Adding upstream version 4.19.249.upstream/4.19.249

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 283 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
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+#
+# Security configuration
+#
+
+menu "Security options"
+
+source security/keys/Kconfig
+
+config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
+	bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
+	default n
+	help
+	  This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel
+	  syslog via dmesg(8).
+
+	  If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced
+	  unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1).
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY
+	bool "Enable different security models"
+	depends on SYSFS
+	depends on MULTIUSER
+	help
+	  This allows you to choose different security modules to be
+	  configured into your kernel.
+
+	  If this option is not selected, the default Linux security
+	  model will be used.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_WRITABLE_HOOKS
+	depends on SECURITY
+	bool
+	default n
+
+config SECURITYFS
+	bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
+	help
+	  This will build the securityfs filesystem.  It is currently used by
+	  the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider.  It is
+	  not used by SELinux or SMACK.
+
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_NETWORK
+	bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	help
+	  This enables the socket and networking security hooks.
+	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+	  implement socket and networking access controls.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+	bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
+	default y
+	depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE) && !UML
+	help
+	  This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by
+	  ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped
+	  into userspace.
+
+	  See Documentation/x86/pti.txt for more details.
+
+config SECURITY_INFINIBAND
+	bool "Infiniband Security Hooks"
+	depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND
+	help
+	  This enables the Infiniband security hooks.
+	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+	  implement Infiniband access controls.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
+	bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks"
+	depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK
+	help
+	  This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks.
+	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+	  implement per-packet access controls based on labels
+	  derived from IPSec policy.  Non-IPSec communications are
+	  designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized
+	  to communicate unlabelled data can send without using
+	  IPSec.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_PATH
+	bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control"
+	depends on SECURITY
+	help
+	  This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control.
+	  If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to
+	  implement pathname based access controls.
+	  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config INTEL_TXT
+	bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)"
+	depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT
+	help
+	  This option enables support for booting the kernel with the
+	  Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize
+	  Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch
+	  of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this
+	  will have no effect.
+
+	  Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and
+	  initial state as well as data reset protection.  This is used to
+	  create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which
+	  helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning
+	  correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside
+	  of the kernel itself.
+
+	  Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having
+	  confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that
+	  it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for
+	  providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it.
+
+	  See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information
+	  about Intel(R) TXT.
+	  See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot.
+	  See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable
+	  Intel TXT support in a kernel boot.
+
+	  If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N.
+
+config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR
+	int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation"
+	depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT)
+	default 65536
+	help
+	  This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected
+	  from userspace allocation.  Keeping a user from writing to low pages
+	  can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs.
+
+	  For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space
+	  a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems.
+	  On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768.
+	  Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map
+	  this low address space will need the permission specific to the
+	  systems running LSM.
+
+config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
+	bool
+	help
+	  The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for
+	  validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in
+	  support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY.
+
+config HARDENED_USERCOPY
+	bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace"
+	depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR
+	imply STRICT_DEVMEM
+	help
+	  This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when
+	  copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and
+	  copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that
+	  are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple
+	  separately allocated pages, are not on the process stack,
+	  or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes
+	  of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures.
+
+config HARDENED_USERCOPY_FALLBACK
+	bool "Allow usercopy whitelist violations to fallback to object size"
+	depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
+	default y
+	help
+	  This is a temporary option that allows missing usercopy whitelists
+	  to be discovered via a WARN() to the kernel log, instead of
+	  rejecting the copy, falling back to non-whitelisted hardened
+	  usercopy that checks the slab allocation size instead of the
+	  whitelist size. This option will be removed once it seems like
+	  all missing usercopy whitelists have been identified and fixed.
+	  Booting with "slab_common.usercopy_fallback=Y/N" can change
+	  this setting.
+
+config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN
+	bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages"
+	depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY
+	depends on EXPERT
+	help
+	  When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP,
+	  hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are,
+	  however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all
+	  been removed. This config is intended to be used only while
+	  trying to find such users.
+
+config FORTIFY_SOURCE
+	bool "Harden common str/mem functions against buffer overflows"
+	depends on ARCH_HAS_FORTIFY_SOURCE
+	# https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=50322
+	# https://bugs.llvm.org/show_bug.cgi?id=41459
+	depends on !CC_IS_CLANG
+	help
+	  Detect overflows of buffers in common string and memory functions
+	  where the compiler can determine and validate the buffer sizes.
+
+config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
+	bool "Force all usermode helper calls through a single binary"
+	help
+	  By default, the kernel can call many different userspace
+	  binary programs through the "usermode helper" kernel
+	  interface.  Some of these binaries are statically defined
+	  either in the kernel code itself, or as a kernel configuration
+	  option.  However, some of these are dynamically created at
+	  runtime, or can be modified after the kernel has started up.
+	  To provide an additional layer of security, route all of these
+	  calls through a single executable that can not have its name
+	  changed.
+
+	  Note, it is up to this single binary to then call the relevant
+	  "real" usermode helper binary, based on the first argument
+	  passed to it.  If desired, this program can filter and pick
+	  and choose what real programs are called.
+
+	  If you wish for all usermode helper programs are to be
+	  disabled, choose this option and then set
+	  STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH to an empty string.
+
+config STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH
+	string "Path to the static usermode helper binary"
+	depends on STATIC_USERMODEHELPER
+	default "/sbin/usermode-helper"
+	help
+	  The binary called by the kernel when any usermode helper
+	  program is wish to be run.  The "real" application's name will
+	  be in the first argument passed to this program on the command
+	  line.
+
+	  If you wish for all usermode helper programs to be disabled,
+	  specify an empty string here (i.e. "").
+
+source security/selinux/Kconfig
+source security/smack/Kconfig
+source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
+source security/apparmor/Kconfig
+source security/loadpin/Kconfig
+source security/yama/Kconfig
+
+source security/integrity/Kconfig
+
+choice
+	prompt "Default security module"
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+
+	help
+	  Select the security module that will be used by default if the
+	  kernel parameter security= is not specified.
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
+		bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
+		bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
+		bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+		bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y
+
+	config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+		bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls"
+
+endchoice
+
+config DEFAULT_SECURITY
+	string
+	default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX
+	default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK
+	default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO
+	default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR
+	default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC
+
+endmenu
+