1 files changed, 120 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/0052-CVE-2023-27522-HTTP-Response-Smuggling-mod_proxy_uws.patch b/debian/patches/0052-CVE-2023-27522-HTTP-Response-Smuggling-mod_proxy_uws.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f39fa72
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0052-CVE-2023-27522-HTTP-Response-Smuggling-mod_proxy_uws.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+From: Eric Covener <covener@apache.org>
+Date: Sun, 5 Mar 2023 20:22:52 +0000
+Subject: CVE-2023-27522: HTTP Response Smuggling mod_proxy_uwsgi
+
+HTTP Response Smuggling vulnerability in Apache HTTP Server via mod_proxy_uwsgi.
+This issue affects Apache HTTP Server: from 2.4.30 through 2.4.55.
+Special characters in the origin response header can truncate/split the response forwarded to the client.
+
+mod_proxy_uwsgi: Stricter backend HTTP response parsing/validation
+
+Reviewed By: ylavic, covener, gbechis, rpluem
+
+git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1908094 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
+origin: https://github.com/apache/httpd/commit/d753ea76b5972a85349b68c31b59d04c60014f2d.patch
+bug-debian: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1032476
+bug-debian-security: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-27522
+bug-cve: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2023-27522
+---
+ .../proxy_uwsgi_response_validation.txt            |  2 +
+ modules/proxy/mod_proxy_uwsgi.c                    | 49 +++++++++++++++-------
+ 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 changes-entries/proxy_uwsgi_response_validation.txt
+
+diff --git a/changes-entries/proxy_uwsgi_response_validation.txt b/changes-entries/proxy_uwsgi_response_validation.txt
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000..2cdb6c6
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/changes-entries/proxy_uwsgi_response_validation.txt
+@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
++  *) mod_proxy_uwsgi: Stricter backend HTTP response parsing/validation.
++     [Yann Ylavic]
+diff --git a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_uwsgi.c b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_uwsgi.c
+index ebe16e8..9ba10b9 100644
+--- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_uwsgi.c
++++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_uwsgi.c
+@@ -303,18 +303,16 @@ static int uwsgi_response(request_rec *r, proxy_conn_rec * backend,
+     pass_bb = apr_brigade_create(r->pool, c->bucket_alloc);
+ 
+     len = ap_getline(buffer, sizeof(buffer), rp, 1);
+-
+     if (len <= 0) {
+-        /* oops */
++        /* invalid or empty */
+         return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+     }
+-
+     backend->worker->s->read += len;
+-
+-    if (len >= sizeof(buffer) - 1) {
+-        /* oops */
++    if ((apr_size_t)len >= sizeof(buffer)) {
++        /* too long */
+         return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+     }
++
+     /* Position of http status code */
+     if (apr_date_checkmask(buffer, "HTTP/#.# ###*")) {
+         status_start = 9;
+@@ -323,8 +321,8 @@ static int uwsgi_response(request_rec *r, proxy_conn_rec * backend,
+         status_start = 7;
+     }
+     else {
+-        /* oops */
+-        return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
++        /* not HTTP */
++        return HTTP_BAD_GATEWAY;
+     }
+     status_end = status_start + 3;
+ 
+@@ -344,21 +342,44 @@ static int uwsgi_response(request_rec *r, proxy_conn_rec * backend,
+     }
+     r->status_line = apr_pstrdup(r->pool, &buffer[status_start]);
+ 
+-    /* start parsing headers */
++    /* parse headers */
+     while ((len = ap_getline(buffer, sizeof(buffer), rp, 1)) > 0) {
++        if ((apr_size_t)len >= sizeof(buffer)) {
++            /* too long */
++            len = -1;
++            break;
++        }
+         value = strchr(buffer, ':');
+-        /* invalid header skip */
+-        if (!value)
+-            continue;
+-        *value = '\0';
+-        ++value;
++        if (!value) {
++            /* invalid header */
++            len = -1;
++            break;
++        }
++        *value++ = '\0';
++        if (*ap_scan_http_token(buffer)) {
++            /* invalid name */
++            len = -1;
++            break;
++        }
+         while (apr_isspace(*value))
+             ++value;
+         for (end = &value[strlen(value) - 1];
+              end > value && apr_isspace(*end); --end)
+             *end = '\0';
++        if (*ap_scan_http_field_content(value)) {
++            /* invalid value */
++            len = -1;
++            break;
++        }
+         apr_table_add(r->headers_out, buffer, value);
+     }
++    if (len < 0) {
++        /* Reset headers, but not to NULL because things below the chain expect
++         * this to be non NULL e.g. the ap_content_length_filter.
++         */
++        r->headers_out = apr_table_make(r->pool, 1);
++        return HTTP_BAD_GATEWAY;
++    }
+ 
+     if ((buf = apr_table_get(r->headers_out, "Content-Type"))) {
+         ap_set_content_type(r, apr_pstrdup(r->pool, buf));