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Diffstat (limited to 'comm/third_party/libgcrypt/cipher/rijndael-ssse3-amd64-asm.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | comm/third_party/libgcrypt/cipher/rijndael-ssse3-amd64-asm.S | 874 |
1 files changed, 874 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/comm/third_party/libgcrypt/cipher/rijndael-ssse3-amd64-asm.S b/comm/third_party/libgcrypt/cipher/rijndael-ssse3-amd64-asm.S new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..8124eb2198 --- /dev/null +++ b/comm/third_party/libgcrypt/cipher/rijndael-ssse3-amd64-asm.S @@ -0,0 +1,874 @@ +/* SSSE3 vector permutation AES for Libgcrypt + * Copyright (C) 2014-2017 Jussi Kivilinna <jussi.kivilinna@iki.fi> + * + * This file is part of Libgcrypt. + * + * Libgcrypt is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of + * the License, or (at your option) any later version. + * + * Libgcrypt is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU Lesser General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License along with this program; if not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>. + * + * + * The code is based on the public domain library libvpaes version 0.5 + * available at http://crypto.stanford.edu/vpaes/ and which carries + * this notice: + * + * libvpaes: constant-time SSSE3 AES encryption and decryption. + * version 0.5 + * + * By Mike Hamburg, Stanford University, 2009. Public domain. + * I wrote essentially all of this code. I did not write the test + * vectors; they are the NIST known answer tests. I hereby release all + * the code and documentation here that I wrote into the public domain. + * + * This is an implementation of AES following my paper, + * "Accelerating AES with Vector Permute Instructions + * CHES 2009; http://shiftleft.org/papers/vector_aes/ + */ + +#if defined(__x86_64__) +#include <config.h> +#if defined(HAVE_GCC_INLINE_ASM_SSSE3) && \ + (defined(HAVE_COMPATIBLE_GCC_AMD64_PLATFORM_AS) || \ + defined(HAVE_COMPATIBLE_GCC_WIN64_PLATFORM_AS)) + +#include "asm-common-amd64.h" + +.text + +## +## _gcry_aes_ssse3_enc_preload +## +ELF(.type _gcry_aes_ssse3_enc_preload,@function) +.globl _gcry_aes_ssse3_enc_preload +_gcry_aes_ssse3_enc_preload: + CFI_STARTPROC(); + ENTER_SYSV_FUNC_PARAMS_0_4 + lea .Laes_consts(%rip), %rax + movdqa (%rax), %xmm9 # 0F + movdqa .Lk_inv (%rax), %xmm10 # inv + movdqa .Lk_inv+16(%rax), %xmm11 # inva + movdqa .Lk_sb1 (%rax), %xmm13 # sb1u + movdqa .Lk_sb1+16(%rax), %xmm12 # sb1t + movdqa .Lk_sb2 (%rax), %xmm15 # sb2u + movdqa .Lk_sb2+16(%rax), %xmm14 # sb2t + EXIT_SYSV_FUNC + ret + CFI_ENDPROC(); +ELF(.size _gcry_aes_ssse3_enc_preload,.-_gcry_aes_ssse3_enc_preload) + +## +## _gcry_aes_ssse3_dec_preload +## +ELF(.type _gcry_aes_ssse3_dec_preload,@function) +.globl _gcry_aes_ssse3_dec_preload +_gcry_aes_ssse3_dec_preload: + CFI_STARTPROC(); + ENTER_SYSV_FUNC_PARAMS_0_4 + lea .Laes_consts(%rip), %rax + movdqa (%rax), %xmm9 # 0F + movdqa .Lk_inv (%rax), %xmm10 # inv + movdqa .Lk_inv+16(%rax), %xmm11 # inva + movdqa .Lk_dsb9 (%rax), %xmm13 # sb9u + movdqa .Lk_dsb9+16(%rax), %xmm12 # sb9t + movdqa .Lk_dsbd (%rax), %xmm15 # sbdu + movdqa .Lk_dsbb (%rax), %xmm14 # sbbu + movdqa .Lk_dsbe (%rax), %xmm8 # sbeu + EXIT_SYSV_FUNC + ret + CFI_ENDPROC(); +ELF(.size _gcry_aes_ssse3_dec_preload,.-_gcry_aes_ssse3_dec_preload) + +## +## Constant-time SSSE3 AES core implementation. +## +## By Mike Hamburg (Stanford University), 2009 +## Public domain. +## + +## +## _aes_encrypt_core +## +## AES-encrypt %xmm0. +## +## Inputs: +## %xmm0 = input +## %xmm9-%xmm15 as in .Laes_preheat +## (%rdi) = scheduled keys +## %rsi = nrounds +## +## Output in %xmm0 +## Clobbers %xmm1-%xmm4, %r9, %r11, %rax, %rcx, %rdx +## Preserves %xmm6 - %xmm7 so you get some local vectors +## +## +.align 16 +ELF(.type _gcry_aes_ssse3_encrypt_core,@function) +.globl _gcry_aes_ssse3_encrypt_core +_gcry_aes_ssse3_encrypt_core: +_aes_encrypt_core: + CFI_STARTPROC(); + ENTER_SYSV_FUNC_PARAMS_0_4 + mov %rdi, %rdx + leaq -1(%rsi), %rax + lea .Laes_consts(%rip), %rcx + leaq .Lk_mc_backward(%rcx), %rdi + mov $16, %rsi + movdqa .Lk_ipt (%rcx), %xmm2 # iptlo + movdqa %xmm9, %xmm1 + pandn %xmm0, %xmm1 + psrld $4, %xmm1 + pand %xmm9, %xmm0 + pshufb %xmm0, %xmm2 + movdqa .Lk_ipt+16(%rcx), %xmm0 # ipthi + pshufb %xmm1, %xmm0 + pxor (%rdx),%xmm2 + pxor %xmm2, %xmm0 + add $16, %rdx + jmp .Laes_entry + +.align 8 +.Laes_loop: + # middle of middle round + movdqa %xmm13, %xmm4 # 4 : sb1u + pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + pxor (%rdx), %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k + movdqa %xmm12, %xmm0 # 0 : sb1t + pshufb %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = sb1t + pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = A + movdqa %xmm15, %xmm4 # 4 : sb2u + pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sb2u + movdqa .Lk_mc_forward-.Lk_mc_backward(%rsi,%rdi), %xmm1 + movdqa %xmm14, %xmm2 # 2 : sb2t + pshufb %xmm3, %xmm2 # 2 = sb2t + pxor %xmm4, %xmm2 # 2 = 2A + movdqa %xmm0, %xmm3 # 3 = A + pshufb %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = B + pxor %xmm2, %xmm0 # 0 = 2A+B + pshufb (%rsi,%rdi), %xmm3 # 3 = D + lea 16(%esi),%esi # next mc + pxor %xmm0, %xmm3 # 3 = 2A+B+D + lea 16(%rdx),%rdx # next key + pshufb %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = 2B+C + pxor %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = 2A+3B+C+D + and $48, %rsi # ... mod 4 + dec %rax # nr-- + +.Laes_entry: + # top of round + movdqa %xmm9, %xmm1 # 1 : i + pandn %xmm0, %xmm1 # 1 = i<<4 + psrld $4, %xmm1 # 1 = i + pand %xmm9, %xmm0 # 0 = k + movdqa %xmm11, %xmm2 # 2 : a/k + pshufb %xmm0, %xmm2 # 2 = a/k + pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = j + movdqa %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 : 1/i + pshufb %xmm1, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/i + pxor %xmm2, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k + movdqa %xmm10, %xmm4 # 4 : 1/j + pshufb %xmm0, %xmm4 # 4 = 1/j + pxor %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k + movdqa %xmm10, %xmm2 # 2 : 1/iak + pshufb %xmm3, %xmm2 # 2 = 1/iak + pxor %xmm0, %xmm2 # 2 = io + movdqa %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 : 1/jak + pshufb %xmm4, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/jak + pxor %xmm1, %xmm3 # 3 = jo + jnz .Laes_loop + + # middle of last round + movdqa .Lk_sbo(%rcx), %xmm4 # 3 : sbou + pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbou + pxor (%rdx), %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k + movdqa .Lk_sbo+16(%rcx), %xmm0 # 0 : sbot + pshufb %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = sb1t + pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = A + pshufb .Lk_sr(%rsi,%rcx), %xmm0 + EXIT_SYSV_FUNC + ret + CFI_ENDPROC(); +ELF(.size _aes_encrypt_core,.-_aes_encrypt_core) + +## +## Decryption core +## +## Same API as encryption core. +## +.align 16 +.globl _gcry_aes_ssse3_decrypt_core +ELF(.type _gcry_aes_ssse3_decrypt_core,@function) +_gcry_aes_ssse3_decrypt_core: +_aes_decrypt_core: + CFI_STARTPROC(); + ENTER_SYSV_FUNC_PARAMS_0_4 + mov %rdi, %rdx + lea .Laes_consts(%rip), %rcx + subl $1, %esi + movl %esi, %eax + shll $4, %esi + xorl $48, %esi + andl $48, %esi + movdqa .Lk_dipt (%rcx), %xmm2 # iptlo + movdqa %xmm9, %xmm1 + pandn %xmm0, %xmm1 + psrld $4, %xmm1 + pand %xmm9, %xmm0 + pshufb %xmm0, %xmm2 + movdqa .Lk_dipt+16(%rcx), %xmm0 # ipthi + pshufb %xmm1, %xmm0 + pxor (%rdx), %xmm2 + pxor %xmm2, %xmm0 + movdqa .Lk_mc_forward+48(%rcx), %xmm5 + lea 16(%rdx), %rdx + neg %rax + jmp .Laes_dec_entry + +.align 16 +.Laes_dec_loop: +## +## Inverse mix columns +## + movdqa %xmm13, %xmm4 # 4 : sb9u + pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sb9u + pxor (%rdx), %xmm4 + movdqa %xmm12, %xmm0 # 0 : sb9t + pshufb %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = sb9t + movdqa .Lk_dsbd+16(%rcx),%xmm1 # 1 : sbdt + pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = ch + lea 16(%rdx), %rdx # next round key + + pshufb %xmm5, %xmm0 # MC ch + movdqa %xmm15, %xmm4 # 4 : sbdu + pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbdu + pxor %xmm0, %xmm4 # 4 = ch + pshufb %xmm3, %xmm1 # 1 = sbdt + pxor %xmm4, %xmm1 # 1 = ch + + pshufb %xmm5, %xmm1 # MC ch + movdqa %xmm14, %xmm4 # 4 : sbbu + pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbbu + inc %rax # nr-- + pxor %xmm1, %xmm4 # 4 = ch + movdqa .Lk_dsbb+16(%rcx),%xmm0 # 0 : sbbt + pshufb %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = sbbt + pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = ch + + pshufb %xmm5, %xmm0 # MC ch + movdqa %xmm8, %xmm4 # 4 : sbeu + pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbeu + pshufd $0x93, %xmm5, %xmm5 + pxor %xmm0, %xmm4 # 4 = ch + movdqa .Lk_dsbe+16(%rcx),%xmm0 # 0 : sbet + pshufb %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = sbet + pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = ch + +.Laes_dec_entry: + # top of round + movdqa %xmm9, %xmm1 # 1 : i + pandn %xmm0, %xmm1 # 1 = i<<4 + psrld $4, %xmm1 # 1 = i + pand %xmm9, %xmm0 # 0 = k + movdqa %xmm11, %xmm2 # 2 : a/k + pshufb %xmm0, %xmm2 # 2 = a/k + pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = j + movdqa %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 : 1/i + pshufb %xmm1, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/i + pxor %xmm2, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k + movdqa %xmm10, %xmm4 # 4 : 1/j + pshufb %xmm0, %xmm4 # 4 = 1/j + pxor %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k + movdqa %xmm10, %xmm2 # 2 : 1/iak + pshufb %xmm3, %xmm2 # 2 = 1/iak + pxor %xmm0, %xmm2 # 2 = io + movdqa %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 : 1/jak + pshufb %xmm4, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/jak + pxor %xmm1, %xmm3 # 3 = jo + jnz .Laes_dec_loop + + # middle of last round + movdqa .Lk_dsbo(%rcx), %xmm4 # 3 : sbou + pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbou + pxor (%rdx), %xmm4 # 4 = sb1u + k + movdqa .Lk_dsbo+16(%rcx), %xmm0 # 0 : sbot + pshufb %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = sb1t + pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = A + pshufb .Lk_sr(%rsi,%rcx), %xmm0 + EXIT_SYSV_FUNC + ret + CFI_ENDPROC(); +ELF(.size _aes_decrypt_core,.-_aes_decrypt_core) + +######################################################## +## ## +## AES key schedule ## +## ## +######################################################## + +.align 16 +.globl _gcry_aes_ssse3_schedule_core +ELF(.type _gcry_aes_ssse3_schedule_core,@function) +_gcry_aes_ssse3_schedule_core: +_aes_schedule_core: + # rdi = key + # rsi = size in bits + # rdx = buffer + # rcx = direction. 0=encrypt, 1=decrypt + # r8 = rotoffs + CFI_STARTPROC(); + ENTER_SYSV_FUNC_PARAMS_5 + + # load the tables + lea .Laes_consts(%rip), %r10 + movdqa (%r10), %xmm9 # 0F + movdqa .Lk_inv (%r10), %xmm10 # inv + movdqa .Lk_inv+16(%r10), %xmm11 # inva + movdqa .Lk_sb1 (%r10), %xmm13 # sb1u + movdqa .Lk_sb1+16(%r10), %xmm12 # sb1t + movdqa .Lk_sb2 (%r10), %xmm15 # sb2u + movdqa .Lk_sb2+16(%r10), %xmm14 # sb2t + + movdqa .Lk_rcon(%r10), %xmm8 # load rcon + movdqu (%rdi), %xmm0 # load key (unaligned) + + # input transform + movdqu %xmm0, %xmm3 + lea .Lk_ipt(%r10), %r11 + call .Laes_schedule_transform + movdqu %xmm0, %xmm7 + + test %rcx, %rcx + jnz .Laes_schedule_am_decrypting + + # encrypting, output zeroth round key after transform + movdqa %xmm0, (%rdx) + jmp .Laes_schedule_go + +.Laes_schedule_am_decrypting: + # decrypting, output zeroth round key after shiftrows + pshufb .Lk_sr(%r8,%r10),%xmm3 + movdqa %xmm3, (%rdx) + xor $48, %r8 + +.Laes_schedule_go: + cmp $192, %rsi + je .Laes_schedule_192 + cmp $256, %rsi + je .Laes_schedule_256 + # 128: fall though + +## +## .Laes_schedule_128 +## +## 128-bit specific part of key schedule. +## +## This schedule is really simple, because all its parts +## are accomplished by the subroutines. +## +.Laes_schedule_128: + mov $10, %rsi + +.Laes_schedule_128_L: + call .Laes_schedule_round + dec %rsi + jz .Laes_schedule_mangle_last + call .Laes_schedule_mangle # write output + jmp .Laes_schedule_128_L + +## +## .Laes_schedule_192 +## +## 192-bit specific part of key schedule. +## +## The main body of this schedule is the same as the 128-bit +## schedule, but with more smearing. The long, high side is +## stored in %xmm7 as before, and the short, low side is in +## the high bits of %xmm6. +## +## This schedule is somewhat nastier, however, because each +## round produces 192 bits of key material, or 1.5 round keys. +## Therefore, on each cycle we do 2 rounds and produce 3 round +## keys. +## +.Laes_schedule_192: + movdqu 8(%rdi),%xmm0 # load key part 2 (very unaligned) + call .Laes_schedule_transform # input transform + pshufd $0x0E, %xmm0, %xmm6 + pslldq $8, %xmm6 # clobber low side with zeros + mov $4, %rsi + +.Laes_schedule_192_L: + call .Laes_schedule_round + palignr $8,%xmm6,%xmm0 + call .Laes_schedule_mangle # save key n + call .Laes_schedule_192_smear + call .Laes_schedule_mangle # save key n+1 + call .Laes_schedule_round + dec %rsi + jz .Laes_schedule_mangle_last + call .Laes_schedule_mangle # save key n+2 + call .Laes_schedule_192_smear + jmp .Laes_schedule_192_L + +## +## .Laes_schedule_192_smear +## +## Smear the short, low side in the 192-bit key schedule. +## +## Inputs: +## %xmm7: high side, b a x y +## %xmm6: low side, d c 0 0 +## %xmm13: 0 +## +## Outputs: +## %xmm6: b+c+d b+c 0 0 +## %xmm0: b+c+d b+c b a +## +.Laes_schedule_192_smear: + pshufd $0x80, %xmm6, %xmm0 # d c 0 0 -> c 0 0 0 + pxor %xmm0, %xmm6 # -> c+d c 0 0 + pshufd $0xFE, %xmm7, %xmm0 # b a _ _ -> b b b a + pxor %xmm6, %xmm0 # -> b+c+d b+c b a + pshufd $0x0E, %xmm0, %xmm6 + pslldq $8, %xmm6 # clobber low side with zeros + ret + +## +## .Laes_schedule_256 +## +## 256-bit specific part of key schedule. +## +## The structure here is very similar to the 128-bit +## schedule, but with an additional 'low side' in +## %xmm6. The low side's rounds are the same as the +## high side's, except no rcon and no rotation. +## +.Laes_schedule_256: + movdqu 16(%rdi),%xmm0 # load key part 2 (unaligned) + call .Laes_schedule_transform # input transform + mov $7, %rsi + +.Laes_schedule_256_L: + call .Laes_schedule_mangle # output low result + movdqa %xmm0, %xmm6 # save cur_lo in xmm6 + + # high round + call .Laes_schedule_round + dec %rsi + jz .Laes_schedule_mangle_last + call .Laes_schedule_mangle + + # low round. swap xmm7 and xmm6 + pshufd $0xFF, %xmm0, %xmm0 + movdqa %xmm7, %xmm5 + movdqa %xmm6, %xmm7 + call .Laes_schedule_low_round + movdqa %xmm5, %xmm7 + + jmp .Laes_schedule_256_L + +## +## .Laes_schedule_round +## +## Runs one main round of the key schedule on %xmm0, %xmm7 +## +## Specifically, runs subbytes on the high dword of %xmm0 +## then rotates it by one byte and xors into the low dword of +## %xmm7. +## +## Adds rcon from low byte of %xmm8, then rotates %xmm8 for +## next rcon. +## +## Smears the dwords of %xmm7 by xoring the low into the +## second low, result into third, result into highest. +## +## Returns results in %xmm7 = %xmm0. +## Clobbers %xmm1-%xmm4, %r11. +## +.Laes_schedule_round: + # extract rcon from xmm8 + pxor %xmm1, %xmm1 + palignr $15, %xmm8, %xmm1 + palignr $15, %xmm8, %xmm8 + pxor %xmm1, %xmm7 + + # rotate + pshufd $0xFF, %xmm0, %xmm0 + palignr $1, %xmm0, %xmm0 + + # fall through... + + # low round: same as high round, but no rotation and no rcon. +.Laes_schedule_low_round: + # smear xmm7 + movdqa %xmm7, %xmm1 + pslldq $4, %xmm7 + pxor %xmm1, %xmm7 + movdqa %xmm7, %xmm1 + pslldq $8, %xmm7 + pxor %xmm1, %xmm7 + pxor .Lk_s63(%r10), %xmm7 + + # subbytes + movdqa %xmm9, %xmm1 + pandn %xmm0, %xmm1 + psrld $4, %xmm1 # 1 = i + pand %xmm9, %xmm0 # 0 = k + movdqa %xmm11, %xmm2 # 2 : a/k + pshufb %xmm0, %xmm2 # 2 = a/k + pxor %xmm1, %xmm0 # 0 = j + movdqa %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 : 1/i + pshufb %xmm1, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/i + pxor %xmm2, %xmm3 # 3 = iak = 1/i + a/k + movdqa %xmm10, %xmm4 # 4 : 1/j + pshufb %xmm0, %xmm4 # 4 = 1/j + pxor %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = jak = 1/j + a/k + movdqa %xmm10, %xmm2 # 2 : 1/iak + pshufb %xmm3, %xmm2 # 2 = 1/iak + pxor %xmm0, %xmm2 # 2 = io + movdqa %xmm10, %xmm3 # 3 : 1/jak + pshufb %xmm4, %xmm3 # 3 = 1/jak + pxor %xmm1, %xmm3 # 3 = jo + movdqa .Lk_sb1(%r10), %xmm4 # 4 : sbou + pshufb %xmm2, %xmm4 # 4 = sbou + movdqa .Lk_sb1+16(%r10), %xmm0 # 0 : sbot + pshufb %xmm3, %xmm0 # 0 = sb1t + pxor %xmm4, %xmm0 # 0 = sbox output + + # add in smeared stuff + pxor %xmm7, %xmm0 + movdqa %xmm0, %xmm7 + ret + +## +## .Laes_schedule_transform +## +## Linear-transform %xmm0 according to tables at (%r11) +## +## Requires that %xmm9 = 0x0F0F... as in preheat +## Output in %xmm0 +## Clobbers %xmm1, %xmm2 +## +.Laes_schedule_transform: + movdqa %xmm9, %xmm1 + pandn %xmm0, %xmm1 + psrld $4, %xmm1 + pand %xmm9, %xmm0 + movdqa (%r11), %xmm2 # lo + pshufb %xmm0, %xmm2 + movdqa 16(%r11), %xmm0 # hi + pshufb %xmm1, %xmm0 + pxor %xmm2, %xmm0 + ret + +## +## .Laes_schedule_mangle +## +## Mangle xmm0 from (basis-transformed) standard version +## to our version. +## +## On encrypt, +## xor with 0x63 +## multiply by circulant 0,1,1,1 +## apply shiftrows transform +## +## On decrypt, +## xor with 0x63 +## multiply by 'inverse mixcolumns' circulant E,B,D,9 +## deskew +## apply shiftrows transform +## +## +## Writes out to (%rdx), and increments or decrements it +## Keeps track of round number mod 4 in %r8 +## Preserves xmm0 +## Clobbers xmm1-xmm5 +## +.Laes_schedule_mangle: + movdqa %xmm0, %xmm4 # save xmm0 for later + movdqa .Lk_mc_forward(%r10),%xmm5 + test %rcx, %rcx + jnz .Laes_schedule_mangle_dec + + # encrypting + add $16, %rdx + pxor .Lk_s63(%r10),%xmm4 + pshufb %xmm5, %xmm4 + movdqa %xmm4, %xmm3 + pshufb %xmm5, %xmm4 + pxor %xmm4, %xmm3 + pshufb %xmm5, %xmm4 + pxor %xmm4, %xmm3 + + jmp .Laes_schedule_mangle_both + +.Laes_schedule_mangle_dec: + lea .Lk_dks_1(%r10), %r11 # first table: *9 + call .Laes_schedule_transform + movdqa %xmm0, %xmm3 + pshufb %xmm5, %xmm3 + + add $32, %r11 # next table: *B + call .Laes_schedule_transform + pxor %xmm0, %xmm3 + pshufb %xmm5, %xmm3 + + add $32, %r11 # next table: *D + call .Laes_schedule_transform + pxor %xmm0, %xmm3 + pshufb %xmm5, %xmm3 + + add $32, %r11 # next table: *E + call .Laes_schedule_transform + pxor %xmm0, %xmm3 + pshufb %xmm5, %xmm3 + + movdqa %xmm4, %xmm0 # restore %xmm0 + add $-16, %rdx + +.Laes_schedule_mangle_both: + pshufb .Lk_sr(%r8,%r10),%xmm3 + add $-16, %r8 + and $48, %r8 + movdqa %xmm3, (%rdx) + ret + +## +## .Laes_schedule_mangle_last +## +## Mangler for last round of key schedule +## Mangles %xmm0 +## when encrypting, outputs out(%xmm0) ^ 63 +## when decrypting, outputs unskew(%xmm0) +## +## Always called right before return... jumps to cleanup and exits +## +.Laes_schedule_mangle_last: + # schedule last round key from xmm0 + lea .Lk_deskew(%r10),%r11 # prepare to deskew + test %rcx, %rcx + jnz .Laes_schedule_mangle_last_dec + + # encrypting + pshufb .Lk_sr(%r8,%r10),%xmm0 # output permute + lea .Lk_opt(%r10), %r11 # prepare to output transform + add $32, %rdx + +.Laes_schedule_mangle_last_dec: + add $-16, %rdx + pxor .Lk_s63(%r10), %xmm0 + call .Laes_schedule_transform # output transform + movdqa %xmm0, (%rdx) # save last key + + #_aes_cleanup + pxor %xmm0, %xmm0 + pxor %xmm1, %xmm1 + pxor %xmm2, %xmm2 + pxor %xmm3, %xmm3 + pxor %xmm4, %xmm4 + pxor %xmm5, %xmm5 + pxor %xmm6, %xmm6 + pxor %xmm7, %xmm7 + pxor %xmm8, %xmm8 + EXIT_SYSV_FUNC + ret + CFI_ENDPROC(); +ELF(.size _gcry_aes_ssse3_schedule_core,.-_gcry_aes_ssse3_schedule_core) + +######################################################## +## ## +## Constants ## +## ## +######################################################## + +.align 16 +ELF(.type _aes_consts,@object) +.Laes_consts: +_aes_consts: + # s0F + .Lk_s0F = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0x0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F + .quad 0x0F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F + + # input transform (lo, hi) + .Lk_ipt = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0xC2B2E8985A2A7000 + .quad 0xCABAE09052227808 + .quad 0x4C01307D317C4D00 + .quad 0xCD80B1FCB0FDCC81 + + # inv, inva + .Lk_inv = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0x0E05060F0D080180 + .quad 0x040703090A0B0C02 + .quad 0x01040A060F0B0780 + .quad 0x030D0E0C02050809 + + # sb1u, sb1t + .Lk_sb1 = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0xB19BE18FCB503E00 + .quad 0xA5DF7A6E142AF544 + .quad 0x3618D415FAE22300 + .quad 0x3BF7CCC10D2ED9EF + + + # sb2u, sb2t + .Lk_sb2 = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0xE27A93C60B712400 + .quad 0x5EB7E955BC982FCD + .quad 0x69EB88400AE12900 + .quad 0xC2A163C8AB82234A + + # sbou, sbot + .Lk_sbo = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0xD0D26D176FBDC700 + .quad 0x15AABF7AC502A878 + .quad 0xCFE474A55FBB6A00 + .quad 0x8E1E90D1412B35FA + + # mc_forward + .Lk_mc_forward = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0x0407060500030201 + .quad 0x0C0F0E0D080B0A09 + .quad 0x080B0A0904070605 + .quad 0x000302010C0F0E0D + .quad 0x0C0F0E0D080B0A09 + .quad 0x0407060500030201 + .quad 0x000302010C0F0E0D + .quad 0x080B0A0904070605 + + # mc_backward + .Lk_mc_backward = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0x0605040702010003 + .quad 0x0E0D0C0F0A09080B + .quad 0x020100030E0D0C0F + .quad 0x0A09080B06050407 + .quad 0x0E0D0C0F0A09080B + .quad 0x0605040702010003 + .quad 0x0A09080B06050407 + .quad 0x020100030E0D0C0F + + # sr + .Lk_sr = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0x0706050403020100 + .quad 0x0F0E0D0C0B0A0908 + .quad 0x030E09040F0A0500 + .quad 0x0B06010C07020D08 + .quad 0x0F060D040B020900 + .quad 0x070E050C030A0108 + .quad 0x0B0E0104070A0D00 + .quad 0x0306090C0F020508 + + # rcon + .Lk_rcon = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0x1F8391B9AF9DEEB6 + .quad 0x702A98084D7C7D81 + + # s63: all equal to 0x63 transformed + .Lk_s63 = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0x5B5B5B5B5B5B5B5B + .quad 0x5B5B5B5B5B5B5B5B + + # output transform + .Lk_opt = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0xFF9F4929D6B66000 + .quad 0xF7974121DEBE6808 + .quad 0x01EDBD5150BCEC00 + .quad 0xE10D5DB1B05C0CE0 + + # deskew tables: inverts the sbox's 'skew' + .Lk_deskew = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0x07E4A34047A4E300 + .quad 0x1DFEB95A5DBEF91A + .quad 0x5F36B5DC83EA6900 + .quad 0x2841C2ABF49D1E77 + +## +## Decryption stuff +## Key schedule constants +## + # decryption key schedule: x -> invskew x*9 + .Lk_dks_1 = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0xB6116FC87ED9A700 + .quad 0x4AED933482255BFC + .quad 0x4576516227143300 + .quad 0x8BB89FACE9DAFDCE + + # decryption key schedule: invskew x*9 -> invskew x*D + .Lk_dks_2 = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0x27438FEBCCA86400 + .quad 0x4622EE8AADC90561 + .quad 0x815C13CE4F92DD00 + .quad 0x73AEE13CBD602FF2 + + # decryption key schedule: invskew x*D -> invskew x*B + .Lk_dks_3 = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0x03C4C50201C6C700 + .quad 0xF83F3EF9FA3D3CFB + .quad 0xEE1921D638CFF700 + .quad 0xA5526A9D7384BC4B + + # decryption key schedule: invskew x*B -> invskew x*E + 0x63 + .Lk_dks_4 = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0xE3C390B053732000 + .quad 0xA080D3F310306343 + .quad 0xA0CA214B036982E8 + .quad 0x2F45AEC48CE60D67 + +## +## Decryption stuff +## Round function constants +## + # decryption input transform + .Lk_dipt = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0x0F505B040B545F00 + .quad 0x154A411E114E451A + .quad 0x86E383E660056500 + .quad 0x12771772F491F194 + + # decryption sbox output *9*u, *9*t + .Lk_dsb9 = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0x851C03539A86D600 + .quad 0xCAD51F504F994CC9 + .quad 0xC03B1789ECD74900 + .quad 0x725E2C9EB2FBA565 + + # decryption sbox output *D*u, *D*t + .Lk_dsbd = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0x7D57CCDFE6B1A200 + .quad 0xF56E9B13882A4439 + .quad 0x3CE2FAF724C6CB00 + .quad 0x2931180D15DEEFD3 + + # decryption sbox output *B*u, *B*t + .Lk_dsbb = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0xD022649296B44200 + .quad 0x602646F6B0F2D404 + .quad 0xC19498A6CD596700 + .quad 0xF3FF0C3E3255AA6B + + # decryption sbox output *E*u, *E*t + .Lk_dsbe = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0x46F2929626D4D000 + .quad 0x2242600464B4F6B0 + .quad 0x0C55A6CDFFAAC100 + .quad 0x9467F36B98593E32 + + # decryption sbox final output + .Lk_dsbo = .-.Laes_consts + .quad 0x1387EA537EF94000 + .quad 0xC7AA6DB9D4943E2D + .quad 0x12D7560F93441D00 + .quad 0xCA4B8159D8C58E9C +ELF(.size _aes_consts,.-_aes_consts) + +#endif +#endif |