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Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | ssh-keygen.c | 3931 |
1 files changed, 3931 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ae05440 --- /dev/null +++ b/ssh-keygen.c @@ -0,0 +1,3931 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.461 2022/12/04 23:50:49 cheloha Exp $ */ +/* + * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi> + * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland + * All rights reserved + * Identity and host key generation and maintenance. + * + * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software + * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this + * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is + * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be + * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include <sys/types.h> +#include <sys/socket.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" +#endif + +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include <stdint.h> +#endif +#include <errno.h> +#include <fcntl.h> +#include <netdb.h> +#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H +# include <paths.h> +#endif +#include <pwd.h> +#include <stdarg.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <unistd.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <locale.h> +#include <time.h> + +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "pathnames.h" +#include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "match.h" +#include "hostfile.h" +#include "dns.h" +#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "ssh-pkcs11.h" +#include "atomicio.h" +#include "krl.h" +#include "digest.h" +#include "utf8.h" +#include "authfd.h" +#include "sshsig.h" +#include "ssh-sk.h" +#include "sk-api.h" /* XXX for SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; remove */ +#include "cipher.h" + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa" +#else +# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519" +#endif + +/* + * Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys. These value can be + * overridden on the command line. + * + * These values, with the exception of DSA, provide security equivalent to at + * least 128 bits of security according to NIST Special Publication 800-57: + * Recommendation for Key Management Part 1 rev 4 section 5.6.1. + * For DSA it (and FIPS-186-4 section 4.2) specifies that the only size for + * which a 160bit hash is acceptable is 1kbit, and since ssh-dss specifies only + * SHA1 we limit the DSA key size 1k bits. + */ +#define DEFAULT_BITS 3072 +#define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024 +#define DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA 256 + +static int quiet = 0; + +/* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */ +static int print_fingerprint = 0; +static int print_bubblebabble = 0; + +/* Hash algorithm to use for fingerprints. */ +static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; + +/* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */ +static char identity_file[PATH_MAX]; +static int have_identity = 0; + +/* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */ +static char *identity_passphrase = NULL; + +/* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */ +static char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL; + +/* Key type when certifying */ +static u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER; + +/* "key ID" of signed key */ +static char *cert_key_id = NULL; + +/* Comma-separated list of principal names for certifying keys */ +static char *cert_principals = NULL; + +/* Validity period for certificates */ +static u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0; +static u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL; + +/* Certificate options */ +#define CERTOPT_X_FWD (1) +#define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1) +#define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD (1<<2) +#define CERTOPT_PTY (1<<3) +#define CERTOPT_USER_RC (1<<4) +#define CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE (1<<5) +#define CERTOPT_REQUIRE_VERIFY (1<<6) +#define CERTOPT_DEFAULT (CERTOPT_X_FWD|CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD| \ + CERTOPT_PORT_FWD|CERTOPT_PTY|CERTOPT_USER_RC) +static u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT; +static char *certflags_command = NULL; +static char *certflags_src_addr = NULL; + +/* Arbitrary extensions specified by user */ +struct cert_ext { + char *key; + char *val; + int crit; +}; +static struct cert_ext *cert_ext; +static size_t ncert_ext; + +/* Conversion to/from various formats */ +enum { + FMT_RFC4716, + FMT_PKCS8, + FMT_PEM +} convert_format = FMT_RFC4716; + +static char *key_type_name = NULL; + +/* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */ +static char *pkcs11provider = NULL; + +/* FIDO/U2F provider to use */ +static char *sk_provider = NULL; + +/* Format for writing private keys */ +static int private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH; + +/* Cipher for new-format private keys */ +static char *openssh_format_cipher = NULL; + +/* Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys. */ +static int rounds = 0; + +/* argv0 */ +extern char *__progname; + +static char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +/* moduli.c */ +int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *); +int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long, + unsigned long); +#endif + +static void +type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp) +{ + if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) + fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name); + if (*bitsp == 0) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + int nid; + + switch(type) { + case KEY_DSA: + *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_DSA; + break; + case KEY_ECDSA: + if (name != NULL && + (nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(name)) > 0) + *bitsp = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid); + if (*bitsp == 0) + *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA; + break; + case KEY_RSA: + *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS; + break; + } +#endif + } +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + switch (type) { + case KEY_DSA: + if (*bitsp != 1024) + fatal("Invalid DSA key length: must be 1024 bits"); + break; + case KEY_RSA: + if (*bitsp < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) + fatal("Invalid RSA key length: minimum is %d bits", + SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE); + else if (*bitsp > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) + fatal("Invalid RSA key length: maximum is %d bits", + OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS); + break; + case KEY_ECDSA: + if (sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1) +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length: valid lengths are " + "256, 384 or 521 bits"); +#else + fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length: valid lengths are " + "256 or 384 bits"); +#endif + } +#endif +} + +/* + * Checks whether a file exists and, if so, asks the user whether they wish + * to overwrite it. + * Returns nonzero if the file does not already exist or if the user agrees to + * overwrite, or zero otherwise. + */ +static int +confirm_overwrite(const char *filename) +{ + char yesno[3]; + struct stat st; + + if (stat(filename, &st) != 0) + return 1; + printf("%s already exists.\n", filename); + printf("Overwrite (y/n)? "); + fflush(stdout); + if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL) + return 0; + if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y') + return 0; + return 1; +} + +static void +ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt) +{ + char buf[1024]; + char *name = NULL; + + if (key_type_name == NULL) + name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; + else { + switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) { + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_DSA: + name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA; + break; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA: + name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA; + break; + case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA_SK: + name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK; + break; +#endif + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA: + name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; + break; + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519; + break; + case KEY_ED25519_SK: + case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT: + name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK; + break; + case KEY_XMSS: + case KEY_XMSS_CERT: + name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS; + break; + default: + fatal("bad key type"); + } + } + snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file), + "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name); + printf("%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file); + fflush(stdout); + if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) + exit(1); + buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0'; + if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0) + strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file)); + have_identity = 1; +} + +static struct sshkey * +load_identity(const char *filename, char **commentp) +{ + char *pass; + struct sshkey *prv; + int r; + + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; + if ((r = sshkey_load_private(filename, "", &prv, commentp)) == 0) + return prv; + if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) + fatal_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", filename); + if (identity_passphrase) + pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); + else + pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + r = sshkey_load_private(filename, pass, &prv, commentp); + freezero(pass, strlen(pass)); + if (r != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Load key \"%s\"", filename); + return prv; +} + +#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" +#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" +#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----" +#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC 0x3f6ff9eb + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +static void +do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *k) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + char comment[61], *b64; + int r; + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + if ((r = sshkey_putb(k, b)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "put key"); + if ((b64 = sshbuf_dtob64_string(b, 1)) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_dtob64_string failed"); + + /* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */ + snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment), + "%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH", + sshkey_size(k), sshkey_type(k), + pw->pw_name, hostname); + + sshkey_free(k); + sshbuf_free(b); + + fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN); + fprintf(stdout, "Comment: \"%s\"\n%s", comment, b64); + fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END); + free(b64); + exit(0); +} + +static void +do_convert_to_pkcs8(struct sshkey *k) +{ + switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) { + case KEY_RSA: + if (!PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->rsa)) + fatal("PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY failed"); + break; + case KEY_DSA: + if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa)) + fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed"); + break; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa)) + fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed"); + break; +#endif + default: + fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k)); + } + exit(0); +} + +static void +do_convert_to_pem(struct sshkey *k) +{ + switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) { + case KEY_RSA: + if (!PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(stdout, k->rsa)) + fatal("PEM_write_RSAPublicKey failed"); + break; + case KEY_DSA: + if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa)) + fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed"); + break; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa)) + fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed"); + break; +#endif + default: + fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k)); + } + exit(0); +} + +static void +do_convert_to(struct passwd *pw) +{ + struct sshkey *k; + struct stat st; + int r; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &k, NULL)) != 0) + k = load_identity(identity_file, NULL); + switch (convert_format) { + case FMT_RFC4716: + do_convert_to_ssh2(pw, k); + break; + case FMT_PKCS8: + do_convert_to_pkcs8(k); + break; + case FMT_PEM: + do_convert_to_pem(k); + break; + default: + fatal_f("unknown key format %d", convert_format); + } + exit(0); +} + +/* + * This is almost exactly the bignum1 encoding, but with 32 bit for length + * instead of 16. + */ +static void +buffer_get_bignum_bits(struct sshbuf *b, BIGNUM *value) +{ + u_int bytes, bignum_bits; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &bignum_bits)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse"); + bytes = (bignum_bits + 7) / 8; + if (sshbuf_len(b) < bytes) + fatal_f("input buffer too small: need %d have %zu", + bytes, sshbuf_len(b)); + if (BN_bin2bn(sshbuf_ptr(b), bytes, value) == NULL) + fatal_f("BN_bin2bn failed"); + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, bytes)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "consume"); +} + +static struct sshkey * +do_convert_private_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b) +{ + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + char *type, *cipher; + u_char e1, e2, e3, *sig = NULL, data[] = "abcde12345"; + int r, rlen, ktype; + u_int magic, i1, i2, i3, i4; + size_t slen; + u_long e; + BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL; + BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL; + BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL; + BIGNUM *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL, *rsa_iqmp = NULL; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &magic)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse magic"); + + if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) { + error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic, + SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC); + return NULL; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cipher, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i2)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i3)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i4)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse"); + debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1, i2, i3, i4); + if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) { + error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher); + free(cipher); + free(type); + return NULL; + } + free(cipher); + + if (strstr(type, "dsa")) { + ktype = KEY_DSA; + } else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) { + ktype = KEY_RSA; + } else { + free(type); + return NULL; + } + if ((key = sshkey_new(ktype)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new failed"); + free(type); + + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_DSA: + if ((dsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa_g = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa_pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa_priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("BN_new"); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_p); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_g); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_q); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_pub_key); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_priv_key); + if (!DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g)) + fatal_f("DSA_set0_pqg failed"); + dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */ + if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, dsa_pub_key, dsa_priv_key)) + fatal_f("DSA_set0_key failed"); + dsa_pub_key = dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */ + break; + case KEY_RSA: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 || + (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) || + (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0)) + fatal_fr(r, "parse RSA"); + e = e1; + debug("e %lx", e); + if (e < 30) { + e <<= 8; + e += e2; + debug("e %lx", e); + e <<= 8; + e += e3; + debug("e %lx", e); + } + if ((rsa_e = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("BN_new"); + if (!BN_set_word(rsa_e, e)) { + BN_clear_free(rsa_e); + sshkey_free(key); + return NULL; + } + if ((rsa_n = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_d = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("BN_new"); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_d); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_n); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_iqmp); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_q); + buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_p); + if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, rsa_d)) + fatal_f("RSA_set0_key failed"); + rsa_n = rsa_e = rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */ + if (!RSA_set0_factors(key->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q)) + fatal_f("RSA_set0_factors failed"); + rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */ + if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(key, rsa_iqmp)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "generate RSA parameters"); + BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp); + break; + } + rlen = sshbuf_len(b); + if (rlen != 0) + error_f("remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen); + + /* try the key */ + if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data), + NULL, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0) + error_fr(r, "signing with converted key failed"); + else if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data), + NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) + error_fr(r, "verification with converted key failed"); + if (r != 0) { + sshkey_free(key); + free(sig); + return NULL; + } + free(sig); + return key; +} + +static int +get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len) +{ + int c; + size_t pos = 0; + + line[0] = '\0'; + while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) { + if (pos >= len - 1) + fatal("input line too long."); + switch (c) { + case '\r': + c = fgetc(fp); + if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF) + fatal("unget: %s", strerror(errno)); + return pos; + case '\n': + return pos; + } + line[pos++] = c; + line[pos] = '\0'; + } + /* We reached EOF */ + return -1; +} + +static void +do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey **k, int *private) +{ + int r, blen, escaped = 0; + u_int len; + char line[1024]; + struct sshbuf *buf; + char encoded[8096]; + FILE *fp; + + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); + if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); + encoded[0] = '\0'; + while ((blen = get_line(fp, line, sizeof(line))) != -1) { + if (blen > 0 && line[blen - 1] == '\\') + escaped++; + if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 || + strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) { + if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL) + *private = 1; + if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) { + break; + } + /* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */ + continue; + } + if (escaped) { + escaped--; + /* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */ + continue; + } + strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded)); + } + len = strlen(encoded); + if (((len % 4) == 3) && + (encoded[len-1] == '=') && + (encoded[len-2] == '=') && + (encoded[len-3] == '=')) + encoded[len-3] = '\0'; + if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(buf, encoded)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "base64 decode"); + if (*private) { + if ((*k = do_convert_private_ssh2(buf)) == NULL) + fatal_f("private key conversion failed"); + } else if ((r = sshkey_fromb(buf, k)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse key"); + sshbuf_free(buf); + fclose(fp); +} + +static void +do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, int *private) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pubkey; + FILE *fp; + + if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); + if ((pubkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) { + fatal_f("%s is not a recognised public key format", + identity_file); + } + fclose(fp); + switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) { + case EVP_PKEY_RSA: + if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new failed"); + (*k)->type = KEY_RSA; + (*k)->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey); + break; + case EVP_PKEY_DSA: + if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new failed"); + (*k)->type = KEY_DSA; + (*k)->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pubkey); + break; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case EVP_PKEY_EC: + if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new failed"); + (*k)->type = KEY_ECDSA; + (*k)->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pubkey); + (*k)->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid((*k)->ecdsa); + break; +#endif + default: + fatal_f("unsupported pubkey type %d", + EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)); + } + EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); + return; +} + +static void +do_convert_from_pem(struct sshkey **k, int *private) +{ + FILE *fp; + RSA *rsa; + + if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); + if ((rsa = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) { + if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new failed"); + (*k)->type = KEY_RSA; + (*k)->rsa = rsa; + fclose(fp); + return; + } + fatal_f("unrecognised raw private key format"); +} + +static void +do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw) +{ + struct sshkey *k = NULL; + int r, private = 0, ok = 0; + struct stat st; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); + + switch (convert_format) { + case FMT_RFC4716: + do_convert_from_ssh2(pw, &k, &private); + break; + case FMT_PKCS8: + do_convert_from_pkcs8(&k, &private); + break; + case FMT_PEM: + do_convert_from_pem(&k, &private); + break; + default: + fatal_f("unknown key format %d", convert_format); + } + + if (!private) { + if ((r = sshkey_write(k, stdout)) == 0) + ok = 1; + if (ok) + fprintf(stdout, "\n"); + } else { + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_DSA: + ok = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL, + NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); + break; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + ok = PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(stdout, k->ecdsa, NULL, + NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); + break; +#endif + case KEY_RSA: + ok = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL, + NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); + break; + default: + fatal_f("unsupported key type %s", sshkey_type(k)); + } + } + + if (!ok) + fatal("key write failed"); + sshkey_free(k); + exit(0); +} +#endif + +static void +do_print_public(struct passwd *pw) +{ + struct sshkey *prv; + struct stat st; + int r; + char *comment = NULL; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); + prv = load_identity(identity_file, &comment); + if ((r = sshkey_write(prv, stdout)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "write key"); + if (comment != NULL && *comment != '\0') + fprintf(stdout, " %s", comment); + fprintf(stdout, "\n"); + if (sshkey_is_sk(prv)) { + debug("sk_application: \"%s\", sk_flags 0x%02x", + prv->sk_application, prv->sk_flags); + } + sshkey_free(prv); + free(comment); + exit(0); +} + +static void +do_download(struct passwd *pw) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + struct sshkey **keys = NULL; + int i, nkeys; + enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; + int fptype; + char *fp, *ra, **comments = NULL; + + fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; + rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; + + pkcs11_init(1); + nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys, &comments); + if (nkeys <= 0) + fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11"); + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { + if (print_fingerprint) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep); + ra = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) + fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail"); + printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", sshkey_size(keys[i]), + fp, sshkey_type(keys[i])); + if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) + printf("%s\n", ra); + free(ra); + free(fp); + } else { + (void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */ + fprintf(stdout, "%s%s\n", + *(comments[i]) == '\0' ? "" : " ", comments[i]); + } + free(comments[i]); + sshkey_free(keys[i]); + } + free(comments); + free(keys); + pkcs11_terminate(); + exit(0); +#else + fatal("no pkcs11 support"); +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ +} + +static struct sshkey * +try_read_key(char **cpp) +{ + struct sshkey *ret; + int r; + + if ((ret = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new failed"); + if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, cpp)) == 0) + return ret; + /* Not a key */ + sshkey_free(ret); + return NULL; +} + +static void +fingerprint_one_key(const struct sshkey *public, const char *comment) +{ + char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL; + enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; + int fptype; + + fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; + rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); + ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) + fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); + mprintf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp, + comment ? comment : "no comment", sshkey_type(public)); + if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) + printf("%s\n", ra); + free(ra); + free(fp); +} + +static void +fingerprint_private(const char *path) +{ + struct stat st; + char *comment = NULL; + struct sshkey *privkey = NULL, *pubkey = NULL; + int r; + + if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) + fatal("%s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &pubkey, &comment)) != 0) + debug_r(r, "load public \"%s\"", path); + if (pubkey == NULL || comment == NULL || *comment == '\0') { + free(comment); + if ((r = sshkey_load_private(path, NULL, + &privkey, &comment)) != 0) + debug_r(r, "load private \"%s\"", path); + } + if (pubkey == NULL && privkey == NULL) + fatal("%s is not a key file.", path); + + fingerprint_one_key(pubkey == NULL ? privkey : pubkey, comment); + sshkey_free(pubkey); + sshkey_free(privkey); + free(comment); +} + +static void +do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) +{ + FILE *f; + struct sshkey *public = NULL; + char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL; + size_t linesize = 0; + int i, invalid = 1; + const char *path; + u_long lnum = 0; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + path = identity_file; + + if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") == 0) { + f = stdin; + path = "(stdin)"; + } else if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, path, strerror(errno)); + + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + lnum++; + cp = line; + cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0'; + /* Trim leading space and comments */ + cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); + if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') + continue; + + /* + * Input may be plain keys, private keys, authorized_keys + * or known_hosts. + */ + + /* + * Try private keys first. Assume a key is private if + * "SSH PRIVATE KEY" appears on the first line and we're + * not reading from stdin (XXX support private keys on stdin). + */ + if (lnum == 1 && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && + strstr(cp, "PRIVATE KEY") != NULL) { + free(line); + fclose(f); + fingerprint_private(path); + exit(0); + } + + /* + * If it's not a private key, then this must be prepared to + * accept a public key prefixed with a hostname or options. + * Try a bare key first, otherwise skip the leading stuff. + */ + if ((public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) { + i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10); + if (i == 0 || ep == NULL || + (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) { + int quoted = 0; + + comment = cp; + for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && + *cp != '\t')); cp++) { + if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') + cp++; /* Skip both */ + else if (*cp == '"') + quoted = !quoted; + } + if (!*cp) + continue; + *cp++ = '\0'; + } + } + /* Retry after parsing leading hostname/key options */ + if (public == NULL && (public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) { + debug("%s:%lu: not a public key", path, lnum); + continue; + } + + /* Find trailing comment, if any */ + for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) + ; + if (*cp != '\0' && *cp != '#') + comment = cp; + + fingerprint_one_key(public, comment); + sshkey_free(public); + invalid = 0; /* One good key in the file is sufficient */ + } + fclose(f); + free(line); + + if (invalid) + fatal("%s is not a public key file.", path); + exit(0); +} + +static void +do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) +{ + struct { + char *key_type; + char *key_type_display; + char *path; + } key_types[] = { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + { "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE }, +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + { "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE }, +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + { "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE }, +#ifdef WITH_XMSS + { "xmss", "XMSS",_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE }, +#endif /* WITH_XMSS */ + { NULL, NULL, NULL } + }; + + u_int32_t bits = 0; + int first = 0; + struct stat st; + struct sshkey *private, *public; + char comment[1024], *prv_tmp, *pub_tmp, *prv_file, *pub_file; + int i, type, fd, r; + + for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) { + public = private = NULL; + prv_tmp = pub_tmp = prv_file = pub_file = NULL; + + xasprintf(&prv_file, "%s%s", + identity_file, key_types[i].path); + + /* Check whether private key exists and is not zero-length */ + if (stat(prv_file, &st) == 0) { + if (st.st_size != 0) + goto next; + } else if (errno != ENOENT) { + error("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path, + strerror(errno)); + goto failnext; + } + + /* + * Private key doesn't exist or is invalid; proceed with + * key generation. + */ + xasprintf(&prv_tmp, "%s%s.XXXXXXXXXX", + identity_file, key_types[i].path); + xasprintf(&pub_tmp, "%s%s.pub.XXXXXXXXXX", + identity_file, key_types[i].path); + xasprintf(&pub_file, "%s%s.pub", + identity_file, key_types[i].path); + + if (first == 0) { + first = 1; + printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname); + } + printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display); + fflush(stdout); + type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type); + if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) { + error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s", + prv_tmp, strerror(errno)); + goto failnext; + } + (void)close(fd); /* just using mkstemp() to reserve a name */ + bits = 0; + type_bits_valid(type, NULL, &bits); + if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "sshkey_generate failed"); + goto failnext; + } + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_from_private"); + snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, + hostname); + if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, prv_tmp, "", + comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, + rounds)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", prv_tmp); + goto failnext; + } + if ((fd = mkstemp(pub_tmp)) == -1) { + error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s", + pub_tmp, strerror(errno)); + goto failnext; + } + (void)fchmod(fd, 0644); + (void)close(fd); + if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, pub_tmp, comment)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", + identity_file); + goto failnext; + } + + /* Rename temporary files to their permanent locations. */ + if (rename(pub_tmp, pub_file) != 0) { + error("Unable to move %s into position: %s", + pub_file, strerror(errno)); + goto failnext; + } + if (rename(prv_tmp, prv_file) != 0) { + error("Unable to move %s into position: %s", + key_types[i].path, strerror(errno)); + failnext: + first = 0; + goto next; + } + next: + sshkey_free(private); + sshkey_free(public); + free(prv_tmp); + free(pub_tmp); + free(prv_file); + free(pub_file); + } + if (first != 0) + printf("\n"); +} + +struct known_hosts_ctx { + const char *host; /* Hostname searched for in find/delete case */ + FILE *out; /* Output file, stdout for find_hosts case */ + int has_unhashed; /* When hashing, original had unhashed hosts */ + int found_key; /* For find/delete, host was found */ + int invalid; /* File contained invalid items; don't delete */ + int hash_hosts; /* Hash hostnames as we go */ + int find_host; /* Search for specific hostname */ + int delete_host; /* Delete host from known_hosts */ +}; + +static int +known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) +{ + struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx; + char *hashed, *cp, *hosts, *ohosts; + int has_wild = l->hosts && strcspn(l->hosts, "*?!") != strlen(l->hosts); + int was_hashed = l->hosts && l->hosts[0] == HASH_DELIM; + + switch (l->status) { + case HKF_STATUS_OK: + case HKF_STATUS_MATCHED: + /* + * Don't hash hosts already already hashed, with wildcard + * characters or a CA/revocation marker. + */ + if (was_hashed || has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) { + fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); + if (has_wild && !ctx->find_host) { + logit("%s:%lu: ignoring host name " + "with wildcard: %.64s", l->path, + l->linenum, l->hosts); + } + return 0; + } + /* + * Split any comma-separated hostnames from the host list, + * hash and store separately. + */ + ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(l->hosts); + while ((cp = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') { + lowercase(cp); + if ((hashed = host_hash(cp, NULL, 0)) == NULL) + fatal("hash_host failed"); + fprintf(ctx->out, "%s %s\n", hashed, l->rawkey); + free(hashed); + ctx->has_unhashed = 1; + } + free(ohosts); + return 0; + case HKF_STATUS_INVALID: + /* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */ + ctx->invalid = 1; + logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum); + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); + return 0; + } + /* NOTREACHED */ + return -1; +} + +static int +known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) +{ + struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx; + enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; + int fptype; + char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL; + + fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; + rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; + + if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) { + if (ctx->delete_host) { + if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) { + /* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */ + fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); + } else { + /* + * Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke + * marker, delete it by *not* writing the + * line to ctx->out. + */ + ctx->found_key = 1; + if (!quiet) + printf("# Host %s found: line %lu\n", + ctx->host, l->linenum); + } + return 0; + } else if (ctx->find_host) { + ctx->found_key = 1; + if (!quiet) { + printf("# Host %s found: line %lu %s\n", + ctx->host, + l->linenum, l->marker == MRK_CA ? "CA" : + (l->marker == MRK_REVOKE ? "REVOKED" : "")); + } + if (ctx->hash_hosts) + known_hosts_hash(l, ctx); + else if (print_fingerprint) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep); + ra = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, + fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) + fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); + mprintf("%s %s %s%s%s\n", ctx->host, + sshkey_type(l->key), fp, + l->comment[0] ? " " : "", + l->comment); + if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) + printf("%s\n", ra); + free(ra); + free(fp); + } else + fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); + return 0; + } + } else if (ctx->delete_host) { + /* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */ + if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { + ctx->invalid = 1; + logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum); + } + fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); + } + return 0; +} + +static void +do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name, int find_host, + int delete_host, int hash_hosts) +{ + char *cp, tmp[PATH_MAX], old[PATH_MAX]; + int r, fd, oerrno, inplace = 0; + struct known_hosts_ctx ctx; + u_int foreach_options; + struct stat sb; + + if (!have_identity) { + cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid); + if (strlcpy(identity_file, cp, sizeof(identity_file)) >= + sizeof(identity_file)) + fatal("Specified known hosts path too long"); + free(cp); + have_identity = 1; + } + if (stat(identity_file, &sb) != 0) + fatal("Cannot stat %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); + + memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); + ctx.out = stdout; + ctx.host = name; + ctx.hash_hosts = hash_hosts; + ctx.find_host = find_host; + ctx.delete_host = delete_host; + + /* + * Find hosts goes to stdout, hash and deletions happen in-place + * A corner case is ssh-keygen -HF foo, which should go to stdout + */ + if (!find_host && (hash_hosts || delete_host)) { + if (strlcpy(tmp, identity_file, sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) || + strlcat(tmp, ".XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) || + strlcpy(old, identity_file, sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old) || + strlcat(old, ".old", sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old)) + fatal("known_hosts path too long"); + umask(077); + if ((fd = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1) + fatal("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno)); + if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) { + oerrno = errno; + unlink(tmp); + fatal("fdopen: %s", strerror(oerrno)); + } + fchmod(fd, sb.st_mode & 0644); + inplace = 1; + } + /* XXX support identity_file == "-" for stdin */ + foreach_options = find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0; + foreach_options |= print_fingerprint ? HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY : 0; + if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(identity_file, (find_host || !hash_hosts) ? + known_hosts_find_delete : known_hosts_hash, &ctx, name, NULL, + foreach_options, 0)) != 0) { + if (inplace) + unlink(tmp); + fatal_fr(r, "hostkeys_foreach"); + } + + if (inplace) + fclose(ctx.out); + + if (ctx.invalid) { + error("%s is not a valid known_hosts file.", identity_file); + if (inplace) { + error("Not replacing existing known_hosts " + "file because of errors"); + unlink(tmp); + } + exit(1); + } else if (delete_host && !ctx.found_key) { + logit("Host %s not found in %s", name, identity_file); + if (inplace) + unlink(tmp); + } else if (inplace) { + /* Backup existing file */ + if (unlink(old) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) + fatal("unlink %.100s: %s", old, strerror(errno)); + if (link(identity_file, old) == -1) + fatal("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", identity_file, old, + strerror(errno)); + /* Move new one into place */ + if (rename(tmp, identity_file) == -1) { + error("rename\"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", tmp, identity_file, + strerror(errno)); + unlink(tmp); + unlink(old); + exit(1); + } + + printf("%s updated.\n", identity_file); + printf("Original contents retained as %s\n", old); + if (ctx.has_unhashed) { + logit("WARNING: %s contains unhashed entries", old); + logit("Delete this file to ensure privacy " + "of hostnames"); + } + } + + exit (find_host && !ctx.found_key); +} + +/* + * Perform changing a passphrase. The argument is the passwd structure + * for the current user. + */ +static void +do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw) +{ + char *comment; + char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2; + struct stat st; + struct sshkey *private; + int r; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); + /* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */ + r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment); + if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { + if (identity_passphrase) + old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); + else + old_passphrase = + read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ", + RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase, + &private, &comment); + freezero(old_passphrase, strlen(old_passphrase)); + if (r != 0) + goto badkey; + } else if (r != 0) { + badkey: + fatal_r(r, "Failed to load key %s", identity_file); + } + if (comment) + mprintf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment); + + /* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */ + if (identity_new_passphrase) { + passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); + passphrase2 = NULL; + } else { + passphrase1 = + read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no " + "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ", + RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + + /* Verify that they are the same. */ + if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) { + explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); + explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); + free(passphrase1); + free(passphrase2); + printf("Pass phrases do not match. Try again.\n"); + exit(1); + } + /* Destroy the other copy. */ + freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); + } + + /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ + if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, + comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file); + freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); + sshkey_free(private); + free(comment); + exit(1); + } + /* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */ + freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); + sshkey_free(private); /* Destroys contents */ + free(comment); + + printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n"); + exit(0); +} + +/* + * Print the SSHFP RR. + */ +static int +do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname, + int print_generic) +{ + struct sshkey *public; + char *comment = NULL; + struct stat st; + int r; + + if (fname == NULL) + fatal_f("no filename"); + if (stat(fname, &st) == -1) { + if (errno == ENOENT) + return 0; + fatal("%s: %s", fname, strerror(errno)); + } + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\"", fname); + export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic); + sshkey_free(public); + free(comment); + return 1; +} + +/* + * Change the comment of a private key file. + */ +static void +do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw, const char *identity_comment) +{ + char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase; + struct sshkey *private; + struct sshkey *public; + struct stat st; + int r; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); + if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", + &private, &comment)) == 0) + passphrase = xstrdup(""); + else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) + fatal_r(r, "Cannot load private key \"%s\"", identity_file); + else { + if (identity_passphrase) + passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); + else if (identity_new_passphrase) + passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); + else + passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", + RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + /* Try to load using the passphrase. */ + if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, passphrase, + &private, &comment)) != 0) { + freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + fatal_r(r, "Cannot load private key \"%s\"", + identity_file); + } + } + + if (private->type != KEY_ED25519 && private->type != KEY_XMSS && + private_key_format != SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH) { + error("Comments are only supported for keys stored in " + "the new format (-o)."); + explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + sshkey_free(private); + exit(1); + } + if (comment) + printf("Old comment: %s\n", comment); + else + printf("No existing comment\n"); + + if (identity_comment) { + strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment)); + } else { + printf("New comment: "); + fflush(stdout); + if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) { + explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + sshkey_free(private); + exit(1); + } + new_comment[strcspn(new_comment, "\n")] = '\0'; + } + if (comment != NULL && strcmp(comment, new_comment) == 0) { + printf("No change to comment\n"); + free(passphrase); + sshkey_free(private); + free(comment); + exit(0); + } + + /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ + if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, + new_comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, + rounds)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file); + freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + sshkey_free(private); + free(comment); + exit(1); + } + freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "sshkey_from_private"); + sshkey_free(private); + + strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); + if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, identity_file, new_comment)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", identity_file); + sshkey_free(public); + free(comment); + + if (strlen(new_comment) > 0) + printf("Comment '%s' applied\n", new_comment); + else + printf("Comment removed\n"); + + exit(0); +} + +static void +cert_ext_add(const char *key, const char *value, int iscrit) +{ + cert_ext = xreallocarray(cert_ext, ncert_ext + 1, sizeof(*cert_ext)); + cert_ext[ncert_ext].key = xstrdup(key); + cert_ext[ncert_ext].val = value == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(value); + cert_ext[ncert_ext].crit = iscrit; + ncert_ext++; +} + +/* qsort(3) comparison function for certificate extensions */ +static int +cert_ext_cmp(const void *_a, const void *_b) +{ + const struct cert_ext *a = (const struct cert_ext *)_a; + const struct cert_ext *b = (const struct cert_ext *)_b; + int r; + + if (a->crit != b->crit) + return (a->crit < b->crit) ? -1 : 1; + if ((r = strcmp(a->key, b->key)) != 0) + return r; + if ((a->val == NULL) != (b->val == NULL)) + return (a->val == NULL) ? -1 : 1; + if (a->val != NULL && (r = strcmp(a->val, b->val)) != 0) + return r; + return 0; +} + +#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1 +#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2 +static void +prepare_options_buf(struct sshbuf *c, int which) +{ + struct sshbuf *b; + size_t i; + int r; + const struct cert_ext *ext; + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + sshbuf_reset(c); + for (i = 0; i < ncert_ext; i++) { + ext = &cert_ext[i]; + if ((ext->crit && (which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS)) || + (!ext->crit && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL))) + continue; + if (ext->val == NULL) { + /* flag option */ + debug3_f("%s", ext->key); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, ext->key)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(c, NULL, 0)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "prepare flag"); + } else { + /* key/value option */ + debug3_f("%s=%s", ext->key, ext->val); + sshbuf_reset(b); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, ext->key)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ext->val)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c, b)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "prepare k/v"); + } + } + sshbuf_free(b); +} + +static void +finalise_cert_exts(void) +{ + /* critical options */ + if (certflags_command != NULL) + cert_ext_add("force-command", certflags_command, 1); + if (certflags_src_addr != NULL) + cert_ext_add("source-address", certflags_src_addr, 1); + if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_REQUIRE_VERIFY) != 0) + cert_ext_add("verify-required", NULL, 1); + /* extensions */ + if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_X_FWD) != 0) + cert_ext_add("permit-X11-forwarding", NULL, 0); + if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0) + cert_ext_add("permit-agent-forwarding", NULL, 0); + if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0) + cert_ext_add("permit-port-forwarding", NULL, 0); + if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PTY) != 0) + cert_ext_add("permit-pty", NULL, 0); + if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0) + cert_ext_add("permit-user-rc", NULL, 0); + if ((certflags_flags & CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE) != 0) + cert_ext_add("no-touch-required", NULL, 0); + /* order lexically by key */ + if (ncert_ext > 0) + qsort(cert_ext, ncert_ext, sizeof(*cert_ext), cert_ext_cmp); +} + +static struct sshkey * +load_pkcs11_key(char *path) +{ +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *public, *private = NULL; + int r, i, nkeys; + + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, NULL)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Couldn't load CA public key \"%s\"", path); + + nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, identity_passphrase, + &keys, NULL); + debug3_f("%d keys", nkeys); + if (nkeys <= 0) + fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11"); + for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { + if (sshkey_equal_public(public, keys[i])) { + private = keys[i]; + continue; + } + sshkey_free(keys[i]); + } + free(keys); + sshkey_free(public); + return private; +#else + fatal("no pkcs11 support"); +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ +} + +/* Signer for sshkey_certify_custom that uses the agent */ +static int +agent_signer(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, + const char *alg, const char *provider, const char *pin, + u_int compat, void *ctx) +{ + int *agent_fdp = (int *)ctx; + + return ssh_agent_sign(*agent_fdp, key, sigp, lenp, + data, datalen, alg, compat); +} + +static void +do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, const char *ca_key_path, int prefer_agent, + unsigned long long cert_serial, int cert_serial_autoinc, + int argc, char **argv) +{ + int r, i, found, agent_fd = -1; + u_int n; + struct sshkey *ca, *public; + char valid[64], *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment; + char *ca_fp = NULL, **plist = NULL, *pin = NULL; + struct ssh_identitylist *agent_ids; + size_t j; + struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL; + +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + pkcs11_init(1); +#endif + tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); + if (pkcs11provider != NULL) { + /* If a PKCS#11 token was specified then try to use it */ + if ((ca = load_pkcs11_key(tmp)) == NULL) + fatal("No PKCS#11 key matching %s found", ca_key_path); + } else if (prefer_agent) { + /* + * Agent signature requested. Try to use agent after making + * sure the public key specified is actually present in the + * agent. + */ + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Cannot load CA public key %s", tmp); + if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Cannot use public key for CA signature"); + if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &agent_ids)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Retrieve agent key list"); + found = 0; + for (j = 0; j < agent_ids->nkeys; j++) { + if (sshkey_equal(ca, agent_ids->keys[j])) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + if (!found) + fatal("CA key %s not found in agent", tmp); + ssh_free_identitylist(agent_ids); + ca->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; + } else { + /* CA key is assumed to be a private key on the filesystem */ + ca = load_identity(tmp, NULL); + if (sshkey_is_sk(ca) && + (ca->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) { + if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for CA key: ", + RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) + fatal_f("couldn't read PIN"); + } + } + free(tmp); + + if (key_type_name != NULL) { + if (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) { + fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s", + sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name); + } + } else if (ca->type == KEY_RSA) { + /* Default to a good signature algorithm */ + key_type_name = "rsa-sha2-512"; + } + ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ca, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + + finalise_cert_exts(); + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { + /* Split list of principals */ + n = 0; + if (cert_principals != NULL) { + otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals); + plist = NULL; + for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) { + plist = xreallocarray(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist)); + if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0') + fatal("Empty principal name"); + } + free(otmp); + } + if (n > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) + fatal("Too many certificate principals specified"); + + tmp = tilde_expand_filename(argv[i], pw->pw_uid); + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &public, &comment)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "load pubkey \"%s\"", tmp); + if (sshkey_is_cert(public)) + fatal_f("key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified", + tmp, sshkey_type(public)); + + /* Prepare certificate to sign */ + if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(public)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Could not upgrade key %s to certificate", tmp); + public->cert->type = cert_key_type; + public->cert->serial = (u_int64_t)cert_serial; + public->cert->key_id = xstrdup(cert_key_id); + public->cert->nprincipals = n; + public->cert->principals = plist; + public->cert->valid_after = cert_valid_from; + public->cert->valid_before = cert_valid_to; + prepare_options_buf(public->cert->critical, OPTIONS_CRITICAL); + prepare_options_buf(public->cert->extensions, + OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS); + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca, + &public->cert->signature_key)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "sshkey_from_private (ca key)"); + + if (agent_fd != -1 && (ca->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) { + if ((r = sshkey_certify_custom(public, ca, + key_type_name, sk_provider, NULL, agent_signer, + &agent_fd)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Couldn't certify %s via agent", tmp); + } else { + if (sshkey_is_sk(ca) && + (ca->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) { + notifier = notify_start(0, + "Confirm user presence for key %s %s", + sshkey_type(ca), ca_fp); + } + r = sshkey_certify(public, ca, key_type_name, + sk_provider, pin); + notify_complete(notifier, "User presence confirmed"); + if (r != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Couldn't certify key %s", tmp); + } + + if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '.')) != NULL && strcmp(cp, ".pub") == 0) + *cp = '\0'; + xasprintf(&out, "%s-cert.pub", tmp); + free(tmp); + + if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, out, comment)) != 0) { + fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", + identity_file); + } + + if (!quiet) { + sshkey_format_cert_validity(public->cert, + valid, sizeof(valid)); + logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\" serial %llu%s%s " + "valid %s", sshkey_cert_type(public), + out, public->cert->key_id, + (unsigned long long)public->cert->serial, + cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "", + cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "", + valid); + } + + sshkey_free(public); + free(out); + if (cert_serial_autoinc) + cert_serial++; + } + if (pin != NULL) + freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); + free(ca_fp); +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + pkcs11_terminate(); +#endif + exit(0); +} + +static u_int64_t +parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now) +{ + int64_t mul, secs; + + mul = *s == '-' ? -1 : 1; + + if ((secs = convtime(s + 1)) == -1) + fatal("Invalid relative certificate time %s", s); + if (mul == -1 && secs > now) + fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s); + return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul); +} + +static void +parse_hex_u64(const char *s, uint64_t *up) +{ + char *ep; + unsigned long long ull; + + errno = 0; + ull = strtoull(s, &ep, 16); + if (*s == '\0' || *ep != '\0') + fatal("Invalid certificate time: not a number"); + if (errno == ERANGE && ull == ULONG_MAX) + fatal_fr(SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR, "Invalid certificate time"); + *up = (uint64_t)ull; +} + +static void +parse_cert_times(char *timespec) +{ + char *from, *to; + time_t now = time(NULL); + int64_t secs; + + /* +timespec relative to now */ + if (*timespec == '+' && strchr(timespec, ':') == NULL) { + if ((secs = convtime(timespec + 1)) == -1) + fatal("Invalid relative certificate life %s", timespec); + cert_valid_to = now + secs; + /* + * Backdate certificate one minute to avoid problems on hosts + * with poorly-synchronised clocks. + */ + cert_valid_from = ((now - 59)/ 60) * 60; + return; + } + + /* + * from:to, where + * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | 0x... | "always" + * to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | 0x... | "forever" + */ + from = xstrdup(timespec); + to = strchr(from, ':'); + if (to == NULL || from == to || *(to + 1) == '\0') + fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", timespec); + *to++ = '\0'; + + if (*from == '-' || *from == '+') + cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now); + else if (strcmp(from, "always") == 0) + cert_valid_from = 0; + else if (strncmp(from, "0x", 2) == 0) + parse_hex_u64(from, &cert_valid_from); + else if (parse_absolute_time(from, &cert_valid_from) != 0) + fatal("Invalid from time \"%s\"", from); + + if (*to == '-' || *to == '+') + cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now); + else if (strcmp(to, "forever") == 0) + cert_valid_to = ~(u_int64_t)0; + else if (strncmp(to, "0x", 2) == 0) + parse_hex_u64(to, &cert_valid_to); + else if (parse_absolute_time(to, &cert_valid_to) != 0) + fatal("Invalid to time \"%s\"", to); + + if (cert_valid_to <= cert_valid_from) + fatal("Empty certificate validity interval"); + free(from); +} + +static void +add_cert_option(char *opt) +{ + char *val, *cp; + int iscrit = 0; + + if (strcasecmp(opt, "clear") == 0) + certflags_flags = 0; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-x11-forwarding") == 0) + certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_X_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-x11-forwarding") == 0) + certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_X_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-agent-forwarding") == 0) + certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) + certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-port-forwarding") == 0) + certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PORT_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) + certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PORT_FWD; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-pty") == 0) + certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PTY; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-pty") == 0) + certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PTY; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-user-rc") == 0) + certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_USER_RC; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0) + certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_USER_RC; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "touch-required") == 0) + certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-touch-required") == 0) + certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-verify-required") == 0) + certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_REQUIRE_VERIFY; + else if (strcasecmp(opt, "verify-required") == 0) + certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_REQUIRE_VERIFY; + else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) { + val = opt + 14; + if (*val == '\0') + fatal("Empty force-command option"); + if (certflags_command != NULL) + fatal("force-command already specified"); + certflags_command = xstrdup(val); + } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "source-address=", 15) == 0) { + val = opt + 15; + if (*val == '\0') + fatal("Empty source-address option"); + if (certflags_src_addr != NULL) + fatal("source-address already specified"); + if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0) + fatal("Invalid source-address list"); + certflags_src_addr = xstrdup(val); + } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "extension:", 10) == 0 || + (iscrit = (strncasecmp(opt, "critical:", 9) == 0))) { + val = xstrdup(strchr(opt, ':') + 1); + if ((cp = strchr(val, '=')) != NULL) + *cp++ = '\0'; + cert_ext_add(val, cp, iscrit); + free(val); + } else + fatal("Unsupported certificate option \"%s\"", opt); +} + +static void +show_options(struct sshbuf *optbuf, int in_critical) +{ + char *name, *arg, *hex; + struct sshbuf *options, *option = NULL; + int r; + + if ((options = sshbuf_fromb(optbuf)) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_fromb failed"); + while (sshbuf_len(options) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(option); + option = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(options, &name, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_froms(options, &option)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse option"); + printf(" %s", name); + if (!in_critical && + (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "no-touch-required") == 0)) { + printf("\n"); + } else if (in_critical && + (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 || + strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0)) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(option, &arg, NULL)) != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "parse critical"); + printf(" %s\n", arg); + free(arg); + } else if (in_critical && + strcmp(name, "verify-required") == 0) { + printf("\n"); + } else if (sshbuf_len(option) > 0) { + hex = sshbuf_dtob16(option); + printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION: %s (len %zu)\n", + hex, sshbuf_len(option)); + sshbuf_reset(option); + free(hex); + } else + printf(" UNKNOWN FLAG OPTION\n"); + free(name); + if (sshbuf_len(option) != 0) + fatal("Option corrupt: extra data at end"); + } + sshbuf_free(option); + sshbuf_free(options); +} + +static void +print_cert(struct sshkey *key) +{ + char valid[64], *key_fp, *ca_fp; + u_int i; + + key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, + fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + if (key_fp == NULL || ca_fp == NULL) + fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint fail"); + sshkey_format_cert_validity(key->cert, valid, sizeof(valid)); + + printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", sshkey_ssh_name(key), + sshkey_cert_type(key)); + printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", sshkey_type(key), key_fp); + printf(" Signing CA: %s %s (using %s)\n", + sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, + key->cert->signature_type); + printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id); + printf(" Serial: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial); + printf(" Valid: %s\n", valid); + printf(" Principals: "); + if (key->cert->nprincipals == 0) + printf("(none)\n"); + else { + for (i = 0; i < key->cert->nprincipals; i++) + printf("\n %s", + key->cert->principals[i]); + printf("\n"); + } + printf(" Critical Options: "); + if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) == 0) + printf("(none)\n"); + else { + printf("\n"); + show_options(key->cert->critical, 1); + } + printf(" Extensions: "); + if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->extensions) == 0) + printf("(none)\n"); + else { + printf("\n"); + show_options(key->cert->extensions, 0); + } +} + +static void +do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw) +{ + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + struct stat st; + int r, is_stdin = 0, ok = 0; + FILE *f; + char *cp, *line = NULL; + const char *path; + size_t linesize = 0; + u_long lnum = 0; + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); + if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && stat(identity_file, &st) == -1) + fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); + + path = identity_file; + if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) { + f = stdin; + path = "(stdin)"; + is_stdin = 1; + } else if ((f = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) + fatal("fopen %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); + + while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) { + lnum++; + sshkey_free(key); + key = NULL; + /* Trim leading space and comments */ + cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); + if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0') + continue; + if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new"); + if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "%s:%lu: invalid key", path, lnum); + continue; + } + if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + error("%s:%lu is not a certificate", path, lnum); + continue; + } + ok = 1; + if (!is_stdin && lnum == 1) + printf("%s:\n", path); + else + printf("%s:%lu:\n", path, lnum); + print_cert(key); + } + free(line); + sshkey_free(key); + fclose(f); + exit(ok ? 0 : 1); +} + +static void +load_krl(const char *path, struct ssh_krl **krlp) +{ + struct sshbuf *krlbuf; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(path, &krlbuf)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Unable to load KRL %s", path); + /* XXX check sigs */ + if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, krlp, NULL, 0)) != 0 || + *krlp == NULL) + fatal_r(r, "Invalid KRL file %s", path); + sshbuf_free(krlbuf); +} + +static void +hash_to_blob(const char *cp, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp, + const char *file, u_long lnum) +{ + char *tmp; + size_t tlen; + struct sshbuf *b; + int r; + + if (strncmp(cp, "SHA256:", 7) != 0) + fatal("%s:%lu: unsupported hash algorithm", file, lnum); + cp += 7; + + /* + * OpenSSH base64 hashes omit trailing '=' + * characters; put them back for decode. + */ + tlen = strlen(cp); + tmp = xmalloc(tlen + 4 + 1); + strlcpy(tmp, cp, tlen + 1); + while ((tlen % 4) != 0) { + tmp[tlen++] = '='; + tmp[tlen] = '\0'; + } + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed"); + if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(b, tmp)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "%s:%lu: decode hash failed", file, lnum); + free(tmp); + *lenp = sshbuf_len(b); + *blobp = xmalloc(*lenp); + memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), *lenp); + sshbuf_free(b); +} + +static void +update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca, + const struct sshkey *ca, struct ssh_krl *krl) +{ + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + u_long lnum = 0; + char *path, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL; + u_char *blob = NULL; + size_t blen = 0, linesize = 0; + unsigned long long serial, serial2; + int i, was_explicit_key, was_sha1, was_sha256, was_hash, r; + FILE *krl_spec; + + path = tilde_expand_filename(file, pw->pw_uid); + if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) { + krl_spec = stdin; + free(path); + path = xstrdup("(standard input)"); + } else if ((krl_spec = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) + fatal("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); + + if (!quiet) + printf("Revoking from %s\n", path); + while (getline(&line, &linesize, krl_spec) != -1) { + lnum++; + was_explicit_key = was_sha1 = was_sha256 = was_hash = 0; + cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); + /* Trim trailing space, comments and strip \n */ + for (i = 0, r = -1; cp[i] != '\0'; i++) { + if (cp[i] == '#' || cp[i] == '\n') { + cp[i] = '\0'; + break; + } + if (cp[i] == ' ' || cp[i] == '\t') { + /* Remember the start of a span of whitespace */ + if (r == -1) + r = i; + } else + r = -1; + } + if (r != -1) + cp[r] = '\0'; + if (*cp == '\0') + continue; + if (strncasecmp(cp, "serial:", 7) == 0) { + if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) { + fatal("revoking certificates by serial number " + "requires specification of a CA key"); + } + cp += 7; + cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); + errno = 0; + serial = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0); + if (*cp == '\0' || (*ep != '\0' && *ep != '-')) + fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"", + path, lnum, cp); + if (errno == ERANGE && serial == ULLONG_MAX) + fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range", + path, lnum); + serial2 = serial; + if (*ep == '-') { + cp = ep + 1; + errno = 0; + serial2 = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0); + if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0') + fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"", + path, lnum, cp); + if (errno == ERANGE && serial2 == ULLONG_MAX) + fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range", + path, lnum); + if (serial2 <= serial) + fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial range " + "%llu:%llu", path, lnum, + (unsigned long long)serial, + (unsigned long long)serial2); + } + if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, + ca, serial, serial2) != 0) { + fatal_f("revoke serial failed"); + } + } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "id:", 3) == 0) { + if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) { + fatal("revoking certificates by key ID " + "requires specification of a CA key"); + } + cp += 3; + cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); + if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca, cp) != 0) + fatal_f("revoke key ID failed"); + } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "hash:", 5) == 0) { + cp += 5; + cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); + hash_to_blob(cp, &blob, &blen, file, lnum); + r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen); + if (r != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed"); + } else { + if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) { + cp += 4; + cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); + was_explicit_key = 1; + } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha1:", 5) == 0) { + cp += 5; + cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); + was_sha1 = 1; + } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha256:", 7) == 0) { + cp += 7; + cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); + was_sha256 = 1; + /* + * Just try to process the line as a key. + * Parsing will fail if it isn't. + */ + } + if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_new"); + if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "%s:%lu: invalid key", path, lnum); + if (was_explicit_key) + r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key); + else if (was_sha1) { + if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, + SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &blob, &blen) != 0) { + fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed", + file, lnum); + } + r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, blob, blen); + } else if (was_sha256) { + if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, + SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, &blob, &blen) != 0) { + fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed", + file, lnum); + } + r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen); + } else + r = ssh_krl_revoke_key(krl, key); + if (r != 0) + fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed"); + freezero(blob, blen); + blob = NULL; + blen = 0; + sshkey_free(key); + } + } + if (strcmp(path, "-") != 0) + fclose(krl_spec); + free(line); + free(path); +} + +static void +do_gen_krl(struct passwd *pw, int updating, const char *ca_key_path, + unsigned long long krl_version, const char *krl_comment, + int argc, char **argv) +{ + struct ssh_krl *krl; + struct stat sb; + struct sshkey *ca = NULL; + int i, r, wild_ca = 0; + char *tmp; + struct sshbuf *kbuf; + + if (*identity_file == '\0') + fatal("KRL generation requires an output file"); + if (stat(identity_file, &sb) == -1) { + if (errno != ENOENT) + fatal("Cannot access KRL \"%s\": %s", + identity_file, strerror(errno)); + if (updating) + fatal("KRL \"%s\" does not exist", identity_file); + } + if (ca_key_path != NULL) { + if (strcasecmp(ca_key_path, "none") == 0) + wild_ca = 1; + else { + tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Cannot load CA public key %s", tmp); + free(tmp); + } + } + + if (updating) + load_krl(identity_file, &krl); + else if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) + fatal("couldn't create KRL"); + + if (krl_version != 0) + ssh_krl_set_version(krl, krl_version); + if (krl_comment != NULL) + ssh_krl_set_comment(krl, krl_comment); + + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) + update_krl_from_file(pw, argv[i], wild_ca, ca, krl); + + if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); + if (ssh_krl_to_blob(krl, kbuf, NULL, 0) != 0) + fatal("Couldn't generate KRL"); + if ((r = sshbuf_write_file(identity_file, kbuf)) != 0) + fatal("write %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); + sshbuf_free(kbuf); + ssh_krl_free(krl); + sshkey_free(ca); +} + +static void +do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int print_krl, int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i, r, ret = 0; + char *comment; + struct ssh_krl *krl; + struct sshkey *k; + + if (*identity_file == '\0') + fatal("KRL checking requires an input file"); + load_krl(identity_file, &krl); + if (print_krl) + krl_dump(krl, stdout); + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(argv[i], &k, &comment)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Cannot load public key %s", argv[i]); + r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, k); + printf("%s%s%s%s: %s\n", argv[i], + *comment ? " (" : "", comment, *comment ? ")" : "", + r == 0 ? "ok" : "REVOKED"); + if (r != 0) + ret = 1; + sshkey_free(k); + free(comment); + } + ssh_krl_free(krl); + exit(ret); +} + +static struct sshkey * +load_sign_key(const char *keypath, const struct sshkey *pubkey) +{ + size_t i, slen, plen = strlen(keypath); + char *privpath = xstrdup(keypath); + static const char * const suffixes[] = { "-cert.pub", ".pub", NULL }; + struct sshkey *ret = NULL, *privkey = NULL; + int r, waspub = 0; + struct stat st; + + /* + * If passed a public key filename, then try to locate the corresponding + * private key. This lets us specify certificates on the command-line + * and have ssh-keygen find the appropriate private key. + */ + for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) { + slen = strlen(suffixes[i]); + if (plen <= slen || + strcmp(privpath + plen - slen, suffixes[i]) != 0) + continue; + privpath[plen - slen] = '\0'; + debug_f("%s looks like a public key, using private key " + "path %s instead", keypath, privpath); + waspub = 1; + } + if (waspub && stat(privpath, &st) != 0 && errno == ENOENT) + fatal("No private key found for public key \"%s\"", keypath); + if ((r = sshkey_load_private(privpath, "", &privkey, NULL)) != 0 && + (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) { + debug_fr(r, "load private key \"%s\"", privpath); + fatal("No private key found for \"%s\"", privpath); + } else if (privkey == NULL) + privkey = load_identity(privpath, NULL); + + if (!sshkey_equal_public(pubkey, privkey)) { + error("Public key %s doesn't match private %s", + keypath, privpath); + goto done; + } + if (sshkey_is_cert(pubkey) && !sshkey_is_cert(privkey)) { + /* + * Graft the certificate onto the private key to make + * it capable of signing. + */ + if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(privkey)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "sshkey_to_certified"); + goto done; + } + if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(pubkey, privkey)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "sshkey_cert_copy"); + goto done; + } + } + /* success */ + ret = privkey; + privkey = NULL; + done: + sshkey_free(privkey); + free(privpath); + return ret; +} + +static int +sign_one(struct sshkey *signkey, const char *filename, int fd, + const char *sig_namespace, const char *hashalg, sshsig_signer *signer, + void *signer_ctx) +{ + struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, wfd = -1, oerrno; + char *wfile = NULL, *asig = NULL, *fp = NULL; + char *pin = NULL, *prompt = NULL; + + if (!quiet) { + if (fd == STDIN_FILENO) + fprintf(stderr, "Signing data on standard input\n"); + else + fprintf(stderr, "Signing file %s\n", filename); + } + if (signer == NULL && sshkey_is_sk(signkey)) { + if ((signkey->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD)) { + xasprintf(&prompt, "Enter PIN for %s key: ", + sshkey_type(signkey)); + if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, + RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) + fatal_f("couldn't read PIN"); + } + if ((signkey->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) { + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(signkey, fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal_f("fingerprint failed"); + fprintf(stderr, "Confirm user presence for key %s %s\n", + sshkey_type(signkey), fp); + free(fp); + } + } + if ((r = sshsig_sign_fd(signkey, hashalg, sk_provider, pin, + fd, sig_namespace, &sigbuf, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "Signing %s failed", filename); + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshsig_armor(sigbuf, &abuf)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor"); + goto out; + } + if ((asig = sshbuf_dup_string(abuf)) == NULL) { + error_f("buffer error"); + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + if (fd == STDIN_FILENO) { + fputs(asig, stdout); + fflush(stdout); + } else { + xasprintf(&wfile, "%s.sig", filename); + if (confirm_overwrite(wfile)) { + if ((wfd = open(wfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, + 0666)) == -1) { + oerrno = errno; + error("Cannot open %s: %s", + wfile, strerror(errno)); + errno = oerrno; + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if (atomicio(vwrite, wfd, asig, + strlen(asig)) != strlen(asig)) { + oerrno = errno; + error("Cannot write to %s: %s", + wfile, strerror(errno)); + errno = oerrno; + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if (!quiet) { + fprintf(stderr, "Write signature to %s\n", + wfile); + } + } + } + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + free(wfile); + free(prompt); + free(asig); + if (pin != NULL) + freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); + sshbuf_free(abuf); + sshbuf_free(sigbuf); + if (wfd != -1) + close(wfd); + return r; +} + +static int +sig_process_opts(char * const *opts, size_t nopts, char **hashalgp, + uint64_t *verify_timep, int *print_pubkey) +{ + size_t i; + time_t now; + + if (verify_timep != NULL) + *verify_timep = 0; + if (print_pubkey != NULL) + *print_pubkey = 0; + if (hashalgp != NULL) + *hashalgp = NULL; + for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { + if (hashalgp != NULL && + strncasecmp(opts[i], "hashalg=", 8) == 0) { + *hashalgp = xstrdup(opts[i] + 8); + } else if (verify_timep && + strncasecmp(opts[i], "verify-time=", 12) == 0) { + if (parse_absolute_time(opts[i] + 12, + verify_timep) != 0 || *verify_timep == 0) { + error("Invalid \"verify-time\" option"); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } else if (print_pubkey && + strcasecmp(opts[i], "print-pubkey") == 0) { + *print_pubkey = 1; + } else { + error("Invalid option \"%s\"", opts[i]); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + } + if (verify_timep && *verify_timep == 0) { + if ((now = time(NULL)) < 0) { + error("Time is before epoch"); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + *verify_timep = (uint64_t)now; + } + return 0; +} + + +static int +sig_sign(const char *keypath, const char *sig_namespace, int require_agent, + int argc, char **argv, char * const *opts, size_t nopts) +{ + int i, fd = -1, r, ret = -1; + int agent_fd = -1; + struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL, *privkey = NULL, *signkey = NULL; + sshsig_signer *signer = NULL; + char *hashalg = NULL; + + /* Check file arguments. */ + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { + if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") != 0) + continue; + if (i > 0 || argc > 1) + fatal("Cannot sign mix of paths and standard input"); + } + + if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, &hashalg, NULL, NULL) != 0) + goto done; /* error already logged */ + + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(keypath, &pubkey, NULL)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "Couldn't load public key %s", keypath); + goto done; + } + + if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) { + if (require_agent) + fatal("Couldn't get agent socket"); + debug_r(r, "Couldn't get agent socket"); + } else { + if ((r = ssh_agent_has_key(agent_fd, pubkey)) == 0) + signer = agent_signer; + else { + if (require_agent) + fatal("Couldn't find key in agent"); + debug_r(r, "Couldn't find key in agent"); + } + } + + if (signer == NULL) { + /* Not using agent - try to load private key */ + if ((privkey = load_sign_key(keypath, pubkey)) == NULL) + goto done; + signkey = privkey; + } else { + /* Will use key in agent */ + signkey = pubkey; + } + + if (argc == 0) { + if ((r = sign_one(signkey, "(stdin)", STDIN_FILENO, + sig_namespace, hashalg, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0) + goto done; + } else { + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { + if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") == 0) + fd = STDIN_FILENO; + else if ((fd = open(argv[i], O_RDONLY)) == -1) { + error("Cannot open %s for signing: %s", + argv[i], strerror(errno)); + goto done; + } + if ((r = sign_one(signkey, argv[i], fd, sig_namespace, + hashalg, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0) + goto done; + if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) + close(fd); + fd = -1; + } + } + + ret = 0; +done: + if (fd != -1 && fd != STDIN_FILENO) + close(fd); + sshkey_free(pubkey); + sshkey_free(privkey); + free(hashalg); + return ret; +} + +static int +sig_verify(const char *signature, const char *sig_namespace, + const char *principal, const char *allowed_keys, const char *revoked_keys, + char * const *opts, size_t nopts) +{ + int r, ret = -1; + int print_pubkey = 0; + struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL; + struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL; + char *fp = NULL; + struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL; + uint64_t verify_time = 0; + + if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, NULL, &verify_time, + &print_pubkey) != 0) + goto done; /* error already logged */ + + memset(&sig_details, 0, sizeof(sig_details)); + if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "Couldn't read signature file"); + goto done; + } + + if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor"); + goto done; + } + if ((r = sshsig_verify_fd(sigbuf, STDIN_FILENO, sig_namespace, + &sign_key, &sig_details)) != 0) + goto done; /* sshsig_verify() prints error */ + + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); + debug("Valid (unverified) signature from key %s", fp); + if (sig_details != NULL) { + debug2_f("signature details: counter = %u, flags = 0x%02x", + sig_details->sk_counter, sig_details->sk_flags); + } + free(fp); + fp = NULL; + + if (revoked_keys != NULL) { + if ((r = sshkey_check_revoked(sign_key, revoked_keys)) != 0) { + debug3_fr(r, "sshkey_check_revoked"); + goto done; + } + } + + if (allowed_keys != NULL && (r = sshsig_check_allowed_keys(allowed_keys, + sign_key, principal, sig_namespace, verify_time)) != 0) { + debug3_fr(r, "sshsig_check_allowed_keys"); + goto done; + } + /* success */ + ret = 0; +done: + if (!quiet) { + if (ret == 0) { + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); + if (principal == NULL) { + printf("Good \"%s\" signature with %s key %s\n", + sig_namespace, sshkey_type(sign_key), fp); + + } else { + printf("Good \"%s\" signature for %s with %s key %s\n", + sig_namespace, principal, + sshkey_type(sign_key), fp); + } + } else { + printf("Could not verify signature.\n"); + } + } + /* Print the signature key if requested */ + if (ret == 0 && print_pubkey && sign_key != NULL) { + if ((r = sshkey_write(sign_key, stdout)) == 0) + fputc('\n', stdout); + else { + error_r(r, "Could not print public key.\n"); + ret = -1; + } + } + sshbuf_free(sigbuf); + sshbuf_free(abuf); + sshkey_free(sign_key); + sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details); + free(fp); + return ret; +} + +static int +sig_find_principals(const char *signature, const char *allowed_keys, + char * const *opts, size_t nopts) +{ + int r, ret = -1; + struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL; + struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL; + char *principals = NULL, *cp, *tmp; + uint64_t verify_time = 0; + + if (sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, NULL, &verify_time, NULL) != 0) + goto done; /* error already logged */ + + if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "Couldn't read signature file"); + goto done; + } + if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "sshsig_armor"); + goto done; + } + if ((r = sshsig_get_pubkey(sigbuf, &sign_key)) != 0) { + error_fr(r, "sshsig_get_pubkey"); + goto done; + } + if ((r = sshsig_find_principals(allowed_keys, sign_key, + verify_time, &principals)) != 0) { + if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND) + error_fr(r, "sshsig_find_principal"); + goto done; + } + ret = 0; +done: + if (ret == 0 ) { + /* Emit matching principals one per line */ + tmp = principals; + while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') + puts(cp); + } else { + fprintf(stderr, "No principal matched.\n"); + } + sshbuf_free(sigbuf); + sshbuf_free(abuf); + sshkey_free(sign_key); + free(principals); + return ret; +} + +static int +sig_match_principals(const char *allowed_keys, char *principal, + char * const *opts, size_t nopts) +{ + int r; + char **principals = NULL; + size_t i, nprincipals = 0; + + if ((r = sig_process_opts(opts, nopts, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != 0) + return r; /* error already logged */ + + if ((r = sshsig_match_principals(allowed_keys, principal, + &principals, &nprincipals)) != 0) { + debug_f("match: %s", ssh_err(r)); + fprintf(stderr, "No principal matched.\n"); + return r; + } + for (i = 0; i < nprincipals; i++) { + printf("%s\n", principals[i]); + free(principals[i]); + } + free(principals); + + return 0; +} + +static void +do_moduli_gen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts) +{ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + /* Moduli generation/screening */ + u_int32_t memory = 0; + BIGNUM *start = NULL; + int moduli_bits = 0; + FILE *out; + size_t i; + const char *errstr; + + /* Parse options */ + for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { + if (strncmp(opts[i], "memory=", 7) == 0) { + memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(opts[i]+7, 1, + UINT_MAX, &errstr); + if (errstr) { + fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s", + errstr, opts[i]+7); + } + } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start=", 6) == 0) { + /* XXX - also compare length against bits */ + if (BN_hex2bn(&start, opts[i]+6) == 0) + fatal("Invalid start point."); + } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "bits=", 5) == 0) { + moduli_bits = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+5, 1, + INT_MAX, &errstr); + if (errstr) { + fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)", + opts[i]+12, errstr); + } + } else { + fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli " + "generation", opts[i]); + } + } + + if ((out = fopen(out_file, "w")) == NULL) { + fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s", + out_file, strerror(errno)); + } + setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); + + if (moduli_bits == 0) + moduli_bits = DEFAULT_BITS; + if (gen_candidates(out, memory, moduli_bits, start) != 0) + fatal("modulus candidate generation failed"); +#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + fatal("Moduli generation is not supported"); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ +} + +static void +do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts) +{ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + /* Moduli generation/screening */ + char *checkpoint = NULL; + u_int32_t generator_wanted = 0; + unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0; + int prime_tests = 0; + FILE *out, *in = stdin; + size_t i; + const char *errstr; + + /* Parse options */ + for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { + if (strncmp(opts[i], "lines=", 6) == 0) { + lines_to_process = strtoul(opts[i]+6, NULL, 10); + } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) { + start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10); + } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) { + checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11); + } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) { + generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum( + opts[i]+10, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr); + if (errstr != NULL) { + fatal("Generator invalid: %s (%s)", + opts[i]+10, errstr); + } + } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "prime-tests=", 12) == 0) { + prime_tests = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+12, 1, + INT_MAX, &errstr); + if (errstr) { + fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)", + opts[i]+12, errstr); + } + } else { + fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli " + "screening", opts[i]); + } + } + + if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) { + if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) { + fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate " + "file \"%s\": %s", identity_file, + strerror(errno)); + } + } + + if ((out = fopen(out_file, "a")) == NULL) { + fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s", + out_file, strerror(errno)); + } + setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); + if (prime_test(in, out, prime_tests == 0 ? 100 : prime_tests, + generator_wanted, checkpoint, + start_lineno, lines_to_process) != 0) + fatal("modulus screening failed"); +#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + fatal("Moduli screening is not supported"); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ +} + +/* Read and confirm a passphrase */ +static char * +read_check_passphrase(const char *prompt1, const char *prompt2, + const char *retry_prompt) +{ + char *passphrase1, *passphrase2; + + for (;;) { + passphrase1 = read_passphrase(prompt1, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + passphrase2 = read_passphrase(prompt2, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) == 0) { + freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); + return passphrase1; + } + /* The passphrases do not match. Clear them and retry. */ + freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); + freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); + fputs(retry_prompt, stdout); + fputc('\n', stdout); + fflush(stdout); + } + /* NOTREACHED */ + return NULL; +} + +static char * +private_key_passphrase(void) +{ + if (identity_passphrase) + return xstrdup(identity_passphrase); + if (identity_new_passphrase) + return xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); + + return read_check_passphrase( + "Enter passphrase (empty for no passphrase): ", + "Enter same passphrase again: ", + "Passphrases do not match. Try again."); +} + +static char * +sk_suffix(const char *application, const uint8_t *user, size_t userlen) +{ + char *ret, *cp; + size_t slen, i; + + /* Trim off URL-like preamble */ + if (strncmp(application, "ssh://", 6) == 0) + ret = xstrdup(application + 6); + else if (strncmp(application, "ssh:", 4) == 0) + ret = xstrdup(application + 4); + else + ret = xstrdup(application); + + /* Count trailing zeros in user */ + for (i = 0; i < userlen; i++) { + if (user[userlen - i - 1] != 0) + break; + } + if (i >= userlen) + return ret; /* user-id was default all-zeros */ + + /* Append user-id, escaping non-UTF-8 characters */ + slen = userlen - i; + if (asmprintf(&cp, INT_MAX, NULL, "%.*s", (int)slen, user) == -1) + fatal_f("asmprintf failed"); + /* Don't emit a user-id that contains path or control characters */ + if (strchr(cp, '/') != NULL || strstr(cp, "..") != NULL || + strchr(cp, '\\') != NULL) { + free(cp); + cp = tohex(user, slen); + } + xextendf(&ret, "_", "%s", cp); + free(cp); + return ret; +} + +static int +do_download_sk(const char *skprovider, const char *device) +{ + struct sshsk_resident_key **srks; + size_t nsrks, i; + int r, ret = -1; + char *fp, *pin = NULL, *pass = NULL, *path, *pubpath; + const char *ext; + struct sshkey *key; + + if (skprovider == NULL) + fatal("Cannot download keys without provider"); + + pin = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + if (!quiet) { + printf("You may need to touch your authenticator " + "to authorize key download.\n"); + } + if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(skprovider, device, pin, 0, + &srks, &nsrks)) != 0) { + if (pin != NULL) + freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); + error_r(r, "Unable to load resident keys"); + return -1; + } + if (nsrks == 0) + logit("No keys to download"); + if (pin != NULL) + freezero(pin, strlen(pin)); + + for (i = 0; i < nsrks; i++) { + key = srks[i]->key; + if (key->type != KEY_ECDSA_SK && key->type != KEY_ED25519_SK) { + error("Unsupported key type %s (%d)", + sshkey_type(key), key->type); + continue; + } + if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) + fatal_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); + debug_f("key %zu: %s %s %s (flags 0x%02x)", i, + sshkey_type(key), fp, key->sk_application, key->sk_flags); + ext = sk_suffix(key->sk_application, + srks[i]->user_id, srks[i]->user_id_len); + xasprintf(&path, "id_%s_rk%s%s", + key->type == KEY_ECDSA_SK ? "ecdsa_sk" : "ed25519_sk", + *ext == '\0' ? "" : "_", ext); + + /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */ + if (!confirm_overwrite(path)) { + free(path); + break; + } + + /* Save the key with the application string as the comment */ + if (pass == NULL) + pass = private_key_passphrase(); + if ((r = sshkey_save_private(key, path, pass, + key->sk_application, private_key_format, + openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", path); + free(path); + break; + } + if (!quiet) { + printf("Saved %s key%s%s to %s\n", sshkey_type(key), + *ext != '\0' ? " " : "", + *ext != '\0' ? key->sk_application : "", + path); + } + + /* Save public key too */ + xasprintf(&pubpath, "%s.pub", path); + free(path); + if ((r = sshkey_save_public(key, pubpath, + key->sk_application)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "Saving public key \"%s\" failed", pubpath); + free(pubpath); + break; + } + free(pubpath); + } + + if (i >= nsrks) + ret = 0; /* success */ + if (pass != NULL) + freezero(pass, strlen(pass)); + sshsk_free_resident_keys(srks, nsrks); + return ret; +} + +static void +save_attestation(struct sshbuf *attest, const char *path) +{ + mode_t omask; + int r; + + if (path == NULL) + return; /* nothing to do */ + if (attest == NULL || sshbuf_len(attest) == 0) + fatal("Enrollment did not return attestation data"); + omask = umask(077); + r = sshbuf_write_file(path, attest); + umask(omask); + if (r != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Unable to write attestation data \"%s\"", path); + if (!quiet) + printf("Your FIDO attestation certificate has been saved in " + "%s\n", path); +} + +static int +confirm_sk_overwrite(const char *application, const char *user) +{ + char yesno[3]; + + printf("A resident key scoped to '%s' with user id '%s' already " + "exists.\n", application == NULL ? "ssh:" : application, + user == NULL ? "null" : user); + printf("Overwrite key in token (y/n)? "); + fflush(stdout); + if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL) + return 0; + if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y') + return 0; + return 1; +} + +static void +usage(void) +{ + fprintf(stderr, + "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-a rounds] [-b bits] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]\n" + " [-m format] [-N new_passphrase] [-O option]\n" + " [-t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa]\n" + " [-w provider] [-Z cipher]\n" + " ssh-keygen -p [-a rounds] [-f keyfile] [-m format] [-N new_passphrase]\n" + " [-P old_passphrase] [-Z cipher]\n" +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + " ssh-keygen -i [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n" + " ssh-keygen -e [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n" +#endif + " ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -c [-a rounds] [-C comment] [-f keyfile] [-P passphrase]\n" + " ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n"); +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 + fprintf(stderr, + " ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n"); +#endif + fprintf(stderr, + " ssh-keygen -F hostname [-lv] [-f known_hosts_file]\n" + " ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]\n" + " ssh-keygen -K [-a rounds] [-w provider]\n" + " ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]\n" + " ssh-keygen -r hostname [-g] [-f input_keyfile]\n" +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + " ssh-keygen -M generate [-O option] output_file\n" + " ssh-keygen -M screen [-f input_file] [-O option] output_file\n" +#endif + " ssh-keygen -I certificate_identity -s ca_key [-hU] [-D pkcs11_provider]\n" + " [-n principals] [-O option] [-V validity_interval]\n" + " [-z serial_number] file ...\n" + " ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -A [-a rounds] [-f prefix_path]\n" + " ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]\n" + " file ...\n" + " ssh-keygen -Q [-l] -f krl_file [file ...]\n" + " ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -s signature_file -f allowed_signers_file\n" + " ssh-keygen -Y match-principals -I signer_identity -f allowed_signers_file\n" + " ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate -n namespace -s signature_file\n" + " ssh-keygen -Y sign -f key_file -n namespace file [-O option] ...\n" + " ssh-keygen -Y verify -f allowed_signers_file -I signer_identity\n" + " -n namespace -s signature_file [-r krl_file] [-O option]\n"); + exit(1); +} + +/* + * Main program for key management. + */ +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + char comment[1024], *passphrase = NULL; + char *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra; + struct sshkey *private, *public; + struct passwd *pw; + int r, opt, type; + int change_passphrase = 0, change_comment = 0, show_cert = 0; + int find_host = 0, delete_host = 0, hash_hosts = 0; + int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0; + int prefer_agent = 0, convert_to = 0, convert_from = 0; + int print_public = 0, print_generic = 0, cert_serial_autoinc = 0; + int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0, download_sk = 0; + unsigned long long cert_serial = 0; + char *identity_comment = NULL, *ca_key_path = NULL, **opts = NULL; + char *sk_application = NULL, *sk_device = NULL, *sk_user = NULL; + char *sk_attestation_path = NULL; + struct sshbuf *challenge = NULL, *attest = NULL; + size_t i, nopts = 0; + u_int32_t bits = 0; + uint8_t sk_flags = SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; + const char *errstr; + int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; + char *sign_op = NULL; + + extern int optind; + extern char *optarg; + + /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ + sanitise_stdfd(); + + __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); + + seed_rng(); + + log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); + + msetlocale(); + + /* we need this for the home * directory. */ + pw = getpwuid(getuid()); + if (!pw) + fatal("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid()); + pw = pwcopy(pw); + if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == -1) + fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); + + sk_provider = getenv("SSH_SK_PROVIDER"); + + /* Remaining characters: dGjJSTWx */ + while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHKLQUXceghiklopquvy" + "C:D:E:F:I:M:N:O:P:R:V:Y:Z:" + "a:b:f:g:m:n:r:s:t:w:z:")) != -1) { + switch (opt) { + case 'A': + gen_all_hostkeys = 1; + break; + case 'b': + bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT32_MAX, + &errstr); + if (errstr) + fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)", + optarg, errstr); + break; + case 'E': + fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); + if (fingerprint_hash == -1) + fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg); + break; + case 'F': + find_host = 1; + rr_hostname = optarg; + break; + case 'H': + hash_hosts = 1; + break; + case 'I': + cert_key_id = optarg; + break; + case 'R': + delete_host = 1; + rr_hostname = optarg; + break; + case 'L': + show_cert = 1; + break; + case 'l': + print_fingerprint = 1; + break; + case 'B': + print_bubblebabble = 1; + break; + case 'm': + if (strcasecmp(optarg, "RFC4716") == 0 || + strcasecmp(optarg, "ssh2") == 0) { + convert_format = FMT_RFC4716; + break; + } + if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) { + convert_format = FMT_PKCS8; + private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8; + break; + } + if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) { + convert_format = FMT_PEM; + private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM; + break; + } + fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg); + case 'n': + cert_principals = optarg; + break; + case 'o': + /* no-op; new format is already the default */ + break; + case 'p': + change_passphrase = 1; + break; + case 'c': + change_comment = 1; + break; + case 'f': + if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, + sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file)) + fatal("Identity filename too long"); + have_identity = 1; + break; + case 'g': + print_generic = 1; + break; + case 'K': + download_sk = 1; + break; + case 'P': + identity_passphrase = optarg; + break; + case 'N': + identity_new_passphrase = optarg; + break; + case 'Q': + check_krl = 1; + break; + case 'O': + opts = xrecallocarray(opts, nopts, nopts + 1, + sizeof(*opts)); + opts[nopts++] = xstrdup(optarg); + break; + case 'Z': + openssh_format_cipher = optarg; + if (cipher_by_name(openssh_format_cipher) == NULL) + fatal("Invalid OpenSSH-format cipher '%s'", + openssh_format_cipher); + break; + case 'C': + identity_comment = optarg; + break; + case 'q': + quiet = 1; + break; + case 'e': + /* export key */ + convert_to = 1; + break; + case 'h': + cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST; + certflags_flags = 0; + break; + case 'k': + gen_krl = 1; + break; + case 'i': + case 'X': + /* import key */ + convert_from = 1; + break; + case 'y': + print_public = 1; + break; + case 's': + ca_key_path = optarg; + break; + case 't': + key_type_name = optarg; + break; + case 'D': + pkcs11provider = optarg; + break; + case 'U': + prefer_agent = 1; + break; + case 'u': + update_krl = 1; + break; + case 'v': + if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) + log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; + else { + if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 && + log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) + log_level++; + } + break; + case 'r': + rr_hostname = optarg; + break; + case 'a': + rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr); + if (errstr) + fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)", + optarg, errstr); + break; + case 'V': + parse_cert_times(optarg); + break; + case 'Y': + sign_op = optarg; + break; + case 'w': + sk_provider = optarg; + break; + case 'z': + errno = 0; + if (*optarg == '+') { + cert_serial_autoinc = 1; + optarg++; + } + cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10); + if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' || + (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX)) + fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg); + break; + case 'M': + if (strcmp(optarg, "generate") == 0) + do_gen_candidates = 1; + else if (strcmp(optarg, "screen") == 0) + do_screen_candidates = 1; + else + fatal("Unsupported moduli option %s", optarg); + break; + default: + usage(); + } + } + +#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL + if (sk_provider == NULL) + sk_provider = "internal"; +#endif + + /* reinit */ + log_init(argv[0], log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); + + argv += optind; + argc -= optind; + + if (sign_op != NULL) { + if (strncmp(sign_op, "find-principals", 15) == 0) { + if (ca_key_path == NULL) { + error("Too few arguments for find-principals:" + "missing signature file"); + exit(1); + } + if (!have_identity) { + error("Too few arguments for find-principals:" + "missing allowed keys file"); + exit(1); + } + return sig_find_principals(ca_key_path, identity_file, + opts, nopts); + } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "match-principals", 16) == 0) { + if (!have_identity) { + error("Too few arguments for match-principals:" + "missing allowed keys file"); + exit(1); + } + if (cert_key_id == NULL) { + error("Too few arguments for match-principals: " + "missing principal ID"); + exit(1); + } + return sig_match_principals(identity_file, cert_key_id, + opts, nopts); + } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "sign", 4) == 0) { + /* NB. cert_principals is actually namespace, via -n */ + if (cert_principals == NULL || + *cert_principals == '\0') { + error("Too few arguments for sign: " + "missing namespace"); + exit(1); + } + if (!have_identity) { + error("Too few arguments for sign: " + "missing key"); + exit(1); + } + return sig_sign(identity_file, cert_principals, + prefer_agent, argc, argv, opts, nopts); + } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "check-novalidate", 16) == 0) { + /* NB. cert_principals is actually namespace, via -n */ + if (cert_principals == NULL || + *cert_principals == '\0') { + error("Too few arguments for check-novalidate: " + "missing namespace"); + exit(1); + } + if (ca_key_path == NULL) { + error("Too few arguments for check-novalidate: " + "missing signature file"); + exit(1); + } + return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals, + NULL, NULL, NULL, opts, nopts); + } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "verify", 6) == 0) { + /* NB. cert_principals is actually namespace, via -n */ + if (cert_principals == NULL || + *cert_principals == '\0') { + error("Too few arguments for verify: " + "missing namespace"); + exit(1); + } + if (ca_key_path == NULL) { + error("Too few arguments for verify: " + "missing signature file"); + exit(1); + } + if (!have_identity) { + error("Too few arguments for sign: " + "missing allowed keys file"); + exit(1); + } + if (cert_key_id == NULL) { + error("Too few arguments for verify: " + "missing principal identity"); + exit(1); + } + return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals, + cert_key_id, identity_file, rr_hostname, + opts, nopts); + } + error("Unsupported operation for -Y: \"%s\"", sign_op); + usage(); + /* NOTREACHED */ + } + + if (ca_key_path != NULL) { + if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) { + error("Too few arguments."); + usage(); + } + } else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl && + !do_gen_candidates && !do_screen_candidates) { + error("Too many arguments."); + usage(); + } + if (change_passphrase && change_comment) { + error("Can only have one of -p and -c."); + usage(); + } + if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) { + error("Cannot use -l with -H or -R."); + usage(); + } + if (gen_krl) { + do_gen_krl(pw, update_krl, ca_key_path, + cert_serial, identity_comment, argc, argv); + return (0); + } + if (check_krl) { + do_check_krl(pw, print_fingerprint, argc, argv); + return (0); + } + if (ca_key_path != NULL) { + if (cert_key_id == NULL) + fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying"); + for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) + add_cert_option(opts[i]); + do_ca_sign(pw, ca_key_path, prefer_agent, + cert_serial, cert_serial_autoinc, argc, argv); + } + if (show_cert) + do_show_cert(pw); + if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host) { + do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname, find_host, + delete_host, hash_hosts); + } + if (pkcs11provider != NULL) + do_download(pw); + if (download_sk) { + for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { + if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) { + sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7); + } else { + fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for " + "FIDO authenticator download", opts[i]); + } + } + return do_download_sk(sk_provider, sk_device); + } + if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble) + do_fingerprint(pw); + if (change_passphrase) + do_change_passphrase(pw); + if (change_comment) + do_change_comment(pw, identity_comment); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + if (convert_to) + do_convert_to(pw); + if (convert_from) + do_convert_from(pw); +#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + if (convert_to || convert_from) + fatal("key conversion disabled at compile time"); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + if (print_public) + do_print_public(pw); + if (rr_hostname != NULL) { + unsigned int n = 0; + + if (have_identity) { + n = do_print_resource_record(pw, identity_file, + rr_hostname, print_generic); + if (n == 0) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); + exit(0); + } else { + + n += do_print_resource_record(pw, + _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, + print_generic); + n += do_print_resource_record(pw, + _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, + print_generic); + n += do_print_resource_record(pw, + _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, + print_generic); + n += do_print_resource_record(pw, + _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, + print_generic); + n += do_print_resource_record(pw, + _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname, + print_generic); + if (n == 0) + fatal("no keys found."); + exit(0); + } + } + + if (do_gen_candidates || do_screen_candidates) { + if (argc <= 0) + fatal("No output file specified"); + else if (argc > 1) + fatal("Too many output files specified"); + } + if (do_gen_candidates) { + do_moduli_gen(argv[0], opts, nopts); + return 0; + } + if (do_screen_candidates) { + do_moduli_screen(argv[0], opts, nopts); + return 0; + } + + if (gen_all_hostkeys) { + do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw); + return (0); + } + + if (key_type_name == NULL) + key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME; + + type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name); + type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits); + + if (!quiet) + printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n", + key_type_name); + switch (type) { + case KEY_ECDSA_SK: + case KEY_ED25519_SK: + for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) { + if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "no-touch-required") == 0) { + sk_flags &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; + } else if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "verify-required") == 0) { + sk_flags |= SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD; + } else if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "resident") == 0) { + sk_flags |= SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY; + } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) { + sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7); + } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "user=", 5) == 0) { + sk_user = xstrdup(opts[i] + 5); + } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "challenge=", 10) == 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(opts[i] + 10, + &challenge)) != 0) { + fatal_r(r, "Unable to load FIDO " + "enrollment challenge \"%s\"", + opts[i] + 10); + } + } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], + "write-attestation=", 18) == 0) { + sk_attestation_path = opts[i] + 18; + } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], + "application=", 12) == 0) { + sk_application = xstrdup(opts[i] + 12); + if (strncmp(sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0) { + fatal("FIDO application string must " + "begin with \"ssh:\""); + } + } else { + fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for " + "FIDO authenticator enrollment", opts[i]); + } + } + if ((attest = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); + r = 0; + for (i = 0 ;;) { + if (!quiet) { + printf("You may need to touch your " + "authenticator%s to authorize key " + "generation.\n", + r == 0 ? "" : " again"); + } + fflush(stdout); + r = sshsk_enroll(type, sk_provider, sk_device, + sk_application == NULL ? "ssh:" : sk_application, + sk_user, sk_flags, passphrase, challenge, + &private, attest); + if (r == 0) + break; + if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS && + (sk_flags & SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY) != 0 && + (sk_flags & SSH_SK_FORCE_OPERATION) == 0 && + confirm_sk_overwrite(sk_application, sk_user)) { + sk_flags |= SSH_SK_FORCE_OPERATION; + continue; + } + if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) + fatal_r(r, "Key enrollment failed"); + else if (passphrase != NULL) { + error("PIN incorrect"); + freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + passphrase = NULL; + } + if (++i >= 3) + fatal("Too many incorrect PINs"); + passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for " + "authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); + } + if (passphrase != NULL) { + freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + passphrase = NULL; + } + break; + default: + if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) + fatal("sshkey_generate failed"); + break; + } + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "sshkey_from_private"); + + if (!have_identity) + ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key"); + + /* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't already exist. */ + hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(identity_file, !quiet); + + /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */ + if (!confirm_overwrite(identity_file)) + exit(1); + + /* Determine the passphrase for the private key */ + passphrase = private_key_passphrase(); + if (identity_comment) { + strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment)); + } else { + /* Create default comment field for the passphrase. */ + snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname); + } + + /* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */ + if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, + comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { + error_r(r, "Saving key \"%s\" failed", identity_file); + freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + exit(1); + } + freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); + sshkey_free(private); + + if (!quiet) { + printf("Your identification has been saved in %s\n", + identity_file); + } + + strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); + if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, identity_file, comment)) != 0) + fatal_r(r, "Unable to save public key to %s", identity_file); + + if (!quiet) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT); + ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_RANDOMART); + if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) + fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); + printf("Your public key has been saved in %s\n", + identity_file); + printf("The key fingerprint is:\n"); + printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment); + printf("The key's randomart image is:\n"); + printf("%s\n", ra); + free(ra); + free(fp); + } + + if (sk_attestation_path != NULL) + save_attestation(attest, sk_attestation_path); + + sshbuf_free(attest); + sshkey_free(public); + + exit(0); +} |