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+/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 4; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */
+/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public
+ * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this
+ * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */
+
+#include "nsISupports.idl"
+#include "nsIPrincipal.idl"
+interface nsIURI;
+interface nsIChannel;
+interface nsIClassInfo;
+interface nsIDocShell;
+interface nsIDomainPolicy;
+interface nsILoadContext;
+
+%{ C++
+#include "jspubtd.h"
+
+namespace mozilla {
+namespace dom {
+class DomainPolicyClone;
+}
+}
+%}
+
+[ptr] native JSContextPtr(JSContext);
+[ptr] native JSObjectPtr(JSObject);
+[ptr] native DomainPolicyClonePtr(mozilla::dom::DomainPolicyClone);
+
+[scriptable, builtinclass, uuid(51daad87-3a0c-44cc-b620-7356801c9022)]
+interface nsIScriptSecurityManager : nsISupports
+{
+ /**
+ * For each of these hooks returning NS_OK means 'let the action continue'.
+ * Returning an error code means 'veto the action'. XPConnect will return
+ * false to the js engine if the action is vetoed. The implementor of this
+ * interface is responsible for setting a JS exception into the JSContext
+ * if that is appropriate.
+ */
+ [noscript] void canCreateWrapper(in JSContextPtr aJSContext,
+ in nsIIDRef aIID,
+ in nsISupports aObj,
+ in nsIClassInfo aClassInfo);
+
+ [noscript] void canCreateInstance(in JSContextPtr aJSContext,
+ in nsCIDRef aCID);
+
+ [noscript] void canGetService(in JSContextPtr aJSContext,
+ in nsCIDRef aCID);
+
+ /**
+ * Check that the script currently running in context "cx" can load "uri".
+ *
+ * Will return error code NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI if the load request
+ * should be denied.
+ *
+ * @param cx the JSContext of the script causing the load
+ * @param uri the URI that is being loaded
+ */
+ [noscript] void checkLoadURIFromScript(in JSContextPtr cx, in nsIURI uri);
+
+ /**
+ * Default CheckLoadURI permissions
+ */
+ // Default permissions
+ const unsigned long STANDARD = 0;
+
+ // Indicate that the load is a load of a new document that is not
+ // user-triggered. Here "user-triggered" could be broadly interpreted --
+ // for example, scripted sets of window.location.href might be treated as
+ // "user-triggered" in some circumstances. A typical example of a load
+ // that is not user-triggered is a <meta> refresh load. If this flag is
+ // set, the load will be denied if the originating principal's URI has the
+ // nsIProtocolHandler::URI_FORBIDS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT flag set.
+ const unsigned long LOAD_IS_AUTOMATIC_DOCUMENT_REPLACEMENT = 1 << 0;
+
+ // Allow the loading of chrome URLs by non-chrome URLs. Use with great
+ // care! This will actually allow the loading of any URI which has the
+ // nsIProtocolHandler::URI_IS_UI_RESOURCE protocol handler flag set. Ths
+ // probably means at least chrome: and resource:.
+ const unsigned long ALLOW_CHROME = 1 << 1;
+
+ // Don't allow URLs which would inherit the caller's principal (such as
+ // javascript: or data:) to load. See
+ // nsIProtocolHandler::URI_INHERITS_SECURITY_CONTEXT.
+ const unsigned long DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL = 1 << 2;
+
+ // Alias for DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL for backwards compat with
+ // JS-implemented extensions.
+ const unsigned long DISALLOW_SCRIPT_OR_DATA = DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL;
+
+ // Don't allow javascript: URLs to load
+ // WARNING: Support for this value was added in Mozilla 1.7.8 and
+ // Firefox 1.0.4. Use in prior versions WILL BE IGNORED.
+ // When using this, make sure that you actually want DISALLOW_SCRIPT, not
+ // DISALLOW_INHERIT_PRINCIPAL
+ const unsigned long DISALLOW_SCRIPT = 1 << 3;
+
+ // Do not report errors if we just want to check if a principal can load
+ // a URI to not unnecessarily spam the error console.
+ const unsigned long DONT_REPORT_ERRORS = 1 << 4;
+
+ /**
+ * Check that content with principal aPrincipal can load "uri".
+ *
+ * Will return error code NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI if the load request
+ * should be denied.
+ *
+ * @param aPrincipal the principal identifying the actor causing the load
+ * @param uri the URI that is being loaded
+ * @param flags the permission set, see above
+ * @param innerWindowID the window ID for error reporting. If this is 0
+ * (which happens automatically if it's not passed from JS), errors
+ * will only appear in the browser console, not window-associated
+ * consoles like the web console.
+ */
+ [binaryname(CheckLoadURIWithPrincipal)]
+ void checkLoadURIWithPrincipalXPCOM(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal,
+ in nsIURI uri,
+ in unsigned long flags,
+ [optional] in unsigned long long innerWindowID);
+
+ /**
+ * Same as the above, but when called from JS, raises exceptions with more
+ * useful messages, including both the tested URI and the principal string.
+ */
+ [implicit_jscontext, binaryname(CheckLoadURIWithPrincipalFromJS)]
+ void checkLoadURIWithPrincipal(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal,
+ in nsIURI uri,
+ [optional] in unsigned long flags,
+ [optional] in unsigned long long innerWindowID);
+
+ /**
+ * Similar to checkLoadURIWithPrincipal but there are two differences:
+ *
+ * 1) The URI is a string, not a URI object.
+ * 2) This function assumes that the URI may still be subject to fixup (and
+ * hence will check whether fixed-up versions of the URI are allowed to
+ * load as well); if any of the versions of this URI is not allowed, this
+ * function will return error code NS_ERROR_DOM_BAD_URI.
+ */
+ [binaryname(CheckLoadURIStrWithPrincipal)]
+ void checkLoadURIStrWithPrincipalXPCOM(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal,
+ in AUTF8String uri,
+ in unsigned long flags);
+
+ /**
+ * Same as the above, but when called from JS, raises exceptions with more
+ * useful messages, including both the tested URI and the principal string.
+ */
+ [implicit_jscontext, binaryname(CheckLoadURIStrWithPrincipalFromJS)]
+ void checkLoadURIStrWithPrincipal(in nsIPrincipal aPrincipal,
+ in AUTF8String uri,
+ [optional] in unsigned long flags);
+
+ /**
+ * Returns true if the URI is from a domain that is allow-listed through
+ * prefs to be allowed to use file:// URIs.
+ * @param aUri the URI to be tested
+ */
+ bool inFileURIAllowlist(in nsIURI aUri);
+
+ ///////////////// Principals ///////////////////////
+
+ /**
+ * Return the all-powerful system principal.
+ */
+ nsIPrincipal getSystemPrincipal();
+
+ /**
+ * Returns a principal that has the OriginAttributes of the load context.
+ * @param loadContext to get the OriginAttributes from.
+ */
+ nsIPrincipal getLoadContextContentPrincipal(in nsIURI uri,
+ in nsILoadContext loadContext);
+
+ /**
+ * Returns a principal that has the OriginAttributes of the docshell.
+ * @param docShell to get the OriginAttributes from.
+ */
+ nsIPrincipal getDocShellContentPrincipal(in nsIURI uri,
+ in nsIDocShell docShell);
+
+ /**
+ * If this is a content principal, return a copy with different
+ * origin attributes.
+ */
+ [implicit_jscontext]
+ nsIPrincipal principalWithOA(in nsIPrincipal principal,
+ in jsval originAttributes);
+
+ /**
+ * Returns a principal whose origin is composed of |uri| and |originAttributes|.
+ * See nsIPrincipal.idl for a description of origin attributes, and
+ * ChromeUtils.webidl for a list of origin attributes and their defaults.
+ */
+ [implicit_jscontext]
+ nsIPrincipal createContentPrincipal(in nsIURI uri, in jsval originAttributes);
+
+ /**
+ * Returns a principal whose origin is the one we pass in.
+ * See nsIPrincipal.idl for a description of origin attributes, and
+ * ChromeUtils.webidl for a list of origin attributes and their defaults.
+ */
+ nsIPrincipal createContentPrincipalFromOrigin(in ACString origin);
+
+ /**
+ * Takes a principal and returns a string representation of it or a nullptr if it can't be serialized.
+ * Example output: `{"1": {"0": "https://mozilla.com", "2": "^privateBrowsingId=1"}}`
+ */
+ ACString principalToJSON(in nsIPrincipal principal);
+
+ /**
+ * Takes a string of the following format:
+ * `{"1": {"0": "https://mozilla.com", "2": "^privateBrowsingId=1"}}`
+ * and turns it into a principal or a nullptr on error.
+ */
+ nsIPrincipal JSONToPrincipal(in ACString json);
+
+ /**
+ * Returns a unique nonce principal with |originAttributes|.
+ * See nsIPrincipal.idl for a description of origin attributes, and
+ * ChromeUtils.webidl for a list of origin attributes and their defaults.
+ */
+ [implicit_jscontext]
+ nsIPrincipal createNullPrincipal(in jsval originAttributes);
+
+ /**
+ * Returns OK if aSourceURI and target have the same "origin"
+ * (scheme, host, and port).
+ * ReportError flag suppresses error reports for functions that
+ * don't need reporting.
+ * FromPrivateWindow indicates whether the error occurs in a private
+ * window or not.
+ */
+ void checkSameOriginURI(in nsIURI aSourceURI,
+ in nsIURI aTargetURI,
+ in boolean reportError,
+ in boolean fromPrivateWindow);
+
+ /**
+ * Get the principal for the given channel. This will typically be the
+ * channel owner if there is one, and the content principal for the
+ * channel's URI otherwise. aChannel must not be null.
+ */
+ nsIPrincipal getChannelResultPrincipal(in nsIChannel aChannel);
+
+ /**
+ * Get the storage principal for the given channel. This is basically the
+ * same of getChannelResultPrincipal() execept for trackers, where we
+ * return a principal with a different OriginAttributes.
+ */
+ nsIPrincipal getChannelResultStoragePrincipal(in nsIChannel aChannel);
+
+ /**
+ * This method returns 2 principals from a nsIChannel:
+ * - aPrincipal is the regular principal.
+ * - aPartitionedPrincipal is aPrincipal plus an isolation key in its
+ * originAttributes.
+ * See more in StoragePrincipalHelper.h
+ */
+ void getChannelResultPrincipals(in nsIChannel aChannel,
+ out nsIPrincipal aPrincipal,
+ out nsIPrincipal aPartitionedPrincipal);
+
+ /**
+ * Temporary API until bug 1220687 is fixed.
+ *
+ * Returns the same value as getChannelResultPrincipal, but ignoring
+ * sandboxing. Specifically, if sandboxing would have prevented the
+ * channel's triggering principal from being returned by
+ * getChannelResultPrincipal, the triggering principal will be returned
+ * by this method.
+ *
+ * Note that this method only ignores sandboxing of the channel in
+ * question, it does not ignore sandboxing of any channels further up a
+ * document chain. The triggering principal itself may still be the null
+ * principal due to sandboxing further up a document chain. In that regard
+ * the ignoring of sandboxing is limited.
+ */
+ [noscript, nostdcall]
+ nsIPrincipal getChannelResultPrincipalIfNotSandboxed(in nsIChannel aChannel);
+
+ /**
+ * Get the content principal for the channel's URI.
+ * aChannel must not be null.
+ */
+ nsIPrincipal getChannelURIPrincipal(in nsIChannel aChannel);
+
+ const unsigned long DEFAULT_USER_CONTEXT_ID = 0;
+
+ const unsigned long DEFAULT_PRIVATE_BROWSING_ID = 0;
+
+ /**
+ * Per-domain controls to enable and disable script. This system is designed
+ * to be used by at most one consumer, and enforces this with its semantics.
+ *
+ * Initially, domainPolicyActive is false. When activateDomainPolicy() is
+ * invoked, domainPolicyActive becomes true, and subsequent calls to
+ * activateDomainPolicy() will fail until deactivate() is invoked on the
+ * nsIDomainPolicy returned from activateDomainPolicy(). At this point,
+ * domainPolicyActive becomes false again, and a new consumer may acquire
+ * control of the system by invoking activateDomainPolicy().
+ */
+ nsIDomainPolicy activateDomainPolicy();
+ readonly attribute boolean domainPolicyActive;
+
+ /**
+ * Only the parent process can directly access domain policies, child
+ * processes only have a read-only mirror to the one in the parent.
+ * For child processes the mirror is updated via messages
+ * and ContentChild will hold the DomainPolicy by calling
+ * ActivateDomainPolicyInternal directly. New consumer to this
+ * function should not be addded.
+ */
+ [noscript] nsIDomainPolicy activateDomainPolicyInternal();
+
+ /**
+ * This function is for internal use only. Every time a child process is spawned, we
+ * must clone any active domain policies in the parent to the new child.
+ */
+ [noscript, notxpcom] void cloneDomainPolicy(in DomainPolicyClonePtr aClone);
+
+ /**
+ * Query mechanism for the above policy.
+ *
+ * If domainPolicyEnabled is false, this simply returns the current value
+ * of javascript.enabled. Otherwise, it returns the same value, but taking
+ * the various blocklist/allowlist exceptions into account.
+ */
+ bool policyAllowsScript(in nsIURI aDomain);
+};
+
+%{C++
+#define NS_SCRIPTSECURITYMANAGER_CONTRACTID "@mozilla.org/scriptsecuritymanager;1"
+%}