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diff --git a/src/exec.c b/src/exec.c
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+++ b/src/exec.c
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+/*
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: ISC
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2009-2022 Todd C. Miller <Todd.Miller@sudo.ws>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This is an open source non-commercial project. Dear PVS-Studio, please check it.
+ * PVS-Studio Static Code Analyzer for C, C++ and C#: http://www.viva64.com
+ */
+
+#include <config.h>
+
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
+# include <login_cap.h>
+# ifndef LOGIN_SETENV
+# define LOGIN_SETENV 0
+# endif
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PROJECT_H
+# include <project.h>
+# include <sys/task.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "sudo.h"
+#include "sudo_exec.h"
+#include "sudo_plugin.h"
+#include "sudo_plugin_int.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PTRACE_INTERCEPT
+static void
+handler(int signo)
+{
+ /* just return */
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_PTRACE_INTERCEPT */
+
+static void
+close_fds(struct command_details *details, int errfd, int intercept_fd)
+{
+ int fd, maxfd;
+ unsigned char *debug_fds;
+ debug_decl(close_fds, SUDO_DEBUG_EXEC);
+
+ if (details->closefrom < 0)
+ debug_return;
+
+ /* Preserve debug fds and error pipe as needed. */
+ maxfd = sudo_debug_get_fds(&debug_fds);
+ for (fd = 0; fd <= maxfd; fd++) {
+ if (sudo_isset(debug_fds, fd))
+ add_preserved_fd(&details->preserved_fds, fd);
+ }
+ if (errfd != -1)
+ add_preserved_fd(&details->preserved_fds, errfd);
+ if (intercept_fd != -1)
+ add_preserved_fd(&details->preserved_fds, intercept_fd);
+
+ /* Close all fds except those explicitly preserved. */
+ closefrom_except(details->closefrom, &details->preserved_fds);
+
+ debug_return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Setup the execution environment immediately prior to the call to execve().
+ * Group setup is performed by policy_init_session(), called earlier.
+ * Returns true on success and false on failure.
+ */
+static bool
+exec_setup(struct command_details *details, int intercept_fd, int errfd)
+{
+ bool ret = false;
+ debug_decl(exec_setup, SUDO_DEBUG_EXEC);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PTRACE_INTERCEPT
+ if (ISSET(details->flags, CD_USE_PTRACE)) {
+ if (!set_exec_filter())
+ goto done;
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_PTRACE_INTERCEPT */
+
+ if (details->pw != NULL) {
+#ifdef HAVE_PROJECT_H
+ set_project(details->pw);
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_PRIV_SET
+ if (details->privs != NULL) {
+ if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, details->privs) != 0) {
+ sudo_warn("%s", U_("unable to set privileges"));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+ if (details->limitprivs != NULL) {
+ if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, details->limitprivs) != 0) {
+ sudo_warn("%s", U_("unable to set limit privileges"));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ } else if (details->privs != NULL) {
+ if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, details->privs) != 0) {
+ sudo_warn("%s", U_("unable to set limit privileges"));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_PRIV_SET */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_GETUSERATTR
+ if (aix_prep_user(details->pw->pw_name, details->tty) != 0) {
+ /* error message displayed by aix_prep_user */
+ goto done;
+ }
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
+ if (details->login_class) {
+ int flags;
+ login_cap_t *lc;
+
+ /*
+ * We only use setusercontext() to set the nice value, rlimits
+ * and umask unless this is a login shell (sudo -i).
+ */
+ lc = login_getclass((char *)details->login_class);
+ if (!lc) {
+ sudo_warnx(U_("unknown login class %s"), details->login_class);
+ errno = ENOENT;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (ISSET(details->flags, CD_LOGIN_SHELL)) {
+ /* Set everything except user, group and login name. */
+ flags = LOGIN_SETALL;
+ CLR(flags, LOGIN_SETGROUP|LOGIN_SETLOGIN|LOGIN_SETUSER|LOGIN_SETENV|LOGIN_SETPATH);
+ } else {
+ flags = LOGIN_SETRESOURCES|LOGIN_SETPRIORITY|LOGIN_SETUMASK;
+ }
+ if (setusercontext(lc, details->pw, details->pw->pw_uid, flags)) {
+ sudo_warn("%s", U_("unable to set user context"));
+ if (details->pw->pw_uid != ROOT_UID)
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H */
+ }
+
+ if (ISSET(details->flags, CD_SET_GROUPS)) {
+ /* set_user_groups() prints error message on failure. */
+ if (!set_user_groups(details))
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (ISSET(details->flags, CD_SET_PRIORITY)) {
+ if (setpriority(PRIO_PROCESS, 0, details->priority) != 0) {
+ sudo_warn("%s", U_("unable to set process priority"));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Policy may override umask in PAM or login.conf. */
+ if (ISSET(details->flags, CD_OVERRIDE_UMASK))
+ (void) umask(details->umask);
+
+ /* Apply resource limits specified by the policy, if any. */
+ set_policy_rlimits();
+
+ /* Close fds before chroot (need /dev) or uid change (prlimit on Linux). */
+ close_fds(details, errfd, intercept_fd);
+
+ if (details->chroot) {
+ if (chroot(details->chroot) != 0 || chdir("/") != 0) {
+ sudo_warn(U_("unable to change root to %s"), details->chroot);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Unlimit the number of processes since Linux's setuid() will
+ * return EAGAIN if RLIMIT_NPROC would be exceeded by the uid switch.
+ */
+ unlimit_nproc();
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SETRESUID)
+ if (setresuid(details->cred.uid, details->cred.euid, details->cred.euid) != 0) {
+ sudo_warn(U_("unable to change to runas uid (%u, %u)"),
+ (unsigned int)details->cred.uid, (unsigned int)details->cred.euid);
+ goto done;
+ }
+#elif defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
+ if (setreuid(details->cred.uid, details->cred.euid) != 0) {
+ sudo_warn(U_("unable to change to runas uid (%u, %u)"),
+ (unsigned int)details->cred.uid, (unsigned int)details->cred.euid);
+ goto done;
+ }
+#else
+ /* Cannot support real user-ID that is different from effective user-ID. */
+ if (setuid(details->cred.euid) != 0) {
+ sudo_warn(U_("unable to change to runas uid (%u, %u)"),
+ (unsigned int)details->cred.euid, (unsigned int)details->cred.euid);
+ goto done;
+ }
+#endif /* !HAVE_SETRESUID && !HAVE_SETREUID */
+
+ /* Restore previous value of RLIMIT_NPROC. */
+ restore_nproc();
+
+ /*
+ * Only change cwd if we have chroot()ed or the policy modules
+ * specifies a different cwd. Must be done after uid change.
+ */
+ if (details->cwd != NULL) {
+ if (details->chroot != NULL || user_details.cwd == NULL ||
+ strcmp(details->cwd, user_details.cwd) != 0) {
+ if (ISSET(details->flags, CD_RBAC_ENABLED)) {
+ /* For SELinux, chdir(2) in sesh after the context change. */
+ SET(details->flags, CD_RBAC_SET_CWD);
+ } else {
+ /* Note: cwd is relative to the new root, if any. */
+ if (chdir(details->cwd) == -1) {
+ sudo_warn(U_("unable to change directory to %s"),
+ details->cwd);
+ if (!ISSET(details->flags, CD_CWD_OPTIONAL))
+ goto done;
+ if (details->chroot != NULL)
+ sudo_warnx(U_("starting from %s"), "/");
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = true;
+
+done:
+ debug_return_bool(ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Setup the execution environment and execute the command.
+ * If SELinux is enabled, run the command via sesh, otherwise
+ * execute it directly.
+ * If the exec fails, cstat is filled in with the value of errno.
+ */
+void
+exec_cmnd(struct command_details *details, sigset_t *mask,
+ int intercept_fd, int errfd)
+{
+ debug_decl(exec_cmnd, SUDO_DEBUG_EXEC);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_PTRACE_INTERCEPT
+ if (ISSET(details->flags, CD_USE_PTRACE)) {
+ struct sigaction sa;
+ sigset_t set;
+
+ /* Tracer will send us SIGUSR1 when it is time to proceed. */
+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+ sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
+ sa.sa_handler = handler;
+ if (sudo_sigaction(SIGUSR1, &sa, NULL) != 0) {
+ sudo_warn(U_("unable to set handler for signal %d"),
+ SIGUSR1);
+ }
+
+ /* Suspend child until tracer seizes control and sends SIGUSR1. */
+ sigfillset(&set);
+ sigdelset(&set, SIGUSR1);
+ sigsuspend(&set);
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_PTRACE_INTERCEPT */
+
+ if (mask != NULL)
+ sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, mask, NULL);
+ restore_signals();
+ if (exec_setup(details, intercept_fd, errfd) == true) {
+ /* headed for execve() */
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+ if (ISSET(details->flags, CD_RBAC_ENABLED)) {
+ selinux_execve(details->execfd, details->command, details->argv,
+ details->envp, details->cwd, details->flags);
+ } else
+#endif
+ {
+ sudo_execve(details->execfd, details->command, details->argv,
+ details->envp, intercept_fd, details->flags);
+ }
+ }
+ sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_ERROR, "unable to exec %s: %s",
+ details->command, strerror(errno));
+ debug_return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check for caught signals sent to sudo before command execution.
+ * Also suspends the process if SIGTSTP was caught.
+ * Returns true if we should terminate, else false.
+ */
+bool
+sudo_terminated(struct command_status *cstat)
+{
+ int signo;
+ bool sigtstp = false;
+ debug_decl(sudo_terminated, SUDO_DEBUG_EXEC);
+
+ for (signo = 0; signo < NSIG; signo++) {
+ if (signal_pending(signo)) {
+ switch (signo) {
+ case SIGCHLD:
+ /* Ignore. */
+ break;
+ case SIGTSTP:
+ /* Suspend below if not terminated. */
+ sigtstp = true;
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* Terminal signal, do not exec command. */
+ cstat->type = CMD_WSTATUS;
+ cstat->val = signo + 128;
+ debug_return_bool(true);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (sigtstp) {
+ struct sigaction sa;
+ sigset_t set, oset;
+
+ /* Send SIGTSTP to ourselves, unblocking it if needed. */
+ memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+ sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
+ sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
+ sa.sa_handler = SIG_DFL;
+ if (sudo_sigaction(SIGTSTP, &sa, NULL) != 0)
+ sudo_warn(U_("unable to set handler for signal %d"), SIGTSTP);
+ sigemptyset(&set);
+ sigaddset(&set, SIGTSTP);
+ sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &set, &oset);
+ if (kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP) != 0)
+ sudo_warn("kill(%d, SIGTSTP)", (int)getpid());
+ sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
+ /* No need to restore old SIGTSTP handler. */
+ }
+ debug_return_bool(false);
+}
+
+static bool
+sudo_needs_pty(struct command_details *details)
+{
+ struct plugin_container *plugin;
+
+ if (ISSET(details->flags, CD_USE_PTY))
+ return true;
+
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(plugin, &io_plugins, entries) {
+ if (plugin->u.io->log_ttyin != NULL ||
+ plugin->u.io->log_ttyout != NULL)
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If we are not running the command in a pty, we were not invoked as
+ * sudoedit, there is no command timeout and there is no close function,
+ * sudo can exec the command directly (and not wait).
+ */
+static bool
+direct_exec_allowed(struct command_details *details)
+{
+ struct plugin_container *plugin;
+ debug_decl(direct_exec_allowed, SUDO_DEBUG_EXEC);
+
+ /* Assumes sudo_needs_pty() was already checked. */
+ if (ISSET(details->flags, CD_RBAC_ENABLED|CD_SET_TIMEOUT|CD_SUDOEDIT) ||
+ policy_plugin.u.policy->close != NULL)
+ debug_return_bool(false);
+
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(plugin, &audit_plugins, entries) {
+ if (plugin->u.audit->close != NULL)
+ debug_return_bool(false);
+ }
+
+ debug_return_bool(true);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Execute a command, potentially in a pty with I/O logging, and
+ * wait for it to finish.
+ * This is a little bit tricky due to how POSIX job control works and
+ * we fact that we have two different controlling terminals to deal with.
+ */
+int
+sudo_execute(struct command_details *details, struct command_status *cstat)
+{
+ debug_decl(sudo_execute, SUDO_DEBUG_EXEC);
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SELINUX) && !defined(HAVE_PTRACE_INTERCEPT)
+ /*
+ * SELinux prevents LD_PRELOAD from functioning so we must use
+ * ptrace-based intercept mode.
+ */
+ if (details->selinux_role != NULL || details->selinux_type != NULL) {
+ if (ISSET(details->flags, CD_INTERCEPT)) {
+ sudo_warnx("%s",
+ U_("intercept mode is not supported with SELinux RBAC on this system"));
+ CLR(details->flags, CD_INTERCEPT);
+ }
+ if (ISSET(details->flags, CD_LOG_SUBCMDS)) {
+ sudo_warnx("%s",
+ U_("unable to log sub-commands with SELinux RBAC on this system"));
+ CLR(details->flags, CD_LOG_SUBCMDS);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* HAVE_SELINUX && !HAVE_PTRACE_INTERCEPT */
+
+ /* If running in background mode, fork and exit. */
+ if (ISSET(details->flags, CD_BACKGROUND)) {
+ switch (sudo_debug_fork()) {
+ case -1:
+ cstat->type = CMD_ERRNO;
+ cstat->val = errno;
+ debug_return_int(-1);
+ case 0:
+ /* child continues without controlling terminal */
+ (void)setpgid(0, 0);
+ break;
+ default:
+ /* parent exits (but does not flush buffers) */
+ sudo_debug_exit_int(__func__, __FILE__, __LINE__,
+ sudo_debug_subsys, 0);
+ _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Restore resource limits before running.
+ * We must do this *before* calling the PAM session module.
+ */
+ restore_limits();
+
+ /*
+ * Run the command in a new pty if there is an I/O plugin or the policy
+ * has requested a pty. If /dev/tty is unavailable and no I/O plugin
+ * is configured, this returns false and we run the command without a pty.
+ */
+ if (sudo_needs_pty(details)) {
+ if (exec_pty(details, cstat))
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we are not running the command in a pty, we may be able to
+ * exec directly, depending on the plugins used.
+ */
+ if (direct_exec_allowed(details)) {
+ if (!sudo_terminated(cstat)) {
+ exec_cmnd(details, NULL, -1, -1);
+ cstat->type = CMD_ERRNO;
+ cstat->val = errno;
+ }
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Run the command in the existing tty (if any) and wait for it to finish.
+ */
+ exec_nopty(details, cstat);
+
+done:
+ /* The caller will run any plugin close functions. */
+ debug_return_int(cstat->type == CMD_ERRNO ? -1 : 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Kill command with increasing urgency.
+ */
+void
+terminate_command(pid_t pid, bool use_pgrp)
+{
+ debug_decl(terminate_command, SUDO_DEBUG_EXEC);
+
+ /* Avoid killing more than a single process or process group. */
+ if (pid <= 0)
+ debug_return;
+
+ /*
+ * Note that SIGCHLD will interrupt the sleep()
+ */
+ if (use_pgrp) {
+ sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO, "killpg %d SIGHUP", (int)pid);
+ killpg(pid, SIGHUP);
+ sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO, "killpg %d SIGTERM", (int)pid);
+ killpg(pid, SIGTERM);
+ sleep(2);
+ sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO, "killpg %d SIGKILL", (int)pid);
+ killpg(pid, SIGKILL);
+ } else {
+ sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO, "kill %d SIGHUP", (int)pid);
+ kill(pid, SIGHUP);
+ sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO, "kill %d SIGTERM", (int)pid);
+ kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+ sleep(2);
+ sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_INFO, "kill %d SIGKILL", (int)pid);
+ kill(pid, SIGKILL);
+ }
+
+ debug_return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free the dynamically-allocated contents of the exec closure.
+ */
+void
+free_exec_closure(struct exec_closure *ec)
+{
+ debug_decl(free_exec_closure, SUDO_DEBUG_EXEC);
+
+ /* Free any remaining intercept resources. */
+ intercept_cleanup();
+
+ sudo_ev_base_free(ec->evbase);
+ sudo_ev_free(ec->backchannel_event);
+ sudo_ev_free(ec->fwdchannel_event);
+ sudo_ev_free(ec->sigint_event);
+ sudo_ev_free(ec->sigquit_event);
+ sudo_ev_free(ec->sigtstp_event);
+ sudo_ev_free(ec->sigterm_event);
+ sudo_ev_free(ec->sighup_event);
+ sudo_ev_free(ec->sigalrm_event);
+ sudo_ev_free(ec->sigpipe_event);
+ sudo_ev_free(ec->sigusr1_event);
+ sudo_ev_free(ec->sigusr2_event);
+ sudo_ev_free(ec->sigchld_event);
+ sudo_ev_free(ec->sigcont_event);
+ sudo_ev_free(ec->siginfo_event);
+ sudo_ev_free(ec->sigwinch_event);
+
+ debug_return;
+}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-05-17 23:58:19 +0000