Adding upstream version 252.22.upstream/252.22upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 555 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/journal/journald-audit.c b/src/journal/journald-audit.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3e87a93
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/journal/journald-audit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,555 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
+
+#include <malloc.h>
+
+#include "alloc-util.h"
+#include "audit-type.h"
+#include "errno-util.h"
+#include "fd-util.h"
+#include "hexdecoct.h"
+#include "io-util.h"
+#include "journald-audit.h"
+#include "missing_audit.h"
+#include "string-util.h"
+
+typedef struct MapField {
+        const char *audit_field;
+        const char *journal_field;
+        int (*map)(const char *field, const char **p, struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n);
+} MapField;
+
+static int map_simple_field(
+                const char *field,
+                const char **p,
+                struct iovec *iovec,
+                size_t *n) {
+
+        _cleanup_free_ char *c = NULL;
+        size_t l = 0;
+        const char *e;
+
+        assert(field);
+        assert(p);
+        assert(iovec);
+        assert(n);
+
+        l = strlen(field);
+        c = malloc(l + 1);
+        if (!c)
+                return -ENOMEM;
+
+        memcpy(c, field, l);
+        for (e = *p; !IN_SET(*e, 0, ' '); e++) {
+                if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(c, l+2))
+                        return -ENOMEM;
+
+                c[l++] = *e;
+        }
+
+        c[l] = 0;
+
+        iovec[(*n)++] = IOVEC_MAKE(c, l);
+
+        *p = e;
+        c = NULL;
+
+        return 1;
+}
+
+static int map_string_field_internal(
+                const char *field,
+                const char **p,
+                struct iovec *iovec,
+                size_t *n,
+                bool filter_printable) {
+
+        _cleanup_free_ char *c = NULL;
+        const char *s, *e;
+        size_t l;
+
+        assert(field);
+        assert(p);
+        assert(iovec);
+        assert(n);
+
+        /* The kernel formats string fields in one of two formats. */
+
+        if (**p == '"') {
+                /* Normal quoted syntax */
+                s = *p + 1;
+                e = strchr(s, '"');
+                if (!e)
+                        return 0;
+
+                l = strlen(field) + (e - s);
+                c = malloc(l+1);
+                if (!c)
+                        return -ENOMEM;
+
+                *((char*) mempcpy(stpcpy(c, field), s, e - s)) = 0;
+
+                e += 1;
+
+        } else if (unhexchar(**p) >= 0) {
+                /* Hexadecimal escaping */
+                l = strlen(field);
+                c = malloc(l + 2);
+                if (!c)
+                        return -ENOMEM;
+
+                memcpy(c, field, l);
+                for (e = *p; !IN_SET(*e, 0, ' '); e += 2) {
+                        int a, b;
+                        uint8_t x;
+
+                        a = unhexchar(e[0]);
+                        if (a < 0)
+                                return 0;
+
+                        b = unhexchar(e[1]);
+                        if (b < 0)
+                                return 0;
+
+                        x = ((uint8_t) a << 4 | (uint8_t) b);
+
+                        if (filter_printable && x < (uint8_t) ' ')
+                                x = (uint8_t) ' ';
+
+                        if (!GREEDY_REALLOC(c, l+2))
+                                return -ENOMEM;
+
+                        c[l++] = (char) x;
+                }
+
+                c[l] = 0;
+        } else
+                return 0;
+
+        iovec[(*n)++] = IOVEC_MAKE(c, l);
+
+        *p = e;
+        c = NULL;
+
+        return 1;
+}
+
+static int map_string_field(const char *field, const char **p, struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n) {
+        return map_string_field_internal(field, p, iovec, n, false);
+}
+
+static int map_string_field_printable(const char *field, const char **p, struct iovec *iovec, size_t *n) {
+        return map_string_field_internal(field, p, iovec, n, true);
+}
+
+static int map_generic_field(
+                const char *prefix,
+                const char **p,
+                struct iovec *iovec,
+                size_t *n) {
+
+        const char *e, *f;
+        char *c, *t;
+        int r;
+
+        /* Implements fallback mappings for all fields we don't know */
+
+        for (e = *p; e < *p + 16; e++) {
+
+                if (IN_SET(*e, 0, ' '))
+                        return 0;
+
+                if (*e == '=')
+                        break;
+
+                if (!(ascii_isalpha(*e) ||
+                      ascii_isdigit(*e) ||
+                      IN_SET(*e, '_', '-')))
+                        return 0;
+        }
+
+        if (e <= *p || e >= *p + 16)
+                return 0;
+
+        c = newa(char, strlen(prefix) + (e - *p) + 2);
+
+        t = stpcpy(c, prefix);
+        for (f = *p; f < e; f++) {
+                char x;
+
+                if (*f >= 'a' && *f <= 'z')
+                        x = (*f - 'a') + 'A'; /* uppercase */
+                else if (*f == '-')
+                        x = '_'; /* dashes → underscores */
+                else
+                        x = *f;
+
+                *(t++) = x;
+        }
+        strcpy(t, "=");
+
+        e++;
+
+        r = map_simple_field(c, &e, iovec, n);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return r;
+
+        *p = e;
+        return r;
+}
+
+/* Kernel fields are those occurring in the audit string before
+ * msg='. All of these fields are trusted, hence carry the "_" prefix.
+ * We try to translate the fields we know into our native names. The
+ * other's are generically mapped to _AUDIT_FIELD_XYZ= */
+static const MapField map_fields_kernel[] = {
+
+        /* First, we map certain well-known audit fields into native
+         * well-known fields */
+        { "pid=",       "_PID=",              map_simple_field },
+        { "ppid=",      "_PPID=",             map_simple_field },
+        { "uid=",       "_UID=",              map_simple_field },
+        { "euid=",      "_EUID=",             map_simple_field },
+        { "fsuid=",     "_FSUID=",            map_simple_field },
+        { "gid=",       "_GID=",              map_simple_field },
+        { "egid=",      "_EGID=",             map_simple_field },
+        { "fsgid=",     "_FSGID=",            map_simple_field },
+        { "tty=",       "_TTY=",              map_simple_field },
+        { "ses=",       "_AUDIT_SESSION=",    map_simple_field },
+        { "auid=",      "_AUDIT_LOGINUID=",   map_simple_field },
+        { "subj=",      "_SELINUX_CONTEXT=",  map_simple_field },
+        { "comm=",      "_COMM=",             map_string_field },
+        { "exe=",       "_EXE=",              map_string_field },
+        { "proctitle=", "_CMDLINE=",          map_string_field_printable },
+
+        /* Some fields don't map to native well-known fields. However,
+         * we know that they are string fields, hence let's undo
+         * string field escaping for them, though we stick to the
+         * generic field names. */
+        { "path=",      "_AUDIT_FIELD_PATH=", map_string_field },
+        { "dev=",       "_AUDIT_FIELD_DEV=",  map_string_field },
+        { "name=",      "_AUDIT_FIELD_NAME=", map_string_field },
+        {}
+};
+
+/* Userspace fields are those occurring in the audit string after
+ * msg='. All of these fields are untrusted, hence carry no "_"
+ * prefix. We map the fields we don't know to AUDIT_FIELD_XYZ= */
+static const MapField map_fields_userspace[] = {
+        { "cwd=",       "AUDIT_FIELD_CWD=",   map_string_field },
+        { "cmd=",       "AUDIT_FIELD_CMD=",   map_string_field },
+        { "acct=",      "AUDIT_FIELD_ACCT=",  map_string_field },
+        { "exe=",       "AUDIT_FIELD_EXE=",   map_string_field },
+        { "comm=",      "AUDIT_FIELD_COMM=",  map_string_field },
+        {}
+};
+
+static int map_all_fields(
+                const char *p,
+                const MapField map_fields[],
+                const char *prefix,
+                bool handle_msg,
+                struct iovec *iovec,
+                size_t *n,
+                size_t m) {
+
+        int r;
+
+        assert(p);
+        assert(iovec);
+        assert(n);
+
+        for (;;) {
+                bool mapped = false;
+                const MapField *mf;
+                const char *v;
+
+                if (*n >= m) {
+                        log_debug(
+                                "More fields in audit message than audit field limit (%i), skipping remaining fields",
+                                N_IOVEC_AUDIT_FIELDS);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                p += strspn(p, WHITESPACE);
+
+                if (*p == 0)
+                        return 0;
+
+                if (handle_msg) {
+                        v = startswith(p, "msg='");
+                        if (v) {
+                                _cleanup_free_ char *c = NULL;
+                                const char *e;
+
+                                /* Userspace message. It's enclosed in
+                                   simple quotation marks, is not
+                                   escaped, but the last field in the
+                                   line, hence let's remove the
+                                   quotation mark, and apply the
+                                   userspace mapping instead of the
+                                   kernel mapping. */
+
+                                e = endswith(v, "'");
+                                if (!e)
+                                        return 0; /* don't continue splitting up if the final quotation mark is missing */
+
+                                c = strndup(v, e - v);
+                                if (!c)
+                                        return -ENOMEM;
+
+                                return map_all_fields(c, map_fields_userspace, "AUDIT_FIELD_", false, iovec, n, m);
+                        }
+                }
+
+                /* Try to map the kernel fields to our own names */
+                for (mf = map_fields; mf->audit_field; mf++) {
+                        v = startswith(p, mf->audit_field);
+                        if (!v)
+                                continue;
+
+                        r = mf->map(mf->journal_field, &v, iovec, n);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse audit array: %m");
+
+                        if (r > 0) {
+                                mapped = true;
+                                p = v;
+                                break;
+                        }
+                }
+
+                if (!mapped) {
+                        r = map_generic_field(prefix, &p, iovec, n);
+                        if (r < 0)
+                                return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse audit array: %m");
+
+                        if (r == 0)
+                                /* Couldn't process as generic field, let's just skip over it */
+                                p += strcspn(p, WHITESPACE);
+                }
+        }
+}
+
+void process_audit_string(Server *s, int type, const char *data, size_t size) {
+        size_t n = 0, z;
+        uint64_t seconds, msec, id;
+        const char *p, *type_name;
+        char id_field[sizeof("_AUDIT_ID=") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(uint64_t)],
+             type_field[sizeof("_AUDIT_TYPE=") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)],
+             source_time_field[sizeof("_SOURCE_REALTIME_TIMESTAMP=") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(usec_t)];
+        struct iovec iovec[N_IOVEC_META_FIELDS + 8 + N_IOVEC_AUDIT_FIELDS];
+        char *m, *type_field_name;
+        int k;
+
+        assert(s);
+
+        if (size <= 0)
+                return;
+
+        if (!data)
+                return;
+
+        /* Note that the input buffer is NUL terminated, but let's
+         * check whether there is a spurious NUL byte */
+        if (memchr(data, 0, size))
+                return;
+
+        p = startswith(data, "audit");
+        if (!p)
+                return;
+
+        k = 0;
+        if (sscanf(p, "(%" PRIu64 ".%" PRIu64 ":%" PRIu64 "):%n",
+                   &seconds,
+                   &msec,
+                   &id,
+                   &k) != 3 || k == 0)
+                return;
+
+        p += k;
+        p += strspn(p, WHITESPACE);
+
+        if (isempty(p))
+                return;
+
+        iovec[n++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING("_TRANSPORT=audit");
+
+        sprintf(source_time_field, "_SOURCE_REALTIME_TIMESTAMP=%" PRIu64,
+                (usec_t) seconds * USEC_PER_SEC + (usec_t) msec * USEC_PER_MSEC);
+        iovec[n++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(source_time_field);
+
+        sprintf(type_field, "_AUDIT_TYPE=%i", type);
+        iovec[n++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(type_field);
+
+        sprintf(id_field, "_AUDIT_ID=%" PRIu64, id);
+        iovec[n++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(id_field);
+
+        assert_cc(4 == LOG_FAC(LOG_AUTH));
+        iovec[n++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING("SYSLOG_FACILITY=4");
+        iovec[n++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING("SYSLOG_IDENTIFIER=audit");
+
+        type_name = audit_type_name_alloca(type);
+
+        type_field_name = strjoina("_AUDIT_TYPE_NAME=", type_name);
+        iovec[n++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(type_field_name);
+
+        m = strjoina("MESSAGE=", type_name, " ", p);
+        iovec[n++] = IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(m);
+
+        z = n;
+
+        map_all_fields(p, map_fields_kernel, "_AUDIT_FIELD_", true, iovec, &n, n + N_IOVEC_AUDIT_FIELDS);
+
+        server_dispatch_message(s, iovec, n, ELEMENTSOF(iovec), NULL, NULL, LOG_NOTICE, 0);
+
+        /* free() all entries that map_all_fields() added. All others
+         * are allocated on the stack or are constant. */
+
+        for (; z < n; z++)
+                free(iovec[z].iov_base);
+}
+
+void server_process_audit_message(
+                Server *s,
+                const void *buffer,
+                size_t buffer_size,
+                const struct ucred *ucred,
+                const union sockaddr_union *sa,
+                socklen_t salen) {
+
+        const struct nlmsghdr *nl = buffer;
+
+        assert(s);
+
+        if (buffer_size < ALIGN(sizeof(struct nlmsghdr)))
+                return;
+
+        assert(buffer);
+
+        /* Filter out fake data */
+        if (!sa ||
+            salen != sizeof(struct sockaddr_nl) ||
+            sa->nl.nl_family != AF_NETLINK ||
+            sa->nl.nl_pid != 0) {
+                log_debug("Audit netlink message from invalid sender.");
+                return;
+        }
+
+        if (!ucred || ucred->pid != 0) {
+                log_debug("Audit netlink message with invalid credentials.");
+                return;
+        }
+
+        if (!NLMSG_OK(nl, buffer_size)) {
+                log_error("Audit netlink message truncated.");
+                return;
+        }
+
+        /* Ignore special Netlink messages */
+        if (IN_SET(nl->nlmsg_type, NLMSG_NOOP, NLMSG_ERROR))
+                return;
+
+        /* Except AUDIT_USER, all messages below AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG are control messages, let's ignore those */
+        if (nl->nlmsg_type < AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG && nl->nlmsg_type != AUDIT_USER)
+                return;
+
+        process_audit_string(s, nl->nlmsg_type, NLMSG_DATA(nl), nl->nlmsg_len - ALIGN(sizeof(struct nlmsghdr)));
+}
+
+static int enable_audit(int fd, bool b) {
+        struct {
+                union {
+                        struct nlmsghdr header;
+                        uint8_t header_space[NLMSG_HDRLEN];
+                };
+                struct audit_status body;
+        } _packed_ request = {
+                .header.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(struct audit_status)),
+                .header.nlmsg_type = AUDIT_SET,
+                .header.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST,
+                .header.nlmsg_seq = 1,
+                .header.nlmsg_pid = 0,
+                .body.mask = AUDIT_STATUS_ENABLED,
+                .body.enabled = b,
+        };
+        union sockaddr_union sa = {
+                .nl.nl_family = AF_NETLINK,
+                .nl.nl_pid = 0,
+        };
+        struct iovec iovec = {
+                .iov_base = &request,
+                .iov_len = NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(struct audit_status)),
+        };
+        struct msghdr mh = {
+                .msg_iov = &iovec,
+                .msg_iovlen = 1,
+                .msg_name = &sa.sa,
+                .msg_namelen = sizeof(sa.nl),
+        };
+
+        ssize_t n;
+
+        n = sendmsg(fd, &mh, MSG_NOSIGNAL);
+        if (n < 0)
+                return -errno;
+        if (n != NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(struct audit_status)))
+                return -EIO;
+
+        /* We don't wait for the result here, we can't do anything
+         * about it anyway */
+
+        return 0;
+}
+
+int server_open_audit(Server *s) {
+        int r;
+
+        if (s->audit_fd < 0) {
+                static const union sockaddr_union sa = {
+                        .nl.nl_family = AF_NETLINK,
+                        .nl.nl_pid    = 0,
+                        .nl.nl_groups = AUDIT_NLGRP_READLOG,
+                };
+
+                s->audit_fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_RAW|SOCK_CLOEXEC|SOCK_NONBLOCK, NETLINK_AUDIT);
+                if (s->audit_fd < 0) {
+                        if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno))
+                                log_debug("Audit not supported in the kernel.");
+                        else
+                                log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to create audit socket, ignoring: %m");
+
+                        return 0;
+                }
+
+                if (bind(s->audit_fd, &sa.sa, sizeof(sa.nl)) < 0) {
+                        log_warning_errno(errno,
+                                          "Failed to join audit multicast group. "
+                                          "The kernel is probably too old or multicast reading is not supported. "
+                                          "Ignoring: %m");
+                        s->audit_fd = safe_close(s->audit_fd);
+                        return 0;
+                }
+        } else
+                (void) fd_nonblock(s->audit_fd, true);
+
+        r = setsockopt_int(s->audit_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_PASSCRED, true);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to set SO_PASSCRED on audit socket: %m");
+
+        r = sd_event_add_io(s->event, &s->audit_event_source, s->audit_fd, EPOLLIN, server_process_datagram, s);
+        if (r < 0)
+                return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add audit fd to event loop: %m");
+
+        if (s->set_audit >= 0) {
+                /* We are listening now, try to enable audit if configured so */
+                r = enable_audit(s->audit_fd, s->set_audit);
+                if (r < 0)
+                        log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to issue audit enable call: %m");
+                else if (s->set_audit > 0)
+                        log_debug("Auditing in kernel turned on.");
+                else
+                        log_debug("Auditing in kernel turned off.");
+        }
+
+        return 0;
+}