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Diffstat (limited to 'deluge/tests/data/testssl.sh')
| -rwxr-xr-x | deluge/tests/data/testssl.sh | 20256 |
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diff --git a/deluge/tests/data/testssl.sh b/deluge/tests/data/testssl.sh new file mode 100755 index 0000000..c04d055 --- /dev/null +++ b/deluge/tests/data/testssl.sh @@ -0,0 +1,20256 @@ +#!/usr/bin/env bash +# +# vim:ts=5:sw=5:expandtab +# we have a spaces softtab, that ensures readability with other editors too + +# testssl.sh is a program for spotting weak SSL/TLS encryption, ciphers, protocols and some +# vulnerabilities or features. It may or may be not distributed by your distribution. +# The upstream versions are available (please leave the links intact): +# +# Development version https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh +# Stable version https://testssl.sh +# File bugs at github https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues +# +# Project lead and initiator: Dirk Wetter, copyleft: 2007-today. +# Main contributions from David Cooper. Further contributors see CREDITS.md . +# +# License: GPLv2, see https://www.fsf.org/licensing/licenses/info/GPLv2.html +# and accompanying license "LICENSE.txt". Redistribution + modification under this +# license permitted. +# If you enclose this program or parts of it in your software, it has to be +# accompanied by the same license (see link). Do not violate the license. +# If you do not agree to these terms, do not use it in the first place! +# +# OpenSSL, which is being used and maybe distributed via one of this projects' +# web sites, is subject to their licensing: https://www.openssl.org/source/license.txt +# +# The client simulation data comes from SSLlabs and is licensed to the 'Qualys SSL Labs +# Terms of Use' (v2.2), see https://www.ssllabs.com/downloads/Qualys_SSL_Labs_Terms_of_Use.pdf, +# stating a CC BY 3.0 US license: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/us/ +# +# Please note: USAGE WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS". +# USE IT AT your OWN RISK! +# Seriously! The threat is you run this code on your computer and untrusted input e.g. +# could be supplied from a server you are querying. +# +# HISTORY: +# Back in 2006 it all started with a few openssl commands... +# That's because openssl is a such a good swiss army knife (see e.g. +# https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Command_Line_Utilities) that it was difficult to resist +# wrapping some shell commands around it, which I used for my pen tests. This is how +# everything started. +# Now it has grown up, it has bash socket support for most features, which has been basically +# replacing more and more functions of OpenSSL and some sockets functions serve as some kind +# of central functions. +# +# WHY BASH? +# Cross-platform is one of the three main goals of this script. Second: Ease of installation. +# No compiling, install gems, go to CPAN, use pip etc. Third: Easy to use and to interpret +# the results. +# /bin/bash including the builtin sockets fulfill all that. The socket checks in bash may sound +# cool and unique -- they are -- but probably you can achieve e.g. the same result with my favorite +# interactive shell: zsh (zmodload zsh/net/socket -- checkout zsh/net/tcp) too! Oh, and btw. +# ksh93 has socket support too. +# /bin/bash though is way more often used within Linux and it's perfect for cross platform support. +# MacOS X has it and also under Windows the MSYS2 extension or Cygwin as well as Bash on Windows (WSL) +# has /bin/bash. +# +# Q: So what's the difference to www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/ or sslcheck.globalsign.com/ ? +# A: As of now ssllabs only check 1) webservers 2) on standard ports, 3) reachable from the +# internet. And those examples above 4) are 3rd parties. If these restrictions are all fine +# with you and you need a management compatible rating -- go ahead and use those. +# +# But also if your fine with those restrictions: testssl.sh is meant as a tool in your hand +# and it's way more flexible. Oh, and did I mention testssl.sh is open source? +# +#################### Stop talking, action now #################### + + +########### Definition of error codes +# +declare -r ERR_BASH=255 # Bash version incorrect +declare -r ERR_CMDLINE=254 # Cmd line couldn't be parsed +declare -r ERR_FCREATE=253 # Output file couldn't be created +declare -r ERR_FNAMEPARSE=252 # Input file couldn't be parsed +declare -r ERR_NOSUPPORT=251 # Feature requested is not supported +declare -r ERR_OSSLBIN=250 # Problem with OpenSSL binary +declare -r ERR_DNSBIN=249 # Problem with DNS lookup binaries +declare -r ERR_OTHERCLIENT=248 # Other client problem +declare -r ERR_DNSLOOKUP=247 # Problem with resolving IP addresses or names +declare -r ERR_CONNECT=246 # Connectivity problem +declare -r ERR_CLUELESS=245 # Weird state, either though user options or testssl.sh +declare -r ERR_RESOURCE=244 # Resources testssl.sh needs couldn't be read +declare -r ERR_CHILD=242 # Child received a signal from master +declare -r ALLOK=0 # All is fine + + +[ -z "${BASH_VERSINFO[0]}" ] && printf "\n\033[1;35m Please make sure you're using \"bash\"! Bye...\033[m\n\n" >&2 && exit $ERR_BASH +[ $(kill -l | grep -c SIG) -eq 0 ] && printf "\n\033[1;35m Please make sure you're calling me without leading \"sh\"! Bye...\033[m\n\n" >&2 && exit $ERR_BASH +[ ${BASH_VERSINFO[0]} -lt 3 ] && printf "\n\033[1;35m Minimum requirement is bash 3.2. You have $BASH_VERSION \033[m\n\n" >&2 && exit $ERR_BASH +[ ${BASH_VERSINFO[0]} -le 3 ] && [ ${BASH_VERSINFO[1]} -le 1 ] && printf "\n\033[1;35m Minimum requirement is bash 3.2. You have $BASH_VERSION \033[m\n\n" >&2 && exit $ERR_BASH + +########### Debugging helpers + profiling +# +declare -r PS4='|${LINENO}> \011${FUNCNAME[0]:+${FUNCNAME[0]}(): }' +DEBUGTIME=${DEBUGTIME:-false} # https://stackoverflow.com/questions/5014823/how-to-profile-a-bash-shell-script-slow-startup#20855353, profiling bash +DEBUG_ALLINONE=${DEBUG_ALLINONE:-false} # true: do debugging in one screen (old behavior for testssl.sh and bash3's default + # false: needed for performance analysis or useful for just having an extra file +DEBUG_ALLINONE=${SETX:-false} # SETX as a shortcut for old style debugging, overriding DEBUG_ALLINONE +if [[ "$SHELLOPTS" =~ xtrace ]]; then + if "$DEBUGTIME"; then + # separate debugging, doesn't mess up the screen, $DEBUGTIME determines whether we also do performance analysis + exec 42>&2 2> >(tee /tmp/testssl-$$.log | sed -u 's/^.*$/now/' | date -f - +%s.%N >/tmp/testssl-$$.time) + # BASH_XTRACEFD=42 + else + if ! "$DEBUG_ALLINONE"; then + exec 42>| /tmp/testssl-$$.log + BASH_XTRACEFD=42 + fi + fi +fi + +########### Traps! Make sure that temporary files are cleaned up after use in ANY case +# +trap "cleanup" QUIT EXIT +trap "child_error" USR1 + + +########### Internal definitions +# +declare -r VERSION="3.0.6" +declare -r SWCONTACT="dirk aet testssl dot sh" +grep -E -q "dev|rc|beta" <<< "$VERSION" && \ + SWURL="https://testssl.sh/dev/" || + SWURL="https://testssl.sh/" +if git log &>/dev/null; then + declare -r GIT_REL="$(git log --format='%h %ci' -1 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $1" "$2" "$3 }')" + declare -r GIT_REL_SHORT="$(git log --format='%h %ci' -1 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $1 }')" + declare -r REL_DATE="$(git log --format='%h %ci' -1 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $2 }')" +fi +declare -r PROG_NAME="$(basename "$0")" +declare -r RUN_DIR="$(dirname "$0")" +declare -r SYSTEM="$(uname -s)" +declare -r SYSTEMREV="$(uname -r)" +SYSTEM2="" # currently only being used for WSL = bash on windows +TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="${TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR:-""}" # If you run testssl.sh and it doesn't find it necessary file automagically set TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR +CA_BUNDLES_PATH="${CA_BUNDLES_PATH:-""}" # You can have your stores some place else +ADDITIONAL_CA_FILES="${ADDITIONAL_CA_FILES:-""}" # single file with a CA in PEM format or comma separated lists of them +CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="" +TLS_DATA_FILE="" # mandatory file for socket-based handshakes +OPENSSL_LOCATION="" +HNAME="$(uname -n)" +HNAME="${HNAME%%.*}" + +declare CMDLINE +CMDLINE_PARSED="" # This makes sure we don't let early fatal() write into files when files aren't created yet +declare -r -a CMDLINE_ARRAY=("$@") # When performing mass testing, the child processes need to be sent the +declare -a MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE # command line in the form of an array (see #702 and https://mywiki.wooledge.org/BashFAQ/050). + + +########### Some predefinitions: date, sed (we always use test and NOT try to determine +# capabilities by querying the OS) +# +HAS_GNUDATE=false +HAS_FREEBSDDATE=false +HAS_OPENBSDDATE=false +if date -d @735275209 >/dev/null 2>&1; then + if date -r @735275209 >/dev/null 2>&1; then + # It can't do any conversion from a plain date output. + HAS_OPENBSDDATE=true + else + HAS_GNUDATE=true + fi +fi +# FreeBSD and OS X date(1) accept "-f inputformat", so do newer OpenBSD versions >~ 6.6. +date -j -f '%s' 1234567 >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ + HAS_FREEBSDDATE=true + +echo A | sed -E 's/A//' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ + declare -r HAS_SED_E=true || \ + declare -r HAS_SED_E=false + +########### Terminal definitions +tty -s && \ + declare -r INTERACTIVE=true || \ + declare -r INTERACTIVE=false + +if [[ -z $TERM_WIDTH ]]; then # no batch file and no otherwise predefined TERM_WIDTH + if ! tput cols &>/dev/null || ! "$INTERACTIVE";then # Prevent tput errors if running non interactive + export TERM_WIDTH=${COLUMNS:-80} + else + export TERM_WIDTH=${COLUMNS:-$(tput cols)} # for custom line wrapping and dashes + fi +fi +TERM_CURRPOS=0 # custom line wrapping needs alter the current horizontal cursor pos + + +########### Defining (and presetting) variables which can be changed +# +# Following variables make use of $ENV and can be used like "OPENSSL=<myprivate_path_to_openssl> ./testssl.sh <URI>" +declare -x OPENSSL +OPENSSL_TIMEOUT=${OPENSSL_TIMEOUT:-""} # Default connect timeout with openssl before we call the server side unreachable +CONNECT_TIMEOUT=${CONNECT_TIMEOUT:-""} # Default connect timeout with sockets before we call the server side unreachable +PHONE_OUT=${PHONE_OUT:-false} # Whether testssl can retrieve CRLs and OCSP +FAST_SOCKET=${FAST_SOCKET:-false} # EXPERIMENTAL feature to accelerate sockets -- DO NOT USE it for production +COLOR=${COLOR:-2} # 3: Extra color (ciphers, curves), 2: Full color, 1: B/W only 0: No ESC at all +COLORBLIND=${COLORBLIND:-false} # if true, swap blue and green in the output +SHOW_EACH_C=${SHOW_EACH_C:-false} # where individual ciphers are tested show just the positively ones tested +SHOW_SIGALGO=${SHOW_SIGALGO:-false} # "secret" switch whether testssl.sh shows the signature algorithm for -E / -e +SNEAKY=${SNEAKY:-false} # is the referer and useragent we leave behind just usual? +QUIET=${QUIET:-false} # don't output the banner. By doing this you acknowledge usage term appearing in the banner +SSL_NATIVE=${SSL_NATIVE:-false} # we do per default bash sockets where possible "true": switch back to "openssl native" +ASSUME_HTTP=${ASSUME_HTTP:-false} # in seldom cases (WAF, old servers, grumpy SSL) service detection fails. "True" enforces HTTP checks +BASICAUTH=${BASICAUTH:-""} # HTTP basic auth credentials can be set here like user:pass +BUGS=${BUGS:-""} # -bugs option from openssl, needed for some BIG IP F5 +WARNINGS=${WARNINGS:-""} # can be either off or batch +DEBUG=${DEBUG:-0} # 1: normal output the files in /tmp/ are kept for further debugging purposes + # 2: list more what's going on , also lists some errors of connections + # 3: slight hexdumps + other info, + # 4: display bytes sent via sockets + # 5: display bytes received via sockets + # 6: whole 9 yards +FAST=${FAST:-false} # preference: show only first cipher, run_allciphers with openssl instead of sockets +WIDE=${WIDE:-false} # whether to display for some options just ciphers or a table w hexcode/KX,Enc,strength etc. +MASS_TESTING_MODE=${MASS_TESTING_MODE:-serial} # can be serial or parallel. Subject to change +LOGFILE="${LOGFILE:-""}" # logfile if used +JSONFILE="${JSONFILE:-""}" # jsonfile if used +CSVFILE="${CSVFILE:-""}" # csvfile if used +HTMLFILE="${HTMLFILE:-""}" # HTML if used +FNAME=${FNAME:-""} # file name to read commands from +FNAME_PREFIX=${FNAME_PREFIX:-""} # output filename prefix, see --outprefix +APPEND=${APPEND:-false} # append to csv/json file instead of overwriting it +[[ -z "$NODNS" ]] && declare NODNS # If unset it does all DNS lookups per default. "min" only for hosts or "none" at all +HAS_IPv6=${HAS_IPv6:-false} # if you have OpenSSL with IPv6 support AND IPv6 networking set it to yes +ALL_CLIENTS=${ALL_CLIENTS:-false} # do you want to run all client simulation form all clients supplied by SSLlabs? +OFFENSIVE=${OFFENSIVE:-true} # do you want to include offensive vulnerability tests which may cause blocking by an IDS? + +########### Tuning vars which cannot be set by a cmd line switch. Use instead e.g "HEADER_MAXSLEEP=10 ./testssl.sh <your_args_here>" +# +EXPERIMENTAL=${EXPERIMENTAL:-false} # a development hook which allows us to disable code +PROXY_WAIT=${PROXY_WAIT:-20} # waiting at max 20 seconds for socket reply through proxy +DNS_VIA_PROXY=${DNS_VIA_PROXY:-true} # do DNS lookups via proxy. --ip=proxy reverses this +IGN_OCSP_PROXY=${IGN_OCSP_PROXY:-false} # Also when --proxy is supplied it is ignored when testing for revocation via OCSP via --phone-out +HEADER_MAXSLEEP=${HEADER_MAXSLEEP:-5} # we wait this long before killing the process to retrieve a service banner / http header +MAX_SOCKET_FAIL=${MAX_SOCKET_FAIL:-2} # If this many failures for TCP socket connects are reached we terminate +MAX_OSSL_FAIL=${MAX_OSSL_FAIL:-2} # If this many failures for s_client connects are reached we terminate +MAX_HEADER_FAIL=${MAX_HEADER_FAIL:-2} # If this many failures for HTTP GET are encountered we don't try again to get the header +MAX_WAITSOCK=${MAX_WAITSOCK:-10} # waiting at max 10 seconds for socket reply. There shouldn't be any reason to change this. +CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK=${CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK:-5} # for the two CCS payload (each). There shouldn't be any reason to change this. +HEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK=${HEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK:-8} # for the heartbleed payload. There shouldn't be any reason to change this. +STARTTLS_SLEEP=${STARTTLS_SLEEP:-10} # max time wait on a socket for STARTTLS. MySQL has a fixed value of 1 which can't be overwritten (#914) +FAST_STARTTLS=${FAST_STARTTLS:-true} # at the cost of reliability decrease the handshakes for STARTTLS +USLEEP_SND=${USLEEP_SND:-0.1} # sleep time for general socket send +USLEEP_REC=${USLEEP_REC:-0.2} # sleep time for general socket receive +HSTS_MIN=${HSTS_MIN:-180} # >=180 days is ok for HSTS + HSTS_MIN=$((HSTS_MIN * 86400)) # correct to seconds +HPKP_MIN=${HPKP_MIN:-30} # >=30 days should be ok for HPKP_MIN, practical hints? + HPKP_MIN=$((HPKP_MIN * 86400)) # correct to seconds +DAYS2WARN1=${DAYS2WARN1:-60} # days to warn before cert expires, threshold 1 +DAYS2WARN2=${DAYS2WARN2:-30} # days to warn before cert expires, threshold 2 +VULN_THRESHLD=${VULN_THRESHLD:-1} # if vulnerabilities to check >$VULN_THRESHLD we DON'T show a separate header line in the output each vuln. check +UNBRACKTD_IPV6=${UNBRACKTD_IPV6:-false} # some versions of OpenSSL (like Gentoo) don't support [bracketed] IPv6 addresses +NO_ENGINE=${NO_ENGINE:-false} # if there are problems finding the (external) openssl engine set this to true +declare -r CLIENT_MIN_PFS=5 # number of ciphers needed to run a test for PFS +CAPATH="${CAPATH:-/etc/ssl/certs/}" # Does nothing yet (FC has only a CA bundle per default, ==> openssl version -d) +GOOD_CA_BUNDLE="" # A bundle of CA certificates that can be used to validate the server's certificate +CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=false # Set to true if server sends a certificate list that contains a certificate + # that does not certify the one immediately preceding it. (See RFC 8446, Section 4.4.2) +STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE="" +HAS_DNS_SANS=false # Whether the certificate includes a subjectAltName extension with a DNS name or an application-specific identifier type. +MEASURE_TIME_FILE=${MEASURE_TIME_FILE:-""} +if [[ -n "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE" ]] && [[ -z "$MEASURE_TIME" ]]; then + MEASURE_TIME=true +else + MEASURE_TIME=${MEASURE_TIME:-false} +fi +DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="openssl" # display OpenSSL ciphername (but both OpenSSL and RFC ciphernames in wide mode) +declare -r UA_STD="TLS tester from $SWURL" +declare -r UA_SNEAKY="Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/68.0" + +########### Initialization part, further global vars just being declared here +# +LC_COLLATE=en_US.UTF-8 # ensures certain regex patterns work as expected and aren't localized, see #1860 +PRINTF="" # which external printf to use. Empty presets the internal one, see #1130 +IKNOW_FNAME=false +FIRST_FINDING=true # is this the first finding we are outputting to file? +JSONHEADER=true # include JSON headers and footers in HTML file, if one is being created +CSVHEADER=true # same for CSV +HTMLHEADER=true # same for HTML +SECTION_FOOTER_NEEDED=false # kludge for tracking whether we need to close the JSON section object +GIVE_HINTS=false # give an additional info to findings +SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=false # Some servers have either a ClientHello total size limit or a 128 cipher limit (e.g. old ASAs) +MULTIPLE_CHECKS=false # need to know whether an MX record or a hostname resolves to multiple IPs to check +CHILD_MASS_TESTING=${CHILD_MASS_TESTING:-false} +TIMEOUT_CMD="" +HAD_SLEPT=0 +NR_SOCKET_FAIL=0 # Counter for socket failures +NR_OSSL_FAIL=0 # .. for OpenSSL connects +NR_HEADER_FAIL=0 # .. for HTTP_GET +PROTOS_OFFERED="" # This keeps which protocol is being offered. See has_server_protocol(). +TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED="" # This contains the hexcode of a cipher known to be supported by the server with TLS 1.2 +CURVES_OFFERED="" # This keeps which curves have been detected. Just for error handling +KNOWN_OSSL_PROB=false # We need OpenSSL a few times. This variable is an indicator if we can't connect. Eases handling +DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="" # .. as hex string, e.g. 0300 or 0303 +TLS13_ONLY=false # Does the server support TLS 1.3 ONLY? +OSSL_SHORTCUT=${OSSL_SHORTCUT:-false} # Hack: if during the scan turns out the OpenSSL binary supports TLS 1.3 would be a better choice, this enables it. +TLS_EXTENSIONS="" +declare -r NPN_PROTOs="spdy/4a2,spdy/3,spdy/3.1,spdy/2,spdy/1,http/1.1" +# alpn_protos needs to be space-separated, not comma-seperated, including odd ones observed @ facebook and others, old ones like h2-17 omitted as they could not be found +declare -r ALPN_PROTOs="h2 spdy/3.1 http/1.1 grpc-exp h2-fb spdy/1 spdy/2 spdy/3 stun.turn stun.nat-discovery webrtc c-webrtc ftp" +declare -a SESS_RESUMPTION +TEMPDIR="" +TMPFILE="" +ERRFILE="" +CLIENT_AUTH=false +TLS_TICKETS=false +NO_SSL_SESSIONID=false +CERT_COMPRESSION=${CERT_COMPRESSION:-false} # secret flag to set in addition to --devel for certificate compression +HOSTCERT="" # File with host certificate, without intermediate certificate +HEADERFILE="" +HEADERVALUE="" +HTTP_STATUS_CODE="" +DH_GROUP_OFFERED="" +DH_GROUP_LEN_P=0 +KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="33" # The extension number for key_share was changed from 40 to 51 in TLSv1.3 draft 23. + # In order to support draft 23 and later in addition to earlier drafts, need to + # know which extension number to use. Note that it appears that a single + # ClientHello cannot advertise both draft 23 and later and earlier drafts. + # Preset may help to deal with STARTTLS + TLS 1.3 draft 23 and later but not earlier. +BAD_SERVER_HELLO_CIPHER=false # reserved for cases where a ServerHello doesn't contain a cipher offered in the ClientHello +GOST_STATUS_PROBLEM=false +PATTERN2SHOW="" +SOCK_REPLY_FILE="" +NW_STR="" +LEN_STR="" +SNI="" +POODLE="" # keep vulnerability status for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV +OSSL_NAME="" # openssl name, in case of LibreSSL it's LibreSSL +OSSL_VER="" # openssl version, will be auto-determined +OSSL_VER_MAJOR=0 +OSSL_VER_MINOR=0 +OSSL_VER_APPENDIX="none" +CLIENT_PROB_NO=1 +HAS_DH_BITS=${HAS_DH_BITS:-false} # initialize openssl variables +HAS_CURVES=false +OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES="" +HAS_SSL2=false +HAS_SSL3=false +HAS_TLS13=false +HAS_X448=false +HAS_X25519=false +HAS_PKUTIL=false +HAS_PKEY=false +HAS_NO_SSL2=false +HAS_NOSERVERNAME=false +HAS_CIPHERSUITES=false +HAS_COMP=false +HAS_NO_COMP=false +HAS_ALPN=false +HAS_NPN=false +HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV=false +HAS_PROXY=false +HAS_XMPP=false +HAS_POSTGRES=false +HAS_MYSQL=false +HAS_LMTP=false +HAS_NNTP=false +HAS_IRC=false +HAS_CHACHA20=false +HAS_AES128_GCM=false +HAS_AES256_GCM=false +HAS_ZLIB=false +HAS_DIG=false +HAS_DIG_R=true +DIG_R="-r" +HAS_HOST=false +HAS_DRILL=false +HAS_NSLOOKUP=false +HAS_IDN=false +HAS_IDN2=false +HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE=false +HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT=false + +OSSL_CIPHERS_S="" +PORT=443 # unless otherwise auto-determined, see below +NODE="" +NODEIP="" +rDNS="" +CORRECT_SPACES="" # Used for IPv6 and proper output formatting +IPADDRs="" +IP46ADDRs="" +LOCAL_A=false # Does the $NODEIP come from /etc/hosts? +LOCAL_AAAA=false # Does the IPv6 IP come from /etc/hosts? +XMPP_HOST="" +PROXYIP="" # $PROXYIP:$PROXPORT is your proxy if --proxy is defined ... +PROXYPORT="" # ... and openssl has proxy support +PROXY="" # Once check_proxy() executed it contains $PROXYIP:$PROXPORT +VULN_COUNT=0 +SERVICE="" # Is the server running an HTTP server, SMTP, POP or IMAP? +URI="" +CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2="" +RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2="" +STARTTLS_PROTOCOL="" +OPTIMAL_PROTO="" # Need this for IIS6 (sigh) + OpenSSL 1.0.2, otherwise some handshakes will fail see + # https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl/issues/19#issuecomment-100897892 +STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO="" # Same for STARTTLS, see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/188 +OPTIMAL_SOCKETS_PROTO="" # Same for tls_sockets(). -- not yet used +ALL_FAILED_SOCKETS=true # Set to true if all attempts to connect to server using tls_sockets/sslv2_sockets failed +TLS_TIME="" # To keep the value of TLS server timestamp +TLS_NOW="" # Similar +TLS_DIFFTIME_SET=false # Tells TLS functions to measure the TLS difftime or not +NOW_TIME="" +HTTP_TIME="" +GET_REQ11="" +START_TIME=0 # time in epoch when the action started +END_TIME=0 # .. ended +SCAN_TIME=0 # diff of both: total scan time +LAST_TIME=0 # only used for performance measurements (MEASURE_TIME=true) +SERVER_COUNTER=0 # Counter for multiple servers + +TLS_LOW_BYTE="" # For "secret" development stuff, see -q below +HEX_CIPHER="" # " + + +########### Global variables for parallel mass testing +# +declare -r PARALLEL_SLEEP=1 # Time to sleep after starting each test +MAX_WAIT_TEST=${MAX_WAIT_TEST:-1200} # Maximum time (in seconds) to wait for a test to complete +MAX_PARALLEL=${MAX_PARALLEL:-20} # Maximum number of tests to run in parallel + # This value may be made larger on systems with faster processors +declare -a -i PARALLEL_TESTING_PID=() # process id for each child test (or 0 to indicate test has already completed) +declare -a PARALLEL_TESTING_CMDLINE=() # command line for each child test +declare -i NR_PARALLEL_TESTS=0 # number of parallel tests run +declare -i NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH=0 # number of parallel tests that have completed and have been processed +declare FIRST_JSON_OUTPUT=true # true if no output has been added to $JSONFILE yet. + + +########### Cipher suite information +# +declare -i TLS_NR_CIPHERS=0 +declare TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE=() +declare TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME=() +declare TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME=() +declare TLS_CIPHER_SSLVERS=() +declare TLS_CIPHER_KX=() +declare TLS_CIPHER_AUTH=() +declare TLS_CIPHER_ENC=() +declare TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT=() +declare TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED=() +declare TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS="TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_CCM_SHA256:TLS_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256" + +########### Severity functions and globals +# +INFO=0 +OK=0 +LOW=1 +MEDIUM=2 +HIGH=3 +CRITICAL=4 +SEVERITY_LEVEL=0 + +set_severity_level() { + local severity=$1 + + if [[ "$severity" == LOW ]]; then + SEVERITY_LEVEL=$LOW + elif [[ "$severity" == MEDIUM ]]; then + SEVERITY_LEVEL=$MEDIUM + elif [[ "$severity" == HIGH ]]; then + SEVERITY_LEVEL=$HIGH + elif [[ "$severity" == CRITICAL ]]; then + SEVERITY_LEVEL=$CRITICAL + else + # WARN and FATAL will always be logged as the represent scanning problems + echo "Supported severity levels are LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH, CRITICAL!" + help 1 + fi +} + +show_finding() { + local severity=$1 + + ( [[ "$severity" == DEBUG ]] ) || + ( [[ "$severity" == INFO ]] && [[ $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $INFO ]] ) || + ( [[ "$severity" == OK ]] && [[ $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $OK ]] ) || + ( [[ "$severity" == LOW ]] && [[ $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $LOW ]] ) || + ( [[ "$severity" == MEDIUM ]] && [[ $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $MEDIUM ]] ) || + ( [[ "$severity" == HIGH ]] && [[ $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $HIGH ]] ) || + ( [[ "$severity" == CRITICAL ]] && [[ $SEVERITY_LEVEL -le $CRITICAL ]] ) || + ( [[ "$severity" == WARN ]] ) || + ( [[ "$severity" == FATAL ]] ) +} + +########### Output functions + +# For HTML output, replace any HTML reserved characters with the entity name +html_reserved(){ + local output + "$do_html" || return 0 + #sed -e 's/\&/\&/g' -e 's/</\</g' -e 's/>/\>/g' -e 's/"/\"/g' -e "s/'/\'/g" <<< "$1" + output="${1//&/&}" + output="${output//</<}" + output="${output//>/>}" + output="${output//\"/"}" + output="${output//\'/'}" + printf -- "%s" "$output" + return 0 +} + +html_out() { + "$do_html" || return 0 + [[ -n "$HTMLFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$HTMLFILE" ]] && printf -- "%b" "$1" >> "$HTMLFILE" +} + +# This is intentionally the same. +safe_echo() { printf -- "%b" "$1"; } +tm_out() { printf -- "%b" "$1"; } +tmln_out() { printf -- "%b" "$1\n"; } + +out() { printf -- "%b" "$1"; html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } +outln() { printf -- "%b" "$1\n"; html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")\n"; } + + +#TODO: Still no shell injection safe but if just run it from the cmd line: that's fine + +# Color print functions, see also https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Bash-Prompt-HOWTO/x329.html +tm_liteblue() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && ( "$COLORBLIND" && tm_out "\033[0;32m$1" || tm_out "\033[0;34m$1" ) || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # not yet used +pr_liteblue() { tm_liteblue "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && ( "$COLORBLIND" && html_out "<span style=\"color:#00cd00;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "<span style=\"color:#0000ee;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" ) || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } +tmln_liteblue() { tm_liteblue "$1"; tmln_out; } +prln_liteblue() { pr_liteblue "$1"; outln; } + +tm_blue() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && ( "$COLORBLIND" && tm_out "\033[1;32m$1" || tm_out "\033[1;34m$1" ) || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # used for head lines of single tests +pr_blue() { tm_blue "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && ( "$COLORBLIND" && html_out "<span style=\"color:lime;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "<span style=\"color:#5c5cff;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" ) || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } +tmln_blue() { tm_blue "$1"; tmln_out; } +prln_blue() { pr_blue "$1"; outln; } + +# we should be able to use aliases here +tm_warning() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[0;35m$1" || tm_underline "$1"; tm_off; } # some local problem: one test cannot be done +tmln_warning() { tm_warning "$1"; tmln_out; } # litemagenta +pr_warning() { tm_warning "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#cd00cd;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || ( [[ "$COLOR" -eq 1 ]] && html_out "<u>$(html_reserved "$1")</u>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")" ); } +prln_warning() { pr_warning "$1"; outln; } + +tm_magenta() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[1;35m$1" || tm_underline "$1"; tm_off; } # fatal error: quitting because of this! +tmln_magenta() { tm_magenta "$1"; tmln_out; } +# different as warning above? +pr_magenta() { tm_magenta "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:magenta;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || ( [[ "$COLOR" -eq 1 ]] && html_out "<u>$(html_reserved "$1")</u>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")" ); } +prln_magenta() { pr_magenta "$1"; outln; } + +tm_litecyan() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[0;36m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # not yet used +tmln_litecyan() { tm_litecyan "$1"; tmln_out; } +pr_litecyan() { tm_litecyan "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#00cdcd;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } +prln_litecyan() { pr_litecyan "$1"; outln; } + +tm_cyan() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[1;36m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # additional hint +tmln_cyan() { tm_cyan "$1"; tmln_out; } +pr_cyan() { tm_cyan "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:cyan;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } +prln_cyan() { pr_cyan "$1"; outln; } + +tm_litegrey() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[0;37m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # ... https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/pull/600#issuecomment-276129876 +tmln_litegrey() { tm_litegrey "$1"; tmln_out; } # not really usable on a black background, see .. +prln_litegrey() { pr_litegrey "$1"; outln; } +pr_litegrey() { tm_litegrey "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:darkgray;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } + +tm_grey() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[1;30m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } +pr_grey() { tm_grey "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#7f7f7f;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } +tmln_grey() { tm_grey "$1"; tmln_out; } +prln_grey() { pr_grey "$1"; outln; } + +tm_svrty_good() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && ( "$COLORBLIND" && tm_out "\033[0;34m$1" || tm_out "\033[0;32m$1" ) || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # litegreen (liteblue), This is good +tmln_svrty_good() { tm_svrty_good "$1"; tmln_out; } +pr_svrty_good() { tm_svrty_good "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && ( "$COLORBLIND" && html_out "<span style=\"color:#0000ee;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "<span style=\"color:#00cd00;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" ) || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } +prln_svrty_good() { pr_svrty_good "$1"; outln; } + +tm_svrty_best() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && ( "$COLORBLIND" && tm_out "\033[1;34m$1" || tm_out "\033[1;32m$1" ) || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # green (blue), This is the best +tmln_svrty_best() { tm_svrty_best "$1"; tmln_out; } +pr_svrty_best() { tm_svrty_best "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && ( "$COLORBLIND" && html_out "<span style=\"color:#5c5cff;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "<span style=\"color:lime;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" ) || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } +prln_svrty_best() { pr_svrty_best "$1"; outln; } + +tm_svrty_low() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[1;33m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # yellow brown | academic or minor problem +tmln_svrty_low() { tm_svrty_low "$1"; tmln_out; } +pr_svrty_low() { tm_svrty_low "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#cdcd00;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } +prln_svrty_low() { pr_svrty_low "$1"; outln; } + +tm_svrty_medium() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[0;33m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # brown | it is not a bad problem but you shouldn't do this +pr_svrty_medium() { tm_svrty_medium "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#cd8000;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } +tmln_svrty_medium(){ tm_svrty_medium "$1"; tmln_out; } +prln_svrty_medium(){ pr_svrty_medium "$1"; outln; } + +tm_svrty_high() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[0;31m$1" || tm_bold "$1"; tm_off; } # litered +pr_svrty_high() { tm_svrty_high "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:#cd0000;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || ( [[ "$COLOR" -eq 1 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")" ); } +tmln_svrty_high() { tm_svrty_high "$1"; tmln_out; } +prln_svrty_high() { pr_svrty_high "$1"; outln; } + +tm_svrty_critical() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out "\033[1;31m$1" || tm_bold "$1"; tm_off; } # red +pr_svrty_critical() { tm_svrty_critical "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:red;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || ( [[ "$COLOR" -eq 1 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")" ); } +tmln_svrty_critical() { tm_svrty_critical "$1"; tmln_out; } +prln_svrty_critical() { pr_svrty_critical "$1"; outln; } + +tm_deemphasize() { tm_out "$1"; } # hook for a weakened screen output, see #600 +pr_deemphasize() { tm_deemphasize "$1"; html_out "<span style=\"color:darkgray;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>"; } +tmln_deemphasize() { tm_deemphasize "$1"; tmln_out; } +prln_deemphasize() { pr_deemphasize "$1"; outln; } + +# color=1 functions +tm_off() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[m"; } + +tm_bold() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[1m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } +tmln_bold() { tm_bold "$1"; tmln_out; } +pr_bold() { tm_bold "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } +prln_bold() { pr_bold "$1" ; outln; } + +NO_ITALICS=false +if [[ $TERM == screen ]]; then + NO_ITALICS=true +elif [[ $SYSTEM == OpenBSD ]]; then + NO_ITALICS=true +elif [[ $SYSTEM == FreeBSD ]]; then + if [[ ${SYSTEMREV%\.*} -le 9 ]]; then + NO_ITALICS=true + fi +fi +tm_italic() { ( [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && ! "$NO_ITALICS" ) && tm_out "\033[3m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } +tmln_italic() { tm_italic "$1" ; tmln_out; } +pr_italic() { tm_italic "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<i>$(html_reserved "$1")</i>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } +prln_italic() { pr_italic "$1"; outln; } + +tm_strikethru() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[9m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } # ugly! +tmln_strikethru() { tm_strikethru "$1"; tmln_out; } +pr_strikethru() { tm_strikethru "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<strike>$(html_reserved "$1")</strike>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } +prln_strikethru() { pr_strikethru "$1" ; outln; } + +tm_underline() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[4m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } +tmln_underline() { tm_underline "$1"; tmln_out; } +pr_underline() { tm_underline "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<u>$(html_reserved "$1")</u>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } +prln_underline() { pr_underline "$1"; outln; } + +tm_reverse() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[7m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } +tm_reverse_bold() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[7m\033[1m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } +pr_reverse() { tm_reverse "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:white;background-color:black;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } +pr_reverse_bold() { tm_reverse_bold "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"color:white;background-color:black;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } + +#pr_headline() { pr_blue "$1"; } +# https://misc.flogisoft.com/bash/tip_colors_and_formatting + +#pr_headline() { [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]] && out "\033[1;30m\033[47m$1" || out "$1"; tm_off; } +tm_headline() { [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && tm_out "\033[1m\033[4m$1" || tm_out "$1"; tm_off; } +tmln_headline() { tm_headline "$1"; tmln_out; } +pr_headline() { tm_headline "$1"; [[ "$COLOR" -ne 0 ]] && html_out "<span style=\"text-decoration:underline;font-weight:bold;\">$(html_reserved "$1")</span>" || html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")"; } +pr_headlineln() { pr_headline "$1" ; outln; } + +tm_squoted() { tm_out "'$1'"; } +pr_squoted() { out "'$1'"; } +tm_dquoted() { tm_out "\"$1\""; } +pr_dquoted() { out "\"$1\""; } + +# either files couldn't be found or openssl isn't good enough (which shouldn't happen anymore) +tm_local_problem() { tm_warning "Local problem: $1"; } +tmln_local_problem() { tmln_warning "Local problem: $1"; } +pr_local_problem() { pr_warning "Local problem: $1"; } +prln_local_problem() { prln_warning "Local problem: $1"; } + +# general failure +tm_fixme() { tm_warning "Fixme: $1"; } +tmln_fixme() { tmln_warning "Fixme: $1"; } +pr_fixme() { pr_warning "Fixme: $1"; } +prln_fixme() { prln_warning "Fixme: $1"; } + +pr_url() { tm_out "$1"; html_out "<a href=\"$1\" style=\"color:black;text-decoration:none;\">$1</a>"; } +pr_boldurl() { tm_bold "$1"; html_out "<a href=\"$1\" style=\"font-weight:bold;color:black;text-decoration:none;\">$1</a>"; } + +### color switcher (see e.g. https://linuxtidbits.wordpress.com/2008/08/11/output-color-on-bash-scripts/ +### https://www.tldp.org/HOWTO/Bash-Prompt-HOWTO/x405.html +### no output support for HTML! +set_color_functions() { + local ncurses_tput=true + + if [[ $SYSTEM == OpenBSD ]] && [[ "$TERM" =~ xterm-256 ]]; then + export TERM=xterm + # OpenBSD can't handle 256 colors (yet) in xterm which might lead to ugly errors + # like "tput: not enough arguments (3) for capability `AF'". Not our fault but + # before we get blamed we fix it here. + fi + + # Empty all vars if we have COLOR=0 equals no escape code -- these are globals: + red="" + green="" + brown="" + blue="" + magenta="" + cyan="" + grey="" + yellow="" + off="" + bold="" + underline="" + italic="" + + type -p tput &>/dev/null || return 0 # Hey wait, do we actually have tput / ncurses ? + tput cols &>/dev/null || return 0 # tput under BSDs and GNUs doesn't work either (TERM undefined?) + tput sgr0 &>/dev/null || ncurses_tput=false + if [[ "$COLOR" -ge 2 ]]; then + if $ncurses_tput; then + red=$(tput setaf 1) + green=$(tput setaf 2) + brown=$(tput setaf 3) + blue=$(tput setaf 4) + magenta=$(tput setaf 5) + cyan=$(tput setaf 6) + grey=$(tput setaf 7) + yellow=$(tput setaf 3; tput bold) + else # this is a try for old BSD, see terminfo(5) + red=$(tput AF 1) + green=$(tput AF 2) + brown=$(tput AF 3) + blue=$(tput AF 4) + magenta=$(tput AF 5) + cyan=$(tput AF 6) + grey=$(tput AF 7) + yellow=$(tput AF 3; tput md) + fi + fi + if [[ "$COLOR" -ge 1 ]]; then + if $ncurses_tput; then + bold=$(tput bold) + underline=$(tput sgr 0 1 2>/dev/null) + italic=$(tput sitm) # This doesn't work on FreeBSDi (9,10) and OpenBSD ... + italic_end=$(tput ritm) # ... and this, too + off=$(tput sgr0) + else # this is a try for old BSD, see terminfo(5) + bold=$(tput md) + underline=$(tput us) + italic=$(tput ZH 2>/dev/null) # This doesn't work on FreeBSDi (9,10) and OpenBSD + italic_end=$(tput ZR 2>/dev/null) # ... probably entry missing in /etc/termcap + reverse=$(tput mr) + off=$(tput me) + fi + fi + # FreeBSD 10 understands ESC codes like 'echo -e "\e[3mfoobar\e[23m"', but also no tput for italics +} + +strip_quote() { + # remove color codes (see https://www.commandlinefu.com/commands/view/3584/remove-color-codes-special-characters-with-sed) + # \', leading and all trailing spaces + sed -e "s,$(echo -e "\033")\[[0-9;]*[a-zA-Z],,g" \ + -e "s/\"/\\'/g" \ + -e 's/^ *//g' \ + -e 's/ *$//g' <<< "$1" +} + +# " deconfuse vim\'s syntax highlighting ;-) + +#################### JSON FILE FORMATTING #################### + +fileout_json_footer() { + if "$do_json"; then + if [[ "$SCAN_TIME" -eq 0 ]]; then + fileout_json_finding "scanTime" "WARN" "Scan interrupted" "" "" "" + elif [[ $SEVERITY_LEVEL -lt $LOW ]] ; then + # no scan time in --severity=low and above, also needed for Travis, hackish... + fileout_json_finding "scanTime" "INFO" $SCAN_TIME "" "" "" + fi + printf "]\n" >> "$JSONFILE" + fi + if "$do_pretty_json"; then + if [[ "$SCAN_TIME" -eq 0 ]]; then + echo -e " ],\n \"scanTime\" : \"Scan interrupted\"\n}" >> "$JSONFILE" + else + echo -e " ],\n \"scanTime\" : ${SCAN_TIME}\n}" >> "$JSONFILE" + fi + fi +} + +fileout_json_section() { + case $1 in + 0) echo -e " \"pretest\" : [" ;; + 1) echo -e " \"singleCipher\" : [" ;; + 2) echo -e ",\n \"protocols\" : [" ;; + 3) echo -e ",\n \"grease\" : [" ;; + 4) echo -e ",\n \"ciphers\" : [" ;; + 5) echo -e ",\n \"pfs\" : [" ;; + 6) echo -e ",\n \"serverPreferences\" : [" ;; + 7) echo -e ",\n \"serverDefaults\" : [" ;; + 8) echo -e ",\n \"headerResponse\" : [" ;; + 9) echo -e ",\n \"vulnerabilities\" : [" ;; + 10) echo -e ",\n \"cipherTests\" : [" ;; + 11) echo -e ",\n \"browserSimulations\": [" ;; + *) echo "invalid section" ;; + esac +} + +fileout_section_header() { + local str="" + "$2" && str="$(fileout_section_footer false)" + "$do_pretty_json" && FIRST_FINDING=true && (printf "%s%s\n" "$str" "$(fileout_json_section "$1")") >> "$JSONFILE" + SECTION_FOOTER_NEEDED=true +} + +# arg1: whether to end object too +fileout_section_footer() { + "$do_pretty_json" && printf "\n ]" >> "$JSONFILE" + "$do_pretty_json" && "$1" && echo -e "\n }" >> "$JSONFILE" + SECTION_FOOTER_NEEDED=false +} + +fileout_json_print_parameter() { + local parameter="$1" + local filler="$2" + local value="$3" + local not_last="$4" + local spaces="" + + "$do_json" && \ + spaces=" " || \ + spaces=" " + if [[ -n "$value" ]] || [[ "$parameter" == finding ]]; then + printf "%s%s%s%s" "$spaces" "\"$parameter\"" "$filler" ": \"$value\"" >> "$JSONFILE" + "$not_last" && printf ",\n" >> "$JSONFILE" + fi +} + +fileout_json_finding() { + local target + local finding="$3" + local cve="$4" + local cwe="$5" + local hint="$6" + + if "$do_json"; then + "$FIRST_FINDING" || echo -n "," >> "$JSONFILE" + echo -e " {" >> "$JSONFILE" + fileout_json_print_parameter "id" " " "$1" true + fileout_json_print_parameter "ip" " " "$NODE/$NODEIP" true + fileout_json_print_parameter "port" " " "$PORT" true + fileout_json_print_parameter "severity" " " "$2" true + fileout_json_print_parameter "cve" " " "$cve" true + fileout_json_print_parameter "cwe" " " "$cwe" true + "$GIVE_HINTS" && fileout_json_print_parameter "hint" " " "$hint" true + fileout_json_print_parameter "finding" " " "$finding" false + echo -e "\n }" >> "$JSONFILE" + fi + if "$do_pretty_json"; then + if [[ "$1" == service ]]; then + if [[ $SERVER_COUNTER -gt 1 ]]; then + echo " ," >> "$JSONFILE" + fi + target="$NODE" + $do_mx_all_ips && target="$URI" + echo -e " { + \"targetHost\" : \"$target\", + \"ip\" : \"$NODEIP\", + \"port\" : \"$PORT\", + \"rDNS\" : \"$rDNS\", + \"service\" : \"$finding\"," >> "$JSONFILE" + $do_mx_all_ips && echo -e " \"hostname\" : \"$NODE\"," >> "$JSONFILE" + else + ("$FIRST_FINDING" && echo -n " {" >> "$JSONFILE") || echo -n ",{" >> "$JSONFILE" + echo -e -n "\n" >> "$JSONFILE" + fileout_json_print_parameter "id" " " "$1" true + fileout_json_print_parameter "severity" " " "$2" true + fileout_json_print_parameter "cve" " " "$cve" true + fileout_json_print_parameter "cwe" " " "$cwe" true + "$GIVE_HINTS" && fileout_json_print_parameter "hint" " " "$hint" true + fileout_json_print_parameter "finding" " " "$finding" false + echo -e -n "\n }" >> "$JSONFILE" + fi + fi +} + +##################### FILE FORMATTING ######################### + +fileout_pretty_json_banner() { + local target + + if ! "$do_mass_testing"; then + [[ -z "$NODE" ]] && parse_hn_port "${URI}" + # NODE, URL_PATH, PORT, IPADDR and IP46ADDR is set now --> wrong place + target="$NODE" + $do_mx_all_ips && target="$URI" + fi + + echo -e " \"Invocation\" : \"$PROG_NAME $CMDLINE\", + \"at\" : \"$HNAME:$OPENSSL_LOCATION\", + \"version\" : \"$VERSION ${GIT_REL_SHORT} from $REL_DATE\", + \"openssl\" : \"$OSSL_NAME $OSSL_VER from $OSSL_BUILD_DATE\", + \"startTime\" : \"$START_TIME\", + \"scanResult\" : [" +} + +fileout_banner() { + if "$JSONHEADER"; then + # "$do_json" && # here we maybe should add a banner, too + "$do_pretty_json" && FIRST_FINDING=true && (printf "%s\n" "$(fileout_pretty_json_banner)") >> "$JSONFILE" + fi +} + +fileout_separator() { + if "$JSONHEADER"; then + "$do_pretty_json" && echo " ," >> "$JSONFILE" + "$do_json" && echo -n "," >> "$JSONFILE" + fi +} + +fileout_footer() { + if "$JSONHEADER"; then + fileout_json_footer + fi + # CSV: no footer + return 0 +} + +fileout_insert_warning() { + # See #815. Make sure we don't mess up the JSON PRETTY format if we complain with a client side warning. + # This should only be called if an *extra* warning will be printed (previously: 'fileout <extra_warning_ID> "WARN" ' + # arg1: json identifier, arg2: normally "WARN", arg3: finding + # + # Also, we have to be careful with any form of mass testing so that a warning won't lead to an invalid JSON + # file. As any child will do any check as well (to be reconsidered later), we don't need also the parent to issue + # warnings upfront, see #1169. As a detection we'll use --file/-iL as in the children jobs it'll be removed: + [[ "$CMDLINE=" =~ --file ]] && return 0 + [[ "$CMDLINE=" =~ -iL ]] && return 0 + # Note we still have the message on screen + in HTML which is not as optimal as it could be + + if "$do_pretty_json"; then + echo -e " \"clientProblem${CLIENT_PROB_NO}\" : [" >>"$JSONFILE" + CLIENT_PROB_NO=$((CLIENT_PROB_NO + 1)) + FIRST_FINDING=true # make sure we don't have a comma here + fi + fileout "$1" "$2" "$3" + if "$do_pretty_json"; then + echo -e "\n ]," >>"$JSONFILE" + fi +} + +fileout_csv_finding() { + safe_echo "\"$1\"," >> "$CSVFILE" + safe_echo "\"$2\"," >> "$CSVFILE" + safe_echo "\"$3\"," >> "$CSVFILE" + safe_echo "\"$4\"," >> "$CSVFILE" + safe_echo "\"$5\"," >> "$CSVFILE" + safe_echo "\"$6\"," >> "$CSVFILE" + if "$GIVE_HINTS"; then + safe_echo "\"$7\"," >> "$CSVFILE" + safe_echo "\"$8\"\n" >> "$CSVFILE" + else + safe_echo "\"$7\"\n" >> "$CSVFILE" + fi +} + + +# ID, SEVERITY, FINDING, CVE, CWE, HINT +fileout() { + local severity="$2" + local cve="$4" + local cwe="$5" + local hint="$6" + + if ( "$do_pretty_json" && [[ "$1" == service ]] ) || show_finding "$severity"; then + local finding=$(strip_lf "$(newline_to_spaces "$(strip_quote "$3")")") # additional quotes will mess up screen output + [[ -e "$JSONFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$JSONFILE" ]] && fileout_json_finding "$1" "$severity" "$finding" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + "$do_csv" && [[ -n "$CSVFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$CSVFILE" ]] && \ + fileout_csv_finding "$1" "$NODE/$NODEIP" "$PORT" "$severity" "$finding" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + "$FIRST_FINDING" && FIRST_FINDING=false + fi +} + + +json_header() { + local fname_prefix + local filename_provided=false + + [[ -n "$JSONFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$JSONFILE" ]] && filename_provided=true + # Similar to HTML: Don't create headers and footers in the following scenarios: + # * no JSON/CSV output is being created. + # * mass testing is being performed and each test will have its own file. + # * this is an individual test within a mass test and all output is being placed in a single file. + ! "$do_json" && ! "$do_pretty_json" && JSONHEADER=false && return 0 + "$do_mass_testing" && ! "$filename_provided" && JSONHEADER=false && return 0 + "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && "$filename_provided" && JSONHEADER=false && return 0 + + if "$do_display_only"; then + fname_prefix="local-ciphers" + elif "$do_mass_testing"; then + : + elif "$do_mx_all_ips"; then + fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}mx-${URI}" + else + # ensure NODE, URL_PATH, PORT, IPADDR and IP46ADDR are set + ! "$filename_provided" && [[ -z "$NODE" ]] && parse_hn_port "${URI}" + fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}${NODE}_p${PORT}" + fi + if [[ -z "$JSONFILE" ]]; then + JSONFILE="$fname_prefix-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".json)" + elif [[ -d "$JSONFILE" ]]; then + JSONFILE="$JSONFILE/${fname_prefix}-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".json)" + fi + # Silently reset APPEND var if the file doesn't exist as otherwise it won't be created + if "$APPEND" && [[ ! -s "$JSONFILE" ]]; then + APPEND=false + fi + if "$APPEND"; then + JSONHEADER=false + else + [[ -s "$JSONFILE" ]] && fatal "non-empty \"$JSONFILE\" exists. Either use \"--append\" or (re)move it" $ERR_FCREATE + "$do_json" && echo "[" > "$JSONFILE" + "$do_pretty_json" && echo "{" > "$JSONFILE" + fi + return 0 +} + + +csv_header() { + local fname_prefix + local filename_provided=false + + [[ -n "$CSVFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$CSVFILE" ]] && filename_provided=true + # CSV similar to JSON + ! "$do_csv" && CSVHEADER=false && return 0 + "$do_mass_testing" && ! "$filename_provided" && CSVHEADER=false && return 0 + "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && "$filename_provided" && CSVHEADER=false && return 0 + + if "$do_display_only"; then + fname_prefix="local-ciphers" + elif "$do_mass_testing"; then + : + elif "$do_mx_all_ips"; then + fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}mx-${URI}" + else + # ensure NODE, URL_PATH, PORT, IPADDR and IP46ADDR are set + ! "$filename_provided" && [[ -z "$NODE" ]] && parse_hn_port "${URI}" + fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}${NODE}_p${PORT}" + fi + if [[ -z "$CSVFILE" ]]; then + CSVFILE="${fname_prefix}-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".csv)" + elif [[ -d "$CSVFILE" ]]; then + CSVFILE="$CSVFILE/${fname_prefix}-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".csv)" + fi + # Silently reset APPEND var if the file doesn't exist as otherwise it won't be created + if "$APPEND" && [[ ! -s "$CSVFILE" ]]; then + APPEND=false + fi + if "$APPEND"; then + CSVHEADER=false + else + [[ -s "$CSVFILE" ]] && fatal "non-empty \"$CSVFILE\" exists. Either use \"--append\" or (re)move it" $ERR_FCREATE + touch "$CSVFILE" + if "$GIVE_HINTS"; then + fileout_csv_finding "id" "fqdn/ip" "port" "severity" "finding" "cve" "cwe" "hint" + else + fileout_csv_finding "id" "fqdn/ip" "port" "severity" "finding" "cve" "cwe" + fi + fi + return 0 +} + + +################# JSON FILE FORMATTING END. HTML START #################### + +html_header() { + local fname_prefix + local filename_provided=false + + [[ -n "$HTMLFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$HTMLFILE" ]] && filename_provided=true + # Don't create HTML headers and footers in the following scenarios: + # * HTML output is not being created. + # * mass testing is being performed and each test will have its own HTML file. + # * this is an individual test within a mass test and all HTML output is being placed in a single file. + ! "$do_html" && HTMLHEADER=false && return 0 + "$do_mass_testing" && ! "$filename_provided" && HTMLHEADER=false && return 0 + "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && "$filename_provided" && HTMLHEADER=false && return 0 + + if "$do_display_only"; then + fname_prefix="local-ciphers" + elif "$do_mass_testing"; then + : + elif "$do_mx_all_ips"; then + fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}mx-${URI}" + else + # ensure NODE, URL_PATH, PORT, IPADDR and IP46ADDR are set + ! "$filename_provided" && [[ -z "$NODE" ]] && parse_hn_port "${URI}" + fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}${NODE}_p${PORT}" + fi + if [[ -z "$HTMLFILE" ]]; then + HTMLFILE="$fname_prefix-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".html)" + elif [[ -d "$HTMLFILE" ]]; then + HTMLFILE="$HTMLFILE/$fname_prefix-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".html)" + fi + # Silently reset APPEND var if the file doesn't exist as otherwise it won't be created + if "$APPEND" && [[ ! -s "$HTMLFILE" ]]; then + APPEND=false + fi + if "$APPEND"; then + HTMLHEADER=false + else + [[ -s "$HTMLFILE" ]] && fatal "non-empty \"$HTMLFILE\" exists. Either use \"--append\" or (re)move it" $ERR_FCREATE + html_out "<?xml version=\"1.0\" encoding=\"UTF-8\" ?>\n" + html_out "<!DOCTYPE html PUBLIC \"-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN\" \"http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd\">\n" + html_out "<!-- This file was created with testssl.sh. https://testssl.sh -->\n" + html_out "<html xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml\">\n" + html_out "<head>\n" + html_out "<meta http-equiv=\"Content-Type\" content=\"application/xml+xhtml; charset=UTF-8\" />\n" + html_out "<title>testssl.sh</title>\n" + html_out "</head>\n" + html_out "<body>\n" + html_out "<pre>\n" + fi + return 0 +} + +html_banner() { + if "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && "$HTMLHEADER"; then + html_out "## Scan started as: \"$PROG_NAME $CMDLINE\"\n" + html_out "## at $HNAME:$OPENSSL_LOCATION\n" + html_out "## version testssl: $VERSION ${GIT_REL_SHORT} from $REL_DATE\n" + html_out "## version openssl: \"$OSSL_NAME $OSSL_VER\" from \"$OSSL_BUILD_DATE\")\n\n" + fi +} + +html_footer() { + if "$HTMLHEADER"; then + html_out "</pre>\n" + html_out "</body>\n" + html_out "</html>\n" + fi + return 0 +} + +################# HTML FILE FORMATTING END #################### + +prepare_logging() { + # arg1: for testing mx records name we put a name of logfile in here, otherwise we get strange file names + local fname_prefix="$1" + local filename_provided=false + + [[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && [[ ! -d "$LOGFILE" ]] && filename_provided=true + + # Similar to html_header(): + ! "$do_logging" && return 0 + "$do_mass_testing" && ! "$filename_provided" && return 0 + "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && "$filename_provided" && return 0 + + [[ -z "$fname_prefix" ]] && fname_prefix="${FNAME_PREFIX}${NODE}_p${PORT}" + + if [[ -z "$LOGFILE" ]]; then + LOGFILE="$fname_prefix-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".log)" + elif [[ -d "$LOGFILE" ]]; then + # actually we were instructed to place all files in a DIR instead of the current working dir + LOGFILE="$LOGFILE/$fname_prefix-$(date +"%Y%m%d-%H%M".log)" + else + : # just for clarity: a log file was specified, no need to do anything else + fi + + if ! "$APPEND"; then + [[ -s "$LOGFILE" ]] && fatal "non-empty \"$LOGFILE\" exists. Either use \"--append\" or (re)move it" $ERR_FCREATE + fi + tmln_out "## Scan started as: \"$PROG_NAME $CMDLINE\"" >>"$LOGFILE" + tmln_out "## at $HNAME:$OPENSSL_LOCATION" >>"$LOGFILE" + tmln_out "## version testssl: $VERSION ${GIT_REL_SHORT} from $REL_DATE" >>"$LOGFILE" + tmln_out "## version openssl: \"$OSSL_VER\" from \"$OSSL_BUILD_DATE\")\n" >>"$LOGFILE" + exec > >(tee -a -i "$LOGFILE") +} + +################### FILE FORMATTING END ######################### + +###### START helper function definitions ###### + +if [[ "${BASH_VERSINFO[0]}" == 3 ]]; then + # older bash can do this only (MacOS X), even SLES 11, see #697 + toupper() { tr 'a-z' 'A-Z' <<< "$1"; } + tolower() { tr 'A-Z' 'a-z' <<< "$1"; } +else + toupper() { echo -n "${1^^}"; } + tolower() { echo -n "${1,,}"; } +fi + +get_last_char() { + echo "${1:~0}" # "${string: -1}" would work too (both also in bash 3.2) +} + # Checking for last char. If already a separator supplied, we don't need an additional one +debugme() { + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 2 ]] && "$@" >&2 + return 0 +} + +hex2dec() { + echo $((16#$1)) +} + +# convert 414243 into ABC +hex2ascii() { + for (( i=0; i<${#1}; i+=2 )); do + # 2>/dev/null added because 'warning: command substitution: ignored null byte in input' + # --> didn't help though + printf "\x${1:$i:2}" 2>/dev/null + done +} + +# convert decimal number < 256 to hex +dec02hex() { + printf "x%02x" "$1" +} + +# convert decimal number between 256 and < 256*256 to hex +dec04hex() { + local a=$(printf "%04x" "$1") + printf "x%02s, x%02s" "${a:0:2}" "${a:2:2}" +} + + +# trim spaces for BSD and old sed +count_lines() { + #echo "${$(wc -l <<< "$1")// /}" + # ^^ bad substitution under bash, zsh ok. For some reason this does the trick: + echo $(wc -l <<< "$1") +} + +count_words() { + #echo "${$(wc -w <<< "$1")// /}" + # ^^ bad substitution under bash, zsh ok. For some reason this does the trick: + echo $(wc -w <<< "$1") +} + +count_ciphers() { + echo $(wc -w <<< "${1//:/ }") +} + +#arg1: TLS 1.2 and below ciphers +#arg2: TLS 1.3 ciphers +#arg3: options (e.g., -V) +actually_supported_osslciphers() { + local tls13_ciphers="$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS" + + [[ "$2" != ALL ]] && tls13_ciphers="$2" + if "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then + $OPENSSL ciphers $3 $OSSL_CIPHERS_S -ciphersuites "$tls13_ciphers" "$1" 2>/dev/null || echo "" + elif [[ -n "$tls13_ciphers" ]]; then + $OPENSSL ciphers $3 $OSSL_CIPHERS_S "$tls13_ciphers:$1" 2>/dev/null || echo "" + else + $OPENSSL ciphers $OSSL_CIPHERS_S $3 "$1" 2>/dev/null || echo "" + fi +} + +# Given a protocol (arg1) and a list of ciphers (arg2) that is formatted as +# ", xx,xx, xx,xx, xx,xx, xx,xx" remove any TLSv1.3 ciphers if the protocol +# is less than 04 and remove any TLSv1.2-only ciphers if the protocol is less +# than 03. +strip_inconsistent_ciphers() { + local -i proto=0x$1 + local cipherlist="$2" + + [[ $proto -lt 4 ]] && cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 13,0[0-9a-fA-F]/}" + if [[ $proto -lt 3 ]]; then + cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,3[b-fB-F]/}" + cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,40/}" + cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,6[7-9a-dA-D]/}" + cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,9[c-fC-F]/}" + cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,[abAB][0-9a-fA-F]/}" + cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 00,[cC][0-5]/}" + cipherlist="${cipherlist//, 16,[bB][7-9aA]/}" + cipherlist="${cipherlist//, [cC]0,2[3-9a-fA-F]/}" + cipherlist="${cipherlist//, [cC]0,3[01278a-fA-F]/}" + cipherlist="${cipherlist//, [cC]0,[4-9aA][0-9a-fA-F]/}" + cipherlist="${cipherlist//, [cC][cC],1[345]/}" + cipherlist="${cipherlist//, [cC][cC],[aA][89a-eA-E]/}" + fi + echo "$cipherlist" + return 0 +} + +newline_to_spaces() { + tr '\n' ' ' <<< "$1" | sed 's/ $//' +} + +colon_to_spaces() { + echo "${1//:/ }" +} + +strip_lf() { + tr -d '\n' <<< "$1" | tr -d '\r' +} + +strip_spaces() { + echo "${1// /}" +} + +# https://web.archive.org/web/20121022051228/http://codesnippets.joyent.com/posts/show/1816 +strip_leading_space() { + printf "%s" "${1#"${1%%[![:space:]]*}"}" +} +strip_trailing_space() { + printf "%s" "${1%"${1##*[![:space:]]}"}" +} + + +# retrieve cipher from ServerHello (via openssl) +get_cipher() { + local cipher="" + local server_hello="$(cat -v "$1")" + # This and two other following instances are not best practice and normally a useless use of "cat", see + # https://web.archive.org/web/20160711205930/http://porkmail.org/era/unix/award.html#uucaletter + # However there seem to be cases where the preferred $(< "$1") logic has a problem. + # Esepcially with bash 3.2 (Mac OS X) and when on the server side binary chars + # are returned, see https://stackoverflow.com/questions/7427262/how-to-read-a-file-into-a-variable-in-shell#22607352 + # and https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1292 + # Performance measurements showed no to barely measureable penalty (1s displayed in 9 tries). + + if [[ "$server_hello" =~ Cipher\ *:\ ([A-Z0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9\-]+|TLS_[A-Za-z0-9_]+|SSL_[A-Za-z0-9_]+) ]]; then + cipher="${BASH_REMATCH##* }" + elif [[ "$server_hello" =~ (New|Reused)", "(SSLv[23]|TLSv1(\.[0-3])?(\/SSLv3)?)", Cipher is "([A-Z0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9\-]+|TLS_[A-Za-z0-9_]+) ]]; then + cipher="${BASH_REMATCH##* }" + fi + tm_out "$cipher" +} + +# retrieve protocol from ServerHello (via openssl) +get_protocol() { + local protocol="" + local server_hello="$(cat -v "$1")" + + if [[ "$server_hello" =~ Protocol\ *:\ (SSLv[23]|TLSv1(\.[0-3])?) ]]; then + protocol="${BASH_REMATCH##* }" + elif [[ "$server_hello" =~ (New|Reused)", TLSv1.3, Cipher is "TLS_[A-Z0-9_]+ ]]; then + # Note: When OpenSSL prints "New, <protocol>, Cipher is <cipher>", <cipher> is the + # negotiated cipher, but <protocol> is not the negotiated protocol. Instead, it is + # the SSL/TLS protocol that first defined <cipher>. Since the ciphers that were + # first defined for TLSv1.3 may only be used with TLSv1.3, this line may be used + # to determine whether TLSv1.3 was negotiated, but if another protocol is specified + # on this line, then this line does not indicate the actual protocol negotiated. Also, + # only TLSv1.3 cipher suites have names that begin with TLS_, which provides additional + # assurance that the above match will only succeed if TLSv1.3 was negotiated. + protocol="TLSv1.3" + fi + tm_out "$protocol" +} + +is_number() { + [[ "$1" =~ ^[1-9][0-9]*$ ]] && \ + return 0 || \ + return 1 +} + +is_ipv4addr() { + local octet="(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|[1-9]?[0-9])" + local ipv4address="$octet\\.$octet\\.$octet\\.$octet" + + [[ -z "$1" ]] && return 1 + # more than numbers, important for hosts like AAA.BBB.CCC.DDD.in-addr.arpa.DOMAIN.TLS + [[ -n $(tr -d '0-9\.' <<< "$1") ]] && return 1 + + grep -Eq "$ipv4address" <<< "$1" && \ + return 0 || \ + return 1 +} + +# a bit easier +is_ipv6addr() { + [[ -z "$1" ]] && return 1 + # less than 2x ":" + [[ $(count_lines "$(tr ':' '\n' <<< "$1")") -le 1 ]] && \ + return 1 + #check on chars allowed: + [[ -n "$(tr -d '0-9:a-fA-F ' <<< "$1" | sed -e '/^$/d')" ]] && \ + return 1 + return 0 +} + +# now some function for the integrated BIGIP F5 Cookie detector (see https://github.com/drwetter/F5-BIGIP-Decoder) + +f5_hex2ip() { + debugme echo "$1" + echo $((16#${1:0:2})).$((16#${1:2:2})).$((16#${1:4:2})).$((16#${1:6:2})) +} +f5_hex2ip6() { + debugme echo "$1" + echo "[${1:0:4}:${1:4:4}:${1:8:4}:${1:12:4}.${1:16:4}:${1:20:4}:${1:24:4}:${1:28:4}]" +} + +f5_determine_routeddomain() { + local tmp + tmp="${1%%o*}" + echo "${tmp/rd/}" +} + +f5_ip_oldstyle() { + local tmp + local a b c d + + tmp="${1/%.*}" # until first dot + tmp="$(printf "%08x" "$tmp")" # convert the whole thing to hex, now back to ip (reversed notation: + tmp="$(f5_hex2ip $tmp)" # transform to ip with reversed notation + IFS="." read -r a b c d <<< "$tmp" # reverse it + echo $d.$c.$b.$a +} + +f5_port_decode() { + local tmp + + tmp="$(strip_lf "$1")" # remove lf if there is one + tmp="${tmp/.0000/}" # to be sure remove trailing zeros with a dot + tmp="${tmp#*.}" # get the port + tmp="$(printf "%04x" "${tmp}")" # to hex + if [[ ${#tmp} -eq 4 ]]; then + : + elif [[ ${#tmp} -eq 3 ]]; then # fill it up with leading zeros if needed + tmp=0${tmp} + elif [[ ${#tmp} -eq 2 ]]; then + tmp=00${tmp} + fi + echo $((16#${tmp:2:2}${tmp:0:2})) # reverse order and convert it from hex to dec +} + + + +###### END helper function definitions ###### + +# prints out multiple lines in $1, left aligned by spaces in $2 +out_row_aligned() { + local first=true + + while read line; do + "$first" && \ + first=false || \ + out "$2" + outln "$line" + done <<< "$1" +} + +# prints text over multiple lines, trying to make no line longer than $max_width. +# Each line is indented with $spaces. +out_row_aligned_max_width() { + local text="$1" + local spaces="$2" + local -i max_width="$3" + local -i i len + local cr=$'\n' + local line + local first=true + + max_width=$max_width-${#spaces} + len=${#text} + while true; do + if [[ $len -lt $max_width ]]; then + # If the remaining text to print is shorter than $max_width, + # then just print it. + i=$len + else + # Find the final space character in the text that is less than + # $max_width characters into the remaining text, and make the + # text up to that space character the next line to print. + line="${text:0:max_width}" + line="${line% *}" + i="${#line}" + if [[ $i -eq $max_width ]]; then + # If there are no space characters in the first $max_width + # characters of the remaining text, then make the text up + # to the first space the next line to print. If there are + # no space characters in the remaining text, make the + # remaining text the next line to print. + line="${text#* }" + i=$len-${#line} + [[ $i -eq 0 ]] && i=$len + fi + fi + if ! "$first"; then + tm_out "${cr}${spaces}" + fi + tm_out "${text:0:i}" + [[ $i -eq $len ]] && break + len=$len-$i-1 + i=$i+1 + text="${text:i:len}" + first=false + [[ $len -eq 0 ]] && break + done + return 0 +} + +out_row_aligned_max_width_by_entry() { + local text="$1" + local spaces="$2" + local -i max_width="$3" + local print_function="$4" + local resp entry prev_entry=" " + + resp="$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$text" "$spaces" "$max_width")" + while read -d " " entry; do + if [[ -n "$entry" ]]; then + $print_function "$entry" + elif [[ -n "$prev_entry" ]]; then + outln; out " " + fi + out " " + prev_entry="$entry" + done <<< "$resp" +} + +print_fixed_width() { + local text="$1" + local -i i len width="$2" + local print_function="$3" + + len=${#text} + $print_function "$text" + for (( i=len; i <= width; i++ )); do + out " " + done +} + +# saves $TMPFILE or file supplied in $2 under name "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.$1". +# Note: after finishing $TEMPDIR will be removed unless DEBUG >=1 +tmpfile_handle() { + local savefile="$2" + [[ -z "$savefile" ]] && savefile=$TMPFILE +#FIXME: make sure/find out if we do not need $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.$1" if debug=0. We would save fs access here + mv $savefile "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.$1" 2>/dev/null + [[ $ERRFILE =~ dev.null ]] && return 0 || \ + mv $ERRFILE "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.${1//.txt/}.errorlog" 2>/dev/null + return 0 +} + +# arg1: line with comment sign, tabs and so on +filter_input() { + sed -e 's/#.*$//' -e '/^$/d' <<< "$1" | tr -d '\n' | tr -d '\t' | tr -d '\r' +} + +# Dl's any URL (arg1) via HTTP 1.1 GET from port 80, arg2: file to store http body. +# Proxy is not honored yet (see cmd line switches) -- except when using curl or wget. +# There the environment variable is used automatically +# Currently it is being used by check_revocation_crl() only. +http_get() { + local proto z + local node="" query="" + local dl="$2" + local useragent="$UA_STD" + local jsonID="http_get" + + "$SNEAKY" && useragent="$UA_SNEAKY" + + if type -p curl &>/dev/null; then + if [[ -z "$PROXY" ]]; then + curl -s --noproxy '*' -A $''"$useragent"'' -o $dl "$1" + else + # for the sake of simplicity assume the proxy is using http + curl -s -x $PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT -A $''"$useragent"'' -o $dl "$1" + fi + return $? + elif type -p wget &>/dev/null; then + # wget has no proxy command line. We need to use http_proxy instead. And for the sake of simplicity + # assume the GET protocol we query is using http -- http_proxy is the $ENV not for the connection TO + # the proxy, but for the protocol we query THROUGH the proxy + if [[ -z "$PROXY" ]]; then + wget --no-proxy -q -U $''"$useragent"'' -O $dl "$1" + else + if [[ -z "$http_proxy" ]]; then + http_proxy=http://$PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT wget -q -U $''"$useragent"'' -O $dl "$1" + else + wget -q -U $''"$useragent"'' -O $dl "$1" + fi + fi + return $? + else + # Worst option: slower and hiccups with chunked transfers. Workaround for the + # latter is using HTTP/1.0. We do not support https here, yet. + # First the URL will be split + IFS=/ read -r proto z node query <<< "$1" + proto=${proto%:} + if [[ "$proto" != http ]]; then + pr_warning "protocol $proto not supported yet" + fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "protocol $proto not supported yet" + return 6 + fi + if [[ -n $PROXY ]]; then + # PROXYNODE works better than PROXYIP on modern versions of squid. \ + # We don't reuse the code in fd_socket() as there's initial CONNECT which makes problems + if ! exec 33<> /dev/tcp/${PROXYNODE}/${PROXYPORT}; then + outln + pr_warning "$PROG_NAME: unable to open a socket to proxy $PROXYNODE:$PROXYPORT" + fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "$PROG_NAME: unable to open a socket to proxy $PROXYNODE:$PROXYPORT" + return 6 + else + printf -- "%b" "GET $proto://$node/$query HTTP/1.0\r\nUser-Agent: $useragent\r\nHost: $node\r\nAccept: */*\r\n\r\n" >&33 + fi + else + IFS=/ read -r proto z node query <<< "$1" + exec 33<>/dev/tcp/$node/80 + printf -- "%b" "GET /$query HTTP/1.0\r\nUser-Agent: $useragent\r\nHost: $node\r\nAccept: */*\r\n\r\n" >&33 + fi + # Strip HTTP header. When in Debug Mode we leave the raw data in place + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then + cat <&33 >${dl}.raw + cat ${dl}.raw | sed '1,/^[[:space:]]*$/d' >${dl} + else + cat <&33 | sed '1,/^[[:space:]]*$/d' >${dl} + fi + exec 33<&- + exec 33>&- + [[ -s "$dl" ]] && return 0 || return 1 + fi +} + +# Outputs the headers when downloading any URL (arg1) via HTTP 1.1 GET from port 80. +# Only works if curl or wget is available. +# There the environment variable is used automatically +# Currently it is being used by check_pwnedkeys() only. +http_get_header() { + local proto z + local node="" query="" + local dl="$2" + local useragent="$UA_STD" + local jsonID="http_get_header" + local headers + local -i ret + + "$SNEAKY" && useragent="$UA_SNEAKY" + + if type -p curl &>/dev/null; then + if [[ -z "$PROXY" ]]; then + headers="$(curl --head -s --noproxy '*' -A $''"$useragent"'' "$1")" + else + # for the sake of simplicity assume the proxy is using http + headers="$(curl --head -s -x $PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT -A $''"$useragent"'' "$1")" + fi + ret=$? + [[ $ret -eq 0 ]] && tm_out "$headers" + return $ret + elif type -p wget &>/dev/null; then + # wget has no proxy command line. We need to use http_proxy instead. And for the sake of simplicity + # assume the GET protocol we query is using http -- http_proxy is the $ENV not for the connection TO + # the proxy, but for the protocol we query THROUGH the proxy + if [[ -z "$PROXY" ]]; then + headers="$(wget --no-proxy -q -S -U $''"$useragent"'' -O /dev/null "$1" 2>&1)" + else + if [[ -z "$http_proxy" ]]; then + headers="$(http_proxy=http://$PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT wget -q -S -U $''"$useragent"'' -O /dev/null "$1" 2>&1)" + else + headers="$(wget -q -S -U $''"$useragent"'' -O /dev/null "$1" 2>&1)" + fi + fi + ret=$? + [[ $ret -eq 0 ]] && tm_out "$headers" + # wget(1): "8: Server issued an error response.". Happens e.g. when 404 is returned. However also if the call wasn't correct (400) + # So we assume for now that everything is submitted correctly. We parse the error code too later + [[ $ret -eq 8 ]] && ret=0 && tm_out "$headers" + return $ret + else + return 1 + fi +} + +ldap_get() { + local ldif + local -i success + local crl="$1" + local tmpfile="$2" + local jsonID="$3" + + if type -p curl &>/dev/null; then + # proxy handling? + ldif="$(curl -s "$crl")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] || return 1 + awk '/certificateRevocationList/ { print $2 }' <<< "$ldif" | $OPENSSL base64 -d -A -out "$tmpfile" 2>/dev/null + [[ -s "$tmpfile" ]] || return 1 + return 0 + else + pr_litecyan " (for LDAP CRL check install \"curl\")" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "LDAP CRL revocation check needs \"curl\"" + return 2 + fi +} + +# checks whether the public key in arg1 appears in the https://pwnedkeys.com/ database. +# arg1: file containing certificate +# arg2: public key algorithm +# arg3 key size +# Responses are as follows: +# 0 - not checked +# 1 - key not found in database +# 2 - key found in database +# 7 - network/proxy failure +check_pwnedkeys() { + local cert="$1" + local cert_key_algo="$2" + local -i cert_keysize="$3" + local pubkey curve response + + "$PHONE_OUT" || return 0 + + # https://pwnedkeys.com only keeps records on 1024 bit and larger RSA keys, + # as well as elliptic-curve keys on the P-256, P-384, and P-521 curves. + if [[ "$cert_key_algo" =~ RSA ]] || [[ "$cert_key_algo" =~ rsa ]]; then + [[ $cert_keysize -ge 1024 ]] || return 0 + elif [[ "$cert_key_algo" =~ ecdsa ]] || [[ "$cert_key_algo" == *ecPublicKey ]]; then + [[ $cert_keysize -eq 256 ]] || [[ $cert_keysize -eq 384 ]] || \ + [[ $cert_keysize -eq 521 ]] || return 0 + else + return 0 + fi + + pubkey="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$cert" -pubkey -noout 2>/dev/null)" + # If it is an elliptic curve key, check that it is P-256, P-384, or P-521. + if [[ "$cert_key_algo" =~ ecdsa ]] || [[ "$cert_key_algo" == *ecPublicKey ]]; then + curve="$($OPENSSL ec -pubin -text <<< "$pubkey" 2>/dev/null)" + curve="${curve#*ASN1 OID: }" + [[ "$curve" == prime256v1* ]] || [[ "$curve" == secp384r1* ]] || \ + [[ "$curve" == secp521r1* ]] || return 0 + fi + fingerprint="$($OPENSSL pkey -pubin -outform DER <<< "$pubkey" 2>/dev/null | $OPENSSL dgst -sha256 -hex 2>/dev/null)" + fingerprint="${fingerprint#*= }" + response="$(http_get_header "https://v1.pwnedkeys.com/$fingerprint")" + # Handle curl's/wget's connectivity exit codes + case $? in + 4|5|7) return 7 ;; + 1|2|3|6) return 0 ;; + # unknown codes we just say "not checked" + esac + if [[ "$response" =~ "404 Not Found" ]]; then + return 1 + elif [[ "$response" =~ "200 OK" ]]; then + return 2 + else + return 0 + fi +} + +check_revocation_crl() { + local crl="$1" + local jsonID="$2" + local tmpfile="" + local scheme retcode + local -i success + + "$PHONE_OUT" || return 0 + [[ -n "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE" ]] || return 0 + scheme="$(tolower "${crl%%://*}")" + # The code for obtaining CRLs only supports LDAP, HTTP, and HTTPS URLs. + [[ "$scheme" == http ]] || [[ "$scheme" == https ]] || [[ "$scheme" == ldap ]] || return 0 + tmpfile=$TEMPDIR/${NODE}-${NODEIP}.${crl##*\/} || exit $ERR_FCREATE + if [[ "$scheme" == ldap ]]; then + ldap_get "$crl" "$tmpfile" "$jsonID" + success=$? + else + http_get "$crl" "$tmpfile" + success=$? + fi + if [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then + return 0 + elif [[ $success -ne 0 ]]; then + out ", " + pr_warning "retrieval of \"$crl\" failed" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "CRL retrieval from $crl failed" + return 1 + fi + # -crl_download could be more elegant but is supported from 1.0.2 onwards only + $OPENSSL crl -inform DER -in "$tmpfile" -outform PEM -out "${tmpfile%%.crl}.pem" &>$ERRFILE + if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then + pr_warning "conversion of \"$tmpfile\" failed" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "conversion of CRL to PEM format failed" + return 1 + fi + if grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem; then + $OPENSSL verify -crl_check -CAfile <(cat $ADDITIONAL_CA_FILES "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE" "${tmpfile%%.crl}.pem") -untrusted $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem $HOSTCERT &> "${tmpfile%%.crl}.err" + else + $OPENSSL verify -crl_check -CAfile <(cat $ADDITIONAL_CA_FILES "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE" "${tmpfile%%.crl}.pem") $HOSTCERT &> "${tmpfile%%.crl}.err" + fi + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then + out ", " + pr_svrty_good "not revoked" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not revoked" + else + retcode=$(awk '/error [1-9][0-9]? at [0-9]+ depth lookup:/ { if (!found) {print $2; found=1} }' "${tmpfile%%.crl}.err") + if [[ "$retcode" == 23 ]]; then # see verify_retcode_helper() + out ", " + pr_svrty_critical "revoked" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "revoked" + else + retcode="$(verify_retcode_helper "$retcode")" + out " $retcode" + retcode="${retcode#(}" + retcode="${retcode%)}" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$retcode" + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then + outln + cat "${tmpfile%%.crl}.err" + fi + fi + fi + return 0 +} + +check_revocation_ocsp() { + local uri="$1" + local stapled_response="$2" + local jsonID="$3" + local tmpfile="" + local -i success + local response="" + local host_header="" + + "$PHONE_OUT" || [[ -n "$stapled_response" ]] || return 0 + [[ -n "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE" ]] || return 0 + if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]] && ! "$IGN_OCSP_PROXY"; then + # see #1106 and https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/6965 + out ", " + pr_warning "revocation not tested as \"openssl ocsp\" doesn't support a proxy" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Revocation not tested as openssl ocsp doesn't support a proxy" + return 0 + fi + grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem || return 0 + tmpfile=$TEMPDIR/${NODE}-${NODEIP}.${uri##*\/} || exit $ERR_FCREATE + if [[ -n "$stapled_response" ]]; then + asciihex_to_binary "$stapled_response" > "$TEMPDIR/stapled_ocsp_response.dd" + $OPENSSL ocsp -no_nonce -respin "$TEMPDIR/stapled_ocsp_response.dd" \ + -issuer $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem -verify_other $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem \ + -CAfile <(cat $ADDITIONAL_CA_FILES "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE") -cert $HOSTCERT -text &> "$tmpfile" + else + host_header=${uri##http://} + host_header=${host_header%%/*} + if [[ "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]]; then + host_header="-header Host ${host_header}" + elif [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 1.1.0* ]] || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 1.1.1* ]] || \ + [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 3.0.0* ]]; then + host_header="-header Host=${host_header}" + else + host_header="-header Host ${host_header}" + fi + $OPENSSL ocsp -no_nonce ${host_header} -url "$uri" \ + -issuer $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem -verify_other $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem \ + -CAfile <(cat $ADDITIONAL_CA_FILES "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE") -cert $HOSTCERT -text &> "$tmpfile" + fi + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && grep -Fq "Response verify OK" "$tmpfile"; then + response="$(grep -F "$HOSTCERT: " "$tmpfile")" + response="${response#$HOSTCERT: }" + response="${response%\.}" + if [[ "$response" =~ "good" ]]; then + out ", " + pr_svrty_good "not revoked" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not revoked" + elif [[ "$response" =~ "revoked" ]]; then + out ", " + pr_svrty_critical "revoked" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "revoked" + else + out ", " + pr_warning "error querying OCSP responder" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$response" + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then + outln + cat "$tmpfile" + else + out " ($response)" + fi + fi + else + [[ -s "$tmpfile" ]] || response="empty ocsp response" + [[ -z "$response" ]] && response="$(awk '/Responder Error:/ { print $3 }' "$tmpfile")" + [[ -z "$response" ]] && grep -Fq "Response Verify Failure" "$tmpfile" && response="unable to verify response" + [[ -z "$response" ]] && response="$(awk -F':' '/Code/ { print $NF }' $tmpfile)" + out ", " + pr_warning "error querying OCSP responder" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$response" + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then + outln + [[ -s "$tmpfile" ]] && cat "$tmpfile" || echo "empty ocsp response" + elif [[ -n "$response" ]]; then + out " ($response)" + fi + fi +} + +wait_kill(){ + local pid=$1 # pid we wait for or kill + local maxsleep=$2 # how long we wait before killing + + HAD_SLEPT=0 + while true; do + if ! ps $pid >/dev/null ; then + return 0 # process terminated before didn't reach $maxsleep + fi + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 6 ]] && ps $pid + sleep 1 + maxsleep=$((maxsleep - 1)) + HAD_SLEPT=$((HAD_SLEPT + 1)) + test $maxsleep -le 0 && break + done # needs to be killed: + kill $pid >&2 2>/dev/null + wait $pid 2>/dev/null # make sure pid terminated, see wait(1p) + return 3 # means killed +} + +# Convert date formats -- we always use GMT=UTC here +# argv1: source date string +# argv2: dest date string +if "$HAS_GNUDATE"; then # Linux and NetBSD + parse_date() { + LC_ALL=C TZ=GMT date -d "$1" "$2" + } +elif "$HAS_FREEBSDDATE"; then # FreeBSD, OS X and newer (~6.6) OpenBSD versions + parse_date() { + LC_ALL=C TZ=GMT date -j -f "$3" "$2" "$1" + } +elif "$HAS_OPENBSDDATE"; then +# We basically echo it as a conversion as we want it is too difficult. Approach for that would be: +# printf '%s\n' "$1" | awk '{ printf "%04d%02d%02d\n", $4, $2, (index("JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec",$1)+2)/3}' +# 4: year, 1: month, 2: day, $3: time (e.g. "Dec 8 10:16:13 2016") +# This way we could also kind of convert args to epoch but as newer OpenBSDs "date" behave like FreeBSD + parse_date() { + local tmp="" + if [[ $2 == +%s* ]]; then + echo "${1// GMT}" + else + tmp="$(printf '%s\n' "$1" | awk '{ printf "%04d-%02d-%02d %08s\n", $4, (index("JanFebMarAprMayJunJulAugSepOctNovDec",$1)+2)/3, $2, $3 }')" + echo "${tmp%:*}" # remove seconds, result now is in line with GNU date 2016-12-08 10:16 + fi + } +else + parse_date() { + LC_ALL=C TZ=GMT date -j "$2" "$1" + } +fi + +# arg1: An ASCII-HEX string +# Print $arg1 in binary format +asciihex_to_binary() { + local string="$1" + local -i len + local -i i ip2 ip4 ip6 ip8 ip10 ip12 ip14 + local -i remainder + + len=${#string} + [[ $len%2 -ne 0 ]] && return 1 + + for (( i=0; i <= len-16 ; i=i+16 )); do + ip2=$((i+2)); ip4=$((i+4)); ip6=$((i+6)); ip8=$((i+8)); ip10=$((i+10)); ip12=$((i+12)); ip14=$((i+14)) + printf -- "\x${string:i:2}\x${string:ip2:2}\x${string:ip4:2}\x${string:ip6:2}\x${string:ip8:2}\x${string:ip10:2}\x${string:ip12:2}\x${string:ip14:2}" + done + + ip2=$((i+2)); ip4=$((i+4)); ip6=$((i+6)); ip8=$((i+8)); ip10=$((i+10)); ip12=$((i+12)); ip14=$((i+14)) + remainder=$len-$i + case $remainder in + 2) printf -- "\x${string:i:2}" ;; + 4) printf -- "\x${string:i:2}\x${string:ip2:2}" ;; + 6) printf -- "\x${string:i:2}\x${string:ip2:2}\x${string:ip4:2}" ;; + 8) printf -- "\x${string:i:2}\x${string:ip2:2}\x${string:ip4:2}\x${string:ip6:2}" ;; + 10) printf -- "\x${string:i:2}\x${string:ip2:2}\x${string:ip4:2}\x${string:ip6:2}\x${string:ip8:2}" ;; + 12) printf -- "\x${string:i:2}\x${string:ip2:2}\x${string:ip4:2}\x${string:ip6:2}\x${string:ip8:2}\x${string:ip10:2}" ;; + 14) printf -- "\x${string:i:2}\x${string:ip2:2}\x${string:ip4:2}\x${string:ip6:2}\x${string:ip8:2}\x${string:ip10:2}\x${string:ip12:2}" ;; + esac + return 0 +} + +# arg1: text string +# Output a comma-separated ASCII-HEX string representation of the input string. +string_to_asciihex() { + local string="$1" + local -i i eos + local output="" + + eos=${#string}-1 + for (( i=0; i<eos; i++ )); do + output+="$(printf "%02x," "'${string:i:1}")" + done + [[ -n "$string" ]] && output+="$(printf "%02x" "'${string:eos:1}")" + tm_out "$output" + return 0 + +} + +# Adjust options to $OPENSSL s_client based on OpenSSL version and protocol version +s_client_options() { + local options=" $1" + local ciphers="notpresent" tls13_ciphers="notpresent" + + # Extract the TLSv1.3 ciphers and the non-TLSv1.3 ciphers + if [[ " $options " =~ " -cipher " ]]; then + ciphers="${options#* -cipher }" + ciphers="${ciphers%% *}" + options="${options//-cipher $ciphers/}" + ciphers="${ciphers##\'}" + ciphers="${ciphers%%\'}" + fi + if [[ " $options " =~ " -ciphersuites " ]]; then + tls13_ciphers="${options#* -ciphersuites }" + tls13_ciphers="${tls13_ciphers%% *}" + options="${options//-ciphersuites $tls13_ciphers/}" + tls13_ciphers="${tls13_ciphers##\'}" + tls13_ciphers="${tls13_ciphers%%\'}" + [[ "$tls13_ciphers" == ALL ]] && tls13_ciphers="$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS" + fi + + # Don't include the -servername option for an SSLv2 or SSLv3 ClientHello. + [[ -n "$SNI" ]] && [[ " $options " =~ \ -ssl[2|3]\ ]] && options="${options//$SNI/}" + + # The server_name extension should not be included in the ClientHello unless + # the -servername option is provided. However, OpenSSL 1.1.1 will include the + # server_name extension unless the -noservername option is provided. So, if + # the command line doesn't include -servername and the -noservername option is + # supported, then add -noservername to the options. + "$HAS_NOSERVERNAME" && [[ ! " $options " =~ " -servername " ]] && options+=" -noservername" + + # Newer versions of OpenSSL have dropped support for the -no_ssl2 option, so + # remove any -no_ssl2 option if the option isn't supported. (Since versions of + # OpenSSL that don't support -no_ssl2 also don't support SSLv2, the option + # isn't needed for these versions of OpenSSL.) + ! "$HAS_NO_SSL2" && options="${options//-no_ssl2/}" + + # At least one server will fail under some circumstances if compression methods are offered. + # So, only offer compression methods if necessary for the test. In OpenSSL 1.1.0 and + # 1.1.1 compression is only offered if the "-comp" option is provided. + # OpenSSL 1.0.0, 1.0.1, and 1.0.2 offer compression unless the "-no_comp" option is provided. + # OpenSSL 0.9.8 does not support either the "-comp" or the "-no_comp" option. + if [[ " $options " =~ " -comp " ]]; then + # Compression is needed for the test. So, remove "-comp" if it isn't supported, but + # otherwise make no changes. + ! "$HAS_COMP" && options="${options//-comp/}" + else + # Compression is not needed. So, specify "-no_comp" if that option is supported. + "$HAS_NO_COMP" && options+=" -no_comp" + fi + + # If $OPENSSL is compiled with TLSv1.3 support and s_client is called without + # specifying a protocol, but specifying a list of ciphers that doesn't include + # any TLSv1.3 ciphers, then the command will always fail. So, if $OPENSSL supports + # TLSv1.3 and a cipher list is provided, but no protocol is specified, then add + # -no_tls1_3 if no TLSv1.3 ciphers are provided. + if "$HAS_TLS13" && [[ "$ciphers" != notpresent ]] && \ + ( [[ "$tls13_ciphers" == notpresent ]] || [[ -z "$tls13_ciphers" ]] ) && \ + [[ ! " $options " =~ \ -ssl[2|3]\ ]] && \ + [[ ! " $options " =~ \ -tls1\ ]] && \ + [[ ! " $options " =~ \ -tls1_[1|2|3]\ ]]; then + options+=" -no_tls1_3" + fi + + if [[ "$ciphers" != notpresent ]] || [[ "$tls13_ciphers" != notpresent ]]; then + if ! "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then + [[ "$ciphers" == notpresent ]] && ciphers="" + [[ "$tls13_ciphers" == notpresent ]] && tls13_ciphers="" + [[ -n "$ciphers" ]] && [[ -n "$tls13_ciphers" ]] && ciphers=":$ciphers" + ciphers="$tls13_ciphers$ciphers" + options+=" -cipher $ciphers" + else + if [[ "$ciphers" != notpresent ]] && [[ -n "$ciphers" ]]; then + options+=" -cipher $ciphers" + fi + if [[ "$tls13_ciphers" != notpresent ]] && [[ -n "$tls13_ciphers" ]]; then + options+=" -ciphersuites $tls13_ciphers" + fi + fi + fi + + # OpenSSL's name for secp256r1 is prime256v1. So whenever we encounter this + # (e.g. client simulations) we replace it with the name which OpenSSL understands + # This shouldn't be needed. We have this here as a last resort + if [[ "$1" =~ " -curves " ]]; then + ! "$HAS_CURVES" && options="${options// -curves / -groups }" + [[ "$1" =~ secp192r1 ]] && options="${options//secp192r1/prime192v1}" + [[ "$1" =~ secp256r1 ]] && options="${options//secp256r1/prime256v1}" + fi + tm_out "$options $keyopts" +} + +###### check code starts here ###### + +# determines whether the port has an HTTP service running or not (plain TLS, no STARTTLS) +# arg1 could be the protocol determined as "working". IIS6 needs that +service_detection() { + local -i was_killed + + if ! "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then + # SNI is not standardized for !HTTPS but fortunately for other protocols s_client doesn't seem to care + printf "$GET_REQ11" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$1 -quiet $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE & + wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP + was_killed=$? + head $TMPFILE | grep -aq '^HTTP\/' && SERVICE=HTTP + [[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -waq "SMTP|ESMTP|Exim|IdeaSmtpServer|Kerio Connect|Postfix" && SERVICE=SMTP # I know some overlap here + [[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -Ewaq "POP|Gpop|MailEnable POP3 Server|OK Dovecot|Cyrus POP3" && SERVICE=POP # I know some overlap here + [[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -Ewaq "IMAP|IMAP4|Cyrus IMAP4IMAP4rev1|IMAP4REV1|Gimap" && SERVICE=IMAP # I know some overlap here + [[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -aq FTP && SERVICE=FTP + [[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -Eaqi "jabber|xmpp" && SERVICE=XMPP + [[ -z "$SERVICE" ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -Eaqw "Jive News|InterNetNews|NNRP|INN|Kerio Connect|NNTP Service|Kerio MailServer|NNTP server" && SERVICE=NNTP + # MongoDB port 27017 will respond to a GET request with a mocked HTTP response + [[ "$SERVICE" == HTTP ]] && head $TMPFILE | grep -Eaqw "MongoDB" && SERVICE=MongoDB + debugme head -50 $TMPFILE | sed -e '/<HTML>/,$d' -e '/<html>/,$d' -e '/<XML/,$d' -e '/<xml/,$d' -e '/<\?XML/,$d' -e '/<\?xml/,$d' -e '/<\!DOCTYPE/,$d' -e '/<\!doctype/,$d' + fi + + out " Service detected: $CORRECT_SPACES" + jsonID="service" + case $SERVICE in + HTTP) + out " $SERVICE" + fileout "${jsonID}" "INFO" "$SERVICE" + ;; + IMAP|POP|SMTP|NNTP|MongoDB) + out " $SERVICE, thus skipping HTTP specific checks" + fileout "${jsonID}" "INFO" "$SERVICE, thus skipping HTTP specific checks" + ;; + *) if "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then + out " certificate-based authentication => skipping all HTTP checks" + echo "certificate-based authentication => skipping all HTTP checks" >$TMPFILE + fileout "${jsonID}" "INFO" "certificate-based authentication => skipping all HTTP checks" + else + out " Couldn't determine what's running on port $PORT" + if "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then + SERVICE=HTTP + out " -- ASSUME_HTTP set though" + fileout "${jsonID}" "DEBUG" "Couldn't determine service -- ASSUME_HTTP set" + else + out ", assuming no HTTP service => skipping all HTTP checks" + fileout "${jsonID}" "DEBUG" "Couldn't determine service, skipping all HTTP checks" + fi + fi + ;; + esac + + outln "\n" + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 0 +} + +# 1: counter variable +# 2: threshold for this variable +# 3: string for first occurrence of problem +# 4: string for repeated occurrence of problem +# +connectivity_problem() { + if [[ $1 -lt $2 ]]; then + if "$TLS13_ONLY" && ! "$HAS_TLS13"; then + : + else + prln_warning " Oops: $3" + fi + return 0 + fi + if [[ $1 -ge $2 ]]; then + if [[ "$4" =~ openssl\ s_client\ connect ]] ; then + fatal "$4" $ERR_CONNECT "Consider increasing MAX_OSSL_FAIL (currently: $2)" + elif [[ "$4" =~ repeated\ TCP\ connect ]]; then + fatal "$4" $ERR_CONNECT "Consider increasing MAX_SOCKET_FAIL (currently: $2)" + fi + fatal "$4" $ERR_CONNECT + fi +} + + +#problems not handled: chunked +run_http_header() { + local header + local referer useragent + local url redirect + local jsonID="HTTP_status_code" + local spaces=" " + + HEADERFILE=$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.http_header.txt + if [[ $NR_HEADER_FAIL -eq 0 ]]; then + # skip repeating this line if it's 2nd, 3rd,.. try + outln; pr_headlineln " Testing HTTP header response @ \"$URL_PATH\" " + outln + fi + if [[ $NR_HEADER_FAIL -ge $MAX_HEADER_FAIL ]]; then + # signal to caller we have a problem + return 1 + fi + + pr_bold " HTTP Status Code " + [[ -z "$1" ]] && url="/" || url="$1" + printf "$GET_REQ11" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -quiet -ign_eof -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$HEADERFILE 2>$ERRFILE & + wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then + # Issue HTTP GET again as it properly finished within $HEADER_MAXSLEEP and didn't hang. + # Doing it again in the foreground to get an accurate header time + printf "$GET_REQ11" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -quiet -ign_eof -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$HEADERFILE 2>$ERRFILE + NOW_TIME=$(date "+%s") + HTTP_TIME=$(awk -F': ' '/^date:/ { print $2 } /^Date:/ { print $2 }' $HEADERFILE) + HAD_SLEPT=0 + else + # 1st GET request hung and needed to be killed. Check whether it succeeded anyway: + if grep -Eiaq "XML|HTML|DOCTYPE|HTTP|Connection" $HEADERFILE; then + # correct by seconds we slept, HAD_SLEPT comes from wait_kill() + NOW_TIME=$(($(date "+%s") - HAD_SLEPT)) + HTTP_TIME=$(awk -F': ' '/^date:/ { print $2 } /^Date:/ { print $2 }' $HEADERFILE) + else + prln_warning " likely HTTP header requests failed (#lines: $(wc -l $HEADERFILE | awk '{ print $1 }'))" + [[ "$DEBUG" -lt 1 ]] && outln "Rerun with DEBUG>=1 and inspect $HEADERFILE\n" + fileout "HTTP_status_code" "WARN" "HTTP header request failed" + debugme cat $HEADERFILE + ((NR_HEADER_FAIL++)) + fi + fi + if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then + ((NR_HEADER_FAIL++)) + if [[ $NR_HEADER_FAIL -ge $MAX_HEADER_FAIL ]]; then + # Now, try to give a hint whether it would make sense to try with OpenSSL 1.1.0 or 1.1.1 instead + if [[ $CURVES_OFFERED == X448 ]] && ! "$HAS_X448" ; then + generic_nonfatal "HTTP header was repeatedly zero due to missing X448 curve." "${spaces}OpenSSL 1.1.1 might help. Skipping complete HTTP header section." + elif [[ $CURVES_OFFERED == X25519 ]] && ! "$HAS_X25519" ; then + generic_nonfatal "HTTP header was repeatedly zero due to missing X25519 curve." "${spaces}OpenSSL 1.1.0 might help. Skipping complete HTTP header section." + elif [[ $CURVES_OFFERED =~ X25519 ]] && [[ $CURVES_OFFERED =~ X448 ]] && ! "$HAS_X25519" && ! "$HAS_X448"; then + generic_nonfatal "HTTP header was repeatedly zero due to missing X25519/X448 curves." "${spaces}OpenSSL >=1.1.0 might help. Skipping complete HTTP header section." + else + # we could give more hints but these are the most likely cases + generic_nonfatal "HTTP header was repeatedly zero." "Skipping complete HTTP header section." + fi + KNOWN_OSSL_PROB=true + return 1 + else + pr_warning "HTTP header reply empty. " + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "HTTP header reply empty" + fi + fi + + # Populate vars for HTTP time + debugme echo "NOW_TIME: $NOW_TIME | HTTP_TIME: $HTTP_TIME" + + # Quit on first empty line to catch 98% of the cases. Next pattern is there because the SEDs tested + # so far seem not to be fine with header containing x0d x0a (CRLF) which is the usual case. + # So we also trigger also on any sign on a single line which is not alphanumeric (plus _) + sed -e '/^$/q' -e '/^[^a-zA-Z_0-9]$/q' $HEADERFILE >$HEADERFILE.tmp + # Now to be more sure we delete from '<' or '{' maybe with a leading blank until the end + sed -e '/^ *<.*$/d' -e '/^ *{.*$/d' $HEADERFILE.tmp >$HEADERFILE + debugme echo -e "---\n $(< $HEADERFILE) \n---" + + HTTP_STATUS_CODE=$(awk '/^HTTP\// { print $2 }' $HEADERFILE 2>>$ERRFILE) + msg_thereafter=$(awk -F"$HTTP_STATUS_CODE" '/^HTTP\// { print $2 }' $HEADERFILE 2>>$ERRFILE) # dirty trick to use the status code as a + msg_thereafter=$(strip_lf "$msg_thereafter") # field separator, otherwise we need a loop with awk + debugme echo "Status/MSG: $HTTP_STATUS_CODE $msg_thereafter" + + [[ -n "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE" ]] && out " $HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter" + case $HTTP_STATUS_CODE in + 301|302|307|308) + redirect=$(grep -a '^Location' $HEADERFILE | sed 's/Location: //' | tr -d '\r\n') + out ", redirecting to \""; pr_url "$redirect"; out "\"" + if [[ $redirect =~ http:// ]]; then + pr_svrty_high " -- Redirect to insecure URL (NOT ok)" + fileout "insecure_redirect" "HIGH" "Redirect to insecure URL: \"$redirect\"" + fi + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\")" + ;; + 200|204|403|405) + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\")" + ;; + 206) + out " -- WHAT?" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\") -- WHAT?" + # partial content shouldn't happen + ;; + 400) + pr_cyan " (Hint: better try another URL)" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\") -- better try another URL" + ;; + 401) + grep -aq "^WWW-Authenticate" $HEADERFILE && out " "; out "$(strip_lf "$(grep -a "^WWW-Authenticate" $HEADERFILE)")" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\") -- $(grep -a "^WWW-Authenticate" $HEADERFILE)" + ;; + 404) + out " (Hint: supply a path which doesn't give a \"$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter\")" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter (\"$URL_PATH\")" + ;; + "") + prln_warning "No HTTP status code." + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "No HTTP status code" + return 1 + ;; + *) + pr_warning ". Oh, didn't expect \"$HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter\"" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Unexpected $HTTP_STATUS_CODE$msg_thereafter @ \"$URL_PATH\"" + ;; + esac + outln + + # we don't call "tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt" as we need the header file in other functions! + return 0 +} + +# Borrowed from Glenn Jackman, see https://unix.stackexchange.com/users/4667/glenn-jackman +# +match_ipv4_httpheader() { + local octet="(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|[1-9]?[0-9])" + local ipv4address="$octet\\.$octet\\.$octet\\.$octet" + local whitelisted_header="pagespeed|page-speed|^Content-Security-Policy|^MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices|^X-OWA-Version|^Location|^Server: PRTG" + local your_ip_msg="(check if it's your IP address or e.g. a cluster IP)" + local result + local first=true + local spaces=" " + local count + local jsonID="ipv4_in_header" + local cwe="CWE-212" + local cve="" + + if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then + run_http_header "$1" || return 1 + fi + + # Whitelist some headers as they are mistakenly identified as ipv4 address. Issues #158, #323. + # Also facebook used to have a CSP rule for 127.0.0.1 + if grep -Evai "$whitelisted_header" $HEADERFILE | grep -Eiq "$ipv4address"; then + pr_bold " IPv4 address in header " + count=0 + while read line; do + result="$(grep -E "$ipv4address" <<< "$line")" + result=$(strip_lf "$result") + if [[ -n "$result" ]]; then + if ! $first; then + out "$spaces" + your_ip_msg="" + else + first=false + fi + pr_svrty_medium "$result" + outln "\n$spaces$your_ip_msg" + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "$result $your_ip_msg" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + count=$count+1 + done < $HEADERFILE + fi +} + + +run_http_date() { + local difftime + local spaces=" " + jsonID="HTTP_clock_skew" + + if [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] || "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then + return 0 + fi + if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then + run_http_header "$1" || return 1 + fi + pr_bold " HTTP clock skew " + if [[ -n "$HTTP_TIME" ]]; then + HTTP_TIME="$(strip_lf "$HTTP_TIME")" + if "$HAS_OPENBSDDATE"; then + # We won't normalize the date under an OpenBSD thus no subtraction is feasible + outln "remote: $HTTP_TIME" + out "${spaces}local: $(LC_ALL=C TZ=GMT date "+%a, %d %b %Y %T %Z")" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$HTTP_TIME - $(TZ=GMT date "+%a, %d %b %Y %T %Z")" + else + HTTP_TIME="$(parse_date "$HTTP_TIME" "+%s" "%a, %d %b %Y %T %Z" 2>>$ERRFILE)" + difftime=$((HTTP_TIME - NOW_TIME)) + [[ $difftime != "-"* ]] && [[ $difftime != "0" ]] && difftime="+$difftime" + # process was killed, so we need to add an error + [[ $HAD_SLEPT -ne 0 ]] && difftime="$difftime (± 1.5)" + out "$difftime sec from localtime"; + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$difftime seconds from localtime" + fi + else + out "Got no HTTP time, maybe try different URL?"; + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "Got no HTTP time, maybe try different URL?" + fi + debugme tm_out ", HTTP_TIME in epoch: $HTTP_TIME" + outln + match_ipv4_httpheader "$1" + return 0 +} + + +# HEADERFILE needs to contain the HTTP header (made sure by invoker) +# arg1: key=word to match +# arg2: hint for fileout() if double header +# arg3: indentation, i.e string w spaces +# arg4: whether we need a CR before "misconfiguration" +# returns: +# 0 if header not found +# 1-n nr of headers found, then in HEADERVALUE the first value from key +# +match_httpheader_key() { + local key="$1" + local spaces="$3" + local first=$4 + local -i nr=0 + + nr=$(grep -Eaic "^ *$key:" $HEADERFILE) + if [[ $nr -eq 0 ]]; then + HEADERVALUE="" + return 0 + elif [[ $nr -eq 1 ]]; then + HEADERVALUE="$(grep -Eia "^ *$key:" $HEADERFILE)" + HEADERVALUE="${HEADERVALUE#*:}" # remove leading part=key to colon + HEADERVALUE="$(strip_lf "$HEADERVALUE")" + HEADERVALUE="$(strip_leading_space "$HEADERVALUE")" + "$first" || out "$spaces" + return 1 + else + "$first" || out "$spaces" + pr_svrty_medium "misconfiguration: " + pr_italic "$key" + pr_svrty_medium " ${nr}x" + outln " -- checking first one only" + out "$spaces" + HEADERVALUE="$(fgrep -Fai "$key:" $HEADERFILE | head -1)" + HEADERVALUE="${HEADERVALUE#*:}" + HEADERVALUE="$(strip_lf "$HEADERVALUE")" + HEADERVALUE="$(strip_leading_space "$HEADERVALUE")" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && tm_italic "$HEADERVALUE" && tm_out "\n$spaces" + fileout "${2}_multiple" "MEDIUM" "Multiple $2 headers. Using first header: $HEADERVALUE" + return $nr + fi +} + +includeSubDomains() { + if grep -aiqw includeSubDomains "$1"; then + pr_svrty_good ", includeSubDomains" + return 0 + else + pr_litecyan ", just this domain" + return 1 + fi +} + +preload() { + if grep -aiqw preload "$1"; then + pr_svrty_good ", preload" + return 0 + else + return 1 + fi +} + + +run_hsts() { + local hsts_age_sec + local hsts_age_days + local spaces=" " + local jsonID="HSTS" + + if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then + run_http_header "$1" || return 1 + fi + pr_bold " Strict Transport Security " + match_httpheader_key "Strict-Transport-Security" "HSTS" "$spaces" "true" + if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then + echo "$HEADERVALUE" >$TMPFILE + hsts_age_sec=$(sed -e 's/[^0-9]*//g' <<< $HEADERVALUE) + debugme echo "hsts_age_sec: $hsts_age_sec" + if [[ -n $hsts_age_sec ]]; then + hsts_age_days=$(( hsts_age_sec / 86400)) + else + hsts_age_days=-1 + fi + if [[ $hsts_age_days -eq -1 ]]; then + pr_svrty_medium "misconfiguration: HSTS max-age (recommended > 15552000 seconds = 180 days ) is required but missing" + fileout "${jsonID}_time" "MEDIUM" "misconfiguration, parameter max-age (recommended > 15552000 seconds = 180 days) missing" + elif [[ $hsts_age_sec -eq 0 ]]; then + pr_svrty_low "HSTS max-age is set to 0. HSTS is disabled" + fileout "${jsonID}_time" "LOW" "0. HSTS is disabled" + elif [[ $hsts_age_sec -ge $HSTS_MIN ]]; then + pr_svrty_good "$hsts_age_days days" ; out "=$hsts_age_sec s" + fileout "${jsonID}_time" "OK" "$hsts_age_days days (=$hsts_age_sec seconds) > $HSTS_MIN seconds" + else + pr_svrty_medium "$hsts_age_sec s = $hsts_age_days days is too short ( >= $HSTS_MIN seconds recommended)" + fileout "${jsonID}_time" "MEDIUM" "max-age too short. $hsts_age_days days (=$hsts_age_sec seconds) < $HSTS_MIN seconds" + fi + if includeSubDomains "$TMPFILE"; then + fileout "${jsonID}_subdomains" "OK" "includes subdomains" + else + fileout "${jsonID}_subdomains" "INFO" "only for this domain" + fi + if preload "$TMPFILE"; then + fileout "${jsonID}_preload" "OK" "domain IS marked for preloading" + else + fileout "${jsonID}_preload" "INFO" "domain is NOT marked for preloading" + #FIXME: To be checked against preloading lists, + # e.g. https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/manager/boot/src/nsSTSPreloadList.inc + # https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/master/net/http/transport_security_state_static.json + fi + else + pr_svrty_low "not offered" + fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "not offered" + fi + outln + + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 0 +} + + +run_hpkp() { + local -i hpkp_age_sec + local -i hpkp_age_days + local -i hpkp_nr_keys + local hpkp_spki hpkp_spki_hostcert + local -a backup_spki + local spaces=" " + local spaces_indented=" " + local certificate_found=false + local -i i nrsaved + local first_hpkp_header + local spki + local ca_hashes="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/ca_hashes.txt" + + if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then + run_http_header "$1" || return 1 + fi + pr_bold " Public Key Pinning " + grep -aiw '^Public-Key-Pins' $HEADERFILE >$TMPFILE # TMPFILE includes report-only + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then + if [[ $(grep -aci '^Public-Key-Pins:' $TMPFILE) -gt 1 ]]; then + pr_svrty_medium "Misconfiguration, multiple Public-Key-Pins headers" + outln ", taking first line" + fileout "HPKP_error" "MEDIUM" "multiple Public-Key-Pins in header" + first_hpkp_header="$(grep -ai '^Public-Key-Pins:' $TMPFILE | head -1)" + # we only evaluate the keys here, unless they a not present + out "$spaces " + elif [[ $(grep -aci '^Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only:' $TMPFILE) -gt 1 ]]; then + outln "Multiple HPKP headers (Report-Only), taking first line" + fileout "HPKP_notice" "INFO" "multiple Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only in header" + first_hpkp_header="$(grep -ai '^Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only:' $TMPFILE | head -1)" + out "$spaces " + elif [[ $(grep -Eaci '^Public-Key-Pins:|^Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only:' $TMPFILE) -eq 2 ]]; then + outln "Public-Key-Pins + Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only detected. Continue with first one" + first_hpkp_header="$(grep -ai '^Public-Key-Pins:' $TMPFILE)" + out "$spaces " + elif [[ $(grep -aci '^Public-Key-Pins:' $TMPFILE) -eq 1 ]]; then + first_hpkp_header="$(grep -ai '^Public-Key-Pins:' $TMPFILE)" + else + outln "Public-Key-Pins-Only detected" + first_hpkp_header="$(grep -ai '^Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only:' $TMPFILE)" + out "$spaces " + fileout "HPKP_SPKIs" "INFO" "Only Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only" + fi + + # remove leading Public-Key-Pins* and convert it to multiline arg + sed -e 's/Public-Key-Pins://g' -e s'/Public-Key-Pins-Report-Only://' <<< "$first_hpkp_header" | \ + tr ';' '\n' | sed -e 's/\"//g' -e 's/^ //' >$TMPFILE + + hpkp_nr_keys=$(grep -ac pin-sha $TMPFILE) + if [[ $hpkp_nr_keys -eq 1 ]]; then + pr_svrty_high "Only one key pinned (NOT ok), means the site may become unavailable in the future, " + fileout "HPKP_SPKIs" "HIGH" "Only one key pinned" + else + pr_svrty_good "$hpkp_nr_keys" + out " keys, " + fileout "HPKP_SPKIs" "OK" "$hpkp_nr_keys keys pinned in header" + fi + + # print key=value pair with awk, then strip non-numbers, to be improved with proper parsing of key-value with awk + if "$HAS_SED_E"; then + hpkp_age_sec=$(awk -F= '/max-age/{max_age=$2; print max_age}' $TMPFILE | sed -E 's/[^[:digit:]]//g') + else + hpkp_age_sec=$(awk -F= '/max-age/{max_age=$2; print max_age}' $TMPFILE | sed -r 's/[^[:digit:]]//g') + fi + hpkp_age_days=$((hpkp_age_sec / 86400)) + if [[ $hpkp_age_sec -ge $HPKP_MIN ]]; then + pr_svrty_good "$hpkp_age_days days" ; out "=$hpkp_age_sec s" + fileout "HPKP_age" "OK" "HPKP age is set to $hpkp_age_days days ($hpkp_age_sec sec)" + else + out "$hpkp_age_sec s = " + pr_svrty_medium "$hpkp_age_days days (< $HPKP_MIN s = $((HPKP_MIN / 86400)) days is not good enough)" + fileout "HPKP_age" "MEDIUM" "age is set to $hpkp_age_days days ($hpkp_age_sec sec) < $HPKP_MIN s = $((HPKP_MIN / 86400)) days is not good enough." + fi + + if includeSubDomains "$TMPFILE"; then + fileout "HPKP_subdomains" "INFO" "is valid for subdomains as well" + else + fileout "HPKP_subdomains" "INFO" "is valid for this domain only" + fi + if preload "$TMPFILE"; then + fileout "HPKP_preload" "INFO" "IS marked for browser preloading" + else + fileout "HPKP_preload" "INFO" "NOT marked for browser preloading" + fi + + # Get the SPKIs first + spki=$(tr ';' '\n' < $TMPFILE | tr -d ' ' | tr -d '\"' | awk -F'=' '/pin.*=/ { print $2 }') + debugme tmln_out "\n$spki" + + # Look at the host certificate first + if [[ ! -s "$HOSTCERT" ]]; then + get_host_cert || return 1 + # no host certificate + fi + + hpkp_spki_hostcert="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -pubkey -noout 2>/dev/null | grep -v PUBLIC | \ + $OPENSSL base64 -d 2>/dev/null | $OPENSSL dgst -sha256 -binary 2>/dev/null | $OPENSSL base64 2>/dev/null)" + hpkp_ca="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -issuer -noout 2>/dev/null |sed 's/^.*CN=//' | sed 's/\/.*$//')" + + # Get keys/hashes from intermediate certificates + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS $PROXY -showcerts -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $SNI") </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE + # Place the server's certificate in $HOSTCERT and any intermediate + # certificates that were provided in $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem + # https://backreference.org/2010/05/09/ocsp-verification-with-openssl/ + awk -v n=-1 "/Certificate chain/ {start=1} + /-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/{ if (start) {inc=1; n++} } + inc { print > (\"$TEMPDIR/level\" n \".crt\") } + /---END CERTIFICATE-----/{ inc=0 }" $TMPFILE + nrsaved=$(count_words "$(echo $TEMPDIR/level?.crt 2>/dev/null)") + rm $TEMPDIR/level0.crt 2>/dev/null + + printf ""> "$TEMPDIR/intermediate.hashes" + if [[ $nrsaved -ge 2 ]]; then + for cert_fname in $TEMPDIR/level?.crt; do + hpkp_spki_ca="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$cert_fname" -pubkey -noout 2>/dev/null | grep -v PUBLIC | $OPENSSL base64 -d 2>/dev/null | + $OPENSSL dgst -sha256 -binary 2>/dev/null | $OPENSSL enc -base64 2>/dev/null)" + hpkp_name="$(get_cn_from_cert $cert_fname)" + hpkp_ca="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $cert_fname -issuer -noout 2>/dev/null |sed 's/^.*CN=//' | sed 's/\/.*$//')" + [[ -n $hpkp_name ]] || hpkp_name=$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$cert_fname" -subject -noout 2>/dev/null | sed 's/^subject= //') + echo "$hpkp_spki_ca $hpkp_name" >> "$TEMPDIR/intermediate.hashes" + done + fi + + # This is where the matching magic starts. First host, intermediate, then root certificate from the supplied stores + spki_match=false + has_backup_spki=false + i=0 + for hpkp_spki in $spki; do + certificate_found=false + # compare collected SPKIs against the host certificate + if [[ "$hpkp_spki_hostcert" == "$hpkp_spki" ]] || [[ "$hpkp_spki_hostcert" == "$hpkp_spki=" ]]; then + certificate_found=true # We have a match + spki_match=true + out "\n$spaces_indented Host cert: " + pr_svrty_good "$hpkp_spki" + fileout "HPKP_$hpkp_spki" "OK" "SPKI $hpkp_spki matches the host certificate" + fi + debugme tm_out "\n $hpkp_spki | $hpkp_spki_hostcert" + + # Check for intermediate match + if ! "$certificate_found"; then + hpkp_matches=$(grep "$hpkp_spki" $TEMPDIR/intermediate.hashes 2>/dev/null) + if [[ -n $hpkp_matches ]]; then # hpkp_matches + hpkp_spki + '=' + # We have a match + certificate_found=true + spki_match=true + out "\n$spaces_indented Sub CA: " + pr_svrty_good "$hpkp_spki" + ca_cn="$(sed "s/^[a-zA-Z0-9\+\/]*=* *//" <<< $"$hpkp_matches" )" + pr_italic " $ca_cn" + fileout "HPKP_$hpkp_spki" "OK" "SPKI $hpkp_spki matches Intermediate CA \"$ca_cn\" pinned in the HPKP header" + fi + fi + + # we compare now against a precompiled list of SPKIs against the ROOT CAs we have in $ca_hashes + if ! "$certificate_found"; then + hpkp_matches=$(grep -h "$hpkp_spki" $ca_hashes 2>/dev/null | sort -u) + if [[ -n $hpkp_matches ]]; then + certificate_found=true # root CA found + spki_match=true + if [[ $(count_lines "$hpkp_matches") -eq 1 ]]; then + # replace by awk + match_ca=$(sed "s/[a-zA-Z0-9\+\/]*=* *//" <<< "$hpkp_matches") + else + match_ca="" + + fi + ca_cn="$(sed "s/^[a-zA-Z0-9\+\/]*=* *//" <<< $"$hpkp_matches" )" + if [[ "$match_ca" == "$hpkp_ca" ]]; then # part of the chain + out "\n$spaces_indented Root CA: " + pr_svrty_good "$hpkp_spki" + pr_italic " $ca_cn" + fileout "HPKP_$hpkp_spki" "INFO" "SPKI $hpkp_spki matches Root CA \"$ca_cn\" pinned. (Root CA part of the chain)" + else # not part of chain + match_ca="" + has_backup_spki=true # Root CA outside the chain --> we save it for unmatched + fileout "HPKP_$hpkp_spki" "INFO" "SPKI $hpkp_spki matches Root CA \"$ca_cn\" pinned. (Root backup SPKI)" + backup_spki[i]="$(strip_lf "$hpkp_spki")" # save it for later + backup_spki_str[i]="$ca_cn" # also the name=CN of the root CA + i=$((i + 1)) + fi + fi + fi + + # still no success --> it's probably a backup SPKI + if ! "$certificate_found"; then + # Most likely a backup SPKI, unfortunately we can't tell for what it is: host, intermediates + has_backup_spki=true + backup_spki[i]="$(strip_lf "$hpkp_spki")" # save it for later + backup_spki_str[i]="" # no root ca + i=$((i + 1)) + fileout "HPKP_$hpkp_spki" "INFO" "SPKI $hpkp_spki doesn't match anything. This is ok for a backup for any certificate" + # CSV/JSON output here for the sake of simplicity, rest we do en bloc below + fi + done + + # now print every backup spki out we saved before + out "\n$spaces_indented Backups: " + + # for i=0 manually do the same as below as there's other indentation here + if [[ -n "${backup_spki_str[0]}" ]]; then + pr_svrty_good "${backup_spki[0]}" + #out " Root CA: " + prln_italic " ${backup_spki_str[0]}" + else + outln "${backup_spki[0]}" + fi + # now for i=1 + for ((i=1; i < ${#backup_spki[@]} ;i++ )); do + if [[ -n "${backup_spki_str[i]}" ]]; then + # it's a Root CA outside the chain + pr_svrty_good "$spaces_indented ${backup_spki[i]}" + #out " Root CA: " + prln_italic " ${backup_spki_str[i]}" + else + outln "$spaces_indented ${backup_spki[i]}" + fi + done + if [[ ! -f "$ca_hashes" ]] && "$spki_match"; then + out "$spaces " + prln_warning "Attribution of further hashes couldn't be done as $ca_hashes could not be found" + fileout "HPKP_SPKImatch" "WARN" "Attribution of further hashes possible as $ca_hashes could not be found" + fi + + # If all else fails... + if ! "$spki_match"; then + "$has_backup_spki" && out "$spaces" # we had a few lines with backup SPKIs already + prln_svrty_high " No matching key for SPKI found " + fileout "HPKP_SPKImatch" "HIGH" "None of the SPKI match your host certificate, intermediate CA or known root CAs. Bricked site?" + fi + + if ! "$has_backup_spki"; then + prln_svrty_high " No backup keys found. Loss/compromise of the currently pinned key(s) will lead to bricked site. " + fileout "HPKP_backup" "HIGH" "No backup keys found. Loss/compromise of the currently pinned key(s) will lead to bricked site." + fi + else + outln "--" + fileout "HPKP" "INFO" "No support for HTTP Public Key Pinning" + fi + + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 0 +} + +emphasize_stuff_in_headers(){ + local html_brown="<span style=\\\"color:olive;\\\">" + local html_yellow="<span style=\\\"color:olive;font-weight:bold;\\\">" + local html_off="<\\/span>" + +# see https://www.grymoire.com/Unix/Sed.html#uh-3 +# outln "$1" | sed "s/[0-9]*/$brown&${off}/g" + tmln_out "$1" | sed -e "s/\([0-9]\)/${brown}\1${off}/g" \ + -e "s/Unix/${yellow}Unix${off}/g" \ + -e "s/Debian/${yellow}Debian${off}/g" \ + -e "s/Win32/${yellow}Win32${off}/g" \ + -e "s/Win64/${yellow}Win64${off}/g" \ + -e "s/Ubuntu/${yellow}Ubuntu${off}/g" \ + -e "s/ubuntu/${yellow}ubuntu${off}/g" \ + -e "s/buster/${yellow}buster${off}/g" \ + -e "s/stretch/${yellow}stretch${off}/g" \ + -e "s/jessie/${yellow}jessie${off}/g" \ + -e "s/squeeze/${yellow}squeeze${off}/g" \ + -e "s/wheezy/${yellow}wheezy${off}/g" \ + -e "s/lenny/${yellow}lenny${off}/g" \ + -e "s/SUSE/${yellow}SUSE${off}/g" \ + -e "s/Red Hat Enterprise Linux/${yellow}Red Hat Enterprise Linux${off}/g" \ + -e "s/Red Hat/${yellow}Red Hat${off}/g" \ + -e "s/CentOS/${yellow}CentOS${off}/g" \ + -e "s/Via/${yellow}Via${off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Forwarded/${yellow}X-Forwarded${off}/g" \ + -e "s/Liferay-Portal/${yellow}Liferay-Portal${off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Cache-Lookup/${yellow}X-Cache-Lookup${off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Cache/${yellow}X-Cache${off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Squid/${yellow}X-Squid${off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Server/${yellow}X-Server${off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Varnish/${yellow}X-Varnish${off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-OWA-Version/${yellow}X-OWA-Version${off}/g" \ + -e "s/MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices/${yellow}MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices${off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Application-Context/${yellow}X-Application-Context${off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Version/${yellow}X-Version${off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Powered-By/${yellow}X-Powered-By${off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-UA-Compatible/${yellow}X-UA-Compatible${off}/g" \ + -e "s/Link/${yellow}Link${off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Rack-Cache/${yellow}X-Rack-Cache${off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Runtime/${yellow}X-Runtime${off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Pingback/${yellow}X-Pingback${off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies/${yellow}X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies${off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-AspNet-Version/${yellow}X-AspNet-Version${off}/g" \ + -e "s/x-note/${yellow}x-note${off}/g" \ + -e "s/x-global-transaction-id/${yellow}x-global-transaction-id${off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Global-Transaction-ID/${yellow}X-Global-Transaction-ID${off}/g" \ + -e "s/Alt-Svc/${yellow}Alt-Svc${off}/g" \ + -e "s/system-wsgw-management-loopback/${yellow}system-wsgw-management-loopback${off}/g" + + if "$do_html"; then + if [[ $COLOR -ge 2 ]]; then + html_out "$(tm_out "$1" | sed -e 's/\&/\&/g' \ + -e 's/</\</g' -e 's/>/\>/g' -e 's/"/\"/g' -e "s/'/\'/g" \ + -e "s/\([0-9]\)/${html_brown}\1${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/Unix/${html_yellow}Unix${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/Debian/${html_yellow}Debian${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/Win32/${html_yellow}Win32${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/Win64/${html_yellow}Win64${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/Ubuntu/${html_yellow}Ubuntu${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/ubuntu/${html_yellow}ubuntu${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/buster/${html_yellow}buster${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/stretch/${html_yellow}stretch${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/jessie/${html_yellow}jessie${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/squeeze/${html_yellow}squeeze${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/wheezy/${html_yellow}wheezy${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/lenny/${html_yellow}lenny${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/SUSE/${html_yellow}SUSE${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/Red Hat Enterprise Linux/${html_yellow}Red Hat Enterprise Linux${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/Red Hat/${html_yellow}Red Hat${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/CentOS/${html_yellow}CentOS${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/Via/${html_yellow}Via${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Forwarded/${html_yellow}X-Forwarded${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/Liferay-Portal/${html_yellow}Liferay-Portal${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Cache-Lookup/${html_yellow}X-Cache-Lookup${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Cache/${html_yellow}X-Cache${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Squid/${html_yellow}X-Squid${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Server/${html_yellow}X-Server${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Varnish/${html_yellow}X-Varnish${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-OWA-Version/${html_yellow}X-OWA-Version${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices/${html_yellow}MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Application-Context/${html_yellow}X-Application-Context${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Version/${html_yellow}X-Version${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Powered-By/${html_yellow}X-Powered-By${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-UA-Compatible/${html_yellow}X-UA-Compatible${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/Link/${html_yellow}Link${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Runtime/${html_yellow}X-Runtime${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Rack-Cache/${html_yellow}X-Rack-Cache${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Pingback/${html_yellow}X-Pingback${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies/${html_yellow}X-Permitted-Cross-Domain-Policies${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-AspNet-Version/${html_yellow}X-AspNet-Version${html_off}/g")" \ + -e "s/x-note/${html_yellow}x-note${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/X-Global-Transaction-ID/${html_yellow}X-Global-Transaction-ID${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/x-global-transaction-id/${html_yellow}x-global-transaction-id${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/Alt-Svc/${html_yellow}Alt-Svc${html_off}/g" \ + -e "s/system-wsgw-management-loopback/${html_yellow}system-wsgw-management-loopback${html_off}/g" +#FIXME: this is double code. The pattern to emphasize would fit better into +# one function. +# Also we need another function like run_other_header as otherwise "Link" "Alt-Svc" will never be found. +# And: I matches case sensitive only which might not detect all banners. (sed ignorecase is not possible w/ BSD sed) + else + html_out "$(html_reserved "$1")" + fi + html_out "\n" + fi +} + +run_server_banner() { + local serverbanner + local jsonID="banner_server" + + if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then + run_http_header "$1" || return 1 + fi + pr_bold " Server banner " + grep -ai '^Server' $HEADERFILE >$TMPFILE + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then + serverbanner=$(sed -e 's/^Server: //' -e 's/^server: //' $TMPFILE) + if [[ "$serverbanner" == $'\n' ]] || [[ "$serverbanner" == $'\r' ]] || [[ "$serverbanner" == $'\n\r' ]] || [[ -z "$serverbanner" ]]; then + outln "exists but empty string" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "Server banner is empty" + else + emphasize_stuff_in_headers "$serverbanner" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$serverbanner" + if [[ "$serverbanner" == *Microsoft-IIS/6.* ]] && [[ $OSSL_VER == 1.0.2* ]]; then + prln_warning " It's recommended to run another test w/ OpenSSL 1.0.1 !" + # see https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl/issues/19#issuecomment-100897892 + fileout "${jsonID}" "WARN" "IIS6_openssl_mismatch: Recommended to rerun this test w/ OpenSSL 1.0.1. See https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl/issues/19#issuecomment-100897892" + fi + fi + # mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generator/ + # https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/245030 + else + outln "(no \"Server\" line in header, interesting!)" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "No Server banner line in header, interesting!" + fi + + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 0 +} + +run_appl_banner() { + local line + local first=true + local spaces=" " + local appl_banners="" + local jsonID="banner_application" + + if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then + run_http_header "$1" || return 1 + fi + pr_bold " Application banner " + grep -Eai '^X-Powered-By|^X-AspNet-Version|^X-Version|^Liferay-Portal|^X-OWA-Version^|^MicrosoftSharePointTeamServices' $HEADERFILE >$TMPFILE + if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then + outln "--" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "No application banner found" + else + while IFS='' read -r line; do + line=$(strip_lf "$line") + if ! $first; then + out "$spaces" + appl_banners="${appl_banners}, ${line}" + else + appl_banners="${line}" + first=false + fi + emphasize_stuff_in_headers "$line" + done < "$TMPFILE" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$appl_banners" + fi + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 0 +} + +run_rp_banner() { + local line + local first=true + local spaces=" " + local rp_banners="" + local jsonID="banner_reverseproxy" + local cwe="CWE-200" + local cve="" + + if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then + run_http_header "$1" || return 1 + fi + pr_bold " Reverse Proxy banner " + grep -Eai '^Via:|^X-Cache|^X-Squid|^X-Varnish:|^X-Server-Name:|^X-Server-Port:|^x-forwarded|^Forwarded' $HEADERFILE >$TMPFILE + if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then + outln "--" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "--" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + while read line; do + line=$(strip_lf "$line") + if $first; then + first=false + else + out "$spaces" + fi + emphasize_stuff_in_headers "$line" + rp_banners="${rp_banners}${line}" + done < $TMPFILE + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$rp_banners" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + outln + + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 0 +} + + +# arg1: multiline string w cookies +# +sub_f5_bigip_check() { + local allcookies="$1" + local ip port cookievalue cookiename + local routed_domain offset + local savedcookies="" + local spaces="$2" + local cwe="CWE-212" + local cve="" + + # taken from https://github.com/drwetter/F5-BIGIP-Decoder, more details see there + + debugme echo -e "all cookies: >> $allcookies <<\n" + while true; do IFS='=' read cookiename cookievalue + [[ -z "$cookievalue" ]] && break + cookievalue=${cookievalue/;/} + debugme echo $cookiename : $cookievalue + if grep -Eq '[0-9]{9,10}\.[0-9]{3,5}\.0000' <<< "$cookievalue"; then + ip="$(f5_ip_oldstyle "$cookievalue")" + port="$(f5_port_decode $cookievalue)" + out "${spaces}F5 cookie (default IPv4 pool member): "; pr_italic "$cookiename "; prln_svrty_medium "${ip}:${port}" + fileout "cookie_bigip_f5" "MEDIUM" "Information leakage: F5 cookie $cookiename $cookievalue is default IPv4 pool member ${ip}:${port}" "$cve" "$cwe" + elif grep -Eq '^rd[0-9]{1,3}o0{20}f{4}[a-f0-9]{8}o[0-9]{1,5}' <<< "$cookievalue"; then + routed_domain="$(f5_determine_routeddomain "$cookievalue")" + offset=$(( 2 + ${#routed_domain} + 1 + 24)) + port="${cookievalue##*o}" + ip="$(f5_hex2ip "${cookievalue:$offset:8}")" + out "${spaces}F5 cookie (IPv4 pool in routed domain "; pr_svrty_medium "$routed_domain"; out "): "; pr_italic "$cookiename "; prln_svrty_medium "${ip}:${port}" + fileout "cookie_bigip_f5" "MEDIUM" "Information leakage: F5 cookie $cookiename $cookievalue is IPv4 pool member in routed domain $routed_domain ${ip}:${port}" "$cve" "$cwe" + elif grep -Eq '^vi[a-f0-9]{32}\.[0-9]{1,5}' <<< "$cookievalue"; then + ip="$(f5_hex2ip6 ${cookievalue:2:32})" + port="${cookievalue##*.}" + port=$(f5_port_decode "$port") + out "${spaces}F5 cookie (default IPv6 pool member): "; pr_italic "$cookiename "; prln_svrty_medium "${ip}:${port}" + fileout "cookie_bigip_f5" "MEDIUM" "Information leakage: F5 cookie $cookiename $cookievalue is default IPv6 pool member ${ip}:${port}" "$cve" "$cwe" + elif grep -Eq '^rd[0-9]{1,3}o[a-f0-9]{32}o[0-9]{1,5}' <<< "$cookievalue"; then + routed_domain="$(f5_determine_routeddomain "$cookievalue")" + offset=$(( 2 + ${#routed_domain} + 1 )) + port="${cookievalue##*o}" + ip="$(f5_hex2ip6 ${cookievalue:$offset:32})" + out "${spaces}F5 cookie (IPv6 pool in routed domain "; pr_svrty_medium "$routed_domain"; out "): "; pr_italic "$cookiename "; prln_svrty_medium "${ip}:${port}" + fileout "cookie_bigip_f5" "MEDIUM" "Information leakage: F5 cookie $cookiename $cookievalue is IPv6 pool member in routed domain $routed_domain ${ip}:${port}" "$cve" "$cwe" + elif grep -Eq '^\!.*=$' <<< "$cookievalue"; then + if [[ "${#cookievalue}" -eq 81 ]] ; then + savedcookies="${savedcookies} ${cookiename}=${cookievalue:1:79}" + out "${spaces}Encrypted F5 cookie named "; pr_italic "${cookiename}"; outln " detected" + fileout "cookie_bigip_f5" "INFO" "encrypted F5 cookie named ${cookiename}" + fi + fi + done <<< "$allcookies" +} + + +run_cookie_flags() { # ARG1: Path + local -i nr_cookies + local -i nr_httponly nr_secure + local negative_word + local msg302="" msg302_="" + local spaces=" " + + if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then + run_http_header "$1" || return 1 + fi + + if [[ ! "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE" =~ 20 ]]; then + if [[ "$HTTP_STATUS_CODE" =~ [301|302] ]]; then + msg302=" -- maybe better try target URL of 30x" + msg302_=" (30x detected, better try target URL of 30x)" + else + msg302=" -- HTTP status $HTTP_STATUS_CODE signals you maybe missed the web application" + msg302_=" (maybe missed the application)" + fi + fi + + pr_bold " Cookie(s) " + grep -ai '^Set-Cookie' $HEADERFILE >$TMPFILE + if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then + outln "(none issued at \"$1\")$msg302" + fileout "cookie_count" "INFO" "0 at \"$1\"$msg302_" + else + nr_cookies=$(count_lines "$(cat $TMPFILE)") + out "$nr_cookies issued: " + fileout "cookie_count" "INFO" "$nr_cookies at \"$1\"$msg302_" + if [[ $nr_cookies -gt 1 ]]; then + negative_word="NONE" + else + negative_word="NOT" + fi + nr_secure=$(grep -iac secure $TMPFILE) + case $nr_secure in + 0) pr_svrty_medium "$negative_word" ;; + [123456789]) pr_svrty_good "$nr_secure/$nr_cookies";; + esac + out " secure, " + if [[ $nr_cookies -eq $nr_secure ]]; then + fileout "cookie_secure" "OK" "All ($nr_cookies) at \"$1\" marked as secure" + else + fileout "cookie_secure" "INFO" "$nr_secure/$nr_cookies at \"$1\" marked as secure" + fi + nr_httponly=$(grep -cai httponly $TMPFILE) + case $nr_httponly in + 0) pr_svrty_medium "$negative_word" ;; + [123456789]) pr_svrty_good "$nr_httponly/$nr_cookies";; + esac + out " HttpOnly" + if [[ $nr_cookies -eq $nr_httponly ]]; then + fileout "cookie_httponly" "OK" "All ($nr_cookies) at \"$1\" marked as HttpOnly$msg302_" + else + fileout "cookie_httponly" "INFO" "$nr_secure/$nr_cookies at \"$1\" marked as HttpOnly$msg302_" + fi + outln "$msg302" + allcookies="$(awk '/[Ss][Ee][Tt]-[Cc][Oo][Oo][Kk][Ii][Ee]:/ { print $2 }' "$TMPFILE")" + sub_f5_bigip_check "$allcookies" "$spaces" + fi + + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 0 +} + + +run_security_headers() { + local good_header="X-Frame-Options X-Content-Type-Options Content-Security-Policy X-Content-Security-Policy X-WebKit-CSP Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only Expect-CT" + local other_header="Access-Control-Allow-Origin Upgrade X-Served-By Referrer-Policy X-UA-Compatible Cache-Control Pragma X-XSS-Protection" + local header header_output + local first=true + local spaces=" " + local have_header=false + + if [[ ! -s $HEADERFILE ]]; then + run_http_header "$1" || return 1 + fi + + pr_bold " Security headers " + for header in $good_header; do + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && echo "testing \"$header\"" + match_httpheader_key "$header" "$header" "$spaces" "$first" + if [[ $? -ge 1 ]]; then + have_header=true + if "$first"; then + first=false + fi + # Include $header when determining where to insert line breaks, but print $header + # separately. + pr_svrty_good "$header"; out ":" + header_output="$(out_row_aligned_max_width "${header:2} $HEADERVALUE" "$spaces " $TERM_WIDTH)" + outln "${header_output#${header:2}}" + fileout "$header" "OK" "$HEADERVALUE" + fi + done + + for header in $other_header; do + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && echo "testing \"$header\"" + match_httpheader_key "$header" "$header" "$spaces" "$first" + if [[ $? -ge 1 ]]; then + have_header=true + if "$first"; then + first=false + fi + out "$header" + outln ": $HEADERVALUE" # shouldn't be that long + fileout "$header" "INFO" "$HEADERVALUE" + fi + done + #TODO: I am not testing for the correctness or anything stupid yet, e.g. "X-Frame-Options: allowall" or Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * + + if ! "$have_header"; then + prln_svrty_medium "--" + fileout "security_headers" "MEDIUM" "--" + fi + + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 0 +} + + +# #1: string with 2 opensssl codes, output is same in NSS/ssllabs terminology +normalize_ciphercode() { + if [[ "${1:2:2}" == "00" ]]; then + tm_out "$(tolower "x${1:7:2}")" + else + tm_out "$(tolower "x${1:2:2}${1:7:2}${1:12:2}")" + fi + return 0 +} + +prettyprint_local() { + local arg line + local hexc hexcode dash ciph sslvers kx auth enc mac export + local re='^[0-9A-Fa-f]+$' + + if [[ "$1" == 0x* ]] || [[ "$1" == 0X* ]]; then + fatal "pls supply x<number> instead" $ERR_CMDLINE + fi + + if [[ -z "$1" ]]; then + pr_headline " Displaying all $OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS local ciphers "; + else + pr_headline " Displaying all local ciphers "; + # pattern provided; which one? + [[ $1 =~ $re ]] && \ + pr_headline "matching number pattern \"$1\" " || \ + pr_headline "matching word pattern "\"$1\"" (ignore case) " + fi + outln "\n" + neat_header + + if [[ -z "$1" ]]; then + actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-V" | while read -r hexcode dash ciph sslvers kx auth enc mac export ; do # -V doesn't work with openssl < 1.0 + hexc="$(normalize_ciphercode $hexcode)" + outln "$(neat_list "$hexc" "$ciph" "$kx" "$enc")" + done + else + #for arg in $(echo $@ | sed 's/,/ /g'); do + for arg in ${*//,/ /}; do + actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-V" | while read -r hexcode dash ciph sslvers kx auth enc mac export ; do # -V doesn't work with openssl < 1.0 + hexc="$(normalize_ciphercode $hexcode)" + # for numbers we don't do word matching: + [[ $arg =~ $re ]] && \ + line="$(neat_list "$hexc" "$ciph" "$kx" "$enc" | grep -ai "$arg")" || \ + line="$(neat_list "$hexc" "$ciph" "$kx" "$enc" | grep -wai "$arg")" + [[ -n "$line" ]] && outln "$line" + done + done + fi + outln + return 0 +} + + +# Generic function for a rated output, no used yet. +# arg1: rating from 2 to -4 if available or not +# arg2: no/yes: decides whether positive or negative logic will be applied and "not" will be printed +# arg3: jsonID +# +rated_output() { + local jsonID=$3 + local logic="" + + if [[ $2 == no ]] || [[ $2 == negative ]]; then + logic="not " + fi + case $1 in + 2) pr_svrty_best "${logic}offered (OK)" + fileout "${jsonID}" "OK" "${logic}offered" + ;; + 1) pr_svrty_good "${logic}offered (OK)" + fileout "${jsonID}" "OK" "${logic}offered" + ;; + 0) out "${logic}offered" + fileout "${jsonID}" "INFO" "${logic}offered" + ;; + -1) pr_svrty_low "${logic}offered" + fileout "${jsonID}" "LOW" "${logic}offered" + ;; + -2) pr_svrty_medium "${logic}offered" + fileout "${jsonID}" "MEDIUM" "${logic}offered" + ;; + -3) pr_svrty_high "${logic}offered (NOT ok)" + fileout "${jsonID}" "HIGH" "${logic}offered" + ;; + -4) pr_svrty_critical "${logic}offered (NOT ok)" + fileout "${jsonID}" "CRITICAL" "${logic}offered" + ;; + *) pr_warning "FIXME: error around $LINENO, (please report this)" + fileout "${jsonID}" "WARN" "return condition $2 when $1 unclear" + return 1 + ;; + esac + return 0 +} + + +openssl2rfc() { + local rfcname="" + local -i i + + for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do + [[ "$1" == ${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} ]] && rfcname="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" && break + done + [[ "$rfcname" == "-" ]] && rfcname="" + [[ -n "$rfcname" ]] && tm_out "$rfcname" + return 0 +} + +rfc2openssl() { + local ossl_name + local -i i + + for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do + [[ "$1" == ${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]} ]] && ossl_name="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" && break + done + [[ "$ossl_name" == "-" ]] && ossl_name="" + [[ -n "$ossl_name" ]] && tm_out "$ossl_name" + return 0 +} + +openssl2hexcode() { + local hexc="" + local -i i + + if [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -eq 0 ]]; then + if "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then + hexc="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V -ciphersuites "$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS" 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' | awk '/ '"$1"' / { print $1 }')" + else + hexc="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' | awk '/ '"$1"' / { print $1 }')" + fi + else + for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do + [[ "$1" == ${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} ]] && hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}" && break + done + fi + [[ -z "$hexc" ]] && return 1 + tm_out "$hexc" + return 0 +} + +rfc2hexcode() { + local hexc="" + local -i i + + for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do + [[ "$1" == "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" ]] && hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}" && break + done + [[ -z "$hexc" ]] && return 1 + tm_out "$hexc" + return 0 +} + +show_rfc_style(){ + local rfcname="" hexcode + local -i i + + hexcode="$(toupper "$1")" + case ${#hexcode} in + 3) hexcode="0x00,0x${hexcode:1:2}" ;; + 5) hexcode="0x${hexcode:1:2},0x${hexcode:3:2}" ;; + 7) hexcode="0x${hexcode:1:2},0x${hexcode:3:2},0x${hexcode:5:2}" ;; + *) return 1 ;; + esac + for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do + [[ "$hexcode" == ${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]} ]] && rfcname="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" && break + done + [[ "$rfcname" == "-" ]] && rfcname="" + [[ -n "$rfcname" ]] && tm_out "$rfcname" + return 0 +} + +neat_header(){ + if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then + out "$(printf -- "Hexcode Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC) KeyExch. Encryption Bits")" + [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != rfc-only ]] && out "$(printf -- " Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL)")" + outln + out "$(printf -- "%s------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------")" + [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != rfc-only ]] && out "$(printf -- "---------------------------------------")" + outln + else + out "$(printf -- "Hexcode Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL) KeyExch. Encryption Bits")" + [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != openssl-only ]] && out "$(printf -- " Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC)")" + outln + out "$(printf -- "%s--------------------------------------------------------------------------")" + [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != openssl-only ]] && out "$(printf -- "---------------------------------------------------")" + outln + fi +} + + +# arg1: hexcode +# arg2: cipher in openssl notation +# arg3: keyexchange +# arg4: encryption (maybe included "export") +# arg5: "true" if the cipher's "quality" should be highlighted +# "false" if the line should be printed in light grey +# empty if line should be returned as a string +neat_list(){ + local hexcode="$1" + local ossl_cipher="$2" tls_cipher="" + local kx enc strength line what_dh bits + local -i i len + + kx="${3//Kx=/}" + enc="${4//Enc=/}" + # In two cases LibreSSL uses very long names for encryption algorithms + # and doesn't include the number of bits. + [[ "$enc" == ChaCha20-Poly1305 ]] && enc="CHACHA20(256)" + [[ "$enc" == GOST-28178-89-CNT ]] && enc="GOST(256)" + + strength="${enc//\)/}" # retrieve (). first remove trailing ")" + strength="${strength#*\(}" # exfiltrate (VAL + enc="${enc%%\(*}" + + enc="${enc//POLY1305/}" # remove POLY1305 + enc="${enc//\//}" # remove "/" + + [[ "$export" =~ export ]] && strength="$strength,exp" + + [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != openssl-only ]] && tls_cipher="$(show_rfc_style "$hexcode")" + + if [[ "$5" != true ]]; then + if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then + line="$(printf -- " %-7s %-49s %-10s %-12s%-8s" "$hexcode" "$tls_cipher" "$kx" "$enc" "$strength")" + [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != rfc-only ]] && line+="$(printf -- " %-33s${SHOW_EACH_C:+ %-0s}" "$ossl_cipher")" + else + line="$(printf -- " %-7s %-33s %-10s %-12s%-8s" "$hexcode" "$ossl_cipher" "$kx" "$enc" "$strength")" + [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" != openssl-only ]] && line+="$(printf -- " %-49s${SHOW_EACH_C:+ %-0s}" "$tls_cipher")" + fi + if [[ -z "$5" ]]; then + tm_out "$line" + else + pr_deemphasize "$line" + fi + return 0 + fi + if [[ "$kx" =~ " " ]]; then + what_dh="${kx%% *}" + bits="${kx##* }" + else + what_dh="$kx" + bits="" + fi + if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then + if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then + out "$(printf -- " %-7s %-49s " "$hexcode" "$tls_cipher")" + else + out "$(printf -- " %-7s %-33s " "$hexcode" "$ossl_cipher")" + fi + else + out "$(printf -- " %-7s " "$hexcode")" + if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then + print_fixed_width "$tls_cipher" 49 pr_cipher_quality + else + print_fixed_width "$ossl_cipher" 33 pr_cipher_quality + fi + fi + out "$what_dh" + if [[ -n "$bits" ]]; then + if [[ $what_dh == DH ]] || [[ $what_dh == EDH ]]; then + pr_dh_quality "$bits" " $bits" + elif [[ $what_dh == ECDH ]]; then + pr_ecdh_quality "$bits" " $bits" + fi + fi + len=${#kx} + for (( i=len; i<10; i++ )); do + out " " + done + out "$(printf -- " %-12s%-8s " "$enc" "$strength")" + if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then + if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" == rfc ]]; then + out "$(printf -- "%-33s${SHOW_EACH_C:+ %-0s}" "$ossl_cipher")" + elif [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" == openssl ]]; then + out "$(printf -- "%-49s${SHOW_EACH_C:+ %-0s}" "$tls_cipher")" + fi + else + if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" == rfc ]]; then + print_fixed_width "$ossl_cipher" 32 pr_cipher_quality + elif [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" == openssl ]]; then + print_fixed_width "$tls_cipher" 48 pr_cipher_quality + fi + out "$(printf -- "${SHOW_EACH_C:+ %-0s}")" + fi +} + +run_cipher_match(){ + local hexc n auth export ciphers_to_test tls13_ciphers_to_test supported_sslv2_ciphers s + local -a hexcode normalized_hexcode ciph sslvers kx enc export2 sigalg + local -a ciphers_found ciphers_found2 ciph2 rfc_ciph rfc_ciph2 ossl_supported + local -a -i index + local -i nr_ciphers=0 nr_ossl_ciphers=0 nr_nonossl_ciphers=0 + local -i num_bundles mod_check bundle_size bundle end_of_bundle + local dhlen has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS" + local cipher proto protos_to_try + local available + local -i sclient_success + local re='^[0-9A-Fa-f]+$' + local using_sockets=true + + "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false + "$FAST" && using_sockets=false + [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false + + pr_headline " Testing ciphers with " + if [[ $1 =~ $re ]]; then + pr_headline "matching number pattern \"$1\" " + tjolines="$tjolines matching number pattern \"$1\"\n\n" + else + pr_headline "word pattern "\"$1\"" (ignore case) " + tjolines="$tjolines word pattern \"$1\" (ignore case)\n\n" + fi + outln + if ! "$using_sockets"; then + [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && pr_warning " Cipher mapping not available, doing a fallback to openssl" + if ! "$HAS_DH_BITS"; then + [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && out "." + prln_warning " (Your $OPENSSL cannot show DH/ECDH bits)" + fi + fi + outln + neat_header + #for arg in $(echo $@ | sed 's/,/ /g'); do + for arg in ${*//, /}; do + if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then + for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do + hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}" + if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then + hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}" + if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == "00" ]]; then + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}" + else + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}" + fi + else + hexc="$(tolower "$hexc")" + hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2},${hexc:12:2}" + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}" + fi + if [[ $arg =~ $re ]]; then + neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}" | grep -qai "$arg" + else + neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}" "${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}" | grep -qwai "$arg" + fi + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && ( "$using_sockets" || "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}" ); then # string matches, so we can ssl to it: + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "${normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]}")" + ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" + rfc_ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" + kx[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}" + enc[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}" + sslvers[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_SSLVERS[i]}" + export2[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}" + ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false + sigalg[nr_ciphers]="" + ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}" + if "$using_sockets" && ! "$has_dh_bits" && \ + ( [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=EDH" ]] ); then + ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=false + fi + nr_ciphers+=1 + fi + done + else + while read hexc n ciph[nr_ciphers] sslvers[nr_ciphers] kx[nr_ciphers] auth enc[nr_ciphers] mac export2[nr_ciphers]; do + hexc="$(normalize_ciphercode $hexc)" + # is argument a number? + if [[ $arg =~ $re ]]; then + neat_list "$hexc" "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" "${kx[nr_ciphers]}" "${enc[nr_ciphers]}" | grep -qai "$arg" + else + neat_list "$hexc" "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" "${kx[nr_ciphers]}" "${enc[nr_ciphers]}" | grep -qwai "$arg" + fi + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then # string matches, so we can ssl to it: + ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$hexc" + sigalg[nr_ciphers]="" + ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=true + nr_ciphers+=1 + fi + done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-V") + fi + + # Test the SSLv2 ciphers, if any. + if "$using_sockets"; then + ciphers_to_test="" + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]]; then + ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode[i]}" + fi + done + if [[ -n "$ciphers_to_test" ]]; then + sslv2_sockets "${ciphers_to_test:2}" "true" + if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then + supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")" + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")" + for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${normalized_hexcode[i]} ]]; then + ciphers_found[i]=true + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s" + fi + done + fi + fi + else + ciphers_to_test="" + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]]; then + ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph[i]}" + fi + done + if [[ -n "$ciphers_to_test" ]]; then + $OPENSSL s_client -cipher "${ciphers_to_test:1}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE" + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then + supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep -A 4 "Ciphers common between both SSL endpoints:" $TMPFILE)" + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")" + for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${ciph[i]} ]]; then + ciphers_found[i]=true + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s" + fi + done + fi + fi + fi + + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if "${ossl_supported[i]}" && [[ "${sslvers[i]}" != "SSLv2" ]]; then + ciphers_found2[nr_ossl_ciphers]=false + ciph2[nr_ossl_ciphers]="${ciph[i]}" + index[nr_ossl_ciphers]=$i + nr_ossl_ciphers+=1 + fi + done + if [[ $nr_ossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then + num_bundles=0 + else + # Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So, + # test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less. + num_bundles=$nr_ossl_ciphers/128 + mod_check=$nr_ossl_ciphers%128 + [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles=$num_bundles+1 + + bundle_size=$nr_ossl_ciphers/$num_bundles + mod_check=$nr_ossl_ciphers%$num_bundles + [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1 + fi + + if "$HAS_TLS13"; then + protos_to_try="-no_ssl2 -tls1_2 -tls1_1 -tls1" + else + protos_to_try="-no_ssl2 -tls1_1 -tls1" + fi + "$HAS_SSL3" && protos_to_try+=" -ssl3" + + for proto in $protos_to_try; do + if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_1 ]]; then + num_bundles=1 + bundle_size=$nr_ossl_ciphers + fi + for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do + end_of_bundle=$bundle*$bundle_size+$bundle_size + [[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_ossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_ossl_ciphers + while true; do + ciphers_to_test="" + tls13_ciphers_to_test="" + for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do + if ! "${ciphers_found2[i]}"; then + if [[ "${ciph2[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph2[i]}" == TLS_* ]]; then + tls13_ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}" + else + ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}" + fi + fi + done + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && [[ -z "$tls13_ciphers_to_test" ]] && break + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto -cipher "\'${ciphers_to_test:1}\'" -ciphersuites "\'${tls13_ciphers_to_test:1}\'" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE" || break + cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + [[ -z "$cipher" ]] && break + for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do + [[ "$cipher" == "${ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break + done + [[ $i -eq $end_of_bundle ]] && break + i=${index[i]} + ciphers_found[i]=true + if [[ "$cipher" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "$cipher" == TLS_* ]]; then + kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file $TMPFILE)" + fi + if [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=EDH" ]]; then + dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet) + kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen" + fi + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TMPFILE && \ + sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")" + done + done + done + + if "$using_sockets"; then + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && [[ "${sslvers[i]}" != "SSLv2" ]]; then + ciphers_found2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=false + hexcode2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${hexcode[i]}" + rfc_ciph2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${rfc_ciph[i]}" + index[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=$i + nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1 + fi + done + fi + + if [[ $nr_nonossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then + num_bundles=0 + else + # Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So, + # test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less. + num_bundles=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/128 + mod_check=$nr_nonossl_ciphers%128 + [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles=$num_bundles+1 + + bundle_size=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/$num_bundles + mod_check=$nr_nonossl_ciphers%$num_bundles + [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1 + fi + + for proto in 04 03 02 01 00; do + for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do + end_of_bundle=$bundle*$bundle_size+$bundle_size + [[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_nonossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_nonossl_ciphers + while true; do + ciphers_to_test="" + for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do + ! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode2[i]}" + done + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break + [[ "$proto" == 04 ]] && [[ ! "$ciphers_to_test" =~ ,\ 13,[0-9a-f][0-9a-f] ]] && break + ciphers_to_test="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$proto" "$ciphers_to_test")" + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break + if "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then + tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all" + else + tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" + fi + sclient_success=$? + [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break + cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt") + for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do + [[ "$cipher" == "${rfc_ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break + done + [[ $i -eq $end_of_bundle ]] && break + i=${index[i]} + ciphers_found[i]=true + [[ "${kx[i]}" == "Kx=any" ]] && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")" + if [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=EDH" ]]; then + dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet) + kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen" + fi + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && \ + sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")" + done + done + done + + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + "${ciphers_found[i]}" || "$SHOW_EACH_C" || continue + export="${export2[i]}" + neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${ciphers_found[i]}" + available="" + if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then + if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then + available="available" + pr_cyan "available" + else + available="not a/v" + pr_deemphasize "not a/v" + fi + fi + outln "${sigalg[i]}" + fileout "cipher_${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "INFO" "$(neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}") $available" + done + "$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits" + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + done + outln + + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 0 # this is a single test for a cipher +} + + + +# test for all ciphers locally configured (w/o distinguishing whether they are good or bad) +run_allciphers() { + local -i nr_ciphers_tested=0 nr_ciphers=0 nr_ossl_ciphers=0 nr_nonossl_ciphers=0 sclient_success=0 + local n auth mac export hexc sslv2_ciphers="" s + local -a normalized_hexcode hexcode ciph sslvers kx enc export2 sigalg ossl_supported + local -i i end_of_bundle bundle bundle_size num_bundles mod_check + local -a ciphers_found ciphers_found2 hexcode2 ciph2 rfc_ciph2 + local -i -a index + local proto protos_to_try + local dhlen available ciphers_to_test tls13_ciphers_to_test supported_sslv2_ciphers + local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS" + local using_sockets=true + + "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false + "$FAST" && using_sockets=false + [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false + + # get a list of all the cipher suites to test + if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then + for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do + hexc="$(tolower "${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}")" + ciph[i]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" + sslvers[i]="${TLS_CIPHER_SSLVERS[i]}" + kx[i]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}" + enc[i]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}" + export2[i]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}" + ciphers_found[i]=false + sigalg[i]="" + ossl_supported[i]=${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]} + if "$using_sockets" && ! "$HAS_DH_BITS" && ( [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]] ); then + ossl_supported[i]=false + fi + if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then + hexcode[i]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}" + if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then + normalized_hexcode[i]="x${hexc:7:2}" + else + normalized_hexcode[i]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}" + fi + else + hexcode[i]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2},${hexc:12:2}" + normalized_hexcode[i]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}" + sslv2_ciphers="$sslv2_ciphers, ${hexcode[i]}" + fi + if "$using_sockets" || "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}"; then + nr_ciphers_tested+=1 + fi + done + nr_ciphers=$TLS_NR_CIPHERS + else + while read -r hexc n ciph[nr_ciphers] sslvers[nr_ciphers] kx[nr_ciphers] auth enc[nr_ciphers] mac export2[nr_ciphers]; do + ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false + if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then + if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:7:2}")" + else + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}")" + fi + else + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}")" + fi + sigalg[nr_ciphers]="" + ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=true + nr_ciphers=$nr_ciphers+1 + done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-V") + nr_ciphers_tested=$nr_ciphers + fi + + if "$using_sockets"; then + sslv2_sockets "${sslv2_ciphers:2}" "true" + if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then + supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")" + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")" + for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${normalized_hexcode[i]} ]]; then + ciphers_found[i]=true + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s" + fi + done + fi + elif "$HAS_SSL2"; then + $OPENSSL s_client $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE" + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then + supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep -A 4 "Ciphers common between both SSL endpoints:" $TMPFILE)" + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")" + for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${ciph[i]} ]]; then + ciphers_found[i]=true + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s" + fi + done + fi + fi + + outln + if "$using_sockets"; then + pr_headlineln " Testing $nr_ciphers_tested ciphers via OpenSSL plus sockets against the server, ordered by encryption strength " + else + pr_headlineln " Testing all $nr_ciphers_tested locally available ciphers against the server, ordered by encryption strength " + [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && pr_warning " Cipher mapping not available, doing a fallback to openssl" + outln + if ! "$HAS_DH_BITS"; then + [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && out "." + prln_warning " Your $OPENSSL cannot show DH/ECDH bits" + fi + fi + outln + neat_header + + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if "${ossl_supported[i]}"; then + [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && continue + ciphers_found2[nr_ossl_ciphers]=false + ciph2[nr_ossl_ciphers]="${ciph[i]}" + index[nr_ossl_ciphers]=$i + nr_ossl_ciphers+=1 + fi + done + + if [[ $nr_ossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then + num_bundles=0 + else + # Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So, + # test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less. + num_bundles=$nr_ossl_ciphers/128 + mod_check=$nr_ossl_ciphers%128 + [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles=$num_bundles+1 + + bundle_size=$nr_ossl_ciphers/$num_bundles + mod_check=$nr_ossl_ciphers%$num_bundles + [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1 + fi + + if "$HAS_TLS13"; then + protos_to_try="-no_ssl2 -tls1_2 -tls1_1 -tls1" + else + protos_to_try="-no_ssl2 -tls1_1 -tls1" + fi + "$HAS_SSL3" && protos_to_try+=" -ssl3" + + for proto in $protos_to_try; do + if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_1 ]]; then + num_bundles=1 + bundle_size=$nr_ossl_ciphers + fi + + [[ "$proto" != "-no_ssl2" ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "${proto:1}") -eq 1 ]] && continue + for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do + end_of_bundle=$bundle*$bundle_size+$bundle_size + [[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_ossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_ossl_ciphers + while true; do + ciphers_to_test="" + tls13_ciphers_to_test="" + for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do + if ! "${ciphers_found2[i]}"; then + if [[ "${ciph2[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph2[i]}" == TLS_* ]]; then + tls13_ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}" + else + ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}" + fi + fi + done + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && [[ -z "$tls13_ciphers_to_test" ]] && break + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto -cipher "\'${ciphers_to_test:1}\'" -ciphersuites "\'${tls13_ciphers_to_test:1}\'" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE" || break + cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + [[ -z "$cipher" ]] && break + for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do + [[ "$cipher" == "${ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break + done + [[ $i -eq $end_of_bundle ]] && break + i=${index[i]} + ciphers_found[i]=true + if [[ "$cipher" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "$cipher" == TLS_* ]]; then + kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file $TMPFILE)" + fi + if [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]]; then + dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet) + kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen" + fi + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TMPFILE && \ + sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")" + done + done + done + + if "$using_sockets"; then + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then + [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && continue + ciphers_found2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=false + hexcode2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${hexcode[i]}" + rfc_ciph2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" + index[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=$i + nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1 + fi + done + fi + + if [[ $nr_nonossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then + num_bundles=0 + else + # Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So, + # test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less. + num_bundles=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/128 + mod_check=$nr_nonossl_ciphers%128 + [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles=$num_bundles+1 + + bundle_size=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/$num_bundles + mod_check=$nr_nonossl_ciphers%$num_bundles + [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1 + fi + + for proto in 04 03 02 01 00; do + for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do + end_of_bundle=$bundle*$bundle_size+$bundle_size + [[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_nonossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_nonossl_ciphers + while true; do + ciphers_to_test="" + for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do + ! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode2[i]}" + done + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break + [[ "$proto" == 04 ]] && [[ ! "$ciphers_to_test" =~ ,\ 13,[0-9a-f][0-9a-f] ]] && break + ciphers_to_test="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$proto" "$ciphers_to_test")" + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break + if "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then + tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all" + else + tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" + fi + sclient_success=$? + [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break + cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt") + for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do + [[ "$cipher" == "${rfc_ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break + done + [[ $i -eq $end_of_bundle ]] && break + i=${index[i]} + ciphers_found[i]=true + [[ "${kx[i]}" == "Kx=any" ]] && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")" + if [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=EDH" ]]; then + dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet) + kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen" + fi + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")" + done + done + done + + for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if "${ciphers_found[i]}" || ( "$SHOW_EACH_C" && ( "$using_sockets" || "${ossl_supported[i]}" ) ); then + export=${export2[i]} + neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${ciphers_found[i]}" + available="" + if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then + if ${ciphers_found[i]}; then + available="available" + pr_cyan "$available" + else + available="not a/v" + pr_deemphasize "$available" + fi + fi + outln "${sigalg[i]}" + fileout "cipher_${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "INFO" "$(neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}") $available" + fi + done + "$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits" + + outln + [[ $sclient_success -ge 6 ]] && return 1 + return 0 +} + +# test for all ciphers per protocol locally configured (w/o distinguishing whether they are good or bad) +# for the specified protocol, test for all ciphers locally configured (w/o distinguishing whether they +# are good or bad) and list them in order to encryption strength. +ciphers_by_strength() { + local proto="$1" proto_hex="$2" proto_text="$3" + local using_sockets="$4" + local ossl_ciphers_proto + local -i nr_ciphers nr_ossl_ciphers nr_nonossl_ciphers success + local n sslvers auth mac export hexc sslv2_ciphers="" cipher + local -a hexcode normalized_hexcode ciph rfc_ciph kx enc export2 + local -a hexcode2 ciph2 rfc_ciph2 + local -i i bundle end_of_bundle bundle_size num_bundles mod_check + local -a ciphers_found ciphers_found2 sigalg ossl_supported index + local dhlen supported_sslv2_ciphers ciphers_to_test tls13_ciphers_to_test addcmd temp + local available + local id + local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS" + + pr_underline "$(printf -- "%b" "$proto_text")" + # for local problem if it happens + out " " + if ! "$using_sockets" && ! locally_supported "$proto"; then + return 0 + fi + outln + + [[ $(has_server_protocol "${proto:1}") -eq 1 ]] && return 0 + + # get a list of all the cipher suites to test + nr_ciphers=0 + if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then + for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do + hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}" + ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" + rfc_ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" + kx[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}" + enc[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}" + export2[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}" + ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false + sigalg[nr_ciphers]="" + ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]} + if "$using_sockets" && ! "$has_dh_bits" && ( [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=EDH" ]] ); then + ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=false + fi + if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then + hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}" + if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}" + else + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}" + fi + else + hexc="$(tolower "$hexc")" + hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2},${hexc:12:2}" + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}" + fi + if ( "$using_sockets" || "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}" ); then + if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]] && [[ "$proto_text" != SSLv2 ]]; then + if [[ "$proto_text" == TLS\ 1.3 ]]; then + [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 13 ]] && nr_ciphers+=1 + elif [[ "$proto_text" == TLS\ 1.2 ]]; then + [[ "${hexc:2:2}" != 13 ]] && nr_ciphers+=1 + elif [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA256 ]] && [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA384 ]] && \ + [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM ]] && [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *_CCM_8 ]]; then + nr_ciphers+=1 + fi + elif [[ ${#hexc} -eq 14 ]] && [[ "$proto_text" == SSLv2 ]]; then + sslv2_ciphers+=", ${hexcode[nr_ciphers]}" + nr_ciphers+=1 + fi + fi + done + else # no sockets, openssl! + # The OpenSSL ciphers function, prior to version 1.1.0, could only understand -ssl2, -ssl3, and -tls1. + if [[ "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]]; then + ossl_ciphers_proto="" + elif [[ "$proto" == -ssl2 ]] || [[ "$proto" == -ssl3 ]] || \ + [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 1.1.0* ]] || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 1.1.1* ]] || \ + [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 3.0.0* ]]; then + ossl_ciphers_proto="$proto" + else + ossl_ciphers_proto="-tls1" + fi + while read hexc n ciph[nr_ciphers] sslvers kx[nr_ciphers] auth enc[nr_ciphers] mac export2[nr_ciphers]; do + if [[ "$proto_text" == TLS\ 1.3 ]]; then + [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == TLS_* ]] || continue + elif [[ "$proto_text" == "TLS 1.2" ]]; then + if [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == TLS_* ]]; then + continue + fi + elif [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == *-SHA256 ]] || [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == *-SHA384 ]] || \ + [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == *-CCM ]] || [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" == *-CCM8 ]] || \ + [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" =~ CHACHA20-POLY1305 ]]; then + continue + fi + ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(normalize_ciphercode "$hexc")" + sigalg[nr_ciphers]="" + ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=true + nr_ciphers+=1 + done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "$ossl_ciphers_proto -V") + fi + + if [[ "$proto" == -ssl2 ]]; then + if "$using_sockets"; then + sslv2_sockets "${sslv2_ciphers:2}" "true" + if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then + supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")" + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")" + for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${normalized_hexcode[i]} ]]; then + ciphers_found[i]=true + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s" + fi + done + fi + else + $OPENSSL s_client $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE" + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then + supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep -A 4 "Ciphers common between both SSL endpoints:" $TMPFILE)" + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")" + for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${ciph[i]} ]]; then + ciphers_found[i]=true + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s" + fi + done + fi + fi + else # no SSLv2 + nr_ossl_ciphers=0 + if ( "$HAS_SSL3" || [[ $proto != -ssl3 ]] ) && ( "$HAS_TLS13" || [[ $proto != -tls1_3 ]] ); then + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if "${ossl_supported[i]}"; then + ciphers_found2[nr_ossl_ciphers]=false + ciph2[nr_ossl_ciphers]="${ciph[i]}" + index[nr_ossl_ciphers]=$i + nr_ossl_ciphers+=1 + fi + done + fi + if [[ $nr_ossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then + num_bundles=0 + else + # Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So, + # test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less. + num_bundles=$nr_ossl_ciphers/128 + mod_check=$nr_ossl_ciphers%128 + [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles=$num_bundles+1 + + bundle_size=$nr_ossl_ciphers/$num_bundles + mod_check=$nr_ossl_ciphers%$num_bundles + [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1 + fi + + for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do + end_of_bundle=$bundle*$bundle_size+$bundle_size + [[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_ossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_ossl_ciphers + for (( success=0; success==0 ; 1 )); do + ciphers_to_test="" + tls13_ciphers_to_test="" + for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do + if ! "${ciphers_found2[i]}"; then + if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_3 ]]; then + tls13_ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}" + else + ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}" + fi + fi + done + success=1 + if [[ -n "$ciphers_to_test" ]] || [[ -n "$tls13_ciphers_to_test" ]]; then + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-cipher "\'${ciphers_to_test:1}\'" -ciphersuites "\'${tls13_ciphers_to_test:1}\'" $proto $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE" + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then + cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + if [[ -n "$cipher" ]]; then + success=0 + for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do + [[ "$cipher" == "${ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break + done + i=${index[i]} + ciphers_found[i]=true + [[ "$proto_text" == TLS\ 1.3 ]] && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file $TMPFILE)" + if [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]]; then + dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet) + kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen" + fi + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TMPFILE && \ + sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")" + fi + fi + fi + done + done + + if "$using_sockets"; then + nr_nonossl_ciphers=0 + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then + ciphers_found2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=false + hexcode2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${hexcode[i]}" + rfc_ciph2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${rfc_ciph[i]}" + index[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=$i + nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1 + fi + done + fi + + if [[ $nr_nonossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then + num_bundles=0 + else + # Some servers can't handle a handshake with >= 128 ciphers. So, + # test cipher suites in bundles of 128 or less. + num_bundles=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/128 + mod_check=$nr_nonossl_ciphers%128 + [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles=$num_bundles+1 + + bundle_size=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/$num_bundles + mod_check=$nr_nonossl_ciphers%$num_bundles + [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1 + fi + + for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do + end_of_bundle=$bundle*$bundle_size+$bundle_size + [[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_nonossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_nonossl_ciphers + for (( success=0; success==0 ; 1 )); do + ciphers_to_test="" + for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do + ! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode2[i]}" + done + success=1 + if [[ -n "$ciphers_to_test" ]]; then + if "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then + tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all" + else + tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" + fi + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then + success=0 + cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt") + for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do + [[ "$cipher" == "${rfc_ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break + done + i=${index[i]} + ciphers_found[i]=true + [[ "$proto_text" == TLS\ 1.3 ]] && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")" + if [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]]; then + dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet) + kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen" + fi + "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && \ + sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")" + fi + fi + done + done + fi + + for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if "${ciphers_found[i]}" || "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then + export=${export2[i]} + normalized_hexcode[i]="$(tolower "${normalized_hexcode[i]}")" + neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${ciphers_found[i]}" + available="" + if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then + if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then + available="available" + pr_cyan "$available" + else + available="not a/v" + pr_deemphasize "$available" + fi + fi + outln "${sigalg[i]}" + id="cipher$proto" + id+="_${normalized_hexcode[i]}" + fileout "$id" "INFO" "$proto_text $(neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}") $available" + fi + done + + "$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits" + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}${proto}.txt + return 0 +#FIXME: no error condition +} + +# test for all ciphers per protocol locally configured (w/o distinguishing whether they are good or bad) +run_cipher_per_proto() { + local proto proto_hex proto_text + local using_sockets=true + + "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false + "$FAST" && using_sockets=false + [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false + + outln + if "$using_sockets"; then + pr_headlineln " Testing ciphers per protocol via OpenSSL plus sockets against the server, ordered by encryption strength " + else + pr_headlineln " Testing all locally available ciphers per protocol against the server, ordered by encryption strength " + [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && pr_warning " Cipher mapping not available, doing a fallback to openssl" + outln + if ! "$HAS_DH_BITS"; then + [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && out "." + prln_warning " (Your $OPENSSL cannot show DH/ECDH bits)" + fi + fi + outln + neat_header + echo -e " -ssl2 22 SSLv2\n -ssl3 00 SSLv3\n -tls1 01 TLS 1\n -tls1_1 02 TLS 1.1\n -tls1_2 03 TLS 1.2\n -tls1_3 04 TLS 1.3" | while read proto proto_hex proto_text; do + ciphers_by_strength "$proto" "$proto_hex" "$proto_text" "$using_sockets" + done + return 0 +#FIXME: no error condition +} + +# arg1 is an ASCII-HEX encoded SSLv3 or TLS ClientHello. +# arg2: new key_share extension (only present to response to HelloRetryRequest) +# arg3: cookie extension (if needed for response to HelloRetryRequest) +# +# This function may be used to either modify a ClientHello for client simulation +# or to create a second ClientHello in response to a HelloRetryRequest. +# If arg2 is present, then this is a response to a HelloRetryRequest, so the +# function replaces the key_share extension with arg2 and adds the cookie +# extension, if present. +# If arg2 is not present, then this is an initial ClientHello for client simulation. +# In this case, if the provided ClientHello contains a server name extension, +# then either: +# 1) replace it with one corresponding to $SNI; or +# 2) remove it, if $SNI is empty +modify_clienthello() { + local tls_handshake_ascii="$1" + local new_key_share="$2" cookie="$3" + local -i len offset tls_handshake_ascii_len len_all len_clienthello + local -i len_extensions len_extension + local tls_content_type tls_version_reclayer handshake_msg_type tls_clientversion + local tls_random tls_sid tls_cipher_suites tls_compression_methods + local tls_extensions="" extension_type len_extensions_hex + local len_servername hexdump_format_str servername_hexstr + local len_servername_hex len_sni_listlen len_sni_ext + local tls_client_hello len_clienthello_hex tls_handshake_ascii_len_hex + local sni_extension_found=false + + tls_handshake_ascii_len=${#tls_handshake_ascii} + + tls_content_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:0:2}" + tls_version_reclayer="${tls_handshake_ascii:2:4}" + len_all=$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:6:4}") + + handshake_msg_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:10:2}" + len_clienthello=$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:12:6}") + tls_clientversion="${tls_handshake_ascii:18:4}" + tls_random="${tls_handshake_ascii:22:64}" + len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:86:2}")+2 + tls_sid="${tls_handshake_ascii:86:$len}" + offset=86+$len + + len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:4}")+4 + tls_cipher_suites="${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:$len}" + offset=$offset+$len + + len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:2}")+2 + tls_compression_methods="${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:$len}" + offset=$offset+$len + + if [[ $offset -ge $tls_handshake_ascii_len ]]; then + # No extensions + tm_out "$tls_handshake_ascii" + return 0 + fi + + len_extensions=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:4}") + offset+=4 + for (( 1; offset < tls_handshake_ascii_len; 1 )); do + extension_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:4}" + offset+=4 + len_extension=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:4}") + + if [[ "$extension_type" == 0000 ]] && [[ -z "$new_key_share" ]]; then + # If this is an initial ClientHello, then either remove + # the SNI extension or replace it with the correct server name. + sni_extension_found=true + if [[ -n "$SNI" ]]; then + # Create a server name extension that corresponds to $SNI + len_servername=${#NODE} + hexdump_format_str="$len_servername/1 \"%02x\"" + servername_hexstr=$(printf $NODE | hexdump -v -e "${hexdump_format_str}") + # convert lengths we need to fill in from dec to hex: + len_servername_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_servername) + len_sni_listlen=$(printf "%02x\n" $((len_servername+3))) + len_sni_ext=$(printf "%02x\n" $((len_servername+5))) + tls_extensions+="000000${len_sni_ext}00${len_sni_listlen}0000${len_servername_hex}${servername_hexstr}" + fi + offset+=$len_extension+4 + elif [[ "$extension_type" != 00$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR ]] || [[ -z "$new_key_share" ]]; then + # If this is in response to a HelloRetryRequest, then do + # not copy over the old key_share extension, but + # all other extensions should be copied into the new ClientHello. + offset=$offset-4 + len=$len_extension+8 + tls_extensions+="${tls_handshake_ascii:$offset:$len}" + offset+=$len + else + # This is the key_share extension, and the modified ClientHello + # is being created in response to a HelloRetryRequest. Replace + # the existing key_share extension with the new one. + tls_extensions+="$new_key_share" + offset+=$len_extension+4 + fi + done + tls_extensions+="$cookie" + + if ! "$sni_extension_found" && [[ -z "$new_key_share" ]]; then + tm_out "$tls_handshake_ascii" + return 0 + fi + + len_extensions=${#tls_extensions}/2 + len_extensions_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_extensions) + len2twobytes "$len_extensions_hex" + tls_extensions="${LEN_STR:0:2}${LEN_STR:4:2}${tls_extensions}" + + tls_client_hello="${tls_clientversion}${tls_random}${tls_sid}${tls_cipher_suites}${tls_compression_methods}${tls_extensions}" + len_clienthello=${#tls_client_hello}/2 + len_clienthello_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_clienthello) + len2twobytes "$len_clienthello_hex" + tls_handshake_ascii="${handshake_msg_type}00${LEN_STR:0:2}${LEN_STR:4:2}${tls_client_hello}" + + tls_handshake_ascii_len=${#tls_handshake_ascii}/2 + tls_handshake_ascii_len_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $tls_handshake_ascii_len) + len2twobytes "$tls_handshake_ascii_len_hex" + tls_handshake_ascii="${tls_content_type}${tls_version_reclayer}${LEN_STR:0:2}${LEN_STR:4:2}${tls_handshake_ascii}" + tm_out "$tls_handshake_ascii" + return 0 +} + +client_simulation_sockets() { + local -i len i ret=0 + local -i save=0 + local lines clienthello data="" + local cipher_list_2send="" + local sock_reply_file2 sock_reply_file3 + local tls_hello_ascii next_packet hello_done=0 + local -i sid_len offset1 offset2 + + if [[ "${1:0:4}" == 1603 ]]; then + clienthello="$(modify_clienthello "$1")" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${clienthello:10}" + else + clienthello="$1" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="" + fi + len=${#clienthello} + for (( i=0; i < len; i=i+2 )); do + data+=", ${clienthello:i:2}" + done + # same as above. If a CIPHER_SUITES string was provided, then check that it is in the ServerHello + # this appeared 1st in yassl + MySQL (https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/pull/784) but adds + # robustness to the implementation + # see also https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/pull/797 + if [[ "${1:0:4}" == 1603 ]]; then + # Extract list of cipher suites from SSLv3 or later ClientHello + sid_len=4*$(hex2dec "${data:174:2}") + offset1=178+$sid_len + offset2=182+$sid_len + len=4*$(hex2dec "${data:offset1:2}${data:offset2:2}")-2 + offset1=186+$sid_len + code2network "$(tolower "${data:offset1:len}")" # convert CIPHER_SUITES to a "standardized" format + else + # Extract list of cipher suites from SSLv2 ClientHello + len=2*$(hex2dec "${clienthello:12:2}") + for (( i=22; i < 22+len; i=i+6 )); do + offset1=$i+2 + offset2=$i+4 + [[ "${clienthello:i:2}" == 00 ]] && cipher_list_2send+=", ${clienthello:offset1:2},${clienthello:offset2:2}" + done + code2network "$(tolower "${cipher_list_2send:2}")" # convert CIPHER_SUITES to a "standardized" format + fi + cipher_list_2send="$NW_STR" + + fd_socket 5 || return 6 + debugme echo -e "\nsending client hello... " + socksend_clienthello "${data}" + sleep $USLEEP_SND + + sockread_serverhello 32768 + tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE") + tls_hello_ascii="${tls_hello_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}" + + # Check if the response is a HelloRetryRequest. + resend_if_hello_retry_request "$clienthello" "$tls_hello_ascii" + ret=$? + if [[ $ret -eq 2 ]]; then + tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE") + tls_hello_ascii="${tls_hello_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}" + elif [[ $ret -eq 1 ]] || [[ $ret -eq 6 ]]; then + close_socket + TMPFILE=$SOCK_REPLY_FILE + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd + return $ret + fi + + if [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:1}" != "8" ]]; then + check_tls_serverhellodone "$tls_hello_ascii" "ephemeralkey" + hello_done=$? + fi + + for(( 1 ; hello_done==1; 1 )); do + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then + sock_reply_file2=${SOCK_REPLY_FILE}.2 + mv "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$sock_reply_file2" + fi + + debugme echo -n "requesting more server hello data... " + socksend "" $USLEEP_SND + sockread_serverhello 32768 + + next_packet=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE") + next_packet="${next_packet%%[!0-9A-F]*}" + if [[ ${#next_packet} -eq 0 ]]; then + # This shouldn't be necessary. However, it protects against + # getting into an infinite loop if the server has nothing + # left to send and check_tls_serverhellodone doesn't + # correctly catch it. + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && mv "$sock_reply_file2" "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" + hello_done=0 + else + tls_hello_ascii+="$next_packet" + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then + sock_reply_file3=${SOCK_REPLY_FILE}.3 + mv "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$sock_reply_file3" #FIXME: we moved that already + mv "$sock_reply_file2" "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" + cat "$sock_reply_file3" >> "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" + rm "$sock_reply_file3" + fi + + check_tls_serverhellodone "$tls_hello_ascii" "ephemeralkey" + hello_done=$? + fi + done + + debugme echo "reading server hello..." + if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then + hexdump -C $SOCK_REPLY_FILE | head -6 + echo + fi + if [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:1}" == 8 ]]; then + parse_sslv2_serverhello "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "false" + if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then + echo "Protocol : SSLv2" > "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" + DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0200" + ret=0 + else + ret=1 + fi + else + parse_tls_serverhello "$tls_hello_ascii" "ephemeralkey" "$cipher_list_2send" + save=$? + + if [[ $save -eq 0 ]]; then + send_close_notify "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" + fi + + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then + # see https://secure.wand.net.nz/trac/libprotoident/wiki/SSL + lines=$(count_lines "$(hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" 2>$ERRFILE)") + tm_out " ($lines lines returned) " + fi + + # determine the return value for higher level, so that they can tell what the result is + if [[ $save -eq 1 ]] || [[ $lines -eq 1 ]]; then + ret=1 # NOT available + else + ret=0 + fi + debugme tmln_out + fi + + close_socket + TMPFILE=$SOCK_REPLY_FILE + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd + return $ret +} + +run_client_simulation() { + # Runs browser simulations. Browser capabilities gathered from: + # https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/clients.html on 10 jan 2016 + local names=() + local short=() + local protos=() + local ciphers=() + local ciphersuites=() + local tlsvers=() + local sni=() + local warning=() + local handshakebytes=() + local lowest_protocol=() + local highest_protocol=() + local service=() + local minDhBits=() + local maxDhBits=() + local minRsaBits=() + local maxRsaBits=() + local minEcdsaBits=() + local curves=() + local requiresSha2=() + local current=() + local i=0 + local name tls proto cipher temp what_dh bits curve supported_curves + local has_dh_bits using_sockets=true + local client_service + local options + local -i ret=0 + local jsonID="clientsimulation" + local client_service="" + + # source the external file + . "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/client-simulation.txt" 2>/dev/null + if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then + prln_local_problem "couldn't find client simulation data in $TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/client-simulation.txt" + return 1 + fi + + "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false + + if [[ $SERVICE != "" ]]; then + client_service="$SERVICE" + elif [[ -n "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" ]]; then + # Can we take the service from STARTTLS? + client_service=$(toupper "${STARTTLS_PROTOCOL%s}") # strip trailing 's' in ftp(s), smtp(s), pop3(s), etc + elif "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then + client_service="HTTP" + else + outln "Could not determine the protocol, only simulating generic clients." + fi + + outln + pr_headline " Running client simulations " + [[ "$client_service" == HTTP ]] && pr_headline "($client_service) " + if "$using_sockets"; then + pr_headlineln "via sockets " + else + pr_headline "via openssl " + prln_warning " -- pls note \"--ssl-native\" will return some false results" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "You shouldn't run this with \"--ssl-native\" as you will get false results" + ret=1 + fi + outln + debugme echo + + if "$WIDE"; then + if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]]; then + out " Browser Protocol Cipher Suite Name (OpenSSL) " + ( "$using_sockets" || "$HAS_DH_BITS") && out "Forward Secrecy" + outln + out "--------------------------------------------------------------------------" + else + out " Browser Protocol Cipher Suite Name (IANA/RFC) " + ( "$using_sockets" || "$HAS_DH_BITS") && out "Forward Secrecy" + outln + out "------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------" + fi + ( "$using_sockets" || "$HAS_DH_BITS") && out "----------------------" + outln + fi + if ! "$using_sockets"; then + # We can't use the connectivity checker here as of now the openssl reply is always empty (reason??) + save_max_ossl_fail=$MAX_OSSL_FAIL + nr_ossl_fail=$NR_OSSL_FAIL + MAX_OSSL_FAIL=100 + fi + for name in "${short[@]}"; do + if "${current[i]}" || "$ALL_CLIENTS" ; then + # for ANY we test this service or if the service we determined from STARTTLS matches + if [[ "${service[i]}" == ANY ]] || [[ "${service[i]}" =~ $client_service ]]; then + out " $(printf -- "%-29s" "${names[i]}")" + if "$using_sockets" && [[ -n "${handshakebytes[i]}" ]]; then + client_simulation_sockets "${handshakebytes[i]}" + sclient_success=$? + if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then + if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}" -lt ${lowest_protocol[i]} ]] || \ + [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}" -gt ${highest_protocol[i]} ]]; then + sclient_success=1 + fi + [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE >$ERRFILE + fi + else + if [[ -n "${curves[i]}" ]]; then + # "$OPENSSL s_client" will fail if the -curves option includes any unsupported curves. + supported_curves="" + for curve in $(colon_to_spaces "${curves[i]}"); do + # Attention! secp256r1 = prime256v1 and secp192r1 = prime192v1 + # We need to map two curves here as otherwise handshakes will go wrong if "-curves" are supplied + # https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/apps/ecparam.c#L221 + ./ssl/t1_lib.c + [[ "$curve" =~ secp256r1 ]] && curve="${curve//secp256r1/prime256v1}" + [[ "$curve" =~ secp192r1 ]] && curve="${curve//secp192r1/prime192v1}" + [[ "$OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES" =~ " $curve " ]] && supported_curves+=":$curve" + done + curves[i]="" + [[ -n "$supported_curves" ]] && curves[i]="-curves ${supported_curves:1}" + fi + options="$(s_client_options "-cipher ${ciphers[i]} -ciphersuites "\'${ciphersuites[i]}\'" ${curves[i]} ${protos[i]} $STARTTLS $BUGS $PROXY -connect $NODEIP:$PORT ${sni[i]}")" + debugme echo "$OPENSSL s_client $options </dev/null" + $OPENSSL s_client $options </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + sclient_success=$? + fi + if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then + # If an ephemeral DH key was used, check that the number of bits is within range. + temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TMPFILE") # extract line + what_dh="${temp%%,*}" + bits="${temp##*, }" + # formatting + curve="${temp#*, }" + if [[ "$curve" == $bits ]]; then + curve="" + else + curve="${curve%%,*}" + fi + bits="${bits/bits/}" + bits="${bits// /}" + if [[ "$what_dh" == X25519 ]] || [[ "$what_dh" == X448 ]]; then + curve="$what_dh" + what_dh="ECDH" + fi + if [[ "$what_dh" == DH ]]; then + [[ ${minDhBits[i]} -ne -1 ]] && [[ $bits -lt ${minDhBits[i]} ]] && sclient_success=1 + [[ ${maxDhBits[i]} -ne -1 ]] && [[ $bits -gt ${maxDhBits[i]} ]] && sclient_success=1 + fi + fi + if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then + outln "No connection" + fileout "${jsonID}-${short[i]}" "INFO" "No connection" + else + proto=$(get_protocol $TMPFILE) + # hack: + [[ "$proto" == TLSv1 ]] && proto="TLSv1.0" + [[ "$proto" == SSLv3 ]] && proto="SSLv3 " + if [[ "$proto" == TLSv1.2 ]] && ( ! "$using_sockets" || [[ -z "${handshakebytes[i]}" ]] ); then + # OpenSSL reports TLS1.2 even if the connection is TLS1.1 or TLS1.0. Need to figure out which one it is... + for tls in ${tlsvers[i]}; do + # If the handshake data includes TLS 1.3 we need to remove it, otherwise the + # simulation will fail with # 'Oops: openssl s_client connect problem' + # before/after trying another protocol. We only print a warning it in debug mode + # as otherwise we would need e.g. handle the curves in a similar fashion -- not + # to speak about ciphers + if [[ $tls =~ 1_3 ]] && ! "$HAS_TLS13"; then + debugme pr_local_problem "TLS 1.3 not supported, " + continue + fi + options="$(s_client_options "$tls -cipher ${ciphers[i]} -ciphersuites "\'${ciphersuites[i]}\'" ${curves[i]} $STARTTLS $BUGS $PROXY -connect $NODEIP:$PORT ${sni[i]}")" + debugme echo "$OPENSSL s_client $options </dev/null" + $OPENSSL s_client $options </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + sclient_success=$? + if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then + case "$tls" in + "-tls1_2") break ;; + "-tls1_1") proto="TLSv1.1" + break ;; + "-tls1") proto="TLSv1.0" + break ;; + esac + fi + done + fi + cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] && ( [[ "$cipher" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "$cipher" == SSL_* ]] ); then + cipher="$(rfc2openssl "$cipher")" + [[ -z "$cipher" ]] && cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + elif [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]] && [[ "$cipher" != TLS_* ]] && [[ "$cipher" != SSL_* ]]; then + cipher="$(openssl2rfc "$cipher")" + [[ -z "$cipher" ]] && cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + fi + out "$proto " + "$WIDE" && out " " + if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then + out "$cipher" + else + pr_cipher_quality "$cipher" + fi + if "$WIDE"; then + if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]]; then + for (( j=${#cipher}; j < 34; j++ )); do + out " " + done + else + for (( j=${#cipher}; j < 50; j++ )); do + out " " + done + fi + fi + if [[ -n "$what_dh" ]]; then + [[ -n "$curve" ]] && curve="($curve)" + "$WIDE" || out ", " + if [[ "$what_dh" == ECDH ]]; then + pr_ecdh_quality "$bits" "$(printf -- "%-12s" "$bits bit $what_dh") $curve" + else + pr_dh_quality "$bits" "$(printf -- "%-12s" "$bits bit $what_dh") $curve" + fi + else + if "$HAS_DH_BITS" || ( "$using_sockets" && [[ -n "${handshakebytes[i]}" ]] ); then + "$WIDE" || out ", " + out "No FS" + fi + fi + outln + if [[ -n "${warning[i]}" ]]; then + out " " + outln "${warning[i]}" + fi + fileout "${jsonID}-${short[i]}" "INFO" "$proto $cipher ${warning[i]}" + debugme cat $TMPFILE + fi + fi # correct service? + fi #current? + ((i++)) + done + if ! "$using_sockets"; then + # restore from above + MAX_OSSL_FAIL=$save_max_ossl_fail + NR_OSSL_FAIL=$nr_ossl_fail + fi + + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return $ret +} + +# generic function whether $1 is supported by s_client ($2: string to display, currently nowhere being used) +# +locally_supported() { + [[ -n "$2" ]] && out "$2 " + if $OPENSSL s_client "$1" -connect invalid. 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option"; then + prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client $1\"" + return 7 + fi + return 0 +} + + +# The protocol check in run_protocols needs to be redone. The using_sockets part there kind of sucks. +# 1) we need to have a variable where the results are being stored so that every other test doesn't have to do this again +# --> we have that but certain information like "downgraded" are not being passed. That's not ok for run_protocols()/ +# for all other functions we can use it +# 2) the code is old and one can do that way better +# We should do what's available and faster (openssl vs. sockets). Keep in mind that the socket reply for SSLv2 returns the number # of ciphers! +# +# arg1: -ssl2|-ssl3|-tls1|-tls1_1|-tls1_2|-tls1_3 +# +run_prototest_openssl() { + local -i ret=0 + local protos proto + + # check whether the protocol being tested is supported by $OPENSSL + $OPENSSL s_client "$1" -connect invalid. 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" && return 7 + case "$1" in + -ssl2) protos="-ssl2" ;; + -ssl3) protos="-ssl3" ;; + -tls1) protos="-no_tls1_2 -no_tls1_1 -no_ssl2"; "$HAS_TLS13" && protos+=" -no_tls1_3" ;; + -tls1_1) protos="-no_tls1_2 -no_ssl2"; "$HAS_TLS13" && protos+=" -no_tls1_3" ;; + -tls1_2) protos="-no_ssl2"; "$HAS_TLS13" && protos+=" -no_tls1_3" ;; + -tls1_3) protos="" ;; + esac + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-state $protos $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>&1 </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + ret=$? + debugme grep -E "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error" + if [[ $ret -ne 0 ]]; then + if grep -aq "no cipher list" $TMPFILE; then + ret=5 # <--- important indicator for SSL2 (maybe others, too) + else + # try again without $PROXY + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-state $protos $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>&1 </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + ret=$? + debugme grep -E "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error" + grep -aq "no cipher list" $TMPFILE && ret=5 # <--- important indicator for SSL2 (maybe others, too) + fi + fi + if [[ $ret -eq 0 ]]; then + proto="$(get_protocol "$TMPFILE")" + proto=${proto/\./_} + proto=${proto/v/} + proto="-$(tolower $proto)" + [[ "$proto" != $1 ]] && ret=2 + case "$proto" in + -ssl3) DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0300" ;; + -tls1) DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0301" ;; + -tls1_1) DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0302" ;; + -tls1_2) DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0303" ;; + -tls1_3) DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0304" ;; + esac + fi + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}$1.txt + return $ret + + # 0: offered + # 1: not offered + # 2: downgraded + # 5: protocol ok, but no cipher + # 7: no local support +} + +# Idempotent function to add SSL/TLS protocols. It should accelerate testing. +# PROTOS_OFFERED can be e.g. "ssl2:no ssl3:no tls1_2:yes" which means that +# SSLv2 and SSLv3 was tested but not available, TLS 1.2 was tested and available +# TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.2 not tested yet +# +# arg1: protocol +# arg2: available (yes) or not (no) +add_tls_offered() { + # the ":" is mandatory here (and @ other places), otherwise e.g. tls1 will match tls1_2 + if [[ "$PROTOS_OFFERED" =~ $1: ]]; then + # we got that protocol already + : + else + PROTOS_OFFERED+="${1}:$2 " + fi +} + +# function which checks whether SSLv2 - TLS 1.2 is being offered, see add_tls_offered() +# arg1: protocol string or hex code for TLS protocol +# echos: 0 if proto known being offered, 1: known not being offered, 2: we don't know yet whether proto is being offered +# return value is always zero +has_server_protocol() { + local proto + local proto_val_pair + + case "$1" in + 04) proto="tls1_3" ;; + 03) proto="tls1_2" ;; + 02) proto="tls1_1" ;; + 01) proto="tls1" ;; + 00) proto="ssl3" ;; + *) proto="$1" ;; + esac + + if [[ "$PROTOS_OFFERED" =~ $proto: ]]; then + for proto_val_pair in $PROTOS_OFFERED; do + if [[ $proto_val_pair =~ $proto: ]]; then + if [[ ${proto_val_pair#*:} == yes ]]; then + echo 0 + return 0 + else + echo 1 + return 0 + fi + fi + done + else + # if empty echo 2, hinting to the caller to check at additional cost/connect + echo 2 + return 0 + fi +} + + +# the protocol check needs to be revamped. It sucks, see above +run_protocols() { + local using_sockets=true + local supported_no_ciph1="supported but couldn't detect a cipher (may need debugging)" + local supported_no_ciph2="supported but couldn't detect a cipher" + local latest_supported="" # version.major and version.minor of highest version supported by the server + local detected_version_string latest_supported_string + local key_share_extn_nr="$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR" + local lines nr_ciphers_detected + local tls13_ciphers_to_test="" + local i drafts_offered="" drafts_offered_str="" supported_versions debug_recomm="" + local tls12_detected_version + local -i ret=0 ret_val_ssl3 ret_val_tls1 ret_val_tls11 ret_val_tls12=0 ret_val_tls13=0 + local offers_tls13=false + local jsonID="SSLv2" + + outln; pr_headline " Testing protocols " + + if "$SSL_NATIVE"; then + using_sockets=false + prln_underline "via native openssl" + else + using_sockets=true + if [[ -n "$STARTTLS" ]]; then + prln_underline "via sockets " + else + prln_underline "via sockets except NPN+ALPN " + fi + fi + outln + [[ "$DEBUG" -le 1 ]] && debug_recomm=", rerun with DEBUG>=2 or --ssl-native" + + pr_bold " SSLv2 "; + if ! "$SSL_NATIVE"; then + sslv2_sockets + case $? in + 6) # couldn't open socket + prln_fixme "couldn't open socket" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "couldn't be tested, socket problem" + ((ret++)) + ;; + 7) # strange reply, couldn't convert the cipher spec length to a hex number + pr_cyan "strange v2 reply " + outln "$debug_recomm" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && hexdump -C "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.sslv2_sockets.dd" | head -1 + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received a strange SSLv2 reply (rerun with DEBUG>=2)" + ;; + 1) # no sslv2 server hello returned, like in openlitespeed which returns HTTP! + prln_svrty_best "not offered (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered" + add_tls_offered ssl2 no + ;; + 0) # reset + prln_svrty_best "not offered (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered" + add_tls_offered ssl2 no + ;; + 4) out "likely "; pr_svrty_best "not offered (OK), " + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "likely not offered" + add_tls_offered ssl2 no + pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}" + ;; + 3) lines=$(count_lines "$(hexdump -C "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.sslv2_sockets.dd" 2>/dev/null)") + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 2 ]] && tm_out " ($lines lines) " + if [[ "$lines" -gt 1 ]]; then + nr_ciphers_detected=$((V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH / 3)) + add_tls_offered ssl2 yes + if [[ 0 -eq "$nr_ciphers_detected" ]]; then + prln_svrty_high "supported but couldn't detect a cipher and vulnerable to CVE-2015-3197 "; + fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "offered, no cipher" "CVE-2015-3197" "CWE-310" + else + pr_svrty_critical "offered (NOT ok), also VULNERABLE to DROWN attack"; + outln " -- $nr_ciphers_detected ciphers" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "vulnerable with $nr_ciphers_detected ciphers" + fi + fi + ;; + *) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm" + ((ret++)) + ;; + esac + debugme tmln_out + else + run_prototest_openssl "-ssl2" + case $? in + 0) prln_svrty_critical "offered (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "offered" + add_tls_offered ssl2 yes + ;; + 1) prln_svrty_best "not offered (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered" + add_tls_offered ssl2 no + ;; + 5) prln_svrty_high "CVE-2015-3197: $supported_no_ciph2"; + fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "offered, no cipher" "CVE-2015-3197" "CWE-310" + add_tls_offered ssl2 yes + ;; + 7) prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -ssl2\"" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not tested due to lack of local support" + ((ret++)) + ;; + esac + fi + + pr_bold " SSLv3 "; + jsonID="SSLv3" + if [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 0 ]]; then + ret_val_ssl3=0 + elif "$using_sockets"; then + tls_sockets "00" "$TLS_CIPHER" + ret_val_ssl3=$? + else + run_prototest_openssl "-ssl3" + ret_val_ssl3=$? + fi + case $ret_val_ssl3 in + 0) prln_svrty_high "offered (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "offered" + if "$using_sockets" || "$HAS_SSL3"; then + latest_supported="0300" + latest_supported_string="SSLv3" + fi + add_tls_offered ssl3 yes + ;; + 1) prln_svrty_best "not offered (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered" + add_tls_offered ssl3 no + ;; + 2) if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]]; then + detected_version_string="TLSv1.$((0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION-0x0301))" + prln_svrty_critical "server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client" + else + if [[ ${#DETECTED_TLS_VERSION} -eq 4 ]]; then + prln_svrty_critical "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2} (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" + else + prln_svrty_medium "strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}" + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}" + ((ret++)) + fi + fi + ;; + 3) pr_svrty_best "not offered (OK), " + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered" + add_tls_offered ssl3 no + pr_warning "SSL downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"; outln + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "SSL downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext" + ;; + 4) out "likely "; pr_svrty_best "not offered (OK), " + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered" + add_tls_offered ssl3 no + pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}" + ;; + 5) pr_svrty_high "$supported_no_ciph1" # protocol detected but no cipher --> comes from run_prototest_openssl + fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "$supported_no_ciph1" + add_tls_offered ssl3 yes + ;; + 7) if "$using_sockets" ; then + # can only happen in debug mode + pr_warning "strange reply, maybe a client side problem with SSLv3"; outln "$debug_recomm" + else + prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -ssl3\"" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not tested due to lack of local support" + fi + ;; + *) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm" + ((ret++)) + ;; + esac + + pr_bold " TLS 1 "; + jsonID="TLS1" + if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1) -eq 0 ]]; then + ret_val_tls1=0 + elif "$using_sockets"; then + tls_sockets "01" "$TLS_CIPHER" + ret_val_tls1=$? + else + run_prototest_openssl "-tls1" + ret_val_tls1=$? + fi + case $ret_val_tls1 in + 0) pr_svrty_low "offered" ; outln " (deprecated)" + fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "offered (deprecated)" + latest_supported="0301" + latest_supported_string="TLSv1.0" + add_tls_offered tls1 yes + ;; # nothing wrong with it -- per se + 1) out "not offered" + add_tls_offered tls1 no + if [[ -z $latest_supported ]]; then + outln + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" # neither good or bad + else + prln_svrty_critical " -- connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string" + fi + ;; + 2) pr_svrty_medium "not offered" + add_tls_offered tls1 no + if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0300 ]]; then + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tm_out " -- downgraded" + outln + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "not offered, and downgraded to SSL" + elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]]; then + detected_version_string="TLSv1.$((0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION-0x0301))" + prln_svrty_critical " -- server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client" + else + if [[ ${#DETECTED_TLS_VERSION} -eq 4 ]]; then + prln_svrty_critical "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2} (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" + else + prln_svrty_medium " -- strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}" + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}" + fi + fi + ;; + 3) out "not offered, " + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered" + add_tls_offered tls1 no + pr_warning "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"; outln + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext" + ;; + 4) out "likely not offered, " + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "likely not offered" + add_tls_offered tls1 no + pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}" + ;; + 5) outln "$supported_no_ciph1" # protocol detected but no cipher --> comes from run_prototest_openssl + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$supported_no_ciph1" + add_tls_offered tls1 yes + ;; + 7) if "$using_sockets" ; then + # can only happen in debug mode + pr_warning "strange reply, maybe a client side problem with TLS 1.0"; outln "$debug_recomm" + else + prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -tls1\"" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not tested due to lack of local support" + fi + ((ret++)) + ;; + *) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm" + ((ret++)) + ;; + esac + + pr_bold " TLS 1.1 "; + jsonID="TLS1_1" + if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_1) -eq 0 ]]; then + ret_val_tls11=0 + elif "$using_sockets"; then + tls_sockets "02" "$TLS_CIPHER" + ret_val_tls11=$? + else + run_prototest_openssl "-tls1_1" + ret_val_tls11=$? + fi + case $ret_val_tls11 in + 0) pr_svrty_low "offered" ; outln " (deprecated)" + fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "offered (deprecated)" + latest_supported="0302" + latest_supported_string="TLSv1.1" + add_tls_offered tls1_1 yes + ;; # nothing wrong with it + 1) out "not offered" + add_tls_offered tls1_1 no + if [[ -z $latest_supported ]]; then + outln + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" # neither good or bad + else + prln_svrty_critical " -- connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string" + fi + ;; + 2) out "not offered" + add_tls_offered tls1_1 no + if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == "$latest_supported" ]]; then + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tm_out " -- downgraded" + outln + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "TLSv1.1 is not offered, and downgraded to a weaker protocol" + elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0300 ]] && [[ "$latest_supported" == 0301 ]]; then + prln_svrty_critical " -- server supports TLSv1.0, but downgraded to SSLv3 (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, and downgraded to SSLv3 rather than TLSv1.0" + elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]] && [[ 0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION -gt 0x0302 ]]; then + detected_version_string="TLSv1.$((0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION-0x0301))" + prln_svrty_critical " -- server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client" + else + if [[ ${#DETECTED_TLS_VERSION} -eq 4 ]]; then + prln_svrty_critical "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2} (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" + else + prln_svrty_medium " -- strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}" + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "strange, server ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}" + fi + fi + ;; + 3) out "not offered, " + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered" + add_tls_offered tls1_1 no + pr_warning "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"; outln + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext" + ;; + 4) out "likely not offered, " + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" + add_tls_offered tls1_1 no + pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}" + ;; + 5) outln "$supported_no_ciph1" # protocol detected but no cipher --> comes from run_prototest_openssl + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$supported_no_ciph1" + add_tls_offered tls1_1 yes + ;; + 7) if "$using_sockets" ; then + # can only happen in debug mode + pr_warning "strange reply, maybe a client side problem with TLS 1.1"; outln "$debug_recomm" + else + prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -tls1_1\"" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not tested due to lack of local support" + fi + ((ret++)) + ;; + *) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm" + ((ret++)) + ;; + esac + + # Now, we are doing a basic/pre test for TLS 1.2 and 1.3 in order not to penalize servers (medium) + # running TLS 1.3 only when TLS 1.2 is not offered. 0 and 5 are the return codes for + # TLS 1.3 support (kind of, including deprecated pre-versions of TLS 1.3) + if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_2) -eq 0 ]]; then + ret_val_tls12=0 + elif "$using_sockets"; then + tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER" + ret_val_tls12=$? + tls12_detected_version="$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" + else + run_prototest_openssl "-tls1_2" + ret_val_tls12=$? + tls12_detected_version="$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" + fi + + if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3) -eq 0 ]]; then + ret_val_tls13=0 + elif "$using_sockets"; then + # Need to ensure that at most 128 ciphers are included in ClientHello. + # If the TLSv1.2 test in determine_optimal_sockets_params() was successful, + # then use the 5 TLSv1.3 ciphers plus the cipher selected in the TLSv1.2 test. + # If the TLSv1.2 test was not successful, then just use the 5 TLSv1.3 ciphers + # plus the list of ciphers used in all of the previous tests ($TLS_CIPHER). + if [[ -n "$TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED" ]]; then + tls13_ciphers_to_test="$TLS13_CIPHER, $TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED, 00,ff" + else + tls13_ciphers_to_test="$TLS13_CIPHER,$TLS_CIPHER" + fi + tls_sockets "04" "$tls13_ciphers_to_test" + ret_val_tls13=$? + else + run_prototest_openssl "-tls1_3" + ret_val_tls13=$? + fi + if [[ $ret_val_tls13 -eq 0 ]] || [[ $ret_val_tls13 -eq 5 ]]; then + offers_tls13=true # This variable comes in handy for further if statements below + fi + # Done with pretesting TLS 1.2 and 1.3. + + pr_bold " TLS 1.2 "; + jsonID="TLS1_2" + case $ret_val_tls12 in + 0) prln_svrty_best "offered (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered" + latest_supported="0303" + latest_supported_string="TLSv1.2" + add_tls_offered tls1_2 yes + ;; # GCM cipher in TLS 1.2: very good! + 1) add_tls_offered tls1_2 no + if "$offers_tls13"; then + out "not offered" + else + pr_svrty_medium "not offered" + fi + if [[ -z $latest_supported ]]; then + outln + if "$offers_tls13"; then + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" + else + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "not offered" # TLS 1.3, no TLS 1.2 --> no GCM, penalty + fi + else + prln_svrty_critical " -- connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string" + fi + ;; + 2) add_tls_offered tls1_2 no + pr_svrty_medium "not offered and downgraded to a weaker protocol" + if [[ "$tls12_detected_version" == 0300 ]]; then + detected_version_string="SSLv3" + elif [[ "$tls12_detected_version" == 03* ]]; then + detected_version_string="TLSv1.$((0x$tls12_detected_version-0x0301))" + fi + if [[ "$tls12_detected_version" == "$latest_supported" ]]; then + outln + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "not offered and downgraded to a weaker protocol" + elif [[ "$tls12_detected_version" == 03* ]] && [[ 0x$tls12_detected_version -lt 0x$latest_supported ]]; then + prln_svrty_critical " -- server supports $latest_supported_string, but downgraded to $detected_version_string" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, and downgraded to $detected_version_string rather than $latest_supported_string" + elif [[ "$tls12_detected_version" == 03* ]] && [[ 0x$tls12_detected_version -gt 0x0303 ]]; then + prln_svrty_critical " -- server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client" + else + if [[ ${#tls12_detected_version} -eq 4 ]]; then + prln_svrty_critical "server responded with version number ${tls12_detected_version:0:2}.${tls12_detected_version:2:2} (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with version number ${tls12_detected_version:0:2}.${tls12_detected_version:2:2}" + else + prln_svrty_medium " -- strange, server ${tls12_detected_version}" + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "strange, server ${tls12_detected_version}" + fi + fi + ;; + 3) out "not offered, " + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" + add_tls_offered tls1_2 no + pr_warning "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"; outln + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext" + ;; + 4) out "likely "; pr_svrty_medium "not offered, " + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "not offered" + add_tls_offered tls1_2 no + pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}" + ;; + 5) outln "$supported_no_ciph1" # protocol detected, but no cipher --> comes from run_prototest_openssl + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$supported_no_ciph1" + add_tls_offered tls1_2 yes + ;; + 7) if "$using_sockets" ; then + # can only happen in debug mode + pr_warning "strange reply, maybe a client side problem with TLS 1.2"; outln "$debug_recomm" + else + prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -tls1_2\"" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not tested due to lack of local support" + fi + ((ret++)) + ;; + *) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm" + ((ret++)) + ;; + esac + + pr_bold " TLS 1.3 "; + jsonID="TLS1_3" + case $ret_val_tls13 in + 0) if ! "$using_sockets"; then + prln_svrty_best "offered (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered" + else + # If TLS 1.3 is offered, then its support was detected + # by determine_optimal_sockets_params(). + if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3_rfc8446) -eq 0 ]]; then + drafts_offered+=" 0304 " + else + for i in 1C 1B 1A 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12; do + if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3_draft$(hex2dec "$i")) -eq 0 ]]; then + drafts_offered+=" 7F$i " + break + fi + done + fi + KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="28" + while true; do + supported_versions="" + for i in 16 15 14 13 12; do + [[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 7F$i\ ]] || supported_versions+=",7f,$i" + done + [[ -z "$supported_versions" ]] && break + supported_versions="00, 2b, 00, $(printf "%02x" $((${#supported_versions}/3+1))), $(printf "%02x" $((${#supported_versions}/3))) $supported_versions" + tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "" "$supported_versions" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] || break + if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:3}" == 7F1 ]]; then + drafts_offered+=" ${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:4} " + elif [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00027F1[2-6] ]]; then + drafts_offered+=" ${BASH_REMATCH:8:4} " + fi + done + KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="33" + while true; do + supported_versions="" + for i in 1C 1B 1A 19 18 17; do + [[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 7F$i\ ]] || supported_versions+=",7f,$i" + done + [[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 0304\ ]] || supported_versions+=",03,04" + [[ -z "$supported_versions" ]] && break + supported_versions="00, 2b, 00, $(printf "%02x" $((${#supported_versions}/3+1))), $(printf "%02x" $((${#supported_versions}/3))) $supported_versions" + tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "" "$supported_versions" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] || break + if [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00020304 ]]; then + drafts_offered+=" 0304 " + elif [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00027F1[7-9A-C] ]]; then + drafts_offered+=" ${BASH_REMATCH:8:4} " + fi + done + KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="$key_share_extn_nr" + if [[ -n "$drafts_offered" ]]; then + for i in 1C 1B 1A 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12; do + if [[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 7F$i\ ]]; then + [[ -n "$drafts_offered_str" ]] && drafts_offered_str+=", " + drafts_offered_str+="draft $(printf "%d" 0x$i)" + fi + done + if [[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 0304\ ]]; then + [[ -n "$drafts_offered_str" ]] && drafts_offered_str+=", " + drafts_offered_str+="final" + fi + if [[ "$drafts_offered" =~ \ 0304\ ]]; then + pr_svrty_best "offered (OK)"; outln ": $drafts_offered_str" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered with $drafts_offered_str" + else + out "offered (OK)"; outln ": $drafts_offered_str" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "offered with $drafts_offered_str" + fi + else + pr_warning "Unexpected results"; outln "$debug_recomm" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "unexpected results" + fi + fi + latest_supported="0304" + latest_supported_string="TLSv1.3" + add_tls_offered tls1_3 yes + ;; + 1) pr_svrty_low "not offered" + if [[ -z $latest_supported ]]; then + outln + fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "not offered" + else + prln_svrty_critical " -- connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "connection failed rather than downgrading to $latest_supported_string" + fi + add_tls_offered tls1_3 no + ;; + 2) if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0300 ]]; then + detected_version_string="SSLv3" + elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]]; then + detected_version_string="TLSv1.$((0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION-0x0301))" + fi + if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == "$latest_supported" ]]; then + outln "not offered and downgraded to a weaker protocol" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered + downgraded to weaker protocol" + elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]] && [[ 0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION -lt 0x$latest_supported ]]; then + out "not offered" + prln_svrty_critical " -- server supports $latest_supported_string, but downgraded to $detected_version_string" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, and downgraded to $detected_version_string rather than $latest_supported_string" + elif [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 03* ]] && [[ 0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION -gt 0x0304 ]]; then + out "not offered" + prln_svrty_critical " -- server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "not offered, server responded with higher version number ($detected_version_string) than requested by client" + else + out "not offered" + prln_svrty_critical " -- server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "server responded with version number ${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}.${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" + fi + add_tls_offered tls1_3 no + ;; + 3) out "not offered " + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" + add_tls_offered tls1_3 no + pr_warning "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext"; outln + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "TLS downgraded to STARTTLS plaintext" + ;; + 4) out "likely not offered, " + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" + add_tls_offered tls1_3 no + pr_warning "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake"; outln "$debug_recomm" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received 4xx/5xx after STARTTLS handshake${debug_recomm}" + ;; + 5) outln "$supported_no_ciph1" # protocol detected but no cipher --> comes from run_prototest_openssl + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$supported_no_ciph1" + add_tls_offered tls1_3 yes + ;; + 7) if "$using_sockets" ; then + # can only happen in debug mode + prln_warning "strange reply, maybe a client side problem with TLS 1.3"; outln "$debug_recomm" + else + prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -tls1_3\"" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "not tested due to lack of local support" + fi + ((ret++)) + ;; + *) pr_fixme "unexpected value around line $((LINENO))"; outln "$debug_recomm" + ((ret++)) + ;; + esac + + debugme echo "PROTOS_OFFERED: $PROTOS_OFFERED" + if [[ ! "$PROTOS_OFFERED" =~ yes ]]; then + outln + ignore_no_or_lame "You should not proceed as no protocol was detected. If you still really really want to, say \"YES\"" "YES" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS + fi + + return $ret +} + + +# list ciphers (and makes sure you have them locally configured) +# arg[1]: non-TLSv1.3 cipher list (or anything else) +# arg[2]: TLSv1.3 cipher list +# arg[3]: protocol (e.g., -ssl2) +# +listciphers() { + local -i ret + local debugname="" + local tls13_ciphers="$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS" + + [[ "$2" != ALL ]] && tls13_ciphers="$2" + if "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then + $OPENSSL ciphers $OSSL_CIPHERS_S $3 -ciphersuites "$tls13_ciphers" "$1" &>$TMPFILE + elif [[ -n "$tls13_ciphers" ]]; then + $OPENSSL ciphers $OSSL_CIPHERS_S $3 "$tls13_ciphers:$1" &>$TMPFILE + else + $OPENSSL ciphers $OSSL_CIPHERS_S $3 "$1" &>$TMPFILE + fi + ret=$? + debugme cat $TMPFILE + debugname="$(sed -e s'/\!/not/g' -e 's/\:/_/g' <<< "$1")" + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.${debugname}.txt + return $ret +} + + +# argv[1]: non-TLSv1.3 cipher list to test in OpenSSL syntax +# argv[2]: TLSv1.3 cipher list to test in OpenSSL syntax +# argv[3]: string on console / HTML or "finding" +# argv[4]: rating whether ok to offer +# argv[5]: string to be appended for fileout +# argv[6]: non-SSLv2 cipher list to test (hexcodes), if using sockets +# argv[7]: SSLv2 cipher list to test (hexcodes), if using sockets +# argv[8]: true if using sockets, false if not +# argv[9]: CVE +# argv[10]: CWE +# +sub_cipherlists() { + local -i i len sclient_success=1 + local cipherlist sslv2_cipherlist detected_ssl2_ciphers + local singlespaces + local proto="" + local -i ret=0 + local jsonID="cipherlist" + local using_sockets="${8}" + local cve="${9}" + local cwe="${10}" + + pr_bold "$3 " + [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]] && proto="$OPTIMAL_PROTO" + jsonID="${jsonID}_$5" + + if "$using_sockets" || listciphers "$1" "$2" $proto; then + if ! "$using_sockets" || ( "$FAST" && listciphers "$1" "$2" -tls1 ); then + for proto in -no_ssl2 -tls1_2 -tls1_1 -tls1 -ssl3; do + if [[ "$proto" == -tls1_2 ]]; then + # If $OPENSSL doesn't support TLSv1.3 or if no TLSv1.3 + # ciphers are being tested, then a TLSv1.2 ClientHello + # was tested in the first iteration. + ! "$HAS_TLS13" && continue + [[ -z "$2" ]] && continue + fi + ! "$HAS_SSL3" && [[ "$proto" == -ssl3 ]] && continue + if [[ "$proto" != -no_ssl2 ]]; then + "$FAST" && continue + [[ $(has_server_protocol "${proto:1}") -eq 1 ]] && continue + fi + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-cipher "$1" -ciphersuites "\'$2\'" $BUGS $STARTTLS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI $proto") 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + sclient_success=$? + debugme cat $ERRFILE + [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && break + done + else + for proto in 04 03 02 01 00; do + # If $cipherlist doesn't contain any TLSv1.3 ciphers, then there is + # no reason to try a TLSv1.3 ClientHello. + [[ "$proto" == 04 ]] && [[ ! "$6" =~ 13,0 ]] && continue + [[ $(has_server_protocol "$proto") -eq 1 ]] && continue + cipherlist="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$proto" ", $6")" + cipherlist="${cipherlist:2}" + if [[ -n "$cipherlist" ]] && [[ "$cipherlist" != 00,ff ]]; then + tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipherlist" + sclient_success=$? + [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0 + [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && break + fi + done + fi + if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ 1 -ne $(has_server_protocol ssl2) ]]; then + if ( [[ -z "$7" ]] || "$FAST" ) && "$HAS_SSL2" && listciphers "$1" "" -ssl2; then + $OPENSSL s_client -cipher "$1" $BUGS $STARTTLS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + sclient_success=$? + debugme cat $ERRFILE + elif [[ -n "$7" ]]; then + sslv2_sockets "$7" "true" + if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then + sslv2_cipherlist="$(strip_spaces "${6//,/}")" + len=${#sslv2_cipherlist} + detected_ssl2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")" + for (( i=0; i<len; i=i+6 )); do + [[ "$detected_ssl2_ciphers" =~ "x${sslv2_cipherlist:i:6}" ]] && sclient_success=0 && break + done + fi + fi + fi + if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && $BAD_SERVER_HELLO_CIPHER; then + # If server failed with a known error, raise it to the user. + if [[ $STARTTLS_PROTOCOL == mysql ]]; then + pr_warning "SERVER_ERROR: test inconclusive due to MySQL Community Edition (yaSSL) bug." + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "SERVER_ERROR, test inconclusive due to MySQL Community Edition (yaSSL) bug." "$cve" "$cwe" + else + pr_warning "SERVER_ERROR: test inconclusive." + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "SERVER_ERROR, test inconclusive." "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + ((ret++)) + else + # Otherwise the error means the server doesn't support that cipher list. + case $4 in + 7) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then + # Strong is excellent to offer + pr_svrty_best "offered (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + pr_svrty_medium "not offered" + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + ;; + 6) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then + # High is good to offer + pr_svrty_good "offered (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + # FIXME: we penalize the absence of high but don't know the result of strong encryption yet (next) + pr_svrty_medium "not offered" + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + ;; + 5) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then + # Neither good nor bad to offer + out "offered (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + out "not offered" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + ;; + 4) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then + # medium is not that bad + pr_svrty_low "offered" + fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + out "not offered" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + ;; + 3) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then + pr_svrty_medium "offered" + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + out "not offered" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + ;; + 2) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then + # bad but there is worse + pr_svrty_high "offered (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + # need a check for -eq 1 here + pr_svrty_good "not offered (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + ;; + 1) if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then + # the ugly ones + pr_svrty_critical "offered (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "offered" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + pr_svrty_best "not offered (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not offered" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + ;; + *) # we shouldn't reach this + pr_warning "?: $4 (please report this)" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "return condition $4 unclear" "$cve" "$cwe" + ((ret++)) + ;; + esac + fi + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.${5}.txt + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tm_out " -- $1" + outln + else + singlespaces=$(sed -e 's/ \+/ /g' -e 's/^ //' -e 's/ $//g' -e 's/ //g' <<< "$3") + if [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]]; then + prln_local_problem "No $singlespaces for SSLv2 configured in $OPENSSL" + else + prln_local_problem "No $singlespaces configured in $OPENSSL" + fi + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Cipher $3 ($1) not supported by local OpenSSL ($OPENSSL)" + fi + return $ret +} + +#TODO: work with fixed lists here --> atm ok, as sockets are preferred. If there would be a single function for testing: yes. +run_cipherlists() { + local hexc hexcode strength + local -i i + local -i ret=0 + local ossl_null_ciphers null_ciphers sslv2_null_ciphers + local ossl_anon_ciphers anon_ciphers sslv2_anon_ciphers + local ossl_exp_ciphers exp_ciphers sslv2_exp_ciphers + local ossl_low_ciphers low_ciphers sslv2_low_ciphers + local ossl_tdes_ciphers tdes_ciphers sslv2_tdes_cipher + local ossl_average_ciphers average_ciphers + local strong_ciphers + local cwe="CWE-327" + local cwe2="CWE-310" + local cve="" + local using_sockets=true + + outln + pr_headlineln " Testing cipher categories " + outln + "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false + + # conversion 2 byte ciphers via: echo "$@" | sed -e 's/[[:xdigit:]]\{2\},/0x&/g' -e 's/, /\n/g' | while read ci; do grep -wi $ci etc/cipher-mapping.txt; done + + ossl_null_ciphers='NULL:eNULL' + null_ciphers="c0,10, c0,06, c0,15, c0,0b, c0,01, c0,3b, c0,3a, c0,39, 00,b9, 00,b8, 00,b5, 00,b4, 00,2e, 00,2d, 00,b1, 00,b0, 00,2c, 00,3b, 00,02, 00,01, 00,82, 00,83, ff,87, 00,ff" + sslv2_null_ciphers="FF,80,10, 00,00,00" + + ossl_anon_ciphers='aNULL:ADH' + anon_ciphers="c0,19, 00,a7, 00,6d, 00,3a, 00,c5, 00,89, c0,47, c0,5b, c0,85, c0,18, 00,a6, 00,6c, 00,34, 00,bf, 00,9b, 00,46, c0,46, c0,5a, c0,84, c0,16, 00,18, c0,17, 00,1b, 00,1a, 00,19, 00,17, c0,15, 00,ff" + sslv2_anon_ciphers="FF,80,10" + + ossl_exp_ciphers='EXPORT:!ADH:!NULL' + # grep -i EXP etc/cipher-mapping.txt + exp_ciphers="00,63, 00,62, 00,61, 00,65, 00,64, 00,60, 00,14, 00,11, 00,19, 00,08, 00,06, 00,27, 00,26, 00,2a, 00,29, 00,0b, 00,0e, 00,17, 00,03, 00,28, 00,2b, 00,ff" + sslv2_exp_ciphers="04,00,80, 02,00,80, 00,00,00" + + ossl_low_ciphers='LOW:DES:RC2:RC4:!ADH:!EXP:!NULL:!eNULL' + # egrep -w '64|56|RC2|RC4' etc/cipher-mapping.txt | egrep -v 'Au=None|export' + low_ciphers="00,04, 00,05, 00,09, 00,0C, 00,0F, 00,12, 00,15, 00,1E, 00,20, 00,22, 00,24, 00,66, 00,8A, 00,8E, 00,92, C0,02, C0,07, C0,0C, C0,11, C0,33, FE,FE, FF,E1, 00,FF" + sslv2_low_ciphers="01,00,80, 03,00,80, 06,00,40, 06,01,40, 08,00,80, FF,80,00" + + ossl_tdes_ciphers='3DES:IDEA:!aNULL:!ADH' + # egrep -w '3DES|IDEA' etc/cipher-mapping.txt | grep -v "Au=None" + tdes_ciphers="00,07, 00,0A, 00,0D, 00,10, 00,13, 00,16, 00,1F, 00,21, 00,23, 00,25, 00,8B, 00,8F, 00,93, C0,03, C0,08, C0,0D, C0,12, C0,1A, C0,1B, C0,1C, C0,34, FE,FF, FF,E0, 00,FF" + sslv2_tdes_ciphers="05,00,80, 07,00,c0, 07,01,c0" + + # Now all AES, CAMELLIA, ARIA and SEED CBC ciphers plus GOST + ossl_average_ciphers='HIGH:MEDIUM:AES:CAMELLIA:ARIA:!IDEA:!CHACHA20:!3DES:!RC2:!RC4:!AESCCM8:!AESCCM:!AESGCM:!ARIAGCM:!aNULL' + # egrep -w "256|128" etc/cipher-mapping.txt | egrep -v "Au=None|AEAD|RC2|RC4|IDEA" + average_ciphers="00,2F, 00,30, 00,31, 00,32, 00,33, 00,35, 00,36, 00,37, 00,38, 00,39, 00,3C, 00,3D, 00,3E, 00,3F, 00,40, 00,41, 00,42, 00,43, 00,44, 00,45, 00,67, 00,68, 00,69, 00,6A, 00,6B, 00,84, 00,85, 00,86, 00,87, 00,88, 00,8C, 00,8D, 00,90, 00,91, 00,94, 00,95, 00,96, 00,97, 00,98, 00,99, 00,9A, 00,AE, 00,AF, 00,B2, 00,B3, 00,B6, 00,B7, 00,BA, 00,BB, 00,BC, 00,BD, 00,BE, 00,C0, 00,C1, 00,C2, 00,C3, 00,C4, C0,04, C0,05, C0,09, C0,0A, C0,0E, C0,0F, C0,13, C0,14, C0,1D, C0,1E, C0,1F, C0,20, C0,21, C0,22, C0,23, C0,24, C0,25, C0,26, C0,27, C0,28, C0,29, C0,2A, C0,35, C0,36, C0,37, C0,38, C0,3C, C0,3D, C0,3E, C0,3F, C0,40, C0,41, C0,42, C0,43, C0,44, C0,45, C0,48, C0,49, C0,4A, C0,4B, C0,4C, C0,4D, C0,4E, C0,4F, C0,64, C0,65, C0,66, C0,67, C0,68, C0,69, C0,70, C0,71, C0,72, C0,73, C0,74, C0,75, C0,76, C0,77, C0,78, C0,79, C0,94, C0,95, C0,96, C0,97, C0,98, C0,99, C0,9A, C0,9B" + # Workaround: If we use sockets and in order not to hit 132+1 ciphers we omit the GOST ciphers if SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG is true. + # This won't be supported by Cisco ACE anyway. Catch is, if SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG was not tested for before (only this function is being called) + "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG" || average_ciphers="${average_ciphers}, 00,80, 00,81, FF,00, FF,01, FF,02, FF,03, FF,85" + average_ciphers="${average_ciphers}, 00,FF" + + # Here's the strongest discrepancy between sockets and OpenSSL + ossl_strong_ciphers='AESGCM:CHACHA20:AESGCM:CamelliaGCM:AESCCM:ARIAGCM' + # grep AEAD etc/cipher-mapping.txt | grep -v Au=None + strong_ciphers="00,9C, 00,9D, 00,9E, 00,9F, 00,A0, 00,A1, 00,A2, 00,A3, 00,A4, 00,A5, 00,A8, 00,A9, 00,AA, 00,AB, 00,AC, 00,AD, 13,01, 13,02, 13,03, 13,04, 13,05, 16,B7, 16,B8, 16,B9, 16,BA, C0,2B, C0,2C, C0,2D, C0,2E, C0,2F, C0,30, C0,31, C0,32, C0,50, C0,51, C0,52, C0,53, C0,54, C0,55, C0,56, C0,57, C0,58, C0,59, C0,5C, C0,5D, C0,5E, C0,5F, C0,60, C0,61, C0,62, C0,63, C0,6A, C0,6B, C0,6C, C0,6D, C0,6E, C0,6F, C0,7A, C0,7B, C0,7C, C0,7D, C0,7E, C0,7F, C0,80, C0,81, C0,82, C0,83, C0,86, C0,87, C0,88, C0,89, C0,8A, C0,8B, C0,8C, C0,8D, C0,8E, C0,8F, C0,90, C0,91, C0,92, C0,93, C0,9C, C0,9D, C0,9E, C0,9F, C0,A0, C0,A1, C0,A2, C0,A3, C0,A4, C0,A5, C0,A6, C0,A7, C0,A8, C0,A9, C0,AA, C0,AB, C0,AC, C0,AD, C0,AE, C0,AF, CC,13, CC,14, CC,15, CC,A8, CC,A9, CC,AA, CC,AB, CC,AC, CC,AD, CC,AE, 00,FF" + + # argv[1]: non-TLSv1.3 cipher list to test in OpenSSL syntax + # argv[2]: TLSv1.3 cipher list to test in OpenSSL syntax + # argv[3]: string on console / HTML or "finding" + # argv[4]: rating whether ok to offer + # argv[5]: string to be appended for fileout + # argv[6]: non-SSLv2 cipher list to test (hexcodes), if using sockets + # argv[7]: SSLv2 cipher list to test (hexcodes), if using sockets + # argv[8]: true if using sockets, false if not + # argv[9]: CVE + # argv[10]: CWE + + sub_cipherlists "$ossl_null_ciphers" "" " NULL ciphers (no encryption) " 1 "NULL" "$null_ciphers" "$sslv2_null_ciphers" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe" + ret=$? + sub_cipherlists "$ossl_anon_ciphers" "" " Anonymous NULL Ciphers (no authentication)" 1 "aNULL" "$anon_ciphers" "$sslv2_anon_ciphers" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe" + ret=$((ret + $?)) + sub_cipherlists "$ossl_exp_ciphers" "" " Export ciphers (w/o ADH+NULL) " 1 "EXPORT" "$exp_ciphers" "$sslv2_exp_ciphers" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe" + ret=$((ret + $?)) + sub_cipherlists "$ossl_low_ciphers" "" " LOW: 64 Bit + DES, RC[2,4] (w/o export) " 2 "LOW" "$low_ciphers" "$sslv2_low_ciphers" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe" + ret=$((ret + $?)) + sub_cipherlists "$ossl_tdes_ciphers" "" " Triple DES Ciphers / IDEA " 3 "3DES_IDEA" "$tdes_ciphers" "$sslv2_tdes_ciphers" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe2" + ret=$((ret + $?)) + sub_cipherlists "$ossl_average_ciphers" "" " Obsolete CBC ciphers (AES, ARIA etc.) " 4 "AVERAGE" "$average_ciphers" "" "$using_sockets" "$cve" "$cwe2" + ret=$((ret + $?)) + sub_cipherlists "$ossl_strong_ciphers" 'ALL' " Strong encryption (AEAD ciphers) " 7 "STRONG" "$strong_ciphers" "" "$using_sockets" "" "" + ret=$((ret + $?)) + + outln + return $ret +} + +# The return value is an indicator of the quality of the DH key length in $1: +# 1 = pr_svrty_critical, 2 = pr_svrty_high, 3 = pr_svrty_medium, 4 = pr_svrty_low +# 5 = neither good nor bad, 6 = pr_svrty_good, 7 = pr_svrty_best +pr_dh_quality() { + local bits="$1" + local string="$2" + + if [[ "$bits" -le 600 ]]; then + pr_svrty_critical "$string" + return 1 + elif [[ "$bits" -le 800 ]]; then + pr_svrty_high "$string" + return 2 + elif [[ "$bits" -le 1280 ]]; then + pr_svrty_medium "$string" + return 3 + elif [[ "$bits" -ge 2048 ]]; then + pr_svrty_good "$string" + return 6 + else + out "$string" + return 5 + fi +} + +# prints out dh group=prime and in round brackets DH bits and labels it accordingly +# arg1: name of dh group, arg2=bit length +pr_dh() { + local -i quality=0 + + pr_italic "$1" + out " (" + pr_dh_quality "$2" "$2 bits" + quality=$? + out ")" + return $quality +} + +pr_ecdh_quality() { + local bits="$1" + local string="$2" + + if [[ "$bits" -le 80 ]]; then # has that ever existed? + pr_svrty_critical "$string" + elif [[ "$bits" -le 108 ]]; then # has that ever existed? + pr_svrty_high "$string" + elif [[ "$bits" -le 163 ]]; then + pr_svrty_medium "$string" + elif [[ "$bits" -le 193 ]]; then # hmm, according to https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Elliptic_Curve_Cryptography it should ok + pr_svrty_low "$string" # but openssl removed it https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/299#issuecomment-220905416 + elif [[ "$bits" -le 224 ]]; then + out "$string" + elif [[ "$bits" -gt 224 ]]; then + pr_svrty_good "$string" + else + out "$string" + fi +} + +pr_ecdh_curve_quality() { + curve="$1" + local -i bits=0 + + case "$curve" in + "sect163k1") bits=163 ;; + "sect163r1") bits=162 ;; + "sect163r2") bits=163 ;; + "sect193r1") bits=193 ;; + "sect193r2") bits=193 ;; + "sect233k1") bits=232 ;; + "sect233r1") bits=233 ;; + "sect239k1") bits=238 ;; + "sect283k1") bits=281 ;; + "sect283r1") bits=282 ;; + "sect409k1") bits=407 ;; + "sect409r1") bits=409 ;; + "sect571k1") bits=570 ;; + "sect571r1") bits=570 ;; + "secp160k1") bits=161 ;; + "secp160r1") bits=161 ;; + "secp160r2") bits=161 ;; + "secp192k1") bits=192 ;; + "prime192v1") bits=192 ;; + "secp224k1") bits=225 ;; + "secp224r1") bits=224 ;; + "secp256k1") bits=256 ;; + "prime256v1") bits=256 ;; + "secp384r1") bits=384 ;; + "secp521r1") bits=521 ;; + "brainpoolP256r1") bits=256 ;; + "brainpoolP384r1") bits=384 ;; + "brainpoolP512r1") bits=512 ;; + "X25519") bits=253 ;; + "X448") bits=448 ;; + esac + pr_ecdh_quality "$bits" "$curve" +} + +# Print $2 based on the quality of the cipher in $1. If $2 is empty, just print $1. +# The return value is an indicator of the quality of the cipher in $1: +# 0 = $1 is empty +# 1 = pr_svrty_critical, 2 = pr_svrty_high, 3 = pr_svrty_medium, 4 = pr_svrty_low +# 5 = neither good nor bad, 6 = pr_svrty_good, 7 = pr_svrty_best +# +# Please note this section isn't particular spot on. It needs to be reconsidered/redone +# SHA1, SSLv3 ciphers are some points which need to be considered. +# Hint: find out by "grep <pattern> etc/cipher-mapping.txt" but it' might be be easier +# to look out Enc= and Au= or Mac= +# +pr_cipher_quality() { + local cipher="$1" + local text="$2" + + [[ -z "$1" ]] && return 0 + [[ -z "$text" ]] && text="$cipher" + + if [[ "$cipher" != TLS_* ]] && [[ "$cipher" != SSL_* ]]; then + # This must be the OpenSSL name for a cipher or for TLS 1.3 ($TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS) + # We can ignore them however as the OpenSSL and RFC names currently match + if [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -eq 0 ]]; then + # We have an OpenSSL name and can't convert it to the RFC name which is rarely + # the case, see "prepare_arrays()" and "./etc/cipher-mapping.txt" + case "$cipher" in + *NULL*|EXP*|ADH*) + pr_svrty_critical "$text" + return 1 + ;; + *RC4*|*RC2*|*MD5|*M1) + pr_svrty_high "$text" + return 2 + ;; + AES256-GCM-SHA384|AES128-GCM-SHA256|AES256-CCM|AES128-CCM|ARIA256-GCM-SHA384|ARIA128-GCM-SHA256) + # RSA kx and e.g. GCM isn't certainly the best + pr_svrty_good "$text" + return 6 + ;; + *GCM*|*CCM*|*CHACHA20*) + pr_svrty_best "$text" + return 7 + ;; #best ones + *CBC3*|*SEED*|*3DES*|*IDEA*) + pr_svrty_medium "$text" + return 3 + ;; + ECDHE*AES*|DHE*AES*SHA*|*CAMELLIA*SHA) + pr_svrty_low "$text" + return 4 + ;; + *) + out "$text" + return 5 + ;; + esac + fi + cipher="$(openssl2rfc "$cipher")" + fi + + # Now we look at the RFC cipher names. The sequence matters - as above. + case "$cipher" in + *NULL*|*EXP*|*_DES40_*|*anon*) + pr_svrty_critical "$text" + return 1 + ;; + *RC4*|*RC2*|*MD5|*MD5_1) + pr_svrty_high "$text" + return 2 + ;; + *_DES_*) + if [[ "$cipher" =~ EDE3 ]]; then + pr_svrty_medium "$text" # 3DES + return 3 + fi + pr_svrty_high "$text" + return 2 + ;; + *CBC3*|*SEED*|*3DES*|*IDEA*) + pr_svrty_medium "$text" + return 3 + ;; + TLS_RSA_*) + if [[ "$cipher" =~ CBC ]]; then + pr_svrty_low "$text" + return 4 + else + pr_svrty_good "$text" + # RSA kx and e.g. GCM isn't certainly the best + return 6 + fi + ;; + *GCM*|*CCM*|*CHACHA20*) + pr_svrty_best "$text" + return 7 + ;; + *ECDHE*AES*CBC*|*DHE*AES*SHA*|*RSA*AES*SHA*|*CAMELLIA*SHA*) + pr_svrty_low "$text" + return 4 + ;; + *) + out "$text" + return 5 + ;; + esac +} + +# arg1: file with input for grepping the type of ephemeral DH key (DH ECDH) +read_dhtype_from_file() { + local temp kx + + temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$1") # extract line + kx="Kx=${temp%%,*}" + [[ "$kx" == "Kx=X25519" ]] && kx="Kx=ECDH" + [[ "$kx" == "Kx=X448" ]] && kx="Kx=ECDH" + tm_out "$kx" + return 0 +} + +# arg1: certificate file +read_sigalg_from_file() { + $OPENSSL x509 -noout -text -in "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk -F':' '/Signature Algorithm/ { print $2; exit; }' +} + + +# arg1: file with input for grepping the bit length for ECDH/DHE +# arg2: whether to print warning "old fart" or not (empty: no) +read_dhbits_from_file() { + local bits what_dh temp curve="" + local add="" + local old_fart=" (your $OPENSSL cannot show DH bits)" + + temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$1") # extract line + what_dh="${temp%%,*}" + bits="${temp##*, }" + curve="${temp#*, }" + if [[ "$curve" == "$bits" ]]; then + curve="" + else + curve="${curve%%,*}" + fi + bits="${bits/bits/}" + bits="${bits// /}" + + if [[ "$what_dh" == X25519 ]] || [[ "$what_dh" == X448 ]]; then + curve="$what_dh" + what_dh="ECDH" + fi + if [[ -z "$2" ]]; then + if [[ -n "$curve" ]]; then + debugme echo ">$HAS_DH_BITS|$what_dh($curve)|$bits<" + else + debugme echo ">$HAS_DH_BITS|$what_dh|$bits<" + fi + fi + [[ -n "$what_dh" ]] && HAS_DH_BITS=true # FIX 190 + if [[ -z "$what_dh" ]] && ! "$HAS_DH_BITS"; then + if [[ "$2" == "string" ]]; then + tm_out "$old_fart" + elif [[ -z "$2" ]]; then + pr_warning "$old_fart" + fi + return 0 + fi + if [[ "$2" == quiet ]]; then + tm_out "$bits" + return 0 + fi + [[ -z "$2" ]] && [[ -n "$bits" ]] && out ", " + if [[ $what_dh == DH ]] || [[ $what_dh == EDH ]]; then + add="bit DH" + [[ -n "$curve" ]] && add+=" ($curve)" + if [[ "$2" == string ]]; then + tm_out ", $bits $add" + else + pr_dh_quality "$bits" "$bits $add" + fi + # https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Elliptic_Curve_Cryptography, https://www.keylength.com/en/compare/ + elif [[ $what_dh == ECDH ]]; then + add="bit ECDH" + [[ -n "$curve" ]] && add+=" ($curve)" + if [[ "$2" == string ]]; then + tm_out ", $bits $add" + else + pr_ecdh_quality "$bits" "$bits $add" + fi + fi + return 0 +} + + +# arg1: ID or empty. If empty resumption by ticket will be tested, otherwise by ID +# return: 0: it has resumption, 1:nope, 2: nope (OpenSSL 1.1.1), 6: CLIENT_AUTH --> problem for resumption, 7: can't tell +# +# This is basically a short(?) version from Bulletproof SSL and TLS (p386). The version according to that would be e.g. +# echo | $OPENSSL s_client -connect testssl.sh:443 -servername testssl.sh -no_ssl2 -reconnect 2>&1 | grep -E 'New|Reused' +# echo | $OPENSSL s_client -connect testssl.sh:443 -servername testssl.sh -no_ssl2 -no_ticket -reconnect 2>&1 | grep -E 'New|Reused|Session-ID' +# +# FIXME: actually Ivan's version seems faster. Worth to check and since when -reconnect is a/v +# +sub_session_resumption() { + local ret ret1 ret2 + local tmpfile=$(mktemp $TEMPDIR/session_resumption.$NODEIP.XXXXXX) + local sess_data=$(mktemp $TEMPDIR/sub_session_data_resumption.$NODEIP.XXXXXX) + local -a rw_line + local not_new_reused=false + local protocol="$1" + + if [[ "$2" == ID ]]; then + local byID=true + local addcmd="-no_ticket" + else + local byID=false + local addcmd="" + if ! "$TLS_TICKETS"; then + return 1 + fi + fi + "$CLIENT_AUTH" && return 6 + if "$HAS_NO_SSL2"; then + addcmd+=" -no_ssl2" + else + protocol=${protocol/\./_} + protocol=${protocol/v/} + protocol="-$(tolower $protocol)" + # In some cases a server will not support session tickets, but will support session resumption + # by ID. In such a case, it may be more likely to support session resumption with TLSv1.2 than + # with TLSv1.3. So, if testing a server that does not support session tickets and that supports + # both TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.2 for session resumption by ID, then use a TLSv1.2 ClientHello. (Note that + # the line below assumes that if $protocol is -tls1_3, then the server either supports TLSv1.2 or + # is TLSv1.3-only. + ! "$TLS_TICKETS" && "$byID" && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_2") -eq 0 ]] && protocol="-tls1_2" + addcmd+=" $protocol" + fi + + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI $addcmd -sess_out $sess_data") </dev/null &>/dev/null + ret1=$? + if [[ $ret1 -ne 0 ]]; then + debugme echo -n "Couldn't connect #1 " + return 7 + fi + if "$byID" && [[ ! "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]] && \ + ( [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 1.1.1* ]] || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 3.0.0* ]] ) && \ + [[ ! -s "$sess_data" ]]; then + # it seems OpenSSL indicates no Session ID resumption by just not generating output + debugme echo -n "No session resumption byID (empty file)" + ret=2 + else + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI $addcmd -sess_in $sess_data") </dev/null >$tmpfile 2>$ERRFILE + ret2=$? + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then + echo -n "$ret1, $ret2, " + [[ -s "$sess_data" ]] && echo "not empty" || echo "empty" + fi + if [[ $ret2 -ne 0 ]]; then + debugme echo -n "Couldn't connect #2 " + return 7 + fi + # "Reused" indicates session material was reused, "New": not + if grep -aq "^Reused" "$tmpfile"; then + new_sid=false + elif grep -aq "^New" "$tmpfile"; then + new_sid=true + else + debugme echo -n "Problem with 2nd ServerHello " + not_new_reused=true + fi + # Now get the line and compare the numbers "read" and "written" as a second criteria. + # If the "read" number is bigger: a new session ID was probably used + rw_line="$(awk '/^SSL handshake has read/ { print $5" "$(NF-1) }' "$tmpfile" )" + rw_line=($rw_line) + if [[ "${rw_line[0]}" -gt "${rw_line[1]}" ]]; then + new_sid2=true + else + new_sid2=false + fi + debugme echo "${rw_line[0]}, ${rw_line[1]}" + + if "$new_sid2" && "$new_sid"; then + debugme echo -n "No session resumption " + ret=1 + elif ! "$new_sid2" && ! "$new_sid"; then + debugme echo -n "Session resumption " + ret=0 + else + debugme echo -n "unclear status: $ret1, $ret2, $new_sid, $new_sid2 -- " + ret=5 + fi + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then + "$byID" && echo "byID" || echo "by ticket" + fi + fi + "$byID" && \ + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.byID.log $tmpfile || \ + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.byticket.log $tmpfile + return $ret +} + +run_server_preference() { + local cipher1="" cipher2="" tls13_cipher1="" tls13_cipher2="" default_proto="" + local prev_cipher="" default_cipher="" + local limitedsense="" supported_sslv2_ciphers + local -a cipher proto + local proto_ossl proto_txt proto_hex cipherlist i + local -i ret=0 j sclient_success str_len + local list_fwd="DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:SEED-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:RC4-MD5:DES-CBC-SHA:RC4-SHA:AES128-SHA:AES128-SHA256:AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384:AECDH-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA" + local list_reverse="ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-RC4-SHA:AECDH-AES128-SHA:ADH-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES128-GCM-SHA256:AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:AES256-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:AES128-SHA256:AES128-SHA:RC4-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:RC4-MD5:DES-CBC3-SHA:SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA" + tls_list_fwd="c0,2c, c0,30, 00,9f, cc,a9, cc,a8, cc,aa, c0,2b, c0,2f, 00,9e, c0,24, c0,28, 00,6b, c0,23, c0,27, 00,67, c0,0a, 00,04, 00,05, 00,09, 00,0a, 00,9a, 00,96, + c0,14, 00,39, c0,09, c0,13, 00,33, 00,9d, 00,9c, 13,01, 13,02, 13,03, 13,04, 13,05, 00,3d, 00,3c, 00,35, 00,2f, 00,ff" + tls_list_rev="00,2f, 00,35, 00,3c, 00,3d, 13,05, 13,04, 13,03, 13,02, 13,01, 00,9c, 00,9d, 00,33, c0,13, c0,09, 00,39, c0,14, 00,96, 00,9a, 00,0a, 00,09, 00,05, 00,04, + c0,0a, 00,67, c0,27, c0,23, 00,6b, c0,28, c0,24, 00,9e, c0,2f, c0,2b, cc,aa, cc,a8, cc,a9, 00,9f, c0,30, c0,2c, 00,ff" + local has_cipher_order=false has_tls13_cipher_order=false + local addcmd="" addcmd2="" + local using_sockets=true + local jsonID="cipher_order" + local cwe="CWE-310" + local cve="" + + "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false + + outln + pr_headlineln " Testing server preferences " + + outln + pr_bold " Has server cipher order? " + + if [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]]; then + addcmd="$OPTIMAL_PROTO" + else + # the supplied openssl will send an SSLv2 ClientHello if $SNI is empty + # and the -no_ssl2 isn't provided. + addcmd="-no_ssl2 $SNI" + fi + + # Determine negotiated protocol upfront + sclient_success=1 + if "$using_sockets" && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -ne 1 ]]; then + # Send similar list of cipher suites as OpenSSL 1.1.1 does + tls_sockets "04" \ + "c0,2c, c0,30, 00,9f, cc,a9, cc,a8, cc,aa, c0,2b, c0,2f, 00,9a, 00,96, + 00,9e, c0,24, c0,28, 00,6b, c0,23, c0,27, 00,67, c0,0a, + c0,14, 00,39, c0,09, c0,13, 00,33, 00,9d, 00,9c, 13,02, + 13,03, 13,01, 13,04, 13,05, 00,3d, 00,3c, 00,35, 00,2f, 00,ff" \ + "ephemeralkey" + sclient_success=$? + if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then + add_tls_offered tls1_3 yes + elif [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]]; then + sclient_success=0 # 2: downgraded + case $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION in + 0303) add_tls_offered tls1_2 yes ;; + 0302) add_tls_offered tls1_1 yes ;; + 0301) add_tls_offered tls1 yes ;; + 0300) add_tls_offered ssl3 yes ;; + esac + fi + if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] ; then + cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE + cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt" + cipher0=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + fi + fi + if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $addcmd") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then + cipher0=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + debugme tm_out "0 --> $cipher0\n" + cp $TMPFILE "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt" + else + # 2 second try with $OPTIMAL_PROTO especially for intolerant IIS6 servers: + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + if ! sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then + pr_warning "Handshake error!" + ret=1 + fi + fi + fi + default_proto=$(get_protocol $TMPFILE) + [[ "$default_proto" == TLSv1.0 ]] && default_proto="TLSv1" + # debugme tm_out " --> $default_proto\n" + + # Some servers don't have a TLS 1.3 cipher order, see #1163 + if [[ "$default_proto" == TLSv1.3 ]]; then + tls_sockets "04" "13,05, 13,04, 13,03, 13,02, 13,01, 00,ff" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && ret=1 && prln_fixme "something weird happened around line $((LINENO - 1))" + cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE + tls13_cipher1=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + debugme tm_out "TLS 1.3: --> $tls13_cipher1\n" + tls_sockets "04" "13,01, 13,02, 13,03, 13,04, 13,05, 00,ff" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && ret=1 && prln_fixme "something weird happened around line $((LINENO - 1))" + cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE + tls13_cipher2=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + debugme tm_out "TLS 1.3: --> $tls13_cipher2\n" + + [[ $tls13_cipher1 == $tls13_cipher2 ]] && has_tls13_cipher_order=true + fi + # Check whether the server has a cipher order for SSLv3 - TLSv1.2 + if [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_2") -ne 0 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_1") -ne 0 ]] && \ + [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1") -ne 0 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "ssl3") -ne 0 ]]; then + # Based on testing performed by determine_optimal_sockets_params(), it is believed that + # this server does not offer SSLv3 - TLSv1.2. + has_cipher_order="$has_tls13_cipher_order" + elif [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" != -ssl2 ]]; then + if [[ -n "$STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO" ]]; then + [[ ! "$STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO" =~ ssl ]] && addcmd2="$SNI" + [[ "$STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO" != -tls1_3 ]] && addcmd2+=" $STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO" + else + addcmd2="-no_ssl2 $SNI" + fi + [[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]] && echo -e "\n Forward: ${list_fwd}" + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -cipher $list_fwd $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $addcmd2") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + if ! sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then + list_fwd="$(actually_supported_osslciphers $list_fwd '' '-tls1')" + pr_warning "no matching cipher in this list found (pls report this): " + outln "$list_fwd . " + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Could not determine server cipher order, no matching cipher in list found (pls report this): $list_fwd" + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + # we assume the problem is with testing here but it could be also the server side + fi + cipher1=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) # cipher1 from 1st serverhello + debugme tm_out "1 --> $cipher1\n" + + # second client hello with reverse list + [[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]] && echo -e "\n Reverse: ${list_reverse}" + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -cipher $list_reverse $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $addcmd2") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + # first handshake worked above so no error handling here + cipher2=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) # cipher2 from 2nd serverhello + debugme tm_out "2 --> $cipher2\n" + + [[ $cipher1 == $cipher2 ]] && has_cipher_order=true + fi + debugme echo "has_cipher_order: $has_cipher_order" + debugme echo "has_tls13_cipher_order: $has_tls13_cipher_order" + + if "$TLS13_ONLY" && ! "$has_tls13_cipher_order"; then + out "no (TLS 1.3 only)" + limitedsense=" (limited sense as client will pick)" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not a cipher order for TLS 1.3 configured" + elif ! "$has_cipher_order" && ! "$has_tls13_cipher_order"; then + # server used the different ends (ciphers) from the client hello + pr_svrty_high "no (NOT ok)" + limitedsense=" (limited sense as client will pick)" + fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "NOT a cipher order configured" + elif "$has_cipher_order" && ! "$has_tls13_cipher_order" && [[ "$default_proto" == TLSv1.3 ]]; then + pr_svrty_good "yes (OK)"; out " -- only for < TLS 1.3" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "server -- TLS 1.3 client determined" + elif ! "$has_cipher_order" && "$has_tls13_cipher_order"; then + pr_svrty_high "no (NOT ok)"; out " -- only for TLS 1.3" + fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "server -- < TLS 1.3 client determined" + else + if "$has_tls13_cipher_order"; then + if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then + out "yes (TLS 1.3 only)" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "server (TLS 1.3)" + else + pr_svrty_best "yes (OK)" + out " -- TLS 1.3 and below" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "server" + fi + else + # we don't have TLS 1.3 at all + pr_svrty_best "yes (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "server" + fi + fi + outln + + pr_bold " Negotiated protocol " + jsonID="protocol_negotiated" + + case "$default_proto" in + *TLSv1.3) + prln_svrty_best $default_proto + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "Default protocol TLS1.3" + ;; + *TLSv1.2) + prln_svrty_best $default_proto + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "Default protocol TLS1.2" + ;; + *TLSv1.1) + prln_svrty_low $default_proto + fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "Default protocol TLS1.1" + ;; + *TLSv1) + prln_svrty_low $default_proto + fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "Default protocol TLS1.0" + ;; + *SSLv2) + prln_svrty_critical $default_proto + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "Default protocol SSLv2" + ;; + *SSLv3) + prln_svrty_critical $default_proto + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "Default protocol SSLv3" + ;; + "") + pr_warning "default proto empty" + if [[ $OSSL_VER == 1.0.2* ]]; then + outln " (Hint: if IIS6 give OpenSSL 1.0.1 a try)" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Default protocol empty (Hint: if IIS6 give OpenSSL 1.0.1 a try)" + else + outln + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Default protocol empty" + fi + ret=1 + ;; + *) + pr_warning "FIXME line $LINENO: $default_proto" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "FIXME line $LINENO: $default_proto" + ret=1 + ;; + esac + + pr_bold " Negotiated cipher " + jsonID="cipher_negotiated" + + # restore file from above + [[ "$default_proto" == TLSv1.3 ]] && cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls13_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE + cipher1=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + + # Sanity check: Handshake with no ciphers and one with forward list didn't overlap + if [[ "$cipher0" != $cipher1 ]]; then + limitedsense=" (matching cipher in list missing)" + fi + + if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] && ( [[ "$cipher1" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "$cipher1" == SSL_* ]] ); then + default_cipher="$(rfc2openssl "$cipher1")" + elif [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]] && [[ "$cipher1" != TLS_* ]] && [[ "$cipher1" != SSL_* ]]; then + default_cipher="$(openssl2rfc "$cipher1")" + fi + [[ -z "$default_cipher" ]] && default_cipher="$cipher1" + pr_cipher_quality "$default_cipher" + case $? in + 1) fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "$default_cipher$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" "string") $limitedsense" + ;; + 2) fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "$default_cipher$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" "string") $limitedsense" + ;; + 3) fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "$default_cipher$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" "string") $limitedsense" + ;; + 6|7) fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "$default_cipher$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" "string") $limitedsense" + ;; # best ones + 4) fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "$default_cipher$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" "string") (cbc) $limitedsense" + ;; # it's CBC. --> lucky13 + 0) pr_warning "default cipher empty" ; + if [[ $OSSL_VER == 1.0.2* ]]; then + out " (Hint: if IIS6 give OpenSSL 1.0.1 a try)" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Default cipher empty (if IIS6 give OpenSSL 1.0.1 a try) $limitedsense" + else + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Default cipher empty $limitedsense" + fi + ret=1 + ;; + *) fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$default_cipher$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" "string") $limitedsense" + ;; + esac + read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" + + if [[ "$cipher0" != $cipher1 ]]; then + pr_warning " -- inconclusive test, matching cipher in list missing" + outln ", better see below" + #FIXME: This is ugly but the best we can do before rewrite this section + else + outln "$limitedsense" + fi + + if "$has_cipher_order"; then + "$FAST" && using_sockets=false + [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false + + pr_bold " Cipher order" + while read proto_ossl proto_hex proto_txt; do + [[ "$proto_ossl" == tls1_3 ]] && ! "$has_tls13_cipher_order" && continue + cipher_pref_check "$proto_ossl" "$proto_hex" "$proto_txt" "$using_sockets" + done <<< "$(tm_out " ssl3 00 SSLv3\n tls1 01 TLSv1\n tls1_1 02 TLSv1.1\n tls1_2 03 TLSv1.2\n tls1_3 04 TLSv1.3\n")" + outln + outln + else + pr_bold " Negotiated cipher per proto"; outln " $limitedsense" + i=1 + for proto_ossl in ssl2 ssl3 tls1 tls1_1 tls1_2 tls1_3; do + if [[ $proto_ossl == ssl2 ]] && ! "$HAS_SSL2"; then + if ! "$using_sockets" || [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -eq 0 ]]; then + out " (SSLv2: "; pr_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -ssl2\""; outln ")"; + continue + else + sslv2_sockets "" "true" + if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then + # Just arbitrarily pick the first cipher in the cipher-mapping.txt list. + proto[i]="SSLv2" + supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")" + for (( j=0; j < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; j++ )); do + if [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_SSLVERS[j]}" == "SSLv2" ]]; then + cipher1="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[j]}" + cipher1="$(tolower "x${cipher1:2:2}${cipher1:7:2}${cipher1:12:2}")" + if [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ $cipher1 ]]; then + if ( [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] && [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[j]}" != "-" ]] ) || [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[j]}" == "-" ]]; then + cipher[i]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[j]}" + else + cipher[i]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[j]}" + fi + break + fi + fi + done + [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && tmln_out "Default cipher for ${proto[i]}: ${cipher[i]}" + else + proto[i]="" + cipher[i]="" + fi + fi + elif ( [[ $proto_ossl == ssl3 ]] && ! "$HAS_SSL3" ) || ( [[ $proto_ossl == tls1_3 ]] && ! "$HAS_TLS13" ); then + if [[ $proto_ossl == ssl3 ]]; then + proto_txt="SSLv3" ; proto_hex="00" ; cipherlist="$TLS_CIPHER" + else + proto_txt="TLSv1.3" ; proto_hex="04" ; cipherlist="$TLS13_CIPHER" + fi + if ! "$using_sockets"; then + out " ($proto_txt: "; pr_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -$proto_ossl\"" ; outln ")"; + continue + else + tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "$cipherlist" + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then + proto[i]="$proto_txt" + cipher1=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt") + cipher[i]="$cipher1" + if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] && [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -ne 0 ]]; then + cipher[i]="$(rfc2openssl "$cipher1")" + [[ -z "${cipher[i]}" ]] && cipher[i]="$cipher1" + fi + [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && tmln_out "Default cipher for ${proto[i]}: ${cipher[i]}" + else + proto[i]="" + cipher[i]="" + fi + fi + else + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -"$proto_ossl" $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then + proto[i]=$(get_protocol $TMPFILE) + cipher[i]=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + [[ ${cipher[i]} == "0000" ]] && cipher[i]="" # Hack! + if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]] && [[ -n "${cipher[i]}" ]]; then + cipher[i]="$(openssl2rfc "${cipher[i]}")" + [[ -z "${cipher[i]}" ]] && cipher[i]=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + fi + [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && tmln_out "Default cipher for ${proto[i]}: ${cipher[i]}" + else + proto[i]="" + cipher[i]="" + fi + fi + [[ -n "${cipher[i]}" ]] && add_tls_offered "$proto_ossl" yes + i=$((i + 1)) + done + + for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6; do + if [[ -n "${cipher[i]}" ]]; then # cipher not empty + if [[ -z "$prev_cipher" ]] || [[ "$prev_cipher" != "${cipher[i]}" ]]; then + [[ -n "$prev_cipher" ]] && outln + str_len=${#cipher[i]} + out " " + if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then + out "${cipher[i]}" + else + pr_cipher_quality "${cipher[i]}" + fi + out ":" + if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]]; then + for (( 1; str_len < 30; str_len++ )); do + out " " + done + else + for (( 1; str_len < 51; str_len++ )); do + out " " + done + fi + else + out ", " # same cipher --> only print out protocol behind it + fi + out "${proto[i]}" + prev_cipher="${cipher[i]}" + fi + fileout "cipher_order_${proto[i]}" "INFO" "${cipher[i]} at ${proto[i]} $limitedsense" + done + outln "\n No further cipher order check has been done as order is determined by the client" + outln + fi + return $ret +} + +check_tls12_pref() { + local batchremoved="-CAMELLIA:-IDEA:-KRB5:-PSK:-SRP:-aNULL:-eNULL" + local batchremoved_success=false + local tested_cipher="" cipher ciphers_to_test + local order="" + local -i nr_ciphers_found_r1=0 nr_ciphers_found_r2=0 + + while true; do + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -tls1_2 $BUGS -cipher "ALL$tested_cipher:$batchremoved" -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE ; then + cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + order+=" $cipher" + tested_cipher="$tested_cipher:-$cipher" + nr_ciphers_found_r1+=1 + "$FAST" && break + else + debugme tmln_out "A: $tested_cipher" + break + fi + done + batchremoved="${batchremoved//-/}" + while true; do + # no ciphers from "ALL$tested_cipher:$batchremoved" left + # now we check $batchremoved, and remove the minus signs first: + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -tls1_2 $BUGS -cipher "$batchremoved" -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE ; then + batchremoved_success=true # signals that we have some of those ciphers and need to put everything together later on + cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + order+=" $cipher" + batchremoved="$batchremoved:-$cipher" + nr_ciphers_found_r1+=1 + debugme tmln_out "B1: $batchremoved" + "$FAST" && break + else + debugme tmln_out "B2: $batchremoved" + break + # nothing left with batchremoved ciphers, we need to put everything together + fi + done + + if "$batchremoved_success"; then + # now we combine the two cipher sets from both while loops + combined_ciphers="$order" + order="" ; tested_cipher="" + while true; do + ciphers_to_test="" + for cipher in $combined_ciphers; do + [[ ! "$tested_cipher:" =~ :-$cipher: ]] && ciphers_to_test+=":$cipher" + done + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -tls1_2 $BUGS -cipher "${ciphers_to_test:1}" -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE ; then + cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + order+=" $cipher" + tested_cipher="$tested_cipher:-$cipher" + nr_ciphers_found_r2+=1 + "$FAST" && break + else + # This shouldn't happen. + break + fi + done + if "$FAST" && [[ $nr_ciphers_found_r2 -ne 1 ]]; then + prln_fixme "something weird happened around line $((LINENO - 14))" + return 1 + elif ! "$FAST" && [[ $nr_ciphers_found_r2 -ne $nr_ciphers_found_r1 ]]; then + prln_fixme "something weird happened around line $((LINENO - 16))" + return 1 + fi + fi + tm_out "$order" + + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 0 +} + + +cipher_pref_check() { + local p="$1" proto_hex="$2" proto="$3" + local using_sockets="$4" + local tested_cipher cipher order rfc_cipher rfc_order + local overflow_probe_cipherlist="ALL:-ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:-AES128-SHA:-DES-CBC3-SHA" + local -i i nr_ciphers nr_nonossl_ciphers num_bundles mod_check bundle_size bundle end_of_bundle success + local hexc ciphers_to_test + local -a rfc_ciph hexcode ciphers_found ciphers_found2 + local -a -i index + local ciphers_found_with_sockets + + order=""; ciphers_found_with_sockets=false + if [[ $p == ssl3 ]] && ! "$HAS_SSL3" && ! "$using_sockets"; then + out "\n SSLv3: "; pr_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -ssl3\""; + return 0 + fi + if [[ $p == tls1_3 ]] && ! "$HAS_TLS13" && ! "$using_sockets"; then + out "\n TLSv1.3 "; pr_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support \"s_client -tls1_3\""; + return 0 + fi + + [[ $(has_server_protocol "$p") -eq 1 ]] && return 0 + + if ( [[ $p != tls1_3 ]] || "$HAS_TLS13" ) && ( [[ $p != ssl3 ]] || "$HAS_SSL3" ); then + if [[ $p == tls1_2 ]] && "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG"; then + order="$(check_tls12_pref)" + else + tested_cipher="" + while true; do + if [[ $p != tls1_3 ]]; then + ciphers_to_test="-cipher ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL${tested_cipher}" + else + ciphers_to_test="" + for cipher in $(colon_to_spaces "$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS"); do + [[ ! "$tested_cipher" =~ ":-"$cipher ]] && ciphers_to_test+=":$cipher" + done + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break + ciphers_to_test="-ciphersuites ${ciphers_to_test:1}" + fi + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS -"$p" $BUGS $ciphers_to_test -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || break + cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + [[ -z "$cipher" ]] && break + order+="$cipher " + tested_cipher+=":-"$cipher + "$FAST" && break + done + fi + fi + + nr_nonossl_ciphers=0 + if "$using_sockets"; then + for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do + ciphers_found[i]=false + hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}" + if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then + if [[ " $order " =~ " ${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} " ]]; then + ciphers_found[i]=true + else + ciphers_found2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=false + hexcode[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}" + rfc_ciph[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" + index[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=$i + # Only test ciphers that are relevant to the protocol. + if [[ "$p" == tls1_3 ]]; then + [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == "13" ]] && nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1 + elif [[ "$p" == tls1_2 ]]; then + [[ "${hexc:2:2}" != 13 ]] && nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1 + elif [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA256 ]] && \ + [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA384 ]] && \ + [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *"_CCM" ]] && \ + [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *"_CCM_8" ]]; then + nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1 + fi + fi + fi + done + fi + + if [[ $nr_nonossl_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then + num_bundles=0 + elif [[ $p != tls1_2 ]] || ! "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG"; then + num_bundles=1 + bundle_size=$nr_nonossl_ciphers + else + num_bundles=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/128 + mod_check=$nr_nonossl_ciphers%128 + [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && num_bundles=$num_bundles+1 + + bundle_size=$nr_nonossl_ciphers/$num_bundles + mod_check=$nr_nonossl_ciphers%$num_bundles + [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && bundle_size+=1 + fi + + for (( bundle=0; bundle < num_bundles; bundle++ )); do + end_of_bundle=$bundle*$bundle_size+$bundle_size + [[ $end_of_bundle -gt $nr_nonossl_ciphers ]] && end_of_bundle=$nr_nonossl_ciphers + while true; do + ciphers_to_test="" + for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do + ! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode[i]}" + done + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break + tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && break + cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt") + for (( i=bundle*bundle_size; i < end_of_bundle; i++ )); do + [[ "$cipher" == "${rfc_ciph[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break + done + i=${index[i]} + ciphers_found[i]=true + ciphers_found_with_sockets=true + if [[ $p != tls1_2 ]] || ! "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG"; then + # Throw out the results found so far and start over using just sockets + bundle=$num_bundles + for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do + ciphers_found[i]=true + done + break + fi + done + done + + # If additional ciphers were found using sockets and there is no + # SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG, then just use sockets to find the cipher order. + # If there is a SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG, then use sockets to find the cipher + # order, but starting with the list of ciphers supported by the server. + if "$ciphers_found_with_sockets"; then + order="" + nr_ciphers=0 + for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do + hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}" + if "${ciphers_found[i]}" && [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then + ciphers_found2[nr_ciphers]=false + hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}" + rfc_ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" + if [[ "$p" == "tls1_3" ]]; then + [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == "13" ]] && nr_ciphers+=1 + elif [[ "$p" == "tls1_2" ]]; then + [[ "${hexc:2:2}" != "13" ]] && nr_ciphers+=1 + elif [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA256 ]] && \ + [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA384 ]] && \ + [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *"_CCM" ]] && \ + [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" != *"_CCM_8" ]]; then + nr_ciphers+=1 + fi + fi + done + while true; do + ciphers_to_test="" + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + ! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode[i]}" + done + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break + tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && break + cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt") + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + [[ "$cipher" == ${rfc_ciph[i]} ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break + done + if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] && [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -ne 0 ]]; then + cipher="$(rfc2openssl "$cipher")" + # If there is no OpenSSL name for the cipher, then use the RFC name + [[ -z "$cipher" ]] && cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt") + fi + order+="$cipher " + done + elif [[ -n "$order" ]] && [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ rfc ]]; then + rfc_order="" + while read -d " " cipher; do + rfc_cipher="$(openssl2rfc "$cipher")" + if [[ -n "$rfc_cipher" ]]; then + rfc_order+="$rfc_cipher " + else + rfc_order+="$cipher " + fi + done <<< "$order" + order="$rfc_order" + fi + + if [[ -n "$order" ]]; then + add_tls_offered "$p" yes + outln + out "$(printf " %-10s " "$proto: ")" + if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then + out "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$order" " " $TERM_WIDTH)" + else + out_row_aligned_max_width_by_entry "$order" " " $TERM_WIDTH pr_cipher_quality + fi + fileout "cipherorder_${proto//./_}" "INFO" "$order" + fi + + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}-$p.txt + return 0 +} + + +# arg1 is OpenSSL s_client parameter or empty +# +get_host_cert() { + local tmpvar=$TEMPDIR/${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt # change later to $TMPFILE + + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI $1") 2>/dev/null </dev/null >$tmpvar + if sclient_connect_successful $? $tmpvar; then + awk '/-----BEGIN/,/-----END/ { print $0 }' $tmpvar >$HOSTCERT + return 0 + else + if [[ -z "$1" ]]; then + prln_warning "could not retrieve host certificate!" + fileout "host_certificate_Problem" "WARN" "Could not retrieve host certificate!" + fi + return 1 + fi + #tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + #return $((${PIPESTATUS[0]} + ${PIPESTATUS[1]})) +} + +verify_retcode_helper() { + local ret=0 + local -i retcode=$1 + + case $retcode in + # codes from ./doc/apps/verify.pod | verify(1ssl) + 44) tm_out "(different CRL scope)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE + 26) tm_out "(unsupported certificate purpose)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE + 24) tm_out "(certificate unreadable)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA + 23) tm_out "(certificate revoked)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED + 21) tm_out "(chain incomplete, only 1 cert provided)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE + 20) tm_out "(chain incomplete)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY + 19) tm_out "(self signed CA in chain)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN + 18) tm_out "(self signed)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT + 10) tm_out "(expired)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED + 9) tm_out "(not yet valid)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID + 2) tm_out "(issuer cert missing)" ;; # X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT + *) ret=1 ; tm_out " (unknown, pls report) $1" ;; + esac + return $ret +} + +# arg1: number of certificate if provided >1 +determine_trust() { + local jsonID="$1" + local json_postfix="$2" + local -i i=1 + local -i num_ca_bundles=0 + local bundle_fname="" + local -a certificate_file verify_retcode trust + local ok_was="" + local notok_was="" + local all_ok=true + local some_ok=false + local code + local ca_bundles="" + local spaces=" " + local -i certificates_provided=1+$(grep -c "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem) + local addtl_warning + + # If $json_postfix is not empty, then there is more than one certificate + # and the output should should be indented by two more spaces. + [[ -n $json_postfix ]] && spaces=" " + + case $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR in + 1.0.2|1.1.0|1.1.1|2.[1-9].*|3.*) # 2.x is LibreSSL. 2.1.1 was tested to work, below is not sure + : + ;; + *) addtl_warning="Your $OPENSSL <= 1.0.2 might be too unreliable to determine trust" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "WARN" "$addtl_warning" + addtl_warning="(${addtl_warning})" + ;; + esac + debugme tmln_out + + # if you run testssl.sh from a different path /you can set either TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR or CA_BUNDLES_PATH to find the CA BUNDLES + if [[ -z "$CA_BUNDLES_PATH" ]]; then + ca_bundles="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/*.pem" + else + ca_bundles="$CA_BUNDLES_PATH/*.pem" + fi + for bundle_fname in $ca_bundles; do + certificate_file[i]=$(basename ${bundle_fname//.pem}) + if [[ ! -r $bundle_fname ]]; then + prln_warning "\"$bundle_fname\" cannot be found / not readable" + return 1 + fi + debugme printf -- " %-12s" "${certificate_file[i]}" + # Set SSL_CERT_DIR to /dev/null so that $OPENSSL verify will only use certificates in $bundle_fname + # in a subshell because that should be valid here only + (export SSL_CERT_DIR="/dev/null"; export SSL_CERT_FILE="/dev/null" + if [[ $certificates_provided -ge 2 ]]; then + $OPENSSL verify -purpose sslserver -CAfile <(cat $ADDITIONAL_CA_FILES "$bundle_fname") -untrusted $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem $HOSTCERT >$TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.1 2>$TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.2 + else + $OPENSSL verify -purpose sslserver -CAfile <(cat $ADDITIONAL_CA_FILES "$bundle_fname") $HOSTCERT >$TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.1 2>$TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.2 + fi) + verify_retcode[i]=$(awk '/error [1-9][0-9]? at [0-9]+ depth lookup:/ { if (!found) {print $2; found=1} }' $TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.1 $TEMPDIR/${certificate_file[i]}.2) + [[ -z "${verify_retcode[i]}" ]] && verify_retcode[i]=0 + if [[ ${verify_retcode[i]} -eq 0 ]]; then + trust[i]=true + some_ok=true + [[ -z "$GOOD_CA_BUNDLE" ]] && GOOD_CA_BUNDLE="$bundle_fname" + debugme tm_svrty_good "Ok " + debugme tmln_out "${verify_retcode[i]}" + else + trust[i]=false + all_ok=false + debugme tm_svrty_high "not trusted " + debugme tmln_out "${verify_retcode[i]}" + fi + ((i++)) + done + num_ca_bundles=$((i - 1)) + debugme tm_out " " + if "$all_ok"; then + # all stores ok + pr_svrty_good "Ok "; pr_warning "$addtl_warning" + # we did to stdout the warning above already, so we could stay here with OK: + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "passed. $addtl_warning" + else + # at least one failed + pr_svrty_critical "NOT ok" + if ! "$some_ok"; then + # all failed (we assume with the same issue), we're displaying the reason + out " " + code="$(verify_retcode_helper "${verify_retcode[1]}")" + if [[ "$code" =~ "pls report" ]]; then + pr_warning "$code" + else + out "$code" + fi + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "failed $code. $addtl_warning" + else + # is one ok and the others not ==> display the culprit store + if "$some_ok"; then + pr_svrty_critical ":" + for ((i=1;i<=num_ca_bundles;i++)); do + if ${trust[i]}; then + ok_was="${certificate_file[i]} $ok_was" + else + #code="$(verify_retcode_helper ${verify_retcode[i]})" + #notok_was="${certificate_file[i]} $notok_was" + pr_svrty_high " ${certificate_file[i]} " + code="$(verify_retcode_helper "${verify_retcode[i]}")" + if [[ "$code" =~ "pls report" ]]; then + pr_warning "$code" + else + out "$code" + fi + notok_was="${certificate_file[i]} $code $notok_was" + fi + done + #pr_svrty_high "$notok_was " + #outln "$code" + outln + # lf + green ones + [[ "$DEBUG" -eq 0 ]] && tm_out "$spaces" + pr_svrty_good "OK: $ok_was" + fi + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "Some certificate trust checks failed -> $notok_was $addtl_warning, OK -> $ok_was" + fi + [[ -n "$addtl_warning" ]] && out "\n$spaces" && pr_warning "$addtl_warning" + fi + outln + return 0 +} + +# not handled: Root CA supplied ("contains anchor" in SSLlabs terminology) + +tls_time() { + local difftime + local spaces=" " + local jsonID="TLS_timestamp" + + pr_bold " TLS clock skew" ; out "$spaces" + + if ( [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ ldap ]] || [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ irc ]] ); then + prln_local_problem "STARTTLS/$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL and --ssl-native collide here" + return 1 + fi + + TLS_DIFFTIME_SET=true # this is a switch whether we want to measure the remote TLS_TIME + tls_sockets "01" "$TLS_CIPHER" # try first TLS 1.0 (most frequently used protocol) + [[ -z "$TLS_TIME" ]] && tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER" # TLS 1.2 + [[ -z "$TLS_TIME" ]] && tls_sockets "02" "$TLS_CIPHER" # TLS 1.1 + [[ -z "$TLS_TIME" ]] && tls_sockets "00" "$TLS_CIPHER" # SSL 3 + + if [[ -n "$TLS_TIME" ]]; then # nothing returned a time! + difftime=$((TLS_TIME - TLS_NOW)) # TLS_NOW has been set in tls_sockets() + if [[ "${#difftime}" -gt 5 ]]; then + # openssl >= 1.0.1f fills this field with random values! --> good for possible fingerprint + out "Random values, no fingerprinting possible " + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "random" + else + [[ $difftime != "-"* ]] && [[ $difftime != "0" ]] && difftime="+$difftime" + out "$difftime"; out " sec from localtime"; + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "off by $difftime seconds from your localtime" + fi + debugme tm_out "$TLS_TIME" + outln + else + outln "SSLv3 through TLS 1.2 didn't return a timestamp" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "None returned by SSLv3 through TLSv1.2" + fi + TLS_DIFFTIME_SET=false # reset the switch to save calls to date and friend in tls_sockets() + return 0 +} + +# core function determining whether handshake succeeded or not +# arg1: return value of "openssl s_client connect" +# arg2: temporary file with the server hello +# returns 0 if connect was successful, 1 if not +# +sclient_connect_successful() { + local server_hello="$(cat -v "$2")" + local re='Master-Key: ([^\ +]*)' + + [[ $1 -eq 0 ]] && return 0 + if [[ "$server_hello" =~ $re ]]; then + [[ -n "${BASH_REMATCH[1]}" ]] && return 0 + fi + [[ "$server_hello" =~ (New|Reused)", "(SSLv[23]|TLSv1(\.[0-3])?(\/SSLv3)?)", Cipher is "([A-Z0-9]+-[A-Za-z0-9\-]+|TLS_[A-Za-z0-9_]+) ]] && return 0 + # what's left now is: master key empty and Session-ID not empty + # ==> probably client-based auth with x509 certificate. We handle that at other places + # + # For robustness we also detected here network / server connectivity problems: + # Just need to check whether $TMPFILE=$2 is empty + if [[ ! -s "$2" ]]; then + ((NR_OSSL_FAIL++)) + connectivity_problem $NR_OSSL_FAIL $MAX_OSSL_FAIL "openssl s_client connect problem" "repeated openssl s_client connect problem, doesn't make sense to continue" + fi + return 1 +} + +extract_new_tls_extensions() { + local tls_extensions + + # this is not beautiful (grep+sed) + # but maybe we should just get the ids and do a private matching, according to + # https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-extensiontype-values/tls-extensiontype-values.xhtml + tls_extensions=$(grep -a 'TLS server extension ' "$1" | \ + sed -e 's/TLS server extension //g' -e 's/\" (id=/\/#/g' \ + -e 's/,.*$/,/g' -e 's/),$/\"/g' \ + -e 's/elliptic curves\/#10/supported_groups\/#10/g') + tls_extensions=$(echo $tls_extensions) # into one line + + if [[ -n "$tls_extensions" ]]; then + # check to see if any new TLS extensions were returned and add any new ones to TLS_EXTENSIONS + while read -d "\"" -r line; do + if [[ $line != "" ]] && [[ ! "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" =~ "$line" ]]; then +#FIXME: This is a string of quoted strings, so this seems to determine the output format already. Better e.g. would be an array + TLS_EXTENSIONS+=" \"${line}\"" + fi + done <<<$tls_extensions + [[ "${TLS_EXTENSIONS:0:1}" == " " ]] && TLS_EXTENSIONS="${TLS_EXTENSIONS:1}" + fi +} + +# Note that since, at the moment, this function is only called by run_server_defaults() +# and run_heartbleed(), this function does not look for the status request or NPN +# extensions. For run_heartbleed(), only the heartbeat extension needs to be detected. +# For run_server_defaults(), the status request and NPN would already be detected by +# get_server_certificate(), if they are supported. In the case of the status extension, +# since including a status request extension in a ClientHello does not work for GOST +# only servers. In the case of NPN, since a server will not include both the NPN and +# ALPN extensions in the same ServerHello. +# +determine_tls_extensions() { + local addcmd + local -i success=1 + local line params="" tls_extensions="" + local alpn_proto alpn="" alpn_list_len_hex alpn_extn_len_hex + local -i alpn_list_len alpn_extn_len + local cbc_cipher_list="ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDH-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:AES256-SHA256:AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA256:CAMELLIA256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA:DH-RSA-SEED-SHA:DH-DSS-SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDH-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:AES128-SHA256:AES128-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA256:SEED-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:IDEA-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" + local cbc_cipher_list_hex="c0,28, c0,24, c0,14, c0,0a, 00,6b, 00,6a, 00,69, 00,68, 00,39, 00,38, 00,37, 00,36, c0,77, c0,73, 00,c4, 00,c3, 00,c2, 00,c1, 00,88, 00,87, 00,86, 00,85, c0,2a, c0,26, c0,0f, c0,05, c0,79, c0,75, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,c0, 00,84, c0,3d, c0,3f, c0,41, c0,43, c0,45, c0,49, c0,4b, c0,4d, c0,4f, c0,27, c0,23, c0,13, c0,09, 00,67, 00,40, 00,3f, 00,3e, 00,33, 00,32, 00,31, 00,30, c0,76, c0,72, 00,be, 00,bd, 00,bc, 00,bb, 00,9a, 00,99, 00,98, 00,97, 00,45, 00,44, 00,43, 00,42, c0,29, c0,25, c0,0e, c0,04, c0,78, c0,74, 00,3c, 00,2f, 00,ba, 00,96, 00,41, 00,07, c0,3c, c0,3e, c0,40, c0,42, c0,44, c0,48, c0,4a, c0,4c, c0,4e, c0,12, c0,08, 00,16, 00,13, 00,10, 00,0d, c0,0d, c0,03, 00,0a, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,63, 00,15, 00,12, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,62, 00,09, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,14, 00,11, 00,08, 00,06, 00,0b, 00,0e" + local using_sockets=true + + [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]] && return 0 + "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false + + if "$using_sockets"; then + tls_extensions="00,01,00,01,02, 00,02,00,00, 00,04,00,00, 00,12,00,00, 00,16,00,00, 00,17,00,00" + if [[ -z $STARTTLS ]]; then + for alpn_proto in $ALPN_PROTOs; do + alpn+=",$(printf "%02x" ${#alpn_proto}),$(string_to_asciihex "$alpn_proto")" + done + alpn_list_len=${#alpn}/3 + alpn_list_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $alpn_list_len) + alpn_extn_len=$alpn_list_len+2 + alpn_extn_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $alpn_extn_len) + tls_extensions+=", 00,10,${alpn_extn_len_hex:0:2},${alpn_extn_len_hex:2:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:0:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:2:2}$alpn" + fi + if [[ ! "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" =~ encrypt-then-mac ]]; then + tls_sockets "03" "$cbc_cipher_list_hex, 00,ff" "all" "$tls_extensions" + success=$? + fi + if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then + tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER" "all" "$tls_extensions" + success=$? + fi + [[ $success -eq 2 ]] && success=0 + [[ $success -eq 0 ]] && extract_new_tls_extensions "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" + if [[ -r "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" ]]; then + cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + fi + else + if "$HAS_ALPN" && [[ -z $STARTTLS ]]; then + params="-alpn \"${ALPN_PROTOs// /,}\"" # we need to replace " " by "," + elif "$HAS_NPN" && [[ -z $STARTTLS ]]; then + params="-nextprotoneg \"$NPN_PROTOs\"" + fi + if [[ -z "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" ]] && [[ -z "$SNI" ]] && "$HAS_NO_SSL2"; then + addcmd="-no_ssl2" + else + addcmd="$SNI" + fi + if [[ ! "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" =~ encrypt-then-mac ]]; then + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $addcmd $OPTIMAL_PROTO -tlsextdebug $params -cipher $cbc_cipher_list") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + success=$? + fi + if [[ $success -ne 0 ]]; then + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $addcmd $OPTIMAL_PROTO -tlsextdebug $params") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + success=$? + fi + [[ $success -eq 0 ]] && extract_new_tls_extensions $TMPFILE + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + fi + return $success +} + +extract_certificates() { + local version="$1" + local savedir + local -i i success nrsaved=0 + local issuerDN CAsubjectDN previssuerDN + + # Place the server's certificate in $HOSTCERT and any intermediate + # certificates that were provided in $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem + savedir="$PWD"; cd $TEMPDIR + # https://backreference.org/2010/05/09/ocsp-verification-with-openssl/ + if [[ "$version" == ssl2 ]]; then + awk -v n=-1 '/Server certificate/ {start=1} + /-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/{ if (start) {inc=1; n++} } + inc { print > ("level" n ".crt") } + /---END CERTIFICATE-----/{ inc=0 }' $TMPFILE + else + awk -v n=-1 '/Certificate chain/ {start=1} + /-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----/{ if (start) {inc=1; n++} } + inc { print > ("level" n ".crt") } + /---END CERTIFICATE-----/{ inc=0 }' $TMPFILE + fi + [[ -s level0.crt ]] && nrsaved=$(count_words "$(echo level?.crt 2>/dev/null)") + if [[ $nrsaved -eq 0 ]]; then + success=1 + else + success=0 + CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=false + mv level0.crt $HOSTCERT + if [[ $nrsaved -eq 1 ]]; then + echo "" > $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem + else + cat level?.crt > $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem + issuerDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -noout -issuer 2>/dev/null)" + issuerDN="${issuerDN:8}" + previssuerDN="$issuerDN" + # The second certificate (level1.crt) SHOULD be issued to the CA + # that issued the server's certificate. But, according to RFC 8446 + # clients SHOULD be prepared to handle cases in which the server + # does not order the certificates correctly. + for (( i=1; i < nrsaved; i++ )); do + CAsubjectDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "level$i.crt" -noout -subject 2>/dev/null)" + if [[ "${CAsubjectDN:9}" == "$issuerDN" ]]; then + cp "level$i.crt" $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem + issuerDN="" # set to empty to prevent further matches + fi + [[ "${CAsubjectDN:9}" != "$previssuerDN" ]] && CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=true + "$CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM" && [[ -z "$issuerDN" ]] && break + previssuerDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "level$i.crt" -noout -issuer 2>/dev/null)" + previssuerDN="${previssuerDN:8}" + done + # This should never happen, but if more than one certificate was + # provided and none of them belong to the CA that issued the + # server's certificate, then the extra certificates should just + # be deleted. There is code elsewhere that assumes that if + # $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem is non-empty, then + # $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem is also present. + [[ -n "$issuerDN" ]] && echo "" > $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem + rm level?.crt + fi + fi + cd "$savedir" + return $success +} + +extract_stapled_ocsp() { + local response="$(cat $TMPFILE)" + local ocsp tmp + local -i ocsp_len + + STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE="" + if [[ "$response" =~ CertificateStatus ]]; then + # This is OpenSSL 1.1.0 or 1.1.1 and the response + # is TLS 1.2 or earlier. + ocsp="${response##*CertificateStatus}" + ocsp="16${ocsp#*16}" + ocsp="${ocsp%%<<<*}" + ocsp="$(strip_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$ocsp")")" + ocsp="${ocsp:8}" + elif [[ "$response" =~ "TLS server extension \"status request\" (id=5), len=0" ]]; then + # This is not OpenSSL 1.1.0 or 1.1.1, and the response + # is TLS 1.2 or earlier. + ocsp="${response%%OCSP response:*}" + ocsp="${ocsp##*<<<}" + ocsp="16${ocsp#*16}" + ocsp="$(strip_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$ocsp")")" + ocsp="${ocsp:8}" + elif [[ "$response" =~ "TLS server extension \"status request\" (id=5), len=" ]]; then + # This is OpenSSL 1.1.1 and the response is TLS 1.3. + ocsp="${response##*TLS server extension \"status request\" (id=5), len=}" + ocsp="${ocsp%%<<<*}" + tmp="${ocsp%%[!0-9]*}" + ocsp="${ocsp#$tmp}" + ocsp_len=2*$tmp + ocsp="$(awk ' { print $3 $4 $5 $6 $7 $8 $9 $10 $11 $12 $13 $14 $15 $16 $17 } ' <<< "$ocsp" | sed 's/-//')" + ocsp="$(strip_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$ocsp")")" + ocsp="${ocsp:0:ocsp_len}" + else + return 0 + fi + # Determine whether this is a single OCSP response or a sequence of + # responses and then extract just the response for the server's + # certificate. + if [[ "${ocsp:0:2}" == "01" ]]; then + STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE="${ocsp:8}" + elif [[ "${ocsp:0:2}" == "02" ]]; then + ocsp_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:8:6}") + STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE="${ocsp:14:ocsp_len}" + fi + return 0 +} + +# arg1 is "<OpenSSL cipher>" +# arg2 is a list of protocols to try (tls1_2, tls1_1, tls1, ssl3) or empty (if all should be tried) +get_server_certificate() { + local protocols_to_try proto + local success ret + local npn_params="" line + local ciphers_to_test="" + # Cipher suites that use a certificate with an RSA (signature) public key + local -r a_rsa="cc,13, cc,15, c0,30, c0,28, c0,14, 00,9f, cc,a8, cc,aa, c0,a3, c0,9f, 00,6b, 00,39, c0,77, 00,c4, 00,88, c0,45, c0,4d, c0,53, c0,61, c0,7d, c0,8b, 16,b7, 16,b9, c0,2f, c0,27, c0,13, 00,9e, c0,a2, c0,9e, 00,67, 00,33, c0,76, 00,be, 00,9a, 00,45, c0,44, c0,4c, c0,52, c0,60, c0,7c, c0,8a, c0,11, c0,12, 00,16, 00,15, 00,14, c0,10" + # Cipher suites that use a certificate with an RSA (encryption) public key + local -r e_rsa="00,b7, c0,99, 00,ad, cc,ae, 00,9d, c0,a1, c0,9d, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,c0, 00,84, 00,95, c0,3d, c0,51, c0,69, c0,6f, c0,7b, c0,93, ff,01, 00,ac, c0,a0, c0,9c, 00,9c, 00,3c, 00,2f, 00,ba, 00,b6, 00,96, 00,41, c0,98, 00,07, 00,94, c0,3c, c0,50, c0,68, c0,6e, c0,7a, c0,92, 00,05, 00,04, 00,92, 00,0a, 00,93, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,62, 00,09, 00,61, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,64, 00,60, 00,08, 00,06, 00,03, 00,b9, 00,b8, 00,2e, 00,3b, 00,02, 00,01, ff,00" + # Cipher suites that use a certificate with a DSA public key + local -r a_dss="00,a3, 00,6a, 00,38, 00,c3, 00,87, c0,43, c0,57, c0,81, 00,a2, 00,40, 00,32, 00,bd, 00,99, 00,44, c0,42, c0,56, c0,80, 00,66, 00,13, 00,63, 00,12, 00,65, 00,11" + # Cipher suites that use a certificate with a DH public key + local -r a_dh="00,a5, 00,a1, 00,69, 00,68, 00,37, 00,36, 00,c2, 00,c1, 00,86, 00,85, c0,3f, c0,41, c0,55, c0,59, c0,7f, c0,83, 00,a4, 00,a0, 00,3f, 00,3e, 00,31, 00,30, 00,bc, 00,bb, 00,98, 00,97, 00,43, 00,42, c0,3e, c0,40, c0,54, c0,58, c0,7e, c0,82, 00,10, 00,0d, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,0b, 00,0e" + # Cipher suites that use a certificate with an ECDH public key + local -r a_ecdh="c0,32, c0,2e, c0,2a, c0,26, c0,0f, c0,05, c0,79, c0,75, c0,4b, c0,4f, c0,5f, c0,63, c0,89, c0,8d, c0,31, c0,2d, c0,29, c0,25, c0,0e, c0,04, c0,78, c0,74, c0,4a, c0,4e, c0,5e, c0,62, c0,88, c0,8c, c0,0c, c0,02, c0,0d, c0,03, c0,0b, c0,01" + # Cipher suites that use a certificate with an ECDSA public key + local -r a_ecdsa="cc,14, c0,2c, c0,24, c0,0a, cc,a9, c0,af, c0,ad, c0,73, c0,49, c0,5d, c0,87, 16,b8, 16,ba, c0,2b, c0,23, c0,09, c0,ae, c0,ac, c0,72, c0,48, c0,5c, c0,86, c0,07, c0,08, c0,06" + # Cipher suites that use a certificate with a GOST public key + local -r a_gost="00,80, 00,81, 00,82, 00,83" + local using_sockets=true + + "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false + + CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=false + if [[ "$1" =~ "tls1_3" ]]; then + [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -eq 1 ]] && return 1 + if "$HAS_TLS13"; then + if [[ "$1" =~ "tls1_3_RSA" ]]; then + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -showcerts -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI -tls1_3 -tlsextdebug -status -msg -sigalgs PSS+SHA256:PSS+SHA384") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + elif [[ "$1" =~ "tls1_3_ECDSA" ]]; then + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -showcerts -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI -tls1_3 -tlsextdebug -status -msg -sigalgs ECDSA+SHA256:ECDSA+SHA384") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + else + return 1 + fi + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || return 1 + DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0304" + extract_certificates "tls1_3" + extract_stapled_ocsp + success=$? + else + # For STARTTLS protocols not being implemented yet via sockets this is a bypass otherwise it won't be usable at all (e.g. LDAP) + if ( [[ "$STARTTLS" =~ ldap ]] || [[ "$STARTTLS" =~ irc ]] ); then + return 1 + elif [[ "$1" =~ "tls1_3_RSA" ]]; then + tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "all+" "00,12,00,00, 00,05,00,05,01,00,00,00,00, 00,0d,00,10,00,0e,08,04,08,05,08,06,04,01,05,01,06,01,02,01" + elif [[ "$1" =~ "tls1_3_ECDSA" ]]; then + tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "all+" "00,12,00,00, 00,05,00,05,01,00,00,00,00, 00,0d,00,0a,00,08,04,03,05,03,06,03,02,03" + else + return 1 + fi + success=$? + [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || return 1 + cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE + fi + [[ $success -eq 0 ]] && add_tls_offered tls1_3 yes + extract_new_tls_extensions $TMPFILE + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return $success + fi + + "$HAS_NPN" && [[ -z "$STARTTLS" ]] && npn_params="-nextprotoneg \"$NPN_PROTOs\"" + + if [[ -n "$2" ]]; then + protocols_to_try="$2" + else + protocols_to_try="tls1_2 tls1_1 tls1 ssl3" + fi + + # throwing 1st every cipher/protocol at the server to know what works + success=7 + + if [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]]; then + success=1 + sslv2_sockets "" "true" + if [[ $? -eq 3 ]]; then + mv $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt $TMPFILE + success=0 + fi + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return $success + fi + + if "$using_sockets"; then + protocols_to_try="${protocols_to_try/tls1_2/03}" + protocols_to_try="${protocols_to_try/tls1_1/02}" + protocols_to_try="${protocols_to_try/tls1/01}" + protocols_to_try="${protocols_to_try/ssl3/00}" + + [[ "$1" =~ aRSA ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_rsa" + [[ "$1" =~ eRSA ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $e_rsa" + [[ "$1" =~ aDSS ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_dss" + [[ "$1" =~ aDH ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_dh" + [[ "$1" =~ aECDH ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_ecdh" + [[ "$1" =~ aECDSA ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_ecdsa" + [[ "$1" =~ aGOST ]] && ciphers_to_test+=", $a_gost" + + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && return 1 + ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test:2}" + + for proto in $protocols_to_try; do + [[ 1 -eq $(has_server_protocol $proto) ]] && continue + tls_sockets "$proto" "$ciphers_to_test, 00,ff" "all" "00,12,00,00, 00,05,00,05,01,00,00,00,00" + ret=$? + [[ $ret -eq 0 ]] && success=0 && break + [[ $ret -eq 2 ]] && success=0 && break + done # this loop is needed for IIS6 and others which have a handshake size limitations + if [[ $success -eq 7 ]]; then + # "-status" above doesn't work for GOST only servers, so we do another test without it and see whether that works then: + tls_sockets "$proto" "$ciphers_to_test, 00,ff" "all" "00,12,00,00" + ret=$? + [[ $ret -eq 0 ]] && success=0 + [[ $ret -eq 2 ]] && success=0 + if [[ $success -eq 7 ]]; then + if [ -z "$1" ]; then + prln_warning "Strange, no SSL/TLS protocol seems to be supported (error around line $((LINENO - 6)))" + fi + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 7 # this is ugly, I know + else + GOST_STATUS_PROBLEM=true + fi + fi + cp $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt $TMPFILE + + # When "$2" is empty, get_server_certificate() is being called with SNI="". + # In case the extensions returned by the server differ depending on whether + # SNI is provided or not, don't collect extensions when SNI="" (unless + # no DNS name was provided at the command line). + [[ -z "$2" ]] && extract_new_tls_extensions $TMPFILE + else + # no sockets, openssl + ciphers_to_test="$1" + if [[ "$1" =~ aRSA ]] && [[ "$1" =~ eRSA ]]; then + ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test/eRSA/}" + elif [[ "$1" =~ aRSA ]]; then + ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test/aRSA/}" + for ciph in $(colon_to_spaces $(actually_supported_osslciphers "aRSA")); do + [[ "$ciph" =~ -RSA- ]] && ciphers_to_test+=":$ciph" + done + elif [[ "$1" =~ eRSA ]]; then + ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test/eRSA/}" + for ciph in $(colon_to_spaces $(actually_supported_osslciphers "aRSA")); do + [[ ! "$ciph" =~ -RSA- ]] && ciphers_to_test+=":$ciph" + done + fi + ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test/::/:}" + [[ "${ciphers_to_test:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test="${ciphers_to_test:1}" + [[ $(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers "$ciphers_to_test")) -ge 1 ]] || return 1 + + for proto in $protocols_to_try; do + [[ 1 -eq $(has_server_protocol $proto) ]] && continue + [[ "$proto" == ssl3 ]] && ! "$HAS_SSL3" && continue + addcmd="" + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $ciphers_to_test -showcerts -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI -$proto -tlsextdebug $npn_params -status -msg") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then + success=0 + break # now we have the certificate + fi + done # this loop is needed for IIS6 and others which have a handshake size limitations + if [[ $success -eq 7 ]]; then + # "-status" above doesn't work for GOST only servers, so we do another test without it and see whether that works then: + [[ "$proto" == ssl3 ]] && ! "$HAS_SSL3" && return 7 + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $ciphers_to_test -showcerts -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI -$proto -tlsextdebug") </dev/null 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + if ! sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then + if [ -z "$1" ]; then + prln_warning "Strange, no SSL/TLS protocol seems to be supported (error around line $((LINENO - 6)))" + fi + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 7 # this is ugly, I know + else + GOST_STATUS_PROBLEM=true + fi + fi + case "$proto" in + "tls1_2") DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0303" ;; + "tls1_1") DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0302" ;; + "tls1") DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0301" ;; + "ssl3") DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0300" ;; + esac + # When "$2" is empty, get_server_certificate() is being called with SNI="". + # In case the extensions returned by the server differ depending on whether + # SNI is provided or not, don't collect extensions when SNI="" (unless + # no DNS name was provided at the command line). + [[ -z "$2" ]] && extract_new_tls_extensions $TMPFILE + + extract_certificates "$proto" + extract_stapled_ocsp + success=$? + fi + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return $success +} + +# arg1: path to certificate +# returns CN +get_cn_from_cert() { + local subject + + # attention! openssl 1.0.2 doesn't properly handle online output from certificates from trustwave.com/github.com + #FIXME: use -nameopt oid for robustness + + # for e.g. russian sites -esc_msb,utf8 works in an UTF8 terminal -- any way to check platform independent? + # see x509(1ssl): + subject="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $1 -noout -subject -nameopt multiline,-align,sname,-esc_msb,utf8,-space_eq 2>>$ERRFILE)" + echo "$(awk -F'=' '/CN=/ { print $2 }' <<< "$subject" | tr '\n' ' ')" + return $? +} + +# Return 0 if the name provided in arg1 is a wildcard name +is_wildcard() +{ + local certname="$1" + + # If the first label in the DNS name begins "xn--", then assume it is an + # A-label and not a wildcard name (RFC 6125, Section 6.4.3). + [[ "${certname:0:4}" == "xn--" ]] && return 1 + + # Remove part of name preceding '*' or '.'. If no "*" appears in the + # left-most label, then it is not a wildcard name (RFC 6125, Section 6.4.3). + basename="$(echo -n "$certname" | sed 's/^[_a-zA-Z0-9\-]*//')" + [[ "${basename:0:1}" != "*" ]] && return 1 # not a wildcard name + + # Check that there are no additional wildcard ('*') characters or any + # other characters that do not belong in a DNS name. + [[ -n $(echo -n "${basename:1}" | sed 's/^[_\.a-zA-Z0-9\-]*//') ]] && return 1 + return 0 +} + +# Return 0 if the name provided in arg2 is a wildcard name and it matches the name provided in arg1. +wildcard_match() +{ + local servername="$1" + local certname="$2" + local basename + local -i basename_offset len_certname len_part1 len_basename + local -i len_servername len_wildcard + + len_servername=${#servername} + len_certname=${#certname} + + # Use rules from RFC 6125 to perform the match. + + # Assume the "*" in the wildcard needs to be replaced by one or more + # characters, although RFC 6125 is not clear about that. + [[ $len_servername -lt $len_certname ]] && return 1 + + is_wildcard "$certname" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1 + + # Comparisons of DNS names are case insensitive, so convert both names to uppercase. + certname="$(toupper "$certname")" + servername="$(toupper "$servername")" + + # Extract part of name that comes after the "*" + basename="$(echo -n "$certname" | sed 's/^[_A-Z0-9\-]*\*//')" + len_basename=${#basename} + len_part1=$len_certname-$len_basename-1 + len_wildcard=$len_servername-$len_certname+1 + basename_offset=$len_servername-$len_basename + + # Check that initial part of $servername matches initial part of $certname + # and that final part of $servername matches final part of $certname. + [[ "${servername:0:len_part1}" != "${certname:0:len_part1}" ]] && return 1 + [[ "${servername:basename_offset:len_basename}" != "$basename" ]] && return 1 + + # Check that part of $servername that matches "*" is all part of a single + # domain label. + [[ -n $(echo -n "${servername:len_part1:len_wildcard}" | sed 's/^[_A-Z0-9\-]*//') ]] && return 1 + + return 0 +} + +# Compare the server name provided in arg1 to the CN and SAN in arg2 and return: +# 0, if server name provided does not match any of the names in the CN or SAN +# 1, if the server name provided matches a name in the SAN +# 2, if the server name provided is a wildcard match against a name in the SAN +# 4, if the server name provided matches the CN +# 5, if the server name provided matches the CN AND a name in the SAN +# 6, if the server name provided matches the CN AND is a wildcard match against a name in the SAN +# 8, if the server name provided is a wildcard match against the CN +# 9, if the server name provided matches a name in the SAN AND is a wildcard match against the CN +# 10, if the server name provided is a wildcard match against the CN AND a name in the SAN + +compare_server_name_to_cert() { + local cert="$1" + local servername cn dns_sans ip_sans san dercert tag + local srv_id="" xmppaddr="" + local -i i len len1 + local -i subret=0 # no error condition, passing results + + HAS_DNS_SANS=false + if [[ -n "$XMPP_HOST" ]]; then + # RFC 6120, Section 13.7.2.1, states that for XMPP the identity that + # should appear in the server's certificate is identity that appears + # in the the 'to' address that the client communicates in the initial + # stream header. + servername="$(toupper "$XMPP_HOST")" + else + servername="$(toupper "$NODE")" + fi + + # Check whether any of the DNS names in the certificate match the servername + dns_sans="$(get_san_dns_from_cert "$cert")" + while read san; do + if [[ -n "$san" ]]; then + HAS_DNS_SANS=true + [[ $(toupper "$san") == "$servername" ]] && subret=1 && break + fi + done <<< "$dns_sans" + + if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then + # Check whether any of the IP addresses in the certificate match the servername + ip_sans=$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$cert" -noout -text 2>>$ERRFILE | grep -A2 "Subject Alternative Name" | \ + tr ',' '\n' | grep "IP Address:" | sed -e 's/IP Address://g' -e 's/ //g') + while read san; do + [[ -n "$san" ]] && [[ "$san" == "$servername" ]] && subret=1 && break + done <<< "$ip_sans" + fi + + if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]] && [[ -n "$XMPP_HOST" ]]; then + # For XMPP hosts, in addition to checking for a matching DNS name, + # should also check for a matching SRV-ID or XmppAddr identifier. + dercert="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$cert" -outform DER 2>>$ERRFILE | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')" + # Look for the beginning of the subjectAltName extension. It + # will begin with the OID (2.5.29.17 = 0603551D11). After the OID + # there may be an indication that the extension is critical (0101FF). + # Finally will be the tag indicating that the value of the extension is + # encoded as an OCTET STRING (04). + if [[ "$dercert" =~ 0603551D110101FF04 ]]; then + dercert="${dercert##*0603551D110101FF04}" + else + dercert="${dercert##*0603551D1104}" + fi + # Skip over the encoding of the length of the OCTET STRING. + if [[ "${dercert:0:1}" == "8" ]]; then + i="${dercert:1:1}" + i=2*$i+2 + dercert="${dercert:i}" + else + dercert="${dercert:2}" + fi + # Next byte should be a 30 (SEQUENCE). + if [[ "${dercert:0:2}" == "30" ]]; then + # Get the length of the subjectAltName extension and then skip + # over the encoding of the length. + if [[ "${dercert:2:1}" == "8" ]]; then + case "${dercert:3:1}" in + 1) len=2*0x${dercert:4:2}; dercert="${dercert:6}" ;; + 2) len=2*0x${dercert:4:4}; dercert="${dercert:8}" ;; + 3) len=2*0x${dercert:4:6}; dercert="${dercert:10}" ;; + *) len=0 ;; + esac + else + len=2*0x${dercert:2:2} + dercert="${dercert:4}" + fi + if [[ $len -ne 0 ]] && [[ $len -lt ${#dercert} ]]; then + # loop through all the names and extract the SRV-ID and XmppAddr identifiers + for (( i=0; i < len; i=i+len_name )); do + tag="${dercert:i:2}" + i+=2 + if [[ "${dercert:i:1}" == "8" ]]; then + i+=1 + case "${dercert:i:1}" in + 1) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:2}; i+=2 ;; + 2) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:4}; i+=4 ;; + 3) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:6}; i+=4 ;; + *) len=0 ;; + esac + else + len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:2} + i+=2 + fi + if [[ "$tag" == "A0" ]]; then + # This is an otherName. + if [[ $len_name -gt 18 ]] && ( [[ "${dercert:i:20}" == "06082B06010505070805" ]] || \ + [[ "${dercert:i:20}" == "06082B06010505070807" ]] ); then + # According to the OID, this is either an SRV-ID or XmppAddr. + j=$i+20 + if [[ "${dercert:j:2}" == "A0" ]]; then + j+=2 + if [[ "${dercert:j:1}" == "8" ]]; then + j+=1 + j+=2*0x${dercert:j:1}+1 + else + j+=2 + fi + if ( [[ "${dercert:i:20}" == "06082B06010505070805" ]] && [[ "${dercert:j:2}" == "0C" ]] ) || \ + ( [[ "${dercert:i:20}" == "06082B06010505070807" ]] && [[ "${dercert:j:2}" == "16" ]] ); then + # XmppAddr should be encoded as UTF8STRING (0C) and + # SRV-ID should be encoded IA5STRING (16). + j+=2 + if [[ "${dercert:j:1}" == "8" ]]; then + j+=1 + case "${dercert:j:1}" in + 1) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2}; j+=2 ;; + 2) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:4}; j+=4 ;; + 3) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:6}; j+=6 ;; + 4) len1=0 ;; + esac + else + len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2} + j+=2 + fi + if [[ $len1 -ne 0 ]]; then + san="$(asciihex_to_binary "${dercert:j:len1}")" + if [[ "${dercert:i:20}" == "06082B06010505070805" ]]; then + xmppaddr+="$san " + else + srv_id+="$san " + fi + fi + fi + fi + fi + fi + done + fi + fi + [[ -n "$srv_id" ]] && HAS_DNS_SANS=true + [[ -n "$xmppaddr" ]] && HAS_DNS_SANS=true + while read -d " " san; do + [[ -n "$san" ]] && [[ $(toupper "$san") == "_XMPP-SERVER.$servername" ]] && subret=1 && break + done <<< "$srv_id" + if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then + while read -d " " san; do + [[ -n "$san" ]] && [[ $(toupper "$san") == "$servername" ]] && subret=1 && break + done <<< "$xmppaddr" + fi + fi + + # Check whether any of the DNS names in the certificate are wildcard names + # that match the servername + if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then + while read san; do + [[ -n "$san" ]] || continue + wildcard_match "$servername" "$san" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && subret=2 && break + done <<< "$dns_sans" + fi + + cn="$(get_cn_from_cert "$cert")" + + # If the CN contains any characters that are not valid for a DNS name, + # then assume it does not contain a DNS name. + [[ -n $(sed 's/^[_\.a-zA-Z0-9*\-]*//' <<< "$cn") ]] && return $subret + + # Check whether the CN in the certificate matches the servername + [[ $(toupper "$cn") == "$servername" ]] && subret+=4 && return $subret + + # Check whether the CN in the certificate is a wildcard name that matches + # the servername + wildcard_match "$servername" "$cn" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && subret+=8 + return $subret +} + +# This function determines whether the certificate (arg3) contains "visibility +# information" (see Section 4.3.3 of +# https://www.etsi.org/deliver/etsi_ts/103500_103599/10352303/01.01.01_60/ts_10352303v010101p.pdf . +etsi_etls_visibility_info() { + local jsonID="$1" + local spaces="$2" + local cert="$3" + local cert_txt="$4" + local dercert tag + local -a fingerprint=() access_description=() + local -i i j len len1 len_name nr_visnames=0 + + # If "visibility information" is present, it will appear in the subjectAltName + # extension (0603551D11) as an otherName with OID 0.4.0.3523.3.1 (060604009B430301). + # OpenSSL displays all names of type otherName as "othername:<unsupported>". + # As certificates will rarely include a name encoded as an otherName, check the + # text version of the certificate for "othername:<unsupported>" before calling + # external functions to obtain the DER encoded certificate. + if [[ "$cert_txt" =~ X509v3\ Subject\ Alternative\ Name:.*othername:\<unsupported\> ]]; then + dercert="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$cert" -outform DER 2>>$ERRFILE | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')" + if [[ "$dercert" =~ 0603551D110101FF04[0-9A-F]*060604009B430301 ]] || \ + [[ "$dercert" =~ 0603551D1104[0-9A-F]*060604009B430301 ]]; then + # Look for the beginning of the subjectAltName extension. It + # will begin with the OID (2.5.29.17 = 0603551D11). After the OID + # there may be an indication that the extension is critical (0101FF). + # Finally will be the tag indicating that the value of the extension is + # encoded as an OCTET STRING (04). + if [[ "$dercert" =~ 0603551D110101FF04 ]]; then + dercert="${dercert##*0603551D110101FF04}" + else + dercert="${dercert##*0603551D1104}" + fi + # Skip over the encoding of the length of the OCTET STRING. + if [[ "${dercert:0:1}" == 8 ]]; then + i="${dercert:1:1}" + i=2*$i+2 + dercert="${dercert:i}" + else + dercert="${dercert:2}" + fi + # Next byte should be a 30 (SEQUENCE). + if [[ "${dercert:0:2}" == 30 ]]; then + # Get the length of the subjectAltName extension and then skip + # over the encoding of the length. + if [[ "${dercert:2:1}" == 8 ]]; then + case "${dercert:3:1}" in + 1) len=2*0x${dercert:4:2}; dercert="${dercert:6}" ;; + 2) len=2*0x${dercert:4:4}; dercert="${dercert:8}" ;; + 3) len=2*0x${dercert:4:6}; dercert="${dercert:10}" ;; + *) len=0 ;; + esac + else + len=2*0x${dercert:2:2} + dercert="${dercert:4}" + fi + if [[ $len -ne 0 ]] && [[ $len -lt ${#dercert} ]]; then + # loop through all the names and extract the visibility information + for (( i=0; i < len; i=i+len_name )); do + tag="${dercert:i:2}" + i+=2 + if [[ "${dercert:i:1}" == 8 ]]; then + i+=1 + case "${dercert:i:1}" in + 1) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:2}; i+=2 ;; + 2) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:4}; i+=4 ;; + 3) i+=1; len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:6}; i+=4 ;; + *) len=0 ;; + esac + else + len_name=2*0x${dercert:i:2} + i+=2 + fi + [[ "$tag" == A0 ]] || continue + # This is an otherName. + [[ $len_name -gt 16 ]] || continue + [[ "${dercert:i:16}" == 060604009B430301 ]] || continue + # According to the OID, this is visibility information. + j=$i+16 + # Skip over the tag (A0) and length for the otherName value. + [[ "${dercert:j:2}" == A0 ]] || continue + j+=2 + if [[ "${dercert:j:1}" == 8 ]]; then + j+=1 + j+=2*0x${dercert:j:1}+1 + else + j+=2 + fi + # The value for this otherName is encoded as a SEQUENCE (30): + # VisibilityInformation ::= SEQUENCE { + # fingerprint OCTET STRING (SIZE(10)), + # accessDescription UTF8String } + [[ "${dercert:j:2}" == 30 ]] || continue + j+=2 + if [[ "${dercert:j:1}" == 8 ]]; then + j+=1 + case "${dercert:j:1}" in + 1) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2}; j+=2 ;; + 2) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:4}; j+=4 ;; + 3) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:6}; j+=6 ;; + 4) len1=0 ;; + esac + else + len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2} + j+=2 + fi + [[ $len1 -ne 0 ]] || continue + # Next is the 10-byte fingerprint, encoded as an OCTET STRING (04) + [[ "${dercert:j:4}" == 040A ]] || continue + j+=4 + fingerprint[nr_visnames]="$(asciihex_to_binary "${dercert:j:20}")" + j+=20 + # Finally comes the access description, encoded as a UTF8String (0C). + [[ "${dercert:j:2}" == 0C ]] || continue + j+=2 + if [[ "${dercert:j:1}" == "8" ]]; then + j+=1 + case "${dercert:j:1}" in + 1) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2}; j+=2 ;; + 2) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:4}; j+=4 ;; + 3) j+=1; len1=2*0x${dercert:j:6}; j+=6 ;; + 4) len1=0 ;; + esac + else + len1=2*0x${dercert:j:2} + j+=2 + fi + access_description[nr_visnames]=""$(asciihex_to_binary "${dercert:j:len1}")"" + nr_visnames+=1 + done + fi + fi + fi + fi + if [[ $nr_visnames -eq 0 ]]; then + outln "not present" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not present" + else + for (( i=0; i < nr_visnames; i++ )); do + [[ $i -ne 0 ]] && out "$spaces" + outln "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "${fingerprint[i]} / ${access_description[i]}" "$spaces" $TERM_WIDTH)" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "${fingerprint[i]} / ${access_description[i]}" + done + fi + return 0 +} + +# NOTE: arg3 must contain the text output of $HOSTCERT. +must_staple() { + local jsonID="cert_mustStapleExtension" + local json_postfix="$1" + local provides_stapling="$2" + local hostcert_txt="$3" + local cert extn + local -i extn_len + local supported=false + + # Note this function is only looking for status_request (5) and not + # status_request_v2 (17), since OpenSSL seems to only include status_request (5) + # in its ClientHello when the "-status" option is used. + + # OpenSSL 1.1.0 supports pretty-printing the "TLS Feature extension." For any + # previous versions of OpenSSL, OpenSSL can only show if the extension OID is present. + if grep -A 1 "TLS Feature:" <<< "$hostcert_txt" | grep -q "status_request"; then + # FIXME: This will indicate that must staple is supported if the + # certificate indicates status_request or status_request_v2. This is + # probably okay, since it seems likely that any TLS Feature extension + # that includes status_request_v2 will also include status_request. + supported=true + elif [[ "$hostcert_txt" =~ '1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1.24:' ]]; then + cert="$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$HOSTCERT" -outform DER 2>>$ERRFILE | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')" + extn="${cert##*06082B06010505070118}" + # Check for critical bit, and skip over it if present. + [[ "${extn:0:6}" == "0101FF" ]] && extn="${extn:6}" + # Next is tag and length of extnValue OCTET STRING. Assume it is less than 128 bytes. + extn="${extn:4}" + # The TLS Feature is a SEQUENCE of INTEGER. Get the length of the SEQUENCE + extn_len=2*$(hex2dec "${extn:2:2}") + # If the extension include the status_request (5), then it supports must staple. + if [[ "${extn:4:extn_len}" =~ 020105 ]]; then + supported=true + fi + fi + + if "$supported"; then + if "$provides_stapling"; then + prln_svrty_good "supported" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "supported" + else + prln_svrty_high "requires OCSP stapling (NOT ok)" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "extension detected but no OCSP stapling provided" + fi + else + outln "--" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "--" + fi + return 0 +} + +# TODO: This function checks for Certificate Transparency support based on RFC 6962. +# It will need to be updated to add checks for Certificate Transparency support based on 6962bis. +# return values are results, no error conditions +certificate_transparency() { + local cert_txt="$1" + local ocsp_response="$2" + local -i number_of_certificates=$3 + local cipher="$4" + local sni_used="$5" + local tls_version="$6" + local sni="" + local ciphers="" + local hexc n ciph sslver kx auth enc mac export + local extra_extns="" + local -i success + # Cipher suites that use a certificate with an RSA (signature) public key + local -r a_rsa="cc,13, cc,15, c0,30, c0,28, c0,14, 00,9f, cc,a8, cc,aa, c0,a3, c0,9f, 00,6b, 00,39, c0,77, 00,c4, 00,88, c0,45, c0,4d, c0,53, c0,61, c0,7d, c0,8b, 16,b7, 16,b9, c0,2f, c0,27, c0,13, 00,9e, c0,a2, c0,9e, 00,67, 00,33, c0,76, 00,be, 00,9a, 00,45, c0,44, c0,4c, c0,52, c0,60, c0,7c, c0,8a, c0,11, c0,12, 00,16, 00,15, 00,14, c0,10" + # Cipher suites that use a certificate with an RSA (encryption) public key + local -r e_rsa="00,b7, c0,99, 00,ad, cc,ae, 00,9d, c0,a1, c0,9d, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,c0, 00,84, 00,95, c0,3d, c0,51, c0,69, c0,6f, c0,7b, c0,93, ff,01, 00,ac, c0,a0, c0,9c, 00,9c, 00,3c, 00,2f, 00,ba, 00,b6, 00,96, 00,41, c0,98, 00,07, 00,94, c0,3c, c0,50, c0,68, c0,6e, c0,7a, c0,92, 00,05, 00,04, 00,92, 00,0a, 00,93, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,62, 00,09, 00,61, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,64, 00,60, 00,08, 00,06, 00,03, 00,b9, 00,b8, 00,2e, 00,3b, 00,02, 00,01, ff,00" + # Cipher suites that use a certificate with a DSA public key + local -r a_dss="00,a3, 00,6a, 00,38, 00,c3, 00,87, c0,43, c0,57, c0,81, 00,a2, 00,40, 00,32, 00,bd, 00,99, 00,44, c0,42, c0,56, c0,80, 00,66, 00,13, 00,63, 00,12, 00,65, 00,11" + # Cipher suites that use a certificate with a DH public key + local -r a_dh="00,a5, 00,a1, 00,69, 00,68, 00,37, 00,36, 00,c2, 00,c1, 00,86, 00,85, c0,3f, c0,41, c0,55, c0,59, c0,7f, c0,83, 00,a4, 00,a0, 00,3f, 00,3e, 00,31, 00,30, 00,bc, 00,bb, 00,98, 00,97, 00,43, 00,42, c0,3e, c0,40, c0,54, c0,58, c0,7e, c0,82, 00,10, 00,0d, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,0b, 00,0e" + # Cipher suites that use a certificate with an ECDH public key + local -r a_ecdh="c0,32, c0,2e, c0,2a, c0,26, c0,0f, c0,05, c0,79, c0,75, c0,4b, c0,4f, c0,5f, c0,63, c0,89, c0,8d, c0,31, c0,2d, c0,29, c0,25, c0,0e, c0,04, c0,78, c0,74, c0,4a, c0,4e, c0,5e, c0,62, c0,88, c0,8c, c0,0c, c0,02, c0,0d, c0,03, c0,0b, c0,01" + # Cipher suites that use a certificate with an ECDSA public key + local -r a_ecdsa="cc,14, c0,2c, c0,24, c0,0a, cc,a9, c0,af, c0,ad, c0,73, c0,49, c0,5d, c0,87, 16,b8, 16,ba, c0,2b, c0,23, c0,09, c0,ae, c0,ac, c0,72, c0,48, c0,5c, c0,86, c0,07, c0,08, c0,06" + # Cipher suites that use a certificate with a GOST public key + local -r a_gost="00,80, 00,81, 00,82, 00,83" + + # First check whether signed certificate timestamps (SCT) are included in the + # server's certificate. If they aren't, check whether the server provided + # a stapled OCSP response with SCTs. If no SCTs were found in the certificate + # or OCSP response, check for an SCT TLS extension. + if [[ "$cert_txt" =~ CT\ Precertificate\ SCTs ]] || [[ "$cert_txt" =~ '1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.2' ]]; then + tm_out "certificate extension" + return 0 + fi + if [[ "$ocsp_response" =~ CT\ Certificate\ SCTs ]] || [[ "$ocsp_response" =~ '1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.4.5' ]]; then + tm_out "OCSP extension" + return 0 + fi + + # If the server only has one certificate, then it is sufficient to check whether + # determine_tls_extensions() discovered an SCT TLS extension. If the server has more than + # one certificate, then it is possible that an SCT TLS extension is returned for some + # certificates, but not for all of them. + if [[ $number_of_certificates -eq 1 ]] && [[ "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" =~ signed\ certificate\ timestamps ]]; then + tm_out "TLS extension" + return 0 + fi + + if [[ $number_of_certificates -gt 1 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE"; then + if [[ "$tls_version" == 0304 ]]; then + ciphers=", 13,01, 13,02, 13,03, 13,04, 13,05" + if [[ "$cipher" == tls1_3_RSA ]]; then + extra_extns=", 00,0d,00,10,00,0e,08,04,08,05,08,06,04,01,05,01,06,01,02,01" + elif [[ "$cipher" == tls1_3_ECDSA ]]; then + extra_extns=", 00,0d,00,0a,00,08,04,03,05,03,06,03,02,03" + else + return 1 + fi + else + [[ "$cipher" =~ aRSA ]] && ciphers+=", $a_rsa" + [[ "$cipher" =~ eRSA ]] && ciphers+=", $e_rsa" + [[ "$cipher" =~ aDSS ]] && ciphers+=", $a_dss" + [[ "$cipher" =~ aDH ]] && ciphers+=", $a_dh" + [[ "$cipher" =~ aECDH ]] && ciphers+=", $a_ecdh" + [[ "$cipher" =~ aECDSA ]] && ciphers+=", $a_ecdsa" + [[ "$cipher" =~ aGOST ]] && ciphers+=", $a_gost" + + [[ -z "$ciphers" ]] && return 1 + ciphers+=", 00,ff" + fi + [[ -z "$sni_used" ]] && sni="$SNI" && SNI="" + tls_sockets "${tls_version:2:2}" "${ciphers:2}" "all" "00,12,00,00$extra_extns" + success=$? + [[ -z "$sni_used" ]] && SNI="$sni" + if ( [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $success -eq 2 ]] ) && \ + grep -a 'TLS server extension ' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" | \ + grep -aq "signed certificate timestamps"; then + tm_out "TLS extension" + return 0 + fi + fi + + if [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] && ! "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then + # At the moment Certificate Transparency only applies to HTTPS. + tm_out "N/A" + else + tm_out "--" + fi + return 0 +} + +certificate_info() { + local proto + local -i certificate_number=$1 + local -i number_of_certificates=$2 + local cert_txt="$3" + local cipher=$4 + local cert_keysize=$5 + local cert_type="$6" + local ocsp_response_binary="$7" + local ocsp_response=$8 + local ocsp_response_status=$9 + local sni_used="${10}" + local ct="${11}" + local certificate_list_ordering_problem="${12}" + local cert_sig_algo cert_sig_hash_algo cert_key_algo cert_keyusage cert_ext_keyusage short_keyAlgo + local outok=true + local expire days2expire secs2warn ocsp_uri crl + local startdate enddate issuer_CN issuer_C issuer_O issuer sans san all_san="" cn + local issuer_DC issuerfinding cn_nosni="" + local cert_fingerprint_sha1 cert_fingerprint_sha2 cert_serial + local policy_oid + local spaces="" + local -i trust_sni=0 trust_nosni=0 diffseconds=0 + local has_dns_sans has_dns_sans_nosni + local trust_sni_finding + local -i certificates_provided + local cnfinding trustfinding trustfinding_nosni + local cnok="OK" + local expfinding expok="OK" + local -i ret=0 + local json_postfix="" # string to place at the end of JSON IDs when there is more than one certificate + local jsonID="" # string to place at beginning of JSON IDs + local indent="" + local days2warn2=$DAYS2WARN2 + local days2warn1=$DAYS2WARN1 + local provides_stapling=false + local caa_node="" all_caa="" caa_property_name="" caa_property_value="" + local response="" + local yearstart yearend clockstart clockend y m d + local gt_825=false gt_825warn=false + + if [[ $number_of_certificates -gt 1 ]]; then + [[ $certificate_number -eq 1 ]] && outln + indent=" " + out "$indent" + pr_headline "Server Certificate #$certificate_number" + [[ -z "$sni_used" ]] && pr_underline " (in response to request w/o SNI)" + outln + json_postfix=" <cert#${certificate_number}>" + spaces=" " + else + spaces=" " + fi + + GOOD_CA_BUNDLE="" + cert_sig_algo="$(awk -F':' '/Signature Algorithm/ { print $2; if (++Match >= 1) exit; }' <<< "$cert_txt")" + cert_sig_algo="${cert_sig_algo// /}" + cert_key_algo="$(awk -F':' '/Public Key Algorithm:/ { print $2; if (++Match >= 1) exit; }' <<< "$cert_txt")" + cert_key_algo="${cert_key_algo// /}" + + out "$indent" ; pr_bold " Signature Algorithm " + jsonID="cert_signatureAlgorithm" + case $cert_sig_algo in + sha1WithRSAEncryption) + pr_svrty_medium "SHA1 with RSA" + if [[ "$SERVICE" == HTTP ]] || "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then + out " -- besides: users will receive a "; pr_svrty_high "strong browser WARNING" + fi + outln + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "SHA1 with RSA" + ;; + sha224WithRSAEncryption) + outln "SHA224 with RSA" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "SHA224 with RSA" + ;; + sha256WithRSAEncryption) + prln_svrty_good "SHA256 with RSA" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "SHA256 with RSA" + ;; + sha384WithRSAEncryption) + prln_svrty_good "SHA384 with RSA" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "SHA384 with RSA" + ;; + sha512WithRSAEncryption) + prln_svrty_good "SHA512 with RSA" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "SHA512 with RSA" + ;; + ecdsa-with-SHA1) + prln_svrty_medium "ECDSA with SHA1" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "ECDSA with SHA1" + ;; + ecdsa-with-SHA224) + outln "ECDSA with SHA224" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "ECDSA with SHA224" + ;; + ecdsa-with-SHA256) + prln_svrty_good "ECDSA with SHA256" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "ECDSA with SHA256" + ;; + ecdsa-with-SHA384) + prln_svrty_good "ECDSA with SHA384" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "ECDSA with SHA384" + ;; + ecdsa-with-SHA512) + prln_svrty_good "ECDSA with SHA512" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "ECDSA with SHA512" + ;; + dsaWithSHA1) + prln_svrty_medium "DSA with SHA1" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "DSA with SHA1" + ;; + dsa_with_SHA224) + outln "DSA with SHA224" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "DSA with SHA224" + ;; + dsa_with_SHA256) + prln_svrty_good "DSA with SHA256" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "DSA with SHA256" + ;; + rsassaPss) + cert_sig_hash_algo="$(grep -A 1 "Signature Algorithm" <<< "$cert_txt" | head -2 | tail -1 | sed 's/^.*Hash Algorithm: //')" + case $cert_sig_hash_algo in + sha1) + prln_svrty_medium "RSASSA-PSS with SHA1" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "RSASSA-PSS with SHA1" + ;; + sha224) + outln "RSASSA-PSS with SHA224" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "RSASSA-PSS with SHA224" + ;; + sha256) + prln_svrty_good "RSASSA-PSS with SHA256" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "RSASSA-PSS with SHA256" + ;; + sha384) + prln_svrty_good "RSASSA-PSS with SHA384" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "RSASSA-PSS with SHA384" + ;; + sha512) + prln_svrty_good "RSASSA-PSS with SHA512" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "RSASSA-PSS with SHA512" + ;; + *) + out "RSASSA-PSS with $cert_sig_hash_algo" + prln_warning " (Unknown hash algorithm)" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "DEBUG" "RSASSA-PSS with $cert_sig_hash_algo" + esac + ;; + md2*) + prln_svrty_critical "MD2" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "MD2" + ;; + md4*) + prln_svrty_critical "MD4" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "MD4" + ;; + md5*) + prln_svrty_critical "MD5" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "MD5" + ;; + *) + out "$cert_sig_algo (" + pr_warning "FIXME: can't tell whether this is good or not" + outln ")" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "DEBUG" "$cert_sig_algo" + ((ret++)) + ;; + esac + # old, but still interesting: https://blog.hboeck.de/archives/754-Playing-with-the-EFF-SSL-Observatory.html + + out "$indent"; pr_bold " Server key size " + jsonID="cert_keySize" + if [[ -z "$cert_keysize" ]]; then + outln "(couldn't determine)" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "cannot be determined" + ((ret++)) + else + case $cert_key_algo in + *RSA*|*rsa*) short_keyAlgo="RSA";; + *ecdsa*|*ecPublicKey) short_keyAlgo="EC";; + *DSA*|*dsa*) short_keyAlgo="DSA";; + *GOST*|*gost*) short_keyAlgo="GOST";; + *dh*|*DH*) short_keyAlgo="DH" ;; + *) pr_fixme "don't know $cert_key_algo " + let ret++ ;; + esac + out "$short_keyAlgo " + # https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4492, https://www.keylength.com/en/compare/ + # https://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/164526/files/NPDF-22.pdf + # see https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-57-part-1/rev-4/final + # Table 2 @ chapter 5.6.1 (~ p66) + if [[ $cert_key_algo =~ ecdsa ]] || [[ $cert_key_algo =~ ecPublicKey ]]; then + if [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 110 ]]; then # a guess + pr_svrty_critical "$cert_keysize" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits" + elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 123 ]]; then # a guess + pr_svrty_high "$cert_keysize" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits" + elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 163 ]]; then + pr_svrty_medium "$cert_keysize" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits" + elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 224 ]]; then + out "$cert_keysize" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits" + elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 533 ]]; then + pr_svrty_good "$cert_keysize" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits" + else + out "keysize: $cert_keysize (not expected, FIXME)" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "DEBUG" " $cert_keysize bits (not expected)" + ((ret++)) + fi + outln " bits" + elif [[ $cert_key_algo =~ RSA ]] || [[ $cert_key_algo =~ rsa ]] || [[ $cert_key_algo =~ dsa ]] || \ + [[ $cert_key_algo =~ dhKeyAgreement ]] || [[ $cert_key_algo == X9.42\ DH ]]; then + if [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 512 ]]; then + pr_svrty_critical "$cert_keysize" + outln " bits" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits" + elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 768 ]]; then + pr_svrty_high "$cert_keysize" + outln " bits" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits" + elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 1024 ]]; then + pr_svrty_medium "$cert_keysize" + outln " bits" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits" + elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 2048 ]]; then + outln "$cert_keysize bits" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits" + elif [[ "$cert_keysize" -le 4096 ]]; then + pr_svrty_good "$cert_keysize" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "$short_keyAlgo $cert_keysize bits" + outln " bits" + else + pr_warning "weird key size: $cert_keysize bits"; outln " (could cause compatibility problems)" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "WARN" "$cert_keysize bits (Odd)" + ((ret++)) + fi + else + out "$cert_key_algo + $cert_keysize bits (" + pr_warning "FIXME: can't tell whether this is good or not" + outln ")" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "WARN" "Server keys $cert_keysize bits, unknown public key algorithm $cert_key_algo" + ((ret++)) + fi + fi + + out "$indent"; pr_bold " Server key usage "; + outok=true + jsonID="cert_keyUsage" + cert_keyusage="$(strip_leading_space "$(awk '/X509v3 Key Usage:/ { getline; print $0 }' <<< "$cert_txt")")" + if [[ -n "$cert_keyusage" ]]; then + outln "$cert_keyusage" + if ( [[ " $cert_type " =~ " RSASig " ]] || [[ " $cert_type " =~ " DSA " ]] || [[ " $cert_type " =~ " ECDSA " ]] ) && \ + [[ ! "$cert_keyusage" =~ "Digital Signature" ]]; then + prln_svrty_high "$indent Certificate incorrectly used for digital signatures" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Certificate incorrectly used for digital signatures: \"$cert_keyusage\"" + outok=false + fi + if [[ " $cert_type " =~ " RSAKMK " ]] && [[ ! "$cert_keyusage" =~ "Key Encipherment" ]]; then + prln_svrty_high "$indent Certificate incorrectly used for key encipherment" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Certificate incorrectly used for key encipherment: \"$cert_keyusage\"" + outok=false + fi + if ( [[ " $cert_type " =~ " DH " ]] || [[ " $cert_type " =~ " ECDH " ]] ) && \ + [[ ! "$cert_keyusage" =~ "Key Agreement" ]]; then + prln_svrty_high "$indent Certificate incorrectly used for key agreement" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Certificate incorrectly used for key agreement: \"$cert_keyusage\"" + outok=false + fi + else + outln "--" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "No server key usage information" + outok=false + fi + if "$outok"; then + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$cert_keyusage" + fi + + out "$indent"; pr_bold " Server extended key usage "; + jsonID="cert_extKeyUsage" + outok=true + cert_ext_keyusage="$(strip_leading_space "$(awk '/X509v3 Extended Key Usage:/ { getline; print $0 }' <<< "$cert_txt")")" + if [[ -n "$cert_ext_keyusage" ]]; then + outln "$cert_ext_keyusage" + if [[ ! "$cert_ext_keyusage" =~ "TLS Web Server Authentication" ]] && [[ ! "$cert_ext_keyusage" =~ "Any Extended Key Usage" ]]; then + prln_svrty_high "$indent Certificate incorrectly used for TLS Web Server Authentication" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Certificate incorrectly used for TLS Web Server Authentication: \"$cert_ext_keyusage\"" + outok=false + fi + else + outln "--" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "No server extended key usage information" + outok=false + fi + if "$outok"; then + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$cert_ext_keyusage" + fi + + out "$indent"; pr_bold " Serial / Fingerprints " + cert_serial="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -in $HOSTCERT -serial 2>>$ERRFILE | sed 's/serial=//')" + fileout "cert_serialNumber${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$cert_serial" + + cert_fingerprint_sha1="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -in $HOSTCERT -fingerprint -sha1 2>>$ERRFILE | sed 's/Fingerprint=//' | sed 's/://g')" + fileout "cert_fingerprintSHA1${json_postfix}" "INFO" "${cert_fingerprint_sha1//SHA1 /}" + outln "$cert_serial / $cert_fingerprint_sha1" + + cert_fingerprint_sha2="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -in $HOSTCERT -fingerprint -sha256 2>>$ERRFILE | sed 's/Fingerprint=//' | sed 's/://g' )" + fileout "cert_fingerprintSHA256${json_postfix}" "INFO" "${cert_fingerprint_sha2//SHA256 /}" + outln "$spaces$cert_fingerprint_sha2" + + # " " needs to be converted back to lf in JSON/CSV output + fileout "cert${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$(< $HOSTCERT)" + + [[ -z $CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2 ]] && \ + CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2="$cert_fingerprint_sha2" || + CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2="$cert_fingerprint_sha2 $CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2" + [[ -z $RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2 ]] && \ + ( [[ $cert_key_algo = *RSA* ]] || [[ $cert_key_algo = *rsa* ]] ) && + RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2="$cert_fingerprint_sha2" + + out "$indent"; pr_bold " Common Name (CN) " + cnfinding="Common Name (CN) : " + cn="$(get_cn_from_cert $HOSTCERT)" + if [[ -n "$cn" ]]; then + pr_italic "$cn" + cnfinding="$cn" + else + cn="no CN field in subject" + out "($cn)" + cnfinding="$cn" + cnok="INFO" + fi + fileout "cert_commonName${json_postfix}" "$cnok" "$cnfinding" + cnfinding="" + + if [[ -n "$sni_used" ]]; then + if grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN" "$HOSTCERT.nosni"; then + cn_nosni="$(get_cn_from_cert "$HOSTCERT.nosni")" + [[ -z "$cn_nosni" ]] && cn_nosni="no CN field in subject" + fi + debugme tm_out "\"$NODE\" | \"$cn\" | \"$cn_nosni\"" + else + debugme tm_out "\"$NODE\" | \"$cn\"" + fi + + if [[ -z "$sni_used" ]] || [[ "$(toupper "$cn_nosni")" == "$(toupper "$cn")" ]]; then + outln + cnfinding="$cn" + elif [[ -z "$cn_nosni" ]]; then + out " (request w/o SNI didn't succeed"; + cnfinding+="request w/o SNI didn't succeed" + if [[ $cert_sig_algo =~ ecdsa ]]; then + out ", usual for EC certificates" + cnfinding+=", usual for EC certificates" + fi + outln ")" + cnfinding+="" + elif [[ "$cn_nosni" == *"no CN field"* ]]; then + outln ", (request w/o SNI: $cn_nosni)" + cnfinding="$cn_nosni" + else + out " (CN in response to request w/o SNI: "; pr_italic "$cn_nosni"; outln ")" + cnfinding="$cn_nosni" + fi + fileout "cert_commonName_wo_SNI${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$cnfinding" + + sans=$(grep -A2 "Subject Alternative Name" <<< "$cert_txt" | \ + grep -E "DNS:|IP Address:|email:|URI:|DirName:|Registered ID:" | tr ',' '\n' | \ + sed -e 's/ *DNS://g' -e 's/ *IP Address://g' -e 's/ *email://g' -e 's/ *URI://g' -e 's/ *DirName://g' \ + -e 's/ *Registered ID://g' \ + -e 's/ *othername:<unsupported>//g' -e 's/ *X400Name:<unsupported>//g' -e 's/ *EdiPartyName:<unsupported>//g') + # ^^^ CACert + + out "$indent"; pr_bold " subjectAltName (SAN) " + jsonID="cert_subjectAltName" + if [[ -n "$sans" ]]; then + while read san; do + [[ -n "$san" ]] && all_san+="$san " + done <<< "$sans" + prln_italic "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$all_san" "$indent " $TERM_WIDTH)" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$all_san" + else + if [[ $SERVICE == "HTTP" ]] || "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then + pr_svrty_high "missing (NOT ok)"; outln " -- Browsers are complaining" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "No SAN, browsers are complaining" + else + pr_svrty_medium "missing"; outln " -- no SAN is deprecated" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "Providing no SAN is deprecated" + fi + fi + + out "$indent"; pr_bold " Issuer " + jsonID="cert_caIssuers" + #FIXME: oid would be better maybe (see above) + issuer="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -noout -issuer -nameopt multiline,-align,sname,-esc_msb,utf8,-space_eq 2>>$ERRFILE)" + issuer_CN="$(awk -F'=' '/CN=/ { print $2 }' <<< "$issuer")" + issuer_O="$(awk -F'=' '/O=/ { print $2 }' <<< "$issuer")" + issuer_C="$(awk -F'=' '/ C=/ { print $2 }' <<< "$issuer")" + issuer_DC="$(awk -F'=' '/DC=/ { print $2 }' <<< "$issuer")" + + if [[ "$issuer_O" == "issuer=" ]] || [[ "$issuer_O" == "issuer= " ]] || [[ "$issuer_CN" == "$cn" ]]; then + prln_svrty_critical "self-signed (NOT ok)" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "selfsigned" + else + issuerfinding="$issuer_CN" + pr_italic "$issuer_CN" + if [[ -z "$issuer_O" ]] && [[ -n "$issuer_DC" ]]; then + for san in $issuer_DC; do + if [[ -z "$issuer_O" ]]; then + issuer_O="${san}" + else + issuer_O="${san}.${issuer_O}" + fi + done + fi + if [[ -n "$issuer_O" ]]; then + issuerfinding+=" (" + out " (" + issuerfinding+="$issuer_O" + pr_italic "$issuer_O" + if [[ -n "$issuer_C" ]]; then + issuerfinding+=" from " + out " from " + issuerfinding+="$issuer_C" + pr_italic "$issuer_C" + fi + issuerfinding+=")" + out ")" + fi + outln + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$issuerfinding" + fi + + out "$indent"; pr_bold " Trust (hostname) " + compare_server_name_to_cert "$HOSTCERT" + trust_sni=$? + + # Find out if the subjectAltName extension is present and contains + # a DNS name, since Section 6.3 of RFC 6125 says: + # Security Warning: A client MUST NOT seek a match for a reference + # identifier of CN-ID if the presented identifiers include a DNS-ID, + # SRV-ID, URI-ID, or any application-specific identifier types + # supported by the client. + has_dns_sans=$HAS_DNS_SANS + + case $trust_sni in + 0) trustfinding="certificate does not match supplied URI" ;; + 1) trustfinding="Ok via SAN" ;; + 2) trustfinding="Ok via SAN wildcard" ;; + 4) if "$has_dns_sans"; then + trustfinding="via CN, but not SAN" + else + trustfinding="via CN only" + fi + ;; + 5) trustfinding="Ok via SAN and CN" ;; + 6) trustfinding="Ok via SAN wildcard and CN" + ;; + 8) if "$has_dns_sans"; then + trustfinding="via CN wildcard, but not SAN" + else + trustfinding="via CN (wildcard) only" + fi + ;; + 9) trustfinding="Ok via CN wildcard and SAN" + ;; + 10) trustfinding="Ok via SAN wildcard and CN wildcard" + ;; + esac + + if [[ $trust_sni -eq 0 ]]; then + pr_svrty_high "$trustfinding" + trust_sni_finding="HIGH" + elif ( [[ $trust_sni -eq 4 ]] || [[ $trust_sni -eq 8 ]] ); then + if [[ $SERVICE == "HTTP" ]] || "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then + # https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=308330 + # https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1245280 + # https://www.chromestatus.com/feature/4981025180483584 + pr_svrty_high "$trustfinding"; out " -- Browsers are complaining" + trust_sni_finding="HIGH" + else + pr_svrty_medium "$trustfinding" + trust_sni_finding="MEDIUM" + # we punish CN matching for non-HTTP as it is deprecated https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2818#section-3.1 + ! "$has_dns_sans" && out " -- CN only match is deprecated" + fi + else + pr_svrty_good "$trustfinding" + trust_sni_finding="OK" + fi + + if [[ -n "$cn_nosni" ]]; then + compare_server_name_to_cert "$HOSTCERT.nosni" + trust_nosni=$? + has_dns_sans_nosni=$HAS_DNS_SANS + fi + + # See issue #733. + if [[ -z "$sni_used" ]]; then + trustfinding_nosni="" + elif ( [[ $trust_sni -eq $trust_nosni ]] && [[ "$has_dns_sans" == "$has_dns_sans_nosni" ]] ) || \ + ( [[ $trust_sni -eq 0 ]] && [[ $trust_nosni -eq 0 ]] ); then + trustfinding_nosni=" (same w/o SNI)" + elif [[ $trust_nosni -eq 0 ]]; then + if [[ $trust_sni -eq 4 ]] || [[ $trust_sni -eq 8 ]]; then + trustfinding_nosni=" (w/o SNI: certificate does not match supplied URI)" + else + trustfinding_nosni=" (SNI mandatory)" + fi + elif [[ $trust_nosni -eq 4 ]] || [[ $trust_nosni -eq 8 ]] || [[ $trust_sni -eq 4 ]] || [[ $trust_sni -eq 8 ]]; then + case $trust_nosni in + 1) trustfinding_nosni="(w/o SNI: Ok via SAN)" ;; + 2) trustfinding_nosni="(w/o SNI: Ok via SAN wildcard)" ;; + 4) if "$has_dns_sans_nosni"; then + trustfinding_nosni="(w/o SNI: via CN, but not SAN)" + else + trustfinding_nosni="(w/o SNI: via CN only)" + fi + ;; + 5) trustfinding_nosni="(w/o SNI: Ok via SAN and CN)" ;; + 6) trustfinding_nosni="(w/o SNI: Ok via SAN wildcard and CN)" ;; + 8) if "$has_dns_sans_nosni"; then + trustfinding_nosni="(w/o SNI: via CN wildcard, but not SAN)" + else + trustfinding_nosni="(w/o SNI: via CN (wildcard) only)" + fi + ;; + 9) trustfinding_nosni="(w/o SNI: Ok via CN wildcard and SAN)" ;; + 10) trustfinding_nosni="(w/o SNI: Ok via SAN wildcard and CN wildcard)" ;; + esac + elif [[ $trust_sni -ne 0 ]]; then + trustfinding_nosni=" (works w/o SNI)" + else + trustfinding_nosni=" (however, works w/o SNI)" + fi + if [[ -n "$sni_used" ]] || [[ $trust_nosni -eq 0 ]] || ( [[ $trust_nosni -ne 4 ]] && [[ $trust_nosni -ne 8 ]] ); then + outln "$trustfinding_nosni" + elif [[ $SERVICE == "HTTP" ]] || "$ASSUME_HTTP"; then + prln_svrty_high "$trustfinding_nosni" + else + prln_svrty_medium "$trustfinding_nosni" + fi + + fileout "cert_trust${json_postfix}" "$trust_sni_finding" "${trustfinding}${trustfinding_nosni}" + + out "$indent"; pr_bold " Chain of trust"; out " " + jsonID="cert_chain_of_trust" + if [[ "$issuer_O" =~ StartCom ]] || [[ "$issuer_O" =~ WoSign ]] || [[ "$issuer_CN" =~ StartCom ]] || [[ "$issuer_CN" =~ WoSign ]]; then + # Shortcut for this special case here. + pr_italic "WoSign/StartCom"; out " are " ; prln_svrty_critical "not trusted anymore (NOT ok)" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "Issuer not trusted anymore (WoSign/StartCom)" + else + # Also handles fileout, keep error if happened + determine_trust "$jsonID" "$json_postfix" || ((ret++)) + fi + + # https://events.ccc.de/congress/2010/Fahrplan/attachments/1777_is-the-SSLiverse-a-safe-place.pdf, see page 40pp + out "$indent"; pr_bold " EV cert"; out " (experimental) " + jsonID="cert_certificatePolicies_EV" + # only the first one, seldom we have two + policy_oid=$(awk '/ .Policy: / { print $2 }' <<< "$cert_txt" | awk 'NR < 2') + if grep -Eq 'Extended Validation|Extended Validated|EV SSL|EV CA' <<< "$issuer" || \ + [[ 2.16.840.1.114028.10.1.2 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \ + [[ 2.16.840.1.114412.1.3.0.2 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \ + [[ 2.16.840.1.114412.2.1 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \ + [[ 2.16.578.1.26.1.3.3 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \ + [[ 1.3.6.1.4.1.17326.10.14.2.1.2 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \ + [[ 1.3.6.1.4.1.17326.10.8.12.1.2 == "$policy_oid" ]] || \ + [[ 1.3.6.1.4.1.13177.10.1.3.10 == "$policy_oid" ]] ; then + out "yes " + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "yes" + else + out "no " + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "no" + fi + debugme echo "($(newline_to_spaces "$policy_oid"))" + outln +#TODO: check browser OIDs: +# https://mxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/security/certverifier/ExtendedValidation.cpp +# https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/chromium/+/master/net/base/ev_root_ca_metadata.cc +# https://certs.opera.com/03/ev-oids.xml +# see #967 + + out "$indent"; pr_bold " ETS/\"eTLS\"" + out ", visibility info " + jsonID="cert_eTLS" + etsi_etls_visibility_info "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "$spaces" "$HOSTCERT" "$cert_txt" + # *Currently* this is even listed as a vulnerability (CWE-310, CVE-2019-919), see + # https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9191, https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-9191 + # For now we leave this here. We may want to change that later or add infos to other sections (PFS & vulnerability) + + out "$indent"; pr_bold " Certificate Validity (UTC) " + # FreeBSD + OSX can't swallow the leading blank: + startdate="${cert_txt#*Validity*Not Before: }" + startdate="${startdate%%GMT*}GMT" + enddate="${cert_txt#*Validity*Not Before: *Not After : }" + enddate="${enddate%%GMT*}GMT" + debugme echo "$enddate - $startdate" + # Now we have a normalized enddate and startdate like "Feb 27 10:03:20 2017 GMT" -- also for OpenBSD + if "$HAS_OPENBSDDATE"; then + # Best we want to do under old versions of OpenBSD, first just remove the GMT and keep start/endate for later output + startdate="$(parse_date "$startdate" "+%s")" + enddate="$(parse_date "$enddate" "+%s")" + # Now we extract a date block and a time block which we need for later output + startdate="$(parse_date "$startdate" +"%F %H:%M" "%b %d %T %Y %Z")" + enddate="$(parse_date "$enddate" +"%F %H:%M" "%b %d %T %Y %Z")" + read yearstart clockstart <<< "$startdate" + read yearend clockend <<< "$enddate" + debugme echo "$yearstart, $clockstart" + debugme echo "$yearend, $clockend" + y=$(( ${yearend:0:4} - ${yearstart:0:4} )) + m=$(( ${yearend:5:1} - ${yearstart:5:1} + ${yearend:6:1} - ${yearstart:6:1} )) + d=$(( ${yearend:8:2} - ${yearstart:8:2} )) + # We take the year, month, days here as old OpenBSD's date is too difficult for real conversion + # see comment in parse_date(). In diffseconds then we have the estimated absolute validity period + diffseconds=$(( d + ((m*30)) + ((y*365)) )) + diffseconds=$((diffseconds * 3600 * 24)) + # Now we estimate the days left plus length of month/year: + yearnow="$(date -juz GMT "+%Y-%m-%d %H:%M")" + y=$(( ${yearend:0:4} - ${yearnow:0:4} )) + m=$(( ${yearend:5:1} - ${yearnow:5:1} + ${yearend:6:1} - ${yearnow:6:1} )) + d=$(( ${yearend:8:2} - ${yearnow:8:2} )) + days2expire=$(( d + ((m*30)) + ((y*365)) )) + else + startdate="$(parse_date "$startdate" +"%F %H:%M" "%b %d %T %Y %Z")" + enddate="$(parse_date "$enddate" +"%F %H:%M" "%b %d %T %Y %Z")" + days2expire=$(( $(parse_date "$enddate" "+%s" $'%F %H:%M') - $(LC_ALL=C date "+%s") )) # first in seconds + days2expire=$((days2expire / 3600 / 24 )) + diffseconds=$(( $(parse_date "$enddate" "+%s" $'%F %H:%M') - $(parse_date "$startdate" "+%s" $'%F %H:%M') )) + fi + # We adjust the thresholds by %50 for LE certificates, relaxing warnings for those certificates. + # . instead of \' because it does not break syntax highlighting in vim + if [[ "$issuer_O" =~ ^Let.s\ Encrypt ]] ; then + days2warn2=$((days2warn2 / 2)) + days2warn1=$((days2warn1 / 2)) + fi + + debugme echo -n "diffseconds: $diffseconds" + expire=$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -checkend 1 2>>$ERRFILE) + if ! grep -qw not <<< "$expire" ; then + pr_svrty_critical "expired" + expfinding="expired" + expok="CRITICAL" + else + secs2warn=$((24 * 60 * 60 * days2warn2)) # low threshold first + expire=$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -checkend $secs2warn 2>>$ERRFILE) + if grep -qw not <<< "$expire"; then + secs2warn=$((24 * 60 * 60 * days2warn1)) # high threshold + expire=$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -checkend $secs2warn 2>>$ERRFILE) + if grep -qw not <<< "$expire"; then + pr_svrty_good "$days2expire >= $days2warn1 days" + expfinding+="$days2expire >= $days2warn1 days" + else + pr_svrty_medium "expires < $days2warn1 days ($days2expire)" + expfinding+="expires < $days2warn1 days ($days2expire)" + expok="MEDIUM" + fi + else + pr_svrty_high "expires < $days2warn2 days ($days2expire)" + expfinding+="expires < $days2warn2 days ($days2expire)" + expok="HIGH" + fi + fi + outln " ($startdate --> $enddate)" + fileout "cert_expirationStatus${json_postfix}" "$expok" "$expfinding" + fileout "cert_notBefore${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$startdate" # we assume that the certificate has no start time in the future + fileout "cert_notAfter${json_postfix}" "$expok" "$enddate" # They are in UTC + + # Internal certificates or those from appliances often have too high validity periods. + # We check for ~10 years and >~ 5 years + if [[ $diffseconds -ge $((3600 * 24 * 365 * 10)) ]]; then + out "$spaces" + prln_svrty_high ">= 10 years is way too long" + fileout "cert_validityPeriod${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "$((diffseconds / (3600 * 24) )) days" + elif [[ $diffseconds -ge $((3600 * 24 * 365 * 5)) ]]; then + out "$spaces" + prln_svrty_medium ">= 5 years is too long" + fileout "cert_validityPeriod${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "$((diffseconds / (3600 * 24) )) days" + elif [[ $diffseconds -ge $((3600 * 24 * 825 + 1)) ]]; then + # Also "official" certificates issued from March 1st, 2018 (1517353200) aren't supposed + # to be valid longer than 825 days which is 1517353200 in epoch seconds + gt_825=true + if "$HAS_OPENBSDDATE"; then + if [[ 20180301 -le ${yearstart//-/} ]]; then + gt_825warn=true + fi + elif [[ $(parse_date "$startdate" "+%s" $'%F %H:%M') -ge 1517353200 ]]; then + gt_825warn=true + fi + # Now, the verdict, depending on the issuing date + out "$spaces" + if "$gt_825warn" && "$gt_825"; then + prln_svrty_medium "> 825 days issued after 2018/03/01 is too long" + fileout "cert_validityPeriod${json_postfix}" "MEDIUM" "$((diffseconds / (3600 * 24) )) > 825 days" + elif "$gt_825"; then + outln ">= 825 days certificate life time but issued before 2018/03/01" + fileout "cert_validityPeriod${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$((diffseconds / (3600 * 24) )) =< 825 days" + fi + else + # All is fine with valididy period + # We ignore for now certificates < 2018/03/01. On the screen we only show debug info + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && outln "${spaces}DEBUG: all is fine with total certificate life time" + fileout "cert_validityPeriod${json_postfix}" "INFO" "No finding" + fi + + certificates_provided=1+$(grep -c "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem) + out "$indent"; pr_bold " # of certificates provided"; out " $certificates_provided" + fileout "certs_countServer${json_postfix}" "INFO" "${certificates_provided}" + if "$certificate_list_ordering_problem"; then + prln_svrty_low " (certificate list ordering problem)" + fileout "certs_list_ordering_problem${json_postfix}" "LOW" "yes" + else + fileout "certs_list_ordering_problem${json_postfix}" "INFO" "no" + outln + fi + + if "$PHONE_OUT"; then + out "$indent"; pr_bold " In pwnedkeys.com DB " + check_pwnedkeys "$HOSTCERT" "$cert_key_algo" "$cert_keysize" + case "$?" in + 0) outln "not checked"; fileout "pwnedkeys${json_postfix}" "INFO" "not checked" ;; + 1) outln "not in database"; fileout "pwnedkeys${json_postfix}" "INFO" "not in database" ;; + 2) pr_svrty_critical "NOT ok --"; outln " key appears in database"; fileout "pwnedkeys${json_postfix}" "CRITICAL" "private key is known" ;; + 7) prln_warning "error querying https://v1.pwnedkeys.com"; fileout "pwnedkeys${json_postfix}" "WARN" "connection error" ;; + esac + fi + + out "$indent"; pr_bold " Certificate Revocation List " + jsonID="cert_crlDistributionPoints" + # ~ get next 50 lines after pattern , strip until Signature Algorithm and retrieve URIs + crl="$(awk '/X509v3 CRL Distribution/{i=50} i&&i--' <<< "$cert_txt" | awk '/^$/,/^ [a-zA-Z0-9]+|^ Signature Algorithm:/' | awk -F'URI:' '/URI/ { print $2 }')" + if [[ -z "$crl" ]] ; then + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "--" + outln "--" + else + if [[ $(count_lines "$crl") -eq 1 ]]; then + out "$crl" + if [[ "$expfinding" != "expired" ]]; then + check_revocation_crl "$crl" "cert_crlRevoked${json_postfix}" + ret=$((ret +$?)) + fi + outln + else # more than one CRL + first_crl=true + while read -r line; do + if "$first_crl"; then + first_crl=false + else + out "$spaces" + fi + out "$line" + if [[ "$expfinding" != expired ]]; then + check_revocation_crl "$line" "cert_crlRevoked${json_postfix}" + ret=$((ret +$?)) + fi + outln + done <<< "$crl" + fi + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$crl" + fi + + out "$indent"; pr_bold " OCSP URI " + jsonID="cert_ocspURL" + ocsp_uri=$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -noout -ocsp_uri 2>>$ERRFILE) + if [[ -z "$ocsp_uri" ]]; then + outln "--" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "--" + else + if [[ $(count_lines "$ocsp_uri") -eq 1 ]]; then + out "$ocsp_uri" + if [[ "$expfinding" != "expired" ]]; then + check_revocation_ocsp "$ocsp_uri" "" "cert_ocspRevoked${json_postfix}" + fi + ret=$((ret +$?)) + outln + else + first_ocsp=true + while read -r line; do + if "$first_ocsp"; then + first_ocsp=false + else + out "$spaces" + fi + out "$line" + if [[ "$expfinding" != "expired" ]]; then + check_revocation_ocsp "$line" "" "cert_ocspRevoked${json_postfix}" + ret=$((ret +$?)) + fi + outln + done <<< "$ocsp_uri" + fi + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$ocsp_uri" + fi + if [[ -z "$ocsp_uri" ]] && [[ -z "$crl" ]]; then + out "$spaces" + pr_svrty_high "NOT ok --" + outln " neither CRL nor OCSP URI provided" + fileout "cert_revocation${json_postfix}" "HIGH" "Neither CRL nor OCSP URI provided" + fi + + out "$indent"; pr_bold " OCSP stapling " + jsonID="OCSP_stapling" + if grep -a "OCSP response" <<< "$ocsp_response" | grep -q "no response sent" ; then + if [[ -n "$ocsp_uri" ]]; then + pr_svrty_low "not offered" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "LOW" "not offered" + else + out "not offered" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "not offered" + fi + else + if grep -a "OCSP Response Status" <<< "$ocsp_response_status" | grep -q successful; then + pr_svrty_good "offered" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "offered" + provides_stapling=true + check_revocation_ocsp "" "$ocsp_response_binary" "cert_ocspRevoked${json_postfix}" + elif [[ "$ocsp_response" =~ Responder\ Error: ]]; then + response="$(awk '/Responder Error:/ { print $3 }' <<< "$ocsp_response")" + pr_warning "stapled OCSP response contained an error response from OCSP responder: $response" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "WARN" "stapled OCSP response contained an error response from OCSP responder: $response" + else + if $GOST_STATUS_PROBLEM; then + pr_warning "(GOST servers make problems here, sorry)" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "WARN" "(The GOST server made a problem here, sorry)" + ((ret++)) + else + out "(response status unknown)" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" " not sure what's going on here, '$ocsp_response'" + debugme grep -a -A20 -B2 "OCSP response" <<<"$ocsp_response" + ((ret++)) + fi + fi + fi + outln + + out "$indent"; pr_bold " OCSP must staple extension "; + must_staple "$json_postfix" "$provides_stapling" "$cert_txt" + + out "$indent"; pr_bold " DNS CAA RR"; out " (experimental) " + jsonID="DNS_CAArecord" + caa_node="$NODE" + caa="" + while ( [[ -z "$caa" ]] && [[ ! -z "$caa_node" ]] ); do + caa="$(get_caa_rr_record $caa_node)" + [[ $caa_node =~ '.'$ ]] || caa_node+="." + caa_node=${caa_node#*.} + done + if [[ -n "$caa" ]]; then + pr_svrty_good "available"; out " - please check for match with \"Issuer\" above" + if [[ $(count_lines "$caa") -eq 1 ]]; then + out ": " + else + outln; out "$spaces" + fi + while read caa; do + if [[ -n "$caa" ]]; then + all_caa+="$caa, " + fi + done <<< "$caa" + all_caa=${all_caa%, } # strip trailing comma + pr_italic "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$all_caa" "$indent " $TERM_WIDTH)" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "$all_caa" + elif [[ -n "$NODNS" ]]; then + out "(instructed to minimize DNS queries)" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "check skipped as instructed" + else + pr_svrty_low "not offered" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "LOW" "--" + fi + outln + + out "$indent"; pr_bold " Certificate Transparency "; + jsonID="certificate_transparency" + if [[ "$ct" =~ extension ]]; then + pr_svrty_good "yes"; outln " ($ct)" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "OK" "yes ($ct)" + else + outln "$ct" + fileout "${jsonID}${json_postfix}" "INFO" "$ct" + fi + outln + return $ret +} + +run_server_defaults() { + local ciph newhostcert sni + local match_found + local sessticket_lifetime_hint="" sessticket_proto="" lifetime unit + local -i i n + local -i certs_found=0 + local -i ret=0 + local -a previous_hostcert previous_hostcert_txt previous_hostcert_type + local -a previous_hostcert_issuer previous_intermediates previous_ordering_problem keysize cipher + local -a ocsp_response_binary ocsp_response ocsp_response_status sni_used tls_version ct + local -a ciphers_to_test certificate_type + local -a -i success + local cn_nosni cn_sni sans_nosni sans_sni san tls_extensions + local using_sockets=true + + "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false + + # Try each public key type once: + # ciphers_to_test[1]: cipher suites using certificates with RSA signature public keys + # ciphers_to_test[2]: cipher suites using certificates with RSA key encipherment public keys + # ciphers_to_test[3]: cipher suites using certificates with DSA signature public keys + # ciphers_to_test[4]: cipher suites using certificates with DH key agreement public keys + # ciphers_to_test[5]: cipher suites using certificates with ECDH key agreement public keys + # ciphers_to_test[6]: cipher suites using certificates with ECDSA signature public keys + # ciphers_to_test[7]: cipher suites using certificates with GOST R 34.10 (either 2001 or 94) public keys + ciphers_to_test[1]="aRSA:eRSA" + ciphers_to_test[2]="" + ciphers_to_test[3]="aDSS:aDH:aECDH:aECDSA:aGOST" + ciphers_to_test[4]="" + ciphers_to_test[5]="" + ciphers_to_test[6]="" + ciphers_to_test[7]="" + ciphers_to_test[8]="tls1_3_RSA" + ciphers_to_test[9]="tls1_3_ECDSA" + certificate_type[1]="" ; certificate_type[2]="" + certificate_type[3]=""; certificate_type[4]="" + certificate_type[5]="" ; certificate_type[6]="" + certificate_type[7]="" ; certificate_type[8]="RSASig" + certificate_type[9]="ECDSA" + + for (( n=1; n <= 16 ; n++ )); do + # Some servers use a different certificate if the ClientHello + # specifies TLSv1.1 and doesn't include a server name extension. + # So, for each public key type for which a certificate was found, + # try again, but only with TLSv1.1 and without SNI. + if [[ $n -ne 1 ]] && [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]]; then + ciphers_to_test[n]="" + elif [[ $n -ge 10 ]]; then + ciphers_to_test[n]="" + [[ ${success[n-9]} -eq 0 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_1") -ne 1 ]] && \ + ciphers_to_test[n]="${ciphers_to_test[n-9]}" && certificate_type[n]="${certificate_type[n-9]}" + fi + + if [[ -n "${ciphers_to_test[n]}" ]]; then + if [[ $n -ge 10 ]]; then + sni="$SNI" + SNI="" + get_server_certificate "${ciphers_to_test[n]}" "tls1_1" + success[n]=$? + SNI="$sni" + else + get_server_certificate "${ciphers_to_test[n]}" + success[n]=$? + fi + if [[ ${success[n]} -eq 0 ]] && [[ -s "$HOSTCERT" ]]; then + [[ $n -ge 10 ]] && [[ ! -e $HOSTCERT.nosni ]] && cp $HOSTCERT $HOSTCERT.nosni + cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.get_server_certificate.txt" $TMPFILE + >$ERRFILE + if [[ -z "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" ]]; then + sessticket_lifetime_hint=$(awk '/session ticket life/ { if (!found) print; found=1 }' $TMPFILE) + sessticket_proto="$(get_protocol "$TMPFILE")" + fi + + if [[ $n -le 7 ]]; then + ciph="$(get_cipher $TMPFILE)" + if [[ "$ciph" != TLS_* ]] && [[ "$ciph" != SSL_* ]]; then + ciph="$(openssl2rfc "$ciph")" + fi + if [[ "$ciph" == TLS_DHE_RSA_* ]] || [[ "$ciph" == TLS_ECDHE_RSA_* ]] || [[ "$ciph" == TLS_CECPQ1_RSA_* ]]; then + certificate_type[n]="RSASig" + if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then + ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aRSA/}" + ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}" + [[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}" + fi + ciphers_to_test[n]="aRSA" + elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_RSA_* ]] || [[ "$ciph" == SSL_* ]] || [[ "$ciph" == TLS_GOST*_RSA_* ]]; then + certificate_type[n]="RSAKMK" + if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then + ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/eRSA/}" + ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}" + [[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}" + fi + ciphers_to_test[n]="eRSA" + elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_DHE_DSS_* ]]; then + certificate_type[n]="DSA" + if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then + ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aDSS/}" + ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}" + [[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}" + fi + ciphers_to_test[n]="aDSS" + elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_DH_* ]]; then + certificate_type[n]="DH" + if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then + ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aDH/}" + ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}" + [[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}" + fi + ciphers_to_test[n]="aDH" + elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_ECDH_* ]]; then + certificate_type[n]="ECDH" + if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then + ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aECDH/}" + ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}" + [[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}" + fi + ciphers_to_test[n]="aECDH" + elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_* ]] || [[ "$ciph" == TLS_CECPQ1_ECDSA_* ]]; then + certificate_type[n]="ECDSA" + if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then + ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aECDSA/}" + ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}" + [[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}" + fi + ciphers_to_test[n]="aECDSA" + elif [[ "$ciph" == TLS_GOST* ]]; then + certificate_type[n]="GOST" + if [[ -z "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]}" ]]; then + ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n]/aGOST/}" + ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]/::/:}" + [[ "${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:0:1}" == : ]] && ciphers_to_test[n+1]="${ciphers_to_test[n+1]:1}" + fi + ciphers_to_test[n]="aGOST" + fi + fi + # check whether the host's certificate has been seen before + match_found=false + i=1 + newhostcert=$(cat $HOSTCERT) + while [[ $i -le $certs_found ]]; do + if [[ "$newhostcert" == "${previous_hostcert[i]}" ]]; then + match_found=true + break; + fi + i=$((i + 1)) + done + if ! "$match_found" && [[ $n -ge 10 ]] && [[ $certs_found -ne 0 ]]; then + # A new certificate was found using TLSv1.1 without SNI. + # Check to see if the new certificate should be displayed. + # It should be displayed if it is either a match for the + # $NODE being tested or if it has the same subject + # (CN and SAN) as other certificates for this host. + compare_server_name_to_cert "$HOSTCERT" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && success[n]=0 || success[n]=1 + + if [[ ${success[n]} -ne 0 ]]; then + cn_nosni="$(toupper "$(get_cn_from_cert $HOSTCERT)")" + sans_nosni="$(toupper "$(get_san_dns_from_cert "$HOSTCERT")")" + + echo "${previous_hostcert[1]}" > $HOSTCERT + cn_sni="$(toupper "$(get_cn_from_cert $HOSTCERT)")" + + # FIXME: Not sure what the matching rule should be. At + # the moment, the no SNI certificate is considered a + # match if the CNs are the same and the SANs (if + # present) contain at least one DNS name in common. + if [[ "$cn_nosni" == "$cn_sni" ]]; then + sans_sni="$(toupper "$(get_san_dns_from_cert "$HOSTCERT")")" + if [[ "$sans_nosni" == "$sans_sni" ]]; then + success[n]=0 + else + while read -r san; do + [[ -n "$san" ]] && [[ " $sans_sni " =~ " $san " ]] && success[n]=0 && break + done <<< "$sans_nosni" + fi + fi + fi + # If the certificate found for TLSv1.1 w/o SNI appears to + # be for a different host, then set match_found to true so + # that the new certificate will not be included in the output. + [[ ${success[n]} -ne 0 ]] && match_found=true + fi + if ! "$match_found"; then + certs_found=$(( certs_found + 1)) + cipher[certs_found]=${ciphers_to_test[n]} + keysize[certs_found]=$(awk '/Server public key/ { print $(NF-1) }' $TMPFILE) + # If an OCSP response was sent, then get the full + # response so that certificate_info() can determine + # whether it includes a certificate transparency extension. + ocsp_response_binary[certs_found]="$STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE" + if grep -a "OCSP response:" $TMPFILE | grep -q "no response sent"; then + ocsp_response[certs_found]="$(grep -a "OCSP response" $TMPFILE)" + else + ocsp_response[certs_found]="$(awk -v n=2 '/OCSP response:/ {start=1; inc=2} /======================================/ { if (start) {inc--} } inc' $TMPFILE)" + fi + ocsp_response_status[certs_found]=$(grep -a "OCSP Response Status" $TMPFILE) + previous_hostcert[certs_found]=$newhostcert + previous_hostcert_txt[certs_found]="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -text 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$newhostcert")" + previous_intermediates[certs_found]=$(cat $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem) + previous_hostcert_issuer[certs_found]="" + [[ -n "${previous_intermediates[certs_found]}" ]] && [[ -r $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem ]] && \ + previous_hostcert_issuer[certs_found]=$(cat $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem) + previous_ordering_problem[certs_found]=$CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM + [[ $n -ge 10 ]] && sni_used[certs_found]="" || sni_used[certs_found]="$SNI" + tls_version[certs_found]="$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" + previous_hostcert_type[certs_found]=" ${certificate_type[n]}" + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then + echo "${previous_hostcert[certs_found]}" > $TEMPDIR/host_certificate_$certs_found.pem + echo "${previous_hostcert_txt[certs_found]}" > $TEMPDIR/host_certificate_$certs_found.txt + fi + else + previous_hostcert_type[i]+=" ${certificate_type[n]}" + fi + fi + fi + done + + determine_tls_extensions + + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" != -ssl2 ]]; then + cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.determine_tls_extensions.txt" $TMPFILE + >$ERRFILE + if [[ -z "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" ]]; then + sessticket_lifetime_hint=$(awk '/session ticket lifetime/ { if (!found) print; found=1 }' $TMPFILE) + sessticket_proto="$(get_protocol "$TMPFILE")" + fi + fi + if "$using_sockets" && ! "$TLS13_ONLY" && [[ -z "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" ]] && [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" != -ssl2 ]]; then + if "$HAS_TLS13" && ( [[ -z "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" ]] || [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -tls1_3 ]] ) ; then + # If a session ticket were sent in response to a TLSv1.3 ClientHello, then a session ticket + # would have been found by get_server_certificate(). So, try again with a TLSv1.2 ClientHello. + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -no_tls1_3 -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + else + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + fi + if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then + sessticket_lifetime_hint=$(awk '/session ticket lifetime/ { if (!found) print; found=1 }' $TMPFILE) + sessticket_proto="$(get_protocol "$TMPFILE")" + fi + fi + [[ -z "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" ]] && TLS_TICKETS=false || TLS_TICKETS=true + + debugme echo "# certificates found $certs_found" + # Now that all of the server's certificates have been found, determine for + # each certificate whether certificate transparency information is provided. + for (( i=1; i <= certs_found; i++ )); do + ct[i]="$(certificate_transparency "${previous_hostcert_txt[i]}" "${ocsp_response[i]}" "$certs_found" "${cipher[i]}" "${sni_used[i]}" "${tls_version[i]}")" + # If certificate_transparency() called tls_sockets() and found a "signed certificate timestamps" extension, + # then add it to $TLS_EXTENSIONS, since it may not have been found by determine_tls_extensions(). + [[ $certs_found -gt 1 ]] && [[ "${ct[i]}" == TLS\ extension ]] && extract_new_tls_extensions "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" + done + + outln + pr_headlineln " Testing server defaults (Server Hello) " + outln + + pr_bold " TLS extensions (standard) " + if [[ -z "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" ]]; then + outln "(none)" + fileout "TLS_extensions" "INFO" "(none)" + else +#FIXME: we rather want to have the chance to print each ext in italics or another format. +# Atm is a string of quoted strings -- that needs to be fixed at the root then + # out_row_aligned_max_width() places line breaks at space characters. + # So, in order to prevent the text for an extension from being broken + # across lines, temporarily replace space characters within the text + # of an extension with "}", and then convert the "}" back to space in + # the output of out_row_aligned_max_width(). + tls_extensions="${TLS_EXTENSIONS// /{}" + tls_extensions="${tls_extensions//\"{\"/\" \"}" + tls_extensions="$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$tls_extensions" " " $TERM_WIDTH)" + tls_extensions="${tls_extensions//{/ }" + outln "$tls_extensions" + fileout "TLS_extensions" "INFO" "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" + fi + + pr_bold " Session Ticket RFC 5077 hint " + jsonID="TLS_session_ticket" + if [[ -z "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" ]]; then + outln "no -- no lifetime advertised" + fileout "${jsonID}" "INFO" "no -- no lifetime advertised" + # it MAY be given a hint of the lifetime of the ticket, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077#section-5.6 . + # Sometimes it just does not -- but it then may also support TLS session tickets reuse + else + lifetime=$(grep -a lifetime <<< "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" | sed 's/[A-Za-z:() ]//g') + unit=$(grep -a lifetime <<< "$sessticket_lifetime_hint" | sed -e 's/^.*'"$lifetime"'//' -e 's/[ ()]//g') + out "$lifetime $unit" + if [[ $((3600 * 24)) -lt $lifetime ]]; then + prln_svrty_low " but: PFS requires session ticket keys to be rotated < daily !" + fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "valid for $lifetime $unit (>daily)" + else + outln ", session tickets keys seems to be rotated < daily" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "valid for $lifetime $unit only (<daily)" + fi + fi + + pr_bold " SSL Session ID support " + jsonID="SSL_sessionID_support" + if "$NO_SSL_SESSIONID"; then + outln "no" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "no" + else + outln "yes" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "yes" + fi + + pr_bold " Session Resumption " + jsonID="sessionresumption_ticket" + sub_session_resumption "$sessticket_proto" + case $? in + 0) SESS_RESUMPTION[2]="ticket=yes" + out "Tickets: yes, " + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "supported" + ;; + 1) SESS_RESUMPTION[2]="ticket=no" + out "Tickets no, " + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not supported" + ;; + 5) SESS_RESUMPTION[2]="ticket=noclue" + pr_warning "Ticket resumption test failed, pls report / " + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check failed, pls report" + ((ret++)) + ;; + 6) SESS_RESUMPTION[2]="ticket=clientauth" + pr_warning "Client Auth: Ticket resumption test not supported / " + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check couldn't be performed because of client authentication" + ;; + 7) SESS_RESUMPTION[2]="ticket=unsuccessful" + pr_warning "Connect problem: Ticket resumption test not possible / " + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check failed because of connect problem" + ((ret++)) + ;; + esac + + jsonID="sessionresumption_ID" + if "$NO_SSL_SESSIONID"; then + SESS_RESUMPTION[1]="ID=no" + outln "ID: no" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "No Session ID, no resumption" + else + sub_session_resumption "$sessticket_proto" ID + case $? in + 0) SESS_RESUMPTION[1]="ID=yes" + outln "ID: yes" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "supported" + ;; + 1|2) SESS_RESUMPTION[1]="ID=no" + outln "ID: no" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not supported" + ;; + 5) SESS_RESUMPTION[1]="ID=noclue" + prln_warning "ID resumption test failed, pls report" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check failed, pls report" + ((ret++)) + ;; + 6) SESS_RESUMPTION[1]="ID=clientauth" + # [[ ${SESS_RESUMPTION[2]} =~ clientauth ]] || pr_warning "Client Auth: " + prln_warning "Client Auth: ID resumption test not supported" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check couldn't be performed because of client authentication" + ;; + 7) SESS_RESUMPTION[1]="ID=unsuccessful" + prln_warning "ID resumption test failed" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "check failed because of connect problem" + ((ret++)) + ;; + esac + fi + + tls_time + + if [[ -n "$SNI" ]] && [[ $certs_found -ne 0 ]] && [[ ! -e $HOSTCERT.nosni ]]; then + # no cipher suites specified here. We just want the default vhost subject + if ! "$HAS_TLS13" && [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -eq 0 ]]; then + sni="$SNI" ; SNI="" + mv $HOSTCERT $HOSTCERT.save + # Send same list of cipher suites as OpenSSL 1.1.1 sends (but with + # all 5 TLSv1.3 ciphers offered. + tls_sockets "04" \ + "c0,2c, c0,30, 00,9f, cc,a9, cc,a8, cc,aa, c0,2b, c0,2f, + 00,9e, c0,24, c0,28, 00,6b, c0,23, c0,27, 00,67, c0,0a, + c0,14, 00,39, c0,09, c0,13, 00,33, 00,9d, 00,9c, 13,02, + 13,03, 13,01, 13,04, 13,05, 00,3d, 00,3c, 00,35, 00,2f, + 00,ff" \ + "all+" + success[0]=$? + if [[ ${success[0]} -eq 0 ]] || [[ ${success[0]} -eq 2 ]]; then + if [[ -s $HOSTCERT ]]; then + mv $HOSTCERT $HOSTCERT.nosni + else + # The connection was successful, but the certificate could + # not be obtained (probably because the connection was TLS 1.3 + # and $OPENSSL does not support the key exchange group that was + # selected). So, try again using OpenSSL (which will not use a TLS 1.3 + # ClientHello). + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $OPTIMAL_PROTO") 2>>$ERRFILE </dev/null | \ + awk '/-----BEGIN/,/-----END/ { print $0 }' >$HOSTCERT.nosni + fi + else + >$HOSTCERT.nosni + fi + mv $HOSTCERT.save $HOSTCERT + SNI="$sni" + else + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $OPTIMAL_PROTO") 2>>$ERRFILE </dev/null | \ + awk '/-----BEGIN/,/-----END/ { print $0 }' >$HOSTCERT.nosni + fi + elif [[ $certs_found -eq 0 ]] && [[ -s "$HOSTCERT" ]]; then + outln + generic_nonfatal "Client problem, shouldn't happen: Host certificate found but we can't continue with \"server defaults\"." + elif [[ $certs_found -eq 0 ]]; then + outln + if $TLS13_ONLY; then + generic_nonfatal "Client problem: We need openssl supporting TLS 1.3. We can't continue with \"server defaults\" as we cannot retrieve the certificate. " + else + generic_nonfatal "Client problem, No server cerificate could be retrieved. Thus we can't continue with \"server defaults\"." + fi + fi + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && [[ -e $HOSTCERT.nosni ]] && $OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT.nosni -text -noout 2>>$ERRFILE > $HOSTCERT.nosni.txt + + fileout "cert_numbers" "INFO" "$certs_found" + for (( i=1; i <= certs_found; i++ )); do + echo "${previous_hostcert[i]}" > $HOSTCERT + echo "${previous_intermediates[i]}" > $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem + echo "${previous_hostcert_issuer[i]}" > $TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem + certificate_info "$i" "$certs_found" "${previous_hostcert_txt[i]}" \ + "${cipher[i]}" "${keysize[i]}" "${previous_hostcert_type[i]}" \ + "${ocsp_response_binary[i]}" "${ocsp_response[i]}" \ + "${ocsp_response_status[i]}" "${sni_used[i]}" "${ct[i]}" \ + "${previous_ordering_problem[i]}" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && ((ret++)) + done + return $ret +} + +get_session_ticket_lifetime_from_serverhello() { + awk '/session ticket.*lifetime/ { print $(NF-1) "$1" }' +} + +get_san_dns_from_cert() { + echo "$($OPENSSL x509 -in "$1" -noout -text 2>>$ERRFILE | \ + grep -A2 "Subject Alternative Name" | tr ',' '\n' | grep "DNS:" | \ + sed -e 's/DNS://g' -e 's/ //g')" +} + + +run_pfs() { + local -i sclient_success + local pfs_offered=false ecdhe_offered=false ffdhe_offered=false + local pfs_tls13_offered=false + local protos_to_try proto hexc dash pfs_cipher sslvers auth mac export curve dhlen + local -a hexcode normalized_hexcode ciph rfc_ciph kx enc ciphers_found sigalg ossl_supported + # generated from 'kEECDH:kEDH:!aNULL:!eNULL:!DES:!3DES:!RC4' with openssl 1.0.2i and openssl 1.1.0 + local pfs_cipher_list="DHE-DSS-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM8:DHE-RSA-AES128-CCM:DHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM8:DHE-RSA-AES256-CCM:DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305-OLD:DHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM8:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-CCM:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM8:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-CCM:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305-OLD:ECDHE-ECDSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305-OLD:ECDHE-RSA-CHACHA20-POLY1305" + local pfs_hex_cipher_list="" ciphers_to_test tls13_ciphers_to_test + local ecdhe_cipher_list="" tls13_cipher_list="" ecdhe_cipher_list_hex="" ffdhe_cipher_list_hex="" + local curves_hex=("00,01" "00,02" "00,03" "00,04" "00,05" "00,06" "00,07" "00,08" "00,09" "00,0a" "00,0b" "00,0c" "00,0d" "00,0e" "00,0f" "00,10" "00,11" "00,12" "00,13" "00,14" "00,15" "00,16" "00,17" "00,18" "00,19" "00,1a" "00,1b" "00,1c" "00,1d" "00,1e") + local -a curves_ossl=("sect163k1" "sect163r1" "sect163r2" "sect193r1" "sect193r2" "sect233k1" "sect233r1" "sect239k1" "sect283k1" "sect283r1" "sect409k1" "sect409r1" "sect571k1" "sect571r1" "secp160k1" "secp160r1" "secp160r2" "secp192k1" "prime192v1" "secp224k1" "secp224r1" "secp256k1" "prime256v1" "secp384r1" "secp521r1" "brainpoolP256r1" "brainpoolP384r1" "brainpoolP512r1" "X25519" "X448") + local -a curves_ossl_output=("K-163" "sect163r1" "B-163" "sect193r1" "sect193r2" "K-233" "B-233" "sect239k1" "K-283" "B-283" "K-409" "B-409" "K-571" "B-571" "secp160k1" "secp160r1" "secp160r2" "secp192k1" "P-192" "secp224k1" "P-224" "secp256k1" "P-256" "P-384" "P-521" "brainpoolP256r1" "brainpoolP384r1" "brainpoolP512r1" "X25519" "X448") + local -ai curves_bits=(163 162 163 193 193 232 233 238 281 282 407 409 570 570 161 161 161 192 192 225 224 256 256 384 521 256 384 512 253 448) + # Many curves have been deprecated, and RFC 8446, Appendix B.3.1.4, states + # that these curves MUST NOT be offered in a TLS 1.3 ClientHello. + local -a curves_deprecated=("true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "true" "false" "false" "false" "true" "true" "true" "false" "false") + local -a ffdhe_groups_hex=("01,00" "01,01" "01,02" "01,03" "01,04") + local -a ffdhe_groups_output=("ffdhe2048" "ffdhe3072" "ffdhe4096" "ffdhe6144" "ffdhe8192") + local -a supported_curve + local -i nr_supported_ciphers=0 nr_curves=0 nr_ossl_curves=0 i j low high + local pfs_ciphers curves_offered="" curves_to_test temp + local len1 len2 curve_found + local key_bitstring quality_str + local -i len_dh_p quality + local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS" + local using_sockets=true + local jsonID="PFS" + + "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false + "$FAST" && using_sockets=false + [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false + + outln + pr_headline " Testing robust (perfect) forward secrecy"; prln_underline ", (P)FS -- omitting Null Authentication/Encryption, 3DES, RC4 " + if ! "$using_sockets"; then + [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && pr_warning " Cipher mapping not available, doing a fallback to openssl" + if ! "$HAS_DH_BITS" && "$WIDE"; then + [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && ! "$SSL_NATIVE" && ! "$FAST" && out "." + pr_warning " (Your $OPENSSL cannot show DH/ECDH bits)" + fi + outln + fi + + if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then + for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do + pfs_cipher="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" + hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}" + if ( [[ "$pfs_cipher" == "TLS_DHE_"* ]] || [[ "$pfs_cipher" == "TLS_ECDHE_"* ]] || [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == "13" ]] ) && \ + [[ ! "$pfs_cipher" =~ NULL ]] && [[ ! "$pfs_cipher" =~ DES ]] && [[ ! "$pfs_cipher" =~ RC4 ]] && \ + [[ ! "$pfs_cipher" =~ PSK ]] && ( "$using_sockets" || "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}" ); then + pfs_hex_cipher_list+=", ${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}" + ciph[nr_supported_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" + rfc_ciph[nr_supported_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" + kx[nr_supported_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}" + enc[nr_supported_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}" + ciphers_found[nr_supported_ciphers]=false + sigalg[nr_supported_ciphers]="" + ossl_supported[nr_supported_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}" + hexcode[nr_supported_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}" + if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then + normalized_hexcode[nr_supported_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}" + else + normalized_hexcode[nr_supported_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}" + fi + "$using_sockets" && ! "$has_dh_bits" && "$WIDE" && ossl_supported[nr_supported_ciphers]=false + nr_supported_ciphers+=1 + fi + done + else + while read -r hexc dash ciph[nr_supported_ciphers] sslvers kx[nr_supported_ciphers] auth enc[nr_supported_ciphers] mac export; do + ciphers_found[nr_supported_ciphers]=false + if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then + normalized_hexcode[nr_supported_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}" + else + normalized_hexcode[nr_supported_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}" + fi + sigalg[nr_supported_ciphers]="" + ossl_supported[nr_supported_ciphers]=true + nr_supported_ciphers+=1 + done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers "$pfs_cipher_list" "ALL" "-V") + fi + export="" + + if [[ $(has_server_protocol "tls1_3") -eq 0 ]]; then + # All TLSv1.3 cipher suites offer robust PFS. + sclient_success=0 + elif "$using_sockets"; then + tls_sockets "04" "${pfs_hex_cipher_list:2}, 00,ff" + sclient_success=$? + [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0 + else + debugme echo $nr_supported_ciphers + debugme echo $(actually_supported_osslciphers $pfs_cipher_list "ALL") + if [[ "$nr_supported_ciphers" -le "$CLIENT_MIN_PFS" ]]; then + outln + prln_local_problem "You only have $nr_supported_ciphers PFS ciphers on the client side " + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "tests skipped as you only have $nr_supported_ciphers PFS ciphers on the client site. ($CLIENT_MIN_PFS are required)" + return 1 + fi + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-cipher $pfs_cipher_list -ciphersuites "ALL" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + sclient_success=$? + [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && [[ $(grep -ac "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" $TMPFILE) -eq 0 ]] && sclient_success=1 + fi + + if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then + outln + prln_svrty_medium " No ciphers supporting Forward Secrecy offered" + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "No ciphers supporting (P)FS offered" + else + outln + pfs_offered=true + pfs_ciphers="" + pr_svrty_good " PFS is offered (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "offered" + if "$WIDE"; then + outln ", ciphers follow (client/browser support is important here) \n" + neat_header + else + out " " + fi + if "$HAS_TLS13"; then + protos_to_try="-no_ssl2 -no_tls1_3" + else + protos_to_try="-no_ssl2" + fi + + for proto in $protos_to_try; do + while true; do + ciphers_to_test="" + tls13_ciphers_to_test="" + for (( i=0; i < nr_supported_ciphers; i++ )); do + if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && "${ossl_supported[i]}"; then + if [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS_* ]]; then + tls13_ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph[i]}" + else + ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph[i]}" + fi + fi + done + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && [[ -z "$tls13_ciphers_to_test" ]] && break + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto -cipher "\'${ciphers_to_test:1}\'" -ciphersuites "\'${tls13_ciphers_to_test:1}\'" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") &>$TMPFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || break + pfs_cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + [[ -z "$pfs_cipher" ]] && break + for (( i=0; i < nr_supported_ciphers; i++ )); do + [[ "$pfs_cipher" == "${ciph[i]}" ]] && break + done + [[ $i -eq $nr_supported_ciphers ]] && break + ciphers_found[i]=true + if [[ "$pfs_cipher" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "$pfs_cipher" == TLS_* ]]; then + pfs_tls13_offered=true + "$WIDE" && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file $TMPFILE)" + fi + if "$WIDE"; then + dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet) + kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen" + fi + "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TMPFILE && \ + sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")" + done + done + if "$using_sockets"; then + for proto in 04 03; do + while true; do + ciphers_to_test="" + for (( i=0; i < nr_supported_ciphers; i++ )); do + ! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode[i]}" + done + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break + [[ "$proto" == "04" ]] && [[ ! "$ciphers_to_test" =~ ,\ 13,[0-9a-f][0-9a-f] ]] && break + ciphers_to_test="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$proto" "$ciphers_to_test")" + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break + if "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then + tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all" + else + tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" + fi + sclient_success=$? + [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break + pfs_cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt") + for (( i=0; i < nr_supported_ciphers; i++ )); do + [[ "$pfs_cipher" == "${rfc_ciph[i]}" ]] && break + done + [[ $i -eq $nr_supported_ciphers ]] && break + ciphers_found[i]=true + if [[ "${kx[i]}" == Kx=any ]]; then + pfs_tls13_offered=true + "$WIDE" && kx[i]="$(read_dhtype_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")" + fi + if "$WIDE"; then + dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet) + kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen" + fi + "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && \ + sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")" + done + done + fi + for (( i=0; i < nr_supported_ciphers; i++ )); do + ! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && ! "$SHOW_EACH_C" && continue + if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then + if ( [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] && [[ "${ciph[i]}" != "-" ]] ) || [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == "-" ]]; then + pfs_cipher="${ciph[i]}" + else + pfs_cipher="${rfc_ciph[i]}" + fi + pfs_ciphers+="$pfs_cipher " + + if [[ "${ciph[i]}" == ECDHE-* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS_* ]] || ( "$using_sockets" && [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == TLS_ECDHE_* ]] ); then + ecdhe_offered=true + ecdhe_cipher_list_hex+=", ${hexcode[i]}" + if [[ "${ciph[i]}" != "-" ]]; then + if [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS_* ]]; then + tls13_cipher_list+=":$pfs_cipher" + else + ecdhe_cipher_list+=":$pfs_cipher" + fi + fi + fi + if [[ "${ciph[i]}" == "DHE-"* ]] || ( "$using_sockets" && [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == "TLS_DHE_"* ]] ); then + ffdhe_offered=true + ffdhe_cipher_list_hex+=", ${hexcode[i]}" + elif [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS13* ]] || [[ "${ciph[i]}" == TLS_* ]]; then + ffdhe_cipher_list_hex+=", ${hexcode[i]}" + fi + fi + if "$WIDE"; then + neat_list "$(tolower "${normalized_hexcode[i]}")" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${ciphers_found[i]}" + if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then + if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then + pr_cipher_quality "${rfc_ciph[i]}" "available" + else + pr_deemphasize "not a/v" + fi + fi + outln "${sigalg[i]}" + fi + done + if ! "$WIDE"; then + if [[ "$COLOR" -le 2 ]]; then + out "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$pfs_ciphers" " " $TERM_WIDTH)" + else + out_row_aligned_max_width_by_entry "$pfs_ciphers" " " $TERM_WIDTH pr_cipher_quality + fi + fi + debugme echo $pfs_offered + "$WIDE" || outln + fileout "${jsonID}_ciphers" "INFO" "$pfs_ciphers" + fi + + # find out what elliptic curves are supported. + if "$ecdhe_offered"; then + for curve in "${curves_ossl[@]}"; do + ossl_supported[nr_curves]=false + supported_curve[nr_curves]=false + [[ "$OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES" =~ " $curve " ]] && ossl_supported[nr_curves]=true && nr_ossl_curves+=1 + nr_curves+=1 + done + + # OpenSSL limits the number of curves that can be specified in the + # "-curves" option to 28. So, break the list in two if there are more + # than 28 curves supported by OpenSSL. + for j in 1 2; do + if [[ $j -eq 1 ]]; then + if [[ $nr_ossl_curves -le 28 ]]; then + low=0; high=$nr_curves + else + low=0; high=$nr_curves/2 + fi + else + if [[ $nr_ossl_curves -le 28 ]]; then + continue # all curves tested in first round + else + low=$nr_curves/2; high=$nr_curves + fi + fi + if "$HAS_TLS13"; then + if "$pfs_tls13_offered"; then + protos_to_try="-no_ssl2 -no_tls1_3" + else + protos_to_try="-no_tls1_3" + fi + else + protos_to_try="-no_ssl2" + fi + + for proto in $protos_to_try; do + while true; do + curves_to_test="" + for (( i=low; i < high; i++ )); do + if ! "$HAS_TLS13" || ! "${curves_deprecated[i]}" || [[ "$proto" == "-no_tls1_3" ]]; then + "${ossl_supported[i]}" && ! "${supported_curve[i]}" && curves_to_test+=":${curves_ossl[i]}" + fi + done + [[ -z "$curves_to_test" ]] && break + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto -cipher "\'${ecdhe_cipher_list:1}\'" -ciphersuites "\'${tls13_cipher_list:1}\'" -curves "${curves_to_test:1}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") &>$TMPFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || break + temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TMPFILE") + curve_found="${temp%%,*}" + if [[ "$curve_found" == ECDH ]]; then + curve_found="${temp#*, }" + curve_found="${curve_found%%,*}" + fi + for (( i=low; i < high; i++ )); do + ! "${supported_curve[i]}" && [[ "${curves_ossl_output[i]}" == "$curve_found" ]] && break + done + [[ $i -eq $high ]] && break + supported_curve[i]=true + done + done + done + fi + if "$ecdhe_offered" && "$using_sockets"; then + protos_to_try="03" + "$pfs_tls13_offered" && protos_to_try="04 03" + for proto in $protos_to_try; do + if [[ "$proto" == 03 ]]; then + ecdhe_cipher_list_hex="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "03" "$ecdhe_cipher_list_hex")" + [[ -z "$ecdhe_cipher_list_hex" ]] && continue + fi + while true; do + curves_to_test="" + for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do + if ! "${curves_deprecated[i]}" || [[ "$proto" == 03 ]]; then + ! "${supported_curve[i]}" && curves_to_test+=", ${curves_hex[i]}" + fi + done + [[ -z "$curves_to_test" ]] && break + len1=$(printf "%02x" "$((2*${#curves_to_test}/7))") + len2=$(printf "%02x" "$((2*${#curves_to_test}/7+2))") + tls_sockets "$proto" "${ecdhe_cipher_list_hex:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" "00, 0a, 00, $len2, 00, $len1, ${curves_to_test:2}" + sclient_success=$? + [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break + temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt") + curve_found="${temp%%,*}" + if [[ "$curve_found" == "ECDH" ]]; then + curve_found="${temp#*, }" + curve_found="${curve_found%%,*}" + fi + for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do + ! "${supported_curve[i]}" && [[ "${curves_ossl_output[i]}" == "$curve_found" ]] && break + done + [[ $i -eq $nr_curves ]] && break + supported_curve[i]=true + done + done + fi + if "$ecdhe_offered"; then + low=1000 + for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do + if "${supported_curve[i]}"; then + curves_offered+="${curves_ossl[i]} " + [[ ${curves_bits[i]} -lt $low ]] && low=${curves_bits[i]} + fi + done + if [[ -n "$curves_offered" ]]; then + "$WIDE" && outln + pr_bold " Elliptic curves offered: " + out_row_aligned_max_width_by_entry "$curves_offered" " " $TERM_WIDTH pr_ecdh_curve_quality + outln + # severity ratings based on quality specified by + # pr_ecdh_quality() for shortest curve offered. + if [[ "$low" -le 163 ]]; then + fileout "${jsonID}_ECDHE_curves" "MEDIUM" "$curves_offered" + elif [[ "$low" -le 193 ]]; then + fileout "${jsonID}_ECDHE_curves" "LOW" "$curves_offered" + elif [[ "$low" -le 224 ]]; then + fileout "${jsonID}_ECDHE_curves" "INFO" "$curves_offered" + else + fileout "${jsonID}_ECDHE_curves" "OK" "$curves_offered" + fi + fi + fi + CURVES_OFFERED="$curves_offered" + CURVES_OFFERED=$(strip_trailing_space "$CURVES_OFFERED") + + # find out what groups are supported. + if "$using_sockets" && ( "$pfs_tls13_offered" || "$ffdhe_offered" ); then + nr_curves=0 + for curve in "${ffdhe_groups_output[@]}"; do + supported_curve[nr_curves]=false + [[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ $curve ]] && supported_curve[nr_curves]=true + nr_curves+=1 + done + protos_to_try="" + "$pfs_tls13_offered" && protos_to_try="04" + if "$ffdhe_offered"; then + if "$pfs_tls13_offered"; then + protos_to_try="04 03" + else + protos_to_try="03" + fi + fi + curve_found="" + for proto in $protos_to_try; do + while true; do + curves_to_test="" + for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do + ! "${supported_curve[i]}" && curves_to_test+=", ${ffdhe_groups_hex[i]}" + done + [[ -z "$curves_to_test" ]] && break + len1=$(printf "%02x" "$((2*${#curves_to_test}/7))") + len2=$(printf "%02x" "$((2*${#curves_to_test}/7+2))") + tls_sockets "$proto" "${ffdhe_cipher_list_hex:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" "00, 0a, 00, $len2, 00, $len1, ${curves_to_test:2}" + sclient_success=$? + [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break + temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt") + curve_found="${temp#*, }" + curve_found="${curve_found%%,*}" + if [[ "$proto" == "03" ]] && [[ -z "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" ]] && [[ "$curve_found" =~ ffdhe ]]; then + DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC7919/$curve_found" + DH_GROUP_LEN_P="${curve_found#ffdhe}" + fi + [[ ! "$curve_found" =~ ffdhe ]] && break + for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do + ! "${supported_curve[i]}" && [[ "${ffdhe_groups_output[i]}" == "$curve_found" ]] && break + done + [[ $i -eq $nr_curves ]] && break + supported_curve[i]=true + done + done + curves_offered="" + for (( i=0; i < nr_curves; i++ )); do + "${supported_curve[i]}" && curves_offered+="${ffdhe_groups_output[i]} " + done + curves_offered="$(strip_trailing_space "$curves_offered")" + if "$ffdhe_offered" && [[ -z "$curves_offered" ]] && [[ -z "$curve_found" ]]; then + # Some servers will fail if the supported_groups extension is present. + tls_sockets "03" "${ffdhe_cipher_list_hex:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" + sclient_success=$? + if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]]; then + temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt") + curve_found="${temp#*, }" + curve_found="${curve_found%%,*}" + fi + fi + if [[ -z "$curves_offered" ]] && [[ -n "$curve_found" ]]; then + # The server is not using one of the groups from RFC 7919. + if [[ -z "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" ]]; then + # this global will get the name of the group either here or in run_logjam() + key_bitstring="$(awk '/-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY/,/-----END PUBLIC KEY/ { print $0 }' $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt)" + get_common_prime "$jsonID" "$key_bitstring" "" + case $? in + 0) curves_offered="$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" + len_dh_p=$DH_GROUP_LEN_P ;; + 2) pr_bold " DH or FF group offered : " + prln_local_problem "Your $OPENSSL does not support the pkey utility." + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$OPENSSL does not support the pkey utility." + esac + else + curves_offered="$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" + len_dh_p=$DH_GROUP_LEN_P + fi + fi + if [[ -n "$curves_offered" ]]; then + if [[ ! "$curves_offered" =~ ffdhe ]] || [[ ! "$curves_offered" =~ \ ]]; then + pr_bold " DH group offered: " + else + pr_bold " Finite field group: " + fi + if [[ "$curves_offered" =~ ffdhe ]]; then + # ok not to display them in italics: + pr_svrty_good "$curves_offered" + quality=6 + else + pr_dh "$curves_offered" "$len_dh_p" + quality=$? + fi + case "$quality" in + 1) quality_str="CRITICAL" ;; + 2) quality_str="HIGH" ;; + 3) quality_str="MEDIUM" ;; + 4) quality_str="LOW" ;; + 5) quality_str="INFO" ;; + 6|7) quality_str="OK" ;; + esac + if [[ "$curves_offered" =~ Unknown ]]; then + fileout "DH_groups" "$quality_str" "$curves_offered ($len_dh_p bits)" + else + fileout "DH_groups" "$quality_str" "$curves_offered" + fi + fi + fi + outln + + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + "$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits" + return 0 +} + + +# good source for configuration and bugs: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS +# good start to read: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Attacks_against_TLS.2FSSL + + +npn_pre(){ + if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then + pr_warning "not tested as proxies do not support proxying it" + fileout "NPN" "WARN" "not tested as proxies do not support proxying it" + return 1 + fi + if ! "$HAS_NPN"; then + pr_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support NPN/SPDY"; + fileout "NPN" "WARN" "not tested $OPENSSL doesn't support NPN/SPDY" + return 7 + fi + return 0 +} + +alpn_pre(){ + if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then + pr_warning "not tested as proxies do not support proxying it" + fileout "ALPN" "WARN" "not tested as proxies do not support proxying it" + return 1 + fi + if ! "$HAS_ALPN" && "$SSL_NATIVE"; then + prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't support ALPN/HTTP2"; + fileout "ALPN" "WARN" "not tested as $OPENSSL does not support it" + return 7 + fi + return 0 +} + +# modern browsers do not support it anymore but we should still test it at least for fingerprinting the server side +# Thus we don't label any support for NPN as good. +# FAST mode skips this test +run_npn() { + local tmpstr + local -i ret=0 + local jsonID="NPN" + + [[ -n "$STARTTLS" ]] && return 0 + "$FAST" && return 0 + pr_bold " NPN/SPDY " + if ! npn_pre; then + outln + return 0 + fi + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-connect $NODEIP:$PORT $BUGS $SNI -nextprotoneg "$NPN_PROTOs"") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && ret=1 + tmpstr="$(grep -a '^Protocols' $TMPFILE | sed 's/Protocols.*: //')" + if [[ -z "$tmpstr" ]] || [[ "$tmpstr" == " " ]]; then + outln "not offered" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" + else + # now comes a strange thing: "Protocols advertised by server:" is empty but connection succeeded + if [[ "$tmpstr" =~ [h2|spdy|http] ]]; then + out "$tmpstr" + outln " (advertised)" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "offered with $tmpstr (advertised)" + else + prln_cyan "please check manually, server response was ambiguous ..." + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "please check manually, server response was ambiguous ..." + ((ret++)) + fi + fi + # btw: nmap can do that too https://nmap.org/nsedoc/scripts/tls-nextprotoneg.html + # nmap --script=tls-nextprotoneg #NODE -p $PORT is your friend if your openssl doesn't want to test this + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return $ret +} + + +run_alpn() { + local tmpstr alpn_extn len + local -i ret=0 + local has_alpn_proto=false + local alpn_finding="" + local jsonID="ALPN" + + [[ -n "$STARTTLS" ]] && return 0 + pr_bold " ALPN/HTTP2 " + if ! alpn_pre; then + outln + return 0 + fi + for proto in $ALPN_PROTOs; do + # for some reason OpenSSL doesn't list the advertised protocols, so instead try common protocols + if "$HAS_ALPN"; then + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-connect $NODEIP:$PORT $BUGS $SNI -alpn $proto") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE + else + alpn_extn="$(printf "%02x" ${#proto}),$(string_to_asciihex "$proto")" + len="$(printf "%04x" $((${#proto}+1)))" + alpn_extn="${len:0:2},${len:2:2},$alpn_extn" + len="$(printf "%04x" $((${#proto}+3)))" + alpn_extn="00,10,${len:0:2},${len:2:2},$alpn_extn" + tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER" "all+" "$alpn_extn" + if [[ -r "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" ]]; then + cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE + else + echo "" > $TMPFILE + fi + fi + tmpstr="$(awk -F':' '/^ALPN protocol*:/ { print $2 }' $TMPFILE)" + if [[ "$tmpstr" == *"$proto" ]]; then + if ! $has_alpn_proto; then + has_alpn_proto=true + else + out ", " + fi + # only h2 is what browser need to use HTTP/2.0 and brings a security,privacy and performance benefit + if [[ "$proto" == "h2" ]]; then + pr_svrty_good "$proto" + fileout "${jsonID}_HTTP2" "OK" "$proto" + else + out "$proto" + alpn_finding+="$proto" + fi + fi + done + if $has_alpn_proto; then + outln " (offered)" + # if h2 is not the only protocol: + [[ -n "$alpn_finding" ]] && fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "$alpn_finding" + else + outln "not offered" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not offered" + fi + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return $ret +} + +# arg1: send string +# arg2: success string: an egrep pattern +# arg3: number of loops we should read from the buffer (optional, otherwise STARTTLS_SLEEP) +starttls_io() { + local nr_waits=$STARTTLS_SLEEP + local buffer="" + local -i i + + [[ -n "$3" ]] && waitsleep=$3 + [[ -z "$2" ]] && echo "FIXME $((LINENO))" + + # If there's a sending part it's IO. Postgres sends via socket and replies via + # strings "S". So there's no I part of IO ;-) + if [[ -n "$1" ]]; then + debugme echo -en "C: $1" + echo -en "$1" >&5 + fi + + # This seems a bit dangerous but works. No blockings yet. "if=nonblock" doesn't work on BSDs + buffer="$(dd bs=512 count=1 <&5 2>/dev/null)" + + for ((i=1; i < $nr_waits; i++ )); do + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 2 ]] && echo -en "\nS: " && echo $buffer + if [[ "$buffer" =~ $2 ]]; then + debugme echo " ---> reply matched \"$2\"" + # the fd sometimes still seem to contain chars which confuses the following TLS handshake, trying to empty: + # dd of=/dev/null bs=512 count=1 <&5 2>/dev/null + return 0 + else + # no match yet, more reading from fd helps. + buffer+=$(dd bs=512 count=1 <&5 2>/dev/null) + fi + done + return 1 +} + + +# Line-based send with newline characters appended (arg2 empty) +# Stream-based send: arg2: <any> +starttls_just_send(){ + if [[ -z "$2" ]] ; then + debugme echo -e "C: $1 plus lf" + echo -ne "$1\r\n" >&5 + else + debugme echo -e "C: $1" + echo -ne "$1" >&5 + fi + return $? +} + +# arg1: (optional): wait time +starttls_just_read(){ + local waitsleep=$STARTTLS_SLEEP + [[ -n "$1" ]] && waitsleep=$1 + if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 2 ]]; then + echo "=== just read banner ===" + cat <&5 & + else + dd of=/dev/null count=8 <&5 2>/dev/null & + fi + wait_kill $! $waitsleep + return 0 +} + +starttls_full_read(){ + local starttls_read_data=() + local one_line="" + local ret=0 + local cont_pattern="$1" + local end_pattern="$2" + local ret_found=0 + + debugme echo "=== reading banner ... ===" + if [[ $# -ge 3 ]]; then + debugme echo "=== we'll have to search for \"$3\" pattern ===" + ret_found=3 + fi + + local oldIFS="$IFS" + IFS='' + while read -r -t $STARTTLS_SLEEP one_line; ret=$?; (exit $ret); do + debugme echo "S: ${one_line}" + if [[ $# -ge 3 ]]; then + if [[ ${one_line} =~ $3 ]]; then + ret_found=0 + debugme echo "^^^^^^^ that's what we were looking for ===" + fi + fi + starttls_read_data+=("${one_line}") + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]]; then + echo "one_line: ${one_line}" + echo "end_pattern: ${end_pattern}" + echo "cont_pattern: ${cont_pattern}" + fi + if [[ ${one_line} =~ ${end_pattern} ]]; then + debugme echo "=== full read finished ===" + IFS="${oldIFS}" + return ${ret_found} + fi + if [[ ! ${one_line} =~ ${cont_pattern} ]]; then + debugme echo "=== full read syntax error, expected regex pattern ${cont_pattern} (cont) or ${end_pattern} (end) ===" + IFS="${oldIFS}" + return 2 + fi + done <&5 + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then + if [[ $ret -ge 128 ]]; then + echo "=== timeout reading ===" + else + echo "=== full read error (no timeout) ===" + fi + fi + IFS="${oldIFS}" + return $ret +} + +starttls_ftp_dialog() { + debugme echo "=== starting ftp STARTTLS dialog ===" + local reAUTHTLS='^ AUTH TLS' + starttls_full_read '^220-' '^220 ' && debugme echo "received server greeting" && + starttls_just_send 'FEAT' && debugme echo "sent FEAT" && + starttls_full_read '^(211-| )' '^211 ' "${reAUTHTLS}" && debugme echo "received server features and checked STARTTLS availability" && + starttls_just_send 'AUTH TLS' && debugme echo "initiated STARTTLS" && + starttls_full_read '^234-' '^234 ' && debugme echo "received ack for STARTTLS" + local ret=$? + debugme echo "=== finished ftp STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ===" + return $ret +} + +# argv1: empty: SMTP, "lmtp" : LMTP +# +starttls_smtp_dialog() { + local greet_str="EHLO" + local proto="smtp" + + if [[ "$1" == lmtp ]]; then + proto="lmtp" + greet_str="LHLO" + fi + debugme echo "=== starting $proto STARTTLS dialog ===" + + local re250STARTTLS='^250[ -]STARTTLS' + starttls_full_read '^220-' '^220 ' && debugme echo "received server greeting" && + starttls_just_send "$greet_str testssl.sh" && debugme echo "sent $greet_str" && + starttls_full_read '^250-' '^250 ' "${re250STARTTLS}" && debugme echo "received server capabilities and checked STARTTLS availability" && + starttls_just_send 'STARTTLS' && debugme echo "initiated STARTTLS" && + starttls_full_read '^220-' '^220 ' && debugme echo "received ack for STARTTLS" + local ret=$? + debugme echo "=== finished $proto STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ===" + return $ret +} + +starttls_pop3_dialog() { + debugme echo "=== starting pop3 STARTTLS dialog ===" + starttls_full_read '^\+OK' '^\+OK' && debugme echo "received server greeting" && + starttls_just_send 'STLS' && debugme echo "initiated STARTTLS" && + starttls_full_read '^\+OK' '^\+OK' && debugme echo "received ack for STARTTLS" + local ret=$? + debugme echo "=== finished pop3 STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ===" + return $ret +} + +starttls_imap_dialog() { + debugme echo "=== starting imap STARTTLS dialog ===" + local reSTARTTLS='^\* CAPABILITY(( .*)? IMAP4rev1( .*)? STARTTLS(.*)?|( .*)? STARTTLS( .*)? IMAP4rev1(.*)?)$' + starttls_full_read '^\* ' '^\* OK ' && debugme echo "received server greeting" && + starttls_just_send 'a001 CAPABILITY' && debugme echo "sent CAPABILITY" && + starttls_full_read '^\* ' '^a001 OK ' "${reSTARTTLS}" && debugme echo "received server capabilities and checked STARTTLS availability" && + starttls_just_send 'a002 STARTTLS' && debugme echo "initiated STARTTLS" && + starttls_full_read '^\* ' '^a002 OK ' && debugme echo "received ack for STARTTLS" + local ret=$? + debugme echo "=== finished imap STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ===" + return $ret +} + +starttls_xmpp_dialog() { + debugme echo "=== starting xmpp STARTTLS dialog ===" + [[ -z $XMPP_HOST ]] && XMPP_HOST="$NODE" + + starttls_io "<stream:stream xmlns:stream='http://etherx.jabber.org/streams' xmlns='jabber:client' to='"$XMPP_HOST"' version='1.0'>" 'starttls(.*)features' 1 && + starttls_io "<starttls xmlns='urn:ietf:params:xml:ns:xmpp-tls'/>" '<proceed' 1 + local ret=$? + debugme echo "=== finished xmpp STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ===" + return $ret +} + +starttls_nntp_dialog() { + debugme echo "=== starting nntp STARTTLS dialog ===" + starttls_full_read '$^' '^20[01] ' && debugme echo "received server greeting" && + starttls_just_send 'STARTTLS' && debugme echo "initiated STARTTLS" && + starttls_full_read '$^' '^382 ' && debugme echo "received ack for STARTTLS" + local ret=$? + debugme echo "=== finished nntp STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ===" + return $ret +} + +starttls_postgres_dialog() { + debugme echo "=== starting postgres STARTTLS dialog ===" + local init_tls=", x00, x00 ,x00 ,x08 ,x04 ,xD2 ,x16 ,x2F" + socksend "${init_tls}" 0 && debugme echo "initiated STARTTLS" && + starttls_io "" S 1 && debugme echo "received ack (="S") for STARTTLS" + local ret=$? + debugme echo "=== finished postgres STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ===" + return $ret +} + +starttls_mysql_dialog() { + debugme echo "=== starting mysql STARTTLS dialog ===" + local login_request=" + , x20, x00, x00, x01, # payload_length, sequence_id + x85, xae, xff, x00, # capability flags, CLIENT_SSL always set + x00, x00, x00, x01, # max-packet size + x21, # character set + x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, # string[23] reserved (all [0]) + x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, + x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00, x00" + socksend "${login_request}" 0 + starttls_just_read 1 && debugme echo "read succeeded" + # 1 is the timeout value which only MySQL needs. Note, there seems no response whether STARTTLS + # succeeded. We could try harder, see https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/apps/s_client.c + # but atm this seems sufficient as later we will fail if there's no STARTTLS. + # BUT: there seem to be cases when the handshake fails (8S01Bad handshake --> 30 38 53 30 31 42 61 64 20 68 61 6e 64 73 68 61 6b 65). + # also there's a banner in the reply "<version><somebytes>mysql_native_password" + # TODO: We could detect if the server supports STARTTLS via the "Server Capabilities" + # bit field, but we'd need to parse the binary stream, with greater precision than regex. + local ret=$? + debugme echo "=== finished mysql STARTTLS dialog with ${ret} ===" + return $ret +} + +# arg1: fd for socket -- which we don't use as it is a hassle and it is not clear whether it works under every bash version +# returns 6 if opening the socket caused a problem, 1 if STARTTLS handshake failed, 0: all ok +# +fd_socket() { + local jabber="" + local proyxline="" + local nodeip="$(tr -d '[]' <<< $NODEIP)" # sockets do not need the square brackets we have of IPv6 addresses + # we just need do it here, that's all! + if [[ -t 5 ]]; then + pr_warning "$PROG_NAME: unable to open a socket because of a tty conflict" + return 6 + fi + if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then + # PROXYNODE works better than PROXYIP on modern versions of squid + if ! exec 5<> /dev/tcp/${PROXYNODE}/${PROXYPORT}; then + outln + pr_warning "$PROG_NAME: unable to open a socket to proxy $PROXYNODE:$PROXYPORT" + return 6 + fi + if "$DNS_VIA_PROXY"; then + printf -- "%b" "CONNECT $NODE:$PORT HTTP/1.0\n\n" >&5 + else + printf -- "%b" "CONNECT $nodeip:$PORT HTTP/1.0\n\n" >&5 + fi + while true; do + read -t $PROXY_WAIT -r proyxline <&5 + if [[ $? -ge 128 ]]; then + pr_warning "Proxy timed out. Unable to CONNECT via proxy. " + close_socket + return 6 + elif [[ "${proyxline%/*}" == HTTP ]]; then + proyxline=${proyxline#* } + if [[ "${proyxline%% *}" != 200 ]]; then + pr_warning "Unable to CONNECT via proxy. " + [[ "$PORT" != 443 ]] && prln_warning "Check whether your proxy supports port $PORT and the underlying protocol." + close_socket + return 6 + fi + fi + if [[ "$proyxline" == $'\r' ]] || [[ -z "$proyxline" ]] ; then + break + fi + done + # For the following execs: 2>/dev/null would remove a potential error message, but disables debugging. + # First we check whether a socket connect timeout was specified + elif [[ -n "$CONNECT_TIMEOUT" ]]; then + if ! $TIMEOUT_CMD $CONNECT_TIMEOUT bash -c "exec 5<>/dev/tcp/$nodeip/$PORT"; then + ((NR_SOCKET_FAIL++)) + connectivity_problem $NR_SOCKET_FAIL $MAX_SOCKET_FAIL "TCP connect problem" "repeated TCP connect problems (connect timeout), giving up" + outln + pr_warning "Unable to open a socket to $NODEIP:$PORT. " + return 6 + fi + # Now comes the the usual case + elif ! exec 5<>/dev/tcp/$nodeip/$PORT; then + ((NR_SOCKET_FAIL++)) + connectivity_problem $NR_SOCKET_FAIL $MAX_SOCKET_FAIL "TCP connect problem" "repeated TCP connect problems, giving up" + outln + pr_warning "Unable to open a socket to $NODEIP:$PORT. " + return 6 + fi + + if [[ -n "$STARTTLS" ]]; then + case "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" in # port + ftp|ftps) # https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4217, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc959 + starttls_ftp_dialog + ;; + smtp|smtps) # SMTP, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc{2033,3207,5321} + starttls_smtp_dialog + ;; + lmtp|lmtps) # LMTP, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc{2033,3207,5321} + starttls_smtp_dialog lmtp + ;; + pop3|pop3s) # POP, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2595 + starttls_pop3_dialog + ;; + nntp|nntps) # NNTP, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4642 + starttls_nntp_dialog + ;; + imap|imaps) # IMAP, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2595, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3501 + starttls_imap_dialog + ;; + irc|ircs) # IRC, https://ircv3.net/specs/extensions/tls-3.1.html, https://ircv3.net/specs/core/capability-negotiation.html + fatal "FIXME: IRC+STARTTLS not yet supported" $ERR_NOSUPPORT + ;; + ldap|ldaps) # LDAP, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2830, https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4511 + fatal "FIXME: LDAP+STARTTLS over sockets not supported yet (try \"--ssl-native\")" $ERR_NOSUPPORT + ;; + acap|acaps) # ACAP = Application Configuration Access Protocol, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2595 + fatal "ACAP Easteregg: not implemented -- probably never will" $ERR_NOSUPPORT + ;; + xmpp|xmpps) # XMPP, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6120 + starttls_xmpp_dialog + # IM observatory: https://xmpp.net , XMPP server directory: https://xmpp.net/directory.php + ;; + postgres) # Postgres SQL, see https://www.postgresql.org/docs/devel/static/protocol-message-formats.html + starttls_postgres_dialog + ;; + mysql) # MySQL, see https://dev.mysql.com/doc/internals/en/x-protocol-lifecycle-lifecycle.html#x-protocol-lifecycle-tls-extension + starttls_mysql_dialog + ;; + *) # we need to throw an error here -- otherwise testssl.sh treats the STARTTLS protocol as plain SSL/TLS which leads to FP + fatal "FIXME: STARTTLS protocol $STARTTLS_PROTOCOL is not yet supported" $ERR_NOSUPPORT + esac + fi + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && return 0 + prln_warning " STARTTLS handshake failed" + return 1 +} + +close_socket(){ + exec 5<&- + exec 5>&- + return 0 +} + +send_close_notify() { + local detected_tlsversion="$1" + + debugme echo "sending close_notify..." + if [[ $detected_tlsversion == 0300 ]]; then + socksend ",x15, x03, x00, x00, x02, x02, x00" 0 + else + socksend ",x15, x03, x01, x00, x02, x02, x00" 0 + fi +} + +# Format string properly for socket +# ARG1: any commented sequence of two bytes hex, separated by commas. It can contain comments, new lines, tabs and white spaces +# NW_STR holds the global with the string prepared for printf, like '\x16\x03\x03\' +code2network() { + NW_STR=$(sed -e 's/,/\\\x/g' <<< "$1" | sed -e 's/# .*$//g' -e 's/ //g' -e '/^$/d' | tr -d '\n' | tr -d '\t') +} + +# sockets inspired by https://blog.chris007.de/using-bash-for-network-socket-operation/ +# ARG1: hexbytes separated by commas, with a leading comma +# ARG2: seconds to sleep +socksend_clienthello() { + local data="" + + code2network "$1" + data="$NW_STR" + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]] && echo && echo "\"$data\"" + if [[ -z "$PRINTF" ]] ;then + # We could also use "dd ibs=1M obs=1M" here but is seems to be at max 3% slower + printf -- "$data" | cat >&5 2>/dev/null & + else + $PRINTF -- "$data" 2>/dev/null >&5 2>/dev/null & + fi + sleep $USLEEP_SND +} + + +# ARG1: hexbytes -- preceded by x -- separated by commas, with a leading comma +# ARG2: seconds to sleep +socksend() { + local data line + + # read line per line and strip comments (bash internal func can't handle multiline statements + data="$(while read line; do + printf "${line%%\#*}" + done <<< "$1" )" + data="${data// /}" # strip ' ' + data="${data//,/\\}" # s&r , by \ + [[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]] && echo && echo "\"$data\"" + if [[ -z "$PRINTF" ]] ;then + printf -- "$data" | cat >&5 2>/dev/null & + else + $PRINTF -- "$data" 2>/dev/null >&5 2>/dev/null & + fi + sleep $2 +} + + +# for SSLv2 to TLS 1.2: +# ARG1: blocksize for reading +sockread_serverhello() { + [[ -z "$2" ]] && maxsleep=$MAX_WAITSOCK || maxsleep=$2 + SOCK_REPLY_FILE=$(mktemp $TEMPDIR/ddreply.XXXXXX) || return 7 + dd bs=$1 of=$SOCK_REPLY_FILE count=1 <&5 2>/dev/null & + wait_kill $! $maxsleep + return $? +} + +#trying a faster version +# ARG1: blocksize for reading +sockread_fast() { + dd bs=$1 count=1 <&5 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' +} + +len2twobytes() { + local len_arg1=${#1} + [[ $len_arg1 -le 2 ]] && LEN_STR=$(printf "00, %02s \n" "$1") + [[ $len_arg1 -eq 3 ]] && LEN_STR=$(printf "0%s, %02s \n" "${1:0:1}" "${1:1:2}") + [[ $len_arg1 -eq 4 ]] && LEN_STR=$(printf "%02s, %02s \n" "${1:0:2}" "${1:2:2}") +} + + +get_pub_key_size() { + local pubkey pubkeybits + local -i i len1 len + + "$HAS_PKEY" || return 1 + + # OpenSSL displays the number of bits for RSA and ECC + pubkeybits=$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -pubkey -in $HOSTCERT 2>>$ERRFILE | $OPENSSL pkey -pubin -text_pub 2>>$ERRFILE | awk -F'(' '/Public-Key/ { print $2 }') + if [[ -n $pubkeybits ]]; then + # remainder e.g. "256 bit)" + pubkeybits="${pubkeybits//\)/}" + echo "Server public key is $pubkeybits" >> $TMPFILE + else + # This extracts the public key for DSA, DH, and GOST + pubkey=$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -pubkey -in $HOSTCERT 2>>$ERRFILE | $OPENSSL pkey -pubin -outform DER 2>>$ERRFILE | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"') + [[ -z "$pubkey" ]] && return 1 + # Skip over tag and length of subjectPublicKeyInfo + i=2 + len1="0x${pubkey:i:2}" + if [[ $len1 -lt 0x80 ]]; then + i=$i+2 + else + len1=$len1-0x80 + i=$i+2*$len1+2 + fi + + # Skip over algorithm field + i=$i+2 + len1="0x${pubkey:i:2}" + i=$i+2 + if [[ $len1 -lt 0x80 ]]; then + i=$i+2*$len1 + else + case $len1 in + 129) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}" ;; + 130) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}" + i=$i+2 + len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}" + ;; + 131) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}" + i=$i+2 + len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}" + i=$i+2 + len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}" + ;; + 132) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}" + i=$i+2 + len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}" + i=$i+2 + len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}" + i=$i+2 + len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}" + ;; + esac + i=$i+2+2*$len + fi + + # Next is the public key BIT STRING. Skip over tag, length, and number of unused bits. + i=$i+2 + len1="0x${pubkey:i:2}" + if [[ $len1 -lt 0x80 ]]; then + i=$i+4 + else + len1=$len1-0x80 + i=$i+2*$len1+4 + fi + + # Now get the length of the public key + i=$i+2 + len1="0x${pubkey:i:2}" + i=$i+2 + if [[ $len1 -lt 0x80 ]]; then + len=$len1 + else + case $len1 in + 129) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}" ;; + 130) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}" + i=$i+2 + len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}" + ;; + 131) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}" + i=$i+2 + len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}" + i=$i+2 + len=256*$len+"0x${pubkey:i:2}" + ;; + 132) len="0x${pubkey:i:2}" + i=$i+2 + len=256*"0x${pubkey:i:2}" + i=$i+2 + len=256*"0x${pubkey:i:2}" + i=$i+2 + len=256*"0x${pubkey:i:2}" + ;; + esac + fi + len=8*$len # convert from bytes to bits + pubkeybits="$(printf "%d" $len)" + echo "Server public key is $pubkeybits bit" >> $TMPFILE + fi + return 0 +} + +# Extract the DH ephemeral key from the ServerKeyExchange message +get_dh_ephemeralkey() { + local tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii="$1" + local -i tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len offset + local dh_p dh_g dh_y dh_param len1 key_bitstring + local -i i dh_p_len dh_g_len dh_y_len dh_param_len + + "$HAS_PKEY" || return 1 + + tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len=${#tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii} + dh_p_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:0:4}") + offset=4+$dh_p_len + if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $offset ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello." + return 1 + fi + + # Subtract any leading 0 bytes + for (( i=4; i < offset; i=i+2 )); do + [[ "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:2}" != "00" ]] && break + dh_p_len=$dh_p_len-2 + done + if [[ $i -ge $offset ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello." + return 1 + fi + dh_p="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:dh_p_len}" + + dh_g_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:4}") + i=4+$offset + offset+=4+$dh_g_len + if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $offset ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello." + return 1 + fi + # Subtract any leading 0 bytes + for (( 1; i < offset; i=i+2 )); do + [[ "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:2}" != "00" ]] && break + dh_g_len=$dh_g_len-2 + done + if [[ $i -ge $offset ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello." + return 1 + fi + dh_g="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:dh_g_len}" + + dh_y_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:offset:4}") + i=4+$offset + offset+=4+$dh_y_len + if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $offset ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello." + return 1 + fi + # Subtract any leading 0 bytes + for (( 1; i < offset; i=i+2 )); do + [[ "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:2}" != "00" ]] && break + dh_y_len=$dh_y_len-2 + done + if [[ $i -ge $offset ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello." + return 1 + fi + dh_y="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:dh_y_len}" + + # The following code assumes that all lengths can be encoded using at most 2 bytes, + # which just means that the encoded length of the public key must be less than + # 65,536 bytes. If the length is anywhere close to that, it is almost certainly an + # encoding error. + if [[ $dh_p_len+$dh_g_len+$dh_y_len -ge 131000 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello." + return 1 + fi + # make ASN.1 INTEGER of p, g, and Y + [[ "0x${dh_p:0:1}" -ge 8 ]] && dh_p_len+=2 && dh_p="00$dh_p" + if [[ $dh_p_len -lt 256 ]]; then + len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_p_len/2)))" + elif [[ $dh_p_len -lt 512 ]]; then + len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_p_len/2)))" + else + len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_p_len/2)))" + fi + dh_p="02${len1}$dh_p" + + [[ "0x${dh_g:0:1}" -ge 8 ]] && dh_g_len+=2 && dh_g="00$dh_g" + if [[ $dh_g_len -lt 256 ]]; then + len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_g_len/2)))" + elif [[ $dh_g_len -lt 512 ]]; then + len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_g_len/2)))" + else + len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_g_len/2)))" + fi + dh_g="02${len1}$dh_g" + + [[ "0x${dh_y:0:1}" -ge 8 ]] && dh_y_len+=2 && dh_y="00$dh_y" + if [[ $dh_y_len -lt 256 ]]; then + len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_y_len/2)))" + elif [[ $dh_y_len -lt 512 ]]; then + len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_y_len/2)))" + else + len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_y_len/2)))" + fi + dh_y="02${len1}$dh_y" + + # Make a SEQUENCE of p and g + dh_param_len=${#dh_p}+${#dh_g} + if [[ $dh_param_len -lt 256 ]]; then + len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_param_len/2)))" + elif [[ $dh_param_len -lt 512 ]]; then + len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_param_len/2)))" + else + len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_param_len/2)))" + fi + dh_param="30${len1}${dh_p}${dh_g}" + + # Make a SEQUENCE of the parameters SEQUENCE and the OID + dh_param_len=22+${#dh_param} + if [[ $dh_param_len -lt 256 ]]; then + len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_param_len/2)))" + elif [[ $dh_param_len -lt 512 ]]; then + len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_param_len/2)))" + else + len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_param_len/2)))" + fi + dh_param="30${len1}06092A864886F70D010301${dh_param}" + + # Encapsulate public key, y, in a BIT STRING + dh_y_len=${#dh_y}+2 + if [[ $dh_y_len -lt 256 ]]; then + len1="$(printf "%02x" $((dh_y_len/2)))" + elif [[ $dh_y_len -lt 512 ]]; then + len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((dh_y_len/2)))" + else + len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((dh_y_len/2)))" + fi + dh_y="03${len1}00$dh_y" + + # Create the public key SEQUENCE + i=${#dh_param}+${#dh_y} + if [[ $i -lt 256 ]]; then + len1="$(printf "%02x" $((i/2)))" + elif [[ $i -lt 512 ]]; then + len1="81$(printf "%02x" $((i/2)))" + else + len1="82$(printf "%04x" $((i/2)))" + fi + key_bitstring="30${len1}${dh_param}${dh_y}" + key_bitstring="$(asciihex_to_binary "$key_bitstring" | $OPENSSL pkey -pubin -inform DER 2> $ERRFILE)" + [[ -z "$key_bitstring" ]] && return 1 + tm_out "$key_bitstring" + return 0 +} + +# arg1: name of file with socket reply +# arg2: true if entire server hello should be parsed +# return values: 0=no SSLv2 (reset) +# 1=no SSLv2 (plaintext reply like it happens with OLS webservers) +# 3=SSLv2 supported (in $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.sslv2_sockets.dd is reply for further processing +# --> there could be checked whether ciphers e.g have been returned at all (or anything else) +# 4=looks like an STARTTLS 5xx message +# 6=socket couldn't be opened +# 7=strange reply we can't deal with +parse_sslv2_serverhello() { + local ret v2_hello_ascii v2_hello_initbyte v2_hello_length + local v2_hello_handshake v2_cert_type v2_hello_cert_length + local v2_hello_cipherspec_length + local -i certificate_len nr_ciphers_detected offset i + local ret=3 + local parse_complete="false" + # SSLv2 server hello: in hex representation, see below + # byte 1+2: length of server hello 0123 + # 3: 04=Handshake message, server hello 45 + # 4: session id hit or not (boolean: 00=false, this 67 + # is the normal case) + # 5: certificate type, 01 = x509 89 + # 6+7 version (00 02 = SSLv2) 10-13 + # 8+9 certificate length 14-17 + # 10+11 cipher spec length 17-20 + # 12+13 connection id length + # [certificate length] ==> certificate + # [cipher spec length] ==> ciphers GOOD: HERE ARE ALL CIPHERS ALREADY! + + # Note: recent SSL/TLS stacks reply with a TLS alert on a SSLv2 client hello. + # The TLS error message is different and could be used for fingerprinting. + + if [[ "$2" == "true" ]]; then + parse_complete=true + fi + "$parse_complete" && echo "======================================" > $TMPFILE + + v2_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' $1) + v2_hello_ascii="${v2_hello_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}" + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && echo "$v2_hello_ascii" + if [[ -z "$v2_hello_ascii" ]]; then + ret=0 # 1 line without any blanks: no server hello received + debugme echo "server hello empty" + else + # now scrape two bytes out of the reply per byte + v2_hello_initbyte="${v2_hello_ascii:0:1}" # normally this belongs to the next, should be 8! + v2_hello_length="${v2_hello_ascii:1:3}" # + 0x8000 see above + v2_hello_handshake="${v2_hello_ascii:4:2}" + v2_cert_type="${v2_hello_ascii:8:2}" + v2_hello_cert_length="${v2_hello_ascii:14:4}" + v2_hello_cipherspec_length="${v2_hello_ascii:18:4}" + + V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH=$(printf "%d\n" "0x$v2_hello_cipherspec_length" 2>/dev/null) + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && ret=7 + + if [[ "${v2_hello_ascii:0:2}" == "35" ]] && "$do_starttls"; then + # this could be a 500/5xx for some weird reason where the STARTTLS handshake failed + debugme echo "$(hex2ascii "$v2_hello_ascii")" + ret=4 + elif [[ "${v2_hello_ascii:0:4}" == "1503" ]]; then + # Cloudflare does this, OpenSSL 1.1.1 and picoTLS. With different alert messages + # Just in case somebody's interested in the exact error, we deliver it ;-) + debugme echo -n ">TLS< alert message discovered: ${v2_hello_ascii} " + case "${v2_hello_ascii:10:2}" in + 01) debugme echo "(01/warning: 0x"${v2_hello_ascii:12:2}"/$(tls_alert "${v2_hello_ascii:12:2}"))" ;; + 02) debugme echo "(02/fatal: 0x"${v2_hello_ascii:12:2}"/$(tls_alert "${v2_hello_ascii:12:2}"))" ;; + *) debugme echo "("${v2_hello_ascii:10:2}" : "${v2_hello_ascii:12:2}"))" ;; + esac + ret=0 + elif [[ $v2_hello_initbyte != "8" ]] || [[ $v2_hello_handshake != "04" ]]; then + ret=1 + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then + echo "no correct server hello" + echo "SSLv2 server init byte: 0x0$v2_hello_initbyte" + echo "SSLv2 hello handshake : 0x$v2_hello_handshake" + fi + fi + + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then + echo "SSLv2 server hello length: 0x0$v2_hello_length" + echo "SSLv2 certificate type: 0x$v2_cert_type" + echo "SSLv2 certificate length: 0x$v2_hello_cert_length" + echo "SSLv2 cipher spec length: 0x$v2_hello_cipherspec_length" + fi + + if "$parse_complete" && [[ 2*$(hex2dec "$v2_hello_length") -ne ${#v2_hello_ascii}-4 ]]; then + ret=7 + fi + fi + + "$parse_complete" || return $ret + + # not sure why we need this + rm -f $HOSTCERT + > $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem + if [[ $ret -eq 3 ]]; then + certificate_len=2*$(hex2dec "$v2_hello_cert_length") + + if [[ "$v2_cert_type" == "01" ]] && [[ "$v2_hello_cert_length" != "00" ]]; then + asciihex_to_binary "${v2_hello_ascii:26:certificate_len}" | \ + $OPENSSL x509 -inform DER -outform PEM -out $HOSTCERT 2>$ERRFILE + if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed certificate in ServerHello." + return 1 + fi + get_pub_key_size + echo "======================================" >> $TMPFILE + fi + + # Output list of supported ciphers + offset=$((certificate_len+26)) + nr_ciphers_detected=$((V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH / 3)) + for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers_detected; i++ )); do + echo "Supported cipher: x$(tolower "${v2_hello_ascii:offset:6}")" >> $TMPFILE + offset=$((offset+6)) + done + echo "======================================" >> $TMPFILE + + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + fi + return $ret +} + +# arg1: hash function +# arg2: key +# arg3: text +hmac() { + local hash_fn="$1" + local key="$2" text="$3" output + local -i ret + + if [[ ! "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]] && [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 3.0.0* ]]; then + output="$(asciihex_to_binary "$text" | $OPENSSL mac -macopt digest:"${hash_fn/-/}" -macopt hexkey:"$key" HMAC 2>/dev/null)" + ret=$? + tm_out "$(strip_lf "$output")" + else + output="$(asciihex_to_binary "$text" | $OPENSSL dgst "$hash_fn" -mac HMAC -macopt hexkey:"$key" 2>/dev/null)" + ret=$? + tm_out "$(awk '/=/ { print $2 }' <<< "$output")" + fi + return $ret +} + +# arg1: hash function +# arg2: pseudorandom key (PRK) +# arg2: info +# arg3: length of output keying material in octets +# See RFC 5869, Section 2.3 +hkdf-expand() { + local hash_fn="$1" + local prk="$2" info="$3" output="" + local -i out_len="$4" + local -i i n mod_check hash_len ret + local counter + local ti tim1 # T(i) and T(i-1) + + case "$hash_fn" in + "-sha256") hash_len=32 ;; + "-sha384") hash_len=48 ;; + *) return 7 + esac + + n=$out_len/$hash_len + mod_check=$out_len%$hash_len + [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && n+=1 + + tim1="" + for (( i=1; i <= n; i++ )); do + counter="$(printf "%02X\n" $i)" + ti="$(hmac "$hash_fn" "$prk" "$tim1$info$counter")" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7 + output+="$ti" + tim1="$ti" + done + out_len=2*$out_len + tm_out "${output:0:out_len}" + return 0 +} + +# arg1: hash function +# arg2: secret +# arg3: label +# arg4: context +# arg5: length +# See RFC 8446, Section 7.1 +hkdf-expand-label() { + local hash_fn="$1" + local secret="$2" label="$3" + local context="$4" + local -i length="$5" + local hkdflabel hkdflabel_label hkdflabel_context + local hkdflabel_length + local -i len + + hkdflabel_length="$(printf "%04X\n" $length)" + if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:2}" == "7F" ]] && [[ 0x${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2} -lt 0x14 ]]; then + # "544c5320312e332c20" = "TLS 1.3, " + hkdflabel_label="544c5320312e332c20$label" + else + # "746c73313320" = "tls13 " + hkdflabel_label="746c73313320$label" + fi + len=${#hkdflabel_label}/2 + hkdflabel_label="$(printf "%02X\n" $len)$hkdflabel_label" + len=${#context}/2 + hkdflabel_context="$(printf "%02X\n" $len)$context" + hkdflabel="$hkdflabel_length$hkdflabel_label$hkdflabel_context" + + hkdf-expand "$hash_fn" "$secret" "$hkdflabel" "$length" + return $? +} + +# arg1: hash function +# arg2: secret +# arg3: label +# arg4: ASCII-HEX of messages +# See RFC 8446, Section 7.1 +derive-secret() { + local hash_fn="$1" + local secret="$2" label="$3" messages="$4" + local hash_messages + local -i hash_len retcode + + case "$hash_fn" in + "-sha256") hash_len=32 ;; + "-sha384") hash_len=48 ;; + *) return 7 + esac + + hash_messages="$(asciihex_to_binary "$messages" | $OPENSSL dgst "$hash_fn" 2>/dev/null | awk '/=/ { print $2 }')" + hkdf-expand-label "$hash_fn" "$secret" "$label" "$hash_messages" "$hash_len" + return $? +} + +# arg1: hash function +# arg2: private key file +# arg3: file containing server's ephemeral public key +# arg4: ASCII-HEX of messages (ClientHello...ServerHello) +# See key derivation schedule diagram in Section 7.1 of RFC 8446 +derive-handshake-traffic-secret() { + local hash_fn="$1" + local priv_file="$2" pub_file="$3" + local messages="$4" + local -i i ret + local early_secret derived_secret shared_secret handshake_secret + + "$HAS_PKUTIL" || return 1 + + # early_secret="$(hmac "$hash_fn" "000...000" "000...000")" + case "$hash_fn" in + "-sha256") early_secret="33ad0a1c607ec03b09e6cd9893680ce210adf300aa1f2660e1b22e10f170f92a" + if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:2}" == "7F" ]] && [[ 0x${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2} -lt 0x14 ]]; then + # "6465726976656420736563726574" = "derived secret" + # derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$early_secret" "6465726976656420736563726574" "")" + derived_secret="c1c0c36bf8fb1d1afa949fbd360e71af69a6244a4c2eaef5bbbb6442a7277d2c" + else + # "64657269766564" = "derived" + # derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$early_secret" "64657269766564" "")" + derived_secret="6f2615a108c702c5678f54fc9dbab69716c076189c48250cebeac3576c3611ba" + fi + ;; + "-sha384") early_secret="7ee8206f5570023e6dc7519eb1073bc4e791ad37b5c382aa10ba18e2357e716971f9362f2c2fe2a76bfd78dfec4ea9b5" + if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:2}" == "7F" ]] && [[ 0x${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2} -lt 0x14 ]]; then + # "6465726976656420736563726574" = "derived secret" + # derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$early_secret" "6465726976656420736563726574" "")" + derived_secret="54c80fa05ee9e0532ce3db8ddeca37a0365683bcd3b27bdc88d2b9fdc115ca4ebc8edc1f0b72a6a0861e803fc34761ef" + else + # "64657269766564" = "derived" + # derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$early_secret" "64657269766564" "")" + derived_secret="1591dac5cbbf0330a4a84de9c753330e92d01f0a88214b4464972fd668049e93e52f2b16fad922fdc0584478428f282b" + fi + ;; + *) return 7 + esac + + shared_secret="$($OPENSSL pkeyutl -derive -inkey "$priv_file" -peerkey "$pub_file" 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')" + + # For draft 18 use $early_secret rather than $derived_secret. + if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:4}" == "7F12" ]]; then + handshake_secret="$(hmac "$hash_fn" "$early_secret" "${shared_secret%%[!0-9A-F]*}")" + else + handshake_secret="$(hmac "$hash_fn" "$derived_secret" "${shared_secret%%[!0-9A-F]*}")" + fi + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7 + + if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:2}" == "7F" ]] && [[ 0x${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2} -lt 0x14 ]]; then + # "7365727665722068616e647368616b65207472616666696320736563726574" = "server handshake traffic secret" + derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$handshake_secret" "7365727665722068616e647368616b65207472616666696320736563726574" "$messages")" + else + # "732068732074726166666963" = "s hs traffic" + derived_secret="$(derive-secret "$hash_fn" "$handshake_secret" "732068732074726166666963" "$messages")" + fi + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7 + tm_out "$derived_secret" + return 0 +} + +# arg1: hash function +# arg2: secret (created by derive-handshake-traffic-secret) +# arg3: purpose ("key" or "iv") +# arg4: length of the key +# See RFC 8446, Section 7.3 +derive-traffic-key() { + local hash_fn="$1" + local secret="$2" purpose="$3" + local -i key_length="$4" + local key + + key="$(hkdf-expand-label "$hash_fn" "$secret" "$purpose" "" "$key_length")" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7 + tm_out "$key" + return 0 +} + +#arg1: TLS cipher +#arg2: file containing cipher name, public key, and private key +#arg3: First ClientHello, if response was a HelloRetryRequest +#arg4: HelloRetryRequest, if one was sent +#arg5: Final (or only) ClientHello +#arg6: ServerHello +derive-handshake-traffic-keys() { + local cipher="$1" + local tmpfile="$2" + local clienthello1="$3" hrr="$4" clienthello2="$5" serverhello="$6" + local hash_clienthello1 + local -i key_len + local -i retcode + local hash_fn + local pub_file priv_file tmpfile + local derived_secret server_write_key server_write_iv + + if [[ "$cipher" == *SHA256 ]]; then + hash_fn="-sha256" + elif [[ "$cipher" == *SHA384 ]]; then + hash_fn="-sha384" + else + return 1 + fi + if [[ "$cipher" == *AES_128* ]]; then + key_len=16 + elif ( [[ "$cipher" == *AES_256* ]] || [[ "$cipher" == *CHACHA20_POLY1305* ]] ); then + key_len=32 + else + return 1 + fi + pub_file="$(mktemp "$TEMPDIR/pubkey.XXXXXX")" || return 7 + awk '/-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY/,/-----END PUBLIC KEY/ { print $0 }' \ + "$tmpfile" > "$pub_file" + [[ ! -s "$pub_file" ]] && return 1 + + priv_file="$(mktemp "$TEMPDIR/privkey.XXXXXX")" || return 7 + if grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN EC PARAMETERS" "$tmpfile"; then + awk '/-----BEGIN EC PARAMETERS/,/-----END EC PRIVATE KEY/ { print $0 }' \ + "$tmpfile" > "$priv_file" + else + awk '/-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY/,/-----END PRIVATE KEY/ { print $0 }' \ + "$tmpfile" > "$priv_file" + fi + [[ ! -s "$priv_file" ]] && return 1 + + if [[ -n "$hrr" ]] && [[ "${serverhello:8:4}" == "7F12" ]]; then + derived_secret="$(derive-handshake-traffic-secret "$hash_fn" "$priv_file" "$pub_file" "$clienthello1$hrr$clienthello2$serverhello")" + elif [[ -n "$hrr" ]]; then + hash_clienthello1="$(asciihex_to_binary "$clienthello1" | $OPENSSL dgst "$hash_fn" 2>/dev/null | awk '/=/ { print $2 }')" + derived_secret="$(derive-handshake-traffic-secret "$hash_fn" "$priv_file" "$pub_file" "FE0000$(printf "%02x" $((${#hash_clienthello1}/2)))$hash_clienthello1$hrr$clienthello2$serverhello")" + else + derived_secret="$(derive-handshake-traffic-secret "$hash_fn" "$priv_file" "$pub_file" "$clienthello2$serverhello")" + fi + retcode=$? + rm $pub_file $priv_file + [[ $retcode -ne 0 ]] && return 1 + # "6b6579" = "key" + server_write_key="$(derive-traffic-key "$hash_fn" "$derived_secret" "6b6579" "$key_len")" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1 + # "6976" = "iv" + server_write_iv="$(derive-traffic-key "$hash_fn" "$derived_secret" "6976" "12")" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1 + tm_out "$server_write_key $server_write_iv" + return 0 +} + +generate-ccm-gcm-keystream() { + local icb="$1" icb_msb icb_lsb1 + local -i i icb_lsb n="$2" + + icb_msb="${icb:0:24}" + icb_lsb=0x${icb:24:8} + + for (( i=0; i < n; i=i+1 )); do + icb_lsb1="$(printf "%08X" $icb_lsb)" + printf "\x${icb_msb:0:2}\x${icb_msb:2:2}\x${icb_msb:4:2}\x${icb_msb:6:2}\x${icb_msb:8:2}\x${icb_msb:10:2}\x${icb_msb:12:2}\x${icb_msb:14:2}\x${icb_msb:16:2}\x${icb_msb:18:2}\x${icb_msb:20:2}\x${icb_msb:22:2}\x${icb_lsb1:0:2}\x${icb_lsb1:2:2}\x${icb_lsb1:4:2}\x${icb_lsb1:6:2}" + icb_lsb+=1 + done + return 0 +} + +# arg1: an OpenSSL ecb cipher (e.g., -aes-128-ecb) +# arg2: key +# arg3: initial counter value (must be 128 bits) +# arg4: ciphertext +# See Sections 6.5 and 7.2 of SP 800-38D and Section 6.2 and Appendix A of SP 800-38C +ccm-gcm-decrypt() { + local cipher="$1" + local key="$2" + local icb="$3" + local ciphertext="$4" + local -i i i1 i2 i3 i4 + local -i ciphertext_len n mod_check + local y plaintext="" + + [[ ${#icb} -ne 32 ]] && return 7 + + ciphertext_len=${#ciphertext} + n=$ciphertext_len/32 + mod_check=$ciphertext_len%32 + [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && n+=1 + y="$(generate-ccm-gcm-keystream "$icb" "$n" | $OPENSSL enc "$cipher" -K "$key" -nopad 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')" + + # XOR the ciphertext with the keystream ($y). For efficiency, work in blocks of 16 bytes at a time (but with each XOR operation working on + # 32 bits. + [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]] && n=$n-1 + for (( i=0; i < n; i++ )); do + i1=32*$i; i2=$i1+8; i3=$i1+16; i4=$i1+24 + plaintext+="$(printf "%08X%08X%08X%08X" "$((0x${ciphertext:i1:8} ^ 0x${y:i1:8}))" "$((0x${ciphertext:i2:8} ^ 0x${y:i2:8}))" "$((0x${ciphertext:i3:8} ^ 0x${y:i3:8}))" "$((0x${ciphertext:i4:8} ^ 0x${y:i4:8}))")" + done + # If the length of the ciphertext is not an even multiple of 16 bytes, then handle the final incomplete block. + if [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]]; then + i1=32*$n + for (( i=0; i < mod_check; i=i+2 )); do + plaintext+="$(printf "%02X" "$((0x${ciphertext:i1:2} ^ 0x${y:i1:2}))")" + i1+=2 + done + fi + tm_out "$plaintext" + return 0 +} + +# See RFC 7539, Section 2.1 +chacha20_Qround() { + local -i a="0x$1" + local -i b="0x$2" + local -i c="0x$3" + local -i d="0x$4" + local -i x y + + a=$(((a+b) & 0xffffffff)) + d=$((d^a)) + # rotate d left 16 bits + x=$((d & 0xffff0000)) + x=$((x >> 16)) + y=$((d & 0x0000ffff)) + y=$((y << 16)) + d=$((x | y)) + + c=$(((c+d) & 0xffffffff)) + b=$((b^c)) + # rotate b left 12 bits + x=$((b & 0xfff00000)) + x=$((x >> 20)) + y=$((b & 0x000fffff)) + y=$((y << 12)) + b=$((x | y)) + + a=$(((a+b) & 0xffffffff)) + d=$((d^a)) + # rotate d left 8 bits + x=$((d & 0xff000000)) + x=$((x >> 24)) + y=$((d & 0x00ffffff)) + y=$((y << 8)) + d=$((x | y)) + + c=$(((c+d) & 0xffffffff)) + b=$((b^c)) + # rotate b left 7 bits + x=$((b & 0xfe000000)) + x=$((x >> 25)) + y=$((b & 0x01ffffff)) + y=$((y << 7)) + b=$((x | y)) + + tm_out "$(printf "%x" $a) $(printf "%x" $b) $(printf "%x" $c) $(printf "%x" $d)" + return 0 +} + +# See RFC 7539, Section 2.3.1 +chacha20_inner_block() { + local s0="$1" s1="$2" s2="$3" s3="$4" + local s4="$5" s5="$6" s6="$7" s7="$8" + local s8="$9" s9="${10}" s10="${11}" s11="${12}" + local s12="${13}" s13="${14}" s14="${15}" s15="${16}" + local res + + res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s0" "$s4" "$s8" "$s12")" + read -r s0 s4 s8 s12 <<< "$res" + res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s1" "$s5" "$s9" "$s13")" + read -r s1 s5 s9 s13 <<< "$res" + res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s2" "$s6" "$s10" "$s14")" + read -r s2 s6 s10 s14 <<< "$res" + res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s3" "$s7" "$s11" "$s15")" + read -r s3 s7 s11 s15 <<< "$res" + res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s0" "$s5" "$s10" "$s15")" + read -r s0 s5 s10 s15 <<< "$res" + res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s1" "$s6" "$s11" "$s12")" + read -r s1 s6 s11 s12 <<< "$res" + res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s2" "$s7" "$s8" "$s13")" + read -r s2 s7 s8 s13 <<< "$res" + res="$(chacha20_Qround "$s3" "$s4" "$s9" "$s14")" + read -r s3 s4 s9 s14 <<< "$res" + + tm_out "$s0 $s1 $s2 $s3 $s4 $s5 $s6 $s7 $s8 $s9 $s10 $s11 $s12 $s13 $s14 $s15" + return 0 +} + +# See RFC 7539, Sections 2.3 and 2.3.1 +chacha20_block() { + local key="$1" + local counter="$2" + local nonce="$3" + local s0 s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9 s10 s11 s12 s13 s14 s15 + local ws0 ws1 ws2 ws3 ws4 ws5 ws6 ws7 ws8 ws9 ws10 ws11 ws12 ws13 ws14 ws15 + local working_state + local -i i + + # create the state variable + s0="61707865"; s1="3320646e"; s2="79622d32"; s3="6b206574" + s4="${key:6:2}${key:4:2}${key:2:2}${key:0:2}" + s5="${key:14:2}${key:12:2}${key:10:2}${key:8:2}" + s6="${key:22:2}${key:20:2}${key:18:2}${key:16:2}" + s7="${key:30:2}${key:28:2}${key:26:2}${key:24:2}" + s8="${key:38:2}${key:36:2}${key:34:2}${key:32:2}" + s9="${key:46:2}${key:44:2}${key:42:2}${key:40:2}" + s10="${key:54:2}${key:52:2}${key:50:2}${key:48:2}" + s11="${key:62:2}${key:60:2}${key:58:2}${key:56:2}" + s12="$counter" + s13="${nonce:6:2}${nonce:4:2}${nonce:2:2}${nonce:0:2}" + s14="${nonce:14:2}${nonce:12:2}${nonce:10:2}${nonce:8:2}" + s15="${nonce:22:2}${nonce:20:2}${nonce:18:2}${nonce:16:2}" + + # Initialize working_state to state + working_state="$s0 $s1 $s2 $s3 $s4 $s5 $s6 $s7 $s8 $s9 $s10 $s11 $s12 $s13 $s14 $s15" + + # compute the 20 rounds (10 calls to inner block function, each of which + # performs 8 quarter rounds). + for (( i=0 ; i < 10; i++ )); do + working_state="$(chacha20_inner_block $working_state)" + done + read -r ws0 ws1 ws2 ws3 ws4 ws5 ws6 ws7 ws8 ws9 ws10 ws11 ws12 ws13 ws14 ws15 <<< "$working_state" + + # Add working state to state + s0="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s0+0x$ws0) & 0xffffffff)))" + s1="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s1+0x$ws1) & 0xffffffff)))" + s2="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s2+0x$ws2) & 0xffffffff)))" + s3="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s3+0x$ws3) & 0xffffffff)))" + s4="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s4+0x$ws4) & 0xffffffff)))" + s5="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s5+0x$ws5) & 0xffffffff)))" + s6="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s6+0x$ws6) & 0xffffffff)))" + s7="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s7+0x$ws7) & 0xffffffff)))" + s8="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s8+0x$ws8) & 0xffffffff)))" + s9="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s9+0x$ws9) & 0xffffffff)))" + s10="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s10+0x$ws10) & 0xffffffff)))" + s11="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s11+0x$ws11) & 0xffffffff)))" + s12="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s12+0x$ws12) & 0xffffffff)))" + s13="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s13+0x$ws13) & 0xffffffff)))" + s14="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s14+0x$ws14) & 0xffffffff)))" + s15="$(printf "%08X" $(((0x$s15+0x$ws15) & 0xffffffff)))" + + # serialize the state + s0="${s0:6:2}${s0:4:2}${s0:2:2}${s0:0:2}" + s1="${s1:6:2}${s1:4:2}${s1:2:2}${s1:0:2}" + s2="${s2:6:2}${s2:4:2}${s2:2:2}${s2:0:2}" + s3="${s3:6:2}${s3:4:2}${s3:2:2}${s3:0:2}" + s4="${s4:6:2}${s4:4:2}${s4:2:2}${s4:0:2}" + s5="${s5:6:2}${s5:4:2}${s5:2:2}${s5:0:2}" + s6="${s6:6:2}${s6:4:2}${s6:2:2}${s6:0:2}" + s7="${s7:6:2}${s7:4:2}${s7:2:2}${s7:0:2}" + s8="${s8:6:2}${s8:4:2}${s8:2:2}${s8:0:2}" + s9="${s9:6:2}${s9:4:2}${s9:2:2}${s9:0:2}" + s10="${s10:6:2}${s10:4:2}${s10:2:2}${s10:0:2}" + s11="${s11:6:2}${s11:4:2}${s11:2:2}${s11:0:2}" + s12="${s12:6:2}${s12:4:2}${s12:2:2}${s12:0:2}" + s13="${s13:6:2}${s13:4:2}${s13:2:2}${s13:0:2}" + s14="${s14:6:2}${s14:4:2}${s14:2:2}${s14:0:2}" + s15="${s15:6:2}${s15:4:2}${s15:2:2}${s15:0:2}" + + tm_out "$s0$s1$s2$s3$s4$s5$s6$s7$s8$s9$s10$s11$s12$s13$s14$s15" + return 0 +} + +# See RFC 7539, Section 2.4 +chacha20() { + local key="$1" + local -i counter=1 + local nonce="$2" + local ciphertext="$3" + local -i i ciphertext_len num_blocks mod_check + local -i i1 i2 i3 i4 i5 i6 i7 i8 i9 i10 i11 i12 i13 i14 i15 i16 + local keystream plaintext="" + + ciphertext_len=${#ciphertext} + num_blocks=$ciphertext_len/128 + + for (( i=0; i < num_blocks; i++)); do + i1=128*$i; i2=$i1+8; i3=$i1+16; i4=$i1+24; i5=$i1+32; i6=$i1+40; i7=$i1+48; i8=$i1+56 + i9=$i1+64; i10=$i1+72; i11=$i1+80; i12=$i1+88; i13=$i1+96; i14=$i1+104; i15=$i1+112; i16=$i1+120 + keystream="$(chacha20_block "$key" "$(printf "%08X" $counter)" "$nonce")" + plaintext+="$(printf "%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X%08X" \ + "$((0x${ciphertext:i1:8} ^ 0x${keystream:0:8}))" \ + "$((0x${ciphertext:i2:8} ^ 0x${keystream:8:8}))" \ + "$((0x${ciphertext:i3:8} ^ 0x${keystream:16:8}))" \ + "$((0x${ciphertext:i4:8} ^ 0x${keystream:24:8}))" \ + "$((0x${ciphertext:i5:8} ^ 0x${keystream:32:8}))" \ + "$((0x${ciphertext:i6:8} ^ 0x${keystream:40:8}))" \ + "$((0x${ciphertext:i7:8} ^ 0x${keystream:48:8}))" \ + "$((0x${ciphertext:i8:8} ^ 0x${keystream:56:8}))" \ + "$((0x${ciphertext:i9:8} ^ 0x${keystream:64:8}))" \ + "$((0x${ciphertext:i10:8} ^ 0x${keystream:72:8}))" \ + "$((0x${ciphertext:i11:8} ^ 0x${keystream:80:8}))" \ + "$((0x${ciphertext:i12:8} ^ 0x${keystream:88:8}))" \ + "$((0x${ciphertext:i13:8} ^ 0x${keystream:96:8}))" \ + "$((0x${ciphertext:i14:8} ^ 0x${keystream:104:8}))" \ + "$((0x${ciphertext:i15:8} ^ 0x${keystream:112:8}))" \ + "$((0x${ciphertext:i16:8} ^ 0x${keystream:120:8}))")" + counter+=1 + done + + mod_check=$ciphertext_len%128 + if [[ $mod_check -ne 0 ]]; then + keystream="$(chacha20_block "$key" "$(printf "%08X" $counter)" "$nonce")" + i1=128*$num_blocks + for (( i=0; i < mod_check; i=i+2 )); do + plaintext+="$(printf "%02X" "$((0x${ciphertext:i1:2} ^ 0x${keystream:i:2}))")" + i1+=2 + done + fi + tm_out "$plaintext" + return 0 +} + +# arg1: TLS cipher +# arg2: key +# arg3: nonce (must be 96 bits in length) +# arg4: ciphertext +sym-decrypt() { + local cipher="$1" + local key="$2" nonce="$3" + local ciphertext="$4" + local ossl_cipher + local plaintext + local -i ciphertext_len tag_len + + case "$cipher" in + *CCM_8*) + tag_len=16 ;; + *CCM*|*GCM*|*CHACHA20_POLY1305*) + tag_len=32 ;; + *) + return 7 ;; + esac + + # The final $tag_len characters of the ciphertext are the authentication tag + ciphertext_len=${#ciphertext} + [[ $ciphertext_len -lt $tag_len ]] && return 7 + ciphertext_len=$ciphertext_len-$tag_len + + if [[ "$cipher" =~ CHACHA20_POLY1305 ]]; then + if "$HAS_CHACHA20"; then + plaintext="$(asciihex_to_binary "${ciphertext:0:ciphertext_len}" | \ + $OPENSSL enc -chacha20 -K "$key" -iv "01000000$nonce" 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')" + plaintext="$(strip_spaces "$plaintext")" + else + plaintext="$(chacha20 "$key" "$nonce" "${ciphertext:0:ciphertext_len}")" + fi + elif [[ "$cipher" == TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 ]] && "$HAS_AES128_GCM"; then + plaintext="$(asciihex_to_binary "${ciphertext:0:ciphertext_len}" | \ + $OPENSSL enc -aes-128-gcm -K "$key" -iv "$nonce" 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')" + plaintext="$(strip_spaces "$plaintext")" + elif [[ "$cipher" == TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 ]] && "$HAS_AES256_GCM"; then + plaintext="$(asciihex_to_binary "${ciphertext:0:ciphertext_len}" | \ + $OPENSSL enc -aes-256-gcm -K "$key" -iv "$nonce" 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')" + plaintext="$(strip_spaces "$plaintext")" + else + if [[ "$cipher" =~ AES_128 ]]; then + ossl_cipher="-aes-128-ecb" + elif [[ "$cipher" =~ AES_256 ]]; then + ossl_cipher="-aes-256-ecb" + else + return 7 + fi + if [[ "$cipher" =~ CCM ]]; then + plaintext="$(ccm-gcm-decrypt "$ossl_cipher" "$key" "02${nonce}000001" "${ciphertext:0:ciphertext_len}")" + else # GCM + plaintext="$(ccm-gcm-decrypt "$ossl_cipher" "$key" "${nonce}00000002" "${ciphertext:0:ciphertext_len}")" + fi + fi + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 7 + + tm_out "$plaintext" + return 0 +} + +# arg1: iv +# arg2: sequence number +get-nonce() { + local iv="$1" + local -i seq_num="$2" + local -i len lsb + local msb nonce + + len=${#iv} + [[ $len -lt 8 ]] && return 7 + i=$len-8 + msb="${iv:0:i}" + lsb="0x${iv:i:8}" + nonce="${msb}$(printf "%08X" "$((lsb ^ seq_num))")" + tm_out "$nonce" + return 0 +} + +# Return: +# 0 if arg1 contains the entire server response. +# 1 if arg1 does not contain the entire server response. +# 2 if the response is malformed. +# 3 if (a) the response version is TLSv1.3; +# (b) arg1 contains the entire ServerHello (and appears to contain the entire response); +# (c) the entire response is supposed to be parsed; and +# (d) the key and IV have not been provided to decrypt the response. +# arg1: ASCII-HEX encoded reply +# arg2: whether to process the full request ("all") or just the basic request plus the ephemeral key if any ("ephemeralkey"). +# arg3: TLS cipher for decrypting TLSv1.3 response +# arg4: key and IV for decrypting TLSv1.3 response +check_tls_serverhellodone() { + local tls_hello_ascii="$1" + local process_full="$2" + local cipher="$3" + local key_and_iv="$4" + local tls_handshake_ascii="" tls_alert_ascii="" + local -i i tls_hello_ascii_len tls_handshake_ascii_len tls_alert_ascii_len + local -i msg_len remaining tls_serverhello_ascii_len sid_len + local -i j offset tls_extensions_len extension_len + local tls_content_type tls_protocol tls_handshake_type tls_msg_type extension_type + local tls_err_level + local key iv + local -i seq_num=0 plaintext_len + local plaintext decrypted_response="" + + DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="" + + [[ -n "$key_and_iv" ]] && read -r key iv <<< "$key_and_iv" + + if [[ -z "$tls_hello_ascii" ]]; then + return 0 # no server hello received + fi + + tls_hello_ascii_len=${#tls_hello_ascii} + for (( i=0; i<tls_hello_ascii_len; i=i+msg_len )); do + remaining=$tls_hello_ascii_len-$i + [[ $remaining -lt 10 ]] && return 1 + + tls_content_type="${tls_hello_ascii:i:2}" + [[ "$tls_content_type" != 14 ]] && [[ "$tls_content_type" != 15 ]] && \ + [[ "$tls_content_type" != 16 ]] && [[ "$tls_content_type" != 17 ]] && return 2 + i=$i+2 + tls_protocol="${tls_hello_ascii:i:4}" + [[ -z "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" ]] && DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="$tls_protocol" + [[ "${tls_protocol:0:2}" != 03 ]] && return 2 + i=$i+4 + msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:i:4}") + i=$i+4 + remaining=$tls_hello_ascii_len-$i + [[ $msg_len -gt $remaining ]] && return 1 + + if [[ "$tls_content_type" == 16 ]]; then + tls_handshake_ascii+="${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}" + tls_handshake_ascii_len=${#tls_handshake_ascii} + decrypted_response+="$tls_content_type$tls_protocol$(printf "%04X" $((msg_len/2)))${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}" + # the ServerHello MUST be the first handshake message + [[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len -ge 2 ]] && [[ "${tls_handshake_ascii:0:2}" != 02 ]] && return 2 + if [[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len -ge 12 ]]; then + DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="${tls_handshake_ascii:8:4}" + + # In TLSv1.3 (starting with draft 22), the version field specifies TLSv1.2, but + # there is a supported_versions extension that specifies the actual version. So, + # if the version field specifies TLSv1.2, then check to see if there is a + # supported_versions extension. + if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0303 ]]; then + tls_serverhello_ascii_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:2:6}") + sid_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:76:2}") + if [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -gt 76+$sid_len ]]; then + # ServerHello contains extensions, so check for supported_versions extension + offset=84+$sid_len + tls_extensions_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:4}") + [[ $tls_extensions_len -ne $tls_serverhello_ascii_len-$sid_len-80 ]] && return 2 + for (( j=0; j<tls_extensions_len; j=j+8+extension_len )); do + [[ $tls_extensions_len-$j -lt 8 ]] && return 2 + offset=88+$sid_len+$j + extension_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:4}" + offset=92+$sid_len+$j + extension_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:4}") + [[ $extension_len -gt $tls_extensions_len-$j-8 ]] && return 2 + if [[ "$extension_type" == 002B ]]; then # supported_versions + [[ $extension_len -ne 4 ]] && return 2 + offset=96+$sid_len+$j + DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:4}" + fi + done + fi + fi + # A version of {0x7F, xx} represents an implementation of a draft version of TLS 1.3 + [[ "${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}" == 7F ]] && DETECTED_TLS_VERSION=0304 + if [[ 0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION -ge 0x0304 ]] && [[ "$process_full" == ephemeralkey ]]; then + tls_serverhello_ascii_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:2:6}") + if [[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len -ge $tls_serverhello_ascii_len+8 ]]; then + tm_out "" + return 0 # The entire ServerHello message has been received (and the rest isn't needed) + fi + fi + fi + elif [[ "$tls_content_type" == 15 ]]; then # TLS ALERT + tls_alert_ascii+="${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}" + decrypted_response+="$tls_content_type$tls_protocol$(printf "%04X" $((msg_len/2)))${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}" + elif [[ "$tls_content_type" == 17 ]] && [[ -n "$key_and_iv" ]]; then # encrypted data + nonce="$(get-nonce "$iv" "$seq_num")" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 2 + plaintext="$(sym-decrypt "$cipher" "$key" "$nonce" "${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}")" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 2 + seq_num+=1 + + # Remove zeros from end of plaintext, if any + plaintext_len=${#plaintext}-2 + while [[ "${plaintext:plaintext_len:2}" == 00 ]]; do + plaintext_len=$plaintext_len-2 + done + tls_content_type="${plaintext:plaintext_len:2}" + decrypted_response+="${tls_content_type}0301$(printf "%04X" $((plaintext_len/2)))${plaintext:0:plaintext_len}" + if [[ "$tls_content_type" == 16 ]]; then + tls_handshake_ascii+="${plaintext:0:plaintext_len}" + elif [[ "$tls_content_type" == 15 ]]; then + tls_alert_ascii+="${plaintext:0:plaintext_len}" + else + return 2 + fi + fi + done + + # If there is a fatal alert, then we are done. + tls_alert_ascii_len=${#tls_alert_ascii} + for (( i=0; i<tls_alert_ascii_len; i=i+4 )); do + remaining=$tls_alert_ascii_len-$i + [[ $remaining -lt 4 ]] && return 1 + tls_err_level=${tls_alert_ascii:i:2} # 1: warning, 2: fatal + [[ $tls_err_level == 02 ]] && DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="" && tm_out "" && return 0 + done + + # If there is a serverHelloDone or Finished, then we are done. + tls_handshake_ascii_len=${#tls_handshake_ascii} + for (( i=0; i<tls_handshake_ascii_len; i=i+msg_len )); do + remaining=$tls_handshake_ascii_len-$i + [[ $remaining -lt 8 ]] && return 1 + tls_msg_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:2}" + i=$i+2 + msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:i:6}") + i=$i+6 + remaining=$tls_handshake_ascii_len-$i + [[ $msg_len -gt $remaining ]] && return 1 + + # For SSLv3 - TLS1.2 look for a ServerHelloDone message. + # For TLS 1.3 look for a Finished message. + [[ $tls_msg_type == 0E ]] && tm_out "" && return 0 + [[ $tls_msg_type == 14 ]] && tm_out "$decrypted_response" && return 0 + done + # If the response is TLSv1.3 and the full response is to be processed, but the + # key and IV have not been provided to decrypt the response, then return 3 if + # the entire ServerHello has been received. + if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0304 ]] && [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && \ + [[ -z "$key_and_iv" ]] && [[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len -gt 0 ]]; then + return 3 + fi + # If we haven't encountered a fatal alert or a server hello done, + # then there must be more data to retrieve. + return 1 +} + +# arg1: tls alert error/warning code +# returns: description +tls_alert() { + local tls_alert_text="" + + case "$1" in + 00) tls_alert_text="close notify" ;; + 0A) tls_alert_text="unexpected message" ;; + 14) tls_alert_text="bad record mac" ;; + 15) tls_alert_text="decryption failed" ;; + 16) tls_alert_text="record overflow" ;; + 1E) tls_alert_text="decompression failure" ;; + 28) tls_alert_text="handshake failure" ;; + 29) tls_alert_text="no certificate RESERVED" ;; + 2A) tls_alert_text="bad certificate" ;; + 2B) tls_alert_text="unsupported certificate" ;; + 2C) tls_alert_text="certificate revoked" ;; + 2D) tls_alert_text="certificate expired" ;; + 2E) tls_alert_text="certificate unknown" ;; + 2F) tls_alert_text="illegal parameter" ;; + 30) tls_alert_text="unknown ca" ;; + 31) tls_alert_text="access denied" ;; + 32) tls_alert_text="decode error" ;; + 33) tls_alert_text="decrypt error" ;; + 3C) tls_alert_text="export restriction RESERVED" ;; + 46) tls_alert_text="protocol version" ;; + 47) tls_alert_text="insufficient security" ;; + 50) tls_alert_text="internal error" ;; + 56) tls_alert_text="inappropriate fallback" ;; + 5A) tls_alert_text="user canceled" ;; + 64) tls_alert_text="no renegotiation" ;; + 6D) tls_alert_text="missing extension" ;; + 6E) tls_alert_text="unsupported extension" ;; + 6F) tls_alert_text="certificate unobtainable" ;; + 70) tls_alert_text="unrecognized name" ;; + 71) tls_alert_text="bad certificate status response" ;; + 72) tls_alert_text="bad certificate hash value" ;; + 73) tls_alert_text="unknown psk identity" ;; + 74) tls_alert_text="certificate required" ;; + 78) tls_alert_text="no application protocol" ;; + *) tls_alert_text="$(hex2dec "$1")";; + esac + echo "$tls_alert_text" + return 0 +} + +# arg1: ASCII-HEX encoded reply +# arg2: (optional): "all" or "all+" - process full response (including Certificate and certificate_status handshake messages) +# "ephemeralkey" - extract the server's ephemeral key (if any) +# arg3: (optional): CIPHER_SUITES string (lowercase, and in the format output by code2network()) +# If present, parse_tls_serverhello() will check that the cipher in the ServerHello appears in +# the CIPHER_SUITES string. +parse_tls_serverhello() { + local tls_hello_ascii="$1" + local process_full="$2" + local cipherlist="$3" + local tls_handshake_ascii="" tls_alert_ascii="" + local -i tls_hello_ascii_len tls_handshake_ascii_len tls_alert_ascii_len msg_len + local tls_serverhello_ascii="" tls_certificate_ascii="" + local tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii="" tls_certificate_status_ascii="" + local tls_encryptedextensions_ascii="" tls_revised_certificate_msg="" + local -i tls_serverhello_ascii_len=0 tls_certificate_ascii_len=0 + local -i tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len=0 tls_certificate_status_ascii_len=0 + local -i tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len=0 + local added_encrypted_extensions=false + local tls_alert_descrip tls_sid_len_hex issuerDN subjectDN CAissuerDN CAsubjectDN + local -i tls_sid_len offset extns_offset nr_certs=0 + local tls_msg_type tls_content_type tls_protocol tls_protocol2 tls_hello_time + local tls_err_level tls_err_descr_no tls_cipher_suite rfc_cipher_suite tls_compression_method + local tls_extensions="" extension_type named_curve_str="" named_curve_oid + local -i i j extension_len extn_len tls_extensions_len ocsp_response_len=0 ocsp_response_list_len ocsp_resp_offset + local -i certificate_list_len certificate_len cipherlist_len + local -i curve_type named_curve + local -i dh_bits=0 msb mask + local hostcert_issuer="" + local len1 len2 len3 key_bitstring="" pem_certificate + local dh_p dh_param ephemeral_param rfc7919_param + local -i dh_p_len dh_param_len + + DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && echo > $TMPFILE + + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && echo $tls_hello_ascii # one line without any blanks + + # Client messages, including handshake messages, are carried by the record layer. + # First, extract the handshake and alert messages. + # see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security-SSL#TLS_record + # byte 0: content type: 0x14=CCS, 0x15=TLS alert x16=Handshake, 0x17 Application, 0x18=HB + # byte 1+2: TLS version word, major is 03, minor 00=SSL3, 01=TLS1 02=TLS1.1 03=TLS 1.2 + # byte 3+4: fragment length + # bytes 5...: message fragment + tls_hello_ascii_len=${#tls_hello_ascii} + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && [[ $tls_hello_ascii_len -gt 0 ]]; then + echo "TLS message fragments:" + fi + for (( i=0; i<tls_hello_ascii_len; i=i+msg_len )); do + if [[ $tls_hello_ascii_len-$i -lt 10 ]]; then + if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then + # The entire server response should have been retrieved. + debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + else + # This could just be a result of the server's response being + # split across two or more packets. + break + fi + fi + tls_content_type="${tls_hello_ascii:i:2}" + i=$i+2 + tls_protocol="${tls_hello_ascii:i:4}" + i=$i+4 + msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:i:4}") + i=$i+4 + + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then + echo " protocol (rec. layer): 0x$tls_protocol" + echo -n " tls_content_type: 0x$tls_content_type" + case $tls_content_type in + 14) tmln_out " (change cipher spec)" ;; + 15) tmln_out " (alert)" ;; + 16) tmln_out " (handshake)" ;; + 17) tmln_out " (application data)" ;; + *) tmln_out ;; + esac + echo " msg_len: $((msg_len/2))" + tmln_out + fi + + if "$do_starttls" ; then + if [[ $tls_content_type == 35 ]] || [[ $tls_content_type == 34 ]]; then + # STARTTLS handshake failed and server replied plaintext with a 5xx or 4xx + [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && printf "%s\n" "400/500: $(hex2ascii "$tls_hello_ascii" 2>/dev/null)" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 4 + elif [[ "$tls_hello_ascii" =~ 6130303220 ]]; then + [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && printf "%s\n" "probably IMAP plaintext reply \"$(hex2ascii "${tls_hello_ascii:0:32}" 2>/dev/null)\"" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 3 + fi + fi + if [[ $tls_content_type != 14 ]] && [[ $tls_content_type != 15 ]] && \ + [[ $tls_content_type != 16 ]] && [[ $tls_content_type != 17 ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Content type other than alert, handshake, change cipher spec, or application data detected." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + elif [[ "${tls_protocol:0:2}" != 03 ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Protocol record_version.major is not 03." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + DETECTED_TLS_VERSION=$tls_protocol + + if [[ $msg_len -gt $tls_hello_ascii_len-$i ]]; then + if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 7 + else + # This could just be a result of the server's response being split + # across two or more packets. Just grab the part that is available. + msg_len=$tls_hello_ascii_len-$i + fi + fi + + if [[ $tls_content_type == 16 ]]; then + tls_handshake_ascii="$tls_handshake_ascii${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}" + elif [[ $tls_content_type == 15 ]]; then # TLS ALERT + tls_alert_ascii="$tls_alert_ascii${tls_hello_ascii:i:msg_len}" + fi + done + + # Now check the alert messages. + tls_alert_ascii_len=${#tls_alert_ascii} + if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && [[ $tls_alert_ascii_len%4 -ne 0 ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + + if [[ $tls_alert_ascii_len -gt 0 ]]; then + debugme echo "TLS alert messages:" + for (( i=0; i+3 < tls_alert_ascii_len; i=i+4 )); do + tls_err_level=${tls_alert_ascii:i:2} # 1: warning, 2: fatal + j=$i+2 + tls_err_descr_no=${tls_alert_ascii:j:2} + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then + debugme tm_out " tls_err_descr_no: 0x${tls_err_descr_no} / = $(hex2dec ${tls_err_descr_no})" + tls_alert_descrip="$(tls_alert "$tls_err_descr_no")" + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then + tmln_out " ($tls_alert_descrip)" + tm_out " tls_err_level: ${tls_err_level}" + fi + case $tls_err_level in + 01) echo -n "warning " >> $TMPFILE + debugme tmln_out " (warning)" ;; + 02) echo -n "fatal " >> $TMPFILE + debugme tmln_out " (fatal)" ;; + esac + echo "alert $tls_alert_descrip" >> $TMPFILE + echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE + fi + + if [[ "$tls_err_level" != 01 ]] && [[ "$tls_err_level" != 02 ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Unexpected AlertLevel (0x$tls_err_level)." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + elif [[ "$tls_err_level" == 02 ]]; then + # Fatal alert + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + done + fi + + # Now extract just the server hello, certificate, certificate status, + # and server key exchange handshake messages. + tls_handshake_ascii_len=${#tls_handshake_ascii} + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && [[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len -gt 0 ]]; then + echo "TLS handshake messages:" + fi + for (( i=0; i<tls_handshake_ascii_len; i=i+msg_len )); do + if [[ $tls_handshake_ascii_len-$i -lt 8 ]]; then + if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then + # The entire server response should have been retrieved. + debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + else + # This could just be a result of the server's response being + # split across two or more packets. + continue + fi + fi + tls_msg_type="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:2}" + i=$i+2 + msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_handshake_ascii:i:6}") + i=$i+6 + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then + tm_out " handshake type: 0x${tls_msg_type}" + case $tls_msg_type in + 00) tmln_out " (hello_request)" ;; + 01) tmln_out " (client_hello)" ;; + 02) tmln_out " (server_hello)" ;; + 03) tmln_out " (hello_verify_request)" ;; + 04) tmln_out " (new_session_ticket)" ;; + 05) tmln_out " (end_of_early_data)" ;; + 06) tmln_out " (hello_retry_request)" ;; + 08) tmln_out " (encrypted_extensions)" ;; + 0B) tmln_out " (certificate)" ;; + 0C) tmln_out " (server_key_exchange)" ;; + 0D) tmln_out " (certificate_request)" ;; + 0E) tmln_out " (server_hello_done)" ;; + 0F) tmln_out " (certificate_verify)" ;; + 10) tmln_out " (client_key_exchange)" ;; + 14) tmln_out " (finished)" ;; + 15) tmln_out " (certificate_url)" ;; + 16) tmln_out " (certificate_status)" ;; + 17) tmln_out " (supplemental_data)" ;; + 18) tmln_out " (key_update)" ;; + 19) tmln_out " (compressed_certificate)" ;; + FE) tmln_out " (message_hash)" ;; + *) tmln_out ;; + esac + echo " msg_len: $((msg_len/2))" + tmln_out + fi + if [[ $msg_len -gt $tls_handshake_ascii_len-$i ]]; then + if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + else + # This could just be a result of the server's response being + # split across two or more packets. Just grab the part that + # is available. + msg_len=$tls_handshake_ascii_len-$i + fi + fi + + if [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 02 ]]; then + if [[ -n "$tls_serverhello_ascii" ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Response contained more than one ServerHello handshake message." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + tls_serverhello_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}" + tls_serverhello_ascii_len=$msg_len + elif [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 08 ]]; then + # Add excrypted extensions (now decrypted) to end of extensions in SeverHello + tls_encryptedextensions_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}" + tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len=$msg_len + if [[ $msg_len -lt 2 ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Response contained a malformed encrypted extensions message" + return 1 + fi + elif [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 0B ]]; then + if [[ -n "$tls_certificate_ascii" ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Response contained more than one Certificate handshake message." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + tls_certificate_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}" + tls_certificate_ascii_len=$msg_len + elif ( [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] || [[ "$process_full" == ephemeralkey ]] ) && [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 0C ]]; then + if [[ -n "$tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii" ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Response contained more than one ServerKeyExchange handshake message." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}" + tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len=$msg_len + elif [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 16 ]]; then + if [[ -n "$tls_certificate_status_ascii" ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Response contained more than one certificate_status handshake message." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + tls_certificate_status_ascii="${tls_handshake_ascii:i:msg_len}" + tls_certificate_status_ascii_len=$msg_len + elif [[ "$tls_msg_type" == 19 ]]; then + if [[ -n "$tls_certificate_ascii" ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Response contained more than one Certificate handshake message." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then + tm_out " Certificate Compression Algorithm: ${tls_handshake_ascii:i:4}" + case ${tls_handshake_ascii:i:4} in + 0001) tmln_out " (ZLIB)" ;; + 0002) tmln_out " (Brotli)" ;; + 0003) tmln_out " (Zstandard)" ;; + *) tmln_out ;; + esac + offset=$((i+4)) + tmln_out " Uncompressed certificate length: $(printf "%d" 0x${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:6})" + tmln_out + fi + if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] && "$HAS_ZLIB" && [[ "${tls_handshake_ascii:i:4}" == 0001 ]]; then + offset=$((i+4)) + tls_certificate_ascii_len=2*0x${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:6} + offset=$((i+16)) + len1=$((msg_len-16)) + tls_certificate_ascii="$(asciihex_to_binary "${tls_handshake_ascii:offset:len1}" | $OPENSSL zlib -d 2>/dev/null | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')" + tls_certificate_ascii="${tls_certificate_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}" + if [[ ${#tls_certificate_ascii} -ne $tls_certificate_ascii_len ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Length of uncompressed certificates did not match specified length." + return 1 + fi + fi + fi + done + + if [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -eq 0 ]]; then + debugme echo "server hello empty, TCP connection closed" + DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="closed TCP connection " + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 # no server hello received + elif [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -lt 76 ]]; then + DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="reply malformed" + debugme echo "Malformed response" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + elif [[ "${tls_handshake_ascii:0:2}" != 02 ]]; then + # the ServerHello MUST be the first handshake message + DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="reply contained no ServerHello" + debugme tmln_warning "The first handshake protocol message is not a ServerHello." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + if [[ $DEBUG -eq 0 ]]; then + echo "CONNECTED(00000003)" > $TMPFILE + else + echo "CONNECTED(00000003)" >> $TMPFILE + fi + + # First parse the server hello handshake message + # byte 0+1: 03, TLS version word see byte 1+2 + # byte 2-5: TLS timestamp for OpenSSL <1.01f + # byte 6-33: random, 28 bytes + # byte 34: session id length + # byte 35+36+sid-len: cipher suite! + # byte 37+sid-len: compression method: 00: none, 01: deflate, 64: LZS + # byte 38+39+sid-len: extension length + tls_protocol2="${tls_serverhello_ascii:0:4}" + DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="$tls_protocol2" + [[ "${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}" == 7F ]] && DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0304" + if [[ "${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}" != 03 ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "server_version.major in ServerHello is not 03." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + + if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]]; then + tls_hello_time="${tls_serverhello_ascii:4:8}" + [[ "$TLS_DIFFTIME_SET" || "$DEBUG" ]] && TLS_TIME=$(hex2dec "$tls_hello_time") + tls_sid_len_hex="${tls_serverhello_ascii:68:2}" + tls_sid_len=2*$(hex2dec "$tls_sid_len_hex") + offset=$((tls_sid_len+70)) + if [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -lt 76+$tls_sid_len ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed response" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + else + offset=68 + fi + + tls_cipher_suite="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}" + + if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]]; then + offset=$((tls_sid_len+74)) + tls_compression_method="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:2}" + extns_offset=$((tls_sid_len+76)) + else + extns_offset=72 + fi + + if [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -gt $extns_offset ]] && \ + ( [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] || [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == 0303 ]] || \ + ( [[ "$process_full" == ephemeralkey ]] && [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -gt "0x03" ]] ) ); then + if [[ $tls_serverhello_ascii_len -lt $extns_offset+4 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed response" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + tls_extensions_len=$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:extns_offset:4}")*2 + if [[ $tls_extensions_len -ne $tls_serverhello_ascii_len-$extns_offset-4 ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Malformed message." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + for (( i=0; i<tls_extensions_len; i=i+8+extension_len )); do + if [[ $tls_extensions_len-$i -lt 8 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed response" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + offset=$((extns_offset+i+4)) + extension_type="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}" + offset=$((extns_offset+i+8)) + extension_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}") + if [[ $extension_len -gt $tls_extensions_len-$i-8 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed response" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + case $extension_type in + 0000) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"server name\" (id=0), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0001) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"max fragment length\" (id=1), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0002) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"client certificate URL\" (id=2), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0003) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"trusted CA keys\" (id=3, len=$extension_len\n)" ;; + 0004) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"truncated HMAC\" (id=4), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0005) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"status request\" (id=5), len=$extension_len\n" + if [[ $extension_len -gt 0 ]] && [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then + # In TLSv1.3 the status_request extension contains the CertificateStatus message, unlike + # TLSv1.2 and below where CertificateStatus appears in its own handshake message. So, if + # the status_request extension is not empty, extract the value and place it in + # $tls_certificate_status_ascii. + tls_certificate_status_ascii_len=$extension_len + offset=$((extns_offset+12+i)) + tls_certificate_status_ascii="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:tls_certificate_status_ascii_len}" + fi + ;; + 0006) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"user mapping\" (id=6), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0007) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"client authz\" (id=7), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0008) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"server authz\" (id=8), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0009) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"cert type\" (id=9), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 000A) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"supported_groups\" (id=10), len=$extension_len\n" + if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then + if [[ $extension_len -lt 4 ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Malformed supported groups extension." + return 1 + fi + echo -n "Supported groups: " >> $TMPFILE + offset=$((extns_offset+12+i)) + len1=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}") + if [[ $extension_len -lt $len1+4 ]] || [[ $len1 -lt 4 ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Malformed supported groups extension." + return 1 + fi + offset=$((offset+4)) + for (( j=0; j < len1; j=j+4 )); do + [[ $j -ne 0 ]] && echo -n ", " >> $TMPFILE + case "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}" in + "0017") echo -n "secp256r1" >> $TMPFILE ;; + "0018") echo -n "secp384r1" >> $TMPFILE ;; + "0019") echo -n "secp521r1" >> $TMPFILE ;; + "001D") echo -n "X25519" >> $TMPFILE ;; + "001E") echo -n "X448" >> $TMPFILE ;; + "0100") echo -n "ffdhe2048" >> $TMPFILE ;; + "0101") echo -n "ffdhe3072" >> $TMPFILE ;; + "0102") echo -n "ffdhe4096" >> $TMPFILE ;; + "0103") echo -n "ffdhe6144" >> $TMPFILE ;; + "0104") echo -n "ffdhe8192" >> $TMPFILE ;; + *) echo -n "unknown (${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4})" >> $TMPFILE ;; + esac + offset=$((offset+4)) + done + echo "" >> $TMPFILE + fi + ;; + 000B) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"EC point formats\" (id=11), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 000C) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"SRP\" (id=12), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 000D) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"signature algorithms\" (id=13), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 000E) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"use SRTP\" (id=14), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 000F) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"heartbeat\" (id=15), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0010) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"application layer protocol negotiation\" (id=16), len=$extension_len\n" + if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then + if [[ $extension_len -lt 4 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed application layer protocol negotiation extension." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + echo -n "ALPN protocol: " >> $TMPFILE + offset=$((extns_offset+12+i)) + j=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}") + if [[ $extension_len -ne $j+4 ]] || [[ $j -lt 2 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed application layer protocol negotiation extension." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + offset=$((offset+4)) + j=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:2}") + if [[ $extension_len -ne $j+6 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed application layer protocol negotiation extension." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + offset=$((offset+2)) + asciihex_to_binary "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:j}" >> "$TMPFILE" + echo "" >> $TMPFILE + echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE + fi + ;; + 0011) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"certificate status version 2\" (id=17), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0012) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"signed certificate timestamps\" (id=18), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0013) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"client certificate type\" (id=19), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0014) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"server certificate type\" (id=20), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0015) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"TLS padding\" (id=21), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0016) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"encrypt-then-mac\" (id=22), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0017) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"extended master secret\" (id=23), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0018) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"token binding\" (id=24), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0019) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"cached info\" (id=25), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0023) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"session ticket\" (id=35), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0028|0033) + # The key share extension was renumbered from 40 to 51 in TLSv1.3 draft 23 since a few + # implementations have been using 40 for the extended_random extension. Since the + # server's version may not yet have been determined, assume that both values represent the + # key share extension. + if [[ "$extension_type" == "00$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR" ]]; then + tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"key share\"" + else + tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"unrecognized extension\"" + fi + if [[ "$extension_type" == 0028 ]]; then + tls_extensions+=" (id=40), len=$extension_len\n" + else + tls_extensions+=" (id=51), len=$extension_len\n" + fi + if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] || [[ "$process_full" == ephemeralkey ]]; then + if [[ $extension_len -lt 4 ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Malformed key share extension." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + offset=$((extns_offset+12+i)) + named_curve=$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}") + offset=$((extns_offset+16+i)) + msg_len=2*"$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}")" + if [[ $msg_len -ne $extension_len-8 ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Malformed key share extension." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + case $named_curve in + 21) dh_bits=224 ; named_curve_str="P-224" ; named_curve_oid="06052b81040021" ;; + 23) dh_bits=256 ; named_curve_str="P-256" ; named_curve_oid="06082a8648ce3d030107" ;; + 24) dh_bits=384 ; named_curve_str="P-384" ; named_curve_oid="06052b81040022" ;; + 25) dh_bits=521 ; named_curve_str="P-521" ; named_curve_oid="06052b81040023" ;; + 29) dh_bits=253 ; named_curve_str="X25519" ;; + 30) dh_bits=448 ; named_curve_str="X448" ;; + 256) dh_bits=2048 ; named_curve_str="ffdhe2048" ;; + 257) dh_bits=3072 ; named_curve_str="ffdhe3072" ;; + 258) dh_bits=4096 ; named_curve_str="ffdhe4096" ;; + 259) dh_bits=6144 ; named_curve_str="ffdhe6144" ;; + 260) dh_bits=8192 ; named_curve_str="ffdhe8192" ;; + *) named_curve_str="" ; named_curve_oid="" ;; + esac + offset=$((extns_offset+20+i)) + if ! "$HAS_PKEY"; then + # The key can't be extracted without the pkey utility. + key_bitstring="" + elif [[ $named_curve -eq 29 ]]; then + key_bitstring="302a300506032b656e032100${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:msg_len}" + elif [[ $named_curve -eq 30 ]]; then + key_bitstring="3042300506032b656f033900${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:msg_len}" + elif [[ $named_curve -lt 256 ]] && [[ -n "$named_curve_oid" ]]; then + len1="$(printf "%02x" $((msg_len/2+1)))" + [[ "0x${len1}" -ge "0x80" ]] && len1="81${len1}" + key_bitstring="03${len1}00${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:msg_len}" + len2="$(printf "%02x" $((${#named_curve_oid}/2+9)))" + len3="$(printf "%02x" $((${#named_curve_oid}/2+${#key_bitstring}/2+11)))" + [[ "0x${len3}" -ge "0x80" ]] && len3="81${len3}" + key_bitstring="30${len3}30${len2}06072a8648ce3d0201${named_curve_oid}${key_bitstring}" + elif [[ "$named_curve_str" =~ "ffdhe" ]] && [[ "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" =~ "BEGIN" ]]; then + dh_param="$($OPENSSL pkey -pubout -outform DER 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" | hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"')" + + # First is the length of the public-key SEQUENCE, and it is always encoded in four bytes (3082xxxx) + # Next is the length of the parameters SEQUENCE, and it is also always encoded in four bytes (3082xxxx) + dh_param_len=8+2*"$(hex2dec "${dh_param:12:4}")" + dh_param="${dh_param:8:dh_param_len}" + if [[ "0x${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:2}" -ge 0x80 ]]; then + key_bitstring="00${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:msg_len}" + msg_len+=2 + else + key_bitstring="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:msg_len}" + fi + len1="$(printf "%04x" $((msg_len/2)))" + key_bitstring="0282${len1}$key_bitstring" + len1="$(printf "%04x" $((${#key_bitstring}/2+1)))" + key_bitstring="${dh_param}0382${len1}00$key_bitstring" + len1="$(printf "%04x" $((${#key_bitstring}/2)))" + key_bitstring="3082${len1}$key_bitstring" + fi + if [[ -n "$key_bitstring" ]]; then + key_bitstring="$(asciihex_to_binary "$key_bitstring" | $OPENSSL pkey -pubin -inform DER 2>$ERRFILE)" + if [[ -z "$key_bitstring" ]] && [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then + if [[ -n "$named_curve_str" ]]; then + prln_warning "Your $OPENSSL doesn't support $named_curve_str" + else + prln_warning "Your $OPENSSL doesn't support named curve $named_curve" + fi + fi + fi + fi + ;; + 0029) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"pre-shared key\" (id=41), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 002A) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"early data\" (id=42), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 002B) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"supported versions\" (id=43), len=$extension_len\n" + if [[ $extension_len -ne 4 ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Malformed supported versions extension." + return 1 + fi + offset=$((extns_offset+12+i)) + tls_protocol2="${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:4}" + DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="$tls_protocol2" + [[ "${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}" == 7F ]] && DETECTED_TLS_VERSION="0304" + ;; + 002C) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"cookie\" (id=44), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 002D) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"psk key exchange modes\" (id=45), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 002E) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"ticket early data info\" (id=46), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 002F) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"certificate authorities\" (id=47), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0030) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"oid filters\" (id=48), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 0031) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"post handshake auth\" (id=49), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + 3374) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"next protocol\" (id=13172), len=$extension_len\n" + if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then + local -i protocol_len + echo -n "Protocols advertised by server: " >> $TMPFILE + offset=$((extns_offset+12+i)) + for (( j=0; j<extension_len; j=j+protocol_len+2 )); do + if [[ $extension_len -lt $j+2 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed next protocol extension." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + protocol_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:2}") + if [[ $extension_len -lt $j+$protocol_len+2 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed next protocol extension." + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + offset=$((offset+2)) + asciihex_to_binary "${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset:protocol_len}" >> "$TMPFILE" + offset=$((offset+protocol_len)) + [[ $j+$protocol_len+2 -lt $extension_len ]] && echo -n ", " >> $TMPFILE + done + echo "" >> $TMPFILE + echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE + fi + ;; + FF01) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"renegotiation info\" (id=65281), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + *) tls_extensions+="TLS server extension \"unrecognized extension\" (id=$(printf "%d\n\n" "0x$extension_type")), len=$extension_len\n" ;; + esac + # After processing all of the extensions in the ServerHello message, + # if it has been determined that the response is TLSv1.3 and the + # response was decrypted, then modify $tls_serverhello_ascii by adding + # the extensions from the EncryptedExtensions and Certificate messages + # and then process them. + if ! "$added_encrypted_extensions" && [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == "0304" ]] && \ + [[ $((i+8+extension_len)) -eq $tls_extensions_len ]]; then + # Note that the encrypted extensions have been added so that + # the aren't added a second time. + added_encrypted_extensions=true + if [[ -n "$tls_encryptedextensions_ascii" ]]; then + tls_serverhello_ascii_len+=$tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len-4 + tls_extensions_len+=$tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len-4 + tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len=$tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len/2-2 + offset=$((extns_offset+4)) + tls_serverhello_ascii="${tls_serverhello_ascii:0:extns_offset}$(printf "%04X" $((0x${tls_serverhello_ascii:extns_offset:4}+$tls_encryptedextensions_ascii_len)))${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset}${tls_encryptedextensions_ascii:4}" + fi + if [[ -n "$tls_certificate_ascii" ]]; then + # In TLS 1.3, the Certificate message begins with a zero length certificate_request_context. + # In addition, certificate_list is now a list of (certificate, extension) pairs rather than + # just certificates. So, extract the extensions and add them to $tls_serverhello_ascii and + # create a new $tls_certificate_ascii that only contains a list of certificates. + if [[ -n "$tls_certificate_ascii" ]]; then + if [[ "${tls_certificate_ascii:0:2}" != "00" ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + if [[ $tls_certificate_ascii_len -lt 8 ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + certificate_list_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:2:6}") + if [[ $certificate_list_len -ne $tls_certificate_ascii_len-8 ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + for (( j=8; j < tls_certificate_ascii_len; j=j+extn_len )); do + if [[ $tls_certificate_ascii_len-$j -lt 6 ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + certificate_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:j:6}") + if [[ $certificate_len -gt $tls_certificate_ascii_len-$j-6 ]]; then + debugme tmln_warning "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + len1=$certificate_len+6 + tls_revised_certificate_msg+="${tls_certificate_ascii:j:len1}" + j+=$len1 + extn_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:j:4}") + j+=4 + # TODO: Should only the extensions associated with the EE certificate be added to $tls_serverhello_ascii? + tls_serverhello_ascii_len+=$extn_len + tls_extensions_len+=$extn_len + offset=$((extns_offset+4)) + tls_serverhello_ascii="${tls_serverhello_ascii:0:extns_offset}$(printf "%04X" $(( 0x${tls_serverhello_ascii:extns_offset:4}+extn_len/2)) )${tls_serverhello_ascii:offset}${tls_certificate_ascii:j:extn_len}" + done + tls_certificate_ascii_len=${#tls_revised_certificate_msg}+6 + tls_certificate_ascii="$(printf "%06X" $(( tls_certificate_ascii_len/2-3)) )$tls_revised_certificate_msg" + fi + fi + fi + done + fi + + if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == "0300" ]]; then + echo "Protocol : SSLv3" >> $TMPFILE + else + echo "Protocol : TLSv1.$((0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION-0x0301))" >> $TMPFILE + fi + echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE + if [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -ne 0 ]]; then + if [[ "${tls_cipher_suite:0:2}" == "00" ]]; then + rfc_cipher_suite="$(show_rfc_style "x${tls_cipher_suite:2:2}")" + else + rfc_cipher_suite="$(show_rfc_style "x${tls_cipher_suite:0:4}")" + fi + elif "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then + rfc_cipher_suite="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V -ciphersuites "$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS" 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' | grep -i " 0x${tls_cipher_suite:0:2},0x${tls_cipher_suite:2:2} " | awk '{ print $3 }')" + else + rfc_cipher_suite="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' | grep -i " 0x${tls_cipher_suite:0:2},0x${tls_cipher_suite:2:2} " | awk '{ print $3 }')" + fi + echo "Cipher : $rfc_cipher_suite" >> $TMPFILE + if [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]]; then + if [[ "$named_curve_str" =~ "ffdhe" ]]; then + echo "Server Temp Key: DH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE + elif [[ "$named_curve_str" == "X25519" ]] || [[ "$named_curve_str" == "X448" ]]; then + echo "Server Temp Key: $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE + else + echo "Server Temp Key: ECDH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE + fi + fi + if [[ -n "$key_bitstring" ]]; then + echo "$key_bitstring" >> $TMPFILE + [[ "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" =~ "BEGIN" ]] && \ + echo "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" >> $TMPFILE + fi + echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE + if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]]; then + case $tls_compression_method in + 00) echo "Compression: NONE" >> $TMPFILE ;; + 01) echo "Compression: zlib compression" >> $TMPFILE ;; + 40) echo "Compression: LZS compression" >> $TMPFILE ;; + *) echo "Compression: unrecognized compression method" >> $TMPFILE ;; + esac + echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE + fi + [[ -n "$tls_extensions" ]] && echo -e "$tls_extensions" >> $TMPFILE + + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then + echo "TLS server hello message:" + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]]; then + echo " tls_protocol: 0x$tls_protocol2" + [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]] && echo " tls_sid_len: 0x$tls_sid_len_hex / = $((tls_sid_len/2))" + fi + if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]]; then + echo -n " tls_hello_time: 0x$tls_hello_time " + parse_date "$TLS_TIME" "+%Y-%m-%d %r" "%s" # in debugging mode we don't mind the cycles and don't use TLS_DIFFTIME_SET + fi + echo -n " tls_cipher_suite: 0x$tls_cipher_suite" + if [[ -n "$rfc_cipher_suite" ]]; then + echo " ($rfc_cipher_suite)" + else + echo "" + fi + if [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]]; then + if [[ "$named_curve_str" =~ "ffdhe" ]]; then + echo " dh_bits: DH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" + elif [[ "$named_curve_str" == "X25519" ]] || [[ "$named_curve_str" == "X448" ]]; then + echo " dh_bits: $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" + else + echo " dh_bits: ECDH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" + fi + fi + if [[ "0x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" -le "0x03" ]]; then + echo -n " tls_compression_method: 0x$tls_compression_method " + case $tls_compression_method in + 00) echo "(NONE)" ;; + 01) echo "(zlib compression)" ;; + 40) echo "(LZS compression)" ;; + *) echo "(unrecognized compression method)" ;; + esac + fi + if [[ -n "$tls_extensions" ]]; then + echo -n " tls_extensions: " + newline_to_spaces "$(grep -a 'TLS server extension ' $TMPFILE | \ + sed -e 's/TLS server extension //g' -e 's/\" (id=/\/#/g' \ + -e 's/,.*$/,/g' -e 's/),$/\"/g' \ + -e 's/elliptic curves\/#10/supported_groups\/#10/g')" + echo "" + if [[ "$tls_extensions" =~ supported_groups ]]; then + echo " Supported Groups: $(grep "Supported groups:" "$TMPFILE" | sed 's/Supported groups: //')" + fi + if [[ "$tls_extensions" =~ application\ layer\ protocol\ negotiation ]]; then + echo " ALPN protocol: $(grep "ALPN protocol:" "$TMPFILE" | sed 's/ALPN protocol: //')" + fi + if [[ "$tls_extensions" =~ next\ protocol ]]; then + echo " NPN protocols: $(grep "Protocols advertised by server:" "$TMPFILE" | sed 's/Protocols advertised by server: //')" + fi + fi + tmln_out + fi + + # If a CIPHER_SUITES string was provided, then check that $tls_cipher_suite is in the string. + # this appeared in yassl + MySQL (https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/pull/784) but adds robustness + # to the implementation + if [[ -n "$cipherlist" ]]; then + tls_cipher_suite="$(tolower "$tls_cipher_suite")" + tls_cipher_suite="${tls_cipher_suite:0:2}\\x${tls_cipher_suite:2:2}" + cipherlist_len=${#cipherlist} + for (( i=0; i < cipherlist_len; i=i+8 )); do + # At the right hand side we need the quotes here! + [[ "${cipherlist:i:6}" == "$tls_cipher_suite" ]] && break + done + if [[ $i -ge $cipherlist_len ]]; then + BAD_SERVER_HELLO_CIPHER=true + debugme echo "The ServerHello specifies a cipher suite that wasn't included in the ClientHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + fi + + # If the ClientHello included a supported_versions extension, then check that the + # $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION appeared in the list offered in the ClientHello. + if [[ "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:0:2}" == 01 ]]; then + # get position of cipher lists (just after session id) + offset=78+2*$(hex2dec "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:76:2}") + # get position of compression methods + offset+=4+2*$(hex2dec "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:offset:4}") + # get position of extensions + extns_offset=$offset+6+2*$(hex2dec "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:offset:2}") + len1=${#TLS_CLIENT_HELLO} + for (( i=extns_offset; i < len1; i=i+8+extension_len )); do + extension_type="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:i:4}" + offset=4+$i + extension_len=2*$(hex2dec "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:offset:4}") + if [[ "$extension_type" == 002b ]]; then + offset+=6 + tls_protocol2="$(tolower "$tls_protocol2")" + for (( j=0; j < extension_len-2; j=j+4 )); do + [[ "${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:offset:4}" == $tls_protocol2 ]] && break + offset+=4 + done + if [[ $j -eq $extension_len-2 ]]; then + debugme echo "The ServerHello specifies a version that wasn't offered in the ClientHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + break + fi + done + fi + + # Now parse the Certificate message. + if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then + # not sure why we need this + [[ -e "$HOSTCERT" ]] && rm "$HOSTCERT" + [[ -e "$TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem" ]] && > "$TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem" + fi + if [[ $tls_certificate_ascii_len -ne 0 ]]; then + # The first certificate is the server's certificate. If there are anything + # subsequent certificates, they are intermediate certificates. + if [[ $tls_certificate_ascii_len -lt 12 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + certificate_list_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:0:6}") + if [[ $certificate_list_len -ne $tls_certificate_ascii_len-6 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + + # Place server's certificate in $HOSTCERT + certificate_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:6:6}") + if [[ $certificate_len -gt $tls_certificate_ascii_len-12 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + asciihex_to_binary "${tls_certificate_ascii:12:certificate_len}" | \ + $OPENSSL x509 -inform DER -outform PEM -out "$HOSTCERT" 2>$ERRFILE + if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed certificate in Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + get_pub_key_size + echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE + echo "---" >> $TMPFILE + echo "Certificate chain" >> $TMPFILE + subjectDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -noout -subject 2>>$ERRFILE)" + issuerDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -in $HOSTCERT -noout -issuer 2>>$ERRFILE)" + echo " $nr_certs s:${subjectDN:9}" >> $TMPFILE + echo " i:${issuerDN:8}" >> $TMPFILE + cat "$HOSTCERT" >> $TMPFILE + + echo "" > "$TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem" + # Place any additional certificates in $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem + CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=false + CAissuerDN="$issuerDN" + for (( i=12+certificate_len; i<tls_certificate_ascii_len; i=i+certificate_len )); do + if [[ $tls_certificate_ascii_len-$i -lt 6 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + certificate_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_ascii:i:6}") + i+=6 + if [[ $certificate_len -gt $tls_certificate_ascii_len-$i ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed certificate in Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + pem_certificate="$(asciihex_to_binary "${tls_certificate_ascii:i:certificate_len}" | \ + $OPENSSL x509 -inform DER -outform PEM 2>$ERRFILE)" + if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed certificate in Certificate Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + nr_certs+=1 + CAsubjectDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -subject 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$pem_certificate")" + # Check that this certificate certifies the one immediately preceding it. + [[ "${CAsubjectDN:9}" != "${CAissuerDN:8}" ]] && CERTIFICATE_LIST_ORDERING_PROBLEM=true + CAissuerDN="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -issuer 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$pem_certificate")" + echo " $nr_certs s:${CAsubjectDN:9}" >> $TMPFILE + echo " i:${CAissuerDN:8}" >> $TMPFILE + echo "$pem_certificate" >> $TMPFILE + echo "$pem_certificate" >> "$TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem" + if [[ -z "$hostcert_issuer" ]] && [[ "${CAsubjectDN:9}" == "${issuerDN:8}" ]]; then + # The issuer's certificate is needed if there is a stapled OCSP response, + # and it may be needed if check_revocation_ocsp() will later be called + # with the OCSP URI in the server's certificate. + hostcert_issuer="$TEMPDIR/hostcert_issuer.pem" + echo "$pem_certificate" > "$hostcert_issuer" + fi + done + echo "---" >> $TMPFILE + echo "Server certificate" >> $TMPFILE + echo "subject=${subjectDN:9}" >> $TMPFILE + echo "issuer=${issuerDN:8}" >> $TMPFILE + echo "---" >> $TMPFILE + fi + + # Now parse the certificate status message + if [[ $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len -ne 0 ]] && [[ $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len -lt 8 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed certificate status Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + elif [[ $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len -ne 0 ]] && [[ "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:0:2}" == "01" ]]; then + # This is a certificate status message of type "ocsp" + ocsp_response_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:2:6}") + if [[ $ocsp_response_len -ne $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len-8 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed certificate status Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + ocsp_resp_offset=8 + elif [[ $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len -ne 0 ]] && [[ "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:0:2}" == "02" ]]; then + # This is a list of OCSP responses, but only the first one is needed + # since the first one corresponds to the server's certificate. + ocsp_response_list_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:2:6}") + if [[ $ocsp_response_list_len -ne $tls_certificate_status_ascii_len-8 ]] || [[ $ocsp_response_list_len -lt 6 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed certificate status Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + ocsp_response_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_certificate_status_ascii:8:6}") + if [[ $ocsp_response_len -gt $ocsp_response_list_len-6 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed certificate status Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + ocsp_resp_offset=14 + fi + STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE="" + if [[ $ocsp_response_len -ne 0 ]]; then + STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE="${tls_certificate_status_ascii:ocsp_resp_offset:ocsp_response_len}" + echo "OCSP response:" >> $TMPFILE + echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE + if [[ -n "$hostcert_issuer" ]]; then + asciihex_to_binary "$STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE" | \ + $OPENSSL ocsp -no_nonce -CAfile $TEMPDIR/intermediatecerts.pem -issuer $hostcert_issuer -cert $HOSTCERT -respin /dev/stdin -resp_text >> $TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE + else + asciihex_to_binary "$STAPLED_OCSP_RESPONSE" | \ + $OPENSSL ocsp -respin /dev/stdin -resp_text >> $TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE + fi + echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE + elif [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]]; then + echo "OCSP response: no response sent" >> $TMPFILE + echo "===============================================================================" >> $TMPFILE + fi + + # Now parse the server key exchange message + if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -ne 0 ]]; then + if [[ $rfc_cipher_suite =~ TLS_ECDHE_ ]] || [[ $rfc_cipher_suite =~ TLS_ECDH_anon ]] || \ + [[ $rfc_cipher_suite == ECDHE* ]] || [[ $rfc_cipher_suite == AECDH* ]]; then + if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt 6 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + curve_type=$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:0:2}") + if [[ $curve_type -eq 3 ]]; then + # named_curve - the curve is identified by a 2-byte number + named_curve=$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:2:4}") + # https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-parameters-8 + case $named_curve in + 1) dh_bits=163 ; named_curve_str="K-163" ;; + 2) dh_bits=162 ; named_curve_str="sect163r1" ;; + 3) dh_bits=163 ; named_curve_str="B-163" ;; + 4) dh_bits=193 ; named_curve_str="sect193r1" ;; + 5) dh_bits=193 ; named_curve_str="sect193r2" ;; + 6) dh_bits=232 ; named_curve_str="K-233" ;; + 7) dh_bits=233 ; named_curve_str="B-233" ;; + 8) dh_bits=238 ; named_curve_str="sect239k1" ;; + 9) dh_bits=281 ; named_curve_str="K-283" ;; + 10) dh_bits=282 ; named_curve_str="B-283" ;; + 11) dh_bits=407 ; named_curve_str="K-409" ;; + 12) dh_bits=409 ; named_curve_str="B-409" ;; + 13) dh_bits=570 ; named_curve_str="K-571" ;; + 14) dh_bits=570 ; named_curve_str="B-571" ;; + 15) dh_bits=161 ; named_curve_str="secp160k1" ;; + 16) dh_bits=161 ; named_curve_str="secp160r1" ;; + 17) dh_bits=161 ; named_curve_str="secp160r2" ;; + 18) dh_bits=192 ; named_curve_str="secp192k1" ;; + 19) dh_bits=192 ; named_curve_str="P-192" ;; + 20) dh_bits=225 ; named_curve_str="secp224k1" ;; + 21) dh_bits=224 ; named_curve_str="P-224" ;; + 22) dh_bits=256 ; named_curve_str="secp256k1" ;; + 23) dh_bits=256 ; named_curve_str="P-256" ;; + 24) dh_bits=384 ; named_curve_str="P-384" ;; + 25) dh_bits=521 ; named_curve_str="P-521" ;; + 26) dh_bits=256 ; named_curve_str="brainpoolP256r1" ;; + 27) dh_bits=384 ; named_curve_str="brainpoolP384r1" ;; + 28) dh_bits=512 ; named_curve_str="brainpoolP512r1" ;; + 29) dh_bits=253 ; named_curve_str="X25519" ;; + 30) dh_bits=448 ; named_curve_str="X448" ;; + esac + fi + if [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]] && [[ $named_curve -ne 29 ]] && [[ $named_curve -ne 30 ]]; then + [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " dh_bits: ECDH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits\n" + echo "Server Temp Key: ECDH, $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE + elif [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]]; then + [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -e " dh_bits: $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits\n" + echo "Server Temp Key: $named_curve_str, $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE + fi + elif [[ $rfc_cipher_suite =~ TLS_DHE_ ]] || [[ $rfc_cipher_suite =~ TLS_DH_anon ]] || \ + [[ $rfc_cipher_suite == "DHE-"* ]] || [[ $rfc_cipher_suite == "EDH-"* ]] || \ + [[ $rfc_cipher_suite == "EXP1024-DHE-"* ]]; then + # For DH ephemeral keys the first field is p, and the length of + # p is the same as the length of the public key. + if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt 4 ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + dh_p_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:0:4}") + offset=4+$dh_p_len + if [[ $tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii_len -lt $offset ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + + # Subtract any leading 0 bytes + for (( i=4; i < offset; i=i+2 )); do + [[ "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:2}" != "00" ]] && break + dh_p_len=$dh_p_len-2 + done + if [[ $i -ge $offset ]]; then + debugme echo "Malformed ServerKeyExchange Handshake message in ServerHello." + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 1 + fi + dh_p="${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:dh_p_len}" + + dh_bits=4*$dh_p_len + msb=$(hex2dec "${tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii:i:2}") + for (( mask=128; msb < mask; mask/=2 )); do + dh_bits=$dh_bits-1 + done + + key_bitstring="$(get_dh_ephemeralkey "$tls_serverkeyexchange_ascii")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && echo "$key_bitstring" >> $TMPFILE + + # Check to see whether the ephemeral public key uses one of the groups from + # RFC 7919 for parameters + case $dh_bits in + 2048) named_curve=256; named_curve_str=" ffdhe2048," ;; + 3072) named_curve=257; named_curve_str=" ffdhe3072," ;; + 4096) named_curve=258; named_curve_str=" ffdhe4096," ;; + 6144) named_curve=259; named_curve_str=" ffdhe6144," ;; + 8192) named_curve=260; named_curve_str=" ffdhe8192," ;; + *) named_curve=0; named_curve_str="" ;; + esac + [[ -z "$key_bitstring" ]] && named_curve=0 && named_curve_str="" + if "$HAS_PKEY" && [[ $named_curve -ne 0 ]] && [[ "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" =~ BEGIN ]]; then + ephemeral_param="$($OPENSSL pkey -pubin -text_pub -noout 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$key_bitstring")" + # OpenSSL 3.0.0 outputs the group name rather than the actual parameter values for some named groups. + if [[ "$ephemeral_param" =~ GROUP: ]]; then + ephemeral_param="${ephemeral_param#*GROUP: }" + rfc7919_param="${named_curve_str# }" + rfc7919_param="${rfc7919_param%,}" + [[ "$ephemeral_param" =~ $rfc7919_param ]] || named_curve_str="" + else + ephemeral_param="$(grep -EA 1000 "prime:|P:" <<< "$ephemeral_param")" + rfc7919_param="$($OPENSSL pkey -text_pub -noout 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "${TLS13_KEY_SHARES[named_curve]}" | grep -EA 1000 "prime:|P:")" + [[ "$ephemeral_param" != "$rfc7919_param" ]] && named_curve_str="" + fi + fi + + [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]] && echo -e " dh_bits: DH,$named_curve_str $dh_bits bits\n" + [[ $dh_bits -ne 0 ]] && echo "Server Temp Key: DH,$named_curve_str $dh_bits bits" >> $TMPFILE + fi + fi + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + + TLS_SERVER_HELLO="02$(printf "%06x" $(( tls_serverhello_ascii_len/2)) )${tls_serverhello_ascii}" + return 0 +} + + +#arg1 (optional): list of ciphers suites or empty +#arg2 (optional): "true" if full server response should be parsed. +# return: 6: couldn't open socket, 3(!): sslv2 handshake succeeded, 0=no SSLv2 +# 1,4,6,7: see return value of parse_sslv2_serverhello() +sslv2_sockets() { + local ret + local cipher_suites="$1" + local client_hello len_client_hello + local len_ciph_suites_byte len_ciph_suites + local server_hello sock_reply_file2 foo + local -i response_len server_hello_len + local parse_complete=false + + # this could be empty so we use '==' + if [[ "$2" == true ]]; then + parse_complete=true + fi + if [[ -z "$cipher_suites" ]]; then + cipher_suites=" + 05,00,80, # 1st cipher 9 cipher specs, only classical V2 ciphers are used here, see FIXME below + 03,00,80, # 2nd there are v3 in v2!!! : https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6101#appendix-E + 01,00,80, # 3rd Cipher specifications introduced in version 3.0 can be included in version 2.0 client hello messages using + 07,00,c0, # 4th the syntax below. [..] # V2CipherSpec (see Version 3.0 name) = { 0x00, CipherSuite }; !!!! + 08,00,80, # 5th + 06,00,40, # 6th + 04,00,80, # 7th + 02,00,80, # 8th + 06,01,40, # 9 + 07,01,c0, # 10 + FF,80,00, # 11 + FF,80,10, # 12 + 00,00,00" # 13 + # FIXME: http://max.euston.net/d/tip_sslciphers.html <-- also SSLv3 ciphers + fi + + code2network "$cipher_suites" # convert CIPHER_SUITES + cipher_suites="$NW_STR" # we don't have the leading \x here so string length is two byte less, see next + len_ciph_suites_byte=${#cipher_suites} + + let "len_ciph_suites_byte += 2" + len_ciph_suites=$(printf "%02x\n" $(( len_ciph_suites_byte / 4 ))) + len_client_hello=$(printf "%02x\n" $((0x$len_ciph_suites + 0x19))) + + client_hello=" + ,80,$len_client_hello # length + ,01 # Client Hello + ,00,02 # SSLv2 + ,00,$len_ciph_suites # cipher spec length + ,00,00 # session ID length + ,00,10 # challenge length + ,$cipher_suites + ,29,22,be,b3,5a,01,8b,04,fe,5f,80,03,a0,13,eb,c4" # Challenge + # https://idea.popcount.org/2012-06-16-dissecting-ssl-handshake/ (client) + + fd_socket 5 || return 6 + debugme echo -n "sending client hello... " + socksend_clienthello "$client_hello" + + sockread_serverhello 32768 + if "$parse_complete"; then + if [[ -s "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" ]]; then + server_hello=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE") + server_hello_len=$((2 + $(hex2dec "${server_hello:1:3}") )) + foo="$(wc -c "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")" + response_len="${foo% *}" + for (( 1; response_len < server_hello_len; 1 )); do + sock_reply_file2=${SOCK_REPLY_FILE}.2 + mv "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$sock_reply_file2" + + debugme echo -n "requesting more server hello data... " + socksend "" $USLEEP_SND + sockread_serverhello 32768 + + [[ ! -s "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" ]] && break + cat "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" >> "$sock_reply_file2" + mv "$sock_reply_file2" "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" + foo="$(wc -c "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")" + response_len="${foo% *}" + done + fi + fi + + debugme echo "reading server hello... " + if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then + hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" | head -6 + tmln_out + fi + + parse_sslv2_serverhello "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$parse_complete" + ret=$? + + close_socket + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd $SOCK_REPLY_FILE + return $ret +} + + +# arg1: supported groups extension +# arg2: "all" - process full response (including Certificate and certificate_status handshake messages) +# "ephemeralkey" - extract the server's ephemeral key (if any) +# Given the supported groups extension, create a key_share extension that includes a key share for +# each group listed in the supported groups extension. +generate_key_share_extension() { + local supported_groups + local -i i len supported_groups_len group + local extn_len list_len + local key_share key_shares="" + local -i nr_key_shares=0 + + supported_groups="${1//\\x/}" + [[ "${supported_groups:0:4}" != "000a" ]] && return 1 + + supported_groups_len=${#supported_groups} + [[ $supported_groups_len -lt 16 ]] && return 1 + + len=2*$(hex2dec "${supported_groups:4:4}") + [[ $len+8 -ne $supported_groups_len ]] && return 1 + + len=2*$(hex2dec "${supported_groups:8:4}") + [[ $len+12 -ne $supported_groups_len ]] && return 1 + + for (( i=12; i<supported_groups_len; i=i+4 )); do + group=$(hex2dec "${supported_groups:i:4}") + # If the Supported groups extensions lists more than one group, + # then don't include the larger key shares in the extension. + [[ $i -gt 12 ]] && [[ $group -gt 256 ]] && continue + + # Versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.0 cannot perform operations + # with X25519 keys, so don't include the X25519 key share + # if the server's response needs to be decrypted and an + # older version of OpenSSL is being used. + if [[ $i -gt 12 ]] && [[ $group -eq 29 ]] && [[ "$2" == all ]]; then + [[ "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]] && continue + if [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR != 1.1.0* ]] && \ + [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR != 1.1.1* ]] && \ + [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR != 3.0.0* ]]; then + continue + fi + fi + + # Versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.1 cannot perform operations + # with X448 keys, so don't include the X448 key share + # if the server's response needs to be decrypted and an + # older version of OpenSSL is being used. + if [[ $i -gt 12 ]] && [[ $group -eq 30 ]] && [[ "$2" == all ]]; then + [[ "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]] && continue + if [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR != 1.1.1* ]] && \ + [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR != 3.0.0* ]]; then + continue + fi + fi + + # NOTE: The public keys could be extracted from the private keys + # (TLS13_KEY_SHARES) using $OPENSSL, but only OpenSSL 1.1.0 and newer can + # extract the public key from an X25519 private key, and only + # OpenSSL 1.1.1 can extract the public key from an X448 private key. + key_share="${TLS13_PUBLIC_KEY_SHARES[group]}" + if [[ ${#key_share} -gt 4 ]]; then + key_shares+=",$key_share" + nr_key_shares+=1 + # Don't include more than two keys, so that the extension isn't too large. + [[ $nr_key_shares -ge 2 ]] && break + fi + done + [[ -z "$key_shares" ]] && tm_out "" && return 0 + + len=${#key_shares}/3 + list_len="$(printf "%04x" "$len")" + len+=2 + extn_len="$(printf "%04x" "$len")" + tm_out "00,$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR,${extn_len:0:2},${extn_len:2:2},${list_len:0:2},${list_len:2:2}$key_shares" + return 0 +} + +# ARG1: TLS version low byte (00: SSLv3, 01: TLS 1.0, 02: TLS 1.1, 03: TLS 1.2) +# ARG2: CIPHER_SUITES string (lowercase, and in the format output by code2network()) +# ARG3: "all" - process full response (including Certificate and certificate_status handshake messages) +# "all+" - same as "all", but do not offer any curves with TLSv1.3 that are not supported by +# $OPENSSL, since response MUST be decrypted. +# "ephemeralkey" - extract the server's ephemeral key (if any) +# ARG4: (optional) additional request extensions +# ARG5: (optional): "true" if ClientHello should advertise compression methods other than "NULL" +# ARG6: (optional): "false" if prepare_tls_clienthello() should not open a new socket +# +prepare_tls_clienthello() { + local tls_low_byte="$1" tls_legacy_version="$1" + local process_full="$3" + local new_socket=true + local tls_word_reclayer="03, 01" # the first TLS version number is the record layer and always 0301 + # -- except: SSLv3 and second ClientHello after HelloRetryRequest + local servername_hexstr len_servername len_servername_hex + local hexdump_format_str part1 part2 + local all_extensions="" + local -i i j len_extension len_padding_extension len_all len_session_id + local len_sni_listlen len_sni_ext len_extension_hex len_padding_extension_hex + local cipher_suites len_ciph_suites len_ciph_suites_byte len_ciph_suites_word + local len_client_hello_word len_all_word + local ecc_cipher_suite_found=false + local extension_signature_algorithms extension_heartbeat session_id + local extension_session_ticket extension_next_protocol extension_padding + local extension_supported_groups="" extension_supported_point_formats="" + local extensions_key_share="" extn_type supported_groups_c2n="" extn_psk_mode="" + local extra_extensions extra_extensions_list="" extension_supported_versions="" + local offer_compression=false compression_methods + + # TLSv1.3 ClientHello messages MUST specify only the NULL compression method. + [[ "$5" == true ]] && [[ "0x$tls_low_byte" -le "0x03" ]] && offer_compression=true + [[ "$6" == false ]] && new_socket=false + + cipher_suites="$2" # we don't have the leading \x here so string length is two byte less, see next + len_ciph_suites_byte=${#cipher_suites} + let "len_ciph_suites_byte += 2" + + # we have additional 2 chars \x in each 2 byte string and 2 byte ciphers, so we need to divide by 4: + len_ciph_suites=$(printf "%02x\n" $(( len_ciph_suites_byte / 4 ))) + len2twobytes "$len_ciph_suites" + len_ciph_suites_word="$LEN_STR" + #[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo $len_ciph_suites_word + + if [[ "$tls_low_byte" != "00" ]]; then + # Add extensions + + # Check to see if any ECC cipher suites are included in cipher_suites + # (not needed for TLSv1.3) + if [[ "0x$tls_low_byte" -le "0x03" ]]; then + for (( i=0; i<len_ciph_suites_byte; i=i+8 )); do + j=$i+4 + part1="0x${cipher_suites:$i:2}" + part2="0x${cipher_suites:$j:2}" + if [[ "$part1" == 0xc0 ]]; then + if [[ "$part2" -ge 0x01 ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x19 ]]; then + ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break + elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x23 ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x3b ]]; then + ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break + elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x48 ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x4f ]]; then + ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break + elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x5c ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x63 ]]; then + ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break + elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x70 ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x79 ]]; then + ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break + elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x86 ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x8d ]]; then + ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break + elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0x9a ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0x9b ]]; then + ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break + elif [[ "$part2" -ge 0xac ]] && [[ "$part2" -le 0xaf ]]; then + ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break + fi + elif [[ "$part1" == 0xcc ]]; then + if [[ "$part2" == 0xa8 ]] || [[ "$part2" == 0xa9 ]] || \ + [[ "$part2" == 0xac ]] || [[ "$part2" == 0x13 ]] || \ + [[ "$part2" == 0x14 ]]; then + ecc_cipher_suite_found=true && break + fi + fi + done + fi + + if [[ -n "$SNI" ]]; then + #formatted example for SNI + #00 00 # extension server_name + #00 1a # length = the following +2 = server_name length + 5 + #00 18 # server_name list_length = server_name length +3 + #00 # server_name type (hostname) + #00 15 # server_name length + #66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 2e 66 66 66 target.mydomain1.tld # server_name target + len_servername=${#NODE} + hexdump_format_str="$len_servername/1 \"%02x,\"" + servername_hexstr=$(printf $NODE | hexdump -v -e "${hexdump_format_str}" | sed 's/,$//') + # convert lengths we need to fill in from dec to hex: + len_servername_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_servername) + len_sni_listlen=$(printf "%02x\n" $((len_servername+3))) + len_sni_ext=$(printf "%02x\n" $((len_servername+5))) + fi + + if [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -le 0x03 ]]; then + extension_signature_algorithms=" + 00, 0d, # Type: signature_algorithms , see RFC 5246 + 00, 20, 00,1e, # lengths + 06,01, 06,02, 06,03, 05,01, 05,02, 05,03, 04,01, 04,02, 04,03, + 03,01, 03,02, 03,03, 02,01, 02,02, 02,03" + else + extension_signature_algorithms=" + 00, 0d, # Type: signature_algorithms , see RFC 8446 + 00, 22, 00, 20, # lengths + 04,03, 05,03, 06,03, 08,04, 08,05, 08,06, + 04,01, 05,01, 06,01, 08,09, 08,0a, 08,0b, + 08,07, 08,08, 02,01, 02,03" + fi + + extension_heartbeat=" + 00, 0f, 00, 01, 01" + + extension_session_ticket=" + 00, 23, 00, 00" + + extension_next_protocol=" + 33, 74, 00, 00" + + extn_psk_mode=" + 00, 2d, 00, 02, 01, 01" + + if "$ecc_cipher_suite_found"; then + # Supported Groups Extension + extension_supported_groups=" + 00, 0a, # Type: Supported Elliptic Curves , see RFC 4492 + 00, 3e, 00, 3c, # lengths + 00, 0e, 00, 0d, 00, 19, 00, 1c, 00, 1e, 00, 0b, 00, 0c, 00, 1b, + 00, 18, 00, 09, 00, 0a, 00, 1a, 00, 16, 00, 17, 00, 1d, 00, 08, + 00, 06, 00, 07, 00, 14, 00, 15, 00, 04, 00, 05, 00, 12, 00, 13, + 00, 01, 00, 02, 00, 03, 00, 0f, 00, 10, 00, 11" + elif [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]]; then + # Supported Groups Extension + if [[ ! "$process_full" =~ all ]] || ( [[ ! "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]] && \ + ( [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 1.1.1* ]] || \ + [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 3.0.0* ]] ) ); then + extension_supported_groups=" + 00,0a, # Type: Supported Groups, see RFC 8446 + 00,10, 00,0e, # lengths + 00,1d, 00,17, 00,1e, 00,18, 00,19, + 01,00, 01,01" + # OpenSSL prior to 1.1.1 does not support X448, so list it as the least + # preferred option if the response needs to be decrypted, and do not + # list it at all if the response MUST be decrypted. + elif [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == 1.1.0* ]] && [[ "$process_full" == all+ ]]; then + extension_supported_groups=" + 00,0a, # Type: Supported Groups, see RFC 8446 + 00,0e, 00,0c, # lengths + 00,1d, 00,17, 00,18, 00,19, + 01,00, 01,01" + elif [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR == "1.1.0"* ]]; then + extension_supported_groups=" + 00,0a, # Type: Supported Groups, see RFC 8446 + 00,10, 00,0e, # lengths + 00,1d, 00,17, 00,18, 00,19, + 01,00, 01,01, 00,1e" + # OpenSSL prior to 1.1.0 does not support either X25519 or X448, + # so list them as the least referred options if the response + # needs to be decrypted, and do not list them at all if the + # response MUST be decrypted. + elif [[ "$process_full" == all+ ]]; then + extension_supported_groups=" + 00,0a, # Type: Supported Groups, see RFC 8446 + 00,0c, 00,0a, # lengths + 00,17, 00,18, 00,19, + 01,00, 01,01" + else + extension_supported_groups=" + 00,0a, # Type: Supported Groups, see RFC 8446 + 00,10, 00,0e, # lengths + 00,17, 00,18, 00,19, + 01,00, 01,01, 00,1d, 00,1e" + fi + + code2network "$extension_supported_groups" + supported_groups_c2n="$NW_STR" + fi + + if "$ecc_cipher_suite_found" || [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]]; then + # Supported Point Formats Extension. + extension_supported_point_formats=" + 00, 0b, # Type: Supported Point Formats , see RFC 4492 + 00, 02, # len + 01, 00" + fi + + # Each extension should appear in the ClientHello at most once. So, + # find out what extensions were provided as an argument and only use + # the provided values for those extensions. + extra_extensions="$(tolower "$4")" + code2network "$extra_extensions" + len_all=${#NW_STR} + for (( i=0; i < len_all; i=i+16+4*0x$len_extension_hex )); do + part2=$i+4 + extn_type="${NW_STR:i:2}${NW_STR:part2:2}" + extra_extensions_list+=" $extn_type " + j=$i+8 + part2=$j+4 + len_extension_hex="${NW_STR:j:2}${NW_STR:part2:2}" + if [[ "$extn_type" == "000a" ]] && [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]]; then + j=14+4*0x$len_extension_hex + supported_groups_c2n="${NW_STR:i:j}" + fi + done + if [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]]; then + extensions_key_share="$(generate_key_share_extension "$supported_groups_c2n" "$process_full")" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1 + fi + + if [[ -n "$SNI" ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ " 0000 " ]]; then + all_extensions=" + 00, 00 # extension server_name + ,00, $len_sni_ext # length SNI EXT + ,00, $len_sni_listlen # server_name list_length + ,00 # server_name type (hostname) + ,00, $len_servername_hex # server_name length. We assume len(hostname) < FF - 9 + ,$servername_hexstr" # server_name target + fi + if [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -ge 0x04 ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ " 002b " ]]; then + # Add supported_versions extension listing all TLS/SSL versions + # from the one specified in $tls_low_byte to SSLv3. + for (( i=0x$tls_low_byte; i >=0; i=i-1 )); do + if [[ 0x$i -eq 4 ]]; then + # FIXME: The ClientHello currently advertises support for various + # draft versions of TLSv1.3. Eventually it should only adversize + # support for the final version (0304). + if [[ "$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR" == 33 ]]; then + extension_supported_versions+=", 03, 04, 7f, 1c, 7f, 1b, 7f, 1a, 7f, 19, 7f, 18, 7f, 17" + else + extension_supported_versions+=", 7f, 16, 7f, 15, 7f, 14, 7f, 13, 7f, 12" + fi + else + extension_supported_versions+=", 03, $(printf "%02x" $i)" + fi + done + [[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+="," + # FIXME: Adjust the lengths ("+15" and "+14") when the draft versions of TLSv1.3 are removed. + if [[ "$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR" == "33" ]]; then + all_extensions+="00, 2b, 00, $(printf "%02x" $((2*0x$tls_low_byte+15))), $(printf "%02x" $((2*0x$tls_low_byte+14)))$extension_supported_versions" + else + all_extensions+="00, 2b, 00, $(printf "%02x" $((2*0x$tls_low_byte+11))), $(printf "%02x" $((2*0x$tls_low_byte+10)))$extension_supported_versions" + fi + fi + + # There does not seem to be any reason to include this extension. However, it appears that + # OpenSSL, Firefox, and Chrome include it in TLS 1.3 ClientHello messages, and there is at + # least one server that will fail the connection if it is absent + # (see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/990). + if [[ "0x$tls_low_byte" -ge 0x04 ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ " 002d " ]]; then + [[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+="," + all_extensions+="$extn_psk_mode" + fi + + if [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ " 0023 " ]]; then + [[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+="," + all_extensions+="$extension_session_ticket" + fi + + # If the ClientHello will include the ALPN extension, then don't include the NPN extension. + if [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ " 3374 " ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ " 0010 " ]]; then + [[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+="," + all_extensions+="$extension_next_protocol" + fi + + # RFC 5246 says that clients MUST NOT offer the signature algorithms + # extension if they are offering TLS versions prior to 1.2. + if [[ "0x$tls_low_byte" -ge 0x03 ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ " 000d " ]]; then + [[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+="," + all_extensions+="$extension_signature_algorithms" + fi + + if [[ -n "$extension_supported_groups" ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ " 000a " ]]; then + [[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+="," + all_extensions+="$extension_supported_groups" + fi + + if [[ -n "$extensions_key_share" ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ " 00$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR " ]]; then + [[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+="," + all_extensions+="$extensions_key_share" + fi + + if [[ -n "$extension_supported_point_formats" ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ " 000b " ]]; then + [[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+="," + all_extensions+="$extension_supported_point_formats" + fi + + if [[ -n "$extra_extensions" ]]; then + [[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+="," + all_extensions+="$extra_extensions" + fi + + # Make sure that a non-empty extension goes last (either heartbeat or padding). + # See PR #792 and https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg19720.html. + if [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ " 000f " ]]; then + [[ -n "$all_extensions" ]] && all_extensions+="," + all_extensions+="$extension_heartbeat" + fi + + code2network "$all_extensions" # convert extensions + all_extensions="$NW_STR" # we don't have the leading \x here so string length is two byte less, see next + len_extension=${#all_extensions} + len_extension+=2 + len_extension=$len_extension/4 + len_extension_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_extension) + + # If the length of the Client Hello would be between 256 and 511 bytes, + # then add a padding extension (see RFC 7685) + len_all=$((0x$len_ciph_suites + 0x2b + 0x$len_extension_hex + 0x2)) + "$offer_compression" && len_all+=2 + [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]] && len_all+=32 # TLSv1.3 ClientHello includes a 32-byte session id + if [[ $len_all -ge 256 ]] && [[ $len_all -le 511 ]] && [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ " 0015 " ]]; then + if [[ $len_all -ge 508 ]]; then + len_padding_extension=1 # Final extension cannot be empty: see PR #792 + else + len_padding_extension=$((508 - len_all)) + fi + len_padding_extension_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_padding_extension) + len2twobytes "$len_padding_extension_hex" + all_extensions="$all_extensions\\x00\\x15\\x${LEN_STR:0:2}\\x${LEN_STR:4:2}" + for (( i=0; i<len_padding_extension; i++ )); do + all_extensions="$all_extensions\\x00" + done + len_extension=$len_extension+$len_padding_extension+0x4 + len_extension_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_extension) + elif [[ ! "$extra_extensions_list" =~ " 0015 " ]] && ( [[ $((len_all%256)) -eq 10 ]] || [[ $((len_all%256)) -eq 14 ]] ); then + # Some servers fail if the length of the ClientHello is 522, 778, 1034, 1290, ... bytes. + # A few servers also fail if the length is 526, 782, 1038, 1294, ... bytes. + # So, if the ClientHello would be one of these length, add a 5-byte padding extension. + all_extensions="$all_extensions\\x00\\x15\\x00\\x01\\x00" + len_extension+=5 + len_extension_hex=$(printf "%02x\n" $len_extension) + fi + len2twobytes "$len_extension_hex" + all_extensions=" + ,$LEN_STR # first the len of all extensions. + ,$all_extensions" + fi + + if [[ 0x$tls_low_byte -gt 0x03 ]]; then + # TLSv1.3 calls for sending a random 32-byte session id in middlebox compatibility mode. + session_id="20,44,b8,92,56,af,74,52,9e,d8,cf,52,14,c8,af,d8,34,0b,e7,7f,eb,86,01,84,50,5d,e4,a1,6a,09,3b,bf,6e" + len_session_id=32 + else + session_id="00" + len_session_id=0 + fi + + # RFC 3546 doesn't specify SSLv3 to have SNI, openssl just ignores the switch if supplied + if [[ "$tls_low_byte" == "00" ]]; then + len_all=$((0x$len_ciph_suites + len_session_id + 0x27)) + else + len_all=$((0x$len_ciph_suites + len_session_id + 0x27 + 0x$len_extension_hex + 0x2)) + fi + "$offer_compression" && len_all+=2 + len2twobytes $(printf "%02x\n" $len_all) + len_client_hello_word="$LEN_STR" + #[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo $len_client_hello_word + + if [[ "$tls_low_byte" == 00 ]]; then + len_all=$((0x$len_ciph_suites + len_session_id + 0x2b)) + else + len_all=$((0x$len_ciph_suites + len_session_id + 0x2b + 0x$len_extension_hex + 0x2)) + fi + "$offer_compression" && len_all+=2 + len2twobytes $(printf "%02x\n" $len_all) + len_all_word="$LEN_STR" + #[[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo $len_all_word + + # if we have SSLv3, the first occurrence of TLS protocol -- record layer -- is SSLv3, otherwise TLS 1.0, + # except in the case of a second ClientHello in TLS 1.3, in which case it is TLS 1.2. + [[ $tls_low_byte == "00" ]] && tls_word_reclayer="03, 00" + + [[ 0x$tls_legacy_version -ge 0x04 ]] && tls_legacy_version="03" + + if "$offer_compression"; then + # See https://www.iana.org/assignments/comp-meth-ids/comp-meth-ids.xhtml#comp-meth-ids-2 + compression_methods="03,01,40,00" # Offer NULL, DEFLATE, and LZS compression + else + compression_methods="01,00" # Only offer NULL compression (0x00) + fi + + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO=" + # TLS header ( 5 bytes) + ,16, $tls_word_reclayer # TLS Version: in wireshark this is always 01 for TLS 1.0-1.2 + ,$len_all_word # Length <--- + # Handshake header: + ,01 # Type (x01 for ClientHello) + ,00, $len_client_hello_word # Length ClientHello + ,03, $tls_legacy_version # TLS version ClientHello + ,54, 51, 1e, 7a # Unix time since see www.moserware.com/2009/06/first-few-milliseconds-of-https.html + ,de, ad, be, ef # Random 28 bytes + ,31, 33, 07, 00, 00, 00, 00, 00 + ,cf, bd, 39, 04, cc, 16, 0b, 85 + ,03, 90, 9f, 77, 04, 33, d4, de + ,$session_id + ,$len_ciph_suites_word # Cipher suites length + ,$cipher_suites + ,$compression_methods" + + if "$new_socket"; then + fd_socket 5 || return 6 + fi + + debugme echo -n "sending client hello... " + socksend_clienthello "$TLS_CLIENT_HELLO$all_extensions" $USLEEP_SND + + if [[ "$tls_low_byte" -gt 0x03 ]]; then + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="$(tolower "$NW_STR")" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x0\\/\\x00\\}" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x1\\/\\x01\\}" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x2\\/\\x02\\}" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x3\\/\\x03\\}" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x4\\/\\x04\\}" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x5\\/\\x05\\}" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x6\\/\\x06\\}" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x7\\/\\x07\\}" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x8\\/\\x08\\}" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x9\\/\\x09\\}" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xa\\/\\x0a\\}" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xb\\/\\x0b\\}" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xc\\/\\x0c\\}" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xd\\/\\x0d\\}" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xe\\/\\x0e\\}" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\xf\\/\\x0f\\}" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO//\\x/}" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${TLS_CLIENT_HELLO:10}" + fi + + return 0 +} + +# arg1: The original ClientHello +# arg2: The server's response +# Return 0 if the response is not a HelloRetryRequest. +# Return 1 if the response is a malformed HelloRetryRequest or if a new ClientHello cannot be sent. +# Return 2 if the response is a HelloRetryRequest, and sending a new ClientHello succeeded. +# Return 6 if the response is a HelloRetryRequest, and sending a new ClientHello failed. +resend_if_hello_retry_request() { + local original_clienthello="$1" + local tls_hello_ascii="$2" + local msg_type tls_low_byte server_version cipher_suite rfc_cipher_suite + local key_share="" new_key_share="" cookie="" second_clienthello data="" + local -i i j msg_len tls_hello_ascii_len sid_len + local -i extns_offset hrr_extns_len extra_extensions_len len_extn + local extra_extensions extn_type part2 new_extra_extns="" + local sha256_hrr="CF21AD74E59A6111BE1D8C021E65B891C2A211167ABB8C5E079E09E2C8A8339C" + + tls_hello_ascii_len=${#tls_hello_ascii} + # A HelloRetryRequest is at least 13 bytes long + [[ $tls_hello_ascii_len -lt 26 ]] && return 0 + # A HelloRetryRequest is a handshake message (16) with a major record version of 03. + [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:4}" != 1603 ]] && return 0 + msg_type="${tls_hello_ascii:10:2}" + if [[ "$msg_type" == 02 ]]; then + # A HRR is a ServerHello with a Random value equal to the + # SHA-256 hash of "HelloRetryRequest" + [[ $tls_hello_ascii_len -lt 76 ]] && return 0 + [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:22:64}" != $sha256_hrr ]] && return 0 + elif [[ "$msg_type" != 06 ]]; then + # The handshake type for hello_retry_request in draft versions was 06. + return 0 + fi + + # This appears to be a HelloRetryRequest message. + debugme echo "reading hello retry request... " + if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then + hexdump -C $SOCK_REPLY_FILE | head -6 + echo + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && echo "$tls_hello_ascii" # one line without any blanks + fi + + # Check the length of the handshake message + msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:6:4}") + if [[ $msg_len -gt $tls_hello_ascii_len-10 ]]; then + debugme echo "malformed HelloRetryRequest" + return 1 + fi + # The HelloRetryRequest message may be followed by something + # else (e.g., a change cipher spec message). Ignore anything + # that follows. + tls_hello_ascii_len=$msg_len+10 + + # Check the length of the HelloRetryRequest message. + msg_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:12:6}") + if [[ $msg_len -ne $tls_hello_ascii_len-18 ]]; then + debugme echo "malformed HelloRetryRequest" + return 1 + fi + + if [[ "$msg_type" == 06 ]]; then + server_version="${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}" + if [[ 0x$server_version -ge 0x7f13 ]]; then + # Starting with TLSv1.3 draft 19, a HelloRetryRequest is at least 15 bytes long + [[ $tls_hello_ascii_len -lt 30 ]] && return 0 + cipher_suite="${tls_hello_ascii:22:2},${tls_hello_ascii:24:2}" + extns_offset=26 + else + extns_offset=22 + fi + else + sid_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:86:2}") + i=88+$sid_len + j=90+$sid_len + cipher_suite="${tls_hello_ascii:i:2},${tls_hello_ascii:j:2}" + extns_offset=94+$sid_len + fi + + # Check the length of the extensions. + hrr_extns_len=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:extns_offset:4}") + if [[ $hrr_extns_len -ne $tls_hello_ascii_len-$extns_offset-4 ]]; then + debugme echo "malformed HelloRetryRequest" + return 1 + fi + + # Parse HelloRetryRequest extensions + for (( i=extns_offset+4; i < tls_hello_ascii_len; i=i+8+len_extn )); do + extn_type="${tls_hello_ascii:i:4}" + j=$i+4 + len_extn=2*$(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:j:4}") + j+=4 + if [[ $len_extn -gt $tls_hello_ascii_len-$j ]]; then + debugme echo "malformed HelloRetryRequest" + return 1 + fi + if [[ "$extn_type" == 002C ]]; then + # If the HRR includes a cookie extension, then it needs to be + # included in the next ClientHello. + j=8+$len_extn + cookie="${tls_hello_ascii:i:j}" + elif [[ "$extn_type" == 00$KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR ]]; then + # If the HRR includes a key_share extension, then it specifies the + # group to be used in the next ClientHello. So, create a key_share + # extension that specifies this group. + if [[ $len_extn -ne 4 ]]; then + debugme echo "malformed key share extension in HelloRetryRequest" + return 1 + fi + key_share="${tls_hello_ascii:j:4}" + new_key_share="$(generate_key_share_extension "000a00040002$key_share" "ephemeralkey")" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && return 1 + [[ -z "$new_key_share" ]] && return 1 + new_key_share="${new_key_share//,/}" + elif [[ "$extn_type" == 002B ]]; then + if [[ $len_extn -ne 4 ]]; then + debugme echo "malformed supported versions extension in HelloRetryRequest" + return 1 + fi + server_version="${tls_hello_ascii:j:4}" + fi + done + + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then + echo "TLS message fragments:" + echo " tls_protocol (reclyr): 0x${tls_hello_ascii:2:4}" + echo " tls_content_type: 0x16 (handshake)" + echo " msg_len: $(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:6:4}")" + echo + echo "TLS handshake message:" + echo -n " handshake type: 0x$msg_type " + case "$msg_type" in + 02) echo "(hello_retry_request formatted as server_hello)" ;; + 06) echo "(hello_retry_request)" ;; + esac + echo " msg_len: $(hex2dec "${tls_hello_ascii:12:6}")" + echo + echo "TLS hello retry request message:" + echo " server version: $server_version" + if [[ "$server_version" == 0304 ]] || [[ 0x$server_version -ge 0x7f13 ]]; then + echo -n " cipher suite: $cipher_suite" + if [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -ne 0 ]]; then + if [[ "${cipher_suite:0:2}" == "00" ]]; then + rfc_cipher_suite="$(show_rfc_style "x${cipher_suite:3:2}")" + else + rfc_cipher_suite="$(show_rfc_style "x${cipher_suite:0:2}${cipher_suite:3:2}")" + fi + elif "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then + rfc_cipher_suite="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V -ciphersuites "$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS" 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' | grep -i " 0x${cipher_suite:0:2},0x${cipher_suite:3:2} " | awk '{ print $3 }')" + else + rfc_cipher_suite="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' | grep -i " 0x${cipher_suite:0:2},0x${cipher_suite:3:2} " | awk '{ print $3 }')" + fi + if [[ -n "$rfc_cipher_suite" ]]; then + echo " ($rfc_cipher_suite)" + else + echo "" + fi + fi + [[ -n "$key_share" ]] && echo " key share: 0x$key_share" + [[ -n "$cookie" ]] && echo " cookie: $cookie" + fi + + # Starting with TLSv1.3 draft 24, the second ClientHello should specify a record layer version of 0x0303 + if [[ "$server_version" == 0304 ]] || [[ 0x$server_version -ge 0x7f18 ]]; then + original_clienthello="160303${original_clienthello:6}" + fi + + if [[ "$server_version" == 0304 ]] || [[ 0x$server_version -ge 0x7f16 ]]; then + # Send a dummy change cipher spec for middlebox compatibility. + debugme echo -en "\nsending dummy change cipher spec... " + socksend ", x14, x03, x03 ,x00, x01, x01" 0 + fi + debugme echo -en "\nsending second client hello... " + second_clienthello="$(modify_clienthello "$original_clienthello" "$new_key_share" "$cookie")" + TLS_CLIENT_HELLO="${second_clienthello:10}" + msg_len=${#second_clienthello} + for (( i=0; i < msg_len; i=i+2 )); do + data+=", ${second_clienthello:i:2}" + done + debugme echo -n "sending client hello... " + socksend_clienthello "$data" $USLEEP_SND + sockread_serverhello 32768 + return 2 +} + +# arg1: TLS version low byte +# (00: SSLv3, 01: TLS 1.0, 02: TLS 1.1, 03: TLS 1.2) +# arg2: (optional) list of cipher suites +# arg3: (optional): "all" - process full response (including Certificate and certificate_status handshake messages) +# "all+" - same as "all", but do not offer any curves with TLSv1.3 that are not supported by +# $OPENSSL, since response MUST be decrypted. +# "ephemeralkey" - extract the server's ephemeral key (if any) +# arg4: (optional) additional request extensions +# arg5: (optional) "true" if ClientHello should advertise compression methods other than "NULL" +# arg6: (optional) "false" if the connection should not be closed before the function returns. +# return: 0: successful connect | 1: protocol or cipher not available | 2: as (0) but downgraded +# 6: couldn't open socket | 7: couldn't open temp file +tls_sockets() { + local -i ret=0 + local -i save=0 + local lines + local tls_low_byte + local cipher_list_2send + local sock_reply_file2 sock_reply_file3 + local tls_hello_ascii next_packet + local clienthello1 original_clienthello hrr="" + local process_full="$3" offer_compression=false skip=false + local close_connection=true + local -i hello_done=0 + local cipher="" key_and_iv="" decrypted_response + + [[ "$5" == true ]] && offer_compression=true + [[ "$6" == false ]] && close_connection=false + tls_low_byte="$1" + if [[ -n "$2" ]]; then # use supplied string in arg2 if there is one + cipher_list_2send="$2" + else # otherwise use std ciphers then + if [[ "$tls_low_byte" == 03 ]]; then + cipher_list_2send="$TLS12_CIPHER" + else + cipher_list_2send="$TLS_CIPHER" + fi + fi + code2network "$(tolower "$cipher_list_2send")" # convert CIPHER_SUITES to a "standardized" format + cipher_list_2send="$NW_STR" + + debugme echo -en "\nsending client hello... " + prepare_tls_clienthello "$tls_low_byte" "$cipher_list_2send" "$process_full" "$4" "$offer_compression" + ret=$? # 6 means opening socket didn't succeed, e.g. timeout + + # if sending didn't succeed we don't bother + if [[ $ret -eq 0 ]]; then + clienthello1="$TLS_CLIENT_HELLO" + sockread_serverhello 32768 + "$TLS_DIFFTIME_SET" && TLS_NOW=$(LC_ALL=C date "+%s") + + tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE") + tls_hello_ascii="${tls_hello_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}" + tls_hello_ascii="${tls_hello_ascii%%140303000101}" + + # Check if the response is a HelloRetryRequest. + original_clienthello="160301$(printf "%04x" "${#clienthello1}")$clienthello1" + resend_if_hello_retry_request "$original_clienthello" "$tls_hello_ascii" + ret=$? + if [[ $ret -eq 2 ]]; then + hrr="${tls_hello_ascii:10}" + tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE") + tls_hello_ascii="${tls_hello_ascii%%[!0-9A-F]*}" + elif [[ $ret -eq 1 ]] || [[ $ret -eq 6 ]]; then + close_socket + TMPFILE=$SOCK_REPLY_FILE + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd + return $ret + fi + + # The server's response may span more than one packet. If only the + # first part of the response needs to be processed, this isn't an + # issue. However, if the entire response needs to be processed or + # if the ephemeral key is needed (which comes last for TLS 1.2 and + # below), then we need to check if response appears to be complete, + # and if it isn't then try to get another packet from the server. + if [[ "$process_full" =~ all ]] || [[ "$process_full" == ephemeralkey ]]; then + hello_done=1; skip=true + fi + for (( 1 ; hello_done==1; 1 )); do + if ! "$skip"; then + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then + sock_reply_file2=$(mktemp $TEMPDIR/ddreply.XXXXXX) || return 7 + mv "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$sock_reply_file2" + fi + + debugme echo -n "requesting more server hello data... " + socksend "" $USLEEP_SND + sockread_serverhello 32768 + + next_packet=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE") + next_packet="${next_packet%%[!0-9A-F]*}" + + if [[ ${#next_packet} -eq 0 ]]; then + # This shouldn't be necessary. However, it protects against + # getting into an infinite loop if the server has nothing + # left to send and check_tls_serverhellodone doesn't + # correctly catch it. + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && mv "$sock_reply_file2" "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" + hello_done=0 + else + tls_hello_ascii+="$next_packet" + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]]; then + sock_reply_file3=$(mktemp $TEMPDIR/ddreply.XXXXXX) || return 7 + mv "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" "$sock_reply_file3" + mv "$sock_reply_file2" "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" + cat "$sock_reply_file3" >> "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" + rm "$sock_reply_file3" + fi + fi + fi + skip=false + if [[ $hello_done -eq 1 ]]; then + decrypted_response="$(check_tls_serverhellodone "$tls_hello_ascii" "$process_full" "$cipher" "$key_and_iv")" + hello_done=$? + [[ "$hello_done" -eq 0 ]] && [[ -n "$decrypted_response" ]] && tls_hello_ascii="$(toupper "$decrypted_response")" + if [[ "$hello_done" -eq 3 ]]; then + hello_done=1; skip=true + debugme echo "reading server hello..." + parse_tls_serverhello "$tls_hello_ascii" "ephemeralkey" + ret=$? + if [[ "$ret" -eq 0 ]] || [[ "$ret" -eq 2 ]]; then + cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt") + if [[ -n "$hrr" ]]; then + key_and_iv="$(derive-handshake-traffic-keys "$cipher" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" "$clienthello1" "$hrr" "$TLS_CLIENT_HELLO" "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO")" + else + key_and_iv="$(derive-handshake-traffic-keys "$cipher" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" "" "" "$TLS_CLIENT_HELLO" "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO")" + fi + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && hello_done=2 + else + hello_done=2 + fi + fi + fi + done + + debugme echo "reading server hello..." + if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then + hexdump -C $SOCK_REPLY_FILE | head -6 + echo + fi + + parse_tls_serverhello "$tls_hello_ascii" "$process_full" "$cipher_list_2send" + save=$? + if "$close_connection" && [[ $save == 0 ]]; then + send_close_notify "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" + fi + + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then + # see https://secure.wand.net.nz/trac/libprotoident/wiki/SSL + lines=$(count_lines "$(hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" 2>$ERRFILE)") + tm_out " ($lines lines returned) " + fi + + # determine the return value for higher level, so that they can tell what the result is + if [[ $save -eq 1 ]] || [[ $lines -eq 1 ]]; then + ret=1 # NOT available + elif [[ $save -eq 3 ]]; then + # only for IMAP currently 'a002 NO Starttls' + ret=3 + elif [[ $save -eq 8 ]]; then + # odd return, we just pass this from parse_tls_serverhello() back + ret=8 + elif [[ $save -eq 4 ]]; then + # STARTTLS problem passing back + ret=4 + else + if [[ 03$tls_low_byte -eq $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION ]]; then + ret=0 # protocol available, TLS version returned equal to the one send + else + debugme echo -n "protocol send: 0x03$tls_low_byte, returned: 0x$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" + ret=2 # protocol NOT available, server downgraded to $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION + fi + fi + debugme echo + else + debugme echo "stuck on sending: $ret" + fi + + "$close_connection" && close_socket + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd $SOCK_REPLY_FILE + return $ret +} + + +####### Vulnerabilities follow ####### +# General overview which browser "supports" which vulnerability: +# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security-SSL#Web_browsers + +# mainly adapted from https://gist.github.com/takeshixx/10107280 +# +run_heartbleed(){ + local tls_hexcode + local heartbleed_payload + local -i n lines_returned + local append="" + local tls_hello_ascii="" + local jsonID="heartbleed" + local cve="CVE-2014-0160" + local cwe="CWE-119" + local hint="" + + [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for heartbleed vulnerability " && outln + pr_bold " Heartbleed"; out " ($cve) " + + if ( [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ ldap ]] || [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ irc ]] ); then + prln_local_problem "STARTTLS/$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL and --ssl-native collide here" + return 1 + fi + + [[ -z "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" ]] && determine_tls_extensions + if [[ ! "${TLS_EXTENSIONS}" =~ heartbeat ]]; then + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + outln ", no heartbeat extension" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no heartbeat extension" "$cve" "$cwe" + return 0 + fi + + if [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1) ]]; then + tls_hexcode="x03, x01" + elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_1) ]]; then + tls_hexcode="x03, x02" + elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_2) ]]; then + tls_hexcode="x03, x03" + elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol ssl3) ]]; then + tls_hexcode="x03, x00" + else # no protocol for some reason defined, determine TLS versions offered with a new handshake + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + case "$(get_protocol $TMPFILE)" in + *1.2) tls_hexcode="x03, x03" ; add_tls_offered tls1_2 yes ;; + *1.1) tls_hexcode="x03, x02" ; add_tls_offered tls1_1 yes ;; + TLSv1) tls_hexcode="x03, x01" ; add_tls_offered tls1 yes ;; + SSLv3) tls_hexcode="x03, x00" ; add_tls_offered ssl3 yes ;; + esac + fi + debugme echo "using protocol $tls_hexcode" + + heartbleed_payload=", x18, $tls_hexcode, x00, x03, x01, x40, x00" + tls_sockets "${tls_hexcode:6:2}" "" "ephemeralkey" "" "" "false" + + [[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]] && tmln_out "\nsending payload with TLS version $tls_hexcode:" + socksend "$heartbleed_payload" 1 + sockread_serverhello 16384 $HEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK + if [[ $? -eq 3 ]]; then + append=", timed out" + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; out "$append" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable $append" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + + # server reply should be (>=SSLv3): 18030x in case of a heartBEAT reply -- which we take as a positive result + tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE") + debugme echo "tls_content_type: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}" + debugme echo "tls_protocol: ${tls_hello_ascii:2:4}" + + lines_returned=$(count_lines "$(hexdump -ve '16/1 "%02x " " \n"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE")") + debugme echo "lines HB reply: $lines_returned" + + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then + tmln_out "\nheartbleed reply: " + hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" | head -20 + [[ $lines_returned -gt 20 ]] && tmln_out "[...]" + tmln_out + fi + + if [[ $lines_returned -gt 1 ]] && [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:4}" == 1803 ]]; then + if [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ ftp ]]; then + # check possibility of weird vsftpd reply, see #426, despite "1803" seems very unlikely... + if grep -q '500 OOPS' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" ; then + append=", successful weeded out vsftpd false positive" + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; out "$append" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable $append" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + out "likely " + pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)" + [[ $DEBUG -lt 3 ]] && tm_out ", use debug >=3 to confirm" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + fi + else + pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + fi + else + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + fi + outln + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd $SOCK_REPLY_FILE + close_socket + return 0 +} + +# helper function +ok_ids(){ + prln_svrty_best "\n ok -- something reset our ccs packets" + return 0 +} + +# see https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt +# mainly adapted from Ramon de C Valle's C code from https://gist.github.com/rcvalle/71f4b027d61a78c42607 +#FIXME: At a certain point ccs needs to be changed and make use of code2network using a file, then tls_sockets +# +run_ccs_injection(){ + local tls_hexcode ccs_message client_hello byte6 + local -i retval ret=0 + local tls_hello_ascii="" + local jsonID="CCS" + local cve="CVE-2014-0224" + local cwe="CWE-310" + local hint="" + + [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for CCS injection vulnerability " && outln + pr_bold " CCS"; out " ($cve) " + + if ( [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ ldap ]] || [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ irc ]] ); then + prln_local_problem "STARTTLS/$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL and --ssl-native collide here" + return 1 + fi + + if [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1) ]]; then + tls_hexcode="x03, x01" + elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_1) ]]; then + tls_hexcode="x03, x02" + elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_2) ]]; then + tls_hexcode="x03, x03" + elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol ssl3) ]]; then + tls_hexcode="x03, x00" + else # no protocol for some reason defined, determine TLS versions offered with a new handshake + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + case "$(get_protocol $TMPFILE)" in + *1.2) tls_hexcode="x03, x03" ; add_tls_offered tls1_2 yes ;; + *1.1) tls_hexcode="x03, x02" ; add_tls_offered tls1_1 yes ;; + TLSv1) tls_hexcode="x03, x01" ; add_tls_offered tls1 yes ;; + SSLv3) tls_hexcode="x03, x00" ; add_tls_offered ssl3 yes ;; + esac + fi + debugme echo "using protocol $tls_hexcode" + + ccs_message=", x14, $tls_hexcode ,x00, x01, x01" + + client_hello=" + # TLS header (5 bytes) + ,x16, # content type (x16 for handshake) + x03, x01, # TLS version in record layer is always TLS 1.0 (except SSLv3) + x00, x93, # length + # Handshake header + x01, # type (x01 for ClientHello) + x00, x00, x8f, # length + $tls_hexcode, # TLS version + # Random (32 byte) + x53, x43, x5b, x90, x9d, x9b, x72, x0b, + xbc, x0c, xbc, x2b, x92, xa8, x48, x97, + xcf, xbd, x39, x04, xcc, x16, x0b, x85, + x03, x90, x9f, x77, x04, x33, xd4, xde, + x00, # session ID length + x00, x68, # cipher suites length + # Cipher suites (51 suites) + xc0, x13, xc0, x12, xc0, x11, xc0, x10, + xc0, x0f, xc0, x0e, xc0, x0d, xc0, x0c, + xc0, x0b, xc0, x0a, xc0, x09, xc0, x08, + xc0, x07, xc0, x06, xc0, x05, xc0, x04, + xc0, x03, xc0, x02, xc0, x01, x00, x39, + x00, x38, x00, x37, x00, x36, x00, x35, x00, x34, + x00, x33, x00, x32, x00, x31, x00, x30, + x00, x2f, x00, x16, x00, x15, x00, x14, + x00, x13, x00, x12, x00, x11, x00, x10, + x00, x0f, x00, x0e, x00, x0d, x00, x0c, + x00, x0b, x00, x0a, x00, x09, x00, x08, + x00, x07, x00, x06, x00, x05, x00, x04, + x00, x03, x00, x02, x00, x01, x01, x00" + + fd_socket 5 || return 1 + +# we now make a standard handshake ... + debugme echo -n "sending client hello... " + socksend "$client_hello" 1 + + debugme echo "reading server hello... " + sockread_serverhello 32768 + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 4 ]]; then + hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" | head -20 + tmln_out "[...]" + tm_out "\nsending payload #1 with TLS version $tls_hexcode: " + fi + rm "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" +# ... and then send the a change cipher spec message + socksend "$ccs_message" 1 || ok_ids + sockread_serverhello 4096 $CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then + tmln_out "\n1st reply: " + hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" | head -20 + tmln_out + tm_out "sending payload #2 with TLS version $tls_hexcode: " + fi + rm "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" + + socksend "$ccs_message" 2 || ok_ids + sockread_serverhello 4096 $CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK + retval=$? + + tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE") + byte6="${tls_hello_ascii:12:2}" + debugme echo "tls_content_type: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:2} | tls_protocol: ${tls_hello_ascii:2:4} | byte6: $byte6" + + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]]; then + tmln_out "\n2nd reply: " + hexdump -C "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE" + tmln_out + fi + +# in general, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#Alert_protocol +# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.2 +# +# not ok for CCSI: 15 | 0301 | 00 02 | 02 15 +# ALERT | TLS 1.0 | Length=2 | Decryption failed (21) +# +# ok: nothing: ==> RST +# +# 0A: Unexpected message +# 28: Handshake failure + if [[ -z "${tls_hello_ascii:0:12}" ]]; then + # empty reply + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + if [[ $retval -eq 3 ]]; then + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable (timed out)" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + elif [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:4}" == "1503" ]]; then + if [[ ! "${tls_hello_ascii:5:2}" =~ [03|02|01|00] ]]; then + pr_warning "test failed " + out "no proper TLS repy (debug info: protocol sent: 1503${tls_hexcode#x03, x}, reply: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:14}" + fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "test failed, around line $LINENO, debug info (${tls_hello_ascii:0:14})" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + ret=1 + elif [[ "$byte6" == "15" ]]; then + # decryption failed received + pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + elif [[ "$byte6" == "0A" ]] || [[ "$byte6" == "28" ]]; then + # Unexpected message / Handshake failure received + pr_warning "likely " + out "not vulnerable (OK)" + out " - alert description type: $byte6" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "probably not vulnerable but received 0x${byte6} instead of 0x15" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + elif [[ "$byte6" == "14" ]]; then + # bad_record_mac -- this is not "not vulnerable" + out "likely " + pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)" + out ", suspicious \"bad_record_mac\" ($byte6)" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "likely VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + else + # other errors, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.2 + out "likely " + pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)" + out ", suspicious error code \"$byte6\" returned. Please report" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "likely VULNERABLE with $byte6" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + fi + elif [[ $STARTTLS_PROTOCOL == "mysql" ]] && [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:14:12}" == "233038533031" ]]; then + # MySQL community edition (yaSSL) returns a MySQL error instead of a TLS Alert + # Error: #08S01 Bad handshake + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + out ", looks like MySQL community edition (yaSSL)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable (MySQL community edition (yaSSL) detected)" "$cve" "$cwe" + elif [[ "$byte6" == [0-9a-f][0-9a-f] ]] && [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:2:2}" != "03" ]]; then + pr_warning "test failed" + out ", probably read buffer too small (${tls_hello_ascii:0:14})" + fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "test failed, probably read buffer too small (${tls_hello_ascii:0:14})" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + ret=1 + else + pr_warning "test failed " + out "around line $LINENO (debug info: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:12},$byte6)" + fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "test failed, around line $LINENO, debug info (${tls_hello_ascii:0:12},$byte6)" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + ret=1 + fi + outln + + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.dd $SOCK_REPLY_FILE + close_socket + return $ret +} + +sub_session_ticket_tls() { + local tls_proto="$1" + local sessticket_tls="" + #FIXME: we likely have done this already before (either @ run_server_defaults() or at least the output + # from a previous handshake) --> would save 1x connect. We have TLS_TICKET but not yet the ticket itself #FIXME + #ATTENTION: we DO NOT use SNI here as we assume ticketbleed is a vulnerability of the TLS stack. If we'd do SNI here, we'd also need + # it in the ClientHello of run_ticketbleed() otherwise the ticket will be different and the whole thing won't work! + # + sessticket_tls="$($OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$BUGS $tls_proto $PROXY -connect $NODEIP:$PORT") </dev/null 2>$ERRFILE | awk '/TLS session ticket:/,/^$/' | awk '!/TLS session ticket/')" + sessticket_tls="$(sed -e 's/^.* - /x/g' -e 's/ .*$//g' <<< "$sessticket_tls" | tr '\n' ',')" + sed -e 's/ /,x/g' -e 's/-/,x/g' <<< "$sessticket_tls" + +} + + +# see https://blog.filippo.io/finding-ticketbleed/ | https://ticketbleed.com/ +run_ticketbleed() { + local tls_hexcode tls_proto="" + local session_tckt_tls="" + local -i len_ch=300 # fixed len of prepared clienthello below + local sid="x00,x0B,xAD,xC0,xDE,x00," # some abitratry bytes + local len_sid="$(( ${#sid} / 4))" + local xlen_sid="$(dec02hex $len_sid)" + local -i len_tckt_tls=0 nr_sid_detected=0 + local xlen_tckt_tls="" xlen_handshake_record_layer="" xlen_handshake_ssl_layer="" + local -i len_handshake_record_layer=0 + local i + local -a memory sid_detected + local early_exit=true + local -i ret=0 + local jsonID="ticketbleed" + local cve="CVE-2016-9244" + local cwe="CWE-200" + local hint="" + + [[ -n "$STARTTLS" ]] && return 0 + [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for Ticketbleed vulnerability " && outln + pr_bold " Ticketbleed"; out " ($cve), experiment. " + + if [[ "$SERVICE" != HTTP ]] && ! "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then + outln "-- (applicable only for HTTPS)" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "not applicable, not HTTP" "$cve" "$cwe" + return 0 + fi + + # highly unlikely that it is NOT supported. We may loose time here but it's more solid + [[ -z "$TLS_EXTENSIONS" ]] && determine_tls_extensions + if [[ ! "${TLS_EXTENSIONS}" =~ "session ticket" ]]; then + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + outln ", no session ticket extension" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "no session ticket extension" "$cve" "$cwe" + return 0 + fi + + if [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1) ]]; then + tls_hexcode="x03, x01"; tls_proto="-tls1" + elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_1) ]]; then + tls_hexcode="x03, x02"; tls_proto="-tls1_1" + elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_2) ]]; then + tls_hexcode="x03, x03"; tls_proto="-tls1_2" + elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol ssl3) ]]; then + tls_hexcode="x03, x00"; tls_proto="-ssl3" + else # no protocol for some reason defined, determine TLS versions offered with a new handshake + "$HAS_TLS13" && tls_proto="-no_tls1_3" + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS $tls_proto -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + case "$(get_protocol $TMPFILE)" in + *1.2) tls_hexcode="x03, x03"; tls_proto="-tls1_2" ; add_tls_offered tls1_2 yes ;; + *1.1) tls_hexcode="x03, x02"; tls_proto="-tls1_1" ; add_tls_offered tls1_1 yes ;; + TLSv1) tls_hexcode="x03, x01"; tls_proto="-tls1" ; add_tls_offered tls1 yes ;; + SSLv3) tls_hexcode="x03, x00"; tls_proto="-ssl3" ; add_tls_offered ssl3 yes ;; + esac + fi + debugme echo "using protocol $tls_hexcode" + + session_tckt_tls="$(sub_session_ticket_tls "$tls_proto")" + if [[ "$session_tckt_tls" == "," ]]; then + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + outln ", no session tickets" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe" + debugme echo " session ticket TLS \"$session_tckt_tls\"" + return 0 + fi + + len_tckt_tls=${#session_tckt_tls} + len_tckt_tls=$(( len_tckt_tls / 4)) + xlen_tckt_tls="$(dec02hex $len_tckt_tls)" + len_handshake_record_layer="$(( len_sid + len_ch + len_tckt_tls ))" + xlen_handshake_record_layer="$(dec04hex "$len_handshake_record_layer")" + len_handshake_ssl_layer="$(( len_handshake_record_layer + 4 ))" + xlen_handshake_ssl_layer="$(dec04hex "$len_handshake_ssl_layer")" + + if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then + echo "len_tckt_tls (hex): $len_tckt_tls ($xlen_tckt_tls)" + echo "sid: $sid" + echo "len_sid (hex) $len_sid ($xlen_sid)" + echo "len_handshake_record_layer: $len_handshake_record_layer ($xlen_handshake_record_layer)" + echo "len_handshake_ssl_layer: $len_handshake_ssl_layer ($xlen_handshake_ssl_layer)" + echo "session_tckt_tls: $session_tckt_tls" + fi + + client_hello=" + # TLS header (5 bytes) + ,x16, # Content type (x16 for handshake) + x03,x01, # TLS version record layer + # Length Secure Socket Layer follows: + $xlen_handshake_ssl_layer, + # Handshake header + x01, # Type (x01 for ClientHello) + # Length of ClientHello follows: + x00, $xlen_handshake_record_layer, + $tls_hexcode, # TLS Version + # Random (32 byte) Unix time etc, see www.moserware.com/2009/06/first-few-milliseconds-of-https.html + xee, xee, x5b, x90, x9d, x9b, x72, x0b, + xbc, x0c, xbc, x2b, x92, xa8, x48, x97, + xcf, xbd, x39, x04, xcc, x16, x0b, x85, + x03, x90, x9f, x77, x04, x33, xff, xff, + $xlen_sid, # Session ID length + $sid + x00, x6a, # Cipher suites length 106 + # 53 Cipher suites + xc0,x14, xc0,x13, xc0,x0a, xc0,x21, + x00,x39, x00,x38, x00,x88, x00,x87, + xc0,x0f, xc0,x05, x00,x35, x00,x84, + xc0,x12, xc0,x08, xc0,x1c, xc0,x1b, + x00,x16, x00,x13, xc0,x0d, xc0,x03, + x00,x0a, xc0,x13, xc0,x09, xc0,x1f, + xc0,x1e, x00,x33, x00,x32, x00,x9a, + x00,x99, x00,x45, x00,x44, xc0,x0e, + xc0,x04, x00,x2f, x00,x96, x00,x41, + xc0,x11, xc0,x07, xc0,x0c, xc0,x02, + x00,x05, x00,x04, x00,x15, x00,x12, + xc0,x30, xc0,x2f, x00,x9d, x00,x9c, + x00,x3d, x00,x3c, x00,x9f, x00,x9e, + x00,xff, + x01, # Compression methods length + x00, # Compression method (x00 for NULL) + x01,x5b, # Extensions length ####### 10b + x14 + x3c +# Extension Padding + x00,x15, + # length: + x00,x38, + x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, + x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, + x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, x00,x00, +# Extension: ec_point_formats + x00,x0b, + # length: + x00,x04, + # data: + x03,x00, x01,x02, +# Extension: elliptic_curves + x00,x0a, + # length + x00,x34, + x00,x32, + # data: + x00,x0e, x00,x0d, x00,x19, x00,x0b, x00,x0c, + x00,x18, x00,x09, x00,x0a, x00,x16, + x00,x17, x00,x08, x00,x06, x00,x07, + x00,x14, x00,x15, x00,x04, x00,x05, + x00,x12, x00,x13, x00,x01, x00,x02, + x00,x03, x00,x0f, x00,x10, x00,x11, +# Extension: Signature Algorithms + x00,x0d, + # length: + x00,x10, + # data: + x00,x0e ,x04,x01, x05,x01 ,x02,x01, x04,x03, x05,x03, + x02,x03, x02,x02, +# Extension: SessionTicket TLS + x00, x23, + # length of SessionTicket TLS + x00, $xlen_tckt_tls, + # data, Session Ticket + $session_tckt_tls # here we have the comma already +# Extension: Heartbeat + x00, x0f, x00, x01, x01" + + # we do 3 client hellos, then see whether different memory is returned + for i in 1 2 3; do + fd_socket 5 || return 6 + debugme echo -n "sending client hello... " + socksend "$client_hello" 0 + + debugme echo "reading server hello (ticketbleed reply)... " + if "$FAST_SOCKET"; then + tls_hello_ascii=$(sockread_fast 32768) + else + sockread_serverhello 32768 $CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK + tls_hello_ascii=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02X"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE") + fi + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && echo "$tls_hello_ascii" + if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 4 ]]; then + echo "=============================" + echo "$tls_hello_ascii" + echo "=============================" + fi + + if [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}" == 15 ]]; then + debugme echo -n "TLS Alert ${tls_hello_ascii:10:4} (TLS version: ${tls_hello_ascii:2:4}) -- " + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe" + send_close_notify "${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}" + close_socket + break + elif [[ -z "${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}" ]]; then + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + out ", reply empty" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe" + send_close_notify "${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}" + close_socket + break + elif [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}" == 16 ]]; then + early_exit=false + debugme echo -n "Handshake (TLS version: ${tls_hello_ascii:2:4}), " + if [[ "${tls_hello_ascii:10:6}" == 020000 ]]; then + debugme echo -n "ServerHello -- " + else + debugme echo -n "Message type: ${tls_hello_ascii:10:6} -- " + fi + sid_input=$(sed -e 's/x//g' -e 's/,//g' <<< "$sid") + sid_detected[i]="${tls_hello_ascii:88:32}" + memory[i]="${tls_hello_ascii:$((88+ len_sid*2)):$((32 - len_sid*2))}" + if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 3 ]]; then + echo + echo "TLS version, record layer: ${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}" + echo "Session ID: ${sid_detected[i]}" + echo "memory: ${memory[i]}" + echo -n "$sid_input in SID: " ; + [[ "${sid_detected[i]}" =~ $sid_input ]] && echo "yes" || echo "no" + fi + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && echo $tls_hello_ascii >$TEMPDIR/${FUNCNAME[0]}.tls_hello_ascii${i}.txt + else + ret=1 + pr_warning "test failed" + out " around line $LINENO (debug info: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}, ${tls_hello_ascii:2:10})" + fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "test failed, around $LINENO (debug info: ${tls_hello_ascii:0:2}, ${tls_hello_ascii:2:10})" "$cve" "$cwe" + send_close_notify "${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}" + close_socket + break + fi + send_close_notify "${tls_hello_ascii:18:4}" + close_socket + done + + if ! "$early_exit"; then + # here we test the replies if a TLS server hello was received >1x + for i in 1 2 3 ; do + if [[ "${sid_detected[i]}" =~ $sid_input ]]; then + # was our faked TLS SID returned? + nr_sid_detected+=1 + fi + done + if [[ $nr_sid_detected -eq 3 ]]; then + if [[ ${memory[1]} != ${memory[2]} ]] && [[ ${memory[2]} != ${memory[3]} ]]; then + pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + else + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + out ", session IDs were returned but potential memory fragments do not differ" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, returned potential memory fragments do not differ" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + else + if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 2 ]]; then + echo + pr_warning "test failed, non reproducible results!" + else + pr_warning "test failed, non reproducible results!" + out " Please run again w \"--debug=2\" (# of faked TLS SIDs detected: $nr_sid_detected)" + fi + fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "test failed, non reproducible results. $nr_sid_detected TLS Session IDs $nr_sid_detected, ${sid_detected[1]},${sid_detected[2]},${sid_detected[3]}" "$cve" "$cwe" + ret=1 + fi + fi + outln + return $ret +} + +# Overview @ https://www.exploresecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/custom/SSL_manual_cheatsheet.html +# +run_renego() { + local legacycmd="" proto="$OPTIMAL_PROTO" + local sec_renego sec_client_renego + local -i ret=0 + local cve="" + local cwe="CWE-310" + local hint="" + local jsonID="" + # No SNI needed here as there won't be two different SSL stacks for one IP + + "$HAS_TLS13" && [[ -z "$proto" ]] && proto="-no_tls1_3" + + [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for Renegotiation vulnerabilities " && outln + + pr_bold " Secure Renegotiation (RFC 5746) " + jsonID="secure_renego" + + if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then + # https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2018/02/08/tlsv1.3/ + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no renegotiation support in TLS 1.3 only servers" + outln + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "TLS 1.3 only server" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + # first fingerprint for the Line "Secure Renegotiation IS NOT" or "Secure Renegotiation IS " + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") 2>&1 </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE + if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then + grep -iaq "Secure Renegotiation IS NOT" $TMPFILE + sec_renego=$? # 0= Secure Renegotiation IS NOT supported + # grep -iaq "Secure Renegotiation IS supported" + #FIXME: didn't occur to me yet but why not also to check on "Secure Renegotiation IS supported" + case $sec_renego in + 0) prln_svrty_critical "Not supported / VULNERABLE (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + ;; + 1) prln_svrty_best "supported (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "supported" "$cve" "$cwe" + ;; + *) prln_warning "FIXME (bug): $sec_renego" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "FIXME (bug) $sec_renego" "$cve" "$cwe" + ;; + esac + else + prln_warning "OpenSSL handshake didn't succeed" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "OpenSSL handshake didn't succeed" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + fi + + # FIXME: Basically this can be done with sockets and we might have that information already + # see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5746#section-3.4: 'The client MUST include either an empty "renegotiation_info" + # extension, or the TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV signaling cipher suite value in the ClientHello. [..] + # When a ServerHello is received, the client MUST check if it includes the "renegotiation_info" extension: + # If the extension is not present, the server does not support secure renegotiation' + + + pr_bold " Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation " + jsonID="secure_client_renego" + cve="CVE-2011-1473" + # see: https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2011/10/31/tls-renegotiation-and-denial-of-service-attacks + # https://blog.ivanristic.com/2009/12/testing-for-ssl-renegotiation.html -- head/get doesn't seem to be needed though + # https://archive.fo/20130415224936/http://www.thc.org/thc-ssl-dos/ + # https://vincent.bernat.ch/en/blog/2011-ssl-dos-mitigation + case "$OSSL_VER" in + 0.9.8*) # we need this for Mac OSX unfortunately + case "$OSSL_VER_APPENDIX" in + [a-l]) + prln_local_problem " Your $OPENSSL cannot test this secure renegotiation vulnerability" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "your $OPENSSL cannot test this secure renegotiation vulnerability" "$cve" "$cwe" + return 1 + ;; + [m-z]) + ;; # all ok + esac + ;; + 1.0.1*|1.0.2*) + legacycmd="-legacy_renegotiation" + ;; + 0.9.9*|1.0*|1.1*) + ;; # all ok + esac + + if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no renegotiation support in TLS 1.3 only servers" + outln + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, TLS 1.3 only" "$cve" "$cwe" + elif "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then + prln_warning "client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested" + sec_client_renego=1 + else + # We need up to two tries here, as some LiteSpeed servers don't answer on "R" and block. Thus first try in the background + # msg enables us to look deeper into it while debugging + echo R | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $BUGS $legacycmd $STARTTLS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE & + wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP + if [[ $? -eq 3 ]]; then + pr_svrty_good "likely not vulnerable (OK)"; outln ", timed out" # it hung + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "likely not vulnerable (timed out)" "$cve" "$cwe" + sec_client_renego=1 + else + # second try in the foreground as we are sure now it won't hang + echo R | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $legacycmd $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE + sec_client_renego=$? + # 0 means client is renegotiating & doesn't return an error --> vuln! + # 1 means client tried to renegotiating but the server side errored then. You still see RENEGOTIATING in the output + if tail -5 $TMPFILE| grep -qa '^closed'; then + # Exemption from above: server closed the connection but return value was zero + # See https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1725 and referenced issue @haproxy + sec_client_renego=1 + fi + case "$sec_client_renego" in + 0) # We try again if server is HTTP. This could be either a node.js server or something else. + # node.js has a mitigation which allows 3x R and then blocks. So we test 4x + # This way we save a couple seconds as we weeded out the ones which are more robust + if [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]]; then + pr_svrty_medium "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; outln ", potential DoS threat" + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "VULNERABLE, potential DoS threat" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + else + (for i in {1..4}; do echo R; sleep 1; done) | \ + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $legacycmd $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE + case $? in + 0) pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; outln ", DoS threat" + fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE, DoS threat" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + ;; + 1) pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)" + outln " -- mitigated" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, mitigated" "$cve" "$cwe" + ;; + *) prln_warning "FIXME (bug): $sec_client_renego (4 tries)" + fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "FIXME (bug 4 tries) $sec_client_renego" "$cve" "$cwe" + ret=1 + ;; + esac + fi + ;; + 1) + prln_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe" + ;; + *) + prln_warning "FIXME (bug): $sec_client_renego" + fileout "$jsonID" "DEBUG" "FIXME (bug) $sec_client_renego - Please report" "$cve" "$cwe" + ret=1 + ;; + esac + fi + fi + + #pr_bold " Insecure Client-Initiated Renegotiation " # pre-RFC 5746, CVE-2009-3555 + #jsonID="insecure_client_renego" + # + # https://www.openssl.org/news/vulnerabilities.html#y2009. It can only be tested with OpenSSL <=0.9.8k + # Insecure Client-Initiated Renegotiation is missing ==> sockets. When we complete the handshake ;-) + + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return $ret +} + +run_crime() { + local -i ret=0 sclient_success + local addcmd="" + local cve="CVE-2012-4929" + local cwe="CWE-310" + local hint="" + + # In a nutshell: don't offer TLS/SPDY compression. This tests for CRIME Vulnerability on HTTPS only, + # not SPDY or ALPN (yet). Please note that it is an attack where you need client side control, so in + # regular situations this # means anyway "game over", with or without CRIME. + # + # https://blog.qualys.com/ssllabs/2012/09/14/crime-information-leakage-attack-against-ssltls + + [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for CRIME vulnerability " && outln + pr_bold " CRIME, TLS " ; out "($cve) " + + if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no compression in TLS 1.3 only servers" + outln + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "TLS 1.3 only server" "$cve" "$cwe" + return 0 + fi + + if ! "$HAS_ZLIB"; then + if "$SSL_NATIVE"; then + prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL lacks zlib support" + fileout "CRIME_TLS" "WARN" "CRIME, TLS: Not tested. $OPENSSL lacks zlib support" "$cve" "$cwe" + return 1 + else + tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER" "" "" "true" + sclient_success=$? + [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0 + [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE + fi + else + [[ "$OSSL_VER" == 0.9.8* ]] && addcmd="-no_ssl2" + "$HAS_TLS13" && [[ -z "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" ]] && addcmd+=" -no_tls1_3" + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -comp $addcmd $STARTTLS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null &>$TMPFILE + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + sclient_success=$? + fi + + if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then + pr_warning "test failed (couldn't connect)" + fileout "CRIME_TLS" "WARN" "Check failed, couldn't connect" "$cve" "$cwe" + ret=1 + elif grep -a Compression $TMPFILE | grep -aq NONE >/dev/null; then + pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)" + if [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] && ! "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then + out " (not using HTTP anyway)" + fileout "CRIME_TLS" "OK" "not vulnerable (not using HTTP anyway)" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + fileout "CRIME_TLS" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + else + if [[ $SERVICE == HTTP ]] || "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then + pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)" + fileout "CRIME_TLS" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + else + pr_svrty_medium "VULNERABLE but not using HTTP: probably no exploit known" + fileout "CRIME_TLS" "MEDIUM" "VULNERABLE, but not using HTTP. Probably no exploit known" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + # not clear whether a protocol != HTTP offers the ability to repeatedly modify the input + # which is done e.g. via javascript in the context of HTTP + fi + fi + outln + +# this needs to be re-done i order to remove the redundant check for spdy + + # weed out starttls, spdy-crime is a web thingy +# if [[ "x$STARTTLS" != "x" ]]; then +# echo +# return $ret +# fi + + # weed out non-webports, spdy-crime is a web thingy. there's a catch thoug, you see it? +# case $PORT in +# 25|465|587|80|110|143|993|995|21) +# echo +# return $ret +# esac + +# if "$HAS_NPN"; then +# $OPENSSL s_client -host $NODE -port $PORT -nextprotoneg $NPN_PROTOs $SNI </dev/null 2>/dev/null >$TMPFILE +# if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then +# echo +# pr_bold "CRIME Vulnerability, SPDY " ; outln "($cve): " + +# STR=$(grep Compression $TMPFILE ) +# if echo $STR | grep -q NONE >/dev/null; then +# pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" +# ret=$((ret + 0)) +# else +# pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)" +# ret=$((ret + 1)) +# fi +# fi +# fi +# [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] tmln_out "$STR" + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return $ret +} + + +# BREACH is a HTTP-level compression & an attack which works against any cipher suite and is agnostic +# to the version of TLS/SSL, more: http://www.breachattack.com/ . Foreign referrers are the important thing here! +# Mitigation: see https://community.qualys.com/message/20360 +# +run_breach() { + local header + local -i ret=0 + local -i was_killed=0 + local referer useragent + local url="$1" + local spaces=" " + local disclaimer="" + local when_makesense=" Can be ignored for static pages or if no secrets in the page" + local cve="CVE-2013-3587" + local cwe="CWE-310" + local hint="" + local jsonID="BREACH" + + [[ $SERVICE != HTTP ]] && ! "$CLIENT_AUTH" && return 7 + + [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for BREACH (HTTP compression) vulnerability " && outln + pr_bold " BREACH"; out " ($cve) " + if "$CLIENT_AUTH"; then + prln_warning "client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "client x509-based authentication prevents this from being tested" "$cve" "$cwe" + return 7 + fi + + # if [[ $NR_HEADER_FAIL -ge $MAX_HEADER_FAIL ]]; then + # pr_warning "Retrieving HTTP header failed before. Skipping." + # fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "HTTP response was wampty before" "$cve" "$cwe" + # outln + # return 1 + # fi + + [[ -z "$url" ]] && url="/" + disclaimer=" - only supplied \"$url\" tested" + + referer="https://google.com/" + [[ "$NODE" =~ google ]] && referer="https://yandex.ru/" # otherwise we have a false positive for google.com + useragent="$UA_STD" + $SNEAKY && useragent="$UA_SNEAKY" + printf "GET $url HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: $NODE\r\nUser-Agent: $useragent\r\nReferer: $referer\r\nConnection: Close\r\nAccept-encoding: gzip,deflate,compress,br\r\nAccept: text/*\r\n\r\n" | $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -quiet -ign_eof -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") 1>$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE & + wait_kill $! $HEADER_MAXSLEEP + was_killed=$? # !=0 was killed + result="$(grep -ia Content-Encoding: $TMPFILE)" + result="$(strip_lf "$result")" + result="${result#*:}" + result="$(strip_spaces "$result")" + debugme echo "$result" + if [[ ! -s $TMPFILE ]]; then + pr_warning "failed (HTTP header request stalled or empty return" + if [[ $was_killed -ne 0 ]]; then + pr_warning " and was terminated" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Test failed as HTTP request stalled and was terminated" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Test failed as HTTP response was empty" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + prln_warning ") " + ret=1 + elif [[ -z $result ]]; then + pr_svrty_good "no HTTP compression (OK) " + outln "$disclaimer" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no HTTP compression $disclaimer" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + pr_svrty_medium "potentially NOT ok, \"$result\" HTTP compression detected." + outln "$disclaimer" + outln "$spaces$when_makesense" + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "potentially VULNERABLE, $result HTTP compression detected $disclaimer" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + fi + # Any URL can be vulnerable. I am testing now only the given URL! + + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return $ret +} + + +# SWEET32 (https://sweet32.info/). Birthday attacks on 64-bit block ciphers. +# In a nutshell: don't use 3DES ciphers anymore (DES, RC2 and IDEA too). +# Please note as opposed to RC4 (stream cipher) RC2 is a block cipher. +# +run_sweet32() { + local -i sclient_success=1 + local sweet32_ciphers="IDEA-CBC-SHA:IDEA-CBC-MD5:RC2-CBC-MD5:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-MD5:DES-CBC3-SHA:RSA-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5:ECDHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:DES-CFB-M1:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5:DES-CBC-MD5:DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" + local sweet32_ciphers_hex="00,07, 00,21, 00,25, c0,12, c0,08, c0,1c, c0,1b, c0,1a, 00,16, 00,13, 00,10, 00,0d, c0,17, 00,1b, c0,0d, c0,03, 00,0a, 00,93, 00,8b, 00,1f, 00,23, c0,34, 00,8f, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,63, 00,15, 00,12, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,1a, 00,62, 00,09, 00,61, 00,1e, 00,22, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,14, 00,11, 00,19, 00,08, 00,06, 00,27, 00,26, 00,2a, 00,29, 00,0b, 00,0e" + local ssl2_sweet32_ciphers='RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:IDEA-CBC-MD5:DES-CBC-MD5:DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC3-MD5:DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CFB-M1' + local ssl2_sweet32_ciphers_hex='03,00,80, 04,00,80, 05,00,80, 06,00,40, 06,01,40, 07,00,C0, 07,01,C0, FF,80,00' + local nr_cipher_minimal=21 + local proto + local cve="CVE-2016-2183 CVE-2016-6329" + local cwe="CWE-327" + local hint="" + local -i nr_sweet32_ciphers=0 nr_supported_ciphers=0 nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers=0 nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers=0 + local ssl2_sweet=false + local using_sockets=true + + [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for SWEET32 (Birthday Attacks on 64-bit Block Ciphers) " && outln + pr_bold " SWEET32"; out " (${cve// /, }) " + + if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then + # Unfortunately there's no restriction using TLS 1.2 with $sweet32_ciphers + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", TLS 1.3 doesn't offer such ciphers" + outln + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe" + return 0 + fi + + "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false + # The openssl binary distributed has almost everything we need (PSK, KRB5 ciphers and feff, ffe0 are typically missing). + # Measurements show that there's little impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here. + if "$using_sockets"; then + for proto in 03 02 01 00; do + [[ $(has_server_protocol "$proto") -eq 1 ]] && continue + tls_sockets "$proto" "${sweet32_ciphers_hex}, 00,ff" + sclient_success=$? + [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0 + [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && break + done + if [[ 1 -ne $(has_server_protocol "ssl2") ]]; then + sslv2_sockets "$ssl2_sweet32_ciphers_hex" + case $? in + 3) ssl2_sweet=true + add_tls_offered ssl2 yes ;; + 0) ;; # ssl2_sweet=false + 1|4|6|7) debugme "${FUNCNAME[0]}: test problem we don't handle here" + ;; + esac + fi + else + nr_sweet32_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $sweet32_ciphers) + nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $sweet32_ciphers)) + debugme echo "$nr_sweet32_ciphers / $nr_supported_ciphers" + + nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $ssl2_sweet32_ciphers) + nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $ssl2_sweet32_ciphers)) + debugme echo "$nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers / $nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers" + + if [[ $(( nr_supported_ciphers + nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers )) -le $nr_cipher_minimal ]]; then + pr_local_problem "Only ${nr_supported_ciphers}+${nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers} \"SWEET32 ciphers\" found in your $OPENSSL." + outln " Test skipped" + fileout "SWEET32" "WARN" "Not tested, lack of local support ($((nr_supported_ciphers + nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers)) ciphers only)" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + return 1 + fi + for proto in -no_ssl2 -tls1_1 -tls1 -ssl3; do + [[ $nr_supported_ciphers -eq 0 ]] && break + ! "$HAS_SSL3" && [[ "$proto" == -ssl3 ]] && continue + if [[ "$proto" != -no_ssl2 ]]; then + "$FAST" && break + [[ $(has_server_protocol "${proto:1}") -eq 1 ]] && continue + fi + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS $proto -cipher $sweet32_ciphers -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + sclient_success=$? + [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]] && grep -Eq "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error" + [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && break + done + if "$HAS_SSL2"; then + if [[ 1 -ne $(has_server_protocol "ssl2") ]]; then + $OPENSSL s_client $STARTTLS $BUGS -ssl2 -cipher $ssl2_sweet32_ciphers -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then + ssl2_sweet=true + add_tls_offered ssl2 yes + fi + fi + else + debugme tm_warning "Can't test with SSLv2 here as $OPENSSL lacks support" + # we omit adding a string for DEBUG==0 here as using sockets is the default and the following elif statement becomes ugly + fi + fi + if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && "$ssl2_sweet" ; then + pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE"; out ", uses 64 bit block ciphers for SSLv2 and above" + fileout "SWEET32" "LOW" "uses 64 bit block ciphers for SSLv2 and above" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + elif [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then + pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE"; out ", uses 64 bit block ciphers" + fileout "SWEET32" "LOW" "uses 64 bit block ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + elif "$ssl2_sweet"; then + pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE"; out ", uses 64 bit block ciphers with SSLv2 only" + fileout "SWEET32" "LOW" "uses 64 bit block ciphers with SSLv2 only" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + else + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; + if "$using_sockets"; then + fileout "SWEET32" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + if [[ "$nr_supported_ciphers" -ge 38 ]]; then + # Likely only PSK/KRB5 ciphers are missing: display discrepancy but no warning + if "$HAS_SSL2"; then + out ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_sweet32_ciphers (SSLv2: $nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers/$nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers) local ciphers" + fileout "SWEET32" "OK" "not vulnerable ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_sweet32_ciphers (SSLv2: $nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers/$nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers)) local ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + out ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_sweet32_ciphers local ciphers" + fileout "SWEET32" "OK" "not vulnerable ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_sweet32_ciphers local ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + else + if "$HAS_SSL2"; then + pr_warning ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_sweet32_ciphers (SSLv2: $nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers/$nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers) local ciphers" + fileout "SWEET32" "WARN" "not vulnerable but ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_sweet32_ciphers (SSLv2: $nr_ssl2_sweet32_ciphers/$nr_ssl2_supported_ciphers)) local ciphers only" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + pr_warning ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_sweet32_ciphers local ciphers" + fileout "SWEET32" "WARN" "not vulnerable but ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_sweet32_ciphers) local ciphers only" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + fi + fi + fi + outln + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + [[ $sclient_success -ge 6 ]] && return 1 + return 0 +} + + +# Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption, in a nutshell: don't use CBC Ciphers in SSLv3 +run_ssl_poodle() { + local -i sclient_success=0 + local cbc_ciphers="ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:AECDH-AES256-SHA:ADH-AES256-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:AES256-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-128-CBC-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA:DH-RSA-SEED-SHA:DH-DSS-SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:AECDH-AES128-SHA:ADH-AES128-SHA:ADH-SEED-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:AES128-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:SEED-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:IDEA-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:RSA-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5:ECDHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" + local cbc_ciphers_hex="c0,14, c0,0a, c0,22, c0,21, c0,20, 00,91, 00,39, 00,38, 00,37, 00,36, 00,88, 00,87, 00,86, 00,85, c0,19, 00,3a, 00,89, c0,0f, c0,05, 00,35, c0,36, 00,84, 00,95, 00,8d, c0,13, c0,09, c0,1f, c0,1e, c0,1d, 00,33, 00,32, 00,31, 00,30, 00,9a, 00,99, 00,98, 00,97, 00,45, 00,44, 00,43, 00,42, c0,18, 00,34, 00,9b, 00,46, c0,0e, c0,04, 00,2f, c0,35, 00,90, 00,96, 00,41, 00,07, 00,94, 00,8c, 00,21, 00,25, c0,12, c0,08, c0,1c, c0,1b, c0,1a, 00,16, 00,13, 00,10, 00,0d, c0,17, 00,1b, c0,0d, c0,03, 00,0a, 00,93, 00,8b, 00,1f, 00,23, c0,34, 00,8f, 00,63, 00,15, 00,12, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,1a, 00,62, 00,09, 00,1e, 00,22, 00,14, 00,11, 00,19, 00,08, 00,06, 00,27, 00,26, 00,2a, 00,29, 00,0b, 00,0e" + local hint="" + local -i nr_cbc_ciphers=0 + local using_sockets=true + local cve="CVE-2014-3566" + local cwe="CWE-310" + local jsonID="POODLE_SSL" + + [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for SSLv3 POODLE (Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption) " && outln + pr_bold " POODLE, SSL"; out " ($cve) " + + if "$TLS13_ONLY" || [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 1 ]]; then + # one condition should normally suffice but we don't know when run_poddle() was called + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + outln ", no SSLv3 support" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no SSLv3" "$cve" "$cwe" + return 0 + fi + + "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false + # The openssl binary distributed has almost everything we need (PSK and KRB5 ciphers are typically missing). + # Measurements show that there's little impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here + if "$using_sockets"; then + tls_sockets "00" "$cbc_ciphers_hex, 00,ff" + sclient_success=$? + else + if ! "$HAS_SSL3"; then + prln_local_problem "Your $OPENSSL doesn't support SSLv3" + return 1 + fi + nr_cbc_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $cbc_ciphers) + nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $cbc_ciphers)) + # SNI not needed as SSLv3 has none: + $OPENSSL s_client -ssl3 $STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $cbc_ciphers -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + sclient_success=$? + [[ "$DEBUG" -eq 2 ]] && grep -Eq "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error" + fi + if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then + POODLE=0 + pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; out ", uses SSLv3+CBC (check TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV mitigation below)" + fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE, uses SSLv3+CBC" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + else + POODLE=1 + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; + if "$using_sockets"; then + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + if [[ "$nr_supported_ciphers" -ge 83 ]]; then + # Likely only KRB and PSK cipher are missing: display discrepancy but no warning + out ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers" + else + pr_warning ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers" + fi + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + fi + outln + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 0 +} + +# for appliance which use padding, no fallback needed +run_tls_poodle() { + local cve="CVE-2014-8730" + local cwe="CWE-310" + local jsonID="POODLE_TLS" + + pr_bold " POODLE, TLS"; out " ($cve), experimental " + #FIXME + prln_warning "#FIXME" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Not yet implemented #FIXME" "$cve" "$cwe" + return 0 +} + +#FIXME: fileout needs to be patched according to new scheme. Postponed as otherwise merge fails ?? +# +# This isn't a vulnerability check per se, but checks for the existence of +# the countermeasure to protect against protocol downgrade attacks. +# +run_tls_fallback_scsv() { + local -i ret=0 + local high_proto="" low_proto="" + local p high_proto_str protos_to_try + local jsonID="fallback_SCSV" + + [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV Protection " && outln + pr_bold " TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV"; out " (RFC 7507) " + + # First check we have support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in our local OpenSSL + if ! "$HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV"; then + prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL lacks TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV support" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$OPENSSL lacks TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV support" + return 1 + fi + + # First determine the highest protocol that the server supports (not including TLSv1.3). + if [[ "$OPTIMAL_PROTO" == -ssl2 ]]; then + prln_svrty_critical "No fallback possible, SSLv2 is the only protocol" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "SSLv2 is the only protocol" + return 0 + fi + for p in tls1_2 tls1_1 tls1 ssl3; do + [[ $(has_server_protocol "$p") -eq 1 ]] && continue + if [[ $(has_server_protocol "$p") -eq 0 ]]; then + high_proto="$p" + break + fi + [[ "$p" == ssl3 ]] && ! "$HAS_SSL3" && continue + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-$p $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then + high_proto="$p" + break + fi + done + case "$high_proto" in + "tls1_2") + high_proto_str="TLS 1.2" + protos_to_try="tls1_1 tls1 ssl3" ;; + "tls1_1") + high_proto_str="TLS 1.1" + protos_to_try="tls1 ssl3" ;; + "tls1") + high_proto_str="TLS 1" + protos_to_try="ssl3" ;; + "ssl3") + prln_svrty_high "No fallback possible, SSLv3 is the only protocol" + fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "only SSLv3 supported" + return 0 + ;; + *) if [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3) -eq 0 ]]; then + # If the server supports TLS 1.3, and does not support TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, or TLS 1, + # then assume it does not support SSLv3, even if SSLv3 cannot be tested. + pr_svrty_good "No fallback possible (OK)"; outln ", TLS 1.3 is the only protocol" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "only TLS 1.3 supported" + elif [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3) -eq 1 ]] && \ + ( [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 1 ]] || "$HAS_SSL3" ); then + # TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, TLS 1, and SSLv3 are all not supported. + # This may be an SSLv2-only server, if $OPENSSL does not support SSLv2. + prln_warning "test failed (couldn't connect)" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Check failed. (couldn't connect)" + return 1 + elif [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1_3) -eq 1 ]]; then + # If the server does not support TLS 1.3, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, or TLS 1, and + # support for SSLv3 cannot be tested, then treat it as HIGH severity, since + # it is very likely that SSLv3 is the only supported protocol. + pr_svrty_high "NOT ok, no fallback possible"; outln ", TLS 1.3, 1.2, 1.1 and 1.0 not supported" + fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "TLS 1.3, 1.2, 1.1, 1.0 not supported" + else + # TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1 are not supported, but can't tell whether TLS 1.3 is supported. + # This could be a TLS 1.3 only server, an SSLv3 only server (if SSLv3 support cannot be tested), + # or a server that does not support SSLv3 or any TLS protocol. So, don't report a severity, + # since this could either be good or bad. + outln "No fallback possible, TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1 not supported" + fileout "$jsonID" "INFO" "TLS 1.2, TLS 1.1, and TLS 1 not supported" + fi + return 0 + esac + + # Next find a second protocol that the server supports. + for p in $protos_to_try; do + [[ $(has_server_protocol "$p") -eq 1 ]] && continue + if [[ $(has_server_protocol "$p") -eq 0 ]]; then + low_proto="$p" + break + fi + [[ "$p" == ssl3 ]] && ! "$HAS_SSL3" && continue + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-$p $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then + low_proto="$p" + break + fi + done + + if ! "$HAS_SSL3" && \ + ( [[ "$low_proto" == ssl3 ]] || \ + ( [[ "$high_proto" == tls1 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 2 ]] ) ); then + # If the protocol that the server would fall back to is SSLv3, but $OPENSSL does + # not support SSLv3, then the test cannot be performed. So, if $OPENSSL does not + # support SSLv3 and it is known that SSLv3 is the fallback protocol ($low_proto), then + # the test cannot be performed. Similarly, if SSLv3 could be the fallback protocol, but + # support for SSLv3 is unknown, then the test cannot be performed. + # NOTE: This check assumes that any server that supports SSLv3 and either TLS 1.2 or + # TLS 1.1 would also support TLS 1. So, if $high_proto is not TLS 1, then it is assumed + # that either (1) $low_proto has already been set (to TLS1.1 or TLS 1) or (2) no protocol + # lower than $high_proto is offered. + prln_local_problem "Can't test: $OPENSSL does not support SSLv3" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Can't test: $OPENSSL does not support SSLv3" + return 1 + fi + if [[ -z "$low_proto" ]]; then + case "$high_proto" in + "tls1_2") + pr_svrty_good "No fallback possible (OK)"; outln ", no protocol below $high_proto_str offered" + ;; + *) outln "No fallback possible, no protocol below $high_proto_str offered (OK)" + ;; + esac + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "no protocol below $high_proto_str offered" + return 0 + fi + case "$low_proto" in + "tls1_1") + p="-no_tls1_2" ;; + "tls1") + p="-no_tls1_2 -no_tls1_1" ;; + "ssl3") + p="-no_tls1_2 -no_tls1_1 -no_tls1" ;; + esac + "$HAS_TLS13" && p+=" -no_tls1_3" + debugme echo "Simulating fallback from $high_proto to $low_proto" + + # ...and do the test (we need to parse the error here!) + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI $p -fallback_scsv") &>$TMPFILE </dev/null + if grep -q "CONNECTED(00" "$TMPFILE"; then + if grep -qa "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" "$TMPFILE"; then + if [[ -z "$POODLE" ]]; then + pr_warning "Rerun including POODLE SSL check. " + pr_svrty_medium "Downgrade attack prevention NOT supported" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "NOT supported. Pls rerun wity POODLE SSL check" + ret=1 + elif [[ "$POODLE" -eq 0 ]]; then + pr_svrty_high "Downgrade attack prevention NOT supported and vulnerable to POODLE SSL" + fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "NOT supported and vulnerable to POODLE SSL" + else + pr_svrty_medium "Downgrade attack prevention NOT supported" + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "NOT supported" + fi + elif grep -qa "alert inappropriate fallback" "$TMPFILE"; then + pr_svrty_good "Downgrade attack prevention supported (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "supported" + elif grep -qa "alert handshake failure" "$TMPFILE"; then + pr_svrty_good "Probably OK. " + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "Probably oK" + # see RFC 7507, https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/121 + # other case reported by Nicolas was F5 and at costumer of mine: the same + pr_svrty_medium "But received non-RFC-compliant \"handshake failure\" instead of \"inappropriate fallback\"" + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "received non-RFC-compliant \"handshake failure\" instead of \"inappropriate fallback\"" + elif grep -qa "ssl handshake failure" "$TMPFILE"; then + pr_svrty_medium "some unexpected \"handshake failure\" instead of \"inappropriate fallback\"" + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "some unexpected \"handshake failure\" instead of \"inappropriate fallback\" (likely: warning)" + else + pr_warning "Check failed, unexpected result " + out ", run $PROG_NAME -Z --debug=1 and look at $TEMPDIR/*tls_fallback_scsv.txt" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Check failed, unexpected result, run $PROG_NAME -Z --debug=1 and look at $TEMPDIR/*tls_fallback_scsv.txt" + ret=1 + fi + else + pr_warning "test failed (couldn't connect)" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Check failed. (couldn't connect)" + ret=1 + fi + + outln + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return $ret +} + + +# Factoring RSA Export Keys: don't use EXPORT RSA ciphers, see https://freakattack.com/ +run_freak() { + local -i sclient_success=0 + local -i i nr_supported_ciphers=0 len + # with correct build it should list these 9 ciphers (plus the two latter as SSLv2 ciphers): + local exportrsa_cipher_list="EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP1024-RC4-SHA:EXP1024-RC4-MD5:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-RC4-MD5" + local exportrsa_tls_cipher_list_hex="00,62, 00,61, 00,64, 00,60, 00,14, 00,0E, 00,08, 00,06, 00,03" + local exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex="04,00,80, 02,00,80, 00,00,00" + local detected_ssl2_ciphers + local addtl_warning="" hexc + local using_sockets=true + local cve="CVE-2015-0204" + local cwe="CWE-310" + local hint="" + local jsonID="FREAK" + + [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for FREAK attack " && outln + pr_bold " FREAK"; out " ($cve) " + + if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", TLS 1.3 only server" + outln + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe" + return 0 + fi + + "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false + if "$using_sockets"; then + nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_words "$exportrsa_tls_cipher_list_hex")+$(count_words "$exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex") + else + nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $exportrsa_cipher_list)) + fi + + case $nr_supported_ciphers in + 0) prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't have any EXPORT RSA ciphers configured" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Not tested. $OPENSSL doesn't have any EXPORT RSA ciphers configured" "$cve" "$cwe" + return 0 + ;; + 1|2|3) + addtl_warning=" ($magenta""tested only with $nr_supported_ciphers out of 9 ciphers only!$off)" ;; + 4|5|6|7) + addtl_warning=" (tested with $nr_supported_ciphers/9 ciphers)" ;; + 8|9|10|11) + addtl_warning="" ;; + esac + if "$using_sockets"; then + tls_sockets "03" "$exportrsa_tls_cipher_list_hex, 00,ff" + sclient_success=$? + [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0 + + # TLS handshake failed with ciphers above. Now we check SSLv2 -- unless we know it's not available + if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl2) -ne 1 ]]; then + sslv2_sockets "$exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex" "true" + if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then + exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex="$(strip_spaces "${exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex//,/}")" + len=${#exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex} + detected_ssl2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")" + for (( i=0; i<len; i=i+6 )); do + [[ "$detected_ssl2_ciphers" =~ x${exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex:i:6} ]] && sclient_success=0 && break + done + fi + fi + else + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $exportrsa_cipher_list -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI -no_ssl2") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + sclient_success=$? + debugme grep -Ea "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error" + if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && "$HAS_SSL2"; then + $OPENSSL s_client $STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $exportrsa_cipher_list -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + sclient_success=$? + fi + fi + if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then + pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; out ", uses EXPORT RSA ciphers" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE, uses EXPORT RSA ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + else + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; out "$addtl_warning" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable $addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + outln + + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then + if "$using_sockets"; then + for hexc in $(sed 's/, / /g' <<< "$exportrsa_tls_cipher_list_hex, $exportrsa_ssl2_cipher_list_hex"); do + if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 5 ]]; then + hexc="0x${hexc:0:2},0x${hexc:3:2}" + else + hexc="0x${hexc:0:2},0x${hexc:3:2},0x${hexc:6:2}" + fi + for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do + [[ "$hexc" == "${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}" ]] && break + done + [[ $i -eq $TLS_NR_CIPHERS ]] && tm_out "$hexc " || tm_out "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} " + done + tmln_out + else + actually_supported_osslciphers $exportrsa_cipher_list + fi + fi + debugme echo $nr_supported_ciphers + + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 0 +} + +# ARGs see below +# Sets the global DH_GROUP_OFFERED, start value: "", after this function: +# DH_GROUP_OFFERED="" +# DH_GROUP_OFFERED="<name of group>" +# return: 1: common primes file problem, 2: no pkey support, 0: went w/o error +get_common_prime() { + local jsonID2="$1" + local key_bitstring="$2" + local spaces="$3" + local pubkey dh_p="" + local -i subret=0 + local common_primes_file="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/common-primes.txt" + local -i lineno_matched=0 + + "$HAS_PKEY" || return 2 + pubkey="$($OPENSSL pkey -pubin -text_pub -noout 2>>$ERRFILE <<< "$key_bitstring")" + if [[ "$pubkey" =~ GROUP: ]]; then + DH_GROUP_OFFERED="${pubkey#*GROUP: }" + case "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" in + modp_1536) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 5" ;; + modp_2048) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 14" ;; + modp_3072) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 15" ;; + modp_4096) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 16" ;; + modp_6144) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 17" ;; + modp_8192) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC3526/Oakley Group 18" ;; + dh_1024_160) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC5114/1024-bit DSA group with 160-bit prime order subgroup" ;; + dh_2048_224) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC5114/2048-bit DSA group with 224-bit prime order subgroup" ;; + dh_2048_256) DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC5114/2048-bit DSA group with 256-bit prime order subgroup" ;; + esac + pubkey="$(awk -F'(' '/Public-Key/ { print $2 }' <<< "$pubkey")" + DH_GROUP_LEN_P="${pubkey%% bit*}" + return 0 + fi + dh_p="$(awk '/prime:|P:/,/generator:|G:/' <<< "$pubkey" | grep -Ev "prime|P:|generator|G:")" + dh_p="$(strip_spaces "$(colon_to_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$dh_p")")")" + [[ "${dh_p:0:2}" == "00" ]] && dh_p="${dh_p:2}" + DH_GROUP_LEN_P="$((4*${#dh_p}))" + debugme tmln_out "len(dh_p): $DH_GROUP_LEN_P | dh_p: $dh_p" + [[ "$DEBUG" -gt 1 ]] && echo "$dh_p" > $TEMPDIR/dh_p.txt + if [[ ! -s "$common_primes_file" ]]; then + prln_local_problem "couldn't read common primes file $common_primes_file" + out "${spaces}" + fileout "$jsonID2" "WARN" "couldn't read common primes file $common_primes_file" + return 1 + else + dh_p="$(toupper "$dh_p")" + # In the previous line of the match is basically the hint we want to echo + # the most elegant thing to get the previous line [ awk '/regex/ { print x }; { x=$0 }' ] doesn't work with gawk + lineno_matched=$(grep -n "$dh_p" "$common_primes_file" 2>/dev/null | awk -F':' '{ print $1 }') + if [[ "$lineno_matched" -ne 0 ]]; then + DH_GROUP_OFFERED="$(awk "NR == $lineno_matched-1" "$common_primes_file" | awk -F'"' '{ print $2 }')" + #subret=1 # vulnerable: common prime + else + DH_GROUP_OFFERED="Unknown DH group" + : + #subret=0 # not vulnerable: no known common prime + fi + return 0 + fi +} + + +# helper function for run_logjam see below +# +out_common_prime() { + local jsonID2="$1" + local cve="$2" + local cwe="$3" + + [[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" == ffdhe* ]] && [[ ! "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ \ ]] && DH_GROUP_OFFERED="RFC7919/$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" + if [[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ ffdhe ]] && [[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ \ ]]; then + out "common primes detected: "; pr_italic "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" + fileout "$jsonID2" "INFO" "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" "$cve" "$cwe" + # Now (below) size matters -- i.e. the bit size. As this is about a known prime we label it more strict. + # This needs maybe needs another thought as it could appear inconsistent with run_pfs and elsewhere. + # for now we label the bit size similar in the screen, but distinguish the leading text for logjam before + elif [[ $DH_GROUP_LEN_P -le 800 ]]; then + pr_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok):"; out " common prime: " + fileout "$jsonID2" "CRITICAL" "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" "$cve" "$cwe" + pr_dh "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" $DH_GROUP_LEN_P + elif [[ $DH_GROUP_LEN_P -le 1024 ]]; then + # really? Here we assume that 1024-bit common prime for nation states are worth and possible to precompute (TBC) + # otherwise 1024 are just medium + pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok):"; out " common prime: " + fileout "$jsonID2" "HIGH" "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" "$cve" "$cwe" + pr_dh "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" $DH_GROUP_LEN_P + elif [[ $DH_GROUP_LEN_P -le 1536 ]]; then + pr_svrty_low "common prime: " + fileout "$jsonID2" "LOW" "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" "$cve" "$cwe" + pr_dh "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" $DH_GROUP_LEN_P + else + out "common prime with $DH_GROUP_LEN_P bits detected: " + fileout "$jsonID2" "INFO" "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" "$cve" "$cwe" + pr_dh "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" $DH_GROUP_LEN_P + fi +} + + +# see https://weakdh.org/logjam.html +run_logjam() { + local -i sclient_success=0 + local exportdh_cipher_list="EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-RC4-SHA:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA" + local exportdh_cipher_list_hex="00,63, 00,65, 00,14, 00,11" + local all_dh_ciphers="cc,15, 00,b3, 00,91, c0,97, 00,a3, 00,9f, cc,aa, c0,a3, c0,9f, 00,6b, 00,6a, 00,39, 00,38, 00,c4, 00,c3, 00,88, 00,87, 00,a7, 00,6d, 00,3a, 00,c5, 00,89, 00,ab, cc,ad, c0,a7, c0,43, c0,45, c0,47, c0,53, c0,57, c0,5b, c0,67, c0,6d, c0,7d, c0,81, c0,85, c0,91, 00,a2, 00,9e, c0,a2, c0,9e, 00,aa, c0,a6, 00,67, 00,40, 00,33, 00,32, 00,be, 00,bd, 00,9a, 00,99, 00,45, 00,44, 00,a6, 00,6c, 00,34, 00,bf, 00,9b, 00,46, 00,b2, 00,90, c0,96, c0,42, c0,44, c0,46, c0,52, c0,56, c0,5a, c0,66, c0,6c, c0,7c, c0,80, c0,84, c0,90, 00,66, 00,18, 00,8e, 00,16, 00,13, 00,1b, 00,8f, 00,63, 00,15, 00,12, 00,1a, 00,65, 00,14, 00,11, 00,19, 00,17, 00,b5, 00,b4, 00,2d" # 93 ciphers + local -i i nr_supported_ciphers=0 server_key_exchange_len=0 ephemeral_pub_len=0 + local addtl_warning="" hexc + local -i ret=0 subret=0 + local server_key_exchange key_bitstring="" + local spaces=" " + local vuln_exportdh_ciphers=false + local openssl_no_expdhciphers=false + local str="" + local using_sockets=true + local cve="CVE-2015-4000" + local cwe="CWE-310" + local hint="" + local jsonID="LOGJAM" + local jsonID2="${jsonID}-common_primes" + + [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for LOGJAM vulnerability " && outln + pr_bold " LOGJAM"; out " ($cve), experimental " + + "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false + # Also as the openssl binary distributed has everything we need measurements show that + # there's no impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here + if ! "$using_sockets"; then + nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $exportdh_cipher_list)) + debugme echo $nr_supported_ciphers + case $nr_supported_ciphers in + 0) prln_local_problem "$OPENSSL doesn't have any DH EXPORT ciphers configured" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Not tested. $OPENSSL doesn't support any DH EXPORT ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" + out "$spaces" + openssl_no_expdhciphers=true + ;; + 1|2|3) addtl_warning=" ($magenta""tested w/ $nr_supported_ciphers/4 ciphers only!$off)" ;; + 4) ;; + esac + fi + + # test for DH export ciphers first + if "$using_sockets"; then + tls_sockets "03" "$exportdh_cipher_list_hex, 00,ff" + sclient_success=$? + [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0 + [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] && vuln_exportdh_ciphers=true + elif [[ $nr_supported_ciphers -ne 0 ]]; then + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher $exportdh_cipher_list -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && vuln_exportdh_ciphers=true + debugme grep -Ea "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error" + fi + + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then + if "$using_sockets"; then + for hexc in $(sed 's/, / /g' <<< "$exportdh_cipher_list_hex"); do + hexc="0x${hexc:0:2},0x${hexc:3:2}" + for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do + [[ "$hexc" == "${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}" ]] && break + done + [[ $i -eq $TLS_NR_CIPHERS ]] && tm_out "$hexc " || tm_out "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} " + done + tmln_out + else + echo $(actually_supported_osslciphers $exportdh_cipher_list) + fi + fi + + # Try all ciphers that use an ephemeral DH key. If successful, check whether the key uses a weak prime. + if [[ -n "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" ]]; then + if [[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ Unknown ]]; then + subret=0 # no common DH key detected + else + subret=1 # known prime/DH key + fi + elif "$using_sockets"; then + tls_sockets "03" "$all_dh_ciphers, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" + sclient_success=$? + if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]]; then + cp "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" $TMPFILE + key_bitstring="$(awk '/-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY/,/-----END PUBLIC KEY/ { print $0 }' $TMPFILE)" + fi + else + # FIXME: determine # of ciphers supported, 48 only are the shipped binaries + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -cipher kEDH -msg -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && grep -q ServerKeyExchange $TMPFILE; then + # Example: '<<< TLS 1.0 Handshake [length 010b], ServerKeyExchange' + # get line with ServerKeyExchange, cut from the beginning to "length ". cut from the end to ']' + str="$(awk '/<<< TLS 1.[0-2].*ServerKeyExchange$/' $TMPFILE)" + if [[ -z "$str" ]] ; then + str="$(awk '/<<< SSL [2-3].*ServerKeyExchange$/' $TMPFILE)" + fi + str="${str#<*length }" + str="${str%]*}" + server_key_exchange_len=$(hex2dec "$str") + server_key_exchange_len=2+$server_key_exchange_len/16 + server_key_exchange="$(grep -A $server_key_exchange_len ServerKeyExchange $TMPFILE | tail -n +2)" + server_key_exchange="$(toupper "$(strip_spaces "$(newline_to_spaces "$server_key_exchange")")")" + server_key_exchange="${server_key_exchange%%[!0-9A-F]*}" + server_key_exchange_len=${#server_key_exchange} + [[ $server_key_exchange_len -gt 8 ]] && [[ "${server_key_exchange:0:2}" == "0C" ]] && ephemeral_pub_len=$(hex2dec "${server_key_exchange:2:6}") + [[ $ephemeral_pub_len -ne 0 ]] && [[ $ephemeral_pub_len -le $server_key_exchange_len ]] && key_bitstring="$(get_dh_ephemeralkey "${server_key_exchange:8}")" + fi + fi + + if [[ -n "$key_bitstring" ]]; then + if [[ -z "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" ]]; then + get_common_prime "$jsonID2" "$key_bitstring" "$spaces" + ret=$? # no common primes file would be ret=1 --> we should treat that some place else before + fi + if [[ "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" =~ Unknown ]]; then + subret=0 # no common DH key detected + else + subret=1 # known prime/DH key + fi + elif [[ -z "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" ]]; then + subret=3 + fi + + # Now if we have DH export ciphers we print them out first + if "$vuln_exportdh_ciphers"; then + pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok):"; out " uses DH EXPORT ciphers" + fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE, uses DH EXPORT ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + if [[ $subret -eq 3 ]]; then + out ", no DH key detected with <= TLS 1.2" + fileout "$jsonID2" "OK" "no DH key detected with <= TLS 1.2" + elif [[ $subret -eq 1 ]]; then + out "\n${spaces}" + out_common_prime "$jsonID2" "$cve" "$cwe" + elif [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then + out " no common primes detected" + fileout "$jsonID2" "INFO" "--" "$cve" "$cwe" + elif [[ $ret -eq 1 ]]; then + out "FIXME 1" + fi + else + if [[ $subret -eq 1 ]]; then + out_common_prime "$jsonID2" "$cve" "$cwe" + if ! "$openssl_no_expdhciphers"; then + outln "," + out "${spaces}but no DH EXPORT ciphers${addtl_warning}" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no DH EXPORT ciphers,$addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + elif [[ $subret -eq 3 ]]; then + pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK):"; out " no DH EXPORT ciphers${addtl_warning}" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no DH EXPORT ciphers,$addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe" + out ", no DH key detected with <= TLS 1.2" + fileout "$jsonID2" "OK" "no DH key with <= TLS 1.2" "$cve" "$cwe" + elif [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then + pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK):"; out " no DH EXPORT ciphers${addtl_warning}" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no DH EXPORT ciphers,$addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe" + # we issue a special warning if there's no common prime but the bit length is too low + if [[ $DH_GROUP_LEN_P -le 1024 ]]; then + out "\n${spaces}But: " + pr_dh "$DH_GROUP_OFFERED" $DH_GROUP_LEN_P + case $? in + 1) fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "no DH EXPORT ciphers, no common prime but $DH_GROUP_OFFERED has only $DH_GROUP_LEN_P bits, $addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe" ;; + 2) fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "no DH EXPORT ciphers, no common prime but $DH_GROUP_OFFERED has only $DH_GROUP_LEN_P bits, $addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe";; + 3) fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "no DH EXPORT ciphers, no common prime but $DH_GROUP_OFFERED has only $DH_GROUP_LEN_P bits, $addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe";; + esac + else + out ", no common prime detected" + fileout "$jsonID2" "OK" "--" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + elif [[ $ret -eq 1 ]]; then + pr_svrty_good "partly not vulnerable:"; out " no DH EXPORT ciphers${addtl_warning}" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no DH EXPORT ciphers,$addtl_warning" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + fi + + outln + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return $ret +} + +# Decrypting RSA with Obsolete and Weakened eNcryption, more @ https://drownattack.com/ +run_drown() { + local -i nr_ciphers_detected ret=0 + local spaces=" " + local cert_fingerprint_sha2="" + local cve="CVE-2016-0800 CVE-2016-0703" + local cwe="CWE-310" + local hint="" + local jsonID="DROWN" + + if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then + outln + pr_headlineln " Testing for DROWN vulnerability " + outln + fi +# if we want to use OPENSSL: check for < openssl 1.0.2g, openssl 1.0.1s if native openssl + pr_bold " DROWN"; out " (${cve// /, }) " + + # Any fingerprint that is placed in $RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2 is also added to + # to $CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2, so if $CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2 is not empty, but + # $RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2 is empty, then the server doesn't have an RSA certificate. + if [[ -z "$CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2" ]]; then + get_host_cert "-cipher aRSA" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && cert_fingerprint_sha2="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -in $HOSTCERT -fingerprint -sha256 2>>$ERRFILE | sed -e 's/^.*Fingerprint=//' -e 's/://g' )" + else + cert_fingerprint_sha2="$RSA_CERT_FINGERPRINT_SHA2" + cert_fingerprint_sha2=${cert_fingerprint_sha2/SHA256 /} + fi + + if ( [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ ldap ]] || [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ irc ]] ); then + prln_local_problem "STARTTLS/$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL and --ssl-native collide here" + return 1 + fi + + if [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl2) -ne 1 ]]; then + sslv2_sockets + else + [[ aaa == bbb ]] # provoke retrurn code=1 + fi + + case $? in + 7) # strange reply, couldn't convert the cipher spec length to a hex number + pr_fixme "strange v2 reply " + outln " (rerun with DEBUG >=2)" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && hexdump -C "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.sslv2_sockets.dd" | head -1 + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "received a strange SSLv2 reply (rerun with DEBUG>=2)" "$cve" "$cwe" + ret=1 + ;; + 3) # vulnerable, [[ -n "$cert_fingerprint_sha2" ]] test is not needed as we should have RSA certificate here + lines=$(count_lines "$(hexdump -C "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.sslv2_sockets.dd" 2>/dev/null)") + debugme tm_out " ($lines lines) " + add_tls_offered ssl2 yes + if [[ "$lines" -gt 1 ]]; then + nr_ciphers_detected=$((V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH / 3)) + if [[ 0 -eq "$nr_ciphers_detected" ]]; then + prln_svrty_high "CVE-2015-3197: SSLv2 supported but couldn't detect a cipher (NOT ok)"; + fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "SSLv2 offered, but could not detect a cipher. Make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere, see https://censys.io/ipv4?q=$cert_fingerprint_sha2" "$cve CVE-2015-3197" "$cwe" "$hint" + else + prln_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok), SSLv2 offered with $nr_ciphers_detected ciphers"; + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE, SSLv2 offered with $nr_ciphers_detected ciphers. Make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere, see https://censys.io/ipv4?q=$cert_fingerprint_sha2" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + fi + outln "$spaces Make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere, see:" + out "$spaces " + pr_url "https://censys.io/ipv4?q=$cert_fingerprint_sha2" + outln + fi + ;; + *) prln_svrty_best "not vulnerable on this host and port (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable on this host and port" "$cve" "$cwe" + if [[ -n "$cert_fingerprint_sha2" ]]; then + outln "$spaces make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere with SSLv2 enabled services" + out "$spaces " + pr_url "https://censys.io/ipv4?q=$cert_fingerprint_sha2" + outln " could help you to find out" + fileout "${jsonID}_hint" "INFO" "Make sure you don't use this certificate elsewhere with SSLv2 enabled services, see https://censys.io/ipv4?q=$cert_fingerprint_sha2" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + outln "$spaces no RSA certificate, thus certificate can't be used with SSLv2 elsewhere" + fileout "${jsonID}_hint" "INFO" "no RSA certificate, can't be used with SSLv2 elsewhere" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + ;; + esac + + return $ret +} + + + +# Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS: don't use CBC Ciphers in SSLv3 TLSv1.0 +run_beast(){ + local hexc dash cbc_cipher sslvers auth mac export + local -a ciph hexcode normalized_hexcode kx enc export2 + local proto proto_hex + local -i i subret nr_ciphers=0 sclient_success=0 + local detected_cbc_ciphers="" ciphers_to_test + local higher_proto_supported="" + local vuln_beast=false + local spaces=" " + local cr=$'\n' + local first=true + local continued=false + local cbc_cipher_list="EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:IDEA-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5:AES128-SHA:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ADH-AES128-SHA:AES256-SHA:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ADH-AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA:EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA:PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:SEED-SHA:DH-DSS-SEED-SHA:DH-RSA-SEED-SHA:DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:ADH-SEED-SHA:PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA:AECDH-AES128-SHA:AECDH-AES256-SHA:SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384" + local cbc_ciphers_hex="00,06, 00,07, 00,08, 00,09, 00,0A, 00,0B, 00,0C, 00,0D, 00,0E, 00,0F, 00,10, 00,11, 00,12, 00,13, 00,14, 00,15, 00,16, 00,19, 00,1A, 00,1B, 00,1E, 00,1F, 00,21, 00,22, 00,23, 00,25, 00,26, 00,27, 00,29, 00,2A, 00,2F, 00,30, 00,31, 00,32, 00,33, 00,34, 00,35, 00,36, 00,37, 00,38, 00,39, 00,3A, 00,41, 00,42, 00,43, 00,44, 00,45, 00,46, 00,61, 00,62, 00,63, 00,84, 00,85, 00,86, 00,87, 00,88, 00,89, 00,8B, 00,8C, 00,8D, 00,8F, 00,90, 00,91, 00,93, 00,94, 00,95, 00,96, 00,97, 00,98, 00,99, 00,9A, 00,9B, 00,AE, 00,AF, 00,B2, 00,B3, 00,B6, 00,B7, C0,03, C0,04, C0,05, C0,08, C0,09, C0,0A, C0,0D, C0,0E, C0,0F, C0,12, C0,13, C0,14, C0,17, C0,18, C0,19, C0,1A, C0,1B, C0,1C, C0,1D, C0,1E, C0,1F, C0,21, C0,22, C0,34, C0,35, C0,36, C0,37, C0,38, C0,64, C0,65, C0,66, C0,67, C0,68, C0,69, C0,70, C0,71, C0,94, C0,95, C0,96, C0,97, C0,98, C0,99, C0,9A, C0,9B, FE,FE, FE,FF, FF,E0, FF,E1" + local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS" + local using_sockets=true + local cve="CVE-2011-3389" + local cwe="CWE-20" + local hint="" + local jsonID="BEAST" + + if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then + outln + pr_headlineln " Testing for BEAST vulnerability " + outln + fi + pr_bold " BEAST"; out " ($cve) " + + if "$TLS13_ONLY" || ( [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl3) -eq 1 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol tls1) -eq 1 ]] ); then + pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)" + outln ", no SSL3 or TLS1" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no SSL3 or TLS1" "$cve" "$cwe" + return 0 + fi + + "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false + # $cbc_ciphers_hex has 126 ciphers, we omitted SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA bc the trailing 00,ff below will pose + # a problem for ACE loadbalancers otherwise. So in case we know this is not true, we'll re-add it + ! "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG" && "$using_sockets" && cbc_ciphers_hex="$cbc_ciphers_hex, C0,20" + + [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false + if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then + for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do + hexc="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}" + if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]] && [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ CBC ]] && \ + [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA256 ]] && [[ ! "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ SHA384 ]]; then + ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" + hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}" + rfc_ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" + kx[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}" + enc[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}" + export2[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}" + ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]} + if "$using_sockets" && "$WIDE" && ! "$has_dh_bits" && \ + ( [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == Kx=EDH ]] ); then + ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=false + fi + if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}" + else + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}" + fi + nr_ciphers+=1 + fi + done + else + # no sockets, openssl + while read hexc dash ciph[nr_ciphers] sslvers kx[nr_ciphers] auth enc[nr_ciphers] mac export2[nr_ciphers]; do + if [[ ":${cbc_cipher_list}:" =~ :${ciph[nr_ciphers]}: ]]; then + ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=true + if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == "00" ]]; then + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}" + else + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}" + fi + nr_ciphers+=1 + fi + done < <(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-tls1 -V") + fi + + # first determine whether it's mitigated by higher protocols + for proto in tls1_1 tls1_2; do + subret=$(has_server_protocol "$proto") + if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then + case $proto in + tls1_1) higher_proto_supported+=" TLSv1.1" ;; + tls1_2) higher_proto_supported+=" TLSv1.2" ;; + esac + elif [[ $subret -eq 2 ]]; then + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-state -"${proto}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") 2>>$ERRFILE >$TMPFILE </dev/null + if sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE; then + higher_proto_supported+=" $(get_protocol $TMPFILE)" + add_tls_offered "$proto" yes + fi + fi + done + + for proto in ssl3 tls1; do + if [[ "$proto" == ssl3 ]] && ! "$using_sockets" && ! locally_supported "-${proto}"; then + continued=true + out " " + continue + fi + subret=$(has_server_protocol "$proto") + if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then + sclient_success=0 + elif [[ $subret -eq 1 ]]; then + sclient_success=1 + elif [[ "$proto" != "ssl3" ]] || "$HAS_SSL3"; then + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-"$proto" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + sclient_success=$? + else + tls_sockets "00" "$TLS_CIPHER" + sclient_success=$? + fi + if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then # protocol supported? + if "$continued"; then # second round: we hit TLS1 + if "$HAS_SSL3" || "$using_sockets"; then + pr_svrty_good "not vulnerable (OK)" ; outln ", no SSL3 or TLS1" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no SSL3 or TLS1" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + prln_svrty_good "no TLS1 (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no TLS1" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + return 0 + else # protocol not succeeded but it's the first time + continued=true + continue # protocol not supported, so we do not need to check each cipher with that protocol + fi + fi # protocol succeeded + add_tls_offered "$proto" yes + + # now we test in one shot with the precompiled ciphers + if "$using_sockets"; then + case "$proto" in + "ssl3") proto_hex="00" ;; + "tls1") proto_hex="01" ;; + esac + tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "$cbc_ciphers_hex, 00,ff" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] || continue + else + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-"$proto" -cipher "$cbc_cipher_list" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || continue + fi + + detected_cbc_ciphers="" + for ((i=0; i<nr_ciphers; i++)); do + ciphers_found[i]=false + sigalg[nr_ciphers]="" + done + while true; do + [[ "$proto" == ssl3 ]] && ! "$HAS_SSL3" && break + ciphers_to_test="" + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + ! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && "${ossl_supported[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph[i]}" + done + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "-cipher "${ciphers_to_test:1}" -"${proto}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE || break + cbc_cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + [[ -z "$cbc_cipher" ]] && break + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + [[ "$cbc_cipher" == "${ciph[i]}" ]] && break + done + ciphers_found[i]=true + if [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] || [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == - ]]; then + detected_cbc_ciphers+="${ciph[i]} " + else + detected_cbc_ciphers+="${rfc_ciph[i]} " + fi + vuln_beast=true + if "$WIDE" && ( [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]] ); then + dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet) + kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen" + fi + "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TMPFILE && \ + sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")" + done + if "$using_sockets"; then + while true; do + ciphers_to_test="" + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + ! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode[i]}" + done + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break + if "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then + tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all" + else + tls_sockets "$proto_hex" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" + fi + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && break + cbc_cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt") + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + [[ "$cbc_cipher" == "${rfc_ciph[i]}" ]] && break + done + [[ $i -eq $nr_ciphers ]] && break + ciphers_found[i]=true + if ( [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] && [[ "${ciph[i]}" != - ]] ) || [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == - ]]; then + detected_cbc_ciphers+="${ciph[i]} " + else + detected_cbc_ciphers+="${rfc_ciph[i]} " + fi + vuln_beast=true + if "$WIDE" && ( [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=ECDH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=DH ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == Kx=EDH ]] ); then + dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet) + kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen" + fi + "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && \ + sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")" + done + fi + + if "$WIDE" && [[ -n "$detected_cbc_ciphers" ]]; then + out "\n "; pr_underline "$(toupper $proto):\n"; + if "$first"; then + neat_header + fi + first=false + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if "${ciphers_found[i]}" || "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then + export="${export2[i]}" + neat_list "$(tolower "${normalized_hexcode[i]}")" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${ciphers_found[i]}" + if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then + if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then + if [[ -n "$higher_proto_supported" ]]; then + pr_svrty_low "available" + else + pr_svrty_medium "available" + fi + else + pr_deemphasize "not a/v" + fi + fi + outln "${sigalg[i]}" + fi + done + fi + + if ! "$WIDE"; then + if [[ -n "$detected_cbc_ciphers" ]]; then + fileout "${jsonID}_CBC_$(toupper $proto)" "MEDIUM" "$detected_cbc_ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + ! "$first" && out "$spaces" + out "$(toupper $proto): " + [[ -n "$higher_proto_supported" ]] && \ + pr_svrty_low "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$detected_cbc_ciphers" " " $TERM_WIDTH)" || \ + pr_svrty_medium "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$detected_cbc_ciphers" " " $TERM_WIDTH)" + outln + detected_cbc_ciphers="" # empty for next round + first=false + else + [[ $proto == tls1 ]] && ! $first && echo -n "$spaces " + prln_svrty_good "no CBC ciphers for $(toupper $proto) (OK)" + first=false + fi + else + if ! "$vuln_beast" ; then + prln_svrty_good "no CBC ciphers for $(toupper $proto) (OK)" + fileout "${jsonID}_CBC_$(toupper $proto)" "OK" "No CBC ciphers for $(toupper $proto)" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + fi + done # for proto in ssl3 tls1 + + if "$vuln_beast"; then + if [[ -n "$higher_proto_supported" ]]; then + if "$WIDE"; then + outln; out " " + # NOT ok seems too harsh for me if we have TLS >1.0 + pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE" + outln " -- but also supports higher protocols (possible mitigation) $higher_proto_supported" + outln + else + out "$spaces" + pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE" + outln " -- but also supports higher protocols $higher_proto_supported (likely mitigated)" + fi + fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "VULNERABLE -- but also supports higher protocols $higher_proto_supported (likely mitigated)" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + else + if "$WIDE"; then + outln + else + out "$spaces" + fi + pr_svrty_medium "VULNERABLE" + outln " -- and no higher protocols as mitigation supported" + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "VULNERABLE -- and no higher protocols as mitigation supported" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + fi + fi + "$first" && ! "$vuln_beast" && prln_svrty_good "no CBC ciphers found for any protocol (OK)" + + "$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits" + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 0 +} + + +# https://web.archive.org/web/20200324101422/http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/Lucky13.html +# in a nutshell: don't offer CBC suites (again). MAC as a fix for padding oracles is not enough. Best: TLS v1.2+ AES GCM +run_lucky13() { + local spaces=" " + local cbc_ciphers="ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-256-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-256-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:DHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:PSK-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA256:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA256:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES256-SHA:DH-RSA-AES256-SHA:DH-DSS-AES256-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA256-SHA:AECDH-AES256-SHA:ADH-AES256-SHA256:ADH-AES256-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA256:ADH-CAMELLIA256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA384:ECDH-RSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES256-SHA:ECDH-RSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:ECDH-ECDSA-CAMELLIA256-SHA384:AES256-SHA256:AES256-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA256:ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA384:ECDHE-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:CAMELLIA256-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:SRP-DSS-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-AES-128-CBC-SHA:SRP-AES-128-CBC-SHA:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA256:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-AES128-SHA:DHE-DSS-AES128-SHA:DH-RSA-AES128-SHA:DH-DSS-AES128-SHA:ECDHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA:DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA:DH-RSA-SEED-SHA:DH-DSS-SEED-SHA:DHE-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DHE-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA:DH-DSS-CAMELLIA128-SHA:AECDH-AES128-SHA:ADH-AES128-SHA256:ADH-AES128-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ADH-SEED-SHA:ADH-CAMELLIA128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256:ECDH-RSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-AES128-SHA:ECDH-RSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDH-ECDSA-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:AES128-SHA256:AES128-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA256:ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:ECDHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:DHE-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:SEED-SHA:CAMELLIA128-SHA:ECDHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:RSA-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:DHE-PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA256:PSK-CAMELLIA128-SHA256:IDEA-CBC-SHA:RSA-PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-SHA:KRB5-IDEA-CBC-MD5:ECDHE-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDHE-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:SRP-DSS-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-RSA-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:SRP-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC3-SHA:AECDH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-RSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:ECDH-ECDSA-DES-CBC3-SHA:DES-CBC3-SHA:RSA-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC3-MD5:ECDHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:DHE-PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DHE-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP1024-DES-CBC-SHA:DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-EDH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-EDH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-ADH-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-KRB5-RC2-CBC-MD5:EXP-KRB5-DES-CBC-MD5:EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA:EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA" + cbc_ciphers_hex1="c0,28, c0,24, c0,14, c0,0a, c0,22, c0,21, c0,20, 00,b7, 00,b3, 00,91, c0,9b, c0,99, c0,97, 00,af, c0,95, 00,6b, 00,6a, 00,69, 00,68, 00,39, 00,38, 00,37, 00,36, c0,77, c0,73, 00,c4, 00,c3, 00,c2, 00,c1, 00,88, 00,87, 00,86, 00,85, c0,19, 00,6d, 00,3a, 00,c5, 00,89, c0,2a, c0,26, c0,0f, c0,05, c0,79, c0,75, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,c0, c0,38, c0,36, 00,84, 00,95, 00,8d, c0,3d, c0,3f, c0,41, c0,43, c0,45, c0,47, c0,49, c0,4b, c0,4d, c0,4f, c0,65, c0,67, c0,69, c0,71, c0,27, c0,23, c0,13, c0,09, c0,1f, c0,1e, c0,1d, 00,67, 00,40, 00,3f, 00,3e, 00,33, 00,32, 00,31, 00,30, c0,76, c0,72, 00,be, 00,bd, 00,bc, 00,bb, 00,9a, 00,99, 00,98, 00,97, 00,45, 00,44, 00,43, 00,42, c0,18, 00,6c, 00,34, 00,bf, 00,9b, 00,46, c0,29, c0,25, c0,0e, c0,04, c0,78, c0,74, 00,3c, 00,2f, 00,ba" + cbc_ciphers_hex2="c0,37, c0,35, 00,b6, 00,b2, 00,90, 00,96, 00,41, c0,9a, c0,98, c0,96, 00,ae, c0,94, 00,07, 00,94, 00,8c, 00,21, 00,25, c0,3c, c0,3e, c0,40, c0,42, c0,44, c0,46, c0,48, c0,4a, c0,4c, c0,4e, c0,64, c0,66, c0,68, c0,70, c0,12, c0,08, c0,1c, c0,1b, c0,1a, 00,16, 00,13, 00,10, 00,0d, c0,17, 00,1b, c0,0d, c0,03, 00,0a, 00,93, 00,8b, 00,1f, 00,23, c0,34, 00,8f, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,63, 00,15, 00,12, 00,0f, 00,0c, 00,1a, 00,62, 00,09, 00,61, 00,1e, 00,22, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,14, 00,11, 00,19, 00,08, 00,06, 00,27, 00,26, 00,2a, 00,29, 00,0b, 00,0e" + local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS" + local -i nr_supported_ciphers=0 sclient_success + local using_sockets=true + local cve="CVE-2013-0169" + local cwe="CWE-310" + local hint="" + local jsonID="LUCKY13" + + if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then + outln + pr_headlineln " Testing for LUCKY13 vulnerability " + outln + fi + pr_bold " LUCKY13"; out " ($cve), experimental " + + if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no CBC ciphers in TLS 1.3 only servers" + outln + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, TLS 1.3 only" "$cve" "$cwe" + return 0 + fi + + "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false + # The openssl binary distributed has almost everything we need (PSK, KRB5 ciphers and feff, ffe0 are typically missing). + # Measurements show that there's little impact whether we use sockets or TLS here, so the default is sockets here + + if "$using_sockets"; then + tls_sockets "03" "${cbc_ciphers_hex1}, 00,ff" + sclient_success=$? + [[ "$sclient_success" -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0 + if [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]]; then + tls_sockets "03" "${cbc_ciphers_hex2}, 00,ff" + sclient_success=$? + [[ $sclient_success -eq 2 ]] && sclient_success=0 + fi + else + nr_cbc_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $cbc_ciphers) + nr_supported_ciphers=$(count_ciphers $(actually_supported_osslciphers $cbc_ciphers)) + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS $BUGS -no_ssl2 -cipher $cbc_ciphers -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? $TMPFILE + sclient_success=$? + [[ "$DEBUG" -eq 2 ]] && grep -Eq "error|failure" $ERRFILE | grep -Eav "unable to get local|verify error" + fi + if [[ $sclient_success -eq 0 ]]; then + out "potentially " + pr_svrty_low "VULNERABLE"; out ", uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS. Check patches" + fileout "$jsonID" "LOW" "potentially vulnerable, uses TLS CBC ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + # the CBC padding which led to timing differences during MAC processing has been solved in openssl (https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20130205.txt) + # and other software. However we can't tell with reasonable effort from the outside. Thus we still issue a warning and label it experimental + else + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)"; + if "$using_sockets"; then + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + if [[ "$nr_supported_ciphers" -ge 133 ]]; then + # Likely only PSK/KRB5 ciphers are missing: display discrepancy but no warning + out ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers" + else + pr_warning ", $nr_supported_ciphers/$nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers" + fi + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable ($nr_supported_ciphers of $nr_cbc_ciphers local ciphers" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + fi + outln + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + [[ $sclient_success -ge 6 ]] && return 1 + return 0 +} + + +# https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7465 REQUIRES that TLS clients and servers NEVER negotiate the use of RC4 cipher suites! +# https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security#RC4_attacks +# https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/03/attack-of-week-rc4-is-kind-of-broken-in.html +# +run_rc4() { + local -i rc4_offered=0 + local -i nr_ciphers=0 nr_ossl_ciphers=0 nr_nonossl_ciphers=0 sclient_success=0 + local n auth mac export hexc sslv2_ciphers_hex="" sslv2_ciphers_ossl="" s + local -a normalized_hexcode hexcode ciph sslvers kx enc export2 sigalg ossl_supported + local -i i + local -a ciphers_found ciphers_found2 hexcode2 ciph2 rfc_ciph2 + local -i -a index + local dhlen available="" ciphers_to_test supported_sslv2_ciphers proto + local has_dh_bits="$HAS_DH_BITS" rc4_detected="" + local using_sockets=true + local cve="CVE-2013-2566 CVE-2015-2808" + local cwe="CWE-310" + local hint="" + local jsonID="RC4" + + "$SSL_NATIVE" && using_sockets=false + "$FAST" && using_sockets=false + [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS == 0 ]] && using_sockets=false + + if [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]]; then + outln + pr_headlineln " Checking for vulnerable RC4 Ciphers " + outln + fi + pr_bold " RC4"; out " (${cve// /, }) " + + if "$TLS13_ONLY"; then + pr_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 1 ]] && out ", no RC4 support in TLS 1.3 only servers" + outln + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, TLS 1.3 only" "$cve" "$cwe" + return 0 + fi + + # Get a list of all the cipher suites to test. #FIXME: This is rather ineffective as RC4 ciphers won't change. + # We should instead build a fixed list here like @ other functions + if "$using_sockets" || [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then + for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do + if [[ "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" =~ RC4 ]] && ( "$using_sockets" || "${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}" ); then + hexc="$(tolower "${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}")" + ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}" + rfc_ciph[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" + sslvers[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_SSLVERS[i]}" + kx[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_KX[i]}" + enc[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i]}" + export2[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]}" + ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false + sigalg[nr_ciphers]="" + ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]="${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]}" + if "$using_sockets" && "$WIDE" && ! "$HAS_DH_BITS" && + ( [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[nr_ciphers]} == "Kx=EDH" ]] ); then + ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=false + fi + if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then + hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2}" + if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:7:2}" + else + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}" + fi + else + hexcode[nr_ciphers]="${hexc:2:2},${hexc:7:2},${hexc:12:2}" + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}" + sslv2_ciphers_hex+=", ${hexcode[nr_ciphers]}" + sslv2_ciphers_ossl+=":${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" + fi + nr_ciphers+=1 + fi + done + else + while read hexc n ciph[nr_ciphers] sslvers[nr_ciphers] kx[nr_ciphers] auth enc[nr_ciphers] mac export2[nr_ciphers]; do + if [[ "${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" =~ RC4 ]]; then + ciphers_found[nr_ciphers]=false + if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then + if [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 00 ]]; then + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:7:2}")" + else + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}")" + fi + else + normalized_hexcode[nr_ciphers]="$(tolower "x${hexc:2:2}${hexc:7:2}${hexc:12:2}")" + sslv2_ciphers_ossl+=":${ciph[nr_ciphers]}" + fi + sigalg[nr_ciphers]="" + ossl_supported[nr_ciphers]=true + nr_ciphers+=1 + fi + done < <($OPENSSL ciphers $OSSL_CIPHERS_S -V 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 2>>$ERRFILE) + fi + + if "$using_sockets" && [[ -n "$sslv2_ciphers_hex" ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl2) -ne 1 ]]; then + sslv2_sockets "${sslv2_ciphers_hex:2}" "true" + if [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && [[ "$V2_HELLO_CIPHERSPEC_LENGTH" -ne 0 ]]; then + supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep "Supported cipher: " "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_sslv2_serverhello.txt")" + "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")" + for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${normalized_hexcode[i]} ]]; then + ciphers_found[i]=true + "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s" + rc4_offered=1 + fi + done + fi + elif "$HAS_SSL2" && [[ -n "$sslv2_ciphers_ossl" ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol ssl2) -ne 1 ]]; then + $OPENSSL s_client -cipher "${sslv2_ciphers_ossl:1}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY -ssl2 >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE" + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then + supported_sslv2_ciphers="$(grep -A 4 "Ciphers common between both SSL endpoints:" $TMPFILE)" + "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && s="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")" + for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if [[ "${sslvers[i]}" == SSLv2 ]] && [[ "$supported_sslv2_ciphers" =~ ${ciph[i]} ]]; then + ciphers_found[i]=true + "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && sigalg[i]="$s" + rc4_offered=1 + fi + done + fi + fi + + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if "${ossl_supported[i]}" && [[ "${sslvers[i]}" != SSLv2 ]]; then + ciphers_found2[nr_ossl_ciphers]=false + ciph2[nr_ossl_ciphers]="${ciph[i]}" + index[nr_ossl_ciphers]=$i + nr_ossl_ciphers+=1 + fi + done + + for proto in -no_ssl2 -tls1_1 -tls1 -ssl3; do + [[ "$proto" != -no_ssl2 ]] && [[ $(has_server_protocol "${proto:1}") -eq 1 ]] && continue + ! "$HAS_SSL3" && [[ "$proto" == -ssl3 ]] && continue + while true; do + ciphers_to_test="" + for (( i=0; i < nr_ossl_ciphers; i++ )); do + ! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=":${ciph2[i]}" + done + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto -cipher "${ciphers_to_test:1}" $STARTTLS $BUGS -connect $NODEIP:$PORT $PROXY $SNI") >$TMPFILE 2>$ERRFILE </dev/null + sclient_connect_successful $? "$TMPFILE" || break + cipher=$(get_cipher $TMPFILE) + [[ -z "$cipher" ]] && break + for (( i=0; i < nr_ossl_ciphers; i++ )); do + [[ "$cipher" == "${ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break + done + [[ $i -eq $nr_ossl_ciphers ]] && break + rc4_offered=1 + i=${index[i]} + ciphers_found[i]=true + if "$WIDE" && ( [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=EDH" ]] ); then + dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TMPFILE" quiet) + kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen" + fi + "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && grep -q "\-\-\-\-\-BEGIN CERTIFICATE\-\-\-\-\-" $TMPFILE && \ + sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$TMPFILE")" + done + done + + if "$using_sockets"; then + for (( i=0; i < nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && [[ "${sslvers[i]}" != SSLv2 ]]; then + ciphers_found2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=false + hexcode2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${hexcode[i]}" + rfc_ciph2[nr_nonossl_ciphers]="${rfc_ciph[i]}" + index[nr_nonossl_ciphers]=$i + nr_nonossl_ciphers+=1 + fi + done + fi + + for proto in 03 02 01 00; do + [[ $(has_server_protocol "$proto") -eq 1 ]] && continue + while true; do + ciphers_to_test="" + for (( i=0; i < nr_nonossl_ciphers; i++ )); do + ! "${ciphers_found2[i]}" && ciphers_to_test+=", ${hexcode2[i]}" + done + [[ -z "$ciphers_to_test" ]] && break + if "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO"; then + tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "all" + else + tls_sockets "$proto" "${ciphers_to_test:2}, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" + fi + sclient_success=$? + [[ $sclient_success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $sclient_success -ne 2 ]] && break + cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt") + for (( i=0; i < nr_nonossl_ciphers; i++ )); do + [[ "$cipher" == "${rfc_ciph2[i]}" ]] && ciphers_found2[i]=true && break + done + [[ $i -eq $nr_nonossl_ciphers ]] && break + rc4_offered=1 + i=${index[i]} + ciphers_found[i]=true + if "$WIDE" && ( [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=ECDH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=DH" ]] || [[ ${kx[i]} == "Kx=EDH" ]] ); then + dhlen=$(read_dhbits_from_file "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" quiet) + kx[i]="${kx[i]} $dhlen" + fi + "$WIDE" && "$SHOW_SIGALGO" && [[ -r "$HOSTCERT" ]] && \ + sigalg[i]="$(read_sigalg_from_file "$HOSTCERT")" + done + done + + if [[ $rc4_offered -eq 1 ]]; then + "$WIDE" || pr_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok): " + if "$WIDE"; then + outln "\n" + neat_header + fi + for (( i=0 ; i<nr_ciphers; i++ )); do + if ! "${ciphers_found[i]}" && ! "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then + continue # no successful connect AND not verbose displaying each cipher + fi + if "$WIDE"; then + #FIXME: JSON+CSV in wide mode is missing + export="${export2[i]}" + neat_list "${normalized_hexcode[i]}" "${ciph[i]}" "${kx[i]}" "${enc[i]}" "${ciphers_found[i]}" + if "$SHOW_EACH_C"; then + if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then + pr_svrty_high "available" + else + pr_deemphasize "not a/v" + fi + fi + outln "${sigalg[i]}" + fi + if "${ciphers_found[i]}"; then + if ( [[ "$DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES" =~ openssl ]] && [[ "${ciph[i]}" != "-" ]] ) || [[ "${rfc_ciph[i]}" == "-" ]]; then + rc4_detected+="${ciph[i]} " + else + rc4_detected+="${rfc_ciph[i]} " + fi + fi + done + ! "$WIDE" && pr_svrty_high "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$rc4_detected" " " $TERM_WIDTH)" + outln + "$WIDE" && out " " && prln_svrty_high "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "HIGH" "VULNERABLE, Detected ciphers: $rc4_detected" "$cve" "$cwe" "$hint" + elif [[ $nr_ciphers -eq 0 ]]; then + prln_local_problem "No RC4 Ciphers configured in $OPENSSL" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "RC4 ciphers not supported by local OpenSSL ($OPENSSL)" + else + prln_svrty_good "no RC4 ciphers detected (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + outln + + "$using_sockets" && HAS_DH_BITS="$has_dh_bits" + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + [[ $sclient_success -ge 6 ]] && return 1 + return 0 +} + + +run_youknowwho() { + local cve="CVE-2013-2566" + local cwe="CWE-310" + # NOT FIXME as there's no code: https://web.archive.org/web/20191008002003/http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/index.html + # https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/03/attack-of-week-rc4-is-kind-of-broken-in.html + return 0 + # in a nutshell: don't use RC4, really not! +} + + # https://www.usenix.org/conference/woot13/workshop-program/presentation/smyth + # https://secure-resumption.com/tlsauth.pdf +run_tls_truncation() { + #FIXME: difficult to test, is there any test available: pls let me know + : +} + +# Test for various server implementation errors that aren't tested for elsewhere. +# Inspired by https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-grease. +run_grease() { + local -i success + local bug_found=false + local normal_hello_ok=false + local cipher_list proto selected_cipher selected_cipher_hex="" extn rnd_bytes + local alpn_proto alpn alpn_list_len_hex extn_len_hex + local selected_alpn_protocol grease_selected_alpn_protocol + local ciph list temp curve_found + local -i i j rnd alpn_list_len extn_len debug_level="" + local -i ret=0 + # Note: The following values were taken from https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-grease. + # These arrays may need to be updated if the values change in the final version of this document. + local -a -r grease_cipher_suites=( "0a,0a" "1a,1a" "2a,2a" "3a,3a" "4a,4a" "5a,5a" "6a,6a" "7a,7a" "8a,8a" "9a,9a" "aa,aa" "ba,ba" "ca,ca" "da,da" "ea,ea" "fa,fa" ) + local -a -r grease_supported_groups=( "0a,0a" "1a,1a" "2a,2a" "3a,3a" "4a,4a" "5a,5a" "6a,6a" "7a,7a" "8a,8a" "9a,9a" "aa,aa" "ba,ba" "ca,ca" "da,da" "ea,ea" "fa,fa" ) + local -a -r grease_extn_values=( "0a,0a" "1a,1a" "2a,2a" "3a,3a" "4a,4a" "5a,5a" "6a,6a" "7a,7a" "8a,8a" "9a,9a" "aa,aa" "ba,ba" "ca,ca" "da,da" "ea,ea" "fa,fa" ) + local -r ecdhe_ciphers="cc,14, cc,13, c0,30, c0,2c, c0,28, c0,24, c0,14, c0,0a, c0,9b, cc,a9, cc,a8, c0,af, c0,ad, c0,77, c0,73, c0,19, cc,ac, c0,38, c0,36, c0,49, c0,4d, c0,5d, c0,61, c0,71, c0,87, c0,8b, c0,2f, c0,2b, c0,27, c0,23, c0,13, c0,09, c0,ae, c0,ac, c0,76, c0,72, c0,18, c0,37, c0,35, c0,9a, c0,48, c0,4c, c0,5c, c0,60, c0,70, c0,86, c0,8a, c0,11, c0,07, c0,16, c0,33, c0,12, c0,08, c0,17, c0,34, c0,10, c0,06, c0,15, c0,3b, c0,3a, c0,39" + local jsonID="GREASE" + + outln; pr_headline " Testing for server implementation bugs "; outln "\n" + + # Many of the following checks work by modifying the "basic" call to + # tls_sockets() and assuming the tested-for bug is present if the + # connection fails. However, this only works if the connection succeeds + # with the "basic" call. So, keep trying different "basic" calls until + # one is found that succeeds. + for (( i=0; i < 5; i++ )); do + case $i in + 0) proto="03" ; cipher_list="$TLS12_CIPHER" ;; + 2) proto="02" ; cipher_list="$TLS_CIPHER" ;; + 3) proto="01" ; cipher_list="$TLS_CIPHER" ;; + 4) proto="00" ; cipher_list="$TLS_CIPHER" ;; + esac + tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list" + success=$? + if [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then + break + fi + done + if [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then + selected_cipher=$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt") + if [[ $TLS_NR_CIPHERS -ne 0 ]]; then + for (( i=0; i < TLS_NR_CIPHERS; i++ )); do + [[ "$selected_cipher" == "${TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i]}" ]] && selected_cipher_hex="${TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]}" && break + done + elif "$HAS_SSL2"; then + selected_cipher_hex="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V -tls1 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' | awk '/'" $selected_cipher "'/ { print $1 }')" + elif "$HAS_CIPHERSUITES"; then + selected_cipher_hex="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V -ciphersuites "$TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS" 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL'| awk '/'" $selected_cipher "'/ { print $1 }')" + else + selected_cipher_hex="$($OPENSSL ciphers -V 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL'| awk '/'" $selected_cipher "'/ { print $1 }')" + fi + if [[ -n "$selected_cipher_hex" ]]; then + normal_hello_ok=true + selected_cipher_hex="${selected_cipher_hex:2:2},${selected_cipher_hex:7:2}" + fi + else + proto="03" + fi + + # Test for yaSSL bug - server only looks at second byte of each cipher + # suite listed in ClientHello (see issue #793). First check to see if + # server ignores the ciphers in the ClientHello entirely, then check to + # see if server only looks at second byte of each offered cipher. + + # Send a list of non-existent ciphers where the second byte does not match + # any existing cipher. + + # Need to ensure that $TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt contains the results of the + # most recent calls to tls_sockets even if tls_sockets is not successful. Setting $DEBUG to + # a non-zero value ensures this. Setting it to 1 prevents any extra information from being + # displayed. + debug_level="$DEBUG" + [[ $DEBUG -eq 0 ]] && DEBUG=1 + debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with non-existent ciphers." + tls_sockets "$proto" "de,d0, de,d1, d3,d2, de,d3, 00,ff" + success=$? + if [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then + prln_svrty_medium " Server claims to support non-existent cipher suite." + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server claims to support non-existent cipher suite." + bug_found=true + elif grep -q "The ServerHello specifies a cipher suite that wasn't included in the ClientHello" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" ; then + prln_svrty_medium " Server responded with a ServerHello rather than an alert even though it doesn't support any of the client-offered cipher suites." + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server responded with a ServerHello rather than an alert even though it doesn't support any of the client-offered cipher suites." + bug_found=true + else + # Send a list of non-existent ciphers such that for each cipher that + # is defined, there is one in the list that matches in the second byte + # (but make sure list contains at more 127 ciphers). + debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with non-existent ciphers, but that match existing ciphers in second byte." + tls_sockets "$proto" "de,01, de,02, de,03, de,04, de,05, de,06, de,07, de,08, de,09, de,0a, de,0b, de,0c, de,0d, de,0e, de,0f, de,10, de,11, de,12, de,13, de,14, de,15, de,16, de,17, de,18, de,19, de,1a, de,1b, de,23, de,24, de,25, de,26, de,27, de,28, de,29, de,2a, de,2b, de,2c, de,2d, de,2e, de,2f, de,30, de,31, de,32, de,33, de,34, de,35, de,36, de,37, de,38, de,39, de,3a, de,3b, de,3c, de,3d, de,3e, de,3f, de,40, de,41, de,42, de,43, de,44, de,45, de,46, de,60, de,61, de,62, de,63, de,64, de,65, de,66, de,67, de,68, de,69, de,6a, de,6b, de,6c, de,6d, de,72, de,73, de,74, de,75, de,76, de,77, de,78, de,79, de,84, de,85, de,86, de,87, de,88, de,89, de,96, de,97, de,98, de,99, de,9a, de,9b, de,9c, de,9d, de,9e, de,9f, de,a0, de,a1, de,a2, de,a3, de,a4, de,a5, de,a6, de,a7, de,ba, de,bb, de,bc, de,bd, de,be, de,bf, de,c0, de,c1, de,c2, de,c3, de,c4, de,c5, 00,ff" + success=$? + if [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then + prln_svrty_medium " Server claims to support non-existent cipher suite." + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server claims to support non-existent cipher suite." + bug_found=true + elif grep -q " The ServerHello specifies a cipher suite that wasn't included in the ClientHello" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" ; then + prln_svrty_medium " Server only compares against second byte in each cipher suite in ClientHello." + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server only compares against second byte in each cipher suite in ClientHello." + bug_found=true + fi + fi + DEBUG="$debug_level" + + # Check that server ignores unrecognized extensions + # see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-grease + if "$normal_hello_ok" && [[ "$proto" != "00" ]]; then + # Try multiple different randomly-generated GREASE extensions, + # but make final test use zero-length extension value, just to + # be sure that works before testing server with a zero-length + # extension as the final extension. + for (( i=1; i <= 5; i++ )); do + # Create a random extension using one of the GREASE values. + rnd=$RANDOM%${#grease_extn_values[@]} + extn="${grease_extn_values[rnd]}" + if [[ $i -eq 5 ]]; then + extn_len=0 + else + # Not sure what a good upper bound is here, but a key_share + # extension with an ffdhe8192 would be over 1024 bytes. + extn_len=$RANDOM%1024 + fi + extn_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $extn_len) + extn+=",${extn_len_hex:0:2},${extn_len_hex:2:2}" + for (( j=0; j <= extn_len-2; j=j+2 )); do + rnd_bytes="$(printf "%04x" $RANDOM)" + extn+=",${rnd_bytes:0:2},${rnd_bytes:2:2}" + done + if [[ $j -lt $extn_len ]]; then + rnd_bytes="$(printf "%04x" $RANDOM)" + extn+=",${rnd_bytes:0:2}" + fi + if [[ $DEBUG -ge 2 ]]; then + echo -en "\nSending ClientHello with unrecognized extension" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && echo -n ": $extn" + echo "" + fi + tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list" "" "$extn" + success=$? + if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then + break + fi + done + if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then + prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello contains an unrecognized extension." + outln " extension used in failed test: $extn" + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello contains an unrecognized extension: $extn" + bug_found=true + else + # Check for inability to handle empty last extension (see PR #792 and + # https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg19720.html). + # (Since this test also uses an unrecognized extension, only run this + # test if the previous test passed, and use the final extension value + # from that test to ensure that the only difference is the location + # of the extension.) + + # The "extra extensions" parameter needs to include the padding and + # heartbeat extensions, since otherwise prepare_tls_clienthello() + # will add these extensions to the end of the ClientHello. + debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with empty last extension." + tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list" "" " + 00,0f, 00,01, 01, + 00,15, 00,56, + 00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00, + 00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00, + 00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00, + 00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00,00, + $extn" + success=$? + if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then + prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if last extension in ClientHello is empty." + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if last extension in ClientHello is empty." + bug_found=true + fi + fi + fi + + # Check for SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG. + # Send a ClientHello with 129 cipher suites (including 0x00,0xff) to see + # if adding a 129th cipher to the list causes a failure. +#TODO: we need to clarify whether the mit is hit at 128 or 129 ciphers. + if "$normal_hello_ok" && [[ "$proto" == 03 ]]; then + debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with 129 cipher suites." + tls_sockets "$proto" "00,27, $cipher_list" + success=$? + if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then + prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello includes more than 128 cipher suites." + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello includes more than 128 cipher suites." + SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=true + bug_found=true + fi + fi + + # Check for ClientHello size bug. According to RFC 7586 "at least one TLS + # implementation is known to hang the connection when [a] ClientHello + # record [with a length between 256 and 511 bytes] is received." + # If the length of the host name is more than 75 bytes (which would make + # $SNI more than 87 bytes), then the ClientHello would be more than 511 + # bytes if the server_name extension were included. Removing the SNI + # extension, however, may not be an option, since the server may reject the + # connection attempt for that reason. + if "$normal_hello_ok" && [[ "$proto" != 00 ]] && [[ ${#SNI} -le 87 ]]; then + # Normally prepare_tls_clienthello() will add a padding extension with a length + # that will make the ClientHello be 512 bytes in length. Providing an "extra + # extensions" parameter with a short padding extension prevents that. + debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with length between 256 and 511 bytes." + tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list" "" "00,15,00,01,00" + success=$? + if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then + prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello is between 256 and 511 bytes in length." + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello is between 256 and 511 bytes in length." + bug_found=true + fi + fi + + # Check that server ignores unrecognized cipher suite values + # see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-grease + if "$normal_hello_ok"; then + list="" + for ciph in "${grease_cipher_suites[@]}"; do + list+=", $ciph" + done + debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with unrecognized cipher suite values." + tls_sockets "$proto" "${list:2}, $selected_cipher_hex, 00,ff" + success=$? + if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then + prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello contains unrecognized cipher suite values." + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello contains unrecognized cipher suite values." + bug_found=true + fi + fi + + # Check that servers that support ECDHE cipher suites ignore + # unrecognized named group values. + # see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-grease + if [[ "$proto" != "00" ]]; then + # Send a ClientHello that lists all of the ECDHE cipher suites + tls_sockets "$proto" "$ecdhe_ciphers, 00,ff" "ephemeralkey" + success=$? + if [[ $success -eq 0 ]] || [[ $success -eq 2 ]]; then + # Send the same ClientHello as before but with an unrecognized + # named group value added. Make the unrecognized value the first + # one in the list replacing one of the values in the original list, + # but don't replace the value that was selected by the server. + rnd=$RANDOM%${#grease_supported_groups[@]} + temp=$(awk -F': ' '/^Server Temp Key/ { print $2 }' "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt") + curve_found="${temp%%,*}" + if [[ "$curve_found" == "ECDH" ]]; then + curve_found="${temp#*, }" + curve_found="${curve_found%%,*}" + fi + if [[ "$curve_found" == "B-571" ]]; then + extn=" + 00, 0a, # Type: Supported Elliptic Curves , see RFC 4492 + 00, 3e, 00, 3c, # lengths + ${grease_supported_groups[rnd]}, 00, 0e, 00, 19, 00, 1c, 00, 1e, 00, 0b, 00, 0c, 00, 1b, + 00, 18, 00, 09, 00, 0a, 00, 1a, 00, 16, 00, 17, 00, 1d, 00, 08, + 00, 06, 00, 07, 00, 14, 00, 15, 00, 04, 00, 05, 00, 12, 00, 13, + 00, 01, 00, 02, 00, 03, 00, 0f, 00, 10, 00, 11" + else + extn=" + 00, 0a, # Type: Supported Elliptic Curves , see RFC 4492 + 00, 3e, 00, 3c, # lengths + ${grease_supported_groups[rnd]}, 00, 0d, 00, 19, 00, 1c, 00, 1e, 00, 0b, 00, 0c, 00, 1b, + 00, 18, 00, 09, 00, 0a, 00, 1a, 00, 16, 00, 17, 00, 1d, 00, 08, + 00, 06, 00, 07, 00, 14, 00, 15, 00, 04, 00, 05, 00, 12, 00, 13, + 00, 01, 00, 02, 00, 03, 00, 0f, 00, 10, 00, 11" + fi + debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with unrecognized named group value in supported_groups extension." + tls_sockets "$proto" "$ecdhe_ciphers, 00,ff" "" "$extn" + success=$? + if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then + prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello contains a supported_groups extension with an unrecognized named group value (${grease_supported_groups[rnd]})." + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello contains a supported_groups extension with an unrecognized named group value (${grease_supported_groups[rnd]})." + bug_found=true + fi + fi + fi + + # Check that servers that support the ALPN extension ignore + # unrecognized ALPN values. + # see https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-grease + if "$normal_hello_ok" && [[ -z $STARTTLS ]] && [[ "$proto" != "00" ]]; then + for alpn_proto in $ALPN_PROTOs; do + alpn+=",$(printf "%02x" ${#alpn_proto}),$(string_to_asciihex "$alpn_proto")" + done + alpn_list_len=${#alpn}/3 + alpn_list_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $alpn_list_len) + extn_len=$alpn_list_len+2 + extn_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $extn_len) + tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list" "all" "00,10,${extn_len_hex:0:2},${extn_len_hex:2:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:0:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:2:2}$alpn" + success=$? + if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then + prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello contains an application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension." + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server fails if ClientHello contains an application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension." + bug_found=true + else + selected_alpn_protocol="$(grep "ALPN protocol:" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" | sed 's/ALPN protocol: //')" + # If using a "normal" ALPN extension worked, then add an unrecognized + # ALPN value to the beginning of the extension and try again. + alpn_proto="ignore/$selected_alpn_protocol" + alpn=",$(printf "%02x" ${#alpn_proto}),$(string_to_asciihex "$alpn_proto")$alpn" + alpn_list_len=${#alpn}/3 + alpn_list_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $alpn_list_len) + extn_len=$alpn_list_len+2 + extn_len_hex=$(printf "%04x" $extn_len) + debugme echo -e "\nSending ClientHello with unrecognized ALPN value in application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension." + tls_sockets "$proto" "$cipher_list" "all" "00,10,${extn_len_hex:0:2},${extn_len_hex:2:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:0:2},${alpn_list_len_hex:2:2}$alpn" + success=$? + if [[ $success -ne 0 ]] && [[ $success -ne 2 ]]; then + prln_svrty_medium " Server fails if ClientHello contains an application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension with an unrecognized ALPN value." + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "erver fails if ClientHello contains an application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension with an unrecognized ALPN value." + bug_found=true + else + grease_selected_alpn_protocol="$(grep "ALPN protocol:" "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt" | sed 's/ALPN protocol: //')" + if [[ -z "$grease_selected_alpn_protocol" ]] && [[ -n "$selected_alpn_protocol" ]]; then + prln_svrty_medium " Server did not ignore unrecognized ALPN value in the application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension." + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server did not ignore unrecognized ALPN value in the application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension." + bug_found=true + elif [[ "$grease_selected_alpn_protocol" =~ ignore/ ]]; then + prln_svrty_medium " Server selected \"ignore/\" ALPN value in the application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension." + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "Server selected \"ignore/\" ALPN value in the application_layer_protocol_negotiation extension." + bug_found=true + fi + fi + fi + fi + + # TODO: For servers that support TLSv1.3, check that servers ignore + # an unrecognized named group value along with a corresponding + # unrecognized key share + # see https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg22322.html + # and https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg22319.html + + # TODO: For servers that support TLSv1.3, check that servers ignore unrecognized + # values in the supported_versions extension. + # see https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/tls/current/msg22319.html + + # TODO: For servers that support TLSv1.3, check that servers don't require the + # psk_key_exchange_modes extension to be present in the ClientHello. + + if ! "$bug_found"; then + outln " No bugs found." + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "No bugs found." + #return 0 + else + #return 1 + : + fi + return $ret + #FIXME: No client side error cases where we want to return 1? +} + +# If the server supports any non-PSK cipher suites that use RSA key transport, +# check if the server is vulnerable to Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT) attacks. +# See "Return Of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT)" by Hanno Böck, +# Juraj Somorovsky, and Craig Young (https://robotattack.org). +# +run_robot() { + local tls_hexcode="03" + # A list of all non-PSK cipher suites that use RSA key transport + local cipherlist="00,9d, c0,a1, c0,9d, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,c0, 00,84, c0,3d, c0,51, c0,7b, ff,00, ff,01, ff,02, ff,03, c0,a0, c0,9c, 00,9c, 00,3c, 00,2f, 00,ba, 00,96, 00,41, 00,07, c0,3c, c0,50, c0,7a, 00,05, 00,04, 00,0a, fe,ff, ff,e0, 00,62, 00,09, 00,61, fe,fe, ff,e1, 00,64, 00,60, 00,08, 00,06, 00,03, 00,3b, 00,02, 00,01" + # A list of all non-PSK cipher suites that use RSA key transport and that use AES in either GCM or CBC mode. + local aes_gcm_cbc_cipherlist="00,9d, 00,9c, 00,3d, 00,35, 00,3c, 00,2f" + local padded_pms encrypted_pms cke_prefix client_key_exchange rnd_pad + local rnd_pms="aa112233445566778899112233445566778899112233445566778899112233445566778899112233445566778899" + local change_cipher_spec finished resp + local -a response + local -i i subret len iteration testnum pubkeybytes + local pubkeybits + local vulnerable=false send_ccs_finished=true + local -i start_time end_time robottimeout=$MAX_WAITSOCK + local cve="CVE-2017-17382 CVE-2017-17427 CVE-2017-17428 CVE-2017-13098 CVE-2017-1000385 CVE-2017-13099 CVE-2016-6883 CVE-2012-5081 CVE-2017-6168" + local cwe="CWE-203" + local jsonID="ROBOT" + + [[ $VULN_COUNT -le $VULN_THRESHLD ]] && outln && pr_headlineln " Testing for Return of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT) vulnerability " && outln + pr_bold " ROBOT " + + if ( [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ ldap ]] || [[ "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" =~ irc ]] ); then + prln_local_problem "STARTTLS/$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL and --ssl-native collide here" + return 1 + fi + + if [[ ! "$HAS_PKUTIL" ]]; then + prln_local_problem "Your $OPENSSL does not support the pkeyutl utility." + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$OPENSSL does not support the pkeyutl utility." "$cve" "$cwe" + return 1 + elif ! "$HAS_PKEY"; then + prln_local_problem "Your $OPENSSL does not support the pkey utility." + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "$OPENSSL does not support the pkey utility." "$cve" "$cwe" + return 1 + fi + + if [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_2) ]]; then + tls_hexcode="03" + elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1_1) ]]; then + tls_hexcode="02" + elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol tls1) ]]; then + tls_hexcode="01" + elif [[ 0 -eq $(has_server_protocol ssl3) ]]; then + tls_hexcode="00" + fi + + # Some hosts are only vulnerable with GCM. First send a list of + # ciphers that use AES in GCM or CBC mode, with the GCM ciphers + # listed first, and then try all ciphers that use RSA key transport + # if there is no connection on the first try. + tls_sockets "$tls_hexcode" "$aes_gcm_cbc_cipherlist, 00,ff" + subret=$? + if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]] || [[ $subret -eq 2 ]]; then + cipherlist="$aes_gcm_cbc_cipherlist" + tls_hexcode="${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" + else + if [[ "$tls_hexcode" != "03" ]]; then + cipherlist="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$tls_hexcode" ", $cipherlist")" + cipherlist="${cipherlist:2}" + fi + tls_sockets "$tls_hexcode" "$cipherlist, 00,ff" + subret=$? + if [[ $subret -eq 2 ]]; then + tls_hexcode="${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}" + cipherlist="$(strip_inconsistent_ciphers "$tls_hexcode" ", $cipherlist")" + cipherlist="${cipherlist:2}" + elif [[ $subret -ne 0 ]]; then + prln_svrty_best "Server does not support any cipher suites that use RSA key transport" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable, no RSA key transport cipher" "$cve" "$cwe" + return 0 + fi + fi + + # Run the tests in two iterations. In iteration 0, send 5 different client + # key exchange (CKE) messages followed by change cipher spec (CCS) and + # Finished messages, and check whether the server provided the same + # response in each case. If the server didn't provide the same response + # for all five messages in iteration 0, then it is vulnerable. Otherwise + # try a second time (iteration 1) with the same CKE messages, but without + # sending the CCS or Finished messages. + # Iterations 0 and 1 are run with a short timeout waiting for the server + # to respond to the CKE message. If the server was found to be potentially + # vulnerable in iteration 0 or 1 and testssl.sh timed out waiting for a + # response in some cases, then retry the test using a longer timeout value. + for (( iteration=0; iteration < 3; iteration++ )); do + if [[ $iteration -eq 1 ]]; then + # If the server was found to be vulnerable in iteration 0, then + # there's no need to try the alternative message flow. + "$vulnerable" && continue + send_ccs_finished=false + elif [[ $iteration -eq 2 ]]; then + # The tests are being rerun, so reset the vulnerable flag. + vulnerable=false + fi + for (( testnum=0; testnum < 5; testnum++ )); do + response[testnum]="untested" + done + for (( testnum=0; testnum < 5; testnum++ )); do + tls_sockets "$tls_hexcode" "$cipherlist, 00,ff" "all" "" "" "false" + + # Create the padded premaster secret to encrypt. The padding should be + # of the form "00 02 <random> 00 <TLS version> <premaster secret>." + # However, for each test except testnum=0 the padding will be + # made incorrect in some way, as specified below. + + # Determine the length of the public key and create the <random> bytes. + # <random> should be a length that makes total length of $padded_pms + # the same as the length of the public key. <random> should contain no 00 bytes. + pubkeybits="$($OPENSSL x509 -noout -pubkey -in $HOSTCERT 2>>$ERRFILE | \ + $OPENSSL pkey -pubin -text_pub 2>>$ERRFILE | awk -F'(' '/Public-Key/ { print $2 }')" + pubkeybits="${pubkeybits%%bit*}" + pubkeybytes=$pubkeybits/8 + [[ $((pubkeybits%8)) -ne 0 ]] && pubkeybytes+=1 + rnd_pad="" + for (( len=0; len < pubkeybytes-52; len=len+2 )); do + rnd_pad+="abcd" + done + [[ $len -eq $pubkeybytes-52 ]] && rnd_pad+="ab" + + case "$testnum" in + # correct padding + 0) padded_pms="0002${rnd_pad}00${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}${rnd_pms}" ;; + # wrong first two bytes + 1) padded_pms="4117${rnd_pad}00${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}${rnd_pms}" ;; + # 0x00 on a wrong position + 2) padded_pms="0002${rnd_pad}11${rnd_pms}0011" ;; + # no 0x00 in the middle + 3) padded_pms="0002${rnd_pad}111111${rnd_pms}" ;; + # wrong version number (according to Klima / Pokorny / Rosa paper) + 4) padded_pms="0002${rnd_pad}000202${rnd_pms}" ;; + esac + + # Encrypt the padded premaster secret using the server's public key. + encrypted_pms="$(asciihex_to_binary "$padded_pms" | \ + $OPENSSL pkeyutl -encrypt -certin -inkey $HOSTCERT -pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:none 2>/dev/null | \ + hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02x"')" + if [[ -z "$encrypted_pms" ]]; then + if [[ "$DETECTED_TLS_VERSION" == "0300" ]]; then + socksend ",x15, x03, x00, x00, x02, x02, x00" 0 + else + socksend ",x15, x03, x01, x00, x02, x02, x00" 0 + fi + close_socket + prln_fixme "Conversion of public key failed around line $((LINENO - 9))" + fileout "$jsonID" "WARN" "Conversion of public key failed around line $((LINENO - 10)) " + return 1 + fi + + # Create the client key exchange message. + len=${#encrypted_pms}/2 + cke_prefix="16${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION}$(printf "%04x" $((len+6)))10$(printf "%06x" $((len+2)))$(printf "%04x" $len)" + encrypted_pms="$cke_prefix$encrypted_pms" + len=${#encrypted_pms} + client_key_exchange="" + for (( i=0; i<len; i=i+2 )); do + client_key_exchange+=", x${encrypted_pms:i:2}" + done + + # The contents of change cipher spec are fixed. + change_cipher_spec=", x14, x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}, x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2}, x00, x01, x01" + + # Send an arbitrary Finished message. + finished=", x16, x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:0:2}, x${DETECTED_TLS_VERSION:2:2} + , x00, x40, x6e, x49, x65, x68, x00, x46, x79, xfd, x5a, x57, xdc + , x3e, xef, xb2, xd2, xac, xe0, x8c, x54, x2d, x5f, x00, x87, xdb + , xb6, xe3, x77, x2c, x9d, x88, x27, x38, x98, x7d, xcd, x7e, xac + , xdd, x5d, x72, xbe, x24, x0d, x20, x36, x14, x0e, x94, x51, xde + , xa0, xb6, xc7, x56, x28, xd8, xa1, xcb, x24, xb9, x03, xd0, x7c, x50" + + if "$send_ccs_finished"; then + debugme echo -en "\nsending client key exchange, change cipher spec, finished... " + socksend "$client_key_exchange$change_cipher_spec$finished" $USLEEP_SND + else + debugme echo -en "\nsending client key exchange... " + socksend "$client_key_exchange" $USLEEP_SND + fi + debugme echo "reading server error response..." + start_time=$(LC_ALL=C date "+%s") + sockread_serverhello 32768 $robottimeout + subret=$? + if [[ $subret -eq 0 ]]; then + end_time=$(LC_ALL=C date "+%s") + resp=$(hexdump -v -e '16/1 "%02x"' "$SOCK_REPLY_FILE") + response[testnum]="${resp%%[!0-9A-F]*}" + # The first time a response is received to a client key + # exchange message, measure the amount of time it took to + # receive a response and set the timeout value for future + # tests to 2 seconds longer than it took to receive a response. + [[ $iteration -ne 2 ]] && [[ $robottimeout -eq $MAX_WAITSOCK ]] && \ + [[ $((end_time-start_time)) -lt $((MAX_WAITSOCK-2)) ]] && \ + robottimeout=$((end_time-start_time+2)) + else + response[testnum]="Timeout waiting for alert" + fi + debugme echo -e "\nresponse[$testnum] = ${response[testnum]}" + [[ $DEBUG -ge 3 ]] && [[ $subret -eq 0 ]] && parse_tls_serverhello "${response[testnum]}" + close_socket + + # Don't continue testing if it has already been determined that + # tests need to be rerun with a longer timeout. + if [[ $iteration -ne 2 ]]; then + for (( i=1; i <= testnum; i++ )); do + if [[ "${response[i]}" != "${response[$((i-1))]}" ]] && \ + ( [[ "${response[i]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]] || \ + [[ "${response[$((i-1))]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]] ); then + vulnerable=true + break + fi + done + "$vulnerable" && break + fi + # Don't continue testing if it has already been determined that the server is + # strongly vulnerable. + if [[ $testnum -eq 2 ]]; then + [[ "${response[1]}" != "${response[2]}" ]] && break + elif [[ $testnum -eq 3 ]]; then + [[ "${response[2]}" != "${response[3]}" ]] && break + [[ "${response[0]}" != "${response[1]}" ]] && break + fi + done + # If the server provided the same error message for all tests, then this + # is an indication that the server is not vulnerable. + if [[ "${response[0]}" != "${response[1]}" ]] || [[ "${response[1]}" != "${response[2]}" ]] || \ + [[ "${response[2]}" != "${response[3]}" ]] || [[ "${response[3]}" != "${response[4]}" ]]; then + vulnerable=true + + # If the test was run with a short timeout and was found to be + # potentially vulnerable due to some tests timing out, then + # verify the results by rerunning with a longer timeout. + if [[ $robottimeout -eq $MAX_WAITSOCK ]]; then + break + elif [[ "${response[0]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]] || \ + [[ "${response[1]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]] || \ + [[ "${response[2]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]] || \ + [[ "${response[3]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]] || \ + [[ "${response[4]}" == "Timeout waiting for alert" ]]; then + robottimeout=10 + else + break + fi + fi + ! "$vulnerable" && [[ $iteration -eq 1 ]] && break + done + + if "$vulnerable"; then + if [[ "${response[1]}" == "${response[2]}" ]] && [[ "${response[2]}" == "${response[3]}" ]]; then + pr_svrty_medium "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)"; outln " - weakly vulnerable as the attack would take too long" + fileout "$jsonID" "MEDIUM" "VULNERABLE, but the attack would take too long" "$cve" "$cwe" + else + prln_svrty_critical "VULNERABLE (NOT ok)" + fileout "$jsonID" "CRITICAL" "VULNERABLE" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + else + prln_svrty_best "not vulnerable (OK)" + fileout "$jsonID" "OK" "not vulnerable" "$cve" "$cwe" + fi + return 0 +} + +old_fart() { + out "Get precompiled bins or compile " + pr_url "https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl" + outln "." + fileout_insert_warning "old_fart" "WARN" "Your $OPENSSL $OSSL_VER version is an old fart... . It doesn\'t make much sense to proceed. Get precompiled bins or compile https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl ." + fatal "Your $OPENSSL $OSSL_VER version is an old fart... . It doesn't make much sense to proceed." $ERR_OSSLBIN +} + +# try very hard to determine the install path to get ahold of the mapping file and the CA bundles +# TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR can be supplied via environment so that the cipher mapping and CA bundles can be found +# www.carbonwind.net/TLS_Cipher_Suites_Project/tls_ssl_cipher_suites_simple_table_all.htm +get_install_dir() { + [[ -z "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR" ]] && TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" + + if [[ -r "$RUN_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt" ]]; then + CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$RUN_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt" + [[ -z "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR" ]] && TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$RUN_DIR" # probably TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR + fi + + [[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt" + if [[ ! -r "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]]; then + [[ -r "$RUN_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$RUN_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" + [[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" + fi + + # we haven't found the cipher file yet... + if [[ ! -r "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]] && type -p readlink &>/dev/null ; then + readlink -f ls &>/dev/null && \ + TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(readlink -f "$(basename "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")" || \ + TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(readlink "$(basename "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")" + # not sure whether Darwin has -f + TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(dirname "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR" 2>/dev/null)" + [[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" + [[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt" + fi + + # still no cipher mapping file: + if [[ ! -r "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]] && type -p realpath &>/dev/null ; then + TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(dirname "$(realpath "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")" + CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt" + [[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" + fi + + # still no cipher mapping file (and realpath is not present): + if [[ ! -r "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]] && type -p readlink &>/dev/null ; then + readlink -f ls &>/dev/null && \ + TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(dirname "$(readlink -f "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")" || \ + TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR="$(dirname "$(readlink "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")")" + # not sure whether Darwin has -f + CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/cipher-mapping.txt" + [[ -r "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" ]] && CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/cipher-mapping.txt" + fi + + if [[ ! -r "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]]; then + DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="openssl-only" + debugme echo "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" + prln_warning "\nATTENTION: No cipher mapping file found!" + outln "Please note from 2.9 on $PROG_NAME needs files in \"\$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/\" to function correctly." + outln + ignore_no_or_lame "Type \"yes\" to ignore this warning and proceed at your own risk" "yes" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_RESOURCE + fi + + TLS_DATA_FILE="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/tls_data.txt" + if [[ ! -r "$TLS_DATA_FILE" ]]; then + prln_warning "\nATTENTION: No TLS data file found -- needed for socket-based handshakes" + outln "Please note from 2.9 on $PROG_NAME needs files in \"\$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/\" to function correctly." + outln + ignore_no_or_lame "Type \"yes\" to ignore this warning and proceed at your own risk" "yes" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_RESOURCE + else + : # see #705, in a nutshell: not portable to initialize a global array inside a function. Thus it'll be done in main part below + fi +} + + +test_openssl_suffix() { + local naming_ext="$(uname).$(uname -m)" + local uname_arch="$(uname -m)" + local myarch_suffix="" + + [[ $uname_arch =~ 64 ]] && myarch_suffix=64 || myarch_suffix=32 + if [[ -f "$1/openssl" ]] && [[ -x "$1/openssl" ]]; then + OPENSSL="$1/openssl" + return 0 + elif [[ -f "$1/openssl.$naming_ext" ]] && [[ -x "$1/openssl.$naming_ext" ]]; then + OPENSSL="$1/openssl.$naming_ext" + return 0 + elif [[ -f "$1/openssl.$uname_arch" ]] && [[ -x "$1/openssl.$uname_arch" ]]; then + OPENSSL="$1/openssl.$uname_arch" + return 0 + elif [[ -f "$1/openssl$myarch_suffix" ]] && [[ -x "$1/openssl$myarch_suffix" ]]; then + OPENSSL="$1/openssl$myarch_suffix" + return 0 + fi + return 1 +} + + +find_openssl_binary() { + local s_client_has=$TEMPDIR/s_client_has.txt + local s_client_starttls_has=$TEMPDIR/s_client_starttls_has.txt + local openssl_location cwd="" + local ossl_wo_dev_info + local curve + local -a curves_ossl=("sect163k1" "sect163r1" "sect163r2" "sect193r1" "sect193r2" "sect233k1" "sect233r1" "sect239k1" "sect283k1" "sect283r1" "sect409k1" "sect409r1" "sect571k1" "sect571r1" "secp160k1" "secp160r1" "secp160r2" "secp192k1" "prime192v1" "secp224k1" "secp224r1" "secp256k1" "prime256v1" "secp384r1" "secp521r1" "brainpoolP256r1" "brainpoolP384r1" "brainpoolP512r1" "X25519" "X448") + + # 0. check environment variable whether it's executable + if [[ -n "$OPENSSL" ]] && [[ ! -x "$OPENSSL" ]]; then + prln_warning "\ncannot find specified (\$OPENSSL=$OPENSSL) binary." + tmln_out " Looking some place else ..." + elif [[ -x "$OPENSSL" ]]; then + : # 1. all ok supplied $OPENSSL was found and has executable bit set -- testrun comes below + elif [[ -e "/mnt/c/Windows/System32/bash.exe" ]] && test_openssl_suffix "$(dirname "$(type -p openssl)")"; then + # 2. otherwise, only if on Bash on Windows, use system binaries only. + SYSTEM2="WSL" + elif test_openssl_suffix "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR"; then + : # 3. otherwise try openssl in path of testssl.sh + elif test_openssl_suffix "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/bin"; then + : # 4. otherwise here, this is supposed to be the standard --platform independent path in the future!!! + elif test_openssl_suffix "$(dirname "$(type -p openssl)")"; then + : # 5. we tried hard and failed, so now we use the system binaries + fi + + [[ ! -x "$OPENSSL" ]] && fatal "cannot exec or find any openssl binary" $ERR_OSSLBIN + + # The former detection only was flawed, because when the system supplied openssl.cnf file + # couldn't be parsed by our openssl it bailed out here with a misleading error, see #1982. + # Now we try with another version of the config file and if it still fails we bail out. + if ! $OPENSSL version -d >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + export OPENSSL_CONF="$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/openssl.cnf" + if ! $OPENSSL version -d >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + fatal "cannot exec or find any openssl binary" $ERR_OSSLBIN + else + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && echo "We provide our own openssl.cnf file as the one from your system cannot be used" + fi + fi + + # https://www.openssl.org/news/openssl-notes.html + OSSL_NAME=$($OPENSSL version 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $1 }') + OSSL_VER=$($OPENSSL version 2>/dev/null | awk -F' ' '{ print $2 }') + OSSL_VER_MAJOR="${OSSL_VER%%\.*}" + ossl_wo_dev_info="${OSSL_VER%%-*}" + OSSL_VER_MINOR="${ossl_wo_dev_info#$OSSL_VER_MAJOR\.}" + OSSL_VER_MINOR="${OSSL_VER_MINOR%%[a-zA-Z]*}" + OSSL_VER_APPENDIX="${OSSL_VER#$OSSL_VER_MAJOR\.$OSSL_VER_MINOR}" + OSSL_VER_PLATFORM=$($OPENSSL version -p 2>/dev/null | sed 's/^platform: //') + OSSL_BUILD_DATE=$($OPENSSL version -a 2>/dev/null | grep '^built' | sed -e 's/built on//' -e 's/: ... //' -e 's/: //' -e 's/ UTC//' -e 's/ +0000//' -e 's/.000000000//') + + # see #190, reverting logic: unless otherwise proved openssl has no dh bits + case "$OSSL_VER_MAJOR.$OSSL_VER_MINOR" in + 1.0.2|1.1.0|1.1.1|3.0.0) HAS_DH_BITS=true ;; + esac + if [[ "$OSSL_NAME" =~ LibreSSL ]]; then + [[ ${OSSL_VER//./} -ge 210 ]] && HAS_DH_BITS=true + if "$SSL_NATIVE"; then + outln + pr_warning "LibreSSL in native ssl mode is not a good choice for testing INSECURE features!" + fi + fi + + initialize_engine + + openssl_location="$(type -p $OPENSSL)" + [[ -n "$GIT_REL" ]] && \ + cwd="$PWD" || \ + cwd="$RUN_DIR" + if [[ "$openssl_location" == ${PWD}/bin ]]; then + OPENSSL_LOCATION="\$PWD/bin/$(basename "$openssl_location")" + elif [[ "$openssl_location" =~ $cwd ]] && [[ "$cwd" != '.' ]]; then + OPENSSL_LOCATION="${openssl_location%%$cwd}" + else + OPENSSL_LOCATION="$openssl_location" + fi + + OSSL_CIPHERS_S="" + HAS_SSL2=false + HAS_SSL3=false + HAS_TLS13=false + HAS_X448=false + HAS_X25519=false + HAS_NO_SSL2=false + HAS_NOSERVERNAME=false + HAS_CIPHERSUITES=false + HAS_COMP=false + HAS_NO_COMP=false + HAS_CURVES=false + OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES="" + HAS_PKEY=false + HAS_PKUTIL=false + HAS_ALPN=false + HAS_NPN=false + HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV=false + HAS_PROXY=false + HAS_XMPP=false + HAS_POSTGRES=false + HAS_MYSQL=false + HAS_LMTP=false + HAS_NNTP=false + HAS_IRC=false + HAS_CHACHA20=false + HAS_AES128_GCM=false + HAS_AES256_GCM=false + HAS_ZLIB=false + + $OPENSSL ciphers -s 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || \ + OSSL_CIPHERS_S="-s" + + # This and all other occurrences we do a little trick using "invalid." to avoid plain and + # link level DNS lookups. See issue #1418 and https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6761#section-6.4 + $OPENSSL s_client -ssl2 -connect invalid. 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || \ + HAS_SSL2=true + + $OPENSSL s_client -ssl3 -connect invalid. 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || \ + HAS_SSL3=true + + $OPENSSL s_client -tls1_3 -connect invalid. 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || \ + HAS_TLS13=true + + $OPENSSL genpkey -algorithm X448 2>&1 | grep -aq "not found" || \ + HAS_X448=true + + $OPENSSL genpkey -algorithm X25519 2>&1 | grep -aq "not found" || \ + HAS_X25519=true + + $OPENSSL s_client -no_ssl2 -connect invalid. 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || \ + HAS_NO_SSL2=true + + $OPENSSL s_client -noservername -connect invalid. 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || \ + HAS_NOSERVERNAME=true + + $OPENSSL s_client -ciphersuites -connect invalid. 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || \ + HAS_CIPHERSUITES=true + + $OPENSSL s_client -comp -connect invalid. 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || \ + HAS_COMP=true + + $OPENSSL s_client -no_comp -connect invalid. 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option" || \ + HAS_NO_COMP=true + + OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS=$(count_ciphers "$(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' 'ALL')") + + if $OPENSSL s_client -curves "${curves_ossl[0]}" -connect invalid. 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option"; then + for curve in "${curves_ossl[@]}"; do + $OPENSSL s_client -groups $curve -connect invalid.:8443 2>&1 | grep -Eiaq "Error with command|unknown option|Failed to set groups" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES+=" $curve " + done + else + HAS_CURVES=true + for curve in "${curves_ossl[@]}"; do + $OPENSSL s_client -curves $curve -connect invalid. 2>&1 | grep -Eiaq "Error with command|unknown option" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES+=" $curve " + done + fi + + $OPENSSL pkey -help 2>&1 | grep -q Error || \ + HAS_PKEY=true + + $OPENSSL pkeyutl 2>&1 | grep -q Error || \ + HAS_PKUTIL=true + + # For the following we feel safe enough to query the s_client help functions. + # That was not good enough for the previous lookups + $OPENSSL s_client -help 2>$s_client_has + + $OPENSSL s_client -starttls foo 2>$s_client_starttls_has + + grep -qw '\-alpn' $s_client_has && \ + HAS_ALPN=true + + grep -qw '\-nextprotoneg' $s_client_has && \ + HAS_NPN=true + + grep -qw '\-fallback_scsv' $s_client_has && \ + HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV=true + + grep -q '\-proxy' $s_client_has && \ + HAS_PROXY=true + + grep -q '\-xmpp' $s_client_has && \ + HAS_XMPP=true + + grep -q 'postgres' $s_client_starttls_has && \ + HAS_POSTGRES=true + + grep -q 'mysql' $s_client_starttls_has && \ + HAS_MYSQL=true + + grep -q 'lmtp' $s_client_starttls_has && \ + HAS_LMTP=true + + grep -q 'nntp' $s_client_starttls_has && \ + HAS_NNTP=true + + grep -q 'irc' $s_client_starttls_has && \ + HAS_IRC=true + + $OPENSSL enc -chacha20 -K 12345678901234567890123456789012 -iv 01000000123456789012345678901234 > /dev/null 2> /dev/null <<< "test" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && HAS_CHACHA20=true + + $OPENSSL enc -aes-128-gcm -K 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef -iv 0123456789abcdef01234567 > /dev/null 2> /dev/null <<< "test" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && HAS_AES128_GCM=true + + $OPENSSL enc -aes-256-gcm -K 0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef -iv 0123456789abcdef01234567 > /dev/null 2> /dev/null <<< "test" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && HAS_AES256_GCM=true + + [[ "$(echo -e "\x78\x9C\xAB\xCA\xC9\x4C\xE2\x02\x00\x06\x20\x01\xBC" | $OPENSSL zlib -d 2>/dev/null)" == zlib ]] && HAS_ZLIB=true + + if [[ -n "$CONNECT_TIMEOUT" ]] || [[ -n "$OPENSSL_TIMEOUT" ]]; then + # We don't set a general timeout as we might not have "timeout" installed and we only + # do what is instructed. Thus we check first what the command line params were, + # then we proceed + if type -p timeout >/dev/null 2>&1; then + # There are different versions of "timeout". Check whether --preserve-status is supported + if timeout --help 2>/dev/null | grep -q 'preserve-status'; then + TIMEOUT_CMD="timeout --preserve-status" + else + TIMEOUT_CMD="timeout" + fi + else + TIMEOUT_CMD="" + outln + fatal "You specified a connect or openssl timeout but the binary \"timeout\" couldn't be found " $ERR_RESOURCE + fi + fi + + if ! "$do_mass_testing"; then + if [[ -n $OPENSSL_TIMEOUT ]]; then + OPENSSL="$TIMEOUT_CMD $OPENSSL_TIMEOUT $OPENSSL" + fi + fi + + return 0 +} + + +check4openssl_oldfarts() { + case "$OSSL_VER" in + 0.9.7*|0.9.6*|0.9.5*) + # 0.9.5a was latest in 0.9.5 an released 2000/4/1, that'll NOT suffice for this test + old_fart ;; + 0.9.8) + case $OSSL_VER_APPENDIX in + a|b|c|d|e) old_fart;; # no SNI! + # other than that we leave this for MacOSX and FreeBSD but it's a pain and likely gives false negatives/positives + esac + ;; + esac + if [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then ## mm: Patch for libressl + prln_warning " Your \"$OPENSSL\" is way too old (<version 1.0) !" + case $SYSTEM in + *BSD|Darwin) + out " Please use binary provided in \$INSTALLDIR/bin/ or from ports/brew or compile from " + pr_url "github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl"; outln "." + fileout_insert_warning "too_old_openssl" "WARN" "Your $OPENSSL $OSSL_VER version is way too old. Please use binary provided in \$INSTALLDIR/bin/ or from ports/brew or compile from github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl ." ;; + *) out " Update openssl binaries or compile from " + pr_url "https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl"; outln "." + fileout_insert_warning "too_old_openssl" "WARN" "Update openssl binaries or compile from https://github.com/PeterMosmans/openssl .";; + esac + ignore_no_or_lame " Type \"yes\" to accept false negatives or positives" "yes" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS + fi + outln +} + +# FreeBSD needs to have /dev/fd mounted. This is a friendly hint, see #258 +check_bsd_mount() { + if [[ "$(uname)" == FreeBSD ]]; then + if ! mount | grep -q "^devfs"; then + outln "you seem to run $PROG_NAME= in a jail. Hopefully you're did \"mount -t fdescfs fdesc /dev/fd\"" + elif mount | grep '/dev/fd' | grep -q fdescfs; then + : + else + fatal "You need to mount fdescfs on FreeBSD: \"mount -t fdescfs fdesc /dev/fd\"" $ERR_OTHERCLIENT + fi + fi +} + +# This sets the PRINTF command for writing into TCP sockets. It is needed because +# The shell builtin printf flushes the write buffer at every \n, ("\x0a") which +# in turn means a new TCP fragment. That causes a slight performance penalty and +# and some F5s to hiccup, see #1113. Unfortunately this can be used only with GNU's +# and OpenBSD's /usr/bin/printf -- FreeBSD + OS X can't do this. Thus here we need +# to pipe through dd or cat, see socksend() and socksend_clienthello(). An empty +# $PRINTF signals the bash internal printf which then uses cat as a stdout buffer. +# A better solution needs to follow. +# +choose_printf() { + local p ptf + + ptf="$(type -aP printf)" + if [[ -n "$ptf" ]]; then + for p in $ptf; do + if $p "\xc0\x14\xc0\xff\xee" | hexdump -C | grep -q 'c0 14 c0 ff ee'; then + PRINTF=$p + return 0 + fi + done + fi + if type -t printf >/dev/null; then + PRINTF="" + return 0 + fi + fatal "Neither external printf nor shell internal found. " $ERR_CLUELESS +} + + +help() { + cat << EOF + + "$PROG_NAME [options] <URI>" or "$PROG_NAME <options>" + + +"$PROG_NAME <options>", where <options> is: + + --help what you're looking at + -b, --banner displays banner + version of $PROG_NAME + -v, --version same as previous + -V, --local pretty print all local ciphers + -V, --local <pattern> which local ciphers with <pattern> are available? If pattern is not a number: word match + + <pattern> is always an ignore case word pattern of cipher hexcode or any other string in the name, kx or bits + +"$PROG_NAME <URI>", where <URI> is: + + <URI> host|host:port|URL|URL:port port 443 is default, URL can only contain HTTPS protocol) + +"$PROG_NAME [options] <URI>", where [options] is: + + -t, --starttls <protocol> Does a default run against a STARTTLS enabled <protocol, + protocol is <ftp|smtp|lmtp|pop3|imap|xmpp|telnet|ldap|nntp|postgres|mysql> + --xmpphost <to_domain> For STARTTLS enabled XMPP it supplies the XML stream to-'' domain -- sometimes needed + --mx <domain/host> Tests MX records from high to low priority (STARTTLS, port 25) + --file/-iL <fname> Mass testing option: Reads one testssl.sh command line per line from <fname>. + Can be combined with --serial or --parallel. Implicitly turns on "--warnings batch". + Text format 1: Comments via # allowed, EOF signals end of <fname> + Text format 2: nmap output in greppable format (-oG), 1 port per line allowed + --mode <serial|parallel> Mass testing to be done serial (default) or parallel (--parallel is shortcut for the latter) + --warnings <batch|off> "batch" doesn't continue when a testing error is encountered, off continues and skips warnings + --connect-timeout <seconds> useful to avoid hangers. Max <seconds> to wait for the TCP socket connect to return + --openssl-timeout <seconds> useful to avoid hangers. Max <seconds> to wait before openssl connect will be terminated + +single check as <options> ("$PROG_NAME URI" does everything except -E and -g): + -e, --each-cipher checks each local cipher remotely + -E, --cipher-per-proto checks those per protocol + -s, --std, --standard tests standard cipher categories by strength + -p, --protocols checks TLS/SSL protocols (including SPDY/HTTP2) + -g, --grease tests several server implementation bugs like GREASE and size limitations + -S, --server-defaults displays the server's default picks and certificate info + -P, --server-preference displays the server's picks: protocol+cipher + -x, --single-cipher <pattern> tests matched <pattern> of ciphers + (if <pattern> not a number: word match) + -c, --client-simulation test client simulations, see which client negotiates with cipher and protocol + -h, --header, --headers tests HSTS, HPKP, server/app banner, security headers, cookie, reverse proxy, IPv4 address + + -U, --vulnerable tests all (of the following) vulnerabilities (if applicable) + -H, --heartbleed tests for Heartbleed vulnerability + -I, --ccs, --ccs-injection tests for CCS injection vulnerability + -T, --ticketbleed tests for Ticketbleed vulnerability in BigIP loadbalancers + -BB, --robot tests for Return of Bleichenbacher's Oracle Threat (ROBOT) vulnerability + -R, --renegotiation tests for renegotiation vulnerabilities + -C, --compression, --crime tests for CRIME vulnerability (TLS compression issue) + -B, --breach tests for BREACH vulnerability (HTTP compression issue) + -O, --poodle tests for POODLE (SSL) vulnerability + -Z, --tls-fallback checks TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV mitigation + -W, --sweet32 tests 64 bit block ciphers (3DES, RC2 and IDEA): SWEET32 vulnerability + -A, --beast tests for BEAST vulnerability + -L, --lucky13 tests for LUCKY13 + -F, --freak tests for FREAK vulnerability + -J, --logjam tests for LOGJAM vulnerability + -D, --drown tests for DROWN vulnerability + -f, --pfs, --fs, --nsa checks (perfect) forward secrecy settings + -4, --rc4, --appelbaum which RC4 ciphers are being offered? + +tuning / connect options (most also can be preset via environment variables): + --fast omits some checks: using openssl for all ciphers (-e), show only first preferred cipher. + -9, --full includes tests for implementation bugs and cipher per protocol (could disappear) + --bugs enables the "-bugs" option of s_client, needed e.g. for some buggy F5s + --assume-http if protocol check fails it assumes HTTP protocol and enforces HTTP checks + --ssl-native fallback to checks with OpenSSL where sockets are normally used + --openssl <PATH> use this openssl binary (default: look in \$PATH, \$RUN_DIR of $PROG_NAME) + --proxy <host:port|auto> (experimental) proxy connects via <host:port>, auto: values from \$env (\$http(s)_proxy) + -6 also use IPv6. Works only with supporting OpenSSL version and IPv6 connectivity + --ip <ip> a) tests the supplied <ip> v4 or v6 address instead of resolving host(s) in URI + b) arg "one" means: just test the first DNS returns (useful for multiple IPs) + -n, --nodns <min|none> if "none": do not try any DNS lookups, "min" queries A, AAAA and MX records + --sneaky leave less traces in target logs: user agent, referer + --ids-friendly skips a few vulnerability checks which may cause IDSs to block the scanning IP + --phone-out allow to contact external servers for CRL download and querying OCSP responder + --add-ca <cafile> path to <cafile> or a comma separated list of CA files enables test against additional CAs. + --basicauth <user:pass> provide HTTP basic auth information. + +output options (can also be preset via environment variables): + --quiet don't output the banner. By doing this you acknowledge usage terms normally appearing in the banner + --wide wide output for tests like RC4, BEAST. PFS also with hexcode, kx, strength, RFC name + --show-each for wide outputs: display all ciphers tested -- not only succeeded ones + --mapping <openssl| openssl: use the OpenSSL cipher suite name as the primary name cipher suite name form (default) + iana|rfc -> use the IANA/(RFC) cipher suite name as the primary name cipher suite name form + no-openssl| -> don't display the OpenSSL cipher suite name, display IANA/(RFC) names only + no-iana|no-rfc> -> don't display the IANA/(RFC) cipher suite name, display OpenSSL names only + --color <0|1|2|3> 0: no escape or other codes, 1: b/w escape codes, 2: color (default), 3: extra color (color all ciphers) + --colorblind swap green and blue in the output + --debug <0-6> 1: screen output normal but keeps debug output in /tmp/. 2-6: see "grep -A 5 '^DEBUG=' testssl.sh" + +file output options (can also be preset via environment variables) + --log, --logging logs stdout to '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.log' in current working directory (cwd) + --logfile|-oL <logfile> logs stdout to 'dir/\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.log'. If 'logfile' is a dir or to a specified 'logfile' + --json additional output of findings to flat JSON file '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.json' in cwd + --jsonfile|-oj <jsonfile> additional output to the specified flat JSON file or directory, similar to --logfile + --json-pretty additional JSON structured output of findings to a file '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.json' in cwd + --jsonfile-pretty|-oJ <jsonfile> additional JSON structured output to the specified file or directory, similar to --logfile + --csv additional output of findings to CSV file '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.csv' in cwd or directory + --csvfile|-oC <csvfile> additional output as CSV to the specified file or directory, similar to --logfile + --html additional output as HTML to file '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}.html' + --htmlfile|-oH <htmlfile> additional output as HTML to the specified file or directory, similar to --logfile + --out(f,F)ile|-oa/-oA <fname> log to a LOG,JSON,CSV,HTML file (see nmap). -oA/-oa: pretty/flat JSON. + "auto" uses '\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}'. If fname if a dir uses 'dir/\${NODE}-p\${port}\${YYYYMMDD-HHMM}' + --hints additional hints to findings + --severity <severity> severities with lower level will be filtered for CSV+JSON, possible values <LOW|MEDIUM|HIGH|CRITICAL> + --append if (non-empty) <logfile>, <csvfile>, <jsonfile> or <htmlfile> exists, append to file. Omits any header + --outprefix <fname_prefix> before '\${NODE}.' above prepend <fname_prefix> + + +Options requiring a value can also be called with '=' e.g. testssl.sh -t=smtp --wide --openssl=/usr/bin/openssl <URI>. +<URI> always needs to be the last parameter. + +EOF + # Set HTMLHEADER and JSONHEADER to false so that the cleanup() function won't + # try to write footers to the HTML and JSON files. + HTMLHEADER=false + JSONHEADER=false + #' Fix syntax highlight on sublime + "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && kill -s USR1 $PPID + exit $1 +} + +maketempf() { + TEMPDIR=$(mktemp -d /tmp/testssl.XXXXXX) + if [[ $? -ne 0 ]]; then + # For e.g. devices where we can't write to /tmp we chose $PWD but we can't + # allow every char as we haven't quoted all strings depending on it, see #1445 + if [[ $PWD =~ [^A-Za-z0-9\.,/_-] ]]; then + fatal "\$PWD contains illegal chars: \"$BASH_REMATCH\"" $ERR_FCREATE + fi + TEMPDIR=$(mktemp -d "$PWD/testssl.XXXXXX") || exit $ERR_FCREATE + fi + TMPFILE=$TEMPDIR/tempfile.txt || exit $ERR_FCREATE + if [[ "$DEBUG" -eq 0 ]]; then + ERRFILE="/dev/null" + else + ERRFILE=$TEMPDIR/errorfile.txt || exit $ERR_FCREATE + fi + HOSTCERT=$TEMPDIR/host_certificate.pem +} + +prepare_debug() { + if [[ $DEBUG -ne 0 ]]; then + cat >$TEMPDIR/environment.txt << EOF + + +GIT_REL: $GIT_REL + +PID: $$ +commandline: "${CMDLINE[@]}" +bash version: ${BASH_VERSINFO[0]}.${BASH_VERSINFO[1]}.${BASH_VERSINFO[2]} +status: ${BASH_VERSINFO[4]} +machine: ${BASH_VERSINFO[5]} +operating system: $SYSTEM $SYSTEMREV +os constraint: $SYSTEM2 +shellopts: $SHELLOPTS +printf: $PRINTF +NO_ITALICS: $NO_ITALICS + +$($OPENSSL version -a 2>/dev/null) +OSSL_VER_MAJOR: $OSSL_VER_MAJOR +OSSL_VER_MINOR: $OSSL_VER_MINOR +OSSL_VER_APPENDIX: $OSSL_VER_APPENDIX +OSSL_BUILD_DATE: $OSSL_BUILD_DATE +OSSL_VER_PLATFORM: $OSSL_VER_PLATFORM + +OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS: $OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS +OPENSSL_CONF: $OPENSSL_CONF +HAS_CURVES: $HAS_CURVES +OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES: $OSSL_SUPPORTED_CURVES + +HAS_IPv6: $HAS_IPv6 +HAS_SSL2: $HAS_SSL2 +HAS_SSL3: $HAS_SSL3 +HAS_TLS13: $HAS_TLS13 +HAS_X448: $HAS_X448 +HAS_X25519: $HAS_X25519 +HAS_NO_SSL2: $HAS_NO_SSL2 +HAS_SPDY: $HAS_SPDY +HAS_ALPN: $HAS_ALPN +HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV: $HAS_FALLBACK_SCSV +HAS_COMP: $HAS_COMP +HAS_NO_COMP: $HAS_NO_COMP +HAS_CIPHERSUITES: $HAS_CIPHERSUITES +HAS_PKEY: $HAS_PKEY +HAS_PKUTIL: $HAS_PKUTIL +HAS_PROXY: $HAS_PROXY +HAS_XMPP: $HAS_XMPP +HAS_POSTGRES: $HAS_POSTGRES +HAS_MYSQL: $HAS_MYSQL +HAS_LMTP: $HAS_LMTP +HAS_NNTP: $HAS_NNTP +HAS_IRC: $HAS_IRC + +HAS_DIG: $HAS_DIG +HAS_HOST: $HAS_HOST +HAS_DRILL: $HAS_DRILL +HAS_NSLOOKUP: $HAS_NSLOOKUP +HAS_IDN: $HAS_IDN +HAS_IDN2: $HAS_IDN2 +HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE: $HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE +HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT: $HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT +HAS_DIG_R: $HAS_DIG_R + +PATH: $PATH +PROG_NAME: $PROG_NAME +TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR: $TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR +RUN_DIR: $RUN_DIR +CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE: $CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE + +CAPATH: $CAPATH +COLOR: $COLOR +COLORBLIND: $COLORBLIND +TERM_WIDTH: $TERM_WIDTH +INTERACTIVE: $INTERACTIVE +HAS_GNUDATE: $HAS_GNUDATE +HAS_FREEBSDDATE: $HAS_FREEBSDDATE +HAS_OPENBSDDATE: $HAS_OPENBSDDATE +HAS_SED_E: $HAS_SED_E + +SHOW_EACH_C: $SHOW_EACH_C +SSL_NATIVE: $SSL_NATIVE +ASSUME_HTTP $ASSUME_HTTP +BASICAUTH: $BASICAUTH +SNEAKY: $SNEAKY +OFFENSIVE: $OFFENSIVE +PHONE_OUT: $PHONE_OUT + +DEBUG: $DEBUG + +HSTS_MIN: $HSTS_MIN +HPKP_MIN: $HPKP_MIN +CLIENT_MIN_PFS: $CLIENT_MIN_PFS +DAYS2WARN1: $DAYS2WARN1 +DAYS2WARN2: $DAYS2WARN2 + +HEADER_MAXSLEEP: $HEADER_MAXSLEEP +MAX_WAITSOCK: $MAX_WAITSOCK +HEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK: $HEARTBLEED_MAX_WAITSOCK +CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK: $CCS_MAX_WAITSOCK +USLEEP_SND $USLEEP_SND +USLEEP_REC $USLEEP_REC + +EOF + type -p locale &>/dev/null && locale >>$TEMPDIR/environment.txt || echo "locale doesn't exist" >>$TEMPDIR/environment.txt + actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL' 'ALL' "-V" &>$TEMPDIR/all_local_ciphers.txt + fi + # see also $TEMPDIR/s_client_has.txt from find_openssl_binary +} + + +prepare_arrays() { + local hexc mac ossl_ciph + local ossl_supported_tls="" ossl_supported_sslv2="" + local -i i=0 + + if [[ -e "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" ]]; then + "$HAS_SSL2" && ossl_supported_sslv2="$($OPENSSL ciphers -ssl2 -V 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 2>$ERRFILE)" + if "$HAS_SSL2"; then + ossl_supported_tls="$(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-tls1 -V")" + else + ossl_supported_tls="$(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL' "-V")" + fi + TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS="" + while read hexc n TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i] TLS_CIPHER_RFC_NAME[i] TLS_CIPHER_SSLVERS[i] TLS_CIPHER_KX[i] TLS_CIPHER_AUTH[i] TLS_CIPHER_ENC[i] mac TLS_CIPHER_EXPORT[i]; do + TLS_CIPHER_HEXCODE[i]="$hexc" + TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]=false + if [[ ${#hexc} -eq 9 ]]; then + # >= SSLv3 ciphers + if [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then + [[ ":${ossl_supported_tls}:" =~ ":${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}:" ]] && TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]=true + else + ossl_ciph="$(awk '/'"$hexc"'/ { print $3 }' <<< "$ossl_supported_tls")" + if [[ -n "$ossl_ciph" ]]; then + TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]=true + [[ "$ossl_ciph" != ${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]} ]] && TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]="$ossl_ciph" + [[ "${hexc:2:2}" == 13 ]] && TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS+=":$ossl_ciph" + fi + fi + elif [[ $OSSL_VER_MAJOR -lt 1 ]]; then + [[ ":${ossl_supported_sslv2}:" =~ ":${TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_NAME[i]}:" ]] && TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]=true + else + [[ "$ossl_supported_sslv2" =~ $hexc ]] && TLS_CIPHER_OSSL_SUPPORTED[i]=true + fi + i+=1 + done < "$CIPHERS_BY_STRENGTH_FILE" + fi + TLS_NR_CIPHERS=i + TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS="${TLS13_OSSL_CIPHERS:1}" +} + + +mybanner() { + local idtag + local bb1 bb2 bb3 + + "$QUIET" && return + "$CHILD_MASS_TESTING" && return + OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS=$(count_ciphers "$(actually_supported_osslciphers 'ALL:COMPLEMENTOFALL:@STRENGTH' 'ALL')") + [[ -n "$GIT_REL" ]] && idtag="$GIT_REL" + bb1=$(cat <<EOF + +########################################################### + $PROG_NAME $VERSION from +EOF +) + bb2=$(cat <<EOF + + This program is free software. Distribution and + modification under GPLv2 permitted. + USAGE w/o ANY WARRANTY. USE IT AT YOUR OWN RISK! + + Please file bugs @ +EOF +) + bb3=$(cat <<EOF + +########################################################### +EOF +) + pr_bold "$bb1 " + pr_boldurl "$SWURL"; outln + if [[ -n "$idtag" ]]; then + #FIXME: if we run it not off the git dir we miss the version tag. + # at least we don't want to display empty brackets here... + pr_bold " (" + pr_grey "$idtag" + prln_bold ")" + fi + pr_bold "$bb2 " + pr_boldurl "https://testssl.sh/bugs/"; outln + pr_bold "$bb3" + outln "\n" + outln " Using \"$($OPENSSL version 2>/dev/null)\" [~$OPENSSL_NR_CIPHERS ciphers]" + out " on $HNAME:" + outln "$OPENSSL_LOCATION" + outln " (built: \"$OSSL_BUILD_DATE\", platform: \"$OSSL_VER_PLATFORM\")\n" +} + +calc_scantime() { + END_TIME=$(date +%s) + SCAN_TIME=$(( END_TIME - START_TIME )) +} + +cleanup() { + # If parallel mass testing is being performed, then the child tests need + # to be killed before $TEMPDIR is deleted. Otherwise, error messages + # will be created if testssl.sh is stopped before all testing is complete. + "$INTERACTIVE" && [[ $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS -gt 0 ]] && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2 + while [[ $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH -lt $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS ]]; do + if [[ ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} -ne 0 ]] && \ + ps ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >/dev/null ; then + kill ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >&2 2>/dev/null + wait ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} 2>/dev/null # make sure pid terminated, see wait(1p) + get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "stopped" + else + # If a test had already completed, but its output wasn't yet processed, + # then process it now. + get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "completed" + fi + NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1 + done + if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]]; then + tmln_out + tm_underline "DEBUG (level $DEBUG): see files in $TEMPDIR" + tmln_out + else + [[ -d "$TEMPDIR" ]] && rm -rf "$TEMPDIR"; + fi + outln + # No shorthand expression to avoid errors when $CMDLINE_PARSED haven't been filled yet. + if [[ $CMDLINE_PARSED == true ]]; then + "$SECTION_FOOTER_NEEDED" && fileout_section_footer true + html_footer + fileout_footer + fi + # debugging off, see above + grep -q xtrace <<< "$SHELLOPTS" && ! "$DEBUG_ALLINONE" && exec 2>&42 42>&- +} + +child_error() { + cleanup + exit $ERR_CHILD +} + + +# Program terminates prematurely, with error code +# arg1: string to print / to write to file +# arg2: global error code, see ERR_* above +# arg3: an optional hint (string) +# +fatal() { + outln + prln_magenta "Fatal error: $1" >&2 + [[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && prln_magenta "Fatal error: $1" >>$LOGFILE + if [[ -n "$3" ]]; then + outln "$3" >&2 + [[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && outln "$3" >>$LOGFILE + fi + # Make sure we don't try to write into files when not created yet. + # No shorthand expression to avoid errors when $CMDLINE_PARSED haven't been filled yet. + [[ $CMDLINE_PARSED == true ]] && fileout "scanProblem" "FATAL" "$1" + exit $2 +} + +# This OTOH doesn't exit but puts a fatal error to the screen but continues with the next +# IP/hostname. It should only be used if a single IP/Hostname in a scan is not reachable. +# arg1: string to print / to write to file +# +ip_fatal() { + outln + prln_magenta "Fatal error: $1, proceeding with next IP (if any)" >&2 + [[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && prln_magenta "Fatal error: $1, proceeding with next IP (if any)" >>$LOGFILE + outln + fileout "scanProblem" "FATAL" "$1, proceeding with next IP (if any)" + return 0 +} + +# This generic function outputs an error onto the screen and handles logging. +# arg1: string to print / to write to file, arg2 (optional): additional hint to write +# +generic_nonfatal() { + prln_magenta "$1" >&2 + [[ -n $2 ]] && outln "$2" + [[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]] && prln_magenta "$1" >>$LOGFILE && [[ -n $2 ]] && outln "$2" >>$LOGFILE + outln + fileout "scanProblem" "WARN" "$1" + return 0 +} + +initialize_engine(){ + # for now only GOST engine + grep -q '^# testssl config file' "$OPENSSL_CONF" 2>/dev/null && \ + return 0 # We have been here already + if "$NO_ENGINE"; then + # Avoid potential conflicts also -- manual hook, see #1117 + export OPENSSL_CONF='' + return 1 + elif $OPENSSL engine gost -v 2>&1 | grep -Eq 'invalid command|no such engine'; then + outln + pr_warning "No engine or GOST support via engine with your $OPENSSL"; outln + fileout_insert_warning "engine_problem" "WARN" "No engine or GOST support via engine with your $OPENSSL" + export OPENSSL_CONF='' + return 1 + elif ! $OPENSSL engine gost -vvvv -t -c 2>/dev/null >/dev/null; then + # check for openssl 1.1.1 config -- not this may not be reliable. We only use this + # to suppress the warning (confuses users), see #1119 + # https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/b524b808a1d1ba204dbdcbb42de4e3bddb3472ac + if ! grep -q 'using the .include directive' /etc/ssl/openssl.cnf; then + outln + pr_warning "No engine or GOST support via engine with your $OPENSSL"; outln + fi + fileout_insert_warning "engine_problem" "WARN" "No engine or GOST support via engine with your $OPENSSL" + # Avoid clashes of OpenSSL 1.1.1 config file with our openssl 1.0.2. This is for Debian 10 + export OPENSSL_CONF='' + return 1 + else + # we have engine support. But we want to check whether an external OPENSSL_CONF was supplied. + # $TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/openssl.cnf is an internal presetting, see #1982 + if [[ -n "$OPENSSL_CONF" ]] && [[ "$OPENSSL_CONF" != "$TESTSSL_INSTALL_DIR/etc/openssl.cnf" ]]; then + prln_warning "For now I am providing the config file to have GOST support" + else + OPENSSL_CONF=$TEMPDIR/gost.conf + # see https://www.mail-archive.com/openssl-users@openssl.org/msg65395.html + cat >$OPENSSL_CONF << EOF +# testssl config file for openssl + +openssl_conf = openssl_def + +[ openssl_def ] +engines = engine_section + +[ engine_section ] +gost = gost_section + +[ gost_section ] +engine_id = gost +default_algorithms = ALL +CRYPT_PARAMS = id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet + +EOF + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_OSSLBIN + export OPENSSL_CONF + fi + fi + return 0 +} + +# arg1: text to display before "-->" +# arg2: arg needed to accept to continue +ignore_no_or_lame() { + local a + + [[ "$WARNINGS" == off ]] && return 0 + [[ "$WARNINGS" == batch ]] && return 1 + tm_warning "$1 --> " + read a + if [[ "$2" == "$(toupper "$2")" ]]; then + # all uppercase requested + if [[ "$a" == "$2" ]]; then + return 0 + else + return 1 + fi + elif [[ "$2" == "$(tolower "$a")" ]]; then + # we normalize the word to continue + return 0 + else + return 1 + fi +} + +# arg1: URI +parse_hn_port() { + local tmp_port + local node_tmp="" + + NODE="$1" + NODE="${NODE/https\:\/\//}" # strip "https" + NODE="${NODE%%/*}" # strip trailing urlpath + if grep -q ':$' <<< "$NODE"; then + if grep -wq http <<< "$NODE"; then + fatal "\"http\" is not what you meant probably" $ERR_CMDLINE + else + fatal "\"$1\" is not a valid URI" $ERR_CMDLINE + fi + fi + # Was an IPv6 address supplied like [AA:BB:CC::]:port ? + if grep -q ']' <<< "$NODE"; then + tmp_port=$(printf "$NODE" | sed 's/\[.*\]//' | sed 's/://') + # determine v6 port, supposed it was supplied additionally + if [[ -n "$tmp_port" ]]; then + PORT=$tmp_port + NODE=$(sed "s/:$PORT//" <<< "$NODE") + fi + NODE=$(sed -e 's/\[//' -e 's/\]//' <<< "$NODE") + else + # determine v4 port, supposed it was supplied additionally + grep -q ':' <<< "$NODE" && \ + PORT=$(sed 's/^.*\://' <<< "$NODE") && NODE=$(sed 's/\:.*$//' <<< "$NODE") + fi + NODE="${NODE%%.}" # strip trailing "." if supplied + + # We check for non-ASCII chars now. If there are some we'll try to convert it if IDN/IDN2 is installed + # If not, we'll continue. Hoping later that dig can use it. If not the error handler will tell + # Honestly we don't care whether it's IDN2008 or IDN2003 or Emoji domains as long as it works. + # So we try to resolve anything supplied. If it can't our resolver error handler takes care + if [[ "$NODE" == *[![:ascii:]]* ]]; then + if ! "$HAS_IDN2" && ! "$HAS_IDN"; then + prln_warning " URI contains non-ASCII characters and libidn/libidn2 not available." + outln " Trying to feed the resolver without converted \"$NODE\" ...\n" + #ToDo: fileout is missing + node_tmp="$NODE" + elif "$HAS_IDN2"; then + node_tmp="$(idn2 "$NODE" 2>/dev/null)" + fi + if "$HAS_IDN" && [[ -z "$node_tmp" ]]; then + node_tmp="$(idn "$NODE" 2>/dev/null)" + fi + if [[ -z "$node_tmp" ]]; then + prln_warning " URI contains non-ASCII characters and IDN conversion failed." + outln " Trying to feed the resolver without converted \"$NODE\" ...\n" + #ToDo: fileout is missing + node_tmp="$NODE" + fi + NODE="$node_tmp" + fi + + debugme echo $NODE:$PORT + SNI="-servername $NODE" + URL_PATH=$(sed 's/https:\/\///' <<< "$1" | sed 's/'"${NODE}"'//' | sed 's/.*'"${PORT}"'//') # remove protocol and node part and port + URL_PATH=$(sed 's/\/\//\//g' <<< "$URL_PATH") # we rather want // -> / + URL_PATH=${URL_PATH%%.} # strip trailing "." so that it is not interpreted as URL + [[ -z "$URL_PATH" ]] && URL_PATH="/" + debugme echo "URL_PATH: $URL_PATH" + return 0 # NODE, URL_PATH, PORT is set now +} + + +# args: string containing ip addresses +filter_ip6_address() { + local a + + for a in "$@"; do + if ! is_ipv6addr "$a"; then + continue + fi + if "$HAS_SED_E"; then + sed -E 's/^abcdeABCDEFf0123456789:]//g' <<< "$a" | sed -e '/^$/d' -e '/^;;/d' + else + sed -r 's/[^abcdefABCDEF0123456789:]//g' <<< "$a" | sed -e '/^$/d' -e '/^;;/d' + fi + done +} + +filter_ip4_address() { + local a + + for a in "$@"; do + if ! is_ipv4addr "$a"; then + continue + fi + if "$HAS_SED_E"; then + sed -E 's/[^[:digit:].]//g' <<< "$a" | sed -e '/^$/d' + else + sed -r 's/[^[:digit:].]//g' <<< "$a" | sed -e '/^$/d' + fi + done +} + +# For security testing sometimes we have local entries. Getent is BS under Linux for localhost: No network, no resolution +# arg1 is the entry we want to look up in the host file +get_local_aaaa() { + local ip6="" + local etchosts="/etc/hosts /c/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts" + + [[ -z "$1" ]] && echo "" && return 1 + # Also multiple records should work fine + ip6=$(grep -wih "$1" $etchosts 2>/dev/null | grep ':' | grep -Ev '^#|\.local' | grep -Ei "[[:space:]]$1" | awk '{ print $1 }') + if is_ipv6addr "$ip6"; then + echo "$ip6" + else + echo "" + fi +} +get_local_a() { + local ip4="" + local etchosts="/etc/hosts /c/Windows/System32/drivers/etc/hosts" + + ip4=$(grep -wih "$1" $etchosts 2>/dev/null | grep -Ev ':|^#|\.local' | grep -Ei "[[:space:]]$1" | awk '{ print $1 }') + if is_ipv4addr "$ip4"; then + echo "$ip4" + else + echo "" + fi +} + +# Does a hard exit if no lookup binary is provided +# Checks for IDN capabilities also +# +check_resolver_bins() { + local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF" + + OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134 + type -p dig &> /dev/null && HAS_DIG=true + type -p host &> /dev/null && HAS_HOST=true + type -p drill &> /dev/null && HAS_DRILL=true + type -p nslookup &> /dev/null && HAS_NSLOOKUP=true + type -p avahi-resolve &>/dev/null && HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE=true + type -p idn &>/dev/null && HAS_IDN=true + type -p idn2 &>/dev/null && HAS_IDN2=true + + if ! "$HAS_DIG" && ! "$HAS_HOST" && ! "$HAS_DRILL" && ! "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then + fatal "Neither \"dig\", \"host\", \"drill\" or \"nslookup\" is present" $ERR_DNSBIN + fi + if "$HAS_DIG"; then + # Old dig versions don't have an option to ignore $HOME/.digrc + if ! dig -h | grep -qE '\-r.*~/.digrc'; then + HAS_DIG_R=false + DIG_R="" + fi + if dig -h | grep -Eq idnout; then + HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT=true + fi + fi + OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134 + return 0 +} + +# arg1: a host name. Returned will be 0-n IPv4 addresses +# watch out: $1 can also be a cname! --> all checked +get_a_record() { + local ip4="" + local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF" + local noidnout="" + + "$HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT" && noidnout="+noidnout" + [[ "$NODNS" == none ]] && return 0 # if no DNS lookup was instructed, leave here + if [[ "$1" == localhost ]]; then + # This is a bit ugly but prevents from doing DNS lookups which could fail + echo 127.0.0.1 + return 0 + fi + if is_ipv4addr "$1"; then + # This saves walking through this. Also it avoids hangs e.g. if you run docker locally without reachabale DNS + echo $1 + return 0 + fi + OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134 + if [[ "$NODE" == *.local ]]; then + if "$HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE"; then + ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(avahi-resolve -4 -n "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $2 }')) + elif "$HAS_DIG"; then + ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(dig $DIG_R @224.0.0.251 -p 5353 +short -t a +notcp "$1" 2>/dev/null | sed '/^;;/d')) + else + fatal "Local hostname given but no 'avahi-resolve' or 'dig' available." $ERR_DNSBIN + fi + fi + if [[ -z "$ip4" ]] && "$HAS_HOST"; then + ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(host -t a "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/address/ { print $NF }')) + fi + if [[ -z "$ip4" ]] && "$HAS_DRILL"; then + ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(drill a "$1" | awk '/ANSWER SECTION/,/AUTHORITY SECTION/ { print $NF }' | awk '/^[0-9]/')) + fi + if [[ -z "$ip4" ]] && "$HAS_DIG"; then + ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(dig $DIG_R +short +timeout=2 +tries=2 $noidnout -t a "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/^[0-9]/ { print $1 }')) + fi + if [[ -z "$ip4" ]] && "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then + ip4=$(filter_ip4_address $(strip_lf "$(nslookup -querytype=a "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/^Name/ { getline; print $NF }')")) + fi + OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134 + safe_echo "$ip4" +} + +# arg1: a host name. Returned will be 0-n IPv6 addresses +# watch out: $1 can also be a cname! --> all checked +get_aaaa_record() { + local ip6="" + local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF" + local noidnout="" + + "$HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT" && noidnout="+noidnout" + [[ "$NODNS" == none ]] && return 0 # if no DNS lookup was instructed, leave here + OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134 + if is_ipv6addr "$1"; then + # This saves walking through this. Also it avoids hangs e.g. if you run docker locally without reachabale DNS + echo "$1" + return 0 + elif is_ipv4addr "$1"; then + # we need also this here as get_aaaa_record is always called after get_a_record and we want to handle this at a low level + return 0 + fi + if [[ -z "$ip6" ]]; then + if [[ "$NODE" == *.local ]]; then + if "$HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE"; then + ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(avahi-resolve -6 -n "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $2 }')) + elif "$HAS_DIG"; then + ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(dig $DIG_R @ff02::fb -p 5353 -t aaaa +short +notcp "$NODE")) + else + fatal "Local hostname given but no 'avahi-resolve' or 'dig' available." $ERR_DNSBIN + fi + elif "$HAS_HOST"; then + ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(host -t aaaa "$1" | awk '/address/ { print $NF }')) + elif "$HAS_DRILL"; then + ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(drill aaaa "$1" | awk '/ANSWER SECTION/,/AUTHORITY SECTION/ { print $NF }' | awk '/^[0-9]/')) + elif "$HAS_DIG"; then + ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(dig $DIG_R +short +timeout=2 +tries=2 $noidnout -t aaaa "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/^[0-9]/ { print $1 }')) + elif "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then + ip6=$(filter_ip6_address $(strip_lf "$(nslookup -type=aaaa "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/'"^${a}"'.*AAAA/ { print $NF }')")) + fi + fi + OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134 + safe_echo "$ip6" +} + +# RFC6844: DNS Certification Authority Authorization (CAA) Resource Record +# arg1: domain to check for +get_caa_rr_record() { + local raw_caa="" + local -i len_caa_property + local caa_property_name + local caa_property_value + local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF" + local all_caa="" + local noidnout="" + + "$HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT" && noidnout="+noidnout" + + [[ -n "$NODNS" ]] && return 0 # if minimum DNS lookup was instructed, leave here + # if there's a type257 record there are two output formats here, mostly depending on age of distribution + # roughly that's the difference between text and binary format + # 1) 'google.com has CAA record 0 issue "symantec.com"' + # 2) 'google.com has TYPE257 record \# 19 0005697373756573796D616E7465632E636F6D' + # for dig +short the output always starts with '0 issue [..]' or '\# 19 [..]' so we normalize thereto to keep caa_flag, caa_property + # caa_property then has key/value pairs, see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6844#section-3 + OPENSSL_CONF="" + if "$HAS_DRILL"; then + raw_caa="$(drill $1 type257 | awk '/'"^${1}"'.*CAA/ { print $5,$6,$7 }')" + elif "$HAS_HOST"; then + raw_caa="$(host -t type257 $1)" + if grep -Ewvq "has no CAA|has no TYPE257" <<< "$raw_caa"; then + raw_caa="$(sed -e 's/^.*has CAA record //' -e 's/^.*has TYPE257 record //' <<< "$raw_caa")" + fi + elif "$HAS_DIG"; then + raw_caa="$(dig $DIG_R +short +timeout=3 +tries=3 $noidnout type257 "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $1" "$2" "$3 }')" + # empty if no CAA record + elif "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then + raw_caa="$(strip_lf "$(nslookup -type=type257 $1 | grep -w rdata_257)")" + if [[ -n "$raw_caa" ]]; then + raw_caa="$(sed 's/^.*rdata_257 = //' <<< "$raw_caa")" + fi + else + return 1 + # No dig, drill, host, or nslookup --> complaint was elsewhere already + fi + OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134 + debugme echo $raw_caa + + if [[ "$raw_caa" =~ \#\ [0-9][0-9] ]]; then + # for posteo we get this binary format returned e.g. for old dig versions: + # \# 19 0005697373756567656F74727573742E636F6D + # \# 23 0009697373756577696C6467656F74727573742E636F6D + # \# 34 0005696F6465666D61696C746F3A686F73746D617374657240706F73 74656F2E6465 + # # len caaflag <more_see_below> @ p o s t e o . d e + while read hash len line ;do + if [[ "${line:0:2}" == "00" ]]; then # probably the caa flag, always 00, so we don't keep this + len_caa_property=$(printf "%0d" "$((10#${line:2:2}))") # get len and do type casting, for posteo we have 05 or 09 here as a string + len_caa_property=$((len_caa_property*2)) # =>word! Now get name from 4th and value from 4th+len position... + line="${line/ /}" # especially with iodefs there's a blank in the string which we just skip + caa_property_name="$(hex2ascii ${line:4:$len_caa_property})" + caa_property_value="$(hex2ascii "${line:$((4+len_caa_property)):100}")" + # echo "${caa_property_name}=${caa_property_value}" + all_caa+="${caa_property_name}=${caa_property_value}\n" + else + outln "please report unknown CAA RR $line with flag @ $NODE" + return 7 + fi + done <<< "$raw_caa" + sort <<< "$(safe_echo "$all_caa")" + return 0 + elif grep -q '"' <<< "$raw_caa"; then + raw_caa=${raw_caa//\"/} # strip all ". Now we should have flag, name, value + #caa_property_name="$(awk '{ print $2 }' <<< "$raw_caa")" + #caa_property_value="$(awk '{ print $3 }' <<< "$raw_caa")" + safe_echo "$(sort <<< "$(awk '{ print $2"="$3 }' <<< "$raw_caa")")" + return 0 + else + # no caa record + return 1 + fi + +# to do: +# 4: check whether $1 is a CNAME and take this + return 0 +} + +# arg1: domain +get_mx_record() { + local mxs"" + local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF" + local noidnout="" + + "$HAS_DIG_NOIDNOUT" && noidnout="+noidnout" + OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134 + # we need the last two columns here + if "$HAS_HOST"; then + mxs="$(host -t MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/is handled by/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')" + elif "$HAS_DRILL"; then + mxs="$(drill mx $1 | awk '/IN[ \t]MX[ \t]+/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')" + elif "$HAS_DIG"; then + mxs="$(dig $DIG_R +short $noidnout -t MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/^[0-9]/ { print $1" "$2 }')" + elif "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then + mxs="$(strip_lf "$(nslookup -type=MX "$1" 2>/dev/null | awk '/mail exchanger/ { print $(NF-1), $NF }')")" + else + # shouldn't reach this, as we checked in the top + fatal "No dig, host, drill or nslookup" $ERR_DNSBIN + fi + OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf" + echo "$mxs" +} + + +# set IPADDRs and IP46ADDRs +# +determine_ip_addresses() { + local ip4="" + local ip6="" + + ip4="$(get_a_record "$NODE")" + ip6="$(get_aaaa_record "$NODE")" + IP46ADDRs=$(newline_to_spaces "$ip4 $ip6") + + if [[ -n "$CMDLINE_IP" ]]; then + # command line has supplied an IP address or "one" + if [[ "$CMDLINE_IP" == one ]]; then + # use first IPv6 or IPv4 address + if "$HAS_IPv6" && [[ -n "$ip6" ]]; then + CMDLINE_IP="$(head -1 <<< "$ip6")" + else + CMDLINE_IP="$(head -1 <<< "$ip4")" + fi + fi + NODEIP="$CMDLINE_IP" + if is_ipv4addr "$NODEIP"; then + ip4="$NODEIP" + elif is_ipv6addr "$NODEIP"; then + ip6="$NODEIP" + else + fatal "couldn't identify supplied \"CMDLINE_IP\"" $ERR_DNSLOOKUP + fi + elif is_ipv4addr "$NODE"; then + ip4="$NODE" # only an IPv4 address was supplied as an argument, no hostname + SNI="" # override Server Name Indication as we test the IP only + else + ip4=$(get_local_a "$NODE") # is there a local host entry? + if [[ -z "$ip4" ]]; then # empty: no (LOCAL_A is predefined as false) + ip4=$(get_a_record "$NODE") + else + LOCAL_A=true # we have the ip4 from local host entry and need to signal this to testssl + fi + # same now for ipv6 + ip6=$(get_local_aaaa "$NODE") + if [[ -z "$ip6" ]]; then + ip6=$(get_aaaa_record "$NODE") + else + LOCAL_AAAA=true # we have a local ipv6 entry and need to signal this to testssl + fi + fi + + # IPv6 only address + if [[ -z "$ip4" ]]; then + if "$HAS_IPv6"; then + IPADDRs=$(newline_to_spaces "$ip6") + IP46ADDRs="$IPADDRs" # IP46ADDRs are the ones to display, IPADDRs the ones to test + fi + else + if "$HAS_IPv6" && [[ -n "$ip6" ]]; then + if is_ipv6addr "$CMDLINE_IP"; then + IPADDRs=$(newline_to_spaces "$ip6") + else + IPADDRs=$(newline_to_spaces "$ip4 $ip6") + fi + else + IPADDRs=$(newline_to_spaces "$ip4") + fi + fi + if [[ -z "$IPADDRs" ]]; then + if [[ -n "$ip6" ]]; then + fatal "Only IPv6 address(es) for \"$NODE\" available, maybe add \"-6\" to $0" $ERR_DNSLOOKUP + else + fatal "No IPv4/IPv6 address(es) for \"$NODE\" available" $ERR_DNSLOOKUP + fi + fi + return 0 # IPADDR and IP46ADDR is set now +} + +determine_rdns() { + local saved_openssl_conf="$OPENSSL_CONF" + local nodeip="" rdns="" line="" + + [[ -n "$NODNS" ]] && rDNS="(instructed to minimize DNS queries)" && return 0 # PTR records were not asked for + local nodeip="$(tr -d '[]' <<< $NODEIP)" # for DNS we do not need the square brackets of IPv6 addresses + OPENSSL_CONF="" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134 + if [[ "$NODE" == *.local ]]; then + if "$HAS_AVAHIRESOLVE"; then + rDNS=$(avahi-resolve -a $nodeip 2>/dev/null | awk '{ print $2 }') + elif "$HAS_DIG"; then + rDNS=$(dig $DIG_R -x $nodeip @224.0.0.251 -p 5353 +notcp +noall +answer +short | awk '{ print $1 }') + fi + elif "$HAS_HOST"; then + rDNS=$(host -t PTR $nodeip 2>/dev/null | awk '/pointer/ { print $NF }') + elif "$HAS_DRILL"; then + rDNS=$(drill -x ptr $nodeip 2>/dev/null | awk '/ANSWER SECTION/ { getline; print $NF }') + elif "$HAS_DIG"; then + # 1+2 should suffice. It's a compromise for if e.g. network is down but we have a docker/localhost server + rDNS=$(dig $DIG_R -x $nodeip +timeout=1 +tries=2 +noall +answer +short | awk '{ print $1 }') # +short returns also CNAME, e.g. openssl.org + elif "$HAS_NSLOOKUP"; then + rDNS=$(strip_lf "$(nslookup -type=PTR $nodeip 2>/dev/null | grep -v 'canonical name =' | grep 'name = ' | awk '{ print $NF }' | sed 's/\.$//')") + fi + OPENSSL_CONF="$saved_openssl_conf" # see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/134 + # First, rDNS can contain > 1 line due to multiple PTR DNS records, though this is not recommended. + # So we use a loop to check for each FQDN returned. There we remove chars which under weird + # circumstances (see #1506) can show up here. The blacklist is taken from RFC 1912 ("Allowable characters in a + # label for a host name are only ASCII, letters, digits, and the `-' character") + while read -r line; do + line="$(tr -dc '[a-zA-Z0-9-_.]' <<< "$line")" + [[ -z "$rdns" ]] && rdns="$line" || rdns="$rdns $line" + done <<< "$rDNS" + rDNS="$rdns" + [[ -z "$rDNS" ]] && rDNS="--" + return 0 +} + +# We need to get the IP address of the proxy so we can use it in fd_socket +# +check_proxy() { + if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then + if ! "$HAS_PROXY"; then + fatal "Your $OPENSSL is too old to support the \"-proxy\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN + fi + if [[ "$PROXY" == auto ]]; then + # Get $ENV https_proxy is the one we care about for connects + PROXY="${https_proxy#*\/\/}" + # Fallback: + [[ -z "$PROXY" ]] && PROXY="${http_proxy#*\/\/}" + [[ -z "$PROXY" ]] && fatal "you specified \"--proxy=auto\" but \"\$http(s)_proxy\" is empty" $ERR_CMDLINE + fi + # strip off http/https part if supplied: + PROXY="${PROXY/http\:\/\//}" + PROXY="${PROXY/https\:\/\//}" # this shouldn't be needed + PROXYNODE="${PROXY%:*}" + PROXYPORT="${PROXY#*:}" + is_number "$PROXYPORT" || fatal "Proxy port cannot be determined from \"$PROXY\"" $ERR_CMDLINE + + #if is_ipv4addr "$PROXYNODE" || is_ipv6addr "$PROXYNODE" ; then + # IPv6 via openssl -proxy: that doesn't work. Sockets does +#FIXME: finish this with LibreSSL which supports an IPv6 proxy + if is_ipv4addr "$PROXYNODE"; then + PROXYIP="$PROXYNODE" + else + PROXYIP="$(get_a_record "$PROXYNODE" 2>/dev/null | grep -v alias | sed 's/^.*address //')" + [[ -z "$PROXYIP" ]] && fatal "Proxy IP cannot be determined from \"$PROXYNODE\"" $ERR_CMDLINE + fi + PROXY="-proxy $PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT" + fi +} + + +# this is only being called from determine_optimal_proto in order to check whether we have a server +# with client authentication, a server with no SSL session ID switched off +# +sclient_auth() { + [[ $1 -eq 0 ]] && return 0 # no client auth (CLIENT_AUTH=false is preset globally) + if [[ -n $(awk '/Master-Key: / { print $2 }' "$2") ]]; then # connect succeeded + if grep -q '^<<< .*CertificateRequest' "$2"; then # CertificateRequest message in -msg + CLIENT_AUTH=true + return 0 + fi + if [[ -z $(awk '/Session-ID: / { print $2 }' "$2") ]]; then # probably no SSL session + if [[ 2 -eq $(grep -c CERTIFICATE "$2") ]]; then # do another sanity check to be sure + CLIENT_AUTH=false + NO_SSL_SESSIONID=true # NO_SSL_SESSIONID is preset globally to false for all other cases + return 0 + fi + fi + fi + # what's left now is: master key empty, handshake returned not successful, session ID empty --> not successful + return 1 +} + +# Determine the best parameters to use with tls_sockets(): +# For TLSv1.3, determine what extension number to use for the key_share extension. +# For TLSv1.2, determine what cipher list to send, since there are more than 128 +# TLSv1.2 ciphers and some servers fail if the ClientHello contains too many ciphers. +# If both TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.2 ClientHello messages result in failed connection attempts, +# then try to determine whether: +# (1) This is an SSLv2-only server +# (2) This server supports some protocol in SSLv3 - TLSv1.1, but cannot handle version negotiation. +# (3) This is not a TLS/SSL enabled server. +# This information can be used by determine_optimal_proto() to help distinguish between a server +# that is not TLS/SSL enabled and one that is not compatible with the version of OpenSSL being used. +determine_optimal_sockets_params() { + local -i ret1=1 ret2=1 + local i proto cipher_offered + local all_failed=true + + # If a STARTTLS protocol is specified and $SSL_NATIVE is true, then skip this test, since + # $SSL_NATIVE may have been set to true as a result of tls_sockets() not supporting the STARTTLS + # protocol. + [[ -n "$STARTTLS_PROTOCOL" ]] && "$SSL_NATIVE" && return 0 + + # NOTE: The following code is only needed as long as draft versions of TLSv1.3 prior to draft 23 + # are supported. It is used to determine whether a draft 23 or pre-draft 23 ClientHello should be + # sent. + KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="33" + tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "" "00, 2b, 00, 0f, 0e, 03,04, 7f,1c, 7f,1b, 7f,1a, 7f,19, 7f,18, 7f,17" + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then + add_tls_offered tls1_3 yes + all_failed=false + else + KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="28" + tls_sockets "04" "$TLS13_CIPHER" "" "00, 2b, 00, 0b, 0a, 7f,16, 7f,15, 7f,14, 7f,13, 7f,12" + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then + add_tls_offered tls1_3 yes + all_failed=false + else + add_tls_offered tls1_3 no + KEY_SHARE_EXTN_NR="33" + fi + fi + if ! "$all_failed"; then + # Determine which version of TLS 1.3 was offered. For drafts 18-21 the + # version appears in the ProtocolVersion field of the ServerHello. For + # drafts 22-28 and the final TLS 1.3 the ProtocolVersion field contains + # 0303 and the actual version appears in the supported_versions extension. + if [[ "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:8:3}" == 7F1 ]]; then + add_tls_offered tls1_3_draft$(hex2dec "${TLS_SERVER_HELLO:10:2}") yes + elif [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00020304 ]]; then + add_tls_offered tls1_3_rfc8446 yes + elif [[ "$TLS_SERVER_HELLO" =~ 002B00027F1[2-9A-C] ]]; then + add_tls_offered tls1_3_draft$(hex2dec "${BASH_REMATCH:10:2}") yes + fi + fi + + # Need to determine which set of ciphers is best to use with + # a TLSv1.2 ClientHello since there are far more than 128 ciphers + # that can be used. + tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER" + ret1=$? + if [[ $ret1 -eq 0 ]] || [[ $ret1 -eq 2 ]]; then + case $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION in + 0303) add_tls_offered tls1_2 yes ;; + 0302) add_tls_offered tls1_1 yes ;; + 0301) add_tls_offered tls1 yes ;; + 0300) add_tls_offered ssl3 yes ;; + esac + all_failed=false + fi + + # Try again with a different, less common, set of cipher suites + # see #807 and #806. If using these cipher suites results in a + # successful connection, then change $TLS12_CIPHER to these + # cipher suites so that later tests will use this list of cipher + # suites. + if [[ $ret1 -ne 0 ]]; then + tls_sockets "03" "$TLS12_CIPHER_2ND_TRY" + ret2=$? + if [[ $ret2 -eq 0 ]]; then + add_tls_offered tls1_2 yes + TLS12_CIPHER="$TLS12_CIPHER_2ND_TRY" + all_failed=false + else + add_tls_offered tls1_2 no + fi + if [[ $ret2 -eq 2 ]]; then + case $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION in + 0302) add_tls_offered tls1_1 yes ;; + 0301) add_tls_offered tls1 yes ;; + 0300) add_tls_offered ssl3 yes ;; + esac + [[ $ret1 -ne 2 ]] && TLS12_CIPHER="$TLS12_CIPHER_2ND_TRY" + all_failed=false + fi + fi + if [[ $ret1 -eq 0 ]] || [[ $ret2 -eq 0 ]]; then + cipher_offered="$(get_cipher "$TEMPDIR/$NODEIP.parse_tls_serverhello.txt")" + if [[ "$cipher_offered" == TLS_* ]] || [[ "$cipher_offered" == SSL_* ]]; then + cipher_offered="$(rfc2hexcode "$cipher_offered")" + else + cipher_offered="$(openssl2hexcode "$cipher_offered")" + fi + [[ ${#cipher_offered} -eq 9 ]] && TLS12_CIPHER_OFFERED="${cipher_offered:2:2},${cipher_offered:7:2}" + fi + + if "$all_failed"; then + # One of the following must be true: + # * This is not a TLS/SSL enabled server. + # * The server only supports SSLv2 + # * The server does not handle version negotiation correctly. + for proto in 01 00 02; do + tls_sockets "$proto" "$TLS_CIPHER" "" "" "true" + ret1=$? + if [[ $ret1 -ne 0 ]]; then + case $proto in + 02) add_tls_offered tls1_1 no ;; + 01) add_tls_offered tls1 no ;; + 00) add_tls_offered ssl3 no ;; + esac + fi + if [[ $ret1 -eq 0 ]] || [[ $ret1 -eq 2 ]]; then + case $DETECTED_TLS_VERSION in + 0302) add_tls_offered tls1_1 yes ;; + 0301) add_tls_offered tls1 yes ;; + 0300) add_tls_offered ssl3 yes ;; + esac + OPTIMAL_SOCKETS_PROTO="$proto" + all_failed=false + break + fi + done + fi + if "$all_failed"; then + sslv2_sockets + [[ $? -eq 3 ]] && all_failed=false && add_tls_offered ssl2 yes + fi + ALL_FAILED_SOCKETS="$all_failed" + return 0 +} + + +# This function determines (STARTTLS_)OPTIMAL_PROTO. It is basically a workaround function as under certain +# circumstances a ClientHello without specifying a protocol will fail. +# Circumstances observed so far: 1.) IIS 6 and openssl 1.0.2 as opposed to 1.0.1 2.) starttls + dovecot imap. +# Independent on the server side it seems reasonable to to know upfront which protocol always works +# +# arg1: if empty: no STARTTLS, else: STARTTLS protocol +# The first try in the loop is empty as we prefer not to specify always a protocol if we can get along w/o it +# +determine_optimal_proto() { + local all_failed=true + local tmp="" + local proto optimal_proto + + "$do_tls_sockets" && return 0 + + >$ERRFILE + if [[ -n "$1" ]]; then + # STARTTLS workaround needed see https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/188 -- kind of odd + for STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO in -tls1_2 -tls1 -ssl3 -tls1_1 -tls1_3 -ssl2; do + case $STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO in + -tls1_3) "$HAS_TLS13" || continue ;; + -ssl3) "$HAS_SSL3" || continue ;; + -ssl2) "$HAS_SSL2" || continue ;; + *) ;; + esac + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO $BUGS -connect "$NODEIP:$PORT" $PROXY -msg $STARTTLS $SNI") </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE + if sclient_auth $? $TMPFILE; then + all_failed=false + add_tls_offered "${STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO/-/}" yes + break + fi + done + "$all_failed" && STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO="" + optimal_proto="$STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO" + debugme echo "STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO: $STARTTLS_OPTIMAL_PROTO" + else + # No STARTTLS + for proto in '' -tls1_2 -tls1 -tls1_3 -ssl3 -tls1_1 -ssl2; do + case $proto in + -tls1_3) "$HAS_TLS13" || continue ;; + -ssl3) "$HAS_SSL3" || continue ;; + -ssl2) "$HAS_SSL2" || continue ;; + *) ;; + esac + $OPENSSL s_client $(s_client_options "$proto $BUGS -connect "$NODEIP:$PORT" -msg $PROXY $SNI") </dev/null >$TMPFILE 2>>$ERRFILE + if sclient_auth $? $TMPFILE; then + # we use the successful handshake at least to get one valid protocol supported -- it saves us time later + if [[ -z "$proto" ]]; then + # convert to openssl terminology + tmp=$(get_protocol $TMPFILE) + tmp=${tmp/\./_} + tmp=${tmp/v/} + tmp="$(tolower $tmp)" + add_tls_offered "${tmp}" yes + debugme echo "one proto determined: $tmp" + OPTIMAL_PROTO="" + else + add_tls_offered "${proto/-/}" yes + OPTIMAL_PROTO="$proto" + fi + all_failed=false + break + fi + done + "$all_failed" && OPTIMAL_PROTO="" + optimal_proto="$OPTIMAL_PROTO" + + debugme echo "OPTIMAL_PROTO: $OPTIMAL_PROTO" + fi + [[ "$optimal_proto" != -ssl2 ]] && ! "$all_failed" && grep -q '^Server Temp Key' $TMPFILE && HAS_DH_BITS=true # FIX #190 + if [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_3")" -eq 0 ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_2")" -ne 0 ]] && + [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_1")" -ne 0 ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1")" -ne 0 ]] && + [[ "$(has_server_protocol "ssl3")" -ne 0 ]]; then + TLS13_ONLY=true + fi + + if [[ "$optimal_proto" == -ssl2 ]]; then + prln_magenta "$NODEIP:$PORT appears to only support SSLv2." + ignore_no_or_lame " Type \"yes\" to proceed and accept false negatives or positives" "yes" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS + elif "$all_failed" && ! "$ALL_FAILED_SOCKETS"; then + if ! "$HAS_TLS13" && "$TLS13_ONLY"; then + pr_magenta " $NODE:$PORT appears to support TLS 1.3 ONLY. You better use --openssl=<path_to_openssl_supporting_TLS_1.3>" + if ! "$OSSL_SHORTCUT" || [[ ! -x /usr/bin/openssl ]] || /usr/bin/openssl s_client -tls1_3 -connect invalid. 2>&1 | grep -aiq "unknown option"; then + outln + ignore_no_or_lame " Type \"yes\" to proceed and accept all scan problems" "yes" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS + MAX_OSSL_FAIL=10 + else + # dirty hack but an idea for the future to be implemented upfront: Now we know, we'll better off + # with the OS supplied openssl binary. We need to inittialize variables / arrays again though. + # And the service detection can't be made up for now + outln ", \n proceeding with /usr/bin/openssl" + OPENSSL=/usr/bin/openssl + find_openssl_binary + prepare_arrays + fi + elif ! "$HAS_SSL3" && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "ssl3")" -eq 0 ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_3")" -ne 0 ]] && \ + [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_2")" -ne 0 ]] && [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1_1")" -ne 0 ]] && + [[ "$(has_server_protocol "tls1")" -ne 0 ]]; then + prln_magenta " $NODE:$PORT appears to support SSLv3 ONLY. You better use --openssl=<path_to_openssl_supporting_SSL_3>" + ignore_no_or_lame " Type \"yes\" to proceed and accept all scan problems" "yes" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS + MAX_OSSL_FAIL=10 + else + prln_bold " Your OpenSSL cannot connect to $NODEIP:$PORT" + ignore_no_or_lame " The results might look ok but they could be nonsense. Really proceed ? (\"yes\" to continue)" "yes" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS + fi + elif "$all_failed"; then + outln + if "$HAS_IPv6"; then + pr_bold " Your $OPENSSL is not IPv6 aware, or $NODEIP:$PORT " + else + pr_bold " $NODEIP:$PORT " + fi + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + prln_bold "doesn't seem to be a TLS/SSL enabled server"; + ignore_no_or_lame " The results might look ok but they could be nonsense. Really proceed ? (\"yes\" to continue)" "yes" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS + elif ! "$all_failed" && "$ALL_FAILED_SOCKETS" && ! "$SSL_NATIVE"; then + # For some reason connecting with tls_sockets/sslv2_sockets didn't work, but connecting + # with $OPENSSL s_client did. + # FIXME: Should we include some sort of "please report" note here? + prln_magenta " Testing with $NODE:$PORT only worked using $OPENSSL." + prln_magenta " Test results may be somewhat better if the --ssl-native option is used." + ignore_no_or_lame " Type \"yes\" to proceed and accept false negatives or positives" "yes" + [[ $? -ne 0 ]] && exit $ERR_CLUELESS + fi + + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 0 +} + + +# arg1 (optional): ftp smtp, lmtp, pop3, imap, xmpp, telnet, ldap, postgres, mysql, irc, nntp (maybe with trailing s) +# +determine_service() { + local ua + local protocol + local basicauth_header="" + + # Check if we can connect to $NODEIP:$PORT. Attention: This ALWAYS uses sockets. Thus timeouts for --ssl-=native do not apply + if ! fd_socket 5; then + if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then + fatal "You're sure $PROXYNODE:$PROXYPORT allows tunneling here? Can't connect to \"$NODEIP:$PORT\"" $ERR_CONNECT + else + if "$MULTIPLE_CHECKS"; then + ip_fatal "Couldn't connect to $NODEIP:$PORT" + return 1 + else + fatal "Can't connect to \"$NODEIP:$PORT\"\nMake sure a firewall is not between you and your scanning target!" $ERR_CONNECT + fi + fi + fi + close_socket + + outln + if [[ -z "$1" ]]; then + # no STARTTLS. + determine_optimal_sockets_params + determine_optimal_proto + $SNEAKY && \ + ua="$UA_SNEAKY" || \ + ua="$UA_STD" + if [[ -n "$BASICAUTH" ]]; then + basicauth_header="Authorization: Basic $(safe_echo "$BASICAUTH" | $OPENSSL base64 2>/dev/null)\r\n" + fi + GET_REQ11="GET $URL_PATH HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: $NODE\r\nUser-Agent: $ua\r\n${basicauth_header}Accept-Encoding: identity\r\nAccept: text/*\r\nConnection: Close\r\n\r\n" + # returns always 0: + service_detection $OPTIMAL_PROTO + else # STARTTLS + if [[ "$1" == postgres ]]; then + protocol="postgres" + else + protocol=${1%s} # strip trailing 's' in ftp(s), smtp(s), pop3(s), etc + fi + + case "$protocol" in + ftp|smtp|lmtp|pop3|imap|xmpp|telnet|ldap|postgres|mysql|nntp) + STARTTLS="-starttls $protocol" + if [[ "$protocol" == xmpp ]]; then + if [[ -n "$XMPP_HOST" ]]; then + if ! "$HAS_XMPP"; then + fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-xmpphost\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN + fi + STARTTLS="$STARTTLS -xmpphost $XMPP_HOST" # small hack -- instead of changing calls all over the place + # see https://xmpp.org/rfcs/rfc3920.html + else + if is_ipv4addr "$NODE"; then + # XMPP needs a jabber domainname + if [[ -n "$rDNS" ]]; then + prln_warning " IP address doesn't work for XMPP, trying PTR record $rDNS" + # remove trailing . + NODE=${rDNS%%.} + else + fatal "No DNS supplied and no PTR record available which I can try for XMPP" $ERR_DNSLOOKUP + fi + fi + if "$HAS_XMPP"; then + # small hack -- instead of changing calls all over the place + STARTTLS="$STARTTLS -xmpphost $NODE" + else + # If the XMPP name cannot be provided using -xmpphost, + # then it needs to be provided to the -connect option + NODEIP="$NODE" + fi + fi + elif [[ "$protocol" == postgres ]]; then + # Check if openssl version supports postgres. + if ! "$HAS_POSTGRES"; then + fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-starttls postgres\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN + fi + elif [[ "$protocol" == mysql ]]; then + # Check if openssl version supports mysql. + if ! "$HAS_MYSQL"; then + fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-starttls mysql\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN + fi + elif [[ "$protocol" == lmtp ]]; then + # Check if openssl version supports lmtp. + if ! "$HAS_LMTP"; then + fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-starttls lmtp\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN + fi + elif [[ "$protocol" == nntp ]]; then + # Check if openssl version supports lmtp. + if ! "$HAS_NNTP"; then + fatal "Your $OPENSSL does not support the \"-starttls nntp\" option" $ERR_OSSLBIN + fi + fi + determine_optimal_sockets_params + determine_optimal_proto "$1" + + out " Service set:$CORRECT_SPACES STARTTLS via " + out "$(toupper "$protocol")" + [[ "$protocol" == mysql ]] && out " (experimental)" + fileout "service" "INFO" "$protocol" + [[ -n "$XMPP_HOST" ]] && out " (XMPP domain=\'$XMPP_HOST\')" + outln + ;; + *) outln + fatal "momentarily only ftp, smtp, lmtp, pop3, imap, xmpp, telnet, ldap, nntp, postgres and mysql allowed" $ERR_CMDLINE + ;; + esac + fi + tmpfile_handle ${FUNCNAME[0]}.txt + return 0 # OPTIMAL_PROTO, GET_REQ*/HEAD_REQ* is set now +} + + +# Sets SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG to true or false, depending on whether we hit the 128 cipher limit. +# Return value is 0 unless we have a problem executing +# +determine_sizelimitbug() { + # overflow_cipher must be some cipher that does not appear in TLS12_CIPHER. + local overflow_cipher='C0,86' + local -i nr_ciphers + + # For STARTTLS protocols not being implemented yet via sockets this is a bypass otherwise it won't be usable at all (e.g. LDAP) + # Fixme: find out whether we can't skip this in general for STARTTLS + [[ "$STARTTLS" =~ ldap ]] && return 0 + [[ "$STARTTLS" =~ irc ]] && return 0 + + # Only with TLS 1.2 offered at the server side it is possible to hit this bug, in practise. Thus + # we assume if TLS 1.2 is not supported, the server has no cipher size limit bug. It still may, + # theoretically, but in a regular check with testssl.sh we won't hit this limit with lower protocols. + # Upon calling this function we already know whether TLS 1.2 is supported. If TLS 1.2 is supported, we + # send 129 ciphers (including 00FF) and check whether it works. + + if [[ 1 -eq $(has_server_protocol 03) ]]; then + SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=false + else + if [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]]; then + nr_ciphers="$(tr ' ' '\n' <<< "${overflow_cipher}, $TLS12_CIPHER" | sed -e '/^$/d' | wc -l)" + if [[ $nr_ciphers -ne 129 ]]; then + prln_warning "FIXME line $LINENO, ${FUNCNAME[0]} sending $nr_ciphers ciphers rather than 129." + else + debugme echo "${FUNCNAME[0]} sending $nr_ciphers ciphers" + fi + fi + tls_sockets 03 "${overflow_cipher}, ${TLS12_CIPHER}" + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then + SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=false + else + SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=true + fi + debugme echo -e "\nSERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG: $SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG" + fi + if "$SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG"; then + out " Pre-test: " + prln_svrty_medium "128 cipher limit bug" + fileout "pre_128cipher" "MEDIUM" "128 cipher limit bug" + else + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && outln " Pre-test: No 128 cipher limit bug" + fileout "pre_128cipher" "INFO" "No 128 cipher limit bug" + fi + return 0 +} + + +display_rdns_etc() { + local ip further_ip_addrs="" + local nodeip="$(tr -d '[]' <<< $NODEIP)" # for displaying IPv6 addresses we don't need [] + + if [[ -n "$PROXY" ]]; then + out " Via Proxy: $CORRECT_SPACES" + outln "$PROXYIP:$PROXYPORT " + fi + if [[ $(count_words "$IP46ADDRs") -gt 1 ]]; then + out " Further IP addresses: $CORRECT_SPACES" + for ip in $IP46ADDRs; do + if [[ "$ip" == "$NODEIP" ]] || [[ "[$ip]" == "$NODEIP" ]]; then + continue + else + further_ip_addrs+="$ip " + fi + done + outln "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$further_ip_addrs" " $CORRECT_SPACES" $TERM_WIDTH)" + fi + if "$LOCAL_A"; then + outln " A record via: $CORRECT_SPACES /etc/hosts " + elif "$LOCAL_AAAA"; then + outln " AAAA record via: $CORRECT_SPACES /etc/hosts " + elif [[ -n "$CMDLINE_IP" ]]; then + if is_ipv6addr $"$CMDLINE_IP"; then + outln " AAAA record via: $CORRECT_SPACES supplied IP \"$CMDLINE_IP\"" + else + outln " A record via: $CORRECT_SPACES supplied IP \"$CMDLINE_IP\"" + fi + fi + if [[ "$rDNS" =~ instructed ]]; then + out "$(printf " %-23s " "rDNS ($nodeip):")" + out "$rDNS" + elif [[ -n "$rDNS" ]]; then + out "$(printf " %-23s " "rDNS ($nodeip):")" + out "$(out_row_aligned_max_width "$rDNS" " $CORRECT_SPACES" $TERM_WIDTH)" + fi +} + +datebanner() { + local scan_time_f="" + + if [[ "$1" =~ Done ]] ; then + scan_time_f="$(printf "%04ss" "$SCAN_TIME")" # 4 digits because of windows + pr_reverse "$1 $(date +%F) $(date +%T) [$scan_time_f] -->> $NODEIP:$PORT ($NODE) <<--" + else + pr_reverse "$1 $(date +%F) $(date +%T) -->> $NODEIP:$PORT ($NODE) <<--" + fi + outln "\n" + [[ "$1" =~ Start ]] && display_rdns_etc +} + +# one line with char $1 over screen width $2 +draw_line() { + out "$(printf -- "$1"'%.s' $(eval "echo {1.."$(($2))"}"))" +} + + +run_mx_all_ips() { + local mxs mx + local mxport + local -i ret=0 + local word="" + + STARTTLS_PROTOCOL="smtp" + # test first higher priority servers + mxs=$(get_mx_record "$1" | sort -n | sed -e 's/^.* //' -e 's/\.$//' | tr '\n' ' ') + if [[ $CMDLINE_IP == one ]]; then + word="as instructed one" # with highest priority + mxs=${mxs%% *} + else + word="the only" + fi + mxport=${2:-25} + if [[ -n "$LOGFILE" ]]; then + prepare_logging + else + prepare_logging "${FNAME_PREFIX}mx-$1" + fi + if [[ -n "$mxs" ]] && [[ "$mxs" != ' ' ]]; then + [[ $(count_words "$mxs") -gt 1 ]] && MULTIPLE_CHECKS=true + if "$MULTIPLE_CHECKS"; then + pr_bold "Testing all MX records (on port $mxport): " + else + pr_bold "Testing $word MX record (on port $mxport): " + fi + outln "$mxs" + [[ $mxport == 465 ]] && STARTTLS_PROTOCOL="" # no starttls for tcp 465, all other ports are starttls + for mx in $mxs; do + draw_line "-" $((TERM_WIDTH * 2 / 3)) + outln + parse_hn_port "$mx:$mxport" + determine_ip_addresses || continue + if [[ $(count_words "$IPADDRs") -gt 1 ]]; then # we have more than one ipv4 address to check + MULTIPLE_CHECKS=true + pr_bold "Testing all IPv4 addresses (port $PORT): "; outln "$IPADDRs" + for ip in $IPADDRs; do + NODEIP="$ip" + lets_roll "${STARTTLS_PROTOCOL}" + done + else + NODEIP="$IPADDRs" + lets_roll "${STARTTLS_PROTOCOL}" + fi + ret=$(($? + ret)) + done + draw_line "-" $((TERM_WIDTH * 2 / 3)) + outln + pr_bold "Done testing all MX records (on port $mxport): "; outln "$mxs" + else + prln_bold " $1 has no MX records(s)" + fi + return $ret +} + +# If run_mass_testing() is being used, then create the command line +# for the test based on the global command line (all elements of the +# command line provided to the parent, except the --file/-iL option) and the +# specific command line options for the test to be run. Each argument +# in the command line needs to be a separate element in an array in order +# to deal with word splitting within file names (see #702). +# +# If run_mass_testing_parallel() is being used, then in addition to the above, +# modify global command line for child tests so that if all (JSON, CSV, HTML) +# output is to go into a single file, each child will have its output placed in +# a separate, named file, so that the separate files can be concatenated +# together once they are complete to create the single file. +# +# If run_mass_testing() is being used, then "$1" is "serial". If +# run_mass_testing_parallel() is being used, then "$1" is "parallel XXXXXXXX" +# where XXXXXXXX is the number of the test being run. +# +create_mass_testing_cmdline() { + local testing_type="$1" + local cmd test_number + local outfile_arg + local -i nr_cmds=0 index=0 + local skip_next=false + + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE=() + [[ "$testing_type" =~ parallel ]] && read -r testing_type test_number <<< "$testing_type" + + # Start by adding the elements from the global command line to the command line for the + # test. If run_mass_testing_parallel(), then modify the command line so that, when + # required, each child process sends its test results to a separate file. If a cmd + # uses '=' for supplying a value we just skip next parameter (we don't use 'parse_opt_equal_sign' here) + debugme echo "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[@]}" + for cmd in "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[@]}"; do + "$skip_next" && skip_next=false && index+=1 && continue + if [[ "$cmd" =~ --file ]] || [[ "$cmd" =~ -iL ]]; then + # Don't include the "--file[=...] or -iL argument in the child's command + # line, but do include "--warnings=batch". + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--warnings=batch" + nr_cmds+=1 + # next is the file itself, as no '=' was supplied + [[ "$cmd" == --file ]] && skip_next=true + [[ "$cmd" == -iL ]] && skip_next=true + elif [[ "$testing_type" == serial ]]; then + if "$JSONHEADER" && ( [[ "$cmd" =~ --jsonfile-pretty ]] || [[ "$cmd" =~ -oJ ]] ); then + >"$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json" + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-pretty=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json" + # next is the jsonfile itself, as no '=' was supplied + [[ "$cmd" == --jsonfile-pretty ]] && skip_next=true + [[ "$cmd" == -oJ ]] && skip_next=true + elif "$JSONHEADER" && ( [[ "$cmd" =~ --jsonfile ]] || [[ "$cmd" =~ -oj ]] ); then + >"$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json" + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json" + # next is the jsonfile itself, as no '=' was supplied + [[ "$cmd" == --jsonfile ]] && skip_next=true + [[ "$cmd" == -oj ]] && skip_next=true + elif "$JSONHEADER" && ( [[ "$cmd" =~ --outFile ]] || [[ "$cmd" =~ -oA ]] ); then + outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$cmd" "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[index+1]}")" + >"$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json" + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="-oJ=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json" + nr_cmds+=1 + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="-oC=$outfile_arg.csv" + nr_cmds+=1 + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="-oH=$outfile_arg.html" + # next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied + [[ "$cmd" == --outFile ]] && skip_next=true + [[ "$cmd" == -oA ]] && skip_next=true + elif "$JSONHEADER" && ( [[ "$cmd" =~ --outfile ]] || [[ "$cmd" =~ -oa ]] ); then + outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$cmd" "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[index+1]}")" + >"$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json" + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="-oj=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json" + nr_cmds+=1 + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="-oC=$outfile_arg.csv" + nr_cmds+=1 + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="-oH=$outfile_arg.html" + # next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied + [[ "$cmd" == --outfile ]] && skip_next=true + [[ "$cmd" == -oa ]] && skip_next=true + else + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd" + fi + nr_cmds+=1 + else + case "$cmd" in + --jsonfile|--jsonfile=*|-oj|-oj=*) + # If <jsonfile> is a file, then have provide a different + # file name to each child process. If <jsonfile> is a + # directory, then just pass it on to the child processes. + if "$JSONHEADER"; then + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_${test_number}.json" + # next is the jsonfile itself, as no '=' was supplied + [[ "$cmd" == --jsonfile ]] && skip_next=true + [[ "$cmd" == -oj ]] && skip_next=true + else + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd" + fi + ;; + --jsonfile-pretty|--jsonfile-pretty=*|-oJ|-oJ=*) + if "$JSONHEADER"; then + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--jsonfile-pretty=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_${test_number}.json" + [[ "$cmd" == --jsonfile-pretty ]] && skip_next=true + [[ "$cmd" == -oJ ]] && skip_next=true + else + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd" + fi + ;; + --csvfile|--csvfile=*|-oC|-oC=*) + if "$CSVHEADER"; then + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--csvfile=$TEMPDIR/csvfile_${test_number}.csv" + [[ "$cmd" == --csvfile ]] && skip_next=true + [[ "$cmd" == -oC ]] && skip_next=true + else + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd" + fi + ;; + --htmlfile|--htmlfile=*|-oH|-oH=*) + if "$HTMLHEADER"; then + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="--htmlfile=$TEMPDIR/htmlfile_${test_number}.html" + [[ "$cmd" == --htmlfile ]] && skip_next=true + [[ "$cmd" == -oH ]] && skip_next=true + else + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd" + fi + ;; + --outfile|--outfile=*|-oa|-oa=*) + if "$JSONHEADER"; then + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="-oj=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_${test_number}.json" + nr_cmds+=1 + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="-oC=$TEMPDIR/csvfile_${test_number}.csv" + nr_cmds+=1 + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="-oH=$TEMPDIR/htmlfile_${test_number}.html" + # next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied + [[ "$cmd" == --outfile ]] && skip_next=true + [[ "$cmd" == -oa ]] && skip_next=true + else + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd" + fi + ;; + --outFile|--outFile=*|-oA|-oA=*) + if "$JSONHEADER"; then + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="-oJ=$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_${test_number}.json" + nr_cmds+=1 + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="-oC=$TEMPDIR/csvfile_${test_number}.csv" + nr_cmds+=1 + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="-oH=$TEMPDIR/htmlfile_${test_number}.html" + # next is the filename itself, as no '=' was supplied + [[ "$cmd" == --outFile ]] && skip_next=true + [[ "$cmd" == -oA ]] && skip_next=true + else + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd" + fi + ;; + *) + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$cmd" + ;; + esac + nr_cmds+=1 + fi + index+=1 + done + + # Now add the command line arguments for the specific test to the command line. + # Skip the first argument sent to this function, since it specifies the type of testing being performed. + shift + while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do + MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[nr_cmds]="$1" + nr_cmds+=1 + shift + done + + return 0 +} + + +ports2starttls() { + local tcp_port=$1 + local ret=0 + + # https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_TCP_and_UDP_port_numbers + case $tcp_port in + 21) echo "-t ftp " ;; + 23) echo "-t telnet " ;; + 119|433) echo "-t nntp " ;; # to come + 25|587) echo "-t smtp " ;; + 110) echo "-t pop3 " ;; + 143) echo "-t imap " ;; + 389) echo "-t ldap ";; + 3306) echo "-t mysql " ;; + 5222) echo "-t xmpp " ;; # domain of jabber server maybe needed + 5432) echo "-t postgres " ;; + 563) ;; # NNTPS + 636) ;; # LDAP + 1443|8443|443|981) ;; # HTTPS + 465) ;; # HTTPS | SMTP + 631) ;; # CUPS + 853) ;; # DNS over TLS + 995|993) ;; # POP3|IMAP + 3389) ;; # RDP + *) ret=1 ;; # we don't know this ports so we rather do not scan it + esac + return $ret +} + +nmap_to_plain_file() { + local target_fname="" + local oneline="" + local ip hostdontcare round_brackets ports_specs starttls + local tmp port host_spec protocol ssl_hint dontcare dontcare1 + #FIXME: IPv6 is missing here + + # Ok, since we are here we are sure to have an nmap file. To avoid questions we make sure it's the right format too + if [[ "$(head -1 "$FNAME")" =~ ( -oG )(.*) ]] || [[ "$(head -1 "$FNAME")" =~ ( -oA )(.*) ]] ; then + # yes, greppable + if [[ $(grep -c Status "$FNAME") -ge 1 ]]; then + [[ $(grep -c '\/open\/' "$FNAME") -eq 0 ]] && \ + fatal "Nmap file $FNAME should contain at least one open port" $ERR_FNAMEPARSE + else + fatal "strange, nmap grepable misses \"Status\"" -1 + fi + else + fatal "Nmap file $FNAME is not in grep(p)able format (-oG filename.g(n)map)" $ERR_FNAMEPARSE + fi + # create ${FNAME%.*}.txt in $TEMPDIR + target_fname="${FNAME%.*}.txt" + target_fname="${target_fname##*\/}" # strip path (Unix) + target_fname="${target_fname##*\\}" # strip path (Dos) + target_fname="$TEMPDIR/$target_fname" + > "${target_fname}" || fatal "Cannot create \"${target_fname}\"" $ERR_FCREATE + + # Line x: "Host: AAA.BBB.CCC.DDD (<FQDN>) Status: Up" + # Line x+1: "Host: AAA.BBB.CCC.DDD (<FQDN>) Ports: 443/open/tcp//https///" + # (or): Host: AAA.BBB.CCC.DDD (<FQDN>) Ports: 22/open/tcp//ssh//<banner>/, 25/open/tcp//smtp//<banner>/, 443/open/tcp//ssl|http//<banner> + while read -r hostdontcare ip round_brackets tmp ports_specs; do + [[ "$ports_specs" =~ "Status: " ]] && continue # we don't need this + [[ "$ports_specs" =~ '/open/tcp/' ]] || continue # no open tcp at all for this IP --> move + host_spec="$ip" + fqdn="${round_brackets/\(/}" + fqdn="${fqdn/\)/}" + if [[ -n "$fqdn" ]]; then + tmp="$(get_a_record "$fqdn")" + debugme echo "$tmp \?= $ip" + if [[ "$tmp" == "$ip" ]]; then + host_spec="$fqdn" + fi + fi + while read -r oneline; do + # 25/open/tcp//smtp//<banner>/, + [[ "$oneline" =~ '/open/tcp/' ]] || continue # no open tcp for this port on this IP --> move on + IFS=/ read -r port dontcare protocol ssl_hint dontcare1 <<< "$oneline" + if [[ "$ssl_hint" =~ ^(ssl|https) ]] || [[ "$dontcare1" =~ ^(ssl|https) ]]; then + echo "${host_spec}:${port}" >>"$target_fname" + else + starttls="$(ports2starttls $port)" + [[ $? -eq 1 ]] && continue # nmap got a port but we don't know how to speak to + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && echo "${starttls}$host_spec:$port" + echo "${starttls}${host_spec}:${port}" >>"$target_fname" + fi + done < <(tr ',' '\n' <<< "$ports_specs") + done < "$FNAME" + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 1 ]] && echo + + [[ -s "$target_fname" ]] || \ + fatal "Couldn't find any open port in $FNAME" $ERR_FNAMEPARSE + export FNAME=$target_fname +} + +run_mass_testing() { + local cmdline="" + local first=true + local gnmapadd="" + local saved_fname="$FNAME" + + if [[ ! -r "$FNAME" ]] && "$IKNOW_FNAME"; then + fatal "Can't read file \"$FNAME\"" $ERR_FNAMEPARSE + fi + + if [[ "$(head -1 "$FNAME")" =~ (Nmap [4-8])(.*)( scan initiated )(.*) ]]; then + gnmapadd="grep(p)able nmap " + nmap_to_plain_file + fi + + pr_reverse "====== Running in file batch mode with ${gnmapadd}file=\"$saved_fname\" ======"; outln "\n" + while read -r cmdline; do + cmdline="$(filter_input "$cmdline")" + [[ -z "$cmdline" ]] && continue + [[ "$cmdline" == EOF ]] && break + # Create the command line for the child in the form of an array (see #702) + create_mass_testing_cmdline "serial" $cmdline + draw_line "=" $((TERM_WIDTH / 2)); outln; + outln "$(create_cmd_line_string "$0" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}")" + # we call ourselves here. $do_mass_testing is the parent, $CHILD_MASS_TESTING... you figured + if [[ -z "$(type -p "$0")" ]]; then + CHILD_MASS_TESTING=true "$RUN_DIR/$PROG_NAME" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}" + else + CHILD_MASS_TESTING=true "$0" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}" + fi + if "$JSONHEADER" && [[ -s "$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json" ]]; then + # Need to ensure that a separator is only added if the test + # produced some JSON output. + "$first" || fileout_separator # this is needed for appended output, see #687 + first=false + cat "$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_child.json" >> "$JSONFILE" + FIRST_FINDING=false + fi + done < "${FNAME}" + return $? +} + +# This function is called when it has been determined that the next child +# process has completed or it has been stopped. If the child process completed, +# then this process prints the child process's output to the terminal and, if +# appropriate, adds any JSON, CSV, and HTML output it has created to the +# appropriate file. If the child process was stopped, then a message indicating +# that is printed, but the incomplete results are not used. +# +get_next_message_testing_parallel_result() { + draw_line "=" $((TERM_WIDTH / 2)); outln; + outln "${PARALLEL_TESTING_CMDLINE[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]}" + if [[ "$1" == completed ]]; then + cat "$TEMPDIR/term_output_$(printf "%08d" $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH).log" + if "$JSONHEADER" && [[ -s "$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_$(printf "%08d" $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH).json" ]]; then + # Need to ensure that a separator is only added if the test + # produced some JSON output. + "$FIRST_JSON_OUTPUT" || fileout_separator # this is needed for appended output, see #687 + FIRST_JSON_OUTPUT=false + FIRST_FINDING=false + cat "$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_$(printf "%08d" $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH).json" >> "$JSONFILE" + fi + "$CSVHEADER" && cat "$TEMPDIR/csvfile_$(printf "%08d" $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH).csv" >> "$CSVFILE" + "$HTMLHEADER" && cat "$TEMPDIR/htmlfile_$(printf "%08d" $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH).html" >> "$HTMLFILE" + elif [[ "$1" == "stopped" ]]; then + outln "\nTest was stopped before it completed.\n" + else + outln "\nTest timed out before it completed.\n" + fi +} + +#FIXME: not called/tested yet +run_mass_testing_parallel() { + local cmdline="" + local -i i nr_active_tests=0 + local -a -i start_time=() + local -i curr_time wait_time + local gnmapadd="" + local saved_fname="$FNAME" + + if [[ ! -r "$FNAME" ]] && $IKNOW_FNAME; then + fatal "Can't read file \"$FNAME\"" $ERR_FNAMEPARSE + fi + + if [[ "$(head -1 "$FNAME")" =~ (Nmap [4-8])(.*)( scan initiated )(.*) ]]; then + gnmapadd="grep(p)able nmap " + nmap_to_plain_file + fi + + pr_reverse "====== Running in file batch mode with ${gnmapadd}file=\"$saved_fname\" ======"; outln "\n" + while read -r cmdline; do + cmdline="$(filter_input "$cmdline")" + [[ -z "$cmdline" ]] && continue + [[ "$cmdline" == "EOF" ]] && break + # Create the command line for the child in the form of an array (see #702) + create_mass_testing_cmdline "parallel $(printf "%08d" $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS)" $cmdline + + # fileout() won't include the "service" information in the JSON file for the child process + # if the JSON file doesn't already exist. + "$JSONHEADER" && >"$TEMPDIR/jsonfile_$(printf "%08d" $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS).json" + PARALLEL_TESTING_CMDLINE[NR_PARALLEL_TESTS]="$(create_cmd_line_string "$0" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}")" + if [[ -z "$(type -p "$0")" ]]; then + CHILD_MASS_TESTING=true "$RUN_DIR/$PROG_NAME" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}" > "$TEMPDIR/term_output_$(printf "%08d" $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS).log" 2>&1 & + else + CHILD_MASS_TESTING=true "$0" "${MASS_TESTING_CMDLINE[@]}" > "$TEMPDIR/term_output_$(printf "%08d" $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS).log" 2>&1 & + fi + PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NR_PARALLEL_TESTS]=$! + start_time[NR_PARALLEL_TESTS]=$(date +%s) + if "$INTERACTIVE"; then + echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2 + echo -n "Started test #$NR_PARALLEL_TESTS" 1>&2 + [[ $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH -lt $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS ]] && \ + echo -n " (waiting for test #$NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH to finish)" 1>&2 + fi + NR_PARALLEL_TESTS+=1 + nr_active_tests+=1 + sleep $PARALLEL_SLEEP + # Get the results of any completed tests + while [[ $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH -lt $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS ]]; do + if [[ ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} -eq 0 ]]; then + "$INTERACTIVE" && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2 + get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "completed" + NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1 + elif ! ps ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >/dev/null ; then + "$INTERACTIVE" && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2 + get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "completed" + NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1 + nr_active_tests=$nr_active_tests-1 + else + break + fi + done + if [[ $nr_active_tests -ge $MAX_PARALLEL ]]; then + curr_time=$(date +%s) + while true; do + # Check to see if any test completed + for (( i=NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH; i < NR_PARALLEL_TESTS; i++ )); do + if [[ ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[i]} -ne 0 ]] && \ + ! ps ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[i]} >/dev/null ; then + PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[i]=0 + nr_active_tests=$nr_active_tests-1 + break + fi + done + [[ $nr_active_tests -lt $MAX_PARALLEL ]] && break + if [[ $curr_time-${start_time[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} -ge $MAX_WAIT_TEST ]]; then + # No test completed in the allocated time, so the first one to + # start will be killed. + kill ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >&2 2>/dev/null + wait ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} 2>/dev/null # make sure pid terminated, see wait(1p) + "$INTERACTIVE" && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2 + get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "timeout" + NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1 + nr_active_tests=$nr_active_tests-1 + break + fi + # Wake up to increment the counter every second (so that the counter + # appears to users as if it is operating smoothly), but check the + # status of the $MAX_PARALLEL active processes less often, since the + # ps command is expensive. + for (( i=0; i <= $((MAX_PARALLEL/5)); i++ )); do + wait_time=$((curr_time-start_time[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH])) + [[ $wait_time -gt $MAX_WAIT_TEST ]] && wait_time=$MAX_WAIT_TEST + if "$INTERACTIVE"; then + echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2 + echo -n "Waiting for test #$NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH to finish" 1>&2 + if [[ $((MAX_WAIT_TEST-wait_time)) -le 60 ]]; then + echo -n " ($((MAX_WAIT_TEST-wait_time)) seconds to timeout)" 1>&2 + else + echo -n " ($wait_time seconds)" 1>&2 + fi + fi + [[ $wait_time -ge $MAX_WAIT_TEST ]] && break + sleep 1 + curr_time=$(date +%s) + done + done + fi + done < "$FNAME" + + # Wait for remaining tests to finish + curr_time=$(date +%s) + while [[ $NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH -lt $NR_PARALLEL_TESTS ]]; do + if [[ ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} -eq 0 ]] || \ + ! ps ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >/dev/null ; then + "$INTERACTIVE" && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2 + get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "completed" + NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1 + elif [[ $curr_time-${start_time[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} -ge $MAX_WAIT_TEST ]]; then + kill ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} >&2 2>/dev/null + wait ${PARALLEL_TESTING_PID[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH]} 2>/dev/null # make sure pid terminated, see wait(1p) + "$INTERACTIVE" && echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2 + get_next_message_testing_parallel_result "timeout" + NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH+=1 + else + # Here it is okay to check process status every second, since the + # status of only one process is being checked. + if "$INTERACTIVE"; then + echo -en "\r \r" 1>&2 + wait_time=$((curr_time-start_time[NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH])) + [[ $wait_time -gt $MAX_WAIT_TEST ]] && wait_time=$MAX_WAIT_TEST + echo -n "Waiting for test #$NEXT_PARALLEL_TEST_TO_FINISH to finish" 1>&2 + if [[ $((MAX_WAIT_TEST-wait_time)) -le 60 ]]; then + echo -n " ($((MAX_WAIT_TEST-wait_time)) seconds to timeout)" 1>&2 + else + echo -n " ($wait_time seconds)" 1>&2 + fi + fi + sleep 1 + curr_time=$(date +%s) + fi + done + return $? +} + + + +# This initializes boolean global do_* variables. They keep track of what to do +# -- as the name insinuates +initialize_globals() { + do_allciphers=false + do_vulnerabilities=false + do_beast=false + do_lucky13=false + do_breach=false + do_ccs_injection=false + do_ticketbleed=false + do_robot=false + do_cipher_per_proto=false + do_crime=false + do_freak=false + do_logjam=false + do_drown=false + do_header=false + do_heartbleed=false + do_mx_all_ips=false + do_mass_testing=false + do_logging=false + do_json=false + do_pretty_json=false + do_csv=false + do_html=false + do_pfs=false + do_protocols=false + do_rc4=false + do_grease=false + do_renego=false + do_cipherlists=false + do_server_defaults=false + do_server_preference=false + do_ssl_poodle=false + do_sweet32=false + do_tls_fallback_scsv=false + do_cipher_match=false + do_tls_sockets=false + do_client_simulation=false + do_display_only=false + do_starttls=false +} + + +# Set default scanning options for the boolean global do_* variables. +set_scanning_defaults() { + do_allciphers=true + do_vulnerabilities=true + do_beast=true + do_lucky13=true + do_breach=true + do_heartbleed="$OFFENSIVE" + do_ccs_injection="$OFFENSIVE" + do_ticketbleed="$OFFENSIVE" + do_robot="$OFFENSIVE" + do_crime=true + do_freak=true + do_logjam=true + do_drown=true + do_ssl_poodle=true + do_sweet32=true + do_header=true + do_pfs=true + do_rc4=true + do_protocols=true + do_renego=true + do_cipherlists=true + do_server_defaults=true + do_server_preference=true + do_tls_fallback_scsv=true + do_client_simulation=true + if "$OFFENSIVE"; then + VULN_COUNT=16 + else + VULN_COUNT=12 + fi +} + +# returns number of $do variables set = number of run_funcs() to perform +count_do_variables() { + local gbl + local true_nr=0 + + for gbl in do_allciphers do_vulnerabilities do_beast do_lucky13 do_breach do_ccs_injection do_ticketbleed do_cipher_per_proto do_crime \ + do_freak do_logjam do_drown do_header do_heartbleed do_mx_all_ips do_pfs do_protocols do_rc4 do_grease do_robot do_renego \ + do_cipherlists do_server_defaults do_server_preference do_ssl_poodle do_tls_fallback_scsv \ + do_sweet32 do_client_simulation do_cipher_match do_tls_sockets do_mass_testing do_display_only; do + [[ "${!gbl}" == true ]] && let true_nr++ + done + return $true_nr +} + + +debug_globals() { + local gbl + + for gbl in do_allciphers do_vulnerabilities do_beast do_lucky13 do_breach do_ccs_injection do_ticketbleed do_cipher_per_proto do_crime \ + do_freak do_logjam do_drown do_header do_heartbleed do_mx_all_ips do_pfs do_protocols do_rc4 do_grease do_robot do_renego \ + do_cipherlists do_server_defaults do_server_preference do_ssl_poodle do_tls_fallback_scsv \ + do_sweet32 do_client_simulation do_cipher_match do_tls_sockets do_mass_testing do_display_only; do + printf "%-22s = %s\n" $gbl "${!gbl}" + done + printf "%-22s : %s\n" URI: "$URI" +} + + +# arg1: either switch+value (=) or switch +# arg2: value (if no = provided) +parse_opt_equal_sign() { + if [[ "$1" == *=* ]]; then + echo ${1#*=} + return 1 # = means we don't need to shift args! + else + echo "$2" + return 0 # we need to shift + fi +} + +# Create the command line string for printing purposes +# See https://stackoverflow.com/questions/10835933/preserve-quotes-in-bash-arguments +create_cmd_line_string() { + local arg + local -a allargs=() + local chars='[ !"#$&()*,;<>?\^`{|}]' + + while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do + if [[ $1 == *\'* ]]; then + arg=\""$1"\" + elif [[ $1 == *$chars* ]]; then + arg="'$1'" + else + arg="$1" + fi + allargs+=("$arg") # ${allargs[@]} is to be used only for printing + shift + done + printf '%s\n' "${allargs[*]}" +} + +check_base_requirements() { + local binary='' + local whitelist=' hexdump grep awk sed ' + + for binary in 'hexdump' 'dd' 'grep' 'awk' 'tr' 'sed' 'wc' 'date' 'cat' 'ps' 'kill' 'head' 'tail' 'dirname'; do + if ! type -p "${binary}" &> /dev/null; then + fatal "You need to install ${binary} for this program to work" $ERR_RESOURCE + fi + [[ ${whitelist} =~ \ ${binary}\ ]] && continue + "${binary}" --help 2>&1 | grep -iq busybox + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then + fatal "${binary} is from busybox. Please install a regular binary" $ERR_RESOURCE + fi + done +} + +parse_cmd_line() { + local outfile_arg="" + local cipher_mapping + local -i subret=0 + + CMDLINE="$(create_cmd_line_string "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[@]}")" + CMDLINE_PARSED=false + + case $1 in + --help|"") + help 0 + ;; + -b|--banner|-v|--version) + maketempf + get_install_dir + find_openssl_binary + prepare_debug + mybanner + exit $ALLOK + ;; + esac + + # initializing + initialize_globals + + while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do + case $1 in + --mx) + do_mx_all_ips=true + PORT=25 + ;; + --mx465) # doesn't work with major ISPs + do_mx_all_ips=true + PORT=465 + ;; + --mx587) # doesn't work with major ISPs + do_mx_all_ips=true + PORT=587 + ;; + --ip|--ip=*) + CMDLINE_IP="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + if [[ "$CMDLINE_IP" == proxy ]]; then + DNS_VIA_PROXY=true + unset CMDLINE_IP + fi + # normalize any IPv6 address + CMDLINE_IP="${CMDLINE_IP//[/}" # fix vim syntax highlighting "] + CMDLINE_IP="${CMDLINE_IP//]/}" + ;; + -n|--nodns|-n=*|--nodns=*) + NODNS="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + if [[ "$NODNS" != none ]] && [[ "$NODNS" != min ]]; then + fatal "Value for nodns switch can be either \"min\" or \"none\"" $ERR_CMDLINE + fi + ;; + -V|-V=*|--local|--local=*) # attention, this could have a value or not! + do_display_only=true + PATTERN2SHOW="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + subret=$? + if [[ "$PATTERN2SHOW" == -* ]]; then + unset PATTERN2SHOW # we hit the next command ==> not our value + else # it was ours, point to next arg + [[ $subret -eq 0 ]] && shift + fi + ;; + -x|-x=*|--single[-_]cipher|--single[-_]cipher=*) + do_cipher_match=true + single_cipher=$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2") + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + ;; + -t|-t=*|--starttls|--starttls=*) + do_starttls=true + STARTTLS_PROTOCOL="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + case $STARTTLS_PROTOCOL in + ftp|smtp|lmtp|pop3|imap|xmpp|telnet|ldap|irc|nntp|postgres|mysql) ;; + ftps|smtps|lmtps|pop3s|imaps|xmpps|telnets|ldaps|ircs|nntps|mysqls) ;; + *) tmln_magenta "\nunrecognized STARTTLS protocol \"$1\", see help" 1>&2 + help 1 ;; + esac + ;; + --xmpphost|--xmpphost=*) + XMPP_HOST=$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2") + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + ;; + -e|--each-cipher) + do_allciphers=true + ;; + -E|--cipher-per-proto|--cipher_per_proto) + do_cipher_per_proto=true + ;; + -p|--protocols) + do_protocols=true + ;; + -s|--std|--standard) + do_cipherlists=true + ;; + -S|--server[-_]defaults) + do_server_defaults=true + ;; + -P|--server[_-]preference|--preference) + do_server_preference=true + ;; + -h|--header|--headers) + do_header=true + ;; + -c|--client-simulation) + do_client_simulation=true + ;; + -U|--vulnerable|--vulnerabilities) + # Lookahead function: If the order of the cmdline is '-U --ids-friendly' + # then we need to make sure we catch --ids-friendly. Normally we do not, + # see #1717. The following statement makes sure. In the do-while + case-esac + # loop it will be execute again, but it does not hurt + if [[ "${CMDLINE_ARRAY[@]}" =~ --ids-friendly ]]; then + OFFENSIVE=false + fi + do_vulnerabilities=true + do_heartbleed="$OFFENSIVE" + do_ccs_injection="$OFFENSIVE" + do_ticketbleed="$OFFENSIVE" + do_robot="$OFFENSIVE" + do_renego=true + do_crime=true + do_breach=true + do_ssl_poodle=true + do_tls_fallback_scsv=true + do_sweet32=true + do_freak=true + do_drown=true + do_logjam=true + do_beast=true + do_lucky13=true + do_rc4=true + if "$OFFENSIVE"; then + VULN_COUNT=16 + else + VULN_COUNT=12 + fi + ;; + --ids-friendly) + OFFENSIVE=false + ;; + -H|--heartbleed) + do_heartbleed=true + let "VULN_COUNT++" + ;; + -I|--ccs|--ccs[-_]injection) + do_ccs_injection=true + let "VULN_COUNT++" + ;; + -T|--ticketbleed) + do_ticketbleed=true + let "VULN_COUNT++" + ;; + -BB|--robot) + do_robot=true + ;; + -R|--renegotiation) + do_renego=true + let "VULN_COUNT++" + ;; + -C|--compression|--crime) + do_crime=true + let "VULN_COUNT++" + ;; + -B|--breach) + do_breach=true + let "VULN_COUNT++" + ;; + -O|--poodle) + do_ssl_poodle=true + do_tls_fallback_scsv=true + let "VULN_COUNT++" + ;; + -Z|--tls[_-]fallback|tls[_-]fallback[_-]scs) + do_tls_fallback_scsv=true + let "VULN_COUNT++" + ;; + -W|--sweet32) + do_sweet32=true + let "VULN_COUNT++" + ;; + -F|--freak) + do_freak=true + let "VULN_COUNT++" + ;; + -D|--drown) + do_drown=true + let "VULN_COUNT++" + ;; + -J|--logjam) + do_logjam=true + let "VULN_COUNT++" + ;; + -A|--beast) + do_beast=true + let "VULN_COUNT++" + ;; + -L|--lucky13) + do_lucky13=true + let "VULN_COUNT++" + ;; + -4|--rc4|--appelbaum) + do_rc4=true + let "VULN_COUNT++" + ;; + -f|--pfs|--fs|--nsa) + do_pfs=true + ;; + -g|--grease) + do_grease=true + ;; + -9|--full) + set_scanning_defaults + do_allciphers=false + do_cipher_per_proto=true + do_grease=true + ;; + --add-ca|--add-CA|--add-ca=*|--add-CA=*) + ADDITIONAL_CA_FILES="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + ;; + --devel) ### this development feature will soon disappear + # arg1: SSL/TLS protocol (SSLv2=22) + # arg2: list of cipher suites / hostname/ip + # arg3: hostname/ip + HEX_CIPHER="$TLS12_CIPHER" + # DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 04 "13,02, 13,01" google.com --> TLS 1.3 + # DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 03 "cc, 13, c0, 13" google.de --> TLS 1.2, old CHACHA/POLY + # DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 03 "cc,a8, cc,a9, cc,aa, cc,ab, cc,ac" blog.cloudflare.com --> new CHACHA/POLY + # DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 01 yandex.ru --> TLS 1.0 + # DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 00 <host which supports SSLv3> + # DEBUG=3 ./testssl.sh --devel 22 <host which still supports SSLv2> + TLS_LOW_BYTE="$2"; + if [[ $# -eq 4 ]]; then # protocol AND ciphers specified + HEX_CIPHER="$3" + shift + fi + shift + do_tls_sockets=true + outln "\nTLS_LOW_BYTE, HEX_CIPHER: \"${TLS_LOW_BYTE}\", \"${HEX_CIPHER}\"" + ;; + --wide) + WIDE=true + ;; + --assuming[_-]http|--assume[-_]http) + ASSUME_HTTP=true + ;; + --sneaky) + SNEAKY=true + ;; + -q|--quiet) + QUIET=true + ;; + --file|--file=*|-iL|-iL=*) + # no shift here as otherwise URI is empty and it bails out + FNAME="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + IKNOW_FNAME=true + WARNINGS=batch # set this implicitly! + do_mass_testing=true + ;; + --mode|--mode=*) + MASS_TESTING_MODE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + case "$MASS_TESTING_MODE" in + serial|parallel) ;; + *) tmln_magenta "\nmass testing mode can be either \"serial\" or \"parallel\"" 1>&2 + help 1 + esac + ;; + --serial) + MASS_TESTING_MODE=serial + ;; + --parallel) + MASS_TESTING_MODE=parallel + ;; + --warnings|--warnings=*) + WARNINGS=$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2") + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + case "$WARNINGS" in + batch|off) ;; + *) tmln_magenta "\nwarnings can be either \"batch\", or \"off\"" 1>&2 + help 1 + esac + ;; + --show[-_]each) + SHOW_EACH_C=true + ;; + --fast) + FAST=true + ;; + --bugs) + BUGS="-bugs" + ;; + --debug|--debug=*) + DEBUG=$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2") + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + case $DEBUG in + [0-6]) ;; + *) tmln_magenta "\nunrecognized debug value \"$1\", must be between 0..6" 1>&2 + help 1 + esac + ;; + --color|--color=*) + COLOR="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + case $COLOR in + [0-3]) ;; + *) COLOR=2 + tmln_magenta "\nunrecognized color: \"$1\", must be between 0..3" 1>&2 + help 1 + esac + ;; + --colorblind) + COLORBLIND=true + ;; + --log|--logging) + "$do_logging" && fatal "two --log* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE + do_logging=true + ;; # DEFINITION of LOGFILE if no arg specified: automagically in parse_hn_port() + # following does the same but additionally we can specify a log location + --logfile|--logfile=*|-oL|-oL=*) + "$do_logging" && fatal "two --log* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE + LOGFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + do_logging=true + ;; + --json) + "$do_pretty_json" && fatal "flat and pretty JSON output are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE + "$do_json" && fatal "--json and --jsonfile are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE + if [[ "$2" =~ \.(json|JSON)$ ]]; then + fatal "No file name allowed after \"--json\" (use \"--jsonfile\" instead)" $ERR_CMDLINE + fi + do_json=true + ;; # DEFINITION of JSONFILE is not arg specified: automagically in parse_hn_port() + # following does the same but additionally we can specify a log location + --jsonfile|--jsonfile=*|-oj|-oj=*) + "$do_pretty_json" && fatal "flat and pretty JSON output are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE + "$do_json" && fatal "--json and --jsonfile are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE + JSONFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + do_json=true + ;; + --json-pretty) + "$do_json" && fatal "flat and pretty JSON output are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE + "$do_pretty_json" && fatal "--json-pretty and --jsonfile-pretty are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE + if [[ "$2" =~ \.(json|JSON)$ ]]; then + fatal "No file name allowed after \"--json\" (use \"--jsonfile-pretty\" instead)" $ERR_CMDLINE + fi + do_pretty_json=true + ;; + --jsonfile-pretty|--jsonfile-pretty=*|-oJ|-oJ=*) + "$do_json" && fatal "flat and pretty JSON output are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE + "$do_pretty_json" && fatal "--json-pretty and --jsonfile-pretty are mutually exclusive" $ERR_CMDLINE + JSONFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + do_pretty_json=true + ;; + --severity|--severity=*) + set_severity_level "$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + ;; + --hints) + GIVE_HINTS=true + ;; + --csv) + "$do_csv" && fatal "two --csv* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE + if [[ "$2" =~ \.(csv|CSV)$ ]]; then + fatal "No file name allowed after \"--csv\" (use \"--csvfile\" instead)" $ERR_CMDLINE + fi + do_csv=true + ;; # DEFINITION of CSVFILE is not arg specified: automagically in parse_hn_port() + # following does the same but additionally we can specify a log location + --csvfile|--csvfile=*|-oC|-oC=*) + "$do_csv" && fatal "two --csv* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE + CSVFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + do_csv=true + ;; + --html) + "$do_html" && fatal "two --html* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE + if [[ "$2" =~ \.(htm|html|HTM|HTML)$ ]]; then + fatal "No file name allowed after \"--html\" (use \"--htmlfile\" instead)" $ERR_CMDLINE + fi + do_html=true + ;; # DEFINITION of HTMLFILE is not arg specified: automagically in parse_hn_port() + # following does the same but additionally we can specify a file location + --htmlfile|--htmlfile=*|-oH|-oH=*) + "$do_html" && fatal "two --html* arguments" $ERR_CMDLINE + HTMLFILE="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + do_html=true + ;; + --outfile|--outfile=*|-oa|-oa=*) + ( "$do_html" || "$do_json" || "$do_pretty_json" || "$do_csv" || "$do_logging" ) && fatal "check your arguments four multiple file output options" $ERR_CMDLINE + outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + if [[ "$outfile_arg" != "auto" ]]; then + if [[ -d "$outfile_arg" ]]; then + HTMLFILE="$outfile_arg" + CSVFILE="$outfile_arg" + JSONFILE="$outfile_arg" + LOGFILE="$outfile_arg" + else + HTMLFILE="$outfile_arg.html" + CSVFILE="$outfile_arg.csv" + JSONFILE="$outfile_arg.json" + LOGFILE="$outfile_arg.log" + fi + fi + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + do_html=true + do_json=true + do_csv=true + do_logging=true + ;; + --outFile|--outFile=*|-oA|-oA=*) + ( "$do_html" || "$do_json" || "$do_pretty_json" || "$do_csv" || "$do_logging" ) && fatal "check your arguments four multiple file output options" $ERR_CMDLINE + outfile_arg="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + if [[ "$outfile_arg" != "auto" ]]; then + if [[ -d "$outfile_arg" ]]; then + HTMLFILE="$outfile_arg" + CSVFILE="$outfile_arg" + JSONFILE="$outfile_arg" + LOGFILE="$outfile_arg" + else + HTMLFILE="$outfile_arg.html" + CSVFILE="$outfile_arg.csv" + JSONFILE="$outfile_arg.json" + LOGFILE="$outfile_arg.log" + fi + fi + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + do_html=true + do_pretty_json=true + do_csv=true + do_logging=true + ;; + --append) + APPEND=true + ;; + --outprefix) + FNAME_PREFIX="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]]; then + shift + case "$(get_last_char "$FNAME_PREFIX")" in + '.') ;; + '-') ;; + '_') ;; + *) FNAME_PREFIX="${FNAME_PREFIX}-" ;; + esac + fi + ;; + --openssl|--openssl=*) + OPENSSL="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + ;; + --openssl-timeout|--openssl-timeout=*) + OPENSSL_TIMEOUT="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + ;; + --connect-timeout|--connect-timeout=*) + CONNECT_TIMEOUT="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + ;; + --mapping|--mapping=*) + cipher_mapping="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + case "$cipher_mapping" in + no-openssl) DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="rfc-only" ;; + no-rfc|no-iana) DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="openssl-only" ;; + openssl) DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="openssl" ;; + rfc|iana) DISPLAY_CIPHERNAMES="rfc" ;; + *) tmln_warning "\nmapping can only be \"no-openssl\", \"no-iana\"(\"no-rfc\"), \"openssl\" or \"iana\"(\"rfc\")" 1>&2 + help 1 ;; + esac + ;; + --proxy|--proxy=*) + PROXY="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + ;; + --phone-out) + PHONE_OUT=true + ;; + -6) # doesn't work automagically. My versions have -DOPENSSL_USE_IPV6, CentOS/RHEL/FC do not + HAS_IPv6=true + ;; + --has[-_]dhbits|--has[_-]dh[-_]bits) + # Should work automagically. Helper switch for CentOS,RHEL+FC w openssl server temp key backport (version 1.0.1), see #190 + HAS_DH_BITS=true + ;; + --ssl_native|--ssl-native) + SSL_NATIVE=true + ;; + --basicauth|--basicauth=*) + BASICAUTH="$(parse_opt_equal_sign "$1" "$2")" + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && shift + ;; + (--) shift + break + ;; + (-*) tmln_warning "$0: unrecognized option \"$1\"" 1>&2; + help 1 + ;; + (*) break + ;; + esac + shift + done + + # Show usage if no further options were specified + if [[ -z "$1" ]] && [[ -z "$FNAME" ]] && ! "$do_display_only"; then + fatal "URI missing" $ERR_CMDLINE + else + # What is left here should be the URI. + URI="$1" + [[ -n "$2" ]] && fatal "URI comes last" $ERR_CMDLINE + fi + + # Now spot some incompatibilities in cmdlines + [[ $CMDLINE_IP == one ]] && [[ "$NODNS" == none ]] && fatal "\"--ip=one\" and \"--nodns=none\" don't work together" $ERR_CMDLINE + [[ $CMDLINE_IP == one ]] && ( is_ipv4addr "$URI" || is_ipv6addr "$URI" ) && fatal "\"--ip=one\" plus supplying an IP address doesn't work" $ERR_CMDLINE + "$do_mx_all_ips" && [[ "$NODNS" == none ]] && fatal "\"--mx\" and \"--nodns=none\" don't work together" $ERR_CMDLINE + [[ -n "$CONNECT_TIMEOUT" ]] && [[ "$MASS_TESTING_MODE" == parallel ]] && fatal "Parallel mass scanning and specifying connect timeouts currently don't work together" $ERR_CMDLINE + + ADDITIONAL_CA_FILES="${ADDITIONAL_CA_FILES//,/ }" + for fname in $ADDITIONAL_CA_FILES; do + [[ -s "$fname" ]] || fatal "CA file \"$fname\" does not exist" $ERR_RESOURCE + grep -q "BEGIN CERTIFICATE" "$fname" || fatal "\"$fname\" is not CA file in PEM format" $ERR_RESOURCE + done + + [[ "$DEBUG" -ge 5 ]] && debug_globals + + count_do_variables + [[ $? -eq 0 ]] && set_scanning_defaults + CMDLINE_PARSED=true +} + + +# connect call from openssl needs ipv6 in square brackets +nodeip_to_proper_ip6() { + local len_nodeip=0 + + if is_ipv6addr $NODEIP; then + ${UNBRACKTD_IPV6} || NODEIP="[$NODEIP]" + len_nodeip=${#NODEIP} + CORRECT_SPACES="$(printf -- " "'%.s' $(eval "echo {1.."$((len_nodeip - 17))"}"))" + # IPv6 addresses are longer, this variable takes care that "further IP" and "Service" is properly aligned + fi +} + + +reset_hostdepended_vars() { + TLS_EXTENSIONS="" + PROTOS_OFFERED="" + CURVES_OFFERED="" + OPTIMAL_PROTO="" + ALL_FAILED_SOCKETS=true + SERVER_SIZE_LIMIT_BUG=false +} + +# Rough estimate, in the future we maybe want to make use of nano secs (%N). Note this +# is for performance debugging purposes (MEASURE_TIME=yes), eye candy is not important. +# +stopwatch() { + local new_delta + local column=$((COLUMNS - 0)) # for future adjustments + + "$MEASURE_TIME" || return + new_delta=$(( $(date +%s) - LAST_TIME )) + printf "%${column}s" "$1: $new_delta" + [[ -e "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE" ]] && echo "$1 : $new_delta " >> "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE" + LAST_TIME=$(( new_delta + LAST_TIME )) +} + + +# arg1(optional): "init" --> just initializing. Or: STARTTLS protocol +lets_roll() { + local -i ret=0 + local section_number=0 + + if [[ "$1" == init ]]; then + # called once upfront to be able to measure preparation time b4 everything starts + START_TIME=$(date +%s) + LAST_TIME=$START_TIME + [[ -n "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE" ]] && >"$MEASURE_TIME_FILE" + return 0 + fi + stopwatch initialized + + [[ -z "$NODEIP" ]] && fatal "$NODE doesn't resolve to an IP address" $ERR_DNSLOOKUP + nodeip_to_proper_ip6 + reset_hostdepended_vars + determine_rdns # Returns always zero or has already exited if fatal error occurred + stopwatch determine_rdns + + ((SERVER_COUNTER++)) + datebanner " Start" + determine_service "$1" # STARTTLS service? Other will be determined here too. Returns 0 if test connect was ok or has already exited if fatal error occurred + # determine_service() can return 1, it indicates that this IP cannot be reached but there are more IPs to check + if [[ $? -eq 0 ]] ; then + # "secret" devel options --devel: + if "$do_tls_sockets"; then + if [[ "$TLS_LOW_BYTE" == 22 ]]; then + sslv2_sockets "" "true" + else + if [[ "$TLS_LOW_BYTE" == 04 ]]; then + if "$CERT_COMPRESSION"; then + # See PR #1279 + [[ $DEBUG -eq 3 ]] && tmln_out "including TLS extension certificate compression" + tls_sockets "$TLS_LOW_BYTE" "$HEX_CIPHER" "all+" "00,1b, 00,03, 02, 00,01" + else + tls_sockets "$TLS_LOW_BYTE" "$HEX_CIPHER" "ephemeralkey" + fi + else + tls_sockets "$TLS_LOW_BYTE" "$HEX_CIPHER" "all" + fi + fi + echo $? + exit $ALLOK; + fi + if "$do_cipher_match"; then + # we will have an invalid JSON with no if statement + fileout_section_header $section_number false + run_cipher_match ${single_cipher} + stopwatch run_cipher_match + else + fileout_section_header $section_number false && ((section_number++)) + determine_sizelimitbug + fileout_section_footer false + + ((section_number++)) + # all top level functions now following have the prefix "run_" + fileout_section_header $section_number false && ((section_number++)) + "$do_protocols" && { + run_protocols; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_protocols; + run_npn; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_npn; + run_alpn; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_alpn; + } + fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++)) + "$do_grease" && { run_grease; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_grease; } + + fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++)) + "$do_cipherlists" && { run_cipherlists; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_cipherlists; } + + fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++)) + "$do_pfs" && { run_pfs; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_pfs; } + + fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++)) + "$do_server_preference" && { run_server_preference; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_server_preference; } + + fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++)) + "$do_server_defaults" && { run_server_defaults; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_server_defaults; } + + if "$do_header"; then + #TODO: refactor this into functions + fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++)) + if [[ $SERVICE == HTTP ]]; then + run_http_header "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret)) + run_http_date "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret)) + run_hsts "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret)) + run_hpkp "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret)) + run_server_banner "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret)) + run_appl_banner "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret)) + run_cookie_flags "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret)) + run_security_headers "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret)) + run_rp_banner "$URL_PATH"; ret=$(($? + ret)) + stopwatch do_header + fi + else + ((section_number++)) + fi + + # vulnerabilities + if [[ $VULN_COUNT -gt $VULN_THRESHLD ]] || "$do_vulnerabilities"; then + outln; pr_headlineln " Testing vulnerabilities " + outln + fi + + fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++)) + "$do_heartbleed" && { run_heartbleed; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_heartbleed; } + "$do_ccs_injection" && { run_ccs_injection; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_ccs_injection; } + "$do_ticketbleed" && { run_ticketbleed; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_ticketbleed; } + "$do_robot" && { run_robot; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_robot; } + "$do_renego" && { run_renego; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_renego; } + "$do_crime" && { run_crime; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_crime; } + "$do_breach" && { run_breach "$URL_PATH" ; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_breach; } + "$do_ssl_poodle" && { run_ssl_poodle; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_ssl_poodle; } + "$do_tls_fallback_scsv" && { run_tls_fallback_scsv; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_tls_fallback_scsv; } + "$do_sweet32" && { run_sweet32; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_sweet32; } + "$do_freak" && { run_freak; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_freak; } + "$do_drown" && { run_drown ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_drown; } + "$do_logjam" && { run_logjam; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_logjam; } + "$do_beast" && { run_beast; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_beast; } + "$do_lucky13" && { run_lucky13; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_lucky13; } + "$do_rc4" && { run_rc4; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_rc4; } + + fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++)) + "$do_allciphers" && { run_allciphers; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_allciphers; } + "$do_cipher_per_proto" && { run_cipher_per_proto; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_cipher_per_proto; } + + fileout_section_header $section_number true && ((section_number++)) + "$do_client_simulation" && { run_client_simulation; ret=$(($? + ret)); stopwatch run_client_simulation; } + fi + fileout_section_footer true + fi + + outln + calc_scantime + datebanner " Done" + + # reset the failed connect counter as we are finished + NR_SOCKET_FAIL=0 + NR_OSSL_FAIL=0 + + "$MEASURE_TIME" && printf "$1: %${COLUMNS}s\n" "$SCAN_TIME" + [[ -e "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE" ]] && echo "Total : $SCAN_TIME " >> "$MEASURE_TIME_FILE" + + return $ret +} + + + +################# main ################# + + + RET=0 # this is a global as we can have a function main(), see #705. Should we toss then all local $ret? + ip="" + stopwatch start + + lets_roll init + initialize_globals + check_base_requirements # needs to come after $do_html is defined + parse_cmd_line "$@" + # CMDLINE_PARSED has been set now. Don't put a function immediately after this which calls fatal(). + # Rather put it after csv_header below. + # html_header() needs to be called early! Otherwise if html_out() is called before html_header() and the + # command line contains --htmlfile <htmlfile> or --html, it'll make problems with html output, see #692. + # json_header and csv_header could be called later but for context reasons we'll leave it here + html_header + json_header + csv_header + get_install_dir + # see #705, we need to source TLS_DATA_FILE here instead of in get_install_dir(), see #705 + [[ -r "$TLS_DATA_FILE" ]] && . "$TLS_DATA_FILE" + set_color_functions + maketempf + find_openssl_binary + choose_printf + check_resolver_bins + prepare_debug ; stopwatch parse + prepare_arrays ; stopwatch prepare_arrays + mybanner + check_proxy + check4openssl_oldfarts + check_bsd_mount + + + if "$do_display_only"; then + prettyprint_local "$PATTERN2SHOW" + exit $? + fi + fileout_banner + + if "$do_mass_testing"; then + prepare_logging + if [[ "$MASS_TESTING_MODE" == parallel ]]; then + run_mass_testing_parallel + else + run_mass_testing + fi + exit $? + fi + html_banner + + #TODO: there shouldn't be the need for a special case for --mx, only the ip addresses we would need upfront and the do-parser + if "$do_mx_all_ips"; then + #FIXME: do we need this really here? + count_do_variables # if we have just 1x "do_*" --> we do a standard run -- otherwise just the one specified + [[ $? -eq 1 ]] && set_scanning_defaults + run_mx_all_ips "${URI}" $PORT # we should reduce run_mx_all_ips to what's necessary as below we have similar code + exit $? + fi + + [[ -z "$NODE" ]] && parse_hn_port "${URI}" # NODE, URL_PATH, PORT, IPADDRs and IP46ADDR is set now + prepare_logging + + if ! determine_ip_addresses; then + fatal "No IP address could be determined" $ERR_DNSLOOKUP + fi + if [[ $(count_words "$IPADDRs") -gt 1 ]]; then # we have more than one ipv4 address to check + MULTIPLE_CHECKS=true + pr_bold "Testing all IPv4 addresses (port $PORT): "; outln "$IPADDRs" + for ip in $IPADDRs; do + draw_line "-" $((TERM_WIDTH * 2 / 3)) + outln + NODEIP="$ip" + lets_roll "${STARTTLS_PROTOCOL}" + RET=$((RET + $?)) # RET value per IP address + done + draw_line "-" $((TERM_WIDTH * 2 / 3)) + outln + pr_bold "Done testing now all IP addresses (on port $PORT): "; outln "$IPADDRs" + else # Just 1x ip4v to check, applies also if CMDLINE_IP was supplied + NODEIP="$IPADDRs" + lets_roll "${STARTTLS_PROTOCOL}" + RET=$? + fi + +exit $RET + |