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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 17:32:43 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-07 17:32:43 +0000 |
commit | 6bf0a5cb5034a7e684dcc3500e841785237ce2dd (patch) | |
tree | a68f146d7fa01f0134297619fbe7e33db084e0aa /docs/bug-mgmt/processes/fixing-security-bugs.rst | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | thunderbird-6bf0a5cb5034a7e684dcc3500e841785237ce2dd.tar.xz thunderbird-6bf0a5cb5034a7e684dcc3500e841785237ce2dd.zip |
Adding upstream version 1:115.7.0.upstream/1%115.7.0upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'docs/bug-mgmt/processes/fixing-security-bugs.rst')
-rw-r--r-- | docs/bug-mgmt/processes/fixing-security-bugs.rst | 217 |
1 files changed, 217 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/fixing-security-bugs.rst b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/fixing-security-bugs.rst new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..e07853ac79 --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/bug-mgmt/processes/fixing-security-bugs.rst @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +Fixing Security Bugs +==================== + +A bug has been reported as security-sensitive in Bugzilla and received a +security rating. + +If this bug is private - which is most likely for a reported security +bug - **the process for patching is slightly different than the usual +process for fixing a bug**. + +Here are security guidelines to follow if you’re involved in reviewing, +testing and landing a security patch. See +:ref:`Security Bug Approval Process` +for more details about how to request sec-approval and land the patch. + +Keeping private information private +----------------------------------- + +A security-sensitive bug in Bugzilla means that all information about +the bug except its ID number are hidden. This includes the title, +comments, reporter, assignee and CC’d people. + +A security-sensitive bug usually remains private until a fix is shipped +in a new release, **and after a certain amount of time to ensure that a +maximum number of users updated their version of Firefox**. Bugs are +usually made public after 6 months and a couple of releases. + +From the moment a security bug has been privately reported to the moment +a fix is shipped and the bug is set public, all information about that +bug needs to be handled carefully in order to avoid an unmitigated +vulnerability becoming known and exploited before we release a +fix (0-day). + +During a normal process, information about the nature of bug can be +accessed through: + +- Bug comments (Bugzilla, GitHub issue) +- Commit message (visible on Bugzilla, tree check-ins and test servers) +- Code comments +- Test cases +- Bug content can potentially be discussed on public IRC/Slack channels + and mailing list emails. + +When patching for a security bug, you’ll need to be mindful about what +type of information you share and where. + +In commit messages +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +People are watching code check-ins, so we want to avoid sharing +information which would disclose or help finding a vulnerability too +easily before we shipped the fix to our users. This includes: + +- The **nature of the vulnerability** (overflow, use-after-free, XSS, + CSP bypass...) +- **Ways to trigger and exploit that vulnerability** + - In commit messages, code comments and test cases. +- The fact that a bug / commit is security-related: + + - **Trigger words** in the commit message or code comments such as + "security", "exploitable", or the nature of a security vulnerability + (overflow, use-after-free…) + - **Security approver’s name** in a commit message. +- The Firefox versions and components affected by the vulnerability. +- Patches with an obvious fix. + +In Bugzilla and other public channels +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +In addition to commits, you’ll need to be mindful of not disclosing +sensitive information about the bug in public places, such as Bugzilla: + +- Mention the bugs in comment of the private bug instead. +- Do not comment sensitive information in public related bugs. +- Also be careful about who you give bug access to: **double check + before CC’ing the wrong person or alias**. +- As of recently, you may now add public bugs in the “duplicate”, + “depends on”, “blocks”, “regression”, “regressed by”, or “see also” section. + Bugzilla will only reveal those relationships to people with ``editbugs`` + permission or access to the security bug. + +On IRC, Slack channels, GitHub issues, mailing lists: If you need to +discuss about a security bug, use a private channel (protected with a +password or with proper right access management) + +During Development +------------------ + +Testing security bugs +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Pushing to Try servers requires Level 1 Commit access but **content +viewing is publicly accessible**. + +As much as possible, **do not push to Try servers**. Testing should be +done locally before checkin in order to prevent public disclosing of the +bug. + +Because of the public visibility, pushing to Try has all the same concerns +as committing the patch. Please heed the concerns in the +:ref:`landing-your-patch` section before thinking about it, and check with +the security team for an informal "sec-approval" before doing so. + +**Do not push the bug's own vulnerability testcase to Try.** + +If you need to push to Try servers, make sure your tests don’t disclose +what the vulnerability is about or how to trigger it. Do not mention +anywhere it is security related. + +Obfuscating a security patch +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +If your security patch looks obvious because of the code it contains +(e.g. a one-line fix), or if you really need to push to Try servers, +**consider integrating your security-related patch to non-security work +in the same area**. And/or pretend it is related to something else, like +some performance improvement or a correctness fix. **Definitely don't +include the bug number in the commit message.** This will help making +the security issue less easily identifiable. (The absolute ban against +"Security through Obscurity" is in relation to cryptographic systems. In +other situations you still can't *rely* on obscurity but it can +sometimes buy you a little time. In this context we need to get the +fixes into the hands of our users faster than attackers can weaponize +and deploy attacks and a little extra time can help.) + +Requesting sec-approval +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +See :ref:`Security Bug Approval Process` +for more details + +.. _landing-your-patch: + +Landing your patch (with or without sec-approval) +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Before asking for sec-approval or landing, ensure your patch does not disclose +information about the security vulnerability unnecessarily. Specifically: + +#. The patch commit message and its contents should not mention security, + security bugs, or sec-approvers. + Note that you can alter the commit message directly in phabricator, + if that's the only thing you need to do - you don't need to amend your + local commit and re-push it. + While comprehensive commit messages are generally encouraged; they + should be omitted for security bugs and instead be posted in the bug + (which will eventually become public.) +#. Separate out tests into a separate commit. + **Do not land tests when landing the patch. Remember we don’t want + to 0-day ourselves!** This includes when pushing to try. + + - Tests should only be checked in later, after an official Firefox + release that contains the fix has been live for at least + four weeks. For example, if Firefox 53 + contains a security issue that affects the world and that issue is + fixed in 54, tests for this fix should not be checked in + until four weeks after 54 goes live. + + The exception to this is if there is a security issue that doesn't + affect any release branches, only mozilla-central and/or other + development branches. Since the security problem was never + released to the world, once the bug is fixed in all affected + places, tests can be checked in to the various branches. + - There are two main techniques for remembering to check in the + tests later: + + a. clone the sec bug into a separate "task" bug **that is also + in a security-sensitive group to ensure it's not publicly visible** + called something like "land tests for bug xxxxx" and assign to + yourself. It should get a "sec-other" keyword rating. + + Tip: In phabricator, you can change the bug linked to + a commit with tests if the tests were already separate, while keeping + the previously granted review, meaning you can just land the patch + when ready, rather than having your reviewer and you have to remember + what this was about a month or two down the line. + b. Or, set the "in-testsuite" flag to "?", and later set it to "+" + when the tests get checked in. + + +Landing tests +~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +Tests can be landed **once the release containing fixes has been live +at least 4 weeks**. + +The exception is if a security issue has never been shipped in a release +build and has been fixed in all development branches. + +Making a security bug public +~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ + +This is the responsibility of the security management team. + +Essentials +---------- + +- **Do not disclose any information about the vulnerability before a + release with a fix has gone live for enough time for users to update + their software**. + + - This includes code comments, commit messages, tests, public + communication channels. + +- If any doubt: '''request sec-approval? ''' +- If any doubt: **needinfo security folks**. +- **If there’s no rating, assume the worst and treat the bug as + sec-critical**. + +Documentation & Contacts +------------------------ + +- :ref:`Normal process for submitting a patch <How to submit a patch>` +- `How to file a security bug <https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Fileabug>`__ +- `Handling Mozilla security bugs (policy) <https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/bugs/>`__ +- :ref:`Security Bug Approval Process` +- `Contacting the Security team(s) at Mozilla: <https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security>`__ |