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Diffstat (limited to 'comm/third_party/libotr/toolkit/otr_toolkit.1')
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diff --git a/comm/third_party/libotr/toolkit/otr_toolkit.1 b/comm/third_party/libotr/toolkit/otr_toolkit.1 new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..9ded38f61e --- /dev/null +++ b/comm/third_party/libotr/toolkit/otr_toolkit.1 @@ -0,0 +1,110 @@ +.\" Hey, EMACS: -*- nroff -*- +.\" First parameter, NAME, should be all caps +.\" Second parameter, SECTION, should be 1-8, maybe w/ subsection +.\" other parameters are allowed: see man(7), man(1) +.TH OTR_PARSE 1 "March 14, 2012" +.\" Please adjust this date whenever revising the manpage. +.\" +.\" Some roff macros, for reference: +.\" .nh disable hyphenation +.\" .hy enable hyphenation +.\" .ad l left justify +.\" .ad b justify to both left and right margins +.\" .nf disable filling +.\" .fi enable filling +.\" .br insert line break +.\" .sp <n> insert n+1 empty lines +.\" for manpage-specific macros, see man(7) +.SH NAME +otr_parse, otr_sesskeys, otr_mackey, otr_readforge, otr_modify, otr_remac \- Process Off-the-Record Messaging transcripts +.SH SYNOPSIS +.B otr_parse +.br +.B otr_sesskeys +.I our_privkey their_pubkey +.br +.B otr_mackey +.I aes_enc_key +.br +.B otr_readforge +.I aes_enc_key [newmsg] +.br +.B otr_modify +.I mackey old_text new_text offset +.br +.B otr_remac +.I mackey sender_instance receiver_instance flags snd_keyid rcv_keyid pubkey counter encdata revealed_mackeys +.SH DESCRIPTION +Off-the-Record (OTR) Messaging allows you to have private conversations +over IM by providing: + - Encryption + - No one else can read your instant messages. + - Authentication + - You are assured the correspondent is who you think it is. + - Deniability + - The messages you send do \fInot\fP have digital signatures that are + checkable by a third party. Anyone can forge messages after a + conversation to make them look like they came from you. However, + \fIduring\fP a conversation, your correspondent is assured the messages + he sees are authentic and unmodified. + - Perfect forward secrecy + - If you lose control of your private keys, no previous conversation + is compromised. +.PP +The OTR Toolkit is useful for analyzing and/or +forging OTR messages. Why do we offer this? Primarily, to make +absolutely sure that transcripts of OTR conversations are really easy +to forge after the fact. [Note that \fIduring\fP an OTR conversation, +messages can't be forged without real-time access to the secret keys on +the participants' computers, and in that case, all security has already +been lost.] Easily-forgeable transcripts help us provide the +"Deniability" property: if someone claims you said something over OTR, +they'll have no proof, as anyone at all can modify a transcript to make +it say whatever they like, and still have all the verification come out +correctly. + +Here are the six programs in the toolkit: + + - otr_parse + - Parse OTR messages given on stdin, showing the values of all the + fields in OTR protocol messages. + + - otr_sesskeys our_privkey their_pubkey + - Shows our public key, the session id, two AES and two MAC keys + derived from the given Diffie-Hellman keys (one private, one public). + + - otr_mackey aes_enc_key + - Shows the MAC key derived from the given AES key. + + - otr_readforge aes_enc_key [newmsg] + - Decrypts an OTR Data message using the given AES key, and displays + the message. + - If newmsg is given, replace the message with that one, encrypt + and MAC it properly, and output the resulting OTR Data Message. + This works even if the given key was not correct for the original + message, so as to enable complete forgeries. + + - otr_modify mackey old_text new_text offset + - Even if you can't read the data because you don't know either + the AES key or the Diffie-Hellman private key, but you can make a + good guess that the substring "old_text" appears at the given + offset in the message, replace the old_text with the new_text + (which must be of the same length), recalculate the MAC with the + given mackey, and output the resulting Data message. + - Note that, even if you don't know any text in an existing message, + you can still forge messages of your choice using the + otr_readforge command, above. + + - otr_remac mackey sender_instance receiver_instance flags snd_keyid rcv_keyid pubkey counter encdata revealed_mackeys + - Make a new OTR protocol version 3 Data Message, with the given + pieces (note that the data part is already encrypted). MAC it + with the given mackey. + +.SH SEE ALSO +.BR "Off-the-Record Messaging" , +at +.UR https://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/ +https://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/ +.UE +.SH AUTHOR +otr_toolkit was written by the OTR Dev Team <otr@cypherpunks.ca>. |