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Diffstat (limited to 'servers/slapd/saslauthz.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | servers/slapd/saslauthz.c | 2101 |
1 files changed, 2101 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/servers/slapd/saslauthz.c b/servers/slapd/saslauthz.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d80370f --- /dev/null +++ b/servers/slapd/saslauthz.c @@ -0,0 +1,2101 @@ +/* $OpenLDAP$ */ +/* This work is part of OpenLDAP Software <http://www.openldap.org/>. + * + * Copyright 1998-2018 The OpenLDAP Foundation. + * Portions Copyright 2000 Mark Adamson, Carnegie Mellon. + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted only as authorized by the OpenLDAP + * Public License. + * + * A copy of this license is available in the file LICENSE in the + * top-level directory of the distribution or, alternatively, at + * <http://www.OpenLDAP.org/license.html>. + */ + +#include "portable.h" + +#include <stdio.h> +#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H +#include <limits.h> +#endif + +#include <ac/stdlib.h> +#include <ac/string.h> +#include <ac/ctype.h> + +#include "slap.h" + +#include "lutil.h" + +#define SASLREGEX_REPLACE 10 + +#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT ((ber_int_t) 0x0010) +#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX ((ber_int_t) 0x0020) +#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN ((ber_int_t) 0x0030) +#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE ((ber_int_t) 0x0040) +#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL ((ber_int_t) 0x0050) +#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_GROUP ((ber_int_t) 0x0060) +#define LDAP_X_SCOPE_USERS ((ber_int_t) 0x0070) + +/* + * IDs in DNauthzid form can now have a type specifier, that + * influences how they are used in related operations. + * + * syntax: dn[.{exact|regex}]:<val> + * + * dn.exact: the value must pass normalization and is used + * in exact DN match. + * dn.regex: the value is treated as a regular expression + * in matching DN values in authz{To|From} + * attributes. + * dn: for backwards compatibility reasons, the value + * is treated as a regular expression, and thus + * it is not normalized nor validated; it is used + * in exact or regex comparisons based on the + * context. + * + * IDs in DNauthzid form can now have a type specifier, that + * influences how they are used in related operations. + * + * syntax: u[.mech[/realm]]:<val> + * + * where mech is a SIMPLE, AUTHZ, or a SASL mechanism name + * and realm is mechanism specific realm (separate to those + * which are representable as part of the principal). + */ + +typedef struct sasl_regexp { + char *sr_match; /* regexp match pattern */ + char *sr_replace; /* regexp replace pattern */ + regex_t sr_workspace; /* workspace for regexp engine */ + int sr_offset[SASLREGEX_REPLACE+2]; /* offsets of $1,$2... in *replace */ +} SaslRegexp_t; + +static int nSaslRegexp = 0; +static SaslRegexp_t *SaslRegexp = NULL; + +#ifdef SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE +#include "rewrite.h" +struct rewrite_info *sasl_rwinfo = NULL; +#define AUTHID_CONTEXT "authid" +#endif /* SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE */ + +/* What SASL proxy authorization policies are allowed? */ +#define SASL_AUTHZ_NONE 0x00 +#define SASL_AUTHZ_FROM 0x01 +#define SASL_AUTHZ_TO 0x02 +#define SASL_AUTHZ_AND 0x10 + +static const char *policy_txt[] = { + "none", "from", "to", "any" +}; + +static int authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_NONE; + +static int +slap_sasl_match( Operation *opx, struct berval *rule, + struct berval *assertDN, struct berval *authc ); + +int slap_sasl_setpolicy( const char *arg ) +{ + int rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + + if ( strcasecmp( arg, "none" ) == 0 ) { + authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_NONE; + } else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "from" ) == 0 ) { + authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_FROM; + } else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "to" ) == 0 ) { + authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_TO; + } else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "both" ) == 0 || strcasecmp( arg, "any" ) == 0 ) { + authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_FROM | SASL_AUTHZ_TO; + } else if ( strcasecmp( arg, "all" ) == 0 ) { + authz_policy = SASL_AUTHZ_FROM | SASL_AUTHZ_TO | SASL_AUTHZ_AND; + } else { + rc = LDAP_OTHER; + } + return rc; +} + +const char * slap_sasl_getpolicy() +{ + if ( authz_policy == (SASL_AUTHZ_FROM | SASL_AUTHZ_TO | SASL_AUTHZ_AND) ) + return "all"; + else + return policy_txt[authz_policy]; +} + +int slap_parse_user( struct berval *id, struct berval *user, + struct berval *realm, struct berval *mech ) +{ + char u; + + assert( id != NULL ); + assert( !BER_BVISNULL( id ) ); + assert( user != NULL ); + assert( realm != NULL ); + assert( mech != NULL ); + + u = id->bv_val[ 0 ]; + + if ( u != 'u' && u != 'U' ) { + /* called with something other than u: */ + return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR; + } + + /* uauthzid form: + * u[.mech[/realm]]:user + */ + + user->bv_val = ber_bvchr( id, ':' ); + if ( BER_BVISNULL( user ) ) { + return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR; + } + user->bv_val[ 0 ] = '\0'; + user->bv_val++; + user->bv_len = id->bv_len - ( user->bv_val - id->bv_val ); + + mech->bv_val = ber_bvchr( id, '.' ); + if ( !BER_BVISNULL( mech ) ) { + mech->bv_val[ 0 ] = '\0'; + mech->bv_val++; + mech->bv_len = user->bv_val - mech->bv_val - 1; + + realm->bv_val = ber_bvchr( mech, '/' ); + + if ( !BER_BVISNULL( realm ) ) { + realm->bv_val[ 0 ] = '\0'; + realm->bv_val++; + mech->bv_len = realm->bv_val - mech->bv_val - 1; + realm->bv_len = user->bv_val - realm->bv_val - 1; + } + + } else { + BER_BVZERO( realm ); + } + + if ( id->bv_val[ 1 ] != '\0' ) { + return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR; + } + + if ( !BER_BVISNULL( mech ) ) { + assert( mech->bv_val == id->bv_val + 2 ); + + AC_MEMCPY( mech->bv_val - 2, mech->bv_val, mech->bv_len + 1 ); + mech->bv_val -= 2; + } + + if ( !BER_BVISNULL( realm ) ) { + assert( realm->bv_val >= id->bv_val + 2 ); + + AC_MEMCPY( realm->bv_val - 2, realm->bv_val, realm->bv_len + 1 ); + realm->bv_val -= 2; + } + + /* leave "u:" before user */ + user->bv_val -= 2; + user->bv_len += 2; + user->bv_val[ 0 ] = u; + user->bv_val[ 1 ] = ':'; + + return LDAP_SUCCESS; +} + +int +authzValidate( + Syntax *syntax, + struct berval *in ) +{ + struct berval bv; + int rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + LDAPURLDesc *ludp = NULL; + int scope = -1; + + /* + * 1) <DN> + * 2) dn[.{exact|children|subtree|onelevel}]:{*|<DN>} + * 3) dn.regex:<pattern> + * 4) u[.mech[/realm]]:<ID> + * 5) group[/<groupClass>[/<memberAttr>]]:<DN> + * 6) <URL> + */ + + assert( in != NULL ); + assert( !BER_BVISNULL( in ) ); + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "authzValidate: parsing %s\n", in->bv_val, 0, 0 ); + + /* + * 2) dn[.{exact|children|subtree|onelevel}]:{*|<DN>} + * 3) dn.regex:<pattern> + * + * <DN> must pass DN normalization + */ + if ( !strncasecmp( in->bv_val, "dn", STRLENOF( "dn" ) ) ) { + bv.bv_val = in->bv_val + STRLENOF( "dn" ); + + if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] == '.' ) { + bv.bv_val++; + + if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "exact:", STRLENOF( "exact:" ) ) ) { + bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "exact:" ); + scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT; + + } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "regex:", STRLENOF( "regex:" ) ) ) { + bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "regex:" ); + scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX; + + } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "children:", STRLENOF( "children:" ) ) ) { + bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "children:" ); + scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN; + + } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "subtree:", STRLENOF( "subtree:" ) ) ) { + bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "subtree:" ); + scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE; + + } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "onelevel:", STRLENOF( "onelevel:" ) ) ) { + bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "onelevel:" ); + scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL; + + } else { + return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + } + + } else { + if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] != ':' ) { + return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + } + scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT; + bv.bv_val++; + } + + bv.bv_val += strspn( bv.bv_val, " " ); + /* jump here in case no type specification was present + * and uri was not an URI... HEADS-UP: assuming EXACT */ +is_dn: bv.bv_len = in->bv_len - ( bv.bv_val - in->bv_val ); + + /* a single '*' means any DN without using regexes */ + if ( ber_bvccmp( &bv, '*' ) ) { + /* LDAP_X_SCOPE_USERS */ + return LDAP_SUCCESS; + } + + switch ( scope ) { + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT: + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN: + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE: + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL: + return dnValidate( NULL, &bv ); + + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX: + return LDAP_SUCCESS; + } + + return rc; + + /* + * 4) u[.mech[/realm]]:<ID> + */ + } else if ( ( in->bv_val[ 0 ] == 'u' || in->bv_val[ 0 ] == 'U' ) + && ( in->bv_val[ 1 ] == ':' + || in->bv_val[ 1 ] == '/' + || in->bv_val[ 1 ] == '.' ) ) + { + char buf[ SLAP_LDAPDN_MAXLEN ]; + struct berval id, + user = BER_BVNULL, + realm = BER_BVNULL, + mech = BER_BVNULL; + + if ( sizeof( buf ) <= in->bv_len ) { + return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + } + + id.bv_len = in->bv_len; + id.bv_val = buf; + strncpy( buf, in->bv_val, sizeof( buf ) ); + + rc = slap_parse_user( &id, &user, &realm, &mech ); + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + } + + return rc; + + /* + * 5) group[/groupClass[/memberAttr]]:<DN> + * + * <groupClass> defaults to "groupOfNames" + * <memberAttr> defaults to "member" + * + * <DN> must pass DN normalization + */ + } else if ( strncasecmp( in->bv_val, "group", STRLENOF( "group" ) ) == 0 ) + { + struct berval group_dn = BER_BVNULL, + group_oc = BER_BVNULL, + member_at = BER_BVNULL; + + bv.bv_val = in->bv_val + STRLENOF( "group" ); + bv.bv_len = in->bv_len - STRLENOF( "group" ); + group_dn.bv_val = ber_bvchr( &bv, ':' ); + if ( group_dn.bv_val == NULL ) { + /* last chance: assume it's a(n exact) DN ... */ + bv.bv_val = in->bv_val; + scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT; + goto is_dn; + } + + /* + * FIXME: we assume that "member" and "groupOfNames" + * are present in schema... + */ + if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] == '/' ) { + group_oc.bv_val = &bv.bv_val[ 1 ]; + group_oc.bv_len = group_dn.bv_val - group_oc.bv_val; + + member_at.bv_val = ber_bvchr( &group_oc, '/' ); + if ( member_at.bv_val ) { + AttributeDescription *ad = NULL; + const char *text = NULL; + + group_oc.bv_len = member_at.bv_val - group_oc.bv_val; + member_at.bv_val++; + member_at.bv_len = group_dn.bv_val - member_at.bv_val; + rc = slap_bv2ad( &member_at, &ad, &text ); + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + return rc; + } + } + + if ( oc_bvfind( &group_oc ) == NULL ) { + return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + } + } + + group_dn.bv_val++; + group_dn.bv_len = in->bv_len - ( group_dn.bv_val - in->bv_val ); + + rc = dnValidate( NULL, &group_dn ); + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + return rc; + } + + return rc; + } + + /* + * ldap:///<base>??<scope>?<filter> + * <scope> ::= {base|one|subtree} + * + * <scope> defaults to "base" + * <base> must pass DN normalization + * <filter> must pass str2filter() + */ + rc = ldap_url_parse( in->bv_val, &ludp ); + switch ( rc ) { + case LDAP_URL_SUCCESS: + /* FIXME: the check is pedantic, but I think it's necessary, + * because people tend to use things like ldaps:// which + * gives the idea SSL is being used. Maybe we could + * accept ldapi:// as well, but the point is that we use + * an URL as an easy means to define bits of a search with + * little parsing. + */ + if ( strcasecmp( ludp->lud_scheme, "ldap" ) != 0 ) { + /* + * must be ldap:/// + */ + rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + goto done; + } + break; + + case LDAP_URL_ERR_BADSCHEME: + /* + * last chance: assume it's a(n exact) DN ... + * + * NOTE: must pass DN normalization + */ + ldap_free_urldesc( ludp ); + bv.bv_val = in->bv_val; + scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT; + goto is_dn; + + default: + rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + goto done; + } + + if ( ( ludp->lud_host && *ludp->lud_host ) + || ludp->lud_attrs || ludp->lud_exts ) + { + /* host part must be empty */ + /* attrs and extensions parts must be empty */ + rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + goto done; + } + + /* Grab the filter */ + if ( ludp->lud_filter ) { + Filter *f = str2filter( ludp->lud_filter ); + if ( f == NULL ) { + rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + goto done; + } + filter_free( f ); + } + + /* Grab the searchbase */ + assert( ludp->lud_dn != NULL ); + ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_dn, 0, 0, &bv ); + rc = dnValidate( NULL, &bv ); + +done: + ldap_free_urldesc( ludp ); + return( rc ); +} + +static int +authzPrettyNormal( + struct berval *val, + struct berval *normalized, + void *ctx, + int normalize ) +{ + struct berval bv; + int rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + LDAPURLDesc *ludp = NULL; + char *lud_dn = NULL, + *lud_filter = NULL; + int scope = -1; + + /* + * 1) <DN> + * 2) dn[.{exact|children|subtree|onelevel}]:{*|<DN>} + * 3) dn.regex:<pattern> + * 4) u[.mech[/realm]]:<ID> + * 5) group[/<groupClass>[/<memberAttr>]]:<DN> + * 6) <URL> + */ + + assert( val != NULL ); + assert( !BER_BVISNULL( val ) ); + + /* + * 2) dn[.{exact|children|subtree|onelevel}]:{*|<DN>} + * 3) dn.regex:<pattern> + * + * <DN> must pass DN normalization + */ + if ( !strncasecmp( val->bv_val, "dn", STRLENOF( "dn" ) ) ) { + struct berval out = BER_BVNULL, + prefix = BER_BVNULL; + char *ptr; + + bv.bv_val = val->bv_val + STRLENOF( "dn" ); + + if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] == '.' ) { + bv.bv_val++; + + if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "exact:", STRLENOF( "exact:" ) ) ) { + bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "exact:" ); + scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT; + + } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "regex:", STRLENOF( "regex:" ) ) ) { + bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "regex:" ); + scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX; + + } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "children:", STRLENOF( "children:" ) ) ) { + bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "children:" ); + scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN; + + } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "subtree:", STRLENOF( "subtree:" ) ) ) { + bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "subtree:" ); + scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE; + + } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "onelevel:", STRLENOF( "onelevel:" ) ) ) { + bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "onelevel:" ); + scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL; + + } else { + return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + } + + } else { + if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] != ':' ) { + return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + } + scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT; + bv.bv_val++; + } + + bv.bv_val += strspn( bv.bv_val, " " ); + /* jump here in case no type specification was present + * and uri was not an URI... HEADS-UP: assuming EXACT */ +is_dn: bv.bv_len = val->bv_len - ( bv.bv_val - val->bv_val ); + + /* a single '*' means any DN without using regexes */ + if ( ber_bvccmp( &bv, '*' ) ) { + ber_str2bv_x( "dn:*", STRLENOF( "dn:*" ), 1, normalized, ctx ); + return LDAP_SUCCESS; + } + + switch ( scope ) { + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT: + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN: + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE: + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL: + if ( normalize ) { + rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &bv, &out, ctx ); + } else { + rc = dnPretty( NULL, &bv, &out, ctx ); + } + if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + } + break; + + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX: + normalized->bv_len = STRLENOF( "dn.regex:" ) + bv.bv_len; + normalized->bv_val = ber_memalloc_x( normalized->bv_len + 1, ctx ); + ptr = lutil_strcopy( normalized->bv_val, "dn.regex:" ); + ptr = lutil_strncopy( ptr, bv.bv_val, bv.bv_len ); + ptr[ 0 ] = '\0'; + return LDAP_SUCCESS; + + default: + return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + } + + /* prepare prefix */ + switch ( scope ) { + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT: + BER_BVSTR( &prefix, "dn:" ); + break; + + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN: + BER_BVSTR( &prefix, "dn.children:" ); + break; + + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE: + BER_BVSTR( &prefix, "dn.subtree:" ); + break; + + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL: + BER_BVSTR( &prefix, "dn.onelevel:" ); + break; + + default: + assert( 0 ); + break; + } + + normalized->bv_len = prefix.bv_len + out.bv_len; + normalized->bv_val = ber_memalloc_x( normalized->bv_len + 1, ctx ); + + ptr = lutil_strcopy( normalized->bv_val, prefix.bv_val ); + ptr = lutil_strncopy( ptr, out.bv_val, out.bv_len ); + ptr[ 0 ] = '\0'; + ber_memfree_x( out.bv_val, ctx ); + + return LDAP_SUCCESS; + + /* + * 4) u[.mech[/realm]]:<ID> + */ + } else if ( ( val->bv_val[ 0 ] == 'u' || val->bv_val[ 0 ] == 'U' ) + && ( val->bv_val[ 1 ] == ':' + || val->bv_val[ 1 ] == '/' + || val->bv_val[ 1 ] == '.' ) ) + { + char buf[ SLAP_LDAPDN_MAXLEN ]; + struct berval id, + user = BER_BVNULL, + realm = BER_BVNULL, + mech = BER_BVNULL; + + if ( sizeof( buf ) <= val->bv_len ) { + return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + } + + id.bv_len = val->bv_len; + id.bv_val = buf; + strncpy( buf, val->bv_val, sizeof( buf ) ); + + rc = slap_parse_user( &id, &user, &realm, &mech ); + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + } + + ber_dupbv_x( normalized, val, ctx ); + + return rc; + + /* + * 5) group[/groupClass[/memberAttr]]:<DN> + * + * <groupClass> defaults to "groupOfNames" + * <memberAttr> defaults to "member" + * + * <DN> must pass DN normalization + */ + } else if ( strncasecmp( val->bv_val, "group", STRLENOF( "group" ) ) == 0 ) + { + struct berval group_dn = BER_BVNULL, + group_oc = BER_BVNULL, + member_at = BER_BVNULL, + out = BER_BVNULL; + char *ptr; + + bv.bv_val = val->bv_val + STRLENOF( "group" ); + bv.bv_len = val->bv_len - STRLENOF( "group" ); + group_dn.bv_val = ber_bvchr( &bv, ':' ); + if ( group_dn.bv_val == NULL ) { + /* last chance: assume it's a(n exact) DN ... */ + bv.bv_val = val->bv_val; + scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT; + goto is_dn; + } + + /* + * FIXME: we assume that "member" and "groupOfNames" + * are present in schema... + */ + if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] == '/' ) { + ObjectClass *oc = NULL; + + group_oc.bv_val = &bv.bv_val[ 1 ]; + group_oc.bv_len = group_dn.bv_val - group_oc.bv_val; + + member_at.bv_val = ber_bvchr( &group_oc, '/' ); + if ( member_at.bv_val ) { + AttributeDescription *ad = NULL; + const char *text = NULL; + + group_oc.bv_len = member_at.bv_val - group_oc.bv_val; + member_at.bv_val++; + member_at.bv_len = group_dn.bv_val - member_at.bv_val; + rc = slap_bv2ad( &member_at, &ad, &text ); + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + return rc; + } + + member_at = ad->ad_cname; + + } + + oc = oc_bvfind( &group_oc ); + if ( oc == NULL ) { + return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + } + + group_oc = oc->soc_cname; + } + + group_dn.bv_val++; + group_dn.bv_len = val->bv_len - ( group_dn.bv_val - val->bv_val ); + + if ( normalize ) { + rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &group_dn, &out, ctx ); + } else { + rc = dnPretty( NULL, &group_dn, &out, ctx ); + } + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + return rc; + } + + normalized->bv_len = STRLENOF( "group" ":" ) + out.bv_len; + if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &group_oc ) ) { + normalized->bv_len += STRLENOF( "/" ) + group_oc.bv_len; + if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &member_at ) ) { + normalized->bv_len += STRLENOF( "/" ) + member_at.bv_len; + } + } + + normalized->bv_val = ber_memalloc_x( normalized->bv_len + 1, ctx ); + ptr = lutil_strcopy( normalized->bv_val, "group" ); + if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &group_oc ) ) { + ptr[ 0 ] = '/'; + ptr++; + ptr = lutil_strncopy( ptr, group_oc.bv_val, group_oc.bv_len ); + if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &member_at ) ) { + ptr[ 0 ] = '/'; + ptr++; + ptr = lutil_strncopy( ptr, member_at.bv_val, member_at.bv_len ); + } + } + ptr[ 0 ] = ':'; + ptr++; + ptr = lutil_strncopy( ptr, out.bv_val, out.bv_len ); + ptr[ 0 ] = '\0'; + ber_memfree_x( out.bv_val, ctx ); + + return rc; + } + + /* + * ldap:///<base>??<scope>?<filter> + * <scope> ::= {base|one|subtree} + * + * <scope> defaults to "base" + * <base> must pass DN normalization + * <filter> must pass str2filter() + */ + rc = ldap_url_parse( val->bv_val, &ludp ); + switch ( rc ) { + case LDAP_URL_SUCCESS: + /* FIXME: the check is pedantic, but I think it's necessary, + * because people tend to use things like ldaps:// which + * gives the idea SSL is being used. Maybe we could + * accept ldapi:// as well, but the point is that we use + * an URL as an easy means to define bits of a search with + * little parsing. + */ + if ( strcasecmp( ludp->lud_scheme, "ldap" ) != 0 ) { + /* + * must be ldap:/// + */ + rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + goto done; + } + + AC_MEMCPY( ludp->lud_scheme, "ldap", STRLENOF( "ldap" ) ); + break; + + case LDAP_URL_ERR_BADSCHEME: + /* + * last chance: assume it's a(n exact) DN ... + * + * NOTE: must pass DN normalization + */ + ldap_free_urldesc( ludp ); + bv.bv_val = val->bv_val; + scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT; + goto is_dn; + + default: + rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + goto done; + } + + if ( ( ludp->lud_host && *ludp->lud_host ) + || ludp->lud_attrs || ludp->lud_exts ) + { + /* host part must be empty */ + /* attrs and extensions parts must be empty */ + rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + goto done; + } + + /* Grab the filter */ + if ( ludp->lud_filter ) { + struct berval filterstr; + Filter *f; + + lud_filter = ludp->lud_filter; + + f = str2filter( lud_filter ); + if ( f == NULL ) { + rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + goto done; + } + filter2bv( f, &filterstr ); + filter_free( f ); + if ( BER_BVISNULL( &filterstr ) ) { + rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + goto done; + } + + ludp->lud_filter = filterstr.bv_val; + } + + /* Grab the searchbase */ + assert( ludp->lud_dn != NULL ); + if ( ludp->lud_dn ) { + struct berval out = BER_BVNULL; + + lud_dn = ludp->lud_dn; + + ber_str2bv( lud_dn, 0, 0, &bv ); + if ( normalize ) { + rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &bv, &out, ctx ); + } else { + rc = dnPretty( NULL, &bv, &out, ctx ); + } + + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + goto done; + } + + ludp->lud_dn = out.bv_val; + } + + ludp->lud_port = 0; + normalized->bv_val = ldap_url_desc2str( ludp ); + if ( normalized->bv_val ) { + normalized->bv_len = strlen( normalized->bv_val ); + + } else { + rc = LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + } + +done: + if ( lud_filter ) { + if ( ludp->lud_filter != lud_filter ) { + ber_memfree( ludp->lud_filter ); + } + ludp->lud_filter = lud_filter; + } + + if ( lud_dn ) { + if ( ludp->lud_dn != lud_dn ) { + ber_memfree( ludp->lud_dn ); + } + ludp->lud_dn = lud_dn; + } + + ldap_free_urldesc( ludp ); + + return( rc ); +} + +int +authzNormalize( + slap_mask_t usage, + Syntax *syntax, + MatchingRule *mr, + struct berval *val, + struct berval *normalized, + void *ctx ) +{ + int rc; + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, ">>> authzNormalize: <%s>\n", + val->bv_val, 0, 0 ); + + rc = authzPrettyNormal( val, normalized, ctx, 1 ); + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "<<< authzNormalize: <%s> (%d)\n", + normalized->bv_val, rc, 0 ); + + return rc; +} + +int +authzPretty( + Syntax *syntax, + struct berval *val, + struct berval *out, + void *ctx) +{ + int rc; + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, ">>> authzPretty: <%s>\n", + val->bv_val, 0, 0 ); + + rc = authzPrettyNormal( val, out, ctx, 0 ); + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "<<< authzPretty: <%s> (%d)\n", + out->bv_val, rc, 0 ); + + return rc; +} + + +static int +slap_parseURI( + Operation *op, + struct berval *uri, + struct berval *base, + struct berval *nbase, + int *scope, + Filter **filter, + struct berval *fstr, + int normalize ) +{ + struct berval bv; + int rc; + LDAPURLDesc *ludp; + + struct berval idx; + + assert( uri != NULL && !BER_BVISNULL( uri ) ); + BER_BVZERO( base ); + BER_BVZERO( nbase ); + BER_BVZERO( fstr ); + *scope = -1; + *filter = NULL; + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "slap_parseURI: parsing %s\n", uri->bv_val, 0, 0 ); + + rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR; + + idx = *uri; + if ( idx.bv_val[ 0 ] == '{' ) { + char *ptr; + + ptr = ber_bvchr( &idx, '}' ) + 1; + + assert( ptr != (void *)1 ); + + idx.bv_len -= ptr - idx.bv_val; + idx.bv_val = ptr; + uri = &idx; + } + + /* + * dn[.<dnstyle>]:<dnpattern> + * <dnstyle> ::= {exact|regex|children|subtree|onelevel} + * + * <dnstyle> defaults to "exact" + * if <dnstyle> is not "regex", <dnpattern> must pass DN normalization + */ + if ( !strncasecmp( uri->bv_val, "dn", STRLENOF( "dn" ) ) ) { + bv.bv_val = uri->bv_val + STRLENOF( "dn" ); + + if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] == '.' ) { + bv.bv_val++; + + if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "exact:", STRLENOF( "exact:" ) ) ) { + bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "exact:" ); + *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT; + + } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "regex:", STRLENOF( "regex:" ) ) ) { + bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "regex:" ); + *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX; + + } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "children:", STRLENOF( "children:" ) ) ) { + bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "children:" ); + *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN; + + } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "subtree:", STRLENOF( "subtree:" ) ) ) { + bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "subtree:" ); + *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE; + + } else if ( !strncasecmp( bv.bv_val, "onelevel:", STRLENOF( "onelevel:" ) ) ) { + bv.bv_val += STRLENOF( "onelevel:" ); + *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL; + + } else { + return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR; + } + + } else { + if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] != ':' ) { + return LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR; + } + *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT; + bv.bv_val++; + } + + bv.bv_val += strspn( bv.bv_val, " " ); + /* jump here in case no type specification was present + * and uri was not an URI... HEADS-UP: assuming EXACT */ +is_dn: bv.bv_len = uri->bv_len - (bv.bv_val - uri->bv_val); + + /* a single '*' means any DN without using regexes */ + if ( ber_bvccmp( &bv, '*' ) ) { + *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_USERS; + } + + switch ( *scope ) { + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT: + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN: + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE: + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL: + if ( normalize ) { + rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &bv, nbase, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + *scope = -1; + } + } else { + ber_dupbv_x( nbase, &bv, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + } + break; + + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX: + ber_dupbv_x( nbase, &bv, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_USERS: + rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + break; + + default: + *scope = -1; + break; + } + + return rc; + + /* + * u:<uid> + */ + } else if ( ( uri->bv_val[ 0 ] == 'u' || uri->bv_val[ 0 ] == 'U' ) + && ( uri->bv_val[ 1 ] == ':' + || uri->bv_val[ 1 ] == '/' + || uri->bv_val[ 1 ] == '.' ) ) + { + Connection c = *op->o_conn; + char buf[ SLAP_LDAPDN_MAXLEN ]; + struct berval id, + user = BER_BVNULL, + realm = BER_BVNULL, + mech = BER_BVNULL; + + if ( sizeof( buf ) <= uri->bv_len ) { + return LDAP_INVALID_SYNTAX; + } + + id.bv_len = uri->bv_len; + id.bv_val = buf; + strncpy( buf, uri->bv_val, sizeof( buf ) ); + + rc = slap_parse_user( &id, &user, &realm, &mech ); + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + return rc; + } + + if ( !BER_BVISNULL( &mech ) ) { + c.c_sasl_bind_mech = mech; + } else { + BER_BVSTR( &c.c_sasl_bind_mech, "AUTHZ" ); + } + + rc = slap_sasl_getdn( &c, op, &user, + realm.bv_val, nbase, SLAP_GETDN_AUTHZID ); + + if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT; + } + + return rc; + + /* + * group[/<groupoc>[/<groupat>]]:<groupdn> + * + * groupoc defaults to "groupOfNames" + * groupat defaults to "member" + * + * <groupdn> must pass DN normalization + */ + } else if ( strncasecmp( uri->bv_val, "group", STRLENOF( "group" ) ) == 0 ) + { + struct berval group_dn = BER_BVNULL, + group_oc = BER_BVNULL, + member_at = BER_BVNULL; + char *tmp; + + bv.bv_val = uri->bv_val + STRLENOF( "group" ); + bv.bv_len = uri->bv_len - STRLENOF( "group" ); + group_dn.bv_val = ber_bvchr( &bv, ':' ); + if ( group_dn.bv_val == NULL ) { + /* last chance: assume it's a(n exact) DN ... */ + bv.bv_val = uri->bv_val; + *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT; + goto is_dn; + } + + if ( bv.bv_val[ 0 ] == '/' ) { + group_oc.bv_val = &bv.bv_val[ 1 ]; + group_oc.bv_len = group_dn.bv_val - group_oc.bv_val; + + member_at.bv_val = ber_bvchr( &group_oc, '/' ); + if ( member_at.bv_val ) { + group_oc.bv_len = member_at.bv_val - group_oc.bv_val; + member_at.bv_val++; + member_at.bv_len = group_dn.bv_val - member_at.bv_val; + + } else { + BER_BVSTR( &member_at, SLAPD_GROUP_ATTR ); + } + + } else { + BER_BVSTR( &group_oc, SLAPD_GROUP_CLASS ); + BER_BVSTR( &member_at, SLAPD_GROUP_ATTR ); + } + group_dn.bv_val++; + group_dn.bv_len = uri->bv_len - ( group_dn.bv_val - uri->bv_val ); + + if ( normalize ) { + rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, &group_dn, nbase, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + *scope = -1; + return rc; + } + } else { + ber_dupbv_x( nbase, &group_dn, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + } + *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_GROUP; + + /* FIXME: caller needs to add value of member attribute + * and close brackets twice */ + fstr->bv_len = STRLENOF( "(&(objectClass=)(=" /* )) */ ) + + group_oc.bv_len + member_at.bv_len; + fstr->bv_val = ch_malloc( fstr->bv_len + 1 ); + + tmp = lutil_strncopy( fstr->bv_val, "(&(objectClass=" /* )) */ , + STRLENOF( "(&(objectClass=" /* )) */ ) ); + tmp = lutil_strncopy( tmp, group_oc.bv_val, group_oc.bv_len ); + tmp = lutil_strncopy( tmp, /* ( */ ")(" /* ) */ , + STRLENOF( /* ( */ ")(" /* ) */ ) ); + tmp = lutil_strncopy( tmp, member_at.bv_val, member_at.bv_len ); + tmp = lutil_strncopy( tmp, "=", STRLENOF( "=" ) ); + + return rc; + } + + /* + * ldap:///<base>??<scope>?<filter> + * <scope> ::= {base|one|subtree} + * + * <scope> defaults to "base" + * <base> must pass DN normalization + * <filter> must pass str2filter() + */ + rc = ldap_url_parse( uri->bv_val, &ludp ); + switch ( rc ) { + case LDAP_URL_SUCCESS: + /* FIXME: the check is pedantic, but I think it's necessary, + * because people tend to use things like ldaps:// which + * gives the idea SSL is being used. Maybe we could + * accept ldapi:// as well, but the point is that we use + * an URL as an easy means to define bits of a search with + * little parsing. + */ + if ( strcasecmp( ludp->lud_scheme, "ldap" ) != 0 ) { + /* + * must be ldap:/// + */ + rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR; + goto done; + } + break; + + case LDAP_URL_ERR_BADSCHEME: + /* + * last chance: assume it's a(n exact) DN ... + * + * NOTE: must pass DN normalization + */ + ldap_free_urldesc( ludp ); + bv.bv_val = uri->bv_val; + *scope = LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT; + goto is_dn; + + default: + rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR; + goto done; + } + + if ( ( ludp->lud_host && *ludp->lud_host ) + || ludp->lud_attrs || ludp->lud_exts ) + { + /* host part must be empty */ + /* attrs and extensions parts must be empty */ + rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR; + goto done; + } + + /* Grab the scope */ + *scope = ludp->lud_scope; + + /* Grab the filter */ + if ( ludp->lud_filter ) { + *filter = str2filter_x( op, ludp->lud_filter ); + if ( *filter == NULL ) { + rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR; + goto done; + } + ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_filter, 0, 0, fstr ); + } + + /* Grab the searchbase */ + ber_str2bv( ludp->lud_dn, 0, 0, base ); + if ( normalize ) { + rc = dnNormalize( 0, NULL, NULL, base, nbase, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + } else { + ber_dupbv_x( nbase, base, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + } + +done: + if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + if( *filter ) { + filter_free_x( op, *filter, 1 ); + *filter = NULL; + } + BER_BVZERO( base ); + BER_BVZERO( fstr ); + } else { + /* Don't free these, return them to caller */ + ludp->lud_filter = NULL; + ludp->lud_dn = NULL; + } + + ldap_free_urldesc( ludp ); + return( rc ); +} + +#ifndef SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE +static int slap_sasl_rx_off(char *rep, int *off) +{ + const char *c; + int n; + + /* Precompile replace pattern. Find the $<n> placeholders */ + off[0] = -2; + n = 1; + for ( c = rep; *c; c++ ) { + if ( *c == '\\' && c[1] ) { + c++; + continue; + } + if ( *c == '$' ) { + if ( n == SASLREGEX_REPLACE ) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, + "SASL replace pattern %s has too many $n " + "placeholders (max %d)\n", + rep, SASLREGEX_REPLACE, 0 ); + + return( LDAP_OTHER ); + } + off[n] = c - rep; + n++; + } + } + + /* Final placeholder, after the last $n */ + off[n] = c - rep; + n++; + off[n] = -1; + return( LDAP_SUCCESS ); +} +#endif /* ! SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE */ + +#ifdef SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE +int slap_sasl_rewrite_config( + const char *fname, + int lineno, + int argc, + char **argv +) +{ + int rc; + char *savearg0; + + /* init at first call */ + if ( sasl_rwinfo == NULL ) { + sasl_rwinfo = rewrite_info_init( REWRITE_MODE_USE_DEFAULT ); + } + + /* strip "authid-" prefix for parsing */ + savearg0 = argv[0]; + argv[0] += STRLENOF( "authid-" ); + rc = rewrite_parse( sasl_rwinfo, fname, lineno, argc, argv ); + argv[0] = savearg0; + + return rc; +} + +static int +slap_sasl_rewrite_destroy( void ) +{ + if ( sasl_rwinfo ) { + rewrite_info_delete( &sasl_rwinfo ); + sasl_rwinfo = NULL; + } + + return 0; +} + +int slap_sasl_regexp_rewrite_config( + const char *fname, + int lineno, + const char *match, + const char *replace, + const char *context ) +{ + int rc; + char *argvRule[] = { "rewriteRule", NULL, NULL, ":@", NULL }; + + /* init at first call */ + if ( sasl_rwinfo == NULL ) { + char *argvEngine[] = { "rewriteEngine", "on", NULL }; + char *argvContext[] = { "rewriteContext", NULL, NULL }; + + /* initialize rewrite engine */ + sasl_rwinfo = rewrite_info_init( REWRITE_MODE_USE_DEFAULT ); + + /* switch on rewrite engine */ + rc = rewrite_parse( sasl_rwinfo, fname, lineno, 2, argvEngine ); + if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) { + return rc; + } + + /* create generic authid context */ + argvContext[1] = AUTHID_CONTEXT; + rc = rewrite_parse( sasl_rwinfo, fname, lineno, 2, argvContext ); + if (rc != LDAP_SUCCESS) { + return rc; + } + } + + argvRule[1] = (char *)match; + argvRule[2] = (char *)replace; + rc = rewrite_parse( sasl_rwinfo, fname, lineno, 4, argvRule ); + + return rc; +} +#endif /* SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE */ + +int slap_sasl_regexp_config( const char *match, const char *replace ) +{ + int rc; + SaslRegexp_t *reg; + + SaslRegexp = (SaslRegexp_t *) ch_realloc( (char *) SaslRegexp, + (nSaslRegexp + 1) * sizeof(SaslRegexp_t) ); + + reg = &SaslRegexp[nSaslRegexp]; + +#ifdef SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE + rc = slap_sasl_regexp_rewrite_config( "sasl-regexp", 0, + match, replace, AUTHID_CONTEXT ); +#else /* ! SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE */ + + /* Precompile matching pattern */ + rc = regcomp( ®->sr_workspace, match, REG_EXTENDED|REG_ICASE ); + if ( rc ) { + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ANY, + "SASL match pattern %s could not be compiled by regexp engine\n", + match, 0, 0 ); + +#ifdef ENABLE_REWRITE + /* Dummy block to force symbol references in librewrite */ + if ( slapMode == ( SLAP_SERVER_MODE|SLAP_TOOL_MODE )) { + rewrite_info_init( 0 ); + } +#endif + return( LDAP_OTHER ); + } + + rc = slap_sasl_rx_off( replace, reg->sr_offset ); +#endif /* ! SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE */ + if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + reg->sr_match = ch_strdup( match ); + reg->sr_replace = ch_strdup( replace ); + + nSaslRegexp++; + } + + return rc; +} + +void +slap_sasl_regexp_destroy( void ) +{ + if ( SaslRegexp ) { + int n; + + for ( n = 0; n < nSaslRegexp; n++ ) { + ch_free( SaslRegexp[ n ].sr_match ); + ch_free( SaslRegexp[ n ].sr_replace ); +#ifndef SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE + regfree( &SaslRegexp[ n ].sr_workspace ); +#endif /* SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE */ + } + + ch_free( SaslRegexp ); + } + +#ifdef SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE + slap_sasl_rewrite_destroy(); +#endif /* SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE */ +} + +void slap_sasl_regexp_unparse( BerVarray *out ) +{ + int i; + BerVarray bva = NULL; + char ibuf[32], *ptr; + struct berval idx; + + if ( !nSaslRegexp ) return; + + idx.bv_val = ibuf; + bva = ch_malloc( (nSaslRegexp+1) * sizeof(struct berval) ); + BER_BVZERO(bva+nSaslRegexp); + for ( i=0; i<nSaslRegexp; i++ ) { + idx.bv_len = sprintf( idx.bv_val, "{%d}", i); + bva[i].bv_len = idx.bv_len + strlen( SaslRegexp[i].sr_match ) + + strlen( SaslRegexp[i].sr_replace ) + 5; + bva[i].bv_val = ch_malloc( bva[i].bv_len+1 ); + ptr = lutil_strcopy( bva[i].bv_val, ibuf ); + *ptr++ = '"'; + ptr = lutil_strcopy( ptr, SaslRegexp[i].sr_match ); + ptr = lutil_strcopy( ptr, "\" \"" ); + ptr = lutil_strcopy( ptr, SaslRegexp[i].sr_replace ); + *ptr++ = '"'; + *ptr = '\0'; + } + *out = bva; +} + +#ifndef SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE +/* Perform replacement on regexp matches */ +static void slap_sasl_rx_exp( + const char *rep, + const int *off, + regmatch_t *str, + const char *saslname, + struct berval *out, + void *ctx ) +{ + int i, n, len, insert; + + /* Get the total length of the final URI */ + + n=1; + len = 0; + while( off[n] >= 0 ) { + /* Len of next section from replacement string (x,y,z above) */ + len += off[n] - off[n-1] - 2; + if( off[n+1] < 0) + break; + + /* Len of string from saslname that matched next $i (b,d above) */ + i = rep[ off[n] + 1 ] - '0'; + len += str[i].rm_eo - str[i].rm_so; + n++; + } + out->bv_val = slap_sl_malloc( len + 1, ctx ); + out->bv_len = len; + + /* Fill in URI with replace string, replacing $i as we go */ + n=1; + insert = 0; + while( off[n] >= 0) { + /* Paste in next section from replacement string (x,y,z above) */ + len = off[n] - off[n-1] - 2; + strncpy( out->bv_val+insert, rep + off[n-1] + 2, len); + insert += len; + if( off[n+1] < 0) + break; + + /* Paste in string from saslname that matched next $i (b,d above) */ + i = rep[ off[n] + 1 ] - '0'; + len = str[i].rm_eo - str[i].rm_so; + strncpy( out->bv_val+insert, saslname + str[i].rm_so, len ); + insert += len; + + n++; + } + + out->bv_val[insert] = '\0'; +} +#endif /* ! SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE */ + +/* Take the passed in SASL name and attempt to convert it into an + LDAP URI to find the matching LDAP entry, using the pattern matching + strings given in the saslregexp config file directive(s) */ + +static int slap_authz_regexp( struct berval *in, struct berval *out, + int flags, void *ctx ) +{ +#ifdef SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE + const char *context = AUTHID_CONTEXT; + + if ( sasl_rwinfo == NULL || BER_BVISNULL( in ) ) { + return 0; + } + + /* FIXME: if aware of authc/authz mapping, + * we could use different contexts ... */ + switch ( rewrite_session( sasl_rwinfo, context, in->bv_val, NULL, + &out->bv_val ) ) + { + case REWRITE_REGEXEC_OK: + if ( !BER_BVISNULL( out ) ) { + char *val = out->bv_val; + ber_str2bv_x( val, 0, 1, out, ctx ); + if ( val != in->bv_val ) { + free( val ); + } + } else { + ber_dupbv_x( out, in, ctx ); + } + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_ARGS, + "[rw] %s: \"%s\" -> \"%s\"\n", + context, in->bv_val, out->bv_val ); + return 1; + + case REWRITE_REGEXEC_UNWILLING: + case REWRITE_REGEXEC_ERR: + default: + return 0; + } + +#else /* ! SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE */ + char *saslname = in->bv_val; + SaslRegexp_t *reg; + regmatch_t sr_strings[SASLREGEX_REPLACE]; /* strings matching $1,$2 ... */ + int i; + + memset( out, 0, sizeof( *out ) ); + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "slap_authz_regexp: converting SASL name %s\n", + saslname, 0, 0 ); + + if (( saslname == NULL ) || ( nSaslRegexp == 0 )) { + return( 0 ); + } + + /* Match the normalized SASL name to the saslregexp patterns */ + for( reg = SaslRegexp,i=0; i<nSaslRegexp; i++,reg++ ) { + if ( regexec( ®->sr_workspace, saslname, SASLREGEX_REPLACE, + sr_strings, 0) == 0 ) + break; + } + + if( i >= nSaslRegexp ) return( 0 ); + + /* + * The match pattern may have been of the form "a(b.*)c(d.*)e" and the + * replace pattern of the form "x$1y$2z". The returned string needs + * to replace the $1,$2 with the strings that matched (b.*) and (d.*) + */ + slap_sasl_rx_exp( reg->sr_replace, reg->sr_offset, + sr_strings, saslname, out, ctx ); + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "slap_authz_regexp: converted SASL name to %s\n", + BER_BVISEMPTY( out ) ? "" : out->bv_val, 0, 0 ); + + return( 1 ); +#endif /* ! SLAP_AUTH_REWRITE */ +} + +/* This callback actually does some work...*/ +static int sasl_sc_sasl2dn( Operation *op, SlapReply *rs ) +{ + struct berval *ndn = op->o_callback->sc_private; + + if ( rs->sr_type != REP_SEARCH ) return LDAP_SUCCESS; + + /* We only want to be called once */ + if ( !BER_BVISNULL( ndn ) ) { + op->o_tmpfree( ndn->bv_val, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + BER_BVZERO( ndn ); + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "%s: slap_sc_sasl2dn: search DN returned more than 1 entry\n", + op->o_log_prefix, 0, 0 ); + return LDAP_UNAVAILABLE; /* short-circuit the search */ + } + + ber_dupbv_x( ndn, &rs->sr_entry->e_nname, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + return LDAP_SUCCESS; +} + + +typedef struct smatch_info { + struct berval *dn; + int match; +} smatch_info; + +static int sasl_sc_smatch( Operation *o, SlapReply *rs ) +{ + smatch_info *sm = o->o_callback->sc_private; + + if (rs->sr_type != REP_SEARCH) return 0; + + if (dn_match(sm->dn, &rs->sr_entry->e_nname)) { + sm->match = 1; + return LDAP_UNAVAILABLE; /* short-circuit the search */ + } + + return 0; +} + +int +slap_sasl_matches( Operation *op, BerVarray rules, + struct berval *assertDN, struct berval *authc ) +{ + int rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH; + + if ( rules != NULL ) { + int i; + + for( i = 0; !BER_BVISNULL( &rules[i] ); i++ ) { + rc = slap_sasl_match( op, &rules[i], assertDN, authc ); + if ( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) break; + } + } + + return rc; +} + +/* + * Map a SASL regexp rule to a DN. If the rule is just a DN or a scope=base + * URI, just strcmp the rule (or its searchbase) to the *assertDN. Otherwise, + * the rule must be used as an internal search for entries. If that search + * returns the *assertDN entry, the match is successful. + * + * The assertDN should not have the dn: prefix + */ + +static int +slap_sasl_match( Operation *opx, struct berval *rule, + struct berval *assertDN, struct berval *authc ) +{ + int rc; + regex_t reg; + smatch_info sm; + slap_callback cb = { NULL, sasl_sc_smatch, NULL, NULL }; + Operation op = {0}; + SlapReply rs = {REP_RESULT}; + struct berval base = BER_BVNULL; + + sm.dn = assertDN; + sm.match = 0; + cb.sc_private = &sm; + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "===>slap_sasl_match: comparing DN %s to rule %s\n", + assertDN->bv_len ? assertDN->bv_val : "(null)", rule->bv_val, 0 ); + + /* NOTE: don't normalize rule if authz syntax is enabled */ + rc = slap_parseURI( opx, rule, &base, &op.o_req_ndn, + &op.ors_scope, &op.ors_filter, &op.ors_filterstr, 0 ); + + if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) goto CONCLUDED; + + switch ( op.ors_scope ) { + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT: +exact_match: + if ( dn_match( &op.o_req_ndn, assertDN ) ) { + rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + } else { + rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH; + } + goto CONCLUDED; + + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN: + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE: + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL: + { + int d = assertDN->bv_len - op.o_req_ndn.bv_len; + + rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH; + + if ( d == 0 && op.ors_scope == LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE ) { + goto exact_match; + + } else if ( d > 0 ) { + struct berval bv; + + /* leave room for at least one char of attributeType, + * one for '=' and one for ',' */ + if ( d < (int) STRLENOF( "x=,") ) { + goto CONCLUDED; + } + + bv.bv_len = op.o_req_ndn.bv_len; + bv.bv_val = assertDN->bv_val + d; + + if ( bv.bv_val[ -1 ] == ',' && dn_match( &op.o_req_ndn, &bv ) ) { + switch ( op.ors_scope ) { + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE: + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN: + rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + break; + + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL: + { + struct berval pdn; + + dnParent( assertDN, &pdn ); + /* the common portion of the DN + * already matches, so only check + * if parent DN of assertedDN + * is all the pattern */ + if ( pdn.bv_len == op.o_req_ndn.bv_len ) { + rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + } + break; + } + default: + /* at present, impossible */ + assert( 0 ); + } + } + } + goto CONCLUDED; + } + + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX: + rc = regcomp(®, op.o_req_ndn.bv_val, + REG_EXTENDED|REG_ICASE|REG_NOSUB); + if ( rc == 0 ) { + rc = regexec(®, assertDN->bv_val, 0, NULL, 0); + regfree( ® ); + } + if ( rc == 0 ) { + rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + } else { + rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH; + } + goto CONCLUDED; + + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_GROUP: { + char *tmp; + + /* Now filterstr looks like "(&(objectClass=<group_oc>)(<member_at>=" + * we need to append the <assertDN> so that the <group_dn> is searched + * with scope "base", and the filter ensures that <assertDN> is + * member of the group */ + tmp = ch_realloc( op.ors_filterstr.bv_val, op.ors_filterstr.bv_len + + assertDN->bv_len + STRLENOF( /*"(("*/ "))" ) + 1 ); + if ( tmp == NULL ) { + rc = LDAP_NO_MEMORY; + goto CONCLUDED; + } + op.ors_filterstr.bv_val = tmp; + + tmp = lutil_strcopy( &tmp[op.ors_filterstr.bv_len], assertDN->bv_val ); + tmp = lutil_strcopy( tmp, /*"(("*/ "))" ); + + /* pass opx because str2filter_x may (and does) use o_tmpmfuncs */ + op.ors_filter = str2filter_x( opx, op.ors_filterstr.bv_val ); + if ( op.ors_filter == NULL ) { + rc = LDAP_PROTOCOL_ERROR; + goto CONCLUDED; + } + op.ors_scope = LDAP_SCOPE_BASE; + + /* hijack match DN: use that of the group instead of the assertDN; + * assertDN is now in the filter */ + sm.dn = &op.o_req_ndn; + + /* do the search */ + break; + } + + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_USERS: + if ( !BER_BVISEMPTY( assertDN ) ) { + rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + } else { + rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH; + } + goto CONCLUDED; + + default: + break; + } + + /* Must run an internal search. */ + if ( op.ors_filter == NULL ) { + rc = LDAP_FILTER_ERROR; + goto CONCLUDED; + } + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "slap_sasl_match: performing internal search (base=%s, scope=%d)\n", + op.o_req_ndn.bv_val, op.ors_scope, 0 ); + + op.o_bd = select_backend( &op.o_req_ndn, 1 ); + if(( op.o_bd == NULL ) || ( op.o_bd->be_search == NULL)) { + rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH; + goto CONCLUDED; + } + + op.o_hdr = opx->o_hdr; + op.o_tag = LDAP_REQ_SEARCH; + op.o_ndn = *authc; + op.o_callback = &cb; + slap_op_time( &op.o_time, &op.o_tincr ); + op.o_do_not_cache = 1; + op.o_is_auth_check = 1; + /* use req_ndn as req_dn instead of non-pretty base of uri */ + if( !BER_BVISNULL( &base ) ) { + ch_free( base.bv_val ); + /* just in case... */ + BER_BVZERO( &base ); + } + ber_dupbv_x( &op.o_req_dn, &op.o_req_ndn, op.o_tmpmemctx ); + op.ors_deref = LDAP_DEREF_NEVER; + op.ors_slimit = 1; + op.ors_tlimit = SLAP_NO_LIMIT; + op.ors_attrs = slap_anlist_no_attrs; + op.ors_attrsonly = 1; + + op.o_bd->be_search( &op, &rs ); + + if (sm.match) { + rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + } else { + rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH; + } + +CONCLUDED: + if( !BER_BVISNULL( &op.o_req_dn ) ) slap_sl_free( op.o_req_dn.bv_val, opx->o_tmpmemctx ); + if( !BER_BVISNULL( &op.o_req_ndn ) ) slap_sl_free( op.o_req_ndn.bv_val, opx->o_tmpmemctx ); + if( op.ors_filter ) filter_free_x( opx, op.ors_filter, 1 ); + if( !BER_BVISNULL( &op.ors_filterstr ) ) ch_free( op.ors_filterstr.bv_val ); + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "<===slap_sasl_match: comparison returned %d\n", rc, 0, 0); + + return( rc ); +} + + +/* + * This function answers the question, "Can this ID authorize to that ID?", + * based on authorization rules. The rules are stored in the *searchDN, in the + * attribute named by *attr. If any of those rules map to the *assertDN, the + * authorization is approved. + * + * The DNs should not have the dn: prefix + */ +static int +slap_sasl_check_authz( Operation *op, + struct berval *searchDN, + struct berval *assertDN, + AttributeDescription *ad, + struct berval *authc ) +{ + int rc, + do_not_cache = op->o_do_not_cache; + BerVarray vals = NULL; + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "==>slap_sasl_check_authz: does %s match %s rule in %s?\n", + assertDN->bv_val, ad->ad_cname.bv_val, searchDN->bv_val); + + /* ITS#4760: don't cache group access */ + op->o_do_not_cache = 1; + rc = backend_attribute( op, NULL, searchDN, ad, &vals, ACL_AUTH ); + op->o_do_not_cache = do_not_cache; + if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) goto COMPLETE; + + /* Check if the *assertDN matches any *vals */ + rc = slap_sasl_matches( op, vals, assertDN, authc ); + +COMPLETE: + if( vals ) ber_bvarray_free_x( vals, op->o_tmpmemctx ); + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "<==slap_sasl_check_authz: %s check returning %d\n", + ad->ad_cname.bv_val, rc, 0); + + return( rc ); +} + +/* + * Given a SASL name (e.g. "UID=name,cn=REALM,cn=MECH,cn=AUTH") + * return the LDAP DN to which it matches. The SASL regexp rules in the config + * file turn the SASL name into an LDAP URI. If the URI is just a DN (or a + * search with scope=base), just return the URI (or its searchbase). Otherwise + * an internal search must be done, and if that search returns exactly one + * entry, return the DN of that one entry. + */ +void +slap_sasl2dn( + Operation *opx, + struct berval *saslname, + struct berval *sasldn, + int flags ) +{ + int rc; + slap_callback cb = { NULL, sasl_sc_sasl2dn, NULL, NULL }; + Operation op = {0}; + SlapReply rs = {REP_RESULT}; + struct berval regout = BER_BVNULL; + struct berval base = BER_BVNULL; + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "==>slap_sasl2dn: " + "converting SASL name %s to a DN\n", + saslname->bv_val, 0,0 ); + + BER_BVZERO( sasldn ); + cb.sc_private = sasldn; + + /* Convert the SASL name into a minimal URI */ + if( !slap_authz_regexp( saslname, ®out, flags, opx->o_tmpmemctx ) ) { + goto FINISHED; + } + + /* NOTE: always normalize regout because it results + * from string submatch expansion */ + rc = slap_parseURI( opx, ®out, &base, &op.o_req_ndn, + &op.ors_scope, &op.ors_filter, &op.ors_filterstr, 1 ); + if ( !BER_BVISNULL( ®out ) ) slap_sl_free( regout.bv_val, opx->o_tmpmemctx ); + if ( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + goto FINISHED; + } + + /* Must do an internal search */ + op.o_bd = select_backend( &op.o_req_ndn, 1 ); + + switch ( op.ors_scope ) { + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_EXACT: + *sasldn = op.o_req_ndn; + BER_BVZERO( &op.o_req_ndn ); + /* intentionally continue to next case */ + + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_REGEX: + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_SUBTREE: + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_CHILDREN: + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_ONELEVEL: + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_GROUP: + case LDAP_X_SCOPE_USERS: + /* correctly parsed, but illegal */ + goto FINISHED; + + case LDAP_SCOPE_BASE: + case LDAP_SCOPE_ONELEVEL: + case LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE: + case LDAP_SCOPE_SUBORDINATE: + /* do a search */ + break; + + default: + /* catch unhandled cases (there shouldn't be) */ + assert( 0 ); + } + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "slap_sasl2dn: performing internal search (base=%s, scope=%d)\n", + op.o_req_ndn.bv_val, op.ors_scope, 0 ); + + if ( ( op.o_bd == NULL ) || ( op.o_bd->be_search == NULL) ) { + goto FINISHED; + } + + /* Must run an internal search. */ + if ( op.ors_filter == NULL ) { + rc = LDAP_FILTER_ERROR; + goto FINISHED; + } + + op.o_hdr = opx->o_hdr; + op.o_tag = LDAP_REQ_SEARCH; + op.o_ndn = opx->o_conn->c_ndn; + op.o_callback = &cb; + slap_op_time( &op.o_time, &op.o_tincr ); + op.o_do_not_cache = 1; + op.o_is_auth_check = 1; + op.ors_deref = LDAP_DEREF_NEVER; + op.ors_slimit = 1; + op.ors_tlimit = SLAP_NO_LIMIT; + op.ors_attrs = slap_anlist_no_attrs; + op.ors_attrsonly = 1; + /* use req_ndn as req_dn instead of non-pretty base of uri */ + if( !BER_BVISNULL( &base ) ) { + ch_free( base.bv_val ); + /* just in case... */ + BER_BVZERO( &base ); + } + ber_dupbv_x( &op.o_req_dn, &op.o_req_ndn, op.o_tmpmemctx ); + + op.o_bd->be_search( &op, &rs ); + +FINISHED: + if( opx == opx->o_conn->c_sasl_bindop && !BER_BVISEMPTY( sasldn ) ) { + opx->o_conn->c_authz_backend = op.o_bd; + } + if( !BER_BVISNULL( &op.o_req_dn ) ) { + slap_sl_free( op.o_req_dn.bv_val, opx->o_tmpmemctx ); + } + if( !BER_BVISNULL( &op.o_req_ndn ) ) { + slap_sl_free( op.o_req_ndn.bv_val, opx->o_tmpmemctx ); + } + if( op.ors_filter ) { + filter_free_x( opx, op.ors_filter, 1 ); + } + if( !BER_BVISNULL( &op.ors_filterstr ) ) { + ch_free( op.ors_filterstr.bv_val ); + } + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, "<==slap_sasl2dn: Converted SASL name to %s\n", + !BER_BVISEMPTY( sasldn ) ? sasldn->bv_val : "<nothing>", 0, 0 ); + + return; +} + + +/* Check if a bind can SASL authorize to another identity. + * The DNs should not have the dn: prefix + */ + +int slap_sasl_authorized( Operation *op, + struct berval *authcDN, struct berval *authzDN ) +{ + int rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH; + + /* User binding as anonymous */ + if ( !authzDN || !authzDN->bv_len || !authzDN->bv_val ) { + rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + goto DONE; + } + + /* User is anonymous */ + if ( !authcDN || !authcDN->bv_len || !authcDN->bv_val ) { + goto DONE; + } + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "==>slap_sasl_authorized: can %s become %s?\n", + authcDN->bv_len ? authcDN->bv_val : "(null)", + authzDN->bv_len ? authzDN->bv_val : "(null)", 0 ); + + /* If person is authorizing to self, succeed */ + if ( dn_match( authcDN, authzDN ) ) { + rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + goto DONE; + } + + /* Allow the manager to authorize as any DN. */ + if( op->o_conn->c_authz_backend && + be_isroot_dn( op->o_conn->c_authz_backend, authcDN )) + { + rc = LDAP_SUCCESS; + goto DONE; + } + + /* Check source rules */ + if( authz_policy & SASL_AUTHZ_TO ) { + rc = slap_sasl_check_authz( op, authcDN, authzDN, + slap_schema.si_ad_saslAuthzTo, authcDN ); + if(( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) ^ (( authz_policy & SASL_AUTHZ_AND) != 0)) { + if( rc != LDAP_SUCCESS ) + rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH; + goto DONE; + } + } + + /* Check destination rules */ + if( authz_policy & SASL_AUTHZ_FROM ) { + rc = slap_sasl_check_authz( op, authzDN, authcDN, + slap_schema.si_ad_saslAuthzFrom, authcDN ); + if( rc == LDAP_SUCCESS ) { + goto DONE; + } + } + + rc = LDAP_INAPPROPRIATE_AUTH; + +DONE: + + Debug( LDAP_DEBUG_TRACE, + "<== slap_sasl_authorized: return %d\n", rc, 0, 0 ); + + return( rc ); +} |