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-rw-r--r--src/random-seed/random-seed.c326
1 files changed, 326 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/random-seed/random-seed.c b/src/random-seed/random-seed.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..82c29d0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/random-seed/random-seed.c
@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#if USE_SYS_RANDOM_H
+# include <sys/random.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/xattr.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "sd-id128.h"
+
+#include "alloc-util.h"
+#include "fd-util.h"
+#include "fs-util.h"
+#include "io-util.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "main-func.h"
+#include "missing_random.h"
+#include "missing_syscall.h"
+#include "mkdir.h"
+#include "parse-util.h"
+#include "random-util.h"
+#include "string-util.h"
+#include "sync-util.h"
+#include "sha256.h"
+#include "util.h"
+#include "xattr-util.h"
+
+typedef enum CreditEntropy {
+ CREDIT_ENTROPY_NO_WAY,
+ CREDIT_ENTROPY_YES_PLEASE,
+ CREDIT_ENTROPY_YES_FORCED,
+} CreditEntropy;
+
+static CreditEntropy may_credit(int seed_fd) {
+ _cleanup_free_ char *creditable = NULL;
+ const char *e;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(seed_fd >= 0);
+
+ e = getenv("SYSTEMD_RANDOM_SEED_CREDIT");
+ if (!e) {
+ log_debug("$SYSTEMD_RANDOM_SEED_CREDIT is not set, not crediting entropy.");
+ return CREDIT_ENTROPY_NO_WAY;
+ }
+ if (streq(e, "force")) {
+ log_debug("$SYSTEMD_RANDOM_SEED_CREDIT is set to 'force', crediting entropy.");
+ return CREDIT_ENTROPY_YES_FORCED;
+ }
+
+ r = parse_boolean(e);
+ if (r <= 0) {
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_RANDOM_SEED_CREDIT, not crediting entropy: %m");
+ else
+ log_debug("Crediting entropy is turned off via $SYSTEMD_RANDOM_SEED_CREDIT, not crediting entropy.");
+
+ return CREDIT_ENTROPY_NO_WAY;
+ }
+
+ /* Determine if the file is marked as creditable */
+ r = fgetxattr_malloc(seed_fd, "user.random-seed-creditable", &creditable);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (ERRNO_IS_XATTR_ABSENT(r))
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Seed file is not marked as creditable, not crediting.");
+ else
+ log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to read extended attribute, ignoring: %m");
+
+ return CREDIT_ENTROPY_NO_WAY;
+ }
+
+ r = parse_boolean(creditable);
+ if (r <= 0) {
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse user.random-seed-creditable extended attribute, ignoring: %s", creditable);
+ else
+ log_debug("Seed file is marked as not creditable, not crediting.");
+
+ return CREDIT_ENTROPY_NO_WAY;
+ }
+
+ /* Don't credit the random seed if we are in first-boot mode, because we are supposed to start from
+ * scratch. This is a safety precaution for cases where we people ship "golden" images with empty
+ * /etc but populated /var that contains a random seed. */
+ if (access("/run/systemd/first-boot", F_OK) < 0) {
+
+ if (errno != ENOENT) {
+ log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to check whether we are in first-boot mode, not crediting entropy: %m");
+ return CREDIT_ENTROPY_NO_WAY;
+ }
+
+ /* If ENOENT all is good, we are not in first-boot mode. */
+ } else {
+ log_debug("Not crediting entropy, since booted in first-boot mode.");
+ return CREDIT_ENTROPY_NO_WAY;
+ }
+
+ return CREDIT_ENTROPY_YES_PLEASE;
+}
+
+static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+ bool read_seed_file, write_seed_file, synchronous, hashed_old_seed = false;
+ _cleanup_close_ int seed_fd = -1, random_fd = -1;
+ _cleanup_free_ void* buf = NULL;
+ struct sha256_ctx hash_state;
+ size_t buf_size;
+ struct stat st;
+ ssize_t k, l;
+ int r;
+
+ log_setup();
+
+ if (argc != 2)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "This program requires one argument.");
+
+ umask(0022);
+
+ buf_size = random_pool_size();
+
+ r = mkdir_parents(RANDOM_SEED, 0755);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create directory " RANDOM_SEED_DIR ": %m");
+
+ /* When we load the seed we read it and write it to the device and then immediately update the saved seed with
+ * new data, to make sure the next boot gets seeded differently. */
+
+ if (streq(argv[1], "load")) {
+
+ seed_fd = open(RANDOM_SEED, O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY|O_CREAT, 0600);
+ if (seed_fd < 0) {
+ int open_rw_error = -errno;
+
+ write_seed_file = false;
+
+ seed_fd = open(RANDOM_SEED, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
+ if (seed_fd < 0) {
+ bool missing = errno == ENOENT;
+
+ log_full_errno(missing ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_ERR,
+ open_rw_error, "Failed to open " RANDOM_SEED " for writing: %m");
+ r = log_full_errno(missing ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_ERR,
+ errno, "Failed to open " RANDOM_SEED " for reading: %m");
+ return missing ? 0 : r;
+ }
+ } else
+ write_seed_file = true;
+
+ random_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY, 0600);
+ if (random_fd < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open /dev/urandom: %m");
+
+ read_seed_file = true;
+ synchronous = true; /* make this invocation a synchronous barrier for random pool initialization */
+
+ } else if (streq(argv[1], "save")) {
+
+ random_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
+ if (random_fd < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open /dev/urandom: %m");
+
+ seed_fd = open(RANDOM_SEED, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY|O_CREAT, 0600);
+ if (seed_fd < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open " RANDOM_SEED ": %m");
+
+ read_seed_file = false;
+ write_seed_file = true;
+ synchronous = false;
+ } else
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "Unknown verb '%s'.", argv[1]);
+
+ if (fstat(seed_fd, &st) < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to stat() seed file " RANDOM_SEED ": %m");
+
+ /* If the seed file is larger than what we expect, then honour the existing size and save/restore as much as it says */
+ if ((uint64_t) st.st_size > buf_size)
+ buf_size = MIN(st.st_size, RANDOM_POOL_SIZE_MAX);
+
+ buf = malloc(buf_size);
+ if (!buf)
+ return log_oom();
+
+ if (read_seed_file) {
+ sd_id128_t mid;
+
+ /* First, let's write the machine ID into /dev/urandom, not crediting entropy. Why? As an
+ * extra protection against "golden images" that are put together sloppily, i.e. images which
+ * are duplicated on multiple systems but where the random seed file is not properly
+ * reset. Frequently the machine ID is properly reset on those systems however (simply
+ * because it's easier to notice, if it isn't due to address clashes and so on, while random
+ * seed equivalence is generally not noticed easily), hence let's simply write the machined
+ * ID into the random pool too. */
+ r = sd_id128_get_machine(&mid);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to get machine ID, ignoring: %m");
+ else {
+ r = loop_write(random_fd, &mid, sizeof(mid), false);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to write machine ID to /dev/urandom, ignoring: %m");
+ }
+
+ k = loop_read(seed_fd, buf, buf_size, false);
+ if (k < 0)
+ log_error_errno(k, "Failed to read seed from " RANDOM_SEED ": %m");
+ else if (k == 0)
+ log_debug("Seed file " RANDOM_SEED " not yet initialized, proceeding.");
+ else {
+ CreditEntropy lets_credit;
+
+ /* If we're going to later write out a seed file, initialize a hash state with
+ * the contents of the seed file we just read, so that the new one can't regress
+ * in entropy. */
+ if (write_seed_file) {
+ sha256_init_ctx(&hash_state);
+ sha256_process_bytes(&k, sizeof(k), &hash_state); /* Hash length to distinguish from new seed. */
+ sha256_process_bytes(buf, k, &hash_state);
+ hashed_old_seed = true;
+ }
+
+ (void) lseek(seed_fd, 0, SEEK_SET);
+
+ lets_credit = may_credit(seed_fd);
+
+ /* Before we credit or use the entropy, let's make sure to securely drop the
+ * creditable xattr from the file, so that we never credit the same random seed
+ * again. Note that further down we'll write a new seed again, and likely mark it as
+ * credible again, hence this is just paranoia to close the short time window between
+ * the time we upload the random seed into the kernel and download the new one from
+ * it. */
+
+ if (fremovexattr(seed_fd, "user.random-seed-creditable") < 0) {
+ if (!ERRNO_IS_XATTR_ABSENT(errno))
+ log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to remove extended attribute, ignoring: %m");
+
+ /* Otherwise, there was no creditable flag set, which is OK. */
+ } else {
+ r = fsync_full(seed_fd);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to synchronize seed to disk, not crediting entropy: %m");
+
+ if (lets_credit == CREDIT_ENTROPY_YES_PLEASE)
+ lets_credit = CREDIT_ENTROPY_NO_WAY;
+ }
+ }
+
+ r = random_write_entropy(random_fd, buf, k,
+ IN_SET(lets_credit, CREDIT_ENTROPY_YES_PLEASE, CREDIT_ENTROPY_YES_FORCED));
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write seed to /dev/urandom: %m");
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (write_seed_file) {
+ bool getrandom_worked = false;
+
+ /* This is just a safety measure. Given that we are root and most likely created the file
+ * ourselves the mode and owner should be correct anyway. */
+ r = fchmod_and_chown(seed_fd, 0600, 0, 0);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to adjust seed file ownership and access mode: %m");
+
+ /* Let's make this whole job asynchronous, i.e. let's make ourselves a barrier for
+ * proper initialization of the random pool. */
+ k = getrandom(buf, buf_size, GRND_NONBLOCK);
+ if (k < 0 && errno == EAGAIN && synchronous) {
+ log_notice("Kernel entropy pool is not initialized yet, waiting until it is.");
+ k = getrandom(buf, buf_size, 0); /* retry synchronously */
+ }
+ if (k < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to read random data with getrandom(), falling back to /dev/urandom: %m");
+ else if ((size_t) k < buf_size)
+ log_debug("Short read from getrandom(), falling back to /dev/urandom.");
+ else
+ getrandom_worked = true;
+
+ if (!getrandom_worked) {
+ /* Retry with classic /dev/urandom */
+ k = loop_read(random_fd, buf, buf_size, false);
+ if (k < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(k, "Failed to read new seed from /dev/urandom: %m");
+ if (k == 0)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
+ "Got EOF while reading from /dev/urandom.");
+ }
+
+ /* If we previously read in a seed file, then hash the new seed into the old one,
+ * and replace the last 32 bytes of the seed with the hash output, so that the
+ * new seed file can't regress in entropy. */
+ if (hashed_old_seed) {
+ uint8_t hash[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ sha256_process_bytes(&k, sizeof(k), &hash_state); /* Hash length to distinguish from old seed. */
+ sha256_process_bytes(buf, k, &hash_state);
+ sha256_finish_ctx(&hash_state, hash);
+ l = MIN((size_t)k, sizeof(hash));
+ memcpy((uint8_t *)buf + k - l, hash, l);
+ }
+
+ r = loop_write(seed_fd, buf, (size_t) k, false);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write new random seed file: %m");
+
+ if (ftruncate(seed_fd, k) < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to truncate random seed file: %m");
+
+ r = fsync_full(seed_fd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to synchronize seed file: %m");
+
+ /* If we got this random seed data from getrandom() the data is suitable for crediting
+ * entropy later on. Let's keep that in mind by setting an extended attribute. on the file */
+ if (getrandom_worked)
+ if (fsetxattr(seed_fd, "user.random-seed-creditable", "1", 1, 0) < 0)
+ log_full_errno(ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno) ? LOG_DEBUG : LOG_WARNING, errno,
+ "Failed to mark seed file as creditable, ignoring: %m");
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION(run);