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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-28 09:13:47 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-28 09:13:47 +0000 |
commit | 102b0d2daa97dae68d3eed54d8fe37a9cc38a892 (patch) | |
tree | bcf648efac40ca6139842707f0eba5a4496a6dd2 /drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/csf_hdr_parser.c | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | arm-trusted-firmware-upstream.tar.xz arm-trusted-firmware-upstream.zip |
Adding upstream version 2.8.0+dfsg.upstream/2.8.0+dfsgupstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/csf_hdr_parser.c')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/csf_hdr_parser.c | 365 |
1 files changed, 365 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/csf_hdr_parser.c b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/csf_hdr_parser.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b878082 --- /dev/null +++ b/drivers/nxp/auth/csf_hdr_parser/csf_hdr_parser.c @@ -0,0 +1,365 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014-2016, Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. + * Copyright 2017-2021 NXP + * + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause + * + */ + +#include <assert.h> +#include <stddef.h> +#include <stdint.h> +#include <string.h> + +#include <arch_helpers.h> +#include <cassert.h> +#include <common/debug.h> +#include <csf_hdr.h> +#include <dcfg.h> +#include <drivers/auth/crypto_mod.h> +#include <lib/utils.h> +#include <sfp.h> + +/* Maximum OID string length ("a.b.c.d.e.f ...") */ +#define MAX_OID_STR_LEN 64 + +#define LIB_NAME "NXP CSFv2" + +#ifdef CSF_HDR_CH3 +/* Barker Code for LS Ch3 ESBC Header */ +static const uint8_t barker_code[CSF_BARKER_LEN] = { 0x12, 0x19, 0x20, 0x01 }; +#else +static const uint8_t barker_code[CSF_BARKER_LEN] = { 0x68, 0x39, 0x27, 0x81 }; +#endif + +#define CHECK_KEY_LEN(key_len) (((key_len) == 2 * RSA_1K_KEY_SZ_BYTES) || \ + ((key_len) == 2 * RSA_2K_KEY_SZ_BYTES) || \ + ((key_len) == 2 * RSA_4K_KEY_SZ_BYTES)) + +/* Flag to indicate if values are there in rotpk_hash_table */ +bool rotpk_not_dpld = true; +uint8_t rotpk_hash_table[MAX_KEY_ENTRIES][SHA256_BYTES]; +uint32_t num_rotpk_hash_entries; + +/* + * This function deploys the hashes of the various platform keys in + * rotpk_hash_table. This is done in case of secure boot after comparison + * of table's hash with the hash in SFP fuses. This installation is done + * only in the first header parsing. + */ +static int deploy_rotpk_hash_table(void *srk_buffer, uint16_t num_srk) +{ + void *ctx; + int ret = 0; + int i, j = 0; + unsigned int digest_size = SHA256_BYTES; + enum hash_algo algo = SHA256; + uint8_t hash[SHA256_BYTES]; + uint32_t srk_hash[SHA256_BYTES/4] __aligned(CACHE_WRITEBACK_GRANULE); + struct srk_table *srktbl = (void *)srk_buffer; + struct sfp_ccsr_regs_t *sfp_ccsr_regs = (void *)(get_sfp_addr() + + SFP_FUSE_REGS_OFFSET); + + + if (num_srk > MAX_KEY_ENTRIES) { + return -1; + } + + ret = hash_init(algo, &ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + return -1; + } + + /* Update hash with that of SRK table */ + ret = hash_update(algo, ctx, (uint8_t *)((uint8_t *)srk_buffer), + num_srk * sizeof(struct srk_table)); + if (ret != 0) { + return -1; + } + + /* Copy hash at destination buffer */ + ret = hash_final(algo, ctx, hash, digest_size); + if (ret != 0) { + return -1; + } + + /* Add comparison of hash with SFP hash here */ + for (i = 0; i < SHA256_BYTES/4; i++) { + srk_hash[i] = + mmio_read_32((uintptr_t)&sfp_ccsr_regs->srk_hash[i]); + } + + VERBOSE("SRK table HASH\n"); + for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + VERBOSE("%x\n", *((uint32_t *)hash + i)); + } + + if (memcmp(hash, srk_hash, SHA256_BYTES) != 0) { + ERROR("Error in installing ROTPK table\n"); + ERROR("SRK hash doesn't match the fuse hash\n"); + return -1; + } + + /* Hash table already deployed */ + if (rotpk_not_dpld == false) { + return 0; + } + + for (i = 0; i < num_srk; i++) { + ret = hash_init(algo, &ctx); + if (ret != 0) { + return -1; + } + + /* Update hash with that of SRK table */ + ret = hash_update(algo, ctx, srktbl[i].pkey, srktbl[i].key_len); + if (ret != 0) { + return -1; + } + + /* Copy hash at destination buffer */ + ret = hash_final(algo, ctx, rotpk_hash_table[i], digest_size); + if (ret != 0) { + return -1; + } + VERBOSE("Table key %d HASH\n", i); + for (j = 0; j < 8; j++) { + VERBOSE("%x\n", *((uint32_t *)rotpk_hash_table[i] + j)); + } + } + rotpk_not_dpld = false; + num_rotpk_hash_entries = num_srk; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Calculate hash of ESBC hdr and ESBC. This function calculates the + * single hash of ESBC header and ESBC image + */ +int calc_img_hash(struct csf_hdr *hdr, + void *img_addr, uint32_t img_size, + uint8_t *img_hash, uint32_t *hash_len) +{ + void *ctx; + int ret = 0; + unsigned int digest_size = SHA256_BYTES; + enum hash_algo algo = SHA256; + + ret = hash_init(algo, &ctx); + /* Copy hash at destination buffer */ + if (ret != 0) { + return -1; + } + + /* Update hash for CSF Header */ + ret = hash_update(algo, ctx, (uint8_t *)hdr, sizeof(struct csf_hdr)); + if (ret != 0) { + return -1; + } + + /* Update hash with that of SRK table */ + ret = hash_update(algo, ctx, + (uint8_t *)((uint8_t *)hdr + hdr->srk_tbl_off), + hdr->len_kr.num_srk * sizeof(struct srk_table)); + if (ret != 0) { + return -1; + } + + /* Update hash for actual Image */ + ret = hash_update(algo, ctx, (uint8_t *)(img_addr), img_size); + if (ret != 0) { + return -1; + } + + /* Copy hash at destination buffer */ + ret = hash_final(algo, ctx, img_hash, digest_size); + if (ret != 0) { + return -1; + } + + *hash_len = digest_size; + + VERBOSE("IMG encoded HASH\n"); + for (int i = 0; i < 8; i++) { + VERBOSE("%x\n", *((uint32_t *)img_hash + i)); + } + + return 0; +} + +/* This function checks if selected key is revoked or not.*/ +static uint32_t is_key_revoked(uint32_t keynum, uint32_t rev_flag) +{ + if (keynum == UNREVOCABLE_KEY) { + return 0; + } + + if (((uint32_t)(1 << (REVOC_KEY_ALIGN - keynum)) & rev_flag) != 0) { + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Parse the header to extract the type of key, + * Check if key is not revoked + * and return the key , key length and key_type + */ +static int32_t get_key(struct csf_hdr *hdr, uint8_t **key, uint32_t *len, + enum sig_alg *key_type) +{ + int i = 0; + uint32_t ret = 0U; + uint32_t key_num, key_revoc_flag; + void *esbc = hdr; + struct srk_table *srktbl = (void *)((uint8_t *)esbc + hdr->srk_tbl_off); + bool sb; + uint32_t mode; + + /* We currently support only RSA keys and signature */ + *key_type = RSA; + + /* Check for number of SRK entries */ + if ((hdr->len_kr.num_srk == 0) || + (hdr->len_kr.num_srk > MAX_KEY_ENTRIES)) { + ERROR("Error in NUM entries in SRK Table\n"); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Check the key number field. It should be not greater than + * number of entries in SRK table. + */ + key_num = hdr->len_kr.srk_sel; + if ((key_num == 0) || (key_num > hdr->len_kr.num_srk)) { + ERROR("Invalid Key number\n"); + return -1; + } + + /* Get revoc key from sfp */ + key_revoc_flag = get_key_revoc(); + + /* Check if selected key has been revoked */ + ret = is_key_revoked(key_num, key_revoc_flag); + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("Selected key has been revoked\n"); + return -1; + } + + /* Check for valid key length - allowed key sized 1k, 2k and 4K */ + for (i = 0; i < hdr->len_kr.num_srk; i++) { + if (CHECK_KEY_LEN(srktbl[i].key_len) == 0) { + ERROR("Invalid key length\n"); + return -1; + } + } + + /* We don't return error from here. While parsing we just try to + * install the srk table. Failure needs to be taken care of in + * case of secure boot. This failure will be handled at the time + * of rotpk comparison in plat_get_rotpk_info function + */ + sb = check_boot_mode_secure(&mode); + if (sb) { + ret = deploy_rotpk_hash_table(srktbl, hdr->len_kr.num_srk); + if (ret != 0) { + ERROR("ROTPK FAILURE\n"); + /* For ITS =1 , return failure */ + if (mode != 0) { + return -1; + } + ERROR("SECURE BOOT DEV-ENV MODE:\n"); + ERROR("\tCHECK ROTPK !\n"); + ERROR("\tCONTINUING ON FAILURE...\n"); + } + } + + /* Return the length of the selected key */ + *len = srktbl[key_num - 1].key_len; + + /* Point key to the selected key */ + *key = (uint8_t *)&(srktbl[key_num - 1].pkey); + + return 0; +} + +/* + * This function would parse the CSF header and do the following: + * 1. Basic integrity checks + * 2. Key checks and extract the key from SRK/IE Table + * 3. Key hash comparison with SRKH in fuses in case of SRK Table + * 4. OEM/UID checks - To be added + * 5. Hash calculation for various components used in signature + * 6. Signature integrity checks + * return -> 0 on success, -1 on failure + */ +int validate_esbc_header(void *img_hdr, void **img_key, uint32_t *key_len, + void **img_sign, uint32_t *sign_len, + enum sig_alg *algo) +{ + struct csf_hdr *hdr = img_hdr; + uint8_t *s; + int32_t ret = 0; + void *esbc = (uint8_t *)img_hdr; + uint8_t *key; + uint32_t klen; + + /* check barker code */ + if (memcmp(hdr->barker, barker_code, CSF_BARKER_LEN) != 0) { + ERROR("Wrong barker code in header\n"); + return -1; + } + + ret = get_key(hdr, &key, &klen, algo); + if (ret != 0) { + return -1; + } + + /* check signaure */ + if (klen == (2 * hdr->sign_len)) { + /* check signature length */ + if (((hdr->sign_len == RSA_1K_KEY_SZ_BYTES) || + (hdr->sign_len == RSA_2K_KEY_SZ_BYTES) || + (hdr->sign_len == RSA_4K_KEY_SZ_BYTES)) == 0) { + ERROR("Wrong Signature length in header\n"); + return -1; + } + } else { + ERROR("RSA key length not twice the signature length\n"); + return -1; + } + + /* modulus most significant bit should be set */ + + if ((key[0] & 0x80) == 0U) { + ERROR("RSA Public key MSB not set\n"); + return -1; + } + + /* modulus value should be odd */ + if ((key[klen / 2 - 1] & 0x1) == 0U) { + ERROR("Public key Modulus in header not odd\n"); + return -1; + } + + /* Check signature value < modulus value */ + s = (uint8_t *)(esbc + hdr->psign); + + if (!(memcmp(s, key, hdr->sign_len) < 0)) { + ERROR("Signature not less than modulus"); + return -1; + } + + /* Populate the return addresses */ + *img_sign = (void *)(s); + + /* Save the length of signature */ + *sign_len = hdr->sign_len; + + *img_key = (uint8_t *)key; + + *key_len = klen; + + return ret; +} |