diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/resolve/resolved-dns-trust-anchor.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/resolve/resolved-dns-trust-anchor.c | 774 |
1 files changed, 774 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/resolve/resolved-dns-trust-anchor.c b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-trust-anchor.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..69a484d --- /dev/null +++ b/src/resolve/resolved-dns-trust-anchor.c @@ -0,0 +1,774 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ + +#include "sd-messages.h" + +#include "alloc-util.h" +#include "conf-files.h" +#include "def.h" +#include "dns-domain.h" +#include "fd-util.h" +#include "fileio.h" +#include "hexdecoct.h" +#include "nulstr-util.h" +#include "parse-util.h" +#include "resolved-dns-dnssec.h" +#include "resolved-dns-trust-anchor.h" +#include "set.h" +#include "sort-util.h" +#include "string-util.h" +#include "strv.h" + +static const char trust_anchor_dirs[] = CONF_PATHS_NULSTR("dnssec-trust-anchors.d"); + +/* The second DS RR from https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml, retrieved February 2017 */ +static const uint8_t root_digest2[] = + { 0xE0, 0x6D, 0x44, 0xB8, 0x0B, 0x8F, 0x1D, 0x39, 0xA9, 0x5C, 0x0B, 0x0D, 0x7C, 0x65, 0xD0, 0x84, + 0x58, 0xE8, 0x80, 0x40, 0x9B, 0xBC, 0x68, 0x34, 0x57, 0x10, 0x42, 0x37, 0xC7, 0xF8, 0xEC, 0x8D }; + +static bool dns_trust_anchor_knows_domain_positive(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *name) { + assert(d); + + /* Returns true if there's an entry for the specified domain + * name in our trust anchor */ + + return + hashmap_contains(d->positive_by_key, &DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CONST(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY, name)) || + hashmap_contains(d->positive_by_key, &DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CONST(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DS, name)); +} + +static int add_root_ksk( + DnsAnswer *answer, + DnsResourceKey *key, + uint16_t key_tag, + uint8_t algorithm, + uint8_t digest_type, + const void *digest, + size_t digest_size) { + + _cleanup_(dns_resource_record_unrefp) DnsResourceRecord *rr = NULL; + int r; + + rr = dns_resource_record_new(key); + if (!rr) + return -ENOMEM; + + rr->ds.key_tag = key_tag; + rr->ds.algorithm = algorithm; + rr->ds.digest_type = digest_type; + rr->ds.digest_size = digest_size; + rr->ds.digest = memdup(digest, rr->ds.digest_size); + if (!rr->ds.digest) + return -ENOMEM; + + r = dns_answer_add(answer, rr, 0, DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return 0; +} + +static int dns_trust_anchor_add_builtin_positive(DnsTrustAnchor *d) { + _cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *answer = NULL; + _cleanup_(dns_resource_key_unrefp) DnsResourceKey *key = NULL; + int r; + + assert(d); + + r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&d->positive_by_key, &dns_resource_key_hash_ops); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + /* Only add the built-in trust anchor if there's neither a DS nor a DNSKEY defined for the root domain. That + * way users have an easy way to override the root domain DS/DNSKEY data. */ + if (dns_trust_anchor_knows_domain_positive(d, ".")) + return 0; + + key = dns_resource_key_new(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DS, ""); + if (!key) + return -ENOMEM; + + answer = dns_answer_new(2); + if (!answer) + return -ENOMEM; + + /* Add the currently valid RRs from https://data.iana.org/root-anchors/root-anchors.xml */ + r = add_root_ksk(answer, key, 20326, DNSSEC_ALGORITHM_RSASHA256, DNSSEC_DIGEST_SHA256, root_digest2, sizeof(root_digest2)); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + r = hashmap_put(d->positive_by_key, key, answer); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + answer = NULL; + return 0; +} + +static int dns_trust_anchor_add_builtin_negative(DnsTrustAnchor *d) { + + static const char private_domains[] = + /* RFC 6761 says that .test is a special domain for + * testing and not to be installed in the root zone */ + "test\0" + + /* RFC 6761 says that these reverse IP lookup ranges + * are for private addresses, and hence should not + * show up in the root zone */ + "10.in-addr.arpa\0" + "16.172.in-addr.arpa\0" + "17.172.in-addr.arpa\0" + "18.172.in-addr.arpa\0" + "19.172.in-addr.arpa\0" + "20.172.in-addr.arpa\0" + "21.172.in-addr.arpa\0" + "22.172.in-addr.arpa\0" + "23.172.in-addr.arpa\0" + "24.172.in-addr.arpa\0" + "25.172.in-addr.arpa\0" + "26.172.in-addr.arpa\0" + "27.172.in-addr.arpa\0" + "28.172.in-addr.arpa\0" + "29.172.in-addr.arpa\0" + "30.172.in-addr.arpa\0" + "31.172.in-addr.arpa\0" + "168.192.in-addr.arpa\0" + + /* The same, but for IPv6. */ + "d.f.ip6.arpa\0" + + /* RFC 6762 reserves the .local domain for Multicast + * DNS, it hence cannot appear in the root zone. (Note + * that we by default do not route .local traffic to + * DNS anyway, except when a configured search domain + * suggests so.) */ + "local\0" + + /* These two are well known, popular private zone + * TLDs, that are blocked from delegation, according + * to: + * http://icannwiki.com/Name_Collision#NGPC_Resolution + * + * There's also ongoing work on making this official + * in an RRC: + * https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-chapin-additional-reserved-tlds-02.txt */ + "home\0" + "corp\0" + + /* The following four TLDs are suggested for private + * zones in RFC 6762, Appendix G, and are hence very + * unlikely to be made official TLDs any day soon */ + "lan\0" + "intranet\0" + "internal\0" + "private\0" + + /* Defined by RFC 8375. The most official choice. */ + "home.arpa\0"; + + const char *name; + int r; + + assert(d); + + /* Only add the built-in trust anchor if there's no negative + * trust anchor defined at all. This enables easy overriding + * of negative trust anchors. */ + + if (set_size(d->negative_by_name) > 0) + return 0; + + r = set_ensure_allocated(&d->negative_by_name, &dns_name_hash_ops); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + /* We add a couple of domains as default negative trust + * anchors, where it's very unlikely they will be installed in + * the root zone. If they exist they must be private, and thus + * unsigned. */ + + NULSTR_FOREACH(name, private_domains) { + if (dns_trust_anchor_knows_domain_positive(d, name)) + continue; + + r = set_put_strdup(&d->negative_by_name, name); + if (r < 0) + return r; + } + + return 0; +} + +static int dns_trust_anchor_load_positive(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *path, unsigned line, const char *s) { + _cleanup_(dns_resource_record_unrefp) DnsResourceRecord *rr = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ char *domain = NULL, *class = NULL, *type = NULL; + _cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *answer = NULL; + DnsAnswer *old_answer = NULL; + const char *p = s; + int r; + + assert(d); + assert(line); + + r = extract_first_word(&p, &domain, NULL, EXTRACT_UNQUOTE); + if (r < 0) + return log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse domain in line %s:%u: %m", path, line); + + r = dns_name_is_valid(domain); + if (r < 0) + return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to check validity of domain name '%s', at line %s:%u, ignoring line: %m", domain, path, line); + if (r == 0) { + log_warning("Domain name %s is invalid, at line %s:%u, ignoring line.", domain, path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + + r = extract_many_words(&p, NULL, 0, &class, &type, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse class and type in line %s:%u: %m", path, line); + if (r != 2) { + log_warning("Missing class or type in line %s:%u", path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (!strcaseeq(class, "IN")) { + log_warning("RR class %s is not supported, ignoring line %s:%u.", class, path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (strcaseeq(type, "DS")) { + _cleanup_free_ char *key_tag = NULL, *algorithm = NULL, *digest_type = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ void *dd = NULL; + uint16_t kt; + int a, dt; + size_t l; + + r = extract_many_words(&p, NULL, 0, &key_tag, &algorithm, &digest_type, NULL); + if (r < 0) { + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DS parameters on line %s:%u: %m", path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + if (r != 3) { + log_warning("Missing DS parameters on line %s:%u", path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + + r = safe_atou16(key_tag, &kt); + if (r < 0) + return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DS key tag %s on line %s:%u: %m", key_tag, path, line); + + a = dnssec_algorithm_from_string(algorithm); + if (a < 0) { + log_warning("Failed to parse DS algorithm %s on line %s:%u", algorithm, path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + + dt = dnssec_digest_from_string(digest_type); + if (dt < 0) { + log_warning("Failed to parse DS digest type %s on line %s:%u", digest_type, path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (isempty(p)) { + log_warning("Missing DS digest on line %s:%u", path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + + r = unhexmem(p, strlen(p), &dd, &l); + if (r < 0) { + log_warning("Failed to parse DS digest %s on line %s:%u", p, path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + + rr = dns_resource_record_new_full(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DS, domain); + if (!rr) + return log_oom(); + + rr->ds.key_tag = kt; + rr->ds.algorithm = a; + rr->ds.digest_type = dt; + rr->ds.digest_size = l; + rr->ds.digest = TAKE_PTR(dd); + + } else if (strcaseeq(type, "DNSKEY")) { + _cleanup_free_ char *flags = NULL, *protocol = NULL, *algorithm = NULL; + _cleanup_free_ void *k = NULL; + uint16_t f; + size_t l; + int a; + + r = extract_many_words(&p, NULL, 0, &flags, &protocol, &algorithm, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DNSKEY parameters on line %s:%u: %m", path, line); + if (r != 3) { + log_warning("Missing DNSKEY parameters on line %s:%u", path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (!streq(protocol, "3")) { + log_warning("DNSKEY Protocol is not 3 on line %s:%u", path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + + r = safe_atou16(flags, &f); + if (r < 0) + return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DNSKEY flags field %s on line %s:%u", flags, path, line); + if ((f & DNSKEY_FLAG_ZONE_KEY) == 0) { + log_warning("DNSKEY lacks zone key bit set on line %s:%u", path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + if ((f & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE)) { + log_warning("DNSKEY is already revoked on line %s:%u", path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + + a = dnssec_algorithm_from_string(algorithm); + if (a < 0) { + log_warning("Failed to parse DNSKEY algorithm %s on line %s:%u", algorithm, path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (isempty(p)) { + log_warning("Missing DNSKEY key on line %s:%u", path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + + r = unbase64mem(p, strlen(p), &k, &l); + if (r < 0) + return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse DNSKEY key data %s on line %s:%u", p, path, line); + + rr = dns_resource_record_new_full(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY, domain); + if (!rr) + return log_oom(); + + rr->dnskey.flags = f; + rr->dnskey.protocol = 3; + rr->dnskey.algorithm = a; + rr->dnskey.key_size = l; + rr->dnskey.key = TAKE_PTR(k); + + } else { + log_warning("RR type %s is not supported, ignoring line %s:%u.", type, path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + + r = hashmap_ensure_allocated(&d->positive_by_key, &dns_resource_key_hash_ops); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + old_answer = hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, rr->key); + answer = dns_answer_ref(old_answer); + + r = dns_answer_add_extend(&answer, rr, 0, DNS_ANSWER_AUTHENTICATED, NULL); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add trust anchor RR: %m"); + + r = hashmap_replace(d->positive_by_key, rr->key, answer); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add answer to trust anchor: %m"); + + old_answer = dns_answer_unref(old_answer); + answer = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +static int dns_trust_anchor_load_negative(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *path, unsigned line, const char *s) { + _cleanup_free_ char *domain = NULL; + const char *p = s; + int r; + + assert(d); + assert(line); + + r = extract_first_word(&p, &domain, NULL, EXTRACT_UNQUOTE); + if (r < 0) + return log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse line %s:%u: %m", path, line); + + r = dns_name_is_valid(domain); + if (r < 0) + return log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to check validity of domain name '%s', at line %s:%u, ignoring line: %m", domain, path, line); + if (r == 0) { + log_warning("Domain name %s is invalid, at line %s:%u, ignoring line.", domain, path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + + if (!isempty(p)) { + log_warning("Trailing garbage at line %s:%u, ignoring line.", path, line); + return -EINVAL; + } + + r = set_ensure_consume(&d->negative_by_name, &dns_name_hash_ops, TAKE_PTR(domain)); + if (r < 0) + return log_oom(); + + return 0; +} + +static int dns_trust_anchor_load_files( + DnsTrustAnchor *d, + const char *suffix, + int (*loader)(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *path, unsigned n, const char *line)) { + + _cleanup_strv_free_ char **files = NULL; + int r; + + assert(d); + assert(suffix); + assert(loader); + + r = conf_files_list_nulstr(&files, suffix, NULL, 0, trust_anchor_dirs); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to enumerate %s trust anchor files: %m", suffix); + + STRV_FOREACH(f, files) { + _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *g = NULL; + unsigned n = 0; + + g = fopen(*f, "re"); + if (!g) { + if (errno == ENOENT) + continue; + + log_warning_errno(errno, "Failed to open '%s', ignoring: %m", *f); + continue; + } + + for (;;) { + _cleanup_free_ char *line = NULL; + char *l; + + r = read_line(g, LONG_LINE_MAX, &line); + if (r < 0) { + log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to read '%s', ignoring: %m", *f); + break; + } + if (r == 0) + break; + + n++; + + l = strstrip(line); + if (isempty(l)) + continue; + + if (*l == ';') + continue; + + (void) loader(d, *f, n, l); + } + } + + return 0; +} + +static int domain_name_cmp(char * const *a, char * const *b) { + return dns_name_compare_func(*a, *b); +} + +static int dns_trust_anchor_dump(DnsTrustAnchor *d) { + DnsAnswer *a; + + assert(d); + + if (hashmap_isempty(d->positive_by_key)) + log_info("No positive trust anchors defined."); + else { + log_info("Positive Trust Anchors:"); + HASHMAP_FOREACH(a, d->positive_by_key) { + DnsResourceRecord *rr; + + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rr, a) + log_info("%s", dns_resource_record_to_string(rr)); + } + } + + if (set_isempty(d->negative_by_name)) + log_info("No negative trust anchors defined."); + else { + _cleanup_free_ char **l = NULL, *j = NULL; + + l = set_get_strv(d->negative_by_name); + if (!l) + return log_oom(); + + typesafe_qsort(l, set_size(d->negative_by_name), domain_name_cmp); + + j = strv_join(l, " "); + if (!j) + return log_oom(); + + log_info("Negative trust anchors: %s", j); + } + + return 0; +} + +int dns_trust_anchor_load(DnsTrustAnchor *d) { + int r; + + assert(d); + + /* If loading things from disk fails, we don't consider this fatal */ + (void) dns_trust_anchor_load_files(d, ".positive", dns_trust_anchor_load_positive); + (void) dns_trust_anchor_load_files(d, ".negative", dns_trust_anchor_load_negative); + + /* However, if the built-in DS fails, then we have a problem. */ + r = dns_trust_anchor_add_builtin_positive(d); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add built-in positive trust anchor: %m"); + + r = dns_trust_anchor_add_builtin_negative(d); + if (r < 0) + return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to add built-in negative trust anchor: %m"); + + dns_trust_anchor_dump(d); + + return 0; +} + +void dns_trust_anchor_flush(DnsTrustAnchor *d) { + assert(d); + + d->positive_by_key = hashmap_free_with_destructor(d->positive_by_key, dns_answer_unref); + d->revoked_by_rr = set_free_with_destructor(d->revoked_by_rr, dns_resource_record_unref); + d->negative_by_name = set_free_free(d->negative_by_name); +} + +int dns_trust_anchor_lookup_positive(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const DnsResourceKey *key, DnsAnswer **ret) { + DnsAnswer *a; + + assert(d); + assert(key); + assert(ret); + + /* We only serve DS and DNSKEY RRs. */ + if (!IN_SET(key->type, DNS_TYPE_DS, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY)) + return 0; + + a = hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, key); + if (!a) + return 0; + + *ret = dns_answer_ref(a); + return 1; +} + +int dns_trust_anchor_lookup_negative(DnsTrustAnchor *d, const char *name) { + int r; + + assert(d); + assert(name); + + for (;;) { + /* If the domain is listed as-is in the NTA database, then that counts */ + if (set_contains(d->negative_by_name, name)) + return true; + + /* If the domain isn't listed as NTA, but is listed as positive trust anchor, then that counts. See RFC + * 7646, section 1.1 */ + if (hashmap_contains(d->positive_by_key, &DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CONST(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_DS, name))) + return false; + + if (hashmap_contains(d->positive_by_key, &DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CONST(DNS_CLASS_IN, DNS_TYPE_KEY, name))) + return false; + + /* And now, let's look at the parent, and check that too */ + r = dns_name_parent(&name); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + break; + } + + return false; +} + +static int dns_trust_anchor_revoked_put(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceRecord *rr) { + int r; + + assert(d); + + r = set_ensure_put(&d->revoked_by_rr, &dns_resource_record_hash_ops, rr); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r > 0) + dns_resource_record_ref(rr); + + return r; +} + +static int dns_trust_anchor_remove_revoked(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceRecord *rr) { + _cleanup_(dns_answer_unrefp) DnsAnswer *new_answer = NULL; + DnsAnswer *old_answer; + DnsAnswerItem *item; + int r; + + /* Remember that this is a revoked trust anchor RR */ + r = dns_trust_anchor_revoked_put(d, rr); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + /* Remove this from the positive trust anchor */ + old_answer = hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, rr->key); + if (!old_answer) + return 0; + + new_answer = dns_answer_ref(old_answer); + + r = dns_answer_remove_by_rr(&new_answer, rr); + if (r <= 0) + return r; + + /* We found the key! Warn the user */ + log_struct(LOG_WARNING, + "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_DNSSEC_TRUST_ANCHOR_REVOKED_STR, + LOG_MESSAGE("DNSSEC trust anchor %s has been revoked.\n" + "Please update the trust anchor, or upgrade your operating system.", + strna(dns_resource_record_to_string(rr))), + "TRUST_ANCHOR=%s", dns_resource_record_to_string(rr)); + + if (dns_answer_size(new_answer) <= 0) { + assert_se(hashmap_remove(d->positive_by_key, rr->key) == old_answer); + dns_answer_unref(old_answer); + return 1; + } + + item = ordered_set_first(new_answer->items); + r = hashmap_replace(d->positive_by_key, item->rr->key, new_answer); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + TAKE_PTR(new_answer); + dns_answer_unref(old_answer); + return 1; +} + +static int dns_trust_anchor_check_revoked_one(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceRecord *revoked_dnskey) { + DnsAnswer *a; + int r; + + assert(d); + assert(revoked_dnskey); + assert(revoked_dnskey->key->type == DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY); + assert(revoked_dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE); + + a = hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, revoked_dnskey->key); + if (a) { + DnsResourceRecord *anchor; + + /* First, look for the precise DNSKEY in our trust anchor database */ + + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(anchor, a) { + + if (anchor->dnskey.protocol != revoked_dnskey->dnskey.protocol) + continue; + + if (anchor->dnskey.algorithm != revoked_dnskey->dnskey.algorithm) + continue; + + if (anchor->dnskey.key_size != revoked_dnskey->dnskey.key_size) + continue; + + /* Note that we allow the REVOKE bit to be + * different! It will be set in the revoked + * key, but unset in our version of it */ + if (((anchor->dnskey.flags ^ revoked_dnskey->dnskey.flags) | DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE) != DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE) + continue; + + if (memcmp(anchor->dnskey.key, revoked_dnskey->dnskey.key, anchor->dnskey.key_size) != 0) + continue; + + dns_trust_anchor_remove_revoked(d, anchor); + break; + } + } + + a = hashmap_get(d->positive_by_key, &DNS_RESOURCE_KEY_CONST(revoked_dnskey->key->class, DNS_TYPE_DS, dns_resource_key_name(revoked_dnskey->key))); + if (a) { + DnsResourceRecord *anchor; + + /* Second, look for DS RRs matching this DNSKEY in our trust anchor database */ + + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(anchor, a) { + + /* We set mask_revoke to true here, since our + * DS fingerprint will be the one of the + * unrevoked DNSKEY, but the one we got passed + * here has the bit set. */ + r = dnssec_verify_dnskey_by_ds(revoked_dnskey, anchor, true); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + + dns_trust_anchor_remove_revoked(d, anchor); + break; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +int dns_trust_anchor_check_revoked(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceRecord *dnskey, DnsAnswer *rrs) { + DnsResourceRecord *rrsig; + int r; + + assert(d); + assert(dnskey); + + /* Looks if "dnskey" is a self-signed RR that has been revoked + * and matches one of our trust anchor entries. If so, removes + * it from the trust anchor and returns > 0. */ + + if (dnskey->key->type != DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY) + return 0; + + /* Is this DNSKEY revoked? */ + if ((dnskey->dnskey.flags & DNSKEY_FLAG_REVOKE) == 0) + return 0; + + /* Could this be interesting to us at all? If not, + * there's no point in looking for and verifying a + * self-signed RRSIG. */ + if (!dns_trust_anchor_knows_domain_positive(d, dns_resource_key_name(dnskey->key))) + return 0; + + /* Look for a self-signed RRSIG in the other rrs belonging to this DNSKEY */ + DNS_ANSWER_FOREACH(rrsig, rrs) { + DnssecResult result; + + if (rrsig->key->type != DNS_TYPE_RRSIG) + continue; + + r = dnssec_rrsig_match_dnskey(rrsig, dnskey, true); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (r == 0) + continue; + + r = dnssec_verify_rrset(rrs, dnskey->key, rrsig, dnskey, USEC_INFINITY, &result); + if (r < 0) + return r; + if (result != DNSSEC_VALIDATED) + continue; + + /* Bingo! This is a revoked self-signed DNSKEY. Let's + * see if this precise one exists in our trust anchor + * database, too. */ + r = dns_trust_anchor_check_revoked_one(d, dnskey); + if (r < 0) + return r; + + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +int dns_trust_anchor_is_revoked(DnsTrustAnchor *d, DnsResourceRecord *rr) { + assert(d); + + if (!IN_SET(rr->key->type, DNS_TYPE_DS, DNS_TYPE_DNSKEY)) + return 0; + + return set_contains(d->revoked_by_rr, rr); +} |