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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-06 02:22:07 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-05-06 02:22:07 +0000
commita982d958e3c5acba737f166177934ecdf8ebdf45 (patch)
treea4acc11aacd2865464d800eb8d8557db8df9d99f /debian/login.pam
parentAdding upstream version 1:4.5. (diff)
downloadshadow-debian.tar.xz
shadow-debian.zip
Adding debian version 1:4.5-1.1.debian/1%4.5-1.1debian
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'debian/login.pam')
-rw-r--r--debian/login.pam116
1 files changed, 116 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/login.pam b/debian/login.pam
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..07ff954
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+++ b/debian/login.pam
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+#
+# The PAM configuration file for the Shadow `login' service
+#
+
+# Enforce a minimal delay in case of failure (in microseconds).
+# (Replaces the `FAIL_DELAY' setting from login.defs)
+# Note that other modules may require another minimal delay. (for example,
+# to disable any delay, you should add the nodelay option to pam_unix)
+auth optional pam_faildelay.so delay=3000000
+
+# Outputs an issue file prior to each login prompt (Replaces the
+# ISSUE_FILE option from login.defs). Uncomment for use
+# auth required pam_issue.so issue=/etc/issue
+
+# Disallows root logins except on tty's listed in /etc/securetty
+# (Replaces the `CONSOLE' setting from login.defs)
+#
+# With the default control of this module:
+# [success=ok new_authtok_reqd=ok ignore=ignore user_unknown=bad default=die]
+# root will not be prompted for a password on insecure lines.
+# if an invalid username is entered, a password is prompted (but login
+# will eventually be rejected)
+#
+# You can change it to a "requisite" module if you think root may mis-type
+# her login and should not be prompted for a password in that case. But
+# this will leave the system as vulnerable to user enumeration attacks.
+#
+# You can change it to a "required" module if you think it permits to
+# guess valid user names of your system (invalid user names are considered
+# as possibly being root on insecure lines), but root passwords may be
+# communicated over insecure lines.
+auth [success=ok new_authtok_reqd=ok ignore=ignore user_unknown=bad default=die] pam_securetty.so
+
+# Disallows other than root logins when /etc/nologin exists
+# (Replaces the `NOLOGINS_FILE' option from login.defs)
+auth requisite pam_nologin.so
+
+# SELinux needs to be the first session rule. This ensures that any
+# lingering context has been cleared. Without this it is possible
+# that a module could execute code in the wrong domain.
+# When the module is present, "required" would be sufficient (When SELinux
+# is disabled, this returns success.)
+session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so close
+
+# Sets the loginuid process attribute
+session required pam_loginuid.so
+
+# SELinux needs to intervene at login time to ensure that the process
+# starts in the proper default security context. Only sessions which are
+# intended to run in the user's context should be run after this.
+session [success=ok ignore=ignore module_unknown=ignore default=bad] pam_selinux.so open
+# When the module is present, "required" would be sufficient (When SELinux
+# is disabled, this returns success.)
+
+# This module parses environment configuration file(s)
+# and also allows you to use an extended config
+# file /etc/security/pam_env.conf.
+#
+# parsing /etc/environment needs "readenv=1"
+session required pam_env.so readenv=1
+# locale variables are also kept into /etc/default/locale in etch
+# reading this file *in addition to /etc/environment* does not hurt
+session required pam_env.so readenv=1 envfile=/etc/default/locale
+
+# Standard Un*x authentication.
+@include common-auth
+
+# This allows certain extra groups to be granted to a user
+# based on things like time of day, tty, service, and user.
+# Please edit /etc/security/group.conf to fit your needs
+# (Replaces the `CONSOLE_GROUPS' option in login.defs)
+auth optional pam_group.so
+
+# Uncomment and edit /etc/security/time.conf if you need to set
+# time restraint on logins.
+# (Replaces the `PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB' option from login.defs
+# as well as /etc/porttime)
+# account requisite pam_time.so
+
+# Uncomment and edit /etc/security/access.conf if you need to
+# set access limits.
+# (Replaces /etc/login.access file)
+# account required pam_access.so
+
+# Sets up user limits according to /etc/security/limits.conf
+# (Replaces the use of /etc/limits in old login)
+session required pam_limits.so
+
+# Prints the last login info upon successful login
+# (Replaces the `LASTLOG_ENAB' option from login.defs)
+session optional pam_lastlog.so
+
+# Prints the message of the day upon successful login.
+# (Replaces the `MOTD_FILE' option in login.defs)
+# This includes a dynamically generated part from /run/motd.dynamic
+# and a static (admin-editable) part from /etc/motd.
+session optional pam_motd.so motd=/run/motd.dynamic
+session optional pam_motd.so noupdate
+
+# Prints the status of the user's mailbox upon successful login
+# (Replaces the `MAIL_CHECK_ENAB' option from login.defs).
+#
+# This also defines the MAIL environment variable
+# However, userdel also needs MAIL_DIR and MAIL_FILE variables
+# in /etc/login.defs to make sure that removing a user
+# also removes the user's mail spool file.
+# See comments in /etc/login.defs
+session optional pam_mail.so standard
+
+# Create a new session keyring.
+session optional pam_keyinit.so force revoke
+
+# Standard Un*x account and session
+@include common-account
+@include common-session
+@include common-password