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+ Open Software Foundation V. Samar (SunSoft)
+ Request For Comments: 86.0 R. Schemers (SunSoft)
+ October 1995
+
+
+
+ UNIFIED LOGIN WITH
+ PLUGGABLE AUTHENTICATION MODULES (PAM)
+
+
+ 1. INTRODUCTION
+
+ Since low-level authentication mechanisms constantly evolve, it is
+ important to shield the high-level consumers of these mechanisms
+ (system-entry services and users) from such low-level changes. With
+ the Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM) framework, we can provide
+ pluggability for a variety of system-entry services -- not just
+ system authentication _per se_, but also for account, session and
+ password management. PAM's ability to _stack_ authentication modules
+ can be used to integrate `login' with different authentication
+ mechanisms such as RSA, DCE, and Kerberos, and thus unify login
+ mechanisms. The PAM framework can also provide easy integration of
+ smart cards into the system.
+
+ Modular design and pluggability have become important for users who
+ want ease of use. In the PC hardware arena, no one wants to set the
+ interrupt vector numbers or resolve the addressing conflict between
+ various devices. In the software arena, people also want to be able
+ to replace components easily for easy customization, maintenance, and
+ upgrades.
+
+ Authentication software deserves special attention because
+ authentication forms a very critical component of any secure computer
+ system. The authentication infrastructure and its components may
+ have to be modified or replaced either because some deficiencies have
+ been found in the current algorithms, or because sites want to
+ enforce a different security policy than what was provided by the
+ system vendor. The replacement and modification should be done in
+ such a way that the user is not affected by these changes.
+
+ The solution has to address not just how the applications use the new
+ authentication mechanisms in a generic fashion, but also how the user
+ will be authenticated to these mechanisms in a generic way. The
+ former is addressed by GSS-API [Linn 93], while this RFC addresses
+ the later; these two efforts are complementary to each other.
+
+ Since most system-entry services (for example, `login', `dtlogin',
+ `rlogin', `ftp', `rsh') may want to be independent of the specific
+ authentication mechanisms used by the machine, it is important that
+ there be a framework for _plugging_ in various mechanisms. This
+ requires that the system applications use a standard API to interact
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 1
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ with the authentication services. If these system-entry services
+ remain independent of the actual mechanism used on that machine, the
+ system administrator can install suitable authentication modules
+ without requiring changes to these applications.
+
+ For any security system to be successful, it has to be easy to use.
+ In the case of authentication, the single most important ease-of-use
+ characteristic is that the user should not be required to learn about
+ various ways of authentication and remember multiple passwords.
+ Ideally, there should be one all-encompassing authentication system
+ where there is only one password, but for heterogeneous sites,
+ multiple authentication mechanisms have to co-exist. The problem of
+ integrating multiple authentication mechanisms such as Kerberos
+ [Steiner 88], RSA [Rivest 78], and Diffie-Hellman [Diffie 76, Taylor
+ 88], is also referred to as _integrated login_, or _unified login_
+ problem. Even if the user has to use multiple authentication
+ mechanisms, the user should not be forced to type multiple passwords.
+ Furthermore, the user should be able to use the new network identity
+ without taking any further actions. The key here is in modular
+ integration of the network authentication technologies with `login'
+ and other system-entry services.
+
+ In this RFC we discuss the architecture and design of pluggable
+ authentication modules. This design gives the capability to use
+ field-replaceable authentication modules along with unified login
+ capability. It thus provides for both _pluggability_ and _ease-of-
+ use_.
+
+ The RFC is organized as follows. We first motivate the need for a
+ generic way to authenticate the user by various system-entry services
+ within the operating system. We describe the goals and constraints
+ of the design. This leads to the architecture, description of the
+ interfaces, and _stacking_ of modules to get unified login
+ functionality. We then describe our experience with the design, and
+ end with a description of future work.
+
+
+ 2. OVERVIEW OF IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION MECHANISMS
+
+ An identification and authentication ("I&A") mechanism is used to
+ establish a user's identity the system (i.e., to a local machine's
+ operating system) and to other principals on the network. On a
+ typical UNIX system, there are various ports of entry into the
+ system, such as `login', `dtlogin', `rlogin', `ftp', `rsh', `su', and
+ `telnet'. In all cases, the user has to be identified and
+ authenticated before granting appropriate access rights to the user.
+ The user identification and authentication for all these entry points
+ needs to be coordinated to ensure a secure system.
+
+ In most of the current UNIX systems, the login mechanism is based
+ upon verification of the password using the modified DES algorithm.
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 2
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ The security of the implementation assumes that the password cannot
+ be guessed, and that the password does not go over the wire in the
+ clear. These assumptions, however, are not universally valid.
+ Various programs are now available freely on the Internet that can
+ run dictionary attack against the encrypted password. Further, some
+ of the network services (for example, `rlogin', `ftp', `telnet') send
+ the password over in clear, and there are "sniffer" programs freely
+ available to steal these passwords. The classical assumptions may be
+ acceptable on a trusted network, but in an open environment there is
+ a need to use more restrictive and stronger authentication
+ mechanisms. Examples of such mechanisms include Kerberos, RSA,
+ Diffie-Hellman, one-time password [Skey 94], and challenge-response
+ based smart card authentication systems. Since this list will
+ continue to evolve, it is important that the system-entry services do
+ not have hard-coded dependencies on any of these authentication
+ mechanisms.
+
+
+ 3. DESIGN GOALS
+
+ The goals of the PAM framework are as follows:
+
+ (a) The system administrator should be able to choose the default
+ authentication mechanism for the machine. This can range from
+ a simple password-based mechanism to a biometric or a smart
+ card based system.
+
+ (b) It should be possible to configure the user authentication
+ mechanism on a per application basis. For example, a site may
+ require S/Key password authentication for `telnet' access,
+ while allowing machine `login' sessions with just UNIX password
+ authentication.
+
+ (c) The framework should support the display requirements of the
+ applications. For example, for a graphical login session such
+ as `dtlogin', the user name and the password may have to be
+ entered in a new window. For networking system-entry
+ applications such as `ftp' and `telnet', the user name and
+ password has to be transmitted over the network to the client
+ machine.
+
+ (d) It should be possible to configure multiple authentication
+ protocols for each of those applications. For example, one may
+ want the users to get authenticated by both Kerberos and RSA
+ authentication systems.
+
+ (e) The system administrator should be able to _stack_ multiple
+ user authentication mechanisms such that the user is
+ authenticated with all authentication protocols without
+ retyping the password.
+
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 3
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ (f) The architecture should allow for multiple passwords if
+ necessary to achieve higher security for users with specific
+ security requirements.
+
+ (g) The system-entry services should not be required to change when
+ the underlying mechanism changes. This can be very useful for
+ third-party developers because they often do not have the
+ source code for these services.
+
+ (h) The architecture should provide for a _pluggable_ model for
+ system authentication, as well as for other related tasks such
+ as password, account, and session management.
+
+ (i) For backward-compatibility reasons, the PAM API should support
+ the authentication requirements of the current system-entry
+ services.
+
+ There are certain issues that the PAM framework does not specifically
+ address:
+
+ (a) We focus only on providing a generic scheme through which users
+ use passwords to establish their identities to the machine.
+ Once the identity is established, how the identity is
+ communicated to other interested parties is outside the scope
+ of this design. There are efforts underway at IETF [Linn 93]
+ to develop a Generic Security Services Application Interface
+ (GSSAPI) that can be used by applications for secure and
+ authenticated communication without knowing the underlying
+ mechanism.
+
+ (b) The _single-signon_ problem of securely transferring the
+ identity of the caller to a remote site is not addressed. For
+ example, the problem of delegating credentials from the
+ `rlogin' client to the other machine without typing the
+ password is not addressed by our work. We also do not address
+ the problem of sending the passwords over the network in the
+ clear.
+
+ (c) We do not address the source of information obtained from the
+ "`getXbyY()'" family of calls (e.g., `getpwnam()'). Different
+ operating systems address this problem differently. For
+ example, Solaris uses the name service switch (NSS) to
+ determine the source of information for the "`getXbyY()'"
+ calls. It is expected that data which is stored in multiple
+ sources (such as passwd entries in NIS+ and the DCE registry)
+ is kept in sync using the appropriate commands (such as
+ `passwd_export').
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 4
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ 4. OVERVIEW OF THE PAM FRAMEWORK
+
+ We propose that the goals listed above can be met through a framework
+ in which authentication modules can be _plugged_ independently of the
+ application. We call this the _Pluggable Authentication Modules_
+ (PAM) framework.
+
+ The core components of the PAM framework are the authentication
+ library API (the front end) and the authentication mechanism-specific
+ modules (the back end), connected through the Service Provider
+ Interface (SPI). Applications write to the PAM API, while the
+ authentication-system providers write to the PAM SPI and supply the
+ back end modules that are independent of the application.
+
+ ftp telnet login (Applications)
+ | | |
+ | | |
+ +--------+--------+
+ |
+ +-----+-----+
+ | PAM API | <-- pam.conf file
+ +-----+-----+
+ |
+ +--------+--------+
+ UNIX Kerberos Smart Cards (Mechanisms)
+
+ Figure 1: The Basic PAM Architecture
+
+ Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the application, the
+ PAM library, and the authentication modules. Three applications
+ (`login', `telnet' and `ftp') are shown which use the PAM
+ authentication interfaces. When an application makes a call to the
+ PAM API, it loads the appropriate authentication module as determined
+ by the configuration file, `pam.conf'. The request is forwarded to
+ the underlying authentication module (for example, UNIX password,
+ Kerberos, smart cards) to perform the specified operation. The PAM
+ layer then returns the response from the authentication module to the
+ application.
+
+ PAM unifies system authentication and access control for the system,
+ and allows plugging of associated authentication modules through well
+ defined interfaces. The plugging can be defined through various
+ means, one of which uses a configuration file, such as the one in
+ Table 1. For each of the system applications, the file specifies the
+ authentication module that should be loaded. In the example below,
+ `login' uses the UNIX password module, while `ftp' and `telnet' use
+ the S/Key module.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 5
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ Table 1: A Simplified View of a Sample PAM Configuration File.
+
+ service module_path
+ ------- -----------
+ login pam_unix.so
+ ftp pam_skey.so
+ telnet pam_skey.so
+
+ Authentication configuration is only one aspect of this interface.
+ Other critical components include account management, session
+ management, and password management. For example, the `login'
+ program may want to verify not only the password but also whether the
+ account has aged or expired. Generic interfaces also need to be
+ provided so that the password can be changed according to the
+ requirements of the module. Furthermore, the application may want to
+ log information about the current session as determined by the
+ module.
+
+ Not all applications or services may need all of the above
+ components, and not each authentication module may need to provide
+ support for all of the interfaces. For example, while `login' may
+ need access to all four components, `su' may need access to just the
+ authentication component. Some applications may use some specific
+ authentication and password management modules but share the account
+ and session management modules with others.
+
+ This reasoning leads to a partitioning of the entire set of
+ interfaces into four areas of functionality: (1) authentication, (2)
+ account, (3) session, and (4) password. The concept of PAM was
+ extended to these functional areas by implementing each of them as a
+ separate pluggable module.
+
+ Breaking the functionality into four modules helps the module
+ providers because they can use the system-provided libraries for the
+ modules that they are not changing. For example, if a supplier wants
+ to provide a better version of Kerberos, they can just provide that
+ new authentication and password module, and reuse the existing ones
+ for account and session.
+
+ 4.1. Module Description
+
+ More details on specific API's are described in Appendix A. A brief
+ description of four modules follows:
+
+ (a) Authentication management: This set includes the
+ `pam_authenticate()' function to authenticate the user, and the
+ `pam_setcred()' interface to set, refresh or destroy the user
+ credentials.
+
+ (b) Account management: This set includes the `pam_acct_mgmt()'
+ function to check whether the authenticated user should be
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 6
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ given access to his/her account. This function can implement
+ account expiration and access hour restrictions.
+
+ (c) Session management: This set includes the `pam_open_session()'
+ and `pam_close_session()' functions for session management and
+ accounting. For example, the system may want to store the
+ total time for the session.
+
+ (d) Password management: This set includes a function,
+ `pam_chauthtok()', to change the password.
+
+
+ 5. FRAMEWORK INTERFACES
+
+ The PAM framework further provides a set of administrative interfaces
+ to support the above modules and to provide for application-module
+ communication. There is no corresponding service provider interface
+ (SPI) for such functions.
+
+ 5.1. Administrative Interfaces
+
+ Each set of PAM transactions starts with `pam_start()' and ends with
+ the `pam_end()' function. The interfaces `pam_get_item()' and
+ `pam_set_item()' are used to read and write the state information
+ associated with the PAM transaction.
+
+ If there is any error with any of the PAM interfaces, the error
+ message can be printed with `pam_strerror()'.
+
+ 5.2. Application-Module Communication
+
+ During application initialization, certain data such as the user name
+ is saved in the PAM framework layer through `pam_start()' so that it
+ can be used by the underlying modules. The application can also pass
+ opaque data to the module which the modules will pass back while
+ communicating with the user.
+
+ 5.3. User-Module Communication
+
+ The `pam_start()' function also passes conversation function that has
+ to be used by the underlying modules to read and write module
+ specific authentication information. For example, these functions
+ can be used to prompt the user for the password in a way determined
+ by the application. PAM can thus be used by graphical, non-
+ graphical, or networked applications.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 7
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ 5.4. Inter-Module Communication
+
+ Though the modules are independent, they can share certain common
+ information about the authentication session such as user name,
+ service name, password, and conversation function through the
+ `pam_get_item()' and `pam_set_item()' interfaces. These API's can
+ also be used by the application to change the state information after
+ having called `pam_start()' once.
+
+ 5.5. Module State Information
+
+ The PAM service modules may want to keep certain module-specific
+ state information about the session. The interfaces `pam_get_data()'
+ and `pam_set_data()' can be used by the service modules to access and
+ update module-specific information as needed from the PAM handle.
+ The modules can also attach a cleanup function with the data. The
+ cleanup function is executed when `pam_end()' is called to indicate
+ the end of the current authentication activity.
+
+ Since the PAM modules are loaded upon demand, there is no direct
+ module initialization support in the PAM framework. If there are
+ certain initialization tasks that the PAM service modules have to do,
+ they should be done upon the first invocation. However, if there are
+ certain clean-up tasks to be done when the authentication session
+ ends, the modules should use `pam_set_data()' to specify the clean-up
+ functions, which would be called when `pam_end()' is called by the
+ application.
+
+
+ 6. MODULE CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
+
+ Table 2 shows an example of a configuration file `pam.conf' with
+ support for authentication, session, account, and password management
+ modules. `login' has three entries: one each for authentication
+ processing, session management and account management. Each entry
+ specifies the module name that should be loaded for the given module
+ type. In this example, the `ftp' service uses the authentication and
+ session modules. Note that all services here share the same session
+ management module, while having different authentication modules.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
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+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 8
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+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ Table 2: Configuration File (pam.conf) with Different Modules
+ and Control Flow
+
+ service module_type control_flag module_path options
+ ------- ----------- ------------ ----------- -------
+ login auth required pam_unix_auth.so nowarn
+ login session required pam_unix_session.so
+ login account required pam_unix_account.so
+ ftp auth required pam_skey_auth.so debug
+ ftp session required pam_unix_session.so
+ telnet session required pam_unix_session.so
+ login password required pam_unix_passwd.so
+ passwd password required pam_unix_passwd.so
+ OTHER auth required pam_unix_auth.so
+ OTHER session required pam_unix_session.so
+ OTHER account required pam_unix_account.so
+
+ The first field, _service_, denotes the service (for example,
+ `login', `passwd', `rlogin'). The name `OTHER' indicates the module
+ used by all other applications that have not been specified in this
+ file. This name can also be used if all services have the same
+ requirements. In the example, since all the services use the same
+ session module, we could have replaced those lines with a single
+ `OTHER' line.
+
+ The second field, _module_type_, indicates the type of the PAM
+ functional module. It can be one of `auth', `account', `session', or
+ `password' modules.
+
+ The third field, _control_flag_ determines the behavior of stacking
+ multiple modules by specifying whether any particular module is
+ _required_, _sufficient_, or _optional_. The next section describes
+ stacking in more detail.
+
+ The fourth field, _module_path_, specifies the location of the
+ module. The PAM framework loads this module upon demand to invoke
+ the required function.
+
+ The fifth field, _options_, is used by the PAM framework layer to
+ pass module specific options to the modules. It is up to the module
+ to parse and interpret the options. This field can be used by the
+ modules to turn on debugging or to pass any module specific
+ parameters such as a timeout value. It is also used to support
+ unified login as described below. The options field can be used by
+ the system administrator to fine-tune the PAM modules.
+
+ If any of the fields are invalid, or if a module is not found, that
+ line is ignored and the error is logged as a critical error via
+ `syslog(3)'. If no entries are found for the given module type, then
+ the PAM framework returns an error to the application.
+
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 9
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ 7. INTEGRATING MULTIPLE AUTHENTICATION SERVICES WITH STACKING
+
+ In the world of heterogeneous systems, the system administrator often
+ has to deal with the problem of integrating multiple authentication
+ mechanisms. The user is often required to know about the
+ authentication command of the new authentication module (for example,
+ `kinit', `dce_login') after logging into the system. This is not
+ user-friendly because it forces people to remember to type the new
+ command and enter the new password. This functionality should be
+ invisible instead of burdening the user with it.
+
+ There are two problems to be addressed here:
+
+ (a) Supporting multiple authentication mechanisms.
+
+ (b) Providing unified login in the presence of multiple mechanisms.
+
+ In the previous section, we described how one could replace the
+ default authentication module with any other module of choice. Now
+ we demonstrate how the same model can be extended to provide support
+ for multiple modules.
+
+ 7.1. Design for Stacked Modules
+
+ One possibility was to provide hard-coded rules in `login' or other
+ applications requiring authentication services [Adamson 95]. But
+ this becomes very specific to the particular combination of
+ authentication protocols, and also requires the source code of the
+ application. Digital's Security Integration Architecture [SIA 95]
+ addresses this problem by specifying the same list of authentication
+ modules for all applications. Since requirements for various
+ applications can vary, it is essential that the configuration be on a
+ per-application basis.
+
+ To support multiple authentication mechanisms, the PAM framework was
+ extended to support _stacking_. When any API is called, the back
+ ends for the stacked modules are invoked in the order listed, and the
+ result returned to the caller. In Figure 2, the authentication
+ service of `login' is stacked and the user is authenticated by UNIX,
+ Kerberos, and RSA authentication mechanisms. Note that in this
+ example, there is no stacking for session or account management
+ modules.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 10
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+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ login
+ |
+ +--------+--------+
+ | | |
+ session auth account
+ | | |
+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +--+--+
+ | PAM | | PAM | | PAM |
+ +--+--+ +--+--+ +--+--+
+ | | |
+ UNIX UNIX UNIX
+ session auth account
+ |
+ Kerberos
+ auth
+ |
+ RSA
+ auth
+
+ Figure 2: Stacking With the PAM Architecture
+
+ Stacking is specified through additional entries in the configuration
+ file shown earlier. As shown in Table 2, for each application (such
+ as `login') the configuration file can specify multiple mechanisms
+ that have to be invoked in the specified order. When mechanisms
+ fail, the _control_flag_ decides which error should be returned to
+ the application. Since the user should not know which authentication
+ module failed when a bad password was typed, the PAM framework
+ continues to call other authentication modules on the stack even on
+ failure. The semantics of the control flag are as follows:
+
+ (a) `required': With this flag, the module failure results in the
+ PAM framework returning the error to the caller _after_
+ executing all other modules on the stack. For the function to
+ be able to return success to the application all `required'
+ modules have to report success. This flag is normally set when
+ authentication by this module is a _must_.
+
+ (b) `optional': With this flag, the PAM framework ignores the
+ module failure and continues with the processing of the next
+ module in sequence. This flag is used when the user is allowed
+ to login even if that particular module has failed.
+
+ (c) `sufficient': With this flag, if the module succeeds the PAM
+ framework returns success to the application immediately
+ without trying any other modules. For failure cases, the
+ _sufficient_ modules are treated as `optional'.
+
+ Table 3 shows a sample configuration file that stacks the `login'
+ command. Here the user is authenticated by UNIX, Kerberos, and RSA
+ authentication services. The `required' key word for _control_flag_
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 11
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ enforces that the user is allowed to login only if he/she is
+ authenticated by _both_ UNIX and Kerberos services. RSA
+ authentication is optional by virtue of the `optional' key word in
+ the _control_flag_ field. The user can still log in even if RSA
+ authentication fails.
+
+ Table 3: PAM Configuration File with Support for Stacking
+
+ service module_type control_flag module_path options
+ ------- ----------- ------------ ----------- -------
+ login auth required pam_unix.so debug
+ login auth required pam_kerb.so use_mapped_pass
+ login auth optional pam_rsa.so use_first_pass
+
+ Table 4 illustrates the use of the sufficient flag for the `rlogin'
+ service. The Berkeley `rlogin' protocol specifies that if the remote
+ host is trusted (as specified in the `/etc/hosts.equiv' file or in
+ the `.rhosts' file in the home directory of the user), then the
+ `rlogin' daemon should not require the user to type the password. If
+ this is not the case, then the user is required to type the password.
+ Instead of hard coding this policy in the `rlogin' daemon, this can
+ be expressed with the `pam.conf' file in Table 4. The PAM module
+ `pam_rhosts_auth.so.1' implements the `.rhosts' policy described
+ above. If a site administrator wants to enable remote login with
+ only passwords, then the first line should be deleted.
+
+ Table 4: PAM Configuration File for the rlogin service
+
+ service module_type control_flag module_path options
+ ------- ----------- ------------ ----------- -------
+ rlogin auth sufficient pam_rhosts_auth.so
+ rlogin auth required pam_unix.so
+
+ 7.2. Password-Mapping
+
+ Multiple authentication mechanisms on a machine can lead to multiple
+ passwords that users have to remember. One attractive solution from
+ the ease-of-use viewpoint is to use the same password for all
+ mechanisms. This, however, can also weaken the security because if
+ that password were to be compromised in any of the multiple
+ mechanisms, all mechanisms would be compromised at the same time.
+ Furthermore, different authentication mechanisms may have their own
+ distinctive password requirements in regards to its length, allowed
+ characters, time interval between updates, aging, locking, and so
+ forth. These requirements make it problematic to use the same
+ password for multiple authentication mechanisms.
+
+ The solution we propose, while not precluding use of the same
+ password for every mechanism, allows for a different password for
+ each mechanism through what we call _password-mapping_. This
+ basically means using the user's _primary_ password to encrypt the
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 12
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ user's other (_secondary_) passwords, and storing these encrypted
+ passwords in a place where they are available to the user. Once the
+ primary password is verified, the authentication modules would obtain
+ the other passwords for their own mechanisms by decrypting the
+ mechanism-specific encrypted password with the primary password, and
+ passing it to the authentication service. The security of this
+ design for password-mapping assumes that the primary password is the
+ user's strongest password, in terms of its unguessability (length,
+ type and mix of characters used, etc.).
+
+ If there is any error in password-mapping, or if the mapping does not
+ exist, the user will be prompted for the password by each
+ authentication module.
+
+ To support password-mapping, the PAM framework saves the primary
+ password and provides it to stacked authentication modules. The
+ password is cleared out before the `pam_authenticate' function
+ returns.
+
+ How the password is encrypted depends completely on the module
+ implementation. The encrypted secondary password (also called a
+ "mapped password") can be stored in a trusted or untrusted place,
+ such as a smart card, a local file, or a directory service. If the
+ encrypted passwords are stored in an untrusted publicly accessible
+ place, this does provide an intruder with opportunities for potential
+ dictionary attack.
+
+ Though password-mapping is voluntary, it is recommended that all
+ module providers add support for the following four mapping options:
+
+ (a) `use_first_pass': Use the same password used by the first
+ mechanism that asked for a password. The module should not ask
+ for the password if the user cannot be authenticated by the
+ first password. This option is normally used when the system
+ administrator wants to enforce the same password across
+ multiple modules.
+
+ (b) `try_first_pass': This is the same as `use_first_pass', except
+ that if the primary password is not valid, it should prompt the
+ user for the password.
+
+ (c) `use_mapped_pass': Use the password-mapping scheme to get the
+ actual password for this module. One possible implementation
+ is to get the mapped-password using the XFN API [XFN 94], and
+ decrypt it with the primary password to get the module-specific
+ password. The module should not ask for the password if the
+ user cannot be authenticated by the first password. The XFN
+ API allows user-defined attributes (such as _mapped-password_)
+ to be stored in the _user-context_. Using the XFN API is
+ particularly attractive because support for the XFN may be
+ found on many systems in the future.
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 13
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ (d) `try_mapped_pass': This is the same as `use_mapped_pass',
+ except that if the primary password is not valid, it should
+ prompt the user for the password.
+
+ When passwords get updated, the PAM framework stores both the old as
+ well as the new password to be able to inform other dependent
+ authentication modules about the change. Other modules can use this
+ information to update the encrypted password without forcing the user
+ to type the sequence of passwords again. The PAM framework clears
+ out the passwords before returning to the application.
+
+ Table 3 illustrates how the same password can be used by `login' for
+ authenticating to the standard UNIX login, Kerberos and RSA services.
+ Once the user has been authenticated to the primary authentication
+ service (UNIX `login' in this example) with the primary password, the
+ option `use_mapped_pass' indicates to the Kerberos module that it
+ should use the primary password to decrypt the stored Kerberos
+ password and then use the Kerberos password to get the ticket for the
+ ticket-granting-service. After that succeeds, the option
+ `use_first_pass' indicates to the RSA module that instead of
+ prompting the user for a password, it should use the primary password
+ typed earlier for authenticating the user. Note that in this
+ scenario, the user has to enter the password just once.
+
+ Note that if a one-time password scheme (e.g., S/Key) is used,
+ password mapping cannot apply.
+
+ 7.3. Implications of Stacking on the PAM Design
+
+ Because of the stacking capability of PAM, we have designed the PAM
+ API's to not return any data to the application, except status. If
+ this were not the case, it would be difficult for the PAM framework
+ to decide which module should return data to the application. When
+ there is any error, the application does not know which of the
+ modules failed. This behavior enables (even requires) the
+ application to be completely independent from the modules.
+
+ Another design decision we have made is that PAM gives only the user
+ name to all the underlying PAM modules, hence it is the
+ responsibility of the PAM modules to convert the name to their own
+ internal format. For example, the Kerberos module may have to
+ convert the UNIX user name to a Kerberos principal name.
+
+ Stacking also forces the modules to be designed such that they can
+ occur anywhere in the stack without any side-effects.
+
+ Since modules such as the authentication and the password module are
+ very closely related, it is important they be configured in the same
+ order and with compatible options.
+
+
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 14
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ 8. INTEGRATION WITH SMART CARDS
+
+ Many networking authentication protocols require possession of a long
+ key to establish the user identity. For ease-of-use reasons, that
+ long key is normally encrypted with the user's password so that the
+ user is not required to memorize it. However, weak passwords can be
+ compromised through a dictionary attack and thus undermine the
+ stronger network authentication mechanism. Furthermore, the
+ encrypted data is normally stored in a centrally accessible service
+ whose availability depends upon the reliability of the associated
+ service. Solutions have been proposed to use a pass-phrase or one-
+ time-password, but those are much longer than the regular eight
+ character passwords traditionally used with UNIX `login'. This makes
+ the solution user-unfriendly because it requires longer strings to be
+ remembered and typed.
+
+ For most authentication protocol implementations, the trust boundary
+ is the local machine. This assumption may not be valid in cases
+ where the user is mobile and has to use publicly available networked
+ computers. In such cases, it is required that the clear text of the
+ key or the password never be made available to the machine.
+
+ Smart cards solve the above problems by reducing password exposure by
+ supporting a _two factor_ authentication mechanism: the first with
+ the possession of the card, and the second with the knowledge of the
+ PIN associated with the card. Not only can the smart cards be a
+ secure repository of multiple passwords, they can also provide the
+ encryption and authentication functions such that the long (private)
+ key is never exposed outside the card.
+
+ The PAM framework allows for integrating smart cards to the system by
+ providing a smart card specific module for authentication.
+ Furthermore, the unified login problem is simplified because the
+ multiple passwords for various authentication mechanisms can be
+ stored on the smart card itself. This can be enabled by adding a
+ suitable key-word such as `use_smart_card' in the _options_ field.
+
+
+ 9. SECURITY ISSUES
+
+ It is important to understand the impact of PAM on the security of
+ any system so that the site-administrator can make an informed
+ decision.
+
+ (a) Sharing of passwords with multiple authentication mechanisms.
+
+ If there are multiple authentication modules, one possibility
+ is to use the same password for all of them. If the password
+ for any of the multiple authentication system is compromised,
+ the user's password in all systems would be compromised. If
+ this is a concern, then multiple passwords might be considered
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 15
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ at the cost of ease-of-use.
+
+ (b) Password-mapping.
+
+ This technique of encrypting all other passwords with the
+ primary password assumes that it is lot more difficult to crack
+ the primary password and that reasonable steps have been taken
+ to ensure limited availability of the encrypted primary
+ password. If this is not done, an intruder could target the
+ primary password as the first point of dictionary attack. If
+ one of the other modules provide stronger security than the
+ password based security, the site would be negating the strong
+ security by using password-mapping. If this is a concern, then
+ multiple passwords might be considered at the cost of ease-of-
+ use. If smart cards are used, they obviate the need for
+ password-mapping completely.
+
+ (c) Security of the configuration file.
+
+ Since the policy file dictates how the user is authenticated,
+ this file should be protected from unauthorized modifications.
+
+ (d) Stacking various PAM modules.
+
+ The system administrator should fully understand the
+ implications of stacking various modules that will be installed
+ on the system and their respective orders and interactions.
+ The composition of various authentication modules should be
+ carefully examined. The trusted computing base of the machine
+ now includes the PAM modules.
+
+
+ 10. EXPERIENCE WITH PAM
+
+ The PAM framework was first added in Solaris 2.3 release as a private
+ internal interface. PAM is currently being used by several system
+ entry applications such as `login', `passwd', `su', `dtlogin',
+ `rlogind', `rshd', `telnetd', `ftpd', `in.rexecd', `uucpd', `init',
+ `sac', and `ttymon'. We have found that PAM provides an excellent
+ framework to encapsulate the authentication-related tasks for the
+ entire system. The Solaris 2.3 PAM API's were hence enhanced and
+ simplified to support stacking.
+
+ PAM modules have been developed for UNIX, DCE, Kerberos, S/Key,
+ remote user authentication, and dialpass authentication. Other PAM
+ modules are under development, and integration with smart cards is
+ being planned.
+
+ Some third parties have used the PAM interface to extend the security
+ mechanisms offered by the Solaris environment.
+
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 16
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ The PAM API has been accepted by Common Desktop Environment (CDE)
+ vendors as the API to be used for integrating the graphical interface
+ for login, `dtlogin' with multiple authentication mechanisms.
+
+
+ 11. FUTURE WORK
+
+ Amongst the various components of PAM, the password component needs
+ to be carefully examined to see whether the stacking semantics are
+ particularly applicable, and how PAM should deal with partial
+ failures when changing passwords.
+
+ The _control_flag_ of the configuration file can be extended to
+ include other semantics. For example, if the error is "name service
+ not available", one may want to retry. It is also possible to offer
+ semantics of "return success if any of the modules return success".
+
+ In an earlier section, we had mentioned integration of smart cards
+ with PAM. Though we feel that integration should be straight forward
+ from the PAM architecture point of view, there may be some issues
+ with implementation because the interfaces to the smart cards have
+ not yet been standardized.
+
+ One possible extension to PAM is to allow the passing of module-
+ specific data between applications and PAM modules. For example, the
+ `login' program likes to build its new environment from a select list
+ of variables, yet the DCE module needs the `KRB5CCNAME' variable to
+ be exported to the child process. For now we have modified the
+ `login' program to explicitly export the `KRB5CCNAME' variable.
+
+ Administrative tools are needed to help system administrators modify
+ `pam.conf', and perform sanity checks on it (i.e., a `pam_check'
+ utility).
+
+
+ 12. CONCLUSION
+
+ The PAM framework and the module interfaces provide pluggability for
+ user authentication, as well as for account, session and password
+ management. The PAM architecture can be used by `login' and by all
+ other system-entry services, and thus ensure that all entry points
+ for the system have been secured. This architecture enables
+ replacement and modification of authentication modules in the field
+ to secure the system against the newly found weaknesses without
+ changing any of the system services.
+
+ The PAM framework can be used to integrate `login' and `dtlogin' with
+ different authentication mechanisms such as RSA and Kerberos.
+ Multiple authentication systems can be accessed with the same
+ password. The PAM framework also provides easy integration of smart
+ cards into the system.
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 17
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ PAM provides complementary functionality to GSS-API, in that it
+ provides mechanisms through which the user gets authenticated to any
+ new system-level authentication service on the machine. GSS-API then
+ uses the credentials for authenticated and secure communications with
+ other application-level service entities on the network.
+
+
+ 13. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
+
+ PAM development has spanned several release cycles at SunSoft.
+ Shau-Ping Lo, Chuck Hickey, and Alex Choy did the first design and
+ implementation. Bill Shannon and Don Stephenson helped with the PAM
+ architecture. Rocky Wu prototyped stacking of multiple modules.
+ Paul Fronberg, Charlie Lai, and Roland Schemers made very significant
+ enhancements to the PAM interfaces and took the project to completion
+ within a very short time. Kathy Slattery wrote the PAM
+ documentation. John Perry integrated PAM within the CDE framework.
+
+
+ APPENDIX A. PAM API'S
+
+ This appendix gives an informal description of the various interfaces
+ of PAM. Since the goal here is just for the reader to get a working
+ knowledge about the PAM interfaces, not all flags and options have
+ been fully defined and explained. The API's described here are
+ subject to change.
+
+ The PAM Service Provider Interface is very similar to the PAM API,
+ except for one extra parameter to pass module-specific options to the
+ underlying modules.
+
+ A.1. Framework Layer API's
+
+ int
+ pam_start(
+ char *service_name,
+ char *user,
+ struct pam_conv *pam_conversation,
+ pam_handle_t **pamh
+ );
+
+ `pam_start()' is called to initiate an authentication transaction.
+ `pam_start()' takes as arguments the name of the service, the name of
+ the user to be authenticated, the address of the conversation
+ structure. `pamh' is later used as a handle for subsequent calls to
+ the PAM library.
+
+ The PAM modules do not communicate directly with the user; instead
+ they rely on the application to perform all such interaction. The
+ application needs to provide the conversation functions, `conv()',
+ and associated application data pointers through a `pam_conv'
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 18
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ structure when it initiates an authentication transaction. The
+ module uses the `conv()' function to prompt the user for data,
+ display error messages, or text information.
+
+ int
+ pam_end(
+ pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ int pam_status
+ );
+
+ `pam_end()' is called to terminate the PAM transaction as specified
+ by `pamh', and to free any storage area allocated by the PAM modules
+ with `pam_set_item()'.
+
+ int
+ pam_set_item(
+ pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ int item_type,
+ void *item
+ );
+
+ int
+ pam_get_item(
+ pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ int item_type,
+ void **item);
+
+ `pam_get_item()' and `pam_set_item()' allow the parameters specified
+ in the initial call to `pam_start()' to be read and updated. This is
+ useful when a particular parameter is not available when
+ `pam_start()' is called or must be modified after the initial call to
+ `pam_start()'. `pam_set_item()' is passed a pointer to the object,
+ `item', and its type, `item_type'. `pam_get_item()' is passed the
+ address of the pointer, `item', which is assigned the address of the
+ requested object.
+
+ The `item_type' is one of the following:
+
+ Table 5: Possible Values for Item_type
+
+ Item Name Description
+ --------- -----------
+ PAM_SERVICE The service name
+ PAM_USER The user name
+ PAM_TTY The tty name
+ PAM_RHOST The remote host name
+ PAM_CONV The pam_conv structure
+ PAM_AUTHTOK The authentication token (password)
+ PAM_OLDAUTHTOK The old authentication token
+ PAM_RUSER The remote user name
+
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 19
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ Note that the values of `PAM_AUTHTOK' and `PAM_OLDAUTHTOK' are only
+ available to PAM modules and not to the applications. They are
+ explicitly cleared out by the framework before returning to the
+ application.
+
+ char *
+ pam_strerror(
+ int errnum
+ );
+
+ `pam_strerror()' maps the error number to a PAM error message string,
+ and returns a pointer to that string.
+
+ int
+ pam_set_data(
+ pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ char *module_data_name,
+ char *data,
+ (*cleanup)(pam_handle_t *pamh, char *data,
+ int error_status)
+ );
+
+ The `pam_set_data()' function stores module specific data within the
+ PAM handle. The `module_data_name' uniquely specifies the name to
+ which some data and cleanup callback function can be attached. The
+ cleanup function is called when `pam_end()' is invoked.
+
+ int
+ pam_get_data(
+ pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ char *module_data_name,
+ void **datap
+ );
+
+ The `pam_get_data()' function obtains module-specific data from the
+ PAM handle stored previously by the `pam_get_data()' function. The
+ `module_data_name' uniquely specifies the name for which data has to
+ be obtained. This function is normally used to retrieve module
+ specific state information.
+
+ A.2. Authentication API's
+
+ int
+ pam_authenticate(
+ pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ int flags
+ );
+
+ The `pam_authenticate()' function is called to verify the identity of
+ the current user. The user is usually required to enter a password
+ or similar authentication token, depending upon the authentication
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 20
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ module configured with the system. The user in question is specified
+ by a prior call to `pam_start()', and is referenced by the
+ authentication handle, `pamh'.
+
+ int
+ pam_setcred(
+ pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ int flags
+ );
+
+ The `pam_setcred()' function is called to set the credentials of the
+ current process associated with the authentication handle, `pamh'.
+ The actions that can be denoted through `flags' include credential
+ initialization, refresh, reinitialization and deletion.
+
+ A.3. Account Management API
+
+ int
+ pam_acct_mgmt(
+ pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ int flags
+ );
+
+ The function `pam_acct_mgmt()' is called to determine whether the
+ current user's account and password are valid. This typically
+ includes checking for password and account expiration, valid login
+ times, etc. The user in question is specified by a prior call to
+ `pam_start()', and is referenced by the authentication handle,
+ `pamh'.
+
+ A.4. Session Management API's
+
+ int
+ pam_open_session(
+ pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ int flags
+ );
+
+ `pam_open_session()' is called to inform the session modules that a
+ new session has been initialized. All programs which use PAM should
+ invoke `pam_open_session()' when beginning a new session.
+
+ int
+ pam_close_session(
+ pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ int flags
+ );
+
+ Upon termination of this session, the `pam_close_session()' function
+ should be invoked to inform the underlying modules that the session
+ has terminated.
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 21
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ A.5. Password Management API's
+
+ int
+ pam_chauthtok(
+ pam_handle_t *pamh,
+ int flags
+ );
+
+ `pam_chauthtok()' is called to change the authentication token
+ associated with the user referenced by the authentication handle
+ `pamh'. After the call, the authentication token of the user will be
+ changed in accordance with the authentication module configured on
+ the system.
+
+
+ APPENDIX B. SAMPLE PAM APPLICATION
+
+ This appendix shows a sample `login' application which uses the PAM
+ API's. It is not meant to be a fully functional login program, as
+ some functionality has been left out in order to emphasize the use of
+ PAM API's.
+
+ #include <security/pam_appl.h>
+
+ static int login_conv(int num_msg, struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **response, void *appdata_ptr);
+
+ static struct pam_conv pam_conv = {login_conv, NULL};
+
+ static pam_handle_t *pamh; /* Authentication handle */
+
+ void
+ main(int argc, char *argv[], char **renvp)
+ {
+
+ /*
+ * Call pam_start to initiate a PAM authentication operation
+ */
+
+ if ((pam_start("login", user_name, &pam_conv, &pamh))
+ != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ login_exit(1);
+
+ pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, ttyn);
+ pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, remote_host);
+
+ while (!authenticated && retry < MAX_RETRIES) {
+ status = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0);
+ authenticated = (status == PAM_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 22
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ if (status != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ fprintf(stderr,"error: %s\n", pam_strerror(status));
+ login_exit(1);
+ }
+
+ /* now check if the authenticated user is allowed to login. */
+
+ if ((status = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ if (status == PAM_AUTHTOK_EXPIRED) {
+ status = pam_chauthtok(pamh, 0);
+ if (status != PAM_SUCCESS)
+ login_exit(1);
+ } else {
+ login_exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * call pam_open_session to open the authenticated session
+ * pam_close_session gets called by the process that
+ * cleans up the utmp entry (i.e., init)
+ */
+ if (status = pam_open_session(pamh, 0) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ login_exit(status);
+ }
+
+ /* set up the process credentials */
+ setgid(pwd->pw_gid);
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the supplementary group access list.
+ * This should be done before pam_setcred because
+ * the PAM modules might add groups during the pam_setcred call
+ */
+ initgroups(user_name, pwd->pw_gid);
+
+ status = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
+ if (status != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ login_exit(status);
+ }
+
+ /* set the real (and effective) UID */
+ setuid(pwd->pw_uid);
+
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS); /* Done using PAM */
+
+ /*
+ * Add DCE/Kerberos cred name, if any.
+ * XXX - The module specific stuff should be removed from login
+ * program eventually. This is better placed in DCE module and
+ * will be once PAM has routines for "exporting" environment
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 23
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ * variables.
+ */
+ krb5p = getenv("KRB5CCNAME");
+ if (krb5p != NULL) {
+ ENVSTRNCAT(krb5ccname, krb5p);
+ envinit[basicenv++] = krb5ccname;
+ }
+ environ = envinit; /* Switch to the new environment. */
+ exec_the_shell();
+
+ /* All done */
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * login_exit - Call exit() and terminate.
+ * This function is here for PAM so cleanup can
+ * be done before the process exits.
+ */
+ static void
+ login_exit(int exit_code)
+ {
+ if (pamh)
+ pam_end(pamh, PAM_ABORT);
+ exit(exit_code);
+ /*NOTREACHED*/
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * login_conv():
+ * This is the conv (conversation) function called from
+ * a PAM authentication module to print error messages
+ * or garner information from the user.
+ */
+
+ static int
+ login_conv(int num_msg, struct pam_message **msg,
+ struct pam_response **response, void *appdata_ptr)
+ {
+
+ while (num_msg--) {
+ switch (m->msg_style) {
+
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
+ r->resp = strdup(getpass(m->msg));
+ break;
+
+ case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
+ (void) fputs(m->msg, stdout);
+ r->resp = malloc(PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE);
+ fgets(r->resp, PAM_MAX_RESP_SIZE, stdin);
+ /* add code here to remove \n from fputs */
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 24
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ break;
+
+ case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
+ (void) fputs(m->msg, stderr);
+ break;
+
+ case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
+ (void) fputs(m->msg, stdout);
+ break;
+
+ default:
+ /* add code here to log error message, etc */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ return (PAM_SUCCESS);
+ }
+
+
+ APPENDIX C. DCE MODULE
+
+ This appendix describes a sample implementation of a DCE PAM module.
+ In order to simplify the description, we do not address the issues
+ raised by password-mapping or stacking. The intent is to show which
+ DCE calls are being made by the DCE module.
+
+ The `pam_sm_*()' functions implement the PAM SPI functions which are
+ called from the PAM API functions.
+
+ C.1. DCE Authentication Management
+
+ The algorithm for authenticating with DCE (not including error
+ checking, prompting for passwords, etc.) is as follows:
+
+ pam_sm_authenticate()
+ {
+ sec_login_setup_identity(...);
+ pam_set_data(...);
+ sec_login_valid_and_cert_ident(...);
+ }
+
+ pam_sm_setcred()
+ {
+ pam_get_data(...);
+ sec_login_set_context(...);
+ }
+
+ The `pam_sm_authenticate()' function for DCE uses the
+ `pam_set_data()' and `pam_get_data()' functions to keep state (like
+ the `sec_login_handle_t' context) between calls. The following
+ cleanup function is also registered and gets called when `pam_end()'
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 25
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ is called:
+
+ dce_cleanup()
+ {
+ if (/* PAM_SUCCESS and
+ sec_login_valid_and_cert_ident success */) {
+ sec_login_release_context(...);
+ } else {
+ sec_login_purge_context(...);
+ }
+ }
+
+ If everything was successful we release the login context, but leave
+ the credentials file intact. If the status passed to `pam_end()' was
+ not `PAM_SUCCESS' (i.e., a required module failed) we purge the login
+ context which also removes the credentials file.
+
+ C.2. DCE Account Management
+
+ The algorithm for DCE account management is as follows:
+
+ pam_sm_acct_mgmt()
+ {
+ pam_get_data(...);
+ sec_login_inquire_net_info(...);
+ /* check for expired password and account */
+ sec_login_free_net_info(...);
+ }
+
+ The `sec_login_inquire_net_info()' function is called to obtain
+ information about when the user's account and/or password are going
+ to expire. A warning message is displayed (using the conversation
+ function) if the user's account or password is going to expire in the
+ near future, or has expired. These warning messages can be disabled
+ using the `nowarn' option in the `pam.conf' file.
+
+ C.3. DCE Session Management
+
+ The DCE session management functions are currently empty. They could
+ be modified to optionally remove the DCE credentials file upon
+ logout, etc.
+
+ C.4. DCE Password Management
+
+ The algorithm for DCE password management is as follows:
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 26
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ pam_sm_chauthtok
+ {
+ sec_rgy_site_open(...);
+ sec_rgy_acct_lookup(...);
+ sec_rgy_acct_passwd(...);
+ sec_rgy_site_close(...);
+ }
+
+ The `sec_rgy_acct_passwd()' function is called to change the user's
+ password in the DCE registry.
+
+
+ REFERENCES
+
+ [Adamson 95] W. A. Adamson, J. Rees, and P. Honeyman, "Joining
+ Security Realms: A Single Login for Netware and
+ Kerberos", CITI Technical Report 95-1, Center for
+ Information Technology Integration, University of
+ Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, February 1995.
+
+ [Diffie 76] W. Diffie and M. E. Hellman, "New Directions in
+ Cryptography", IEEE Transactions on Information
+ Theory, November 1976.
+
+ [Linn 93] J. Linn, "Generic Security Service Application
+ Programming Interface", Internet RFC 1508, 1509, 1993.
+
+ [Rivest 78] R. L. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. Adleman., "A Method
+ for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Pubic-key
+ Cryptosystems", Communications of the ACM, 21(2),
+ 1978.
+
+ [SIA 95] "Digital UNIX Security", Digital Equipment
+ Corporation, Order Number AA-Q0R2C-TE, July 1995.
+
+ [Skey 94] N. M. Haller, "The S/Key One-Time Password System",
+ ISOC Symposium on Network and Distributed Security,
+ 1994.
+
+ [Steiner 88] J.G. Steiner, B. C. Neuman, and J. I. Schiller,
+ "Kerberos, An Authentication Service for Open Network
+ Systems", in Proceedings of the Winter USENIX
+ Conference, Dallas, Jan 1988.
+
+ [Taylor 88] B. Taylor and D. Goldberg, "Secure Networking in the
+ Sun Environment", Sun Microsystems Technical Paper,
+ 1988.
+
+ [XFN 94] "Federated Naming: the XFN Specifications", X/Open
+ Preliminary Specification, X/Open Document #P403,
+ ISBN:1-85912-045-8, X/Open Co. Ltd., July 1994.
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 27
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ OSF-RFC 86.0 PAM October 1995
+
+
+
+ AUTHOR'S ADDRESS
+
+ Vipin Samar Internet email: vipin@eng.sun.com
+ SunSoft, Inc. Telephone: +1-415-336-1002
+ 2550 Garcia Avenue
+ Mountain View, CA 94043
+ USA
+
+ Roland J. Schemers III Internet email: schemers@eng.sun.com
+ SunSoft, Inc. Telephone: +1-415-336-1035
+ 2550 Garcia Avenue
+ Mountain View, CA 94043
+ USA
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+ Samar, Schemers Page 28