From 378c18e5f024ac5a8aef4cb40d7c9aa9633d144c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Date: Sun, 7 Apr 2024 16:30:35 +0200
Subject: Adding upstream version 2.38.1.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
---
 sys-utils/setpriv.c | 1061 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 1061 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 sys-utils/setpriv.c

(limited to 'sys-utils/setpriv.c')

diff --git a/sys-utils/setpriv.c b/sys-utils/setpriv.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ddc2cc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sys-utils/setpriv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1061 @@
+/*
+ * setpriv(1) - set various kernel privilege bits and run something
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2012 Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) any
+ * later version.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along
+ * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc.,
+ * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA.
+ */
+
+#include <cap-ng.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <getopt.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+#include <linux/securebits.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "c.h"
+#include "caputils.h"
+#include "closestream.h"
+#include "nls.h"
+#include "optutils.h"
+#include "strutils.h"
+#include "xalloc.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "signames.h"
+#include "env.h"
+
+#ifndef PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
+# define PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 38
+#endif
+#ifndef PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
+# define PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS 39
+#endif
+
+#define SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR 127	/* how we exit when we fail to set privs */
+
+/* The shell to set SHELL env.variable if none is given in the user's passwd entry.  */
+#define DEFAULT_SHELL "/bin/sh"
+
+static gid_t get_group(const char *s, const char *err);
+
+enum cap_type {
+	CAP_TYPE_EFFECTIVE   = CAPNG_EFFECTIVE,
+	CAP_TYPE_PERMITTED   = CAPNG_PERMITTED,
+	CAP_TYPE_INHERITABLE = CAPNG_INHERITABLE,
+	CAP_TYPE_BOUNDING    = CAPNG_BOUNDING_SET,
+	CAP_TYPE_AMBIENT     = (1 << 4)
+};
+
+/*
+ * Note: We are subject to https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=895105
+ * and we will therefore have problems if new capabilities are added.  Once
+ * that bug is fixed, I'll (Andy Lutomirski) submit a corresponding fix to
+ * setpriv.  In the mean time, the code here tries to work reasonably well.
+ */
+
+struct privctx {
+	unsigned int
+		nnp:1,			/* no_new_privs */
+		have_ruid:1,		/* real uid */
+		have_euid:1,		/* effective uid */
+		have_rgid:1,		/* real gid */
+		have_egid:1,		/* effective gid */
+		have_passwd:1,		/* passwd entry */
+		have_groups:1,		/* add groups */
+		keep_groups:1,		/* keep groups */
+		clear_groups:1,		/* remove groups */
+		init_groups:1,		/* initialize groups */
+		reset_env:1,		/* reset environment */
+		have_securebits:1;	/* remove groups */
+
+	/* uids and gids */
+	uid_t ruid, euid;
+	gid_t rgid, egid;
+
+	/* real user passwd entry */
+	struct passwd passwd;
+
+	/* supplementary groups */
+	size_t num_groups;
+	gid_t *groups;
+
+	/* caps */
+	const char *caps_to_inherit;
+	const char *ambient_caps;
+	const char *bounding_set;
+
+	/* securebits */
+	int securebits;
+	/* parent death signal (<0 clear, 0 nothing, >0 signal) */
+	int pdeathsig;
+
+	/* LSMs */
+	const char *selinux_label;
+	const char *apparmor_profile;
+};
+
+static void __attribute__((__noreturn__)) usage(void)
+{
+	FILE *out = stdout;
+	fputs(USAGE_HEADER, out);
+	fprintf(out, _(" %s [options] <program> [<argument>...]\n"),
+		program_invocation_short_name);
+
+	fputs(USAGE_SEPARATOR, out);
+	fputs(_("Run a program with different privilege settings.\n"), out);
+
+	fputs(USAGE_OPTIONS, out);
+	fputs(_(" -d, --dump                  show current state (and do not exec)\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --nnp, --no-new-privs       disallow granting new privileges\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --ambient-caps <caps,...>   set ambient capabilities\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --inh-caps <caps,...>       set inheritable capabilities\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --bounding-set <caps>       set capability bounding set\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --ruid <uid|user>           set real uid\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --euid <uid|user>           set effective uid\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --rgid <gid|user>           set real gid\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --egid <gid|group>          set effective gid\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --reuid <uid|user>          set real and effective uid\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --regid <gid|group>         set real and effective gid\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --clear-groups              clear supplementary groups\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --keep-groups               keep supplementary groups\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --init-groups               initialize supplementary groups\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --groups <group,...>        set supplementary groups by UID or name\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --securebits <bits>         set securebits\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --pdeathsig keep|clear|<signame>\n"
+	        "                             set or clear parent death signal\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --selinux-label <label>     set SELinux label\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --apparmor-profile <pr>     set AppArmor profile\n"), out);
+	fputs(_(" --reset-env                 clear all environment and initialize\n"
+		"                               HOME, SHELL, USER, LOGNAME and PATH\n"), out);
+
+	fputs(USAGE_SEPARATOR, out);
+	printf(USAGE_HELP_OPTIONS(29));
+	fputs(USAGE_SEPARATOR, out);
+	fputs(_(" This tool can be dangerous.  Read the manpage, and be careful.\n"), out);
+	printf(USAGE_MAN_TAIL("setpriv(1)"));
+
+	exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+}
+
+static int has_cap(enum cap_type which, unsigned int i)
+{
+	switch (which) {
+	case CAP_TYPE_EFFECTIVE:
+	case CAP_TYPE_BOUNDING:
+	case CAP_TYPE_INHERITABLE:
+	case CAP_TYPE_PERMITTED:
+		return capng_have_capability((capng_type_t)which, i);
+	case CAP_TYPE_AMBIENT:
+		return prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET,
+				(unsigned long) i, 0UL, 0UL);
+	default:
+		warnx(_("invalid capability type"));
+		return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+/* Returns the number of capabilities printed. */
+static int print_caps(FILE *f, enum cap_type which)
+{
+	int i, n = 0, max = cap_last_cap();
+
+	for (i = 0; i <= max; i++) {
+		int ret = has_cap(which, i);
+
+		if (i == 0 && ret < 0)
+			return -1;
+
+		if (ret == 1) {
+			const char *name = capng_capability_to_name(i);
+			if (n)
+				fputc(',', f);
+			if (name)
+				fputs(name, f);
+			else
+				warnx(_("cap %d: libcap-ng is broken"), i);
+			n++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return n;
+}
+
+static void dump_one_secbit(int *first, int *bits, int bit, const char *name)
+{
+	if (*bits & bit) {
+		if (*first)
+			*first = 0;
+		else
+			printf(",");
+		fputs(name, stdout);
+		*bits &= ~bit;
+	}
+}
+
+static void dump_securebits(void)
+{
+	int first = 1;
+	int bits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+
+	if (bits < 0) {
+		warnx(_("getting process secure bits failed"));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	printf(_("Securebits: "));
+
+	dump_one_secbit(&first, &bits, SECBIT_NOROOT, "noroot");
+	dump_one_secbit(&first, &bits, SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED, "noroot_locked");
+	dump_one_secbit(&first, &bits, SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP,
+			"no_setuid_fixup");
+	dump_one_secbit(&first, &bits, SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED,
+			"no_setuid_fixup_locked");
+	bits &= ~SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS;
+	dump_one_secbit(&first, &bits, SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED,
+			"keep_caps_locked");
+	if (bits) {
+		if (first)
+			first = 0;
+		else
+			printf(",");
+		printf("0x%x", (unsigned)bits);
+	}
+
+	if (first)
+		printf(_("[none]\n"));
+	else
+		printf("\n");
+}
+
+static void dump_label(const char *name)
+{
+	char buf[4097];
+	ssize_t len;
+	int fd, e;
+
+	fd = open(_PATH_PROC_ATTR_CURRENT, O_RDONLY);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		warn(_("cannot open %s"), _PATH_PROC_ATTR_CURRENT);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	len = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
+	e = errno;
+	close(fd);
+	if (len < 0) {
+		errno = e;
+		warn(_("cannot read %s"), name);
+		return;
+	}
+	if (sizeof(buf) - 1 <= (size_t)len) {
+		warnx(_("%s: too long"), name);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	buf[len] = 0;
+	if (0 < len && buf[len - 1] == '\n')
+		buf[len - 1] = 0;
+	printf("%s: %s\n", name, buf);
+}
+
+static void dump_groups(void)
+{
+	int n = getgroups(0, NULL);
+	gid_t *groups;
+
+	if (n < 0) {
+		warn("getgroups failed");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	groups = xmalloc(n * sizeof(gid_t));
+	n = getgroups(n, groups);
+	if (n < 0) {
+		free(groups);
+		warn("getgroups failed");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	printf(_("Supplementary groups: "));
+	if (n == 0)
+		printf(_("[none]"));
+	else {
+		int i;
+		for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
+			if (0 < i)
+				printf(",");
+			printf("%ld", (long)groups[i]);
+		}
+	}
+	printf("\n");
+	free(groups);
+}
+
+static void dump_pdeathsig(void)
+{
+	int pdeathsig;
+
+	if (prctl(PR_GET_PDEATHSIG, &pdeathsig) != 0) {
+		warn(_("get pdeathsig failed"));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	printf(_("Parent death signal: "));
+	if (pdeathsig && signum_to_signame(pdeathsig) != NULL)
+		printf("%s\n", signum_to_signame(pdeathsig));
+	else if (pdeathsig)
+		printf("%d\n", pdeathsig);
+	else
+		printf(_("[none]\n"));
+}
+
+static void dump(int dumplevel)
+{
+	int x;
+	uid_t ru, eu, su;
+	gid_t rg, eg, sg;
+
+	if (getresuid(&ru, &eu, &su) == 0) {
+		printf(_("uid: %u\n"), ru);
+		printf(_("euid: %u\n"), eu);
+		/* Saved and fs uids always equal euid. */
+		if (3 <= dumplevel)
+			printf(_("suid: %u\n"), su);
+	} else
+		warn(_("getresuid failed"));
+
+	if (getresgid(&rg, &eg, &sg) == 0) {
+		printf("gid: %ld\n", (long)rg);
+		printf("egid: %ld\n", (long)eg);
+		/* Saved and fs gids always equal egid. */
+		if (dumplevel >= 3)
+			printf("sgid: %ld\n", (long)sg);
+	} else
+		warn(_("getresgid failed"));
+
+	dump_groups();
+
+	x = prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+	if (0 <= x)
+		printf("no_new_privs: %d\n", x);
+	else
+		warn("setting no_new_privs failed");
+
+	if (2 <= dumplevel) {
+		printf(_("Effective capabilities: "));
+		if (print_caps(stdout, CAP_TYPE_EFFECTIVE) == 0)
+			printf(_("[none]"));
+		printf("\n");
+
+		printf(_("Permitted capabilities: "));
+		if (print_caps(stdout, CAP_TYPE_PERMITTED) == 0)
+			printf(_("[none]"));
+		printf("\n");
+	}
+
+	printf(_("Inheritable capabilities: "));
+	if (print_caps(stdout, CAP_TYPE_INHERITABLE) == 0)
+		printf(_("[none]"));
+	printf("\n");
+
+	printf(_("Ambient capabilities: "));
+	x = print_caps(stdout, CAP_TYPE_AMBIENT);
+	if (x == 0)
+		printf(_("[none]"));
+	if (x < 0)
+		printf(_("[unsupported]"));
+	printf("\n");
+
+	printf(_("Capability bounding set: "));
+	if (print_caps(stdout, CAP_TYPE_BOUNDING) == 0)
+		printf(_("[none]"));
+	printf("\n");
+
+	dump_securebits();
+	dump_pdeathsig();
+
+	if (access(_PATH_SYS_SELINUX, F_OK) == 0)
+		dump_label(_("SELinux label"));
+
+	if (access(_PATH_SYS_APPARMOR, F_OK) == 0) {
+		dump_label(_("AppArmor profile"));
+	}
+}
+
+static void list_known_caps(void)
+{
+	int i, max = cap_last_cap();
+
+	for (i = 0; i <= max; i++) {
+		const char *name = capng_capability_to_name(i);
+		if (name)
+			printf("%s\n", name);
+		else
+			warnx(_("cap %d: libcap-ng is broken"), i);
+	}
+}
+
+static void parse_groups(struct privctx *opts, const char *str)
+{
+	char *groups = xstrdup(str);
+	char *buf = groups;	/* We'll reuse it */
+	char *c;
+	size_t i = 0;
+
+	opts->have_groups = 1;
+	opts->num_groups = 0;
+	while ((c = strsep(&groups, ",")))
+		opts->num_groups++;
+
+	/* Start again */
+	strcpy(buf, str);	/* It's exactly the right length */
+	groups = buf;
+
+	opts->groups = xcalloc(opts->num_groups, sizeof(gid_t));
+	while ((c = strsep(&groups, ",")))
+		opts->groups[i++] = get_group(c, _("Invalid supplementary group id"));
+
+	free(groups);
+}
+
+static void parse_pdeathsig(struct privctx *opts, const char *str)
+{
+	if (!strcmp(str, "keep")) {
+		if (prctl(PR_GET_PDEATHSIG, &opts->pdeathsig) != 0)
+			errx(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR,
+				 _("failed to get parent death signal"));
+	} else if (!strcmp(str, "clear")) {
+		opts->pdeathsig = -1;
+	} else if ((opts->pdeathsig = signame_to_signum(str)) < 0) {
+		errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("unknown signal: %s"), str);
+	}
+}
+
+static void do_setresuid(const struct privctx *opts)
+{
+	uid_t ruid, euid, suid;
+	if (getresuid(&ruid, &euid, &suid) != 0)
+		err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR, _("getresuid failed"));
+	if (opts->have_ruid)
+		ruid = opts->ruid;
+	if (opts->have_euid)
+		euid = opts->euid;
+
+	/* Also copy effective to saved (for paranoia). */
+	if (setresuid(ruid, euid, euid) != 0)
+		err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR, _("setresuid failed"));
+}
+
+static void do_setresgid(const struct privctx *opts)
+{
+	gid_t rgid, egid, sgid;
+	if (getresgid(&rgid, &egid, &sgid) != 0)
+		err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR, _("getresgid failed"));
+	if (opts->have_rgid)
+		rgid = opts->rgid;
+	if (opts->have_egid)
+		egid = opts->egid;
+
+	/* Also copy effective to saved (for paranoia). */
+	if (setresgid(rgid, egid, egid) != 0)
+		err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR, _("setresgid failed"));
+}
+
+static void bump_cap(unsigned int cap)
+{
+	if (capng_have_capability(CAPNG_PERMITTED, cap))
+		capng_update(CAPNG_ADD, CAPNG_EFFECTIVE, cap);
+}
+
+static int cap_update(capng_act_t action,
+		enum cap_type type, unsigned int cap)
+{
+	switch (type) {
+		case CAP_TYPE_EFFECTIVE:
+		case CAP_TYPE_BOUNDING:
+		case CAP_TYPE_INHERITABLE:
+		case CAP_TYPE_PERMITTED:
+			return capng_update(action, (capng_type_t) type, cap);
+		case CAP_TYPE_AMBIENT:
+		{
+			int ret;
+
+			if (action == CAPNG_ADD)
+				ret = prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE,
+						(unsigned long) cap, 0UL, 0UL);
+			else
+				ret = prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER,
+						(unsigned long) cap, 0UL, 0UL);
+
+			return ret;
+		}
+		default:
+			errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("unsupported capability type"));
+			return -1;
+	}
+}
+
+static void do_caps(enum cap_type type, const char *caps)
+{
+	char *my_caps = xstrdup(caps);
+	char *c;
+
+	while ((c = strsep(&my_caps, ","))) {
+		capng_act_t action;
+		if (*c == '+')
+			action = CAPNG_ADD;
+		else if (*c == '-')
+			action = CAPNG_DROP;
+		else
+			errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("bad capability string"));
+
+		if (!strcmp(c + 1, "all")) {
+			int i;
+			/* We can trust the return value from cap_last_cap(),
+			 * so use that directly. */
+			for (i = 0; i <= cap_last_cap(); i++)
+				cap_update(action, type, i);
+		} else {
+			int cap = capng_name_to_capability(c + 1);
+			if (0 <= cap)
+				cap_update(action, type, cap);
+			else if (sscanf(c + 1, "cap_%d", &cap) == 1
+			    && 0 <= cap && cap <= cap_last_cap())
+				cap_update(action, type, cap);
+			else
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+				     _("unknown capability \"%s\""), c + 1);
+		}
+	}
+
+	free(my_caps);
+}
+
+static void parse_securebits(struct privctx *opts, const char *arg)
+{
+	char *buf = xstrdup(arg);
+	char *c;
+
+	opts->have_securebits = 1;
+	opts->securebits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+	if (opts->securebits < 0)
+		err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR, _("getting process secure bits failed"));
+
+	if (opts->securebits & ~(int)(SECBIT_NOROOT |
+				      SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED |
+				      SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP |
+				      SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED |
+				      SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS |
+				      SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED))
+		errx(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR,
+		     _("unrecognized securebit set -- refusing to adjust"));
+
+	while ((c = strsep(&buf, ","))) {
+		if (*c != '+' && *c != '-')
+			errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("bad securebits string"));
+
+		if (!strcmp(c + 1, "all")) {
+			if (*c == '-')
+				opts->securebits = 0;
+			else
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+				     _("+all securebits is not allowed"));
+		} else {
+			int bit;
+			if (!strcmp(c + 1, "noroot"))
+				bit = SECBIT_NOROOT;
+			else if (!strcmp(c + 1, "noroot_locked"))
+				bit = SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED;
+			else if (!strcmp(c + 1, "no_setuid_fixup"))
+				bit = SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP;
+			else if (!strcmp(c + 1, "no_setuid_fixup_locked"))
+				bit = SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED;
+			else if (!strcmp(c + 1, "keep_caps"))
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+				     _("adjusting keep_caps does not make sense"));
+			else if (!strcmp(c + 1, "keep_caps_locked"))
+				bit = SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED;	/* sigh */
+			else
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("unrecognized securebit"));
+
+			if (*c == '+')
+				opts->securebits |= bit;
+			else
+				opts->securebits &= ~bit;
+		}
+	}
+
+	opts->securebits |= SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS;	/* We need it, and it's reset on exec */
+
+	free(buf);
+}
+
+static void do_selinux_label(const char *label)
+{
+	int fd;
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (access(_PATH_SYS_SELINUX, F_OK) != 0)
+		errx(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR, _("SELinux is not running"));
+
+	fd = open(_PATH_PROC_ATTR_EXEC, O_RDWR);
+	if (fd == -1)
+		err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR,
+		    _("cannot open %s"), _PATH_PROC_ATTR_EXEC);
+
+	len = strlen(label);
+	errno = 0;
+	if (write(fd, label, len) != (ssize_t) len)
+		err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR,
+		    _("write failed: %s"), _PATH_PROC_ATTR_EXEC);
+
+	if (close(fd) != 0)
+		err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR,
+		    _("close failed: %s"), _PATH_PROC_ATTR_EXEC);
+}
+
+static void do_apparmor_profile(const char *label)
+{
+	FILE *f;
+
+	if (access(_PATH_SYS_APPARMOR, F_OK) != 0)
+		errx(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR, _("AppArmor is not running"));
+
+	f = fopen(_PATH_PROC_ATTR_EXEC, "r+");
+	if (!f)
+		err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR,
+		    _("cannot open %s"), _PATH_PROC_ATTR_EXEC);
+
+	fprintf(f, "exec %s", label);
+
+	if (close_stream(f) != 0)
+		err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR,
+		    _("write failed: %s"), _PATH_PROC_ATTR_EXEC);
+}
+
+
+static void do_reset_environ(struct passwd *pw)
+{
+	char *term = getenv("TERM");
+
+	if (term)
+		term = xstrdup(term);
+#ifdef HAVE_CLEARENV
+	clearenv();
+#else
+	environ = NULL;
+#endif
+	if (term) {
+		xsetenv("TERM", term, 1);
+		free(term);
+	}
+
+	if (pw->pw_shell && *pw->pw_shell)
+		xsetenv("SHELL", pw->pw_shell, 1);
+	else
+		xsetenv("SHELL", DEFAULT_SHELL, 1);
+
+	xsetenv("HOME", pw->pw_dir, 1);
+	xsetenv("USER", pw->pw_name, 1);
+	xsetenv("LOGNAME", pw->pw_name, 1);
+
+	if (pw->pw_uid)
+		xsetenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH, 1);
+	else
+		xsetenv("PATH", _PATH_DEFPATH_ROOT, 1);
+}
+
+static uid_t get_user(const char *s, const char *err)
+{
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	long tmp;
+	pw = getpwnam(s);
+	if (pw)
+		return pw->pw_uid;
+	tmp = strtol_or_err(s, err);
+	return tmp;
+}
+
+static gid_t get_group(const char *s, const char *err)
+{
+	struct group *gr;
+	long tmp;
+	gr = getgrnam(s);
+	if (gr)
+		return gr->gr_gid;
+	tmp = strtol_or_err(s, err);
+	return tmp;
+}
+
+static struct passwd *get_passwd(const char *s, uid_t *uid, const char *err)
+{
+	struct passwd *pw;
+	long tmp;
+	pw = getpwnam(s);
+	if (pw) {
+		*uid = pw->pw_uid;
+	} else {
+		tmp = strtol_or_err(s, err);
+		*uid = tmp;
+		pw = getpwuid(*uid);
+	}
+	return pw;
+}
+
+static struct passwd *passwd_copy(struct passwd *dst, const struct passwd *src)
+{
+	struct passwd *rv;
+	rv = memcpy(dst, src, sizeof(*dst));
+	rv->pw_name = xstrdup(rv->pw_name);
+	rv->pw_passwd = xstrdup(rv->pw_passwd);
+	rv->pw_gecos = xstrdup(rv->pw_gecos);
+	rv->pw_dir = xstrdup(rv->pw_dir);
+	rv->pw_shell = xstrdup(rv->pw_shell);
+	return rv;
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+	enum {
+		NNP = CHAR_MAX + 1,
+		RUID,
+		EUID,
+		RGID,
+		EGID,
+		REUID,
+		REGID,
+		CLEAR_GROUPS,
+		KEEP_GROUPS,
+		INIT_GROUPS,
+		GROUPS,
+		INHCAPS,
+		AMBCAPS,
+		LISTCAPS,
+		CAPBSET,
+		SECUREBITS,
+		PDEATHSIG,
+		SELINUX_LABEL,
+		APPARMOR_PROFILE,
+		RESET_ENV
+	};
+
+	static const struct option longopts[] = {
+		{ "dump",             no_argument,       NULL, 'd'              },
+		{ "nnp",              no_argument,       NULL, NNP              },
+		{ "no-new-privs",     no_argument,       NULL, NNP              },
+		{ "inh-caps",         required_argument, NULL, INHCAPS          },
+		{ "ambient-caps",     required_argument, NULL, AMBCAPS          },
+		{ "list-caps",        no_argument,       NULL, LISTCAPS         },
+		{ "ruid",             required_argument, NULL, RUID             },
+		{ "euid",             required_argument, NULL, EUID             },
+		{ "rgid",             required_argument, NULL, RGID             },
+		{ "egid",             required_argument, NULL, EGID             },
+		{ "reuid",            required_argument, NULL, REUID            },
+		{ "regid",            required_argument, NULL, REGID            },
+		{ "clear-groups",     no_argument,       NULL, CLEAR_GROUPS     },
+		{ "keep-groups",      no_argument,       NULL, KEEP_GROUPS      },
+		{ "init-groups",      no_argument,       NULL, INIT_GROUPS      },
+		{ "groups",           required_argument, NULL, GROUPS           },
+		{ "bounding-set",     required_argument, NULL, CAPBSET          },
+		{ "securebits",       required_argument, NULL, SECUREBITS       },
+		{ "pdeathsig",        required_argument, NULL, PDEATHSIG,       },
+		{ "selinux-label",    required_argument, NULL, SELINUX_LABEL    },
+		{ "apparmor-profile", required_argument, NULL, APPARMOR_PROFILE },
+		{ "help",             no_argument,       NULL, 'h'              },
+		{ "reset-env",        no_argument,       NULL, RESET_ENV,       },
+		{ "version",          no_argument,       NULL, 'V'              },
+		{ NULL, 0, NULL, 0 }
+	};
+
+	static const ul_excl_t excl[] = {
+		/* keep in same order with enum definitions */
+		{CLEAR_GROUPS, KEEP_GROUPS, INIT_GROUPS, GROUPS},
+		{0}
+	};
+	int excl_st[ARRAY_SIZE(excl)] = UL_EXCL_STATUS_INIT;
+
+	int c;
+	struct privctx opts;
+	struct passwd *pw = NULL;
+	int dumplevel = 0;
+	int total_opts = 0;
+	int list_caps = 0;
+
+	setlocale(LC_ALL, "");
+	bindtextdomain(PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
+	textdomain(PACKAGE);
+	close_stdout_atexit();
+
+	memset(&opts, 0, sizeof(opts));
+
+	while ((c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "+dhV", longopts, NULL)) != -1) {
+		err_exclusive_options(c, longopts, excl, excl_st);
+		total_opts++;
+		switch (c) {
+		case 'd':
+			dumplevel++;
+			break;
+		case NNP:
+			if (opts.nnp)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+				     _("duplicate --no-new-privs option"));
+			opts.nnp = 1;
+			break;
+		case RUID:
+			if (opts.have_ruid)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("duplicate ruid"));
+			opts.have_ruid = 1;
+			pw = get_passwd(optarg, &opts.ruid, _("failed to parse ruid"));
+			if (pw) {
+				passwd_copy(&opts.passwd, pw);
+				opts.have_passwd = 1;
+			}
+			break;
+		case EUID:
+			if (opts.have_euid)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("duplicate euid"));
+			opts.have_euid = 1;
+			opts.euid = get_user(optarg, _("failed to parse euid"));
+			break;
+		case REUID:
+			if (opts.have_ruid || opts.have_euid)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("duplicate ruid or euid"));
+			opts.have_ruid = opts.have_euid = 1;
+			pw = get_passwd(optarg, &opts.ruid, _("failed to parse reuid"));
+			opts.euid = opts.ruid;
+			if (pw) {
+				passwd_copy(&opts.passwd, pw);
+				opts.have_passwd = 1;
+			}
+			break;
+		case RGID:
+			if (opts.have_rgid)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("duplicate rgid"));
+			opts.have_rgid = 1;
+			opts.rgid = get_group(optarg, _("failed to parse rgid"));
+			break;
+		case EGID:
+			if (opts.have_egid)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("duplicate egid"));
+			opts.have_egid = 1;
+			opts.egid = get_group(optarg, _("failed to parse egid"));
+			break;
+		case REGID:
+			if (opts.have_rgid || opts.have_egid)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("duplicate rgid or egid"));
+			opts.have_rgid = opts.have_egid = 1;
+			opts.rgid = opts.egid = get_group(optarg, _("failed to parse regid"));
+			break;
+		case CLEAR_GROUPS:
+			if (opts.clear_groups)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+				     _("duplicate --clear-groups option"));
+			opts.clear_groups = 1;
+			break;
+		case KEEP_GROUPS:
+			if (opts.keep_groups)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+				     _("duplicate --keep-groups option"));
+			opts.keep_groups = 1;
+			break;
+		case INIT_GROUPS:
+			if (opts.init_groups)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+				     _("duplicate --init-groups option"));
+			opts.init_groups = 1;
+			break;
+		case GROUPS:
+			if (opts.have_groups)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+				     _("duplicate --groups option"));
+			parse_groups(&opts, optarg);
+			break;
+		case PDEATHSIG:
+			if (opts.pdeathsig)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+				     _("duplicate --keep-pdeathsig option"));
+			parse_pdeathsig(&opts, optarg);
+			break;
+		case LISTCAPS:
+			list_caps = 1;
+			break;
+		case INHCAPS:
+			if (opts.caps_to_inherit)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+				     _("duplicate --inh-caps option"));
+			opts.caps_to_inherit = optarg;
+			break;
+		case AMBCAPS:
+			if (opts.ambient_caps)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+				     _("duplicate --ambient-caps option"));
+			opts.ambient_caps = optarg;
+			break;
+		case CAPBSET:
+			if (opts.bounding_set)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+				     _("duplicate --bounding-set option"));
+			opts.bounding_set = optarg;
+			break;
+		case SECUREBITS:
+			if (opts.have_securebits)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+				     _("duplicate --securebits option"));
+			parse_securebits(&opts, optarg);
+			break;
+		case SELINUX_LABEL:
+			if (opts.selinux_label)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+				     _("duplicate --selinux-label option"));
+			opts.selinux_label = optarg;
+			break;
+		case APPARMOR_PROFILE:
+			if (opts.apparmor_profile)
+				errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+				     _("duplicate --apparmor-profile option"));
+			opts.apparmor_profile = optarg;
+			break;
+		case RESET_ENV:
+			opts.reset_env = 1;
+			break;
+
+		case 'h':
+			usage();
+		case 'V':
+			print_version(EXIT_SUCCESS);
+		default:
+			errtryhelp(EXIT_FAILURE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (dumplevel) {
+		if (total_opts != dumplevel || optind < argc)
+			errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+			     _("--dump is incompatible with all other options"));
+		dump(dumplevel);
+		return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+	}
+
+	if (list_caps) {
+		if (total_opts != 1 || optind < argc)
+			errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+			     _("--list-caps must be specified alone"));
+		list_known_caps();
+		return EXIT_SUCCESS;
+	}
+
+	if (argc <= optind)
+		errx(EXIT_FAILURE, _("No program specified"));
+
+	if ((opts.have_rgid || opts.have_egid)
+	    && !opts.keep_groups && !opts.clear_groups && !opts.init_groups
+	    && !opts.have_groups)
+		errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+		     _("--[re]gid requires --keep-groups, --clear-groups, --init-groups, or --groups"));
+
+	if (opts.init_groups && !opts.have_ruid)
+		errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+		     _("--init-groups requires --ruid or --reuid"));
+
+	if (opts.init_groups && !opts.have_passwd)
+		errx(EXIT_FAILURE,
+		     _("uid %ld not found, --init-groups requires an user that "
+		       "can be found on the system"),
+		     (long) opts.ruid);
+
+	if (opts.reset_env) {
+		if (opts.have_passwd)
+			/* pwd according to --ruid or --reuid */
+			pw = &opts.passwd;
+		else
+			/* pwd for the current user */
+			pw = getpwuid(getuid());
+		do_reset_environ(pw);
+	}
+
+	if (opts.nnp && prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
+		err(EXIT_FAILURE, _("disallow granting new privileges failed"));
+
+	if (opts.selinux_label)
+		do_selinux_label(opts.selinux_label);
+	if (opts.apparmor_profile)
+		do_apparmor_profile(opts.apparmor_profile);
+
+	if (prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
+		err(EXIT_FAILURE, _("keep process capabilities failed"));
+
+	/* We're going to want CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_SETUID, and CAP_SETGID if
+	 * possible.  */
+	bump_cap(CAP_SETPCAP);
+	bump_cap(CAP_SETUID);
+	bump_cap(CAP_SETGID);
+	if (capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS) != 0)
+		err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR, _("activate capabilities"));
+
+	if (opts.have_ruid || opts.have_euid) {
+		do_setresuid(&opts);
+		/* KEEPCAPS doesn't work for the effective mask. */
+		if (capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS) != 0)
+			err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR, _("reactivate capabilities"));
+	}
+
+	if (opts.have_rgid || opts.have_egid)
+		do_setresgid(&opts);
+
+	if (opts.have_groups) {
+		if (setgroups(opts.num_groups, opts.groups) != 0)
+			err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR, _("setgroups failed"));
+	} else if (opts.init_groups) {
+		if (initgroups(opts.passwd.pw_name, opts.passwd.pw_gid) != 0)
+			err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR, _("initgroups failed"));
+	} else if (opts.clear_groups) {
+		gid_t x = 0;
+		if (setgroups(0, &x) != 0)
+			err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR, _("setgroups failed"));
+	}
+
+	if (opts.have_securebits && prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, opts.securebits, 0, 0, 0) != 0)
+		err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR, _("set process securebits failed"));
+
+	if (opts.bounding_set) {
+		do_caps(CAP_TYPE_BOUNDING, opts.bounding_set);
+		errno = EPERM;	/* capng doesn't set errno if we're missing CAP_SETPCAP */
+		if (capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_BOUNDS) != 0)
+			err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR, _("apply bounding set"));
+	}
+
+	if (opts.caps_to_inherit) {
+		do_caps(CAP_TYPE_INHERITABLE, opts.caps_to_inherit);
+		if (capng_apply(CAPNG_SELECT_CAPS) != 0)
+			err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR, _("apply capabilities"));
+	}
+
+	if (opts.ambient_caps) {
+		do_caps(CAP_TYPE_AMBIENT, opts.ambient_caps);
+	}
+
+	/* Clear or set parent death signal */
+	if (opts.pdeathsig && prctl(PR_SET_PDEATHSIG, opts.pdeathsig < 0 ? 0 : opts.pdeathsig) != 0)
+		err(SETPRIV_EXIT_PRIVERR, _("set parent death signal failed"));
+
+	execvp(argv[optind], argv + optind);
+	errexec(argv[optind]);
+}
-- 
cgit v1.2.3