1 files changed, 138 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/comm/third_party/botan/src/lib/pubkey/xmss/xmss_verification_operation.cpp b/comm/third_party/botan/src/lib/pubkey/xmss/xmss_verification_operation.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b9442aa03d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/comm/third_party/botan/src/lib/pubkey/xmss/xmss_verification_operation.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+/*
+ * XMSS Verification Operation
+ * Provides signature verification capabilities for Extended Hash-Based
+ * Signatures (XMSS).
+ *
+ * (C) 2016,2017 Matthias Gierlings
+ *
+ * Botan is released under the Simplified BSD License (see license.txt)
+ **/
+
+#include <botan/internal/xmss_verification_operation.h>
+#include <botan/internal/xmss_common_ops.h>
+#include <botan/internal/xmss_tools.h>
+#include <array>
+
+namespace Botan {
+
+XMSS_Verification_Operation::XMSS_Verification_Operation(
+   const XMSS_PublicKey& public_key) :
+   m_pub_key(public_key),
+   m_hash(public_key.xmss_hash_function()),
+   m_msg_buf(0)
+   {
+   }
+
+secure_vector<uint8_t>
+XMSS_Verification_Operation::root_from_signature(const XMSS_Signature& sig,
+      const secure_vector<uint8_t>& msg,
+      XMSS_Address& adrs,
+      const secure_vector<uint8_t>& seed)
+   {
+   const auto params = m_pub_key.xmss_parameters();
+
+   const uint32_t next_index = static_cast<uint32_t>(sig.unused_leaf_index());
+   adrs.set_type(XMSS_Address::Type::OTS_Hash_Address);
+   adrs.set_ots_address(next_index);
+
+   XMSS_WOTS_PublicKey pub_key_ots(m_pub_key.wots_parameters().oid(),
+                                   msg,
+                                   sig.tree().ots_signature(),
+                                   adrs,
+                                   seed);
+
+   adrs.set_type(XMSS_Address::Type::LTree_Address);
+   adrs.set_ltree_address(next_index);
+
+   std::array<secure_vector<uint8_t>, 2> node;
+   XMSS_Common_Ops::create_l_tree(node[0], pub_key_ots, adrs, seed, m_hash, params);
+
+   adrs.set_type(XMSS_Address::Type::Hash_Tree_Address);
+   adrs.set_tree_index(next_index);
+
+   for(size_t k = 0; k < params.tree_height(); k++)
+      {
+      adrs.set_tree_height(static_cast<uint32_t>(k));
+      if(((next_index / (static_cast<size_t>(1) << k)) & 0x01) == 0)
+         {
+         adrs.set_tree_index(adrs.get_tree_index() >> 1);
+         XMSS_Common_Ops::randomize_tree_hash(node[1],
+                                              node[0],
+                                              sig.tree().authentication_path()[k],
+                                              adrs,
+                                              seed,
+                                              m_hash,
+                                              params);
+         }
+      else
+         {
+         adrs.set_tree_index((adrs.get_tree_index() - 1) >> 1);
+         XMSS_Common_Ops::randomize_tree_hash(node[1],
+                                              sig.tree().authentication_path()[k],
+                                              node[0],
+                                              adrs,
+                                              seed,
+                                              m_hash,
+                                              params);
+         }
+      node[0] = node[1];
+      }
+   return node[0];
+   }
+
+bool
+XMSS_Verification_Operation::verify(const XMSS_Signature& sig,
+                                    const secure_vector<uint8_t>& msg,
+                                    const XMSS_PublicKey& public_key)
+   {
+   XMSS_Address adrs;
+   secure_vector<uint8_t> index_bytes;
+   XMSS_Tools::concat(index_bytes,
+                      sig.unused_leaf_index(),
+                      m_pub_key.xmss_parameters().element_size());
+   secure_vector<uint8_t> msg_digest =
+      m_hash.h_msg(sig.randomness(),
+                   public_key.root(),
+                   index_bytes,
+                   msg);
+
+   secure_vector<uint8_t> node = root_from_signature(sig,
+                                 msg_digest,
+                                 adrs,
+                                 public_key.public_seed());
+
+   return (node == public_key.root());
+   }
+
+// FIXME: XMSS signature verification requires the "randomness" parameter out
+// of the XMSS signature, which is part of the prefix that is hashed before
+// msg. Since the signature is unknown till sign() is called all message
+// content has to be buffered. For large messages this can be inconvenient or
+// impossible.
+// Possible solution: Change PK_Ops::Verification interface to take the
+// signature as constructor argument, make sign a parameterless member call.
+void XMSS_Verification_Operation::update(const uint8_t msg[], size_t msg_len)
+   {
+   std::copy(msg, msg + msg_len, std::back_inserter(m_msg_buf));
+   }
+
+bool XMSS_Verification_Operation::is_valid_signature(const uint8_t sig[],
+      size_t sig_len)
+   {
+   try
+      {
+      XMSS_Signature signature(m_pub_key.xmss_parameters().oid(),
+                               secure_vector<uint8_t>(sig, sig + sig_len));
+      bool result = verify(signature, m_msg_buf, m_pub_key);
+      m_msg_buf.clear();
+      return result;
+      }
+   catch(...)
+      {
+      m_msg_buf.clear();
+      return false;
+      }
+   }
+
+}
+