Adding upstream version 2.8.0+dfsg.upstream/2.8.0+dfsgupstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

1 files changed, 420 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/services/spd/opteed/opteed_main.c b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_main.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..160a693
--- /dev/null
+++ b/services/spd/opteed/opteed_main.c
@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2013-2017, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This is the Secure Payload Dispatcher (SPD). The dispatcher is meant to be a
+ * plug-in component to the Secure Monitor, registered as a runtime service. The
+ * SPD is expected to be a functional extension of the Secure Payload (SP) that
+ * executes in Secure EL1. The Secure Monitor will delegate all SMCs targeting
+ * the Trusted OS/Applications range to the dispatcher. The SPD will either
+ * handle the request locally or delegate it to the Secure Payload. It is also
+ * responsible for initialising and maintaining communication with the SP.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <bl31/bl31.h>
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <common/runtime_svc.h>
+#include <lib/el3_runtime/context_mgmt.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+#include <tools_share/uuid.h>
+
+#include "opteed_private.h"
+#include "teesmc_opteed.h"
+#include "teesmc_opteed_macros.h"
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Address of the entrypoint vector table in OPTEE. It is
+ * initialised once on the primary core after a cold boot.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+struct optee_vectors *optee_vector_table;
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Array to keep track of per-cpu OPTEE state
+ ******************************************************************************/
+optee_context_t opteed_sp_context[OPTEED_CORE_COUNT];
+uint32_t opteed_rw;
+
+static int32_t opteed_init(void);
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function is the handler registered for S-EL1 interrupts by the
+ * OPTEED. It validates the interrupt and upon success arranges entry into
+ * the OPTEE at 'optee_fiq_entry()' for handling the interrupt.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static uint64_t opteed_sel1_interrupt_handler(uint32_t id,
+					    uint32_t flags,
+					    void *handle,
+					    void *cookie)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id;
+	optee_context_t *optee_ctx;
+
+	/* Check the security state when the exception was generated */
+	assert(get_interrupt_src_ss(flags) == NON_SECURE);
+
+	/* Sanity check the pointer to this cpu's context */
+	assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
+
+	/* Save the non-secure context before entering the OPTEE */
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
+
+	/* Get a reference to this cpu's OPTEE context */
+	linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+	optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id];
+	assert(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE));
+
+	cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t)&optee_vector_table->fiq_entry);
+	cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
+	cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
+
+	/*
+	 * Tell the OPTEE that it has to handle an FIQ (synchronously).
+	 * Also the instruction in normal world where the interrupt was
+	 * generated is passed for debugging purposes. It is safe to
+	 * retrieve this address from ELR_EL3 as the secure context will
+	 * not take effect until el3_exit().
+	 */
+	SMC_RET1(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx, read_elr_el3());
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * OPTEE Dispatcher setup. The OPTEED finds out the OPTEE entrypoint and type
+ * (aarch32/aarch64) if not already known and initialises the context for entry
+ * into OPTEE for its initialization.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static int32_t opteed_setup(void)
+{
+	entry_point_info_t *optee_ep_info;
+	uint32_t linear_id;
+	uint64_t opteed_pageable_part;
+	uint64_t opteed_mem_limit;
+	uint64_t dt_addr;
+
+	linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+
+	/*
+	 * Get information about the Secure Payload (BL32) image. Its
+	 * absence is a critical failure.  TODO: Add support to
+	 * conditionally include the SPD service
+	 */
+	optee_ep_info = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE);
+	if (!optee_ep_info) {
+		WARN("No OPTEE provided by BL2 boot loader, Booting device"
+			" without OPTEE initialization. SMC`s destined for OPTEE"
+			" will return SMC_UNK\n");
+		return 1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If there's no valid entry point for SP, we return a non-zero value
+	 * signalling failure initializing the service. We bail out without
+	 * registering any handlers
+	 */
+	if (!optee_ep_info->pc)
+		return 1;
+
+	opteed_rw = optee_ep_info->args.arg0;
+	opteed_pageable_part = optee_ep_info->args.arg1;
+	opteed_mem_limit = optee_ep_info->args.arg2;
+	dt_addr = optee_ep_info->args.arg3;
+
+	opteed_init_optee_ep_state(optee_ep_info,
+				opteed_rw,
+				optee_ep_info->pc,
+				opteed_pageable_part,
+				opteed_mem_limit,
+				dt_addr,
+				&opteed_sp_context[linear_id]);
+
+	/*
+	 * All OPTEED initialization done. Now register our init function with
+	 * BL31 for deferred invocation
+	 */
+	bl31_register_bl32_init(&opteed_init);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function passes control to the OPTEE image (BL32) for the first time
+ * on the primary cpu after a cold boot. It assumes that a valid secure
+ * context has already been created by opteed_setup() which can be directly
+ * used.  It also assumes that a valid non-secure context has been
+ * initialised by PSCI so it does not need to save and restore any
+ * non-secure state. This function performs a synchronous entry into
+ * OPTEE. OPTEE passes control back to this routine through a SMC.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static int32_t opteed_init(void)
+{
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+	optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id];
+	entry_point_info_t *optee_entry_point;
+	uint64_t rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Get information about the OPTEE (BL32) image. Its
+	 * absence is a critical failure.
+	 */
+	optee_entry_point = bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(SECURE);
+	assert(optee_entry_point);
+
+	cm_init_my_context(optee_entry_point);
+
+	/*
+	 * Arrange for an entry into OPTEE. It will be returned via
+	 * OPTEE_ENTRY_DONE case
+	 */
+	rc = opteed_synchronous_sp_entry(optee_ctx);
+	assert(rc != 0);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function is responsible for handling all SMCs in the Trusted OS/App
+ * range from the non-secure state as defined in the SMC Calling Convention
+ * Document. It is also responsible for communicating with the Secure
+ * payload to delegate work and return results back to the non-secure
+ * state. Lastly it will also return any information that OPTEE needs to do
+ * the work assigned to it.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static uintptr_t opteed_smc_handler(uint32_t smc_fid,
+			 u_register_t x1,
+			 u_register_t x2,
+			 u_register_t x3,
+			 u_register_t x4,
+			 void *cookie,
+			 void *handle,
+			 u_register_t flags)
+{
+	cpu_context_t *ns_cpu_context;
+	uint32_t linear_id = plat_my_core_pos();
+	optee_context_t *optee_ctx = &opteed_sp_context[linear_id];
+	uint64_t rc;
+
+	/*
+	 * Determine which security state this SMC originated from
+	 */
+
+	if (is_caller_non_secure(flags)) {
+		/*
+		 * This is a fresh request from the non-secure client.
+		 * The parameters are in x1 and x2. Figure out which
+		 * registers need to be preserved, save the non-secure
+		 * state and send the request to the secure payload.
+		 */
+		assert(handle == cm_get_context(NON_SECURE));
+
+		cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(NON_SECURE);
+
+		/*
+		 * We are done stashing the non-secure context. Ask the
+		 * OPTEE to do the work now.
+		 */
+
+		/*
+		 * Verify if there is a valid context to use, copy the
+		 * operation type and parameters to the secure context
+		 * and jump to the fast smc entry point in the secure
+		 * payload. Entry into S-EL1 will take place upon exit
+		 * from this function.
+		 */
+		assert(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx == cm_get_context(SECURE));
+
+		/* Set appropriate entry for SMC.
+		 * We expect OPTEE to manage the PSTATE.I and PSTATE.F
+		 * flags as appropriate.
+		 */
+		if (GET_SMC_TYPE(smc_fid) == SMC_TYPE_FAST) {
+			cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t)
+					&optee_vector_table->fast_smc_entry);
+		} else {
+			cm_set_elr_el3(SECURE, (uint64_t)
+					&optee_vector_table->yield_smc_entry);
+		}
+
+		cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(SECURE);
+		cm_set_next_eret_context(SECURE);
+
+		write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx),
+			      CTX_GPREG_X4,
+			      read_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(handle),
+					   CTX_GPREG_X4));
+		write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx),
+			      CTX_GPREG_X5,
+			      read_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(handle),
+					   CTX_GPREG_X5));
+		write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx),
+			      CTX_GPREG_X6,
+			      read_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(handle),
+					   CTX_GPREG_X6));
+		/* Propagate hypervisor client ID */
+		write_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx),
+			      CTX_GPREG_X7,
+			      read_ctx_reg(get_gpregs_ctx(handle),
+					   CTX_GPREG_X7));
+
+		SMC_RET4(&optee_ctx->cpu_ctx, smc_fid, x1, x2, x3);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Returning from OPTEE
+	 */
+
+	switch (smc_fid) {
+	/*
+	 * OPTEE has finished initialising itself after a cold boot
+	 */
+	case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_ENTRY_DONE:
+		/*
+		 * Stash the OPTEE entry points information. This is done
+		 * only once on the primary cpu
+		 */
+		assert(optee_vector_table == NULL);
+		optee_vector_table = (optee_vectors_t *) x1;
+
+		if (optee_vector_table) {
+			set_optee_pstate(optee_ctx->state, OPTEE_PSTATE_ON);
+
+			/*
+			 * OPTEE has been successfully initialized.
+			 * Register power management hooks with PSCI
+			 */
+			psci_register_spd_pm_hook(&opteed_pm);
+
+			/*
+			 * Register an interrupt handler for S-EL1 interrupts
+			 * when generated during code executing in the
+			 * non-secure state.
+			 */
+			flags = 0;
+			set_interrupt_rm_flag(flags, NON_SECURE);
+			rc = register_interrupt_type_handler(INTR_TYPE_S_EL1,
+						opteed_sel1_interrupt_handler,
+						flags);
+			if (rc)
+				panic();
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * OPTEE reports completion. The OPTEED must have initiated
+		 * the original request through a synchronous entry into
+		 * OPTEE. Jump back to the original C runtime context.
+		 */
+		opteed_synchronous_sp_exit(optee_ctx, x1);
+		break;
+
+
+	/*
+	 * These function IDs is used only by OP-TEE to indicate it has
+	 * finished:
+	 * 1. turning itself on in response to an earlier psci
+	 *    cpu_on request
+	 * 2. resuming itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend
+	 *    request.
+	 */
+	case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_ON_DONE:
+	case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_RESUME_DONE:
+
+
+	/*
+	 * These function IDs is used only by the SP to indicate it has
+	 * finished:
+	 * 1. suspending itself after an earlier psci cpu_suspend
+	 *    request.
+	 * 2. turning itself off in response to an earlier psci
+	 *    cpu_off request.
+	 */
+	case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_OFF_DONE:
+	case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SUSPEND_DONE:
+	case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SYSTEM_OFF_DONE:
+	case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_SYSTEM_RESET_DONE:
+
+		/*
+		 * OPTEE reports completion. The OPTEED must have initiated the
+		 * original request through a synchronous entry into OPTEE.
+		 * Jump back to the original C runtime context, and pass x1 as
+		 * return value to the caller
+		 */
+		opteed_synchronous_sp_exit(optee_ctx, x1);
+		break;
+
+	/*
+	 * OPTEE is returning from a call or being preempted from a call, in
+	 * either case execution should resume in the normal world.
+	 */
+	case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_CALL_DONE:
+		/*
+		 * This is the result from the secure client of an
+		 * earlier request. The results are in x0-x3. Copy it
+		 * into the non-secure context, save the secure state
+		 * and return to the non-secure state.
+		 */
+		assert(handle == cm_get_context(SECURE));
+		cm_el1_sysregs_context_save(SECURE);
+
+		/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
+		ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
+		assert(ns_cpu_context);
+
+		/* Restore non-secure state */
+		cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
+		cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
+
+		SMC_RET4(ns_cpu_context, x1, x2, x3, x4);
+
+	/*
+	 * OPTEE has finished handling a S-EL1 FIQ interrupt. Execution
+	 * should resume in the normal world.
+	 */
+	case TEESMC_OPTEED_RETURN_FIQ_DONE:
+		/* Get a reference to the non-secure context */
+		ns_cpu_context = cm_get_context(NON_SECURE);
+		assert(ns_cpu_context);
+
+		/*
+		 * Restore non-secure state. There is no need to save the
+		 * secure system register context since OPTEE was supposed
+		 * to preserve it during S-EL1 interrupt handling.
+		 */
+		cm_el1_sysregs_context_restore(NON_SECURE);
+		cm_set_next_eret_context(NON_SECURE);
+
+		SMC_RET0((uint64_t) ns_cpu_context);
+
+	default:
+		panic();
+	}
+}
+
+/* Define an OPTEED runtime service descriptor for fast SMC calls */
+DECLARE_RT_SVC(
+	opteed_fast,
+
+	OEN_TOS_START,
+	OEN_TOS_END,
+	SMC_TYPE_FAST,
+	opteed_setup,
+	opteed_smc_handler
+);
+
+/* Define an OPTEED runtime service descriptor for yielding SMC calls */
+DECLARE_RT_SVC(
+	opteed_std,
+
+	OEN_TOS_START,
+	OEN_TOS_END,
+	SMC_TYPE_YIELD,
+	NULL,
+	opteed_smc_handler
+);