Merging upstream version 4.19.269.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

6 files changed, 100 insertions, 27 deletions

diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index a101f5d2f..e16f0d45b 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
@@ -515,6 +515,22 @@ config ARM64_ERRATUM_1542419
 
 	  If unsure, say Y.
 
+config ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098
+	bool "Cortex-A57/A72: 1742098: ELR recorded incorrectly on interrupt taken between cryptographic instructions in a sequence"
+	depends on COMPAT
+	default y
+	help
+	  This option removes the AES hwcap for aarch32 user-space to
+	  workaround erratum 1742098 on Cortex-A57 and Cortex-A72.
+
+	  Affected parts may corrupt the AES state if an interrupt is
+	  taken between a pair of AES instructions. These instructions
+	  are only present if the cryptography extensions are present.
+	  All software should have a fallback implementation for CPUs
+	  that don't implement the cryptography extensions.
+
+	  If unsure, say Y.
+
 config CAVIUM_ERRATUM_22375
 	bool "Cavium erratum 22375, 24313"
 	default y
diff --git a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts
index 1e6a71066..ea990543d 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/rockchip/rk3399-puma-haikou.dts
@@ -203,7 +203,7 @@
 	cap-sd-highspeed;
 	cd-gpios = <&gpio0 RK_PA7 GPIO_ACTIVE_LOW>;
 	disable-wp;
-	max-frequency = <150000000>;
+	max-frequency = <40000000>;
 	pinctrl-names = "default";
 	pinctrl-0 = <&sdmmc_clk &sdmmc_cmd &sdmmc_cd &sdmmc_bus4>;
 	vmmc-supply = <&vcc3v3_baseboard>;
diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
index 64ae14371..61fd28522 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h
@@ -55,7 +55,8 @@
 #define ARM64_SSBS				34
 #define ARM64_WORKAROUND_1542419		35
 #define ARM64_SPECTRE_BHB			36
+#define ARM64_WORKAROUND_1742098		37
 
-#define ARM64_NCAPS				37
+#define ARM64_NCAPS				38
 
 #endif /* __ASM_CPUCAPS_H */
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
index d0b7dd608..7edb587fe 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c
@@ -142,9 +142,12 @@ static void install_bp_hardening_cb(bp_hardening_cb_t fn,
 		__copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end);
 	}
 
-	__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
-	__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn);
-	__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start, hyp_vecs_start);
+	if (fn != __this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.fn)) {
+		__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
+		__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.fn, fn);
+		__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start,
+				 hyp_vecs_start);
+	}
 	spin_unlock(&bp_lock);
 }
 #else
@@ -683,6 +686,15 @@ static const struct midr_range arm64_harden_el2_vectors[] = {
 
 #endif
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098
+static struct midr_range broken_aarch32_aes[] = {
+	MIDR_RANGE(MIDR_CORTEX_A57, 0, 1, 0xf, 0xf),
+	MIDR_ALL_VERSIONS(MIDR_CORTEX_A72),
+	{},
+};
+#endif
+
+
 const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
 #if	defined(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_826319) || \
 	defined(CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_827319) || \
@@ -884,6 +896,14 @@ const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_errata[] = {
 		.cpu_enable = cpu_enable_trap_ctr_access,
 	},
 #endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098
+	{
+		.desc = "ARM erratum 1742098",
+		.capability = ARM64_WORKAROUND_1742098,
+		CAP_MIDR_RANGE_LIST(broken_aarch32_aes),
+		.type = ARM64_CPUCAP_LOCAL_CPU_ERRATUM,
+	},
+#endif
 	{
 	}
 };
@@ -1186,8 +1206,11 @@ static void kvm_setup_bhb_slot(const char *hyp_vecs_start)
 		__copy_hyp_vect_bpi(slot, hyp_vecs_start, hyp_vecs_end);
 	}
 
-	__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
-	__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start, hyp_vecs_start);
+	if (hyp_vecs_start != __this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.template_start)) {
+		__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.hyp_vectors_slot, slot);
+		__this_cpu_write(bp_hardening_data.template_start,
+				 hyp_vecs_start);
+	}
 	spin_unlock(&bp_lock);
 }
 #else
@@ -1223,7 +1246,13 @@ void spectre_bhb_enable_mitigation(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry)
 	} else if (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU)) {
 		switch (spectre_bhb_loop_affected(SCOPE_SYSTEM)) {
 		case 8:
-			kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start);
+			/*
+			 * A57/A72-r0 will already have selected the
+			 * spectre-indirect vector, which is sufficient
+			 * for BHB too.
+			 */
+			if (!__this_cpu_read(bp_hardening_data.fn))
+				kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k8_start);
 			break;
 		case 24:
 			kvm_setup_bhb_slot(__spectre_bhb_loop_k24_start);
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
index 03b0fdcca..d7e73a796 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <asm/cpufeature.h>
 #include <asm/cpu_ops.h>
 #include <asm/fpsimd.h>
+#include <asm/hwcap.h>
 #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
 #include <asm/sysreg.h>
@@ -1154,6 +1155,14 @@ static void cpu_enable_ssbs(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_SSBD */
 
+static void elf_hwcap_fixup(void)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098
+	if (cpus_have_const_cap(ARM64_WORKAROUND_1742098))
+		compat_elf_hwcap2 &= ~COMPAT_HWCAP2_AES;
+#endif /* ARM64_ERRATUM_1742098 */
+}
+
 static const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities arm64_features[] = {
 	{
 		.desc = "GIC system register CPU interface",
@@ -1802,8 +1811,10 @@ void __init setup_cpu_features(void)
 	mark_const_caps_ready();
 	setup_elf_hwcaps(arm64_elf_hwcaps);
 
-	if (system_supports_32bit_el0())
+	if (system_supports_32bit_el0()) {
 		setup_elf_hwcaps(compat_elf_hwcaps);
+		elf_hwcap_fixup();
+	}
 
 	if (system_uses_ttbr0_pan())
 		pr_info("emulated: Privileged Access Never (PAN) using TTBR0_EL1 switching\n");
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
index 4f9acb5fb..5b425ed9c 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/efi.c
@@ -16,6 +16,14 @@
 
 #include <asm/efi.h>
 
+static bool region_is_misaligned(const efi_memory_desc_t *md)
+{
+	if (PAGE_SIZE == EFI_PAGE_SIZE)
+		return false;
+	return !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr) ||
+	       !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT);
+}
+
 /*
  * Only regions of type EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE need to be
  * executable, everything else can be mapped with the XN bits
@@ -29,14 +37,22 @@ static __init pteval_t create_mapping_protection(efi_memory_desc_t *md)
 	if (type == EFI_MEMORY_MAPPED_IO)
 		return PROT_DEVICE_nGnRE;
 
-	if (WARN_ONCE(!PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr),
-		      "UEFI Runtime regions are not aligned to 64 KB -- buggy firmware?"))
+	if (region_is_misaligned(md)) {
+		static bool __initdata code_is_misaligned;
+
 		/*
-		 * If the region is not aligned to the page size of the OS, we
-		 * can not use strict permissions, since that would also affect
-		 * the mapping attributes of the adjacent regions.
+		 * Regions that are not aligned to the OS page size cannot be
+		 * mapped with strict permissions, as those might interfere
+		 * with the permissions that are needed by the adjacent
+		 * region's mapping. However, if we haven't encountered any
+		 * misaligned runtime code regions so far, we can safely use
+		 * non-executable permissions for non-code regions.
 		 */
-		return pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC);
+		code_is_misaligned |= (type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE);
+
+		return code_is_misaligned ? pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC)
+					  : pgprot_val(PAGE_KERNEL);
+	}
 
 	/* R-- */
 	if ((attr & (EFI_MEMORY_XP | EFI_MEMORY_RO)) ==
@@ -66,19 +82,16 @@ int __init efi_create_mapping(struct mm_struct *mm, efi_memory_desc_t *md)
 	bool page_mappings_only = (md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE ||
 				   md->type == EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA);
 
-	if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(md->phys_addr) ||
-	    !PAGE_ALIGNED(md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT)) {
-		/*
-		 * If the end address of this region is not aligned to page
-		 * size, the mapping is rounded up, and may end up sharing a
-		 * page frame with the next UEFI memory region. If we create
-		 * a block entry now, we may need to split it again when mapping
-		 * the next region, and support for that is going to be removed
-		 * from the MMU routines. So avoid block mappings altogether in
-		 * that case.
-		 */
+	/*
+	 * If this region is not aligned to the page size used by the OS, the
+	 * mapping will be rounded outwards, and may end up sharing a page
+	 * frame with an adjacent runtime memory region. Given that the page
+	 * table descriptor covering the shared page will be rewritten when the
+	 * adjacent region gets mapped, we must avoid block mappings here so we
+	 * don't have to worry about splitting them when that happens.
+	 */
+	if (region_is_misaligned(md))
 		page_mappings_only = true;
-	}
 
 	create_pgd_mapping(mm, md->phys_addr, md->virt_addr,
 			   md->num_pages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT,
@@ -106,6 +119,9 @@ int __init efi_set_mapping_permissions(struct mm_struct *mm,
 	BUG_ON(md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_CODE &&
 	       md->type != EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DATA);
 
+	if (region_is_misaligned(md))
+		return 0;
+
 	/*
 	 * Calling apply_to_page_range() is only safe on regions that are
 	 * guaranteed to be mapped down to pages. Since we are only called