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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 14:22:51 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 14:22:51 +0000
commit9ada0093e92388590c7368600ca4e9e3e376f0d0 (patch)
treea56fe41110023676d7082028cbaa47ca4b6e6164 /modules/pam_unix
parentInitial commit. (diff)
downloadpam-9ada0093e92388590c7368600ca4e9e3e376f0d0.tar.xz
pam-9ada0093e92388590c7368600ca4e9e3e376f0d0.zip
Adding upstream version 1.5.2.upstream/1.5.2upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'modules/pam_unix')
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/CHANGELOG54
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am63
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/Makefile.in1537
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/README206
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/README.xml41
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.c163
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.h1
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt_main.c18
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/lckpwdf.-c142
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/md5.c258
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/md5.h39
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/md5_broken.c4
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/md5_crypt.c157
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/md5_good.c5
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8285
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml501
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c291
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c215
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c875
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c134
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/passverify.c1211
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/passverify.h115
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/support.c893
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/support.h182
-rwxr-xr-xmodules/pam_unix/tst-pam_unix2
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.853
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8.xml67
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c246
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/unix_update.852
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8.xml67
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c192
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/yppasswd.h51
-rw-r--r--modules/pam_unix/yppasswd_xdr.c40
33 files changed, 8160 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/CHANGELOG b/modules/pam_unix/CHANGELOG
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f8f70f5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/CHANGELOG
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+$Id$
+
+* Mon Aug 16 1999 Jan Rękorajski <baggins@pld.org.pl>
+- fixed reentrancy problems
+
+* Sun Jul 4 21:03:42 PDT 1999
+
+- temporarily removed the crypt16 stuff. I'm really paranoid about
+ crypto stuff and exporting it, and there are a few too many 's-box'
+ references in the code for my liking..
+
+* Wed Jun 30 1999 Steve Langasek <vorlon@netexpress.net>
+- further NIS+ fixes
+
+* Sun Jun 27 1999 Steve Langasek <vorlon@netexpress.net>
+- fix to uid-handling code for NIS+
+
+* Sat Jun 26 1999 Jan Rękorajski <baggins@mimuw.edu.pl>
+- merged MD5 fix and early failure syslog
+ by Andrey Vladimirovich Savochkin <saw@msu.ru>
+- minor fixes
+- added signal handler to unix_chkpwd
+
+* Fri Jun 25 1999 Stephen Langasek <vorlon@netexpress.net>
+- reorganized the code to let it build as separate C files
+
+* Sun Jun 20 1999 Jan Rękorajski <baggins@mimuw.edu.pl>
+- fixes in pam_unix_auth, it incorrectly saved and restored return
+ value when likeauth option was used
+
+* Tue Jun 15 1999 Jan Rękorajski <baggins@mimuw.edu.pl>
+- added NIS+ support
+
+* Mon Jun 14 1999 Jan Rękorajski <baggins@mimuw.edu.pl>
+- total rewrite based on pam_pwdb module, now there is ONE pam_unix.so
+ module, it accepts the same options as pam_pwdb - all of them correctly ;)
+ (pam_pwdb dosn't understand what DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK means)
+
+* Tue Apr 20 1999 Jan Rękorajski <baggins@mimuw.edu.pl>
+- Arghhh, pam_unix_passwd was not updating /etc/shadow when used with
+ pam_cracklib.
+
+* Mon Apr 19 1999 Jan Rękorajski <baggins@mimuw.edu.pl>
+- added "remember=XXX" option that means 'remember XXX old passwords'
+ Old passwords are stored in /etc/security/opasswd, there can be
+ maximum of 400 passwords per user.
+
+* Sat Mar 27 1999 Jan Rękorajski <baggins@mimuw.edu.pl>
+- added crypt16 to pam_unix_auth and pam_unix_passwd (check only, this algorithm
+ is too lame to use it in real life)
+
+* Sun Mar 21 1999 Jan Rękorajski <baggins@mimuw.edu.pl>
+- pam_unix_auth now correctly behave when user has NULL AUTHTOK
+- pam_unix_auth returns PAM_PERM_DENIED when seteuid fails
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1658735
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2005, 2006, 2009, 2011 Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@suse.de>
+#
+
+CLEANFILES = *~
+MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = $(MANS) README
+
+EXTRA_DIST = md5.c md5_crypt.c lckpwdf.-c $(XMLS) CHANGELOG
+
+if HAVE_DOC
+dist_man_MANS = pam_unix.8 unix_chkpwd.8 unix_update.8
+endif
+XMLS = README.xml pam_unix.8.xml unix_chkpwd.8.xml unix_update.8.xml
+dist_check_SCRIPTS = tst-pam_unix
+TESTS = $(dist_check_SCRIPTS)
+
+securelibdir = $(SECUREDIR)
+secureconfdir = $(SCONFIGDIR)
+
+AM_CFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/libpam/include -I$(top_srcdir)/libpamc/include \
+ -DCHKPWD_HELPER=\"$(sbindir)/unix_chkpwd\" \
+ -DUPDATE_HELPER=\"$(sbindir)/unix_update\" \
+ @TIRPC_CFLAGS@ @NSL_CFLAGS@ $(WARN_CFLAGS)
+
+pam_unix_la_LDFLAGS = -no-undefined -avoid-version -module
+if HAVE_VERSIONING
+ pam_unix_la_LDFLAGS += -Wl,--version-script=$(srcdir)/../modules.map
+endif
+pam_unix_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la \
+ @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ @TIRPC_LIBS@ @NSL_LIBS@
+
+securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_unix.la
+
+noinst_HEADERS = md5.h support.h yppasswd.h bigcrypt.h passverify.h
+
+sbin_PROGRAMS = unix_chkpwd unix_update
+
+noinst_PROGRAMS = bigcrypt
+
+pam_unix_la_SOURCES = bigcrypt.c pam_unix_acct.c \
+ pam_unix_auth.c pam_unix_passwd.c pam_unix_sess.c support.c \
+ passverify.c yppasswd_xdr.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c
+
+bigcrypt_SOURCES = bigcrypt.c bigcrypt_main.c
+bigcrypt_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS)
+bigcrypt_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@
+
+unix_chkpwd_SOURCES = unix_chkpwd.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c bigcrypt.c \
+ passverify.c
+unix_chkpwd_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @EXE_CFLAGS@ -DHELPER_COMPILE=\"unix_chkpwd\"
+unix_chkpwd_LDFLAGS = @EXE_LDFLAGS@
+unix_chkpwd_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ @LIBAUDIT@
+
+unix_update_SOURCES = unix_update.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c bigcrypt.c \
+ passverify.c
+unix_update_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @EXE_CFLAGS@ -DHELPER_COMPILE=\"unix_update\"
+unix_update_LDFLAGS = @EXE_LDFLAGS@
+unix_update_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@
+
+if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN
+dist_noinst_DATA = README
+-include $(top_srcdir)/Make.xml.rules
+endif
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.in b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4dcfdf6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.in
@@ -0,0 +1,1537 @@
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+# Copyright (C) 1994-2020 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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+ $(top_srcdir)/build-aux/test-driver
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+ACLOCAL = @ACLOCAL@
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+AR = @AR@
+AUTOCONF = @AUTOCONF@
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+CFLAGS = @CFLAGS@
+CPP = @CPP@
+CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@
+CRYPTO_LIBS = @CRYPTO_LIBS@
+CRYPT_CFLAGS = @CRYPT_CFLAGS@
+CRYPT_LIBS = @CRYPT_LIBS@
+CYGPATH_W = @CYGPATH_W@
+DEFS = @DEFS@
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+INSTALL_DATA = @INSTALL_DATA@
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+INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM@
+INTLLIBS = @INTLLIBS@
+INTL_MACOSX_LIBS = @INTL_MACOSX_LIBS@
+LD = @LD@
+LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@
+LEX = @LEX@
+LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@
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+LIBAUDIT = @LIBAUDIT@
+LIBCRYPT = @LIBCRYPT@
+LIBDB = @LIBDB@
+LIBDL = @LIBDL@
+LIBICONV = @LIBICONV@
+LIBINTL = @LIBINTL@
+LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@
+LIBPRELUDE_CFLAGS = @LIBPRELUDE_CFLAGS@
+LIBPRELUDE_CONFIG = @LIBPRELUDE_CONFIG@
+LIBPRELUDE_CONFIG_PREFIX = @LIBPRELUDE_CONFIG_PREFIX@
+LIBPRELUDE_LDFLAGS = @LIBPRELUDE_LDFLAGS@
+LIBPRELUDE_LIBS = @LIBPRELUDE_LIBS@
+LIBPRELUDE_PREFIX = @LIBPRELUDE_PREFIX@
+LIBPRELUDE_PTHREAD_CFLAGS = @LIBPRELUDE_PTHREAD_CFLAGS@
+LIBS = @LIBS@
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+MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@
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+PACKAGE_BUGREPORT = @PACKAGE_BUGREPORT@
+PACKAGE_NAME = @PACKAGE_NAME@
+PACKAGE_STRING = @PACKAGE_STRING@
+PACKAGE_TARNAME = @PACKAGE_TARNAME@
+PACKAGE_URL = @PACKAGE_URL@
+PACKAGE_VERSION = @PACKAGE_VERSION@
+PATH_SEPARATOR = @PATH_SEPARATOR@
+PKG_CONFIG = @PKG_CONFIG@
+PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR = @PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR@
+PKG_CONFIG_PATH = @PKG_CONFIG_PATH@
+POSUB = @POSUB@
+RANLIB = @RANLIB@
+SCONFIGDIR = @SCONFIGDIR@
+SECUREDIR = @SECUREDIR@
+SED = @SED@
+SET_MAKE = @SET_MAKE@
+SHELL = @SHELL@
+STRINGPARAM_HMAC = @STRINGPARAM_HMAC@
+STRINGPARAM_VENDORDIR = @STRINGPARAM_VENDORDIR@
+STRIP = @STRIP@
+TIRPC_CFLAGS = @TIRPC_CFLAGS@
+TIRPC_LIBS = @TIRPC_LIBS@
+USE_NLS = @USE_NLS@
+VERSION = @VERSION@
+WARN_CFLAGS = @WARN_CFLAGS@
+XGETTEXT = @XGETTEXT@
+XGETTEXT_015 = @XGETTEXT_015@
+XGETTEXT_EXTRA_OPTIONS = @XGETTEXT_EXTRA_OPTIONS@
+XMLCATALOG = @XMLCATALOG@
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+abs_builddir = @abs_builddir@
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+abs_top_builddir = @abs_top_builddir@
+abs_top_srcdir = @abs_top_srcdir@
+ac_ct_AR = @ac_ct_AR@
+ac_ct_CC = @ac_ct_CC@
+ac_ct_DUMPBIN = @ac_ct_DUMPBIN@
+am__include = @am__include@
+am__leading_dot = @am__leading_dot@
+am__quote = @am__quote@
+am__tar = @am__tar@
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+bindir = @bindir@
+build = @build@
+build_alias = @build_alias@
+build_cpu = @build_cpu@
+build_os = @build_os@
+build_vendor = @build_vendor@
+builddir = @builddir@
+datadir = @datadir@
+datarootdir = @datarootdir@
+docdir = @docdir@
+dvidir = @dvidir@
+exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@
+host = @host@
+host_alias = @host_alias@
+host_cpu = @host_cpu@
+host_os = @host_os@
+host_vendor = @host_vendor@
+htmldir = @htmldir@
+includedir = @includedir@
+infodir = @infodir@
+install_sh = @install_sh@
+libdir = @libdir@
+libexecdir = @libexecdir@
+localedir = @localedir@
+localstatedir = @localstatedir@
+mandir = @mandir@
+mkdir_p = @mkdir_p@
+oldincludedir = @oldincludedir@
+pam_xauth_path = @pam_xauth_path@
+pdfdir = @pdfdir@
+prefix = @prefix@
+program_transform_name = @program_transform_name@
+psdir = @psdir@
+sbindir = @sbindir@
+sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@
+srcdir = @srcdir@
+sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@
+systemdunitdir = @systemdunitdir@
+target_alias = @target_alias@
+top_build_prefix = @top_build_prefix@
+top_builddir = @top_builddir@
+top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@
+CLEANFILES = *~
+MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = $(MANS) README
+EXTRA_DIST = md5.c md5_crypt.c lckpwdf.-c $(XMLS) CHANGELOG
+@HAVE_DOC_TRUE@dist_man_MANS = pam_unix.8 unix_chkpwd.8 unix_update.8
+XMLS = README.xml pam_unix.8.xml unix_chkpwd.8.xml unix_update.8.xml
+dist_check_SCRIPTS = tst-pam_unix
+TESTS = $(dist_check_SCRIPTS)
+securelibdir = $(SECUREDIR)
+secureconfdir = $(SCONFIGDIR)
+AM_CFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/libpam/include -I$(top_srcdir)/libpamc/include \
+ -DCHKPWD_HELPER=\"$(sbindir)/unix_chkpwd\" \
+ -DUPDATE_HELPER=\"$(sbindir)/unix_update\" \
+ @TIRPC_CFLAGS@ @NSL_CFLAGS@ $(WARN_CFLAGS)
+
+pam_unix_la_LDFLAGS = -no-undefined -avoid-version -module \
+ $(am__append_1)
+pam_unix_la_LIBADD = $(top_builddir)/libpam/libpam.la \
+ @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ @TIRPC_LIBS@ @NSL_LIBS@
+
+securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_unix.la
+noinst_HEADERS = md5.h support.h yppasswd.h bigcrypt.h passverify.h
+pam_unix_la_SOURCES = bigcrypt.c pam_unix_acct.c \
+ pam_unix_auth.c pam_unix_passwd.c pam_unix_sess.c support.c \
+ passverify.c yppasswd_xdr.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c
+
+bigcrypt_SOURCES = bigcrypt.c bigcrypt_main.c
+bigcrypt_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS)
+bigcrypt_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@
+unix_chkpwd_SOURCES = unix_chkpwd.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c bigcrypt.c \
+ passverify.c
+
+unix_chkpwd_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @EXE_CFLAGS@ -DHELPER_COMPILE=\"unix_chkpwd\"
+unix_chkpwd_LDFLAGS = @EXE_LDFLAGS@
+unix_chkpwd_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@ @LIBAUDIT@
+unix_update_SOURCES = unix_update.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c bigcrypt.c \
+ passverify.c
+
+unix_update_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @EXE_CFLAGS@ -DHELPER_COMPILE=\"unix_update\"
+unix_update_LDFLAGS = @EXE_LDFLAGS@
+unix_update_LDADD = @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@
+@ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN_TRUE@dist_noinst_DATA = README
+all: all-am
+
+.SUFFIXES:
+.SUFFIXES: .c .lo .log .o .obj .test .test$(EXEEXT) .trs
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+ @for dep in $?; do \
+ case '$(am__configure_deps)' in \
+ *$$dep*) \
+ ( cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh ) \
+ && { if test -f $@; then exit 0; else break; fi; }; \
+ exit 1;; \
+ esac; \
+ done; \
+ echo ' cd $(top_srcdir) && $(AUTOMAKE) --gnu modules/pam_unix/Makefile'; \
+ $(am__cd) $(top_srcdir) && \
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+ *) \
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+ @$(NORMAL_INSTALL)
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+ if test -n "$$list"; then \
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+ $(MKDIR_P) "$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)" || exit 1; \
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+ for p in $$list; do echo "$$p $$p"; done | \
+ sed 's/$(EXEEXT)$$//' | \
+ while read p p1; do if test -f $$p \
+ || test -f $$p1 \
+ ; then echo "$$p"; echo "$$p"; else :; fi; \
+ done | \
+ sed -e 'p;s,.*/,,;n;h' \
+ -e 's|.*|.|' \
+ -e 'p;x;s,.*/,,;s/$(EXEEXT)$$//;$(transform);s/$$/$(EXEEXT)/' | \
+ sed 'N;N;N;s,\n, ,g' | \
+ $(AWK) 'BEGIN { files["."] = ""; dirs["."] = 1 } \
+ { d=$$3; if (dirs[d] != 1) { print "d", d; dirs[d] = 1 } \
+ if ($$2 == $$4) files[d] = files[d] " " $$1; \
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+ END { for (d in files) print "f", d, files[d] }' | \
+ while read type dir files; do \
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+ echo " $(INSTALL_PROGRAM_ENV) $(LIBTOOL) $(AM_LIBTOOLFLAGS) $(LIBTOOLFLAGS) --mode=install $(INSTALL_PROGRAM) $$files '$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)$$dir'"; \
+ $(INSTALL_PROGRAM_ENV) $(LIBTOOL) $(AM_LIBTOOLFLAGS) $(LIBTOOLFLAGS) --mode=install $(INSTALL_PROGRAM) $$files "$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)$$dir" || exit $$?; \
+ } \
+ ; done
+
+uninstall-sbinPROGRAMS:
+ @$(NORMAL_UNINSTALL)
+ @list='$(sbin_PROGRAMS)'; test -n "$(sbindir)" || list=; \
+ files=`for p in $$list; do echo "$$p"; done | \
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+ `; \
+ test -n "$$list" || exit 0; \
+ echo " ( cd '$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)' && rm -f" $$files ")"; \
+ cd "$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)" && rm -f $$files
+
+clean-sbinPROGRAMS:
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+ echo " rm -f" $$list; \
+ rm -f $$list || exit $$?; \
+ test -n "$(EXEEXT)" || exit 0; \
+ list=`for p in $$list; do echo "$$p"; done | sed 's/$(EXEEXT)$$//'`; \
+ echo " rm -f" $$list; \
+ rm -f $$list
+
+install-securelibLTLIBRARIES: $(securelib_LTLIBRARIES)
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+ list2=; for p in $$list; do \
+ if test -f $$p; then \
+ list2="$$list2 $$p"; \
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+ done; \
+ test -z "$$list2" || { \
+ echo " $(MKDIR_P) '$(DESTDIR)$(securelibdir)'"; \
+ $(MKDIR_P) "$(DESTDIR)$(securelibdir)" || exit 1; \
+ echo " $(LIBTOOL) $(AM_LIBTOOLFLAGS) $(LIBTOOLFLAGS) --mode=install $(INSTALL) $(INSTALL_STRIP_FLAG) $$list2 '$(DESTDIR)$(securelibdir)'"; \
+ $(LIBTOOL) $(AM_LIBTOOLFLAGS) $(LIBTOOLFLAGS) --mode=install $(INSTALL) $(INSTALL_STRIP_FLAG) $$list2 "$(DESTDIR)$(securelibdir)"; \
+ }
+
+uninstall-securelibLTLIBRARIES:
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diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/README b/modules/pam_unix/README
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..67a2d21
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/README
@@ -0,0 +1,206 @@
+pam_unix — Module for traditional password authentication
+
+━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
+
+DESCRIPTION
+
+This is the standard Unix authentication module. It uses standard calls from
+the system's libraries to retrieve and set account information as well as
+authentication. Usually this is obtained from the /etc/passwd and the /etc/
+shadow file as well if shadow is enabled.
+
+The account component performs the task of establishing the status of the
+user's account and password based on the following shadow elements: expire,
+last_change, max_change, min_change, warn_change. In the case of the latter, it
+may offer advice to the user on changing their password or, through the
+PAM_AUTHTOKEN_REQD return, delay giving service to the user until they have
+established a new password. The entries listed above are documented in the
+shadow(5) manual page. Should the user's record not contain one or more of
+these entries, the corresponding shadow check is not performed.
+
+The authentication component performs the task of checking the users
+credentials (password). The default action of this module is to not permit the
+user access to a service if their official password is blank.
+
+A helper binary, unix_chkpwd(8), is provided to check the user's password when
+it is stored in a read protected database. This binary is very simple and will
+only check the password of the user invoking it. It is called transparently on
+behalf of the user by the authenticating component of this module. In this way
+it is possible for applications like xlock(1) to work without being
+setuid-root. The module, by default, will temporarily turn off SIGCHLD handling
+for the duration of execution of the helper binary. This is generally the right
+thing to do, as many applications are not prepared to handle this signal from a
+child they didn't know was fork()d. The noreap module argument can be used to
+suppress this temporary shielding and may be needed for use with certain
+applications.
+
+The maximum length of a password supported by the pam_unix module via the
+helper binary is PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE - currently 512 bytes. The rest of the
+password provided by the conversation function to the module will be ignored.
+
+The password component of this module performs the task of updating the user's
+password. The default encryption hash is taken from the ENCRYPT_METHOD variable
+from /etc/login.defs
+
+The session component of this module logs when a user logins or leave the
+system.
+
+Remaining arguments, supported by others functions of this module, are silently
+ignored. Other arguments are logged as errors through syslog(3).
+
+OPTIONS
+
+debug
+
+ Turns on debugging via syslog(3).
+
+audit
+
+ A little more extreme than debug.
+
+quiet
+
+ Turns off informational messages namely messages about session open and
+ close via syslog(3).
+
+nullok
+
+ The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a
+ service if their official password is blank. The nullok argument overrides
+ this default.
+
+nullresetok
+
+ Allow users to authenticate with blank password if password reset is
+ enforced even if nullok is not set. If password reset is not required and
+ nullok is not set the authentication with blank password will be denied.
+
+try_first_pass
+
+ Before prompting the user for their password, the module first tries the
+ previous stacked module's password in case that satisfies this module as
+ well.
+
+use_first_pass
+
+ The argument use_first_pass forces the module to use a previous stacked
+ modules password and will never prompt the user - if no password is
+ available or the password is not appropriate, the user will be denied
+ access.
+
+nodelay
+
+ This argument can be used to discourage the authentication component from
+ requesting a delay should the authentication as a whole fail. The default
+ action is for the module to request a delay-on-failure of the order of two
+ second.
+
+use_authtok
+
+ When password changing enforce the module to set the new password to the
+ one provided by a previously stacked password module (this is used in the
+ example of the stacking of the pam_passwdqc module documented below).
+
+authtok_type=type
+
+ This argument can be used to modify the password prompt when changing
+ passwords to include the type of the password. Empty by default.
+
+nis
+
+ NIS RPC is used for setting new passwords.
+
+remember=n
+
+ The last n passwords for each user are saved in /etc/security/opasswd in
+ order to force password change history and keep the user from alternating
+ between the same password too frequently. The MD5 password hash algorithm
+ is used for storing the old passwords. Instead of this option the
+ pam_pwhistory module should be used.
+
+shadow
+
+ Try to maintain a shadow based system.
+
+md5
+
+ When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the MD5 algorithm.
+
+bigcrypt
+
+ When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the DEC C2
+ algorithm.
+
+sha256
+
+ When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the SHA256
+ algorithm. The SHA256 algorithm must be supported by the crypt(3) function.
+
+sha512
+
+ When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the SHA512
+ algorithm. The SHA512 algorithm must be supported by the crypt(3) function.
+
+blowfish
+
+ When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the blowfish
+ algorithm. The blowfish algorithm must be supported by the crypt(3)
+ function.
+
+gost_yescrypt
+
+ When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the gost-yescrypt
+ algorithm. The gost-yescrypt algorithm must be supported by the crypt(3)
+ function.
+
+yescrypt
+
+ When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the yescrypt
+ algorithm. The yescrypt algorithm must be supported by the crypt(3)
+ function.
+
+rounds=n
+
+ Set the optional number of rounds of the SHA256, SHA512, blowfish,
+ gost-yescrypt, and yescrypt password hashing algorithms to n.
+
+broken_shadow
+
+ Ignore errors reading shadow information for users in the account
+ management module.
+
+minlen=n
+
+ Set a minimum password length of n characters. The max. for DES crypt based
+ passwords are 8 characters.
+
+no_pass_expiry
+
+ When set ignore password expiration as defined by the shadow entry of the
+ user. The option has an effect only in case pam_unix was not used for the
+ authentication or it returned authentication failure meaning that other
+ authentication source or method succeeded. The example can be public key
+ authentication in sshd. The module will return PAM_SUCCESS instead of
+ eventual PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD or PAM_AUTHTOK_EXPIRED.
+
+Invalid arguments are logged with syslog(3).
+
+EXAMPLES
+
+An example usage for /etc/pam.d/login would be:
+
+# Authenticate the user
+auth required pam_unix.so
+# Ensure users account and password are still active
+account required pam_unix.so
+# Change the user's password, but at first check the strength
+# with pam_passwdqc(8)
+password required pam_passwdqc.so config=/etc/passwdqc.conf
+password required pam_unix.so use_authtok nullok yescrypt
+session required pam_unix.so
+
+
+AUTHOR
+
+pam_unix was written by various people.
+
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/README.xml b/modules/pam_unix/README.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7fd340b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/README.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding='UTF-8'?>
+<!DOCTYPE article PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.3//EN"
+"http://www.docbook.org/xml/4.3/docbookx.dtd"
+[
+<!--
+<!ENTITY pamaccess SYSTEM "pam_unix.8.xml">
+-->
+]>
+
+<article>
+
+ <articleinfo>
+
+ <title>
+ <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+ href="pam_unix.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//refnamediv[@id = "pam_unix-name"]/*)'/>
+ </title>
+
+ </articleinfo>
+
+ <section>
+ <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+ href="pam_unix.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//refsect1[@id = "pam_unix-description"]/*)'/>
+ </section>
+
+ <section>
+ <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+ href="pam_unix.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//refsect1[@id = "pam_unix-options"]/*)'/>
+ </section>
+
+ <section>
+ <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+ href="pam_unix.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//refsect1[@id = "pam_unix-examples"]/*)'/>
+ </section>
+
+ <section>
+ <xi:include xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude"
+ href="pam_unix.8.xml" xpointer='xpointer(//refsect1[@id = "pam_unix-author"]/*)'/>
+ </section>
+
+</article>
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.c b/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d8d61a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+/*
+ * This function implements the "bigcrypt" algorithm specifically for
+ * Linux-PAM.
+ *
+ * This algorithm is algorithm 0 (default) shipped with the C2 secure
+ * implementation of Digital UNIX.
+ *
+ * Disclaimer: This work is not based on the source code to Digital
+ * UNIX, nor am I connected to Digital Equipment Corp, in any way
+ * other than as a customer. This code is based on published
+ * interfaces and reasonable guesswork.
+ *
+ * Description: The cleartext is divided into blocks of SEGMENT_SIZE=8
+ * characters or less. Each block is encrypted using the standard UNIX
+ * libc crypt function. The result of the encryption for one block
+ * provides the salt for the succeeding block.
+ *
+ * Restrictions: The buffer used to hold the encrypted result is
+ * statically allocated. (see MAX_PASS_LEN below). This is necessary,
+ * as the returned pointer points to "static data that are overwritten
+ * by each call", (XPG3: XSI System Interface + Headers pg 109), and
+ * this is a drop in replacement for crypt();
+ *
+ * Andy Phillips <atp@mssl.ucl.ac.uk>
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
+#include <crypt.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "bigcrypt.h"
+
+/*
+ * Max cleartext password length in segments of 8 characters this
+ * function can deal with (16 segments of 8 chars= max 128 character
+ * password).
+ */
+
+#define MAX_PASS_LEN 16
+#define SEGMENT_SIZE 8
+#define SALT_SIZE 2
+#define KEYBUF_SIZE ((MAX_PASS_LEN*SEGMENT_SIZE)+SALT_SIZE)
+#define ESEGMENT_SIZE 11
+#define CBUF_SIZE ((MAX_PASS_LEN*ESEGMENT_SIZE)+SALT_SIZE+1)
+
+char *bigcrypt(const char *key, const char *salt)
+{
+ char *dec_c2_cryptbuf;
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+ struct crypt_data *cdata;
+#endif
+ unsigned long int keylen, n_seg, j;
+ char *cipher_ptr, *plaintext_ptr, *tmp_ptr, *salt_ptr;
+ char keybuf[KEYBUF_SIZE + 1];
+
+ D(("called with key='%s', salt='%s'.", key, salt));
+
+ /* reset arrays */
+ dec_c2_cryptbuf = malloc(CBUF_SIZE);
+ if (!dec_c2_cryptbuf) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+ cdata = malloc(sizeof(*cdata));
+ if(!cdata) {
+ free(dec_c2_cryptbuf);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ cdata->initialized = 0;
+#endif
+ memset(keybuf, 0, KEYBUF_SIZE + 1);
+ memset(dec_c2_cryptbuf, 0, CBUF_SIZE);
+
+ /* fill KEYBUF_SIZE with key */
+ strncpy(keybuf, key, KEYBUF_SIZE);
+
+ /* deal with case that we are doing a password check for a
+ conventially encrypted password: the salt will be
+ SALT_SIZE+ESEGMENT_SIZE long. */
+ if (strlen(salt) == (SALT_SIZE + ESEGMENT_SIZE))
+ keybuf[SEGMENT_SIZE] = '\0'; /* terminate password early(?) */
+
+ keylen = strlen(keybuf);
+
+ if (!keylen) {
+ n_seg = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* work out how many segments */
+ n_seg = 1 + ((keylen - 1) / SEGMENT_SIZE);
+ }
+
+ if (n_seg > MAX_PASS_LEN)
+ n_seg = MAX_PASS_LEN; /* truncate at max length */
+
+ /* set up some pointers */
+ cipher_ptr = dec_c2_cryptbuf;
+ plaintext_ptr = keybuf;
+
+ /* do the first block with supplied salt */
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+ tmp_ptr = crypt_r(plaintext_ptr, salt, cdata); /* libc crypt_r() */
+#else
+ tmp_ptr = crypt(plaintext_ptr, salt); /* libc crypt() */
+#endif
+ if (tmp_ptr == NULL) {
+ free(dec_c2_cryptbuf);
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+ free(cdata);
+#endif
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ /* and place in the static area */
+ strncpy(cipher_ptr, tmp_ptr, 13);
+ cipher_ptr += ESEGMENT_SIZE + SALT_SIZE;
+ plaintext_ptr += SEGMENT_SIZE; /* first block of SEGMENT_SIZE */
+
+ /* change the salt (1st 2 chars of previous block) - this was found
+ by dowsing */
+
+ salt_ptr = cipher_ptr - ESEGMENT_SIZE;
+
+ /* so far this is identical to "return crypt(key, salt);", if
+ there is more than one block encrypt them... */
+
+ if (n_seg > 1) {
+ for (j = 2; j <= n_seg; j++) {
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+ tmp_ptr = crypt_r(plaintext_ptr, salt_ptr, cdata);
+#else
+ tmp_ptr = crypt(plaintext_ptr, salt_ptr);
+#endif
+ if (tmp_ptr == NULL) {
+ _pam_overwrite(dec_c2_cryptbuf);
+ free(dec_c2_cryptbuf);
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+ free(cdata);
+#endif
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* skip the salt for seg!=0 */
+ strncpy(cipher_ptr, (tmp_ptr + SALT_SIZE), ESEGMENT_SIZE);
+
+ cipher_ptr += ESEGMENT_SIZE;
+ plaintext_ptr += SEGMENT_SIZE;
+ salt_ptr = cipher_ptr - ESEGMENT_SIZE;
+ }
+ }
+ D(("key=|%s|, salt=|%s|\nbuf=|%s|\n", key, salt, dec_c2_cryptbuf));
+
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+ free(cdata);
+#endif
+
+ /* this is the <NUL> terminated encrypted password */
+ return dec_c2_cryptbuf;
+}
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.h b/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a66a96e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt.h
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+extern char *bigcrypt(const char *key, const char *salt);
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt_main.c b/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fab212d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/bigcrypt_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "bigcrypt.h"
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ if (argc < 3) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s password salt\n",
+ strchr(argv[0], '/') ?
+ (strchr(argv[0], '/') + 1) :
+ argv[0]);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", bigcrypt(argv[1], argv[2]));
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/lckpwdf.-c b/modules/pam_unix/lckpwdf.-c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c3e6315
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/lckpwdf.-c
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+/*
+ * This is a hack, but until libc and glibc both include this function
+ * by default (libc only includes it if nys is not being used, at the
+ * moment, and glibc doesn't appear to have it at all) we need to have
+ * it here, too. :-(
+ *
+ * This should not become an official part of PAM.
+ *
+ * BEGIN_HACK
+ */
+
+/*
+ * lckpwdf.c -- prevent simultaneous updates of password files
+ *
+ * Before modifying any of the password files, call lckpwdf(). It may block
+ * for up to 15 seconds trying to get the lock. Return value is 0 on success
+ * or -1 on failure. When you are done, call ulckpwdf() to release the lock.
+ * The lock is also released automatically when the process exits. Only one
+ * process at a time may hold the lock.
+ *
+ * These functions are supposed to be conformant with AT&T SVID Issue 3.
+ *
+ * Written by Marek Michalkiewicz <marekm@i17linuxb.ists.pwr.wroc.pl>,
+ * public domain.
+ */
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#endif
+
+#define LOCKFILE "/etc/.pwd.lock"
+#define TIMEOUT 15
+
+static int lockfd = -1;
+
+static int set_close_on_exec(int fd)
+{
+ int flags = fcntl(fd, F_GETFD, 0);
+ if (flags == -1)
+ return -1;
+ flags |= FD_CLOEXEC;
+ return fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, flags);
+}
+
+static int do_lock(int fd)
+{
+ struct flock fl;
+
+ memset(&fl, 0, sizeof fl);
+ fl.l_type = F_WRLCK;
+ fl.l_whence = SEEK_SET;
+ return fcntl(fd, F_SETLKW, &fl);
+}
+
+static void alarm_catch(int sig)
+{
+/* does nothing, but fcntl F_SETLKW will fail with EINTR */
+}
+
+static int lckpwdf(void)
+{
+ struct sigaction act, oldact;
+ sigset_t set, oldset;
+
+ if (lockfd != -1)
+ return -1;
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if(is_selinux_enabled()>0)
+ {
+ lockfd = open(LOCKFILE, O_WRONLY);
+ if(lockfd == -1 && errno == ENOENT)
+ {
+ char *create_context_raw;
+ int rc;
+
+ if(getfilecon_raw("/etc/passwd", &create_context_raw))
+ return -1;
+ rc = setfscreatecon_raw(create_context_raw);
+ freecon(create_context_raw);
+ if(rc)
+ return -1;
+ lockfd = open(LOCKFILE, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0600);
+ if(setfscreatecon_raw(NULL))
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+#endif
+ lockfd = open(LOCKFILE, O_CREAT | O_WRONLY, 0600);
+ if (lockfd == -1)
+ return -1;
+ if (set_close_on_exec(lockfd) == -1)
+ goto cleanup_fd;
+
+ memset(&act, 0, sizeof act);
+ act.sa_handler = alarm_catch;
+ act.sa_flags = 0;
+ sigfillset(&act.sa_mask);
+ if (sigaction(SIGALRM, &act, &oldact) == -1)
+ goto cleanup_fd;
+
+ sigemptyset(&set);
+ sigaddset(&set, SIGALRM);
+ if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &set, &oldset) == -1)
+ goto cleanup_sig;
+
+ alarm(TIMEOUT);
+ if (do_lock(lockfd) == -1)
+ goto cleanup_alarm;
+ alarm(0);
+ sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldset, NULL);
+ sigaction(SIGALRM, &oldact, NULL);
+ return 0;
+
+ cleanup_alarm:
+ alarm(0);
+ sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oldset, NULL);
+ cleanup_sig:
+ sigaction(SIGALRM, &oldact, NULL);
+ cleanup_fd:
+ close(lockfd);
+ lockfd = -1;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static int ulckpwdf(void)
+{
+ unlink(LOCKFILE);
+ if (lockfd == -1)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (close(lockfd) == -1) {
+ lockfd = -1;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ lockfd = -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+/* END_HACK */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/md5.c b/modules/pam_unix/md5.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..593d6dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/md5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,258 @@
+/*
+ * $Id$
+ *
+ * This code implements the MD5 message-digest algorithm.
+ * The algorithm is due to Ron Rivest. This code was
+ * written by Colin Plumb in 1993, no copyright is claimed.
+ * This code is in the public domain; do with it what you wish.
+ *
+ * Equivalent code is available from RSA Data Security, Inc.
+ * This code has been tested against that, and is equivalent,
+ * except that you don't need to include two pages of legalese
+ * with every copy.
+ *
+ * To compute the message digest of a chunk of bytes, declare an
+ * MD5Context structure, pass it to MD5Init, call MD5Update as
+ * needed on buffers full of bytes, and then call MD5Final, which
+ * will fill a supplied 16-byte array with the digest.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "md5.h"
+
+#ifndef HIGHFIRST
+#define byteReverse(buf, len) /* Nothing */
+#else
+
+typedef unsigned char PAM_ATTRIBUTE_ALIGNED(4) uint8_aligned;
+
+static void byteReverse(uint8_aligned *buf, unsigned longs);
+
+#ifndef ASM_MD5
+/*
+ * Note: this code is harmless on little-endian machines.
+ */
+static void byteReverse(uint8_aligned *buf, unsigned longs)
+{
+ uint32 t;
+ do {
+ t = (uint32) ((unsigned) buf[3] << 8 | buf[2]) << 16 |
+ ((unsigned) buf[1] << 8 | buf[0]);
+ *(uint32 *) buf = t;
+ buf += 4;
+ } while (--longs);
+}
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Start MD5 accumulation. Set bit count to 0 and buffer to mysterious
+ * initialization constants.
+ */
+void MD5Name(MD5Init)(struct MD5Context *ctx)
+{
+ ctx->buf.i[0] = 0x67452301U;
+ ctx->buf.i[1] = 0xefcdab89U;
+ ctx->buf.i[2] = 0x98badcfeU;
+ ctx->buf.i[3] = 0x10325476U;
+
+ ctx->bits[0] = 0;
+ ctx->bits[1] = 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Update context to reflect the concatenation of another buffer full
+ * of bytes.
+ */
+void MD5Name(MD5Update)(struct MD5Context *ctx, unsigned const char *buf, unsigned len)
+{
+ uint32 t;
+
+ /* Update bitcount */
+
+ t = ctx->bits[0];
+ if ((ctx->bits[0] = t + ((uint32) len << 3)) < t)
+ ctx->bits[1]++; /* Carry from low to high */
+ ctx->bits[1] += len >> 29;
+
+ t = (t >> 3) & 0x3f; /* Bytes already in shsInfo->data */
+
+ /* Handle any leading odd-sized chunks */
+
+ if (t) {
+ unsigned char *p = ctx->in.c + t;
+
+ t = 64 - t;
+ if (len < t) {
+ memcpy(p, buf, len);
+ return;
+ }
+ memcpy(p, buf, t);
+ byteReverse(ctx->in.c, 16);
+ MD5Name(MD5Transform)(ctx->buf.i, ctx->in.i);
+ buf += t;
+ len -= t;
+ }
+ /* Process data in 64-byte chunks */
+
+ while (len >= 64) {
+ memcpy(ctx->in.c, buf, 64);
+ byteReverse(ctx->in.c, 16);
+ MD5Name(MD5Transform)(ctx->buf.i, ctx->in.i);
+ buf += 64;
+ len -= 64;
+ }
+
+ /* Handle any remaining bytes of data. */
+
+ memcpy(ctx->in.c, buf, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Final wrapup - pad to 64-byte boundary with the bit pattern
+ * 1 0* (64-bit count of bits processed, MSB-first)
+ */
+void MD5Name(MD5Final)(unsigned char digest[16], struct MD5Context *ctx)
+{
+ unsigned count;
+ unsigned char *p;
+
+ /* Compute number of bytes mod 64 */
+ count = (ctx->bits[0] >> 3) & 0x3F;
+
+ /* Set the first char of padding to 0x80. This is safe since there is
+ always at least one byte free */
+ p = ctx->in.c + count;
+ *p++ = 0x80;
+
+ /* Bytes of padding needed to make 64 bytes */
+ count = 64 - 1 - count;
+
+ /* Pad out to 56 mod 64 */
+ if (count < 8) {
+ /* Two lots of padding: Pad the first block to 64 bytes */
+ memset(p, 0, count);
+ byteReverse(ctx->in.c, 16);
+ MD5Name(MD5Transform)(ctx->buf.i, ctx->in.i);
+
+ /* Now fill the next block with 56 bytes */
+ memset(ctx->in.c, 0, 56);
+ } else {
+ /* Pad block to 56 bytes */
+ memset(p, 0, count - 8);
+ }
+ byteReverse(ctx->in.c, 14);
+
+ /* Append length in bits and transform */
+ memcpy(ctx->in.i + 14, ctx->bits, 2*sizeof(uint32));
+
+ MD5Name(MD5Transform)(ctx->buf.i, ctx->in.i);
+ byteReverse(ctx->buf.c, 4);
+ memcpy(digest, ctx->buf.c, 16);
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); /* In case it's sensitive */
+}
+
+#ifndef ASM_MD5
+
+/* The four core functions - F1 is optimized somewhat */
+
+/* #define F1(x, y, z) (x & y | ~x & z) */
+#define F1(x, y, z) (z ^ (x & (y ^ z)))
+#define F2(x, y, z) F1(z, x, y)
+#define F3(x, y, z) (x ^ y ^ z)
+#define F4(x, y, z) (y ^ (x | ~z))
+
+/* This is the central step in the MD5 algorithm. */
+#define MD5STEP(f, w, x, y, z, data, s) \
+ ( w += f(x, y, z) + data, w = w<<s | w>>(32-s), w += x )
+
+/*
+ * The core of the MD5 algorithm, this alters an existing MD5 hash to
+ * reflect the addition of 16 longwords of new data. MD5Update blocks
+ * the data and converts bytes into longwords for this routine.
+ */
+void MD5Name(MD5Transform)(uint32 buf[4], uint32 const in[16])
+{
+ register uint32 a, b, c, d;
+
+ a = buf[0];
+ b = buf[1];
+ c = buf[2];
+ d = buf[3];
+
+ MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xd76aa478U, 7);
+ MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[1] + 0xe8c7b756U, 12);
+ MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x242070dbU, 17);
+ MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[3] + 0xc1bdceeeU, 22);
+ MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf57c0fafU, 7);
+ MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[5] + 0x4787c62aU, 12);
+ MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa8304613U, 17);
+ MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[7] + 0xfd469501U, 22);
+ MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x698098d8U, 7);
+ MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[9] + 0x8b44f7afU, 12);
+ MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffff5bb1U, 17);
+ MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[11] + 0x895cd7beU, 22);
+ MD5STEP(F1, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x6b901122U, 7);
+ MD5STEP(F1, d, a, b, c, in[13] + 0xfd987193U, 12);
+ MD5STEP(F1, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xa679438eU, 17);
+ MD5STEP(F1, b, c, d, a, in[15] + 0x49b40821U, 22);
+
+ MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xf61e2562U, 5);
+ MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[6] + 0xc040b340U, 9);
+ MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x265e5a51U, 14);
+ MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[0] + 0xe9b6c7aaU, 20);
+ MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xd62f105dU, 5);
+ MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[10] + 0x02441453U, 9);
+ MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0xd8a1e681U, 14);
+ MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[4] + 0xe7d3fbc8U, 20);
+ MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0x21e1cde6U, 5);
+ MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[14] + 0xc33707d6U, 9);
+ MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xf4d50d87U, 14);
+ MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[8] + 0x455a14edU, 20);
+ MD5STEP(F2, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0xa9e3e905U, 5);
+ MD5STEP(F2, d, a, b, c, in[2] + 0xfcefa3f8U, 9);
+ MD5STEP(F2, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0x676f02d9U, 14);
+ MD5STEP(F2, b, c, d, a, in[12] + 0x8d2a4c8aU, 20);
+
+ MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[5] + 0xfffa3942U, 4);
+ MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[8] + 0x8771f681U, 11);
+ MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[11] + 0x6d9d6122U, 16);
+ MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[14] + 0xfde5380cU, 23);
+ MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[1] + 0xa4beea44U, 4);
+ MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[4] + 0x4bdecfa9U, 11);
+ MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[7] + 0xf6bb4b60U, 16);
+ MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[10] + 0xbebfbc70U, 23);
+ MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[13] + 0x289b7ec6U, 4);
+ MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[0] + 0xeaa127faU, 11);
+ MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[3] + 0xd4ef3085U, 16);
+ MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[6] + 0x04881d05U, 23);
+ MD5STEP(F3, a, b, c, d, in[9] + 0xd9d4d039U, 4);
+ MD5STEP(F3, d, a, b, c, in[12] + 0xe6db99e5U, 11);
+ MD5STEP(F3, c, d, a, b, in[15] + 0x1fa27cf8U, 16);
+ MD5STEP(F3, b, c, d, a, in[2] + 0xc4ac5665U, 23);
+
+ MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[0] + 0xf4292244U, 6);
+ MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[7] + 0x432aff97U, 10);
+ MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[14] + 0xab9423a7U, 15);
+ MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[5] + 0xfc93a039U, 21);
+ MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[12] + 0x655b59c3U, 6);
+ MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[3] + 0x8f0ccc92U, 10);
+ MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[10] + 0xffeff47dU, 15);
+ MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[1] + 0x85845dd1U, 21);
+ MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[8] + 0x6fa87e4fU, 6);
+ MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[15] + 0xfe2ce6e0U, 10);
+ MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[6] + 0xa3014314U, 15);
+ MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[13] + 0x4e0811a1U, 21);
+ MD5STEP(F4, a, b, c, d, in[4] + 0xf7537e82U, 6);
+ MD5STEP(F4, d, a, b, c, in[11] + 0xbd3af235U, 10);
+ MD5STEP(F4, c, d, a, b, in[2] + 0x2ad7d2bbU, 15);
+ MD5STEP(F4, b, c, d, a, in[9] + 0xeb86d391U, 21);
+
+ buf[0] += a;
+ buf[1] += b;
+ buf[2] += c;
+ buf[3] += d;
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/md5.h b/modules/pam_unix/md5.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3dc54bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/md5.h
@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+
+#ifndef MD5_H
+#define MD5_H
+
+#include "pam_cc_compat.h"
+
+typedef unsigned int uint32;
+
+struct MD5Context {
+ union {
+ uint32 i[4];
+ unsigned char c[16] PAM_ATTRIBUTE_ALIGNED(4);
+ } buf;
+ uint32 bits[2];
+ union {
+ uint32 i[16];
+ unsigned char c[64] PAM_ATTRIBUTE_ALIGNED(4);
+ } in;
+};
+
+void GoodMD5Init(struct MD5Context *);
+void GoodMD5Update(struct MD5Context *, unsigned const char *, unsigned);
+void GoodMD5Final(unsigned char digest[16], struct MD5Context *);
+void GoodMD5Transform(uint32 buf[4], uint32 const in[16]);
+void BrokenMD5Init(struct MD5Context *);
+void BrokenMD5Update(struct MD5Context *, unsigned const char *, unsigned);
+void BrokenMD5Final(unsigned char digest[16], struct MD5Context *);
+void BrokenMD5Transform(uint32 buf[4], uint32 const in[16]);
+
+char *Goodcrypt_md5(const char *pw, const char *salt);
+char *Brokencrypt_md5(const char *pw, const char *salt);
+
+/*
+ * This is needed to make RSAREF happy on some MS-DOS compilers.
+ */
+
+typedef struct MD5Context MD5_CTX;
+
+#endif /* MD5_H */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/md5_broken.c b/modules/pam_unix/md5_broken.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..193daeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/md5_broken.c
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+#define MD5Name(x) Broken##x
+
+#include "md5.c"
+#include "md5_crypt.c"
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/md5_crypt.c b/modules/pam_unix/md5_crypt.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94f7b43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/md5_crypt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+/*
+ * $Id$
+ *
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * "THE BEER-WARE LICENSE" (Revision 42):
+ * <phk@login.dknet.dk> wrote this file. As long as you retain this notice you
+ * can do whatever you want with this stuff. If we meet some day, and you think
+ * this stuff is worth it, you can buy me a beer in return. Poul-Henning Kamp
+ * ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * Origin: Id: crypt.c,v 1.3 1995/05/30 05:42:22 rgrimes Exp
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "pam_inline.h"
+
+static unsigned char itoa64[] = /* 0 ... 63 => ascii - 64 */
+"./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
+
+static void to64(char *s, unsigned long v, int n)
+{
+ while (--n >= 0) {
+ *s++ = itoa64[v & 0x3f];
+ v >>= 6;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * UNIX password
+ *
+ * Use MD5 for what it is best at...
+ */
+
+char *MD5Name(crypt_md5)(const char *pw, const char *salt)
+{
+ const char *magic = "$1$";
+ /* This string is magic for this algorithm. Having
+ * it this way, we can get get better later on */
+ char *passwd, *p;
+ const char *sp, *ep;
+ unsigned char final[16];
+ int sl, pl, i, j;
+ MD5_CTX ctx, ctx1;
+ unsigned long l;
+
+ /* Refine the Salt first */
+ sp = salt;
+
+ /* TODO: now that we're using malloc'ed memory, get rid of the
+ strange constant buffer size. */
+ passwd = malloc(120);
+ if (passwd == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ /* If it starts with the magic string, then skip that */
+ if ((ep = pam_str_skip_prefix_len(sp, magic, strlen(magic))) != NULL)
+ sp = ep;
+
+ /* It stops at the first '$', max 8 chars */
+ for (ep = sp; *ep && *ep != '$' && ep < (sp + 8); ep++)
+ continue;
+
+ /* get the length of the true salt */
+ sl = ep - sp;
+
+ MD5Name(MD5Init)(&ctx);
+
+ /* The password first, since that is what is most unknown */
+ MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx,(unsigned const char *)pw,strlen(pw));
+
+ /* Then our magic string */
+ MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx,(unsigned const char *)magic,strlen(magic));
+
+ /* Then the raw salt */
+ MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx,(unsigned const char *)sp,sl);
+
+ /* Then just as many characters of the MD5(pw,salt,pw) */
+ MD5Name(MD5Init)(&ctx1);
+ MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)pw,strlen(pw));
+ MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)sp,sl);
+ MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)pw,strlen(pw));
+ MD5Name(MD5Final)(final,&ctx1);
+ for (pl = strlen(pw); pl > 0; pl -= 16)
+ MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx,(unsigned const char *)final,pl>16 ? 16 : pl);
+
+ /* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */
+ memset(final, 0, sizeof final);
+
+ /* Then something really weird... */
+ for (j = 0, i = strlen(pw); i; i >>= 1)
+ if (i & 1)
+ MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx, (unsigned const char *)final+j, 1);
+ else
+ MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx, (unsigned const char *)pw+j, 1);
+
+ /* Now make the output string */
+ strcpy(passwd, magic);
+ strncat(passwd, sp, sl);
+ strcat(passwd, "$");
+
+ MD5Name(MD5Final)(final,&ctx);
+
+ /*
+ * and now, just to make sure things don't run too fast
+ * On a 60 Mhz Pentium this takes 34 msec, so you would
+ * need 30 seconds to build a 1000 entry dictionary...
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
+ MD5Name(MD5Init)(&ctx1);
+ if (i & 1)
+ MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)pw,strlen(pw));
+ else
+ MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)final,16);
+
+ if (i % 3)
+ MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)sp,sl);
+
+ if (i % 7)
+ MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)pw,strlen(pw));
+
+ if (i & 1)
+ MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)final,16);
+ else
+ MD5Name(MD5Update)(&ctx1,(unsigned const char *)pw,strlen(pw));
+ MD5Name(MD5Final)(final,&ctx1);
+ }
+
+ p = passwd + strlen(passwd);
+
+ l = (final[0] << 16) | (final[6] << 8) | final[12];
+ to64(p, l, 4);
+ p += 4;
+ l = (final[1] << 16) | (final[7] << 8) | final[13];
+ to64(p, l, 4);
+ p += 4;
+ l = (final[2] << 16) | (final[8] << 8) | final[14];
+ to64(p, l, 4);
+ p += 4;
+ l = (final[3] << 16) | (final[9] << 8) | final[15];
+ to64(p, l, 4);
+ p += 4;
+ l = (final[4] << 16) | (final[10] << 8) | final[5];
+ to64(p, l, 4);
+ p += 4;
+ l = final[11];
+ to64(p, l, 2);
+ p += 2;
+ *p = '\0';
+
+ /* Don't leave anything around in vm they could use. */
+ memset(final, 0, sizeof final);
+
+ return passwd;
+}
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/md5_good.c b/modules/pam_unix/md5_good.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..131e451
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/md5_good.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#define HIGHFIRST
+#define MD5Name(x) Good##x
+
+#include "md5.c"
+#include "md5_crypt.c"
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8 b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d9cdea5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8
@@ -0,0 +1,285 @@
+'\" t
+.\" Title: pam_unix
+.\" Author: [see the "AUTHOR" section]
+.\" Generator: DocBook XSL Stylesheets v1.79.1 <http://docbook.sf.net/>
+.\" Date: 09/03/2021
+.\" Manual: Linux-PAM Manual
+.\" Source: Linux-PAM Manual
+.\" Language: English
+.\"
+.TH "PAM_UNIX" "8" "09/03/2021" "Linux-PAM Manual" "Linux\-PAM Manual"
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.\" * Define some portability stuff
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.\" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+.\" http://bugs.debian.org/507673
+.\" http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/groff/2009-02/msg00013.html
+.\" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+.ie \n(.g .ds Aq \(aq
+.el .ds Aq '
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.\" * set default formatting
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.\" disable hyphenation
+.nh
+.\" disable justification (adjust text to left margin only)
+.ad l
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.\" * MAIN CONTENT STARTS HERE *
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.SH "NAME"
+pam_unix \- Module for traditional password authentication
+.SH "SYNOPSIS"
+.HP \w'\fBpam_unix\&.so\fR\ 'u
+\fBpam_unix\&.so\fR [\&.\&.\&.]
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+.PP
+This is the standard Unix authentication module\&. It uses standard calls from the system\*(Aqs libraries to retrieve and set account information as well as authentication\&. Usually this is obtained from the /etc/passwd and the /etc/shadow file as well if shadow is enabled\&.
+.PP
+The account component performs the task of establishing the status of the user\*(Aqs account and password based on the following
+\fIshadow\fR
+elements: expire, last_change, max_change, min_change, warn_change\&. In the case of the latter, it may offer advice to the user on changing their password or, through the
+\fBPAM_AUTHTOKEN_REQD\fR
+return, delay giving service to the user until they have established a new password\&. The entries listed above are documented in the
+\fBshadow\fR(5)
+manual page\&. Should the user\*(Aqs record not contain one or more of these entries, the corresponding
+\fIshadow\fR
+check is not performed\&.
+.PP
+The authentication component performs the task of checking the users credentials (password)\&. The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a service if their official password is blank\&.
+.PP
+A helper binary,
+\fBunix_chkpwd\fR(8), is provided to check the user\*(Aqs password when it is stored in a read protected database\&. This binary is very simple and will only check the password of the user invoking it\&. It is called transparently on behalf of the user by the authenticating component of this module\&. In this way it is possible for applications like
+\fBxlock\fR(1)
+to work without being setuid\-root\&. The module, by default, will temporarily turn off SIGCHLD handling for the duration of execution of the helper binary\&. This is generally the right thing to do, as many applications are not prepared to handle this signal from a child they didn\*(Aqt know was
+\fBfork()\fRd\&. The
+\fBnoreap\fR
+module argument can be used to suppress this temporary shielding and may be needed for use with certain applications\&.
+.PP
+The maximum length of a password supported by the pam_unix module via the helper binary is
+\fIPAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE\fR
+\- currently 512 bytes\&. The rest of the password provided by the conversation function to the module will be ignored\&.
+.PP
+The password component of this module performs the task of updating the user\*(Aqs password\&. The default encryption hash is taken from the
+\fBENCRYPT_METHOD\fR
+variable from
+\fI/etc/login\&.defs\fR
+.PP
+The session component of this module logs when a user logins or leave the system\&.
+.PP
+Remaining arguments, supported by others functions of this module, are silently ignored\&. Other arguments are logged as errors through
+\fBsyslog\fR(3)\&.
+.SH "OPTIONS"
+.PP
+\fBdebug\fR
+.RS 4
+Turns on debugging via
+\fBsyslog\fR(3)\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBaudit\fR
+.RS 4
+A little more extreme than debug\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBquiet\fR
+.RS 4
+Turns off informational messages namely messages about session open and close via
+\fBsyslog\fR(3)\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBnullok\fR
+.RS 4
+The default action of this module is to not permit the user access to a service if their official password is blank\&. The
+\fBnullok\fR
+argument overrides this default\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBnullresetok\fR
+.RS 4
+Allow users to authenticate with blank password if password reset is enforced even if
+\fBnullok\fR
+is not set\&. If password reset is not required and
+\fBnullok\fR
+is not set the authentication with blank password will be denied\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBtry_first_pass\fR
+.RS 4
+Before prompting the user for their password, the module first tries the previous stacked module\*(Aqs password in case that satisfies this module as well\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBuse_first_pass\fR
+.RS 4
+The argument
+\fBuse_first_pass\fR
+forces the module to use a previous stacked modules password and will never prompt the user \- if no password is available or the password is not appropriate, the user will be denied access\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBnodelay\fR
+.RS 4
+This argument can be used to discourage the authentication component from requesting a delay should the authentication as a whole fail\&. The default action is for the module to request a delay\-on\-failure of the order of two second\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBuse_authtok\fR
+.RS 4
+When password changing enforce the module to set the new password to the one provided by a previously stacked
+\fBpassword\fR
+module (this is used in the example of the stacking of the
+\fBpam_passwdqc\fR
+module documented below)\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBauthtok_type=\fR\fB\fItype\fR\fR
+.RS 4
+This argument can be used to modify the password prompt when changing passwords to include the type of the password\&. Empty by default\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBnis\fR
+.RS 4
+NIS RPC is used for setting new passwords\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBremember=\fR\fB\fIn\fR\fR
+.RS 4
+The last
+\fIn\fR
+passwords for each user are saved in
+/etc/security/opasswd
+in order to force password change history and keep the user from alternating between the same password too frequently\&. The MD5 password hash algorithm is used for storing the old passwords\&. Instead of this option the
+\fBpam_pwhistory\fR
+module should be used\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBshadow\fR
+.RS 4
+Try to maintain a shadow based system\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBmd5\fR
+.RS 4
+When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the MD5 algorithm\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBbigcrypt\fR
+.RS 4
+When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the DEC C2 algorithm\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBsha256\fR
+.RS 4
+When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the SHA256 algorithm\&. The SHA256 algorithm must be supported by the
+\fBcrypt\fR(3)
+function\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBsha512\fR
+.RS 4
+When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the SHA512 algorithm\&. The SHA512 algorithm must be supported by the
+\fBcrypt\fR(3)
+function\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBblowfish\fR
+.RS 4
+When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the blowfish algorithm\&. The blowfish algorithm must be supported by the
+\fBcrypt\fR(3)
+function\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBgost_yescrypt\fR
+.RS 4
+When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the gost\-yescrypt algorithm\&. The gost\-yescrypt algorithm must be supported by the
+\fBcrypt\fR(3)
+function\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fByescrypt\fR
+.RS 4
+When a user changes their password next, encrypt it with the yescrypt algorithm\&. The yescrypt algorithm must be supported by the
+\fBcrypt\fR(3)
+function\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBrounds=\fR\fB\fIn\fR\fR
+.RS 4
+Set the optional number of rounds of the SHA256, SHA512, blowfish, gost\-yescrypt, and yescrypt password hashing algorithms to
+\fIn\fR\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBbroken_shadow\fR
+.RS 4
+Ignore errors reading shadow information for users in the account management module\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBminlen=\fR\fB\fIn\fR\fR
+.RS 4
+Set a minimum password length of
+\fIn\fR
+characters\&. The max\&. for DES crypt based passwords are 8 characters\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+\fBno_pass_expiry\fR
+.RS 4
+When set ignore password expiration as defined by the
+\fIshadow\fR
+entry of the user\&. The option has an effect only in case
+\fIpam_unix\fR
+was not used for the authentication or it returned authentication failure meaning that other authentication source or method succeeded\&. The example can be public key authentication in
+\fIsshd\fR\&. The module will return
+\fBPAM_SUCCESS\fR
+instead of eventual
+\fBPAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD\fR
+or
+\fBPAM_AUTHTOK_EXPIRED\fR\&.
+.RE
+.PP
+Invalid arguments are logged with
+\fBsyslog\fR(3)\&.
+.SH "MODULE TYPES PROVIDED"
+.PP
+All module types (\fBaccount\fR,
+\fBauth\fR,
+\fBpassword\fR
+and
+\fBsession\fR) are provided\&.
+.SH "RETURN VALUES"
+.PP
+PAM_IGNORE
+.RS 4
+Ignore this module\&.
+.RE
+.SH "EXAMPLES"
+.PP
+An example usage for
+/etc/pam\&.d/login
+would be:
+.sp
+.if n \{\
+.RS 4
+.\}
+.nf
+# Authenticate the user
+auth required pam_unix\&.so
+# Ensure users account and password are still active
+account required pam_unix\&.so
+# Change the user\*(Aqs password, but at first check the strength
+# with pam_passwdqc(8)
+password required pam_passwdqc\&.so config=/etc/passwdqc\&.conf
+password required pam_unix\&.so use_authtok nullok yescrypt
+session required pam_unix\&.so
+
+.fi
+.if n \{\
+.RE
+.\}
+.sp
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.PP
+\fBlogin.defs\fR(5),
+\fBpam.conf\fR(5),
+\fBpam.d\fR(5),
+\fBpam\fR(8)
+.SH "AUTHOR"
+.PP
+pam_unix was written by various people\&.
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f9c818
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix.8.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,501 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding='UTF-8'?>
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.3//EN"
+ "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.3/docbookx.dtd">
+
+<refentry id="pam_unix">
+
+ <refmeta>
+ <refentrytitle>pam_unix</refentrytitle>
+ <manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+ <refmiscinfo class="sectdesc">Linux-PAM Manual</refmiscinfo>
+ </refmeta>
+
+ <refnamediv id="pam_unix-name">
+ <refname>pam_unix</refname>
+ <refpurpose>Module for traditional password authentication</refpurpose>
+ </refnamediv>
+
+ <refsynopsisdiv>
+ <cmdsynopsis id="pam_unix-cmdsynopsis">
+ <command>pam_unix.so</command>
+ <arg choice="opt">
+ ...
+ </arg>
+ </cmdsynopsis>
+ </refsynopsisdiv>
+
+ <refsect1 id="pam_unix-description">
+
+ <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+
+ <para>
+ This is the standard Unix authentication module. It uses standard
+ calls from the system's libraries to retrieve and set account
+ information as well as authentication. Usually this is obtained
+ from the /etc/passwd and the /etc/shadow file as well if shadow is
+ enabled.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ The account component performs the task of establishing the status
+ of the user's account and password based on the following
+ <emphasis>shadow</emphasis> elements: expire, last_change, max_change,
+ min_change, warn_change. In the case of the latter, it may offer advice
+ to the user on changing their password or, through the
+ <emphasis remap='B'>PAM_AUTHTOKEN_REQD</emphasis> return, delay
+ giving service to the user until they have established a new password.
+ The entries listed above are documented in the <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>shadow</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry> manual page. Should the user's record not contain
+ one or more of these entries, the corresponding
+ <emphasis>shadow</emphasis> check is not performed.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ The authentication component performs the task of checking the
+ users credentials (password). The default action of this module
+ is to not permit the user access to a service if their official
+ password is blank.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ A helper binary, <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>unix_chkpwd</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>, is provided
+ to check the user's password when it is stored in a read
+ protected database. This binary is very simple and will only
+ check the password of the user invoking it. It is called
+ transparently on behalf of the user by the authenticating
+ component of this module. In this way it is possible
+ for applications like <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>xlock</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry> to work without
+ being setuid-root. The module, by default, will temporarily turn
+ off SIGCHLD handling for the duration of execution of the helper
+ binary. This is generally the right thing to do, as many applications
+ are not prepared to handle this signal from a child they didn't know
+ was <function>fork()</function>d. The <option>noreap</option> module
+ argument can be used to suppress this temporary shielding and may be
+ needed for use with certain applications.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ The maximum length of a password supported by the pam_unix module
+ via the helper binary is <emphasis>PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE</emphasis>
+ - currently 512 bytes. The rest of the password provided by the
+ conversation function to the module will be ignored.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ The password component of this module performs the task of updating
+ the user's password. The default encryption hash is taken from the
+ <emphasis remap='B'>ENCRYPT_METHOD</emphasis> variable from
+ <emphasis>/etc/login.defs</emphasis>
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ The session component of this module logs when a user logins
+ or leave the system.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ Remaining arguments, supported by others functions of this
+ module, are silently ignored. Other arguments are logged as
+ errors through <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>syslog</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>.
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id="pam_unix-options">
+
+ <title>OPTIONS</title>
+ <variablelist>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>debug</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Turns on debugging via
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>syslog</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>audit</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ A little more extreme than debug.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>quiet</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Turns off informational messages namely messages about
+ session open and close via
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>syslog</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>nullok</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ The default action of this module is to not permit the
+ user access to a service if their official password is blank.
+ The <option>nullok</option> argument overrides this default.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>nullresetok</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Allow users to authenticate with blank password if password reset
+ is enforced even if <option>nullok</option> is not set. If password
+ reset is not required and <option>nullok</option> is not set the
+ authentication with blank password will be denied.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>try_first_pass</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Before prompting the user for their password, the module first
+ tries the previous stacked module's password in case that
+ satisfies this module as well.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>use_first_pass</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ The argument <option>use_first_pass</option> forces the module
+ to use a previous stacked modules password and will never prompt
+ the user - if no password is available or the password is not
+ appropriate, the user will be denied access.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>nodelay</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ This argument can be used to discourage the authentication
+ component from requesting a delay should the authentication
+ as a whole fail. The default action is for the module to
+ request a delay-on-failure of the order of two second.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>use_authtok</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ When password changing enforce the module to set the new
+ password to the one provided by a previously stacked
+ <option>password</option> module (this is used in the
+ example of the stacking of the <command>pam_passwdqc</command>
+ module documented below).
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>authtok_type=<replaceable>type</replaceable></option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ This argument can be used to modify the password prompt
+ when changing passwords to include the type of the password.
+ Empty by default.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>nis</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ NIS RPC is used for setting new passwords.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>remember=<replaceable>n</replaceable></option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ The last <replaceable>n</replaceable> passwords for each
+ user are saved in <filename>/etc/security/opasswd</filename>
+ in order to force password change history and keep the user
+ from alternating between the same password too frequently.
+ The MD5 password hash algorithm is used for storing the
+ old passwords.
+ Instead of this option the <command>pam_pwhistory</command>
+ module should be used.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>shadow</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Try to maintain a shadow based system.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>md5</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ When a user changes their password next, encrypt
+ it with the MD5 algorithm.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>bigcrypt</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ When a user changes their password next,
+ encrypt it with the DEC C2 algorithm.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>sha256</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ When a user changes their password next,
+ encrypt it with the SHA256 algorithm. The
+ SHA256 algorithm must be supported by the <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>crypt</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry> function.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>sha512</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ When a user changes their password next,
+ encrypt it with the SHA512 algorithm. The
+ SHA512 algorithm must be supported by the <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>crypt</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry> function.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>blowfish</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ When a user changes their password next,
+ encrypt it with the blowfish algorithm. The
+ blowfish algorithm must be supported by the <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>crypt</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry> function.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>gost_yescrypt</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ When a user changes their password next,
+ encrypt it with the gost-yescrypt algorithm. The
+ gost-yescrypt algorithm must be supported by the <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>crypt</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry> function.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>yescrypt</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ When a user changes their password next,
+ encrypt it with the yescrypt algorithm. The
+ yescrypt algorithm must be supported by the <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>crypt</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry> function.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>rounds=<replaceable>n</replaceable></option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Set the optional number of rounds of the SHA256, SHA512,
+ blowfish, gost-yescrypt, and yescrypt password hashing
+ algorithms to
+ <replaceable>n</replaceable>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>broken_shadow</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Ignore errors reading shadow information for
+ users in the account management module.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>minlen=<replaceable>n</replaceable></option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Set a minimum password length of <replaceable>n</replaceable>
+ characters. The max. for DES crypt based passwords are 8
+ characters.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>
+ <option>no_pass_expiry</option>
+ </term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ When set ignore password expiration as defined by the
+ <emphasis>shadow</emphasis> entry of the user. The option has an
+ effect only in case <emphasis>pam_unix</emphasis> was not used
+ for the authentication or it returned authentication failure
+ meaning that other authentication source or method succeeded.
+ The example can be public key authentication in
+ <emphasis>sshd</emphasis>. The module will return
+ <emphasis remap='B'>PAM_SUCCESS</emphasis> instead of eventual
+ <emphasis remap='B'>PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD</emphasis> or
+ <emphasis remap='B'>PAM_AUTHTOK_EXPIRED</emphasis>.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ </variablelist>
+ <para>
+ Invalid arguments are logged with <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>syslog</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>.
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id="pam_unix-types">
+ <title>MODULE TYPES PROVIDED</title>
+ <para>
+ All module types (<option>account</option>, <option>auth</option>,
+ <option>password</option> and <option>session</option>) are provided.
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id='pam_unix-return_values'>
+ <title>RETURN VALUES</title>
+ <variablelist>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term>PAM_IGNORE</term>
+ <listitem>
+ <para>
+ Ignore this module.
+ </para>
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+ </variablelist>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id='pam_unix-examples'>
+ <title>EXAMPLES</title>
+ <para>
+ An example usage for <filename>/etc/pam.d/login</filename>
+ would be:
+ <programlisting>
+# Authenticate the user
+auth required pam_unix.so
+# Ensure users account and password are still active
+account required pam_unix.so
+# Change the user's password, but at first check the strength
+# with pam_passwdqc(8)
+password required pam_passwdqc.so config=/etc/passwdqc.conf
+password required pam_unix.so use_authtok nullok yescrypt
+session required pam_unix.so
+ </programlisting>
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id='pam_unix-see_also'>
+ <title>SEE ALSO</title>
+ <para>
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>login.defs</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>,
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>pam.conf</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>,
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>pam.d</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>,
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>pam</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id='pam_unix-author'>
+ <title>AUTHOR</title>
+ <para>
+ pam_unix was written by various people.
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+</refentry>
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8f5ed3e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c
@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+/*
+ * pam_unix account management
+ *
+ * Copyright Elliot Lee, 1996. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright Jan Rękorajski, 1999. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <time.h> /* for time() */
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <security/pam_ext.h>
+#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
+
+#include "pam_cc_compat.h"
+#include "support.h"
+#include "passverify.h"
+
+int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned long long ctrl,
+ const char *user, int *daysleft)
+{
+ int retval=0, child, fds[2];
+ struct sigaction newsa, oldsa;
+ D(("running verify_binary"));
+
+ /* create a pipe for the messages */
+ if (pipe(fds) != 0) {
+ D(("could not make pipe"));
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Could not make pipe: %m");
+ return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+ D(("called."));
+
+ if (off(UNIX_NOREAP, ctrl)) {
+ /*
+ * This code arranges that the demise of the child does not cause
+ * the application to receive a signal it is not expecting - which
+ * may kill the application or worse.
+ *
+ * The "noreap" module argument is provided so that the admin can
+ * override this behavior.
+ */
+ memset(&newsa, '\0', sizeof(newsa));
+ newsa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
+ sigaction(SIGCHLD, &newsa, &oldsa);
+ }
+
+ /* fork */
+ child = fork();
+ if (child == 0) {
+ static char *envp[] = { NULL };
+ const char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
+
+ /* XXX - should really tidy up PAM here too */
+
+ /* reopen stdout as pipe */
+ if (dup2(fds[1], STDOUT_FILENO) != STDOUT_FILENO) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "dup2 of %s failed: %m", "stdout");
+ _exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL);
+ }
+
+ if (pam_modutil_sanitize_helper_fds(pamh, PAM_MODUTIL_PIPE_FD,
+ PAM_MODUTIL_IGNORE_FD,
+ PAM_MODUTIL_PIPE_FD) < 0) {
+ _exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL);
+ }
+
+ if (geteuid() == 0) {
+ /* must set the real uid to 0 so the helper will not error
+ out if pam is called from setuid binary (su, sudo...) */
+ if (setuid(0) == -1) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "setuid failed: %m");
+ printf("-1\n");
+ fflush(stdout);
+ _exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* exec binary helper */
+ args[0] = CHKPWD_HELPER;
+ args[1] = user;
+ args[2] = "chkexpiry";
+
+ DIAG_PUSH_IGNORE_CAST_QUAL;
+ execve(CHKPWD_HELPER, (char *const *) args, envp);
+ DIAG_POP_IGNORE_CAST_QUAL;
+
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "helper binary execve failed: %m");
+ /* should not get here: exit with error */
+ D(("helper binary is not available"));
+ printf("-1\n");
+ fflush(stdout);
+ _exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL);
+ } else {
+ close(fds[1]);
+ if (child > 0) {
+ char buf[32];
+ int rc=0;
+ /* wait for helper to complete: */
+ while ((rc=waitpid(child, &retval, 0)) < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+ if (rc<0) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_chkpwd waitpid returned %d: %m", rc);
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ } else if (!WIFEXITED(retval)) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_chkpwd abnormal exit: %d", retval);
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ } else {
+ retval = WEXITSTATUS(retval);
+ rc = pam_modutil_read(fds[0], buf, sizeof(buf) - 1);
+ if(rc > 0) {
+ buf[rc] = '\0';
+ if (sscanf(buf,"%d", daysleft) != 1 )
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+ else {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "read unix_chkpwd output error %d: %m", rc);
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Fork failed: %m");
+ D(("fork failed"));
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+ close(fds[0]);
+ }
+
+ if (off(UNIX_NOREAP, ctrl)) {
+ sigaction(SIGCHLD, &oldsa, NULL); /* restore old signal handler */
+ }
+
+ D(("Returning %d",retval));
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * PAM framework looks for this entry-point to pass control to the
+ * account management module.
+ */
+
+int
+pam_sm_acct_mgmt(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ unsigned long long ctrl;
+ const void *void_uname;
+ const char *uname;
+ int retval, daysleft = -1;
+ char buf[256];
+
+ D(("called."));
+
+ ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, NULL, NULL, NULL, argc, argv);
+
+ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, &void_uname);
+ uname = void_uname;
+ D(("user = `%s'", uname));
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS || uname == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "could not identify user (from uid=%lu)",
+ (unsigned long int)getuid());
+ return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+
+ retval = _unix_verify_user(pamh, ctrl, uname, &daysleft);
+
+ if (on(UNIX_NO_PASS_EXPIRY, ctrl)) {
+ const void *pretval = NULL;
+ int authrv = PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL; /* authentication not called */
+
+ if (pam_get_data(pamh, "unix_setcred_return", &pretval) == PAM_SUCCESS
+ && pretval)
+ authrv = *(const int *)pretval;
+
+ if (authrv != PAM_SUCCESS
+ && (retval == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD || retval == PAM_AUTHTOK_EXPIRED))
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ switch (retval) {
+ case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+ "account %s has expired (account expired)",
+ uname);
+ _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG,
+ _("Your account has expired; please contact your system administrator."));
+ break;
+ case PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD:
+ if (daysleft == 0) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+ "expired password for user %s (root enforced)",
+ uname);
+ _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG,
+ _("You are required to change your password immediately (administrator enforced)."));
+ } else {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "expired password for user %s (password aged)",
+ uname);
+ _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG,
+ _("You are required to change your password immediately (password expired)."));
+ }
+ break;
+ case PAM_AUTHTOK_EXPIRED:
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+ "account %s has expired (failed to change password)",
+ uname);
+ _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG,
+ _("Your account has expired; please contact your system administrator."));
+ break;
+ case PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR:
+ /*
+ * We ignore "password changed too early" error
+ * as it is relevant only for password change.
+ */
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ /* fallthrough */
+ case PAM_SUCCESS:
+ if (daysleft >= 0) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "password for user %s will expire in %d days",
+ uname, daysleft);
+#if defined HAVE_DNGETTEXT && defined ENABLE_NLS
+ snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf),
+ dngettext(PACKAGE,
+ "Warning: your password will expire in %d day.",
+ "Warning: your password will expire in %d days.",
+ daysleft),
+ daysleft);
+#else
+ if (daysleft == 1)
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof (buf),
+ _("Warning: your password will expire in %d day."),
+ daysleft);
+ else
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof (buf),
+ /* TRANSLATORS: only used if dngettext is not supported */
+ _("Warning: your password will expire in %d days."),
+ daysleft);
+#endif
+ _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_TEXT_INFO, buf);
+ }
+ }
+
+ D(("all done"));
+
+ return retval;
+}
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4eccff8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+/*
+ * pam_unix authentication management
+ *
+ * Copyright Alexander O. Yuriev, 1996. All rights reserved.
+ * NIS+ support by Thorsten Kukuk <kukuk@weber.uni-paderborn.de>
+ * Copyright Jan Rękorajski, 1999. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <security/pam_ext.h>
+
+#include "support.h"
+
+/*
+ * PAM framework looks for these entry-points to pass control to the
+ * authentication module.
+ */
+
+/* Fun starts here :)
+
+ * pam_sm_authenticate() performs UNIX/shadow authentication
+ *
+ * First, if shadow support is available, attempt to perform
+ * authentication using shadow passwords. If shadow is not
+ * available, or user does not have a shadow password, fallback
+ * onto a normal UNIX authentication
+ */
+
+#define AUTH_RETURN \
+do { \
+ D(("recording return code for next time [%d]", \
+ retval)); \
+ *ret_data = retval; \
+ pam_set_data(pamh, "unix_setcred_return", \
+ (void *) ret_data, setcred_free); \
+ D(("done. [%s]", pam_strerror(pamh, retval))); \
+ return retval; \
+} while (0)
+
+
+static void
+setcred_free (pam_handle_t *pamh UNUSED, void *ptr, int err UNUSED)
+{
+ if (ptr)
+ free (ptr);
+}
+
+int
+pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ unsigned long long ctrl;
+ int retval, *ret_data = NULL;
+ const char *name;
+ const char *p;
+
+ D(("called."));
+
+ ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, NULL, NULL, NULL, argc, argv);
+
+ /* Get a few bytes so we can pass our return value to
+ pam_sm_setcred() and pam_sm_acct_mgmt(). */
+ ret_data = malloc(sizeof(int));
+ if (!ret_data) {
+ D(("cannot malloc ret_data"));
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+ "pam_unix_auth: cannot allocate ret_data");
+ return PAM_BUF_ERR;
+ }
+
+ /* get the user'name' */
+
+ retval = pam_get_user(pamh, &name, NULL);
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ /*
+ * Various libraries at various times have had bugs related to
+ * '+' or '-' as the first character of a user name. Don't
+ * allow this characters here.
+ */
+ if (name[0] == '-' || name[0] == '+') {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "bad username [%s]", name);
+ retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+ AUTH_RETURN;
+ }
+ if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl))
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "username [%s] obtained", name);
+ } else {
+ if (retval == PAM_CONV_AGAIN) {
+ D(("pam_get_user/conv() function is not ready yet"));
+ /* it is safe to resume this function so we translate this
+ * retval to the value that indicates we're happy to resume.
+ */
+ retval = PAM_INCOMPLETE;
+ } else if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl)) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "could not obtain username");
+ }
+ AUTH_RETURN;
+ }
+
+ /* if this user does not have a password... */
+
+ if (_unix_blankpasswd(pamh, ctrl, name)) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "user [%s] has blank password; authenticated without it", name);
+ name = NULL;
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ AUTH_RETURN;
+ }
+ /* get this user's authentication token */
+
+ retval = pam_get_authtok(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, &p , NULL);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (retval != PAM_CONV_AGAIN) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+ "auth could not identify password for [%s]", name);
+ } else {
+ D(("conversation function is not ready yet"));
+ /*
+ * it is safe to resume this function so we translate this
+ * retval to the value that indicates we're happy to resume.
+ */
+ retval = PAM_INCOMPLETE;
+ }
+ name = NULL;
+ AUTH_RETURN;
+ }
+ D(("user=%s, password=[%s]", name, p));
+
+ /* verify the password of this user */
+ retval = _unix_verify_password(pamh, name, p, ctrl);
+ name = p = NULL;
+
+ AUTH_RETURN;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * The only thing _pam_set_credentials_unix() does is initialization of
+ * UNIX group IDs.
+ *
+ * Well, everybody but me on linux-pam is convinced that it should not
+ * initialize group IDs, so I am not doing it but don't say that I haven't
+ * warned you. -- AOY
+ */
+
+int
+pam_sm_setcred (pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags,
+ int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ int retval;
+ const void *pretval = NULL;
+ unsigned long long ctrl;
+
+ D(("called."));
+
+ ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, NULL, NULL, NULL, argc, argv);
+
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+ D(("recovering return code from auth call"));
+ /* We will only find something here if UNIX_LIKE_AUTH is set --
+ don't worry about an explicit check of argv. */
+ if (on(UNIX_LIKE_AUTH, ctrl)
+ && pam_get_data(pamh, "unix_setcred_return", &pretval) == PAM_SUCCESS
+ && pretval) {
+ retval = *(const int *)pretval;
+ pam_set_data(pamh, "unix_setcred_return", NULL, NULL);
+ D(("recovered data indicates that old retval was %d", retval));
+ }
+
+ return retval;
+}
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a20e919
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,875 @@
+/*
+ * pam_unix password management
+ *
+ * Main coding by Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>, Red Hat Software.
+ * Copyright (C) 1996.
+ * Copyright (c) Jan Rękorajski, 1999.
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc., 2007, 2008.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <time.h> /* for time() */
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <security/pam_ext.h>
+#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
+
+#include "pam_cc_compat.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "support.h"
+#include "passverify.h"
+#include "bigcrypt.h"
+
+#if (HAVE_YP_GET_DEFAULT_DOMAIN || HAVE_GETDOMAINNAME) && HAVE_YP_MASTER
+# define HAVE_NIS
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NIS
+# include <rpc/rpc.h>
+
+# if HAVE_RPCSVC_YP_PROT_H
+# include <rpcsvc/yp_prot.h>
+# endif
+
+# if HAVE_RPCSVC_YPCLNT_H
+# include <rpcsvc/ypclnt.h>
+# endif
+
+# include "yppasswd.h"
+
+# if !HAVE_DECL_GETRPCPORT &&!HAVE_RPCB_GETADDR
+extern int getrpcport(const char *host, unsigned long prognum,
+ unsigned long versnum, unsigned int proto);
+# endif /* GNU libc 2.1 */
+#endif
+
+/*
+ How it works:
+ Gets in username (has to be done) from the calling program
+ Does authentication of user (only if we are not running as root)
+ Gets new password/checks for sanity
+ Sets it.
+ */
+
+#define MAX_PASSWD_TRIES 3
+
+#ifdef HAVE_NIS
+#ifdef HAVE_RPCB_GETADDR
+static unsigned short
+__taddr2port (const struct netconfig *nconf, const struct netbuf *nbuf)
+{
+ unsigned short port = 0;
+ struct __rpc_sockinfo si;
+ struct sockaddr_in *sin;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
+ if (!__rpc_nconf2sockinfo(nconf, &si))
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (si.si_af)
+ {
+ case AF_INET:
+ sin = nbuf->buf;
+ port = sin->sin_port;
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+ sin6 = nbuf->buf;
+ port = sin6->sin6_port;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return htons (port);
+}
+#endif
+
+static char *getNISserver(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned long long ctrl)
+{
+ char *master;
+ char *domainname;
+ int port, err;
+#if defined(HAVE_RPCB_GETADDR)
+ struct netconfig *nconf;
+ struct netbuf svcaddr;
+ char addrbuf[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+ void *handle;
+ int found;
+#endif
+
+
+#ifdef HAVE_YP_GET_DEFAULT_DOMAIN
+ if ((err = yp_get_default_domain(&domainname)) != 0) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "can't get local yp domain: %s",
+ yperr_string(err));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#elif defined(HAVE_GETDOMAINNAME)
+ char domainname_res[256];
+
+ if (getdomainname (domainname_res, sizeof (domainname_res)) == 0)
+ {
+ if (strcmp (domainname_res, "(none)") == 0)
+ {
+ /* If domainname is not set, some systems will return "(none)" */
+ domainname_res[0] = '\0';
+ }
+ domainname = domainname_res;
+ }
+ else domainname = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if ((err = yp_master(domainname, "passwd.byname", &master)) != 0) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "can't find the master ypserver: %s",
+ yperr_string(err));
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_RPCB_GETADDR
+ svcaddr.len = 0;
+ svcaddr.maxlen = sizeof (addrbuf);
+ svcaddr.buf = addrbuf;
+ port = 0;
+ found = 0;
+
+ handle = setnetconfig();
+ while ((nconf = getnetconfig(handle)) != NULL) {
+ if (!strcmp(nconf->nc_proto, "udp")) {
+ if (rpcb_getaddr(YPPASSWDPROG, YPPASSWDPROC_UPDATE,
+ nconf, &svcaddr, master)) {
+ port = __taddr2port (nconf, &svcaddr);
+ endnetconfig (handle);
+ found=1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (rpc_createerr.cf_stat != RPC_UNKNOWNHOST) {
+ clnt_pcreateerror (master);
+ pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "rpcb_getaddr (%s) failed!", master);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!found) {
+ pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "Cannot find suitable transport for protocol 'udp'");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#else
+ port = getrpcport(master, YPPASSWDPROG, YPPASSWDPROC_UPDATE, IPPROTO_UDP);
+#endif
+ if (port == 0) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING,
+ "yppasswdd not running on NIS master host");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (port >= IPPORT_RESERVED) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING,
+ "yppasswd daemon running on illegal port");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl)) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "Use NIS server on %s with port %d",
+ master, port);
+ }
+ return master;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+
+static int _unix_run_update_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned long long ctrl, const char *user,
+ const char *fromwhat, const char *towhat, int remember)
+{
+ int retval, child, fds[2];
+ struct sigaction newsa, oldsa;
+
+ D(("called."));
+ /* create a pipe for the password */
+ if (pipe(fds) != 0) {
+ D(("could not make pipe"));
+ return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+
+ if (off(UNIX_NOREAP, ctrl)) {
+ /*
+ * This code arranges that the demise of the child does not cause
+ * the application to receive a signal it is not expecting - which
+ * may kill the application or worse.
+ *
+ * The "noreap" module argument is provided so that the admin can
+ * override this behavior.
+ */
+ memset(&newsa, '\0', sizeof(newsa));
+ newsa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
+ sigaction(SIGCHLD, &newsa, &oldsa);
+ }
+
+ /* fork */
+ child = fork();
+ if (child == 0) {
+ static char *envp[] = { NULL };
+ const char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
+ char buffer[16];
+
+ /* XXX - should really tidy up PAM here too */
+
+ /* reopen stdin as pipe */
+ if (dup2(fds[0], STDIN_FILENO) != STDIN_FILENO) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "dup2 of %s failed: %m", "stdin");
+ _exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL);
+ }
+
+ if (pam_modutil_sanitize_helper_fds(pamh, PAM_MODUTIL_IGNORE_FD,
+ PAM_MODUTIL_PIPE_FD,
+ PAM_MODUTIL_PIPE_FD) < 0) {
+ _exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL);
+ }
+
+ /* exec binary helper */
+ args[0] = UPDATE_HELPER;
+ args[1] = user;
+ args[2] = "update";
+ if (on(UNIX_SHADOW, ctrl))
+ args[3] = "1";
+ else
+ args[3] = "0";
+
+ snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%d", remember);
+ args[4] = buffer;
+
+ DIAG_PUSH_IGNORE_CAST_QUAL;
+ execve(UPDATE_HELPER, (char *const *) args, envp);
+ DIAG_POP_IGNORE_CAST_QUAL;
+
+ /* should not get here: exit with error */
+ D(("helper binary is not available"));
+ _exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL);
+ } else if (child > 0) {
+ /* wait for child */
+ /* if the stored password is NULL */
+ int rc=0;
+ if (fromwhat) {
+ int len = strlen(fromwhat);
+
+ if (len > PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE)
+ len = PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE;
+ pam_modutil_write(fds[1], fromwhat, len);
+ }
+ pam_modutil_write(fds[1], "", 1);
+ if (towhat) {
+ int len = strlen(towhat);
+
+ if (len > PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE)
+ len = PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE;
+ pam_modutil_write(fds[1], towhat, len);
+ }
+ pam_modutil_write(fds[1], "", 1);
+
+ close(fds[0]); /* close here to avoid possible SIGPIPE above */
+ close(fds[1]);
+ /* wait for helper to complete: */
+ while ((rc=waitpid(child, &retval, 0)) < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+ if (rc<0) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_update waitpid failed: %m");
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ } else if (!WIFEXITED(retval)) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_update abnormal exit: %d", retval);
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ } else {
+ retval = WEXITSTATUS(retval);
+ }
+ } else {
+ D(("fork failed"));
+ close(fds[0]);
+ close(fds[1]);
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+
+ if (off(UNIX_NOREAP, ctrl)) {
+ sigaction(SIGCHLD, &oldsa, NULL); /* restore old signal handler */
+ }
+
+ return retval;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int check_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *newpass)
+{
+ static char buf[16384];
+ char *s_pas;
+ int retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ FILE *opwfile;
+ size_t len = strlen(forwho);
+
+ opwfile = fopen(OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE, "r");
+ if (opwfile == NULL)
+ return PAM_ABORT;
+
+ while (fgets(buf, 16380, opwfile)) {
+ if (!strncmp(buf, forwho, len) && (buf[len] == ':' ||
+ buf[len] == ',')) {
+ char *sptr;
+ buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+ /* s_luser = */ strtok_r(buf, ":,", &sptr);
+ /* s_uid = */ strtok_r(NULL, ":,", &sptr);
+ /* s_npas = */ strtok_r(NULL, ":,", &sptr);
+ s_pas = strtok_r(NULL, ":,", &sptr);
+ while (s_pas != NULL) {
+ char *md5pass = Goodcrypt_md5(newpass, s_pas);
+ if (md5pass == NULL || !strcmp(md5pass, s_pas)) {
+ _pam_delete(md5pass);
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ break;
+ }
+ s_pas = strtok_r(NULL, ":,", &sptr);
+ _pam_delete(md5pass);
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ fclose(opwfile);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static int _do_setpass(pam_handle_t* pamh, const char *forwho,
+ const char *fromwhat,
+ char *towhat, unsigned long long ctrl, int remember)
+{
+ struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+ int retval = 0;
+ int unlocked = 0;
+
+ D(("called"));
+
+ pwd = getpwnam(forwho);
+
+ if (pwd == NULL) {
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (on(UNIX_NIS, ctrl) && _unix_comesfromsource(pamh, forwho, 0, 1)) {
+#ifdef HAVE_NIS
+ char *master;
+
+ if ((master=getNISserver(pamh, ctrl)) != NULL) {
+ struct timeval timeout;
+ struct yppasswd yppwd;
+ CLIENT *clnt;
+ int status;
+ enum clnt_stat err;
+
+ /* Unlock passwd file to avoid deadlock */
+ unlock_pwdf();
+ unlocked = 1;
+
+ /* Initialize password information */
+ yppwd.newpw.pw_passwd = pwd->pw_passwd;
+ yppwd.newpw.pw_name = pwd->pw_name;
+ yppwd.newpw.pw_uid = pwd->pw_uid;
+ yppwd.newpw.pw_gid = pwd->pw_gid;
+ yppwd.newpw.pw_gecos = pwd->pw_gecos;
+ yppwd.newpw.pw_dir = pwd->pw_dir;
+ yppwd.newpw.pw_shell = pwd->pw_shell;
+ yppwd.oldpass = fromwhat ? strdup (fromwhat) : strdup ("");
+ yppwd.newpw.pw_passwd = towhat;
+
+ D(("Set password %s for %s", yppwd.newpw.pw_passwd, forwho));
+
+ /* The yppasswd.x file said `unix authentication required',
+ * so I added it. This is the only reason it is in here.
+ * My yppasswdd doesn't use it, but maybe some others out there
+ * do. --okir
+ */
+ clnt = clnt_create(master, YPPASSWDPROG, YPPASSWDVERS, "udp");
+ clnt->cl_auth = authunix_create_default();
+ memset((char *) &status, '\0', sizeof(status));
+ timeout.tv_sec = 25;
+ timeout.tv_usec = 0;
+ err = clnt_call(clnt, YPPASSWDPROC_UPDATE,
+ (xdrproc_t) xdr_yppasswd, (char *) &yppwd,
+ (xdrproc_t) xdr_int, (char *) &status,
+ timeout);
+
+ free (yppwd.oldpass);
+
+ if (err) {
+ _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_TEXT_INFO,
+ clnt_sperrno(err));
+ } else if (status) {
+ D(("Error while changing NIS password.\n"));
+ }
+ D(("The password has%s been changed on %s.",
+ (err || status) ? " not" : "", master));
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "password%s changed for %s on %s",
+ (err || status) ? " not" : "", pwd->pw_name, master);
+
+ auth_destroy(clnt->cl_auth);
+ clnt_destroy(clnt);
+ if (err || status) {
+ _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_TEXT_INFO,
+ _("NIS password could not be changed."));
+ retval = PAM_TRY_AGAIN;
+ }
+#ifdef PAM_DEBUG
+ sleep(5);
+#endif
+ } else {
+ retval = PAM_TRY_AGAIN;
+ }
+#else
+ if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl)) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "No NIS support available");
+ }
+
+ retval = PAM_TRY_AGAIN;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (_unix_comesfromsource(pamh, forwho, 1, 0)) {
+ if(unlocked) {
+ if (lock_pwdf() != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
+ }
+ }
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (unix_selinux_confined())
+ return _unix_run_update_binary(pamh, ctrl, forwho, fromwhat, towhat, remember);
+#endif
+ /* first, save old password */
+ if (save_old_password(pamh, forwho, fromwhat, remember)) {
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (on(UNIX_SHADOW, ctrl) || is_pwd_shadowed(pwd)) {
+ retval = unix_update_shadow(pamh, forwho, towhat);
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS)
+ if (!is_pwd_shadowed(pwd))
+ retval = unix_update_passwd(pamh, forwho, "x");
+ } else {
+ retval = unix_update_passwd(pamh, forwho, towhat);
+ }
+ }
+
+
+done:
+ unlock_pwdf();
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static int _unix_verify_shadow(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *user, unsigned long long ctrl)
+{
+ struct passwd *pwent = NULL; /* Password and shadow password */
+ struct spwd *spent = NULL; /* file entries for the user */
+ int daysleft;
+ int retval;
+
+ retval = get_account_info(pamh, user, &pwent, &spent);
+ if (retval == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) {
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS && spent == NULL)
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+ if (retval == PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER) {
+ retval = _unix_run_verify_binary(pamh, ctrl, user, &daysleft);
+ if (retval == PAM_AUTH_ERR || retval == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN)
+ return retval;
+ }
+ else if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS)
+ retval = check_shadow_expiry(pamh, spent, &daysleft);
+
+ if (on(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl) || retval == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD)
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static int _pam_unix_approve_pass(pam_handle_t * pamh
+ ,unsigned long long ctrl
+ ,const char *pass_old
+ ,const char *pass_new,
+ int pass_min_len)
+{
+ const void *user;
+ const char *remark = NULL;
+ int retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+ D(("&new=%p, &old=%p", pass_old, pass_new));
+ D(("new=[%s]", pass_new));
+ D(("old=[%s]", pass_old));
+
+ if (pass_new == NULL || (pass_old && !strcmp(pass_old, pass_new))) {
+ if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl)) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "bad authentication token");
+ }
+ _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG, pass_new == NULL ?
+ _("No password has been supplied.") :
+ _("The password has not been changed."));
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ /*
+ * if one wanted to hardwire authentication token strength
+ * checking this would be the place - AGM
+ */
+
+ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, &user);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl)) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Can not get username");
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (strlen(pass_new) > PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE) {
+ remark = _("You must choose a shorter password.");
+ D(("length exceeded [%s]", remark));
+ } else if (off(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl)) {
+ if ((int)strlen(pass_new) < pass_min_len)
+ remark = _("You must choose a longer password.");
+ D(("length check [%s]", remark));
+ if (on(UNIX_REMEMBER_PASSWD, ctrl)) {
+ if ((retval = check_old_password(user, pass_new)) == PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR)
+ remark = _("Password has been already used. Choose another.");
+ if (retval == PAM_ABORT) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "can't open %s file to check old passwords",
+ OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE);
+ return retval;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (remark) {
+ _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG, remark);
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+int
+pam_sm_chauthtok(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ unsigned long long ctrl, lctrl;
+ int retval;
+ int remember = -1;
+ int rounds = 0;
+ int pass_min_len = 0;
+
+ /* <DO NOT free() THESE> */
+ const char *user;
+ const void *item;
+ const char *pass_old, *pass_new;
+ /* </DO NOT free() THESE> */
+
+ D(("called."));
+
+ ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, &remember, &rounds, &pass_min_len,
+ argc, argv);
+
+ /*
+ * First get the name of a user
+ */
+ retval = pam_get_user(pamh, &user, NULL);
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ /*
+ * Various libraries at various times have had bugs related to
+ * '+' or '-' as the first character of a user name. Don't
+ * allow them.
+ */
+ if (user[0] == '-' || user[0] == '+') {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "bad username [%s]", user);
+ return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS && on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl))
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "username [%s] obtained",
+ user);
+ } else {
+ if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl))
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "password - could not identify user");
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ D(("Got username of %s", user));
+
+ /*
+ * Before we do anything else, check to make sure that the user's
+ * info is in one of the databases we can modify from this module,
+ * which currently is 'files' and 'nis'. We have to do this because
+ * getpwnam() doesn't tell you *where* the information it gives you
+ * came from, nor should it. That's our job.
+ */
+ if (_unix_comesfromsource(pamh, user, 1, on(UNIX_NIS, ctrl)) == 0) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "user \"%s\" does not exist in /etc/passwd%s",
+ user, on(UNIX_NIS, ctrl) ? " or NIS" : "");
+ return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+ } else {
+ struct passwd *pwd;
+ _unix_getpwnam(pamh, user, 1, 1, &pwd);
+ if (pwd == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "user \"%s\" has corrupted passwd entry",
+ user);
+ return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This is not an AUTH module!
+ */
+ if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl))
+ set(UNIX__NULLOK, ctrl);
+
+ if (on(UNIX__PRELIM, ctrl)) {
+ /*
+ * obtain and verify the current password (OLDAUTHTOK) for
+ * the user.
+ */
+ D(("prelim check"));
+
+ if (_unix_blankpasswd(pamh, ctrl, user)) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else if (off(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl) ||
+ (on(UNIX_NIS, ctrl) && _unix_comesfromsource(pamh, user, 0, 1))) {
+ /* instruct user what is happening */
+ if (off(UNIX__QUIET, ctrl)) {
+ retval = pam_info(pamh, _("Changing password for %s."), user);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ return retval;
+ }
+ retval = pam_get_authtok(pamh, PAM_OLDAUTHTOK, &pass_old, NULL);
+
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+ "password - (old) token not obtained");
+ return retval;
+ }
+ /* verify that this is the password for this user */
+
+ retval = _unix_verify_password(pamh, user, pass_old, ctrl);
+ } else {
+ D(("process run by root so do nothing this time around"));
+ pass_old = NULL;
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS; /* root doesn't have too */
+ }
+
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ D(("Authentication failed"));
+ pass_old = NULL;
+ return retval;
+ }
+ pass_old = NULL;
+ retval = _unix_verify_shadow(pamh,user, ctrl);
+ if (retval == PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR) {
+ if (off(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl))
+ _make_remark(pamh, ctrl, PAM_ERROR_MSG,
+ _("You must wait longer to change your password."));
+ else
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ } else if (on(UNIX__UPDATE, ctrl)) {
+ /*
+ * tpass is used below to store the _pam_md() return; it
+ * should be _pam_delete()'d.
+ */
+
+ char *tpass = NULL;
+ int retry = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * obtain the proposed password
+ */
+
+ D(("do update"));
+
+ /*
+ * get the old token back. NULL was ok only if root [at this
+ * point we assume that this has already been enforced on a
+ * previous call to this function].
+ */
+
+ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_OLDAUTHTOK, &item);
+
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "user not authenticated");
+ return retval;
+ }
+ pass_old = item;
+ D(("pass_old [%s]", pass_old));
+
+ D(("get new password now"));
+
+ lctrl = ctrl;
+
+ if (on(UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK, lctrl)) {
+ set(UNIX_USE_FIRST_PASS, lctrl);
+ }
+ if (on(UNIX_USE_FIRST_PASS, lctrl)) {
+ retry = MAX_PASSWD_TRIES-1;
+ }
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ while ((retval != PAM_SUCCESS) && (retry++ < MAX_PASSWD_TRIES)) {
+ /*
+ * use_authtok is to force the use of a previously entered
+ * password -- needed for pluggable password strength checking
+ */
+
+ retval = pam_get_authtok(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, &pass_new, NULL);
+
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl)) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "password - new password not obtained");
+ }
+ pass_old = NULL; /* tidy up */
+ return retval;
+ }
+ D(("returned to _unix_chauthtok"));
+
+ /*
+ * At this point we know who the user is and what they
+ * propose as their new password. Verify that the new
+ * password is acceptable.
+ */
+
+ if (*(const char *)pass_new == '\0') { /* "\0" password = NULL */
+ pass_new = NULL;
+ }
+ retval = _pam_unix_approve_pass(pamh, ctrl, pass_old,
+ pass_new, pass_min_len);
+
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_AUTHTOK, NULL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+ "new password not acceptable");
+ pass_new = pass_old = NULL; /* tidy up */
+ return retval;
+ }
+ if (lock_pwdf() != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
+ }
+
+ if (pass_old) {
+ retval = _unix_verify_password(pamh, user, pass_old, ctrl);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "user password changed by another process");
+ unlock_pwdf();
+ return retval;
+ }
+ }
+
+ retval = _unix_verify_shadow(pamh, user, ctrl);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "user shadow entry expired");
+ unlock_pwdf();
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ retval = _pam_unix_approve_pass(pamh, ctrl, pass_old, pass_new,
+ pass_min_len);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+ "new password not acceptable 2");
+ pass_new = pass_old = NULL; /* tidy up */
+ unlock_pwdf();
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * By reaching here we have approved the passwords and must now
+ * rebuild the password database file.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * First we encrypt the new password.
+ */
+
+ tpass = create_password_hash(pamh, pass_new, ctrl, rounds);
+ if (tpass == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+ "crypt() failure or out of memory for password");
+ pass_new = pass_old = NULL; /* tidy up */
+ unlock_pwdf();
+ return PAM_BUF_ERR;
+ }
+
+ D(("password processed"));
+
+ /* update the password database(s) -- race conditions..? */
+
+ retval = _do_setpass(pamh, user, pass_old, tpass, ctrl,
+ remember);
+ /* _do_setpass has called unlock_pwdf for us */
+
+ _pam_delete(tpass);
+ pass_old = pass_new = NULL;
+ } else { /* something has broken with the module */
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+ "password received unknown request");
+ retval = PAM_ABORT;
+ }
+
+ D(("retval was %d", retval));
+
+ return retval;
+}
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3f6a8fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_sess.c
@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+/*
+ * pam_unix session management
+ *
+ * Copyright Alexander O. Yuriev, 1996. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright Jan Rękorajski, 1999. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <security/pam_ext.h>
+#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
+
+#include "support.h"
+
+/*
+ * PAM framework looks for these entry-points to pass control to the
+ * session module.
+ */
+
+int
+pam_sm_open_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ char *user_name, *service;
+ unsigned long long ctrl;
+ int retval;
+ const char *login_name;
+
+ D(("called."));
+
+ ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, NULL, NULL, NULL, argc, argv);
+
+ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user_name);
+ if (user_name == NULL || *user_name == '\0' || retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "open_session - error recovering username");
+ return PAM_SESSION_ERR; /* How did we get authenticated with
+ no username?! */
+ }
+ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_SERVICE, (void *) &service);
+ if (service == NULL || *service == '\0' || retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+ "open_session - error recovering service");
+ return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ }
+ login_name = pam_modutil_getlogin(pamh);
+ if (login_name == NULL) {
+ login_name = "";
+ }
+ if (off (UNIX_QUIET, ctrl)) {
+ char uid[32];
+ struct passwd *pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam (pamh, user_name);
+ if (pwd == NULL) {
+ snprintf (uid, 32, "getpwnam error");
+ }
+ else {
+ snprintf (uid, 32, "%u", pwd->pw_uid);
+ }
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "session opened for user %s(uid=%s) by %s(uid=%lu)", user_name, uid, login_name, (unsigned long)getuid());
+ }
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+int
+pam_sm_close_session(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
+{
+ char *user_name, *service;
+ unsigned long long ctrl;
+ int retval;
+
+ D(("called."));
+
+ ctrl = _set_ctrl(pamh, flags, NULL, NULL, NULL, argc, argv);
+
+ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user_name);
+ if (user_name == NULL || *user_name == '\0' || retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "close_session - error recovering username");
+ return PAM_SESSION_ERR; /* How did we get authenticated with
+ no username?! */
+ }
+ retval = pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_SERVICE, (void *) &service);
+ if (service == NULL || *service == '\0' || retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+ "close_session - error recovering service");
+ return PAM_SESSION_ERR;
+ }
+ if (off (UNIX_QUIET, ctrl))
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_INFO, "session closed for user %s",
+ user_name);
+
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2474a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1211 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright information at end of file.
+ */
+#include "config.h"
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include "support.h"
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H
+#include <crypt.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "pam_cc_compat.h"
+#include "pam_inline.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "bigcrypt.h"
+#include "passverify.h"
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED (is_selinux_enabled()>0)
+#else
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED 0
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+#define pam_modutil_getpwnam(h,n) getpwnam(n)
+#define pam_modutil_getspnam(h,n) getspnam(n)
+#define pam_syslog(h,a,b,c) helper_log_err(a,b,c)
+#else
+#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
+#include <security/pam_ext.h>
+#endif
+
+#if defined(USE_LCKPWDF) && !defined(HAVE_LCKPWDF)
+# include "./lckpwdf.-c"
+#endif
+
+static void
+strip_hpux_aging(char *hash)
+{
+ static const char valid[] = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
+ "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
+ "0123456789./";
+ if ((*hash != '$') && (strlen(hash) > 13)) {
+ for (hash += 13; *hash != '\0'; hash++) {
+ if (strchr(valid, *hash) == NULL) {
+ *hash = '\0';
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+PAMH_ARG_DECL(int verify_pwd_hash,
+ const char *p, char *hash, unsigned int nullok)
+{
+ size_t hash_len;
+ char *pp = NULL;
+ int retval;
+ D(("called"));
+
+ strip_hpux_aging(hash);
+ hash_len = strlen(hash);
+ if (!hash_len) {
+ /* the stored password is NULL */
+ if (nullok) { /* this means we've succeeded */
+ D(("user has empty password - access granted"));
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ D(("user has empty password - access denied"));
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+ } else if (!p || *hash == '*' || *hash == '!') {
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ } else {
+ if (pam_str_skip_prefix(hash, "$1$") != NULL) {
+ pp = Goodcrypt_md5(p, hash);
+ if (pp && strcmp(pp, hash) != 0) {
+ _pam_delete(pp);
+ pp = Brokencrypt_md5(p, hash);
+ }
+ } else if (*hash != '$' && hash_len >= 13) {
+ pp = bigcrypt(p, hash);
+ if (pp && hash_len == 13 && strlen(pp) > hash_len) {
+ _pam_overwrite(pp + hash_len);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Ok, we don't know the crypt algorithm, but maybe
+ * libcrypt knows about it? We should try it.
+ */
+#if defined(CRYPT_CHECKSALT_AVAILABLE) && CRYPT_CHECKSALT_AVAILABLE
+ /* Get the status of the hash from checksalt */
+ int retval_checksalt = crypt_checksalt(hash);
+
+ /*
+ * Check for hashing methods that are disabled by
+ * libcrypt configuration and/or system preset.
+ */
+ if (retval_checksalt == CRYPT_SALT_METHOD_DISABLED) {
+ /*
+ * pam_syslog() needs a pam handle,
+ * but that's not available here.
+ */
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "The support for password hash \"%.6s\" "
+ "has been disabled in libcrypt "
+ "configuration.",
+ hash);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check for malformed hashes, like descrypt hashes
+ * starting with "$2...", which might have been
+ * generated by unsafe base64 encoding functions
+ * as used in glibc <= 2.16.
+ * Such hashes are likely to be rejected by many
+ * recent implementations of libcrypt.
+ */
+ if (retval_checksalt == CRYPT_SALT_INVALID) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "The password hash \"%.6s\" is unknown to "
+ "libcrypt.",
+ hash);
+ }
+#else
+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
+ (void)pamh;
+#endif
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+ struct crypt_data *cdata;
+ cdata = malloc(sizeof(*cdata));
+ if (cdata != NULL) {
+ cdata->initialized = 0;
+ pp = x_strdup(crypt_r(p, hash, cdata));
+ memset(cdata, '\0', sizeof(*cdata));
+ free(cdata);
+ }
+#else
+ pp = x_strdup(crypt(p, hash));
+#endif
+ }
+ p = NULL; /* no longer needed here */
+
+ /* the moment of truth -- do we agree with the password? */
+ D(("comparing state of pp[%s] and hash[%s]", pp, hash));
+
+ if (pp && strcmp(pp, hash) == 0) {
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (pp)
+ _pam_delete(pp);
+ D(("done [%d].", retval));
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+int
+is_pwd_shadowed(const struct passwd *pwd)
+{
+ if (pwd != NULL) {
+ if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "x") == 0) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if ((pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '#') &&
+ (pwd->pw_passwd[1] == '#') &&
+ (strcmp(pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_passwd + 2) == 0)) {
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+PAMH_ARG_DECL(int get_account_info,
+ const char *name, struct passwd **pwd, struct spwd **spwdent)
+{
+ /* UNIX passwords area */
+ *pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, name); /* Get password file entry... */
+ *spwdent = NULL;
+
+ if (*pwd != NULL) {
+ if (strcmp((*pwd)->pw_passwd, "*NP*") == 0)
+ { /* NIS+ */
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+ uid_t save_euid, save_uid;
+
+ save_euid = geteuid();
+ save_uid = getuid();
+ if (save_uid == (*pwd)->pw_uid) {
+ if (setreuid(save_euid, save_uid))
+ return PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT;
+ } else {
+ if (setreuid(0, -1))
+ return PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT;
+ if (setreuid(-1, (*pwd)->pw_uid)) {
+ if (setreuid(-1, 0)
+ || setreuid(0, -1)
+ || setreuid(-1, (*pwd)->pw_uid)) {
+ return PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ *spwdent = pam_modutil_getspnam(pamh, name);
+ if (save_uid == (*pwd)->pw_uid) {
+ if (setreuid(save_uid, save_euid))
+ return PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT;
+ } else {
+ if (setreuid(-1, 0)
+ || setreuid(save_uid, -1)
+ || setreuid(-1, save_euid))
+ return PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT;
+ }
+
+ if (*spwdent == NULL || (*spwdent)->sp_pwdp == NULL)
+ return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
+#else
+ /* we must run helper for NIS+ passwords */
+ return PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER;
+#endif
+ } else if (is_pwd_shadowed(*pwd)) {
+ /*
+ * ...and shadow password file entry for this user,
+ * if shadowing is enabled
+ */
+ *spwdent = pam_modutil_getspnam(pamh, name);
+ if (*spwdent == NULL) {
+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
+ /* still a chance the user can authenticate */
+ return PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER;
+#endif
+ return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
+ }
+ if ((*spwdent)->sp_pwdp == NULL)
+ return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+ }
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+PAMH_ARG_DECL(int get_pwd_hash,
+ const char *name, struct passwd **pwd, char **hash)
+{
+ int retval;
+ struct spwd *spwdent = NULL;
+
+ retval = get_account_info(PAMH_ARG(name, pwd, &spwdent));
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ if (spwdent)
+ *hash = x_strdup(spwdent->sp_pwdp);
+ else
+ *hash = x_strdup((*pwd)->pw_passwd);
+ if (*hash == NULL)
+ return PAM_BUF_ERR;
+
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+PAMH_ARG_DECL(int check_shadow_expiry,
+ struct spwd *spent, int *daysleft)
+{
+ long int curdays;
+ *daysleft = -1;
+ curdays = (long int)(time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24));
+ D(("today is %d, last change %d", curdays, spent->sp_lstchg));
+ if ((curdays >= spent->sp_expire) && (spent->sp_expire != -1)) {
+ D(("account expired"));
+ return PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
+ }
+ if (spent->sp_lstchg == 0) {
+ D(("need a new password"));
+ *daysleft = 0;
+ return PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD;
+ }
+ if (curdays < spent->sp_lstchg) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG,
+ "account %s has password changed in future",
+ spent->sp_namp);
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ if ((curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max)
+ && (curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_inact)
+ && (curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max + spent->sp_inact)
+ && (spent->sp_max != -1) && (spent->sp_inact != -1)) {
+ *daysleft = (int)((spent->sp_lstchg + spent->sp_max) - curdays);
+ D(("authtok expired"));
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_EXPIRED;
+ }
+ if ((curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max) && (spent->sp_max != -1)) {
+ D(("need a new password 2"));
+ return PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD;
+ }
+ if ((curdays - spent->sp_lstchg > spent->sp_max - spent->sp_warn)
+ && (spent->sp_max != -1) && (spent->sp_warn != -1)) {
+ *daysleft = (int)((spent->sp_lstchg + spent->sp_max) - curdays);
+ D(("warn before expiry"));
+ }
+ if ((curdays - spent->sp_lstchg < spent->sp_min)
+ && (spent->sp_min != -1)) {
+ /*
+ * The last password change was too recent. This error will be ignored
+ * if no password change is attempted.
+ */
+ D(("password change too recent"));
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+/* passwd/salt conversion macros */
+
+#define PW_TMPFILE "/etc/npasswd"
+#define SH_TMPFILE "/etc/nshadow"
+#define OPW_TMPFILE "/etc/security/nopasswd"
+
+/*
+ * i64c - convert an integer to a radix 64 character
+ */
+static int
+i64c(int i)
+{
+ if (i < 0)
+ return ('.');
+ else if (i > 63)
+ return ('z');
+ if (i == 0)
+ return ('.');
+ if (i == 1)
+ return ('/');
+ if (i >= 2 && i <= 11)
+ return ('0' - 2 + i);
+ if (i >= 12 && i <= 37)
+ return ('A' - 12 + i);
+ if (i >= 38 && i <= 63)
+ return ('a' - 38 + i);
+ return ('\0');
+}
+
+/* <where> must point to a buffer of at least <length>+1 length */
+static void
+crypt_make_salt(char *where, int length)
+{
+ struct timeval tv;
+ MD5_CTX ctx;
+ unsigned char tmp[16];
+ unsigned char *src = (unsigned char *)where;
+ int i;
+#ifdef PAM_PATH_RANDOMDEV
+ int fd;
+ int rv;
+
+ if ((rv = fd = open(PAM_PATH_RANDOMDEV, O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
+ while ((rv = read(fd, where, length)) != length && errno == EINTR);
+ close (fd);
+ }
+ if (rv != length) {
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Code lifted from Marek Michalkiewicz's shadow suite. (CG)
+ * removed use of static variables (AGM)
+ *
+ * will work correctly only for length <= 16 */
+ src = tmp;
+ GoodMD5Init(&ctx);
+ gettimeofday(&tv, (struct timezone *) 0);
+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &tv, sizeof tv);
+ i = getpid();
+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
+ i = clock();
+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, src, length);
+ GoodMD5Final(tmp, &ctx);
+#ifdef PAM_PATH_RANDOMDEV
+ }
+#endif
+ for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
+ *where++ = i64c(src[i] & 077);
+ *where = '\0';
+}
+
+char *
+crypt_md5_wrapper(const char *pass_new)
+{
+ unsigned char result[16];
+ char *cp = (char *) result;
+
+ cp = stpcpy(cp, "$1$"); /* magic for the MD5 */
+ crypt_make_salt(cp, 8);
+
+ /* no longer need cleartext */
+ cp = Goodcrypt_md5(pass_new, (const char *) result);
+ pass_new = NULL;
+
+ return cp;
+}
+
+PAMH_ARG_DECL(char * create_password_hash,
+ const char *password, unsigned long long ctrl, int rounds)
+{
+ const char *algoid;
+#if defined(CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE) && CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE > 64
+ /* Strings returned by crypt_gensalt_rn will be no longer than this. */
+ char salt[CRYPT_GENSALT_OUTPUT_SIZE];
+#else
+ char salt[64]; /* contains rounds number + max 16 bytes of salt + algo id */
+#endif
+ char *sp;
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+ struct crypt_data *cdata = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (on(UNIX_MD5_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ /* algoid = "$1" */
+ return crypt_md5_wrapper(password);
+ } else if (on(UNIX_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ algoid = "$y$";
+ } else if (on(UNIX_GOST_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ algoid = "$gy$";
+ } else if (on(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ algoid = "$2b$";
+ } else if (on(UNIX_SHA256_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ algoid = "$5$";
+ } else if (on(UNIX_SHA512_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ algoid = "$6$";
+ } else { /* must be crypt/bigcrypt */
+ char tmppass[9];
+ char *hashed;
+
+ crypt_make_salt(salt, 2);
+ if (off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT, ctrl) && strlen(password) > 8) {
+ strncpy(tmppass, password, sizeof(tmppass)-1);
+ tmppass[sizeof(tmppass)-1] = '\0';
+ password = tmppass;
+ }
+ hashed = bigcrypt(password, salt);
+ memset(tmppass, '\0', sizeof(tmppass));
+ password = NULL;
+ return hashed;
+ }
+
+#if defined(CRYPT_GENSALT_IMPLEMENTS_AUTO_ENTROPY) && CRYPT_GENSALT_IMPLEMENTS_AUTO_ENTROPY
+ /*
+ * Any version of libcrypt supporting auto entropy is
+ * guaranteed to have crypt_gensalt_rn().
+ */
+ sp = crypt_gensalt_rn(algoid, rounds, NULL, 0, salt, sizeof(salt));
+#else
+ sp = stpcpy(salt, algoid);
+ if (on(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl)) {
+ sp += snprintf(sp, sizeof(salt) - (16 + 1 + (sp - salt)), "rounds=%u$", rounds);
+ }
+ crypt_make_salt(sp, 16);
+#endif /* CRYPT_GENSALT_IMPLEMENTS_AUTO_ENTROPY */
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+ sp = NULL;
+ cdata = malloc(sizeof(*cdata));
+ if (cdata != NULL) {
+ cdata->initialized = 0;
+ sp = crypt_r(password, salt, cdata);
+ }
+#else
+ sp = crypt(password, salt);
+#endif
+ if (!sp || strncmp(algoid, sp, strlen(algoid)) != 0) {
+ /* libxcrypt/libc doesn't know the algorithm, error out */
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "Algo %s not supported by the crypto backend.\n",
+ on(UNIX_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl) ? "yescrypt" :
+ on(UNIX_GOST_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl) ? "gost_yescrypt" :
+ on(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS, ctrl) ? "blowfish" :
+ on(UNIX_SHA256_PASS, ctrl) ? "sha256" :
+ on(UNIX_SHA512_PASS, ctrl) ? "sha512" : algoid);
+ if(sp) {
+ memset(sp, '\0', strlen(sp));
+ }
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+ free(cdata);
+#endif
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ sp = x_strdup(sp);
+#ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_R
+ free(cdata);
+#endif
+ return sp;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+int
+unix_selinux_confined(void)
+{
+ static int confined = -1;
+ int fd;
+ char tempfile[]="/etc/.pwdXXXXXX";
+
+ if (confined != -1)
+ return confined;
+
+ /* cannot be confined without SELinux enabled */
+ if (!SELINUX_ENABLED){
+ confined = 0;
+ return confined;
+ }
+
+ /* let's try opening shadow read only */
+ if ((fd=open("/etc/shadow", O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
+ close(fd);
+ confined = 0;
+ return confined;
+ }
+
+ if (errno == EACCES) {
+ confined = 1;
+ return confined;
+ }
+
+ /* shadow opening failed because of other reasons let's try
+ creating a file in /etc */
+ if ((fd=mkstemp(tempfile)) != -1) {
+ unlink(tempfile);
+ close(fd);
+ confined = 0;
+ return confined;
+ }
+
+ confined = 1;
+ return confined;
+}
+
+#else
+int
+unix_selinux_confined(void)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
+int
+lock_pwdf(void)
+{
+ int i;
+ int retval;
+
+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
+ if (unix_selinux_confined()) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+#endif
+ /* These values for the number of attempts and the sleep time
+ are, of course, completely arbitrary.
+ My reading of the PAM docs is that, once pam_chauthtok() has been
+ called with PAM_UPDATE_AUTHTOK, we are obliged to take any
+ reasonable steps to make sure the token is updated; so retrying
+ for 1/10 sec. isn't overdoing it. */
+ i=0;
+ while((retval = lckpwdf()) != 0 && i < 100) {
+ usleep(1000);
+ i++;
+ }
+ if(retval != 0) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
+ }
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+void
+unlock_pwdf(void)
+{
+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
+ if (unix_selinux_confined()) {
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+ ulckpwdf();
+}
+#else
+int
+lock_pwdf(void)
+{
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+
+void
+unlock_pwdf(void)
+{
+ return;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+save_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *oldpass,
+ int howmany)
+#else
+int
+save_old_password(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, const char *oldpass,
+ int howmany)
+#endif
+{
+ static char buf[16384];
+ static char nbuf[16384];
+ char *s_luser, *s_uid, *s_npas, *s_pas, *pass;
+ int npas;
+ FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+ int err = 0;
+ int oldmask;
+ int found = 0;
+ struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+ size_t len = strlen(forwho);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ char *prev_context_raw = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (howmany < 0) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ if (oldpass == NULL) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ oldmask = umask(077);
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ char *passwd_context_raw = NULL;
+ if (getfilecon_raw("/etc/passwd",&passwd_context_raw)<0) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ };
+ if (getfscreatecon_raw(&prev_context_raw)<0) {
+ freecon(passwd_context_raw);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ if (setfscreatecon_raw(passwd_context_raw)) {
+ freecon(passwd_context_raw);
+ freecon(prev_context_raw);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ freecon(passwd_context_raw);
+ }
+#endif
+ pwfile = fopen(OPW_TMPFILE, "w");
+ umask(oldmask);
+ if (pwfile == NULL) {
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ opwfile = fopen(OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE, "r");
+ if (opwfile == NULL) {
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ while (fgets(buf, 16380, opwfile)) {
+ if (!strncmp(buf, forwho, len) && strchr(":,\n", buf[len]) != NULL) {
+ char *sptr = NULL;
+ found = 1;
+ if (howmany == 0)
+ continue;
+ buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+ s_luser = strtok_r(buf, ":", &sptr);
+ if (s_luser == NULL) {
+ found = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ s_uid = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
+ if (s_uid == NULL) {
+ found = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ s_npas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
+ if (s_npas == NULL) {
+ found = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ s_pas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
+ npas = strtol(s_npas, NULL, 10) + 1;
+ while (npas > howmany && s_pas != NULL) {
+ s_pas = strpbrk(s_pas, ",");
+ if (s_pas != NULL)
+ s_pas++;
+ npas--;
+ }
+ pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
+ if (s_pas == NULL)
+ snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%s:%d:%s\n",
+ s_luser, s_uid, npas, pass);
+ else
+ snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf),"%s:%s:%d:%s,%s\n",
+ s_luser, s_uid, npas, s_pas, pass);
+ _pam_delete(pass);
+ if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else if (fputs(buf, pwfile) < 0) {
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ fclose(opwfile);
+
+ if (!found) {
+ pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, forwho);
+ if (pwd == NULL) {
+ err = 1;
+ } else {
+ pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
+ snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%lu:1:%s\n",
+ forwho, (unsigned long)pwd->pw_uid, pass);
+ _pam_delete(pass);
+ if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (fflush(pwfile) || fsync(fileno(pwfile))) {
+ D(("fflush or fsync error writing entries to old passwords file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+ D(("fclose error writing entries to old passwords file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (!err) {
+ if (rename(OPW_TMPFILE, OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE))
+ err = 1;
+ }
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ if (setfscreatecon_raw(prev_context_raw)) {
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ if (prev_context_raw)
+ freecon(prev_context_raw);
+ prev_context_raw = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!err) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ unlink(OPW_TMPFILE);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+}
+
+PAMH_ARG_DECL(int unix_update_passwd,
+ const char *forwho, const char *towhat)
+{
+ struct passwd *tmpent = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+ FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+ int err = 1;
+ int oldmask;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ char *prev_context_raw = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ oldmask = umask(077);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ char *passwd_context_raw = NULL;
+ if (getfilecon_raw("/etc/passwd",&passwd_context_raw)<0) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ };
+ if (getfscreatecon_raw(&prev_context_raw)<0) {
+ freecon(passwd_context_raw);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ if (setfscreatecon_raw(passwd_context_raw)) {
+ freecon(passwd_context_raw);
+ freecon(prev_context_raw);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ freecon(passwd_context_raw);
+ }
+#endif
+ pwfile = fopen(PW_TMPFILE, "w");
+ umask(oldmask);
+ if (pwfile == NULL) {
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ opwfile = fopen("/etc/passwd", "r");
+ if (opwfile == NULL) {
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
+ while (tmpent) {
+ if (!strcmp(tmpent->pw_name, forwho)) {
+ /* To shut gcc up */
+ union {
+ const char *const_charp;
+ char *charp;
+ } assigned_passwd;
+ assigned_passwd.const_charp = towhat;
+
+ tmpent->pw_passwd = assigned_passwd.charp;
+ err = 0;
+ }
+ if (putpwent(tmpent, pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entry to password file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
+ }
+ fclose(opwfile);
+
+ if (fflush(pwfile) || fsync(fileno(pwfile))) {
+ D(("fflush or fsync error writing entries to password file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+ D(("fclose error writing entries to password file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+done:
+ if (!err) {
+ if (!rename(PW_TMPFILE, "/etc/passwd"))
+ pam_syslog(pamh,
+ LOG_NOTICE, "password changed for %s", forwho);
+ else
+ err = 1;
+ }
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ if (setfscreatecon_raw(prev_context_raw)) {
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ if (prev_context_raw)
+ freecon(prev_context_raw);
+ prev_context_raw = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (!err) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ unlink(PW_TMPFILE);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+}
+
+PAMH_ARG_DECL(int unix_update_shadow,
+ const char *forwho, char *towhat)
+{
+ struct spwd spwdent, *stmpent = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+ FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
+ int err = 0;
+ int oldmask;
+ int wroteentry = 0;
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ char *prev_context_raw = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ oldmask = umask(077);
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ char *shadow_context_raw = NULL;
+ if (getfilecon_raw("/etc/shadow",&shadow_context_raw)<0) {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ };
+ if (getfscreatecon_raw(&prev_context_raw)<0) {
+ freecon(shadow_context_raw);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ if (setfscreatecon_raw(shadow_context_raw)) {
+ freecon(shadow_context_raw);
+ freecon(prev_context_raw);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+ freecon(shadow_context_raw);
+ }
+#endif
+ pwfile = fopen(SH_TMPFILE, "w");
+ umask(oldmask);
+ if (pwfile == NULL) {
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ opwfile = fopen("/etc/shadow", "r");
+ if (opwfile == NULL) {
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
+ fclose(opwfile);
+ fclose(pwfile);
+ err = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
+ while (stmpent) {
+
+ if (!strcmp(stmpent->sp_namp, forwho)) {
+ stmpent->sp_pwdp = towhat;
+ stmpent->sp_lstchg = time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24);
+ if (stmpent->sp_lstchg == 0)
+ stmpent->sp_lstchg = -1; /* Don't request passwort change
+ only because time isn't set yet. */
+ wroteentry = 1;
+ D(("Set password %s for %s", stmpent->sp_pwdp, forwho));
+ }
+
+ if (putspent(stmpent, pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entry to shadow file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
+ }
+
+ fclose(opwfile);
+
+ if (!wroteentry && !err) {
+ DIAG_PUSH_IGNORE_CAST_QUAL;
+ spwdent.sp_namp = (char *)forwho;
+ DIAG_POP_IGNORE_CAST_QUAL;
+ spwdent.sp_pwdp = towhat;
+ spwdent.sp_lstchg = time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24);
+ if (spwdent.sp_lstchg == 0)
+ spwdent.sp_lstchg = -1; /* Don't request passwort change
+ only because time isn't set yet. */
+ spwdent.sp_min = spwdent.sp_max = spwdent.sp_warn = spwdent.sp_inact =
+ spwdent.sp_expire = -1;
+ spwdent.sp_flag = (unsigned long)-1l;
+ if (putspent(&spwdent, pwfile)) {
+ D(("error writing entry to shadow file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (fflush(pwfile) || fsync(fileno(pwfile))) {
+ D(("fflush or fsync error writing entries to shadow file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (fclose(pwfile)) {
+ D(("fclose error writing entries to shadow file: %m"));
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+ done:
+ if (!err) {
+ if (!rename(SH_TMPFILE, "/etc/shadow"))
+ pam_syslog(pamh,
+ LOG_NOTICE, "password changed for %s", forwho);
+ else
+ err = 1;
+ }
+
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
+ if (setfscreatecon_raw(prev_context_raw)) {
+ err = 1;
+ }
+ if (prev_context_raw)
+ freecon(prev_context_raw);
+ prev_context_raw = NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (!err) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ unlink(SH_TMPFILE);
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+
+int
+helper_verify_password(const char *name, const char *p, int nullok)
+{
+ struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+ char *hash = NULL;
+ int retval;
+
+ retval = get_pwd_hash(name, &pwd, &hash);
+
+ if (pwd == NULL || hash == NULL) {
+ helper_log_err(LOG_NOTICE, "check pass; user unknown");
+ retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+ } else if (p[0] == '\0' && nullok) {
+ if (hash[0] == '\0') {
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+ } else {
+ retval = verify_pwd_hash(p, hash, nullok);
+ }
+
+ if (hash) {
+ _pam_overwrite(hash);
+ _pam_drop(hash);
+ }
+
+ p = NULL; /* no longer needed here */
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+void
+PAM_FORMAT((printf, 2, 3))
+helper_log_err(int err, const char *format, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, format);
+ openlog(HELPER_COMPILE, LOG_CONS | LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
+ vsyslog(err, format, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ closelog();
+}
+
+static void
+su_sighandler(int sig)
+{
+#ifndef SA_RESETHAND
+ /* emulate the behaviour of the SA_RESETHAND flag */
+ if ( sig == SIGILL || sig == SIGTRAP || sig == SIGBUS || sig = SIGSERV ) {
+ struct sigaction sa;
+ memset(&sa, '\0', sizeof(sa));
+ sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
+ sigaction(sig, &sa, NULL);
+ }
+#endif
+ if (sig > 0) {
+ _exit(sig);
+ }
+}
+
+void
+setup_signals(void)
+{
+ struct sigaction action; /* posix signal structure */
+
+ /*
+ * Setup signal handlers
+ */
+ (void) memset((void *) &action, 0, sizeof(action));
+ action.sa_handler = su_sighandler;
+#ifdef SA_RESETHAND
+ action.sa_flags = SA_RESETHAND;
+#endif
+ (void) sigaction(SIGILL, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGTRAP, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGBUS, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGSEGV, &action, NULL);
+ action.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
+ action.sa_flags = 0;
+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &action, NULL);
+ (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &action, NULL);
+}
+
+char *
+getuidname(uid_t uid)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+ static char username[256];
+
+ pw = getpwuid(uid);
+ if (pw == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ strncpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(username));
+ username[sizeof(username) - 1] = '\0';
+
+ return username;
+}
+
+#endif
+/* ****************************************************************** *
+ * Copyright (c) Jan Rękorajski 1999.
+ * Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan 1996-8.
+ * Copyright (c) Alex O. Yuriev, 1996.
+ * Copyright (c) Cristian Gafton 1996.
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc. 1996, 2007, 2008.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c07037d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright information at end of file.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+
+#define PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT
+
+#define OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE "/etc/security/opasswd"
+
+int
+is_pwd_shadowed(const struct passwd *pwd);
+
+char *
+crypt_md5_wrapper(const char *pass_new);
+
+int
+unix_selinux_confined(void);
+
+int
+lock_pwdf(void);
+
+void
+unlock_pwdf(void);
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+int
+save_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *oldpass,
+ int howmany);
+#else
+int
+save_old_password(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, const char *oldpass,
+ int howmany);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+void
+helper_log_err(int err, const char *format,...);
+
+int
+helper_verify_password(const char *name, const char *p, int nullok);
+
+void
+setup_signals(void);
+
+char *
+getuidname(uid_t uid);
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
+#define PAMH_ARG_DECL(fname, ...) fname(__VA_ARGS__)
+#define PAMH_ARG(...) __VA_ARGS__
+#else
+#define PAMH_ARG_DECL(fname, ...) fname(pam_handle_t *pamh, __VA_ARGS__)
+#define PAMH_ARG(...) pamh, __VA_ARGS__
+#endif
+
+PAMH_ARG_DECL(int verify_pwd_hash,
+ const char *p, char *hash, unsigned int nullok);
+
+PAMH_ARG_DECL(char * create_password_hash,
+ const char *password, unsigned long long ctrl, int rounds);
+
+PAMH_ARG_DECL(int get_account_info,
+ const char *name, struct passwd **pwd, struct spwd **spwdent);
+
+PAMH_ARG_DECL(int get_pwd_hash,
+ const char *name, struct passwd **pwd, char **hash);
+
+PAMH_ARG_DECL(int check_shadow_expiry,
+ struct spwd *spent, int *daysleft);
+
+PAMH_ARG_DECL(int unix_update_passwd,
+ const char *forwho, const char *towhat);
+
+PAMH_ARG_DECL(int unix_update_shadow,
+ const char *forwho, char *towhat);
+
+/* ****************************************************************** *
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc. 2007.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.c b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..27ca712
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.c
@@ -0,0 +1,893 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright information at end of file.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <utmp.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_RPCSVC_YPCLNT_H
+#include <rpcsvc/ypclnt.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+#include <security/pam_modules.h>
+#include <security/pam_ext.h>
+#include <security/pam_modutil.h>
+
+#include "pam_cc_compat.h"
+#include "pam_inline.h"
+#include "support.h"
+#include "passverify.h"
+
+/* this is a front-end for module-application conversations */
+
+int _make_remark(pam_handle_t * pamh, unsigned long long ctrl,
+ int type, const char *text)
+{
+ int retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+ if (off(UNIX__QUIET, ctrl)) {
+ retval = pam_prompt(pamh, type, NULL, "%s", text);
+ }
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * set the control flags for the UNIX module.
+ */
+
+unsigned long long _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags, int *remember,
+ int *rounds, int *pass_min_len, int argc,
+ const char **argv)
+{
+ unsigned long long ctrl;
+ char *val;
+ int j;
+
+ D(("called."));
+
+ ctrl = UNIX_DEFAULTS; /* the default selection of options */
+
+ /* set some flags manually */
+
+ if (getuid() == 0 && !(flags & PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK)) {
+ D(("IAMROOT"));
+ set(UNIX__IAMROOT, ctrl);
+ }
+ if (flags & PAM_UPDATE_AUTHTOK) {
+ D(("UPDATE_AUTHTOK"));
+ set(UNIX__UPDATE, ctrl);
+ }
+ if (flags & PAM_PRELIM_CHECK) {
+ D(("PRELIM_CHECK"));
+ set(UNIX__PRELIM, ctrl);
+ }
+ if (flags & PAM_SILENT) {
+ D(("SILENT"));
+ set(UNIX__QUIET, ctrl);
+ }
+
+ /* preset encryption method with value from /etc/login.defs */
+ val = pam_modutil_search_key(pamh, LOGIN_DEFS, "ENCRYPT_METHOD");
+ if (val) {
+ for (j = 0; j < UNIX_CTRLS_; ++j) {
+ if (unix_args[j].token && unix_args[j].is_hash_algo
+ && !strncasecmp(val, unix_args[j].token, strlen(unix_args[j].token))) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (j >= UNIX_CTRLS_) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_WARNING, "unrecognized ENCRYPT_METHOD value [%s]", val);
+ } else {
+ ctrl &= unix_args[j].mask; /* for turning things off */
+ ctrl |= unix_args[j].flag; /* for turning things on */
+ }
+ free (val);
+
+ /* read number of rounds for crypt algo */
+ if (rounds && (on(UNIX_SHA256_PASS, ctrl) || on(UNIX_SHA512_PASS, ctrl))) {
+ val = pam_modutil_search_key(pamh, LOGIN_DEFS, "SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS");
+
+ if (val) {
+ *rounds = strtol(val, NULL, 10);
+ set(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl);
+ free (val);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* now parse the arguments to this module */
+
+ for (; argc-- > 0; ++argv) {
+ const char *str = NULL;
+
+ D(("pam_unix arg: %s", *argv));
+
+ for (j = 0; j < UNIX_CTRLS_; ++j) {
+ if (unix_args[j].token
+ && (str = pam_str_skip_prefix_len(*argv,
+ unix_args[j].token,
+ strlen(unix_args[j].token))) != NULL) {
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (str == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "unrecognized option [%s]", *argv);
+ } else {
+ /* special cases */
+ if (j == UNIX_REMEMBER_PASSWD) {
+ if (remember == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "option remember not allowed for this module type");
+ continue;
+ }
+ *remember = strtol(str, NULL, 10);
+ if ((*remember == INT_MIN) || (*remember == INT_MAX))
+ *remember = -1;
+ if (*remember > 400)
+ *remember = 400;
+ } else if (j == UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN) {
+ if (pass_min_len == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "option minlen not allowed for this module type");
+ continue;
+ }
+ *pass_min_len = atoi(str);
+ } else if (j == UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS) {
+ if (rounds == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "option rounds not allowed for this module type");
+ continue;
+ }
+ *rounds = strtol(str, NULL, 10);
+ }
+
+ ctrl &= unix_args[j].mask; /* for turning things off */
+ ctrl |= unix_args[j].flag; /* for turning things on */
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (UNIX_DES_CRYPT(ctrl)
+ && pass_min_len && *pass_min_len > 8)
+ {
+ pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "Password minlen reset to 8 characters");
+ *pass_min_len = 8;
+ }
+
+ if (flags & PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK) {
+ D(("DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK"));
+ set(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl);
+ }
+
+ /* Set default rounds for blowfish, gost-yescrypt and yescrypt */
+ if (off(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl) && rounds != NULL) {
+ if (on(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS, ctrl) ||
+ on(UNIX_GOST_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl) ||
+ on(UNIX_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ *rounds = 5;
+ set(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Enforce sane "rounds" values */
+ if (on(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl)) {
+ if (on(UNIX_GOST_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl) ||
+ on(UNIX_YESCRYPT_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ if (*rounds < 3 || *rounds > 11)
+ *rounds = 5;
+ } else if (on(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ if (*rounds < 4 || *rounds > 31)
+ *rounds = 5;
+ } else if (on(UNIX_SHA256_PASS, ctrl) || on(UNIX_SHA512_PASS, ctrl)) {
+ if ((*rounds < 1000) || (*rounds == INT_MAX)) {
+ /* don't care about bogus values */
+ *rounds = 0;
+ unset(UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS, ctrl);
+ } else if (*rounds >= 10000000) {
+ *rounds = 9999999;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* auditing is a more sensitive version of debug */
+
+ if (on(UNIX_AUDIT, ctrl)) {
+ set(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl);
+ }
+ /* return the set of flags */
+
+ D(("done."));
+ return ctrl;
+}
+
+/* ************************************************************** *
+ * Useful non-trivial functions *
+ * ************************************************************** */
+
+ /*
+ * the following is used to keep track of the number of times a user fails
+ * to authenticate themself.
+ */
+
+#define FAIL_PREFIX "-UN*X-FAIL-"
+#define UNIX_MAX_RETRIES 3
+
+struct _pam_failed_auth {
+ char *user; /* user that's failed to be authenticated */
+ char *name; /* attempt from user with name */
+ int uid; /* uid of calling user */
+ int euid; /* euid of calling process */
+ int count; /* number of failures so far */
+};
+
+#ifndef PAM_DATA_REPLACE
+#error "Need to get an updated libpam 0.52 or better"
+#endif
+
+static void _cleanup_failures(pam_handle_t * pamh, void *fl, int err)
+{
+ int quiet;
+ const void *service = NULL;
+ const void *ruser = NULL;
+ const void *rhost = NULL;
+ const void *tty = NULL;
+ struct _pam_failed_auth *failure;
+
+ D(("called"));
+
+ quiet = err & PAM_DATA_SILENT; /* should we log something? */
+ err &= PAM_DATA_REPLACE; /* are we just replacing data? */
+ failure = (struct _pam_failed_auth *) fl;
+
+ if (failure != NULL) {
+
+ if (!quiet && !err) { /* under advisement from Sun,may go away */
+
+ /* log the number of authentication failures */
+ if (failure->count > 1) {
+ (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_SERVICE,
+ &service);
+ (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER,
+ &ruser);
+ (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST,
+ &rhost);
+ (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY,
+ &tty);
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+ "%d more authentication failure%s; "
+ "logname=%s uid=%d euid=%d "
+ "tty=%s ruser=%s rhost=%s "
+ "%s%s",
+ failure->count - 1, failure->count == 2 ? "" : "s",
+ failure->name, failure->uid, failure->euid,
+ tty ? (const char *)tty : "", ruser ? (const char *)ruser : "",
+ rhost ? (const char *)rhost : "",
+ (failure->user && failure->user[0] != '\0')
+ ? " user=" : "", failure->user
+ );
+
+ if (failure->count > UNIX_MAX_RETRIES) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+ "service(%s) ignoring max retries; %d > %d",
+ service == NULL ? "**unknown**" : (const char *)service,
+ failure->count,
+ UNIX_MAX_RETRIES);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ _pam_delete(failure->user); /* tidy up */
+ _pam_delete(failure->name); /* tidy up */
+ free(failure);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * _unix_getpwnam() searches only /etc/passwd and NIS to find user information
+ */
+static void _unix_cleanup(pam_handle_t *pamh UNUSED, void *data, int error_status UNUSED)
+{
+ free(data);
+}
+
+int _unix_getpwnam(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name,
+ int files, int nis, struct passwd **ret)
+{
+ FILE *passwd;
+ char buf[16384];
+ int matched = 0, buflen;
+ char *slogin, *spasswd, *suid, *sgid, *sgecos, *shome, *sshell, *p;
+
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+
+ if (!matched && files) {
+ int userlen = strlen(name);
+ passwd = fopen("/etc/passwd", "r");
+ if (passwd != NULL) {
+ while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), passwd) != NULL) {
+ if ((buf[userlen] == ':') &&
+ (strncmp(name, buf, userlen) == 0)) {
+ p = buf + strlen(buf) - 1;
+ while (isspace(*p) && (p >= buf)) {
+ *p-- = '\0';
+ }
+ matched = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ fclose(passwd);
+ }
+ }
+
+#if defined(HAVE_YP_GET_DEFAULT_DOMAIN) && defined (HAVE_YP_BIND) && defined (HAVE_YP_MATCH) && defined (HAVE_YP_UNBIND)
+ if (!matched && nis) {
+ char *userinfo = NULL, *domain = NULL;
+ int len = 0, i;
+ len = yp_get_default_domain(&domain);
+ if (len == YPERR_SUCCESS) {
+ len = yp_bind(domain);
+ }
+ if (len == YPERR_SUCCESS) {
+ i = yp_match(domain, "passwd.byname", name,
+ strlen(name), &userinfo, &len);
+ yp_unbind(domain);
+ if ((i == YPERR_SUCCESS) && ((size_t)len < sizeof(buf))) {
+ strncpy(buf, userinfo, sizeof(buf) - 1);
+ buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = '\0';
+ matched = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+#else
+ /* we don't have NIS support, make compiler happy. */
+ (void) nis;
+#endif
+
+ if (matched && (ret != NULL)) {
+ *ret = NULL;
+
+ slogin = buf;
+
+ spasswd = strchr(slogin, ':');
+ if (spasswd == NULL) {
+ return matched;
+ }
+ *spasswd++ = '\0';
+
+ suid = strchr(spasswd, ':');
+ if (suid == NULL) {
+ return matched;
+ }
+ *suid++ = '\0';
+
+ sgid = strchr(suid, ':');
+ if (sgid == NULL) {
+ return matched;
+ }
+ *sgid++ = '\0';
+
+ sgecos = strchr(sgid, ':');
+ if (sgecos == NULL) {
+ return matched;
+ }
+ *sgecos++ = '\0';
+
+ shome = strchr(sgecos, ':');
+ if (shome == NULL) {
+ return matched;
+ }
+ *shome++ = '\0';
+
+ sshell = strchr(shome, ':');
+ if (sshell == NULL) {
+ return matched;
+ }
+ *sshell++ = '\0';
+
+ buflen = sizeof(struct passwd) +
+ strlen(slogin) + 1 +
+ strlen(spasswd) + 1 +
+ strlen(sgecos) + 1 +
+ strlen(shome) + 1 +
+ strlen(sshell) + 1;
+ *ret = malloc(buflen);
+ if (*ret == NULL) {
+ return matched;
+ }
+ memset(*ret, '\0', buflen);
+
+ (*ret)->pw_uid = strtol(suid, &p, 10);
+ if ((strlen(suid) == 0) || (*p != '\0')) {
+ free(*ret);
+ *ret = NULL;
+ return matched;
+ }
+
+ (*ret)->pw_gid = strtol(sgid, &p, 10);
+ if ((strlen(sgid) == 0) || (*p != '\0')) {
+ free(*ret);
+ *ret = NULL;
+ return matched;
+ }
+
+ p = ((char*)(*ret)) + sizeof(struct passwd);
+ (*ret)->pw_name = strcpy(p, slogin);
+ p += strlen(p) + 1;
+ (*ret)->pw_passwd = strcpy(p, spasswd);
+ p += strlen(p) + 1;
+ (*ret)->pw_gecos = strcpy(p, sgecos);
+ p += strlen(p) + 1;
+ (*ret)->pw_dir = strcpy(p, shome);
+ p += strlen(p) + 1;
+ (*ret)->pw_shell = strcpy(p, sshell);
+
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "_pam_unix_getpwnam_%s", name);
+
+ if (pam_set_data(pamh, buf,
+ *ret, _unix_cleanup) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ free(*ret);
+ *ret = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return matched;
+}
+
+/*
+ * _unix_comsefromsource() is a quick check to see if information about a given
+ * user comes from a particular source (just files and nis for now)
+ *
+ */
+int _unix_comesfromsource(pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ const char *name, int files, int nis)
+{
+ return _unix_getpwnam(pamh, name, files, nis, NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify the password of a user
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+static int _unix_run_helper_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *passwd,
+ unsigned long long ctrl, const char *user)
+{
+ int retval, child, fds[2];
+ struct sigaction newsa, oldsa;
+
+ D(("called."));
+ /* create a pipe for the password */
+ if (pipe(fds) != 0) {
+ D(("could not make pipe"));
+ return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+
+ if (off(UNIX_NOREAP, ctrl)) {
+ /*
+ * This code arranges that the demise of the child does not cause
+ * the application to receive a signal it is not expecting - which
+ * may kill the application or worse.
+ *
+ * The "noreap" module argument is provided so that the admin can
+ * override this behavior.
+ */
+ memset(&newsa, '\0', sizeof(newsa));
+ newsa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
+ sigaction(SIGCHLD, &newsa, &oldsa);
+ }
+
+ /* fork */
+ child = fork();
+ if (child == 0) {
+ static char *envp[] = { NULL };
+ const char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
+
+ /* XXX - should really tidy up PAM here too */
+
+ /* reopen stdin as pipe */
+ if (dup2(fds[0], STDIN_FILENO) != STDIN_FILENO) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "dup2 of %s failed: %m", "stdin");
+ _exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL);
+ }
+
+ if (pam_modutil_sanitize_helper_fds(pamh, PAM_MODUTIL_IGNORE_FD,
+ PAM_MODUTIL_PIPE_FD,
+ PAM_MODUTIL_PIPE_FD) < 0) {
+ _exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL);
+ }
+
+ if (geteuid() == 0) {
+ /* must set the real uid to 0 so the helper will not error
+ out if pam is called from setuid binary (su, sudo...) */
+ if (setuid(0) == -1) {
+ D(("setuid failed"));
+ _exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* exec binary helper */
+ args[0] = CHKPWD_HELPER;
+ args[1] = user;
+ if (off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl)) { /* this means we've succeeded */
+ args[2]="nullok";
+ } else {
+ args[2]="nonull";
+ }
+
+ DIAG_PUSH_IGNORE_CAST_QUAL;
+ execve(CHKPWD_HELPER, (char *const *) args, envp);
+ DIAG_POP_IGNORE_CAST_QUAL;
+
+ /* should not get here: exit with error */
+ D(("helper binary is not available"));
+ _exit(PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL);
+ } else if (child > 0) {
+ /* wait for child */
+ /* if the stored password is NULL */
+ int rc=0;
+ if (passwd != NULL) { /* send the password to the child */
+ int len = strlen(passwd);
+
+ if (len > PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE)
+ len = PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE;
+ if (write(fds[1], passwd, len) == -1 ||
+ write(fds[1], "", 1) == -1) {
+ pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_ERR, "Cannot send password to helper: %m");
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+ passwd = NULL;
+ } else { /* blank password */
+ if (write(fds[1], "", 1) == -1) {
+ pam_syslog (pamh, LOG_ERR, "Cannot send password to helper: %m");
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+ }
+ close(fds[0]); /* close here to avoid possible SIGPIPE above */
+ close(fds[1]);
+ /* wait for helper to complete: */
+ while ((rc=waitpid(child, &retval, 0)) < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+ if (rc<0) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_chkpwd waitpid returned %d: %m", rc);
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ } else if (!WIFEXITED(retval)) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_chkpwd abnormal exit: %d", retval);
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ } else {
+ retval = WEXITSTATUS(retval);
+ }
+ } else {
+ D(("fork failed"));
+ close(fds[0]);
+ close(fds[1]);
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+
+ if (off(UNIX_NOREAP, ctrl)) {
+ sigaction(SIGCHLD, &oldsa, NULL); /* restore old signal handler */
+ }
+
+ D(("returning %d", retval));
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/*
+ * _unix_blankpasswd() is a quick check for a blank password
+ *
+ * returns TRUE if user does not have a password
+ * - to avoid prompting for one in such cases (CG)
+ */
+
+int
+_unix_blankpasswd (pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned long long ctrl, const char *name)
+{
+ struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+ char *salt = NULL;
+ int daysleft;
+ int retval;
+ int blank = 0;
+ int execloop;
+ int nonexistent_check = 1;
+
+ D(("called"));
+
+ /*
+ * This function does not have to be too smart if something goes
+ * wrong, return FALSE and let this case to be treated somewhere
+ * else (CG)
+ */
+
+ if (on(UNIX_NULLRESETOK, ctrl)) {
+ retval = _unix_verify_user(pamh, ctrl, name, &daysleft);
+ if (retval == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
+ /* password reset is enforced, allow authentication with empty password */
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_DEBUG, "user [%s] has expired blank password, enabling nullok", name);
+ set(UNIX__NULLOK, ctrl);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (on(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl))
+ return 0; /* will fail but don't let on yet */
+
+ /* UNIX passwords area */
+
+ /*
+ * Execute this loop twice: one checking the password hash of an existing
+ * user and another one for a non-existing user. This way the runtimes
+ * are equal, making it more difficult to differentiate existing from
+ * non-existing users.
+ */
+ for (execloop = 0; execloop < 2; ++execloop) {
+ retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt);
+
+ if (retval == PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER) {
+ if (_unix_run_helper_binary(pamh, NULL, ctrl, name) == PAM_SUCCESS)
+ blank = nonexistent_check;
+ } else if (retval == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) {
+ name = "root";
+ nonexistent_check = 0;
+ continue;
+ } else if (salt != NULL) {
+ if (strlen(salt) == 0)
+ blank = nonexistent_check;
+ }
+ name = "pam_unix_non_existent:";
+ /* non-existent user check will not affect the blank value */
+ }
+
+ /* tidy up */
+ if (salt)
+ _pam_delete(salt);
+
+ return blank;
+}
+
+int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name
+ ,const char *p, unsigned long long ctrl)
+{
+ struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+ char *salt = NULL;
+ char *data_name;
+ char pw[PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE + 1];
+ int retval;
+
+
+ D(("called"));
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PAM_FAIL_DELAY
+ if (off(UNIX_NODELAY, ctrl)) {
+ D(("setting delay"));
+ (void) pam_fail_delay(pamh, 2000000); /* 2 sec delay for on failure */
+ }
+#endif
+
+ /* locate the entry for this user */
+
+ D(("locating user's record"));
+
+ retval = get_pwd_hash(pamh, name, &pwd, &salt);
+
+ data_name = (char *) malloc(sizeof(FAIL_PREFIX) + strlen(name));
+ if (data_name == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT, "no memory for data-name");
+ } else {
+ strcpy(data_name, FAIL_PREFIX);
+ strcpy(data_name + sizeof(FAIL_PREFIX) - 1, name);
+ }
+
+ if (p != NULL && strlen(p) > PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE) {
+ memset(pw, 0, sizeof(pw));
+ p = strncpy(pw, p, sizeof(pw) - 1);
+ }
+
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (retval == PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER) {
+ D(("running helper binary"));
+ retval = _unix_run_helper_binary(pamh, p, ctrl, name);
+ } else {
+ D(("user's record unavailable"));
+ p = NULL;
+ if (on(UNIX_AUDIT, ctrl)) {
+ /* this might be a typo and the user has given a password
+ instead of a username. Careful with this. */
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+ "check pass; user (%s) unknown", name);
+ } else {
+ name = NULL;
+ if (on(UNIX_DEBUG, ctrl) || pwd == NULL) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+ "check pass; user unknown");
+ } else {
+ /* don't log failure as another pam module can succeed */
+ goto cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ retval = verify_pwd_hash(pamh, p, salt, off(UNIX__NONULL, ctrl));
+ }
+
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (data_name) /* reset failures */
+ pam_set_data(pamh, data_name, NULL, _cleanup_failures);
+ } else {
+ if (data_name != NULL) {
+ struct _pam_failed_auth *new = NULL;
+ const struct _pam_failed_auth *old = NULL;
+
+ /* get a failure recorder */
+
+ new = (struct _pam_failed_auth *)
+ malloc(sizeof(struct _pam_failed_auth));
+
+ if (new != NULL) {
+
+ const char *login_name;
+ const void *void_old;
+
+
+ login_name = pam_modutil_getlogin(pamh);
+ if (login_name == NULL) {
+ login_name = "";
+ }
+
+ new->user = strdup(name ? name : "");
+ new->uid = getuid();
+ new->euid = geteuid();
+ new->name = strdup(login_name);
+
+ /* any previous failures for this user ? */
+ if (pam_get_data(pamh, data_name, &void_old)
+ == PAM_SUCCESS)
+ old = void_old;
+ else
+ old = NULL;
+
+ if (old != NULL) {
+ new->count = old->count + 1;
+ if (new->count >= UNIX_MAX_RETRIES) {
+ retval = PAM_MAXTRIES;
+ }
+ } else {
+ const void *service=NULL;
+ const void *ruser=NULL;
+ const void *rhost=NULL;
+ const void *tty=NULL;
+
+ (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_SERVICE,
+ &service);
+ (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER,
+ &ruser);
+ (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST,
+ &rhost);
+ (void) pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_TTY,
+ &tty);
+
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
+ "authentication failure; "
+ "logname=%s uid=%d euid=%d "
+ "tty=%s ruser=%s rhost=%s "
+ "%s%s",
+ new->name, new->uid, new->euid,
+ tty ? (const char *)tty : "",
+ ruser ? (const char *)ruser : "",
+ rhost ? (const char *)rhost : "",
+ (new->user && new->user[0] != '\0')
+ ? " user=" : "",
+ new->user
+ );
+ new->count = 1;
+ }
+
+ pam_set_data(pamh, data_name, new, _cleanup_failures);
+
+ } else {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_CRIT,
+ "no memory for failure recorder");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+cleanup:
+ memset(pw, 0, sizeof(pw)); /* clear memory of the password */
+ if (data_name)
+ _pam_delete(data_name);
+ if (salt)
+ _pam_delete(salt);
+
+ D(("done [%d].", retval));
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+int
+_unix_verify_user(pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ unsigned long long ctrl,
+ const char *name,
+ int *daysleft)
+{
+ int retval;
+ struct spwd *spent;
+ struct passwd *pwent;
+
+ retval = get_account_info(pamh, name, &pwent, &spent);
+ if (retval == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN) {
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR,
+ "could not identify user (from getpwnam(%s))",
+ name);
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS && spent == NULL)
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+ if (retval == PAM_UNIX_RUN_HELPER) {
+ retval = _unix_run_verify_binary(pamh, ctrl, name, daysleft);
+ if (retval == PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL &&
+ on(UNIX_BROKEN_SHADOW, ctrl))
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (on(UNIX_BROKEN_SHADOW,ctrl))
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ else
+ return retval;
+ } else
+ retval = check_shadow_expiry(pamh, spent, daysleft);
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+/* ****************************************************************** *
+ * Copyright (c) Jan Rękorajski 1999.
+ * Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan 1996-8.
+ * Copyright (c) Alex O. Yuriev, 1996.
+ * Copyright (c) Cristian Gafton 1996.
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc. 2007.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/support.h b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..19754dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/support.h
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+/*
+ * $Id$
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H
+#define _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+
+/*
+ * File to read value of ENCRYPT_METHOD from.
+ */
+#define LOGIN_DEFS "/etc/login.defs"
+
+
+/*
+ * here is the string to inform the user that the new passwords they
+ * typed were not the same.
+ */
+
+/* type definition for the control options */
+
+typedef struct {
+ const char *token;
+ unsigned long long mask; /* shall assume 64 bits of flags */
+ unsigned long long flag;
+ unsigned int is_hash_algo;
+} UNIX_Ctrls;
+
+/*
+ * macro to determine if a given flag is on
+ */
+
+#define on(x,ctrl) (unix_args[x].flag & ctrl)
+
+/*
+ * macro to determine that a given flag is NOT on
+ */
+
+#define off(x,ctrl) (!on(x,ctrl))
+
+/*
+ * macro to turn on/off a ctrl flag manually
+ */
+
+#define set(x,ctrl) (ctrl = ((ctrl)&unix_args[x].mask)|unix_args[x].flag)
+#define unset(x,ctrl) (ctrl &= ~(unix_args[x].flag))
+
+/* the generic mask */
+
+#define _ALL_ON_ (~0ULL)
+
+/* end of macro definitions definitions for the control flags */
+
+/* ****************************************************************** *
+ * ctrl flags proper..
+ */
+
+/*
+ * here are the various options recognized by the unix module. They
+ * are enumerated here and then defined below. Internal arguments are
+ * given NULL tokens.
+ */
+
+#define UNIX__OLD_PASSWD 0 /* internal */
+#define UNIX__VERIFY_PASSWD 1 /* internal */
+#define UNIX__IAMROOT 2 /* internal */
+
+#define UNIX_AUDIT 3 /* print more things than debug..
+ some information may be sensitive */
+#define UNIX_USE_FIRST_PASS 4
+#define UNIX_TRY_FIRST_PASS 5
+#define UNIX_AUTHTOK_TYPE 6 /* TYPE for pam_get_authtok() */
+
+#define UNIX__PRELIM 7 /* internal */
+#define UNIX__UPDATE 8 /* internal */
+#define UNIX__NONULL 9 /* internal */
+#define UNIX__QUIET 10 /* internal */
+#define UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK 11 /* insist on reading PAM_AUTHTOK */
+#define UNIX_SHADOW 12 /* signal shadow on */
+#define UNIX_MD5_PASS 13 /* force the use of MD5 passwords */
+#define UNIX__NULLOK 14 /* Null token ok */
+#define UNIX_DEBUG 15 /* send more info to syslog(3) */
+#define UNIX_NODELAY 16 /* admin does not want a fail-delay */
+#define UNIX_NIS 17 /* wish to use NIS for pwd */
+#define UNIX_BIGCRYPT 18 /* use DEC-C2 crypt()^x function */
+#define UNIX_LIKE_AUTH 19 /* need to auth for setcred to work */
+#define UNIX_REMEMBER_PASSWD 20 /* Remember N previous passwords */
+#define UNIX_NOREAP 21 /* don't reap child process */
+#define UNIX_BROKEN_SHADOW 22 /* ignore errors reading password aging
+ * information during acct management */
+#define UNIX_SHA256_PASS 23 /* new password hashes will use SHA256 */
+#define UNIX_SHA512_PASS 24 /* new password hashes will use SHA512 */
+#define UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS 25 /* optional number of rounds for new
+ password hash algorithms */
+#define UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS 26 /* new password hashes will use blowfish */
+#define UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN 27 /* min length for password */
+#define UNIX_QUIET 28 /* Don't print informational messages */
+#define UNIX_NO_PASS_EXPIRY 29 /* Don't check for password expiration if not used for authentication */
+#define UNIX_DES 30 /* DES, default */
+#define UNIX_GOST_YESCRYPT_PASS 31 /* new password hashes will use gost-yescrypt */
+#define UNIX_YESCRYPT_PASS 32 /* new password hashes will use yescrypt */
+#define UNIX_NULLRESETOK 33 /* allow empty password if password reset is enforced */
+/* -------------- */
+#define UNIX_CTRLS_ 34 /* number of ctrl arguments defined */
+
+#define UNIX_DES_CRYPT(ctrl) (off(UNIX_MD5_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BIGCRYPT,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA256_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_SHA512_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_GOST_YESCRYPT_PASS,ctrl)&&off(UNIX_YESCRYPT_PASS,ctrl))
+
+static const UNIX_Ctrls unix_args[UNIX_CTRLS_] =
+{
+/* symbol token name ctrl mask ctrl *
+ * --------------------------- -------------------- ------------------------- ---------------- */
+
+/* UNIX__OLD_PASSWD */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 01, 0},
+/* UNIX__VERIFY_PASSWD */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 02, 0},
+/* UNIX__IAMROOT */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 04, 0},
+/* UNIX_AUDIT */ {"audit", _ALL_ON_, 010, 0},
+/* UNIX_USE_FIRST_PASS */ {"use_first_pass", _ALL_ON_^(060ULL), 020, 0},
+/* UNIX_TRY_FIRST_PASS */ {"try_first_pass", _ALL_ON_^(060ULL), 040, 0},
+/* UNIX_AUTHTOK_TYPE */ {"authtok_type=", _ALL_ON_, 0100, 0},
+/* UNIX__PRELIM */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600ULL), 0200, 0},
+/* UNIX__UPDATE */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_^(0600ULL), 0400, 0},
+/* UNIX__NONULL */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 01000, 0},
+/* UNIX__QUIET */ {NULL, _ALL_ON_, 02000, 0},
+/* UNIX_USE_AUTHTOK */ {"use_authtok", _ALL_ON_, 04000, 0},
+/* UNIX_SHADOW */ {"shadow", _ALL_ON_, 010000, 0},
+/* UNIX_MD5_PASS */ {"md5", _ALL_ON_^(015660420000ULL), 020000, 1},
+/* UNIX__NULLOK */ {"nullok", _ALL_ON_^(01000ULL), 0, 0},
+/* UNIX_DEBUG */ {"debug", _ALL_ON_, 040000, 0},
+/* UNIX_NODELAY */ {"nodelay", _ALL_ON_, 0100000, 0},
+/* UNIX_NIS */ {"nis", _ALL_ON_, 0200000, 0},
+/* UNIX_BIGCRYPT */ {"bigcrypt", _ALL_ON_^(015660420000ULL), 0400000, 1},
+/* UNIX_LIKE_AUTH */ {"likeauth", _ALL_ON_, 01000000, 0},
+/* UNIX_REMEMBER_PASSWD */ {"remember=", _ALL_ON_, 02000000, 0},
+/* UNIX_NOREAP */ {"noreap", _ALL_ON_, 04000000, 0},
+/* UNIX_BROKEN_SHADOW */ {"broken_shadow", _ALL_ON_, 010000000, 0},
+/* UNIX_SHA256_PASS */ {"sha256", _ALL_ON_^(015660420000ULL), 020000000, 1},
+/* UNIX_SHA512_PASS */ {"sha512", _ALL_ON_^(015660420000ULL), 040000000, 1},
+/* UNIX_ALGO_ROUNDS */ {"rounds=", _ALL_ON_, 0100000000, 0},
+/* UNIX_BLOWFISH_PASS */ {"blowfish", _ALL_ON_^(015660420000ULL), 0200000000, 1},
+/* UNIX_MIN_PASS_LEN */ {"minlen=", _ALL_ON_, 0400000000, 0},
+/* UNIX_QUIET */ {"quiet", _ALL_ON_, 01000000000, 0},
+/* UNIX_NO_PASS_EXPIRY */ {"no_pass_expiry", _ALL_ON_, 02000000000, 0},
+/* UNIX_DES */ {"des", _ALL_ON_^(015660420000ULL), 0, 1},
+/* UNIX_GOST_YESCRYPT_PASS */ {"gost_yescrypt", _ALL_ON_^(015660420000ULL), 04000000000, 1},
+/* UNIX_YESCRYPT_PASS */ {"yescrypt", _ALL_ON_^(015660420000ULL), 010000000000, 1},
+/* UNIX_NULLRESETOK */ {"nullresetok", _ALL_ON_, 020000000000, 0},
+};
+
+#define UNIX_DEFAULTS (unix_args[UNIX__NONULL].flag)
+
+/* use this to free strings. ESPECIALLY password strings */
+
+#define _pam_delete(xx) \
+{ \
+ _pam_overwrite(xx); \
+ _pam_drop(xx); \
+}
+
+extern int _make_remark(pam_handle_t * pamh, unsigned long long ctrl,
+ int type, const char *text);
+extern unsigned long long _set_ctrl(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags,
+ int *remember, int *rounds,
+ int *pass_min_len,
+ int argc, const char **argv);
+extern int _unix_getpwnam (pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ const char *name, int files, int nis,
+ struct passwd **ret);
+extern int _unix_comesfromsource (pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ const char *name, int files, int nis);
+extern int _unix_blankpasswd(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned long long ctrl,
+ const char *name);
+extern int _unix_verify_password(pam_handle_t * pamh, const char *name,
+ const char *p, unsigned long long ctrl);
+
+extern int _unix_verify_user(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned long long ctrl,
+ const char *name, int *daysleft);
+
+extern int _unix_run_verify_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ unsigned long long ctrl,
+ const char *user, int *daysleft);
+#endif /* _PAM_UNIX_SUPPORT_H */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/tst-pam_unix b/modules/pam_unix/tst-pam_unix
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..2292280
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/tst-pam_unix
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+#!/bin/sh
+../../tests/tst-dlopen .libs/pam_unix.so
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8 b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..93c95bd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+'\" t
+.\" Title: unix_chkpwd
+.\" Author: [see the "AUTHOR" section]
+.\" Generator: DocBook XSL Stylesheets v1.79.1 <http://docbook.sf.net/>
+.\" Date: 09/03/2021
+.\" Manual: Linux-PAM Manual
+.\" Source: Linux-PAM Manual
+.\" Language: English
+.\"
+.TH "UNIX_CHKPWD" "8" "09/03/2021" "Linux-PAM Manual" "Linux\-PAM Manual"
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.\" * Define some portability stuff
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.\" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+.\" http://bugs.debian.org/507673
+.\" http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/groff/2009-02/msg00013.html
+.\" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+.ie \n(.g .ds Aq \(aq
+.el .ds Aq '
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.\" * set default formatting
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.\" disable hyphenation
+.nh
+.\" disable justification (adjust text to left margin only)
+.ad l
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.\" * MAIN CONTENT STARTS HERE *
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.SH "NAME"
+unix_chkpwd \- Helper binary that verifies the password of the current user
+.SH "SYNOPSIS"
+.HP \w'\fBunix_chkpwd\fR\ 'u
+\fBunix_chkpwd\fR [\&.\&.\&.]
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+.PP
+\fIunix_chkpwd\fR
+is a helper program for the
+\fIpam_unix\fR
+module that verifies the password of the current user\&. It also checks password and account expiration dates in
+\fIshadow\fR\&. It is not intended to be run directly from the command line and logs a security violation if done so\&.
+.PP
+It is typically installed setuid root or setgid shadow\&.
+.PP
+The interface of the helper \- command line options, and input/output data format are internal to the
+\fIpam_unix\fR
+module and it should not be called directly from applications\&.
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.PP
+\fBpam_unix\fR(8)
+.SH "AUTHOR"
+.PP
+Written by Andrew Morgan and other various people\&.
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a10dbe3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.8.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding='UTF-8'?>
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.3//EN"
+ "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.3/docbookx.dtd">
+
+<refentry id="unix_chkpwd">
+
+ <refmeta>
+ <refentrytitle>unix_chkpwd</refentrytitle>
+ <manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+ <refmiscinfo class="sectdesc">Linux-PAM Manual</refmiscinfo>
+ </refmeta>
+
+ <refnamediv id="unix_chkpwd-name">
+ <refname>unix_chkpwd</refname>
+ <refpurpose>Helper binary that verifies the password of the current user</refpurpose>
+ </refnamediv>
+
+ <refsynopsisdiv>
+ <cmdsynopsis id="unix_chkpwd-cmdsynopsis">
+ <command>unix_chkpwd</command>
+ <arg choice="opt">
+ ...
+ </arg>
+ </cmdsynopsis>
+ </refsynopsisdiv>
+
+ <refsect1 id="unix_chkpwd-description">
+
+ <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <emphasis>unix_chkpwd</emphasis> is a helper program for the
+ <emphasis>pam_unix</emphasis> module that verifies the
+ password of the current user. It also checks password and account
+ expiration dates in <emphasis>shadow</emphasis>. It is not intended to
+ be run directly from the command line and logs a security violation if
+ done so.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ It is typically installed setuid root or setgid shadow.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ The interface of the helper - command line options, and input/output
+ data format are internal to the <emphasis>pam_unix</emphasis>
+ module and it should not be called directly from applications.
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id='unix_chkpwd-see_also'>
+ <title>SEE ALSO</title>
+ <para>
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>pam_unix</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id='unix_chkpwd-author'>
+ <title>AUTHOR</title>
+ <para>
+ Written by Andrew Morgan and other various people.
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+</refentry>
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3931bab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,246 @@
+/*
+ * This program is designed to run setuid(root) or with sufficient
+ * privilege to read all of the unix password databases. It is designed
+ * to provide a mechanism for the current user (defined by this
+ * process's uid) to verify their own password.
+ *
+ * The password is read from the standard input. The exit status of
+ * this program indicates whether the user is authenticated or not.
+ *
+ * Copyright information is located at the end of the file.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT
+#include <libaudit.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <security/_pam_types.h>
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+
+#include "passverify.h"
+#include "pam_inline.h"
+
+static int _check_expiry(const char *uname)
+{
+ struct spwd *spent;
+ struct passwd *pwent;
+ int retval;
+ int daysleft;
+
+ retval = get_account_info(uname, &pwent, &spent);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ helper_log_err(LOG_ERR, "could not obtain user info (%s)", uname);
+ printf("-1\n");
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ if (spent == NULL) {
+ printf("-1\n");
+ return retval;
+ }
+
+ retval = check_shadow_expiry(spent, &daysleft);
+ printf("%d\n", daysleft);
+ return retval;
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT
+static int _audit_log(int type, const char *uname, int rc)
+{
+ int audit_fd;
+
+ audit_fd = audit_open();
+ if (audit_fd < 0) {
+ /* You get these error codes only when the kernel doesn't have
+ * audit compiled in. */
+ if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EPROTONOSUPPORT ||
+ errno == EAFNOSUPPORT)
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+ helper_log_err(LOG_CRIT, "audit_open() failed: %m");
+ return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+
+ rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, type, NULL, "PAM:unix_chkpwd",
+ uname, -1, NULL, NULL, NULL, rc == PAM_SUCCESS);
+ if (rc == -EPERM && geteuid() != 0) {
+ rc = 0;
+ }
+
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+
+ return rc < 0 ? PAM_AUTH_ERR : PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+#endif
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ char pass[PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE + 1];
+ char *option;
+ int npass, nullok;
+ int blankpass = 0;
+ int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ char *user;
+ char *passwords[] = { pass };
+
+ /*
+ * Catch or ignore as many signal as possible.
+ */
+ setup_signals();
+
+ /*
+ * we establish that this program is running with non-tty stdin.
+ * this is to discourage casual use. It does *NOT* prevent an
+ * intruder from repeatadly running this program to determine the
+ * password of the current user (brute force attack, but one for
+ * which the attacker must already have gained access to the user's
+ * account).
+ */
+
+ if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO) || argc != 3 ) {
+ helper_log_err(LOG_NOTICE
+ ,"inappropriate use of Unix helper binary [UID=%d]"
+ ,getuid());
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT
+ _audit_log(AUDIT_ANOM_EXEC, getuidname(getuid()), PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
+#endif
+ fprintf(stderr
+ ,"This binary is not designed for running in this way\n"
+ "-- the system administrator has been informed\n");
+ sleep(10); /* this should discourage/annoy the user */
+ return PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Determine what the current user's name is.
+ * We must thus skip the check if the real uid is 0.
+ */
+ if (getuid() == 0) {
+ user=argv[1];
+ }
+ else {
+ user = getuidname(getuid());
+ /* if the caller specifies the username, verify that user
+ matches it */
+ if (user == NULL || strcmp(user, argv[1])) {
+ user = argv[1];
+ /* no match -> permanently change to the real user and proceed */
+ if (setuid(getuid()) != 0)
+ return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ option=argv[2];
+
+ if (strcmp(option, "chkexpiry") == 0)
+ /* Check account information from the shadow file */
+ return _check_expiry(argv[1]);
+ /* read the nullok/nonull option */
+ else if (strcmp(option, "nullok") == 0)
+ nullok = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(option, "nonull") == 0)
+ nullok = 0;
+ else {
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT
+ _audit_log(AUDIT_ANOM_EXEC, getuidname(getuid()), PAM_SYSTEM_ERR);
+#endif
+ return PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
+ }
+ /* read the password from stdin (a pipe from the pam_unix module) */
+
+ npass = pam_read_passwords(STDIN_FILENO, 1, passwords);
+
+ if (npass != 1) { /* is it a valid password? */
+ helper_log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no password supplied");
+ *pass = '\0';
+ }
+
+ if (*pass == '\0') {
+ blankpass = 1;
+ }
+
+ retval = helper_verify_password(user, pass, nullok);
+
+ memset(pass, '\0', PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE); /* clear memory of the password */
+
+ /* return pass or fail */
+
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (!nullok || !blankpass) {
+ /* no need to log blank pass test */
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT
+ if (getuid() != 0)
+ _audit_log(AUDIT_USER_AUTH, user, PAM_AUTH_ERR);
+#endif
+ helper_log_err(LOG_NOTICE, "password check failed for user (%s)", user);
+ }
+ /* if helper_verify_password() returned PAM_USER_UNKNOWN, the
+ most appropriate error to propagate to
+ _unix_verify_password() is PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL; otherwise
+ return general failure */
+ if (retval == PAM_USER_UNKNOWN)
+ return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
+ else
+ return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
+ } else {
+ if (getuid() != 0) {
+#ifdef HAVE_LIBAUDIT
+ return _audit_log(AUDIT_USER_AUTH, user, PAM_SUCCESS);
+#else
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+#endif
+ }
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan, 1996. All rights reserved
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc., 2007,2008. All rights reserved
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8 b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1f5ac7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+'\" t
+.\" Title: unix_update
+.\" Author: [see the "AUTHOR" section]
+.\" Generator: DocBook XSL Stylesheets v1.79.1 <http://docbook.sf.net/>
+.\" Date: 09/03/2021
+.\" Manual: Linux-PAM Manual
+.\" Source: Linux-PAM Manual
+.\" Language: English
+.\"
+.TH "UNIX_UPDATE" "8" "09/03/2021" "Linux-PAM Manual" "Linux\-PAM Manual"
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.\" * Define some portability stuff
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.\" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+.\" http://bugs.debian.org/507673
+.\" http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/groff/2009-02/msg00013.html
+.\" ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+.ie \n(.g .ds Aq \(aq
+.el .ds Aq '
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.\" * set default formatting
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.\" disable hyphenation
+.nh
+.\" disable justification (adjust text to left margin only)
+.ad l
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.\" * MAIN CONTENT STARTS HERE *
+.\" -----------------------------------------------------------------
+.SH "NAME"
+unix_update \- Helper binary that updates the password of a given user
+.SH "SYNOPSIS"
+.HP \w'\fBunix_update\fR\ 'u
+\fBunix_update\fR [\&.\&.\&.]
+.SH "DESCRIPTION"
+.PP
+\fIunix_update\fR
+is a helper program for the
+\fIpam_unix\fR
+module that updates the password of a given user\&. It is not intended to be run directly from the command line and logs a security violation if done so\&.
+.PP
+The purpose of the helper is to enable tighter confinement of login and password changing services\&. The helper is thus called only when SELinux is enabled on the system\&.
+.PP
+The interface of the helper \- command line options, and input/output data format are internal to the
+\fIpam_unix\fR
+module and it should not be called directly from applications\&.
+.SH "SEE ALSO"
+.PP
+\fBpam_unix\fR(8)
+.SH "AUTHOR"
+.PP
+Written by Tomas Mraz and other various people\&.
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8.xml b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c7467b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.8.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding='UTF-8'?>
+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook XML V4.3//EN"
+ "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.3/docbookx.dtd">
+
+<refentry id="unix_update">
+
+ <refmeta>
+ <refentrytitle>unix_update</refentrytitle>
+ <manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+ <refmiscinfo class="sectdesc">Linux-PAM Manual</refmiscinfo>
+ </refmeta>
+
+ <refnamediv id="unix_update-name">
+ <refname>unix_update</refname>
+ <refpurpose>Helper binary that updates the password of a given user</refpurpose>
+ </refnamediv>
+
+ <refsynopsisdiv>
+ <cmdsynopsis id="unix_update-cmdsynopsis">
+ <command>unix_update</command>
+ <arg choice="opt">
+ ...
+ </arg>
+ </cmdsynopsis>
+ </refsynopsisdiv>
+
+ <refsect1 id="unix_update-description">
+
+ <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
+
+ <para>
+ <emphasis>unix_update</emphasis> is a helper program for the
+ <emphasis>pam_unix</emphasis> module that updates the
+ password of a given user. It is not intended to be run directly
+ from the command line and logs a security violation if done so.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ The purpose of the helper is to enable tighter confinement of
+ login and password changing services. The helper is thus called only
+ when SELinux is enabled on the system.
+ </para>
+
+ <para>
+ The interface of the helper - command line options, and input/output
+ data format are internal to the <emphasis>pam_unix</emphasis>
+ module and it should not be called directly from applications.
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id='unix_update-see_also'>
+ <title>SEE ALSO</title>
+ <para>
+ <citerefentry>
+ <refentrytitle>pam_unix</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
+ </citerefentry>
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1 id='unix_update-author'>
+ <title>AUTHOR</title>
+ <para>
+ Written by Tomas Mraz and other various people.
+ </para>
+ </refsect1>
+
+</refentry>
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3559972
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+/*
+ * This program is designed to run with sufficient privilege
+ * to read and write all of the unix password databases.
+ * Its purpose is to allow updating the databases when
+ * SELinux confinement of the caller domain prevents them to
+ * do that themselves.
+ *
+ * The password is read from the standard input. The exit status of
+ * this program indicates whether the password was updated or not.
+ *
+ * Copyright information is located at the end of the file.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+
+#include <security/_pam_types.h>
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
+
+#include "passverify.h"
+#include "pam_inline.h"
+
+static int
+set_password(const char *forwho, const char *shadow, const char *remember)
+{
+ struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
+ int retval;
+ char pass[PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE + 1];
+ char towhat[PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE + 1];
+ int npass = 0;
+ /* we don't care about number format errors because the helper
+ should be called internally only */
+ int doshadow = atoi(shadow);
+ int nremember = atoi(remember);
+ char *passwords[] = { pass, towhat };
+
+ /* read the password from stdin (a pipe from the pam_unix module) */
+
+ npass = pam_read_passwords(STDIN_FILENO, 2, passwords);
+
+ if (npass != 2) { /* is it a valid password? */
+ if (npass == 1) {
+ helper_log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no new password supplied");
+ memset(pass, '\0', PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE);
+ } else {
+ helper_log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no valid passwords supplied");
+ }
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+
+ if (lock_pwdf() != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
+
+ pwd = getpwnam(forwho);
+
+ if (pwd == NULL) {
+ retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* If real caller uid is not root we must verify that
+ received old pass agrees with the current one.
+ We always allow change from null pass. */
+ if (getuid()) {
+ retval = helper_verify_password(forwho, pass, 1);
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* first, save old password */
+ if (save_old_password(forwho, pass, nremember)) {
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (doshadow || is_pwd_shadowed(pwd)) {
+ retval = unix_update_shadow(forwho, towhat);
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS)
+ if (!is_pwd_shadowed(pwd))
+ retval = unix_update_passwd(forwho, "x");
+ } else {
+ retval = unix_update_passwd(forwho, towhat);
+ }
+
+done:
+ memset(pass, '\0', PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE);
+ memset(towhat, '\0', PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE);
+
+ unlock_pwdf();
+
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
+ }
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
+{
+ char *option;
+
+ /*
+ * Catch or ignore as many signal as possible.
+ */
+ setup_signals();
+
+ /*
+ * we establish that this program is running with non-tty stdin.
+ * this is to discourage casual use. It does *NOT* prevent an
+ * intruder from repeatadly running this program to determine the
+ * password of the current user (brute force attack, but one for
+ * which the attacker must already have gained access to the user's
+ * account).
+ */
+
+ if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO) || argc != 5 ) {
+ helper_log_err(LOG_NOTICE
+ ,"inappropriate use of Unix helper binary [UID=%d]"
+ ,getuid());
+ fprintf(stderr
+ ,"This binary is not designed for running in this way\n"
+ "-- the system administrator has been informed\n");
+ sleep(10); /* this should discourage/annoy the user */
+ return PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
+ }
+
+ /* We must be root to read/update shadow.
+ */
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
+ return PAM_CRED_INSUFFICIENT;
+ }
+
+ option = argv[2];
+
+ if (strcmp(option, "update") == 0) {
+ /* Attempting to change the password */
+ return set_password(argv[1], argv[3], argv[4]);
+ }
+
+ return PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan, 1996. All rights reserved
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc., 2007, 2008. All rights reserved
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
+ * written permission.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/yppasswd.h b/modules/pam_unix/yppasswd.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5f94707
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/yppasswd.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/*
+ * yppasswdd
+ * Copyright 1994, 1995, 1996 Olaf Kirch, <okir@lst.de>
+ *
+ * This program is covered by the GNU General Public License, version 2
+ * or later. It is provided in the hope that it is useful. However, the author
+ * disclaims ALL WARRANTIES, expressed or implied. See the GPL for details.
+ *
+ * This file was generated automatically by rpcgen from yppasswd.x, and
+ * editied manually.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _YPPASSWD_H_
+#define _YPPASSWD_H_
+
+#define YPPASSWDPROG ((u_long)100009)
+#define YPPASSWDVERS ((u_long)1)
+#define YPPASSWDPROC_UPDATE ((u_long)1)
+
+/*
+ * The password struct passed by the update call. I renamed it to
+ * xpasswd to avoid a type clash with the one defined in <pwd.h>.
+ */
+#ifndef __sgi
+typedef struct xpasswd {
+ char *pw_name;
+ char *pw_passwd;
+ int pw_uid;
+ int pw_gid;
+ char *pw_gecos;
+ char *pw_dir;
+ char *pw_shell;
+} xpasswd;
+
+#else
+#include <pwd.h>
+typedef struct xpasswd xpasswd;
+#endif
+
+/* The updated password information, plus the old password.
+ */
+typedef struct yppasswd {
+ char *oldpass;
+ xpasswd newpw;
+} yppasswd;
+
+/* XDR encoding/decoding routines */
+bool_t xdr_xpasswd(XDR * xdrs, xpasswd * objp);
+bool_t xdr_yppasswd(XDR * xdrs, yppasswd * objp);
+
+#endif /* _YPPASSWD_H_ */
diff --git a/modules/pam_unix/yppasswd_xdr.c b/modules/pam_unix/yppasswd_xdr.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f2b86a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/pam_unix/yppasswd_xdr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * yppasswdd
+ * Copyright 1994, 1995, 1996 Olaf Kirch, <okir@lst.de>
+ *
+ * This program is covered by the GNU General Public License, version 2
+ * or later. It is provided in the hope that it is useful. However, the author
+ * disclaims ALL WARRANTIES, expressed or implied. See the GPL for details.
+ *
+ * This file was generated automatically by rpcgen from yppasswd.x, and
+ * editied manually.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_RPC_RPC_H
+
+#include <rpc/rpc.h>
+#include "yppasswd.h"
+
+bool_t
+xdr_xpasswd(XDR * xdrs, xpasswd * objp)
+{
+ return xdr_string(xdrs, &objp->pw_name, ~0)
+ && xdr_string(xdrs, &objp->pw_passwd, ~0)
+ && xdr_int(xdrs, &objp->pw_uid)
+ && xdr_int(xdrs, &objp->pw_gid)
+ && xdr_string(xdrs, &objp->pw_gecos, ~0)
+ && xdr_string(xdrs, &objp->pw_dir, ~0)
+ && xdr_string(xdrs, &objp->pw_shell, ~0);
+}
+
+
+bool_t
+xdr_yppasswd(XDR * xdrs, yppasswd * objp)
+{
+ return xdr_string(xdrs, &objp->oldpass, ~0)
+ && xdr_xpasswd(xdrs, &objp->newpw);
+}
+
+#endif