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Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | comm/mailnews/base/src/nsMsgContentPolicy.cpp | 928 |
1 files changed, 928 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/comm/mailnews/base/src/nsMsgContentPolicy.cpp b/comm/mailnews/base/src/nsMsgContentPolicy.cpp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6494732cad --- /dev/null +++ b/comm/mailnews/base/src/nsMsgContentPolicy.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,928 @@ +/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +#include "nsMsgContentPolicy.h" +#include "nsIMsgMailSession.h" +#include "nsIPermissionManager.h" +#include "nsIPrefService.h" +#include "nsIPrefBranch.h" +#include "nsIAbManager.h" +#include "nsIAbDirectory.h" +#include "nsIAbCard.h" +#include "nsIMsgWindow.h" +#include "nsIMsgHdr.h" +#include "nsIEncryptedSMIMEURIsSrvc.h" +#include "nsNetUtil.h" +#include "nsIMsgComposeService.h" +#include "nsIDocShellTreeItem.h" +#include "nsIWebNavigation.h" +#include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h" +#include "nsFrameLoaderOwner.h" +#include "nsFrameLoader.h" +#include "nsMsgUtils.h" +#include "nsThreadUtils.h" +#include "mozilla/mailnews/MimeHeaderParser.h" +#include "mozilla/dom/HTMLImageElement.h" +#include "nsINntpUrl.h" +#include "nsILoadInfo.h" +#include "nsSandboxFlags.h" +#include "nsQueryObject.h" +#include "mozilla/dom/WindowGlobalParent.h" +#include "mozilla/SyncRunnable.h" +#include "nsIObserverService.h" + +static const char kBlockRemoteImages[] = + "mailnews.message_display.disable_remote_image"; +static const char kTrustedDomains[] = "mail.trusteddomains"; + +using namespace mozilla; +using namespace mozilla::mailnews; + +// Per message headder flags to keep track of whether the user is allowing +// remote content for a particular message. if you change or add more values to +// these constants, be sure to modify the corresponding definitions in +// mailWindowOverlay.js +#define kNoRemoteContentPolicy 0 +#define kBlockRemoteContent 1 +#define kAllowRemoteContent 2 + +NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsMsgContentPolicy, nsIContentPolicy, nsIMsgContentPolicy, + nsIObserver, nsISupportsWeakReference) + +nsMsgContentPolicy::nsMsgContentPolicy() { mBlockRemoteImages = true; } + +nsMsgContentPolicy::~nsMsgContentPolicy() { + // hey, we are going away...clean up after ourself....unregister our observer + nsresult rv; + nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefInternal = + do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv); + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { + prefInternal->RemoveObserver(kBlockRemoteImages, this); + } +} + +nsresult nsMsgContentPolicy::Init() { + nsresult rv; + + // register ourself as an observer on the mail preference to block remote + // images + nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefInternal = + do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + prefInternal->AddObserver(kBlockRemoteImages, this, true); + + prefInternal->GetCharPref(kTrustedDomains, mTrustedMailDomains); + prefInternal->GetBoolPref(kBlockRemoteImages, &mBlockRemoteImages); + + // Grab a handle on the PermissionManager service for managing allowed remote + // content senders. + mPermissionManager = do_GetService(NS_PERMISSIONMANAGER_CONTRACTID, &rv); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + return NS_OK; +} + +/** + * @returns true if the sender referenced by aMsgHdr is explicitly allowed to + * load remote images according to the PermissionManager + */ +bool nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldAcceptRemoteContentForSender( + nsIMsgDBHdr* aMsgHdr) { + if (!aMsgHdr) return false; + + // extract the e-mail address from the msg hdr + nsCString author; + nsresult rv = aMsgHdr->GetAuthor(getter_Copies(author)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + nsCString emailAddress; + ExtractEmail(EncodedHeader(author), emailAddress); + if (emailAddress.IsEmpty()) return false; + + nsCOMPtr<nsIIOService> ios = + do_GetService("@mozilla.org/network/io-service;1", &rv); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> mailURI; + emailAddress.InsertLiteral("chrome://messenger/content/email=", 0); + rv = ios->NewURI(emailAddress, nullptr, nullptr, getter_AddRefs(mailURI)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + // check with permission manager + uint32_t permission = 0; + mozilla::OriginAttributes attrs; + RefPtr<mozilla::BasePrincipal> principal = + mozilla::BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(mailURI, attrs); + rv = mPermissionManager->TestPermissionFromPrincipal(principal, "image"_ns, + &permission); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + // Only return true if the permission manager has an explicit allow + return (permission == nsIPermissionManager::ALLOW_ACTION); +} + +/** + * Extract the host name from aContentLocation, and look it up in our list + * of trusted domains. + */ +bool nsMsgContentPolicy::IsTrustedDomain(nsIURI* aContentLocation) { + bool trustedDomain = false; + // get the host name of the server hosting the remote image + nsAutoCString host; + nsresult rv = aContentLocation->GetHost(host); + + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !mTrustedMailDomains.IsEmpty()) + trustedDomain = MsgHostDomainIsTrusted(host, mTrustedMailDomains); + + return trustedDomain; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldLoad(nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo, + const nsACString& aMimeGuess, + int16_t* aDecision) { + nsresult rv = NS_OK; + ExtContentPolicyType aContentType = aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType(); + nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> aRequestingContext; + if (aContentType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) + aRequestingContext = aLoadInfo->ContextForTopLevelLoad(); + else + aRequestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode(); + nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> loadingPrincipal = aLoadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal(); + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> aRequestingLocation; + if (loadingPrincipal) { + BasePrincipal::Cast(loadingPrincipal) + ->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(aRequestingLocation)); + } + + // The default decision at the start of the function is to accept the load. + // Once we have checked the content type and the requesting location, then + // we switch it to reject. + // + // Be very careful about returning error codes - if this method returns an + // NS_ERROR_*, any decision made here will be ignored, and the document could + // be accepted when we don't want it to be. + // + // In most cases if an error occurs, its something we didn't expect so we + // should be rejecting the document anyway. + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; + + NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aContentLocation); + +#ifdef DEBUG_MsgContentPolicy + fprintf(stderr, "aContentType: %d\naContentLocation = %s\n", aContentType, + aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()); + fprintf(stderr, "aRequestingContext is %s\n", + aRequestingContext ? "not null" : "null"); +#endif + +#ifndef MOZ_THUNDERBIRD + // Go find out if we are dealing with mailnews. Anything else + // isn't our concern and we accept content. + nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> rootDocShell; + rv = GetRootDocShellForContext(aRequestingContext, + getter_AddRefs(rootDocShell)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + // We only want to deal with mailnews + if (rootDocShell->GetAppType() != nsIDocShell::APP_TYPE_MAIL) return NS_OK; +#endif + + switch (aContentType) { + // Plugins (nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT) are blocked on document load. + case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT: + // At this point, we have no intention of supporting a different JS + // setting on a subdocument, so we don't worry about TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT + // here. + + if (NS_IsMainThread()) { + rv = SetDisableItemsOnMailNewsUrlDocshells(aContentLocation, aLoadInfo); + } else { + auto SetDisabling = [&, location = nsCOMPtr(aContentLocation), + loadInfo = nsCOMPtr(aLoadInfo)]() -> auto { + rv = SetDisableItemsOnMailNewsUrlDocshells(location, loadInfo); + }; + nsCOMPtr<nsIRunnable> task = + NS_NewRunnableFunction("SetDisabling", SetDisabling); + mozilla::SyncRunnable::DispatchToThread( + mozilla::GetMainThreadSerialEventTarget(), task); + } + // if something went wrong during the tweaking, reject this content + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + NS_WARNING("Failed to set disable items on docShells"); + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_TYPE; + return NS_OK; + } + break; + + case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT: + // We cannot block CSP reports. + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; + return NS_OK; + break; + + default: + break; + } + + // NOTE: Not using NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER because this is a legitimate case + // that can happen. Also keep in mind that the default policy used for a + // failure code is ACCEPT. + if (!aRequestingLocation) return NS_ERROR_INVALID_POINTER; + +#ifdef DEBUG_MsgContentPolicy + fprintf(stderr, "aRequestingLocation = %s\n", + aRequestingLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()); +#endif + + // If the requesting location is safe, accept the content location request. + if (IsSafeRequestingLocation(aRequestingLocation)) return rv; + + // Now default to reject so early returns via NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS + // cause content to be rejected. + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST; + + // We want to establish the following: + // \--------\ requester | | | + // content \------------\ | | | + // requested \| mail message | news message | http(s)/data etc. + // -------------------------+---------------+--------------+------------------ + // mail message content | load if same | don't load | don't load + // mailbox, imap, JsAccount | message (1) | (2) | (3) + // -------------------------+---------------+--------------+------------------ + // news message | don't load (4)| load (5) | load (6) + // -------------------------+---------------+--------------+------------------ + // http(s)/data, etc. | (default) | (default) | (default) + // -------------------------+---------------+--------------+------------------ + nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgMessageUrl> contentURL(do_QueryInterface(aContentLocation)); + if (contentURL) { + nsCOMPtr<nsINntpUrl> contentNntpURL(do_QueryInterface(aContentLocation)); + if (!contentNntpURL) { + // Mail message (mailbox, imap or JsAccount) content requested, for + // example a message part, like an image: To load mail message content the + // requester must have the same "normalized" principal. This is basically + // a "same origin" test, it protects against cross-loading of mail message + // content from other mail or news messages. + nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgMessageUrl> requestURL( + do_QueryInterface(aRequestingLocation)); + // If the request URL is not also a message URL, then we don't accept. + if (requestURL) { + nsCString contentPrincipalSpec, requestPrincipalSpec; + nsresult rv1 = contentURL->GetNormalizedSpec(contentPrincipalSpec); + nsresult rv2 = requestURL->GetNormalizedSpec(requestPrincipalSpec); + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv1) && NS_SUCCEEDED(rv2) && + contentPrincipalSpec.Equals(requestPrincipalSpec)) + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; // (1) + } + return NS_OK; // (2) and (3) + } + + // News message content requested. Don't accept request coming + // from a mail message since it would access the news server. + nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgMessageUrl> requestURL( + do_QueryInterface(aRequestingLocation)); + if (requestURL) { + nsCOMPtr<nsINntpUrl> requestNntpURL( + do_QueryInterface(aRequestingLocation)); + if (!requestNntpURL) return NS_OK; // (4) + } + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; // (5) and (6) + return NS_OK; + } + + // If exposed protocol not covered by the test above or protocol that has been + // specifically exposed by an add-on, or is a chrome url, then allow the load. + if (IsExposedProtocol(aContentLocation)) { + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; + return NS_OK; + } + + // Never load unexposed protocols except for web protocols and file. + // Protocols like ftp are always blocked. + if (ShouldBlockUnexposedProtocol(aContentLocation)) return NS_OK; + + // Mailnews URIs are not loaded in child processes, so I think that beyond + // here, if we're in a child process, the decision will always be accept. + // + // targetContext->Canonical does not work in a child process, so we can't + // really move on anyway. + if (!XRE_IsParentProcess()) { + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; + return NS_OK; + } + + // Find out the URI that originally initiated the set of requests for this + // context. + RefPtr<mozilla::dom::BrowsingContext> targetContext; + rv = aLoadInfo->GetTargetBrowsingContext(getter_AddRefs(targetContext)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_OK); + + if (!targetContext) { + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; + return NS_OK; + } + + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> originatorLocation; + dom::CanonicalBrowsingContext* cbc = targetContext->Canonical(); + if (cbc) { + dom::WindowGlobalParent* wgp = cbc->GetCurrentWindowGlobal(); + if (wgp) { + originatorLocation = wgp->GetDocumentURI(); + } + } + if (!originatorLocation) { + return NS_OK; + } + +#ifdef DEBUG_MsgContentPolicy + fprintf(stderr, "originatorLocation = %s\n", + originatorLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()); +#endif + + // Don't load remote content for encrypted messages. + nsCOMPtr<nsIEncryptedSMIMEURIsService> encryptedURIService = do_GetService( + "@mozilla.org/messenger-smime/smime-encrypted-uris-service;1", &rv); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + bool isEncrypted; + rv = encryptedURIService->IsEncrypted(aRequestingLocation->GetSpecOrDefault(), + &isEncrypted); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + if (isEncrypted) { + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST; + NotifyContentWasBlocked(targetContext->Id(), aContentLocation); + return NS_OK; + } + + // If we are allowing all remote content... + if (!mBlockRemoteImages) { + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; + return NS_OK; + } + + uint32_t permission; + mozilla::OriginAttributes attrs; + RefPtr<mozilla::BasePrincipal> principal = + mozilla::BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(aContentLocation, attrs); + mPermissionManager->TestPermissionFromPrincipal(principal, "image"_ns, + &permission); + switch (permission) { + case nsIPermissionManager::UNKNOWN_ACTION: { + // No exception was found for this location. + break; + } + case nsIPermissionManager::ALLOW_ACTION: { + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; + return NS_OK; + } + case nsIPermissionManager::DENY_ACTION: { + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST; + return NS_OK; + } + } + + // Handle compose windows separately from mail. Work out if we're in a compose + // window or not. + nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgCompose> msgCompose = + GetMsgComposeForBrowsingContext(targetContext); + if (msgCompose) { + ComposeShouldLoad(msgCompose, aRequestingContext, originatorLocation, + aContentLocation, aDecision); + return NS_OK; + } + + // Allow content when using a remote page. + bool isHttp; + bool isHttps; + rv = originatorLocation->SchemeIs("http", &isHttp); + nsresult rv2 = originatorLocation->SchemeIs("https", &isHttps); + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && NS_SUCCEEDED(rv2) && (isHttp || isHttps)) { + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; + return NS_OK; + } + + // The default decision is still to reject. + ShouldAcceptContentForPotentialMsg(targetContext->Id(), aRequestingLocation, + aContentLocation, aDecision); + return NS_OK; +} + +/** + * Determines if the requesting location is a safe one, i.e. its under the + * app/user's control - so file, about, chrome etc. + */ +bool nsMsgContentPolicy::IsSafeRequestingLocation(nsIURI* aRequestingLocation) { + if (!aRequestingLocation) return false; + + // If aRequestingLocation is one of chrome, resource, file or view-source, + // allow aContentLocation to load. + bool isChrome; + bool isRes; + bool isFile; + bool isViewSource; + + nsresult rv = aRequestingLocation->SchemeIs("chrome", &isChrome); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + rv = aRequestingLocation->SchemeIs("resource", &isRes); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + rv = aRequestingLocation->SchemeIs("file", &isFile); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + rv = aRequestingLocation->SchemeIs("view-source", &isViewSource); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + if (isChrome || isRes || isFile || isViewSource) return true; + + // Only allow about: to load anything if the requesting location is not the + // special about:blank one. + bool isAbout; + rv = aRequestingLocation->SchemeIs("about", &isAbout); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + if (!isAbout) return false; + + nsCString fullSpec; + rv = aRequestingLocation->GetSpec(fullSpec); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + return !fullSpec.EqualsLiteral("about:blank"); +} + +/** + * Determines if the content location is a scheme that we're willing to expose + * for unlimited loading of content. + */ +bool nsMsgContentPolicy::IsExposedProtocol(nsIURI* aContentLocation) { + nsAutoCString contentScheme; + nsresult rv = aContentLocation->GetScheme(contentScheme); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + // Check some exposed protocols. Not all protocols in the list of + // network.protocol-handler.expose.* prefs in all-thunderbird.js are + // admitted purely based on their scheme. + // news, snews, nntp, imap and mailbox are checked before the call + // to this function by matching content location and requesting location. + if (contentScheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("mailto")) return true; + + if (contentScheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("about")) { + // We want to allow about pages to load content freely. But not about:blank. + nsAutoCString fullSpec; + rv = aContentLocation->GetSpec(fullSpec); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + if (fullSpec.EqualsLiteral("about:blank")) { + return false; + } + return true; + } + + // check if customized exposed scheme + if (mCustomExposedProtocols.Contains(contentScheme)) return true; + + bool isChrome; + rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("chrome", &isChrome); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + bool isRes; + rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("resource", &isRes); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + bool isData; + rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("data", &isData); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + bool isMozExtension; + rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("moz-extension", &isMozExtension); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); + + return isChrome || isRes || isData || isMozExtension; +} + +/** + * We block most unexposed protocols that access remote data + * - apart from web protocols, and file. + */ +bool nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldBlockUnexposedProtocol( + nsIURI* aContentLocation) { + // Error condition - we must return true so that we block. + + // about:blank is "web", it should not be blocked. + nsAutoCString fullSpec; + nsresult rv = aContentLocation->GetSpec(fullSpec); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true); + if (fullSpec.EqualsLiteral("about:blank")) { + return false; + } + + bool isHttp; + rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("http", &isHttp); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true); + + bool isHttps; + rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("https", &isHttps); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true); + + bool isWs; // websocket + rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("ws", &isWs); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true); + + bool isWss; // secure websocket + rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("wss", &isWss); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true); + + bool isBlob; + rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("blob", &isBlob); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true); + + bool isFile; + rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("file", &isFile); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true); + + return !isHttp && !isHttps && !isWs && !isWss && !isBlob && !isFile; +} + +/** + * The default for this function will be to reject the content request. + * When determining if to allow the request for a given msg hdr, the function + * will go through the list of remote content blocking criteria: + * + * #1 Allow if there is a db header for a manual override. + * #2 Allow if the message is in an RSS folder. + * #3 Allow if the domain for the remote image in our white list. + * #4 Allow if the author has been specifically white listed. + */ +int16_t nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldAcceptRemoteContentForMsgHdr( + nsIMsgDBHdr* aMsgHdr, nsIURI* aRequestingLocation, + nsIURI* aContentLocation) { + if (!aMsgHdr) return static_cast<int16_t>(nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST); + + // Case #1, check the db hdr for the remote content policy on this particular + // message. + uint32_t remoteContentPolicy = kNoRemoteContentPolicy; + aMsgHdr->GetUint32Property("remoteContentPolicy", &remoteContentPolicy); + + // Case #2, check if the message is in an RSS folder + bool isRSS = false; + IsRSSArticle(aRequestingLocation, &isRSS); + + // Case #3, the domain for the remote image is in our white list + bool trustedDomain = IsTrustedDomain(aContentLocation); + + // Case 4 means looking up items in the permissions database. So if + // either of the two previous items means we load the data, just do it. + if (isRSS || remoteContentPolicy == kAllowRemoteContent || trustedDomain) + return nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; + + // Case #4, author is in our white list.. + bool allowForSender = ShouldAcceptRemoteContentForSender(aMsgHdr); + + int16_t result = allowForSender + ? static_cast<int16_t>(nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT) + : static_cast<int16_t>(nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST); + + // kNoRemoteContentPolicy means we have never set a value on the message + if (result == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST && !remoteContentPolicy) + aMsgHdr->SetUint32Property("remoteContentPolicy", kBlockRemoteContent); + + return result; +} + +class RemoteContentNotifierEvent : public mozilla::Runnable { + public: + RemoteContentNotifierEvent(uint64_t aBrowsingContextId, nsIURI* aContentURI) + : mozilla::Runnable("RemoteContentNotifierEvent"), + mBrowsingContextId(aBrowsingContextId), + mContentURI(aContentURI) {} + + NS_IMETHOD Run() { + nsAutoString data; + data.AppendInt(mBrowsingContextId); + nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> observerService = + mozilla::services::GetObserverService(); + observerService->NotifyObservers(mContentURI, "remote-content-blocked", + data.get()); + return NS_OK; + } + + private: + uint64_t mBrowsingContextId; + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> mContentURI; +}; + +/** + * This function is used to show a blocked remote content notification. + */ +void nsMsgContentPolicy::NotifyContentWasBlocked(uint64_t aBrowsingContextId, + nsIURI* aContentLocation) { + // Post this as an event because it can cause dom mutations, and we + // get called at a bad time to be causing dom mutations. + NS_DispatchToCurrentThread( + new RemoteContentNotifierEvent(aBrowsingContextId, aContentLocation)); +} + +/** + * This function is used to determine if we allow content for a remote message. + * If we reject loading remote content, then we'll inform the message window + * that this message has remote content (and hence we are not loading it). + * + * See ShouldAcceptRemoteContentForMsgHdr for the actual decisions that + * determine if we are going to allow remote content. + */ +void nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldAcceptContentForPotentialMsg( + uint64_t aBrowsingContextId, nsIURI* aRequestingLocation, + nsIURI* aContentLocation, int16_t* aDecision) { + NS_ASSERTION( + *aDecision == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST, + "AllowContentForPotentialMessage expects default decision to be reject!"); + + // Is it a mailnews url? + nsresult rv; + nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgMessageUrl> msgUrl( + do_QueryInterface(aRequestingLocation, &rv)); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + // It isn't a mailnews url - so we accept the load here, and let other + // content policies make the decision if we should be loading it or not. + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; + return; + } + + nsCString resourceURI; + rv = msgUrl->GetUri(resourceURI); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(rv); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgDBHdr> msgHdr; + rv = GetMsgDBHdrFromURI(resourceURI, getter_AddRefs(msgHdr)); + + // Get a decision on whether or not to allow remote content for this message + // header. + *aDecision = ShouldAcceptRemoteContentForMsgHdr(msgHdr, aRequestingLocation, + aContentLocation); + + // If we're not allowing the remote content, tell the nsIMsgWindow loading + // this url that this is the case, so that the UI knows to show the remote + // content header bar, so the user can override if they wish. + if (*aDecision == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST) { + NotifyContentWasBlocked(aBrowsingContextId, aContentLocation); + } +} + +/** + * Content policy logic for compose windows + */ +void nsMsgContentPolicy::ComposeShouldLoad(nsIMsgCompose* aMsgCompose, + nsISupports* aRequestingContext, + nsIURI* aOriginatorLocation, + nsIURI* aContentLocation, + int16_t* aDecision) { + NS_ASSERTION(*aDecision == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST, + "ComposeShouldLoad expects default decision to be reject!"); + + nsCString originalMsgURI; + nsresult rv = aMsgCompose->GetOriginalMsgURI(originalMsgURI); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(rv); + + if (!originalMsgURI.IsEmpty()) { + nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgDBHdr> msgHdr; + rv = GetMsgDBHdrFromURI(originalMsgURI, getter_AddRefs(msgHdr)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(rv); + *aDecision = + ShouldAcceptRemoteContentForMsgHdr(msgHdr, nullptr, aContentLocation); + + if (!aOriginatorLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().EqualsLiteral( + "about:blank?compose")) { + return; + } + } + + // We want to allow the user to add remote content, but do that only when + // the allowRemoteContent was set. This way quoted remoted content won't + // automatically load, but e.g. pasted content will load because the UI + // code toggles the flag. + nsCOMPtr<mozilla::dom::Element> element = + do_QueryInterface(aRequestingContext); + RefPtr<mozilla::dom::HTMLImageElement> image = + mozilla::dom::HTMLImageElement::FromNodeOrNull(element); + if (image) { + // Special case image elements. + bool allowRemoteContent = false; + aMsgCompose->GetAllowRemoteContent(&allowRemoteContent); + if (allowRemoteContent) { + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; + return; + } + } +} + +already_AddRefed<nsIMsgCompose> +nsMsgContentPolicy::GetMsgComposeForBrowsingContext( + mozilla::dom::BrowsingContext* aBrowsingContext) { + nsresult rv; + + nsIDocShell* shell = aBrowsingContext->GetDocShell(); + if (!shell) return nullptr; + nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> docShellTreeItem(shell); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> rootItem; + rv = docShellTreeItem->GetInProcessSameTypeRootTreeItem( + getter_AddRefs(rootItem)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, nullptr); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell(do_QueryInterface(rootItem, &rv)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, nullptr); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgComposeService> composeService( + do_GetService("@mozilla.org/messengercompose;1", &rv)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, nullptr); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgCompose> msgCompose; + // Don't bother checking rv, as GetMsgComposeForDocShell returns + // NS_ERROR_FAILURE for not found. + composeService->GetMsgComposeForDocShell(docShell, + getter_AddRefs(msgCompose)); + return msgCompose.forget(); +} + +nsresult nsMsgContentPolicy::SetDisableItemsOnMailNewsUrlDocshells( + nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) { + // XXX if this class changes so that this method can be called from + // ShouldProcess, and if it's possible for this to be null when called from + // ShouldLoad, but not in the corresponding ShouldProcess call, + // we need to re-think the assumptions underlying this code. + + NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aContentLocation); + NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aLoadInfo); + + RefPtr<mozilla::dom::BrowsingContext> browsingContext = + aLoadInfo->GetTargetBrowsingContext(); + if (!browsingContext) { + return NS_OK; + } + + // We're only worried about policy settings in content docshells. + if (!browsingContext->IsContent()) { + return NS_OK; + } + + nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell = browsingContext->GetDocShell(); + if (!docShell) { + // If there's no docshell to get to, there's nowhere for the JavaScript to + // run, so we're already safe and don't need to disable anything. + return NS_OK; + } + + // Ensure starting off unsandboxed. We sandbox later if needed. + MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(browsingContext->SetSandboxFlags(SANDBOXED_NONE)); + + nsresult rv; + bool isAllowedContent = !ShouldBlockUnexposedProtocol(aContentLocation); + nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgMessageUrl> msgUrl = do_QueryInterface(aContentLocation); + if (!msgUrl && !isAllowedContent) { + // If it's not a mailnews url or allowed content url (http[s]|file) then + // bail; otherwise set whether JavaScript is allowed. + return NS_OK; + } + + if (!isAllowedContent) { + // Disable JavaScript on message URLs. + rv = browsingContext->SetAllowJavascript(false); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + rv = browsingContext->SetAllowContentRetargetingOnChildren(false); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + // NOTE! Do not set single sandboxing flags only. Sandboxing - when used - + // starts off with all things sandboxed, and individual sandbox keywords + // will *allow* the specific feature. + // Disabling by setting single flags without starting off with all things + // sandboxed would the normal assumptions about sandboxing. + // The flags - contrary to the keywords - *prevent* a given feature. + uint32_t sandboxFlags = SANDBOX_ALL_FLAGS; + + // Do not block links with target attribute from opening (at all). + // xref bug 421310 - we would like to prevent using target, but *handle* + // links like the target wasn't there. + sandboxFlags &= ~SANDBOXED_AUXILIARY_NAVIGATION; + + // For some unexplicable reason, when SANDBOXED_ORIGIN is in affect, then + // images will not work with test --verify. So unset it. + sandboxFlags &= ~SANDBOXED_ORIGIN; + + // Having both SANDBOXED_TOPLEVEL_NAVIGATION and + // SANDBOXED_TOPLEVEL_NAVIGATION_USER_ACTIVATION will generate a warning, + // see BothAllowTopNavigationAndUserActivationPresent. So unset it. + sandboxFlags &= ~SANDBOXED_TOPLEVEL_NAVIGATION_USER_ACTIVATION; + + rv = browsingContext->SetSandboxFlags(sandboxFlags); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + } else { + // JavaScript is allowed on non-message URLs. + rv = browsingContext->SetAllowJavascript(true); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + rv = browsingContext->SetAllowContentRetargetingOnChildren(true); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + } + + rv = docShell->SetAllowPlugins(false); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + return NS_OK; +} + +/** + * Gets the root docshell from a requesting context. + */ +nsresult nsMsgContentPolicy::GetRootDocShellForContext( + nsISupports* aRequestingContext, nsIDocShell** aDocShell) { + NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aRequestingContext); + nsresult rv; + + nsIDocShell* shell = NS_CP_GetDocShellFromContext(aRequestingContext); + NS_ENSURE_TRUE(shell, NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER); + nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> docshellTreeItem(shell); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> rootItem; + rv = docshellTreeItem->GetInProcessRootTreeItem(getter_AddRefs(rootItem)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + return CallQueryInterface(rootItem, aDocShell); +} + +/** + * Gets the originating URI that started off a set of requests, accounting + * for multiple iframes. + * + * Navigates up the docshell tree from aRequestingContext and finds the + * highest parent with the same type docshell as aRequestingContext, then + * returns the URI associated with that docshell. + */ +nsresult nsMsgContentPolicy::GetOriginatingURIForContext( + nsISupports* aRequestingContext, nsIURI** aURI) { + NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aRequestingContext); + nsresult rv; + + nsIDocShell* shell = NS_CP_GetDocShellFromContext(aRequestingContext); + if (!shell) { + *aURI = nullptr; + return NS_OK; + } + nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> docshellTreeItem(shell); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> rootItem; + rv = docshellTreeItem->GetInProcessSameTypeRootTreeItem( + getter_AddRefs(rootItem)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + nsCOMPtr<nsIWebNavigation> webNavigation(do_QueryInterface(rootItem, &rv)); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + return webNavigation->GetCurrentURI(aURI); +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldProcess(nsIURI* aContentLocation, + nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo, + const nsACString& aMimeGuess, + int16_t* aDecision) { + // XXX Returning ACCEPT is presumably only a reasonable thing to do if we + // think that ShouldLoad is going to catch all possible cases (i.e. that + // everything we use to make decisions is going to be available at + // ShouldLoad time, and not only become available in time for ShouldProcess). + // Do we think that's actually the case? + *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP nsMsgContentPolicy::Observe(nsISupports* aSubject, + const char* aTopic, + const char16_t* aData) { + if (!strcmp(NS_PREFBRANCH_PREFCHANGE_TOPIC_ID, aTopic)) { + NS_LossyConvertUTF16toASCII pref(aData); + + nsresult rv; + + nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefBranchInt = do_QueryInterface(aSubject, &rv); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + if (pref.Equals(kBlockRemoteImages)) + prefBranchInt->GetBoolPref(kBlockRemoteImages, &mBlockRemoteImages); + } + + return NS_OK; +} + +/** + * Implementation of nsIMsgContentPolicy + * + */ +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsMsgContentPolicy::AddExposedProtocol(const nsACString& aScheme) { + if (mCustomExposedProtocols.Contains(nsCString(aScheme))) return NS_OK; + + mCustomExposedProtocols.AppendElement(aScheme); + + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsMsgContentPolicy::RemoveExposedProtocol(const nsACString& aScheme) { + mCustomExposedProtocols.RemoveElement(nsCString(aScheme)); + + return NS_OK; +} |