diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'debian/patches/CVE-2022-37436.patch')
-rw-r--r-- | debian/patches/CVE-2022-37436.patch | 125 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 125 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2022-37436.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2022-37436.patch deleted file mode 100644 index a123959..0000000 --- a/debian/patches/CVE-2022-37436.patch +++ /dev/null @@ -1,125 +0,0 @@ -From 8b6d55f6a047acf62675e32606b037f5eea8ccc7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 -From: Eric Covener <covener@apache.org> -Date: Tue, 10 Jan 2023 13:20:09 +0000 -Subject: [PATCH] Merge r1906539 from trunk: - -fail on bad header - -Submitted By: covener -Reviewed By: covener, rpluem, gbechis - - -git-svn-id: https://svn.apache.org/repos/asf/httpd/httpd/branches/2.4.x@1906541 13f79535-47bb-0310-9956-ffa450edef68 ---- - modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------- - server/protocol.c | 2 ++ - 2 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-) - ---- a/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c -+++ b/modules/proxy/mod_proxy_http.c -@@ -1011,7 +1011,7 @@ - * any sense at all, since we depend on buffer still containing - * what was read by ap_getline() upon return. - */ --static void ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, -+static apr_status_t ap_proxy_read_headers(request_rec *r, request_rec *rr, - char *buffer, int size, - conn_rec *c, int *pread_len) - { -@@ -1043,19 +1043,26 @@ - rc = ap_proxygetline(tmp_bb, buffer, size, rr, - AP_GETLINE_FOLD | AP_GETLINE_NOSPC_EOL, &len); - -- if (len <= 0) -- break; - -- if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) { -- /* The header could not fit in the provided buffer, warn. -- * XXX: falls through with the truncated header, 5xx instead? -- */ -- int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2; -- ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124) -- "header size is over the limit allowed by " -- "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). " -- "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'", -- size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc); -+ if (rc != APR_SUCCESS) { -+ if (APR_STATUS_IS_ENOSPC(rc)) { -+ int trunc = (len > 128 ? 128 : len) / 2; -+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10124) -+ "header size is over the limit allowed by " -+ "ResponseFieldSize (%d bytes). " -+ "Bad response header: '%.*s[...]%s'", -+ size, trunc, buffer, buffer + len - trunc); -+ } -+ else { -+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, rc, r, APLOGNO(10404) -+ "Error reading headers from backend"); -+ } -+ r->headers_out = NULL; -+ return rc; -+ } -+ -+ if (len <= 0) { -+ break; - } - else { - ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_TRACE4, 0, r, "%s", buffer); -@@ -1078,7 +1085,7 @@ - if (psc->badopt == bad_error) { - /* Nope, it wasn't even an extra HTTP header. Give up. */ - r->headers_out = NULL; -- return; -+ return APR_EINVAL; - } - else if (psc->badopt == bad_body) { - /* if we've already started loading headers_out, then -@@ -1092,13 +1099,13 @@ - "in headers returned by %s (%s)", - r->uri, r->method); - *pread_len = len; -- return; -+ return APR_SUCCESS; - } - else { - ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01099) - "No HTTP headers returned by %s (%s)", - r->uri, r->method); -- return; -+ return APR_SUCCESS; - } - } - } -@@ -1128,6 +1135,7 @@ - process_proxy_header(r, dconf, buffer, value); - saw_headers = 1; - } -+ return APR_SUCCESS; - } - - -@@ -1398,10 +1406,10 @@ - "Set-Cookie", NULL); - - /* shove the headers direct into r->headers_out */ -- ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size, origin, -- &pread_len); -+ rc = ap_proxy_read_headers(r, backend->r, buffer, response_field_size, -+ origin, &pread_len); - -- if (r->headers_out == NULL) { -+ if (rc != APR_SUCCESS || r->headers_out == NULL) { - ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, APLOGNO(01106) - "bad HTTP/%d.%d header returned by %s (%s)", - major, minor, r->uri, r->method); ---- a/server/protocol.c -+++ b/server/protocol.c -@@ -508,6 +508,8 @@ - /* PR#43039: We shouldn't accept NULL bytes within the line */ - bytes_handled = strlen(*s); - if (bytes_handled < *read) { -+ ap_log_data(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, ap_server_conf, -+ "NULL bytes in header", *s, *read, 0); - *read = bytes_handled; - if (rv == APR_SUCCESS) { - rv = APR_EINVAL; |