Adding upstream version 1:9.11.5.P4+dfsg.upstream/1%9.11.5.P4+dfsgupstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 15818 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.2h-patch b/bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.2h-patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3a55fd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bin/pkcs11/openssl-1.0.2h-patch
@@ -0,0 +1,15818 @@
+Index: openssl/Configure
+diff -u openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/Configure:1.17.2.3
+--- openssl/Configure:1.9.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.4.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1	Mon Jun 13 15:41:03 2016
++++ openssl/Configure	Mon Jun 13 15:51:06 2016
+@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
+ 
+ # see INSTALL for instructions.
+ 
+-my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
++my $usage="Usage: Configure --pk11-libname=PK11_LIB_LOCATION --pk11-flavor=FLAVOR [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [experimental-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-krb5] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--test-sanity] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
+ 
+ # Options:
+ #
+@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@
+ #               default).  This needn't be set in advance, you can
+ #               just as well use "make INSTALL_PREFIX=/whatever install".
+ #
++# --pk11-libname  PKCS#11 library name.
++#               (No default)
++#
++# --pk11-flavor either crypto-accelerator or sign-only
++#               (No default)
++#
+ # --with-krb5-dir  Declare where Kerberos 5 lives.  The libraries are expected
+ #		to live in the subdirectory lib/ and the header files in
+ #		include/.  A value is required.
+@@ -402,31 +408,30 @@
+ #
+ #       ./Configure linux-armv4 -march=armv6 -D__ARM_MAX_ARCH__=8
+ #
+-"linux-armv4",	"gcc: -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+-"linux-aarch64","gcc: -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${aarch64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
++"linux-armv4",	"gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${armv4_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
++"linux-aarch64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${aarch64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+ # Configure script adds minimally required -march for assembly support,
+ # if no -march was specified at command line. mips32 and mips64 below
+ # refer to contemporary MIPS Architecture specifications, MIPS32 and
+ # MIPS64, rather than to kernel bitness.
+-"linux-mips32",	"gcc:-mabi=32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+-"linux-mips64",   "gcc:-mabi=n32 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
+-"linux64-mips64",   "gcc:-mabi=64 -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
++"linux-mips32",	"gcc:-mabi=32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips32_asm}:o32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
++"linux-mips64",   "gcc:-mabi=n32 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:n32:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=n32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::32",
++"linux64-mips64",   "gcc:-mabi=64 -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall -DBN_DIV3W::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${mips64_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mabi=64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+ #### IA-32 targets...
+-"linux-ia32-icc",	"icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+-"linux-elf",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+-"linux-aout",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out",
++"linux-ia32-icc",	"icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-KPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
++"linux-elf",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_elf_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
++"linux-aout",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -march=i486 -Wall::(unknown):::BN_LLONG ${x86_gcc_des} ${x86_gcc_opts}:${x86_asm}:a.out",
+ ####
+-"linux-generic64","gcc:-O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+-"linux-ppc64",	"gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+-"linux-ppc64le","gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:$ppc64_asm:linux64le:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::",
++"linux-generic64","gcc:-DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL BF_PTR:${no_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
++"linux-ppc64",	"gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:${ppc64_asm}:linux64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
++"linux-ppc64le","gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_UNROLL:$ppc64_asm:linux64le:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::",
+ "linux-ia64",	"gcc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_UNROLL DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+-"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
+-"linux-x86_64",	"gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+-"linux-x86_64-clang",	"clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall -Wextra $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+-"debug-linux-x86_64-clang",	"clang: -DBN_DEBUG -DREF_CHECK -DCONF_DEBUG -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -g -Wall -Wextra $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+-"linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+-"linux-x32",	"gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32",
+-"linux64-s390x",	"gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
++"linux-ia64-icc","icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_RISC1 DES_INT:${ia64_asm}:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR)",
++"linux-x86_64",	"gcc:-m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
++"linux-x86_64-clang",	"clang: -m64 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Weverything $clang_disabled_warnings -Qunused-arguments::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
++"linux-x86_64-icc", "icc:-DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O2::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl -no_cpprt:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC::.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
++"linux-x32",	"gcc:-mx32 -DL_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT RC4_CHUNK_LL DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${x86_64_asm}:elf:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-mx32:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::x32",
++"linux64-s390x",	"gcc:-m64 -DB_ENDIAN -DTERMIO -O3 -Wall::-D_REENTRANT::-ldl:SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG RC4_CHAR RC4_CHUNK DES_INT DES_UNROLL:${s390x_asm}:64:dlfcn:linux-shared:-fPIC:-m64:.so.\$(SHLIB_MAJOR).\$(SHLIB_MINOR):::64",
+ #### So called "highgprs" target for z/Architecture CPUs
+ # "Highgprs" is kernel feature first implemented in Linux 2.6.32, see
+ # /proc/cpuinfo. The idea is to preserve most significant bits of
+@@ -724,6 +729,10 @@
+ my $idx_arflags = $idx++;
+ my $idx_multilib = $idx++;
+ 
++# PKCS#11 engine patch
++my $pk11_libname="";
++my $pk11_flavor="";
++
+ my $prefix="";
+ my $libdir="";
+ my $openssldir="";
+@@ -944,7 +953,15 @@
+ 			}
+ 		elsif (/^[-+]/)
+ 			{
+-			if (/^--prefix=(.*)$/)
++			if (/^--pk11-libname=(.*)$/)
++				{
++				$pk11_libname=$1;
++				}
++			elsif (/^--pk11-flavor=(.*)$/)
++				{
++				$pk11_flavor=$1;
++				}
++			elsif (/^--prefix=(.*)$/)
+ 				{
+ 				$prefix=$1;
+ 				}
+@@ -1115,6 +1132,22 @@
+ 	exit 0;
+ }
+ 
++if (! $pk11_libname)
++        {
++        print STDERR "You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.\n";
++        print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
++        exit 1;
++        }
++
++if (! $pk11_flavor
++    || !($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator" || $pk11_flavor eq "sign-only"))
++	{
++	print STDERR "You must set --pk11-flavor.\n";
++	print STDERR "Choices are crypto-accelerator and sign-only.\n";
++	print STDERR "See README.pkcs11 for more information.\n";
++	exit 1;
++	}
++
+ if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) {
+ 	$target = "Cygwin".$1;
+ }
+@@ -1192,6 +1225,25 @@
+ 	$exp_cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$ALGO";
+ 	}
+ 
++if ($pk11_flavor eq "crypto-accelerator")
++	{
++	$openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n";
++	$default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO";
++	$depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO";
++	$options .= " no-hw-pkcs11so";
++	print "    no-hw-pkcs11so  [pk11-flavor]";
++	print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO\n";
++	}
++else
++	{
++	$openssl_other_defines .= "#define OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n";
++	$default_depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA";
++	$depflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA";
++	$options .= " no-hw-pkcs11ca";
++	print "    no-hw-pkcs11ca  [pk11-flavor]";
++	print " OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA\n";
++}
++
+ my $IsMK1MF=scalar grep /^$target$/,@MK1MF_Builds;
+ 
+ $exe_ext=".exe" if ($target eq "Cygwin" || $target eq "DJGPP" || $target =~ /^mingw/);
+@@ -1289,6 +1341,8 @@
+ if ($flags ne "")	{ $cflags="$flags$cflags"; }
+ else			{ $no_user_cflags=1;       }
+ 
++$cflags="-DPK11_LIB_LOCATION=\"$pk11_libname\" $cflags";
++
+ # Kerberos settings.  The flavor must be provided from outside, either through
+ # the script "config" or manually.
+ if (!$no_krb5)
+@@ -1698,6 +1752,7 @@
+ 	s/^VERSION=.*/VERSION=$version/;
+ 	s/^MAJOR=.*/MAJOR=$major/;
+ 	s/^MINOR=.*/MINOR=$minor/;
++	s/^PK11_LIB_LOCATION=.*/PK11_LIB_LOCATION=$pk11_libname/;
+ 	s/^SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=$shlib_version_number/;
+ 	s/^SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=.*/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY=$shlib_version_history/;
+ 	s/^SHLIB_MAJOR=.*/SHLIB_MAJOR=$shlib_major/;
+Index: openssl/Makefile.org
+diff -u openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.8.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/Makefile.org:1.10.2.3
+--- openssl/Makefile.org:1.5.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.8.1.2.1.2.1	Mon Jun 13 15:41:03 2016
++++ openssl/Makefile.org	Mon Jun 13 15:51:08 2016
+@@ -26,6 +26,9 @@
+ INSTALL_PREFIX=
+ INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl
+ 
++# You must set this through --pk11-libname configure option.
++PK11_LIB_LOCATION=
++
+ # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this!
+ OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl
+ 
+Index: openssl/README.pkcs11
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/README.pkcs11:1.8
+--- /dev/null	Mon Jun 13 15:55:24 2016
++++ openssl/README.pkcs11	Fri Oct  4 14:16:43 2013
+@@ -0,0 +1,266 @@
++ISC modified
++============
++
++The previous key naming scheme was kept for backward compatibility.
++
++The PKCS#11 engine exists in two flavors, crypto-accelerator and
++sign-only. The first one is from the Solaris patch and uses the
++PKCS#11 device for all crypto operations it supports. The second
++is a stripped down version which provides only the useful
++function (i.e., signature with a RSA private key in the device
++protected key store and key loading).
++
++As a hint PKCS#11 boards should use the crypto-accelerator flavor,
++external PKCS#11 devices the sign-only. SCA 6000 is an example
++of the first, AEP Keyper of the second.
++
++Note it is mandatory to set a pk11-flavor (and only one) in
++config/Configure.
++
++It is highly recommended to compile in (vs. as a DSO) the engine.
++The way to configure this is system dependent, on Unixes it is no-shared
++(and is in general the default), on WIN32 it is enable-static-engine
++(and still enable to build the OpenSSL libraries as DLLs).
++
++PKCS#11 engine support for OpenSSL 0.9.8l
++=========================================
++
++[Nov 19, 2009]
++
++Contents:
++
++Overview
++Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch
++FAQs
++Feedback
++
++Overview
++========
++
++This patch containing code available in OpenSolaris adds support for PKCS#11
++engine into OpenSSL and implements PKCS#11 v2.20. It is to be applied against
++OpenSSL 0.9.8l source code distribution as shipped by OpenSSL.Org. Your system
++must provide PKCS#11 backend otherwise the patch is useless. You provide the
++PKCS#11 library name during the build configuration phase, see below.
++
++Patch can be applied like this:
++
++	# NOTE: use gtar if on Solaris
++	tar xfzv openssl-0.9.8l.tar.gz
++	# now download the patch to the current directory
++	# ...
++	cd openssl-0.9.8l
++	# NOTE: must use gpatch if on Solaris (is part of the system)
++	patch -p1 < path-to/pkcs11_engine-0.9.8l.patch.2009-11-19
++
++It is designed to support pure acceleration for RSA, DSA, DH and all the
++symetric ciphers and message digest algorithms that PKCS#11 and OpenSSL share
++except for missing support for patented algorithms MDC2, RC3, RC5 and IDEA.
++
++According to the PKCS#11 providers installed on your machine, it can support
++following mechanisms:
++
++	RSA, DSA, DH, RAND, DES-CBC, DES-EDE3-CBC, DES-ECB, DES-EDE3, RC4,
++	AES-128-CBC, AES-192-CBC, AES-256-CBC, AES-128-ECB, AES-192-ECB,
++	AES-256-ECB, AES-128-CTR, AES-192-CTR, AES-256-CTR, MD5, SHA1, SHA224,
++	SHA256, SHA384, SHA512
++
++Note that for AES counter mode the application must provide their own EVP
++functions since OpenSSL doesn't support counter mode through EVP yet. You may
++see OpenSSH source code (cipher.c) to get the idea how to do that. SunSSH is an
++example of code that uses the PKCS#11 engine and deals with the fork-safety
++problem (see engine.c and packet.c files if interested).
++
++You must provide the location of PKCS#11 library in your system to the
++configure script. You will be instructed to do that when you try to run the
++config script:
++
++	$ ./config 
++	Operating system: i86pc-whatever-solaris2
++	Configuring for solaris-x86-cc
++	You must set --pk11-libname for PKCS#11 library.
++	See README.pkcs11 for more information.
++
++Taking openCryptoki project on Linux AMD64 box as an example, you would run
++configure script like this:
++
++	./config --pk11-libname=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/PKCS11_API.so
++
++To check whether newly built openssl really supports PKCS#11 it's enough to run
++"apps/openssl engine" and look for "(pkcs11) PKCS #11 engine support" in the
++output. If you see no PKCS#11 engine support check that the built openssl binary
++and the PKCS#11 library from --pk11-libname don't conflict on 32/64 bits.
++
++The patch, during various phases of development, was tested on Solaris against
++PKCS#11 engine available from Solaris Cryptographic Framework (Solaris 10 and
++OpenSolaris) and also on Linux using PKCS#11 libraries from openCryptoki project
++(see openCryptoki website http://sourceforge.net/projects/opencryptoki for more
++information). Some Linux distributions even ship those libraries with the
++system. The patch should work on any system that is supported by OpenSSL itself
++and has functional PKCS#11 library.
++
++The patch contains "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
++(Cryptoki)" - files cryptoki.h, pkcs11.h, pkcs11f.h and pkcs11t.h which are
++copyrighted by RSA Security Inc., see pkcs11.h for more information.
++
++Other added/modified code in this patch is copyrighted by Sun Microsystems,
++Inc. and is released under the OpenSSL license (see LICENSE file for more
++information).
++
++Revisions of the patch for 0.9.8 branch
++=======================================
++
++2009-11-19
++- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8l
++
++- bugs and RFEs:
++
++	6479874 OpenSSL should support RSA key by reference/hardware keystores
++	6896677 PKCS#11 engine's hw_pk11_err.h needs to be split
++	6732677 make check to trigger Solaris specific code automatic in the
++		PKCS#11 engine
++
++2009-03-11
++- adjusted for OpenSSL version 0.9.8j 
++
++- README.pkcs11 moved out of the patch, and is shipped together with it in a
++  tarball instead so that it can be read before the patch is applied.
++
++- fixed bugs:
++
++	6804216 pkcs#11 engine should support a key length range for RC4
++	6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if
++		meta slot is disabled
++
++2008-12-02
++- fixed bugs and RFEs (most of the work done by Vladimir Kotal)
++
++	6723504 more granular locking in PKCS#11 engine
++	6667128 CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE assumption does not hold true
++	6710420 PKCS#11 engine source should be lint clean
++	6747327 PKCS#11 engine atfork handlers need to be aware of guys who take
++		it seriously
++	6746712 PKCS#11 engine source code should be cstyle clean
++	6731380 return codes of several functions are not checked in the PKCS#11
++		engine code
++	6746735 PKCS#11 engine should use extended FILE space API
++	6734038 Apache SSL web server using the pkcs11 engine fails to start if
++		meta slot is disabled
++
++2008-08-01
++- fixed bug
++
++	6731839 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine no longer uses n2cp for symmetric ciphers
++		and digests
++
++- Solaris specific code for slot selection made automatic
++
++2008-07-29
++- update the patch to OpenSSL 0.9.8h version
++- pkcs11t.h updated to the latest version:
++
++	6545665 make CKM_AES_CTR available to non-kernel users
++
++- fixed bugs in the engine code:
++
++	6602801 PK11_SESSION cache has to employ reference counting scheme for
++		asymmetric key operations
++	6605538 pkcs11 functions C_FindObjects[{Init,Final}]() not called
++		atomically
++	6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys
++	6652362 pk11_RSA_finish() is cutting corners
++	6662112 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() use locking in
++		suboptimal way
++	6666625 pk11_destroy_{rsa,dsa,dh}_key_objects() should be more
++		resilient to destroy failures
++	6667273 OpenSSL engine should not use free() but OPENSSL_free()
++	6670363 PKCS#11 engine fails to reuse existing symmetric keys
++	6678135 memory corruption in pk11_DH_generate_key() in pkcs#11 engine
++	6678503 DSA signature conversion in pk11_dsa_do_verify() ignores size
++		of big numbers leading to failures
++	6706562 pk11_DH_compute_key() returns 0 in case of failure instead of
++		-1
++	6706622 pk11_load_{pub,priv}key create corrupted RSA key references
++	6707129 return values from BN_new() in pk11_DH_generate_key() are not
++		checked
++	6707274 DSA/RSA/DH PKCS#11 engine operations need to be resistant to
++		structure reuse
++	6707782 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine pretends to be aware of
++		OPENSSL_NO_{RSA,DSA,DH}
++	defines but fails miserably
++	6709966 make check_new_*() to return values to indicate cache hit/miss
++	6705200 pk11_dh struct initialization in PKCS#11 engine is missing
++		generate_params parameter
++	6709513 PKCS#11 engine sets IV length even for ECB modes
++	6728296 buffer length not initialized for C_(En|De)crypt_Final() in the
++		PKCS#11 engine
++	6728871 PKCS#11 engine must reset global_session in pk11_finish()
++
++- new features and enhancements:
++
++	6562155 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for SHA224/256/384/512
++	6685012 OpenSSL pkcs#11 engine needs support for new cipher modes
++	6725903 OpenSSL PKCS#11 engine shouldn't use soft token for symmetric
++		ciphers and digests
++
++2007-10-15
++- update for 0.9.8f version
++- update for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference"
++
++2007-10-02
++- draft for "6607670 teach pkcs#11 engine how to use keys be reference"
++- draft for "6607307 pkcs#11 engine can't read RSA private keys"
++
++2007-09-26
++- 6375348 Using pkcs11 as the SSLCryptoDevice with Apache/OpenSSL causes
++	  significant performance drop
++- 6573196 memory is leaked when OpenSSL is used with PKCS#11 engine
++
++2007-05-25
++- 6558630 race in OpenSSL pkcs11 engine when using symetric block ciphers
++
++2007-05-19
++- initial patch for 0.9.8e using latest OpenSolaris code
++
++FAQs
++====
++
++(1) my build failed on Linux distro with this error:
++
++../libcrypto.a(hw_pk11.o): In function `pk11_library_init':
++hw_pk11.c:(.text+0x20f5): undefined reference to `pthread_atfork'
++
++Answer:
++
++	- don't use "no-threads" when configuring
++	- if you didn't then OpenSSL failed to create a threaded library by
++	  default. You may manually edit Configure and try again. Look for the
++	  architecture that Configure printed, for example:
++
++Configured for linux-elf.
++
++	- then edit Configure, find string "linux-elf" (inluding the quotes),
++	  and add flags to support threads to the 4th column of the 2nd string.
++	  If you build with GCC then adding "-pthread" should be enough. With
++	  "linux-elf" as an example, you would add " -pthread" right after
++	  "-D_REENTRANT", like this:
++
++....-O3 -fomit-frame-pointer -Wall::-D_REENTRANT -pthread::-ldl:.....
++
++(2) I'm using MinGW/MSYS environment and get undeclared reference error for
++pthread_atfork() function when trying to build OpenSSL with the patch.
++
++Answer:
++
++	Sorry, pthread_atfork() is not implemented in the current pthread-win32
++	(as of Nov 2009). You can not use the patch there.
++
++
++Feedback
++========
++
++Please send feedback to security-discuss@opensolaris.org. The patch was
++created by Jan.Pechanec@Sun.COM from code available in OpenSolaris.
++
++Latest version should be always available on http://blogs.sun.com/janp.
++
+Index: openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h
+diff -u openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.4.1.10.1.4.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.8.2.3
+--- openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h:1.6.2.1.4.1.10.1.4.1.2.1.2.1	Mon Jun 13 15:41:06 2016
++++ openssl/crypto/opensslconf.h	Mon Jun 13 15:51:23 2016
+@@ -53,6 +53,9 @@
+ 
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_DOING_MAKEDEPEND */
+ 
++#ifndef OPENSSL_THREADS
++# define OPENSSL_THREADS
++#endif
+ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+ # define OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE
+ #endif
+@@ -106,6 +109,8 @@
+ # endif
+ #endif
+ 
++#define OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ
++
+ /* crypto/opensslconf.h.in */
+ 
+ /* Generate 80386 code? */
+@@ -152,7 +157,7 @@
+  * This enables code handling data aligned at natural CPU word
+  * boundary. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details.
+  */
+-#undef RC4_CHUNK
++#define RC4_CHUNK unsigned long
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -160,7 +165,7 @@
+ /* If this is set to 'unsigned int' on a DEC Alpha, this gives about a
+  * %20 speed up (longs are 8 bytes, int's are 4). */
+ #ifndef DES_LONG
+-#define DES_LONG unsigned long
++#define DES_LONG unsigned int
+ #endif
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -171,9 +176,9 @@
+ /* Should we define BN_DIV2W here? */
+ 
+ /* Only one for the following should be defined */
+-#undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
++#define SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG
+ #undef SIXTY_FOUR_BIT
+-#define THIRTY_TWO_BIT
++#undef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
+ #endif
+ 
+ #if defined(HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_RC4_LOCL_H)
+@@ -185,7 +190,7 @@
+ 
+ #if defined(HEADER_BF_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H)
+ #define CONFIG_HEADER_BF_LOCL_H
+-#undef BF_PTR
++#define BF_PTR2
+ #endif /* HEADER_BF_LOCL_H */
+ 
+ #if defined(HEADER_DES_LOCL_H) && !defined(CONFIG_HEADER_DES_LOCL_H)
+@@ -215,7 +220,7 @@
+ /* Unroll the inner loop, this sometimes helps, sometimes hinders.
+  * Very mucy CPU dependant */
+ #ifndef DES_UNROLL
+-#undef DES_UNROLL
++#define DES_UNROLL
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* These default values were supplied by
+Index: openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c
+diff -u openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.2.1.28.1.2.1 openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.10.2
+--- openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c:1.6.2.1.28.1.2.1	Wed Dec 23 18:55:13 2015
++++ openssl/crypto/bio/bss_file.c	Wed Dec 23 19:28:46 2015
+@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@
+     if (file == NULL) {
+         SYSerr(SYS_F_FOPEN, get_last_sys_error());
+         ERR_add_error_data(5, "fopen('", filename, "','", mode, "')");
+-        if (errno == ENOENT)
++        if ((errno == ENOENT) || ((*mode == 'r') && (errno == EACCES)))
+             BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE);
+         else
+             BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_FILE, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile
+diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.4.1.14.1.2.1 openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.9.6.2
+--- openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile:1.8.2.1.4.1.14.1.2.1	Wed Dec 23 18:55:22 2015
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/Makefile	Wed Dec 23 19:28:56 2015
+@@ -22,13 +22,15 @@
+ 	tb_rsa.c tb_dsa.c tb_ecdsa.c tb_dh.c tb_ecdh.c tb_rand.c tb_store.c \
+ 	tb_cipher.c tb_digest.c tb_pkmeth.c tb_asnmth.c \
+ 	eng_openssl.c eng_cnf.c eng_dyn.c eng_cryptodev.c \
+-	eng_rdrand.c
++	eng_rdrand.c \
++	hw_pk11.c hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so_pub.c
+ LIBOBJ= eng_err.o eng_lib.o eng_list.o eng_init.o eng_ctrl.o \
+ 	eng_table.o eng_pkey.o eng_fat.o eng_all.o \
+ 	tb_rsa.o tb_dsa.o tb_ecdsa.o tb_dh.o tb_ecdh.o tb_rand.o tb_store.o \
+ 	tb_cipher.o tb_digest.o tb_pkmeth.o tb_asnmth.o \
+ 	eng_openssl.o eng_cnf.o eng_dyn.o eng_cryptodev.o \
+-	eng_rdrand.o
++	eng_rdrand.o \
++	hw_pk11.o hw_pk11_pub.o hw_pk11so.o hw_pk11so_pub.o
+ 
+ SRC= $(LIBSRC)
+ 
+@@ -282,6 +284,83 @@
+ eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
+ eng_table.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h eng_int.h
+ eng_table.o: eng_table.c
++hw_pk11.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/aes.h
++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h
++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/dh.h
++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/dso.h
++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h
++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h
++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/err.h
++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h
++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h
++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
++hw_pk11.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11.c
++hw_pk11.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11ca.h pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dh.h ../../include/openssl/dsa.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11_pub.c hw_pk11ca.h
++hw_pk11_pub.o: pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/md5.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pem.h ../../include/openssl/pem2.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h
++hw_pk11so.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h
++hw_pk11so.o: hw_pk11_err.c hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.c hw_pk11so.h pkcs11.h
++hw_pk11so.o: pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pem.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/pem2.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: ../cryptlib.h cryptoki.h hw_pk11_err.h hw_pk11so.h
++hw_pk11so_pub.o: hw_pk11so_pub.c pkcs11.h pkcs11f.h pkcs11t.h
+ tb_asnmth.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h
+ tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h
+ tb_asnmth.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h:1.4
+--- /dev/null	Mon Jun 13 15:55:25 2016
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/cryptoki.h	Thu Dec 18 00:14:12 2008
+@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
++/*
++ * CDDL HEADER START
++ *
++ * The contents of this file are subject to the terms of the
++ * Common Development and Distribution License, Version 1.0 only
++ * (the "License").  You may not use this file except in compliance
++ * with the License.
++ *
++ * You can obtain a copy of the license at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE
++ * or http://www.opensolaris.org/os/licensing.
++ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions
++ * and limitations under the License.
++ *
++ * When distributing Covered Code, include this CDDL HEADER in each
++ * file and include the License file at usr/src/OPENSOLARIS.LICENSE.
++ * If applicable, add the following below this CDDL HEADER, with the
++ * fields enclosed by brackets "[]" replaced with your own identifying
++ * information: Portions Copyright [yyyy] [name of copyright owner]
++ *
++ * CDDL HEADER END
++ */
++/*
++ * Copyright 2003 Sun Microsystems, Inc.   All rights reserved.
++ * Use is subject to license terms.
++ */
++
++#ifndef	_CRYPTOKI_H
++#define	_CRYPTOKI_H
++
++/* ident	"@(#)cryptoki.h	1.2	05/06/08 SMI" */
++
++#ifdef	__cplusplus
++extern "C" {
++#endif
++
++#ifndef	CK_PTR
++#define	CK_PTR *
++#endif
++
++#ifndef CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION
++#define	CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name
++#endif
++
++#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION
++#define	CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType name
++#endif
++
++#ifndef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER
++#define	CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) returnType (* name)
++#endif
++
++#ifndef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION
++#define	CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) returnType (* name)
++#endif
++
++#ifndef NULL_PTR
++#include <unistd.h>	/* For NULL */
++#define	NULL_PTR NULL
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * pkcs11t.h defines TRUE and FALSE in a way that upsets lint
++ */
++#ifndef	CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
++#define	CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
++#ifndef	TRUE
++#define	TRUE	1
++#endif /* TRUE */
++#ifndef	FALSE
++#define	FALSE	0
++#endif /* FALSE */
++#endif /* CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE */
++
++#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
++
++#include "pkcs11.h"
++
++/* Solaris specific functions */
++
++#include <stdlib.h>
++
++/*
++ * SUNW_C_GetMechSession will initialize the framework and do all
++ * the necessary PKCS#11 calls to create a session capable of
++ * providing operations on the requested mechanism
++ */
++CK_RV SUNW_C_GetMechSession(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech,
++    CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR hSession);
++
++/*
++ * SUNW_C_KeyToObject will create a secret key object for the given
++ * mechanism from the rawkey data.
++ */
++CK_RV SUNW_C_KeyToObject(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,
++    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, const void *rawkey, size_t rawkey_len,
++    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR obj);
++
++
++#ifdef	__cplusplus
++}
++#endif
++
++#endif	/* _CRYPTOKI_H */
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c
+diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.4.1.14.1.4.1 openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.6.6.2
+--- openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c:1.5.2.1.4.1.14.1.4.1	Mon Jun 13 15:41:32 2016
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/eng_all.c	Mon Jun 13 15:51:59 2016
+@@ -119,6 +119,14 @@
+ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG)
+     ENGINE_load_capi();
+ # endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA
++    ENGINE_load_pk11ca();
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO
++    ENGINE_load_pk11so();
++#endif
++#endif
+ #endif
+     ENGINE_register_all_complete();
+ }
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h
+diff -u openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.4.1.14.1 openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.6.6.1
+--- openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h:1.5.2.1.4.1.14.1	Wed Mar  4 14:43:55 2015
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/engine.h	Wed Mar  4 15:22:32 2015
+@@ -405,6 +405,12 @@
+ void ENGINE_load_ubsec(void);
+ void ENGINE_load_padlock(void);
+ void ENGINE_load_capi(void);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA
++void ENGINE_load_pk11ca(void);
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO
++void ENGINE_load_pk11so(void);
++#endif
+ #  ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GMP
+ void ENGINE_load_gmp(void);
+ #  endif
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c:1.33
+--- /dev/null	Mon Jun 13 15:55:25 2016
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c	Fri Oct  4 14:07:41 2013
+@@ -0,0 +1,4010 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
++ * Use is subject to license terms.
++ */
++
++/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
++/*
++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
++ *
++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
++ * Afchine Madjlessi.
++ */
++/*
++ * ====================================================================
++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ *
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ *
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
++ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
++ *    distribution.
++ *
++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
++ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
++ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
++ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
++ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
++ *
++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
++ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
++ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
++ *
++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
++ *    acknowledgment:
++ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ * ====================================================================
++ *
++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
++ *
++ */
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++
++#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <cryptlib.h>
++#include <openssl/engine.h>
++#include <openssl/dso.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++#include <openssl/md5.h>
++#include <openssl/pem.h>
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++#include <openssl/rsa.h>
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++#include <openssl/dsa.h>
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++#include <openssl/dh.h>
++#endif
++#include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/objects.h>
++#include <openssl/x509.h>
++#include <openssl/aes.h>
++#include <openssl/des.h>
++
++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++typedef int pid_t;
++#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId()
++#define NOPTHREADS
++#ifndef NULL_PTR
++#define NULL_PTR NULL
++#endif
++#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++	returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++	returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
++	returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
++#else
++#include <signal.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <dlfcn.h>
++#endif
++
++/* Debug mutexes */
++/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */
++#define DEBUG_MUTEX
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */
++#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
++#define __USE_UNIX98
++#endif
++#include <pthread.h>
++#endif
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
++
++/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
++#define	PK11_DBG	"PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
++/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
++/* #undef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++/*
++ * Solaris specific code. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more
++ * information.
++ */
++#if defined(__SVR4) && defined(__sun)
++#undef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++#endif
++
++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
++#include "cryptoki.h"
++#include "pkcs11.h"
++#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
++#else
++#include "cryptoki.h"
++#include "pkcs11.h"
++#endif
++#include "hw_pk11ca.h"
++#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
++
++/*
++ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
++ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
++ * RSA keys by reference feature.
++ */
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
++#endif
++
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++/*
++ * Tables for symmetric ciphers and digest mechs found in the pkcs11_kernel
++ * library. See comment at check_hw_mechanisms() for more information.
++ */
++static int *hw_cnids;
++static int *hw_dnids;
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
++static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
++
++/*
++ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
++ * logging into the token.
++ */
++CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
++
++/*
++ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
++ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
++ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
++ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
++ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
++ * PK11_SESSION object.
++ *
++ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
++ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
++ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
++ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
++ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
++ *
++ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
++ * They are also used for active list protection.
++ */
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
++ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
++ * list) for given algorithm type
++ */
++PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
++
++/*
++ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
++ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
++ * without losing the secret key objects.
++ */
++static CK_SESSION_HANDLE	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++
++/* ENGINE level stuff */
++static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
++static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
++static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
++static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));
++static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
++
++/* RAND stuff */
++static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
++static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
++static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
++static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
++static int pk11_rand_status(void);
++
++/* These functions are also used in other files */
++PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++
++/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
++extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
++extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *session, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++#endif
++
++/* Local helper functions */
++static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
++static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
++	CK_BBOOL persistent);
++static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
++static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
++static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
++
++/* Symmetric cipher and digest support functions */
++static int cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
++static int pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids);
++static int pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids);
++static int pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
++	const unsigned char *iv, int enc);
++static int pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
++static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
++	const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl);
++#else
++static int pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
++	const unsigned char *in, size_t inl);
++#endif
++static int pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx);
++static int pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
++	const int **nids, int nid);
++static int pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
++	const int **nids, int nid);
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
++	const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp);
++static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
++	int key_len);
++static int md_nid_to_pk11(int nid);
++static int pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
++static int pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data,
++	size_t count);
++static int pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md);
++static int pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from);
++static int pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
++
++static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
++static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
++    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
++    int *local_cipher_nids);
++static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
++    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest,
++    int *local_digest_nids);
++static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR, int slot_id,
++    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids,
++    int id);
++static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
++    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
++    int id);
++
++static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
++static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
++
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++static int check_hw_mechanisms(void);
++static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table);
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++/* Index for the supported ciphers */
++enum pk11_cipher_id {
++	PK11_DES_CBC,
++	PK11_DES3_CBC,
++	PK11_DES_ECB,
++	PK11_DES3_ECB,
++	PK11_RC4,
++	PK11_AES_128_CBC,
++	PK11_AES_192_CBC,
++	PK11_AES_256_CBC,
++	PK11_AES_128_ECB,
++	PK11_AES_192_ECB,
++	PK11_AES_256_ECB,
++	PK11_AES_128_CTR,
++	PK11_AES_192_CTR,
++	PK11_AES_256_CTR,
++	PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,
++	PK11_CIPHER_MAX
++};
++
++/* Index for the supported digests */
++enum pk11_digest_id {
++	PK11_MD5,
++	PK11_SHA1,
++	PK11_SHA224,
++	PK11_SHA256,
++	PK11_SHA384,
++	PK11_SHA512,
++	PK11_DIGEST_MAX
++};
++
++#define	TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv)	\
++	{								\
++	if (uselock)							\
++		LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);				\
++	if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1)			\
++		{							\
++		  retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl,	\
++		  priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent);	\
++		}							\
++	if (uselock)							\
++		UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);				\
++	}
++
++static int cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
++static int digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
++static int cipher_count		= 0;
++static int digest_count		= 0;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa	= CK_FALSE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_recover = CK_FALSE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dsa	= CK_FALSE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_dh	= CK_FALSE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
++
++typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_st
++	{
++	enum pk11_cipher_id	id;
++	int			nid;
++	int			iv_len;
++	int			min_key_len;
++	int			max_key_len;
++	CK_KEY_TYPE		key_type;
++	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	mech_type;
++	} PK11_CIPHER;
++
++static PK11_CIPHER ciphers[] =
++	{
++	{ PK11_DES_CBC,		NID_des_cbc,		8,	 8,   8,
++		CKK_DES,	CKM_DES_CBC, },
++	{ PK11_DES3_CBC,	NID_des_ede3_cbc,	8,	24,  24,
++		CKK_DES3,	CKM_DES3_CBC, },
++	{ PK11_DES_ECB,		NID_des_ecb,		0,	 8,   8,
++		CKK_DES,	CKM_DES_ECB, },
++	{ PK11_DES3_ECB,	NID_des_ede3_ecb,	0,	24,  24,
++		CKK_DES3,	CKM_DES3_ECB, },
++	{ PK11_RC4,		NID_rc4,		0,	16, 256,
++		CKK_RC4,	CKM_RC4, },
++	{ PK11_AES_128_CBC,	NID_aes_128_cbc,	16,	16,  16,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
++	{ PK11_AES_192_CBC,	NID_aes_192_cbc,	16,	24,  24,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
++	{ PK11_AES_256_CBC,	NID_aes_256_cbc,	16,	32,  32,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CBC, },
++	{ PK11_AES_128_ECB,	NID_aes_128_ecb,	0,	16,  16,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
++	{ PK11_AES_192_ECB,	NID_aes_192_ecb,	0,	24,  24,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
++	{ PK11_AES_256_ECB,	NID_aes_256_ecb,	0,	32,  32,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_ECB, },
++	{ PK11_AES_128_CTR,	NID_aes_128_ctr,	16,	16,  16,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
++	{ PK11_AES_192_CTR,	NID_aes_192_ctr,	16,	24,  24,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
++	{ PK11_AES_256_CTR,	NID_aes_256_ctr,	16,	32,  32,
++		CKK_AES,	CKM_AES_CTR, },
++	{ PK11_BLOWFISH_CBC,	NID_bf_cbc,		8,	16,  16,
++		CKK_BLOWFISH,	CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC, },
++	};
++
++typedef struct PK11_DIGEST_st
++	{
++	enum pk11_digest_id	id;
++	int			nid;
++	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE	mech_type;
++	} PK11_DIGEST;
++
++static PK11_DIGEST digests[] =
++	{
++	{PK11_MD5,	NID_md5,	CKM_MD5, },
++	{PK11_SHA1,	NID_sha1,	CKM_SHA_1, },
++	{PK11_SHA224,	NID_sha224,	CKM_SHA224, },
++	{PK11_SHA256,	NID_sha256,	CKM_SHA256, },
++	{PK11_SHA384,	NID_sha384,	CKM_SHA384, },
++	{PK11_SHA512,	NID_sha512,	CKM_SHA512, },
++	{0,		NID_undef,	0xFFFF, },
++	};
++
++/*
++ * Structure to be used for the cipher_data/md_data in
++ * EVP_CIPHER_CTX/EVP_MD_CTX structures in order to use the same pk11
++ * session in multiple cipher_update calls
++ */
++typedef struct PK11_CIPHER_STATE_st
++	{
++	PK11_SESSION	*sp;
++	} PK11_CIPHER_STATE;
++
++
++/*
++ * libcrypto EVP stuff - this is how we get wired to EVP so the engine gets
++ * called when libcrypto requests a cipher NID.
++ *
++ * Note how the PK11_CIPHER_STATE is used here.
++ */
++
++/* DES CBC EVP */
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_cbc =
++	{
++	NID_des_cbc,
++	8, 8, 8,
++	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++/* 3DES CBC EVP */
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_cbc =
++	{
++	NID_des_ede3_cbc,
++	8, 24, 8,
++	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++/*
++ * ECB modes don't use an Initial Vector so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
++ * get_asn1_parameters fields are set to NULL.
++ */
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_des_ecb =
++	{
++	NID_des_ecb,
++	8, 8, 8,
++	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	NULL,
++	NULL,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_3des_ecb =
++	{
++	NID_des_ede3_ecb,
++	8, 24, 8,
++	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	NULL,
++	NULL,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_cbc =
++	{
++	NID_aes_128_cbc,
++	16, 16, 16,
++	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_cbc =
++	{
++	NID_aes_192_cbc,
++	16, 24, 16,
++	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_cbc =
++	{
++	NID_aes_256_cbc,
++	16, 32, 16,
++	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++/*
++ * ECB modes don't use IV so that's why set_asn1_parameters and
++ * get_asn1_parameters are set to NULL.
++ */
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ecb =
++	{
++	NID_aes_128_ecb,
++	16, 16, 0,
++	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	NULL,
++	NULL,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ecb =
++	{
++	NID_aes_192_ecb,
++	16, 24, 0,
++	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	NULL,
++	NULL,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ecb =
++	{
++	NID_aes_256_ecb,
++	16, 32, 0,
++	EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	NULL,
++	NULL,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_128_ctr =
++	{
++	NID_aes_128_ctr,
++	16, 16, 16,
++	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_192_ctr =
++	{
++	NID_aes_192_ctr,
++	16, 24, 16,
++	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_aes_256_ctr =
++	{
++	NID_aes_256_ctr,
++	16, 32, 16,
++	EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_bf_cbc =
++	{
++	NID_bf_cbc,
++	8, 16, 8,
++	EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv,
++	EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_CIPHER pk11_rc4 =
++	{
++	NID_rc4,
++	1, 16, 0,
++	EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH,
++	pk11_cipher_init,
++	pk11_cipher_do_cipher,
++	pk11_cipher_cleanup,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	NULL,
++	NULL,
++	NULL
++	};
++
++static const EVP_MD pk11_md5 =
++	{
++	NID_md5,
++	NID_md5WithRSAEncryption,
++	MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++	0,
++	pk11_digest_init,
++	pk11_digest_update,
++	pk11_digest_final,
++	pk11_digest_copy,
++	pk11_digest_cleanup,
++	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++	MD5_CBLOCK,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	};
++
++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha1 =
++	{
++	NID_sha1,
++	NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption,
++	SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
++	pk11_digest_init,
++	pk11_digest_update,
++	pk11_digest_final,
++	pk11_digest_copy,
++	pk11_digest_cleanup,
++	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++	SHA_CBLOCK,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	};
++
++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha224 =
++	{
++	NID_sha224,
++	NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption,
++	SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
++	pk11_digest_init,
++	pk11_digest_update,
++	pk11_digest_final,
++	pk11_digest_copy,
++	pk11_digest_cleanup,
++	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++	/* SHA-224 uses the same cblock size as SHA-256 */
++	SHA256_CBLOCK,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	};
++
++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha256 =
++	{
++	NID_sha256,
++	NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption,
++	SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
++	pk11_digest_init,
++	pk11_digest_update,
++	pk11_digest_final,
++	pk11_digest_copy,
++	pk11_digest_cleanup,
++	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++	SHA256_CBLOCK,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	};
++
++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha384 =
++	{
++	NID_sha384,
++	NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption,
++	SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
++	pk11_digest_init,
++	pk11_digest_update,
++	pk11_digest_final,
++	pk11_digest_copy,
++	pk11_digest_cleanup,
++	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++	/* SHA-384 uses the same cblock size as SHA-512 */
++	SHA512_CBLOCK,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	};
++
++static const EVP_MD pk11_sha512 =
++	{
++	NID_sha512,
++	NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption,
++	SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH,
++	EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE|EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT,
++	pk11_digest_init,
++	pk11_digest_update,
++	pk11_digest_final,
++	pk11_digest_copy,
++	pk11_digest_cleanup,
++	EVP_PKEY_RSA_method,
++	SHA512_CBLOCK,
++	sizeof (PK11_CIPHER_STATE),
++	};
++
++/*
++ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
++ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
++ */
++#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH		ENGINE_CMD_BASE
++#define PK11_CMD_PIN			(ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1)
++#define PK11_CMD_SLOT			(ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2)
++static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
++	{
++		{
++		PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
++		"SO_PATH",
++		"Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
++		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
++		},
++		{
++		PK11_CMD_PIN,
++		"PIN",
++		"Specifies the pin code",
++		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
++		},
++		{
++		PK11_CMD_SLOT,
++		"SLOT",
++		"Specifies the slot (default is auto select)",
++		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC,
++		},
++		{0, NULL, NULL, 0}
++	};
++
++
++static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
++	{
++	pk11_rand_seed,
++	pk11_rand_bytes,
++	pk11_rand_cleanup,
++	pk11_rand_add,
++	pk11_rand_bytes,
++	pk11_rand_status
++	};
++
++
++/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
++#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines"
++#endif
++static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
++static const char *engine_pk11_name =
++	"PKCS #11 engine support (crypto accelerator)";
++
++CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
++static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
++
++/*
++ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
++ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
++ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
++ */
++static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
++
++static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
++static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
++/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
++CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
++static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
++static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
++char *pk11_pin = NULL;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE;
++static int pk11_pid = 0;
++
++static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
++
++/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
++static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
++	{
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	int type;
++	pthread_mutexattr_t attr;
++
++	if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0)
++	{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100);
++		return (0);
++	}
++
++#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
++	if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0)
++	{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101);
++		return (0);
++	}
++#endif
++
++	if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
++		goto malloc_err;
++	(void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr);
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++	find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
++	if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
++		goto malloc_err;
++	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++	find_lock[OP_DSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
++	if (find_lock[OP_DSA] == NULL)
++		goto malloc_err;
++	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DSA], &attr);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++	find_lock[OP_DH] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
++	if (find_lock[OP_DH] == NULL)
++		goto malloc_err;
++	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_DH], &attr);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++
++	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
++		{
++		session_cache[type].lock =
++		    OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
++		if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
++			goto malloc_err;
++		(void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr);
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++
++malloc_err:
++	pk11_free_all_locks();
++	PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++	return (0);
++#else
++	return (1);
++#endif
++	}
++
++static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
++	{
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	int type;
++
++	if (token_lock != NULL)
++		{
++		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock);
++		OPENSSL_free(token_lock);
++		token_lock = NULL;
++		}
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++	if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
++		{
++		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
++		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
++		find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
++		}
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++	if (find_lock[OP_DSA] != NULL)
++		{
++		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
++		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DSA]);
++		find_lock[OP_DSA] = NULL;
++		}
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++	if (find_lock[OP_DH] != NULL)
++		{
++		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_DH]);
++		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_DH]);
++		find_lock[OP_DH] = NULL;
++		}
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++
++	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
++		{
++		if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
++			{
++			(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
++			OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
++			session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++#endif
++	}
++
++/*
++ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
++ */
++static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
++	{
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++	const RSA_METHOD *rsa = NULL;
++	RSA_METHOD *pk11_rsa = PK11_RSA();
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++		if (!pk11_library_init(e))
++			return (0);
++
++	if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, pk11_engine_ciphers) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_digests(e, pk11_engine_digests))
++		return (0);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++	if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
++		{
++		if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
++		    !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
++		    !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
++			return (0);
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		}
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++	if (pk11_have_dsa == CK_TRUE)
++		{
++		if (!ENGINE_set_DSA(e, PK11_DSA()))
++			return (0);
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DSA\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		}
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++	if (pk11_have_dh == CK_TRUE)
++		{
++		if (!ENGINE_set_DH(e, PK11_DH()))
++			return (0);
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered DH\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		}
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++	if (pk11_have_random)
++		{
++		if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
++			return (0);
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		}
++	if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
++		return (0);
++
++/*
++ * Apache calls OpenSSL function RSA_blinding_on() once during startup
++ * which in turn calls bn_mod_exp. Since we do not implement bn_mod_exp
++ * here, we wire it back to the OpenSSL software implementation.
++ * Since it is used only once, performance is not a concern.
++ */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++	rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
++	pk11_rsa->rsa_mod_exp = rsa->rsa_mod_exp;
++	pk11_rsa->bn_mod_exp = rsa->bn_mod_exp;
++	if (pk11_have_recover != CK_TRUE)
++		pk11_rsa->rsa_pub_dec = rsa->rsa_pub_dec;
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++
++	/* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
++	ERR_load_pk11_strings();
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
++#ifdef	ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
++#error  "dynamic engine not supported"
++static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
++	{
++	if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
++		return (0);
++
++	if (!bind_pk11(e))
++		return (0);
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
++IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
++
++#else
++static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
++	{
++	ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
++
++	if (!ret)
++		return (NULL);
++
++	if (!bind_pk11(ret))
++		{
++		ENGINE_free(ret);
++		return (NULL);
++		}
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++void
++ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
++	{
++	ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
++
++	/*
++	 * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
++	 * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
++	 */
++	/* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
++	if (!pk11_dso)
++		pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
++
++	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++		return;
++		}
++
++	e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
++	if (!e_pk11)
++		{
++		DSO_free(pk11_dso);
++		pk11_dso = NULL;
++		return;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
++	 * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
++	 * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
++	 * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
++	 */
++	if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
++		{
++		DSO_free(pk11_dso);
++		pk11_dso = NULL;
++		ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
++		return;
++		}
++
++	ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
++
++	ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
++	ERR_clear_error();
++	}
++#endif	/* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
++
++/*
++ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
++ * the function symbol names to bind to.
++ */
++static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
++
++static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
++	{
++	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
++		return (PK11_LIBNAME);
++
++	return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
++	}
++
++static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
++	{
++	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
++		OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
++
++	PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
++	}
++
++static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
++	{
++	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
++
++	return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
++	}
++
++/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
++static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
++	{
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	int i;
++
++	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++		return;
++
++	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
++	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++		{
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
++		}
++#endif
++	}
++
++/* release all engine specific mutexes */
++static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
++	{
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	int i;
++
++	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++		return;
++
++	for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
++		{
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
++		}
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#endif
++	}
++
++/*
++ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
++ * accessible to all threads.
++ */
++static void pk11_fork_child(void)
++	{
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	int i;
++
++	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++		return;
++
++	for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
++		{
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
++		}
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#endif
++	}
++
++/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
++static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
++{
++	return (pk11_library_init(e));
++}
++
++static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args =
++	{
++	NULL_PTR,		/* CreateMutex */
++	NULL_PTR,		/* DestroyMutex */
++	NULL_PTR,		/* LockMutex */
++	NULL_PTR,		/* UnlockMutex */
++	CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK,	/* flags */
++	NULL_PTR,		/* pReserved */
++	};
++
++/*
++ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
++ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
++ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
++ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
++ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
++ */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
++	{
++	CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
++	CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
++	CK_INFO info;
++	CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
++	int any_slot_found;
++	int i;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++	struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act;
++#endif
++
++	/*
++	 * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which
++	 * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still
++	 * at least one existing functional reference to the engine
++	 * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is
++	 * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application
++	 * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork()
++	 * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can
++	 * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional
++	 * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In
++	 * that case we need the PID check so that we properly
++	 * initialize the engine again.
++	 */
++	if (pk11_library_initialized)
++		{
++		if (pk11_pid == getpid())
++			{
++			return (1);
++			}
++		else
++			{
++			global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++			/*
++			 * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
++			 * the application calls fork() without finishing the
++			 * engine first.
++			 */
++			pk11_free_all_locks();
++			}
++		}
++
++	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++	if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
++		goto err;
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++	/* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
++	p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
++		PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
++	if (!p)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/* get the full function list from the loaded library */
++	rv = p(&pFuncList);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++	/* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */
++
++	(void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act));
++	(void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act));
++	(void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act));
++	(void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act);
++	(void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act);
++	(void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act);
++#endif
++	rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++	(void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL);
++	(void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL);
++	(void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL);
++#endif
++	if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
++		goto err;
++
++	/*
++	 * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
++	 * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
++	 * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
++	 * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
++	 * because no slot was present.
++	 */
++	if (any_slot_found == 0)
++		return (1);
++
++	if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
++			    PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * Disable digest if C_GetOperationState is not supported since
++	 * this function is required by OpenSSL digest copy function
++	 */
++	/* Keyper fails to return CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED */
++	if (pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(global_session, NULL, &ul_state_len)
++			!= CKR_OK) {
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: C_GetOperationState() not supported, "
++		    "setting digest_count to 0\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		digest_count = 0;
++	}
++
++	pk11_library_initialized = TRUE;
++	pk11_pid = getpid();
++	/*
++	 * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
++	 * will do the cleanup.
++	 */
++	if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
++		goto err;
++	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++		session_cache[i].head = NULL;
++	/*
++	 * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
++	 * for asymmetric ciphers.
++	 */
++	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++		active_list[i] = NULL;
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
++		{
++		if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
++		    pk11_fork_child) != 0)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE;
++		}
++#endif
++
++	return (1);
++
++err:
++	return (0);
++	}
++
++/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
++	{
++	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
++	ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
++	if (pk11_pin) {
++		memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
++		OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
++	}
++	pk11_pin = NULL;
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
++ * library.
++ */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
++	{
++	int i;
++
++	if (pk11_pin) {
++		memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
++		OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
++	}
++	pk11_pin = NULL;
++
++	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
++
++	if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
++		goto err;
++
++	/* free all active lists */
++	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++		pk11_free_active_list(i);
++
++	pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
++	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++
++	/*
++	 * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
++	 * may have side-effects.
++	 */
++#if 0
++	pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
++#endif
++
++	if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++	pk11_dso = NULL;
++	pFuncList = NULL;
++	pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
++	pk11_pid = 0;
++	/*
++	 * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
++	 * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
++	 * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
++	 * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
++	 * the engine before calling fork().
++	 */
++	pk11_free_all_locks();
++
++	return (1);
++
++err:
++	return (0);
++	}
++
++/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
++	{
++	int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
++
++	switch (cmd)
++		{
++	case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
++		if (p == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
++			return (0);
++			}
++
++		if (initialized)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
++			return (0);
++			}
++
++		return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
++	case PK11_CMD_PIN:
++		if (pk11_pin) {
++			memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
++			OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
++		}
++		pk11_pin = NULL;
++
++		if (p == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
++			return (0);
++			}
++
++		pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p);
++		if (pk11_pin == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			return (0);
++			}
++		return (1);
++	case PK11_CMD_SLOT:
++		SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i;
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif
++		return (1);
++	default:
++		break;
++		}
++
++	PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
++
++	return (0);
++	}
++
++
++/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
++static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
++	{
++	return;
++	}
++
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
++	{
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
++		return;
++
++	/*
++	 * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
++	 * the calling functions do not care anyway
++	 */
++	pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
++
++	return;
++	}
++
++static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
++	{
++	pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
++	}
++
++static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
++		return (0);
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
++		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
++static int pk11_rand_status(void)
++	{
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
++static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++	{
++	switch (optype)
++		{
++#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++		case OP_RSA:
++			if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
++				sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
++				}
++			if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
++				sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
++				}
++			if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
++				sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
++				}
++			if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
++				sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
++				}
++			if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
++				sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
++				}
++			break;
++#endif
++#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++		case OP_DSA:
++			if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
++				sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
++				}
++			if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
++				sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
++				}
++			break;
++#endif
++#ifndef	OPENSSL_NO_DH
++		case OP_DH:
++			if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
++				sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
++				}
++			break;
++#endif
++		default:
++			break;
++		}
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
++ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
++ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
++ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
++ */
++PK11_SESSION *
++pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++	{
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL;
++#endif
++	static pid_t pid = 0;
++	pid_t new_pid;
++	CK_RV rv;
++
++	switch (optype)
++		{
++		case OP_RSA:
++		case OP_DSA:
++		case OP_DH:
++		case OP_RAND:
++		case OP_DIGEST:
++		case OP_CIPHER:
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
++#endif
++			break;
++		default:
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
++				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++			return (NULL);
++		}
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++
++	/*
++	 * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
++	 * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
++	 * here, with no PID information.
++	 */
++	if (pid == 0)
++		pid = getpid();
++
++	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
++	sp = freelist;
++
++	/*
++	 * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled
++	 * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
++	 * structure from the freelist.
++	 */
++	if (sp == NULL)
++		{
++		if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
++				PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		(void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
++
++		/*
++		 * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
++		 * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
++		 * mark them as unused.
++		 */
++		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		freelist = sp->next;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
++	 * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
++	 */
++	if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
++		{
++		pid = new_pid;
++
++		/*
++		 * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
++		 * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
++		 * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
++		 * head of the list).
++		 */
++		while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
++			{
++			freelist = sp1->next;
++			/*
++			 * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
++			 * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
++			 * sessions and destroy all objects.
++			 */
++			pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
++			OPENSSL_free(sp1);
++			}
++
++		/* we have to free the active list as well. */
++		pk11_free_active_list(optype);
++
++		/* Initialize the process */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
++		if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
++			    rv);
++			OPENSSL_free(sp);
++			sp = NULL;
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
++		 * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
++		 * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
++		 * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
++		 * information.
++		 */
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++		if (check_hw_mechanisms() == 0)
++			goto err;
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
++			goto err;
++
++		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
++			    rv);
++			OPENSSL_free(sp);
++			sp = NULL;
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
++		 * re-initialization.
++		 */
++		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
++			{
++			OPENSSL_free(sp);
++			sp = NULL;
++			goto err;
++			}
++		if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) 
++			{
++			/*
++			 * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
++			 * the caller cope with the situation.
++			 */
++			freelist = sp;
++			sp = NULL;
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++	if (sp->pid == 0)
++		{
++		/* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
++		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
++			{
++			OPENSSL_free(sp);
++			sp = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	/* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
++	session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
++
++err:
++	if (sp != NULL)
++		sp->next = NULL;
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++
++	return (sp);
++	}
++
++
++void
++pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++	{
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
++#endif
++	PK11_SESSION *freelist;
++
++	/*
++	 * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
++	 * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
++	 * next time we will ask for a new session.
++	 */
++	if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
++		return;
++
++	switch (optype)
++		{
++		case OP_RSA:
++		case OP_DSA:
++		case OP_DH:
++		case OP_RAND:
++		case OP_DIGEST:
++		case OP_CIPHER:
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
++#endif
++			break;
++		default:
++			PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
++				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++			return;
++		}
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
++	sp->next = freelist;
++	session_cache[optype].head = sp;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++	}
++
++
++/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
++static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
++	{
++	int ret = 1;
++	int type;
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++	(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(NULL);
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++	(void) pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(NULL);
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++	(void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(NULL);
++
++	/*
++	 * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
++	 * return 0 on exit.
++	 */
++	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
++		{
++		if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
++			ret = 0;
++		}
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
++ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
++ * return an error on return.
++ */
++static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++	PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
++	pid_t mypid = getpid();
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
++#endif
++	int ret = 1;
++
++	switch (optype)
++		{
++		case OP_RSA:
++		case OP_DSA:
++		case OP_DH:
++		case OP_RAND:
++		case OP_DIGEST:
++		case OP_CIPHER:
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
++#endif
++			break;
++		default:
++			PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
++				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++			return (0);
++		}
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
++	while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
++		{
++		if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
++			{
++			rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
++			if (rv != CKR_OK)
++				{
++				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
++					PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
++				ret = 0;
++				}
++			}
++		freelist = sp->next;
++		pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
++		OPENSSL_free(sp);
++		}
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++
++static int
++pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
++
++	switch (optype)
++		{
++		case OP_RSA:
++		case OP_DSA:
++		case OP_DH:
++			myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
++			break;
++		case OP_RAND:
++			myslot = rand_SLOTID;
++			break;
++		case OP_DIGEST:
++		case OP_CIPHER:
++			myslot = SLOTID;
++			break;
++		default:
++			PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
++			    PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++			return (0);
++		}
++
++	sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++	rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++		NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
++	if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We are probably a child process so force the
++		 * reinitialize of the session
++		 */
++		pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
++		if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
++			return (0);
++		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
++		}
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	sp->pid = getpid();
++
++	switch (optype)
++		{
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++		case OP_RSA:
++			sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++			sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++			sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
++			break;
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++		case OP_DSA:
++			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++			sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
++			break;
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++		case OP_DH:
++			sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++			sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
++			sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
++			break;
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++		case OP_CIPHER:
++			sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++			sp->opdata_encrypt = -1;
++			break;
++		default:
++			break;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
++	 * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
++	 */
++	sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
++	sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
++	{
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
++		    ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE);
++		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
++		if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
++			{
++			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
++			sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
++			}
++		if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
++			{
++			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
++			sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
++	{
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
++		    ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE);
++		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
++		if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
++			{
++			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
++			sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e'
++		 * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We
++		 * must free those as well.
++		 */
++		if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
++			{
++			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
++			sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
++			}
++		if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
++			{
++			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
++			sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
++ * objects in the free list.
++ */
++int
++pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
++	{
++	int ret = 1;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
++	CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
++
++	if (session != NULL)
++		local_free_session = session;
++	else
++		{
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
++#else
++		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
++		uselock = FALSE;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
++	 */
++	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
++		{
++		local_free_session = sp->next;
++
++		/*
++		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
++		 * destroy operations fails.
++		 */
++		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
++			{
++			ret = 0;
++			continue;
++			}
++		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
++			{
++			ret = 0;
++			continue;
++			}
++		}
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	if (session == NULL)
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
++#else
++	if (session == NULL)
++		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++/* Destroy DSA public key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
++	{
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key,
++		    ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_FALSE);
++		sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		sp->opdata_dsa_pub = NULL;
++		if (sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num != NULL)
++			{
++			BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num);
++			sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++/* Destroy DSA private key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
++	{
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key,
++		    ret, uselock, OP_DSA, CK_TRUE);
++		sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		sp->opdata_dsa_priv = NULL;
++		if (sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num != NULL)
++			{
++			BN_free(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num);
++			sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Destroy DSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
++ * objects in the free list.
++ */
++int
++pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
++	{
++	int ret = 1;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
++	CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
++
++	if (session != NULL)
++		local_free_session = session;
++	else
++		{
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0);
++#else
++		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DSA].head;
++		uselock = FALSE;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
++	 */
++	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
++		{
++		local_free_session = sp->next;
++
++		/*
++		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
++		 * destroy operations fails.
++		 */
++		if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
++			{
++			ret = 0;
++			continue;
++			}
++		if (pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
++			{
++			ret = 0;
++			continue;
++			}
++		}
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	if (session == NULL)
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DSA].lock) == 0);
++#else
++	if (session == NULL)
++		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++/* Destroy DH key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
++	{
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (sp->opdata_dh_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_dh_key,
++		    ret, uselock, OP_DH, CK_TRUE);
++		sp->opdata_dh_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		sp->opdata_dh = NULL;
++		if (sp->opdata_dh_priv_num != NULL)
++			{
++			BN_free(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num);
++			sp->opdata_dh_priv_num = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Destroy DH key object wrapper.
++ *
++ * arg0: pointer to PKCS#11 engine session structure
++ *       if session is NULL, try to destroy all objects in the free list
++ */
++int
++pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
++	{
++	int ret = 1;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
++	CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
++
++	if (session != NULL)
++		local_free_session = session;
++	else
++		{
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0);
++#else
++		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_DH].head;
++		uselock = FALSE;
++		}
++
++	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
++		{
++		local_free_session = sp->next;
++
++		/*
++		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
++		 * destroy operations fails.
++		 */
++		if (pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, uselock) == 0)
++			{
++			ret = 0;
++			continue;
++			}
++		}
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	if (session == NULL)
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_DH].lock) == 0);
++#else
++	if (session == NULL)
++		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++
++static int
++pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
++	CK_BBOOL persistent)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++
++	/*
++	 * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
++	 * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
++	 * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
++	 */
++	if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
++		return (1);
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
++		    rv);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++
++/* Symmetric ciphers and digests support functions */
++
++static int
++cipher_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
++	{
++	int i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; i++)
++		if (ciphers[i].nid == nid)
++			return (ciphers[i].id);
++	return (-1);
++	}
++
++static int
++pk11_usable_ciphers(const int **nids)
++	{
++	if (cipher_count > 0)
++		*nids = cipher_nids;
++	else
++		*nids = NULL;
++	return (cipher_count);
++	}
++
++static int
++pk11_usable_digests(const int **nids)
++	{
++	if (digest_count > 0)
++		*nids = digest_nids;
++	else
++		*nids = NULL;
++	return (digest_count);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Init context for encryption or decryption using a symmetric key.
++ */
++static int pk11_init_symmetric(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, PK11_CIPHER *pcipher,
++	PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pmech)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS ctr_params;
++
++	/*
++	 * We expect pmech->mechanism to be already set and
++	 * pParameter/ulParameterLen initialized to NULL/0 before
++	 * pk11_init_symetric() is called.
++	 */
++	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->mechanism != 0);
++	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->pParameter == NULL);
++	OPENSSL_assert(pmech->ulParameterLen == 0);
++
++	if (ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_128_ctr ||
++	    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_192_ctr ||
++	    ctx->cipher->nid == NID_aes_256_ctr)
++		{
++		pmech->pParameter = (void *)(&ctr_params);
++		pmech->ulParameterLen = sizeof (ctr_params);
++		/*
++		 * For now, we are limited to the fixed length of the counter,
++		 * it covers the whole counter block. That's what RFC 4344
++		 * needs. For more information on internal structure of the
++		 * counter block, see RFC 3686. If needed in the future, we can
++		 * add code so that the counter length can be set via
++		 * ENGINE_ctrl() function.
++		 */
++		ctr_params.ulCounterBits = AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 8;
++		OPENSSL_assert(pcipher->iv_len == AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		(void) memcpy(ctr_params.cb, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		if (pcipher->iv_len > 0)
++			{
++			pmech->pParameter = (void *)ctx->iv;
++			pmech->ulParameterLen = pcipher->iv_len;
++			}
++		}
++
++	/* if we get here, the encryption needs to be reinitialized */
++	if (ctx->encrypt)
++		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
++			sp->opdata_cipher_key);
++	else
++		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, pmech,
++			sp->opdata_cipher_key);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, ctx->encrypt ?
++		    PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT : PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
++		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int
++pk11_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
++    const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
++	{
++	CK_MECHANISM mech;
++	int index;
++	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++	PK11_CIPHER *p_ciph_table_row;
++
++	state->sp = NULL;
++
++	index = cipher_nid_to_pk11(ctx->cipher->nid);
++	if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_CIPHER_MAX)
++		return (0);
++
++	p_ciph_table_row = &ciphers[index];
++	/*
++	 * iv_len in the ctx->cipher structure is the maximum IV length for the
++	 * current cipher and it must be less or equal to the IV length in our
++	 * ciphers table. The key length must be in the allowed interval. From
++	 * all cipher modes that the PKCS#11 engine supports only RC4 allows a
++	 * key length to be in some range, all other NIDs have a precise key
++	 * length. Every application can define its own EVP functions so this
++	 * code serves as a sanity check.
++	 *
++	 * Note that the reason why the IV length in ctx->cipher might be
++	 * greater than the actual length is that OpenSSL uses BLOCK_CIPHER_defs
++	 * macro to define functions that return EVP structures for all DES
++	 * modes. So, even ECB modes get 8 byte IV.
++	 */
++	if (ctx->cipher->iv_len < p_ciph_table_row->iv_len ||
++	    ctx->key_len < p_ciph_table_row->min_key_len ||
++	    ctx->key_len > p_ciph_table_row->max_key_len) {
++		PK11err(PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM);
++		return (0);
++	}
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_CIPHER)) == NULL)
++		return (0);
++
++	/* if applicable, the mechanism parameter is used for IV */
++	mech.mechanism = p_ciph_table_row->mech_type;
++	mech.pParameter = NULL;
++	mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
++
++	/* The key object is destroyed here if it is not the current key. */
++	(void) check_new_cipher_key(sp, key, ctx->key_len);
++
++	/*
++	 * If the key is the same and the encryption is also the same, then
++	 * just reuse it. However, we must not forget to reinitialize the
++	 * context that was finalized in pk11_cipher_cleanup().
++	 */
++	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE &&
++	    sp->opdata_encrypt == ctx->encrypt)
++		{
++		state->sp = sp;
++		if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
++			return (0);
++
++		return (1);
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * Check if the key has been invalidated. If so, a new key object
++	 * needs to be created.
++	 */
++	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		sp->opdata_cipher_key = pk11_get_cipher_key(
++			ctx, key, p_ciph_table_row->key_type, sp);
++		}
++
++	if (sp->opdata_encrypt != ctx->encrypt && sp->opdata_encrypt != -1)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * The previous encryption/decryption is different. Need to
++		 * terminate the previous * active encryption/decryption here.
++		 */
++		if (!pk11_cipher_final(sp))
++			{
++			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
++			return (0);
++			}
++		}
++
++	if (sp->opdata_cipher_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_CIPHER);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	/* now initialize the context with a new key */
++	if (pk11_init_symmetric(ctx, p_ciph_table_row, sp, &mech) == 0)
++		return (0);
++
++	sp->opdata_encrypt = ctx->encrypt;
++	state->sp = sp;
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * When reusing the same key in an encryption/decryption session for a
++ * decryption/encryption session, we need to close the active session
++ * and recreate a new one. Note that the key is in the global session so
++ * that it needs not be recreated.
++ *
++ * It is more appropriate to use C_En/DecryptFinish here. At the time of this
++ * development, these two functions in the PKCS#11 libraries used return
++ * unexpected errors when passing in 0 length output. It may be a good
++ * idea to try them again if performance is a problem here and fix
++ * C_En/DecryptFinial if there are bugs there causing the problem.
++ */
++static int
++pk11_cipher_final(PK11_SESSION *sp)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++		NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * An engine interface function. The calling function allocates sufficient
++ * memory for the output buffer "out" to hold the results.
++ */
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
++static int
++pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
++	const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inl)
++#else
++static int
++pk11_cipher_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
++	const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
++#endif
++	{
++	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->cipher_data;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++	CK_RV rv;
++	unsigned long outl = inl;
++
++	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
++		return (0);
++
++	sp = (PK11_SESSION *) state->sp;
++
++	if (!inl)
++		return (1);
++
++	/* RC4 is the only stream cipher we support */
++	if (ctx->cipher->nid != NID_rc4 && (inl % ctx->cipher->block_size) != 0)
++		return (0);
++
++	if (ctx->encrypt)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptUpdate(sp->session,
++			(unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
++			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE, rv);
++			return (0);
++			}
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptUpdate(sp->session,
++			(unsigned char *)in, inl, out, &outl);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER,
++			    PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE, rv);
++			return (0);
++			}
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * For DES_CBC, DES3_CBC, AES_CBC, and RC4, the output size is always
++	 * the same size of input.
++	 * The application has guaranteed to call the block ciphers with
++	 * correctly aligned buffers.
++	 */
++	if (inl != outl)
++		return (0);
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Return the session to the pool. Calling C_EncryptFinal() and C_DecryptFinal()
++ * here is the right thing because in EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), engine's
++ * do_cipher() is not even called, and in EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() it is called but
++ * the engine can't find out that it's the finalizing call. We wouldn't
++ * necessarily have to finalize the context here since reinitializing it with
++ * C_(Encrypt|Decrypt)Init() should be fine but for the sake of correctness,
++ * let's do it. Some implementations might leak memory if the previously used
++ * context is initialized without finalizing it first.
++ */
++static int
++pk11_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_ULONG len = EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH;
++	CK_BYTE buf[EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH];
++	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->cipher_data;
++
++	if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We are not interested in the data here, we just need to get
++		 * rid of the context.
++		 */
++		if (ctx->encrypt)
++			rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptFinal(
++			    state->sp->session, buf, &len);
++		else
++			rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptFinal(
++			    state->sp->session, buf, &len);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, ctx->encrypt ?
++			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL : PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL, rv);
++			pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
++			return (0);
++			}
++
++		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_CIPHER);
++		state->sp = NULL;
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Registered by the ENGINE when used to find out how to deal with
++ * a particular NID in the ENGINE. This says what we'll do at the
++ * top level - note, that list is restricted by what we answer with
++ */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int
++pk11_engine_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher,
++	const int **nids, int nid)
++	{
++	if (!cipher)
++		return (pk11_usable_ciphers(nids));
++
++	switch (nid)
++		{
++		case NID_des_ede3_cbc:
++			*cipher = &pk11_3des_cbc;
++			break;
++		case NID_des_cbc:
++			*cipher = &pk11_des_cbc;
++			break;
++		case NID_des_ede3_ecb:
++			*cipher = &pk11_3des_ecb;
++			break;
++		case NID_des_ecb:
++			*cipher = &pk11_des_ecb;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_128_cbc:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_cbc;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_192_cbc:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_cbc;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_256_cbc:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_cbc;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_128_ecb:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ecb;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_192_ecb:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ecb;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_256_ecb:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ecb;
++			break;
++		case NID_bf_cbc:
++			*cipher = &pk11_bf_cbc;
++			break;
++		case NID_rc4:
++			*cipher = &pk11_rc4;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_128_ctr:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_128_ctr;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_192_ctr:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_192_ctr;
++			break;
++		case NID_aes_256_ctr:
++			*cipher = &pk11_aes_256_ctr;
++			break;
++		default:
++			*cipher = NULL;
++			break;
++		}
++	return (*cipher != NULL);
++	}
++
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int
++pk11_engine_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest,
++	const int **nids, int nid)
++	{
++	if (!digest)
++		return (pk11_usable_digests(nids));
++
++	switch (nid)
++		{
++		case NID_md5:
++			*digest = &pk11_md5;
++			break;
++		case NID_sha1:
++			*digest = &pk11_sha1;
++			break;
++		case NID_sha224:
++			*digest = &pk11_sha224;
++			break;
++		case NID_sha256:
++			*digest = &pk11_sha256;
++			break;
++		case NID_sha384:
++			*digest = &pk11_sha384;
++			break;
++		case NID_sha512:
++			*digest = &pk11_sha512;
++			break;
++		default:
++			*digest = NULL;
++			break;
++		}
++	return (*digest != NULL);
++	}
++
++
++/* Create a secret key object in a PKCS#11 session */
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_cipher_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
++	const unsigned char *key, CK_KEY_TYPE key_type, PK11_SESSION *sp)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	CK_OBJECT_CLASS obj_key = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
++	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 6;
++	unsigned char key_buf[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
++
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
++		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
++		{CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
++		{CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
++		{CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
++		{CKA_VALUE, (void*) NULL, 0},
++		};
++
++	/*
++	 * Create secret key object in global_session. All other sessions
++	 * can use the key handles. Here is why:
++	 * OpenSSL will call EncryptInit and EncryptUpdate using a secret key.
++	 * It may then call DecryptInit and DecryptUpdate using the same key.
++	 * To use the same key object, we need to call EncryptFinal with
++	 * a 0 length message. Currently, this does not work for 3DES
++	 * mechanism. To get around this problem, we close the session and
++	 * then create a new session to use the same key object. When a session
++	 * is closed, all the object handles will be invalid. Thus, create key
++	 * objects in a global session, an individual session may be closed to
++	 * terminate the active operation.
++	 */
++	CK_SESSION_HANDLE session = global_session;
++	a_key_template[0].pValue = &obj_key;
++	a_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
++	if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX)
++		{
++		a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key;
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
++		memcpy(key_buf, key, ctx->key_len);
++		if ((key_type == CKK_DES) ||
++		    (key_type == CKK_DES2) ||
++		    (key_type == CKK_DES3))
++			DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[0]);
++		if ((key_type == CKK_DES2) ||
++		    (key_type == CKK_DES3))
++			DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[8]);
++		if (key_type == CKK_DES3)
++			DES_fixup_key_parity((DES_cblock *) &key_buf[16]);
++		a_key_template[5].pValue = (void *) key_buf;
++		}
++	a_key_template[5].ulValueLen = (unsigned long) ctx->key_len;
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
++		a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
++		    rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * Save the key information used in this session.
++	 * The max can be saved is PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX.
++	 */
++	if (ctx->key_len > PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX)
++		{
++		sp->opdata_key_len = PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX;
++		(void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key, sp->opdata_key_len);
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		sp->opdata_key_len = ctx->key_len;
++		(void) memcpy(sp->opdata_key, key_buf, sp->opdata_key_len);
++		}
++	memset(key_buf, 0, PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX);
++err:
++
++	return (h_key);
++	}
++
++static int
++md_nid_to_pk11(int nid)
++	{
++	int i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; i++)
++		if (digests[i].nid == nid)
++			return (digests[i].id);
++	return (-1);
++	}
++
++static int
++pk11_digest_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_MECHANISM mech;
++	int index;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++	PK11_DIGEST *pdp;
++	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
++
++	state->sp = NULL;
++
++	index = md_nid_to_pk11(ctx->digest->type);
++	if (index < 0 || index >= PK11_DIGEST_MAX)
++		return (0);
++
++	pdp = &digests[index];
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DIGEST)) == NULL)
++		return (0);
++
++	/* at present, no parameter is needed for supported digests */
++	mech.mechanism = pdp->mech_type;
++	mech.pParameter = NULL;
++	mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestInit(sp->session, &mech);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, PK11_R_DIGESTINIT, rv);
++		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DIGEST);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	state->sp = sp;
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++static int
++pk11_digest_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
++
++	/* 0 length message will cause a failure in C_DigestFinal */
++	if (count == 0)
++		return (1);
++
++	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
++		return (0);
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestUpdate(state->sp->session, (CK_BYTE *) data,
++		count);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE, rv);
++		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
++		state->sp = NULL;
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++static int
++pk11_digest_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	unsigned long len;
++	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) ctx->md_data;
++	len = ctx->digest->md_size;
++
++	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
++		return (0);
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_DigestFinal(state->sp->session, md, &len);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL, rv);
++		pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
++		state->sp = NULL;
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	if (ctx->digest->md_size != len)
++		return (0);
++
++	/*
++	 * Final is called and digest is returned, so return the session
++	 * to the pool
++	 */
++	pk11_return_session(state->sp, OP_DIGEST);
++	state->sp = NULL;
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++static int
++pk11_digest_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *to, const EVP_MD_CTX *from)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	int ret = 0;
++	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state, *state_to;
++	CK_BYTE_PTR pstate = NULL;
++	CK_ULONG ul_state_len;
++
++	/* The copy-from state */
++	state = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) from->md_data;
++	if (state == NULL || state->sp == NULL)
++		goto err;
++
++	/* Initialize the copy-to state */
++	if (!pk11_digest_init(to))
++		goto err;
++	state_to = (PK11_CIPHER_STATE *) to->md_data;
++
++	/* Get the size of the operation state of the copy-from session */
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, NULL,
++		&ul_state_len);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
++		    rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++	if (ul_state_len == 0)
++		{
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	pstate = OPENSSL_malloc(ul_state_len);
++	if (pstate == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/* Get the operation state of the copy-from session */
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetOperationState(state->sp->session, pstate,
++		&ul_state_len);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,
++		    rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/* Set the operation state of the copy-to session */
++	rv = pFuncList->C_SetOperationState(state_to->sp->session, pstate,
++		ul_state_len, 0, 0);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY,
++		    PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	ret = 1;
++err:
++	if (pstate != NULL)
++		OPENSSL_free(pstate);
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++/* Return any pending session state to the pool */
++static int
++pk11_digest_cleanup(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
++	{
++	PK11_CIPHER_STATE *state = ctx->md_data;
++	unsigned char buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
++
++	if (state != NULL && state->sp != NULL)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * If state->sp is not NULL then pk11_digest_final() has not
++		 * been called yet. We must call it now to free any memory
++		 * that might have been allocated in the token when
++		 * pk11_digest_init() was called. pk11_digest_final()
++		 * will return the session to the cache.
++		 */
++		if (!pk11_digest_final(ctx, buf))
++			return (0);
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Check if the new key is the same as the key object in the session. If the key
++ * is the same, no need to create a new key object. Otherwise, the old key
++ * object needs to be destroyed and a new one will be created. Return 1 for
++ * cache hit, 0 for cache miss. Note that we must check the key length first
++ * otherwise we could end up reusing a different, longer key with the same
++ * prefix.
++ */
++static int check_new_cipher_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, const unsigned char *key,
++	int key_len)
++	{
++	if (sp->opdata_key_len != key_len ||
++	    memcmp(sp->opdata_key, key, key_len) != 0)
++		{
++		(void) pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(sp);
++		return (0);
++		}
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/* Destroy one or more secret key objects. */
++static int pk11_destroy_cipher_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
++	{
++	int ret = 0;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
++
++	if (session != NULL)
++		local_free_session = session;
++	else
++		{
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0);
++#else
++		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_CIPHER].head;
++		}
++
++	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
++		{
++		local_free_session = sp->next;
++
++		if (sp->opdata_cipher_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++			{
++			/*
++			 * The secret key object is created in the
++			 * global_session. See pk11_get_cipher_key().
++			 */
++			if (pk11_destroy_object(global_session,
++				sp->opdata_cipher_key, CK_FALSE) == 0)
++				goto err;
++			sp->opdata_cipher_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++			}
++		}
++	ret = 1;
++err:
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	if (session == NULL)
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_CIPHER].lock) == 0);
++#else
++	if (session == NULL)
++		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++
++/*
++ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
++ *
++ * CKM_RSA_X_509
++ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
++ * CKM_DSA
++ *
++ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
++ * public key slot.
++ *
++ * Symmetric ciphers optionally supported
++ *
++ * CKM_DES3_CBC
++ * CKM_DES_CBC
++ * CKM_AES_CBC
++ * CKM_DES3_ECB
++ * CKM_DES_ECB
++ * CKM_AES_ECB
++ * CKM_AES_CTR
++ * CKM_RC4
++ * CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC
++ *
++ * Digests optionally supported
++ *
++ * CKM_MD5
++ * CKM_SHA_1
++ * CKM_SHA224
++ * CKM_SHA256
++ * CKM_SHA384
++ * CKM_SHA512
++ *
++ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
++ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
++ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
++ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
++ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
++ */
++static int
++pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
++	{
++	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
++	CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
++	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
++	CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
++	unsigned int i;
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0;
++	CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
++	int slot_n_cipher = 0;
++	int slot_n_digest = 0;
++	CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
++	int current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
++	int current_slot_n_digest = 0;
++
++	int local_cipher_nids[PK11_CIPHER_MAX];
++	int local_digest_nids[PK11_DIGEST_MAX];
++
++	/* let's initialize the output parameter */
++	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
++		*any_slot_found = 0;
++
++	/* Get slot list for memory allocation */
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	/* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
++	if (ulSlotCount == 0)
++		{
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		return (1);
++		}
++
++	pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
++
++	if (pSlotList == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	/* Get the slot list for processing */
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
++		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
++
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
++		{
++		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		/* Check if slot has random support. */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			continue;
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++		if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
++			{
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++			pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
++			rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
++			break;
++			}
++		}
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++	pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
++	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
++		{
++		CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
++		CK_BBOOL slot_has_recover = CK_FALSE;
++		CK_BBOOL slot_has_dsa = CK_FALSE;
++		CK_BBOOL slot_has_dh = CK_FALSE;
++		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			continue;
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++		/*
++		 * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
++		 * verifying with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
++		 */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
++			&mech_info);
++
++		if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
++				(mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
++			{
++			/*
++			 * Check if this slot is capable of encryption,
++			 * decryption, sign, and verify with CKM_RSA_X_509.
++			 */
++			rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
++			    CKM_RSA_X_509, &mech_info);
++
++			if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
++			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY) &&
++			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
++			    (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT)))
++				{
++				slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
++				if (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER)
++					{
++					slot_has_recover = CK_TRUE;
++					}
++				}
++			}
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++		/*
++		 * Check if this slot is capable of signing and
++		 * verifying with CKM_DSA.
++		 */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_DSA,
++			&mech_info);
++		if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN) &&
++		    (mech_info.flags & CKF_VERIFY)))
++			{
++			slot_has_dsa = CK_TRUE;
++			}
++
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++		/*
++		 * Check if this slot is capable of DH key generataion and
++		 * derivation.
++		 */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
++		    CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, &mech_info);
++
++		if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR))
++			{
++			rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot,
++				CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, &mech_info);
++			if (rv == CKR_OK && (mech_info.flags & CKF_DERIVE))
++				{
++				slot_has_dh = CK_TRUE;
++				}
++			}
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++
++		if (!found_candidate_slot &&
++		    (slot_has_rsa || slot_has_dsa || slot_has_dh))
++			{
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++			fprintf(stderr,
++			    "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++			best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
++			pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
++			pk11_have_recover = slot_has_recover;
++			pk11_have_dsa = slot_has_dsa;
++			pk11_have_dh = slot_has_dh;
++			found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
++			/*
++			 * Cache the flags for later use. We might
++			 * need those if RSA keys by reference feature
++			 * is used.
++			 */
++			pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++			fprintf(stderr,
++			    "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
++			    PK11_DBG);
++			fprintf(stderr,
++			    "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
++			    best_slot_sofar);
++			fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to "
++			    "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
++			}
++		else
++			{
++			fprintf(stderr,
++			    "%s: no rsa/dsa/dh\n", PK11_DBG);
++			}
++#else
++			} /* if */
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		} /* for */
++
++	if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE)
++		{
++		pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
++		}
++
++	found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
++	best_slot_sofar = 0;
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking cipher/digest ==\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++	SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
++	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
++		{
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
++		current_slot_n_cipher = 0;
++		current_slot_n_digest = 0;
++		(void) memset(local_cipher_nids, 0, sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
++		(void) memset(local_digest_nids, 0, sizeof (local_digest_nids));
++
++		pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pFuncList, current_slot,
++		    &current_slot_n_cipher, local_cipher_nids);
++
++		pk11_find_digests(pFuncList, current_slot,
++		    &current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids);
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_cipher %d\n", PK11_DBG,
++			current_slot_n_cipher);
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: current_slot_n_digest %d\n", PK11_DBG,
++			current_slot_n_digest);
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: best so far cipher/digest slot: %d\n",
++			PK11_DBG, best_slot_sofar);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++		/*
++		 * If the current slot supports more ciphers/digests than
++		 * the previous best one we change the current best to this one,
++		 * otherwise leave it where it is.
++		 */
++		if ((current_slot_n_cipher + current_slot_n_digest) >
++		    (slot_n_cipher + slot_n_digest))
++			{
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++			fprintf(stderr,
++				"%s: changing best so far slot to %d\n",
++				PK11_DBG, current_slot);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++			best_slot_sofar = SLOTID = current_slot;
++			cipher_count = slot_n_cipher = current_slot_n_cipher;
++			digest_count = slot_n_digest = current_slot_n_digest;
++			(void) memcpy(cipher_nids, local_cipher_nids,
++			    sizeof (local_cipher_nids));
++			(void) memcpy(digest_nids, local_digest_nids, 
++			    sizeof (local_digest_nids));
++			}
++		}
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr,
++	    "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
++	fprintf(stderr,
++	    "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
++	fprintf(stderr,
++	    "%s: chosen cipher/digest slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, SLOTID);
++	fprintf(stderr,
++	    "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
++	fprintf(stderr,
++	    "%s: pk11_have_recover %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_recover);
++	fprintf(stderr,
++	    "%s: pk11_have_dsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dsa);
++	fprintf(stderr,
++	    "%s: pk11_have_dh %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_dh);
++	fprintf(stderr,
++	    "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
++	fprintf(stderr,
++	    "%s: cipher_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, cipher_count);
++	fprintf(stderr,
++	    "%s: digest_count %d\n", PK11_DBG, digest_count);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++	if (pSlotList != NULL)
++		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
++
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++	OPENSSL_free(hw_cnids);
++	OPENSSL_free(hw_dnids);
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
++		*any_slot_found = 1;
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++static void pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
++    int slot_id, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_cipher,
++    int *local_cipher_nids, int id)
++	{
++	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
++	CK_RV rv;
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++	rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		return;
++		}
++
++	if ((mech_info.flags & CKF_ENCRYPT) &&
++	    (mech_info.flags & CKF_DECRYPT))
++		{
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++		if (nid_in_table(ciphers[id].nid, hw_cnids))
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++			{
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++			local_cipher_nids[(*current_slot_n_cipher)++] =
++			    ciphers[id].nid;
++			}
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		else
++			{
++		fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
++			}
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		}
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	else
++		{
++		fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
++		}
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++	return;
++	}
++
++static void pk11_get_digest(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist, int slot_id,
++    CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids,
++    int id)
++	{
++	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
++	CK_RV rv;
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking mech: %x", PK11_DBG, mech);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++	rv = pflist->C_GetMechanismInfo(slot_id, mech, &mech_info);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		fprintf(stderr, " not found\n");
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		return;
++		}
++
++	if (mech_info.flags & CKF_DIGEST)
++		{
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++		if (nid_in_table(digests[id].nid, hw_dnids))
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++			{
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		fprintf(stderr, " usable\n");
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++			local_digest_nids[(*current_slot_n_digest)++] =
++			    digests[id].nid;
++			}
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		else
++			{
++		fprintf(stderr, " rejected, software implementation only\n");
++			}
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		}
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	else
++		{
++		fprintf(stderr, " unusable\n");
++		}
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++	return;
++	}
++
++/* Find what symmetric ciphers this slot supports. */
++static void pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
++    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_cipher, int *local_cipher_nids)
++	{
++	int i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < PK11_CIPHER_MAX; ++i)
++		{
++		pk11_get_symmetric_cipher(pflist, current_slot,
++		    ciphers[i].mech_type, current_slot_n_cipher,
++		    local_cipher_nids, ciphers[i].id);
++		}
++	}
++
++/* Find what digest algorithms this slot supports. */
++static void pk11_find_digests(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist,
++    CK_SLOT_ID current_slot, int *current_slot_n_digest, int *local_digest_nids)
++	{
++	int i;
++
++	for (i = 0; i < PK11_DIGEST_MAX; ++i)
++		{
++		pk11_get_digest(pflist, current_slot, digests[i].mech_type,
++		    current_slot_n_digest, local_digest_nids, digests[i].id);
++		}
++	}
++
++#ifdef	SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION
++/*
++ * It would be great if we could use pkcs11_kernel directly since this library
++ * offers hardware slots only. That's the easiest way to achieve the situation
++ * where we use the hardware accelerators when present and OpenSSL native code
++ * otherwise. That presumes the fact that OpenSSL native code is faster than the
++ * code in the soft token. It's a logical assumption - Crypto Framework has some
++ * inherent overhead so going there for the software implementation of a
++ * mechanism should be logically slower in contrast to the OpenSSL native code,
++ * presuming that both implementations are of similar speed. For example, the
++ * soft token for AES is roughly three times slower than OpenSSL for 64 byte
++ * blocks and still 20% slower for 8KB blocks. So, if we want to ship products
++ * that use the PKCS#11 engine by default, we must somehow avoid that regression
++ * on machines without hardware acceleration. That's why switching to the
++ * pkcs11_kernel library seems like a very good idea.
++ *
++ * The problem is that OpenSSL built with SunStudio is roughly 2x slower for
++ * asymmetric operations (RSA/DSA/DH) than the soft token built with the same
++ * compiler. That means that if we switched to pkcs11_kernel from the libpkcs11
++ * library, we would have had a performance regression on machines without
++ * hardware acceleration for asymmetric operations for all applications that use
++ * the PKCS#11 engine. There is one such application - Apache web server since
++ * it's shipped configured to use the PKCS#11 engine by default. Having said
++ * that, we can't switch to the pkcs11_kernel library now and have to come with
++ * a solution that, on non-accelerated machines, uses the OpenSSL native code
++ * for all symmetric ciphers and digests while it uses the soft token for
++ * asymmetric operations.
++ *
++ * This is the idea: dlopen() pkcs11_kernel directly and find out what
++ * mechanisms are there. We don't care about duplications (more slots can
++ * support the same mechanism), we just want to know what mechanisms can be
++ * possibly supported in hardware on that particular machine. As said before,
++ * pkcs11_kernel will show you hardware providers only.
++ *
++ * Then, we rely on the fact that since we use libpkcs11 library we will find
++ * the metaslot. When we go through the metaslot's mechanisms for symmetric
++ * ciphers and digests, we check that any found mechanism is in the table
++ * created using the pkcs11_kernel library. So, as a result we have two arrays
++ * of mechanisms that were advertised as supported in hardware which was the
++ * goal of that whole excercise. Thus, we can use libpkcs11 but avoid soft token
++ * code for symmetric ciphers and digests. See pk11_choose_slots() for more
++ * information.
++ *
++ * This is Solaris specific code, if SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION is not defined
++ * the code won't be used.
++ */
++#if defined(__sparcv9) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__amd64)
++static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/64/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
++#else
++static const char pkcs11_kernel[] = "/usr/lib/security/pkcs11_kernel.so.1";
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * Check hardware capabilities of the machines. The output are two lists,
++ * hw_cnids and hw_dnids, that contain hardware mechanisms found in all hardware
++ * providers together. They are not sorted and may contain duplicate mechanisms.
++ */
++static int check_hw_mechanisms(void)
++	{
++	int i;
++	CK_RV rv;
++	void *handle;
++	CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
++	CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
++	CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
++	int n_cipher = 0, n_digest = 0;
++	CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pflist = NULL;
++	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
++	int *tmp_hw_cnids = NULL, *tmp_hw_dnids = NULL;
++	int hw_ctable_size, hw_dtable_size;
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION code running\n",
++	    PK11_DBG);
++#endif
++	if ((handle = dlopen(pkcs11_kernel, RTLD_LAZY)) == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if ((p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)dlsym(handle,
++	    PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST)) == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/* get the full function list from the loaded library */
++	if (p(&pflist) != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pflist->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
++	if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
++		    PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/* no slots, set the hw mechanism tables as empty */
++	if (ulSlotCount == 0)
++		{
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: no hardware mechanisms found\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif
++		hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
++		hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (int));
++		if (hw_cnids == NULL || hw_dnids == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS,
++			    PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			return (0);
++			}
++		/* this means empty tables */
++		hw_cnids[0] = NID_undef;
++		hw_dnids[0] = NID_undef;
++		return (1);
++		}
++
++	pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
++	if (pSlotList == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/* Get the slot list for processing */
++	if (pflist->C_GetSlotList(0, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount) != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * We don't care about duplicit mechanisms in multiple slots and also
++	 * reserve one slot for the terminal NID_undef which we use to stop the
++	 * search.
++	 */
++	hw_ctable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_CIPHER_MAX + 1;
++	hw_dtable_size = ulSlotCount * PK11_DIGEST_MAX + 1;
++	tmp_hw_cnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_ctable_size * sizeof (int));
++	tmp_hw_dnids = OPENSSL_malloc(hw_dtable_size * sizeof (int));
++	if (tmp_hw_cnids == NULL || tmp_hw_dnids == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * Do not use memset since we should not rely on the fact that NID_undef
++	 * is zero now.
++	 */
++	for (i = 0; i < hw_ctable_size; ++i)
++		tmp_hw_cnids[i] = NID_undef;
++	for (i = 0; i < hw_dtable_size; ++i)
++		tmp_hw_dnids[i] = NID_undef;
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, pkcs11_kernel);
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: found %d hardware slots\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: now looking for mechs supported in hw\n",
++	    PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
++		{
++		if (pflist->C_GetTokenInfo(pSlotList[i], &token_info) != CKR_OK)
++			continue;
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++		/*
++		 * We are filling the hw mech tables here. Global tables are
++		 * still NULL so all mechanisms are put into tmp tables.
++		 */
++		pk11_find_symmetric_ciphers(pflist, pSlotList[i],
++		    &n_cipher, tmp_hw_cnids);
++		pk11_find_digests(pflist, pSlotList[i],
++		    &n_digest, tmp_hw_dnids);
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
++	 * may have side-effects. Also, C_Finalize() is triggered by
++	 * dlclose(3C).
++	 */
++#if 0
++	pflist->C_Finalize(NULL);
++#endif
++	OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
++	(void) dlclose(handle);
++	hw_cnids = tmp_hw_cnids;
++	hw_dnids = tmp_hw_dnids;
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: hw mechs check complete\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++	return (1);
++
++err:
++	if (pSlotList != NULL)
++		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
++	if (tmp_hw_cnids != NULL)
++		OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_cnids);
++	if (tmp_hw_dnids != NULL)
++		OPENSSL_free(tmp_hw_dnids);
++
++	return (0);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Check presence of a NID in the table of NIDs. The table may be NULL (i.e.,
++ * non-existent).
++ */
++static int nid_in_table(int nid, int *nid_table)
++	{
++	int i = 0;
++
++	/*
++	 * a special case. NULL means that we are initializing a new
++	 * table.
++	 */
++	if (nid_table == NULL)
++		return (1);
++
++	/*
++	 * the table is never full, there is always at least one
++	 * NID_undef.
++	 */
++	while (nid_table[i] != NID_undef)
++		{
++		if (nid_table[i++] == nid)
++			{
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, " (NID %d in hw table, idx %d)", nid, i);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++			return (1);
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (0);
++	}
++#endif	/* SOLARIS_HW_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c:1.5
+--- /dev/null	Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c	Tue Jun 14 00:43:26 2011
+@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
++ * Use is subject to license terms.
++ */
++
++/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.c */
++/*
++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
++ *
++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
++ * Afchine Madjlessi.
++ */
++/*
++ * ====================================================================
++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ *
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ *
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
++ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
++ *    distribution.
++ *
++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
++ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
++ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
++ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
++ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
++ *
++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
++ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
++ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
++ *
++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
++ *    acknowledgment:
++ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ * ====================================================================
++ *
++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
++ *
++ */
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
++
++/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
++static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_functs[]=
++{
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT, 0),			"PK11_INIT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FINISH, 0),		"PK11_FINISH"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY, 0),		"PK11_DESTROY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CTRL, 0),			"PK11_CTRL"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_INIT, 0),		"PK11_RSA_INIT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_FINISH, 0),		"PK11_RSA_FINISH"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY, 0),		"PK11_RSA_GEN_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, 0),		"PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, 0),		"PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, 0),		"PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, 0),		"PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, 0),		"PK11_RSA_SIGN"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0),		"PK11_RSA_VERIFY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_ADD, 0),		"PK11_RAND_ADD"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, 0),		"PK11_RAND_BYTES"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_SESSION, 0),		"PK11_GET_SESSION"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_SESSION, 0),		"PK11_FREE_SESSION"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY, 0),		"PK11_LOAD_PUBKEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, 0),		"PK11_LOAD_PRIV_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW, 0),	"PK11_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, 0),	"PK11_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW, 0),	"PK11_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW, 0),	"PK11_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, 0),		"PK11_DSA_SIGN"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, 0),		"PK11_DSA_VERIFY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_INIT, 0),		"PK11_DSA_INIT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DSA_FINISH, 0),		"PK11_DSA_FINISH"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_INIT, 0),		"PK11_DH_INIT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_FINISH, 0),		"PK11_DH_FINISH"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH, 0),		"PK11_MOD_EXP_DH"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, 0),		"PK11_GET_DH_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS, 0),	"PK11_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, 0),		"PK11_SETUP_SESSION"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, 0),	"PK11_DESTROY_OBJECT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT, 0),		"PK11_CIPHER_INIT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER, 0),	"PK11_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY, 0),	"PK11_GET_CIPHER_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT, 0),		"PK11_DIGEST_INIT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE, 0),		"PK11_DIGEST_UPDATE"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL, 0),		"PK11_DIGEST_FINAL"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, 0),		"PK11_CHOOSE_SLOT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL, 0),		"PK11_CIPHER_FINAL"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, 0),		"PK11_LIBRARY_INIT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_LOAD, 0),			"ENGINE_LOAD_PK11"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, 0),		"PK11_DH_GEN_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, 0),		"PK11_DH_COMP_KEY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY, 0),		"PK11_DIGEST_COPY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP, 0),	"PK11_CIPHER_CLEANUP"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, 0),		"PK11_ACTIVE_ADD"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, 0),		"PK11_ACTIVE_DELETE"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS, 0),	"PK11_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC, 0),	"PK11_INIT_SYMMETRIC"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS, 0),	"PK11_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 0),	"PK11_INIT_ALL_LOCKS"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION, 0),	"PK11_RETURN_SESSION"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_GET_PIN, 0),		"PK11_GET_PIN"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, 0),	"PK11_FIND_ONE_OBJECT"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS, 0),	"PK11_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_CACHE_PIN, 0),		"PK11_CACHE_PIN"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY, 0),	"PK11_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, 0),		"PK11_TOKEN_LOGIN"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN, 0),		"PK11_TOKEN_RELOGIN"},
++{ ERR_PACK(0, PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS, 0),		"PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS"},
++{ 0, NULL}
++};
++
++static ERR_STRING_DATA pk11_str_reasons[]=
++{
++{ PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED,		"PKCS#11 DSO already loaded"},
++{ PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE,			"unable to load PKCS#11 DSO"},
++{ PK11_R_NOT_LOADED,			"PKCS#11 DSO not loaded"},
++{ PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER,		"null parameter passed"},
++{ PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,	"command not implemented"},
++{ PK11_R_INITIALIZE,			"C_Initialize failed"},
++{ PK11_R_FINALIZE,			"C_Finalize failed"},
++{ PK11_R_GETINFO,			"C_GetInfo faile"},
++{ PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST,			"C_GetSlotList failed"},
++{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT,	"no modulus or no exponent"},
++{ PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID,	"attr sensitive or invalid"},
++{ PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,		"C_GetAttributeValue failed"},
++{ PK11_R_NO_MODULUS,			"no modulus"},
++{ PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT,			"no exponent"},
++{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT,		"C_FindObjectsInit failed"},
++{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,			"C_FindObjects failed"},
++{ PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,		"C_FindObjectsFinal failed"},
++{ PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,			"C_CreateObject failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,			"C_DestroyObject failed"},
++{ PK11_R_OPENSESSION,			"C_OpenSession failed"},
++{ PK11_R_CLOSESESSION,			"C_CloseSession failed"},
++{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT,			"C_EncryptInit failed"},
++{ PK11_R_ENCRYPT,			"C_Encrypt failed"},
++{ PK11_R_SIGNINIT,			"C_SignInit failed"},
++{ PK11_R_SIGN,				"C_Sign failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT,			"C_DecryptInit failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DECRYPT,			"C_Decrypt failed"},
++{ PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,			"C_VerifyRecover failed"},
++{ PK11_R_VERIFY,			"C_Verify failed"},
++{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT,		"C_VerifyRecoverInit failed"},
++{ PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER,			"C_VerifyRecover failed"},
++{ PK11_R_GEN_KEY,			"C_GenerateKeyPair failed"},
++{ PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM,			"C_SeedRandom failed"},
++{ PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM,		"C_GenerateRandom failed"},
++{ PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH,	"invalid message length"},
++{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE,	"unknown algorithm type"},
++{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID,	"unknown asn1 onject id"},
++{ PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE,		"unknown padding type"},
++{ PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED,		"padding check failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG,		"digest too big"},
++{ PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE,		"malloc failure"},
++{ PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED,	"ctl command not implemented"},
++{ PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN,	"data is bigger than mod"},
++{ PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS,	"data is too larger for mod"},
++{ PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT,		"a dsa component is missing"},
++{ PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH,	"invalid signature length"},
++{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R,	"missing r in dsa verify"},
++{ PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S,	"missing s in dsa verify"},
++{ PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY,		"inconsistent key type"},
++{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE,			"C_EncryptUpdate failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE,			"C_DecryptUpdate failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DIGESTINIT,			"C_DigestInit failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE,			"C_DigestUpdate failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL,			"C_DigestFinal failed"},
++{ PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL,			"C_EncryptFinal failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL,			"C_DecryptFinal failed"},
++{ PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT,		"Slot does not support PRNG"},
++{ PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO,			"C_GetTokenInfo failed"},
++{ PK11_R_DERIVEKEY,			"C_DeriveKey failed"},
++{ PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE,		"C_GetOperationState failed"},
++{ PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE,		"C_SetOperationState failed"},
++{ PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE,		"invalid PKCS#11 object handle"},
++{ PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM,		"IV or key length incorrect"},
++{ PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE,	"invalid operation type"},
++{ PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED,		"failed to add NID" },
++{ PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED,			"atfork() failed" },
++{ PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED,		"C_Login() failed on token" },
++{ PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND,	"more than one object found" },
++{ PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI,		"pkcs11 URI provided is invalid" },
++{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN,		"could not read PIN from terminal" },
++{ PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND,	"PIN not read from external command" },
++{ PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND,	"could not popen() dialog command" },
++{ PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED,			"pipe() failed" },
++{ PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC,		"bad passphrasedialog specification" },
++{ PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED,		"token not initialized" },
++{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET,		"token PIN required but not set" },
++{ PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED,	"token PIN required but not provided" },
++{ PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL,		"missing mandatory 'object' keyword" },
++{ PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH,	"token attrs provided do not match" },
++{ PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND,		"private key not found in keystore" },
++{ PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND,		"specified object not found" },
++{ PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID,	"PIN set but caching policy invalid" },
++{ PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED,		"sysconf() failed" },
++{ PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED,			"mmap() failed" },
++{ PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING,	"PROC_LOCK_MEMORY privilege missing" },
++{ PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED,			"mlock() failed" },
++{ PK11_R_FORK_FAILED,			"fork() failed" },
++{ 0,	NULL}
++};
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_ERR */
++
++static int pk11_lib_error_code = 0;
++static int pk11_error_init = 1;
++
++static void
++ERR_load_pk11_strings(void)
++	{
++	if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
++		pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
++
++	if (pk11_error_init)
++		{
++		pk11_error_init = 0;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
++		ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
++		ERR_load_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
++#endif
++		}
++}
++
++static void
++ERR_unload_pk11_strings(void)
++	{
++	if (pk11_error_init == 0)
++		{
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
++		ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_functs);
++		ERR_unload_strings(pk11_lib_error_code, pk11_str_reasons);
++#endif
++		pk11_error_init = 1;
++		}
++}
++
++void
++ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line)
++{
++	if (pk11_lib_error_code == 0)
++		pk11_lib_error_code = ERR_get_next_error_library();
++	ERR_PUT_error(pk11_lib_error_code, function, reason, file, line);
++}
++
++void
++PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv)
++{
++	char tmp_buf[20];
++
++	PK11err(function, reason);
++	(void) BIO_snprintf(tmp_buf, sizeof (tmp_buf), "%lx", rv);
++	ERR_add_error_data(2, "PK11 CK_RV=0X", tmp_buf);
++}
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h:1.13
+--- /dev/null	Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_err.h	Fri Oct  4 14:04:20 2013
+@@ -0,0 +1,440 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
++ * Use is subject to license terms.
++ */
++
++/*
++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
++ *
++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
++ * Afchine Madjlessi.
++ */
++/*
++ * ====================================================================
++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ *
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ *
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
++ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
++ *    distribution.
++ *
++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
++ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
++ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
++ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
++ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
++ *
++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
++ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
++ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
++ *
++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
++ *    acknowledgment:
++ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ * ====================================================================
++ *
++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
++ *
++ */
++
++#ifndef	HW_PK11_ERR_H
++#define	HW_PK11_ERR_H
++
++void ERR_pk11_error(int function, int reason, char *file, int line);
++void PK11err_add_data(int function, int reason, CK_RV rv);
++#define	PK11err(f, r)	ERR_pk11_error((f), (r), __FILE__, __LINE__)
++
++/* Error codes for the PK11 functions. */
++
++/* Function codes. */
++
++#define	PK11_F_INIT				100
++#define	PK11_F_FINISH				101
++#define	PK11_F_DESTROY				102
++#define	PK11_F_CTRL				103
++#define	PK11_F_RSA_INIT				104
++#define	PK11_F_RSA_FINISH			105
++#define	PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY			106
++#define	PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY			107
++#define	PK11_F_RSA_GEN_KEY			108
++#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC			109
++#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC			110
++#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC			111
++#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC			112
++#define	PK11_F_RSA_SIGN				113
++#define	PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY			114
++#define	PK11_F_RAND_ADD				115
++#define	PK11_F_RAND_BYTES			116
++#define	PK11_F_GET_SESSION			117
++#define	PK11_F_FREE_SESSION			118
++#define	PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY			119
++#define	PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY			120
++#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW			121
++#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW			122
++#define	PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW			123
++#define	PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW			124
++#define	PK11_F_DSA_SIGN				125
++#define	PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY			126
++#define	PK11_F_DSA_INIT				127
++#define	PK11_F_DSA_FINISH			128
++#define	PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY			129
++#define	PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY			130
++#define	PK11_F_DH_INIT				131
++#define	PK11_F_DH_FINISH			132
++#define	PK11_F_MOD_EXP_DH			133
++#define	PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY			134
++#define	PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS		135
++#define	PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION			136
++#define	PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT			137
++#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_INIT			138
++#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_DO_CIPHER			139
++#define	PK11_F_GET_CIPHER_KEY			140
++#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_INIT			141
++#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_UPDATE			142
++#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_FINAL			143
++#define	PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT			144
++#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_FINAL			145
++#define	PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT			146
++#define	PK11_F_LOAD				147
++#define	PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY			148
++#define	PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY			149
++#define	PK11_F_DIGEST_COPY			150
++#define	PK11_F_CIPHER_CLEANUP			151
++#define	PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD			152
++#define	PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE			153
++#define	PK11_F_CHECK_HW_MECHANISMS		154
++#define	PK11_F_INIT_SYMMETRIC			155
++#define	PK11_F_ADD_AES_CTR_NIDS			156
++#define	PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS			157
++#define	PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION			158
++#define	PK11_F_GET_PIN				159
++#define	PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT			160
++#define	PK11_F_CHECK_TOKEN_ATTRS		161
++#define	PK11_F_CACHE_PIN			162
++#define	PK11_F_MLOCK_PIN_IN_MEMORY		163
++#define	PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN			164
++#define	PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN			165
++#define	PK11_F_RUN_ASKPASS			166
++
++/* Reason codes. */
++#define	PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED 			100
++#define	PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE 			101
++#define	PK11_R_NOT_LOADED 			102
++#define	PK11_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER 		103
++#define	PK11_R_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 		104
++#define	PK11_R_INITIALIZE 			105
++#define	PK11_R_FINALIZE 			106
++#define	PK11_R_GETINFO 				107
++#define	PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST 			108
++#define	PK11_R_NO_MODULUS_OR_NO_EXPONENT 	109
++#define	PK11_R_ATTRIBUT_SENSITIVE_OR_INVALID 	110
++#define	PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE 		111
++#define	PK11_R_NO_MODULUS 			112
++#define	PK11_R_NO_EXPONENT 			113
++#define	PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT 			114
++#define	PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS 			115
++#define	PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL 		116
++#define	PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT 			118
++#define	PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT 			119
++#define	PK11_R_OPENSESSION 			120
++#define	PK11_R_CLOSESESSION 			121
++#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT 			122
++#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPT 				123
++#define	PK11_R_SIGNINIT 			124
++#define	PK11_R_SIGN 				125
++#define	PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT 			126
++#define	PK11_R_DECRYPT 				127
++#define	PK11_R_VERIFYINIT 			128
++#define	PK11_R_VERIFY 				129
++#define	PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT 		130
++#define	PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER 			131
++#define	PK11_R_GEN_KEY 				132
++#define	PK11_R_SEEDRANDOM 			133
++#define	PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM 			134
++#define	PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH 		135
++#define	PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE 		136
++#define	PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID 		137
++#define	PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE 		138
++#define	PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED 		139
++#define	PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG 			140
++#define	PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE 			141
++#define	PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 	142
++#define	PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN 	143
++#define	PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS 	144
++#define	PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT		145
++#define	PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH		146
++#define	PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R		147
++#define	PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S		148
++#define	PK11_R_INCONSISTENT_KEY			149
++#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPTUPDATE			150
++#define	PK11_R_DECRYPTUPDATE			151
++#define	PK11_R_DIGESTINIT			152
++#define	PK11_R_DIGESTUPDATE			153
++#define	PK11_R_DIGESTFINAL			154
++#define	PK11_R_ENCRYPTFINAL			155
++#define	PK11_R_DECRYPTFINAL			156
++#define	PK11_R_NO_PRNG_SUPPORT			157
++#define	PK11_R_GETTOKENINFO			158
++#define	PK11_R_DERIVEKEY			159
++#define	PK11_R_GET_OPERATION_STATE		160
++#define	PK11_R_SET_OPERATION_STATE		161
++#define	PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE			162
++#define	PK11_R_KEY_OR_IV_LEN_PROBLEM		163
++#define	PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE		164
++#define	PK11_R_ADD_NID_FAILED			165
++#define	PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED			166
++
++#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED		167
++#define	PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND	168
++#define	PK11_R_INVALID_PKCS11_URI		169
++#define	PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN		170
++#define	PK11_R_COULD_NOT_OPEN_COMMAND		171
++#define	PK11_R_PIPE_FAILED			172
++#define	PK11_R_PIN_NOT_READ_FROM_COMMAND	173
++#define	PK11_R_BAD_PASSPHRASE_SPEC		174
++#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED		175
++#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET		176
++#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED		177
++#define	PK11_R_MISSING_OBJECT_LABEL		178
++#define	PK11_R_TOKEN_ATTRS_DO_NOT_MATCH		179
++#define	PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND		180
++#define	PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND			181
++#define	PK11_R_PIN_CACHING_POLICY_INVALID	182
++#define	PK11_R_SYSCONF_FAILED			183
++#define	PK11_R_MMAP_FAILED			183
++#define	PK11_R_PRIV_PROC_LOCK_MEMORY_MISSING	184
++#define	PK11_R_MLOCK_FAILED			185
++#define	PK11_R_FORK_FAILED			186
++
++/* max byte length of a symetric key we support */
++#define	PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX			32
++
++#ifdef NOPTHREADS
++/*
++ * CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE lock is primarily used for the protection of the
++ * free_session list and active_list but generally serves as a global
++ * per-process lock for the whole engine.
++ *
++ * We reuse CRYPTO_LOCK_EC lock (which is defined in OpenSSL for EC method) as
++ * the global engine lock. This is not optimal w.r.t. performance but
++ * it's safe.
++ */
++#define CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE	CRYPTO_LOCK_EC
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * This structure encapsulates all reusable information for a PKCS#11
++ * session. A list of these objects is created on behalf of the
++ * calling application using an on-demand method. Each operation
++ * type (see PK11_OPTYPE below) has its own per-process list.
++ * Each of the lists is basically a cache for faster PKCS#11 object
++ * access to avoid expensive C_Find{,Init,Final}Object() calls.
++ *
++ * When a new request comes in, an object will be taken from the list
++ * (if there is one) or a new one is created to handle the request
++ * (if the list is empty). See pk11_get_session() on how it is done.
++ */
++typedef struct PK11_st_SESSION
++	{
++	struct PK11_st_SESSION	*next;
++	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	session;	/* PK11 session handle */
++	pid_t			pid;		/* Current process ID */
++	CK_BBOOL		pub_persistent;	/* is pub key in keystore? */
++	CK_BBOOL		priv_persistent;/* is priv key in keystore? */
++	union
++		{
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++		struct
++			{
++			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	rsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
++			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	rsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
++			RSA			*rsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
++			BIGNUM			*rsa_n_num; /* pub modulus */
++			BIGNUM			*rsa_e_num; /* pub exponent */
++			RSA			*rsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
++			BIGNUM			*rsa_pn_num; /* pub modulus */
++			BIGNUM			*rsa_pe_num; /* pub exponent */
++			BIGNUM			*rsa_d_num; /* priv exponent */
++			} u_RSA;
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++		struct
++			{
++			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	dsa_pub_key; /* pub handle */
++			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	dsa_priv_key; /* priv handle */
++			DSA			*dsa_pub; /* pub key addr */
++			BIGNUM			*dsa_pub_num; /* pub key */
++			DSA			*dsa_priv; /* priv key addr */
++			BIGNUM			*dsa_priv_num; /* priv key */
++			} u_DSA;
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++		struct
++			{
++			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	dh_key; /* key handle */
++			DH			*dh; /* dh key addr */
++			BIGNUM			*dh_priv_num; /* priv dh key */
++			} u_DH;
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++		struct
++			{
++			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE	cipher_key; /* key handle */
++			unsigned char		key[PK11_KEY_LEN_MAX];
++			int			key_len; /* priv key len */
++			int			encrypt; /* 1/0 enc/decr */
++			} u_cipher;
++		} opdata_u;
++	} PK11_SESSION;
++
++#define	opdata_rsa_pub_key	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub_key
++#define	opdata_rsa_priv_key	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv_key
++#define	opdata_rsa_pub		opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pub
++#define	opdata_rsa_priv		opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_priv
++#define	opdata_rsa_n_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_n_num
++#define	opdata_rsa_e_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_e_num
++#define	opdata_rsa_pn_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pn_num
++#define	opdata_rsa_pe_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_pe_num
++#define	opdata_rsa_d_num	opdata_u.u_RSA.rsa_d_num
++#define	opdata_dsa_pub_key	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_key
++#define	opdata_dsa_priv_key	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_key
++#define	opdata_dsa_pub		opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub
++#define	opdata_dsa_pub_num	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_pub_num
++#define	opdata_dsa_priv		opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv
++#define	opdata_dsa_priv_num	opdata_u.u_DSA.dsa_priv_num
++#define	opdata_dh_key		opdata_u.u_DH.dh_key
++#define	opdata_dh		opdata_u.u_DH.dh
++#define	opdata_dh_priv_num	opdata_u.u_DH.dh_priv_num
++#define	opdata_cipher_key	opdata_u.u_cipher.cipher_key
++#define	opdata_key		opdata_u.u_cipher.key
++#define	opdata_key_len		opdata_u.u_cipher.key_len
++#define	opdata_encrypt		opdata_u.u_cipher.encrypt
++
++/*
++ * We have 3 different groups of operation types:
++ *   1) asymmetric operations
++ *   2) random operations
++ *   3) symmetric and digest operations
++ *
++ * This division into groups stems from the fact that it's common that hardware
++ * providers may support operations from one group only. For example, hardware
++ * providers on UltraSPARC T2, n2rng(7d), ncp(7d), and n2cp(7d), each support
++ * only a single group of operations.
++ *
++ * For every group a different slot can be chosen. That means that we must have
++ * at least 3 different lists of cached PKCS#11 sessions since sessions from
++ * different groups may be initialized in different slots.
++ *
++ * To provide locking granularity in multithreaded environment, the groups are
++ * further splitted into types with each type having a separate session cache.
++ */
++typedef enum PK11_OPTYPE_ENUM
++	{
++	OP_RAND,
++	OP_RSA,
++	OP_DSA,
++	OP_DH,
++	OP_CIPHER,
++	OP_DIGEST,
++	OP_MAX
++	} PK11_OPTYPE;
++
++/*
++ * This structure contains the heads of the lists forming the object caches
++ * and locks associated with the lists.
++ */
++typedef struct PK11_st_CACHE
++	{
++	PK11_SESSION *head;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	pthread_mutex_t *lock;
++#endif
++	} PK11_CACHE;
++
++/* structure for tracking handles of asymmetric key objects */
++typedef struct PK11_active_st
++	{
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h;
++	unsigned int refcnt;
++	struct PK11_active_st *prev;
++	struct PK11_active_st *next;
++	} PK11_active;
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++extern pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[];
++#endif
++extern PK11_active *active_list[];
++/*
++ * These variables are specific for the RSA keys by reference code. See
++ * hw_pk11_pub.c for explanation.
++ */
++extern CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++#define	LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type)	\
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0)
++#define	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type)	\
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(find_lock[alg_type]) == 0)
++#else
++#define	LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type)	\
++	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE)
++#define	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type)	\
++	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE)
++#endif
++
++extern PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++extern void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++extern int pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++extern int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
++	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
++extern EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
++	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
++extern RSA_METHOD *PK11_RSA(void);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++extern int pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++extern DSA_METHOD *PK11_DSA(void);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++extern int pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++extern int pk11_destroy_dh_object(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++extern DH_METHOD *PK11_DH(void);
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++
++extern CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList;
++
++#endif /* HW_PK11_ERR_H */
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c:1.42
+--- /dev/null	Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c	Fri Oct  4 14:27:06 2013
+@@ -0,0 +1,3556 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
++ * Use is subject to license terms.
++ */
++
++/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
++/*
++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
++ *
++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
++ * Afchine Madjlessi.
++ */
++/*
++ * ====================================================================
++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ *
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ *
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
++ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
++ *    distribution.
++ *
++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
++ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
++ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
++ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
++ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
++ *
++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
++ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
++ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
++ *
++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
++ *    acknowledgment:
++ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ * ====================================================================
++ *
++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
++ *
++ */
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++
++#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <cryptlib.h>
++#include <openssl/engine.h>
++#include <openssl/dso.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++#include <openssl/pem.h>
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++#include <openssl/rsa.h>
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++#include <openssl/dsa.h>
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++#include <openssl/dh.h>
++#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DH */
++#include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/objects.h>
++#include <openssl/x509.h>
++
++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++#define NOPTHREADS
++typedef int pid_t;
++#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE
++static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt);
++#ifndef NULL_PTR
++#define NULL_PTR NULL
++#endif
++#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++	returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++	returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
++	returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
++#else
++#include <unistd.h>
++#endif
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++#include <pthread.h>
++#endif
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
++
++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
++#include "cryptoki.h"
++#include "pkcs11.h"
++#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
++#else
++#include "cryptoki.h"
++#include "pkcs11.h"
++#endif
++#include "hw_pk11ca.h"
++#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
++
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
++extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
++#endif
++
++#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)))
++#define getpassphrase(x)	getpass(x)
++#endif
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++/* RSA stuff */
++static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
++static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
++static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
++static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
++static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa);
++static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa);
++static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
++	unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
++static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
++	unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
++	const RSA *rsa);
++#else
++static int pk11_RSA_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
++	unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
++	const RSA *rsa);
++#endif
++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file,
++	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
++	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
++
++static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
++static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
++static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
++static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa);
++
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
++	BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
++	BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
++	CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
++
++static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
++static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
++#endif
++
++/* DSA stuff */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa);
++static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa);
++static DSA_SIG *pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen,
++	DSA *dsa);
++static int pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
++	DSA_SIG *sig, DSA *dsa);
++
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
++	BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa, DSA **key_ptr,
++	BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
++
++static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
++static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa);
++#endif
++
++/* DH stuff */
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh);
++static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh);
++static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh);
++static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key,
++	const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
++
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh, DH **key_ptr,
++	BIGNUM **priv_key, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
++
++static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh);
++#endif
++
++static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
++static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
++	CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
++static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
++
++static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
++	CK_BBOOL is_private);
++
++/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
++#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
++static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
++#else
++static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list
++ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error
++ * variable and jump to the specified label.
++ */
++#define	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label)	\
++	{								\
++	if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0)			\
++		{							\
++		var = TRUE;						\
++		if (unlock)						\
++			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);			\
++		goto label;						\
++		}							\
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
++ * entry otherwise return NULL.
++ *
++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
++ * held.
++ */
++static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++	{
++	PK11_active *entry;
++
++	for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
++		if (entry->h == h)
++			return (entry);
++
++	return (NULL);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
++ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
++ * failure.
++ *
++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
++ * held.
++ */
++int
++pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++	{
++	PK11_active *entry = NULL;
++
++	if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
++		return (-1);
++		}
++
++	/* search for entry in the active list */
++	if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
++		entry->refcnt++;
++	else
++		{
++		/* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
++		entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
++		if (entry == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			return (-1);
++			}
++		entry->h = h;
++		entry->refcnt = 1;
++		entry->prev = NULL;
++		entry->next = NULL;
++		/* connect the newly created entry to the list */
++		if (active_list[type] == NULL)
++			active_list[type] = entry;
++		else /* make the entry first in the list */
++			{
++			entry->next = active_list[type];
++			active_list[type]->prev = entry;
++			active_list[type] = entry;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (entry->refcnt);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
++ *
++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
++ * held.
++ */
++void
++pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++	{
++	PK11_active *prev_entry;
++
++	/* remove the entry from the list and free it */
++	if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
++		{
++		prev_entry->next = entry->next;
++		if (entry->next != NULL)
++			entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		active_list[type] = entry->next;
++		/* we were the first but not the only one */
++		if (entry->next != NULL)
++			entry->next->prev = NULL;
++		}
++
++	/* sanitization */
++	entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	entry->prev = NULL;
++	entry->next = NULL;
++	OPENSSL_free(entry);
++	}
++
++/* Free all entries from the active list. */
++void
++pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
++	{
++	PK11_active *entry;
++
++	/* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
++	switch (type)
++		{
++		case OP_RSA:
++		case OP_DSA:
++		case OP_DH:
++			break;
++		default:
++			return;
++		}
++
++	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
++	LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
++	while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
++		pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
++ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
++ *
++ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
++ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
++ *
++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
++ * held.
++ */
++int
++pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++	{
++	PK11_active *entry = NULL;
++
++	if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
++		return (-1);
++		}
++
++	OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
++	entry->refcnt--;
++	if (entry->refcnt == 0)
++		{
++		pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
++		return (1);
++		}
++
++	return (0);
++	}
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
++static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa =
++	{
++	"PKCS#11 RSA method",
++	pk11_RSA_public_encrypt,		/* rsa_pub_encrypt */
++	pk11_RSA_public_decrypt,		/* rsa_pub_decrypt */
++	pk11_RSA_private_encrypt,		/* rsa_priv_encrypt */
++	pk11_RSA_private_decrypt,		/* rsa_priv_decrypt */
++	NULL,					/* rsa_mod_exp */
++	NULL,					/* bn_mod_exp */
++	pk11_RSA_init,				/* init */
++	pk11_RSA_finish,			/* finish */
++	RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER,			/* flags */
++	NULL,					/* app_data */
++	pk11_RSA_sign,				/* rsa_sign */
++	pk11_RSA_verify				/* rsa_verify */
++	};
++
++RSA_METHOD *
++PK11_RSA(void)
++	{
++	return (&pk11_rsa);
++	}
++#endif
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++/* Our internal DSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
++static DSA_METHOD pk11_dsa =
++	{
++	"PKCS#11 DSA method",
++	pk11_dsa_do_sign, 	/* dsa_do_sign */
++	NULL, 			/* dsa_sign_setup */
++	pk11_dsa_do_verify, 	/* dsa_do_verify */
++	NULL,			/* dsa_mod_exp */
++	NULL, 			/* bn_mod_exp */
++	pk11_DSA_init, 		/* init */
++	pk11_DSA_finish, 	/* finish */
++	0, 			/* flags */
++	NULL 			/* app_data */
++	};
++
++DSA_METHOD *
++PK11_DSA(void)
++	{
++	return (&pk11_dsa);
++	}
++#endif
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++/*
++ * PKCS #11 V2.20, section 11.2 specifies that the number of bytes needed for
++ * output buffer may somewhat exceed the precise number of bytes needed, but
++ * should not exceed it by a large amount. That may be caused, for example, by
++ * rounding it up to multiple of X in the underlying bignum library. 8 should be
++ * enough.
++ */
++#define	DH_BUF_RESERVE	8
++
++/* Our internal DH_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
++static DH_METHOD pk11_dh =
++	{
++	"PKCS#11 DH method",
++	pk11_DH_generate_key,	/* generate_key */
++	pk11_DH_compute_key,	/* compute_key */
++	NULL,			/* bn_mod_exp */
++	pk11_DH_init,		/* init */
++	pk11_DH_finish,		/* finish */
++	0,			/* flags */
++	NULL,			/* app_data */
++	NULL			/* generate_params */
++	};
++
++DH_METHOD *
++PK11_DH(void)
++	{
++	return (&pk11_dh);
++	}
++#endif
++
++/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
++#define	SSL_SIG_LENGTH		36
++
++/* Lengths of DSA data and signature */
++#define	DSA_DATA_LEN		20
++#define	DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN	40
++
++static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
++static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++/*
++ * Similiar to OpenSSL to take advantage of the paddings. The goal is to
++ * support all paddings in this engine although PK11 library does not
++ * support all the paddings used in OpenSSL.
++ * The input errors should have been checked in the padding functions.
++ */
++static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++		unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
++	{
++	int i, num = 0, r = -1;
++	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
++
++	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
++	if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
++		{
++		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	switch (padding)
++		{
++	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
++		i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
++		break;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
++	case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
++		i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
++		break;
++#endif
++	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
++		i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
++		break;
++	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
++		i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
++		break;
++	default:
++		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++	if (i <= 0) goto err;
++
++	/* PK11 functions are called here */
++	r = pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
++err:
++	if (buf != NULL)
++		{
++		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
++		OPENSSL_free(buf);
++		}
++	return (r);
++	}
++
++
++/*
++ * Similar to Openssl to take advantage of the paddings. The input errors
++ * should be catched in the padding functions
++ */
++static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
++	{
++	int i, num = 0, r = -1;
++	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
++
++	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
++	if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
++		{
++		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	switch (padding)
++		{
++	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
++		i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
++		break;
++	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
++		i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
++		break;
++	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
++	default:
++		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++	if (i <= 0) goto err;
++
++	/* PK11 functions are called here */
++	r = pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(num, buf, to, rsa);
++err:
++	if (buf != NULL)
++		{
++		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
++		OPENSSL_free(buf);
++		}
++	return (r);
++	}
++
++/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
++static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
++	{
++	BIGNUM f;
++	int j, num = 0, r = -1;
++	unsigned char *p;
++	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
++
++	BN_init(&f);
++
++	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
++
++	if ((buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL)
++		{
++		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
++	 * and chops off the top '0' bytes
++	 */
++	if (flen > num)
++		{
++		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
++			PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/* make data into a big number */
++	if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, &f) == NULL)
++		goto err;
++
++	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
++		{
++		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC,
++			PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/* PK11 functions are called here */
++	r = pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
++
++	/*
++	 * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
++	 * Needs to skip these 0's paddings here.
++	 */
++	for (j = 0; j < r; j++)
++		if (buf[j] != 0)
++			break;
++
++	p = buf + j;
++	j = r - j;  /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
++
++	switch (padding)
++		{
++	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
++		r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, p, j, num);
++		break;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
++	case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
++		r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, p, j, num, NULL, 0);
++		break;
++#endif
++	case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
++		r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, p, j, num);
++		break;
++	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
++		r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, j, num);
++		break;
++	default:
++		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++	if (r < 0)
++		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
++
++err:
++	BN_clear_free(&f);
++	if (buf != NULL)
++		{
++		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
++		OPENSSL_free(buf);
++		}
++	return (r);
++	}
++
++/* Similar to OpenSSL code. Input errors are also checked here */
++static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
++	{
++	BIGNUM f;
++	int i, num = 0, r = -1;
++	unsigned char *p;
++	unsigned char *buf = NULL;
++
++	BN_init(&f);
++	num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
++	buf = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num);
++	if (buf == NULL)
++		{
++		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things
++	 * and chops off the top '0' bytes
++	 */
++	if (flen > num)
++		{
++		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, &f) == NULL)
++		goto err;
++
++	if (BN_ucmp(&f, rsa->n) >= 0)
++		{
++		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC,
++			PK11_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/* PK11 functions are called here */
++	r = pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(flen, from, buf, rsa);
++
++	/*
++	 * PK11 CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism pads 0's at the beginning.
++	 * Needs to skip these 0's here
++	 */
++	for (i = 0; i < r; i++)
++		if (buf[i] != 0)
++			break;
++
++	p = buf + i;
++	i = r - i;  /* i is only used with no-padding mode */
++
++	switch (padding)
++		{
++	case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
++		r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, p, i, num);
++		break;
++	case RSA_NO_PADDING:
++		r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, p, i, num);
++		break;
++	default:
++		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++	if (r < 0)
++		RSAerr(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC, PK11_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
++
++err:
++	BN_clear_free(&f);
++	if (buf != NULL)
++		{
++		OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, num);
++		OPENSSL_free(buf);
++		}
++	return (r);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * This function implements RSA public encryption using C_EncryptInit and
++ * C_Encrypt pk11 interfaces. Note that the CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
++ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
++ */
++static int pk11_RSA_public_encrypt_low(int flen,
++	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
++	{
++	CK_ULONG bytes_encrypted = flen;
++	int retval = -1;
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
++	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++		return (-1);
++
++	(void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
++
++	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
++	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
++			pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
++			    &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
++			    sp->session);
++
++	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_EncryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
++			h_pub_key);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
++			    PK11_R_ENCRYPTINIT, rv);
++			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++			return (-1);
++			}
++
++		rv = pFuncList->C_Encrypt(sp->session,
++			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_encrypted);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_ENC_LOW,
++			    PK11_R_ENCRYPT, rv);
++			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++			return (-1);
++			}
++		retval = bytes_encrypted;
++		}
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++	return (retval);
++	}
++
++
++/*
++ * This function implements RSA private encryption using C_SignInit and
++ * C_Sign pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
++ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
++ */
++static int pk11_RSA_private_encrypt_low(int flen,
++	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
++	{
++	CK_ULONG ul_sig_len = flen;
++	int retval = -1;
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
++	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++		return (-1);
++
++	(void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
++
++	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
++	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
++			pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
++			    &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
++			    &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
++		}
++
++	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech,
++			h_priv_key);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW,
++			    PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
++			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++			return (-1);
++			}
++
++		rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
++			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &ul_sig_len);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_ENC_LOW, PK11_R_SIGN,
++			    rv);
++			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++			return (-1);
++			}
++
++		retval = ul_sig_len;
++		}
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++	return (retval);
++	}
++
++
++/*
++ * This function implements RSA private decryption using C_DecryptInit and
++ * C_Decrypt pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 mechanism is used here.
++ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
++ */
++static int pk11_RSA_private_decrypt_low(int flen,
++	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
++	{
++	CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
++	int retval = -1;
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
++	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++		return (-1);
++
++	(void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
++
++	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
++	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
++			pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
++			    &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
++			    &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
++
++	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_DecryptInit(sp->session, p_mech,
++			h_priv_key);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
++				PK11_R_DECRYPTINIT, rv);
++			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++			return (-1);
++			}
++
++		rv = pFuncList->C_Decrypt(sp->session,
++			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PRIV_DEC_LOW,
++			    PK11_R_DECRYPT, rv);
++			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++			return (-1);
++			}
++		retval = bytes_decrypted;
++		}
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++	return (retval);
++	}
++
++
++/*
++ * This function implements RSA public decryption using C_VerifyRecoverInit
++ * and C_VerifyRecover pk11 APIs. Note that CKM_RSA_X_509 is used here.
++ * The calling function allocated sufficient memory in "to" to store results.
++ */
++static int pk11_RSA_public_decrypt_low(int flen,
++	const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa)
++	{
++	CK_ULONG bytes_decrypted = flen;
++	int retval = -1;
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL, 0};
++	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++		return (-1);
++
++	(void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
++
++	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
++	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
++			pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
++			    &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
++			    sp->session);
++
++	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecoverInit(sp->session,
++			p_mech, h_pub_key);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
++				PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVERINIT, rv);
++			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++			return (-1);
++			}
++
++		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyRecover(sp->session,
++			(unsigned char *)from, flen, to, &bytes_decrypted);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_PUB_DEC_LOW,
++			    PK11_R_VERIFYRECOVER, rv);
++			pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++			return (-1);
++			}
++		retval = bytes_decrypted;
++		}
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++	return (retval);
++	}
++
++static int pk11_RSA_init(RSA *rsa)
++	{
++	/*
++	 * This flag in the RSA_METHOD enables the new rsa_sign,
++	 * rsa_verify functions. See rsa.h for details.
++	 */
++	rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++static int pk11_RSA_finish(RSA *rsa)
++	{
++	/*
++	 * Since we are overloading OpenSSL's native RSA_eay_finish() we need
++	 * to do the same as in the original function, i.e. to free bignum
++	 * structures.
++	 */
++	if (rsa->_method_mod_n != NULL)
++		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
++	if (rsa->_method_mod_p != NULL)
++		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
++	if (rsa->_method_mod_q != NULL)
++		BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
++ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
++ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
++ */
++static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
++	unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
++	{
++	X509_SIG sig;
++	ASN1_TYPE parameter;
++	int i, j = 0;
++	unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
++	X509_ALGOR algor;
++	ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
++	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++	int ret = 0;
++	unsigned long ulsiglen;
++
++	/* Encode the digest */
++	/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
++	if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
++		{
++		if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
++				PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
++		s = (unsigned char *)m;
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		sig.algor = &algor;
++		sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
++		if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
++				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
++				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
++		parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
++		sig.algor->parameter = &parameter;
++
++		sig.digest = &digest;
++		sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
++		sig.digest->length = m_len;
++
++		i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
++		}
++
++	j = RSA_size(rsa);
++	if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
++		{
++		s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
++		if (s == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		p = s;
++		(void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
++		}
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++		goto err;
++
++	(void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
++
++	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
++	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
++			pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa,
++			    &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
++			    &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num,
++			    sp->session);
++
++	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		ulsiglen = j;
++		rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
++			(CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
++		*siglen = ulsiglen;
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		ret = 1;
++		}
++
++err:
++	if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
++		{
++		(void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
++		OPENSSL_free(s);
++		}
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000000L
++static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
++	unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
++	const RSA *rsa)
++#else
++static int pk11_RSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *m,
++	unsigned int m_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, unsigned int siglen,
++	const RSA *rsa)
++#endif
++	{
++	X509_SIG sig;
++	ASN1_TYPE parameter;
++	int i, j = 0;
++	unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
++	X509_ALGOR algor;
++	ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
++	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	/* Encode the digest	*/
++	/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
++	if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
++		{
++		if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
++				PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
++		s = (unsigned char *)m;
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		sig.algor = &algor;
++		sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
++		if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
++				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY,
++				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
++		parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
++		sig.algor->parameter = &parameter;
++		sig.digest = &digest;
++		sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
++		sig.digest->length = m_len;
++		i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
++		}
++
++	j = RSA_size(rsa);
++	if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
++		{
++		s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
++		if (s == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		p = s;
++		(void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
++		}
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++		goto err;
++
++	(void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
++
++	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key;
++	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
++			pk11_get_public_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa, &sp->opdata_rsa_pub,
++			    &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num,
++			    sp->session);
++
++	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
++			h_pub_key);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
++			    rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session, s, i,
++			(CK_BYTE_PTR)sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		ret = 1;
++		}
++
++err:
++	if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
++		{
++		(void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
++		OPENSSL_free(s);
++		}
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
++
++#define	MAXATTR	1024
++
++/*
++ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
++ * PKCS#11 token.
++ */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file,
++	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
++	{
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++	FILE *privkey;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	RSA *rsa = NULL;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++	/* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
++	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
++	CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
++	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;	/* key in keystore */
++
++	/* we look for private keys only */
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
++		{CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
++		{CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
++		};
++
++	/*
++	 * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
++	 * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
++	 * never ask for private components.
++	 */
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR},		/* n */
++		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR},	/* e */
++		};
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++		return (NULL);
++
++	/*
++	 * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
++	 */
++	if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file)
++		{
++		search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1;
++		search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
++
++		if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
++		    CK_TRUE) == 0)
++			goto err;
++
++		/* see find_lock array definition
++		   for more info on object locking */
++		LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++		/*
++		 * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
++		 * if we can't find it.
++		 */
++		if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
++		    &ks_key) == 0)
++			{
++			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
++			hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
++				        "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle",
++					NULL, NULL, NULL);
++
++		/*
++		 * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm
++		 * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer
++		 * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However,
++		 * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect
++		 * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We
++		 * do not check the return value because even in case
++		 * of failure the sp structure will have both key
++		 * pointer and object handle cleaned and
++		 * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the
++		 * OpenSSL error message buffer.
++		 */
++		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE);
++
++		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
++		/* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
++		sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE;
++
++		/*
++		 * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not
++		 * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for
++		 * consistency reasons.
++		 */
++		if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
++			{
++			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
++		 * everything else is 0 or NULL.
++		 */
++		rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
++		RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key);
++
++		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
++		    get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
++					 PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we
++		 * must take care of handle management ourselves.
++		 */
++		KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err);
++
++		/*
++		 * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
++		 * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
++		 */
++		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
++		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
++		/*
++		 * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
++		 * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
++		 * in the keystore.
++		 */
++		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0],
++			&sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
++		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1],
++			&sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
++
++		UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
++			goto err;
++
++		if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
++			goto err;
++		}
++	else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
++		{
++		pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++		(void) fclose(privkey);
++		if (pkey != NULL)
++			{
++			rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
++			if (rsa != NULL)
++				{
++				/*
++				 * This will always destroy the RSA
++				 * object since we have a new RSA
++				 * structure here.
++				 */
++				(void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
++				sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
++
++				h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
++				    pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa,
++				    &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
++				    &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
++				    &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
++				    &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
++				if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++					goto err;
++				}
++			else
++				goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++	return (pkey);
++err:
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++	if (rsa != NULL)
++		RSA_free(rsa);
++	if (pkey != NULL)
++		{
++		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++		pkey = NULL;
++		}
++	rollback = rollback;
++	return (pkey);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
++ * PKCS#11 token.
++ */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
++	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
++	{
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++	FILE *pubkey;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	RSA *rsa = NULL;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++	/* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
++	CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
++	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;	/* key in keystore */
++
++	/* we look for public keys only */
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
++		{CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
++		{CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
++		};
++
++	/*
++	 * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
++	 * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
++	 */
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR},		/* n */
++		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR},	/* e */
++		};
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++		return (NULL);
++
++	/*
++	 * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
++	 */
++	if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file)
++		{
++		search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1;
++		search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
++
++		if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
++		    CK_FALSE) == 0)
++			goto err;
++
++		/* see find_lock array definition
++		   for more info on object locking */
++		LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++		/*
++		 * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
++		 * if we can't find it.
++		 */
++		if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
++		    &ks_key) == 0)
++			{
++			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
++		 * structure. No cache hit is possible.
++		 */
++		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE);
++
++		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
++		/* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
++		sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE;
++
++		/*
++		 * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
++		 */
++		if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
++			{
++			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
++		 * everything else is 0 or NULL.
++		 */
++		rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
++
++		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
++		    get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
++					 PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
++		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
++
++		UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
++			goto err;
++
++		if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
++			goto err;
++
++		/*
++		 * Create a session object from it so that when calling
++		 * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
++		 * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
++		 * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
++		 * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
++		 * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
++		 * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
++		 * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
++		 * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
++		 * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
++		 */
++		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
++		    pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
++		    &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
++		    &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
++		if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++			goto err;
++		}
++	else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
++		{
++		pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++		(void) fclose(pubkey);
++		if (pkey != NULL)
++			{
++			rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
++			if (rsa != NULL)
++				{
++				/*
++				 * This will always destroy the RSA
++				 * object since we have a new RSA
++				 * structure here.
++				 */
++				(void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
++				sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
++
++				h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
++				    pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
++				    &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
++				    &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
++				if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++					goto err;
++				}
++			else
++				goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++	return (pkey);
++err:
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++	if (rsa != NULL)
++		RSA_free(rsa);
++	if (pkey != NULL)
++		{
++		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++		pkey = NULL;
++		}
++	return (pkey);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure.
++ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys.
++ */
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
++    RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
++    CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	CK_ULONG found;
++	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
++	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
++	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
++	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
++
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
++		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
++		{CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
++		{CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
++		{CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
++		{CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
++		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
++		};
++
++	int i;
++
++	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
++	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
++
++	a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
++	a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
++		(size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
++	if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto malloc_err;
++		}
++
++	BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue);
++
++	a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
++	a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
++		(size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen);
++	if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto malloc_err;
++		}
++
++	BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue);
++
++	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
++	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
++		ul_key_attr_count);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (found == 0)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
++			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
++			    PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++	if (rsa_n_num != NULL)
++		if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			rollback = TRUE;
++			goto err;
++			}
++	if (rsa_e_num != NULL)
++		if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			BN_free(*rsa_n_num);
++			*rsa_n_num = NULL;
++			rollback = TRUE;
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
++	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
++	if (key_ptr != NULL)
++		*key_ptr = rsa;
++
++err:
++	if (rollback)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
++		 * since we are doing rollback.
++		 */
++		if (found == 0)
++			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
++		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		}
++
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++malloc_err:
++	for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++)
++		{
++		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
++			{
++			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
++			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (h_key);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure.
++ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys.
++ */
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
++pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num,
++    BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	int i;
++	CK_ULONG found;
++	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
++	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
++	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
++	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
++
++	/* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
++		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
++		{CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
++		{CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
++		{CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
++		{CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
++		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		};
++
++	if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) {
++		h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
++		LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++		goto set;
++	}
++	
++	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
++	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
++
++	/* Put the private key components into the template */
++	if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto malloc_err;
++		}
++
++	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
++	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++	/*
++	 * We are getting the private key but the private 'd'
++	 * component is NULL.  That means this is key by reference RSA
++	 * key. In that case, we can use only public components for
++	 * searching for the private key handle.
++	 */
++	if (rsa->d == NULL)
++		{
++		ul_key_attr_count = 8;
++		/*
++		 * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
++		 * session keys.
++		 */
++		a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
++		ul_key_attr_count);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (found == 0)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components
++		 * only so we tried to find the private key in the
++		 * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a
++		 * problem. Note that for other key types we just
++		 * create a new session key using the private
++		 * components from the RSA structure.
++		 */
++		if (rsa->d == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
++			    PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
++			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
++				PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++set:
++	if (rsa_d_num != NULL)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never
++		 * extract private components from the keystore. In
++		 * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the
++		 * application to properly cope with that. It is
++		 * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by
++		 * reference are used we expect it to be used
++		 * exclusively using the high level API and then there
++		 * is no problem. If the application expects the
++		 * private components to be read from the keystore
++		 * then that is not a supported way of usage.
++		 */
++		if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			rollback = TRUE;
++			goto err;
++			}
++		else
++			*rsa_d_num = NULL;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
++	 * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
++	 * 'n'/'e' components as well.
++	 */
++	*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n);
++	*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e);
++
++	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
++	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
++	if (key_ptr != NULL)
++		*key_ptr = rsa;
++
++err:
++	if (rollback)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
++		 * since we are doing rollback.
++		 */
++		if (found == 0 &&
++		    (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0)
++			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
++		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		}
++
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++malloc_err:
++	/*
++	 * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
++	 * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
++	 */
++	for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
++		{
++		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
++			{
++			(void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
++				a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
++			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
++			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (h_key);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
++ */
++static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
++	{
++	/*
++	 * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
++	 * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
++	 * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
++	 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
++	 *
++	 * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
++	 * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
++	 * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
++	 * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
++	 * both data signing and verifying.
++	 */
++	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) ||
++	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
++	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
++	    (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
++		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
++		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
++		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
++		 */
++		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
++		return (0);
++		}
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
++ */
++static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
++	{
++	/*
++	 * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making
++	 * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent
++	 * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure
++	 * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the
++	 * public component since with the keys by reference
++	 * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA
++	 * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we
++	 * compare the handle as well.
++	 */
++	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) ||
++	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
++	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
++	    (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) ||
++	    (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) ||
++	    (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
++		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
++		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
++		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
++		 */
++		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
++		return (0);
++		}
++	return (1);
++	}
++#endif
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++/* The DSA function implementation */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_DSA_init(DSA *dsa)
++	{
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_DSA_finish(DSA *dsa)
++	{
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++
++static DSA_SIG *
++pk11_dsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA *dsa)
++	{
++	BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
++	int i;
++	DSA_SIG *dsa_sig = NULL;
++
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
++	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
++
++	/*
++	 * The signature is the concatenation of r and s,
++	 * each is 20 bytes long
++	 */
++	unsigned char sigret[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
++	unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
++	unsigned int siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN / 2;
++
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++
++	if ((dsa->p == NULL) || (dsa->q == NULL) || (dsa->g == NULL))
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MISSING_KEY_COMPONENT);
++		goto ret;
++		}
++
++	i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
++	if (dlen > i)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
++		goto ret;
++		}
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
++		goto ret;
++
++	(void) check_new_dsa_key_priv(sp, dsa);
++
++	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key;
++	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_dsa_priv_key =
++			pk11_get_private_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa,
++			    &sp->opdata_dsa_priv,
++			    &sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, sp->session);
++
++	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
++			goto ret;
++			}
++
++		(void) memset(sigret, 0, siglen);
++		rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session,
++			(unsigned char*) dgst, dlen, sigret,
++			(CK_ULONG_PTR) &siglen);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
++			goto ret;
++			}
++		}
++
++
++	if ((s = BN_new()) == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto ret;
++		}
++
++	if ((r = BN_new()) == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto ret;
++		}
++
++	if ((dsa_sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto ret;
++		}
++
++	if (BN_bin2bn(sigret, siglen2, r) == NULL ||
++	    BN_bin2bn(&sigret[siglen2], siglen2, s) == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto ret;
++		}
++
++	dsa_sig->r = r;
++	dsa_sig->s = s;
++
++ret:
++	if (dsa_sig == NULL)
++		{
++		if (r != NULL)
++			BN_free(r);
++		if (s != NULL)
++			BN_free(s);
++		}
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
++	return (dsa_sig);
++	}
++
++static int
++pk11_dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, DSA_SIG *sig,
++	DSA *dsa)
++	{
++	int i;
++	CK_RV rv;
++	int retval = 0;
++	CK_MECHANISM Mechanism_dsa = {CKM_DSA, NULL, 0};
++	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &Mechanism_dsa;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key;
++
++	unsigned char sigbuf[DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN];
++	unsigned long siglen = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN;
++	unsigned long siglen2 = DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2;
++
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++
++	if (BN_is_zero(sig->r) || sig->r->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->r, dsa->q) >= 0)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
++			PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_R);
++		goto ret;
++		}
++
++	if (BN_is_zero(sig->s) || sig->s->neg || BN_ucmp(sig->s, dsa->q) >= 0)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
++			PK11_R_INVALID_DSA_SIGNATURE_S);
++		goto ret;
++		}
++
++	i = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q); /* should be 20 */
++
++	if (dlen > i)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY,
++			PK11_R_INVALID_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
++		goto ret;
++		}
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DSA)) == NULL)
++		goto ret;
++
++	(void) check_new_dsa_key_pub(sp, dsa);
++
++	h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key;
++	if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_dsa_pub_key =
++			pk11_get_public_dsa_key((DSA *)dsa, &sp->opdata_dsa_pub,
++			    &sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, sp->session);
++
++	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_VerifyInit(sp->session, p_mech,
++			h_pub_key);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFYINIT,
++			    rv);
++			goto ret;
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * The representation of each of the two big numbers could
++		 * be shorter than DSA_SIGNATURE_LEN/2 bytes so we need
++		 * to act accordingly and shift if necessary.
++		 */
++		(void) memset(sigbuf, 0, siglen);
++		BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigbuf + siglen2 - BN_num_bytes(sig->r));
++		BN_bn2bin(sig->s, &sigbuf[siglen2] + siglen2 -
++		    BN_num_bytes(sig->s));
++
++		rv = pFuncList->C_Verify(sp->session,
++			(unsigned char *) dgst, dlen, sigbuf, (CK_ULONG)siglen);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DSA_VERIFY, PK11_R_VERIFY, rv);
++			goto ret;
++			}
++		}
++
++	retval = 1;
++ret:
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DSA);
++	return (retval);
++	}
++
++
++/*
++ * Create a public key object in a session from a given dsa structure.
++ * The *dsa_pub_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA public keys.
++ */
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
++    DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_pub_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	CK_ULONG found;
++	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
++	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
++	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
++	int i;
++
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
++		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
++		{CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
++		{CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
++		{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* p */
++		{CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},	/* q */
++		{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* g */
++		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}		/* pub_key - y */
++		};
++
++	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
++	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
++
++	if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[4].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[4].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(dsa->pub_key, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto malloc_err;
++		}
++
++	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
++	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
++		ul_key_attr_count);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (found == 0)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
++			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY,
++			    PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++	if (dsa_pub_num != NULL)
++		if ((*dsa_pub_num = BN_dup(dsa->pub_key)) == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			rollback = TRUE;
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
++	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
++	if (key_ptr != NULL)
++		*key_ptr = dsa;
++
++err:
++	if (rollback)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
++		 * since we are doing rollback.
++		 */
++		if (found == 0)
++			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
++		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		}
++
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++
++malloc_err:
++	for (i = 4; i <= 7; i++)
++		{
++		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
++			{
++			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
++			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (h_key);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Create a private key object in the session from a given dsa structure
++ * The *dsa_priv_num pointer is non-NULL for DSA private keys.
++ */
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_dsa_key(DSA* dsa,
++    DSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dsa_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
++	int i;
++	CK_ULONG found;
++	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_DSA;
++	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 9;
++	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
++
++	/* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
++		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
++		{CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
++		{CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
++		{CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
++		{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* p */
++		{CKA_SUBPRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},	/* q */
++		{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0},		/* g */
++		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}		/* priv_key - x */
++		};
++
++	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
++	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
++
++	/* Put the private key components into the template */
++	if (init_template_value(dsa->p, &a_key_template[5].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[5].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(dsa->q, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(dsa->g, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(dsa->priv_key, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto malloc_err;
++		}
++
++	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
++	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
++		ul_key_attr_count);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (found == 0)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
++			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY,
++			    PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++	if (dsa_priv_num != NULL)
++		if ((*dsa_priv_num = BN_dup(dsa->priv_key)) == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_DSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			rollback = TRUE;
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
++	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
++	if (key_ptr != NULL)
++		*key_ptr = dsa;
++
++err:
++	if (rollback)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
++		 * since we are doing rollback.
++		 */
++		if (found == 0)
++			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
++		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		}
++
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DSA);
++
++malloc_err:
++	/*
++	 * 5 to 8 entries in the key template are key components.
++	 * They need to be freed apon exit or error.
++	 */
++	for (i = 5; i <= 8; i++)
++		{
++		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
++			{
++			(void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
++				a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
++			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
++			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (h_key);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
++ */
++static int check_new_dsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
++	{
++	/*
++	 * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
++	 * check for cache hit stronger. Only public key component of DSA
++	 * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
++	 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
++	 */
++	if ((sp->opdata_dsa_pub != dsa) ||
++	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_pub_num, dsa->pub_key) != 0))
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
++		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
++		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
++		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
++		 */
++		(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
++		return (0);
++		}
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
++ */
++static int check_new_dsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, DSA *dsa)
++	{
++	/*
++	 * Provide protection against DSA structure reuse by making the
++	 * check for cache hit stronger. Only private key component of DSA
++	 * key matters here so it is sufficient to compare it with value
++	 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
++	 */
++	if ((sp->opdata_dsa_priv != dsa) ||
++	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dsa_priv_num, dsa->priv_key) != 0))
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
++		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
++		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
++		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
++		 */
++		(void) pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
++		return (0);
++		}
++	return (1);
++	}
++#endif
++
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++/* The DH function implementation */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_DH_init(DH *dh)
++	{
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_DH_finish(DH *dh)
++	{
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Generate DH key-pair.
++ *
++ * Warning: Unlike OpenSSL's DH_generate_key(3) we ignore dh->priv_key
++ * and override it even if it is set. OpenSSL does not touch dh->priv_key
++ * if set and just computes dh->pub_key. It looks like PKCS#11 standard
++ * is not capable of providing this functionality. This could be a problem
++ * for applications relying on OpenSSL's semantics.
++ */
++static int pk11_DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
++	{
++	CK_ULONG i;
++	CK_RV rv, rv1;
++	int reuse_mem_len = 0, ret = 0;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++	CK_BYTE_PTR reuse_mem;
++
++	CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0};
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++
++	CK_ULONG ul_pub_key_attr_count = 3;
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_template[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
++		{CKA_PRIME, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_BASE, (void *)NULL, 0}
++		};
++
++	CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
++		{CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
++		{CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)}
++		};
++
++	CK_ULONG pub_key_attr_result_count = 1;
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE pub_key_result[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
++		};
++
++	CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
++		};
++
++	pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
++	if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > 0)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We must not increase ulValueLen by DH_BUF_RESERVE since that
++		 * could cause the same rounding problem. See definition of
++		 * DH_BUF_RESERVE above.
++		 */
++		pub_key_template[1].pValue =
++			OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen +
++			DH_BUF_RESERVE);
++		if (pub_key_template[1].pValue == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		i = BN_bn2bin(dh->p, pub_key_template[1].pValue);
++		}
++	else
++		goto err;
++
++	pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
++	if (pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen > 0)
++		{
++		pub_key_template[2].pValue =
++			OPENSSL_malloc(pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen +
++			DH_BUF_RESERVE);
++		if (pub_key_template[2].pValue == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		i = BN_bn2bin(dh->g, pub_key_template[2].pValue);
++		}
++	else
++		goto err;
++
++	/*
++	 * Note: we are only using PK11_SESSION structure for getting
++	 *	 a session handle. The objects created in this function are
++	 *	 destroyed before return and thus not cached.
++	 */
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
++		goto err;
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateKeyPair(sp->session,
++	    &mechanism,
++	    pub_key_template,
++	    ul_pub_key_attr_count,
++	    priv_key_template,
++	    ul_priv_key_attr_count,
++	    &h_pub_key,
++	    &h_priv_key);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GEN_KEY, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * Reuse the larger memory allocated. We know the larger memory
++	 * should be sufficient for reuse.
++	 */
++	if (pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen > pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen)
++		{
++		reuse_mem = pub_key_template[1].pValue;
++		reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[1].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		reuse_mem = pub_key_template[2].pValue;
++		reuse_mem_len = pub_key_template[2].ulValueLen + DH_BUF_RESERVE;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
++		pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
++	rv1 = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
++		priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK || rv1 != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		rv = (rv != CKR_OK) ? rv : rv1;
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (((CK_LONG) pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0 ||
++		((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/* Reuse the memory allocated */
++	pub_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
++	pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_pub_key,
++		pub_key_result, pub_key_attr_result_count);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (pub_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
++		{
++		if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
++			if ((dh->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
++				{
++				PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
++					PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++				goto err;
++				}
++		dh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(pub_key_result[0].pValue,
++			pub_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->pub_key);
++		if (dh->pub_key == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++	/* Reuse the memory allocated */
++	priv_key_result[0].pValue = reuse_mem;
++	priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen = reuse_mem_len;
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_priv_key,
++		priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
++		{
++		if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
++			if ((dh->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
++				{
++				PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
++					PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++				goto err;
++				}
++		dh->priv_key = BN_bin2bn(priv_key_result[0].pValue,
++			priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen, dh->priv_key);
++		if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++	ret = 1;
++
++err:
++
++	if (h_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_pub_key);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
++			    PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
++			}
++		}
++
++	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_priv_key);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_GEN_KEY,
++			    PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
++			}
++		}
++
++	for (i = 1; i <= 2; i++)
++		{
++		if (pub_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
++			{
++			OPENSSL_free(pub_key_template[i].pValue);
++			pub_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++static int pk11_DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key,
++	DH *dh)
++	{
++	unsigned int i;
++	CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE, NULL_PTR, 0};
++	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_SECRET_KEY;
++	CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_GENERIC_SECRET;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_derived_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++
++	CK_ULONG seclen;
++	CK_ULONG ul_priv_key_attr_count = 3;
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_template[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_class)},
++		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
++		{CKA_VALUE_LEN, &seclen, sizeof (seclen)},
++		};
++
++	CK_ULONG priv_key_attr_result_count = 1;
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE priv_key_result[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_VALUE, (void *)NULL, 0}
++		};
++
++	CK_RV rv;
++	int ret = -1;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++
++	if (dh->priv_key == NULL)
++		goto err;
++
++	priv_key_template[0].pValue = &key_class;
++	priv_key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
++	seclen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_DH)) == NULL)
++		goto err;
++
++	mechanism.ulParameterLen = BN_num_bytes(pub_key);
++	mechanism.pParameter = OPENSSL_malloc(mechanism.ulParameterLen);
++	if (mechanism.pParameter == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++	BN_bn2bin(pub_key, mechanism.pParameter);
++
++	(void) check_new_dh_key(sp, dh);
++
++	h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key;
++	if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		h_key = sp->opdata_dh_key =
++			pk11_get_dh_key((DH*) dh, &sp->opdata_dh,
++			    &sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, sp->session);
++
++	if (h_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_DeriveKey(sp->session,
++	    &mechanism,
++	    h_key,
++	    priv_key_template,
++	    ul_priv_key_attr_count,
++	    &h_derived_key);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_DERIVEKEY, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
++	    priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
++		    rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (((CK_LONG) priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen) <= 0)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++	priv_key_result[0].pValue =
++		OPENSSL_malloc(priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen);
++	if (!priv_key_result[0].pValue)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, h_derived_key,
++		priv_key_result, priv_key_attr_result_count);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY, PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE,
++		    rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * OpenSSL allocates the output buffer 'key' which is the same
++	 * length of the public key. It is long enough for the derived key
++	 */
++	if (priv_key_result[0].type == CKA_VALUE)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE mechanism is not supposed to strip
++		 * leading zeros from a computed shared secret. However,
++		 * OpenSSL always did it so we must do the same here. The
++		 * vagueness of the spec regarding leading zero bytes was
++		 * finally cleared with TLS 1.1 (RFC 4346) saying that leading
++		 * zeros are stripped before the computed data is used as the
++		 * pre-master secret.
++		 */
++		for (i = 0; i < priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen; ++i)
++			{
++			if (((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue)[i] != 0)
++				break;
++			}
++
++		(void) memcpy(key, ((char *)priv_key_result[0].pValue) + i,
++			priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i);
++		ret = priv_key_result[0].ulValueLen - i;
++		}
++
++err:
++
++	if (h_derived_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(sp->session, h_derived_key);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DH_COMP_KEY,
++			    PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT, rv);
++			}
++		}
++	if (priv_key_result[0].pValue)
++		{
++		OPENSSL_free(priv_key_result[0].pValue);
++		priv_key_result[0].pValue = NULL;
++		}
++
++	if (mechanism.pParameter)
++		{
++		OPENSSL_free(mechanism.pParameter);
++		mechanism.pParameter = NULL;
++		}
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_DH);
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_dh_key(DH* dh,
++	DH **key_ptr, BIGNUM **dh_priv_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
++	CK_KEY_TYPE key_type = CKK_DH;
++	CK_ULONG found;
++	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
++	int i;
++
++	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 7;
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE key_template[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_CLASS, (void*) NULL, sizeof (class)},
++		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void*) NULL, sizeof (key_type)},
++		{CKA_DERIVE, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
++		{CKA_PRIVATE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
++		{CKA_PRIME, (void *) NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_BASE, (void *) NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_VALUE, (void *) NULL, 0},
++		};
++
++	key_template[0].pValue = &class;
++	key_template[1].pValue = &key_type;
++
++	key_template[4].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->p);
++	key_template[4].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
++		(size_t)key_template[4].ulValueLen);
++	if (key_template[4].pValue == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto malloc_err;
++		}
++
++	BN_bn2bin(dh->p, key_template[4].pValue);
++
++	key_template[5].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->g);
++	key_template[5].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
++		(size_t)key_template[5].ulValueLen);
++	if (key_template[5].pValue == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto malloc_err;
++		}
++
++	BN_bn2bin(dh->g, key_template[5].pValue);
++
++	key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(dh->priv_key);
++	key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
++		(size_t)key_template[6].ulValueLen);
++	if (key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto malloc_err;
++		}
++
++	BN_bn2bin(dh->priv_key, key_template[6].pValue);
++
++	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
++	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_template,
++		ul_key_attr_count);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL,
++		    rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (found == 0)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
++			key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT,
++			    rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++	if (dh_priv_num != NULL)
++		if ((*dh_priv_num = BN_dup(dh->priv_key)) == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_DH_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			rollback = TRUE;
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
++	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_DH, FALSE, rollback, err);
++	if (key_ptr != NULL)
++		*key_ptr = dh;
++
++err:
++	if (rollback)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
++		 * since we are doing rollback.
++		 */
++		if (found == 0)
++			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
++		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		}
++
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_DH);
++
++malloc_err:
++	for (i = 4; i <= 6; i++)
++		{
++		if (key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
++			{
++			OPENSSL_free(key_template[i].pValue);
++			key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (h_key);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
++ *
++ * Note: we rely on pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects() to set sp->opdata_dh
++ *       to CK_INVALID_HANDLE even when it fails to destroy the object.
++ */
++static int check_new_dh_key(PK11_SESSION *sp, DH *dh)
++	{
++	/*
++	 * Provide protection against DH structure reuse by making the
++	 * check for cache hit stronger. Private key component of DH key
++	 * is unique so it is sufficient to compare it with value cached
++	 * in PK11_SESSION structure.
++	 */
++	if ((sp->opdata_dh != dh) ||
++	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_dh_priv_num, dh->priv_key) != 0))
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
++		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
++		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
++		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
++		 */
++		(void) pk11_destroy_dh_object(sp, TRUE);
++		return (0);
++		}
++	return (1);
++	}
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * Local function to simplify key template population
++ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
++ */
++static int
++init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
++	CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
++	{
++	CK_ULONG len = 0;
++
++	/*
++	 * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is
++	 * easier to check that here than individually in the callers.
++	 */
++	if (bn != NULL)
++		len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
++
++	if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
++		return (1);
++
++	*ul_value_len = len;
++	*p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
++	if (*p_value == NULL)
++		return (0);
++
++	BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++static void
++attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
++	{
++	if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
++		*bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the
++ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got.
++ * Assume object store locked.
++ *
++ * Returns:
++ *	1 OK
++ *	0 no object or more than 1 object found
++ */
++static int
++find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
++    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_ULONG objcnt;
++
++	if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
++		    rv);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
++
++	if (objcnt > 1)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
++		    PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
++		return (0);
++		}
++	else if (objcnt == 0)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
++		return (0);
++		}
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/* from uri stuff */
++
++extern char *pk11_pin;
++
++static int pk11_get_pin(void);
++
++static int
++pk11_get_pin(void)
++{
++	char *pin;
++
++	/* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++	pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: ");
++	if (pin == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++		return (0);
++		}
++	pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin);
++	if (pk11_pin == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++		return (0);
++		}
++	memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
++ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
++ * multiple threads.
++ *
++ * Returns:
++ *	1 on success
++ *	0 on failure
++ */
++static int
++pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
++    CK_BBOOL is_private)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++
++#if 0
++	/* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */
++	if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
++		    PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
++		return (0);
++		}
++#endif
++
++	/*
++	 * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been
++	 * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we
++	 * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access
++	 * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for
++	 * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED
++	 * flag is set.
++	 */
++	if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
++	     (is_private == CK_TRUE)) &&
++	    (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED))
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread
++	 * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We
++	 * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with
++	 * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the
++	 * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment
++	 * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
++	 * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call
++	 * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We
++	 * lock right before C_Login().
++	 */
++	if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
++	    (is_private == CK_TRUE))
++		{
++		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
++			{
++			if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
++				{
++				PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
++				    PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
++				return (0);
++				}
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
++		 * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
++		 * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
++		 * the engine.
++		 *
++		 * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
++		 * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
++		 */
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
++			{
++			if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
++			    CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
++			    strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
++				{
++				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
++				    PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
++				goto err_locked;
++				}
++
++			*login_done = CK_TRUE;
++
++			}
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++		}
++	else
++		{
++			/*
++			 * If token does not require login we take it as the
++			 * login was done.
++			 */
++			*login_done = CK_TRUE;
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++
++err_locked:
++	if (pk11_pin) {
++		memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
++		OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
++	}
++	pk11_pin = NULL;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++	return (0);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the
++ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login()
++ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for
++ * this.
++ *
++ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
++ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
++ *
++ * Returns:
++ *	1 on success
++ *	0 on failure
++ */
++int
++pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++
++	if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
++		return (0);
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++	if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
++	    (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
++		    PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++		return (0);
++		}
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++#ifdef	OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt)
++	{
++	static char buf[128];
++	HANDLE h;
++	DWORD cc, mode;
++	int cnt;
++
++	h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
++	fputs(prompt, stderr);
++	fflush(stderr);
++	fflush(stdout);
++	FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h);
++	GetConsoleMode(h, &mode);
++	SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT);
++
++	for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++)
++		{
++		ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL);
++		if (buf[cnt] == '\r')
++			break;
++		fputc('*', stdout);
++		fflush(stderr);
++		fflush(stdout);
++		}
++
++	SetConsoleMode(h, mode);
++	buf[cnt] = '\0';
++	fputs("\n", stderr);
++	return buf;
++	}
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA */
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h:1.4
+--- /dev/null	Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11ca.h	Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011
+@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
++/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11ca/PK11CA */
++
++#define token_lock			pk11ca_token_lock
++#define find_lock			pk11ca_find_lock
++#define active_list			pk11ca_active_list
++#define pubkey_token_flags		pk11ca_pubkey_token_flags
++#define pubkey_SLOTID			pk11ca_pubkey_SLOTID
++#define ERR_pk11_error			ERR_pk11ca_error
++#define PK11err_add_data		PK11CAerr_add_data
++#define pk11_get_session		pk11ca_get_session
++#define pk11_return_session		pk11ca_return_session
++#define pk11_active_add			pk11ca_active_add
++#define pk11_active_delete		pk11ca_active_delete
++#define pk11_active_remove		pk11ca_active_remove
++#define pk11_free_active_list		pk11ca_free_active_list
++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects	pk11ca_destroy_rsa_key_objects
++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub	pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_pub
++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv	pk11ca_destroy_rsa_object_priv
++#define pk11_load_privkey		pk11ca_load_privkey
++#define pk11_load_pubkey		pk11ca_load_pubkey
++#define PK11_RSA			PK11CA_RSA
++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects	pk11ca_destroy_dsa_key_objects
++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub	pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_pub
++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv	pk11ca_destroy_dsa_object_priv
++#define PK11_DSA			PK11CA_DSA
++#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects	pk11ca_destroy_dh_key_objects
++#define pk11_destroy_dh_object		pk11ca_destroy_dh_object
++#define PK11_DH				PK11CA_DH
++#define pk11_token_relogin		pk11ca_token_relogin
++#define pFuncList			pk11ca_pFuncList
++#define pk11_pin			pk11ca_pin
++#define ENGINE_load_pk11		ENGINE_load_pk11ca
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c:1.8
+--- /dev/null	Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.c	Fri Oct  4 14:05:16 2013
+@@ -0,0 +1,1775 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
++ * Use is subject to license terms.
++ */
++
++/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11.c */
++/*
++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
++ *
++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
++ * Afchine Madjlessi.
++ */
++/*
++ * ====================================================================
++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ *
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ *
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
++ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
++ *    distribution.
++ *
++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
++ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
++ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
++ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
++ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
++ *
++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
++ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
++ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
++ *
++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
++ *    acknowledgment:
++ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ * ====================================================================
++ *
++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
++ *
++ */
++
++/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */
++
++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++#error RSA is disabled
++#endif
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++
++#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <cryptlib.h>
++#include <openssl/engine.h>
++#include <openssl/dso.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++#include <openssl/md5.h>
++#include <openssl/pem.h>
++#include <openssl/rsa.h>
++#include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/objects.h>
++#include <openssl/x509.h>
++
++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++typedef int pid_t;
++#define getpid() GetCurrentProcessId()
++#define NOPTHREADS
++#ifndef NULL_PTR
++#define NULL_PTR NULL
++#endif
++#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++	returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++	returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
++	returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
++#else
++#include <signal.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <dlfcn.h>
++#endif
++
++/* Debug mutexes */
++/*#undef DEBUG_MUTEX */
++#define DEBUG_MUTEX
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++/* for pthread error check on Linuxes */
++#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
++#define __USE_UNIX98
++#endif
++#include <pthread.h>
++#endif
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
++
++/* label for debug messages printed on stderr */
++#define	PK11_DBG	"PKCS#11 ENGINE DEBUG"
++/* prints a lot of debug messages on stderr about slot selection process */
++/*#undef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++#define OPENSSL_NO_DSA
++#endif
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
++#define OPENSSL_NO_DH
++#endif
++
++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
++#include "cryptoki.h"
++#include "pkcs11.h"
++#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
++#else
++#include "cryptoki.h"
++#include "pkcs11.h"
++#endif
++#include "hw_pk11so.h"
++#include "hw_pk11_err.c"
++
++/*
++ * We use this lock to prevent multiple C_Login()s, guard getpassphrase(),
++ * uri_struct manipulation, and static token info. All of that is used by the
++ * RSA keys by reference feature.
++ */
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
++#endif
++
++/* PKCS#11 session caches and their locks for all operation types */
++static PK11_CACHE session_cache[OP_MAX];
++
++/*
++ * We cache the flags so that we do not have to run C_GetTokenInfo() again when
++ * logging into the token.
++ */
++CK_FLAGS pubkey_token_flags;
++
++/*
++ * As stated in v2.20, 11.7 Object Management Function, in section for
++ * C_FindObjectsInit(), at most one search operation may be active at a given
++ * time in a given session. Therefore, C_Find{,Init,Final}Objects() should be
++ * grouped together to form one atomic search operation. This is already
++ * ensured by the property of unique PKCS#11 session handle used for each
++ * PK11_SESSION object.
++ *
++ * This is however not the biggest concern - maintaining consistency of the
++ * underlying object store is more important. The same section of the spec also
++ * says that one thread can be in the middle of a search operation while another
++ * thread destroys the object matching the search template which would result in
++ * invalid handle returned from the search operation.
++ *
++ * Hence, the following locks are used for both protection of the object stores.
++ * They are also used for active list protection.
++ */
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++pthread_mutex_t *find_lock[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * lists of asymmetric key handles which are active (referenced by at least one
++ * PK11_SESSION structure, either held by a thread or present in free_session
++ * list) for given algorithm type
++ */
++PK11_active *active_list[OP_MAX] = { NULL };
++
++/*
++ * Create all secret key objects in a global session so that they are available
++ * to use for other sessions. These other sessions may be opened or closed
++ * without losing the secret key objects.
++ */
++static CK_SESSION_HANDLE	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++
++/* ENGINE level stuff */
++static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e);
++static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e);
++static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e);
++static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void));
++static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e);
++
++/* RAND stuff */
++static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num);
++static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add_entropy);
++static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void);
++static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
++static int pk11_rand_status(void);
++
++/* These functions are also used in other files */
++PK11_SESSION *pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++void pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++
++/* active list manipulation functions used in this file */
++extern int pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type);
++extern void pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type);
++
++int pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session);
++int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++int pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock);
++
++/* Local helper functions */
++static int pk11_free_all_sessions(void);
++static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++static int pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype);
++static int pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
++	CK_BBOOL persistent);
++static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
++static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void);
++static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name);
++
++static int pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found);
++
++static int pk11_init_all_locks(void);
++static void pk11_free_all_locks(void);
++
++#define	TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, obj_hdl, retval, uselock, alg_type, priv)	\
++	{								\
++	if (uselock)							\
++		LOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);				\
++	if (pk11_active_delete(obj_hdl, alg_type) == 1)			\
++		{							\
++		  retval = pk11_destroy_object(sp->session, obj_hdl,	\
++		  priv ? sp->priv_persistent : sp->pub_persistent);	\
++		}							\
++	if (uselock)							\
++		UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);				\
++	}
++
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_rsa	= CK_FALSE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_have_random = CK_FALSE;
++
++/*
++ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
++ * The definitions for control commands specific to this engine
++ */
++#define PK11_CMD_SO_PATH		ENGINE_CMD_BASE
++#define PK11_CMD_PIN			(ENGINE_CMD_BASE+1)
++#define PK11_CMD_SLOT			(ENGINE_CMD_BASE+2)
++static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN pk11_cmd_defns[] =
++	{
++		{
++		PK11_CMD_SO_PATH,
++		"SO_PATH",
++		"Specifies the path to the 'pkcs#11' shared library",
++		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
++		},
++		{
++		PK11_CMD_PIN,
++		"PIN",
++		"Specifies the pin code",
++		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING
++		},
++		{
++		PK11_CMD_SLOT,
++		"SLOT",
++		"Specifies the slot (default is auto select)",
++		ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC,
++		},
++		{0, NULL, NULL, 0}
++	};
++
++
++static RAND_METHOD pk11_random =
++	{
++	pk11_rand_seed,
++	pk11_rand_bytes,
++	pk11_rand_cleanup,
++	pk11_rand_add,
++	pk11_rand_bytes,
++	pk11_rand_status
++	};
++
++
++/* Constants used when creating the ENGINE */
++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11CA
++#error "can't load both crypto-accelerator and sign-only PKCS#11 engines"
++#endif
++static const char *engine_pk11_id = "pkcs11";
++static const char *engine_pk11_name = "PKCS #11 engine support (sign only)";
++
++CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pFuncList = NULL;
++static const char PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST[] = "C_GetFunctionList";
++
++/*
++ * This is a static string constant for the DSO file name and the function
++ * symbol names to bind to. We set it in the Configure script based on whether
++ * this is 32 or 64 bit build.
++ */
++static const char def_PK11_LIBNAME[] = PK11_LIB_LOCATION;
++
++/* Needed in hw_pk11_pub.c as well so that's why it is not static. */
++CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID = 0;
++static CK_SLOT_ID rand_SLOTID = 0;
++static CK_SLOT_ID SLOTID = 0;
++char *pk11_pin = NULL;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_atfork_initialized = FALSE;
++static int pk11_pid = 0;
++
++static DSO *pk11_dso = NULL;
++
++/* allocate and initialize all locks used by the engine itself */
++static int pk11_init_all_locks(void)
++	{
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	int type;
++	pthread_mutexattr_t attr;
++
++	if (pthread_mutexattr_init(&attr) != 0)
++	{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 100);
++		return (0);
++	}
++
++#ifdef DEBUG_MUTEX
++	if (pthread_mutexattr_settype(&attr, PTHREAD_MUTEX_ERRORCHECK) != 0)
++	{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, 101);
++		return (0);
++	}
++#endif
++
++	if ((token_lock = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t))) == NULL)
++		goto malloc_err;
++	(void) pthread_mutex_init(token_lock, &attr);
++
++	find_lock[OP_RSA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
++	if (find_lock[OP_RSA] == NULL)
++		goto malloc_err;
++	(void) pthread_mutex_init(find_lock[OP_RSA], &attr);
++
++	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
++		{
++		session_cache[type].lock =
++		    OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (pthread_mutex_t));
++		if (session_cache[type].lock == NULL)
++			goto malloc_err;
++		(void) pthread_mutex_init(session_cache[type].lock, &attr);
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++
++malloc_err:
++	pk11_free_all_locks();
++	PK11err(PK11_F_INIT_ALL_LOCKS, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++	return (0);
++#else
++	return (1);
++#endif
++	}
++
++static void pk11_free_all_locks(void)
++	{
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	int type;
++
++	if (token_lock != NULL)
++		{
++		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(token_lock);
++		OPENSSL_free(token_lock);
++		token_lock = NULL;
++		}
++
++	if (find_lock[OP_RSA] != NULL)
++		{
++		(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
++		OPENSSL_free(find_lock[OP_RSA]);
++		find_lock[OP_RSA] = NULL;
++		}
++
++	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
++		{
++		if (session_cache[type].lock != NULL)
++			{
++			(void) pthread_mutex_destroy(session_cache[type].lock);
++			OPENSSL_free(session_cache[type].lock);
++			session_cache[type].lock = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++#endif
++	}
++
++/*
++ * This internal function is used by ENGINE_pk11() and "dynamic" ENGINE support.
++ */
++static int bind_pk11(ENGINE *e)
++	{
++	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++		if (!pk11_library_init(e))
++			return (0);
++
++	if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_pk11_id) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_pk11_name))
++		return (0);
++
++	if (pk11_have_rsa == CK_TRUE)
++		{
++		if (!ENGINE_set_RSA(e, PK11_RSA()) ||
++		    !ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(e, pk11_load_privkey) ||
++		    !ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(e, pk11_load_pubkey))
++			return (0);
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered RSA\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		}
++
++	if (pk11_have_random)
++		{
++		if (!ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &pk11_random))
++			return (0);
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: registered random\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		}
++	if (!ENGINE_set_init_function(e, pk11_init) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, pk11_destroy) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, pk11_finish) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(e, pk11_ctrl) ||
++	    !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(e, pk11_cmd_defns))
++		return (0);
++
++	/* Ensure the pk11 error handling is set up */
++	ERR_load_pk11_strings();
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/* Dynamic engine support is disabled at a higher level for Solaris */
++#ifdef	ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT
++#error	"dynamic engine not supported"
++static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id)
++	{
++	if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_pk11_id) != 0))
++		return (0);
++
++	if (!bind_pk11(e))
++		return (0);
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN()
++IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper)
++
++#else
++static ENGINE *engine_pk11(void)
++	{
++	ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new();
++
++	if (!ret)
++		return (NULL);
++
++	if (!bind_pk11(ret))
++		{
++		ENGINE_free(ret);
++		return (NULL);
++		}
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++void
++ENGINE_load_pk11(void)
++	{
++	ENGINE *e_pk11 = NULL;
++
++	/*
++	 * Do not use dynamic PKCS#11 library on Solaris due to
++	 * security reasons. We will link it in statically.
++	 */
++	/* Attempt to load PKCS#11 library */
++	if (!pk11_dso)
++		pk11_dso = DSO_load(NULL, get_PK11_LIBNAME(), NULL, 0);
++
++	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++		return;
++		}
++
++	e_pk11 = engine_pk11();
++	if (!e_pk11)
++		{
++		DSO_free(pk11_dso);
++		pk11_dso = NULL;
++		return;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * At this point, the pk11 shared library is either dynamically
++	 * loaded or statically linked in. So, initialize the pk11
++	 * library before calling ENGINE_set_default since the latter
++	 * needs cipher and digest algorithm information
++	 */
++	if (!pk11_library_init(e_pk11))
++		{
++		DSO_free(pk11_dso);
++		pk11_dso = NULL;
++		ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
++		return;
++		}
++
++	ENGINE_add(e_pk11);
++
++	ENGINE_free(e_pk11);
++	ERR_clear_error();
++	}
++#endif	/* ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT */
++
++/*
++ * These are the static string constants for the DSO file name and
++ * the function symbol names to bind to.
++ */
++static const char *PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
++
++static const char *get_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
++	{
++	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
++		return (PK11_LIBNAME);
++
++	return (def_PK11_LIBNAME);
++	}
++
++static void free_PK11_LIBNAME(void)
++	{
++	if (PK11_LIBNAME)
++		OPENSSL_free((void*)PK11_LIBNAME);
++
++	PK11_LIBNAME = NULL;
++	}
++
++static long set_PK11_LIBNAME(const char *name)
++	{
++	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
++
++	return ((PK11_LIBNAME = BUF_strdup(name)) != NULL ? 1 : 0);
++	}
++
++/* acquire all engine specific mutexes before fork */
++static void pk11_fork_prepare(void)
++	{
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	int i;
++
++	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++		return;
++
++	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
++	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++		{
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
++		}
++#endif
++	}
++
++/* release all engine specific mutexes */
++static void pk11_fork_parent(void)
++	{
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	int i;
++
++	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++		return;
++
++	for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
++		{
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
++		}
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#endif
++	}
++
++/*
++ * same situation as in parent - we need to unlock all locks to make them
++ * accessible to all threads.
++ */
++static void pk11_fork_child(void)
++	{
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	int i;
++
++	if (!pk11_library_initialized)
++		return;
++
++	for (i = OP_MAX - 1; i >= 0; i--)
++		{
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[i].lock) == 0);
++		}
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#endif
++	}
++
++/* Initialization function for the pk11 engine */
++static int pk11_init(ENGINE *e)
++{
++	return (pk11_library_init(e));
++}
++
++static CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS pk11_init_args =
++	{
++	NULL_PTR,		/* CreateMutex */
++	NULL_PTR,		/* DestroyMutex */
++	NULL_PTR,		/* LockMutex */
++	NULL_PTR,		/* UnlockMutex */
++	CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK,	/* flags */
++	NULL_PTR,		/* pReserved */
++	};
++
++/*
++ * Initialization function. Sets up various PKCS#11 library components.
++ * It selects a slot based on predefined critiera. In the process, it also
++ * count how many ciphers and digests to support. Since the cipher and
++ * digest information is needed when setting default engine, this function
++ * needs to be called before calling ENGINE_set_default.
++ */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_library_init(ENGINE *e)
++	{
++	CK_C_GetFunctionList p;
++	CK_RV rv = CKR_OK;
++	CK_INFO info;
++	int any_slot_found;
++	int i;
++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++	struct sigaction sigint_act, sigterm_act, sighup_act;
++#endif
++
++	/*
++	 * pk11_library_initialized is set to 0 in pk11_finish() which
++	 * is called from ENGINE_finish(). However, if there is still
++	 * at least one existing functional reference to the engine
++	 * (see engine(3) for more information), pk11_finish() is
++	 * skipped. For example, this can happen if an application
++	 * forgets to clear one cipher context. In case of a fork()
++	 * when the application is finishing the engine so that it can
++	 * be reinitialized in the child, forgotten functional
++	 * reference causes pk11_library_initialized to stay 1. In
++	 * that case we need the PID check so that we properly
++	 * initialize the engine again.
++	 */
++	if (pk11_library_initialized)
++		{
++		if (pk11_pid == getpid())
++			{
++			return (1);
++			}
++		else
++			{
++			global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++			/*
++			 * free the locks first to prevent memory leak in case
++			 * the application calls fork() without finishing the
++			 * engine first.
++			 */
++			pk11_free_all_locks();
++			}
++		}
++
++	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/* get the C_GetFunctionList function from the loaded library */
++	p = (CK_C_GetFunctionList)DSO_bind_func(pk11_dso,
++		PK11_GET_FUNCTION_LIST);
++	if (!p)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	/* get the full function list from the loaded library */
++	rv = p(&pFuncList);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++	/* Not all PKCS#11 library are signal safe! */
++
++	(void) memset(&sigint_act, 0, sizeof(sigint_act));
++	(void) memset(&sigterm_act, 0, sizeof(sigterm_act));
++	(void) memset(&sighup_act, 0, sizeof(sighup_act));
++	(void) sigaction(SIGINT, NULL, &sigint_act);
++	(void) sigaction(SIGTERM, NULL, &sigterm_act);
++	(void) sigaction(SIGHUP, NULL, &sighup_act);
++#endif
++	rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
++#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++	(void) sigaction(SIGINT, &sigint_act, NULL);
++	(void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &sigterm_act, NULL);
++	(void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &sighup_act, NULL);
++#endif
++	if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_INITIALIZE, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetInfo(&info);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_GETINFO, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (pk11_choose_slots(&any_slot_found) == 0)
++		goto err;
++
++	/*
++	 * The library we use, set in def_PK11_LIBNAME, may not offer any
++	 * slot(s). In that case, we must not proceed but we must not return an
++	 * error. The reason is that applications that try to set up the PKCS#11
++	 * engine don't exit on error during the engine initialization just
++	 * because no slot was present.
++	 */
++	if (any_slot_found == 0)
++		return (1);
++
++	if (global_session == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT,
++			    PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++	pk11_library_initialized = TRUE;
++	pk11_pid = getpid();
++	/*
++	 * if initialization of the locks fails pk11_init_all_locks()
++	 * will do the cleanup.
++	 */
++	if (!pk11_init_all_locks())
++		goto err;
++	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++		session_cache[i].head = NULL;
++	/*
++	 * initialize active lists. We only use active lists
++	 * for asymmetric ciphers.
++	 */
++	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++		active_list[i] = NULL;
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	if (!pk11_atfork_initialized)
++		{
++		if (pthread_atfork(pk11_fork_prepare, pk11_fork_parent,
++		    pk11_fork_child) != 0)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_LIBRARY_INIT, PK11_R_ATFORK_FAILED);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		pk11_atfork_initialized = TRUE;
++		}
++#endif
++
++	return (1);
++
++err:
++	return (0);
++	}
++
++/* Destructor (complements the "ENGINE_pk11()" constructor) */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_destroy(ENGINE *e)
++	{
++	free_PK11_LIBNAME();
++	ERR_unload_pk11_strings();
++	if (pk11_pin) {
++		memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
++		OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
++	}
++	pk11_pin = NULL;
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Termination function to clean up the session, the token, and the pk11
++ * library.
++ */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_finish(ENGINE *e)
++	{
++	int i;
++
++	if (pk11_pin) {
++		memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
++		OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
++	}
++	pk11_pin = NULL;
++
++	if (pk11_dso == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_NOT_LOADED);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	OPENSSL_assert(pFuncList != NULL);
++
++	if (pk11_free_all_sessions() == 0)
++		goto err;
++
++	/* free all active lists */
++	for (i = 0; i < OP_MAX; i++)
++		pk11_free_active_list(i);
++
++	pFuncList->C_CloseSession(global_session);
++	global_session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++
++	/*
++	 * Since we are part of a library (libcrypto.so), calling this function
++	 * may have side-effects.
++	 */
++#if 0
++	pFuncList->C_Finalize(NULL);
++#endif
++
++	if (!DSO_free(pk11_dso))
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_FINISH, PK11_R_DSO_FAILURE);
++		goto err;
++		}
++	pk11_dso = NULL;
++	pFuncList = NULL;
++	pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
++	pk11_pid = 0;
++	/*
++	 * There is no way how to unregister atfork handlers (other than
++	 * unloading the library) so we just free the locks. For this reason
++	 * the atfork handlers check if the engine is initialized and bail out
++	 * immediately if not. This is necessary in case a process finishes
++	 * the engine before calling fork().
++	 */
++	pk11_free_all_locks();
++
++	return (1);
++
++err:
++	return (0);
++	}
++
++/* Standard engine interface function to set the dynamic library path */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static int pk11_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void))
++	{
++	int initialized = ((pk11_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1);
++
++	switch (cmd)
++		{
++	case PK11_CMD_SO_PATH:
++		if (p == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
++			return (0);
++			}
++
++		if (initialized)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_ALREADY_LOADED);
++			return (0);
++			}
++
++		return (set_PK11_LIBNAME((const char *)p));
++	case PK11_CMD_PIN:
++		if (pk11_pin) {
++			memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
++			OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
++		}
++		pk11_pin = NULL;
++
++		if (p == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
++			return (0);
++			}
++
++		pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(p);
++		if (pk11_pin == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			return (0);
++			}
++		return (1);
++	case PK11_CMD_SLOT:
++		SLOTID = (CK_SLOT_ID)i;
++#ifdef DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: slot set\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif
++		return (1);
++	default:
++		break;
++		}
++
++	PK11err(PK11_F_CTRL, PK11_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
++
++	return (0);
++	}
++
++
++/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
++static void pk11_rand_cleanup(void)
++	{
++	return;
++	}
++
++/* ARGSUSED */
++static void pk11_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
++	{
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
++		return;
++
++	/*
++	 * Ignore any errors (e.g. CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED) since
++	 * the calling functions do not care anyway
++	 */
++	pFuncList->C_SeedRandom(sp->session, (unsigned char *) buf, num);
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
++
++	return;
++	}
++
++static void pk11_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
++	{
++	pk11_rand_add(buf, num, 0);
++	}
++
++static int pk11_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RAND)) == NULL)
++		return (0);
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GenerateRandom(sp->session, buf, num);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RAND_BYTES, PK11_R_GENERATERANDOM, rv);
++		pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RAND);
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/* Required function by the engine random interface. It does nothing here */
++static int pk11_rand_status(void)
++	{
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/* Free all BIGNUM structures from PK11_SESSION. */
++static void pk11_free_nums(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++	{
++	switch (optype)
++		{
++		case OP_RSA:
++			if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
++				sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
++				}
++			if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
++				sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
++				}
++			if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
++				sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
++				}
++			if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
++				sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
++				}
++			if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
++				{
++				BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
++				sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
++				}
++			break;
++		default:
++			break;
++		}
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Get new PK11_SESSION structure ready for use. Every process must have
++ * its own freelist of PK11_SESSION structures so handle fork() here
++ * by destroying the old and creating new freelist.
++ * The returned PK11_SESSION structure is disconnected from the freelist.
++ */
++PK11_SESSION *
++pk11_get_session(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++	{
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL, *sp1, *freelist;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock = NULL;
++#endif
++	static pid_t pid = 0;
++	pid_t new_pid;
++	CK_RV rv;
++
++	switch (optype)
++		{
++		case OP_RSA:
++		case OP_DSA:
++		case OP_DH:
++		case OP_RAND:
++		case OP_DIGEST:
++		case OP_CIPHER:
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
++#endif
++			break;
++		default:
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
++				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++			return (NULL);
++		}
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++
++	/*
++	 * Will use it to find out if we forked. We cannot use the PID field in
++	 * the session structure because we could get a newly allocated session
++	 * here, with no PID information.
++	 */
++	if (pid == 0)
++		pid = getpid();
++
++	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
++	sp = freelist;
++
++	/*
++	 * If the free list is empty, allocate new unitialized (filled
++	 * with zeroes) PK11_SESSION structure otherwise return first
++	 * structure from the freelist.
++	 */
++	if (sp == NULL)
++		{
++		if ((sp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_SESSION))) == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_SESSION,
++				PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		(void) memset(sp, 0, sizeof (PK11_SESSION));
++
++		/*
++		 * It is a new session so it will look like a cache miss to the
++		 * code below. So, we must not try to to destroy its members so
++		 * mark them as unused.
++		 */
++		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		freelist = sp->next;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * Check whether we have forked. In that case, we must get rid of all
++	 * inherited sessions and start allocating new ones.
++	 */
++	if (pid != (new_pid = getpid()))
++		{
++		pid = new_pid;
++
++		/*
++		 * We are a new process and thus need to free any inherited
++		 * PK11_SESSION objects aside from the first session (sp) which
++		 * is the only PK11_SESSION structure we will reuse (for the
++		 * head of the list).
++		 */
++		while ((sp1 = freelist) != NULL)
++			{
++			freelist = sp1->next;
++			/*
++			 * NOTE: we do not want to call pk11_free_all_sessions()
++			 * here because it would close underlying PKCS#11
++			 * sessions and destroy all objects.
++			 */
++			pk11_free_nums(sp1, optype);
++			OPENSSL_free(sp1);
++			}
++
++		/* we have to free the active list as well. */
++		pk11_free_active_list(optype);
++
++		/* Initialize the process */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_Initialize((CK_VOID_PTR)&pk11_init_args);
++		if ((rv != CKR_OK) && (rv != CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED))
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_INITIALIZE,
++			    rv);
++			OPENSSL_free(sp);
++			sp = NULL;
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * Choose slot here since the slot table is different on this
++		 * process. If we are here then we must have found at least one
++		 * usable slot before so we don't need to check any_slot_found.
++		 * See pk11_library_init()'s usage of this function for more
++		 * information.
++		 */
++		if (pk11_choose_slots(NULL) == 0)
++			goto err;
++
++		/* Open the global_session for the new process */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(SLOTID, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &global_session);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION,
++			    rv);
++			OPENSSL_free(sp);
++			sp = NULL;
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * It is an inherited session from our parent so it needs
++		 * re-initialization.
++		 */
++		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
++			{
++			OPENSSL_free(sp);
++			sp = NULL;
++			goto err;
++			}
++		if (pk11_token_relogin(sp->session) == 0) 
++			{
++			/*
++			 * We will keep the session in the cache list and let
++			 * the caller cope with the situation.
++			 */
++			freelist = sp;
++			sp = NULL;
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++	if (sp->pid == 0)
++		{
++		/* It is a new session and needs initialization. */
++		if (pk11_setup_session(sp, optype) == 0)
++			{
++			OPENSSL_free(sp);
++			sp = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	/* set new head for the list of PK11_SESSION objects */
++	session_cache[optype].head = freelist;
++
++err:
++	if (sp != NULL)
++		sp->next = NULL;
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++
++	return (sp);
++	}
++
++
++void
++pk11_return_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++	{
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
++#endif
++	PK11_SESSION *freelist;
++
++	/*
++	 * If this is a session from the parent it will be taken care of and
++	 * freed in pk11_get_session() as part of the post-fork clean up the
++	 * next time we will ask for a new session.
++	 */
++	if (sp == NULL || sp->pid != getpid())
++		return;
++
++	switch (optype)
++		{
++		case OP_RSA:
++		case OP_DSA:
++		case OP_DH:
++		case OP_RAND:
++		case OP_DIGEST:
++		case OP_CIPHER:
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
++#endif
++			break;
++		default:
++			PK11err(PK11_F_RETURN_SESSION,
++				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++			return;
++		}
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
++	sp->next = freelist;
++	session_cache[optype].head = sp;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++	}
++
++
++/* Destroy all objects. This function is called when the engine is finished */
++static int pk11_free_all_sessions()
++	{
++	int ret = 1;
++	int type;
++
++	(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(NULL);
++
++	/*
++	 * We try to release as much as we can but any error means that we will
++	 * return 0 on exit.
++	 */
++	for (type = 0; type < OP_MAX; type++)
++		{
++		if (pk11_free_session_list(type) == 0)
++			ret = 0;
++		}
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Destroy session structures from the linked list specified. Free as many
++ * sessions as possible but any failure in C_CloseSession() means that we
++ * return an error on return.
++ */
++static int pk11_free_session_list(PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++	PK11_SESSION *freelist = NULL;
++	pid_t mypid = getpid();
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	pthread_mutex_t *freelist_lock;
++#endif
++	int ret = 1;
++
++	switch (optype)
++		{
++		case OP_RSA:
++		case OP_DSA:
++		case OP_DH:
++		case OP_RAND:
++		case OP_DIGEST:
++		case OP_CIPHER:
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++			freelist_lock = session_cache[optype].lock;
++#endif
++			break;
++		default:
++			PK11err(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
++				PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++			return (0);
++		}
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(freelist_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++	freelist = session_cache[optype].head;
++	while ((sp = freelist) != NULL)
++		{
++		if (sp->session != CK_INVALID_HANDLE && sp->pid == mypid)
++			{
++			rv = pFuncList->C_CloseSession(sp->session);
++			if (rv != CKR_OK)
++				{
++				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FREE_ALL_SESSIONS,
++					PK11_R_CLOSESESSION, rv);
++				ret = 0;
++				}
++			}
++		freelist = sp->next;
++		pk11_free_nums(sp, optype);
++		OPENSSL_free(sp);
++		}
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(freelist_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++
++static int
++pk11_setup_session(PK11_SESSION *sp, PK11_OPTYPE optype)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_SLOT_ID myslot;
++
++	switch (optype)
++		{
++		case OP_RSA:
++			myslot = pubkey_SLOTID;
++			break;
++		case OP_RAND:
++			myslot = rand_SLOTID;
++			break;
++		default:
++			PK11err(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION,
++			    PK11_R_INVALID_OPERATION_TYPE);
++			return (0);
++		}
++
++	sp->session = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: myslot=%d optype=%d\n", PK11_DBG, myslot, optype);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++	rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++		NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
++	if (rv == CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We are probably a child process so force the
++		 * reinitialize of the session
++		 */
++		pk11_library_initialized = FALSE;
++		if (!pk11_library_init(NULL))
++			return (0);
++		rv = pFuncList->C_OpenSession(myslot, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION,
++			NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &sp->session);
++		}
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_SETUP_SESSION, PK11_R_OPENSESSION, rv);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	sp->pid = getpid();
++
++	if (optype == OP_RSA)
++		{
++		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
++		sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
++		sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
++		sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
++		sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
++		sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
++		sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * We always initialize the session as containing a non-persistent
++	 * object. The key load functions set it to persistent if that is so.
++	 */
++	sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
++	sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/* Destroy RSA public key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
++	{
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key,
++		    ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_FALSE);
++		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		sp->opdata_rsa_pub = NULL;
++		if (sp->opdata_rsa_n_num != NULL)
++			{
++			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num);
++			sp->opdata_rsa_n_num = NULL;
++			}
++		if (sp->opdata_rsa_e_num != NULL)
++			{
++			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num);
++			sp->opdata_rsa_e_num = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++/* Destroy RSA private key from single session. */
++int
++pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, CK_BBOOL uselock)
++	{
++	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		TRY_OBJ_DESTROY(sp, sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key,
++		    ret, uselock, OP_RSA, CK_TRUE);
++		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		sp->opdata_rsa_priv = NULL;
++		if (sp->opdata_rsa_d_num != NULL)
++			{
++			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_d_num);
++			sp->opdata_rsa_d_num = NULL;
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * For the RSA key by reference code, public components 'n'/'e'
++		 * are the key components we use to check for the cache hit. We
++		 * must free those as well.
++		 */
++		if (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num != NULL)
++			{
++			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
++			sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num = NULL;
++			}
++		if (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num != NULL)
++			{
++			BN_free(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
++			sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Destroy RSA key object wrapper. If session is NULL, try to destroy all
++ * objects in the free list.
++ */
++int
++pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects(PK11_SESSION *session)
++	{
++	int ret = 1;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++	PK11_SESSION *local_free_session;
++	CK_BBOOL uselock = TRUE;
++
++	if (session != NULL)
++		local_free_session = session;
++	else
++		{
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
++#else
++		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++		local_free_session = session_cache[OP_RSA].head;
++		uselock = FALSE;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * go through the list of sessions and delete key objects
++	 */
++	while ((sp = local_free_session) != NULL)
++		{
++		local_free_session = sp->next;
++
++		/*
++		 * Do not terminate list traversal if one of the
++		 * destroy operations fails.
++		 */
++		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, uselock) == 0)
++			{
++			ret = 0;
++			continue;
++			}
++		if (pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, uselock) == 0)
++			{
++			ret = 0;
++			continue;
++			}
++		}
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	if (session == NULL)
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(session_cache[OP_RSA].lock) == 0);
++#else
++	if (session == NULL)
++		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++static int
++pk11_destroy_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE oh,
++	CK_BBOOL persistent)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++
++	/*
++	 * We never try to destroy persistent objects which are the objects
++	 * stored in the keystore. Also, we always use read-only sessions so
++	 * C_DestroyObject() would be returning CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY here.
++	 */
++	if (persistent == CK_TRUE)
++		return (1);
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, oh);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_DESTROY_OBJECT, PK11_R_DESTROYOBJECT,
++		    rv);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++
++/*
++ * Public key mechanisms optionally supported
++ *
++ * CKM_RSA_PKCS
++ *
++ * The first slot that supports at least one of those mechanisms is chosen as a
++ * public key slot.
++ *
++ * The output of this function is a set of global variables indicating which
++ * mechanisms from RSA, DSA, DH and RAND are present, and also two arrays of
++ * mechanisms, one for symmetric ciphers and one for digests. Also, 3 global
++ * variables carry information about which slot was chosen for (a) public key
++ * mechanisms, (b) random operations, and (c) symmetric ciphers and digests.
++ */
++static int
++pk11_choose_slots(int *any_slot_found)
++	{
++	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList = NULL_PTR;
++	CK_ULONG ulSlotCount = 0;
++	CK_MECHANISM_INFO mech_info;
++	CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
++	unsigned int i;
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_SLOT_ID best_slot_sofar = 0;
++	CK_BBOOL found_candidate_slot = CK_FALSE;
++	CK_SLOT_ID current_slot = 0;
++
++	/* let's initialize the output parameter */
++	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
++		*any_slot_found = 0;
++
++	/* Get slot list for memory allocation */
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, NULL_PTR, &ulSlotCount);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	/* it's not an error if we didn't find any providers */
++	if (ulSlotCount == 0)
++		{
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++		fprintf(stderr, "%s: no crypto providers found\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		return (1);
++		}
++
++	pSlotList = OPENSSL_malloc(ulSlotCount * sizeof (CK_SLOT_ID));
++
++	if (pSlotList == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	/* Get the slot list for processing */
++	rv = pFuncList->C_GetSlotList(CK_FALSE, pSlotList, &ulSlotCount);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_CHOOSE_SLOT, PK11_R_GETSLOTLIST, rv);
++		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: provider: %s\n", PK11_DBG, def_PK11_LIBNAME);
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: number of slots: %d\n", PK11_DBG, ulSlotCount);
++
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking rand slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
++		{
++		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		/* Check if slot has random support. */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			continue;
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++		if (token_info.flags & CKF_RNG)
++			{
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: this token has CKF_RNG flag\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++			pk11_have_random = CK_TRUE;
++			rand_SLOTID = current_slot;
++			break;
++			}
++		}
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: == checking pubkey slots ==\n", PK11_DBG);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++	pubkey_SLOTID = pSlotList[0];
++	for (i = 0; i < ulSlotCount; i++)
++		{
++		CK_BBOOL slot_has_rsa = CK_FALSE;
++		current_slot = pSlotList[i];
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: checking slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, i);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_GetTokenInfo(current_slot, &token_info);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			continue;
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr, "%s: token label: %.32s\n", PK11_DBG, token_info.label);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++		/*
++		 * Check if this slot is capable of signing with CKM_RSA_PKCS.
++		 */
++		rv = pFuncList->C_GetMechanismInfo(current_slot, CKM_RSA_PKCS,
++			&mech_info);
++
++		if (rv == CKR_OK && ((mech_info.flags & CKF_SIGN)))
++			{
++			slot_has_rsa = CK_TRUE;
++			}
++
++		if (!found_candidate_slot && slot_has_rsa)
++			{
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++			fprintf(stderr,
++			    "%s: potential slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, current_slot);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++			best_slot_sofar = current_slot;
++			pk11_have_rsa = slot_has_rsa;
++			found_candidate_slot = CK_TRUE;
++			/*
++			 * Cache the flags for later use. We might
++			 * need those if RSA keys by reference feature
++			 * is used.
++			 */
++			pubkey_token_flags = token_info.flags;
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++			fprintf(stderr,
++			    "%s: setting found_candidate_slot to CK_TRUE\n",
++			    PK11_DBG);
++			fprintf(stderr,
++			    "%s: best so far slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG,
++			    best_slot_sofar);
++			fprintf(stderr, "%s: pubkey flags changed to "
++			    "%lu.\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_token_flags);
++			}
++		else
++			{
++			fprintf(stderr,
++			    "%s: no rsa\n", PK11_DBG);
++			}
++#else
++			} /* if */
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++		} /* for */
++
++	if (found_candidate_slot == CK_TRUE)
++		{
++		pubkey_SLOTID = best_slot_sofar;
++		}
++
++	/*SLOTID = pSlotList[0];*/
++
++#ifdef	DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION
++	fprintf(stderr,
++	    "%s: chosen pubkey slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, pubkey_SLOTID);
++	fprintf(stderr,
++	    "%s: chosen rand slot: %d\n", PK11_DBG, rand_SLOTID);
++	fprintf(stderr,
++	    "%s: pk11_have_rsa %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_rsa);
++	fprintf(stderr,
++	    "%s: pk11_have_random %d\n", PK11_DBG, pk11_have_random);
++#endif	/* DEBUG_SLOT_SELECTION */
++
++	if (pSlotList != NULL)
++		OPENSSL_free(pSlotList);
++
++	if (any_slot_found != NULL)
++		*any_slot_found = 1;
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h:1.4
+--- /dev/null	Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so.h	Wed Jun 15 21:12:20 2011
+@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
++/* Redefine all pk11/PK11 external symbols to pk11so/PK11SO */
++
++#define token_lock			pk11so_token_lock
++#define find_lock			pk11so_find_lock
++#define active_list			pk11so_active_list
++#define pubkey_token_flags		pk11so_pubkey_token_flags
++#define pubkey_SLOTID			pk11so_pubkey_SLOTID
++#define ERR_pk11_error			ERR_pk11so_error
++#define PK11err_add_data		PK11SOerr_add_data
++#define pk11_get_session		pk11so_get_session
++#define pk11_return_session		pk11so_return_session
++#define pk11_active_add			pk11so_active_add
++#define pk11_active_delete		pk11so_active_delete
++#define pk11_active_remove		pk11so_active_remove
++#define pk11_free_active_list		pk11so_free_active_list
++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_key_objects	pk11so_destroy_rsa_key_objects
++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub	pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_pub
++#define pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv	pk11so_destroy_rsa_object_priv
++#define pk11_load_privkey		pk11so_load_privkey
++#define pk11_load_pubkey		pk11so_load_pubkey
++#define PK11_RSA			PK11SO_RSA
++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_key_objects	pk11so_destroy_dsa_key_objects
++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_pub	pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_pub
++#define pk11_destroy_dsa_object_priv	pk11so_destroy_dsa_object_priv
++#define PK11_DSA			PK11SO_DSA
++#define pk11_destroy_dh_key_objects	pk11so_destroy_dh_key_objects
++#define pk11_destroy_dh_object		pk11so_destroy_dh_object
++#define PK11_DH				PK11SO_DH
++#define pk11_token_relogin		pk11so_token_relogin
++#define pFuncList			pk11so_pFuncList
++#define pk11_pin			pk11so_pin
++#define ENGINE_load_pk11		ENGINE_load_pk11so
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c:1.10
+--- /dev/null	Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/hw_pk11so_pub.c	Fri Oct  4 14:05:38 2013
+@@ -0,0 +1,1642 @@
++/*
++ * Copyright 2009 Sun Microsystems, Inc.  All rights reserved.
++ * Use is subject to license terms.
++ */
++
++/* crypto/engine/hw_pk11_pub.c */
++/*
++ * This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project for
++ * use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/).
++ *
++ * This project also referenced hw_pkcs11-0.9.7b.patch written by
++ * Afchine Madjlessi.
++ */
++/*
++ * ====================================================================
++ * Copyright (c) 2000-2001 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ *
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ *
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
++ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
++ *    distribution.
++ *
++ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
++ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
++ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
++ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
++ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
++ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
++ *
++ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
++ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
++ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
++ *
++ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
++ *    acknowledgment:
++ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
++ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
++ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
++ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
++ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
++ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
++ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
++ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
++ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
++ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
++ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
++ * ====================================================================
++ *
++ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
++ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
++ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
++ *
++ */
++
++/* Modified to keep only RNG and RSA Sign */
++
++#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
++#error RSA is disabled
++#endif
++
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <sys/types.h>
++
++#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
++#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <cryptlib.h>
++#include <openssl/engine.h>
++#include <openssl/dso.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/bn.h>
++#include <openssl/pem.h>
++#include <openssl/rsa.h>
++#include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/objects.h>
++#include <openssl/x509.h>
++
++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++#define NOPTHREADS
++typedef int pid_t;
++#define HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE
++static char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt);
++#ifndef NULL_PTR
++#define NULL_PTR NULL
++#endif
++#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++	returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++	returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
++#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
++	returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
++#else
++#include <unistd.h>
++#endif
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++#include <pthread.h>
++#endif
++
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11
++#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO
++
++#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++#pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
++#include "cryptoki.h"
++#include "pkcs11.h"
++#pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
++#else
++#include "cryptoki.h"
++#include "pkcs11.h"
++#endif
++#include "hw_pk11so.h"
++#include "hw_pk11_err.h"
++
++static CK_BBOOL pk11_login_done = CK_FALSE;
++extern CK_SLOT_ID pubkey_SLOTID;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++extern pthread_mutex_t *token_lock;
++#endif
++
++#if !(defined(HAVE_GETPASSPHRASE) || (defined (__SVR4) && defined (__sun)))
++#define getpassphrase(x)	getpass(x)
++#endif
++
++/* RSA stuff */
++static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
++	unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa);
++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE*, const char *privkey_file,
++	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE*, const char *pubkey_file,
++	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data);
++
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
++	BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA* rsa, RSA** key_ptr,
++	BIGNUM **rsa_d_num, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
++	CK_SESSION_HANDLE session);
++
++static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
++static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa);
++
++static int find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey);
++static int init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *pValue,
++	CK_ULONG *ulValueLen);
++static void attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn);
++
++static int pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
++	CK_BBOOL is_private);
++
++/* Read mode string to be used for fopen() */
++#if SOLARIS_OPENSSL
++static char *read_mode_flags = "rF";
++#else
++static char *read_mode_flags = "r";
++#endif
++
++/*
++ * increment/create reference for an asymmetric key handle via active list
++ * manipulation. If active list operation fails, unlock (if locked), set error
++ * variable and jump to the specified label.
++ */
++#define	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(key_handle, alg_type, unlock, var, label)	\
++	{								\
++	if (pk11_active_add(key_handle, alg_type) < 0)			\
++		{							\
++		var = TRUE;						\
++		if (unlock)						\
++			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(alg_type);			\
++		goto label;						\
++		}							\
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Find active list entry according to object handle and return pointer to the
++ * entry otherwise return NULL.
++ *
++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
++ * held.
++ */
++static PK11_active *pk11_active_find(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++	{
++	PK11_active *entry;
++
++	for (entry = active_list[type]; entry != NULL; entry = entry->next)
++		if (entry->h == h)
++			return (entry);
++
++	return (NULL);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Search for an entry in the active list using PKCS#11 object handle as a
++ * search key and return refcnt of the found/created entry or -1 in case of
++ * failure.
++ *
++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
++ * held.
++ */
++int
++pk11_active_add(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++	{
++	PK11_active *entry = NULL;
++
++	if (h == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
++		return (-1);
++		}
++
++	/* search for entry in the active list */
++	if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) != NULL)
++		entry->refcnt++;
++	else
++		{
++		/* not found, create new entry and add it to the list */
++		entry = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof (PK11_active));
++		if (entry == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_ADD, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			return (-1);
++			}
++		entry->h = h;
++		entry->refcnt = 1;
++		entry->prev = NULL;
++		entry->next = NULL;
++		/* connect the newly created entry to the list */
++		if (active_list[type] == NULL)
++			active_list[type] = entry;
++		else /* make the entry first in the list */
++			{
++			entry->next = active_list[type];
++			active_list[type]->prev = entry;
++			active_list[type] = entry;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (entry->refcnt);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Remove active list entry from the list and free it.
++ *
++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
++ * held.
++ */
++void
++pk11_active_remove(PK11_active *entry, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++	{
++	PK11_active *prev_entry;
++
++	/* remove the entry from the list and free it */
++	if ((prev_entry = entry->prev) != NULL)
++		{
++		prev_entry->next = entry->next;
++		if (entry->next != NULL)
++			entry->next->prev = prev_entry;
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		active_list[type] = entry->next;
++		/* we were the first but not the only one */
++		if (entry->next != NULL)
++			entry->next->prev = NULL;
++		}
++
++	/* sanitization */
++	entry->h = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	entry->prev = NULL;
++	entry->next = NULL;
++	OPENSSL_free(entry);
++	}
++
++/* Free all entries from the active list. */
++void
++pk11_free_active_list(PK11_OPTYPE type)
++	{
++	PK11_active *entry;
++
++	/* only for asymmetric types since only they have C_Find* locks. */
++	switch (type)
++		{
++		case OP_RSA:
++			break;
++		default:
++			return;
++		}
++
++	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
++	LOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
++	while ((entry = active_list[type]) != NULL)
++		pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(type);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Search for active list entry associated with given PKCS#11 object handle,
++ * decrement its refcnt and if it drops to 0, disconnect the entry and free it.
++ *
++ * Return 1 if the PKCS#11 object associated with the entry has no references,
++ * return 0 if there is at least one reference, -1 on error.
++ *
++ * This function presumes it is called with lock protecting the active list
++ * held.
++ */
++int
++pk11_active_delete(CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h, PK11_OPTYPE type)
++	{
++	PK11_active *entry = NULL;
++
++	if ((entry = pk11_active_find(h, type)) == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_ACTIVE_DELETE, PK11_R_INVALID_HANDLE);
++		return (-1);
++		}
++
++	OPENSSL_assert(entry->refcnt > 0);
++	entry->refcnt--;
++	if (entry->refcnt == 0)
++		{
++		pk11_active_remove(entry, type);
++		return (1);
++		}
++
++	return (0);
++	}
++
++/* Our internal RSA_METHOD that we provide pointers to */
++static RSA_METHOD pk11_rsa;
++
++RSA_METHOD *
++PK11_RSA(void)
++	{
++	const RSA_METHOD *rsa;
++
++	if (pk11_rsa.name == NULL)
++		{
++		rsa = RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay();
++		memcpy(&pk11_rsa, rsa, sizeof(*rsa));
++		pk11_rsa.name = "PKCS#11 RSA method";
++		pk11_rsa.rsa_sign = pk11_RSA_sign;
++		}
++	return (&pk11_rsa);
++	}
++
++/* Size of an SSL signature: MD5+SHA1 */
++#define	SSL_SIG_LENGTH		36
++
++static CK_BBOOL mytrue = TRUE;
++static CK_BBOOL myfalse = FALSE;
++
++/*
++ * Standard engine interface function. Majority codes here are from
++ * rsa/rsa_sign.c. We replaced the decrypt function call by C_Sign of PKCS#11.
++ * See more details in rsa/rsa_sign.c
++ */
++static int pk11_RSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len,
++	unsigned char *sigret, unsigned int *siglen, const RSA *rsa)
++	{
++	X509_SIG sig;
++	ASN1_TYPE parameter;
++	int i, j = 0;
++	unsigned char *p, *s = NULL;
++	X509_ALGOR algor;
++	ASN1_OCTET_STRING digest;
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_MECHANISM mech_rsa = {CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL, 0};
++	CK_MECHANISM *p_mech = &mech_rsa;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_priv_key;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp = NULL;
++	int ret = 0;
++	unsigned long ulsiglen;
++
++	/* Encode the digest */
++	/* Special case: SSL signature, just check the length */
++	if (type == NID_md5_sha1)
++		{
++		if (m_len != SSL_SIG_LENGTH)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
++				PK11_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		i = SSL_SIG_LENGTH;
++		s = (unsigned char *)m;
++		}
++	else
++		{
++		sig.algor = &algor;
++		sig.algor->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(type);
++		if (sig.algor->algorithm == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
++				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		if (sig.algor->algorithm->length == 0)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN,
++				PK11_R_UNKNOWN_ASN1_OBJECT_ID);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		parameter.type = V_ASN1_NULL;
++		parameter.value.ptr = NULL;
++		sig.algor->parameter = &parameter;
++
++		sig.digest = &digest;
++		sig.digest->data = (unsigned char *)m;
++		sig.digest->length = m_len;
++
++		i = i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, NULL);
++		}
++
++	j = RSA_size(rsa);
++	if ((i - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) > j)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (type != NID_md5_sha1)
++		{
++		s = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)(j + 1));
++		if (s == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		p = s;
++		(void) i2d_X509_SIG(&sig, &p);
++		}
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++		goto err;
++
++	(void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
++
++	h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key;
++	if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
++			pk11_get_private_rsa_key((RSA *)rsa,
++			    &sp->opdata_rsa_priv, &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
++			    &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num,
++			    sp->session);
++
++	if (h_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_SignInit(sp->session, p_mech, h_priv_key);
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGNINIT, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		ulsiglen = j;
++		rv = pFuncList->C_Sign(sp->session, s, i, sigret,
++			(CK_ULONG_PTR) &ulsiglen);
++		*siglen = ulsiglen;
++
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_RSA_SIGN, PK11_R_SIGN, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		ret = 1;
++		}
++
++err:
++	if ((type != NID_md5_sha1) && (s != NULL))
++		{
++		(void) memset(s, 0, (unsigned int)(j + 1));
++		OPENSSL_free(s);
++		}
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++	return (ret);
++	}
++
++static int hndidx_rsa = -1;
++
++#define	MAXATTR	1024
++
++/*
++ * Load RSA private key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
++ * PKCS#11 token.
++ */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_privkey(ENGINE *e, const char *privkey_file,
++	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
++	{
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++	FILE *privkey;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  h_priv_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	RSA *rsa = NULL;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++	/* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
++	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
++	CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
++	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;	/* key in keystore */
++
++	/* we look for private keys only */
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
++		{CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
++		{CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
++		};
++
++	/*
++	 * These public attributes are needed to initialize the OpenSSL RSA
++	 * structure with something we can use to look up the key. Note that we
++	 * never ask for private components.
++	 */
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR},		/* n */
++		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR},	/* e */
++		};
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++		return (NULL);
++
++	/*
++	 * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
++	 */
++	if (strstr(privkey_file, "pkcs11:") == privkey_file)
++		{
++		search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(privkey_file, ":") + 1;
++		search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
++
++		if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
++		    CK_TRUE) == 0)
++			goto err;
++
++		/* see find_lock array definition
++		   for more info on object locking */
++		LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++		/*
++		 * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
++		 * if we can't find it.
++		 */
++		if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
++		    &ks_key) == 0)
++			{
++			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		if (hndidx_rsa == -1)
++			hndidx_rsa = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0,
++				        "pkcs11 RSA HSM key handle",
++					NULL, NULL, NULL);
++
++		/*
++		 * We might have a cache hit which we could confirm
++		 * according to the 'n'/'e' params, RSA public pointer
++		 * as NULL, and non-NULL RSA private pointer. However,
++		 * it is easier just to recreate everything. We expect
++		 * the keys to be loaded once and used many times. We
++		 * do not check the return value because even in case
++		 * of failure the sp structure will have both key
++		 * pointer and object handle cleaned and
++		 * pk11_destroy_object() reports the failure to the
++		 * OpenSSL error message buffer.
++		 */
++		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, FALSE);
++
++		sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key = ks_key;
++		/* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
++		sp->priv_persistent = CK_TRUE;
++
++		/*
++		 * Cache the RSA private structure pointer. We do not
++		 * use it now for key-by-ref keys but let's do it for
++		 * consistency reasons.
++		 */
++		if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_priv = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
++			{
++			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
++		 * everything else is 0 or NULL.
++		 */
++		rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER | RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY;
++		RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa, (void *) ks_key);
++
++		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
++		    get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY,
++					 PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * We do not use pk11_get_private_rsa_key() here so we
++		 * must take care of handle management ourselves.
++		 */
++		KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(ks_key, OP_RSA, TRUE, rollback, err);
++
++		/*
++		 * Those are the sensitive components we do not want to export
++		 * from the token at all: rsa->(d|p|q|dmp1|dmq1|iqmp).
++		 */
++		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
++		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
++		/*
++		 * Must have 'n'/'e' components in the session structure as
++		 * well. They serve as a public look-up key for the private key
++		 * in the keystore.
++		 */
++		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0],
++			&sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num);
++		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1],
++			&sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num);
++
++		UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
++			goto err;
++
++		if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
++			goto err;
++		}
++	else if ((privkey = fopen(privkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
++		{
++		pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(privkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++		(void) fclose(privkey);
++		if (pkey != NULL)
++			{
++			rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
++			if (rsa != NULL)
++				{
++				/*
++				 * This will always destroy the RSA
++				 * object since we have a new RSA
++				 * structure here.
++				 */
++				(void) check_new_rsa_key_priv(sp, rsa);
++				sp->priv_persistent = CK_FALSE;
++
++				h_priv_key = sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key =
++				    pk11_get_private_rsa_key(rsa,
++				    &sp->opdata_rsa_priv,
++				    &sp->opdata_rsa_d_num,
++				    &sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num,
++				    &sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, sp->session);
++				if (h_priv_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++					goto err;
++				}
++			else
++				goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++	return (pkey);
++err:
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++	if (rsa != NULL)
++		RSA_free(rsa);
++	if (pkey != NULL)
++		{
++		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++		pkey = NULL;
++		}
++	rollback = rollback;
++	return (pkey);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Load RSA public key from a file or get its PKCS#11 handle if stored in the
++ * PKCS#11 token.
++ */
++/* ARGSUSED */
++EVP_PKEY *pk11_load_pubkey(ENGINE *e, const char *pubkey_file,
++	UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data)
++	{
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++	FILE *pubkey;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_pub_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	RSA *rsa = NULL;
++	PK11_SESSION *sp;
++	/* Anything else below is needed for the key by reference extension. */
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_BBOOL is_token = TRUE;
++	CK_BYTE attr_data[2][MAXATTR];
++	CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE ks_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;	/* key in keystore */
++
++	/* we look for public keys only */
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE search_templ[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_TOKEN, &is_token, sizeof(is_token)},
++		{CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class)},
++		{CKA_LABEL, NULL, 0}
++		};
++
++	/*
++	 * These public attributes are needed to initialize OpenSSL RSA
++	 * structure with something we can use to look up the key.
++	 */
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE get_templ[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)attr_data[0], MAXATTR},		/* n */
++		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)attr_data[1], MAXATTR},	/* e */
++		};
++
++	if ((sp = pk11_get_session(OP_RSA)) == NULL)
++		return (NULL);
++
++	/*
++	 * Use simple scheme "pkcs11:<KEY_LABEL>" for now.
++	 */
++	if (strstr(pubkey_file, "pkcs11:") == pubkey_file)
++		{
++		search_templ[2].pValue = strstr(pubkey_file, ":") + 1;
++		search_templ[2].ulValueLen = strlen(search_templ[2].pValue);
++
++		if (pk11_token_login(sp->session, &pk11_login_done,
++		    CK_FALSE) == 0)
++			goto err;
++
++		/* see find_lock array definition
++		   for more info on object locking */
++		LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++		/*
++		 * Now let's try to find the key in the token. It is a failure
++		 * if we can't find it.
++		 */
++		if (find_one_object(OP_RSA, sp->session, search_templ, 3,
++		    &ks_key) == 0)
++			{
++			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * We load a new public key so we will create a new RSA
++		 * structure. No cache hit is possible.
++		 */
++		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, FALSE);
++
++		sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key = ks_key;
++		/* This object shall not be deleted on a cache miss. */
++		sp->pub_persistent = CK_TRUE;
++
++		/*
++		 * Cache the RSA public structure pointer.
++		 */
++		if ((rsa = sp->opdata_rsa_pub = RSA_new_method(e)) == NULL)
++			{
++			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * Now we have to initialize an OpenSSL RSA structure,
++		 * everything else is 0 or NULL.
++		 */
++		rsa->flags = RSA_FLAG_SIGN_VER;
++
++		if ((rv = pFuncList->C_GetAttributeValue(sp->session, ks_key,
++		    get_templ, 2)) != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_LOAD_PUBKEY,
++					 PK11_R_GETATTRIBUTVALUE, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[0], attr_data[0], &rsa->n);
++		attr_to_BN(&get_templ[1], attr_data[1], &rsa->e);
++
++		UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL)
++			goto err;
++
++		if (EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa) == 0)
++			goto err;
++
++		/*
++		 * Create a session object from it so that when calling
++		 * pk11_get_public_rsa_key() the next time, we can find it. The
++		 * reason why we do that is that we cannot tell from the RSA
++		 * structure (OpenSSL RSA structure does not have any room for
++		 * additional data used by the engine, for example) if it bears
++		 * a public key stored in the keystore or not so it's better if
++		 * we always have a session key. Note that this is different
++		 * from what we do for the private keystore objects but in that
++		 * case, we can tell from the RSA structure that the keystore
++		 * object is in play - the 'd' component is NULL in that case.
++		 */
++		h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
++		    pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
++		    &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
++		    &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
++		if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++			goto err;
++		}
++	else if ((pubkey = fopen(pubkey_file, read_mode_flags)) != NULL)
++		{
++		pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL);
++		(void) fclose(pubkey);
++		if (pkey != NULL)
++			{
++			rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey);
++			if (rsa != NULL)
++				{
++				/*
++				 * This will always destroy the RSA
++				 * object since we have a new RSA
++				 * structure here.
++				 */
++				(void) check_new_rsa_key_pub(sp, rsa);
++				sp->pub_persistent = CK_FALSE;
++
++				h_pub_key = sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key =
++				    pk11_get_public_rsa_key(rsa,
++				    &sp->opdata_rsa_pub, &sp->opdata_rsa_n_num,
++				    &sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, sp->session);
++				if (h_pub_key == CK_INVALID_HANDLE)
++					goto err;
++				}
++			else
++				goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++	return (pkey);
++err:
++	pk11_return_session(sp, OP_RSA);
++	if (rsa != NULL)
++		RSA_free(rsa);
++	if (pkey != NULL)
++		{
++		EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++		pkey = NULL;
++		}
++	return (pkey);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Create a public key object in a session from a given rsa structure.
++ * The *rsa_n_num and *rsa_e_num pointers are non-NULL for RSA public keys.
++ */
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pk11_get_public_rsa_key(RSA *rsa,
++    RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num,
++    CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	CK_ULONG found;
++	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
++	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
++	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 8;
++	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
++
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
++		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
++		{CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
++		{CKA_ENCRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
++		{CKA_VERIFY, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
++		{CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
++		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0}
++		};
++
++	int i;
++
++	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
++	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
++
++	a_key_template[6].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
++	a_key_template[6].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
++		(size_t)a_key_template[6].ulValueLen);
++	if (a_key_template[6].pValue == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto malloc_err;
++		}
++
++	BN_bn2bin(rsa->n, a_key_template[6].pValue);
++
++	a_key_template[7].ulValueLen = BN_num_bytes(rsa->e);
++	a_key_template[7].pValue = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc(
++		(size_t)a_key_template[7].ulValueLen);
++	if (a_key_template[7].pValue == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto malloc_err;
++		}
++
++	BN_bn2bin(rsa->e, a_key_template[7].pValue);
++
++	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
++	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
++		ul_key_attr_count);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (found == 0)
++		{
++		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
++			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY,
++			    PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++	if (rsa_n_num != NULL)
++		if ((*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n)) == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			rollback = TRUE;
++			goto err;
++			}
++	if (rsa_e_num != NULL)
++		if ((*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e)) == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PUB_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			BN_free(*rsa_n_num);
++			*rsa_n_num = NULL;
++			rollback = TRUE;
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
++	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
++	if (key_ptr != NULL)
++		*key_ptr = rsa;
++
++err:
++	if (rollback)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
++		 * since we are doing rollback.
++		 */
++		if (found == 0)
++			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
++		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		}
++
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++malloc_err:
++	for (i = 6; i <= 7; i++)
++		{
++		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
++			{
++			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
++			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (h_key);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Create a private key object in the session from a given rsa structure.
++ * The *rsa_d_num pointer is non-NULL for RSA private keys.
++ */
++static CK_OBJECT_HANDLE
++pk11_get_private_rsa_key(RSA *rsa, RSA **key_ptr, BIGNUM **rsa_d_num,
++    BIGNUM **rsa_n_num, BIGNUM **rsa_e_num, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++	int i;
++	CK_ULONG found;
++	CK_OBJECT_CLASS o_key = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
++	CK_KEY_TYPE k_type = CKK_RSA;
++	CK_ULONG ul_key_attr_count = 14;
++	CK_BBOOL rollback = FALSE;
++
++	/* Both CKA_TOKEN and CKA_SENSITIVE have to be FALSE for session keys */
++	CK_ATTRIBUTE  a_key_template[] =
++		{
++		{CKA_CLASS, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_OBJECT_CLASS)},
++		{CKA_KEY_TYPE, (void *) NULL, sizeof (CK_KEY_TYPE)},
++		{CKA_TOKEN, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
++		{CKA_SENSITIVE, &myfalse, sizeof (myfalse)},
++		{CKA_DECRYPT, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
++		{CKA_SIGN, &mytrue, sizeof (mytrue)},
++		{CKA_MODULUS, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_PRIME_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_PRIME_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_EXPONENT_1, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_EXPONENT_2, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		{CKA_COEFFICIENT, (void *)NULL, 0},
++		};
++
++	if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) != 0) {
++		h_key = (CK_OBJECT_HANDLE)RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, hndidx_rsa);
++		LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++		goto set;
++	}
++	
++	a_key_template[0].pValue = &o_key;
++	a_key_template[1].pValue = &k_type;
++
++	/* Put the private key components into the template */
++	if (init_template_value(rsa->n, &a_key_template[6].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[6].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(rsa->e, &a_key_template[7].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[7].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(rsa->d, &a_key_template[8].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[8].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(rsa->p, &a_key_template[9].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[9].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(rsa->q, &a_key_template[10].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[10].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(rsa->dmp1, &a_key_template[11].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[11].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(rsa->dmq1, &a_key_template[12].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[12].ulValueLen) == 0 ||
++	    init_template_value(rsa->iqmp, &a_key_template[13].pValue,
++		&a_key_template[13].ulValueLen) == 0)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++		goto malloc_err;
++		}
++
++	/* see find_lock array definition for more info on object locking */
++	LOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++	/*
++	 * We are getting the private key but the private 'd'
++	 * component is NULL.  That means this is key by reference RSA
++	 * key. In that case, we can use only public components for
++	 * searching for the private key handle.
++	 */
++	if (rsa->d == NULL)
++		{
++		ul_key_attr_count = 8;
++		/*
++		 * We will perform the search in the token, not in the existing
++		 * session keys.
++		 */
++		a_key_template[2].pValue = &mytrue;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(session, a_key_template,
++		ul_key_attr_count);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(session, &h_key, 1, &found);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
++
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSFINAL, rv);
++		goto err;
++		}
++
++	if (found == 0)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We have an RSA structure with 'n'/'e' components
++		 * only so we tried to find the private key in the
++		 * keystore. If it was really a token key we have a
++		 * problem. Note that for other key types we just
++		 * create a new session key using the private
++		 * components from the RSA structure.
++		 */
++		if (rsa->d == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
++			    PK11_R_PRIV_KEY_NOT_FOUND);
++			goto err;
++			}
++
++		rv = pFuncList->C_CreateObject(session,
++			a_key_template, ul_key_attr_count, &h_key);
++		if (rv != CKR_OK)
++			{
++			PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY,
++				PK11_R_CREATEOBJECT, rv);
++			goto err;
++			}
++		}
++
++set:
++	if (rsa_d_num != NULL)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * When RSA keys by reference code is used, we never
++		 * extract private components from the keystore. In
++		 * that case 'd' was set to NULL and we expect the
++		 * application to properly cope with that. It is
++		 * documented in openssl(5). In general, if keys by
++		 * reference are used we expect it to be used
++		 * exclusively using the high level API and then there
++		 * is no problem. If the application expects the
++		 * private components to be read from the keystore
++		 * then that is not a supported way of usage.
++		 */
++		if (rsa->d != NULL && (*rsa_d_num = BN_dup(rsa->d)) == NULL)
++			{
++			PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PRIV_RSA_KEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++			rollback = TRUE;
++			goto err;
++			}
++		else
++			*rsa_d_num = NULL;
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * For the key by reference code, we need public components as well
++	 * since 'd' component is always NULL. For that reason, we always cache
++	 * 'n'/'e' components as well.
++	 */
++	*rsa_n_num = BN_dup(rsa->n);
++	*rsa_e_num = BN_dup(rsa->e);
++
++	/* LINTED: E_CONSTANT_CONDITION */
++	KEY_HANDLE_REFHOLD(h_key, OP_RSA, FALSE, rollback, err);
++	if (key_ptr != NULL)
++		*key_ptr = rsa;
++
++err:
++	if (rollback)
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We do not care about the return value from C_DestroyObject()
++		 * since we are doing rollback.
++		 */
++		if (found == 0 &&
++		    (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) == 0)
++			(void) pFuncList->C_DestroyObject(session, h_key);
++		h_key = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
++		}
++
++	UNLOCK_OBJSTORE(OP_RSA);
++
++malloc_err:
++	/*
++	 * 6 to 13 entries in the key template are key components.
++	 * They need to be freed upon exit or error.
++	 */
++	for (i = 6; i <= 13; i++)
++		{
++		if (a_key_template[i].pValue != NULL)
++			{
++			(void) memset(a_key_template[i].pValue, 0,
++				a_key_template[i].ulValueLen);
++			OPENSSL_free(a_key_template[i].pValue);
++			a_key_template[i].pValue = NULL;
++			}
++		}
++
++	return (h_key);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
++ */
++static int check_new_rsa_key_pub(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
++	{
++	/*
++	 * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making the
++	 * check for cache hit stronger. Only public components of RSA
++	 * key matter here so it is sufficient to compare them with values
++	 * cached in PK11_SESSION structure.
++	 *
++	 * We must check the handle as well since with key by reference, public
++	 * components 'n'/'e' are cached in private keys as well. That means we
++	 * could have a cache hit in a private key when looking for a public
++	 * key. That would not work, you cannot have one PKCS#11 object for
++	 * both data signing and verifying.
++	 */
++	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_pub != rsa) ||
++	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_n_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
++	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_e_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
++	    (sp->opdata_rsa_priv_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
++		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
++		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
++		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
++		 */
++		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_pub(sp, TRUE);
++		return (0);
++		}
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Check for cache miss and clean the object pointer and handle
++ * in such case. Return 1 for cache hit, 0 for cache miss.
++ */
++static int check_new_rsa_key_priv(PK11_SESSION *sp, const RSA *rsa)
++	{
++	/*
++	 * Provide protection against RSA structure reuse by making
++	 * the check for cache hit stronger. Comparing public exponent
++	 * of RSA key with value cached in PK11_SESSION structure
++	 * should be sufficient. Note that we want to compare the
++	 * public component since with the keys by reference
++	 * mechanism, private components are not in the RSA
++	 * structure. Also, see check_new_rsa_key_pub() about why we
++	 * compare the handle as well.
++	 */
++	if ((sp->opdata_rsa_priv != rsa) ||
++	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num, rsa->n) != 0) ||
++	    (BN_cmp(sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num, rsa->e) != 0) ||
++	    (sp->opdata_rsa_pn_num == NULL) ||
++	    (sp->opdata_rsa_pe_num == NULL) ||
++	    (sp->opdata_rsa_pub_key != CK_INVALID_HANDLE))
++		{
++		/*
++		 * We do not check the return value because even in case of
++		 * failure the sp structure will have both key pointer
++		 * and object handle cleaned and pk11_destroy_object()
++		 * reports the failure to the OpenSSL error message buffer.
++		 */
++		(void) pk11_destroy_rsa_object_priv(sp, TRUE);
++		return (0);
++		}
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Local function to simplify key template population
++ * Return 0 -- error, 1 -- no error
++ */
++static int
++init_template_value(BIGNUM *bn, CK_VOID_PTR *p_value,
++	CK_ULONG *ul_value_len)
++	{
++	CK_ULONG len = 0;
++
++	/*
++	 * This function can be used on non-initialized BIGNUMs. It is
++	 * easier to check that here than individually in the callers.
++	 */
++	if (bn != NULL)
++		len = BN_num_bytes(bn);
++
++	if (bn == NULL || len == 0)
++		return (1);
++
++	*ul_value_len = len;
++	*p_value = (CK_VOID_PTR)OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)*ul_value_len);
++	if (*p_value == NULL)
++		return (0);
++
++	BN_bn2bin(bn, *p_value);
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++static void
++attr_to_BN(CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR attr, CK_BYTE attr_data[], BIGNUM **bn)
++	{
++	if (attr->ulValueLen > 0)
++		*bn = BN_bin2bn(attr_data, attr->ulValueLen, NULL);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Find one object in the token. It is an error if we can not find the
++ * object or if we find more objects based on the template we got.
++ * Assume object store locked.
++ *
++ * Returns:
++ *	1 OK
++ *	0 no object or more than 1 object found
++ */
++static int
++find_one_object(PK11_OPTYPE op, CK_SESSION_HANDLE s,
++    CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR ptempl, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR pkey)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++	CK_ULONG objcnt;
++
++	if ((rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjectsInit(s, ptempl, nattr)) != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
++		    PK11_R_FINDOBJECTSINIT, rv);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	rv = pFuncList->C_FindObjects(s, pkey, 1, &objcnt);
++	if (rv != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_FINDOBJECTS,
++		    rv);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	(void) pFuncList->C_FindObjectsFinal(s);
++
++	if (objcnt > 1)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT,
++		    PK11_R_MORE_THAN_ONE_OBJECT_FOUND);
++		return (0);
++		}
++	else if (objcnt == 0)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_FIND_ONE_OBJECT, PK11_R_NO_OBJECT_FOUND);
++		return (0);
++		}
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/* from uri stuff */
++
++extern char *pk11_pin;
++
++static int pk11_get_pin(void);
++
++static int
++pk11_get_pin(void)
++{
++	char *pin;
++
++	/* The getpassphrase() function is not MT safe. */
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++	pin = getpassphrase("Enter PIN: ");
++	if (pin == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_GET_PIN, PK11_R_COULD_NOT_READ_PIN);
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++		return (0);
++		}
++	pk11_pin = BUF_strdup(pin);
++	if (pk11_pin == NULL)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_LOAD_PRIVKEY, PK11_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++		return (0);
++		}
++	memset(pin, 0, strlen(pin));
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Log in to the keystore if we are supposed to do that at all. Take care of
++ * reading and caching the PIN etc. Log in only once even when called from
++ * multiple threads.
++ *
++ * Returns:
++ *	1 on success
++ *	0 on failure
++ */
++static int
++pk11_token_login(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_BBOOL *login_done,
++    CK_BBOOL is_private)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++
++#if 0
++	/* doesn't work on the AEP Keyper??? */
++	if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0)
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
++		    PK11_R_TOKEN_NOT_INITIALIZED);
++		return (0);
++		}
++#endif
++
++	/*
++	 * If login is required or needed but the PIN has not been
++	 * even initialized we can bail out right now. Note that we
++	 * are supposed to always log in if we are going to access
++	 * private keys. However, we may need to log in even for
++	 * accessing public keys in case that the CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED
++	 * flag is set.
++	 */
++	if (((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
++	     (is_private == CK_TRUE)) &&
++	    (~pubkey_token_flags & CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED))
++		{
++		PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN, PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_SET);
++		return (0);
++		}
++
++	/*
++	 * Note on locking: it is possible that more than one thread
++	 * gets into pk11_get_pin() so we must deal with that. We
++	 * cannot avoid it since we cannot guard fork() in there with
++	 * a lock because we could end up in a dead lock in the
++	 * child. Why? Remember we are in a multithreaded environment
++	 * so we must lock all mutexes in the prefork function to
++	 * avoid a situation in which a thread that did not call
++	 * fork() held a lock, making future unlocking impossible. We
++	 * lock right before C_Login().
++	 */
++	if ((pubkey_token_flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) ||
++	    (is_private == CK_TRUE))
++		{
++		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
++			{
++			if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
++				{
++				PK11err(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
++				    PK11_R_TOKEN_PIN_NOT_PROVIDED);
++				return (0);
++				}
++			}
++
++		/*
++		 * Note that what we are logging into is the keystore from
++		 * pubkey_SLOTID because we work with OP_RSA session type here.
++		 * That also means that we can work with only one keystore in
++		 * the engine.
++		 *
++		 * We must make sure we do not try to login more than once.
++		 * Also, see the comment above on locking strategy.
++		 */
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++		CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++		if (*login_done == CK_FALSE)
++			{
++			if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session,
++			    CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*)pk11_pin,
++			    strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
++				{
++				PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_LOGIN,
++				    PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
++				goto err_locked;
++				}
++
++			*login_done = CK_TRUE;
++
++			}
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++		}
++	else
++		{
++			/*
++			 * If token does not require login we take it as the
++			 * login was done.
++			 */
++			*login_done = CK_TRUE;
++		}
++
++	return (1);
++
++err_locked:
++	if (pk11_pin) {
++		memset(pk11_pin, 0, strlen(pk11_pin));
++		OPENSSL_free((void*)pk11_pin);
++	}
++	pk11_pin = NULL;
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++	return (0);
++	}
++
++/*
++ * Log in to the keystore in the child if we were logged in in the
++ * parent. There are similarities in the code with pk11_token_login()
++ * but still it is quite different so we need a separate function for
++ * this.
++ *
++ * Note that this function is called under the locked session mutex when fork is
++ * detected. That means that C_Login() will be called from the child just once.
++ *
++ * Returns:
++ *	1 on success
++ *	0 on failure
++ */
++int
++pk11_token_relogin(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
++	{
++	CK_RV rv;
++
++	if ((pk11_pin == NULL) && (pk11_get_pin() == 0))
++		return (0);
++
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_lock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++	if ((rv = pFuncList->C_Login(session, CKU_USER,
++	    (CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR)pk11_pin, strlen(pk11_pin))) != CKR_OK)
++		{
++		PK11err_add_data(PK11_F_TOKEN_RELOGIN,
++		    PK11_R_TOKEN_LOGIN_FAILED, rv);
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++		OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++		CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++		return (0);
++		}
++#ifndef NOPTHREADS
++	OPENSSL_assert(pthread_mutex_unlock(token_lock) == 0);
++#else
++	CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_PK11_ENGINE);
++#endif
++
++	return (1);
++	}
++
++#ifdef	OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
++char *getpassphrase(const char *prompt)
++	{
++	static char buf[128];
++	HANDLE h;
++	DWORD cc, mode;
++	int cnt;
++
++	h = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE);
++	fputs(prompt, stderr);
++	fflush(stderr);
++	fflush(stdout);
++	FlushConsoleInputBuffer(h);
++	GetConsoleMode(h, &mode);
++	SetConsoleMode(h, ENABLE_PROCESSED_INPUT);
++
++	for (cnt = 0; cnt < sizeof(buf) - 1; cnt++)
++		{
++		ReadFile(h, buf + cnt, 1, &cc, NULL);
++		if (buf[cnt] == '\r')
++			break;
++		fputc('*', stdout);
++		fflush(stderr);
++		fflush(stdout);
++		}
++
++	SetConsoleMode(h, mode);
++	buf[cnt] = '\0';
++	fputs("\n", stderr);
++	return buf;
++	}
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11SO */
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW_PK11 */
++#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_HW */
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h:1.1.1.1
+--- /dev/null	Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11.h	Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007
+@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
++/* pkcs11.h include file for PKCS #11. */
++/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */
++
++/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
++ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
++ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
++
++ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
++ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
++ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or 
++ * referencing the derived work.
++
++ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the 
++ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
++ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
++ * warranty of any kind.
++ */
++
++#ifndef _PKCS11_H_
++#define _PKCS11_H_ 1
++
++#ifdef __cplusplus
++extern "C" {
++#endif
++
++/* Before including this file (pkcs11.h) (or pkcs11t.h by
++ * itself), 6 platform-specific macros must be defined.  These
++ * macros are described below, and typical definitions for them
++ * are also given.  Be advised that these definitions can depend
++ * on both the platform and the compiler used (and possibly also
++ * on whether a Cryptoki library is linked statically or
++ * dynamically).
++ *
++ * In addition to defining these 6 macros, the packing convention
++ * for Cryptoki structures should be set.  The Cryptoki
++ * convention on packing is that structures should be 1-byte
++ * aligned.
++ *
++ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce
++ * Win32 stuff, this might be done by using the following
++ * preprocessor directive before including pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
++ *
++ * #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
++ *
++ * and using the following preprocessor directive after including
++ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
++ *
++ * #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
++ *
++ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
++ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, this might be done by using
++ * the following preprocessor directive before including
++ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
++ *
++ * #pragma pack(1)
++ *
++ * In a UNIX environment, you're on your own for this.  You might
++ * not need to do (or be able to do!) anything.
++ *
++ *
++ * Now for the macros:
++ *
++ *
++ * 1. CK_PTR: The indirection string for making a pointer to an
++ * object.  It can be used like this:
++ *
++ * typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR;
++ *
++ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce
++ * Win32 stuff, it might be defined by:
++ *
++ * #define CK_PTR *
++ *
++ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
++ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, it might be defined by:
++ *
++ * #define CK_PTR far *
++ *
++ * In a typical UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
++ *
++ * #define CK_PTR *
++ *
++ *
++ * 2. CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
++ * an exportable Cryptoki library function definition out of a
++ * return type and a function name.  It should be used in the
++ * following fashion to define the exposed Cryptoki functions in
++ * a Cryptoki library:
++ *
++ * CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
++ *   CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
++ * )
++ * {
++ *   ...
++ * }
++ *
++ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to define a
++ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by:
++ *
++ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++ *   returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
++ *
++ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
++ * Studio to define a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it
++ * might be defined by:
++ *
++ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++ *   returnType __export _far _pascal name
++ *
++ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
++ *
++ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++ *   returnType name
++ *
++ *
++ * 3. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
++ * an importable Cryptoki library function declaration out of a
++ * return type and a function name.  It should be used in the
++ * following fashion:
++ *
++ * extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
++ *   CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
++ * );
++ *
++ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to declare a
++ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by:
++ *
++ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++ *   returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
++ *
++ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
++ * Studio to declare a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it
++ * might be defined by:
++ *
++ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++ *   returnType __export _far _pascal name
++ *
++ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
++ *
++ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++ *   returnType name
++ *
++ *
++ * 4. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name): A macro
++ * which makes a Cryptoki API function pointer declaration or
++ * function pointer type declaration out of a return type and a
++ * function name.  It should be used in the following fashion:
++ *
++ * // Define funcPtr to be a pointer to a Cryptoki API function
++ * // taking arguments args and returning CK_RV.
++ * CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtr)(args);
++ *
++ * or
++ *
++ * // Define funcPtrType to be the type of a pointer to a
++ * // Cryptoki API function taking arguments args and returning
++ * // CK_RV, and then define funcPtr to be a variable of type
++ * // funcPtrType.
++ * typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtrType)(args);
++ * funcPtrType funcPtr;
++ *
++ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to access
++ * functions in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, in might be defined by:
++ *
++ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
++ *   returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
++ *
++ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
++ * Studio to access functions in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it might
++ * be defined by:
++ *
++ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
++ *   returnType __export _far _pascal (* name)
++ *
++ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
++ *
++ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
++ *   returnType (* name)
++ *
++ *
++ * 5. CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
++ * a function pointer type for an application callback out of
++ * a return type for the callback and a name for the callback.
++ * It should be used in the following fashion:
++ *
++ * CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args);
++ *
++ * to declare a function pointer, myCallback, to a callback
++ * which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV.  It can also
++ * be used like this:
++ *
++ * typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args);
++ * myCallbackType myCallback;
++ *
++ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to do Win32
++ * Cryptoki development, it might be defined by:
++ *
++ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++ *   returnType (* name)
++ *
++ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
++ * Studio to do Win16 development, it might be defined by:
++ *
++ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++ *   returnType _far _pascal (* name)
++ *
++ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
++ *
++ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
++ *   returnType (* name)
++ *
++ *
++ * 6. NULL_PTR: This macro is the value of a NULL pointer.
++ *
++ * In any ANSI/ISO C environment (and in many others as well),
++ * this should best be defined by
++ *
++ * #ifndef NULL_PTR
++ * #define NULL_PTR 0
++ * #endif
++ */
++
++
++/* All the various Cryptoki types and #define'd values are in the
++ * file pkcs11t.h. */
++#include "pkcs11t.h"
++
++#define __PASTE(x,y)      x##y
++
++
++/* ==============================================================
++ * Define the "extern" form of all the entry points.
++ * ==============================================================
++ */
++
++#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST  1
++#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
++  extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, name)
++
++/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
++ * function prototypes. */
++#include "pkcs11f.h"
++
++#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
++
++
++/* ==============================================================
++ * Define the typedef form of all the entry points.  That is, for
++ * each Cryptoki function C_XXX, define a type CK_C_XXX which is
++ * a pointer to that kind of function.
++ * ==============================================================
++ */
++
++#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST  1
++#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
++  typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, __PASTE(CK_,name))
++
++/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
++ * function prototypes. */
++#include "pkcs11f.h"
++
++#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
++
++
++/* ==============================================================
++ * Define structed vector of entry points.  A CK_FUNCTION_LIST
++ * contains a CK_VERSION indicating a library's Cryptoki version
++ * and then a whole slew of function pointers to the routines in
++ * the library.  This type was declared, but not defined, in
++ * pkcs11t.h.
++ * ==============================================================
++ */
++
++#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
++  __PASTE(CK_,name) name;
++  
++struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST {
++
++  CK_VERSION    version;  /* Cryptoki version */
++
++/* Pile all the function pointers into the CK_FUNCTION_LIST. */
++/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
++ * function prototypes. */
++#include "pkcs11f.h"
++
++};
++
++#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
++
++
++#undef __PASTE
++
++#ifdef __cplusplus
++}
++#endif
++
++#endif
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h:1.1.1.1
+--- /dev/null	Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11f.h	Wed Oct 24 23:27:09 2007
+@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@
++/* pkcs11f.h include file for PKCS #11. */
++/* $Revision: 1.1.1.1 $ */
++
++/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
++ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
++ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
++
++ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
++ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
++ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or 
++ * referencing the derived work.
++
++ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the 
++ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
++ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
++ * warranty of any kind.
++ */
++
++/* This header file contains pretty much everything about all the */
++/* Cryptoki function prototypes.  Because this information is */
++/* used for more than just declaring function prototypes, the */
++/* order of the functions appearing herein is important, and */
++/* should not be altered. */
++
++/* General-purpose */
++
++/* C_Initialize initializes the Cryptoki library. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Initialize)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_VOID_PTR   pInitArgs  /* if this is not NULL_PTR, it gets
++                            * cast to CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR
++                            * and dereferenced */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_Finalize indicates that an application is done with the
++ * Cryptoki library. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Finalize)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_VOID_PTR   pReserved  /* reserved.  Should be NULL_PTR */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_GetInfo returns general information about Cryptoki. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetInfo)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_INFO_PTR   pInfo  /* location that receives information */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_GetFunctionList returns the function list. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionList)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList  /* receives pointer to
++                                            * function list */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++
++/* Slot and token management */
++
++/* C_GetSlotList obtains a list of slots in the system. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotList)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_BBOOL       tokenPresent,  /* only slots with tokens? */
++  CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList,     /* receives array of slot IDs */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR   pulCount       /* receives number of slots */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in
++ * the system. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotInfo)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SLOT_ID       slotID,  /* the ID of the slot */
++  CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo    /* receives the slot information */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token
++ * in the system. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetTokenInfo)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SLOT_ID        slotID,  /* ID of the token's slot */
++  CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo    /* receives the token information */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_GetMechanismList obtains a list of mechanism types
++ * supported by a token. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismList)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SLOT_ID            slotID,          /* ID of token's slot */
++  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList,  /* gets mech. array */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR          pulCount         /* gets # of mechs. */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular
++ * mechanism possibly supported by a token. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismInfo)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SLOT_ID            slotID,  /* ID of the token's slot */
++  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE     type,    /* type of mechanism */
++  CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo    /* receives mechanism info */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_InitToken initializes a token. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitToken)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++/* pLabel changed from CK_CHAR_PTR to CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR for v2.10 */
++(
++  CK_SLOT_ID      slotID,    /* ID of the token's slot */
++  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin,      /* the SO's initial PIN */
++  CK_ULONG        ulPinLen,  /* length in bytes of the PIN */
++  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel     /* 32-byte token label (blank padded) */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitPIN)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
++  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR   pPin,      /* the normal user's PIN */
++  CK_ULONG          ulPinLen   /* length in bytes of the PIN */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user who is logged in. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetPIN)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
++  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR   pOldPin,   /* the old PIN */
++  CK_ULONG          ulOldLen,  /* length of the old PIN */
++  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR   pNewPin,   /* the new PIN */
++  CK_ULONG          ulNewLen   /* length of the new PIN */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++
++/* Session management */
++
++/* C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a
++ * token. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_OpenSession)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SLOT_ID            slotID,        /* the slot's ID */
++  CK_FLAGS              flags,         /* from CK_SESSION_INFO */
++  CK_VOID_PTR           pApplication,  /* passed to callback */
++  CK_NOTIFY             Notify,        /* callback function */
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession      /* gets session handle */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a
++ * token. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseSession)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession  /* the session's handle */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions with a token. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseAllSessions)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SLOT_ID     slotID  /* the token's slot */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about the session. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSessionInfo)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE   hSession,  /* the session's handle */
++  CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo      /* receives session info */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_GetOperationState obtains the state of the cryptographic operation
++ * in a session. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetOperationState)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,             /* session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pOperationState,      /* gets state */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulOperationStateLen  /* gets state length */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic
++ * operation in a session. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetOperationState)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR      pOperationState,      /* holds state */
++  CK_ULONG         ulOperationStateLen,  /* holds state length */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey,       /* en/decryption key */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey    /* sign/verify key */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_Login logs a user into a token. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Login)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
++  CK_USER_TYPE      userType,  /* the user type */
++  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR   pPin,      /* the user's PIN */
++  CK_ULONG          ulPinLen   /* the length of the PIN */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_Logout logs a user out from a token. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Logout)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession  /* the session's handle */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++
++/* Object management */
++
++/* C_CreateObject creates a new object. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CreateObject)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
++  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR  pTemplate,   /* the object's template */
++  CK_ULONG          ulCount,     /* attributes in template */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject  /* gets new object's handle. */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the
++ * copy. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CopyObject)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,    /* the session's handle */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE     hObject,     /* the object's handle */
++  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pTemplate,   /* template for new object */
++  CK_ULONG             ulCount,     /* attributes in template */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject  /* receives handle of copy */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_DestroyObject destroys an object. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DestroyObject)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hObject    /* the object's handle */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetObjectSize)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hObject,   /* the object's handle */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulSize    /* receives size of object */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more object
++ * attributes. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetAttributeValue)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,   /* the session's handle */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hObject,    /* the object's handle */
++  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR  pTemplate,  /* specifies attrs; gets vals */
++  CK_ULONG          ulCount     /* attributes in template */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more object
++ * attributes */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetAttributeValue)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,   /* the session's handle */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hObject,    /* the object's handle */
++  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR  pTemplate,  /* specifies attrs and values */
++  CK_ULONG          ulCount     /* attributes in template */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session
++ * objects that match a template. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsInit)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,   /* the session's handle */
++  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR  pTemplate,  /* attribute values to match */
++  CK_ULONG          ulCount     /* attrs in search template */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session
++ * objects that match a template, obtaining additional object
++ * handles. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjects)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++ CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,          /* session's handle */
++ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject,          /* gets obj. handles */
++ CK_ULONG             ulMaxObjectCount,  /* max handles to get */
++ CK_ULONG_PTR         pulObjectCount     /* actual # returned */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_FindObjectsFinal finishes a search for token and session
++ * objects. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsFinal)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession  /* the session's handle */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++
++/* Encryption and decryption */
++
++/* C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptInit)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
++  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,  /* the encryption mechanism */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey         /* handle of encryption key */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Encrypt)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,               /* the plaintext data */
++  CK_ULONG          ulDataLen,           /* bytes of plaintext */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedData,      /* gets ciphertext */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulEncryptedDataLen  /* gets c-text size */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption
++ * operation. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptUpdate)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,           /* session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,              /* the plaintext data */
++  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen,          /* plaintext data len */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,     /* gets ciphertext */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text size */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption
++ * operation. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptFinal)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,                /* session handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pLastEncryptedPart,      /* last c-text */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulLastEncryptedPartLen  /* gets last size */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptInit)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
++  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,  /* the decryption mechanism */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey         /* handle of decryption key */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Decrypt)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,           /* session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedData,     /* ciphertext */
++  CK_ULONG          ulEncryptedDataLen, /* ciphertext length */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,              /* gets plaintext */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulDataLen          /* gets p-text size */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption
++ * operation. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptUpdate)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,      /* encrypted data */
++  CK_ULONG          ulEncryptedPartLen,  /* input length */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,               /* gets plaintext */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulPartLen           /* p-text size */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption
++ * operation. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptFinal)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,       /* the session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pLastPart,      /* gets plaintext */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulLastPartLen  /* p-text size */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++
++/* Message digesting */
++
++/* C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestInit)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,   /* the session's handle */
++  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism  /* the digesting mechanism */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_Digest digests data in a single part. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Digest)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,     /* the session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,        /* data to be digested */
++  CK_ULONG          ulDataLen,    /* bytes of data to digest */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pDigest,      /* gets the message digest */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulDigestLen  /* gets digest length */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting
++ * operation. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestUpdate)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,     /* data to be digested */
++  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen  /* bytes of data to be digested */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting
++ * operation, by digesting the value of a secret key as part of
++ * the data already digested. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestKey)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey       /* secret key to digest */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting
++ * operation. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestFinal)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,     /* the session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pDigest,      /* gets the message digest */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulDigestLen  /* gets byte count of digest */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++
++/* Signing and MACing */
++
++/* C_SignInit initializes a signature (private key encryption)
++ * operation, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to
++ * the data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the
++ *signature. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignInit)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
++  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,  /* the signature mechanism */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey         /* handle of signature key */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single
++ * part, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the
++ * data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Sign)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,        /* the session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,           /* the data to sign */
++  CK_ULONG          ulDataLen,       /* count of bytes to sign */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,      /* gets the signature */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulSignatureLen  /* gets signature length */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation,
++ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, 
++ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignUpdate)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,     /* the data to sign */
++  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen  /* count of bytes to sign */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation, 
++ * returning the signature. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignFinal)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,        /* the session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,      /* gets the signature */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulSignatureLen  /* gets signature length */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where
++ * the data can be recovered from the signature. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecoverInit)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,   /* the session's handle */
++  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey        /* handle of the signature key */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the
++ * data can be recovered from the signature. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecover)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,        /* the session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,           /* the data to sign */
++  CK_ULONG          ulDataLen,       /* count of bytes to sign */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,      /* gets the signature */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulSignatureLen  /* gets signature length */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++
++/* Verifying signatures and MACs */
++
++/* C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the
++ * signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext cannot
++ *  cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA). */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyInit)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
++  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,  /* the verification mechanism */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey         /* verification key */ 
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation, 
++ * where the signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext
++ * cannot be recovered from the signature. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Verify)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,       /* the session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,          /* signed data */
++  CK_ULONG          ulDataLen,      /* length of signed data */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,     /* signature */
++  CK_ULONG          ulSignatureLen  /* signature length*/
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification
++ * operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data, 
++ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyUpdate)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,     /* signed data */
++  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen  /* length of signed data */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification
++ * operation, checking the signature. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyFinal)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,       /* the session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,     /* signature to verify */
++  CK_ULONG          ulSignatureLen  /* signature length */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification
++ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecoverInit)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
++  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,  /* the verification mechanism */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey         /* verification key */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part
++ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecover)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,        /* the session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,      /* signature to verify */
++  CK_ULONG          ulSignatureLen,  /* signature length */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,           /* gets signed data */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulDataLen       /* gets signed data len */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++
++/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */
++
++/* C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting
++ * and encryption operation. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestEncryptUpdate)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,               /* the plaintext data */
++  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen,           /* plaintext length */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,      /* gets ciphertext */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulEncryptedPartLen  /* gets c-text length */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
++ * digesting operation. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptDigestUpdate)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,      /* ciphertext */
++  CK_ULONG          ulEncryptedPartLen,  /* ciphertext length */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,               /* gets plaintext */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulPartLen           /* gets plaintext len */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and
++ * encryption operation. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignEncryptUpdate)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,               /* the plaintext data */
++  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen,           /* plaintext length */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,      /* gets ciphertext */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulEncryptedPartLen  /* gets c-text length */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
++ * verify operation. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptVerifyUpdate)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,      /* ciphertext */
++  CK_ULONG          ulEncryptedPartLen,  /* ciphertext length */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,               /* gets plaintext */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulPartLen           /* gets p-text length */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++
++/* Key management */
++
++/* C_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key
++ * object. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKey)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,    /* the session's handle */
++  CK_MECHANISM_PTR     pMechanism,  /* key generation mech. */
++  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pTemplate,   /* template for new key */
++  CK_ULONG             ulCount,     /* # of attrs in template */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey        /* gets handle of new key */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair, 
++ * creating new key objects. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKeyPair)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,                    /* session
++                                                     * handle */
++  CK_MECHANISM_PTR     pMechanism,                  /* key-gen
++                                                     * mech. */
++  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pPublicKeyTemplate,          /* template
++                                                     * for pub.
++                                                     * key */
++  CK_ULONG             ulPublicKeyAttributeCount,   /* # pub.
++                                                     * attrs. */
++  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pPrivateKeyTemplate,         /* template
++                                                     * for priv.
++                                                     * key */
++  CK_ULONG             ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount,  /* # priv.
++                                                     * attrs. */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey,                 /* gets pub.
++                                                     * key
++                                                     * handle */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey                 /* gets
++                                                     * priv. key
++                                                     * handle */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WrapKey)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,        /* the session's handle */
++  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,      /* the wrapping mechanism */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hWrappingKey,    /* wrapping key */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey,            /* key to be wrapped */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pWrappedKey,     /* gets wrapped key */
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulWrappedKeyLen /* gets wrapped key size */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new
++ * key object. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_UnwrapKey)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,          /* session's handle */
++  CK_MECHANISM_PTR     pMechanism,        /* unwrapping mech. */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE     hUnwrappingKey,    /* unwrapping key */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR          pWrappedKey,       /* the wrapped key */
++  CK_ULONG             ulWrappedKeyLen,   /* wrapped key len */
++  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pTemplate,         /* new key template */
++  CK_ULONG             ulAttributeCount,  /* template length */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey              /* gets new handle */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key
++ * object. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DeriveKey)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,          /* session's handle */
++  CK_MECHANISM_PTR     pMechanism,        /* key deriv. mech. */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE     hBaseKey,          /* base key */
++  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pTemplate,         /* new key template */
++  CK_ULONG             ulAttributeCount,  /* template length */
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey              /* gets new handle */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++
++/* Random number generation */
++
++/* C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's
++ * random number generator. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SeedRandom)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSeed,     /* the seed material */
++  CK_ULONG          ulSeedLen  /* length of seed material */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_GenerateRandom generates random data. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateRandom)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       RandomData,  /* receives the random data */
++  CK_ULONG          ulRandomLen  /* # of bytes to generate */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++
++/* Parallel function management */
++
++/* C_GetFunctionStatus is a legacy function; it obtains an
++ * updated status of a function running in parallel with an
++ * application. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionStatus)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession  /* the session's handle */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++/* C_CancelFunction is a legacy function; it cancels a function
++ * running in parallel. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CancelFunction)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession  /* the session's handle */
++);
++#endif
++
++
++
++/* Functions added in for Cryptoki Version 2.01 or later */
++
++/* C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event (token insertion,
++ * removal, etc.) to occur. */
++CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WaitForSlotEvent)
++#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
++(
++  CK_FLAGS flags,        /* blocking/nonblocking flag */
++  CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot,  /* location that receives the slot ID */
++  CK_VOID_PTR pRserved   /* reserved.  Should be NULL_PTR */
++);
++#endif
+Index: openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h
+diff -u /dev/null openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h:1.2
+--- /dev/null	Mon Jun 13 15:55:26 2016
++++ openssl/crypto/engine/pkcs11t.h	Sat Aug 30 11:58:07 2008
+@@ -0,0 +1,1885 @@
++/* pkcs11t.h include file for PKCS #11. */
++/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */
++
++/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
++ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
++ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
++
++ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
++ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
++ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or
++ * referencing the derived work.
++
++ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the
++ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
++ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
++ * warranty of any kind.
++ */
++
++/* See top of pkcs11.h for information about the macros that
++ * must be defined and the structure-packing conventions that
++ * must be set before including this file. */
++
++#ifndef _PKCS11T_H_
++#define _PKCS11T_H_ 1
++
++#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MAJOR 2
++#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_MINOR 20
++#define CRYPTOKI_VERSION_AMENDMENT 3
++
++#define CK_TRUE 1
++#define CK_FALSE 0
++
++#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
++#ifndef FALSE
++#define FALSE CK_FALSE
++#endif
++
++#ifndef TRUE
++#define TRUE CK_TRUE
++#endif
++#endif
++
++/* an unsigned 8-bit value */
++typedef unsigned char     CK_BYTE;
++
++/* an unsigned 8-bit character */
++typedef CK_BYTE           CK_CHAR;
++
++/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */
++typedef CK_BYTE           CK_UTF8CHAR;
++
++/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */
++typedef CK_BYTE           CK_BBOOL;
++
++/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */
++typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG;
++
++/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */
++/* CK_LONG is new for v2.0 */
++typedef long int          CK_LONG;
++
++/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */
++typedef CK_ULONG          CK_FLAGS;
++
++
++/* some special values for certain CK_ULONG variables */
++#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL)
++#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE    0
++
++
++typedef CK_BYTE     CK_PTR   CK_BYTE_PTR;
++typedef CK_CHAR     CK_PTR   CK_CHAR_PTR;
++typedef CK_UTF8CHAR CK_PTR   CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR;
++typedef CK_ULONG    CK_PTR   CK_ULONG_PTR;
++typedef void        CK_PTR   CK_VOID_PTR;
++
++/* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR-- i.e., pointer to pointer to void */
++typedef CK_VOID_PTR CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR_PTR;
++
++
++/* The following value is always invalid if used as a session */
++/* handle or object handle */
++#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE 0
++
++
++typedef struct CK_VERSION {
++  CK_BYTE       major;  /* integer portion of version number */
++  CK_BYTE       minor;  /* 1/100ths portion of version number */
++} CK_VERSION;
++
++typedef CK_VERSION CK_PTR CK_VERSION_PTR;
++
++
++typedef struct CK_INFO {
++  /* manufacturerID and libraryDecription have been changed from
++   * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
++  CK_VERSION    cryptokiVersion;     /* Cryptoki interface ver */
++  CK_UTF8CHAR   manufacturerID[32];  /* blank padded */
++  CK_FLAGS      flags;               /* must be zero */
++
++  /* libraryDescription and libraryVersion are new for v2.0 */
++  CK_UTF8CHAR   libraryDescription[32];  /* blank padded */
++  CK_VERSION    libraryVersion;          /* version of library */
++} CK_INFO;
++
++typedef CK_INFO CK_PTR    CK_INFO_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_NOTIFICATION enumerates the types of notifications that
++ * Cryptoki provides to an application */
++/* CK_NOTIFICATION has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG
++ * for v2.0 */
++typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION;
++#define CKN_SURRENDER       0
++
++/* The following notification is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
++#define CKN_OTP_CHANGED     1
++
++
++typedef CK_ULONG          CK_SLOT_ID;
++
++typedef CK_SLOT_ID CK_PTR CK_SLOT_ID_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot */
++typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO {
++  /* slotDescription and manufacturerID have been changed from
++   * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
++  CK_UTF8CHAR   slotDescription[64];  /* blank padded */
++  CK_UTF8CHAR   manufacturerID[32];   /* blank padded */
++  CK_FLAGS      flags;
++
++  /* hardwareVersion and firmwareVersion are new for v2.0 */
++  CK_VERSION    hardwareVersion;  /* version of hardware */
++  CK_VERSION    firmwareVersion;  /* version of firmware */
++} CK_SLOT_INFO;
++
++/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot
++ *      Bit Flag              Mask        Meaning
++ */
++#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT     0x00000001  /* a token is there */
++#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE  0x00000002  /* removable devices*/
++#define CKF_HW_SLOT           0x00000004  /* hardware slot */
++
++typedef CK_SLOT_INFO CK_PTR CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token */
++typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO {
++  /* label, manufacturerID, and model have been changed from
++   * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
++  CK_UTF8CHAR   label[32];           /* blank padded */
++  CK_UTF8CHAR   manufacturerID[32];  /* blank padded */
++  CK_UTF8CHAR   model[16];           /* blank padded */
++  CK_CHAR       serialNumber[16];    /* blank padded */
++  CK_FLAGS      flags;               /* see below */
++
++  /* ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount,
++   * ulRwSessionCount, ulMaxPinLen, and ulMinPinLen have all been
++   * changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
++  CK_ULONG      ulMaxSessionCount;     /* max open sessions */
++  CK_ULONG      ulSessionCount;        /* sess. now open */
++  CK_ULONG      ulMaxRwSessionCount;   /* max R/W sessions */
++  CK_ULONG      ulRwSessionCount;      /* R/W sess. now open */
++  CK_ULONG      ulMaxPinLen;           /* in bytes */
++  CK_ULONG      ulMinPinLen;           /* in bytes */
++  CK_ULONG      ulTotalPublicMemory;   /* in bytes */
++  CK_ULONG      ulFreePublicMemory;    /* in bytes */
++  CK_ULONG      ulTotalPrivateMemory;  /* in bytes */
++  CK_ULONG      ulFreePrivateMemory;   /* in bytes */
++
++  /* hardwareVersion, firmwareVersion, and time are new for
++   * v2.0 */
++  CK_VERSION    hardwareVersion;       /* version of hardware */
++  CK_VERSION    firmwareVersion;       /* version of firmware */
++  CK_CHAR       utcTime[16];           /* time */
++} CK_TOKEN_INFO;
++
++/* The flags parameter is defined as follows:
++ *      Bit Flag                    Mask        Meaning
++ */
++#define CKF_RNG                     0x00000001  /* has random #
++                                                 * generator */
++#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED         0x00000002  /* token is
++                                                 * write-
++                                                 * protected */
++#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED          0x00000004  /* user must
++                                                 * login */
++#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED    0x00000008  /* normal user's
++                                                 * PIN is set */
++
++/* CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED is new for v2.0.  If it is set,
++ * that means that *every* time the state of cryptographic
++ * operations of a session is successfully saved, all keys
++ * needed to continue those operations are stored in the state */
++#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED  0x00000020
++
++/* CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN is new for v2.0.  If it is set, that means
++ * that the token has some sort of clock.  The time on that
++ * clock is returned in the token info structure */
++#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN          0x00000040
++
++/* CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH is new for v2.0.  If it is
++ * set, that means that there is some way for the user to login
++ * without sending a PIN through the Cryptoki library itself */
++#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH 0x00000100
++
++/* CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS is new for v2.0.  If it is true,
++ * that means that a single session with the token can perform
++ * dual simultaneous cryptographic operations (digest and
++ * encrypt; decrypt and digest; sign and encrypt; and decrypt
++ * and sign) */
++#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS  0x00000200
++
++/* CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the
++ * token has been initialized using C_InitializeToken or an
++ * equivalent mechanism outside the scope of PKCS #11.
++ * Calling C_InitializeToken when this flag is set will cause
++ * the token to be reinitialized. */
++#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED       0x00000400
++
++/* CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION if new for v2.10. If it is
++ * true, the token supports secondary authentication for
++ * private key objects. This flag is deprecated in v2.11 and
++   onwards. */
++#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION  0x00000800
++
++/* CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an
++ * incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once
++ * since the last successful authentication. */
++#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW       0x00010000
++
++/* CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true,
++ * supplying an incorrect user PIN will it to become locked. */
++#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY       0x00020000
++
++/* CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the
++ * user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not
++ * possible. */
++#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED          0x00040000
++
++/* CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true,
++ * the user PIN value is the default value set by token
++ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been
++ * expired by the card. */
++#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED   0x00080000
++
++/* CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an
++ * incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since
++ * the last successful authentication. */
++#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW         0x00100000
++
++/* CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true,
++ * supplying an incorrect SO PIN will it to become locked. */
++#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY         0x00200000
++
++/* CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the SO
++ * PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible.
++ */
++#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED            0x00400000
++
++/* CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true,
++ * the SO PIN value is the default value set by token
++ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been
++ * expired by the card. */
++#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED     0x00800000
++
++typedef CK_TOKEN_INFO CK_PTR CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a Cryptoki-assigned value that
++ * identifies a session */
++typedef CK_ULONG          CK_SESSION_HANDLE;
++
++typedef CK_SESSION_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_USER_TYPE enumerates the types of Cryptoki users */
++/* CK_USER_TYPE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for
++ * v2.0 */
++typedef CK_ULONG          CK_USER_TYPE;
++/* Security Officer */
++#define CKU_SO    0
++/* Normal user */
++#define CKU_USER  1
++/* Context specific (added in v2.20) */
++#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC   2
++
++/* CK_STATE enumerates the session states */
++/* CK_STATE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for
++ * v2.0 */
++typedef CK_ULONG          CK_STATE;
++#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION  0
++#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS  1
++#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION  2
++#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS  3
++#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS    4
++
++
++/* CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session */
++typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO {
++  CK_SLOT_ID    slotID;
++  CK_STATE      state;
++  CK_FLAGS      flags;          /* see below */
++
++  /* ulDeviceError was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
++   * v2.0 */
++  CK_ULONG      ulDeviceError;  /* device-dependent error code */
++} CK_SESSION_INFO;
++
++/* The flags are defined in the following table:
++ *      Bit Flag                Mask        Meaning
++ */
++#define CKF_RW_SESSION          0x00000002  /* session is r/w */
++#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION      0x00000004  /* no parallel */
++
++typedef CK_SESSION_INFO CK_PTR CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an
++ * object  */
++typedef CK_ULONG          CK_OBJECT_HANDLE;
++
++typedef CK_OBJECT_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or
++ * types) of objects that Cryptoki recognizes.  It is defined
++ * as follows: */
++/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
++ * v2.0 */
++typedef CK_ULONG          CK_OBJECT_CLASS;
++
++/* The following classes of objects are defined: */
++/* CKO_HW_FEATURE is new for v2.10 */
++/* CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS is new for v2.11 */
++/* CKO_MECHANISM is new for v2.20 */
++#define CKO_DATA              0x00000000
++#define CKO_CERTIFICATE       0x00000001
++#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY        0x00000002
++#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY       0x00000003
++#define CKO_SECRET_KEY        0x00000004
++#define CKO_HW_FEATURE        0x00000005
++#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006
++#define CKO_MECHANISM         0x00000007
++
++/* CKO_OTP_KEY is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
++#define CKO_OTP_KEY           0x00000008
++
++#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED    0x80000000
++
++typedef CK_OBJECT_CLASS CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR;
++
++/* CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is new for v2.10. CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a
++ * value that identifies the hardware feature type of an object
++ * with CK_OBJECT_CLASS equal to CKO_HW_FEATURE. */
++typedef CK_ULONG          CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE;
++
++/* The following hardware feature types are defined */
++/* CKH_USER_INTERFACE is new for v2.20 */
++#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER  0x00000001
++#define CKH_CLOCK           0x00000002
++#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE  0x00000003
++#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED  0x80000000
++
++/* CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type */
++/* CK_KEY_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
++typedef CK_ULONG          CK_KEY_TYPE;
++
++/* the following key types are defined: */
++#define CKK_RSA             0x00000000
++#define CKK_DSA             0x00000001
++#define CKK_DH              0x00000002
++
++/* CKK_ECDSA and CKK_KEA are new for v2.0 */
++/* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_EC is preferred. */
++#define CKK_ECDSA           0x00000003
++#define CKK_EC              0x00000003
++#define CKK_X9_42_DH        0x00000004
++#define CKK_KEA             0x00000005
++
++#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET  0x00000010
++#define CKK_RC2             0x00000011
++#define CKK_RC4             0x00000012
++#define CKK_DES             0x00000013
++#define CKK_DES2            0x00000014
++#define CKK_DES3            0x00000015
++
++/* all these key types are new for v2.0 */
++#define CKK_CAST            0x00000016
++#define CKK_CAST3           0x00000017
++/* CKK_CAST5 is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_CAST128 is preferred. */
++#define CKK_CAST5           0x00000018
++#define CKK_CAST128         0x00000018
++#define CKK_RC5             0x00000019
++#define CKK_IDEA            0x0000001A
++#define CKK_SKIPJACK        0x0000001B
++#define CKK_BATON           0x0000001C
++#define CKK_JUNIPER         0x0000001D
++#define CKK_CDMF            0x0000001E
++#define CKK_AES             0x0000001F
++
++/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */
++#define CKK_BLOWFISH        0x00000020
++#define CKK_TWOFISH         0x00000021
++
++/* SecurID, HOTP, and ACTI are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
++#define CKK_SECURID         0x00000022
++#define CKK_HOTP            0x00000023
++#define CKK_ACTI            0x00000024
++
++/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
++#define CKK_CAMELLIA                   0x00000025
++/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
++#define CKK_ARIA                       0x00000026
++
++
++#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED  0x80000000
++
++
++/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate
++ * type */
++/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG
++ * for v2.0 */
++typedef CK_ULONG          CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
++
++/* The following certificate types are defined: */
++/* CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT is new for v2.10 */
++/* CKC_WTLS is new for v2.20 */
++#define CKC_X_509           0x00000000
++#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT 0x00000001
++#define CKC_WTLS            0x00000002
++#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED  0x80000000
++
++
++/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute
++ * type */
++/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
++ * v2.0 */
++typedef CK_ULONG          CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE;
++
++/* The CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE flag identifies an attribute which
++   consists of an array of values. */
++#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE    0x40000000
++
++/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1
++   and relates to the CKA_OTP_FORMAT attribute */
++#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_DECIMAL      0
++#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_HEXADECIMAL  1
++#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_ALPHANUMERIC 2
++#define CK_OTP_FORMAT_BINARY       3
++
++/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1
++   and relates to the CKA_OTP_..._REQUIREMENT attributes */
++#define CK_OTP_PARAM_IGNORED       0
++#define CK_OTP_PARAM_OPTIONAL      1
++#define CK_OTP_PARAM_MANDATORY     2
++
++/* The following attribute types are defined: */
++#define CKA_CLASS              0x00000000
++#define CKA_TOKEN              0x00000001
++#define CKA_PRIVATE            0x00000002
++#define CKA_LABEL              0x00000003
++#define CKA_APPLICATION        0x00000010
++#define CKA_VALUE              0x00000011
++
++/* CKA_OBJECT_ID is new for v2.10 */
++#define CKA_OBJECT_ID          0x00000012
++
++#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE   0x00000080
++#define CKA_ISSUER             0x00000081
++#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER      0x00000082
++
++/* CKA_AC_ISSUER, CKA_OWNER, and CKA_ATTR_TYPES are new
++ * for v2.10 */
++#define CKA_AC_ISSUER          0x00000083
++#define CKA_OWNER              0x00000084
++#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES         0x00000085
++
++/* CKA_TRUSTED is new for v2.11 */
++#define CKA_TRUSTED            0x00000086
++
++/* CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY ...
++ * CKA_CHECK_VALUE are new for v2.20 */
++#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY        0x00000087
++#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN   0x00000088
++#define CKA_URL                         0x00000089
++#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY  0x0000008A
++#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY   0x0000008B
++#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE                 0x00000090
++
++#define CKA_KEY_TYPE           0x00000100
++#define CKA_SUBJECT            0x00000101
++#define CKA_ID                 0x00000102
++#define CKA_SENSITIVE          0x00000103
++#define CKA_ENCRYPT            0x00000104
++#define CKA_DECRYPT            0x00000105
++#define CKA_WRAP               0x00000106
++#define CKA_UNWRAP             0x00000107
++#define CKA_SIGN               0x00000108
++#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER       0x00000109
++#define CKA_VERIFY             0x0000010A
++#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER     0x0000010B
++#define CKA_DERIVE             0x0000010C
++#define CKA_START_DATE         0x00000110
++#define CKA_END_DATE           0x00000111
++#define CKA_MODULUS            0x00000120
++#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS       0x00000121
++#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT    0x00000122
++#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT   0x00000123
++#define CKA_PRIME_1            0x00000124
++#define CKA_PRIME_2            0x00000125
++#define CKA_EXPONENT_1         0x00000126
++#define CKA_EXPONENT_2         0x00000127
++#define CKA_COEFFICIENT        0x00000128
++#define CKA_PRIME              0x00000130
++#define CKA_SUBPRIME           0x00000131
++#define CKA_BASE               0x00000132
++
++/* CKA_PRIME_BITS and CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS are new for v2.11 */
++#define CKA_PRIME_BITS         0x00000133
++#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS      0x00000134
++#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS     CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS
++/* (To retain backwards-compatibility) */
++
++#define CKA_VALUE_BITS         0x00000160
++#define CKA_VALUE_LEN          0x00000161
++
++/* CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_LOCAL, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
++ * CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS,
++ * and CKA_EC_POINT are new for v2.0 */
++#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE        0x00000162
++#define CKA_LOCAL              0x00000163
++#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE  0x00000164
++#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE   0x00000165
++
++/* CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM is new for v2.11 */
++#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM  0x00000166
++
++#define CKA_MODIFIABLE         0x00000170
++
++/* CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated in v2.11,
++ * CKA_EC_PARAMS is preferred. */
++#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS       0x00000180
++#define CKA_EC_PARAMS          0x00000180
++
++#define CKA_EC_POINT           0x00000181
++
++/* CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS,
++ * are new for v2.10. Deprecated in v2.11 and onwards. */
++#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH     0x00000200
++#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS     0x00000201
++
++/* CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE ...
++ * CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE are new for v2.20 */
++#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE  0x00000202
++
++#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED    0x00000210
++#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE        (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000211)
++#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE      (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000212)
++
++/* CKA_OTP... atttributes are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3. */
++#define CKA_OTP_FORMAT                0x00000220
++#define CKA_OTP_LENGTH                0x00000221
++#define CKA_OTP_TIME_INTERVAL         0x00000222
++#define CKA_OTP_USER_FRIENDLY_MODE    0x00000223
++#define CKA_OTP_CHALLENGE_REQUIREMENT 0x00000224
++#define CKA_OTP_TIME_REQUIREMENT      0x00000225
++#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER_REQUIREMENT   0x00000226
++#define CKA_OTP_PIN_REQUIREMENT       0x00000227
++#define CKA_OTP_COUNTER               0x0000022E
++#define CKA_OTP_TIME                  0x0000022F
++#define CKA_OTP_USER_IDENTIFIER       0x0000022A
++#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_IDENTIFIER    0x0000022B
++#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO          0x0000022C
++#define CKA_OTP_SERVICE_LOGO_TYPE     0x0000022D
++
++
++/* CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE, CKA_RESET_ON_INIT, and CKA_HAS_RESET
++ * are new for v2.10 */
++#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE    0x00000300
++#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT      0x00000301
++#define CKA_HAS_RESET          0x00000302
++
++/* The following attributes are new for v2.20 */
++#define CKA_PIXEL_X                     0x00000400
++#define CKA_PIXEL_Y                     0x00000401
++#define CKA_RESOLUTION                  0x00000402
++#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS                   0x00000403
++#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS                0x00000404
++#define CKA_COLOR                       0x00000405
++#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL              0x00000406
++#define CKA_CHAR_SETS                   0x00000480
++#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS            0x00000481
++#define CKA_MIME_TYPES                  0x00000482
++#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE              0x00000500
++#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES     0x00000501
++#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES      0x00000502
++#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES    0x00000503
++#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS          (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000600)
++
++#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED     0x80000000
++
++/* CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, length
++ * and value of an attribute */
++typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE {
++  CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type;
++  CK_VOID_PTR       pValue;
++
++  /* ulValueLen went from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
++  CK_ULONG          ulValueLen;  /* in bytes */
++} CK_ATTRIBUTE;
++
++typedef CK_ATTRIBUTE CK_PTR CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date */
++typedef struct CK_DATE{
++  CK_CHAR       year[4];   /* the year ("1900" - "9999") */
++  CK_CHAR       month[2];  /* the month ("01" - "12") */
++  CK_CHAR       day[2];    /* the day   ("01" - "31") */
++} CK_DATE;
++
++
++/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism
++ * type */
++/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
++ * v2.0 */
++typedef CK_ULONG          CK_MECHANISM_TYPE;
++
++/* the following mechanism types are defined: */
++#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN      0x00000000
++#define CKM_RSA_PKCS                   0x00000001
++#define CKM_RSA_9796                   0x00000002
++#define CKM_RSA_X_509                  0x00000003
++
++/* CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS
++ * are new for v2.0.  They are mechanisms which hash and sign */
++#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS               0x00000004
++#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS               0x00000005
++#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS              0x00000006
++
++/* CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS, and
++ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP are new for v2.10 */
++#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS         0x00000007
++#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS         0x00000008
++#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP              0x00000009
++
++/* CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_RSA_X9_31, CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31,
++ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS are new for v2.11 */
++#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN     0x0000000A
++#define CKM_RSA_X9_31                  0x0000000B
++#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31             0x0000000C
++#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS               0x0000000D
++#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS          0x0000000E
++
++#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN           0x00000010
++#define CKM_DSA                        0x00000011
++#define CKM_DSA_SHA1                   0x00000012
++#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN       0x00000020
++#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE             0x00000021
++
++/* CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE,
++ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE, and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE are new for
++ * v2.11 */
++#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN      0x00000030
++#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE            0x00000031
++#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE     0x00000032
++#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE           0x00000033
++
++/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
++#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS            0x00000040
++#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS            0x00000041
++#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS            0x00000042
++#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS        0x00000043
++#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS        0x00000044
++#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS        0x00000045
++
++/* SHA-224 RSA mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
++#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS            0x00000046
++#define CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS        0x00000047
++
++#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN                0x00000100
++#define CKM_RC2_ECB                    0x00000101
++#define CKM_RC2_CBC                    0x00000102
++#define CKM_RC2_MAC                    0x00000103
++
++/* CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
++#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL            0x00000104
++#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD                0x00000105
++
++#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN                0x00000110
++#define CKM_RC4                        0x00000111
++#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN                0x00000120
++#define CKM_DES_ECB                    0x00000121
++#define CKM_DES_CBC                    0x00000122
++#define CKM_DES_MAC                    0x00000123
++
++/* CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_DES_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
++#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL            0x00000124
++#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD                0x00000125
++
++#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN               0x00000130
++#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN               0x00000131
++#define CKM_DES3_ECB                   0x00000132
++#define CKM_DES3_CBC                   0x00000133
++#define CKM_DES3_MAC                   0x00000134
++
++/* CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN,
++ * CKM_CDMF_ECB, CKM_CDMF_CBC, CKM_CDMF_MAC,
++ * CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL, and CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
++#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL           0x00000135
++#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD               0x00000136
++#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN               0x00000140
++#define CKM_CDMF_ECB                   0x00000141
++#define CKM_CDMF_CBC                   0x00000142
++#define CKM_CDMF_MAC                   0x00000143
++#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL           0x00000144
++#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD               0x00000145
++
++/* the following four DES mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
++#define CKM_DES_OFB64                  0x00000150
++#define CKM_DES_OFB8                   0x00000151
++#define CKM_DES_CFB64                  0x00000152
++#define CKM_DES_CFB8                   0x00000153
++
++#define CKM_MD2                        0x00000200
++
++/* CKM_MD2_HMAC and CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
++#define CKM_MD2_HMAC                   0x00000201
++#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL           0x00000202
++
++#define CKM_MD5                        0x00000210
++
++/* CKM_MD5_HMAC and CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
++#define CKM_MD5_HMAC                   0x00000211
++#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL           0x00000212
++
++#define CKM_SHA_1                      0x00000220
++
++/* CKM_SHA_1_HMAC and CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
++#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC                 0x00000221
++#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL         0x00000222
++
++/* CKM_RIPEMD128, CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC,
++ * CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC,
++ * and CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.10 */
++#define CKM_RIPEMD128                  0x00000230
++#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC             0x00000231
++#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL     0x00000232
++#define CKM_RIPEMD160                  0x00000240
++#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC             0x00000241
++#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL     0x00000242
++
++/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
++#define CKM_SHA256                     0x00000250
++#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC                0x00000251
++#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL        0x00000252
++
++/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
++#define CKM_SHA224                     0x00000255
++#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC                0x00000256
++#define CKM_SHA224_HMAC_GENERAL        0x00000257
++
++#define CKM_SHA384                     0x00000260
++#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC                0x00000261
++#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL        0x00000262
++#define CKM_SHA512                     0x00000270
++#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC                0x00000271
++#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL        0x00000272
++
++/* SecurID is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
++#define CKM_SECURID_KEY_GEN            0x00000280
++#define CKM_SECURID                    0x00000282
++
++/* HOTP is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
++#define CKM_HOTP_KEY_GEN    0x00000290
++#define CKM_HOTP            0x00000291
++
++/* ACTI is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
++#define CKM_ACTI            0x000002A0
++#define CKM_ACTI_KEY_GEN    0x000002A1
++
++/* All of the following mechanisms are new for v2.0 */
++/* Note that CAST128 and CAST5 are the same algorithm */
++#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN               0x00000300
++#define CKM_CAST_ECB                   0x00000301
++#define CKM_CAST_CBC                   0x00000302
++#define CKM_CAST_MAC                   0x00000303
++#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL           0x00000304
++#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD               0x00000305
++#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN              0x00000310
++#define CKM_CAST3_ECB                  0x00000311
++#define CKM_CAST3_CBC                  0x00000312
++#define CKM_CAST3_MAC                  0x00000313
++#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL          0x00000314
++#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD              0x00000315
++#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN              0x00000320
++#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN            0x00000320
++#define CKM_CAST5_ECB                  0x00000321
++#define CKM_CAST128_ECB                0x00000321
++#define CKM_CAST5_CBC                  0x00000322
++#define CKM_CAST128_CBC                0x00000322
++#define CKM_CAST5_MAC                  0x00000323
++#define CKM_CAST128_MAC                0x00000323
++#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL          0x00000324
++#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL        0x00000324
++#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD              0x00000325
++#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD            0x00000325
++#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN                0x00000330
++#define CKM_RC5_ECB                    0x00000331
++#define CKM_RC5_CBC                    0x00000332
++#define CKM_RC5_MAC                    0x00000333
++#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL            0x00000334
++#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD                0x00000335
++#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN               0x00000340
++#define CKM_IDEA_ECB                   0x00000341
++#define CKM_IDEA_CBC                   0x00000342
++#define CKM_IDEA_MAC                   0x00000343
++#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL           0x00000344
++#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD               0x00000345
++#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN     0x00000350
++#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY   0x00000360
++#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA  0x00000362
++#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE  0x00000363
++#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA          0x00000364
++#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY       0x00000365
++#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN    0x00000370
++#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE     0x00000371
++#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE    0x00000372
++
++/* CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN,
++ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and
++ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH are new for v2.11 */
++#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH  0x00000373
++#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN     0x00000374
++#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE      0x00000375
++#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE     0x00000376
++#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH   0x00000377
++
++/* CKM_TLS_PRF is new for v2.20 */
++#define CKM_TLS_PRF                    0x00000378
++
++#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC               0x00000380
++#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC              0x00000381
++#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION         0x00000390
++#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION         0x00000391
++#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION        0x00000392
++
++/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
++#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION      0x00000393
++#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION      0x00000394
++#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION      0x00000395
++
++/* SHA-224 key derivation is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
++#define CKM_SHA224_KEY_DERIVATION      0x00000396
++
++#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC            0x000003A0
++#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC            0x000003A1
++#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC           0x000003A2
++#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC          0x000003A3
++#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC          0x000003A4
++#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC        0x000003A4
++#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC         0x000003A5
++#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC       0x000003A5
++#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128           0x000003A6
++#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40            0x000003A7
++#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC      0x000003A8
++#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC      0x000003A9
++#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC       0x000003AA
++#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC        0x000003AB
++
++/* CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 is new for v2.10 */
++#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2                0x000003B0
++
++#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC    0x000003C0
++
++/* WTLS mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
++#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN         0x000003D0
++#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE          0x000003D1
++#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC   0x000003D2
++#define CKM_WTLS_PRF                        0x000003D3
++#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE  0x000003D4
++#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE  0x000003D5
++
++#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS             0x00000400
++#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP          0x00000401
++
++/* CKM_CMS_SIG is new for v2.20 */
++#define CKM_CMS_SIG                    0x00000500
++
++/* CKM_KIP mechanisms are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */
++#define CKM_KIP_DERIVE                 0x00000510
++#define CKM_KIP_WRAP                   0x00000511
++#define CKM_KIP_MAC                    0x00000512
++
++/* Camellia is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_KEY_GEN           0x00000550
++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB               0x00000551
++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC               0x00000552
++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC               0x00000553
++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_MAC_GENERAL       0x00000554
++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_PAD           0x00000555
++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA  0x00000556
++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA  0x00000557
++#define CKM_CAMELLIA_CTR               0x00000558
++
++/* ARIA is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
++#define CKM_ARIA_KEY_GEN               0x00000560
++#define CKM_ARIA_ECB                   0x00000561
++#define CKM_ARIA_CBC                   0x00000562
++#define CKM_ARIA_MAC                   0x00000563
++#define CKM_ARIA_MAC_GENERAL           0x00000564
++#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_PAD               0x00000565
++#define CKM_ARIA_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA      0x00000566
++#define CKM_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA      0x00000567
++
++/* Fortezza mechanisms */
++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN           0x00001000
++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64             0x00001001
++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64             0x00001002
++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64             0x00001003
++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64             0x00001004
++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32             0x00001005
++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16             0x00001006
++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8              0x00001007
++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP              0x00001008
++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP      0x00001009
++#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX            0x0000100a
++#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN           0x00001010
++#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE             0x00001011
++#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP         0x00001020
++#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN              0x00001030
++#define CKM_BATON_ECB128               0x00001031
++#define CKM_BATON_ECB96                0x00001032
++#define CKM_BATON_CBC128               0x00001033
++#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER              0x00001034
++#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE              0x00001035
++#define CKM_BATON_WRAP                 0x00001036
++
++/* CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11,
++ * CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN is preferred */
++#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN         0x00001040
++#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN            0x00001040
++
++#define CKM_ECDSA                      0x00001041
++#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1                 0x00001042
++
++/* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE
++ * are new for v2.11 */
++#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE               0x00001050
++#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE      0x00001051
++#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE               0x00001052
++
++#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN            0x00001060
++#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128             0x00001061
++#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128             0x00001062
++#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER            0x00001063
++#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE            0x00001064
++#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP               0x00001065
++#define CKM_FASTHASH                   0x00001070
++
++/* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_MAC,
++ * CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN,
++ * CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, and CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN are
++ * new for v2.11 */
++#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN                0x00001080
++#define CKM_AES_ECB                    0x00001081
++#define CKM_AES_CBC                    0x00001082
++#define CKM_AES_MAC                    0x00001083
++#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL            0x00001084
++#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD                0x00001085
++
++/* AES counter mode is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
++#define CKM_AES_CTR                    0x00001086
++
++/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */
++#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN           0x00001090
++#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC               0x00001091
++#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN            0x00001092
++#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC                0x00001093
++
++
++/* CKM_xxx_ENCRYPT_DATA mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
++#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA       0x00001100
++#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA       0x00001101
++#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA      0x00001102
++#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA      0x00001103
++#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA       0x00001104
++#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA       0x00001105
++
++#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN          0x00002000
++#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN      0x00002001
++#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN     0x00002002
++
++#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED             0x80000000
++
++typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular
++ * mechanism  */
++typedef struct CK_MECHANISM {
++  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism;
++  CK_VOID_PTR       pParameter;
++
++  /* ulParameterLen was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
++   * v2.0 */
++  CK_ULONG          ulParameterLen;  /* in bytes */
++} CK_MECHANISM;
++
++typedef CK_MECHANISM CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_MECHANISM_INFO provides information about a particular
++ * mechanism */
++typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO {
++    CK_ULONG    ulMinKeySize;
++    CK_ULONG    ulMaxKeySize;
++    CK_FLAGS    flags;
++} CK_MECHANISM_INFO;
++
++/* The flags are defined as follows:
++ *      Bit Flag               Mask        Meaning */
++#define CKF_HW                 0x00000001  /* performed by HW */
++
++/* The flags CKF_ENCRYPT, CKF_DECRYPT, CKF_DIGEST, CKF_SIGN,
++ * CKG_SIGN_RECOVER, CKF_VERIFY, CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER,
++ * CKF_GENERATE, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKF_WRAP, CKF_UNWRAP,
++ * and CKF_DERIVE are new for v2.0.  They specify whether or not
++ * a mechanism can be used for a particular task */
++#define CKF_ENCRYPT            0x00000100
++#define CKF_DECRYPT            0x00000200
++#define CKF_DIGEST             0x00000400
++#define CKF_SIGN               0x00000800
++#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER       0x00001000
++#define CKF_VERIFY             0x00002000
++#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER     0x00004000
++#define CKF_GENERATE           0x00008000
++#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR  0x00010000
++#define CKF_WRAP               0x00020000
++#define CKF_UNWRAP             0x00040000
++#define CKF_DERIVE             0x00080000
++
++/* CKF_EC_F_P, CKF_EC_F_2M, CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS, CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE,
++ * CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS, and CKF_EC_COMPRESS are new for v2.11. They
++ * describe a token's EC capabilities not available in mechanism
++ * information. */
++#define CKF_EC_F_P             0x00100000
++#define CKF_EC_F_2M            0x00200000
++#define CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS    0x00400000
++#define CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE      0x00800000
++#define CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS      0x01000000
++#define CKF_EC_COMPRESS        0x02000000
++
++#define CKF_EXTENSION          0x80000000 /* FALSE for this version */
++
++typedef CK_MECHANISM_INFO CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a
++ * Cryptoki function */
++/* CK_RV was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
++typedef CK_ULONG          CK_RV;
++
++#define CKR_OK                                0x00000000
++#define CKR_CANCEL                            0x00000001
++#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY                       0x00000002
++#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID                   0x00000003
++
++/* CKR_FLAGS_INVALID was removed for v2.0 */
++
++/* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED are new for v2.0 */
++#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR                     0x00000005
++#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED                   0x00000006
++
++/* CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS,
++ * and CKR_CANT_LOCK are new for v2.01 */
++#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD                     0x00000007
++#define CKR_NO_EVENT                          0x00000008
++#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS            0x00000009
++#define CKR_CANT_LOCK                         0x0000000A
++
++#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY               0x00000010
++#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE               0x00000011
++#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID            0x00000012
++#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID           0x00000013
++#define CKR_DATA_INVALID                      0x00000020
++#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE                    0x00000021
++#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR                      0x00000030
++#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY                     0x00000031
++#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED                    0x00000032
++#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID            0x00000040
++#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE          0x00000041
++#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED                 0x00000050
++#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL             0x00000051
++
++/* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED is new for v2.0 */
++#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED            0x00000054
++
++#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID                0x00000060
++
++/* CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE was removed for v2.0 */
++
++#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE                    0x00000062
++#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT             0x00000063
++
++/* CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED,
++ * CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED,
++ * CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, and CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE are new for
++ * v2.0 */
++#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED                    0x00000064
++#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED                       0x00000065
++#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED                        0x00000066
++#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE                  0x00000067
++#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED        0x00000068
++#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE                 0x00000069
++#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE                 0x0000006A
++
++#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID                 0x00000070
++#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID           0x00000071
++
++/* CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INCONSISTENT and CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INVALID
++ * were removed for v2.0 */
++#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID             0x00000082
++#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE                  0x00000090
++#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED         0x00000091
++#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT                     0x000000A0
++#define CKR_PIN_INVALID                       0x000000A1
++#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE                     0x000000A2
++
++/* CKR_PIN_EXPIRED and CKR_PIN_LOCKED are new for v2.0 */
++#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED                       0x000000A3
++#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED                        0x000000A4
++
++#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED                    0x000000B0
++#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT                     0x000000B1
++#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID            0x000000B3
++#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED    0x000000B4
++#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY                 0x000000B5
++#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS                    0x000000B6
++
++/* CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS and
++ * CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS are new for v2.0 */
++#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS          0x000000B7
++#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS      0x000000B8
++
++#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID                 0x000000C0
++#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE               0x000000C1
++#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE               0x000000D0
++#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT             0x000000D1
++#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT                 0x000000E0
++#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED              0x000000E1
++#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED             0x000000E2
++#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID     0x000000F0
++#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE         0x000000F1
++#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT  0x000000F2
++#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN            0x00000100
++#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN                0x00000101
++#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED          0x00000102
++#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID                 0x00000103
++
++/* CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN and CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES
++ * are new to v2.01 */
++#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN    0x00000104
++#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES               0x00000105
++
++#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID               0x00000110
++#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE             0x00000112
++#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID       0x00000113
++#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE           0x00000114
++#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT    0x00000115
++#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED         0x00000120
++
++/* These are new to v2.0 */
++#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG                     0x00000121
++
++/* These are new to v2.11 */
++#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID             0x00000130
++
++/* These are new to v2.0 */
++#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL                  0x00000150
++#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID               0x00000160
++#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE             0x00000170
++#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE                  0x00000180
++
++/* These are new to v2.01 */
++#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED          0x00000190
++#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED      0x00000191
++#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD                         0x000001A0
++#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED                  0x000001A1
++
++/* The following return values are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
++#define CKR_NEW_PIN_MODE                      0x000001B0
++#define CKR_NEXT_OTP                          0x000001B1
++
++/* This is new to v2.20 */
++#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED                 0x00000200
++
++#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED                    0x80000000
++
++
++/* CK_NOTIFY is an application callback that processes events */
++typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)(
++  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,     /* the session's handle */
++  CK_NOTIFICATION   event,
++  CK_VOID_PTR       pApplication  /* passed to C_OpenSession */
++);
++
++
++/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure holding a Cryptoki spec
++ * version and pointers of appropriate types to all the
++ * Cryptoki functions */
++/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is new for v2.0 */
++typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_FUNCTION_LIST;
++
++typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR;
++
++typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_CREATEMUTEX is an application callback for creating a
++ * mutex object */
++typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)(
++  CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex  /* location to receive ptr to mutex */
++);
++
++
++/* CK_DESTROYMUTEX is an application callback for destroying a
++ * mutex object */
++typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)(
++  CK_VOID_PTR pMutex  /* pointer to mutex */
++);
++
++
++/* CK_LOCKMUTEX is an application callback for locking a mutex */
++typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)(
++  CK_VOID_PTR pMutex  /* pointer to mutex */
++);
++
++
++/* CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is an application callback for unlocking a
++ * mutex */
++typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)(
++  CK_VOID_PTR pMutex  /* pointer to mutex */
++);
++
++
++/* CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS provides the optional arguments to
++ * C_Initialize */
++typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS {
++  CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex;
++  CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex;
++  CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex;
++  CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex;
++  CK_FLAGS flags;
++  CK_VOID_PTR pReserved;
++} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS;
++
++/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot
++ *      Bit Flag                           Mask       Meaning
++ */
++#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS 0x00000001
++#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK                  0x00000002
++
++typedef CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS CK_PTR CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR;
++
++
++/* additional flags for parameters to functions */
++
++/* CKF_DONT_BLOCK is for the function C_WaitForSlotEvent */
++#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK     1
++
++/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is new for v2.10.
++ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE  is used to indicate the Message
++ * Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when
++ * formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption
++ * scheme. */
++typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE;
++
++typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR;
++
++/* The following MGFs are defined */
++/* CKG_MGF1_SHA256, CKG_MGF1_SHA384, and CKG_MGF1_SHA512
++ * are new for v2.20 */
++#define CKG_MGF1_SHA1         0x00000001
++#define CKG_MGF1_SHA256       0x00000002
++#define CKG_MGF1_SHA384       0x00000003
++#define CKG_MGF1_SHA512       0x00000004
++/* SHA-224 is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
++#define CKG_MGF1_SHA224       0x00000005
++
++/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10.
++ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE  is used to indicate the source
++ * of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block
++ * for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. */
++typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE;
++
++typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR;
++
++/* The following encoding parameter sources are defined */
++#define CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED    0x00000001
++
++/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.10.
++ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
++ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. */
++typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS {
++        CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg;
++        CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
++        CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source;
++        CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData;
++        CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen;
++} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++/* CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
++ * CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
++ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS mechanism(s). */
++typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS {
++        CK_MECHANISM_TYPE    hashAlg;
++        CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
++        CK_ULONG             sLen;
++} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++/* CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is new for v2.11. */
++typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE;
++
++/* The following EC Key Derivation Functions are defined */
++#define CKD_NULL                 0x00000001
++#define CKD_SHA1_KDF             0x00000002
++
++/* CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
++ * CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
++ * CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE and CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE mechanisms,
++ * where each party contributes one key pair.
++ */
++typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
++  CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
++  CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
++  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
++} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
++ * CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
++ * CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. */
++typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
++  CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
++  CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
++  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
++  CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
++  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
++} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
++  CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
++  CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
++  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
++  CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
++  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
++} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++/* Typedefs and defines for the CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN and the
++ * CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN mechanisms (new for PKCS #11 v2.11) */
++typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE;
++typedef CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR;
++
++/* The following X9.42 DH key derivation functions are defined
++   (besides CKD_NULL already defined : */
++#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1        0x00000003
++#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE 0x00000004
++
++/* CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
++ * CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
++ * CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE key derivation mechanism, where each party
++ * contributes one key pair */
++typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
++  CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
++  CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
++  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
++} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
++
++typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++/* CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
++ * CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
++ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE key derivation
++ * mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs */
++typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
++  CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
++  CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
++  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
++  CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
++  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
++} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
++  CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
++  CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
++  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
++  CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
++  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
++} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
++ * CKM_KEA_DERIVE mechanism */
++/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
++typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS {
++  CK_BBOOL      isSender;
++  CK_ULONG      ulRandomLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pRandomA;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pRandomB;
++  CK_ULONG      ulPublicDataLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pPublicData;
++} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_RC2_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_ECB and
++ * CKM_RC2_MAC mechanisms.  An instance of CK_RC2_PARAMS just
++ * holds the effective keysize */
++typedef CK_ULONG          CK_RC2_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_RC2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_CBC
++ * mechanism */
++typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS {
++  /* ulEffectiveBits was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
++   * v2.0 */
++  CK_ULONG      ulEffectiveBits;  /* effective bits (1-1024) */
++
++  CK_BYTE       iv[8];            /* IV for CBC mode */
++} CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the
++ * CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */
++/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
++typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
++  CK_ULONG      ulEffectiveBits;  /* effective bits (1-1024) */
++  CK_ULONG      ulMacLength;      /* Length of MAC in bytes */
++} CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \
++  CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_RC5_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_ECB and
++ * CKM_RC5_MAC mechanisms */
++/* CK_RC5_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
++typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS {
++  CK_ULONG      ulWordsize;  /* wordsize in bits */
++  CK_ULONG      ulRounds;    /* number of rounds */
++} CK_RC5_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_RC5_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_CBC
++ * mechanism */
++/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
++typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS {
++  CK_ULONG      ulWordsize;  /* wordsize in bits */
++  CK_ULONG      ulRounds;    /* number of rounds */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pIv;         /* pointer to IV */
++  CK_ULONG      ulIvLen;     /* length of IV in bytes */
++} CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the
++ * CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */
++/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
++typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
++  CK_ULONG      ulWordsize;   /* wordsize in bits */
++  CK_ULONG      ulRounds;     /* number of rounds */
++  CK_ULONG      ulMacLength;  /* Length of MAC in bytes */
++} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \
++  CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to most block
++ * ciphers' MAC_GENERAL mechanisms.  Its value is the length of
++ * the MAC */
++/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
++typedef CK_ULONG          CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++/* CK_DES/AES_ECB/CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS are new for v2.20 */
++typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
++  CK_BYTE      iv[8];
++  CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
++  CK_ULONG     length;
++} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
++  CK_BYTE      iv[16];
++  CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
++  CK_ULONG     length;
++} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
++ * CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP mechanism */
++/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
++typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS {
++  CK_ULONG      ulPasswordLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pPassword;
++  CK_ULONG      ulPublicDataLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pPublicData;
++  CK_ULONG      ulPAndGLen;
++  CK_ULONG      ulQLen;
++  CK_ULONG      ulRandomLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pRandomA;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pPrimeP;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pBaseG;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pSubprimeQ;
++} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS CK_PTR \
++  CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
++ * CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism */
++/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
++typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS {
++  CK_ULONG      ulOldWrappedXLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pOldWrappedX;
++  CK_ULONG      ulOldPasswordLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pOldPassword;
++  CK_ULONG      ulOldPublicDataLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pOldPublicData;
++  CK_ULONG      ulOldRandomLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pOldRandomA;
++  CK_ULONG      ulNewPasswordLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pNewPassword;
++  CK_ULONG      ulNewPublicDataLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pNewPublicData;
++  CK_ULONG      ulNewRandomLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pNewRandomA;
++} CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS CK_PTR \
++  CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++
++typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS {
++  CK_BYTE_PTR      pInitVector;
++  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR  pPassword;
++  CK_ULONG         ulPasswordLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR      pSalt;
++  CK_ULONG         ulSaltLen;
++  CK_ULONG         ulIteration;
++} CK_PBE_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_PBE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++
++/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
++ * CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP mechanism */
++/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
++typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS {
++  CK_BYTE       bBC;     /* block contents byte */
++  CK_BYTE_PTR   pX;      /* extra data */
++  CK_ULONG      ulXLen;  /* length of extra data in bytes */
++} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR \
++  CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++
++typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA {
++  CK_BYTE_PTR  pClientRandom;
++  CK_ULONG     ulClientRandomLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR  pServerRandom;
++  CK_ULONG     ulServerRandomLen;
++} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA;
++
++
++typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
++  CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
++  CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion;
++} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
++
++typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \
++  CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++
++typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT {
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret;
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret;
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey;
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR      pIVClient;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR      pIVServer;
++} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT;
++
++typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR;
++
++
++typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
++  CK_ULONG                ulMacSizeInBits;
++  CK_ULONG                ulKeySizeInBits;
++  CK_ULONG                ulIVSizeInBits;
++  CK_BBOOL                bIsExport;
++  CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA     RandomInfo;
++  CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
++} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++/* CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is new for version 2.20 */
++typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS {
++  CK_BYTE_PTR  pSeed;
++  CK_ULONG     ulSeedLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR  pLabel;
++  CK_ULONG     ulLabelLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR  pOutput;
++  CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen;
++} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++/* WTLS is new for version 2.20 */
++typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA {
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom;
++  CK_ULONG    ulClientRandomLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom;
++  CK_ULONG    ulServerRandomLen;
++} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA;
++
++typedef CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA CK_PTR CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR;
++
++typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
++  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE   DigestMechanism;
++  CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR         pVersion;
++} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \
++  CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS {
++  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSeed;
++  CK_ULONG          ulSeedLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pLabel;
++  CK_ULONG          ulLabelLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR       pOutput;
++  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulOutputLen;
++} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT {
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret;
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR      pIV;
++} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT;
++
++typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR;
++
++typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
++  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE       DigestMechanism;
++  CK_ULONG                ulMacSizeInBits;
++  CK_ULONG                ulKeySizeInBits;
++  CK_ULONG                ulIVSizeInBits;
++  CK_ULONG                ulSequenceNumber;
++  CK_BBOOL                bIsExport;
++  CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA     RandomInfo;
++  CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
++} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++/* CMS is new for version 2.20 */
++typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS {
++  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE      certificateHandle;
++  CK_MECHANISM_PTR      pSigningMechanism;
++  CK_MECHANISM_PTR      pDigestMechanism;
++  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR       pContentType;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR           pRequestedAttributes;
++  CK_ULONG              ulRequestedAttributesLen;
++  CK_BYTE_PTR           pRequiredAttributes;
++  CK_ULONG              ulRequiredAttributesLen;
++} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA {
++  CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
++  CK_ULONG    ulLen;
++} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA;
++
++typedef CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA CK_PTR \
++  CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR;
++
++
++/* The CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is used for the
++ * CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism.  It specifies which bit
++ * of the base key should be used as the first bit of the
++ * derived key */
++/* CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
++typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is new for v2.10.
++ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to
++ * indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate
++ * key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. */
++typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE;
++
++typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR;
++
++/* The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */
++#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1 0x00000001
++
++
++/* CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10.
++ * CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the
++ * source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5
++ * PBKDF2. */
++typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE;
++
++typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR;
++
++/* The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */
++#define CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED        0x00000001
++
++/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is new for v2.10.
++ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the
++ * parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. */
++typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS {
++        CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE           saltSource;
++        CK_VOID_PTR                                pSaltSourceData;
++        CK_ULONG                                   ulSaltSourceDataLen;
++        CK_ULONG                                   iterations;
++        CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf;
++        CK_VOID_PTR                                pPrfData;
++        CK_ULONG                                   ulPrfDataLen;
++        CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR                            pPassword;
++        CK_ULONG_PTR                               ulPasswordLen;
++} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++/* All CK_OTP structs are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
++
++typedef CK_ULONG CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE;
++typedef CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE CK_PARAM_TYPE; /* B/w compatibility */
++
++typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAM {
++    CK_OTP_PARAM_TYPE type;
++    CK_VOID_PTR pValue;
++    CK_ULONG ulValueLen;
++} CK_OTP_PARAM;
++
++typedef CK_OTP_PARAM CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR;
++
++typedef struct CK_OTP_PARAMS {
++    CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams;
++    CK_ULONG ulCount;
++} CK_OTP_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_OTP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_OTP_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++typedef struct CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO {
++    CK_OTP_PARAM_PTR pParams;
++    CK_ULONG ulCount;
++} CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO;
++
++typedef CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO CK_PTR CK_OTP_SIGNATURE_INFO_PTR;
++
++/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
++#define CK_OTP_VALUE          0
++#define CK_OTP_PIN            1
++#define CK_OTP_CHALLENGE      2
++#define CK_OTP_TIME           3
++#define CK_OTP_COUNTER        4
++#define CK_OTP_FLAGS          5
++#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_LENGTH  6
++#define CK_OTP_OUTPUT_FORMAT  7
++
++/* The following OTP-related defines are new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 1 */
++#define CKF_NEXT_OTP          0x00000001
++#define CKF_EXCLUDE_TIME      0x00000002
++#define CKF_EXCLUDE_COUNTER   0x00000004
++#define CKF_EXCLUDE_CHALLENGE 0x00000008
++#define CKF_EXCLUDE_PIN       0x00000010
++#define CKF_USER_FRIENDLY_OTP 0x00000020
++
++/* CK_KIP_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 2 */
++typedef struct CK_KIP_PARAMS {
++    CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism;
++    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey;
++    CK_BYTE_PTR       pSeed;
++    CK_ULONG          ulSeedLen;
++} CK_KIP_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_KIP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KIP_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++/* CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
++typedef struct CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS {
++    CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
++    CK_BYTE cb[16];
++} CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CTR_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++/* CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
++typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS {
++    CK_ULONG ulCounterBits;
++    CK_BYTE cb[16];
++} CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CTR_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++/* CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
++typedef struct CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
++    CK_BYTE      iv[16];
++    CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
++    CK_ULONG     length;
++} CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CAMELLIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++/* CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS is new for PKCS #11 v2.20 amendment 3 */
++typedef struct CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
++    CK_BYTE      iv[16];
++    CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
++    CK_ULONG     length;
++} CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
++
++typedef CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ARIA_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
++
++#endif
+Index: openssl/util/libeay.num
+diff -u openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.6.1.2.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/util/libeay.num:1.13.2.3
+--- openssl/util/libeay.num:1.8.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.6.1.2.1.2.1.2.1	Mon Jun 13 15:42:32 2016
++++ openssl/util/libeay.num	Mon Jun 13 15:52:51 2016
+@@ -4415,4 +4415,5 @@
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host             4771	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+ EC_GROUP_get_mont_data                  4772	EXIST::FUNCTION:EC
+ i2d_re_X509_tbs                         4773	EXIST::FUNCTION:
+-EVP_PKEY_asn1_set_item                  4774	EXIST::FUNCTION:
++ENGINE_load_pk11ca                      4774	EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11CA,ENGINE
++ENGINE_load_pk11so                      4774	EXIST::FUNCTION:HW_PKCS11SO,ENGINE
+Index: openssl/util/mk1mf.pl
+diff -u openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.12.2.3
+--- openssl/util/mk1mf.pl:1.9.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.2.1.2.1.2.1	Mon Jun 13 15:42:33 2016
++++ openssl/util/mk1mf.pl	Mon Jun 13 15:52:52 2016
+@@ -122,6 +122,8 @@
+ 	no-ecdh					- No ECDH
+ 	no-engine				- No engine
+ 	no-hw					- No hw
++	no-hw-pkcs11ca				- No hw PKCS#11 CA flavor
++	no-hw-pkcs11so				- No hw PKCS#11 SO flavor
+ 	nasm 					- Use NASM for x86 asm
+ 	nw-nasm					- Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare
+ 	nw-mwasm				- Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare
+@@ -287,6 +289,8 @@
+ $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_GOST" if $no_gost;
+ $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE"   if $no_engine;
+ $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW"   if $no_hw;
++$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11CA"   if $no_hw_pkcs11ca;
++$cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW_PKCS11SO"   if $no_hw_pkcs11so;
+ $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS"    if $fips;
+ $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE"    if $no_jpake;
+ $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_EC2M"    if $no_ec2m;
+@@ -361,6 +365,9 @@
+ 		$dir=$val;
+ 		}
+ 
++	if ($key eq "PK11_LIB_LOCATION")
++		{ $cflags .= " -D$key=\\\"$val\\\"" if $val ne "";}
++
+ 	if ($key eq "KRB5_INCLUDES")
+ 		{ $cflags .= " $val";}
+ 
+@@ -1219,6 +1226,8 @@
+ 		"no-gost" => \$no_gost,
+ 		"no-engine" => \$no_engine,
+ 		"no-hw" => \$no_hw,
++		"no-hw-pkcs11ca" => \$no_hw_pkcs11ca,
++		"no-hw-pkcs11so" => \$no_hw_pkcs11so,
+ 		"no-rsax" => 0,
+ 		"just-ssl" =>
+ 			[\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast,
+Index: openssl/util/mkdef.pl
+diff -u openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.2.1.4.1 openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.11.2.2
+--- openssl/util/mkdef.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.10.1.2.1.2.1.4.1	Mon Jun 13 15:42:34 2016
++++ openssl/util/mkdef.pl	Mon Jun 13 15:52:52 2016
+@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@
+ 			 # External "algorithms"
+ 			 "FP_API", "STDIO", "SOCK", "KRB5", "DGRAM",
+ 			 # Engines
+-			 "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP",
++			 "STATIC_ENGINE", "ENGINE", "HW", "GMP", "HW_PKCS11CA", "HW_PKCS11SO",
+ 			 # RFC3779
+ 			 "RFC3779",
+ 			 # TLS
+@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@
+ my $no_md2; my $no_md4; my $no_md5; my $no_sha; my $no_ripemd; my $no_mdc2;
+ my $no_rsa; my $no_dsa; my $no_dh; my $no_hmac=0; my $no_aes; my $no_krb5;
+ my $no_ec; my $no_ecdsa; my $no_ecdh; my $no_engine; my $no_hw;
++my $no_pkcs11ca; my $no_pkcs11so;
+ my $no_fp_api; my $no_static_engine=1; my $no_gmp; my $no_deprecated;
+ my $no_rfc3779; my $no_psk; my $no_tlsext; my $no_cms; my $no_capieng;
+ my $no_jpake; my $no_srp; my $no_ssl2; my $no_ec2m; my $no_nistp_gcc; 
+@@ -251,6 +252,8 @@
+ 	elsif (/^no-sctp$/)	{ $no_sctp=1; }
+ 	elsif (/^no-srtp$/)	{ $no_srtp=1; }
+ 	elsif (/^no-unit-test$/){ $no_unit_test=1; }
++	elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11ca$/) { $no_pkcs11ca=1; }
++	elsif (/^no-hw-pkcs11so$/) { $no_pkcs11so=1; }
+ 	}
+ 
+ 
+@@ -1206,6 +1209,8 @@
+ 			if ($keyword eq "KRB5" && $no_krb5) { return 0; }
+ 			if ($keyword eq "ENGINE" && $no_engine) { return 0; }
+ 			if ($keyword eq "HW" && $no_hw) { return 0; }
++			if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11CA" && $no_pkcs11ca) { return 0; }
++			if ($keyword eq "HW_PKCS11SO" && $no_pkcs11so) { return 0; }
+ 			if ($keyword eq "FP_API" && $no_fp_api) { return 0; }
+ 			if ($keyword eq "STATIC_ENGINE" && $no_static_engine) { return 0; }
+ 			if ($keyword eq "GMP" && $no_gmp) { return 0; }
+Index: openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl
+diff -u openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.8.1.2.1.2.1 openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.10.2.3
+--- openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl:1.7.2.1.4.1.2.1.4.1.8.1.2.1.2.1	Mon Jun 13 15:42:35 2016
++++ openssl/util/pl/VC-32.pl	Mon Jun 13 15:52:53 2016
+@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@
+     $base_cflags= " $mf_cflag";
+     my $f = $shlib || $fips ?' /MD':' /MT';
+     $opt_cflags=$f.' /Ox';
+-    $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
++    $dbg_cflags=$f.'d /Od /Zi -DDEBUG -D_DEBUG';
+     $lflags="/nologo /subsystem:console /opt:ref";
+ 
+     *::perlasm_compile_target = sub {