/* -*- Mode: C++; tab-width: 2; indent-tabs-mode: nil; c-basic-offset: 2 -*- */ /* This Source Code Form is subject to the terms of the Mozilla Public * License, v. 2.0. If a copy of the MPL was not distributed with this * file, You can obtain one at http://mozilla.org/MPL/2.0/. */ #include "nsMsgContentPolicy.h" #include "nsIMsgMailSession.h" #include "nsIPermissionManager.h" #include "nsIPrefService.h" #include "nsIPrefBranch.h" #include "nsIAbManager.h" #include "nsIAbDirectory.h" #include "nsIAbCard.h" #include "nsIMsgWindow.h" #include "nsIMsgHdr.h" #include "nsIEncryptedSMIMEURIsSrvc.h" #include "nsNetUtil.h" #include "nsIMsgComposeService.h" #include "nsIDocShellTreeItem.h" #include "nsIWebNavigation.h" #include "nsContentPolicyUtils.h" #include "nsFrameLoaderOwner.h" #include "nsFrameLoader.h" #include "nsMsgUtils.h" #include "nsThreadUtils.h" #include "mozilla/mailnews/MimeHeaderParser.h" #include "mozilla/dom/HTMLImageElement.h" #include "nsINntpUrl.h" #include "nsILoadInfo.h" #include "nsSandboxFlags.h" #include "nsQueryObject.h" #include "mozilla/dom/WindowGlobalParent.h" #include "mozilla/SyncRunnable.h" #include "nsIObserverService.h" static const char kBlockRemoteImages[] = "mailnews.message_display.disable_remote_image"; static const char kTrustedDomains[] = "mail.trusteddomains"; using namespace mozilla; using namespace mozilla::mailnews; // Per message headder flags to keep track of whether the user is allowing // remote content for a particular message. if you change or add more values to // these constants, be sure to modify the corresponding definitions in // mailWindowOverlay.js #define kNoRemoteContentPolicy 0 #define kBlockRemoteContent 1 #define kAllowRemoteContent 2 NS_IMPL_ISUPPORTS(nsMsgContentPolicy, nsIContentPolicy, nsIMsgContentPolicy, nsIObserver, nsISupportsWeakReference) nsMsgContentPolicy::nsMsgContentPolicy() { mBlockRemoteImages = true; } nsMsgContentPolicy::~nsMsgContentPolicy() { // hey, we are going away...clean up after ourself....unregister our observer nsresult rv; nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefInternal = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv)) { prefInternal->RemoveObserver(kBlockRemoteImages, this); } } nsresult nsMsgContentPolicy::Init() { nsresult rv; // register ourself as an observer on the mail preference to block remote // images nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefInternal = do_GetService(NS_PREFSERVICE_CONTRACTID, &rv); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); prefInternal->AddObserver(kBlockRemoteImages, this, true); prefInternal->GetCharPref(kTrustedDomains, mTrustedMailDomains); prefInternal->GetBoolPref(kBlockRemoteImages, &mBlockRemoteImages); // Grab a handle on the PermissionManager service for managing allowed remote // content senders. mPermissionManager = do_GetService(NS_PERMISSIONMANAGER_CONTRACTID, &rv); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); return NS_OK; } /** * @returns true if the sender referenced by aMsgHdr is explicitly allowed to * load remote images according to the PermissionManager */ bool nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldAcceptRemoteContentForSender( nsIMsgDBHdr* aMsgHdr) { if (!aMsgHdr) return false; // extract the e-mail address from the msg hdr nsCString author; nsresult rv = aMsgHdr->GetAuthor(getter_Copies(author)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); nsCString emailAddress; ExtractEmail(EncodedHeader(author), emailAddress); if (emailAddress.IsEmpty()) return false; nsCOMPtr<nsIIOService> ios = do_GetService("@mozilla.org/network/io-service;1", &rv); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> mailURI; emailAddress.InsertLiteral("chrome://messenger/content/email=", 0); rv = ios->NewURI(emailAddress, nullptr, nullptr, getter_AddRefs(mailURI)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); // check with permission manager uint32_t permission = 0; mozilla::OriginAttributes attrs; RefPtr<mozilla::BasePrincipal> principal = mozilla::BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(mailURI, attrs); rv = mPermissionManager->TestPermissionFromPrincipal(principal, "image"_ns, &permission); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); // Only return true if the permission manager has an explicit allow return (permission == nsIPermissionManager::ALLOW_ACTION); } /** * Extract the host name from aContentLocation, and look it up in our list * of trusted domains. */ bool nsMsgContentPolicy::IsTrustedDomain(nsIURI* aContentLocation) { bool trustedDomain = false; // get the host name of the server hosting the remote image nsAutoCString host; nsresult rv = aContentLocation->GetHost(host); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && !mTrustedMailDomains.IsEmpty()) trustedDomain = MsgHostDomainIsTrusted(host, mTrustedMailDomains); return trustedDomain; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldLoad(nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo, const nsACString& aMimeGuess, int16_t* aDecision) { nsresult rv = NS_OK; ExtContentPolicyType aContentType = aLoadInfo->GetExternalContentPolicyType(); nsCOMPtr<nsISupports> aRequestingContext; if (aContentType == ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT) aRequestingContext = aLoadInfo->ContextForTopLevelLoad(); else aRequestingContext = aLoadInfo->LoadingNode(); nsCOMPtr<nsIPrincipal> loadingPrincipal = aLoadInfo->GetLoadingPrincipal(); nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> aRequestingLocation; if (loadingPrincipal) { BasePrincipal::Cast(loadingPrincipal) ->GetURI(getter_AddRefs(aRequestingLocation)); } // The default decision at the start of the function is to accept the load. // Once we have checked the content type and the requesting location, then // we switch it to reject. // // Be very careful about returning error codes - if this method returns an // NS_ERROR_*, any decision made here will be ignored, and the document could // be accepted when we don't want it to be. // // In most cases if an error occurs, its something we didn't expect so we // should be rejecting the document anyway. *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aContentLocation); #ifdef DEBUG_MsgContentPolicy fprintf(stderr, "aContentType: %d\naContentLocation = %s\n", aContentType, aContentLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()); fprintf(stderr, "aRequestingContext is %s\n", aRequestingContext ? "not null" : "null"); #endif #ifndef MOZ_THUNDERBIRD // Go find out if we are dealing with mailnews. Anything else // isn't our concern and we accept content. nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> rootDocShell; rv = GetRootDocShellForContext(aRequestingContext, getter_AddRefs(rootDocShell)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // We only want to deal with mailnews if (rootDocShell->GetAppType() != nsIDocShell::APP_TYPE_MAIL) return NS_OK; #endif switch (aContentType) { // Plugins (nsIContentPolicy::TYPE_OBJECT) are blocked on document load. case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_DOCUMENT: // At this point, we have no intention of supporting a different JS // setting on a subdocument, so we don't worry about TYPE_SUBDOCUMENT // here. if (NS_IsMainThread()) { rv = SetDisableItemsOnMailNewsUrlDocshells(aContentLocation, aLoadInfo); } else { auto SetDisabling = [&, location = nsCOMPtr(aContentLocation), loadInfo = nsCOMPtr(aLoadInfo)]() -> auto { rv = SetDisableItemsOnMailNewsUrlDocshells(location, loadInfo); }; nsCOMPtr<nsIRunnable> task = NS_NewRunnableFunction("SetDisabling", SetDisabling); mozilla::SyncRunnable::DispatchToThread( mozilla::GetMainThreadSerialEventTarget(), task); } // if something went wrong during the tweaking, reject this content if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { NS_WARNING("Failed to set disable items on docShells"); *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_TYPE; return NS_OK; } break; case ExtContentPolicy::TYPE_CSP_REPORT: // We cannot block CSP reports. *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; return NS_OK; break; default: break; } // NOTE: Not using NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER because this is a legitimate case // that can happen. Also keep in mind that the default policy used for a // failure code is ACCEPT. if (!aRequestingLocation) return NS_ERROR_INVALID_POINTER; #ifdef DEBUG_MsgContentPolicy fprintf(stderr, "aRequestingLocation = %s\n", aRequestingLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()); #endif // If the requesting location is safe, accept the content location request. if (IsSafeRequestingLocation(aRequestingLocation)) return rv; // Now default to reject so early returns via NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS // cause content to be rejected. *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST; // We want to establish the following: // \--------\ requester | | | // content \------------\ | | | // requested \| mail message | news message | http(s)/data etc. // -------------------------+---------------+--------------+------------------ // mail message content | load if same | don't load | don't load // mailbox, imap, JsAccount | message (1) | (2) | (3) // -------------------------+---------------+--------------+------------------ // news message | don't load (4)| load (5) | load (6) // -------------------------+---------------+--------------+------------------ // http(s)/data, etc. | (default) | (default) | (default) // -------------------------+---------------+--------------+------------------ nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgMessageUrl> contentURL(do_QueryInterface(aContentLocation)); if (contentURL) { nsCOMPtr<nsINntpUrl> contentNntpURL(do_QueryInterface(aContentLocation)); if (!contentNntpURL) { // Mail message (mailbox, imap or JsAccount) content requested, for // example a message part, like an image: To load mail message content the // requester must have the same "normalized" principal. This is basically // a "same origin" test, it protects against cross-loading of mail message // content from other mail or news messages. nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgMessageUrl> requestURL( do_QueryInterface(aRequestingLocation)); // If the request URL is not also a message URL, then we don't accept. if (requestURL) { nsCString contentPrincipalSpec, requestPrincipalSpec; nsresult rv1 = contentURL->GetNormalizedSpec(contentPrincipalSpec); nsresult rv2 = requestURL->GetNormalizedSpec(requestPrincipalSpec); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv1) && NS_SUCCEEDED(rv2) && contentPrincipalSpec.Equals(requestPrincipalSpec)) *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; // (1) } return NS_OK; // (2) and (3) } // News message content requested. Don't accept request coming // from a mail message since it would access the news server. nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgMessageUrl> requestURL( do_QueryInterface(aRequestingLocation)); if (requestURL) { nsCOMPtr<nsINntpUrl> requestNntpURL( do_QueryInterface(aRequestingLocation)); if (!requestNntpURL) return NS_OK; // (4) } *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; // (5) and (6) return NS_OK; } // If exposed protocol not covered by the test above or protocol that has been // specifically exposed by an add-on, or is a chrome url, then allow the load. if (IsExposedProtocol(aContentLocation)) { *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; return NS_OK; } // Never load unexposed protocols except for web protocols and file. // Protocols like ftp are always blocked. if (ShouldBlockUnexposedProtocol(aContentLocation)) return NS_OK; // Mailnews URIs are not loaded in child processes, so I think that beyond // here, if we're in a child process, the decision will always be accept. // // targetContext->Canonical does not work in a child process, so we can't // really move on anyway. if (!XRE_IsParentProcess()) { *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; return NS_OK; } // Find out the URI that originally initiated the set of requests for this // context. RefPtr<mozilla::dom::BrowsingContext> targetContext; rv = aLoadInfo->GetTargetBrowsingContext(getter_AddRefs(targetContext)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, NS_OK); if (!targetContext) { *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; return NS_OK; } nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> originatorLocation; dom::CanonicalBrowsingContext* cbc = targetContext->Canonical(); if (cbc) { dom::WindowGlobalParent* wgp = cbc->GetCurrentWindowGlobal(); if (wgp) { originatorLocation = wgp->GetDocumentURI(); } } if (!originatorLocation) { return NS_OK; } #ifdef DEBUG_MsgContentPolicy fprintf(stderr, "originatorLocation = %s\n", originatorLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().get()); #endif // Don't load remote content for encrypted messages. nsCOMPtr<nsIEncryptedSMIMEURIsService> encryptedURIService = do_GetService( "@mozilla.org/messenger-smime/smime-encrypted-uris-service;1", &rv); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); bool isEncrypted; rv = encryptedURIService->IsEncrypted(aRequestingLocation->GetSpecOrDefault(), &isEncrypted); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (isEncrypted) { *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST; NotifyContentWasBlocked(targetContext->Id(), aContentLocation); return NS_OK; } // If we are allowing all remote content... if (!mBlockRemoteImages) { *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; return NS_OK; } uint32_t permission; mozilla::OriginAttributes attrs; RefPtr<mozilla::BasePrincipal> principal = mozilla::BasePrincipal::CreateContentPrincipal(aContentLocation, attrs); mPermissionManager->TestPermissionFromPrincipal(principal, "image"_ns, &permission); switch (permission) { case nsIPermissionManager::UNKNOWN_ACTION: { // No exception was found for this location. break; } case nsIPermissionManager::ALLOW_ACTION: { *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; return NS_OK; } case nsIPermissionManager::DENY_ACTION: { *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST; return NS_OK; } } // Handle compose windows separately from mail. Work out if we're in a compose // window or not. nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgCompose> msgCompose = GetMsgComposeForBrowsingContext(targetContext); if (msgCompose) { ComposeShouldLoad(msgCompose, aRequestingContext, originatorLocation, aContentLocation, aDecision); return NS_OK; } // Allow content when using a remote page. bool isHttp; bool isHttps; rv = originatorLocation->SchemeIs("http", &isHttp); nsresult rv2 = originatorLocation->SchemeIs("https", &isHttps); if (NS_SUCCEEDED(rv) && NS_SUCCEEDED(rv2) && (isHttp || isHttps)) { *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; return NS_OK; } // The default decision is still to reject. ShouldAcceptContentForPotentialMsg(targetContext->Id(), aRequestingLocation, aContentLocation, aDecision); return NS_OK; } /** * Determines if the requesting location is a safe one, i.e. its under the * app/user's control - so file, about, chrome etc. */ bool nsMsgContentPolicy::IsSafeRequestingLocation(nsIURI* aRequestingLocation) { if (!aRequestingLocation) return false; // If aRequestingLocation is one of chrome, resource, file or view-source, // allow aContentLocation to load. bool isChrome; bool isRes; bool isFile; bool isViewSource; nsresult rv = aRequestingLocation->SchemeIs("chrome", &isChrome); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); rv = aRequestingLocation->SchemeIs("resource", &isRes); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); rv = aRequestingLocation->SchemeIs("file", &isFile); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); rv = aRequestingLocation->SchemeIs("view-source", &isViewSource); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); if (isChrome || isRes || isFile || isViewSource) return true; // Only allow about: to load anything if the requesting location is not the // special about:blank one. bool isAbout; rv = aRequestingLocation->SchemeIs("about", &isAbout); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); if (!isAbout) return false; nsCString fullSpec; rv = aRequestingLocation->GetSpec(fullSpec); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); return !fullSpec.EqualsLiteral("about:blank"); } /** * Determines if the content location is a scheme that we're willing to expose * for unlimited loading of content. */ bool nsMsgContentPolicy::IsExposedProtocol(nsIURI* aContentLocation) { nsAutoCString contentScheme; nsresult rv = aContentLocation->GetScheme(contentScheme); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); // Check some exposed protocols. Not all protocols in the list of // network.protocol-handler.expose.* prefs in all-thunderbird.js are // admitted purely based on their scheme. // news, snews, nntp, imap and mailbox are checked before the call // to this function by matching content location and requesting location. if (contentScheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("mailto")) return true; if (contentScheme.LowerCaseEqualsLiteral("about")) { // We want to allow about pages to load content freely. But not about:blank. nsAutoCString fullSpec; rv = aContentLocation->GetSpec(fullSpec); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); if (fullSpec.EqualsLiteral("about:blank")) { return false; } return true; } // check if customized exposed scheme if (mCustomExposedProtocols.Contains(contentScheme)) return true; bool isChrome; rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("chrome", &isChrome); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); bool isRes; rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("resource", &isRes); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); bool isData; rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("data", &isData); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); bool isMozExtension; rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("moz-extension", &isMozExtension); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, false); return isChrome || isRes || isData || isMozExtension; } /** * We block most unexposed protocols that access remote data * - apart from web protocols, and file. */ bool nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldBlockUnexposedProtocol( nsIURI* aContentLocation) { // Error condition - we must return true so that we block. // about:blank is "web", it should not be blocked. nsAutoCString fullSpec; nsresult rv = aContentLocation->GetSpec(fullSpec); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true); if (fullSpec.EqualsLiteral("about:blank")) { return false; } bool isHttp; rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("http", &isHttp); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true); bool isHttps; rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("https", &isHttps); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true); bool isWs; // websocket rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("ws", &isWs); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true); bool isWss; // secure websocket rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("wss", &isWss); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true); bool isBlob; rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("blob", &isBlob); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true); bool isFile; rv = aContentLocation->SchemeIs("file", &isFile); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, true); return !isHttp && !isHttps && !isWs && !isWss && !isBlob && !isFile; } /** * The default for this function will be to reject the content request. * When determining if to allow the request for a given msg hdr, the function * will go through the list of remote content blocking criteria: * * #1 Allow if there is a db header for a manual override. * #2 Allow if the message is in an RSS folder. * #3 Allow if the domain for the remote image in our white list. * #4 Allow if the author has been specifically white listed. */ int16_t nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldAcceptRemoteContentForMsgHdr( nsIMsgDBHdr* aMsgHdr, nsIURI* aRequestingLocation, nsIURI* aContentLocation) { if (!aMsgHdr) return static_cast<int16_t>(nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST); // Case #1, check the db hdr for the remote content policy on this particular // message. uint32_t remoteContentPolicy = kNoRemoteContentPolicy; aMsgHdr->GetUint32Property("remoteContentPolicy", &remoteContentPolicy); // Case #2, check if the message is in an RSS folder bool isRSS = false; IsRSSArticle(aRequestingLocation, &isRSS); // Case #3, the domain for the remote image is in our white list bool trustedDomain = IsTrustedDomain(aContentLocation); // Case 4 means looking up items in the permissions database. So if // either of the two previous items means we load the data, just do it. if (isRSS || remoteContentPolicy == kAllowRemoteContent || trustedDomain) return nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; // Case #4, author is in our white list.. bool allowForSender = ShouldAcceptRemoteContentForSender(aMsgHdr); int16_t result = allowForSender ? static_cast<int16_t>(nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT) : static_cast<int16_t>(nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST); // kNoRemoteContentPolicy means we have never set a value on the message if (result == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST && !remoteContentPolicy) aMsgHdr->SetUint32Property("remoteContentPolicy", kBlockRemoteContent); return result; } class RemoteContentNotifierEvent : public mozilla::Runnable { public: RemoteContentNotifierEvent(uint64_t aBrowsingContextId, nsIURI* aContentURI) : mozilla::Runnable("RemoteContentNotifierEvent"), mBrowsingContextId(aBrowsingContextId), mContentURI(aContentURI) {} NS_IMETHOD Run() { nsAutoString data; data.AppendInt(mBrowsingContextId); nsCOMPtr<nsIObserverService> observerService = mozilla::services::GetObserverService(); observerService->NotifyObservers(mContentURI, "remote-content-blocked", data.get()); return NS_OK; } private: uint64_t mBrowsingContextId; nsCOMPtr<nsIURI> mContentURI; }; /** * This function is used to show a blocked remote content notification. */ void nsMsgContentPolicy::NotifyContentWasBlocked(uint64_t aBrowsingContextId, nsIURI* aContentLocation) { // Post this as an event because it can cause dom mutations, and we // get called at a bad time to be causing dom mutations. NS_DispatchToCurrentThread( new RemoteContentNotifierEvent(aBrowsingContextId, aContentLocation)); } /** * This function is used to determine if we allow content for a remote message. * If we reject loading remote content, then we'll inform the message window * that this message has remote content (and hence we are not loading it). * * See ShouldAcceptRemoteContentForMsgHdr for the actual decisions that * determine if we are going to allow remote content. */ void nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldAcceptContentForPotentialMsg( uint64_t aBrowsingContextId, nsIURI* aRequestingLocation, nsIURI* aContentLocation, int16_t* aDecision) { NS_ASSERTION( *aDecision == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST, "AllowContentForPotentialMessage expects default decision to be reject!"); // Is it a mailnews url? nsresult rv; nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgMessageUrl> msgUrl( do_QueryInterface(aRequestingLocation, &rv)); if (NS_FAILED(rv)) { // It isn't a mailnews url - so we accept the load here, and let other // content policies make the decision if we should be loading it or not. *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; return; } nsCString resourceURI; rv = msgUrl->GetUri(resourceURI); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(rv); nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgDBHdr> msgHdr; rv = GetMsgDBHdrFromURI(resourceURI, getter_AddRefs(msgHdr)); // Get a decision on whether or not to allow remote content for this message // header. *aDecision = ShouldAcceptRemoteContentForMsgHdr(msgHdr, aRequestingLocation, aContentLocation); // If we're not allowing the remote content, tell the nsIMsgWindow loading // this url that this is the case, so that the UI knows to show the remote // content header bar, so the user can override if they wish. if (*aDecision == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST) { NotifyContentWasBlocked(aBrowsingContextId, aContentLocation); } } /** * Content policy logic for compose windows */ void nsMsgContentPolicy::ComposeShouldLoad(nsIMsgCompose* aMsgCompose, nsISupports* aRequestingContext, nsIURI* aOriginatorLocation, nsIURI* aContentLocation, int16_t* aDecision) { NS_ASSERTION(*aDecision == nsIContentPolicy::REJECT_REQUEST, "ComposeShouldLoad expects default decision to be reject!"); nsCString originalMsgURI; nsresult rv = aMsgCompose->GetOriginalMsgURI(originalMsgURI); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(rv); if (!originalMsgURI.IsEmpty()) { nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgDBHdr> msgHdr; rv = GetMsgDBHdrFromURI(originalMsgURI, getter_AddRefs(msgHdr)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS_VOID(rv); *aDecision = ShouldAcceptRemoteContentForMsgHdr(msgHdr, nullptr, aContentLocation); if (!aOriginatorLocation->GetSpecOrDefault().EqualsLiteral( "about:blank?compose")) { return; } } // We want to allow the user to add remote content, but do that only when // the allowRemoteContent was set. This way quoted remoted content won't // automatically load, but e.g. pasted content will load because the UI // code toggles the flag. nsCOMPtr<mozilla::dom::Element> element = do_QueryInterface(aRequestingContext); RefPtr<mozilla::dom::HTMLImageElement> image = mozilla::dom::HTMLImageElement::FromNodeOrNull(element); if (image) { // Special case image elements. bool allowRemoteContent = false; aMsgCompose->GetAllowRemoteContent(&allowRemoteContent); if (allowRemoteContent) { *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; return; } } } already_AddRefed<nsIMsgCompose> nsMsgContentPolicy::GetMsgComposeForBrowsingContext( mozilla::dom::BrowsingContext* aBrowsingContext) { nsresult rv; nsIDocShell* shell = aBrowsingContext->GetDocShell(); if (!shell) return nullptr; nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> docShellTreeItem(shell); nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> rootItem; rv = docShellTreeItem->GetInProcessSameTypeRootTreeItem( getter_AddRefs(rootItem)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, nullptr); nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell(do_QueryInterface(rootItem, &rv)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, nullptr); nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgComposeService> composeService( do_GetService("@mozilla.org/messengercompose;1", &rv)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, nullptr); nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgCompose> msgCompose; // Don't bother checking rv, as GetMsgComposeForDocShell returns // NS_ERROR_FAILURE for not found. composeService->GetMsgComposeForDocShell(docShell, getter_AddRefs(msgCompose)); return msgCompose.forget(); } nsresult nsMsgContentPolicy::SetDisableItemsOnMailNewsUrlDocshells( nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo) { // XXX if this class changes so that this method can be called from // ShouldProcess, and if it's possible for this to be null when called from // ShouldLoad, but not in the corresponding ShouldProcess call, // we need to re-think the assumptions underlying this code. NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aContentLocation); NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aLoadInfo); RefPtr<mozilla::dom::BrowsingContext> browsingContext = aLoadInfo->GetTargetBrowsingContext(); if (!browsingContext) { return NS_OK; } // We're only worried about policy settings in content docshells. if (!browsingContext->IsContent()) { return NS_OK; } nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShell> docShell = browsingContext->GetDocShell(); if (!docShell) { // If there's no docshell to get to, there's nowhere for the JavaScript to // run, so we're already safe and don't need to disable anything. return NS_OK; } // Ensure starting off unsandboxed. We sandbox later if needed. MOZ_ALWAYS_SUCCEEDS(browsingContext->SetSandboxFlags(SANDBOXED_NONE)); nsresult rv; bool isAllowedContent = !ShouldBlockUnexposedProtocol(aContentLocation); nsCOMPtr<nsIMsgMessageUrl> msgUrl = do_QueryInterface(aContentLocation); if (!msgUrl && !isAllowedContent) { // If it's not a mailnews url or allowed content url (http[s]|file) then // bail; otherwise set whether JavaScript is allowed. return NS_OK; } if (!isAllowedContent) { // Disable JavaScript on message URLs. rv = browsingContext->SetAllowJavascript(false); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); rv = browsingContext->SetAllowContentRetargetingOnChildren(false); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); // NOTE! Do not set single sandboxing flags only. Sandboxing - when used - // starts off with all things sandboxed, and individual sandbox keywords // will *allow* the specific feature. // Disabling by setting single flags without starting off with all things // sandboxed would the normal assumptions about sandboxing. // The flags - contrary to the keywords - *prevent* a given feature. uint32_t sandboxFlags = SANDBOX_ALL_FLAGS; // Do not block links with target attribute from opening (at all). // xref bug 421310 - we would like to prevent using target, but *handle* // links like the target wasn't there. sandboxFlags &= ~SANDBOXED_AUXILIARY_NAVIGATION; // For some unexplicable reason, when SANDBOXED_ORIGIN is in affect, then // images will not work with test --verify. So unset it. sandboxFlags &= ~SANDBOXED_ORIGIN; // Having both SANDBOXED_TOPLEVEL_NAVIGATION and // SANDBOXED_TOPLEVEL_NAVIGATION_USER_ACTIVATION will generate a warning, // see BothAllowTopNavigationAndUserActivationPresent. So unset it. sandboxFlags &= ~SANDBOXED_TOPLEVEL_NAVIGATION_USER_ACTIVATION; rv = browsingContext->SetSandboxFlags(sandboxFlags); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } else { // JavaScript is allowed on non-message URLs. rv = browsingContext->SetAllowJavascript(true); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); rv = browsingContext->SetAllowContentRetargetingOnChildren(true); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); } rv = docShell->SetAllowPlugins(false); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); return NS_OK; } /** * Gets the root docshell from a requesting context. */ nsresult nsMsgContentPolicy::GetRootDocShellForContext( nsISupports* aRequestingContext, nsIDocShell** aDocShell) { NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aRequestingContext); nsresult rv; nsIDocShell* shell = NS_CP_GetDocShellFromContext(aRequestingContext); NS_ENSURE_TRUE(shell, NS_ERROR_NULL_POINTER); nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> docshellTreeItem(shell); nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> rootItem; rv = docshellTreeItem->GetInProcessRootTreeItem(getter_AddRefs(rootItem)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); return CallQueryInterface(rootItem, aDocShell); } /** * Gets the originating URI that started off a set of requests, accounting * for multiple iframes. * * Navigates up the docshell tree from aRequestingContext and finds the * highest parent with the same type docshell as aRequestingContext, then * returns the URI associated with that docshell. */ nsresult nsMsgContentPolicy::GetOriginatingURIForContext( nsISupports* aRequestingContext, nsIURI** aURI) { NS_ENSURE_ARG_POINTER(aRequestingContext); nsresult rv; nsIDocShell* shell = NS_CP_GetDocShellFromContext(aRequestingContext); if (!shell) { *aURI = nullptr; return NS_OK; } nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> docshellTreeItem(shell); nsCOMPtr<nsIDocShellTreeItem> rootItem; rv = docshellTreeItem->GetInProcessSameTypeRootTreeItem( getter_AddRefs(rootItem)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); nsCOMPtr<nsIWebNavigation> webNavigation(do_QueryInterface(rootItem, &rv)); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); return webNavigation->GetCurrentURI(aURI); } NS_IMETHODIMP nsMsgContentPolicy::ShouldProcess(nsIURI* aContentLocation, nsILoadInfo* aLoadInfo, const nsACString& aMimeGuess, int16_t* aDecision) { // XXX Returning ACCEPT is presumably only a reasonable thing to do if we // think that ShouldLoad is going to catch all possible cases (i.e. that // everything we use to make decisions is going to be available at // ShouldLoad time, and not only become available in time for ShouldProcess). // Do we think that's actually the case? *aDecision = nsIContentPolicy::ACCEPT; return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsMsgContentPolicy::Observe(nsISupports* aSubject, const char* aTopic, const char16_t* aData) { if (!strcmp(NS_PREFBRANCH_PREFCHANGE_TOPIC_ID, aTopic)) { NS_LossyConvertUTF16toASCII pref(aData); nsresult rv; nsCOMPtr<nsIPrefBranch> prefBranchInt = do_QueryInterface(aSubject, &rv); NS_ENSURE_SUCCESS(rv, rv); if (pref.Equals(kBlockRemoteImages)) prefBranchInt->GetBoolPref(kBlockRemoteImages, &mBlockRemoteImages); } return NS_OK; } /** * Implementation of nsIMsgContentPolicy * */ NS_IMETHODIMP nsMsgContentPolicy::AddExposedProtocol(const nsACString& aScheme) { if (mCustomExposedProtocols.Contains(nsCString(aScheme))) return NS_OK; mCustomExposedProtocols.AppendElement(aScheme); return NS_OK; } NS_IMETHODIMP nsMsgContentPolicy::RemoveExposedProtocol(const nsACString& aScheme) { mCustomExposedProtocols.RemoveElement(nsCString(aScheme)); return NS_OK; }