fido_assert_count(assert); i++) {
+		if (fido_assert_user_id_len(assert, i) == user_id_len &&
+		    memcmp(fido_assert_user_id_ptr(assert, i), user_id,
+		    user_id_len) == 0) {
+			skdebug(__func__, "credential exists");
+			r = FIDO_OK;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+ out:
+	fido_assert_free(&assert);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+    const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+    struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
+{
+	fido_cred_t *cred = NULL;
+	const uint8_t *ptr;
+	uint8_t user_id[32];
+	struct sk_usbhid *sk = NULL;
+	struct sk_enroll_response *response = NULL;
+	size_t len;
+	int credprot;
+	int cose_alg;
+	int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL;
+	int r;
+	char *device = NULL;
+
+	fido_init(SSH_FIDO_INIT_ARG);
+
+	if (enroll_response == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "enroll_response == NULL");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*enroll_response = NULL;
+	memset(user_id, 0, sizeof(user_id));
+	if (check_enroll_options(options, &device, user_id,
+	    sizeof(user_id)) != 0)
+		goto out; /* error already logged */
+
+	switch(alg) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+		cose_alg = COSE_ES256;
+		break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+		cose_alg = COSE_EDDSA;
+		break;
+	default:
+		skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d", alg);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (device != NULL)
+		sk = sk_open(device);
+	else
+		sk = sk_probe(NULL, NULL, 0, 0);
+	if (sk == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND;
+		skdebug(__func__, "failed to find sk");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	skdebug(__func__, "using device %s", sk->path);
+	if ((flags & SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY) != 0 &&
+	    (flags & SSH_SK_FORCE_OPERATION) == 0 &&
+	    (r = key_lookup(sk->dev, application, user_id, sizeof(user_id),
+	    pin)) != FIDO_ERR_NO_CREDENTIALS) {
+		if (r != FIDO_OK) {
+			ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r);
+			skdebug(__func__, "key_lookup failed");
+		} else {
+			ret = SSH_SK_ERR_CREDENTIAL_EXISTS;
+			skdebug(__func__, "key exists");
+		}
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((cred = fido_cred_new()) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_new failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_cred_set_type(cred, cose_alg)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_type: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_cred_set_clientdata(cred,
+	    challenge, challenge_len)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_clientdata: %s",
+		    fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_cred_set_rk(cred, (flags & SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY) != 0 ?
+	    FIDO_OPT_TRUE : FIDO_OPT_OMIT)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_rk: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_cred_set_user(cred, user_id, sizeof(user_id),
+	    "openssh", "openssh", NULL)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_user: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_cred_set_rp(cred, application, NULL)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_rp: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((flags & (SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY|SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) != 0) {
+#if !defined(HAVE_FIDO_DEV_SUPPORTS_CRED_PROT) || \
+    !defined(HAVE_FIDO_CRED_SET_PROT)
+		skdebug(__func__, "libfido2 version does not support a feature required for this operation. Please upgrade to >=1.5.0");
+		ret = SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
+		goto out;
+		credprot = 0; (void)credprot; /* avoid warning */
+#endif
+		if (!fido_dev_supports_cred_prot(sk->dev)) {
+			skdebug(__func__, "%s does not support credprot, "
+			    "refusing to create unprotected "
+			    "resident/verify-required key", sk->path);
+			ret = SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD))
+			credprot = FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_REQUIRED;
+		else
+			credprot = FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_OPTIONAL_WITH_ID;
+
+		if ((r = fido_cred_set_prot(cred, credprot)) != FIDO_OK) {
+			skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_prot: %s",
+			    fido_strerr(r));
+			ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_dev_make_cred(sk->dev, cred, pin)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_make_cred: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+		ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (fido_cred_x5c_ptr(cred) != NULL) {
+		if ((r = fido_cred_verify(cred)) != FIDO_OK) {
+			skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_verify: %s",
+			    fido_strerr(r));
+			goto out;
+		}
+	} else {
+		skdebug(__func__, "self-attested credential");
+		if ((r = fido_cred_verify_self(cred)) != FIDO_OK) {
+			skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_verify_self: %s",
+			    fido_strerr(r));
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	response->flags = flags;
+	if (pack_public_key(alg, cred, response) != 0) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "pack_public_key failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ptr = fido_cred_id_ptr(cred)) != NULL) {
+		len = fido_cred_id_len(cred);
+		if ((response->key_handle = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
+			skdebug(__func__, "calloc key handle failed");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		memcpy(response->key_handle, ptr, len);
+		response->key_handle_len = len;
+	}
+	if ((ptr = fido_cred_sig_ptr(cred)) != NULL) {
+		len = fido_cred_sig_len(cred);
+		if ((response->signature = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
+			skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		memcpy(response->signature, ptr, len);
+		response->signature_len = len;
+	}
+	if ((ptr = fido_cred_x5c_ptr(cred)) != NULL) {
+		len = fido_cred_x5c_len(cred);
+		skdebug(__func__, "attestation cert len=%zu", len);
+		if ((response->attestation_cert = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
+			skdebug(__func__, "calloc attestation cert failed");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		memcpy(response->attestation_cert, ptr, len);
+		response->attestation_cert_len = len;
+	}
+	if ((ptr = fido_cred_authdata_ptr(cred)) != NULL) {
+		len = fido_cred_authdata_len(cred);
+		skdebug(__func__, "authdata len=%zu", len);
+		if ((response->authdata = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
+			skdebug(__func__, "calloc authdata failed");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		memcpy(response->authdata, ptr, len);
+		response->authdata_len = len;
+	}
+	*enroll_response = response;
+	response = NULL;
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	free(device);
+	if (response != NULL) {
+		free(response->public_key);
+		free(response->key_handle);
+		free(response->signature);
+		free(response->attestation_cert);
+		free(response->authdata);
+		free(response);
+	}
+	sk_close(sk);
+	fido_cred_free(&cred);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+static int
+pack_sig_ecdsa(fido_assert_t *assert, struct sk_sign_response *response)
+{
+	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
+	const unsigned char *cp;
+	size_t sig_len;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	cp = fido_assert_sig_ptr(assert, 0);
+	sig_len = fido_assert_sig_len(assert, 0);
+	if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &cp, sig_len)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "d2i_ECDSA_SIG failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
+	response->sig_r_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
+	response->sig_s_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_s);
+	if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL ||
+	    (response->sig_s = calloc(1, response->sig_s_len)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	BN_bn2bin(sig_r, response->sig_r);
+	BN_bn2bin(sig_s, response->sig_s);
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		free(response->sig_r);
+		free(response->sig_s);
+		response->sig_r = NULL;
+		response->sig_s = NULL;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+static int
+pack_sig_ed25519(fido_assert_t *assert, struct sk_sign_response *response)
+{
+	const unsigned char *ptr;
+	size_t len;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	ptr = fido_assert_sig_ptr(assert, 0);
+	len = fido_assert_sig_len(assert, 0);
+	if (len != 64) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "bad length %zu", len);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	response->sig_r_len = len;
+	if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memcpy(response->sig_r, ptr, len);
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	if (ret != 0) {
+		free(response->sig_r);
+		response->sig_r = NULL;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+pack_sig(uint32_t  alg, fido_assert_t *assert,
+    struct sk_sign_response *response)
+{
+	switch(alg) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+		return pack_sig_ecdsa(assert, response);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+		return pack_sig_ed25519(assert, response);
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Checks sk_options for sk_sign() and sk_load_resident_keys() */
+static int
+check_sign_load_resident_options(struct sk_option **options, char **devicep)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (options == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	for (i = 0; options[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(options[i]->name, "device") == 0) {
+			if ((*devicep = strdup(options[i]->value)) == NULL) {
+				skdebug(__func__, "strdup device failed");
+				return -1;
+			}
+			skdebug(__func__, "requested device %s", *devicep);
+		} else {
+			skdebug(__func__, "requested unsupported option %s",
+			    options[i]->name);
+			if (options[i]->required) {
+				skdebug(__func__, "unknown required option");
+				return -1;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
+    const char *application,
+    const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+    uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+    struct sk_sign_response **sign_response)
+{
+	fido_assert_t *assert = NULL;
+	char *device = NULL;
+	struct sk_usbhid *sk = NULL;
+	struct sk_sign_response *response = NULL;
+	int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL, internal_uv;
+	int r;
+
+	fido_init(SSH_FIDO_INIT_ARG);
+
+	if (sign_response == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "sign_response == NULL");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*sign_response = NULL;
+	if (check_sign_load_resident_options(options, &device) != 0)
+		goto out; /* error already logged */
+	if (device != NULL)
+		sk = sk_open(device);
+	else if (pin != NULL || (flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD))
+		sk = sk_probe(NULL, NULL, 0, 0);
+	else
+		sk = sk_probe(application, key_handle, key_handle_len, 0);
+	if (sk == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND;
+		skdebug(__func__, "failed to find sk");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((assert = fido_assert_new()) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_new failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_assert_set_clientdata(assert,
+	    data, datalen)) != FIDO_OK)  {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_clientdata: %s",
+		    fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_assert_set_rp(assert, application)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_rp: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_assert_allow_cred(assert, key_handle,
+	    key_handle_len)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_allow_cred: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_assert_set_up(assert,
+	    (flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) ?
+	    FIDO_OPT_TRUE : FIDO_OPT_FALSE)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_up: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * WinHello requests the PIN by default.  Make "uv" request explicit
+	 * to allow keys with and without -O verify-required to make sense.
+	 */
+	if (pin == NULL && fido_dev_is_winhello (sk->dev) &&
+	    (r = fido_assert_set_uv(assert, FIDO_OPT_FALSE)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_uv: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+	}
+	if (pin == NULL && (flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) {
+		if (check_sk_options(sk->dev, "uv", &internal_uv) < 0 ||
+		    internal_uv != 1) {
+			skdebug(__func__, "check_sk_options uv");
+			ret = SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = fido_assert_set_uv(assert,
+		    FIDO_OPT_TRUE)) != FIDO_OK) {
+			skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_uv: %s",
+			    fido_strerr(r));
+			ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_dev_get_assert(sk->dev, assert, pin)) != FIDO_OK) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_assert: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+		ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	response->flags = fido_assert_flags(assert, 0);
+	response->counter = fido_assert_sigcount(assert, 0);
+	if (pack_sig(alg, assert, response) != 0) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "pack_sig failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*sign_response = response;
+	response = NULL;
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	free(device);
+	if (response != NULL) {
+		free(response->sig_r);
+		free(response->sig_s);
+		free(response);
+	}
+	sk_close(sk);
+	fido_assert_free(&assert);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+read_rks(struct sk_usbhid *sk, const char *pin,
+    struct sk_resident_key ***rksp, size_t *nrksp)
+{
+	int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL, r = -1, internal_uv;
+	fido_credman_metadata_t *metadata = NULL;
+	fido_credman_rp_t *rp = NULL;
+	fido_credman_rk_t *rk = NULL;
+	size_t i, j, nrp, nrk, user_id_len;
+	const fido_cred_t *cred;
+	const char *rp_id, *rp_name, *user_name;
+	struct sk_resident_key *srk = NULL, **tmp;
+	const u_char *user_id;
+
+	if (pin == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "no PIN specified");
+		ret = SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((metadata = fido_credman_metadata_new()) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "alloc failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (check_sk_options(sk->dev, "uv", &internal_uv) != 0) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "check_sk_options failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_metadata(sk->dev, metadata, pin)) != 0) {
+		if (r == FIDO_ERR_INVALID_COMMAND) {
+			skdebug(__func__, "device %s does not support "
+			    "resident keys", sk->path);
+			ret = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		skdebug(__func__, "get metadata for %s failed: %s",
+		    sk->path, fido_strerr(r));
+		ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	skdebug(__func__, "existing %llu, remaining %llu",
+	    (unsigned long long)fido_credman_rk_existing(metadata),
+	    (unsigned long long)fido_credman_rk_remaining(metadata));
+	if ((rp = fido_credman_rp_new()) == NULL) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "alloc rp failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_rp(sk->dev, rp, pin)) != 0) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "get RPs for %s failed: %s",
+		    sk->path, fido_strerr(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+	nrp = fido_credman_rp_count(rp);
+	skdebug(__func__, "Device %s has resident keys for %zu RPs",
+	    sk->path, nrp);
+
+	/* Iterate over RP IDs that have resident keys */
+	for (i = 0; i < nrp; i++) {
+		rp_id = fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i);
+		rp_name = fido_credman_rp_name(rp, i);
+		skdebug(__func__, "rp %zu: name=\"%s\" id=\"%s\" hashlen=%zu",
+		    i, rp_name == NULL ? "(none)" : rp_name,
+		    rp_id == NULL ? "(none)" : rp_id,
+		    fido_credman_rp_id_hash_len(rp, i));
+
+		/* Skip non-SSH RP IDs */
+		if (rp_id == NULL ||
+		    strncasecmp(fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), "ssh:", 4) != 0)
+			continue;
+
+		fido_credman_rk_free(&rk);
+		if ((rk = fido_credman_rk_new()) == NULL) {
+			skdebug(__func__, "alloc rk failed");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_rk(sk->dev,
+		    fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), rk, pin)) != 0) {
+			skdebug(__func__, "get RKs for %s slot %zu failed: %s",
+			    sk->path, i, fido_strerr(r));
+			goto out;
+		}
+		nrk = fido_credman_rk_count(rk);
+		skdebug(__func__, "RP \"%s\" has %zu resident keys",
+		    fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), nrk);
+
+		/* Iterate over resident keys for this RP ID */
+		for (j = 0; j < nrk; j++) {
+			if ((cred = fido_credman_rk(rk, j)) == NULL) {
+				skdebug(__func__, "no RK in slot %zu", j);
+				continue;
+			}
+			if ((user_name = fido_cred_user_name(cred)) == NULL)
+				user_name = "";
+			user_id = fido_cred_user_id_ptr(cred);
+			user_id_len = fido_cred_user_id_len(cred);
+			skdebug(__func__, "Device %s RP \"%s\" user \"%s\" "
+			    "uidlen %zu slot %zu: type %d flags 0x%02x "
+			    "prot 0x%02x", sk->path, rp_id, user_name,
+			    user_id_len, j, fido_cred_type(cred),
+			    fido_cred_flags(cred), fido_cred_prot(cred));
+
+			/* build response entry */
+			if ((srk = calloc(1, sizeof(*srk))) == NULL ||
+			    (srk->key.key_handle = calloc(1,
+			    fido_cred_id_len(cred))) == NULL ||
+			    (srk->application = strdup(rp_id)) == NULL ||
+			    (user_id_len > 0 &&
+			     (srk->user_id = calloc(1, user_id_len)) == NULL)) {
+				skdebug(__func__, "alloc sk_resident_key");
+				goto out;
+			}
+
+			srk->key.key_handle_len = fido_cred_id_len(cred);
+			memcpy(srk->key.key_handle, fido_cred_id_ptr(cred),
+			    srk->key.key_handle_len);
+			srk->user_id_len = user_id_len;
+			if (srk->user_id_len != 0)
+				memcpy(srk->user_id, user_id, srk->user_id_len);
+
+			switch (fido_cred_type(cred)) {
+			case COSE_ES256:
+				srk->alg = SSH_SK_ECDSA;
+				break;
+			case COSE_EDDSA:
+				srk->alg = SSH_SK_ED25519;
+				break;
+			default:
+				skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d",
+				    fido_cred_type(cred));
+				goto out; /* XXX free rk and continue */
+			}
+
+			if (fido_cred_prot(cred) == FIDO_CRED_PROT_UV_REQUIRED
+			    && internal_uv == -1)
+				srk->flags |=  SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD;
+
+			if ((r = pack_public_key(srk->alg, cred,
+			    &srk->key)) != 0) {
+				skdebug(__func__, "pack public key failed");
+				goto out;
+			}
+			/* append */
+			if ((tmp = recallocarray(*rksp, *nrksp, (*nrksp) + 1,
+			    sizeof(**rksp))) == NULL) {
+				skdebug(__func__, "alloc rksp");
+				goto out;
+			}
+			*rksp = tmp;
+			(*rksp)[(*nrksp)++] = srk;
+			srk = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	/* Success */
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	if (srk != NULL) {
+		free(srk->application);
+		freezero(srk->key.public_key, srk->key.public_key_len);
+		freezero(srk->key.key_handle, srk->key.key_handle_len);
+		freezero(srk->user_id, srk->user_id_len);
+		freezero(srk, sizeof(*srk));
+	}
+	fido_credman_rp_free(&rp);
+	fido_credman_rk_free(&rk);
+	fido_credman_metadata_free(&metadata);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+    struct sk_resident_key ***rksp, size_t *nrksp)
+{
+	int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL, r = -1;
+	size_t i, nrks = 0;
+	struct sk_resident_key **rks = NULL;
+	struct sk_usbhid *sk = NULL;
+	char *device = NULL;
+
+	*rksp = NULL;
+	*nrksp = 0;
+
+	fido_init(SSH_FIDO_INIT_ARG);
+
+	if (check_sign_load_resident_options(options, &device) != 0)
+		goto out; /* error already logged */
+	if (device != NULL)
+		sk = sk_open(device);
+	else
+		sk = sk_probe(NULL, NULL, 0, 1);
+	if (sk == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND;
+		skdebug(__func__, "failed to find sk");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	skdebug(__func__, "trying %s", sk->path);
+	if ((r = read_rks(sk, pin, &rks, &nrks)) != 0) {
+		skdebug(__func__, "read_rks failed for %s", sk->path);
+		ret = r;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success, unless we have no keys but a specific error */
+	if (nrks > 0 || ret == SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL)
+		ret = 0;
+	*rksp = rks;
+	*nrksp = nrks;
+	rks = NULL;
+	nrks = 0;
+ out:
+	sk_close(sk);
+	for (i = 0; i < nrks; i++) {
+		free(rks[i]->application);
+		freezero(rks[i]->key.public_key, rks[i]->key.public_key_len);
+		freezero(rks[i]->key.key_handle, rks[i]->key.key_handle_len);
+		freezero(rks[i]->user_id, rks[i]->user_id_len);
+		freezero(rks[i], sizeof(*rks[i]));
+	}
+	free(device);
+	free(rks);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL */
diff --git a/smult_curve25519_ref.c b/smult_curve25519_ref.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2e69934
--- /dev/null
+++ b/smult_curve25519_ref.c
@@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: smult_curve25519_ref.c,v 1.2 2013/11/02 22:02:14 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+version 20081011
+Matthew Dempsky
+Public domain.
+Derived from public domain code by D. J. Bernstein.
+*/
+
+int crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(unsigned char *, const unsigned char *, const unsigned char *);
+
+static void add(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int a[32],const unsigned int b[32])
+{
+  unsigned int j;
+  unsigned int u;
+  u = 0;
+  for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) { u += a[j] + b[j]; out[j] = u & 255; u >>= 8; }
+  u += a[31] + b[31]; out[31] = u;
+}
+
+static void sub(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int a[32],const unsigned int b[32])
+{
+  unsigned int j;
+  unsigned int u;
+  u = 218;
+  for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) {
+    u += a[j] + 65280 - b[j];
+    out[j] = u & 255;
+    u >>= 8;
+  }
+  u += a[31] - b[31];
+  out[31] = u;
+}
+
+static void squeeze(unsigned int a[32])
+{
+  unsigned int j;
+  unsigned int u;
+  u = 0;
+  for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) { u += a[j]; a[j] = u & 255; u >>= 8; }
+  u += a[31]; a[31] = u & 127;
+  u = 19 * (u >> 7);
+  for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) { u += a[j]; a[j] = u & 255; u >>= 8; }
+  u += a[31]; a[31] = u;
+}
+
+static const unsigned int minusp[32] = {
+ 19, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 128
+} ;
+
+static void freeze(unsigned int a[32])
+{
+  unsigned int aorig[32];
+  unsigned int j;
+  unsigned int negative;
+
+  for (j = 0;j < 32;++j) aorig[j] = a[j];
+  add(a,a,minusp);
+  negative = -((a[31] >> 7) & 1);
+  for (j = 0;j < 32;++j) a[j] ^= negative & (aorig[j] ^ a[j]);
+}
+
+static void mult(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int a[32],const unsigned int b[32])
+{
+  unsigned int i;
+  unsigned int j;
+  unsigned int u;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) {
+    u = 0;
+    for (j = 0;j <= i;++j) u += a[j] * b[i - j];
+    for (j = i + 1;j < 32;++j) u += 38 * a[j] * b[i + 32 - j];
+    out[i] = u;
+  }
+  squeeze(out);
+}
+
+static void mult121665(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int a[32])
+{
+  unsigned int j;
+  unsigned int u;
+
+  u = 0;
+  for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) { u += 121665 * a[j]; out[j] = u & 255; u >>= 8; }
+  u += 121665 * a[31]; out[31] = u & 127;
+  u = 19 * (u >> 7);
+  for (j = 0;j < 31;++j) { u += out[j]; out[j] = u & 255; u >>= 8; }
+  u += out[j]; out[j] = u;
+}
+
+static void square(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int a[32])
+{
+  unsigned int i;
+  unsigned int j;
+  unsigned int u;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) {
+    u = 0;
+    for (j = 0;j < i - j;++j) u += a[j] * a[i - j];
+    for (j = i + 1;j < i + 32 - j;++j) u += 38 * a[j] * a[i + 32 - j];
+    u *= 2;
+    if ((i & 1) == 0) {
+      u += a[i / 2] * a[i / 2];
+      u += 38 * a[i / 2 + 16] * a[i / 2 + 16];
+    }
+    out[i] = u;
+  }
+  squeeze(out);
+}
+
+static void select(unsigned int p[64],unsigned int q[64],const unsigned int r[64],const unsigned int s[64],unsigned int b)
+{
+  unsigned int j;
+  unsigned int t;
+  unsigned int bminus1;
+
+  bminus1 = b - 1;
+  for (j = 0;j < 64;++j) {
+    t = bminus1 & (r[j] ^ s[j]);
+    p[j] = s[j] ^ t;
+    q[j] = r[j] ^ t;
+  }
+}
+
+static void mainloop(unsigned int work[64],const unsigned char e[32])
+{
+  unsigned int xzm1[64];
+  unsigned int xzm[64];
+  unsigned int xzmb[64];
+  unsigned int xzm1b[64];
+  unsigned int xznb[64];
+  unsigned int xzn1b[64];
+  unsigned int a0[64];
+  unsigned int a1[64];
+  unsigned int b0[64];
+  unsigned int b1[64];
+  unsigned int c1[64];
+  unsigned int r[32];
+  unsigned int s[32];
+  unsigned int t[32];
+  unsigned int u[32];
+  unsigned int j;
+  unsigned int b;
+  int pos;
+
+  for (j = 0;j < 32;++j) xzm1[j] = work[j];
+  xzm1[32] = 1;
+  for (j = 33;j < 64;++j) xzm1[j] = 0;
+
+  xzm[0] = 1;
+  for (j = 1;j < 64;++j) xzm[j] = 0;
+
+  for (pos = 254;pos >= 0;--pos) {
+    b = e[pos / 8] >> (pos & 7);
+    b &= 1;
+    select(xzmb,xzm1b,xzm,xzm1,b);
+    add(a0,xzmb,xzmb + 32);
+    sub(a0 + 32,xzmb,xzmb + 32);
+    add(a1,xzm1b,xzm1b + 32);
+    sub(a1 + 32,xzm1b,xzm1b + 32);
+    square(b0,a0);
+    square(b0 + 32,a0 + 32);
+    mult(b1,a1,a0 + 32);
+    mult(b1 + 32,a1 + 32,a0);
+    add(c1,b1,b1 + 32);
+    sub(c1 + 32,b1,b1 + 32);
+    square(r,c1 + 32);
+    sub(s,b0,b0 + 32);
+    mult121665(t,s);
+    add(u,t,b0);
+    mult(xznb,b0,b0 + 32);
+    mult(xznb + 32,s,u);
+    square(xzn1b,c1);
+    mult(xzn1b + 32,r,work);
+    select(xzm,xzm1,xznb,xzn1b,b);
+  }
+
+  for (j = 0;j < 64;++j) work[j] = xzm[j];
+}
+
+static void recip(unsigned int out[32],const unsigned int z[32])
+{
+  unsigned int z2[32];
+  unsigned int z9[32];
+  unsigned int z11[32];
+  unsigned int z2_5_0[32];
+  unsigned int z2_10_0[32];
+  unsigned int z2_20_0[32];
+  unsigned int z2_50_0[32];
+  unsigned int z2_100_0[32];
+  unsigned int t0[32];
+  unsigned int t1[32];
+  int i;
+
+  /* 2 */ square(z2,z);
+  /* 4 */ square(t1,z2);
+  /* 8 */ square(t0,t1);
+  /* 9 */ mult(z9,t0,z);
+  /* 11 */ mult(z11,z9,z2);
+  /* 22 */ square(t0,z11);
+  /* 2^5 - 2^0 = 31 */ mult(z2_5_0,t0,z9);
+
+  /* 2^6 - 2^1 */ square(t0,z2_5_0);
+  /* 2^7 - 2^2 */ square(t1,t0);
+  /* 2^8 - 2^3 */ square(t0,t1);
+  /* 2^9 - 2^4 */ square(t1,t0);
+  /* 2^10 - 2^5 */ square(t0,t1);
+  /* 2^10 - 2^0 */ mult(z2_10_0,t0,z2_5_0);
+
+  /* 2^11 - 2^1 */ square(t0,z2_10_0);
+  /* 2^12 - 2^2 */ square(t1,t0);
+  /* 2^20 - 2^10 */ for (i = 2;i < 10;i += 2) { square(t0,t1); square(t1,t0); }
+  /* 2^20 - 2^0 */ mult(z2_20_0,t1,z2_10_0);
+
+  /* 2^21 - 2^1 */ square(t0,z2_20_0);
+  /* 2^22 - 2^2 */ square(t1,t0);
+  /* 2^40 - 2^20 */ for (i = 2;i < 20;i += 2) { square(t0,t1); square(t1,t0); }
+  /* 2^40 - 2^0 */ mult(t0,t1,z2_20_0);
+
+  /* 2^41 - 2^1 */ square(t1,t0);
+  /* 2^42 - 2^2 */ square(t0,t1);
+  /* 2^50 - 2^10 */ for (i = 2;i < 10;i += 2) { square(t1,t0); square(t0,t1); }
+  /* 2^50 - 2^0 */ mult(z2_50_0,t0,z2_10_0);
+
+  /* 2^51 - 2^1 */ square(t0,z2_50_0);
+  /* 2^52 - 2^2 */ square(t1,t0);
+  /* 2^100 - 2^50 */ for (i = 2;i < 50;i += 2) { square(t0,t1); square(t1,t0); }
+  /* 2^100 - 2^0 */ mult(z2_100_0,t1,z2_50_0);
+
+  /* 2^101 - 2^1 */ square(t1,z2_100_0);
+  /* 2^102 - 2^2 */ square(t0,t1);
+  /* 2^200 - 2^100 */ for (i = 2;i < 100;i += 2) { square(t1,t0); square(t0,t1); }
+  /* 2^200 - 2^0 */ mult(t1,t0,z2_100_0);
+
+  /* 2^201 - 2^1 */ square(t0,t1);
+  /* 2^202 - 2^2 */ square(t1,t0);
+  /* 2^250 - 2^50 */ for (i = 2;i < 50;i += 2) { square(t0,t1); square(t1,t0); }
+  /* 2^250 - 2^0 */ mult(t0,t1,z2_50_0);
+
+  /* 2^251 - 2^1 */ square(t1,t0);
+  /* 2^252 - 2^2 */ square(t0,t1);
+  /* 2^253 - 2^3 */ square(t1,t0);
+  /* 2^254 - 2^4 */ square(t0,t1);
+  /* 2^255 - 2^5 */ square(t1,t0);
+  /* 2^255 - 21 */ mult(out,t1,z11);
+}
+
+int crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(unsigned char *q,
+  const unsigned char *n,
+  const unsigned char *p)
+{
+  unsigned int work[96];
+  unsigned char e[32];
+  unsigned int i;
+  for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) e[i] = n[i];
+  e[0] &= 248;
+  e[31] &= 127;
+  e[31] |= 64;
+  for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) work[i] = p[i];
+  mainloop(work,e);
+  recip(work + 32,work + 32);
+  mult(work + 64,work,work + 32);
+  freeze(work + 64);
+  for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) q[i] = work[64 + i];
+  return 0;
+}
diff --git a/sntrup761.c b/sntrup761.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..57368bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sntrup761.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1273 @@
+/*  $OpenBSD: sntrup761.c,v 1.6 2023/01/11 02:13:52 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Public Domain, Authors:
+ * - Daniel J. Bernstein
+ * - Chitchanok Chuengsatiansup
+ * - Tanja Lange
+ * - Christine van Vredendaal
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef USE_SNTRUP761X25519
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+
+#define int8 crypto_int8
+#define uint8 crypto_uint8
+#define int16 crypto_int16
+#define uint16 crypto_uint16
+#define int32 crypto_int32
+#define uint32 crypto_uint32
+#define int64 crypto_int64
+#define uint64 crypto_uint64
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_sort/int32/portable4/int32_minmax.inc */
+#define int32_MINMAX(a,b) \
+do { \
+  int64_t ab = (int64_t)b ^ (int64_t)a; \
+  int64_t c = (int64_t)b - (int64_t)a; \
+  c ^= ab & (c ^ b); \
+  c >>= 31; \
+  c &= ab; \
+  a ^= c; \
+  b ^= c; \
+} while(0)
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_sort/int32/portable4/sort.c */
+
+
+static void crypto_sort_int32(void *array,long long n)
+{
+  long long top,p,q,r,i,j;
+  int32 *x = array;
+
+  if (n < 2) return;
+  top = 1;
+  while (top < n - top) top += top;
+
+  for (p = top;p >= 1;p >>= 1) {
+    i = 0;
+    while (i + 2 * p <= n) {
+      for (j = i;j < i + p;++j)
+        int32_MINMAX(x[j],x[j+p]);
+      i += 2 * p;
+    }
+    for (j = i;j < n - p;++j)
+      int32_MINMAX(x[j],x[j+p]);
+
+    i = 0;
+    j = 0;
+    for (q = top;q > p;q >>= 1) {
+      if (j != i) for (;;) {
+        if (j == n - q) goto done;
+        int32 a = x[j + p];
+        for (r = q;r > p;r >>= 1)
+          int32_MINMAX(a,x[j + r]);
+        x[j + p] = a;
+        ++j;
+        if (j == i + p) {
+          i += 2 * p;
+          break;
+        }
+      }
+      while (i + p <= n - q) {
+        for (j = i;j < i + p;++j) {
+          int32 a = x[j + p];
+          for (r = q;r > p;r >>= 1)
+            int32_MINMAX(a,x[j+r]);
+          x[j + p] = a;
+        }
+        i += 2 * p;
+      }
+      /* now i + p > n - q */
+      j = i;
+      while (j < n - q) {
+        int32 a = x[j + p];
+        for (r = q;r > p;r >>= 1)
+          int32_MINMAX(a,x[j+r]);
+        x[j + p] = a;
+        ++j;
+      }
+
+      done: ;
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_sort/uint32/useint32/sort.c */
+
+/* can save time by vectorizing xor loops */
+/* can save time by integrating xor loops with int32_sort */
+
+static void crypto_sort_uint32(void *array,long long n)
+{
+  crypto_uint32 *x = array;
+  long long j;
+  for (j = 0;j < n;++j) x[j] ^= 0x80000000;
+  crypto_sort_int32(array,n);
+  for (j = 0;j < n;++j) x[j] ^= 0x80000000;
+}
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/uint32.c */
+
+/*
+CPU division instruction typically takes time depending on x.
+This software is designed to take time independent of x.
+Time still varies depending on m; user must ensure that m is constant.
+Time also varies on CPUs where multiplication is variable-time.
+There could be more CPU issues.
+There could also be compiler issues.
+*/
+
+static void uint32_divmod_uint14(uint32 *q,uint16 *r,uint32 x,uint16 m)
+{
+  uint32 v = 0x80000000;
+  uint32 qpart;
+  uint32 mask;
+
+  v /= m;
+
+  /* caller guarantees m > 0 */
+  /* caller guarantees m < 16384 */
+  /* vm <= 2^31 <= vm+m-1 */
+  /* xvm <= 2^31 x <= xvm+x(m-1) */
+
+  *q = 0;
+
+  qpart = (x*(uint64)v)>>31;
+  /* 2^31 qpart <= xv <= 2^31 qpart + 2^31-1 */
+  /* 2^31 qpart m <= xvm <= 2^31 qpart m + (2^31-1)m */
+  /* 2^31 qpart m <= 2^31 x <= 2^31 qpart m + (2^31-1)m + x(m-1) */
+  /* 0 <= 2^31 newx <= (2^31-1)m + x(m-1) */
+  /* 0 <= newx <= (1-1/2^31)m + x(m-1)/2^31 */
+  /* 0 <= newx <= (1-1/2^31)(2^14-1) + (2^32-1)((2^14-1)-1)/2^31 */
+
+  x -= qpart*m; *q += qpart;
+  /* x <= 49146 */
+
+  qpart = (x*(uint64)v)>>31;
+  /* 0 <= newx <= (1-1/2^31)m + x(m-1)/2^31 */
+  /* 0 <= newx <= m + 49146(2^14-1)/2^31 */
+  /* 0 <= newx <= m + 0.4 */
+  /* 0 <= newx <= m */
+
+  x -= qpart*m; *q += qpart;
+  /* x <= m */
+
+  x -= m; *q += 1;
+  mask = -(x>>31);
+  x += mask&(uint32)m; *q += mask;
+  /* x < m */
+
+  *r = x;
+}
+
+
+static uint16 uint32_mod_uint14(uint32 x,uint16 m)
+{
+  uint32 q;
+  uint16 r;
+  uint32_divmod_uint14(&q,&r,x,m);
+  return r;
+}
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/int32.c */
+
+static void int32_divmod_uint14(int32 *q,uint16 *r,int32 x,uint16 m)
+{
+  uint32 uq,uq2;
+  uint16 ur,ur2;
+  uint32 mask;
+
+  uint32_divmod_uint14(&uq,&ur,0x80000000+(uint32)x,m);
+  uint32_divmod_uint14(&uq2,&ur2,0x80000000,m);
+  ur -= ur2; uq -= uq2;
+  mask = -(uint32)(ur>>15);
+  ur += mask&m; uq += mask;
+  *r = ur; *q = uq;
+}
+
+
+static uint16 int32_mod_uint14(int32 x,uint16 m)
+{
+  int32 q;
+  uint16 r;
+  int32_divmod_uint14(&q,&r,x,m);
+  return r;
+}
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/paramsmenu.h */
+/* pick one of these three: */
+#define SIZE761
+#undef SIZE653
+#undef SIZE857
+
+/* pick one of these two: */
+#define SNTRUP /* Streamlined NTRU Prime */
+#undef LPR /* NTRU LPRime */
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/params.h */
+#ifndef params_H
+#define params_H
+
+/* menu of parameter choices: */
+
+
+/* what the menu means: */
+
+#if defined(SIZE761)
+#define p 761
+#define q 4591
+#define Rounded_bytes 1007
+#ifndef LPR
+#define Rq_bytes 1158
+#define w 286
+#else
+#define w 250
+#define tau0 2156
+#define tau1 114
+#define tau2 2007
+#define tau3 287
+#endif
+
+#elif defined(SIZE653)
+#define p 653
+#define q 4621
+#define Rounded_bytes 865
+#ifndef LPR
+#define Rq_bytes 994
+#define w 288
+#else
+#define w 252
+#define tau0 2175
+#define tau1 113
+#define tau2 2031
+#define tau3 290
+#endif
+
+#elif defined(SIZE857)
+#define p 857
+#define q 5167
+#define Rounded_bytes 1152
+#ifndef LPR
+#define Rq_bytes 1322
+#define w 322
+#else
+#define w 281
+#define tau0 2433
+#define tau1 101
+#define tau2 2265
+#define tau3 324
+#endif
+
+#else
+#error "no parameter set defined"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef LPR
+#define I 256
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/Decode.h */
+#ifndef Decode_H
+#define Decode_H
+
+
+/* Decode(R,s,M,len) */
+/* assumes 0 < M[i] < 16384 */
+/* produces 0 <= R[i] < M[i] */
+
+#endif
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/Decode.c */
+
+static void Decode(uint16 *out,const unsigned char *S,const uint16 *M,long long len)
+{
+  if (len == 1) {
+    if (M[0] == 1)
+      *out = 0;
+    else if (M[0] <= 256)
+      *out = uint32_mod_uint14(S[0],M[0]);
+    else
+      *out = uint32_mod_uint14(S[0]+(((uint16)S[1])<<8),M[0]);
+  }
+  if (len > 1) {
+    uint16 R2[(len+1)/2];
+    uint16 M2[(len+1)/2];
+    uint16 bottomr[len/2];
+    uint32 bottomt[len/2];
+    long long i;
+    for (i = 0;i < len-1;i += 2) {
+      uint32 m = M[i]*(uint32) M[i+1];
+      if (m > 256*16383) {
+        bottomt[i/2] = 256*256;
+        bottomr[i/2] = S[0]+256*S[1];
+        S += 2;
+        M2[i/2] = (((m+255)>>8)+255)>>8;
+      } else if (m >= 16384) {
+        bottomt[i/2] = 256;
+        bottomr[i/2] = S[0];
+        S += 1;
+        M2[i/2] = (m+255)>>8;
+      } else {
+        bottomt[i/2] = 1;
+        bottomr[i/2] = 0;
+        M2[i/2] = m;
+      }
+    }
+    if (i < len)
+      M2[i/2] = M[i];
+    Decode(R2,S,M2,(len+1)/2);
+    for (i = 0;i < len-1;i += 2) {
+      uint32 r = bottomr[i/2];
+      uint32 r1;
+      uint16 r0;
+      r += bottomt[i/2]*R2[i/2];
+      uint32_divmod_uint14(&r1,&r0,r,M[i]);
+      r1 = uint32_mod_uint14(r1,M[i+1]); /* only needed for invalid inputs */
+      *out++ = r0;
+      *out++ = r1;
+    }
+    if (i < len)
+      *out++ = R2[i/2];
+  }
+}
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/Encode.h */
+#ifndef Encode_H
+#define Encode_H
+
+
+/* Encode(s,R,M,len) */
+/* assumes 0 <= R[i] < M[i] < 16384 */
+
+#endif
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/Encode.c */
+
+/* 0 <= R[i] < M[i] < 16384 */
+static void Encode(unsigned char *out,const uint16 *R,const uint16 *M,long long len)
+{
+  if (len == 1) {
+    uint16 r = R[0];
+    uint16 m = M[0];
+    while (m > 1) {
+      *out++ = r;
+      r >>= 8;
+      m = (m+255)>>8;
+    }
+  }
+  if (len > 1) {
+    uint16 R2[(len+1)/2];
+    uint16 M2[(len+1)/2];
+    long long i;
+    for (i = 0;i < len-1;i += 2) {
+      uint32 m0 = M[i];
+      uint32 r = R[i]+R[i+1]*m0;
+      uint32 m = M[i+1]*m0;
+      while (m >= 16384) {
+        *out++ = r;
+        r >>= 8;
+        m = (m+255)>>8;
+      }
+      R2[i/2] = r;
+      M2[i/2] = m;
+    }
+    if (i < len) {
+      R2[i/2] = R[i];
+      M2[i/2] = M[i];
+    }
+    Encode(out,R2,M2,(len+1)/2);
+  }
+}
+
+/* from supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/kem.c */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+#endif
+
+
+/* ----- masks */
+
+#ifndef LPR
+
+/* return -1 if x!=0; else return 0 */
+static int int16_nonzero_mask(int16 x)
+{
+  uint16 u = x; /* 0, else 1...65535 */
+  uint32 v = u; /* 0, else 1...65535 */
+  v = -v; /* 0, else 2^32-65535...2^32-1 */
+  v >>= 31; /* 0, else 1 */
+  return -v; /* 0, else -1 */
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* return -1 if x<0; otherwise return 0 */
+static int int16_negative_mask(int16 x)
+{
+  uint16 u = x;
+  u >>= 15;
+  return -(int) u;
+  /* alternative with gcc -fwrapv: */
+  /* x>>15 compiles to CPU's arithmetic right shift */
+}
+
+/* ----- arithmetic mod 3 */
+
+typedef int8 small;
+
+/* F3 is always represented as -1,0,1 */
+/* so ZZ_fromF3 is a no-op */
+
+/* x must not be close to top int16 */
+static small F3_freeze(int16 x)
+{
+  return int32_mod_uint14(x+1,3)-1;
+}
+
+/* ----- arithmetic mod q */
+
+#define q12 ((q-1)/2)
+typedef int16 Fq;
+/* always represented as -q12...q12 */
+/* so ZZ_fromFq is a no-op */
+
+/* x must not be close to top int32 */
+static Fq Fq_freeze(int32 x)
+{
+  return int32_mod_uint14(x+q12,q)-q12;
+}
+
+#ifndef LPR
+
+static Fq Fq_recip(Fq a1)
+{
+  int i = 1;
+  Fq ai = a1;
+
+  while (i < q-2) {
+    ai = Fq_freeze(a1*(int32)ai);
+    i += 1;
+  }
+  return ai;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- Top and Right */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+#define tau 16
+
+static int8 Top(Fq C)
+{
+  return (tau1*(int32)(C+tau0)+16384)>>15;
+}
+
+static Fq Right(int8 T)
+{
+  return Fq_freeze(tau3*(int32)T-tau2);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ----- small polynomials */
+
+#ifndef LPR
+
+/* 0 if Weightw_is(r), else -1 */
+static int Weightw_mask(small *r)
+{
+  int weight = 0;
+  int i;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) weight += r[i]&1;
+  return int16_nonzero_mask(weight-w);
+}
+
+/* R3_fromR(R_fromRq(r)) */
+static void R3_fromRq(small *out,const Fq *r)
+{
+  int i;
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) out[i] = F3_freeze(r[i]);
+}
+
+/* h = f*g in the ring R3 */
+static void R3_mult(small *h,const small *f,const small *g)
+{
+  small fg[p+p-1];
+  small result;
+  int i,j;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) {
+    result = 0;
+    for (j = 0;j <= i;++j) result = F3_freeze(result+f[j]*g[i-j]);
+    fg[i] = result;
+  }
+  for (i = p;i < p+p-1;++i) {
+    result = 0;
+    for (j = i-p+1;j < p;++j) result = F3_freeze(result+f[j]*g[i-j]);
+    fg[i] = result;
+  }
+
+  for (i = p+p-2;i >= p;--i) {
+    fg[i-p] = F3_freeze(fg[i-p]+fg[i]);
+    fg[i-p+1] = F3_freeze(fg[i-p+1]+fg[i]);
+  }
+
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) h[i] = fg[i];
+}
+
+/* returns 0 if recip succeeded; else -1 */
+static int R3_recip(small *out,const small *in)
+{
+  small f[p+1],g[p+1],v[p+1],r[p+1];
+  int i,loop,delta;
+  int sign,swap,t;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) v[i] = 0;
+  for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) r[i] = 0;
+  r[0] = 1;
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) f[i] = 0;
+  f[0] = 1; f[p-1] = f[p] = -1;
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) g[p-1-i] = in[i];
+  g[p] = 0;
+
+  delta = 1;
+
+  for (loop = 0;loop < 2*p-1;++loop) {
+    for (i = p;i > 0;--i) v[i] = v[i-1];
+    v[0] = 0;
+
+    sign = -g[0]*f[0];
+    swap = int16_negative_mask(-delta) & int16_nonzero_mask(g[0]);
+    delta ^= swap&(delta^-delta);
+    delta += 1;
+
+    for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) {
+      t = swap&(f[i]^g[i]); f[i] ^= t; g[i] ^= t;
+      t = swap&(v[i]^r[i]); v[i] ^= t; r[i] ^= t;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) g[i] = F3_freeze(g[i]+sign*f[i]);
+    for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) r[i] = F3_freeze(r[i]+sign*v[i]);
+
+    for (i = 0;i < p;++i) g[i] = g[i+1];
+    g[p] = 0;
+  }
+
+  sign = f[0];
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) out[i] = sign*v[p-1-i];
+
+  return int16_nonzero_mask(delta);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- polynomials mod q */
+
+/* h = f*g in the ring Rq */
+static void Rq_mult_small(Fq *h,const Fq *f,const small *g)
+{
+  Fq fg[p+p-1];
+  Fq result;
+  int i,j;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) {
+    result = 0;
+    for (j = 0;j <= i;++j) result = Fq_freeze(result+f[j]*(int32)g[i-j]);
+    fg[i] = result;
+  }
+  for (i = p;i < p+p-1;++i) {
+    result = 0;
+    for (j = i-p+1;j < p;++j) result = Fq_freeze(result+f[j]*(int32)g[i-j]);
+    fg[i] = result;
+  }
+
+  for (i = p+p-2;i >= p;--i) {
+    fg[i-p] = Fq_freeze(fg[i-p]+fg[i]);
+    fg[i-p+1] = Fq_freeze(fg[i-p+1]+fg[i]);
+  }
+
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) h[i] = fg[i];
+}
+
+#ifndef LPR
+
+/* h = 3f in Rq */
+static void Rq_mult3(Fq *h,const Fq *f)
+{
+  int i;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) h[i] = Fq_freeze(3*f[i]);
+}
+
+/* out = 1/(3*in) in Rq */
+/* returns 0 if recip succeeded; else -1 */
+static int Rq_recip3(Fq *out,const small *in)
+{
+  Fq f[p+1],g[p+1],v[p+1],r[p+1];
+  int i,loop,delta;
+  int swap,t;
+  int32 f0,g0;
+  Fq scale;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) v[i] = 0;
+  for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) r[i] = 0;
+  r[0] = Fq_recip(3);
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) f[i] = 0;
+  f[0] = 1; f[p-1] = f[p] = -1;
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) g[p-1-i] = in[i];
+  g[p] = 0;
+
+  delta = 1;
+
+  for (loop = 0;loop < 2*p-1;++loop) {
+    for (i = p;i > 0;--i) v[i] = v[i-1];
+    v[0] = 0;
+
+    swap = int16_negative_mask(-delta) & int16_nonzero_mask(g[0]);
+    delta ^= swap&(delta^-delta);
+    delta += 1;
+
+    for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) {
+      t = swap&(f[i]^g[i]); f[i] ^= t; g[i] ^= t;
+      t = swap&(v[i]^r[i]); v[i] ^= t; r[i] ^= t;
+    }
+
+    f0 = f[0];
+    g0 = g[0];
+    for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) g[i] = Fq_freeze(f0*g[i]-g0*f[i]);
+    for (i = 0;i < p+1;++i) r[i] = Fq_freeze(f0*r[i]-g0*v[i]);
+
+    for (i = 0;i < p;++i) g[i] = g[i+1];
+    g[p] = 0;
+  }
+
+  scale = Fq_recip(f[0]);
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) out[i] = Fq_freeze(scale*(int32)v[p-1-i]);
+
+  return int16_nonzero_mask(delta);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- rounded polynomials mod q */
+
+static void Round(Fq *out,const Fq *a)
+{
+  int i;
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) out[i] = a[i]-F3_freeze(a[i]);
+}
+
+/* ----- sorting to generate short polynomial */
+
+static void Short_fromlist(small *out,const uint32 *in)
+{
+  uint32 L[p];
+  int i;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < w;++i) L[i] = in[i]&(uint32)-2;
+  for (i = w;i < p;++i) L[i] = (in[i]&(uint32)-3)|1;
+  crypto_sort_uint32(L,p);
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) out[i] = (L[i]&3)-1;
+}
+
+/* ----- underlying hash function */
+
+#define Hash_bytes 32
+
+/* e.g., b = 0 means out = Hash0(in) */
+static void Hash_prefix(unsigned char *out,int b,const unsigned char *in,int inlen)
+{
+  unsigned char x[inlen+1];
+  unsigned char h[64];
+  int i;
+
+  x[0] = b;
+  for (i = 0;i < inlen;++i) x[i+1] = in[i];
+  crypto_hash_sha512(h,x,inlen+1);
+  for (i = 0;i < 32;++i) out[i] = h[i];
+}
+
+/* ----- higher-level randomness */
+
+static uint32 urandom32(void)
+{
+  unsigned char c[4];
+  uint32 out[4];
+
+  randombytes(c,4);
+  out[0] = (uint32)c[0];
+  out[1] = ((uint32)c[1])<<8;
+  out[2] = ((uint32)c[2])<<16;
+  out[3] = ((uint32)c[3])<<24;
+  return out[0]+out[1]+out[2]+out[3];
+}
+
+static void Short_random(small *out)
+{
+  uint32 L[p];
+  int i;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) L[i] = urandom32();
+  Short_fromlist(out,L);
+}
+
+#ifndef LPR
+
+static void Small_random(small *out)
+{
+  int i;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) out[i] = (((urandom32()&0x3fffffff)*3)>>30)-1;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- Streamlined NTRU Prime Core */
+
+#ifndef LPR
+
+/* h,(f,ginv) = KeyGen() */
+static void KeyGen(Fq *h,small *f,small *ginv)
+{
+  small g[p];
+  Fq finv[p];
+
+  for (;;) {
+    Small_random(g);
+    if (R3_recip(ginv,g) == 0) break;
+  }
+  Short_random(f);
+  Rq_recip3(finv,f); /* always works */
+  Rq_mult_small(h,finv,g);
+}
+
+/* c = Encrypt(r,h) */
+static void Encrypt(Fq *c,const small *r,const Fq *h)
+{
+  Fq hr[p];
+
+  Rq_mult_small(hr,h,r);
+  Round(c,hr);
+}
+
+/* r = Decrypt(c,(f,ginv)) */
+static void Decrypt(small *r,const Fq *c,const small *f,const small *ginv)
+{
+  Fq cf[p];
+  Fq cf3[p];
+  small e[p];
+  small ev[p];
+  int mask;
+  int i;
+
+  Rq_mult_small(cf,c,f);
+  Rq_mult3(cf3,cf);
+  R3_fromRq(e,cf3);
+  R3_mult(ev,e,ginv);
+
+  mask = Weightw_mask(ev); /* 0 if weight w, else -1 */
+  for (i = 0;i < w;++i) r[i] = ((ev[i]^1)&~mask)^1;
+  for (i = w;i < p;++i) r[i] = ev[i]&~mask;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- NTRU LPRime Core */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+
+/* (G,A),a = KeyGen(G); leaves G unchanged */
+static void KeyGen(Fq *A,small *a,const Fq *G)
+{
+  Fq aG[p];
+
+  Short_random(a);
+  Rq_mult_small(aG,G,a);
+  Round(A,aG);
+}
+
+/* B,T = Encrypt(r,(G,A),b) */
+static void Encrypt(Fq *B,int8 *T,const int8 *r,const Fq *G,const Fq *A,const small *b)
+{
+  Fq bG[p];
+  Fq bA[p];
+  int i;
+
+  Rq_mult_small(bG,G,b);
+  Round(B,bG);
+  Rq_mult_small(bA,A,b);
+  for (i = 0;i < I;++i) T[i] = Top(Fq_freeze(bA[i]+r[i]*q12));
+}
+
+/* r = Decrypt((B,T),a) */
+static void Decrypt(int8 *r,const Fq *B,const int8 *T,const small *a)
+{
+  Fq aB[p];
+  int i;
+
+  Rq_mult_small(aB,B,a);
+  for (i = 0;i < I;++i)
+    r[i] = -int16_negative_mask(Fq_freeze(Right(T[i])-aB[i]+4*w+1));
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- encoding I-bit inputs */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+
+#define Inputs_bytes (I/8)
+typedef int8 Inputs[I]; /* passed by reference */
+
+static void Inputs_encode(unsigned char *s,const Inputs r)
+{
+  int i;
+  for (i = 0;i < Inputs_bytes;++i) s[i] = 0;
+  for (i = 0;i < I;++i) s[i>>3] |= r[i]<<(i&7);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- Expand */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+
+static const unsigned char aes_nonce[16] = {0};
+
+static void Expand(uint32 *L,const unsigned char *k)
+{
+  int i;
+  crypto_stream_aes256ctr((unsigned char *) L,4*p,aes_nonce,k);
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) {
+    uint32 L0 = ((unsigned char *) L)[4*i];
+    uint32 L1 = ((unsigned char *) L)[4*i+1];
+    uint32 L2 = ((unsigned char *) L)[4*i+2];
+    uint32 L3 = ((unsigned char *) L)[4*i+3];
+    L[i] = L0+(L1<<8)+(L2<<16)+(L3<<24);
+  }
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- Seeds */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+
+#define Seeds_bytes 32
+
+static void Seeds_random(unsigned char *s)
+{
+  randombytes(s,Seeds_bytes);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- Generator, HashShort */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+
+/* G = Generator(k) */
+static void Generator(Fq *G,const unsigned char *k)
+{
+  uint32 L[p];
+  int i;
+
+  Expand(L,k);
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) G[i] = uint32_mod_uint14(L[i],q)-q12;
+}
+
+/* out = HashShort(r) */
+static void HashShort(small *out,const Inputs r)
+{
+  unsigned char s[Inputs_bytes];
+  unsigned char h[Hash_bytes];
+  uint32 L[p];
+
+  Inputs_encode(s,r);
+  Hash_prefix(h,5,s,sizeof s);
+  Expand(L,h);
+  Short_fromlist(out,L);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- NTRU LPRime Expand */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+
+/* (S,A),a = XKeyGen() */
+static void XKeyGen(unsigned char *S,Fq *A,small *a)
+{
+  Fq G[p];
+
+  Seeds_random(S);
+  Generator(G,S);
+  KeyGen(A,a,G);
+}
+
+/* B,T = XEncrypt(r,(S,A)) */
+static void XEncrypt(Fq *B,int8 *T,const int8 *r,const unsigned char *S,const Fq *A)
+{
+  Fq G[p];
+  small b[p];
+
+  Generator(G,S);
+  HashShort(b,r);
+  Encrypt(B,T,r,G,A,b);
+}
+
+#define XDecrypt Decrypt
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- encoding small polynomials (including short polynomials) */
+
+#define Small_bytes ((p+3)/4)
+
+/* these are the only functions that rely on p mod 4 = 1 */
+
+static void Small_encode(unsigned char *s,const small *f)
+{
+  small x;
+  int i;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < p/4;++i) {
+    x = *f++ + 1;
+    x += (*f++ + 1)<<2;
+    x += (*f++ + 1)<<4;
+    x += (*f++ + 1)<<6;
+    *s++ = x;
+  }
+  x = *f++ + 1;
+  *s++ = x;
+}
+
+static void Small_decode(small *f,const unsigned char *s)
+{
+  unsigned char x;
+  int i;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < p/4;++i) {
+    x = *s++;
+    *f++ = ((small)(x&3))-1; x >>= 2;
+    *f++ = ((small)(x&3))-1; x >>= 2;
+    *f++ = ((small)(x&3))-1; x >>= 2;
+    *f++ = ((small)(x&3))-1;
+  }
+  x = *s++;
+  *f++ = ((small)(x&3))-1;
+}
+
+/* ----- encoding general polynomials */
+
+#ifndef LPR
+
+static void Rq_encode(unsigned char *s,const Fq *r)
+{
+  uint16 R[p],M[p];
+  int i;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) R[i] = r[i]+q12;
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) M[i] = q;
+  Encode(s,R,M,p);
+}
+
+static void Rq_decode(Fq *r,const unsigned char *s)
+{
+  uint16 R[p],M[p];
+  int i;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) M[i] = q;
+  Decode(R,s,M,p);
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) r[i] = ((Fq)R[i])-q12;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- encoding rounded polynomials */
+
+static void Rounded_encode(unsigned char *s,const Fq *r)
+{
+  uint16 R[p],M[p];
+  int i;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) R[i] = ((r[i]+q12)*10923)>>15;
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) M[i] = (q+2)/3;
+  Encode(s,R,M,p);
+}
+
+static void Rounded_decode(Fq *r,const unsigned char *s)
+{
+  uint16 R[p],M[p];
+  int i;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) M[i] = (q+2)/3;
+  Decode(R,s,M,p);
+  for (i = 0;i < p;++i) r[i] = R[i]*3-q12;
+}
+
+/* ----- encoding top polynomials */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+
+#define Top_bytes (I/2)
+
+static void Top_encode(unsigned char *s,const int8 *T)
+{
+  int i;
+  for (i = 0;i < Top_bytes;++i)
+    s[i] = T[2*i]+(T[2*i+1]<<4);
+}
+
+static void Top_decode(int8 *T,const unsigned char *s)
+{
+  int i;
+  for (i = 0;i < Top_bytes;++i) {
+    T[2*i] = s[i]&15;
+    T[2*i+1] = s[i]>>4;
+  }
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- Streamlined NTRU Prime Core plus encoding */
+
+#ifndef LPR
+
+typedef small Inputs[p]; /* passed by reference */
+#define Inputs_random Short_random
+#define Inputs_encode Small_encode
+#define Inputs_bytes Small_bytes
+
+#define Ciphertexts_bytes Rounded_bytes
+#define SecretKeys_bytes (2*Small_bytes)
+#define PublicKeys_bytes Rq_bytes
+
+/* pk,sk = ZKeyGen() */
+static void ZKeyGen(unsigned char *pk,unsigned char *sk)
+{
+  Fq h[p];
+  small f[p],v[p];
+
+  KeyGen(h,f,v);
+  Rq_encode(pk,h);
+  Small_encode(sk,f); sk += Small_bytes;
+  Small_encode(sk,v);
+}
+
+/* C = ZEncrypt(r,pk) */
+static void ZEncrypt(unsigned char *C,const Inputs r,const unsigned char *pk)
+{
+  Fq h[p];
+  Fq c[p];
+  Rq_decode(h,pk);
+  Encrypt(c,r,h);
+  Rounded_encode(C,c);
+}
+
+/* r = ZDecrypt(C,sk) */
+static void ZDecrypt(Inputs r,const unsigned char *C,const unsigned char *sk)
+{
+  small f[p],v[p];
+  Fq c[p];
+
+  Small_decode(f,sk); sk += Small_bytes;
+  Small_decode(v,sk);
+  Rounded_decode(c,C);
+  Decrypt(r,c,f,v);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- NTRU LPRime Expand plus encoding */
+
+#ifdef LPR
+
+#define Ciphertexts_bytes (Rounded_bytes+Top_bytes)
+#define SecretKeys_bytes Small_bytes
+#define PublicKeys_bytes (Seeds_bytes+Rounded_bytes)
+
+static void Inputs_random(Inputs r)
+{
+  unsigned char s[Inputs_bytes];
+  int i;
+
+  randombytes(s,sizeof s);
+  for (i = 0;i < I;++i) r[i] = 1&(s[i>>3]>>(i&7));
+}
+
+/* pk,sk = ZKeyGen() */
+static void ZKeyGen(unsigned char *pk,unsigned char *sk)
+{
+  Fq A[p];
+  small a[p];
+
+  XKeyGen(pk,A,a); pk += Seeds_bytes;
+  Rounded_encode(pk,A);
+  Small_encode(sk,a);
+}
+
+/* c = ZEncrypt(r,pk) */
+static void ZEncrypt(unsigned char *c,const Inputs r,const unsigned char *pk)
+{
+  Fq A[p];
+  Fq B[p];
+  int8 T[I];
+
+  Rounded_decode(A,pk+Seeds_bytes);
+  XEncrypt(B,T,r,pk,A);
+  Rounded_encode(c,B); c += Rounded_bytes;
+  Top_encode(c,T);
+}
+
+/* r = ZDecrypt(C,sk) */
+static void ZDecrypt(Inputs r,const unsigned char *c,const unsigned char *sk)
+{
+  small a[p];
+  Fq B[p];
+  int8 T[I];
+
+  Small_decode(a,sk);
+  Rounded_decode(B,c);
+  Top_decode(T,c+Rounded_bytes);
+  XDecrypt(r,B,T,a);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* ----- confirmation hash */
+
+#define Confirm_bytes 32
+
+/* h = HashConfirm(r,pk,cache); cache is Hash4(pk) */
+static void HashConfirm(unsigned char *h,const unsigned char *r,const unsigned char *pk,const unsigned char *cache)
+{
+#ifndef LPR
+  unsigned char x[Hash_bytes*2];
+  int i;
+
+  Hash_prefix(x,3,r,Inputs_bytes);
+  for (i = 0;i < Hash_bytes;++i) x[Hash_bytes+i] = cache[i];
+#else
+  unsigned char x[Inputs_bytes+Hash_bytes];
+  int i;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < Inputs_bytes;++i) x[i] = r[i];
+  for (i = 0;i < Hash_bytes;++i) x[Inputs_bytes+i] = cache[i];
+#endif
+  Hash_prefix(h,2,x,sizeof x);
+}
+
+/* ----- session-key hash */
+
+/* k = HashSession(b,y,z) */
+static void HashSession(unsigned char *k,int b,const unsigned char *y,const unsigned char *z)
+{
+#ifndef LPR
+  unsigned char x[Hash_bytes+Ciphertexts_bytes+Confirm_bytes];
+  int i;
+
+  Hash_prefix(x,3,y,Inputs_bytes);
+  for (i = 0;i < Ciphertexts_bytes+Confirm_bytes;++i) x[Hash_bytes+i] = z[i];
+#else
+  unsigned char x[Inputs_bytes+Ciphertexts_bytes+Confirm_bytes];
+  int i;
+
+  for (i = 0;i < Inputs_bytes;++i) x[i] = y[i];
+  for (i = 0;i < Ciphertexts_bytes+Confirm_bytes;++i) x[Inputs_bytes+i] = z[i];
+#endif
+  Hash_prefix(k,b,x,sizeof x);
+}
+
+/* ----- Streamlined NTRU Prime and NTRU LPRime */
+
+/* pk,sk = KEM_KeyGen() */
+static void KEM_KeyGen(unsigned char *pk,unsigned char *sk)
+{
+  int i;
+
+  ZKeyGen(pk,sk); sk += SecretKeys_bytes;
+  for (i = 0;i < PublicKeys_bytes;++i) *sk++ = pk[i];
+  randombytes(sk,Inputs_bytes); sk += Inputs_bytes;
+  Hash_prefix(sk,4,pk,PublicKeys_bytes);
+}
+
+/* c,r_enc = Hide(r,pk,cache); cache is Hash4(pk) */
+static void Hide(unsigned char *c,unsigned char *r_enc,const Inputs r,const unsigned char *pk,const unsigned char *cache)
+{
+  Inputs_encode(r_enc,r);
+  ZEncrypt(c,r,pk); c += Ciphertexts_bytes;
+  HashConfirm(c,r_enc,pk,cache);
+}
+
+/* c,k = Encap(pk) */
+static void Encap(unsigned char *c,unsigned char *k,const unsigned char *pk)
+{
+  Inputs r;
+  unsigned char r_enc[Inputs_bytes];
+  unsigned char cache[Hash_bytes];
+
+  Hash_prefix(cache,4,pk,PublicKeys_bytes);
+  Inputs_random(r);
+  Hide(c,r_enc,r,pk,cache);
+  HashSession(k,1,r_enc,c);
+}
+
+/* 0 if matching ciphertext+confirm, else -1 */
+static int Ciphertexts_diff_mask(const unsigned char *c,const unsigned char *c2)
+{
+  uint16 differentbits = 0;
+  int len = Ciphertexts_bytes+Confirm_bytes;
+
+  while (len-- > 0) differentbits |= (*c++)^(*c2++);
+  return (1&((differentbits-1)>>8))-1;
+}
+
+/* k = Decap(c,sk) */
+static void Decap(unsigned char *k,const unsigned char *c,const unsigned char *sk)
+{
+  const unsigned char *pk = sk + SecretKeys_bytes;
+  const unsigned char *rho = pk + PublicKeys_bytes;
+  const unsigned char *cache = rho + Inputs_bytes;
+  Inputs r;
+  unsigned char r_enc[Inputs_bytes];
+  unsigned char cnew[Ciphertexts_bytes+Confirm_bytes];
+  int mask;
+  int i;
+
+  ZDecrypt(r,c,sk);
+  Hide(cnew,r_enc,r,pk,cache);
+  mask = Ciphertexts_diff_mask(c,cnew);
+  for (i = 0;i < Inputs_bytes;++i) r_enc[i] ^= mask&(r_enc[i]^rho[i]);
+  HashSession(k,1+mask,r_enc,c);
+}
+
+/* ----- crypto_kem API */
+
+
+int crypto_kem_sntrup761_keypair(unsigned char *pk,unsigned char *sk)
+{
+  KEM_KeyGen(pk,sk);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int crypto_kem_sntrup761_enc(unsigned char *c,unsigned char *k,const unsigned char *pk)
+{
+  Encap(c,k,pk);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int crypto_kem_sntrup761_dec(unsigned char *k,const unsigned char *c,const unsigned char *sk)
+{
+  Decap(k,c,sk);
+  return 0;
+}
+#endif /* USE_SNTRUP761X25519 */
diff --git a/sntrup761.sh b/sntrup761.sh
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db4e9ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sntrup761.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#       $OpenBSD: sntrup761.sh,v 1.7 2023/01/11 02:13:52 djm Exp $
+#       Placed in the Public Domain.
+#
+AUTHOR="supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/implementors"
+FILES="
+	supercop-20201130/crypto_sort/int32/portable4/int32_minmax.inc
+	supercop-20201130/crypto_sort/int32/portable4/sort.c
+	supercop-20201130/crypto_sort/uint32/useint32/sort.c
+	supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/uint32.c
+	supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/int32.c
+	supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/paramsmenu.h
+	supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/params.h
+	supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/Decode.h
+	supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/Decode.c
+	supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/Encode.h
+	supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/Encode.c
+	supercop-20201130/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/kem.c
+"
+###
+
+set -e
+cd $1
+echo -n '/*  $'
+echo 'OpenBSD: $ */'
+echo
+echo '/*'
+echo ' * Public Domain, Authors:'
+sed -e '/Alphabetical order:/d' -e 's/^/ * - /' < $AUTHOR
+echo ' */'
+echo
+echo '#include <string.h>'
+echo '#include "crypto_api.h"'
+echo
+# Map the types used in this code to the ones in crypto_api.h.  We use #define
+# instead of typedef since some systems have existing intXX types and do not
+# permit multiple typedefs even if they do not conflict.
+for t in int8 uint8 int16 uint16 int32 uint32 int64 uint64; do
+	echo "#define $t crypto_${t}"
+done
+echo
+for i in $FILES; do
+	echo "/* from $i */"
+	# Changes to all files:
+	#  - remove all includes, we inline everything required.
+	#  - make functions not required elsewhere static.
+	#  - rename the functions we do use.
+	#  - remove unnecessary defines and externs.
+	sed -e "/#include/d" \
+	    -e "s/crypto_kem_/crypto_kem_sntrup761_/g" \
+	    -e "s/^void /static void /g" \
+	    -e "s/^int16 /static int16 /g" \
+	    -e "s/^uint16 /static uint16 /g" \
+	    -e "/^extern /d" \
+	    -e '/CRYPTO_NAMESPACE/d' \
+	    -e "/^#define int32 crypto_int32/d" \
+	    -e 's/[	 ]*$//' \
+	    $i | \
+	case "$i" in
+	# Use int64_t for intermediate values in int32_MINMAX to prevent signed
+	# 32-bit integer overflow when called by crypto_sort_uint32.
+	*/int32_minmax.inc)
+	    sed -e "s/int32 ab = b ^ a/int64_t ab = (int64_t)b ^ (int64_t)a/" \
+	        -e "s/int32 c = b - a/int64_t c = (int64_t)b - (int64_t)a/"
+	    ;;
+	*/int32/portable4/sort.c)
+	    sed -e "s/void crypto_sort/void crypto_sort_int32/g"
+	    ;;
+	*/uint32/useint32/sort.c)
+	    sed -e "s/void crypto_sort/void crypto_sort_uint32/g"
+	    ;;
+	# Remove unused function to prevent warning.
+	*/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/int32.c)
+	    sed -e '/ int32_div_uint14/,/^}$/d'
+	    ;;
+	# Remove unused function to prevent warning.
+	*/crypto_kem/sntrup761/ref/uint32.c)
+	    sed -e '/ uint32_div_uint14/,/^}$/d'
+	    ;;
+	# Default: pass through.
+	*)
+	    cat
+	    ;;
+	esac
+	echo
+done
diff --git a/srclimit.c b/srclimit.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5014ed7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/srclimit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Darren Tucker <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "addr.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "srclimit.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+static int max_children, max_persource, ipv4_masklen, ipv6_masklen;
+
+/* Per connection state, used to enforce unauthenticated connection limit. */
+static struct child_info {
+	int id;
+	struct xaddr addr;
+} *child;
+
+void
+srclimit_init(int max, int persource, int ipv4len, int ipv6len)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	max_children = max;
+	ipv4_masklen = ipv4len;
+	ipv6_masklen = ipv6len;
+	max_persource = persource;
+	if (max_persource == INT_MAX)	/* no limit */
+		return;
+	debug("%s: max connections %d, per source %d, masks %d,%d", __func__,
+	    max, persource, ipv4len, ipv6len);
+	if (max <= 0)
+		fatal("%s: invalid number of sockets: %d", __func__, max);
+	child = xcalloc(max_children, sizeof(*child));
+	for (i = 0; i < max_children; i++)
+		child[i].id = -1;
+}
+
+/* returns 1 if connection allowed, 0 if not allowed. */
+int
+srclimit_check_allow(int sock, int id)
+{
+	struct xaddr xa, xb, xmask;
+	struct sockaddr_storage addr;
+	socklen_t addrlen = sizeof(addr);
+	struct sockaddr *sa = (struct sockaddr *)&addr;
+	int i, bits, first_unused, count = 0;
+	char xas[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+	if (max_persource == INT_MAX)	/* no limit */
+		return 1;
+
+	debug("%s: sock %d id %d limit %d", __func__, sock, id, max_persource);
+	if (getpeername(sock, sa, &addrlen) != 0)
+		return 1;	/* not remote socket? */
+	if (addr_sa_to_xaddr(sa, addrlen, &xa) != 0)
+		return 1;	/* unknown address family? */
+
+	/* Mask address off address to desired size. */
+	bits = xa.af == AF_INET ? ipv4_masklen : ipv6_masklen;
+	if (addr_netmask(xa.af, bits, &xmask) != 0 ||
+	    addr_and(&xb, &xa, &xmask) != 0) {
+		debug3("%s: invalid mask %d bits", __func__, bits);
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	first_unused = max_children;
+	/* Count matching entries and find first unused one. */
+	for (i = 0; i < max_children; i++) {
+		if (child[i].id == -1) {
+			if (i < first_unused)
+				first_unused = i;
+		} else if (addr_cmp(&child[i].addr, &xb) == 0) {
+			count++;
+		}
+	}
+	if (addr_ntop(&xa, xas, sizeof(xas)) != 0) {
+		debug3("%s: addr ntop failed", __func__);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	debug3("%s: new unauthenticated connection from %s/%d, at %d of %d",
+	    __func__, xas, bits, count, max_persource);
+
+	if (first_unused == max_children) { /* no free slot found */
+		debug3("%s: no free slot", __func__);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (first_unused < 0 || first_unused >= max_children)
+		fatal("%s: internal error: first_unused out of range",
+		    __func__);
+
+	if (count >= max_persource)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Connection allowed, store masked address. */
+	child[first_unused].id = id;
+	memcpy(&child[first_unused].addr, &xb, sizeof(xb));
+	return 1;
+}
+
+void
+srclimit_done(int id)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (max_persource == INT_MAX)	/* no limit */
+		return;
+
+	debug("%s: id %d", __func__, id);
+	/* Clear corresponding state entry. */
+	for (i = 0; i < max_children; i++) {
+		if (child[i].id == id) {
+			child[i].id = -1;
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+}
diff --git a/srclimit.h b/srclimit.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6e04f32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/srclimit.h
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2020 Darren Tucker <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+void	srclimit_init(int, int, int, int);
+int	srclimit_check_allow(int, int);
+void	srclimit_done(int);
diff --git a/ssh-add.0 b/ssh-add.0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac7d079
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-add.0
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+SSH-ADD(1)                  General Commands Manual                 SSH-ADD(1)
+
+NAME
+     ssh-add M-bM-^@M-^S adds private key identities to the OpenSSH authentication agent
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     ssh-add [-cDdKkLlqvXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-H hostkey_file]
+             [-h destination_constraint] [-S provider] [-t life] [file ...]
+     ssh-add -s pkcs11
+     ssh-add -e pkcs11
+     ssh-add -T pubkey ...
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     ssh-add adds private key identities to the authentication agent,
+     ssh-agent(1).  When run without arguments, it adds the files
+     ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519,
+     ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk, and ~/.ssh/id_dsa.  After loading a private key,
+     ssh-add will try to load corresponding certificate information from the
+     filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to the name of the private key
+     file.  Alternative file names can be given on the command line.
+
+     If any file requires a passphrase, ssh-add asks for the passphrase from
+     the user.  The passphrase is read from the user's tty.  ssh-add retries
+     the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given.
+
+     The authentication agent must be running and the SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+     environment variable must contain the name of its socket for ssh-add to
+     work.
+
+     The options are as follows:
+
+     -c      Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation
+             before being used for authentication.  Confirmation is performed
+             by ssh-askpass(1).  Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero
+             exit status from ssh-askpass(1), rather than text entered into
+             the requester.
+
+     -D      Deletes all identities from the agent.
+
+     -d      Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent.
+             If ssh-add has been run without arguments, the keys for the
+             default identities and their corresponding certificates will be
+             removed.  Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a
+             list of paths to public key files to specify keys and
+             certificates to be removed from the agent.  If no public key is
+             found at a given path, ssh-add will append .pub and retry.  If
+             the argument list consists of M-bM-^@M-^\-M-bM-^@M-^] then ssh-add will read public
+             keys to be removed from standard input.
+
+     -E fingerprint_hash
+             Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
+             fingerprints.  Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].  The
+             default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     -e pkcs11
+             Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11.
+
+     -H hostkey_file
+             Specifies a known hosts file to look up hostkeys when using
+             destination-constrained keys via the -h flag.  This option may be
+             specified multiple times to allow multiple files to be searched.
+             If no files are specified, ssh-add will use the default
+             ssh_config(5) known hosts files: ~/.ssh/known_hosts,
+             ~/.ssh/known_hosts2, /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts, and
+             /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2.
+
+     -h destination_constraint
+             When adding keys, constrain them to be usable only through
+             specific hosts or to specific destinations.
+
+             Destination constraints of the form M-bM-^@M-^X[user@]dest-hostnameM-bM-^@M-^Y permit
+             use of the key only from the origin host (the one running
+             ssh-agent(1)) to the listed destination host, with optional user
+             name.
+
+             Constraints of the form M-bM-^@M-^Xsrc-hostname>[user@]dst-hostnameM-bM-^@M-^Y allow
+             a key available on a forwarded ssh-agent(1) to be used through a
+             particular host (as specified by M-bM-^@M-^Xsrc-hostnameM-bM-^@M-^Y) to authenticate
+             to a further host, specified by M-bM-^@M-^Xdst-hostnameM-bM-^@M-^Y.
+
+             Multiple destination constraints may be added when loading keys.
+             When attempting authentication with a key that has destination
+             constraints, the whole connection path, including ssh-agent(1)
+             forwarding, is tested against those constraints and each hop must
+             be permitted for the attempt to succeed.  For example, if key is
+             forwarded to a remote host, M-bM-^@M-^Xhost-bM-bM-^@M-^Y, and is attempting
+             authentication to another host, M-bM-^@M-^Xhost-cM-bM-^@M-^Y, then the operation will
+             be successful only if M-bM-^@M-^Xhost-bM-bM-^@M-^Y was permitted from the origin host
+             and the subsequent M-bM-^@M-^Xhost-b>host-cM-bM-^@M-^Y hop is also permitted by
+             destination constraints.
+
+             Hosts are identified by their host keys, and are looked up from
+             known hosts files by ssh-add.  Wildcards patterns may be used for
+             hostnames and certificate host keys are supported.  By default,
+             keys added by ssh-add are not destination constrained.
+
+             Destination constraints were added in OpenSSH release 8.9.
+             Support in both the remote SSH client and server is required when
+             using destination-constrained keys over a forwarded ssh-agent(1)
+             channel.
+
+             It is also important to note that destination constraints can
+             only be enforced by ssh-agent(1) when a key is used, or when it
+             is forwarded by a cooperating ssh(1).  Specifically, it does not
+             prevent an attacker with access to a remote SSH_AUTH_SOCK from
+             forwarding it again and using it on a different host (but only to
+             a permitted destination).
+
+     -K      Load resident keys from a FIDO authenticator.
+
+     -k      When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process
+             plain private keys only and skip certificates.
+
+     -L      Lists public key parameters of all identities currently
+             represented by the agent.
+
+     -l      Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the
+             agent.
+
+     -q      Be quiet after a successful operation.
+
+     -S provider
+             Specifies a path to a library that will be used when adding FIDO
+             authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the
+             internal USB HID support.
+
+     -s pkcs11
+             Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11.
+
+     -T pubkey ...
+             Tests whether the private keys that correspond to the specified
+             pubkey files are usable by performing sign and verify operations
+             on each.
+
+     -t life
+             Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent.  The
+             lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format
+             specified in sshd_config(5).
+
+     -v      Verbose mode.  Causes ssh-add to print debugging messages about
+             its progress.  This is helpful in debugging problems.  Multiple
+             -v options increase the verbosity.  The maximum is 3.
+
+     -X      Unlock the agent.
+
+     -x      Lock the agent with a password.
+
+ENVIRONMENT
+     DISPLAY, SSH_ASKPASS and SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE
+             If ssh-add needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from
+             the current terminal if it was run from a terminal.  If ssh-add
+             does not have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and
+             SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by
+             SSH_ASKPASS (by default M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-askpassM-bM-^@M-^]) and open an X11 window to
+             read the passphrase.  This is particularly useful when calling
+             ssh-add from a .xsession or related script.
+
+             SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE allows further control over the use of an
+             askpass program.  If this variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\neverM-bM-^@M-^] then ssh-add
+             will never attempt to use one.  If it is set to M-bM-^@M-^\preferM-bM-^@M-^], then
+             ssh-add will prefer to use the askpass program instead of the TTY
+             when requesting passwords.  Finally, if the variable is set to
+             M-bM-^@M-^\forceM-bM-^@M-^], then the askpass program will be used for all passphrase
+             input regardless of whether DISPLAY is set.
+
+     SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+             Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
+             with the agent.
+
+     SSH_SK_PROVIDER
+             Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
+             FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+             the built-in USB HID support.
+
+FILES
+     ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
+     ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+     ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
+     ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+             Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
+             authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of
+             the user.
+
+     Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user.  Note that
+     ssh-add ignores identity files if they are accessible by others.
+
+EXIT STATUS
+     Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails, and 2 if
+     ssh-add is unable to contact the authentication agent.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-askpass(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
+
+AUTHORS
+     OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+     Tatu Ylonen.  Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+     de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+     created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+     versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 7.2                    February 4, 2022                    OpenBSD 7.2
diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4601f59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-add.1
@@ -0,0 +1,342 @@
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.84 2022/02/04 02:49:17 dtucker Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\"                    All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: February 4 2022 $
+.Dt SSH-ADD 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Nd adds private key identities to the OpenSSH authentication agent
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Op Fl cDdKkLlqvXx
+.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+.Op Fl H Ar hostkey_file
+.Op Fl h Ar destination_constraint
+.Op Fl S Ar provider
+.Op Fl t Ar life
+.Op Ar
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Fl s Ar pkcs11
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Fl e Ar pkcs11
+.Nm ssh-add
+.Fl T
+.Ar pubkey ...
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+adds private key identities to the authentication agent,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+When run without arguments, it adds the files
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk ,
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa .
+After loading a private key,
+.Nm
+will try to load corresponding certificate information from the
+filename obtained by appending
+.Pa -cert.pub
+to the name of the private key file.
+Alternative file names can be given on the command line.
+.Pp
+If any file requires a passphrase,
+.Nm
+asks for the passphrase from the user.
+The passphrase is read from the user's tty.
+.Nm
+retries the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given.
+.Pp
+The authentication agent must be running and the
+.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+environment variable must contain the name of its socket for
+.Nm
+to work.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl c
+Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation before
+being used for authentication.
+Confirmation is performed by
+.Xr ssh-askpass 1 .
+Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from
+.Xr ssh-askpass 1 ,
+rather than text entered into the requester.
+.It Fl D
+Deletes all identities from the agent.
+.It Fl d
+Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent.
+If
+.Nm
+has been run without arguments, the keys for the default identities and
+their corresponding certificates will be removed.
+Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a list of paths to
+public key files to specify keys and certificates to be removed from the agent.
+If no public key is found at a given path,
+.Nm
+will append
+.Pa .pub
+and retry.
+If the argument list consists of
+.Dq -
+then
+.Nm
+will read public keys to be removed from standard input.
+.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
+Valid options are:
+.Dq md5
+and
+.Dq sha256 .
+The default is
+.Dq sha256 .
+.It Fl e Ar pkcs11
+Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
+.Ar pkcs11 .
+.It Fl H Ar hostkey_file
+Specifies a known hosts file to look up hostkeys when using
+destination-constrained keys via the
+.Fl h
+flag.
+This option may be specified multiple times to allow multiple files to be
+searched.
+If no files are specified,
+.Nm
+will use the default
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+known hosts files:
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts2 ,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts ,
+and
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2 .
+.It Fl h Ar destination_constraint
+When adding keys, constrain them to be usable only through specific hosts or to
+specific destinations.
+.Pp
+Destination constraints of the form
+.Sq [user@]dest-hostname
+permit use of the key only from the origin host (the one running
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 )
+to the listed destination host, with optional user name.
+.Pp
+Constraints of the form
+.Sq src-hostname>[user@]dst-hostname
+allow a key available on a forwarded
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+to be used through a particular host (as specified by
+.Sq src-hostname )
+to authenticate to a further host,
+specified by
+.Sq dst-hostname .
+.Pp
+Multiple destination constraints may be added when loading keys.
+When attempting authentication with a key that has destination constraints,
+the whole connection path, including
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding, is tested against those constraints and each
+hop must be permitted for the attempt to succeed.
+For example, if key is forwarded to a remote host,
+.Sq host-b ,
+and is attempting authentication to another host,
+.Sq host-c ,
+then the operation will be successful only if
+.Sq host-b
+was permitted from the origin host and the subsequent
+.Sq host-b>host-c
+hop is also permitted by destination constraints.
+.Pp
+Hosts are identified by their host keys, and are looked up from known hosts
+files by
+.Nm .
+Wildcards patterns may be used for hostnames and certificate host
+keys are supported.
+By default, keys added by
+.Nm
+are not destination constrained.
+.Pp
+Destination constraints were added in OpenSSH release 8.9.
+Support in both the remote SSH client and server is required when using
+destination-constrained keys over a forwarded
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+channel.
+.Pp
+It is also important to note that destination constraints can only be
+enforced by
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+when a key is used, or when it is forwarded by a
+.Sy cooperating
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+Specifically, it does not prevent an attacker with access to a remote
+.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+from forwarding it again and using it on a different host (but only to
+a permitted destination).
+.It Fl K
+Load resident keys from a FIDO authenticator.
+.It Fl k
+When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process plain private
+keys only and skip certificates.
+.It Fl L
+Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented
+by the agent.
+.It Fl l
+Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent.
+.It Fl q
+Be quiet after a successful operation.
+.It Fl S Ar provider
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when adding
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the
+internal USB HID support.
+.It Fl s Ar pkcs11
+Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
+.Ar pkcs11 .
+.It Fl T Ar pubkey ...
+Tests whether the private keys that correspond to the specified
+.Ar pubkey
+files are usable by performing sign and verify operations on each.
+.It Fl t Ar life
+Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent.
+The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format
+specified in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print debugging messages about its progress.
+This is helpful in debugging problems.
+Multiple
+.Fl v
+options increase the verbosity.
+The maximum is 3.
+.It Fl X
+Unlock the agent.
+.It Fl x
+Lock the agent with a password.
+.El
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ev "DISPLAY", "SSH_ASKPASS" and "SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE"
+If
+.Nm
+needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current
+terminal if it was run from a terminal.
+If
+.Nm
+does not have a terminal associated with it but
+.Ev DISPLAY
+and
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+are set, it will execute the program specified by
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+(by default
+.Dq ssh-askpass )
+and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.
+This is particularly useful when calling
+.Nm
+from a
+.Pa .xsession
+or related script.
+.Pp
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE
+allows further control over the use of an askpass program.
+If this variable is set to
+.Dq never
+then
+.Nm
+will never attempt to use one.
+If it is set to
+.Dq prefer ,
+then
+.Nm
+will prefer to use the askpass program instead of the TTY when requesting
+passwords.
+Finally, if the variable is set to
+.Dq force ,
+then the askpass program will be used for all passphrase input regardless
+of whether
+.Ev DISPLAY
+is set.
+.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+Identifies the path of a
+.Ux Ns -domain
+socket used to communicate with the agent.
+.It Ev SSH_SK_PROVIDER
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+the built-in USB HID support.
+.El
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
+authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of the user.
+.El
+.Pp
+Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user.
+Note that
+.Nm
+ignores identity files if they are accessible by others.
+.Sh EXIT STATUS
+Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails,
+and 2 if
+.Nm
+is unable to contact the authentication agent.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-askpass 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..777f21e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-add.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1014 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.166 2022/06/18 02:17:16 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Adds an identity to the authentication server, or removes an identity.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 implementation,
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+
+/* argv0 */
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Default files to add */
+static char *default_files[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA,
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA,
+	_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK,
+#endif
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519,
+	_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK,
+	_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS,
+	_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+
+/* Default lifetime (0 == forever) */
+static int lifetime = 0;
+
+/* User has to confirm key use */
+static int confirm = 0;
+
+/* Maximum number of signatures (XMSS) */
+static u_int maxsign = 0;
+static u_int minleft = 0;
+
+/* we keep a cache of one passphrase */
+static char *pass = NULL;
+static void
+clear_pass(void)
+{
+	if (pass) {
+		freezero(pass, strlen(pass));
+		pass = NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+delete_one(int agent_fd, const struct sshkey *key, const char *comment,
+    const char *path, int qflag)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, key)) != 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n",
+		    path, ssh_err(r));
+		return r;
+	}
+	if (!qflag) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s %s (%s)\n", path,
+		    sshkey_type(key), comment ? comment : "no comment");
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+delete_stdin(int agent_fd, int qflag)
+{
+	char *line = NULL, *cp;
+	size_t linesize = 0;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	int lnum = 0, r, ret = -1;
+
+	while (getline(&line, &linesize, stdin) != -1) {
+		lnum++;
+		sshkey_free(key);
+		key = NULL;
+		line[strcspn(line, "\n")] = '\0';
+		cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
+		if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
+			continue;
+		if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("sshkey_new");
+		if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) {
+			error_r(r, "(stdin):%d: invalid key", lnum);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (delete_one(agent_fd, key, cp, "(stdin)", qflag) == 0)
+			ret = 0;
+	}
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	free(line);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+delete_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag)
+{
+	struct sshkey *public, *cert = NULL;
+	char *certpath = NULL, *comment = NULL;
+	int r, ret = -1;
+
+	if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0)
+		return delete_stdin(agent_fd, qflag);
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &public,  &comment)) != 0) {
+		printf("Bad key file %s: %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (delete_one(agent_fd, public, comment, filename, qflag) == 0)
+		ret = 0;
+
+	if (key_only)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Now try to delete the corresponding certificate too */
+	free(comment);
+	comment = NULL;
+	xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, &comment)) != 0) {
+		if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT)
+			error_r(r, "Failed to load certificate \"%s\"", certpath);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, public))
+		fatal("Certificate %s does not match private key %s",
+		    certpath, filename);
+
+	if (delete_one(agent_fd, cert, comment, certpath, qflag) == 0)
+		ret = 0;
+
+ out:
+	sshkey_free(cert);
+	sshkey_free(public);
+	free(certpath);
+	free(comment);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* Send a request to remove all identities. */
+static int
+delete_all(int agent_fd, int qflag)
+{
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Since the agent might be forwarded, old or non-OpenSSH, when asked
+	 * to remove all keys, attempt to remove both protocol v.1 and v.2
+	 * keys.
+	 */
+	if (ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 2) == 0)
+		ret = 0;
+	/* ignore error-code for ssh1 */
+	ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 1);
+
+	if (ret != 0)
+		fprintf(stderr, "Failed to remove all identities.\n");
+	else if (!qflag)
+		fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n");
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag,
+    const char *skprovider, struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints,
+    size_t ndest_constraints)
+{
+	struct sshkey *private, *cert;
+	char *comment = NULL;
+	char msg[1024], *certpath = NULL;
+	int r, fd, ret = -1;
+	size_t i;
+	u_int32_t left;
+	struct sshbuf *keyblob;
+	struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
+
+	if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) {
+		fd = STDIN_FILENO;
+		filename = "(stdin)";
+	} else if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
+		perror(filename);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Since we'll try to load a keyfile multiple times, permission errors
+	 * will occur multiple times, so check perms first and bail if wrong.
+	 */
+	if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) {
+		if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) {
+			close(fd);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &keyblob)) != 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
+		    filename, ssh_err(r));
+		sshbuf_free(keyblob);
+		close(fd);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	close(fd);
+
+	/* At first, try empty passphrase */
+	if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, "", &private,
+	    &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
+		    filename, ssh_err(r));
+		goto fail_load;
+	}
+	/* try last */
+	if (private == NULL && pass != NULL) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, &private,
+		    &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
+			    filename, ssh_err(r));
+			goto fail_load;
+		}
+	}
+	if (private == NULL) {
+		/* clear passphrase since it did not work */
+		clear_pass();
+		snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %s%s: ",
+		    filename, confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : "");
+		for (;;) {
+			pass = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+			if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0)
+				goto fail_load;
+			if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass,
+			    &private, &comment)) == 0)
+				break;
+			else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
+				    filename, ssh_err(r));
+ fail_load:
+				clear_pass();
+				sshbuf_free(keyblob);
+				return -1;
+			}
+			clear_pass();
+			snprintf(msg, sizeof msg,
+			    "Bad passphrase, try again for %s%s: ", filename,
+			    confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : "");
+		}
+	}
+	if (comment == NULL || *comment == '\0')
+		comment = xstrdup(filename);
+	sshbuf_free(keyblob);
+
+	/* For XMSS */
+	if ((r = sshkey_set_filename(private, filename)) != 0) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Could not add filename to private key: %s (%s)\n",
+		    filename, comment);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (maxsign && minleft &&
+	    (r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) == 0) {
+		for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) {
+			if (!sshkey_equal_public(idlist->keys[i], private))
+				continue;
+			left = sshkey_signatures_left(idlist->keys[i]);
+			if (left < minleft) {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Only %d signatures left.\n", left);
+				break;
+			}
+			fprintf(stderr, "Skipping update: ");
+			if (left == minleft) {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "required signatures left (%d).\n", left);
+			} else {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "more signatures left (%d) than"
+				    " required (%d).\n", left, minleft);
+			}
+			ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
+	}
+
+	if (sshkey_is_sk(private)) {
+		if (skprovider == NULL) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Cannot load FIDO key %s "
+			    "without provider\n", filename);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Don't send provider constraint for other keys */
+		skprovider = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment,
+	    lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider,
+	    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints)) == 0) {
+		ret = 0;
+		if (!qflag) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n",
+			    filename, comment);
+			if (lifetime != 0) {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime);
+			}
+			if (confirm != 0) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm "
+				    "each use of the key\n");
+			}
+		}
+	} else {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity \"%s\": %s\n",
+		    filename, ssh_err(r));
+	}
+
+	/* Skip trying to load the cert if requested */
+	if (key_only)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Now try to add the certificate flavour too */
+	xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, NULL)) != 0) {
+		if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT)
+			error_r(r, "Failed to load certificate \"%s\"", certpath);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, private)) {
+		error("Certificate %s does not match private key %s",
+		    certpath, filename);
+		sshkey_free(cert);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Graft with private bits */
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(private)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_certified");
+		sshkey_free(cert);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, private)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshkey_cert_copy");
+		sshkey_free(cert);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	sshkey_free(cert);
+
+	if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment,
+	    lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider,
+	    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints)) != 0) {
+		error_r(r, "Certificate %s (%s) add failed", certpath,
+		    private->cert->key_id);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	if (!qflag) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Certificate added: %s (%s)\n", certpath,
+		    private->cert->key_id);
+		if (lifetime != 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n",
+			    lifetime);
+		}
+		if (confirm != 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm each use "
+			    "of the key\n");
+		}
+	}
+
+ out:
+	free(certpath);
+	free(comment);
+	sshkey_free(private);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag,
+    struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints)
+{
+	char *pin = NULL;
+	int r, ret = -1;
+
+	if (add) {
+		if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ",
+		    RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL)
+			return -1;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = ssh_update_card(agent_fd, add, id, pin == NULL ? "" : pin,
+	    lifetime, confirm, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints)) == 0) {
+		ret = 0;
+		if (!qflag) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n",
+			    add ? "added" : "removed", id);
+		}
+	} else {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s card \"%s\": %s\n",
+		    add ? "add" : "remove", id, ssh_err(r));
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+	free(pin);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+test_key(int agent_fd, const char *filename)
+{
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	u_char *sig = NULL;
+	size_t slen = 0;
+	int r, ret = -1;
+	char data[1024];
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &key, NULL)) != 0) {
+		error_r(r, "Couldn't read public key %s", filename);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	arc4random_buf(data, sizeof(data));
+	if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(agent_fd, key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data),
+	    NULL, 0)) != 0) {
+		error_r(r, "Agent signature failed for %s", filename);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data),
+	    NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) {
+		error_r(r, "Signature verification failed for %s", filename);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	ret = 0;
+ done:
+	free(sig);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+list_identities(int agent_fd, int do_fp)
+{
+	char *fp;
+	int r;
+	struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
+	u_int32_t left;
+	size_t i;
+
+	if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
+		if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
+			fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities: %s\n",
+			    ssh_err(r));
+		else
+			printf("The agent has no identities.\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) {
+		if (do_fp) {
+			fp = sshkey_fingerprint(idlist->keys[i],
+			    fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+			printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(idlist->keys[i]),
+			    fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, idlist->comments[i],
+			    sshkey_type(idlist->keys[i]));
+			free(fp);
+		} else {
+			if ((r = sshkey_write(idlist->keys[i], stdout)) != 0) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "sshkey_write: %s\n",
+				    ssh_err(r));
+				continue;
+			}
+			fprintf(stdout, " %s", idlist->comments[i]);
+			left = sshkey_signatures_left(idlist->keys[i]);
+			if (left > 0)
+				fprintf(stdout,
+				    " [signatures left %d]", left);
+			fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+		}
+	}
+	ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+lock_agent(int agent_fd, int lock)
+{
+	char prompt[100], *p1, *p2;
+	int r, passok = 1, ret = -1;
+
+	strlcpy(prompt, "Enter lock password: ", sizeof(prompt));
+	p1 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+	if (lock) {
+		strlcpy(prompt, "Again: ", sizeof prompt);
+		p2 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+		if (strcmp(p1, p2) != 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Passwords do not match.\n");
+			passok = 0;
+		}
+		freezero(p2, strlen(p2));
+	}
+	if (passok) {
+		if ((r = ssh_lock_agent(agent_fd, lock, p1)) == 0) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Agent %slocked.\n", lock ? "" : "un");
+			ret = 0;
+		} else {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent: %s\n",
+			    lock ? "" : "un", ssh_err(r));
+		}
+	}
+	freezero(p1, strlen(p1));
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+load_resident_keys(int agent_fd, const char *skprovider, int qflag,
+    struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints)
+{
+	struct sshsk_resident_key **srks;
+	size_t nsrks, i;
+	struct sshkey *key;
+	int r, ok = 0;
+	char *fp;
+
+	pass = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+	if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(skprovider, NULL, pass, 0,
+	    &srks, &nsrks)) != 0) {
+		error_r(r, "Unable to load resident keys");
+		return r;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < nsrks; i++) {
+		key = srks[i]->key;
+		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
+		    fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+		if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, key, "",
+		    lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider,
+		    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints)) != 0) {
+			error("Unable to add key %s %s",
+			    sshkey_type(key), fp);
+			free(fp);
+			ok = r;
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (ok == 0)
+			ok = 1;
+		if (!qflag) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "Resident identity added: %s %s\n",
+			    sshkey_type(key), fp);
+			if (lifetime != 0) {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime);
+			}
+			if (confirm != 0) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm "
+				    "each use of the key\n");
+			}
+		}
+		free(fp);
+	}
+	sshsk_free_resident_keys(srks, nsrks);
+	if (nsrks == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+	return ok == 1 ? 0 : ok;
+}
+
+static int
+do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file, int qflag,
+    const char *skprovider, struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints,
+    size_t ndest_constraints)
+{
+	if (deleting) {
+		if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag) == -1)
+			return -1;
+	} else {
+		if (add_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag, skprovider,
+		    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints) == -1)
+			return -1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Append string 's' to a NULL-terminated array of strings */
+static void
+stringlist_append(char ***listp, const char *s)
+{
+	size_t i = 0;
+
+	if (*listp == NULL)
+		*listp = xcalloc(2, sizeof(**listp));
+	else {
+		for (i = 0; (*listp)[i] != NULL; i++)
+			; /* count */
+		*listp = xrecallocarray(*listp, i + 1, i + 2, sizeof(**listp));
+	}
+	(*listp)[i] = xstrdup(s);
+}
+
+static void
+parse_dest_constraint_hop(const char *s, struct dest_constraint_hop *dch,
+    char **hostkey_files)
+{
+	char *user = NULL, *host, *os, *path;
+	size_t i;
+	struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
+	const struct hostkey_entry *hke;
+	int r, want_ca;
+
+	memset(dch, '\0', sizeof(*dch));
+	os = xstrdup(s);
+	if ((host = strchr(os, '@')) == NULL)
+		host = os;
+	else {
+		*host++ = '\0';
+		user = os;
+	}
+	cleanhostname(host);
+	/* Trivial case: username@ (all hosts) */
+	if (*host == '\0') {
+		if (user == NULL) {
+			fatal("Invalid key destination constraint \"%s\": "
+			    "does not specify user or host", s);
+		}
+		dch->user = xstrdup(user);
+		/* other fields left blank */
+		free(os);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (hostkey_files == NULL)
+		fatal_f("no hostkey files");
+	/* Otherwise we need to look up the keys for this hostname */
+	hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
+	for (i = 0; hostkey_files[i]; i++) {
+		path = tilde_expand_filename(hostkey_files[i], getuid());
+		debug2_f("looking up host keys for \"%s\" in %s", host, path);
+                load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, path, 0);
+		free(path);
+	}
+	dch->user = user == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(user);
+	dch->hostname = xstrdup(host);
+	for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
+		hke = hostkeys->entries + i;
+		want_ca = hke->marker == MRK_CA;
+		if (hke->marker != MRK_NONE && !want_ca)
+			continue;
+		debug3_f("%s%s%s: adding %s %skey from %s:%lu as key %u",
+		    user == NULL ? "": user, user == NULL ? "" : "@",
+		    host, sshkey_type(hke->key), want_ca ? "CA " : "",
+		    hke->file, hke->line, dch->nkeys);
+		dch->keys = xrecallocarray(dch->keys, dch->nkeys,
+		    dch->nkeys + 1, sizeof(*dch->keys));
+		dch->key_is_ca = xrecallocarray(dch->key_is_ca, dch->nkeys,
+		    dch->nkeys + 1, sizeof(*dch->key_is_ca));
+		if ((r = sshkey_from_private(hke->key,
+		    &(dch->keys[dch->nkeys]))) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_from_private");
+		dch->key_is_ca[dch->nkeys] = want_ca;
+		dch->nkeys++;
+	}
+	if (dch->nkeys == 0)
+		fatal("No host keys found for destination \"%s\"", host);
+	free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
+	free(os);
+	return;
+}
+
+static void
+parse_dest_constraint(const char *s, struct dest_constraint ***dcp,
+    size_t *ndcp, char **hostkey_files)
+{
+	struct dest_constraint *dc;
+	char *os, *cp;
+
+	dc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*dc));
+	os = xstrdup(s);
+	if ((cp = strchr(os, '>')) == NULL) {
+		/* initial hop; no 'from' hop specified */
+		parse_dest_constraint_hop(os, &dc->to, hostkey_files);
+	} else {
+		/* two hops specified */
+		*(cp++) = '\0';
+		parse_dest_constraint_hop(os, &dc->from, hostkey_files);
+		parse_dest_constraint_hop(cp, &dc->to, hostkey_files);
+		if (dc->from.user != NULL) {
+			fatal("Invalid key constraint %s: cannot specify "
+			    "user on 'from' host", os);
+		}
+	}
+	/* XXX eliminate or error on duplicates */
+	debug2_f("constraint %zu: %s%s%s (%u keys) > %s%s%s (%u keys)", *ndcp,
+	    dc->from.user ? dc->from.user : "", dc->from.user ? "@" : "",
+	    dc->from.hostname ? dc->from.hostname : "(ORIGIN)", dc->from.nkeys,
+	    dc->to.user ? dc->to.user : "", dc->to.user ? "@" : "",
+	    dc->to.hostname ? dc->to.hostname : "(ANY)", dc->to.nkeys);
+	*dcp = xrecallocarray(*dcp, *ndcp, *ndcp + 1, sizeof(**dcp));
+	(*dcp)[(*ndcp)++] = dc;
+	free(os);
+}
+
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr,
+"usage: ssh-add [-cDdKkLlqvXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-H hostkey_file]\n"
+"               [-h destination_constraint] [-S provider] [-t life]\n"
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+"               [-M maxsign] [-m minleft]\n"
+#endif
+"               [file ...]\n"
+"       ssh-add -s pkcs11\n"
+"       ssh-add -e pkcs11\n"
+"       ssh-add -T pubkey ...\n"
+	);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	extern char *optarg;
+	extern int optind;
+	int agent_fd;
+	char *pkcs11provider = NULL, *skprovider = NULL;
+	char **dest_constraint_strings = NULL, **hostkey_files = NULL;
+	int r, i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0, do_download = 0;
+	int xflag = 0, lflag = 0, Dflag = 0, qflag = 0, Tflag = 0;
+	SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
+	LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+	struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints = NULL;
+	size_t ndest_constraints = 0;
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+	seed_rng();
+
+	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, 1);
+
+	setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+
+	/* First, get a connection to the authentication agent. */
+	switch (r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) {
+	case 0:
+		break;
+	case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT:
+		fprintf(stderr, "Could not open a connection to your "
+		    "authentication agent.\n");
+		exit(2);
+	default:
+		fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to agent: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
+		exit(2);
+	}
+
+	skprovider = getenv("SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
+
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "vkKlLcdDTxXE:e:h:H:M:m:qs:S:t:")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'v':
+			if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
+				log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+			else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+				log_level++;
+			break;
+		case 'E':
+			fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
+			if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
+				fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'H':
+			stringlist_append(&hostkey_files, optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+			stringlist_append(&dest_constraint_strings, optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'k':
+			key_only = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'K':
+			do_download = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+		case 'L':
+			if (lflag != 0)
+				fatal("-%c flag already specified", lflag);
+			lflag = ch;
+			break;
+		case 'x':
+		case 'X':
+			if (xflag != 0)
+				fatal("-%c flag already specified", xflag);
+			xflag = ch;
+			break;
+		case 'c':
+			confirm = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'm':
+			minleft = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, NULL);
+			if (minleft == 0) {
+				usage();
+				ret = 1;
+				goto done;
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'M':
+			maxsign = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, NULL);
+			if (maxsign == 0) {
+				usage();
+				ret = 1;
+				goto done;
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'd':
+			deleting = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'D':
+			Dflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 's':
+			pkcs11provider = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'S':
+			skprovider = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'e':
+			deleting = 1;
+			pkcs11provider = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1 ||
+			    lifetime < 0 || (u_long)lifetime > UINT32_MAX) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
+				ret = 1;
+				goto done;
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'q':
+			qflag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'T':
+			Tflag = 1;
+			break;
+		default:
+			usage();
+			ret = 1;
+			goto done;
+		}
+	}
+	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, 1);
+
+	if ((xflag != 0) + (lflag != 0) + (Dflag != 0) > 1)
+		fatal("Invalid combination of actions");
+	else if (xflag) {
+		if (lock_agent(agent_fd, xflag == 'x' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
+			ret = 1;
+		goto done;
+	} else if (lflag) {
+		if (list_identities(agent_fd, lflag == 'l' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
+			ret = 1;
+		goto done;
+	} else if (Dflag) {
+		if (delete_all(agent_fd, qflag) == -1)
+			ret = 1;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+	if (skprovider == NULL)
+		skprovider = "internal";
+#endif
+
+	if (hostkey_files == NULL) {
+		/* use defaults from readconf.c */
+		stringlist_append(&hostkey_files, _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
+		stringlist_append(&hostkey_files, _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
+		stringlist_append(&hostkey_files, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE);
+		stringlist_append(&hostkey_files, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2);
+	}
+	if (dest_constraint_strings != NULL) {
+		for (i = 0; dest_constraint_strings[i] != NULL; i++) {
+			parse_dest_constraint(dest_constraint_strings[i],
+			  &dest_constraints, &ndest_constraints, hostkey_files);
+		}
+	}
+
+	argc -= optind;
+	argv += optind;
+	if (Tflag) {
+		if (argc <= 0)
+			fatal("no keys to test");
+		for (r = i = 0; i < argc; i++)
+			r |= test_key(agent_fd, argv[i]);
+		ret = r == 0 ? 0 : 1;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (pkcs11provider != NULL) {
+		if (update_card(agent_fd, !deleting, pkcs11provider,
+		    qflag, dest_constraints, ndest_constraints) == -1)
+			ret = 1;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (do_download) {
+		if (skprovider == NULL)
+			fatal("Cannot download keys without provider");
+		if (load_resident_keys(agent_fd, skprovider, qflag,
+		    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints) != 0)
+			ret = 1;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (argc == 0) {
+		char buf[PATH_MAX];
+		struct passwd *pw;
+		struct stat st;
+		int count = 0;
+
+		if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "No user found with uid %u\n",
+			    (u_int)getuid());
+			ret = 1;
+			goto done;
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) {
+			snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+			    default_files[i]);
+			if (stat(buf, &st) == -1)
+				continue;
+			if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, buf,
+			    qflag, skprovider,
+			    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints) == -1)
+				ret = 1;
+			else
+				count++;
+		}
+		if (count == 0)
+			ret = 1;
+	} else {
+		for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+			if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only,
+			    argv[i], qflag, skprovider,
+			    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints) == -1)
+				ret = 1;
+		}
+	}
+done:
+	clear_pass();
+	ssh_close_authentication_socket(agent_fd);
+	return ret;
+}
diff --git a/ssh-agent.0 b/ssh-agent.0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2c7b860
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-agent.0
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+SSH-AGENT(1)                General Commands Manual               SSH-AGENT(1)
+
+NAME
+     ssh-agent M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH authentication agent
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]
+               [-O option] [-P allowed_providers] [-t life]
+     ssh-agent [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-O option]
+               [-P allowed_providers] [-t life] command [arg ...]
+     ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     ssh-agent is a program to hold private keys used for public key
+     authentication.  Through use of environment variables the agent can be
+     located and automatically used for authentication when logging in to
+     other machines using ssh(1).
+
+     The options are as follows:
+
+     -a bind_address
+             Bind the agent to the UNIX-domain socket bind_address.  The
+             default is $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>.
+
+     -c      Generate C-shell commands on stdout.  This is the default if
+             SHELL looks like it's a csh style of shell.
+
+     -D      Foreground mode.  When this option is specified, ssh-agent will
+             not fork.
+
+     -d      Debug mode.  When this option is specified, ssh-agent will not
+             fork and will write debug information to standard error.
+
+     -E fingerprint_hash
+             Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
+             fingerprints.  Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].  The
+             default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     -k      Kill the current agent (given by the SSH_AGENT_PID environment
+             variable).
+
+     -O option
+             Specify an option when starting ssh-agent.  Currently only one
+             option is supported: no-restrict-websafe.  This instructs
+             ssh-agent to permit signatures using FIDO keys that might be web
+             authentication requests.  By default, ssh-agent refuses signature
+             requests for FIDO keys where the key application string does not
+             start with M-bM-^@M-^\ssh:M-bM-^@M-^] and when the data to be signed does not appear
+             to be a ssh(1) user authentication request or a ssh-keygen(1)
+             signature.  The default behaviour prevents forwarded access to a
+             FIDO key from also implicitly forwarding the ability to
+             authenticate to websites.
+
+     -P allowed_providers
+             Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 provider
+             and FIDO authenticator middleware shared libraries that may be
+             used with the -S or -s options to ssh-add(1).  Libraries that do
+             not match the pattern list will be refused.  See PATTERNS in
+             ssh_config(5) for a description of pattern-list syntax.  The
+             default list is M-bM-^@M-^\/usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/*M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     -s      Generate Bourne shell commands on stdout.  This is the default if
+             SHELL does not look like it's a csh style of shell.
+
+     -t life
+             Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added
+             to the agent.  The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a
+             time format specified in sshd_config(5).  A lifetime specified
+             for an identity with ssh-add(1) overrides this value.  Without
+             this option the default maximum lifetime is forever.
+
+     command [arg ...]
+             If a command (and optional arguments) is given, this is executed
+             as a subprocess of the agent.  The agent exits automatically when
+             the command given on the command line terminates.
+
+     There are two main ways to get an agent set up.  The first is at the
+     start of an X session, where all other windows or programs are started as
+     children of the ssh-agent program.  The agent starts a command under
+     which its environment variables are exported, for example ssh-agent xterm
+     &.  When the command terminates, so does the agent.
+
+     The second method is used for a login session.  When ssh-agent is
+     started, it prints the shell commands required to set its environment
+     variables, which in turn can be evaluated in the calling shell, for
+     example eval `ssh-agent -s`.
+
+     In both cases, ssh(1) looks at these environment variables and uses them
+     to establish a connection to the agent.
+
+     The agent initially does not have any private keys.  Keys are added using
+     ssh-add(1) or by ssh(1) when AddKeysToAgent is set in ssh_config(5).
+     Multiple identities may be stored in ssh-agent concurrently and ssh(1)
+     will automatically use them if present.  ssh-add(1) is also used to
+     remove keys from ssh-agent and to query the keys that are held in one.
+
+     Connections to ssh-agent may be forwarded from further remote hosts using
+     the -A option to ssh(1) (but see the caveats documented therein),
+     avoiding the need for authentication data to be stored on other machines.
+     Authentication passphrases and private keys never go over the network:
+     the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote connections and
+     the result is returned to the requester, allowing the user access to
+     their identities anywhere in the network in a secure fashion.
+
+ENVIRONMENT
+     SSH_AGENT_PID  When ssh-agent starts, it stores the name of the agent's
+                    process ID (PID) in this variable.
+
+     SSH_AUTH_SOCK  When ssh-agent starts, it creates a UNIX-domain socket and
+                    stores its pathname in this variable.  It is accessible
+                    only to the current user, but is easily abused by root or
+                    another instance of the same user.
+
+FILES
+     $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
+             UNIX-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the
+             authentication agent.  These sockets should only be readable by
+             the owner.  The sockets should get automatically removed when the
+             agent exits.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), sshd(8)
+
+AUTHORS
+     OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+     Tatu Ylonen.  Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+     de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+     created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+     versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 7.2                     October 7, 2022                    OpenBSD 7.2
diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0bf65d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-agent.1
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.75 2022/10/07 06:00:58 jmc Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\"                    All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: October 7 2022 $
+.Dt SSH-AGENT 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-agent
+.Nd OpenSSH authentication agent
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh-agent
+.Op Fl c | s
+.Op Fl \&Dd
+.Op Fl a Ar bind_address
+.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Op Fl P Ar allowed_providers
+.Op Fl t Ar life
+.Nm ssh-agent
+.Op Fl a Ar bind_address
+.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Op Fl P Ar allowed_providers
+.Op Fl t Ar life
+.Ar command Op Ar arg ...
+.Nm ssh-agent
+.Op Fl c | s
+.Fl k
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication.
+Through use of environment variables the agent can be located
+and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other
+machines using
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl a Ar bind_address
+Bind the agent to the
+.Ux Ns -domain
+socket
+.Ar bind_address .
+The default is
+.Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt .
+.It Fl c
+Generate C-shell commands on
+.Dv stdout .
+This is the default if
+.Ev SHELL
+looks like it's a csh style of shell.
+.It Fl D
+Foreground mode.
+When this option is specified,
+.Nm
+will not fork.
+.It Fl d
+Debug mode.
+When this option is specified,
+.Nm
+will not fork and will write debug information to standard error.
+.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
+Valid options are:
+.Dq md5
+and
+.Dq sha256 .
+The default is
+.Dq sha256 .
+.It Fl k
+Kill the current agent (given by the
+.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
+environment variable).
+.It Fl O Ar option
+Specify an option when starting
+.Nm .
+Currently only one option is supported:
+.Cm no-restrict-websafe .
+This instructs
+.Nm
+to permit signatures using FIDO keys that might be web authentication
+requests.
+By default,
+.Nm
+refuses signature requests for FIDO keys where the key application string
+does not start with
+.Dq ssh:
+and when the data to be signed does not appear to be a
+.Xr ssh 1
+user authentication request or a
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+signature.
+The default behaviour prevents forwarded access to a FIDO key from also
+implicitly forwarding the ability to authenticate to websites.
+.It Fl P Ar allowed_providers
+Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 provider and FIDO
+authenticator middleware shared libraries that may be used with the
+.Fl S
+or
+.Fl s
+options to
+.Xr ssh-add 1 .
+Libraries that do not match the pattern list will be refused.
+See PATTERNS in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for a description of pattern-list syntax.
+The default list is
+.Dq /usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/* .
+.It Fl s
+Generate Bourne shell commands on
+.Dv stdout .
+This is the default if
+.Ev SHELL
+does not look like it's a csh style of shell.
+.It Fl t Ar life
+Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent.
+The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+A lifetime specified for an identity with
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+overrides this value.
+Without this option the default maximum lifetime is forever.
+.It Ar command Op Ar arg ...
+If a command (and optional arguments) is given,
+this is executed as a subprocess of the agent.
+The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
+line terminates.
+.El
+.Pp
+There are two main ways to get an agent set up.
+The first is at the start of an X session,
+where all other windows or programs are started as children of the
+.Nm
+program.
+The agent starts a command under which its environment
+variables are exported, for example
+.Cm ssh-agent xterm & .
+When the command terminates, so does the agent.
+.Pp
+The second method is used for a login session.
+When
+.Nm
+is started,
+it prints the shell commands required to set its environment variables,
+which in turn can be evaluated in the calling shell, for example
+.Cm eval `ssh-agent -s` .
+.Pp
+In both cases,
+.Xr ssh 1
+looks at these environment variables
+and uses them to establish a connection to the agent.
+.Pp
+The agent initially does not have any private keys.
+Keys are added using
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+or by
+.Xr ssh 1
+when
+.Cm AddKeysToAgent
+is set in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+Multiple identities may be stored in
+.Nm
+concurrently and
+.Xr ssh 1
+will automatically use them if present.
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+is also used to remove keys from
+.Nm
+and to query the keys that are held in one.
+.Pp
+Connections to
+.Nm
+may be forwarded from further remote hosts using the
+.Fl A
+option to
+.Xr ssh 1
+(but see the caveats documented therein),
+avoiding the need for authentication data to be stored on other machines.
+Authentication passphrases and private keys never go over the network:
+the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote connections
+and the result is returned to the requester,
+allowing the user access to their identities anywhere in the network
+in a secure fashion.
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width "SSH_AGENT_PID"
+.It Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
+When
+.Nm
+starts, it stores the name of the agent's process ID (PID) in this variable.
+.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+When
+.Nm
+starts, it creates a
+.Ux Ns -domain
+socket and stores its pathname in this variable.
+It is accessible only to the current user,
+but is easily abused by root or another instance of the same user.
+.El
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
+.Ux Ns -domain
+sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
+These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
+The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An -nosplit
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+.An Tatu Ylonen .
+.An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , Niels Provos , Theo de Raadt
+and
+.An Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH.
+.An Markus Friedl
+contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..63e1137
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-agent.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2272 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.294 2022/12/04 11:03:11 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * The authentication agent program.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
+# include <sys/un.h>
+#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#endif
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+# include <poll.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+
+#ifndef DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS
+# define DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*"
+#endif
+
+/* Maximum accepted message length */
+#define AGENT_MAX_LEN		(256*1024)
+/* Maximum bytes to read from client socket */
+#define AGENT_RBUF_LEN		(4096)
+/* Maximum number of recorded session IDs/hostkeys per connection */
+#define AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS		16
+/* Maximum size of session ID */
+#define AGENT_MAX_SID_LEN		128
+/* Maximum number of destination constraints to accept on a key */
+#define AGENT_MAX_DEST_CONSTRAINTS	1024
+
+/* XXX store hostkey_sid in a refcounted tree */
+
+typedef enum {
+	AUTH_UNUSED = 0,
+	AUTH_SOCKET = 1,
+	AUTH_CONNECTION = 2,
+} sock_type;
+
+struct hostkey_sid {
+	struct sshkey *key;
+	struct sshbuf *sid;
+	int forwarded;
+};
+
+typedef struct socket_entry {
+	int fd;
+	sock_type type;
+	struct sshbuf *input;
+	struct sshbuf *output;
+	struct sshbuf *request;
+	size_t nsession_ids;
+	struct hostkey_sid *session_ids;
+} SocketEntry;
+
+u_int sockets_alloc = 0;
+SocketEntry *sockets = NULL;
+
+typedef struct identity {
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+	struct sshkey *key;
+	char *comment;
+	char *provider;
+	time_t death;
+	u_int confirm;
+	char *sk_provider;
+	struct dest_constraint *dest_constraints;
+	size_t ndest_constraints;
+} Identity;
+
+struct idtable {
+	int nentries;
+	TAILQ_HEAD(idqueue, identity) idlist;
+};
+
+/* private key table */
+struct idtable *idtab;
+
+int max_fd = 0;
+
+/* pid of shell == parent of agent */
+pid_t parent_pid = -1;
+time_t parent_alive_interval = 0;
+
+/* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */
+pid_t cleanup_pid = 0;
+
+/* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
+char socket_name[PATH_MAX];
+char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];
+
+/* Pattern-list of allowed PKCS#11/Security key paths */
+static char *allowed_providers;
+
+/* locking */
+#define LOCK_SIZE	32
+#define LOCK_SALT_SIZE	16
+#define LOCK_ROUNDS	1
+int locked = 0;
+u_char lock_pwhash[LOCK_SIZE];
+u_char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE];
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Default lifetime in seconds (0 == forever) */
+static int lifetime = 0;
+
+static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+
+/* Refuse signing of non-SSH messages for web-origin FIDO keys */
+static int restrict_websafe = 1;
+
+static void
+close_socket(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	close(e->fd);
+	sshbuf_free(e->input);
+	sshbuf_free(e->output);
+	sshbuf_free(e->request);
+	for (i = 0; i < e->nsession_ids; i++) {
+		sshkey_free(e->session_ids[i].key);
+		sshbuf_free(e->session_ids[i].sid);
+	}
+	free(e->session_ids);
+	memset(e, '\0', sizeof(*e));
+	e->fd = -1;
+	e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
+}
+
+static void
+idtab_init(void)
+{
+	idtab = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*idtab));
+	TAILQ_INIT(&idtab->idlist);
+	idtab->nentries = 0;
+}
+
+static void
+free_dest_constraint_hop(struct dest_constraint_hop *dch)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (dch == NULL)
+		return;
+	free(dch->user);
+	free(dch->hostname);
+	for (i = 0; i < dch->nkeys; i++)
+		sshkey_free(dch->keys[i]);
+	free(dch->keys);
+	free(dch->key_is_ca);
+}
+
+static void
+free_dest_constraints(struct dest_constraint *dcs, size_t ndcs)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ndcs; i++) {
+		free_dest_constraint_hop(&dcs[i].from);
+		free_dest_constraint_hop(&dcs[i].to);
+	}
+	free(dcs);
+}
+
+static void
+free_identity(Identity *id)
+{
+	sshkey_free(id->key);
+	free(id->provider);
+	free(id->comment);
+	free(id->sk_provider);
+	free_dest_constraints(id->dest_constraints, id->ndest_constraints);
+	free(id);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Match 'key' against the key/CA list in a destination constraint hop
+ * Returns 0 on success or -1 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+match_key_hop(const char *tag, const struct sshkey *key,
+    const struct dest_constraint_hop *dch)
+{
+	const char *reason = NULL;
+	const char *hostname = dch->hostname ? dch->hostname : "(ORIGIN)";
+	u_int i;
+	char *fp;
+
+	if (key == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	/* XXX logspam */
+	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
+	debug3_f("%s: entering hostname %s, requested key %s %s, %u keys avail",
+	    tag, hostname, sshkey_type(key), fp, dch->nkeys);
+	free(fp);
+	for (i = 0; i < dch->nkeys; i++) {
+		if (dch->keys[i] == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		/* XXX logspam */
+		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(dch->keys[i], SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
+		debug3_f("%s: key %u: %s%s %s", tag, i,
+		    dch->key_is_ca[i] ? "CA " : "",
+		    sshkey_type(dch->keys[i]), fp);
+		free(fp);
+		if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+			/* plain key */
+			if (dch->key_is_ca[i] ||
+			    !sshkey_equal(key, dch->keys[i]))
+				continue;
+			return 0;
+		}
+		/* certificate */
+		if (!dch->key_is_ca[i])
+			continue;
+		if (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_key == NULL)
+			return -1; /* shouldn't happen */
+		if (!sshkey_equal(key->cert->signature_key, dch->keys[i]))
+			continue;
+		if (sshkey_cert_check_host(key, hostname, 1,
+		    SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, &reason) != 0) {
+			debug_f("cert %s / hostname %s rejected: %s",
+			    key->cert->key_id, hostname, reason);
+			continue;
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/* Check destination constraints on an identity against the hostkey/user */
+static int
+permitted_by_dest_constraints(const struct sshkey *fromkey,
+    const struct sshkey *tokey, Identity *id, const char *user,
+    const char **hostnamep)
+{
+	size_t i;
+	struct dest_constraint *d;
+
+	if (hostnamep != NULL)
+		*hostnamep = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < id->ndest_constraints; i++) {
+		d = id->dest_constraints + i;
+		/* XXX remove logspam */
+		debug2_f("constraint %zu %s%s%s (%u keys) > %s%s%s (%u keys)",
+		    i, d->from.user ? d->from.user : "",
+		    d->from.user ? "@" : "",
+		    d->from.hostname ? d->from.hostname : "(ORIGIN)",
+		    d->from.nkeys,
+		    d->to.user ? d->to.user : "", d->to.user ? "@" : "",
+		    d->to.hostname ? d->to.hostname : "(ANY)", d->to.nkeys);
+
+		/* Match 'from' key */
+		if (fromkey == NULL) {
+			/* We are matching the first hop */
+			if (d->from.hostname != NULL || d->from.nkeys != 0)
+				continue;
+		} else if (match_key_hop("from", fromkey, &d->from) != 0)
+			continue;
+
+		/* Match 'to' key */
+		if (tokey != NULL && match_key_hop("to", tokey, &d->to) != 0)
+			continue;
+
+		/* Match user if specified */
+		if (d->to.user != NULL && user != NULL &&
+		    !match_pattern(user, d->to.user))
+			continue;
+
+		/* successfully matched this constraint */
+		if (hostnamep != NULL)
+			*hostnamep = d->to.hostname;
+		debug2_f("allowed for hostname %s",
+		    d->to.hostname == NULL ? "*" : d->to.hostname);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* no match */
+	debug2_f("%s identity \"%s\" not permitted for this destination",
+	    sshkey_type(id->key), id->comment);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether hostkeys on a SocketEntry and the optionally specified user
+ * are permitted by the destination constraints on the Identity.
+ * Returns 0 on success or -1 otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+identity_permitted(Identity *id, SocketEntry *e, char *user,
+    const char **forward_hostnamep, const char **last_hostnamep)
+{
+	size_t i;
+	const char **hp;
+	struct hostkey_sid *hks;
+	const struct sshkey *fromkey = NULL;
+	const char *test_user;
+	char *fp1, *fp2;
+
+	/* XXX remove logspam */
+	debug3_f("entering: key %s comment \"%s\", %zu socket bindings, "
+	    "%zu constraints", sshkey_type(id->key), id->comment,
+	    e->nsession_ids, id->ndest_constraints);
+	if (id->ndest_constraints == 0)
+		return 0; /* unconstrained */
+	if (e->nsession_ids == 0)
+		return 0; /* local use */
+	/*
+	 * Walk through the hops recorded by session_id and try to find a
+	 * constraint that satisfies each.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < e->nsession_ids; i++) {
+		hks = e->session_ids + i;
+		if (hks->key == NULL)
+			fatal_f("internal error: no bound key");
+		/* XXX remove logspam */
+		fp1 = fp2 = NULL;
+		if (fromkey != NULL &&
+		    (fp1 = sshkey_fingerprint(fromkey, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
+		if ((fp2 = sshkey_fingerprint(hks->key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
+		debug3_f("socketentry fd=%d, entry %zu %s, "
+		    "from hostkey %s %s to user %s hostkey %s %s",
+		    e->fd, i, hks->forwarded ? "FORWARD" : "AUTH",
+		    fromkey ? sshkey_type(fromkey) : "(ORIGIN)",
+		    fromkey ? fp1 : "", user ? user : "(ANY)",
+		    sshkey_type(hks->key), fp2);
+		free(fp1);
+		free(fp2);
+		/*
+		 * Record the hostnames for the initial forwarding and
+		 * the final destination.
+		 */
+		hp = NULL;
+		if (i == e->nsession_ids - 1)
+			hp = last_hostnamep;
+		else if (i == 0)
+			hp = forward_hostnamep;
+		/* Special handling for final recorded binding */
+		test_user = NULL;
+		if (i == e->nsession_ids - 1) {
+			/* Can only check user at final hop */
+			test_user = user;
+			/*
+			 * user is only presented for signature requests.
+			 * If this is the case, make sure last binding is not
+			 * for a forwarding.
+			 */
+			if (hks->forwarded && user != NULL) {
+				error_f("tried to sign on forwarding hop");
+				return -1;
+			}
+		} else if (!hks->forwarded) {
+			error_f("tried to forward though signing bind");
+			return -1;
+		}
+		if (permitted_by_dest_constraints(fromkey, hks->key, id,
+		    test_user, hp) != 0)
+			return -1;
+		fromkey = hks->key;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Another special case: if the last bound session ID was for a
+	 * forwarding, and this function is not being called to check a sign
+	 * request (i.e. no 'user' supplied), then only permit the key if
+	 * there is a permission that would allow it to be used at another
+	 * destination. This hides keys that are allowed to be used to
+	 * authenticate *to* a host but not permitted for *use* beyond it.
+	 */
+	hks = &e->session_ids[e->nsession_ids - 1];
+	if (hks->forwarded && user == NULL &&
+	    permitted_by_dest_constraints(hks->key, NULL, id,
+	    NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+		debug3_f("key permitted at host but not after");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* success */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* return matching private key for given public key */
+static Identity *
+lookup_identity(struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	Identity *id;
+
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) {
+		if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key))
+			return (id);
+	}
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+/* Check confirmation of keysign request */
+static int
+confirm_key(Identity *id, const char *extra)
+{
+	char *p;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	p = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+	if (p != NULL &&
+	    ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.%s%s",
+	    id->comment, p,
+	    extra == NULL ? "" : "\n", extra == NULL ? "" : extra))
+		ret = 0;
+	free(p);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static void
+send_status(SocketEntry *e, int success)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(e->output, 1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(e->output, success ?
+	    SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+}
+
+/* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */
+static void
+process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+	Identity *id;
+	struct sshbuf *msg, *keys;
+	int r;
+	u_int nentries = 0;
+
+	debug2_f("entering");
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (keys = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) {
+		/* identity not visible, don't include in response */
+		if (identity_permitted(id, e, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0)
+			continue;
+		if ((r = sshkey_puts_opts(id->key, keys,
+		    SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(keys, id->comment)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "compose key/comment");
+			continue;
+		}
+		nentries++;
+	}
+	debug2_f("replying with %u allowed of %u available keys",
+	    nentries, idtab->nentries);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, nentries)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_putb(msg, keys)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	sshbuf_free(keys);
+}
+
+
+static char *
+agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags)
+{
+	if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+		if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256)
+			return "rsa-sha2-256";
+		else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512)
+			return "rsa-sha2-512";
+	} else if (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
+		if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256)
+			return "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com";
+		else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512)
+			return "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com";
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to parse the contents of a buffer as a SSH publickey userauth
+ * request, checking its contents for consistency and matching the embedded
+ * key against the one that is being used for signing.
+ * Note: does not modify msg buffer.
+ * Optionally extract the username, session ID and/or hostkey from the request.
+ */
+static int
+parse_userauth_request(struct sshbuf *msg, const struct sshkey *expected_key,
+    char **userp, struct sshbuf **sess_idp, struct sshkey **hostkeyp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sess_id = NULL;
+	char *user = NULL, *service = NULL, *method = NULL, *pkalg = NULL;
+	int r;
+	u_char t, sig_follows;
+	struct sshkey *mkey = NULL, *hostkey = NULL;
+
+	if (userp != NULL)
+		*userp = NULL;
+	if (sess_idp != NULL)
+		*sess_idp = NULL;
+	if (hostkeyp != NULL)
+		*hostkeyp = NULL;
+	if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(msg)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb");
+
+	/* SSH userauth request */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_froms(b, &sess_id)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (sshbuf_len(sess_id) == 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &t)) != 0 || /* SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &user, NULL)) != 0 || /* server user */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &service, NULL)) != 0 || /* service */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &method, NULL)) != 0 || /* method */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_follows)) != 0 || /* sig-follows */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || /* alg */
+	    (r = sshkey_froms(b, &mkey)) != 0) /* key */
+		goto out;
+	if (t != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST ||
+	    sig_follows != 1 ||
+	    strcmp(service, "ssh-connection") != 0 ||
+	    !sshkey_equal(expected_key, mkey) ||
+	    sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg) != expected_key->type) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (strcmp(method, "publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_froms(b, &hostkey)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	} else if (strcmp(method, "publickey") != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+	debug3_f("well formed userauth");
+	if (userp != NULL) {
+		*userp = user;
+		user = NULL;
+	}
+	if (sess_idp != NULL) {
+		*sess_idp = sess_id;
+		sess_id = NULL;
+	}
+	if (hostkeyp != NULL) {
+		*hostkeyp = hostkey;
+		hostkey = NULL;
+	}
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	sshbuf_free(sess_id);
+	free(user);
+	free(service);
+	free(method);
+	free(pkalg);
+	sshkey_free(mkey);
+	sshkey_free(hostkey);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to parse the contents of a buffer as a SSHSIG signature request.
+ * Note: does not modify buffer.
+ */
+static int
+parse_sshsig_request(struct sshbuf *msg)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(msg)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb");
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(b, 0, "SSHSIG", 6)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_consume(b, 6)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* namespace */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* hashalg */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0) /* H(msg) */
+		goto out;
+	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function inspects a message to be signed by a FIDO key that has a
+ * web-like application string (i.e. one that does not begin with "ssh:".
+ * It checks that the message is one of those expected for SSH operations
+ * (pubkey userauth, sshsig, CA key signing) to exclude signing challenges
+ * for the web.
+ */
+static int
+check_websafe_message_contents(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *data)
+{
+	if (parse_userauth_request(data, key, NULL, NULL, NULL) == 0) {
+		debug_f("signed data matches public key userauth request");
+		return 1;
+	}
+	if (parse_sshsig_request(data) == 0) {
+		debug_f("signed data matches SSHSIG signature request");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/* XXX check CA signature operation */
+
+	error("web-origin key attempting to sign non-SSH message");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+buf_equal(const struct sshbuf *a, const struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	if (sshbuf_ptr(a) == NULL || sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (sshbuf_len(a) != sshbuf_len(b))
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(a), sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(a)) != 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* ssh2 only */
+static void
+process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+	u_char *signature = NULL;
+	size_t slen = 0;
+	u_int compat = 0, flags;
+	int r, ok = -1, retried = 0;
+	char *fp = NULL, *pin = NULL, *prompt = NULL;
+	char *user = NULL, *sig_dest = NULL;
+	const char *fwd_host = NULL, *dest_host = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *msg = NULL, *data = NULL, *sid = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL, *hostkey = NULL;
+	struct identity *id;
+	struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
+
+	debug_f("entering");
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (data = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->request, data)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &flags)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse");
+		goto send;
+	}
+
+	if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) {
+		verbose_f("%s key not found", sshkey_type(key));
+		goto send;
+	}
+	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
+
+	if (id->ndest_constraints != 0) {
+		if (e->nsession_ids == 0) {
+			logit_f("refusing use of destination-constrained key "
+			    "to sign on unbound connection");
+			goto send;
+		}
+		if (parse_userauth_request(data, key, &user, &sid,
+		    &hostkey) != 0) {
+			logit_f("refusing use of destination-constrained key "
+			   "to sign an unidentified signature");
+			goto send;
+		}
+		/* XXX logspam */
+		debug_f("user=%s", user);
+		if (identity_permitted(id, e, user, &fwd_host, &dest_host) != 0)
+			goto send;
+		/* XXX display fwd_host/dest_host in askpass UI */
+		/*
+		 * Ensure that the session ID is the most recent one
+		 * registered on the socket - it should have been bound by
+		 * ssh immediately before userauth.
+		 */
+		if (buf_equal(sid,
+		    e->session_ids[e->nsession_ids - 1].sid) != 0) {
+			error_f("unexpected session ID (%zu listed) on "
+			    "signature request for target user %s with "
+			    "key %s %s", e->nsession_ids, user,
+			    sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
+			goto send;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Ensure that the hostkey embedded in the signature matches
+		 * the one most recently bound to the socket. An exception is
+		 * made for the initial forwarding hop.
+		 */
+		if (e->nsession_ids > 1 && hostkey == NULL) {
+			error_f("refusing use of destination-constrained key: "
+			    "no hostkey recorded in signature for forwarded "
+			    "connection");
+			goto send;
+		}
+		if (hostkey != NULL && !sshkey_equal(hostkey,
+		    e->session_ids[e->nsession_ids - 1].key)) {
+			error_f("refusing use of destination-constrained key: "
+			    "mismatch between hostkey in request and most "
+			    "recently bound session");
+			goto send;
+		}
+		xasprintf(&sig_dest, "public key authentication request for "
+		    "user \"%s\" to listed host", user);
+	}
+	if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id, sig_dest) != 0) {
+		verbose_f("user refused key");
+		goto send;
+	}
+	if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key)) {
+		if (restrict_websafe &&
+		    strncmp(id->key->sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0 &&
+		    !check_websafe_message_contents(key, data)) {
+			/* error already logged */
+			goto send;
+		}
+		if (id->key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
+			notifier = notify_start(0,
+			    "Confirm user presence for key %s %s%s%s",
+			    sshkey_type(id->key), fp,
+			    sig_dest == NULL ? "" : "\n",
+			    sig_dest == NULL ? "" : sig_dest);
+		}
+	}
+ retry_pin:
+	if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen,
+	    sshbuf_ptr(data), sshbuf_len(data), agent_decode_alg(key, flags),
+	    id->sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0) {
+		debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign");
+		if (pin == NULL && !retried && sshkey_is_sk(id->key) &&
+		    r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
+			notify_complete(notifier, NULL);
+			notifier = NULL;
+			/* XXX include sig_dest */
+			xasprintf(&prompt, "Enter PIN%sfor %s key %s: ",
+			    (id->key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) ?
+			    " and confirm user presence " : " ",
+			    sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
+			pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_USE_ASKPASS);
+			retried = 1;
+			goto retry_pin;
+		}
+		error_fr(r, "sshkey_sign");
+		goto send;
+	}
+	/* Success */
+	ok = 0;
+ send:
+	debug_f("good signature");
+	notify_complete(notifier, "User presence confirmed");
+
+	if (ok == 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	} else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose failure");
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
+
+	sshbuf_free(sid);
+	sshbuf_free(data);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	sshkey_free(hostkey);
+	free(fp);
+	free(signature);
+	free(sig_dest);
+	free(user);
+	free(prompt);
+	if (pin != NULL)
+		freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+}
+
+/* shared */
+static void
+process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+	int r, success = 0;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	Identity *id;
+
+	debug2_f("entering");
+	if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse key");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) {
+		debug_f("key not found");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	/* identity not visible, cannot be removed */
+	if (identity_permitted(id, e, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0)
+		goto done; /* error already logged */
+	/* We have this key, free it. */
+	if (idtab->nentries < 1)
+		fatal_f("internal error: nentries %d", idtab->nentries);
+	TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
+	free_identity(id);
+	idtab->nentries--;
+	success = 1;
+ done:
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	send_status(e, success);
+}
+
+static void
+process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+	Identity *id;
+
+	debug2_f("entering");
+	/* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */
+	for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id;
+	    id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist)) {
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
+		free_identity(id);
+	}
+
+	/* Mark that there are no identities. */
+	idtab->nentries = 0;
+
+	/* Send success. */
+	send_status(e, 1);
+}
+
+/* removes expired keys and returns number of seconds until the next expiry */
+static time_t
+reaper(void)
+{
+	time_t deadline = 0, now = monotime();
+	Identity *id, *nxt;
+
+	for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
+		nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
+		if (id->death == 0)
+			continue;
+		if (now >= id->death) {
+			debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment);
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
+			free_identity(id);
+			idtab->nentries--;
+		} else
+			deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death :
+			    MINIMUM(deadline, id->death);
+	}
+	if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now)
+		return 0;
+	else
+		return (deadline - now);
+}
+
+static int
+parse_dest_constraint_hop(struct sshbuf *b, struct dest_constraint_hop *dch)
+{
+	u_char key_is_ca;
+	size_t elen = 0;
+	int r;
+	struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+	char *fp;
+
+	memset(dch, '\0', sizeof(*dch));
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &dch->user, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &dch->hostname, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, &elen)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (elen != 0) {
+		error_f("unsupported extensions (len %zu)", elen);
+		r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (*dch->hostname == '\0') {
+		free(dch->hostname);
+		dch->hostname = NULL;
+	}
+	if (*dch->user == '\0') {
+		free(dch->user);
+		dch->user = NULL;
+	}
+	while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+		dch->keys = xrecallocarray(dch->keys, dch->nkeys,
+		    dch->nkeys + 1, sizeof(*dch->keys));
+		dch->key_is_ca = xrecallocarray(dch->key_is_ca, dch->nkeys,
+		    dch->nkeys + 1, sizeof(*dch->key_is_ca));
+		if ((r = sshkey_froms(b, &k)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &key_is_ca)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
+		debug3_f("%s%s%s: adding %skey %s %s",
+		    dch->user == NULL ? "" : dch->user,
+		    dch->user == NULL ? "" : "@",
+		    dch->hostname, key_is_ca ? "CA " : "", sshkey_type(k), fp);
+		free(fp);
+		dch->keys[dch->nkeys] = k;
+		dch->key_is_ca[dch->nkeys] = key_is_ca != 0;
+		dch->nkeys++;
+		k = NULL; /* transferred */
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshkey_free(k);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_dest_constraint(struct sshbuf *m, struct dest_constraint *dc)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *frombuf = NULL, *tobuf = NULL;
+	int r;
+	size_t elen = 0;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+
+	memset(dc, '\0', sizeof(*dc));
+	if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_froms(b, &frombuf)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_froms(b, &tobuf)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, &elen)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = parse_dest_constraint_hop(frombuf, &dc->from) != 0) ||
+	    (r = parse_dest_constraint_hop(tobuf, &dc->to) != 0))
+		goto out; /* already logged */
+	if (elen != 0) {
+		error_f("unsupported extensions (len %zu)", elen);
+		r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	debug2_f("parsed %s (%u keys) > %s%s%s (%u keys)",
+	    dc->from.hostname ? dc->from.hostname : "(ORIGIN)", dc->from.nkeys,
+	    dc->to.user ? dc->to.user : "", dc->to.user ? "@" : "",
+	    dc->to.hostname ? dc->to.hostname : "(ANY)", dc->to.nkeys);
+	/* check consistency */
+	if ((dc->from.hostname == NULL) != (dc->from.nkeys == 0) ||
+	    dc->from.user != NULL) {
+		error_f("inconsistent \"from\" specification");
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (dc->to.hostname == NULL || dc->to.nkeys == 0) {
+		error_f("incomplete \"to\" specification");
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	sshbuf_free(frombuf);
+	sshbuf_free(tobuf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
+    struct dest_constraint **dcsp, size_t *ndcsp)
+{
+	char *ext_name = NULL;
+	int r;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &ext_name, NULL)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse constraint extension");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	debug_f("constraint ext %s", ext_name);
+	if (strcmp(ext_name, "sk-provider@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		if (sk_providerp == NULL) {
+			error_f("%s not valid here", ext_name);
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (*sk_providerp != NULL) {
+			error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, sk_providerp, NULL)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "parse %s", ext_name);
+			goto out;
+		}
+	} else if (strcmp(ext_name,
+	    "restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com") == 0) {
+		if (*dcsp != NULL) {
+			error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "parse %s outer", ext_name);
+			goto out;
+		}
+		while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+			if (*ndcsp >= AGENT_MAX_DEST_CONSTRAINTS) {
+				error_f("too many %s constraints", ext_name);
+				goto out;
+			}
+			*dcsp = xrecallocarray(*dcsp, *ndcsp, *ndcsp + 1,
+			    sizeof(**dcsp));
+			if ((r = parse_dest_constraint(b,
+			    *dcsp + (*ndcsp)++)) != 0)
+				goto out; /* error already logged */
+		}
+	} else {
+		error_f("unsupported constraint \"%s\"", ext_name);
+		r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(ext_name);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+parse_key_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshkey *k, time_t *deathp,
+    u_int *secondsp, int *confirmp, char **sk_providerp,
+    struct dest_constraint **dcsp, size_t *ndcsp)
+{
+	u_char ctype;
+	int r;
+	u_int seconds, maxsign = 0;
+
+	while (sshbuf_len(m)) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ctype)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "parse constraint type");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		switch (ctype) {
+		case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
+			if (*deathp != 0) {
+				error_f("lifetime already set");
+				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &seconds)) != 0) {
+				error_fr(r, "parse lifetime constraint");
+				goto out;
+			}
+			*deathp = monotime() + seconds;
+			*secondsp = seconds;
+			break;
+		case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
+			if (*confirmp != 0) {
+				error_f("confirm already set");
+				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			*confirmp = 1;
+			break;
+		case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN:
+			if (k == NULL) {
+				error_f("maxsign not valid here");
+				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (maxsign != 0) {
+				error_f("maxsign already set");
+				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &maxsign)) != 0) {
+				error_fr(r, "parse maxsign constraint");
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if ((r = sshkey_enable_maxsign(k, maxsign)) != 0) {
+				error_fr(r, "enable maxsign");
+				goto out;
+			}
+			break;
+		case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION:
+			if ((r = parse_key_constraint_extension(m,
+			    sk_providerp, dcsp, ndcsp)) != 0)
+				goto out; /* error already logged */
+			break;
+		default:
+			error_f("Unknown constraint %d", ctype);
+			r = SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void
+process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+	Identity *id;
+	int success = 0, confirm = 0;
+	char *fp, *comment = NULL, *sk_provider = NULL;
+	char canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
+	time_t death = 0;
+	u_int seconds = 0;
+	struct dest_constraint *dest_constraints = NULL;
+	size_t ndest_constraints = 0;
+	struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	debug2_f("entering");
+	if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 ||
+	    k == NULL ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (parse_key_constraints(e->request, k, &death, &seconds, &confirm,
+	    &sk_provider, &dest_constraints, &ndest_constraints) != 0) {
+		error_f("failed to parse constraints");
+		sshbuf_reset(e->request);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (sk_provider != NULL) {
+		if (!sshkey_is_sk(k)) {
+			error("Cannot add provider: %s is not an "
+			    "authenticator-hosted key", sshkey_type(k));
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (strcasecmp(sk_provider, "internal") == 0) {
+			debug_f("internal provider");
+		} else {
+			if (realpath(sk_provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
+				verbose("failed provider \"%.100s\": "
+				    "realpath: %s", sk_provider,
+				    strerror(errno));
+				goto out;
+			}
+			free(sk_provider);
+			sk_provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
+			if (match_pattern_list(sk_provider,
+			    allowed_providers, 0) != 1) {
+				error("Refusing add key: "
+				    "provider %s not allowed", sk_provider);
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_shield_private(k)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "shield private");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (lifetime && !death)
+		death = monotime() + lifetime;
+	if ((id = lookup_identity(k)) == NULL) {
+		id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
+		/* Increment the number of identities. */
+		idtab->nentries++;
+	} else {
+		/* identity not visible, do not update */
+		if (identity_permitted(id, e, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0)
+			goto out; /* error already logged */
+		/* key state might have been updated */
+		sshkey_free(id->key);
+		free(id->comment);
+		free(id->sk_provider);
+		free_dest_constraints(id->dest_constraints,
+		    id->ndest_constraints);
+	}
+	/* success */
+	id->key = k;
+	id->comment = comment;
+	id->death = death;
+	id->confirm = confirm;
+	id->sk_provider = sk_provider;
+	id->dest_constraints = dest_constraints;
+	id->ndest_constraints = ndest_constraints;
+
+	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+	debug_f("add %s %s \"%.100s\" (life: %u) (confirm: %u) "
+	    "(provider: %s) (destination constraints: %zu)",
+	    sshkey_ssh_name(k), fp, comment, seconds, confirm,
+	    sk_provider == NULL ? "none" : sk_provider, ndest_constraints);
+	free(fp);
+	/* transferred */
+	k = NULL;
+	comment = NULL;
+	sk_provider = NULL;
+	dest_constraints = NULL;
+	ndest_constraints = 0;
+	success = 1;
+ out:
+	free(sk_provider);
+	free(comment);
+	sshkey_free(k);
+	free_dest_constraints(dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
+	send_status(e, success);
+}
+
+/* XXX todo: encrypt sensitive data with passphrase */
+static void
+process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
+{
+	int r, success = 0, delay;
+	char *passwd;
+	u_char passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE];
+	static u_int fail_count = 0;
+	size_t pwlen;
+
+	debug2_f("entering");
+	/*
+	 * This is deliberately fatal: the user has requested that we lock,
+	 * but we can't parse their request properly. The only safe thing to
+	 * do is abort.
+	 */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, &pwlen)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	if (pwlen == 0) {
+		debug("empty password not supported");
+	} else if (locked && !lock) {
+		if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
+		    passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
+			fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
+		if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_pwhash, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
+			debug("agent unlocked");
+			locked = 0;
+			fail_count = 0;
+			explicit_bzero(lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash));
+			success = 1;
+		} else {
+			/* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */
+			if (fail_count < 100)
+				fail_count++;
+			delay = 100000 * fail_count;
+			debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds",
+			    (double)delay/1000000);
+			usleep(delay);
+		}
+		explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash));
+	} else if (!locked && lock) {
+		debug("agent locked");
+		locked = 1;
+		arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt));
+		if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
+		    lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
+			fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
+		success = 1;
+	}
+	freezero(passwd, pwlen);
+	send_status(e, success);
+}
+
+static void
+no_identities(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+static void
+process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+	char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
+	char **comments = NULL;
+	int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
+	u_int seconds = 0;
+	time_t death = 0;
+	struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
+	Identity *id;
+	struct dest_constraint *dest_constraints = NULL;
+	size_t ndest_constraints = 0;
+
+	debug2_f("entering");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse");
+		goto send;
+	}
+	if (parse_key_constraints(e->request, NULL, &death, &seconds, &confirm,
+	    NULL, &dest_constraints, &ndest_constraints) != 0) {
+		error_f("failed to parse constraints");
+		goto send;
+	}
+	if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
+		verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
+		    provider, strerror(errno));
+		goto send;
+	}
+	if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, allowed_providers, 0) != 1) {
+		verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": "
+		    "provider not allowed", canonical_provider);
+		goto send;
+	}
+	debug_f("add %.100s", canonical_provider);
+	if (lifetime && !death)
+		death = monotime() + lifetime;
+
+	count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys, &comments);
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		k = keys[i];
+		if (lookup_identity(k) == NULL) {
+			id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
+			id->key = k;
+			keys[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
+			id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
+			if (*comments[i] != '\0') {
+				id->comment = comments[i];
+				comments[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
+			} else {
+				id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
+			}
+			id->death = death;
+			id->confirm = confirm;
+			id->dest_constraints = dest_constraints;
+			id->ndest_constraints = ndest_constraints;
+			dest_constraints = NULL; /* transferred */
+			ndest_constraints = 0;
+			TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
+			idtab->nentries++;
+			success = 1;
+		}
+		/* XXX update constraints for existing keys */
+		sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+		free(comments[i]);
+	}
+send:
+	free(pin);
+	free(provider);
+	free(keys);
+	free(comments);
+	free_dest_constraints(dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
+	send_status(e, success);
+}
+
+static void
+process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+	char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
+	int r, success = 0;
+	Identity *id, *nxt;
+
+	debug2_f("entering");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse");
+		goto send;
+	}
+	free(pin);
+
+	if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
+		verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
+		    provider, strerror(errno));
+		goto send;
+	}
+
+	debug_f("remove %.100s", canonical_provider);
+	for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
+		nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
+		/* Skip file--based keys */
+		if (id->provider == NULL)
+			continue;
+		if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) {
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
+			free_identity(id);
+			idtab->nentries--;
+		}
+	}
+	if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0)
+		success = 1;
+	else
+		error_f("pkcs11_del_provider failed");
+send:
+	free(provider);
+	send_status(e, success);
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+
+static int
+process_ext_session_bind(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+	int r, sid_match, key_match;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *sid = NULL, *sig = NULL;
+	char *fp = NULL;
+	size_t i;
+	u_char fwd = 0;
+
+	debug2_f("entering");
+	if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_froms(e->request, &sid)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_froms(e->request, &sig)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &fwd)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
+	/* check signature with hostkey on session ID */
+	if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sshbuf_ptr(sig), sshbuf_len(sig),
+	    sshbuf_ptr(sid), sshbuf_len(sid), NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshkey_verify for %s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* check whether sid/key already recorded */
+	for (i = 0; i < e->nsession_ids; i++) {
+		if (!e->session_ids[i].forwarded) {
+			error_f("attempt to bind session ID to socket "
+			    "previously bound for authentication attempt");
+			r = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		sid_match = buf_equal(sid, e->session_ids[i].sid) == 0;
+		key_match = sshkey_equal(key, e->session_ids[i].key);
+		if (sid_match && key_match) {
+			debug_f("session ID already recorded for %s %s",
+			    sshkey_type(key), fp);
+			r = 0;
+			goto out;
+		} else if (sid_match) {
+			error_f("session ID recorded against different key "
+			    "for %s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp);
+			r = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * new sid with previously-seen key can happen, e.g. multiple
+		 * connections to the same host.
+		 */
+	}
+	/* record new key/sid */
+	if (e->nsession_ids >= AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS) {
+		error_f("too many session IDs recorded");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	e->session_ids = xrecallocarray(e->session_ids, e->nsession_ids,
+	    e->nsession_ids + 1, sizeof(*e->session_ids));
+	i = e->nsession_ids++;
+	debug_f("recorded %s %s (slot %zu of %d)", sshkey_type(key), fp, i,
+	    AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS);
+	e->session_ids[i].key = key;
+	e->session_ids[i].forwarded = fwd != 0;
+	key = NULL; /* transferred */
+	/* can't transfer sid; it's refcounted and scoped to request's life */
+	if ((e->session_ids[i].sid = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_putb(e->session_ids[i].sid, sid)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putb session ID");
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(fp);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	sshbuf_free(sid);
+	sshbuf_free(sig);
+	return r == 0 ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+static void
+process_extension(SocketEntry *e)
+{
+	int r, success = 0;
+	char *name;
+
+	debug2_f("entering");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &name, NULL)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse");
+		goto send;
+	}
+	if (strcmp(name, "session-bind@openssh.com") == 0)
+		success = process_ext_session_bind(e);
+	else
+		debug_f("unsupported extension \"%s\"", name);
+	free(name);
+send:
+	send_status(e, success);
+}
+/*
+ * dispatch incoming message.
+ * returns 1 on success, 0 for incomplete messages or -1 on error.
+ */
+static int
+process_message(u_int socknum)
+{
+	u_int msg_len;
+	u_char type;
+	const u_char *cp;
+	int r;
+	SocketEntry *e;
+
+	if (socknum >= sockets_alloc)
+		fatal_f("sock %u >= allocated %u", socknum, sockets_alloc);
+	e = &sockets[socknum];
+
+	if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < 5)
+		return 0;		/* Incomplete message header. */
+	cp = sshbuf_ptr(e->input);
+	msg_len = PEEK_U32(cp);
+	if (msg_len > AGENT_MAX_LEN) {
+		debug_f("socket %u (fd=%d) message too long %u > %u",
+		    socknum, e->fd, msg_len, AGENT_MAX_LEN);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < msg_len + 4)
+		return 0;		/* Incomplete message body. */
+
+	/* move the current input to e->request */
+	sshbuf_reset(e->request);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->input, e->request)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) {
+		if (r == SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE ||
+		    r == SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE) {
+			error_fr(r, "parse");
+			return -1;
+		}
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	}
+
+	debug_f("socket %u (fd=%d) type %d", socknum, e->fd, type);
+
+	/* check whether agent is locked */
+	if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) {
+		sshbuf_reset(e->request);
+		switch (type) {
+		case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
+			/* send empty lists */
+			no_identities(e);
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* send a fail message for all other request types */
+			send_status(e, 0);
+		}
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case SSH_AGENTC_LOCK:
+	case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK:
+		process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK);
+		break;
+	case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES:
+		process_remove_all_identities(e); /* safe for !WITH_SSH1 */
+		break;
+	/* ssh2 */
+	case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST:
+		process_sign_request2(e);
+		break;
+	case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
+		process_request_identities(e);
+		break;
+	case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY:
+	case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED:
+		process_add_identity(e);
+		break;
+	case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY:
+		process_remove_identity(e);
+		break;
+	case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES:
+		process_remove_all_identities(e);
+		break;
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY:
+	case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED:
+		process_add_smartcard_key(e);
+		break;
+	case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY:
+		process_remove_smartcard_key(e);
+		break;
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+	case SSH_AGENTC_EXTENSION:
+		process_extension(e);
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Unknown message.  Respond with failure. */
+		error("Unknown message %d", type);
+		sshbuf_reset(e->request);
+		send_status(e, 0);
+		break;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
+{
+	u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc;
+
+	debug_f("type = %s", type == AUTH_CONNECTION ? "CONNECTION" :
+	    (type == AUTH_SOCKET ? "SOCKET" : "UNKNOWN"));
+	set_nonblock(fd);
+
+	if (fd > max_fd)
+		max_fd = fd;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
+		if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) {
+			sockets[i].fd = fd;
+			if ((sockets[i].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (sockets[i].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+			    (sockets[i].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+				fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+			sockets[i].type = type;
+			return;
+		}
+	old_alloc = sockets_alloc;
+	new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10;
+	sockets = xrecallocarray(sockets, old_alloc, new_alloc,
+	    sizeof(sockets[0]));
+	for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++)
+		sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
+	sockets_alloc = new_alloc;
+	sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd;
+	if ((sockets[old_alloc].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (sockets[old_alloc].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (sockets[old_alloc].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	sockets[old_alloc].type = type;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_socket_read(u_int socknum)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
+	socklen_t slen;
+	uid_t euid;
+	gid_t egid;
+	int fd;
+
+	slen = sizeof(sunaddr);
+	fd = accept(sockets[socknum].fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (getpeereid(fd, &euid, &egid) == -1) {
+		error("getpeereid %d failed: %s", fd, strerror(errno));
+		close(fd);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) {
+		error("uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u",
+		    (u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid());
+		close(fd);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, fd);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_conn_read(u_int socknum)
+{
+	char buf[AGENT_RBUF_LEN];
+	ssize_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((len = read(sockets[socknum].fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) <= 0) {
+		if (len == -1) {
+			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
+				return 0;
+			error_f("read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s",
+			    socknum, sockets[socknum].fd, strerror(errno));
+		}
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(sockets[socknum].input, buf, len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	for (;;) {
+		if ((r = process_message(socknum)) == -1)
+			return -1;
+		else if (r == 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+handle_conn_write(u_int socknum)
+{
+	ssize_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	if (sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output) == 0)
+		return 0; /* shouldn't happen */
+	if ((len = write(sockets[socknum].fd,
+	    sshbuf_ptr(sockets[socknum].output),
+	    sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output))) <= 0) {
+		if (len == -1) {
+			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
+				return 0;
+			error_f("read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s",
+			    socknum, sockets[socknum].fd, strerror(errno));
+		}
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sockets[socknum].output, len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "consume");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+after_poll(struct pollfd *pfd, size_t npfd, u_int maxfds)
+{
+	size_t i;
+	u_int socknum, activefds = npfd;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < npfd; i++) {
+		if (pfd[i].revents == 0)
+			continue;
+		/* Find sockets entry */
+		for (socknum = 0; socknum < sockets_alloc; socknum++) {
+			if (sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_SOCKET &&
+			    sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_CONNECTION)
+				continue;
+			if (pfd[i].fd == sockets[socknum].fd)
+				break;
+		}
+		if (socknum >= sockets_alloc) {
+			error_f("no socket for fd %d", pfd[i].fd);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Process events */
+		switch (sockets[socknum].type) {
+		case AUTH_SOCKET:
+			if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) == 0)
+				break;
+			if (npfd > maxfds) {
+				debug3("out of fds (active %u >= limit %u); "
+				    "skipping accept", activefds, maxfds);
+				break;
+			}
+			if (handle_socket_read(socknum) == 0)
+				activefds++;
+			break;
+		case AUTH_CONNECTION:
+			if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLHUP|POLLERR)) != 0 &&
+			    handle_conn_read(socknum) != 0)
+				goto close_sock;
+			if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLOUT|POLLHUP)) != 0 &&
+			    handle_conn_write(socknum) != 0) {
+ close_sock:
+				if (activefds == 0)
+					fatal("activefds == 0 at close_sock");
+				close_socket(&sockets[socknum]);
+				activefds--;
+				break;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+prepare_poll(struct pollfd **pfdp, size_t *npfdp, int *timeoutp, u_int maxfds)
+{
+	struct pollfd *pfd = *pfdp;
+	size_t i, j, npfd = 0;
+	time_t deadline;
+	int r;
+
+	/* Count active sockets */
+	for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
+		switch (sockets[i].type) {
+		case AUTH_SOCKET:
+		case AUTH_CONNECTION:
+			npfd++;
+			break;
+		case AUTH_UNUSED:
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (npfd != *npfdp &&
+	    (pfd = recallocarray(pfd, *npfdp, npfd, sizeof(*pfd))) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("recallocarray failed");
+	*pfdp = pfd;
+	*npfdp = npfd;
+
+	for (i = j = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
+		switch (sockets[i].type) {
+		case AUTH_SOCKET:
+			if (npfd > maxfds) {
+				debug3("out of fds (active %zu >= limit %u); "
+				    "skipping arming listener", npfd, maxfds);
+				break;
+			}
+			pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd;
+			pfd[j].revents = 0;
+			pfd[j].events = POLLIN;
+			j++;
+			break;
+		case AUTH_CONNECTION:
+			pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd;
+			pfd[j].revents = 0;
+			/*
+			 * Only prepare to read if we can handle a full-size
+			 * input read buffer and enqueue a max size reply..
+			 */
+			if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(sockets[i].input,
+			    AGENT_RBUF_LEN)) == 0 &&
+			    (r = sshbuf_check_reserve(sockets[i].output,
+			    AGENT_MAX_LEN)) == 0)
+				pfd[j].events = POLLIN;
+			else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
+				fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
+			if (sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output) > 0)
+				pfd[j].events |= POLLOUT;
+			j++;
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	deadline = reaper();
+	if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
+		deadline = (deadline == 0) ? parent_alive_interval :
+		    MINIMUM(deadline, parent_alive_interval);
+	if (deadline == 0) {
+		*timeoutp = -1; /* INFTIM */
+	} else {
+		if (deadline > INT_MAX / 1000)
+			*timeoutp = INT_MAX / 1000;
+		else
+			*timeoutp = deadline * 1000;
+	}
+	return (1);
+}
+
+static void
+cleanup_socket(void)
+{
+	if (cleanup_pid != 0 && getpid() != cleanup_pid)
+		return;
+	debug_f("cleanup");
+	if (socket_name[0])
+		unlink(socket_name);
+	if (socket_dir[0])
+		rmdir(socket_dir);
+}
+
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+	cleanup_socket();
+	_exit(i);
+}
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+cleanup_handler(int sig)
+{
+	cleanup_socket();
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	pkcs11_terminate();
+#endif
+	_exit(2);
+}
+
+static void
+check_parent_exists(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * If our parent has exited then getppid() will return (pid_t)1,
+	 * so testing for that should be safe.
+	 */
+	if (parent_pid != -1 && getppid() != parent_pid) {
+		/* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */
+		cleanup_socket();
+		_exit(2);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
+	    "                 [-O option] [-P allowed_providers] [-t life]\n"
+	    "       ssh-agent [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-O option]\n"
+	    "                 [-P allowed_providers] [-t life] command [arg ...]\n"
+	    "       ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+	int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
+	int sock, ch, result, saved_errno;
+	char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
+#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+	struct rlimit rlim;
+#endif
+	extern int optind;
+	extern char *optarg;
+	pid_t pid;
+	char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
+	size_t len;
+	mode_t prev_mask;
+	int timeout = -1; /* INFTIM */
+	struct pollfd *pfd = NULL;
+	size_t npfd = 0;
+	u_int maxfds;
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	/* drop */
+	setegid(getgid());
+	setgid(getgid());
+
+	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
+
+#ifdef RLIMIT_NOFILE
+	if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: getrlimit: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
+#endif
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+	seed_rng();
+
+	while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:O:P:t:")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'E':
+			fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
+			if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
+				fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'c':
+			if (s_flag)
+				usage();
+			c_flag++;
+			break;
+		case 'k':
+			k_flag++;
+			break;
+		case 'O':
+			if (strcmp(optarg, "no-restrict-websafe") == 0)
+				restrict_websafe  = 0;
+			else
+				fatal("Unknown -O option");
+			break;
+		case 'P':
+			if (allowed_providers != NULL)
+				fatal("-P option already specified");
+			allowed_providers = xstrdup(optarg);
+			break;
+		case 's':
+			if (c_flag)
+				usage();
+			s_flag++;
+			break;
+		case 'd':
+			if (d_flag || D_flag)
+				usage();
+			d_flag++;
+			break;
+		case 'D':
+			if (d_flag || D_flag)
+				usage();
+			D_flag++;
+			break;
+		case 'a':
+			agentsocket = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
+				usage();
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			usage();
+		}
+	}
+	ac -= optind;
+	av += optind;
+
+	if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag))
+		usage();
+
+	if (allowed_providers == NULL)
+		allowed_providers = xstrdup(DEFAULT_ALLOWED_PROVIDERS);
+
+	if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
+		shell = getenv("SHELL");
+		if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 &&
+		    strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
+			c_flag = 1;
+	}
+	if (k_flag) {
+		const char *errstr = NULL;
+
+		pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
+		if (pidstr == NULL) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n",
+			    SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr);
+		if (errstr) {
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n",
+			    SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) {
+			perror("kill");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n";
+		printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+		printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
+		printf("echo Agent pid %ld killed;\n", (long)pid);
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Minimum file descriptors:
+	 * stdio (3) + listener (1) + syslog (1 maybe) + connection (1) +
+	 * a few spare for libc / stack protectors / sanitisers, etc.
+	 */
+#define SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS (3+1+1+1+4)
+	if (rlim.rlim_cur < SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS)
+		fatal("%s: file descriptor rlimit %lld too low (minimum %u)",
+		    __progname, (long long)rlim.rlim_cur, SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS);
+	maxfds = rlim.rlim_cur - SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS;
+
+	parent_pid = getpid();
+
+	if (agentsocket == NULL) {
+		/* Create private directory for agent socket */
+		mktemp_proto(socket_dir, sizeof(socket_dir));
+		if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) {
+			perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%ld", socket_dir,
+		    (long)parent_pid);
+	} else {
+		/* Try to use specified agent socket */
+		socket_dir[0] = '\0';
+		strlcpy(socket_name, agentsocket, sizeof socket_name);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
+	 * the parent.
+	 */
+	prev_mask = umask(0177);
+	sock = unix_listener(socket_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
+	if (sock < 0) {
+		/* XXX - unix_listener() calls error() not perror() */
+		*socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
+		cleanup_exit(1);
+	}
+	umask(prev_mask);
+
+	/*
+	 * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
+	 * the socket data.  The child continues as the authentication agent.
+	 */
+	if (D_flag || d_flag) {
+		log_init(__progname,
+		    d_flag ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
+		    SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
+		format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
+		printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
+		    SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+		printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid);
+		fflush(stdout);
+		goto skip;
+	}
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid == -1) {
+		perror("fork");
+		cleanup_exit(1);
+	}
+	if (pid != 0) {		/* Parent - execute the given command. */
+		close(sock);
+		snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%ld", (long)pid);
+		if (ac == 0) {
+			format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
+			printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
+			    SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+			printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf,
+			    SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
+			printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)pid);
+			exit(0);
+		}
+		if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 ||
+		    setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) {
+			perror("setenv");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		execvp(av[0], av);
+		perror(av[0]);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	/* child */
+	log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
+
+	if (setsid() == -1) {
+		error("setsid: %s", strerror(errno));
+		cleanup_exit(1);
+	}
+
+	(void)chdir("/");
+	if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 1) == -1)
+		error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
+	/* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */
+	rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) == -1) {
+		error("setrlimit RLIMIT_CORE: %s", strerror(errno));
+		cleanup_exit(1);
+	}
+#endif
+
+skip:
+
+	cleanup_pid = getpid();
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	pkcs11_init(0);
+#endif
+	new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
+	if (ac > 0)
+		parent_alive_interval = 10;
+	idtab_init();
+	ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+	ssh_signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
+	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
+	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
+
+	if (pledge("stdio rpath cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
+	platform_pledge_agent();
+
+	while (1) {
+		prepare_poll(&pfd, &npfd, &timeout, maxfds);
+		result = poll(pfd, npfd, timeout);
+		saved_errno = errno;
+		if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
+			check_parent_exists();
+		(void) reaper();	/* remove expired keys */
+		if (result == -1) {
+			if (saved_errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+			fatal("poll: %s", strerror(saved_errno));
+		} else if (result > 0)
+			after_poll(pfd, npfd, maxfds);
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+}
diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ea0c0a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-dss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.48 2022/10/28 00:44:44 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include "sshkey.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#define INTBLOB_LEN	20
+#define SIGBLOB_LEN	(2*INTBLOB_LEN)
+
+static u_int
+ssh_dss_size(const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *dsa_p;
+
+	if (key->dsa == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &dsa_p, NULL, NULL);
+	return BN_num_bits(dsa_p);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_dss_alloc(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	if ((k->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_dss_cleanup(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	DSA_free(k->dsa);
+	k->dsa = NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_dss_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *dsa_p_a, *dsa_q_a, *dsa_g_a, *dsa_pub_key_a;
+	const BIGNUM *dsa_p_b, *dsa_q_b, *dsa_g_b, *dsa_pub_key_b;
+
+	if (a->dsa == NULL || b->dsa == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	DSA_get0_pqg(a->dsa, &dsa_p_a, &dsa_q_a, &dsa_g_a);
+	DSA_get0_pqg(b->dsa, &dsa_p_b, &dsa_q_b, &dsa_g_b);
+	DSA_get0_key(a->dsa, &dsa_pub_key_a, NULL);
+	DSA_get0_key(b->dsa, &dsa_pub_key_b, NULL);
+	if (dsa_p_a == NULL || dsa_p_b == NULL ||
+	    dsa_q_a == NULL || dsa_q_b == NULL ||
+	    dsa_g_a == NULL || dsa_g_b == NULL ||
+	    dsa_pub_key_a == NULL || dsa_pub_key_b == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (BN_cmp(dsa_p_a, dsa_p_b) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (BN_cmp(dsa_q_a, dsa_q_b) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (BN_cmp(dsa_g_a, dsa_g_b) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (BN_cmp(dsa_pub_key_a, dsa_pub_key_b) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_dss_serialize_public(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	int r;
+	const BIGNUM *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key;
+
+	if (key->dsa == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g);
+	DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL);
+	if (dsa_p == NULL || dsa_q == NULL ||
+	    dsa_g == NULL || dsa_pub_key == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_p)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_q)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_g)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_pub_key)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_dss_serialize_private(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	int r;
+	const BIGNUM *dsa_priv_key;
+
+	DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, NULL, &dsa_priv_key);
+	if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+		if ((r = ssh_dss_serialize_public(key, b, opts)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_priv_key)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_dss_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits)
+{
+	DSA *private;
+
+	if (bits != 1024)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+	if ((private = DSA_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if (!DSA_generate_parameters_ex(private, bits, NULL, 0, NULL,
+	    NULL, NULL) || !DSA_generate_key(private)) {
+		DSA_free(private);
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	}
+	k->dsa = private;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_dss_copy_public(const struct sshkey *from, struct sshkey *to)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key;
+	BIGNUM *dsa_p_dup = NULL, *dsa_q_dup = NULL, *dsa_g_dup = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key_dup = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	DSA_get0_pqg(from->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g);
+	DSA_get0_key(from->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL);
+	if ((dsa_p_dup = BN_dup(dsa_p)) == NULL ||
+	    (dsa_q_dup = BN_dup(dsa_q)) == NULL ||
+	    (dsa_g_dup = BN_dup(dsa_g)) == NULL ||
+	    (dsa_pub_key_dup = BN_dup(dsa_pub_key)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (!DSA_set0_pqg(to->dsa, dsa_p_dup, dsa_q_dup, dsa_g_dup)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	dsa_p_dup = dsa_q_dup = dsa_g_dup = NULL; /* transferred */
+	if (!DSA_set0_key(to->dsa, dsa_pub_key_dup, NULL)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	dsa_pub_key_dup = NULL; /* transferred */
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	BN_clear_free(dsa_p_dup);
+	BN_clear_free(dsa_q_dup);
+	BN_clear_free(dsa_g_dup);
+	BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key_dup);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_dss_deserialize_public(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b,
+    struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL, *dsa_pub_key = NULL;
+
+	if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_p) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_q) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_g) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_pub_key) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (!DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g)) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */
+	if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, dsa_pub_key, NULL)) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	dsa_pub_key = NULL; /* transferred */
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8);
+#endif
+	/* success */
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	BN_clear_free(dsa_p);
+	BN_clear_free(dsa_q);
+	BN_clear_free(dsa_g);
+	BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_dss_deserialize_private(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b,
+    struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	int r;
+	BIGNUM *dsa_priv_key = NULL;
+
+	if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+		if ((r = ssh_dss_deserialize_public(ktype, b, key)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_priv_key)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, NULL, dsa_priv_key)) {
+		BN_clear_free(dsa_priv_key);
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_dss_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+    u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+    const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
+{
+	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
+	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
+	size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = 0;
+	if (sigp != NULL)
+		*sigp = NULL;
+
+	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
+	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (dlen == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
+	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
+	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
+	slen = BN_num_bytes(sig_s);
+	if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	explicit_bzero(sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN);
+	BN_bn2bin(sig_r, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen);
+	BN_bn2bin(sig_s, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - slen);
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-dss")) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	len = sshbuf_len(b);
+	if (sigp != NULL) {
+		if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
+	}
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = len;
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+    const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
+    struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
+{
+	DSA_SIG *dsig = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
+	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL;
+	size_t len, hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	char *ktype = NULL;
+
+	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
+	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
+	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (hlen == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	/* fetch signature */
+	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (strcmp("ssh-dss", ktype) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (len != SIGBLOB_LEN) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* parse signature */
+	if ((dsig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (sig_r = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (sig_s = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig_r) == NULL) ||
+	    (BN_bin2bn(sigblob + INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig_s) == NULL)) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (!DSA_SIG_set0(dsig, sig_r, sig_s)) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
+
+	/* sha1 the data */
+	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, dlen,
+	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, hlen, dsig, key->dsa)) {
+	case 1:
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+	case 0:
+		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	default:
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+	DSA_SIG_free(dsig);
+	BN_clear_free(sig_r);
+	BN_clear_free(sig_s);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	free(ktype);
+	if (sigblob != NULL)
+		freezero(sigblob, len);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_dss_funcs = {
+	/* .size = */		ssh_dss_size,
+	/* .alloc = */		ssh_dss_alloc,
+	/* .cleanup = */	ssh_dss_cleanup,
+	/* .equal = */		ssh_dss_equal,
+	/* .ssh_serialize_public = */ ssh_dss_serialize_public,
+	/* .ssh_deserialize_public = */ ssh_dss_deserialize_public,
+	/* .ssh_serialize_private = */ ssh_dss_serialize_private,
+	/* .ssh_deserialize_private = */ ssh_dss_deserialize_private,
+	/* .generate = */	ssh_dss_generate,
+	/* .copy_public = */	ssh_dss_copy_public,
+	/* .sign = */		ssh_dss_sign,
+	/* .verify = */		ssh_dss_verify,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_dss_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"ssh-dss",
+	/* .shortname = */	"DSA",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_DSA,
+	/* .nid = */		0,
+	/* .cert = */		0,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	0,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_dss_funcs,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_dsa_cert_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+	/* .shortname = */	"DSA-CERT",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_DSA_CERT,
+	/* .nid = */		0,
+	/* .cert = */		1,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	0,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_dss_funcs,
+};
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c b/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..729e548
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa-sk.c,v 1.17 2022/10/28 00:44:44 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google Inc.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h> /* needed for DEBUG_SK only */
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include "sshkey.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+    const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat,
+    struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
+{
+	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+#else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+/* Reuse some ECDSA internals */
+extern struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_ecdsa_funcs;
+
+static void
+ssh_ecdsa_sk_cleanup(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	sshkey_sk_cleanup(k);
+	sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.cleanup(k);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ecdsa_sk_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
+{
+	if (!sshkey_sk_fields_equal(a, b))
+		return 0;
+	if (!sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.equal(a, b))
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ecdsa_sk_serialize_public(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.serialize_public(key, b, opts)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((r = sshkey_serialize_sk(key, b)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ecdsa_sk_serialize_private(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.serialize_public(key,
+		    b, opts)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_serialize_private_sk(key, b)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ecdsa_sk_copy_public(const struct sshkey *from, struct sshkey *to)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.copy_public(from, to)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((r = sshkey_copy_public_sk(from, to)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ecdsa_sk_deserialize_public(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b,
+    struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.deserialize_public(ktype, b, key)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((r = sshkey_deserialize_sk(b, key)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ecdsa_sk_deserialize_private(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b,
+    struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_ecdsa_funcs.deserialize_public(ktype,
+		    b, key)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize_sk(b, key)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check FIDO/W3C webauthn signatures clientData field against the expected
+ * format and prepare a hash of it for use in signature verification.
+ *
+ * webauthn signatures do not sign the hash of the message directly, but
+ * instead sign a JSON-like "clientData" wrapper structure that contains the
+ * message hash along with a other information.
+ *
+ * Fortunately this structure has a fixed format so it is possible to verify
+ * that the hash of the signed message is present within the clientData
+ * structure without needing to implement any JSON parsing.
+ */
+static int
+webauthn_check_prepare_hash(const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+    const char *origin, const struct sshbuf *wrapper,
+    uint8_t flags, const struct sshbuf *extensions,
+    u_char *msghash, size_t msghashlen)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *chall = NULL, *m = NULL;
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (chall = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Ensure origin contains no quote character and that the flags are
+	 * consistent with what we received
+	 */
+	if (strchr(origin, '\"') != NULL ||
+	    (flags & 0x40) != 0 /* AD */ ||
+	    ((flags & 0x80) == 0 /* ED */) != (sshbuf_len(extensions) == 0)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare the preamble to clientData that we expect, poking the
+	 * challenge and origin into their canonical positions in the
+	 * structure. The crossOrigin flag and any additional extension
+	 * fields present are ignored.
+	 */
+#define WEBAUTHN_0	"{\"type\":\"webauthn.get\",\"challenge\":\""
+#define WEBAUTHN_1	"\",\"origin\":\""
+#define WEBAUTHN_2	"\""
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(m, WEBAUTHN_0, sizeof(WEBAUTHN_0) - 1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_dtourlb64(chall, m, 0)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(m, WEBAUTHN_1, sizeof(WEBAUTHN_1) - 1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(m, origin, strlen(origin))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(m, WEBAUTHN_2, sizeof(WEBAUTHN_2) - 1)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: received origin: %s\n", __func__, origin);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: received clientData:\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump(wrapper, stderr);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: expected clientData premable:\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump(m, stderr);
+#endif
+	/* Check that the supplied clientData has the preamble we expect */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(wrapper, 0, sshbuf_ptr(m), sshbuf_len(m))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Prepare hash of clientData */
+	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, wrapper,
+	    msghash, msghashlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(chall);
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+    const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
+    struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
+{
+	ECDSA_SIG *esig = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
+	u_char sig_flags;
+	u_char msghash[32], apphash[32], sighash[32];
+	u_int sig_counter;
+	int is_webauthn = 0, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL, *original_signed = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *webauthn_wrapper = NULL, *webauthn_exts = NULL;
+	char *ktype = NULL, *webauthn_origin = NULL;
+	struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL;
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+	char *tmp = NULL;
+#endif
+
+	if (detailsp != NULL)
+		*detailsp = NULL;
+	if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
+	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA_SK ||
+	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	if (key->ecdsa_nid != NID_X9_62_prime256v1)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	/* fetch signature */
+	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((details = calloc(1, sizeof(*details))) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (strcmp(ktype, "webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com") == 0)
+		is_webauthn = 1;
+	else if (strcmp(ktype, "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com") != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_froms(b, &sigbuf) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_flags) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_get_u32(b, &sig_counter) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (is_webauthn) {
+		if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &webauthn_origin, NULL) != 0 ||
+		    sshbuf_froms(b, &webauthn_wrapper) != 0 ||
+		    sshbuf_froms(b, &webauthn_exts) != 0) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* parse signature */
+	if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_r) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_s) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: data: (len %zu)\n", __func__, datalen);
+	/* sshbuf_dump_data(data, datalen, stderr); */
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_r: %s\n", __func__, (tmp = BN_bn2hex(sig_r)));
+	free(tmp);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_s: %s\n", __func__, (tmp = BN_bn2hex(sig_s)));
+	free(tmp);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_flags = 0x%02x, sig_counter = %u\n",
+	    __func__, sig_flags, sig_counter);
+	if (is_webauthn) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: webauthn origin: %s\n", __func__,
+		    webauthn_origin);
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: webauthn_wrapper:\n", __func__);
+		sshbuf_dump(webauthn_wrapper, stderr);
+	}
+#endif
+	if ((esig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(esig, sig_r, sig_s)) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
+
+	/* Reconstruct data that was supposedly signed */
+	if ((original_signed = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (is_webauthn) {
+		if ((ret = webauthn_check_prepare_hash(data, dlen,
+		    webauthn_origin, webauthn_wrapper, sig_flags, webauthn_exts,
+		    msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	} else if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, data, dlen,
+	    msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* Application value is hashed before signature */
+	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, key->sk_application,
+	    strlen(key->sk_application), apphash, sizeof(apphash))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed application:\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump_data(apphash, sizeof(apphash), stderr);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed message:\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump_data(msghash, sizeof(msghash), stderr);
+#endif
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_put(original_signed,
+	    apphash, sizeof(apphash))) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_put_u8(original_signed, sig_flags)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_put_u32(original_signed, sig_counter)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_putb(original_signed, webauthn_exts)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_put(original_signed, msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* Signature is over H(original_signed) */
+	if ((ret = ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, original_signed,
+	    sighash, sizeof(sighash))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	details->sk_counter = sig_counter;
+	details->sk_flags = sig_flags;
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed buf:\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump(original_signed, stderr);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed hash:\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump_data(sighash, sizeof(sighash), stderr);
+#endif
+
+	/* Verify it */
+	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(sighash, sizeof(sighash), esig, key->ecdsa)) {
+	case 1:
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+	case 0:
+		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	default:
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	if (detailsp != NULL) {
+		*detailsp = details;
+		details = NULL;
+	}
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(&sig_flags, sizeof(sig_flags));
+	explicit_bzero(&sig_counter, sizeof(sig_counter));
+	explicit_bzero(msghash, sizeof(msghash));
+	explicit_bzero(sighash, sizeof(msghash));
+	explicit_bzero(apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+	sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+	sshbuf_free(webauthn_wrapper);
+	sshbuf_free(webauthn_exts);
+	free(webauthn_origin);
+	sshbuf_free(original_signed);
+	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	ECDSA_SIG_free(esig);
+	BN_clear_free(sig_r);
+	BN_clear_free(sig_s);
+	free(ktype);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_ecdsa_sk_funcs = {
+	/* .size = */		NULL,
+	/* .alloc = */		NULL,
+	/* .cleanup = */	ssh_ecdsa_sk_cleanup,
+	/* .equal = */		ssh_ecdsa_sk_equal,
+	/* .ssh_serialize_public = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_serialize_public,
+	/* .ssh_deserialize_public = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_deserialize_public,
+	/* .ssh_serialize_private = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_serialize_private,
+	/* .ssh_deserialize_private = */ ssh_ecdsa_sk_deserialize_private,
+	/* .generate = */	NULL,
+	/* .copy_public = */	ssh_ecdsa_sk_copy_public,
+	/* .sign = */		NULL,
+	/* .verify = */		ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_sk_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com",
+	/* .shortname = */	"ECDSA-SK",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_ECDSA_SK,
+	/* .nid = */		NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
+	/* .cert = */		0,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	256,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_ecdsa_sk_funcs,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_sk_cert_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+	/* .shortname = */	"ECDSA-SK-CERT",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT,
+	/* .nid = */		NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
+	/* .cert = */		1,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	256,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_ecdsa_sk_funcs,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_sk_webauthn_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com",
+	/* .shortname = */	"ECDSA-SK",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_ECDSA_SK,
+	/* .nid = */		NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
+	/* .cert = */		0,
+	/* .sigonly = */	1,
+	/* .keybits = */	256,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_ecdsa_sk_funcs,
+};
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4bcb89b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,470 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa.c,v 1.25 2022/10/28 00:44:44 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include "sshkey.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+static u_int
+ssh_ecdsa_size(const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	switch (key->ecdsa_nid) {
+	case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
+		return 256;
+	case NID_secp384r1:
+		return 384;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+	case NID_secp521r1:
+		return 521;
+#endif
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_ecdsa_cleanup(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	EC_KEY_free(k->ecdsa);
+	k->ecdsa = NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ecdsa_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
+{
+	const EC_GROUP *grp_a, *grp_b;
+	const EC_POINT *pub_a, *pub_b;
+
+	if (a->ecdsa == NULL || b->ecdsa == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if ((grp_a = EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa)) == NULL ||
+	    (grp_b = EC_KEY_get0_group(b->ecdsa)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if ((pub_a = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa)) == NULL ||
+	    (pub_b = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (EC_GROUP_cmp(grp_a, grp_b, NULL) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (EC_POINT_cmp(grp_a, pub_a, pub_b, NULL) != 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ecdsa_serialize_public(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (key->ecdsa == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
+	    sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ecdsa_serialize_private(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+		if ((r = ssh_ecdsa_serialize_public(key, b, opts)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b,
+	    EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ecdsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits)
+{
+	EC_KEY *private;
+
+	if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+	if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) {
+		EC_KEY_free(private);
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+	}
+	EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
+	k->ecdsa = private;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ecdsa_copy_public(const struct sshkey *from, struct sshkey *to)
+{
+	to->ecdsa_nid = from->ecdsa_nid;
+	if ((to->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(from->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(to->ecdsa,
+	    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(from->ecdsa)) != 1)
+		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; /* caller will free k->ecdsa */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ecdsa_deserialize_public(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b,
+    struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	int r;
+	char *curve = NULL;
+
+	if ((key->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(ktype)) == -1)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &curve, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (key->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	EC_KEY_free(key->ecdsa);
+	key->ecdsa = NULL;
+	if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa),
+	    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key->ecdsa)) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa),
+	    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key->ecdsa));
+#endif
+ out:
+	free(curve);
+	if (r != 0) {
+		EC_KEY_free(key->ecdsa);
+		key->ecdsa = NULL;
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ecdsa_deserialize_private(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b,
+    struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	int r;
+	BIGNUM *exponent = NULL;
+
+	if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+		if ((r = ssh_ecdsa_deserialize_public(ktype, b, key)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &exponent)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(key->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(key->ecdsa)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	BN_clear_free(exponent);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+ssh_ecdsa_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+    u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t dlen,
+    const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
+{
+	ECDSA_SIG *esig = NULL;
+	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
+	int hash_alg;
+	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	size_t len, hlen;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = 0;
+	if (sigp != NULL)
+		*sigp = NULL;
+
+	if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
+	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
+	    (hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, dlen,
+	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((esig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, hlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ECDSA_SIG_get0(esig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig_r)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig_s)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, bb)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	len = sshbuf_len(b);
+	if (sigp != NULL) {
+		if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
+	}
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = len;
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	sshbuf_free(bb);
+	ECDSA_SIG_free(esig);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+    const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
+    struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
+{
+	ECDSA_SIG *esig = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
+	int hash_alg;
+	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	size_t hlen;
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
+	char *ktype = NULL;
+
+	if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
+	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
+	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
+	    (hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	/* fetch signature */
+	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_froms(b, &sigbuf) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* parse signature */
+	if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_r) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_s) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((esig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(esig, sig_r, sig_s)) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
+
+	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, dlen,
+	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, hlen, esig, key->ecdsa)) {
+	case 1:
+		ret = 0;
+		break;
+	case 0:
+		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	default:
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	ECDSA_SIG_free(esig);
+	BN_clear_free(sig_r);
+	BN_clear_free(sig_s);
+	free(ktype);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* NB. not static; used by ECDSA-SK */
+const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_ecdsa_funcs = {
+	/* .size = */		ssh_ecdsa_size,
+	/* .alloc = */		NULL,
+	/* .cleanup = */	ssh_ecdsa_cleanup,
+	/* .equal = */		ssh_ecdsa_equal,
+	/* .ssh_serialize_public = */ ssh_ecdsa_serialize_public,
+	/* .ssh_deserialize_public = */ ssh_ecdsa_deserialize_public,
+	/* .ssh_serialize_private = */ ssh_ecdsa_serialize_private,
+	/* .ssh_deserialize_private = */ ssh_ecdsa_deserialize_private,
+	/* .generate = */	ssh_ecdsa_generate,
+	/* .copy_public = */	ssh_ecdsa_copy_public,
+	/* .sign = */		ssh_ecdsa_sign,
+	/* .verify = */		ssh_ecdsa_verify,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp256_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256",
+	/* .shortname = */	"ECDSA",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_ECDSA,
+	/* .nid = */		NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
+	/* .cert = */		0,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	0,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_ecdsa_funcs,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp256_cert_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+	/* .shortname = */	"ECDSA-CERT",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
+	/* .nid = */		NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
+	/* .cert = */		1,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	0,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_ecdsa_funcs,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp384_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384",
+	/* .shortname = */	"ECDSA",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_ECDSA,
+	/* .nid = */		NID_secp384r1,
+	/* .cert = */		0,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	0,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_ecdsa_funcs,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp384_cert_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+	/* .shortname = */	"ECDSA-CERT",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
+	/* .nid = */		NID_secp384r1,
+	/* .cert = */		1,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	0,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_ecdsa_funcs,
+};
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp521_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521",
+	/* .shortname = */	"ECDSA",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_ECDSA,
+	/* .nid = */		NID_secp521r1,
+	/* .cert = */		0,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	0,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_ecdsa_funcs,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp521_cert_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+	/* .shortname = */	"ECDSA-CERT",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
+	/* .nid = */		NID_secp521r1,
+	/* .cert = */		1,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	0,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_ecdsa_funcs,
+};
+#endif
+
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
diff --git a/ssh-ed25519-sk.c b/ssh-ed25519-sk.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c6bc5e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-ed25519-sk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519-sk.c,v 1.15 2022/10/28 00:44:44 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+/* Reuse some ED25519 internals */
+extern struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_ed25519_funcs;
+
+static void
+ssh_ed25519_sk_cleanup(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	sshkey_sk_cleanup(k);
+	sshkey_ed25519_funcs.cleanup(k);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ed25519_sk_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
+{
+	if (!sshkey_sk_fields_equal(a, b))
+		return 0;
+	if (!sshkey_ed25519_funcs.equal(a, b))
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ed25519_sk_serialize_public(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_ed25519_funcs.serialize_public(key, b, opts)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((r = sshkey_serialize_sk(key, b)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ed25519_sk_serialize_private(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_ed25519_funcs.serialize_public(key, b, opts)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((r = sshkey_serialize_private_sk(key, b)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ed25519_sk_copy_public(const struct sshkey *from, struct sshkey *to)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_ed25519_funcs.copy_public(from, to)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((r = sshkey_copy_public_sk(from, to)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ed25519_sk_deserialize_public(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b,
+    struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_ed25519_funcs.deserialize_public(ktype, b, key)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((r = sshkey_deserialize_sk(b, key)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ed25519_sk_deserialize_private(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b,
+    struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_ed25519_funcs.deserialize_public(ktype, b, key)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize_sk(b, key)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ed25519_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+    const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
+    struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL;
+	char *ktype = NULL;
+	const u_char *sigblob;
+	const u_char *sm;
+	u_char *m = NULL;
+	u_char apphash[32];
+	u_char msghash[32];
+	u_char sig_flags;
+	u_int sig_counter;
+	size_t len;
+	unsigned long long smlen = 0, mlen = 0;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	int ret;
+	struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL;
+
+	if (detailsp != NULL)
+		*detailsp = NULL;
+
+	if (key == NULL ||
+	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519_SK ||
+	    key->ed25519_pk == NULL ||
+	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_flags) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_get_u32(b, &sig_counter) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: data:\n", __func__);
+	/* sshbuf_dump_data(data, datalen, stderr); */
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: sigblob:\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump_data(sigblob, len, stderr);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_flags = 0x%02x, sig_counter = %u\n",
+	    __func__, sig_flags, sig_counter);
+#endif
+	if (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (len > crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, key->sk_application,
+	    strlen(key->sk_application), apphash, sizeof(apphash)) != 0 ||
+	    ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, data, dlen,
+	    msghash, sizeof(msghash)) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed application:\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump_data(apphash, sizeof(apphash), stderr);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed message:\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump_data(msghash, sizeof(msghash), stderr);
+#endif
+	if ((details = calloc(1, sizeof(*details))) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	details->sk_counter = sig_counter;
+	details->sk_flags = sig_flags;
+	if ((encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_put(encoded, sigblob, len) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_put(encoded, apphash, sizeof(apphash)) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, sig_flags) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, sig_counter) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_put(encoded, msghash, sizeof(msghash)) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed buf:\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump(encoded, stderr);
+#endif
+	sm = sshbuf_ptr(encoded);
+	smlen = sshbuf_len(encoded);
+	mlen = smlen;
+	if ((m = malloc(smlen)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519_open(m, &mlen, sm, smlen,
+	    key->ed25519_pk)) != 0) {
+		debug2_f("crypto_sign_ed25519_open failed: %d", ret);
+	}
+	if (ret != 0 || mlen != smlen - len) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* XXX compare 'm' and 'sm + len' ? */
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+	if (detailsp != NULL) {
+		*detailsp = details;
+		details = NULL;
+	}
+ out:
+	if (m != NULL)
+		freezero(m, smlen); /* NB mlen may be invalid if r != 0 */
+	sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	sshbuf_free(encoded);
+	free(ktype);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_ed25519_sk_funcs = {
+	/* .size = */		NULL,
+	/* .alloc = */		NULL,
+	/* .cleanup = */	ssh_ed25519_sk_cleanup,
+	/* .equal = */		ssh_ed25519_sk_equal,
+	/* .ssh_serialize_public = */ ssh_ed25519_sk_serialize_public,
+	/* .ssh_deserialize_public = */ ssh_ed25519_sk_deserialize_public,
+	/* .ssh_serialize_private = */ ssh_ed25519_sk_serialize_private,
+	/* .ssh_deserialize_private = */ ssh_ed25519_sk_deserialize_private,
+	/* .generate = */	NULL,
+	/* .copy_public = */	ssh_ed25519_sk_copy_public,
+	/* .sign = */		NULL,
+	/* .verify = */		ssh_ed25519_sk_verify,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ed25519_sk_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com",
+	/* .shortname = */	"ED25519-SK",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_ED25519_SK,
+	/* .nid = */		0,
+	/* .cert = */		0,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	256,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_ed25519_sk_funcs,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ed25519_sk_cert_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+	/* .shortname = */	"ED25519-SK-CERT",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT,
+	/* .nid = */		0,
+	/* .cert = */		1,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	256,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_ed25519_sk_funcs,
+};
diff --git a/ssh-ed25519.c b/ssh-ed25519.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22d8db0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-ed25519.c
@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519.c,v 1.19 2022/10/28 00:44:44 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+static void
+ssh_ed25519_cleanup(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	freezero(k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
+	freezero(k->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ);
+	k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
+	k->ed25519_sk = NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ed25519_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
+{
+	if (a->ed25519_pk == NULL || b->ed25519_pk == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (memcmp(a->ed25519_pk, b->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ed25519_serialize_public(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (key->ed25519_pk == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ed25519_serialize_private(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ed25519_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits)
+{
+	if ((k->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL ||
+	    (k->ed25519_sk = malloc(ED25519_SK_SZ)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(k->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_sk);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ed25519_copy_public(const struct sshkey *from, struct sshkey *to)
+{
+	if (from->ed25519_pk == NULL)
+		return 0; /* XXX SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR ? */
+	if ((to->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	memcpy(to->ed25519_pk, from->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ed25519_deserialize_public(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b,
+    struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	u_char *pk = NULL;
+	size_t len = 0;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pk, &len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (len != ED25519_PK_SZ) {
+		freezero(pk, len);
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	}
+	key->ed25519_pk = pk;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ed25519_deserialize_private(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b,
+    struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	int r;
+	size_t sklen = 0;
+	u_char *ed25519_sk = NULL;
+
+	if ((r = ssh_ed25519_deserialize_public(NULL, b, key)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	key->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk;
+	ed25519_sk = NULL; /* transferred */
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	freezero(ed25519_sk, sklen);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ed25519_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+    u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+    const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
+{
+	u_char *sig = NULL;
+	size_t slen = 0, len;
+	unsigned long long smlen;
+	int r, ret;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = 0;
+	if (sigp != NULL)
+		*sigp = NULL;
+
+	if (key == NULL ||
+	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 ||
+	    key->ed25519_sk == NULL ||
+	    datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
+	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+	if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519(sig, &smlen, data, datalen,
+	    key->ed25519_sk)) != 0 || smlen <= datalen) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* XXX better error? */
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* encode signature */
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-ed25519")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, smlen - datalen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	len = sshbuf_len(b);
+	if (sigp != NULL) {
+		if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
+	}
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = len;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	if (sig != NULL)
+		freezero(sig, slen);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+    const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
+    struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	char *ktype = NULL;
+	const u_char *sigblob;
+	u_char *sm = NULL, *m = NULL;
+	size_t len;
+	unsigned long long smlen = 0, mlen = 0;
+	int r, ret;
+
+	if (key == NULL ||
+	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 ||
+	    key->ed25519_pk == NULL ||
+	    dlen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
+	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &sigblob, &len)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (strcmp("ssh-ed25519", ktype) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (len > crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (dlen >= SIZE_MAX - len) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	smlen = len + dlen;
+	mlen = smlen;
+	if ((sm = malloc(smlen)) == NULL || (m = malloc(mlen)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memcpy(sm, sigblob, len);
+	memcpy(sm+len, data, dlen);
+	if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519_open(m, &mlen, sm, smlen,
+	    key->ed25519_pk)) != 0) {
+		debug2_f("crypto_sign_ed25519_open failed: %d", ret);
+	}
+	if (ret != 0 || mlen != dlen) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* XXX compare 'm' and 'data' ? */
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if (sm != NULL)
+		freezero(sm, smlen);
+	if (m != NULL)
+		freezero(m, smlen); /* NB mlen may be invalid if r != 0 */
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	free(ktype);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* NB. not static; used by ED25519-SK */
+const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_ed25519_funcs = {
+	/* .size = */		NULL,
+	/* .alloc = */		NULL,
+	/* .cleanup = */	ssh_ed25519_cleanup,
+	/* .equal = */		ssh_ed25519_equal,
+	/* .ssh_serialize_public = */ ssh_ed25519_serialize_public,
+	/* .ssh_deserialize_public = */ ssh_ed25519_deserialize_public,
+	/* .ssh_serialize_private = */ ssh_ed25519_serialize_private,
+	/* .ssh_deserialize_private = */ ssh_ed25519_deserialize_private,
+	/* .generate = */	ssh_ed25519_generate,
+	/* .copy_public = */	ssh_ed25519_copy_public,
+	/* .sign = */		ssh_ed25519_sign,
+	/* .verify = */		ssh_ed25519_verify,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ed25519_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"ssh-ed25519",
+	/* .shortname = */	"ED25519",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_ED25519,
+	/* .nid = */		0,
+	/* .cert = */		0,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	256,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_ed25519_funcs,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ed25519_cert_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+	/* .shortname = */	"ED25519-CERT",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_ED25519_CERT,
+	/* .nid = */		0,
+	/* .cert = */		1,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	256,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_ed25519_funcs,
+};
diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a8af117
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-gss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.15 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SSH_GSS_H
+#define _SSH_GSS_H
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
+#include <gssapi.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
+#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef KRB5
+# ifndef HEIMDAL
+#  ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+#   include <gssapi_generic.h>
+#  elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H)
+#   include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
+#  endif
+
+/* Old MIT Kerberos doesn't seem to define GSS_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE */
+
+#  if !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
+#   define GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE gss_nt_service_name
+#  endif /* !HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_... */
+
+# endif /* !HEIMDAL */
+#endif /* KRB5 */
+
+/* draft-ietf-secsh-gsskeyex-06 */
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE		60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN			61
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE	63
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR			64
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK			65
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC			66
+
+#define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
+
+typedef struct {
+	char *filename;
+	char *envvar;
+	char *envval;
+	void *data;
+} ssh_gssapi_ccache;
+
+typedef struct {
+	gss_buffer_desc displayname;
+	gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
+	gss_cred_id_t creds;
+	struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
+	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+} ssh_gssapi_client;
+
+typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+	char *enc_name;
+	char *name;
+	gss_OID_desc oid;
+	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+} ssh_gssapi_mech;
+
+typedef struct {
+	OM_uint32	major; /* both */
+	OM_uint32	minor; /* both */
+	gss_ctx_id_t	context; /* both */
+	gss_name_t	name; /* both */
+	gss_OID		oid; /* client */
+	gss_cred_id_t	creds; /* server */
+	gss_name_t	client; /* server */
+	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* server */
+} Gssctxt;
+
+extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
+
+int  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+void ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *, gss_OID);
+void ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *);
+ssh_gssapi_mech *ssh_gssapi_get_ctype(Gssctxt *);
+void ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(void);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *, gss_OID, int *);
+
+struct sshbuf;
+int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *, gss_buffer_desc *);
+
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int,
+    gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
+    gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+void ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *);
+char *ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *, OM_uint32 *, OM_uint32 *);
+void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *,
+    const char *, const char *, const struct sshbuf *);
+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
+
+/* In the server */
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+#endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.0 b/ssh-keygen.0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b2e356
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-keygen.0
@@ -0,0 +1,902 @@
+SSH-KEYGEN(1)               General Commands Manual              SSH-KEYGEN(1)
+
+NAME
+     ssh-keygen M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH authentication key utility
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     ssh-keygen [-q] [-a rounds] [-b bits] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]
+                [-m format] [-N new_passphrase] [-O option]
+                [-t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa]
+                [-w provider] [-Z cipher]
+     ssh-keygen -p [-a rounds] [-f keyfile] [-m format] [-N new_passphrase]
+                [-P old_passphrase] [-Z cipher]
+     ssh-keygen -i [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]
+     ssh-keygen -e [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]
+     ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]
+     ssh-keygen -c [-a rounds] [-C comment] [-f keyfile] [-P passphrase]
+     ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]
+     ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]
+     ssh-keygen -D pkcs11
+     ssh-keygen -F hostname [-lv] [-f known_hosts_file]
+     ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]
+     ssh-keygen -K [-a rounds] [-w provider]
+     ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]
+     ssh-keygen -r hostname [-g] [-f input_keyfile]
+     ssh-keygen -M generate [-O option] output_file
+     ssh-keygen -M screen [-f input_file] [-O option] output_file
+     ssh-keygen -I certificate_identity -s ca_key [-hU] [-D pkcs11_provider]
+                [-n principals] [-O option] [-V validity_interval]
+                [-z serial_number] file ...
+     ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]
+     ssh-keygen -A [-a rounds] [-f prefix_path]
+     ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]
+                file ...
+     ssh-keygen -Q [-l] -f krl_file file ...
+     ssh-keygen -Y find-principals [-O option] -s signature_file
+                -f allowed_signers_file
+     ssh-keygen -Y match-principals -I signer_identity -f allowed_signers_file
+     ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate [-O option] -n namespace -s signature_file
+     ssh-keygen -Y sign [-O option] -f key_file -n namespace file ...
+     ssh-keygen -Y verify [-O option] -f allowed_signers_file
+                -I signer_identity -n namespace -s signature_file
+                [-r revocation_file]
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     ssh-keygen generates, manages and converts authentication keys for
+     ssh(1).  ssh-keygen can create keys for use by SSH protocol version 2.
+
+     The type of key to be generated is specified with the -t option.  If
+     invoked without any arguments, ssh-keygen will generate an RSA key.
+
+     ssh-keygen is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman
+     group exchange (DH-GEX).  See the MODULI GENERATION section for details.
+
+     Finally, ssh-keygen can be used to generate and update Key Revocation
+     Lists, and to test whether given keys have been revoked by one.  See the
+     KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details.
+
+     Normally each user wishing to use SSH with public key authentication runs
+     this once to create the authentication key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa,
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519,
+     ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.  Additionally, the system
+     administrator may use this to generate host keys, as seen in /etc/rc.
+
+     Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which to
+     store the private key.  The public key is stored in a file with the same
+     name but M-bM-^@M-^\.pubM-bM-^@M-^] appended.  The program also asks for a passphrase.  The
+     passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase (host keys must have an
+     empty passphrase), or it may be a string of arbitrary length.  A
+     passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a
+     series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of
+     characters you want.  Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are not
+     simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English prose has only
+     1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad passphrases),
+     and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and non-
+     alphanumeric characters.  The passphrase can be changed later by using
+     the -p option.
+
+     There is no way to recover a lost passphrase.  If the passphrase is lost
+     or forgotten, a new key must be generated and the corresponding public
+     key copied to other machines.
+
+     ssh-keygen will by default write keys in an OpenSSH-specific format.
+     This format is preferred as it offers better protection for keys at rest
+     as well as allowing storage of key comments within the private key file
+     itself.  The key comment may be useful to help identify the key.  The
+     comment is initialized to M-bM-^@M-^\user@hostM-bM-^@M-^] when the key is created, but can be
+     changed using the -c option.
+
+     It is still possible for ssh-keygen to write the previously-used PEM
+     format private keys using the -m flag.  This may be used when generating
+     new keys, and existing new-format keys may be converted using this option
+     in conjunction with the -p (change passphrase) flag.
+
+     After a key is generated, ssh-keygen will ask where the keys should be
+     placed to be activated.
+
+     The options are as follows:
+
+     -A      Generate host keys of all default key types (rsa, ecdsa, and
+             ed25519) if they do not already exist.  The host keys are
+             generated with the default key file path, an empty passphrase,
+             default bits for the key type, and default comment.  If -f has
+             also been specified, its argument is used as a prefix to the
+             default path for the resulting host key files.  This is used by
+             /etc/rc to generate new host keys.
+
+     -a rounds
+             When saving a private key, this option specifies the number of
+             KDF (key derivation function, currently bcrypt_pbkdf(3)) rounds
+             used.  Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification
+             and increased resistance to brute-force password cracking (should
+             the keys be stolen).  The default is 16 rounds.
+
+     -B      Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key
+             file.
+
+     -b bits
+             Specifies the number of bits in the key to create.  For RSA keys,
+             the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 3072 bits.
+             Generally, 3072 bits is considered sufficient.  DSA keys must be
+             exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2.  For ECDSA keys,
+             the -b flag determines the key length by selecting from one of
+             three elliptic curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits.  Attempting to
+             use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys will
+             fail.  ECDSA-SK, Ed25519 and Ed25519-SK keys have a fixed length
+             and the -b flag will be ignored.
+
+     -C comment
+             Provides a new comment.
+
+     -c      Requests changing the comment in the private and public key
+             files.  The program will prompt for the file containing the
+             private keys, for the passphrase if the key has one, and for the
+             new comment.
+
+     -D pkcs11
+             Download the public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
+             pkcs11.  When used in combination with -s, this option indicates
+             that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the CERTIFICATES
+             section for details).
+
+     -E fingerprint_hash
+             Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
+             fingerprints.  Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].  The
+             default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     -e      This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and
+             print to stdout a public key in one of the formats specified by
+             the -m option.  The default export format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^].  This
+             option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs,
+             including several commercial SSH implementations.
+
+     -F hostname | [hostname]:port
+             Search for the specified hostname (with optional port number) in
+             a known_hosts file, listing any occurrences found.  This option
+             is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be
+             used in conjunction with the -H option to print found keys in a
+             hashed format.
+
+     -f filename
+             Specifies the filename of the key file.
+
+     -g      Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records
+             using the -r command.
+
+     -H      Hash a known_hosts file.  This replaces all hostnames and
+             addresses with hashed representations within the specified file;
+             the original content is moved to a file with a .old suffix.
+             These hashes may be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do
+             not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be
+             disclosed.  This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames
+             and is therefore safe to use on files that mix hashed and non-
+             hashed names.
+
+     -h      When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user
+             certificate.  See the CERTIFICATES section for details.
+
+     -I certificate_identity
+             Specify the key identity when signing a public key.  See the
+             CERTIFICATES section for details.
+
+     -i      This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file
+             in the format specified by the -m option and print an OpenSSH
+             compatible private (or public) key to stdout.  This option allows
+             importing keys from other software, including several commercial
+             SSH implementations.  The default import format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     -K      Download resident keys from a FIDO authenticator.  Public and
+             private key files will be written to the current directory for
+             each downloaded key.  If multiple FIDO authenticators are
+             attached, keys will be downloaded from the first touched
+             authenticator.  See the FIDO AUTHENTICATOR section for more
+             information.
+
+     -k      Generate a KRL file.  In this mode, ssh-keygen will generate a
+             KRL file at the location specified via the -f flag that revokes
+             every key or certificate presented on the command line.
+             Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key
+             file or using the format described in the KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+             section.
+
+     -L      Prints the contents of one or more certificates.
+
+     -l      Show fingerprint of specified public key file.  For RSA and DSA
+             keys ssh-keygen tries to find the matching public key file and
+             prints its fingerprint.  If combined with -v, a visual ASCII art
+             representation of the key is supplied with the fingerprint.
+
+     -M generate
+             Generate candidate Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange (DH-GEX)
+             parameters for eventual use by the
+             M-bM-^@M-^Xdiffie-hellman-group-exchange-*M-bM-^@M-^Y key exchange methods.  The
+             numbers generated by this operation must be further screened
+             before use.  See the MODULI GENERATION section for more
+             information.
+
+     -M screen
+             Screen candidate parameters for Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange.
+             This will accept a list of candidate numbers and test that they
+             are safe (Sophie Germain) primes with acceptable group
+             generators.  The results of this operation may be added to the
+             /etc/moduli file.  See the MODULI GENERATION section for more
+             information.
+
+     -m key_format
+             Specify a key format for key generation, the -i (import), -e
+             (export) conversion options, and the -p change passphrase
+             operation.  The latter may be used to convert between OpenSSH
+             private key and PEM private key formats.  The supported key
+             formats are: M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^] (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key),
+             M-bM-^@M-^\PKCS8M-bM-^@M-^] (PKCS8 public or private key) or M-bM-^@M-^\PEMM-bM-^@M-^] (PEM public key).
+             By default OpenSSH will write newly-generated private keys in its
+             own format, but when converting public keys for export the
+             default format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^].  Setting a format of M-bM-^@M-^\PEMM-bM-^@M-^] when
+             generating or updating a supported private key type will cause
+             the key to be stored in the legacy PEM private key format.
+
+     -N new_passphrase
+             Provides the new passphrase.
+
+     -n principals
+             Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be
+             included in a certificate when signing a key.  Multiple
+             principals may be specified, separated by commas.  See the
+             CERTIFICATES section for details.
+
+     -O option
+             Specify a key/value option.  These are specific to the operation
+             that ssh-keygen has been requested to perform.
+
+             When signing certificates, one of the options listed in the
+             CERTIFICATES section may be specified here.
+
+             When performing moduli generation or screening, one of the
+             options listed in the MODULI GENERATION section may be specified.
+
+             When generating FIDO authenticator-backed keys, the options
+             listed in the FIDO AUTHENTICATOR section may be specified.
+
+             When performing signature-related options using the -Y flag, the
+             following options are accepted:
+
+             hashalg=algorithm
+                     Selects the hash algorithm to use for hashing the message
+                     to be signed.  Valid algorithms are M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^] and
+                     M-bM-^@M-^\sha512.M-bM-^@M-^] The default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha512.M-bM-^@M-^]
+
+             print-pubkey
+                     Print the full public key to standard output after
+                     signature verification.
+
+             verify-time=timestamp
+                     Specifies a time to use when validating signatures
+                     instead of the current time.  The time may be specified
+                     as a date or time in the YYYYMMDD[Z] or in
+                     YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] formats.  Dates and times will be
+                     interpreted in the current system time zone unless
+                     suffixed with a Z character, which causes them to be
+                     interpreted in the UTC time zone.
+
+             The -O option may be specified multiple times.
+
+     -P passphrase
+             Provides the (old) passphrase.
+
+     -p      Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of
+             creating a new private key.  The program will prompt for the file
+             containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for
+             the new passphrase.
+
+     -Q      Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL.  If the -l option
+             is also specified then the contents of the KRL will be printed.
+
+     -q      Silence ssh-keygen.
+
+     -R hostname | [hostname]:port
+             Removes all keys belonging to the specified hostname (with
+             optional port number) from a known_hosts file.  This option is
+             useful to delete hashed hosts (see the -H option above).
+
+     -r hostname
+             Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named hostname for
+             the specified public key file.
+
+     -s ca_key
+             Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key.  See the
+             CERTIFICATES section for details.
+
+             When generating a KRL, -s specifies a path to a CA public key
+             file used to revoke certificates directly by key ID or serial
+             number.  See the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details.
+
+     -t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa
+             Specifies the type of key to create.  The possible values are
+             M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-skM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519-skM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+             This flag may also be used to specify the desired signature type
+             when signing certificates using an RSA CA key.  The available RSA
+             signature variants are M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-rsaM-bM-^@M-^] (SHA1 signatures, not
+             recommended), M-bM-^@M-^\rsa-sha2-256M-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\rsa-sha2-512M-bM-^@M-^] (the default).
+
+     -U      When used in combination with -s or -Y sign, this option
+             indicates that a CA key resides in a ssh-agent(1).  See the
+             CERTIFICATES section for more information.
+
+     -u      Update a KRL.  When specified with -k, keys listed via the
+             command line are added to the existing KRL rather than a new KRL
+             being created.
+
+     -V validity_interval
+             Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate.  A
+             validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that
+             the certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time,
+             or may consist of two times separated by a colon to indicate an
+             explicit time interval.
+
+             The start time may be specified as:
+             M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-"   The string M-bM-^@M-^\alwaysM-bM-^@M-^] to indicate the certificate has no
+                 specified start time.
+             M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-"   A date or time in the system time zone formatted as YYYYMMDD
+                 or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS].
+             M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-"   A date or time in the UTC time zone as YYYYMMDDZ or
+                 YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z.
+             M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-"   A relative time before the current system time consisting of
+                 a minus sign followed by an interval in the format described
+                 in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5).
+             M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-"   A raw seconds since epoch (Jan 1 1970 00:00:00 UTC) as a
+                 hexadecimal number beginning with M-bM-^@M-^\0xM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+             The end time may be specified similarly to the start time:
+             M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-"   The string M-bM-^@M-^\foreverM-bM-^@M-^] to indicate the certificate has no
+                 specified end time.
+             M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-"   A date or time in the system time zone formatted as YYYYMMDD
+                 or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS].
+             M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-"   A date or time in the UTC time zone as YYYYMMDDZ or
+                 YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z.
+             M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-"   A relative time after the current system time consisting of a
+                 plus sign followed by an interval in the format described in
+                 the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5).
+             M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-"   A raw seconds since epoch (Jan 1 1970 00:00:00 UTC) as a
+                 hexadecimal number beginning with M-bM-^@M-^\0xM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+             For example:
+
+             +52w1d  Valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now.
+
+             -4w:+4w
+                     Valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now.
+
+             20100101123000:20110101123000
+                     Valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM,
+                     January 1st, 2011.
+
+             20100101123000Z:20110101123000Z
+                     Similar, but interpreted in the UTC time zone rather than
+                     the system time zone.
+
+             -1d:20110101
+                     Valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011.
+
+             0x1:0x2000000000
+                     Valid from roughly early 1970 to May 2033.
+
+             -1m:forever
+                     Valid from one minute ago and never expiring.
+
+     -v      Verbose mode.  Causes ssh-keygen to print debugging messages
+             about its progress.  This is helpful for debugging moduli
+             generation.  Multiple -v options increase the verbosity.  The
+             maximum is 3.
+
+     -w provider
+             Specifies a path to a library that will be used when creating
+             FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+             the internal USB HID support.
+
+     -Y find-principals
+             Find the principal(s) associated with the public key of a
+             signature, provided using the -s flag in an authorized signers
+             file provided using the -f flag.  The format of the allowed
+             signers file is documented in the ALLOWED SIGNERS section below.
+             If one or more matching principals are found, they are returned
+             on standard output.
+
+     -Y match-principals
+             Find principal matching the principal name provided using the -I
+             flag in the authorized signers file specified using the -f flag.
+             If one or more matching principals are found, they are returned
+             on standard output.
+
+     -Y check-novalidate
+             Checks that a signature generated using ssh-keygen -Y sign has a
+             valid structure.  This does not validate if a signature comes
+             from an authorized signer.  When testing a signature, ssh-keygen
+             accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace
+             using -n.  A file containing the corresponding signature must
+             also be supplied using the -s flag.  Successful testing of the
+             signature is signalled by ssh-keygen returning a zero exit
+             status.
+
+     -Y sign
+             Cryptographically sign a file or some data using a SSH key.  When
+             signing, ssh-keygen accepts zero or more files to sign on the
+             command-line - if no files are specified then ssh-keygen will
+             sign data presented on standard input.  Signatures are written to
+             the path of the input file with M-bM-^@M-^\.sigM-bM-^@M-^] appended, or to standard
+             output if the message to be signed was read from standard input.
+
+             The key used for signing is specified using the -f option and may
+             refer to either a private key, or a public key with the private
+             half available via ssh-agent(1).  An additional signature
+             namespace, used to prevent signature confusion across different
+             domains of use (e.g. file signing vs email signing) must be
+             provided via the -n flag.  Namespaces are arbitrary strings, and
+             may include: M-bM-^@M-^\fileM-bM-^@M-^] for file signing, M-bM-^@M-^\emailM-bM-^@M-^] for email signing.
+             For custom uses, it is recommended to use names following a
+             NAMESPACE@YOUR.DOMAIN pattern to generate unambiguous namespaces.
+
+     -Y verify
+             Request to verify a signature generated using ssh-keygen -Y sign
+             as described above.  When verifying a signature, ssh-keygen
+             accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace
+             using -n.  A file containing the corresponding signature must
+             also be supplied using the -s flag, along with the identity of
+             the signer using -I and a list of allowed signers via the -f
+             flag.  The format of the allowed signers file is documented in
+             the ALLOWED SIGNERS section below.  A file containing revoked
+             keys can be passed using the -r flag.  The revocation file may be
+             a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys.  Successful
+             verification by an authorized signer is signalled by ssh-keygen
+             returning a zero exit status.
+
+     -y      This option will read a private OpenSSH format file and print an
+             OpenSSH public key to stdout.
+
+     -Z cipher
+             Specifies the cipher to use for encryption when writing an
+             OpenSSH-format private key file.  The list of available ciphers
+             may be obtained using "ssh -Q cipher".  The default is
+             M-bM-^@M-^\aes256-ctrM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     -z serial_number
+             Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to
+             distinguish this certificate from others from the same CA.  If
+             the serial_number is prefixed with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
+             serial number will be incremented for each certificate signed on
+             a single command-line.  The default serial number is zero.
+
+             When generating a KRL, the -z flag is used to specify a KRL
+             version number.
+
+MODULI GENERATION
+     ssh-keygen may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group
+     Exchange (DH-GEX) protocol.  Generating these groups is a two-step
+     process: first, candidate primes are generated using a fast, but memory
+     intensive process.  These candidate primes are then tested for
+     suitability (a CPU-intensive process).
+
+     Generation of primes is performed using the -M generate option.  The
+     desired length of the primes may be specified by the -O bits option.  For
+     example:
+
+           # ssh-keygen -M generate -O bits=2048 moduli-2048.candidates
+
+     By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the desired
+     length range.  This may be overridden using the -O start option, which
+     specifies a different start point (in hex).
+
+     Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for
+     suitability.  This may be performed using the -M screen option.  In this
+     mode ssh-keygen will read candidates from standard input (or a file
+     specified using the -f option).  For example:
+
+           # ssh-keygen -M screen -f moduli-2048.candidates moduli-2048
+
+     By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests.
+     This may be overridden using the -O prime-tests option.  The DH generator
+     value will be chosen automatically for the prime under consideration.  If
+     a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the -O
+     generator option.  Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
+
+     Screened DH groups may be installed in /etc/moduli.  It is important that
+     this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths.
+
+     A number of options are available for moduli generation and screening via
+     the -O flag:
+
+     lines=number
+             Exit after screening the specified number of lines while
+             performing DH candidate screening.
+
+     start-line=line-number
+             Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH
+             candidate screening.
+
+     checkpoint=filename
+             Write the last line processed to the specified file while
+             performing DH candidate screening.  This will be used to skip
+             lines in the input file that have already been processed if the
+             job is restarted.
+
+     memory=mbytes
+             Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when
+             generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+
+     start=hex-value
+             Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for
+             DH-GEX.
+
+     generator=value
+             Specify desired generator (in decimal) when testing candidate
+             moduli for DH-GEX.
+
+CERTIFICATES
+     ssh-keygen supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be
+     used for user or host authentication.  Certificates consist of a public
+     key, some identity information, zero or more principal (user or host)
+     names and a set of options that are signed by a Certification Authority
+     (CA) key.  Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify
+     its signature on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys.
+     Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format
+     to the X.509 certificates used in ssl(8).
+
+     ssh-keygen supports two types of certificates: user and host.  User
+     certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates
+     authenticate server hosts to users.  To generate a user certificate:
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub
+
+     The resultant certificate will be placed in /path/to/user_key-cert.pub.
+     A host certificate requires the -h option:
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub
+
+     The host certificate will be output to /path/to/host_key-cert.pub.
+
+     It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by
+     providing the token library using -D and identifying the CA key by
+     providing its public half as an argument to -s:
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub
+
+     Similarly, it is possible for the CA key to be hosted in a ssh-agent(1).
+     This is indicated by the -U flag and, again, the CA key must be
+     identified by its public half.
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -Us ca_key.pub -I key_id user_key.pub
+
+     In all cases, key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server
+     when the certificate is used for authentication.
+
+     Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal
+     (user/host) names.  By default, generated certificates are valid for all
+     users or hosts.  To generate a certificate for a specified set of
+     principals:
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub
+           $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain host_key.pub
+
+     Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may
+     be specified through certificate options.  A certificate option may
+     disable features of the SSH session, may be valid only when presented
+     from particular source addresses or may force the use of a specific
+     command.
+
+     The options that are valid for user certificates are:
+
+     clear   Clear all enabled permissions.  This is useful for clearing the
+             default set of permissions so permissions may be added
+             individually.
+
+     critical:name[=contents]
+     extension:name[=contents]
+             Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or extension.
+             The specified name should include a domain suffix, e.g.
+             M-bM-^@M-^\name@example.comM-bM-^@M-^].  If contents is specified then it is included
+             as the contents of the extension/option encoded as a string,
+             otherwise the extension/option is created with no contents
+             (usually indicating a flag).  Extensions may be ignored by a
+             client or server that does not recognise them, whereas unknown
+             critical options will cause the certificate to be refused.
+
+     force-command=command
+             Forces the execution of command instead of any shell or command
+             specified by the user when the certificate is used for
+             authentication.
+
+     no-agent-forwarding
+             Disable ssh-agent(1) forwarding (permitted by default).
+
+     no-port-forwarding
+             Disable port forwarding (permitted by default).
+
+     no-pty  Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default).
+
+     no-user-rc
+             Disable execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8) (permitted by default).
+
+     no-x11-forwarding
+             Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default).
+
+     permit-agent-forwarding
+             Allows ssh-agent(1) forwarding.
+
+     permit-port-forwarding
+             Allows port forwarding.
+
+     permit-pty
+             Allows PTY allocation.
+
+     permit-user-rc
+             Allows execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8).
+
+     permit-X11-forwarding
+             Allows X11 forwarding.
+
+     no-touch-required
+             Do not require signatures made using this key include
+             demonstration of user presence (e.g. by having the user touch the
+             authenticator).  This option only makes sense for the FIDO
+             authenticator algorithms ecdsa-sk and ed25519-sk.
+
+     source-address=address_list
+             Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is
+             considered valid.  The address_list is a comma-separated list of
+             one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR format.
+
+     verify-required
+             Require signatures made using this key indicate that the user was
+             first verified.  This option only makes sense for the FIDO
+             authenticator algorithms ecdsa-sk and ed25519-sk.  Currently PIN
+             authentication is the only supported verification method, but
+             other methods may be supported in the future.
+
+     At present, no standard options are valid for host keys.
+
+     Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime.  The -V
+     option allows specification of certificate start and end times.  A
+     certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be
+     considered valid.  By default, certificates are valid from the UNIX Epoch
+     to the distant future.
+
+     For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA
+     public key must be trusted by sshd(8) or ssh(1).  Refer to those manual
+     pages for details.
+
+FIDO AUTHENTICATOR
+     ssh-keygen is able to generate FIDO authenticator-backed keys, after
+     which they may be used much like any other key type supported by OpenSSH,
+     so long as the hardware authenticator is attached when the keys are used.
+     FIDO authenticators generally require the user to explicitly authorise
+     operations by touching or tapping them.  FIDO keys consist of two parts:
+     a key handle part stored in the private key file on disk, and a per-
+     device private key that is unique to each FIDO authenticator and that
+     cannot be exported from the authenticator hardware.  These are combined
+     by the hardware at authentication time to derive the real key that is
+     used to sign authentication challenges.  Supported key types are ecdsa-sk
+     and ed25519-sk.
+
+     The options that are valid for FIDO keys are:
+
+     application
+             Override the default FIDO application/origin string of M-bM-^@M-^\ssh:M-bM-^@M-^].
+             This may be useful when generating host or domain-specific
+             resident keys.  The specified application string must begin with
+             M-bM-^@M-^\ssh:M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     challenge=path
+             Specifies a path to a challenge string that will be passed to the
+             FIDO authenticator during key generation.  The challenge string
+             may be used as part of an out-of-band protocol for key enrollment
+             (a random challenge is used by default).
+
+     device  Explicitly specify a fido(4) device to use, rather than letting
+             the authenticator middleware select one.
+
+     no-touch-required
+             Indicate that the generated private key should not require touch
+             events (user presence) when making signatures.  Note that sshd(8)
+             will refuse such signatures by default, unless overridden via an
+             authorized_keys option.
+
+     resident
+             Indicate that the key handle should be stored on the FIDO
+             authenticator itself.  This makes it easier to use the
+             authenticator on multiple computers.  Resident keys may be
+             supported on FIDO2 authenticators and typically require that a
+             PIN be set on the authenticator prior to generation.  Resident
+             keys may be loaded off the authenticator using ssh-add(1).
+             Storing both parts of a key on a FIDO authenticator increases the
+             likelihood of an attacker being able to use a stolen
+             authenticator device.
+
+     user    A username to be associated with a resident key, overriding the
+             empty default username.  Specifying a username may be useful when
+             generating multiple resident keys for the same application name.
+
+     verify-required
+             Indicate that this private key should require user verification
+             for each signature.  Not all FIDO authenticators support this
+             option.  Currently PIN authentication is the only supported
+             verification method, but other methods may be supported in the
+             future.
+
+     write-attestation=path
+             May be used at key generation time to record the attestation data
+             returned from FIDO authenticators during key generation.  This
+             information is potentially sensitive.  By default, this
+             information is discarded.
+
+KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+     ssh-keygen is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs).
+     These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a
+     compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are
+     being revoked by serial number.
+
+     KRLs may be generated using the -k flag.  This option reads one or more
+     files from the command line and generates a new KRL.  The files may
+     either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys, listed one
+     per line.  Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or
+     contents in the KRL and certificates revoked by serial number or key ID
+     (if the serial is zero or not available).
+
+     Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the
+     types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke
+     certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete
+     original certificate on hand.  A KRL specification consists of lines
+     containing one of the following directives followed by a colon and some
+     directive-specific information.
+
+     serial: serial_number[-serial_number]
+             Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number.  Serial
+             numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be
+             expressed in decimal, hex or octal.  If two serial numbers are
+             specified separated by a hyphen, then the range of serial numbers
+             including and between each is revoked.  The CA key must have been
+             specified on the ssh-keygen command line using the -s option.
+
+     id: key_id
+             Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string.  The CA
+             key must have been specified on the ssh-keygen command line using
+             the -s option.
+
+     key: public_key
+             Revokes the specified key.  If a certificate is listed, then it
+             is revoked as a plain public key.
+
+     sha1: public_key
+             Revokes the specified key by including its SHA1 hash in the KRL.
+
+     sha256: public_key
+             Revokes the specified key by including its SHA256 hash in the
+             KRL.  KRLs that revoke keys by SHA256 hash are not supported by
+             OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9.
+
+     hash: fingerprint
+             Revokes a key using a fingerprint hash, as obtained from a
+             sshd(8) authentication log message or the ssh-keygen -l flag.
+             Only SHA256 fingerprints are supported here and resultant KRLs
+             are not supported by OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9.
+
+     KRLs may be updated using the -u flag in addition to -k.  When this
+     option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into the
+     KRL, adding to those already there.
+
+     It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular
+     key (or keys).  The -Q flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key
+     specified on the command line.  If any key listed on the command line has
+     been revoked (or an error encountered) then ssh-keygen will exit with a
+     non-zero exit status.  A zero exit status will only be returned if no key
+     was revoked.
+
+ALLOWED SIGNERS
+     When verifying signatures, ssh-keygen uses a simple list of identities
+     and keys to determine whether a signature comes from an authorized
+     source.  This "allowed signers" file uses a format patterned after the
+     AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT described in sshd(8).  Each line of the file
+     contains the following space-separated fields: principals, options,
+     keytype, base64-encoded key.  Empty lines and lines starting with a M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y
+     are ignored as comments.
+
+     The principals field is a pattern-list (see PATTERNS in ssh_config(5))
+     consisting of one or more comma-separated USER@DOMAIN identity patterns
+     that are accepted for signing.  When verifying, the identity presented
+     via the -I option must match a principals pattern in order for the
+     corresponding key to be considered acceptable for verification.
+
+     The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
+     specifications.  No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
+     The following option specifications are supported (note that option
+     keywords are case-insensitive):
+
+     cert-authority
+             Indicates that this key is accepted as a certificate authority
+             (CA) and that certificates signed by this CA may be accepted for
+             verification.
+
+     namespaces=namespace-list
+             Specifies a pattern-list of namespaces that are accepted for this
+             key.  If this option is present, the signature namespace embedded
+             in the signature object and presented on the verification
+             command-line must match the specified list before the key will be
+             considered acceptable.
+
+     valid-after=timestamp
+             Indicates that the key is valid for use at or after the specified
+             timestamp, which may be a date or time in the YYYYMMDD[Z] or
+             YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] formats.  Dates and times will be interpreted
+             in the current system time zone unless suffixed with a Z
+             character, which causes them to be interpreted in the UTC time
+             zone.
+
+     valid-before=timestamp
+             Indicates that the key is valid for use at or before the
+             specified timestamp.
+
+     When verifying signatures made by certificates, the expected principal
+     name must match both the principals pattern in the allowed signers file
+     and the principals embedded in the certificate itself.
+
+     An example allowed signers file:
+
+        # Comments allowed at start of line
+        user1@example.com,user2@example.com ssh-rsa AAAAX1...
+        # A certificate authority, trusted for all principals in a domain.
+        *@example.com cert-authority ssh-ed25519 AAAB4...
+        # A key that is accepted only for file signing.
+        user2@example.com namespaces="file" ssh-ed25519 AAA41...
+
+ENVIRONMENT
+     SSH_SK_PROVIDER
+             Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
+             FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+             the built-in USB HID support.
+
+FILES
+     ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
+     ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+     ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
+     ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+             Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
+             authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of
+             the user.  This file should not be readable by anyone but the
+             user.  It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the
+             key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of
+             this file using 128-bit AES.  This file is not automatically
+             accessed by ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for
+             the private key.  ssh(1) will read this file when a login attempt
+             is made.
+
+     ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+             Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
+             authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA public key for
+             authentication.  The contents of this file should be added to
+             ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to
+             log in using public key authentication.  There is no need to keep
+             the contents of this file secret.
+
+     /etc/moduli
+             Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.  The file format
+             is described in moduli(5).
+
+SEE ALSO
+     ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), moduli(5), sshd(8)
+
+     The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format, RFC 4716, 2006.
+
+AUTHORS
+     OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+     Tatu Ylonen.  Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+     de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+     created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+     versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 7.2                   September 10, 2022                   OpenBSD 7.2
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8b1f617
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -0,0 +1,1334 @@
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.226 2022/09/10 08:50:53 jsg Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\"                    All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: September 10 2022 $
+.Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Nd OpenSSH authentication key utility
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Op Fl q
+.Op Fl a Ar rounds
+.Op Fl b Ar bits
+.Op Fl C Ar comment
+.Op Fl f Ar output_keyfile
+.Op Fl m Ar format
+.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Op Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa
+.Op Fl w Ar provider
+.Op Fl Z Ar cipher
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl p
+.Op Fl a Ar rounds
+.Op Fl f Ar keyfile
+.Op Fl m Ar format
+.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
+.Op Fl P Ar old_passphrase
+.Op Fl Z Ar cipher
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl i
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Op Fl m Ar key_format
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl e
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Op Fl m Ar key_format
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl y
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl c
+.Op Fl a Ar rounds
+.Op Fl C Ar comment
+.Op Fl f Ar keyfile
+.Op Fl P Ar passphrase
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl l
+.Op Fl v
+.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl B
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl D Ar pkcs11
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl F Ar hostname
+.Op Fl lv
+.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl H
+.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl K
+.Op Fl a Ar rounds
+.Op Fl w Ar provider
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl R Ar hostname
+.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl r Ar hostname
+.Op Fl g
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl M Cm generate
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Ar output_file
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl M Cm screen
+.Op Fl f Ar input_file
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Ar output_file
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl I Ar certificate_identity
+.Fl s Ar ca_key
+.Op Fl hU
+.Op Fl D Ar pkcs11_provider
+.Op Fl n Ar principals
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Op Fl V Ar validity_interval
+.Op Fl z Ar serial_number
+.Ar
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl L
+.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl A
+.Op Fl a Ar rounds
+.Op Fl f Ar prefix_path
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl k
+.Fl f Ar krl_file
+.Op Fl u
+.Op Fl s Ar ca_public
+.Op Fl z Ar version_number
+.Ar
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl Q
+.Op Fl l
+.Fl f Ar krl_file
+.Ar
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl Y Cm find-principals
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Fl s Ar signature_file
+.Fl f Ar allowed_signers_file
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl Y Cm match-principals
+.Fl I Ar signer_identity
+.Fl f Ar allowed_signers_file
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl Y Cm check-novalidate
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Fl n Ar namespace
+.Fl s Ar signature_file
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl Y Cm sign
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Fl f Ar key_file
+.Fl n Ar namespace
+.Ar
+.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl Y Cm verify
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Fl f Ar allowed_signers_file
+.Fl I Ar signer_identity
+.Fl n Ar namespace
+.Fl s Ar signature_file
+.Op Fl r Ar revocation_file
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+generates, manages and converts authentication keys for
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.Nm
+can create keys for use by SSH protocol version 2.
+.Pp
+The type of key to be generated is specified with the
+.Fl t
+option.
+If invoked without any arguments,
+.Nm
+will generate an RSA key.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman group
+exchange (DH-GEX).
+See the
+.Sx MODULI GENERATION
+section for details.
+.Pp
+Finally,
+.Nm
+can be used to generate and update Key Revocation Lists, and to test whether
+given keys have been revoked by one.
+See the
+.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+section for details.
+.Pp
+Normally each user wishing to use SSH
+with public key authentication runs this once to create the authentication
+key in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
+or
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
+Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
+as seen in
+.Pa /etc/rc .
+.Pp
+Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
+to store the private key.
+The public key is stored in a file with the same name but
+.Dq .pub
+appended.
+The program also asks for a passphrase.
+The passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase
+(host keys must have an empty passphrase), or it may be a string of
+arbitrary length.
+A passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a
+series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of
+characters you want.
+Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are
+not simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English
+prose has only 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad
+passphrases), and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters,
+numbers, and non-alphanumeric characters.
+The passphrase can be changed later by using the
+.Fl p
+option.
+.Pp
+There is no way to recover a lost passphrase.
+If the passphrase is lost or forgotten, a new key must be generated
+and the corresponding public key copied to other machines.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+will by default write keys in an OpenSSH-specific format.
+This format is preferred as it offers better protection for
+keys at rest as well as allowing storage of key comments within
+the private key file itself.
+The key comment may be useful to help identify the key.
+The comment is initialized to
+.Dq user@host
+when the key is created, but can be changed using the
+.Fl c
+option.
+.Pp
+It is still possible for
+.Nm
+to write the previously-used PEM format private keys using the
+.Fl m
+flag.
+This may be used when generating new keys, and existing new-format
+keys may be converted using this option in conjunction with the
+.Fl p
+(change passphrase) flag.
+.Pp
+After a key is generated,
+.Nm
+will ask where the keys
+should be placed to be activated.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl A
+Generate host keys of all default key types (rsa, ecdsa, and
+ed25519) if they do not already exist.
+The host keys are generated with the default key file path,
+an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment.
+If
+.Fl f
+has also been specified, its argument is used as a prefix to the
+default path for the resulting host key files.
+This is used by
+.Pa /etc/rc
+to generate new host keys.
+.It Fl a Ar rounds
+When saving a private key, this option specifies the number of KDF
+(key derivation function, currently
+.Xr bcrypt_pbkdf 3 )
+rounds used.
+Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification and increased
+resistance to brute-force password cracking (should the keys be stolen).
+The default is 16 rounds.
+.It Fl B
+Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key file.
+.It Fl b Ar bits
+Specifies the number of bits in the key to create.
+For RSA keys, the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 3072 bits.
+Generally, 3072 bits is considered sufficient.
+DSA keys must be exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2.
+For ECDSA keys, the
+.Fl b
+flag determines the key length by selecting from one of three elliptic
+curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits.
+Attempting to use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys
+will fail.
+ECDSA-SK, Ed25519 and Ed25519-SK keys have a fixed length and the
+.Fl b
+flag will be ignored.
+.It Fl C Ar comment
+Provides a new comment.
+.It Fl c
+Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files.
+The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for
+the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment.
+.It Fl D Ar pkcs11
+Download the public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
+.Ar pkcs11 .
+When used in combination with
+.Fl s ,
+this option indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the
+.Sx CERTIFICATES
+section for details).
+.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
+Valid options are:
+.Dq md5
+and
+.Dq sha256 .
+The default is
+.Dq sha256 .
+.It Fl e
+This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and
+print to stdout a public key in one of the formats specified by the
+.Fl m
+option.
+The default export format is
+.Dq RFC4716 .
+This option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs, including
+several commercial SSH implementations.
+.It Fl F Ar hostname | [hostname]:port
+Search for the specified
+.Ar hostname
+(with optional port number)
+in a
+.Pa known_hosts
+file, listing any occurrences found.
+This option is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be
+used in conjunction with the
+.Fl H
+option to print found keys in a hashed format.
+.It Fl f Ar filename
+Specifies the filename of the key file.
+.It Fl g
+Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records using the
+.Fl r
+command.
+.It Fl H
+Hash a
+.Pa known_hosts
+file.
+This replaces all hostnames and addresses with hashed representations
+within the specified file; the original content is moved to a file with
+a .old suffix.
+These hashes may be used normally by
+.Nm ssh
+and
+.Nm sshd ,
+but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
+be disclosed.
+This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames and is therefore safe
+to use on files that mix hashed and non-hashed names.
+.It Fl h
+When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user
+certificate.
+See the
+.Sx CERTIFICATES
+section for details.
+.It Fl I Ar certificate_identity
+Specify the key identity when signing a public key.
+See the
+.Sx CERTIFICATES
+section for details.
+.It Fl i
+This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file
+in the format specified by the
+.Fl m
+option and print an OpenSSH compatible private
+(or public) key to stdout.
+This option allows importing keys from other software, including several
+commercial SSH implementations.
+The default import format is
+.Dq RFC4716 .
+.It Fl K
+Download resident keys from a FIDO authenticator.
+Public and private key files will be written to the current directory for
+each downloaded key.
+If multiple FIDO authenticators are attached, keys will be downloaded from
+the first touched authenticator.
+See the
+.Sx FIDO AUTHENTICATOR
+section for more information.
+.It Fl k
+Generate a KRL file.
+In this mode,
+.Nm
+will generate a KRL file at the location specified via the
+.Fl f
+flag that revokes every key or certificate presented on the command line.
+Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key file or
+using the format described in the
+.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+section.
+.It Fl L
+Prints the contents of one or more certificates.
+.It Fl l
+Show fingerprint of specified public key file.
+For RSA and DSA keys
+.Nm
+tries to find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint.
+If combined with
+.Fl v ,
+a visual ASCII art representation of the key is supplied with the
+fingerprint.
+.It Fl M Cm generate
+Generate candidate Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange (DH-GEX) parameters for
+eventual use by the
+.Sq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-*
+key exchange methods.
+The numbers generated by this operation must be further screened before
+use.
+See the
+.Sx MODULI GENERATION
+section for more information.
+.It Fl M Cm screen
+Screen candidate parameters for Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange.
+This will accept a list of candidate numbers and test that they are
+safe (Sophie Germain) primes with acceptable group generators.
+The results of this operation may be added to the
+.Pa /etc/moduli
+file.
+See the
+.Sx MODULI GENERATION
+section for more information.
+.It Fl m Ar key_format
+Specify a key format for key generation, the
+.Fl i
+(import),
+.Fl e
+(export) conversion options, and the
+.Fl p
+change passphrase operation.
+The latter may be used to convert between OpenSSH private key and PEM
+private key formats.
+The supported key formats are:
+.Dq RFC4716
+(RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key),
+.Dq PKCS8
+(PKCS8 public or private key)
+or
+.Dq PEM
+(PEM public key).
+By default OpenSSH will write newly-generated private keys in its own
+format, but when converting public keys for export the default format is
+.Dq RFC4716 .
+Setting a format of
+.Dq PEM
+when generating or updating a supported private key type will cause the
+key to be stored in the legacy PEM private key format.
+.It Fl N Ar new_passphrase
+Provides the new passphrase.
+.It Fl n Ar principals
+Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be included in
+a certificate when signing a key.
+Multiple principals may be specified, separated by commas.
+See the
+.Sx CERTIFICATES
+section for details.
+.It Fl O Ar option
+Specify a key/value option.
+These are specific to the operation that
+.Nm
+has been requested to perform.
+.Pp
+When signing certificates, one of the options listed in the
+.Sx CERTIFICATES
+section may be specified here.
+.Pp
+When performing moduli generation or screening, one of the options
+listed in the
+.Sx MODULI GENERATION
+section may be specified.
+.Pp
+When generating FIDO authenticator-backed keys, the options listed in the
+.Sx FIDO AUTHENTICATOR
+section may be specified.
+.Pp
+When performing signature-related options using the
+.Fl Y
+flag, the following options are accepted:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm hashalg Ns = Ns Ar algorithm
+Selects the hash algorithm to use for hashing the message to be signed.
+Valid algorithms are
+.Dq sha256
+and
+.Dq sha512.
+The default is
+.Dq sha512.
+.It Cm print-pubkey
+Print the full public key to standard output after signature verification.
+.It Cm verify-time Ns = Ns Ar timestamp
+Specifies a time to use when validating signatures instead of the current
+time.
+The time may be specified as a date or time in the YYYYMMDD[Z] or
+in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] formats.
+Dates and times will be interpreted in the current system time zone unless
+suffixed with a Z character, which causes them to be interpreted in the
+UTC time zone.
+.El
+.Pp
+The
+.Fl O
+option may be specified multiple times.
+.It Fl P Ar passphrase
+Provides the (old) passphrase.
+.It Fl p
+Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of
+creating a new private key.
+The program will prompt for the file
+containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for the
+new passphrase.
+.It Fl Q
+Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL.
+If the
+.Fl l
+option is also specified then the contents of the KRL will be printed.
+.It Fl q
+Silence
+.Nm ssh-keygen .
+.It Fl R Ar hostname | [hostname]:port
+Removes all keys belonging to the specified
+.Ar hostname
+(with optional port number)
+from a
+.Pa known_hosts
+file.
+This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the
+.Fl H
+option above).
+.It Fl r Ar hostname
+Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named
+.Ar hostname
+for the specified public key file.
+.It Fl s Ar ca_key
+Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key.
+See the
+.Sx CERTIFICATES
+section for details.
+.Pp
+When generating a KRL,
+.Fl s
+specifies a path to a CA public key file used to revoke certificates directly
+by key ID or serial number.
+See the
+.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+section for details.
+.It Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa
+Specifies the type of key to create.
+The possible values are
+.Dq dsa ,
+.Dq ecdsa ,
+.Dq ecdsa-sk ,
+.Dq ed25519 ,
+.Dq ed25519-sk ,
+or
+.Dq rsa .
+.Pp
+This flag may also be used to specify the desired signature type when
+signing certificates using an RSA CA key.
+The available RSA signature variants are
+.Dq ssh-rsa
+(SHA1 signatures, not recommended),
+.Dq rsa-sha2-256 ,
+and
+.Dq rsa-sha2-512
+(the default).
+.It Fl U
+When used in combination with
+.Fl s
+or
+.Fl Y Cm sign ,
+this option indicates that a CA key resides in a
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+See the
+.Sx CERTIFICATES
+section for more information.
+.It Fl u
+Update a KRL.
+When specified with
+.Fl k ,
+keys listed via the command line are added to the existing KRL rather than
+a new KRL being created.
+.It Fl V Ar validity_interval
+Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate.
+A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the
+certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or may consist
+of two times separated by a colon to indicate an explicit time interval.
+.Pp
+The start time may be specified as:
+.Bl -bullet -compact
+.It
+The string
+.Dq always
+to indicate the certificate has no specified start time.
+.It
+A date or time in the system time zone formatted as YYYYMMDD or
+YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS].
+.It
+A date or time in the UTC time zone as YYYYMMDDZ or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z.
+.It
+A relative time before the current system time consisting of a minus sign
+followed by an interval in the format described in the
+TIME FORMATS section of
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.It
+A raw seconds since epoch (Jan 1 1970 00:00:00 UTC) as a hexadecimal
+number beginning with
+.Dq 0x .
+.El
+.Pp
+The end time may be specified similarly to the start time:
+.Bl -bullet -compact
+.It
+The string
+.Dq forever
+to indicate the certificate has no specified end time.
+.It
+A date or time in the system time zone formatted as YYYYMMDD or
+YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS].
+.It
+A date or time in the UTC time zone as YYYYMMDDZ or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z.
+.It
+A relative time after the current system time consisting of a plus sign
+followed by an interval in the format described in the
+TIME FORMATS section of
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.It
+A raw seconds since epoch (Jan 1 1970 00:00:00 UTC) as a hexadecimal
+number beginning with
+.Dq 0x .
+.El
+.Pp
+For example:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It +52w1d
+Valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now.
+.It -4w:+4w
+Valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now.
+.It 20100101123000:20110101123000
+Valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011.
+.It 20100101123000Z:20110101123000Z
+Similar, but interpreted in the UTC time zone rather than the system time zone.
+.It -1d:20110101
+Valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011.
+.It 0x1:0x2000000000
+Valid from roughly early 1970 to May 2033.
+.It -1m:forever
+Valid from one minute ago and never expiring.
+.El
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print debugging messages about its progress.
+This is helpful for debugging moduli generation.
+Multiple
+.Fl v
+options increase the verbosity.
+The maximum is 3.
+.It Fl w Ar provider
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when creating
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+the internal USB HID support.
+.It Fl Y Cm find-principals
+Find the principal(s) associated with the public key of a signature,
+provided using the
+.Fl s
+flag in an authorized signers file provided using the
+.Fl f
+flag.
+The format of the allowed signers file is documented in the
+.Sx ALLOWED SIGNERS
+section below.
+If one or more matching principals are found, they are returned on
+standard output.
+.It Fl Y Cm match-principals
+Find principal matching the principal name provided using the
+.Fl I
+flag in the authorized signers file specified using the
+.Fl f
+flag.
+If one or more matching principals are found, they are returned on
+standard output.
+.It Fl Y Cm check-novalidate
+Checks that a signature generated using
+.Nm
+.Fl Y Cm sign
+has a valid structure.
+This does not validate if a signature comes from an authorized signer.
+When testing a signature,
+.Nm
+accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace using
+.Fl n .
+A file containing the corresponding signature must also be supplied using the
+.Fl s
+flag.
+Successful testing of the signature is signalled by
+.Nm
+returning a zero exit status.
+.It Fl Y Cm sign
+Cryptographically sign a file or some data using a SSH key.
+When signing,
+.Nm
+accepts zero or more files to sign on the command-line - if no files
+are specified then
+.Nm
+will sign data presented on standard input.
+Signatures are written to the path of the input file with
+.Dq .sig
+appended, or to standard output if the message to be signed was read from
+standard input.
+.Pp
+The key used for signing is specified using the
+.Fl f
+option and may refer to either a private key, or a public key with the private
+half available via
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+An additional signature namespace, used to prevent signature confusion across
+different domains of use (e.g. file signing vs email signing) must be provided
+via the
+.Fl n
+flag.
+Namespaces are arbitrary strings, and may include:
+.Dq file
+for file signing,
+.Dq email
+for email signing.
+For custom uses, it is recommended to use names following a
+NAMESPACE@YOUR.DOMAIN pattern to generate unambiguous namespaces.
+.It Fl Y Cm verify
+Request to verify a signature generated using
+.Nm
+.Fl Y Cm sign
+as described above.
+When verifying a signature,
+.Nm
+accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace using
+.Fl n .
+A file containing the corresponding signature must also be supplied using the
+.Fl s
+flag, along with the identity of the signer using
+.Fl I
+and a list of allowed signers via the
+.Fl f
+flag.
+The format of the allowed signers file is documented in the
+.Sx ALLOWED SIGNERS
+section below.
+A file containing revoked keys can be passed using the
+.Fl r
+flag.
+The revocation file may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys.
+Successful verification by an authorized signer is signalled by
+.Nm
+returning a zero exit status.
+.It Fl y
+This option will read a private
+OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout.
+.It Fl Z Ar cipher
+Specifies the cipher to use for encryption when writing an OpenSSH-format
+private key file.
+The list of available ciphers may be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q cipher .
+The default is
+.Dq aes256-ctr .
+.It Fl z Ar serial_number
+Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to distinguish
+this certificate from others from the same CA.
+If the
+.Ar serial_number
+is prefixed with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the serial number will be incremented for each certificate
+signed on a single command-line.
+The default serial number is zero.
+.Pp
+When generating a KRL, the
+.Fl z
+flag is used to specify a KRL version number.
+.El
+.Sh MODULI GENERATION
+.Nm
+may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange
+(DH-GEX) protocol.
+Generating these groups is a two-step process: first, candidate
+primes are generated using a fast, but memory intensive process.
+These candidate primes are then tested for suitability (a CPU-intensive
+process).
+.Pp
+Generation of primes is performed using the
+.Fl M Cm generate
+option.
+The desired length of the primes may be specified by the
+.Fl O Cm bits
+option.
+For example:
+.Pp
+.Dl # ssh-keygen -M generate -O bits=2048 moduli-2048.candidates
+.Pp
+By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the
+desired length range.
+This may be overridden using the
+.Fl O Cm start
+option, which specifies a different start point (in hex).
+.Pp
+Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for
+suitability.
+This may be performed using the
+.Fl M Cm screen
+option.
+In this mode
+.Nm
+will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified using the
+.Fl f
+option).
+For example:
+.Pp
+.Dl # ssh-keygen -M screen -f moduli-2048.candidates moduli-2048
+.Pp
+By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests.
+This may be overridden using the
+.Fl O Cm prime-tests
+option.
+The DH generator value will be chosen automatically for the
+prime under consideration.
+If a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the
+.Fl O Cm generator
+option.
+Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
+.Pp
+Screened DH groups may be installed in
+.Pa /etc/moduli .
+It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths.
+.Pp
+A number of options are available for moduli generation and screening via the
+.Fl O
+flag:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ic lines Ns = Ns Ar number
+Exit after screening the specified number of lines while performing DH
+candidate screening.
+.It Ic start-line Ns = Ns Ar line-number
+Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH candidate
+screening.
+.It Ic checkpoint Ns = Ns Ar filename
+Write the last line processed to the specified file while performing DH
+candidate screening.
+This will be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been
+processed if the job is restarted.
+.It Ic memory Ns = Ns Ar mbytes
+Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating
+candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.It Ic start Ns = Ns Ar hex-value
+Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.It Ic generator Ns = Ns Ar value
+Specify desired generator (in decimal) when testing candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.El
+.Sh CERTIFICATES
+.Nm
+supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be used for
+user or host authentication.
+Certificates consist of a public key, some identity information, zero or
+more principal (user or host) names and a set of options that
+are signed by a Certification Authority (CA) key.
+Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify its signature
+on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys.
+Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format to
+the X.509 certificates used in
+.Xr ssl 8 .
+.Pp
+.Nm
+supports two types of certificates: user and host.
+User certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates
+authenticate server hosts to users.
+To generate a user certificate:
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub
+.Pp
+The resultant certificate will be placed in
+.Pa /path/to/user_key-cert.pub .
+A host certificate requires the
+.Fl h
+option:
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub
+.Pp
+The host certificate will be output to
+.Pa /path/to/host_key-cert.pub .
+.Pp
+It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by
+providing the token library using
+.Fl D
+and identifying the CA key by providing its public half as an argument
+to
+.Fl s :
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub
+.Pp
+Similarly, it is possible for the CA key to be hosted in a
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+This is indicated by the
+.Fl U
+flag and, again, the CA key must be identified by its public half.
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keygen -Us ca_key.pub -I key_id user_key.pub
+.Pp
+In all cases,
+.Ar key_id
+is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server when the certificate
+is used for authentication.
+.Pp
+Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal (user/host)
+names.
+By default, generated certificates are valid for all users or hosts.
+To generate a certificate for a specified set of principals:
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub
+.Dl "$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain host_key.pub"
+.Pp
+Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may
+be specified through certificate options.
+A certificate option may disable features of the SSH session, may be
+valid only when presented from particular source addresses or may
+force the use of a specific command.
+.Pp
+The options that are valid for user certificates are:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It Ic clear
+Clear all enabled permissions.
+This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may
+be added individually.
+.Pp
+.It Ic critical : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents
+.It Ic extension : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents
+Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or extension.
+The specified
+.Ar name
+should include a domain suffix, e.g.\&
+.Dq name@example.com .
+If
+.Ar contents
+is specified then it is included as the contents of the extension/option
+encoded as a string, otherwise the extension/option is created with no
+contents (usually indicating a flag).
+Extensions may be ignored by a client or server that does not recognise them,
+whereas unknown critical options will cause the certificate to be refused.
+.Pp
+.It Ic force-command Ns = Ns Ar command
+Forces the execution of
+.Ar command
+instead of any shell or command specified by the user when
+the certificate is used for authentication.
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-agent-forwarding
+Disable
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding (permitted by default).
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-port-forwarding
+Disable port forwarding (permitted by default).
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-pty
+Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default).
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-user-rc
+Disable execution of
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+by
+.Xr sshd 8
+(permitted by default).
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-x11-forwarding
+Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default).
+.Pp
+.It Ic permit-agent-forwarding
+Allows
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding.
+.Pp
+.It Ic permit-port-forwarding
+Allows port forwarding.
+.Pp
+.It Ic permit-pty
+Allows PTY allocation.
+.Pp
+.It Ic permit-user-rc
+Allows execution of
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+by
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+.Pp
+.It Ic permit-X11-forwarding
+Allows X11 forwarding.
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-touch-required
+Do not require signatures made using this key include demonstration
+of user presence (e.g. by having the user touch the authenticator).
+This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+and
+.Cm ed25519-sk .
+.Pp
+.It Ic source-address Ns = Ns Ar address_list
+Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid.
+The
+.Ar address_list
+is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR
+format.
+.Pp
+.It Ic verify-required
+Require signatures made using this key indicate that the user was first
+verified.
+This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+and
+.Cm ed25519-sk .
+Currently PIN authentication is the only supported verification method,
+but other methods may be supported in the future.
+.El
+.Pp
+At present, no standard options are valid for host keys.
+.Pp
+Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime.
+The
+.Fl V
+option allows specification of certificate start and end times.
+A certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be
+considered valid.
+By default, certificates are valid from the
+.Ux
+Epoch to the distant future.
+.Pp
+For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA
+public key must be trusted by
+.Xr sshd 8
+or
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+Refer to those manual pages for details.
+.Sh FIDO AUTHENTICATOR
+.Nm
+is able to generate FIDO authenticator-backed keys, after which
+they may be used much like any other key type supported by OpenSSH, so
+long as the hardware authenticator is attached when the keys are used.
+FIDO authenticators generally require the user to explicitly authorise
+operations by touching or tapping them.
+FIDO keys consist of two parts: a key handle part stored in the
+private key file on disk, and a per-device private key that is unique
+to each FIDO authenticator and that cannot be exported from the
+authenticator hardware.
+These are combined by the hardware at authentication time to derive
+the real key that is used to sign authentication challenges.
+Supported key types are
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+and
+.Cm ed25519-sk .
+.Pp
+The options that are valid for FIDO keys are:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm application
+Override the default FIDO application/origin string of
+.Dq ssh: .
+This may be useful when generating host or domain-specific resident keys.
+The specified application string must begin with
+.Dq ssh: .
+.It Cm challenge Ns = Ns Ar path
+Specifies a path to a challenge string that will be passed to the
+FIDO authenticator during key generation.
+The challenge string may be used as part of an out-of-band
+protocol for key enrollment
+(a random challenge is used by default).
+.It Cm device
+Explicitly specify a
+.Xr fido 4
+device to use, rather than letting the authenticator middleware select one.
+.It Cm no-touch-required
+Indicate that the generated private key should not require touch
+events (user presence) when making signatures.
+Note that
+.Xr sshd 8
+will refuse such signatures by default, unless overridden via
+an authorized_keys option.
+.It Cm resident
+Indicate that the key handle should be stored on the FIDO
+authenticator itself.
+This makes it easier to use the authenticator on multiple computers.
+Resident keys may be supported on FIDO2 authenticators and typically
+require that a PIN be set on the authenticator prior to generation.
+Resident keys may be loaded off the authenticator using
+.Xr ssh-add 1 .
+Storing both parts of a key on a FIDO authenticator increases the likelihood
+of an attacker being able to use a stolen authenticator device.
+.It Cm user
+A username to be associated with a resident key,
+overriding the empty default username.
+Specifying a username may be useful when generating multiple resident keys
+for the same application name.
+.It Cm verify-required
+Indicate that this private key should require user verification for
+each signature.
+Not all FIDO authenticators support this option.
+Currently PIN authentication is the only supported verification method,
+but other methods may be supported in the future.
+.It Cm write-attestation Ns = Ns Ar path
+May be used at key generation time to record the attestation data
+returned from FIDO authenticators during key generation.
+This information is potentially sensitive.
+By default, this information is discarded.
+.El
+.Sh KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+.Nm
+is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs).
+These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a
+compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are being
+revoked by serial number.
+.Pp
+KRLs may be generated using the
+.Fl k
+flag.
+This option reads one or more files from the command line and generates a new
+KRL.
+The files may either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys,
+listed one per line.
+Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or contents in the KRL and
+certificates revoked by serial number or key ID (if the serial is zero or
+not available).
+.Pp
+Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the
+types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke
+certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete original
+certificate on hand.
+A KRL specification consists of lines containing one of the following directives
+followed by a colon and some directive-specific information.
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm serial : Ar serial_number Ns Op - Ns Ar serial_number
+Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number.
+Serial numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be expressed
+in decimal, hex or octal.
+If two serial numbers are specified separated by a hyphen, then the range
+of serial numbers including and between each is revoked.
+The CA key must have been specified on the
+.Nm
+command line using the
+.Fl s
+option.
+.It Cm id : Ar key_id
+Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string.
+The CA key must have been specified on the
+.Nm
+command line using the
+.Fl s
+option.
+.It Cm key : Ar public_key
+Revokes the specified key.
+If a certificate is listed, then it is revoked as a plain public key.
+.It Cm sha1 : Ar public_key
+Revokes the specified key by including its SHA1 hash in the KRL.
+.It Cm sha256 : Ar public_key
+Revokes the specified key by including its SHA256 hash in the KRL.
+KRLs that revoke keys by SHA256 hash are not supported by OpenSSH versions
+prior to 7.9.
+.It Cm hash : Ar fingerprint
+Revokes a key using a fingerprint hash, as obtained from a
+.Xr sshd 8
+authentication log message or the
+.Nm
+.Fl l
+flag.
+Only SHA256 fingerprints are supported here and resultant KRLs are
+not supported by OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9.
+.El
+.Pp
+KRLs may be updated using the
+.Fl u
+flag in addition to
+.Fl k .
+When this option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into
+the KRL, adding to those already there.
+.Pp
+It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular key
+(or keys).
+The
+.Fl Q
+flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key specified on the command line.
+If any key listed on the command line has been revoked (or an error encountered)
+then
+.Nm
+will exit with a non-zero exit status.
+A zero exit status will only be returned if no key was revoked.
+.Sh ALLOWED SIGNERS
+When verifying signatures,
+.Nm
+uses a simple list of identities and keys to determine whether a signature
+comes from an authorized source.
+This "allowed signers" file uses a format patterned after the
+AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT described in
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+Each line of the file contains the following space-separated fields:
+principals, options, keytype, base64-encoded key.
+Empty lines and lines starting with a
+.Ql #
+are ignored as comments.
+.Pp
+The principals field is a pattern-list (see PATTERNS in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 )
+consisting of one or more comma-separated USER@DOMAIN identity patterns
+that are accepted for signing.
+When verifying, the identity presented via the
+.Fl I
+option must match a principals pattern in order for the corresponding key to be
+considered acceptable for verification.
+.Pp
+The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifications.
+No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
+The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords
+are case-insensitive):
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm cert-authority
+Indicates that this key is accepted as a certificate authority (CA) and
+that certificates signed by this CA may be accepted for verification.
+.It Cm namespaces Ns = Ns "namespace-list"
+Specifies a pattern-list of namespaces that are accepted for this key.
+If this option is present, the signature namespace embedded in the
+signature object and presented on the verification command-line must
+match the specified list before the key will be considered acceptable.
+.It Cm valid-after Ns = Ns "timestamp"
+Indicates that the key is valid for use at or after the specified timestamp,
+which may be a date or time in the YYYYMMDD[Z] or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] formats.
+Dates and times will be interpreted in the current system time zone unless
+suffixed with a Z character, which causes them to be interpreted in the UTC
+time zone.
+.It Cm valid-before Ns = Ns "timestamp"
+Indicates that the key is valid for use at or before the specified timestamp.
+.El
+.Pp
+When verifying signatures made by certificates, the expected principal
+name must match both the principals pattern in the allowed signers file and
+the principals embedded in the certificate itself.
+.Pp
+An example allowed signers file:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+# Comments allowed at start of line
+user1@example.com,user2@example.com ssh-rsa AAAAX1...
+# A certificate authority, trusted for all principals in a domain.
+*@example.com cert-authority ssh-ed25519 AAAB4...
+# A key that is accepted only for file signing.
+user2@example.com namespaces="file" ssh-ed25519 AAA41...
+.Ed
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ev SSH_SK_PROVIDER
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+the built-in USB HID support.
+.El
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
+authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of the user.
+This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
+It is possible to
+specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be
+used to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES.
+This file is not automatically accessed by
+.Nm
+but it is offered as the default file for the private key.
+.Xr ssh 1
+will read this file when a login attempt is made.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
+authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA public key for authentication.
+The contents of this file should be added to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+on all machines
+where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
+There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/moduli
+Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
+The file format is described in
+.Xr moduli 5 .
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr moduli 5 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Rs
+.%R RFC 4716
+.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format"
+.%D 2006
+.Re
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ae05440
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3931 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.461 2022/12/04 23:50:49 cheloha Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Identity and host key generation and maintenance.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <locale.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "dns.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "krl.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "sshsig.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+#include "sk-api.h" /* XXX for SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; remove */
+#include "cipher.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
+#else
+# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519"
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys.  These value can be
+ * overridden on the command line.
+ *
+ * These values, with the exception of DSA, provide security equivalent to at
+ * least 128 bits of security according to NIST Special Publication 800-57:
+ * Recommendation for Key Management Part 1 rev 4 section 5.6.1.
+ * For DSA it (and FIPS-186-4 section 4.2) specifies that the only size for
+ * which a 160bit hash is acceptable is 1kbit, and since ssh-dss specifies only
+ * SHA1 we limit the DSA key size 1k bits.
+ */
+#define DEFAULT_BITS		3072
+#define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA	1024
+#define DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA	256
+
+static int quiet = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */
+static int print_fingerprint = 0;
+static int print_bubblebabble = 0;
+
+/* Hash algorithm to use for fingerprints. */
+static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
+
+/* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */
+static char identity_file[PATH_MAX];
+static int have_identity = 0;
+
+/* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */
+static char *identity_passphrase = NULL;
+
+/* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */
+static char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL;
+
+/* Key type when certifying */
+static u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER;
+
+/* "key ID" of signed key */
+static char *cert_key_id = NULL;
+
+/* Comma-separated list of principal names for certifying keys */
+static char *cert_principals = NULL;
+
+/* Validity period for certificates */
+static u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0;
+static u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL;
+
+/* Certificate options */
+#define CERTOPT_X_FWD				(1)
+#define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD			(1<<1)
+#define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD			(1<<2)
+#define CERTOPT_PTY				(1<<3)
+#define CERTOPT_USER_RC				(1<<4)
+#define CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE	(1<<5)
+#define CERTOPT_REQUIRE_VERIFY			(1<<6)
+#define CERTOPT_DEFAULT	(CERTOPT_X_FWD|CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD| \
+			 CERTOPT_PORT_FWD|CERTOPT_PTY|CERTOPT_USER_RC)
+static u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT;
+static char *certflags_command = NULL;
+static char *certflags_src_addr = NULL;
+
+/* Arbitrary extensions specified by user */
+struct cert_ext {
+	char *key;
+	char *val;
+	int crit;
+};
+static struct cert_ext *cert_ext;
+static size_t ncert_ext;
+
+/* Conversion to/from various formats */
+enum {
+	FMT_RFC4716,
+	FMT_PKCS8,
+	FMT_PEM
+} convert_format = FMT_RFC4716;
+
+static char *key_type_name = NULL;
+
+/* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */
+static char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
+
+/* FIDO/U2F provider to use */
+static char *sk_provider = NULL;
+
+/* Format for writing private keys */
+static int private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH;
+
+/* Cipher for new-format private keys */
+static char *openssh_format_cipher = NULL;
+
+/* Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys. */
+static int rounds = 0;
+
+/* argv0 */
+extern char *__progname;
+
+static char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/* moduli.c */
+int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
+int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long,
+    unsigned long);
+#endif
+
+static void
+type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp)
+{
+	if (type == KEY_UNSPEC)
+		fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name);
+	if (*bitsp == 0) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+		int nid;
+
+		switch(type) {
+		case KEY_DSA:
+			*bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_DSA;
+			break;
+		case KEY_ECDSA:
+			if (name != NULL &&
+			    (nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(name)) > 0)
+				*bitsp = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid);
+			if (*bitsp == 0)
+				*bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA;
+			break;
+		case KEY_RSA:
+			*bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS;
+			break;
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	switch (type) {
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		if (*bitsp != 1024)
+			fatal("Invalid DSA key length: must be 1024 bits");
+		break;
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		if (*bitsp < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+			fatal("Invalid RSA key length: minimum is %d bits",
+			    SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
+		else if (*bitsp > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
+			fatal("Invalid RSA key length: maximum is %d bits",
+			    OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS);
+		break;
+	case KEY_ECDSA:
+		if (sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1)
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+			fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length: valid lengths are "
+			    "256, 384 or 521 bits");
+#else
+			fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length: valid lengths are "
+			    "256 or 384 bits");
+#endif
+	}
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether a file exists and, if so, asks the user whether they wish
+ * to overwrite it.
+ * Returns nonzero if the file does not already exist or if the user agrees to
+ * overwrite, or zero otherwise.
+ */
+static int
+confirm_overwrite(const char *filename)
+{
+	char yesno[3];
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (stat(filename, &st) != 0)
+		return 1;
+	printf("%s already exists.\n", filename);
+	printf("Overwrite (y/n)? ");
+	fflush(stdout);
+	if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y')
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
+{
+	char buf[1024];
+	char *name = NULL;
+
+	if (key_type_name == NULL)
+		name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
+	else {
+		switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) {
+		case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+		case KEY_DSA:
+			name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA;
+			break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+		case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+		case KEY_ECDSA:
+			name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA;
+			break;
+		case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+		case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+			name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK;
+			break;
+#endif
+		case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+		case KEY_RSA:
+			name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
+			break;
+		case KEY_ED25519:
+		case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+			name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
+			break;
+		case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+		case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+			name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK;
+			break;
+		case KEY_XMSS:
+		case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
+			name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS;
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("bad key type");
+		}
+	}
+	snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file),
+	    "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name);
+	printf("%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file);
+	fflush(stdout);
+	if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL)
+		exit(1);
+	buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0';
+	if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0)
+		strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file));
+	have_identity = 1;
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+load_identity(const char *filename, char **commentp)
+{
+	char *pass;
+	struct sshkey *prv;
+	int r;
+
+	if (commentp != NULL)
+		*commentp = NULL;
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_private(filename, "", &prv, commentp)) == 0)
+		return prv;
+	if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
+		fatal_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", filename);
+	if (identity_passphrase)
+		pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+	else
+		pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+	r = sshkey_load_private(filename, pass, &prv, commentp);
+	freezero(pass, strlen(pass));
+	if (r != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", filename);
+	return prv;
+}
+
+#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN		"---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
+#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END		"---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
+#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN		"---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----"
+#define	SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC	0x3f6ff9eb
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+static void
+do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	char comment[61], *b64;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshkey_putb(k, b)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "put key");
+	if ((b64 = sshbuf_dtob64_string(b, 1)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_dtob64_string failed");
+
+	/* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */
+	snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment),
+	    "%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH",
+	    sshkey_size(k), sshkey_type(k),
+	    pw->pw_name, hostname);
+
+	sshkey_free(k);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+
+	fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN);
+	fprintf(stdout, "Comment: \"%s\"\n%s", comment, b64);
+	fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END);
+	free(b64);
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_to_pkcs8(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) {
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		if (!PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->rsa))
+			fatal("PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY failed");
+		break;
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa))
+			fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed");
+		break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	case KEY_ECDSA:
+		if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa))
+			fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed");
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:
+		fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k));
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_to_pem(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) {
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		if (!PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(stdout, k->rsa))
+			fatal("PEM_write_RSAPublicKey failed");
+		break;
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa))
+			fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed");
+		break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	case KEY_ECDSA:
+		if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa))
+			fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed");
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:
+		fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k));
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_to(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	struct sshkey *k;
+	struct stat st;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!have_identity)
+		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &k, NULL)) != 0)
+		k = load_identity(identity_file, NULL);
+	switch (convert_format) {
+	case FMT_RFC4716:
+		do_convert_to_ssh2(pw, k);
+		break;
+	case FMT_PKCS8:
+		do_convert_to_pkcs8(k);
+		break;
+	case FMT_PEM:
+		do_convert_to_pem(k);
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal_f("unknown key format %d", convert_format);
+	}
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is almost exactly the bignum1 encoding, but with 32 bit for length
+ * instead of 16.
+ */
+static void
+buffer_get_bignum_bits(struct sshbuf *b, BIGNUM *value)
+{
+	u_int bytes, bignum_bits;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &bignum_bits)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	bytes = (bignum_bits + 7) / 8;
+	if (sshbuf_len(b) < bytes)
+		fatal_f("input buffer too small: need %d have %zu",
+		    bytes, sshbuf_len(b));
+	if (BN_bin2bn(sshbuf_ptr(b), bytes, value) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("BN_bin2bn failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, bytes)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "consume");
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+do_convert_private_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	char *type, *cipher;
+	u_char e1, e2, e3, *sig = NULL, data[] = "abcde12345";
+	int r, rlen, ktype;
+	u_int magic, i1, i2, i3, i4;
+	size_t slen;
+	u_long e;
+	BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL, *rsa_iqmp = NULL;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &magic)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse magic");
+
+	if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) {
+		error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic,
+		    SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cipher, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i2)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i3)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i4)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1, i2, i3, i4);
+	if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) {
+		error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher);
+		free(cipher);
+		free(type);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	free(cipher);
+
+	if (strstr(type, "dsa")) {
+		ktype = KEY_DSA;
+	} else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) {
+		ktype = KEY_RSA;
+	} else {
+		free(type);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((key = sshkey_new(ktype)) == NULL)
+		fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+	free(type);
+
+	switch (key->type) {
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		if ((dsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+		    (dsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+		    (dsa_g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+		    (dsa_pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+		    (dsa_priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("BN_new");
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_p);
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_g);
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_q);
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_pub_key);
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_priv_key);
+		if (!DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g))
+			fatal_f("DSA_set0_pqg failed");
+		dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */
+		if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, dsa_pub_key, dsa_priv_key))
+			fatal_f("DSA_set0_key failed");
+		dsa_pub_key = dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */
+		break;
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 ||
+		    (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) ||
+		    (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0))
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse RSA");
+		e = e1;
+		debug("e %lx", e);
+		if (e < 30) {
+			e <<= 8;
+			e += e2;
+			debug("e %lx", e);
+			e <<= 8;
+			e += e3;
+			debug("e %lx", e);
+		}
+		if ((rsa_e = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("BN_new");
+		if (!BN_set_word(rsa_e, e)) {
+			BN_clear_free(rsa_e);
+			sshkey_free(key);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		if ((rsa_n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+		    (rsa_d = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+		    (rsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+		    (rsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+		    (rsa_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("BN_new");
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_d);
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_n);
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_iqmp);
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_q);
+		buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_p);
+		if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, rsa_d))
+			fatal_f("RSA_set0_key failed");
+		rsa_n = rsa_e = rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */
+		if (!RSA_set0_factors(key->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q))
+			fatal_f("RSA_set0_factors failed");
+		rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */
+		if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(key, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "generate RSA parameters");
+		BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp);
+		break;
+	}
+	rlen = sshbuf_len(b);
+	if (rlen != 0)
+		error_f("remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen);
+
+	/* try the key */
+	if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data),
+	    NULL, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+		error_fr(r, "signing with converted key failed");
+	else if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data),
+	    NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0)
+		error_fr(r, "verification with converted key failed");
+	if (r != 0) {
+		sshkey_free(key);
+		free(sig);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	free(sig);
+	return key;
+}
+
+static int
+get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len)
+{
+	int c;
+	size_t pos = 0;
+
+	line[0] = '\0';
+	while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) {
+		if (pos >= len - 1)
+			fatal("input line too long.");
+		switch (c) {
+		case '\r':
+			c = fgetc(fp);
+			if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF)
+				fatal("unget: %s", strerror(errno));
+			return pos;
+		case '\n':
+			return pos;
+		}
+		line[pos++] = c;
+		line[pos] = '\0';
+	}
+	/* We reached EOF */
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey **k, int *private)
+{
+	int r, blen, escaped = 0;
+	u_int len;
+	char line[1024];
+	struct sshbuf *buf;
+	char encoded[8096];
+	FILE *fp;
+
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+	encoded[0] = '\0';
+	while ((blen = get_line(fp, line, sizeof(line))) != -1) {
+		if (blen > 0 && line[blen - 1] == '\\')
+			escaped++;
+		if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 ||
+		    strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) {
+			if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL)
+				*private = 1;
+			if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) {
+				break;
+			}
+			/* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (escaped) {
+			escaped--;
+			/* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */
+			continue;
+		}
+		strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded));
+	}
+	len = strlen(encoded);
+	if (((len % 4) == 3) &&
+	    (encoded[len-1] == '=') &&
+	    (encoded[len-2] == '=') &&
+	    (encoded[len-3] == '='))
+		encoded[len-3] = '\0';
+	if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(buf, encoded)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "base64 decode");
+	if (*private) {
+		if ((*k = do_convert_private_ssh2(buf)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("private key conversion failed");
+	} else if ((r = sshkey_fromb(buf, k)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse key");
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	fclose(fp);
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, int *private)
+{
+	EVP_PKEY *pubkey;
+	FILE *fp;
+
+	if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+	if ((pubkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
+		fatal_f("%s is not a recognised public key format",
+		    identity_file);
+	}
+	fclose(fp);
+	switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) {
+	case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
+		if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+			fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+		(*k)->type = KEY_RSA;
+		(*k)->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey);
+		break;
+	case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
+		if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+			fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+		(*k)->type = KEY_DSA;
+		(*k)->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pubkey);
+		break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	case EVP_PKEY_EC:
+		if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+			fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+		(*k)->type = KEY_ECDSA;
+		(*k)->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pubkey);
+		(*k)->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid((*k)->ecdsa);
+		break;
+#endif
+	default:
+		fatal_f("unsupported pubkey type %d",
+		    EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey));
+	}
+	EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
+	return;
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_from_pem(struct sshkey **k, int *private)
+{
+	FILE *fp;
+	RSA *rsa;
+
+	if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+	if ((rsa = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
+		if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+			fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+		(*k)->type = KEY_RSA;
+		(*k)->rsa = rsa;
+		fclose(fp);
+		return;
+	}
+	fatal_f("unrecognised raw private key format");
+}
+
+static void
+do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+	int r, private = 0, ok = 0;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (!have_identity)
+		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+
+	switch (convert_format) {
+	case FMT_RFC4716:
+		do_convert_from_ssh2(pw, &k, &private);
+		break;
+	case FMT_PKCS8:
+		do_convert_from_pkcs8(&k, &private);
+		break;
+	case FMT_PEM:
+		do_convert_from_pem(&k, &private);
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal_f("unknown key format %d", convert_format);
+	}
+
+	if (!private) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_write(k, stdout)) == 0)
+			ok = 1;
+		if (ok)
+			fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+	} else {
+		switch (k->type) {
+		case KEY_DSA:
+			ok = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL,
+			    NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+			break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+		case KEY_ECDSA:
+			ok = PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(stdout, k->ecdsa, NULL,
+			    NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+			break;
+#endif
+		case KEY_RSA:
+			ok = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL,
+			    NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k));
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!ok)
+		fatal("key write failed");
+	sshkey_free(k);
+	exit(0);
+}
+#endif
+
+static void
+do_print_public(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	struct sshkey *prv;
+	struct stat st;
+	int r;
+	char *comment = NULL;
+
+	if (!have_identity)
+		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+	prv = load_identity(identity_file, &comment);
+	if ((r = sshkey_write(prv, stdout)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "write key");
+	if (comment != NULL && *comment != '\0')
+		fprintf(stdout, " %s", comment);
+	fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+	if (sshkey_is_sk(prv)) {
+		debug("sk_application: \"%s\", sk_flags 0x%02x",
+			prv->sk_application, prv->sk_flags);
+	}
+	sshkey_free(prv);
+	free(comment);
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_download(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
+	int i, nkeys;
+	enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
+	int fptype;
+	char *fp, *ra, **comments = NULL;
+
+	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
+	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
+
+	pkcs11_init(1);
+	nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys, &comments);
+	if (nkeys <= 0)
+		fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
+	for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+		if (print_fingerprint) {
+			fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep);
+			ra = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fingerprint_hash,
+			    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+			if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+				fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
+			printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", sshkey_size(keys[i]),
+			    fp, sshkey_type(keys[i]));
+			if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+				printf("%s\n", ra);
+			free(ra);
+			free(fp);
+		} else {
+			(void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */
+			fprintf(stdout, "%s%s\n",
+			    *(comments[i]) == '\0' ? "" : " ", comments[i]);
+		}
+		free(comments[i]);
+		sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+	}
+	free(comments);
+	free(keys);
+	pkcs11_terminate();
+	exit(0);
+#else
+	fatal("no pkcs11 support");
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+try_read_key(char **cpp)
+{
+	struct sshkey *ret;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((ret = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+		fatal("sshkey_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, cpp)) == 0)
+		return ret;
+	/* Not a key */
+	sshkey_free(ret);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+fingerprint_one_key(const struct sshkey *public, const char *comment)
+{
+	char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL;
+	enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
+	int fptype;
+
+	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
+	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
+	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
+	ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+	if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+	mprintf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp,
+	    comment ? comment : "no comment", sshkey_type(public));
+	if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+		printf("%s\n", ra);
+	free(ra);
+	free(fp);
+}
+
+static void
+fingerprint_private(const char *path)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	char *comment = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *privkey = NULL, *pubkey = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &pubkey, &comment)) != 0)
+		debug_r(r, "load public \"%s\"", path);
+	if (pubkey == NULL || comment == NULL || *comment == '\0') {
+		free(comment);
+		if ((r = sshkey_load_private(path, NULL,
+		    &privkey, &comment)) != 0)
+			debug_r(r, "load private \"%s\"", path);
+	}
+	if (pubkey == NULL && privkey == NULL)
+		fatal("%s is not a key file.", path);
+
+	fingerprint_one_key(pubkey == NULL ? privkey : pubkey, comment);
+	sshkey_free(pubkey);
+	sshkey_free(privkey);
+	free(comment);
+}
+
+static void
+do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+	struct sshkey *public = NULL;
+	char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL;
+	size_t linesize = 0;
+	int i, invalid = 1;
+	const char *path;
+	u_long lnum = 0;
+
+	if (!have_identity)
+		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+	path = identity_file;
+
+	if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") == 0) {
+		f = stdin;
+		path = "(stdin)";
+	} else if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, path, strerror(errno));
+
+	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+		lnum++;
+		cp = line;
+		cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
+		/* Trim leading space and comments */
+		cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
+		if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * Input may be plain keys, private keys, authorized_keys
+		 * or known_hosts.
+		 */
+
+		/*
+		 * Try private keys first. Assume a key is private if
+		 * "SSH PRIVATE KEY" appears on the first line and we're
+		 * not reading from stdin (XXX support private keys on stdin).
+		 */
+		if (lnum == 1 && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 &&
+		    strstr(cp, "PRIVATE KEY") != NULL) {
+			free(line);
+			fclose(f);
+			fingerprint_private(path);
+			exit(0);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * If it's not a private key, then this must be prepared to
+		 * accept a public key prefixed with a hostname or options.
+		 * Try a bare key first, otherwise skip the leading stuff.
+		 */
+		if ((public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) {
+			i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10);
+			if (i == 0 || ep == NULL ||
+			    (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) {
+				int quoted = 0;
+
+				comment = cp;
+				for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' &&
+				    *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
+					if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
+						cp++;	/* Skip both */
+					else if (*cp == '"')
+						quoted = !quoted;
+				}
+				if (!*cp)
+					continue;
+				*cp++ = '\0';
+			}
+		}
+		/* Retry after parsing leading hostname/key options */
+		if (public == NULL && (public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) {
+			debug("%s:%lu: not a public key", path, lnum);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Find trailing comment, if any */
+		for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+			;
+		if (*cp != '\0' && *cp != '#')
+			comment = cp;
+
+		fingerprint_one_key(public, comment);
+		sshkey_free(public);
+		invalid = 0; /* One good key in the file is sufficient */
+	}
+	fclose(f);
+	free(line);
+
+	if (invalid)
+		fatal("%s is not a public key file.", path);
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	struct {
+		char *key_type;
+		char *key_type_display;
+		char *path;
+	} key_types[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+		{ "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE },
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+		{ "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE },
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+		{ "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE },
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+		{ "xmss", "XMSS",_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE },
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
+		{ NULL, NULL, NULL }
+	};
+
+	u_int32_t bits = 0;
+	int first = 0;
+	struct stat st;
+	struct sshkey *private, *public;
+	char comment[1024], *prv_tmp, *pub_tmp, *prv_file, *pub_file;
+	int i, type, fd, r;
+
+	for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) {
+		public = private = NULL;
+		prv_tmp = pub_tmp = prv_file = pub_file = NULL;
+
+		xasprintf(&prv_file, "%s%s",
+		    identity_file, key_types[i].path);
+
+		/* Check whether private key exists and is not zero-length */
+		if (stat(prv_file, &st) == 0) {
+			if (st.st_size != 0)
+				goto next;
+		} else if (errno != ENOENT) {
+			error("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			goto failnext;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Private key doesn't exist or is invalid; proceed with
+		 * key generation.
+		 */
+		xasprintf(&prv_tmp, "%s%s.XXXXXXXXXX",
+		    identity_file, key_types[i].path);
+		xasprintf(&pub_tmp, "%s%s.pub.XXXXXXXXXX",
+		    identity_file, key_types[i].path);
+		xasprintf(&pub_file, "%s%s.pub",
+		    identity_file, key_types[i].path);
+
+		if (first == 0) {
+			first = 1;
+			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
+		}
+		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
+		fflush(stdout);
+		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
+		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
+			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
+			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
+			goto failnext;
+		}
+		(void)close(fd); /* just using mkstemp() to reserve a name */
+		bits = 0;
+		type_bits_valid(type, NULL, &bits);
+		if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) {
+			error_r(r, "sshkey_generate failed");
+			goto failnext;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_from_private");
+		snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name,
+		    hostname);
+		if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, prv_tmp, "",
+		    comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
+		    rounds)) != 0) {
+			error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", prv_tmp);
+			goto failnext;
+		}
+		if ((fd = mkstemp(pub_tmp)) == -1) {
+			error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s",
+			    pub_tmp, strerror(errno));
+			goto failnext;
+		}
+		(void)fchmod(fd, 0644);
+		(void)close(fd);
+		if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, pub_tmp, comment)) != 0) {
+			error_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s",
+			    identity_file);
+			goto failnext;
+		}
+
+		/* Rename temporary files to their permanent locations. */
+		if (rename(pub_tmp, pub_file) != 0) {
+			error("Unable to move %s into position: %s",
+			    pub_file, strerror(errno));
+			goto failnext;
+		}
+		if (rename(prv_tmp, prv_file) != 0) {
+			error("Unable to move %s into position: %s",
+			    key_types[i].path, strerror(errno));
+ failnext:
+			first = 0;
+			goto next;
+		}
+ next:
+		sshkey_free(private);
+		sshkey_free(public);
+		free(prv_tmp);
+		free(pub_tmp);
+		free(prv_file);
+		free(pub_file);
+	}
+	if (first != 0)
+		printf("\n");
+}
+
+struct known_hosts_ctx {
+	const char *host;	/* Hostname searched for in find/delete case */
+	FILE *out;		/* Output file, stdout for find_hosts case */
+	int has_unhashed;	/* When hashing, original had unhashed hosts */
+	int found_key;		/* For find/delete, host was found */
+	int invalid;		/* File contained invalid items; don't delete */
+	int hash_hosts;		/* Hash hostnames as we go */
+	int find_host;		/* Search for specific hostname */
+	int delete_host;	/* Delete host from known_hosts */
+};
+
+static int
+known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+	struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx;
+	char *hashed, *cp, *hosts, *ohosts;
+	int has_wild = l->hosts && strcspn(l->hosts, "*?!") != strlen(l->hosts);
+	int was_hashed = l->hosts && l->hosts[0] == HASH_DELIM;
+
+	switch (l->status) {
+	case HKF_STATUS_OK:
+	case HKF_STATUS_MATCHED:
+		/*
+		 * Don't hash hosts already already hashed, with wildcard
+		 * characters or a CA/revocation marker.
+		 */
+		if (was_hashed || has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
+			fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+			if (has_wild && !ctx->find_host) {
+				logit("%s:%lu: ignoring host name "
+				    "with wildcard: %.64s", l->path,
+				    l->linenum, l->hosts);
+			}
+			return 0;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Split any comma-separated hostnames from the host list,
+		 * hash and store separately.
+		 */
+		ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(l->hosts);
+		while ((cp = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
+			lowercase(cp);
+			if ((hashed = host_hash(cp, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
+				fatal("hash_host failed");
+			fprintf(ctx->out, "%s %s\n", hashed, l->rawkey);
+			free(hashed);
+			ctx->has_unhashed = 1;
+		}
+		free(ohosts);
+		return 0;
+	case HKF_STATUS_INVALID:
+		/* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */
+		ctx->invalid = 1;
+		logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default:
+		fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+	struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx;
+	enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
+	int fptype;
+	char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL;
+
+	fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
+	rep =    print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
+
+	if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) {
+		if (ctx->delete_host) {
+			if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
+				/* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */
+				fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+			} else {
+				/*
+				 * Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke
+				 * marker, delete it by *not* writing the
+				 * line to ctx->out.
+				 */
+				ctx->found_key = 1;
+				if (!quiet)
+					printf("# Host %s found: line %lu\n",
+					    ctx->host, l->linenum);
+			}
+			return 0;
+		} else if (ctx->find_host) {
+			ctx->found_key = 1;
+			if (!quiet) {
+				printf("# Host %s found: line %lu %s\n",
+				    ctx->host,
+				    l->linenum, l->marker == MRK_CA ? "CA" :
+				    (l->marker == MRK_REVOKE ? "REVOKED" : ""));
+			}
+			if (ctx->hash_hosts)
+				known_hosts_hash(l, ctx);
+			else if (print_fingerprint) {
+				fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep);
+				ra = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key,
+				    fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+				if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+					fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+				mprintf("%s %s %s%s%s\n", ctx->host,
+				    sshkey_type(l->key), fp,
+				    l->comment[0] ? " " : "",
+				    l->comment);
+				if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
+					printf("%s\n", ra);
+				free(ra);
+				free(fp);
+			} else
+				fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	} else if (ctx->delete_host) {
+		/* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */
+		if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
+			ctx->invalid = 1;
+			logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
+		}
+		fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name, int find_host,
+    int delete_host, int hash_hosts)
+{
+	char *cp, tmp[PATH_MAX], old[PATH_MAX];
+	int r, fd, oerrno, inplace = 0;
+	struct known_hosts_ctx ctx;
+	u_int foreach_options;
+	struct stat sb;
+
+	if (!have_identity) {
+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid);
+		if (strlcpy(identity_file, cp, sizeof(identity_file)) >=
+		    sizeof(identity_file))
+			fatal("Specified known hosts path too long");
+		free(cp);
+		have_identity = 1;
+	}
+	if (stat(identity_file, &sb) != 0)
+		fatal("Cannot stat %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+
+	memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
+	ctx.out = stdout;
+	ctx.host = name;
+	ctx.hash_hosts = hash_hosts;
+	ctx.find_host = find_host;
+	ctx.delete_host = delete_host;
+
+	/*
+	 * Find hosts goes to stdout, hash and deletions happen in-place
+	 * A corner case is ssh-keygen -HF foo, which should go to stdout
+	 */
+	if (!find_host && (hash_hosts || delete_host)) {
+		if (strlcpy(tmp, identity_file, sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) ||
+		    strlcat(tmp, ".XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) ||
+		    strlcpy(old, identity_file, sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old) ||
+		    strlcat(old, ".old", sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old))
+			fatal("known_hosts path too long");
+		umask(077);
+		if ((fd = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1)
+			fatal("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno));
+		if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
+			oerrno = errno;
+			unlink(tmp);
+			fatal("fdopen: %s", strerror(oerrno));
+		}
+		fchmod(fd, sb.st_mode & 0644);
+		inplace = 1;
+	}
+	/* XXX support identity_file == "-" for stdin */
+	foreach_options = find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0;
+	foreach_options |= print_fingerprint ? HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY : 0;
+	if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(identity_file, (find_host || !hash_hosts) ?
+	    known_hosts_find_delete : known_hosts_hash, &ctx, name, NULL,
+	    foreach_options, 0)) != 0) {
+		if (inplace)
+			unlink(tmp);
+		fatal_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach");
+	}
+
+	if (inplace)
+		fclose(ctx.out);
+
+	if (ctx.invalid) {
+		error("%s is not a valid known_hosts file.", identity_file);
+		if (inplace) {
+			error("Not replacing existing known_hosts "
+			    "file because of errors");
+			unlink(tmp);
+		}
+		exit(1);
+	} else if (delete_host && !ctx.found_key) {
+		logit("Host %s not found in %s", name, identity_file);
+		if (inplace)
+			unlink(tmp);
+	} else if (inplace) {
+		/* Backup existing file */
+		if (unlink(old) == -1 && errno != ENOENT)
+			fatal("unlink %.100s: %s", old, strerror(errno));
+		if (link(identity_file, old) == -1)
+			fatal("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", identity_file, old,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		/* Move new one into place */
+		if (rename(tmp, identity_file) == -1) {
+			error("rename\"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", tmp, identity_file,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			unlink(tmp);
+			unlink(old);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+
+		printf("%s updated.\n", identity_file);
+		printf("Original contents retained as %s\n", old);
+		if (ctx.has_unhashed) {
+			logit("WARNING: %s contains unhashed entries", old);
+			logit("Delete this file to ensure privacy "
+			    "of hostnames");
+		}
+	}
+
+	exit (find_host && !ctx.found_key);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform changing a passphrase.  The argument is the passwd structure
+ * for the current user.
+ */
+static void
+do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	char *comment;
+	char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
+	struct stat st;
+	struct sshkey *private;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!have_identity)
+		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+	/* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */
+	r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment);
+	if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
+		if (identity_passphrase)
+			old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+		else
+			old_passphrase =
+			    read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ",
+			    RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+		r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase,
+		    &private, &comment);
+		freezero(old_passphrase, strlen(old_passphrase));
+		if (r != 0)
+			goto badkey;
+	} else if (r != 0) {
+ badkey:
+		fatal_r(r, "Failed to load key %s", identity_file);
+	}
+	if (comment)
+		mprintf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment);
+
+	/* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */
+	if (identity_new_passphrase) {
+		passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
+		passphrase2 = NULL;
+	} else {
+		passphrase1 =
+			read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no "
+			    "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+		passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
+		    RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+
+		/* Verify that they are the same. */
+		if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
+			explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+			explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
+			free(passphrase1);
+			free(passphrase2);
+			printf("Pass phrases do not match.  Try again.\n");
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		/* Destroy the other copy. */
+		freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
+	}
+
+	/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
+	if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
+	    comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+		error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file);
+		freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+		sshkey_free(private);
+		free(comment);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	/* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */
+	freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+	sshkey_free(private);		 /* Destroys contents */
+	free(comment);
+
+	printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n");
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print the SSHFP RR.
+ */
+static int
+do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname,
+    int print_generic)
+{
+	struct sshkey *public;
+	char *comment = NULL;
+	struct stat st;
+	int r;
+
+	if (fname == NULL)
+		fatal_f("no filename");
+	if (stat(fname, &st) == -1) {
+		if (errno == ENOENT)
+			return 0;
+		fatal("%s: %s", fname, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\"", fname);
+	export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic);
+	sshkey_free(public);
+	free(comment);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Change the comment of a private key file.
+ */
+static void
+do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw, const char *identity_comment)
+{
+	char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase;
+	struct sshkey *private;
+	struct sshkey *public;
+	struct stat st;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!have_identity)
+		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+	if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "",
+	    &private, &comment)) == 0)
+		passphrase = xstrdup("");
+	else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
+		fatal_r(r, "Cannot load private key \"%s\"", identity_file);
+	else {
+		if (identity_passphrase)
+			passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+		else if (identity_new_passphrase)
+			passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
+		else
+			passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ",
+			    RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+		/* Try to load using the passphrase. */
+		if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, passphrase,
+		    &private, &comment)) != 0) {
+			freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+			fatal_r(r, "Cannot load private key \"%s\"",
+			    identity_file);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (private->type != KEY_ED25519 && private->type != KEY_XMSS &&
+	    private_key_format != SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH) {
+		error("Comments are only supported for keys stored in "
+		    "the new format (-o).");
+		explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+		sshkey_free(private);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	if (comment)
+		printf("Old comment: %s\n", comment);
+	else
+		printf("No existing comment\n");
+
+	if (identity_comment) {
+		strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment));
+	} else {
+		printf("New comment: ");
+		fflush(stdout);
+		if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) {
+			explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+			sshkey_free(private);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+		new_comment[strcspn(new_comment, "\n")] = '\0';
+	}
+	if (comment != NULL && strcmp(comment, new_comment) == 0) {
+		printf("No change to comment\n");
+		free(passphrase);
+		sshkey_free(private);
+		free(comment);
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+	/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
+	if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase,
+	    new_comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
+	    rounds)) != 0) {
+		error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file);
+		freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+		sshkey_free(private);
+		free(comment);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+	if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_from_private");
+	sshkey_free(private);
+
+	strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
+	if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, identity_file, new_comment)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", identity_file);
+	sshkey_free(public);
+	free(comment);
+
+	if (strlen(new_comment) > 0)
+		printf("Comment '%s' applied\n", new_comment);
+	else
+		printf("Comment removed\n");
+
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+cert_ext_add(const char *key, const char *value, int iscrit)
+{
+	cert_ext = xreallocarray(cert_ext, ncert_ext + 1, sizeof(*cert_ext));
+	cert_ext[ncert_ext].key = xstrdup(key);
+	cert_ext[ncert_ext].val = value == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(value);
+	cert_ext[ncert_ext].crit = iscrit;
+	ncert_ext++;
+}
+
+/* qsort(3) comparison function for certificate extensions */
+static int
+cert_ext_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b)
+{
+	const struct cert_ext *a = (const struct cert_ext *)_a;
+	const struct cert_ext *b = (const struct cert_ext *)_b;
+	int r;
+
+	if (a->crit != b->crit)
+		return (a->crit < b->crit) ? -1 : 1;
+	if ((r = strcmp(a->key, b->key)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((a->val == NULL) != (b->val == NULL))
+		return (a->val == NULL) ? -1 : 1;
+	if (a->val != NULL && (r = strcmp(a->val, b->val)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL	1
+#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS	2
+static void
+prepare_options_buf(struct sshbuf *c, int which)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	size_t i;
+	int r;
+	const struct cert_ext *ext;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	sshbuf_reset(c);
+	for (i = 0; i < ncert_ext; i++) {
+		ext = &cert_ext[i];
+		if ((ext->crit && (which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS)) ||
+		    (!ext->crit && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL)))
+			continue;
+		if (ext->val == NULL) {
+			/* flag option */
+			debug3_f("%s", ext->key);
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, ext->key)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_string(c, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "prepare flag");
+		} else {
+			/* key/value option */
+			debug3_f("%s=%s", ext->key, ext->val);
+			sshbuf_reset(b);
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, ext->key)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ext->val)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c, b)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "prepare k/v");
+		}
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+}
+
+static void
+finalise_cert_exts(void)
+{
+	/* critical options */
+	if (certflags_command != NULL)
+		cert_ext_add("force-command", certflags_command, 1);
+	if (certflags_src_addr != NULL)
+		cert_ext_add("source-address", certflags_src_addr, 1);
+	if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_REQUIRE_VERIFY) != 0)
+		cert_ext_add("verify-required", NULL, 1);
+	/* extensions */
+	if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_X_FWD) != 0)
+		cert_ext_add("permit-X11-forwarding", NULL, 0);
+	if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0)
+		cert_ext_add("permit-agent-forwarding", NULL, 0);
+	if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0)
+		cert_ext_add("permit-port-forwarding", NULL, 0);
+	if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PTY) != 0)
+		cert_ext_add("permit-pty", NULL, 0);
+	if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0)
+		cert_ext_add("permit-user-rc", NULL, 0);
+	if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE) != 0)
+		cert_ext_add("no-touch-required", NULL, 0);
+	/* order lexically by key */
+	if (ncert_ext > 0)
+		qsort(cert_ext, ncert_ext, sizeof(*cert_ext), cert_ext_cmp);
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+load_pkcs11_key(char *path)
+{
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *public, *private = NULL;
+	int r, i, nkeys;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "Couldn't load CA public key \"%s\"", path);
+
+	nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, identity_passphrase,
+	    &keys, NULL);
+	debug3_f("%d keys", nkeys);
+	if (nkeys <= 0)
+		fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
+	for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+		if (sshkey_equal_public(public, keys[i])) {
+			private = keys[i];
+			continue;
+		}
+		sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+	}
+	free(keys);
+	sshkey_free(public);
+	return private;
+#else
+	fatal("no pkcs11 support");
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+}
+
+/* Signer for sshkey_certify_custom that uses the agent */
+static int
+agent_signer(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+    const char *alg, const char *provider, const char *pin,
+    u_int compat, void *ctx)
+{
+	int *agent_fdp = (int *)ctx;
+
+	return ssh_agent_sign(*agent_fdp, key, sigp, lenp,
+	    data, datalen, alg, compat);
+}
+
+static void
+do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, const char *ca_key_path, int prefer_agent,
+    unsigned long long cert_serial, int cert_serial_autoinc,
+    int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int r, i, found, agent_fd = -1;
+	u_int n;
+	struct sshkey *ca, *public;
+	char valid[64], *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment;
+	char *ca_fp = NULL, **plist = NULL, *pin = NULL;
+	struct ssh_identitylist *agent_ids;
+	size_t j;
+	struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	pkcs11_init(1);
+#endif
+	tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid);
+	if (pkcs11provider != NULL) {
+		/* If a PKCS#11 token was specified then try to use it */
+		if ((ca = load_pkcs11_key(tmp)) == NULL)
+			fatal("No PKCS#11 key matching %s found", ca_key_path);
+	} else if (prefer_agent) {
+		/*
+		 * Agent signature requested. Try to use agent after making
+		 * sure the public key specified is actually present in the
+		 * agent.
+		 */
+		if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0)
+			fatal_r(r, "Cannot load CA public key %s", tmp);
+		if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0)
+			fatal_r(r, "Cannot use public key for CA signature");
+		if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &agent_ids)) != 0)
+			fatal_r(r, "Retrieve agent key list");
+		found = 0;
+		for (j = 0; j < agent_ids->nkeys; j++) {
+			if (sshkey_equal(ca, agent_ids->keys[j])) {
+				found = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (!found)
+			fatal("CA key %s not found in agent", tmp);
+		ssh_free_identitylist(agent_ids);
+		ca->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+	} else {
+		/* CA key is assumed to be a private key on the filesystem */
+		ca = load_identity(tmp, NULL);
+		if (sshkey_is_sk(ca) &&
+		    (ca->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) {
+			if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for CA key: ",
+			    RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL)
+				fatal_f("couldn't read PIN");
+		}
+	}
+	free(tmp);
+
+	if (key_type_name != NULL) {
+		if (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) {
+			fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s",
+			    sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name);
+		}
+	} else if (ca->type == KEY_RSA) {
+		/* Default to a good signature algorithm */
+		key_type_name = "rsa-sha2-512";
+	}
+	ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ca, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+
+	finalise_cert_exts();
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+		/* Split list of principals */
+		n = 0;
+		if (cert_principals != NULL) {
+			otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals);
+			plist = NULL;
+			for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) {
+				plist = xreallocarray(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist));
+				if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0')
+					fatal("Empty principal name");
+			}
+			free(otmp);
+		}
+		if (n > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS)
+			fatal("Too many certificate principals specified");
+
+		tmp = tilde_expand_filename(argv[i], pw->pw_uid);
+		if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &public, &comment)) != 0)
+			fatal_r(r, "load pubkey \"%s\"", tmp);
+		if (sshkey_is_cert(public))
+			fatal_f("key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified",
+			    tmp, sshkey_type(public));
+
+		/* Prepare certificate to sign */
+		if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(public)) != 0)
+			fatal_r(r, "Could not upgrade key %s to certificate", tmp);
+		public->cert->type = cert_key_type;
+		public->cert->serial = (u_int64_t)cert_serial;
+		public->cert->key_id = xstrdup(cert_key_id);
+		public->cert->nprincipals = n;
+		public->cert->principals = plist;
+		public->cert->valid_after = cert_valid_from;
+		public->cert->valid_before = cert_valid_to;
+		prepare_options_buf(public->cert->critical, OPTIONS_CRITICAL);
+		prepare_options_buf(public->cert->extensions,
+		    OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS);
+		if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca,
+		    &public->cert->signature_key)) != 0)
+			fatal_r(r, "sshkey_from_private (ca key)");
+
+		if (agent_fd != -1 && (ca->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) {
+			if ((r = sshkey_certify_custom(public, ca,
+			    key_type_name, sk_provider, NULL, agent_signer,
+			    &agent_fd)) != 0)
+				fatal_r(r, "Couldn't certify %s via agent", tmp);
+		} else {
+			if (sshkey_is_sk(ca) &&
+			    (ca->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+				notifier = notify_start(0,
+				    "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
+				    sshkey_type(ca), ca_fp);
+			}
+			r = sshkey_certify(public, ca, key_type_name,
+			    sk_provider, pin);
+			notify_complete(notifier, "User presence confirmed");
+			if (r != 0)
+				fatal_r(r, "Couldn't certify key %s", tmp);
+		}
+
+		if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '.')) != NULL && strcmp(cp, ".pub") == 0)
+			*cp = '\0';
+		xasprintf(&out, "%s-cert.pub", tmp);
+		free(tmp);
+
+		if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, out, comment)) != 0) {
+			fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s",
+			    identity_file);
+		}
+
+		if (!quiet) {
+			sshkey_format_cert_validity(public->cert,
+			    valid, sizeof(valid));
+			logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\" serial %llu%s%s "
+			    "valid %s", sshkey_cert_type(public),
+			    out, public->cert->key_id,
+			    (unsigned long long)public->cert->serial,
+			    cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "",
+			    cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "",
+			    valid);
+		}
+
+		sshkey_free(public);
+		free(out);
+		if (cert_serial_autoinc)
+			cert_serial++;
+	}
+	if (pin != NULL)
+		freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+	free(ca_fp);
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	pkcs11_terminate();
+#endif
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+static u_int64_t
+parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now)
+{
+	int64_t mul, secs;
+
+	mul = *s == '-' ? -1 : 1;
+
+	if ((secs = convtime(s + 1)) == -1)
+		fatal("Invalid relative certificate time %s", s);
+	if (mul == -1 && secs > now)
+		fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s);
+	return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul);
+}
+
+static void
+parse_hex_u64(const char *s, uint64_t *up)
+{
+	char *ep;
+	unsigned long long ull;
+
+	errno = 0;
+	ull = strtoull(s, &ep, 16);
+	if (*s == '\0' || *ep != '\0')
+		fatal("Invalid certificate time: not a number");
+	if (errno == ERANGE && ull == ULONG_MAX)
+		fatal_fr(SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR, "Invalid certificate time");
+	*up = (uint64_t)ull;
+}
+
+static void
+parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
+{
+	char *from, *to;
+	time_t now = time(NULL);
+	int64_t secs;
+
+	/* +timespec relative to now */
+	if (*timespec == '+' && strchr(timespec, ':') == NULL) {
+		if ((secs = convtime(timespec + 1)) == -1)
+			fatal("Invalid relative certificate life %s", timespec);
+		cert_valid_to = now + secs;
+		/*
+		 * Backdate certificate one minute to avoid problems on hosts
+		 * with poorly-synchronised clocks.
+		 */
+		cert_valid_from = ((now - 59)/ 60) * 60;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * from:to, where
+	 * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | 0x... | "always"
+	 *   to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | 0x... | "forever"
+	 */
+	from = xstrdup(timespec);
+	to = strchr(from, ':');
+	if (to == NULL || from == to || *(to + 1) == '\0')
+		fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", timespec);
+	*to++ = '\0';
+
+	if (*from == '-' || *from == '+')
+		cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now);
+	else if (strcmp(from, "always") == 0)
+		cert_valid_from = 0;
+	else if (strncmp(from, "0x", 2) == 0)
+		parse_hex_u64(from, &cert_valid_from);
+	else if (parse_absolute_time(from, &cert_valid_from) != 0)
+		fatal("Invalid from time \"%s\"", from);
+
+	if (*to == '-' || *to == '+')
+		cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now);
+	else if (strcmp(to, "forever") == 0)
+		cert_valid_to = ~(u_int64_t)0;
+	else if (strncmp(to, "0x", 2) == 0)
+		parse_hex_u64(to, &cert_valid_to);
+	else if (parse_absolute_time(to, &cert_valid_to) != 0)
+		fatal("Invalid to time \"%s\"", to);
+
+	if (cert_valid_to <= cert_valid_from)
+		fatal("Empty certificate validity interval");
+	free(from);
+}
+
+static void
+add_cert_option(char *opt)
+{
+	char *val, *cp;
+	int iscrit = 0;
+
+	if (strcasecmp(opt, "clear") == 0)
+		certflags_flags = 0;
+	else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-x11-forwarding") == 0)
+		certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_X_FWD;
+	else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-x11-forwarding") == 0)
+		certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_X_FWD;
+	else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-agent-forwarding") == 0)
+		certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD;
+	else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0)
+		certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD;
+	else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-port-forwarding") == 0)
+		certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PORT_FWD;
+	else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0)
+		certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PORT_FWD;
+	else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-pty") == 0)
+		certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PTY;
+	else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-pty") == 0)
+		certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PTY;
+	else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-user-rc") == 0)
+		certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_USER_RC;
+	else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0)
+		certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_USER_RC;
+	else if (strcasecmp(opt, "touch-required") == 0)
+		certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE;
+	else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-touch-required") == 0)
+		certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE;
+	else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-verify-required") == 0)
+		certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_REQUIRE_VERIFY;
+	else if (strcasecmp(opt, "verify-required") == 0)
+		certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_REQUIRE_VERIFY;
+	else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) {
+		val = opt + 14;
+		if (*val == '\0')
+			fatal("Empty force-command option");
+		if (certflags_command != NULL)
+			fatal("force-command already specified");
+		certflags_command = xstrdup(val);
+	} else if (strncasecmp(opt, "source-address=", 15) == 0) {
+		val = opt + 15;
+		if (*val == '\0')
+			fatal("Empty source-address option");
+		if (certflags_src_addr != NULL)
+			fatal("source-address already specified");
+		if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0)
+			fatal("Invalid source-address list");
+		certflags_src_addr = xstrdup(val);
+	} else if (strncasecmp(opt, "extension:", 10) == 0 ||
+		    (iscrit = (strncasecmp(opt, "critical:", 9) == 0))) {
+		val = xstrdup(strchr(opt, ':') + 1);
+		if ((cp = strchr(val, '=')) != NULL)
+			*cp++ = '\0';
+		cert_ext_add(val, cp, iscrit);
+		free(val);
+	} else
+		fatal("Unsupported certificate option \"%s\"", opt);
+}
+
+static void
+show_options(struct sshbuf *optbuf, int in_critical)
+{
+	char *name, *arg, *hex;
+	struct sshbuf *options, *option = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((options = sshbuf_fromb(optbuf)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb failed");
+	while (sshbuf_len(options) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(option);
+		option = NULL;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(options, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_froms(options, &option)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse option");
+		printf("                %s", name);
+		if (!in_critical &&
+		    (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0 ||
+		    strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 ||
+		    strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0 ||
+		    strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0 ||
+		    strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0 ||
+		    strcmp(name, "no-touch-required") == 0)) {
+			printf("\n");
+		} else if (in_critical &&
+		    (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 ||
+		    strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0)) {
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(option, &arg, NULL)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse critical");
+			printf(" %s\n", arg);
+			free(arg);
+		} else if (in_critical &&
+		    strcmp(name, "verify-required") == 0) {
+			printf("\n");
+		} else if (sshbuf_len(option) > 0) {
+			hex = sshbuf_dtob16(option);
+			printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION: %s (len %zu)\n",
+			    hex, sshbuf_len(option));
+			sshbuf_reset(option);
+			free(hex);
+		} else
+			printf(" UNKNOWN FLAG OPTION\n");
+		free(name);
+		if (sshbuf_len(option) != 0)
+			fatal("Option corrupt: extra data at end");
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(option);
+	sshbuf_free(options);
+}
+
+static void
+print_cert(struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	char valid[64], *key_fp, *ca_fp;
+	u_int i;
+
+	key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+	ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
+	    fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+	if (key_fp == NULL || ca_fp == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
+	sshkey_format_cert_validity(key->cert, valid, sizeof(valid));
+
+	printf("        Type: %s %s certificate\n", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+	    sshkey_cert_type(key));
+	printf("        Public key: %s %s\n", sshkey_type(key), key_fp);
+	printf("        Signing CA: %s %s (using %s)\n",
+	    sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
+	    key->cert->signature_type);
+	printf("        Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
+	printf("        Serial: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial);
+	printf("        Valid: %s\n", valid);
+	printf("        Principals: ");
+	if (key->cert->nprincipals == 0)
+		printf("(none)\n");
+	else {
+		for (i = 0; i < key->cert->nprincipals; i++)
+			printf("\n                %s",
+			    key->cert->principals[i]);
+		printf("\n");
+	}
+	printf("        Critical Options: ");
+	if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) == 0)
+		printf("(none)\n");
+	else {
+		printf("\n");
+		show_options(key->cert->critical, 1);
+	}
+	printf("        Extensions: ");
+	if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->extensions) == 0)
+		printf("(none)\n");
+	else {
+		printf("\n");
+		show_options(key->cert->extensions, 0);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	struct stat st;
+	int r, is_stdin = 0, ok = 0;
+	FILE *f;
+	char *cp, *line = NULL;
+	const char *path;
+	size_t linesize = 0;
+	u_long lnum = 0;
+
+	if (!have_identity)
+		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
+	if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
+
+	path = identity_file;
+	if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) {
+		f = stdin;
+		path = "(stdin)";
+		is_stdin = 1;
+	} else if ((f = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
+		fatal("fopen %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+
+	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+		lnum++;
+		sshkey_free(key);
+		key = NULL;
+		/* Trim leading space and comments */
+		cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
+		if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
+			continue;
+		if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+			fatal("sshkey_new");
+		if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) {
+			error_r(r, "%s:%lu: invalid key", path, lnum);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+			error("%s:%lu is not a certificate", path, lnum);
+			continue;
+		}
+		ok = 1;
+		if (!is_stdin && lnum == 1)
+			printf("%s:\n", path);
+		else
+			printf("%s:%lu:\n", path, lnum);
+		print_cert(key);
+	}
+	free(line);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	fclose(f);
+	exit(ok ? 0 : 1);
+}
+
+static void
+load_krl(const char *path, struct ssh_krl **krlp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *krlbuf;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(path, &krlbuf)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "Unable to load KRL %s", path);
+	/* XXX check sigs */
+	if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, krlp, NULL, 0)) != 0 ||
+	    *krlp == NULL)
+		fatal_r(r, "Invalid KRL file %s", path);
+	sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
+}
+
+static void
+hash_to_blob(const char *cp, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp,
+    const char *file, u_long lnum)
+{
+	char *tmp;
+	size_t tlen;
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	int r;
+
+	if (strncmp(cp, "SHA256:", 7) != 0)
+		fatal("%s:%lu: unsupported hash algorithm", file, lnum);
+	cp += 7;
+
+	/*
+	 * OpenSSH base64 hashes omit trailing '='
+	 * characters; put them back for decode.
+	 */
+	tlen = strlen(cp);
+	tmp = xmalloc(tlen + 4 + 1);
+	strlcpy(tmp, cp, tlen + 1);
+	while ((tlen % 4) != 0) {
+		tmp[tlen++] = '=';
+		tmp[tlen] = '\0';
+	}
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(b, tmp)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "%s:%lu: decode hash failed", file, lnum);
+	free(tmp);
+	*lenp = sshbuf_len(b);
+	*blobp = xmalloc(*lenp);
+	memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), *lenp);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+}
+
+static void
+update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca,
+    const struct sshkey *ca, struct ssh_krl *krl)
+{
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	u_long lnum = 0;
+	char *path, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL;
+	u_char *blob = NULL;
+	size_t blen = 0, linesize = 0;
+	unsigned long long serial, serial2;
+	int i, was_explicit_key, was_sha1, was_sha256, was_hash, r;
+	FILE *krl_spec;
+
+	path = tilde_expand_filename(file, pw->pw_uid);
+	if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) {
+		krl_spec = stdin;
+		free(path);
+		path = xstrdup("(standard input)");
+	} else if ((krl_spec = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
+		fatal("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
+
+	if (!quiet)
+		printf("Revoking from %s\n", path);
+	while (getline(&line, &linesize, krl_spec) != -1) {
+		lnum++;
+		was_explicit_key = was_sha1 = was_sha256 = was_hash = 0;
+		cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
+		/* Trim trailing space, comments and strip \n */
+		for (i = 0, r = -1; cp[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+			if (cp[i] == '#' || cp[i] == '\n') {
+				cp[i] = '\0';
+				break;
+			}
+			if (cp[i] == ' ' || cp[i] == '\t') {
+				/* Remember the start of a span of whitespace */
+				if (r == -1)
+					r = i;
+			} else
+				r = -1;
+		}
+		if (r != -1)
+			cp[r] = '\0';
+		if (*cp == '\0')
+			continue;
+		if (strncasecmp(cp, "serial:", 7) == 0) {
+			if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) {
+				fatal("revoking certificates by serial number "
+				    "requires specification of a CA key");
+			}
+			cp += 7;
+			cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+			errno = 0;
+			serial = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0);
+			if (*cp == '\0' || (*ep != '\0' && *ep != '-'))
+				fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"",
+				    path, lnum, cp);
+			if (errno == ERANGE && serial == ULLONG_MAX)
+				fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range",
+				    path, lnum);
+			serial2 = serial;
+			if (*ep == '-') {
+				cp = ep + 1;
+				errno = 0;
+				serial2 = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0);
+				if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0')
+					fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"",
+					    path, lnum, cp);
+				if (errno == ERANGE && serial2 == ULLONG_MAX)
+					fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range",
+					    path, lnum);
+				if (serial2 <= serial)
+					fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial range "
+					    "%llu:%llu", path, lnum,
+					    (unsigned long long)serial,
+					    (unsigned long long)serial2);
+			}
+			if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl,
+			    ca, serial, serial2) != 0) {
+				fatal_f("revoke serial failed");
+			}
+		} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "id:", 3) == 0) {
+			if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) {
+				fatal("revoking certificates by key ID "
+				    "requires specification of a CA key");
+			}
+			cp += 3;
+			cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+			if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca, cp) != 0)
+				fatal_f("revoke key ID failed");
+		} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "hash:", 5) == 0) {
+			cp += 5;
+			cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+			hash_to_blob(cp, &blob, &blen, file, lnum);
+			r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
+			if (r != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
+		} else {
+			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
+				cp += 4;
+				cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+				was_explicit_key = 1;
+			} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha1:", 5) == 0) {
+				cp += 5;
+				cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+				was_sha1 = 1;
+			} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha256:", 7) == 0) {
+				cp += 7;
+				cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
+				was_sha256 = 1;
+				/*
+				 * Just try to process the line as a key.
+				 * Parsing will fail if it isn't.
+				 */
+			}
+			if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+				fatal("sshkey_new");
+			if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0)
+				fatal_r(r, "%s:%lu: invalid key", path, lnum);
+			if (was_explicit_key)
+				r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key);
+			else if (was_sha1) {
+				if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key,
+				    SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &blob, &blen) != 0) {
+					fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed",
+					    file, lnum);
+				}
+				r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, blob, blen);
+			} else if (was_sha256) {
+				if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key,
+				    SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, &blob, &blen) != 0) {
+					fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed",
+					    file, lnum);
+				}
+				r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
+			} else
+				r = ssh_krl_revoke_key(krl, key);
+			if (r != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
+			freezero(blob, blen);
+			blob = NULL;
+			blen = 0;
+			sshkey_free(key);
+		}
+	}
+	if (strcmp(path, "-") != 0)
+		fclose(krl_spec);
+	free(line);
+	free(path);
+}
+
+static void
+do_gen_krl(struct passwd *pw, int updating, const char *ca_key_path,
+    unsigned long long krl_version, const char *krl_comment,
+    int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	struct ssh_krl *krl;
+	struct stat sb;
+	struct sshkey *ca = NULL;
+	int i, r, wild_ca = 0;
+	char *tmp;
+	struct sshbuf *kbuf;
+
+	if (*identity_file == '\0')
+		fatal("KRL generation requires an output file");
+	if (stat(identity_file, &sb) == -1) {
+		if (errno != ENOENT)
+			fatal("Cannot access KRL \"%s\": %s",
+			    identity_file, strerror(errno));
+		if (updating)
+			fatal("KRL \"%s\" does not exist", identity_file);
+	}
+	if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
+		if (strcasecmp(ca_key_path, "none") == 0)
+			wild_ca = 1;
+		else {
+			tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid);
+			if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0)
+				fatal_r(r, "Cannot load CA public key %s", tmp);
+			free(tmp);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (updating)
+		load_krl(identity_file, &krl);
+	else if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL)
+		fatal("couldn't create KRL");
+
+	if (krl_version != 0)
+		ssh_krl_set_version(krl, krl_version);
+	if (krl_comment != NULL)
+		ssh_krl_set_comment(krl, krl_comment);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
+		update_krl_from_file(pw, argv[i], wild_ca, ca, krl);
+
+	if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if (ssh_krl_to_blob(krl, kbuf, NULL, 0) != 0)
+		fatal("Couldn't generate KRL");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_write_file(identity_file, kbuf)) != 0)
+		fatal("write %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+	sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+	ssh_krl_free(krl);
+	sshkey_free(ca);
+}
+
+static void
+do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int print_krl, int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int i, r, ret = 0;
+	char *comment;
+	struct ssh_krl *krl;
+	struct sshkey *k;
+
+	if (*identity_file == '\0')
+		fatal("KRL checking requires an input file");
+	load_krl(identity_file, &krl);
+	if (print_krl)
+		krl_dump(krl, stdout);
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_load_public(argv[i], &k, &comment)) != 0)
+			fatal_r(r, "Cannot load public key %s", argv[i]);
+		r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, k);
+		printf("%s%s%s%s: %s\n", argv[i],
+		    *comment ? " (" : "", comment, *comment ? ")" : "",
+		    r == 0 ? "ok" : "REVOKED");
+		if (r != 0)
+			ret = 1;
+		sshkey_free(k);
+		free(comment);
+	}
+	ssh_krl_free(krl);
+	exit(ret);
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+load_sign_key(const char *keypath, const struct sshkey *pubkey)
+{
+	size_t i, slen, plen = strlen(keypath);
+	char *privpath = xstrdup(keypath);
+	static const char * const suffixes[] = { "-cert.pub", ".pub", NULL };
+	struct sshkey *ret = NULL, *privkey = NULL;
+	int r, waspub = 0;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	/*
+	 * If passed a public key filename, then try to locate the corresponding
+	 * private key. This lets us specify certificates on the command-line
+	 * and have ssh-keygen find the appropriate private key.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) {
+		slen = strlen(suffixes[i]);
+		if (plen <= slen ||
+		    strcmp(privpath + plen - slen, suffixes[i]) != 0)
+			continue;
+		privpath[plen - slen] = '\0';
+		debug_f("%s looks like a public key, using private key "
+		    "path %s instead", keypath, privpath);
+		waspub = 1;
+	}
+	if (waspub && stat(privpath, &st) != 0 && errno == ENOENT)
+		fatal("No private key found for public key \"%s\"", keypath);
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_private(privpath, "", &privkey, NULL)) != 0 &&
+	    (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) {
+		debug_fr(r, "load private key \"%s\"", privpath);
+		fatal("No private key found for \"%s\"", privpath);
+	} else if (privkey == NULL)
+		privkey = load_identity(privpath, NULL);
+
+	if (!sshkey_equal_public(pubkey, privkey)) {
+		error("Public key %s doesn't match private %s",
+		    keypath, privpath);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(pubkey) && !sshkey_is_cert(privkey)) {
+		/*
+		 * Graft the certificate onto the private key to make
+		 * it capable of signing.
+		 */
+		if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(privkey)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_certified");
+			goto done;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(pubkey, privkey)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "sshkey_cert_copy");
+			goto done;
+		}
+	}
+	/* success */
+	ret = privkey;
+	privkey = NULL;
+ done:
+	sshkey_free(privkey);
+	free(privpath);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+sign_one(struct sshkey *signkey, const char *filename, int fd,
+    const char *sig_namespace, const char *hashalg, sshsig_signer *signer,
+    void *signer_ctx)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, wfd = -1, oerrno;
+	char *wfile = NULL, *asig = NULL, *fp = NULL;
+	char *pin = NULL, *prompt = NULL;
+
+	if (!quiet) {
+		if (fd == STDIN_FILENO)
+			fprintf(stderr, "Signing data on standard input\n");
+		else
+			fprintf(stderr, "Signing file %s\n", filename);
+	}
+	if (signer == NULL && sshkey_is_sk(signkey)) {
+		if ((signkey->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) {
+			xasprintf(&prompt, "Enter PIN for %s key: ",
+			    sshkey_type(signkey));
+			if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt,
+			    RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL)
+				fatal_f("couldn't read PIN");
+		}
+		if ((signkey->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(signkey, fingerprint_hash,
+			    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+				fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
+			fprintf(stderr, "Confirm user presence for key %s %s\n",
+			    sshkey_type(signkey), fp);
+			free(fp);
+		}
+	}
+	if ((r = sshsig_sign_fd(signkey, hashalg, sk_provider, pin,
+	    fd, sig_namespace, &sigbuf, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0) {
+		error_r(r, "Signing %s failed", filename);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshsig_armor(sigbuf, &abuf)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((asig = sshbuf_dup_string(abuf)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("buffer error");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (fd == STDIN_FILENO) {
+		fputs(asig, stdout);
+		fflush(stdout);
+	} else {
+		xasprintf(&wfile, "%s.sig", filename);
+		if (confirm_overwrite(wfile)) {
+			if ((wfd = open(wfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC,
+			    0666)) == -1) {
+				oerrno = errno;
+				error("Cannot open %s: %s",
+				    wfile, strerror(errno));
+				errno = oerrno;
+				r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (atomicio(vwrite, wfd, asig,
+			    strlen(asig)) != strlen(asig)) {
+				oerrno = errno;
+				error("Cannot write to %s: %s",
+				    wfile, strerror(errno));
+				errno = oerrno;
+				r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			if (!quiet) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Write signature to %s\n",
+				    wfile);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(wfile);
+	free(prompt);
+	free(asig);
+	if (pin != NULL)
+		freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+	sshbuf_free(abuf);
+	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+	if (wfd != -1)
+		close(wfd);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sig_process_opts(char * const *opts, size_t nopts, char **hashalgp,
+    uint64_t *verify_timep, int *print_pubkey)
+{
+	size_t i;
+	time_t now;
+
+	if (verify_timep != NULL)
+		*verify_timep = 0;
+	if (print_pubkey != NULL)
+		*print_pubkey = 0;
+	if (hashalgp != NULL)
+		*hashalgp = NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+		if (hashalgp != NULL &&
+		    strncasecmp(opts[i], "hashalg=", 8) == 0) {
+			*hashalgp = xstrdup(opts[i] + 8);
+		} else if (verify_timep &&
+		    strncasecmp(opts[i], "verify-time=", 12) == 0) {
+			if (parse_absolute_time(opts[i] + 12,
+			    verify_timep) != 0 || *verify_timep == 0) {
+				error("Invalid \"verify-time\" option");
+				return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+			}
+		} else if (print_pubkey &&
+		    strcasecmp(opts[i], "print-pubkey") == 0) {
+			*print_pubkey = 1;
+		} else {
+			error("Invalid option \"%s\"", opts[i]);
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		}
+	}
+	if (verify_timep && *verify_timep == 0) {
+		if ((now = time(NULL)) < 0) {
+			error("Time is before epoch");
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		}
+		*verify_timep = (uint64_t)now;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+sig_sign(const char *keypath, const char *sig_namespace, int require_agent,
+    int argc, char **argv, char * const *opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+	int i, fd = -1, r, ret = -1;
+	int agent_fd = -1;
+	struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL, *privkey = NULL, *signkey = NULL;
+	sshsig_signer *signer = NULL;
+	char *hashalg = NULL;
+
+	/* Check file arguments. */
+	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") != 0)
+			continue;
+		if (i > 0 || argc > 1)
+			fatal("Cannot sign mix of paths and standard input");
+	}
+
+	if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, &hashalg, NULL, NULL) != 0)
+		goto done; /* error already logged */
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_load_public(keypath, &pubkey, NULL)) != 0) {
+		error_r(r, "Couldn't load public key %s", keypath);
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) {
+		if (require_agent)
+			fatal("Couldn't get agent socket");
+		debug_r(r, "Couldn't get agent socket");
+	} else {
+		if ((r = ssh_agent_has_key(agent_fd, pubkey)) == 0)
+			signer = agent_signer;
+		else {
+			if (require_agent)
+				fatal("Couldn't find key in agent");
+			debug_r(r, "Couldn't find key in agent");
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (signer == NULL) {
+		/* Not using agent - try to load private key */
+		if ((privkey = load_sign_key(keypath, pubkey)) == NULL)
+			goto done;
+		signkey = privkey;
+	} else {
+		/* Will use key in agent */
+		signkey = pubkey;
+	}
+
+	if (argc == 0) {
+		if ((r = sign_one(signkey, "(stdin)", STDIN_FILENO,
+		    sig_namespace, hashalg, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0)
+			goto done;
+	} else {
+		for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
+			if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") == 0)
+				fd = STDIN_FILENO;
+			else if ((fd = open(argv[i], O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
+				error("Cannot open %s for signing: %s",
+				    argv[i], strerror(errno));
+				goto done;
+			}
+			if ((r = sign_one(signkey, argv[i], fd, sig_namespace,
+			    hashalg, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0)
+				goto done;
+			if (fd != STDIN_FILENO)
+				close(fd);
+			fd = -1;
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+done:
+	if (fd != -1 && fd != STDIN_FILENO)
+		close(fd);
+	sshkey_free(pubkey);
+	sshkey_free(privkey);
+	free(hashalg);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+sig_verify(const char *signature, const char *sig_namespace,
+    const char *principal, const char *allowed_keys, const char *revoked_keys,
+    char * const *opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+	int r, ret = -1;
+	int print_pubkey = 0;
+	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL;
+	char *fp = NULL;
+	struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
+	uint64_t verify_time = 0;
+
+	if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, NULL, &verify_time,
+	    &print_pubkey) != 0)
+		goto done; /* error already logged */
+
+	memset(&sig_details, 0, sizeof(sig_details));
+	if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) {
+		error_r(r, "Couldn't read signature file");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshsig_verify_fd(sigbuf, STDIN_FILENO, sig_namespace,
+	    &sign_key, &sig_details)) != 0)
+		goto done; /* sshsig_verify() prints error */
+
+	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash,
+	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+	debug("Valid (unverified) signature from key %s", fp);
+	if (sig_details != NULL) {
+		debug2_f("signature details: counter = %u, flags = 0x%02x",
+		    sig_details->sk_counter, sig_details->sk_flags);
+	}
+	free(fp);
+	fp = NULL;
+
+	if (revoked_keys != NULL) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_check_revoked(sign_key, revoked_keys)) != 0) {
+			debug3_fr(r, "sshkey_check_revoked");
+			goto done;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (allowed_keys != NULL && (r = sshsig_check_allowed_keys(allowed_keys,
+	    sign_key, principal, sig_namespace, verify_time)) != 0) {
+		debug3_fr(r, "sshsig_check_allowed_keys");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	ret = 0;
+done:
+	if (!quiet) {
+		if (ret == 0) {
+			if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash,
+			    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+				fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+			if (principal == NULL) {
+				printf("Good \"%s\" signature with %s key %s\n",
+				    sig_namespace, sshkey_type(sign_key), fp);
+
+			} else {
+				printf("Good \"%s\" signature for %s with %s key %s\n",
+				    sig_namespace, principal,
+				    sshkey_type(sign_key), fp);
+			}
+		} else {
+			printf("Could not verify signature.\n");
+		}
+	}
+	/* Print the signature key if requested */
+	if (ret == 0 && print_pubkey && sign_key != NULL) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_write(sign_key, stdout)) == 0)
+			fputc('\n', stdout);
+		else {
+			error_r(r, "Could not print public key.\n");
+			ret = -1;
+		}
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+	sshbuf_free(abuf);
+	sshkey_free(sign_key);
+	sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
+	free(fp);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+sig_find_principals(const char *signature, const char *allowed_keys,
+    char * const *opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+	int r, ret = -1;
+	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL;
+	char *principals = NULL, *cp, *tmp;
+	uint64_t verify_time = 0;
+
+	if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, NULL, &verify_time, NULL) != 0)
+		goto done; /* error already logged */
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) {
+		error_r(r, "Couldn't read signature file");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshsig_get_pubkey(sigbuf, &sign_key)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshsig_get_pubkey");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshsig_find_principals(allowed_keys, sign_key,
+	    verify_time, &principals)) != 0) {
+		if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
+			error_fr(r, "sshsig_find_principal");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	ret = 0;
+done:
+	if (ret == 0 ) {
+		/* Emit matching principals one per line */
+		tmp = principals;
+		while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0')
+			puts(cp);
+	} else {
+		fprintf(stderr, "No principal matched.\n");
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+	sshbuf_free(abuf);
+	sshkey_free(sign_key);
+	free(principals);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+sig_match_principals(const char *allowed_keys, char *principal,
+	char * const *opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+	int r;
+	char **principals = NULL;
+	size_t i, nprincipals = 0;
+
+	if ((r = sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
+		return r; /* error already logged */
+
+	if ((r = sshsig_match_principals(allowed_keys, principal,
+	    &principals, &nprincipals)) != 0) {
+		debug_f("match: %s", ssh_err(r));
+		fprintf(stderr, "No principal matched.\n");
+		return r;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < nprincipals; i++) {
+		printf("%s\n", principals[i]);
+		free(principals[i]);
+	}
+	free(principals);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+do_moduli_gen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	/* Moduli generation/screening */
+	u_int32_t memory = 0;
+	BIGNUM *start = NULL;
+	int moduli_bits = 0;
+	FILE *out;
+	size_t i;
+	const char *errstr;
+
+	/* Parse options */
+	for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+		if (strncmp(opts[i], "memory=", 7) == 0) {
+			memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(opts[i]+7, 1,
+			    UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+			if (errstr) {
+				fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s",
+				    errstr, opts[i]+7);
+			}
+		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start=", 6) == 0) {
+			/* XXX - also compare length against bits */
+			if (BN_hex2bn(&start, opts[i]+6) == 0)
+				fatal("Invalid start point.");
+		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "bits=", 5) == 0) {
+			moduli_bits = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+5, 1,
+			    INT_MAX, &errstr);
+			if (errstr) {
+				fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
+					opts[i]+12, errstr);
+			}
+		} else {
+			fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli "
+			    "generation", opts[i]);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((out = fopen(out_file, "w")) == NULL) {
+		fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s",
+		    out_file, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+
+	if (moduli_bits == 0)
+		moduli_bits = DEFAULT_BITS;
+	if (gen_candidates(out, memory, moduli_bits, start) != 0)
+		fatal("modulus candidate generation failed");
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	fatal("Moduli generation is not supported");
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+}
+
+static void
+do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	/* Moduli generation/screening */
+	char *checkpoint = NULL;
+	u_int32_t generator_wanted = 0;
+	unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0;
+	int prime_tests = 0;
+	FILE *out, *in = stdin;
+	size_t i;
+	const char *errstr;
+
+	/* Parse options */
+	for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+		if (strncmp(opts[i], "lines=", 6) == 0) {
+			lines_to_process = strtoul(opts[i]+6, NULL, 10);
+		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) {
+			start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10);
+		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) {
+			checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11);
+		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) {
+			generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(
+			    opts[i]+10, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+			if (errstr != NULL) {
+				fatal("Generator invalid: %s (%s)",
+				    opts[i]+10, errstr);
+			}
+		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "prime-tests=", 12) == 0) {
+			prime_tests = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+12, 1,
+			    INT_MAX, &errstr);
+			if (errstr) {
+				fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
+					opts[i]+12, errstr);
+			}
+		} else {
+			fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli "
+			    "screening", opts[i]);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) {
+		if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) {
+			fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate "
+			    "file \"%s\": %s", identity_file,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((out = fopen(out_file, "a")) == NULL) {
+		fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s",
+		    out_file, strerror(errno));
+	}
+	setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+	if (prime_test(in, out, prime_tests == 0 ? 100 : prime_tests,
+	    generator_wanted, checkpoint,
+	    start_lineno, lines_to_process) != 0)
+		fatal("modulus screening failed");
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	fatal("Moduli screening is not supported");
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+}
+
+/* Read and confirm a passphrase */
+static char *
+read_check_passphrase(const char *prompt1, const char *prompt2,
+    const char *retry_prompt)
+{
+	char *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		passphrase1 = read_passphrase(prompt1, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+		passphrase2 = read_passphrase(prompt2, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+		if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) == 0) {
+			freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
+			return passphrase1;
+		}
+		/* The passphrases do not match. Clear them and retry. */
+		freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+		freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
+		fputs(retry_prompt, stdout);
+		fputc('\n', stdout);
+		fflush(stdout);
+	}
+	/* NOTREACHED */
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static char *
+private_key_passphrase(void)
+{
+	if (identity_passphrase)
+		return xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+	if (identity_new_passphrase)
+		return xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
+
+	return read_check_passphrase(
+	    "Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase): ",
+	    "Enter same passphrase again: ",
+	    "Passphrases do not match.  Try again.");
+}
+
+static char *
+sk_suffix(const char *application, const uint8_t *user, size_t userlen)
+{
+	char *ret, *cp;
+	size_t slen, i;
+
+	/* Trim off URL-like preamble */
+	if (strncmp(application, "ssh://", 6) == 0)
+		ret =  xstrdup(application + 6);
+	else if (strncmp(application, "ssh:", 4) == 0)
+		ret =  xstrdup(application + 4);
+	else
+		ret = xstrdup(application);
+
+	/* Count trailing zeros in user */
+	for (i = 0; i < userlen; i++) {
+		if (user[userlen - i - 1] != 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	if (i >= userlen)
+		return ret; /* user-id was default all-zeros */
+
+	/* Append user-id, escaping non-UTF-8 characters */
+	slen = userlen - i;
+	if (asmprintf(&cp, INT_MAX, NULL, "%.*s", (int)slen, user) == -1)
+		fatal_f("asmprintf failed");
+	/* Don't emit a user-id that contains path or control characters */
+	if (strchr(cp, '/') != NULL || strstr(cp, "..") != NULL ||
+	    strchr(cp, '\\') != NULL) {
+		free(cp);
+		cp = tohex(user, slen);
+	}
+	xextendf(&ret, "_", "%s", cp);
+	free(cp);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+do_download_sk(const char *skprovider, const char *device)
+{
+	struct sshsk_resident_key **srks;
+	size_t nsrks, i;
+	int r, ret = -1;
+	char *fp, *pin = NULL, *pass = NULL, *path, *pubpath;
+	const char *ext;
+	struct sshkey *key;
+
+	if (skprovider == NULL)
+		fatal("Cannot download keys without provider");
+
+	pin = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+	if (!quiet) {
+		printf("You may need to touch your authenticator "
+		    "to authorize key download.\n");
+	}
+	if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(skprovider, device, pin, 0,
+	    &srks, &nsrks)) != 0) {
+		if (pin != NULL)
+			freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+		error_r(r, "Unable to load resident keys");
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (nsrks == 0)
+		logit("No keys to download");
+	if (pin != NULL)
+		freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nsrks; i++) {
+		key = srks[i]->key;
+		if (key->type != KEY_ECDSA_SK && key->type != KEY_ED25519_SK) {
+			error("Unsupported key type %s (%d)",
+			    sshkey_type(key), key->type);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+		debug_f("key %zu: %s %s %s (flags 0x%02x)", i,
+		    sshkey_type(key), fp, key->sk_application, key->sk_flags);
+		ext = sk_suffix(key->sk_application,
+		    srks[i]->user_id, srks[i]->user_id_len);
+		xasprintf(&path, "id_%s_rk%s%s",
+		    key->type == KEY_ECDSA_SK ? "ecdsa_sk" : "ed25519_sk",
+		    *ext == '\0' ? "" : "_", ext);
+
+		/* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */
+		if (!confirm_overwrite(path)) {
+			free(path);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* Save the key with the application string as the comment */
+		if (pass == NULL)
+			pass = private_key_passphrase();
+		if ((r = sshkey_save_private(key, path, pass,
+		    key->sk_application, private_key_format,
+		    openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+			error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", path);
+			free(path);
+			break;
+		}
+		if (!quiet) {
+			printf("Saved %s key%s%s to %s\n", sshkey_type(key),
+			    *ext != '\0' ? " " : "",
+			    *ext != '\0' ? key->sk_application : "",
+			    path);
+		}
+
+		/* Save public key too */
+		xasprintf(&pubpath, "%s.pub", path);
+		free(path);
+		if ((r = sshkey_save_public(key, pubpath,
+		    key->sk_application)) != 0) {
+			error_r(r, "Saving public key \"%s\" failed", pubpath);
+			free(pubpath);
+			break;
+		}
+		free(pubpath);
+	}
+
+	if (i >= nsrks)
+		ret = 0; /* success */
+	if (pass != NULL)
+		freezero(pass, strlen(pass));
+	sshsk_free_resident_keys(srks, nsrks);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+save_attestation(struct sshbuf *attest, const char *path)
+{
+	mode_t omask;
+	int r;
+
+	if (path == NULL)
+		return; /* nothing to do */
+	if (attest == NULL || sshbuf_len(attest) == 0)
+		fatal("Enrollment did not return attestation data");
+	omask = umask(077);
+	r = sshbuf_write_file(path, attest);
+	umask(omask);
+	if (r != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "Unable to write attestation data \"%s\"", path);
+	if (!quiet)
+		printf("Your FIDO attestation certificate has been saved in "
+		    "%s\n", path);
+}
+
+static int
+confirm_sk_overwrite(const char *application, const char *user)
+{
+	char yesno[3];
+
+	printf("A resident key scoped to '%s' with user id '%s' already "
+	    "exists.\n", application == NULL ? "ssh:" : application,
+	    user == NULL ? "null" : user);
+	printf("Overwrite key in token (y/n)? ");
+	fflush(stdout);
+	if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y')
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-a rounds] [-b bits] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]\n"
+	    "                  [-m format] [-N new_passphrase] [-O option]\n"
+	    "                  [-t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa]\n"
+	    "                  [-w provider] [-Z cipher]\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -p [-a rounds] [-f keyfile] [-m format] [-N new_passphrase]\n"
+	    "                   [-P old_passphrase] [-Z cipher]\n"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	    "       ssh-keygen -i [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -e [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n"
+#endif
+	    "       ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -c [-a rounds] [-C comment] [-f keyfile] [-P passphrase]\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n");
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "       ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n");
+#endif
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "       ssh-keygen -F hostname [-lv] [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -K [-a rounds] [-w provider]\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -r hostname [-g] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	    "       ssh-keygen -M generate [-O option] output_file\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -M screen [-f input_file] [-O option] output_file\n"
+#endif
+	    "       ssh-keygen -I certificate_identity -s ca_key [-hU] [-D pkcs11_provider]\n"
+	    "                  [-n principals] [-O option] [-V validity_interval]\n"
+	    "                  [-z serial_number] file ...\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -A [-a rounds] [-f prefix_path]\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]\n"
+	    "                  file ...\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -Q [-l] -f krl_file [file ...]\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -s signature_file -f allowed_signers_file\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -Y match-principals -I signer_identity -f allowed_signers_file\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate -n namespace -s signature_file\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -Y sign -f key_file -n namespace file [-O option] ...\n"
+	    "       ssh-keygen -Y verify -f allowed_signers_file -I signer_identity\n"
+	    "                  -n namespace -s signature_file [-r krl_file] [-O option]\n");
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Main program for key management.
+ */
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	char comment[1024], *passphrase = NULL;
+	char *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra;
+	struct sshkey *private, *public;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	int r, opt, type;
+	int change_passphrase = 0, change_comment = 0, show_cert = 0;
+	int find_host = 0, delete_host = 0, hash_hosts = 0;
+	int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0;
+	int prefer_agent = 0, convert_to = 0, convert_from = 0;
+	int print_public = 0, print_generic = 0, cert_serial_autoinc = 0;
+	int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0, download_sk = 0;
+	unsigned long long cert_serial = 0;
+	char *identity_comment = NULL, *ca_key_path = NULL, **opts = NULL;
+	char *sk_application = NULL, *sk_device = NULL, *sk_user = NULL;
+	char *sk_attestation_path = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *challenge = NULL, *attest = NULL;
+	size_t i, nopts = 0;
+	u_int32_t bits = 0;
+	uint8_t sk_flags = SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
+	const char *errstr;
+	int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+	char *sign_op = NULL;
+
+	extern int optind;
+	extern char *optarg;
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+
+	seed_rng();
+
+	log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+	msetlocale();
+
+	/* we need this for the home * directory.  */
+	pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+	if (!pw)
+		fatal("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid());
+	pw = pwcopy(pw);
+	if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == -1)
+		fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	sk_provider = getenv("SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
+
+	/* Remaining characters: dGjJSTWx */
+	while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHKLQUXceghiklopquvy"
+	    "C:D:E:F:I:M:N:O:P:R:V:Y:Z:"
+	    "a:b:f:g:m:n:r:s:t:w:z:")) != -1) {
+		switch (opt) {
+		case 'A':
+			gen_all_hostkeys = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'b':
+			bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT32_MAX,
+			    &errstr);
+			if (errstr)
+				fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)",
+					optarg, errstr);
+			break;
+		case 'E':
+			fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
+			if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
+				fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'F':
+			find_host = 1;
+			rr_hostname = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'H':
+			hash_hosts = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'I':
+			cert_key_id = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'R':
+			delete_host = 1;
+			rr_hostname = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'L':
+			show_cert = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			print_fingerprint = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'B':
+			print_bubblebabble = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'm':
+			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "RFC4716") == 0 ||
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "ssh2") == 0) {
+				convert_format = FMT_RFC4716;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) {
+				convert_format = FMT_PKCS8;
+				private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) {
+				convert_format = FMT_PEM;
+				private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM;
+				break;
+			}
+			fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg);
+		case 'n':
+			cert_principals = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'o':
+			/* no-op; new format is already the default */
+			break;
+		case 'p':
+			change_passphrase = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'c':
+			change_comment = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+			if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg,
+			    sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file))
+				fatal("Identity filename too long");
+			have_identity = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'g':
+			print_generic = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'K':
+			download_sk = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'P':
+			identity_passphrase = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'N':
+			identity_new_passphrase = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'Q':
+			check_krl = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'O':
+			opts = xrecallocarray(opts, nopts, nopts + 1,
+			    sizeof(*opts));
+			opts[nopts++] = xstrdup(optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'Z':
+			openssh_format_cipher = optarg;
+			if (cipher_by_name(openssh_format_cipher) == NULL)
+				fatal("Invalid OpenSSH-format cipher '%s'",
+				    openssh_format_cipher);
+			break;
+		case 'C':
+			identity_comment = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'q':
+			quiet = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'e':
+			/* export key */
+			convert_to = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+			cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST;
+			certflags_flags = 0;
+			break;
+		case 'k':
+			gen_krl = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'i':
+		case 'X':
+			/* import key */
+			convert_from = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'y':
+			print_public = 1;
+			break;
+		case 's':
+			ca_key_path = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			key_type_name = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'D':
+			pkcs11provider = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'U':
+			prefer_agent = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'u':
+			update_krl = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'v':
+			if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
+				log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+			else {
+				if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 &&
+				    log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+					log_level++;
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'r':
+			rr_hostname = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'a':
+			rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr);
+			if (errstr)
+				fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
+					optarg, errstr);
+			break;
+		case 'V':
+			parse_cert_times(optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'Y':
+			sign_op = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'w':
+			sk_provider = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'z':
+			errno = 0;
+			if (*optarg == '+') {
+				cert_serial_autoinc = 1;
+				optarg++;
+			}
+			cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10);
+			if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' ||
+			    (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX))
+				fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'M':
+			if (strcmp(optarg, "generate") == 0)
+				do_gen_candidates = 1;
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "screen") == 0)
+				do_screen_candidates = 1;
+			else
+				fatal("Unsupported moduli option %s", optarg);
+			break;
+		default:
+			usage();
+		}
+	}
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+	if (sk_provider == NULL)
+		sk_provider = "internal";
+#endif
+
+	/* reinit */
+	log_init(argv[0], log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+	argv += optind;
+	argc -= optind;
+
+	if (sign_op != NULL) {
+		if (strncmp(sign_op, "find-principals", 15) == 0) {
+			if (ca_key_path == NULL) {
+				error("Too few arguments for find-principals:"
+				    "missing signature file");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			if (!have_identity) {
+				error("Too few arguments for find-principals:"
+				    "missing allowed keys file");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			return sig_find_principals(ca_key_path, identity_file,
+			    opts, nopts);
+		} else if (strncmp(sign_op, "match-principals", 16) == 0) {
+			if (!have_identity) {
+				error("Too few arguments for match-principals:"
+				    "missing allowed keys file");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			if (cert_key_id == NULL) {
+				error("Too few arguments for match-principals: "
+				    "missing principal ID");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			return sig_match_principals(identity_file, cert_key_id,
+			    opts, nopts);
+		} else if (strncmp(sign_op, "sign", 4) == 0) {
+			/* NB. cert_principals is actually namespace, via -n */
+			if (cert_principals == NULL ||
+			    *cert_principals == '\0') {
+				error("Too few arguments for sign: "
+				    "missing namespace");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			if (!have_identity) {
+				error("Too few arguments for sign: "
+				    "missing key");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			return sig_sign(identity_file, cert_principals,
+			    prefer_agent, argc, argv, opts, nopts);
+		} else if (strncmp(sign_op, "check-novalidate", 16) == 0) {
+			/* NB. cert_principals is actually namespace, via -n */
+			if (cert_principals == NULL ||
+			    *cert_principals == '\0') {
+				error("Too few arguments for check-novalidate: "
+				    "missing namespace");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			if (ca_key_path == NULL) {
+				error("Too few arguments for check-novalidate: "
+				    "missing signature file");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals,
+			    NULL, NULL, NULL, opts, nopts);
+		} else if (strncmp(sign_op, "verify", 6) == 0) {
+			/* NB. cert_principals is actually namespace, via -n */
+			if (cert_principals == NULL ||
+			    *cert_principals == '\0') {
+				error("Too few arguments for verify: "
+				    "missing namespace");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			if (ca_key_path == NULL) {
+				error("Too few arguments for verify: "
+				    "missing signature file");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			if (!have_identity) {
+				error("Too few arguments for sign: "
+				    "missing allowed keys file");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			if (cert_key_id == NULL) {
+				error("Too few arguments for verify: "
+				    "missing principal identity");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals,
+			    cert_key_id, identity_file, rr_hostname,
+			    opts, nopts);
+		}
+		error("Unsupported operation for -Y: \"%s\"", sign_op);
+		usage();
+		/* NOTREACHED */
+	}
+
+	if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
+		if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) {
+			error("Too few arguments.");
+			usage();
+		}
+	} else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl &&
+	    !do_gen_candidates && !do_screen_candidates) {
+		error("Too many arguments.");
+		usage();
+	}
+	if (change_passphrase && change_comment) {
+		error("Can only have one of -p and -c.");
+		usage();
+	}
+	if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) {
+		error("Cannot use -l with -H or -R.");
+		usage();
+	}
+	if (gen_krl) {
+		do_gen_krl(pw, update_krl, ca_key_path,
+		    cert_serial, identity_comment, argc, argv);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (check_krl) {
+		do_check_krl(pw, print_fingerprint, argc, argv);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
+		if (cert_key_id == NULL)
+			fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying");
+		for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++)
+			add_cert_option(opts[i]);
+		do_ca_sign(pw, ca_key_path, prefer_agent,
+		    cert_serial, cert_serial_autoinc, argc, argv);
+	}
+	if (show_cert)
+		do_show_cert(pw);
+	if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host) {
+		do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname, find_host,
+		    delete_host, hash_hosts);
+	}
+	if (pkcs11provider != NULL)
+		do_download(pw);
+	if (download_sk) {
+		for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+			if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) {
+				sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7);
+			} else {
+				fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for "
+				    "FIDO authenticator download", opts[i]);
+			}
+		}
+		return do_download_sk(sk_provider, sk_device);
+	}
+	if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble)
+		do_fingerprint(pw);
+	if (change_passphrase)
+		do_change_passphrase(pw);
+	if (change_comment)
+		do_change_comment(pw, identity_comment);
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	if (convert_to)
+		do_convert_to(pw);
+	if (convert_from)
+		do_convert_from(pw);
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	if (convert_to || convert_from)
+		fatal("key conversion disabled at compile time");
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	if (print_public)
+		do_print_public(pw);
+	if (rr_hostname != NULL) {
+		unsigned int n = 0;
+
+		if (have_identity) {
+			n = do_print_resource_record(pw, identity_file,
+			    rr_hostname, print_generic);
+			if (n == 0)
+				fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
+			exit(0);
+		} else {
+
+			n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+			    _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
+			    print_generic);
+			n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+			    _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
+			    print_generic);
+			n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+			    _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
+			    print_generic);
+			n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+			    _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
+			    print_generic);
+			n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
+			    _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
+			    print_generic);
+			if (n == 0)
+				fatal("no keys found.");
+			exit(0);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (do_gen_candidates || do_screen_candidates) {
+		if (argc <= 0)
+			fatal("No output file specified");
+		else if (argc > 1)
+			fatal("Too many output files specified");
+	}
+	if (do_gen_candidates) {
+		do_moduli_gen(argv[0], opts, nopts);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (do_screen_candidates) {
+		do_moduli_screen(argv[0], opts, nopts);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (gen_all_hostkeys) {
+		do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw);
+		return (0);
+	}
+
+	if (key_type_name == NULL)
+		key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
+
+	type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name);
+	type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
+
+	if (!quiet)
+		printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n",
+		    key_type_name);
+	switch (type) {
+	case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+		for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+			if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "no-touch-required") == 0) {
+				sk_flags &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
+			} else if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "verify-required") == 0) {
+				sk_flags |= SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD;
+			} else if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "resident") == 0) {
+				sk_flags |= SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY;
+			} else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) {
+				sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7);
+			} else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "user=", 5) == 0) {
+				sk_user = xstrdup(opts[i] + 5);
+			} else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "challenge=", 10) == 0) {
+				if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(opts[i] + 10,
+				    &challenge)) != 0) {
+					fatal_r(r, "Unable to load FIDO "
+					    "enrollment challenge \"%s\"",
+					    opts[i] + 10);
+				}
+			} else if (strncasecmp(opts[i],
+			    "write-attestation=", 18) == 0) {
+				sk_attestation_path = opts[i] + 18;
+			} else if (strncasecmp(opts[i],
+			    "application=", 12) == 0) {
+				sk_application = xstrdup(opts[i] + 12);
+				if (strncmp(sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0) {
+					fatal("FIDO application string must "
+					    "begin with \"ssh:\"");
+				}
+			} else {
+				fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for "
+				    "FIDO authenticator enrollment", opts[i]);
+			}
+		}
+		if ((attest = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
+		r = 0;
+		for (i = 0 ;;) {
+			if (!quiet) {
+				printf("You may need to touch your "
+				    "authenticator%s to authorize key "
+				    "generation.\n",
+				    r == 0 ? "" : " again");
+			}
+			fflush(stdout);
+			r = sshsk_enroll(type, sk_provider, sk_device,
+			    sk_application == NULL ? "ssh:" : sk_application,
+			    sk_user, sk_flags, passphrase, challenge,
+			    &private, attest);
+			if (r == 0)
+				break;
+			if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS &&
+			    (sk_flags & SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY) != 0 &&
+			    (sk_flags & SSH_SK_FORCE_OPERATION) == 0 &&
+			    confirm_sk_overwrite(sk_application, sk_user)) {
+				sk_flags |= SSH_SK_FORCE_OPERATION;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
+				fatal_r(r, "Key enrollment failed");
+			else if (passphrase != NULL) {
+				error("PIN incorrect");
+				freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+				passphrase = NULL;
+			}
+			if (++i >= 3)
+				fatal("Too many incorrect PINs");
+			passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for "
+			    "authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+		}
+		if (passphrase != NULL) {
+			freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+			passphrase = NULL;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0)
+			fatal("sshkey_generate failed");
+		break;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "sshkey_from_private");
+
+	if (!have_identity)
+		ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key");
+
+	/* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't already exist. */
+	hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(identity_file, !quiet);
+
+	/* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */
+	if (!confirm_overwrite(identity_file))
+		exit(1);
+
+	/* Determine the passphrase for the private key */
+	passphrase = private_key_passphrase();
+	if (identity_comment) {
+		strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment));
+	} else {
+		/* Create default comment field for the passphrase. */
+		snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname);
+	}
+
+	/* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */
+	if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase,
+	    comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+		error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file);
+		freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+	sshkey_free(private);
+
+	if (!quiet) {
+		printf("Your identification has been saved in %s\n",
+		    identity_file);
+	}
+
+	strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
+	if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, identity_file, comment)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", identity_file);
+
+	if (!quiet) {
+		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+		ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash,
+		    SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+		if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+			fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+		printf("Your public key has been saved in %s\n",
+		    identity_file);
+		printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
+		printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
+		printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
+		printf("%s\n", ra);
+		free(ra);
+		free(fp);
+	}
+
+	if (sk_attestation_path != NULL)
+		save_attestation(attest, sk_attestation_path);
+
+	sshbuf_free(attest);
+	sshkey_free(public);
+
+	exit(0);
+}
diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.0 b/ssh-keyscan.0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0c6814
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-keyscan.0
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+SSH-KEYSCAN(1)              General Commands Manual             SSH-KEYSCAN(1)
+
+NAME
+     ssh-keyscan M-bM-^@M-^S gather SSH public keys from servers
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     ssh-keyscan [-46cDHv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]
+                 [host | addrlist namelist]
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     ssh-keyscan is a utility for gathering the public SSH host keys of a
+     number of hosts.  It was designed to aid in building and verifying
+     ssh_known_hosts files, the format of which is documented in sshd(8).
+     ssh-keyscan provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and
+     perl scripts.
+
+     ssh-keyscan uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as
+     possible in parallel, so it is very efficient.  The keys from a domain of
+     1,000 hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those
+     hosts are down or do not run sshd(8).  For scanning, one does not need
+     login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the
+     scanning process involve any encryption.
+
+     Hosts to be scanned may be specified by hostname, address or by CIDR
+     network range (e.g. 192.168.16/28).  If a network range is specified,
+     then all addresses in that range will be scanned.
+
+     The options are as follows:
+
+     -4      Force ssh-keyscan to use IPv4 addresses only.
+
+     -6      Force ssh-keyscan to use IPv6 addresses only.
+
+     -c      Request certificates from target hosts instead of plain keys.
+
+     -D      Print keys found as SSHFP DNS records.  The default is to print
+             keys in a format usable as a ssh(1) known_hosts file.
+
+     -f file
+             Read hosts or M-bM-^@M-^\addrlist namelistM-bM-^@M-^] pairs from file, one per line.
+             If M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y is supplied instead of a filename, ssh-keyscan will read
+             from the standard input.  Names read from a file must start with
+             an address, hostname or CIDR network range to be scanned.
+             Addresses and hostnames may optionally be followed by comma-
+             separated name or address aliases that will be copied to the
+             output.  For example:
+
+             192.168.11.0/24
+             10.20.1.1
+             happy.example.org
+             10.0.0.1,sad.example.org
+
+     -H      Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output.  Hashed names may
+             be used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not reveal
+             identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed.
+
+     -p port
+             Connect to port on the remote host.
+
+     -T timeout
+             Set the timeout for connection attempts.  If timeout seconds have
+             elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the
+             last time anything was read from that host, the connection is
+             closed and the host in question considered unavailable.  The
+             default is 5 seconds.
+
+     -t type
+             Specify the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts.  The
+             possible values are M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-skM-bM-^@M-^],
+             M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519-skM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^].  Multiple values may be specified by
+             separating them with commas.  The default is to fetch M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^],
+             M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-skM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519-skM-bM-^@M-^] keys.
+
+     -v      Verbose mode: print debugging messages about progress.
+
+     If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using ssh-keyscan without
+     verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to man in the middle
+     attacks.  On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk,
+     ssh-keyscan can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the
+     middle attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was
+     created.
+
+FILES
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+
+EXAMPLES
+     Print the RSA host key for machine hostname:
+
+           $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa hostname
+
+     Search a network range, printing all supported key types:
+
+           $ ssh-keyscan 192.168.0.64/25
+
+     Find all hosts from the file ssh_hosts which have new or different keys
+     from those in the sorted file ssh_known_hosts:
+
+           $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa,ed25519 -f ssh_hosts | \
+                   sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts -
+
+SEE ALSO
+     ssh(1), sshd(8)
+
+     Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC
+     4255, 2006.
+
+AUTHORS
+     David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu> wrote the initial version, and Wayne
+     Davison <wayned@users.sourceforge.net> added support for protocol version
+     2.
+
+OpenBSD 7.2                    October 28, 2022                    OpenBSD 7.2
diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.1 b/ssh-keyscan.1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ca4feea
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-keyscan.1
@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+.\"	$OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.47 2022/10/28 02:29:34 djm Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
+.\"
+.\" Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
+.\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
+.\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: October 28 2022 $
+.Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-keyscan
+.Nd gather SSH public keys from servers
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh-keyscan
+.Op Fl 46cDHv
+.Op Fl f Ar file
+.Op Fl p Ar port
+.Op Fl T Ar timeout
+.Op Fl t Ar type
+.Op Ar host | addrlist namelist
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is a utility for gathering the public SSH host keys of a number of
+hosts.
+It was designed to aid in building and verifying
+.Pa ssh_known_hosts
+files,
+the format of which is documented in
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+.Nm
+provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and perl
+scripts.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as possible in
+parallel, so it is very efficient.
+The keys from a domain of 1,000
+hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those
+hosts are down or do not run
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+For scanning, one does not need
+login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the
+scanning process involve any encryption.
+.Pp
+Hosts to be scanned may be specified by hostname, address or by CIDR
+network range (e.g. 192.168.16/28).
+If a network range is specified, then all addresses in that range will
+be scanned.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl 4
+Force
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.It Fl 6
+Force
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.It Fl c
+Request certificates from target hosts instead of plain keys.
+.It Fl D
+Print keys found as SSHFP DNS records.
+The default is to print keys in a format usable as a
+.Xr ssh 1
+.Pa known_hosts
+file.
+.It Fl f Ar file
+Read hosts or
+.Dq addrlist namelist
+pairs from
+.Ar file ,
+one per line.
+If
+.Sq -
+is supplied instead of a filename,
+.Nm
+will read from the standard input.
+Names read from a file must start with an address, hostname or CIDR network
+range to be scanned.
+Addresses and hostnames may optionally be followed by comma-separated name
+or address aliases that will be copied to the output.
+For example:
+.Bd -literal
+192.168.11.0/24
+10.20.1.1
+happy.example.org
+10.0.0.1,sad.example.org
+.Ed
+.It Fl H
+Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output.
+Hashed names may be used normally by
+.Xr ssh 1
+and
+.Xr sshd 8 ,
+but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
+be disclosed.
+.It Fl p Ar port
+Connect to
+.Ar port
+on the remote host.
+.It Fl T Ar timeout
+Set the timeout for connection attempts.
+If
+.Ar timeout
+seconds have elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the
+last time anything was read from that host, the connection is
+closed and the host in question considered unavailable.
+The default is 5 seconds.
+.It Fl t Ar type
+Specify the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts.
+The possible values are
+.Dq dsa ,
+.Dq ecdsa ,
+.Dq ed25519 ,
+.Dq ecdsa-sk ,
+.Dq ed25519-sk ,
+or
+.Dq rsa .
+Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas.
+The default is to fetch
+.Dq rsa ,
+.Dq ecdsa ,
+.Dq ed25519 ,
+.Dq ecdsa-sk ,
+and
+.Dq ed25519-sk
+keys.
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode:
+print debugging messages about progress.
+.El
+.Pp
+If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using
+.Nm
+without verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to
+.Em man in the middle
+attacks.
+On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk,
+.Nm
+can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the middle
+attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created.
+.Sh FILES
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+.Sh EXAMPLES
+Print the RSA host key for machine
+.Ar hostname :
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa hostname
+.Pp
+Search a network range, printing all supported key types:
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keyscan 192.168.0.64/25
+.Pp
+Find all hosts from the file
+.Pa ssh_hosts
+which have new or different keys from those in the sorted file
+.Pa ssh_known_hosts :
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa,ed25519 -f ssh_hosts | \e
+	sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts -
+.Ed
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Rs
+.%D 2006
+.%R RFC 4255
+.%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints
+.Re
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An -nosplit
+.An David Mazieres Aq Mt dm@lcs.mit.edu
+wrote the initial version, and
+.An Wayne Davison Aq Mt wayned@users.sourceforge.net
+added support for protocol version 2.
diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1318c2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
@@ -0,0 +1,872 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.149 2022/12/26 19:16:03 jmc Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
+ *
+ * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
+ * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
+ * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+ 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh_api.h"
+#include "dns.h"
+#include "addr.h"
+
+/* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6.  This can be set on the command line.
+   Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */
+int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
+
+int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
+
+#define KT_DSA		(1)
+#define KT_RSA		(1<<1)
+#define KT_ECDSA	(1<<2)
+#define KT_ED25519	(1<<3)
+#define KT_XMSS		(1<<4)
+#define KT_ECDSA_SK	(1<<5)
+#define KT_ED25519_SK	(1<<6)
+
+#define KT_MIN		KT_DSA
+#define KT_MAX		KT_ED25519_SK
+
+int get_cert = 0;
+int get_keytypes = KT_RSA|KT_ECDSA|KT_ED25519|KT_ECDSA_SK|KT_ED25519_SK;
+
+int hash_hosts = 0;		/* Hash hostname on output */
+
+int print_sshfp = 0;		/* Print SSHFP records instead of known_hosts */
+
+int found_one = 0;		/* Successfully found a key */
+
+#define MAXMAXFD 256
+
+/* The number of seconds after which to give up on a TCP connection */
+int timeout = 5;
+
+int maxfd;
+#define MAXCON (maxfd - 10)
+
+extern char *__progname;
+struct pollfd *read_wait;
+int ncon;
+
+/*
+ * Keep a connection structure for each file descriptor.  The state
+ * associated with file descriptor n is held in fdcon[n].
+ */
+typedef struct Connection {
+	u_char c_status;	/* State of connection on this file desc. */
+#define CS_UNUSED 0		/* File descriptor unused */
+#define CS_CON 1		/* Waiting to connect/read greeting */
+#define CS_SIZE 2		/* Waiting to read initial packet size */
+#define CS_KEYS 3		/* Waiting to read public key packet */
+	int c_fd;		/* Quick lookup: c->c_fd == c - fdcon */
+	int c_plen;		/* Packet length field for ssh packet */
+	int c_len;		/* Total bytes which must be read. */
+	int c_off;		/* Length of data read so far. */
+	int c_keytype;		/* Only one of KT_* */
+	sig_atomic_t c_done;	/* SSH2 done */
+	char *c_namebase;	/* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */
+	char *c_name;		/* Hostname of connection for errors */
+	char *c_namelist;	/* Pointer to other possible addresses */
+	char *c_output_name;	/* Hostname of connection for output */
+	char *c_data;		/* Data read from this fd */
+	struct ssh *c_ssh;	/* SSH-connection */
+	struct timespec c_ts;	/* Time at which connection gets aborted */
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(Connection) c_link;	/* List of connections in timeout order. */
+} con;
+
+TAILQ_HEAD(conlist, Connection) tq;	/* Timeout Queue */
+con *fdcon;
+
+static void keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key);
+
+static int
+fdlim_get(int hard)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
+	struct rlimit rlfd;
+
+	if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	if ((hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur) == RLIM_INFINITY)
+		return SSH_SYSFDMAX;
+	else
+		return hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur;
+#else
+	return SSH_SYSFDMAX;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int
+fdlim_set(int lim)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
+	struct rlimit rlfd;
+#endif
+
+	if (lim <= 0)
+		return (-1);
+#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
+	if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	rlfd.rlim_cur = lim;
+	if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1)
+		return (-1);
+#elif defined (HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE)
+	setdtablesize(lim);
+#endif
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This is an strsep function that returns a null field for adjacent
+ * separators.  This is the same as the 4.4BSD strsep, but different from the
+ * one in the GNU libc.
+ */
+static char *
+xstrsep(char **str, const char *delim)
+{
+	char *s, *e;
+
+	if (!**str)
+		return (NULL);
+
+	s = *str;
+	e = s + strcspn(s, delim);
+
+	if (*e != '\0')
+		*e++ = '\0';
+	*str = e;
+
+	return (s);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get the next non-null token (like GNU strsep).  Strsep() will return a
+ * null token for two adjacent separators, so we may have to loop.
+ */
+static char *
+strnnsep(char **stringp, char *delim)
+{
+	char *tok;
+
+	do {
+		tok = xstrsep(stringp, delim);
+	} while (tok && *tok == '\0');
+	return (tok);
+}
+
+
+static int
+key_print_wrapper(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	con *c;
+
+	if ((c = ssh_get_app_data(ssh)) != NULL)
+		keyprint(c, hostkey);
+	/* always abort key exchange */
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh2_capable(int remote_major, int remote_minor)
+{
+	switch (remote_major) {
+	case 1:
+		if (remote_minor == 99)
+			return 1;
+		break;
+	case 2:
+		return 1;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
+{
+	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+	int r;
+
+	switch (c->c_keytype) {
+	case KT_DSA:
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
+		    "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-dss";
+		break;
+	case KT_RSA:
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
+		    "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
+		    "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
+		    "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
+		    "rsa-sha2-512,"
+		    "rsa-sha2-256,"
+		    "ssh-rsa";
+		break;
+	case KT_ED25519:
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
+		    "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-ed25519";
+		break;
+	case KT_XMSS:
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
+		    "ssh-xmss-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-xmss@openssh.com";
+		break;
+	case KT_ECDSA:
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
+		    "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
+		    "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
+		    "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
+		    "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,"
+		    "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,"
+		    "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521";
+		break;
+	case KT_ECDSA_SK:
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
+		    "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
+		    "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com";
+		break;
+	case KT_ED25519_SK:
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
+		    "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
+		    "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com";
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("unknown key type %d", c->c_keytype);
+		break;
+	}
+	if ((r = kex_setup(c->c_ssh, myproposal)) != 0) {
+		free(c->c_ssh);
+		fprintf(stderr, "kex_setup: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
+		exit(1);
+	}
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
+	c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
+	c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+	c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+	c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+	c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+	c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
+# endif
+#endif
+	c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+	c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+	ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(c->c_ssh, key_print_wrapper);
+	/*
+	 * do the key-exchange until an error occurs or until
+	 * the key_print_wrapper() callback sets c_done.
+	 */
+	ssh_dispatch_run(c->c_ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &c->c_done);
+}
+
+static void
+keyprint_one(const char *host, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	char *hostport = NULL, *hashed = NULL;
+	const char *known_host;
+
+	found_one = 1;
+
+	if (print_sshfp) {
+		export_dns_rr(host, key, stdout, 0);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	hostport = put_host_port(host, ssh_port);
+	lowercase(hostport);
+	if (hash_hosts && (hashed = host_hash(hostport, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
+		fatal("host_hash failed");
+	known_host = hash_hosts ? hashed : hostport;
+	if (!get_cert)
+		fprintf(stdout, "%s ", known_host);
+	sshkey_write(key, stdout);
+	fputs("\n", stdout);
+	free(hashed);
+	free(hostport);
+}
+
+static void
+keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	char *hosts = c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name;
+	char *host, *ohosts;
+
+	if (key == NULL)
+		return;
+	if (get_cert || (!hash_hosts && ssh_port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)) {
+		keyprint_one(hosts, key);
+		return;
+	}
+	ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(hosts);
+	while ((host = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL)
+		keyprint_one(host, key);
+	free(ohosts);
+}
+
+static int
+tcpconnect(char *host)
+{
+	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
+	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	int gaierr, s = -1;
+
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", ssh_port);
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
+		error("getaddrinfo %s: %s", host, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		s = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+		if (s == -1) {
+			error("socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (set_nonblock(s) == -1)
+			fatal_f("set_nonblock(%d)", s);
+		if (connect(s, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 &&
+		    errno != EINPROGRESS)
+			error("connect (`%s'): %s", host, strerror(errno));
+		else
+			break;
+		close(s);
+		s = -1;
+	}
+	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
+	return s;
+}
+
+static int
+conalloc(const char *iname, const char *oname, int keytype)
+{
+	char *namebase, *name, *namelist;
+	int s;
+
+	namebase = namelist = xstrdup(iname);
+
+	do {
+		name = xstrsep(&namelist, ",");
+		if (!name) {
+			free(namebase);
+			return (-1);
+		}
+	} while ((s = tcpconnect(name)) < 0);
+
+	if (s >= maxfd)
+		fatal("conalloc: fdno %d too high", s);
+	if (fdcon[s].c_status)
+		fatal("conalloc: attempt to reuse fdno %d", s);
+
+	debug3_f("oname %s kt %d", oname, keytype);
+	fdcon[s].c_fd = s;
+	fdcon[s].c_status = CS_CON;
+	fdcon[s].c_namebase = namebase;
+	fdcon[s].c_name = name;
+	fdcon[s].c_namelist = namelist;
+	fdcon[s].c_output_name = xstrdup(oname);
+	fdcon[s].c_data = (char *) &fdcon[s].c_plen;
+	fdcon[s].c_len = 4;
+	fdcon[s].c_off = 0;
+	fdcon[s].c_keytype = keytype;
+	monotime_ts(&fdcon[s].c_ts);
+	fdcon[s].c_ts.tv_sec += timeout;
+	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
+	read_wait[s].fd = s;
+	read_wait[s].events = POLLIN;
+	ncon++;
+	return (s);
+}
+
+static void
+confree(int s)
+{
+	if (s >= maxfd || fdcon[s].c_status == CS_UNUSED)
+		fatal("confree: attempt to free bad fdno %d", s);
+	free(fdcon[s].c_namebase);
+	free(fdcon[s].c_output_name);
+	if (fdcon[s].c_status == CS_KEYS)
+		free(fdcon[s].c_data);
+	fdcon[s].c_status = CS_UNUSED;
+	fdcon[s].c_keytype = 0;
+	if (fdcon[s].c_ssh) {
+		ssh_packet_close(fdcon[s].c_ssh);
+		free(fdcon[s].c_ssh);
+		fdcon[s].c_ssh = NULL;
+	} else
+		close(s);
+	TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
+	read_wait[s].fd = -1;
+	read_wait[s].events = 0;
+	ncon--;
+}
+
+static void
+contouch(int s)
+{
+	TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
+	monotime_ts(&fdcon[s].c_ts);
+	fdcon[s].c_ts.tv_sec += timeout;
+	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
+}
+
+static int
+conrecycle(int s)
+{
+	con *c = &fdcon[s];
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = conalloc(c->c_namelist, c->c_output_name, c->c_keytype);
+	confree(s);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static void
+congreet(int s)
+{
+	int n = 0, remote_major = 0, remote_minor = 0;
+	char buf[256], *cp;
+	char remote_version[sizeof buf];
+	size_t bufsiz;
+	con *c = &fdcon[s];
+
+	/* send client banner */
+	n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n",
+	    PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2);
+	if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(buf)) {
+		error("snprintf: buffer too small");
+		confree(s);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != (size_t)n) {
+		error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
+		confree(s);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Read the server banner as per RFC4253 section 4.2.  The "SSH-"
+	 * protocol identification string may be preceeded by an arbitrarily
+	 * large banner which we must read and ignore.  Loop while reading
+	 * newline-terminated lines until we have one starting with "SSH-".
+	 * The ID string cannot be longer than 255 characters although the
+	 * preceeding banner lines may (in which case they'll be discarded
+	 * in multiple iterations of the outer loop).
+	 */
+	for (;;) {
+		memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+		bufsiz = sizeof(buf);
+		cp = buf;
+		while (bufsiz-- &&
+		    (n = atomicio(read, s, cp, 1)) == 1 && *cp != '\n') {
+			if (*cp == '\r')
+				*cp = '\n';
+			cp++;
+		}
+		if (n != 1 || strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	if (n == 0) {
+		switch (errno) {
+		case EPIPE:
+			error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", c->c_name);
+			break;
+		case ECONNREFUSED:
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
+			break;
+		}
+		conrecycle(s);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (cp >= buf + sizeof(buf)) {
+		error("%s: greeting exceeds allowable length", c->c_name);
+		confree(s);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
+		error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name);
+		confree(s);
+		return;
+	}
+	*cp = '\0';
+	if ((c->c_ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, s, s)) == NULL)
+		fatal("ssh_packet_set_connection failed");
+	ssh_packet_set_timeout(c->c_ssh, timeout, 1);
+	ssh_set_app_data(c->c_ssh, c);	/* back link */
+	c->c_ssh->compat = 0;
+	if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
+	    &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) == 3)
+		compat_banner(c->c_ssh, remote_version);
+	if (!ssh2_capable(remote_major, remote_minor)) {
+		debug("%s doesn't support ssh2", c->c_name);
+		confree(s);
+		return;
+	}
+	fprintf(stderr, "%c %s:%d %s\n", print_sshfp ? ';' : '#',
+	    c->c_name, ssh_port, chop(buf));
+	keygrab_ssh2(c);
+	confree(s);
+}
+
+static void
+conread(int s)
+{
+	con *c = &fdcon[s];
+	size_t n;
+
+	if (c->c_status == CS_CON) {
+		congreet(s);
+		return;
+	}
+	n = atomicio(read, s, c->c_data + c->c_off, c->c_len - c->c_off);
+	if (n == 0) {
+		error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
+		confree(s);
+		return;
+	}
+	c->c_off += n;
+
+	if (c->c_off == c->c_len)
+		switch (c->c_status) {
+		case CS_SIZE:
+			c->c_plen = htonl(c->c_plen);
+			c->c_len = c->c_plen + 8 - (c->c_plen & 7);
+			c->c_off = 0;
+			c->c_data = xmalloc(c->c_len);
+			c->c_status = CS_KEYS;
+			break;
+		default:
+			fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status);
+			break;
+		}
+
+	contouch(s);
+}
+
+static void
+conloop(void)
+{
+	struct timespec seltime, now;
+	con *c;
+	int i;
+
+	monotime_ts(&now);
+	c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq);
+
+	if (c && timespeccmp(&c->c_ts, &now, >))
+		timespecsub(&c->c_ts, &now, &seltime);
+	else
+		timespecclear(&seltime);
+
+	while (ppoll(read_wait, maxfd, &seltime, NULL) == -1) {
+		if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
+			continue;
+		error("poll error");
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < maxfd; i++) {
+		if (read_wait[i].revents & (POLLHUP|POLLERR|POLLNVAL))
+			confree(i);
+		else if (read_wait[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLHUP))
+			conread(i);
+	}
+
+	c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq);
+	while (c && timespeccmp(&c->c_ts, &now, <)) {
+		int s = c->c_fd;
+
+		c = TAILQ_NEXT(c, c_link);
+		conrecycle(s);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+do_one_host(char *host)
+{
+	char *name = strnnsep(&host, " \t\n");
+	int j;
+
+	if (name == NULL)
+		return;
+	for (j = KT_MIN; j <= KT_MAX; j *= 2) {
+		if (get_keytypes & j) {
+			while (ncon >= MAXCON)
+				conloop();
+			conalloc(name, *host ? host : name, j);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+do_host(char *host)
+{
+	char daddr[128];
+	struct xaddr addr, end_addr;
+	u_int masklen;
+
+	if (host == NULL)
+		return;
+	if (addr_pton_cidr(host, &addr, &masklen) != 0) {
+		/* Assume argument is a hostname */
+		do_one_host(host);
+	} else {
+		/* Argument is a CIDR range */
+		debug("CIDR range %s", host);
+		end_addr = addr;
+		if (addr_host_to_all1s(&end_addr, masklen) != 0)
+			goto badaddr;
+		/*
+		 * Note: we deliberately include the all-zero/ones addresses.
+		 */
+		for (;;) {
+			if (addr_ntop(&addr, daddr, sizeof(daddr)) != 0) {
+ badaddr:
+				error("Invalid address %s", host);
+				return;
+			}
+			debug("CIDR expand: address %s", daddr);
+			do_one_host(daddr);
+			if (addr_cmp(&addr, &end_addr) == 0)
+				break;
+			addr_increment(&addr);
+		};
+	}
+}
+
+void
+sshfatal(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
+    LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, level, suffix, fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	cleanup_exit(255);
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr,
+	    "usage: %s [-46cDHv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]\n"
+	    "\t\t   [host | addrlist namelist]\n",
+	    __progname);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int debug_flag = 0, log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+	int opt, fopt_count = 0, j;
+	char *tname, *cp, *line = NULL;
+	size_t linesize = 0;
+	FILE *fp;
+
+	extern int optind;
+	extern char *optarg;
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+	seed_rng();
+	TAILQ_INIT(&tq);
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	if (argc <= 1)
+		usage();
+
+	while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "cDHv46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) {
+		switch (opt) {
+		case 'H':
+			hash_hosts = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'c':
+			get_cert = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'D':
+			print_sshfp = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'p':
+			ssh_port = a2port(optarg);
+			if (ssh_port <= 0) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg);
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'T':
+			timeout = convtime(optarg);
+			if (timeout == -1 || timeout == 0) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Bad timeout '%s'\n", optarg);
+				usage();
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'v':
+			if (!debug_flag) {
+				debug_flag = 1;
+				log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+			}
+			else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+				log_level++;
+			else
+				fatal("Too high debugging level.");
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+			if (strcmp(optarg, "-") == 0)
+				optarg = NULL;
+			argv[fopt_count++] = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			get_keytypes = 0;
+			tname = strtok(optarg, ",");
+			while (tname) {
+				int type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname);
+
+				switch (type) {
+				case KEY_DSA:
+					get_keytypes |= KT_DSA;
+					break;
+				case KEY_ECDSA:
+					get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA;
+					break;
+				case KEY_RSA:
+					get_keytypes |= KT_RSA;
+					break;
+				case KEY_ED25519:
+					get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519;
+					break;
+				case KEY_XMSS:
+					get_keytypes |= KT_XMSS;
+					break;
+				case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+					get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519_SK;
+					break;
+				case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+					get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA_SK;
+					break;
+				case KEY_UNSPEC:
+				default:
+					fatal("Unknown key type \"%s\"", tname);
+				}
+				tname = strtok(NULL, ",");
+			}
+			break;
+		case '4':
+			IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
+			break;
+		case '6':
+			IPv4or6 = AF_INET6;
+			break;
+		default:
+			usage();
+		}
+	}
+	if (optind == argc && !fopt_count)
+		usage();
+
+	log_init("ssh-keyscan", log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
+
+	maxfd = fdlim_get(1);
+	if (maxfd < 0)
+		fatal("%s: fdlim_get: bad value", __progname);
+	if (maxfd > MAXMAXFD)
+		maxfd = MAXMAXFD;
+	if (MAXCON <= 0)
+		fatal("%s: not enough file descriptors", __progname);
+	if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
+		fdlim_set(maxfd);
+	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
+	read_wait = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(struct pollfd));
+	for (j = 0; j < maxfd; j++)
+		read_wait[j].fd = -1;
+
+	for (j = 0; j < fopt_count; j++) {
+		if (argv[j] == NULL)
+			fp = stdin;
+		else if ((fp = fopen(argv[j], "r")) == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j], strerror(errno));
+
+		while (getline(&line, &linesize, fp) != -1) {
+			/* Chomp off trailing whitespace and comments */
+			if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) == NULL)
+				cp = line + strlen(line) - 1;
+			while (cp >= line) {
+				if (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t' ||
+				    *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
+					*cp-- = '\0';
+				else
+					break;
+			}
+
+			/* Skip empty lines */
+			if (*line == '\0')
+				continue;
+
+			do_host(line);
+		}
+
+		if (ferror(fp))
+			fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j], strerror(errno));
+
+		fclose(fp);
+	}
+	free(line);
+
+	while (optind < argc)
+		do_host(argv[optind++]);
+
+	while (ncon > 0)
+		conloop();
+
+	return found_one ? 0 : 1;
+}
diff --git a/ssh-keysign.0 b/ssh-keysign.0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f75f12f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-keysign.0
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+SSH-KEYSIGN(8)              System Manager's Manual             SSH-KEYSIGN(8)
+
+NAME
+     ssh-keysign M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH helper for host-based authentication
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     ssh-keysign
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     ssh-keysign is used by ssh(1) to access the local host keys and generate
+     the digital signature required during host-based authentication.
+
+     ssh-keysign is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the global
+     client configuration file /etc/ssh/ssh_config by setting EnableSSHKeysign
+     to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     ssh-keysign is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from ssh(1).
+     See ssh(1) and sshd(8) for more information about host-based
+     authentication.
+
+FILES
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+             Controls whether ssh-keysign is enabled.
+
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+             These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to
+             generate the digital signature.  They should be owned by root,
+             readable only by root, and not accessible to others.  Since they
+             are readable only by root, ssh-keysign must be set-uid root if
+             host-based authentication is used.
+
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
+             If these files exist, they are assumed to contain public
+             certificate information corresponding with the private keys
+             above.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), sshd(8)
+
+HISTORY
+     ssh-keysign first appeared in OpenBSD 3.2.
+
+AUTHORS
+     Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+
+OpenBSD 7.2                     March 31, 2022                     OpenBSD 7.2
diff --git a/ssh-keysign.8 b/ssh-keysign.8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6b4b9b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-keysign.8
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.17 2022/03/31 17:27:27 naddy Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: March 31 2022 $
+.Dt SSH-KEYSIGN 8
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-keysign
+.Nd OpenSSH helper for host-based authentication
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is used by
+.Xr ssh 1
+to access the local host keys and generate the digital signature
+required during host-based authentication.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the
+global client configuration file
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+by setting
+.Cm EnableSSHKeysign
+to
+.Dq yes .
+.Pp
+.Nm
+is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+See
+.Xr ssh 1
+and
+.Xr sshd 8
+for more information about host-based authentication.
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+Controls whether
+.Nm
+is enabled.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to
+generate the digital signature.
+They should be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
+accessible to others.
+Since they are readable only by root,
+.Nm
+must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
+If these files exist, they are assumed to contain public certificate
+information corresponding with the private keys above.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh HISTORY
+.Nm
+first appeared in
+.Ox 3.2 .
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org
diff --git a/ssh-keysign.c b/ssh-keysign.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b989f5e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-keysign.c
@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.71 2022/08/01 11:09:26 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+static int
+valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret, char **pkalgp,
+    u_char *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	u_char type, *pkblob;
+	char *p;
+	size_t blen, len;
+	char *pkalg, *luser;
+	int r, pktype, fail;
+
+	if (ret != NULL)
+		*ret = NULL;
+	if (pkalgp != NULL)
+		*pkalgp = NULL;
+	fail = 0;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_from failed");
+
+	/* session id */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, NULL, &len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse session ID");
+	if (len != 20 && /* SHA1 */
+	    len != 32 && /* SHA256 */
+	    len != 48 && /* SHA384 */
+	    len != 64)   /* SHA512 */
+		fail++;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
+	if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
+		fail++;
+
+	/* server user */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse user");
+
+	/* service */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse service");
+	if (strcmp("ssh-connection", p) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	free(p);
+
+	/* method */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse method");
+	if (strcmp("hostbased", p) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	free(p);
+
+	/* pubkey */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse pk");
+
+	pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
+	if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC)
+		fail++;
+	else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "decode key");
+		fail++;
+	} else if (key->type != pktype)
+		fail++;
+
+	/* client host name, handle trailing dot */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse hostname");
+	debug2_f("check expect chost %s got %s", host, p);
+	if (strlen(host) != len - 1)
+		fail++;
+	else if (p[len - 1] != '.')
+		fail++;
+	else if (strncasecmp(host, p, len - 1) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	free(p);
+
+	/* local user */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &luser, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse luser");
+
+	if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, luser) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	free(luser);
+
+	/* end of message */
+	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
+		fail++;
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+
+	debug3_f("fail %d", fail);
+
+	if (!fail) {
+		if (ret != NULL) {
+			*ret = key;
+			key = NULL;
+		}
+		if (pkalgp != NULL) {
+			*pkalgp = pkalg;
+			pkalg = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	free(pkalg);
+	free(pkblob);
+
+	return (fail ? -1 : 0);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	Options options;
+#define NUM_KEYTYPES 5
+	struct sshkey *keys[NUM_KEYTYPES], *key = NULL;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	int r, key_fd[NUM_KEYTYPES], i, found, version = 2, fd;
+	u_char *signature, *data, rver;
+	char *host, *fp, *pkalg;
+	size_t slen, dlen;
+
+	if (pledge("stdio rpath getpw dns id", NULL) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Ensure that stdin and stdout are connected */
+	if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) < 2)
+		exit(1);
+	/* Leave /dev/null fd iff it is attached to stderr */
+	if (fd > 2)
+		close(fd);
+
+	i = 0;
+	/* XXX This really needs to read sshd_config for the paths */
+	key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
+	key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
+	key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
+	key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
+	key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
+
+	if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL)
+		fatal("getpwuid failed");
+	pw = pwcopy(pw);
+
+	permanently_set_uid(pw);
+
+	seed_rng();
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_SSH_KEYSIGN
+	log_init("ssh-keysign", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
+#endif
+
+	/* verify that ssh-keysign is enabled by the admin */
+	initialize_options(&options);
+	(void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, "", "",
+	    &options, 0, NULL);
+	(void)fill_default_options(&options);
+	if (options.enable_ssh_keysign != 1)
+		fatal("ssh-keysign not enabled in %s",
+		    _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE);
+
+	if (pledge("stdio dns", NULL) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
+
+	for (i = found = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
+		if (key_fd[i] != -1)
+			found = 1;
+	}
+	if (found == 0)
+		fatal("could not open any host key");
+
+	found = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
+		keys[i] = NULL;
+		if (key_fd[i] == -1)
+			continue;
+		r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(key_fd[i], KEY_UNSPEC,
+		    NULL, &key, NULL);
+		close(key_fd[i]);
+		if (r != 0)
+			debug_r(r, "parse key %d", i);
+		else if (key != NULL) {
+			keys[i] = key;
+			found = 1;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!found)
+		fatal("no hostkey found");
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+	if (ssh_msg_recv(STDIN_FILENO, b) < 0)
+		fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __progname);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rver)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "%s: buffer error", __progname);
+	if (rver != version)
+		fatal("%s: bad version: received %d, expected %d",
+		    __progname, rver, version);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&fd)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "%s: buffer error", __progname);
+	if (fd < 0 || fd == STDIN_FILENO || fd == STDOUT_FILENO)
+		fatal("%s: bad fd = %d", __progname, fd);
+	if ((host = get_local_name(fd)) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: cannot get local name for fd", __progname);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "%s: buffer error", __progname);
+	if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, &pkalg, data, dlen) < 0)
+		fatal("%s: not a valid request", __progname);
+	free(host);
+
+	found = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
+		if (keys[i] != NULL &&
+		    sshkey_equal_public(key, keys[i])) {
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!found) {
+		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __progname);
+		fatal("%s: no matching hostkey found for key %s %s", __progname,
+		    sshkey_type(key), fp ? fp : "");
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen,
+	    pkalg, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "%s: sshkey_sign failed", __progname);
+	free(data);
+
+	/* send reply */
+	sshbuf_reset(b);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "%s: buffer error", __progname);
+	if (ssh_msg_send(STDOUT_FILENO, version, b) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __progname);
+
+	return (0);
+}
diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cfd833d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.17 2020/10/18 11:32:02 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Pedro Martelletto. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+/* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */
+
+static int fd = -1;
+static pid_t pid = -1;
+
+static void
+send_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	u_char buf[4];
+	size_t mlen = sshbuf_len(m);
+	int r;
+
+	POKE_U32(buf, mlen);
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
+	    atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m),
+	    sshbuf_len(m)) != sshbuf_len(m))
+		error("write to helper failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(m, mlen)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "consume");
+}
+
+static int
+recv_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	u_int l, len;
+	u_char c, buf[1024];
+	int r;
+
+	if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, 4)) != 4) {
+		error("read from helper failed: %u", len);
+		return (0); /* XXX */
+	}
+	len = PEEK_U32(buf);
+	if (len > 256 * 1024)
+		fatal("response too long: %u", len);
+	/* read len bytes into m */
+	sshbuf_reset(m);
+	while (len > 0) {
+		l = len;
+		if (l > sizeof(buf))
+			l = sizeof(buf);
+		if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, l) != l) {
+			error("response from helper failed.");
+			return (0); /* XXX */
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put(m, buf, l)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+		len -= l;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &c)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse type");
+	return c;
+}
+
+int
+pkcs11_init(int interactive)
+{
+	return (0);
+}
+
+void
+pkcs11_terminate(void)
+{
+	if (fd >= 0)
+		close(fd);
+}
+
+static int
+rsa_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
+{
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *msg = NULL;
+	u_char *blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+	size_t blen, slen = 0;
+	int r, ret = -1;
+
+	if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
+		goto fail;
+	key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+	if (key == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshkey_new failed");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	key->type = KEY_RSA;
+	RSA_up_ref(rsa);
+	key->rsa = rsa;
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "encode key");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, from, flen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(msg);
+	sshbuf_reset(msg);
+
+	if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &signature, &slen)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+		if (slen <= (size_t)RSA_size(rsa)) {
+			memcpy(to, signature, slen);
+			ret = slen;
+		}
+		free(signature);
+	}
+ fail:
+	free(blob);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+static ECDSA_SIG *
+ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv,
+    const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *ec)
+{
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *msg = NULL;
+	ECDSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
+	const u_char *cp;
+	u_char *blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+	size_t blen, slen = 0;
+	int r, nid;
+
+	nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec);
+	if (nid < 0) {
+		error_f("couldn't get curve nid");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+	if (key == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshkey_new failed");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	key->ecdsa = ec;
+	key->ecdsa_nid = nid;
+	key->type = KEY_ECDSA;
+	EC_KEY_up_ref(ec);
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "encode key");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, dgst, dgst_len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(msg);
+	sshbuf_reset(msg);
+
+	if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &signature, &slen)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+		cp = signature;
+		ret = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &cp, slen);
+		free(signature);
+	}
+
+ fail:
+	free(blob);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	return (ret);
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+static RSA_METHOD	*helper_rsa;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+static EC_KEY_METHOD	*helper_ecdsa;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+/* redirect private key crypto operations to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */
+static void
+wrap_key(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	if (k->type == KEY_RSA)
+		RSA_set_method(k->rsa, helper_rsa);
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+	else if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA)
+		EC_KEY_set_method(k->ecdsa, helper_ecdsa);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+	else
+		fatal_f("unknown key type");
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_start_helper_methods(void)
+{
+	if (helper_rsa != NULL)
+		return (0);
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+	int (*orig_sign)(int, const unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *,
+	    unsigned int *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, EC_KEY *) = NULL;
+	if (helper_ecdsa != NULL)
+		return (0);
+	helper_ecdsa = EC_KEY_METHOD_new(EC_KEY_OpenSSL());
+	if (helper_ecdsa == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(helper_ecdsa, &orig_sign, NULL, NULL);
+	EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(helper_ecdsa, orig_sign, NULL, ecdsa_do_sign);
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+	if ((helper_rsa = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method())) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("RSA_meth_dup failed");
+	if (!RSA_meth_set1_name(helper_rsa, "ssh-pkcs11-helper") ||
+	    !RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(helper_rsa, rsa_encrypt))
+		fatal_f("failed to prepare method");
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_start_helper(void)
+{
+	int pair[2];
+	char *helper, *verbosity = NULL;
+
+	if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1)
+		verbosity = "-vvv";
+
+	if (pkcs11_start_helper_methods() == -1) {
+		error("pkcs11_start_helper_methods failed");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) {
+		error("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
+		error("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return (-1);
+	} else if (pid == 0) {
+		if ((dup2(pair[1], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
+		    (dup2(pair[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) {
+			fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		close(pair[0]);
+		close(pair[1]);
+		helper = getenv("SSH_PKCS11_HELPER");
+		if (helper == NULL || strlen(helper) == 0)
+			helper = _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER;
+		debug_f("starting %s %s", helper,
+		    verbosity == NULL ? "" : verbosity);
+		execlp(helper, helper, verbosity, (char *)NULL);
+		fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", helper, strerror(errno));
+		_exit(1);
+	}
+	close(pair[1]);
+	fd = pair[0];
+	return (0);
+}
+
+int
+pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp,
+    char ***labelsp)
+{
+	struct sshkey *k;
+	int r, type;
+	u_char *blob;
+	char *label;
+	size_t blen;
+	u_int nkeys, i;
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+
+	if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(msg);
+	sshbuf_reset(msg);
+
+	type = recv_msg(msg);
+	if (type == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &nkeys)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse nkeys");
+		*keysp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(struct sshkey *));
+		if (labelsp)
+			*labelsp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(char *));
+		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+			/* XXX clean up properly instead of fatal() */
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &label, NULL)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse key");
+			if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &k)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "decode key");
+			wrap_key(k);
+			(*keysp)[i] = k;
+			if (labelsp)
+				(*labelsp)[i] = label;
+			else
+				free(label);
+			free(blob);
+		}
+	} else if (type == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &nkeys)) != 0)
+			nkeys = -1;
+	} else {
+		nkeys = -1;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	return (nkeys);
+}
+
+int
+pkcs11_del_provider(char *name)
+{
+	int r, ret = -1;
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "")) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	send_msg(msg);
+	sshbuf_reset(msg);
+
+	if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS)
+		ret = 0;
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46b357c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8)        System Manager's Manual       SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8)
+
+NAME
+     ssh-pkcs11-helper M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH helper for PKCS#11 support
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     ssh-pkcs11-helper [-v]
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     ssh-pkcs11-helper is used by ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), and ssh-keygen(1) to
+     access keys provided by a PKCS#11 token.
+
+     ssh-pkcs11-helper is not intended to be invoked directly by the user.
+
+     A single option is supported:
+
+     -v      Verbose mode.  Causes ssh-pkcs11-helper to print debugging
+             messages about its progress.  This is helpful in debugging
+             problems.  Multiple -v options increase the verbosity.  The
+             maximum is 3.
+
+             Note that ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), and ssh-keygen(1) will
+             automatically pass the -v flag to ssh-pkcs11-helper when they
+             have themselves been placed in debug mode.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1)
+
+HISTORY
+     ssh-pkcs11-helper first appeared in OpenBSD 4.7.
+
+AUTHORS
+     Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+
+OpenBSD 7.2                     April 29, 2022                     OpenBSD 7.2
diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5edc985
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.8,v 1.7 2022/04/29 03:24:30 djm Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+.\"
+.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: April 29 2022 $
+.Dt SSH-PKCS11-HELPER 8
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-pkcs11-helper
+.Nd OpenSSH helper for PKCS#11 support
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm
+.Op Fl v
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is used by
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+and
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+to access keys provided by a PKCS#11 token.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+is not intended to be invoked directly by the user.
+.Pp
+A single option is supported:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print debugging messages about its progress.
+This is helpful in debugging problems.
+Multiple
+.Fl v
+options increase the verbosity.
+The maximum is 3.
+.Pp
+Note that
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+and
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+will automatically pass the
+.Fl v
+flag to
+.Nm
+when they have themselves been placed in debug mode.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+.Sh HISTORY
+.Nm
+first appeared in
+.Ox 4.7 .
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org
diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c3eaae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,446 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.c,v 1.26 2021/11/18 03:31:44 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+/* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */
+
+struct pkcs11_keyinfo {
+	struct sshkey	*key;
+	char		*providername, *label;
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_keyinfo) next;
+};
+
+TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_keyinfo) pkcs11_keylist;
+
+#define MAX_MSG_LENGTH		10240 /*XXX*/
+
+/* input and output queue */
+struct sshbuf *iqueue;
+struct sshbuf *oqueue;
+
+static void
+add_key(struct sshkey *k, char *name, char *label)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki;
+
+	ki = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ki));
+	ki->providername = xstrdup(name);
+	ki->key = k;
+	ki->label = xstrdup(label);
+	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next);
+}
+
+static void
+del_keys_by_name(char *name)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki, *nxt;
+
+	for (ki = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_keylist); ki; ki = nxt) {
+		nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(ki, next);
+		if (!strcmp(ki->providername, name)) {
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next);
+			free(ki->providername);
+			free(ki->label);
+			sshkey_free(ki->key);
+			free(ki);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/* lookup matching 'private' key */
+static struct sshkey *
+lookup_key(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki;
+
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(ki, &pkcs11_keylist, next) {
+		debug("check %s %s %s", sshkey_type(ki->key),
+		    ki->providername, ki->label);
+		if (sshkey_equal(k, ki->key))
+			return (ki->key);
+	}
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+static void
+send_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(oqueue, m)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "enqueue");
+}
+
+static void
+process_add(void)
+{
+	char *name, *pin;
+	struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
+	int r, i, nkeys;
+	u_char *blob;
+	size_t blen;
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	char **labels = NULL;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	if ((nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(name, pin, &keys, &labels)) > 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg,
+		    SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, nkeys)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+			if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(keys[i], &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
+				debug_fr(r, "encode key");
+				continue;
+			}
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, labels[i])) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "compose key");
+			free(blob);
+			add_key(keys[i], name, labels[i]);
+			free(labels[i]);
+		}
+	} else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, -nkeys)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	free(labels);
+	free(keys); /* keys themselves are transferred to pkcs11_keylist */
+	free(pin);
+	free(name);
+	send_msg(msg);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static void
+process_del(void)
+{
+	char *name, *pin;
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	del_keys_by_name(name);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, pkcs11_del_provider(name) == 0 ?
+	    SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+	free(pin);
+	free(name);
+	send_msg(msg);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static void
+process_sign(void)
+{
+	u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL;
+	size_t blen, dlen, slen = 0;
+	int r, ok = -1;
+	struct sshkey *key, *found;
+	struct sshbuf *msg;
+
+	/* XXX support SHA2 signature flags */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &data, &dlen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "decode key");
+	else {
+		if ((found = lookup_key(key)) != NULL) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+			int ret;
+
+			if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
+				slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
+				signature = xmalloc(slen);
+				ret = RSA_private_encrypt(dlen, data, signature,
+				    found->rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+				if (ret != -1) {
+					slen = ret;
+					ok = 0;
+				}
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+			} else if (key->type == KEY_ECDSA) {
+				u_int xslen = ECDSA_size(key->ecdsa);
+
+				signature = xmalloc(xslen);
+				/* "The parameter type is ignored." */
+				ret = ECDSA_sign(-1, data, dlen, signature,
+				    &xslen, found->ecdsa);
+				if (ret != 0)
+					ok = 0;
+				else
+					error_f("ECDSA_sign returned %d", ret);
+				slen = xslen;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+			} else
+				error_f("don't know how to sign with key "
+				    "type %d", (int)key->type);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+		}
+		sshkey_free(key);
+	}
+	if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if (ok == 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "compose response");
+	} else {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "compose failure response");
+	}
+	free(data);
+	free(blob);
+	free(signature);
+	send_msg(msg);
+	sshbuf_free(msg);
+}
+
+static void
+process(void)
+{
+	u_int msg_len;
+	u_int buf_len;
+	u_int consumed;
+	u_char type;
+	const u_char *cp;
+	int r;
+
+	buf_len = sshbuf_len(iqueue);
+	if (buf_len < 5)
+		return;		/* Incomplete message. */
+	cp = sshbuf_ptr(iqueue);
+	msg_len = get_u32(cp);
+	if (msg_len > MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
+		error("bad message len %d", msg_len);
+		cleanup_exit(11);
+	}
+	if (buf_len < msg_len + 4)
+		return;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, 4)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(iqueue, &type)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse type/len");
+	buf_len -= 4;
+	switch (type) {
+	case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY:
+		debug("process_add");
+		process_add();
+		break;
+	case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY:
+		debug("process_del");
+		process_del();
+		break;
+	case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST:
+		debug("process_sign");
+		process_sign();
+		break;
+	default:
+		error("Unknown message %d", type);
+		break;
+	}
+	/* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */
+	if (buf_len < sshbuf_len(iqueue)) {
+		error("iqueue grew unexpectedly");
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+	consumed = buf_len - sshbuf_len(iqueue);
+	if (msg_len < consumed) {
+		error("msg_len %d < consumed %d", msg_len, consumed);
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+	if (msg_len > consumed) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, msg_len - consumed)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "consume");
+	}
+}
+
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+	/* XXX */
+	_exit(i);
+}
+
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	int r, ch, in, out, log_stderr = 0;
+	ssize_t len;
+	SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
+	LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+	char buf[4*4096];
+	extern char *__progname;
+	struct pollfd pfd[2];
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+	seed_rng();
+	TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_keylist);
+
+	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "v")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'v':
+			log_stderr = 1;
+			if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR)
+				log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+			else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+				log_level++;
+			break;
+		default:
+			fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-v]\n", __progname);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+	pkcs11_init(0);
+	in = STDIN_FILENO;
+	out = STDOUT_FILENO;
+
+	if ((iqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if ((oqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	while (1) {
+		memset(pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
+		pfd[0].fd = in;
+		pfd[1].fd = out;
+
+		/*
+		 * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle
+		 * the worst-case length packet it can generate,
+		 * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads.
+		 */
+		if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(iqueue, sizeof(buf))) == 0 &&
+		    (r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0)
+			pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
+		else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
+			fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
+
+		if (sshbuf_len(oqueue) > 0)
+			pfd[1].events = POLLOUT;
+
+		if ((r = poll(pfd, 2, -1 /* INFTIM */)) <= 0) {
+			if (r == 0 || errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+			fatal("poll: %s", strerror(errno));
+		}
+
+		/* copy stdin to iqueue */
+		if ((pfd[0].revents & (POLLIN|POLLHUP|POLLERR)) != 0) {
+			len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf);
+			if (len == 0) {
+				debug("read eof");
+				cleanup_exit(0);
+			} else if (len < 0) {
+				error("read: %s", strerror(errno));
+				cleanup_exit(1);
+			} else if ((r = sshbuf_put(iqueue, buf, len)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+		}
+		/* send oqueue to stdout */
+		if ((pfd[1].revents & (POLLOUT|POLLHUP)) != 0) {
+			len = write(out, sshbuf_ptr(oqueue),
+			    sshbuf_len(oqueue));
+			if (len < 0) {
+				error("write: %s", strerror(errno));
+				cleanup_exit(1);
+			} else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(oqueue, len)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "consume");
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Process requests from client if we can fit the results
+		 * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input
+		 * and let the output queue drain.
+		 */
+		if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0)
+			process();
+		else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
+			fatal_fr(r, "reserve");
+	}
+}
+
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+	_exit(i);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "PKCS#11 code is not enabled\n");
+	return 1;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+#else /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	extern char *__progname;
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
+	log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
+	fatal("PKCS#11 support disabled at compile time");
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b2e2b32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1887 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.55 2021/11/18 21:11:01 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Pedro Martelletto. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT
+#include "pkcs11.h"
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+struct pkcs11_slotinfo {
+	CK_TOKEN_INFO		token;
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	session;
+	int			logged_in;
+};
+
+struct pkcs11_provider {
+	char			*name;
+	void			*handle;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*function_list;
+	CK_INFO			info;
+	CK_ULONG		nslots;
+	CK_SLOT_ID		*slotlist;
+	struct pkcs11_slotinfo	*slotinfo;
+	int			valid;
+	int			refcount;
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next;
+};
+
+TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_provider) pkcs11_providers;
+
+struct pkcs11_key {
+	struct pkcs11_provider	*provider;
+	CK_ULONG		slotidx;
+	char			*keyid;
+	int			keyid_len;
+};
+
+int pkcs11_interactive = 0;
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+static void
+ossl_error(const char *msg)
+{
+	unsigned long    e;
+
+	error_f("%s", msg);
+	while ((e = ERR_get_error()) != 0)
+		error_f("libcrypto error: %s", ERR_error_string(e, NULL));
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+int
+pkcs11_init(int interactive)
+{
+	pkcs11_interactive = interactive;
+	TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_providers);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * finalize a provider shared library, it's no longer usable.
+ * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider,
+ * so the actual freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref().
+ * this is called when a provider gets unregistered.
+ */
+static void
+pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
+{
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_ULONG i;
+
+	debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d valid %d",
+	    p->name, p->refcount, p->valid);
+	if (!p->valid)
+		return;
+	for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
+		if (p->slotinfo[i].session &&
+		    (rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession(
+		    p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK)
+			error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv);
+	}
+	if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
+		error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv);
+	p->valid = 0;
+	p->function_list = NULL;
+	dlclose(p->handle);
+}
+
+/*
+ * remove a reference to the provider.
+ * called when a key gets destroyed or when the provider is unregistered.
+ */
+static void
+pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
+{
+	debug_f("provider \"%s\" refcount %d", p->name, p->refcount);
+	if (--p->refcount <= 0) {
+		if (p->valid)
+			error_f("provider \"%s\" still valid", p->name);
+		free(p->name);
+		free(p->slotlist);
+		free(p->slotinfo);
+		free(p);
+	}
+}
+
+/* unregister all providers, keys might still point to the providers */
+void
+pkcs11_terminate(void)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_provider *p;
+
+	while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_providers)) != NULL) {
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
+		pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
+		pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
+	}
+}
+
+/* lookup provider by name */
+static struct pkcs11_provider *
+pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_provider *p;
+
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) {
+		debug("check provider \"%s\"", p->name);
+		if (!strcmp(provider_id, p->name))
+			return (p);
+	}
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+/* unregister provider by name */
+int
+pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_provider *p;
+
+	if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) {
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
+		pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
+		pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+static RSA_METHOD *rsa_method;
+static int rsa_idx = 0;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method;
+static int ec_key_idx = 0;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+/* release a wrapped object */
+static void
+pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx,
+    long argl, void *argp)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_key	*k11 = ptr;
+
+	debug_f("parent %p ptr %p idx %d", parent, ptr, idx);
+	if (k11 == NULL)
+		return;
+	if (k11->provider)
+		pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider);
+	free(k11->keyid);
+	free(k11);
+}
+
+/* find a single 'obj' for given attributes */
+static int
+pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr,
+    CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
+{
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f;
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	session;
+	CK_ULONG		nfound = 0;
+	CK_RV			rv;
+	int			ret = -1;
+
+	f = p->function_list;
+	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+	if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK ||
+	    nfound != 1) {
+		debug("C_FindObjects failed (nfound %lu nattr %lu): %lu",
+		    nfound, nattr, rv);
+	} else
+		ret = 0;
+	if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK)
+		error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si,
+    CK_USER_TYPE type)
+{
+	char			*pin = NULL, prompt[1024];
+	CK_RV			 rv;
+
+	if (provider == NULL || si == NULL || !provider->valid) {
+		error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	if (!pkcs11_interactive) {
+		error("need pin entry%s",
+		    (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) ?
+		    " on reader keypad" : "");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)
+		verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad.");
+	else {
+		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ",
+		    si->token.label);
+		if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF)) == NULL) {
+			debug_f("no pin specified");
+			return (-1);	/* bail out */
+		}
+	}
+	rv = provider->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin,
+	    (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0);
+	if (pin != NULL)
+		freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+
+	switch (rv) {
+	case CKR_OK:
+	case CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN:
+		/* success */
+		break;
+	case CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE:
+		error("PKCS#11 login failed: PIN length out of range");
+		return -1;
+	case CKR_PIN_INCORRECT:
+		error("PKCS#11 login failed: PIN incorrect");
+		return -1;
+	case CKR_PIN_LOCKED:
+		error("PKCS#11 login failed: PIN locked");
+		return -1;
+	default:
+		error("PKCS#11 login failed: error %lu", rv);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	si->logged_in = 1;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_login(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_USER_TYPE type)
+{
+	if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid) {
+		error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	return pkcs11_login_slot(k11->provider,
+	    &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type);
+}
+
+
+static int
+pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj,
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type, int *val)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_slotinfo	*si;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f;
+	CK_BBOOL		flag = 0;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		attr;
+	CK_RV			 rv;
+
+	*val = 0;
+
+	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
+		error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	f = k11->provider->function_list;
+	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
+
+	attr.type = type;
+	attr.pValue = &flag;
+	attr.ulValueLen = sizeof(flag);
+
+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(si->session, obj, &attr, 1);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	*val = flag != 0;
+	debug_f("provider \"%s\" slot %lu object %lu: attrib %lu = %d",
+	    k11->provider->name, k11->slotidx, obj, type, *val);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_get_key(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_slotinfo	*si;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	 obj;
+	CK_RV			 rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS		 private_key_class;
+	CK_BBOOL		 true_val;
+	CK_MECHANISM		 mech;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_filter[3];
+	int			 always_auth = 0;
+	int			 did_login = 0;
+
+	if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
+		error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	f = k11->provider->function_list;
+	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
+
+	if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) {
+		if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_USER) < 0) {
+			error("login failed");
+			return (-1);
+		}
+		did_login = 1;
+	}
+
+	memset(&key_filter, 0, sizeof(key_filter));
+	private_key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	key_filter[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
+	key_filter[0].pValue = &private_key_class;
+	key_filter[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(private_key_class);
+
+	key_filter[1].type = CKA_ID;
+	key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid;
+	key_filter[1].ulValueLen = k11->keyid_len;
+
+	true_val = CK_TRUE;
+	key_filter[2].type = CKA_SIGN;
+	key_filter[2].pValue = &true_val;
+	key_filter[2].ulValueLen = sizeof(true_val);
+
+	/* try to find object w/CKA_SIGN first, retry w/o */
+	if (pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 3, &obj) < 0 &&
+	    pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 2, &obj) < 0) {
+		error("cannot find private key");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	memset(&mech, 0, sizeof(mech));
+	mech.mechanism = mech_type;
+	mech.pParameter = NULL_PTR;
+	mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
+
+	if ((rv = f->C_SignInit(si->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_SignInit failed: %lu", rv);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(k11, obj, CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE,
+	    &always_auth); /* ignore errors here */
+	if (always_auth && !did_login) {
+		debug_f("always-auth key");
+		if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) < 0) {
+			error("login failed for always-auth key");
+			return (-1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */
+static int
+pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
+    int padding)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_key	*k11;
+	struct pkcs11_slotinfo	*si;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f;
+	CK_ULONG		tlen = 0;
+	CK_RV			rv;
+	int			rval = -1;
+
+	if ((k11 = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx)) == NULL) {
+		error("RSA_get_ex_data failed");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	if (pkcs11_get_key(k11, CKM_RSA_PKCS) == -1) {
+		error("pkcs11_get_key failed");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	f = k11->provider->function_list;
+	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
+	tlen = RSA_size(rsa);
+
+	/* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
+	rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &tlen);
+	if (rv == CKR_OK)
+		rval = tlen;
+	else
+		error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv);
+
+	return (rval);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
+    int padding)
+{
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper(void)
+{
+	if (rsa_method != NULL)
+		return (0);
+	rsa_method = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method());
+	if (rsa_method == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	rsa_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, "ssh-pkcs11-rsa",
+	    NULL, NULL, pkcs11_k11_free);
+	if (rsa_idx == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	if (!RSA_meth_set1_name(rsa_method, "pkcs11") ||
+	    !RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt) ||
+	    !RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt)) {
+		error_f("setup pkcs11 method failed");
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */
+static int
+pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_key	*k11;
+
+	if (pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper() == -1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11));
+	k11->provider = provider;
+	provider->refcount++;	/* provider referenced by RSA key */
+	k11->slotidx = slotidx;
+	/* identify key object on smartcard */
+	k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen;
+	if (k11->keyid_len > 0) {
+		k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
+		memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
+	}
+
+	RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method);
+	RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+/* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */
+static ECDSA_SIG *
+ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv,
+    const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *ec)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_key	*k11;
+	struct pkcs11_slotinfo	*si;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f;
+	CK_ULONG		siglen = 0, bnlen;
+	CK_RV			rv;
+	ECDSA_SIG		*ret = NULL;
+	u_char			*sig;
+	BIGNUM			*r = NULL, *s = NULL;
+
+	if ((k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx)) == NULL) {
+		ossl_error("EC_KEY_get_key_method_data failed for ec");
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	if (pkcs11_get_key(k11, CKM_ECDSA) == -1) {
+		error("pkcs11_get_key failed");
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	f = k11->provider->function_list;
+	si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
+
+	siglen = ECDSA_size(ec);
+	sig = xmalloc(siglen);
+
+	/* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
+	rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)dgst, dgst_len, sig, &siglen);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (siglen < 64 || siglen > 132 || siglen % 2) {
+		ossl_error("d2i_ECDSA_SIG failed");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	bnlen = siglen/2;
+	if ((ret = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
+		error("ECDSA_SIG_new failed");
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((r = BN_bin2bn(sig, bnlen, NULL)) == NULL ||
+	    (s = BN_bin2bn(sig+bnlen, bnlen, NULL)) == NULL) {
+		ossl_error("d2i_ECDSA_SIG failed");
+		ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
+		ret = NULL;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(ret, r, s)) {
+		error_f("ECDSA_SIG_set0 failed");
+		ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
+		ret = NULL;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	r = s = NULL; /* now owned by ret */
+	/* success */
+ done:
+	BN_free(r);
+	BN_free(s);
+	free(sig);
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper(void)
+{
+	int (*orig_sign)(int, const unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *,
+	    unsigned int *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, EC_KEY *) = NULL;
+
+	if (ec_key_method != NULL)
+		return (0);
+	ec_key_idx = EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(0, "ssh-pkcs11-ecdsa",
+	    NULL, NULL, pkcs11_k11_free);
+	if (ec_key_idx == -1)
+		return (-1);
+	ec_key_method = EC_KEY_METHOD_new(EC_KEY_OpenSSL());
+	if (ec_key_method == NULL)
+		return (-1);
+	EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(ec_key_method, &orig_sign, NULL, NULL);
+	EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(ec_key_method, orig_sign, NULL, ecdsa_do_sign);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, EC_KEY *ec)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_key	*k11;
+
+	if (pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper() == -1)
+		return (-1);
+
+	k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11));
+	k11->provider = provider;
+	provider->refcount++;	/* provider referenced by ECDSA key */
+	k11->slotidx = slotidx;
+	/* identify key object on smartcard */
+	k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen;
+	if (k11->keyid_len > 0) {
+		k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
+		memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
+	}
+	EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method);
+	EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+/* remove trailing spaces */
+static void
+rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (!len)
+		return;
+	for (i = len - 1;  i > 0; i--)
+		if (i == len - 1 || buf[i] == ' ')
+			buf[i] = '\0';
+		else
+			break;
+}
+
+/*
+ * open a pkcs11 session and login if required.
+ * if pin == NULL we delay login until key use
+ */
+static int
+pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin,
+    CK_ULONG user)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_slotinfo	*si;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f;
+	CK_RV			rv;
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	session;
+	int			login_required, ret;
+
+	f = p->function_list;
+	si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
+
+	login_required = si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED;
+
+	/* fail early before opening session */
+	if (login_required && !pkcs11_interactive &&
+	    (pin == NULL || strlen(pin) == 0)) {
+		error("pin required");
+		return (-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED);
+	}
+	if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION|
+	    CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv);
+		return (-1);
+	}
+	if (login_required && pin != NULL && strlen(pin) != 0) {
+		rv = f->C_Login(session, user, (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin));
+		if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) {
+			error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv);
+			ret = (rv == CKR_PIN_LOCKED) ?
+			    -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED :
+			    -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_LOGIN_FAIL;
+			if ((rv = f->C_CloseSession(session)) != CKR_OK)
+				error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv);
+			return (ret);
+		}
+		si->logged_in = 1;
+	}
+	si->session = session;
+	return (0);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_key_included(struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < *nkeys; i++)
+		if (sshkey_equal(key, (*keysp)[i]))
+			return (1);
+	return (0);
+}
+
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+static struct sshkey *
+pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
+{
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
+	CK_RV			 rv;
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING	*octet = NULL;
+	EC_KEY			*ec = NULL;
+	EC_GROUP		*group = NULL;
+	struct sshkey		*key = NULL;
+	const unsigned char	*attrp = NULL;
+	int			 i;
+	int			 nid;
+
+	memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
+	key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
+	key_attr[1].type = CKA_EC_POINT;
+	key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS;
+
+	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+	f = p->function_list;
+
+	/* figure out size of the attributes */
+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but
+	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
+	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
+	 */
+	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
+		error("invalid attribute length");
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* allocate buffers for attributes */
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+		if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
+			key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen);
+
+	/* retrieve ID, public point and curve parameters of EC key */
+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	ec = EC_KEY_new();
+	if (ec == NULL) {
+		error("EC_KEY_new failed");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	attrp = key_attr[2].pValue;
+	group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen);
+	if (group == NULL) {
+		ossl_error("d2i_ECPKParameters failed");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if (EC_KEY_set_group(ec, group) == 0) {
+		ossl_error("EC_KEY_set_group failed");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen <= 2) {
+		error("CKA_EC_POINT too small");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	attrp = key_attr[1].pValue;
+	octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[1].ulValueLen);
+	if (octet == NULL) {
+		ossl_error("d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING failed");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	attrp = octet->data;
+	if (o2i_ECPublicKey(&ec, &attrp, octet->length) == NULL) {
+		ossl_error("o2i_ECPublicKey failed");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec);
+	if (nid < 0) {
+		error("couldn't get curve nid");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], ec))
+		goto fail;
+
+	key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+	if (key == NULL) {
+		error("sshkey_new failed");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	key->ecdsa = ec;
+	key->ecdsa_nid = nid;
+	key->type = KEY_ECDSA;
+	key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+	ec = NULL;	/* now owned by key */
+
+fail:
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+		free(key_attr[i].pValue);
+	if (ec)
+		EC_KEY_free(ec);
+	if (group)
+		EC_GROUP_free(group);
+	if (octet)
+		ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(octet);
+
+	return (key);
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+
+static struct sshkey *
+pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
+{
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[3];
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
+	CK_RV			 rv;
+	RSA			*rsa = NULL;
+	BIGNUM			*rsa_n, *rsa_e;
+	struct sshkey		*key = NULL;
+	int			 i;
+
+	memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
+	key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
+	key_attr[1].type = CKA_MODULUS;
+	key_attr[2].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
+
+	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+	f = p->function_list;
+
+	/* figure out size of the attributes */
+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but
+	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
+	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
+	 */
+	if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+	    key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
+		error("invalid attribute length");
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	/* allocate buffers for attributes */
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+		if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
+			key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen);
+
+	/* retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key */
+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	rsa = RSA_new();
+	if (rsa == NULL) {
+		error("RSA_new failed");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[1].pValue, key_attr[1].ulValueLen, NULL);
+	rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
+	if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) {
+		error("BN_bin2bn failed");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL))
+		fatal_f("set key");
+	rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
+
+	if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], rsa))
+		goto fail;
+
+	key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+	if (key == NULL) {
+		error("sshkey_new failed");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	key->rsa = rsa;
+	key->type = KEY_RSA;
+	key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+	rsa = NULL;	/* now owned by key */
+
+fail:
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+		free(key_attr[i].pValue);
+	RSA_free(rsa);
+
+	return (key);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj, struct sshkey **keyp, char **labelp)
+{
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 cert_attr[3];
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
+	CK_RV			 rv;
+	X509			*x509 = NULL;
+	X509_NAME		*x509_name = NULL;
+	EVP_PKEY		*evp;
+	RSA			*rsa = NULL;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	EC_KEY			*ec = NULL;
+#endif
+	struct sshkey		*key = NULL;
+	int			 i;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+	int			 nid;
+#endif
+	const u_char		*cp;
+	char			*subject = NULL;
+
+	*keyp = NULL;
+	*labelp = NULL;
+
+	memset(&cert_attr, 0, sizeof(cert_attr));
+	cert_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
+	cert_attr[1].type = CKA_SUBJECT;
+	cert_attr[2].type = CKA_VALUE;
+
+	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+	f = p->function_list;
+
+	/* figure out size of the attributes */
+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but
+	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
+	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
+	 */
+	if (cert_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
+	    cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
+		error("invalid attribute length");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* allocate buffers for attributes */
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+		if (cert_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
+			cert_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, cert_attr[i].ulValueLen);
+
+	/* retrieve ID, subject and value of certificate */
+	rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Decode DER-encoded cert subject */
+	cp = cert_attr[1].pValue;
+	if ((x509_name = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &cp,
+	    cert_attr[1].ulValueLen)) == NULL ||
+	    (subject = X509_NAME_oneline(x509_name, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
+		subject = xstrdup("invalid subject");
+	X509_NAME_free(x509_name);
+
+	cp = cert_attr[2].pValue;
+	if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[2].ulValueLen)) == NULL) {
+		error("d2i_x509 failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL) {
+		error("X509_get_pubkey failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(evp) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
+		if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp) == NULL) {
+			error("invalid x509; no rsa key");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp))) == NULL) {
+			error("RSAPublicKey_dup failed");
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], rsa))
+			goto out;
+
+		key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+		if (key == NULL) {
+			error("sshkey_new failed");
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		key->rsa = rsa;
+		key->type = KEY_RSA;
+		key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+		rsa = NULL;	/* now owned by key */
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+	} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(evp) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+		if (EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(evp) == NULL) {
+			error("invalid x509; no ec key");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((ec = EC_KEY_dup(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(evp))) == NULL) {
+			error("EC_KEY_dup failed");
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec);
+		if (nid < 0) {
+			error("couldn't get curve nid");
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], ec))
+			goto out;
+
+		key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+		if (key == NULL) {
+			error("sshkey_new failed");
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		key->ecdsa = ec;
+		key->ecdsa_nid = nid;
+		key->type = KEY_ECDSA;
+		key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
+		ec = NULL;	/* now owned by key */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+	} else {
+		error("unknown certificate key type");
+		goto out;
+	}
+ out:
+	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
+		free(cert_attr[i].pValue);
+	X509_free(x509);
+	RSA_free(rsa);
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	EC_KEY_free(ec);
+#endif
+	if (key == NULL) {
+		free(subject);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	*keyp = key;
+	*labelp = subject;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#if 0
+static int
+have_rsa_key(const RSA *rsa)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
+
+	RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL);
+	return rsa_n != NULL && rsa_e != NULL;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void
+note_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, const char *context,
+    struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	char *fp;
+
+	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+		return;
+	}
+	debug2("%s: provider %s slot %lu: %s %s", context, p->name,
+	    (u_long)slotidx, sshkey_type(key), fp);
+	free(fp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * lookup certificates for token in slot identified by slotidx,
+ * add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys.
+ * keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys.
+ */
+static int
+pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys)
+{
+	struct sshkey		*key = NULL;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS		 key_class;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[1];
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
+	CK_RV			 rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	 obj;
+	CK_ULONG		 n = 0;
+	int			 ret = -1;
+	char			*label;
+
+	memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
+	memset(&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
+
+	key_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
+	key_attr[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
+	key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
+	key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
+
+	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+	f = p->function_list;
+
+	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	while (1) {
+		CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE	ck_cert_type;
+
+		rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &n);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+			error("C_FindObjects failed: %lu", rv);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		if (n == 0)
+			break;
+
+		memset(&ck_cert_type, 0, sizeof(ck_cert_type));
+		memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
+		key_attr[0].type = CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
+		key_attr[0].pValue = &ck_cert_type;
+		key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(ck_cert_type);
+
+		rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, key_attr, 1);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+			error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+
+		key = NULL;
+		label = NULL;
+		switch (ck_cert_type) {
+		case CKC_X_509:
+			if (pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj,
+			    &key, &label) != 0) {
+				error("failed to fetch key");
+				continue;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			error("skipping unsupported certificate type %lu",
+			    ck_cert_type);
+			continue;
+		}
+		note_key(p, slotidx, __func__, key);
+		if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) {
+			debug2_f("key already included");;
+			sshkey_free(key);
+		} else {
+			/* expand key array and add key */
+			*keysp = xrecallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys,
+			    *nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *));
+			(*keysp)[*nkeys] = key;
+			if (labelsp != NULL) {
+				*labelsp = xrecallocarray(*labelsp, *nkeys,
+				    *nkeys + 1, sizeof(char *));
+				(*labelsp)[*nkeys] = xstrdup((char *)label);
+			}
+			*nkeys = *nkeys + 1;
+			debug("have %d keys", *nkeys);
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+fail:
+	rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * lookup public keys for token in slot identified by slotidx,
+ * add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys.
+ * keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys.
+ */
+static int
+pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+    struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys)
+{
+	struct sshkey		*key = NULL;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS		 key_class;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 key_attr[2];
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
+	CK_RV			 rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	 obj;
+	CK_ULONG		 n = 0;
+	int			 ret = -1;
+
+	memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
+	memset(&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
+
+	key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	key_attr[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
+	key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
+	key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
+
+	session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
+	f = p->function_list;
+
+	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	while (1) {
+		CK_KEY_TYPE	ck_key_type;
+		CK_UTF8CHAR	label[256];
+
+		rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &n);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+			error("C_FindObjects failed: %lu", rv);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		if (n == 0)
+			break;
+
+		memset(&ck_key_type, 0, sizeof(ck_key_type));
+		memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
+		key_attr[0].type = CKA_KEY_TYPE;
+		key_attr[0].pValue = &ck_key_type;
+		key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(ck_key_type);
+		key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL;
+		key_attr[1].pValue = &label;
+		key_attr[1].ulValueLen = sizeof(label) - 1;
+
+		rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, key_attr, 2);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+			error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+
+		label[key_attr[1].ulValueLen] = '\0';
+
+		switch (ck_key_type) {
+		case CKK_RSA:
+			key = pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
+			break;
+#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW)
+		case CKK_ECDSA:
+			key = pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
+			break;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+		default:
+			/* XXX print key type? */
+			key = NULL;
+			error("skipping unsupported key type");
+		}
+
+		if (key == NULL) {
+			error("failed to fetch key");
+			continue;
+		}
+		note_key(p, slotidx, __func__, key);
+		if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) {
+			debug2_f("key already included");;
+			sshkey_free(key);
+		} else {
+			/* expand key array and add key */
+			*keysp = xrecallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys,
+			    *nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *));
+			(*keysp)[*nkeys] = key;
+			if (labelsp != NULL) {
+				*labelsp = xrecallocarray(*labelsp, *nkeys,
+				    *nkeys + 1, sizeof(char *));
+				(*labelsp)[*nkeys] = xstrdup((char *)label);
+			}
+			*nkeys = *nkeys + 1;
+			debug("have %d keys", *nkeys);
+		}
+	}
+
+	ret = 0;
+fail:
+	rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
+		ret = -1;
+	}
+
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN
+#define FILL_ATTR(attr, idx, typ, val, len) \
+	{ (attr[idx]).type=(typ); (attr[idx]).pValue=(val); (attr[idx]).ulValueLen=len; idx++; }
+
+static struct sshkey *
+pkcs11_rsa_generate_private_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+    char *label, CK_ULONG bits, CK_BYTE keyid, u_int32_t *err)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_slotinfo	*si;
+	char			*plabel = label ? label : "";
+	int			 npub = 0, npriv = 0;
+	CK_RV			 rv;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f;
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+	CK_BBOOL		 true_val = CK_TRUE, false_val = CK_FALSE;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	 pubKey, privKey;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 tpub[16], tpriv[16];
+	CK_MECHANISM		 mech = {
+	    CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0
+	};
+	CK_BYTE			 pubExponent[] = {
+	    0x01, 0x00, 0x01 /* RSA_F4 in bytes */
+	};
+	pubkey_filter[0].pValue = &pubkey_class;
+	cert_filter[0].pValue = &cert_class;
+
+	*err = 0;
+
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ENCRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &false_val,
+	    sizeof(false_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_WRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &bits, sizeof(bits));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, pubExponent,
+	    sizeof(pubExponent));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
+
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_TOKEN,  &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_LABEL,  plabel, strlen(plabel));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_PRIVATE,  &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SENSITIVE,  &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DECRYPT,  &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN,  &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER,  &false_val,
+	    sizeof(false_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_UNWRAP,  &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DERIVE,  &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
+
+	f = p->function_list;
+	si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
+	session = si->session;
+
+	if ((rv = f->C_GenerateKeyPair(session, &mech, tpub, npub, tpriv, npriv,
+	    &pubKey, &privKey)) != CKR_OK) {
+		error_f("key generation failed: error 0x%lx", rv);
+		*err = rv;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &pubKey);
+}
+
+static int
+pkcs11_decode_hex(const char *hex, unsigned char **dest, size_t *rlen)
+{
+	size_t	i, len;
+	char	ptr[3];
+
+	if (dest)
+		*dest = NULL;
+	if (rlen)
+		*rlen = 0;
+
+	if ((len = strlen(hex)) % 2)
+		return -1;
+	len /= 2;
+
+	*dest = xmalloc(len);
+
+	ptr[2] = '\0';
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		ptr[0] = hex[2 * i];
+		ptr[1] = hex[(2 * i) + 1];
+		if (!isxdigit(ptr[0]) || !isxdigit(ptr[1]))
+			return -1;
+		(*dest)[i] = (unsigned char)strtoul(ptr, NULL, 16);
+	}
+
+	if (rlen)
+		*rlen = len;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static struct ec_curve_info {
+	const char	*name;
+	const char	*oid;
+	const char	*oid_encoded;
+	size_t		 size;
+} ec_curve_infos[] = {
+	{"prime256v1",	"1.2.840.10045.3.1.7",	"06082A8648CE3D030107", 256},
+	{"secp384r1",	"1.3.132.0.34",		"06052B81040022",	384},
+	{"secp521r1",	"1.3.132.0.35",		"06052B81040023",	521},
+	{NULL,		NULL,			NULL,			0},
+};
+
+static struct sshkey *
+pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
+    char *label, CK_ULONG bits, CK_BYTE keyid, u_int32_t *err)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_slotinfo	*si;
+	char			*plabel = label ? label : "";
+	int			 i;
+	size_t			 ecparams_size;
+	unsigned char		*ecparams = NULL;
+	int			 npub = 0, npriv = 0;
+	CK_RV			 rv;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f;
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+	CK_BBOOL		 true_val = CK_TRUE, false_val = CK_FALSE;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	 pubKey, privKey;
+	CK_MECHANISM		 mech = {
+	    CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0
+	};
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 tpub[16], tpriv[16];
+
+	*err = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; ec_curve_infos[i].name; i++) {
+		if (ec_curve_infos[i].size == bits)
+			break;
+	}
+	if (!ec_curve_infos[i].name) {
+		error_f("invalid key size %lu", bits);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (pkcs11_decode_hex(ec_curve_infos[i].oid_encoded, &ecparams,
+	    &ecparams_size) == -1) {
+		error_f("invalid oid");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ENCRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &false_val,
+	    sizeof(false_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_WRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_EC_PARAMS, ecparams, ecparams_size);
+	FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
+
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_PRIVATE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SENSITIVE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DECRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &false_val,
+	    sizeof(false_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_UNWRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
+	FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
+
+	f = p->function_list;
+	si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
+	session = si->session;
+
+	if ((rv = f->C_GenerateKeyPair(session, &mech, tpub, npub, tpriv, npriv,
+	    &pubKey, &privKey)) != CKR_OK) {
+		error_f("key generation failed: error 0x%lx", rv);
+		*err = rv;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	return pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &pubKey);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */
+
+/*
+ * register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if
+ * keyp is provided, fetch keys.
+ */
+static int
+pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
+    struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp,
+    struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user)
+{
+	int nkeys, need_finalize = 0;
+	int ret = -1;
+	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
+	void *handle = NULL;
+	CK_RV (*getfunctionlist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST **);
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
+	CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
+	CK_ULONG i;
+
+	if (providerp == NULL)
+		goto fail;
+	*providerp = NULL;
+
+	if (keyp != NULL)
+		*keyp = NULL;
+	if (labelsp != NULL)
+		*labelsp = NULL;
+
+	if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) {
+		debug_f("provider already registered: %s", provider_id);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	/* open shared pkcs11-library */
+	if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
+		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror());
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
+		error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
+	p->name = xstrdup(provider_id);
+	p->handle = handle;
+	/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
+	if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_GetFunctionList for provider %s failed: %lu",
+		    provider_id, rv);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	p->function_list = f;
+	if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_Initialize for provider %s failed: %lu",
+		    provider_id, rv);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	need_finalize = 1;
+	if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_GetInfo for provider %s failed: %lu",
+		    provider_id, rv);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID));
+	rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription));
+	debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d"
+	    " libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d",
+	    provider_id,
+	    p->info.manufacturerID,
+	    p->info.cryptokiVersion.major,
+	    p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor,
+	    p->info.libraryDescription,
+	    p->info.libraryVersion.major,
+	    p->info.libraryVersion.minor);
+	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (p->nslots == 0) {
+		debug_f("provider %s returned no slots", provider_id);
+		ret = -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_NO_SLOTS;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
+	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots))
+	    != CKR_OK) {
+		error("C_GetSlotList for provider %s failed: %lu",
+		    provider_id, rv);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo));
+	p->valid = 1;
+	nkeys = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
+		token = &p->slotinfo[i].token;
+		if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token))
+		    != CKR_OK) {
+			error("C_GetTokenInfo for provider %s slot %lu "
+			    "failed: %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i, rv);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
+			debug2_f("ignoring uninitialised token in "
+			    "provider %s slot %lu", provider_id, (u_long)i);
+			continue;
+		}
+		rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label));
+		rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID));
+		rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model));
+		rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber));
+		debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> "
+		    "model <%s> serial <%s> flags 0x%lx",
+		    provider_id, (unsigned long)i,
+		    token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model,
+		    token->serialNumber, token->flags);
+		/*
+		 * open session, login with pin and retrieve public
+		 * keys (if keyp is provided)
+		 */
+		if ((ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0 ||
+		    keyp == NULL)
+			continue;
+		pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
+		pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
+		if (nkeys == 0 && !p->slotinfo[i].logged_in &&
+		    pkcs11_interactive) {
+			/*
+			 * Some tokens require login before they will
+			 * expose keys.
+			 */
+			if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->slotinfo[i],
+			    CKU_USER) < 0) {
+				error("login failed");
+				continue;
+			}
+			pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
+			pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* now owned by caller */
+	*providerp = p;
+
+	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
+	p->refcount++;	/* add to provider list */
+
+	return (nkeys);
+fail:
+	if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
+		error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu",
+		    provider_id, rv);
+	if (p) {
+		free(p->name);
+		free(p->slotlist);
+		free(p->slotinfo);
+		free(p);
+	}
+	if (handle)
+		dlclose(handle);
+	if (ret > 0)
+		ret = -1;
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * register a new provider and get number of keys hold by the token,
+ * fails if provider already exists
+ */
+int
+pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
+    char ***labelsp)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
+	int nkeys;
+
+	nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, keyp, labelsp,
+	    &p, CKU_USER);
+
+	/* no keys found or some other error, de-register provider */
+	if (nkeys <= 0 && p != NULL) {
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
+		pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
+		pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
+	}
+	if (nkeys == 0)
+		debug_f("provider %s returned no keys", provider_id);
+
+	return (nkeys);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN
+struct sshkey *
+pkcs11_gakp(char *provider_id, char *pin, unsigned int slotidx, char *label,
+    unsigned int type, unsigned int bits, unsigned char keyid, u_int32_t *err)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_provider	*p = NULL;
+	struct pkcs11_slotinfo	*si;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f;
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+	struct sshkey		*k = NULL;
+	int			 ret = -1, reset_pin = 0, reset_provider = 0;
+	CK_RV			 rv;
+
+	*err = 0;
+
+	if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL)
+		debug_f("provider \"%s\" available", provider_id);
+	else if ((ret = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, NULL,
+	    &p, CKU_SO)) < 0) {
+		debug_f("could not register provider %s", provider_id);
+		goto out;
+	} else
+		reset_provider = 1;
+
+	f = p->function_list;
+	si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
+	session = si->session;
+
+	if ((rv = f->C_SetOperationState(session , pin, strlen(pin),
+	    CK_INVALID_HANDLE, CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) != CKR_OK) {
+		debug_f("could not supply SO pin: %lu", rv);
+		reset_pin = 0;
+	} else
+		reset_pin = 1;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		if ((k = pkcs11_rsa_generate_private_key(p, slotidx, label,
+		    bits, keyid, err)) == NULL) {
+			debug_f("failed to generate RSA key");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		break;
+	case KEY_ECDSA:
+		if ((k = pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(p, slotidx, label,
+		    bits, keyid, err)) == NULL) {
+			debug_f("failed to generate ECDSA key");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		*err = SSH_PKCS11_ERR_GENERIC;
+		debug_f("unknown type %d", type);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (reset_pin)
+		f->C_SetOperationState(session , NULL, 0, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
+		    CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
+
+	if (reset_provider)
+		pkcs11_del_provider(provider_id);
+
+	return (k);
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+pkcs11_destroy_keypair(char *provider_id, char *pin, unsigned long slotidx,
+    unsigned char keyid, u_int32_t *err)
+{
+	struct pkcs11_provider	*p = NULL;
+	struct pkcs11_slotinfo	*si;
+	struct sshkey		*k = NULL;
+	int			 reset_pin = 0, reset_provider = 0;
+	CK_ULONG		 nattrs;
+	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f;
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE		 attrs[16];
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS		 key_class;
+	CK_KEY_TYPE		 key_type;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	 obj = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
+	CK_RV			 rv;
+
+	*err = 0;
+
+	if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) {
+		debug_f("using provider \"%s\"", provider_id);
+	} else if (pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, NULL, &p,
+	    CKU_SO) < 0) {
+		debug_f("could not register provider %s",
+		    provider_id);
+		goto out;
+	} else
+		reset_provider = 1;
+
+	f = p->function_list;
+	si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
+	session = si->session;
+
+	if ((rv = f->C_SetOperationState(session , pin, strlen(pin),
+	    CK_INVALID_HANDLE, CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) != CKR_OK) {
+		debug_f("could not supply SO pin: %lu", rv);
+		reset_pin = 0;
+	} else
+		reset_pin = 1;
+
+	/* private key */
+	nattrs = 0;
+	key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
+	FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class));
+	FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
+
+	if (pkcs11_find(p, slotidx, attrs, nattrs, &obj) == 0 &&
+	    obj != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+		if ((rv = f->C_DestroyObject(session, obj)) != CKR_OK) {
+			debug_f("could not destroy private key 0x%hhx",
+			    keyid);
+			*err = rv;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* public key */
+	nattrs = 0;
+	key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
+	FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class));
+	FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
+
+	if (pkcs11_find(p, slotidx, attrs, nattrs, &obj) == 0 &&
+	    obj != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
+
+		/* get key type */
+		nattrs = 0;
+		FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type,
+		    sizeof(key_type));
+		rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attrs, nattrs);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK) {
+			debug_f("could not get key type of public key 0x%hhx",
+			    keyid);
+			*err = rv;
+			key_type = -1;
+		}
+		if (key_type == CKK_RSA)
+			k = pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
+		else if (key_type == CKK_ECDSA)
+			k = pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
+
+		if ((rv = f->C_DestroyObject(session, obj)) != CKR_OK) {
+			debug_f("could not destroy public key 0x%hhx", keyid);
+			*err = rv;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+out:
+	if (reset_pin)
+		f->C_SetOperationState(session , NULL, 0, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
+		    CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
+
+	if (reset_provider)
+		pkcs11_del_provider(provider_id);
+
+	return (k);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */
+#else /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+
+int
+pkcs11_init(int interactive)
+{
+	error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__);
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+int
+pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
+    char ***labelsp)
+{
+	error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__);
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+void
+pkcs11_terminate(void)
+{
+	error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__);
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.h b/ssh-pkcs11.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..81f1d7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.h
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.h,v 1.6 2020/01/25 00:03:36 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Errors for pkcs11_add_provider() */
+#define	SSH_PKCS11_ERR_GENERIC			1
+#define	SSH_PKCS11_ERR_LOGIN_FAIL		2
+#define	SSH_PKCS11_ERR_NO_SLOTS			3
+#define	SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED		4
+#define	SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED		5
+
+int	pkcs11_init(int);
+void	pkcs11_terminate(void);
+int	pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, struct sshkey ***, char ***);
+int	pkcs11_del_provider(char *);
+#ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN
+struct sshkey *
+	pkcs11_gakp(char *, char *, unsigned int, char *, unsigned int,
+	    unsigned int, unsigned char, u_int32_t *);
+struct sshkey *
+	pkcs11_destroy_keypair(char *, char *, unsigned long, unsigned char,
+	    u_int32_t *);
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(ENABLE_PKCS11)
+#undef ENABLE_PKCS11
+#endif
diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6516ddc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,769 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.78 2022/10/28 02:47:04 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *);
+
+static u_int
+ssh_rsa_size(const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
+
+	if (key->rsa == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
+	return BN_num_bits(rsa_n);
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_rsa_alloc(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	if ((k->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_rsa_cleanup(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	RSA_free(k->rsa);
+	k->rsa = NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_rsa_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *rsa_e_a, *rsa_n_a;
+	const BIGNUM *rsa_e_b, *rsa_n_b;
+
+	if (a->rsa == NULL || b->rsa == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	RSA_get0_key(a->rsa, &rsa_n_a, &rsa_e_a, NULL);
+	RSA_get0_key(b->rsa, &rsa_n_b, &rsa_e_b, NULL);
+	if (rsa_e_a == NULL || rsa_e_b == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (rsa_n_a == NULL || rsa_n_b == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (BN_cmp(rsa_e_a, rsa_e_b) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (BN_cmp(rsa_n_a, rsa_n_b) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_rsa_serialize_public(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	int r;
+	const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
+
+	if (key->rsa == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_e)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_n)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_rsa_serialize_private(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	int r;
+	const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *rsa_d, *rsa_iqmp, *rsa_p, *rsa_q;
+
+	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d);
+	RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &rsa_p, &rsa_q);
+	RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_iqmp);
+
+	if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+		/* Note: can't reuse ssh_rsa_serialize_public: e, n vs. n, e */
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_n)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_e)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_d)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_iqmp)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_p)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_q)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_rsa_generate(struct sshkey *k, int bits)
+{
+	RSA *private = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *f4 = NULL;
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
+	    bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+	if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
+	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	k->rsa = private;
+	private = NULL;
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	RSA_free(private);
+	BN_free(f4);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_rsa_copy_public(const struct sshkey *from, struct sshkey *to)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
+	BIGNUM *rsa_n_dup = NULL, *rsa_e_dup = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	RSA_get0_key(from->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL);
+	if ((rsa_n_dup = BN_dup(rsa_n)) == NULL ||
+	    (rsa_e_dup = BN_dup(rsa_e)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (!RSA_set0_key(to->rsa, rsa_n_dup, rsa_e_dup, NULL)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rsa_n_dup = rsa_e_dup = NULL; /* transferred */
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	BN_clear_free(rsa_n_dup);
+	BN_clear_free(rsa_e_dup);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_rsa_deserialize_public(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b,
+    struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL;
+
+	if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_e) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_n) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL)) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
+	if ((ret = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key, 0)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
+#endif
+	/* success */
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	BN_clear_free(rsa_n);
+	BN_clear_free(rsa_e);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_rsa_deserialize_private(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b,
+    struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	int r;
+	BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *rsa_iqmp = NULL, *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL;
+
+	/* Note: can't reuse ssh_rsa_deserialize_public: e, n vs. n, e */
+	if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_n)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_e)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL)) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_d)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_iqmp)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_p)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_q)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, rsa_d)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */
+	if (!RSA_set0_factors(key->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */
+	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key, 0)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(key, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (RSA_blinding_on(key->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	BN_clear_free(rsa_n);
+	BN_clear_free(rsa_e);
+	BN_clear_free(rsa_d);
+	BN_clear_free(rsa_p);
+	BN_clear_free(rsa_q);
+	BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static const char *
+rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg)
+{
+	switch (hash_alg) {
+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
+		return "ssh-rsa";
+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
+		return "rsa-sha2-256";
+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
+		return "rsa-sha2-512";
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the hash algorithm ID for a given algorithm identifier as used
+ * inside the signature blob,
+ */
+static int
+rsa_hash_id_from_ident(const char *ident)
+{
+	if (strcmp(ident, "ssh-rsa") == 0)
+		return SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
+	if (strcmp(ident, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0)
+		return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
+	if (strcmp(ident, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0)
+		return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the hash algorithm ID for the specified key name. This includes
+ * all the cases of rsa_hash_id_from_ident() but also the certificate key
+ * types.
+ */
+static int
+rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = rsa_hash_id_from_ident(alg)) != -1)
+		return r;
+	if (strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0)
+		return SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
+	if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0)
+		return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
+	if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0)
+		return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+static int
+rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type)
+{
+	switch (type) {
+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
+		return NID_sha1;
+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
+		return NID_sha256;
+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
+		return NID_sha512;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+int
+ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *rsa_p, *rsa_q, *rsa_d;
+	BIGNUM *aux = NULL, *d_consttime = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *rsa_dmq1 = NULL, *rsa_dmp1 = NULL, *rsa_iqmp = NULL;
+	BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL ||
+	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_d);
+	RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &rsa_p, &rsa_q);
+
+	if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((aux = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (rsa_dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (rsa_dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((d_consttime = BN_dup(rsa_d)) == NULL ||
+	    (rsa_iqmp = BN_dup(iqmp)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	BN_set_flags(aux, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+	BN_set_flags(d_consttime, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
+
+	if ((BN_sub(aux, rsa_q, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
+	    (BN_mod(rsa_dmq1, d_consttime, aux, ctx) == 0) ||
+	    (BN_sub(aux, rsa_p, BN_value_one()) == 0) ||
+	    (BN_mod(rsa_dmp1, d_consttime, aux, ctx) == 0)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (!RSA_set0_crt_params(key->rsa, rsa_dmp1, rsa_dmq1, rsa_iqmp)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	rsa_dmp1 = rsa_dmq1 = rsa_iqmp = NULL; /* transferred */
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	BN_clear_free(aux);
+	BN_clear_free(d_consttime);
+	BN_clear_free(rsa_dmp1);
+	BN_clear_free(rsa_dmq1);
+	BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp);
+	BN_CTX_free(ctx);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */
+static int
+ssh_rsa_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+    u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+    const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
+	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL;
+	size_t slen = 0;
+	u_int hlen, len;
+	int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = 0;
+	if (sigp != NULL)
+		*sigp = NULL;
+
+	if (alg == NULL || strlen(alg) == 0)
+		hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
+	else
+		hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg);
+	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
+	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
+	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+	slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
+	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	/* hash the data */
+	nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg);
+	if ((hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
+	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, hlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (len < slen) {
+		size_t diff = slen - len;
+		memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
+		explicit_bzero(sig, diff);
+	} else if (len > slen) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* encode signature */
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, rsa_hash_alg_ident(hash_alg))) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, slen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	len = sshbuf_len(b);
+	if (sigp != NULL) {
+		if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
+	}
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = len;
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+	freezero(sig, slen);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+    const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
+    struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
+	char *sigtype = NULL;
+	int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, hlen;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL;
+
+	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL ||
+	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
+	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
+	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &sigtype, NULL) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_ident(sigtype)) == -1) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Allow ssh-rsa-cert-v01 certs to generate SHA2 signatures for
+	 * legacy reasons, but otherwise the signature type should match.
+	 */
+	if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com") != 0) {
+		if ((want_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg)) == -1) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (hash_alg != want_alg) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* RSA_verify expects a signature of RSA_size */
+	modlen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
+	if (len > modlen) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH;
+		goto out;
+	} else if (len < modlen) {
+		diff = modlen - len;
+		osigblob = sigblob;
+		if ((sigblob = realloc(sigblob, modlen)) == NULL) {
+			sigblob = osigblob; /* put it back for clear/free */
+			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		memmove(sigblob + diff, sigblob, len);
+		explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
+		len = modlen;
+	}
+	if ((hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, dlen,
+	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, hlen, sigblob, len,
+	    key->rsa);
+ out:
+	freezero(sigblob, len);
+	free(sigtype);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * See:
+ * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
+ * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
+ */
+
+/*
+ * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
+ *	oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
+ */
+static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
+	0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
+	0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
+	0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
+	0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
+	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
+	0x04, 0x14  /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
+};
+
+/*
+ * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
+ * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
+ *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
+ *      id-sha256(1) }
+ */
+static const u_char id_sha256[] = {
+	0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */
+	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
+	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
+	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */
+	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
+	0x04, 0x20  /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */
+};
+
+/*
+ * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
+ * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
+ *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
+ *      id-sha256(3) }
+ */
+static const u_char id_sha512[] = {
+	0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */
+	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
+	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
+	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */
+	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
+	0x04, 0x40  /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */
+};
+
+static int
+rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp)
+{
+	switch (hash_alg) {
+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
+		*oidp = id_sha1;
+		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1);
+		break;
+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
+		*oidp = id_sha256;
+		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256);
+		break;
+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
+		*oidp = id_sha512;
+		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512);
+		break;
+	default:
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen,
+    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
+{
+	size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
+	int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
+	const u_char *oid = NULL;
+	u_char *decrypted = NULL;
+
+	if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0)
+		return ret;
+	ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
+	if (hashlen != hlen) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
+	if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
+	    siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
+	    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
+	hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
+	if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	ret = 0;
+done:
+	freezero(decrypted, rsasize);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_rsa_funcs = {
+	/* .size = */		ssh_rsa_size,
+	/* .alloc = */		ssh_rsa_alloc,
+	/* .cleanup = */	ssh_rsa_cleanup,
+	/* .equal = */		ssh_rsa_equal,
+	/* .ssh_serialize_public = */ ssh_rsa_serialize_public,
+	/* .ssh_deserialize_public = */ ssh_rsa_deserialize_public,
+	/* .ssh_serialize_private = */ ssh_rsa_serialize_private,
+	/* .ssh_deserialize_private = */ ssh_rsa_deserialize_private,
+	/* .generate = */	ssh_rsa_generate,
+	/* .copy_public = */	ssh_rsa_copy_public,
+	/* .sign = */		ssh_rsa_sign,
+	/* .verify = */		ssh_rsa_verify,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"ssh-rsa",
+	/* .shortname = */	"RSA",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_RSA,
+	/* .nid = */		0,
+	/* .cert = */		0,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	0,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_rsa_funcs,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_cert_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+	/* .shortname = */	"RSA-CERT",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_RSA_CERT,
+	/* .nid = */		0,
+	/* .cert = */		1,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	0,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_rsa_funcs,
+};
+
+/* SHA2 signature algorithms */
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha256_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"rsa-sha2-256",
+	/* .shortname = */	"RSA",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_RSA,
+	/* .nid = */		0,
+	/* .cert = */		0,
+	/* .sigonly = */	1,
+	/* .keybits = */	0,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_rsa_funcs,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha512_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"rsa-sha2-512",
+	/* .shortname = */	"RSA",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_RSA,
+	/* .nid = */		0,
+	/* .cert = */		0,
+	/* .sigonly = */	1,
+	/* .keybits = */	0,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_rsa_funcs,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha256_cert_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+	/* .shortname = */	"RSA-CERT",
+	/* .sigalg = */		"rsa-sha2-256",
+	/* .type = */		KEY_RSA_CERT,
+	/* .nid = */		0,
+	/* .cert = */		1,
+	/* .sigonly = */	1,
+	/* .keybits = */	0,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_rsa_funcs,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha512_cert_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+	/* .shortname = */	"RSA-CERT",
+	/* .sigalg = */		"rsa-sha2-512",
+	/* .type = */		KEY_RSA_CERT,
+	/* .nid = */		0,
+	/* .cert = */		1,
+	/* .sigonly = */	1,
+	/* .keybits = */	0,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_rsa_funcs,
+};
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/ssh-sandbox.h b/ssh-sandbox.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd5fd83
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-sandbox.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sandbox.h,v 1.1 2011/06/23 09:34:13 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+struct monitor;
+struct ssh_sandbox;
+
+struct ssh_sandbox *ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *);
+void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *);
+void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *);
+void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *, pid_t);
diff --git a/ssh-sk-client.c b/ssh-sk-client.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..321fe53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-sk-client.c
@@ -0,0 +1,480 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk-client.c,v 1.12 2022/01/14 03:34:00 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */
+
+static int
+start_helper(int *fdp, pid_t *pidp, void (**osigchldp)(int))
+{
+	void (*osigchld)(int);
+	int oerrno, pair[2];
+	pid_t pid;
+	char *helper, *verbosity = NULL;
+
+	*fdp = -1;
+	*pidp = 0;
+	*osigchldp = SIG_DFL;
+
+	helper = getenv("SSH_SK_HELPER");
+	if (helper == NULL || strlen(helper) == 0)
+		helper = _PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER;
+	if (access(helper, X_OK) != 0) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		error_f("helper \"%s\" unusable: %s", helper, strerror(errno));
+		errno = oerrno;
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+	verbosity = "-vvv";
+#endif
+
+	/* Start helper */
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) {
+		error("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	}
+	osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+	if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		error("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+		close(pair[0]);
+		close(pair[1]);
+		ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+		errno = oerrno;
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	}
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		if ((dup2(pair[1], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
+		    (dup2(pair[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) {
+			error_f("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		close(pair[0]);
+		close(pair[1]);
+		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+		debug_f("starting %s %s", helper,
+		    verbosity == NULL ? "" : verbosity);
+		execlp(helper, helper, verbosity, (char *)NULL);
+		error_f("execlp: %s", strerror(errno));
+		_exit(1);
+	}
+	close(pair[1]);
+
+	/* success */
+	debug3_f("started pid=%ld", (long)pid);
+	*fdp = pair[0];
+	*pidp = pid;
+	*osigchldp = osigchld;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+reap_helper(pid_t pid)
+{
+	int status, oerrno;
+
+	debug3_f("pid=%ld", (long)pid);
+
+	errno = 0;
+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+		if (errno == EINTR) {
+			errno = 0;
+			continue;
+		}
+		oerrno = errno;
+		error_f("waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
+		errno = oerrno;
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	}
+	if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+		error_f("helper exited abnormally");
+		return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+	} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+		error_f("helper exited with non-zero exit status");
+		return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+client_converse(struct sshbuf *msg, struct sshbuf **respp, u_int type)
+{
+	int oerrno, fd, r2, ll, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	u_int rtype, rerr;
+	pid_t pid;
+	u_char version;
+	void (*osigchld)(int);
+	struct sshbuf *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
+	*respp = NULL;
+
+	if ((r = start_helper(&fd, &pid, &osigchld)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	if ((req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* Request preamble: type, log_on_stderr, log_level */
+	ll = log_level_get();
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(req, type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(req, log_is_on_stderr() != 0)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(req, ll < 0 ? 0 : ll)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_putb(req, msg)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "compose");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = ssh_msg_send(fd, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION, req)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "send");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = ssh_msg_recv(fd, resp)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "receive");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(resp, &version)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse version");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (version != SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION) {
+		error_f("unsupported version: got %u, expected %u",
+		    version, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION);
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(resp, &rtype)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse message type");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (rtype == SSH_SK_HELPER_ERROR) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(resp, &rerr)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "parse");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		debug_f("helper returned error -%u", rerr);
+		/* OpenSSH error values are negative; encoded as -err on wire */
+		if (rerr == 0 || rerr >= INT_MAX)
+			r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		else
+			r = -(int)rerr;
+		goto out;
+	} else if (rtype != type) {
+		error_f("helper returned incorrect message type %u, "
+		    "expecting %u", rtype, type);
+		r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	oerrno = errno;
+	close(fd);
+	if ((r2 = reap_helper(pid)) != 0) {
+		if (r == 0) {
+			r = r2;
+			oerrno = errno;
+		}
+	}
+	if (r == 0) {
+		*respp = resp;
+		resp = NULL;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(req);
+	sshbuf_free(resp);
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+	errno = oerrno;
+	return r;
+
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_sign(const char *provider, struct sshkey *key,
+    u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+    u_int compat, const char *pin)
+{
+	int oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *kbuf = NULL, *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
+
+	*sigp = NULL;
+	*lenp = 0;
+
+#ifndef ENABLE_SK
+	return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+#endif
+
+	if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, kbuf)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "encode key");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(req, kbuf)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, provider)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(req, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, NULL)) != 0 || /* alg */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(req, compat)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, pin)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "compose");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = client_converse(req, &resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(resp, sigp, lenp)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse signature");
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(resp) != 0) {
+		error_f("trailing data in response");
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	oerrno = errno;
+	if (r != 0) {
+		freezero(*sigp, *lenp);
+		*sigp = NULL;
+		*lenp = 0;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+	sshbuf_free(req);
+	sshbuf_free(resp);
+	errno = oerrno;
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+    const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags,
+    const char *pin, struct sshbuf *challenge_buf,
+    struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshbuf *attest)
+{
+	int oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *kbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL, *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+
+	*keyp = NULL;
+	if (attest != NULL)
+		sshbuf_reset(attest);
+
+#ifndef ENABLE_SK
+	return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+#endif
+
+	if (type < 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	if ((abuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(req, (u_int)type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, provider_path)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, device)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, application)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, userid)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(req, flags)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, pin)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(req, challenge_buf)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "compose");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = client_converse(req, &resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(resp, abuf)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse");
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(resp) != 0) {
+		error_f("trailing data in response");
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(kbuf, &key)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "encode");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (attest != NULL && (r = sshbuf_putb(attest, abuf)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "encode attestation information");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+	*keyp = key;
+	key = NULL;
+ out:
+	oerrno = errno;
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+	sshbuf_free(abuf);
+	sshbuf_free(req);
+	sshbuf_free(resp);
+	errno = oerrno;
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void
+sshsk_free_resident_key(struct sshsk_resident_key *srk)
+{
+	if (srk == NULL)
+		return;
+	sshkey_free(srk->key);
+	freezero(srk->user_id, srk->user_id_len);
+	free(srk);
+}
+
+
+void
+sshsk_free_resident_keys(struct sshsk_resident_key **srks, size_t nsrks)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (srks == NULL || nsrks == 0)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nsrks; i++)
+		sshsk_free_resident_key(srks[i]);
+	free(srks);
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+    const char *pin, u_int flags, struct sshsk_resident_key ***srksp,
+    size_t *nsrksp)
+{
+	int oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *kbuf = NULL, *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	struct sshsk_resident_key *srk = NULL, **srks = NULL, **tmp;
+	u_char *userid = NULL;
+	size_t userid_len = 0, nsrks = 0;
+
+	*srksp = NULL;
+	*nsrksp = 0;
+
+	if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, provider_path)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, device)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, pin)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(req, flags)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "compose");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = client_converse(req, &resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	while (sshbuf_len(resp) != 0) {
+		/* key, comment, user_id */
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(resp, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_string(resp, &userid, &userid_len)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "parse");
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(kbuf, &key)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "decode key");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((srk = calloc(1, sizeof(*srk))) == NULL) {
+			error_f("calloc failed");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		srk->key = key;
+		key = NULL;
+		srk->user_id = userid;
+		srk->user_id_len = userid_len;
+		userid = NULL;
+		userid_len = 0;
+		if ((tmp = recallocarray(srks, nsrks, nsrks + 1,
+		    sizeof(*srks))) == NULL) {
+			error_f("recallocarray keys failed");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		debug_f("srks[%zu]: %s %s uidlen %zu", nsrks,
+		    sshkey_type(srk->key), srk->key->sk_application,
+		    srk->user_id_len);
+		srks = tmp;
+		srks[nsrks++] = srk;
+		srk = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+	*srksp = srks;
+	*nsrksp = nsrks;
+	srks = NULL;
+	nsrks = 0;
+ out:
+	oerrno = errno;
+	sshsk_free_resident_key(srk);
+	sshsk_free_resident_keys(srks, nsrks);
+	freezero(userid, userid_len);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+	sshbuf_free(req);
+	sshbuf_free(resp);
+	errno = oerrno;
+	return r;
+}
diff --git a/ssh-sk-helper.0 b/ssh-sk-helper.0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1971c46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-sk-helper.0
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+SSH-SK-HELPER(8)            System Manager's Manual           SSH-SK-HELPER(8)
+
+NAME
+     ssh-sk-helper M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH helper for FIDO authenticator support
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     ssh-sk-helper [-v]
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     ssh-sk-helper is used by ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), and ssh-keygen(1) to
+     access keys provided by a FIDO authenticator.
+
+     ssh-sk-helper is not intended to be invoked directly by the user.
+
+     A single option is supported:
+
+     -v      Verbose mode.  Causes ssh-sk-helper to print debugging messages
+             about its progress.  This is helpful in debugging problems.
+             Multiple -v options increase the verbosity.  The maximum is 3.
+
+             Note that ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), and ssh-keygen(1) will
+             automatically pass the -v flag to ssh-sk-helper when they have
+             themselves been placed in debug mode.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1)
+
+HISTORY
+     ssh-sk-helper first appeared in OpenBSD 6.7.
+
+AUTHORS
+     Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+
+OpenBSD 7.2                     April 29, 2022                     OpenBSD 7.2
diff --git a/ssh-sk-helper.8 b/ssh-sk-helper.8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e9b2ae1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-sk-helper.8
@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-sk-helper.8,v 1.4 2022/04/29 03:24:30 djm Exp $
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+.\"
+.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+.\"
+.Dd $Mdocdate: April 29 2022 $
+.Dt SSH-SK-HELPER 8
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh-sk-helper
+.Nd OpenSSH helper for FIDO authenticator support
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm
+.Op Fl v
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+is used by
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+and
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+to access keys provided by a FIDO authenticator.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+is not intended to be invoked directly by the user.
+.Pp
+A single option is supported:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print debugging messages about its progress.
+This is helpful in debugging problems.
+Multiple
+.Fl v
+options increase the verbosity.
+The maximum is 3.
+.Pp
+Note that
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+and
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+will automatically pass the
+.Fl v
+flag to
+.Nm
+when they have themselves been placed in debug mode.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+.Sh HISTORY
+.Nm
+first appeared in
+.Ox 6.7 .
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An Damien Miller Aq Mt djm@openbsd.org
diff --git a/ssh-sk-helper.c b/ssh-sk-helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9857b63
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-sk-helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk-helper.c,v 1.14 2022/12/04 11:03:11 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This is a tiny program used to isolate the address space used for
+ * security key middleware signing operations from ssh-agent. It is similar
+ * to ssh-pkcs11-helper.c but considerably simpler as the operations for
+ * security keys are stateless.
+ *
+ * Please crank SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION in sshkey.h for any incompatible
+ * protocol changes.
+ */
+ 
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK
+extern char *__progname;
+
+static struct sshbuf *reply_error(int r, char *fmt, ...)
+    __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)));
+
+static struct sshbuf *
+reply_error(int r, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	char *msg;
+	va_list ap;
+	struct sshbuf *resp;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	xvasprintf(&msg, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	debug("%s: %s", __progname, msg);
+	free(msg);
+
+	if (r >= 0)
+		fatal_f("invalid error code %d", r);
+
+	if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+	if (sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_ERROR) != 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_put_u32(resp, (u_int)-r) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: buffer error", __progname);
+	return resp;
+}
+
+/* If the specified string is zero length, then free it and replace with NULL */
+static void
+null_empty(char **s)
+{
+	if (s == NULL || *s == NULL || **s != '\0')
+		return;
+
+	free(*s);
+	*s = NULL;
+}
+
+static struct sshbuf *
+process_sign(struct sshbuf *req)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *resp, *kbuf;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	uint32_t compat;
+	const u_char *message;
+	u_char *sig = NULL;
+	size_t msglen, siglen = 0;
+	char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_froms(req, &kbuf)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(req, &message, &msglen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* alg */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &compat)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "%s: parse", __progname);
+	if (sshbuf_len(req) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: trailing data in request", __progname);
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(kbuf, &key)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "%s: Unable to parse private key", __progname);
+	if (!sshkey_is_sk(key)) {
+		fatal("%s: Unsupported key type %s",
+		    __progname, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+	}
+
+	debug_f("ready to sign with key %s, provider %s: "
+	    "msg len %zu, compat 0x%lx", sshkey_type(key),
+	    provider, msglen, (u_long)compat);
+
+	null_empty(&pin);
+
+	if ((r = sshsk_sign(provider, key, &sig, &siglen,
+	    message, msglen, compat, pin)) != 0) {
+		resp = reply_error(r, "Signing failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, siglen)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "%s: compose", __progname);
+ out:
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+	free(provider);
+	if (sig != NULL)
+		freezero(sig, siglen);
+	if (pin != NULL)
+		freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+	return resp;
+}
+
+static struct sshbuf *
+process_enroll(struct sshbuf *req)
+{
+	int r;
+	u_int type;
+	char *provider, *application, *pin, *device, *userid;
+	uint8_t flags;
+	struct sshbuf *challenge, *attest, *kbuf, *resp;
+	struct sshkey *key;
+
+	if ((attest = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &device, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &application, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &userid, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(req, &flags)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &pin, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_froms(req, &challenge)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "%s: parse", __progname);
+	if (sshbuf_len(req) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: trailing data in request", __progname);
+
+	if (type > INT_MAX)
+		fatal("%s: bad type %u", __progname, type);
+	if (sshbuf_len(challenge) == 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(challenge);
+		challenge = NULL;
+	}
+	null_empty(&device);
+	null_empty(&userid);
+	null_empty(&pin);
+
+	if ((r = sshsk_enroll((int)type, provider, device, application, userid,
+	    flags, pin, challenge, &key, attest)) != 0) {
+		resp = reply_error(r, "Enrollment failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+	if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, kbuf)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "%s: encode key", __progname);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(resp, attest)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "%s: compose", __progname);
+
+ out:
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+	sshbuf_free(attest);
+	sshbuf_free(challenge);
+	free(provider);
+	free(application);
+	if (pin != NULL)
+		freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+
+	return resp;
+}
+
+static struct sshbuf *
+process_load_resident(struct sshbuf *req)
+{
+	int r;
+	char *provider, *pin, *device;
+	struct sshbuf *kbuf, *resp;
+	struct sshsk_resident_key **srks = NULL;
+	size_t nsrks = 0, i;
+	u_int flags;
+
+	if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &device, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &pin, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &flags)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "%s: parse", __progname);
+	if (sshbuf_len(req) != 0)
+		fatal("%s: trailing data in request", __progname);
+
+	null_empty(&device);
+	null_empty(&pin);
+
+	if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(provider, device, pin, flags,
+	    &srks, &nsrks)) != 0) {
+		resp = reply_error(r, "sshsk_load_resident failed: %s",
+		    ssh_err(r));
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "%s: compose", __progname);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nsrks; i++) {
+		debug_f("key %zu %s %s uidlen %zu", i,
+		    sshkey_type(srks[i]->key), srks[i]->key->sk_application,
+		    srks[i]->user_id_len);
+		sshbuf_reset(kbuf);
+		if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(srks[i]->key, kbuf)) != 0)
+			fatal_r(r, "%s: encode key", __progname);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(resp, "")) != 0 || /* comment */
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, srks[i]->user_id,
+		    srks[i]->user_id_len)) != 0)
+			fatal_r(r, "%s: compose key", __progname);
+	}
+
+ out:
+	sshsk_free_resident_keys(srks, nsrks);
+	sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+	free(provider);
+	free(device);
+	if (pin != NULL)
+		freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+	return resp;
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
+	LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *req, *resp;
+	int in, out, ch, r, vflag = 0;
+	u_int rtype, ll = 0;
+	uint8_t version, log_stderr = 0;
+
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+	while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "v")) != -1) {
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 'v':
+			vflag = 1;
+			if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR)
+				log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+			else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+				log_level++;
+			break;
+		default:
+			fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-v]\n", __progname);
+			exit(1);
+		}
+	}
+	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, vflag);
+
+	/*
+	 * Rearrange our file descriptors a little; we don't trust the
+	 * providers not to fiddle with stdin/out.
+	 */
+	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+	if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 || (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: dup: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
+	close(STDIN_FILENO);
+	close(STDOUT_FILENO);
+	sanitise_stdfd(); /* resets to /dev/null */
+
+	if ((req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+	if (ssh_msg_recv(in, req) < 0)
+		fatal("ssh_msg_recv failed");
+	close(in);
+	debug_f("received message len %zu", sshbuf_len(req));
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(req, &version)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "%s: parse version", __progname);
+	if (version != SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION) {
+		fatal("unsupported version: received %d, expected %d",
+		    version, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION);
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &rtype)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(req, &log_stderr)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &ll)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "%s: parse", __progname);
+
+	if (!vflag && log_level_name((LogLevel)ll) != NULL)
+		log_init(__progname, (LogLevel)ll, log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+	switch (rtype) {
+	case SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN:
+		resp = process_sign(req);
+		break;
+	case SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL:
+		resp = process_enroll(req);
+		break;
+	case SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT:
+		resp = process_load_resident(req);
+		break;
+	default:
+		fatal("%s: unsupported request type %u", __progname, rtype);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(req);
+	debug_f("reply len %zu", sshbuf_len(resp));
+
+	if (ssh_msg_send(out, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION, resp) == -1)
+		fatal("ssh_msg_send failed");
+	sshbuf_free(resp);
+	close(out);
+
+	return (0);
+}
+#else /* ENABLE_SK */
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "ssh-sk-helper: disabled at compile time\n");
+	return -1;
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_SK */
diff --git a/ssh-sk.c b/ssh-sk.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbeb393
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-sk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,877 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk.c,v 1.39 2022/07/20 03:29:14 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK
+
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+
+/*
+ * Almost every use of OpenSSL in this file is for ECDSA-NISTP256.
+ * This is strictly a larger hammer than necessary, but it reduces changes
+ * with upstream.
+ */
+#ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+# undef WITH_OPENSSL
+#endif
+
+struct sshsk_provider {
+	char *path;
+	void *dlhandle;
+
+	/* Return the version of the middleware API */
+	uint32_t (*sk_api_version)(void);
+
+	/* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */
+	int (*sk_enroll)(int alg, const uint8_t *challenge,
+	    size_t challenge_len, const char *application, uint8_t flags,
+	    const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+	    struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
+
+	/* Sign a challenge */
+	int (*sk_sign)(int alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+	    const char *application,
+	    const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+	    uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+	    struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
+
+	/* Enumerate resident keys */
+	int (*sk_load_resident_keys)(const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+	    struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
+};
+
+/* Built-in version */
+int ssh_sk_enroll(int alg, const uint8_t *challenge,
+    size_t challenge_len, const char *application, uint8_t flags,
+    const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+    struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
+int ssh_sk_sign(int alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+    const char *application,
+    const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+    uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+    struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
+int ssh_sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+    struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
+
+static void
+sshsk_free(struct sshsk_provider *p)
+{
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return;
+	free(p->path);
+	if (p->dlhandle != NULL)
+		dlclose(p->dlhandle);
+	free(p);
+}
+
+static struct sshsk_provider *
+sshsk_open(const char *path)
+{
+	struct sshsk_provider *ret = NULL;
+	uint32_t version;
+
+	if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
+		error("No FIDO SecurityKeyProvider specified");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
+		error_f("calloc failed");
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if ((ret->path = strdup(path)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("strdup failed");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	/* Skip the rest if we're using the linked in middleware */
+	if (strcasecmp(ret->path, "internal") == 0) {
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+		ret->sk_enroll = ssh_sk_enroll;
+		ret->sk_sign = ssh_sk_sign;
+		ret->sk_load_resident_keys = ssh_sk_load_resident_keys;
+		return ret;
+#else
+		error("internal security key support not enabled");
+		goto fail;
+#endif
+	}
+	if ((ret->dlhandle = dlopen(path, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
+		error("Provider \"%s\" dlopen failed: %s", path, dlerror());
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((ret->sk_api_version = dlsym(ret->dlhandle,
+	    "sk_api_version")) == NULL) {
+		error("Provider \"%s\" dlsym(sk_api_version) failed: %s",
+		    path, dlerror());
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	version = ret->sk_api_version();
+	debug_f("provider %s implements version 0x%08lx", ret->path,
+	    (u_long)version);
+	if ((version & SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK) != SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+		error("Provider \"%s\" implements unsupported "
+		    "version 0x%08lx (supported: 0x%08lx)",
+		    path, (u_long)version, (u_long)SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((ret->sk_enroll = dlsym(ret->dlhandle, "sk_enroll")) == NULL) {
+		error("Provider %s dlsym(sk_enroll) failed: %s",
+		    path, dlerror());
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((ret->sk_sign = dlsym(ret->dlhandle, "sk_sign")) == NULL) {
+		error("Provider \"%s\" dlsym(sk_sign) failed: %s",
+		    path, dlerror());
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((ret->sk_load_resident_keys = dlsym(ret->dlhandle,
+	    "sk_load_resident_keys")) == NULL) {
+		error("Provider \"%s\" dlsym(sk_load_resident_keys) "
+		    "failed: %s", path, dlerror());
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	return ret;
+fail:
+	sshsk_free(ret);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+sshsk_free_enroll_response(struct sk_enroll_response *r)
+{
+	if (r == NULL)
+		return;
+	freezero(r->key_handle, r->key_handle_len);
+	freezero(r->public_key, r->public_key_len);
+	freezero(r->signature, r->signature_len);
+	freezero(r->attestation_cert, r->attestation_cert_len);
+	freezero(r->authdata, r->authdata_len);
+	freezero(r, sizeof(*r));
+}
+
+static void
+sshsk_free_sign_response(struct sk_sign_response *r)
+{
+	if (r == NULL)
+		return;
+	freezero(r->sig_r, r->sig_r_len);
+	freezero(r->sig_s, r->sig_s_len);
+	freezero(r, sizeof(*r));
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/* Assemble key from response */
+static int
+sshsk_ecdsa_assemble(struct sk_enroll_response *resp, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	EC_POINT *q = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	*keyp = NULL;
+	if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_ECDSA_SK)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshkey_new failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	key->ecdsa_nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+	if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
+	    (q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) == NULL ||
+	    (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		error_f("allocation failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b,
+	    resp->public_key, resp->public_key_len)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_string");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(b, q, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse");
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q) != 0) {
+		error("Authenticator returned invalid ECDSA key");
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(key->ecdsa, q) != 1) {
+		/* XXX assume it is a allocation error */
+		error_f("allocation failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	*keyp = key;
+	key = NULL; /* transferred */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	EC_POINT_free(q);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+static int
+sshsk_ed25519_assemble(struct sk_enroll_response *resp, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	*keyp = NULL;
+	if (resp->public_key_len != ED25519_PK_SZ) {
+		error_f("invalid size: %zu", resp->public_key_len);
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_ED25519_SK)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshkey_new failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((key->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("malloc failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memcpy(key->ed25519_pk, resp->public_key, ED25519_PK_SZ);
+	/* success */
+	*keyp = key;
+	key = NULL; /* transferred */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshsk_key_from_response(int alg, const char *application, uint8_t flags,
+    struct sk_enroll_response *resp, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	*keyp = NULL;
+
+	/* Check response validity */
+	if (resp->public_key == NULL || resp->key_handle == NULL) {
+		error_f("sk_enroll response invalid");
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	switch (alg) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+		if ((r = sshsk_ecdsa_assemble(resp, &key)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+		if ((r = sshsk_ed25519_assemble(resp, &key)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		break;
+	default:
+		error_f("unsupported algorithm %d", alg);
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	key->sk_flags = flags;
+	if ((key->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (key->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		error_f("allocation failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((key->sk_application = strdup(application)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("strdup application failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(key->sk_key_handle, resp->key_handle,
+	    resp->key_handle_len)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "put key handle");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+	*keyp = key;
+	key = NULL;
+ out:
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+skerr_to_ssherr(int skerr)
+{
+	switch (skerr) {
+	case SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED:
+		return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+	case SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED:
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+	case SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND:
+		return SSH_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND;
+	case SSH_SK_ERR_CREDENTIAL_EXISTS:
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
+	case SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL:
+	default:
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+sshsk_free_options(struct sk_option **opts)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (opts == NULL)
+		return;
+	for (i = 0; opts[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		free(opts[i]->name);
+		free(opts[i]->value);
+		free(opts[i]);
+	}
+	free(opts);
+}
+
+static int
+sshsk_add_option(struct sk_option ***optsp, size_t *noptsp,
+    const char *name, const char *value, uint8_t required)
+{
+	struct sk_option **opts = *optsp;
+	size_t nopts = *noptsp;
+
+	if ((opts = recallocarray(opts, nopts, nopts + 2, /* extra for NULL */
+	    sizeof(*opts))) == NULL) {
+		error_f("array alloc failed");
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+	*optsp = opts;
+	*noptsp = nopts + 1;
+	if ((opts[nopts] = calloc(1, sizeof(**opts))) == NULL) {
+		error_f("alloc failed");
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+	if ((opts[nopts]->name = strdup(name)) == NULL ||
+	    (opts[nopts]->value = strdup(value)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("alloc failed");
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+	opts[nopts]->required = required;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+make_options(const char *device, const char *user_id,
+    struct sk_option ***optsp)
+{
+	struct sk_option **opts = NULL;
+	size_t nopts = 0;
+	int r, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (device != NULL &&
+	    (r = sshsk_add_option(&opts, &nopts, "device", device, 0)) != 0) {
+		ret = r;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (user_id != NULL &&
+	    (r = sshsk_add_option(&opts, &nopts, "user", user_id, 0)) != 0) {
+		ret = r;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	*optsp = opts;
+	opts = NULL;
+	nopts = 0;
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	sshsk_free_options(opts);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+
+static int
+fill_attestation_blob(const struct sk_enroll_response *resp,
+    struct sshbuf *attest)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (attest == NULL)
+		return 0; /* nothing to do */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(attest, "ssh-sk-attest-v01")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
+	    resp->attestation_cert, resp->attestation_cert_len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
+	    resp->signature, resp->signature_len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
+	    resp->authdata, resp->authdata_len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(attest, 0)) != 0 || /* resvd flags */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest, NULL, 0)) != 0 /* resvd */) {
+		error_fr(r, "compose");
+		return r;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+    const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags,
+    const char *pin, struct sshbuf *challenge_buf,
+    struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshbuf *attest)
+{
+	struct sshsk_provider *skp = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	u_char randchall[32];
+	const u_char *challenge;
+	size_t challenge_len;
+	struct sk_enroll_response *resp = NULL;
+	struct sk_option **opts = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	int alg;
+
+	debug_f("provider \"%s\", device \"%s\", application \"%s\", "
+	    "userid \"%s\", flags 0x%02x, challenge len %zu%s",
+	    provider_path, device, application, userid, flags,
+	    challenge_buf == NULL ? 0 : sshbuf_len(challenge_buf),
+	    (pin != NULL && *pin != '\0') ? " with-pin" : "");
+
+	*keyp = NULL;
+	if (attest)
+		sshbuf_reset(attest);
+
+	if ((r = make_options(device, userid, &opts)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+		alg = SSH_SK_ECDSA;
+		break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+		alg = SSH_SK_ED25519;
+		break;
+	default:
+		error_f("unsupported key type");
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (provider_path == NULL) {
+		error_f("missing provider");
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (application == NULL || *application == '\0') {
+		error_f("missing application");
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (challenge_buf == NULL) {
+		debug_f("using random challenge");
+		arc4random_buf(randchall, sizeof(randchall));
+		challenge = randchall;
+		challenge_len = sizeof(randchall);
+	} else if (sshbuf_len(challenge_buf) == 0) {
+		error("Missing enrollment challenge");
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	} else {
+		challenge = sshbuf_ptr(challenge_buf);
+		challenge_len = sshbuf_len(challenge_buf);
+		debug3_f("using explicit challenge len=%zd", challenge_len);
+	}
+	if ((skp = sshsk_open(provider_path)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX sshsk_open return code? */
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* XXX validate flags? */
+	/* enroll key */
+	if ((r = skp->sk_enroll(alg, challenge, challenge_len, application,
+	    flags, pin, opts, &resp)) != 0) {
+		debug_f("provider \"%s\" failure %d", provider_path, r);
+		r = skerr_to_ssherr(r);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshsk_key_from_response(alg, application, resp->flags,
+	    resp, &key)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Optionally fill in the attestation information */
+	if ((r = fill_attestation_blob(resp, attest)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* success */
+	*keyp = key;
+	key = NULL; /* transferred */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshsk_free_options(opts);
+	sshsk_free(skp);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	sshsk_free_enroll_response(resp);
+	explicit_bzero(randchall, sizeof(randchall));
+	return r;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+static int
+sshsk_ecdsa_sig(struct sk_sign_response *resp, struct sshbuf *sig)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *inner_sig = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	/* Check response validity */
+	if (resp->sig_r == NULL || resp->sig_s == NULL) {
+		error_f("sk_sign response invalid");
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((inner_sig = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* Prepare and append inner signature object */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(inner_sig,
+	    resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(inner_sig,
+	    resp->sig_s, resp->sig_s_len)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "compose inner");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(sig, inner_sig)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(sig, resp->flags)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(sig, resp->counter)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "compose");
+		goto out;
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_r:\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump_data(resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len, stderr);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_s:\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump_data(resp->sig_s, resp->sig_s_len, stderr);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: inner:\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump(inner_sig, stderr);
+#endif
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(inner_sig);
+	return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+static int
+sshsk_ed25519_sig(struct sk_sign_response *resp, struct sshbuf *sig)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	/* Check response validity */
+	if (resp->sig_r == NULL) {
+		error_f("sk_sign response invalid");
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sig,
+	    resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(sig, resp->flags)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(sig, resp->counter)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "compose");
+		goto out;
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_r:\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump_data(resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len, stderr);
+#endif
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_sign(const char *provider_path, struct sshkey *key,
+    u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+    u_int compat, const char *pin)
+{
+	struct sshsk_provider *skp = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	int type, alg;
+	struct sk_sign_response *resp = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *inner_sig = NULL, *sig = NULL;
+	struct sk_option **opts = NULL;
+
+	debug_f("provider \"%s\", key %s, flags 0x%02x%s",
+	    provider_path, sshkey_type(key), key->sk_flags,
+	    (pin != NULL && *pin != '\0') ? " with-pin" : "");
+
+	if (sigp != NULL)
+		*sigp = NULL;
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = 0;
+	type = sshkey_type_plain(key->type);
+	switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+		alg = SSH_SK_ECDSA;
+		break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+		alg = SSH_SK_ED25519;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	}
+	if (provider_path == NULL ||
+	    key->sk_key_handle == NULL ||
+	    key->sk_application == NULL || *key->sk_application == '\0') {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((skp = sshsk_open(provider_path)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX sshsk_open return code? */
+		goto out;
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: sk_flags = 0x%02x, sk_application = \"%s\"\n",
+	    __func__, key->sk_flags, key->sk_application);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: sk_key_handle:\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump(key->sk_key_handle, stderr);
+#endif
+	if ((r = skp->sk_sign(alg, data, datalen, key->sk_application,
+	    sshbuf_ptr(key->sk_key_handle), sshbuf_len(key->sk_key_handle),
+	    key->sk_flags, pin, opts, &resp)) != 0) {
+		debug_f("sk_sign failed with code %d", r);
+		r = skerr_to_ssherr(r);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* Assemble signature */
+	if ((sig = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sig, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "compose outer");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+		if ((r = sshsk_ecdsa_sig(resp, sig)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+		if ((r = sshsk_ed25519_sig(resp, sig)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		break;
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_flags = 0x%02x, sig_counter = %u\n",
+	    __func__, resp->flags, resp->counter);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: data to sign:\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump_data(data, datalen, stderr);
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: sigbuf:\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump(sig, stderr);
+#endif
+	if (sigp != NULL) {
+		if ((*sigp = malloc(sshbuf_len(sig))) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(sig), sshbuf_len(sig));
+	}
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = sshbuf_len(sig);
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshsk_free_options(opts);
+	sshsk_free(skp);
+	sshsk_free_sign_response(resp);
+	sshbuf_free(sig);
+	sshbuf_free(inner_sig);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static void
+sshsk_free_sk_resident_keys(struct sk_resident_key **rks, size_t nrks)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (nrks == 0 || rks == NULL)
+		return;
+	for (i = 0; i < nrks; i++) {
+		free(rks[i]->application);
+		freezero(rks[i]->user_id, rks[i]->user_id_len);
+		freezero(rks[i]->key.key_handle, rks[i]->key.key_handle_len);
+		freezero(rks[i]->key.public_key, rks[i]->key.public_key_len);
+		freezero(rks[i]->key.signature, rks[i]->key.signature_len);
+		freezero(rks[i]->key.attestation_cert,
+		    rks[i]->key.attestation_cert_len);
+		freezero(rks[i], sizeof(**rks));
+	}
+	free(rks);
+}
+
+static void
+sshsk_free_resident_key(struct sshsk_resident_key *srk)
+{
+	if (srk == NULL)
+		return;
+	sshkey_free(srk->key);
+	freezero(srk->user_id, srk->user_id_len);
+	free(srk);
+}
+
+
+void
+sshsk_free_resident_keys(struct sshsk_resident_key **srks, size_t nsrks)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (srks == NULL || nsrks == 0)
+		return;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nsrks; i++)
+		sshsk_free_resident_key(srks[i]);
+	free(srks);
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+    const char *pin, u_int flags, struct sshsk_resident_key ***srksp,
+    size_t *nsrksp)
+{
+	struct sshsk_provider *skp = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sk_resident_key **rks = NULL;
+	size_t i, nrks = 0, nsrks = 0;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	struct sshsk_resident_key *srk = NULL, **srks = NULL, **tmp;
+	uint8_t sk_flags;
+	struct sk_option **opts = NULL;
+
+	debug_f("provider \"%s\"%s", provider_path,
+	    (pin != NULL && *pin != '\0') ? ", have-pin": "");
+
+	if (srksp == NULL || nsrksp == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	*srksp = NULL;
+	*nsrksp = 0;
+
+	if ((r = make_options(device, NULL, &opts)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((skp = sshsk_open(provider_path)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX sshsk_open return code? */
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = skp->sk_load_resident_keys(pin, opts, &rks, &nrks)) != 0) {
+		error("Provider \"%s\" returned failure %d", provider_path, r);
+		r = skerr_to_ssherr(r);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < nrks; i++) {
+		debug3_f("rk %zu: slot %zu, alg %d, app \"%s\", uidlen %zu",
+		    i, rks[i]->slot, rks[i]->alg, rks[i]->application,
+		    rks[i]->user_id_len);
+		/* XXX need better filter here */
+		if (strncmp(rks[i]->application, "ssh:", 4) != 0)
+			continue;
+		switch (rks[i]->alg) {
+		case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+		case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+			break;
+		default:
+			continue;
+		}
+		sk_flags = SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD|SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY;
+		if ((rks[i]->flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD))
+			sk_flags |= SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD;
+		if ((r = sshsk_key_from_response(rks[i]->alg,
+		    rks[i]->application, sk_flags, &rks[i]->key, &key)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if ((srk = calloc(1, sizeof(*srk))) == NULL) {
+			error_f("calloc failed");
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		srk->key = key;
+		key = NULL; /* transferred */
+		if ((srk->user_id = calloc(1, rks[i]->user_id_len)) == NULL) {
+			error_f("calloc failed");
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		memcpy(srk->user_id, rks[i]->user_id, rks[i]->user_id_len);
+		srk->user_id_len = rks[i]->user_id_len;
+		if ((tmp = recallocarray(srks, nsrks, nsrks + 1,
+		    sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL) {
+			error_f("recallocarray failed");
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		srks = tmp;
+		srks[nsrks++] = srk;
+		srk = NULL;
+		/* XXX synthesise comment */
+	}
+	/* success */
+	*srksp = srks;
+	*nsrksp = nsrks;
+	srks = NULL;
+	nsrks = 0;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshsk_free_options(opts);
+	sshsk_free(skp);
+	sshsk_free_sk_resident_keys(rks, nrks);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	sshsk_free_resident_key(srk);
+	sshsk_free_resident_keys(srks, nsrks);
+	return r;
+}
+
+#endif /* ENABLE_SK */
diff --git a/ssh-sk.h b/ssh-sk.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..89d1b66
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-sk.h
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk.h,v 1.11 2021/10/28 02:54:18 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SSH_SK_H
+#define _SSH_SK_H 1
+
+struct sshbuf;
+struct sshkey;
+struct sk_option;
+
+/* Version of protocol expected from ssh-sk-helper */
+#define SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION		5
+
+/* ssh-sk-helper messages */
+#define SSH_SK_HELPER_ERROR		0	/* Only valid H->C */
+#define SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN		1
+#define SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL		2
+#define SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT	3
+
+struct sshsk_resident_key {
+	struct sshkey *key;
+	uint8_t *user_id;
+	size_t user_id_len;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Enroll (generate) a new security-key hosted private key of given type
+ * via the specified provider middleware.
+ * If challenge_buf is NULL then a random 256 bit challenge will be used.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error code on failure.
+ *
+ * If successful and the attest_data buffer is not NULL then attestation
+ * information is placed there.
+ */
+int sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+    const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags,
+    const char *pin, struct sshbuf *challenge_buf,
+    struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshbuf *attest);
+
+/*
+ * Calculate an ECDSA_SK or ED25519_SK signature using the specified key
+ * and provider middleware.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error code on failure.
+ */
+int sshsk_sign(const char *provider_path, struct sshkey *key,
+    u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+    u_int compat, const char *pin);
+
+/*
+ * Enumerates and loads all SSH-compatible resident keys from a security
+ * key.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error code on failure.
+ */
+int sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+    const char *pin, u_int flags, struct sshsk_resident_key ***srksp,
+    size_t *nsrksp);
+
+/* Free an array of sshsk_resident_key (as returned from sshsk_load_resident) */
+void sshsk_free_resident_keys(struct sshsk_resident_key **srks, size_t nsrks);
+
+#endif /* _SSH_SK_H */
+
diff --git a/ssh-xmss.c b/ssh-xmss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b3aec0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-xmss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-xmss.c,v 1.14 2022/10/28 00:44:44 djm Exp $*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Stefan-Lukas Gazdag.
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Markus Friedl.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshkey-xmss.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+
+#include "xmss_fast.h"
+
+static void
+ssh_xmss_cleanup(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	freezero(k->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(k));
+	freezero(k->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_sklen(k));
+	sshkey_xmss_free_state(k);
+	free(k->xmss_name);
+	free(k->xmss_filename);
+	k->xmss_pk = NULL;
+	k->xmss_sk = NULL;
+	k->xmss_name = NULL;
+	k->xmss_filename = NULL;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_xmss_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
+{
+	if (a->xmss_pk == NULL || b->xmss_pk == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (sshkey_xmss_pklen(a) != sshkey_xmss_pklen(b))
+		return 0;
+	if (memcmp(a->xmss_pk, b->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(a)) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_xmss_serialize_public(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (key->xmss_name == NULL || key->xmss_pk == NULL ||
+	    sshkey_xmss_pklen(key) == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->xmss_name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_pk,
+	    sshkey_xmss_pklen(key))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_pk_info(key, b, opts)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_xmss_serialize_private(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (key->xmss_name == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	/* Note: can't reuse ssh_xmss_serialize_public because of sk order */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->xmss_name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_pk,
+	    sshkey_xmss_pklen(key))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_sk,
+	    sshkey_xmss_sklen(key))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(key, b, opts)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_xmss_copy_public(const struct sshkey *from, struct sshkey *to)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	u_int32_t left;
+	size_t pklen;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_xmss_init(to, from->xmss_name)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (from->xmss_pk == NULL)
+		return 0; /* XXX SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR ? */
+
+	if ((pklen = sshkey_xmss_pklen(from)) == 0 ||
+	    sshkey_xmss_pklen(to) != pklen)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if ((to->xmss_pk = malloc(pklen)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	memcpy(to->xmss_pk, from->xmss_pk, pklen);
+	/* simulate number of signatures left on pubkey */
+	left = sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(from);
+	if (left)
+		sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(to, left);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_xmss_deserialize_public(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b,
+    struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	size_t len = 0;
+	char *xmss_name = NULL;
+	u_char *pk = NULL;
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &xmss_name, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_init(key, xmss_name)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pk, &len)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (len == 0 || len != sshkey_xmss_pklen(key)) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	key->xmss_pk = pk;
+	pk = NULL;
+	if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
+	    (ret = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_pk_info(key, b)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	free(xmss_name);
+	freezero(pk, len);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_xmss_deserialize_private(const char *ktype, struct sshbuf *b,
+    struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	int r;
+	char *xmss_name = NULL;
+	size_t pklen = 0, sklen = 0;
+	u_char *xmss_pk = NULL, *xmss_sk = NULL;
+
+	/* Note: can't reuse ssh_xmss_deserialize_public because of sk order */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &xmss_name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &xmss_pk, &pklen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &xmss_sk, &sklen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
+	    (r = sshkey_xmss_init(key, xmss_name)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (pklen != sshkey_xmss_pklen(key) ||
+	    sklen != sshkey_xmss_sklen(key)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	key->xmss_pk = xmss_pk;
+	key->xmss_sk = xmss_sk;
+	xmss_pk = xmss_sk = NULL;
+	/* optional internal state */
+	if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(key, b)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(xmss_name);
+	freezero(xmss_pk, pklen);
+	freezero(xmss_sk, sklen);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_xmss_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+    u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+    const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
+{
+	u_char *sig = NULL;
+	size_t slen = 0, len = 0, required_siglen;
+	unsigned long long smlen;
+	int r, ret;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = 0;
+	if (sigp != NULL)
+		*sigp = NULL;
+
+	if (key == NULL ||
+	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_XMSS ||
+	    key->xmss_sk == NULL ||
+	    sshkey_xmss_params(key) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((r = sshkey_xmss_siglen(key, &required_siglen)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (datalen >= INT_MAX - required_siglen)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	smlen = slen = datalen + required_siglen;
+	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state(key, 1)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((ret = xmss_sign(key->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_bds_state(key), sig, &smlen,
+	    data, datalen, sshkey_xmss_params(key))) != 0 || smlen <= datalen) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* XXX better error? */
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* encode signature */
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-xmss@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, smlen - datalen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	len = sshbuf_len(b);
+	if (sigp != NULL) {
+		if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
+	}
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = len;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_update_state(key, 1)) != 0) {
+		/* discard signature since we cannot update the state */
+		if (r == 0 && sigp != NULL && *sigp != NULL) {
+			explicit_bzero(*sigp, len);
+			free(*sigp);
+		}
+		if (sigp != NULL)
+			*sigp = NULL;
+		if (lenp != NULL)
+			*lenp = 0;
+		r = ret;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	if (sig != NULL)
+		freezero(sig, slen);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_xmss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+    const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
+    struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	char *ktype = NULL;
+	const u_char *sigblob;
+	u_char *sm = NULL, *m = NULL;
+	size_t len, required_siglen;
+	unsigned long long smlen = 0, mlen = 0;
+	int r, ret;
+
+	if (key == NULL ||
+	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_XMSS ||
+	    key->xmss_pk == NULL ||
+	    sshkey_xmss_params(key) == NULL ||
+	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((r = sshkey_xmss_siglen(key, &required_siglen)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (dlen >= INT_MAX - required_siglen)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &sigblob, &len)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (strcmp("ssh-xmss@openssh.com", ktype) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (len != required_siglen) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (dlen >= SIZE_MAX - len) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	smlen = len + dlen;
+	mlen = smlen;
+	if ((sm = malloc(smlen)) == NULL || (m = malloc(mlen)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	memcpy(sm, sigblob, len);
+	memcpy(sm+len, data, dlen);
+	if ((ret = xmss_sign_open(m, &mlen, sm, smlen,
+	    key->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_params(key))) != 0) {
+		debug2_f("xmss_sign_open failed: %d", ret);
+	}
+	if (ret != 0 || mlen != dlen) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* XXX compare 'm' and 'data' ? */
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if (sm != NULL)
+		freezero(sm, smlen);
+	if (m != NULL)
+		freezero(m, smlen);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	free(ktype);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_xmss_funcs = {
+	/* .size = */		NULL,
+	/* .alloc = */		NULL,
+	/* .cleanup = */	ssh_xmss_cleanup,
+	/* .equal = */		ssh_xmss_equal,
+	/* .ssh_serialize_public = */ ssh_xmss_serialize_public,
+	/* .ssh_deserialize_public = */ ssh_xmss_deserialize_public,
+	/* .ssh_serialize_private = */ ssh_xmss_serialize_private,
+	/* .ssh_deserialize_private = */ ssh_xmss_deserialize_private,
+	/* .generate = */	sshkey_xmss_generate_private_key,
+	/* .copy_public = */	ssh_xmss_copy_public,
+	/* .sign = */		ssh_xmss_sign,
+	/* .verify = */		ssh_xmss_verify,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"ssh-xmss@openssh.com",
+	/* .shortname = */	"XMSS",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_XMSS,
+	/* .nid = */		0,
+	/* .cert = */		0,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	256,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_xmss_funcs,
+};
+
+const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_cert_impl = {
+	/* .name = */		"ssh-xmss-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+	/* .shortname = */	"XMSS-CERT",
+	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
+	/* .type = */		KEY_XMSS_CERT,
+	/* .nid = */		0,
+	/* .cert = */		1,
+	/* .sigonly = */	0,
+	/* .keybits = */	256,
+	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_xmss_funcs,
+};
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/ssh.0 b/ssh.0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94a98ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh.0
@@ -0,0 +1,1018 @@
+SSH(1)                      General Commands Manual                     SSH(1)
+
+NAME
+     ssh M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH remote login client
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface] [-b bind_address]
+         [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file]
+         [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file]
+         [-J destination] [-L address] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec]
+         [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port] [-Q query_option] [-R address]
+         [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port] [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination
+         [command [argument ...]]
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     ssh (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
+     executing commands on a remote machine.  It is intended to provide secure
+     encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure
+     network.  X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and UNIX-domain sockets
+     can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+
+     ssh connects and logs into the specified destination, which may be
+     specified as either [user@]hostname or a URI of the form
+     ssh://[user@]hostname[:port].  The user must prove their identity to the
+     remote machine using one of several methods (see below).
+
+     If a command is specified, it will be executed on the remote host instead
+     of a login shell.  A complete command line may be specified as command,
+     or it may have additional arguments.  If supplied, the arguments will be
+     appended to the command, separated by spaces, before it is sent to the
+     server to be executed.
+
+     The options are as follows:
+
+     -4      Forces ssh to use IPv4 addresses only.
+
+     -6      Forces ssh to use IPv6 addresses only.
+
+     -A      Enables forwarding of connections from an authentication agent
+             such as ssh-agent(1).  This can also be specified on a per-host
+             basis in a configuration file.
+
+             Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.  Users with the
+             ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+             agent's UNIX-domain socket) can access the local agent through
+             the forwarded connection.  An attacker cannot obtain key material
+             from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys
+             that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into
+             the agent.  A safer alternative may be to use a jump host (see
+             -J).
+
+     -a      Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
+
+     -B bind_interface
+             Bind to the address of bind_interface before attempting to
+             connect to the destination host.  This is only useful on systems
+             with more than one address.
+
+     -b bind_address
+             Use bind_address on the local machine as the source address of
+             the connection.  Only useful on systems with more than one
+             address.
+
+     -C      Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout,
+             stderr, and data for forwarded X11, TCP and UNIX-domain
+             connections).  The compression algorithm is the same used by
+             gzip(1).  Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow
+             connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks.
+             The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the
+             configuration files; see the Compression option in ssh_config(5).
+
+     -c cipher_spec
+             Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.
+             cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers listed in order
+             of preference.  See the Ciphers keyword in ssh_config(5) for more
+             information.
+
+     -D [bind_address:]port
+             Specifies a local M-bM-^@M-^\dynamicM-bM-^@M-^] application-level port forwarding.
+             This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local
+             side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address.  Whenever a
+             connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over
+             the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to
+             determine where to connect to from the remote machine.  Currently
+             the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh will act
+             as a SOCKS server.  Only root can forward privileged ports.
+             Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the
+             configuration file.
+
+             IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in
+             square brackets.  Only the superuser can forward privileged
+             ports.  By default, the local port is bound in accordance with
+             the GatewayPorts setting.  However, an explicit bind_address may
+             be used to bind the connection to a specific address.  The
+             bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be
+             bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates
+             that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+
+     -E log_file
+             Append debug logs to log_file instead of standard error.
+
+     -e escape_char
+             Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y).
+             The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a
+             line.  The escape character followed by a dot (M-bM-^@M-^X.M-bM-^@M-^Y) closes the
+             connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and
+             followed by itself sends the escape character once.  Setting the
+             character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] disables any escapes and makes the session
+             fully transparent.
+
+     -F configfile
+             Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file.  If a
+             configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide
+             configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) will be ignored.  The
+             default for the per-user configuration file is ~/.ssh/config.  If
+             set to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^], no configuration files will be read.
+
+     -f      Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution.
+             This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or
+             passphrases, but the user wants it in the background.  This
+             implies -n.  The recommended way to start X11 programs at a
+             remote site is with something like ssh -f host xterm.
+
+             If the ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^],
+             then a client started with -f will wait for all remote port
+             forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in
+             the background.  Refer to the description of
+             ForkAfterAuthentication in ssh_config(5) for details.
+
+     -G      Causes ssh to print its configuration after evaluating Host and
+             Match blocks and exit.
+
+     -g      Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports.  If used
+             on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified
+             on the master process.
+
+     -I pkcs11
+             Specify the PKCS#11 shared library ssh should use to communicate
+             with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user authentication.
+
+     -i identity_file
+             Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public
+             key authentication is read.  You can also specify a public key
+             file to use the corresponding private key that is loaded in
+             ssh-agent(1) when the private key file is not present locally.
+             The default is ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa,
+             ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk and
+             ~/.ssh/id_dsa.  Identity files may also be specified on a per-
+             host basis in the configuration file.  It is possible to have
+             multiple -i options (and multiple identities specified in
+             configuration files).  If no certificates have been explicitly
+             specified by the CertificateFile directive, ssh will also try to
+             load certificate information from the filename obtained by
+             appending -cert.pub to identity filenames.
+
+     -J destination
+             Connect to the target host by first making a ssh connection to
+             the jump host described by destination and then establishing a
+             TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there.  Multiple
+             jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters.  This
+             is a shortcut to specify a ProxyJump configuration directive.
+             Note that configuration directives supplied on the command-line
+             generally apply to the destination host and not any specified
+             jump hosts.  Use ~/.ssh/config to specify configuration for jump
+             hosts.
+
+     -K      Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation)
+             of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
+
+     -k      Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the
+             server.
+
+     -L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
+     -L [bind_address:]port:remote_socket
+     -L local_socket:host:hostport
+     -L local_socket:remote_socket
+             Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket
+             on the local (client) host are to be forwarded to the given host
+             and port, or Unix socket, on the remote side.  This works by
+             allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port on the local
+             side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address, or to a
+             Unix socket.  Whenever a connection is made to the local port or
+             socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and
+             a connection is made to either host port hostport, or the Unix
+             socket remote_socket, from the remote machine.
+
+             Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+             Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.  IPv6 addresses
+             can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
+
+             By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+             GatewayPorts setting.  However, an explicit bind_address may be
+             used to bind the connection to a specific address.  The
+             bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be
+             bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates
+             that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+
+     -l login_name
+             Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine.  This also
+             may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+
+     -M      Places the ssh client into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode for connection sharing.
+             Multiple -M options places ssh into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode but with
+             confirmation required using ssh-askpass(1) before each operation
+             that changes the multiplexing state (e.g. opening a new session).
+             Refer to the description of ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for
+             details.
+
+     -m mac_spec
+             A comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code)
+             algorithms, specified in order of preference.  See the MACs
+             keyword in ssh_config(5) for more information.
+
+     -N      Do not execute a remote command.  This is useful for just
+             forwarding ports.  Refer to the description of SessionType in
+             ssh_config(5) for details.
+
+     -n      Redirects stdin from /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from
+             stdin).  This must be used when ssh is run in the background.  A
+             common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote
+             machine.  For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will
+             start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will
+             be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel.  The ssh
+             program will be put in the background.  (This does not work if
+             ssh needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the -f
+             option.)  Refer to the description of StdinNull in ssh_config(5)
+             for details.
+
+     -O ctl_cmd
+             Control an active connection multiplexing master process.  When
+             the -O option is specified, the ctl_cmd argument is interpreted
+             and passed to the master process.  Valid commands are: M-bM-^@M-^\checkM-bM-^@M-^]
+             (check that the master process is running), M-bM-^@M-^\forwardM-bM-^@M-^] (request
+             forwardings without command execution), M-bM-^@M-^\cancelM-bM-^@M-^] (cancel
+             forwardings), M-bM-^@M-^\exitM-bM-^@M-^] (request the master to exit), and M-bM-^@M-^\stopM-bM-^@M-^]
+             (request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing
+             requests).
+
+     -o option
+             Can be used to give options in the format used in the
+             configuration file.  This is useful for specifying options for
+             which there is no separate command-line flag.  For full details
+             of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+             ssh_config(5).
+
+                   AddKeysToAgent
+                   AddressFamily
+                   BatchMode
+                   BindAddress
+                   CanonicalDomains
+                   CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+                   CanonicalizeHostname
+                   CanonicalizeMaxDots
+                   CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+                   CASignatureAlgorithms
+                   CertificateFile
+                   CheckHostIP
+                   Ciphers
+                   ClearAllForwardings
+                   Compression
+                   ConnectionAttempts
+                   ConnectTimeout
+                   ControlMaster
+                   ControlPath
+                   ControlPersist
+                   DynamicForward
+                   EnableEscapeCommandline
+                   EscapeChar
+                   ExitOnForwardFailure
+                   FingerprintHash
+                   ForkAfterAuthentication
+                   ForwardAgent
+                   ForwardX11
+                   ForwardX11Timeout
+                   ForwardX11Trusted
+                   GatewayPorts
+                   GlobalKnownHostsFile
+                   GSSAPIAuthentication
+                   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+                   HashKnownHosts
+                   Host
+                   HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+                   HostbasedAuthentication
+                   HostKeyAlgorithms
+                   HostKeyAlias
+                   Hostname
+                   IdentitiesOnly
+                   IdentityAgent
+                   IdentityFile
+                   IPQoS
+                   KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+                   KbdInteractiveDevices
+                   KexAlgorithms
+                   KnownHostsCommand
+                   LocalCommand
+                   LocalForward
+                   LogLevel
+                   MACs
+                   Match
+                   NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+                   NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+                   PasswordAuthentication
+                   PermitLocalCommand
+                   PermitRemoteOpen
+                   PKCS11Provider
+                   Port
+                   PreferredAuthentications
+                   ProxyCommand
+                   ProxyJump
+                   ProxyUseFdpass
+                   PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+                   PubkeyAuthentication
+                   RekeyLimit
+                   RemoteCommand
+                   RemoteForward
+                   RequestTTY
+                   RequiredRSASize
+                   SendEnv
+                   ServerAliveInterval
+                   ServerAliveCountMax
+                   SessionType
+                   SetEnv
+                   StdinNull
+                   StreamLocalBindMask
+                   StreamLocalBindUnlink
+                   StrictHostKeyChecking
+                   TCPKeepAlive
+                   Tunnel
+                   TunnelDevice
+                   UpdateHostKeys
+                   User
+                   UserKnownHostsFile
+                   VerifyHostKeyDNS
+                   VisualHostKey
+                   XAuthLocation
+
+     -p port
+             Port to connect to on the remote host.  This can be specified on
+             a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+
+     -Q query_option
+             Queries for the algorithms supported by one of the following
+             features: cipher (supported symmetric ciphers), cipher-auth
+             (supported symmetric ciphers that support authenticated
+             encryption), help (supported query terms for use with the -Q
+             flag), mac (supported message integrity codes), kex (key exchange
+             algorithms), key (key types), key-cert (certificate key types),
+             key-plain (non-certificate key types), key-sig (all key types and
+             signature algorithms), protocol-version (supported SSH protocol
+             versions), and sig (supported signature algorithms).
+             Alternatively, any keyword from ssh_config(5) or sshd_config(5)
+             that takes an algorithm list may be used as an alias for the
+             corresponding query_option.
+
+     -q      Quiet mode.  Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be
+             suppressed.
+
+     -R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
+     -R [bind_address:]port:local_socket
+     -R remote_socket:host:hostport
+     -R remote_socket:local_socket
+     -R [bind_address:]port
+             Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket
+             on the remote (server) host are to be forwarded to the local
+             side.
+
+             This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port
+             or to a Unix socket on the remote side.  Whenever a connection is
+             made to this port or Unix socket, the connection is forwarded
+             over the secure channel, and a connection is made from the local
+             machine to either an explicit destination specified by host port
+             hostport, or local_socket, or, if no explicit destination was
+             specified, ssh will act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy and forward
+             connections to the destinations requested by the remote SOCKS
+             client.
+
+             Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+             Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on
+             the remote machine.  IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing
+             the address in square brackets.
+
+             By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to
+             the loopback interface only.  This may be overridden by
+             specifying a bind_address.  An empty bind_address, or the address
+             M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y, indicates that the remote socket should listen on all
+             interfaces.  Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed
+             if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see
+             sshd_config(5)).
+
+             If the port argument is M-bM-^@M-^X0M-bM-^@M-^Y, the listen port will be dynamically
+             allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time.
+             When used together with -O forward, the allocated port will be
+             printed to the standard output.
+
+     -S ctl_path
+             Specifies the location of a control socket for connection
+             sharing, or the string M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to disable connection sharing.
+             Refer to the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster in
+             ssh_config(5) for details.
+
+     -s      May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote
+             system.  Subsystems facilitate the use of SSH as a secure
+             transport for other applications (e.g. sftp(1)).  The subsystem
+             is specified as the remote command.  Refer to the description of
+             SessionType in ssh_config(5) for details.
+
+     -T      Disable pseudo-terminal allocation.
+
+     -t      Force pseudo-terminal allocation.  This can be used to execute
+             arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be
+             very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services.  Multiple -t
+             options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty.
+
+     -V      Display the version number and exit.
+
+     -v      Verbose mode.  Causes ssh to print debugging messages about its
+             progress.  This is helpful in debugging connection,
+             authentication, and configuration problems.  Multiple -v options
+             increase the verbosity.  The maximum is 3.
+
+     -W host:port
+             Requests that standard input and output on the client be
+             forwarded to host on port over the secure channel.  Implies -N,
+             -T, ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings, though these
+             can be overridden in the configuration file or using -o command
+             line options.
+
+     -w local_tun[:remote_tun]
+             Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified tun(4)
+             devices between the client (local_tun) and the server
+             (remote_tun).
+
+             The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
+             M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], which uses the next available tunnel device.  If
+             remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^].  See also the
+             Tunnel and TunnelDevice directives in ssh_config(5).
+
+             If the Tunnel directive is unset, it will be set to the default
+             tunnel mode, which is M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^].  If a different Tunnel
+             forwarding mode it desired, then it should be specified before
+             -w.
+
+     -X      Enables X11 forwarding.  This can also be specified on a per-host
+             basis in a configuration file.
+
+             X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.  Users with the
+             ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+             user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display
+             through the forwarded connection.  An attacker may then be able
+             to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
+
+             For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY
+             extension restrictions by default.  Refer to the ssh -Y option
+             and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for more
+             information.
+
+     -x      Disables X11 forwarding.
+
+     -Y      Enables trusted X11 forwarding.  Trusted X11 forwardings are not
+             subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls.
+
+     -y      Send log information using the syslog(3) system module.  By
+             default this information is sent to stderr.
+
+     ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user
+     configuration file and a system-wide configuration file.  The file format
+     and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5).
+
+AUTHENTICATION
+     The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocol 2.
+
+     The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based
+     authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication,
+     keyboard-interactive authentication, and password authentication.
+     Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, though
+     PreferredAuthentications can be used to change the default order.
+
+     Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs
+     in from is listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote
+     machine, the user is non-root and the user names are the same on both
+     sides, or if the files ~/.rhosts or ~/.shosts exist in the user's home
+     directory on the remote machine and contain a line containing the name of
+     the client machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is
+     considered for login.  Additionally, the server must be able to verify
+     the client's host key (see the description of /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+     and ~/.ssh/known_hosts, below) for login to be permitted.  This
+     authentication method closes security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS
+     spoofing, and routing spoofing.  [Note to the administrator:
+     /etc/hosts.equiv, ~/.rhosts, and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are
+     inherently insecure and should be disabled if security is desired.]
+
+     Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on
+     public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and
+     decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive
+     the decryption key from the encryption key.  The idea is that each user
+     creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes.  The
+     server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
+     ssh implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using
+     one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms.  The HISTORY section of
+     ssl(8) contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
+
+     The file ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted
+     for logging in.  When the user logs in, the ssh program tells the server
+     which key pair it would like to use for authentication.  The client
+     proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that
+     the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account.
+
+     The server may inform the client of errors that prevented public key
+     authentication from succeeding after authentication completes using a
+     different method.  These may be viewed by increasing the LogLevel to
+     DEBUG or higher (e.g. by using the -v flag).
+
+     The user creates their key pair by running ssh-keygen(1).  This stores
+     the private key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa (DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (ECDSA),
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk (authenticator-hosted ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+     (Ed25519), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk (authenticator-hosted Ed25519), or
+     ~/.ssh/id_rsa (RSA) and stores the public key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (DSA),
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub (authenticator-hosted
+     ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (Ed25519), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
+     (authenticator-hosted Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (RSA) in the user's
+     home directory.  The user should then copy the public key to
+     ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in their home directory on the remote machine.
+     The authorized_keys file corresponds to the conventional ~/.rhosts file,
+     and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long.  After this,
+     the user can log in without giving the password.
+
+     A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of
+     certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys,
+     signed certificates are used.  This has the advantage that a single
+     trusted certification authority can be used in place of many
+     public/private keys.  See the CERTIFICATES section of ssh-keygen(1) for
+     more information.
+
+     The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication
+     may be with an authentication agent.  See ssh-agent(1) and (optionally)
+     the AddKeysToAgent directive in ssh_config(5) for more information.
+
+     Keyboard-interactive authentication works as follows: The server sends an
+     arbitrary "challenge" text and prompts for a response, possibly multiple
+     times.  Examples of keyboard-interactive authentication include BSD
+     Authentication (see login.conf(5)) and PAM (some non-OpenBSD systems).
+
+     Finally, if other authentication methods fail, ssh prompts the user for a
+     password.  The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however,
+     since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by
+     someone listening on the network.
+
+     ssh automatically maintains and checks a database containing
+     identification for all hosts it has ever been used with.  Host keys are
+     stored in ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory.  Additionally,
+     the file /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known
+     hosts.  Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file.  If a
+     host's identification ever changes, ssh warns about this and disables
+     password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle
+     attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption.  The
+     StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines
+     whose host key is not known or has changed.
+
+     When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
+     either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, if no
+     command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives the user a
+     normal shell as an interactive session.  All communication with the
+     remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
+
+     If an interactive session is requested, ssh by default will only request
+     a pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive sessions when the client has one.
+     The flags -T and -t can be used to override this behaviour.
+
+     If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the user may use the escape
+     characters noted below.
+
+     If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the session is transparent and
+     can be used to reliably transfer binary data.  On most systems, setting
+     the escape character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] will also make the session transparent
+     even if a tty is used.
+
+     The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine
+     exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.
+
+ESCAPE CHARACTERS
+     When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of
+     functions through the use of an escape character.
+
+     A single tilde character can be sent as ~~ or by following the tilde by a
+     character other than those described below.  The escape character must
+     always follow a newline to be interpreted as special.  The escape
+     character can be changed in configuration files using the EscapeChar
+     configuration directive or on the command line by the -e option.
+
+     The supported escapes (assuming the default M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y) are:
+
+     ~.      Disconnect.
+
+     ~^Z     Background ssh.
+
+     ~#      List forwarded connections.
+
+     ~&      Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection /
+             X11 sessions to terminate.
+
+     ~?      Display a list of escape characters.
+
+     ~B      Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful if the peer
+             supports it).
+
+     ~C      Open command line.  Currently this allows the addition of port
+             forwardings using the -L, -R and -D options (see above).  It also
+             allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings with
+             -KL[bind_address:]port for local, -KR[bind_address:]port for
+             remote and -KD[bind_address:]port for dynamic port-forwardings.
+             !command allows the user to execute a local command if the
+             PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in ssh_config(5).  Basic
+             help is available, using the -h option.
+
+     ~R      Request rekeying of the connection (only useful if the peer
+             supports it).
+
+     ~V      Decrease the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written
+             to stderr.
+
+     ~v      Increase the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written
+             to stderr.
+
+TCP FORWARDING
+     Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over a secure channel can be
+     specified either on the command line or in a configuration file.  One
+     possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail
+     server; another is going through firewalls.
+
+     In the example below, we look at encrypting communication for an IRC
+     client, even though the IRC server it connects to does not directly
+     support encrypted communication.  This works as follows: the user
+     connects to the remote host using ssh, specifying the ports to be used to
+     forward the connection.  After that it is possible to start the program
+     locally, and ssh will encrypt and forward the connection to the remote
+     server.
+
+     The following example tunnels an IRC session from the client to an IRC
+     server at M-bM-^@M-^\server.example.comM-bM-^@M-^], joining channel M-bM-^@M-^\#usersM-bM-^@M-^], nickname
+     M-bM-^@M-^\pinkyM-bM-^@M-^], using the standard IRC port, 6667:
+
+         $ ssh -f -L 6667:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10
+         $ irc -c '#users' pinky IRC/127.0.0.1
+
+     The -f option backgrounds ssh and the remote command M-bM-^@M-^\sleep 10M-bM-^@M-^] is
+     specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to
+     start the program which is going to use the tunnel.  If no connections
+     are made within the time specified, ssh will exit.
+
+X11 FORWARDING
+     If the ForwardX11 variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of the
+     -X, -x, and -Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the DISPLAY
+     environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is
+     automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
+     programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the
+     encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made
+     from the local machine.  The user should not manually set DISPLAY.
+     Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in
+     configuration files.
+
+     The DISPLAY value set by ssh will point to the server machine, but with a
+     display number greater than zero.  This is normal, and happens because
+     ssh creates a M-bM-^@M-^\proxyM-bM-^@M-^] X server on the server machine for forwarding the
+     connections over the encrypted channel.
+
+     ssh will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine.
+     For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store
+     it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections
+     carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection
+     is opened.  The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server
+     machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
+
+     If the ForwardAgent variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of
+     the -A and -a options above) and the user is using an authentication
+     agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the
+     remote side.
+
+VERIFYING HOST KEYS
+     When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the
+     server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option
+     StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled).  Fingerprints can be determined
+     using ssh-keygen(1):
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+
+     If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be
+     accepted or rejected.  If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server
+     are available, the ssh-keygen(1) -E option may be used to downgrade the
+     fingerprint algorithm to match.
+
+     Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at
+     fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually,
+     using random art.  By setting the VisualHostKey option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], a small
+     ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the
+     session itself is interactive or not.  By learning the pattern a known
+     server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed
+     when a completely different pattern is displayed.  Because these patterns
+     are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern
+     remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same,
+     not guaranteed proof.
+
+     To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all
+     known hosts, the following command line can be used:
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+
+     If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is
+     available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS.  An additional resource
+     record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is
+     able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented.
+
+     In this example, we are connecting a client to a server,
+     M-bM-^@M-^\host.example.comM-bM-^@M-^].  The SSHFP resource records should first be added to
+     the zonefile for host.example.com:
+
+           $ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
+
+     The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile.  To check that
+     the zone is answering fingerprint queries:
+
+           $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com
+
+     Finally the client connects:
+
+           $ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com
+           [...]
+           Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS.
+           Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
+
+     See the VerifyHostKeyDNS option in ssh_config(5) for more information.
+
+SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
+     ssh contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using
+     the tun(4) network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined
+     securely.  The sshd_config(5) configuration option PermitTunnel controls
+     whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3
+     traffic).
+
+     The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with
+     remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from
+     10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway
+     to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it.
+
+     On the client:
+
+           # ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true
+           # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
+           # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2
+
+     On the server:
+
+           # ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252
+           # route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1
+
+     Client access may be more finely tuned via the /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
+     file (see below) and the PermitRootLogin server option.  The following
+     entry would permit connections on tun(4) device 1 from user M-bM-^@M-^\janeM-bM-^@M-^] and on
+     tun device 2 from user M-bM-^@M-^\johnM-bM-^@M-^], if PermitRootLogin is set to
+     M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^]:
+
+       tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane
+       tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
+
+     Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be
+     more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs.  More
+     permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as ipsecctl(8) and
+     isakmpd(8).
+
+ENVIRONMENT
+     ssh will normally set the following environment variables:
+
+     DISPLAY               The DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the
+                           X11 server.  It is automatically set by ssh to
+                           point to a value of the form M-bM-^@M-^\hostname:nM-bM-^@M-^], where
+                           M-bM-^@M-^\hostnameM-bM-^@M-^] indicates the host where the shell runs,
+                           and M-bM-^@M-^XnM-bM-^@M-^Y is an integer M-bM-^IM-% 1.  ssh uses this special
+                           value to forward X11 connections over the secure
+                           channel.  The user should normally not set DISPLAY
+                           explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection
+                           insecure (and will require the user to manually
+                           copy any required authorization cookies).
+
+     HOME                  Set to the path of the user's home directory.
+
+     LOGNAME               Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with
+                           systems that use this variable.
+
+     MAIL                  Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
+
+     PATH                  Set to the default PATH, as specified when
+                           compiling ssh.
+
+     SSH_ASKPASS           If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the
+                           passphrase from the current terminal if it was run
+                           from a terminal.  If ssh does not have a terminal
+                           associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are
+                           set, it will execute the program specified by
+                           SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the
+                           passphrase.  This is particularly useful when
+                           calling ssh from a .xsession or related script.
+                           (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to
+                           redirect the input from /dev/null to make this
+                           work.)
+
+     SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE   Allows further control over the use of an askpass
+                           program.  If this variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\neverM-bM-^@M-^] then
+                           ssh will never attempt to use one.  If it is set to
+                           M-bM-^@M-^\preferM-bM-^@M-^], then ssh will prefer to use the askpass
+                           program instead of the TTY when requesting
+                           passwords.  Finally, if the variable is set to
+                           M-bM-^@M-^\forceM-bM-^@M-^], then the askpass program will be used for
+                           all passphrase input regardless of whether DISPLAY
+                           is set.
+
+     SSH_AUTH_SOCK         Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to
+                           communicate with the agent.
+
+     SSH_CONNECTION        Identifies the client and server ends of the
+                           connection.  The variable contains four space-
+                           separated values: client IP address, client port
+                           number, server IP address, and server port number.
+
+     SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND  This variable contains the original command line if
+                           a forced command is executed.  It can be used to
+                           extract the original arguments.
+
+     SSH_TTY               This is set to the name of the tty (path to the
+                           device) associated with the current shell or
+                           command.  If the current session has no tty, this
+                           variable is not set.
+
+     SSH_TUNNEL            Optionally set by sshd(8) to contain the interface
+                           names assigned if tunnel forwarding was requested
+                           by the client.
+
+     SSH_USER_AUTH         Optionally set by sshd(8), this variable may
+                           contain a pathname to a file that lists the
+                           authentication methods successfully used when the
+                           session was established, including any public keys
+                           that were used.
+
+     TZ                    This variable is set to indicate the present time
+                           zone if it was set when the daemon was started
+                           (i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new
+                           connections).
+
+     USER                  Set to the name of the user logging in.
+
+     Additionally, ssh reads ~/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the format
+     M-bM-^@M-^\VARNAME=valueM-bM-^@M-^] to the environment if the file exists and users are
+     allowed to change their environment.  For more information, see the
+     PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5).
+
+FILES
+     ~/.rhosts
+             This file is used for host-based authentication (see above).  On
+             some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the
+             user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd(8)
+             reads it as root.  Additionally, this file must be owned by the
+             user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else.  The
+             recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the
+             user, and not accessible by others.
+
+     ~/.shosts
+             This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows
+             host-based authentication without permitting login with
+             rlogin/rsh.
+
+     ~/.ssh/
+             This directory is the default location for all user-specific
+             configuration and authentication information.  There is no
+             general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
+             secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute
+             for the user, and not accessible by others.
+
+     ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+             Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used
+             for logging in as this user.  The format of this file is
+             described in the sshd(8) manual page.  This file is not highly
+             sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the
+             user, and not accessible by others.
+
+     ~/.ssh/config
+             This is the per-user configuration file.  The file format and
+             configuration options are described in ssh_config(5).  Because of
+             the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+             read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
+
+     ~/.ssh/environment
+             Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
+             ENVIRONMENT, above.
+
+     ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
+     ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+     ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
+     ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+             Contains the private key for authentication.  These files contain
+             sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not
+             accessible by others (read/write/execute).  ssh will simply
+             ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others.  It is
+             possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which
+             will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using
+             AES-128.
+
+     ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
+     ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+             Contains the public key for authentication.  These files are not
+             sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.
+
+     ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+             Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged
+             into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host
+             keys.  See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this
+             file.
+
+     ~/.ssh/rc
+             Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in,
+             just before the user's shell (or command) is started.  See the
+             sshd(8) manual page for more information.
+
+     /etc/hosts.equiv
+             This file is for host-based authentication (see above).  It
+             should only be writable by root.
+
+     /etc/shosts.equiv
+             This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but
+             allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+             rlogin/rsh.
+
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+             Systemwide configuration file.  The file format and configuration
+             options are described in ssh_config(5).
+
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+             These files contain the private parts of the host keys and are
+             used for host-based authentication.
+
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+             Systemwide list of known host keys.  This file should be prepared
+             by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of
+             all machines in the organization.  It should be world-readable.
+             See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this file.
+
+     /etc/ssh/sshrc
+             Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in,
+             just before the user's shell (or command) is started.  See the
+             sshd(8) manual page for more information.
+
+EXIT STATUS
+     ssh exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an
+     error occurred.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     scp(1), sftp(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1),
+     tun(4), ssh_config(5), ssh-keysign(8), sshd(8)
+
+STANDARDS
+     S. Lehtinen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned
+     Numbers, RFC 4250, January 2006.
+
+     T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture,
+     RFC 4251, January 2006.
+
+     T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol,
+     RFC 4252, January 2006.
+
+     T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
+     Protocol, RFC 4253, January 2006.
+
+     T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol, RFC
+     4254, January 2006.
+
+     J. Schlyter and W. Griffin, Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell
+     (SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC 4255, January 2006.
+
+     F. Cusack and M. Forssen, Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the
+     Secure Shell Protocol (SSH), RFC 4256, January 2006.
+
+     J. Galbraith and P. Remaker, The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break
+     Extension, RFC 4335, January 2006.
+
+     M. Bellare, T. Kohno, and C. Namprempre, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport
+     Layer Encryption Modes, RFC 4344, January 2006.
+
+     B. Harris, Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport
+     Layer Protocol, RFC 4345, January 2006.
+
+     M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for
+     the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006.
+
+     J. Galbraith and R. Thayer, The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File
+     Format, RFC 4716, November 2006.
+
+     D. Stebila and J. Green, Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
+     Secure Shell Transport Layer, RFC 5656, December 2009.
+
+     A. Perrig and D. Song, Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve
+     Real-World Security, 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
+     Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99).
+
+AUTHORS
+     OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+     Tatu Ylonen.  Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+     de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+     created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+     versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 7.2                    November 28, 2022                   OpenBSD 7.2
diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3d1ba1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -0,0 +1,1783 @@
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\"                    All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.433 2022/11/28 01:37:36 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 28 2022 $
+.Dt SSH 1
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh
+.Nd OpenSSH remote login client
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm ssh
+.Op Fl 46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy
+.Op Fl B Ar bind_interface
+.Op Fl b Ar bind_address
+.Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec
+.Op Fl D Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port
+.Op Fl E Ar log_file
+.Op Fl e Ar escape_char
+.Op Fl F Ar configfile
+.Op Fl I Ar pkcs11
+.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
+.Op Fl J Ar destination
+.Op Fl L Ar address
+.Op Fl l Ar login_name
+.Op Fl m Ar mac_spec
+.Op Fl O Ar ctl_cmd
+.Op Fl o Ar option
+.Op Fl p Ar port
+.Op Fl Q Ar query_option
+.Op Fl R Ar address
+.Op Fl S Ar ctl_path
+.Op Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port
+.Op Fl w Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun
+.Ar destination
+.Op Ar command Op Ar argument ...
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+(SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
+executing commands on a remote machine.
+It is intended to provide secure encrypted communications between
+two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.
+X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and
+.Ux Ns -domain
+sockets can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+connects and logs into the specified
+.Ar destination ,
+which may be specified as either
+.Sm off
+.Oo user @ Oc hostname
+.Sm on
+or a URI of the form
+.Sm off
+.No ssh:// Oo user @ Oc hostname Op : port .
+.Sm on
+The user must prove
+their identity to the remote machine using one of several methods
+(see below).
+.Pp
+If a
+.Ar command
+is specified,
+it will be executed on the remote host instead of a login shell.
+A complete command line may be specified as
+.Ar command ,
+or it may have additional arguments.
+If supplied, the arguments will be appended to the command, separated by
+spaces, before it is sent to the server to be executed.
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It Fl 4
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.Pp
+.It Fl 6
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.Pp
+.It Fl A
+Enables forwarding of connections from an authentication agent such as
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
+.Pp
+Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
+Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
+(for the agent's
+.Ux Ns -domain
+socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
+An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
+however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
+authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
+A safer alternative may be to use a jump host
+(see
+.Fl J ) .
+.Pp
+.It Fl a
+Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
+.Pp
+.It Fl B Ar bind_interface
+Bind to the address of
+.Ar bind_interface
+before attempting to connect to the destination host.
+This is only useful on systems with more than one address.
+.Pp
+.It Fl b Ar bind_address
+Use
+.Ar bind_address
+on the local machine as the source address
+of the connection.
+Only useful on systems with more than one address.
+.Pp
+.It Fl C
+Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and
+data for forwarded X11, TCP and
+.Ux Ns -domain
+connections).
+The compression algorithm is the same used by
+.Xr gzip 1 .
+Compression is desirable on modem lines and other
+slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks.
+The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the
+configuration files; see the
+.Cm Compression
+option in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.It Fl c Ar cipher_spec
+Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.
+.Ar cipher_spec
+is a comma-separated list of ciphers
+listed in order of preference.
+See the
+.Cm Ciphers
+keyword in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information.
+.Pp
+.It Fl D Xo
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+.Ar port
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+Specifies a local
+.Dq dynamic
+application-level port forwarding.
+This works by allocating a socket to listen to
+.Ar port
+on the local side, optionally bound to the specified
+.Ar bind_address .
+Whenever a connection is made to this port, the
+connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application
+protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
+remote machine.
+Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
+.Nm
+will act as a SOCKS server.
+Only root can forward privileged ports.
+Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+.Pp
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
+Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+setting.
+However, an explicit
+.Ar bind_address
+may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
+The
+.Ar bind_address
+of
+.Dq localhost
+indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
+empty address or
+.Sq *
+indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+.Pp
+.It Fl E Ar log_file
+Append debug logs to
+.Ar log_file
+instead of standard error.
+.Pp
+.It Fl e Ar escape_char
+Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default:
+.Ql ~ ) .
+The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line.
+The escape character followed by a dot
+.Pq Ql \&.
+closes the connection;
+followed by control-Z suspends the connection;
+and followed by itself sends the escape character once.
+Setting the character to
+.Dq none
+disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent.
+.Pp
+.It Fl F Ar configfile
+Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file.
+If a configuration file is given on the command line,
+the system-wide configuration file
+.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+will be ignored.
+The default for the per-user configuration file is
+.Pa ~/.ssh/config .
+If set to
+.Dq none ,
+no configuration files will be read.
+.Pp
+.It Fl f
+Requests
+.Nm
+to go to background just before command execution.
+This is useful if
+.Nm
+is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user
+wants it in the background.
+This implies
+.Fl n .
+The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with
+something like
+.Ic ssh -f host xterm .
+.Pp
+If the
+.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
+configuration option is set to
+.Dq yes ,
+then a client started with
+.Fl f
+will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established
+before placing itself in the background.
+Refer to the description of
+.Cm ForkAfterAuthentication
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for details.
+.Pp
+.It Fl G
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print its configuration after evaluating
+.Cm Host
+and
+.Cm Match
+blocks and exit.
+.Pp
+.It Fl g
+Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports.
+If used on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified
+on the master process.
+.Pp
+.It Fl I Ar pkcs11
+Specify the PKCS#11 shared library
+.Nm
+should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user
+authentication.
+.Pp
+.It Fl i Ar identity_file
+Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for
+public key authentication is read.
+You can also specify a public key file to use the corresponding
+private key that is loaded in
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+when the private key file is not present locally.
+The default is
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa .
+Identity files may also be specified on
+a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+It is possible to have multiple
+.Fl i
+options (and multiple identities specified in
+configuration files).
+If no certificates have been explicitly specified by the
+.Cm CertificateFile
+directive,
+.Nm
+will also try to load certificate information from the filename obtained
+by appending
+.Pa -cert.pub
+to identity filenames.
+.Pp
+.It Fl J Ar destination
+Connect to the target host by first making a
+.Nm
+connection to the jump host described by
+.Ar destination
+and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from
+there.
+Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters.
+This is a shortcut to specify a
+.Cm ProxyJump
+configuration directive.
+Note that configuration directives supplied on the command-line generally
+apply to the destination host and not any specified jump hosts.
+Use
+.Pa ~/.ssh/config
+to specify configuration for jump hosts.
+.Pp
+.It Fl K
+Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI
+credentials to the server.
+.Pp
+.It Fl k
+Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
+.Pp
+.It Fl L Xo
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+.Ar port : host : hostport
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+.It Fl L Xo
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+.Ar port : remote_socket
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+.It Fl L Xo
+.Sm off
+.Ar local_socket : host : hostport
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+.It Fl L Xo
+.Sm off
+.Ar local_socket : remote_socket
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the local
+(client) host are to be forwarded to the given host and port, or Unix socket,
+on the remote side.
+This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP
+.Ar port
+on the local side, optionally bound to the specified
+.Ar bind_address ,
+or to a Unix socket.
+Whenever a connection is made to the local port or socket, the
+connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is
+made to either
+.Ar host
+port
+.Ar hostport ,
+or the Unix socket
+.Ar remote_socket ,
+from the remote machine.
+.Pp
+Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
+.Pp
+By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+setting.
+However, an explicit
+.Ar bind_address
+may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
+The
+.Ar bind_address
+of
+.Dq localhost
+indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
+empty address or
+.Sq *
+indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+.Pp
+.It Fl l Ar login_name
+Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine.
+This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
+.Pp
+.It Fl M
+Places the
+.Nm
+client into
+.Dq master
+mode for connection sharing.
+Multiple
+.Fl M
+options places
+.Nm
+into
+.Dq master
+mode but with confirmation required using
+.Xr ssh-askpass 1
+before each operation that changes the multiplexing state
+(e.g. opening a new session).
+Refer to the description of
+.Cm ControlMaster
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for details.
+.Pp
+.It Fl m Ar mac_spec
+A comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code) algorithms,
+specified in order of preference.
+See the
+.Cm MACs
+keyword in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information.
+.Pp
+.It Fl N
+Do not execute a remote command.
+This is useful for just forwarding ports.
+Refer to the description of
+.Cm SessionType
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for details.
+.Pp
+.It Fl n
+Redirects stdin from
+.Pa /dev/null
+(actually, prevents reading from stdin).
+This must be used when
+.Nm
+is run in the background.
+A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine.
+For example,
+.Ic ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs &
+will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11
+connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel.
+The
+.Nm
+program will be put in the background.
+(This does not work if
+.Nm
+needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the
+.Fl f
+option.)
+Refer to the description of
+.Cm StdinNull
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for details.
+.Pp
+.It Fl O Ar ctl_cmd
+Control an active connection multiplexing master process.
+When the
+.Fl O
+option is specified, the
+.Ar ctl_cmd
+argument is interpreted and passed to the master process.
+Valid commands are:
+.Dq check
+(check that the master process is running),
+.Dq forward
+(request forwardings without command execution),
+.Dq cancel
+(cancel forwardings),
+.Dq exit
+(request the master to exit), and
+.Dq stop
+(request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing requests).
+.Pp
+.It Fl o Ar option
+Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file.
+This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate
+command-line flag.
+For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
+.It AddKeysToAgent
+.It AddressFamily
+.It BatchMode
+.It BindAddress
+.It CanonicalDomains
+.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+.It CanonicalizeHostname
+.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
+.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+.It CASignatureAlgorithms
+.It CertificateFile
+.It CheckHostIP
+.It Ciphers
+.It ClearAllForwardings
+.It Compression
+.It ConnectionAttempts
+.It ConnectTimeout
+.It ControlMaster
+.It ControlPath
+.It ControlPersist
+.It DynamicForward
+.It EnableEscapeCommandline
+.It EscapeChar
+.It ExitOnForwardFailure
+.It FingerprintHash
+.It ForkAfterAuthentication
+.It ForwardAgent
+.It ForwardX11
+.It ForwardX11Timeout
+.It ForwardX11Trusted
+.It GatewayPorts
+.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
+.It GSSAPIAuthentication
+.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+.It HashKnownHosts
+.It Host
+.It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+.It HostbasedAuthentication
+.It HostKeyAlgorithms
+.It HostKeyAlias
+.It Hostname
+.It IdentitiesOnly
+.It IdentityAgent
+.It IdentityFile
+.It IPQoS
+.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+.It KbdInteractiveDevices
+.It KexAlgorithms
+.It KnownHostsCommand
+.It LocalCommand
+.It LocalForward
+.It LogLevel
+.It MACs
+.It Match
+.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+.It PasswordAuthentication
+.It PermitLocalCommand
+.It PermitRemoteOpen
+.It PKCS11Provider
+.It Port
+.It PreferredAuthentications
+.It ProxyCommand
+.It ProxyJump
+.It ProxyUseFdpass
+.It PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+.It PubkeyAuthentication
+.It RekeyLimit
+.It RemoteCommand
+.It RemoteForward
+.It RequestTTY
+.It RequiredRSASize
+.It SendEnv
+.It ServerAliveInterval
+.It ServerAliveCountMax
+.It SessionType
+.It SetEnv
+.It StdinNull
+.It StreamLocalBindMask
+.It StreamLocalBindUnlink
+.It StrictHostKeyChecking
+.It TCPKeepAlive
+.It Tunnel
+.It TunnelDevice
+.It UpdateHostKeys
+.It User
+.It UserKnownHostsFile
+.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
+.It VisualHostKey
+.It XAuthLocation
+.El
+.Pp
+.It Fl p Ar port
+Port to connect to on the remote host.
+This can be specified on a
+per-host basis in the configuration file.
+.Pp
+.It Fl Q Ar query_option
+Queries for the algorithms supported by one of the following features:
+.Ar cipher
+(supported symmetric ciphers),
+.Ar cipher-auth
+(supported symmetric ciphers that support authenticated encryption),
+.Ar help
+(supported query terms for use with the
+.Fl Q
+flag),
+.Ar mac
+(supported message integrity codes),
+.Ar kex
+(key exchange algorithms),
+.Ar key
+(key types),
+.Ar key-cert
+(certificate key types),
+.Ar key-plain
+(non-certificate key types),
+.Ar key-sig
+(all key types and signature algorithms),
+.Ar protocol-version
+(supported SSH protocol versions), and
+.Ar sig
+(supported signature algorithms).
+Alternatively, any keyword from
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+or
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+that takes an algorithm list may be used as an alias for the corresponding
+query_option.
+.Pp
+.It Fl q
+Quiet mode.
+Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed.
+.Pp
+.It Fl R Xo
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+.Ar port : host : hostport
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+.It Fl R Xo
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+.Ar port : local_socket
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+.It Fl R Xo
+.Sm off
+.Ar remote_socket : host : hostport
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+.It Fl R Xo
+.Sm off
+.Ar remote_socket : local_socket
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+.It Fl R Xo
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
+.Ar port
+.Sm on
+.Xc
+Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the remote
+(server) host are to be forwarded to the local side.
+.Pp
+This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP
+.Ar port
+or to a Unix socket on the remote side.
+Whenever a connection is made to this port or Unix socket, the
+connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection
+is made from the local machine to either an explicit destination specified by
+.Ar host
+port
+.Ar hostport ,
+or
+.Ar local_socket ,
+or, if no explicit destination was specified,
+.Nm
+will act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy and forward connections to the destinations
+requested by the remote SOCKS client.
+.Pp
+Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
+Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
+logging in as root on the remote machine.
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
+.Pp
+By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to the loopback
+interface only.
+This may be overridden by specifying a
+.Ar bind_address .
+An empty
+.Ar bind_address ,
+or the address
+.Ql * ,
+indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces.
+Specifying a remote
+.Ar bind_address
+will only succeed if the server's
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+option is enabled (see
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ) .
+.Pp
+If the
+.Ar port
+argument is
+.Ql 0 ,
+the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
+to the client at run time.
+When used together with
+.Ic -O forward ,
+the allocated port will be printed to the standard output.
+.Pp
+.It Fl S Ar ctl_path
+Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing,
+or the string
+.Dq none
+to disable connection sharing.
+Refer to the description of
+.Cm ControlPath
+and
+.Cm ControlMaster
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for details.
+.Pp
+.It Fl s
+May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system.
+Subsystems facilitate the use of SSH
+as a secure transport for other applications (e.g.\&
+.Xr sftp 1 ) .
+The subsystem is specified as the remote command.
+Refer to the description of
+.Cm SessionType
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for details.
+.Pp
+.It Fl T
+Disable pseudo-terminal allocation.
+.Pp
+.It Fl t
+Force pseudo-terminal allocation.
+This can be used to execute arbitrary
+screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful,
+e.g. when implementing menu services.
+Multiple
+.Fl t
+options force tty allocation, even if
+.Nm
+has no local tty.
+.Pp
+.It Fl V
+Display the version number and exit.
+.Pp
+.It Fl v
+Verbose mode.
+Causes
+.Nm
+to print debugging messages about its progress.
+This is helpful in
+debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
+Multiple
+.Fl v
+options increase the verbosity.
+The maximum is 3.
+.Pp
+.It Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port
+Requests that standard input and output on the client be forwarded to
+.Ar host
+on
+.Ar port
+over the secure channel.
+Implies
+.Fl N ,
+.Fl T ,
+.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
+and
+.Cm ClearAllForwardings ,
+though these can be overridden in the configuration file or using
+.Fl o
+command line options.
+.Pp
+.It Fl w Xo
+.Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun
+.Xc
+Requests
+tunnel
+device forwarding with the specified
+.Xr tun 4
+devices between the client
+.Pq Ar local_tun
+and the server
+.Pq Ar remote_tun .
+.Pp
+The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
+.Dq any ,
+which uses the next available tunnel device.
+If
+.Ar remote_tun
+is not specified, it defaults to
+.Dq any .
+See also the
+.Cm Tunnel
+and
+.Cm TunnelDevice
+directives in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+If the
+.Cm Tunnel
+directive is unset, it will be set to the default tunnel mode, which is
+.Dq point-to-point .
+If a different
+.Cm Tunnel
+forwarding mode it desired, then it should be specified before
+.Fl w .
+.Pp
+.It Fl X
+Enables X11 forwarding.
+This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
+.Pp
+X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.
+Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
+(for the user's X authorization database)
+can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection.
+An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
+.Pp
+For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY extension
+restrictions by default.
+Refer to the
+.Nm
+.Fl Y
+option and the
+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
+directive in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information.
+.Pp
+.It Fl x
+Disables X11 forwarding.
+.Pp
+.It Fl Y
+Enables trusted X11 forwarding.
+Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension
+controls.
+.Pp
+.It Fl y
+Send log information using the
+.Xr syslog 3
+system module.
+By default this information is sent to stderr.
+.El
+.Pp
+.Nm
+may additionally obtain configuration data from
+a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file.
+The file format and configuration options are described in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Sh AUTHENTICATION
+The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocol 2.
+.Pp
+The methods available for authentication are:
+GSSAPI-based authentication,
+host-based authentication,
+public key authentication,
+keyboard-interactive authentication,
+and password authentication.
+Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above,
+though
+.Cm PreferredAuthentications
+can be used to change the default order.
+.Pp
+Host-based authentication works as follows:
+If the machine the user logs in from is listed in
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+or
+.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
+on the remote machine, the user is non-root and the user names are
+the same on both sides, or if the files
+.Pa ~/.rhosts
+or
+.Pa ~/.shosts
+exist in the user's home directory on the
+remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client
+machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is
+considered for login.
+Additionally, the server
+.Em must
+be able to verify the client's
+host key (see the description of
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts ,
+below)
+for login to be permitted.
+This authentication method closes security holes due to IP
+spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing.
+[Note to the administrator:
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv ,
+.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
+and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be
+disabled if security is desired.]
+.Pp
+Public key authentication works as follows:
+The scheme is based on public-key cryptography,
+using cryptosystems
+where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys,
+and it is unfeasible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key.
+The idea is that each user creates a public/private
+key pair for authentication purposes.
+The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
+.Nm
+implements public key authentication protocol automatically,
+using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms.
+The HISTORY section of
+.Xr ssl 8
+contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
+.Pp
+The file
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in.
+When the user logs in, the
+.Nm
+program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for
+authentication.
+The client proves that it has access to the private key
+and the server checks that the corresponding public key
+is authorized to accept the account.
+.Pp
+The server may inform the client of errors that prevented public key
+authentication from succeeding after authentication completes using a
+different method.
+These may be viewed by increasing the
+.Cm LogLevel
+to
+.Cm DEBUG
+or higher (e.g. by using the
+.Fl v
+flag).
+.Pp
+The user creates their key pair by running
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+This stores the private key in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+(DSA),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+(ECDSA),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
+(authenticator-hosted ECDSA),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+(Ed25519),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
+(authenticator-hosted Ed25519),
+or
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+(RSA)
+and stores the public key in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+(DSA),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+(ECDSA),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
+(authenticator-hosted ECDSA),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+(Ed25519),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
+(authenticator-hosted Ed25519),
+or
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+(RSA)
+in the user's home directory.
+The user should then copy the public key
+to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+in their home directory on the remote machine.
+The
+.Pa authorized_keys
+file corresponds to the conventional
+.Pa ~/.rhosts
+file, and has one key
+per line, though the lines can be very long.
+After this, the user can log in without giving the password.
+.Pp
+A variation on public key authentication
+is available in the form of certificate authentication:
+instead of a set of public/private keys,
+signed certificates are used.
+This has the advantage that a single trusted certification authority
+can be used in place of many public/private keys.
+See the CERTIFICATES section of
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+for more information.
+.Pp
+The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication
+may be with an authentication agent.
+See
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+and (optionally) the
+.Cm AddKeysToAgent
+directive in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information.
+.Pp
+Keyboard-interactive authentication works as follows:
+The server sends an arbitrary
+.Qq challenge
+text and prompts for a response, possibly multiple times.
+Examples of keyboard-interactive authentication include
+.Bx
+Authentication (see
+.Xr login.conf 5 )
+and PAM (some
+.Pf non- Ox
+systems).
+.Pp
+Finally, if other authentication methods fail,
+.Nm
+prompts the user for a password.
+The password is sent to the remote
+host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted,
+the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+automatically maintains and checks a database containing
+identification for all hosts it has ever been used with.
+Host keys are stored in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+in the user's home directory.
+Additionally, the file
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+is automatically checked for known hosts.
+Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file.
+If a host's identification ever changes,
+.Nm
+warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent
+server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks,
+which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption.
+The
+.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
+option can be used to control logins to machines whose
+host key is not known or has changed.
+.Pp
+When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
+either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or,
+if no command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives
+the user a normal shell as an interactive session.
+All communication with
+the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
+.Pp
+If an interactive session is requested,
+.Nm
+by default will only request a pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive
+sessions when the client has one.
+The flags
+.Fl T
+and
+.Fl t
+can be used to override this behaviour.
+.Pp
+If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the
+user may use the escape characters noted below.
+.Pp
+If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated,
+the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data.
+On most systems, setting the escape character to
+.Dq none
+will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used.
+.Pp
+The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote
+machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.
+.Sh ESCAPE CHARACTERS
+When a pseudo-terminal has been requested,
+.Nm
+supports a number of functions through the use of an escape character.
+.Pp
+A single tilde character can be sent as
+.Ic ~~
+or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below.
+The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as
+special.
+The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the
+.Cm EscapeChar
+configuration directive or on the command line by the
+.Fl e
+option.
+.Pp
+The supported escapes (assuming the default
+.Ql ~ )
+are:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm ~.
+Disconnect.
+.It Cm ~^Z
+Background
+.Nm .
+.It Cm ~#
+List forwarded connections.
+.It Cm ~&
+Background
+.Nm
+at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to terminate.
+.It Cm ~?
+Display a list of escape characters.
+.It Cm ~B
+Send a BREAK to the remote system
+(only useful if the peer supports it).
+.It Cm ~C
+Open command line.
+Currently this allows the addition of port forwardings using the
+.Fl L ,
+.Fl R
+and
+.Fl D
+options (see above).
+It also allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings
+with
+.Sm off
+.Fl KL Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
+.Sm on
+for local,
+.Sm off
+.Fl KR Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
+.Sm on
+for remote and
+.Sm off
+.Fl KD Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
+.Sm on
+for dynamic port-forwardings.
+.Ic !\& Ns Ar command
+allows the user to execute a local command if the
+.Ic PermitLocalCommand
+option is enabled in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+Basic help is available, using the
+.Fl h
+option.
+.It Cm ~R
+Request rekeying of the connection
+(only useful if the peer supports it).
+.It Cm ~V
+Decrease the verbosity
+.Pq Ic LogLevel
+when errors are being written to stderr.
+.It Cm ~v
+Increase the verbosity
+.Pq Ic LogLevel
+when errors are being written to stderr.
+.El
+.Sh TCP FORWARDING
+Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over a secure channel
+can be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file.
+One possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a
+mail server; another is going through firewalls.
+.Pp
+In the example below, we look at encrypting communication for an IRC client,
+even though the IRC server it connects to does not directly
+support encrypted communication.
+This works as follows:
+the user connects to the remote host using
+.Nm ,
+specifying the ports to be used to forward the connection.
+After that it is possible to start the program locally,
+and
+.Nm
+will encrypt and forward the connection to the remote server.
+.Pp
+The following example tunnels an IRC session from the client
+to an IRC server at
+.Dq server.example.com ,
+joining channel
+.Dq #users ,
+nickname
+.Dq pinky ,
+using the standard IRC port, 6667:
+.Bd -literal -offset 4n
+$ ssh -f -L 6667:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10
+$ irc -c '#users' pinky IRC/127.0.0.1
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The
+.Fl f
+option backgrounds
+.Nm
+and the remote command
+.Dq sleep 10
+is specified to allow an amount of time
+(10 seconds, in the example)
+to start the program which is going to use the tunnel.
+If no connections are made within the time specified,
+.Nm
+will exit.
+.Sh X11 FORWARDING
+If the
+.Cm ForwardX11
+variable is set to
+.Dq yes
+(or see the description of the
+.Fl X ,
+.Fl x ,
+and
+.Fl Y
+options above)
+and the user is using X11 (the
+.Ev DISPLAY
+environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is
+automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
+programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the
+encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made
+from the local machine.
+The user should not manually set
+.Ev DISPLAY .
+Forwarding of X11 connections can be
+configured on the command line or in configuration files.
+.Pp
+The
+.Ev DISPLAY
+value set by
+.Nm
+will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater than zero.
+This is normal, and happens because
+.Nm
+creates a
+.Dq proxy
+X server on the server machine for forwarding the
+connections over the encrypted channel.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine.
+For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie,
+store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded
+connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when
+the connection is opened.
+The real authentication cookie is never
+sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
+.Pp
+If the
+.Cm ForwardAgent
+variable is set to
+.Dq yes
+(or see the description of the
+.Fl A
+and
+.Fl a
+options above) and
+the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent
+is automatically forwarded to the remote side.
+.Sh VERIFYING HOST KEYS
+When connecting to a server for the first time,
+a fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user
+(unless the option
+.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
+has been disabled).
+Fingerprints can be determined using
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 :
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+.Pp
+If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched
+and the key can be accepted or rejected.
+If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server are available, the
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+.Fl E
+option may be used to downgrade the fingerprint algorithm to match.
+.Pp
+Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys
+just by looking at fingerprint strings,
+there is also support to compare host keys visually,
+using
+.Em random art .
+By setting the
+.Cm VisualHostKey
+option to
+.Dq yes ,
+a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter
+if the session itself is interactive or not.
+By learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily
+find out that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern
+is displayed.
+Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks
+similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the
+host key is the same, not guaranteed proof.
+.Pp
+To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for
+all known hosts, the following command line can be used:
+.Pp
+.Dl $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+.Pp
+If the fingerprint is unknown,
+an alternative method of verification is available:
+SSH fingerprints verified by DNS.
+An additional resource record (RR),
+SSHFP,
+is added to a zonefile
+and the connecting client is able to match the fingerprint
+with that of the key presented.
+.Pp
+In this example, we are connecting a client to a server,
+.Dq host.example.com .
+The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for
+host.example.com:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+$ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile.
+To check that the zone is answering fingerprint queries:
+.Pp
+.Dl $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com
+.Pp
+Finally the client connects:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+$ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com
+[...]
+Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS.
+Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
+.Ed
+.Pp
+See the
+.Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS
+option in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information.
+.Sh SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
+.Nm
+contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling
+using the
+.Xr tun 4
+network pseudo-device,
+allowing two networks to be joined securely.
+The
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+configuration option
+.Cm PermitTunnel
+controls whether the server supports this,
+and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traffic).
+.Pp
+The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24
+with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection
+from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2,
+provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network,
+at 192.168.1.15, allows it.
+.Pp
+On the client:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+# ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true
+# ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
+# route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2
+.Ed
+.Pp
+On the server:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+# ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252
+# route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Client access may be more finely tuned via the
+.Pa /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
+file (see below) and the
+.Cm PermitRootLogin
+server option.
+The following entry would permit connections on
+.Xr tun 4
+device 1 from user
+.Dq jane
+and on tun device 2 from user
+.Dq john ,
+if
+.Cm PermitRootLogin
+is set to
+.Dq forced-commands-only :
+.Bd -literal -offset 2n
+tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane
+tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
+.Ed
+.Pp
+Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead,
+it may be more suited to temporary setups,
+such as for wireless VPNs.
+More permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as
+.Xr ipsecctl 8
+and
+.Xr isakmpd 8 .
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Nm
+will normally set the following environment variables:
+.Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"
+.It Ev DISPLAY
+The
+.Ev DISPLAY
+variable indicates the location of the X11 server.
+It is automatically set by
+.Nm
+to point to a value of the form
+.Dq hostname:n ,
+where
+.Dq hostname
+indicates the host where the shell runs, and
+.Sq n
+is an integer \*(Ge 1.
+.Nm
+uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure
+channel.
+The user should normally not set
+.Ev DISPLAY
+explicitly, as that
+will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to
+manually copy any required authorization cookies).
+.It Ev HOME
+Set to the path of the user's home directory.
+.It Ev LOGNAME
+Synonym for
+.Ev USER ;
+set for compatibility with systems that use this variable.
+.It Ev MAIL
+Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
+.It Ev PATH
+Set to the default
+.Ev PATH ,
+as specified when compiling
+.Nm .
+.It Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+If
+.Nm
+needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current
+terminal if it was run from a terminal.
+If
+.Nm
+does not have a terminal associated with it but
+.Ev DISPLAY
+and
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+are set, it will execute the program specified by
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.
+This is particularly useful when calling
+.Nm
+from a
+.Pa .xsession
+or related script.
+(Note that on some machines it
+may be necessary to redirect the input from
+.Pa /dev/null
+to make this work.)
+.It Ev SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE
+Allows further control over the use of an askpass program.
+If this variable is set to
+.Dq never
+then
+.Nm
+will never attempt to use one.
+If it is set to
+.Dq prefer ,
+then
+.Nm
+will prefer to use the askpass program instead of the TTY when requesting
+passwords.
+Finally, if the variable is set to
+.Dq force ,
+then the askpass program will be used for all passphrase input regardless
+of whether
+.Ev DISPLAY
+is set.
+.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+Identifies the path of a
+.Ux Ns -domain
+socket used to communicate with the agent.
+.It Ev SSH_CONNECTION
+Identifies the client and server ends of the connection.
+The variable contains
+four space-separated values: client IP address, client port number,
+server IP address, and server port number.
+.It Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
+This variable contains the original command line if a forced command
+is executed.
+It can be used to extract the original arguments.
+.It Ev SSH_TTY
+This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated
+with the current shell or command.
+If the current session has no tty,
+this variable is not set.
+.It Ev SSH_TUNNEL
+Optionally set by
+.Xr sshd 8
+to contain the interface names assigned if tunnel forwarding was
+requested by the client.
+.It Ev SSH_USER_AUTH
+Optionally set by
+.Xr sshd 8 ,
+this variable may contain a pathname to a file that lists the authentication
+methods successfully used when the session was established, including any
+public keys that were used.
+.It Ev TZ
+This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it
+was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value
+on to new connections).
+.It Ev USER
+Set to the name of the user logging in.
+.El
+.Pp
+Additionally,
+.Nm
+reads
+.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
+and adds lines of the format
+.Dq VARNAME=value
+to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to
+change their environment.
+For more information, see the
+.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+option in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It Pa ~/.rhosts
+This file is used for host-based authentication (see above).
+On some machines this file may need to be
+world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
+because
+.Xr sshd 8
+reads it as root.
+Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
+and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
+The recommended
+permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
+accessible by others.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.shosts
+This file is used in exactly the same way as
+.Pa .rhosts ,
+but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+rlogin/rsh.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/
+This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
+and authentication information.
+There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
+secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user,
+and not accessible by others.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA)
+that can be used for logging in as this user.
+The format of this file is described in the
+.Xr sshd 8
+manual page.
+This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
+permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
+This is the per-user configuration file.
+The file format and configuration options are described in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
+Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT ,
+above.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+Contains the private key for authentication.
+These files
+contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not
+accessible by others (read/write/execute).
+.Nm
+will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others.
+It is possible to specify a passphrase when
+generating the key which will be used to encrypt the
+sensitive part of this file using AES-128.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+Contains the public key for authentication.
+These files are not
+sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into
+that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys.
+See
+.Xr sshd 8
+for further details of the format of this file.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+Commands in this file are executed by
+.Nm
+when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is
+started.
+See the
+.Xr sshd 8
+manual page for more information.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+This file is for host-based authentication (see above).
+It should only be writable by root.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
+This file is used in exactly the same way as
+.Pa hosts.equiv ,
+but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+rlogin/rsh.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+Systemwide configuration file.
+The file format and configuration options are described in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+These files contain the private parts of the host keys
+and are used for host-based authentication.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+Systemwide list of known host keys.
+This file should be prepared by the
+system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
+organization.
+It should be world-readable.
+See
+.Xr sshd 8
+for further details of the format of this file.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
+Commands in this file are executed by
+.Nm
+when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started.
+See the
+.Xr sshd 8
+manual page for more information.
+.El
+.Sh EXIT STATUS
+.Nm
+exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
+if an error occurred.
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr scp 1 ,
+.Xr sftp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+.Xr tun 4 ,
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+.Xr ssh-keysign 8 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh STANDARDS
+.Rs
+.%A S. Lehtinen
+.%A C. Lonvick
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4250
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A C. Lonvick
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4251
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A C. Lonvick
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4252
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A C. Lonvick
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4253
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A T. Ylonen
+.%A C. Lonvick
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4254
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A J. Schlyter
+.%A W. Griffin
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4255
+.%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A F. Cusack
+.%A M. Forssen
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4256
+.%T Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH)
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A J. Galbraith
+.%A P. Remaker
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4335
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A M. Bellare
+.%A T. Kohno
+.%A C. Namprempre
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4344
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A B. Harris
+.%D January 2006
+.%R RFC 4345
+.%T Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A M. Friedl
+.%A N. Provos
+.%A W. Simpson
+.%D March 2006
+.%R RFC 4419
+.%T Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A J. Galbraith
+.%A R. Thayer
+.%D November 2006
+.%R RFC 4716
+.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A D. Stebila
+.%A J. Green
+.%D December 2009
+.%R RFC 5656
+.%T Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer
+.Re
+.Pp
+.Rs
+.%A A. Perrig
+.%A D. Song
+.%D 1999
+.%O International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
+.%T Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security
+.Re
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..87454b8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2388 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.584 2023/01/17 18:52:44 millert Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Ssh client program.  This program can be used to log into a remote machine.
+ * The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding
+ * of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Modified to work with SSLeay by Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
+ * in Canada (German citizen).
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <locale.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "clientloop.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "mac.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "version.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+#endif
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Saves a copy of argv for setproctitle emulation */
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+static char **saved_av;
+#endif
+
+/* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on.  May be set on the command line. */
+int debug_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating whether a tty should be requested */
+int tty_flag = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Flag indicating that the current process should be backgrounded and
+ * a new mux-client launched in the foreground for ControlPersist.
+ */
+int need_controlpersist_detach = 0;
+
+/* Copies of flags for ControlPersist foreground mux-client */
+int ostdin_null_flag, osession_type, otty_flag, orequest_tty;
+
+/*
+ * General data structure for command line options and options configurable
+ * in configuration files.  See readconf.h.
+ */
+Options options;
+
+/* optional user configfile */
+char *config = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Name of the host we are connecting to.  This is the name given on the
+ * command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a
+ * configuration file.
+ */
+char *host;
+
+/*
+ * A config can specify a path to forward, overriding SSH_AUTH_SOCK. If this is
+ * not NULL, forward the socket at this path instead.
+ */
+char *forward_agent_sock_path = NULL;
+
+/* socket address the host resolves to */
+struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr;
+
+/* Private host keys. */
+Sensitive sensitive_data;
+
+/* command to be executed */
+struct sshbuf *command;
+
+/* # of replies received for global requests */
+static int forward_confirms_pending = -1;
+
+/* mux.c */
+extern int muxserver_sock;
+extern u_int muxclient_command;
+
+/* Prints a help message to the user.  This function never returns. */
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr,
+"usage: ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface]\n"
+"           [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port]\n"
+"           [-E log_file] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11]\n"
+"           [-i identity_file] [-J [user@]host[:port]] [-L address]\n"
+"           [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n"
+"           [-Q query_option] [-R address] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port]\n"
+"           [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination [command [argument ...]]\n"
+	);
+	exit(255);
+}
+
+static int ssh_session2(struct ssh *, const struct ssh_conn_info *);
+static void load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *);
+static void main_sigchld_handler(int);
+
+/* ~/ expand a list of paths. NB. assumes path[n] is heap-allocated. */
+static void
+tilde_expand_paths(char **paths, u_int num_paths)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	char *cp;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) {
+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(paths[i], getuid());
+		free(paths[i]);
+		paths[i] = cp;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expands the set of percent_expand options used by the majority of keywords
+ * in the client that support percent expansion.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+static char *
+default_client_percent_expand(const char *str,
+    const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+{
+	return percent_expand(str,
+	    DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo),
+	    (char *)NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Expands the set of percent_expand options used by the majority of keywords
+ * AND perform environment variable substitution.
+ * Caller must free returned string.
+ */
+static char *
+default_client_percent_dollar_expand(const char *str,
+    const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+{
+	char *ret;
+
+	ret = percent_dollar_expand(str,
+	    DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo),
+	    (char *)NULL);
+	if (ret == NULL)
+		fatal("invalid environment variable expansion");
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to resolve a host name / port to a set of addresses and
+ * optionally return any CNAMEs encountered along the way.
+ * Returns NULL on failure.
+ * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
+ */
+static struct addrinfo *
+resolve_host(const char *name, int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen)
+{
+	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	const char *errstr = NULL;
+	struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+	int gaierr;
+	LogLevel loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+
+	if (port <= 0)
+		port = default_ssh_port();
+	if (cname != NULL)
+		*cname = '\0';
+	debug3_f("lookup %s:%d", name, port);
+
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
+	    AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	if (cname != NULL)
+		hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
+	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) {
+		if (logerr || (gaierr != EAI_NONAME && gaierr != EAI_NODATA))
+			loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+		do_log2(loglevel, "%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s",
+		    __progname, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (cname != NULL && res->ai_canonname != NULL) {
+		if (!valid_domain(res->ai_canonname, 0, &errstr)) {
+			error("ignoring bad CNAME \"%s\" for host \"%s\": %s",
+			    res->ai_canonname, name, errstr);
+		} else if (strlcpy(cname, res->ai_canonname, clen) >= clen) {
+			error_f("host \"%s\" cname \"%s\" too long (max %lu)",
+			    name,  res->ai_canonname, (u_long)clen);
+			if (clen > 0)
+				*cname = '\0';
+		}
+	}
+	return res;
+}
+
+/* Returns non-zero if name can only be an address and not a hostname */
+static int
+is_addr_fast(const char *name)
+{
+	return (strchr(name, '%') != NULL || strchr(name, ':') != NULL ||
+	    strspn(name, "0123456789.") == strlen(name));
+}
+
+/* Returns non-zero if name represents a valid, single address */
+static int
+is_addr(const char *name)
+{
+	char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+
+	if (is_addr_fast(name))
+		return 1;
+
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", default_ssh_port());
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
+	    AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV;
+	if (getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (res == NULL || res->ai_next != NULL) {
+		freeaddrinfo(res);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	freeaddrinfo(res);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to resolve a numeric host address / port to a single address.
+ * Returns a canonical address string.
+ * Returns NULL on failure.
+ * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
+ */
+static struct addrinfo *
+resolve_addr(const char *name, int port, char *caddr, size_t clen)
+{
+	char addr[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	struct addrinfo hints, *res;
+	int gaierr;
+
+	if (port <= 0)
+		port = default_ssh_port();
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
+	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+	hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
+	    AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
+	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
+	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV;
+	if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) {
+		debug2_f("could not resolve name %.100s as address: %s",
+		    name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (res == NULL) {
+		debug_f("getaddrinfo %.100s returned no addresses", name);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	if (res->ai_next != NULL) {
+		debug_f("getaddrinfo %.100s returned multiple addresses", name);
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((gaierr = getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen,
+	    addr, sizeof(addr), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) {
+		debug_f("Could not format address for name %.100s: %s",
+		    name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (strlcpy(caddr, addr, clen) >= clen) {
+		error_f("host \"%s\" addr \"%s\" too long (max %lu)",
+		    name,  addr, (u_long)clen);
+		if (clen > 0)
+			*caddr = '\0';
+ fail:
+		freeaddrinfo(res);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return res;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether the cname is a permitted replacement for the hostname
+ * and perform the replacement if it is.
+ * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
+ */
+static int
+check_follow_cname(int direct, char **namep, const char *cname)
+{
+	int i;
+	struct allowed_cname *rule;
+
+	if (*cname == '\0' || !config_has_permitted_cnames(&options) ||
+	    strcmp(*namep, cname) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
+		return 0;
+	/*
+	 * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by
+	 * a proxy or jump host unless the user specifically requests so.
+	 */
+	if (!direct &&
+	    options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
+		return 0;
+	debug3_f("check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", *namep, cname);
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_permitted_cnames; i++) {
+		rule = options.permitted_cnames + i;
+		if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list, 1) != 1 ||
+		    match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list, 1) != 1)
+			continue;
+		verbose("Canonicalized DNS aliased hostname "
+		    "\"%s\" => \"%s\"", *namep, cname);
+		free(*namep);
+		*namep = xstrdup(cname);
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Attempt to resolve the supplied hostname after applying the user's
+ * canonicalization rules. Returns the address list for the host or NULL
+ * if no name was found after canonicalization.
+ * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
+ */
+static struct addrinfo *
+resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port)
+{
+	int i, direct, ndots;
+	char *cp, *fullhost, newname[NI_MAXHOST];
+	struct addrinfo *addrs;
+
+	/*
+	 * Attempt to canonicalise addresses, regardless of
+	 * whether hostname canonicalisation was requested
+	 */
+	if ((addrs = resolve_addr(*hostp, port,
+	    newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL) {
+		debug2_f("hostname %.100s is address", *hostp);
+		if (strcasecmp(*hostp, newname) != 0) {
+			debug2_f("canonicalised address \"%s\" => \"%s\"",
+			    *hostp, newname);
+			free(*hostp);
+			*hostp = xstrdup(newname);
+		}
+		return addrs;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If this looks like an address but didn't parse as one, it might
+	 * be an address with an invalid interface scope. Skip further
+	 * attempts at canonicalisation.
+	 */
+	if (is_addr_fast(*hostp)) {
+		debug_f("hostname %.100s is an unrecognised address", *hostp);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by
+	 * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so.
+	 */
+	direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) &&
+	    options.jump_host == NULL;
+	if (!direct &&
+	    options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* If domain name is anchored, then resolve it now */
+	if ((*hostp)[strlen(*hostp) - 1] == '.') {
+		debug3_f("name is fully qualified");
+		fullhost = xstrdup(*hostp);
+		if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0,
+		    newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL)
+			goto found;
+		free(fullhost);
+		goto notfound;
+	}
+
+	/* Don't apply canonicalization to sufficiently-qualified hostnames */
+	ndots = 0;
+	for (cp = *hostp; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
+		if (*cp == '.')
+			ndots++;
+	}
+	if (ndots > options.canonicalize_max_dots) {
+		debug3_f("not canonicalizing hostname \"%s\" (max dots %d)",
+		    *hostp, options.canonicalize_max_dots);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	/* Attempt each supplied suffix */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_canonical_domains; i++) {
+		if (strcasecmp(options.canonical_domains[i], "none") == 0)
+			break;
+		xasprintf(&fullhost, "%s.%s.", *hostp,
+		    options.canonical_domains[i]);
+		debug3_f("attempting \"%s\" => \"%s\"", *hostp, fullhost);
+		if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0,
+		    newname, sizeof(newname))) == NULL) {
+			free(fullhost);
+			continue;
+		}
+ found:
+		/* Remove trailing '.' */
+		fullhost[strlen(fullhost) - 1] = '\0';
+		/* Follow CNAME if requested */
+		if (!check_follow_cname(direct, &fullhost, newname)) {
+			debug("Canonicalized hostname \"%s\" => \"%s\"",
+			    *hostp, fullhost);
+		}
+		free(*hostp);
+		*hostp = fullhost;
+		return addrs;
+	}
+ notfound:
+	if (!options.canonicalize_fallback_local)
+		fatal("%s: Could not resolve host \"%s\"", __progname, *hostp);
+	debug2_f("host %s not found in any suffix", *hostp);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and either
+ * discarding the key or fatal()ing for others.
+ */
+static void
+check_load(int r, struct sshkey **k, const char *path, const char *message)
+{
+	switch (r) {
+	case 0:
+		/* Check RSA keys size and discard if undersized */
+		if (k != NULL && *k != NULL &&
+		    (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(*k,
+		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+			error_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path);
+			free(*k);
+			*k = NULL;
+		}
+		break;
+	case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+	case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
+		fatal_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path);
+	case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
+		/* Ignore missing files */
+		if (errno == ENOENT)
+			break;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	default:
+		error_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path);
+		break;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Read per-user configuration file.  Ignore the system wide config
+ * file if the user specifies a config file on the command line.
+ */
+static void
+process_config_files(const char *host_name, struct passwd *pw, int final_pass,
+    int *want_final_pass)
+{
+	char buf[PATH_MAX];
+	int r;
+
+	if (config != NULL) {
+		if (strcasecmp(config, "none") != 0 &&
+		    !read_config_file(config, pw, host, host_name, &options,
+		    SSHCONF_USERCONF | (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0),
+		    want_final_pass))
+			fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: "
+			    "%.100s", config, strerror(errno));
+	} else {
+		r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
+		    _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
+		if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
+			(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name,
+			    &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF |
+			    (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass);
+
+		/* Read systemwide configuration file after user config. */
+		(void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw,
+		    host, host_name, &options,
+		    final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0, want_final_pass);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Rewrite the port number in an addrinfo list of addresses */
+static void
+set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs, int port)
+{
+	struct addrinfo *addr;
+
+	for (addr = addrs; addr != NULL; addr = addr->ai_next) {
+		switch (addr->ai_family) {
+		case AF_INET:
+			((struct sockaddr_in *)addr->ai_addr)->
+			    sin_port = htons(port);
+			break;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr->ai_addr)->
+			    sin6_port = htons(port);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+{
+	if (cinfo == NULL)
+		return;
+	free(cinfo->conn_hash_hex);
+	free(cinfo->shorthost);
+	free(cinfo->uidstr);
+	free(cinfo->keyalias);
+	free(cinfo->thishost);
+	free(cinfo->host_arg);
+	free(cinfo->portstr);
+	free(cinfo->remhost);
+	free(cinfo->remuser);
+	free(cinfo->homedir);
+	free(cinfo->locuser);
+	free(cinfo);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Main program for the ssh client.
+ */
+int
+main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
+	int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, direct, timeout_ms;
+	int was_addr, config_test = 0, opt_terminated = 0, want_final_pass = 0;
+	char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, *logfile;
+	char cname[NI_MAXHOST], thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
+	struct stat st;
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	extern int optind, optreset;
+	extern char *optarg;
+	struct Forward fwd;
+	struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL;
+	size_t n, len;
+	u_int j;
+	struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo = NULL;
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	/*
+	 * Discard other fds that are hanging around. These can cause problem
+	 * with backgrounded ssh processes started by ControlPersist.
+	 */
+	closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+	/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
+	/* Save argv so it isn't clobbered by setproctitle() emulation */
+	saved_av = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_av));
+	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+		saved_av[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
+	saved_av[i] = NULL;
+	compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
+	av = saved_av;
+#endif
+
+	seed_rng();
+
+	/* Get user data. */
+	pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+	if (!pw) {
+		logit("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid());
+		exit(255);
+	}
+	/* Take a copy of the returned structure. */
+	pw = pwcopy(pw);
+
+	/*
+	 * Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created
+	 * with the default umask.  This will make them world-readable but
+	 * writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we
+	 * don't set the modes explicitly.
+	 */
+	umask(022 | umask(077));
+
+	msetlocale();
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been
+	 * set.
+	 */
+	initialize_options(&options);
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare main ssh transport/connection structures
+	 */
+	if ((ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state()) == NULL)
+		fatal("Couldn't allocate session state");
+	channel_init_channels(ssh);
+
+	/* Parse command-line arguments. */
+	host = NULL;
+	use_syslog = 0;
+	logfile = NULL;
+	argv0 = av[0];
+
+ again:
+	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx"
+	    "AB:CD:E:F:GI:J:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) { /* HUZdhjruz */
+		switch (opt) {
+		case '1':
+			fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported");
+			break;
+		case '2':
+			/* Ignored */
+			break;
+		case '4':
+			options.address_family = AF_INET;
+			break;
+		case '6':
+			options.address_family = AF_INET6;
+			break;
+		case 'n':
+			options.stdin_null = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+			options.fork_after_authentication = 1;
+			options.stdin_null = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'x':
+			options.forward_x11 = 0;
+			break;
+		case 'X':
+			options.forward_x11 = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'y':
+			use_syslog = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'E':
+			logfile = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'G':
+			config_test = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'Y':
+			options.forward_x11 = 1;
+			options.forward_x11_trusted = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'g':
+			options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'O':
+			if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)
+				fatal("Cannot specify multiplexing "
+				    "command with -W");
+			else if (muxclient_command != 0)
+				fatal("Multiplexing command already specified");
+			if (strcmp(optarg, "check") == 0)
+				muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK;
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "forward") == 0)
+				muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD;
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "exit") == 0)
+				muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE;
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "stop") == 0)
+				muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP;
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "cancel") == 0)
+				muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD;
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "proxy") == 0)
+				muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY;
+			else
+				fatal("Invalid multiplex command.");
+			break;
+		case 'P':	/* deprecated */
+			break;
+		case 'Q':
+			cp = NULL;
+			if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher") == 0 ||
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "Ciphers") == 0)
+				cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 0);
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher-auth") == 0)
+				cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 1);
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "mac") == 0 ||
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "MACs") == 0)
+				cp = mac_alg_list('\n');
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0 ||
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "KexAlgorithms") == 0)
+				cp = kex_alg_list('\n');
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0)
+				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n');
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0)
+				cp = sshkey_alg_list(1, 0, 0, '\n');
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0)
+				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 0, '\n');
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-sig") == 0 ||
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes") == 0 || /* deprecated name */
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms") == 0 ||
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "HostKeyAlgorithms") == 0 ||
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedKeyTypes") == 0 || /* deprecated name */
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes") == 0 || /* deprecated name */
+			    strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms") == 0)
+				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, '\n');
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "sig") == 0)
+				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, '\n');
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "protocol-version") == 0)
+				cp = xstrdup("2");
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "compression") == 0) {
+				cp = xstrdup(compression_alg_list(0));
+				len = strlen(cp);
+				for (n = 0; n < len; n++)
+					if (cp[n] == ',')
+						cp[n] = '\n';
+			} else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) {
+				cp = xstrdup(
+				    "cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\n"
+				    "key\nkey-cert\nkey-plain\nkey-sig\nmac\n"
+				    "protocol-version\nsig");
+			}
+			if (cp == NULL)
+				fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg);
+			printf("%s\n", cp);
+			free(cp);
+			exit(0);
+			break;
+		case 'a':
+			options.forward_agent = 0;
+			break;
+		case 'A':
+			options.forward_agent = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'k':
+			options.gss_deleg_creds = 0;
+			break;
+		case 'K':
+			options.gss_authentication = 1;
+			options.gss_deleg_creds = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'i':
+			p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid());
+			if (stat(p, &st) == -1)
+				fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
+				    "not accessible: %s.\n", p,
+				    strerror(errno));
+			else
+				add_identity_file(&options, NULL, p, 1);
+			free(p);
+			break;
+		case 'I':
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+			free(options.pkcs11_provider);
+			options.pkcs11_provider = xstrdup(optarg);
+#else
+			fprintf(stderr, "no support for PKCS#11.\n");
+#endif
+			break;
+		case 'J':
+			if (options.jump_host != NULL) {
+				fatal("Only a single -J option is permitted "
+				    "(use commas to separate multiple "
+				    "jump hops)");
+			}
+			if (options.proxy_command != NULL)
+				fatal("Cannot specify -J with ProxyCommand");
+			if (parse_jump(optarg, &options, 1) == -1)
+				fatal("Invalid -J argument");
+			options.proxy_command = xstrdup("none");
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES)
+				options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_FORCE;
+			else
+				options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_YES;
+			break;
+		case 'v':
+			if (debug_flag == 0) {
+				debug_flag = 1;
+				options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+			} else {
+				if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) {
+					debug_flag++;
+					options.log_level++;
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'V':
+			fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
+			    SSH_RELEASE, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
+			exit(0);
+			break;
+		case 'w':
+			if (options.tun_open == -1)
+				options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT;
+			options.tun_local = a2tun(optarg, &options.tun_remote);
+			if (options.tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Bad tun device '%s'\n", optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'W':
+			if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)
+				fatal("stdio forward already specified");
+			if (muxclient_command != 0)
+				fatal("Cannot specify stdio forward with -O");
+			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) {
+				options.stdio_forward_host = fwd.listen_host;
+				options.stdio_forward_port = fwd.listen_port;
+				free(fwd.connect_host);
+			} else {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Bad stdio forwarding specification '%s'\n",
+				    optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
+			options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_NONE;
+			break;
+		case 'q':
+			options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
+			break;
+		case 'e':
+			if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 &&
+			    (u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 &&
+			    (u_char) optarg[1] < 128)
+				options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31;
+			else if (strlen(optarg) == 1)
+				options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0];
+			else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0)
+				options.escape_char = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
+			else {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n",
+				    optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'c':
+			if (!ciphers_valid(*optarg == '+' || *optarg == '^' ?
+			    optarg + 1 : optarg)) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n",
+				    optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			free(options.ciphers);
+			options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'm':
+			if (mac_valid(optarg)) {
+				free(options.macs);
+				options.macs = xstrdup(optarg);
+			} else {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n",
+				    optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'M':
+			if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_YES)
+				options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK;
+			else
+				options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES;
+			break;
+		case 'p':
+			if (options.port == -1) {
+				options.port = a2port(optarg);
+				if (options.port <= 0) {
+					fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n",
+					    optarg);
+					exit(255);
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'l':
+			if (options.user == NULL)
+				options.user = optarg;
+			break;
+
+		case 'L':
+			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 0))
+				add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
+			else {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Bad local forwarding specification '%s'\n",
+				    optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case 'R':
+			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1) ||
+			    parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 1)) {
+				add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
+			} else {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Bad remote forwarding specification "
+				    "'%s'\n", optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case 'D':
+			if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) {
+				add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
+			} else {
+				fprintf(stderr,
+				    "Bad dynamic forwarding specification "
+				    "'%s'\n", optarg);
+				exit(255);
+			}
+			break;
+
+		case 'C':
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+			options.compression = 1;
+#else
+			error("Compression not supported, disabling.");
+#endif
+			break;
+		case 'N':
+			if (options.session_type != -1 &&
+			    options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE)
+				fatal("Cannot specify -N with -s/SessionType");
+			options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_NONE;
+			options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
+			break;
+		case 'T':
+			options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
+			break;
+		case 'o':
+			line = xstrdup(optarg);
+			if (process_config_line(&options, pw,
+			    host ? host : "", host ? host : "", line,
+			    "command-line", 0, NULL, SSHCONF_USERCONF) != 0)
+				exit(255);
+			free(line);
+			break;
+		case 's':
+			if (options.session_type != -1 &&
+			    options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM)
+				fatal("Cannot specify -s with -N/SessionType");
+			options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM;
+			break;
+		case 'S':
+			free(options.control_path);
+			options.control_path = xstrdup(optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'b':
+			options.bind_address = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'B':
+			options.bind_interface = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'F':
+			config = optarg;
+			break;
+		default:
+			usage();
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (optind > 1 && strcmp(av[optind - 1], "--") == 0)
+		opt_terminated = 1;
+
+	ac -= optind;
+	av += optind;
+
+	if (ac > 0 && !host) {
+		int tport;
+		char *tuser;
+		switch (parse_ssh_uri(*av, &tuser, &host, &tport)) {
+		case -1:
+			usage();
+			break;
+		case 0:
+			if (options.user == NULL) {
+				options.user = tuser;
+				tuser = NULL;
+			}
+			free(tuser);
+			if (options.port == -1 && tport != -1)
+				options.port = tport;
+			break;
+		default:
+			p = xstrdup(*av);
+			cp = strrchr(p, '@');
+			if (cp != NULL) {
+				if (cp == p)
+					usage();
+				if (options.user == NULL) {
+					options.user = p;
+					p = NULL;
+				}
+				*cp++ = '\0';
+				host = xstrdup(cp);
+				free(p);
+			} else
+				host = p;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (ac > 1 && !opt_terminated) {
+			optind = optreset = 1;
+			goto again;
+		}
+		ac--, av++;
+	}
+
+	/* Check that we got a host name. */
+	if (!host)
+		usage();
+
+	options.host_arg = xstrdup(host);
+
+	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
+	if ((command = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	/*
+	 * Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There
+	 * is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum
+	 * packet size.  Also sets the tty flag if there is no command.
+	 */
+	if (!ac) {
+		/* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */
+		if (options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM) {
+			fprintf(stderr,
+			    "You must specify a subsystem to invoke.\n");
+			usage();
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* A command has been specified.  Store it into the buffer. */
+		for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) {
+			if ((r = sshbuf_putf(command, "%s%s",
+			    i ? " " : "", av[i])) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+		}
+	}
+
+	ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize "log" output.  Since we are the client all output
+	 * goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E.
+	 */
+	if (use_syslog && logfile != NULL)
+		fatal("Can't specify both -y and -E");
+	if (logfile != NULL)
+		log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
+	log_init(argv0,
+	    options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
+	    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
+	    options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
+	    SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER : options.log_facility,
+	    !use_syslog);
+
+	if (debug_flag)
+		logit("%s, %s", SSH_RELEASE, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
+
+	/* Parse the configuration files */
+	process_config_files(options.host_arg, pw, 0, &want_final_pass);
+	if (want_final_pass)
+		debug("configuration requests final Match pass");
+
+	/* Hostname canonicalisation needs a few options filled. */
+	fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(&options);
+
+	/* If the user has replaced the hostname then take it into use now */
+	if (options.hostname != NULL) {
+		/* NB. Please keep in sync with readconf.c:match_cfg_line() */
+		cp = percent_expand(options.hostname,
+		    "h", host, (char *)NULL);
+		free(host);
+		host = cp;
+		free(options.hostname);
+		options.hostname = xstrdup(host);
+	}
+
+	/* Don't lowercase addresses, they will be explicitly canonicalised */
+	if ((was_addr = is_addr(host)) == 0)
+		lowercase(host);
+
+	/*
+	 * Try to canonicalize if requested by configuration or the
+	 * hostname is an address.
+	 */
+	if (options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_NO || was_addr)
+		addrs = resolve_canonicalize(&host, options.port);
+
+	/*
+	 * If CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified but
+	 * other canonicalization did not happen (by not being requested
+	 * or by failing with fallback) then the hostname may still be changed
+	 * as a result of CNAME following.
+	 *
+	 * Try to resolve the bare hostname name using the system resolver's
+	 * usual search rules and then apply the CNAME follow rules.
+	 *
+	 * Skip the lookup if a ProxyCommand is being used unless the user
+	 * has specifically requested canonicalisation for this case via
+	 * CanonicalizeHostname=always
+	 */
+	direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) &&
+	    options.jump_host == NULL;
+	if (addrs == NULL && config_has_permitted_cnames(&options) && (direct ||
+	    options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)) {
+		if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port,
+		    direct, cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) {
+			/* Don't fatal proxied host names not in the DNS */
+			if (direct)
+				cleanup_exit(255); /* logged in resolve_host */
+		} else
+			check_follow_cname(direct, &host, cname);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If canonicalisation is enabled then re-parse the configuration
+	 * files as new stanzas may match.
+	 */
+	if (options.canonicalize_hostname != 0 && !want_final_pass) {
+		debug("hostname canonicalisation enabled, "
+		    "will re-parse configuration");
+		want_final_pass = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (want_final_pass) {
+		debug("re-parsing configuration");
+		free(options.hostname);
+		options.hostname = xstrdup(host);
+		process_config_files(options.host_arg, pw, 1, NULL);
+		/*
+		 * Address resolution happens early with canonicalisation
+		 * enabled and the port number may have changed since, so
+		 * reset it in address list
+		 */
+		if (addrs != NULL && options.port > 0)
+			set_addrinfo_port(addrs, options.port);
+	}
+
+	/* Fill configuration defaults. */
+	if (fill_default_options(&options) != 0)
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+
+	if (options.user == NULL)
+		options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+
+	/*
+	 * If ProxyJump option specified, then construct a ProxyCommand now.
+	 */
+	if (options.jump_host != NULL) {
+		char port_s[8];
+		const char *jumpuser = options.jump_user, *sshbin = argv0;
+		int port = options.port, jumpport = options.jump_port;
+
+		if (port <= 0)
+			port = default_ssh_port();
+		if (jumpport <= 0)
+			jumpport = default_ssh_port();
+		if (jumpuser == NULL)
+			jumpuser = options.user;
+		if (strcmp(options.jump_host, host) == 0 && port == jumpport &&
+		    strcmp(options.user, jumpuser) == 0)
+			fatal("jumphost loop via %s", options.jump_host);
+
+		/*
+		 * Try to use SSH indicated by argv[0], but fall back to
+		 * "ssh" if it appears unavailable.
+		 */
+		if (strchr(argv0, '/') != NULL && access(argv0, X_OK) != 0)
+			sshbin = "ssh";
+
+		/* Consistency check */
+		if (options.proxy_command != NULL)
+			fatal("inconsistent options: ProxyCommand+ProxyJump");
+		/* Never use FD passing for ProxyJump */
+		options.proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
+		snprintf(port_s, sizeof(port_s), "%d", options.jump_port);
+		xasprintf(&options.proxy_command,
+		    "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%.*s -W '[%%h]:%%p' %s",
+		    sshbin,
+		    /* Optional "-l user" argument if jump_user set */
+		    options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : " -l ",
+		    options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : options.jump_user,
+		    /* Optional "-p port" argument if jump_port set */
+		    options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : " -p ",
+		    options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : port_s,
+		    /* Optional additional jump hosts ",..." */
+		    options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : " -J ",
+		    options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : options.jump_extra,
+		    /* Optional "-F" argument if -F specified */
+		    config == NULL ? "" : " -F ",
+		    config == NULL ? "" : config,
+		    /* Optional "-v" arguments if -v set */
+		    debug_flag ? " -" : "",
+		    debug_flag, "vvv",
+		    /* Mandatory hostname */
+		    options.jump_host);
+		debug("Setting implicit ProxyCommand from ProxyJump: %s",
+		    options.proxy_command);
+	}
+
+	if (options.port == 0)
+		options.port = default_ssh_port();
+	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
+
+	/* Tidy and check options */
+	if (options.host_key_alias != NULL)
+		lowercase(options.host_key_alias);
+	if (options.proxy_command != NULL &&
+	    strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0 &&
+	    options.proxy_use_fdpass)
+		fatal("ProxyCommand=- and ProxyUseFDPass are incompatible");
+	if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) {
+		if (options.control_persist && options.control_path != NULL) {
+			debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with "
+			    "ControlPersist; disabling");
+			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+		} else if (sshbuf_len(command) != 0 ||
+		    options.remote_command != NULL ||
+		    options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO) {
+			debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with "
+			    "remote command execution; disabling");
+			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+		} else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) {
+			/* no point logging anything; user won't see it */
+			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+		}
+	}
+	if (options.connection_attempts <= 0)
+		fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts");
+
+	if (sshbuf_len(command) != 0 && options.remote_command != NULL)
+		fatal("Cannot execute command-line and remote command.");
+
+	/* Cannot fork to background if no command. */
+	if (options.fork_after_authentication && sshbuf_len(command) == 0 &&
+	    options.remote_command == NULL &&
+	    options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE)
+		fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command "
+		    "to execute.");
+
+	/* reinit */
+	log_init(argv0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, !use_syslog);
+	for (j = 0; j < options.num_log_verbose; j++) {
+		if (strcasecmp(options.log_verbose[j], "none") == 0)
+			break;
+		log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[j]);
+	}
+
+	if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES ||
+	    options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE)
+		tty_flag = 1;
+
+	/* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */
+	if (sshbuf_len(command) == 0 && options.remote_command == NULL)
+		tty_flag = options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_NO;
+
+	/* Force no tty */
+	if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO ||
+	    (muxclient_command && muxclient_command != SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY) ||
+	    options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_NONE)
+		tty_flag = 0;
+	/* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
+	if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || options.stdin_null) &&
+	    options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) {
+		if (tty_flag)
+			logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because "
+			    "stdin is not a terminal.");
+		tty_flag = 0;
+	}
+
+	/* Set up strings used to percent_expand() arguments */
+	cinfo = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cinfo));
+	if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
+		fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
+	cinfo->thishost = xstrdup(thishost);
+	thishost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0';
+	cinfo->shorthost = xstrdup(thishost);
+	xasprintf(&cinfo->portstr, "%d", options.port);
+	xasprintf(&cinfo->uidstr, "%llu",
+	    (unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
+	cinfo->keyalias = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias ?
+	    options.host_key_alias : options.host_arg);
+	cinfo->conn_hash_hex = ssh_connection_hash(cinfo->thishost, host,
+	    cinfo->portstr, options.user);
+	cinfo->host_arg = xstrdup(options.host_arg);
+	cinfo->remhost = xstrdup(host);
+	cinfo->remuser = xstrdup(options.user);
+	cinfo->homedir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
+	cinfo->locuser = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+
+	/*
+	 * Expand tokens in arguments. NB. LocalCommand is expanded later,
+	 * after port-forwarding is set up, so it may pick up any local
+	 * tunnel interface name allocated.
+	 */
+	if (options.remote_command != NULL) {
+		debug3("expanding RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command);
+		cp = options.remote_command;
+		options.remote_command = default_client_percent_expand(cp,
+		    cinfo);
+		debug3("expanded RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command);
+		free(cp);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put(command, options.remote_command,
+		    strlen(options.remote_command))) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+	}
+
+	if (options.control_path != NULL) {
+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path, getuid());
+		free(options.control_path);
+		options.control_path = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp,
+		    cinfo);
+		free(cp);
+	}
+
+	if (options.identity_agent != NULL) {
+		p = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_agent, getuid());
+		cp = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(p, cinfo);
+		free(p);
+		free(options.identity_agent);
+		options.identity_agent = cp;
+	}
+
+	if (options.forward_agent_sock_path != NULL) {
+		p = tilde_expand_filename(options.forward_agent_sock_path,
+		    getuid());
+		cp = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(p, cinfo);
+		free(p);
+		free(options.forward_agent_sock_path);
+		options.forward_agent_sock_path = cp;
+		if (stat(options.forward_agent_sock_path, &st) != 0) {
+			error("Cannot forward agent socket path \"%s\": %s",
+			    options.forward_agent_sock_path, strerror(errno));
+			if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+				cleanup_exit(255);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (options.num_system_hostfiles > 0 &&
+	    strcasecmp(options.system_hostfiles[0], "none") == 0) {
+		if (options.num_system_hostfiles > 1)
+			fatal("Invalid GlobalKnownHostsFiles: \"none\" "
+			    "appears with other entries");
+		free(options.system_hostfiles[0]);
+		options.system_hostfiles[0] = NULL;
+		options.num_system_hostfiles = 0;
+	}
+
+	if (options.num_user_hostfiles > 0 &&
+	    strcasecmp(options.user_hostfiles[0], "none") == 0) {
+		if (options.num_user_hostfiles > 1)
+			fatal("Invalid UserKnownHostsFiles: \"none\" "
+			    "appears with other entries");
+		free(options.user_hostfiles[0]);
+		options.user_hostfiles[0] = NULL;
+		options.num_user_hostfiles = 0;
+	}
+	for (j = 0; j < options.num_user_hostfiles; j++) {
+		if (options.user_hostfiles[j] == NULL)
+			continue;
+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.user_hostfiles[j], getuid());
+		p = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
+		if (strcmp(options.user_hostfiles[j], p) != 0)
+			debug3("expanded UserKnownHostsFile '%s' -> "
+			    "'%s'", options.user_hostfiles[j], p);
+		free(options.user_hostfiles[j]);
+		free(cp);
+		options.user_hostfiles[j] = p;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
+		if (options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) {
+			cp = options.local_forwards[i].listen_path;
+			p = options.local_forwards[i].listen_path =
+			    default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo);
+			if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0)
+				debug3("expanded LocalForward listen path "
+				    "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p);
+			free(cp);
+		}
+		if (options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) {
+			cp = options.local_forwards[i].connect_path;
+			p = options.local_forwards[i].connect_path =
+			    default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo);
+			if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0)
+				debug3("expanded LocalForward connect path "
+				    "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p);
+			free(cp);
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+		if (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) {
+			cp = options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path;
+			p = options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path =
+			    default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo);
+			if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0)
+				debug3("expanded RemoteForward listen path "
+				    "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p);
+			free(cp);
+		}
+		if (options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) {
+			cp = options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path;
+			p = options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path =
+			    default_client_percent_expand(cp, cinfo);
+			if (strcmp(cp, p) != 0)
+				debug3("expanded RemoteForward connect path "
+				    "'%s' -> '%s'", cp, p);
+			free(cp);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (config_test) {
+		dump_client_config(&options, host);
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
+	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
+	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
+		if ((cp = getenv(options.sk_provider + 1)) == NULL) {
+			debug("Authenticator provider %s did not resolve; "
+			    "disabling", options.sk_provider);
+			free(options.sk_provider);
+			options.sk_provider = NULL;
+		} else {
+			debug2("resolved SecurityKeyProvider %s => %s",
+			    options.sk_provider, cp);
+			free(options.sk_provider);
+			options.sk_provider = xstrdup(cp);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL)
+		fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command");
+	if (options.control_path != NULL) {
+		int sock;
+		if ((sock = muxclient(options.control_path)) >= 0) {
+			ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock);
+			ssh_packet_set_mux(ssh);
+			goto skip_connect;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If hostname canonicalisation was not enabled, then we may not
+	 * have yet resolved the hostname. Do so now.
+	 */
+	if (addrs == NULL && options.proxy_command == NULL) {
+		debug2("resolving \"%s\" port %d", host, options.port);
+		if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1,
+		    cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL)
+			cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */
+	}
+
+	if (options.connection_timeout >= INT_MAX/1000)
+		timeout_ms = INT_MAX;
+	else
+		timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
+
+	/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
+	if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, options.host_arg, addrs, &hostaddr,
+	    options.port, options.connection_attempts,
+	    &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0)
+		exit(255);
+
+	if (addrs != NULL)
+		freeaddrinfo(addrs);
+
+	ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.server_alive_interval,
+	    options.server_alive_count_max);
+
+	if (timeout_ms > 0)
+		debug3("timeout: %d ms remain after connect", timeout_ms);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we successfully made the connection and we have hostbased auth
+	 * enabled, load the public keys so we can later use the ssh-keysign
+	 * helper to sign challenges.
+	 */
+	sensitive_data.nkeys = 0;
+	sensitive_data.keys = NULL;
+	if (options.hostbased_authentication) {
+		int loaded = 0;
+
+		sensitive_data.nkeys = 10;
+		sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys,
+		    sizeof(*sensitive_data.keys));
+
+		/* XXX check errors? */
+#define L_PUBKEY(p,o) do { \
+	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
+		fatal_f("pubkey out of array bounds"); \
+	check_load(sshkey_load_public(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), NULL), \
+	    &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "pubkey"); \
+	if (sensitive_data.keys[o] != NULL) { \
+		debug2("hostbased key %d: %s key from \"%s\"", o, \
+		    sshkey_ssh_name(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p); \
+		loaded++; \
+	} \
+} while (0)
+#define L_CERT(p,o) do { \
+	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
+		fatal_f("cert out of array bounds"); \
+	check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), \
+	    &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "cert"); \
+	if (sensitive_data.keys[o] != NULL) { \
+		debug2("hostbased key %d: %s cert from \"%s\"", o, \
+		    sshkey_ssh_name(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p); \
+		loaded++; \
+	} \
+} while (0)
+
+		if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1) {
+			L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 0);
+			L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 1);
+			L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 2);
+			L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 3);
+			L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 4);
+			L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 5);
+			L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 6);
+			L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 7);
+			L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 8);
+			L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 9);
+			if (loaded == 0)
+				debug("HostbasedAuthentication enabled but no "
+				   "local public host keys could be loaded.");
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* load options.identity_files */
+	load_public_identity_files(cinfo);
+
+	/* optionally set the SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME variable */
+	if (options.identity_agent &&
+	    strcmp(options.identity_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) != 0) {
+		if (strcmp(options.identity_agent, "none") == 0) {
+			unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+		} else {
+			cp = options.identity_agent;
+			/* legacy (limited) format */
+			if (cp[0] == '$' && cp[1] != '{') {
+				if (!valid_env_name(cp + 1)) {
+					fatal("Invalid IdentityAgent "
+					    "environment variable name %s", cp);
+				}
+				if ((p = getenv(cp + 1)) == NULL)
+					unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+				else
+					setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, p, 1);
+			} else {
+				/* identity_agent specifies a path directly */
+				setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, cp, 1);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (options.forward_agent && options.forward_agent_sock_path != NULL) {
+		cp = options.forward_agent_sock_path;
+		if (cp[0] == '$') {
+			if (!valid_env_name(cp + 1)) {
+				fatal("Invalid ForwardAgent environment variable name %s", cp);
+			}
+			if ((p = getenv(cp + 1)) != NULL)
+				forward_agent_sock_path = xstrdup(p);
+			else
+				options.forward_agent = 0;
+			free(cp);
+		} else {
+			forward_agent_sock_path = cp;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Expand ~ in known host file names. */
+	tilde_expand_paths(options.system_hostfiles,
+	    options.num_system_hostfiles);
+	tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles);
+
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+
+	/* Log into the remote system.  Never returns if the login fails. */
+	ssh_login(ssh, &sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr,
+	    options.port, pw, timeout_ms, cinfo);
+
+	/* We no longer need the private host keys.  Clear them now. */
+	if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) {
+		for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) {
+			if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) {
+				/* Destroys contents safely */
+				debug3("clear hostkey %d", i);
+				sshkey_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]);
+				sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+		free(sensitive_data.keys);
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
+		free(options.identity_files[i]);
+		options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
+		if (options.identity_keys[i]) {
+			sshkey_free(options.identity_keys[i]);
+			options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) {
+		free(options.certificate_files[i]);
+		options.certificate_files[i] = NULL;
+	}
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	(void)pkcs11_del_provider(options.pkcs11_provider);
+#endif
+
+ skip_connect:
+	exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, cinfo);
+	ssh_conn_info_free(cinfo);
+	ssh_packet_close(ssh);
+
+	if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
+		unlink(options.control_path);
+
+	/* Kill ProxyCommand if it is running. */
+	ssh_kill_proxy_command();
+
+	return exit_status;
+}
+
+static void
+control_persist_detach(void)
+{
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	debug_f("backgrounding master process");
+
+	/*
+	 * master (current process) into the background, and make the
+	 * foreground process a client of the backgrounded master.
+	 */
+	switch ((pid = fork())) {
+	case -1:
+		fatal_f("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+	case 0:
+		/* Child: master process continues mainloop */
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* Parent: set up mux client to connect to backgrounded master */
+		debug2_f("background process is %ld", (long)pid);
+		options.stdin_null = ostdin_null_flag;
+		options.request_tty = orequest_tty;
+		tty_flag = otty_flag;
+		options.session_type = osession_type;
+		close(muxserver_sock);
+		muxserver_sock = -1;
+		options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
+		muxclient(options.control_path);
+		/* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */
+		fatal("Failed to connect to new control master");
+	}
+	if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !(log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag)) == -1)
+		error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+	daemon(1, 1);
+	setproctitle("%s [mux]", options.control_path);
+}
+
+/* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */
+static void
+fork_postauth(void)
+{
+	if (need_controlpersist_detach)
+		control_persist_detach();
+	debug("forking to background");
+	options.fork_after_authentication = 0;
+	if (daemon(1, 1) == -1)
+		fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+	if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !(log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag)) == -1)
+		error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+}
+
+static void
+forwarding_success(void)
+{
+	if (forward_confirms_pending == -1)
+		return;
+	if (--forward_confirms_pending == 0) {
+		debug_f("all expected forwarding replies received");
+		if (options.fork_after_authentication)
+			fork_postauth();
+	} else {
+		debug2_f("%d expected forwarding replies remaining",
+		    forward_confirms_pending);
+	}
+}
+
+/* Callback for remote forward global requests */
+static void
+ssh_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
+{
+	struct Forward *rfwd = (struct Forward *)ctxt;
+	u_int port;
+	int r;
+
+	/* XXX verbose() on failure? */
+	debug("remote forward %s for: listen %s%s%d, connect %s:%d",
+	    type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
+	    rfwd->listen_path ? rfwd->listen_path :
+	    rfwd->listen_host ? rfwd->listen_host : "",
+	    (rfwd->listen_path || rfwd->listen_host) ? ":" : "",
+	    rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
+	    rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+	if (rfwd->listen_path == NULL && rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
+		if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
+			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
+			if (port > 65535) {
+				error("Invalid allocated port %u for remote "
+				    "forward to %s:%d", port,
+				    rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
+				/* Ensure failure processing runs below */
+				type = SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE;
+				channel_update_permission(ssh,
+				    rfwd->handle, -1);
+			} else {
+				rfwd->allocated_port = (int)port;
+				logit("Allocated port %u for remote "
+				    "forward to %s:%d",
+				    rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_path ?
+				    rfwd->connect_path : rfwd->connect_host,
+				    rfwd->connect_port);
+				channel_update_permission(ssh,
+				    rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port);
+			}
+		} else {
+			channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) {
+		if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) {
+			if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
+				fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed "
+				    "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
+			else
+				fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed "
+				    "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
+		} else {
+			if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
+				logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed "
+				    "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
+			else
+				logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed "
+				    "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
+		}
+	}
+	forwarding_success();
+}
+
+static void
+client_cleanup_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int force, void *arg)
+{
+	debug("stdio forwarding: done");
+	cleanup_exit(0);
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
+{
+	if (!success)
+		fatal("stdio forwarding failed");
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_tun_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
+{
+	if (!success) {
+		error("Tunnel forwarding failed");
+		if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+			cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+
+	debug_f("tunnel forward established, id=%d", id);
+	forwarding_success();
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	int in, out;
+
+	if (options.stdio_forward_host == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	debug3_f("%s:%d", options.stdio_forward_host,
+	    options.stdio_forward_port);
+
+	if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 ||
+	    (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1)
+		fatal_f("dup() in/out failed");
+	if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, options.stdio_forward_host,
+	    options.stdio_forward_port, in, out,
+	    CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed");
+	channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0);
+	channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL);
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_init_forward_permissions(struct ssh *ssh, const char *what, char **opens,
+    u_int num_opens)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	int port;
+	char *addr, *arg, *oarg;
+	int where = FORWARD_LOCAL;
+
+	channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where);
+	if (num_opens == 0)
+		return; /* permit any */
+
+	/* handle keywords: "any" / "none" */
+	if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "any") == 0)
+		return;
+	if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "none") == 0) {
+		channel_disable_admin(ssh, where);
+		return;
+	}
+	/* Otherwise treat it as a list of permitted host:port */
+	for (i = 0; i < num_opens; i++) {
+		oarg = arg = xstrdup(opens[i]);
+		addr = hpdelim(&arg);
+		if (addr == NULL)
+			fatal_f("missing host in %s", what);
+		addr = cleanhostname(addr);
+		if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0))
+			fatal_f("bad port number in %s", what);
+		/* Send it to channels layer */
+		channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM,
+		    where, addr, port);
+		free(oarg);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_init_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, char **ifname)
+{
+	int success = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	ssh_init_forward_permissions(ssh, "permitremoteopen",
+	    options.permitted_remote_opens,
+	    options.num_permitted_remote_opens);
+
+	if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+		forward_confirms_pending = 0; /* track pending requests */
+	/* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
+		debug("Local connections to %.200s:%d forwarded to remote "
+		    "address %.200s:%d",
+		    (options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ?
+		    options.local_forwards[i].listen_path :
+		    (options.local_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
+		    (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
+		    options.local_forwards[i].listen_host,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].listen_port,
+		    (options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ?
+		    options.local_forwards[i].connect_path :
+		    options.local_forwards[i].connect_host,
+		    options.local_forwards[i].connect_port);
+		success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh,
+		    &options.local_forwards[i], &options.fwd_opts);
+	}
+	if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+		fatal("Could not request local forwarding.");
+	if (i > 0 && success == 0)
+		error("Could not request local forwarding.");
+
+	/* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
+		debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to "
+		    "local address %.200s:%d",
+		    (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ?
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path :
+		    (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
+		    "LOCALHOST" : options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host,
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
+		    (options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ?
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path :
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
+		    options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
+		if ((options.remote_forwards[i].handle =
+		    channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh,
+		    &options.remote_forwards[i])) >= 0) {
+			client_register_global_confirm(
+			    ssh_confirm_remote_forward,
+			    &options.remote_forwards[i]);
+			forward_confirms_pending++;
+		} else if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+			fatal("Could not request remote forwarding.");
+		else
+			logit("Warning: Could not request remote forwarding.");
+	}
+
+	/* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */
+	if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
+		if ((*ifname = client_request_tun_fwd(ssh,
+		    options.tun_open, options.tun_local,
+		    options.tun_remote, ssh_tun_confirm, NULL)) != NULL)
+			forward_confirms_pending++;
+		else if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
+			fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
+		else
+			error("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
+	}
+	if (forward_confirms_pending > 0) {
+		debug_f("expecting replies for %d forwards",
+		    forward_confirms_pending);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+check_agent_present(void)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (options.forward_agent) {
+		/* Clear agent forwarding if we don't have an agent. */
+		if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) != 0) {
+			options.forward_agent = 0;
+			if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
+				debug_r(r, "ssh_get_authentication_socket");
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+ssh_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
+{
+	extern char **environ;
+	const char *display, *term;
+	int r, interactive = tty_flag;
+	char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
+
+	if (!success)
+		return; /* No need for error message, channels code sends one */
+
+	display = getenv("DISPLAY");
+	if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11)
+		debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set");
+	if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display,
+	    options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted,
+	    options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) {
+		/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
+		debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
+		    "spoofing.");
+		x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id, display, proto,
+		    data, 1);
+		client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN);
+		/* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
+		interactive = 1;
+	}
+
+	check_agent_present();
+	if (options.forward_agent) {
+		debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
+		channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+	}
+
+	/* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */
+	ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, interactive,
+	    options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
+
+	if ((term = lookup_env_in_list("TERM", options.setenv,
+	    options.num_setenv)) == NULL || *term == '\0')
+		term = getenv("TERM");
+	client_session2_setup(ssh, id, tty_flag,
+	    options.session_type == SESSION_TYPE_SUBSYSTEM, term,
+	    NULL, fileno(stdin), command, environ);
+}
+
+/* open new channel for a session */
+static int
+ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Channel *c;
+	int window, packetmax, in, out, err;
+
+	if (options.stdin_null) {
+		in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY);
+	} else {
+		in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+	}
+	out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
+	err = dup(STDERR_FILENO);
+
+	if (in == -1 || out == -1 || err == -1)
+		fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
+
+	window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
+	packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
+	if (tty_flag) {
+		window >>= 1;
+		packetmax >>= 1;
+	}
+	c = channel_new(ssh,
+	    "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err,
+	    window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
+	    "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
+
+	debug3_f("channel_new: %d", c->self);
+
+	channel_send_open(ssh, c->self);
+	if (options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE)
+		channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self,
+		    ssh_session2_setup, NULL);
+
+	return c->self;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+{
+	int r, id = -1;
+	char *cp, *tun_fwd_ifname = NULL;
+
+	/* XXX should be pre-session */
+	if (!options.control_persist)
+		ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh);
+
+	ssh_init_forwarding(ssh, &tun_fwd_ifname);
+
+	if (options.local_command != NULL) {
+		debug3("expanding LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
+		cp = options.local_command;
+		options.local_command = percent_expand(cp,
+		    DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo),
+		    "T", tun_fwd_ifname == NULL ? "NONE" : tun_fwd_ifname,
+		    (char *)NULL);
+		debug3("expanded LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
+		free(cp);
+	}
+
+	/* Start listening for multiplex clients */
+	if (!ssh_packet_get_mux(ssh))
+		muxserver_listen(ssh);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we are in control persist mode and have a working mux listen
+	 * socket, then prepare to background ourselves and have a foreground
+	 * client attach as a control client.
+	 * NB. we must save copies of the flags that we override for
+	 * the backgrounding, since we defer attachment of the client until
+	 * after the connection is fully established (in particular,
+	 * async rfwd replies have been received for ExitOnForwardFailure).
+	 */
+	if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock != -1) {
+		ostdin_null_flag = options.stdin_null;
+		osession_type = options.session_type;
+		orequest_tty = options.request_tty;
+		otty_flag = tty_flag;
+		options.stdin_null = 1;
+		options.session_type = SESSION_TYPE_NONE;
+		tty_flag = 0;
+		if (!options.fork_after_authentication &&
+		    (osession_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE ||
+		    options.stdio_forward_host != NULL))
+			need_controlpersist_detach = 1;
+		options.fork_after_authentication = 1;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * ControlPersist mux listen socket setup failed, attempt the
+	 * stdio forward setup that we skipped earlier.
+	 */
+	if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock == -1)
+		ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh);
+
+	if (options.session_type != SESSION_TYPE_NONE)
+		id = ssh_session2_open(ssh);
+	else {
+		ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh,
+		    options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO,
+		    options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
+	}
+
+	/* If we don't expect to open a new session, then disallow it */
+	if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO &&
+	    (ssh->compat & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) {
+		debug("Requesting no-more-sessions@openssh.com");
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
+		    "no-more-sessions@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+	}
+
+	/* Execute a local command */
+	if (options.local_command != NULL &&
+	    options.permit_local_command)
+		ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command);
+
+	/*
+	 * stdout is now owned by the session channel; clobber it here
+	 * so future channel closes are propagated to the local fd.
+	 * NB. this can only happen after LocalCommand has completed,
+	 * as it may want to write to stdout.
+	 */
+	if (!need_controlpersist_detach && stdfd_devnull(0, 1, 0) == -1)
+		error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+
+	/*
+	 * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote
+	 * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background.
+	 */
+	if (options.fork_after_authentication) {
+		if (options.exit_on_forward_failure &&
+		    options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
+			debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward "
+			    "confirmation received");
+		} else
+			fork_postauth();
+	}
+
+	return client_loop(ssh, tty_flag, tty_flag ?
+	    options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
+}
+
+/* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */
+static void
+load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+{
+	char *filename, *cp;
+	struct sshkey *public;
+	int i;
+	u_int n_ids, n_certs;
+	char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+	struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+	int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
+	char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+	struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+	int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
+	char **comments = NULL;
+	int nkeys;
+#endif /* PKCS11 */
+
+	n_ids = n_certs = 0;
+	memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files));
+	memset(identity_keys, 0, sizeof(identity_keys));
+	memset(identity_file_userprovided, 0,
+	    sizeof(identity_file_userprovided));
+	memset(certificate_files, 0, sizeof(certificate_files));
+	memset(certificates, 0, sizeof(certificates));
+	memset(certificate_file_userprovided, 0,
+	    sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided));
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+	if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL &&
+	    options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
+	    (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) &&
+	    (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL,
+	    &keys, &comments)) > 0) {
+		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+			if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) {
+				sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+				free(comments[i]);
+				continue;
+			}
+			identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i];
+			identity_files[n_ids] = comments[i]; /* transferred */
+			n_ids++;
+		}
+		free(keys);
+		free(comments);
+	}
+#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
+		if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES ||
+		    strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) {
+			free(options.identity_files[i]);
+			options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
+			continue;
+		}
+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], getuid());
+		filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
+		free(cp);
+		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
+		    &public, filename, "pubkey");
+		debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
+		    public ? public->type : -1);
+		free(options.identity_files[i]);
+		identity_files[n_ids] = filename;
+		identity_keys[n_ids] = public;
+		identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] =
+		    options.identity_file_userprovided[i];
+		if (++n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
+			continue;
+
+		/*
+		 * If no certificates have been explicitly listed then try
+		 * to add the default certificate variant too.
+		 */
+		if (options.num_certificate_files != 0)
+			continue;
+		xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename);
+		check_load(sshkey_load_public(cp, &public, NULL),
+		    &public, filename, "pubkey");
+		debug("identity file %s type %d", cp,
+		    public ? public->type : -1);
+		if (public == NULL) {
+			free(cp);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) {
+			debug_f("key %s type %s is not a certificate",
+			    cp, sshkey_type(public));
+			sshkey_free(public);
+			free(cp);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* NB. leave filename pointing to private key */
+		identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(filename);
+		identity_keys[n_ids] = public;
+		identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] =
+		    options.identity_file_userprovided[i];
+		n_ids++;
+	}
+
+	if (options.num_certificate_files > SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES)
+		fatal_f("too many certificates");
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) {
+		cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.certificate_files[i],
+		    getuid());
+		filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
+		free(cp);
+
+		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
+		    &public, filename, "certificate");
+		debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename,
+		    public ? public->type : -1);
+		free(options.certificate_files[i]);
+		options.certificate_files[i] = NULL;
+		if (public == NULL) {
+			free(filename);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) {
+			debug_f("key %s type %s is not a certificate",
+			    filename, sshkey_type(public));
+			sshkey_free(public);
+			free(filename);
+			continue;
+		}
+		certificate_files[n_certs] = filename;
+		certificates[n_certs] = public;
+		certificate_file_userprovided[n_certs] =
+		    options.certificate_file_userprovided[i];
+		++n_certs;
+	}
+
+	options.num_identity_files = n_ids;
+	memcpy(options.identity_files, identity_files, sizeof(identity_files));
+	memcpy(options.identity_keys, identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys));
+	memcpy(options.identity_file_userprovided,
+	    identity_file_userprovided, sizeof(identity_file_userprovided));
+
+	options.num_certificate_files = n_certs;
+	memcpy(options.certificate_files,
+	    certificate_files, sizeof(certificate_files));
+	memcpy(options.certificates, certificates, sizeof(certificates));
+	memcpy(options.certificate_file_userprovided,
+	    certificate_file_userprovided,
+	    sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided));
+}
+
+static void
+main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
+{
+	int save_errno = errno;
+	pid_t pid;
+	int status;
+
+	while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
+	    (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR))
+		;
+	errno = save_errno;
+}
diff --git a/ssh.h b/ssh.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8110c06
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh.h
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.h,v 1.90 2020/07/14 23:57:01 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/* Cipher used for encrypting authentication files. */
+#define SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER	SSH_CIPHER_3DES
+
+/* Default port number. */
+#define SSH_DEFAULT_PORT	22
+
+/*
+ * Maximum number of certificate files that can be specified
+ * in configuration files or on the command line.
+ */
+#define SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES	100
+
+/*
+ * Maximum number of RSA authentication identity files that can be specified
+ * in configuration files or on the command line.
+ */
+#define SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES		100
+
+/*
+ * Major protocol version.  Different version indicates major incompatibility
+ * that prevents communication.
+ *
+ * Minor protocol version.  Different version indicates minor incompatibility
+ * that does not prevent interoperation.
+ */
+#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1	1
+#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_1	5
+
+/* We support only SSH2 */
+#define PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2	2
+#define PROTOCOL_MINOR_2	0
+
+/*
+ * Name for the service.  The port named by this service overrides the
+ * default port if present.
+ */
+#define SSH_SERVICE_NAME	"ssh"
+
+/*
+ * Name of the environment variable containing the process ID of the
+ * authentication agent.
+ */
+#define SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME	"SSH_AGENT_PID"
+
+/*
+ * Name of the environment variable containing the pathname of the
+ * authentication socket.
+ */
+#define SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME "SSH_AUTH_SOCK"
+
+/*
+ * Environment variable for overwriting the default location of askpass
+ */
+#define SSH_ASKPASS_ENV		"SSH_ASKPASS"
+
+/*
+ * Environment variable to control whether or not askpass is used.
+ */
+#define SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE_ENV		"SSH_ASKPASS_REQUIRE"
+
+/*
+ * Force host key length and server key length to differ by at least this
+ * many bits.  This is to make double encryption with rsaref work.
+ */
+#define SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED		128
+
+/*
+ * Length of the session key in bytes.  (Specified as 256 bits in the
+ * protocol.)
+ */
+#define SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH		32
+
+/* Used to identify ``EscapeChar none'' */
+#define SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE		-2
+
+/*
+ * unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes;
+ * sshd will change its privileges to this user and its
+ * primary group.
+ */
+#ifndef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER		"sshd"
+#endif
+
+/* Listen backlog for sshd, ssh-agent and forwarding sockets */
+#define SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG		128
+
+/* Limits for banner exchange */
+#define SSH_MAX_BANNER_LEN		8192
+#define SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES	1024
diff --git a/ssh2.h b/ssh2.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..32ddae8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh2.h,v 1.19 2020/11/19 23:05:05 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * RFC4251:
+ *
+ *   Transport layer protocol:
+ *
+ *     1-19     Transport layer generic (e.g. disconnect, ignore, debug,
+ *              etc)
+ *     20-29    Algorithm negotiation
+ *     30-49    Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for
+ *              different authentication methods)
+ *
+ *   User authentication protocol:
+ *
+ *     50-59    User authentication generic
+ *     60-79    User authentication method specific (numbers can be reused
+ *              for different authentication methods)
+ *
+ *   Connection protocol:
+ *
+ *     80-89    Connection protocol generic
+ *     90-127   Channel related messages
+ *
+ *   Reserved for client protocols:
+ *
+ *     128-191  Reserved
+ *
+ *   Local extensions:
+ *
+ *     192-255  Local extensions
+ */
+
+/* special marker for no message */
+
+#define SSH_MSG_NONE					0
+
+/* ranges */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN				1
+#define SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX				49
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN				50
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX				79
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN		60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX		SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX
+#define SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MIN				80
+#define SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MAX				127
+#define SSH2_MSG_RESERVED_MIN				128
+#define SSH2_MSG_RESERVED_MAX				191
+#define SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN				192
+#define SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MAX				255
+#define SSH2_MSG_MIN					1
+#define SSH2_MSG_MAX					255
+
+/* transport layer: generic */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT				1
+#define SSH2_MSG_IGNORE					2
+#define SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED				3
+#define SSH2_MSG_DEBUG					4
+#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST			5
+#define SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT				6
+#define SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO				7
+
+/* transport layer: alg negotiation */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT				20
+#define SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS				21
+
+/* transport layer: kex specific messages, can be reused */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_INIT				30
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXDH_REPLY				31
+
+/* dh-group-exchange */
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD			30
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP			31
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT			32
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY			33
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST			34
+
+/* ecdh */
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT				30
+#define SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY				31
+
+/* user authentication: generic */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST			50
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE			51
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS			52
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER			53
+
+/* user authentication: method specific, can be reused */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK				60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ		60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST			60
+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE			61
+
+/* connection protocol: generic */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST				80
+#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS			81
+#define SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE			82
+
+/* channel related messages */
+
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN				90
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION		91
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE			92
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST			93
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA				94
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA			95
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF				96
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE				97
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST			98
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS			99
+#define SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE			100
+
+/* disconnect reason code */
+
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_NOT_ALLOWED_TO_CONNECT	1
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR			2
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_KEY_EXCHANGE_FAILED		3
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED	4
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_RESERVED			4
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_MAC_ERROR			5
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_COMPRESSION_ERROR		6
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_SERVICE_NOT_AVAILABLE		7
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NOT_SUPPORTED	8
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_HOST_KEY_NOT_VERIFIABLE		9
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_CONNECTION_LOST			10
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION			11
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS		12
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_AUTH_CANCELLED_BY_USER		13
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_NO_MORE_AUTH_METHODS_AVAILABLE	14
+#define SSH2_DISCONNECT_ILLEGAL_USER_NAME		15
+
+/* misc */
+
+#define SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED		1
+#define SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED			2
+#define SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE			3
+#define SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE			4
+
+#define SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR			1
+
+/* Certificate types for OpenSSH certificate keys extension */
+#define SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER				1
+#define SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST				2
diff --git a/ssh_api.c b/ssh_api.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d3c6617
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh_api.c
@@ -0,0 +1,570 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.27 2021/04/03 06:18:41 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "ssh_api.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "version.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+
+int	_ssh_exchange_banner(struct ssh *);
+int	_ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
+int	_ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
+int	_ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(struct ssh *);
+int	_ssh_verify_host_key(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
+struct sshkey *_ssh_host_public_key(int, int, struct ssh *);
+struct sshkey *_ssh_host_private_key(int, int, struct ssh *);
+int	_ssh_host_key_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
+    u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
+
+/*
+ * stubs for the server side implementation of kex.
+ * disable privsep so our stubs will never be called.
+ */
+int	use_privsep = 0;
+int	mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, u_int *,
+    const u_char *, u_int, const char *, const char *, const char *, u_int);
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+DH	*mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
+#endif
+
+int
+mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, u_int datalen, const char *alg,
+    const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
+{
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+DH *
+mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
+{
+	return (NULL);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* API */
+
+int
+ssh_init(struct ssh **sshp, int is_server, struct kex_params *kex_params)
+{
+	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+	struct ssh *ssh;
+	char **proposal;
+	static int called;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!called) {
+		seed_rng();
+		called = 1;
+	}
+
+	if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if (is_server)
+		ssh_packet_set_server(ssh);
+
+	/* Initialize key exchange */
+	proposal = kex_params ? kex_params->proposal : myproposal;
+	if ((r = kex_ready(ssh, proposal)) != 0) {
+		ssh_free(ssh);
+		return r;
+	}
+	ssh->kex->server = is_server;
+	if (is_server) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
+# endif
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+		ssh->kex->load_host_public_key=&_ssh_host_public_key;
+		ssh->kex->load_host_private_key=&_ssh_host_private_key;
+		ssh->kex->sign=&_ssh_host_key_sign;
+	} else {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
+# endif
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+		ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+		ssh->kex->verify_host_key =&_ssh_verify_host_key;
+	}
+	*sshp = ssh;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_free(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct key_entry *k;
+
+	if (ssh == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * we've only created the public keys variants in case we
+	 * are a acting as a server.
+	 */
+	while ((k = TAILQ_FIRST(&ssh->public_keys)) != NULL) {
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&ssh->public_keys, k, next);
+		if (ssh->kex && ssh->kex->server)
+			sshkey_free(k->key);
+		free(k);
+	}
+	while ((k = TAILQ_FIRST(&ssh->private_keys)) != NULL) {
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&ssh->private_keys, k, next);
+		free(k);
+	}
+	ssh_packet_close(ssh);
+	free(ssh);
+}
+
+void
+ssh_set_app_data(struct ssh *ssh, void *app_data)
+{
+	ssh->app_data = app_data;
+}
+
+void *
+ssh_get_app_data(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return ssh->app_data;
+}
+
+/* Returns < 0 on error, 0 otherwise */
+int
+ssh_add_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
+	struct key_entry *k = NULL, *k_prv = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (ssh->kex->server) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		if ((k = malloc(sizeof(*k))) == NULL ||
+		    (k_prv = malloc(sizeof(*k_prv))) == NULL) {
+			free(k);
+			sshkey_free(pubkey);
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		}
+		k_prv->key = key;
+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->private_keys, k_prv, next);
+
+		/* add the public key, too */
+		k->key = pubkey;
+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->public_keys, k, next);
+		r = 0;
+	} else {
+		if ((k = malloc(sizeof(*k))) == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		k->key = key;
+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->public_keys, k, next);
+		r = 0;
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(struct ssh *ssh,
+    int (*cb)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *))
+{
+	if (cb == NULL || ssh->kex == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	ssh->kex->verify_host_key = cb;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_input_append(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, size_t len)
+{
+	return sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_input(ssh), data, len);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_next(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep)
+{
+	int r;
+	u_int32_t seqnr;
+	u_char type;
+
+	/*
+	 * Try to read a packet. Return SSH_MSG_NONE if no packet or not
+	 * enough data.
+	 */
+	*typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
+	if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) == 0 ||
+	    sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) == 0)
+		return _ssh_exchange_banner(ssh);
+	/*
+	 * If we enough data and a dispatch function then
+	 * call the function and get the next packet.
+	 * Otherwise return the packet type to the caller so it
+	 * can decide how to go on.
+	 *
+	 * We will only call the dispatch function for:
+	 *     20-29    Algorithm negotiation
+	 *     30-49    Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for
+	 *              different authentication methods)
+	 */
+	for (;;) {
+		if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, &type, &seqnr)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX &&
+		    type >= SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT && type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX &&
+		    ssh->dispatch[type] != NULL) {
+			if ((r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ssh)) != 0)
+				return r;
+		} else {
+			*typep = type;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+const u_char *
+ssh_packet_payload(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp)
+{
+	return sshpkt_ptr(ssh, lenp);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_packet_put(struct ssh *ssh, int type, const u_char *data, size_t len)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put(ssh, data, len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+const u_char *
+ssh_output_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *len)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *output = ssh_packet_get_output(ssh);
+
+	*len = sshbuf_len(output);
+	return sshbuf_ptr(output);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_output_consume(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len)
+{
+	return sshbuf_consume(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), len);
+}
+
+int
+ssh_output_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len)
+{
+	return (0 == sshbuf_check_reserve(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), len));
+}
+
+int
+ssh_input_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len)
+{
+	return (0 == sshbuf_check_reserve(ssh_packet_get_input(ssh), len));
+}
+
+/* Read other side's version identification. */
+int
+_ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *banner)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *input = ssh_packet_get_input(ssh);
+	const char *mismatch = "Protocol mismatch.\r\n";
+	const u_char *s = sshbuf_ptr(input);
+	u_char c;
+	char *cp = NULL, *remote_version = NULL;
+	int r = 0, remote_major, remote_minor, expect_nl;
+	size_t n, j;
+
+	for (j = n = 0;;) {
+		sshbuf_reset(banner);
+		expect_nl = 0;
+		for (;;) {
+			if (j >= sshbuf_len(input))
+				return 0; /* insufficient data in input buf */
+			c = s[j++];
+			if (c == '\r') {
+				expect_nl = 1;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (c == '\n')
+				break;
+			if (expect_nl)
+				goto bad;
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(banner, c)) != 0)
+				return r;
+			if (sshbuf_len(banner) > SSH_MAX_BANNER_LEN)
+				goto bad;
+		}
+		if (sshbuf_len(banner) >= 4 &&
+		    memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(banner), "SSH-", 4) == 0)
+			break;
+		debug_f("%.*s", (int)sshbuf_len(banner),
+		    sshbuf_ptr(banner));
+		/* Accept lines before banner only on client */
+		if (ssh->kex->server || ++n > SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES) {
+  bad:
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh),
+			    mismatch, strlen(mismatch))) != 0)
+				return r;
+			return SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
+		}
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, j)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	/* XXX remote version must be the same size as banner for sscanf */
+	if ((cp = sshbuf_dup_string(banner)) == NULL ||
+	    (remote_version = calloc(1, sshbuf_len(banner))) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that the versions match.  In future this might accept
+	 * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
+	 */
+	if (sscanf(cp, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
+	    &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
+	    remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
+
+	compat_banner(ssh, remote_version);
+	if  (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 99) {
+		remote_major = 2;
+		remote_minor = 0;
+	}
+	if (remote_major != 2)
+		r = SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH;
+
+	debug("Remote version string %.100s", cp);
+ out:
+	free(cp);
+	free(remote_version);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Send our own protocol version identification. */
+int
+_ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *banner)
+{
+	char *cp;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(banner, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_VERSION)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_putb(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), banner)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	/* Remove trailing \r\n */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(banner, 2)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((cp = sshbuf_dup_string(banner)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	debug("Local version string %.100s", cp);
+	free(cp);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+_ssh_exchange_banner(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+	int r;
+
+	/*
+	 * if _ssh_read_banner() cannot parse a full version string
+	 * it will return NULL and we end up calling it again.
+	 */
+
+	r = 0;
+	if (kex->server) {
+		if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) == 0)
+			r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->server_version);
+		if (r == 0 &&
+		    sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) != 0 &&
+		    sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) == 0)
+			r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->client_version);
+	} else {
+		if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) == 0)
+			r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->server_version);
+		if (r == 0 &&
+		    sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) != 0 &&
+		    sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) == 0)
+			r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->client_version);
+	}
+	if (r != 0)
+		return r;
+	/* start initial kex as soon as we have exchanged the banners */
+	if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) != 0 &&
+	    sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) != 0) {
+		if ((r = _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(ssh)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+_ssh_host_public_key(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct key_entry *k;
+
+	debug3_f("need %d", type);
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) {
+		debug3_f("check %s", sshkey_type(k->key));
+		if (k->key->type == type &&
+		    (type != KEY_ECDSA || k->key->ecdsa_nid == nid))
+			return (k->key);
+	}
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+_ssh_host_private_key(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct key_entry *k;
+
+	debug3_f("need %d", type);
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->private_keys, next) {
+		debug3_f("check %s", sshkey_type(k->key));
+		if (k->key->type == type &&
+		    (type != KEY_ECDSA || k->key->ecdsa_nid == nid))
+			return (k->key);
+	}
+	return (NULL);
+}
+
+int
+_ssh_verify_host_key(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct key_entry *k;
+
+	debug3_f("need %s", sshkey_type(hostkey));
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) {
+		debug3_f("check %s", sshkey_type(k->key));
+		if (sshkey_equal_public(hostkey, k->key))
+			return (0);	/* ok */
+	}
+	return (-1);	/* failed */
+}
+
+/* offer hostkey algorithms in kexinit depending on registered keys */
+int
+_ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct key_entry *k;
+	char *orig, *avail, *oavail = NULL, *alg, *replace = NULL;
+	char **proposal;
+	size_t maxlen;
+	int ktype, r;
+
+	/* XXX we de-serialize ssh->kex->my, modify it, and change it */
+	if ((r = kex_buf2prop(ssh->kex->my, NULL, &proposal)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	orig = proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+	if ((oavail = avail = strdup(orig)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
+	if ((replace = calloc(1, maxlen)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*replace = '\0';
+	while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
+		if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
+			continue;
+		TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) {
+			if (k->key->type == ktype ||
+			    (sshkey_is_cert(k->key) && k->key->type ==
+			    sshkey_type_plain(ktype))) {
+				if (*replace != '\0')
+					strlcat(replace, ",", maxlen);
+				strlcat(replace, alg, maxlen);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (*replace != '\0') {
+		debug2_f("orig/%d    %s", ssh->kex->server, orig);
+		debug2_f("replace/%d %s", ssh->kex->server, replace);
+		free(orig);
+		proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = replace;
+		replace = NULL;	/* owned by proposal */
+		r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, proposal);
+	}
+ out:
+	free(oavail);
+	free(replace);
+	kex_prop_free(proposal);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+_ssh_host_key_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey,
+    struct sshkey *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg)
+{
+	return sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slen, data, dlen,
+	    alg, NULL, NULL, ssh->compat);
+}
diff --git a/ssh_api.h b/ssh_api.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..584f896
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh_api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.h,v 1.2 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2012 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef API_H
+#define API_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+
+struct kex_params {
+	char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
+};
+
+/* public SSH API functions */
+
+/*
+ * ssh_init() create a ssh connection object with given (optional)
+ * key exchange parameters.
+ */
+int	ssh_init(struct ssh **, int is_server, struct kex_params *kex_params);
+
+/*
+ * release ssh connection state.
+ */
+void	ssh_free(struct ssh *);
+
+/*
+ * attach application specific data to the connection state
+ */
+void	ssh_set_app_data(struct ssh *, void *);
+void	*ssh_get_app_data(struct ssh *);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_add_hostkey() registers a private/public hostkey for an ssh
+ * connection.
+ * ssh_add_hostkey() needs to be called before a key exchange is
+ * initiated with ssh_packet_next().
+ * private hostkeys are required if we need to act as a server.
+ * public hostkeys are used to verify the servers hostkey.
+ */
+int	ssh_add_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback() registers a callback function
+ * which should be called instead of the default verification. The
+ * function given must return 0 if the hostkey is ok, -1 if the
+ * verification has failed.
+ */
+int	ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(struct ssh *ssh,
+    int (*cb)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *));
+
+/*
+ * ssh_packet_next() advances to the next input packet and returns
+ * the packet type in typep.
+ * ssh_packet_next() works by processing an input byte-stream,
+ * decrypting the received data and hiding the key-exchange from
+ * the caller.
+ * ssh_packet_next() sets typep if there is no new packet available.
+ * in this case the caller must fill the input byte-stream by passing
+ * the data received over network to ssh_input_append().
+ * additionally, the caller needs to send the resulting output
+ * byte-stream back over the network. otherwise the key exchange
+ * would not proceed. the output byte-stream is accessed through
+ * ssh_output_ptr().
+ */
+int	ssh_packet_next(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_packet_payload() returns a pointer to the raw payload data of
+ * the current input packet and the length of this payload.
+ * the payload is accessible until ssh_packet_next() is called again.
+ */
+const u_char	*ssh_packet_payload(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_packet_put() creates an encrypted packet with the given type
+ * and payload.
+ * the encrypted packet is appended to the output byte-stream.
+ */
+int	ssh_packet_put(struct ssh *ssh, int type, const u_char *data,
+    size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_input_space() checks if 'len' bytes can be appended to the
+ * input byte-stream.
+ */
+int	ssh_input_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_input_append() appends data to the input byte-stream.
+ */
+int	ssh_input_append(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_output_space() checks if 'len' bytes can be appended to the
+ * output byte-stream. XXX
+ */
+int	ssh_output_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_output_ptr() retrieves both a pointer and the length of the
+ * current output byte-stream. the bytes need to be sent over the
+ * network. the number of bytes that have been successfully sent can
+ * be removed from the output byte-stream with ssh_output_consume().
+ */
+const u_char	*ssh_output_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *len);
+
+/*
+ * ssh_output_consume() removes the given number of bytes from
+ * the output byte-stream.
+ */
+int	ssh_output_consume(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len);
+
+#endif
diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..842ea86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh_config
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: ssh_config,v 1.35 2020/07/17 03:43:42 dtucker Exp $
+
+# This is the ssh client system-wide configuration file.  See
+# ssh_config(5) for more information.  This file provides defaults for
+# users, and the values can be changed in per-user configuration files
+# or on the command line.
+
+# Configuration data is parsed as follows:
+#  1. command line options
+#  2. user-specific file
+#  3. system-wide file
+# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
+# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
+# configuration file, and defaults at the end.
+
+# Site-wide defaults for some commonly used options.  For a comprehensive
+# list of available options, their meanings and defaults, please see the
+# ssh_config(5) man page.
+
+# Host *
+#   ForwardAgent no
+#   ForwardX11 no
+#   PasswordAuthentication yes
+#   HostbasedAuthentication no
+#   GSSAPIAuthentication no
+#   GSSAPIDelegateCredentials no
+#   BatchMode no
+#   CheckHostIP yes
+#   AddressFamily any
+#   ConnectTimeout 0
+#   StrictHostKeyChecking ask
+#   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+#   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+#   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+#   IdentityFile ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+#   Port 22
+#   Ciphers aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,aes128-cbc,3des-cbc
+#   MACs hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com
+#   EscapeChar ~
+#   Tunnel no
+#   TunnelDevice any:any
+#   PermitLocalCommand no
+#   VisualHostKey no
+#   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
+#   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
+#   UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k
diff --git a/ssh_config.0 b/ssh_config.0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4960dad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh_config.0
@@ -0,0 +1,1326 @@
+SSH_CONFIG(5)                 File Formats Manual                SSH_CONFIG(5)
+
+NAME
+     ssh_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH client configuration file
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     ssh(1) obtains configuration data from the following sources in the
+     following order:
+
+           1.   command-line options
+           2.   user's configuration file (~/.ssh/config)
+           3.   system-wide configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config)
+
+     For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used.  The
+     configuration files contain sections separated by Host specifications,
+     and that section is only applied for hosts that match one of the patterns
+     given in the specification.  The matched host name is usually the one
+     given on the command line (see the CanonicalizeHostname option for
+     exceptions).
+
+     Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host-
+     specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and
+     general defaults at the end.
+
+     The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.  Lines starting
+     with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are interpreted as comments.  Arguments may
+     optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in order to represent
+     arguments containing spaces.  Configuration options may be separated by
+     whitespace or optional whitespace and exactly one M-bM-^@M-^X=M-bM-^@M-^Y; the latter format
+     is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when specifying
+     configuration options using the ssh, scp, and sftp -o option.
+
+     The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
+     keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
+
+     Host    Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or
+             Match keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the
+             patterns given after the keyword.  If more than one pattern is
+             provided, they should be separated by whitespace.  A single M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y
+             as a pattern can be used to provide global defaults for all
+             hosts.  The host is usually the hostname argument given on the
+             command line (see the CanonicalizeHostname keyword for
+             exceptions).
+
+             A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an
+             exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y).  If a negated entry is matched, then the
+             Host entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns
+             on the line match.  Negated matches are therefore useful to
+             provide exceptions for wildcard matches.
+
+             See PATTERNS for more information on patterns.
+
+     Match   Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or
+             Match keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the
+             Match keyword are satisfied.  Match conditions are specified
+             using one or more criteria or the single token all which always
+             matches.  The available criteria keywords are: canonical, final,
+             exec, host, originalhost, user, and localuser.  The all criteria
+             must appear alone or immediately after canonical or final.  Other
+             criteria may be combined arbitrarily.  All criteria but all,
+             canonical, and final require an argument.  Criteria may be
+             negated by prepending an exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y).
+
+             The canonical keyword matches only when the configuration file is
+             being re-parsed after hostname canonicalization (see the
+             CanonicalizeHostname option).  This may be useful to specify
+             conditions that work with canonical host names only.
+
+             The final keyword requests that the configuration be re-parsed
+             (regardless of whether CanonicalizeHostname is enabled), and
+             matches only during this final pass.  If CanonicalizeHostname is
+             enabled, then canonical and final match during the same pass.
+
+             The exec keyword executes the specified command under the user's
+             shell.  If the command returns a zero exit status then the
+             condition is considered true.  Commands containing whitespace
+             characters must be quoted.  Arguments to exec accept the tokens
+             described in the TOKENS section.
+
+             The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-
+             separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators
+             described in the PATTERNS section.  The criteria for the host
+             keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any
+             substitution by the Hostname or CanonicalizeHostname options.
+             The originalhost keyword matches against the hostname as it was
+             specified on the command-line.  The user keyword matches against
+             the target username on the remote host.  The localuser keyword
+             matches against the name of the local user running ssh(1) (this
+             keyword may be useful in system-wide ssh_config files).
+
+     AddKeysToAgent
+             Specifies whether keys should be automatically added to a running
+             ssh-agent(1).  If this option is set to yes and a key is loaded
+             from a file, the key and its passphrase are added to the agent
+             with the default lifetime, as if by ssh-add(1).  If this option
+             is set to ask, ssh(1) will require confirmation using the
+             SSH_ASKPASS program before adding a key (see ssh-add(1) for
+             details).  If this option is set to confirm, each use of the key
+             must be confirmed, as if the -c option was specified to
+             ssh-add(1).  If this option is set to no, no keys are added to
+             the agent.  Alternately, this option may be specified as a time
+             interval using the format described in the TIME FORMATS section
+             of sshd_config(5) to specify the key's lifetime in ssh-agent(1),
+             after which it will automatically be removed.  The argument must
+             be no (the default), yes, confirm (optionally followed by a time
+             interval), ask or a time interval.
+
+     AddressFamily
+             Specifies which address family to use when connecting.  Valid
+             arguments are any (the default), inet (use IPv4 only), or inet6
+             (use IPv6 only).
+
+     BatchMode
+             If set to yes, user interaction such as password prompts and host
+             key confirmation requests will be disabled.  This option is
+             useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user is present
+             to interact with ssh(1).  The argument must be yes or no (the
+             default).
+
+     BindAddress
+             Use the specified address on the local machine as the source
+             address of the connection.  Only useful on systems with more than
+             one address.
+
+     BindInterface
+             Use the address of the specified interface on the local machine
+             as the source address of the connection.
+
+     CanonicalDomains
+             When CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, this option specifies the
+             list of domain suffixes in which to search for the specified
+             destination host.
+
+     CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+             Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname
+             canonicalization fails.  The default, yes, will attempt to look
+             up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's search
+             rules.  A value of no will cause ssh(1) to fail instantly if
+             CanonicalizeHostname is enabled and the target hostname cannot be
+             found in any of the domains specified by CanonicalDomains.
+
+     CanonicalizeHostname
+             Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed.
+             The default, no, is not to perform any name rewriting and let the
+             system resolver handle all hostname lookups.  If set to yes then,
+             for connections that do not use a ProxyCommand or ProxyJump,
+             ssh(1) will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the
+             command line using the CanonicalDomains suffixes and
+             CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs rules.  If CanonicalizeHostname is
+             set to always, then canonicalization is applied to proxied
+             connections too.
+
+             If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are
+             processed again using the new target name to pick up any new
+             configuration in matching Host and Match stanzas.  A value of
+             none disables the use of a ProxyJump host.
+
+     CanonicalizeMaxDots
+             Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname
+             before canonicalization is disabled.  The default, 1, allows a
+             single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain).
+
+     CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+             Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed
+             when canonicalizing hostnames.  The rules consist of one or more
+             arguments of source_domain_list:target_domain_list, where
+             source_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that may follow
+             CNAMEs in canonicalization, and target_domain_list is a pattern-
+             list of domains that they may resolve to.
+
+             For example, "*.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com"
+             will allow hostnames matching "*.a.example.com" to be
+             canonicalized to names in the "*.b.example.com" or
+             "*.c.example.com" domains.
+
+             A single argument of "none" causes no CNAMEs to be considered for
+             canonicalization.  This is the default behaviour.
+
+     CASignatureAlgorithms
+             Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of
+             certificates by certificate authorities (CAs).  The default is:
+
+                   ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
+                   ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+                   sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+                   sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+                   rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+
+             If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
+             specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead
+             of replacing them.  If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y
+             character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards)
+             will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+
+             ssh(1) will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms
+             other than those specified.
+
+     CertificateFile
+             Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read.  A
+             corresponding private key must be provided separately in order to
+             use this certificate either from an IdentityFile directive or -i
+             flag to ssh(1), via ssh-agent(1), or via a PKCS11Provider or
+             SecurityKeyProvider.
+
+             Arguments to CertificateFile may use the tilde syntax to refer to
+             a user's home directory, the tokens described in the TOKENS
+             section and environment variables as described in the ENVIRONMENT
+             VARIABLES section.
+
+             It is possible to have multiple certificate files specified in
+             configuration files; these certificates will be tried in
+             sequence.  Multiple CertificateFile directives will add to the
+             list of certificates used for authentication.
+
+     CheckHostIP
+             If set to yes, ssh(1) will additionally check the host IP address
+             in the known_hosts file.  This allows it to detect if a host key
+             changed due to DNS spoofing and will add addresses of destination
+             hosts to ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the process, regardless of the
+             setting of StrictHostKeyChecking.  If the option is set to no
+             (the default), the check will not be executed.
+
+     Ciphers
+             Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
+             Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.  If the specified list
+             begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers will be
+             appended to the default set instead of replacing them.  If the
+             specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
+             ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from the default
+             set instead of replacing them.  If the specified list begins with
+             a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the
+             head of the default set.
+
+             The supported ciphers are:
+
+                   3des-cbc
+                   aes128-cbc
+                   aes192-cbc
+                   aes256-cbc
+                   aes128-ctr
+                   aes192-ctr
+                   aes256-ctr
+                   aes128-gcm@openssh.com
+                   aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+                   chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+
+             The default is:
+
+                   chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
+                   aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+                   aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+
+             The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using "ssh -Q
+             cipher".
+
+     ClearAllForwardings
+             Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
+             specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
+             cleared.  This option is primarily useful when used from the
+             ssh(1) command line to clear port forwardings set in
+             configuration files, and is automatically set by scp(1) and
+             sftp(1).  The argument must be yes or no (the default).
+
+     Compression
+             Specifies whether to use compression.  The argument must be yes
+             or no (the default).
+
+     ConnectionAttempts
+             Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before
+             exiting.  The argument must be an integer.  This may be useful in
+             scripts if the connection sometimes fails.  The default is 1.
+
+     ConnectTimeout
+             Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the
+             SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
+             This timeout is applied both to establishing the connection and
+             to performing the initial SSH protocol handshake and key
+             exchange.
+
+     ControlMaster
+             Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network
+             connection.  When set to yes, ssh(1) will listen for connections
+             on a control socket specified using the ControlPath argument.
+             Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same
+             ControlPath with ControlMaster set to no (the default).  These
+             sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network
+             connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to
+             connecting normally if the control socket does not exist, or is
+             not listening.
+
+             Setting this to ask will cause ssh(1) to listen for control
+             connections, but require confirmation using ssh-askpass(1).  If
+             the ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh(1) will continue without
+             connecting to a master instance.
+
+             X11 and ssh-agent(1) forwarding is supported over these
+             multiplexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded
+             will be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not
+             possible to forward multiple displays or agents.
+
+             Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try
+             to use a master connection but fall back to creating a new one if
+             one does not already exist.  These options are: auto and autoask.
+             The latter requires confirmation like the ask option.
+
+     ControlPath
+             Specify the path to the control socket used for connection
+             sharing as described in the ControlMaster section above or the
+             string none to disable connection sharing.  Arguments to
+             ControlPath may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home
+             directory, the tokens described in the TOKENS section and
+             environment variables as described in the ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+             section.  It is recommended that any ControlPath used for
+             opportunistic connection sharing include at least %h, %p, and %r
+             (or alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory that is not
+             writable by other users.  This ensures that shared connections
+             are uniquely identified.
+
+     ControlPersist
+             When used in conjunction with ControlMaster, specifies that the
+             master connection should remain open in the background (waiting
+             for future client connections) after the initial client
+             connection has been closed.  If set to no (the default), then the
+             master connection will not be placed into the background, and
+             will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed.
+             If set to yes or 0, then the master connection will remain in the
+             background indefinitely (until killed or closed via a mechanism
+             such as the "ssh -O exit").  If set to a time in seconds, or a
+             time in any of the formats documented in sshd_config(5), then the
+             backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate after
+             it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the
+             specified time.
+
+     DynamicForward
+             Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
+             the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to
+             determine where to connect to from the remote machine.
+
+             The argument must be [bind_address:]port.  IPv6 addresses can be
+             specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.  By default,
+             the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts
+             setting.  However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind
+             the connection to a specific address.  The bind_address of
+             localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local
+             use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port
+             should be available from all interfaces.
+
+             Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
+             ssh(1) will act as a SOCKS server.  Multiple forwardings may be
+             specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command
+             line.  Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+
+     EnableEscapeCommandline
+             Enables the command line option in the EscapeChar menu for
+             interactive sessions (default M-bM-^@M-^X~CM-bM-^@M-^Y).  By default, the command
+             line is disabled.
+
+     EnableSSHKeysign
+             Setting this option to yes in the global client configuration
+             file /etc/ssh/ssh_config enables the use of the helper program
+             ssh-keysign(8) during HostbasedAuthentication.  The argument must
+             be yes or no (the default).  This option should be placed in the
+             non-hostspecific section.  See ssh-keysign(8) for more
+             information.
+
+     EscapeChar
+             Sets the escape character (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y).  The escape character
+             can also be set on the command line.  The argument should be a
+             single character, M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y followed by a letter, or none to disable
+             the escape character entirely (making the connection transparent
+             for binary data).
+
+     ExitOnForwardFailure
+             Specifies whether ssh(1) should terminate the connection if it
+             cannot set up all requested dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote
+             port forwardings, (e.g. if either end is unable to bind and
+             listen on a specified port).  Note that ExitOnForwardFailure does
+             not apply to connections made over port forwardings and will not,
+             for example, cause ssh(1) to exit if TCP connections to the
+             ultimate forwarding destination fail.  The argument must be yes
+             or no (the default).
+
+     FingerprintHash
+             Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
+             fingerprints.  Valid options are: md5 and sha256 (the default).
+
+     ForkAfterAuthentication
+             Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution.
+             This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or
+             passphrases, but the user wants it in the background.  This
+             implies the StdinNull configuration option being set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+             The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is
+             with something like ssh -f host xterm, which is the same as ssh
+             host xterm if the ForkAfterAuthentication configuration option is
+             set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+             If the ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^],
+             then a client started with the ForkAfterAuthentication
+             configuration option being set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] will wait for all remote
+             port forwards to be successfully established before placing
+             itself in the background.  The argument to this keyword must be
+             yes (same as the -f option) or no (the default).
+
+     ForwardAgent
+             Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if
+             any) will be forwarded to the remote machine.  The argument may
+             be yes, no (the default), an explicit path to an agent socket or
+             the name of an environment variable (beginning with M-bM-^@M-^X$M-bM-^@M-^Y) in which
+             to find the path.
+
+             Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.  Users with the
+             ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+             agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through
+             the forwarded connection.  An attacker cannot obtain key material
+             from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys
+             that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into
+             the agent.
+
+     ForwardX11
+             Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically
+             redirected over the secure channel and DISPLAY set.  The argument
+             must be yes or no (the default).
+
+             X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.  Users with the
+             ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
+             user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11
+             display through the forwarded connection.  An attacker may then
+             be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the
+             ForwardX11Trusted option is also enabled.
+
+     ForwardX11Timeout
+             Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding using the format
+             described in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5).  X11
+             connections received by ssh(1) after this time will be refused.
+             Setting ForwardX11Timeout to zero will disable the timeout and
+             permit X11 forwarding for the life of the connection.  The
+             default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty
+             minutes has elapsed.
+
+     ForwardX11Trusted
+             If this option is set to yes, remote X11 clients will have full
+             access to the original X11 display.
+
+             If this option is set to no (the default), remote X11 clients
+             will be considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or
+             tampering with data belonging to trusted X11 clients.
+             Furthermore, the xauth(1) token used for the session will be set
+             to expire after 20 minutes.  Remote clients will be refused
+             access after this time.
+
+             See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
+             the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
+
+     GatewayPorts
+             Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
+             forwarded ports.  By default, ssh(1) binds local port forwardings
+             to the loopback address.  This prevents other remote hosts from
+             connecting to forwarded ports.  GatewayPorts can be used to
+             specify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the
+             wildcard address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to
+             forwarded ports.  The argument must be yes or no (the default).
+
+     GlobalKnownHostsFile
+             Specifies one or more files to use for the global host key
+             database, separated by whitespace.  The default is
+             /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts, /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2.
+
+     GSSAPIAuthentication
+             Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+             The default is no.
+
+     GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+             Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.  The default is no.
+
+     HashKnownHosts
+             Indicates that ssh(1) should hash host names and addresses when
+             they are added to ~/.ssh/known_hosts.  These hashed names may be
+             used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not visually
+             reveal identifying information if the file's contents are
+             disclosed.  The default is no.  Note that existing names and
+             addresses in known hosts files will not be converted
+             automatically, but may be manually hashed using ssh-keygen(1).
+
+     HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+             Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for
+             hostbased authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+             Alternately if the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
+             then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to the
+             default set instead of replacing them.  If the specified list
+             begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified signature
+             algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default
+             set instead of replacing them.  If the specified list begins with
+             a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified signature algorithms will be
+             placed at the head of the default set.  The default for this
+             option is:
+
+                ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ssh-ed25519,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+                sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+                sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+
+             The -Q option of ssh(1) may be used to list supported signature
+             algorithms.  This was formerly named HostbasedKeyTypes.
+
+     HostbasedAuthentication
+             Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public
+             key authentication.  The argument must be yes or no (the
+             default).
+
+     HostKeyAlgorithms
+             Specifies the host key signature algorithms that the client wants
+             to use in order of preference.  Alternately if the specified list
+             begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified signature
+             algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of
+             replacing them.  If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y
+             character, then the specified signature algorithms (including
+             wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of
+             replacing them.  If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y
+             character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed
+             at the head of the default set.  The default for this option is:
+
+                ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ssh-ed25519,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+                sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+                sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+
+             If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default
+             is modified to prefer their algorithms.
+
+             The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained
+             using "ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms".
+
+     HostKeyAlias
+             Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host
+             name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key
+             database files and when validating host certificates.  This
+             option is useful for tunneling SSH connections or for multiple
+             servers running on a single host.
+
+     Hostname
+             Specifies the real host name to log into.  This can be used to
+             specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts.  Arguments to
+             Hostname accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section.
+             Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line
+             and in Hostname specifications).  The default is the name given
+             on the command line.
+
+     IdentitiesOnly
+             Specifies that ssh(1) should only use the configured
+             authentication identity and certificate files (either the default
+             files, or those explicitly configured in the ssh_config files or
+             passed on the ssh(1) command-line), even if ssh-agent(1) or a
+             PKCS11Provider or SecurityKeyProvider offers more identities.
+             The argument to this keyword must be yes or no (the default).
+             This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent offers
+             many different identities.
+
+     IdentityAgent
+             Specifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with the
+             authentication agent.
+
+             This option overrides the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable and
+             can be used to select a specific agent.  Setting the socket name
+             to none disables the use of an authentication agent.  If the
+             string "SSH_AUTH_SOCK" is specified, the location of the socket
+             will be read from the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable.
+             Otherwise if the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X$M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
+             then it will be treated as an environment variable containing the
+             location of the socket.
+
+             Arguments to IdentityAgent may use the tilde syntax to refer to a
+             user's home directory, the tokens described in the TOKENS section
+             and environment variables as described in the ENVIRONMENT
+             VARIABLES section.
+
+     IdentityFile
+             Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-
+             hosted ECDSA, Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA
+             authentication identity is read.  You can also specify a public
+             key file to use the corresponding private key that is loaded in
+             ssh-agent(1) when the private key file is not present locally.
+             The default is ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa,
+             ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk and
+             ~/.ssh/id_dsa.  Additionally, any identities represented by the
+             authentication agent will be used for authentication unless
+             IdentitiesOnly is set.  If no certificates have been explicitly
+             specified by CertificateFile, ssh(1) will try to load certificate
+             information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to
+             the path of a specified IdentityFile.
+
+             Arguments to IdentityFile may use the tilde syntax to refer to a
+             user's home directory or the tokens described in the TOKENS
+             section.
+
+             It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in
+             configuration files; all these identities will be tried in
+             sequence.  Multiple IdentityFile directives will add to the list
+             of identities tried (this behaviour differs from that of other
+             configuration directives).
+
+             IdentityFile may be used in conjunction with IdentitiesOnly to
+             select which identities in an agent are offered during
+             authentication.  IdentityFile may also be used in conjunction
+             with CertificateFile in order to provide any certificate also
+             needed for authentication with the identity.
+
+     IgnoreUnknown
+             Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they
+             are encountered in configuration parsing.  This may be used to
+             suppress errors if ssh_config contains options that are
+             unrecognised by ssh(1).  It is recommended that IgnoreUnknown be
+             listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied
+             to unknown options that appear before it.
+
+     Include
+             Include the specified configuration file(s).  Multiple pathnames
+             may be specified and each pathname may contain glob(7) wildcards
+             and, for user configurations, shell-like M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y references to user
+             home directories.  Wildcards will be expanded and processed in
+             lexical order.  Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in
+             ~/.ssh if included in a user configuration file or /etc/ssh if
+             included from the system configuration file.  Include directive
+             may appear inside a Match or Host block to perform conditional
+             inclusion.
+
+     IPQoS   Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections.
+             Accepted values are af11, af12, af13, af21, af22, af23, af31,
+             af32, af33, af41, af42, af43, cs0, cs1, cs2, cs3, cs4, cs5, cs6,
+             cs7, ef, le, lowdelay, throughput, reliability, a numeric value,
+             or none to use the operating system default.  This option may
+             take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace.  If one
+             argument is specified, it is used as the packet class
+             unconditionally.  If two values are specified, the first is
+             automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second
+             for non-interactive sessions.  The default is af21 (Low-Latency
+             Data) for interactive sessions and cs1 (Lower Effort) for non-
+             interactive sessions.
+
+     KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+             Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication.
+             The argument to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no.
+             ChallengeResponseAuthentication is a deprecated alias for this.
+
+     KbdInteractiveDevices
+             Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive
+             authentication.  Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
+             The default is to use the server specified list.  The methods
+             available vary depending on what the server supports.  For an
+             OpenSSH server, it may be zero or more of: bsdauth and pam.
+
+     KexAlgorithms
+             Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.  Multiple
+             algorithms must be comma-separated.  If the specified list begins
+             with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms will be
+             appended to the default set instead of replacing them.  If the
+             specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
+             algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default
+             set instead of replacing them.  If the specified list begins with
+             a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at
+             the head of the default set.  The default is:
+
+                   sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
+                   curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
+                   ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+                   diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+                   diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
+                   diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
+                   diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+
+             The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
+             obtained using "ssh -Q kex".
+
+     KnownHostsCommand
+             Specifies a command to use to obtain a list of host keys, in
+             addition to those listed in UserKnownHostsFile and
+             GlobalKnownHostsFile.  This command is executed after the files
+             have been read.  It may write host key lines to standard output
+             in identical format to the usual files (described in the
+             VERIFYING HOST KEYS section in ssh(1)).  Arguments to
+             KnownHostsCommand accept the tokens described in the TOKENS
+             section.  The command may be invoked multiple times per
+             connection: once when preparing the preference list of host key
+             algorithms to use, again to obtain the host key for the requested
+             host name and, if CheckHostIP is enabled, one more time to obtain
+             the host key matching the server's address.  If the command exits
+             abnormally or returns a non-zero exit status then the connection
+             is terminated.
+
+     LocalCommand
+             Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after
+             successfully connecting to the server.  The command string
+             extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's
+             shell.  Arguments to LocalCommand accept the tokens described in
+             the TOKENS section.
+
+             The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the
+             session of the ssh(1) that spawned it.  It should not be used for
+             interactive commands.
+
+             This directive is ignored unless PermitLocalCommand has been
+             enabled.
+
+     LocalForward
+             Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
+             the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote
+             machine.  The first argument specifies the listener and may be
+             [bind_address:]port or a Unix domain socket path.  The second
+             argument is the destination and may be host:hostport or a Unix
+             domain socket path if the remote host supports it.
+
+             IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square
+             brackets.  Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
+             forwardings can be given on the command line.  Only the superuser
+             can forward privileged ports.  By default, the local port is
+             bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting.  However, an
+             explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a
+             specific address.  The bind_address of localhost indicates that
+             the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty
+             address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port should be available from
+             all interfaces.  Unix domain socket paths may use the tokens
+             described in the TOKENS section and environment variables as
+             described in the ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section.
+
+     LogLevel
+             Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
+             ssh(1).  The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO,
+             VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.  The default is INFO.
+             DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.  DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify
+             higher levels of verbose output.
+
+     LogVerbose
+             Specify one or more overrides to LogLevel.  An override consists
+             of a pattern lists that matches the source file, function and
+             line number to force detailed logging for.  For example, an
+             override pattern of:
+
+                   kex.c:*:1000,*:kex_exchange_identification():*,packet.c:*
+
+             would enable detailed logging for line 1000 of kex.c, everything
+             in the kex_exchange_identification() function, and all code in
+             the packet.c file.  This option is intended for debugging and no
+             overrides are enabled by default.
+
+     MACs    Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in
+             order of preference.  The MAC algorithm is used for data
+             integrity protection.  Multiple algorithms must be comma-
+             separated.  If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
+             then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+             instead of replacing them.  If the specified list begins with a
+             M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms (including
+             wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of
+             replacing them.  If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y
+             character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the
+             head of the default set.
+
+             The algorithms that contain "-etm" calculate the MAC after
+             encryption (encrypt-then-mac).  These are considered safer and
+             their use recommended.
+
+             The default is:
+
+                   umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
+                   hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+                   hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+                   umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
+                   hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+
+             The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+             "ssh -Q mac".
+
+     NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+             Disable host authentication for localhost (loopback addresses).
+             The argument to this keyword must be yes or no (the default).
+
+     NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+             Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up.  The
+             argument to this keyword must be an integer.  The default is 3.
+
+     PasswordAuthentication
+             Specifies whether to use password authentication.  The argument
+             to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no.
+
+     PermitLocalCommand
+             Allow local command execution via the LocalCommand option or
+             using the !command escape sequence in ssh(1).  The argument must
+             be yes or no (the default).
+
+     PermitRemoteOpen
+             Specifies the destinations to which remote TCP port forwarding is
+             permitted when RemoteForward is used as a SOCKS proxy.  The
+             forwarding specification must be one of the following forms:
+
+                   PermitRemoteOpen host:port
+                   PermitRemoteOpen IPv4_addr:port
+                   PermitRemoteOpen [IPv6_addr]:port
+
+             Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with
+             whitespace.  An argument of any can be used to remove all
+             restrictions and permit any forwarding requests.  An argument of
+             none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests.  The
+             wildcard M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or
+             ports respectively.  Otherwise, no pattern matching or address
+             lookups are performed on supplied names.
+
+     PKCS11Provider
+             Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use or none to indicate that
+             no provider should be used (the default).  The argument to this
+             keyword is a path to the PKCS#11 shared library ssh(1) should use
+             to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user
+             authentication.
+
+     Port    Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host.  The
+             default is 22.
+
+     PreferredAuthentications
+             Specifies the order in which the client should try authentication
+             methods.  This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.
+             keyboard-interactive) over another method (e.g. password).  The
+             default is:
+
+                   gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
+                   keyboard-interactive,password
+
+     ProxyCommand
+             Specifies the command to use to connect to the server.  The
+             command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed
+             using the user's shell M-bM-^@M-^XexecM-bM-^@M-^Y directive to avoid a lingering
+             shell process.
+
+             Arguments to ProxyCommand accept the tokens described in the
+             TOKENS section.  The command can be basically anything, and
+             should read from its standard input and write to its standard
+             output.  It should eventually connect an sshd(8) server running
+             on some machine, or execute sshd -i somewhere.  Host key
+             management will be done using the Hostname of the host being
+             connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user).  Setting
+             the command to none disables this option entirely.  Note that
+             CheckHostIP is not available for connects with a proxy command.
+
+             This directive is useful in conjunction with nc(1) and its proxy
+             support.  For example, the following directive would connect via
+             an HTTP proxy at 192.0.2.0:
+
+                ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p
+
+     ProxyJump
+             Specifies one or more jump proxies as either [user@]host[:port]
+             or an ssh URI.  Multiple proxies may be separated by comma
+             characters and will be visited sequentially.  Setting this option
+             will cause ssh(1) to connect to the target host by first making a
+             ssh(1) connection to the specified ProxyJump host and then
+             establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate target from there.
+             Setting the host to none disables this option entirely.
+
+             Note that this option will compete with the ProxyCommand option -
+             whichever is specified first will prevent later instances of the
+             other from taking effect.
+
+             Note also that the configuration for the destination host (either
+             supplied via the command-line or the configuration file) is not
+             generally applied to jump hosts.  ~/.ssh/config should be used if
+             specific configuration is required for jump hosts.
+
+     ProxyUseFdpass
+             Specifies that ProxyCommand will pass a connected file descriptor
+             back to ssh(1) instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
+             The default is no.
+
+     PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+             Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public
+             key authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.  If the
+             specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the algorithms
+             after it will be appended to the default instead of replacing it.
+             If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
+             specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from
+             the default set instead of replacing them.  If the specified list
+             begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms will
+             be placed at the head of the default set.  The default for this
+             option is:
+
+                ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ssh-ed25519,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+                sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+                sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+
+             The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained
+             using "ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms".
+
+     PubkeyAuthentication
+             Specifies whether to try public key authentication.  The argument
+             to this keyword must be yes (the default), no, unbound or
+             host-bound.  The final two options enable public key
+             authentication while respectively disabling or enabling the
+             OpenSSH host-bound authentication protocol extension required for
+             restricted ssh-agent(1) forwarding.
+
+     RekeyLimit
+             Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted or
+             received before the session key is renegotiated, optionally
+             followed by a maximum amount of time that may pass before the
+             session key is renegotiated.  The first argument is specified in
+             bytes and may have a suffix of M-bM-^@M-^XKM-bM-^@M-^Y, M-bM-^@M-^XMM-bM-^@M-^Y, or M-bM-^@M-^XGM-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate
+             Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.  The default is
+             between M-bM-^@M-^X1GM-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X4GM-bM-^@M-^Y, depending on the cipher.  The optional
+             second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units
+             documented in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5).  The
+             default value for RekeyLimit is default none, which means that
+             rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data
+             has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
+
+     RemoteCommand
+             Specifies a command to execute on the remote machine after
+             successfully connecting to the server.  The command string
+             extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's
+             shell.  Arguments to RemoteCommand accept the tokens described in
+             the TOKENS section.
+
+     RemoteForward
+             Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
+             the secure channel.  The remote port may either be forwarded to a
+             specified host and port from the local machine, or may act as a
+             SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote client to connect to
+             arbitrary destinations from the local machine.  The first
+             argument is the listening specification and may be
+             [bind_address:]port or, if the remote host supports it, a Unix
+             domain socket path.  If forwarding to a specific destination then
+             the second argument must be host:hostport or a Unix domain socket
+             path, otherwise if no destination argument is specified then the
+             remote forwarding will be established as a SOCKS proxy.  When
+             acting as a SOCKS proxy, the destination of the connection can be
+             restricted by PermitRemoteOpen.
+
+             IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square
+             brackets.  Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
+             forwardings can be given on the command line.  Privileged ports
+             can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote
+             machine.  Unix domain socket paths may use the tokens described
+             in the TOKENS section and environment variables as described in
+             the ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section.
+
+             If the port argument is 0, the listen port will be dynamically
+             allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time.
+
+             If the bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind
+             to loopback addresses.  If the bind_address is M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y or an empty
+             string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all
+             interfaces.  Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed
+             if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see
+             sshd_config(5)).
+
+     RequestTTY
+             Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session.  The
+             argument may be one of: no (never request a TTY), yes (always
+             request a TTY when standard input is a TTY), force (always
+             request a TTY) or auto (request a TTY when opening a login
+             session).  This option mirrors the -t and -T flags for ssh(1).
+
+     RequiredRSASize
+             Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that ssh(1) will
+             accept.  User authentication keys smaller than this limit will be
+             ignored.  Servers that present host keys smaller than this limit
+             will cause the connection to be terminated.  The default is 1024
+             bits.  Note that this limit may only be raised from the default.
+
+     RevokedHostKeys
+             Specifies revoked host public keys.  Keys listed in this file
+             will be refused for host authentication.  Note that if this file
+             does not exist or is not readable, then host authentication will
+             be refused for all hosts.  Keys may be specified as a text file,
+             listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation
+             List (KRL) as generated by ssh-keygen(1).  For more information
+             on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1).
+
+     SecurityKeyProvider
+             Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
+             FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+             the built-in USB HID support.
+
+             If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X$M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then it will
+             be treated as an environment variable containing the path to the
+             library.
+
+     SendEnv
+             Specifies what variables from the local environ(7) should be sent
+             to the server.  The server must also support it, and the server
+             must be configured to accept these environment variables.  Note
+             that the TERM environment variable is always sent whenever a
+             pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol.
+             Refer to AcceptEnv in sshd_config(5) for how to configure the
+             server.  Variables are specified by name, which may contain
+             wildcard characters.  Multiple environment variables may be
+             separated by whitespace or spread across multiple SendEnv
+             directives.
+
+             See PATTERNS for more information on patterns.
+
+             It is possible to clear previously set SendEnv variable names by
+             prefixing patterns with -.  The default is not to send any
+             environment variables.
+
+     ServerAliveCountMax
+             Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be
+             sent without ssh(1) receiving any messages back from the server.
+             If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are
+             being sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the
+             session.  It is important to note that the use of server alive
+             messages is very different from TCPKeepAlive (below).  The server
+             alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and
+             therefore will not be spoofable.  The TCP keepalive option
+             enabled by TCPKeepAlive is spoofable.  The server alive mechanism
+             is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a
+             connection has become unresponsive.
+
+             The default value is 3.  If, for example, ServerAliveInterval
+             (see below) is set to 15 and ServerAliveCountMax is left at the
+             default, if the server becomes unresponsive, ssh will disconnect
+             after approximately 45 seconds.
+
+     ServerAliveInterval
+             Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has
+             been received from the server, ssh(1) will send a message through
+             the encrypted channel to request a response from the server.  The
+             default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to
+             the server.
+
+     SessionType
+             May be used to either request invocation of a subsystem on the
+             remote system, or to prevent the execution of a remote command at
+             all.  The latter is useful for just forwarding ports.  The
+             argument to this keyword must be none (same as the -N option),
+             subsystem (same as the -s option) or default (shell or command
+             execution).
+
+     SetEnv  Directly specify one or more environment variables and their
+             contents to be sent to the server.  Similarly to SendEnv, with
+             the exception of the TERM variable, the server must be prepared
+             to accept the environment variable.
+
+     StdinNull
+             Redirects stdin from /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from
+             stdin).  Either this or the equivalent -n option must be used
+             when ssh is run in the background.  The argument to this keyword
+             must be yes (same as the -n option) or no (the default).
+
+     StreamLocalBindMask
+             Sets the octal file creation mode mask (umask) used when creating
+             a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding.
+             This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain
+             socket file.
+
+             The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket
+             file that is readable and writable only by the owner.  Note that
+             not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
+             socket files.
+
+     StreamLocalBindUnlink
+             Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file
+             for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
+             If the socket file already exists and StreamLocalBindUnlink is
+             not enabled, ssh will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-
+             domain socket file.  This option is only used for port forwarding
+             to a Unix-domain socket file.
+
+             The argument must be yes or no (the default).
+
+     StrictHostKeyChecking
+             If this flag is set to yes, ssh(1) will never automatically add
+             host keys to the ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to connect
+             to hosts whose host key has changed.  This provides maximum
+             protection against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, though it
+             can be annoying when the /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly
+             maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made.
+             This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts.
+
+             If this flag is set to accept-new then ssh will automatically add
+             new host keys to the user's known_hosts file, but will not permit
+             connections to hosts with changed host keys.  If this flag is set
+             to no or off, ssh will automatically add new host keys to the
+             user known hosts files and allow connections to hosts with
+             changed hostkeys to proceed, subject to some restrictions.  If
+             this flag is set to ask (the default), new host keys will be
+             added to the user known host files only after the user has
+             confirmed that is what they really want to do, and ssh will
+             refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.  The host
+             keys of known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases.
+
+     SyslogFacility
+             Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+             ssh(1).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
+             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
+             default is USER.
+
+     TCPKeepAlive
+             Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
+             to the other side.  If they are sent, death of the connection or
+             crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed.  However,
+             this means that connections will die if the route is down
+             temporarily, and some people find it annoying.
+
+             The default is yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the
+             client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host
+             dies.  This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
+
+             To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to no.
+             See also ServerAliveInterval for protocol-level keepalives.
+
+     Tunnel  Request tun(4) device forwarding between the client and the
+             server.  The argument must be yes, point-to-point (layer 3),
+             ethernet (layer 2), or no (the default).  Specifying yes requests
+             the default tunnel mode, which is point-to-point.
+
+     TunnelDevice
+             Specifies the tun(4) devices to open on the client (local_tun)
+             and the server (remote_tun).
+
+             The argument must be local_tun[:remote_tun].  The devices may be
+             specified by numerical ID or the keyword any, which uses the next
+             available tunnel device.  If remote_tun is not specified, it
+             defaults to any.  The default is any:any.
+
+     UpdateHostKeys
+             Specifies whether ssh(1) should accept notifications of
+             additional hostkeys from the server sent after authentication has
+             completed and add them to UserKnownHostsFile.  The argument must
+             be yes, no or ask.  This option allows learning alternate
+             hostkeys for a server and supports graceful key rotation by
+             allowing a server to send replacement public keys before old ones
+             are removed.
+
+             Additional hostkeys are only accepted if the key used to
+             authenticate the host was already trusted or explicitly accepted
+             by the user, the host was authenticated via UserKnownHostsFile
+             (i.e. not GlobalKnownHostsFile) and the host was authenticated
+             using a plain key and not a certificate.
+
+             UpdateHostKeys is enabled by default if the user has not
+             overridden the default UserKnownHostsFile setting and has not
+             enabled VerifyHostKeyDNS, otherwise UpdateHostKeys will be set to
+             no.
+
+             If UpdateHostKeys is set to ask, then the user is asked to
+             confirm the modifications to the known_hosts file.  Confirmation
+             is currently incompatible with ControlPersist, and will be
+             disabled if it is enabled.
+
+             Presently, only sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the
+             "hostkeys@openssh.com" protocol extension used to inform the
+             client of all the server's hostkeys.
+
+     User    Specifies the user to log in as.  This can be useful when a
+             different user name is used on different machines.  This saves
+             the trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the
+             command line.
+
+     UserKnownHostsFile
+             Specifies one or more files to use for the user host key
+             database, separated by whitespace.  Each filename may use tilde
+             notation to refer to the user's home directory, the tokens
+             described in the TOKENS section and environment variables as
+             described in the ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES section.  A value of none
+             causes ssh(1) to ignore any user-specific known hosts files.  The
+             default is ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ~/.ssh/known_hosts2.
+
+     VerifyHostKeyDNS
+             Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP
+             resource records.  If this option is set to yes, the client will
+             implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint from DNS.
+             Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set
+             to ask.  If this option is set to ask, information on fingerprint
+             match will be displayed, but the user will still need to confirm
+             new host keys according to the StrictHostKeyChecking option.  The
+             default is no.
+
+             See also VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1).
+
+     VisualHostKey
+             If this flag is set to yes, an ASCII art representation of the
+             remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the
+             fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys.  If this
+             flag is set to no (the default), no fingerprint strings are
+             printed at login and only the fingerprint string will be printed
+             for unknown host keys.
+
+     XAuthLocation
+             Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program.  The default
+             is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth.
+
+PATTERNS
+     A pattern consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y (a
+     wildcard that matches zero or more characters), or M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y (a wildcard that
+     matches exactly one character).  For example, to specify a set of
+     declarations for any host in the ".co.uk" set of domains, the following
+     pattern could be used:
+
+           Host *.co.uk
+
+     The following pattern would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network
+     range:
+
+           Host 192.168.0.?
+
+     A pattern-list is a comma-separated list of patterns.  Patterns within
+     pattern-lists may be negated by preceding them with an exclamation mark
+     (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y).  For example, to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an
+     organization except from the "dialup" pool, the following entry (in
+     authorized_keys) could be used:
+
+           from="!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com"
+
+     Note that a negated match will never produce a positive result by itself.
+     For example, attempting to match "host3" against the following pattern-
+     list will fail:
+
+           from="!host1,!host2"
+
+     The solution here is to include a term that will yield a positive match,
+     such as a wildcard:
+
+           from="!host1,!host2,*"
+
+TOKENS
+     Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, which are expanded at
+     runtime:
+
+           %%    A literal M-bM-^@M-^X%M-bM-^@M-^Y.
+           %C    Hash of %l%h%p%r.
+           %d    Local user's home directory.
+           %f    The fingerprint of the server's host key.
+           %H    The known_hosts hostname or address that is being searched
+                 for.
+           %h    The remote hostname.
+           %I    A string describing the reason for a KnownHostsCommand
+                 execution: either ADDRESS when looking up a host by address
+                 (only when CheckHostIP is enabled), HOSTNAME when searching
+                 by hostname, or ORDER when preparing the host key algorithm
+                 preference list to use for the destination host.
+           %i    The local user ID.
+           %K    The base64 encoded host key.
+           %k    The host key alias if specified, otherwise the original
+                 remote hostname given on the command line.
+           %L    The local hostname.
+           %l    The local hostname, including the domain name.
+           %n    The original remote hostname, as given on the command line.
+           %p    The remote port.
+           %r    The remote username.
+           %T    The local tun(4) or tap(4) network interface assigned if
+                 tunnel forwarding was requested, or "NONE" otherwise.
+           %t    The type of the server host key, e.g.  ssh-ed25519.
+           %u    The local username.
+
+     CertificateFile, ControlPath, IdentityAgent, IdentityFile,
+     KnownHostsCommand, LocalForward, Match exec, RemoteCommand,
+     RemoteForward, and UserKnownHostsFile accept the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h,
+     %i, %k, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u.
+
+     KnownHostsCommand additionally accepts the tokens %f, %H, %I, %K and %t.
+
+     Hostname accepts the tokens %% and %h.
+
+     LocalCommand accepts all tokens.
+
+     ProxyCommand and ProxyJump accept the tokens %%, %h, %n, %p, and %r.
+
+ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+     Arguments to some keywords can be expanded at runtime from environment
+     variables on the client by enclosing them in ${}, for example
+     ${HOME}/.ssh would refer to the user's .ssh directory.  If a specified
+     environment variable does not exist then an error will be returned and
+     the setting for that keyword will be ignored.
+
+     The keywords CertificateFile, ControlPath, IdentityAgent, IdentityFile,
+     KnownHostsCommand, and UserKnownHostsFile support environment variables.
+     The keywords LocalForward and RemoteForward support environment variables
+     only for Unix domain socket paths.
+
+FILES
+     ~/.ssh/config
+             This is the per-user configuration file.  The format of this file
+             is described above.  This file is used by the SSH client.
+             Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict
+             permissions: read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
+
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+             Systemwide configuration file.  This file provides defaults for
+             those values that are not specified in the user's configuration
+             file, and for those users who do not have a configuration file.
+             This file must be world-readable.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     ssh(1)
+
+AUTHORS
+     OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+     Tatu Ylonen.  Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+     de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+     created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+     versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 7.2                    January 13, 2023                    OpenBSD 7.2
diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9eb6b97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@@ -0,0 +1,2208 @@
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\"                    All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.378 2023/01/13 07:13:40 jmc Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: January 13 2023 $
+.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm ssh_config
+.Nd OpenSSH client configuration file
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Xr ssh 1
+obtains configuration data from the following sources in
+the following order:
+.Pp
+.Bl -enum -offset indent -compact
+.It
+command-line options
+.It
+user's configuration file
+.Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config
+.It
+system-wide configuration file
+.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+.El
+.Pp
+For each parameter, the first obtained value
+will be used.
+The configuration files contain sections separated by
+.Cm Host
+specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that
+match one of the patterns given in the specification.
+The matched host name is usually the one given on the command line
+(see the
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+option for exceptions).
+.Pp
+Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more
+host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
+file, and general defaults at the end.
+.Pp
+The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
+Lines starting with
+.Ql #
+and empty lines are interpreted as comments.
+Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
+.Pq \&"
+in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
+Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or
+optional whitespace and exactly one
+.Ql = ;
+the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace
+when specifying configuration options using the
+.Nm ssh ,
+.Nm scp ,
+and
+.Nm sftp
+.Fl o
+option.
+.Pp
+The possible
+keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
+keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm Host
+Restricts the following declarations (up to the next
+.Cm Host
+or
+.Cm Match
+keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns
+given after the keyword.
+If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace.
+A single
+.Ql *
+as a pattern can be used to provide global
+defaults for all hosts.
+The host is usually the
+.Ar hostname
+argument given on the command line
+(see the
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+keyword for exceptions).
+.Pp
+A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an exclamation mark
+.Pq Sq !\& .
+If a negated entry is matched, then the
+.Cm Host
+entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns on the line
+match.
+Negated matches are therefore useful to provide exceptions for wildcard
+matches.
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm Match
+Restricts the following declarations (up to the next
+.Cm Host
+or
+.Cm Match
+keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the
+.Cm Match
+keyword are satisfied.
+Match conditions are specified using one or more criteria
+or the single token
+.Cm all
+which always matches.
+The available criteria keywords are:
+.Cm canonical ,
+.Cm final ,
+.Cm exec ,
+.Cm host ,
+.Cm originalhost ,
+.Cm user ,
+and
+.Cm localuser .
+The
+.Cm all
+criteria must appear alone or immediately after
+.Cm canonical
+or
+.Cm final .
+Other criteria may be combined arbitrarily.
+All criteria but
+.Cm all ,
+.Cm canonical ,
+and
+.Cm final
+require an argument.
+Criteria may be negated by prepending an exclamation mark
+.Pq Sq !\& .
+.Pp
+The
+.Cm canonical
+keyword matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed
+after hostname canonicalization (see the
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+option).
+This may be useful to specify conditions that work with canonical host
+names only.
+.Pp
+The
+.Cm final
+keyword requests that the configuration be re-parsed (regardless of whether
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+is enabled), and matches only during this final pass.
+If
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+is enabled, then
+.Cm canonical
+and
+.Cm final
+match during the same pass.
+.Pp
+The
+.Cm exec
+keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell.
+If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is considered true.
+Commands containing whitespace characters must be quoted.
+Arguments to
+.Cm exec
+accept the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section.
+.Pp
+The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-separated
+lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the
+.Sx PATTERNS
+section.
+The criteria for the
+.Cm host
+keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution
+by the
+.Cm Hostname
+or
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+options.
+The
+.Cm originalhost
+keyword matches against the hostname as it was specified on the command-line.
+The
+.Cm user
+keyword matches against the target username on the remote host.
+The
+.Cm localuser
+keyword matches against the name of the local user running
+.Xr ssh 1
+(this keyword may be useful in system-wide
+.Nm
+files).
+.It Cm AddKeysToAgent
+Specifies whether keys should be automatically added to a running
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+If this option is set to
+.Cm yes
+and a key is loaded from a file, the key and its passphrase are added to
+the agent with the default lifetime, as if by
+.Xr ssh-add 1 .
+If this option is set to
+.Cm ask ,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will require confirmation using the
+.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
+program before adding a key (see
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+for details).
+If this option is set to
+.Cm confirm ,
+each use of the key must be confirmed, as if the
+.Fl c
+option was specified to
+.Xr ssh-add 1 .
+If this option is set to
+.Cm no ,
+no keys are added to the agent.
+Alternately, this option may be specified as a time interval
+using the format described in the
+.Sx TIME FORMATS
+section of
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+to specify the key's lifetime in
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+after which it will automatically be removed.
+The argument must be
+.Cm no
+(the default),
+.Cm yes ,
+.Cm confirm
+(optionally followed by a time interval),
+.Cm ask
+or a time interval.
+.It Cm AddressFamily
+Specifies which address family to use when connecting.
+Valid arguments are
+.Cm any
+(the default),
+.Cm inet
+(use IPv4 only), or
+.Cm inet6
+(use IPv6 only).
+.It Cm BatchMode
+If set to
+.Cm yes ,
+user interaction such as password prompts and host key confirmation requests
+will be disabled.
+This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user
+is present to interact with
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes
+or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
+.It Cm BindAddress
+Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of
+the connection.
+Only useful on systems with more than one address.
+.It Cm BindInterface
+Use the address of the specified interface on the local machine as the
+source address of the connection.
+.It Cm CanonicalDomains
+When
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+is enabled, this option specifies the list of domain suffixes in which to
+search for the specified destination host.
+.It Cm CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname canonicalization fails.
+The default,
+.Cm yes ,
+will attempt to look up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's
+search rules.
+A value of
+.Cm no
+will cause
+.Xr ssh 1
+to fail instantly if
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+is enabled and the target hostname cannot be found in any of the domains
+specified by
+.Cm CanonicalDomains .
+.It Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed.
+The default,
+.Cm no ,
+is not to perform any name rewriting and let the system resolver handle all
+hostname lookups.
+If set to
+.Cm yes
+then, for connections that do not use a
+.Cm ProxyCommand
+or
+.Cm ProxyJump ,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command line
+using the
+.Cm CanonicalDomains
+suffixes and
+.Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+rules.
+If
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+is set to
+.Cm always ,
+then canonicalization is applied to proxied connections too.
+.Pp
+If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are processed
+again using the new target name to pick up any new configuration in matching
+.Cm Host
+and
+.Cm Match
+stanzas.
+A value of
+.Cm none
+disables the use of a
+.Cm ProxyJump
+host.
+.It Cm CanonicalizeMaxDots
+Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname before
+canonicalization is disabled.
+The default, 1,
+allows a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain).
+.It Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
+Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed when
+canonicalizing hostnames.
+The rules consist of one or more arguments of
+.Ar source_domain_list : Ns Ar target_domain_list ,
+where
+.Ar source_domain_list
+is a pattern-list of domains that may follow CNAMEs in canonicalization,
+and
+.Ar target_domain_list
+is a pattern-list of domains that they may resolve to.
+.Pp
+For example,
+.Qq *.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com
+will allow hostnames matching
+.Qq *.a.example.com
+to be canonicalized to names in the
+.Qq *.b.example.com
+or
+.Qq *.c.example.com
+domains.
+.Pp
+A single argument of
+.Qq none
+causes no CNAMEs to be considered for canonicalization.
+This is the default behaviour.
+.It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
+Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
+by certificate authorities (CAs).
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+.Ed
+.Pp
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
+.Pp
+.Xr ssh 1
+will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those
+specified.
+.It Cm CertificateFile
+Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read.
+A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order
+to use this certificate either
+from an
+.Cm IdentityFile
+directive or
+.Fl i
+flag to
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+via
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+or via a
+.Cm PKCS11Provider
+or
+.Cm SecurityKeyProvider .
+.Pp
+Arguments to
+.Cm CertificateFile
+may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory,
+the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+section.
+.Pp
+It is possible to have multiple certificate files specified in
+configuration files; these certificates will be tried in sequence.
+Multiple
+.Cm CertificateFile
+directives will add to the list of certificates used for
+authentication.
+.It Cm CheckHostIP
+If set to
+.Cm yes ,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will additionally check the host IP address in the
+.Pa known_hosts
+file.
+This allows it to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing
+and will add addresses of destination hosts to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+in the process, regardless of the setting of
+.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking .
+If the option is set to
+.Cm no
+(the default),
+the check will not be executed.
+.It Cm Ciphers
+Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
+Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
+default set.
+.Pp
+The supported ciphers are:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+3des-cbc
+aes128-cbc
+aes192-cbc
+aes256-cbc
+aes128-ctr
+aes192-ctr
+aes256-ctr
+aes128-gcm@openssh.com
+aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
+aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q cipher .
+.It Cm ClearAllForwardings
+Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
+specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
+cleared.
+This option is primarily useful when used from the
+.Xr ssh 1
+command line to clear port forwardings set in
+configuration files, and is automatically set by
+.Xr scp 1
+and
+.Xr sftp 1 .
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes
+or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
+.It Cm Compression
+Specifies whether to use compression.
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes
+or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
+.It Cm ConnectionAttempts
+Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting.
+The argument must be an integer.
+This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails.
+The default is 1.
+.It Cm ConnectTimeout
+Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the
+SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
+This timeout is applied both to establishing the connection and to performing
+the initial SSH protocol handshake and key exchange.
+.It Cm ControlMaster
+Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection.
+When set to
+.Cm yes ,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the
+.Cm ControlPath
+argument.
+Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same
+.Cm ControlPath
+with
+.Cm ControlMaster
+set to
+.Cm no
+(the default).
+These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network connection
+rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to connecting normally
+if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening.
+.Pp
+Setting this to
+.Cm ask
+will cause
+.Xr ssh 1
+to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using
+.Xr ssh-askpass 1 .
+If the
+.Cm ControlPath
+cannot be opened,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will continue without connecting to a master instance.
+.Pp
+X11 and
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the
+display and agent forwarded will be the one belonging to the master
+connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents.
+.Pp
+Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a
+master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already
+exist.
+These options are:
+.Cm auto
+and
+.Cm autoask .
+The latter requires confirmation like the
+.Cm ask
+option.
+.It Cm ControlPath
+Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described
+in the
+.Cm ControlMaster
+section above or the string
+.Cm none
+to disable connection sharing.
+Arguments to
+.Cm ControlPath
+may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory,
+the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+section.
+It is recommended that any
+.Cm ControlPath
+used for opportunistic connection sharing include
+at least %h, %p, and %r (or alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory
+that is not writable by other users.
+This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified.
+.It Cm ControlPersist
+When used in conjunction with
+.Cm ControlMaster ,
+specifies that the master connection should remain open
+in the background (waiting for future client connections)
+after the initial client connection has been closed.
+If set to
+.Cm no
+(the default),
+then the master connection will not be placed into the background,
+and will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed.
+If set to
+.Cm yes
+or 0,
+then the master connection will remain in the background indefinitely
+(until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the
+.Qq ssh -O exit ) .
+If set to a time in seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+then the backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate
+after it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the
+specified time.
+.It Cm DynamicForward
+Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded
+over the secure channel, and the application
+protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
+remote machine.
+.Pp
+The argument must be
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .
+.Sm on
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
+By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+setting.
+However, an explicit
+.Ar bind_address
+may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
+The
+.Ar bind_address
+of
+.Cm localhost
+indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
+empty address or
+.Sq *
+indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+.Pp
+Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
+.Xr ssh 1
+will act as a SOCKS server.
+Multiple forwardings may be specified, and
+additional forwardings can be given on the command line.
+Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+.It Cm EnableEscapeCommandline
+Enables the command line option in the
+.Cm EscapeChar
+menu for interactive sessions (default
+.Ql ~C ) .
+By default, the command line is disabled.
+.It Cm EnableSSHKeysign
+Setting this option to
+.Cm yes
+in the global client configuration file
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+enables the use of the helper program
+.Xr ssh-keysign 8
+during
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes
+or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
+This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section.
+See
+.Xr ssh-keysign 8
+for more information.
+.It Cm EscapeChar
+Sets the escape character (default:
+.Ql ~ ) .
+The escape character can also
+be set on the command line.
+The argument should be a single character,
+.Ql ^
+followed by a letter, or
+.Cm none
+to disable the escape
+character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary
+data).
+.It Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
+Specifies whether
+.Xr ssh 1
+should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested
+dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings, (e.g.\&
+if either end is unable to bind and listen on a specified port).
+Note that
+.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
+does not apply to connections made over port forwardings and will not,
+for example, cause
+.Xr ssh 1
+to exit if TCP connections to the ultimate forwarding destination fail.
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes
+or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
+.It Cm FingerprintHash
+Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
+Valid options are:
+.Cm md5
+and
+.Cm sha256
+(the default).
+.It Cm ForkAfterAuthentication
+Requests
+.Nm ssh
+to go to background just before command execution.
+This is useful if
+.Nm ssh
+is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user
+wants it in the background.
+This implies the
+.Cm StdinNull
+configuration option being set to
+.Dq yes .
+The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with
+something like
+.Ic ssh -f host xterm ,
+which is the same as
+.Ic ssh host xterm
+if the
+.Cm ForkAfterAuthentication
+configuration option is set to
+.Dq yes .
+.Pp
+If the
+.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
+configuration option is set to
+.Dq yes ,
+then a client started with the
+.Cm ForkAfterAuthentication
+configuration option being set to
+.Dq yes
+will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established
+before placing itself in the background.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Cm yes
+(same as the
+.Fl f
+option) or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
+.It Cm ForwardAgent
+Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any)
+will be forwarded to the remote machine.
+The argument may be
+.Cm yes ,
+.Cm no
+(the default),
+an explicit path to an agent socket or the name of an environment variable
+(beginning with
+.Sq $ )
+in which to find the path.
+.Pp
+Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
+Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
+(for the agent's Unix-domain socket)
+can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
+An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
+however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
+authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
+.It Cm ForwardX11
+Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected
+over the secure channel and
+.Ev DISPLAY
+set.
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes
+or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
+.Pp
+X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.
+Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
+(for the user's X11 authorization database)
+can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection.
+An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring
+if the
+.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
+option is also enabled.
+.It Cm ForwardX11Timeout
+Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding
+using the format described in the
+.Sx TIME FORMATS
+section of
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+X11 connections received by
+.Xr ssh 1
+after this time will be refused.
+Setting
+.Cm ForwardX11Timeout
+to zero will disable the timeout and permit X11 forwarding for the life
+of the connection.
+The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty minutes has
+elapsed.
+.It Cm ForwardX11Trusted
+If this option is set to
+.Cm yes ,
+remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display.
+.Pp
+If this option is set to
+.Cm no
+(the default),
+remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented
+from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11
+clients.
+Furthermore, the
+.Xr xauth 1
+token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes.
+Remote clients will be refused access after this time.
+.Pp
+See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
+the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
+.It Cm GatewayPorts
+Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
+forwarded ports.
+By default,
+.Xr ssh 1
+binds local port forwardings to the loopback address.
+This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+can be used to specify that ssh
+should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address,
+thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports.
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes
+or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
+.It Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile
+Specifies one or more files to use for the global
+host key database, separated by whitespace.
+The default is
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts ,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2 .
+.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
+Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
+Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm HashKnownHosts
+Indicates that
+.Xr ssh 1
+should hash host names and addresses when they are added to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
+These hashed names may be used normally by
+.Xr ssh 1
+and
+.Xr sshd 8 ,
+but they do not visually reveal identifying information if the
+file's contents are disclosed.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
+will not be converted automatically,
+but may be manually hashed using
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for hostbased
+authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended
+to the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
+will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed
+at the head of the default set.
+The default for this option is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The
+.Fl Q
+option of
+.Xr ssh 1
+may be used to list supported signature algorithms.
+This was formerly named HostbasedKeyTypes.
+.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
+authentication.
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes
+or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
+.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+Specifies the host key signature algorithms
+that the client wants to use in order of preference.
+Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to
+the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
+will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed
+at the head of the default set.
+The default for this option is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+.Ed
+.Pp
+If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified
+to prefer their algorithms.
+.Pp
+The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
+.It Cm HostKeyAlias
+Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
+real host name when looking up or saving the host key
+in the host key database files and when validating host certificates.
+This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections
+or for multiple servers running on a single host.
+.It Cm Hostname
+Specifies the real host name to log into.
+This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts.
+Arguments to
+.Cm Hostname
+accept the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section.
+Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in
+.Cm Hostname
+specifications).
+The default is the name given on the command line.
+.It Cm IdentitiesOnly
+Specifies that
+.Xr ssh 1
+should only use the configured authentication identity and certificate files
+(either the default files, or those explicitly configured in the
+.Nm
+files
+or passed on the
+.Xr ssh 1
+command-line),
+even if
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+or a
+.Cm PKCS11Provider
+or
+.Cm SecurityKeyProvider
+offers more identities.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Cm yes
+or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
+This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent
+offers many different identities.
+.It Cm IdentityAgent
+Specifies the
+.Ux Ns -domain
+socket used to communicate with the authentication agent.
+.Pp
+This option overrides the
+.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+environment variable and can be used to select a specific agent.
+Setting the socket name to
+.Cm none
+disables the use of an authentication agent.
+If the string
+.Qq SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the
+.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+environment variable.
+Otherwise if the specified value begins with a
+.Sq $
+character, then it will be treated as an environment variable containing
+the location of the socket.
+.Pp
+Arguments to
+.Cm IdentityAgent
+may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory,
+the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+section.
+.It Cm IdentityFile
+Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA,
+Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity is read.
+You can also specify a public key file to use the corresponding
+private key that is loaded in
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+when the private key file is not present locally.
+The default is
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa .
+Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent
+will be used for authentication unless
+.Cm IdentitiesOnly
+is set.
+If no certificates have been explicitly specified by
+.Cm CertificateFile ,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by
+appending
+.Pa -cert.pub
+to the path of a specified
+.Cm IdentityFile .
+.Pp
+Arguments to
+.Cm IdentityFile
+may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory
+or the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section.
+.Pp
+It is possible to have
+multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these
+identities will be tried in sequence.
+Multiple
+.Cm IdentityFile
+directives will add to the list of identities tried (this behaviour
+differs from that of other configuration directives).
+.Pp
+.Cm IdentityFile
+may be used in conjunction with
+.Cm IdentitiesOnly
+to select which identities in an agent are offered during authentication.
+.Cm IdentityFile
+may also be used in conjunction with
+.Cm CertificateFile
+in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with
+the identity.
+.It Cm IgnoreUnknown
+Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are
+encountered in configuration parsing.
+This may be used to suppress errors if
+.Nm
+contains options that are unrecognised by
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+It is recommended that
+.Cm IgnoreUnknown
+be listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied
+to unknown options that appear before it.
+.It Cm Include
+Include the specified configuration file(s).
+Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain
+.Xr glob 7
+wildcards and, for user configurations, shell-like
+.Sq ~
+references to user home directories.
+Wildcards will be expanded and processed in lexical order.
+Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in
+.Pa ~/.ssh
+if included in a user configuration file or
+.Pa /etc/ssh
+if included from the system configuration file.
+.Cm Include
+directive may appear inside a
+.Cm Match
+or
+.Cm Host
+block
+to perform conditional inclusion.
+.It Cm IPQoS
+Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections.
+Accepted values are
+.Cm af11 ,
+.Cm af12 ,
+.Cm af13 ,
+.Cm af21 ,
+.Cm af22 ,
+.Cm af23 ,
+.Cm af31 ,
+.Cm af32 ,
+.Cm af33 ,
+.Cm af41 ,
+.Cm af42 ,
+.Cm af43 ,
+.Cm cs0 ,
+.Cm cs1 ,
+.Cm cs2 ,
+.Cm cs3 ,
+.Cm cs4 ,
+.Cm cs5 ,
+.Cm cs6 ,
+.Cm cs7 ,
+.Cm ef ,
+.Cm le ,
+.Cm lowdelay ,
+.Cm throughput ,
+.Cm reliability ,
+a numeric value, or
+.Cm none
+to use the operating system default.
+This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace.
+If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally.
+If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for
+interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions.
+The default is
+.Cm af21
+(Low-Latency Data)
+for interactive sessions and
+.Cm cs1
+(Lower Effort)
+for non-interactive sessions.
+.It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Cm yes
+(the default)
+or
+.Cm no .
+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+is a deprecated alias for this.
+.It Cm KbdInteractiveDevices
+Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication.
+Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
+The default is to use the server specified list.
+The methods available vary depending on what the server supports.
+For an OpenSSH server,
+it may be zero or more of:
+.Cm bsdauth
+and
+.Cm pam .
+.It Cm KexAlgorithms
+Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+default set.
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
+curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
+ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
+diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
+diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q kex .
+.It Cm KnownHostsCommand
+Specifies a command to use to obtain a list of host keys, in addition to
+those listed in
+.Cm UserKnownHostsFile
+and
+.Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile .
+This command is executed after the files have been read.
+It may write host key lines to standard output in identical format to the
+usual files (described in the
+.Sx VERIFYING HOST KEYS
+section in
+.Xr ssh 1 ) .
+Arguments to
+.Cm KnownHostsCommand
+accept the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section.
+The command may be invoked multiple times per connection: once when preparing
+the preference list of host key algorithms to use, again to obtain the
+host key for the requested host name and, if
+.Cm CheckHostIP
+is enabled, one more time to obtain the host key matching the server's
+address.
+If the command exits abnormally or returns a non-zero exit status then the
+connection is terminated.
+.It Cm LocalCommand
+Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully
+connecting to the server.
+The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
+the user's shell.
+Arguments to
+.Cm LocalCommand
+accept the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section.
+.Pp
+The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the
+session of the
+.Xr ssh 1
+that spawned it.
+It should not be used for interactive commands.
+.Pp
+This directive is ignored unless
+.Cm PermitLocalCommand
+has been enabled.
+.It Cm LocalForward
+Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
+the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine.
+The first argument specifies the listener and may be
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
+.Sm on
+or a Unix domain socket path.
+The second argument is the destination and may be
+.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport
+or a Unix domain socket path if the remote host supports it.
+.Pp
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
+Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
+given on the command line.
+Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
+By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+setting.
+However, an explicit
+.Ar bind_address
+may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
+The
+.Ar bind_address
+of
+.Cm localhost
+indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
+empty address or
+.Sq *
+indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
+Unix domain socket paths may use the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+section.
+.It Cm LogLevel
+Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+The possible values are:
+QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
+The default is INFO.
+DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
+.It Cm LogVerbose
+Specify one or more overrides to LogLevel.
+An override consists of a pattern lists that matches the source file, function
+and line number to force detailed logging for.
+For example, an override pattern of:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+kex.c:*:1000,*:kex_exchange_identification():*,packet.c:*
+.Ed
+.Pp
+would enable detailed logging for line 1000 of
+.Pa kex.c ,
+everything in the
+.Fn kex_exchange_identification
+function, and all code in the
+.Pa packet.c
+file.
+This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
+.It Cm MACs
+Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
+in order of preference.
+The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
+Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+default set.
+.Pp
+The algorithms that contain
+.Qq -etm
+calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
+These are considered safer and their use recommended.
+.Pp
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
+hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
+hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q mac .
+.It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+Disable host authentication for localhost (loopback addresses).
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Cm yes
+or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
+.It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts
+Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up.
+The argument to this keyword must be an integer.
+The default is 3.
+.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
+Specifies whether to use password authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Cm yes
+(the default)
+or
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm PermitLocalCommand
+Allow local command execution via the
+.Ic LocalCommand
+option or using the
+.Ic !\& Ns Ar command
+escape sequence in
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes
+or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
+.It Cm PermitRemoteOpen
+Specifies the destinations to which remote TCP port forwarding is permitted when
+.Cm RemoteForward
+is used as a SOCKS proxy.
+The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm PermitRemoteOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar host : port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm PermitRemoteOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar IPv4_addr : port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm PermitRemoteOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port
+.Sm on
+.El
+.Pp
+Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace.
+An argument of
+.Cm any
+can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests.
+An argument of
+.Cm none
+can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests.
+The wildcard
+.Sq *
+can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or ports respectively.
+Otherwise, no pattern matching or address lookups are performed on supplied
+names.
+.It Cm PKCS11Provider
+Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use or
+.Cm none
+to indicate that no provider should be used (the default).
+The argument to this keyword is a path to the PKCS#11 shared library
+.Xr ssh 1
+should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user
+authentication.
+.It Cm Port
+Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host.
+The default is 22.
+.It Cm PreferredAuthentications
+Specifies the order in which the client should try authentication methods.
+This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.\&
+.Cm keyboard-interactive )
+over another method (e.g.\&
+.Cm password ) .
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
+keyboard-interactive,password
+.Ed
+.It Cm ProxyCommand
+Specifies the command to use to connect to the server.
+The command
+string extends to the end of the line, and is executed
+using the user's shell
+.Ql exec
+directive to avoid a lingering shell process.
+.Pp
+Arguments to
+.Cm ProxyCommand
+accept the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section.
+The command can be basically anything,
+and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output.
+It should eventually connect an
+.Xr sshd 8
+server running on some machine, or execute
+.Ic sshd -i
+somewhere.
+Host key management will be done using the
+.Cm Hostname
+of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user).
+Setting the command to
+.Cm none
+disables this option entirely.
+Note that
+.Cm CheckHostIP
+is not available for connects with a proxy command.
+.Pp
+This directive is useful in conjunction with
+.Xr nc 1
+and its proxy support.
+For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at
+192.0.2.0:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p
+.Ed
+.It Cm ProxyJump
+Specifies one or more jump proxies as either
+.Xo
+.Sm off
+.Op Ar user No @
+.Ar host
+.Op : Ns Ar port
+.Sm on
+or an ssh URI
+.Xc .
+Multiple proxies may be separated by comma characters and will be visited
+sequentially.
+Setting this option will cause
+.Xr ssh 1
+to connect to the target host by first making a
+.Xr ssh 1
+connection to the specified
+.Cm ProxyJump
+host and then establishing a
+TCP forwarding to the ultimate target from there.
+Setting the host to
+.Cm none
+disables this option entirely.
+.Pp
+Note that this option will compete with the
+.Cm ProxyCommand
+option - whichever is specified first will prevent later instances of the
+other from taking effect.
+.Pp
+Note also that the configuration for the destination host (either supplied
+via the command-line or the configuration file) is not generally applied
+to jump hosts.
+.Pa ~/.ssh/config
+should be used if specific configuration is required for jump hosts.
+.It Cm ProxyUseFdpass
+Specifies that
+.Cm ProxyCommand
+will pass a connected file descriptor back to
+.Xr ssh 1
+instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public key
+authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the default
+instead of replacing it.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+default set.
+The default for this option is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
+.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
+Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Cm yes
+(the default),
+.Cm no ,
+.Cm unbound
+or
+.Cm host-bound .
+The final two options enable public key authentication while respectively
+disabling or enabling the OpenSSH host-bound authentication protocol
+extension required for restricted
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding.
+.It Cm RekeyLimit
+Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted or received
+before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed by a maximum
+amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated.
+The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of
+.Sq K ,
+.Sq M ,
+or
+.Sq G
+to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.
+The default is between
+.Sq 1G
+and
+.Sq 4G ,
+depending on the cipher.
+The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the
+units documented in the TIME FORMATS section of
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+The default value for
+.Cm RekeyLimit
+is
+.Cm default none ,
+which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
+of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
+.It Cm RemoteCommand
+Specifies a command to execute on the remote machine after successfully
+connecting to the server.
+The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
+the user's shell.
+Arguments to
+.Cm RemoteCommand
+accept the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section.
+.It Cm RemoteForward
+Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
+the secure channel.
+The remote port may either be forwarded to a specified host and port
+from the local machine, or may act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote
+client to connect to arbitrary destinations from the local machine.
+The first argument is the listening specification and may be
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
+.Sm on
+or, if the remote host supports it, a Unix domain socket path.
+If forwarding to a specific destination then the second argument must be
+.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport
+or a Unix domain socket path,
+otherwise if no destination argument is specified then the remote forwarding
+will be established as a SOCKS proxy.
+When acting as a SOCKS proxy, the destination of the connection can be
+restricted by
+.Cm PermitRemoteOpen .
+.Pp
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
+Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
+forwardings can be given on the command line.
+Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
+logging in as root on the remote machine.
+Unix domain socket paths may use the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+section.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Ar port
+argument is 0,
+the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
+to the client at run time.
+.Pp
+If the
+.Ar bind_address
+is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses.
+If the
+.Ar bind_address
+is
+.Ql *
+or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all
+interfaces.
+Specifying a remote
+.Ar bind_address
+will only succeed if the server's
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+option is enabled (see
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ) .
+.It Cm RequestTTY
+Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session.
+The argument may be one of:
+.Cm no
+(never request a TTY),
+.Cm yes
+(always request a TTY when standard input is a TTY),
+.Cm force
+(always request a TTY) or
+.Cm auto
+(request a TTY when opening a login session).
+This option mirrors the
+.Fl t
+and
+.Fl T
+flags for
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Cm RequiredRSASize
+Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that
+.Xr ssh 1
+will accept.
+User authentication keys smaller than this limit will be ignored.
+Servers that present host keys smaller than this limit will cause the
+connection to be terminated.
+The default is
+.Cm 1024
+bits.
+Note that this limit may only be raised from the default.
+.It Cm RevokedHostKeys
+Specifies revoked host public keys.
+Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication.
+Note that if this file does not exist or is not readable,
+then host authentication will be refused for all hosts.
+Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as
+an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.It Cm SecurityKeyProvider
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+the built-in USB HID support.
+.Pp
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq $
+character, then it will be treated as an environment variable containing
+the path to the library.
+.It Cm SendEnv
+Specifies what variables from the local
+.Xr environ 7
+should be sent to the server.
+The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to
+accept these environment variables.
+Note that the
+.Ev TERM
+environment variable is always sent whenever a
+pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol.
+Refer to
+.Cm AcceptEnv
+in
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+for how to configure the server.
+Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters.
+Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
+across multiple
+.Cm SendEnv
+directives.
+.Pp
+See
+.Sx PATTERNS
+for more information on patterns.
+.Pp
+It is possible to clear previously set
+.Cm SendEnv
+variable names by prefixing patterns with
+.Pa - .
+The default is not to send any environment variables.
+.It Cm ServerAliveCountMax
+Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be
+sent without
+.Xr ssh 1
+receiving any messages back from the server.
+If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent,
+ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session.
+It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very
+different from
+.Cm TCPKeepAlive
+(below).
+The server alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel
+and therefore will not be spoofable.
+The TCP keepalive option enabled by
+.Cm TCPKeepAlive
+is spoofable.
+The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or
+server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive.
+.Pp
+The default value is 3.
+If, for example,
+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
+(see below) is set to 15 and
+.Cm ServerAliveCountMax
+is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive,
+ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds.
+.It Cm ServerAliveInterval
+Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
+from the server,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will send a message through the encrypted
+channel to request a response from the server.
+The default
+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server.
+.It Cm SessionType
+May be used to either request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system,
+or to prevent the execution of a remote command at all.
+The latter is useful for just forwarding ports.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Cm none
+(same as the
+.Fl N
+option),
+.Cm subsystem
+(same as the
+.Fl s
+option) or
+.Cm default
+(shell or command execution).
+.It Cm SetEnv
+Directly specify one or more environment variables and their contents to
+be sent to the server.
+Similarly to
+.Cm SendEnv ,
+with the exception of the
+.Ev TERM
+variable, the server must be prepared to accept the environment variable.
+.It Cm StdinNull
+Redirects stdin from
+.Pa /dev/null
+(actually, prevents reading from stdin).
+Either this or the equivalent
+.Fl n
+option must be used when
+.Nm ssh
+is run in the background.
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Cm yes
+(same as the
+.Fl n
+option) or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
+.It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
+Sets the octal file creation mode mask
+.Pq umask
+used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote
+port forwarding.
+This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
+.Pp
+The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is
+readable and writable only by the owner.
+Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
+socket files.
+.It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
+Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local
+or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
+If the socket file already exists and
+.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
+is not enabled,
+.Nm ssh
+will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file.
+This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
+.Pp
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes
+or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
+.It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
+If this flag is set to
+.Cm yes ,
+.Xr ssh 1
+will never automatically add host keys to the
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
+This provides maximum protection against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks,
+though it can be annoying when the
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are
+frequently made.
+This option forces the user to manually
+add all new hosts.
+.Pp
+If this flag is set to
+.Cm accept-new
+then ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user's
+.Pa known_hosts
+file, but will not permit connections to hosts with
+changed host keys.
+If this flag is set to
+.Cm no
+or
+.Cm off ,
+ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user known hosts files
+and allow connections to hosts with changed hostkeys to proceed,
+subject to some restrictions.
+If this flag is set to
+.Cm ask
+(the default),
+new host keys
+will be added to the user known host files only after the user
+has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and
+ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
+The host keys of
+known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases.
+.It Cm SyslogFacility
+Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+The default is USER.
+.It Cm TCPKeepAlive
+Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
+other side.
+If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
+of the machines will be properly noticed.
+However, this means that
+connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
+find it annoying.
+.Pp
+The default is
+.Cm yes
+(to send TCP keepalive messages), and the client will notice
+if the network goes down or the remote host dies.
+This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
+.Pp
+To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
+.Cm no .
+See also
+.Cm ServerAliveInterval
+for protocol-level keepalives.
+.It Cm Tunnel
+Request
+.Xr tun 4
+device forwarding between the client and the server.
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes ,
+.Cm point-to-point
+(layer 3),
+.Cm ethernet
+(layer 2),
+or
+.Cm no
+(the default).
+Specifying
+.Cm yes
+requests the default tunnel mode, which is
+.Cm point-to-point .
+.It Cm TunnelDevice
+Specifies the
+.Xr tun 4
+devices to open on the client
+.Pq Ar local_tun
+and the server
+.Pq Ar remote_tun .
+.Pp
+The argument must be
+.Sm off
+.Ar local_tun Op : Ar remote_tun .
+.Sm on
+The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
+.Cm any ,
+which uses the next available tunnel device.
+If
+.Ar remote_tun
+is not specified, it defaults to
+.Cm any .
+The default is
+.Cm any:any .
+.It Cm UpdateHostKeys
+Specifies whether
+.Xr ssh 1
+should accept notifications of additional hostkeys from the server sent
+after authentication has completed and add them to
+.Cm UserKnownHostsFile .
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes ,
+.Cm no
+or
+.Cm ask .
+This option allows learning alternate hostkeys for a server
+and supports graceful key rotation by allowing a server to send replacement
+public keys before old ones are removed.
+.Pp
+Additional hostkeys are only accepted if the key used to authenticate the
+host was already trusted or explicitly accepted by the user, the host was
+authenticated via
+.Cm UserKnownHostsFile
+(i.e. not
+.Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile )
+and the host was authenticated using a plain key and not a certificate.
+.Pp
+.Cm UpdateHostKeys
+is enabled by default if the user has not overridden the default
+.Cm UserKnownHostsFile
+setting and has not enabled
+.Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS ,
+otherwise
+.Cm UpdateHostKeys
+will be set to
+.Cm no .
+.Pp
+If
+.Cm UpdateHostKeys
+is set to
+.Cm ask ,
+then the user is asked to confirm the modifications to the known_hosts file.
+Confirmation is currently incompatible with
+.Cm ControlPersist ,
+and will be disabled if it is enabled.
+.Pp
+Presently, only
+.Xr sshd 8
+from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the
+.Qq hostkeys@openssh.com
+protocol extension used to inform the client of all the server's hostkeys.
+.It Cm User
+Specifies the user to log in as.
+This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines.
+This saves the trouble of
+having to remember to give the user name on the command line.
+.It Cm UserKnownHostsFile
+Specifies one or more files to use for the user
+host key database, separated by whitespace.
+Each filename may use tilde notation to refer to the user's home directory,
+the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section and environment variables as described in the
+.Sx ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+section.
+A value of
+.Cm none
+causes
+.Xr ssh 1
+to ignore any user-specific known hosts files.
+The default is
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts2 .
+.It Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS
+Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource
+records.
+If this option is set to
+.Cm yes ,
+the client will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint
+from DNS.
+Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set to
+.Cm ask .
+If this option is set to
+.Cm ask ,
+information on fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still
+need to confirm new host keys according to the
+.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
+option.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.Pp
+See also
+.Sx VERIFYING HOST KEYS
+in
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Cm VisualHostKey
+If this flag is set to
+.Cm yes ,
+an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is
+printed in addition to the fingerprint string at login and
+for unknown host keys.
+If this flag is set to
+.Cm no
+(the default),
+no fingerprint strings are printed at login and
+only the fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys.
+.It Cm XAuthLocation
+Specifies the full pathname of the
+.Xr xauth 1
+program.
+The default is
+.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth .
+.El
+.Sh PATTERNS
+A
+.Em pattern
+consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters,
+.Sq *
+(a wildcard that matches zero or more characters),
+or
+.Sq ?\&
+(a wildcard that matches exactly one character).
+For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the
+.Qq .co.uk
+set of domains,
+the following pattern could be used:
+.Pp
+.Dl Host *.co.uk
+.Pp
+The following pattern
+would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range:
+.Pp
+.Dl Host 192.168.0.?
+.Pp
+A
+.Em pattern-list
+is a comma-separated list of patterns.
+Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated
+by preceding them with an exclamation mark
+.Pq Sq !\& .
+For example,
+to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organization
+except from the
+.Qq dialup
+pool,
+the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used:
+.Pp
+.Dl from=\&"!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com\&"
+.Pp
+Note that a negated match will never produce a positive result by itself.
+For example, attempting to match
+.Qq host3
+against the following pattern-list will fail:
+.Pp
+.Dl from=\&"!host1,!host2\&"
+.Pp
+The solution here is to include a term that will yield a positive match,
+such as a wildcard:
+.Pp
+.Dl from=\&"!host1,!host2,*\&"
+.Sh TOKENS
+Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens,
+which are expanded at runtime:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact
+.It %%
+A literal
+.Sq % .
+.It \&%C
+Hash of %l%h%p%r.
+.It %d
+Local user's home directory.
+.It %f
+The fingerprint of the server's host key.
+.It %H
+The
+.Pa known_hosts
+hostname or address that is being searched for.
+.It %h
+The remote hostname.
+.It \%%I
+A string describing the reason for a
+.Cm KnownHostsCommand
+execution: either
+.Cm ADDRESS
+when looking up a host by address (only when
+.Cm CheckHostIP
+is enabled),
+.Cm HOSTNAME
+when searching by hostname, or
+.Cm ORDER
+when preparing the host key algorithm preference list to use for the
+destination host.
+.It %i
+The local user ID.
+.It %K
+The base64 encoded host key.
+.It %k
+The host key alias if specified, otherwise the original remote hostname given
+on the command line.
+.It %L
+The local hostname.
+.It %l
+The local hostname, including the domain name.
+.It %n
+The original remote hostname, as given on the command line.
+.It %p
+The remote port.
+.It %r
+The remote username.
+.It \&%T
+The local
+.Xr tun 4
+or
+.Xr tap 4
+network interface assigned if
+tunnel forwarding was requested, or
+.Qq NONE
+otherwise.
+.It %t
+The type of the server host key, e.g.
+.Cm ssh-ed25519 .
+.It %u
+The local username.
+.El
+.Pp
+.Cm CertificateFile ,
+.Cm ControlPath ,
+.Cm IdentityAgent ,
+.Cm IdentityFile ,
+.Cm KnownHostsCommand ,
+.Cm LocalForward ,
+.Cm Match exec ,
+.Cm RemoteCommand ,
+.Cm RemoteForward ,
+and
+.Cm UserKnownHostsFile
+accept the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %k, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u.
+.Pp
+.Cm KnownHostsCommand
+additionally accepts the tokens %f, %H, %I, %K and %t.
+.Pp
+.Cm Hostname
+accepts the tokens %% and %h.
+.Pp
+.Cm LocalCommand
+accepts all tokens.
+.Pp
+.Cm ProxyCommand
+and
+.Cm ProxyJump
+accept the tokens %%, %h, %n, %p, and %r.
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT VARIABLES
+Arguments to some keywords can be expanded at runtime from environment
+variables on the client by enclosing them in
+.Ic ${} ,
+for example
+.Ic ${HOME}/.ssh
+would refer to the user's .ssh directory.
+If a specified environment variable does not exist then an error will be
+returned and the setting for that keyword will be ignored.
+.Pp
+The keywords
+.Cm CertificateFile ,
+.Cm ControlPath ,
+.Cm IdentityAgent ,
+.Cm IdentityFile ,
+.Cm KnownHostsCommand ,
+and
+.Cm UserKnownHostsFile
+support environment variables.
+The keywords
+.Cm LocalForward
+and
+.Cm RemoteForward
+support environment variables only for Unix domain socket paths.
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
+This is the per-user configuration file.
+The format of this file is described above.
+This file is used by the SSH client.
+Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
+read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
+Systemwide configuration file.
+This file provides defaults for those
+values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and
+for those users who do not have a configuration file.
+This file must be world-readable.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr ssh 1
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An -nosplit
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by
+.An Tatu Ylonen .
+.An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl ,
+.An Niels Provos , Theo de Raadt
+and
+.An Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+.An Markus Friedl
+contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/sshbuf-getput-basic.c b/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5c71b0e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
@@ -0,0 +1,633 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.13 2022/05/25 06:03:44 djm Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+int
+sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len)
+{
+	const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len)) < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (v != NULL && len != 0)
+		memcpy(v, p, len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 8)) < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = PEEK_U64(p);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 4)) < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = PEEK_U32(p);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 2)) < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = PEEK_U16(p);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 1)) < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = (u_int8_t)*p;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+check_offset(const struct sshbuf *buf, int wr, size_t offset, size_t len)
+{
+	if (sshbuf_ptr(buf) == NULL) /* calls sshbuf_check_sanity() */
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if (offset >= SIZE_MAX - len)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (offset + len > sshbuf_len(buf)) {
+		return wr ?
+		    SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE : SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+check_roffset(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, size_t len,
+    const u_char **p)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	*p = NULL;
+	if ((r = check_offset(buf, 0, offset, len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	*p = sshbuf_ptr(buf) + offset;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_peek_u64(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int64_t *valp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = 0;
+	if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 8, &p)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = PEEK_U64(p);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_peek_u32(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int32_t *valp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = 0;
+	if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 4, &p)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = PEEK_U32(p);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_peek_u16(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int16_t *valp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = 0;
+	if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 2, &p)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = PEEK_U16(p);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_peek_u8(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_char *valp)
+{
+	const u_char *p = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = 0;
+	if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 1, &p)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = *p;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+	const u_char *val;
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = NULL;
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = 0;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &val, &len)) < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (valp != NULL) {
+		if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
+			SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL"));
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		}
+		if (len != 0)
+			memcpy(*valp, val, len);
+		(*valp)[len] = '\0';
+	}
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = len;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+	size_t len;
+	const u_char *p;
+	int r;
+
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = NULL;
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = 0;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = p;
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = len;
+	if (sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4) != 0) {
+		/* Shouldn't happen */
+		SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
+		SSHBUF_ABORT();
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp,
+    size_t *lenp)
+{
+	u_int32_t len;
+	const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = NULL;
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = 0;
+	if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 4) {
+		SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE"));
+		return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+	}
+	len = PEEK_U32(p);
+	if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) {
+		SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE"));
+		return SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(buf) - 4 < len) {
+		SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE"));
+		return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+	}
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = p + 4;
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = len;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+	size_t len;
+	const u_char *p, *z;
+	int r;
+
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = NULL;
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = 0;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	/* Allow a \0 only at the end of the string */
+	if (len > 0 &&
+	    (z = memchr(p , '\0', len)) != NULL && z < p + len - 1) {
+		SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT"));
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0)
+		return -1;
+	if (valp != NULL) {
+		if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
+			SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL"));
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		}
+		if (len != 0)
+			memcpy(*valp, p, len);
+		(*valp)[len] = '\0';
+	}
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = (size_t)len;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v)
+{
+	u_int32_t len;
+	u_char *p;
+	int r;
+
+	/*
+	 * Use sshbuf_peek_string_direct() to figure out if there is
+	 * a complete string in 'buf' and copy the string directly
+	 * into 'v'.
+	 */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_reserve(v, len, &p)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get(buf, p, len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
+{
+	u_char *p;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len, &p)) < 0)
+		return r;
+	if (len != 0)
+		memcpy(p, v, len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
+{
+	if (v == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	return sshbuf_put(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+	int r;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	r = sshbuf_putfv(buf, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+	va_list ap2;
+	int r, len;
+	u_char *p;
+
+	VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
+	if ((len = vsnprintf(NULL, 0, fmt, ap2)) < 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (len == 0) {
+		r = 0;
+		goto out; /* Nothing to do */
+	}
+	va_end(ap2);
+	VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, (size_t)len + 1, &p)) < 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = vsnprintf((char *)p, len + 1, fmt, ap2)) != len) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		goto out; /* Shouldn't happen */
+	}
+	/* Consume terminating \0 */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(buf, 1)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	va_end(ap2);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val)
+{
+	u_char *p;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 8, &p)) < 0)
+		return r;
+	POKE_U64(p, val);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val)
+{
+	u_char *p;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 4, &p)) < 0)
+		return r;
+	POKE_U32(p, val);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val)
+{
+	u_char *p;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 2, &p)) < 0)
+		return r;
+	POKE_U16(p, val);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val)
+{
+	u_char *p;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 1, &p)) < 0)
+		return r;
+	p[0] = val;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+check_woffset(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, size_t len, u_char **p)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	*p = NULL;
+	if ((r = check_offset(buf, 1, offset, len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY;
+	*p = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf) + offset;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_poke_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int64_t val)
+{
+	u_char *p = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 8, &p)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	POKE_U64(p, val);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_poke_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int32_t val)
+{
+	u_char *p = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 4, &p)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	POKE_U32(p, val);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_poke_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int16_t val)
+{
+	u_char *p = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 2, &p)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	POKE_U16(p, val);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_poke_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_char val)
+{
+	u_char *p = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 1, &p)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	*p = val;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_poke(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, void *v, size_t len)
+{
+	u_char *p = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, len, &p)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	memcpy(p, v, len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
+{
+	u_char *d;
+	int r;
+
+	if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) {
+		SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE"));
+		return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4, &d)) < 0)
+		return r;
+	POKE_U32(d, len);
+	if (len != 0)
+		memcpy(d + 4, v, len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v)
+{
+	return sshbuf_put_string(buf, v, v == NULL ? 0 : strlen(v));
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
+{
+	if (v == NULL)
+		return sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0);
+
+	return sshbuf_put_string(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp)
+{
+	const u_char *p;
+	size_t len;
+	struct sshbuf *ret;
+	int r;
+
+	if (buf == NULL || bufp == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	*bufp = NULL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_from(p, len)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4)) != 0 ||  /* Shouldn't happen */
+	    (r = sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf)) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(ret);
+		return r;
+	}
+	*bufp = ret;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
+{
+	u_char *d;
+	const u_char *s = (const u_char *)v;
+	int r, prepend;
+
+	if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 5) {
+		SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE"));
+		return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
+	}
+	/* Skip leading zero bytes */
+	for (; len > 0 && *s == 0; len--, s++)
+		;
+	/*
+	 * If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to
+	 * avoid interpretation as a negative number.
+	 */
+	prepend = len > 0 && (s[0] & 0x80) != 0;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4 + prepend, &d)) < 0)
+		return r;
+	POKE_U32(d, len + prepend);
+	if (prepend)
+		d[4] = 0;
+	if (len != 0)
+		memcpy(d + 4 + prepend, s, len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf,
+    const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+	const u_char *d;
+	size_t len, olen;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &olen)) < 0)
+		return r;
+	len = olen;
+	/* Refuse negative (MSB set) bignums */
+	if ((len != 0 && (*d & 0x80) != 0))
+		return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE;
+	/* Refuse overlong bignums, allow prepended \0 to avoid MSB set */
+	if (len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 ||
+	    (len == SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 && *d != 0))
+		return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE;
+	/* Trim leading zeros */
+	while (len > 0 && *d == 0x00) {
+		d++;
+		len--;
+	}
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = d;
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = len;
+	if (sshbuf_consume(buf, olen + 4) != 0) {
+		/* Shouldn't happen */
+		SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
+		SSHBUF_ABORT();
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c b/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..56ffdd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-crypto.c,v 1.10 2022/05/25 06:03:44 djm Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+# include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM **valp)
+{
+	BIGNUM *v;
+	const u_char *d;
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	if (valp != NULL)
+		*valp = NULL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(buf, &d, &len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (valp != NULL) {
+		if ((v = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+		    BN_bin2bn(d, len, v) == NULL) {
+			BN_clear_free(v);
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		}
+		*valp = v;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+static int
+get_ec(const u_char *d, size_t len, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
+{
+	/* Refuse overlong bignums */
+	if (len == 0 || len > SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT)
+		return SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE;
+	/* Only handle uncompressed points */
+	if (*d != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	if (v != NULL && EC_POINT_oct2point(g, v, d, len, NULL) != 1)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX assumption */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
+{
+	const u_char *d;
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &len)) < 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((r = get_ec(d, len, v, g)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	/* Skip string */
+	if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+		/* Shouldn't happen */
+		SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
+		SSHBUF_ABORT();
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_get_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_KEY *v)
+{
+	EC_POINT *pt = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(v));
+	int r;
+	const u_char *d;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (pt == NULL) {
+		SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL"));
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &len)) < 0) {
+		EC_POINT_free(pt);
+		return r;
+	}
+	if ((r = get_ec(d, len, pt, EC_KEY_get0_group(v))) != 0) {
+		EC_POINT_free(pt);
+		return r;
+	}
+	if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(v, pt) != 1) {
+		EC_POINT_free(pt);
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* XXX assumption */
+	}
+	EC_POINT_free(pt);
+	/* Skip string */
+	if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+		/* Shouldn't happen */
+		SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
+		SSHBUF_ABORT();
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	return 0;	
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v)
+{
+	u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1];
+	int len = BN_num_bytes(v), prepend = 0, r;
+
+	if (len < 0 || len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	*d = '\0';
+	if (BN_bn2bin(v, d + 1) != len)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */
+	/* If MSB is set, prepend a \0 */
+	if (len > 0 && (d[1] & 0x80) != 0)
+		prepend = 1;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, d + 1 - prepend, len + prepend)) < 0) {
+		explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d));
+		return r;
+	}
+	explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+int
+sshbuf_put_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
+{
+	u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT];
+	size_t len;
+	int ret;
+
+	if ((len = EC_POINT_point2oct(g, v, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+	    NULL, 0, NULL)) > SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT) {
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	}
+	if (EC_POINT_point2oct(g, v, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+	    d, len, NULL) != len) {
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */
+	}
+	ret = sshbuf_put_string(buf, d, len);
+	explicit_bzero(d, len);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_put_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_KEY *v)
+{
+	return sshbuf_put_ec(buf, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(v),
+	    EC_KEY_get0_group(v));
+}
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/sshbuf-io.c b/sshbuf-io.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..13ef40e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshbuf-io.c
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sshbuf-io.c,v 1.2 2020/01/25 23:28:06 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+/* Load a file from a fd into a buffer */
+int
+sshbuf_load_fd(int fd, struct sshbuf **blobp)
+{
+	u_char buf[4096];
+	size_t len;
+	struct stat st;
+	int r;
+	struct sshbuf *blob;
+
+	*blobp = NULL;
+
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1)
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
+	    st.st_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	for (;;) {
+		if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) {
+			if (errno == EPIPE)
+				break;
+			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if (sshbuf_len(blob) > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
+	    st.st_size != (off_t)sshbuf_len(blob)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	*blobp = blob;
+	blob = NULL; /* transferred */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+	sshbuf_free(blob);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_load_file(const char *path, struct sshbuf **bufp)
+{
+	int r, fd, oerrno;
+
+	*bufp = NULL;
+	if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, bufp)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	oerrno = errno;
+	close(fd);
+	if (r != 0)
+		errno = oerrno;
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_write_file(const char *path, struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+	int fd, oerrno;
+
+	if ((fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
+	    sshbuf_len(buf)) != sshbuf_len(buf) || close(fd) != 0) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		close(fd);
+		unlink(path);
+		errno = oerrno;
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/sshbuf-misc.c b/sshbuf-misc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c5c42b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshbuf-misc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sshbuf-misc.c,v 1.18 2022/01/22 00:43:43 djm Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+void
+sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f)
+{
+	size_t i, j;
+	const u_char *p = (const u_char *)s;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) {
+		fprintf(f, "%.4zu: ", i);
+		for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) {
+			if (j < len)
+				fprintf(f, "%02x ", p[j]);
+			else
+				fprintf(f, "   ");
+		}
+		fprintf(f, " ");
+		for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) {
+			if (j < len) {
+				if  (isascii(p[j]) && isprint(p[j]))
+					fprintf(f, "%c", p[j]);
+				else
+					fprintf(f, ".");
+			}
+		}
+		fprintf(f, "\n");
+	}
+}
+
+void
+sshbuf_dump(const struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f)
+{
+	fprintf(f, "buffer len = %zu\n", sshbuf_len(buf));
+	sshbuf_dump_data(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), f);
+}
+
+char *
+sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+	size_t i, j, len = sshbuf_len(buf);
+	const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+	char *ret;
+	const char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef";
+
+	if (len == 0)
+		return strdup("");
+	if (SIZE_MAX / 2 <= len || (ret = malloc(len * 2 + 1)) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	for (i = j = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		ret[j++] = hex[(p[i] >> 4) & 0xf];
+		ret[j++] = hex[p[i] & 0xf];
+	}
+	ret[j] = '\0';
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_dtob64(const struct sshbuf *d, struct sshbuf *b64, int wrap)
+{
+	size_t i, slen = 0;
+	char *s = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (d == NULL || b64 == NULL || sshbuf_len(d) >= SIZE_MAX / 2)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (sshbuf_len(d) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	slen = ((sshbuf_len(d) + 2) / 3) * 4 + 1;
+	if ((s = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if (b64_ntop(sshbuf_ptr(d), sshbuf_len(d), s, slen) == -1) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (wrap) {
+		for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b64, s[i])) != 0)
+				goto fail;
+			if (i % 70 == 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b64, '\n')) != 0)
+				goto fail;
+		}
+		if ((i - 1) % 70 != 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b64, '\n')) != 0)
+			goto fail;
+	} else {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put(b64, s, strlen(s))) != 0)
+			goto fail;
+	}
+	/* Success */
+	r = 0;
+ fail:
+	freezero(s, slen);
+	return r;
+}
+
+char *
+sshbuf_dtob64_string(const struct sshbuf *buf, int wrap)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *tmp;
+	char *ret;
+
+	if ((tmp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	if (sshbuf_dtob64(buf, tmp, wrap) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(tmp);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	ret = sshbuf_dup_string(tmp);
+	sshbuf_free(tmp);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64)
+{
+	size_t plen = strlen(b64);
+	int nlen, r;
+	u_char *p;
+
+	if (plen == 0)
+		return 0;
+	if ((p = malloc(plen)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((nlen = b64_pton(b64, p, plen)) < 0) {
+		freezero(p, plen);
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, nlen)) < 0) {
+		freezero(p, plen);
+		return r;
+	}
+	freezero(p, plen);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_dtourlb64(const struct sshbuf *d, struct sshbuf *b64, int wrap)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	u_char *p;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	size_t i, l;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	/* Encode using regular base64; we'll transform it once done */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_dtob64(d, b, wrap)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* remove padding from end of encoded string*/
+	for (;;) {
+		l = sshbuf_len(b);
+		if (l <= 1 || sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (sshbuf_ptr(b)[l - 1] != '=')
+			break;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(b, 1)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	/* Replace characters with rfc4648 equivalents */
+	l = sshbuf_len(b);
+	if ((p = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+		if (p[i] == '+')
+			p[i] = '-';
+		else if (p[i] == '/')
+			p[i] = '_';
+	}
+	r = sshbuf_putb(b64, b);
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
+}
+
+char *
+sshbuf_dup_string(struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+	const u_char *p = NULL, *s = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
+	size_t l = sshbuf_len(buf);
+	char *r;
+
+	if (s == NULL || l > SIZE_MAX)
+		return NULL;
+	/* accept a nul only as the last character in the buffer */
+	if (l > 0 && (p = memchr(s, '\0', l)) != NULL) {
+		if (p != s + l - 1)
+			return NULL;
+		l--; /* the nul is put back below */
+	}
+	if ((r = malloc(l + 1)) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	if (l > 0)
+		memcpy(r, s, l);
+	r[l] = '\0';
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_cmp(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t offset,
+    const void *s, size_t len)
+{
+	if (sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if (offset > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (offset + len > sshbuf_len(b))
+		return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+	if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(b) + offset, s, len) != 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_find(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t start_offset,
+    const void *s, size_t len, size_t *offsetp)
+{
+	void *p;
+
+	if (offsetp != NULL)
+		*offsetp = 0;
+	if (sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if (start_offset > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (start_offset > sshbuf_len(b) || start_offset + len > sshbuf_len(b))
+		return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+	if ((p = memmem(sshbuf_ptr(b) + start_offset,
+	    sshbuf_len(b) - start_offset, s, len)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	if (offsetp != NULL)
+		*offsetp = (const u_char *)p - sshbuf_ptr(b);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_read(int fd, struct sshbuf *buf, size_t maxlen, size_t *rlen)
+{
+	int r, oerrno;
+	size_t adjust;
+	ssize_t rr;
+	u_char *d;
+
+	if (rlen != NULL)
+		*rlen = 0;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, maxlen, &d)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	rr = read(fd, d, maxlen);
+	oerrno = errno;
+
+	/* Adjust the buffer to include only what was actually read */
+	if ((adjust = maxlen - (rr > 0 ? rr : 0)) != 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(buf, adjust)) != 0) {
+			/* avoid returning uninitialised data to caller */
+			memset(d + rr, '\0', adjust);
+			return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* shouldn't happen */
+		}
+	}
+	if (rr < 0) {
+		errno = oerrno;
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	} else if (rr == 0) {
+		errno = EPIPE;
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	if (rlen != NULL)
+		*rlen = (size_t)rr;
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/sshbuf.c b/sshbuf.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d7f4e4a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshbuf.c
@@ -0,0 +1,427 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sshbuf.c,v 1.19 2022/12/02 04:40:27 djm Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#ifdef SSHBUF_DEBUG
+# define SSHBUF_TELL(what) do { \
+		printf("%s:%d %s: %s size %zu alloc %zu off %zu max %zu\n", \
+		    __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__, what, \
+		    buf->size, buf->alloc, buf->off, buf->max_size); \
+		fflush(stdout); \
+	} while (0)
+#else
+# define SSHBUF_TELL(what)
+#endif
+
+struct sshbuf {
+	u_char *d;		/* Data */
+	const u_char *cd;	/* Const data */
+	size_t off;		/* First available byte is buf->d + buf->off */
+	size_t size;		/* Last byte is buf->d + buf->size - 1 */
+	size_t max_size;	/* Maximum size of buffer */
+	size_t alloc;		/* Total bytes allocated to buf->d */
+	int readonly;		/* Refers to external, const data */
+	u_int refcount;		/* Tracks self and number of child buffers */
+	struct sshbuf *parent;	/* If child, pointer to parent */
+};
+
+static inline int
+sshbuf_check_sanity(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+	SSHBUF_TELL("sanity");
+	if (__predict_false(buf == NULL ||
+	    (!buf->readonly && buf->d != buf->cd) ||
+	    buf->refcount < 1 || buf->refcount > SSHBUF_REFS_MAX ||
+	    buf->cd == NULL ||
+	    buf->max_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX ||
+	    buf->alloc > buf->max_size ||
+	    buf->size > buf->alloc ||
+	    buf->off > buf->size)) {
+		/* Do not try to recover from corrupted buffer internals */
+		SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
+		ssh_signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL);
+		raise(SIGSEGV);
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void
+sshbuf_maybe_pack(struct sshbuf *buf, int force)
+{
+	SSHBUF_DBG(("force %d", force));
+	SSHBUF_TELL("pre-pack");
+	if (buf->off == 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
+		return;
+	if (force ||
+	    (buf->off >= SSHBUF_PACK_MIN && buf->off >= buf->size / 2)) {
+		memmove(buf->d, buf->d + buf->off, buf->size - buf->off);
+		buf->size -= buf->off;
+		buf->off = 0;
+		SSHBUF_TELL("packed");
+	}
+}
+
+struct sshbuf *
+sshbuf_new(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *ret;
+
+	if ((ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1)) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	ret->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT;
+	ret->max_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
+	ret->readonly = 0;
+	ret->refcount = 1;
+	ret->parent = NULL;
+	if ((ret->cd = ret->d = calloc(1, ret->alloc)) == NULL) {
+		free(ret);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+struct sshbuf *
+sshbuf_from(const void *blob, size_t len)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *ret;
+
+	if (blob == NULL || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX ||
+	    (ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1)) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	ret->alloc = ret->size = ret->max_size = len;
+	ret->readonly = 1;
+	ret->refcount = 1;
+	ret->parent = NULL;
+	ret->cd = blob;
+	ret->d = NULL;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_set_parent(struct sshbuf *child, struct sshbuf *parent)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(child)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_check_sanity(parent)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (child->parent != NULL && child->parent != parent)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	child->parent = parent;
+	child->parent->refcount++;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct sshbuf *
+sshbuf_fromb(struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *ret;
+
+	if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0)
+		return NULL;
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_from(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf))) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	if (sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(ret);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+sshbuf_free(struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+	if (buf == NULL)
+		return;
+	/*
+	 * The following will leak on insane buffers, but this is the safest
+	 * course of action - an invalid pointer or already-freed pointer may
+	 * have been passed to us and continuing to scribble over memory would
+	 * be bad.
+	 */
+	if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we are a parent with still-extant children, then don't free just
+	 * yet. The last child's call to sshbuf_free should decrement our
+	 * refcount to 0 and trigger the actual free.
+	 */
+	buf->refcount--;
+	if (buf->refcount > 0)
+		return;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we are a child, the free our parent to decrement its reference
+	 * count and possibly free it.
+	 */
+	sshbuf_free(buf->parent);
+	buf->parent = NULL;
+
+	if (!buf->readonly) {
+		explicit_bzero(buf->d, buf->alloc);
+		free(buf->d);
+	}
+	freezero(buf, sizeof(*buf));
+}
+
+void
+sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+	u_char *d;
+
+	if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) {
+		/* Nonsensical. Just make buffer appear empty */
+		buf->off = buf->size;
+		return;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0)
+		return;
+	buf->off = buf->size = 0;
+	if (buf->alloc != SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT) {
+		if ((d = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT,
+		    1)) != NULL) {
+			buf->cd = buf->d = d;
+			buf->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT;
+		}
+	}
+	explicit_bzero(buf->d, buf->alloc);
+}
+
+size_t
+sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+	return buf->max_size;
+}
+
+size_t
+sshbuf_alloc(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+	return buf->alloc;
+}
+
+const struct sshbuf *
+sshbuf_parent(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+	return buf->parent;
+}
+
+u_int
+sshbuf_refcount(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+	return buf->refcount;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size)
+{
+	size_t rlen;
+	u_char *dp;
+	int r;
+
+	SSHBUF_DBG(("set max buf = %p len = %zu", buf, max_size));
+	if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (max_size == buf->max_size)
+		return 0;
+	if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
+		return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY;
+	if (max_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
+		return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
+	/* pack and realloc if necessary */
+	sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, max_size < buf->size);
+	if (max_size < buf->alloc && max_size > buf->size) {
+		if (buf->size < SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT)
+			rlen = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT;
+		else
+			rlen = ROUNDUP(buf->size, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
+		if (rlen > max_size)
+			rlen = max_size;
+		SSHBUF_DBG(("new alloc = %zu", rlen));
+		if ((dp = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, rlen, 1)) == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		buf->cd = buf->d = dp;
+		buf->alloc = rlen;
+	}
+	SSHBUF_TELL("new-max");
+	if (max_size < buf->alloc)
+		return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
+	buf->max_size = max_size;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+size_t
+sshbuf_len(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+	if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	return buf->size - buf->off;
+}
+
+size_t
+sshbuf_avail(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+	if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
+		return 0;
+	return buf->max_size - (buf->size - buf->off);
+}
+
+const u_char *
+sshbuf_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+	if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0)
+		return NULL;
+	return buf->cd + buf->off;
+}
+
+u_char *
+sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+	if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
+		return NULL;
+	return buf->d + buf->off;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
+		return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY;
+	SSHBUF_TELL("check");
+	/* Check that len is reasonable and that max_size + available < len */
+	if (len > buf->max_size || buf->max_size - len < buf->size - buf->off)
+		return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	size_t rlen, need;
+	u_char *dp;
+	int r;
+
+	SSHBUF_DBG(("allocate buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
+	if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	/*
+	 * If the requested allocation appended would push us past max_size
+	 * then pack the buffer, zeroing buf->off.
+	 */
+	sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, buf->size + len > buf->max_size);
+	SSHBUF_TELL("allocate");
+	if (len + buf->size <= buf->alloc)
+		return 0; /* already have it. */
+
+	/*
+	 * Prefer to alloc in SSHBUF_SIZE_INC units, but
+	 * allocate less if doing so would overflow max_size.
+	 */
+	need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc;
+	rlen = ROUNDUP(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
+	SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen));
+	if (rlen > buf->max_size)
+		rlen = buf->alloc + need;
+	SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen));
+	if ((dp = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, rlen, 1)) == NULL) {
+		SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail"));
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+	buf->alloc = rlen;
+	buf->cd = buf->d = dp;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) < 0) {
+		/* shouldn't fail */
+		return r;
+	}
+	SSHBUF_TELL("done");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp)
+{
+	u_char *dp;
+	int r;
+
+	if (dpp != NULL)
+		*dpp = NULL;
+
+	SSHBUF_DBG(("reserve buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
+	if ((r = sshbuf_allocate(buf, len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	dp = buf->d + buf->size;
+	buf->size += len;
+	if (dpp != NULL)
+		*dpp = dp;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	SSHBUF_DBG(("len = %zu", len));
+	if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (len == 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (len > sshbuf_len(buf))
+		return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+	buf->off += len;
+	/* deal with empty buffer */
+	if (buf->off == buf->size)
+		buf->off = buf->size = 0;
+	SSHBUF_TELL("done");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_consume_end(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	SSHBUF_DBG(("len = %zu", len));
+	if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (len == 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (len > sshbuf_len(buf))
+		return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+	buf->size -= len;
+	SSHBUF_TELL("done");
+	return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/sshbuf.h b/sshbuf.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e2155f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshbuf.h
@@ -0,0 +1,393 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.28 2022/12/02 04:40:27 djm Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SSHBUF_H
+#define _SSHBUF_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# include <openssl/bn.h>
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+#  include <openssl/ec.h>
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX		0x8000000	/* Hard maximum size */
+#define SSHBUF_REFS_MAX		0x100000	/* Max child buffers */
+#define SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM	(16384 / 8)	/* Max bignum *bytes* */
+#define SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT	((528 * 2 / 8) + 1) /* Max EC point *bytes* */
+
+struct sshbuf;
+
+/*
+ * Create a new sshbuf buffer.
+ * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
+ */
+struct sshbuf *sshbuf_new(void);
+
+/*
+ * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from existing data.
+ * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
+ */
+struct sshbuf *sshbuf_from(const void *blob, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of an existing
+ * buffer. The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the
+ * resultant buffer.
+ * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
+ */
+struct sshbuf *sshbuf_fromb(struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of a string in
+ * an existing buffer (the string is consumed in the process).
+ * The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the resultant
+ * buffer.
+ * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
+ */
+int	sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp);
+
+/*
+ * Clear and free buf
+ */
+void	sshbuf_free(struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Reset buf, clearing its contents. NB. max_size is preserved.
+ */
+void	sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Return the maximum size of buf
+ */
+size_t	sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Set the maximum size of buf
+ * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int	sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size);
+
+/*
+ * Returns the length of data in buf
+ */
+size_t	sshbuf_len(const struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Returns number of bytes left in buffer before hitting max_size.
+ */
+size_t	sshbuf_avail(const struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Returns a read-only pointer to the start of the data in buf
+ */
+const u_char *sshbuf_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Returns a mutable pointer to the start of the data in buf, or
+ * NULL if the buffer is read-only.
+ */
+u_char *sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Check whether a reservation of size len will succeed in buf
+ * Safer to use than direct comparisons again sshbuf_avail as it copes
+ * with unsigned overflows correctly.
+ * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int	sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Preallocates len additional bytes in buf.
+ * Useful for cases where the caller knows how many bytes will ultimately be
+ * required to avoid realloc in the buffer code.
+ * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int	sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Reserve len bytes in buf.
+ * Returns 0 on success and a pointer to the first reserved byte via the
+ * optional dpp parameter or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int	sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp);
+
+/*
+ * Consume len bytes from the start of buf
+ * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int	sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Consume len bytes from the end of buf
+ * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int	sshbuf_consume_end(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
+
+/* Extract or deposit some bytes */
+int	sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len);
+int	sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len);
+int	sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v);
+
+/* Append using a printf(3) format */
+int	sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...)
+	    __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+int	sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap);
+
+/* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */
+int	sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp);
+int	sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp);
+int	sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp);
+int	sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp);
+int	sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val);
+int	sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val);
+int	sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val);
+int	sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val);
+
+/* Functions to peek at the contents of a buffer without modifying it. */
+int	sshbuf_peek_u64(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset,
+    u_int64_t *valp);
+int	sshbuf_peek_u32(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset,
+    u_int32_t *valp);
+int	sshbuf_peek_u16(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset,
+    u_int16_t *valp);
+int	sshbuf_peek_u8(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset,
+    u_char *valp);
+
+/*
+ * Functions to poke values into an existing buffer (e.g. a length header
+ * to a packet). The destination bytes must already exist in the buffer.
+ */
+int sshbuf_poke_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int64_t val);
+int sshbuf_poke_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int32_t val);
+int sshbuf_poke_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int16_t val);
+int sshbuf_poke_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_char val);
+int sshbuf_poke(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, void *v, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded strings (u32 len || data)
+ * The "cstring" variants admit no \0 characters in the string contents.
+ * Caller must free *valp.
+ */
+int	sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
+int	sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp);
+int	sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v);
+int	sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len);
+int	sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v);
+int	sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v);
+
+/*
+ * "Direct" variant of sshbuf_get_string, returns pointer into the sshbuf to
+ * avoid an malloc+memcpy. The pointer is guaranteed to be valid until the
+ * next sshbuf-modifying function call. Caller does not free.
+ */
+int	sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp,
+	    size_t *lenp);
+
+/* Skip past a string */
+#define sshbuf_skip_string(buf) sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)
+
+/* Another variant: "peeks" into the buffer without modifying it */
+int	sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp,
+	    size_t *lenp);
+
+/*
+ * Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded bignums and elliptic
+ * curve points.
+ */
+int	sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len);
+int	sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf,
+	    const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+int	sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM **valp);
+int	sshbuf_put_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v);
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+int	sshbuf_get_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g);
+int	sshbuf_get_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_KEY *v);
+int	sshbuf_put_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g);
+int	sshbuf_put_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_KEY *v);
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+/* Dump the contents of the buffer in a human-readable format */
+void	sshbuf_dump(const struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f);
+
+/* Dump specified memory in a human-readable format */
+void	sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f);
+
+/* Return the hexadecimal representation of the contents of the buffer */
+char	*sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/* Encode the contents of the buffer as base64 */
+char	*sshbuf_dtob64_string(const struct sshbuf *buf, int wrap);
+int	sshbuf_dtob64(const struct sshbuf *d, struct sshbuf *b64, int wrap);
+/* RFC4648 "base64url" encoding variant */
+int	sshbuf_dtourlb64(const struct sshbuf *d, struct sshbuf *b64, int wrap);
+
+/* Decode base64 data and append it to the buffer */
+int	sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64);
+
+/*
+ * Tests whether the buffer contains the specified byte sequence at the
+ * specified offset. Returns 0 on successful match, or a ssherr.h code
+ * otherwise. SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT indicates sufficient bytes were
+ * present but the buffer contents did not match those supplied. Zero-
+ * length comparisons are not allowed.
+ *
+ * If sufficient data is present to make a comparison, then it is
+ * performed with timing independent of the value of the data. If
+ * insufficient data is present then the comparison is not attempted at
+ * all.
+ */
+int	sshbuf_cmp(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t offset,
+    const void *s, size_t len);
+
+/*
+ * Searches the buffer for the specified string. Returns 0 on success
+ * and updates *offsetp with the offset of the first match, relative to
+ * the start of the buffer. Otherwise sshbuf_find will return a ssherr.h
+ * error code. SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT indicates sufficient bytes were
+ * present in the buffer for a match to be possible but none was found.
+ * Searches for zero-length data are not allowed.
+ */
+int
+sshbuf_find(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t start_offset,
+    const void *s, size_t len, size_t *offsetp);
+
+/*
+ * Duplicate the contents of a buffer to a string (caller to free).
+ * Returns NULL on buffer error, or if the buffer contains a premature
+ * nul character.
+ */
+char *sshbuf_dup_string(struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Fill a buffer from a file descriptor or filename. Both allocate the
+ * buffer for the caller.
+ */
+int sshbuf_load_fd(int, struct sshbuf **)
+    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
+int sshbuf_load_file(const char *, struct sshbuf **)
+    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
+
+/*
+ * Write a buffer to a path, creating/truncating as needed (mode 0644,
+ * subject to umask). The buffer contents are not modified.
+ */
+int sshbuf_write_file(const char *path, struct sshbuf *buf)
+    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
+
+/* Read up to maxlen bytes from a fd directly to a buffer */
+int sshbuf_read(int, struct sshbuf *, size_t, size_t *)
+    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
+
+/* Macros for decoding/encoding integers */
+#define PEEK_U64(p) \
+	(((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 56) | \
+	 ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]) << 48) | \
+	 ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[2]) << 40) | \
+	 ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[3]) << 32) | \
+	 ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[4]) << 24) | \
+	 ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[5]) << 16) | \
+	 ((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[6]) << 8) | \
+	  (u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[7]))
+#define PEEK_U32(p) \
+	(((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 24) | \
+	 ((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]) << 16) | \
+	 ((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[2]) << 8) | \
+	  (u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[3]))
+#define PEEK_U16(p) \
+	(((u_int16_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 8) | \
+	  (u_int16_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]))
+
+#define POKE_U64(p, v) \
+	do { \
+		const u_int64_t __v = (v); \
+		((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 56) & 0xff; \
+		((u_char *)(p))[1] = (__v >> 48) & 0xff; \
+		((u_char *)(p))[2] = (__v >> 40) & 0xff; \
+		((u_char *)(p))[3] = (__v >> 32) & 0xff; \
+		((u_char *)(p))[4] = (__v >> 24) & 0xff; \
+		((u_char *)(p))[5] = (__v >> 16) & 0xff; \
+		((u_char *)(p))[6] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \
+		((u_char *)(p))[7] = __v & 0xff; \
+	} while (0)
+#define POKE_U32(p, v) \
+	do { \
+		const u_int32_t __v = (v); \
+		((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 24) & 0xff; \
+		((u_char *)(p))[1] = (__v >> 16) & 0xff; \
+		((u_char *)(p))[2] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \
+		((u_char *)(p))[3] = __v & 0xff; \
+	} while (0)
+#define POKE_U16(p, v) \
+	do { \
+		const u_int16_t __v = (v); \
+		((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \
+		((u_char *)(p))[1] = __v & 0xff; \
+	} while (0)
+
+/* Internal definitions follow. Exposed for regress tests */
+#ifdef SSHBUF_INTERNAL
+
+/*
+ * Return the allocation size of buf
+ */
+size_t	sshbuf_alloc(const struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Increment the reference count of buf.
+ */
+int	sshbuf_set_parent(struct sshbuf *child, struct sshbuf *parent);
+
+/*
+ * Return the parent buffer of buf, or NULL if it has no parent.
+ */
+const struct sshbuf *sshbuf_parent(const struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+/*
+ * Return the reference count of buf
+ */
+u_int	sshbuf_refcount(const struct sshbuf *buf);
+
+# define SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT	256		/* Initial allocation */
+# define SSHBUF_SIZE_INC	256		/* Preferred increment length */
+# define SSHBUF_PACK_MIN	8192		/* Minimum packable offset */
+
+/* # define SSHBUF_ABORT abort */
+/* # define SSHBUF_DEBUG */
+
+# ifndef SSHBUF_ABORT
+#  define SSHBUF_ABORT()
+# endif
+
+# ifdef SSHBUF_DEBUG
+#  define SSHBUF_DBG(x) do { \
+		printf("%s:%d %s: ", __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); \
+		printf x; \
+		printf("\n"); \
+		fflush(stdout); \
+	} while (0)
+# else
+#  define SSHBUF_DBG(x)
+# endif
+#endif /* SSHBUF_INTERNAL */
+
+#endif /* _SSHBUF_H */
diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..792bc34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1722 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.361 2023/01/13 02:44:02 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the
+ * login (authentication) dialog.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <net/if.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
+# include <ifaddrs.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "dns.h"
+#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "version.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+
+struct sshkey *previous_host_key = NULL;
+
+static int matching_host_key_dns = 0;
+
+static pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0;
+
+/* import */
+extern int debug_flag;
+extern Options options;
+extern char *__progname;
+
+static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *);
+static void warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *);
+
+/* Expand a proxy command */
+static char *
+expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user,
+    const char *host, const char *host_arg, int port)
+{
+	char *tmp, *ret, strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	const char *keyalias = options.host_key_alias ?
+	    options.host_key_alias : host_arg;
+
+	snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
+	xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command);
+	ret = percent_expand(tmp,
+	    "h", host,
+	    "k", keyalias,
+	    "n", host_arg,
+	    "p", strport,
+	    "r", options.user,
+	    (char *)NULL);
+	free(tmp);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command that passes a
+ * a connected fd back to us.
+ */
+static int
+ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host,
+    const char *host_arg, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
+{
+	char *command_string;
+	int sp[2], sock;
+	pid_t pid;
+	char *shell;
+
+	if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
+		shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
+
+	if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sp) == -1)
+		fatal("Could not create socketpair to communicate with "
+		    "proxy dialer: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+	command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user,
+	    host, host_arg, port);
+	debug("Executing proxy dialer command: %.500s", command_string);
+
+	/* Fork and execute the proxy command. */
+	if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+		char *argv[10];
+
+		close(sp[1]);
+		/* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
+		if (sp[0] != 0) {
+			if (dup2(sp[0], 0) == -1)
+				perror("dup2 stdin");
+		}
+		if (sp[0] != 1) {
+			if (dup2(sp[0], 1) == -1)
+				perror("dup2 stdout");
+		}
+		if (sp[0] >= 2)
+			close(sp[0]);
+
+		/*
+		 * Stderr is left for non-ControlPersist connections is so
+		 * error messages may be printed on the user's terminal.
+		 */
+		if (!debug_flag && options.control_path != NULL &&
+		    options.control_persist && stdfd_devnull(0, 0, 1) == -1)
+			error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+
+		argv[0] = shell;
+		argv[1] = "-c";
+		argv[2] = command_string;
+		argv[3] = NULL;
+
+		/*
+		 * Execute the proxy command.
+		 * Note that we gave up any extra privileges above.
+		 */
+		execv(argv[0], argv);
+		perror(argv[0]);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	/* Parent. */
+	if (pid == -1)
+		fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	close(sp[0]);
+	free(command_string);
+
+	if ((sock = mm_receive_fd(sp[1])) == -1)
+		fatal("proxy dialer did not pass back a connection");
+	close(sp[1]);
+
+	while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Set the connection file descriptors. */
+	if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL)
+		return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command.
+ */
+static int
+ssh_proxy_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg,
+    u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
+{
+	char *command_string;
+	int pin[2], pout[2];
+	pid_t pid;
+	char *shell;
+
+	if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
+		shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
+
+	/* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */
+	if (pipe(pin) == -1 || pipe(pout) == -1)
+		fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+
+	command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user,
+	    host, host_arg, port);
+	debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string);
+
+	/* Fork and execute the proxy command. */
+	if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+		char *argv[10];
+
+		/* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
+		close(pin[1]);
+		if (pin[0] != 0) {
+			if (dup2(pin[0], 0) == -1)
+				perror("dup2 stdin");
+			close(pin[0]);
+		}
+		close(pout[0]);
+		if (dup2(pout[1], 1) == -1)
+			perror("dup2 stdout");
+		/* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */
+		close(pout[1]);
+
+		/*
+		 * Stderr is left for non-ControlPersist connections is so
+		 * error messages may be printed on the user's terminal.
+		 */
+		if (!debug_flag && options.control_path != NULL &&
+		    options.control_persist && stdfd_devnull(0, 0, 1) == -1)
+			error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+
+		argv[0] = shell;
+		argv[1] = "-c";
+		argv[2] = command_string;
+		argv[3] = NULL;
+
+		/*
+		 * Execute the proxy command.  Note that we gave up any
+		 * extra privileges above.
+		 */
+		ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+		execv(argv[0], argv);
+		perror(argv[0]);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+	/* Parent. */
+	if (pid == -1)
+		fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	else
+		proxy_command_pid = pid; /* save pid to clean up later */
+
+	/* Close child side of the descriptors. */
+	close(pin[0]);
+	close(pout[1]);
+
+	/* Free the command name. */
+	free(command_string);
+
+	/* Set the connection file descriptors. */
+	if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, pout[0], pin[1]) == NULL)
+		return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_kill_proxy_command(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Send SIGHUP to proxy command if used. We don't wait() in
+	 * case it hangs and instead rely on init to reap the child
+	 */
+	if (proxy_command_pid > 1)
+		kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP);
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
+/*
+ * Search a interface address list (returned from getifaddrs(3)) for an
+ * address that matches the desired address family on the specified interface.
+ * Returns 0 and fills in *resultp and *rlenp on success. Returns -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int
+check_ifaddrs(const char *ifname, int af, const struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs,
+    struct sockaddr_storage *resultp, socklen_t *rlenp)
+{
+	struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
+	struct sockaddr_in *sa;
+	struct in6_addr *v6addr;
+	const struct ifaddrs *ifa;
+	int allow_local;
+
+	/*
+	 * Prefer addresses that are not loopback or linklocal, but use them
+	 * if nothing else matches.
+	 */
+	for (allow_local = 0; allow_local < 2; allow_local++) {
+		for (ifa = ifaddrs; ifa != NULL; ifa = ifa->ifa_next) {
+			if (ifa->ifa_addr == NULL || ifa->ifa_name == NULL ||
+			    (ifa->ifa_flags & IFF_UP) == 0 ||
+			    ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != af ||
+			    strcmp(ifa->ifa_name, options.bind_interface) != 0)
+				continue;
+			switch (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family) {
+			case AF_INET:
+				sa = (struct sockaddr_in *)ifa->ifa_addr;
+				if (!allow_local && sa->sin_addr.s_addr ==
+				    htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK))
+					continue;
+				if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) {
+					error_f("v4 addr doesn't fit");
+					return -1;
+				}
+				*rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+				memcpy(resultp, sa, *rlenp);
+				return 0;
+			case AF_INET6:
+				sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)ifa->ifa_addr;
+				v6addr = &sa6->sin6_addr;
+				if (!allow_local &&
+				    (IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(v6addr) ||
+				    IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(v6addr)))
+					continue;
+				if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) {
+					error_f("v6 addr doesn't fit");
+					return -1;
+				}
+				*rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+				memcpy(resultp, sa6, *rlenp);
+				return 0;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Creates a socket for use as the ssh connection.
+ */
+static int
+ssh_create_socket(struct addrinfo *ai)
+{
+	int sock, r;
+	struct sockaddr_storage bindaddr;
+	socklen_t bindaddrlen = 0;
+	struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL;
+#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
+	struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs = NULL;
+#endif
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
+
+	sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
+	if (sock == -1) {
+		error("socket: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+
+	/* Use interactive QOS (if specified) until authentication completed */
+	if (options.ip_qos_interactive != INT_MAX)
+		set_sock_tos(sock, options.ip_qos_interactive);
+
+	/* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */
+	if (options.bind_address == NULL && options.bind_interface == NULL)
+		return sock;
+
+	if (options.bind_address != NULL) {
+		memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
+		hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family;
+		hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype;
+		hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol;
+		hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
+		if ((r = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL,
+		    &hints, &res)) != 0) {
+			error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address,
+			    ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		if (res == NULL) {
+			error("getaddrinfo: no addrs");
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		memcpy(&bindaddr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen);
+		bindaddrlen = res->ai_addrlen;
+	} else if (options.bind_interface != NULL) {
+#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
+		if ((r = getifaddrs(&ifaddrs)) != 0) {
+			error("getifaddrs: %s: %s", options.bind_interface,
+			    strerror(errno));
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		bindaddrlen = sizeof(bindaddr);
+		if (check_ifaddrs(options.bind_interface, ai->ai_family,
+		    ifaddrs, &bindaddr, &bindaddrlen) != 0) {
+			logit("getifaddrs: %s: no suitable addresses",
+			    options.bind_interface);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+#else
+		error("BindInterface not supported on this platform.");
+#endif
+	}
+	if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen,
+	    ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) {
+		error_f("getnameinfo failed: %s", ssh_gai_strerror(r));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen) != 0) {
+		error("bind %s: %s", ntop, strerror(errno));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	debug_f("bound to %s", ntop);
+	/* success */
+	goto out;
+fail:
+	close(sock);
+	sock = -1;
+ out:
+	if (res != NULL)
+		freeaddrinfo(res);
+#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
+	if (ifaddrs != NULL)
+		freeifaddrs(ifaddrs);
+#endif
+	return sock;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host.
+ * The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr.
+ * If port is 0, the default port will be used.
+ * Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per
+ * second).  If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h
+ * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact
+ * the daemon.
+ */
+static int
+ssh_connect_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop,
+    struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int connection_attempts,
+    int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive)
+{
+	int on = 1, saved_timeout_ms = *timeout_ms;
+	int oerrno, sock = -1, attempt;
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+	struct addrinfo *ai;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+	memset(ntop, 0, sizeof(ntop));
+	memset(strport, 0, sizeof(strport));
+
+	for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) {
+		if (attempt > 0) {
+			/* Sleep a moment before retrying. */
+			sleep(1);
+			debug("Trying again...");
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in
+		 * sequence until the connection succeeds.
+		 */
+		for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+			if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET &&
+			    ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) {
+				errno = EAFNOSUPPORT;
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+			    ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+			    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
+				oerrno = errno;
+				error_f("getnameinfo failed");
+				errno = oerrno;
+				continue;
+			}
+			debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.",
+				host, ntop, strport);
+
+			/* Create a socket for connecting. */
+			sock = ssh_create_socket(ai);
+			if (sock < 0) {
+				/* Any error is already output */
+				errno = 0;
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			*timeout_ms = saved_timeout_ms;
+			if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+			    timeout_ms) >= 0) {
+				/* Successful connection. */
+				memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
+				break;
+			} else {
+				oerrno = errno;
+				debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s",
+				    ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
+				close(sock);
+				sock = -1;
+				errno = oerrno;
+			}
+		}
+		if (sock != -1)
+			break;	/* Successful connection. */
+	}
+
+	/* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */
+	if (sock == -1) {
+		error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
+		    host, strport, errno == 0 ? "failure" : strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	debug("Connection established.");
+
+	/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
+	if (want_keepalive &&
+	    setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on,
+	    sizeof(on)) == -1)
+		error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Set the connection. */
+	if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL)
+		return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+ssh_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg,
+    struct addrinfo *addrs, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port,
+    int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive)
+{
+	int in, out;
+
+	if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
+		return ssh_connect_direct(ssh, host, addrs, hostaddr, port,
+		    connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive);
+	} else if (strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0) {
+		if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 ||
+		    (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1) {
+			if (in >= 0)
+				close(in);
+			error_f("dup() in/out failed");
+			return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
+		}
+		if ((ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, in, out)) == NULL)
+			return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
+		return 0;
+	} else if (options.proxy_use_fdpass) {
+		return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, port,
+		    options.proxy_command);
+	}
+	return ssh_proxy_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, port,
+	    options.proxy_command);
+}
+
+/* defaults to 'no' */
+static int
+confirm(const char *prompt, const char *fingerprint)
+{
+	const char *msg, *again = "Please type 'yes' or 'no': ";
+	const char *again_fp = "Please type 'yes', 'no' or the fingerprint: ";
+	char *p, *cp;
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	if (options.batch_mode)
+		return 0;
+	for (msg = prompt;;msg = fingerprint ? again_fp : again) {
+		cp = p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO);
+		if (p == NULL)
+			return 0;
+		p += strspn(p, " \t"); /* skip leading whitespace */
+		p[strcspn(p, " \t\n")] = '\0'; /* remove trailing whitespace */
+		if (p[0] == '\0' || strcasecmp(p, "no") == 0)
+			ret = 0;
+		else if (strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0 || (fingerprint != NULL &&
+		    strcmp(p, fingerprint) == 0))
+			ret = 1;
+		free(cp);
+		if (ret != -1)
+			return ret;
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+sockaddr_is_local(struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
+{
+	switch (hostaddr->sa_family) {
+	case AF_INET:
+		return (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)->
+		    sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		return IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(
+		    &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr));
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prepare the hostname and ip address strings that are used to lookup
+ * host keys in known_hosts files. These may have a port number appended.
+ */
+void
+get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr,
+    u_short port, char **hostfile_hostname, char **hostfile_ipaddr)
+{
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
+	socklen_t addrlen;
+
+	switch (hostaddr == NULL ? -1 : hostaddr->sa_family) {
+	case -1:
+		addrlen = 0;
+		break;
+	case AF_INET:
+		addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
+		break;
+	default:
+		addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't have the remote ip-address for connections
+	 * using a proxy command
+	 */
+	if (hostfile_ipaddr != NULL) {
+		if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
+			if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, addrlen,
+			    ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
+			fatal_f("getnameinfo failed");
+			*hostfile_ipaddr = put_host_port(ntop, port);
+		} else {
+			*hostfile_ipaddr = xstrdup("<no hostip for proxy "
+			    "command>");
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Allow the user to record the key under a different name or
+	 * differentiate a non-standard port.  This is useful for ssh
+	 * tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple
+	 * sshd's on different ports on the same machine.
+	 */
+	if (hostfile_hostname != NULL) {
+		if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
+			*hostfile_hostname = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias);
+			debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", *hostfile_hostname);
+		} else {
+			*hostfile_hostname = put_host_port(hostname, port);
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/* returns non-zero if path appears in hostfiles, or 0 if not. */
+static int
+path_in_hostfiles(const char *path, char **hostfiles, u_int num_hostfiles)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_hostfiles; i++) {
+		if (strcmp(path, hostfiles[i]) == 0)
+			return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+struct find_by_key_ctx {
+	const char *host, *ip;
+	const struct sshkey *key;
+	char **names;
+	u_int nnames;
+};
+
+/* Try to replace home directory prefix (per $HOME) with a ~/ sequence */
+static char *
+try_tilde_unexpand(const char *path)
+{
+	char *home, *ret = NULL;
+	size_t l;
+
+	if (*path != '/')
+		return xstrdup(path);
+	if ((home = getenv("HOME")) == NULL || (l = strlen(home)) == 0)
+		return xstrdup(path);
+	if (strncmp(path, home, l) != 0)
+		return xstrdup(path);
+	/*
+	 * ensure we have matched on a path boundary: either the $HOME that
+	 * we just compared ends with a '/' or the next character of the path
+	 * must be a '/'.
+	 */
+	if (home[l - 1] != '/' && path[l] != '/')
+		return xstrdup(path);
+	if (path[l] == '/')
+		l++;
+	xasprintf(&ret, "~/%s", path + l);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+hostkeys_find_by_key_cb(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
+{
+	struct find_by_key_ctx *ctx = (struct find_by_key_ctx *)_ctx;
+	char *path;
+
+	/* we are looking for keys with names that *do not* match */
+	if ((l->match & HKF_MATCH_HOST) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	/* not interested in marker lines */
+	if (l->marker != MRK_NONE)
+		return 0;
+	/* we are only interested in exact key matches */
+	if (l->key == NULL || !sshkey_equal(ctx->key, l->key))
+		return 0;
+	path = try_tilde_unexpand(l->path);
+	debug_f("found matching key in %s:%lu", path, l->linenum);
+	ctx->names = xrecallocarray(ctx->names,
+	    ctx->nnames, ctx->nnames + 1, sizeof(*ctx->names));
+	xasprintf(&ctx->names[ctx->nnames], "%s:%lu: %s", path, l->linenum,
+	    strncmp(l->hosts, HASH_MAGIC, strlen(HASH_MAGIC)) == 0 ?
+	    "[hashed name]" : l->hosts);
+	ctx->nnames++;
+	free(path);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+hostkeys_find_by_key_hostfile(const char *file, const char *which,
+    struct find_by_key_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("trying %s hostfile \"%s\"", which, file);
+	if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(file, hostkeys_find_by_key_cb, ctx,
+	    ctx->host, ctx->ip, HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY, 0)) != 0) {
+		if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno == ENOENT) {
+			debug_f("hostkeys file %s does not exist", file);
+			return 0;
+		}
+		error_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach failed for %s", file);
+		return r;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Find 'key' in known hosts file(s) that do not match host/ip.
+ * Used to display also-known-as information for previously-unseen hostkeys.
+ */
+static void
+hostkeys_find_by_key(const char *host, const char *ip, const struct sshkey *key,
+    char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles,
+    char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles,
+    char ***names, u_int *nnames)
+{
+	struct find_by_key_ctx ctx = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+	u_int i;
+
+	*names = NULL;
+	*nnames = 0;
+
+	if (key == NULL || sshkey_is_cert(key))
+		return;
+
+	ctx.host = host;
+	ctx.ip = ip;
+	ctx.key = key;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++) {
+		if (hostkeys_find_by_key_hostfile(user_hostfiles[i],
+		    "user", &ctx) != 0)
+			goto fail;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++) {
+		if (hostkeys_find_by_key_hostfile(system_hostfiles[i],
+		    "system", &ctx) != 0)
+			goto fail;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	*names = ctx.names;
+	*nnames = ctx.nnames;
+	ctx.names = NULL;
+	ctx.nnames = 0;
+	return;
+ fail:
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx.nnames; i++)
+		free(ctx.names[i]);
+	free(ctx.names);
+}
+
+#define MAX_OTHER_NAMES	8 /* Maximum number of names to list */
+static char *
+other_hostkeys_message(const char *host, const char *ip,
+    const struct sshkey *key,
+    char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles,
+    char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles)
+{
+	char *ret = NULL, **othernames = NULL;
+	u_int i, n, num_othernames = 0;
+
+	hostkeys_find_by_key(host, ip, key,
+	    user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles,
+	    system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles,
+	    &othernames, &num_othernames);
+	if (num_othernames == 0)
+		return xstrdup("This key is not known by any other names.");
+
+	xasprintf(&ret, "This host key is known by the following other "
+	    "names/addresses:");
+
+	n = num_othernames;
+	if (n > MAX_OTHER_NAMES)
+		n = MAX_OTHER_NAMES;
+	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+		xextendf(&ret, "\n", "    %s", othernames[i]);
+	}
+	if (n < num_othernames) {
+		xextendf(&ret, "\n", "    (%d additional names omitted)",
+		    num_othernames - n);
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < num_othernames; i++)
+		free(othernames[i]);
+	free(othernames);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *command_template,
+    const char *invocation, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo,
+    const struct sshkey *host_key, const char *hostfile_hostname)
+{
+	int r, i, ac = 0;
+	char *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL, *tmp;
+	char *command = NULL, *tag = NULL, **av = NULL;
+	FILE *f = NULL;
+	pid_t pid;
+	void (*osigchld)(int);
+
+	xasprintf(&tag, "KnownHostsCommand-%s", invocation);
+
+	if (host_key != NULL) {
+		if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+		if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(host_key, &keytext)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_to_base64 failed");
+	}
+	/*
+	 * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
+	 * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
+	 */
+	osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+
+	/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
+	if (argv_split(command_template, &ac, &av, 0) != 0) {
+		error("%s \"%s\" contains invalid quotes", tag,
+		    command_template);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (ac == 0) {
+		error("%s \"%s\" yielded no arguments", tag,
+		    command_template);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
+		tmp = percent_dollar_expand(av[i],
+		    DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(cinfo),
+		    "H", hostfile_hostname,
+		    "I", invocation,
+		    "t", host_key == NULL ? "NONE" : sshkey_ssh_name(host_key),
+		    "f", key_fp == NULL ? "NONE" : key_fp,
+		    "K", keytext == NULL ? "NONE" : keytext,
+		    (char *)NULL);
+		if (tmp == NULL)
+			fatal_f("percent_expand failed");
+		free(av[i]);
+		av[i] = tmp;
+	}
+	/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
+	command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
+
+	if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f,
+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH|
+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1);
+
+	if (exited_cleanly(pid, tag, command, 0) != 0)
+		fatal("KnownHostsCommand failed");
+
+ out:
+	if (f != NULL)
+		fclose(f);
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+		free(av[i]);
+	free(av);
+	free(tag);
+	free(command);
+	free(key_fp);
+	free(keytext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key
+ * is not valid. user_hostfile[0] will not be updated if 'readonly' is true.
+ */
+#define RDRW	0
+#define RDONLY	1
+#define ROQUIET	2
+static int
+check_host_key(char *hostname, const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo,
+    struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+    struct sshkey *host_key, int readonly, int clobber_port,
+    char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles,
+    char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles,
+    const char *hostfile_command)
+{
+	HostStatus host_status = -1, ip_status = -1;
+	struct sshkey *raw_key = NULL;
+	char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL;
+	char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra;
+	char msg[1024];
+	const char *type, *fail_reason = NULL;
+	const struct hostkey_entry *host_found = NULL, *ip_found = NULL;
+	int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0, confirmed;
+	int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr);
+	int r, want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0;
+	int hostkey_trusted = 0; /* Known or explicitly accepted by user */
+	struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys;
+	u_int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The
+	 * problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple
+	 * machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of
+	 * them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings.  This
+	 * essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however,
+	 * this is probably not a real problem.
+	 */
+	if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local &&
+	    options.host_key_alias == NULL) {
+		debug("Forcing accepting of host key for "
+		    "loopback/localhost.");
+		options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Don't ever try to write an invalid name to a known hosts file.
+	 * Note: do this before get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr() to catch
+	 * '[' or ']' in the name before they are added.
+	 */
+	if (strcspn(hostname, "@?*#[]|'\'\"\\") != strlen(hostname)) {
+		debug_f("invalid hostname \"%s\"; will not record: %s",
+		    hostname, fail_reason);
+		readonly = RDONLY;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare the hostname and address strings used for hostkey lookup.
+	 * In some cases, these will have a port number appended.
+	 */
+	get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(hostname, hostaddr,
+	    clobber_port ? 0 : port, &host, &ip);
+
+	/*
+	 * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy
+	 * command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with
+	 */
+	if (options.check_host_ip && (local ||
+	    strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL))
+		options.check_host_ip = 0;
+
+	host_hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
+	for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++)
+		load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, user_hostfiles[i], 0);
+	for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++)
+		load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, system_hostfiles[i], 0);
+	if (hostfile_command != NULL && !clobber_port) {
+		load_hostkeys_command(host_hostkeys, hostfile_command,
+		    "HOSTNAME", cinfo, host_key, host);
+	}
+
+	ip_hostkeys = NULL;
+	if (!want_cert && options.check_host_ip) {
+		ip_hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
+		for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++)
+			load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, user_hostfiles[i], 0);
+		for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++)
+			load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, system_hostfiles[i], 0);
+		if (hostfile_command != NULL && !clobber_port) {
+			load_hostkeys_command(ip_hostkeys, hostfile_command,
+			    "ADDRESS", cinfo, host_key, ip);
+		}
+	}
+
+ retry:
+	/* Reload these as they may have changed on cert->key downgrade */
+	want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key);
+	type = sshkey_type(host_key);
+
+	/*
+	 * Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known
+	 * hosts or in the systemwide list.
+	 */
+	host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host_key,
+	    &host_found);
+
+	/*
+	 * If there are no hostfiles, or if the hostkey was found via
+	 * KnownHostsCommand, then don't try to touch the disk.
+	 */
+	if (!readonly && (num_user_hostfiles == 0 ||
+	    (host_found != NULL && host_found->note != 0)))
+		readonly = RDONLY;
+
+	/*
+	 * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are
+	 * localhost, looking for a certificate, or the hostname was an ip
+	 * address to begin with.
+	 */
+	if (!want_cert && ip_hostkeys != NULL) {
+		ip_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, host_key,
+		    &ip_found);
+		if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED &&
+		    (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED ||
+		    (ip_found != NULL &&
+		    !sshkey_equal(ip_found->key, host_found->key))))
+			host_ip_differ = 1;
+	} else
+		ip_status = host_status;
+
+	switch (host_status) {
+	case HOST_OK:
+		/* The host is known and the key matches. */
+		debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host %s.",
+		    host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key");
+		debug("Found %s in %s:%lu", want_cert ? "CA key" : "key",
+		    host_found->file, host_found->line);
+		if (want_cert) {
+			if (sshkey_cert_check_host(host_key,
+			    options.host_key_alias == NULL ?
+			    hostname : options.host_key_alias, 0,
+			    options.ca_sign_algorithms, &fail_reason) != 0) {
+				error("%s", fail_reason);
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			/*
+			 * Do not attempt hostkey update if a certificate was
+			 * successfully matched.
+			 */
+			if (options.update_hostkeys != 0) {
+				options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+				debug3_f("certificate host key in use; "
+				    "disabling UpdateHostkeys");
+			}
+		}
+		/* Turn off UpdateHostkeys if key was in system known_hosts */
+		if (options.update_hostkeys != 0 &&
+		    (path_in_hostfiles(host_found->file,
+		    system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) ||
+		    (ip_status == HOST_OK && ip_found != NULL &&
+		    path_in_hostfiles(ip_found->file,
+		    system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles)))) {
+			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+			debug3_f("host key found in GlobalKnownHostsFile; "
+			    "disabling UpdateHostkeys");
+		}
+		if (options.update_hostkeys != 0 && host_found->note) {
+			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+			debug3_f("host key found via KnownHostsCommand; "
+			    "disabling UpdateHostkeys");
+		}
+		if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
+			if (readonly || want_cert)
+				logit("%s host key for IP address "
+				    "'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.",
+				    type, ip);
+			else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip,
+			    host_key, options.hash_known_hosts))
+				logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP "
+				    "address '%.128s' to the list of known "
+				    "hosts (%.500s).", type, ip,
+				    user_hostfiles[0]);
+			else
+				logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host "
+				    "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
+				    "of known hosts.", type, ip);
+		} else if (options.visual_host_key) {
+			fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+			ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+			if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+				fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+			logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s", fp, ra);
+			free(ra);
+			free(fp);
+		}
+		hostkey_trusted = 1;
+		break;
+	case HOST_NEW:
+		if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 &&
+		    port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT && !clobber_port) {
+			debug("checking without port identifier");
+			if (check_host_key(hostname, cinfo, hostaddr, 0,
+			    host_key, ROQUIET, 1,
+			    user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles,
+			    system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles,
+			    hostfile_command) == 0) {
+				debug("found matching key w/out port");
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (readonly || want_cert)
+			goto fail;
+		/* The host is new. */
+		if (options.strict_host_key_checking ==
+		    SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES) {
+			/*
+			 * User has requested strict host key checking.  We
+			 * will not add the host key automatically.  The only
+			 * alternative left is to abort.
+			 */
+			error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you "
+			    "have requested strict checking.", type, host);
+			goto fail;
+		} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking ==
+		    SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) {
+			char *msg1 = NULL, *msg2 = NULL;
+
+			xasprintf(&msg1, "The authenticity of host "
+			    "'%.200s (%s)' can't be established", host, ip);
+
+			if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key)) {
+				xextendf(&msg1, "\n", "but keys of different "
+				    "type are already known for this host.");
+			} else
+				xextendf(&msg1, "", ".");
+
+			fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+			ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+			    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+			if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+				fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+			xextendf(&msg1, "\n", "%s key fingerprint is %s.",
+			    type, fp);
+			if (options.visual_host_key)
+				xextendf(&msg1, "\n", "%s", ra);
+			if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
+				xextendf(&msg1, "\n",
+				    "%s host key fingerprint found in DNS.",
+				    matching_host_key_dns ?
+				    "Matching" : "No matching");
+			}
+			/* msg2 informs for other names matching this key */
+			if ((msg2 = other_hostkeys_message(host, ip, host_key,
+			    user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles,
+			    system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles)) != NULL)
+				xextendf(&msg1, "\n", "%s", msg2);
+
+			xextendf(&msg1, "\n",
+			    "Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
+			    "(yes/no/[fingerprint])? ");
+
+			confirmed = confirm(msg1, fp);
+			free(ra);
+			free(fp);
+			free(msg1);
+			free(msg2);
+			if (!confirmed)
+				goto fail;
+			hostkey_trusted = 1; /* user explicitly confirmed */
+		}
+		/*
+		 * If in "new" or "off" strict mode, add the key automatically
+		 * to the local known_hosts file.
+		 */
+		if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
+			snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip);
+			hostp = hostline;
+			if (options.hash_known_hosts) {
+				/* Add hash of host and IP separately */
+				r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0],
+				    host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts) &&
+				    add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip,
+				    host_key, options.hash_known_hosts);
+			} else {
+				/* Add unhashed "host,ip" */
+				r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0],
+				    hostline, host_key,
+				    options.hash_known_hosts);
+			}
+		} else {
+			r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host,
+			    host_key, options.hash_known_hosts);
+			hostp = host;
+		}
+
+		if (!r)
+			logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known "
+			    "hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfiles[0]);
+		else
+			logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the "
+			    "list of known hosts.", hostp, type);
+		break;
+	case HOST_REVOKED:
+		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+		error("@       WARNING: REVOKED HOST KEY DETECTED!               @");
+		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+		error("The %s host key for %s is marked as revoked.", type, host);
+		error("This could mean that a stolen key is being used to");
+		error("impersonate this host.");
+
+		/*
+		 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
+		 * to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
+		 */
+		if (options.strict_host_key_checking !=
+		    SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) {
+			error("%s host key for %.200s was revoked and you have "
+			    "requested strict checking.", type, host);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		goto continue_unsafe;
+
+	case HOST_CHANGED:
+		if (want_cert) {
+			/*
+			 * This is only a debug() since it is valid to have
+			 * CAs with wildcard DNS matches that don't match
+			 * all hosts that one might visit.
+			 */
+			debug("Host certificate authority does not "
+			    "match %s in %s:%lu", CA_MARKER,
+			    host_found->file, host_found->line);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		if (readonly == ROQUIET)
+			goto fail;
+		if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) {
+			char *key_msg;
+			if (ip_status == HOST_NEW)
+				key_msg = "is unknown";
+			else if (ip_status == HOST_OK)
+				key_msg = "is unchanged";
+			else
+				key_msg = "has a different value";
+			error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+			error("@       WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED!          @");
+			error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+			error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host);
+			error("and the key for the corresponding IP address %s", ip);
+			error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
+			error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
+			error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
+			if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
+				error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu",
+				    ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
+		}
+		/* The host key has changed. */
+		warn_changed_key(host_key);
+		if (num_user_hostfiles > 0 || num_system_hostfiles > 0) {
+			error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid "
+			    "of this message.", num_user_hostfiles > 0 ?
+			    user_hostfiles[0] : system_hostfiles[0]);
+		}
+		error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu",
+		    sshkey_type(host_found->key),
+		    host_found->file, host_found->line);
+
+		/*
+		 * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
+		 * to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
+		 */
+		if (options.strict_host_key_checking !=
+		    SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) {
+			error("Host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
+			    "requested strict checking.", host);
+			goto fail;
+		}
+
+ continue_unsafe:
+		/*
+		 * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow
+		 * the connection but without MITM-able authentication or
+		 * forwarding.
+		 */
+		if (options.password_authentication) {
+			error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid "
+			    "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+			options.password_authentication = 0;
+			cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+		}
+		if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) {
+			error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled"
+			    " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+			options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
+			cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+		}
+		if (options.forward_agent) {
+			error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+			    "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+			options.forward_agent = 0;
+			cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+		}
+		if (options.forward_x11) {
+			error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+			    "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+			options.forward_x11 = 0;
+			cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+		}
+		if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 ||
+		    options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
+			error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+			    "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+			options.num_local_forwards =
+			    options.num_remote_forwards = 0;
+			cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+		}
+		if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
+			error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid "
+			    "man-in-the-middle attacks.");
+			options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
+			cancelled_forwarding = 1;
+		}
+		if (options.update_hostkeys != 0) {
+			error("UpdateHostkeys is disabled because the host "
+			    "key is not trusted.");
+			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+		}
+		if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && cancelled_forwarding)
+			fatal("Error: forwarding disabled due to host key "
+			    "check failure");
+
+		/*
+		 * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id.
+		 * This could be done by converting the host key to an
+		 * identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself
+		 * by that sentence, and ask the user if they wish to
+		 * accept the authentication.
+		 */
+		break;
+	case HOST_FOUND:
+		fatal("internal error");
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED &&
+	    ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) {
+		snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
+		    "Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' "
+		    "differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'"
+		    "\nOffending key for IP in %s:%lu",
+		    type, host, ip, ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
+		if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
+			len = strlen(msg);
+			snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len,
+			    "\nMatching host key in %s:%lu",
+			    host_found->file, host_found->line);
+		}
+		if (options.strict_host_key_checking ==
+		    SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) {
+			strlcat(msg, "\nAre you sure you want "
+			    "to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", sizeof(msg));
+			if (!confirm(msg, NULL))
+				goto fail;
+		} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking !=
+		    SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) {
+			logit("%s", msg);
+			error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking.");
+			goto fail;
+		} else {
+			logit("%s", msg);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!hostkey_trusted && options.update_hostkeys) {
+		debug_f("hostkey not known or explicitly trusted: "
+		    "disabling UpdateHostkeys");
+		options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+	}
+
+	free(ip);
+	free(host);
+	if (host_hostkeys != NULL)
+		free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
+	if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
+		free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
+	return 0;
+
+fail:
+	if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) {
+		/*
+		 * No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and
+		 * search normally.
+		 */
+		debug("No matching CA found. Retry with plain key");
+		if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &raw_key)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "decode key");
+		if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(raw_key)) != 0)
+			fatal_r(r, "Couldn't drop certificate");
+		host_key = raw_key;
+		goto retry;
+	}
+	sshkey_free(raw_key);
+	free(ip);
+	free(host);
+	if (host_hostkeys != NULL)
+		free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
+	if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
+		free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
+	return -1;
+}
+
+/* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */
+int
+verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key,
+    const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	int r = -1, flags = 0;
+	char valid[64], *fp = NULL, *cafp = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *plain = NULL;
+
+	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
+	    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+		error_fr(r, "fingerprint host key");
+		r = -1;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(host_key)) {
+		if ((cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key->cert->signature_key,
+		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+			error_fr(r, "fingerprint CA key");
+			r = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		sshkey_format_cert_validity(host_key->cert,
+		    valid, sizeof(valid));
+		debug("Server host certificate: %s %s, serial %llu "
+		    "ID \"%s\" CA %s %s valid %s",
+		    sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp,
+		    (unsigned long long)host_key->cert->serial,
+		    host_key->cert->key_id,
+		    sshkey_ssh_name(host_key->cert->signature_key), cafp,
+		    valid);
+		for (i = 0; i < host_key->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+			debug2("Server host certificate hostname: %s",
+			    host_key->cert->principals[i]);
+		}
+	} else {
+		debug("Server host key: %s %s", sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp);
+	}
+
+	if (sshkey_equal(previous_host_key, host_key)) {
+		debug2_f("server host key %s %s matches cached key",
+		    sshkey_type(host_key), fp);
+		r = 0;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Check in RevokedHostKeys file if specified */
+	if (options.revoked_host_keys != NULL) {
+		r = sshkey_check_revoked(host_key, options.revoked_host_keys);
+		switch (r) {
+		case 0:
+			break; /* not revoked */
+		case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
+			error("Host key %s %s revoked by file %s",
+			    sshkey_type(host_key), fp,
+			    options.revoked_host_keys);
+			r = -1;
+			goto out;
+		default:
+			error_r(r, "Error checking host key %s %s in "
+			    "revoked keys file %s", sshkey_type(host_key),
+			    fp, options.revoked_host_keys);
+			r = -1;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
+		/*
+		 * XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS, so downgrade
+		 * them and try the plain key.
+		 */
+		if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &plain)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if (sshkey_is_cert(plain))
+			sshkey_drop_cert(plain);
+		if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, plain, &flags) == 0) {
+			if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
+				if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
+				    flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
+				    flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) {
+					r = 0;
+					goto out;
+				}
+				if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
+					matching_host_key_dns = 1;
+				} else {
+					warn_changed_key(plain);
+					error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS "
+					    "with the new host key to get rid "
+					    "of this message.");
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	r = check_host_key(host, cinfo, hostaddr, options.port, host_key,
+	    RDRW, 0, options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles,
+	    options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles,
+	    options.known_hosts_command);
+
+out:
+	sshkey_free(plain);
+	free(fp);
+	free(cafp);
+	if (r == 0 && host_key != NULL) {
+		sshkey_free(previous_host_key);
+		r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &previous_host_key);
+	}
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the
+ * server.  This does not need any extra privileges.  The basic connection
+ * to the server must already have been established before this is called.
+ * If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns.
+ * This function does not require super-user privileges.
+ */
+void
+ssh_login(struct ssh *ssh, Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
+    struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms,
+    const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+{
+	char *host;
+	char *server_user, *local_user;
+	int r;
+
+	local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+	server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user;
+
+	/* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */
+	host = xstrdup(orighost);
+	lowercase(host);
+
+	/* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */
+	if ((r = kex_exchange_identification(ssh, timeout_ms, NULL)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange");
+
+	/* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */
+	ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh);
+
+	/* key exchange */
+	/* authenticate user */
+	debug("Authenticating to %s:%d as '%s'", host, port, server_user);
+	ssh_kex2(ssh, host, hostaddr, port, cinfo);
+	ssh_userauth2(ssh, local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
+	free(local_user);
+	free(host);
+}
+
+/* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */
+static int
+show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	int type[] = {
+		KEY_RSA,
+		KEY_DSA,
+		KEY_ECDSA,
+		KEY_ED25519,
+		KEY_XMSS,
+		-1
+	};
+	int i, ret = 0;
+	char *fp, *ra;
+	const struct hostkey_entry *found;
+
+	for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) {
+		if (type[i] == key->type)
+			continue;
+		if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i],
+		    -1, &found))
+			continue;
+		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
+		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+		ra = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
+		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
+		if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
+			fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
+		logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
+		    "in %s:%lu\n"
+		    "%s key fingerprint %s.",
+		    sshkey_type(found->key),
+		    found->host, found->file, found->line,
+		    sshkey_type(found->key), fp);
+		if (options.visual_host_key)
+			logit("%s", ra);
+		free(ra);
+		free(fp);
+		ret = 1;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *host_key)
+{
+	char *fp;
+
+	fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+	if (fp == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail");
+
+	error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+	error("@    WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED!     @");
+	error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
+	error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
+	error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
+	error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");
+	error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
+	    sshkey_type(host_key), fp);
+	error("Please contact your system administrator.");
+
+	free(fp);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Execute a local command
+ */
+int
+ssh_local_cmd(const char *args)
+{
+	char *shell;
+	pid_t pid;
+	int status;
+	void (*osighand)(int);
+
+	if (!options.permit_local_command ||
+	    args == NULL || !*args)
+		return (1);
+
+	if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
+		shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
+
+	osighand = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+		debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
+		execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
+		error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s",
+		    shell, args, strerror(errno));
+		_exit(1);
+	} else if (pid == -1)
+		fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osighand);
+
+	if (!WIFEXITED(status))
+		return (1);
+
+	return (WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+void
+maybe_add_key_to_agent(const char *authfile, struct sshkey *private,
+    const char *comment, const char *passphrase)
+{
+	int auth_sock = -1, r;
+	const char *skprovider = NULL;
+
+	if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 0)
+		return;
+
+	if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) {
+		debug3("no authentication agent, not adding key");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 2 &&
+	    !ask_permission("Add key %s (%s) to agent?", authfile, comment)) {
+		debug3("user denied adding this key");
+		close(auth_sock);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (sshkey_is_sk(private))
+		skprovider = options.sk_provider;
+	if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth_sock, private,
+	    comment == NULL ? authfile : comment,
+	    options.add_keys_to_agent_lifespan,
+	    (options.add_keys_to_agent == 3), 0, skprovider, NULL, 0)) == 0)
+		debug("identity added to agent: %s", authfile);
+	else
+		debug("could not add identity to agent: %s (%d)", authfile, r);
+	close(auth_sock);
+}
diff --git a/sshconnect.h b/sshconnect.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f518a9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshconnect.h
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.46 2020/12/22 00:15:23 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+typedef struct Sensitive Sensitive;
+struct Sensitive {
+	struct sshkey	**keys;
+	int		nkeys;
+};
+
+struct ssh_conn_info {
+	char *conn_hash_hex;
+	char *shorthost;
+	char *uidstr;
+	char *keyalias;
+	char *thishost;
+	char *host_arg;
+	char *portstr;
+	char *remhost;
+	char *remuser;
+	char *homedir;
+	char *locuser;
+};
+
+struct addrinfo;
+struct ssh;
+struct hostkeys;
+struct ssh_conn_info;
+
+/* default argument for client percent expansions */
+#define DEFAULT_CLIENT_PERCENT_EXPAND_ARGS(conn_info) \
+	"C", conn_info->conn_hash_hex, \
+	"L", conn_info->shorthost, \
+	"i", conn_info->uidstr, \
+	"k", conn_info->keyalias, \
+	"l", conn_info->thishost, \
+	"n", conn_info->host_arg, \
+	"p", conn_info->portstr, \
+	"d", conn_info->homedir, \
+	"h", conn_info->remhost, \
+	"r", conn_info->remuser, \
+	"u", conn_info->locuser
+
+int	 ssh_connect(struct ssh *, const char *, const char *,
+	    struct addrinfo *, struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short,
+	    int, int *, int);
+void	 ssh_kill_proxy_command(void);
+
+void	 ssh_login(struct ssh *, Sensitive *, const char *,
+    struct sockaddr *, u_short, struct passwd *, int,
+    const struct ssh_conn_info *);
+
+int	 verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *,
+    const struct ssh_conn_info *);
+
+void	 get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
+    char **, char **);
+
+void	 ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
+    const struct ssh_conn_info *);
+
+void	 ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *, const char *,
+    char *, Sensitive *);
+
+int	 ssh_local_cmd(const char *);
+
+void	 maybe_add_key_to_agent(const char *, struct sshkey *,
+    const char *, const char *);
+
+void	 load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *, const char *,
+    const char *, const struct ssh_conn_info *,
+    const struct sshkey *, const char *);
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..58fe98d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2396 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.361 2022/09/17 10:33:18 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+#include <vis.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "sshconnect.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "readconf.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "utf8.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+
+/* import */
+extern char *client_version_string;
+extern char *server_version_string;
+extern Options options;
+
+/*
+ * SSH2 key exchange
+ */
+
+static char *xxx_host;
+static struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr;
+static const struct ssh_conn_info *xxx_conn_info;
+
+static int
+verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(hostkey,
+	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "Bad server host key");
+	if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey,
+	    xxx_conn_info) == -1)
+		fatal("Host key verification failed.");
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Returns the first item from a comma-separated algorithm list */
+static char *
+first_alg(const char *algs)
+{
+	char *ret, *cp;
+
+	ret = xstrdup(algs);
+	if ((cp = strchr(ret, ',')) != NULL)
+		*cp = '\0';
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static char *
+order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+    const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+{
+	char *oavail = NULL, *avail = NULL, *first = NULL, *last = NULL;
+	char *alg = NULL, *hostname = NULL, *ret = NULL, *best = NULL;
+	size_t maxlen;
+	struct hostkeys *hostkeys = NULL;
+	int ktype;
+	u_int i;
+
+	/* Find all hostkeys for this hostname */
+	get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, hostaddr, port, &hostname, NULL);
+	hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++)
+		load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.user_hostfiles[i], 0);
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++) {
+		load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname,
+		    options.system_hostfiles[i], 0);
+	}
+	if (options.known_hosts_command != NULL) {
+		load_hostkeys_command(hostkeys, options.known_hosts_command,
+		    "ORDER", cinfo, NULL, host);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * If a plain public key exists that matches the type of the best
+	 * preference HostkeyAlgorithms, then use the whole list as is.
+	 * Note that we ignore whether the best preference algorithm is a
+	 * certificate type, as sshconnect.c will downgrade certs to
+	 * plain keys if necessary.
+	 */
+	best = first_alg(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+	if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
+	    sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(best)),
+	    sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(best), NULL)) {
+		debug3_f("have matching best-preference key type %s, "
+		    "using HostkeyAlgorithms verbatim", best);
+		ret = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys
+	 * while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible.
+	 */
+	oavail = avail = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+	maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
+	first = xmalloc(maxlen);
+	last = xmalloc(maxlen);
+	*first = *last = '\0';
+
+#define ALG_APPEND(to, from) \
+	do { \
+		if (*to != '\0') \
+			strlcat(to, ",", maxlen); \
+		strlcat(to, from, maxlen); \
+	} while (0)
+
+	while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
+		if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
+			fatal_f("unknown alg %s", alg);
+		/*
+		 * If we have a @cert-authority marker in known_hosts then
+		 * prefer all certificate algorithms.
+		 */
+		if (sshkey_type_is_cert(ktype) &&
+		    lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, MRK_CA)) {
+			ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* If the key appears in known_hosts then prefer it */
+		if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
+		    sshkey_type_plain(ktype),
+		    sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(alg), NULL)) {
+			ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Otherwise, put it last */
+		ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
+	}
+#undef ALG_APPEND
+	xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first,
+	    (*first == '\0' || *last == '\0') ? "" : ",", last);
+	if (*first != '\0')
+		debug3_f("prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", first);
+	else
+		debug3_f("no algorithms matched; accept original");
+ out:
+	free(best);
+	free(first);
+	free(last);
+	free(hostname);
+	free(oavail);
+	free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
+    const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+{
+	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+	char *s, *all_key;
+	char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
+	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
+
+	xxx_host = host;
+	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+	xxx_conn_info = cinfo;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the user has not specified HostkeyAlgorithms, or has only
+	 * appended or removed algorithms from that list then prefer algorithms
+	 * that are in the list that are supported by known_hosts keys.
+	 */
+	if (options.hostkeyalgorithms == NULL ||
+	    options.hostkeyalgorithms[0] == '-' ||
+	    options.hostkeyalgorithms[0] == '+')
+		use_known_hosts_order = 1;
+
+	/* Expand or fill in HostkeyAlgorithms */
+	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+	if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options.hostkeyalgorithms,
+	    kex_default_pk_alg(), all_key)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "kex_assemble_namelist");
+	free(all_key);
+
+	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc =
+	    compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] =
+	    (char *)compression_alg_list(options.compression);
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
+	if (use_known_hosts_order) {
+		/* Query known_hosts and prefer algorithms that appear there */
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
+		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh,
+		    order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo));
+	} else {
+		/* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms exactly */
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
+		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+	}
+
+	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+		ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
+		    options.rekey_interval);
+
+	/* start key exchange */
+	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
+	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
+	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
+	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
+# endif
+#endif
+	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
+	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+	ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
+
+	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done);
+
+	/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
+	    compat_kex_proposal(ssh, options.kex_algorithms);
+	if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "kex_prop2buf");
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+#endif
+	/* Free only parts of proposal that were dynamically allocated here. */
+	free(prop_kex);
+	free(prop_enc);
+	free(prop_hostkey);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Authenticate user
+ */
+
+typedef struct cauthctxt Authctxt;
+typedef struct cauthmethod Authmethod;
+typedef struct identity Identity;
+typedef struct idlist Idlist;
+
+struct identity {
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
+	int	agent_fd;		/* >=0 if agent supports key */
+	struct sshkey	*key;		/* public/private key */
+	char	*filename;		/* comment for agent-only keys */
+	int	tried;
+	int	isprivate;		/* key points to the private key */
+	int	userprovided;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity);
+
+struct cauthctxt {
+	const char *server_user;
+	const char *local_user;
+	const char *host;
+	const char *service;
+	struct cauthmethod *method;
+	sig_atomic_t success;
+	char *authlist;
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	/* gssapi */
+	gss_OID_set gss_supported_mechs;
+	u_int mech_tried;
+#endif
+	/* pubkey */
+	struct idlist keys;
+	int agent_fd;
+	/* hostbased */
+	Sensitive *sensitive;
+	char *oktypes, *ktypes;
+	const char *active_ktype;
+	/* kbd-interactive */
+	int info_req_seen;
+	int attempt_kbdint;
+	/* password */
+	int attempt_passwd;
+	/* generic */
+	void *methoddata;
+};
+
+struct cauthmethod {
+	char	*name;		/* string to compare against server's list */
+	int	(*userauth)(struct ssh *ssh);
+	void	(*cleanup)(struct ssh *ssh);
+	int	*enabled;	/* flag in option struct that enables method */
+	int	*batch_flag;	/* flag in option struct that disables method */
+};
+
+static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+
+static int userauth_none(struct ssh *);
+static int userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *);
+static int userauth_passwd(struct ssh *);
+static int userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *);
+static int userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *);
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+static int userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *);
+static void userauth_gssapi_cleanup(struct ssh *);
+static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+#endif
+
+void	userauth(struct ssh *, char *);
+
+static void pubkey_cleanup(struct ssh *);
+static int sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *);
+static void pubkey_prepare(struct ssh *, Authctxt *);
+static void pubkey_reset(Authctxt *);
+static struct sshkey *load_identity_file(Identity *);
+
+static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist);
+static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name);
+static char *authmethods_get(void);
+
+Authmethod authmethods[] = {
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	{"gssapi-with-mic",
+		userauth_gssapi,
+		userauth_gssapi_cleanup,
+		&options.gss_authentication,
+		NULL},
+#endif
+	{"hostbased",
+		userauth_hostbased,
+		NULL,
+		&options.hostbased_authentication,
+		NULL},
+	{"publickey",
+		userauth_pubkey,
+		NULL,
+		&options.pubkey_authentication,
+		NULL},
+	{"keyboard-interactive",
+		userauth_kbdint,
+		NULL,
+		&options.kbd_interactive_authentication,
+		&options.batch_mode},
+	{"password",
+		userauth_passwd,
+		NULL,
+		&options.password_authentication,
+		&options.batch_mode},
+	{"none",
+		userauth_none,
+		NULL,
+		NULL,
+		NULL},
+	{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}
+};
+
+void
+ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
+    const char *server_user, char *host, Sensitive *sensitive)
+{
+	Authctxt authctxt;
+	int r;
+
+	if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL)
+		options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get();
+
+	/* setup authentication context */
+	memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt));
+	authctxt.server_user = server_user;
+	authctxt.local_user = local_user;
+	authctxt.host = host;
+	authctxt.service = "ssh-connection";		/* service name */
+	authctxt.success = 0;
+	authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none");
+	authctxt.authlist = NULL;
+	authctxt.methoddata = NULL;
+	authctxt.sensitive = sensitive;
+	authctxt.active_ktype = authctxt.oktypes = authctxt.ktypes = NULL;
+	authctxt.info_req_seen = 0;
+	authctxt.attempt_kbdint = 0;
+	authctxt.attempt_passwd = 0;
+#if GSSAPI
+	authctxt.gss_supported_mechs = NULL;
+	authctxt.mech_tried = 0;
+#endif
+	authctxt.agent_fd = -1;
+	pubkey_prepare(ssh, &authctxt);
+	if (authctxt.method == NULL) {
+		fatal_f("internal error: cannot send userauth none request");
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "ssh-userauth")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+
+	ssh->authctxt = &authctxt;
+	ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
+	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success);	/* loop until success */
+	pubkey_cleanup(ssh);
+	ssh->authctxt = NULL;
+
+	ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL);
+
+	if (!authctxt.success)
+		fatal("Authentication failed.");
+	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
+		verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d) using \"%s\".", host,
+		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
+		    authctxt.method->name);
+	} else {
+		verbose("Authenticated to %s (via proxy) using \"%s\".", host,
+		    authctxt.method->name);
+	}
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
+		char *reply;
+
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &reply, NULL)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		debug2("service_accept: %s", reply);
+		free(reply);
+	} else {
+		debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service");
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received");
+
+	/* initial userauth request */
+	userauth_none(ssh);
+
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_error);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner);
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh);
+}
+
+void
+userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+
+	if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL)
+		authctxt->method->cleanup(ssh);
+
+	free(authctxt->methoddata);
+	authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+	if (authlist == NULL) {
+		authlist = authctxt->authlist;
+	} else {
+		free(authctxt->authlist);
+		authctxt->authlist = authlist;
+	}
+	for (;;) {
+		Authmethod *method = authmethod_get(authlist);
+		if (method == NULL)
+			fatal("%s@%s: Permission denied (%s).",
+			    authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host, authlist);
+		authctxt->method = method;
+
+		/* reset the per method handler */
+		ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN,
+		    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX, NULL);
+
+		/* and try new method */
+		if (method->userauth(ssh) != 0) {
+			debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name);
+			break;
+		} else {
+			debug2("we did not send a packet, disable method");
+			method->enabled = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	fatal_f("bad message during authentication: type %d", type);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("entering");
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, &len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
+		fmprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(msg);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal_f("no authentication context");
+	free(authctxt->authlist);
+	authctxt->authlist = NULL;
+	if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL)
+		authctxt->method->cleanup(ssh);
+	free(authctxt->methoddata);
+	authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+	authctxt->success = 1;			/* break out */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#if 0
+static int
+input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal_f("no authentication context");
+
+	fatal("Unexpected authentication success during %s.",
+	    authctxt->method->name);
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	char *authlist = NULL;
+	u_char partial;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_userauth_failure: no authentication context");
+
+	if (sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &authlist, NULL) != 0 ||
+	    sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &partial) != 0 ||
+	    sshpkt_get_end(ssh) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (partial != 0) {
+		verbose("Authenticated using \"%s\" with partial success.",
+		    authctxt->method->name);
+		/* reset state */
+		pubkey_reset(authctxt);
+	}
+	debug("Authentications that can continue: %s", authlist);
+
+	userauth(ssh, authlist);
+	authlist = NULL;
+ out:
+	free(authlist);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Format an identity for logging including filename, key type, fingerprint
+ * and location (agent, etc.). Caller must free.
+ */
+static char *
+format_identity(Identity *id)
+{
+	char *fp = NULL, *ret = NULL;
+	const char *note = "";
+
+	if (id->key != NULL) {
+		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+	}
+	if (id->key) {
+		if ((id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0)
+			note = " token";
+		else if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key))
+			note = " authenticator";
+	}
+	xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s%s%s%s",
+	    id->filename,
+	    id->key ? sshkey_type(id->key) : "", id->key ? " " : "",
+	    fp ? fp : "",
+	    id->userprovided ? " explicit" : "", note,
+	    id->agent_fd != -1 ? " agent" : "");
+	free(fp);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	Identity *id = NULL;
+	int pktype, found = 0, sent = 0;
+	size_t blen;
+	char *pkalg = NULL, *fp = NULL, *ident = NULL;
+	u_char *pkblob = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_userauth_pk_ok: no authentication context");
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto done;
+
+	if ((pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+		debug_f("server sent unknown pkalg %s", pkalg);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
+		debug_r(r, "no key from blob. pkalg %s", pkalg);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (key->type != pktype) {
+		error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
+		    "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
+		    key->type, pktype);
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been
+	 * moved to the end of the queue.  this also avoids confusion by
+	 * duplicate keys
+	 */
+	TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(id, &authctxt->keys, idlist, next) {
+		if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key)) {
+			found = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!found || id == NULL) {
+		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+		error_f("server replied with unknown key: %s %s",
+		    sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "<ERROR>" : fp);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	ident = format_identity(id);
+	debug("Server accepts key: %s", ident);
+	sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, id);
+	r = 0;
+ done:
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	free(ident);
+	free(fp);
+	free(pkalg);
+	free(pkblob);
+
+	/* try another method if we did not send a packet */
+	if (r == 0 && sent == 0)
+		userauth(ssh, NULL);
+	return r;
+}
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+static int
+userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL;
+	OM_uint32 min;
+	int r, ok = 0;
+	gss_OID mech = NULL;
+
+	/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
+	 * once. */
+
+	if (authctxt->gss_supported_mechs == NULL)
+		gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs);
+
+	/* Check to see whether the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
+	while (authctxt->mech_tried < authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->count &&
+	    !ok) {
+		mech = &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->
+		    elements[authctxt->mech_tried];
+		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
+		if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
+		    mech, authctxt->host)) {
+			ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
+		} else {
+			authctxt->mech_tried++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (!ok || mech == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (mech->length) + 2)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, mech->length)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put(ssh, mech->elements, mech->length)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE, &input_gssapi_response);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR, &input_gssapi_error);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
+
+	authctxt->mech_tried++; /* Move along to next candidate */
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+userauth_gssapi_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt = (Gssctxt *)authctxt->methoddata;
+
+	ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&gssctxt);
+	authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+
+	free(authctxt->gss_supported_mechs);
+	authctxt->gss_supported_mechs = NULL;
+}
+
+static OM_uint32
+process_gssapi_token(struct ssh *ssh, gss_buffer_t recv_tok)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
+	OM_uint32 status, ms, flags;
+	int r;
+
+	status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
+	    recv_tok, &send_tok, &flags);
+
+	if (send_tok.length > 0) {
+		u_char type = GSS_ERROR(status) ?
+		    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK :
+		    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN;
+
+		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
+		    send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "send %u packet", type);
+
+		gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
+	}
+
+	if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+		/* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */
+		if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
+			    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "send completion");
+		} else {
+			struct sshbuf *b;
+
+			if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+				fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+			ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user,
+			    authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic",
+			    ssh->kex->session_id);
+
+			if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
+				fatal_f("sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed");
+			gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
+
+			status = ssh_gssapi_sign(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic);
+
+			if (!GSS_ERROR(status)) {
+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
+				    SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC)) != 0 ||
+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value,
+				    mic.length)) != 0 ||
+				    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+					fatal_fr(r, "send MIC");
+			}
+
+			sshbuf_free(b);
+			gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return status;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+	size_t oidlen;
+	u_char *oidv = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+	/* Setup our OID */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &oidv, &oidlen)) != 0)
+		goto done;
+
+	if (oidlen <= 2 ||
+	    oidv[0] != SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
+	    oidv[1] != oidlen - 2) {
+		debug("Badly encoded mechanism OID received");
+		userauth(ssh, NULL);
+		goto ok;
+	}
+
+	if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv + 2, oidlen - 2))
+		fatal("Server returned different OID than expected");
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto done;
+
+	if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) {
+		/* Start again with next method on list */
+		debug("Trying to start again");
+		userauth(ssh, NULL);
+		goto ok;
+	}
+ ok:
+	r = 0;
+ done:
+	free(oidv);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+	u_char *p = NULL;
+	size_t len;
+	OM_uint32 status;
+	int r;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	recv_tok.value = p;
+	recv_tok.length = len;
+	status = process_gssapi_token(ssh, &recv_tok);
+
+	/* Start again with the next method in the list */
+	if (GSS_ERROR(status)) {
+		userauth(ssh, NULL);
+		/* ok */
+	}
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(p);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	Gssctxt *gssctxt;
+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
+	OM_uint32 ms;
+	u_char *p = NULL;
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
+	gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
+		free(p);
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	/* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */
+	recv_tok.value = p;
+	recv_tok.length = len;
+	(void)ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
+	    &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL);
+	free(p);
+	gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
+
+	/* Server will be returning a failed packet after this one */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	char *msg = NULL;
+	char *lang = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 ||	/* maj */
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 ||	/* min */
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh);
+	debug("Server GSSAPI Error:\n%s", msg);
+ out:
+	free(msg);
+	free(lang);
+	return r;
+}
+#endif /* GSSAPI */
+
+static int
+userauth_none(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+	int r;
+
+	/* initial userauth request */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+userauth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+	char *password, *prompt = NULL;
+	const char *host = options.host_key_alias ?  options.host_key_alias :
+	    authctxt->host;
+	int r;
+
+	if (authctxt->attempt_passwd++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (authctxt->attempt_passwd != 1)
+		error("Permission denied, please try again.");
+
+	xasprintf(&prompt, "%s@%s's password: ", authctxt->server_user, host);
+	password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+
+	free(prompt);
+	if (password != NULL)
+		freezero(password, strlen(password));
+
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ,
+	    &input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, prompt user and send SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
+ */
+/* ARGSUSED */
+static int
+input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	char *info = NULL, *lang = NULL, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL;
+	char prompt[256];
+	const char *host;
+	int r;
+
+	debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq");
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: "
+		    "no authentication context");
+	host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &info, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (strlen(info) > 0)
+		logit("%s", info);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0)	/* additional info */
+		goto out;
+
+	snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
+	    "Enter %.30s@%.128s's old password: ",
+	    authctxt->server_user, host);
+	password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+	if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	freezero(password, strlen(password));
+	password = NULL;
+	while (password == NULL) {
+		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
+		    "Enter %.30s@%.128s's new password: ",
+		    authctxt->server_user, host);
+		password = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF);
+		if (password == NULL) {
+			/* bail out */
+			r = 0;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
+		    "Retype %.30s@%.128s's new password: ",
+		    authctxt->server_user, host);
+		retype = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+		if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) {
+			freezero(password, strlen(password));
+			logit("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit.");
+			password = NULL;
+		}
+		freezero(retype, strlen(retype));
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ,
+	    &input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if (password)
+		freezero(password, strlen(password));
+	free(info);
+	free(lang);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Select an algorithm for publickey signatures.
+ * Returns algorithm (caller must free) or NULL if no mutual algorithm found.
+ *
+ * Call with ssh==NULL to ignore server-sig-algs extension list and
+ * only attempt with the key's base signature type.
+ */
+static char *
+key_sig_algorithm(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	char *allowed, *oallowed, *cp, *tmp, *alg = NULL;
+	const char *server_sig_algs;
+
+	/*
+	 * The signature algorithm will only differ from the key algorithm
+	 * for RSA keys/certs and when the server advertises support for
+	 * newer (SHA2) algorithms.
+	 */
+	if (ssh == NULL || ssh->kex->server_sig_algs == NULL ||
+	    (key->type != KEY_RSA && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT) ||
+	    (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE))) {
+		/* Filter base key signature alg against our configuration */
+		return match_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+		    options.pubkey_accepted_algos, NULL);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Workaround OpenSSH 7.4 bug: this version supports RSA/SHA-2 but
+	 * fails to advertise it via SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO.
+	 */
+	server_sig_algs = ssh->kex->server_sig_algs;
+	if (key->type == KEY_RSA && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74))
+		server_sig_algs = "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512";
+
+	/*
+	 * For RSA keys/certs, since these might have a different sig type:
+	 * find the first entry in PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms of the right type
+	 * that also appears in the supported signature algorithms list from
+	 * the server.
+	 */
+	oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
+	while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) {
+		if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type)
+			continue;
+		tmp = match_list(sshkey_sigalg_by_name(cp),
+		    server_sig_algs, NULL);
+		if (tmp != NULL)
+			alg = xstrdup(cp);
+		free(tmp);
+		if (alg != NULL)
+			break;
+	}
+	free(oallowed);
+	return alg;
+}
+
+static int
+identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, const char *alg)
+{
+	struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL, *prv = NULL;
+	int is_agent = 0, retried = 0, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
+	char *fp = NULL, *pin = NULL, *prompt = NULL;
+
+	*sigp = NULL;
+	*lenp = 0;
+
+	/* The agent supports this key. */
+	if (id->key != NULL && id->agent_fd != -1) {
+		return ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp,
+		    data, datalen, alg, compat);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * We have already loaded the private key or the private key is
+	 * stored in external hardware.
+	 */
+	if (id->key != NULL &&
+	    (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT))) {
+		sign_key = id->key;
+		is_agent = 1;
+	} else {
+		/* Load the private key from the file. */
+		if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+		if (id->key != NULL && !sshkey_equal_public(prv, id->key)) {
+			error_f("private key %s contents do not match public",
+			    id->filename);
+			r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		sign_key = prv;
+	}
+ retry_pin:
+	/* Prompt for touch for non-agent FIDO keys that request UP */
+	if (!is_agent && sshkey_is_sk(sign_key) &&
+	    (sign_key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+		/* XXX should batch mode just skip these? */
+		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key,
+		    options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("fingerprint failed");
+		notifier = notify_start(options.batch_mode,
+		    "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
+		    sshkey_type(sign_key), fp);
+		free(fp);
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
+	    alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0) {
+		debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign");
+		if (!retried && pin == NULL && !is_agent &&
+		    sshkey_is_sk(sign_key) &&
+		    r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
+			notify_complete(notifier, NULL);
+			notifier = NULL;
+			xasprintf(&prompt, "Enter PIN for %s key %s: ",
+			    sshkey_type(sign_key), id->filename);
+			pin = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+			retried = 1;
+			goto retry_pin;
+		}
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * PKCS#11 tokens may not support all signature algorithms,
+	 * so check what we get back.
+	 */
+	if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(*sigp, *lenp, alg)) != 0) {
+		debug_fr(r, "sshkey_check_sigtype");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(prompt);
+	if (pin != NULL)
+		freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+	notify_complete(notifier, r == 0 ? "User presence confirmed" : NULL);
+	sshkey_free(prv);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+id_filename_matches(Identity *id, Identity *private_id)
+{
+	static const char * const suffixes[] = { ".pub", "-cert.pub", NULL };
+	size_t len = strlen(id->filename), plen = strlen(private_id->filename);
+	size_t i, slen;
+
+	if (strcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename) == 0)
+		return 1;
+	for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) {
+		slen = strlen(suffixes[i]);
+		if (len > slen && plen == len - slen &&
+		    strcmp(id->filename + (len - slen), suffixes[i]) == 0 &&
+		    memcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename, plen) == 0)
+			return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *id)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	Identity *private_id, *sign_id = NULL;
+	u_char *signature = NULL;
+	size_t slen = 0, skip = 0;
+	int r, fallback_sigtype, sent = 0;
+	char *alg = NULL, *fp = NULL;
+	const char *loc = "", *method = "publickey";
+	int hostbound = 0;
+
+	/* prefer host-bound pubkey signatures if supported by server */
+	if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_HAS_PUBKEY_HOSTBOUND) != 0 &&
+	    (options.pubkey_authentication & SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_HBOUND) != 0) {
+		hostbound = 1;
+		method = "publickey-hostbound-v00@openssh.com";
+	}
+
+	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+
+	debug3_f("using %s with %s %s", method, sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
+
+	/*
+	 * If the key is an certificate, try to find a matching private key
+	 * and use it to complete the signature.
+	 * If no such private key exists, fall back to trying the certificate
+	 * key itself in case it has a private half already loaded.
+	 * This will try to set sign_id to the private key that will perform
+	 * the signature.
+	 */
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(id->key)) {
+		TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) {
+			if (sshkey_equal_public(id->key, private_id->key) &&
+			    id->key->type != private_id->key->type) {
+				sign_id = private_id;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Exact key matches are preferred, but also allow
+		 * filename matches for non-PKCS#11/agent keys that
+		 * didn't load public keys. This supports the case
+		 * of keeping just a private key file and public
+		 * certificate on disk.
+		 */
+		if (sign_id == NULL &&
+		    !id->isprivate && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
+		    (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) {
+			TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) {
+				if (private_id->key == NULL &&
+				    id_filename_matches(id, private_id)) {
+					sign_id = private_id;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		if (sign_id != NULL) {
+			debug2_f("using private key \"%s\"%s for "
+			    "certificate", sign_id->filename,
+			    sign_id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : "");
+		} else {
+			debug_f("no separate private key for certificate "
+			    "\"%s\"", id->filename);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If the above didn't select another identity to do the signing
+	 * then default to the one we started with.
+	 */
+	if (sign_id == NULL)
+		sign_id = id;
+
+	/* assemble and sign data */
+	for (fallback_sigtype = 0; fallback_sigtype <= 1; fallback_sigtype++) {
+		free(alg);
+		slen = 0;
+		signature = NULL;
+		if ((alg = key_sig_algorithm(fallback_sigtype ? NULL : ssh,
+		    id->key)) == NULL) {
+			error_f("no mutual signature supported");
+			goto out;
+		}
+		debug3_f("signing using %s %s", alg, fp);
+
+		sshbuf_free(b);
+		if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+		if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
+			if ((r = sshbuf_putb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putb");
+		} else {
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b,
+			    ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put_stringb");
+		}
+		skip = sshbuf_len(b);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, alg)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshkey_puts(id->key, b)) != 0) {
+			fatal_fr(r, "assemble signed data");
+		}
+		if (hostbound) {
+			if (ssh->kex->initial_hostkey == NULL) {
+				fatal_f("internal error: initial hostkey "
+				    "not recorded");
+			}
+			if ((r = sshkey_puts(ssh->kex->initial_hostkey, b)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "assemble %s hostkey", method);
+		}
+		/* generate signature */
+		r = identity_sign(sign_id, &signature, &slen,
+		    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), ssh->compat, alg);
+		if (r == 0)
+			break;
+		else if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
+			goto out; /* soft failure */
+		else if (r == SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED &&
+		    !fallback_sigtype) {
+			if (sign_id->agent_fd != -1)
+				loc = "agent ";
+			else if ((sign_id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0)
+				loc = "token ";
+			logit("%skey %s %s returned incorrect signature type",
+			    loc, sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
+			continue;
+		}
+		error_fr(r, "signing failed for %s \"%s\"%s",
+		    sshkey_type(sign_id->key), sign_id->filename,
+		    id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : "");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (slen == 0 || signature == NULL) /* shouldn't happen */
+		fatal_f("no signature");
+
+	/* append signature */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "append signature");
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+#endif
+	/* skip session id and packet type */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, skip + 1)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "consume");
+
+	/* put remaining data from buffer into packet */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, b)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "enqueue request");
+
+	/* success */
+	sent = 1;
+
+ out:
+	free(fp);
+	free(alg);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	freezero(signature, slen);
+	return sent;
+}
+
+static int
+send_pubkey_test(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *id)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+	u_char *blob = NULL;
+	char *alg = NULL;
+	size_t bloblen;
+	u_int have_sig = 0;
+	int sent = 0, r;
+
+	if ((alg = key_sig_algorithm(ssh, id->key)) == NULL) {
+		debug_f("no mutual signature algorithm");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0) {
+		/* we cannot handle this key */
+		debug3_f("cannot handle key");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok);
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, have_sig)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, alg)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, blob, bloblen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+	sent = 1;
+
+ out:
+	free(alg);
+	free(blob);
+	return sent;
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+load_identity_file(Identity *id)
+{
+	struct sshkey *private = NULL;
+	char prompt[300], *passphrase, *comment;
+	int r, quit = 0, i;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	if (stat(id->filename, &st) == -1) {
+		do_log2(id->userprovided ?
+		    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3,
+		    "no such identity: %s: %s", id->filename, strerror(errno));
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt,
+	    "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", id->filename);
+	for (i = 0; i <= options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
+		if (i == 0)
+			passphrase = "";
+		else {
+			passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
+			if (*passphrase == '\0') {
+				debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
+				free(passphrase);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		switch ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, id->filename,
+		    passphrase, &private, &comment))) {
+		case 0:
+			break;
+		case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE:
+			if (options.batch_mode) {
+				quit = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+			if (i != 0)
+				debug2("bad passphrase given, try again...");
+			break;
+		case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
+			if (errno == ENOENT) {
+				debug2_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", id->filename);
+				quit = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		default:
+			error_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", id->filename);
+			quit = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (private != NULL && sshkey_is_sk(private) &&
+		    options.sk_provider == NULL) {
+			debug("key \"%s\" is an authenticator-hosted key, "
+			    "but no provider specified", id->filename);
+			sshkey_free(private);
+			private = NULL;
+			quit = 1;
+		}
+		if (!quit && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(private,
+		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+			debug_fr(r, "Skipping key %s", id->filename);
+			sshkey_free(private);
+			private = NULL;
+			quit = 1;
+		}
+		if (!quit && private != NULL && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
+		    !(id->key && id->isprivate))
+			maybe_add_key_to_agent(id->filename, private, comment,
+			    passphrase);
+		if (i > 0)
+			freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+		free(comment);
+		if (private != NULL || quit)
+			break;
+	}
+	return private;
+}
+
+static int
+key_type_allowed_by_config(struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
+	    options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1)
+		return 1;
+
+	/* RSA keys/certs might be allowed by alternate signature types */
+	switch (key->type) {
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512",
+		    options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1)
+			return 1;
+		if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256",
+		    options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1)
+			return 1;
+		break;
+	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+		if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+		    options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1)
+			return 1;
+		if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+		    options.pubkey_accepted_algos, 0) == 1)
+			return 1;
+		break;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* obtain a list of keys from the agent */
+static int
+get_agent_identities(struct ssh *ssh, int *agent_fdp,
+    struct ssh_identitylist **idlistp)
+{
+	int r, agent_fd;
+	struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
+
+	if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) {
+		if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
+			debug_fr(r, "ssh_get_authentication_socket");
+		return r;
+	}
+	if ((r = ssh_agent_bind_hostkey(agent_fd, ssh->kex->initial_hostkey,
+	    ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->initial_sig, 0)) == 0)
+		debug_f("bound agent to hostkey");
+	else
+		debug2_fr(r, "ssh_agent_bind_hostkey");
+
+	if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
+		debug_fr(r, "ssh_fetch_identitylist");
+		close(agent_fd);
+		return r;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	*agent_fdp = agent_fd;
+	*idlistp = idlist;
+	debug_f("agent returned %zu keys", idlist->nkeys);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * try keys in the following order:
+ *	1. certificates listed in the config file
+ *	2. other input certificates
+ *	3. agent keys that are found in the config file
+ *	4. other agent keys
+ *	5. keys that are only listed in the config file
+ */
+static void
+pubkey_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	struct identity *id, *id2, *tmp;
+	struct idlist agent, files, *preferred;
+	struct sshkey *key;
+	int agent_fd = -1, i, r, found;
+	size_t j;
+	struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
+	char *ident;
+
+	TAILQ_INIT(&agent);	/* keys from the agent */
+	TAILQ_INIT(&files);	/* keys from the config file */
+	preferred = &authctxt->keys;
+	TAILQ_INIT(preferred);	/* preferred order of keys */
+
+	/* list of keys stored in the filesystem and PKCS#11 */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
+		key = options.identity_keys[i];
+		if (key && key->cert &&
+		    key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) {
+			debug_f("ignoring certificate %s: not a user "
+			    "certificate", options.identity_files[i]);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (key && sshkey_is_sk(key) && options.sk_provider == NULL) {
+			debug_f("ignoring authenticator-hosted key %s as no "
+			    "SecurityKeyProvider has been specified",
+			    options.identity_files[i]);
+			continue;
+		}
+		options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
+		id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+		id->agent_fd = -1;
+		id->key = key;
+		id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]);
+		id->userprovided = options.identity_file_userprovided[i];
+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next);
+	}
+	/* list of certificates specified by user */
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) {
+		key = options.certificates[i];
+		if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || key->cert == NULL ||
+		    key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) {
+			debug_f("ignoring certificate %s: not a user "
+			    "certificate", options.identity_files[i]);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (key && sshkey_is_sk(key) && options.sk_provider == NULL) {
+			debug_f("ignoring authenticator-hosted key "
+			    "certificate %s as no "
+			    "SecurityKeyProvider has been specified",
+			    options.identity_files[i]);
+			continue;
+		}
+		id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+		id->agent_fd = -1;
+		id->key = key;
+		id->filename = xstrdup(options.certificate_files[i]);
+		id->userprovided = options.certificate_file_userprovided[i];
+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+	}
+	/* list of keys supported by the agent */
+	if ((r = get_agent_identities(ssh, &agent_fd, &idlist)) == 0) {
+		for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) {
+			if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(idlist->keys[j],
+			    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+				debug_fr(r, "ignoring %s agent key",
+				    sshkey_ssh_name(idlist->keys[j]));
+				continue;
+			}
+			found = 0;
+			TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) {
+				/*
+				 * agent keys from the config file are
+				 * preferred
+				 */
+				if (sshkey_equal(idlist->keys[j], id->key)) {
+					TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
+					TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+					id->agent_fd = agent_fd;
+					found = 1;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			if (!found && !options.identities_only) {
+				id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
+				/* XXX "steals" key/comment from idlist */
+				id->key = idlist->keys[j];
+				id->filename = idlist->comments[j];
+				idlist->keys[j] = NULL;
+				idlist->comments[j] = NULL;
+				id->agent_fd = agent_fd;
+				TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&agent, id, next);
+			}
+		}
+		ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
+		/* append remaining agent keys */
+		TAILQ_CONCAT(preferred, &agent, next);
+		authctxt->agent_fd = agent_fd;
+	}
+	/* Prefer PKCS11 keys that are explicitly listed */
+	TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, &files, next, tmp) {
+		if (id->key == NULL || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0)
+			continue;
+		found = 0;
+		TAILQ_FOREACH(id2, &files, next) {
+			if (id2->key == NULL ||
+			    (id2->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0)
+				continue;
+			if (sshkey_equal(id->key, id2->key)) {
+				TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
+				TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
+				found = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		/* If IdentitiesOnly set and key not found then don't use it */
+		if (!found && options.identities_only) {
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
+			freezero(id, sizeof(*id));
+		}
+	}
+	/* append remaining keys from the config file */
+	TAILQ_CONCAT(preferred, &files, next);
+	/* finally, filter by PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms */
+	TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) {
+		if (id->key != NULL && !key_type_allowed_by_config(id->key)) {
+			debug("Skipping %s key %s - "
+			    "corresponding algo not in PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms",
+			    sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), id->filename);
+			TAILQ_REMOVE(preferred, id, next);
+			sshkey_free(id->key);
+			free(id->filename);
+			memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
+			continue;
+		}
+	}
+	/* List the keys we plan on using */
+	TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) {
+		ident = format_identity(id);
+		debug("Will attempt key: %s", ident);
+		free(ident);
+	}
+	debug2_f("done");
+}
+
+static void
+pubkey_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+	Identity *id;
+
+	if (authctxt->agent_fd != -1) {
+		ssh_close_authentication_socket(authctxt->agent_fd);
+		authctxt->agent_fd = -1;
+	}
+	for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id;
+	    id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) {
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
+		sshkey_free(id->key);
+		free(id->filename);
+		free(id);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+pubkey_reset(Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+	Identity *id;
+
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &authctxt->keys, next)
+		id->tried = 0;
+}
+
+static int
+try_identity(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *id)
+{
+	if (!id->key)
+		return (0);
+	if (sshkey_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
+	    (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
+		debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 server",
+		    sshkey_type(id->key), id->filename);
+		return (0);
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+	Identity *id;
+	int sent = 0;
+	char *ident;
+
+	while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) {
+		if (id->tried++)
+			return (0);
+		/* move key to the end of the queue */
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
+		/*
+		 * send a test message if we have the public key. for
+		 * encrypted keys we cannot do this and have to load the
+		 * private key instead
+		 */
+		if (id->key != NULL) {
+			if (try_identity(ssh, id)) {
+				ident = format_identity(id);
+				debug("Offering public key: %s", ident);
+				free(ident);
+				sent = send_pubkey_test(ssh, id);
+			}
+		} else {
+			debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename);
+			id->key = load_identity_file(id);
+			if (id->key != NULL) {
+				if (try_identity(ssh, id)) {
+					id->isprivate = 1;
+					sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, id);
+				}
+				sshkey_free(id->key);
+				id->key = NULL;
+				id->isprivate = 0;
+			}
+		}
+		if (sent)
+			return (sent);
+	}
+	return (0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send userauth request message specifying keyboard-interactive method.
+ */
+static int
+userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+	int r;
+
+	if (authctxt->attempt_kbdint++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
+		return 0;
+	/* disable if no SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST has been seen */
+	if (authctxt->attempt_kbdint > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) {
+		debug3("userauth_kbdint: disable: no info_req_seen");
+		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	debug2("userauth_kbdint");
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||		/* lang */
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, options.kbd_interactive_devices ?
+	    options.kbd_interactive_devices : "")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse INFO_REQUEST, prompt user and send INFO_RESPONSE
+ */
+static int
+input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
+	char *name = NULL, *inst = NULL, *lang = NULL, *prompt = NULL;
+	char *display_prompt = NULL, *response = NULL;
+	u_char echo = 0;
+	u_int num_prompts, i;
+	int r;
+
+	debug2_f("entering");
+
+	if (authctxt == NULL)
+		fatal_f("no authentication context");
+
+	authctxt->info_req_seen = 1;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &inst, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (strlen(name) > 0)
+		logit("%s", name);
+	if (strlen(inst) > 0)
+		logit("%s", inst);
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &num_prompts)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/*
+	 * Begin to build info response packet based on prompts requested.
+	 * We commit to providing the correct number of responses, so if
+	 * further on we run into a problem that prevents this, we have to
+	 * be sure and clean this up and send a correct error response.
+	 */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, num_prompts)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	debug2_f("num_prompts %d", num_prompts);
+	for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) {
+		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &prompt, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &echo)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if (asmprintf(&display_prompt, INT_MAX, NULL, "(%s@%s) %s",
+		    authctxt->server_user, options.host_key_alias ?
+		    options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host, prompt) == -1)
+			fatal_f("asmprintf failed");
+		response = read_passphrase(display_prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, response)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		freezero(response, strlen(response));
+		free(prompt);
+		free(display_prompt);
+		display_prompt = response = prompt = NULL;
+	}
+	/* done with parsing incoming message. */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	r = sshpkt_send(ssh);
+ out:
+	if (response)
+		freezero(response, strlen(response));
+	free(prompt);
+	free(display_prompt);
+	free(name);
+	free(inst);
+	free(lang);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+ssh_keysign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	struct stat st;
+	pid_t pid;
+	int r, to[2], from[2], status;
+	int sock = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
+	u_char rversion = 0, version = 2;
+	void (*osigchld)(int);
+
+	*sigp = NULL;
+	*lenp = 0;
+
+	if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) == -1) {
+		error_f("not installed: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (fflush(stdout) != 0) {
+		error_f("fflush: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (pipe(to) == -1) {
+		error_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (pipe(from) == -1) {
+		error_f("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
+		error_f("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return -1;
+	}
+	osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+	if (pid == 0) {
+		close(from[0]);
+		if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
+			fatal_f("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+		close(to[1]);
+		if (dup2(to[0], STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
+			fatal_f("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+		close(from[1]);
+		close(to[0]);
+
+		if (dup2(sock, STDERR_FILENO + 1) == -1)
+			fatal_f("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+		sock = STDERR_FILENO + 1;
+		fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 0);	/* keep the socket on exec */
+		closefrom(sock + 1);
+
+		debug3_f("[child] pid=%ld, exec %s",
+		    (long)getpid(), _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN);
+		execl(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, (char *)NULL);
+		fatal_f("exec(%s): %s", _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN,
+		    strerror(errno));
+	}
+	close(from[1]);
+	close(to[0]);
+	sock = STDERR_FILENO + 1;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	/* send # of sock, data to be signed */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, data, datalen)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+	if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, b) == -1)
+		fatal_f("couldn't send request");
+	sshbuf_reset(b);
+	r = ssh_msg_recv(from[0], b);
+	close(from[0]);
+	close(to[1]);
+	if (r < 0) {
+		error_f("no reply");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	errno = 0;
+	while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+		if (errno != EINTR) {
+			error_f("waitpid %ld: %s", (long)pid, strerror(errno));
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+		error_f("exited abnormally");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+		error_f("exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rversion)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "buffer error");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if (rversion != version) {
+		error_f("bad version");
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, sigp, lenp)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "buffer error");
+ fail:
+		ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+		sshbuf_free(b);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
+	struct sshkey *private = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	u_char *sig = NULL, *keyblob = NULL;
+	char *fp = NULL, *chost = NULL, *lname = NULL;
+	size_t siglen = 0, keylen = 0;
+	int i, r, success = 0;
+
+	if (authctxt->ktypes == NULL) {
+		authctxt->oktypes = xstrdup(options.hostbased_accepted_algos);
+		authctxt->ktypes = authctxt->oktypes;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Work through each listed type pattern in HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+	 * trying each hostkey that matches the type in turn.
+	 */
+	for (;;) {
+		if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL)
+			authctxt->active_ktype = strsep(&authctxt->ktypes, ",");
+		if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL ||
+		    *authctxt->active_ktype == '\0')
+			break;
+		debug3_f("trying key type %s", authctxt->active_ktype);
+
+		/* check for a useful key */
+		private = NULL;
+		for (i = 0; i < authctxt->sensitive->nkeys; i++) {
+			if (authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] == NULL ||
+			    authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
+				continue;
+			if (!sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs(
+			    sshkey_ssh_name(authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]),
+			    authctxt->active_ktype))
+				continue;
+			/* we take and free the key */
+			private = authctxt->sensitive->keys[i];
+			authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] = NULL;
+			break;
+		}
+		/* Found one */
+		if (private != NULL)
+			break;
+		/* No more keys of this type; advance */
+		authctxt->active_ktype = NULL;
+	}
+	if (private == NULL) {
+		free(authctxt->oktypes);
+		authctxt->oktypes = authctxt->ktypes = NULL;
+		authctxt->active_ktype = NULL;
+		debug("No more client hostkeys for hostbased authentication.");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(private, options.fingerprint_hash,
+	    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	debug_f("trying hostkey %s %s using sigalg %s",
+	    sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp, authctxt->active_ktype);
+
+	/* figure out a name for the client host */
+	lname = get_local_name(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+	if (lname == NULL) {
+		error_f("cannot get local ipaddr/name");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* XXX sshbuf_put_stringf? */
+	xasprintf(&chost, "%s.", lname);
+	debug2_f("chost %s", chost);
+
+	/* construct data */
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(private, &keyblob, &keylen)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_blob");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->active_ktype)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->local_user)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "buffer error");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+#endif
+	if ((r = ssh_keysign(ssh, private, &sig, &siglen,
+	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b))) != 0) {
+		error("sign using hostkey %s %s failed",
+		    sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->active_ktype)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, chost)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->local_user)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sig, siglen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "packet error");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	success = 1;
+
+ out:
+	if (sig != NULL)
+		freezero(sig, siglen);
+	free(keyblob);
+	free(lname);
+	free(fp);
+	free(chost);
+	sshkey_free(private);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+
+	return success;
+}
+
+/* find auth method */
+
+/*
+ * given auth method name, if configurable options permit this method fill
+ * in auth_ident field and return true, otherwise return false.
+ */
+static int
+authmethod_is_enabled(Authmethod *method)
+{
+	if (method == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	/* return false if options indicate this method is disabled */
+	if  (method->enabled == NULL || *method->enabled == 0)
+		return 0;
+	/* return false if batch mode is enabled but method needs interactive mode */
+	if  (method->batch_flag != NULL && *method->batch_flag != 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static Authmethod *
+authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
+{
+	Authmethod *method = NULL;
+	if (name != NULL)
+		for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++)
+			if (strcmp(name, method->name) == 0)
+				return method;
+	debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL");
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* XXX internal state */
+static Authmethod *current = NULL;
+static char *supported = NULL;
+static char *preferred = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Given the authentication method list sent by the server, return the
+ * next method we should try.  If the server initially sends a nil list,
+ * use a built-in default list.
+ */
+static Authmethod *
+authmethod_get(char *authlist)
+{
+	char *name = NULL;
+	u_int next;
+
+	/* Use a suitable default if we're passed a nil list.  */
+	if (authlist == NULL || strlen(authlist) == 0)
+		authlist = options.preferred_authentications;
+
+	if (supported == NULL || strcmp(authlist, supported) != 0) {
+		debug3("start over, passed a different list %s", authlist);
+		free(supported);
+		supported = xstrdup(authlist);
+		preferred = options.preferred_authentications;
+		debug3("preferred %s", preferred);
+		current = NULL;
+	} else if (current != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current))
+		return current;
+
+	for (;;) {
+		if ((name = match_list(preferred, supported, &next)) == NULL) {
+			debug("No more authentication methods to try.");
+			current = NULL;
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		preferred += next;
+		debug3("authmethod_lookup %s", name);
+		debug3("remaining preferred: %s", preferred);
+		if ((current = authmethod_lookup(name)) != NULL &&
+		    authmethod_is_enabled(current)) {
+			debug3("authmethod_is_enabled %s", name);
+			debug("Next authentication method: %s", name);
+			free(name);
+			return current;
+		}
+		free(name);
+	}
+}
+
+static char *
+authmethods_get(void)
+{
+	Authmethod *method = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	char *list;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) {
+		if (authmethod_is_enabled(method)) {
+			if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s",
+			    sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "", method->name)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
+		}
+	}
+	if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return list;
+}
diff --git a/sshd.0 b/sshd.0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cc72dd6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshd.0
@@ -0,0 +1,678 @@
+SSHD(8)                     System Manager's Manual                    SSHD(8)
+
+NAME
+     sshd M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH daemon
+
+SYNOPSIS
+     sshd [-46DdeiqTtV] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_certificate_file]
+          [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]
+          [-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     sshd (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for ssh(1).  It provides
+     secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an
+     insecure network.
+
+     sshd listens for connections from clients.  It is normally started at
+     boot from /etc/rc.  It forks a new daemon for each incoming connection.
+     The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication,
+     command execution, and data exchange.
+
+     sshd can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file
+     (by default sshd_config(5)); command-line options override values
+     specified in the configuration file.  sshd rereads its configuration file
+     when it receives a hangup signal, SIGHUP, by executing itself with the
+     name and options it was started with, e.g. /usr/sbin/sshd.
+
+     The options are as follows:
+
+     -4      Forces sshd to use IPv4 addresses only.
+
+     -6      Forces sshd to use IPv6 addresses only.
+
+     -C connection_spec
+             Specify the connection parameters to use for the -T extended test
+             mode.  If provided, any Match directives in the configuration
+             file that would apply are applied before the configuration is
+             written to standard output.  The connection parameters are
+             supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order,
+             either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list.
+             The keywords are M-bM-^@M-^\addrM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\userM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\hostM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\laddrM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\lportM-bM-^@M-^], and
+             M-bM-^@M-^\rdomainM-bM-^@M-^] and correspond to source address, user, resolved source
+             host name, local address, local port number and routing domain
+             respectively.
+
+     -c host_certificate_file
+             Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify sshd during
+             key exchange.  The certificate file must match a host key file
+             specified using the -h option or the HostKey configuration
+             directive.
+
+     -D      When this option is specified, sshd will not detach and does not
+             become a daemon.  This allows easy monitoring of sshd.
+
+     -d      Debug mode.  The server sends verbose debug output to standard
+             error, and does not put itself in the background.  The server
+             also will not fork(2) and will only process one connection.  This
+             option is only intended for debugging for the server.  Multiple
+             -d options increase the debugging level.  Maximum is 3.
+
+     -E log_file
+             Append debug logs to log_file instead of the system log.
+
+     -e      Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log.
+
+     -f config_file
+             Specifies the name of the configuration file.  The default is
+             /etc/ssh/sshd_config.  sshd refuses to start if there is no
+             configuration file.
+
+     -g login_grace_time
+             Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves
+             (default 120 seconds).  If the client fails to authenticate the
+             user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits.
+             A value of zero indicates no limit.
+
+     -h host_key_file
+             Specifies a file from which a host key is read.  This option must
+             be given if sshd is not run as root (as the normal host key files
+             are normally not readable by anyone but root).  The default is
+             /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and
+             /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.  It is possible to have multiple host
+             key files for the different host key algorithms.
+
+     -i      Specifies that sshd is being run from inetd(8).
+
+     -o option
+             Can be used to give options in the format used in the
+             configuration file.  This is useful for specifying options for
+             which there is no separate command-line flag.  For full details
+             of the options, and their values, see sshd_config(5).
+
+     -p port
+             Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections
+             (default 22).  Multiple port options are permitted.  Ports
+             specified in the configuration file with the Port option are
+             ignored when a command-line port is specified.  Ports specified
+             using the ListenAddress option override command-line ports.
+
+     -q      Quiet mode.  Nothing is sent to the system log.  Normally the
+             beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is
+             logged.
+
+     -T      Extended test mode.  Check the validity of the configuration
+             file, output the effective configuration to stdout and then exit.
+             Optionally, Match rules may be applied by specifying the
+             connection parameters using one or more -C options.
+
+     -t      Test mode.  Only check the validity of the configuration file and
+             sanity of the keys.  This is useful for updating sshd reliably as
+             configuration options may change.
+
+     -u len  This option is used to specify the size of the field in the utmp
+             structure that holds the remote host name.  If the resolved host
+             name is longer than len, the dotted decimal value will be used
+             instead.  This allows hosts with very long host names that
+             overflow this field to still be uniquely identified.  Specifying
+             -u0 indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put
+             into the utmp file.  -u0 may also be used to prevent sshd from
+             making DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or
+             configuration requires it.  Authentication mechanisms that may
+             require DNS include HostbasedAuthentication and using a
+             from="pattern-list" option in a key file.  Configuration options
+             that require DNS include using a USER@HOST pattern in AllowUsers
+             or DenyUsers.
+
+     -V      Display the version number and exit.
+
+AUTHENTICATION
+     The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocol 2 only.  Each host has a
+     host-specific key, used to identify the host.  Whenever a client
+     connects, the daemon responds with its public host key.  The client
+     compares the host key against its own database to verify that it has not
+     changed.  Forward secrecy is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key
+     agreement.  This key agreement results in a shared session key.  The rest
+     of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher.  The client selects
+     the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server.
+     Additionally, session integrity is provided through a cryptographic
+     message authentication code (MAC).
+
+     Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.  The
+     client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication,
+     public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password
+     authentication.
+
+     Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure
+     that it is accessible.  An account is not accessible if it is locked,
+     listed in DenyUsers or its group is listed in DenyGroups .  The
+     definition of a locked account is system dependent. Some platforms have
+     their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field (
+     M-bM-^@M-^X*LK*M-bM-^@M-^Y on Solaris and UnixWare, M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y on HP-UX, containing M-bM-^@M-^XNologinM-bM-^@M-^Y on
+     Tru64, a leading M-bM-^@M-^X*LOCKED*M-bM-^@M-^Y on FreeBSD and a leading M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y on most
+     Linuxes).  If there is a requirement to disable password authentication
+     for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field
+     should be set to something other than these values (eg M-bM-^@M-^XNPM-bM-^@M-^Y or M-bM-^@M-^X*NP*M-bM-^@M-^Y ).
+
+     If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing
+     the session is entered.  At this time the client may request things like
+     allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP
+     connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the
+     secure channel.
+
+     After this, the client either requests an interactive shell or execution
+     or a non-interactive command, which sshd will execute via the user's
+     shell using its -c option.  The sides then enter session mode.  In this
+     mode, either side may send data at any time, and such data is forwarded
+     to/from the shell or command on the server side, and the user terminal in
+     the client side.
+
+     When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other
+     connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the
+     client, and both sides exit.
+
+LOGIN PROCESS
+     When a user successfully logs in, sshd does the following:
+
+           1.   If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified,
+                prints last login time and /etc/motd (unless prevented in the
+                configuration file or by ~/.hushlogin; see the FILES section).
+
+           2.   If the login is on a tty, records login time.
+
+           3.   Checks /etc/nologin; if it exists, prints contents and quits
+                (unless root).
+
+           4.   Changes to run with normal user privileges.
+
+           5.   Sets up basic environment.
+
+           6.   Reads the file ~/.ssh/environment, if it exists, and users are
+                allowed to change their environment.  See the
+                PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5).
+
+           7.   Changes to user's home directory.
+
+           8.   If ~/.ssh/rc exists and the sshd_config(5) PermitUserRC option
+                is set, runs it; else if /etc/ssh/sshrc exists, runs it;
+                otherwise runs xauth(1).  The M-bM-^@M-^\rcM-bM-^@M-^] files are given the X11
+                authentication protocol and cookie in standard input.  See
+                SSHRC, below.
+
+           9.   Runs user's shell or command.  All commands are run under the
+                user's login shell as specified in the system password
+                database.
+
+SSHRC
+     If the file ~/.ssh/rc exists, sh(1) runs it after reading the environment
+     files but before starting the user's shell or command.  It must not
+     produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead.  If X11
+     forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its
+     standard input (and DISPLAY in its environment).  The script must call
+     xauth(1) because sshd will not run xauth automatically to add X11
+     cookies.
+
+     The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
+     which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible;
+     AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
+
+     This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
+     something similar to:
+
+        if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then
+                if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
+                        # X11UseLocalhost=yes
+                        echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
+                            cut -c11-` $proto $cookie
+                else
+                        # X11UseLocalhost=no
+                        echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
+                fi | xauth -q -
+        fi
+
+     If this file does not exist, /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if that does not
+     exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie.
+
+AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
+     AuthorizedKeysFile specifies the files containing public keys for public
+     key authentication; if this option is not specified, the default is
+     ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2.  Each line of the
+     file contains one key (empty lines and lines starting with a M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are
+     ignored as comments).  Public keys consist of the following space-
+     separated fields: options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.  The
+     options field is optional.  The supported key types are:
+
+           sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com
+           ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
+           ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
+           ecdsa-sha2-nistp521
+           sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com
+           ssh-ed25519
+           ssh-dss
+           ssh-rsa
+
+     The comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
+     user to identify the key).
+
+     Note that lines in this file can be several hundred bytes long (because
+     of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8 kilobytes,
+     which permits RSA keys up to 16 kilobits.  You don't want to type them
+     in; instead, copy the id_dsa.pub, id_ecdsa.pub, id_ecdsa_sk.pub,
+     id_ed25519.pub, id_ed25519_sk.pub, or the id_rsa.pub file and edit it.
+
+     sshd enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size of 1024 bits.
+
+     The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
+     specifications.  No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
+     The following option specifications are supported (note that option
+     keywords are case-insensitive):
+
+     agent-forwarding
+             Enable authentication agent forwarding previously disabled by the
+             restrict option.
+
+     cert-authority
+             Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA)
+             that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user
+             authentication.
+
+             Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key
+             options.  If both certificate restrictions and key options are
+             present, the most restrictive union of the two is applied.
+
+     command="command"
+             Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used
+             for authentication.  The command supplied by the user (if any) is
+             ignored.  The command is run on a pty if the client requests a
+             pty; otherwise it is run without a tty.  If an 8-bit clean
+             channel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify
+             no-pty.  A quote may be included in the command by quoting it
+             with a backslash.
+
+             This option might be useful to restrict certain public keys to
+             perform just a specific operation.  An example might be a key
+             that permits remote backups but nothing else.  Note that the
+             client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are
+             explicitly prohibited, e.g. using the restrict key option.
+
+             The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
+             SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable.  Note that this option
+             applies to shell, command or subsystem execution.  Also note that
+             this command may be superseded by a sshd_config(5) ForceCommand
+             directive.
+
+             If a command is specified and a forced-command is embedded in a
+             certificate used for authentication, then the certificate will be
+             accepted only if the two commands are identical.
+
+     environment="NAME=value"
+             Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
+             logging in using this key.  Environment variables set this way
+             override other default environment values.  Multiple options of
+             this type are permitted.  Environment processing is disabled by
+             default and is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option.
+
+     expiry-time="timespec"
+             Specifies a time after which the key will not be accepted.  The
+             time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD[Z] date or a
+             YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] time.  Dates and times will be interpreted in
+             the system time zone unless suffixed by a Z character, in which
+             case they will be interpreted in the UTC time zone.
+
+     from="pattern-list"
+             Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either
+             the canonical name of the remote host or its IP address must be
+             present in the comma-separated list of patterns.  See PATTERNS in
+             ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
+
+             In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to
+             hostnames or addresses, a from stanza may match IP addresses
+             using CIDR address/masklen notation.
+
+             The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security:
+             public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or
+             name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody
+             somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in
+             from anywhere in the world.  This additional option makes using a
+             stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have
+             to be compromised in addition to just the key).
+
+     no-agent-forwarding
+             Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
+             authentication.
+
+     no-port-forwarding
+             Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
+             Any port forward requests by the client will return an error.
+             This might be used, e.g. in connection with the command option.
+
+     no-pty  Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).
+
+     no-user-rc
+             Disables execution of ~/.ssh/rc.
+
+     no-X11-forwarding
+             Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
+             Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.
+
+     permitlisten="[host:]port"
+             Limit remote port forwarding with the ssh(1) -R option such that
+             it may only listen on the specified host (optional) and port.
+             IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in
+             square brackets.  Multiple permitlisten options may be applied
+             separated by commas.  Hostnames may include wildcards as
+             described in the PATTERNS section in ssh_config(5).  A port
+             specification of * matches any port.  Note that the setting of
+             GatewayPorts may further restrict listen addresses.  Note that
+             ssh(1) will send a hostname of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] if a listen host was
+             not specified when the forwarding was requested, and that this
+             name is treated differently to the explicit localhost addresses
+             M-bM-^@M-^\127.0.0.1M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\::1M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     permitopen="host:port"
+             Limit local port forwarding with the ssh(1) -L option such that
+             it may only connect to the specified host and port.  IPv6
+             addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square
+             brackets.  Multiple permitopen options may be applied separated
+             by commas.  No pattern matching or name lookup is performed on
+             the specified hostnames, they must be literal host names and/or
+             addresses.  A port specification of * matches any port.
+
+     port-forwarding
+             Enable port forwarding previously disabled by the restrict
+             option.
+
+     principals="principals"
+             On a cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for
+             certificate authentication as a comma-separated list.  At least
+             one name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of
+             principals for the certificate to be accepted.  This option is
+             ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate
+             signers using the cert-authority option.
+
+     pty     Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the restrict
+             option.
+
+     no-touch-required
+             Do not require demonstration of user presence for signatures made
+             using this key.  This option only makes sense for the FIDO
+             authenticator algorithms ecdsa-sk and ed25519-sk.
+
+     verify-required
+             Require that signatures made using this key attest that they
+             verified the user, e.g. via a PIN.  This option only makes sense
+             for the FIDO authenticator algorithms ecdsa-sk and ed25519-sk.
+
+     restrict
+             Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11
+             forwarding, as well as disabling PTY allocation and execution of
+             ~/.ssh/rc.  If any future restriction capabilities are added to
+             authorized_keys files, they will be included in this set.
+
+     tunnel="n"
+             Force a tun(4) device on the server.  Without this option, the
+             next available device will be used if the client requests a
+             tunnel.
+
+     user-rc
+             Enables execution of ~/.ssh/rc previously disabled by the
+             restrict option.
+
+     X11-forwarding
+             Permits X11 forwarding previously disabled by the restrict
+             option.
+
+     An example authorized_keys file:
+
+        # Comments are allowed at start of line. Blank lines are allowed.
+        # Plain key, no restrictions
+        ssh-rsa ...
+        # Forced command, disable PTY and all forwarding
+        restrict,command="dump /home" ssh-rsa ...
+        # Restriction of ssh -L forwarding destinations
+        permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-rsa ...
+        # Restriction of ssh -R forwarding listeners
+        permitlisten="localhost:8080",permitlisten="[::1]:22000" ssh-rsa ...
+        # Configuration for tunnel forwarding
+        tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa ...
+        # Override of restriction to allow PTY allocation
+        restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa ...
+        # Allow FIDO key without requiring touch
+        no-touch-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com ...
+        # Require user-verification (e.g. PIN or biometric) for FIDO key
+        verify-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com ...
+        # Trust CA key, allow touch-less FIDO if requested in certificate
+        cert-authority,no-touch-required,principals="user_a" ssh-rsa ...
+
+SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
+     The /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host
+     public keys for all known hosts.  The global file should be prepared by
+     the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained
+     automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host, its key is
+     added to the per-user file.
+
+     Each line in these files contains the following fields: marker
+     (optional), hostnames, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.  The fields
+     are separated by spaces.
+
+     The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of
+     M-bM-^@M-^\@cert-authorityM-bM-^@M-^], to indicate that the line contains a certification
+     authority (CA) key, or M-bM-^@M-^\@revokedM-bM-^@M-^], to indicate that the key contained on
+     the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted.  Only one marker
+     should be used on a key line.
+
+     Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns (M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y act as
+     wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the host name.  When
+     sshd is authenticating a client, such as when using
+     HostbasedAuthentication, this will be the canonical client host name.
+     When ssh(1) is authenticating a server, this will be the host name given
+     by the user, the value of the ssh(1) HostkeyAlias if it was specified, or
+     the canonical server hostname if the ssh(1) CanonicalizeHostname option
+     was used.
+
+     A pattern may also be preceded by M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate negation: if the host
+     name matches a negated pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if
+     it matched another pattern on the line.  A hostname or address may
+     optionally be enclosed within M-bM-^@M-^X[M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X]M-bM-^@M-^Y brackets then followed by M-bM-^@M-^X:M-bM-^@M-^Y
+     and a non-standard port number.
+
+     Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host
+     names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed.  Hashed
+     hostnames start with a M-bM-^@M-^X|M-bM-^@M-^Y character.  Only one hashed hostname may
+     appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard
+     operators may be applied.
+
+     The keytype and base64-encoded key are taken directly from the host key;
+     they can be obtained, for example, from /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub.
+     The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not
+     used.
+
+     Lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are ignored as comments.
+
+     When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any
+     matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if
+     the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key of the
+     certification authority that signed the certificate.  For a key to be
+     trusted as a certification authority, it must use the M-bM-^@M-^\@cert-authorityM-bM-^@M-^]
+     marker described above.
+
+     The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked,
+     for example when it is known that the associated private key has been
+     stolen.  Revoked keys are specified by including the M-bM-^@M-^\@revokedM-bM-^@M-^] marker at
+     the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for authentication
+     or as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning from
+     ssh(1) when they are encountered.
+
+     It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or
+     different host keys for the same names.  This will inevitably happen when
+     short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file.  It
+     is possible that the files contain conflicting information;
+     authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either
+     file.
+
+     Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters
+     long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand.
+     Rather, generate them by a script, ssh-keyscan(1) or by taking, for
+     example, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub and adding the host names at the
+     front.  ssh-keygen(1) also offers some basic automated editing for
+     ~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and
+     converting all host names to their hashed representations.
+
+     An example ssh_known_hosts file:
+
+        # Comments allowed at start of line
+        cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
+        # A hashed hostname
+        |1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa
+        AAAA1234.....=
+        # A revoked key
+        @revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
+        # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org
+        @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
+
+FILES
+     ~/.hushlogin
+             This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
+             /etc/motd, if PrintLastLog and PrintMotd, respectively, are
+             enabled.  It does not suppress printing of the banner specified
+             by Banner.
+
+     ~/.rhosts
+             This file is used for host-based authentication (see ssh(1) for
+             more information).  On some machines this file may need to be
+             world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS
+             partition, because sshd reads it as root.  Additionally, this
+             file must be owned by the user, and must not have write
+             permissions for anyone else.  The recommended permission for most
+             machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by
+             others.
+
+     ~/.shosts
+             This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows
+             host-based authentication without permitting login with
+             rlogin/rsh.
+
+     ~/.ssh/
+             This directory is the default location for all user-specific
+             configuration and authentication information.  There is no
+             general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
+             secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute
+             for the user, and not accessible by others.
+
+     ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+             Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used
+             for logging in as this user.  The format of this file is
+             described above.  The content of the file is not highly
+             sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the
+             user, and not accessible by others.
+
+             If this file, the ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory
+             are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or
+             replaced by unauthorized users.  In this case, sshd will not
+             allow it to be used unless the StrictModes option has been set to
+             M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     ~/.ssh/environment
+             This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
+             It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
+             M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y), and assignment lines of the form name=value.  The file
+             should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by
+             anyone else.  Environment processing is disabled by default and
+             is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option.
+
+     ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+             Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged
+             into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host
+             keys.  The format of this file is described above.  This file
+             should be writable only by root/the owner and can, but need not
+             be, world-readable.
+
+     ~/.ssh/rc
+             Contains initialization routines to be run before the user's home
+             directory becomes accessible.  This file should be writable only
+             by the user, and need not be readable by anyone else.
+
+     /etc/hosts.equiv
+             This file is for host-based authentication (see ssh(1)).  It
+             should only be writable by root.
+
+     /etc/moduli
+             Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group
+             Exchange" key exchange method.  The file format is described in
+             moduli(5).  If no usable groups are found in this file then fixed
+             internal groups will be used.
+
+     /etc/motd
+             See motd(5).
+
+     /etc/nologin
+             If this file exists, sshd refuses to let anyone except root log
+             in.  The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to
+             log in, and non-root connections are refused.  The file should be
+             world-readable.
+
+     /etc/shosts.equiv
+             This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but
+             allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+             rlogin/rsh.
+
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+             These files contain the private parts of the host keys.  These
+             files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and
+             not accessible to others.  Note that sshd does not start if these
+             files are group/world-accessible.
+
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
+             These files contain the public parts of the host keys.  These
+             files should be world-readable but writable only by root.  Their
+             contents should match the respective private parts.  These files
+             are not really used for anything; they are provided for the
+             convenience of the user so their contents can be copied to known
+             hosts files.  These files are created using ssh-keygen(1).
+
+     /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+             Systemwide list of known host keys.  This file should be prepared
+             by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of
+             all machines in the organization.  The format of this file is
+             described above.  This file should be writable only by root/the
+             owner and should be world-readable.
+
+     /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+             Contains configuration data for sshd.  The file format and
+             configuration options are described in sshd_config(5).
+
+     /etc/ssh/sshrc
+             Similar to ~/.ssh/rc, it can be used to specify machine-specific
+             login-time initializations globally.  This file should be
+             writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
+
+     /var/empty
+             chroot(2) directory used by sshd during privilege separation in
+             the pre-authentication phase.  The directory should not contain
+             any files and must be owned by root and not group or world-
+             writable.
+
+     /var/run/sshd.pid
+             Contains the process ID of the sshd listening for connections (if
+             there are several daemons running concurrently for different
+             ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last).
+             The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-
+             readable.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     scp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1),
+     ssh-keyscan(1), chroot(2), login.conf(5), moduli(5), sshd_config(5),
+     inetd(8), sftp-server(8)
+
+AUTHORS
+     OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+     Tatu Ylonen.  Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+     de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+     created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+     versions 1.5 and 2.0.  Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
+     for privilege separation.
+
+OpenBSD 7.2                    January 18, 2023                    OpenBSD 7.2
diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bace978
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshd.8
@@ -0,0 +1,1030 @@
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\"                    All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.322 2023/01/18 01:50:21 millert Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: January 18 2023 $
+.Dt SSHD 8
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm sshd
+.Nd OpenSSH daemon
+.Sh SYNOPSIS
+.Nm sshd
+.Bk -words
+.Op Fl 46DdeiqTtV
+.Op Fl C Ar connection_spec
+.Op Fl c Ar host_certificate_file
+.Op Fl E Ar log_file
+.Op Fl f Ar config_file
+.Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time
+.Op Fl h Ar host_key_file
+.Op Fl o Ar option
+.Op Fl p Ar port
+.Op Fl u Ar len
+.Ek
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Nm
+(OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+It provides secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts
+over an insecure network.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+listens for connections from clients.
+It is normally started at boot from
+.Pa /etc/rc .
+It forks a new
+daemon for each incoming connection.
+The forked daemons handle
+key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution,
+and data exchange.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file
+(by default
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ) ;
+command-line options override values specified in the
+configuration file.
+.Nm
+rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal,
+.Dv SIGHUP ,
+by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.\&
+.Pa /usr/sbin/sshd .
+.Pp
+The options are as follows:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Fl 4
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv4 addresses only.
+.It Fl 6
+Forces
+.Nm
+to use IPv6 addresses only.
+.It Fl C Ar connection_spec
+Specify the connection parameters to use for the
+.Fl T
+extended test mode.
+If provided, any
+.Cm Match
+directives in the configuration file that would apply are applied before the
+configuration is written to standard output.
+The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be
+supplied in any order, either with multiple
+.Fl C
+options or as a comma-separated list.
+The keywords are
+.Dq addr ,
+.Dq user ,
+.Dq host ,
+.Dq laddr ,
+.Dq lport ,
+and
+.Dq rdomain
+and correspond to source address, user, resolved source host name,
+local address, local port number and routing domain respectively.
+.It Fl c Ar host_certificate_file
+Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify
+.Nm
+during key exchange.
+The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the
+.Fl h
+option or the
+.Cm HostKey
+configuration directive.
+.It Fl D
+When this option is specified,
+.Nm
+will not detach and does not become a daemon.
+This allows easy monitoring of
+.Nm sshd .
+.It Fl d
+Debug mode.
+The server sends verbose debug output to standard error,
+and does not put itself in the background.
+The server also will not
+.Xr fork 2
+and will only process one connection.
+This option is only intended for debugging for the server.
+Multiple
+.Fl d
+options increase the debugging level.
+Maximum is 3.
+.It Fl E Ar log_file
+Append debug logs to
+.Ar log_file
+instead of the system log.
+.It Fl e
+Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log.
+.It Fl f Ar config_file
+Specifies the name of the configuration file.
+The default is
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config .
+.Nm
+refuses to start if there is no configuration file.
+.It Fl g Ar login_grace_time
+Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default
+120 seconds).
+If the client fails to authenticate the user within
+this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits.
+A value of zero indicates no limit.
+.It Fl h Ar host_key_file
+Specifies a file from which a host key is read.
+This option must be given if
+.Nm
+is not run as root (as the normal
+host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root).
+The default is
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+and
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .
+It is possible to have multiple host key files for
+the different host key algorithms.
+.It Fl i
+Specifies that
+.Nm
+is being run from
+.Xr inetd 8 .
+.It Fl o Ar option
+Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file.
+This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate
+command-line flag.
+For full details of the options, and their values, see
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.It Fl p Ar port
+Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections
+(default 22).
+Multiple port options are permitted.
+Ports specified in the configuration file with the
+.Cm Port
+option are ignored when a command-line port is specified.
+Ports specified using the
+.Cm ListenAddress
+option override command-line ports.
+.It Fl q
+Quiet mode.
+Nothing is sent to the system log.
+Normally the beginning,
+authentication, and termination of each connection is logged.
+.It Fl T
+Extended test mode.
+Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration
+to stdout and then exit.
+Optionally,
+.Cm Match
+rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more
+.Fl C
+options.
+.It Fl t
+Test mode.
+Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys.
+This is useful for updating
+.Nm
+reliably as configuration options may change.
+.It Fl u Ar len
+This option is used to specify the size of the field
+in the
+.Vt utmp
+structure that holds the remote host name.
+If the resolved host name is longer than
+.Ar len ,
+the dotted decimal value will be used instead.
+This allows hosts with very long host names that
+overflow this field to still be uniquely identified.
+Specifying
+.Fl u0
+indicates that only dotted decimal addresses
+should be put into the
+.Pa utmp
+file.
+.Fl u0
+may also be used to prevent
+.Nm
+from making DNS requests unless the authentication
+mechanism or configuration requires it.
+Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+and using a
+.Cm from="pattern-list"
+option in a key file.
+Configuration options that require DNS include using a
+USER@HOST pattern in
+.Cm AllowUsers
+or
+.Cm DenyUsers .
+.It Fl V
+Display the version number and exit.
+.El
+.Sh AUTHENTICATION
+The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocol 2 only.
+Each host has a host-specific key,
+used to identify the host.
+Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public
+host key.
+The client compares the
+host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed.
+Forward secrecy is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
+This key agreement results in a shared session key.
+The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher.
+The client selects the encryption algorithm
+to use from those offered by the server.
+Additionally, session integrity is provided
+through a cryptographic message authentication code (MAC).
+.Pp
+Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
+The client tries to authenticate itself using
+host-based authentication,
+public key authentication,
+challenge-response authentication,
+or password authentication.
+.Pp
+Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to
+ensure that it is accessible.  An account is not accessible if it is
+locked, listed in
+.Cm DenyUsers
+or its group is listed in
+.Cm DenyGroups
+\&.  The definition of a locked account is system dependent. Some platforms
+have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field (
+.Ql \&*LK\&*
+on Solaris and UnixWare,
+.Ql \&*
+on HP-UX, containing
+.Ql Nologin
+on Tru64,
+a leading
+.Ql \&*LOCKED\&*
+on FreeBSD and a leading
+.Ql \&!
+on most Linuxes).
+If there is a requirement to disable password authentication
+for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field
+should be set to something other than these values (eg
+.Ql NP
+or
+.Ql \&*NP\&*
+).
+.Pp
+If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for
+preparing the session is entered.
+At this time the client may request
+things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections,
+forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent
+connection over the secure channel.
+.Pp
+After this, the client either requests an interactive shell or execution
+or a non-interactive command, which
+.Nm
+will execute via the user's shell using its
+.Fl c
+option.
+The sides then enter session mode.
+In this mode, either side may send
+data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or
+command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side.
+.Pp
+When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other
+connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to
+the client, and both sides exit.
+.Sh LOGIN PROCESS
+When a user successfully logs in,
+.Nm
+does the following:
+.Bl -enum -offset indent
+.It
+If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified,
+prints last login time and
+.Pa /etc/motd
+(unless prevented in the configuration file or by
+.Pa ~/.hushlogin ;
+see the
+.Sx FILES
+section).
+.It
+If the login is on a tty, records login time.
+.It
+Checks
+.Pa /etc/nologin ;
+if it exists, prints contents and quits
+(unless root).
+.It
+Changes to run with normal user privileges.
+.It
+Sets up basic environment.
+.It
+Reads the file
+.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
+if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment.
+See the
+.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+option in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.It
+Changes to user's home directory.
+.It
+If
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+exists and the
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+.Cm PermitUserRC
+option is set, runs it; else if
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
+exists, runs
+it; otherwise runs
+.Xr xauth 1 .
+The
+.Dq rc
+files are given the X11
+authentication protocol and cookie in standard input.
+See
+.Sx SSHRC ,
+below.
+.It
+Runs user's shell or command.
+All commands are run under the user's login shell as specified in the
+system password database.
+.El
+.Sh SSHRC
+If the file
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+exists,
+.Xr sh 1
+runs it after reading the
+environment files but before starting the user's shell or command.
+It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used
+instead.
+If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in
+its standard input (and
+.Ev DISPLAY
+in its environment).
+The script must call
+.Xr xauth 1
+because
+.Nm
+will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies.
+.Pp
+The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
+which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes
+accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
+.Pp
+This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
+something similar to:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then
+	if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
+		# X11UseLocalhost=yes
+		echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
+		    cut -c11-` $proto $cookie
+	else
+		# X11UseLocalhost=no
+		echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
+	fi | xauth -q -
+fi
+.Ed
+.Pp
+If this file does not exist,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
+is run, and if that
+does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie.
+.Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+specifies the files containing public keys for
+public key authentication;
+if this option is not specified, the default is
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 .
+Each line of the file contains one
+key (empty lines and lines starting with a
+.Ql #
+are ignored as
+comments).
+Public keys consist of the following space-separated fields:
+options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.
+The options field is optional.
+The supported key types are:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
+.It
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com
+.It
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
+.It
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
+.It
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521
+.It
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com
+.It
+ssh-ed25519
+.It
+ssh-dss
+.It
+ssh-rsa
+.El
+.Pp
+The comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
+user to identify the key).
+.Pp
+Note that lines in this file can be several hundred bytes long
+(because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of
+8 kilobytes, which permits RSA keys up to 16 kilobits.
+You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the
+.Pa id_dsa.pub ,
+.Pa id_ecdsa.pub ,
+.Pa id_ecdsa_sk.pub ,
+.Pa id_ed25519.pub ,
+.Pa id_ed25519_sk.pub ,
+or the
+.Pa id_rsa.pub
+file and edit it.
+.Pp
+.Nm
+enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size of 1024 bits.
+.Pp
+The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
+specifications.
+No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
+The following option specifications are supported (note
+that option keywords are case-insensitive):
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm agent-forwarding
+Enable authentication agent forwarding previously disabled by the
+.Cm restrict
+option.
+.It Cm cert-authority
+Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is
+trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication.
+.Pp
+Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options.
+If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most
+restrictive union of the two is applied.
+.It Cm command="command"
+Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for
+authentication.
+The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored.
+The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty;
+otherwise it is run without a tty.
+If an 8-bit clean channel is required,
+one must not request a pty or should specify
+.Cm no-pty .
+A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash.
+.Pp
+This option might be useful
+to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation.
+An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else.
+Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11
+forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited, e.g. using the
+.Cm restrict
+key option.
+.Pp
+The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
+.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
+environment variable.
+Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution.
+Also note that this command may be superseded by a
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+.Cm ForceCommand
+directive.
+.Pp
+If a command is specified and a forced-command is embedded in a certificate
+used for authentication, then the certificate will be accepted only if the
+two commands are identical.
+.It Cm environment="NAME=value"
+Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
+logging in using this key.
+Environment variables set this way
+override other default environment values.
+Multiple options of this type are permitted.
+Environment processing is disabled by default and is
+controlled via the
+.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+option.
+.It Cm expiry-time="timespec"
+Specifies a time after which the key will not be accepted.
+The time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD[Z] date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] time.
+Dates and times will be interpreted in the system time zone unless suffixed
+by a Z character, in which case they will be interpreted in the UTC time zone.
+.It Cm from="pattern-list"
+Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical
+name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the
+comma-separated list of patterns.
+See PATTERNS in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.Pp
+In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or
+addresses, a
+.Cm from
+stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation.
+.Pp
+The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key
+authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or
+anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key
+permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world.
+This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name
+servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to
+just the key).
+.It Cm no-agent-forwarding
+Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
+authentication.
+.It Cm no-port-forwarding
+Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
+Any port forward requests by the client will return an error.
+This might be used, e.g. in connection with the
+.Cm command
+option.
+.It Cm no-pty
+Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).
+.It Cm no-user-rc
+Disables execution of
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc .
+.It Cm no-X11-forwarding
+Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
+Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.
+.It Cm permitlisten="[host:]port"
+Limit remote port forwarding with the
+.Xr ssh 1
+.Fl R
+option such that it may only listen on the specified host (optional) and port.
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
+Multiple
+.Cm permitlisten
+options may be applied separated by commas.
+Hostnames may include wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+A port specification of
+.Cm *
+matches any port.
+Note that the setting of
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+may further restrict listen addresses.
+Note that
+.Xr ssh 1
+will send a hostname of
+.Dq localhost
+if a listen host was not specified when the forwarding was requested, and
+that this name is treated differently to the explicit localhost addresses
+.Dq 127.0.0.1
+and
+.Dq ::1 .
+.It Cm permitopen="host:port"
+Limit local port forwarding with the
+.Xr ssh 1
+.Fl L
+option such that it may only connect to the specified host and port.
+IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
+Multiple
+.Cm permitopen
+options may be applied separated by commas.
+No pattern matching or name lookup is performed on the
+specified hostnames, they must be literal host names and/or addresses.
+A port specification of
+.Cm *
+matches any port.
+.It Cm port-forwarding
+Enable port forwarding previously disabled by the
+.Cm restrict
+option.
+.It Cm principals="principals"
+On a
+.Cm cert-authority
+line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a
+comma-separated list.
+At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's
+list of principals for the certificate to be accepted.
+This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate
+signers using the
+.Cm cert-authority
+option.
+.It Cm pty
+Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the
+.Cm restrict
+option.
+.It Cm no-touch-required
+Do not require demonstration of user presence
+for signatures made using this key.
+This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+and
+.Cm ed25519-sk .
+.It Cm verify-required
+Require that signatures made using this key attest that they verified
+the user, e.g. via a PIN.
+This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+and
+.Cm ed25519-sk .
+.It Cm restrict
+Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11 forwarding,
+as well as disabling PTY allocation
+and execution of
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc .
+If any future restriction capabilities are added to authorized_keys files,
+they will be included in this set.
+.It Cm tunnel="n"
+Force a
+.Xr tun 4
+device on the server.
+Without this option, the next available device will be used if
+the client requests a tunnel.
+.It Cm user-rc
+Enables execution of
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+previously disabled by the
+.Cm restrict
+option.
+.It Cm X11-forwarding
+Permits X11 forwarding previously disabled by the
+.Cm restrict
+option.
+.El
+.Pp
+An example authorized_keys file:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+# Comments are allowed at start of line. Blank lines are allowed.
+# Plain key, no restrictions
+ssh-rsa ...
+# Forced command, disable PTY and all forwarding
+restrict,command="dump /home" ssh-rsa ...
+# Restriction of ssh -L forwarding destinations
+permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-rsa ...
+# Restriction of ssh -R forwarding listeners
+permitlisten="localhost:8080",permitlisten="[::1]:22000" ssh-rsa ...
+# Configuration for tunnel forwarding
+tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa ...
+# Override of restriction to allow PTY allocation
+restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa ...
+# Allow FIDO key without requiring touch
+no-touch-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com ...
+# Require user-verification (e.g. PIN or biometric) for FIDO key
+verify-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com ...
+# Trust CA key, allow touch-less FIDO if requested in certificate
+cert-authority,no-touch-required,principals="user_a" ssh-rsa ...
+.Ed
+.Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
+The
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+files contain host public keys for all known hosts.
+The global file should
+be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is
+maintained automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host,
+its key is added to the per-user file.
+.Pp
+Each line in these files contains the following fields: marker (optional),
+hostnames, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.
+The fields are separated by spaces.
+.Pp
+The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of
+.Dq @cert-authority ,
+to indicate that the line contains a certification authority (CA) key,
+or
+.Dq @revoked ,
+to indicate that the key contained on the line is revoked and must not ever
+be accepted.
+Only one marker should be used on a key line.
+.Pp
+Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns
+.Pf ( Ql *
+and
+.Ql \&?
+act as
+wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the host name.
+When
+.Nm sshd
+is authenticating a client, such as when using
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication ,
+this will be the canonical client host name.
+When
+.Xr ssh 1
+is authenticating a server, this will be the host name
+given by the user, the value of the
+.Xr ssh 1
+.Cm HostkeyAlias
+if it was specified, or the canonical server hostname if the
+.Xr ssh 1
+.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
+option was used.
+.Pp
+A pattern may also be preceded by
+.Ql \&!
+to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated
+pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another
+pattern on the line.
+A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within
+.Ql \&[
+and
+.Ql \&]
+brackets then followed by
+.Ql \&:
+and a non-standard port number.
+.Pp
+Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names
+and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed.
+Hashed hostnames start with a
+.Ql |
+character.
+Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above
+negation or wildcard operators may be applied.
+.Pp
+The keytype and base64-encoded key are taken directly from the host key; they
+can be obtained, for example, from
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub .
+The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used.
+.Pp
+Lines starting with
+.Ql #
+and empty lines are ignored as comments.
+.Pp
+When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any
+matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or,
+if the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key
+of the certification authority that signed the certificate.
+For a key to be trusted as a certification authority, it must use the
+.Dq @cert-authority
+marker described above.
+.Pp
+The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked,
+for example when it is known that the associated private key has been
+stolen.
+Revoked keys are specified by including the
+.Dq @revoked
+marker at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for
+authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will
+produce a warning from
+.Xr ssh 1
+when they are encountered.
+.Pp
+It is permissible (but not
+recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same
+names.
+This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names
+from different domains are put in the file.
+It is possible
+that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is
+accepted if valid information can be found from either file.
+.Pp
+Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters
+long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand.
+Rather, generate them by a script,
+.Xr ssh-keyscan 1
+or by taking, for example,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
+and adding the host names at the front.
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1
+also offers some basic automated editing for
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+including removing hosts matching a host name and converting all host
+names to their hashed representations.
+.Pp
+An example ssh_known_hosts file:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+# Comments allowed at start of line
+cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
+# A hashed hostname
+|1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa
+AAAA1234.....=
+# A revoked key
+@revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
+# A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org
+@cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
+.Ed
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It Pa ~/.hushlogin
+This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
+.Pa /etc/motd ,
+if
+.Cm PrintLastLog
+and
+.Cm PrintMotd ,
+respectively,
+are enabled.
+It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by
+.Cm Banner .
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.rhosts
+This file is used for host-based authentication (see
+.Xr ssh 1
+for more information).
+On some machines this file may need to be
+world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
+because
+.Nm
+reads it as root.
+Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
+and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
+The recommended
+permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
+accessible by others.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.shosts
+This file is used in exactly the same way as
+.Pa .rhosts ,
+but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+rlogin/rsh.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/
+This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
+and authentication information.
+There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
+secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user,
+and not accessible by others.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA)
+that can be used for logging in as this user.
+The format of this file is described above.
+The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
+permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
+.Pp
+If this file, the
+.Pa ~/.ssh
+directory, or the user's home directory are writable
+by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized
+users.
+In this case,
+.Nm
+will not allow it to be used unless the
+.Cm StrictModes
+option has been set to
+.Dq no .
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
+This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
+It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
+.Ql # ) ,
+and assignment lines of the form name=value.
+The file should be writable
+only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else.
+Environment processing is disabled by default and is
+controlled via the
+.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+option.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into
+that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys.
+The format of this file is described above.
+This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
+can, but need not be, world-readable.
+.Pp
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+Contains initialization routines to be run before
+the user's home directory becomes accessible.
+This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
+readable by anyone else.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+This file is for host-based authentication (see
+.Xr ssh 1 ) .
+It should only be writable by root.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/moduli
+Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange"
+key exchange method.
+The file format is described in
+.Xr moduli 5 .
+If no usable groups are found in this file then fixed internal groups will
+be used.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/motd
+See
+.Xr motd 5 .
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/nologin
+If this file exists,
+.Nm
+refuses to let anyone except root log in.
+The contents of the file
+are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are
+refused.
+The file should be world-readable.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
+This file is used in exactly the same way as
+.Pa hosts.equiv ,
+but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
+rlogin/rsh.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+These files contain the private parts of the host keys.
+These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
+accessible to others.
+Note that
+.Nm
+does not start if these files are group/world-accessible.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
+These files contain the public parts of the host keys.
+These files should be world-readable but writable only by
+root.
+Their contents should match the respective private parts.
+These files are not
+really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of
+the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files.
+These files are created using
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+Systemwide list of known host keys.
+This file should be prepared by the
+system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
+organization.
+The format of this file is described above.
+This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
+should be world-readable.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+Contains configuration data for
+.Nm sshd .
+The file format and configuration options are described in
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.Pp
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
+Similar to
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc ,
+it can be used to specify
+machine-specific login-time initializations globally.
+This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /var/empty
+.Xr chroot 2
+directory used by
+.Nm
+during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase.
+The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root
+and not group or world-writable.
+.Pp
+.It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid
+Contains the process ID of the
+.Nm
+listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
+concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
+started last).
+The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr scp 1 ,
+.Xr sftp 1 ,
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
+.Xr chroot 2 ,
+.Xr login.conf 5 ,
+.Xr moduli 5 ,
+.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
+.Xr inetd 8 ,
+.Xr sftp-server 8
+.Sh AUTHORS
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
+Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
+Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
+protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
+for privilege separation.
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6321936
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2462 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.596 2023/01/18 01:50:21 millert Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * This program is the ssh daemon.  It listens for connections from clients,
+ * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
+ * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
+ * connection.  This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
+ * authentication agent connections.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * SSH2 implementation:
+ * Privilege Separation:
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+# include <sys/time.h>
+#endif
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
+#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+#include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <grp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
+#include <poll.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+#include <sys/security.h>
+#include <prot.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "kex.h"
+#include "myproposal.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "canohost.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "dispatch.h"
+#include "channels.h"
+#include "session.h"
+#include "monitor.h"
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+#include "ssh-gss.h"
+#endif
+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "version.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
+#include "srclimit.h"
+#include "dh.h"
+
+/* Re-exec fds */
+#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD	(STDERR_FILENO + 1)
+#define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD		(STDERR_FILENO + 2)
+#define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD		(STDERR_FILENO + 3)
+#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD		(STDERR_FILENO + 4)
+
+extern char *__progname;
+
+/* Server configuration options. */
+ServerOptions options;
+
+/* Name of the server configuration file. */
+char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
+
+/*
+ * Debug mode flag.  This can be set on the command line.  If debug
+ * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
+ * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
+ * the first connection.
+ */
+int debug_flag = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys.
+ * If test_flag > 1 ("-T" flag), then sshd will also dump the effective
+ * configuration, optionally using connection information provided by the
+ * "-C" flag.
+ */
+static int test_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
+static int inetd_flag = 0;
+
+/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
+static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
+
+/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
+static int log_stderr = 0;
+
+/* Saved arguments to main(). */
+static char **saved_argv;
+static int saved_argc;
+
+/* re-exec */
+static int rexeced_flag = 0;
+static int rexec_flag = 1;
+static int rexec_argc = 0;
+static char **rexec_argv;
+
+/*
+ * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
+ * signal handler.
+ */
+#define	MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS	16
+static int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
+static int num_listen_socks = 0;
+
+/* Daemon's agent connection */
+int auth_sock = -1;
+static int have_agent = 0;
+
+/*
+ * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
+ * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
+ * that the pages do not get written into swap.  However, there are some
+ * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
+ * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
+ * not very useful.  Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
+ */
+struct {
+	struct sshkey	**host_keys;		/* all private host keys */
+	struct sshkey	**host_pubkeys;		/* all public host keys */
+	struct sshkey	**host_certificates;	/* all public host certificates */
+	int		have_ssh2_key;
+} sensitive_data;
+
+/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
+static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
+
+/* record remote hostname or ip */
+u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX+1;
+
+/*
+ * startup_pipes/flags are used for tracking children of the listening sshd
+ * process early in their lifespans. This tracking is needed for three things:
+ *
+ * 1) Implementing the MaxStartups limit of concurrent unauthenticated
+ *    connections.
+ * 2) Avoiding a race condition for SIGHUP processing, where child processes
+ *    may have listen_socks open that could collide with main listener process
+ *    after it restarts.
+ * 3) Ensuring that rexec'd sshd processes have received their initial state
+ *    from the parent listen process before handling SIGHUP.
+ *
+ * Child processes signal that they have completed closure of the listen_socks
+ * and (if applicable) received their rexec state by sending a char over their
+ * sock. Child processes signal that authentication has completed by closing
+ * the sock (or by exiting).
+ */
+static int *startup_pipes = NULL;
+static int *startup_flags = NULL;	/* Indicates child closed listener */
+static int startup_pipe = -1;		/* in child */
+
+/* variables used for privilege separation */
+int use_privsep = -1;
+struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
+int privsep_is_preauth = 1;
+static int privsep_chroot = 1;
+
+/* global connection state and authentication contexts */
+Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
+struct ssh *the_active_state;
+
+/* global key/cert auth options. XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
+struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL;
+
+/* sshd_config buffer */
+struct sshbuf *cfg;
+
+/* Included files from the configuration file */
+struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes);
+
+/* message to be displayed after login */
+struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+
+/* Unprivileged user */
+struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
+
+/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
+void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+void demote_sensitive_data(void);
+static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
+
+static char *listener_proctitle;
+
+/*
+ * Close all listening sockets
+ */
+static void
+close_listen_socks(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
+		close(listen_socks[i]);
+	num_listen_socks = 0;
+}
+
+static void
+close_startup_pipes(void)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	if (startup_pipes)
+		for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+			if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
+				close(startup_pipes[i]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for SIGHUP.  Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
+ * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
+ * the server key).
+ */
+
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+sighup_handler(int sig)
+{
+	received_sighup = 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
+ * Restarts the server.
+ */
+static void
+sighup_restart(void)
+{
+	logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
+	if (options.pid_file != NULL)
+		unlink(options.pid_file);
+	platform_pre_restart();
+	close_listen_socks();
+	close_startup_pipes();
+	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */
+	execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
+	logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
+	    strerror(errno));
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
+ */
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+sigterm_handler(int sig)
+{
+	received_sigterm = sig;
+}
+
+/*
+ * SIGCHLD handler.  This is called whenever a child dies.  This will then
+ * reap any zombies left by exited children.
+ */
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
+{
+	int save_errno = errno;
+	pid_t pid;
+	int status;
+
+	while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
+	    (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR))
+		;
+	errno = save_errno;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
+ */
+/*ARGSUSED*/
+static void
+grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized
+	 * keys command helpers or privsep children.
+	 */
+	if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) {
+		ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
+		kill(0, SIGTERM);
+	}
+
+	/* Log error and exit. */
+	sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s port %d",
+	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(the_active_state),
+	    ssh_remote_port(the_active_state));
+}
+
+/* Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
+void
+destroy_sensitive_data(void)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+			sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+		}
+		if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
+			sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
+			sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/* Demote private to public keys for network child */
+void
+demote_sensitive_data(void)
+{
+	struct sshkey *tmp;
+	u_int i;
+	int r;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
+			if ((r = sshkey_from_private(
+			    sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0)
+				fatal_r(r, "could not demote host %s key",
+				    sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]));
+			sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
+			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
+		}
+		/* Certs do not need demotion */
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+reseed_prngs(void)
+{
+	u_int32_t rnd[256];
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	RAND_poll();
+#endif
+	arc4random_stir(); /* noop on recent arc4random() implementations */
+	arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* let arc4random notice PID change */
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+	/* give libcrypto a chance to notice the PID change */
+	if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1)
+		fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__);
+#endif
+
+	explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+}
+
+static void
+privsep_preauth_child(void)
+{
+	gid_t gidset[1];
+
+	/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
+	privsep_challenge_enable();
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	/* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
+	ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
+#endif
+
+	reseed_prngs();
+
+	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+	demote_sensitive_data();
+
+	/* Demote the child */
+	if (privsep_chroot) {
+		/* Change our root directory */
+		if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
+			fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
+			    strerror(errno));
+		if (chdir("/") == -1)
+			fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+		/* Drop our privileges */
+		debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid,
+		    (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid);
+		gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid;
+		if (setgroups(1, gidset) == -1)
+			fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw);
+	}
+}
+
+static int
+privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	int status, r;
+	pid_t pid;
+	struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL;
+
+	/* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
+	pmonitor = monitor_init();
+	/* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
+	pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex;
+
+	if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
+		box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid == -1) {
+		fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
+	} else if (pid != 0) {
+		debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
+
+		pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
+		if (have_agent) {
+			r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock);
+			if (r != 0) {
+				error_r(r, "Could not get agent socket");
+				have_agent = 0;
+			}
+		}
+		if (box != NULL)
+			ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid);
+		monitor_child_preauth(ssh, pmonitor);
+
+		/* Wait for the child's exit status */
+		while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+			if (errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+			pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
+			fatal_f("waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
+		}
+		privsep_is_preauth = 0;
+		pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
+		if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
+			if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
+				fatal_f("preauth child exited with status %d",
+				    WEXITSTATUS(status));
+		} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
+			fatal_f("preauth child terminated by signal %d",
+			    WTERMSIG(status));
+		if (box != NULL)
+			ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box);
+		return 1;
+	} else {
+		/* child */
+		close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+		close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
+
+		/* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
+		set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
+
+		privsep_preauth_child();
+		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+		if (box != NULL)
+			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
+
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+{
+#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
+	if (1) {
+#else
+	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
+#endif
+		/* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
+		use_privsep = 0;
+		goto skip;
+	}
+
+	/* New socket pair */
+	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
+
+	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
+	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
+		fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
+	else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
+		verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
+		sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
+		monitor_clear_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+		monitor_child_postauth(ssh, pmonitor);
+
+		/* NEVERREACHED */
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+	/* child */
+
+	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
+	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
+
+	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
+	demote_sensitive_data();
+
+	reseed_prngs();
+
+	/* Drop privileges */
+	do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
+
+ skip:
+	/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
+	monitor_apply_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+
+	/*
+	 * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
+	 * this information is not part of the key state.
+	 */
+	ssh_packet_set_authenticated(ssh);
+}
+
+static void
+append_hostkey_type(struct sshbuf *b, const char *s)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (match_pattern_list(s, options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) {
+		debug3_f("%s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", s);
+		return;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) > 0 ? "," : "", s)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+}
+
+static char *
+list_hostkey_types(void)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	struct sshkey *key;
+	char *ret;
+	u_int i;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
+		if (key == NULL)
+			key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
+		if (key == NULL)
+			continue;
+		switch (key->type) {
+		case KEY_RSA:
+			/* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
+			append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-512");
+			append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-256");
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case KEY_DSA:
+		case KEY_ECDSA:
+		case KEY_ED25519:
+		case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+		case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+		case KEY_XMSS:
+			append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+			break;
+		}
+		/* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */
+		key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
+		if (key == NULL)
+			continue;
+		switch (key->type) {
+		case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+			/* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
+			append_hostkey_type(b,
+			    "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com");
+			append_hostkey_type(b,
+			    "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com");
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+		case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+		case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+		case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+		case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+		case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
+			append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	debug_f("%s", ret);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static struct sshkey *
+get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	struct sshkey *key;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		switch (type) {
+		case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+		case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+		case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+		case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+		case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+		case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+		case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
+			key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
+			break;
+		default:
+			key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
+			if (key == NULL && !need_private)
+				key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
+			break;
+		}
+		if (key == NULL || key->type != type)
+			continue;
+		switch (type) {
+		case KEY_ECDSA:
+		case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+		case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+		case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+			if (key->ecdsa_nid != nid)
+				continue;
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		default:
+			return need_private ?
+			    sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key;
+		}
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh);
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 1, ssh);
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
+{
+	if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
+		return (NULL);
+	return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
+		return (NULL);
+	return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]);
+}
+
+int
+get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+			if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] ||
+			    (compare && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] &&
+			    sshkey_equal(key,
+			    sensitive_data.host_certificates[i])))
+				return (i);
+		} else {
+			if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i] ||
+			    (compare && sensitive_data.host_keys[i] &&
+			    sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[i])))
+				return (i);
+			if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] ||
+			    (compare && sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] &&
+			    sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i])))
+				return (i);
+		}
+	}
+	return (-1);
+}
+
+/* Inform the client of all hostkeys */
+static void
+notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *buf;
+	struct sshkey *key;
+	u_int i, nkeys;
+	int r;
+	char *fp;
+
+	/* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */
+	if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS)
+		return;
+
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
+	for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh);
+		if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC ||
+		    sshkey_is_cert(key))
+			continue;
+		fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
+		debug3_f("key %d: %s %s", i, sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp);
+		free(fp);
+		if (nkeys == 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Start building the request when we find the
+			 * first usable key.
+			 */
+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* want reply */
+				sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: start request", __func__);
+		}
+		/* Append the key to the request */
+		sshbuf_reset(buf);
+		if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, buf)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "couldn't put hostkey %d", i);
+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0)
+			sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: append key", __func__);
+		nkeys++;
+	}
+	debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
+	if (nkeys == 0)
+		fatal_f("no hostkeys");
+	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
+ * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
+ * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
+ * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
+ */
+static int
+should_drop_connection(int startups)
+{
+	int p, r;
+
+	if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
+		return 0;
+	if (startups >= options.max_startups)
+		return 1;
+	if (options.max_startups_rate == 100)
+		return 1;
+
+	p  = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
+	p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
+	p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
+	p += options.max_startups_rate;
+	r = arc4random_uniform(100);
+
+	debug_f("p %d, r %d", p, r);
+	return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check whether connection should be accepted by MaxStartups.
+ * Returns 0 if the connection is accepted. If the connection is refused,
+ * returns 1 and attempts to send notification to client.
+ * Logs when the MaxStartups condition is entered or exited, and periodically
+ * while in that state.
+ */
+static int
+drop_connection(int sock, int startups, int notify_pipe)
+{
+	char *laddr, *raddr;
+	const char msg[] = "Exceeded MaxStartups\r\n";
+	static time_t last_drop, first_drop;
+	static u_int ndropped;
+	LogLevel drop_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
+	time_t now;
+
+	now = monotime();
+	if (!should_drop_connection(startups) &&
+	    srclimit_check_allow(sock, notify_pipe) == 1) {
+		if (last_drop != 0 &&
+		    startups < options.max_startups_begin - 1) {
+			/* XXX maybe need better hysteresis here */
+			logit("exited MaxStartups throttling after %s, "
+			    "%u connections dropped",
+			    fmt_timeframe(now - first_drop), ndropped);
+			last_drop = 0;
+		}
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+#define SSHD_MAXSTARTUPS_LOG_INTERVAL	(5 * 60)
+	if (last_drop == 0) {
+		error("beginning MaxStartups throttling");
+		drop_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+		first_drop = now;
+		ndropped = 0;
+	} else if (last_drop + SSHD_MAXSTARTUPS_LOG_INTERVAL < now) {
+		/* Periodic logs */
+		error("in MaxStartups throttling for %s, "
+		    "%u connections dropped",
+		    fmt_timeframe(now - first_drop), ndropped + 1);
+		drop_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+	}
+	last_drop = now;
+	ndropped++;
+
+	laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock);
+	raddr = get_peer_ipaddr(sock);
+	do_log2(drop_level, "drop connection #%d from [%s]:%d on [%s]:%d "
+	    "past MaxStartups", startups, raddr, get_peer_port(sock),
+	    laddr, get_local_port(sock));
+	free(laddr);
+	free(raddr);
+	/* best-effort notification to client */
+	(void)write(sock, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static void
+usage(void)
+{
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
+	fprintf(stderr,
+"usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTtV] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n"
+"            [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
+"            [-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
+	);
+	exit(1);
+}
+
+static void
+send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m = NULL, *inc = NULL;
+	struct include_item *item = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	debug3_f("entering fd = %d config len %zu", fd,
+	    sshbuf_len(conf));
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	/* pack includes into a string */
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(item, &includes, entry) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->selector)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->filename)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "compose includes");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Protocol from reexec master to child:
+	 *	string	configuration
+	 *	string	included_files[] {
+	 *		string	selector
+	 *		string	filename
+	 *		string	contents
+	 *	}
+	 */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose config");
+	if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1)
+		error_f("ssh_msg_send failed");
+
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+	sshbuf_free(inc);
+
+	debug3_f("done");
+}
+
+static void
+recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *m, *inc;
+	u_char *cp, ver;
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+	struct include_item *item;
+
+	debug3_f("entering fd = %d", fd);
+
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, m) == -1)
+		fatal_f("ssh_msg_recv failed");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ver)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse version");
+	if (ver != 0)
+		fatal_f("rexec version mismatch");
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse config");
+
+	if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
+		fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+
+	while (sshbuf_len(inc) != 0) {
+		item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
+		if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->selector, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse includes");
+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&includes, item, entry);
+	}
+
+	free(cp);
+	sshbuf_free(m);
+
+	debug3_f("done");
+}
+
+/* Accept a connection from inetd */
+static void
+server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out)
+{
+	if (rexeced_flag) {
+		close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
+		*sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+	} else {
+		*sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+		*sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
+	}
+	/*
+	 * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
+	 * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
+	 * ttyfd happens to be one of those.
+	 */
+	if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, !log_stderr) == -1)
+		error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+	debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Listen for TCP connections
+ */
+static void
+listen_on_addrs(struct listenaddr *la)
+{
+	int ret, listen_sock;
+	struct addrinfo *ai;
+	char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
+
+	for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
+		if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
+			continue;
+		if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
+			fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
+			    "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
+		if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+		    ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
+		    NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
+			error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
+			    ssh_gai_strerror(ret));
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Create socket for listening. */
+		listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
+		    ai->ai_protocol);
+		if (listen_sock == -1) {
+			/* kernel may not support ipv6 */
+			verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
+			close(listen_sock);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) {
+			verbose("socket: CLOEXEC: %s", strerror(errno));
+			close(listen_sock);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Socket options */
+		set_reuseaddr(listen_sock);
+		if (la->rdomain != NULL &&
+		    set_rdomain(listen_sock, la->rdomain) == -1) {
+			close(listen_sock);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */
+		if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
+			sock_set_v6only(listen_sock);
+
+		debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
+
+		/* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
+		if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+			error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
+			    strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
+			close(listen_sock);
+			continue;
+		}
+		listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
+		num_listen_socks++;
+
+		/* Start listening on the port. */
+		if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1)
+			fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s",
+			    ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
+		logit("Server listening on %s port %s%s%s.",
+		    ntop, strport,
+		    la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ",
+		    la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+server_listen(void)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	/* Initialise per-source limit tracking. */
+	srclimit_init(options.max_startups, options.per_source_max_startups,
+	    options.per_source_masklen_ipv4, options.per_source_masklen_ipv6);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_listen_addrs; i++) {
+		listen_on_addrs(&options.listen_addrs[i]);
+		freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs[i].addrs);
+		free(options.listen_addrs[i].rdomain);
+		memset(&options.listen_addrs[i], 0,
+		    sizeof(options.listen_addrs[i]));
+	}
+	free(options.listen_addrs);
+	options.listen_addrs = NULL;
+	options.num_listen_addrs = 0;
+
+	if (!num_listen_socks)
+		fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
+}
+
+/*
+ * The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns
+ * from this function are in a forked subprocess.
+ */
+static void
+server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
+{
+	struct pollfd *pfd = NULL;
+	int i, j, ret, npfd;
+	int ostartups = -1, startups = 0, listening = 0, lameduck = 0;
+	int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }, *startup_pollfd;
+	char c = 0;
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+	socklen_t fromlen;
+	pid_t pid;
+	u_char rnd[256];
+	sigset_t nsigset, osigset;
+
+	/* pipes connected to unauthenticated child sshd processes */
+	startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int));
+	startup_flags = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int));
+	startup_pollfd = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int));
+	for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
+		startup_pipes[i] = -1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Prepare signal mask that we use to block signals that might set
+	 * received_sigterm or received_sighup, so that we are guaranteed
+	 * to immediately wake up the ppoll if a signal is received after
+	 * the flag is checked.
+	 */
+	sigemptyset(&nsigset);
+	sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGHUP);
+	sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGCHLD);
+	sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGTERM);
+	sigaddset(&nsigset, SIGQUIT);
+
+	/* sized for worst-case */
+	pfd = xcalloc(num_listen_socks + options.max_startups,
+	    sizeof(struct pollfd));
+
+	/*
+	 * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
+	 * the daemon is killed with a signal.
+	 */
+	for (;;) {
+		sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nsigset, &osigset);
+		if (received_sigterm) {
+			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+			    (int) received_sigterm);
+			close_listen_socks();
+			if (options.pid_file != NULL)
+				unlink(options.pid_file);
+			exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
+		}
+		if (ostartups != startups) {
+			setproctitle("%s [listener] %d of %d-%d startups",
+			    listener_proctitle, startups,
+			    options.max_startups_begin, options.max_startups);
+			ostartups = startups;
+		}
+		if (received_sighup) {
+			if (!lameduck) {
+				debug("Received SIGHUP; waiting for children");
+				close_listen_socks();
+				lameduck = 1;
+			}
+			if (listening <= 0) {
+				sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &osigset, NULL);
+				sighup_restart();
+			}
+		}
+
+		for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
+			pfd[i].fd = listen_socks[i];
+			pfd[i].events = POLLIN;
+		}
+		npfd = num_listen_socks;
+		for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) {
+			startup_pollfd[i] = -1;
+			if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) {
+				pfd[npfd].fd = startup_pipes[i];
+				pfd[npfd].events = POLLIN;
+				startup_pollfd[i] = npfd++;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* Wait until a connection arrives or a child exits. */
+		ret = ppoll(pfd, npfd, NULL, &osigset);
+		if (ret == -1 && errno != EINTR) {
+			error("ppoll: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			if (errno == EINVAL)
+				cleanup_exit(1); /* can't recover */
+		}
+		sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &osigset, NULL);
+		if (ret == -1)
+			continue;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) {
+			if (startup_pipes[i] == -1 ||
+			    startup_pollfd[i] == -1 ||
+			    !(pfd[startup_pollfd[i]].revents & (POLLIN|POLLHUP)))
+				continue;
+			switch (read(startup_pipes[i], &c, sizeof(c))) {
+			case -1:
+				if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
+					continue;
+				if (errno != EPIPE) {
+					error_f("startup pipe %d (fd=%d): "
+					    "read %s", i, startup_pipes[i],
+					    strerror(errno));
+				}
+				/* FALLTHROUGH */
+			case 0:
+				/* child exited or completed auth */
+				close(startup_pipes[i]);
+				srclimit_done(startup_pipes[i]);
+				startup_pipes[i] = -1;
+				startups--;
+				if (startup_flags[i])
+					listening--;
+				break;
+			case 1:
+				/* child has finished preliminaries */
+				if (startup_flags[i]) {
+					listening--;
+					startup_flags[i] = 0;
+				}
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
+			if (!(pfd[i].revents & POLLIN))
+				continue;
+			fromlen = sizeof(from);
+			*newsock = accept(listen_socks[i],
+			    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen);
+			if (*newsock == -1) {
+				if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
+				    errno != ECONNABORTED && errno != EAGAIN)
+					error("accept: %.100s",
+					    strerror(errno));
+				if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
+					usleep(100 * 1000);
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1) {
+				close(*newsock);
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
+				error_f("pipe(startup_p): %s", strerror(errno));
+				close(*newsock);
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (drop_connection(*newsock, startups, startup_p[0])) {
+				close(*newsock);
+				close(startup_p[0]);
+				close(startup_p[1]);
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
+			    SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) {
+				error("reexec socketpair: %s",
+				    strerror(errno));
+				close(*newsock);
+				close(startup_p[0]);
+				close(startup_p[1]);
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
+				if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
+					startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
+					startups++;
+					startup_flags[j] = 1;
+					break;
+				}
+
+			/*
+			 * Got connection.  Fork a child to handle it, unless
+			 * we are in debugging mode.
+			 */
+			if (debug_flag) {
+				/*
+				 * In debugging mode.  Close the listening
+				 * socket, and start processing the
+				 * connection without forking.
+				 */
+				debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
+				close_listen_socks();
+				*sock_in = *newsock;
+				*sock_out = *newsock;
+				close(startup_p[0]);
+				close(startup_p[1]);
+				startup_pipe = -1;
+				pid = getpid();
+				if (rexec_flag) {
+					send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg);
+					close(config_s[0]);
+				}
+				free(pfd);
+				return;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * Normal production daemon.  Fork, and have
+			 * the child process the connection. The
+			 * parent continues listening.
+			 */
+			platform_pre_fork();
+			listening++;
+			if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
+				/*
+				 * Child.  Close the listening and
+				 * max_startup sockets.  Start using
+				 * the accepted socket. Reinitialize
+				 * logging (since our pid has changed).
+				 * We return from this function to handle
+				 * the connection.
+				 */
+				platform_post_fork_child();
+				startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
+				close_startup_pipes();
+				close_listen_socks();
+				*sock_in = *newsock;
+				*sock_out = *newsock;
+				log_init(__progname,
+				    options.log_level,
+				    options.log_facility,
+				    log_stderr);
+				if (rexec_flag)
+					close(config_s[0]);
+				else {
+					/*
+					 * Signal parent that the preliminaries
+					 * for this child are complete. For the
+					 * re-exec case, this happens after the
+					 * child has received the rexec state
+					 * from the server.
+					 */
+					(void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe,
+					    "\0", 1);
+				}
+				free(pfd);
+				return;
+			}
+
+			/* Parent.  Stay in the loop. */
+			platform_post_fork_parent(pid);
+			if (pid == -1)
+				error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			else
+				debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
+
+			close(startup_p[1]);
+
+			if (rexec_flag) {
+				close(config_s[1]);
+				send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg);
+				close(config_s[0]);
+			}
+			close(*newsock);
+
+			/*
+			 * Ensure that our random state differs
+			 * from that of the child
+			 */
+			arc4random_stir();
+			arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+			RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+			if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1)
+				fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__);
+#endif
+			explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and
+ * return an error if any are found).  Basically we are worried about
+ * source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody
+ * (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable"
+ * under certain circumstances, but rhosts authentication is useless
+ * if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped
+ * source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do
+ * rest of the interaction and could still bypass security.  So we
+ * exit here if we detect any IP options.
+ */
+static void
+check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+#ifdef IP_OPTIONS
+	int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
+	struct sockaddr_storage from;
+	u_char opts[200];
+	socklen_t i, option_size = sizeof(opts), fromlen = sizeof(from);
+	char text[sizeof(opts) * 3 + 1];
+
+	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
+	if (getpeername(sock_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
+	    &fromlen) == -1)
+		return;
+	if (from.ss_family != AF_INET)
+		return;
+	/* XXX IPv6 options? */
+
+	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
+	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
+		text[0] = '\0';
+		for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+			snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
+			    " %2.2x", opts[i]);
+		fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
+		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
+	}
+	return;
+#endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
+}
+
+/* Set the routing domain for this process */
+static void
+set_process_rdomain(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN)
+	if (name == NULL)
+		return; /* default */
+
+	if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) {
+		/* "expands" to routing domain of connection */
+		if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL)
+			return;
+	}
+	/* NB. We don't pass 'ssh' to sys_set_process_rdomain() */
+	return sys_set_process_rdomain(name);
+#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
+	int rtable, ortable = getrtable();
+	const char *errstr;
+
+	if (name == NULL)
+		return; /* default */
+
+	if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) {
+		/* "expands" to routing domain of connection */
+		if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL)
+			return;
+	}
+
+	rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr);
+	if (errstr != NULL) /* Shouldn't happen */
+		fatal("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr);
+	if (rtable != ortable && setrtable(rtable) != 0)
+		fatal("Unable to set routing domain %d: %s",
+		    rtable, strerror(errno));
+	debug_f("set routing domain %d (was %d)", rtable, ortable);
+#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
+	fatal("Unable to set routing domain: not supported in this platform");
+#endif
+}
+
+static void
+accumulate_host_timing_secret(struct sshbuf *server_cfg,
+    struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	static struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx;
+	u_char *hash;
+	size_t len;
+	struct sshbuf *buf;
+	int r;
+
+	if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512)) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("ssh_digest_start");
+	if (key == NULL) { /* finalize */
+		/* add server config in case we are using agent for host keys */
+		if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(server_cfg),
+		    sshbuf_len(server_cfg)) != 0)
+			fatal_f("ssh_digest_update");
+		len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512);
+		hash = xmalloc(len);
+		if (ssh_digest_final(ctx, hash, len) != 0)
+			fatal_f("ssh_digest_final");
+		options.timing_secret = PEEK_U64(hash);
+		freezero(hash, len);
+		ssh_digest_free(ctx);
+		ctx = NULL;
+		return;
+	}
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("could not allocate buffer");
+	if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, buf)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "encode %s key", sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+	if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)) != 0)
+		fatal_f("ssh_digest_update");
+	sshbuf_reset(buf);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+}
+
+static char *
+prepare_proctitle(int ac, char **av)
+{
+	char *ret = NULL;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+		xextendf(&ret, " ", "%s", av[i]);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Main program for the daemon.
+ */
+int
+main(int ac, char **av)
+{
+	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
+	extern char *optarg;
+	extern int optind;
+	int r, opt, on = 1, already_daemon, remote_port;
+	int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
+	const char *remote_ip, *rdomain;
+	char *fp, *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL;
+	int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
+	u_int i, j;
+	u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
+	mode_t new_umask;
+	struct sshkey *key;
+	struct sshkey *pubkey;
+	int keytype;
+	Authctxt *authctxt;
+	struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;
+	sigset_t sigmask;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+	(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
+#endif
+	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+
+	sigemptyset(&sigmask);
+	sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &sigmask, NULL);
+
+	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
+	saved_argc = ac;
+	rexec_argc = ac;
+	saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv));
+	for (i = 0; (int)i < ac; i++)
+		saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
+	saved_argv[i] = NULL;
+
+#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
+	/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
+	compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
+	av = saved_argv;
+#endif
+
+	if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
+		debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+	sanitise_stdfd();
+
+	/* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
+	initialize_server_options(&options);
+
+	/* Parse command-line arguments. */
+	while ((opt = getopt(ac, av,
+	    "C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DQRTdeiqrtV")) != -1) {
+		switch (opt) {
+		case '4':
+			options.address_family = AF_INET;
+			break;
+		case '6':
+			options.address_family = AF_INET6;
+			break;
+		case 'f':
+			config_file_name = optarg;
+			break;
+		case 'c':
+			servconf_add_hostcert("[command-line]", 0,
+			    &options, optarg);
+			break;
+		case 'd':
+			if (debug_flag == 0) {
+				debug_flag = 1;
+				options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+			} else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+				options.log_level++;
+			break;
+		case 'D':
+			no_daemon_flag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'E':
+			logfile = optarg;
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case 'e':
+			log_stderr = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'i':
+			inetd_flag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'r':
+			rexec_flag = 0;
+			break;
+		case 'R':
+			rexeced_flag = 1;
+			inetd_flag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'Q':
+			/* ignored */
+			break;
+		case 'q':
+			options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
+			break;
+		case 'b':
+			/* protocol 1, ignored */
+			break;
+		case 'p':
+			options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
+			if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
+			if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'g':
+			if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'k':
+			/* protocol 1, ignored */
+			break;
+		case 'h':
+			servconf_add_hostkey("[command-line]", 0,
+			    &options, optarg, 1);
+			break;
+		case 't':
+			test_flag = 1;
+			break;
+		case 'T':
+			test_flag = 2;
+			break;
+		case 'C':
+			connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
+			if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info,
+			    optarg) == -1)
+				exit(1);
+			break;
+		case 'u':
+			utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, HOST_NAME_MAX+1+1, NULL);
+			if (utmp_len > HOST_NAME_MAX+1) {
+				fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
+				exit(1);
+			}
+			break;
+		case 'o':
+			line = xstrdup(optarg);
+			if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
+			    "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, &includes) != 0)
+				exit(1);
+			free(line);
+			break;
+		case 'V':
+			fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
+			    SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
+			exit(0);
+		default:
+			usage();
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag)
+		rexec_flag = 0;
+	if (!test_flag && rexec_flag && !path_absolute(av[0]))
+		fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path");
+	if (rexeced_flag)
+		closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD);
+	else
+		closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
+
+	seed_rng();
+
+	/* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */
+	if (logfile != NULL)
+		log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
+	/*
+	 * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
+	 * key (unless started from inetd)
+	 */
+	log_init(__progname,
+	    options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
+	    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
+	    options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
+	    SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
+	    log_stderr || !inetd_flag || debug_flag);
+
+	/*
+	 * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
+	 * root's environment
+	 */
+	if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
+		(void) unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
+
+	sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * If we're not doing an extended test do not silently ignore connection
+	 * test params.
+	 */
+	if (test_flag < 2 && connection_info != NULL)
+		fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without "
+		    "test mode (-T)");
+
+	/* Fetch our configuration */
+	if ((cfg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	if (rexeced_flag) {
+		setproctitle("%s", "[rexeced]");
+		recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, cfg);
+		if (!debug_flag) {
+			startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+			close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+			/*
+			 * Signal parent that this child is at a point where
+			 * they can go away if they have a SIGHUP pending.
+			 */
+			(void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1);
+		}
+	} else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
+		load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg);
+
+	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
+	    cfg, &includes, NULL, rexeced_flag);
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
+		dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
+#endif
+
+	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
+	fill_default_server_options(&options);
+
+	/* Check that options are sensible */
+	if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL &&
+	    (options.authorized_keys_command != NULL &&
+	    strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0))
+		fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without "
+		    "AuthorizedKeysCommandUser");
+	if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL &&
+	    (options.authorized_principals_command != NULL &&
+	    strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_command, "none") != 0))
+		fatal("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand set without "
+		    "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser");
+
+	/*
+	 * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods.
+	 * Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before
+	 * daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches
+	 * and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login.
+	 */
+	if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
+		for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) {
+			if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i],
+			    1) == 0)
+				break;
+		}
+		if (i >= options.num_auth_methods)
+			fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by "
+			    "enabled authentication methods");
+	}
+
+	/* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
+	if (optind < ac) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION, SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION);
+
+	/* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
+	privsep_chroot = use_privsep && (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0);
+	if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) {
+		if (privsep_chroot || options.kerberos_authentication)
+			fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
+			    SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
+	} else {
+		privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw);
+		freezero(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd));
+		privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*");
+	}
+	endpwent();
+
+	/* load host keys */
+	sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
+	    sizeof(struct sshkey *));
+	sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
+	    sizeof(struct sshkey *));
+
+	if (options.host_key_agent) {
+		if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
+			setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
+			    options.host_key_agent, 1);
+		if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) == 0)
+			have_agent = 1;
+		else
+			error_r(r, "Could not connect to agent \"%s\"",
+			    options.host_key_agent);
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
+		int ll = options.host_key_file_userprovided[i] ?
+		    SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR : SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+
+		if (options.host_key_files[i] == NULL)
+			continue;
+		if ((r = sshkey_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "",
+		    &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
+			do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"",
+			    options.host_key_files[i]);
+		if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
+		    key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
+			debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
+			    options.host_key_files[i]);
+			key->sk_flags &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
+		}
+		if (r == 0 && key != NULL &&
+		    (r = sshkey_shield_private(key)) != 0) {
+			do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to shield host key \"%s\"",
+			    options.host_key_files[i]);
+			sshkey_free(key);
+			key = NULL;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_key_files[i],
+		    &pubkey, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
+			do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"",
+			    options.host_key_files[i]);
+		if (pubkey != NULL && key != NULL) {
+			if (!sshkey_equal(pubkey, key)) {
+				error("Public key for %s does not match "
+				    "private key", options.host_key_files[i]);
+				sshkey_free(pubkey);
+				pubkey = NULL;
+			}
+		}
+		if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL) {
+			if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey)) != 0)
+				fatal_r(r, "Could not demote key: \"%s\"",
+				    options.host_key_files[i]);
+		}
+		if (pubkey != NULL && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(pubkey,
+		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "Host key %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
+			sshkey_free(pubkey);
+			sshkey_free(key);
+			continue;
+		}
+		sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
+		sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey;
+
+		if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && have_agent) {
+			debug("will rely on agent for hostkey %s",
+			    options.host_key_files[i]);
+			keytype = pubkey->type;
+		} else if (key != NULL) {
+			keytype = key->type;
+			accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, key);
+		} else {
+			do_log2(ll, "Unable to load host key: %s",
+			    options.host_key_files[i]);
+			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+			sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		switch (keytype) {
+		case KEY_RSA:
+		case KEY_DSA:
+		case KEY_ECDSA:
+		case KEY_ED25519:
+		case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+		case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+		case KEY_XMSS:
+			if (have_agent || key != NULL)
+				sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
+			break;
+		}
+		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(pubkey, options.fingerprint_hash,
+		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+			fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+		debug("%s host key #%d: %s %s",
+		    key ? "private" : "agent", i, sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
+		free(fp);
+	}
+	accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL);
+	if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
+		logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
+		exit(1);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical
+	 * indices to the public keys that they relate to.
+	 */
+	sensitive_data.host_certificates = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
+	    sizeof(struct sshkey *));
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
+		sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_cert_files; i++) {
+		if (options.host_cert_files[i] == NULL)
+			continue;
+		if ((r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_cert_files[i],
+		    &key, NULL)) != 0) {
+			error_r(r, "Could not load host certificate \"%s\"",
+			    options.host_cert_files[i]);
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+			error("Certificate file is not a certificate: %s",
+			    options.host_cert_files[i]);
+			sshkey_free(key);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Find matching private key */
+		for (j = 0; j < options.num_host_key_files; j++) {
+			if (sshkey_equal_public(key,
+			    sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[j])) {
+				sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (j >= options.num_host_key_files) {
+			error("No matching private key for certificate: %s",
+			    options.host_cert_files[i]);
+			sshkey_free(key);
+			continue;
+		}
+		sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key;
+		debug("host certificate: #%u type %d %s", j, key->type,
+		    sshkey_type(key));
+	}
+
+	if (privsep_chroot) {
+		struct stat st;
+
+		if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
+		    (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
+			fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
+			    _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+		if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) &&
+		    (st.st_uid != getuid () ||
+		    (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0))
+#else
+		if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
+#endif
+			fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
+			    "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
+	}
+
+	if (test_flag > 1) {
+		/*
+		 * If no connection info was provided by -C then use
+		 * use a blank one that will cause no predicate to match.
+		 */
+		if (connection_info == NULL)
+			connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
+		connection_info->test = 1;
+		parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, connection_info);
+		dump_config(&options);
+	}
+
+	/* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
+	if (test_flag)
+		exit(0);
+
+	/*
+	 * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited.  This
+	 * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the
+	 * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM
+	 * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
+	 * module which might be used).
+	 */
+	if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
+		debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (rexec_flag) {
+		if (rexec_argc < 0)
+			fatal("rexec_argc %d < 0", rexec_argc);
+		rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *));
+		for (i = 0; i < (u_int)rexec_argc; i++) {
+			debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]);
+			rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i];
+		}
+		rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R";
+		rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL;
+	}
+	listener_proctitle = prepare_proctitle(ac, av);
+
+	/* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
+	new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022;
+	(void) umask(new_umask);
+
+	/* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
+	if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag))
+		log_stderr = 1;
+	log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
+	    options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+	for (i = 0; i < options.num_log_verbose; i++)
+		log_verbose_add(options.log_verbose[i]);
+
+	/*
+	 * If not in debugging mode, not started from inetd and not already
+	 * daemonized (eg re-exec via SIGHUP), disconnect from the controlling
+	 * terminal, and fork.  The original process exits.
+	 */
+	already_daemon = daemonized();
+	if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag || already_daemon)) {
+
+		if (daemon(0, 0) == -1)
+			fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
+
+		disconnect_controlling_tty();
+	}
+	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
+	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+	/*
+	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+	 * unmounted if desired.
+	 */
+	if (chdir("/") == -1)
+		error("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/* ignore SIGPIPE */
+	ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
+	/* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */
+	if (inetd_flag) {
+		server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out);
+	} else {
+		platform_pre_listen();
+		server_listen();
+
+		ssh_signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
+		ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+		ssh_signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+		ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+
+		/*
+		 * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
+		 * is setup and the listen sockets are bound
+		 */
+		if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) {
+			FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
+
+			if (f == NULL) {
+				error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
+				    options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
+			} else {
+				fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
+				fclose(f);
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
+		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
+		    &newsock, config_s);
+	}
+
+	/* This is the child processing a new connection. */
+	setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
+
+	/*
+	 * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
+	 * setlogin() affects the entire process group.  We don't
+	 * want the child to be able to affect the parent.
+	 */
+	if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() == -1)
+		error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if (rexec_flag) {
+		debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
+		    sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
+		dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO);
+		dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
+		if (startup_pipe == -1)
+			close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+		else if (startup_pipe != REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) {
+			dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
+			close(startup_pipe);
+			startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD;
+		}
+
+		dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
+		close(config_s[1]);
+
+		ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* avoid reset to SIG_DFL */
+		execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv);
+
+		/* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */
+		error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno));
+		recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL);
+		log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
+		    options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+		/* Clean up fds */
+		close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
+		newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
+		if (stdfd_devnull(1, 1, 0) == -1)
+			error_f("stdfd_devnull failed");
+		debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
+		    sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
+	}
+
+	/* Executed child processes don't need these. */
+	fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+	fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+
+	/* We will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. */
+	ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
+	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+	ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
+	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+	ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
+
+	/*
+	 * Register our connection.  This turns encryption off because we do
+	 * not have a key.
+	 */
+	if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, sock_in, sock_out)) == NULL)
+		fatal("Unable to create connection");
+	the_active_state = ssh;
+	ssh_packet_set_server(ssh);
+
+	check_ip_options(ssh);
+
+	/* Prepare the channels layer */
+	channel_init_channels(ssh);
+	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
+	process_channel_timeouts(ssh, &options);
+	process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
+
+	/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
+	if (options.tcp_keep_alive && ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
+	    setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
+		error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+	if ((remote_port = ssh_remote_port(ssh)) < 0) {
+		debug("ssh_remote_port failed");
+		cleanup_exit(255);
+	}
+
+	if (options.routing_domain != NULL)
+		set_process_rdomain(ssh, options.routing_domain);
+
+	/*
+	 * The rest of the code depends on the fact that
+	 * ssh_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if
+	 * the socket goes away.
+	 */
+	remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
+#endif
+
+	rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh);
+
+	/* Log the connection. */
+	laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
+	verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d%s%s%s",
+	    remote_ip, remote_port, laddr,  ssh_local_port(ssh),
+	    rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain \"",
+	    rdomain == NULL ? "" : rdomain,
+	    rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\"");
+	free(laddr);
+
+	/*
+	 * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
+	 * successfully authenticates itself.  So we set up an alarm which is
+	 * cleared after successful authentication.  A limit of zero
+	 * indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging
+	 * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
+	 * are about to discover the bug.
+	 */
+	ssh_signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
+	if (!debug_flag)
+		alarm(options.login_grace_time);
+
+	if ((r = kex_exchange_identification(ssh, -1,
+	    options.version_addendum)) != 0)
+		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "banner exchange");
+
+	ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh);
+
+	/* allocate authentication context */
+	authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt));
+	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
+
+	authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg;
+
+	/* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
+	the_authctxt = authctxt;
+
+	/* Set default key authentication options */
+	if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL)
+		fatal("allocation failed");
+
+	/* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
+	if ((loginmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+	auth_debug_reset();
+
+	if (use_privsep) {
+		if (privsep_preauth(ssh) == 1)
+			goto authenticated;
+	} else if (have_agent) {
+		if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) {
+			error_r(r, "Unable to get agent socket");
+			have_agent = 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* perform the key exchange */
+	/* authenticate user and start session */
+	do_ssh2_kex(ssh);
+	do_authentication2(ssh);
+
+	/*
+	 * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
+	 * the current keystate and exits
+	 */
+	if (use_privsep) {
+		mm_send_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+		ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+		exit(0);
+	}
+
+ authenticated:
+	/*
+	 * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
+	 * authentication.
+	 */
+	alarm(0);
+	ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+	authctxt->authenticated = 1;
+	if (startup_pipe != -1) {
+		close(startup_pipe);
+		startup_pipe = -1;
+	}
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	audit_event(ssh, SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+	if (options.gss_authentication) {
+		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
+		ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
+		restore_uid();
+	}
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam) {
+		do_pam_setcred(1);
+		do_pam_session(ssh);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
+	 * file descriptor passing.
+	 */
+	if (use_privsep) {
+		privsep_postauth(ssh, authctxt);
+		/* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
+	}
+
+	ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.client_alive_interval,
+	    options.client_alive_count_max);
+
+	/* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */
+	notify_hostkeys(ssh);
+
+	/* Start session. */
+	do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt);
+
+	/* The connection has been terminated. */
+	ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
+	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
+	    (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
+
+	verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
+
+#ifdef USE_PAM
+	if (options.use_pam)
+		finish_pam();
+#endif /* USE_PAM */
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
+#endif
+
+	ssh_packet_close(ssh);
+
+	if (use_privsep)
+		mm_terminate();
+
+	exit(0);
+}
+
+int
+sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey,
+    struct sshkey *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if (use_privsep) {
+		if (privkey) {
+			if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, privkey, signature, slenp,
+			    data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL,
+			    ssh->compat) < 0)
+				fatal_f("privkey sign failed");
+		} else {
+			if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, pubkey, signature, slenp,
+			    data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider, NULL,
+			    ssh->compat) < 0)
+				fatal_f("pubkey sign failed");
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (privkey) {
+			if (sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen,
+			    alg, options.sk_provider, NULL, ssh->compat) < 0)
+				fatal_f("privkey sign failed");
+		} else {
+			if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey,
+			    signature, slenp, data, dlen, alg,
+			    ssh->compat)) != 0) {
+				fatal_fr(r, "agent sign failed");
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* SSH2 key exchange */
+static void
+do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
+	struct kex *kex;
+	char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
+	    options.kex_algorithms);
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc =
+	    compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
+
+	if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+		    myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
+	}
+
+	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
+		ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
+		    options.rekey_interval);
+
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
+	   compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, list_hostkey_types());
+
+	/* start key exchange */
+	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
+		fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
+	kex = ssh->kex;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
+# endif
+#endif
+	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+	kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
+	kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
+	kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
+	kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
+
+	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+	/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "send test");
+#endif
+	free(prop_kex);
+	free(prop_enc);
+	free(prop_hostkey);
+	debug("KEX done");
+}
+
+/* server specific fatal cleanup */
+void
+cleanup_exit(int i)
+{
+	if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) {
+		do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt);
+		if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
+		    pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
+			debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
+			if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
+			    errno != ESRCH) {
+				error_f("kill(%d): %s", pmonitor->m_pid,
+				    strerror(errno));
+			}
+		}
+	}
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
+	if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
+		audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
+#endif
+	_exit(i);
+}
diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36894ac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshd_config
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+#	$OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.104 2021/07/02 05:11:21 dtucker Exp $
+
+# This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file.  See
+# sshd_config(5) for more information.
+
+# This sshd was compiled with PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin
+
+# The strategy used for options in the default sshd_config shipped with
+# OpenSSH is to specify options with their default value where
+# possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
+# default value.
+
+#Port 22
+#AddressFamily any
+#ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+#ListenAddress ::
+
+#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+
+# Ciphers and keying
+#RekeyLimit default none
+
+# Logging
+#SyslogFacility AUTH
+#LogLevel INFO
+
+# Authentication:
+
+#LoginGraceTime 2m
+#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
+#StrictModes yes
+#MaxAuthTries 6
+#MaxSessions 10
+
+#PubkeyAuthentication yes
+
+# The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2
+# but this is overridden so installations will only check .ssh/authorized_keys
+AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+
+#AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none
+
+#AuthorizedKeysCommand none
+#AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody
+
+# For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
+#HostbasedAuthentication no
+# Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for
+# HostbasedAuthentication
+#IgnoreUserKnownHosts no
+# Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files
+#IgnoreRhosts yes
+
+# To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
+#PasswordAuthentication yes
+#PermitEmptyPasswords no
+
+# Change to no to disable s/key passwords
+#KbdInteractiveAuthentication yes
+
+# Kerberos options
+#KerberosAuthentication no
+#KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes
+#KerberosTicketCleanup yes
+#KerberosGetAFSToken no
+
+# GSSAPI options
+#GSSAPIAuthentication no
+#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
+
+# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
+# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+# be allowed through the KbdInteractiveAuthentication and
+# PasswordAuthentication.  Depending on your PAM configuration,
+# PAM authentication via KbdInteractiveAuthentication may bypass
+# the setting of "PermitRootLogin prohibit-password".
+# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+# and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
+#UsePAM no
+
+#AllowAgentForwarding yes
+#AllowTcpForwarding yes
+#GatewayPorts no
+#X11Forwarding no
+#X11DisplayOffset 10
+#X11UseLocalhost yes
+#PermitTTY yes
+#PrintMotd yes
+#PrintLastLog yes
+#TCPKeepAlive yes
+#PermitUserEnvironment no
+#Compression delayed
+#ClientAliveInterval 0
+#ClientAliveCountMax 3
+#UseDNS no
+#PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid
+#MaxStartups 10:30:100
+#PermitTunnel no
+#ChrootDirectory none
+#VersionAddendum none
+
+# no default banner path
+#Banner none
+
+# override default of no subsystems
+Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
+
+# Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis
+#Match User anoncvs
+#	X11Forwarding no
+#	AllowTcpForwarding no
+#	PermitTTY no
+#	ForceCommand cvs server
diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b0bb6f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshd_config.0
@@ -0,0 +1,1278 @@
+SSHD_CONFIG(5)                File Formats Manual               SSHD_CONFIG(5)
+
+NAME
+     sshd_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH daemon configuration file
+
+DESCRIPTION
+     sshd(8) reads configuration data from /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or the file
+     specified with -f on the command line).  The file contains keyword-
+     argument pairs, one per line.  For each keyword, the first obtained value
+     will be used.  Lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are interpreted as
+     comments.  Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in
+     order to represent arguments containing spaces.
+
+     The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
+     keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
+
+     AcceptEnv
+             Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be
+             copied into the session's environ(7).  See SendEnv and SetEnv in
+             ssh_config(5) for how to configure the client.  The TERM
+             environment variable is always accepted whenever the client
+             requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol.
+             Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard
+             characters M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y.  Multiple environment variables may be
+             separated by whitespace or spread across multiple AcceptEnv
+             directives.  Be warned that some environment variables could be
+             used to bypass restricted user environments.  For this reason,
+             care should be taken in the use of this directive.  The default
+             is not to accept any environment variables.
+
+     AddressFamily
+             Specifies which address family should be used by sshd(8).  Valid
+             arguments are any (the default), inet (use IPv4 only), or inet6
+             (use IPv6 only).
+
+     AllowAgentForwarding
+             Specifies whether ssh-agent(1) forwarding is permitted.  The
+             default is yes.  Note that disabling agent forwarding does not
+             improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as
+             they can always install their own forwarders.
+
+     AllowGroups
+             This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns,
+             separated by spaces.  If specified, login is allowed only for
+             users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one
+             of the patterns.  Only group names are valid; a numerical group
+             ID is not recognized.  By default, login is allowed for all
+             groups.  The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the
+             following order: DenyGroups, AllowGroups.
+
+             See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
+
+     AllowStreamLocalForwarding
+             Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is
+             permitted.  The available options are yes (the default) or all to
+             allow StreamLocal forwarding, no to prevent all StreamLocal
+             forwarding, local to allow local (from the perspective of ssh(1))
+             forwarding only or remote to allow remote forwarding only.  Note
+             that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security
+             unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always
+             install their own forwarders.
+
+     AllowTcpForwarding
+             Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted.  The available
+             options are yes (the default) or all to allow TCP forwarding, no
+             to prevent all TCP forwarding, local to allow local (from the
+             perspective of ssh(1)) forwarding only or remote to allow remote
+             forwarding only.  Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not
+             improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as
+             they can always install their own forwarders.
+
+     AllowUsers
+             This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns,
+             separated by spaces.  If specified, login is allowed only for
+             user names that match one of the patterns.  Only user names are
+             valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.  By default, login
+             is allowed for all users.  If the pattern takes the form
+             USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting
+             logins to particular users from particular hosts.  HOST criteria
+             may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
+             address/masklen format.  The allow/deny users directives are
+             processed in the following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers.
+
+             See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
+
+     AuthenticationMethods
+             Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully
+             completed for a user to be granted access.  This option must be
+             followed by one or more lists of comma-separated authentication
+             method names, or by the single string any to indicate the default
+             behaviour of accepting any single authentication method.  If the
+             default is overridden, then successful authentication requires
+             completion of every method in at least one of these lists.
+
+             For example, "publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive"
+             would require the user to complete public key authentication,
+             followed by either password or keyboard interactive
+             authentication.  Only methods that are next in one or more lists
+             are offered at each stage, so for this example it would not be
+             possible to attempt password or keyboard-interactive
+             authentication before public key.
+
+             For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to
+             restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a colon
+             followed by the device identifier bsdauth or pam.  depending on
+             the server configuration.  For example,
+             "keyboard-interactive:bsdauth" would restrict keyboard
+             interactive authentication to the bsdauth device.
+
+             If the publickey method is listed more than once, sshd(8)
+             verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not
+             reused for subsequent authentications.  For example,
+             "publickey,publickey" requires successful authentication using
+             two different public keys.
+
+             Note that each authentication method listed should also be
+             explicitly enabled in the configuration.
+
+             The available authentication methods are: "gssapi-with-mic",
+             "hostbased", "keyboard-interactive", "none" (used for access to
+             password-less accounts when PermitEmptyPasswords is enabled),
+             "password" and "publickey".
+
+     AuthorizedKeysCommand
+             Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys.
+             The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or
+             others and specified by an absolute path.  Arguments to
+             AuthorizedKeysCommand accept the tokens described in the TOKENS
+             section.  If no arguments are specified then the username of the
+             target user is used.
+
+             The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines
+             of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in sshd(8)).
+             AuthorizedKeysCommand is tried after the usual AuthorizedKeysFile
+             files and will not be executed if a matching key is found there.
+             By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
+
+     AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
+             Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand
+             is run.  It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no
+             other role on the host than running authorized keys commands.  If
+             AuthorizedKeysCommand is specified but AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
+             is not, then sshd(8) will refuse to start.
+
+     AuthorizedKeysFile
+             Specifies the file that contains the public keys used for user
+             authentication.  The format is described in the AUTHORIZED_KEYS
+             FILE FORMAT section of sshd(8).  Arguments to AuthorizedKeysFile
+             accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section.  After
+             expansion, AuthorizedKeysFile is taken to be an absolute path or
+             one relative to the user's home directory.  Multiple files may be
+             listed, separated by whitespace.  Alternately this option may be
+             set to none to skip checking for user keys in files.  The default
+             is ".ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2".
+
+     AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+             Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed
+             certificate principals as per AuthorizedPrincipalsFile.  The
+             program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others
+             and specified by an absolute path.  Arguments to
+             AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accept the tokens described in the
+             TOKENS section.  If no arguments are specified then the username
+             of the target user is used.
+
+             The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines
+             of AuthorizedPrincipalsFile output.  If either
+             AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand or AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is
+             specified, then certificates offered by the client for
+             authentication must contain a principal that is listed.  By
+             default, no AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run.
+
+     AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
+             Specifies the user under whose account the
+             AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run.  It is recommended to use a
+             dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running
+             authorized principals commands.  If AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+             is specified but AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser is not, then
+             sshd(8) will refuse to start.
+
+     AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+             Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for
+             certificate authentication.  When using certificates signed by a
+             key listed in TrustedUserCAKeys, this file lists names, one of
+             which must appear in the certificate for it to be accepted for
+             authentication.  Names are listed one per line preceded by key
+             options (as described in AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in sshd(8)).
+             Empty lines and comments starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are ignored.
+
+             Arguments to AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accept the tokens described
+             in the TOKENS section.  After expansion, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+             is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's
+             home directory.  The default is none, i.e. not to use a
+             principals file M-bM-^@M-^S in this case, the username of the user must
+             appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be accepted.
+
+             Note that AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is only used when
+             authentication proceeds using a CA listed in TrustedUserCAKeys
+             and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via
+             ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, though the principals= key option offers
+             a similar facility (see sshd(8) for details).
+
+     Banner  The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user
+             before authentication is allowed.  If the argument is none then
+             no banner is displayed.  By default, no banner is displayed.
+
+     CASignatureAlgorithms
+             Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of
+             certificates by certificate authorities (CAs).  The default is:
+
+                   ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
+                   ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+                   sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+                   sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+                   rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+
+             If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
+             specified algorithms will be appended to the default set instead
+             of replacing them.  If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y
+             character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards)
+             will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+
+             Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted
+             for public key or host-based authentication.
+
+     ChannelTimeout
+             Specifies whether and how quickly sshd(8) should close inactive
+             channels.  Timeouts are specified as one or more M-bM-^@M-^\type=intervalM-bM-^@M-^]
+             pairs separated by whitespace, where the M-bM-^@M-^\typeM-bM-^@M-^] must be a channel
+             type name (as described in the table below), optionally
+             containing wildcard characters.
+
+             The timeout value M-bM-^@M-^\intervalM-bM-^@M-^] is specified in seconds or may use
+             any of the units documented in the TIME FORMATS section.  For
+             example, M-bM-^@M-^\session:*=5mM-bM-^@M-^] would cause all sessions to terminate
+             after five minutes of inactivity.  Specifying a zero value
+             disables the inactivity timeout.
+
+             The available channel types include:
+
+             agent-connection
+                     Open connections to ssh-agent(1).
+
+             direct-tcpip, direct-streamlocal@openssh.com
+                     Open TCP or Unix socket (respectively) connections that
+                     have been established from a ssh(1) local forwarding,
+                     i.e. LocalForward or DynamicForward.
+
+             forwarded-tcpip, forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com
+                     Open TCP or Unix socket (respectively) connections that
+                     have been established to a sshd(8) listening on behalf of
+                     a ssh(1) remote forwarding, i.e. RemoteForward.
+
+             session:command
+                     Command execution sessions.
+
+             session:shell
+                     Interactive shell sessions.
+
+             session:subsystem:...
+                     Subsystem sessions, e.g. for sftp(1), which could be
+                     identified as session:subsystem:sftp.
+
+             x11-connection
+                     Open X11 forwarding sessions.
+
+             Note that in all the above cases, terminating an inactive session
+             does not guarantee to remove all resources associated with the
+             session, e.g. shell processes or X11 clients relating to the
+             session may continue to execute.
+
+             Moreover, terminating an inactive channel or session does not
+             necessarily close the SSH connection, nor does it prevent a
+             client from requesting another channel of the same type.  In
+             particular, expiring an inactive forwarding session does not
+             prevent another identical forwarding from being subsequently
+             created.  See also UnusedConnectionTimeout, which may be used in
+             conjunction with this option.
+
+             The default is not to expire channels of any type for inactivity.
+
+     ChrootDirectory
+             Specifies the pathname of a directory to chroot(2) to after
+             authentication.  At session startup sshd(8) checks that all
+             components of the pathname are root-owned directories which are
+             not writable by any other user or group.  After the chroot,
+             sshd(8) changes the working directory to the user's home
+             directory.  Arguments to ChrootDirectory accept the tokens
+             described in the TOKENS section.
+
+             The ChrootDirectory must contain the necessary files and
+             directories to support the user's session.  For an interactive
+             session this requires at least a shell, typically sh(1), and
+             basic /dev nodes such as null(4), zero(4), stdin(4), stdout(4),
+             stderr(4), and tty(4) devices.  For file transfer sessions using
+             SFTP no additional configuration of the environment is necessary
+             if the in-process sftp-server is used, though sessions which use
+             logging may require /dev/log inside the chroot directory on some
+             operating systems (see sftp-server(8) for details).
+
+             For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be
+             prevented from modification by other processes on the system
+             (especially those outside the jail).  Misconfiguration can lead
+             to unsafe environments which sshd(8) cannot detect.
+
+             The default is none, indicating not to chroot(2).
+
+     Ciphers
+             Specifies the ciphers allowed.  Multiple ciphers must be comma-
+             separated.  If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
+             then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+             instead of replacing them.  If the specified list begins with a
+             M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards)
+             will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+             If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
+             specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the default set.
+
+             The supported ciphers are:
+
+                   3des-cbc
+                   aes128-cbc
+                   aes192-cbc
+                   aes256-cbc
+                   aes128-ctr
+                   aes192-ctr
+                   aes256-ctr
+                   aes128-gcm@openssh.com
+                   aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+                   chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+
+             The default is:
+
+                   chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
+                   aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+                   aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+
+             The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using "ssh -Q
+             cipher".
+
+     ClientAliveCountMax
+             Sets the number of client alive messages which may be sent
+             without sshd(8) receiving any messages back from the client.  If
+             this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being
+             sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session.
+             It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is
+             very different from TCPKeepAlive.  The client alive messages are
+             sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be
+             spoofable.  The TCP keepalive option enabled by TCPKeepAlive is
+             spoofable.  The client alive mechanism is valuable when the
+             client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become
+             unresponsive.
+
+             The default value is 3.  If ClientAliveInterval is set to 15, and
+             ClientAliveCountMax is left at the default, unresponsive SSH
+             clients will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
+             Setting a zero ClientAliveCountMax disables connection
+             termination.
+
+     ClientAliveInterval
+             Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has
+             been received from the client, sshd(8) will send a message
+             through the encrypted channel to request a response from the
+             client.  The default is 0, indicating that these messages will
+             not be sent to the client.
+
+     Compression
+             Specifies whether compression is enabled after the user has
+             authenticated successfully.  The argument must be yes, delayed (a
+             legacy synonym for yes) or no.  The default is yes.
+
+     DenyGroups
+             This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns,
+             separated by spaces.  Login is disallowed for users whose primary
+             group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns.
+             Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not
+             recognized.  By default, login is allowed for all groups.  The
+             allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following
+             order: DenyGroups, AllowGroups.
+
+             See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
+
+     DenyUsers
+             This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns,
+             separated by spaces.  Login is disallowed for user names that
+             match one of the patterns.  Only user names are valid; a
+             numerical user ID is not recognized.  By default, login is
+             allowed for all users.  If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST
+             then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to
+             particular users from particular hosts.  HOST criteria may
+             additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen
+             format.  The allow/deny users directives are processed in the
+             following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers.
+
+             See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
+
+     DisableForwarding
+             Disables all forwarding features, including X11, ssh-agent(1),
+             TCP and StreamLocal.  This option overrides all other forwarding-
+             related options and may simplify restricted configurations.
+
+     ExposeAuthInfo
+             Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication
+             methods and public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate
+             the user.  The location of the file is exposed to the user
+             session through the SSH_USER_AUTH environment variable.  The
+             default is no.
+
+     FingerprintHash
+             Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints.
+             Valid options are: md5 and sha256.  The default is sha256.
+
+     ForceCommand
+             Forces the execution of the command specified by ForceCommand,
+             ignoring any command supplied by the client and ~/.ssh/rc if
+             present.  The command is invoked by using the user's login shell
+             with the -c option.  This applies to shell, command, or subsystem
+             execution.  It is most useful inside a Match block.  The command
+             originally supplied by the client is available in the
+             SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable.  Specifying a command
+             of internal-sftp will force the use of an in-process SFTP server
+             that requires no support files when used with ChrootDirectory.
+             The default is none.
+
+     GatewayPorts
+             Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports
+             forwarded for the client.  By default, sshd(8) binds remote port
+             forwardings to the loopback address.  This prevents other remote
+             hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.  GatewayPorts can be
+             used to specify that sshd should allow remote port forwardings to
+             bind to non-loopback addresses, thus allowing other hosts to
+             connect.  The argument may be no to force remote port forwardings
+             to be available to the local host only, yes to force remote port
+             forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or clientspecified
+             to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding
+             is bound.  The default is no.
+
+     GSSAPIAuthentication
+             Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+             The default is no.
+
+     GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+             Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials
+             cache on logout.  The default is yes.
+
+     GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
+             Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI
+             acceptor a client authenticates against.  If set to yes then the
+             client must authenticate against the host service on the current
+             hostname.  If set to no then the client may authenticate against
+             any service key stored in the machine's default store.  This
+             facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed
+             machines.  The default is yes.
+
+     HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+             Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for
+             hostbased authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+             Alternately if the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
+             then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to the
+             default set instead of replacing them.  If the specified list
+             begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified signature
+             algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from the default
+             set instead of replacing them.  If the specified list begins with
+             a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified signature algorithms will be
+             placed at the head of the default set.  The default for this
+             option is:
+
+                ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ssh-ed25519,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+                sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+                sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+
+             The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained
+             using "ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms".  This was formerly
+             named HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes.
+
+     HostbasedAuthentication
+             Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication
+             together with successful public key client host authentication is
+             allowed (host-based authentication).  The default is no.
+
+     HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly
+             Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a
+             reverse name lookup when matching the name in the ~/.shosts,
+             ~/.rhosts, and /etc/hosts.equiv files during
+             HostbasedAuthentication.  A setting of yes means that sshd(8)
+             uses the name supplied by the client rather than attempting to
+             resolve the name from the TCP connection itself.  The default is
+             no.
+
+     HostCertificate
+             Specifies a file containing a public host certificate.  The
+             certificate's public key must match a private host key already
+             specified by HostKey.  The default behaviour of sshd(8) is not to
+             load any certificates.
+
+     HostKey
+             Specifies a file containing a private host key used by SSH.  The
+             defaults are /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key,
+             /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.
+
+             Note that sshd(8) will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-
+             accessible and that the HostKeyAlgorithms option restricts which
+             of the keys are actually used by sshd(8).
+
+             It is possible to have multiple host key files.  It is also
+             possible to specify public host key files instead.  In this case
+             operations on the private key will be delegated to an
+             ssh-agent(1).
+
+     HostKeyAgent
+             Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with an
+             agent that has access to the private host keys.  If the string
+             "SSH_AUTH_SOCK" is specified, the location of the socket will be
+             read from the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable.
+
+     HostKeyAlgorithms
+             Specifies the host key signature algorithms that the server
+             offers.  The default for this option is:
+
+                ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ssh-ed25519,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+                sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+                sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+
+             The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained
+             using "ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms".
+
+     IgnoreRhosts
+             Specifies whether to ignore per-user .rhosts and .shosts files
+             during HostbasedAuthentication.  The system-wide /etc/hosts.equiv
+             and /etc/shosts.equiv are still used regardless of this setting.
+
+             Accepted values are yes (the default) to ignore all per-user
+             files, shosts-only to allow the use of .shosts but to ignore
+             .rhosts or no to allow both .shosts and rhosts.
+
+     IgnoreUserKnownHosts
+             Specifies whether sshd(8) should ignore the user's
+             ~/.ssh/known_hosts during HostbasedAuthentication and use only
+             the system-wide known hosts file /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts.  The
+             default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     Include
+             Include the specified configuration file(s).  Multiple pathnames
+             may be specified and each pathname may contain glob(7) wildcards
+             that will be expanded and processed in lexical order.  Files
+             without absolute paths are assumed to be in /etc/ssh.  An Include
+             directive may appear inside a Match block to perform conditional
+             inclusion.
+
+     IPQoS   Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the
+             connection.  Accepted values are af11, af12, af13, af21, af22,
+             af23, af31, af32, af33, af41, af42, af43, cs0, cs1, cs2, cs3,
+             cs4, cs5, cs6, cs7, ef, le, lowdelay, throughput, reliability, a
+             numeric value, or none to use the operating system default.  This
+             option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace.
+             If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class
+             unconditionally.  If two values are specified, the first is
+             automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second
+             for non-interactive sessions.  The default is af21 (Low-Latency
+             Data) for interactive sessions and cs1 (Lower Effort) for non-
+             interactive sessions.
+
+     KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+             Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication.
+             All authentication styles from login.conf(5) are supported.  The
+             default is yes.  The argument to this keyword must be yes or no.
+             ChallengeResponseAuthentication is a deprecated alias for this.
+
+     KerberosAuthentication
+             Specifies whether the password provided by the user for
+             PasswordAuthentication will be validated through the Kerberos
+             KDC.  To use this option, the server needs a Kerberos servtab
+             which allows the verification of the KDC's identity.  The default
+             is no.
+
+     KerberosGetAFSToken
+             If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to
+             acquire an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory.
+             The default is no.
+
+     KerberosOrLocalPasswd
+             If password authentication through Kerberos fails then the
+             password will be validated via any additional local mechanism
+             such as /etc/passwd.  The default is yes.
+
+     KerberosTicketCleanup
+             Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket
+             cache file on logout.  The default is yes.
+
+     KexAlgorithms
+             Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.  Multiple
+             algorithms must be comma-separated.  Alternately if the specified
+             list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms
+             will be appended to the default set instead of replacing them.
+             If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
+             specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed from
+             the default set instead of replacing them.  If the specified list
+             begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms will
+             be placed at the head of the default set.  The supported
+             algorithms are:
+
+                   curve25519-sha256
+                   curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
+                   diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
+                   diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+                   diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+                   diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
+                   diffie-hellman-group18-sha512
+                   diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
+                   diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
+                   ecdh-sha2-nistp256
+                   ecdh-sha2-nistp384
+                   ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+                   sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
+
+             The default is:
+
+                   sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
+                   curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
+                   ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+                   diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+                   diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
+                   diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+
+             The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
+             obtained using "ssh -Q KexAlgorithms".
+
+     ListenAddress
+             Specifies the local addresses sshd(8) should listen on.  The
+             following forms may be used:
+
+                   ListenAddress hostname|address [rdomain domain]
+                   ListenAddress hostname:port [rdomain domain]
+                   ListenAddress IPv4_address:port [rdomain domain]
+                   ListenAddress [hostname|address]:port [rdomain domain]
+
+             The optional rdomain qualifier requests sshd(8) listen in an
+             explicit routing domain.  If port is not specified, sshd will
+             listen on the address and all Port options specified.  The
+             default is to listen on all local addresses on the current
+             default routing domain.  Multiple ListenAddress options are
+             permitted.  For more information on routing domains, see
+             rdomain(4).
+
+     LoginGraceTime
+             The server disconnects after this time if the user has not
+             successfully logged in.  If the value is 0, there is no time
+             limit.  The default is 120 seconds.
+
+     LogLevel
+             Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
+             sshd(8).  The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO,
+             VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.  The default is INFO.
+             DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.  DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify
+             higher levels of debugging output.  Logging with a DEBUG level
+             violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
+
+     LogVerbose
+             Specify one or more overrides to LogLevel.  An override consists
+             of a pattern lists that matches the source file, function and
+             line number to force detailed logging for.  For example, an
+             override pattern of:
+
+                   kex.c:*:1000,*:kex_exchange_identification():*,packet.c:*
+
+             would enable detailed logging for line 1000 of kex.c, everything
+             in the kex_exchange_identification() function, and all code in
+             the packet.c file.  This option is intended for debugging and no
+             overrides are enabled by default.
+
+     MACs    Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code)
+             algorithms.  The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity
+             protection.  Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.  If the
+             specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
+             algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of
+             replacing them.  If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y
+             character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards)
+             will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+             If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
+             specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default
+             set.
+
+             The algorithms that contain "-etm" calculate the MAC after
+             encryption (encrypt-then-mac).  These are considered safer and
+             their use recommended.  The supported MACs are:
+
+                   hmac-md5
+                   hmac-md5-96
+                   hmac-sha1
+                   hmac-sha1-96
+                   hmac-sha2-256
+                   hmac-sha2-512
+                   umac-64@openssh.com
+                   umac-128@openssh.com
+                   hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com
+                   hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com
+                   hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com
+                   hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com
+                   hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com
+                   hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com
+                   umac-64-etm@openssh.com
+                   umac-128-etm@openssh.com
+
+             The default is:
+
+                   umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
+                   hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+                   hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+                   umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
+                   hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+
+             The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+             "ssh -Q mac".
+
+     Match   Introduces a conditional block.  If all of the criteria on the
+             Match line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines
+             override those set in the global section of the config file,
+             until either another Match line or the end of the file.  If a
+             keyword appears in multiple Match blocks that are satisfied, only
+             the first instance of the keyword is applied.
+
+             The arguments to Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or
+             the single token All which matches all criteria.  The available
+             criteria are User, Group, Host, LocalAddress, LocalPort, RDomain,
+             and Address (with RDomain representing the rdomain(4) on which
+             the connection was received).
+
+             The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-
+             separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators
+             described in the PATTERNS section of ssh_config(5).
+
+             The patterns in an Address criteria may additionally contain
+             addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format, such as
+             192.0.2.0/24 or 2001:db8::/32.  Note that the mask length
+             provided must be consistent with the address - it is an error to
+             specify a mask length that is too long for the address or one
+             with bits set in this host portion of the address.  For example,
+             192.0.2.0/33 and 192.0.2.0/8, respectively.
+
+             Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
+             Match keyword.  Available keywords are AcceptEnv,
+             AllowAgentForwarding, AllowGroups, AllowStreamLocalForwarding,
+             AllowTcpForwarding, AllowUsers, AuthenticationMethods,
+             AuthorizedKeysCommand, AuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
+             AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand,
+             AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+             Banner, CASignatureAlgorithms, ChannelTimeout, ChrootDirectory,
+             ClientAliveCountMax, ClientAliveInterval, DenyGroups, DenyUsers,
+             DisableForwarding, ExposeAuthInfo, ForceCommand, GatewayPorts,
+             GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+             HostbasedAuthentication, HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly,
+             IgnoreRhosts, Include, IPQoS, KbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+             KerberosAuthentication, LogLevel, MaxAuthTries, MaxSessions,
+             PasswordAuthentication, PermitEmptyPasswords, PermitListen,
+             PermitOpen, PermitRootLogin, PermitTTY, PermitTunnel,
+             PermitUserRC, PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, PubkeyAuthentication,
+             PubkeyAuthOptions, RekeyLimit, RevokedKeys, RDomain, SetEnv,
+             StreamLocalBindMask, StreamLocalBindUnlink, TrustedUserCAKeys,
+             UnusedConnectionTimeout, X11DisplayOffset, X11Forwarding and
+             X11UseLocalhost.
+
+     MaxAuthTries
+             Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted
+             per connection.  Once the number of failures reaches half this
+             value, additional failures are logged.  The default is 6.
+
+     MaxSessions
+             Specifies the maximum number of open shell, login or subsystem
+             (e.g. sftp) sessions permitted per network connection.  Multiple
+             sessions may be established by clients that support connection
+             multiplexing.  Setting MaxSessions to 1 will effectively disable
+             session multiplexing, whereas setting it to 0 will prevent all
+             shell, login and subsystem sessions while still permitting
+             forwarding.  The default is 10.
+
+     MaxStartups
+             Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated
+             connections to the SSH daemon.  Additional connections will be
+             dropped until authentication succeeds or the LoginGraceTime
+             expires for a connection.  The default is 10:30:100.
+
+             Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying the
+             three colon separated values start:rate:full (e.g. "10:30:60").
+             sshd(8) will refuse connection attempts with a probability of
+             rate/100 (30%) if there are currently start (10) unauthenticated
+             connections.  The probability increases linearly and all
+             connection attempts are refused if the number of unauthenticated
+             connections reaches full (60).
+
+     ModuliFile
+             Specifies the moduli(5) file that contains the Diffie-Hellman
+             groups used for the M-bM-^@M-^\diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1M-bM-^@M-^] and
+             M-bM-^@M-^\diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256M-bM-^@M-^] key exchange methods.  The
+             default is /etc/moduli.
+
+     PasswordAuthentication
+             Specifies whether password authentication is allowed.  The
+             default is yes.
+
+     PermitEmptyPasswords
+             When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
+             server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.  The
+             default is no.
+
+     PermitListen
+             Specifies the addresses/ports on which a remote TCP port
+             forwarding may listen.  The listen specification must be one of
+             the following forms:
+
+                   PermitListen port
+                   PermitListen host:port
+
+             Multiple permissions may be specified by separating them with
+             whitespace.  An argument of any can be used to remove all
+             restrictions and permit any listen requests.  An argument of none
+             can be used to prohibit all listen requests.  The host name may
+             contain wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in
+             ssh_config(5).  The wildcard M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y can also be used in place of a
+             port number to allow all ports.  By default all port forwarding
+             listen requests are permitted.  Note that the GatewayPorts option
+             may further restrict which addresses may be listened on.  Note
+             also that ssh(1) will request a listen host of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] if no
+             listen host was specifically requested, and this name is treated
+             differently to explicit localhost addresses of M-bM-^@M-^\127.0.0.1M-bM-^@M-^] and
+             M-bM-^@M-^\::1M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+     PermitOpen
+             Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is
+             permitted.  The forwarding specification must be one of the
+             following forms:
+
+                   PermitOpen host:port
+                   PermitOpen IPv4_addr:port
+                   PermitOpen [IPv6_addr]:port
+
+             Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with
+             whitespace.  An argument of any can be used to remove all
+             restrictions and permit any forwarding requests.  An argument of
+             none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests.  The
+             wildcard M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or
+             ports respectively.  Otherwise, no pattern matching or address
+             lookups are performed on supplied names.  By default all port
+             forwarding requests are permitted.
+
+     PermitRootLogin
+             Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1).  The argument
+             must be yes, prohibit-password, forced-commands-only, or no.  The
+             default is prohibit-password.
+
+             If this option is set to prohibit-password (or its deprecated
+             alias, without-password), password and keyboard-interactive
+             authentication are disabled for root.
+
+             If this option is set to forced-commands-only, root login with
+             public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the
+             command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking
+             remote backups even if root login is normally not allowed).  All
+             other authentication methods are disabled for root.
+
+             If this option is set to no, root is not allowed to log in.
+
+     PermitTTY
+             Specifies whether pty(4) allocation is permitted.  The default is
+             yes.
+
+     PermitTunnel
+             Specifies whether tun(4) device forwarding is allowed.  The
+             argument must be yes, point-to-point (layer 3), ethernet (layer
+             2), or no.  Specifying yes permits both point-to-point and
+             ethernet.  The default is no.
+
+             Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected
+             tun(4) device must allow access to the user.
+
+     PermitUserEnvironment
+             Specifies whether ~/.ssh/environment and environment= options in
+             ~/.ssh/authorized_keys are processed by sshd(8).  Valid options
+             are yes, no or a pattern-list specifying which environment
+             variable names to accept (for example "LANG,LC_*").  The default
+             is no.  Enabling environment processing may enable users to
+             bypass access restrictions in some configurations using
+             mechanisms such as LD_PRELOAD.
+
+     PermitUserRC
+             Specifies whether any ~/.ssh/rc file is executed.  The default is
+             yes.
+
+     PerSourceMaxStartups
+             Specifies the number of unauthenticated connections allowed from
+             a given source address, or M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] if there is no limit.  This
+             limit is applied in addition to MaxStartups, whichever is lower.
+             The default is none.
+
+     PerSourceNetBlockSize
+             Specifies the number of bits of source address that are grouped
+             together for the purposes of applying PerSourceMaxStartups
+             limits.  Values for IPv4 and optionally IPv6 may be specified,
+             separated by a colon.  The default is 32:128, which means each
+             address is considered individually.
+
+     PidFile
+             Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the SSH
+             daemon, or none to not write one.  The default is
+             /var/run/sshd.pid.
+
+     Port    Specifies the port number that sshd(8) listens on.  The default
+             is 22.  Multiple options of this type are permitted.  See also
+             ListenAddress.
+
+     PrintLastLog
+             Specifies whether sshd(8) should print the date and time of the
+             last user login when a user logs in interactively.  The default
+             is yes.
+
+     PrintMotd
+             Specifies whether sshd(8) should print /etc/motd when a user logs
+             in interactively.  (On some systems it is also printed by the
+             shell, /etc/profile, or equivalent.)  The default is yes.
+
+     PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+             Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for
+             public key authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+             Alternately if the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
+             then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+             instead of replacing them.  If the specified list begins with a
+             M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms (including
+             wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of
+             replacing them.  If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y
+             character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the
+             head of the default set.  The default for this option is:
+
+                ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+                ssh-ed25519,
+                ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+                sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+                sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+                rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+
+             The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained
+             using "ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms".
+
+     PubkeyAuthOptions
+             Sets one or more public key authentication options.  The
+             supported keywords are: none (the default; indicating no
+             additional options are enabled), touch-required and
+             verify-required.
+
+             The touch-required option causes public key authentication using
+             a FIDO authenticator algorithm (i.e. ecdsa-sk or ed25519-sk) to
+             always require the signature to attest that a physically present
+             user explicitly confirmed the authentication (usually by touching
+             the authenticator).  By default, sshd(8) requires user presence
+             unless overridden with an authorized_keys option.  The
+             touch-required flag disables this override.
+
+             The verify-required option requires a FIDO key signature attest
+             that the user was verified, e.g. via a PIN.
+
+             Neither the touch-required or verify-required options have any
+             effect for other, non-FIDO, public key types.
+
+     PubkeyAuthentication
+             Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed.  The
+             default is yes.
+
+     RekeyLimit
+             Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted or
+             received before the session key is renegotiated, optionally
+             followed by a maximum amount of time that may pass before the
+             session key is renegotiated.  The first argument is specified in
+             bytes and may have a suffix of M-bM-^@M-^XKM-bM-^@M-^Y, M-bM-^@M-^XMM-bM-^@M-^Y, or M-bM-^@M-^XGM-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate
+             Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.  The default is
+             between M-bM-^@M-^X1GM-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X4GM-bM-^@M-^Y, depending on the cipher.  The optional
+             second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units
+             documented in the TIME FORMATS section.  The default value for
+             RekeyLimit is default none, which means that rekeying is
+             performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent
+             or received and no time based rekeying is done.
+
+     RequiredRSASize
+             Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that sshd(8) will
+             accept.  User and host-based authentication keys smaller than
+             this limit will be refused.  The default is 1024 bits.  Note that
+             this limit may only be raised from the default.
+
+     RevokedKeys
+             Specifies revoked public keys file, or none to not use one.  Keys
+             listed in this file will be refused for public key
+             authentication.  Note that if this file is not readable, then
+             public key authentication will be refused for all users.  Keys
+             may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line,
+             or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by
+             ssh-keygen(1).  For more information on KRLs, see the KEY
+             REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1).
+
+     RDomain
+             Specifies an explicit routing domain that is applied after
+             authentication has completed.  The user session, as well as any
+             forwarded or listening IP sockets, will be bound to this
+             rdomain(4).  If the routing domain is set to %D, then the domain
+             in which the incoming connection was received will be applied.
+
+     SecurityKeyProvider
+             Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading FIDO
+             authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the
+             built-in USB HID support.
+
+     SetEnv  Specifies one or more environment variables to set in child
+             sessions started by sshd(8) as M-bM-^@M-^\NAME=VALUEM-bM-^@M-^].  The environment
+             value may be quoted (e.g. if it contains whitespace characters).
+             Environment variables set by SetEnv override the default
+             environment and any variables specified by the user via AcceptEnv
+             or PermitUserEnvironment.
+
+     StreamLocalBindMask
+             Sets the octal file creation mode mask (umask) used when creating
+             a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding.
+             This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain
+             socket file.
+
+             The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket
+             file that is readable and writable only by the owner.  Note that
+             not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
+             socket files.
+
+     StreamLocalBindUnlink
+             Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file
+             for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
+             If the socket file already exists and StreamLocalBindUnlink is
+             not enabled, sshd will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-
+             domain socket file.  This option is only used for port forwarding
+             to a Unix-domain socket file.
+
+             The argument must be yes or no.  The default is no.
+
+     StrictModes
+             Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership
+             of the user's files and home directory before accepting login.
+             This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally
+             leave their directory or files world-writable.  The default is
+             yes.  Note that this does not apply to ChrootDirectory, whose
+             permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally.
+
+     Subsystem
+             Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon).
+             Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional
+             arguments) to execute upon subsystem request.
+
+             The command sftp-server implements the SFTP file transfer
+             subsystem.
+
+             Alternately the name internal-sftp implements an in-process SFTP
+             server.  This may simplify configurations using ChrootDirectory
+             to force a different filesystem root on clients.
+
+             By default no subsystems are defined.
+
+     SyslogFacility
+             Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
+             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
+             default is AUTH.
+
+     TCPKeepAlive
+             Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
+             to the other side.  If they are sent, death of the connection or
+             crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed.  However,
+             this means that connections will die if the route is down
+             temporarily, and some people find it annoying.  On the other
+             hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang
+             indefinitely on the server, leaving "ghost" users and consuming
+             server resources.
+
+             The default is yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the
+             server will notice if the network goes down or the client host
+             crashes.  This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
+
+             To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to no.
+
+     TrustedUserCAKeys
+             Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate
+             authorities that are trusted to sign user certificates for
+             authentication, or none to not use one.  Keys are listed one per
+             line; empty lines and comments starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are allowed.  If
+             a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing
+             CA key listed in this file, then it may be used for
+             authentication for any user listed in the certificate's
+             principals list.  Note that certificates that lack a list of
+             principals will not be permitted for authentication using
+             TrustedUserCAKeys.  For more details on certificates, see the
+             CERTIFICATES section in ssh-keygen(1).
+
+     UnusedConnectionTimeout
+             Specifies whether and how quickly sshd(8) should close client
+             connections with no open channels.  Open channels include active
+             shell, command execution or subsystem sessions, connected
+             network, socket, agent or X11 forwardings.  Forwarding listeners,
+             such as those from the ssh(1) -R flag, are not considered as open
+             channels and do not prevent the timeout.  The timeout value is
+             specified in seconds or may use any of the units documented in
+             the TIME FORMATS section.
+
+             Note that this timeout starts when the client connection
+             completes user authentication but before the client has an
+             opportunity to open any channels.  Caution should be used when
+             using short timeout values, as they may not provide sufficient
+             time for the client to request and open its channels before
+             terminating the connection.
+
+             The default none is to never expire connections for having no
+             open channels.  This option may be useful in conjunction with
+             ChannelTimeout.
+
+     UseDNS  Specifies whether sshd(8) should look up the remote host name,
+             and to check that the resolved host name for the remote IP
+             address maps back to the very same IP address.
+
+             If this option is set to no (the default) then only addresses and
+             not host names may be used in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys from and
+             sshd_config Match Host directives.
+
+     UsePAM  Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface.  If set to
+             yes this will enable PAM authentication using
+             KbdInteractiveAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication in
+             addition to PAM account and session module processing for all
+             authentication types.
+
+             Because PAM keyboard-interactive authentication usually serves an
+             equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable
+             either PasswordAuthentication or KbdInteractiveAuthentication.
+
+             If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
+             non-root user.  The default is no.
+
+     VersionAddendum
+             Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH
+             protocol banner sent by the server upon connection.  The default
+             is none.
+
+     X11DisplayOffset
+             Specifies the first display number available for sshd(8)'s X11
+             forwarding.  This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11
+             servers.  The default is 10.
+
+     X11Forwarding
+             Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.  The argument must
+             be yes or no.  The default is no.
+
+             When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure
+             to the server and to client displays if the sshd(8) proxy display
+             is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see
+             X11UseLocalhost), though this is not the default.  Additionally,
+             the authentication spoofing and authentication data verification
+             and substitution occur on the client side.  The security risk of
+             using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11 display server may
+             be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests forwarding (see
+             the warnings for ForwardX11 in ssh_config(5)).  A system
+             administrator may have a stance in which they want to protect
+             clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly
+             requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a no setting.
+
+             Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from
+             forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own
+             forwarders.
+
+     X11UseLocalhost
+             Specifies whether sshd(8) should bind the X11 forwarding server
+             to the loopback address or to the wildcard address.  By default,
+             sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets
+             the hostname part of the DISPLAY environment variable to
+             localhost.  This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the
+             proxy display.  However, some older X11 clients may not function
+             with this configuration.  X11UseLocalhost may be set to no to
+             specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the
+             wildcard address.  The argument must be yes or no.  The default
+             is yes.
+
+     XAuthLocation
+             Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program, or none to
+             not use one.  The default is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth.
+
+TIME FORMATS
+     sshd(8) command-line arguments and configuration file options that
+     specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form:
+     time[qualifier], where time is a positive integer value and qualifier is
+     one of the following:
+
+           M-bM-^_M-(noneM-bM-^_M-)  seconds
+           s | S   seconds
+           m | M   minutes
+           h | H   hours
+           d | D   days
+           w | W   weeks
+
+     Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate the total time
+     value.
+
+     Time format examples:
+
+           600     600 seconds (10 minutes)
+           10m     10 minutes
+           1h30m   1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes)
+
+TOKENS
+     Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, which are expanded at
+     runtime:
+
+           %%    A literal M-bM-^@M-^X%M-bM-^@M-^Y.
+           %D    The routing domain in which the incoming connection was
+                 received.
+           %F    The fingerprint of the CA key.
+           %f    The fingerprint of the key or certificate.
+           %h    The home directory of the user.
+           %i    The key ID in the certificate.
+           %K    The base64-encoded CA key.
+           %k    The base64-encoded key or certificate for authentication.
+           %s    The serial number of the certificate.
+           %T    The type of the CA key.
+           %t    The key or certificate type.
+           %U    The numeric user ID of the target user.
+           %u    The username.
+
+     AuthorizedKeysCommand accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, %U, and %u.
+
+     AuthorizedKeysFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
+
+     AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K,
+     %k, %s, %T, %t, %U, and %u.
+
+     AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
+
+     ChrootDirectory accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
+
+     RoutingDomain accepts the token %D.
+
+FILES
+     /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+             Contains configuration data for sshd(8).  This file should be
+             writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not
+             necessary) that it be world-readable.
+
+SEE ALSO
+     sftp-server(8), sshd(8)
+
+AUTHORS
+     OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+     Tatu Ylonen.  Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+     de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+     created OpenSSH.  Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+     versions 1.5 and 2.0.  Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
+     for privilege separation.
+
+OpenBSD 7.2                    January 18, 2023                    OpenBSD 7.2
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7313a7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -0,0 +1,2082 @@
+.\"
+.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+.\"                    All rights reserved
+.\"
+.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+.\" can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+.\"
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell.  All rights reserved.
+.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+.\"
+.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+.\" are met:
+.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+.\"    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+.\"    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+.\"
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+.\"
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.347 2023/01/18 06:55:32 jmc Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: January 18 2023 $
+.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
+.Os
+.Sh NAME
+.Nm sshd_config
+.Nd OpenSSH daemon configuration file
+.Sh DESCRIPTION
+.Xr sshd 8
+reads configuration data from
+.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+(or the file specified with
+.Fl f
+on the command line).
+The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
+For each keyword, the first obtained value will be used.
+Lines starting with
+.Ql #
+and empty lines are interpreted as comments.
+Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
+.Pq \&"
+in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
+.Pp
+The possible
+keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
+keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm AcceptEnv
+Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into
+the session's
+.Xr environ 7 .
+See
+.Cm SendEnv
+and
+.Cm SetEnv
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for how to configure the client.
+The
+.Ev TERM
+environment variable is always accepted whenever the client
+requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol.
+Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters
+.Ql *
+and
+.Ql \&? .
+Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
+across multiple
+.Cm AcceptEnv
+directives.
+Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted
+user environments.
+For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive.
+The default is not to accept any environment variables.
+.It Cm AddressFamily
+Specifies which address family should be used by
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+Valid arguments are
+.Cm any
+(the default),
+.Cm inet
+(use IPv4 only), or
+.Cm inet6
+(use IPv6 only).
+.It Cm AllowAgentForwarding
+Specifies whether
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding is permitted.
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+Note that disabling agent forwarding does not improve security
+unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install
+their own forwarders.
+.It Cm AllowGroups
+This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
+by spaces.
+If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary
+group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns.
+Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
+By default, login is allowed for all groups.
+The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See PATTERNS in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding
+Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is permitted.
+The available options are
+.Cm yes
+(the default)
+or
+.Cm all
+to allow StreamLocal forwarding,
+.Cm no
+to prevent all StreamLocal forwarding,
+.Cm local
+to allow local (from the perspective of
+.Xr ssh 1 )
+forwarding only or
+.Cm remote
+to allow remote forwarding only.
+Note that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security unless
+users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their
+own forwarders.
+.It Cm AllowTcpForwarding
+Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted.
+The available options are
+.Cm yes
+(the default)
+or
+.Cm all
+to allow TCP forwarding,
+.Cm no
+to prevent all TCP forwarding,
+.Cm local
+to allow local (from the perspective of
+.Xr ssh 1 )
+forwarding only or
+.Cm remote
+to allow remote forwarding only.
+Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless
+users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their
+own forwarders.
+.It Cm AllowUsers
+This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
+by spaces.
+If specified, login is allowed only for user names that
+match one of the patterns.
+Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
+By default, login is allowed for all users.
+If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST
+are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
+users from particular hosts.
+HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
+address/masklen format.
+The allow/deny users directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers .
+.Pp
+See PATTERNS in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm AuthenticationMethods
+Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed
+for a user to be granted access.
+This option must be followed by one or more lists of comma-separated
+authentication method names, or by the single string
+.Cm any
+to indicate the default behaviour of accepting any single authentication
+method.
+If the default is overridden, then successful authentication requires
+completion of every method in at least one of these lists.
+.Pp
+For example,
+.Qq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive
+would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by
+either password or keyboard interactive authentication.
+Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage,
+so for this example it would not be possible to attempt password or
+keyboard-interactive authentication before public key.
+.Pp
+For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to
+restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a
+colon followed by the device identifier
+.Cm bsdauth
+or
+.Cm pam .
+depending on the server configuration.
+For example,
+.Qq keyboard-interactive:bsdauth
+would restrict keyboard interactive authentication to the
+.Cm bsdauth
+device.
+.Pp
+If the publickey method is listed more than once,
+.Xr sshd 8
+verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not reused for
+subsequent authentications.
+For example,
+.Qq publickey,publickey
+requires successful authentication using two different public keys.
+.Pp
+Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled
+in the configuration.
+.Pp
+The available authentication methods are:
+.Qq gssapi-with-mic ,
+.Qq hostbased ,
+.Qq keyboard-interactive ,
+.Qq none
+(used for access to password-less accounts when
+.Cm PermitEmptyPasswords
+is enabled),
+.Qq password
+and
+.Qq publickey .
+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
+Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys.
+The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and
+specified by an absolute path.
+Arguments to
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
+accept the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section.
+If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used.
+.Pp
+The program should produce on standard output zero or
+more lines of authorized_keys output (see
+.Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS
+in
+.Xr sshd 8 ) .
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
+is tried after the usual
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+files and will not be executed if a matching key is found there.
+By default, no
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
+is run.
+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
+Specifies the user under whose account the
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
+is run.
+It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host
+than running authorized keys commands.
+If
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
+is specified but
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
+is not, then
+.Xr sshd 8
+will refuse to start.
+.It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+Specifies the file that contains the public keys used for user authentication.
+The format is described in the AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT section of
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+Arguments to
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+accept the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section.
+After expansion,
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home
+directory.
+Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace.
+Alternately this option may be set to
+.Cm none
+to skip checking for user keys in files.
+The default is
+.Qq .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 .
+.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed
+certificate principals as per
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile .
+The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and
+specified by an absolute path.
+Arguments to
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+accept the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section.
+If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used.
+.Pp
+The program should produce on standard output zero or
+more lines of
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+output.
+If either
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+or
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+is specified, then certificates offered by the client for authentication
+must contain a principal that is listed.
+By default, no
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+is run.
+.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
+Specifies the user under whose account the
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+is run.
+It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host
+than running authorized principals commands.
+If
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+is specified but
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
+is not, then
+.Xr sshd 8
+will refuse to start.
+.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for
+certificate authentication.
+When using certificates signed by a key listed in
+.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
+this file lists names, one of which must appear in the certificate for it
+to be accepted for authentication.
+Names are listed one per line preceded by key options (as described in
+.Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
+in
+.Xr sshd 8 ) .
+Empty lines and comments starting with
+.Ql #
+are ignored.
+.Pp
+Arguments to
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+accept the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section.
+After expansion,
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory.
+The default is
+.Cm none ,
+i.e. not to use a principals file \(en in this case, the username
+of the user must appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be
+accepted.
+.Pp
+Note that
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in
+.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
+and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ,
+though the
+.Cm principals=
+key option offers a similar facility (see
+.Xr sshd 8
+for details).
+.It Cm Banner
+The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before
+authentication is allowed.
+If the argument is
+.Cm none
+then no banner is displayed.
+By default, no banner is displayed.
+.It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
+Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
+by certificate authorities (CAs).
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+.Ed
+.Pp
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
+.Pp
+Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for
+public key or host-based authentication.
+.It Cm ChannelTimeout
+Specifies whether and how quickly
+.Xr sshd 8
+should close inactive channels.
+Timeouts are specified as one or more
+.Dq type=interval
+pairs separated by whitespace, where the
+.Dq type
+must be a channel type name (as described in the table below), optionally
+containing wildcard characters.
+.Pp
+The timeout value
+.Dq interval
+is specified in seconds or may use any of the units documented in the
+.Sx TIME FORMATS
+section.
+For example,
+.Dq session:*=5m
+would cause all sessions to terminate after five minutes of inactivity.
+Specifying a zero value disables the inactivity timeout.
+.Pp
+The available channel types include:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm agent-connection
+Open connections to
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+.It Cm direct-tcpip , Cm direct-streamlocal@openssh.com
+Open TCP or Unix socket (respectively) connections that have
+been established from a
+.Xr ssh 1
+local forwarding, i.e.\&
+.Cm LocalForward
+or
+.Cm DynamicForward .
+.It Cm forwarded-tcpip , Cm forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com
+Open TCP or Unix socket (respectively) connections that have been
+established to a
+.Xr sshd 8
+listening on behalf of a
+.Xr ssh 1
+remote forwarding, i.e.\&
+.Cm RemoteForward .
+.It Cm session:command
+Command execution sessions.
+.It Cm session:shell
+Interactive shell sessions.
+.It Cm session:subsystem:...
+Subsystem sessions, e.g. for
+.Xr sftp 1 ,
+which could be identified as
+.Cm session:subsystem:sftp .
+.It Cm x11-connection
+Open X11 forwarding sessions.
+.El
+.Pp
+Note that in all the above cases, terminating an inactive session does not
+guarantee to remove all resources associated with the session, e.g. shell
+processes or X11 clients relating to the session may continue to execute.
+.Pp
+Moreover, terminating an inactive channel or session does not necessarily
+close the SSH connection, nor does it prevent a client from
+requesting another channel of the same type.
+In particular, expiring an inactive forwarding session does not prevent
+another identical forwarding from being subsequently created.
+See also
+.Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout ,
+which may be used in conjunction with this option.
+.Pp
+The default is not to expire channels of any type for inactivity.
+.It Cm ChrootDirectory
+Specifies the pathname of a directory to
+.Xr chroot 2
+to after authentication.
+At session startup
+.Xr sshd 8
+checks that all components of the pathname are root-owned directories
+which are not writable by any other user or group.
+After the chroot,
+.Xr sshd 8
+changes the working directory to the user's home directory.
+Arguments to
+.Cm ChrootDirectory
+accept the tokens described in the
+.Sx TOKENS
+section.
+.Pp
+The
+.Cm ChrootDirectory
+must contain the necessary files and directories to support the
+user's session.
+For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically
+.Xr sh 1 ,
+and basic
+.Pa /dev
+nodes such as
+.Xr null 4 ,
+.Xr zero 4 ,
+.Xr stdin 4 ,
+.Xr stdout 4 ,
+.Xr stderr 4 ,
+and
+.Xr tty 4
+devices.
+For file transfer sessions using SFTP
+no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the in-process
+sftp-server is used,
+though sessions which use logging may require
+.Pa /dev/log
+inside the chroot directory on some operating systems (see
+.Xr sftp-server 8
+for details).
+.Pp
+For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be
+prevented from modification by other processes on the system (especially
+those outside the jail).
+Misconfiguration can lead to unsafe environments which
+.Xr sshd 8
+cannot detect.
+.Pp
+The default is
+.Cm none ,
+indicating not to
+.Xr chroot 2 .
+.It Cm Ciphers
+Specifies the ciphers allowed.
+Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
+default set.
+.Pp
+The supported ciphers are:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
+.It
+3des-cbc
+.It
+aes128-cbc
+.It
+aes192-cbc
+.It
+aes256-cbc
+.It
+aes128-ctr
+.It
+aes192-ctr
+.It
+aes256-ctr
+.It
+aes128-gcm@openssh.com
+.It
+aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+.It
+chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+.El
+.Pp
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
+aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q cipher .
+.It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+Sets the number of client alive messages which may be sent without
+.Xr sshd 8
+receiving any messages back from the client.
+If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent,
+sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session.
+It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very
+different from
+.Cm TCPKeepAlive .
+The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel
+and therefore will not be spoofable.
+The TCP keepalive option enabled by
+.Cm TCPKeepAlive
+is spoofable.
+The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or
+server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive.
+.Pp
+The default value is 3.
+If
+.Cm ClientAliveInterval
+is set to 15, and
+.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients
+will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
+Setting a zero
+.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+disables connection termination.
+.It Cm ClientAliveInterval
+Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
+from the client,
+.Xr sshd 8
+will send a message through the encrypted
+channel to request a response from the client.
+The default
+is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client.
+.It Cm Compression
+Specifies whether compression is enabled after
+the user has authenticated successfully.
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes ,
+.Cm delayed
+(a legacy synonym for
+.Cm yes )
+or
+.Cm no .
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+.It Cm DenyGroups
+This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
+by spaces.
+Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary
+group list matches one of the patterns.
+Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
+By default, login is allowed for all groups.
+The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Pp
+See PATTERNS in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm DenyUsers
+This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
+by spaces.
+Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns.
+Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
+By default, login is allowed for all users.
+If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST
+are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
+users from particular hosts.
+HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
+address/masklen format.
+The allow/deny users directives are processed in the following order:
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm AllowUsers .
+.Pp
+See PATTERNS in
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+for more information on patterns.
+.It Cm DisableForwarding
+Disables all forwarding features, including X11,
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
+TCP and StreamLocal.
+This option overrides all other forwarding-related options and may
+simplify restricted configurations.
+.It Cm ExposeAuthInfo
+Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication methods and
+public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate the user.
+The location of the file is exposed to the user session through the
+.Ev SSH_USER_AUTH
+environment variable.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm FingerprintHash
+Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints.
+Valid options are:
+.Cm md5
+and
+.Cm sha256 .
+The default is
+.Cm sha256 .
+.It Cm ForceCommand
+Forces the execution of the command specified by
+.Cm ForceCommand ,
+ignoring any command supplied by the client and
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+if present.
+The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option.
+This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution.
+It is most useful inside a
+.Cm Match
+block.
+The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
+.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
+environment variable.
+Specifying a command of
+.Cm internal-sftp
+will force the use of an in-process SFTP server that requires no support
+files when used with
+.Cm ChrootDirectory .
+The default is
+.Cm none .
+.It Cm GatewayPorts
+Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports
+forwarded for the client.
+By default,
+.Xr sshd 8
+binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address.
+This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+can be used to specify that sshd
+should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus
+allowing other hosts to connect.
+The argument may be
+.Cm no
+to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only,
+.Cm yes
+to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or
+.Cm clientspecified
+to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
+Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
+Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+on logout.
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
+Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
+a client authenticates against.
+If set to
+.Cm yes
+then the client must authenticate against the host
+service on the current hostname.
+If set to
+.Cm no
+then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the
+machine's default store.
+This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+.It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
+authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to
+the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
+will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed at
+the head of the default set.
+The default for this option is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms .
+This was formerly named HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes.
+.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
+with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
+(host-based authentication).
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly
+Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse
+name lookup when matching the name in the
+.Pa ~/.shosts ,
+.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
+and
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+files during
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+A setting of
+.Cm yes
+means that
+.Xr sshd 8
+uses the name supplied by the client rather than
+attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm HostCertificate
+Specifies a file containing a public host certificate.
+The certificate's public key must match a private host key already specified
+by
+.Cm HostKey .
+The default behaviour of
+.Xr sshd 8
+is not to load any certificates.
+.It Cm HostKey
+Specifies a file containing a private host key
+used by SSH.
+The defaults are
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ,
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+and
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .
+.Pp
+Note that
+.Xr sshd 8
+will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible
+and that the
+.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+option restricts which of the keys are actually used by
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+.Pp
+It is possible to have multiple host key files.
+It is also possible to specify public host key files instead.
+In this case operations on the private key will be delegated
+to an
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
+.It Cm HostKeyAgent
+Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
+with an agent that has access to the private host keys.
+If the string
+.Qq SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the
+.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+environment variable.
+.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+Specifies the host key signature algorithms
+that the server offers.
+The default for this option is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
+.It Cm IgnoreRhosts
+Specifies whether to ignore per-user
+.Pa .rhosts
+and
+.Pa .shosts
+files during
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
+The system-wide
+.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
+and
+.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
+are still used regardless of this setting.
+.Pp
+Accepted values are
+.Cm yes
+(the default) to ignore all per-user files,
+.Cm shosts-only
+to allow the use of
+.Pa .shosts
+but to ignore
+.Pa .rhosts
+or
+.Cm no
+to allow both
+.Pa .shosts
+and
+.Pa rhosts .
+.It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should ignore the user's
+.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
+during
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication
+and use only the system-wide known hosts file
+.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts .
+The default is
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm Include
+Include the specified configuration file(s).
+Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain
+.Xr glob 7
+wildcards that will be expanded and processed in lexical order.
+Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in
+.Pa /etc/ssh .
+An
+.Cm Include
+directive may appear inside a
+.Cm Match
+block
+to perform conditional inclusion.
+.It Cm IPQoS
+Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection.
+Accepted values are
+.Cm af11 ,
+.Cm af12 ,
+.Cm af13 ,
+.Cm af21 ,
+.Cm af22 ,
+.Cm af23 ,
+.Cm af31 ,
+.Cm af32 ,
+.Cm af33 ,
+.Cm af41 ,
+.Cm af42 ,
+.Cm af43 ,
+.Cm cs0 ,
+.Cm cs1 ,
+.Cm cs2 ,
+.Cm cs3 ,
+.Cm cs4 ,
+.Cm cs5 ,
+.Cm cs6 ,
+.Cm cs7 ,
+.Cm ef ,
+.Cm le ,
+.Cm lowdelay ,
+.Cm throughput ,
+.Cm reliability ,
+a numeric value, or
+.Cm none
+to use the operating system default.
+This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace.
+If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally.
+If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for
+interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions.
+The default is
+.Cm af21
+(Low-Latency Data)
+for interactive sessions and
+.Cm cs1
+(Lower Effort)
+for non-interactive sessions.
+.It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication.
+All authentication styles from
+.Xr login.conf 5
+are supported.
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+The argument to this keyword must be
+.Cm yes
+or
+.Cm no .
+.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+is a deprecated alias for this.
+.It Cm KerberosAuthentication
+Specifies whether the password provided by the user for
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication
+will be validated through the Kerberos KDC.
+To use this option, the server needs a
+Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm KerberosGetAFSToken
+If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire
+an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd
+If password authentication through Kerberos fails then
+the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism
+such as
+.Pa /etc/passwd .
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+.It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup
+Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
+file on logout.
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+.It Cm KexAlgorithms
+Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+default set.
+The supported algorithms are:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
+.It
+curve25519-sha256
+.It
+curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
+.It
+diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
+.It
+diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+.It
+diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+.It
+diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
+.It
+diffie-hellman-group18-sha512
+.It
+diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
+.It
+diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
+.It
+ecdh-sha2-nistp256
+.It
+ecdh-sha2-nistp384
+.It
+ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+.It
+sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
+.El
+.Pp
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
+curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
+ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
+diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
+.It Cm ListenAddress
+Specifies the local addresses
+.Xr sshd 8
+should listen on.
+The following forms may be used:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm ListenAddress
+.Sm off
+.Ar hostname | address
+.Sm on
+.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain
+.It
+.Cm ListenAddress
+.Sm off
+.Ar hostname : port
+.Sm on
+.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain
+.It
+.Cm ListenAddress
+.Sm off
+.Ar IPv4_address : port
+.Sm on
+.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain
+.It
+.Cm ListenAddress
+.Sm off
+.Oo Ar hostname | address Oc : Ar port
+.Sm on
+.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain
+.El
+.Pp
+The optional
+.Cm rdomain
+qualifier requests
+.Xr sshd 8
+listen in an explicit routing domain.
+If
+.Ar port
+is not specified,
+sshd will listen on the address and all
+.Cm Port
+options specified.
+The default is to listen on all local addresses on the current default
+routing domain.
+Multiple
+.Cm ListenAddress
+options are permitted.
+For more information on routing domains, see
+.Xr rdomain 4 .
+.It Cm LoginGraceTime
+The server disconnects after this time if the user has not
+successfully logged in.
+If the value is 0, there is no time limit.
+The default is 120 seconds.
+.It Cm LogLevel
+Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+The possible values are:
+QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
+The default is INFO.
+DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
+Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
+.It Cm LogVerbose
+Specify one or more overrides to LogLevel.
+An override consists of a pattern lists that matches the source file, function
+and line number to force detailed logging for.
+For example, an override pattern of:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+kex.c:*:1000,*:kex_exchange_identification():*,packet.c:*
+.Ed
+.Pp
+would enable detailed logging for line 1000 of
+.Pa kex.c ,
+everything in the
+.Fn kex_exchange_identification
+function, and all code in the
+.Pa packet.c
+file.
+This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
+.It Cm MACs
+Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
+The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
+Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+default set.
+.Pp
+The algorithms that contain
+.Qq -etm
+calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
+These are considered safer and their use recommended.
+The supported MACs are:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
+.It
+hmac-md5
+.It
+hmac-md5-96
+.It
+hmac-sha1
+.It
+hmac-sha1-96
+.It
+hmac-sha2-256
+.It
+hmac-sha2-512
+.It
+umac-64@openssh.com
+.It
+umac-128@openssh.com
+.It
+hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com
+.It
+hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com
+.It
+hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com
+.It
+hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com
+.It
+hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com
+.It
+hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com
+.It
+umac-64-etm@openssh.com
+.It
+umac-128-etm@openssh.com
+.El
+.Pp
+The default is:
+.Bd -literal -offset indent
+umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
+hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
+hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q mac .
+.It Cm Match
+Introduces a conditional block.
+If all of the criteria on the
+.Cm Match
+line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those
+set in the global section of the config file, until either another
+.Cm Match
+line or the end of the file.
+If a keyword appears in multiple
+.Cm Match
+blocks that are satisfied, only the first instance of the keyword is
+applied.
+.Pp
+The arguments to
+.Cm Match
+are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or the single token
+.Cm All
+which matches all criteria.
+The available criteria are
+.Cm User ,
+.Cm Group ,
+.Cm Host ,
+.Cm LocalAddress ,
+.Cm LocalPort ,
+.Cm RDomain ,
+and
+.Cm Address
+(with
+.Cm RDomain
+representing the
+.Xr rdomain 4
+on which the connection was received).
+.Pp
+The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-separated
+lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the
+.Sx PATTERNS
+section of
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+.Pp
+The patterns in an
+.Cm Address
+criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
+address/masklen format,
+such as 192.0.2.0/24 or 2001:db8::/32.
+Note that the mask length provided must be consistent with the address -
+it is an error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address
+or one with bits set in this host portion of the address.
+For example, 192.0.2.0/33 and 192.0.2.0/8, respectively.
+.Pp
+Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
+.Cm Match
+keyword.
+Available keywords are
+.Cm AcceptEnv ,
+.Cm AllowAgentForwarding ,
+.Cm AllowGroups ,
+.Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding ,
+.Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
+.Cm AllowUsers ,
+.Cm AuthenticationMethods ,
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand ,
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ,
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand ,
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ,
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile ,
+.Cm Banner ,
+.Cm CASignatureAlgorithms ,
+.Cm ChannelTimeout ,
+.Cm ChrootDirectory ,
+.Cm ClientAliveCountMax ,
+.Cm ClientAliveInterval ,
+.Cm DenyGroups ,
+.Cm DenyUsers ,
+.Cm DisableForwarding ,
+.Cm ExposeAuthInfo ,
+.Cm ForceCommand ,
+.Cm GatewayPorts ,
+.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication ,
+.Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms ,
+.Cm HostbasedAuthentication ,
+.Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly ,
+.Cm IgnoreRhosts ,
+.Cm Include ,
+.Cm IPQoS ,
+.Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
+.Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
+.Cm LogLevel ,
+.Cm MaxAuthTries ,
+.Cm MaxSessions ,
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication ,
+.Cm PermitEmptyPasswords ,
+.Cm PermitListen ,
+.Cm PermitOpen ,
+.Cm PermitRootLogin ,
+.Cm PermitTTY ,
+.Cm PermitTunnel ,
+.Cm PermitUserRC ,
+.Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms ,
+.Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,
+.Cm PubkeyAuthOptions ,
+.Cm RekeyLimit ,
+.Cm RevokedKeys ,
+.Cm RDomain ,
+.Cm SetEnv ,
+.Cm StreamLocalBindMask ,
+.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
+.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
+.Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout ,
+.Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
+.Cm X11Forwarding
+and
+.Cm X11UseLocalhost .
+.It Cm MaxAuthTries
+Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per
+connection.
+Once the number of failures reaches half this value,
+additional failures are logged.
+The default is 6.
+.It Cm MaxSessions
+Specifies the maximum number of open shell, login or subsystem (e.g. sftp)
+sessions permitted per network connection.
+Multiple sessions may be established by clients that support connection
+multiplexing.
+Setting
+.Cm MaxSessions
+to 1 will effectively disable session multiplexing, whereas setting it to 0
+will prevent all shell, login and subsystem sessions while still permitting
+forwarding.
+The default is 10.
+.It Cm MaxStartups
+Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the
+SSH daemon.
+Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the
+.Cm LoginGraceTime
+expires for a connection.
+The default is 10:30:100.
+.Pp
+Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying
+the three colon separated values
+start:rate:full (e.g. "10:30:60").
+.Xr sshd 8
+will refuse connection attempts with a probability of rate/100 (30%)
+if there are currently start (10) unauthenticated connections.
+The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts
+are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches full (60).
+.It Cm ModuliFile
+Specifies the
+.Xr moduli 5
+file that contains the Diffie-Hellman groups used for the
+.Dq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
+and
+.Dq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
+key exchange methods.
+The default is
+.Pa /etc/moduli .
+.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
+Specifies whether password authentication is allowed.
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+.It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords
+When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
+server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm PermitListen
+Specifies the addresses/ports on which a remote TCP port forwarding may listen.
+The listen specification must be one of the following forms:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm PermitListen
+.Sm off
+.Ar port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm PermitListen
+.Sm off
+.Ar host : port
+.Sm on
+.El
+.Pp
+Multiple permissions may be specified by separating them with whitespace.
+An argument of
+.Cm any
+can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any listen requests.
+An argument of
+.Cm none
+can be used to prohibit all listen requests.
+The host name may contain wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+The wildcard
+.Sq *
+can also be used in place of a port number to allow all ports.
+By default all port forwarding listen requests are permitted.
+Note that the
+.Cm GatewayPorts
+option may further restrict which addresses may be listened on.
+Note also that
+.Xr ssh 1
+will request a listen host of
+.Dq localhost
+if no listen host was specifically requested, and this name is
+treated differently to explicit localhost addresses of
+.Dq 127.0.0.1
+and
+.Dq ::1 .
+.It Cm PermitOpen
+Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted.
+The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
+.It
+.Cm PermitOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar host : port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm PermitOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar IPv4_addr : port
+.Sm on
+.It
+.Cm PermitOpen
+.Sm off
+.Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port
+.Sm on
+.El
+.Pp
+Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace.
+An argument of
+.Cm any
+can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests.
+An argument of
+.Cm none
+can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests.
+The wildcard
+.Sq *
+can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or ports respectively.
+Otherwise, no pattern matching or address lookups are performed on supplied
+names.
+By default all port forwarding requests are permitted.
+.It Cm PermitRootLogin
+Specifies whether root can log in using
+.Xr ssh 1 .
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes ,
+.Cm prohibit-password ,
+.Cm forced-commands-only ,
+or
+.Cm no .
+The default is
+.Cm prohibit-password .
+.Pp
+If this option is set to
+.Cm prohibit-password
+(or its deprecated alias,
+.Cm without-password ) ,
+password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root.
+.Pp
+If this option is set to
+.Cm forced-commands-only ,
+root login with public key authentication will be allowed,
+but only if the
+.Ar command
+option has been specified
+(which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is
+normally not allowed).
+All other authentication methods are disabled for root.
+.Pp
+If this option is set to
+.Cm no ,
+root is not allowed to log in.
+.It Cm PermitTTY
+Specifies whether
+.Xr pty 4
+allocation is permitted.
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+.It Cm PermitTunnel
+Specifies whether
+.Xr tun 4
+device forwarding is allowed.
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes ,
+.Cm point-to-point
+(layer 3),
+.Cm ethernet
+(layer 2), or
+.Cm no .
+Specifying
+.Cm yes
+permits both
+.Cm point-to-point
+and
+.Cm ethernet .
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.Pp
+Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected
+.Xr tun 4
+device must allow access to the user.
+.It Cm PermitUserEnvironment
+Specifies whether
+.Pa ~/.ssh/environment
+and
+.Cm environment=
+options in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+are processed by
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+Valid options are
+.Cm yes ,
+.Cm no
+or a pattern-list specifying which environment variable names to accept
+(for example
+.Qq LANG,LC_* ) .
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access
+restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as
+.Ev LD_PRELOAD .
+.It Cm PermitUserRC
+Specifies whether any
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+file is executed.
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+.It Cm PerSourceMaxStartups
+Specifies the number of unauthenticated connections allowed from a
+given source address, or
+.Dq none
+if there is no limit.
+This limit is applied in addition to
+.Cm MaxStartups ,
+whichever is lower.
+The default is
+.Cm none .
+.It Cm PerSourceNetBlockSize
+Specifies the number of bits of source address that are grouped together
+for the purposes of applying PerSourceMaxStartups limits.
+Values for IPv4 and optionally IPv6 may be specified, separated by a colon.
+The default is
+.Cm 32:128 ,
+which means each address is considered individually.
+.It Cm PidFile
+Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the
+SSH daemon, or
+.Cm none
+to not write one.
+The default is
+.Pa /var/run/sshd.pid .
+.It Cm Port
+Specifies the port number that
+.Xr sshd 8
+listens on.
+The default is 22.
+Multiple options of this type are permitted.
+See also
+.Cm ListenAddress .
+.It Cm PrintLastLog
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs
+in interactively.
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+.It Cm PrintMotd
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should print
+.Pa /etc/motd
+when a user logs in interactively.
+(On some systems it is also printed by the shell,
+.Pa /etc/profile ,
+or equivalent.)
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for public key
+authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+.Sq +
+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq -
+character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+from the default set instead of replacing them.
+If the specified list begins with a
+.Sq ^
+character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+default set.
+The default for this option is:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+.Ed
+.Pp
+The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+.Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
+.It Cm PubkeyAuthOptions
+Sets one or more public key authentication options.
+The supported keywords are:
+.Cm none
+(the default; indicating no additional options are enabled),
+.Cm touch-required
+and
+.Cm verify-required .
+.Pp
+The
+.Cm touch-required
+option causes public key authentication using a FIDO authenticator algorithm
+(i.e.\&
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+or
+.Cm ed25519-sk )
+to always require the signature to attest that a physically present user
+explicitly confirmed the authentication (usually by touching the authenticator).
+By default,
+.Xr sshd 8
+requires user presence unless overridden with an authorized_keys option.
+The
+.Cm touch-required
+flag disables this override.
+.Pp
+The
+.Cm verify-required
+option requires a FIDO key signature attest that the user was verified,
+e.g. via a PIN.
+.Pp
+Neither the
+.Cm touch-required
+or
+.Cm verify-required
+options have any effect for other, non-FIDO, public key types.
+.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
+Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed.
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+.It Cm RekeyLimit
+Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted or received
+before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed by a maximum
+amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated.
+The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of
+.Sq K ,
+.Sq M ,
+or
+.Sq G
+to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.
+The default is between
+.Sq 1G
+and
+.Sq 4G ,
+depending on the cipher.
+The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the
+units documented in the
+.Sx TIME FORMATS
+section.
+The default value for
+.Cm RekeyLimit
+is
+.Cm default none ,
+which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
+of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
+.It Cm RequiredRSASize
+Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that
+.Xr sshd 8
+will accept.
+User and host-based authentication keys smaller than this limit will be
+refused.
+The default is
+.Cm 1024
+bits.
+Note that this limit may only be raised from the default.
+.It Cm RevokedKeys
+Specifies revoked public keys file, or
+.Cm none
+to not use one.
+Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication.
+Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will
+be refused for all users.
+Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as
+an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.It Cm RDomain
+Specifies an explicit routing domain that is applied after authentication
+has completed.
+The user session, as well as any forwarded or listening IP sockets,
+will be bound to this
+.Xr rdomain 4 .
+If the routing domain is set to
+.Cm \&%D ,
+then the domain in which the incoming connection was received will be applied.
+.It Cm SecurityKeyProvider
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+the built-in USB HID support.
+.It Cm SetEnv
+Specifies one or more environment variables to set in child sessions started
+by
+.Xr sshd 8
+as
+.Dq NAME=VALUE .
+The environment value may be quoted (e.g. if it contains whitespace
+characters).
+Environment variables set by
+.Cm SetEnv
+override the default environment and any variables specified by the user
+via
+.Cm AcceptEnv
+or
+.Cm PermitUserEnvironment .
+.It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
+Sets the octal file creation mode mask
+.Pq umask
+used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote
+port forwarding.
+This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
+.Pp
+The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is
+readable and writable only by the owner.
+Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
+socket files.
+.It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
+Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local
+or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
+If the socket file already exists and
+.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
+is not enabled,
+.Nm sshd
+will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file.
+This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
+.Pp
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes
+or
+.Cm no .
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm StrictModes
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should check file modes and ownership of the
+user's files and home directory before accepting login.
+This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their
+directory or files world-writable.
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+Note that this does not apply to
+.Cm ChrootDirectory ,
+whose permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally.
+.It Cm Subsystem
+Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon).
+Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments)
+to execute upon subsystem request.
+.Pp
+The command
+.Cm sftp-server
+implements the SFTP file transfer subsystem.
+.Pp
+Alternately the name
+.Cm internal-sftp
+implements an in-process SFTP server.
+This may simplify configurations using
+.Cm ChrootDirectory
+to force a different filesystem root on clients.
+.Pp
+By default no subsystems are defined.
+.It Cm SyslogFacility
+Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+The default is AUTH.
+.It Cm TCPKeepAlive
+Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
+other side.
+If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
+of the machines will be properly noticed.
+However, this means that
+connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
+find it annoying.
+On the other hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent,
+sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving
+.Qq ghost
+users and consuming server resources.
+.Pp
+The default is
+.Cm yes
+(to send TCP keepalive messages), and the server will notice
+if the network goes down or the client host crashes.
+This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
+.Pp
+To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
+Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are
+trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or
+.Cm none
+to not use one.
+Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and comments starting with
+.Ql #
+are allowed.
+If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing CA key
+listed in this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user
+listed in the certificate's principals list.
+Note that certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted
+for authentication using
+.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys .
+For more details on certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in
+.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.It Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout
+Specifies whether and how quickly
+.Xr sshd 8
+should close client connections with no open channels.
+Open channels include active shell, command execution or subsystem
+sessions, connected network, socket, agent or X11 forwardings.
+Forwarding listeners, such as those from the
+.Xr ssh 1
+.Fl R
+flag, are not considered as open channels and do not prevent the timeout.
+The timeout value
+is specified in seconds or may use any of the units documented in the
+.Sx TIME FORMATS
+section.
+.Pp
+Note that this timeout starts when the client connection completes
+user authentication but before the client has an opportunity to open any
+channels.
+Caution should be used when using short timeout values, as they may not
+provide sufficient time for the client to request and open its channels
+before terminating the connection.
+.Pp
+The default
+.Cm none
+is to never expire connections for having no open channels.
+This option may be useful in conjunction with
+.Cm ChannelTimeout .
+.It Cm UseDNS
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should look up the remote host name, and to check that
+the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the
+very same IP address.
+.Pp
+If this option is set to
+.Cm no
+(the default) then only addresses and not host names may be used in
+.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
+.Cm from
+and
+.Nm
+.Cm Match
+.Cm Host
+directives.
+.It Cm UsePAM
+Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface.
+If set to
+.Cm yes
+this will enable PAM authentication using
+.Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+and
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication
+in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all
+authentication types.
+.Pp
+Because PAM keyboard-interactive authentication usually serves an equivalent
+role to password authentication, you should disable either
+.Cm PasswordAuthentication
+or
+.Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication .
+.Pp
+If
+.Cm UsePAM
+is enabled, you will not be able to run
+.Xr sshd 8
+as a non-root user.
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.It Cm VersionAddendum
+Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
+sent by the server upon connection.
+The default is
+.Cm none .
+.It Cm X11DisplayOffset
+Specifies the first display number available for
+.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
+X11 forwarding.
+This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
+The default is 10.
+.It Cm X11Forwarding
+Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes
+or
+.Cm no .
+The default is
+.Cm no .
+.Pp
+When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to
+the server and to client displays if the
+.Xr sshd 8
+proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see
+.Cm X11UseLocalhost ) ,
+though this is not the default.
+Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data
+verification and substitution occur on the client side.
+The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11
+display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests
+forwarding (see the warnings for
+.Cm ForwardX11
+in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ) .
+A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to
+protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly
+requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a
+.Cm no
+setting.
+.Pp
+Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from
+forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders.
+.It Cm X11UseLocalhost
+Specifies whether
+.Xr sshd 8
+should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to
+the wildcard address.
+By default,
+sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the
+hostname part of the
+.Ev DISPLAY
+environment variable to
+.Cm localhost .
+This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display.
+However, some older X11 clients may not function with this
+configuration.
+.Cm X11UseLocalhost
+may be set to
+.Cm no
+to specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wildcard
+address.
+The argument must be
+.Cm yes
+or
+.Cm no .
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
+.It Cm XAuthLocation
+Specifies the full pathname of the
+.Xr xauth 1
+program, or
+.Cm none
+to not use one.
+The default is
+.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth .
+.El
+.Sh TIME FORMATS
+.Xr sshd 8
+command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time
+may be expressed using a sequence of the form:
+.Sm off
+.Ar time Op Ar qualifier ,
+.Sm on
+where
+.Ar time
+is a positive integer value and
+.Ar qualifier
+is one of the following:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
+.It Aq Cm none
+seconds
+.It Cm s | Cm S
+seconds
+.It Cm m | Cm M
+minutes
+.It Cm h | Cm H
+hours
+.It Cm d | Cm D
+days
+.It Cm w | Cm W
+weeks
+.El
+.Pp
+Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate
+the total time value.
+.Pp
+Time format examples:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
+.It 600
+600 seconds (10 minutes)
+.It 10m
+10 minutes
+.It 1h30m
+1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes)
+.El
+.Sh TOKENS
+Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens,
+which are expanded at runtime:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact
+.It %%
+A literal
+.Sq % .
+.It \&%D
+The routing domain in which the incoming connection was received.
+.It %F
+The fingerprint of the CA key.
+.It %f
+The fingerprint of the key or certificate.
+.It %h
+The home directory of the user.
+.It %i
+The key ID in the certificate.
+.It %K
+The base64-encoded CA key.
+.It %k
+The base64-encoded key or certificate for authentication.
+.It %s
+The serial number of the certificate.
+.It \&%T
+The type of the CA key.
+.It %t
+The key or certificate type.
+.It \&%U
+The numeric user ID of the target user.
+.It %u
+The username.
+.El
+.Pp
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
+accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, %U, and %u.
+.Pp
+.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
+accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
+.Pp
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
+accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, %k, %s, %T, %t, %U, and %u.
+.Pp
+.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
+accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
+.Pp
+.Cm ChrootDirectory
+accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
+.Pp
+.Cm RoutingDomain
+accepts the token %D.
+.Sh FILES
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
+Contains configuration data for
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended
+(though not necessary) that it be world-readable.
+.El
+.Sh SEE ALSO
+.Xr sftp-server 8 ,
+.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh AUTHORS
+.An -nosplit
+OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+ssh 1.2.12 release by
+.An Tatu Ylonen .
+.An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , Niels Provos ,
+.An Theo de Raadt
+and
+.An Dug Song
+removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+created OpenSSH.
+.An Markus Friedl
+contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+.An Niels Provos
+and
+.An Markus Friedl
+contributed support for privilege separation.
diff --git a/ssherr.c b/ssherr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bd954aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssherr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: ssherr.c,v 1.10 2020/01/25 23:13:09 djm Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+const char *
+ssh_err(int n)
+{
+	switch (n) {
+	case SSH_ERR_SUCCESS:
+		return "success";
+	case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+		return "unexpected internal error";
+	case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
+		return "memory allocation failed";
+	case SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE:
+		return "incomplete message";
+	case SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT:
+		return "invalid format";
+	case SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE:
+		return "bignum is negative";
+	case SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE:
+		return "string is too large";
+	case SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE:
+		return "bignum is too large";
+	case SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE:
+		return "elliptic curve point is too large";
+	case SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE:
+		return "insufficient buffer space";
+	case SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:
+		return "invalid argument";
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH:
+		return "key bits do not match";
+	case SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID:
+		return "invalid elliptic curve";
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH:
+		return "key type does not match";
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN:
+		return "unknown or unsupported key type";
+	case SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH:
+		return "elliptic curve does not match";
+	case SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT:
+		return "plain key provided where certificate required";
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB:
+		return "key lacks certificate data";
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE:
+		return "unknown/unsupported certificate type";
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY:
+		return "invalid certificate signing key";
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE:
+		return "invalid elliptic curve value";
+	case SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID:
+		return "incorrect signature";
+	case SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR:
+		return "error in libcrypto";  /* XXX fetch and return */
+	case SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA:
+		return "unexpected bytes remain after decoding";
+	case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
+		return strerror(errno);
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID:
+		return "invalid certificate";
+	case SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION:
+		return "communication with agent failed";
+	case SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE:
+		return "agent refused operation";
+	case SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE:
+		return "DH GEX group out of range";
+	case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
+		return "disconnected";
+	case SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID:
+		return "message authentication code incorrect";
+	case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH:
+		return "no matching cipher found";
+	case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH:
+		return "no matching MAC found";
+	case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH:
+		return "no matching compression method found";
+	case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH:
+		return "no matching key exchange method found";
+	case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH:
+		return "no matching host key type found";
+	case SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH:
+		return "protocol version mismatch";
+	case SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
+		return "could not read protocol version";
+	case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED:
+		return "could not load host key";
+	case SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY:
+		return "rekeying not supported by peer";
+	case SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT:
+		return "passphrase is too short (minimum five characters)";
+	case SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED:
+		return "file changed while reading";
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER:
+		return "key encrypted using unsupported cipher";
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE:
+		return "incorrect passphrase supplied to decrypt private key";
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS:
+		return "bad permissions";
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH:
+		return "certificate does not match key";
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND:
+		return "key not found";
+	case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT:
+		return "agent not present";
+	case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES:
+		return "agent contains no identities";
+	case SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY:
+		return "internal error: buffer is read-only";
+	case SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC:
+		return "KRL file has invalid magic number";
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
+		return "Key is revoked";
+	case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
+		return "Connection closed";
+	case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
+		return "Connection timed out";
+	case SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT:
+		return "Connection corrupted";
+	case SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR:
+		return "Protocol error";
+	case SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH:
+		return "Invalid key length";
+	case SSH_ERR_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE:
+		return "number is too large";
+	case SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED:
+		return "signature algorithm not supported";
+	case SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED:
+		return "requested feature not supported";
+	case SSH_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND:
+		return "device not found";
+	default:
+		return "unknown error";
+	}
+}
diff --git a/ssherr.h b/ssherr.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..085e752
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssherr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: ssherr.h,v 1.8 2020/01/25 23:13:09 djm Exp $	*/
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SSHERR_H
+#define _SSHERR_H
+
+/* XXX are these too granular? not granular enough? I can't decide - djm */
+
+/* Error codes */
+#define SSH_ERR_SUCCESS				0
+#define SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR			-1
+#define SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL			-2
+#define SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE		-3
+#define SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT			-4
+#define SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE		-5
+#define SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE		-6
+#define SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE		-7
+#define SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE		-8
+#define SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE			-9
+#define SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT		-10
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH		-11
+#define SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID		-12
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH		-13
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN		-14 /* XXX UNSUPPORTED? */
+#define SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH		-15
+#define SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT			-16
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB		-17
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE		-18
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY	-19
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE		-20
+#define SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID		-21
+#define SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR			-22
+#define SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA	-23
+#define SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR			-24
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID		-25
+#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION		-26
+#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE			-27
+#define SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE		-28
+#define SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED			-29
+#define SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID			-30
+#define SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH		-31
+#define SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH		-32
+#define SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH		-33
+#define SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH		-34
+#define SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH		-35
+#define SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED		-36
+#define SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH		-37
+#define SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION		-38
+#define SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY			-39
+#define SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT		-40
+#define SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED			-41
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER		-42
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE		-43
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS		-44
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH		-45
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND			-46
+#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT		-47
+#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES		-48
+#define SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY		-49
+#define SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC			-50
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED			-51
+#define SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED			-52
+#define SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT			-53
+#define SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT			-54
+#define SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR			-55
+#define SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH			-56
+#define SSH_ERR_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE		-57
+#define SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED		-58
+#define SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED		-59
+#define SSH_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND		-60
+
+/* Translate a numeric error code to a human-readable error string */
+const char *ssh_err(int n);
+
+#endif /* _SSHERR_H */
diff --git a/sshkey-xmss.c b/sshkey-xmss.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..818aba9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshkey-xmss.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1113 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.c,v 1.12 2022/10/28 00:39:29 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/uio.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H
+# include <sys/file.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshkey-xmss.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#include "xmss_fast.h"
+
+/* opaque internal XMSS state */
+#define XMSS_MAGIC		"xmss-state-v1"
+#define XMSS_CIPHERNAME		"aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
+struct ssh_xmss_state {
+	xmss_params	params;
+	u_int32_t	n, w, h, k;
+
+	bds_state	bds;
+	u_char		*stack;
+	u_int32_t	stackoffset;
+	u_char		*stacklevels;
+	u_char		*auth;
+	u_char		*keep;
+	u_char		*th_nodes;
+	u_char		*retain;
+	treehash_inst	*treehash;
+
+	u_int32_t	idx;		/* state read from file */
+	u_int32_t	maxidx;		/* restricted # of signatures */
+	int		have_state;	/* .state file exists */
+	int		lockfd;		/* locked in sshkey_xmss_get_state() */
+	u_char		allow_update;	/* allow sshkey_xmss_update_state() */
+	char		*enc_ciphername;/* encrypt state with cipher */
+	u_char		*enc_keyiv;	/* encrypt state with key */
+	u_int32_t	enc_keyiv_len;	/* length of enc_keyiv */
+};
+
+int	 sshkey_xmss_init_bds_state(struct sshkey *);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_init_enc_key(struct sshkey *, const char *);
+void	 sshkey_xmss_free_bds(struct sshkey *);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file(struct sshkey *, const char *,
+	    int *, int);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_encrypt_state(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
+	    struct sshbuf **);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_decrypt_state(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
+	    struct sshbuf **);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
+
+#define PRINT(...) do { if (printerror) sshlog(__FILE__, __func__, __LINE__, \
+    0, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, NULL, __VA_ARGS__); } while (0)
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_init(struct sshkey *key, const char *name)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state;
+
+	if (key->xmss_state != NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	if (name == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	state = calloc(sizeof(struct ssh_xmss_state), 1);
+	if (state == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if (strcmp(name, XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME) == 0) {
+		state->n = 32;
+		state->w = 16;
+		state->h = 10;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H16_NAME) == 0) {
+		state->n = 32;
+		state->w = 16;
+		state->h = 16;
+	} else if (strcmp(name, XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H20_NAME) == 0) {
+		state->n = 32;
+		state->w = 16;
+		state->h = 20;
+	} else {
+		free(state);
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+	}
+	if ((key->xmss_name = strdup(name)) == NULL) {
+		free(state);
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+	state->k = 2;	/* XXX hardcoded */
+	state->lockfd = -1;
+	if (xmss_set_params(&state->params, state->n, state->h, state->w,
+	    state->k) != 0) {
+		free(state);
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	}
+	key->xmss_state = state;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+sshkey_xmss_free_state(struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
+
+	sshkey_xmss_free_bds(key);
+	if (state) {
+		if (state->enc_keyiv) {
+			explicit_bzero(state->enc_keyiv, state->enc_keyiv_len);
+			free(state->enc_keyiv);
+		}
+		free(state->enc_ciphername);
+		free(state);
+	}
+	key->xmss_state = NULL;
+}
+
+#define SSH_XMSS_K2_MAGIC	"k=2"
+#define num_stack(x)		((x->h+1)*(x->n))
+#define num_stacklevels(x)	(x->h+1)
+#define num_auth(x)		((x->h)*(x->n))
+#define num_keep(x)		((x->h >> 1)*(x->n))
+#define num_th_nodes(x)		((x->h - x->k)*(x->n))
+#define num_retain(x)		(((1ULL << x->k) - x->k - 1) * (x->n))
+#define num_treehash(x)		((x->h) - (x->k))
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_init_bds_state(struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
+	u_int32_t i;
+
+	state->stackoffset = 0;
+	if ((state->stack = calloc(num_stack(state), 1)) == NULL ||
+	    (state->stacklevels = calloc(num_stacklevels(state), 1))== NULL ||
+	    (state->auth = calloc(num_auth(state), 1)) == NULL ||
+	    (state->keep = calloc(num_keep(state), 1)) == NULL ||
+	    (state->th_nodes = calloc(num_th_nodes(state), 1)) == NULL ||
+	    (state->retain = calloc(num_retain(state), 1)) == NULL ||
+	    (state->treehash = calloc(num_treehash(state),
+	    sizeof(treehash_inst))) == NULL) {
+		sshkey_xmss_free_bds(key);
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < state->h - state->k; i++)
+		state->treehash[i].node = &state->th_nodes[state->n*i];
+	xmss_set_bds_state(&state->bds, state->stack, state->stackoffset,
+	    state->stacklevels, state->auth, state->keep, state->treehash,
+	    state->retain, 0);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+void
+sshkey_xmss_free_bds(struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
+
+	if (state == NULL)
+		return;
+	free(state->stack);
+	free(state->stacklevels);
+	free(state->auth);
+	free(state->keep);
+	free(state->th_nodes);
+	free(state->retain);
+	free(state->treehash);
+	state->stack = NULL;
+	state->stacklevels = NULL;
+	state->auth = NULL;
+	state->keep = NULL;
+	state->th_nodes = NULL;
+	state->retain = NULL;
+	state->treehash = NULL;
+}
+
+void *
+sshkey_xmss_params(const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
+
+	if (state == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	return &state->params;
+}
+
+void *
+sshkey_xmss_bds_state(const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
+
+	if (state == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	return &state->bds;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_siglen(const struct sshkey *key, size_t *lenp)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
+
+	if (lenp == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (state == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	*lenp = 4 + state->n +
+	    state->params.wots_par.keysize +
+	    state->h * state->n;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+size_t
+sshkey_xmss_pklen(const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
+
+	if (state == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	return state->n * 2;
+}
+
+size_t
+sshkey_xmss_sklen(const struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
+
+	if (state == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	return state->n * 4 + 4;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_init_enc_key(struct sshkey *k, const char *ciphername)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
+	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+	size_t keylen = 0, ivlen = 0;
+
+	if (state == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if ((state->enc_ciphername = strdup(ciphername)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
+	ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
+	state->enc_keyiv_len = keylen + ivlen;
+	if ((state->enc_keyiv = calloc(state->enc_keyiv_len, 1)) == NULL) {
+		free(state->enc_ciphername);
+		state->enc_ciphername = NULL;
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+	arc4random_buf(state->enc_keyiv, state->enc_keyiv_len);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
+	int r;
+
+	if (state == NULL || state->enc_keyiv == NULL ||
+	    state->enc_ciphername == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, state->enc_ciphername)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->enc_keyiv,
+	    state->enc_keyiv_len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
+	size_t len;
+	int r;
+
+	if (state == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &state->enc_ciphername, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->enc_keyiv, &len)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	state->enc_keyiv_len = len;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_serialize_pk_info(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
+	u_char have_info = 1;
+	u_int32_t idx;
+	int r;
+
+	if (state == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (opts != SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO)
+		return 0;
+	idx = k->xmss_sk ? PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk) : state->idx;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_info)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, idx)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->maxidx)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_deserialize_pk_info(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
+	u_char have_info;
+	int r;
+
+	if (state == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	/* optional */
+	if (sshbuf_len(b) == 0)
+		return 0;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_info)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (have_info != 1)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->idx)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->maxidx)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_generate_private_key(struct sshkey *k, int bits)
+{
+	int r;
+	const char *name;
+
+	if (bits == 10) {
+		name = XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME;
+	} else if (bits == 16) {
+		name = XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H16_NAME;
+	} else if (bits == 20) {
+		name = XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H20_NAME;
+	} else {
+		name = XMSS_DEFAULT_NAME;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_xmss_init(k, name)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_xmss_init_bds_state(k)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_xmss_init_enc_key(k, XMSS_CIPHERNAME)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((k->xmss_pk = malloc(sshkey_xmss_pklen(k))) == NULL ||
+	    (k->xmss_sk = malloc(sshkey_xmss_sklen(k))) == NULL) {
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+	xmss_keypair(k->xmss_pk, k->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_bds_state(k),
+	    sshkey_xmss_params(k));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename,
+    int *have_file, int printerror)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *enc = NULL;
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR, r, fd = -1;
+	u_int32_t len;
+	unsigned char buf[4], *data = NULL;
+
+	*have_file = 0;
+	if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) >= 0) {
+		*have_file = 1;
+		if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
+			PRINT("corrupt state file: %s", filename);
+			goto done;
+		}
+		len = PEEK_U32(buf);
+		if ((data = calloc(len, 1)) == NULL) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto done;
+		}
+		if (atomicio(read, fd, data, len) != len) {
+			PRINT("cannot read blob: %s", filename);
+			goto done;
+		}
+		if ((enc = sshbuf_from(data, len)) == NULL) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto done;
+		}
+		sshkey_xmss_free_bds(k);
+		if ((r = sshkey_xmss_decrypt_state(k, enc, &b)) != 0) {
+			ret = r;
+			goto done;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0) {
+			ret = r;
+			goto done;
+		}
+		ret = 0;
+	}
+done:
+	if (fd != -1)
+		close(fd);
+	free(data);
+	sshbuf_free(enc);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_get_state(const struct sshkey *k, int printerror)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
+	u_int32_t idx = 0;
+	char *filename = NULL;
+	char *statefile = NULL, *ostatefile = NULL, *lockfile = NULL;
+	int lockfd = -1, have_state = 0, have_ostate, tries = 0;
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, r;
+
+	if (state == NULL)
+		goto done;
+	/*
+	 * If maxidx is set, then we are allowed a limited number
+	 * of signatures, but don't need to access the disk.
+	 * Otherwise we need to deal with the on-disk state.
+	 */
+	if (state->maxidx) {
+		/* xmss_sk always contains the current state */
+		idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk);
+		if (idx < state->maxidx) {
+			state->allow_update = 1;
+			return 0;
+		}
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	}
+	if ((filename = k->xmss_filename) == NULL)
+		goto done;
+	if (asprintf(&lockfile, "%s.lock", filename) == -1 ||
+	    asprintf(&statefile, "%s.state", filename) == -1 ||
+	    asprintf(&ostatefile, "%s.ostate", filename) == -1) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((lockfd = open(lockfile, O_CREAT|O_RDONLY, 0600)) == -1) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		PRINT("cannot open/create: %s", lockfile);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	while (flock(lockfd, LOCK_EX|LOCK_NB) == -1) {
+		if (errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+			PRINT("cannot lock: %s", lockfile);
+			goto done;
+		}
+		if (++tries > 10) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+			PRINT("giving up on: %s", lockfile);
+			goto done;
+		}
+		usleep(1000*100*tries);
+	}
+	/* XXX no longer const */
+	if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file((struct sshkey *)k,
+	    statefile, &have_state, printerror)) != 0) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file((struct sshkey *)k,
+		    ostatefile, &have_ostate, printerror)) == 0) {
+			state->allow_update = 1;
+			r = sshkey_xmss_forward_state(k, 1);
+			state->idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk);
+			state->allow_update = 0;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!have_state && !have_ostate) {
+		/* check that bds state is initialized */
+		if (state->bds.auth == NULL)
+			goto done;
+		PRINT("start from scratch idx 0: %u", state->idx);
+	} else if (r != 0) {
+		ret = r;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (state->idx + 1 < state->idx) {
+		PRINT("state wrap: %u", state->idx);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	state->have_state = have_state;
+	state->lockfd = lockfd;
+	state->allow_update = 1;
+	lockfd = -1;
+	ret = 0;
+done:
+	if (lockfd != -1)
+		close(lockfd);
+	free(lockfile);
+	free(statefile);
+	free(ostatefile);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_forward_state(const struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t reserve)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
+	u_char *sig = NULL;
+	size_t required_siglen;
+	unsigned long long smlen;
+	u_char data;
+	int ret, r;
+
+	if (state == NULL || !state->allow_update)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (reserve == 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (state->idx + reserve <= state->idx)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((r = sshkey_xmss_siglen(k, &required_siglen)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((sig = malloc(required_siglen)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	while (reserve-- > 0) {
+		state->idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk);
+		smlen = required_siglen;
+		if ((ret = xmss_sign(k->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_bds_state(k),
+		    sig, &smlen, &data, 0, sshkey_xmss_params(k))) != 0) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	free(sig);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_update_state(const struct sshkey *k, int printerror)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *enc = NULL;
+	u_int32_t idx = 0;
+	unsigned char buf[4];
+	char *filename = NULL;
+	char *statefile = NULL, *ostatefile = NULL, *nstatefile = NULL;
+	int fd = -1;
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	if (state == NULL || !state->allow_update)
+		return ret;
+	if (state->maxidx) {
+		/* no update since the number of signatures is limited */
+		ret = 0;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk);
+	if (idx == state->idx) {
+		/* no signature happened, no need to update */
+		ret = 0;
+		goto done;
+	} else if (idx != state->idx + 1) {
+		PRINT("more than one signature happened: idx %u state %u",
+		    idx, state->idx);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	state->idx = idx;
+	if ((filename = k->xmss_filename) == NULL)
+		goto done;
+	if (asprintf(&statefile, "%s.state", filename) == -1 ||
+	    asprintf(&ostatefile, "%s.ostate", filename) == -1 ||
+	    asprintf(&nstatefile, "%s.nstate", filename) == -1) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	unlink(nstatefile);
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b)) != 0) {
+		PRINT("SERLIALIZE FAILED: %d", ret);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_encrypt_state(k, b, &enc)) != 0) {
+		PRINT("ENCRYPT FAILED: %d", ret);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((fd = open(nstatefile, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_EXCL, 0600)) == -1) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		PRINT("open new state file: %s", nstatefile);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	POKE_U32(buf, sshbuf_len(enc));
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		PRINT("write new state file hdr: %s", nstatefile);
+		close(fd);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(enc), sshbuf_len(enc)) !=
+	    sshbuf_len(enc)) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		PRINT("write new state file data: %s", nstatefile);
+		close(fd);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (fsync(fd) == -1) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		PRINT("sync new state file: %s", nstatefile);
+		close(fd);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (close(fd) == -1) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		PRINT("close new state file: %s", nstatefile);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (state->have_state) {
+		unlink(ostatefile);
+		if (link(statefile, ostatefile)) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+			PRINT("backup state %s to %s", statefile, ostatefile);
+			goto done;
+		}
+	}
+	if (rename(nstatefile, statefile) == -1) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		PRINT("rename %s to %s", nstatefile, statefile);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	ret = 0;
+done:
+	if (state->lockfd != -1) {
+		close(state->lockfd);
+		state->lockfd = -1;
+	}
+	if (nstatefile)
+		unlink(nstatefile);
+	free(statefile);
+	free(ostatefile);
+	free(nstatefile);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	sshbuf_free(enc);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
+	treehash_inst *th;
+	u_int32_t i, node;
+	int r;
+
+	if (state == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (state->stack == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	state->stackoffset = state->bds.stackoffset;	/* copy back */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, SSH_XMSS_K2_MAGIC)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->idx)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->stack, num_stack(state))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->stackoffset)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->stacklevels, num_stacklevels(state))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->auth, num_auth(state))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->keep, num_keep(state))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->th_nodes, num_th_nodes(state))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->retain, num_retain(state))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, num_treehash(state))) != 0)
+		return r;
+	for (i = 0; i < num_treehash(state); i++) {
+		th = &state->treehash[i];
+		node = th->node - state->th_nodes;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, th->h)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, th->next_idx)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, th->stackusage)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, th->completed)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, node)) != 0)
+			return r;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	u_char have_stack, have_filename, have_enc;
+
+	if (state == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, opts)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	switch (opts) {
+	case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE:
+		r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b);
+		break;
+	case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL:
+		if ((r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b);
+		break;
+	case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD:
+		/* all of stack/filename/enc are optional */
+		have_stack = state->stack != NULL;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_stack)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		if (have_stack) {
+			state->idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk);	/* update */
+			if ((r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b)) != 0)
+				return r;
+		}
+		have_filename = k->xmss_filename != NULL;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_filename)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		if (have_filename &&
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, k->xmss_filename)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		have_enc = state->enc_keyiv != NULL;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_enc)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		if (have_enc &&
+		    (r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->maxidx)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, state->allow_update)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		break;
+	case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT:
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	default:
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		break;
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
+	treehash_inst *th;
+	u_int32_t i, lh, node;
+	size_t ls, lsl, la, lk, ln, lr;
+	char *magic;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (state == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (k->xmss_sk == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((state->treehash = calloc(num_treehash(state),
+	    sizeof(treehash_inst))) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &magic, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->idx)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->stack, &ls)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->stackoffset)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->stacklevels, &lsl)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->auth, &la)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->keep, &lk)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->th_nodes, &ln)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->retain, &lr)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &lh)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (strcmp(magic, SSH_XMSS_K2_MAGIC) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* XXX check stackoffset */
+	if (ls != num_stack(state) ||
+	    lsl != num_stacklevels(state) ||
+	    la != num_auth(state) ||
+	    lk != num_keep(state) ||
+	    ln != num_th_nodes(state) ||
+	    lr != num_retain(state) ||
+	    lh != num_treehash(state)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < num_treehash(state); i++) {
+		th = &state->treehash[i];
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &th->h)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &th->next_idx)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &th->stackusage)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &th->completed)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &node)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if (node < num_th_nodes(state))
+			th->node = &state->th_nodes[node];
+	}
+	POKE_U32(k->xmss_sk, state->idx);
+	xmss_set_bds_state(&state->bds, state->stack, state->stackoffset,
+	    state->stacklevels, state->auth, state->keep, state->treehash,
+	    state->retain, 0);
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(magic);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
+	enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts;
+	u_char have_state, have_stack, have_filename, have_enc;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_state)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	opts = have_state;
+	switch (opts) {
+	case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT:
+		r = 0;
+		break;
+	case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD:
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_stack)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		if (have_stack &&
+		    (r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_filename)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		if (have_filename &&
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &k->xmss_filename, NULL)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_enc)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		if (have_enc &&
+		    (r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->maxidx)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &state->allow_update)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		break;
+	case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE:
+		if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		break;
+	case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL:
+		if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0)
+			return r;
+		break;
+	default:
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		break;
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_encrypt_state(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
+   struct sshbuf **retp)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
+	struct sshbuf *encrypted = NULL, *encoded = NULL, *padded = NULL;
+	struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
+	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+	u_char *cp, *key, *iv = NULL;
+	size_t i, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen, encrypted_len, aadlen;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (retp != NULL)
+		*retp = NULL;
+	if (state == NULL ||
+	    state->enc_keyiv == NULL ||
+	    state->enc_ciphername == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
+	keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
+	ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
+	authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
+	if (state->enc_keyiv_len != keylen + ivlen) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	key = state->enc_keyiv;
+	if ((encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (padded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (iv = malloc(ivlen)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* replace first 4 bytes of IV with index to ensure uniqueness */
+	memcpy(iv, key + keylen, ivlen);
+	POKE_U32(iv, state->idx);
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, XMSS_MAGIC, sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, state->idx)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* padded state will be encrypted */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_putb(padded, b)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	i = 0;
+	while (sshbuf_len(padded) % blocksize) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(padded, ++i & 0xff)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	encrypted_len = sshbuf_len(padded);
+
+	/* header including the length of state is used as AAD */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, encrypted_len)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	aadlen = sshbuf_len(encoded);
+
+	/* concat header and state */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_putb(encoded, padded)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* reserve space for encryption of encoded data plus auth tag */
+	/* encrypt at offset addlen */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encrypted,
+	    encrypted_len + aadlen + authlen, &cp)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
+	    iv, ivlen, 1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp, sshbuf_ptr(encoded),
+	    encrypted_len, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if (retp != NULL) {
+		*retp = encrypted;
+		encrypted = NULL;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(padded);
+	sshbuf_free(encoded);
+	sshbuf_free(encrypted);
+	cipher_free(ciphercontext);
+	free(iv);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_decrypt_state(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *encoded,
+   struct sshbuf **retp)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
+	struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *decrypted = NULL;
+	struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
+	const struct sshcipher *cipher = NULL;
+	u_char *key, *iv = NULL, *dp;
+	size_t keylen, ivlen, authlen, aadlen;
+	u_int blocksize, encrypted_len, index;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (retp != NULL)
+		*retp = NULL;
+	if (state == NULL ||
+	    state->enc_keyiv == NULL ||
+	    state->enc_ciphername == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
+	keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
+	ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
+	authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
+	if (state->enc_keyiv_len != keylen + ivlen) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	key = state->enc_keyiv;
+
+	if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(encoded)) == NULL ||
+	    (decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (iv = malloc(ivlen)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* check magic */
+	if (sshbuf_len(encoded) < sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC) ||
+	    memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(encoded), XMSS_MAGIC, sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC))) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* parse public portion */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(encoded, sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(encoded, &index)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(encoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* check size of encrypted key blob */
+	if (encrypted_len < blocksize || (encrypted_len % blocksize) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */
+	if (sshbuf_len(encoded) < authlen ||
+	    sshbuf_len(encoded) - authlen < encrypted_len) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	aadlen = sshbuf_len(copy) - sshbuf_len(encoded);
+
+	/* replace first 4 bytes of IV with index to ensure uniqueness */
+	memcpy(iv, key + keylen, ivlen);
+	POKE_U32(iv, index);
+
+	/* decrypt private state of key */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, aadlen + encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
+	    iv, ivlen, 0)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(copy),
+	    encrypted_len, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* there should be no trailing data */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(encoded, encrypted_len + authlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (sshbuf_len(encoded) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* remove AAD */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decrypted, aadlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* XXX encrypted includes unchecked padding */
+
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+	if (retp != NULL) {
+		*retp = decrypted;
+		decrypted = NULL;
+	}
+ out:
+	cipher_free(ciphercontext);
+	sshbuf_free(copy);
+	sshbuf_free(decrypted);
+	free(iv);
+	return r;
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
+	u_int32_t idx;
+
+	if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_XMSS && state &&
+	    state->maxidx) {
+		idx = k->xmss_sk ? PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk) : state->idx;
+		if (idx < state->maxidx)
+			return state->maxidx - idx;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign)
+{
+	struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
+
+	if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (maxsign == 0)
+		return 0;
+	if (state->idx + maxsign < state->idx)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	state->maxidx = state->idx + maxsign;
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/sshkey-xmss.h b/sshkey-xmss.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab8b9c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshkey-xmss.h
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.h,v 1.4 2022/10/28 00:39:29 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2017 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef SSHKEY_XMSS_H
+#define SSHKEY_XMSS_H
+
+#define XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME	"XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H10"
+#define XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H16_NAME	"XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H16"
+#define XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H20_NAME	"XMSS_SHA2-256_W16_H20"
+#define XMSS_DEFAULT_NAME		XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME
+
+size_t	 sshkey_xmss_pklen(const struct sshkey *);
+size_t	 sshkey_xmss_sklen(const struct sshkey *);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_init(struct sshkey *, const char *);
+void	 sshkey_xmss_free_state(struct sshkey *);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_generate_private_key(struct sshkey *, int);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
+	    enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_serialize_pk_info(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
+	    enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_deserialize_pk_info(struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
+
+int	 sshkey_xmss_siglen(const struct sshkey *, size_t *);
+void	*sshkey_xmss_params(const struct sshkey *);
+void	*sshkey_xmss_bds_state(const struct sshkey *);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_get_state(const struct sshkey *, int);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *, u_int32_t);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_forward_state(const struct sshkey *, u_int32_t);
+int	 sshkey_xmss_update_state(const struct sshkey *, int);
+u_int32_t sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *);
+
+#endif /* SSHKEY_XMSS_H */
diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4371225
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3663 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.134 2022/10/28 02:47:04 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010,2011 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+#include <util.h>
+#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */
+
+#include "ssh2.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+#include "sshkey-xmss.h"
+#include "xmss_fast.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+/* openssh private key file format */
+#define MARK_BEGIN		"-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define MARK_END		"-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+#define MARK_BEGIN_LEN		(sizeof(MARK_BEGIN) - 1)
+#define MARK_END_LEN		(sizeof(MARK_END) - 1)
+#define KDFNAME			"bcrypt"
+#define AUTH_MAGIC		"openssh-key-v1"
+#define SALT_LEN		16
+#define DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME	"aes256-ctr"
+#define	DEFAULT_ROUNDS		16
+
+/* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */
+#define LEGACY_BEGIN		"SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n"
+
+/*
+ * Constants relating to "shielding" support; protection of keys expected
+ * to remain in memory for long durations
+ */
+#define SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN	(16 * 1024)
+#define SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER		"aes256-ctr" /* XXX want AES-EME* */
+#define SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH	SSH_DIGEST_SHA512
+
+int	sshkey_private_serialize_opt(struct sshkey *key,
+    struct sshbuf *buf, enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
+static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *buf,
+    struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert);
+
+/* Supported key types */
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ed25519_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ed25519_cert_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ed25519_sk_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ed25519_sk_cert_impl;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+#  ifdef ENABLE_SK
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_sk_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_sk_cert_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_sk_webauthn_impl;
+#  endif /* ENABLE_SK */
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp256_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp256_cert_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp384_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp384_cert_impl;
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp521_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_ecdsa_nistp521_cert_impl;
+#  endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_cert_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha256_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha256_cert_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha512_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_rsa_sha512_cert_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_dss_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_dsa_cert_impl;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_impl;
+extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_cert_impl;
+#endif
+
+const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpls[] = {
+	&sshkey_ed25519_impl,
+	&sshkey_ed25519_cert_impl,
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK
+	&sshkey_ed25519_sk_impl,
+	&sshkey_ed25519_sk_cert_impl,
+#endif
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	&sshkey_ecdsa_nistp256_impl,
+	&sshkey_ecdsa_nistp256_cert_impl,
+	&sshkey_ecdsa_nistp384_impl,
+	&sshkey_ecdsa_nistp384_cert_impl,
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+	&sshkey_ecdsa_nistp521_impl,
+	&sshkey_ecdsa_nistp521_cert_impl,
+#  endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+#  ifdef ENABLE_SK
+	&sshkey_ecdsa_sk_impl,
+	&sshkey_ecdsa_sk_cert_impl,
+	&sshkey_ecdsa_sk_webauthn_impl,
+#  endif /* ENABLE_SK */
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+	&sshkey_dss_impl,
+	&sshkey_dsa_cert_impl,
+	&sshkey_rsa_impl,
+	&sshkey_rsa_cert_impl,
+	&sshkey_rsa_sha256_impl,
+	&sshkey_rsa_sha256_cert_impl,
+	&sshkey_rsa_sha512_impl,
+	&sshkey_rsa_sha512_cert_impl,
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+	&sshkey_xmss_impl,
+	&sshkey_xmss_cert_impl,
+#endif
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const struct sshkey_impl *
+sshkey_impl_from_type(int type)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if (keyimpls[i]->type == type)
+			return keyimpls[i];
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static const struct sshkey_impl *
+sshkey_impl_from_type_nid(int type, int nid)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if (keyimpls[i]->type == type &&
+		    (keyimpls[i]->nid == 0 || keyimpls[i]->nid == nid))
+			return keyimpls[i];
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static const struct sshkey_impl *
+sshkey_impl_from_key(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	if (k == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	return sshkey_impl_from_type_nid(k->type, k->ecdsa_nid);
+}
+
+const char *
+sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(k)) == NULL)
+		return "unknown";
+	return impl->shortname;
+}
+
+static const char *
+sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int nid)
+{
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type_nid(type, nid)) == NULL)
+		return "ssh-unknown";
+	return impl->name;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_type_is_cert(int type)
+{
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(type)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	return impl->cert;
+}
+
+const char *
+sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(k->type, k->ecdsa_nid);
+}
+
+const char *
+sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(sshkey_type_plain(k->type),
+	    k->ecdsa_nid);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_type_from_name(const char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+	for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		impl = keyimpls[i];
+		/* Only allow shortname matches for plain key types */
+		if ((impl->name != NULL && strcmp(name, impl->name) == 0) ||
+		    (!impl->cert && strcasecmp(impl->shortname, name) == 0))
+			return impl->type;
+	}
+	return KEY_UNSPEC;
+}
+
+static int
+key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(int type)
+{
+	switch (type) {
+	case KEY_ECDSA:
+	case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+	case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+	case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+		return 1;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if (!key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(keyimpls[i]->type))
+			continue;
+		if (keyimpls[i]->name != NULL &&
+		    strcmp(name, keyimpls[i]->name) == 0)
+			return keyimpls[i]->nid;
+	}
+	return -1;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs(const char *keyname, const char *sigalgs)
+{
+	int ktype;
+
+	if (sigalgs == NULL || *sigalgs == '\0' ||
+	    (ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(keyname)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
+		return 0;
+	else if (ktype == KEY_RSA) {
+		return match_pattern_list("ssh-rsa", sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
+		    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
+		    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", sigalgs, 0) == 1;
+	} else if (ktype == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
+		return match_pattern_list("ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+		    sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
+		    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+		    sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
+		    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+		    sigalgs, 0) == 1;
+	} else
+		return match_pattern_list(keyname, sigalgs, 0) == 1;
+}
+
+char *
+sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
+{
+	char *tmp, *ret = NULL;
+	size_t i, nlen, rlen = 0;
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+	for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		impl = keyimpls[i];
+		if (impl->name == NULL)
+			continue;
+		if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
+			continue;
+		if ((certs_only && !impl->cert) || (plain_only && impl->cert))
+			continue;
+		if (ret != NULL)
+			ret[rlen++] = sep;
+		nlen = strlen(impl->name);
+		if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
+			free(ret);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+		ret = tmp;
+		memcpy(ret + rlen, impl->name, nlen + 1);
+		rlen += nlen;
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_names_valid2(const char *names, int allow_wildcard)
+{
+	char *s, *cp, *p;
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+	int i, type;
+
+	if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
+		return 0;
+	if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+		type = sshkey_type_from_name(p);
+		if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
+			if (allow_wildcard) {
+				/*
+				 * Try matching key types against the string.
+				 * If any has a positive or negative match then
+				 * the component is accepted.
+				 */
+				impl = NULL;
+				for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+					if (match_pattern_list(
+					    keyimpls[i]->name, p, 0) != 0) {
+						impl = keyimpls[i];
+						break;
+					}
+				}
+				if (impl != NULL)
+					continue;
+			}
+			free(s);
+			return 0;
+		}
+	}
+	free(s);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+u_int
+sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(k)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (impl->funcs->size != NULL)
+		return impl->funcs->size(k);
+	return impl->keybits;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type)
+{
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(type)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	/* All non-certificate types may act as CAs */
+	return !impl->cert;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	if (k == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	return sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	if (k == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) {
+	case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+		return 1;
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */
+int
+sshkey_type_plain(int type)
+{
+	switch (type) {
+	case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+		return KEY_RSA;
+	case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+		return KEY_DSA;
+	case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+		return KEY_ECDSA;
+	case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+		return KEY_ECDSA_SK;
+	case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+		return KEY_ED25519;
+	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+		return KEY_ED25519_SK;
+	case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
+		return KEY_XMSS;
+	default:
+		return type;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Return the cert equivalent to a plain key type */
+static int
+sshkey_type_certified(int type)
+{
+	switch (type) {
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		return KEY_RSA_CERT;
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		return KEY_DSA_CERT;
+	case KEY_ECDSA:
+		return KEY_ECDSA_CERT;
+	case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+		return KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT;
+	case KEY_ED25519:
+		return KEY_ED25519_CERT;
+	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+		return KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT;
+	case KEY_XMSS:
+		return KEY_XMSS_CERT;
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
+int
+sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
+{
+	if (strcmp(name, "nistp256") == 0)
+		return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+	else if (strcmp(name, "nistp384") == 0)
+		return NID_secp384r1;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+	else if (strcmp(name, "nistp521") == 0)
+		return NID_secp521r1;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+	else
+		return -1;
+}
+
+u_int
+sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int nid)
+{
+	switch (nid) {
+	case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
+		return 256;
+	case NID_secp384r1:
+		return 384;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+	case NID_secp521r1:
+		return 521;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int bits)
+{
+	switch (bits) {
+	case 256:
+		return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+	case 384:
+		return NID_secp384r1;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+	case 521:
+		return NID_secp521r1;
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+	default:
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+const char *
+sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int nid)
+{
+	switch (nid) {
+	case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
+		return "nistp256";
+	case NID_secp384r1:
+		return "nistp384";
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+	case NID_secp521r1:
+		return "nistp521";
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+	default:
+		return NULL;
+	}
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid)
+{
+	int kbits = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid);
+
+	if (kbits <= 0)
+		return -1;
+
+	/* RFC5656 section 6.2.1 */
+	if (kbits <= 256)
+		return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
+	else if (kbits <= 384)
+		return SSH_DIGEST_SHA384;
+	else
+		return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+static void
+cert_free(struct sshkey_cert *cert)
+{
+	u_int i;
+
+	if (cert == NULL)
+		return;
+	sshbuf_free(cert->certblob);
+	sshbuf_free(cert->critical);
+	sshbuf_free(cert->extensions);
+	free(cert->key_id);
+	for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++)
+		free(cert->principals[i]);
+	free(cert->principals);
+	sshkey_free(cert->signature_key);
+	free(cert->signature_type);
+	freezero(cert, sizeof(*cert));
+}
+
+static struct sshkey_cert *
+cert_new(void)
+{
+	struct sshkey_cert *cert;
+
+	if ((cert = calloc(1, sizeof(*cert))) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	if ((cert->certblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (cert->critical = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (cert->extensions = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		cert_free(cert);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	cert->key_id = NULL;
+	cert->principals = NULL;
+	cert->signature_key = NULL;
+	cert->signature_type = NULL;
+	return cert;
+}
+
+struct sshkey *
+sshkey_new(int type)
+{
+	struct sshkey *k;
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl = NULL;
+
+	if (type != KEY_UNSPEC &&
+	    (impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(type)) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* All non-certificate types may act as CAs */
+	if ((k = calloc(1, sizeof(*k))) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	k->type = type;
+	k->ecdsa_nid = -1;
+	if (impl != NULL && impl->funcs->alloc != NULL) {
+		if (impl->funcs->alloc(k) != 0) {
+			free(k);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) {
+		if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) {
+			sshkey_free(k);
+			return NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return k;
+}
+
+/* Frees common FIDO fields */
+void
+sshkey_sk_cleanup(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	free(k->sk_application);
+	sshbuf_free(k->sk_key_handle);
+	sshbuf_free(k->sk_reserved);
+	k->sk_application = NULL;
+	k->sk_key_handle = k->sk_reserved = NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+sshkey_free_contents(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+	if (k == NULL)
+		return;
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(k->type)) != NULL &&
+	    impl->funcs->cleanup != NULL)
+		impl->funcs->cleanup(k);
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(k))
+		cert_free(k->cert);
+	freezero(k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len);
+	freezero(k->shield_prekey, k->shield_prekey_len);
+}
+
+void
+sshkey_free(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	sshkey_free_contents(k);
+	freezero(k, sizeof(*k));
+}
+
+static int
+cert_compare(struct sshkey_cert *a, struct sshkey_cert *b)
+{
+	if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
+		return 1;
+	if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (sshbuf_len(a->certblob) != sshbuf_len(b->certblob))
+		return 0;
+	if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(a->certblob), sshbuf_ptr(b->certblob),
+	    sshbuf_len(a->certblob)) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Compares FIDO-specific pubkey fields only */
+int
+sshkey_sk_fields_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
+{
+	if (a->sk_application == NULL || b->sk_application == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if (strcmp(a->sk_application, b->sk_application) != 0)
+		return 0;
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compare public portions of key only, allowing comparisons between
+ * certificates and plain keys too.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
+{
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+	if (a == NULL || b == NULL ||
+	    sshkey_type_plain(a->type) != sshkey_type_plain(b->type))
+		return 0;
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(a->type)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	return impl->funcs->equal(a, b);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
+{
+	if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type)
+		return 0;
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(a)) {
+		if (!cert_compare(a->cert, b->cert))
+			return 0;
+	}
+	return sshkey_equal_public(a, b);
+}
+
+
+/* Serialise common FIDO key parts */
+int
+sshkey_serialize_sk(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, int force_plain,
+  enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	const char *typename;
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+	if (key == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	type = force_plain ? sshkey_type_plain(key->type) : key->type;
+
+	if (sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) {
+		if (key->cert == NULL)
+			return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT;
+		if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0)
+			return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB;
+		/* Use the existing blob */
+		if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0)
+			return ret;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(type)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+
+	typename = sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid);
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0)
+		return ret;
+	return impl->funcs->serialize_public(key, b, opts);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	return to_blob_buf(key, b, 0, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_puts_opts(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *tmp;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((tmp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	r = to_blob_buf(key, tmp, 0, opts);
+	if (r == 0)
+		r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, tmp);
+	sshbuf_free(tmp);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	return sshkey_puts_opts(key, b, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	return to_blob_buf(key, b, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+static int
+to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp, int force_plain,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	size_t len;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = 0;
+	if (blobp != NULL)
+		*blobp = NULL;
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((ret = to_blob_buf(key, b, force_plain, opts)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	len = sshbuf_len(b);
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = len;
+	if (blobp != NULL) {
+		if ((*blobp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
+	}
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+	return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 0, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+	return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg,
+    u_char **retp, size_t *lenp)
+{
+	u_char *blob = NULL, *ret = NULL;
+	size_t blob_len = 0;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (retp != NULL)
+		*retp = NULL;
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = 0;
+	if (ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg) == 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = to_blob(k, &blob, &blob_len, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT))
+	    != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((ret = calloc(1, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(dgst_alg, blob, blob_len,
+	    ret, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	if (retp != NULL) {
+		*retp = ret;
+		ret = NULL;
+	}
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg);
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(ret);
+	if (blob != NULL)
+		freezero(blob, blob_len);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static char *
+fingerprint_b64(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
+{
+	char *ret;
+	size_t plen = strlen(alg) + 1;
+	size_t rlen = ((dgst_raw_len + 2) / 3) * 4 + plen + 1;
+
+	if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (ret = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	strlcpy(ret, alg, rlen);
+	strlcat(ret, ":", rlen);
+	if (dgst_raw_len == 0)
+		return ret;
+	if (b64_ntop(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, ret + plen, rlen - plen) == -1) {
+		freezero(ret, rlen);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	/* Trim padding characters from end */
+	ret[strcspn(ret, "=")] = '\0';
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static char *
+fingerprint_hex(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
+{
+	char *retval, hex[5];
+	size_t i, rlen = dgst_raw_len * 3 + strlen(alg) + 2;
+
+	if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (retval = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	strlcpy(retval, alg, rlen);
+	strlcat(retval, ":", rlen);
+	for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
+		snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%s%02x",
+		    i > 0 ? ":" : "", dgst_raw[i]);
+		strlcat(retval, hex, rlen);
+	}
+	return retval;
+}
+
+static char *
+fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
+{
+	char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' };
+	char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm',
+	    'n', 'p', 'r', 's', 't', 'v', 'z', 'x' };
+	u_int i, j = 0, rounds, seed = 1;
+	char *retval;
+
+	rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1;
+	if ((retval = calloc(rounds, 6)) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	retval[j++] = 'x';
+	for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
+		u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4;
+		if ((i + 1 < rounds) || (dgst_raw_len % 2 != 0)) {
+			idx0 = (((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 6) & 3) +
+			    seed) % 6;
+			idx1 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 2) & 15;
+			idx2 = ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) & 3) +
+			    (seed / 6)) % 6;
+			retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
+			retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
+			retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
+			if ((i + 1) < rounds) {
+				idx3 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])) >> 4) & 15;
+				idx4 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1]))) & 15;
+				retval[j++] = consonants[idx3];
+				retval[j++] = '-';
+				retval[j++] = consonants[idx4];
+				seed = ((seed * 5) +
+				    ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) * 7) +
+				    ((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])))) % 36;
+			}
+		} else {
+			idx0 = seed % 6;
+			idx1 = 16;
+			idx2 = seed / 6;
+			retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
+			retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
+			retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
+		}
+	}
+	retval[j++] = 'x';
+	retval[j++] = '\0';
+	return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Draw an ASCII-Art representing the fingerprint so human brain can
+ * profit from its built-in pattern recognition ability.
+ * This technique is called "random art" and can be found in some
+ * scientific publications like this original paper:
+ *
+ * "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security",
+ * Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
+ * Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
+ * sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf
+ *
+ * The subject came up in a talk by Dan Kaminsky, too.
+ *
+ * If you see the picture is different, the key is different.
+ * If the picture looks the same, you still know nothing.
+ *
+ * The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane,
+ * leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes.
+ * Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise.  Bumping into walls
+ * makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn.
+ * Graphs are not unambiguous, because circles in graphs can be
+ * walked in either direction.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Field sizes for the random art.  Have to be odd, so the starting point
+ * can be in the exact middle of the picture, and FLDBASE should be >=8 .
+ * Else pictures would be too dense, and drawing the frame would
+ * fail, too, because the key type would not fit in anymore.
+ */
+#define	FLDBASE		8
+#define	FLDSIZE_Y	(FLDBASE + 1)
+#define	FLDSIZE_X	(FLDBASE * 2 + 1)
+static char *
+fingerprint_randomart(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len,
+    const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Chars to be used after each other every time the worm
+	 * intersects with itself.  Matter of taste.
+	 */
+	char	*augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE";
+	char	*retval, *p, title[FLDSIZE_X], hash[FLDSIZE_X];
+	u_char	 field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y];
+	size_t	 i, tlen, hlen;
+	u_int	 b;
+	int	 x, y, r;
+	size_t	 len = strlen(augmentation_string) - 1;
+
+	if ((retval = calloc((FLDSIZE_X + 3), (FLDSIZE_Y + 2))) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+
+	/* initialize field */
+	memset(field, 0, FLDSIZE_X * FLDSIZE_Y * sizeof(char));
+	x = FLDSIZE_X / 2;
+	y = FLDSIZE_Y / 2;
+
+	/* process raw key */
+	for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
+		int input;
+		/* each byte conveys four 2-bit move commands */
+		input = dgst_raw[i];
+		for (b = 0; b < 4; b++) {
+			/* evaluate 2 bit, rest is shifted later */
+			x += (input & 0x1) ? 1 : -1;
+			y += (input & 0x2) ? 1 : -1;
+
+			/* assure we are still in bounds */
+			x = MAXIMUM(x, 0);
+			y = MAXIMUM(y, 0);
+			x = MINIMUM(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1);
+			y = MINIMUM(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1);
+
+			/* augment the field */
+			if (field[x][y] < len - 2)
+				field[x][y]++;
+			input = input >> 2;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* mark starting point and end point*/
+	field[FLDSIZE_X / 2][FLDSIZE_Y / 2] = len - 1;
+	field[x][y] = len;
+
+	/* assemble title */
+	r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s %u]",
+		sshkey_type(k), sshkey_size(k));
+	/* If [type size] won't fit, then try [type]; fits "[ED25519-CERT]" */
+	if (r < 0 || r > (int)sizeof(title))
+		r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s]", sshkey_type(k));
+	tlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(title);
+
+	/* assemble hash ID. */
+	r = snprintf(hash, sizeof(hash), "[%s]", alg);
+	hlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(hash);
+
+	/* output upper border */
+	p = retval;
+	*p++ = '+';
+	for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - tlen) / 2; i++)
+		*p++ = '-';
+	memcpy(p, title, tlen);
+	p += tlen;
+	for (i += tlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
+		*p++ = '-';
+	*p++ = '+';
+	*p++ = '\n';
+
+	/* output content */
+	for (y = 0; y < FLDSIZE_Y; y++) {
+		*p++ = '|';
+		for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++)
+			*p++ = augmentation_string[MINIMUM(field[x][y], len)];
+		*p++ = '|';
+		*p++ = '\n';
+	}
+
+	/* output lower border */
+	*p++ = '+';
+	for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - hlen) / 2; i++)
+		*p++ = '-';
+	memcpy(p, hash, hlen);
+	p += hlen;
+	for (i += hlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
+		*p++ = '-';
+	*p++ = '+';
+
+	return retval;
+}
+
+char *
+sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg,
+    enum sshkey_fp_rep dgst_rep)
+{
+	char *retval = NULL;
+	u_char *dgst_raw;
+	size_t dgst_raw_len;
+
+	if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_alg, &dgst_raw, &dgst_raw_len) != 0)
+		return NULL;
+	switch (dgst_rep) {
+	case SSH_FP_DEFAULT:
+		if (dgst_alg == SSH_DIGEST_MD5) {
+			retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
+			    dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+		} else {
+			retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
+			    dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+		}
+		break;
+	case SSH_FP_HEX:
+		retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
+		    dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+		break;
+	case SSH_FP_BASE64:
+		retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
+		    dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+		break;
+	case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE:
+		retval = fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+		break;
+	case SSH_FP_RANDOMART:
+		retval = fingerprint_randomart(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
+		    dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k);
+		break;
+	default:
+		freezero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	freezero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
+	return retval;
+}
+
+static int
+peek_type_nid(const char *s, size_t l, int *nid)
+{
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		impl = keyimpls[i];
+		if (impl->name == NULL || strlen(impl->name) != l)
+			continue;
+		if (memcmp(s, impl->name, l) == 0) {
+			*nid = -1;
+			if (key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(impl->type))
+				*nid = impl->nid;
+			return impl->type;
+		}
+	}
+	return KEY_UNSPEC;
+}
+
+/* XXX this can now be made const char * */
+int
+sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
+{
+	struct sshkey *k;
+	char *cp, *blobcopy;
+	size_t space;
+	int r, type, curve_nid = -1;
+	struct sshbuf *blob;
+
+	if (ret == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (ret->type != KEY_UNSPEC && sshkey_impl_from_type(ret->type) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	/* Decode type */
+	cp = *cpp;
+	space = strcspn(cp, " \t");
+	if (space == strlen(cp))
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	if ((type = peek_type_nid(cp, space, &curve_nid)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+
+	/* skip whitespace */
+	for (cp += space; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+		;
+	if (*cp == '\0')
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	if (ret->type != KEY_UNSPEC && ret->type != type)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+	if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+	/* find end of keyblob and decode */
+	space = strcspn(cp, " \t");
+	if ((blobcopy = strndup(cp, space)) == NULL) {
+		sshbuf_free(blob);
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(blob, blobcopy)) != 0) {
+		free(blobcopy);
+		sshbuf_free(blob);
+		return r;
+	}
+	free(blobcopy);
+	if ((r = sshkey_fromb(blob, &k)) != 0) {
+		sshbuf_free(blob);
+		return r;
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(blob);
+
+	/* skip whitespace and leave cp at start of comment */
+	for (cp += space; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
+		;
+
+	/* ensure type of blob matches type at start of line */
+	if (k->type != type) {
+		sshkey_free(k);
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+	}
+	if (key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(type) && curve_nid != k->ecdsa_nid) {
+		sshkey_free(k);
+		return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
+	}
+
+	/* Fill in ret from parsed key */
+	sshkey_free_contents(ret);
+	*ret = *k;
+	freezero(k, sizeof(*k));
+
+	/* success */
+	*cpp = cp;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *key, char **b64p)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	char *uu = NULL;
+
+	if (b64p != NULL)
+		*b64p = NULL;
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, b)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64_string(b, 0)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* Success */
+	if (b64p != NULL) {
+		*b64p = uu;
+		uu = NULL;
+	}
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	free(uu);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	char *uu = NULL;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &uu)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s %s",
+	    sshkey_ssh_name(key), uu)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(uu);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshkey_format_text(key, b)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 1, f) != 1) {
+		if (feof(f))
+			errno = EPIPE;
+		r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* Success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
+}
+
+const char *
+sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	switch (k->cert->type) {
+	case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER:
+		return "user";
+	case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST:
+		return "host";
+	default:
+		return "unknown";
+	}
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_check_rsa_length(const struct sshkey *k, int min_size)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
+	int nbits;
+
+	if (k == NULL || k->rsa == NULL ||
+	    (k->type != KEY_RSA && k->type != KEY_RSA_CERT))
+		return 0;
+	RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
+	nbits = BN_num_bits(rsa_n);
+	if (nbits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
+	    (min_size > 0 && nbits < min_size))
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+int
+sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k)
+{
+	EC_GROUP *eg;
+	int nids[] = {
+		NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
+		NID_secp384r1,
+#  ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
+		NID_secp521r1,
+#  endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+		-1
+	};
+	int nid;
+	u_int i;
+	const EC_GROUP *g = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
+
+	/*
+	 * The group may be stored in a ASN.1 encoded private key in one of two
+	 * ways: as a "named group", which is reconstituted by ASN.1 object ID
+	 * or explicit group parameters encoded into the key blob. Only the
+	 * "named group" case sets the group NID for us, but we can figure
+	 * it out for the other case by comparing against all the groups that
+	 * are supported.
+	 */
+	if ((nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(g)) > 0)
+		return nid;
+	for (i = 0; nids[i] != -1; i++) {
+		if ((eg = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nids[i])) == NULL)
+			return -1;
+		if (EC_GROUP_cmp(g, eg, NULL) == 0)
+			break;
+		EC_GROUP_free(eg);
+	}
+	if (nids[i] != -1) {
+		/* Use the group with the NID attached */
+		EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(eg, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
+		if (EC_KEY_set_group(k, eg) != 1) {
+			EC_GROUP_free(eg);
+			return -1;
+		}
+	}
+	return nids[i];
+}
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+int
+sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+	struct sshkey *k;
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+	if (keyp == NULL || sshkey_type_is_cert(type))
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	*keyp = NULL;
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(type)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+	if (impl->funcs->generate == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+	if ((k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	k->type = type;
+	if ((ret = impl->funcs->generate(k, bits)) != 0) {
+		sshkey_free(k);
+		return ret;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	*keyp = k;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *from_key, struct sshkey *to_key)
+{
+	u_int i;
+	const struct sshkey_cert *from;
+	struct sshkey_cert *to;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (to_key == NULL || (from = from_key->cert) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	if ((to = cert_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_putb(to->certblob, from->certblob)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_putb(to->critical, from->critical)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_putb(to->extensions, from->extensions)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	to->serial = from->serial;
+	to->type = from->type;
+	if (from->key_id == NULL)
+		to->key_id = NULL;
+	else if ((to->key_id = strdup(from->key_id)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	to->valid_after = from->valid_after;
+	to->valid_before = from->valid_before;
+	if (from->signature_key == NULL)
+		to->signature_key = NULL;
+	else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(from->signature_key,
+	    &to->signature_key)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (from->signature_type != NULL &&
+	    (to->signature_type = strdup(from->signature_type)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (from->nprincipals > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (from->nprincipals > 0) {
+		if ((to->principals = calloc(from->nprincipals,
+		    sizeof(*to->principals))) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < from->nprincipals; i++) {
+			to->principals[i] = strdup(from->principals[i]);
+			if (to->principals[i] == NULL) {
+				to->nprincipals = i;
+				r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	to->nprincipals = from->nprincipals;
+
+	/* success */
+	cert_free(to_key->cert);
+	to_key->cert = to;
+	to = NULL;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	cert_free(to);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_copy_public_sk(const struct sshkey *from, struct sshkey *to)
+{
+	/* Append security-key application string */
+	if ((to->sk_application = strdup(from->sk_application)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **pkp)
+{
+	struct sshkey *n = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+	*pkp = NULL;
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(k)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+	if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = impl->funcs->copy_public(k, n)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(k) && (r = sshkey_cert_copy(k, n)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	*pkp = n;
+	n = NULL;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshkey_free(n);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_is_shielded(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	return k != NULL && k->shielded_private != NULL;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_shield_private(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *prvbuf = NULL;
+	u_char *prekey = NULL, *enc = NULL, keyiv[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	struct sshcipher_ctx *cctx = NULL;
+	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+	size_t i, enclen = 0;
+	struct sshkey *kswap = NULL, tmp;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: entering for %s\n", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
+#endif
+	if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (cipher_keylen(cipher) + cipher_ivlen(cipher) >
+	    ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Prepare a random pre-key, and from it an ephemeral key */
+	if ((prekey = malloc(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	arc4random_buf(prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN);
+	if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH,
+	    prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN,
+	    keyiv, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: key+iv\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump_data(keyiv, ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH),
+	    stderr);
+#endif
+	if ((r = cipher_init(&cctx, cipher, keyiv, cipher_keylen(cipher),
+	    keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 1)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Serialise and encrypt the private key using the ephemeral key */
+	if ((prvbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshkey_is_shielded(k) && (r = sshkey_unshield_private(k)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, prvbuf,
+	    SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* pad to cipher blocksize */
+	i = 0;
+	while (sshbuf_len(prvbuf) % cipher_blocksize(cipher)) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(prvbuf, ++i & 0xff)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: serialised\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump(prvbuf, stderr);
+#endif
+	/* encrypt */
+	enclen = sshbuf_len(prvbuf);
+	if ((enc = malloc(enclen)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = cipher_crypt(cctx, 0, enc,
+	    sshbuf_ptr(prvbuf), sshbuf_len(prvbuf), 0, 0)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: encrypted\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump_data(enc, enclen, stderr);
+#endif
+
+	/* Make a scrubbed, public-only copy of our private key argument */
+	if ((r = sshkey_from_private(k, &kswap)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Swap the private key out (it will be destroyed below) */
+	tmp = *kswap;
+	*kswap = *k;
+	*k = tmp;
+
+	/* Insert the shielded key into our argument */
+	k->shielded_private = enc;
+	k->shielded_len = enclen;
+	k->shield_prekey = prekey;
+	k->shield_prekey_len = SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN;
+	enc = prekey = NULL; /* transferred */
+	enclen = 0;
+
+	/* preserve key fields that are required for correct operation */
+	k->sk_flags = kswap->sk_flags;
+
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+
+ out:
+	/* XXX behaviour on error - invalidate original private key? */
+	cipher_free(cctx);
+	explicit_bzero(keyiv, sizeof(keyiv));
+	explicit_bzero(&tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+	freezero(enc, enclen);
+	freezero(prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN);
+	sshkey_free(kswap);
+	sshbuf_free(prvbuf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Check deterministic padding after private key */
+static int
+private2_check_padding(struct sshbuf *decrypted)
+{
+	u_char pad;
+	size_t i;
+	int r;
+
+	i = 0;
+	while (sshbuf_len(decrypted)) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(decrypted, &pad)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if (pad != (++i & 0xff)) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	explicit_bzero(&pad, sizeof(pad));
+	explicit_bzero(&i, sizeof(i));
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *prvbuf = NULL;
+	u_char *cp, keyiv[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	struct sshcipher_ctx *cctx = NULL;
+	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+	struct sshkey *kswap = NULL, tmp;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: entering for %s\n", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
+#endif
+	if (!sshkey_is_shielded(k))
+		return 0; /* nothing to do */
+
+	if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (cipher_keylen(cipher) + cipher_ivlen(cipher) >
+	    ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* check size of shielded key blob */
+	if (k->shielded_len < cipher_blocksize(cipher) ||
+	    (k->shielded_len % cipher_blocksize(cipher)) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Calculate the ephemeral key from the prekey */
+	if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH,
+	    k->shield_prekey, k->shield_prekey_len,
+	    keyiv, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = cipher_init(&cctx, cipher, keyiv, cipher_keylen(cipher),
+	    keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 0)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: key+iv\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump_data(keyiv, ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH),
+	    stderr);
+#endif
+
+	/* Decrypt and parse the shielded private key using the ephemeral key */
+	if ((prvbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(prvbuf, k->shielded_len, &cp)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* decrypt */
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: encrypted\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump_data(k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len, stderr);
+#endif
+	if ((r = cipher_crypt(cctx, 0, cp,
+	    k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len, 0, 0)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s: serialised\n", __func__);
+	sshbuf_dump(prvbuf, stderr);
+#endif
+	/* Parse private key */
+	if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(prvbuf, &kswap)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = private2_check_padding(prvbuf)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Swap the parsed key back into place */
+	tmp = *kswap;
+	*kswap = *k;
+	*k = tmp;
+
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+
+ out:
+	cipher_free(cctx);
+	explicit_bzero(keyiv, sizeof(keyiv));
+	explicit_bzero(&tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+	sshkey_free(kswap);
+	sshbuf_free(prvbuf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *certbuf)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *principals = NULL, *crit = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *exts = NULL, *ca = NULL;
+	u_char *sig = NULL;
+	size_t signed_len = 0, slen = 0, kidlen = 0;
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	/* Copy the entire key blob for verification and later serialisation */
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->certblob, certbuf)) != 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* Parse body of certificate up to signature */
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->serial)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &key->cert->type)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->cert->key_id, &kidlen)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &principals)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_after)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_before)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &crit)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &exts)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &ca)) != 0) {
+		/* XXX debug print error for ret */
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Signature is left in the buffer so we can calculate this length */
+	signed_len = sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) - sshbuf_len(b);
+
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &sig, &slen)) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER &&
+	    key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Parse principals section */
+	while (sshbuf_len(principals) > 0) {
+		char *principal = NULL;
+		char **oprincipals = NULL;
+
+		if (key->cert->nprincipals >= SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(principals, &principal,
+		    NULL)) != 0) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		oprincipals = key->cert->principals;
+		key->cert->principals = recallocarray(key->cert->principals,
+		    key->cert->nprincipals, key->cert->nprincipals + 1,
+		    sizeof(*key->cert->principals));
+		if (key->cert->principals == NULL) {
+			free(principal);
+			key->cert->principals = oprincipals;
+			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		key->cert->principals[key->cert->nprincipals++] = principal;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Stash a copies of the critical options and extensions sections
+	 * for later use.
+	 */
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->critical, crit)) != 0 ||
+	    (exts != NULL &&
+	    (ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->extensions, exts)) != 0))
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * Validate critical options and extensions sections format.
+	 */
+	while (sshbuf_len(crit) != 0) {
+		if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+			sshbuf_reset(key->cert->critical);
+			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	while (exts != NULL && sshbuf_len(exts) != 0) {
+		if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+			sshbuf_reset(key->cert->extensions);
+			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Parse CA key and check signature */
+	if (sshkey_from_blob_internal(ca, &key->cert->signature_key, 0) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(key->cert->signature_key->type)) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ret = sshkey_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen,
+	    sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, slen,
+	    &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Success */
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(ca);
+	sshbuf_free(crit);
+	sshbuf_free(exts);
+	sshbuf_free(principals);
+	free(sig);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_deserialize_sk(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key)
+{
+	/* Parse additional security-key application string */
+	if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->sk_application, NULL) != 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
+    int allow_cert)
+{
+	int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	char *ktype = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *copy;
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK /* XXX */
+	sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
+#endif
+	if (keyp != NULL)
+		*keyp = NULL;
+	if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(b)) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	type = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype);
+	if (!allow_cert && sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(type)) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) {
+		/* Skip nonce that preceeds all certificates */
+		if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if ((ret = impl->funcs->deserialize_public(ktype, b, key)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Parse certificate potion */
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && (ret = cert_parse(b, key, copy)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (key != NULL && sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	ret = 0;
+	if (keyp != NULL) {
+		*keyp = key;
+		key = NULL;
+	}
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(copy);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	free(ktype);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *blob, size_t blen, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((b = sshbuf_from(blob, blen)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+	return sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b;
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &b)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
+{
+	int r;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	char *sigtype = NULL;
+
+	if (sigtypep != NULL)
+		*sigtypep = NULL;
+	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &sigtype, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	if (sigtypep != NULL) {
+		*sigtypep = sigtype;
+		sigtype = NULL;
+	}
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(sigtype);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ *
+ * Checks whether a certificate's signature type is allowed.
+ * Returns 0 (success) if the certificate signature type appears in the
+ * "allowed" pattern-list, or the key is not a certificate to begin with.
+ * Otherwise returns a ssherr.h code.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(const struct sshkey *key, const char *allowed)
+{
+	if (key == NULL || allowed == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(key->type))
+		return 0;
+	if (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (match_pattern_list(key->cert->signature_type, allowed, 0) != 1)
+		return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Returns the expected signature algorithm for a given public key algorithm.
+ */
+const char *
+sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *name)
+{
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		impl = keyimpls[i];
+		if (strcmp(impl->name, name) != 0)
+			continue;
+		if (impl->sigalg != NULL)
+			return impl->sigalg;
+		if (!impl->cert)
+			return impl->name;
+		return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(
+		    sshkey_type_plain(impl->type), impl->nid);
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verifies that the signature algorithm appearing inside the signature blob
+ * matches that which was requested.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
+    const char *requested_alg)
+{
+	const char *expected_alg;
+	char *sigtype = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (requested_alg == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	if ((expected_alg = sshkey_sigalg_by_name(requested_alg)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	r = strcmp(expected_alg, sigtype) == 0;
+	free(sigtype);
+	return r ? 0 : SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+    u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+    const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, u_int compat)
+{
+	int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key);
+	int r2, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+	if (sigp != NULL)
+		*sigp = NULL;
+	if (lenp != NULL)
+		*lenp = 0;
+	if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+	if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (sshkey_is_sk(key)) {
+		r = sshsk_sign(sk_provider, key, sigp, lenp, data,
+		    datalen, compat, sk_pin);
+	} else {
+		if (impl->funcs->sign == NULL)
+			r = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+		else {
+			r = impl->funcs->sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
+			    alg, sk_provider, sk_pin, compat);
+		 }
+	}
+	if (was_shielded && (r2 = sshkey_shield_private(key)) != 0)
+		return r2;
+	return r;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ssh_key_verify returns 0 for a correct signature  and < 0 on error.
+ * If "alg" specified, then the signature must use that algorithm.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+    const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
+    const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
+    struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
+{
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+	if (detailsp != NULL)
+		*detailsp = NULL;
+	if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+	return impl->funcs->verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
+	    alg, compat, detailsp);
+}
+
+/* Convert a plain key to their _CERT equivalent */
+int
+sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	int newtype;
+
+	if ((newtype = sshkey_type_certified(k->type)) == -1)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	k->type = newtype;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Convert a certificate to its raw key equivalent */
+int
+sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type))
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+	cert_free(k->cert);
+	k->cert = NULL;
+	k->type = sshkey_type_plain(k->type);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Sign a certified key, (re-)generating the signed certblob. */
+int
+sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg,
+    const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin,
+    sshkey_certify_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
+{
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+	struct sshbuf *principals = NULL;
+	u_char *ca_blob = NULL, *sig_blob = NULL, nonce[32];
+	size_t i, ca_len, sig_len;
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *cert = NULL;
+	char *sigtype = NULL;
+
+	if (k == NULL || k->cert == NULL ||
+	    k->cert->certblob == NULL || ca == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (!sshkey_is_cert(k))
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+	if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(ca->type))
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(k)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	/*
+	 * If no alg specified as argument but a signature_type was set,
+	 * then prefer that. If both were specified, then they must match.
+	 */
+	if (alg == NULL)
+		alg = k->cert->signature_type;
+	else if (k->cert->signature_type != NULL &&
+	    strcmp(alg, k->cert->signature_type) != 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	/*
+	 * If no signing algorithm or signature_type was specified and we're
+	 * using a RSA key, then default to a good signature algorithm.
+	 */
+	if (alg == NULL && ca->type == KEY_RSA)
+		alg = "rsa-sha2-512";
+
+	if ((ret = sshkey_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len)) != 0)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
+
+	cert = k->cert->certblob; /* for readability */
+	sshbuf_reset(cert);
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, sshkey_ssh_name(k))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* -v01 certs put nonce first */
+	arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce));
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, nonce, sizeof(nonce))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Public key next */
+	if ((ret = impl->funcs->serialize_public(k, cert,
+	    SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Then remaining cert fields */
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->serial)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_put_u32(cert, k->cert->type)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->cert->key_id)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((principals = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+		if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(principals,
+		    k->cert->principals[i])) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, principals)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_after)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_before)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->critical)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->extensions)) != 0 ||
+	    (ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* Reserved */
+	    (ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, ca_blob, ca_len)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Sign the whole mess */
+	if ((ret = signer(ca, &sig_blob, &sig_len, sshbuf_ptr(cert),
+	    sshbuf_len(cert), alg, sk_provider, sk_pin, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* Check and update signature_type against what was actually used */
+	if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, sigtype) != 0) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (k->cert->signature_type == NULL) {
+		k->cert->signature_type = sigtype;
+		sigtype = NULL;
+	}
+	/* Append signature and we are done */
+	if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, sig_blob, sig_len)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	if (ret != 0)
+		sshbuf_reset(cert);
+	free(sig_blob);
+	free(ca_blob);
+	free(sigtype);
+	sshbuf_free(principals);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+default_key_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
+    const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+    const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin,
+    u_int compat, void *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx != NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	return sshkey_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg,
+	    sk_provider, sk_pin, compat);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg,
+    const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin)
+{
+	return sshkey_certify_custom(k, ca, alg, sk_provider, sk_pin,
+	    default_key_sign, NULL);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *k,
+    int want_host, int require_principal, int wildcard_pattern,
+    uint64_t verify_time, const char *name, const char **reason)
+{
+	u_int i, principal_matches;
+
+	if (reason == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (!sshkey_is_cert(k)) {
+		*reason = "Key is not a certificate";
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+	}
+	if (want_host) {
+		if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) {
+			*reason = "Certificate invalid: not a host certificate";
+			return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) {
+			*reason = "Certificate invalid: not a user certificate";
+			return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+		}
+	}
+	if (verify_time < k->cert->valid_after) {
+		*reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid";
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+	}
+	if (verify_time >= k->cert->valid_before) {
+		*reason = "Certificate invalid: expired";
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+	}
+	if (k->cert->nprincipals == 0) {
+		if (require_principal) {
+			*reason = "Certificate lacks principal list";
+			return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+		}
+	} else if (name != NULL) {
+		principal_matches = 0;
+		for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+			if (wildcard_pattern) {
+				if (match_pattern(k->cert->principals[i],
+				    name)) {
+					principal_matches = 1;
+					break;
+				}
+			} else if (strcmp(name, k->cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
+				principal_matches = 1;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		if (!principal_matches) {
+			*reason = "Certificate invalid: name is not a listed "
+			    "principal";
+			return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+		}
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(const struct sshkey *k,
+    int want_host, int require_principal, int wildcard_pattern,
+    const char *name, const char **reason)
+{
+	time_t now;
+
+	if ((now = time(NULL)) < 0) {
+		/* yikes - system clock before epoch! */
+		*reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid";
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+	}
+	return sshkey_cert_check_authority(k, want_host, require_principal,
+	    wildcard_pattern, (uint64_t)now, name, reason);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_cert_check_host(const struct sshkey *key, const char *host,
+    int wildcard_principals, const char *ca_sign_algorithms,
+    const char **reason)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(key, 1, 0, wildcard_principals,
+	    host, reason)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) != 0) {
+		*reason = "Certificate contains unsupported critical options";
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+	}
+	if (ca_sign_algorithms != NULL &&
+	    (r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key, ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) {
+		*reason = "Certificate signed with disallowed algorithm";
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+size_t
+sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *cert, char *s, size_t l)
+{
+	char from[32], to[32], ret[128];
+
+	*from = *to = '\0';
+	if (cert->valid_after == 0 &&
+	    cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
+		return strlcpy(s, "forever", l);
+
+	if (cert->valid_after != 0)
+		format_absolute_time(cert->valid_after, from, sizeof(from));
+	if (cert->valid_before != 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
+		format_absolute_time(cert->valid_before, to, sizeof(to));
+
+	if (cert->valid_after == 0)
+		snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "before %s", to);
+	else if (cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
+		snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "after %s", from);
+	else
+		snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "from %s to %s", from, to);
+
+	return strlcpy(s, ret, l);
+}
+
+/* Common serialization for FIDO private keys */
+int
+sshkey_serialize_private_sk(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_private_serialize_opt(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key);
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
+		if (key->cert == NULL ||
+		    sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = impl->funcs->serialize_private(key, b, opts)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/*
+	 * success (but we still need to append the output to buf after
+	 * possibly re-shielding the private key)
+	 */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if (was_shielded)
+		r = sshkey_shield_private(key);
+	if (r == 0)
+		r = sshbuf_putb(buf, b);
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_private_serialize(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
+{
+	return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(key, b,
+	    SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+/* Shared deserialization of FIDO private key components */
+int
+sshkey_private_deserialize_sk(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	int r;
+
+	if ((k->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (k->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &k->sk_application, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &k->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_reserved)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp)
+{
+	const struct sshkey_impl *impl;
+	char *tname = NULL;
+	char *expect_sk_application = NULL;
+	u_char *expect_ed25519_pk = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+	int type, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (kp != NULL)
+		*kp = NULL;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &tname, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname);
+	if (sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) {
+		/*
+		 * Certificate key private keys begin with the certificate
+		 * itself. Make sure this matches the type of the enclosing
+		 * private key.
+		 */
+		if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if (k->type != type) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/* For ECDSA keys, the group must match too */
+		if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA &&
+		    k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Several fields are redundant between certificate and
+		 * private key body, we require these to match.
+		 */
+		expect_sk_application = k->sk_application;
+		expect_ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk;
+		k->sk_application = NULL;
+		k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
+		/* XXX xmss too or refactor */
+	} else {
+		if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_type(type)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = impl->funcs->deserialize_private(tname, buf, k)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* XXX xmss too or refactor */
+	if ((expect_sk_application != NULL && (k->sk_application == NULL ||
+	    strcmp(expect_sk_application, k->sk_application) != 0)) ||
+	    (expect_ed25519_pk != NULL && (k->ed25519_pk == NULL ||
+	    memcmp(expect_ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ) != 0))) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+	if (kp != NULL) {
+		*kp = k;
+		k = NULL;
+	}
+ out:
+	free(tname);
+	sshkey_free(k);
+	free(expect_sk_application);
+	free(expect_ed25519_pk);
+	return r;
+}
+
+#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+int
+sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public)
+{
+	EC_POINT *nq = NULL;
+	BIGNUM *order = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
+
+	/*
+	 * NB. This assumes OpenSSL has already verified that the public
+	 * point lies on the curve. This is done by EC_POINT_oct2point()
+	 * implicitly calling EC_POINT_is_on_curve(). If this code is ever
+	 * reachable with public points not unmarshalled using
+	 * EC_POINT_oct2point then the caller will need to explicitly check.
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 * We shouldn't ever hit this case because bignum_get_ecpoint()
+	 * refuses to load GF2m points.
+	 */
+	if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+	    NID_X9_62_prime_field)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Q != infinity */
+	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, public))
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (y = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (order = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* log2(x) > log2(order)/2, log2(y) > log2(order)/2 */
+	if (EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, NULL) != 1 ||
+	    EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, public,
+	    x, y, NULL) != 1) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_num_bits(x) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2 ||
+	    BN_num_bits(y) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* nQ == infinity (n == order of subgroup) */
+	if ((nq = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EC_POINT_mul(group, nq, NULL, public, order, NULL) != 1) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, nq) != 1)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* x < order - 1, y < order - 1 */
+	if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_cmp(x, tmp) >= 0 || BN_cmp(y, tmp) >= 0)
+		goto out;
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	BN_clear_free(x);
+	BN_clear_free(y);
+	BN_clear_free(order);
+	BN_clear_free(tmp);
+	EC_POINT_free(nq);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+	BIGNUM *order = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
+	int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
+
+	if ((order = BN_new()) == NULL || (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* log2(private) > log2(order)/2 */
+	if (EC_GROUP_get_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), order, NULL) != 1) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_num_bits(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) <=
+	    BN_num_bits(order) / 2)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* private < order - 1 */
+	if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) {
+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (BN_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key), tmp) >= 0)
+		goto out;
+	ret = 0;
+ out:
+	BN_clear_free(order);
+	BN_clear_free(tmp);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+void
+sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point)
+{
+	BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
+
+	if (point == NULL) {
+		fputs("point=(NULL)\n", stderr);
+		return;
+	}
+	if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL || (y = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_new failed\n", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
+	    NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: group is not a prime field\n", __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point,
+	    x, y, NULL) != 1) {
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp\n",
+		    __func__);
+		goto out;
+	}
+	fputs("x=", stderr);
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, x);
+	fputs("\ny=", stderr);
+	BN_print_fp(stderr, y);
+	fputs("\n", stderr);
+ out:
+	BN_clear_free(x);
+	BN_clear_free(y);
+}
+
+void
+sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *key)
+{
+	const BIGNUM *exponent;
+
+	sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key),
+	    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key));
+	fputs("exponent=", stderr);
+	if ((exponent = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL)
+		fputs("(NULL)", stderr);
+	else
+		BN_print_fp(stderr, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key));
+	fputs("\n", stderr);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+
+static int
+sshkey_private_to_blob2(struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob,
+    const char *passphrase, const char *comment, const char *ciphername,
+    int rounds)
+{
+	u_char *cp, *key = NULL, *pubkeyblob = NULL;
+	u_char salt[SALT_LEN];
+	char *b64 = NULL;
+	size_t i, pubkeylen, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen;
+	u_int check;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
+	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
+	const char *kdfname = KDFNAME;
+	struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *encrypted = NULL, *kdf = NULL;
+
+	if (rounds <= 0)
+		rounds = DEFAULT_ROUNDS;
+	if (passphrase == NULL || !strlen(passphrase)) {
+		ciphername = "none";
+		kdfname = "none";
+	} else if (ciphername == NULL)
+		ciphername = DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME;
+	if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((kdf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
+	keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
+	ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
+	authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
+	if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) {
+		arc4random_buf(salt, SALT_LEN);
+		if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase),
+		    salt, SALT_LEN, key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(kdf, salt, SALT_LEN)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(kdf, rounds)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	} else if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0) {
+		/* Unsupported KDF type */
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
+	    key + keylen, ivlen, 1)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, ciphername)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, kdfname)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(encoded, kdf)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, 1)) != 0 ||	/* number of keys */
+	    (r = sshkey_to_blob(prv, &pubkeyblob, &pubkeylen)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(encoded, pubkeyblob, pubkeylen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* set up the buffer that will be encrypted */
+
+	/* Random check bytes */
+	check = arc4random();
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* append private key and comment*/
+	if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(prv, encrypted,
+	    SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* padding */
+	i = 0;
+	while (sshbuf_len(encrypted) % blocksize) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encrypted, ++i & 0xff)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* length in destination buffer */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, sshbuf_len(encrypted))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* encrypt */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encoded,
+	    sshbuf_len(encrypted) + authlen, &cp)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp,
+	    sshbuf_ptr(encrypted), sshbuf_len(encrypted), 0, authlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	sshbuf_reset(blob);
+
+	/* assemble uuencoded key */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_dtob64(encoded, blob, 1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(kdf);
+	sshbuf_free(encoded);
+	sshbuf_free(encrypted);
+	cipher_free(ciphercontext);
+	explicit_bzero(salt, sizeof(salt));
+	if (key != NULL)
+		freezero(key, keylen + ivlen);
+	if (pubkeyblob != NULL)
+		freezero(pubkeyblob, pubkeylen);
+	if (b64 != NULL)
+		freezero(b64, strlen(b64));
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+private2_uudecode(struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshbuf **decodedp)
+{
+	const u_char *cp;
+	size_t encoded_len;
+	int r;
+	u_char last;
+	struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *decoded = NULL;
+
+	if (blob == NULL || decodedp == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	*decodedp = NULL;
+
+	if ((encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (decoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* check preamble */
+	cp = sshbuf_ptr(blob);
+	encoded_len = sshbuf_len(blob);
+	if (encoded_len < (MARK_BEGIN_LEN + MARK_END_LEN) ||
+	    memcmp(cp, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	cp += MARK_BEGIN_LEN;
+	encoded_len -= MARK_BEGIN_LEN;
+
+	/* Look for end marker, removing whitespace as we go */
+	while (encoded_len > 0) {
+		if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
+			if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, *cp)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		last = *cp;
+		encoded_len--;
+		cp++;
+		if (last == '\n') {
+			if (encoded_len >= MARK_END_LEN &&
+			    memcmp(cp, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN) == 0) {
+				/* \0 terminate */
+				if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, 0)) != 0)
+					goto out;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (encoded_len == 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* decode base64 */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(decoded, (char *)sshbuf_ptr(encoded))) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* check magic */
+	if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC) ||
+	    memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(decoded), AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	*decodedp = decoded;
+	decoded = NULL;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(encoded);
+	sshbuf_free(decoded);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+private2_decrypt(struct sshbuf *decoded, const char *passphrase,
+    struct sshbuf **decryptedp, struct sshkey **pubkeyp)
+{
+	char *ciphername = NULL, *kdfname = NULL;
+	const struct sshcipher *cipher = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	size_t keylen = 0, ivlen = 0, authlen = 0, slen = 0;
+	struct sshbuf *kdf = NULL, *decrypted = NULL;
+	struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
+	u_char *key = NULL, *salt = NULL, *dp;
+	u_int blocksize, rounds, nkeys, encrypted_len, check1, check2;
+
+	if (decoded == NULL || decryptedp == NULL || pubkeyp == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+	*decryptedp = NULL;
+	*pubkeyp = NULL;
+
+	if ((decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* parse public portion of key */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &ciphername, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &kdfname, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_froms(decoded, &kdf)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &nkeys)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (nkeys != 1) {
+		/* XXX only one key supported at present */
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_froms(decoded, &pubkey)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0 && strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") == 0 && strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((passphrase == NULL || strlen(passphrase) == 0) &&
+	    strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0) {
+		/* passphrase required */
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* check size of encrypted key blob */
+	blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
+	if (encrypted_len < blocksize || (encrypted_len % blocksize) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* setup key */
+	keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
+	ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
+	authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
+	if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(kdf, &salt, &slen)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(kdf, &rounds)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+		if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), salt, slen,
+		    key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */
+	if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < authlen ||
+	    sshbuf_len(decoded) - authlen < encrypted_len) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* decrypt private portion of key */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
+	    key + keylen, ivlen, 0)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded),
+	    encrypted_len, 0, authlen)) != 0) {
+		/* an integrity error here indicates an incorrect passphrase */
+		if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
+			r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, encrypted_len + authlen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* there should be no trailing data */
+	if (sshbuf_len(decoded) != 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* check check bytes */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check2)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	if (check1 != check2) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	*decryptedp = decrypted;
+	decrypted = NULL;
+	*pubkeyp = pubkey;
+	pubkey = NULL;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	cipher_free(ciphercontext);
+	free(ciphername);
+	free(kdfname);
+	sshkey_free(pubkey);
+	if (salt != NULL) {
+		explicit_bzero(salt, slen);
+		free(salt);
+	}
+	if (key != NULL) {
+		explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen);
+		free(key);
+	}
+	sshbuf_free(kdf);
+	sshbuf_free(decrypted);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
+    struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+	char *comment = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *decoded = NULL, *decrypted = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *k = NULL, *pubkey = NULL;
+
+	if (keyp != NULL)
+		*keyp = NULL;
+	if (commentp != NULL)
+		*commentp = NULL;
+
+	/* Undo base64 encoding and decrypt the private section */
+	if ((r = private2_uudecode(blob, &decoded)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = private2_decrypt(decoded, passphrase,
+	    &decrypted, &pubkey)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (type != KEY_UNSPEC &&
+	    sshkey_type_plain(type) != sshkey_type_plain(pubkey->type)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Load the private key and comment */
+	if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(decrypted, &k)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decrypted, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Check deterministic padding after private section */
+	if ((r = private2_check_padding(decrypted)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	/* Check that the public key in the envelope matches the private key */
+	if (!sshkey_equal(pubkey, k)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+	if (keyp != NULL) {
+		*keyp = k;
+		k = NULL;
+	}
+	if (commentp != NULL) {
+		*commentp = comment;
+		comment = NULL;
+	}
+ out:
+	free(comment);
+	sshbuf_free(decoded);
+	sshbuf_free(decrypted);
+	sshkey_free(k);
+	sshkey_free(pubkey);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_parse_private2_pubkey(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+    struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *decoded = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
+	u_int nkeys = 0;
+
+	if (keyp != NULL)
+		*keyp = NULL;
+
+	if ((r = private2_uudecode(blob, &decoded)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* parse public key from unencrypted envelope */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* cipher */
+	    (r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* KDF alg */
+	    (r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* KDF hint */
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &nkeys)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (nkeys != 1) {
+		/* XXX only one key supported at present */
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* Parse the public key */
+	if ((r = sshkey_froms(decoded, &pubkey)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (type != KEY_UNSPEC &&
+	    sshkey_type_plain(type) != sshkey_type_plain(pubkey->type)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+	if (keyp != NULL) {
+		*keyp = pubkey;
+		pubkey = NULL;
+	}
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(decoded);
+	sshkey_free(pubkey);
+	return r;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/* convert SSH v2 key to PEM or PKCS#8 format */
+static int
+sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
+    int format, const char *_passphrase, const char *comment)
+{
+	int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key);
+	int success, r;
+	int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase);
+	u_char *passphrase = (len > 0) ? (u_char *)_passphrase : NULL;
+	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL;
+	char *bptr;
+	BIO *bio = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *blob;
+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+
+	if (len > 0 && len <= 4)
+		return SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT;
+	if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 && (pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+
+	switch (key->type) {
+	case KEY_DSA:
+		if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
+			success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa,
+			    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+		} else {
+			success = EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa);
+		}
+		break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	case KEY_ECDSA:
+		if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
+			success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa,
+			    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+		} else {
+			success = EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa);
+		}
+		break;
+#endif
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
+			success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa,
+			    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
+		} else {
+			success = EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa);
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		success = 0;
+		break;
+	}
+	if (success == 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8) {
+		if ((success = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bio, pkey, cipher,
+		    passphrase, len, NULL, NULL)) == 0) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if ((blen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &bptr)) <= 0) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, bptr, blen)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	if (was_shielded)
+		r = sshkey_shield_private(key);
+	if (r == 0)
+		r = sshbuf_putb(buf, blob);
+
+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+	sshbuf_free(blob);
+	BIO_free(bio);
+	return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+/* Serialise "key" to buffer "blob" */
+int
+sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
+    const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
+    int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
+{
+	switch (key->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	case KEY_DSA:
+	case KEY_ECDSA:
+	case KEY_RSA:
+		break; /* see below */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	case KEY_ED25519:
+	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+	case KEY_XMSS:
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+		return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
+		    comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
+	default:
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+	}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+	switch (format) {
+	case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH:
+		return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
+		    comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
+	case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM:
+	case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8:
+		return sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(key, blob,
+		    format, passphrase, comment);
+	default:
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+static int
+translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long pem_err)
+{
+	int pem_reason = ERR_GET_REASON(pem_err);
+
+	switch (ERR_GET_LIB(pem_err)) {
+	case ERR_LIB_PEM:
+		switch (pem_reason) {
+		case PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ:
+		case PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD:
+		case PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
+			return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+		default:
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		}
+	case ERR_LIB_EVP:
+		switch (pem_reason) {
+		case EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
+			return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+#ifdef EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR
+		case EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR:
+#endif
+		case EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR:
+#ifdef EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR
+		case EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR:
+#endif
+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		default:
+			return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+		}
+	case ERR_LIB_ASN1:
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	}
+	return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+}
+
+static void
+clear_libcrypto_errors(void)
+{
+	while (ERR_get_error() != 0)
+		;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Translate OpenSSL error codes to determine whether
+ * passphrase is required/incorrect.
+ */
+static int
+convert_libcrypto_error(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Some password errors are reported at the beginning
+	 * of the error queue.
+	 */
+	if (translate_libcrypto_error(ERR_peek_error()) ==
+	    SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+	return translate_libcrypto_error(ERR_peek_last_error());
+}
+
+static int
+pem_passphrase_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u)
+{
+	char *p = (char *)u;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (p == NULL || (len = strlen(p)) == 0)
+		return -1;
+	if (size < 0 || len > (size_t)size)
+		return -1;
+	memcpy(buf, p, len);
+	return (int)len;
+}
+
+static int
+sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+    const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+	EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *prv = NULL;
+	BIO *bio = NULL;
+	int r;
+
+	if (keyp != NULL)
+		*keyp = NULL;
+
+	if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL || sshbuf_len(blob) > INT_MAX)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if (BIO_write(bio, sshbuf_ptr(blob), sshbuf_len(blob)) !=
+	    (int)sshbuf_len(blob)) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	clear_libcrypto_errors();
+	if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, pem_passphrase_cb,
+	    (char *)passphrase)) == NULL) {
+		/*
+		 * libcrypto may return various ASN.1 errors when attempting
+		 * to parse a key with an incorrect passphrase.
+		 * Treat all format errors as "incorrect passphrase" if a
+		 * passphrase was supplied.
+		 */
+		if (passphrase != NULL && *passphrase != '\0')
+			r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+		else
+			r = convert_libcrypto_error();
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_RSA &&
+	    (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_RSA)) {
+		if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		prv->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk);
+		prv->type = KEY_RSA;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+		RSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->rsa, 8);
+#endif
+		if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(prv, 0)) != 0)
+			goto out;
+	} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
+	    (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) {
+		if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		prv->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pk);
+		prv->type = KEY_DSA;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+		DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8);
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+	} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_EC &&
+	    (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_ECDSA)) {
+		if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		prv->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk);
+		prv->type = KEY_ECDSA;
+		prv->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(prv->ecdsa);
+		if (prv->ecdsa_nid == -1 ||
+		    sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(prv->ecdsa_nid) == NULL ||
+		    sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(prv->ecdsa),
+		    EC_KEY_get0_public_key(prv->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
+		    sshkey_ec_validate_private(prv->ecdsa) != 0) {
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+# ifdef DEBUG_PK
+		if (prv != NULL && prv->ecdsa != NULL)
+			sshkey_dump_ec_key(prv->ecdsa);
+# endif
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+	} else {
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	r = 0;
+	if (keyp != NULL) {
+		*keyp = prv;
+		prv = NULL;
+	}
+ out:
+	BIO_free(bio);
+	EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+	sshkey_free(prv);
+	return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+int
+sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+    const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (keyp != NULL)
+		*keyp = NULL;
+	if (commentp != NULL)
+		*commentp = NULL;
+
+	switch (type) {
+	case KEY_ED25519:
+	case KEY_XMSS:
+		/* No fallback for new-format-only keys */
+		return sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase,
+		    keyp, commentp);
+	default:
+		r = sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp,
+		    commentp);
+		/* Only fallback to PEM parser if a format error occurred. */
+		if (r != SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT)
+			return r;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+		return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type,
+		    passphrase, keyp);
+#else
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+	}
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, const char *passphrase,
+    struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
+{
+	if (keyp != NULL)
+		*keyp = NULL;
+	if (commentp != NULL)
+		*commentp = NULL;
+
+	return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC,
+	    passphrase, keyp, commentp);
+}
+
+void
+sshkey_sig_details_free(struct sshkey_sig_details *details)
+{
+	freezero(details, sizeof(*details));
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+    struct sshkey **pubkeyp)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (pubkeyp != NULL)
+		*pubkeyp = NULL;
+	/* only new-format private keys bundle a public key inside */
+	if ((r = sshkey_parse_private2_pubkey(blob, type, pubkeyp)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+/*
+ * serialize the key with the current state and forward the state
+ * maxsign times.
+ */
+int
+sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
+    u_int32_t maxsign, int printerror)
+{
+	int r, rupdate;
+
+	if (maxsign == 0 ||
+	    sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
+		return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b,
+		    SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
+	if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state(k, printerror)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b,
+	    SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_xmss_forward_state(k, maxsign)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	r = 0;
+out:
+	if ((rupdate = sshkey_xmss_update_state(k, printerror)) != 0) {
+		if (r == 0)
+			r = rupdate;
+	}
+	return r;
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_XMSS)
+		return sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(k);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign)
+{
+	if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	return sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(k, maxsign);
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename)
+{
+	if (k == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
+		return 0;
+	if (filename == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	if ((k->xmss_filename = strdup(filename)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	return 0;
+}
+#else
+int
+sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
+    u_int32_t maxsign, int printerror)
+{
+	return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
+}
+
+u_int32_t
+sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign)
+{
+	return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename)
+{
+	if (k == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..771c4bc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshkey.h
@@ -0,0 +1,351 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.61 2022/10/28 00:44:44 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+#ifndef SSHKEY_H
+#define SSHKEY_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/rsa.h>
+#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+#  include <openssl/ec.h>
+#  include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#  define EC_KEY	void
+#  define EC_GROUP	void
+#  define EC_POINT	void
+# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#define SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+# define BIGNUM		void
+# define RSA		void
+# define DSA		void
+# define EC_KEY		void
+# define EC_GROUP	void
+# define EC_POINT	void
+#define SSH_OPENSSL_VERSION "without OpenSSL"
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE	1024
+#define SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE	(1 << 20)
+
+struct sshbuf;
+
+/* Key types */
+enum sshkey_types {
+	KEY_RSA,
+	KEY_DSA,
+	KEY_ECDSA,
+	KEY_ED25519,
+	KEY_RSA_CERT,
+	KEY_DSA_CERT,
+	KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
+	KEY_ED25519_CERT,
+	KEY_XMSS,
+	KEY_XMSS_CERT,
+	KEY_ECDSA_SK,
+	KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT,
+	KEY_ED25519_SK,
+	KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT,
+	KEY_UNSPEC
+};
+
+/* Default fingerprint hash */
+#define SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT	SSH_DIGEST_SHA256
+
+/* Fingerprint representation formats */
+enum sshkey_fp_rep {
+	SSH_FP_DEFAULT = 0,
+	SSH_FP_HEX,
+	SSH_FP_BASE64,
+	SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE,
+	SSH_FP_RANDOMART
+};
+
+/* Private key serialisation formats, used on the wire */
+enum sshkey_serialize_rep {
+	SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT = 0,
+	SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE = 1,	/* only state is serialized */
+	SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL = 2,	/* include keys for saving to disk */
+	SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD = 3,	/* everything, for encrypting in ram */
+	SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO = 254,	/* minimal information */
+};
+
+/* Private key disk formats */
+enum sshkey_private_format {
+	SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH = 0,
+	SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM = 1,
+	SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 = 2,
+};
+
+/* key is stored in external hardware */
+#define SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT		0x0001
+
+#define SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS	256
+/* XXX opaquify? */
+struct sshkey_cert {
+	struct sshbuf	*certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */
+	u_int		 type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */
+	u_int64_t	 serial;
+	char		*key_id;
+	u_int		 nprincipals;
+	char		**principals;
+	u_int64_t	 valid_after, valid_before;
+	struct sshbuf	*critical;
+	struct sshbuf	*extensions;
+	struct sshkey	*signature_key;
+	char		*signature_type;
+};
+
+/* XXX opaquify? */
+struct sshkey {
+	int	 type;
+	int	 flags;
+	/* KEY_RSA */
+	RSA	*rsa;
+	/* KEY_DSA */
+	DSA	*dsa;
+	/* KEY_ECDSA and KEY_ECDSA_SK */
+	int	 ecdsa_nid;	/* NID of curve */
+	EC_KEY	*ecdsa;
+	/* KEY_ED25519 and KEY_ED25519_SK */
+	u_char	*ed25519_sk;
+	u_char	*ed25519_pk;
+	/* KEY_XMSS */
+	char	*xmss_name;
+	char	*xmss_filename;	/* for state file updates */
+	void	*xmss_state;	/* depends on xmss_name, opaque */
+	u_char	*xmss_sk;
+	u_char	*xmss_pk;
+	/* KEY_ECDSA_SK and KEY_ED25519_SK */
+	char	*sk_application;
+	uint8_t	sk_flags;
+	struct sshbuf *sk_key_handle;
+	struct sshbuf *sk_reserved;
+	/* Certificates */
+	struct sshkey_cert *cert;
+	/* Private key shielding */
+	u_char	*shielded_private;
+	size_t	shielded_len;
+	u_char	*shield_prekey;
+	size_t	shield_prekey_len;
+};
+
+#define	ED25519_SK_SZ	crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES
+#define	ED25519_PK_SZ	crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES
+
+/* Additional fields contained in signature */
+struct sshkey_sig_details {
+	uint32_t sk_counter;	/* U2F signature counter */
+	uint8_t sk_flags;	/* U2F signature flags; see ssh-sk.h */
+};
+
+struct sshkey_impl_funcs {
+	u_int (*size)(const struct sshkey *);	/* optional */
+	int (*alloc)(struct sshkey *);		/* optional */
+	void (*cleanup)(struct sshkey *);	/* optional */
+	int (*equal)(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *);
+	int (*serialize_public)(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
+	    enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
+	int (*deserialize_public)(const char *, struct sshbuf *,
+	    struct sshkey *);
+	int (*serialize_private)(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
+	    enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
+	int (*deserialize_private)(const char *, struct sshbuf *,
+	    struct sshkey *);
+	int (*generate)(struct sshkey *, int);	/* optional */
+	int (*copy_public)(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *);
+	int (*sign)(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
+	    const u_char *, size_t, const char *,
+	    const char *, const char *, u_int); /* optional */
+	int (*verify)(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
+	    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int,
+	    struct sshkey_sig_details **);
+};
+
+struct sshkey_impl {
+	const char *name;
+	const char *shortname;
+	const char *sigalg;
+	int type;
+	int nid;
+	int cert;
+	int sigonly;
+	int keybits;
+	const struct sshkey_impl_funcs *funcs;
+};
+
+struct sshkey	*sshkey_new(int);
+void		 sshkey_free(struct sshkey *);
+int		 sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *,
+    const struct sshkey *);
+int		 sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *);
+char		*sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *,
+    int, enum sshkey_fp_rep);
+int		 sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k,
+    int, u_char **retp, size_t *lenp);
+const char	*sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *);
+const char	*sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *);
+int		 sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
+int		 sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *);
+int		 sshkey_read(struct sshkey *, char **);
+u_int		 sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *);
+
+int		 sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp);
+int		 sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **);
+
+int		 sshkey_is_shielded(struct sshkey *);
+int		 sshkey_shield_private(struct sshkey *);
+int		 sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *);
+
+int	 sshkey_type_from_name(const char *);
+int	 sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *);
+int	 sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *);
+int	 sshkey_type_is_cert(int);
+int	 sshkey_type_plain(int);
+
+/* Returns non-zero if key name match sigalgs pattern list. (handles RSA) */
+int	 sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs(const char *, const char *);
+
+int	 sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *);
+int	 sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *);
+int	 sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *);
+int	 sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *, int, int, int,
+    uint64_t, const char *, const char **);
+int	 sshkey_cert_check_authority_now(const struct sshkey *, int, int, int,
+    const char *, const char **);
+int	 sshkey_cert_check_host(const struct sshkey *, const char *,
+    int , const char *, const char **);
+size_t	 sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *,
+    char *, size_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__, 2, 3)));
+int	 sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(const struct sshkey *, const char *);
+
+int	 sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
+    const char *, const char *, const char *);
+/* Variant allowing use of a custom signature function (e.g. for ssh-agent) */
+typedef int sshkey_certify_signer(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
+    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, const char *,
+    u_int, void *);
+int	 sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, const char *,
+    const char *, const char *, sshkey_certify_signer *, void *);
+
+int		 sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *);
+int		 sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *);
+const char *	 sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int);
+u_int		 sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int);
+int		 sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int);
+int		 sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *);
+int		 sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid);
+int		 sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+int		 sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *);
+const char	*sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
+const char	*sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
+int		 sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
+char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
+
+int	 sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
+int	 sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
+int	 sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
+int	 sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *);
+int	 sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *, char **);
+int	 sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
+int	 sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
+int	 sshkey_puts_opts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
+int	 sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *);
+int	 sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
+
+int	 sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
+    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, const char *, u_int);
+int	 sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
+    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
+int	 sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
+const char *sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *);
+int	 sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, char **);
+
+/* for debug */
+void	sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
+void	sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *);
+
+/* private key parsing and serialisation */
+int	sshkey_private_serialize(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf);
+int	sshkey_private_serialize_opt(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
+    enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
+int	sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf,  struct sshkey **keyp);
+
+/* private key file format parsing and serialisation */
+int	sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
+    const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
+    int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds);
+int	sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer,
+    const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
+int	sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+    const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
+int	sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob,
+    int type, struct sshkey **pubkeyp);
+
+int sshkey_check_rsa_length(const struct sshkey *, int);
+/* XXX should be internal, but used by ssh-keygen */
+int ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *, const BIGNUM *);
+
+/* stateful keys (e.g. XMSS) */
+int	 sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *, const char *);
+int	 sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *, u_int32_t);
+u_int32_t sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *);
+int	 sshkey_forward_state(const struct sshkey *, u_int32_t, int);
+int	 sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(struct sshkey *key,
+    struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t maxsign, int);
+
+void	 sshkey_sig_details_free(struct sshkey_sig_details *);
+
+#ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+int	sshkey_sk_fields_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b);
+void	sshkey_sk_cleanup(struct sshkey *k);
+int	sshkey_serialize_sk(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b);
+int	sshkey_copy_public_sk(const struct sshkey *from, struct sshkey *to);
+int	sshkey_deserialize_sk(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key);
+int	sshkey_serialize_private_sk(const struct sshkey *key,
+    struct sshbuf *buf);
+int	sshkey_private_deserialize_sk(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey *k);
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+int	check_rsa_length(const RSA *rsa); /* XXX remove */
+#endif
+#endif
+
+#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+# undef RSA
+# undef DSA
+# undef EC_KEY
+# undef EC_GROUP
+# undef EC_POINT
+#elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
+# undef EC_KEY
+# undef EC_GROUP
+# undef EC_POINT
+#endif
+
+#endif /* SSHKEY_H */
diff --git a/sshlogin.c b/sshlogin.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06a7b38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshlogin.c
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.35 2020/10/18 11:32:02 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * This file performs some of the things login(1) normally does.  We cannot
+ * easily use something like login -p -h host -f user, because there are
+ * several different logins around, and it is hard to determined what kind of
+ * login the current system has.  Also, we want to be able to execute commands
+ * on a tty.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "sshlogin.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "loginrec.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "servconf.h"
+
+extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+extern ServerOptions options;
+
+/*
+ * Returns the time when the user last logged in.  Returns 0 if the
+ * information is not available.  This must be called before record_login.
+ * The host the user logged in from will be returned in buf.
+ */
+time_t
+get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname,
+    char *buf, size_t bufsize)
+{
+	struct logininfo li;
+
+	login_get_lastlog(&li, uid);
+	strlcpy(buf, li.hostname, bufsize);
+	return (time_t)li.tv_sec;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generate and store last login message.  This must be done before
+ * login_login() is called and lastlog is updated.
+ */
+static void
+store_lastlog_message(const char *user, uid_t uid)
+{
+#ifndef NO_SSH_LASTLOG
+# ifndef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG
+	char hostname[HOST_NAME_MAX+1] = "";
+	time_t last_login_time;
+# endif
+	char *time_string;
+	int r;
+
+	if (!options.print_lastlog)
+		return;
+
+# ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG
+	time_string = sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(user, uid);
+	if (time_string != NULL) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg,
+		    time_string, strlen(time_string))) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		free(time_string);
+	}
+# else
+	last_login_time = get_last_login_time(uid, user, hostname,
+	    sizeof(hostname));
+
+	if (last_login_time != 0) {
+		time_string = ctime(&last_login_time);
+		time_string[strcspn(time_string, "\n")] = '\0';
+		if (strcmp(hostname, "") == 0)
+			r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "Last login: %s\r\n",
+			    time_string);
+		else
+			r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "Last login: %s from %s\r\n",
+			    time_string, hostname);
+		if (r != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+	}
+# endif /* CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG */
+#endif /* NO_SSH_LASTLOG */
+}
+
+/*
+ * Records that the user has logged in.  I wish these parts of operating
+ * systems were more standardized.
+ */
+void
+record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user, uid_t uid,
+    const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen)
+{
+	struct logininfo *li;
+
+	/* save previous login details before writing new */
+	store_lastlog_message(user, uid);
+
+	li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, tty);
+	login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen);
+	login_login(li);
+	login_free_entry(li);
+}
+
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+void
+record_utmp_only(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user,
+		 const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen)
+{
+	struct logininfo *li;
+
+	li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, ttyname);
+	login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen);
+	login_utmp_only(li);
+	login_free_entry(li);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Records that the user has logged out. */
+void
+record_logout(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user)
+{
+	struct logininfo *li;
+
+	li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, NULL, tty);
+	login_logout(li);
+	login_free_entry(li);
+}
diff --git a/sshlogin.h b/sshlogin.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..52119a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshlogin.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.h,v 1.8 2006/08/03 03:34:42 deraadt Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+void	record_login(pid_t, const char *, const char *, uid_t,
+    const char *, struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
+void   record_logout(pid_t, const char *, const char *);
+time_t	get_last_login_time(uid_t, const char *, char *, size_t);
+
+#ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
+void	record_utmp_only(pid_t, const char *, const char *, const char *,
+		struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
+#endif
diff --git a/sshpty.c b/sshpty.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cae0b97
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshpty.c
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.34 2019/07/04 16:20:10 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
+# include <paths.h>
+#endif
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+# include <util.h>
+#endif
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "sshpty.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H
+# include <pty.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef O_NOCTTY
+#define O_NOCTTY 0
+#endif
+
+#ifdef __APPLE__
+# include <AvailabilityMacros.h>
+# if (MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MAX_ALLOWED >= MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_5)
+#  define __APPLE_PRIVPTY__
+# endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Allocates and opens a pty.  Returns 0 if no pty could be allocated, or
+ * nonzero if a pty was successfully allocated.  On success, open file
+ * descriptors for the pty and tty sides and the name of the tty side are
+ * returned (the buffer must be able to hold at least 64 characters).
+ */
+
+int
+pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
+{
+	/* openpty(3) exists in OSF/1 and some other os'es */
+	char *name;
+	int i;
+
+	i = openpty(ptyfd, ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	if (i == -1) {
+		error("openpty: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		return 0;
+	}
+	name = ttyname(*ttyfd);
+	if (!name)
+		fatal("openpty returns device for which ttyname fails.");
+
+	strlcpy(namebuf, name, namebuflen);	/* possible truncation */
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/* Releases the tty.  Its ownership is returned to root, and permissions to 0666. */
+
+void
+pty_release(const char *tty)
+{
+#if !defined(__APPLE_PRIVPTY__) && !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY)
+	if (chown(tty, (uid_t) 0, (gid_t) 0) == -1)
+		error("chown %.100s 0 0 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
+	if (chmod(tty, (mode_t) 0666) == -1)
+		error("chmod %.100s 0666 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
+#endif /* !__APPLE_PRIVPTY__ && !HAVE_OPENPTY */
+}
+
+/* Makes the tty the process's controlling tty and sets it to sane modes. */
+
+void
+pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *tty)
+{
+	int fd;
+
+	/* First disconnect from the old controlling tty. */
+#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
+	fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+	if (fd >= 0) {
+		(void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
+		close(fd);
+	}
+#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
+	if (setsid() == -1)
+		error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+
+	/*
+	 * Verify that we are successfully disconnected from the controlling
+	 * tty.
+	 */
+	fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
+	if (fd >= 0) {
+		error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty.");
+		close(fd);
+	}
+	/* Make it our controlling tty. */
+#ifdef TIOCSCTTY
+	debug("Setting controlling tty using TIOCSCTTY.");
+	if (ioctl(*ttyfd, TIOCSCTTY, NULL) < 0)
+		error("ioctl(TIOCSCTTY): %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#endif /* TIOCSCTTY */
+#ifdef NEED_SETPGRP
+	if (setpgrp(0,0) < 0)
+		error("SETPGRP %s",strerror(errno));
+#endif /* NEED_SETPGRP */
+	fd = open(tty, O_RDWR);
+	if (fd == -1)
+		error("%.100s: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno));
+	else
+		close(fd);
+
+	/* Verify that we now have a controlling tty. */
+	fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_WRONLY);
+	if (fd == -1)
+		error("open /dev/tty failed - could not set controlling tty: %.100s",
+		    strerror(errno));
+	else
+		close(fd);
+}
+
+/* Changes the window size associated with the pty. */
+
+void
+pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col,
+	u_int xpixel, u_int ypixel)
+{
+	struct winsize w;
+
+	/* may truncate u_int -> u_short */
+	w.ws_row = row;
+	w.ws_col = col;
+	w.ws_xpixel = xpixel;
+	w.ws_ypixel = ypixel;
+	(void) ioctl(ptyfd, TIOCSWINSZ, &w);
+}
+
+void
+pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty)
+{
+	struct group *grp;
+	gid_t gid;
+	mode_t mode;
+	struct stat st;
+
+	/* Determine the group to make the owner of the tty. */
+	grp = getgrnam("tty");
+	if (grp == NULL)
+		debug("%s: no tty group", __func__);
+	gid = (grp != NULL) ? grp->gr_gid : pw->pw_gid;
+	mode = (grp != NULL) ? 0620 : 0600;
+
+	/*
+	 * Change owner and mode of the tty as required.
+	 * Warn but continue if filesystem is read-only and the uids match/
+	 * tty is owned by root.
+	 */
+	if (stat(tty, &st) == -1)
+		fatal("stat(%.100s) failed: %.100s", tty,
+		    strerror(errno));
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+	ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty);
+#endif
+
+	if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) {
+		if (chown(tty, pw->pw_uid, gid) == -1) {
+			if (errno == EROFS &&
+			    (st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0))
+				debug("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s",
+				    tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid,
+				    strerror(errno));
+			else
+				fatal("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s",
+				    tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid,
+				    strerror(errno));
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((st.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) != mode) {
+		if (chmod(tty, mode) == -1) {
+			if (errno == EROFS &&
+			    (st.st_mode & (S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)) == 0)
+				debug("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s",
+				    tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno));
+			else
+				fatal("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s",
+				    tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno));
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */
+void
+disconnect_controlling_tty(void)
+{
+#ifdef TIOCNOTTY
+	int fd;
+
+	if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) >= 0) {
+		(void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL);
+		close(fd);
+	}
+#endif /* TIOCNOTTY */
+}
diff --git a/sshpty.h b/sshpty.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9ec7e9a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshpty.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshpty.h,v 1.13 2016/11/29 03:54:50 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Functions for allocating a pseudo-terminal and making it the controlling
+ * tty.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include <termios.h>
+
+struct termios *get_saved_tio(void);
+void	 leave_raw_mode(int);
+void	 enter_raw_mode(int);
+
+int	 pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
+void	 pty_release(const char *);
+void	 pty_make_controlling_tty(int *, const char *);
+void	 pty_change_window_size(int, u_int, u_int, u_int, u_int);
+void	 pty_setowner(struct passwd *, const char *);
+void	 disconnect_controlling_tty(void);
diff --git a/sshsig.c b/sshsig.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..eb2a931
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshsig.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1148 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshsig.c,v 1.30 2022/08/19 03:06:30 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "authfile.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshsig.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "match.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+#define SIG_VERSION		0x01
+#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE		"SSHSIG"
+#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN	(sizeof(MAGIC_PREAMBLE) - 1)
+#define BEGIN_SIGNATURE		"-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----\n"
+#define END_SIGNATURE		"-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----"
+#define RSA_SIGN_ALG		"rsa-sha2-512" /* XXX maybe make configurable */
+#define RSA_SIGN_ALLOWED	"rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256"
+#define HASHALG_DEFAULT		"sha512" /* XXX maybe make configurable */
+#define HASHALG_ALLOWED		"sha256,sha512"
+
+int
+sshsig_armor(const struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshbuf **out)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	*out = NULL;
+
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, BEGIN_SIGNATURE,
+	    sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshbuf_putf");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_dtob64(blob, buf, 1)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "base64 encode signature");
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, END_SIGNATURE,
+	    sizeof(END_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '\n')) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	*out = buf;
+	buf = NULL; /* transferred */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_dearmor(struct sshbuf *sig, struct sshbuf **out)
+{
+	int r;
+	size_t eoffset = 0;
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *sbuf = NULL;
+	char *b64 = NULL;
+
+	if ((sbuf = sshbuf_fromb(sig)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshbuf_fromb failed");
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(sbuf, 0,
+	    BEGIN_SIGNATURE, sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) {
+		error("Couldn't parse signature: missing header");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sbuf, sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "consume");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_find(sbuf, 0, "\n" END_SIGNATURE,
+	    sizeof("\n" END_SIGNATURE)-1, &eoffset)) != 0) {
+		error("Couldn't parse signature: missing footer");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(sbuf, sshbuf_len(sbuf)-eoffset)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "consume");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if ((b64 = sshbuf_dup_string(sbuf)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshbuf_dup_string failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshbuf_new() failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(buf, b64)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "decode base64");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* success */
+	*out = buf;
+	r = 0;
+	buf = NULL; /* transferred */
+done:
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	sshbuf_free(sbuf);
+	free(b64);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshsig_wrap_sign(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
+    const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, const struct sshbuf *h_message,
+    const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out,
+    sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
+{
+	int r;
+	size_t slen = 0;
+	u_char *sig = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *blob = NULL;
+	struct sshbuf *tosign = NULL;
+	const char *sign_alg = NULL;
+
+	if ((tosign = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+	    (blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(tosign, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(tosign, sig_namespace)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(tosign, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(tosign, hashalg)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(tosign, h_message)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "assemble message to sign");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* If using RSA keys then default to a good signature algorithm */
+	if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)
+		sign_alg = RSA_SIGN_ALG;
+
+	if (signer != NULL) {
+		if ((r = signer(key, &sig, &slen,
+		    sshbuf_ptr(tosign), sshbuf_len(tosign),
+		    sign_alg, sk_provider, sk_pin, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0) {
+			error_r(r, "Couldn't sign message (signer)");
+			goto done;
+		}
+	} else {
+		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen,
+		    sshbuf_ptr(tosign), sshbuf_len(tosign),
+		    sign_alg, sk_provider, sk_pin, 0)) != 0) {
+			error_r(r, "Couldn't sign message");
+			goto done;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(blob, SIG_VERSION)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshkey_puts(key, blob)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(blob, sig_namespace)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(blob, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(blob, hashalg)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(blob, sig, slen)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "assemble signature object");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (out != NULL) {
+		*out = blob;
+		blob = NULL;
+	}
+	r = 0;
+done:
+	free(sig);
+	sshbuf_free(blob);
+	sshbuf_free(tosign);
+	return r;
+}
+
+/* Check preamble and version. */
+static int
+sshsig_parse_preamble(struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	uint32_t sversion;
+
+	if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(buf, 0, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_consume(buf, (sizeof(MAGIC_PREAMBLE)-1))) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &sversion)) != 0) {
+		error("Couldn't verify signature: invalid format");
+		return r;
+	}
+
+	if (sversion > SIG_VERSION) {
+		error("Signature version %lu is larger than supported "
+		    "version %u", (unsigned long)sversion, SIG_VERSION);
+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+sshsig_check_hashalg(const char *hashalg)
+{
+	if (hashalg == NULL ||
+	    match_pattern_list(hashalg, HASHALG_ALLOWED, 0) == 1)
+		return 0;
+	error_f("unsupported hash algorithm \"%.100s\"", hashalg);
+	return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+static int
+sshsig_peek_hashalg(struct sshbuf *signature, char **hashalgp)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+	char *hashalg = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (hashalgp != NULL)
+		*hashalgp = NULL;
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_fromb(signature)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+	if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(buf)) != 0)
+		goto done;
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &hashalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse signature object");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+	*hashalgp = hashalg;
+	hashalg = NULL;
+ done:
+	free(hashalg);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshsig_wrap_verify(struct sshbuf *signature, const char *hashalg,
+    const struct sshbuf *h_message, const char *expect_namespace,
+    struct sshkey **sign_keyp, struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details)
+{
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL, *toverify = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	const u_char *sig;
+	char *got_namespace = NULL, *sigtype = NULL, *sig_hashalg = NULL;
+	size_t siglen;
+
+	debug_f("verify message length %zu", sshbuf_len(h_message));
+	if (sig_details != NULL)
+		*sig_details = NULL;
+	if (sign_keyp != NULL)
+		*sign_keyp = NULL;
+
+	if ((toverify = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(toverify, MAGIC_PREAMBLE,
+	    MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(toverify, expect_namespace)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(toverify, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(toverify, hashalg)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(toverify, h_message)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "assemble message to verify");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(signature)) != 0)
+		goto done;
+
+	if ((r = sshkey_froms(signature, &key)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(signature, &got_namespace, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string(signature, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(signature, &sig_hashalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(signature, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "parse signature object");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (sshbuf_len(signature) != 0) {
+		error("Signature contains trailing data");
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (strcmp(expect_namespace, got_namespace) != 0) {
+		error("Couldn't verify signature: namespace does not match");
+		debug_f("expected namespace \"%s\" received \"%s\"",
+		    expect_namespace, got_namespace);
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (strcmp(hashalg, sig_hashalg) != 0) {
+		error("Couldn't verify signature: hash algorithm mismatch");
+		debug_f("expected algorithm \"%s\" received \"%s\"",
+		    hashalg, sig_hashalg);
+		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+		goto done;
+	}
+	/* Ensure that RSA keys use an acceptable signature algorithm */
+	if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
+		if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0) {
+			error_r(r, "Couldn't verify signature: unable to get "
+			    "signature type");
+			goto done;
+		}
+		if (match_pattern_list(sigtype, RSA_SIGN_ALLOWED, 0) != 1) {
+			error("Couldn't verify signature: unsupported RSA "
+			    "signature algorithm %s", sigtype);
+			r = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+			goto done;
+		}
+	}
+	if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sig, siglen, sshbuf_ptr(toverify),
+	    sshbuf_len(toverify), NULL, 0, sig_details)) != 0) {
+		error_r(r, "Signature verification failed");
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+	if (sign_keyp != NULL) {
+		*sign_keyp = key;
+		key = NULL; /* transferred */
+	}
+done:
+	free(got_namespace);
+	free(sigtype);
+	free(sig_hashalg);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	sshbuf_free(toverify);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+hash_buffer(const struct sshbuf *m, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp)
+{
+	char *hex, hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	int alg, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+
+	*bp = NULL;
+	memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
+
+	if ((r = sshsig_check_hashalg(hashalg)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((alg = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(hashalg)) == -1) {
+		error_f("can't look up hash algorithm %s", hashalg);
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(alg, m, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "ssh_digest_buffer");
+		return r;
+	}
+	if ((hex = tohex(hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != NULL) {
+		debug3_f("final hash: %s", hex);
+		freezero(hex, strlen(hex));
+	}
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*bp = b;
+	b = NULL; /* transferred */
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_signb(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
+    const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin,
+    const struct sshbuf *message, const char *sig_namespace,
+    struct sshbuf **out, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (hashalg == NULL)
+		hashalg = HASHALG_DEFAULT;
+	if (out != NULL)
+		*out = NULL;
+	if ((r = hash_buffer(message, hashalg, &b)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "hash buffer");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshsig_wrap_sign(key, hashalg, sk_provider, sk_pin, b,
+	    sig_namespace, out, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_verifyb(struct sshbuf *signature, const struct sshbuf *message,
+    const char *expect_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp,
+    struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	char *hashalg = NULL;
+
+	if (sig_details != NULL)
+		*sig_details = NULL;
+	if (sign_keyp != NULL)
+		*sign_keyp = NULL;
+	if ((r = sshsig_peek_hashalg(signature, &hashalg)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	debug_f("signature made with hash \"%s\"", hashalg);
+	if ((r = hash_buffer(message, hashalg, &b)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "hash buffer");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshsig_wrap_verify(signature, hashalg, b, expect_namespace,
+	    sign_keyp, sig_details)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	free(hashalg);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp)
+{
+	char *hex, rbuf[8192], hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+	ssize_t n, total = 0;
+	struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+	int alg, oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+
+	*bp = NULL;
+	memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
+
+	if ((r = sshsig_check_hashalg(hashalg)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((alg = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(hashalg)) == -1) {
+		error_f("can't look up hash algorithm %s", hashalg);
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	if ((ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("ssh_digest_start failed");
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	for (;;) {
+		if ((n = read(fd, rbuf, sizeof(rbuf))) == -1) {
+			if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
+				continue;
+			oerrno = errno;
+			error_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
+			errno = oerrno;
+			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+			goto out;
+		} else if (n == 0) {
+			debug2_f("hashed %zu bytes", total);
+			break; /* EOF */
+		}
+		total += (size_t)n;
+		if ((r = ssh_digest_update(ctx, rbuf, (size_t)n)) != 0) {
+			error_fr(r, "ssh_digest_update");
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	if ((r = ssh_digest_final(ctx, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "ssh_digest_final");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((hex = tohex(hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != NULL) {
+		debug3_f("final hash: %s", hex);
+		freezero(hex, strlen(hex));
+	}
+	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "sshbuf_put");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	*bp = b;
+	b = NULL; /* transferred */
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	oerrno = errno;
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	ssh_digest_free(ctx);
+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+	errno = oerrno;
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_sign_fd(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
+    const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin,
+    int fd, const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out,
+    sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (hashalg == NULL)
+		hashalg = HASHALG_DEFAULT;
+	if (out != NULL)
+		*out = NULL;
+	if ((r = hash_file(fd, hashalg, &b)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "hash_file");
+		return r;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshsig_wrap_sign(key, hashalg, sk_provider, sk_pin, b,
+	    sig_namespace, out, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_verify_fd(struct sshbuf *signature, int fd,
+    const char *expect_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp,
+    struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details)
+{
+	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	char *hashalg = NULL;
+
+	if (sig_details != NULL)
+		*sig_details = NULL;
+	if (sign_keyp != NULL)
+		*sign_keyp = NULL;
+	if ((r = sshsig_peek_hashalg(signature, &hashalg)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	debug_f("signature made with hash \"%s\"", hashalg);
+	if ((r = hash_file(fd, hashalg, &b)) != 0) {
+		error_fr(r, "hash_file");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((r = sshsig_wrap_verify(signature, hashalg, b, expect_namespace,
+	    sign_keyp, sig_details)) != 0)
+		goto out;
+	/* success */
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(b);
+	free(hashalg);
+	return r;
+}
+
+struct sshsigopt {
+	int ca;
+	char *namespaces;
+	uint64_t valid_after, valid_before;
+};
+
+struct sshsigopt *
+sshsigopt_parse(const char *opts, const char *path, u_long linenum,
+    const char **errstrp)
+{
+	struct sshsigopt *ret;
+	int r;
+	char *opt;
+	const char *errstr = NULL;
+
+	if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
+		return NULL;
+	if (opts == NULL || *opts == '\0')
+		return ret; /* Empty options yields empty options :) */
+
+	while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') {
+		/* flag options */
+		if ((r = opt_flag("cert-authority", 0, &opts)) != -1) {
+			ret->ca = 1;
+		} else if (opt_match(&opts, "namespaces")) {
+			if (ret->namespaces != NULL) {
+				errstr = "multiple \"namespaces\" clauses";
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			ret->namespaces = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr);
+			if (ret->namespaces == NULL)
+				goto fail;
+		} else if (opt_match(&opts, "valid-after")) {
+			if (ret->valid_after != 0) {
+				errstr = "multiple \"valid-after\" clauses";
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL)
+				goto fail;
+			if (parse_absolute_time(opt, &ret->valid_after) != 0 ||
+			    ret->valid_after == 0) {
+				free(opt);
+				errstr = "invalid \"valid-after\" time";
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			free(opt);
+		} else if (opt_match(&opts, "valid-before")) {
+			if (ret->valid_before != 0) {
+				errstr = "multiple \"valid-before\" clauses";
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL)
+				goto fail;
+			if (parse_absolute_time(opt, &ret->valid_before) != 0 ||
+			    ret->valid_before == 0) {
+				free(opt);
+				errstr = "invalid \"valid-before\" time";
+				goto fail;
+			}
+			free(opt);
+		}
+		/*
+		 * Skip the comma, and move to the next option
+		 * (or break out if there are no more).
+		 */
+		if (*opts == '\0' || *opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t')
+			break;		/* End of options. */
+		/* Anything other than a comma is an unknown option */
+		if (*opts != ',') {
+			errstr = "unknown key option";
+			goto fail;
+		}
+		opts++;
+		if (*opts == '\0') {
+			errstr = "unexpected end-of-options";
+			goto fail;
+		}
+	}
+	/* final consistency check */
+	if (ret->valid_after != 0 && ret->valid_before != 0 &&
+	    ret->valid_before <= ret->valid_after) {
+		errstr = "\"valid-before\" time is before \"valid-after\"";
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	return ret;
+ fail:
+	if (errstrp != NULL)
+		*errstrp = errstr;
+	sshsigopt_free(ret);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+sshsigopt_free(struct sshsigopt *opts)
+{
+	if (opts == NULL)
+		return;
+	free(opts->namespaces);
+	free(opts);
+}
+
+static int
+parse_principals_key_and_options(const char *path, u_long linenum, char *line,
+    const char *required_principal, char **principalsp, struct sshkey **keyp,
+    struct sshsigopt **sigoptsp)
+{
+	char *opts = NULL, *tmp, *cp, *principals = NULL;
+	const char *reason = NULL;
+	struct sshsigopt *sigopts = NULL;
+	struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (principalsp != NULL)
+		*principalsp = NULL;
+	if (sigoptsp != NULL)
+		*sigoptsp = NULL;
+	if (keyp != NULL)
+		*keyp = NULL;
+
+	cp = line;
+	cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); /* skip leading whitespace */
+	if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; /* blank or all-comment line */
+
+	/* format: identity[,identity...] [option[,option...]] key */
+	if ((tmp = strdelimw(&cp)) == NULL || cp == NULL) {
+		error("%s:%lu: invalid line", path, linenum);
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((principals = strdup(tmp)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("strdup failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/*
+	 * Bail out early if we're looking for a particular principal and this
+	 * line does not list it.
+	 */
+	if (required_principal != NULL) {
+		if (match_pattern_list(required_principal,
+		    principals, 0) != 1) {
+			/* principal didn't match */
+			r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		debug_f("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%s\"",
+		    path, linenum, required_principal);
+	}
+
+	if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshkey_new failed");
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (sshkey_read(key, &cp) != 0) {
+		/* no key? Check for options */
+		opts = cp;
+		if (sshkey_advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) {
+			error("%s:%lu: invalid options", path, linenum);
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0') {
+			error("%s:%lu: missing key", path, linenum);
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+		*cp++ = '\0';
+		skip_space(&cp);
+		if (sshkey_read(key, &cp) != 0) {
+			error("%s:%lu: invalid key", path, linenum);
+			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+	debug3("%s:%lu: options %s", path, linenum, opts == NULL ? "" : opts);
+	if ((sigopts = sshsigopt_parse(opts, path, linenum, &reason)) == NULL) {
+		error("%s:%lu: bad options: %s", path, linenum, reason);
+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	if (principalsp != NULL) {
+		*principalsp = principals;
+		principals = NULL; /* transferred */
+	}
+	if (sigoptsp != NULL) {
+		*sigoptsp = sigopts;
+		sigopts = NULL; /* transferred */
+	}
+	if (keyp != NULL) {
+		*keyp = key;
+		key = NULL; /* transferred */
+	}
+	r = 0;
+ out:
+	free(principals);
+	sshsigopt_free(sigopts);
+	sshkey_free(key);
+	return r;
+}
+
+static int
+cert_filter_principals(const char *path, u_long linenum,
+    char **principalsp, const struct sshkey *cert, uint64_t verify_time)
+{
+	char *cp, *oprincipals, *principals;
+	const char *reason;
+	struct sshbuf *nprincipals;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, success = 0;
+	u_int i;
+
+	oprincipals = principals = *principalsp;
+	*principalsp = NULL;
+
+	if ((nprincipals = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	while ((cp = strsep(&principals, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
+		/* Check certificate validity */
+		if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority(cert, 0, 1, 0,
+		    verify_time, NULL, &reason)) != 0) {
+			debug("%s:%lu: principal \"%s\" not authorized: %s",
+			    path, linenum, cp, reason);
+			continue;
+		}
+		/* Return all matching principal names from the cert */
+		for (i = 0; i < cert->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
+			if (match_pattern(cert->cert->principals[i], cp)) {
+				if ((r = sshbuf_putf(nprincipals, "%s%s",
+					sshbuf_len(nprincipals) != 0 ? "," : "",
+						cert->cert->principals[i])) != 0) {
+					error_f("buffer error");
+					goto out;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (sshbuf_len(nprincipals) == 0) {
+		error("%s:%lu: no valid principals found", path, linenum);
+		r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if ((principals = sshbuf_dup_string(nprincipals)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("buffer error");
+		goto out;
+	}
+	/* success */
+	success = 1;
+	*principalsp = principals;
+ out:
+	sshbuf_free(nprincipals);
+	free(oprincipals);
+	return success ? 0 : r;
+}
+
+static int
+check_allowed_keys_line(const char *path, u_long linenum, char *line,
+    const struct sshkey *sign_key, const char *principal,
+    const char *sig_namespace, uint64_t verify_time, char **principalsp)
+{
+	struct sshkey *found_key = NULL;
+	char *principals = NULL;
+	int r, success = 0;
+	const char *reason = NULL;
+	struct sshsigopt *sigopts = NULL;
+	char tvalid[64], tverify[64];
+
+	if (principalsp != NULL)
+		*principalsp = NULL;
+
+	/* Parse the line */
+	if ((r = parse_principals_key_and_options(path, linenum, line,
+	    principal, &principals, &found_key, &sigopts)) != 0) {
+		/* error already logged */
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	if (!sigopts->ca && sshkey_equal(found_key, sign_key)) {
+		/* Exact match of key */
+		debug("%s:%lu: matched key", path, linenum);
+	} else if (sigopts->ca && sshkey_is_cert(sign_key) &&
+	    sshkey_equal_public(sign_key->cert->signature_key, found_key)) {
+		if (principal) {
+			/* Match certificate CA key with specified principal */
+			if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority(sign_key, 0, 1, 0,
+			    verify_time, principal, &reason)) != 0) {
+				error("%s:%lu: certificate not authorized: %s",
+				    path, linenum, reason);
+				goto done;
+			}
+			debug("%s:%lu: matched certificate CA key",
+			    path, linenum);
+		} else {
+			/* No principal specified - find all matching ones */
+			if ((r = cert_filter_principals(path, linenum,
+			    &principals, sign_key, verify_time)) != 0) {
+				/* error already displayed */
+				debug_r(r, "%s:%lu: cert_filter_principals",
+				    path, linenum);
+				goto done;
+			}
+			debug("%s:%lu: matched certificate CA key",
+			    path, linenum);
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* Didn't match key */
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* Check whether options preclude the use of this key */
+	if (sigopts->namespaces != NULL && sig_namespace != NULL &&
+	    match_pattern_list(sig_namespace, sigopts->namespaces, 0) != 1) {
+		error("%s:%lu: key is not permitted for use in signature "
+		    "namespace \"%s\"", path, linenum, sig_namespace);
+		goto done;
+	}
+
+	/* check key time validity */
+	format_absolute_time((uint64_t)verify_time, tverify, sizeof(tverify));
+	if (sigopts->valid_after != 0 &&
+	    (uint64_t)verify_time < sigopts->valid_after) {
+		format_absolute_time(sigopts->valid_after,
+		    tvalid, sizeof(tvalid));
+		error("%s:%lu: key is not yet valid: "
+		    "verify time %s < valid-after %s", path, linenum,
+		    tverify, tvalid);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	if (sigopts->valid_before != 0 &&
+	    (uint64_t)verify_time > sigopts->valid_before) {
+		format_absolute_time(sigopts->valid_before,
+		    tvalid, sizeof(tvalid));
+		error("%s:%lu: key has expired: "
+		    "verify time %s > valid-before %s", path, linenum,
+		    tverify, tvalid);
+		goto done;
+	}
+	success = 1;
+
+ done:
+	if (success && principalsp != NULL) {
+		*principalsp = principals;
+		principals = NULL; /* transferred */
+	}
+	free(principals);
+	sshkey_free(found_key);
+	sshsigopt_free(sigopts);
+	return success ? 0 : SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_check_allowed_keys(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key,
+    const char *principal, const char *sig_namespace, uint64_t verify_time)
+{
+	FILE *f = NULL;
+	char *line = NULL;
+	size_t linesize = 0;
+	u_long linenum = 0;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, oerrno;
+
+	/* Check key and principal against file */
+	if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		error("Unable to open allowed keys file \"%s\": %s",
+		    path, strerror(errno));
+		errno = oerrno;
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+		linenum++;
+		r = check_allowed_keys_line(path, linenum, line, sign_key,
+		    principal, sig_namespace, verify_time, NULL);
+		free(line);
+		line = NULL;
+		linesize = 0;
+		if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
+			continue;
+		else if (r == 0) {
+			/* success */
+			fclose(f);
+			return 0;
+		} else
+			break;
+	}
+	/* Either we hit an error parsing or we simply didn't find the key */
+	fclose(f);
+	free(line);
+	return r == 0 ? SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND : r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_find_principals(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key,
+    uint64_t verify_time, char **principals)
+{
+	FILE *f = NULL;
+	char *line = NULL;
+	size_t linesize = 0;
+	u_long linenum = 0;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, oerrno;
+
+	if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		error("Unable to open allowed keys file \"%s\": %s",
+		    path, strerror(errno));
+		errno = oerrno;
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+		linenum++;
+		r = check_allowed_keys_line(path, linenum, line,
+		    sign_key, NULL, NULL, verify_time, principals);
+		free(line);
+		line = NULL;
+		linesize = 0;
+		if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
+			continue;
+		else if (r == 0) {
+			/* success */
+			fclose(f);
+			return 0;
+		} else
+			break;
+	}
+	free(line);
+	/* Either we hit an error parsing or we simply didn't find the key */
+	if (ferror(f) != 0) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		fclose(f);
+		error("Unable to read allowed keys file \"%s\": %s",
+		    path, strerror(errno));
+		errno = oerrno;
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	}
+	fclose(f);
+	return r == 0 ? SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND : r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_match_principals(const char *path, const char *principal,
+    char ***principalsp, size_t *nprincipalsp)
+{
+	FILE *f = NULL;
+	char *found, *line = NULL, **principals = NULL, **tmp;
+	size_t i, nprincipals = 0, linesize = 0;
+	u_long linenum = 0;
+	int oerrno = 0, r, ret = 0;
+
+	if (principalsp != NULL)
+		*principalsp = NULL;
+	if (nprincipalsp != NULL)
+		*nprincipalsp = 0;
+
+	/* Check key and principal against file */
+	if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) {
+		oerrno = errno;
+		error("Unable to open allowed keys file \"%s\": %s",
+		    path, strerror(errno));
+		errno = oerrno;
+		return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+		linenum++;
+		/* Parse the line */
+		if ((r = parse_principals_key_and_options(path, linenum, line,
+		    principal, &found, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+			if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
+				continue;
+			ret = r;
+			oerrno = errno;
+			break; /* unexpected error */
+		}
+		if ((tmp = recallocarray(principals, nprincipals,
+		    nprincipals + 1, sizeof(*principals))) == NULL) {
+			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+			free(found);
+			break;
+		}
+		principals = tmp;
+		principals[nprincipals++] = found; /* transferred */
+		free(line);
+		line = NULL;
+		linesize = 0;
+	}
+	fclose(f);
+
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		if (nprincipals == 0)
+			ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+		if (principalsp != NULL) {
+			*principalsp = principals;
+			principals = NULL; /* transferred */
+		}
+		if (nprincipalsp != 0) {
+			*nprincipalsp = nprincipals;
+			nprincipals = 0;
+		}
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < nprincipals; i++)
+		free(principals[i]);
+	free(principals);
+
+	errno = oerrno;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_get_pubkey(struct sshbuf *signature, struct sshkey **pubkey)
+{
+	struct sshkey *pk = NULL;
+	int r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+
+	if (pubkey == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(signature)) != 0)
+		return r;
+	if ((r = sshkey_froms(signature, &pk)) != 0)
+		return r;
+
+	*pubkey = pk;
+	pk = NULL;
+	return 0;
+}
diff --git a/sshsig.h b/sshsig.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac55779
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshsig.h
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshsig.h,v 1.11 2021/11/27 07:14:46 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef SSHSIG_H
+#define SSHSIG_H
+
+struct sshbuf;
+struct sshkey;
+struct sshsigopt;
+struct sshkey_sig_details;
+
+typedef int sshsig_signer(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
+    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, const char *,
+    u_int, void *);
+
+/* Buffer-oriented API */
+
+/*
+ * Creates a detached SSH signature for a given buffer.
+ * Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ * out is populated with the detached signature, or NULL on failure.
+ */
+int sshsig_signb(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
+    const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin, const struct sshbuf *message,
+    const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out,
+    sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Verifies that a detached signature is valid and optionally returns key
+ * used to sign via argument.
+ * Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int sshsig_verifyb(struct sshbuf *signature,
+    const struct sshbuf *message, const char *sig_namespace,
+    struct sshkey **sign_keyp, struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details);
+
+/* File/FD-oriented API */
+
+/*
+ * Creates a detached SSH signature for a given file.
+ * Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ * out is populated with the detached signature, or NULL on failure.
+ */
+int sshsig_sign_fd(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
+    const char *sk_provider, const char *sk_pin,
+    int fd, const char *sig_namespace,
+    struct sshbuf **out, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx);
+
+/*
+ * Verifies that a detached signature over a file is valid and optionally
+ * returns key used to sign via argument.
+ * Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
+ */
+int sshsig_verify_fd(struct sshbuf *signature, int fd,
+    const char *sig_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp,
+    struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details);
+
+/* Utility functions */
+
+/*
+ * Return a base64 encoded "ASCII armoured" version of a raw signature.
+ */
+int sshsig_armor(const struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshbuf **out);
+
+/*
+ * Decode a base64 encoded armoured signature to a raw signature.
+ */
+int sshsig_dearmor(struct sshbuf *sig, struct sshbuf **out);
+
+/*
+ * Checks whether a particular key/principal/namespace is permitted by
+ * an allowed_keys file. Returns 0 on success.
+ */
+int sshsig_check_allowed_keys(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key,
+    const char *principal, const char *ns, uint64_t verify_time);
+
+/* Parse zero or more allowed_keys signature options */
+struct sshsigopt *sshsigopt_parse(const char *opts,
+    const char *path, u_long linenum, const char **errstrp);
+
+/* Free signature options */
+void sshsigopt_free(struct sshsigopt *opts);
+
+/* Get public key from signature */
+int sshsig_get_pubkey(struct sshbuf *signature, struct sshkey **pubkey);
+
+/* Find principal in allowed_keys file, given a sshkey. Returns
+ * 0 on success.
+ */
+int sshsig_find_principals(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key,
+    uint64_t verify_time, char **principal);
+
+/* Find all principals in allowed_keys file matching *principal */
+int sshsig_match_principals(const char *path,
+	const char *principal, char ***principalsp, size_t *nprincipalsp);
+
+#endif /* SSHSIG_H */
diff --git a/sshtty.c b/sshtty.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d214ce3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshtty.c
@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshtty.c,v 1.14 2010/01/09 05:04:24 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+#include "sshpty.h"
+
+static struct termios _saved_tio;
+static int _in_raw_mode = 0;
+
+struct termios *
+get_saved_tio(void)
+{
+	return _in_raw_mode ? &_saved_tio : NULL;
+}
+
+void
+leave_raw_mode(int quiet)
+{
+	if (!_in_raw_mode)
+		return;
+	if (tcsetattr(fileno(stdin), TCSADRAIN, &_saved_tio) == -1) {
+		if (!quiet)
+			perror("tcsetattr");
+	} else
+		_in_raw_mode = 0;
+}
+
+void
+enter_raw_mode(int quiet)
+{
+	struct termios tio;
+
+	if (tcgetattr(fileno(stdin), &tio) == -1) {
+		if (!quiet)
+			perror("tcgetattr");
+		return;
+	}
+	_saved_tio = tio;
+	tio.c_iflag |= IGNPAR;
+	tio.c_iflag &= ~(ISTRIP | INLCR | IGNCR | ICRNL | IXON | IXANY | IXOFF);
+#ifdef IUCLC
+	tio.c_iflag &= ~IUCLC;
+#endif
+	tio.c_lflag &= ~(ISIG | ICANON | ECHO | ECHOE | ECHOK | ECHONL);
+#ifdef IEXTEN
+	tio.c_lflag &= ~IEXTEN;
+#endif
+	tio.c_oflag &= ~OPOST;
+	tio.c_cc[VMIN] = 1;
+	tio.c_cc[VTIME] = 0;
+	if (tcsetattr(fileno(stdin), TCSADRAIN, &tio) == -1) {
+		if (!quiet)
+			perror("tcsetattr");
+	} else
+		_in_raw_mode = 1;
+}
diff --git a/survey.sh.in b/survey.sh.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d6075a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/survey.sh.in
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Darren Tucker
+#
+# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+#
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+# WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+# ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+# WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+# ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+
+host="@host@"
+AWK="@AWK@"
+CC="@CC@"
+CPP="@CPP@"
+CFLAGS="@CFLAGS@"
+CPPFLAGS="@CPPFLAGS@"
+LDFLAGS="@LDFLAGS@"
+LIBS="@LIBS@"
+
+# Note format:
+# identifier: [data] CRCR
+
+echo "openssh-survey-version: 1"
+echo
+echo "openssh-version: `./ssh -V 2>&1`"
+echo
+configinv=`$AWK '/^  \\\$.*configure/' config.log | sed 's/^  \\\$ //g'`
+echo "configure-invocation: $configinv"
+echo
+echo "host: $host"
+echo
+echo "uname: `uname`"
+echo
+echo "uname-r: `uname -r`"
+echo
+echo "uname-m: `uname -m`"
+echo
+echo "uname-p: `uname -p`"
+echo
+echo "oslevel: `oslevel 2>/dev/null`"
+echo
+echo "oslevel-r: `oslevel -r 2>/dev/null`"
+echo
+echo "cc: $CC"
+echo
+echo "cflags: $CFLAGS"
+echo
+echo "cppflags: $CPPFLAGS"
+echo
+echo "ldflags: $LDFLAGS"
+echo
+echo "libs: $LIBS"
+echo
+echo "ccver-v: `$CC -v 2>&1 | sed '/^[ \t]*$/d'`"
+echo
+echo "ccver-V: `$CC -V 2>&1 | sed '/^[ \t]*$/d'`"
+echo
+echo "cppdefines:"
+${CPP} -dM - </dev/null
+echo
+echo "config.h:"
+egrep '#define|#undef' config.h
+echo
diff --git a/ttymodes.c b/ttymodes.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1d20ce8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ttymodes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,450 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.c,v 1.36 2021/01/27 09:26:54 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/*
+ * SSH2 tty modes support by Kevin Steves.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Encoding and decoding of terminal modes in a portable way.
+ * Much of the format is defined in ttymodes.h; it is included multiple times
+ * into this file with the appropriate macro definitions to generate the
+ * suitable code.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "compat.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+
+#define TTY_OP_END		0
+/*
+ * uint32 (u_int) follows speed.
+ */
+#define TTY_OP_ISPEED	128
+#define TTY_OP_OSPEED	129
+
+/*
+ * Converts POSIX speed_t to a baud rate.  The values of the
+ * constants for speed_t are not themselves portable.
+ */
+static int
+speed_to_baud(speed_t speed)
+{
+	switch (speed) {
+	case B0:
+		return 0;
+	case B50:
+		return 50;
+	case B75:
+		return 75;
+	case B110:
+		return 110;
+	case B134:
+		return 134;
+	case B150:
+		return 150;
+	case B200:
+		return 200;
+	case B300:
+		return 300;
+	case B600:
+		return 600;
+	case B1200:
+		return 1200;
+	case B1800:
+		return 1800;
+	case B2400:
+		return 2400;
+	case B4800:
+		return 4800;
+	case B9600:
+		return 9600;
+
+#ifdef B19200
+	case B19200:
+		return 19200;
+#else /* B19200 */
+#ifdef EXTA
+	case EXTA:
+		return 19200;
+#endif /* EXTA */
+#endif /* B19200 */
+
+#ifdef B38400
+	case B38400:
+		return 38400;
+#else /* B38400 */
+#ifdef EXTB
+	case EXTB:
+		return 38400;
+#endif /* EXTB */
+#endif /* B38400 */
+
+#ifdef B7200
+	case B7200:
+		return 7200;
+#endif /* B7200 */
+#ifdef B14400
+	case B14400:
+		return 14400;
+#endif /* B14400 */
+#ifdef B28800
+	case B28800:
+		return 28800;
+#endif /* B28800 */
+#ifdef B57600
+	case B57600:
+		return 57600;
+#endif /* B57600 */
+#ifdef B76800
+	case B76800:
+		return 76800;
+#endif /* B76800 */
+#ifdef B115200
+	case B115200:
+		return 115200;
+#endif /* B115200 */
+#ifdef B230400
+	case B230400:
+		return 230400;
+#endif /* B230400 */
+	default:
+		return 9600;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Converts a numeric baud rate to a POSIX speed_t.
+ */
+static speed_t
+baud_to_speed(int baud)
+{
+	switch (baud) {
+	case 0:
+		return B0;
+	case 50:
+		return B50;
+	case 75:
+		return B75;
+	case 110:
+		return B110;
+	case 134:
+		return B134;
+	case 150:
+		return B150;
+	case 200:
+		return B200;
+	case 300:
+		return B300;
+	case 600:
+		return B600;
+	case 1200:
+		return B1200;
+	case 1800:
+		return B1800;
+	case 2400:
+		return B2400;
+	case 4800:
+		return B4800;
+	case 9600:
+		return B9600;
+
+#ifdef B19200
+	case 19200:
+		return B19200;
+#else /* B19200 */
+#ifdef EXTA
+	case 19200:
+		return EXTA;
+#endif /* EXTA */
+#endif /* B19200 */
+
+#ifdef B38400
+	case 38400:
+		return B38400;
+#else /* B38400 */
+#ifdef EXTB
+	case 38400:
+		return EXTB;
+#endif /* EXTB */
+#endif /* B38400 */
+
+#ifdef B7200
+	case 7200:
+		return B7200;
+#endif /* B7200 */
+#ifdef B14400
+	case 14400:
+		return B14400;
+#endif /* B14400 */
+#ifdef B28800
+	case 28800:
+		return B28800;
+#endif /* B28800 */
+#ifdef B57600
+	case 57600:
+		return B57600;
+#endif /* B57600 */
+#ifdef B76800
+	case 76800:
+		return B76800;
+#endif /* B76800 */
+#ifdef B115200
+	case 115200:
+		return B115200;
+#endif /* B115200 */
+#ifdef B230400
+	case 230400:
+		return B230400;
+#endif /* B230400 */
+	default:
+		return B9600;
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode a special character into SSH line format.
+ */
+static u_int
+special_char_encode(cc_t c)
+{
+#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE
+	if (c == _POSIX_VDISABLE)
+		return 255;
+#endif /* _POSIX_VDISABLE */
+	return c;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode a special character from SSH line format.
+ */
+static cc_t
+special_char_decode(u_int c)
+{
+#ifdef _POSIX_VDISABLE
+	if (c == 255)
+		return _POSIX_VDISABLE;
+#endif /* _POSIX_VDISABLE */
+	return c;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd
+ * or tiop in a portable manner, and appends the modes to a packet
+ * being constructed.
+ */
+void
+ssh_tty_make_modes(struct ssh *ssh, int fd, struct termios *tiop)
+{
+	struct termios tio;
+	struct sshbuf *buf;
+	int r, ibaud, obaud;
+
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+
+	if (tiop == NULL) {
+		if (fd == -1) {
+			debug_f("no fd or tio");
+			goto end;
+		}
+		if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) {
+			logit("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+			goto end;
+		}
+	} else
+		tio = *tiop;
+
+	/* Store input and output baud rates. */
+	obaud = speed_to_baud(cfgetospeed(&tio));
+	ibaud = speed_to_baud(cfgetispeed(&tio));
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, TTY_OP_OSPEED)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, obaud)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, TTY_OP_ISPEED)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, ibaud)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose");
+
+	/* Store values of mode flags. */
+#define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, OP)) != 0 || \
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, \
+	    special_char_encode(tio.c_cc[NAME]))) != 0) \
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose %s", #NAME);
+
+#define SSH_TTYMODE_IUTF8 42  /* for SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE */
+
+#define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \
+	if (OP == SSH_TTYMODE_IUTF8 && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE)) { \
+		debug3_f("SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE"); \
+	} else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, OP)) != 0 || \
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, ((tio.FIELD & NAME) != 0))) != 0) \
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose %s", #NAME);
+
+#include "ttymodes.h"
+
+#undef TTYCHAR
+#undef TTYMODE
+
+end:
+	/* Mark end of mode data. */
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, TTY_OP_END)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "compose end");
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decodes terminal modes for the terminal referenced by fd in a portable
+ * manner from a packet being read.
+ */
+void
+ssh_tty_parse_modes(struct ssh *ssh, int fd)
+{
+	struct termios tio;
+	struct sshbuf *buf;
+	const u_char *data;
+	u_char opcode;
+	u_int baud, u;
+	int r, failure = 0;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &len)) != 0)
+		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+	if (len == 0)
+		return;
+	if ((buf = sshbuf_from(data, len)) == NULL) {
+		error_f("sshbuf_from failed");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Get old attributes for the terminal.  We will modify these
+	 * flags. I am hoping that if there are any machine-specific
+	 * modes, they will initially have reasonable values.
+	 */
+	if (tcgetattr(fd, &tio) == -1) {
+		logit("tcgetattr: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		failure = -1;
+	}
+
+	while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &opcode)) != 0)
+			fatal_fr(r, "parse opcode");
+		switch (opcode) {
+		case TTY_OP_END:
+			goto set;
+
+		case TTY_OP_ISPEED:
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &baud)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse ispeed");
+			if (failure != -1 &&
+			    cfsetispeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1)
+				error("cfsetispeed failed for %d", baud);
+			break;
+
+		case TTY_OP_OSPEED:
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &baud)) != 0)
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse ospeed");
+			if (failure != -1 &&
+			    cfsetospeed(&tio, baud_to_speed(baud)) == -1)
+				error("cfsetospeed failed for %d", baud);
+			break;
+
+#define TTYCHAR(NAME, OP) \
+		case OP: \
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &u)) != 0) \
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse %s", #NAME); \
+			tio.c_cc[NAME] = special_char_decode(u); \
+			break;
+#define TTYMODE(NAME, FIELD, OP) \
+		case OP: \
+			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &u)) != 0) \
+				fatal_fr(r, "parse %s", #NAME); \
+			if (u) \
+				tio.FIELD |= NAME; \
+			else \
+				tio.FIELD &= ~NAME; \
+			break;
+
+#include "ttymodes.h"
+
+#undef TTYCHAR
+#undef TTYMODE
+
+		default:
+			debug("Ignoring unsupported tty mode opcode %d (0x%x)",
+			    opcode, opcode);
+			/*
+			 * SSH2:
+			 * Opcodes 1 to 159 are defined to have a uint32
+			 * argument.
+			 * Opcodes 160 to 255 are undefined and cause parsing
+			 * to stop.
+			 */
+			if (opcode > 0 && opcode < 160) {
+				if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, NULL)) != 0)
+					fatal_fr(r, "parse arg");
+				break;
+			} else {
+				logit_f("unknown opcode %d", opcode);
+				goto set;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+set:
+	len = sshbuf_len(buf);
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	if (len > 0) {
+		logit_f("%zu bytes left", len);
+		return;		/* Don't process bytes passed */
+	}
+	if (failure == -1)
+		return;		/* Packet parsed ok but tcgetattr() failed */
+
+	/* Set the new modes for the terminal. */
+	if (tcsetattr(fd, TCSANOW, &tio) == -1)
+		logit("Setting tty modes failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+}
diff --git a/ttymodes.h b/ttymodes.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24f0756
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ttymodes.h
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ttymodes.h,v 1.16 2017/04/30 23:26:54 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+/*
+ * SSH2 tty modes support by Kevin Steves.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * The tty mode description is a string, consisting of
+ * opcode-arguments pairs.  It is terminated by opcode TTY_OP_END (0).
+ * Opcodes 1-159 have uint32 arguments.
+ * Opcodes 160-255 are not yet defined and cause parsing to stop (they
+ * should only be used after any other data).
+ *
+ * The client puts in the string any modes it knows about, and the
+ * server ignores any modes it does not know about.  This allows some degree
+ * of machine-independence, at least between systems that use a posix-like
+ * tty interface.  The protocol can support other systems as well, but might
+ * require reimplementing as mode names would likely be different.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Some constants and prototypes are defined in packet.h; this file
+ * is only intended for including from ttymodes.c.
+ */
+
+/* termios macro */
+/* name, op */
+TTYCHAR(VINTR, 1)
+TTYCHAR(VQUIT, 2)
+TTYCHAR(VERASE, 3)
+#if defined(VKILL)
+TTYCHAR(VKILL, 4)
+#endif /* VKILL */
+TTYCHAR(VEOF, 5)
+#if defined(VEOL)
+TTYCHAR(VEOL, 6)
+#endif /* VEOL */
+#ifdef VEOL2
+TTYCHAR(VEOL2, 7)
+#endif /* VEOL2 */
+TTYCHAR(VSTART, 8)
+TTYCHAR(VSTOP, 9)
+#if defined(VSUSP)
+TTYCHAR(VSUSP, 10)
+#endif /* VSUSP */
+#if defined(VDSUSP)
+TTYCHAR(VDSUSP, 11)
+#endif /* VDSUSP */
+#if defined(VREPRINT)
+TTYCHAR(VREPRINT, 12)
+#endif /* VREPRINT */
+#if defined(VWERASE)
+TTYCHAR(VWERASE, 13)
+#endif /* VWERASE */
+#if defined(VLNEXT)
+TTYCHAR(VLNEXT, 14)
+#endif /* VLNEXT */
+#if defined(VFLUSH)
+TTYCHAR(VFLUSH, 15)
+#endif /* VFLUSH */
+#ifdef VSWTCH
+TTYCHAR(VSWTCH, 16)
+#endif /* VSWTCH */
+#if defined(VSTATUS)
+TTYCHAR(VSTATUS, 17)
+#endif /* VSTATUS */
+#ifdef VDISCARD
+TTYCHAR(VDISCARD, 18)
+#endif /* VDISCARD */
+
+/* name, field, op */
+TTYMODE(IGNPAR,	c_iflag, 30)
+TTYMODE(PARMRK,	c_iflag, 31)
+TTYMODE(INPCK,	c_iflag, 32)
+TTYMODE(ISTRIP,	c_iflag, 33)
+TTYMODE(INLCR,	c_iflag, 34)
+TTYMODE(IGNCR,	c_iflag, 35)
+TTYMODE(ICRNL,	c_iflag, 36)
+#if defined(IUCLC)
+TTYMODE(IUCLC,	c_iflag, 37)
+#endif
+TTYMODE(IXON,	c_iflag, 38)
+TTYMODE(IXANY,	c_iflag, 39)
+TTYMODE(IXOFF,	c_iflag, 40)
+#ifdef IMAXBEL
+TTYMODE(IMAXBEL,c_iflag, 41)
+#endif /* IMAXBEL */
+#ifdef IUTF8
+TTYMODE(IUTF8,  c_iflag, 42)
+#endif /* IUTF8 */
+
+TTYMODE(ISIG,	c_lflag, 50)
+TTYMODE(ICANON,	c_lflag, 51)
+#ifdef XCASE
+TTYMODE(XCASE,	c_lflag, 52)
+#endif
+TTYMODE(ECHO,	c_lflag, 53)
+TTYMODE(ECHOE,	c_lflag, 54)
+TTYMODE(ECHOK,	c_lflag, 55)
+TTYMODE(ECHONL,	c_lflag, 56)
+TTYMODE(NOFLSH,	c_lflag, 57)
+TTYMODE(TOSTOP,	c_lflag, 58)
+#ifdef IEXTEN
+TTYMODE(IEXTEN, c_lflag, 59)
+#endif /* IEXTEN */
+#if defined(ECHOCTL)
+TTYMODE(ECHOCTL,c_lflag, 60)
+#endif /* ECHOCTL */
+#ifdef ECHOKE
+TTYMODE(ECHOKE,	c_lflag, 61)
+#endif /* ECHOKE */
+#if defined(PENDIN)
+TTYMODE(PENDIN,	c_lflag, 62)
+#endif /* PENDIN */
+
+TTYMODE(OPOST,	c_oflag, 70)
+#if defined(OLCUC)
+TTYMODE(OLCUC,	c_oflag, 71)
+#endif
+#ifdef ONLCR
+TTYMODE(ONLCR,	c_oflag, 72)
+#endif
+#ifdef OCRNL
+TTYMODE(OCRNL,	c_oflag, 73)
+#endif
+#ifdef ONOCR
+TTYMODE(ONOCR,	c_oflag, 74)
+#endif
+#ifdef ONLRET
+TTYMODE(ONLRET,	c_oflag, 75)
+#endif
+
+TTYMODE(CS7,	c_cflag, 90)
+TTYMODE(CS8,	c_cflag, 91)
+TTYMODE(PARENB,	c_cflag, 92)
+TTYMODE(PARODD,	c_cflag, 93)
diff --git a/uidswap.c b/uidswap.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6ed3024
--- /dev/null
+++ b/uidswap.c
@@ -0,0 +1,238 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.42 2019/06/28 13:35:04 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Code for uid-swapping.
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include <grp.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+
+/*
+ * Note: all these functions must work in all of the following cases:
+ *    1. euid=0, ruid=0
+ *    2. euid=0, ruid!=0
+ *    3. euid!=0, ruid!=0
+ * Additionally, they must work regardless of whether the system has
+ * POSIX saved uids or not.
+ */
+
+#if defined(_POSIX_SAVED_IDS) && !defined(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS)
+/* Lets assume that posix saved ids also work with seteuid, even though that
+   is not part of the posix specification. */
+#define SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+/* Saved effective uid. */
+static uid_t	saved_euid = 0;
+static gid_t	saved_egid = 0;
+#endif
+
+/* Saved effective uid. */
+static int	privileged = 0;
+static int	temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0;
+static uid_t	user_groups_uid;
+static gid_t	*saved_egroups = NULL, *user_groups = NULL;
+static int	saved_egroupslen = -1, user_groupslen = -1;
+
+/*
+ * Temporarily changes to the given uid.  If the effective user
+ * id is not root, this does nothing.  This call cannot be nested.
+ */
+void
+temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	/* Save the current euid, and egroups. */
+#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+	saved_euid = geteuid();
+	saved_egid = getegid();
+	debug("temporarily_use_uid: %u/%u (e=%u/%u)",
+	    (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+	    (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid);
+#ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
+	if (saved_euid != 0) {
+		privileged = 0;
+		return;
+	}
+#endif
+#else
+	if (geteuid() != 0) {
+		privileged = 0;
+		return;
+	}
+#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+
+	privileged = 1;
+	temporarily_use_uid_effective = 1;
+
+	saved_egroupslen = getgroups(0, NULL);
+	if (saved_egroupslen == -1)
+		fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	if (saved_egroupslen > 0) {
+		saved_egroups = xreallocarray(saved_egroups,
+		    saved_egroupslen, sizeof(gid_t));
+		if (getgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) == -1)
+			fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	} else { /* saved_egroupslen == 0 */
+		free(saved_egroups);
+		saved_egroups = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* set and save the user's groups */
+	if (user_groupslen == -1 || user_groups_uid != pw->pw_uid) {
+		if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1)
+			fatal("initgroups: %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name,
+			    strerror(errno));
+
+		user_groupslen = getgroups(0, NULL);
+		if (user_groupslen == -1)
+			fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		if (user_groupslen > 0) {
+			user_groups = xreallocarray(user_groups,
+			    user_groupslen, sizeof(gid_t));
+			if (getgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) == -1)
+				fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+		} else { /* user_groupslen == 0 */
+			free(user_groups);
+			user_groups = NULL;
+		}
+		user_groups_uid = pw->pw_uid;
+	}
+	/* Set the effective uid to the given (unprivileged) uid. */
+	if (setgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) == -1)
+		fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+#ifndef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+	/* Propagate the privileged gid to all of our gids. */
+	if (setgid(getegid()) == -1)
+		debug("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int) getegid(), strerror(errno));
+	/* Propagate the privileged uid to all of our uids. */
+	if (setuid(geteuid()) == -1)
+		debug("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) geteuid(), strerror(errno));
+#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+	if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) == -1)
+		fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+		    strerror(errno));
+	if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) == -1)
+		fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+		    strerror(errno));
+}
+
+/*
+ * Restores to the original (privileged) uid.
+ */
+void
+restore_uid(void)
+{
+	/* it's a no-op unless privileged */
+	if (!privileged) {
+		debug("restore_uid: (unprivileged)");
+		return;
+	}
+	if (!temporarily_use_uid_effective)
+		fatal("restore_uid: temporarily_use_uid not effective");
+
+#ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID
+	debug("restore_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid);
+	/* Set the effective uid back to the saved privileged uid. */
+	if (seteuid(saved_euid) == -1)
+		fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_euid, strerror(errno));
+	if (setegid(saved_egid) == -1)
+		fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_egid, strerror(errno));
+#else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+	/*
+	 * We are unable to restore the real uid to its unprivileged value.
+	 * Propagate the real uid (usually more privileged) to effective uid
+	 * as well.
+	 */
+	if (setuid(getuid()) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+	if (setgid(getgid()) == -1)
+		fatal("%s: setgid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+#endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */
+
+	if (setgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) == -1)
+		fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+	temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Permanently sets all uids to the given uid.  This cannot be
+ * called while temporarily_use_uid is effective.
+ */
+void
+permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST
+	uid_t old_uid = getuid();
+	gid_t old_gid = getgid();
+#endif
+
+	if (pw == NULL)
+		fatal("permanently_set_uid: no user given");
+	if (temporarily_use_uid_effective)
+		fatal("permanently_set_uid: temporarily_use_uid effective");
+	debug("permanently_set_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
+	    (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
+
+	if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1)
+		fatal("setresgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
+
+#ifdef __APPLE__
+	/*
+	 * OS X requires initgroups after setgid to opt back into
+	 * memberd support for >16 supplemental groups.
+	 */
+	if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1)
+		fatal("initgroups %.100s %u: %.100s",
+		    pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
+#endif
+
+	if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) == -1)
+		fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno));
+
+#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST
+	/* Try restoration of GID if changed (test clearing of saved gid) */
+	if (old_gid != pw->pw_gid && pw->pw_uid != 0 &&
+	    (setgid(old_gid) != -1 || setegid(old_gid) != -1))
+		fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]gid", __func__);
+#endif
+
+	/* Verify GID drop was successful */
+	if (getgid() != pw->pw_gid || getegid() != pw->pw_gid) {
+		fatal("%s: egid incorrect gid:%u egid:%u (should be %u)",
+		    __func__, (u_int)getgid(), (u_int)getegid(),
+		    (u_int)pw->pw_gid);
+	}
+
+#ifndef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST
+	/* Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid) */
+	if (old_uid != pw->pw_uid &&
+	    (setuid(old_uid) != -1 || seteuid(old_uid) != -1))
+		fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]uid", __func__);
+#endif
+
+	/* Verify UID drop was successful */
+	if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) {
+		fatal("%s: euid incorrect uid:%u euid:%u (should be %u)",
+		    __func__, (u_int)getuid(), (u_int)geteuid(),
+		    (u_int)pw->pw_uid);
+	}
+}
diff --git a/uidswap.h b/uidswap.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4ac91aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/uidswap.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.h,v 1.14 2018/07/18 11:34:05 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+void	 temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *);
+void	 restore_uid(void);
+void	 permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *);
diff --git a/umac.c b/umac.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a710424
--- /dev/null
+++ b/umac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1282 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.22 2022/01/01 05:55:06 jsg Exp $ */
+/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * umac.c -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication
+ *
+ * Version 0.93b of rfc4418.txt -- 2006 July 18
+ *
+ * For a full description of UMAC message authentication see the UMAC
+ * world-wide-web page at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/umac
+ * Please report bugs and suggestions to the UMAC webpage.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Ted Krovetz
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and
+ * its documentation for any purpose and with or without fee, is hereby
+ * granted provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies
+ * and in supporting documentation, and that the name of the copyright
+ * holder not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to
+ * distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission.
+ *
+ * Comments should be directed to Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org)
+ *
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+ /* ////////////////////// IMPORTANT NOTES /////////////////////////////////
+  *
+  * 1) This version does not work properly on messages larger than 16MB
+  *
+  * 2) If you set the switch to use SSE2, then all data must be 16-byte
+  *    aligned
+  *
+  * 3) When calling the function umac(), it is assumed that msg is in
+  * a writable buffer of length divisible by 32 bytes. The message itself
+  * does not have to fill the entire buffer, but bytes beyond msg may be
+  * zeroed.
+  *
+  * 4) Three free AES implementations are supported by this implementation of
+  * UMAC. Paulo Barreto's version is in the public domain and can be found
+  * at http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ (search for
+  * "Barreto"). The only two files needed are rijndael-alg-fst.c and
+  * rijndael-alg-fst.h. Brian Gladman's version is distributed with the GNU
+  * Public license at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It
+  * includes a fast IA-32 assembly version. The OpenSSL crypo library is
+  * the third.
+  *
+  * 5) With FORCE_C_ONLY flags set to 0, incorrect results are sometimes
+  * produced under gcc with optimizations set -O3 or higher. Dunno why.
+  *
+  /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- User Switches ---------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#ifndef UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN
+#define UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN     8  /* Alowable: 4, 8, 12, 16                  */
+#endif
+
+#if UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 4 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 8 && \
+    UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 12 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 16
+# error UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN must be defined to 4, 8, 12 or 16
+#endif
+
+/* #define FORCE_C_ONLY        1  ANSI C and 64-bit integers req'd        */
+/* #define AES_IMPLEMENTAION   1  1 = OpenSSL, 2 = Barreto, 3 = Gladman   */
+/* #define SSE2                0  Is SSE2 is available?                   */
+/* #define RUN_TESTS           0  Run basic correctness/speed tests       */
+/* #define UMAC_AE_SUPPORT     0  Enable authenticated encryption         */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* -- Global Includes --------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "umac.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- Primitive Data Types ---                                           */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* The following assumptions may need change on your system */
+typedef u_int8_t	UINT8;  /* 1 byte   */
+typedef u_int16_t	UINT16; /* 2 byte   */
+typedef u_int32_t	UINT32; /* 4 byte   */
+typedef u_int64_t	UINT64; /* 8 bytes  */
+typedef unsigned int	UWORD;  /* Register */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- Constants -------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#define UMAC_KEY_LEN           16  /* UMAC takes 16 bytes of external key */
+
+/* Message "words" are read from memory in an endian-specific manner.     */
+/* For this implementation to behave correctly, __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ must    */
+/* be set true if the host computer is little-endian.                     */
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 1
+#else
+#define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 0
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Architecture Specific ------------------------------------------ */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Primitive Routines --------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- 32-bit by 32-bit to 64-bit Multiplication ------------------------ */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#define MUL64(a,b) ((UINT64)((UINT64)(UINT32)(a) * (UINT64)(UINT32)(b)))
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* --- Endian Conversion --- Forcing assembly on some platforms           */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
+#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p)		get_u32(p)
+#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v)	put_u32(p,v)
+#else
+#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p)		get_u32_le(p)
+#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v)	put_u32_le(p,v)
+#endif
+
+#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(p)		(get_u32_le(p))
+#define STORE_UINT32_BIG(p,v)		put_u32(p, v)
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Begin KDF & PDF Section ---------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* UMAC uses AES with 16 byte block and key lengths */
+#define AES_BLOCK_LEN  16
+
+/* OpenSSL's AES */
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
+# include <openssl/aes.h>
+#endif
+typedef AES_KEY aes_int_key[1];
+#define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key)                  \
+  AES_encrypt((u_char *)(in),(u_char *)(out),(AES_KEY *)int_key)
+#define aes_key_setup(key,int_key)                      \
+  AES_set_encrypt_key((const u_char *)(key),UMAC_KEY_LEN*8,int_key)
+#else
+#include "rijndael.h"
+#define AES_ROUNDS ((UMAC_KEY_LEN / 4) + 6)
+typedef UINT8 aes_int_key[AES_ROUNDS+1][4][4];	/* AES internal */
+#define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key) \
+  rijndaelEncrypt((u32 *)(int_key), AES_ROUNDS, (u8 *)(in), (u8 *)(out))
+#define aes_key_setup(key,int_key) \
+  rijndaelKeySetupEnc((u32 *)(int_key), (const unsigned char *)(key), \
+  UMAC_KEY_LEN*8)
+#endif
+
+/* The user-supplied UMAC key is stretched using AES in a counter
+ * mode to supply all random bits needed by UMAC. The kdf function takes
+ * an AES internal key representation 'key' and writes a stream of
+ * 'nbytes' bytes to the memory pointed at by 'bufp'. Each distinct
+ * 'ndx' causes a distinct byte stream.
+ */
+static void kdf(void *bufp, aes_int_key key, UINT8 ndx, int nbytes)
+{
+    UINT8 in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN] = {0};
+    UINT8 out_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
+    UINT8 *dst_buf = (UINT8 *)bufp;
+    int i;
+
+    /* Setup the initial value */
+    in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-9] = ndx;
+    in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = i = 1;
+
+    while (nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_LEN) {
+        aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key);
+        memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,AES_BLOCK_LEN);
+        in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = ++i;
+        nbytes -= AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+        dst_buf += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
+    }
+    if (nbytes) {
+        aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key);
+        memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,nbytes);
+    }
+    explicit_bzero(in_buf, sizeof(in_buf));
+    explicit_bzero(out_buf, sizeof(out_buf));
+}
+
+/* The final UHASH result is XOR'd with the output of a pseudorandom
+ * function. Here, we use AES to generate random output and
+ * xor the appropriate bytes depending on the last bits of nonce.
+ * This scheme is optimized for sequential, increasing big-endian nonces.
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+    UINT8 cache[AES_BLOCK_LEN];  /* Previous AES output is saved      */
+    UINT8 nonce[AES_BLOCK_LEN];  /* The AES input making above cache  */
+    aes_int_key prf_key;         /* Expanded AES key for PDF          */
+} pdf_ctx;
+
+static void pdf_init(pdf_ctx *pc, aes_int_key prf_key)
+{
+    UINT8 buf[UMAC_KEY_LEN];
+
+    kdf(buf, prf_key, 0, UMAC_KEY_LEN);
+    aes_key_setup(buf, pc->prf_key);
+
+    /* Initialize pdf and cache */
+    memset(pc->nonce, 0, sizeof(pc->nonce));
+    aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key);
+    explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+}
+
+static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, const UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8])
+{
+    /* 'ndx' indicates that we'll be using the 0th or 1st eight bytes
+     * of the AES output. If last time around we returned the ndx-1st
+     * element, then we may have the result in the cache already.
+     */
+
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
+#define LOW_BIT_MASK 3
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
+#define LOW_BIT_MASK 1
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN > 8)
+#define LOW_BIT_MASK 0
+#endif
+    union {
+        UINT8 tmp_nonce_lo[4];
+        UINT32 align;
+    } t;
+#if LOW_BIT_MASK != 0
+    int ndx = nonce[7] & LOW_BIT_MASK;
+#endif
+    *(UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[1];
+    t.tmp_nonce_lo[3] &= ~LOW_BIT_MASK; /* zero last bit */
+
+    if ( (((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1]) ||
+         (((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0]) )
+    {
+        ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0] = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0];
+        ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1] = ((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0];
+        aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key);
+    }
+
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
+    *((UINT32 *)buf) ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[ndx];
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
+    *((UINT64 *)buf) ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[ndx];
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12)
+    ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0];
+    ((UINT32 *)buf)[2] ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[2];
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+    ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0];
+    ((UINT64 *)buf)[1] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[1];
+#endif
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Begin NH Hash Section ------------------------------------------ */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* The NH-based hash functions used in UMAC are described in the UMAC paper
+ * and specification, both of which can be found at the UMAC website.
+ * The interface to this implementation has two
+ * versions, one expects the entire message being hashed to be passed
+ * in a single buffer and returns the hash result immediately. The second
+ * allows the message to be passed in a sequence of buffers. In the
+ * multiple-buffer interface, the client calls the routine nh_update() as
+ * many times as necessary. When there is no more data to be fed to the
+ * hash, the client calls nh_final() which calculates the hash output.
+ * Before beginning another hash calculation the nh_reset() routine
+ * must be called. The single-buffer routine, nh(), is equivalent to
+ * the sequence of calls nh_update() and nh_final(); however it is
+ * optimized and should be preferred whenever the multiple-buffer interface
+ * is not necessary. When using either interface, it is the client's
+ * responsibility to pass no more than L1_KEY_LEN bytes per hash result.
+ *
+ * The routine nh_init() initializes the nh_ctx data structure and
+ * must be called once, before any other PDF routine.
+ */
+
+ /* The "nh_aux" routines do the actual NH hashing work. They
+  * expect buffers to be multiples of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. These routines
+  * produce output for all STREAMS NH iterations in one call,
+  * allowing the parallel implementation of the streams.
+  */
+
+#define STREAMS (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN / 4) /* Number of times hash is applied  */
+#define L1_KEY_LEN         1024     /* Internal key bytes                 */
+#define L1_KEY_SHIFT         16     /* Toeplitz key shift between streams */
+#define L1_PAD_BOUNDARY      32     /* pad message to boundary multiple   */
+#define ALLOC_BOUNDARY       16     /* Keep buffers aligned to this       */
+#define HASH_BUF_BYTES       64     /* nh_aux_hb buffer multiple          */
+
+typedef struct {
+    UINT8  nh_key [L1_KEY_LEN + L1_KEY_SHIFT * (STREAMS - 1)]; /* NH Key */
+    UINT8  data   [HASH_BUF_BYTES];    /* Incoming data buffer           */
+    int next_data_empty;    /* Bookkeeping variable for data buffer.     */
+    int bytes_hashed;       /* Bytes (out of L1_KEY_LEN) incorporated.   */
+    UINT64 state[STREAMS];               /* on-line state     */
+} nh_ctx;
+
+
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
+
+static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
+/* NH hashing primitive. Previous (partial) hash result is loaded and
+* then stored via hp pointer. The length of the data pointed at by "dp",
+* "dlen", is guaranteed to be divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY (32).  Key
+* is expected to be endian compensated in memory at key setup.
+*/
+{
+    UINT64 h;
+    UWORD c = dlen / 32;
+    UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
+    const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
+    UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
+    UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7;
+
+    h = *((UINT64 *)hp);
+    do {
+        d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
+        d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
+        d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
+        d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
+        k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
+        k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
+        h += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
+        h += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
+        h += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
+        h += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
+
+        d += 8;
+        k += 8;
+    } while (--c);
+  *((UINT64 *)hp) = h;
+}
+
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
+
+static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
+/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
+ * reading and writing 16 bytes of hash-state per call.
+ */
+{
+  UINT64 h1,h2;
+  UWORD c = dlen / 32;
+  UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
+  const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
+  UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
+  UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
+        k8,k9,k10,k11;
+
+  h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
+  h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
+  k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
+  do {
+    d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
+    d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
+    d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
+    d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
+    k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
+    k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
+
+    h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
+    h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
+
+    h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
+    h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
+
+    h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
+    h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
+
+    h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
+    h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
+
+    k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
+
+    d += 8;
+    k += 8;
+  } while (--c);
+  ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
+  ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
+}
+
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12)
+
+static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
+/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
+ * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call.
+*/
+{
+    UINT64 h1,h2,h3;
+    UWORD c = dlen / 32;
+    UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
+    const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
+    UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
+    UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
+        k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15;
+
+    h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
+    h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
+    h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2);
+    k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
+    k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
+    do {
+        d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
+        d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
+        d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
+        d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
+        k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
+        k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15);
+
+        h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
+        h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
+        h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4));
+
+        h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
+        h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
+        h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5));
+
+        h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
+        h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
+        h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6));
+
+        h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
+        h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
+        h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7));
+
+        k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
+        k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15;
+
+        d += 8;
+        k += 8;
+    } while (--c);
+    ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
+    ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
+    ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3;
+}
+
+#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+
+static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
+/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
+ * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call.
+*/
+{
+    UINT64 h1,h2,h3,h4;
+    UWORD c = dlen / 32;
+    UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
+    const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
+    UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
+    UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
+        k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15,
+        k16,k17,k18,k19;
+
+    h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
+    h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
+    h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2);
+    h4 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 3);
+    k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
+    k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
+    do {
+        d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
+        d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
+        d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
+        d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
+        k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
+        k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15);
+        k16 = *(k+16); k17 = *(k+17); k18 = *(k+18); k19 = *(k+19);
+
+        h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
+        h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
+        h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4));
+        h4 += MUL64((k12 + d0), (k16 + d4));
+
+        h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
+        h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
+        h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5));
+        h4 += MUL64((k13 + d1), (k17 + d5));
+
+        h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
+        h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
+        h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6));
+        h4 += MUL64((k14 + d2), (k18 + d6));
+
+        h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
+        h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
+        h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7));
+        h4 += MUL64((k15 + d3), (k19 + d7));
+
+        k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
+        k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15;
+        k8 = k16; k9 = k17; k10 = k18; k11 = k19;
+
+        d += 8;
+        k += 8;
+    } while (--c);
+    ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
+    ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
+    ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3;
+    ((UINT64 *)hp)[3] = h4;
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+#endif  /* UMAC_OUTPUT_LENGTH */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_transform(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes)
+/* This function is a wrapper for the primitive NH hash functions. It takes
+ * as argument "hc" the current hash context and a buffer which must be a
+ * multiple of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. The key passed to nh_aux is offset
+ * appropriately according to how much message has been hashed already.
+ */
+{
+    UINT8 *key;
+
+    key = hc->nh_key + hc->bytes_hashed;
+    nh_aux(key, buf, hc->state, nbytes);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
+static void endian_convert(void *buf, UWORD bpw, UINT32 num_bytes)
+/* We endian convert the keys on little-endian computers to               */
+/* compensate for the lack of big-endian memory reads during hashing.     */
+{
+    UWORD iters = num_bytes / bpw;
+    if (bpw == 4) {
+        UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf;
+        do {
+            *p = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p);
+            p++;
+        } while (--iters);
+    } else if (bpw == 8) {
+        UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf;
+        UINT32 t;
+        do {
+            t = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p+1);
+            p[1] = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p);
+            p[0] = t;
+            p += 2;
+        } while (--iters);
+    }
+}
+#define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) endian_convert((x),(y),(z))
+#else
+#define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) do{}while(0)  /* Do nothing */
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_reset(nh_ctx *hc)
+/* Reset nh_ctx to ready for hashing of new data */
+{
+    hc->bytes_hashed = 0;
+    hc->next_data_empty = 0;
+    hc->state[0] = 0;
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+    hc->state[1] = 0;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+    hc->state[2] = 0;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+    hc->state[3] = 0;
+#endif
+
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_init(nh_ctx *hc, aes_int_key prf_key)
+/* Generate nh_key, endian convert and reset to be ready for hashing.   */
+{
+    kdf(hc->nh_key, prf_key, 1, sizeof(hc->nh_key));
+    endian_convert_if_le(hc->nh_key, 4, sizeof(hc->nh_key));
+    nh_reset(hc);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_update(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes)
+/* Incorporate nbytes of data into a nh_ctx, buffer whatever is not an    */
+/* even multiple of HASH_BUF_BYTES.                                       */
+{
+    UINT32 i,j;
+
+    j = hc->next_data_empty;
+    if ((j + nbytes) >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) {
+        if (j) {
+            i = HASH_BUF_BYTES - j;
+            memcpy(hc->data+j, buf, i);
+            nh_transform(hc,hc->data,HASH_BUF_BYTES);
+            nbytes -= i;
+            buf += i;
+            hc->bytes_hashed += HASH_BUF_BYTES;
+        }
+        if (nbytes >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) {
+            i = nbytes & ~(HASH_BUF_BYTES - 1);
+            nh_transform(hc, buf, i);
+            nbytes -= i;
+            buf += i;
+            hc->bytes_hashed += i;
+        }
+        j = 0;
+    }
+    memcpy(hc->data + j, buf, nbytes);
+    hc->next_data_empty = j + nbytes;
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void zero_pad(UINT8 *p, int nbytes)
+{
+/* Write "nbytes" of zeroes, beginning at "p" */
+    if (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) {
+        while ((ptrdiff_t)p % sizeof(UWORD)) {
+            *p = 0;
+            nbytes--;
+            p++;
+        }
+        while (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) {
+            *(UWORD *)p = 0;
+            nbytes -= sizeof(UWORD);
+            p += sizeof(UWORD);
+        }
+    }
+    while (nbytes) {
+        *p = 0;
+        nbytes--;
+        p++;
+    }
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh_final(nh_ctx *hc, UINT8 *result)
+/* After passing some number of data buffers to nh_update() for integration
+ * into an NH context, nh_final is called to produce a hash result. If any
+ * bytes are in the buffer hc->data, incorporate them into the
+ * NH context. Finally, add into the NH accumulation "state" the total number
+ * of bits hashed. The resulting numbers are written to the buffer "result".
+ * If nh_update was never called, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY zeroes are incorporated.
+ */
+{
+    int nh_len, nbits;
+
+    if (hc->next_data_empty != 0) {
+        nh_len = ((hc->next_data_empty + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) &
+                                                ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
+        zero_pad(hc->data + hc->next_data_empty,
+                                          nh_len - hc->next_data_empty);
+        nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len);
+        hc->bytes_hashed += hc->next_data_empty;
+    } else if (hc->bytes_hashed == 0) {
+	nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY;
+        zero_pad(hc->data, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY);
+        nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len);
+    }
+
+    nbits = (hc->bytes_hashed << 3);
+    ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[0] + nbits;
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+    ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[1] + nbits;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+    ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[2] + nbits;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+    ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[3] + nbits;
+#endif
+    nh_reset(hc);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static void nh(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 padded_len,
+               UINT32 unpadded_len, UINT8 *result)
+/* All-in-one nh_update() and nh_final() equivalent.
+ * Assumes that padded_len is divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY and result is
+ * well aligned
+ */
+{
+    UINT32 nbits;
+
+    /* Initialize the hash state */
+    nbits = (unpadded_len << 3);
+
+    ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = nbits;
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+    ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = nbits;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+    ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = nbits;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+    ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = nbits;
+#endif
+
+    nh_aux(hc->nh_key, buf, result, padded_len);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Begin UHASH Section -------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* UHASH is a multi-layered algorithm. Data presented to UHASH is first
+ * hashed by NH. The NH output is then hashed by a polynomial-hash layer
+ * unless the initial data to be hashed is short. After the polynomial-
+ * layer, an inner-product hash is used to produce the final UHASH output.
+ *
+ * UHASH provides two interfaces, one all-at-once and another where data
+ * buffers are presented sequentially. In the sequential interface, the
+ * UHASH client calls the routine uhash_update() as many times as necessary.
+ * When there is no more data to be fed to UHASH, the client calls
+ * uhash_final() which
+ * calculates the UHASH output. Before beginning another UHASH calculation
+ * the uhash_reset() routine must be called. The all-at-once UHASH routine,
+ * uhash(), is equivalent to the sequence of calls uhash_update() and
+ * uhash_final(); however it is optimized and should be
+ * used whenever the sequential interface is not necessary.
+ *
+ * The routine uhash_init() initializes the uhash_ctx data structure and
+ * must be called once, before any other UHASH routine.
+ */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Constants and uhash_ctx ---------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Poly hash and Inner-Product hash Constants --------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* Primes and masks */
+#define p36    ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFBull)              /* 2^36 -  5 */
+#define p64    ((UINT64)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC5ull)              /* 2^64 - 59 */
+#define m36    ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFFull)  /* The low 36 of 64 bits */
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+typedef struct uhash_ctx {
+    nh_ctx hash;                          /* Hash context for L1 NH hash  */
+    UINT64 poly_key_8[STREAMS];           /* p64 poly keys                */
+    UINT64 poly_accum[STREAMS];           /* poly hash result             */
+    UINT64 ip_keys[STREAMS*4];            /* Inner-product keys           */
+    UINT32 ip_trans[STREAMS];             /* Inner-product translation    */
+    UINT32 msg_len;                       /* Total length of data passed  */
+                                          /* to uhash */
+} uhash_ctx;
+typedef struct uhash_ctx *uhash_ctx_t;
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* The polynomial hashes use Horner's rule to evaluate a polynomial one
+ * word at a time. As described in the specification, poly32 and poly64
+ * require keys from special domains. The following implementations exploit
+ * the special domains to avoid overflow. The results are not guaranteed to
+ * be within Z_p32 and Z_p64, but the Inner-Product hash implementation
+ * patches any errant values.
+ */
+
+static UINT64 poly64(UINT64 cur, UINT64 key, UINT64 data)
+{
+    UINT32 key_hi = (UINT32)(key >> 32),
+           key_lo = (UINT32)key,
+           cur_hi = (UINT32)(cur >> 32),
+           cur_lo = (UINT32)cur,
+           x_lo,
+           x_hi;
+    UINT64 X,T,res;
+
+    X =  MUL64(key_hi, cur_lo) + MUL64(cur_hi, key_lo);
+    x_lo = (UINT32)X;
+    x_hi = (UINT32)(X >> 32);
+
+    res = (MUL64(key_hi, cur_hi) + x_hi) * 59 + MUL64(key_lo, cur_lo);
+
+    T = ((UINT64)x_lo << 32);
+    res += T;
+    if (res < T)
+        res += 59;
+
+    res += data;
+    if (res < data)
+        res += 59;
+
+    return res;
+}
+
+
+/* Although UMAC is specified to use a ramped polynomial hash scheme, this
+ * implementation does not handle all ramp levels. Because we don't handle
+ * the ramp up to p128 modulus in this implementation, we are limited to
+ * 2^14 poly_hash() invocations per stream (for a total capacity of 2^24
+ * bytes input to UMAC per tag, ie. 16MB).
+ */
+static void poly_hash(uhash_ctx_t hc, UINT32 data_in[])
+{
+    int i;
+    UINT64 *data=(UINT64*)data_in;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
+        if ((UINT32)(data[i] >> 32) == 0xfffffffful) {
+            hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
+                                       hc->poly_key_8[i], p64 - 1);
+            hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
+                                       hc->poly_key_8[i], (data[i] - 59));
+        } else {
+            hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
+                                       hc->poly_key_8[i], data[i]);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+
+/* The final step in UHASH is an inner-product hash. The poly hash
+ * produces a result not necessarily WORD_LEN bytes long. The inner-
+ * product hash breaks the polyhash output into 16-bit chunks and
+ * multiplies each with a 36 bit key.
+ */
+
+static UINT64 ip_aux(UINT64 t, UINT64 *ipkp, UINT64 data)
+{
+    t = t + ipkp[0] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 48);
+    t = t + ipkp[1] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 32);
+    t = t + ipkp[2] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 16);
+    t = t + ipkp[3] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data);
+
+    return t;
+}
+
+static UINT32 ip_reduce_p36(UINT64 t)
+{
+/* Divisionless modular reduction */
+    UINT64 ret;
+
+    ret = (t & m36) + 5 * (t >> 36);
+    if (ret >= p36)
+        ret -= p36;
+
+    /* return least significant 32 bits */
+    return (UINT32)(ret);
+}
+
+
+/* If the data being hashed by UHASH is no longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then
+ * the polyhash stage is skipped and ip_short is applied directly to the
+ * NH output.
+ */
+static void ip_short(uhash_ctx_t ahc, UINT8 *nh_res, u_char *res)
+{
+    UINT64 t;
+    UINT64 *nhp = (UINT64 *)nh_res;
+
+    t  = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys, nhp[0]);
+    STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+0, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[0]);
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+    t  = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+4, nhp[1]);
+    STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+1, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[1]);
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+    t  = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+8, nhp[2]);
+    STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+2, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[2]);
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+    t  = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+12, nhp[3]);
+    STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+3, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[3]);
+#endif
+}
+
+/* If the data being hashed by UHASH is longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then
+ * the polyhash stage is not skipped and ip_long is applied to the
+ * polyhash output.
+ */
+static void ip_long(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *res)
+{
+    int i;
+    UINT64 t;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
+        /* fix polyhash output not in Z_p64 */
+        if (ahc->poly_accum[i] >= p64)
+            ahc->poly_accum[i] -= p64;
+        t  = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+(i*4), ahc->poly_accum[i]);
+        STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+i,
+                         ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[i]);
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* Reset uhash context for next hash session */
+static int uhash_reset(uhash_ctx_t pc)
+{
+    nh_reset(&pc->hash);
+    pc->msg_len = 0;
+    pc->poly_accum[0] = 1;
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
+    pc->poly_accum[1] = 1;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
+    pc->poly_accum[2] = 1;
+#endif
+#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
+    pc->poly_accum[3] = 1;
+#endif
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* Given a pointer to the internal key needed by kdf() and a uhash context,
+ * initialize the NH context and generate keys needed for poly and inner-
+ * product hashing. All keys are endian adjusted in memory so that native
+ * loads cause correct keys to be in registers during calculation.
+ */
+static void uhash_init(uhash_ctx_t ahc, aes_int_key prf_key)
+{
+    int i;
+    UINT8 buf[(8*STREAMS+4)*sizeof(UINT64)];
+
+    /* Zero the entire uhash context */
+    memset(ahc, 0, sizeof(uhash_ctx));
+
+    /* Initialize the L1 hash */
+    nh_init(&ahc->hash, prf_key);
+
+    /* Setup L2 hash variables */
+    kdf(buf, prf_key, 2, sizeof(buf));    /* Fill buffer with index 1 key */
+    for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
+        /* Fill keys from the buffer, skipping bytes in the buffer not
+         * used by this implementation. Endian reverse the keys if on a
+         * little-endian computer.
+         */
+        memcpy(ahc->poly_key_8+i, buf+24*i, 8);
+        endian_convert_if_le(ahc->poly_key_8+i, 8, 8);
+        /* Mask the 64-bit keys to their special domain */
+        ahc->poly_key_8[i] &= ((UINT64)0x01ffffffu << 32) + 0x01ffffffu;
+        ahc->poly_accum[i] = 1;  /* Our polyhash prepends a non-zero word */
+    }
+
+    /* Setup L3-1 hash variables */
+    kdf(buf, prf_key, 3, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 2 key */
+    for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++)
+          memcpy(ahc->ip_keys+4*i, buf+(8*i+4)*sizeof(UINT64),
+                                                 4*sizeof(UINT64));
+    endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_keys, sizeof(UINT64),
+                                                  sizeof(ahc->ip_keys));
+    for (i = 0; i < STREAMS*4; i++)
+        ahc->ip_keys[i] %= p36;  /* Bring into Z_p36 */
+
+    /* Setup L3-2 hash variables    */
+    /* Fill buffer with index 4 key */
+    kdf(ahc->ip_trans, prf_key, 4, STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32));
+    endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_trans, sizeof(UINT32),
+                         STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32));
+    explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+static uhash_ctx_t uhash_alloc(u_char key[])
+{
+/* Allocate memory and force to a 16-byte boundary. */
+    uhash_ctx_t ctx;
+    u_char bytes_to_add;
+    aes_int_key prf_key;
+
+    ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)malloc(sizeof(uhash_ctx)+ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
+    if (ctx) {
+        if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
+            bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY -
+                              ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY -1));
+            ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add);
+            *((u_char *)ctx - 1) = bytes_to_add;
+        }
+        aes_key_setup(key,prf_key);
+        uhash_init(ctx, prf_key);
+    }
+    return (ctx);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+static int uhash_free(uhash_ctx_t ctx)
+{
+/* Free memory allocated by uhash_alloc */
+    u_char bytes_to_sub;
+
+    if (ctx) {
+        if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
+            bytes_to_sub = *((u_char *)ctx - 1);
+            ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx - bytes_to_sub);
+        }
+        free(ctx);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+#endif
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static int uhash_update(uhash_ctx_t ctx, const u_char *input, long len)
+/* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and
+ * hash each one with NH, calling the polyhash on each NH output.
+ */
+{
+    UWORD bytes_hashed, bytes_remaining;
+    UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS];
+    UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf;
+
+    if (ctx->msg_len + len <= L1_KEY_LEN) {
+        nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len);
+        ctx->msg_len += len;
+    } else {
+
+         bytes_hashed = ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN;
+         if (ctx->msg_len == L1_KEY_LEN)
+             bytes_hashed = L1_KEY_LEN;
+
+         if (bytes_hashed + len >= L1_KEY_LEN) {
+
+             /* If some bytes have been passed to the hash function      */
+             /* then we want to pass at most (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed) */
+             /* bytes to complete the current nh_block.                  */
+             if (bytes_hashed) {
+                 bytes_remaining = (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed);
+                 nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, bytes_remaining);
+                 nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
+                 ctx->msg_len += bytes_remaining;
+                 poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+                 len -= bytes_remaining;
+                 input += bytes_remaining;
+             }
+
+             /* Hash directly from input stream if enough bytes */
+             while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN) {
+                 nh(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, L1_KEY_LEN,
+                                   L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result);
+                 ctx->msg_len += L1_KEY_LEN;
+                 len -= L1_KEY_LEN;
+                 input += L1_KEY_LEN;
+                 poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+             }
+         }
+
+         /* pass remaining < L1_KEY_LEN bytes of input data to NH */
+         if (len) {
+             nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len);
+             ctx->msg_len += len;
+         }
+     }
+
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+static int uhash_final(uhash_ctx_t ctx, u_char *res)
+/* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */
+{
+    UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS];
+    UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf;
+
+    if (ctx->msg_len > L1_KEY_LEN) {
+        if (ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN) {
+            nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
+            poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+        }
+        ip_long(ctx, res);
+    } else {
+        nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
+        ip_short(ctx,nh_result, res);
+    }
+    uhash_reset(ctx);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+static int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *msg, long len, u_char *res)
+/* assumes that msg is in a writable buffer of length divisible by */
+/* L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. Bytes beyond msg[len] may be zeroed.           */
+{
+    UINT8 nh_result[STREAMS*sizeof(UINT64)];
+    UINT32 nh_len;
+    int extra_zeroes_needed;
+
+    /* If the message to be hashed is no longer than L1_HASH_LEN, we skip
+     * the polyhash.
+     */
+    if (len <= L1_KEY_LEN) {
+	if (len == 0)                  /* If zero length messages will not */
+		nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY;  /* be seen, comment out this case   */
+	else
+		nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
+        extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len;
+        zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed);
+        nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result);
+        ip_short(ahc,nh_result, res);
+    } else {
+        /* Otherwise, we hash each L1_KEY_LEN chunk with NH, passing the NH
+         * output to poly_hash().
+         */
+        do {
+            nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, L1_KEY_LEN, L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result);
+            poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+            len -= L1_KEY_LEN;
+            msg += L1_KEY_LEN;
+        } while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN);
+        if (len) {
+            nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
+            extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len;
+            zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed);
+            nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result);
+            poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
+        }
+
+        ip_long(ahc, res);
+    }
+
+    uhash_reset(ahc);
+    return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- Begin UMAC Section --------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+/* The UMAC interface has two interfaces, an all-at-once interface where
+ * the entire message to be authenticated is passed to UMAC in one buffer,
+ * and a sequential interface where the message is presented a little at a
+ * time. The all-at-once is more optimized than the sequential version and
+ * should be preferred when the sequential interface is not required.
+ */
+struct umac_ctx {
+    uhash_ctx hash;          /* Hash function for message compression    */
+    pdf_ctx pdf;             /* PDF for hashed output                    */
+    void *free_ptr;          /* Address to free this struct via          */
+} umac_ctx;
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+int umac_reset(struct umac_ctx *ctx)
+/* Reset the hash function to begin a new authentication.        */
+{
+    uhash_reset(&ctx->hash);
+    return (1);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx)
+/* Deallocate the ctx structure */
+{
+    if (ctx) {
+        if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY)
+            ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)ctx->free_ptr;
+        freezero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
+    }
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+struct umac_ctx *umac_new(const u_char key[])
+/* Dynamically allocate a umac_ctx struct, initialize variables,
+ * generate subkeys from key. Align to 16-byte boundary.
+ */
+{
+    struct umac_ctx *ctx, *octx;
+    size_t bytes_to_add;
+    aes_int_key prf_key;
+
+    octx = ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
+    if (ctx) {
+        if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
+            bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY -
+                              ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY - 1));
+            ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add);
+        }
+        ctx->free_ptr = octx;
+        aes_key_setup(key, prf_key);
+        pdf_init(&ctx->pdf, prf_key);
+        uhash_init(&ctx->hash, prf_key);
+        explicit_bzero(prf_key, sizeof(prf_key));
+    }
+
+    return (ctx);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+int umac_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], const u_char nonce[8])
+/* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */
+{
+    uhash_final(&ctx->hash, (u_char *)tag);
+    pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (const UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag);
+
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+int umac_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, const u_char *input, long len)
+/* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and   */
+/* hash each one, calling the PDF on the hashed output whenever the hash- */
+/* output buffer is full.                                                 */
+{
+    uhash_update(&ctx->hash, input, len);
+    return (1);
+}
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+
+#if 0
+int umac(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input,
+         long len, u_char tag[],
+         u_char nonce[8])
+/* All-in-one version simply calls umac_update() and umac_final().        */
+{
+    uhash(&ctx->hash, input, len, (u_char *)tag);
+    pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag);
+
+    return (1);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ----- End UMAC Section ----------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
diff --git a/umac.h b/umac.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f21398a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/umac.h
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: umac.h,v 1.5 2022/01/01 01:55:30 jsg Exp $ */
+/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * 
+ * umac.h -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication
+ *
+ * Version 0.93a of rfc4418.txt -- 2006 July 14
+ *
+ * For a full description of UMAC message authentication see the UMAC
+ * world-wide-web page at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/umac
+ * Please report bugs and suggestions to the UMAC webpage.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Ted Krovetz
+ *                                                                 
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and
+ * its documentation for any purpose and with or without fee, is hereby
+ * granted provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies
+ * and in supporting documentation, and that the name of the copyright
+ * holder not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to
+ * distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission.
+ *
+ * Comments should be directed to Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org)                                        
+ *                                                                   
+ * ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+ 
+ /* ////////////////////// IMPORTANT NOTES /////////////////////////////////
+  *
+  * 1) This version does not work properly on messages larger than 16MB
+  *
+  * 2) If you set the switch to use SSE2, then all data must be 16-byte
+  *    aligned
+  *
+  * 3) When calling the function umac(), it is assumed that msg is in
+  * a writable buffer of length divisible by 32 bytes. The message itself
+  * does not have to fill the entire buffer, but bytes beyond msg may be
+  * zeroed.
+  *
+  * 4) Two free AES implementations are supported by this implementation of
+  * UMAC. Paulo Barreto's version is in the public domain and can be found
+  * at http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ (search for
+  * "Barreto"). The only two files needed are rijndael-alg-fst.c and
+  * rijndael-alg-fst.h.
+  * Brian Gladman's version is distributed with GNU Public license
+  * and can be found at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It
+  * includes a fast IA-32 assembly version.
+  *
+  /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// */
+#ifndef HEADER_UMAC_H
+#define HEADER_UMAC_H
+
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+    extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+struct umac_ctx *umac_new(const u_char key[]);
+/* Dynamically allocate a umac_ctx struct, initialize variables, 
+ * generate subkeys from key.
+ */
+
+#if 0
+int umac_reset(struct umac_ctx *ctx);
+/* Reset a umac_ctx to begin authenticating a new message */
+#endif
+
+int umac_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, const u_char *input, long len);
+/* Incorporate len bytes pointed to by input into context ctx */
+
+int umac_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], const u_char nonce[8]);
+/* Incorporate any pending data and the ctr value, and return tag. 
+ * This function returns error code if ctr < 0. 
+ */
+
+int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx);
+/* Deallocate the context structure */
+
+#if 0
+int umac(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input, 
+         long len, u_char tag[],
+         u_char nonce[8]);
+/* All-in-one implementation of the functions Reset, Update and Final */
+#endif
+
+/* uhash.h */
+
+
+#if 0
+typedef struct uhash_ctx *uhash_ctx_t;
+  /* The uhash_ctx structure is defined by the implementation of the    */
+  /* UHASH functions.                                                   */
+ 
+uhash_ctx_t uhash_alloc(u_char key[16]);
+  /* Dynamically allocate a uhash_ctx struct and generate subkeys using */
+  /* the kdf and kdf_key passed in. If kdf_key_len is 0 then RC6 is     */
+  /* used to generate key with a fixed key. If kdf_key_len > 0 but kdf  */
+  /* is NULL then the first 16 bytes pointed at by kdf_key is used as a */
+  /* key for an RC6 based KDF.                                          */
+  
+int uhash_free(uhash_ctx_t ctx);
+
+int uhash_set_params(uhash_ctx_t ctx,
+                   void       *params);
+
+int uhash_reset(uhash_ctx_t ctx);
+
+int uhash_update(uhash_ctx_t ctx,
+               u_char       *input,
+               long        len);
+
+int uhash_final(uhash_ctx_t ctx,
+              u_char        output[]);
+
+int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ctx,
+        u_char       *input,
+        long        len,
+        u_char        output[]);
+
+#endif
+
+/* matching umac-128 API, we reuse umac_ctx, since it's opaque */
+struct umac_ctx *umac128_new(const u_char key[]);
+int umac128_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, const u_char *input, long len);
+int umac128_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], const u_char nonce[8]);
+int umac128_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+    }
+#endif
+
+#endif /* HEADER_UMAC_H */
diff --git a/umac128.c b/umac128.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f717925
--- /dev/null
+++ b/umac128.c
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: umac128.c,v 1.2 2018/02/08 04:12:32 dtucker Exp $ */
+
+#define UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN	16
+#define umac_new	umac128_new
+#define umac_update	umac128_update
+#define umac_final	umac128_final
+#define umac_delete	umac128_delete
+#define umac_ctx	umac128_ctx
+
+#include "umac.c"
diff --git a/utf8.c b/utf8.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f63b25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/utf8.c
@@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: utf8.c,v 1.11 2020/05/01 06:28:52 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Ingo Schwarze <schwarze@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Utility functions for multibyte-character handling,
+ * in particular to sanitize untrusted strings for terminal output.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LANGINFO_H
+# include <langinfo.h>
+#endif
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <locale.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
+# include <vis.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_WCHAR_H
+# include <wchar.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "utf8.h"
+
+static int	 dangerous_locale(void);
+static int	 grow_dst(char **, size_t *, size_t, char **, size_t);
+
+
+/*
+ * For US-ASCII and UTF-8 encodings, we can safely recover from
+ * encoding errors and from non-printable characters.  For any
+ * other encodings, err to the side of caution and abort parsing:
+ * For state-dependent encodings, recovery is impossible.
+ * For arbitrary encodings, replacement of non-printable
+ * characters would be non-trivial and too fragile.
+ * The comments indicate what nl_langinfo(CODESET)
+ * returns for US-ASCII on various operating systems.
+ */
+
+static int
+dangerous_locale(void) {
+	char	*loc;
+
+	loc = nl_langinfo(CODESET);
+	return strcmp(loc, "UTF-8") != 0 &&
+	    strcmp(loc, "US-ASCII") != 0 &&		/* OpenBSD */
+	    strcmp(loc, "ANSI_X3.4-1968") != 0 &&	/* Linux */
+	    strcmp(loc, "ISO8859-1") != 0 &&		/* AIX */
+	    strcmp(loc, "646") != 0 &&			/* Solaris, NetBSD */
+	    strcmp(loc, "") != 0;			/* Solaris 6 */
+}
+
+static int
+grow_dst(char **dst, size_t *sz, size_t maxsz, char **dp, size_t need)
+{
+	char	*tp;
+	size_t	 tsz;
+
+	if (*dp + need < *dst + *sz)
+		return 0;
+	tsz = *sz + 128;
+	if (tsz > maxsz)
+		tsz = maxsz;
+	if ((tp = recallocarray(*dst, *sz, tsz, 1)) == NULL)
+		return -1;
+	*dp = tp + (*dp - *dst);
+	*dst = tp;
+	*sz = tsz;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following two functions limit the number of bytes written,
+ * including the terminating '\0', to sz.  Unless wp is NULL,
+ * they limit the number of display columns occupied to *wp.
+ * Whichever is reached first terminates the output string.
+ * To stay close to the standard interfaces, they return the number of
+ * non-NUL bytes that would have been written if both were unlimited.
+ * If wp is NULL, newline, carriage return, and tab are allowed;
+ * otherwise, the actual number of columns occupied by what was
+ * written is returned in *wp.
+ */
+
+int
+vasnmprintf(char **str, size_t maxsz, int *wp, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+	char	*src;	/* Source string returned from vasprintf. */
+	char	*sp;	/* Pointer into src. */
+	char	*dst;	/* Destination string to be returned. */
+	char	*dp;	/* Pointer into dst. */
+	char	*tp;	/* Temporary pointer for dst. */
+	size_t	 sz;	/* Number of bytes allocated for dst. */
+	wchar_t	 wc;	/* Wide character at sp. */
+	int	 len;	/* Number of bytes in the character at sp. */
+	int	 ret;	/* Number of bytes needed to format src. */
+	int	 width;	/* Display width of the character wc. */
+	int	 total_width, max_width, print;
+
+	src = NULL;
+	if ((ret = vasprintf(&src, fmt, ap)) <= 0)
+		goto fail;
+
+	sz = strlen(src) + 1;
+	if ((dst = malloc(sz)) == NULL) {
+		free(src);
+		ret = -1;
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	if (maxsz > INT_MAX)
+		maxsz = INT_MAX;
+
+	sp = src;
+	dp = dst;
+	ret = 0;
+	print = 1;
+	total_width = 0;
+	max_width = wp == NULL ? INT_MAX : *wp;
+	while (*sp != '\0') {
+		if ((len = mbtowc(&wc, sp, MB_CUR_MAX)) == -1) {
+			(void)mbtowc(NULL, NULL, MB_CUR_MAX);
+			if (dangerous_locale()) {
+				ret = -1;
+				break;
+			}
+			len = 1;
+			width = -1;
+		} else if (wp == NULL &&
+		    (wc == L'\n' || wc == L'\r' || wc == L'\t')) {
+			/*
+			 * Don't use width uninitialized; the actual
+			 * value doesn't matter because total_width
+			 * is only returned for wp != NULL.
+			 */
+			width = 0;
+		} else if ((width = wcwidth(wc)) == -1 &&
+		    dangerous_locale()) {
+			ret = -1;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* Valid, printable character. */
+
+		if (width >= 0) {
+			if (print && (dp - dst >= (int)maxsz - len ||
+			    total_width > max_width - width))
+				print = 0;
+			if (print) {
+				if (grow_dst(&dst, &sz, maxsz,
+				    &dp, len) == -1) {
+					ret = -1;
+					break;
+				}
+				total_width += width;
+				memcpy(dp, sp, len);
+				dp += len;
+			}
+			sp += len;
+			if (ret >= 0)
+				ret += len;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* Escaping required. */
+
+		while (len > 0) {
+			if (print && (dp - dst >= (int)maxsz - 4 ||
+			    total_width > max_width - 4))
+				print = 0;
+			if (print) {
+				if (grow_dst(&dst, &sz, maxsz,
+				    &dp, 4) == -1) {
+					ret = -1;
+					break;
+				}
+				tp = vis(dp, *sp, VIS_OCTAL | VIS_ALL, 0);
+				width = tp - dp;
+				total_width += width;
+				dp = tp;
+			} else
+				width = 4;
+			len--;
+			sp++;
+			if (ret >= 0)
+				ret += width;
+		}
+		if (len > 0)
+			break;
+	}
+	free(src);
+	*dp = '\0';
+	*str = dst;
+	if (wp != NULL)
+		*wp = total_width;
+
+	/*
+	 * If the string was truncated by the width limit but
+	 * would have fit into the size limit, the only sane way
+	 * to report the problem is using the return value, such
+	 * that the usual idiom "if (ret < 0 || ret >= sz) error"
+	 * works as expected.
+	 */
+
+	if (ret < (int)maxsz && !print)
+		ret = -1;
+	return ret;
+
+fail:
+	if (wp != NULL)
+		*wp = 0;
+	if (ret == 0) {
+		*str = src;
+		return 0;
+	} else {
+		*str = NULL;
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+int
+snmprintf(char *str, size_t sz, int *wp, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list	 ap;
+	char	*cp = NULL;
+	int	 ret;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	ret = vasnmprintf(&cp, sz, wp, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	if (cp != NULL) {
+		(void)strlcpy(str, cp, sz);
+		free(cp);
+	} else
+		*str = '\0';
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+asmprintf(char **outp, size_t sz, int *wp, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list	 ap;
+	int	 ret;
+
+	*outp = NULL;
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	ret = vasnmprintf(outp, sz, wp, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * To stay close to the standard interfaces, the following functions
+ * return the number of non-NUL bytes written.
+ */
+
+int
+vfmprintf(FILE *stream, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+	char	*str = NULL;
+	int	 ret;
+
+	if ((ret = vasnmprintf(&str, INT_MAX, NULL, fmt, ap)) < 0) {
+		free(str);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	if (fputs(str, stream) == EOF)
+		ret = -1;
+	free(str);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+fmprintf(FILE *stream, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list	 ap;
+	int	 ret;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	ret = vfmprintf(stream, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+int
+mprintf(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list	 ap;
+	int	 ret;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	ret = vfmprintf(stdout, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set up libc for multibyte output in the user's chosen locale.
+ *
+ * XXX: we are known to have problems with Turkish (i/I confusion) so we
+ *      deliberately fall back to the C locale for now. Longer term we should
+ *      always prefer to select C.[encoding] if possible, but there's no
+ *      standardisation in locales between systems, so we'll need to survey
+ *      what's out there first.
+ */
+void
+msetlocale(void)
+{
+	const char *vars[] = { "LC_ALL", "LC_CTYPE", "LANG", NULL };
+	char *cp;
+	int i;
+
+	/*
+	 * We can't yet cope with dotless/dotted I in Turkish locales,
+	 * so fall back to the C locale for these.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; vars[i] != NULL; i++) {
+		if ((cp = getenv(vars[i])) == NULL)
+			continue;
+		if (strncasecmp(cp, "TR", 2) != 0)
+			break;
+		/*
+		 * If we're in a UTF-8 locale then prefer to use
+		 * the C.UTF-8 locale (or equivalent) if it exists.
+		 */
+		if ((strcasestr(cp, "UTF-8") != NULL ||
+		    strcasestr(cp, "UTF8") != NULL) &&
+		    (setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C.UTF-8") != NULL ||
+		    setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "POSIX.UTF-8") != NULL))
+			return;
+		setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "C");
+		return;
+	}
+	/* We can handle this locale */
+	setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "");
+}
diff --git a/utf8.h b/utf8.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09941d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/utf8.h
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: utf8.h,v 1.4 2021/04/03 06:18:41 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2016 Ingo Schwarze <schwarze@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+int	 vasnmprintf(char **, size_t, int *, const char *, va_list);
+int	 mprintf(const char *, ...)
+	    __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+int	 fmprintf(FILE *, const char *, ...)
+	    __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+int	 vfmprintf(FILE *, const char *, va_list);
+int	 snmprintf(char *, size_t, int *, const char *, ...)
+	    __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5)));
+int	 asmprintf(char **, size_t, int *, const char *, ...)
+	    __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5)));
+void	 msetlocale(void);
diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d83ae5b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/version.h
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.96 2023/02/02 12:10:22 djm Exp $ */
+
+#define SSH_VERSION	"OpenSSH_9.2"
+
+#define SSH_PORTABLE	"p1"
+#define SSH_RELEASE	SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
diff --git a/xmalloc.c b/xmalloc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..67191e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xmalloc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.37 2022/03/13 23:27:54 cheloha Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return
+ * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error).
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
+char *malloc_options = "S";
+#endif /* __OpenBSD__ */
+
+void *
+xmalloc(size_t size)
+{
+	void *ptr;
+
+	if (size == 0)
+		fatal("xmalloc: zero size");
+	ptr = malloc(size);
+	if (ptr == NULL)
+		fatal("xmalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)", size);
+	return ptr;
+}
+
+void *
+xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size)
+{
+	void *ptr;
+
+	if (size == 0 || nmemb == 0)
+		fatal("xcalloc: zero size");
+	if (SIZE_MAX / nmemb < size)
+		fatal("xcalloc: nmemb * size > SIZE_MAX");
+	ptr = calloc(nmemb, size);
+	if (ptr == NULL)
+		fatal("xcalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)",
+		    size * nmemb);
+	return ptr;
+}
+
+void *
+xreallocarray(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
+{
+	void *new_ptr;
+
+	new_ptr = reallocarray(ptr, nmemb, size);
+	if (new_ptr == NULL)
+		fatal("xreallocarray: out of memory (%zu elements of %zu bytes)",
+		    nmemb, size);
+	return new_ptr;
+}
+
+void *
+xrecallocarray(void *ptr, size_t onmemb, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
+{
+	void *new_ptr;
+
+	new_ptr = recallocarray(ptr, onmemb, nmemb, size);
+	if (new_ptr == NULL)
+		fatal("xrecallocarray: out of memory (%zu elements of %zu bytes)",
+		    nmemb, size);
+	return new_ptr;
+}
+
+char *
+xstrdup(const char *str)
+{
+	size_t len;
+	char *cp;
+
+	len = strlen(str) + 1;
+	cp = xmalloc(len);
+	return memcpy(cp, str, len);
+}
+
+int
+xvasprintf(char **ret, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+	int i;
+
+	i = vasprintf(ret, fmt, ap);
+	if (i < 0 || *ret == NULL)
+		fatal("xvasprintf: could not allocate memory");
+	return i;
+}
+
+int
+xasprintf(char **ret, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	va_list ap;
+	int i;
+
+	va_start(ap, fmt);
+	i = xvasprintf(ret, fmt, ap);
+	va_end(ap);
+	return i;
+}
diff --git a/xmalloc.h b/xmalloc.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a6b8d23
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xmalloc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.20 2021/04/03 06:18:41 djm Exp $ */
+
+/*
+ * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
+ * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+ *                    All rights reserved
+ * Created: Mon Mar 20 22:09:17 1995 ylo
+ *
+ * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return
+ * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error).
+ *
+ * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
+ * can be used freely for any purpose.  Any derived versions of this
+ * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
+ * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
+ * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
+ */
+
+void	*xmalloc(size_t);
+void	*xcalloc(size_t, size_t);
+void	*xreallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t);
+void	*xrecallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t, size_t);
+char	*xstrdup(const char *);
+int	 xasprintf(char **, const char *, ...)
+    __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
+int	 xvasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list)
+    __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
diff --git a/xmss_commons.c b/xmss_commons.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8d6b80b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xmss_commons.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: xmss_commons.c,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+xmss_commons.c 20160722
+Andreas Hülsing
+Joost Rijneveld
+Public domain.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+
+#include "xmss_commons.h"
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+void to_byte(unsigned char *out, unsigned long long in, uint32_t bytes)
+{
+  int32_t i;
+  for (i = bytes-1; i >= 0; i--) {
+    out[i] = in & 0xff;
+    in = in >> 8;
+  }
+}
+
+#if 0
+void hexdump(const unsigned char *a, size_t len)
+{
+  size_t i;
+  for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+    printf("%02x", a[i]);
+}
+#endif
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/xmss_commons.h b/xmss_commons.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a98e479
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xmss_commons.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+/* $OpenBSD: xmss_commons.h,v 1.3 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+xmss_commons.h 20160722
+Andreas Hülsing
+Joost Rijneveld
+Public domain.
+*/
+#ifndef XMSS_COMMONS_H
+#define XMSS_COMMONS_H
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#endif
+void to_byte(unsigned char *output, unsigned long long in, uint32_t bytes);
+#if 0
+void hexdump(const unsigned char *a, size_t len);
+#endif
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/xmss_fast.c b/xmss_fast.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..421b39a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xmss_fast.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1106 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: xmss_fast.c,v 1.3 2018/03/22 07:06:11 markus Exp $ */
+/*
+xmss_fast.c version 20160722
+Andreas Hülsing
+Joost Rijneveld
+Public domain.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "xmss_fast.h"
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+#include "xmss_wots.h"
+#include "xmss_hash.h"
+
+#include "xmss_commons.h"
+#include "xmss_hash_address.h"
+// For testing
+#include "stdio.h"
+
+
+
+/**
+ * Used for pseudorandom keygeneration,
+ * generates the seed for the WOTS keypair at address addr
+ *
+ * takes n byte sk_seed and returns n byte seed using 32 byte address addr.
+ */
+static void get_seed(unsigned char *seed, const unsigned char *sk_seed, int n, uint32_t addr[8])
+{
+  unsigned char bytes[32];
+  // Make sure that chain addr, hash addr, and key bit are 0!
+  setChainADRS(addr,0);
+  setHashADRS(addr,0);
+  setKeyAndMask(addr,0);
+  // Generate pseudorandom value
+  addr_to_byte(bytes, addr);
+  prf(seed, bytes, sk_seed, n);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Initialize xmss params struct
+ * parameter names are the same as in the draft
+ * parameter k is K as used in the BDS algorithm
+ */
+int xmss_set_params(xmss_params *params, int n, int h, int w, int k)
+{
+  if (k >= h || k < 2 || (h - k) % 2) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "For BDS traversal, H - K must be even, with H > K >= 2!\n");
+    return 1;
+  }
+  params->h = h;
+  params->n = n;
+  params->k = k;
+  wots_params wots_par;
+  wots_set_params(&wots_par, n, w);
+  params->wots_par = wots_par;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Initialize BDS state struct
+ * parameter names are the same as used in the description of the BDS traversal
+ */
+void xmss_set_bds_state(bds_state *state, unsigned char *stack, int stackoffset, unsigned char *stacklevels, unsigned char *auth, unsigned char *keep, treehash_inst *treehash, unsigned char *retain, int next_leaf)
+{
+  state->stack = stack;
+  state->stackoffset = stackoffset;
+  state->stacklevels = stacklevels;
+  state->auth = auth;
+  state->keep = keep;
+  state->treehash = treehash;
+  state->retain = retain;
+  state->next_leaf = next_leaf;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Initialize xmssmt_params struct
+ * parameter names are the same as in the draft
+ *
+ * Especially h is the total tree height, i.e. the XMSS trees have height h/d
+ */
+int xmssmt_set_params(xmssmt_params *params, int n, int h, int d, int w, int k)
+{
+  if (h % d) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "d must divide h without remainder!\n");
+    return 1;
+  }
+  params->h = h;
+  params->d = d;
+  params->n = n;
+  params->index_len = (h + 7) / 8;
+  xmss_params xmss_par;
+  if (xmss_set_params(&xmss_par, n, (h/d), w, k)) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+  params->xmss_par = xmss_par;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes a leaf from a WOTS public key using an L-tree.
+ */
+static void l_tree(unsigned char *leaf, unsigned char *wots_pk, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8])
+{
+  unsigned int l = params->wots_par.len;
+  unsigned int n = params->n;
+  uint32_t i = 0;
+  uint32_t height = 0;
+  uint32_t bound;
+
+  //ADRS.setTreeHeight(0);
+  setTreeHeight(addr, height);
+  
+  while (l > 1) {
+     bound = l >> 1; //floor(l / 2);
+     for (i = 0; i < bound; i++) {
+       //ADRS.setTreeIndex(i);
+       setTreeIndex(addr, i);
+       //wots_pk[i] = RAND_HASH(pk[2i], pk[2i + 1], SEED, ADRS);
+       hash_h(wots_pk+i*n, wots_pk+i*2*n, pub_seed, addr, n);
+     }
+     //if ( l % 2 == 1 ) {
+     if (l & 1) {
+       //pk[floor(l / 2) + 1] = pk[l];
+       memcpy(wots_pk+(l>>1)*n, wots_pk+(l-1)*n, n);
+       //l = ceil(l / 2);
+       l=(l>>1)+1;
+     }
+     else {
+       //l = ceil(l / 2);
+       l=(l>>1);
+     }
+     //ADRS.setTreeHeight(ADRS.getTreeHeight() + 1);
+     height++;
+     setTreeHeight(addr, height);
+   }
+   //return pk[0];
+   memcpy(leaf, wots_pk, n);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the leaf at a given address. First generates the WOTS key pair, then computes leaf using l_tree. As this happens position independent, we only require that addr encodes the right ltree-address.
+ */
+static void gen_leaf_wots(unsigned char *leaf, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t ltree_addr[8], uint32_t ots_addr[8])
+{
+  unsigned char seed[params->n];
+  unsigned char pk[params->wots_par.keysize];
+
+  get_seed(seed, sk_seed, params->n, ots_addr);
+  wots_pkgen(pk, seed, &(params->wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr);
+
+  l_tree(leaf, pk, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr);
+}
+
+static int treehash_minheight_on_stack(bds_state* state, const xmss_params *params, const treehash_inst *treehash) {
+  unsigned int r = params->h, i;
+  for (i = 0; i < treehash->stackusage; i++) {
+    if (state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset - i - 1] < r) {
+      r = state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset - i - 1];
+    }
+  }
+  return r;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Merkle's TreeHash algorithm. The address only needs to initialize the first 78 bits of addr. Everything else will be set by treehash.
+ * Currently only used for key generation.
+ *
+ */
+static void treehash_setup(unsigned char *node, int height, int index, bds_state *state, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t addr[8])
+{
+  unsigned int idx = index;
+  unsigned int n = params->n;
+  unsigned int h = params->h;
+  unsigned int k = params->k;
+  // use three different addresses because at this point we use all three formats in parallel
+  uint32_t ots_addr[8];
+  uint32_t ltree_addr[8];
+  uint32_t  node_addr[8];
+  // only copy layer and tree address parts
+  memcpy(ots_addr, addr, 12);
+  // type = ots
+  setType(ots_addr, 0);
+  memcpy(ltree_addr, addr, 12);
+  setType(ltree_addr, 1);
+  memcpy(node_addr, addr, 12);
+  setType(node_addr, 2);
+
+  uint32_t lastnode, i;
+  unsigned char stack[(height+1)*n];
+  unsigned int stacklevels[height+1];
+  unsigned int stackoffset=0;
+  unsigned int nodeh;
+
+  lastnode = idx+(1<<height);
+
+  for (i = 0; i < h-k; i++) {
+    state->treehash[i].h = i;
+    state->treehash[i].completed = 1;
+    state->treehash[i].stackusage = 0;
+  }
+
+  i = 0;
+  for (; idx < lastnode; idx++) {
+    setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx);
+    setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx);
+    gen_leaf_wots(stack+stackoffset*n, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr, ots_addr);
+    stacklevels[stackoffset] = 0;
+    stackoffset++;
+    if (h - k > 0 && i == 3) {
+      memcpy(state->treehash[0].node, stack+stackoffset*n, n);
+    }
+    while (stackoffset>1 && stacklevels[stackoffset-1] == stacklevels[stackoffset-2])
+    {
+      nodeh = stacklevels[stackoffset-1];
+      if (i >> nodeh == 1) {
+        memcpy(state->auth + nodeh*n, stack+(stackoffset-1)*n, n);
+      }
+      else {
+        if (nodeh < h - k && i >> nodeh == 3) {
+          memcpy(state->treehash[nodeh].node, stack+(stackoffset-1)*n, n);
+        }
+        else if (nodeh >= h - k) {
+          memcpy(state->retain + ((1 << (h - 1 - nodeh)) + nodeh - h + (((i >> nodeh) - 3) >> 1)) * n, stack+(stackoffset-1)*n, n);
+        }
+      }
+      setTreeHeight(node_addr, stacklevels[stackoffset-1]);
+      setTreeIndex(node_addr, (idx >> (stacklevels[stackoffset-1]+1)));
+      hash_h(stack+(stackoffset-2)*n, stack+(stackoffset-2)*n, pub_seed,
+          node_addr, n);
+      stacklevels[stackoffset-2]++;
+      stackoffset--;
+    }
+    i++;
+  }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+    node[i] = stack[i];
+}
+
+static void treehash_update(treehash_inst *treehash, bds_state *state, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+  int n = params->n;
+
+  uint32_t ots_addr[8];
+  uint32_t ltree_addr[8];
+  uint32_t  node_addr[8];
+  // only copy layer and tree address parts
+  memcpy(ots_addr, addr, 12);
+  // type = ots
+  setType(ots_addr, 0);
+  memcpy(ltree_addr, addr, 12);
+  setType(ltree_addr, 1);
+  memcpy(node_addr, addr, 12);
+  setType(node_addr, 2);
+
+  setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, treehash->next_idx);
+  setOTSADRS(ots_addr, treehash->next_idx);
+
+  unsigned char nodebuffer[2 * n];
+  unsigned int nodeheight = 0;
+  gen_leaf_wots(nodebuffer, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr, ots_addr);
+  while (treehash->stackusage > 0 && state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1] == nodeheight) {
+    memcpy(nodebuffer + n, nodebuffer, n);
+    memcpy(nodebuffer, state->stack + (state->stackoffset-1)*n, n);
+    setTreeHeight(node_addr, nodeheight);
+    setTreeIndex(node_addr, (treehash->next_idx >> (nodeheight+1)));
+    hash_h(nodebuffer, nodebuffer, pub_seed, node_addr, n);
+    nodeheight++;
+    treehash->stackusage--;
+    state->stackoffset--;
+  }
+  if (nodeheight == treehash->h) { // this also implies stackusage == 0
+    memcpy(treehash->node, nodebuffer, n);
+    treehash->completed = 1;
+  }
+  else {
+    memcpy(state->stack + state->stackoffset*n, nodebuffer, n);
+    treehash->stackusage++;
+    state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset] = nodeheight;
+    state->stackoffset++;
+    treehash->next_idx++;
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes a root node given a leaf and an authapth
+ */
+static void validate_authpath(unsigned char *root, const unsigned char *leaf, unsigned long leafidx, const unsigned char *authpath, const xmss_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8])
+{
+  unsigned int n = params->n;
+
+  uint32_t i, j;
+  unsigned char buffer[2*n];
+
+  // If leafidx is odd (last bit = 1), current path element is a right child and authpath has to go to the left.
+  // Otherwise, it is the other way around
+  if (leafidx & 1) {
+    for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
+      buffer[n+j] = leaf[j];
+    for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
+      buffer[j] = authpath[j];
+  }
+  else {
+    for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
+      buffer[j] = leaf[j];
+    for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
+      buffer[n+j] = authpath[j];
+  }
+  authpath += n;
+
+  for (i=0; i < params->h-1; i++) {
+    setTreeHeight(addr, i);
+    leafidx >>= 1;
+    setTreeIndex(addr, leafidx);
+    if (leafidx&1) {
+      hash_h(buffer+n, buffer, pub_seed, addr, n);
+      for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
+        buffer[j] = authpath[j];
+    }
+    else {
+      hash_h(buffer, buffer, pub_seed, addr, n);
+      for (j = 0; j < n; j++)
+        buffer[j+n] = authpath[j];
+    }
+    authpath += n;
+  }
+  setTreeHeight(addr, (params->h-1));
+  leafidx >>= 1;
+  setTreeIndex(addr, leafidx);
+  hash_h(root, buffer, pub_seed, addr, n);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Performs one treehash update on the instance that needs it the most.
+ * Returns 1 if such an instance was not found
+ **/
+static char bds_treehash_update(bds_state *state, unsigned int updates, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+  uint32_t i, j;
+  unsigned int level, l_min, low;
+  unsigned int h = params->h;
+  unsigned int k = params->k;
+  unsigned int used = 0;
+
+  for (j = 0; j < updates; j++) {
+    l_min = h;
+    level = h - k;
+    for (i = 0; i < h - k; i++) {
+      if (state->treehash[i].completed) {
+        low = h;
+      }
+      else if (state->treehash[i].stackusage == 0) {
+        low = i;
+      }
+      else {
+        low = treehash_minheight_on_stack(state, params, &(state->treehash[i]));
+      }
+      if (low < l_min) {
+        level = i;
+        l_min = low;
+      }
+    }
+    if (level == h - k) {
+      break;
+    }
+    treehash_update(&(state->treehash[level]), state, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, addr);
+    used++;
+  }
+  return updates - used;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Updates the state (typically NEXT_i) by adding a leaf and updating the stack
+ * Returns 1 if all leaf nodes have already been processed
+ **/
+static char bds_state_update(bds_state *state, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, unsigned char *pub_seed, const uint32_t addr[8]) {
+  uint32_t ltree_addr[8];
+  uint32_t node_addr[8];
+  uint32_t ots_addr[8];
+
+  int n = params->n;
+  int h = params->h;
+  int k = params->k;
+
+  int nodeh;
+  int idx = state->next_leaf;
+  if (idx == 1 << h) {
+    return 1;
+  }
+
+  // only copy layer and tree address parts
+  memcpy(ots_addr, addr, 12);
+  // type = ots
+  setType(ots_addr, 0);
+  memcpy(ltree_addr, addr, 12);
+  setType(ltree_addr, 1);
+  memcpy(node_addr, addr, 12);
+  setType(node_addr, 2);
+  
+  setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx);
+  setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx);
+
+  gen_leaf_wots(state->stack+state->stackoffset*n, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr, ots_addr);
+
+  state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset] = 0;
+  state->stackoffset++;
+  if (h - k > 0 && idx == 3) {
+    memcpy(state->treehash[0].node, state->stack+state->stackoffset*n, n);
+  }
+  while (state->stackoffset>1 && state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1] == state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-2]) {
+    nodeh = state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1];
+    if (idx >> nodeh == 1) {
+      memcpy(state->auth + nodeh*n, state->stack+(state->stackoffset-1)*n, n);
+    }
+    else {
+      if (nodeh < h - k && idx >> nodeh == 3) {
+        memcpy(state->treehash[nodeh].node, state->stack+(state->stackoffset-1)*n, n);
+      }
+      else if (nodeh >= h - k) {
+        memcpy(state->retain + ((1 << (h - 1 - nodeh)) + nodeh - h + (((idx >> nodeh) - 3) >> 1)) * n, state->stack+(state->stackoffset-1)*n, n);
+      }
+    }
+    setTreeHeight(node_addr, state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1]);
+    setTreeIndex(node_addr, (idx >> (state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-1]+1)));
+    hash_h(state->stack+(state->stackoffset-2)*n, state->stack+(state->stackoffset-2)*n, pub_seed, node_addr, n);
+
+    state->stacklevels[state->stackoffset-2]++;
+    state->stackoffset--;
+  }
+  state->next_leaf++;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Returns the auth path for node leaf_idx and computes the auth path for the
+ * next leaf node, using the algorithm described by Buchmann, Dahmen and Szydlo
+ * in "Post Quantum Cryptography", Springer 2009.
+ */
+static void bds_round(bds_state *state, const unsigned long leaf_idx, const unsigned char *sk_seed, const xmss_params *params, unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8])
+{
+  unsigned int i;
+  unsigned int n = params->n;
+  unsigned int h = params->h;
+  unsigned int k = params->k;
+
+  unsigned int tau = h;
+  unsigned int startidx;
+  unsigned int offset, rowidx;
+  unsigned char buf[2 * n];
+
+  uint32_t ots_addr[8];
+  uint32_t ltree_addr[8];
+  uint32_t  node_addr[8];
+  // only copy layer and tree address parts
+  memcpy(ots_addr, addr, 12);
+  // type = ots
+  setType(ots_addr, 0);
+  memcpy(ltree_addr, addr, 12);
+  setType(ltree_addr, 1);
+  memcpy(node_addr, addr, 12);
+  setType(node_addr, 2);
+
+  for (i = 0; i < h; i++) {
+    if (! ((leaf_idx >> i) & 1)) {
+      tau = i;
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (tau > 0) {
+    memcpy(buf,     state->auth + (tau-1) * n, n);
+    // we need to do this before refreshing state->keep to prevent overwriting
+    memcpy(buf + n, state->keep + ((tau-1) >> 1) * n, n);
+  }
+  if (!((leaf_idx >> (tau + 1)) & 1) && (tau < h - 1)) {
+    memcpy(state->keep + (tau >> 1)*n, state->auth + tau*n, n);
+  }
+  if (tau == 0) {
+    setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, leaf_idx);
+    setOTSADRS(ots_addr, leaf_idx);
+    gen_leaf_wots(state->auth, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr, ots_addr);
+  }
+  else {
+    setTreeHeight(node_addr, (tau-1));
+    setTreeIndex(node_addr, leaf_idx >> tau);
+    hash_h(state->auth + tau * n, buf, pub_seed, node_addr, n);
+    for (i = 0; i < tau; i++) {
+      if (i < h - k) {
+        memcpy(state->auth + i * n, state->treehash[i].node, n);
+      }
+      else {
+        offset = (1 << (h - 1 - i)) + i - h;
+        rowidx = ((leaf_idx >> i) - 1) >> 1;
+        memcpy(state->auth + i * n, state->retain + (offset + rowidx) * n, n);
+      }
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < ((tau < h - k) ? tau : (h - k)); i++) {
+      startidx = leaf_idx + 1 + 3 * (1 << i);
+      if (startidx < 1U << h) {
+        state->treehash[i].h = i;
+        state->treehash[i].next_idx = startidx;
+        state->treehash[i].completed = 0;
+        state->treehash[i].stackusage = 0;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates a XMSS key pair for a given parameter set.
+ * Format sk: [(32bit) idx || SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED] omitting algo oid.
+ */
+int xmss_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk, bds_state *state, xmss_params *params)
+{
+  unsigned int n = params->n;
+  // Set idx = 0
+  sk[0] = 0;
+  sk[1] = 0;
+  sk[2] = 0;
+  sk[3] = 0;
+  // Init SK_SEED (n byte), SK_PRF (n byte), and PUB_SEED (n byte)
+  randombytes(sk+4, 3*n);
+  // Copy PUB_SEED to public key
+  memcpy(pk+n, sk+4+2*n, n);
+
+  uint32_t addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+
+  // Compute root
+  treehash_setup(pk, params->h, 0, state, sk+4, params, sk+4+2*n, addr);
+  // copy root to sk
+  memcpy(sk+4+3*n, pk, n);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message.
+ * Returns
+ * 1. an array containing the signature followed by the message AND
+ * 2. an updated secret key!
+ *
+ */
+int xmss_sign(unsigned char *sk, bds_state *state, unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long *sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long msglen, const xmss_params *params)
+{
+  unsigned int h = params->h;
+  unsigned int n = params->n;
+  unsigned int k = params->k;
+  uint16_t i = 0;
+
+  // Extract SK
+  unsigned long idx = ((unsigned long)sk[0] << 24) | ((unsigned long)sk[1] << 16) | ((unsigned long)sk[2] << 8) | sk[3];
+  unsigned char sk_seed[n];
+  memcpy(sk_seed, sk+4, n);
+  unsigned char sk_prf[n];
+  memcpy(sk_prf, sk+4+n, n);
+  unsigned char pub_seed[n];
+  memcpy(pub_seed, sk+4+2*n, n);
+  
+  // index as 32 bytes string
+  unsigned char idx_bytes_32[32];
+  to_byte(idx_bytes_32, idx, 32);
+  
+  unsigned char hash_key[3*n]; 
+  
+  // Update SK
+  sk[0] = ((idx + 1) >> 24) & 255;
+  sk[1] = ((idx + 1) >> 16) & 255;
+  sk[2] = ((idx + 1) >> 8) & 255;
+  sk[3] = (idx + 1) & 255;
+  // -- Secret key for this non-forward-secure version is now updated.
+  // -- A productive implementation should use a file handle instead and write the updated secret key at this point!
+
+  // Init working params
+  unsigned char R[n];
+  unsigned char msg_h[n];
+  unsigned char ots_seed[n];
+  uint32_t ots_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+
+  // ---------------------------------
+  // Message Hashing
+  // ---------------------------------
+
+  // Message Hash:
+  // First compute pseudorandom value
+  prf(R, idx_bytes_32, sk_prf, n);
+  // Generate hash key (R || root || idx)
+  memcpy(hash_key, R, n);
+  memcpy(hash_key+n, sk+4+3*n, n);
+  to_byte(hash_key+2*n, idx, n);
+  // Then use it for message digest
+  h_msg(msg_h, msg, msglen, hash_key, 3*n, n);
+
+  // Start collecting signature
+  *sig_msg_len = 0;
+
+  // Copy index to signature
+  sig_msg[0] = (idx >> 24) & 255;
+  sig_msg[1] = (idx >> 16) & 255;
+  sig_msg[2] = (idx >> 8) & 255;
+  sig_msg[3] = idx & 255;
+
+  sig_msg += 4;
+  *sig_msg_len += 4;
+
+  // Copy R to signature
+  for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+    sig_msg[i] = R[i];
+
+  sig_msg += n;
+  *sig_msg_len += n;
+
+  // ----------------------------------
+  // Now we start to "really sign"
+  // ----------------------------------
+
+  // Prepare Address
+  setType(ots_addr, 0);
+  setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx);
+
+  // Compute seed for OTS key pair
+  get_seed(ots_seed, sk_seed, n, ots_addr);
+
+  // Compute WOTS signature
+  wots_sign(sig_msg, msg_h, ots_seed, &(params->wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr);
+
+  sig_msg += params->wots_par.keysize;
+  *sig_msg_len += params->wots_par.keysize;
+
+  // the auth path was already computed during the previous round
+  memcpy(sig_msg, state->auth, h*n);
+
+  if (idx < (1U << h) - 1) {
+    bds_round(state, idx, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ots_addr);
+    bds_treehash_update(state, (h - k) >> 1, sk_seed, params, pub_seed, ots_addr);
+  }
+
+/* TODO: save key/bds state here! */
+
+  sig_msg += params->h*n;
+  *sig_msg_len += params->h*n;
+
+  //Whipe secret elements?
+  //zerobytes(tsk, CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES);
+
+
+  memcpy(sig_msg, msg, msglen);
+  *sig_msg_len += msglen;
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given message signature pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int xmss_sign_open(unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long *msglen, const unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *pk, const xmss_params *params)
+{
+  unsigned int n = params->n;
+
+  unsigned long long i, m_len;
+  unsigned long idx=0;
+  unsigned char wots_pk[params->wots_par.keysize];
+  unsigned char pkhash[n];
+  unsigned char root[n];
+  unsigned char msg_h[n];
+  unsigned char hash_key[3*n];
+
+  unsigned char pub_seed[n];
+  memcpy(pub_seed, pk+n, n);
+
+  // Init addresses
+  uint32_t ots_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+  uint32_t ltree_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+  uint32_t node_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+
+  setType(ots_addr, 0);
+  setType(ltree_addr, 1);
+  setType(node_addr, 2);
+
+  // Extract index
+  idx = ((unsigned long)sig_msg[0] << 24) | ((unsigned long)sig_msg[1] << 16) | ((unsigned long)sig_msg[2] << 8) | sig_msg[3];
+  printf("verify:: idx = %lu\n", idx);
+  
+  // Generate hash key (R || root || idx)
+  memcpy(hash_key, sig_msg+4,n);
+  memcpy(hash_key+n, pk, n);
+  to_byte(hash_key+2*n, idx, n);
+  
+  sig_msg += (n+4);
+  sig_msg_len -= (n+4);
+
+  // hash message 
+  unsigned long long tmp_sig_len = params->wots_par.keysize+params->h*n;
+  m_len = sig_msg_len - tmp_sig_len;
+  h_msg(msg_h, sig_msg + tmp_sig_len, m_len, hash_key, 3*n, n);
+
+  //-----------------------
+  // Verify signature
+  //-----------------------
+
+  // Prepare Address
+  setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx);
+  // Check WOTS signature
+  wots_pkFromSig(wots_pk, sig_msg, msg_h, &(params->wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr);
+
+  sig_msg += params->wots_par.keysize;
+  sig_msg_len -= params->wots_par.keysize;
+
+  // Compute Ltree
+  setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx);
+  l_tree(pkhash, wots_pk, params, pub_seed, ltree_addr);
+
+  // Compute root
+  validate_authpath(root, pkhash, idx, sig_msg, params, pub_seed, node_addr);
+
+  sig_msg += params->h*n;
+  sig_msg_len -= params->h*n;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+    if (root[i] != pk[i])
+      goto fail;
+
+  *msglen = sig_msg_len;
+  for (i = 0; i < *msglen; i++)
+    msg[i] = sig_msg[i];
+
+  return 0;
+
+
+fail:
+  *msglen = sig_msg_len;
+  for (i = 0; i < *msglen; i++)
+    msg[i] = 0;
+  *msglen = -1;
+  return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Generates a XMSSMT key pair for a given parameter set.
+ * Format sk: [(ceil(h/8) bit) idx || SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED] omitting algo oid.
+ */
+int xmssmt_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk, bds_state *states, unsigned char *wots_sigs, xmssmt_params *params)
+{
+  unsigned int n = params->n;
+  unsigned int i;
+  unsigned char ots_seed[params->n];
+  // Set idx = 0
+  for (i = 0; i < params->index_len; i++) {
+    sk[i] = 0;
+  }
+  // Init SK_SEED (n byte), SK_PRF (n byte), and PUB_SEED (n byte)
+  randombytes(sk+params->index_len, 3*n);
+  // Copy PUB_SEED to public key
+  memcpy(pk+n, sk+params->index_len+2*n, n);
+
+  // Set address to point on the single tree on layer d-1
+  uint32_t addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+  setLayerADRS(addr, (params->d-1));
+  // Set up state and compute wots signatures for all but topmost tree root
+  for (i = 0; i < params->d - 1; i++) {
+    // Compute seed for OTS key pair
+    treehash_setup(pk, params->xmss_par.h, 0, states + i, sk+params->index_len, &(params->xmss_par), pk+n, addr);
+    setLayerADRS(addr, (i+1));
+    get_seed(ots_seed, sk+params->index_len, n, addr);
+    wots_sign(wots_sigs + i*params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize, pk, ots_seed, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pk+n, addr);
+  }
+  treehash_setup(pk, params->xmss_par.h, 0, states + i, sk+params->index_len, &(params->xmss_par), pk+n, addr);
+  memcpy(sk+params->index_len+3*n, pk, n);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Signs a message.
+ * Returns
+ * 1. an array containing the signature followed by the message AND
+ * 2. an updated secret key!
+ *
+ */
+int xmssmt_sign(unsigned char *sk, bds_state *states, unsigned char *wots_sigs, unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long *sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long msglen, const xmssmt_params *params)
+{
+  unsigned int n = params->n;
+  
+  unsigned int tree_h = params->xmss_par.h;
+  unsigned int h = params->h;
+  unsigned int k = params->xmss_par.k;
+  unsigned int idx_len = params->index_len;
+  uint64_t idx_tree;
+  uint32_t idx_leaf;
+  uint64_t i, j;
+  int needswap_upto = -1;
+  unsigned int updates;
+
+  unsigned char sk_seed[n];
+  unsigned char sk_prf[n];
+  unsigned char pub_seed[n];
+  // Init working params
+  unsigned char R[n];
+  unsigned char msg_h[n];
+  unsigned char hash_key[3*n];
+  unsigned char ots_seed[n];
+  uint32_t addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+  uint32_t ots_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+  unsigned char idx_bytes_32[32];
+  bds_state tmp;
+
+  // Extract SK 
+  unsigned long long idx = 0;
+  for (i = 0; i < idx_len; i++) {
+    idx |= ((unsigned long long)sk[i]) << 8*(idx_len - 1 - i);
+  }
+
+  memcpy(sk_seed, sk+idx_len, n);
+  memcpy(sk_prf, sk+idx_len+n, n);
+  memcpy(pub_seed, sk+idx_len+2*n, n);
+
+  // Update SK
+  for (i = 0; i < idx_len; i++) {
+    sk[i] = ((idx + 1) >> 8*(idx_len - 1 - i)) & 255;
+  }
+  // -- Secret key for this non-forward-secure version is now updated.
+  // -- A productive implementation should use a file handle instead and write the updated secret key at this point!
+
+
+  // ---------------------------------
+  // Message Hashing
+  // ---------------------------------
+
+  // Message Hash:
+  // First compute pseudorandom value
+  to_byte(idx_bytes_32, idx, 32);
+  prf(R, idx_bytes_32, sk_prf, n);
+  // Generate hash key (R || root || idx)
+  memcpy(hash_key, R, n);
+  memcpy(hash_key+n, sk+idx_len+3*n, n);
+  to_byte(hash_key+2*n, idx, n);
+  
+  // Then use it for message digest
+  h_msg(msg_h, msg, msglen, hash_key, 3*n, n);
+
+  // Start collecting signature
+  *sig_msg_len = 0;
+
+  // Copy index to signature
+  for (i = 0; i < idx_len; i++) {
+    sig_msg[i] = (idx >> 8*(idx_len - 1 - i)) & 255;
+  }
+
+  sig_msg += idx_len;
+  *sig_msg_len += idx_len;
+
+  // Copy R to signature
+  for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+    sig_msg[i] = R[i];
+
+  sig_msg += n;
+  *sig_msg_len += n;
+
+  // ----------------------------------
+  // Now we start to "really sign"
+  // ----------------------------------
+
+  // Handle lowest layer separately as it is slightly different...
+
+  // Prepare Address
+  setType(ots_addr, 0);
+  idx_tree = idx >> tree_h;
+  idx_leaf = (idx & ((1 << tree_h)-1));
+  setLayerADRS(ots_addr, 0);
+  setTreeADRS(ots_addr, idx_tree);
+  setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+  // Compute seed for OTS key pair
+  get_seed(ots_seed, sk_seed, n, ots_addr);
+
+  // Compute WOTS signature
+  wots_sign(sig_msg, msg_h, ots_seed, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr);
+
+  sig_msg += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize;
+  *sig_msg_len += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize;
+
+  memcpy(sig_msg, states[0].auth, tree_h*n);
+  sig_msg += tree_h*n;
+  *sig_msg_len += tree_h*n;
+
+  // prepare signature of remaining layers
+  for (i = 1; i < params->d; i++) {
+    // put WOTS signature in place
+    memcpy(sig_msg, wots_sigs + (i-1)*params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize, params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize);
+
+    sig_msg += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize;
+    *sig_msg_len += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize;
+
+    // put AUTH nodes in place
+    memcpy(sig_msg, states[i].auth, tree_h*n);
+    sig_msg += tree_h*n;
+    *sig_msg_len += tree_h*n;
+  }
+
+  updates = (tree_h - k) >> 1;
+
+  setTreeADRS(addr, (idx_tree + 1));
+  // mandatory update for NEXT_0 (does not count towards h-k/2) if NEXT_0 exists
+  if ((1 + idx_tree) * (1 << tree_h) + idx_leaf < (1ULL << h)) {
+    bds_state_update(&states[params->d], sk_seed, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, addr);
+  }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < params->d; i++) {
+    // check if we're not at the end of a tree
+    if (! (((idx + 1) & ((1ULL << ((i+1)*tree_h)) - 1)) == 0)) {
+      idx_leaf = (idx >> (tree_h * i)) & ((1 << tree_h)-1);
+      idx_tree = (idx >> (tree_h * (i+1)));
+      setLayerADRS(addr, i);
+      setTreeADRS(addr, idx_tree);
+      if (i == (unsigned int) (needswap_upto + 1)) {
+        bds_round(&states[i], idx_leaf, sk_seed, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, addr);
+      }
+      updates = bds_treehash_update(&states[i], updates, sk_seed, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, addr);
+      setTreeADRS(addr, (idx_tree + 1));
+      // if a NEXT-tree exists for this level;
+      if ((1 + idx_tree) * (1 << tree_h) + idx_leaf < (1ULL << (h - tree_h * i))) {
+        if (i > 0 && updates > 0 && states[params->d + i].next_leaf < (1ULL << h)) {
+          bds_state_update(&states[params->d + i], sk_seed, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, addr);
+          updates--;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+    else if (idx < (1ULL << h) - 1) {
+      memcpy(&tmp, states+params->d + i, sizeof(bds_state));
+      memcpy(states+params->d + i, states + i, sizeof(bds_state));
+      memcpy(states + i, &tmp, sizeof(bds_state));
+
+      setLayerADRS(ots_addr, (i+1));
+      setTreeADRS(ots_addr, ((idx + 1) >> ((i+2) * tree_h)));
+      setOTSADRS(ots_addr, (((idx >> ((i+1) * tree_h)) + 1) & ((1 << tree_h)-1)));
+
+      get_seed(ots_seed, sk+params->index_len, n, ots_addr);
+      wots_sign(wots_sigs + i*params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize, states[i].stack, ots_seed, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr);
+
+      states[params->d + i].stackoffset = 0;
+      states[params->d + i].next_leaf = 0;
+
+      updates--; // WOTS-signing counts as one update
+      needswap_upto = i;
+      for (j = 0; j < tree_h-k; j++) {
+        states[i].treehash[j].completed = 1;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  //Whipe secret elements?
+  //zerobytes(tsk, CRYPTO_SECRETKEYBYTES);
+
+  memcpy(sig_msg, msg, msglen);
+  *sig_msg_len += msglen;
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Verifies a given message signature pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int xmssmt_sign_open(unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long *msglen, const unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *pk, const xmssmt_params *params)
+{
+  unsigned int n = params->n;
+
+  unsigned int tree_h = params->xmss_par.h;
+  unsigned int idx_len = params->index_len;
+  uint64_t idx_tree;
+  uint32_t idx_leaf;
+
+  unsigned long long i, m_len;
+  unsigned long long idx=0;
+  unsigned char wots_pk[params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize];
+  unsigned char pkhash[n];
+  unsigned char root[n];
+  unsigned char msg_h[n];
+  unsigned char hash_key[3*n];
+
+  unsigned char pub_seed[n];
+  memcpy(pub_seed, pk+n, n);
+
+  // Init addresses
+  uint32_t ots_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+  uint32_t ltree_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+  uint32_t node_addr[8] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+
+  // Extract index
+  for (i = 0; i < idx_len; i++) {
+    idx |= ((unsigned long long)sig_msg[i]) << (8*(idx_len - 1 - i));
+  }
+  printf("verify:: idx = %llu\n", idx);
+  sig_msg += idx_len;
+  sig_msg_len -= idx_len;
+  
+  // Generate hash key (R || root || idx)
+  memcpy(hash_key, sig_msg,n);
+  memcpy(hash_key+n, pk, n);
+  to_byte(hash_key+2*n, idx, n);
+
+  sig_msg += n;
+  sig_msg_len -= n;
+  
+
+  // hash message (recall, R is now on pole position at sig_msg
+  unsigned long long tmp_sig_len = (params->d * params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize) + (params->h * n);
+  m_len = sig_msg_len - tmp_sig_len;
+  h_msg(msg_h, sig_msg + tmp_sig_len, m_len, hash_key, 3*n, n);
+
+  
+  //-----------------------
+  // Verify signature
+  //-----------------------
+
+  // Prepare Address
+  idx_tree = idx >> tree_h;
+  idx_leaf = (idx & ((1 << tree_h)-1));
+  setLayerADRS(ots_addr, 0);
+  setTreeADRS(ots_addr, idx_tree);
+  setType(ots_addr, 0);
+
+  memcpy(ltree_addr, ots_addr, 12);
+  setType(ltree_addr, 1);
+
+  memcpy(node_addr, ltree_addr, 12);
+  setType(node_addr, 2);
+  
+  setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+  // Check WOTS signature
+  wots_pkFromSig(wots_pk, sig_msg, msg_h, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr);
+
+  sig_msg += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize;
+  sig_msg_len -= params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize;
+
+  // Compute Ltree
+  setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx_leaf);
+  l_tree(pkhash, wots_pk, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, ltree_addr);
+
+  // Compute root
+  validate_authpath(root, pkhash, idx_leaf, sig_msg, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, node_addr);
+
+  sig_msg += tree_h*n;
+  sig_msg_len -= tree_h*n;
+
+  for (i = 1; i < params->d; i++) {
+    // Prepare Address
+    idx_leaf = (idx_tree & ((1 << tree_h)-1));
+    idx_tree = idx_tree >> tree_h;
+
+    setLayerADRS(ots_addr, i);
+    setTreeADRS(ots_addr, idx_tree);
+    setType(ots_addr, 0);
+
+    memcpy(ltree_addr, ots_addr, 12);
+    setType(ltree_addr, 1);
+
+    memcpy(node_addr, ltree_addr, 12);
+    setType(node_addr, 2);
+
+    setOTSADRS(ots_addr, idx_leaf);
+
+    // Check WOTS signature
+    wots_pkFromSig(wots_pk, sig_msg, root, &(params->xmss_par.wots_par), pub_seed, ots_addr);
+
+    sig_msg += params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize;
+    sig_msg_len -= params->xmss_par.wots_par.keysize;
+
+    // Compute Ltree
+    setLtreeADRS(ltree_addr, idx_leaf);
+    l_tree(pkhash, wots_pk, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, ltree_addr);
+
+    // Compute root
+    validate_authpath(root, pkhash, idx_leaf, sig_msg, &(params->xmss_par), pub_seed, node_addr);
+
+    sig_msg += tree_h*n;
+    sig_msg_len -= tree_h*n;
+
+  }
+
+  for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
+    if (root[i] != pk[i])
+      goto fail;
+
+  *msglen = sig_msg_len;
+  for (i = 0; i < *msglen; i++)
+    msg[i] = sig_msg[i];
+
+  return 0;
+
+
+fail:
+  *msglen = sig_msg_len;
+  for (i = 0; i < *msglen; i++)
+    msg[i] = 0;
+  *msglen = -1;
+  return -1;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/xmss_fast.h b/xmss_fast.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2ffba70
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xmss_fast.h
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+/* $OpenBSD: xmss_fast.h,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+xmss_fast.h version 20160722
+Andreas Hülsing
+Joost Rijneveld
+Public domain.
+*/
+
+#include "xmss_wots.h"
+
+#ifndef XMSS_H
+#define XMSS_H
+typedef struct{
+  unsigned int level;
+  unsigned long long subtree;
+  unsigned int subleaf;
+} leafaddr;
+
+typedef struct{
+  wots_params wots_par;
+  unsigned int n;
+  unsigned int h;
+  unsigned int k;
+} xmss_params;
+
+typedef struct{
+  xmss_params xmss_par;
+  unsigned int n;
+  unsigned int h;
+  unsigned int d;
+  unsigned int index_len;
+} xmssmt_params;
+
+typedef struct{
+  unsigned int h;
+  unsigned int next_idx;
+  unsigned int stackusage;
+  unsigned char completed;
+  unsigned char *node;
+} treehash_inst;
+
+typedef struct {
+  unsigned char *stack;
+  unsigned int stackoffset;
+  unsigned char *stacklevels;
+  unsigned char *auth;
+  unsigned char *keep;
+  treehash_inst *treehash;
+  unsigned char *retain;
+  unsigned int next_leaf;
+} bds_state;
+
+/**
+ * Initialize BDS state struct
+ * parameter names are the same as used in the description of the BDS traversal
+ */
+void xmss_set_bds_state(bds_state *state, unsigned char *stack, int stackoffset, unsigned char *stacklevels, unsigned char *auth, unsigned char *keep, treehash_inst *treehash, unsigned char *retain, int next_leaf);
+/**
+ * Initializes parameter set.
+ * Needed, for any of the other methods.
+ */
+int xmss_set_params(xmss_params *params, int n, int h, int w, int k);
+/**
+ * Initialize xmssmt_params struct
+ * parameter names are the same as in the draft
+ * 
+ * Especially h is the total tree height, i.e. the XMSS trees have height h/d
+ */
+int xmssmt_set_params(xmssmt_params *params, int n, int h, int d, int w, int k);
+/**
+ * Generates a XMSS key pair for a given parameter set.
+ * Format sk: [(32bit) idx || SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED] omitting algo oid.
+ */
+int xmss_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk, bds_state *state, xmss_params *params);
+/**
+ * Signs a message.
+ * Returns 
+ * 1. an array containing the signature followed by the message AND
+ * 2. an updated secret key!
+ * 
+ */
+int xmss_sign(unsigned char *sk, bds_state *state, unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long *sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *msg,unsigned long long msglen, const xmss_params *params);
+/**
+ * Verifies a given message signature pair under a given public key.
+ * 
+ * Note: msg and msglen are pure outputs which carry the message in case verification succeeds. The (input) message is assumed to be within sig_msg which has the form (sig||msg). 
+ */
+int xmss_sign_open(unsigned char *msg,unsigned long long *msglen, const unsigned char *sig_msg,unsigned long long sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *pk, const xmss_params *params);
+
+/*
+ * Generates a XMSSMT key pair for a given parameter set.
+ * Format sk: [(ceil(h/8) bit) idx || SK_SEED || SK_PRF || PUB_SEED || root]
+ * Format pk: [root || PUB_SEED] omitting algo oid.
+ */
+int xmssmt_keypair(unsigned char *pk, unsigned char *sk, bds_state *states, unsigned char *wots_sigs, xmssmt_params *params);
+/**
+ * Signs a message.
+ * Returns 
+ * 1. an array containing the signature followed by the message AND
+ * 2. an updated secret key!
+ * 
+ */
+int xmssmt_sign(unsigned char *sk, bds_state *state, unsigned char *wots_sigs, unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long *sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long msglen, const xmssmt_params *params);
+/**
+ * Verifies a given message signature pair under a given public key.
+ */
+int xmssmt_sign_open(unsigned char *msg, unsigned long long *msglen, const unsigned char *sig_msg, unsigned long long sig_msg_len, const unsigned char *pk, const xmssmt_params *params);
+#endif
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/xmss_hash.c b/xmss_hash.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db0e5fa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xmss_hash.c
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash.c,v 1.3 2022/04/20 16:00:25 millert Exp $ */
+/*
+hash.c version 20160722
+Andreas Hülsing
+Joost Rijneveld
+Public domain.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+
+#include "xmss_hash_address.h"
+#include "xmss_commons.h"
+#include "xmss_hash.h"
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+int core_hash_SHA2(unsigned char *, const unsigned int, const unsigned char *,
+    unsigned int, const unsigned char *, unsigned long long, unsigned int);
+
+unsigned char* addr_to_byte(unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]){
+#if IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN==1 
+  int i = 0;
+  for(i=0;i<8;i++)
+    to_byte(bytes+i*4, addr[i],4);
+  return bytes;  
+#else
+  memcpy(bytes, addr, 32);
+  return bytes; 
+#endif   
+}
+
+int core_hash_SHA2(unsigned char *out, const unsigned int type, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen, unsigned int n){  
+  unsigned long long i = 0;
+  unsigned char buf[inlen + n + keylen];
+  
+  // Input is (toByte(X, 32) || KEY || M) 
+  
+  // set toByte
+  to_byte(buf, type, n);
+  
+  for (i=0; i < keylen; i++) {
+    buf[i+n] = key[i];
+  }
+  
+  for (i=0; i < inlen; i++) {
+    buf[keylen + n + i] = in[i];
+  }
+
+  if (n == 32) {
+    SHA256(buf, inlen + keylen + n, out);
+    return 0;
+  }
+  else {
+    if (n == 64) {
+      SHA512(buf, inlen + keylen + n, out);
+      return 0;
+    }
+  }
+  return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Implements PRF
+ */
+int prf(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{ 
+  return core_hash_SHA2(out, 3, key, keylen, in, 32, keylen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Implemts H_msg
+ */
+int h_msg(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned long long inlen, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned int keylen, const unsigned int n)
+{
+  if (keylen != 3*n){
+    // H_msg takes 3n-bit keys, but n does not match the keylength of keylen
+    return -1;
+  }  
+  return core_hash_SHA2(out, 2, key, keylen, in, inlen, n);
+}
+
+/**
+ * We assume the left half is in in[0]...in[n-1]
+ */
+int hash_h(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8], const unsigned int n)
+{
+
+  unsigned char buf[2*n];
+  unsigned char key[n];
+  unsigned char bitmask[2*n];
+  unsigned char byte_addr[32];
+  unsigned int i;
+
+  setKeyAndMask(addr, 0);
+  addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr);
+  prf(key, byte_addr, pub_seed, n);
+  // Use MSB order
+  setKeyAndMask(addr, 1);
+  addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr);
+  prf(bitmask, byte_addr, pub_seed, n);
+  setKeyAndMask(addr, 2);
+  addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr);
+  prf(bitmask+n, byte_addr, pub_seed, n);
+  for (i = 0; i < 2*n; i++) {
+    buf[i] = in[i] ^ bitmask[i];
+  }
+  return core_hash_SHA2(out, 1, key, n, buf, 2*n, n);
+}
+
+int hash_f(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8], const unsigned int n)
+{
+  unsigned char buf[n];
+  unsigned char key[n];
+  unsigned char bitmask[n];
+  unsigned char byte_addr[32];
+  unsigned int i;
+
+  setKeyAndMask(addr, 0);  
+  addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr);  
+  prf(key, byte_addr, pub_seed, n);
+  
+  setKeyAndMask(addr, 1);
+  addr_to_byte(byte_addr, addr);
+  prf(bitmask, byte_addr, pub_seed, n);
+  
+  for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+    buf[i] = in[i] ^ bitmask[i];
+  }
+  return core_hash_SHA2(out, 0, key, n, buf, n, n);
+}
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/xmss_hash.h b/xmss_hash.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d19c621
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xmss_hash.h
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash.h,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+hash.h version 20160722
+Andreas Hülsing
+Joost Rijneveld
+Public domain.
+*/
+
+#ifndef HASH_H
+#define HASH_H
+
+#define IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN 1
+
+unsigned char* addr_to_byte(unsigned char *bytes, const uint32_t addr[8]);
+int prf(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *key, unsigned int keylen);
+int h_msg(unsigned char *out,const unsigned char *in,unsigned long long inlen, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned int keylen, const unsigned int n);
+int hash_h(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8], const unsigned int n);
+int hash_f(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8], const unsigned int n);
+
+#endif
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/xmss_hash_address.c b/xmss_hash_address.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2702c45
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xmss_hash_address.c
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash_address.c,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+hash_address.c version 20160722
+Andreas Hülsing
+Joost Rijneveld
+Public domain.
+*/
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include "xmss_hash_address.h"	/* prototypes */
+
+void setLayerADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t layer){
+  adrs[0] = layer;
+}
+
+void setTreeADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint64_t tree){
+  adrs[1] = (uint32_t) (tree >> 32);
+  adrs[2] = (uint32_t) tree;
+}
+
+void setType(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t type){
+  adrs[3] = type;
+  int i;
+  for(i = 4; i < 8; i++){
+    adrs[i] = 0;
+  }
+}
+
+void setKeyAndMask(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t keyAndMask){
+  adrs[7] = keyAndMask;
+}
+
+// OTS
+
+void setOTSADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t ots){
+  adrs[4] = ots;
+}
+
+void setChainADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t chain){
+  adrs[5] = chain;
+}
+
+void setHashADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t hash){
+  adrs[6] = hash;
+}
+
+// L-tree
+
+void setLtreeADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t ltree){
+  adrs[4] = ltree;
+}
+
+// Hash Tree & L-tree
+
+void setTreeHeight(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t treeHeight){
+  adrs[5] = treeHeight;
+}
+
+void setTreeIndex(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t treeIndex){
+  adrs[6] = treeIndex;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/xmss_hash_address.h b/xmss_hash_address.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..66bb4cc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xmss_hash_address.h
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+/* $OpenBSD: xmss_hash_address.h,v 1.2 2018/02/26 03:56:44 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+hash_address.h version 20160722
+Andreas Hülsing
+Joost Rijneveld
+Public domain.
+*/
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+void setLayerADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t layer);
+
+void setTreeADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint64_t tree);
+
+void setType(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t type);
+
+void setKeyAndMask(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t keyAndMask);
+
+// OTS
+
+void setOTSADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t ots);
+
+void setChainADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t chain);
+
+void setHashADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t hash);
+
+// L-tree
+
+void setLtreeADRS(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t ltree);
+
+// Hash Tree & L-tree
+
+void setTreeHeight(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t treeHeight);
+
+void setTreeIndex(uint32_t adrs[8], uint32_t treeIndex);
+
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/xmss_wots.c b/xmss_wots.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..993e661
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xmss_wots.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: xmss_wots.c,v 1.3 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+wots.c version 20160722
+Andreas Hülsing
+Joost Rijneveld
+Public domain.
+*/
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <limits.h>
+#include "xmss_commons.h"
+#include "xmss_hash.h"
+#include "xmss_wots.h"
+#include "xmss_hash_address.h"
+
+
+/* libm-free version of log2() for wots */
+static inline int
+wots_log2(uint32_t v)
+{
+  int      b;
+
+  for (b = sizeof (v) * CHAR_BIT - 1; b >= 0; b--) {
+    if ((1U << b) & v) {
+      return b;
+    }
+  }
+  return 0;
+}
+
+void
+wots_set_params(wots_params *params, int n, int w)
+{
+  params->n = n;
+  params->w = w;
+  params->log_w = wots_log2(params->w);
+  params->len_1 = (CHAR_BIT * n) / params->log_w;
+  params->len_2 = (wots_log2(params->len_1 * (w - 1)) / params->log_w) + 1;
+  params->len = params->len_1 + params->len_2;
+  params->keysize = params->len * params->n;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Helper method for pseudorandom key generation
+ * Expands an n-byte array into a len*n byte array
+ * this is done using PRF
+ */
+static void expand_seed(unsigned char *outseeds, const unsigned char *inseed, const wots_params *params)
+{
+  uint32_t i = 0;
+  unsigned char ctr[32];
+  for(i = 0; i < params->len; i++){
+    to_byte(ctr, i, 32);
+    prf((outseeds + (i*params->n)), ctr, inseed, params->n);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Computes the chaining function.
+ * out and in have to be n-byte arrays
+ *
+ * interprets in as start-th value of the chain
+ * addr has to contain the address of the chain
+ */
+static void gen_chain(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int start, unsigned int steps, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8])
+{
+  uint32_t i, j;
+  for (j = 0; j < params->n; j++)
+    out[j] = in[j];
+
+  for (i = start; i < (start+steps) && i < params->w; i++) {
+    setHashADRS(addr, i);
+    hash_f(out, out, pub_seed, addr, params->n);
+  }
+}
+
+/**
+ * base_w algorithm as described in draft.
+ *
+ *
+ */
+static void base_w(int *output, const int out_len, const unsigned char *input, const wots_params *params)
+{
+  int in = 0;
+  int out = 0;
+  uint32_t total = 0;
+  int bits = 0;
+  int consumed = 0;
+
+  for (consumed = 0; consumed < out_len; consumed++) {
+    if (bits == 0) {
+      total = input[in];
+      in++;
+      bits += 8;
+    }
+    bits -= params->log_w;
+    output[out] = (total >> bits) & (params->w - 1);
+    out++;
+  }
+}
+
+void wots_pkgen(unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8])
+{
+  uint32_t i;
+  expand_seed(pk, sk, params);
+  for (i=0; i < params->len; i++) {
+    setChainADRS(addr, i);
+    gen_chain(pk+i*params->n, pk+i*params->n, 0, params->w-1, params, pub_seed, addr);
+  }
+}
+
+
+int wots_sign(unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg, const unsigned char *sk, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8])
+{
+  //int basew[params->len];
+  int csum = 0;
+  uint32_t i = 0;
+  int *basew = calloc(params->len, sizeof(int));
+  if (basew == NULL)
+    return -1;
+
+  base_w(basew, params->len_1, msg, params);
+
+  for (i=0; i < params->len_1; i++) {
+    csum += params->w - 1 - basew[i];
+  }
+
+  csum = csum << (8 - ((params->len_2 * params->log_w) % 8));
+
+  int len_2_bytes = ((params->len_2 * params->log_w) + 7) / 8;
+
+  unsigned char csum_bytes[len_2_bytes];
+  to_byte(csum_bytes, csum, len_2_bytes);
+
+  int csum_basew[params->len_2];
+  base_w(csum_basew, params->len_2, csum_bytes, params);
+
+  for (i = 0; i < params->len_2; i++) {
+    basew[params->len_1 + i] = csum_basew[i];
+  }
+
+  expand_seed(sig, sk, params);
+
+  for (i = 0; i < params->len; i++) {
+    setChainADRS(addr, i);
+    gen_chain(sig+i*params->n, sig+i*params->n, 0, basew[i], params, pub_seed, addr);
+  }
+  free(basew);
+  return 0;
+}
+
+int wots_pkFromSig(unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8])
+{
+  int csum = 0;
+  uint32_t i = 0;
+  int *basew = calloc(params->len, sizeof(int));
+  if (basew == NULL)
+    return -1;
+
+  base_w(basew, params->len_1, msg, params);
+
+  for (i=0; i < params->len_1; i++) {
+    csum += params->w - 1 - basew[i];
+  }
+
+  csum = csum << (8 - ((params->len_2 * params->log_w) % 8));
+
+  int len_2_bytes = ((params->len_2 * params->log_w) + 7) / 8;
+
+  unsigned char csum_bytes[len_2_bytes];
+  to_byte(csum_bytes, csum, len_2_bytes);
+
+  int csum_basew[params->len_2];
+  base_w(csum_basew, params->len_2, csum_bytes, params);
+
+  for (i = 0; i < params->len_2; i++) {
+    basew[params->len_1 + i] = csum_basew[i];
+  }
+  for (i=0; i < params->len; i++) {
+    setChainADRS(addr, i);
+    gen_chain(pk+i*params->n, sig+i*params->n, basew[i], params->w-1-basew[i], params, pub_seed, addr);
+  }
+  free(basew);
+  return 0;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/xmss_wots.h b/xmss_wots.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1eebf3b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/xmss_wots.h
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+/* $OpenBSD: xmss_wots.h,v 1.3 2018/02/26 12:14:53 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+wots.h version 20160722
+Andreas Hülsing
+Joost Rijneveld
+Public domain.
+*/
+
+#ifndef WOTS_H
+#define WOTS_H
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include "stdint.h"
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * WOTS parameter set
+ * 
+ * Meaning as defined in draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-02
+ */
+typedef struct {
+  uint32_t len_1;
+  uint32_t len_2;
+  uint32_t len;
+  uint32_t n;
+  uint32_t w;
+  uint32_t log_w;
+  uint32_t keysize;
+} wots_params;
+
+/**
+ * Set the WOTS parameters, 
+ * only m, n, w are required as inputs,
+ * len, len_1, and len_2 are computed from those.
+ *
+ * Assumes w is a power of 2
+ */
+void wots_set_params(wots_params *params, int n, int w);
+
+/**
+ * WOTS key generation. Takes a 32byte seed for the secret key, expands it to a full WOTS secret key and computes the corresponding public key. 
+ * For this it takes the seed pub_seed which is used to generate bitmasks and hash keys and the address of this WOTS key pair addr
+ * 
+ * params, must have been initialized before using wots_set params for params ! This is not done in this function
+ * 
+ * Places the computed public key at address pk.
+ */
+void wots_pkgen(unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sk, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a m-byte message and the 32-byte seed for the secret key to compute a signature that is placed at "sig".
+ *  
+ */
+int wots_sign(unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg, const unsigned char *sk, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+/**
+ * Takes a WOTS signature, a m-byte message and computes a WOTS public key that it places at pk.
+ * 
+ */
+int wots_pkFromSig(unsigned char *pk, const unsigned char *sig, const unsigned char *msg, const wots_params *params, const unsigned char *pub_seed, uint32_t addr[8]);
+
+#endif
+#endif /* WITH_XMSS */