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-rw-r--r--src/basic/chase-symlinks.c603
1 files changed, 603 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/basic/chase-symlinks.c b/src/basic/chase-symlinks.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ac55311
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/basic/chase-symlinks.c
@@ -0,0 +1,603 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
+
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+
+#include "alloc-util.h"
+#include "chase-symlinks.h"
+#include "fd-util.h"
+#include "fileio.h"
+#include "fs-util.h"
+#include "glyph-util.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "path-util.h"
+#include "string-util.h"
+#include "user-util.h"
+
+bool unsafe_transition(const struct stat *a, const struct stat *b) {
+ /* Returns true if the transition from a to b is safe, i.e. that we never transition from unprivileged to
+ * privileged files or directories. Why bother? So that unprivileged code can't symlink to privileged files
+ * making us believe we read something safe even though it isn't safe in the specific context we open it in. */
+
+ if (a->st_uid == 0) /* Transitioning from privileged to unprivileged is always fine */
+ return false;
+
+ return a->st_uid != b->st_uid; /* Otherwise we need to stay within the same UID */
+}
+
+static int log_unsafe_transition(int a, int b, const char *path, ChaseSymlinksFlags flags) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *n1 = NULL, *n2 = NULL, *user_a = NULL, *user_b = NULL;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ if (!FLAGS_SET(flags, CHASE_WARN))
+ return -ENOLINK;
+
+ (void) fd_get_path(a, &n1);
+ (void) fd_get_path(b, &n2);
+
+ if (fstat(a, &st) == 0)
+ user_a = uid_to_name(st.st_uid);
+ if (fstat(b, &st) == 0)
+ user_b = uid_to_name(st.st_uid);
+
+ return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOLINK),
+ "Detected unsafe path transition %s (owned by %s) %s %s (owned by %s) during canonicalization of %s.",
+ strna(n1), strna(user_a), special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), strna(n2), strna(user_b), path);
+}
+
+static int log_autofs_mount_point(int fd, const char *path, ChaseSymlinksFlags flags) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *n1 = NULL;
+
+ if (!FLAGS_SET(flags, CHASE_WARN))
+ return -EREMOTE;
+
+ (void) fd_get_path(fd, &n1);
+
+ return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EREMOTE),
+ "Detected autofs mount point %s during canonicalization of %s.",
+ strna(n1), path);
+}
+
+int chase_symlinks(
+ const char *path,
+ const char *original_root,
+ ChaseSymlinksFlags flags,
+ char **ret_path,
+ int *ret_fd) {
+
+ _cleanup_free_ char *buffer = NULL, *done = NULL, *root = NULL;
+ _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
+ unsigned max_follow = CHASE_SYMLINKS_MAX; /* how many symlinks to follow before giving up and returning ELOOP */
+ bool exists = true, append_trail_slash = false;
+ struct stat previous_stat;
+ const char *todo;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(path);
+
+ /* Either the file may be missing, or we return an fd to the final object, but both make no sense */
+ if ((flags & CHASE_NONEXISTENT) && ret_fd)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if ((flags & CHASE_STEP) && ret_fd)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (isempty(path))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* This is a lot like canonicalize_file_name(), but takes an additional "root" parameter, that allows following
+ * symlinks relative to a root directory, instead of the root of the host.
+ *
+ * Note that "root" primarily matters if we encounter an absolute symlink. It is also used when following
+ * relative symlinks to ensure they cannot be used to "escape" the root directory. The path parameter passed is
+ * assumed to be already prefixed by it, except if the CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT flag is set, in which case it is first
+ * prefixed accordingly.
+ *
+ * Algorithmically this operates on two path buffers: "done" are the components of the path we already
+ * processed and resolved symlinks, "." and ".." of. "todo" are the components of the path we still need to
+ * process. On each iteration, we move one component from "todo" to "done", processing it's special meaning
+ * each time. The "todo" path always starts with at least one slash, the "done" path always ends in no
+ * slash. We always keep an O_PATH fd to the component we are currently processing, thus keeping lookup races
+ * to a minimum.
+ *
+ * Suggested usage: whenever you want to canonicalize a path, use this function. Pass the absolute path you got
+ * as-is: fully qualified and relative to your host's root. Optionally, specify the root parameter to tell this
+ * function what to do when encountering a symlink with an absolute path as directory: prefix it by the
+ * specified path.
+ *
+ * There are five ways to invoke this function:
+ *
+ * 1. Without CHASE_STEP or ret_fd: in this case the path is resolved and the normalized path is
+ * returned in `ret_path`. The return value is < 0 on error. If CHASE_NONEXISTENT is also set, 0
+ * is returned if the file doesn't exist, > 0 otherwise. If CHASE_NONEXISTENT is not set, >= 0 is
+ * returned if the destination was found, -ENOENT if it wasn't.
+ *
+ * 2. With ret_fd: in this case the destination is opened after chasing it as O_PATH and this file
+ * descriptor is returned as return value. This is useful to open files relative to some root
+ * directory. Note that the returned O_PATH file descriptors must be converted into a regular one (using
+ * fd_reopen() or such) before it can be used for reading/writing. ret_fd may not be combined with
+ * CHASE_NONEXISTENT.
+ *
+ * 3. With CHASE_STEP: in this case only a single step of the normalization is executed, i.e. only the first
+ * symlink or ".." component of the path is resolved, and the resulting path is returned. This is useful if
+ * a caller wants to trace the path through the file system verbosely. Returns < 0 on error, > 0 if the
+ * path is fully normalized, and == 0 for each normalization step. This may be combined with
+ * CHASE_NONEXISTENT, in which case 1 is returned when a component is not found.
+ *
+ * 4. With CHASE_SAFE: in this case the path must not contain unsafe transitions, i.e. transitions from
+ * unprivileged to privileged files or directories. In such cases the return value is -ENOLINK. If
+ * CHASE_WARN is also set, a warning describing the unsafe transition is emitted. CHASE_WARN cannot
+ * be used in PID 1.
+ *
+ * 5. With CHASE_NO_AUTOFS: in this case if an autofs mount point is encountered, path normalization
+ * is aborted and -EREMOTE is returned. If CHASE_WARN is also set, a warning showing the path of
+ * the mount point is emitted. CHASE_WARN cannot be used in PID 1.
+ */
+
+ /* A root directory of "/" or "" is identical to none */
+ if (empty_or_root(original_root))
+ original_root = NULL;
+
+ if (!original_root && !ret_path && !(flags & (CHASE_NONEXISTENT|CHASE_NO_AUTOFS|CHASE_SAFE|CHASE_STEP)) && ret_fd) {
+ /* Shortcut the ret_fd case if the caller isn't interested in the actual path and has no root set
+ * and doesn't care about any of the other special features we provide either. */
+ r = open(path, O_PATH|O_CLOEXEC|((flags & CHASE_NOFOLLOW) ? O_NOFOLLOW : 0));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ *ret_fd = r;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (original_root) {
+ r = path_make_absolute_cwd(original_root, &root);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* Simplify the root directory, so that it has no duplicate slashes and nothing at the
+ * end. While we won't resolve the root path we still simplify it. Note that dropping the
+ * trailing slash should not change behaviour, since when opening it we specify O_DIRECTORY
+ * anyway. Moreover at the end of this function after processing everything we'll always turn
+ * the empty string back to "/". */
+ delete_trailing_chars(root, "/");
+ path_simplify(root);
+
+ if (flags & CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT) {
+ buffer = path_join(root, path);
+ if (!buffer)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!buffer) {
+ r = path_make_absolute_cwd(path, &buffer);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ fd = open(empty_to_root(root), O_CLOEXEC|O_DIRECTORY|O_PATH);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (flags & CHASE_SAFE)
+ if (fstat(fd, &previous_stat) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (flags & CHASE_TRAIL_SLASH)
+ append_trail_slash = endswith(buffer, "/") || endswith(buffer, "/.");
+
+ if (root) {
+ /* If we are operating on a root directory, let's take the root directory as it is. */
+
+ todo = path_startswith(buffer, root);
+ if (!todo)
+ return log_full_errno(flags & CHASE_WARN ? LOG_WARNING : LOG_DEBUG,
+ SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ECHRNG),
+ "Specified path '%s' is outside of specified root directory '%s', refusing to resolve.",
+ path, root);
+
+ done = strdup(root);
+ } else {
+ todo = buffer;
+ done = strdup("/");
+ }
+ if (!done)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *first = NULL;
+ _cleanup_close_ int child = -1;
+ struct stat st;
+ const char *e;
+
+ r = path_find_first_component(&todo, /* accept_dot_dot= */ true, &e);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r == 0) { /* We reached the end. */
+ if (append_trail_slash)
+ if (!strextend(&done, "/"))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ first = strndup(e, r);
+ if (!first)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* Two dots? Then chop off the last bit of what we already found out. */
+ if (path_equal(first, "..")) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *parent = NULL;
+ _cleanup_close_ int fd_parent = -1;
+
+ /* If we already are at the top, then going up will not change anything. This is in-line with
+ * how the kernel handles this. */
+ if (empty_or_root(done))
+ continue;
+
+ r = path_extract_directory(done, &parent);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* Don't allow this to leave the root dir. */
+ if (root &&
+ path_startswith(done, root) &&
+ !path_startswith(parent, root))
+ continue;
+
+ free_and_replace(done, parent);
+
+ if (flags & CHASE_STEP)
+ goto chased_one;
+
+ fd_parent = openat(fd, "..", O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_PATH);
+ if (fd_parent < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (flags & CHASE_SAFE) {
+ if (fstat(fd_parent, &st) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (unsafe_transition(&previous_stat, &st))
+ return log_unsafe_transition(fd, fd_parent, path, flags);
+
+ previous_stat = st;
+ }
+
+ close_and_replace(fd, fd_parent);
+
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* Otherwise let's see what this is. */
+ child = openat(fd, first, O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW|O_PATH);
+ if (child < 0) {
+ if (errno == ENOENT &&
+ (flags & CHASE_NONEXISTENT) &&
+ (isempty(todo) || path_is_safe(todo))) {
+ /* If CHASE_NONEXISTENT is set, and the path does not exist, then
+ * that's OK, return what we got so far. But don't allow this if the
+ * remaining path contains "../" or something else weird. */
+
+ if (!path_extend(&done, first, todo))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ exists = false;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return -errno;
+ }
+
+ if (fstat(child, &st) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+ if ((flags & CHASE_SAFE) &&
+ unsafe_transition(&previous_stat, &st))
+ return log_unsafe_transition(fd, child, path, flags);
+
+ previous_stat = st;
+
+ if ((flags & CHASE_NO_AUTOFS) &&
+ fd_is_fs_type(child, AUTOFS_SUPER_MAGIC) > 0)
+ return log_autofs_mount_point(child, path, flags);
+
+ if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode) && !((flags & CHASE_NOFOLLOW) && isempty(todo))) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *destination = NULL;
+
+ /* This is a symlink, in this case read the destination. But let's make sure we
+ * don't follow symlinks without bounds. */
+ if (--max_follow <= 0)
+ return -ELOOP;
+
+ r = readlinkat_malloc(fd, first, &destination);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (isempty(destination))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (path_is_absolute(destination)) {
+
+ /* An absolute destination. Start the loop from the beginning, but use the root
+ * directory as base. */
+
+ safe_close(fd);
+ fd = open(empty_to_root(root), O_CLOEXEC|O_DIRECTORY|O_PATH);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (flags & CHASE_SAFE) {
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (unsafe_transition(&previous_stat, &st))
+ return log_unsafe_transition(child, fd, path, flags);
+
+ previous_stat = st;
+ }
+
+ /* Note that we do not revalidate the root, we take it as is. */
+ r = free_and_strdup(&done, empty_to_root(root));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ /* Prefix what's left to do with what we just read, and start the loop again, but
+ * remain in the current directory. */
+ if (!path_extend(&destination, todo))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ free_and_replace(buffer, destination);
+ todo = buffer;
+
+ if (flags & CHASE_STEP)
+ goto chased_one;
+
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* If this is not a symlink, then let's just add the name we read to what we already verified. */
+ if (!path_extend(&done, first))
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ /* And iterate again, but go one directory further down. */
+ close_and_replace(fd, child);
+ }
+
+ if (ret_path)
+ *ret_path = TAKE_PTR(done);
+
+ if (ret_fd) {
+ /* Return the O_PATH fd we currently are looking to the caller. It can translate it to a
+ * proper fd by opening /proc/self/fd/xyz. */
+
+ assert(fd >= 0);
+ *ret_fd = TAKE_FD(fd);
+ }
+
+ if (flags & CHASE_STEP)
+ return 1;
+
+ return exists;
+
+chased_one:
+ if (ret_path) {
+ const char *e;
+
+ /* todo may contain slashes at the beginning. */
+ r = path_find_first_component(&todo, /* accept_dot_dot= */ true, &e);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r == 0)
+ *ret_path = TAKE_PTR(done);
+ else {
+ char *c;
+
+ c = path_join(done, e);
+ if (!c)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ *ret_path = c;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int chase_symlinks_and_open(
+ const char *path,
+ const char *root,
+ ChaseSymlinksFlags chase_flags,
+ int open_flags,
+ char **ret_path) {
+
+ _cleanup_close_ int path_fd = -1;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ if (chase_flags & (CHASE_NONEXISTENT|CHASE_STEP))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (empty_or_root(root) && !ret_path && (chase_flags & (CHASE_NO_AUTOFS|CHASE_SAFE)) == 0) {
+ /* Shortcut this call if none of the special features of this call are requested */
+ r = open(path, open_flags | (FLAGS_SET(chase_flags, CHASE_NOFOLLOW) ? O_NOFOLLOW : 0));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ r = chase_symlinks(path, root, chase_flags, ret_path ? &p : NULL, &path_fd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ assert(path_fd >= 0);
+
+ r = fd_reopen(path_fd, open_flags);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (ret_path)
+ *ret_path = TAKE_PTR(p);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+int chase_symlinks_and_opendir(
+ const char *path,
+ const char *root,
+ ChaseSymlinksFlags chase_flags,
+ char **ret_path,
+ DIR **ret_dir) {
+
+ _cleanup_close_ int path_fd = -1;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
+ DIR *d;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!ret_dir)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (chase_flags & (CHASE_NONEXISTENT|CHASE_STEP))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (empty_or_root(root) && !ret_path && (chase_flags & (CHASE_NO_AUTOFS|CHASE_SAFE)) == 0) {
+ /* Shortcut this call if none of the special features of this call are requested */
+ d = opendir(path);
+ if (!d)
+ return -errno;
+
+ *ret_dir = d;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ r = chase_symlinks(path, root, chase_flags, ret_path ? &p : NULL, &path_fd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ assert(path_fd >= 0);
+
+ d = xopendirat(path_fd, ".", O_NOFOLLOW);
+ if (!d)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (ret_path)
+ *ret_path = TAKE_PTR(p);
+
+ *ret_dir = d;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int chase_symlinks_and_stat(
+ const char *path,
+ const char *root,
+ ChaseSymlinksFlags chase_flags,
+ char **ret_path,
+ struct stat *ret_stat,
+ int *ret_fd) {
+
+ _cleanup_close_ int path_fd = -1;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(path);
+ assert(ret_stat);
+
+ if (chase_flags & (CHASE_NONEXISTENT|CHASE_STEP))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (empty_or_root(root) && !ret_path && (chase_flags & (CHASE_NO_AUTOFS|CHASE_SAFE)) == 0 && !ret_fd) {
+ /* Shortcut this call if none of the special features of this call are requested */
+
+ if (fstatat(AT_FDCWD, path, ret_stat, FLAGS_SET(chase_flags, CHASE_NOFOLLOW) ? AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW : 0) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ r = chase_symlinks(path, root, chase_flags, ret_path ? &p : NULL, &path_fd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ assert(path_fd >= 0);
+
+ if (fstat(path_fd, ret_stat) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ if (ret_path)
+ *ret_path = TAKE_PTR(p);
+ if (ret_fd)
+ *ret_fd = TAKE_FD(path_fd);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int chase_symlinks_and_access(
+ const char *path,
+ const char *root,
+ ChaseSymlinksFlags chase_flags,
+ int access_mode,
+ char **ret_path,
+ int *ret_fd) {
+
+ _cleanup_close_ int path_fd = -1;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(path);
+
+ if (chase_flags & (CHASE_NONEXISTENT|CHASE_STEP))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (empty_or_root(root) && !ret_path && (chase_flags & (CHASE_NO_AUTOFS|CHASE_SAFE)) == 0 && !ret_fd) {
+ /* Shortcut this call if none of the special features of this call are requested */
+
+ if (faccessat(AT_FDCWD, path, access_mode, FLAGS_SET(chase_flags, CHASE_NOFOLLOW) ? AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW : 0) < 0)
+ return -errno;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ r = chase_symlinks(path, root, chase_flags, ret_path ? &p : NULL, &path_fd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ assert(path_fd >= 0);
+
+ r = access_fd(path_fd, access_mode);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (ret_path)
+ *ret_path = TAKE_PTR(p);
+ if (ret_fd)
+ *ret_fd = TAKE_FD(path_fd);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int chase_symlinks_and_fopen_unlocked(
+ const char *path,
+ const char *root,
+ ChaseSymlinksFlags chase_flags,
+ const char *open_flags,
+ char **ret_path,
+ FILE **ret_file) {
+
+ _cleanup_free_ char *final_path = NULL;
+ _cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
+ int mode_flags, r;
+
+ assert(path);
+ assert(open_flags);
+ assert(ret_file);
+
+ mode_flags = fopen_mode_to_flags(open_flags);
+ if (mode_flags < 0)
+ return mode_flags;
+
+ fd = chase_symlinks_and_open(path, root, chase_flags, mode_flags, ret_path ? &final_path : NULL);
+ if (fd < 0)
+ return fd;
+
+ r = take_fdopen_unlocked(&fd, open_flags, ret_file);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if (ret_path)
+ *ret_path = TAKE_PTR(final_path);
+
+ return 0;
+}