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-rw-r--r--modules/arch/unix/Makefile.in3
-rw-r--r--modules/arch/unix/config5.m424
-rw-r--r--modules/arch/unix/mod_privileges.c588
-rw-r--r--modules/arch/unix/mod_unixd.c433
-rw-r--r--modules/arch/unix/mod_unixd.h41
5 files changed, 1089 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/modules/arch/unix/Makefile.in b/modules/arch/unix/Makefile.in
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..167b343
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/arch/unix/Makefile.in
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+
+include $(top_srcdir)/build/special.mk
+
diff --git a/modules/arch/unix/config5.m4 b/modules/arch/unix/config5.m4
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..77027a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/arch/unix/config5.m4
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+
+APACHE_MODPATH_INIT(arch/unix)
+
+if ap_mpm_is_enabled "worker" \
+ || ap_mpm_is_enabled "event" \
+ || ap_mpm_is_enabled "prefork"; then
+ unixd_mods_enable=yes
+else
+ unixd_mods_enable=no
+fi
+
+APACHE_MODULE(unixd, unix specific support, , , $unixd_mods_enable)
+APACHE_MODULE(privileges, Per-virtualhost Unix UserIDs and enhanced security for Solaris, , , no, [
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS(priv.h, [ap_HAVE_PRIV_H="yes"], [ap_HAVE_PRIV_H="no"])
+ if test $ap_HAVE_PRIV_H = "no"; then
+ AC_MSG_WARN([Your system does not support privileges.])
+ enable_privileges="no"
+ fi
+])
+
+APR_ADDTO(INCLUDES, [-I\$(top_srcdir)/$modpath_current])
+
+APACHE_MODPATH_FINISH
+
diff --git a/modules/arch/unix/mod_privileges.c b/modules/arch/unix/mod_privileges.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fede3d8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/arch/unix/mod_privileges.c
@@ -0,0 +1,588 @@
+/* Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
+ * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with
+ * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
+ * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
+ * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
+ * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <priv.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "httpd.h"
+#include "http_config.h"
+#include "http_protocol.h"
+#include "http_log.h"
+#include "mpm_common.h"
+#include "ap_mpm.h"
+#include "apr_strings.h"
+
+/* TODO - get rid of unixd dependency */
+#include "unixd.h"
+
+#define CFG_CHECK(x) if ((x) == -1) { \
+ char msgbuf[128]; \
+ apr_strerror(errno, msgbuf, sizeof(msgbuf)); \
+ return apr_pstrdup(cmd->pool, msgbuf); \
+}
+#define CR_CHECK(x, y) if (x == -1) \
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_CRIT, errno, 0, y \
+ "Failed to initialise privileges")
+
+module AP_MODULE_DECLARE_DATA privileges_module;
+
+/* #define BIG_SECURITY_HOLE 1 */
+
+typedef enum { PRIV_UNSET, PRIV_FAST, PRIV_SECURE, PRIV_SELECTIVE } priv_mode;
+
+typedef struct {
+ priv_set_t *priv;
+ priv_set_t *child_priv;
+ uid_t uid;
+ gid_t gid;
+ priv_mode mode;
+} priv_cfg;
+
+typedef struct {
+ priv_mode mode;
+} priv_dir_cfg;
+
+static priv_set_t *priv_setid;
+static priv_set_t *priv_default = NULL;
+static int dtrace_enabled = 0;
+
+static apr_status_t priv_cfg_cleanup(void *CFG)
+{
+ priv_cfg *cfg = CFG;
+ priv_freeset(cfg->priv);
+ priv_freeset(cfg->child_priv);
+ return APR_SUCCESS;
+}
+static void *privileges_merge_cfg(apr_pool_t *pool, void *BASE, void *ADD)
+{
+ /* inherit the mode if it's not set; the rest won't be inherited */
+ priv_cfg *base = BASE;
+ priv_cfg *add = ADD;
+ priv_cfg *ret = apr_pmemdup(pool, add, sizeof(priv_cfg));
+ ret->mode = (add->mode == PRIV_UNSET) ? base->mode : add->mode;
+ return ret;
+}
+static void *privileges_create_cfg(apr_pool_t *pool, server_rec *s)
+{
+ priv_cfg *cfg = apr_palloc(pool, sizeof(priv_cfg));
+
+ /* Start at basic privileges all round. */
+ cfg->priv = priv_str_to_set("basic", ",", NULL);
+ cfg->child_priv = priv_str_to_set("basic", ",", NULL);
+
+ /* By default, run in secure vhost mode.
+ * That means dropping basic privileges we don't usually need.
+ */
+ CR_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->priv, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY), APLOGNO(03160));
+ CR_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->priv, PRIV_PROC_INFO), APLOGNO(03161));
+ CR_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->priv, PRIV_PROC_SESSION), APLOGNO(03162));
+
+/* Hmmm, should CGI default to secure too ? */
+/*
+ CR_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY), APLOGNO(03163));
+ CR_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_PROC_INFO), APLOGNO(03164));
+ CR_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_PROC_SESSION), APLOGNO(03165));
+ CR_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_PROC_FORK), APLOGNO(03166));
+ CR_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_PROC_EXEC), APLOGNO(03167));
+*/
+
+ /* we´ll use 0 for unset */
+ cfg->uid = 0;
+ cfg->gid = 0;
+ cfg->mode = PRIV_UNSET;
+ apr_pool_cleanup_register(pool, cfg, priv_cfg_cleanup,
+ apr_pool_cleanup_null);
+
+ /* top-level default_priv wants the top-level cfg */
+ if (priv_default == NULL) {
+ priv_default = cfg->priv;
+ }
+ return cfg;
+}
+static void *privileges_create_dir_cfg(apr_pool_t *pool, char *dummy)
+{
+ priv_dir_cfg *cfg = apr_palloc(pool, sizeof(priv_dir_cfg));
+ cfg->mode = PRIV_UNSET;
+ return cfg;
+}
+static void *privileges_merge_dir_cfg(apr_pool_t *pool, void *BASE, void *ADD)
+{
+ priv_dir_cfg *base = BASE;
+ priv_dir_cfg *add = ADD;
+ priv_dir_cfg *ret = apr_palloc(pool, sizeof(priv_dir_cfg));
+ ret->mode = (add->mode == PRIV_UNSET) ? base->mode : add->mode;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static apr_status_t privileges_end_req(void *data)
+{
+ request_rec *r = data;
+ priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(r->server->module_config,
+ &privileges_module);
+ priv_dir_cfg *dcfg = ap_get_module_config(r->per_dir_config,
+ &privileges_module);
+
+ /* ugly hack: grab default uid and gid from unixd */
+ extern unixd_config_rec ap_unixd_config;
+
+ /* If we forked a child, we dropped privilege to revert, so
+ * all we can do now is exit
+ */
+ if ((cfg->mode == PRIV_SECURE) ||
+ ((cfg->mode == PRIV_SELECTIVE) && (dcfg->mode == PRIV_SECURE))) {
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ /* if either user or group are not the default, restore them */
+ if (cfg->uid || cfg->gid) {
+ if (setppriv(PRIV_ON, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, priv_setid) == -1) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02136)
+ "PRIV_ON failed restoring default user/group");
+ }
+ if (cfg->uid && (setuid(ap_unixd_config.user_id) == -1)) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02137)
+ "Error restoring default userid");
+ }
+ if (cfg->gid && (setgid(ap_unixd_config.group_id) == -1)) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02138)
+ "Error restoring default group");
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* restore default privileges */
+ if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, priv_default) == -1) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, errno, r, APLOGNO(02139)
+ "Error restoring default privileges");
+ }
+ return APR_SUCCESS;
+}
+static int privileges_req(request_rec *r)
+{
+ /* secure mode: fork a process to handle the request */
+ apr_proc_t proc;
+ apr_status_t rv;
+ int exitcode;
+ apr_exit_why_e exitwhy;
+ int fork_req;
+ priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(r->server->module_config,
+ &privileges_module);
+
+ void *breadcrumb = ap_get_module_config(r->request_config,
+ &privileges_module);
+
+ if (!breadcrumb) {
+ /* first call: this is the vhost */
+ fork_req = (cfg->mode == PRIV_SECURE);
+
+ /* set breadcrumb */
+ ap_set_module_config(r->request_config, &privileges_module, &cfg->mode);
+
+ /* If we have per-dir config, defer doing anything */
+ if ((cfg->mode == PRIV_SELECTIVE)) {
+ /* Defer dropping privileges 'til we have a directory
+ * context that'll tell us whether to fork.
+ */
+ return DECLINED;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ /* second call is for per-directory. */
+ priv_dir_cfg *dcfg;
+ if ((cfg->mode != PRIV_SELECTIVE)) {
+ /* Our fate was already determined for the vhost -
+ * nothing to do per-directory
+ */
+ return DECLINED;
+ }
+ dcfg = ap_get_module_config(r->per_dir_config, &privileges_module);
+ fork_req = (dcfg->mode == PRIV_SECURE);
+ }
+
+ if (fork_req) {
+ rv = apr_proc_fork(&proc, r->pool);
+ switch (rv) {
+ case APR_INPARENT:
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02140)
+ "parent waiting for child");
+ /* FIXME - does the child need to run synchronously?
+ * esp. if we enable mod_privileges with threaded MPMs?
+ * We do need at least to ensure r outlives the child.
+ */
+ rv = apr_proc_wait(&proc, &exitcode, &exitwhy, APR_WAIT);
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02141) "parent: child %s",
+ (rv == APR_CHILD_DONE) ? "done" : "notdone");
+
+ /* The child has taken responsibility for reading all input
+ * and sending all output. So we need to bow right out,
+ * and even abandon "normal" housekeeping.
+ */
+ r->eos_sent = 1;
+ apr_table_unset(r->headers_in, "Content-Type");
+ apr_table_unset(r->headers_in, "Content-Length");
+ /* Testing with ab and 100k requests reveals no nasties
+ * so I infer we're not leaking anything like memory
+ * or file descriptors. That's nice!
+ */
+ return DONE;
+ case APR_INCHILD:
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, APLOGNO(02142) "In child!");
+ break; /* now we'll drop privileges in the child */
+ default:
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02143)
+ "Failed to fork secure child process!");
+ return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* OK, now drop privileges. */
+
+ /* cleanup should happen even if something fails part-way through here */
+ apr_pool_cleanup_register(r->pool, r, privileges_end_req,
+ apr_pool_cleanup_null);
+ /* set user and group if configured */
+ if (cfg->uid || cfg->gid) {
+ if (setppriv(PRIV_ON, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, priv_setid) == -1) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02144)
+ "No privilege to set user/group");
+ }
+ /* if we should be able to set these but can't, it could be
+ * a serious security issue. Bail out rather than risk it!
+ */
+ if (cfg->uid && (setuid(cfg->uid) == -1)) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02145)
+ "Error setting userid");
+ return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (cfg->gid && (setgid(cfg->gid) == -1)) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, APLOGNO(02146)
+ "Error setting group");
+ return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+ /* set vhost's privileges */
+ if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, cfg->priv) == -1) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, errno, r, APLOGNO(02147)
+ "Error setting effective privileges");
+ return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* ... including those of any subprocesses */
+ if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, cfg->child_priv) == -1) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, errno, r, APLOGNO(02148)
+ "Error setting inheritable privileges");
+ return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, cfg->child_priv) == -1) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, errno, r, APLOGNO(02149)
+ "Error setting limit privileges");
+ return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ /* If we're in a child process, drop down PPERM too */
+ if (fork_req) {
+ if (setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, cfg->priv) == -1) {
+ ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, errno, r, APLOGNO(02150)
+ "Error setting permitted privileges");
+ return HTTP_INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return OK;
+}
+#define PDROP_CHECK(x) if (x == -1) { \
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_CRIT, errno, s, APLOGNO(02151) \
+ "Error dropping privileges"); \
+ return !OK; \
+ }
+
+static int privileges_drop_first(apr_pool_t *pool, server_rec *s)
+{
+ /* We need to set privileges before mod_unixd,
+ * 'cos otherwise setuid will wipe our privilege to do so
+ */
+ priv_cfg *spcfg;
+ server_rec *sp;
+ priv_set_t *ppriv = priv_allocset();
+
+ /* compute ppriv from the union of all the vhosts plus setid */
+ priv_copyset(priv_setid, ppriv);
+ for (sp = s; sp != NULL; sp=sp->next) {
+ spcfg = ap_get_module_config(sp->module_config, &privileges_module);
+ priv_union(spcfg->priv, ppriv);
+ }
+ PDROP_CHECK(setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_PERMITTED, ppriv))
+ PDROP_CHECK(setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, ppriv))
+ priv_freeset(ppriv);
+
+ return OK;
+}
+static int privileges_drop_last(apr_pool_t *pool, server_rec *s)
+{
+ /* Our config stuff has set the privileges we need, so now
+ * we just set them to those of the parent server_rec
+ *
+ * This has to happen after mod_unixd, 'cos mod_unixd needs
+ * privileges we drop here.
+ */
+ priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(s->module_config, &privileges_module);
+
+ /* defaults - the default vhost */
+ PDROP_CHECK(setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_LIMIT, cfg->child_priv))
+ PDROP_CHECK(setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_INHERITABLE, cfg->child_priv))
+ PDROP_CHECK(setppriv(PRIV_SET, PRIV_EFFECTIVE, cfg->priv))
+
+ return OK;
+}
+static apr_status_t privileges_term(void *rec)
+{
+ priv_freeset(priv_setid);
+ return APR_SUCCESS;
+}
+static int privileges_postconf(apr_pool_t *pconf, apr_pool_t *plog,
+ apr_pool_t *ptemp, server_rec *s)
+{
+ priv_cfg *cfg;
+ server_rec *sp;
+
+ /* if we have dtrace enabled, merge it into everything */
+ if (dtrace_enabled) {
+ for (sp = s; sp != NULL; sp = sp->next) {
+ cfg = ap_get_module_config(sp->module_config, &privileges_module);
+ CR_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->priv, PRIV_DTRACE_KERNEL), APLOGNO(03168));
+ CR_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->priv, PRIV_DTRACE_PROC), APLOGNO(03169));
+ CR_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->priv, PRIV_DTRACE_USER), APLOGNO(03170));
+ CR_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_DTRACE_KERNEL), APLOGNO(03171));
+ CR_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_DTRACE_PROC), APLOGNO(03172));
+ CR_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_DTRACE_USER), APLOGNO(03173));
+ }
+ CR_CHECK(priv_addset(priv_default, PRIV_DTRACE_KERNEL), APLOGNO(03174));
+ CR_CHECK(priv_addset(priv_default, PRIV_DTRACE_PROC), APLOGNO(03175));
+ CR_CHECK(priv_addset(priv_default, PRIV_DTRACE_USER), APLOGNO(03176));
+ }
+
+ /* set up priv_setid for per-request use */
+ priv_setid = priv_allocset();
+ apr_pool_cleanup_register(pconf, NULL, privileges_term,
+ apr_pool_cleanup_null);
+ priv_emptyset(priv_setid);
+ if (priv_addset(priv_setid, PRIV_PROC_SETID) == -1) {
+ ap_log_perror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_CRIT, errno, ptemp, APLOGNO(02152)
+ "priv_addset");
+ return !OK;
+ }
+ return OK;
+}
+static int privileges_init(apr_pool_t *pconf, apr_pool_t *plog,
+ apr_pool_t *ptemp)
+{
+ /* refuse to work if the MPM is threaded */
+ int threaded;
+ int rv = ap_mpm_query(AP_MPMQ_IS_THREADED, &threaded);
+ if (rv != APR_SUCCESS) {
+ ap_log_perror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_NOTICE, rv, ptemp, APLOGNO(02153)
+ "mod_privileges: unable to determine MPM characteristics."
+ " Please ensure you are using a non-threaded MPM "
+ "with this module.");
+ }
+ if (threaded) {
+ ap_log_perror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_CRIT, rv, ptemp, APLOGNO(02154)
+ "mod_privileges is not compatible with a threaded MPM.");
+ return !OK;
+ }
+ return OK;
+}
+static void privileges_hooks(apr_pool_t *pool)
+{
+ ap_hook_post_read_request(privileges_req, NULL, NULL,
+ APR_HOOK_REALLY_FIRST);
+ ap_hook_header_parser(privileges_req, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_REALLY_FIRST);
+ ap_hook_drop_privileges(privileges_drop_first, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_FIRST);
+ ap_hook_drop_privileges(privileges_drop_last, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_LAST);
+ ap_hook_post_config(privileges_postconf, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
+ ap_hook_pre_config(privileges_init, NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_FIRST);
+}
+
+static const char *vhost_user(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dir, const char *arg)
+{
+ priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config,
+ &privileges_module);
+ cfg->uid = ap_uname2id(arg);
+ if (cfg->uid == 0) {
+ return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "Invalid userid for VHostUser: ",
+ arg, NULL);
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+static const char *vhost_group(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dir, const char *arg)
+{
+ priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config,
+ &privileges_module);
+ cfg->gid = ap_gname2id(arg);
+ if (cfg->uid == 0) {
+ return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "Invalid groupid for VHostGroup: ",
+ arg, NULL);
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+static const char *vhost_secure(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dir, int arg)
+{
+ priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config,
+ &privileges_module);
+ if (!arg) {
+ /* add basic privileges, excluding those covered by cgimode */
+ CFG_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->priv, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY));
+ CFG_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->priv, PRIV_PROC_INFO));
+ CFG_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->priv, PRIV_PROC_SESSION));
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+static const char *vhost_cgimode(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dir, const char *arg)
+{
+ priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config,
+ &privileges_module);
+ if (!strcasecmp(arg, "on")) {
+ /* default - nothing to do */
+ }
+ else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "off")) {
+ /* drop fork+exec privs */
+ CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->priv, PRIV_PROC_FORK));
+ CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->priv, PRIV_PROC_EXEC));
+ }
+ else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "secure")) {
+ /* deny privileges to CGI procs */
+ CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_PROC_FORK));
+ CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_PROC_EXEC));
+ CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY));
+ CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_PROC_INFO));
+ CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, PRIV_PROC_SESSION));
+ }
+ else {
+ return "VHostCGIMode must be On, Off or Secure";
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+static const char *dtraceenable(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dir, int arg)
+{
+ const char *err = ap_check_cmd_context(cmd, GLOBAL_ONLY);
+ if (err != NULL) {
+ return err;
+ }
+ dtrace_enabled = arg;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *privs_mode(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dir, const char *arg)
+{
+ priv_mode mode = PRIV_UNSET;
+ if (!strcasecmp(arg, "FAST")) {
+ mode = PRIV_FAST;
+ }
+ else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "SECURE")) {
+ mode = PRIV_SECURE;
+ }
+ else if (!strcasecmp(arg, "SELECTIVE")) {
+ mode = PRIV_SELECTIVE;
+ }
+
+ if (cmd->path) {
+ /* In a directory context, set the per_dir_config */
+ priv_dir_cfg *cfg = dir;
+ cfg->mode = mode;
+ if ((mode == PRIV_UNSET) || (mode == PRIV_SELECTIVE)) {
+ return "PrivilegesMode in a Directory context must be FAST or SECURE";
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ /* In a global or vhost context, set the server config */
+ priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config,
+ &privileges_module);
+ cfg->mode = mode;
+ if (mode == PRIV_UNSET) {
+ return "PrivilegesMode must be FAST, SECURE or SELECTIVE";
+ }
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#ifdef BIG_SECURITY_HOLE
+static const char *vhost_privs(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dir, const char *arg)
+{
+ priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config,
+ &privileges_module);
+ const char *priv = arg;
+
+ if (*priv == '-') {
+ CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->priv, priv+1));
+ }
+ else if (*priv == '+') {
+ CFG_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->priv, priv+1));
+ }
+ else {
+ priv_emptyset(cfg->priv);
+ CFG_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->priv, priv));
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+static const char *vhost_cgiprivs(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dir, const char *arg)
+{
+ priv_cfg *cfg = ap_get_module_config(cmd->server->module_config,
+ &privileges_module);
+ const char *priv = arg;
+ if (*priv == '-') {
+ CFG_CHECK(priv_delset(cfg->child_priv, priv+1));
+ }
+ else if (*priv == '+') {
+ CFG_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->child_priv, priv+1));
+ }
+ else {
+ priv_emptyset(cfg->child_priv);
+ CFG_CHECK(priv_addset(cfg->child_priv, priv));
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif
+static const command_rec privileges_cmds[] = {
+ AP_INIT_TAKE1("VHostUser", vhost_user, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
+ "Userid under which the virtualhost will run"),
+ AP_INIT_TAKE1("VHostGroup", vhost_group, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
+ "Group under which the virtualhost will run"),
+ AP_INIT_FLAG("VHostSecure", vhost_secure, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
+ "Run in enhanced security mode (default ON)"),
+ AP_INIT_TAKE1("VHostCGIMode", vhost_cgimode, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
+ "Enable fork+exec for this virtualhost (Off|Secure|On)"),
+ AP_INIT_FLAG("DTracePrivileges", dtraceenable, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
+ "Enable DTrace"),
+ AP_INIT_TAKE1("PrivilegesMode", privs_mode, NULL, RSRC_CONF|ACCESS_CONF,
+ "tradeoff performance vs security (fast or secure)"),
+#ifdef BIG_SECURITY_HOLE
+ AP_INIT_ITERATE("VHostPrivs", vhost_privs, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
+ "Privileges available in the (virtual) server"),
+ AP_INIT_ITERATE("VHostCGIPrivs", vhost_cgiprivs, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
+ "Privileges available to external programs"),
+#endif
+ {NULL}
+};
+AP_DECLARE_MODULE(privileges) = {
+ STANDARD20_MODULE_STUFF,
+ privileges_create_dir_cfg,
+ privileges_merge_dir_cfg,
+ privileges_create_cfg,
+ privileges_merge_cfg,
+ privileges_cmds,
+ privileges_hooks
+};
diff --git a/modules/arch/unix/mod_unixd.c b/modules/arch/unix/mod_unixd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1baa278
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/arch/unix/mod_unixd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,433 @@
+/* Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
+ * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with
+ * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
+ * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
+ * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
+ * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "ap_config.h"
+#include "httpd.h"
+#include "http_config.h"
+#include "http_main.h"
+#include "http_log.h"
+#include "http_core.h"
+#include "mpm_common.h"
+#include "os.h"
+#include "ap_mpm.h"
+#include "mod_unixd.h"
+#include "apr_thread_proc.h"
+#include "apr_strings.h"
+#include "apr_portable.h"
+#ifdef HAVE_PWD_H
+#include <pwd.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_RESOURCE_H
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#endif
+/* XXX */
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_GRP_H
+#include <grp.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
+#include <strings.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SEM_H
+#include <sys/sem.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifndef DEFAULT_USER
+#define DEFAULT_USER "#-1"
+#endif
+#ifndef DEFAULT_GROUP
+#define DEFAULT_GROUP "#-1"
+#endif
+
+#if 0
+typedef struct {
+ const char *user_name;
+ uid_t user_id;
+ gid_t group_id;
+ const char *chroot_dir;
+} unixd_config_t;
+#else
+/*
+ * TODO: clean up the separation between this code
+ * and its data structures and unixd.c, as shown
+ * by the fact that we include unixd.h. Create
+ * mod_unixd.h which does what we need and
+ * clean up unixd.h for what it no longer needs
+ */
+#include "unixd.h"
+#endif
+
+
+/* Set group privileges.
+ *
+ * Note that we use the username as set in the config files, rather than
+ * the lookup of to uid --- the same uid may have multiple passwd entries,
+ * with different sets of groups for each.
+ */
+
+static int set_group_privs(void)
+{
+ if (!geteuid()) {
+ const char *name;
+
+ /* Get username if passed as a uid */
+
+ if (ap_unixd_config.user_name[0] == '#') {
+ struct passwd *ent;
+ uid_t uid = atol(&ap_unixd_config.user_name[1]);
+
+ if ((ent = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) {
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ALERT, errno, NULL, APLOGNO(02155)
+ "getpwuid: couldn't determine user name from uid %ld, "
+ "you probably need to modify the User directive",
+ (long)uid);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ name = ent->pw_name;
+ }
+ else
+ name = ap_unixd_config.user_name;
+
+#if !defined(OS2)
+ /* OS/2 doesn't support groups. */
+ /*
+ * Set the GID before initgroups(), since on some platforms
+ * setgid() is known to zap the group list.
+ */
+ if (setgid(ap_unixd_config.group_id) == -1) {
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ALERT, errno, NULL, APLOGNO(02156)
+ "setgid: unable to set group id to Group %ld",
+ (long)ap_unixd_config.group_id);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ /* Reset `groups' attributes. */
+
+ if (initgroups(name, ap_unixd_config.group_id) == -1) {
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ALERT, errno, NULL, APLOGNO(02157)
+ "initgroups: unable to set groups for User %s "
+ "and Group %ld", name, (long)ap_unixd_config.group_id);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif /* !defined(OS2) */
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int
+unixd_drop_privileges(apr_pool_t *pool, server_rec *s)
+{
+ int rv = set_group_privs();
+
+ if (rv) {
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ if (NULL != ap_unixd_config.chroot_dir) {
+ if (geteuid()) {
+ rv = errno;
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ALERT, errno, NULL, APLOGNO(02158)
+ "Cannot chroot when not started as root");
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ if (chdir(ap_unixd_config.chroot_dir) != 0) {
+ rv = errno;
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ALERT, errno, NULL, APLOGNO(02159)
+ "Can't chdir to %s", ap_unixd_config.chroot_dir);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ if (chroot(ap_unixd_config.chroot_dir) != 0) {
+ rv = errno;
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ALERT, errno, NULL, APLOGNO(02160)
+ "Can't chroot to %s", ap_unixd_config.chroot_dir);
+ return rv;
+ }
+
+ if (chdir("/") != 0) {
+ rv = errno;
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ALERT, errno, NULL, APLOGNO(02161)
+ "Can't chdir to new root");
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Only try to switch if we're running as root */
+ if (!geteuid() && (
+#ifdef _OSD_POSIX
+ os_init_job_environment(NULL, ap_unixd_config.user_name, ap_exists_config_define("DEBUG")) != 0 ||
+#endif
+ setuid(ap_unixd_config.user_id) == -1)) {
+ rv = errno;
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ALERT, errno, NULL, APLOGNO(02162)
+ "setuid: unable to change to uid: %ld",
+ (long) ap_unixd_config.user_id);
+ return rv;
+ }
+#if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)
+ /* this applies to Linux 2.4+ */
+ if (ap_coredumpdir_configured) {
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1)) {
+ rv = errno;
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ALERT, errno, NULL, APLOGNO(02163)
+ "set dumpable failed - this child will not coredump"
+ " after software errors");
+ return rv;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return OK;
+}
+
+
+static const char *
+unixd_set_user(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dummy,
+ const char *arg)
+{
+ const char *err = ap_check_cmd_context(cmd, GLOBAL_ONLY);
+ if (err != NULL) {
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ ap_unixd_config.user_name = arg;
+ ap_unixd_config.user_id = ap_uname2id(arg);
+#if !defined (BIG_SECURITY_HOLE) && !defined (OS2)
+ if (ap_unixd_config.user_id == 0) {
+ return "Error:\tApache has not been designed to serve pages while\n"
+ "\trunning as root. There are known race conditions that\n"
+ "\twill allow any local user to read any file on the system.\n"
+ "\tIf you still desire to serve pages as root then\n"
+ "\tadd -DBIG_SECURITY_HOLE to the CFLAGS env variable\n"
+ "\tand then rebuild the server.\n"
+ "\tIt is strongly suggested that you instead modify the User\n"
+ "\tdirective in your httpd.conf file to list a non-root\n"
+ "\tuser.\n";
+ }
+#endif
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char*
+unixd_set_group(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dummy,
+ const char *arg)
+{
+ const char *err = ap_check_cmd_context(cmd, GLOBAL_ONLY);
+ if (err != NULL) {
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ ap_unixd_config.group_name = arg;
+ ap_unixd_config.group_id = ap_gname2id(arg);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char*
+unixd_set_chroot_dir(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dummy,
+ const char *arg)
+{
+ const char *err = ap_check_cmd_context(cmd, GLOBAL_ONLY);
+ if (err != NULL) {
+ return err;
+ }
+ if (!ap_is_directory(cmd->pool, arg)) {
+ return "ChrootDir must be a valid directory";
+ }
+
+ ap_unixd_config.chroot_dir = arg;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *
+unixd_set_suexec(cmd_parms *cmd, void *dummy, int arg)
+{
+ const char *err = ap_check_cmd_context(cmd, GLOBAL_ONLY);
+
+ if (err != NULL) {
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ if (!ap_unixd_config.suexec_enabled && arg) {
+ return apr_pstrcat(cmd->pool, "suEXEC isn't supported: ",
+ ap_unixd_config.suexec_disabled_reason, NULL);
+ }
+
+ if (!arg) {
+ ap_unixd_config.suexec_disabled_reason = "Suexec directive is Off";
+ }
+
+ ap_unixd_config.suexec_enabled = arg;
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#ifdef AP_SUEXEC_CAPABILITIES
+/* If suexec is using capabilities, don't test for the setuid bit. */
+#define SETUID_TEST(finfo) (1)
+#else
+#define SETUID_TEST(finfo) (finfo.protection & APR_USETID)
+#endif
+
+static int
+unixd_pre_config(apr_pool_t *pconf, apr_pool_t *plog,
+ apr_pool_t *ptemp)
+{
+ apr_finfo_t wrapper;
+ ap_unixd_config.user_name = DEFAULT_USER;
+ ap_unixd_config.user_id = ap_uname2id(DEFAULT_USER);
+ ap_unixd_config.group_name = DEFAULT_GROUP;
+ ap_unixd_config.group_id = ap_gname2id(DEFAULT_GROUP);
+
+ ap_unixd_config.chroot_dir = NULL; /* none */
+
+ /* Check for suexec */
+ ap_unixd_config.suexec_enabled = 0;
+ if ((apr_stat(&wrapper, SUEXEC_BIN, APR_FINFO_NORM, ptemp))
+ == APR_SUCCESS) {
+ if (SETUID_TEST(wrapper) && wrapper.user == 0
+ && (access(SUEXEC_BIN, R_OK|X_OK) == 0)) {
+ ap_unixd_config.suexec_enabled = 1;
+ ap_unixd_config.suexec_disabled_reason = "";
+ }
+ else {
+ ap_unixd_config.suexec_disabled_reason =
+ "Invalid owner or file mode for " SUEXEC_BIN;
+ }
+ }
+ else {
+ ap_unixd_config.suexec_disabled_reason =
+ "Missing suexec binary " SUEXEC_BIN;
+ }
+
+ ap_sys_privileges_handlers(1);
+ return OK;
+}
+
+AP_DECLARE(int) ap_unixd_setup_child(void)
+{
+ if (set_group_privs()) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (NULL != ap_unixd_config.chroot_dir) {
+ if (geteuid()) {
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ALERT, errno, NULL, APLOGNO(02164)
+ "Cannot chroot when not started as root");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (chdir(ap_unixd_config.chroot_dir) != 0) {
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ALERT, errno, NULL, APLOGNO(02165)
+ "Can't chdir to %s", ap_unixd_config.chroot_dir);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (chroot(ap_unixd_config.chroot_dir) != 0) {
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ALERT, errno, NULL, APLOGNO(02166)
+ "Can't chroot to %s", ap_unixd_config.chroot_dir);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (chdir("/") != 0) {
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ALERT, errno, NULL, APLOGNO(02167)
+ "Can't chdir to new root");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Only try to switch if we're running as root */
+ if (!geteuid() && (
+#ifdef _OSD_POSIX
+ os_init_job_environment(NULL, ap_unixd_config.user_name, ap_exists_config_define("DEBUG")) != 0 ||
+#endif
+ setuid(ap_unixd_config.user_id) == -1)) {
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ALERT, errno, NULL, APLOGNO(02168)
+ "setuid: unable to change to uid: %ld",
+ (long) ap_unixd_config.user_id);
+ return -1;
+ }
+#if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)
+ /* this applies to Linux 2.4+ */
+ if (ap_coredumpdir_configured) {
+ if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 1)) {
+ ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ALERT, errno, NULL, APLOGNO(02169)
+ "set dumpable failed - this child will not coredump"
+ " after software errors");
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void unixd_dump_config(apr_pool_t *p, server_rec *s)
+{
+ apr_file_t *out = NULL;
+ apr_uid_t uid = ap_unixd_config.user_id;
+ apr_gid_t gid = ap_unixd_config.group_id;
+ char *no_root = "";
+ if (!ap_exists_config_define("DUMP_RUN_CFG"))
+ return;
+ if (geteuid() != 0)
+ no_root = " not_used";
+ apr_file_open_stdout(&out, p);
+ apr_file_printf(out, "User: name=\"%s\" id=%lu%s\n",
+ ap_unixd_config.user_name, (unsigned long)uid, no_root);
+ apr_file_printf(out, "Group: name=\"%s\" id=%lu%s\n",
+ ap_unixd_config.group_name, (unsigned long)gid, no_root);
+ if (ap_unixd_config.chroot_dir)
+ apr_file_printf(out, "ChrootDir: \"%s\"%s\n",
+ ap_unixd_config.chroot_dir, no_root);
+}
+
+static void unixd_hooks(apr_pool_t *pool)
+{
+ ap_hook_pre_config(unixd_pre_config,
+ NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_FIRST);
+ ap_hook_test_config(unixd_dump_config,
+ NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_FIRST);
+ ap_hook_drop_privileges(unixd_drop_privileges,
+ NULL, NULL, APR_HOOK_MIDDLE);
+}
+
+static const command_rec unixd_cmds[] = {
+ AP_INIT_TAKE1("User", unixd_set_user, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
+ "Effective user id for this server"),
+ AP_INIT_TAKE1("Group", unixd_set_group, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
+ "Effective group id for this server"),
+ AP_INIT_TAKE1("ChrootDir", unixd_set_chroot_dir, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
+ "The directory to chroot(2) into"),
+ AP_INIT_FLAG("Suexec", unixd_set_suexec, NULL, RSRC_CONF,
+ "Enable or disable suEXEC support"),
+ {NULL}
+};
+
+AP_DECLARE_MODULE(unixd) = {
+ STANDARD20_MODULE_STUFF,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ unixd_cmds,
+ unixd_hooks
+};
+
diff --git a/modules/arch/unix/mod_unixd.h b/modules/arch/unix/mod_unixd.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a7f439e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/modules/arch/unix/mod_unixd.h
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/* Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more
+ * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with
+ * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership.
+ * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0
+ * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with
+ * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * @file mod_unixd.h
+ * @brief common stuff that unix MPMs will want
+ *
+ * @addtogroup APACHE_OS_UNIX
+ * @{
+ */
+
+#ifndef MOD_UNIXD_H
+#define MOD_UNIXD_H
+
+#include "ap_config.h"
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+AP_DECLARE(int) ap_unixd_setup_child(void);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
+/** @} */
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-22 10:19:53 +0000