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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 14:40:04 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 14:40:04 +0000
commit25505898530a333011f4fd5cbc841ad6b26c089c (patch)
tree333a33fdd60930bcccc3f177ed9467d535e9bac6 /ssh-keygen.0
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadopenssh-25505898530a333011f4fd5cbc841ad6b26c089c.tar.xz
openssh-25505898530a333011f4fd5cbc841ad6b26c089c.zip
Adding upstream version 1:9.2p1.upstream/1%9.2p1upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
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+SSH-KEYGEN(1) General Commands Manual SSH-KEYGEN(1)
+
+NAME
+ ssh-keygen M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH authentication key utility
+
+SYNOPSIS
+ ssh-keygen [-q] [-a rounds] [-b bits] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]
+ [-m format] [-N new_passphrase] [-O option]
+ [-t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa]
+ [-w provider] [-Z cipher]
+ ssh-keygen -p [-a rounds] [-f keyfile] [-m format] [-N new_passphrase]
+ [-P old_passphrase] [-Z cipher]
+ ssh-keygen -i [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]
+ ssh-keygen -e [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]
+ ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]
+ ssh-keygen -c [-a rounds] [-C comment] [-f keyfile] [-P passphrase]
+ ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]
+ ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]
+ ssh-keygen -D pkcs11
+ ssh-keygen -F hostname [-lv] [-f known_hosts_file]
+ ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]
+ ssh-keygen -K [-a rounds] [-w provider]
+ ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]
+ ssh-keygen -r hostname [-g] [-f input_keyfile]
+ ssh-keygen -M generate [-O option] output_file
+ ssh-keygen -M screen [-f input_file] [-O option] output_file
+ ssh-keygen -I certificate_identity -s ca_key [-hU] [-D pkcs11_provider]
+ [-n principals] [-O option] [-V validity_interval]
+ [-z serial_number] file ...
+ ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]
+ ssh-keygen -A [-a rounds] [-f prefix_path]
+ ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]
+ file ...
+ ssh-keygen -Q [-l] -f krl_file file ...
+ ssh-keygen -Y find-principals [-O option] -s signature_file
+ -f allowed_signers_file
+ ssh-keygen -Y match-principals -I signer_identity -f allowed_signers_file
+ ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate [-O option] -n namespace -s signature_file
+ ssh-keygen -Y sign [-O option] -f key_file -n namespace file ...
+ ssh-keygen -Y verify [-O option] -f allowed_signers_file
+ -I signer_identity -n namespace -s signature_file
+ [-r revocation_file]
+
+DESCRIPTION
+ ssh-keygen generates, manages and converts authentication keys for
+ ssh(1). ssh-keygen can create keys for use by SSH protocol version 2.
+
+ The type of key to be generated is specified with the -t option. If
+ invoked without any arguments, ssh-keygen will generate an RSA key.
+
+ ssh-keygen is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman
+ group exchange (DH-GEX). See the MODULI GENERATION section for details.
+
+ Finally, ssh-keygen can be used to generate and update Key Revocation
+ Lists, and to test whether given keys have been revoked by one. See the
+ KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details.
+
+ Normally each user wishing to use SSH with public key authentication runs
+ this once to create the authentication key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa,
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519,
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk or ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Additionally, the system
+ administrator may use this to generate host keys, as seen in /etc/rc.
+
+ Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which to
+ store the private key. The public key is stored in a file with the same
+ name but M-bM-^@M-^\.pubM-bM-^@M-^] appended. The program also asks for a passphrase. The
+ passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase (host keys must have an
+ empty passphrase), or it may be a string of arbitrary length. A
+ passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a
+ series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of
+ characters you want. Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are not
+ simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English prose has only
+ 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad passphrases),
+ and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and non-
+ alphanumeric characters. The passphrase can be changed later by using
+ the -p option.
+
+ There is no way to recover a lost passphrase. If the passphrase is lost
+ or forgotten, a new key must be generated and the corresponding public
+ key copied to other machines.
+
+ ssh-keygen will by default write keys in an OpenSSH-specific format.
+ This format is preferred as it offers better protection for keys at rest
+ as well as allowing storage of key comments within the private key file
+ itself. The key comment may be useful to help identify the key. The
+ comment is initialized to M-bM-^@M-^\user@hostM-bM-^@M-^] when the key is created, but can be
+ changed using the -c option.
+
+ It is still possible for ssh-keygen to write the previously-used PEM
+ format private keys using the -m flag. This may be used when generating
+ new keys, and existing new-format keys may be converted using this option
+ in conjunction with the -p (change passphrase) flag.
+
+ After a key is generated, ssh-keygen will ask where the keys should be
+ placed to be activated.
+
+ The options are as follows:
+
+ -A Generate host keys of all default key types (rsa, ecdsa, and
+ ed25519) if they do not already exist. The host keys are
+ generated with the default key file path, an empty passphrase,
+ default bits for the key type, and default comment. If -f has
+ also been specified, its argument is used as a prefix to the
+ default path for the resulting host key files. This is used by
+ /etc/rc to generate new host keys.
+
+ -a rounds
+ When saving a private key, this option specifies the number of
+ KDF (key derivation function, currently bcrypt_pbkdf(3)) rounds
+ used. Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification
+ and increased resistance to brute-force password cracking (should
+ the keys be stolen). The default is 16 rounds.
+
+ -B Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key
+ file.
+
+ -b bits
+ Specifies the number of bits in the key to create. For RSA keys,
+ the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 3072 bits.
+ Generally, 3072 bits is considered sufficient. DSA keys must be
+ exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2. For ECDSA keys,
+ the -b flag determines the key length by selecting from one of
+ three elliptic curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits. Attempting to
+ use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys will
+ fail. ECDSA-SK, Ed25519 and Ed25519-SK keys have a fixed length
+ and the -b flag will be ignored.
+
+ -C comment
+ Provides a new comment.
+
+ -c Requests changing the comment in the private and public key
+ files. The program will prompt for the file containing the
+ private keys, for the passphrase if the key has one, and for the
+ new comment.
+
+ -D pkcs11
+ Download the public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
+ pkcs11. When used in combination with -s, this option indicates
+ that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the CERTIFICATES
+ section for details).
+
+ -E fingerprint_hash
+ Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
+ fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ -e This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and
+ print to stdout a public key in one of the formats specified by
+ the -m option. The default export format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^]. This
+ option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs,
+ including several commercial SSH implementations.
+
+ -F hostname | [hostname]:port
+ Search for the specified hostname (with optional port number) in
+ a known_hosts file, listing any occurrences found. This option
+ is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be
+ used in conjunction with the -H option to print found keys in a
+ hashed format.
+
+ -f filename
+ Specifies the filename of the key file.
+
+ -g Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records
+ using the -r command.
+
+ -H Hash a known_hosts file. This replaces all hostnames and
+ addresses with hashed representations within the specified file;
+ the original content is moved to a file with a .old suffix.
+ These hashes may be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do
+ not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be
+ disclosed. This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames
+ and is therefore safe to use on files that mix hashed and non-
+ hashed names.
+
+ -h When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user
+ certificate. See the CERTIFICATES section for details.
+
+ -I certificate_identity
+ Specify the key identity when signing a public key. See the
+ CERTIFICATES section for details.
+
+ -i This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file
+ in the format specified by the -m option and print an OpenSSH
+ compatible private (or public) key to stdout. This option allows
+ importing keys from other software, including several commercial
+ SSH implementations. The default import format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ -K Download resident keys from a FIDO authenticator. Public and
+ private key files will be written to the current directory for
+ each downloaded key. If multiple FIDO authenticators are
+ attached, keys will be downloaded from the first touched
+ authenticator. See the FIDO AUTHENTICATOR section for more
+ information.
+
+ -k Generate a KRL file. In this mode, ssh-keygen will generate a
+ KRL file at the location specified via the -f flag that revokes
+ every key or certificate presented on the command line.
+ Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key
+ file or using the format described in the KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+ section.
+
+ -L Prints the contents of one or more certificates.
+
+ -l Show fingerprint of specified public key file. For RSA and DSA
+ keys ssh-keygen tries to find the matching public key file and
+ prints its fingerprint. If combined with -v, a visual ASCII art
+ representation of the key is supplied with the fingerprint.
+
+ -M generate
+ Generate candidate Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange (DH-GEX)
+ parameters for eventual use by the
+ M-bM-^@M-^Xdiffie-hellman-group-exchange-*M-bM-^@M-^Y key exchange methods. The
+ numbers generated by this operation must be further screened
+ before use. See the MODULI GENERATION section for more
+ information.
+
+ -M screen
+ Screen candidate parameters for Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange.
+ This will accept a list of candidate numbers and test that they
+ are safe (Sophie Germain) primes with acceptable group
+ generators. The results of this operation may be added to the
+ /etc/moduli file. See the MODULI GENERATION section for more
+ information.
+
+ -m key_format
+ Specify a key format for key generation, the -i (import), -e
+ (export) conversion options, and the -p change passphrase
+ operation. The latter may be used to convert between OpenSSH
+ private key and PEM private key formats. The supported key
+ formats are: M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^] (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key),
+ M-bM-^@M-^\PKCS8M-bM-^@M-^] (PKCS8 public or private key) or M-bM-^@M-^\PEMM-bM-^@M-^] (PEM public key).
+ By default OpenSSH will write newly-generated private keys in its
+ own format, but when converting public keys for export the
+ default format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^]. Setting a format of M-bM-^@M-^\PEMM-bM-^@M-^] when
+ generating or updating a supported private key type will cause
+ the key to be stored in the legacy PEM private key format.
+
+ -N new_passphrase
+ Provides the new passphrase.
+
+ -n principals
+ Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be
+ included in a certificate when signing a key. Multiple
+ principals may be specified, separated by commas. See the
+ CERTIFICATES section for details.
+
+ -O option
+ Specify a key/value option. These are specific to the operation
+ that ssh-keygen has been requested to perform.
+
+ When signing certificates, one of the options listed in the
+ CERTIFICATES section may be specified here.
+
+ When performing moduli generation or screening, one of the
+ options listed in the MODULI GENERATION section may be specified.
+
+ When generating FIDO authenticator-backed keys, the options
+ listed in the FIDO AUTHENTICATOR section may be specified.
+
+ When performing signature-related options using the -Y flag, the
+ following options are accepted:
+
+ hashalg=algorithm
+ Selects the hash algorithm to use for hashing the message
+ to be signed. Valid algorithms are M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^] and
+ M-bM-^@M-^\sha512.M-bM-^@M-^] The default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha512.M-bM-^@M-^]
+
+ print-pubkey
+ Print the full public key to standard output after
+ signature verification.
+
+ verify-time=timestamp
+ Specifies a time to use when validating signatures
+ instead of the current time. The time may be specified
+ as a date or time in the YYYYMMDD[Z] or in
+ YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] formats. Dates and times will be
+ interpreted in the current system time zone unless
+ suffixed with a Z character, which causes them to be
+ interpreted in the UTC time zone.
+
+ The -O option may be specified multiple times.
+
+ -P passphrase
+ Provides the (old) passphrase.
+
+ -p Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of
+ creating a new private key. The program will prompt for the file
+ containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for
+ the new passphrase.
+
+ -Q Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL. If the -l option
+ is also specified then the contents of the KRL will be printed.
+
+ -q Silence ssh-keygen.
+
+ -R hostname | [hostname]:port
+ Removes all keys belonging to the specified hostname (with
+ optional port number) from a known_hosts file. This option is
+ useful to delete hashed hosts (see the -H option above).
+
+ -r hostname
+ Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named hostname for
+ the specified public key file.
+
+ -s ca_key
+ Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key. See the
+ CERTIFICATES section for details.
+
+ When generating a KRL, -s specifies a path to a CA public key
+ file used to revoke certificates directly by key ID or serial
+ number. See the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details.
+
+ -t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa
+ Specifies the type of key to create. The possible values are
+ M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-skM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519-skM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ This flag may also be used to specify the desired signature type
+ when signing certificates using an RSA CA key. The available RSA
+ signature variants are M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-rsaM-bM-^@M-^] (SHA1 signatures, not
+ recommended), M-bM-^@M-^\rsa-sha2-256M-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\rsa-sha2-512M-bM-^@M-^] (the default).
+
+ -U When used in combination with -s or -Y sign, this option
+ indicates that a CA key resides in a ssh-agent(1). See the
+ CERTIFICATES section for more information.
+
+ -u Update a KRL. When specified with -k, keys listed via the
+ command line are added to the existing KRL rather than a new KRL
+ being created.
+
+ -V validity_interval
+ Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate. A
+ validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that
+ the certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time,
+ or may consist of two times separated by a colon to indicate an
+ explicit time interval.
+
+ The start time may be specified as:
+ M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-" The string M-bM-^@M-^\alwaysM-bM-^@M-^] to indicate the certificate has no
+ specified start time.
+ M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-" A date or time in the system time zone formatted as YYYYMMDD
+ or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS].
+ M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-" A date or time in the UTC time zone as YYYYMMDDZ or
+ YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z.
+ M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-" A relative time before the current system time consisting of
+ a minus sign followed by an interval in the format described
+ in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5).
+ M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-" A raw seconds since epoch (Jan 1 1970 00:00:00 UTC) as a
+ hexadecimal number beginning with M-bM-^@M-^\0xM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ The end time may be specified similarly to the start time:
+ M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-" The string M-bM-^@M-^\foreverM-bM-^@M-^] to indicate the certificate has no
+ specified end time.
+ M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-" A date or time in the system time zone formatted as YYYYMMDD
+ or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS].
+ M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-" A date or time in the UTC time zone as YYYYMMDDZ or
+ YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z.
+ M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-" A relative time after the current system time consisting of a
+ plus sign followed by an interval in the format described in
+ the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5).
+ M-bM-^@M-M-bM-^@M-" A raw seconds since epoch (Jan 1 1970 00:00:00 UTC) as a
+ hexadecimal number beginning with M-bM-^@M-^\0xM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ For example:
+
+ +52w1d Valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now.
+
+ -4w:+4w
+ Valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now.
+
+ 20100101123000:20110101123000
+ Valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM,
+ January 1st, 2011.
+
+ 20100101123000Z:20110101123000Z
+ Similar, but interpreted in the UTC time zone rather than
+ the system time zone.
+
+ -1d:20110101
+ Valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011.
+
+ 0x1:0x2000000000
+ Valid from roughly early 1970 to May 2033.
+
+ -1m:forever
+ Valid from one minute ago and never expiring.
+
+ -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-keygen to print debugging messages
+ about its progress. This is helpful for debugging moduli
+ generation. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The
+ maximum is 3.
+
+ -w provider
+ Specifies a path to a library that will be used when creating
+ FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+ the internal USB HID support.
+
+ -Y find-principals
+ Find the principal(s) associated with the public key of a
+ signature, provided using the -s flag in an authorized signers
+ file provided using the -f flag. The format of the allowed
+ signers file is documented in the ALLOWED SIGNERS section below.
+ If one or more matching principals are found, they are returned
+ on standard output.
+
+ -Y match-principals
+ Find principal matching the principal name provided using the -I
+ flag in the authorized signers file specified using the -f flag.
+ If one or more matching principals are found, they are returned
+ on standard output.
+
+ -Y check-novalidate
+ Checks that a signature generated using ssh-keygen -Y sign has a
+ valid structure. This does not validate if a signature comes
+ from an authorized signer. When testing a signature, ssh-keygen
+ accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace
+ using -n. A file containing the corresponding signature must
+ also be supplied using the -s flag. Successful testing of the
+ signature is signalled by ssh-keygen returning a zero exit
+ status.
+
+ -Y sign
+ Cryptographically sign a file or some data using a SSH key. When
+ signing, ssh-keygen accepts zero or more files to sign on the
+ command-line - if no files are specified then ssh-keygen will
+ sign data presented on standard input. Signatures are written to
+ the path of the input file with M-bM-^@M-^\.sigM-bM-^@M-^] appended, or to standard
+ output if the message to be signed was read from standard input.
+
+ The key used for signing is specified using the -f option and may
+ refer to either a private key, or a public key with the private
+ half available via ssh-agent(1). An additional signature
+ namespace, used to prevent signature confusion across different
+ domains of use (e.g. file signing vs email signing) must be
+ provided via the -n flag. Namespaces are arbitrary strings, and
+ may include: M-bM-^@M-^\fileM-bM-^@M-^] for file signing, M-bM-^@M-^\emailM-bM-^@M-^] for email signing.
+ For custom uses, it is recommended to use names following a
+ NAMESPACE@YOUR.DOMAIN pattern to generate unambiguous namespaces.
+
+ -Y verify
+ Request to verify a signature generated using ssh-keygen -Y sign
+ as described above. When verifying a signature, ssh-keygen
+ accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace
+ using -n. A file containing the corresponding signature must
+ also be supplied using the -s flag, along with the identity of
+ the signer using -I and a list of allowed signers via the -f
+ flag. The format of the allowed signers file is documented in
+ the ALLOWED SIGNERS section below. A file containing revoked
+ keys can be passed using the -r flag. The revocation file may be
+ a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys. Successful
+ verification by an authorized signer is signalled by ssh-keygen
+ returning a zero exit status.
+
+ -y This option will read a private OpenSSH format file and print an
+ OpenSSH public key to stdout.
+
+ -Z cipher
+ Specifies the cipher to use for encryption when writing an
+ OpenSSH-format private key file. The list of available ciphers
+ may be obtained using "ssh -Q cipher". The default is
+ M-bM-^@M-^\aes256-ctrM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ -z serial_number
+ Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to
+ distinguish this certificate from others from the same CA. If
+ the serial_number is prefixed with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
+ serial number will be incremented for each certificate signed on
+ a single command-line. The default serial number is zero.
+
+ When generating a KRL, the -z flag is used to specify a KRL
+ version number.
+
+MODULI GENERATION
+ ssh-keygen may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group
+ Exchange (DH-GEX) protocol. Generating these groups is a two-step
+ process: first, candidate primes are generated using a fast, but memory
+ intensive process. These candidate primes are then tested for
+ suitability (a CPU-intensive process).
+
+ Generation of primes is performed using the -M generate option. The
+ desired length of the primes may be specified by the -O bits option. For
+ example:
+
+ # ssh-keygen -M generate -O bits=2048 moduli-2048.candidates
+
+ By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the desired
+ length range. This may be overridden using the -O start option, which
+ specifies a different start point (in hex).
+
+ Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for
+ suitability. This may be performed using the -M screen option. In this
+ mode ssh-keygen will read candidates from standard input (or a file
+ specified using the -f option). For example:
+
+ # ssh-keygen -M screen -f moduli-2048.candidates moduli-2048
+
+ By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests.
+ This may be overridden using the -O prime-tests option. The DH generator
+ value will be chosen automatically for the prime under consideration. If
+ a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the -O
+ generator option. Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
+
+ Screened DH groups may be installed in /etc/moduli. It is important that
+ this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths.
+
+ A number of options are available for moduli generation and screening via
+ the -O flag:
+
+ lines=number
+ Exit after screening the specified number of lines while
+ performing DH candidate screening.
+
+ start-line=line-number
+ Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH
+ candidate screening.
+
+ checkpoint=filename
+ Write the last line processed to the specified file while
+ performing DH candidate screening. This will be used to skip
+ lines in the input file that have already been processed if the
+ job is restarted.
+
+ memory=mbytes
+ Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when
+ generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+
+ start=hex-value
+ Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for
+ DH-GEX.
+
+ generator=value
+ Specify desired generator (in decimal) when testing candidate
+ moduli for DH-GEX.
+
+CERTIFICATES
+ ssh-keygen supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be
+ used for user or host authentication. Certificates consist of a public
+ key, some identity information, zero or more principal (user or host)
+ names and a set of options that are signed by a Certification Authority
+ (CA) key. Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify
+ its signature on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys.
+ Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format
+ to the X.509 certificates used in ssl(8).
+
+ ssh-keygen supports two types of certificates: user and host. User
+ certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates
+ authenticate server hosts to users. To generate a user certificate:
+
+ $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub
+
+ The resultant certificate will be placed in /path/to/user_key-cert.pub.
+ A host certificate requires the -h option:
+
+ $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub
+
+ The host certificate will be output to /path/to/host_key-cert.pub.
+
+ It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by
+ providing the token library using -D and identifying the CA key by
+ providing its public half as an argument to -s:
+
+ $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub
+
+ Similarly, it is possible for the CA key to be hosted in a ssh-agent(1).
+ This is indicated by the -U flag and, again, the CA key must be
+ identified by its public half.
+
+ $ ssh-keygen -Us ca_key.pub -I key_id user_key.pub
+
+ In all cases, key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server
+ when the certificate is used for authentication.
+
+ Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal
+ (user/host) names. By default, generated certificates are valid for all
+ users or hosts. To generate a certificate for a specified set of
+ principals:
+
+ $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub
+ $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain host_key.pub
+
+ Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may
+ be specified through certificate options. A certificate option may
+ disable features of the SSH session, may be valid only when presented
+ from particular source addresses or may force the use of a specific
+ command.
+
+ The options that are valid for user certificates are:
+
+ clear Clear all enabled permissions. This is useful for clearing the
+ default set of permissions so permissions may be added
+ individually.
+
+ critical:name[=contents]
+ extension:name[=contents]
+ Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or extension.
+ The specified name should include a domain suffix, e.g.
+ M-bM-^@M-^\name@example.comM-bM-^@M-^]. If contents is specified then it is included
+ as the contents of the extension/option encoded as a string,
+ otherwise the extension/option is created with no contents
+ (usually indicating a flag). Extensions may be ignored by a
+ client or server that does not recognise them, whereas unknown
+ critical options will cause the certificate to be refused.
+
+ force-command=command
+ Forces the execution of command instead of any shell or command
+ specified by the user when the certificate is used for
+ authentication.
+
+ no-agent-forwarding
+ Disable ssh-agent(1) forwarding (permitted by default).
+
+ no-port-forwarding
+ Disable port forwarding (permitted by default).
+
+ no-pty Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default).
+
+ no-user-rc
+ Disable execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8) (permitted by default).
+
+ no-x11-forwarding
+ Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default).
+
+ permit-agent-forwarding
+ Allows ssh-agent(1) forwarding.
+
+ permit-port-forwarding
+ Allows port forwarding.
+
+ permit-pty
+ Allows PTY allocation.
+
+ permit-user-rc
+ Allows execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8).
+
+ permit-X11-forwarding
+ Allows X11 forwarding.
+
+ no-touch-required
+ Do not require signatures made using this key include
+ demonstration of user presence (e.g. by having the user touch the
+ authenticator). This option only makes sense for the FIDO
+ authenticator algorithms ecdsa-sk and ed25519-sk.
+
+ source-address=address_list
+ Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is
+ considered valid. The address_list is a comma-separated list of
+ one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR format.
+
+ verify-required
+ Require signatures made using this key indicate that the user was
+ first verified. This option only makes sense for the FIDO
+ authenticator algorithms ecdsa-sk and ed25519-sk. Currently PIN
+ authentication is the only supported verification method, but
+ other methods may be supported in the future.
+
+ At present, no standard options are valid for host keys.
+
+ Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime. The -V
+ option allows specification of certificate start and end times. A
+ certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be
+ considered valid. By default, certificates are valid from the UNIX Epoch
+ to the distant future.
+
+ For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA
+ public key must be trusted by sshd(8) or ssh(1). Refer to those manual
+ pages for details.
+
+FIDO AUTHENTICATOR
+ ssh-keygen is able to generate FIDO authenticator-backed keys, after
+ which they may be used much like any other key type supported by OpenSSH,
+ so long as the hardware authenticator is attached when the keys are used.
+ FIDO authenticators generally require the user to explicitly authorise
+ operations by touching or tapping them. FIDO keys consist of two parts:
+ a key handle part stored in the private key file on disk, and a per-
+ device private key that is unique to each FIDO authenticator and that
+ cannot be exported from the authenticator hardware. These are combined
+ by the hardware at authentication time to derive the real key that is
+ used to sign authentication challenges. Supported key types are ecdsa-sk
+ and ed25519-sk.
+
+ The options that are valid for FIDO keys are:
+
+ application
+ Override the default FIDO application/origin string of M-bM-^@M-^\ssh:M-bM-^@M-^].
+ This may be useful when generating host or domain-specific
+ resident keys. The specified application string must begin with
+ M-bM-^@M-^\ssh:M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ challenge=path
+ Specifies a path to a challenge string that will be passed to the
+ FIDO authenticator during key generation. The challenge string
+ may be used as part of an out-of-band protocol for key enrollment
+ (a random challenge is used by default).
+
+ device Explicitly specify a fido(4) device to use, rather than letting
+ the authenticator middleware select one.
+
+ no-touch-required
+ Indicate that the generated private key should not require touch
+ events (user presence) when making signatures. Note that sshd(8)
+ will refuse such signatures by default, unless overridden via an
+ authorized_keys option.
+
+ resident
+ Indicate that the key handle should be stored on the FIDO
+ authenticator itself. This makes it easier to use the
+ authenticator on multiple computers. Resident keys may be
+ supported on FIDO2 authenticators and typically require that a
+ PIN be set on the authenticator prior to generation. Resident
+ keys may be loaded off the authenticator using ssh-add(1).
+ Storing both parts of a key on a FIDO authenticator increases the
+ likelihood of an attacker being able to use a stolen
+ authenticator device.
+
+ user A username to be associated with a resident key, overriding the
+ empty default username. Specifying a username may be useful when
+ generating multiple resident keys for the same application name.
+
+ verify-required
+ Indicate that this private key should require user verification
+ for each signature. Not all FIDO authenticators support this
+ option. Currently PIN authentication is the only supported
+ verification method, but other methods may be supported in the
+ future.
+
+ write-attestation=path
+ May be used at key generation time to record the attestation data
+ returned from FIDO authenticators during key generation. This
+ information is potentially sensitive. By default, this
+ information is discarded.
+
+KEY REVOCATION LISTS
+ ssh-keygen is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs).
+ These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a
+ compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are
+ being revoked by serial number.
+
+ KRLs may be generated using the -k flag. This option reads one or more
+ files from the command line and generates a new KRL. The files may
+ either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys, listed one
+ per line. Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or
+ contents in the KRL and certificates revoked by serial number or key ID
+ (if the serial is zero or not available).
+
+ Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the
+ types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke
+ certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete
+ original certificate on hand. A KRL specification consists of lines
+ containing one of the following directives followed by a colon and some
+ directive-specific information.
+
+ serial: serial_number[-serial_number]
+ Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number. Serial
+ numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be
+ expressed in decimal, hex or octal. If two serial numbers are
+ specified separated by a hyphen, then the range of serial numbers
+ including and between each is revoked. The CA key must have been
+ specified on the ssh-keygen command line using the -s option.
+
+ id: key_id
+ Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string. The CA
+ key must have been specified on the ssh-keygen command line using
+ the -s option.
+
+ key: public_key
+ Revokes the specified key. If a certificate is listed, then it
+ is revoked as a plain public key.
+
+ sha1: public_key
+ Revokes the specified key by including its SHA1 hash in the KRL.
+
+ sha256: public_key
+ Revokes the specified key by including its SHA256 hash in the
+ KRL. KRLs that revoke keys by SHA256 hash are not supported by
+ OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9.
+
+ hash: fingerprint
+ Revokes a key using a fingerprint hash, as obtained from a
+ sshd(8) authentication log message or the ssh-keygen -l flag.
+ Only SHA256 fingerprints are supported here and resultant KRLs
+ are not supported by OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9.
+
+ KRLs may be updated using the -u flag in addition to -k. When this
+ option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into the
+ KRL, adding to those already there.
+
+ It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular
+ key (or keys). The -Q flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key
+ specified on the command line. If any key listed on the command line has
+ been revoked (or an error encountered) then ssh-keygen will exit with a
+ non-zero exit status. A zero exit status will only be returned if no key
+ was revoked.
+
+ALLOWED SIGNERS
+ When verifying signatures, ssh-keygen uses a simple list of identities
+ and keys to determine whether a signature comes from an authorized
+ source. This "allowed signers" file uses a format patterned after the
+ AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT described in sshd(8). Each line of the file
+ contains the following space-separated fields: principals, options,
+ keytype, base64-encoded key. Empty lines and lines starting with a M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y
+ are ignored as comments.
+
+ The principals field is a pattern-list (see PATTERNS in ssh_config(5))
+ consisting of one or more comma-separated USER@DOMAIN identity patterns
+ that are accepted for signing. When verifying, the identity presented
+ via the -I option must match a principals pattern in order for the
+ corresponding key to be considered acceptable for verification.
+
+ The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
+ specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
+ The following option specifications are supported (note that option
+ keywords are case-insensitive):
+
+ cert-authority
+ Indicates that this key is accepted as a certificate authority
+ (CA) and that certificates signed by this CA may be accepted for
+ verification.
+
+ namespaces=namespace-list
+ Specifies a pattern-list of namespaces that are accepted for this
+ key. If this option is present, the signature namespace embedded
+ in the signature object and presented on the verification
+ command-line must match the specified list before the key will be
+ considered acceptable.
+
+ valid-after=timestamp
+ Indicates that the key is valid for use at or after the specified
+ timestamp, which may be a date or time in the YYYYMMDD[Z] or
+ YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] formats. Dates and times will be interpreted
+ in the current system time zone unless suffixed with a Z
+ character, which causes them to be interpreted in the UTC time
+ zone.
+
+ valid-before=timestamp
+ Indicates that the key is valid for use at or before the
+ specified timestamp.
+
+ When verifying signatures made by certificates, the expected principal
+ name must match both the principals pattern in the allowed signers file
+ and the principals embedded in the certificate itself.
+
+ An example allowed signers file:
+
+ # Comments allowed at start of line
+ user1@example.com,user2@example.com ssh-rsa AAAAX1...
+ # A certificate authority, trusted for all principals in a domain.
+ *@example.com cert-authority ssh-ed25519 AAAB4...
+ # A key that is accepted only for file signing.
+ user2@example.com namespaces="file" ssh-ed25519 AAA41...
+
+ENVIRONMENT
+ SSH_SK_PROVIDER
+ Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
+ FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+ the built-in USB HID support.
+
+FILES
+ ~/.ssh/id_dsa
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
+ ~/.ssh/id_rsa
+ Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
+ authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of
+ the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the
+ user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the
+ key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of
+ this file using 128-bit AES. This file is not automatically
+ accessed by ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for
+ the private key. ssh(1) will read this file when a login attempt
+ is made.
+
+ ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
+ Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
+ authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA public key for
+ authentication. The contents of this file should be added to
+ ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to
+ log in using public key authentication. There is no need to keep
+ the contents of this file secret.
+
+ /etc/moduli
+ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX. The file format
+ is described in moduli(5).
+
+SEE ALSO
+ ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), moduli(5), sshd(8)
+
+ The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format, RFC 4716, 2006.
+
+AUTHORS
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
+ Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
+ de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
+ created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
+ versions 1.5 and 2.0.
+
+OpenBSD 7.2 September 10, 2022 OpenBSD 7.2