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Diffstat (limited to '')
| -rw-r--r-- | netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpNTLMAuth.cpp | 404 |
1 files changed, 404 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpNTLMAuth.cpp b/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpNTLMAuth.cpp new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..0d8f5f083a --- /dev/null +++ b/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpNTLMAuth.cpp @@ -0,0 +1,404 @@ +/* vim:set ts=4 sw=2 sts=2 et ci: */ +/* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public + * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this + * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ + +// HttpLog.h should generally be included first +#include "HttpLog.h" + +#include "nsHttpNTLMAuth.h" +#include "nsIAuthModule.h" +#include "nsCOMPtr.h" +#include "nsServiceManagerUtils.h" +#include "plbase64.h" +#include "prnetdb.h" + +//----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +#include "nsIPrefBranch.h" +#include "nsIHttpAuthenticableChannel.h" +#include "nsIURI.h" +#ifdef XP_WIN +# include "nsIChannel.h" +# include "nsIX509Cert.h" +# include "nsITransportSecurityInfo.h" +#endif +#include "mozilla/Attributes.h" +#include "mozilla/Base64.h" +#include "mozilla/CheckedInt.h" +#include "mozilla/Maybe.h" +#include "mozilla/Tokenizer.h" +#include "mozilla/UniquePtr.h" +#include "mozilla/Unused.h" +#include "nsCRT.h" +#include "nsNetUtil.h" +#include "nsIChannel.h" +#include "nsUnicharUtils.h" +#include "mozilla/net/HttpAuthUtils.h" +#include "mozilla/ClearOnShutdown.h" +#include "mozilla/net/DNS.h" +#include "mozilla/StaticPrefs_browser.h" + +namespace mozilla { +namespace net { + +static const char kAllowProxies[] = "network.automatic-ntlm-auth.allow-proxies"; +static const char kAllowNonFqdn[] = + "network.automatic-ntlm-auth.allow-non-fqdn"; +static const char kTrustedURIs[] = "network.automatic-ntlm-auth.trusted-uris"; +static const char kForceGeneric[] = "network.auth.force-generic-ntlm"; +static const char kSSOinPBmode[] = "network.auth.private-browsing-sso"; + +StaticRefPtr<nsHttpNTLMAuth> nsHttpNTLMAuth::gSingleton; + +static bool IsNonFqdn(nsIURI* uri) { + nsAutoCString host; + if (NS_FAILED(uri->GetAsciiHost(host))) { + return false; + } + + // return true if host does not contain a dot and is not an ip address + return !host.IsEmpty() && !host.Contains('.') && !HostIsIPLiteral(host); +} + +// Check to see if we should use our generic (internal) NTLM auth module. +static bool ForceGenericNTLM() { + nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefs = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID); + if (!prefs) return false; + bool flag = false; + + if (NS_FAILED(prefs->GetBoolPref(kForceGeneric, &flag))) flag = false; + + LOG(("Force use of generic ntlm auth module: %d\n", flag)); + return flag; +} + +// Check to see if we should use default credentials for this host or proxy. +static bool CanUseDefaultCredentials(nsIHttpAuthenticableChannel* channel, + bool isProxyAuth) { + nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefs = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID); + if (!prefs) { + return false; + } + + // Proxy should go all the time, it's not considered a privacy leak + // to send default credentials to a proxy. + if (isProxyAuth) { + bool val; + if (NS_FAILED(prefs->GetBoolPref(kAllowProxies, &val))) val = false; + LOG(("Default credentials allowed for proxy: %d\n", val)); + return val; + } + + // Prevent using default credentials for authentication when we are in the + // private browsing mode (but not in "never remember history" mode) and when + // not explicitely allowed. Otherwise, it would cause a privacy data leak. + nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> bareChannel = do_QueryInterface(channel); + MOZ_ASSERT(bareChannel); + + if (NS_UsePrivateBrowsing(bareChannel)) { + bool ssoInPb; + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(prefs->GetBoolPref(kSSOinPBmode, &ssoInPb)) && ssoInPb) { + return true; + } + + if (!StaticPrefs::browser_privatebrowsing_autostart()) { + return false; + } + } + + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; + Unused << channel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); + + bool allowNonFqdn; + if (NS_FAILED(prefs->GetBoolPref(kAllowNonFqdn, &allowNonFqdn))) { + allowNonFqdn = false; + } + if (allowNonFqdn && uri && IsNonFqdn(uri)) { + LOG(("Host is non-fqdn, default credentials are allowed\n")); + return true; + } + + bool isTrustedHost = (uri && auth::URIMatchesPrefPattern(uri, kTrustedURIs)); + LOG(("Default credentials allowed for host: %d\n", isTrustedHost)); + return isTrustedHost; +} + +// Dummy class for session state object. This class doesn't hold any data. +// Instead we use its existence as a flag. See ChallengeReceived. +class nsNTLMSessionState final : public nsISupports { + ~nsNTLMSessionState() = default; + + public: + NS_DECL_ISUPPORTS +}; +NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS0(nsNTLMSessionState) + +//----------------------------------------------------------------------------- + +already_AddRefed<nsIHttpAuthenticator> nsHttpNTLMAuth::GetOrCreate() { + nsCOMPtr<nsIHttpAuthenticator> authenticator; + if (gSingleton) { + authenticator = gSingleton; + } else { + gSingleton = new nsHttpNTLMAuth(); + ClearOnShutdown(&gSingleton); + authenticator = gSingleton; + } + + return authenticator.forget(); +} + +NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsHttpNTLMAuth, nsIHttpAuthenticator) + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsHttpNTLMAuth::ChallengeReceived(nsIHttpAuthenticableChannel* channel, + const nsACString& challenge, bool isProxyAuth, + nsISupports** sessionState, + nsISupports** continuationState, + bool* identityInvalid) { + LOG(("nsHttpNTLMAuth::ChallengeReceived [ss=%p cs=%p]\n", *sessionState, + *continuationState)); + + // Use the native NTLM if available + mUseNative = true; + + // NOTE: we don't define any session state, but we do use the pointer. + + *identityInvalid = false; + + // Start a new auth sequence if the challenge is exactly "NTLM". + // If native NTLM auth apis are available and enabled through prefs, + // try to use them. + if (challenge.Equals("NTLM"_ns, nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator)) { + nsCOMPtr<nsIAuthModule> module; + +#ifdef MOZ_AUTH_EXTENSION + // Check to see if we should default to our generic NTLM auth module + // through UseGenericNTLM. (We use native auth by default if the + // system provides it.) If *sessionState is non-null, we failed to + // instantiate a native NTLM module the last time, so skip trying again. + bool forceGeneric = ForceGenericNTLM(); + if (!forceGeneric && !*sessionState) { + // Check for approved default credentials hosts and proxies. If + // *continuationState is non-null, the last authentication attempt + // failed so skip default credential use. + if (!*continuationState && + CanUseDefaultCredentials(channel, isProxyAuth)) { + // Try logging in with the user's default credentials. If + // successful, |identityInvalid| is false, which will trigger + // a default credentials attempt once we return. + module = nsIAuthModule::CreateInstance("sys-ntlm"); + } +# ifdef XP_WIN + else { + // Try to use native NTLM and prompt the user for their domain, + // username, and password. (only supported by windows nsAuthSSPI + // module.) Note, for servers that use LMv1 a weak hash of the user's + // password will be sent. We rely on windows internal apis to decide + // whether we should support this older, less secure version of the + // protocol. + module = nsIAuthModule::CreateInstance("sys-ntlm"); + *identityInvalid = true; + } +# endif // XP_WIN + if (!module) LOG(("Native sys-ntlm auth module not found.\n")); + } + +# ifdef XP_WIN + // On windows, never fall back unless the user has specifically requested + // so. + if (!forceGeneric && !module) return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED; +# endif + + // If no native support was available. Fall back on our internal NTLM + // implementation. + if (!module) { + if (!*sessionState) { + // Remember the fact that we cannot use the "sys-ntlm" module, + // so we don't ever bother trying again for this auth domain. + RefPtr<nsNTLMSessionState> state = new nsNTLMSessionState(); + state.forget(sessionState); + } + + // Use our internal NTLM implementation. Note, this is less secure, + // see bug 520607 for details. + LOG(("Trying to fall back on internal ntlm auth.\n")); + module = nsIAuthModule::CreateInstance("ntlm"); + + mUseNative = false; + + // Prompt user for domain, username, and password. + *identityInvalid = true; + } +#endif + + // If this fails, then it means that we cannot do NTLM auth. + if (!module) { + LOG(("No ntlm auth modules available.\n")); + return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED; + } + + // A non-null continuation state implies that we failed to authenticate. + // Blow away the old authentication state, and use the new one. + module.forget(continuationState); + } + return NS_OK; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsHttpNTLMAuth::GenerateCredentialsAsync( + nsIHttpAuthenticableChannel* authChannel, + nsIHttpAuthenticatorCallback* aCallback, const nsACString& challenge, + bool isProxyAuth, const nsAString& domain, const nsAString& username, + const nsAString& password, nsISupports* sessionState, + nsISupports* continuationState, nsICancelable** aCancellable) { + return NS_ERROR_NOT_IMPLEMENTED; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsHttpNTLMAuth::GenerateCredentials( + nsIHttpAuthenticableChannel* authChannel, const nsACString& aChallenge, + bool isProxyAuth, const nsAString& domain, const nsAString& user, + const nsAString& pass, nsISupports** sessionState, + nsISupports** continuationState, uint32_t* aFlags, nsACString& creds) + +{ + LOG(("nsHttpNTLMAuth::GenerateCredentials\n")); + + creds.Truncate(); + *aFlags = 0; + + // if user or password is empty, ChallengeReceived returned + // identityInvalid = false, that means we are using default user + // credentials; see nsAuthSSPI::Init method for explanation of this + // condition + if (user.IsEmpty() || pass.IsEmpty()) *aFlags = USING_INTERNAL_IDENTITY; + + nsresult rv; + nsCOMPtr<nsIAuthModule> module = do_QueryInterface(*continuationState, &rv); + NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); + + void *inBuf, *outBuf; + uint32_t inBufLen, outBufLen; + Maybe<nsTArray<uint8_t>> certArray; + + // initial challenge + if (aChallenge.Equals("NTLM"_ns, nsCaseInsensitiveCStringComparator)) { + // NTLM service name format is 'HTTP@host' for both http and https + nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> uri; + rv = authChannel->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(uri)); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; + nsAutoCString serviceName, host; + rv = uri->GetAsciiHost(host); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; + serviceName.AppendLiteral("HTTP@"); + serviceName.Append(host); + // initialize auth module + uint32_t reqFlags = nsIAuthModule::REQ_DEFAULT; + if (isProxyAuth) reqFlags |= nsIAuthModule::REQ_PROXY_AUTH; + + rv = module->Init(serviceName, reqFlags, domain, user, pass); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; + + inBufLen = 0; + inBuf = nullptr; +// This update enables updated Windows machines (Win7 or patched previous +// versions) and Linux machines running Samba (updated for Channel +// Binding), to perform Channel Binding when authenticating using NTLMv2 +// and an outer secure channel. +// +// Currently only implemented for Windows, linux support will be landing in +// a separate patch, update this #ifdef accordingly then. +// Extended protection update is just for Linux and Windows machines. +#if defined(XP_WIN) /* || defined (LINUX) */ + // We should retrieve the server certificate and compute the CBT, + // but only when we are using the native NTLM implementation and + // not the internal one. + // It is a valid case not having the security info object. This + // occures when we connect an https site through an ntlm proxy. + // After the ssl tunnel has been created, we get here the second + // time and now generate the CBT from now valid security info. + nsCOMPtr<nsIChannel> channel = do_QueryInterface(authChannel, &rv); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; + + nsCOMPtr<nsITransportSecurityInfo> securityInfo; + rv = channel->GetSecurityInfo(getter_AddRefs(securityInfo)); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; + + if (mUseNative && securityInfo) { + nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> cert; + rv = securityInfo->GetServerCert(getter_AddRefs(cert)); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) return rv; + + if (cert) { + certArray.emplace(); + rv = cert->GetRawDER(*certArray); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return rv; + } + + // If there is a server certificate, we pass it along the + // first time we call GetNextToken(). + inBufLen = certArray->Length(); + inBuf = certArray->Elements(); + } + } +#endif + } else { + // decode challenge; skip past "NTLM " to the start of the base64 + // encoded data. + if (aChallenge.Length() < 6) { + return NS_ERROR_UNEXPECTED; // bogus challenge + } + + // strip off any padding (see bug 230351) + nsDependentCSubstring challenge(aChallenge, 5); + uint32_t len = challenge.Length(); + while (len > 0 && challenge[len - 1] == '=') { + len--; + } + + // decode into the input secbuffer + rv = Base64Decode(challenge.BeginReading(), len, (char**)&inBuf, &inBufLen); + if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { + return rv; + } + } + + rv = module->GetNextToken(inBuf, inBufLen, &outBuf, &outBufLen); + if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { + // base64 encode data in output buffer and prepend "NTLM " + CheckedUint32 credsLen = ((CheckedUint32(outBufLen) + 2) / 3) * 4; + credsLen += 5; // "NTLM " + credsLen += 1; // null terminate + + if (!credsLen.isValid()) { + rv = NS_ERROR_FAILURE; + } else { + nsAutoCString encoded; + (void)Base64Encode(nsDependentCSubstring((char*)outBuf, outBufLen), + encoded); + creds = nsPrintfCString("NTLM %s", encoded.get()); + } + + // OK, we are done with |outBuf| + free(outBuf); + } + + // inBuf needs to be freed if it's not pointing into certArray + if (inBuf && !certArray) { + free(inBuf); + } + + return rv; +} + +NS_IMETHODIMP +nsHttpNTLMAuth::GetAuthFlags(uint32_t* flags) { + *flags = CONNECTION_BASED | IDENTITY_INCLUDES_DOMAIN | IDENTITY_ENCRYPTED; + return NS_OK; +} + +} // namespace net +} // namespace mozilla |