From b750101eb236130cf056c675997decbac904cc49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Daniel Baumann Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2024 17:35:18 +0200 Subject: Adding upstream version 252.22. Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann --- src/shared/creds-util.h | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 70 insertions(+) create mode 100644 src/shared/creds-util.h (limited to 'src/shared/creds-util.h') diff --git a/src/shared/creds-util.h b/src/shared/creds-util.h new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf3d6c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/shared/creds-util.h @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ +#pragma once + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "sd-id128.h" + +#include "fd-util.h" +#include "time-util.h" + +#define CREDENTIAL_NAME_MAX FDNAME_MAX + +/* Put a size limit on the individual credential */ +#define CREDENTIAL_SIZE_MAX (1024U*1024U) + +/* Refuse to store more than 1M per service, after all this is unswappable memory. Note that for now we put + * this to the same limit as the per-credential limit, i.e. if the user has n > 1 credentials instead of 1 it + * won't get them more space. */ +#define CREDENTIALS_TOTAL_SIZE_MAX CREDENTIAL_SIZE_MAX + +/* Put a size limit on encrypted credentials (which is the same as the unencrypted size plus a spacious 128K of extra + * space for headers, IVs, exported TPM2 key material and so on. */ +#define CREDENTIAL_ENCRYPTED_SIZE_MAX (CREDENTIAL_SIZE_MAX + 128U*1024U) + +bool credential_name_valid(const char *s); + +/* Where creds have been passed to the local execution context */ +int get_credentials_dir(const char **ret); +int get_encrypted_credentials_dir(const char **ret); + +/* Where creds have been passed to the system */ +#define SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY "/run/credentials/@system" +#define ENCRYPTED_SYSTEM_CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY "/run/credentials/@encrypted" + +int read_credential(const char *name, void **ret, size_t *ret_size); + +typedef enum CredentialSecretFlags { + CREDENTIAL_SECRET_GENERATE = 1 << 0, + CREDENTIAL_SECRET_WARN_NOT_ENCRYPTED = 1 << 1, + CREDENTIAL_SECRET_FAIL_ON_TEMPORARY_FS = 1 << 2, +} CredentialSecretFlags; + +int get_credential_host_secret(CredentialSecretFlags flags, void **ret, size_t *ret_size); + +int get_credential_user_password(const char *username, char **ret_password, bool *ret_is_hashed); + +/* The four modes we support: keyed only by on-disk key, only by TPM2 HMAC key, and by the combination of + * both, as well as one with a fixed zero length key if TPM2 is missing (the latter of course provides no + * authenticity or confidentiality, but is still useful for integrity protection, and makes things simpler + * for us to handle). */ +#define CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST SD_ID128_MAKE(5a,1c,6a,86,df,9d,40,96,b1,d5,a6,5e,08,62,f1,9a) +#define CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC SD_ID128_MAKE(0c,7c,c0,7b,11,76,45,91,9c,4b,0b,ea,08,bc,20,fe) +#define CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK SD_ID128_MAKE(fa,f7,eb,93,41,e3,41,2c,a1,a4,36,f9,5a,29,36,2f) +#define CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC SD_ID128_MAKE(93,a8,94,09,48,74,44,90,90,ca,f2,fc,93,ca,b5,53) +#define CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_HOST_AND_TPM2_HMAC_WITH_PK \ + SD_ID128_MAKE(af,49,50,a8,49,13,4e,b1,a7,38,46,30,4f,f3,0c,05) +#define CRED_AES256_GCM_BY_TPM2_ABSENT SD_ID128_MAKE(05,84,69,da,f6,f5,43,24,80,05,49,da,0f,8e,a2,fb) + +/* Two special IDs to pick a general automatic mode (i.e. tpm2+host if TPM2 exists, only host otherwise) or + * an initrd-specific automatic mode (i.e. tpm2 if firmware can do it, otherwise fixed zero-length key, and + * never involve host keys). These IDs will never be stored on disk, but are useful only internally while + * figuring out what precisely to write to disk. To mark that these aren't a "real" type, we'll prefix them + * with an underscore. */ +#define _CRED_AUTO SD_ID128_MAKE(a2,19,cb,07,85,b2,4c,04,b1,6d,18,ca,b9,d2,ee,01) +#define _CRED_AUTO_INITRD SD_ID128_MAKE(02,dc,8e,de,3a,02,43,ab,a9,ec,54,9c,05,e6,a0,71) + +int encrypt_credential_and_warn(sd_id128_t with_key, const char *name, usec_t timestamp, usec_t not_after, const char *tpm2_device, uint32_t tpm2_hash_pcr_mask, const char *tpm2_pubkey_path, uint32_t tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask, const void *input, size_t input_size, void **ret, size_t *ret_size); +int decrypt_credential_and_warn(const char *validate_name, usec_t validate_timestamp, const char *tpm2_device, const char *tpm2_signature_path, const void *input, size_t input_size, void **ret, size_t *ret_size); -- cgit v1.2.3