1 files changed, 0 insertions, 69 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/kvm-add-gds_no-support-to-kvm.patch b/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/kvm-add-gds_no-support-to-kvm.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index e16870f6e..000000000
--- a/debian/patches/bugfix/x86/gds/kvm-add-gds_no-support-to-kvm.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,69 +0,0 @@
-From e9a103c76a5ffb605204f25222e6217931ff129b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
-Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2023 19:43:14 -0700
-Subject: KVM: Add GDS_NO support to KVM
-
-From: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
-
-commit 81ac7e5d741742d650b4ed6186c4826c1a0631a7 upstream
-
-Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a transient execution attack using
-gather instructions from the AVX2 and AVX512 extensions. This attack
-allows malicious code to infer data that was previously stored in
-vector registers. Systems that are not vulnerable to GDS will set the
-GDS_NO bit of the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR. This is useful for VM
-guests that may think they are on vulnerable systems that are, in
-fact, not affected. Guests that are running on affected hosts where
-the mitigation is enabled are protected as if they were running
-on an unaffected system.
-
-On all hosts that are not affected or that are mitigated, set the
-GDS_NO bit.
-
-Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
-Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
-Acked-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
-Signed-off-by: Daniel Sneddon <daniel.sneddon@linux.intel.com>
-Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
----
- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |    7 +++++++
- arch/x86/kvm/x86.c         |    5 +++++
- 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+)
-
---- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
-@@ -628,6 +628,13 @@ static const char * const gds_strings[]
- 	[GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR]	= "Unknown: Dependent on hypervisor status",
- };
- 
-+bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void)
-+{
-+	return (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL ||
-+		gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED);
-+}
-+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gds_ucode_mitigated);
-+
- void update_gds_msr(void)
- {
- 	u64 mcu_ctrl_after;
---- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
-+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
-@@ -217,6 +217,8 @@ struct kvm_stats_debugfs_item debugfs_en
- 
- u64 __read_mostly host_xcr0;
- 
-+extern bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void);
-+
- static int emulator_fix_hypercall(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt);
- 
- static inline void kvm_async_pf_hash_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-@@ -1224,6 +1226,9 @@ u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
- 	/* Guests don't need to know "Fill buffer clear control" exists */
- 	data &= ~ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR_CTRL;
- 
-+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_GDS) || gds_ucode_mitigated())
-+		data |= ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO;
-+
- 	return data;
- }
-