Adding upstream version 4.19.249.upstream/4.19.249upstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 1251 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/bcm/spu.c b/drivers/crypto/bcm/spu.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dbb5c03dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/bcm/spu.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1251 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016 Broadcom
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License, version 2, as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation (the "GPL").
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU
+ * General Public License version 2 (GPLv2) for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * version 2 (GPLv2) along with this source code.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+
+#include "util.h"
+#include "spu.h"
+#include "spum.h"
+#include "cipher.h"
+
+/* This array is based on the hash algo type supported in spu.h */
+char *tag_to_hash_idx[] = { "none", "md5", "sha1", "sha224", "sha256" };
+
+char *hash_alg_name[] = { "None", "md5", "sha1", "sha224", "sha256", "aes",
+	"sha384", "sha512", "sha3_224", "sha3_256", "sha3_384", "sha3_512" };
+
+char *aead_alg_name[] = { "ccm(aes)", "gcm(aes)", "authenc" };
+
+/* Assumes SPU-M messages are in big endian */
+void spum_dump_msg_hdr(u8 *buf, unsigned int buf_len)
+{
+	u8 *ptr = buf;
+	struct SPUHEADER *spuh = (struct SPUHEADER *)buf;
+	unsigned int hash_key_len = 0;
+	unsigned int hash_state_len = 0;
+	unsigned int cipher_key_len = 0;
+	unsigned int iv_len;
+	u32 pflags;
+	u32 cflags;
+	u32 ecf;
+	u32 cipher_alg;
+	u32 cipher_mode;
+	u32 cipher_type;
+	u32 hash_alg;
+	u32 hash_mode;
+	u32 hash_type;
+	u32 sctx_size;   /* SCTX length in words */
+	u32 sctx_pl_len; /* SCTX payload length in bytes */
+
+	packet_log("\n");
+	packet_log("SPU Message header %p len: %u\n", buf, buf_len);
+
+	/* ========== Decode MH ========== */
+	packet_log("  MH 0x%08x\n", be32_to_cpu(*((u32 *)ptr)));
+	if (spuh->mh.flags & MH_SCTX_PRES)
+		packet_log("    SCTX  present\n");
+	if (spuh->mh.flags & MH_BDESC_PRES)
+		packet_log("    BDESC present\n");
+	if (spuh->mh.flags & MH_MFM_PRES)
+		packet_log("    MFM   present\n");
+	if (spuh->mh.flags & MH_BD_PRES)
+		packet_log("    BD    present\n");
+	if (spuh->mh.flags & MH_HASH_PRES)
+		packet_log("    HASH  present\n");
+	if (spuh->mh.flags & MH_SUPDT_PRES)
+		packet_log("    SUPDT present\n");
+	packet_log("    Opcode 0x%02x\n", spuh->mh.op_code);
+
+	ptr += sizeof(spuh->mh) + sizeof(spuh->emh);  /* skip emh. unused */
+
+	/* ========== Decode SCTX ========== */
+	if (spuh->mh.flags & MH_SCTX_PRES) {
+		pflags = be32_to_cpu(spuh->sa.proto_flags);
+		packet_log("  SCTX[0] 0x%08x\n", pflags);
+		sctx_size = pflags & SCTX_SIZE;
+		packet_log("    Size %u words\n", sctx_size);
+
+		cflags = be32_to_cpu(spuh->sa.cipher_flags);
+		packet_log("  SCTX[1] 0x%08x\n", cflags);
+		packet_log("    Inbound:%lu (1:decrypt/vrfy 0:encrypt/auth)\n",
+			   (cflags & CIPHER_INBOUND) >> CIPHER_INBOUND_SHIFT);
+		packet_log("    Order:%lu (1:AuthFirst 0:EncFirst)\n",
+			   (cflags & CIPHER_ORDER) >> CIPHER_ORDER_SHIFT);
+		packet_log("    ICV_IS_512:%lx\n",
+			   (cflags & ICV_IS_512) >> ICV_IS_512_SHIFT);
+		cipher_alg = (cflags & CIPHER_ALG) >> CIPHER_ALG_SHIFT;
+		cipher_mode = (cflags & CIPHER_MODE) >> CIPHER_MODE_SHIFT;
+		cipher_type = (cflags & CIPHER_TYPE) >> CIPHER_TYPE_SHIFT;
+		packet_log("    Crypto Alg:%u Mode:%u Type:%u\n",
+			   cipher_alg, cipher_mode, cipher_type);
+		hash_alg = (cflags & HASH_ALG) >> HASH_ALG_SHIFT;
+		hash_mode = (cflags & HASH_MODE) >> HASH_MODE_SHIFT;
+		hash_type = (cflags & HASH_TYPE) >> HASH_TYPE_SHIFT;
+		packet_log("    Hash   Alg:%x Mode:%x Type:%x\n",
+			   hash_alg, hash_mode, hash_type);
+		packet_log("    UPDT_Offset:%u\n", cflags & UPDT_OFST);
+
+		ecf = be32_to_cpu(spuh->sa.ecf);
+		packet_log("  SCTX[2] 0x%08x\n", ecf);
+		packet_log("    WriteICV:%lu CheckICV:%lu ICV_SIZE:%u ",
+			   (ecf & INSERT_ICV) >> INSERT_ICV_SHIFT,
+			   (ecf & CHECK_ICV) >> CHECK_ICV_SHIFT,
+			   (ecf & ICV_SIZE) >> ICV_SIZE_SHIFT);
+		packet_log("BD_SUPPRESS:%lu\n",
+			   (ecf & BD_SUPPRESS) >> BD_SUPPRESS_SHIFT);
+		packet_log("    SCTX_IV:%lu ExplicitIV:%lu GenIV:%lu ",
+			   (ecf & SCTX_IV) >> SCTX_IV_SHIFT,
+			   (ecf & EXPLICIT_IV) >> EXPLICIT_IV_SHIFT,
+			   (ecf & GEN_IV) >> GEN_IV_SHIFT);
+		packet_log("IV_OV_OFST:%lu EXP_IV_SIZE:%u\n",
+			   (ecf & IV_OFFSET) >> IV_OFFSET_SHIFT,
+			   ecf & EXP_IV_SIZE);
+
+		ptr += sizeof(struct SCTX);
+
+		if (hash_alg && hash_mode) {
+			char *name = "NONE";
+
+			switch (hash_alg) {
+			case HASH_ALG_MD5:
+				hash_key_len = 16;
+				name = "MD5";
+				break;
+			case HASH_ALG_SHA1:
+				hash_key_len = 20;
+				name = "SHA1";
+				break;
+			case HASH_ALG_SHA224:
+				hash_key_len = 28;
+				name = "SHA224";
+				break;
+			case HASH_ALG_SHA256:
+				hash_key_len = 32;
+				name = "SHA256";
+				break;
+			case HASH_ALG_SHA384:
+				hash_key_len = 48;
+				name = "SHA384";
+				break;
+			case HASH_ALG_SHA512:
+				hash_key_len = 64;
+				name = "SHA512";
+				break;
+			case HASH_ALG_AES:
+				hash_key_len = 0;
+				name = "AES";
+				break;
+			case HASH_ALG_NONE:
+				break;
+			}
+
+			packet_log("    Auth Key Type:%s Length:%u Bytes\n",
+				   name, hash_key_len);
+			packet_dump("    KEY: ", ptr, hash_key_len);
+			ptr += hash_key_len;
+		} else if ((hash_alg == HASH_ALG_AES) &&
+			   (hash_mode == HASH_MODE_XCBC)) {
+			char *name = "NONE";
+
+			switch (cipher_type) {
+			case CIPHER_TYPE_AES128:
+				hash_key_len = 16;
+				name = "AES128-XCBC";
+				break;
+			case CIPHER_TYPE_AES192:
+				hash_key_len = 24;
+				name = "AES192-XCBC";
+				break;
+			case CIPHER_TYPE_AES256:
+				hash_key_len = 32;
+				name = "AES256-XCBC";
+				break;
+			}
+			packet_log("    Auth Key Type:%s Length:%u Bytes\n",
+				   name, hash_key_len);
+			packet_dump("    KEY: ", ptr, hash_key_len);
+			ptr += hash_key_len;
+		}
+
+		if (hash_alg && (hash_mode == HASH_MODE_NONE) &&
+		    (hash_type == HASH_TYPE_UPDT)) {
+			char *name = "NONE";
+
+			switch (hash_alg) {
+			case HASH_ALG_MD5:
+				hash_state_len = 16;
+				name = "MD5";
+				break;
+			case HASH_ALG_SHA1:
+				hash_state_len = 20;
+				name = "SHA1";
+				break;
+			case HASH_ALG_SHA224:
+				hash_state_len = 32;
+				name = "SHA224";
+				break;
+			case HASH_ALG_SHA256:
+				hash_state_len = 32;
+				name = "SHA256";
+				break;
+			case HASH_ALG_SHA384:
+				hash_state_len = 48;
+				name = "SHA384";
+				break;
+			case HASH_ALG_SHA512:
+				hash_state_len = 64;
+				name = "SHA512";
+				break;
+			case HASH_ALG_AES:
+				hash_state_len = 0;
+				name = "AES";
+				break;
+			case HASH_ALG_NONE:
+				break;
+			}
+
+			packet_log("    Auth State Type:%s Length:%u Bytes\n",
+				   name, hash_state_len);
+			packet_dump("    State: ", ptr, hash_state_len);
+			ptr += hash_state_len;
+		}
+
+		if (cipher_alg) {
+			char *name = "NONE";
+
+			switch (cipher_alg) {
+			case CIPHER_ALG_DES:
+				cipher_key_len = 8;
+				name = "DES";
+				break;
+			case CIPHER_ALG_3DES:
+				cipher_key_len = 24;
+				name = "3DES";
+				break;
+			case CIPHER_ALG_RC4:
+				cipher_key_len = 260;
+				name = "ARC4";
+				break;
+			case CIPHER_ALG_AES:
+				switch (cipher_type) {
+				case CIPHER_TYPE_AES128:
+					cipher_key_len = 16;
+					name = "AES128";
+					break;
+				case CIPHER_TYPE_AES192:
+					cipher_key_len = 24;
+					name = "AES192";
+					break;
+				case CIPHER_TYPE_AES256:
+					cipher_key_len = 32;
+					name = "AES256";
+					break;
+				}
+				break;
+			case CIPHER_ALG_NONE:
+				break;
+			}
+
+			packet_log("    Cipher Key Type:%s Length:%u Bytes\n",
+				   name, cipher_key_len);
+
+			/* XTS has two keys */
+			if (cipher_mode == CIPHER_MODE_XTS) {
+				packet_dump("    KEY2: ", ptr, cipher_key_len);
+				ptr += cipher_key_len;
+				packet_dump("    KEY1: ", ptr, cipher_key_len);
+				ptr += cipher_key_len;
+
+				cipher_key_len *= 2;
+			} else {
+				packet_dump("    KEY: ", ptr, cipher_key_len);
+				ptr += cipher_key_len;
+			}
+
+			if (ecf & SCTX_IV) {
+				sctx_pl_len = sctx_size * sizeof(u32) -
+					sizeof(struct SCTX);
+				iv_len = sctx_pl_len -
+					(hash_key_len + hash_state_len +
+					 cipher_key_len);
+				packet_log("    IV Length:%u Bytes\n", iv_len);
+				packet_dump("    IV: ", ptr, iv_len);
+				ptr += iv_len;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* ========== Decode BDESC ========== */
+	if (spuh->mh.flags & MH_BDESC_PRES) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		struct BDESC_HEADER *bdesc = (struct BDESC_HEADER *)ptr;
+#endif
+		packet_log("  BDESC[0] 0x%08x\n", be32_to_cpu(*((u32 *)ptr)));
+		packet_log("    OffsetMAC:%u LengthMAC:%u\n",
+			   be16_to_cpu(bdesc->offset_mac),
+			   be16_to_cpu(bdesc->length_mac));
+		ptr += sizeof(u32);
+
+		packet_log("  BDESC[1] 0x%08x\n", be32_to_cpu(*((u32 *)ptr)));
+		packet_log("    OffsetCrypto:%u LengthCrypto:%u\n",
+			   be16_to_cpu(bdesc->offset_crypto),
+			   be16_to_cpu(bdesc->length_crypto));
+		ptr += sizeof(u32);
+
+		packet_log("  BDESC[2] 0x%08x\n", be32_to_cpu(*((u32 *)ptr)));
+		packet_log("    OffsetICV:%u OffsetIV:%u\n",
+			   be16_to_cpu(bdesc->offset_icv),
+			   be16_to_cpu(bdesc->offset_iv));
+		ptr += sizeof(u32);
+	}
+
+	/* ========== Decode BD ========== */
+	if (spuh->mh.flags & MH_BD_PRES) {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		struct BD_HEADER *bd = (struct BD_HEADER *)ptr;
+#endif
+		packet_log("  BD[0] 0x%08x\n", be32_to_cpu(*((u32 *)ptr)));
+		packet_log("    Size:%ubytes PrevLength:%u\n",
+			   be16_to_cpu(bd->size), be16_to_cpu(bd->prev_length));
+		ptr += 4;
+	}
+
+	/* Double check sanity */
+	if (buf + buf_len != ptr) {
+		packet_log(" Packet parsed incorrectly. ");
+		packet_log("buf:%p buf_len:%u buf+buf_len:%p ptr:%p\n",
+			   buf, buf_len, buf + buf_len, ptr);
+	}
+
+	packet_log("\n");
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_ns2_ctx_max_payload() - Determine the max length of the payload for a
+ * SPU message for a given cipher and hash alg context.
+ * @cipher_alg:		The cipher algorithm
+ * @cipher_mode:	The cipher mode
+ * @blocksize:		The size of a block of data for this algo
+ *
+ * The max payload must be a multiple of the blocksize so that if a request is
+ * too large to fit in a single SPU message, the request can be broken into
+ * max_payload sized chunks. Each chunk must be a multiple of blocksize.
+ *
+ * Return: Max payload length in bytes
+ */
+u32 spum_ns2_ctx_max_payload(enum spu_cipher_alg cipher_alg,
+			     enum spu_cipher_mode cipher_mode,
+			     unsigned int blocksize)
+{
+	u32 max_payload = SPUM_NS2_MAX_PAYLOAD;
+	u32 excess;
+
+	/* In XTS on SPU-M, we'll need to insert tweak before input data */
+	if (cipher_mode == CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+		max_payload -= SPU_XTS_TWEAK_SIZE;
+
+	excess = max_payload % blocksize;
+
+	return max_payload - excess;
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_nsp_ctx_max_payload() - Determine the max length of the payload for a
+ * SPU message for a given cipher and hash alg context.
+ * @cipher_alg:		The cipher algorithm
+ * @cipher_mode:	The cipher mode
+ * @blocksize:		The size of a block of data for this algo
+ *
+ * The max payload must be a multiple of the blocksize so that if a request is
+ * too large to fit in a single SPU message, the request can be broken into
+ * max_payload sized chunks. Each chunk must be a multiple of blocksize.
+ *
+ * Return: Max payload length in bytes
+ */
+u32 spum_nsp_ctx_max_payload(enum spu_cipher_alg cipher_alg,
+			     enum spu_cipher_mode cipher_mode,
+			     unsigned int blocksize)
+{
+	u32 max_payload = SPUM_NSP_MAX_PAYLOAD;
+	u32 excess;
+
+	/* In XTS on SPU-M, we'll need to insert tweak before input data */
+	if (cipher_mode == CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+		max_payload -= SPU_XTS_TWEAK_SIZE;
+
+	excess = max_payload % blocksize;
+
+	return max_payload - excess;
+}
+
+/** spum_payload_length() - Given a SPU-M message header, extract the payload
+ * length.
+ * @spu_hdr:	Start of SPU header
+ *
+ * Assumes just MH, EMH, BD (no SCTX, BDESC. Works for response frames.
+ *
+ * Return: payload length in bytes
+ */
+u32 spum_payload_length(u8 *spu_hdr)
+{
+	struct BD_HEADER *bd;
+	u32 pl_len;
+
+	/* Find BD header.  skip MH, EMH */
+	bd = (struct BD_HEADER *)(spu_hdr + 8);
+	pl_len = be16_to_cpu(bd->size);
+
+	return pl_len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_response_hdr_len() - Given the length of the hash key and encryption
+ * key, determine the expected length of a SPU response header.
+ * @auth_key_len:	authentication key length (bytes)
+ * @enc_key_len:	encryption key length (bytes)
+ * @is_hash:		true if response message is for a hash operation
+ *
+ * Return: length of SPU response header (bytes)
+ */
+u16 spum_response_hdr_len(u16 auth_key_len, u16 enc_key_len, bool is_hash)
+{
+	if (is_hash)
+		return SPU_HASH_RESP_HDR_LEN;
+	else
+		return SPU_RESP_HDR_LEN;
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_hash_pad_len() - Calculate the length of hash padding required to extend
+ * data to a full block size.
+ * @hash_alg:   hash algorithm
+ * @hash_mode:       hash mode
+ * @chunksize:  length of data, in bytes
+ * @hash_block_size:  size of a block of data for hash algorithm
+ *
+ * Reserve space for 1 byte (0x80) start of pad and the total length as u64
+ *
+ * Return:  length of hash pad in bytes
+ */
+u16 spum_hash_pad_len(enum hash_alg hash_alg, enum hash_mode hash_mode,
+		      u32 chunksize, u16 hash_block_size)
+{
+	unsigned int length_len;
+	unsigned int used_space_last_block;
+	int hash_pad_len;
+
+	/* AES-XCBC hash requires just padding to next block boundary */
+	if ((hash_alg == HASH_ALG_AES) && (hash_mode == HASH_MODE_XCBC)) {
+		used_space_last_block = chunksize % hash_block_size;
+		hash_pad_len = hash_block_size - used_space_last_block;
+		if (hash_pad_len >= hash_block_size)
+			hash_pad_len -= hash_block_size;
+		return hash_pad_len;
+	}
+
+	used_space_last_block = chunksize % hash_block_size + 1;
+	if ((hash_alg == HASH_ALG_SHA384) || (hash_alg == HASH_ALG_SHA512))
+		length_len = 2 * sizeof(u64);
+	else
+		length_len = sizeof(u64);
+
+	used_space_last_block += length_len;
+	hash_pad_len = hash_block_size - used_space_last_block;
+	if (hash_pad_len < 0)
+		hash_pad_len += hash_block_size;
+
+	hash_pad_len += 1 + length_len;
+	return hash_pad_len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_gcm_ccm_pad_len() - Determine the required length of GCM or CCM padding.
+ * @cipher_mode:	Algo type
+ * @data_size:		Length of plaintext (bytes)
+ *
+ * @Return: Length of padding, in bytes
+ */
+u32 spum_gcm_ccm_pad_len(enum spu_cipher_mode cipher_mode,
+			 unsigned int data_size)
+{
+	u32 pad_len = 0;
+	u32 m1 = SPU_GCM_CCM_ALIGN - 1;
+
+	if ((cipher_mode == CIPHER_MODE_GCM) ||
+	    (cipher_mode == CIPHER_MODE_CCM))
+		pad_len = ((data_size + m1) & ~m1) - data_size;
+
+	return pad_len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_assoc_resp_len() - Determine the size of the receive buffer required to
+ * catch associated data.
+ * @cipher_mode:	cipher mode
+ * @assoc_len:		length of associated data (bytes)
+ * @iv_len:		length of IV (bytes)
+ * @is_encrypt:		true if encrypting. false if decrypting.
+ *
+ * Return: length of associated data in response message (bytes)
+ */
+u32 spum_assoc_resp_len(enum spu_cipher_mode cipher_mode,
+			unsigned int assoc_len, unsigned int iv_len,
+			bool is_encrypt)
+{
+	u32 buflen = 0;
+	u32 pad;
+
+	if (assoc_len)
+		buflen = assoc_len;
+
+	if (cipher_mode == CIPHER_MODE_GCM) {
+		/* AAD needs to be padded in responses too */
+		pad = spum_gcm_ccm_pad_len(cipher_mode, buflen);
+		buflen += pad;
+	}
+	if (cipher_mode == CIPHER_MODE_CCM) {
+		/*
+		 * AAD needs to be padded in responses too
+		 * for CCM, len + 2 needs to be 128-bit aligned.
+		 */
+		pad = spum_gcm_ccm_pad_len(cipher_mode, buflen + 2);
+		buflen += pad;
+	}
+
+	return buflen;
+}
+
+/**
+ * spu_aead_ivlen() - Calculate the length of the AEAD IV to be included
+ * in a SPU request after the AAD and before the payload.
+ * @cipher_mode:  cipher mode
+ * @iv_ctr_len:   initialization vector length in bytes
+ *
+ * In Linux ~4.2 and later, the assoc_data sg includes the IV. So no need
+ * to include the IV as a separate field in the SPU request msg.
+ *
+ * Return: Length of AEAD IV in bytes
+ */
+u8 spum_aead_ivlen(enum spu_cipher_mode cipher_mode, u16 iv_len)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_hash_type() - Determine the type of hash operation.
+ * @src_sent:  The number of bytes in the current request that have already
+ *             been sent to the SPU to be hashed.
+ *
+ * We do not use HASH_TYPE_FULL for requests that fit in a single SPU message.
+ * Using FULL causes failures (such as when the string to be hashed is empty).
+ * For similar reasons, we never use HASH_TYPE_FIN. Instead, submit messages
+ * as INIT or UPDT and do the hash padding in sw.
+ */
+enum hash_type spum_hash_type(u32 src_sent)
+{
+	return src_sent ? HASH_TYPE_UPDT : HASH_TYPE_INIT;
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_digest_size() - Determine the size of a hash digest to expect the SPU to
+ * return.
+ * alg_digest_size: Number of bytes in the final digest for the given algo
+ * alg:             The hash algorithm
+ * htype:           Type of hash operation (init, update, full, etc)
+ *
+ * When doing incremental hashing for an algorithm with a truncated hash
+ * (e.g., SHA224), the SPU returns the full digest so that it can be fed back as
+ * a partial result for the next chunk.
+ */
+u32 spum_digest_size(u32 alg_digest_size, enum hash_alg alg,
+		     enum hash_type htype)
+{
+	u32 digestsize = alg_digest_size;
+
+	/* SPU returns complete digest when doing incremental hash and truncated
+	 * hash algo.
+	 */
+	if ((htype == HASH_TYPE_INIT) || (htype == HASH_TYPE_UPDT)) {
+		if (alg == HASH_ALG_SHA224)
+			digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+		else if (alg == HASH_ALG_SHA384)
+			digestsize = SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	}
+	return digestsize;
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_create_request() - Build a SPU request message header, up to and
+ * including the BD header. Construct the message starting at spu_hdr. Caller
+ * should allocate this buffer in DMA-able memory at least SPU_HEADER_ALLOC_LEN
+ * bytes long.
+ * @spu_hdr: Start of buffer where SPU request header is to be written
+ * @req_opts: SPU request message options
+ * @cipher_parms: Parameters related to cipher algorithm
+ * @hash_parms:   Parameters related to hash algorithm
+ * @aead_parms:   Parameters related to AEAD operation
+ * @data_size:    Length of data to be encrypted or authenticated. If AEAD, does
+ *		  not include length of AAD.
+
+ * Return: the length of the SPU header in bytes. 0 if an error occurs.
+ */
+u32 spum_create_request(u8 *spu_hdr,
+			struct spu_request_opts *req_opts,
+			struct spu_cipher_parms *cipher_parms,
+			struct spu_hash_parms *hash_parms,
+			struct spu_aead_parms *aead_parms,
+			unsigned int data_size)
+{
+	struct SPUHEADER *spuh;
+	struct BDESC_HEADER *bdesc;
+	struct BD_HEADER *bd;
+
+	u8 *ptr;
+	u32 protocol_bits = 0;
+	u32 cipher_bits = 0;
+	u32 ecf_bits = 0;
+	u8 sctx_words = 0;
+	unsigned int buf_len = 0;
+
+	/* size of the cipher payload */
+	unsigned int cipher_len = hash_parms->prebuf_len + data_size +
+				hash_parms->pad_len;
+
+	/* offset of prebuf or data from end of BD header */
+	unsigned int cipher_offset = aead_parms->assoc_size +
+		aead_parms->iv_len + aead_parms->aad_pad_len;
+
+	/* total size of the DB data (without STAT word padding) */
+	unsigned int real_db_size = spu_real_db_size(aead_parms->assoc_size,
+						 aead_parms->iv_len,
+						 hash_parms->prebuf_len,
+						 data_size,
+						 aead_parms->aad_pad_len,
+						 aead_parms->data_pad_len,
+						 hash_parms->pad_len);
+
+	unsigned int auth_offset = 0;
+	unsigned int offset_iv = 0;
+
+	/* size/offset of the auth payload */
+	unsigned int auth_len;
+
+	auth_len = real_db_size;
+
+	if (req_opts->is_aead && req_opts->is_inbound)
+		cipher_len -= hash_parms->digestsize;
+
+	if (req_opts->is_aead && req_opts->is_inbound)
+		auth_len -= hash_parms->digestsize;
+
+	if ((hash_parms->alg == HASH_ALG_AES) &&
+	    (hash_parms->mode == HASH_MODE_XCBC)) {
+		auth_len -= hash_parms->pad_len;
+		cipher_len -= hash_parms->pad_len;
+	}
+
+	flow_log("%s()\n", __func__);
+	flow_log("  in:%u authFirst:%u\n",
+		 req_opts->is_inbound, req_opts->auth_first);
+	flow_log("  %s. cipher alg:%u mode:%u type %u\n",
+		 spu_alg_name(cipher_parms->alg, cipher_parms->mode),
+		 cipher_parms->alg, cipher_parms->mode, cipher_parms->type);
+	flow_log("    key: %d\n", cipher_parms->key_len);
+	flow_dump("    key: ", cipher_parms->key_buf, cipher_parms->key_len);
+	flow_log("    iv: %d\n", cipher_parms->iv_len);
+	flow_dump("    iv: ", cipher_parms->iv_buf, cipher_parms->iv_len);
+	flow_log("  auth alg:%u mode:%u type %u\n",
+		 hash_parms->alg, hash_parms->mode, hash_parms->type);
+	flow_log("  digestsize: %u\n", hash_parms->digestsize);
+	flow_log("  authkey: %d\n", hash_parms->key_len);
+	flow_dump("  authkey: ", hash_parms->key_buf, hash_parms->key_len);
+	flow_log("  assoc_size:%u\n", aead_parms->assoc_size);
+	flow_log("  prebuf_len:%u\n", hash_parms->prebuf_len);
+	flow_log("  data_size:%u\n", data_size);
+	flow_log("  hash_pad_len:%u\n", hash_parms->pad_len);
+	flow_log("  real_db_size:%u\n", real_db_size);
+	flow_log(" auth_offset:%u auth_len:%u cipher_offset:%u cipher_len:%u\n",
+		 auth_offset, auth_len, cipher_offset, cipher_len);
+	flow_log("  aead_iv: %u\n", aead_parms->iv_len);
+
+	/* starting out: zero the header (plus some) */
+	ptr = spu_hdr;
+	memset(ptr, 0, sizeof(struct SPUHEADER));
+
+	/* format master header word */
+	/* Do not set the next bit even though the datasheet says to */
+	spuh = (struct SPUHEADER *)ptr;
+	ptr += sizeof(struct SPUHEADER);
+	buf_len += sizeof(struct SPUHEADER);
+
+	spuh->mh.op_code = SPU_CRYPTO_OPERATION_GENERIC;
+	spuh->mh.flags |= (MH_SCTX_PRES | MH_BDESC_PRES | MH_BD_PRES);
+
+	/* Format sctx word 0 (protocol_bits) */
+	sctx_words = 3;		/* size in words */
+
+	/* Format sctx word 1 (cipher_bits) */
+	if (req_opts->is_inbound)
+		cipher_bits |= CIPHER_INBOUND;
+	if (req_opts->auth_first)
+		cipher_bits |= CIPHER_ORDER;
+
+	/* Set the crypto parameters in the cipher.flags */
+	cipher_bits |= cipher_parms->alg << CIPHER_ALG_SHIFT;
+	cipher_bits |= cipher_parms->mode << CIPHER_MODE_SHIFT;
+	cipher_bits |= cipher_parms->type << CIPHER_TYPE_SHIFT;
+
+	/* Set the auth parameters in the cipher.flags */
+	cipher_bits |= hash_parms->alg << HASH_ALG_SHIFT;
+	cipher_bits |= hash_parms->mode << HASH_MODE_SHIFT;
+	cipher_bits |= hash_parms->type << HASH_TYPE_SHIFT;
+
+	/*
+	 * Format sctx extensions if required, and update main fields if
+	 * required)
+	 */
+	if (hash_parms->alg) {
+		/* Write the authentication key material if present */
+		if (hash_parms->key_len) {
+			memcpy(ptr, hash_parms->key_buf, hash_parms->key_len);
+			ptr += hash_parms->key_len;
+			buf_len += hash_parms->key_len;
+			sctx_words += hash_parms->key_len / 4;
+		}
+
+		if ((cipher_parms->mode == CIPHER_MODE_GCM) ||
+		    (cipher_parms->mode == CIPHER_MODE_CCM))
+			/* unpadded length */
+			offset_iv = aead_parms->assoc_size;
+
+		/* if GCM/CCM we need to write ICV into the payload */
+		if (!req_opts->is_inbound) {
+			if ((cipher_parms->mode == CIPHER_MODE_GCM) ||
+			    (cipher_parms->mode == CIPHER_MODE_CCM))
+				ecf_bits |= 1 << INSERT_ICV_SHIFT;
+		} else {
+			ecf_bits |= CHECK_ICV;
+		}
+
+		/* Inform the SPU of the ICV size (in words) */
+		if (hash_parms->digestsize == 64)
+			cipher_bits |= ICV_IS_512;
+		else
+			ecf_bits |=
+			(hash_parms->digestsize / 4) << ICV_SIZE_SHIFT;
+	}
+
+	if (req_opts->bd_suppress)
+		ecf_bits |= BD_SUPPRESS;
+
+	/* copy the encryption keys in the SAD entry */
+	if (cipher_parms->alg) {
+		if (cipher_parms->key_len) {
+			memcpy(ptr, cipher_parms->key_buf,
+			       cipher_parms->key_len);
+			ptr += cipher_parms->key_len;
+			buf_len += cipher_parms->key_len;
+			sctx_words += cipher_parms->key_len / 4;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * if encrypting then set IV size, use SCTX IV unless no IV
+		 * given here
+		 */
+		if (cipher_parms->iv_buf && cipher_parms->iv_len) {
+			/* Use SCTX IV */
+			ecf_bits |= SCTX_IV;
+
+			/* cipher iv provided so put it in here */
+			memcpy(ptr, cipher_parms->iv_buf, cipher_parms->iv_len);
+
+			ptr += cipher_parms->iv_len;
+			buf_len += cipher_parms->iv_len;
+			sctx_words += cipher_parms->iv_len / 4;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * RFC4543 (GMAC/ESP) requires data to be sent as part of AAD
+	 * so we need to override the BDESC parameters.
+	 */
+	if (req_opts->is_rfc4543) {
+		if (req_opts->is_inbound)
+			data_size -= hash_parms->digestsize;
+		offset_iv = aead_parms->assoc_size + data_size;
+		cipher_len = 0;
+		cipher_offset = offset_iv;
+		auth_len = cipher_offset + aead_parms->data_pad_len;
+	}
+
+	/* write in the total sctx length now that we know it */
+	protocol_bits |= sctx_words;
+
+	/* Endian adjust the SCTX */
+	spuh->sa.proto_flags = cpu_to_be32(protocol_bits);
+	spuh->sa.cipher_flags = cpu_to_be32(cipher_bits);
+	spuh->sa.ecf = cpu_to_be32(ecf_bits);
+
+	/* === create the BDESC section === */
+	bdesc = (struct BDESC_HEADER *)ptr;
+
+	bdesc->offset_mac = cpu_to_be16(auth_offset);
+	bdesc->length_mac = cpu_to_be16(auth_len);
+	bdesc->offset_crypto = cpu_to_be16(cipher_offset);
+	bdesc->length_crypto = cpu_to_be16(cipher_len);
+
+	/*
+	 * CCM in SPU-M requires that ICV not be in same 32-bit word as data or
+	 * padding.  So account for padding as necessary.
+	 */
+	if (cipher_parms->mode == CIPHER_MODE_CCM)
+		auth_len += spum_wordalign_padlen(auth_len);
+
+	bdesc->offset_icv = cpu_to_be16(auth_len);
+	bdesc->offset_iv = cpu_to_be16(offset_iv);
+
+	ptr += sizeof(struct BDESC_HEADER);
+	buf_len += sizeof(struct BDESC_HEADER);
+
+	/* === no MFM section === */
+
+	/* === create the BD section === */
+
+	/* add the BD header */
+	bd = (struct BD_HEADER *)ptr;
+	bd->size = cpu_to_be16(real_db_size);
+	bd->prev_length = 0;
+
+	ptr += sizeof(struct BD_HEADER);
+	buf_len += sizeof(struct BD_HEADER);
+
+	packet_dump("  SPU request header: ", spu_hdr, buf_len);
+
+	return buf_len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_cipher_req_init() - Build a SPU request message header, up to and
+ * including the BD header.
+ * @spu_hdr:      Start of SPU request header (MH)
+ * @cipher_parms: Parameters that describe the cipher request
+ *
+ * Construct the message starting at spu_hdr. Caller should allocate this buffer
+ * in DMA-able memory at least SPU_HEADER_ALLOC_LEN bytes long.
+ *
+ * Return: the length of the SPU header in bytes. 0 if an error occurs.
+ */
+u16 spum_cipher_req_init(u8 *spu_hdr, struct spu_cipher_parms *cipher_parms)
+{
+	struct SPUHEADER *spuh;
+	u32 protocol_bits = 0;
+	u32 cipher_bits = 0;
+	u32 ecf_bits = 0;
+	u8 sctx_words = 0;
+	u8 *ptr = spu_hdr;
+
+	flow_log("%s()\n", __func__);
+	flow_log("  cipher alg:%u mode:%u type %u\n", cipher_parms->alg,
+		 cipher_parms->mode, cipher_parms->type);
+	flow_log("  cipher_iv_len: %u\n", cipher_parms->iv_len);
+	flow_log("    key: %d\n", cipher_parms->key_len);
+	flow_dump("    key: ", cipher_parms->key_buf, cipher_parms->key_len);
+
+	/* starting out: zero the header (plus some) */
+	memset(spu_hdr, 0, sizeof(struct SPUHEADER));
+	ptr += sizeof(struct SPUHEADER);
+
+	/* format master header word */
+	/* Do not set the next bit even though the datasheet says to */
+	spuh = (struct SPUHEADER *)spu_hdr;
+
+	spuh->mh.op_code = SPU_CRYPTO_OPERATION_GENERIC;
+	spuh->mh.flags |= (MH_SCTX_PRES | MH_BDESC_PRES | MH_BD_PRES);
+
+	/* Format sctx word 0 (protocol_bits) */
+	sctx_words = 3;		/* size in words */
+
+	/* copy the encryption keys in the SAD entry */
+	if (cipher_parms->alg) {
+		if (cipher_parms->key_len) {
+			ptr += cipher_parms->key_len;
+			sctx_words += cipher_parms->key_len / 4;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * if encrypting then set IV size, use SCTX IV unless no IV
+		 * given here
+		 */
+		if (cipher_parms->iv_len) {
+			/* Use SCTX IV */
+			ecf_bits |= SCTX_IV;
+			ptr += cipher_parms->iv_len;
+			sctx_words += cipher_parms->iv_len / 4;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Set the crypto parameters in the cipher.flags */
+	cipher_bits |= cipher_parms->alg << CIPHER_ALG_SHIFT;
+	cipher_bits |= cipher_parms->mode << CIPHER_MODE_SHIFT;
+	cipher_bits |= cipher_parms->type << CIPHER_TYPE_SHIFT;
+
+	/* copy the encryption keys in the SAD entry */
+	if (cipher_parms->alg && cipher_parms->key_len)
+		memcpy(spuh + 1, cipher_parms->key_buf, cipher_parms->key_len);
+
+	/* write in the total sctx length now that we know it */
+	protocol_bits |= sctx_words;
+
+	/* Endian adjust the SCTX */
+	spuh->sa.proto_flags = cpu_to_be32(protocol_bits);
+
+	/* Endian adjust the SCTX */
+	spuh->sa.cipher_flags = cpu_to_be32(cipher_bits);
+	spuh->sa.ecf = cpu_to_be32(ecf_bits);
+
+	packet_dump("  SPU request header: ", spu_hdr,
+		    sizeof(struct SPUHEADER));
+
+	return sizeof(struct SPUHEADER) + cipher_parms->key_len +
+		cipher_parms->iv_len + sizeof(struct BDESC_HEADER) +
+		sizeof(struct BD_HEADER);
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_cipher_req_finish() - Finish building a SPU request message header for a
+ * block cipher request. Assumes much of the header was already filled in at
+ * setkey() time in spu_cipher_req_init().
+ * @spu_hdr:         Start of the request message header (MH field)
+ * @spu_req_hdr_len: Length in bytes of the SPU request header
+ * @isInbound:       0 encrypt, 1 decrypt
+ * @cipher_parms:    Parameters describing cipher operation to be performed
+ * @update_key:      If true, rewrite the cipher key in SCTX
+ * @data_size:       Length of the data in the BD field
+ *
+ * Assumes much of the header was already filled in at setkey() time in
+ * spum_cipher_req_init().
+ * spum_cipher_req_init() fills in the encryption key. For RC4, when submitting
+ * a request for a non-first chunk, we use the 260-byte SUPDT field from the
+ * previous response as the key. update_key is true for this case. Unused in all
+ * other cases.
+ */
+void spum_cipher_req_finish(u8 *spu_hdr,
+			    u16 spu_req_hdr_len,
+			    unsigned int is_inbound,
+			    struct spu_cipher_parms *cipher_parms,
+			    bool update_key,
+			    unsigned int data_size)
+{
+	struct SPUHEADER *spuh;
+	struct BDESC_HEADER *bdesc;
+	struct BD_HEADER *bd;
+	u8 *bdesc_ptr = spu_hdr + spu_req_hdr_len -
+	    (sizeof(struct BD_HEADER) + sizeof(struct BDESC_HEADER));
+
+	u32 cipher_bits;
+
+	flow_log("%s()\n", __func__);
+	flow_log(" in: %u\n", is_inbound);
+	flow_log(" cipher alg: %u, cipher_type: %u\n", cipher_parms->alg,
+		 cipher_parms->type);
+	if (update_key) {
+		flow_log(" cipher key len: %u\n", cipher_parms->key_len);
+		flow_dump("  key: ", cipher_parms->key_buf,
+			  cipher_parms->key_len);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * In XTS mode, API puts "i" parameter (block tweak) in IV.  For
+	 * SPU-M, should be in start of the BD; tx_sg_create() copies it there.
+	 * IV in SPU msg for SPU-M should be 0, since that's the "j" parameter
+	 * (block ctr within larger data unit) - given we can send entire disk
+	 * block (<= 4KB) in 1 SPU msg, don't need to use this parameter.
+	 */
+	if (cipher_parms->mode == CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+		memset(cipher_parms->iv_buf, 0, cipher_parms->iv_len);
+
+	flow_log(" iv len: %d\n", cipher_parms->iv_len);
+	flow_dump("    iv: ", cipher_parms->iv_buf, cipher_parms->iv_len);
+	flow_log(" data_size: %u\n", data_size);
+
+	/* format master header word */
+	/* Do not set the next bit even though the datasheet says to */
+	spuh = (struct SPUHEADER *)spu_hdr;
+
+	/* cipher_bits was initialized at setkey time */
+	cipher_bits = be32_to_cpu(spuh->sa.cipher_flags);
+
+	/* Format sctx word 1 (cipher_bits) */
+	if (is_inbound)
+		cipher_bits |= CIPHER_INBOUND;
+	else
+		cipher_bits &= ~CIPHER_INBOUND;
+
+	/* update encryption key for RC4 on non-first chunk */
+	if (update_key) {
+		spuh->sa.cipher_flags |=
+			cipher_parms->type << CIPHER_TYPE_SHIFT;
+		memcpy(spuh + 1, cipher_parms->key_buf, cipher_parms->key_len);
+	}
+
+	if (cipher_parms->alg && cipher_parms->iv_buf && cipher_parms->iv_len)
+		/* cipher iv provided so put it in here */
+		memcpy(bdesc_ptr - cipher_parms->iv_len, cipher_parms->iv_buf,
+		       cipher_parms->iv_len);
+
+	spuh->sa.cipher_flags = cpu_to_be32(cipher_bits);
+
+	/* === create the BDESC section === */
+	bdesc = (struct BDESC_HEADER *)bdesc_ptr;
+	bdesc->offset_mac = 0;
+	bdesc->length_mac = 0;
+	bdesc->offset_crypto = 0;
+
+	/* XTS mode, data_size needs to include tweak parameter */
+	if (cipher_parms->mode == CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+		bdesc->length_crypto = cpu_to_be16(data_size +
+						  SPU_XTS_TWEAK_SIZE);
+	else
+		bdesc->length_crypto = cpu_to_be16(data_size);
+
+	bdesc->offset_icv = 0;
+	bdesc->offset_iv = 0;
+
+	/* === no MFM section === */
+
+	/* === create the BD section === */
+	/* add the BD header */
+	bd = (struct BD_HEADER *)(bdesc_ptr + sizeof(struct BDESC_HEADER));
+	bd->size = cpu_to_be16(data_size);
+
+	/* XTS mode, data_size needs to include tweak parameter */
+	if (cipher_parms->mode == CIPHER_MODE_XTS)
+		bd->size = cpu_to_be16(data_size + SPU_XTS_TWEAK_SIZE);
+	else
+		bd->size = cpu_to_be16(data_size);
+
+	bd->prev_length = 0;
+
+	packet_dump("  SPU request header: ", spu_hdr, spu_req_hdr_len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_request_pad() - Create pad bytes at the end of the data.
+ * @pad_start:		Start of buffer where pad bytes are to be written
+ * @gcm_ccm_padding:	length of GCM/CCM padding, in bytes
+ * @hash_pad_len:	Number of bytes of padding extend data to full block
+ * @auth_alg:		authentication algorithm
+ * @auth_mode:		authentication mode
+ * @total_sent:		length inserted at end of hash pad
+ * @status_padding:	Number of bytes of padding to align STATUS word
+ *
+ * There may be three forms of pad:
+ *  1. GCM/CCM pad - for GCM/CCM mode ciphers, pad to 16-byte alignment
+ *  2. hash pad - pad to a block length, with 0x80 data terminator and
+ *                size at the end
+ *  3. STAT pad - to ensure the STAT field is 4-byte aligned
+ */
+void spum_request_pad(u8 *pad_start,
+		      u32 gcm_ccm_padding,
+		      u32 hash_pad_len,
+		      enum hash_alg auth_alg,
+		      enum hash_mode auth_mode,
+		      unsigned int total_sent, u32 status_padding)
+{
+	u8 *ptr = pad_start;
+
+	/* fix data alignent for GCM/CCM */
+	if (gcm_ccm_padding > 0) {
+		flow_log("  GCM: padding to 16 byte alignment: %u bytes\n",
+			 gcm_ccm_padding);
+		memset(ptr, 0, gcm_ccm_padding);
+		ptr += gcm_ccm_padding;
+	}
+
+	if (hash_pad_len > 0) {
+		/* clear the padding section */
+		memset(ptr, 0, hash_pad_len);
+
+		if ((auth_alg == HASH_ALG_AES) &&
+		    (auth_mode == HASH_MODE_XCBC)) {
+			/* AES/XCBC just requires padding to be 0s */
+			ptr += hash_pad_len;
+		} else {
+			/* terminate the data */
+			*ptr = 0x80;
+			ptr += (hash_pad_len - sizeof(u64));
+
+			/* add the size at the end as required per alg */
+			if (auth_alg == HASH_ALG_MD5)
+				*(u64 *)ptr = cpu_to_le64((u64)total_sent * 8);
+			else		/* SHA1, SHA2-224, SHA2-256 */
+				*(u64 *)ptr = cpu_to_be64((u64)total_sent * 8);
+			ptr += sizeof(u64);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* pad to a 4byte alignment for STAT */
+	if (status_padding > 0) {
+		flow_log("  STAT: padding to 4 byte alignment: %u bytes\n",
+			 status_padding);
+
+		memset(ptr, 0, status_padding);
+		ptr += status_padding;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_xts_tweak_in_payload() - Indicate that SPUM DOES place the XTS tweak
+ * field in the packet payload (rather than using IV)
+ *
+ * Return: 1
+ */
+u8 spum_xts_tweak_in_payload(void)
+{
+	return 1;
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_tx_status_len() - Return the length of the STATUS field in a SPU
+ * response message.
+ *
+ * Return: Length of STATUS field in bytes.
+ */
+u8 spum_tx_status_len(void)
+{
+	return SPU_TX_STATUS_LEN;
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_rx_status_len() - Return the length of the STATUS field in a SPU
+ * response message.
+ *
+ * Return: Length of STATUS field in bytes.
+ */
+u8 spum_rx_status_len(void)
+{
+	return SPU_RX_STATUS_LEN;
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_status_process() - Process the status from a SPU response message.
+ * @statp:  start of STATUS word
+ * Return:
+ *   0 - if status is good and response should be processed
+ *   !0 - status indicates an error and response is invalid
+ */
+int spum_status_process(u8 *statp)
+{
+	u32 status;
+
+	status = __be32_to_cpu(*(__be32 *)statp);
+	flow_log("SPU response STATUS %#08x\n", status);
+	if (status & SPU_STATUS_ERROR_FLAG) {
+		pr_err("%s() Warning: Error result from SPU: %#08x\n",
+		       __func__, status);
+		if (status & SPU_STATUS_INVALID_ICV)
+			return SPU_INVALID_ICV;
+		return -EBADMSG;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_ccm_update_iv() - Update the IV as per the requirements for CCM mode.
+ *
+ * @digestsize:		Digest size of this request
+ * @cipher_parms:	(pointer to) cipher parmaeters, includes IV buf & IV len
+ * @assoclen:		Length of AAD data
+ * @chunksize:		length of input data to be sent in this req
+ * @is_encrypt:		true if this is an output/encrypt operation
+ * @is_esp:		true if this is an ESP / RFC4309 operation
+ *
+ */
+void spum_ccm_update_iv(unsigned int digestsize,
+			struct spu_cipher_parms *cipher_parms,
+			unsigned int assoclen,
+			unsigned int chunksize,
+			bool is_encrypt,
+			bool is_esp)
+{
+	u8 L;		/* L from CCM algorithm, length of plaintext data */
+	u8 mprime;	/* M' from CCM algo, (M - 2) / 2, where M=authsize */
+	u8 adata;
+
+	if (cipher_parms->iv_len != CCM_AES_IV_SIZE) {
+		pr_err("%s(): Invalid IV len %d for CCM mode, should be %d\n",
+		       __func__, cipher_parms->iv_len, CCM_AES_IV_SIZE);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * IV needs to be formatted as follows:
+	 *
+	 * |          Byte 0               | Bytes 1 - N | Bytes (N+1) - 15 |
+	 * | 7 | 6 | 5 | 4 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | Bits 7 - 0  |    Bits 7 - 0    |
+	 * | 0 |Ad?|(M - 2) / 2|   L - 1   |    Nonce    | Plaintext Length |
+	 *
+	 * Ad? = 1 if AAD present, 0 if not present
+	 * M = size of auth field, 8, 12, or 16 bytes (SPU-M) -or-
+	 *                         4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16 bytes (SPU2)
+	 * L = Size of Plaintext Length field; Nonce size = 15 - L
+	 *
+	 * It appears that the crypto API already expects the L-1 portion
+	 * to be set in the first byte of the IV, which implicitly determines
+	 * the nonce size, and also fills in the nonce.  But the other bits
+	 * in byte 0 as well as the plaintext length need to be filled in.
+	 *
+	 * In rfc4309/esp mode, L is not already in the supplied IV and
+	 * we need to fill it in, as well as move the IV data to be after
+	 * the salt
+	 */
+	if (is_esp) {
+		L = CCM_ESP_L_VALUE;	/* RFC4309 has fixed L */
+	} else {
+		/* L' = plaintext length - 1 so Plaintext length is L' + 1 */
+		L = ((cipher_parms->iv_buf[0] & CCM_B0_L_PRIME) >>
+		      CCM_B0_L_PRIME_SHIFT) + 1;
+	}
+
+	mprime = (digestsize - 2) >> 1;  /* M' = (M - 2) / 2 */
+	adata = (assoclen > 0);  /* adata = 1 if any associated data */
+
+	cipher_parms->iv_buf[0] = (adata << CCM_B0_ADATA_SHIFT) |
+				  (mprime << CCM_B0_M_PRIME_SHIFT) |
+				  ((L - 1) << CCM_B0_L_PRIME_SHIFT);
+
+	/* Nonce is already filled in by crypto API, and is 15 - L bytes */
+
+	/* Don't include digest in plaintext size when decrypting */
+	if (!is_encrypt)
+		chunksize -= digestsize;
+
+	/* Fill in length of plaintext, formatted to be L bytes long */
+	format_value_ccm(chunksize, &cipher_parms->iv_buf[15 - L + 1], L);
+}
+
+/**
+ * spum_wordalign_padlen() - Given the length of a data field, determine the
+ * padding required to align the data following this field on a 4-byte boundary.
+ * @data_size: length of data field in bytes
+ *
+ * Return: length of status field padding, in bytes
+ */
+u32 spum_wordalign_padlen(u32 data_size)
+{
+	return ((data_size + 3) & ~3) - data_size;
+}