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-rw-r--r--debian/patches/CVE-2022-37436.patch125
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 125 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2022-37436.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2022-37436.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a123959..0000000
--- a/debian/patches/CVE-2022-37436.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-From 8b6d55f6a047acf62675e32606b037f5eea8ccc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Eric Covener <covener@apache.org>
-Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 13:20:09 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1906539 from trunk:
-
-fail on bad header
-
-Submitted By: covener
-Reviewed By: covener, rpluem, gbechis
-
-
-git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1906541 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68
----
- modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------
- server/protocol.c | 2 ++
- 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
-
---- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
-+++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c
-@@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@
- * any sense at all, since we depend on buffer still containing
- * what was read by ap_getline() upon return.
- */
--static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
-+static apr_status_t ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr,
- char *buffer, int size,
- conn_rec *c, int *pread_len)
- {
-@@ -1043,19 +1043,26 @@
- rc = ap_proxygetline(tmp_bb, buffer, size, rr,
- AP_GETLINE_FOLD | AP_GETLINE_NOSPC_EOL, &len);
-
-- if (len <= 0)
-- break;
-
-- if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) {
-- /* The header could not fit in the provided buffer, warn.
-- * XXX: falls through with the truncated header, 5xx instead?
-- */
-- int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2;
-- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124)
-- "header size is over the limit allowed by "
-- "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). "
-- "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'",
-- size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc);
-+ if (rc != APR_SUCCESS) {
-+ if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) {
-+ int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2;
-+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124)
-+ "header size is over the limit allowed by "
-+ "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). "
-+ "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'",
-+ size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc);
-+ }
-+ else {
-+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10404)
-+ "Error reading headers from backend");
-+ }
-+ r->headers_out = NULL;
-+ return rc;
-+ }
-+
-+ if (len <= 0) {
-+ break;
- }
- else {
- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, r, "%s", buffer);
-@@ -1078,7 +1085,7 @@
- if (psc->badopt == bad_error) {
- /* Nope, it wasn't even an extra HTTP header. Give up. */
- r->headers_out = NULL;
-- return;
-+ return APR_EINVAL;
- }
- else if (psc->badopt == bad_body) {
- /* if we've already started loading headers_out, then
-@@ -1092,13 +1099,13 @@
- "in headers returned by %s (%s)",
- r->uri, r->method);
- *pread_len = len;
-- return;
-+ return APR_SUCCESS;
- }
- else {
- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01099)
- "No HTTP headers returned by %s (%s)",
- r->uri, r->method);
-- return;
-+ return APR_SUCCESS;
- }
- }
- }
-@@ -1128,6 +1135,7 @@
- process_proxy_header(r, dconf, buffer, value);
- saw_headers = 1;
- }
-+ return APR_SUCCESS;
- }
-
-
-@@ -1398,10 +1406,10 @@
- "Set-Cookie", NULL);
-
- /* shove the headers direct into r->headers_out */
-- ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size, origin,
-- &pread_len);
-+ rc = ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size,
-+ origin, &pread_len);
-
-- if (r->headers_out == NULL) {
-+ if (rc != APR_SUCCESS || r->headers_out == NULL) {
- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01106)
- "bad HTTP/%d.%d header returned by %s (%s)",
- major, minor, r->uri, r->method);
---- a/server/protocol.c
-+++ b/server/protocol.c
-@@ -508,6 +508,8 @@
- /* PR#43039: We shouldn't accept NULL bytes within the line */
- bytes_handled = strlen(*s);
- if (bytes_handled < *read) {
-+ ap_log_data(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, ap_server_conf,
-+ "NULL bytes in header", *s, *read, 0);
- *read = bytes_handled;
- if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) {
- rv = APR_EINVAL;