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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-08 04:30:29 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-08 04:30:29 +0000
commita90479ae4182a67f685d546e95602aa31bfdc645 (patch)
tree10955c3ab320fd3fedfb985454e84519bbdb4bd5
parentAdding debian version 241-7~deb10u8. (diff)
downloadsystemd-a90479ae4182a67f685d546e95602aa31bfdc645.tar.xz
systemd-a90479ae4182a67f685d546e95602aa31bfdc645.zip
Adding debian version 241-7~deb10u9.debian/241-7_deb10u9
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
-rw-r--r--debian/changelog8
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/0001-man-share-description-of-SYSTEMD_COLORS-in-other-too.patch79
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/0002-pager-set-LESSSECURE-whenver-we-invoke-a-pager.patch112
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/0003-pager-Fix-deadlock-when-using-built-in-pager.patch35
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/0004-pager-make-pager-secure-when-under-euid-is-changed-o.patch180
-rw-r--r--debian/patches/series4
6 files changed, 418 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/changelog b/debian/changelog
index 3766b2e..70d04c3 100644
--- a/debian/changelog
+++ b/debian/changelog
@@ -1,3 +1,11 @@
+systemd (241-7~deb10u9) buster-security; urgency=medium
+
+ * Non-maintainer upload by the LTS Security Team.
+ * CVE-2023-26604: Local privilege escalation for some sudo
+ configurations.
+
+ -- Adrian Bunk <bunk@debian.org> Thu, 30 Mar 2023 22:32:31 +0300
+
systemd (241-7~deb10u8) buster-security; urgency=high
* Non-maintainer upload by the Security Team.
diff --git a/debian/patches/0001-man-share-description-of-SYSTEMD_COLORS-in-other-too.patch b/debian/patches/0001-man-share-description-of-SYSTEMD_COLORS-in-other-too.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..63c24c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0001-man-share-description-of-SYSTEMD_COLORS-in-other-too.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+From 5489d98aa994019e06abd7aa66173a9868a5b1b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
+Date: Fri, 15 Nov 2019 11:59:34 +0100
+Subject: man: share description of $SYSTEMD_COLORS in other tools
+
+It was only described in systemd(1), making it hard to discover.
+Fixes #13561.
+
+The same for $SYSTEMD_URLIFY.
+
+I think all the tools whose man pages include less-variables.xml support
+those variables.
+---
+ man/less-variables.xml | 20 +++++++++++++++++++-
+ man/systemd.xml | 19 ++-----------------
+ 2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/man/less-variables.xml b/man/less-variables.xml
+index eb332b56b0..334eb19871 100644
+--- a/man/less-variables.xml
++++ b/man/less-variables.xml
+@@ -42,5 +42,23 @@
+ the invoking terminal is determined to be UTF-8 compatible).</para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+- </variablelist>
++ <varlistentry id='colors'>
++ <term><varname>$SYSTEMD_COLORS</varname></term>
++
++ <listitem><para>The value must be a boolean. Controls whether colorized output should be
++ generated. This can be specified to override the decision that <command>systemd</command> makes based
++ on <varname>$TERM</varname> and what the console is connected to.</para>
++ </listitem>
++ </varlistentry>
++
++ <varlistentry id='urlify'>
++ <term><varname>$SYSTEMD_URLIFY</varname></term>
++
++ <listitem><para>The value must be a boolean. Controls whether clickable links should be generated in
++ the output for terminal emulators supporting this. This can be specified to override the decision that
++ <command>systemd</command> makes based on <varname>$TERM</varname> and other conditions.</para>
++ </listitem>
++ </varlistentry>
++
++ </variablelist>
+ </refsect1>
+diff --git a/man/systemd.xml b/man/systemd.xml
+index 5287bdaba8..1ff1f34dbe 100644
+--- a/man/systemd.xml
++++ b/man/systemd.xml
+@@ -873,23 +873,8 @@
+ script runlevel link farms.</para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+- <varlistentry>
+- <term><varname>$SYSTEMD_COLORS</varname></term>
+-
+- <listitem><para>The value must be a boolean. Controls whether colorized output should be
+- generated. This can be specified to override the decision that <command>systemd</command>
+- makes based on <varname>$TERM</varname> and what the console is connected to.</para>
+- </listitem>
+- </varlistentry>
+-
+- <varlistentry>
+- <term><varname>$SYSTEMD_URLIFY</varname></term>
+-
+- <listitem><para>The value must be a boolean. Controls whether clickable links should be generated in the output
+- for terminal emulators supporting this. This can be specified to override the decision that
+- <command>systemd</command> makes based on <varname>$TERM</varname> and other conditions.</para>
+- </listitem>
+- </varlistentry>
++ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="colors" />
++ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="urlify" />
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><varname>$LISTEN_PID</varname></term>
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/0002-pager-set-LESSSECURE-whenver-we-invoke-a-pager.patch b/debian/patches/0002-pager-set-LESSSECURE-whenver-we-invoke-a-pager.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4b4ccc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0002-pager-set-LESSSECURE-whenver-we-invoke-a-pager.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+From 47bf4e7c6be2f73ecc8cfd8732920987df09e487 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
+Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2020 19:37:13 +0200
+Subject: pager: set $LESSSECURE whenver we invoke a pager
+
+Some extra safety when invoked via "sudo". With this we address a
+genuine design flaw of sudo, and we shouldn't need to deal with this.
+But it's still a good idea to disable this surface given how exotic it
+is.
+
+Prompted by #5666
+---
+ man/less-variables.xml | 9 +++++++++
+ man/systemctl.xml | 1 +
+ man/systemd.xml | 1 +
+ src/shared/pager.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/man/less-variables.xml b/man/less-variables.xml
+index 334eb19871..fed4178b01 100644
+--- a/man/less-variables.xml
++++ b/man/less-variables.xml
+@@ -60,5 +60,14 @@
+ </listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
++ <varlistentry id='lesssecure'>
++ <term><varname>$SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE</varname></term>
++
++ <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. Overrides the <varname>$LESSSECURE</varname> environment
++ variable when invoking the pager, which controls the "secure" mode of less (which disables commands
++ such as <literal>|</literal> which allow to easily shell out to external command lines). By default
++ less secure mode is enabled, with this setting it may be disabled.</para></listitem>
++ </varlistentry>
++
+ </variablelist>
+ </refsect1>
+diff --git a/man/systemctl.xml b/man/systemctl.xml
+index 08aacd8f41..22b26d3607 100644
+--- a/man/systemctl.xml
++++ b/man/systemctl.xml
+@@ -2039,6 +2039,7 @@ Jan 12 10:46:45 example.com bluetoothd[8900]: gatt-time-server: Input/output err
+ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="pager"/>
+ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="less"/>
+ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="lesscharset"/>
++ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="lesssecure"/>
+ </refsect1>
+
+ <refsect1>
+diff --git a/man/systemd.xml b/man/systemd.xml
+index 1ff1f34dbe..d0d847c353 100644
+--- a/man/systemd.xml
++++ b/man/systemd.xml
+@@ -875,6 +875,7 @@
+
+ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="colors" />
+ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="urlify" />
++ <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="lesssecure"/>
+
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><varname>$LISTEN_PID</varname></term>
+diff --git a/src/shared/pager.c b/src/shared/pager.c
+index bf2597e65a..7a56271760 100644
+--- a/src/shared/pager.c
++++ b/src/shared/pager.c
+@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+
+ #include "copy.h"
++#include "env-util.h"
+ #include "fd-util.h"
+ #include "fileio.h"
+ #include "io-util.h"
+@@ -152,8 +153,7 @@ int pager_open(PagerFlags flags) {
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
+- /* Initialize a good charset for less. This is
+- * particularly important if we output UTF-8
++ /* Initialize a good charset for less. This is particularly important if we output UTF-8
+ * characters. */
+ less_charset = getenv("SYSTEMD_LESSCHARSET");
+ if (!less_charset && is_locale_utf8())
+@@ -164,6 +164,25 @@ int pager_open(PagerFlags flags) {
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+
++ /* People might invoke us from sudo, don't needlessly allow less to be a way to shell out
++ * privileged stuff. */
++ r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE");
++ if (r == 0) { /* Remove env var if off */
++ if (unsetenv("LESSSECURE") < 0) {
++ log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to uset environment variable LESSSECURE: %m");
++ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
++ } else {
++ /* Set env var otherwise */
++ if (r < 0)
++ log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse $SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE, ignoring: %m");
++
++ if (setenv("LESSSECURE", "1", 1) < 0) {
++ log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to set environment variable LESSSECURE: %m");
++ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
++ }
++
+ if (pager_args) {
+ r = loop_write(exe_name_pipe[1], pager_args[0], strlen(pager_args[0]) + 1, false);
+ if (r < 0) {
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/0003-pager-Fix-deadlock-when-using-built-in-pager.patch b/debian/patches/0003-pager-Fix-deadlock-when-using-built-in-pager.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ab5a229
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0003-pager-Fix-deadlock-when-using-built-in-pager.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From d982f0decd1215d6fbd60c0e9ce6c0ffb8a0188c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Felix Riemann <felix.riemann@sma.de>
+Date: Wed, 29 May 2019 21:17:42 +0200
+Subject: pager: Fix deadlock when using built-in pager
+
+The parent is waiting for an EOF on the pipe transmitting the pager name
+before starting to send data. With external pagers this happens due to
+execlp() CLOEXEC'ing the pipe, so the internal pager needs to close it
+manually.
+---
+ src/shared/pager.c | 4 +++-
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/shared/pager.c b/src/shared/pager.c
+index 7a56271760..6f1d57a096 100644
+--- a/src/shared/pager.c
++++ b/src/shared/pager.c
+@@ -212,11 +212,13 @@ int pager_open(PagerFlags flags) {
+ "Failed to execute '%s', using next fallback pager: %m", exe);
+ }
+
+- r = loop_write(exe_name_pipe[1], "(built-in)", strlen("(built-in") + 1, false);
++ r = loop_write(exe_name_pipe[1], "(built-in)", strlen("(built-in)") + 1, false);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write pager name to socket: %m");
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
++ /* Close pipe to signal the parent to start sending data */
++ safe_close_pair(exe_name_pipe);
+ pager_fallback();
+ /* not reached */
+ }
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/0004-pager-make-pager-secure-when-under-euid-is-changed-o.patch b/debian/patches/0004-pager-make-pager-secure-when-under-euid-is-changed-o.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6138f80
--- /dev/null
+++ b/debian/patches/0004-pager-make-pager-secure-when-under-euid-is-changed-o.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+From d8510d35c857547ddb601a988545ccb9a1e43fcc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
+Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2020 11:15:05 +0200
+Subject: pager: make pager secure when under euid is changed or explicitly
+ requested
+
+The variable is renamed to SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE (because it's not just about
+less now), and we automatically enable secure mode in certain cases, but not
+otherwise.
+
+This approach is more nuanced, but should provide a better experience for
+users:
+
+- Previusly we would set LESSSECURE=1 and trust the pager to make use of
+ it. But this has an effect only on less. We need to not start pagers which
+ are insecure when in secure mode. In particular more is like that and is a
+ very popular pager.
+
+- We don't enable secure mode always, which means that those other pagers can
+ reasonably used.
+
+- We do the right thing by default, but the user has ultimate control by
+ setting SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE.
+
+Fixes #5666.
+
+v2:
+- also check $PKEXEC_UID
+
+v3:
+- use 'sd_pid_get_owner_uid() != geteuid()' as the condition
+---
+ man/less-variables.xml | 30 ++++++++++++++++----
+ src/shared/pager.c | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
+ 2 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/man/less-variables.xml b/man/less-variables.xml
+index fed4178b01..b892854509 100644
+--- a/man/less-variables.xml
++++ b/man/less-variables.xml
+@@ -61,12 +61,30 @@
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ <varlistentry id='lesssecure'>
+- <term><varname>$SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE</varname></term>
+-
+- <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. Overrides the <varname>$LESSSECURE</varname> environment
+- variable when invoking the pager, which controls the "secure" mode of less (which disables commands
+- such as <literal>|</literal> which allow to easily shell out to external command lines). By default
+- less secure mode is enabled, with this setting it may be disabled.</para></listitem>
++ <term><varname>$SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE</varname></term>
++
++ <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. When true, the "secure" mode of the pager is enabled; if
++ false, disabled. If <varname>$SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE</varname> is not set at all, secure mode is enabled
++ if the effective UID is not the same as the owner of the login session, see <citerefentry
++ project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>geteuid</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry> and
++ <citerefentry><refentrytitle>sd_pid_get_owner_uid</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
++ In secure mode, <option>LESSSECURE=1</option> will be set when invoking the pager, and the pager shall
++ disable commands that open or create new files or start new subprocesses. When
++ <varname>$SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE</varname> is not set at all, pagers which are not known to implement
++ secure mode will not be used. (Currently only
++ <citerefentry><refentrytitle>less</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry> implements
++ secure mode.)</para>
++
++ <para>Note: when commands are invoked with elevated privileges, for example under <citerefentry
++ project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>sudo</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry> or
++ <citerefentry
++ project='die-net'><refentrytitle>pkexec</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry>, care
++ must be taken to ensure that unintended interactive features are not enabled. "Secure" mode for the
++ pager may be enabled automatically as describe above. Setting <varname>SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE=0</varname>
++ or not removing it from the inherited environment allows the user to invoke arbitrary commands. Note
++ that if the <varname>$SYSTEMD_PAGER</varname> or <varname>$PAGER</varname> variables are to be
++ honoured, <varname>$SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE</varname> must be set too. It might be reasonable to completly
++ disable the pager using <option>--no-pager</option> instead.</para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
+ </variablelist>
+diff --git a/src/shared/pager.c b/src/shared/pager.c
+index 6f1d57a096..0f53cad429 100644
+--- a/src/shared/pager.c
++++ b/src/shared/pager.c
+@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
+ #include <sys/prctl.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+
++#include "sd-login.h"
++
+ #include "copy.h"
+ #include "env-util.h"
+ #include "fd-util.h"
+@@ -165,25 +167,42 @@ int pager_open(PagerFlags flags) {
+ }
+
+ /* People might invoke us from sudo, don't needlessly allow less to be a way to shell out
+- * privileged stuff. */
+- r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE");
+- if (r == 0) { /* Remove env var if off */
+- if (unsetenv("LESSSECURE") < 0) {
+- log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to uset environment variable LESSSECURE: %m");
+- _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+- }
+- } else {
+- /* Set env var otherwise */
++ * privileged stuff. If the user set $SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE, trust their configuration of the
++ * pager. If they didn't, use secure mode when under euid is changed. If $SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE
++ * wasn't explicitly set, and we autodetect the need for secure mode, only use the pager we
++ * know to be good. */
++ int use_secure_mode = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE");
++ bool trust_pager = use_secure_mode >= 0;
++ if (use_secure_mode == -ENXIO) {
++ uid_t uid;
++
++ r = sd_pid_get_owner_uid(0, &uid);
+ if (r < 0)
+- log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse $SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE, ignoring: %m");
++ log_debug_errno(r, "sd_pid_get_owner_uid() failed, enabling pager secure mode: %m");
+
+- if (setenv("LESSSECURE", "1", 1) < 0) {
+- log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to set environment variable LESSSECURE: %m");
+- _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+- }
++ use_secure_mode = r < 0 || uid != geteuid();
++
++ } else if (use_secure_mode < 0) {
++ log_warning_errno(use_secure_mode, "Unable to parse $SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE, assuming true: %m");
++ use_secure_mode = true;
+ }
+
+- if (pager_args) {
++ /* We generally always set variables used by less, even if we end up using a different pager.
++ * They shouldn't hurt in any case, and ideally other pagers would look at them too. */
++ if (use_secure_mode)
++ r = setenv("LESSSECURE", "1", 1);
++ else
++ r = unsetenv("LESSSECURE");
++ if (r < 0) {
++ log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to adjust environment variable LESSSECURE: %m");
++ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++ }
++
++ if (trust_pager && pager_args) { /* The pager config might be set globally, and we cannot
++ * know if the user adjusted it to be appropriate for the
++ * secure mode. Thus, start the pager specified through
++ * envvars only when $SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE was explicitly set
++ * as well. */
+ r = loop_write(exe_name_pipe[1], pager_args[0], strlen(pager_args[0]) + 1, false);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write pager name to socket: %m");
+@@ -195,13 +214,14 @@ int pager_open(PagerFlags flags) {
+ "Failed to execute '%s', using fallback pagers: %m", pager_args[0]);
+ }
+
+- /* Debian's alternatives command for pagers is
+- * called 'pager'. Note that we do not call
+- * sensible-pagers here, since that is just a
+- * shell script that implements a logic that
+- * is similar to this one anyway, but is
+- * Debian-specific. */
++ /* Debian's alternatives command for pagers is called 'pager'. Note that we do not call
++ * sensible-pagers here, since that is just a shell script that implements a logic that is
++ * similar to this one anyway, but is Debian-specific. */
+ FOREACH_STRING(exe, "pager", "less", "more") {
++ /* Only less implements secure mode right now. */
++ if (use_secure_mode && !streq(exe, "less"))
++ continue;
++
+ r = loop_write(exe_name_pipe[1], exe, strlen(exe) + 1, false);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write pager name to socket: %m");
+@@ -212,6 +232,7 @@ int pager_open(PagerFlags flags) {
+ "Failed to execute '%s', using next fallback pager: %m", exe);
+ }
+
++ /* Our builtin is also very secure. */
+ r = loop_write(exe_name_pipe[1], "(built-in)", strlen("(built-in)") + 1, false);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write pager name to socket: %m");
+--
+2.30.2
+
diff --git a/debian/patches/series b/debian/patches/series
index 3952047..e224247 100644
--- a/debian/patches/series
+++ b/debian/patches/series
@@ -77,3 +77,7 @@ debian/Revert-core-enable-TasksMax-for-all-services-by-default-a.patch
debian/Let-graphical-session-pre.target-be-manually-started.patch
debian/Add-env-variable-for-machine-ID-path.patch
debian/Drop-seccomp-system-call-filter-for-udev.patch
+0001-man-share-description-of-SYSTEMD_COLORS-in-other-too.patch
+0002-pager-set-LESSSECURE-whenver-we-invoke-a-pager.patch
+0003-pager-Fix-deadlock-when-using-built-in-pager.patch
+0004-pager-make-pager-secure-when-under-euid-is-changed-o.patch