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/* Copyright (C) 2017 CZ.NIC, z.s.p.o. <knot-dns@labs.nic.cz>
This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program. If not, see <https://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
*/
/** @file
* Implementation of packet-caching. Prototypes in ./impl.h
*
* The packet is stashed in entry_h::data as uint16_t length + full packet wire format.
*/
#include "lib/utils.h"
#include "lib/layer/iterate.h" /* kr_response_classify */
#include "lib/cache/impl.h"
/** Compute TTL for a packet. Generally it's minimum TTL, with extra conditions. */
static uint32_t packet_ttl(const knot_pkt_t *pkt, bool is_negative)
{
bool has_ttl = false;
uint32_t ttl = UINT32_MAX;
/* Find minimum entry TTL in the packet or SOA minimum TTL. */
for (knot_section_t i = KNOT_ANSWER; i <= KNOT_ADDITIONAL; ++i) {
const knot_pktsection_t *sec = knot_pkt_section(pkt, i);
for (unsigned k = 0; k < sec->count; ++k) {
const knot_rrset_t *rr = knot_pkt_rr(sec, k);
if (is_negative) {
/* Use SOA minimum TTL for negative answers. */
if (rr->type == KNOT_RRTYPE_SOA) {
return MIN(rr->ttl, knot_soa_minimum(rr->rrs.rdata));
} else {
continue; /* Use SOA only for negative answers. */
}
}
if (knot_rrtype_is_metatype(rr->type)) {
continue; /* Skip metatypes. */
}
ttl = MIN(ttl, rr->ttl);
}
}
/* If no valid TTL present, go with zero (will get clamped to minimum). */
return has_ttl ? ttl : 0;
}
void stash_pkt(const knot_pkt_t *pkt, const struct kr_query *qry,
const struct kr_request *req, const bool has_optout)
{
/* In some cases, stash also the packet. */
const bool is_negative = kr_response_classify(pkt)
& (PKT_NODATA|PKT_NXDOMAIN);
const struct kr_qflags * const qf = &qry->flags;
const bool want_negative = qf->DNSSEC_INSECURE || !qf->DNSSEC_WANT || has_optout;
const bool want_pkt = qf->DNSSEC_BOGUS /*< useful for +cd answers */
|| (is_negative && want_negative);
if (!want_pkt || !knot_wire_get_aa(pkt->wire)
|| pkt->parsed != pkt->size /*< malformed packet; still can't detect KNOT_EFEWDATA */
) {
return;
}
/* Compute rank. If cd bit is set or we got answer via non-validated
* forwarding, make the rank bad; otherwise it depends on flags.
* TODO: probably make validator attempt validation even with +cd. */
uint8_t rank = KR_RANK_AUTH;
const bool risky_vldr = is_negative && qf->FORWARD && qf->CNAME;
/* ^^ CNAME'ed NXDOMAIN answer in forwarding mode can contain
* unvalidated records; original commit: d6e22f476. */
if (knot_wire_get_cd(req->qsource.packet->wire) || qf->STUB || risky_vldr) {
kr_rank_set(&rank, KR_RANK_OMIT);
} else {
if (qf->DNSSEC_BOGUS) {
kr_rank_set(&rank, KR_RANK_BOGUS);
} else if (qf->DNSSEC_INSECURE) {
kr_rank_set(&rank, KR_RANK_INSECURE);
} else if (!qf->DNSSEC_WANT) {
/* no TAs at all, leave _RANK_AUTH */
} else if (has_optout) {
/* All bad cases should be filtered above,
* at least the same way as pktcache in kresd 1.5.x. */
kr_rank_set(&rank, KR_RANK_SECURE);
} else assert(false);
}
const uint16_t pkt_type = knot_pkt_qtype(pkt);
const knot_dname_t *owner = knot_pkt_qname(pkt); /* qname can't be compressed */
// LATER: nothing exists under NXDOMAIN. Implement that (optionally)?
#if 0
if (knot_wire_get_rcode(pkt->wire) == KNOT_RCODE_NXDOMAIN
/* && !qf->DNSSEC_INSECURE */ ) {
pkt_type = KNOT_RRTYPE_NS;
}
#endif
/* Construct the key under which the pkt will be stored. */
struct key k_storage, *k = &k_storage;
knot_db_val_t key;
int ret = kr_dname_lf(k->buf, owner, false);
if (ret) {
/* A server might (incorrectly) reply with QDCOUNT=0. */
assert(owner == NULL);
return;
}
key = key_exact_type_maypkt(k, pkt_type);
/* For now we stash the full packet byte-exactly as it came from upstream. */
const uint16_t pkt_size = pkt->size;
knot_db_val_t val_new_entry = {
.data = NULL,
.len = offsetof(struct entry_h, data) + sizeof(pkt_size) + pkt->size,
};
/* Prepare raw memory for the new entry and fill it. */
struct kr_cache *cache = &req->ctx->cache;
ret = entry_h_splice(&val_new_entry, rank, key, k->type, pkt_type,
owner, qry, cache, qry->timestamp.tv_sec);
if (ret) return; /* some aren't really errors */
assert(val_new_entry.data);
struct entry_h *eh = val_new_entry.data;
memset(eh, 0, offsetof(struct entry_h, data));
eh->time = qry->timestamp.tv_sec;
eh->ttl = MAX(MIN(packet_ttl(pkt, is_negative), cache->ttl_max), cache->ttl_min);
eh->rank = rank;
eh->is_packet = true;
eh->has_optout = qf->DNSSEC_OPTOUT;
memcpy(eh->data, &pkt_size, sizeof(pkt_size));
memcpy(eh->data + sizeof(pkt_size), pkt->wire, pkt_size);
WITH_VERBOSE(qry) {
auto_free char *type_str = kr_rrtype_text(pkt_type),
*owner_str = kr_dname_text(owner);
VERBOSE_MSG(qry, "=> stashed packet: rank 0%.2o, TTL %d, "
"%s %s (%d B)\n",
eh->rank, eh->ttl,
type_str, owner_str, (int)val_new_entry.len);
}
}
int answer_from_pkt(kr_layer_t *ctx, knot_pkt_t *pkt, uint16_t type,
const struct entry_h *eh, const void *eh_bound, uint32_t new_ttl)
{
struct kr_request *req = ctx->req;
struct kr_query *qry = req->current_query;
uint16_t pkt_len;
memcpy(&pkt_len, eh->data, sizeof(pkt_len));
if (pkt_len > pkt->max_size) {
return kr_error(ENOENT);
}
/* Copy answer and reparse it, but keep the original message id. */
uint16_t msgid = knot_wire_get_id(pkt->wire);
knot_pkt_clear(pkt);
memcpy(pkt->wire, eh->data + 2, pkt_len);
pkt->size = pkt_len;
int ret = knot_pkt_parse(pkt, 0);
if (ret == KNOT_EFEWDATA || ret == KNOT_EMALF) {
return kr_error(ENOENT);
/* LATER(opt): try harder to avoid stashing such packets */
}
if (ret != KNOT_EOK) {
assert(!ret);
return kr_error(ret);
}
knot_wire_set_id(pkt->wire, msgid);
/* Add rank into the additional field. */
for (size_t i = 0; i < pkt->rrset_count; ++i) {
assert(!pkt->rr[i].additional);
uint8_t *rr_rank = mm_alloc(&pkt->mm, sizeof(*rr_rank));
if (!rr_rank) {
return kr_error(ENOMEM);
}
*rr_rank = eh->rank;
pkt->rr[i].additional = rr_rank;
}
/* Adjust TTL in each record. */
const uint32_t drift = eh->ttl - new_ttl;
for (knot_section_t i = KNOT_ANSWER; i <= KNOT_ADDITIONAL; ++i) {
const knot_pktsection_t *sec = knot_pkt_section(pkt, i);
for (unsigned k = 0; k < sec->count; ++k) {
knot_rrset_t *rrs = // vv FIXME??
/*const-cast*/(knot_rrset_t *)knot_pkt_rr(sec, k);
/* We need to be careful: due to enforcing minimum TTL
* on packet, some records may be below that value.
* We keep those records at TTL 0. */
if (rrs->ttl >= drift) {
rrs->ttl -= drift;
} else {
rrs->ttl = 0;
}
}
}
/* Finishing touches. TODO: perhaps factor out */
struct kr_qflags * const qf = &qry->flags;
qf->EXPIRING = is_expiring(eh->ttl, new_ttl);
qf->CACHED = true;
qf->NO_MINIMIZE = true;
qf->DNSSEC_INSECURE = kr_rank_test(eh->rank, KR_RANK_INSECURE);
qf->DNSSEC_BOGUS = kr_rank_test(eh->rank, KR_RANK_BOGUS);
if (qf->DNSSEC_INSECURE || qf->DNSSEC_BOGUS) {
qf->DNSSEC_WANT = false;
}
qf->DNSSEC_OPTOUT = eh->has_optout;
VERBOSE_MSG(qry, "=> satisfied by exact packet: rank 0%.2o, new TTL %d\n",
eh->rank, new_ttl);
return kr_ok();
}
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