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-rw-r--r--plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl2_mem_params_desc.c106
-rw-r--r--plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl2_setup.c202
-rw-r--r--plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl31_setup.c291
-rw-r--r--plat/brcm/common/brcm_ccn.c36
-rw-r--r--plat/brcm/common/brcm_common.c59
-rw-r--r--plat/brcm/common/brcm_gicv3.c91
-rw-r--r--plat/brcm/common/brcm_image_load.c41
-rw-r--r--plat/brcm/common/brcm_io_storage.c408
-rw-r--r--plat/brcm/common/brcm_mhu.c131
-rw-r--r--plat/brcm/common/brcm_mhu.h19
-rw-r--r--plat/brcm/common/brcm_scpi.c252
-rw-r--r--plat/brcm/common/brcm_scpi.h107
12 files changed, 1743 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl2_mem_params_desc.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl2_mem_params_desc.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aed99d9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl2_mem_params_desc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <common/desc_image_load.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Following descriptor provides BL image/ep information that gets used
+ * by BL2 to load the images and also subset of this information is
+ * passed to next BL image. The image loading sequence is managed by
+ * populating the images in required loading order. The image execution
+ * sequence is managed by populating the `next_handoff_image_id` with
+ * the next executable image id.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+static bl_mem_params_node_t bl2_mem_params_descs[] = {
+#ifdef SCP_BL2_BASE
+ /* Fill SCP_BL2 related information if it exists */
+ {
+ .image_id = SCP_BL2_IMAGE_ID,
+
+ SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(ep_info, PARAM_IMAGE_BINARY,
+ VERSION_2, entry_point_info_t, SECURE | NON_EXECUTABLE),
+
+ SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(image_info, PARAM_IMAGE_BINARY,
+ VERSION_2, image_info_t, 0),
+ .image_info.image_base = SCP_BL2_BASE,
+ .image_info.image_max_size = PLAT_MAX_SCP_BL2_SIZE,
+
+ .next_handoff_image_id = INVALID_IMAGE_ID,
+ },
+#endif /* SCP_BL2_BASE */
+
+ /* Fill BL31 related information */
+ {
+ .image_id = BL31_IMAGE_ID,
+
+ SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(ep_info, PARAM_EP,
+ VERSION_2, entry_point_info_t,
+ SECURE | EXECUTABLE | EP_FIRST_EXE),
+ .ep_info.pc = BL31_BASE,
+ .ep_info.spsr = SPSR_64(MODE_EL3, MODE_SP_ELX,
+ DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS),
+#if DEBUG
+ .ep_info.args.arg3 = BRCM_BL31_PLAT_PARAM_VAL,
+#endif
+
+ SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(image_info, PARAM_EP,
+ VERSION_2, image_info_t, IMAGE_ATTRIB_PLAT_SETUP),
+ .image_info.image_base = BL31_BASE,
+ .image_info.image_max_size = BL31_LIMIT - BL31_BASE,
+
+#ifdef BL32_BASE
+ .next_handoff_image_id = BL32_IMAGE_ID,
+#else
+ .next_handoff_image_id = BL33_IMAGE_ID,
+#endif
+ },
+
+#ifdef BL32_BASE
+ /* Fill BL32 related information */
+ {
+ .image_id = BL32_IMAGE_ID,
+
+ SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(ep_info, PARAM_EP,
+ VERSION_2, entry_point_info_t, SECURE | EXECUTABLE),
+ .ep_info.pc = BL32_BASE,
+
+ SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(image_info, PARAM_EP,
+ VERSION_2, image_info_t, 0),
+ .image_info.image_base = BL32_BASE,
+ .image_info.image_max_size = BL32_LIMIT - BL32_BASE,
+
+ .next_handoff_image_id = BL33_IMAGE_ID,
+ },
+#endif /* BL32_BASE */
+
+ /* Fill BL33 related information */
+ {
+ .image_id = BL33_IMAGE_ID,
+ SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(ep_info, PARAM_EP,
+ VERSION_2, entry_point_info_t, NON_SECURE | EXECUTABLE),
+#ifdef PRELOADED_BL33_BASE
+ .ep_info.pc = PRELOADED_BL33_BASE,
+
+ SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(image_info, PARAM_EP,
+ VERSION_2, image_info_t, IMAGE_ATTRIB_SKIP_LOADING),
+#else
+ .ep_info.pc = PLAT_BRCM_NS_IMAGE_OFFSET,
+
+ SET_STATIC_PARAM_HEAD(image_info, PARAM_EP,
+ VERSION_2, image_info_t, 0),
+ .image_info.image_base = PLAT_BRCM_NS_IMAGE_OFFSET,
+ .image_info.image_max_size = BRCM_DRAM1_SIZE,
+#endif /* PRELOADED_BL33_BASE */
+
+ .next_handoff_image_id = INVALID_IMAGE_ID,
+ }
+};
+
+REGISTER_BL_IMAGE_DESCS(bl2_mem_params_descs)
diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl2_setup.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl2_setup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9a7153b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl2_setup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <common/desc_image_load.h>
+#include <drivers/arm/sp804_delay_timer.h>
+#include <lib/mmio.h>
+
+#include <bcm_console.h>
+#include <platform_def.h>
+#include <plat/brcm/common/plat_brcm.h>
+
+/* Data structure which holds the extents of the trusted SRAM for BL2 */
+static meminfo_t bl2_tzram_layout __aligned(CACHE_WRITEBACK_GRANULE);
+
+/* Weak definitions may be overridden in specific BRCM platform */
+#pragma weak plat_bcm_bl2_platform_setup
+#pragma weak plat_bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup
+#pragma weak plat_bcm_security_setup
+#pragma weak plat_bcm_bl2_plat_handle_scp_bl2
+#pragma weak plat_bcm_bl2_early_platform_setup
+
+void plat_bcm_bl2_early_platform_setup(void)
+{
+}
+
+void plat_bcm_bl2_platform_setup(void)
+{
+}
+
+void plat_bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup(void)
+{
+}
+
+void plat_bcm_security_setup(void)
+{
+}
+
+void bcm_bl2_early_platform_setup(uintptr_t tb_fw_config,
+ meminfo_t *mem_layout)
+{
+ /* Initialize the console to provide early debug support */
+ bcm_console_boot_init();
+
+ /* Setup the BL2 memory layout */
+ bl2_tzram_layout = *mem_layout;
+
+ /* Initialise the IO layer and register platform IO devices */
+ plat_brcm_io_setup();
+
+ /* Log HW reset event */
+ INFO("RESET: 0x%x\n",
+ mmio_read_32(CRMU_RESET_EVENT_LOG));
+}
+
+void bl2_early_platform_setup2(u_register_t arg0, u_register_t arg1,
+ u_register_t arg2, u_register_t arg3)
+{
+ /* SoC specific setup */
+ plat_bcm_bl2_early_platform_setup();
+
+ /* Initialize delay timer driver using SP804 dual timer 0 */
+ sp804_timer_init(SP804_TIMER0_BASE,
+ SP804_TIMER0_CLKMULT, SP804_TIMER0_CLKDIV);
+
+ /* BRCM platforms generic setup */
+ bcm_bl2_early_platform_setup((uintptr_t)arg0, (meminfo_t *)arg1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform Broadcom platform setup.
+ */
+void bcm_bl2_platform_setup(void)
+{
+ /* Initialize the secure environment */
+ plat_bcm_security_setup();
+}
+
+void bl2_platform_setup(void)
+{
+ bcm_bl2_platform_setup();
+ plat_bcm_bl2_platform_setup();
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Perform the very early platform specific architectural setup here. At the
+ * moment this is only initializes the mmu in a quick and dirty way.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup(void)
+{
+#ifndef MMU_DISABLED
+ if (!(read_sctlr_el1() & SCTLR_M_BIT)) {
+ const mmap_region_t bl_regions[] = {
+ MAP_REGION_FLAT(bl2_tzram_layout.total_base,
+ bl2_tzram_layout.total_size,
+ MT_MEMORY | MT_RW | MT_SECURE),
+ MAP_REGION_FLAT(BL_CODE_BASE,
+ BL_CODE_END - BL_CODE_BASE,
+ MT_CODE | MT_SECURE),
+ MAP_REGION_FLAT(BL_RO_DATA_BASE,
+ BL_RO_DATA_END - BL_RO_DATA_BASE,
+ MT_RO_DATA | MT_SECURE),
+#if USE_COHERENT_MEM
+ MAP_REGION_FLAT(BL_COHERENT_RAM_BASE,
+ BL_COHERENT_RAM_END -
+ BL_COHERENT_RAM_BASE,
+ MT_DEVICE | MT_RW | MT_SECURE),
+#endif
+ {0}
+ };
+
+ setup_page_tables(bl_regions, plat_brcm_get_mmap());
+ enable_mmu_el1(0);
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+void bl2_plat_arch_setup(void)
+{
+#ifdef ENA_MMU_BEFORE_DDR_INIT
+ /*
+ * Once MMU is enabled before DDR, MEMORY TESTS
+ * get affected as read/write transaction might occures from
+ * caches. So For running memory test, one should not set this
+ * flag.
+ */
+ bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup();
+ plat_bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup();
+#else
+ plat_bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup();
+ bcm_bl2_plat_arch_setup();
+#endif
+}
+
+int bcm_bl2_handle_post_image_load(unsigned int image_id)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+ bl_mem_params_node_t *bl_mem_params = get_bl_mem_params_node(image_id);
+
+ assert(bl_mem_params);
+
+ switch (image_id) {
+ case BL32_IMAGE_ID:
+ bl_mem_params->ep_info.spsr = brcm_get_spsr_for_bl32_entry();
+ break;
+
+ case BL33_IMAGE_ID:
+ /* BL33 expects to receive the primary CPU MPID (through r0) */
+ bl_mem_params->ep_info.args.arg0 = 0xffff & read_mpidr();
+ bl_mem_params->ep_info.spsr = brcm_get_spsr_for_bl33_entry();
+ break;
+
+#ifdef SCP_BL2_BASE
+ case SCP_BL2_IMAGE_ID:
+ /* The subsequent handling of SCP_BL2 is platform specific */
+ err = bcm_bl2_handle_scp_bl2(&bl_mem_params->image_info);
+ if (err)
+ WARN("Failure in platform-specific handling of SCP_BL2 image.\n");
+ break;
+#endif
+ default:
+ /* Do nothing in default case */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function can be used by the platforms to update/use image
+ * information for given `image_id`.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+int bcm_bl2_plat_handle_post_image_load(unsigned int image_id)
+{
+ return bcm_bl2_handle_post_image_load(image_id);
+}
+
+int bl2_plat_handle_post_image_load(unsigned int image_id)
+{
+ return bcm_bl2_plat_handle_post_image_load(image_id);
+}
+
+#ifdef SCP_BL2_BASE
+int plat_bcm_bl2_plat_handle_scp_bl2(image_info_t *scp_bl2_image_info)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int bcm_bl2_handle_scp_bl2(image_info_t *scp_bl2_image_info)
+{
+ return plat_bcm_bl2_plat_handle_scp_bl2(scp_bl2_image_info);
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl31_setup.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl31_setup.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d3fa83d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_bl31_setup.c
@@ -0,0 +1,291 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2015-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <drivers/arm/sp804_delay_timer.h>
+#include <lib/utils.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+
+#include <bcm_console.h>
+#include <plat_brcm.h>
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+#ifdef BL33_SHARED_DDR_BASE
+struct bl33_info *bl33_info = (struct bl33_info *)BL33_SHARED_DDR_BASE;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Placeholder variables for copying the arguments that have been passed to
+ * BL31 from BL2.
+ */
+static entry_point_info_t bl32_image_ep_info;
+static entry_point_info_t bl33_image_ep_info;
+
+/* Weak definitions may be overridden in specific BRCM platform */
+#pragma weak plat_bcm_bl31_early_platform_setup
+#pragma weak plat_brcm_pwrc_setup
+#pragma weak plat_brcm_security_setup
+
+void plat_brcm_security_setup(void)
+{
+
+}
+
+void plat_brcm_pwrc_setup(void)
+{
+
+}
+
+void plat_bcm_bl31_early_platform_setup(void *from_bl2,
+ bl_params_t *plat_params_from_bl2)
+{
+
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Return a pointer to the 'entry_point_info' structure of the next image for
+ * the security state specified. BL33 corresponds to the non-secure image type
+ * while BL32 corresponds to the secure image type. A NULL pointer is returned
+ * if the image does not exist.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+struct entry_point_info *bl31_plat_get_next_image_ep_info(uint32_t type)
+{
+ entry_point_info_t *next_image_info;
+
+ assert(sec_state_is_valid(type));
+ next_image_info = (type == NON_SECURE)
+ ? &bl33_image_ep_info : &bl32_image_ep_info;
+ /*
+ * None of the images on the ARM development platforms can have 0x0
+ * as the entrypoint
+ */
+ if (next_image_info->pc)
+ return next_image_info;
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Perform any BL31 early platform setup common to ARM standard platforms.
+ * Here is an opportunity to copy parameters passed by the calling EL (S-EL1
+ * in BL2 & EL3 in BL1) before they are lost (potentially). This needs to be
+ * done before the MMU is initialized so that the memory layout can be used
+ * while creating page tables. BL2 has flushed this information to memory, so
+ * we are guaranteed to pick up good data.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void __init brcm_bl31_early_platform_setup(void *from_bl2,
+ uintptr_t soc_fw_config,
+ uintptr_t hw_config,
+ void *plat_params_from_bl2)
+{
+ /* Initialize the console to provide early debug support */
+ bcm_console_boot_init();
+
+ /* Initialize delay timer driver using SP804 dual timer 0 */
+ sp804_timer_init(SP804_TIMER0_BASE,
+ SP804_TIMER0_CLKMULT, SP804_TIMER0_CLKDIV);
+
+#if RESET_TO_BL31
+ /* There are no parameters from BL2 if BL31 is a reset vector */
+ assert(from_bl2 == NULL);
+ assert(plat_params_from_bl2 == NULL);
+
+# ifdef BL32_BASE
+ /* Populate entry point information for BL32 */
+ SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl32_image_ep_info,
+ PARAM_EP,
+ VERSION_1,
+ 0);
+ SET_SECURITY_STATE(bl32_image_ep_info.h.attr, SECURE);
+ bl32_image_ep_info.pc = BL32_BASE;
+ bl32_image_ep_info.spsr = brcm_get_spsr_for_bl32_entry();
+# endif /* BL32_BASE */
+
+ /* Populate entry point information for BL33 */
+ SET_PARAM_HEAD(&bl33_image_ep_info,
+ PARAM_EP,
+ VERSION_1,
+ 0);
+ /*
+ * Tell BL31 where the non-trusted software image
+ * is located and the entry state information
+ */
+ bl33_image_ep_info.pc = plat_get_ns_image_entrypoint();
+
+ bl33_image_ep_info.spsr = brcm_get_spsr_for_bl33_entry();
+ SET_SECURITY_STATE(bl33_image_ep_info.h.attr, NON_SECURE);
+
+# if ARM_LINUX_KERNEL_AS_BL33
+ /*
+ * According to the file ``Documentation/arm64/booting.txt`` of the
+ * Linux kernel tree, Linux expects the physical address of the device
+ * tree blob (DTB) in x0, while x1-x3 are reserved for future use and
+ * must be 0.
+ */
+ bl33_image_ep_info.args.arg0 = (u_register_t)PRELOADED_DTB_BASE;
+ bl33_image_ep_info.args.arg1 = 0U;
+ bl33_image_ep_info.args.arg2 = 0U;
+ bl33_image_ep_info.args.arg3 = 0U;
+# endif
+
+#else /* RESET_TO_BL31 */
+
+ /*
+ * In debug builds, we pass a special value in 'plat_params_from_bl2'
+ * to verify platform parameters from BL2 to BL31.
+ * In release builds, it's not used.
+ */
+ assert(((unsigned long long)plat_params_from_bl2) ==
+ BRCM_BL31_PLAT_PARAM_VAL);
+
+ /*
+ * Check params passed from BL2 should not be NULL
+ */
+ bl_params_t *params_from_bl2 = (bl_params_t *)from_bl2;
+
+ assert(params_from_bl2 != NULL);
+ assert(params_from_bl2->h.type == PARAM_BL_PARAMS);
+ assert(params_from_bl2->h.version >= VERSION_2);
+
+ bl_params_node_t *bl_params = params_from_bl2->head;
+
+ /*
+ * Copy BL33 and BL32 (if present), entry point information.
+ * They are stored in Secure RAM, in BL2's address space.
+ */
+ while (bl_params != NULL) {
+ if (bl_params->image_id == BL32_IMAGE_ID &&
+ bl_params->image_info->h.attr != IMAGE_ATTRIB_SKIP_LOADING)
+ bl32_image_ep_info = *bl_params->ep_info;
+
+ if (bl_params->image_id == BL33_IMAGE_ID)
+ bl33_image_ep_info = *bl_params->ep_info;
+
+ bl_params = bl_params->next_params_info;
+ }
+
+ if (bl33_image_ep_info.pc == 0U)
+ panic();
+#endif /* RESET_TO_BL31 */
+
+#ifdef BL33_SHARED_DDR_BASE
+ /* Pass information to BL33 thorugh x0 */
+ bl33_image_ep_info.args.arg0 = (u_register_t)BL33_SHARED_DDR_BASE;
+ bl33_image_ep_info.args.arg1 = 0ULL;
+ bl33_image_ep_info.args.arg2 = 0ULL;
+ bl33_image_ep_info.args.arg3 = 0ULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+void bl31_early_platform_setup2(u_register_t arg0, u_register_t arg1,
+ u_register_t arg2, u_register_t arg3)
+{
+#ifdef BL31_LOG_LEVEL
+ SET_LOG_LEVEL(BL31_LOG_LEVEL);
+#endif
+
+ brcm_bl31_early_platform_setup((void *)arg0, arg1, arg2, (void *)arg3);
+
+ plat_bcm_bl31_early_platform_setup((void *)arg0, (void *)arg3);
+
+#ifdef DRIVER_CC_ENABLE
+ /*
+ * Initialize Interconnect for this cluster during cold boot.
+ * No need for locks as no other CPU is active.
+ */
+ plat_brcm_interconnect_init();
+
+ /*
+ * Enable Interconnect coherency for the primary CPU's cluster.
+ * Earlier bootloader stages might already do this (e.g. Trusted
+ * Firmware's BL1 does it) but we can't assume so. There is no harm in
+ * executing this code twice anyway.
+ * Platform specific PSCI code will enable coherency for other
+ * clusters.
+ */
+ plat_brcm_interconnect_enter_coherency();
+#endif
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Perform any BL31 platform setup common to ARM standard platforms
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void brcm_bl31_platform_setup(void)
+{
+ /* Initialize the GIC driver, cpu and distributor interfaces */
+ plat_brcm_gic_driver_init();
+ plat_brcm_gic_init();
+
+ /* Initialize power controller before setting up topology */
+ plat_brcm_pwrc_setup();
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Perform any BL31 platform runtime setup prior to BL31 exit common to ARM
+ * standard platforms
+ * Perform BL31 platform setup
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void brcm_bl31_plat_runtime_setup(void)
+{
+ console_switch_state(CONSOLE_FLAG_RUNTIME);
+
+ /* Initialize the runtime console */
+ bcm_console_runtime_init();
+}
+
+void bl31_platform_setup(void)
+{
+ brcm_bl31_platform_setup();
+
+ /* Initialize the secure environment */
+ plat_brcm_security_setup();
+}
+
+void bl31_plat_runtime_setup(void)
+{
+ brcm_bl31_plat_runtime_setup();
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * Perform the very early platform specific architectural setup shared between
+ * ARM standard platforms. This only does basic initialization. Later
+ * architectural setup (bl31_arch_setup()) does not do anything platform
+ * specific.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void __init brcm_bl31_plat_arch_setup(void)
+{
+#ifndef MMU_DISABLED
+ const mmap_region_t bl_regions[] = {
+ MAP_REGION_FLAT(BL31_BASE, BL31_END - BL31_BASE,
+ MT_MEMORY | MT_RW | MT_SECURE),
+ MAP_REGION_FLAT(BL_CODE_BASE, BL_CODE_END - BL_CODE_BASE,
+ MT_CODE | MT_SECURE),
+ MAP_REGION_FLAT(BL_RO_DATA_BASE,
+ BL_RO_DATA_END - BL_RO_DATA_BASE,
+ MT_RO_DATA | MT_SECURE),
+#if USE_COHERENT_MEM
+ MAP_REGION_FLAT(BL_COHERENT_RAM_BASE,
+ BL_COHERENT_RAM_END - BL_COHERENT_RAM_BASE,
+ MT_DEVICE | MT_RW | MT_SECURE),
+#endif
+ {0}
+ };
+
+ setup_page_tables(bl_regions, plat_brcm_get_mmap());
+
+ enable_mmu_el3(0);
+#endif
+}
+
+void __init bl31_plat_arch_setup(void)
+{
+ brcm_bl31_plat_arch_setup();
+}
diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_ccn.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_ccn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9396aaa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_ccn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <drivers/arm/ccn.h>
+
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+static const unsigned char master_to_rn_id_map[] = {
+ PLAT_BRCM_CLUSTER_TO_CCN_ID_MAP
+};
+
+static const ccn_desc_t bcm_ccn_desc = {
+ .periphbase = PLAT_BRCM_CCN_BASE,
+ .num_masters = ARRAY_SIZE(master_to_rn_id_map),
+ .master_to_rn_id_map = master_to_rn_id_map
+};
+
+void plat_brcm_interconnect_init(void)
+{
+ ccn_init(&bcm_ccn_desc);
+}
+
+void plat_brcm_interconnect_enter_coherency(void)
+{
+ ccn_enter_snoop_dvm_domain(1 << MPIDR_AFFLVL1_VAL(read_mpidr_el1()));
+}
+
+void plat_brcm_interconnect_exit_coherency(void)
+{
+ ccn_exit_snoop_dvm_domain(1 << MPIDR_AFFLVL1_VAL(read_mpidr_el1()));
+}
diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_common.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_common.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f23719d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <arch.h>
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+
+#include <plat_brcm.h>
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+/* Weak definitions may be overridden in specific BRCM platform */
+#pragma weak plat_get_ns_image_entrypoint
+#pragma weak plat_brcm_get_mmap
+
+uintptr_t plat_get_ns_image_entrypoint(void)
+{
+#ifdef PRELOADED_BL33_BASE
+ return PRELOADED_BL33_BASE;
+#else
+ return PLAT_BRCM_NS_IMAGE_OFFSET;
+#endif
+}
+
+uint32_t brcm_get_spsr_for_bl32_entry(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * The Secure Payload Dispatcher service is responsible for
+ * setting the SPSR prior to entry into the BL32 image.
+ */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+uint32_t brcm_get_spsr_for_bl33_entry(void)
+{
+ unsigned int mode;
+ uint32_t spsr;
+
+ /* Figure out what mode we enter the non-secure world in */
+ mode = el_implemented(2) ? MODE_EL2 : MODE_EL1;
+
+ /*
+ * TODO: Consider the possibility of specifying the SPSR in
+ * the FIP ToC and allowing the platform to have a say as
+ * well.
+ */
+ spsr = SPSR_64(mode, MODE_SP_ELX, DISABLE_ALL_EXCEPTIONS);
+ return spsr;
+}
+
+const mmap_region_t *plat_brcm_get_mmap(void)
+{
+ return plat_brcm_mmap;
+}
diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_gicv3.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_gicv3.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4137c0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_gicv3.c
@@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <drivers/arm/gicv3.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+/* The GICv3 driver only needs to be initialized in EL3 */
+static uintptr_t brcm_rdistif_base_addrs[PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT];
+
+static const interrupt_prop_t brcm_interrupt_props[] = {
+ /* G1S interrupts */
+ PLAT_BRCM_G1S_IRQ_PROPS(INTR_GROUP1S),
+ /* G0 interrupts */
+ PLAT_BRCM_G0_IRQ_PROPS(INTR_GROUP0)
+};
+
+/*
+ * MPIDR hashing function for translating MPIDRs read from GICR_TYPER register
+ * to core position.
+ *
+ * Calculating core position is dependent on MPIDR_EL1.MT bit. However, affinity
+ * values read from GICR_TYPER don't have an MT field. To reuse the same
+ * translation used for CPUs, we insert MT bit read from the PE's MPIDR into
+ * that read from GICR_TYPER.
+ *
+ * Assumptions:
+ *
+ * - All CPUs implemented in the system have MPIDR_EL1.MT bit set;
+ * - No CPUs implemented in the system use affinity level 3.
+ */
+static unsigned int brcm_gicv3_mpidr_hash(u_register_t mpidr)
+{
+ mpidr |= (read_mpidr_el1() & MPIDR_MT_MASK);
+ return plat_core_pos_by_mpidr(mpidr);
+}
+
+static const gicv3_driver_data_t brcm_gic_data = {
+ .gicd_base = PLAT_BRCM_GICD_BASE,
+ .gicr_base = PLAT_BRCM_GICR_BASE,
+ .interrupt_props = brcm_interrupt_props,
+ .interrupt_props_num = ARRAY_SIZE(brcm_interrupt_props),
+ .rdistif_num = PLATFORM_CORE_COUNT,
+ .rdistif_base_addrs = brcm_rdistif_base_addrs,
+ .mpidr_to_core_pos = brcm_gicv3_mpidr_hash
+};
+
+void plat_brcm_gic_driver_init(void)
+{
+ /* TODO Check if this is required to be initialized here
+ * after getting initialized in EL3, should we re-init this here
+ * in S-EL1
+ */
+ gicv3_driver_init(&brcm_gic_data);
+}
+
+void plat_brcm_gic_init(void)
+{
+ gicv3_distif_init();
+ gicv3_rdistif_init(plat_my_core_pos());
+ gicv3_cpuif_enable(plat_my_core_pos());
+}
+
+void plat_brcm_gic_cpuif_enable(void)
+{
+ gicv3_cpuif_enable(plat_my_core_pos());
+}
+
+void plat_brcm_gic_cpuif_disable(void)
+{
+ gicv3_cpuif_disable(plat_my_core_pos());
+}
+
+void plat_brcm_gic_pcpu_init(void)
+{
+ gicv3_rdistif_init(plat_my_core_pos());
+}
+
+void plat_brcm_gic_redistif_on(void)
+{
+ gicv3_rdistif_on(plat_my_core_pos());
+}
+
+void plat_brcm_gic_redistif_off(void)
+{
+ gicv3_rdistif_off(plat_my_core_pos());
+}
diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_image_load.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_image_load.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ba02bda
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_image_load.c
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <common/bl_common.h>
+#include <common/desc_image_load.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+
+#pragma weak plat_flush_next_bl_params
+#pragma weak plat_get_bl_image_load_info
+#pragma weak plat_get_next_bl_params
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function flushes the data structures so that they are visible
+ * in memory for the next BL image.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+void plat_flush_next_bl_params(void)
+{
+ flush_bl_params_desc();
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function returns the list of loadable images.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+struct bl_load_info *plat_get_bl_image_load_info(void)
+{
+ return get_bl_load_info_from_mem_params_desc();
+}
+
+/*******************************************************************************
+ * This function returns the list of executable images.
+ ******************************************************************************/
+struct bl_params *plat_get_next_bl_params(void)
+{
+ bl_params_t *next_bl_params = get_next_bl_params_from_mem_params_desc();
+
+ populate_next_bl_params_config(next_bl_params);
+ return next_bl_params;
+}
diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_io_storage.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_io_storage.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..66ec292
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_io_storage.c
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <drivers/io/io_driver.h>
+#include <drivers/io/io_fip.h>
+#include <drivers/io/io_memmap.h>
+#include <drivers/io/io_storage.h>
+#include <tools_share/firmware_image_package.h>
+
+#include <cmn_plat_def.h>
+#include <cmn_plat_util.h>
+#include <plat_brcm.h>
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+/* IO devices */
+static const io_dev_connector_t *fip_dev_con;
+static uintptr_t fip_dev_handle;
+static const io_dev_connector_t *memmap_dev_con;
+static uintptr_t memmap_dev_handle;
+
+static const io_block_spec_t fip_block_spec = {
+ .offset = PLAT_BRCM_FIP_BASE,
+ .length = PLAT_BRCM_FIP_MAX_SIZE
+};
+
+static const io_block_spec_t qspi_fip_block_spec = {
+ .offset = PLAT_BRCM_FIP_QSPI_BASE,
+ .length = PLAT_BRCM_FIP_MAX_SIZE
+};
+
+static const io_block_spec_t nand_fip_block_spec = {
+ .offset = PLAT_BRCM_FIP_NAND_BASE,
+ .length = PLAT_BRCM_FIP_MAX_SIZE
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t bl2_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_TRUSTED_BOOT_FIRMWARE_BL2,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t scp_bl2_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_SCP_FIRMWARE_SCP_BL2,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t bl31_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_EL3_RUNTIME_FIRMWARE_BL31,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t bl32_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_SECURE_PAYLOAD_BL32,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t bl32_extra1_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_SECURE_PAYLOAD_BL32_EXTRA1,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t bl32_extra2_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_SECURE_PAYLOAD_BL32_EXTRA2,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t bl33_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_NON_TRUSTED_FIRMWARE_BL33,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t tb_fw_config_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_TB_FW_CONFIG,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t hw_config_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_HW_CONFIG,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t soc_fw_config_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_SOC_FW_CONFIG,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t tos_fw_config_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_TOS_FW_CONFIG,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t nt_fw_config_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_NT_FW_CONFIG,
+};
+
+#if TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT
+static const io_uuid_spec_t tb_fw_cert_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_TRUSTED_BOOT_FW_CERT,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t trusted_key_cert_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_TRUSTED_KEY_CERT,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t scp_fw_key_cert_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_SCP_FW_KEY_CERT,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t soc_fw_key_cert_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_SOC_FW_KEY_CERT,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t tos_fw_key_cert_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_TRUSTED_OS_FW_KEY_CERT,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t nt_fw_key_cert_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_NON_TRUSTED_FW_KEY_CERT,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t scp_fw_cert_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_SCP_FW_CONTENT_CERT,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t soc_fw_cert_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_SOC_FW_CONTENT_CERT,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t tos_fw_cert_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_TRUSTED_OS_FW_CONTENT_CERT,
+};
+
+static const io_uuid_spec_t nt_fw_cert_uuid_spec = {
+ .uuid = UUID_NON_TRUSTED_FW_CONTENT_CERT,
+};
+#endif /* TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT */
+
+static int open_fip(const uintptr_t spec);
+static int open_memmap(const uintptr_t spec);
+static int open_qspi(const uintptr_t spec);
+static int open_nand(const uintptr_t spec);
+
+struct plat_io_policy {
+ uintptr_t *dev_handle;
+ uintptr_t image_spec;
+ int (*check)(const uintptr_t spec);
+};
+
+/* By default, BRCM platforms load images from the FIP */
+static const struct plat_io_policy policies[] = {
+ [FIP_IMAGE_ID] = {
+ &memmap_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&fip_block_spec,
+ open_memmap
+ },
+ [BL2_IMAGE_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&bl2_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [SCP_BL2_IMAGE_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&scp_bl2_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [BL31_IMAGE_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&bl31_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [BL32_IMAGE_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&bl32_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [BL32_EXTRA1_IMAGE_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&bl32_extra1_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [BL32_EXTRA2_IMAGE_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&bl32_extra2_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [BL33_IMAGE_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&bl33_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [TB_FW_CONFIG_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&tb_fw_config_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [HW_CONFIG_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&hw_config_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [SOC_FW_CONFIG_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&soc_fw_config_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [TOS_FW_CONFIG_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&tos_fw_config_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [NT_FW_CONFIG_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&nt_fw_config_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+#if TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT
+ [TRUSTED_BOOT_FW_CERT_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&tb_fw_cert_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [TRUSTED_KEY_CERT_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&trusted_key_cert_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [SCP_FW_KEY_CERT_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&scp_fw_key_cert_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [SOC_FW_KEY_CERT_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&soc_fw_key_cert_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [TRUSTED_OS_FW_KEY_CERT_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&tos_fw_key_cert_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [NON_TRUSTED_FW_KEY_CERT_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&nt_fw_key_cert_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [SCP_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&scp_fw_cert_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [SOC_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&soc_fw_cert_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [TRUSTED_OS_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&tos_fw_cert_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+ [NON_TRUSTED_FW_CONTENT_CERT_ID] = {
+ &fip_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&nt_fw_cert_uuid_spec,
+ open_fip
+ },
+#endif /* TRUSTED_BOARD_BOOT */
+};
+
+/* By default, BRCM platforms load images from the FIP */
+static const struct plat_io_policy boot_source_policies[] = {
+ [BOOT_SOURCE_QSPI] = {
+ &memmap_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&qspi_fip_block_spec,
+ open_qspi
+ },
+ [BOOT_SOURCE_NAND] = {
+ &memmap_dev_handle,
+ (uintptr_t)&nand_fip_block_spec,
+ open_nand
+ },
+};
+
+/* Weak definitions may be overridden in specific brcm platform */
+#pragma weak plat_brcm_io_setup
+#pragma weak plat_brcm_process_flags
+
+static int open_fip(const uintptr_t spec)
+{
+ int result;
+ uintptr_t local_image_handle;
+
+ /* See if a Firmware Image Package is available */
+ result = io_dev_init(fip_dev_handle, (uintptr_t)FIP_IMAGE_ID);
+ if (result == 0) {
+ result = io_open(fip_dev_handle, spec, &local_image_handle);
+ if (result == 0) {
+ VERBOSE("Using FIP\n");
+ io_close(local_image_handle);
+ }
+ }
+ return result;
+}
+
+
+static int open_memmap(const uintptr_t spec)
+{
+ int result;
+ uintptr_t local_image_handle;
+
+ result = io_dev_init(memmap_dev_handle, (uintptr_t)NULL);
+ if (result == 0) {
+ result = io_open(memmap_dev_handle, spec, &local_image_handle);
+ if (result == 0) {
+ VERBOSE("Using Memmap\n");
+ io_close(local_image_handle);
+ }
+ }
+ return result;
+}
+
+static int open_qspi(const uintptr_t spec)
+{
+ return open_memmap(spec);
+}
+
+static int open_nand(const uintptr_t spec)
+{
+ return open_memmap(spec);
+}
+
+
+void brcm_io_setup(void)
+{
+ int io_result;
+ uint32_t boot_source;
+
+ io_result = register_io_dev_fip(&fip_dev_con);
+ assert(io_result == 0);
+
+ io_result = register_io_dev_memmap(&memmap_dev_con);
+ assert(io_result == 0);
+
+ /* Open connections to devices and cache the handles */
+ io_result = io_dev_open(fip_dev_con, (uintptr_t)NULL,
+ &fip_dev_handle);
+ assert(io_result == 0);
+
+ boot_source = boot_source_get();
+ switch (boot_source) {
+ case BOOT_SOURCE_QSPI:
+ case BOOT_SOURCE_NAND:
+ default:
+ io_result = io_dev_open(memmap_dev_con, (uintptr_t)NULL,
+ &memmap_dev_handle);
+ break;
+ }
+ assert(io_result == 0);
+
+ /* Ignore improbable errors in release builds */
+ (void)io_result;
+}
+
+void plat_brcm_io_setup(void)
+{
+ brcm_io_setup();
+}
+
+void plat_brcm_process_flags(uint16_t plat_toc_flags __unused)
+{
+ WARN("%s not implemented\n", __func__);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return an IO device handle and specification which can be used to access
+ * an image. Use this to enforce platform load policy
+ */
+int plat_get_image_source(unsigned int image_id, uintptr_t *dev_handle,
+ uintptr_t *image_spec)
+{
+ int result;
+ const struct plat_io_policy *policy;
+ uint32_t boot_source;
+ uint16_t lcl_plat_toc_flg;
+
+ assert(image_id < ARRAY_SIZE(policies));
+
+ boot_source = boot_source_get();
+ if (image_id == FIP_IMAGE_ID)
+ policy = &boot_source_policies[boot_source];
+ else
+ policy = &policies[image_id];
+
+ result = policy->check(policy->image_spec);
+ if (result == 0) {
+ *image_spec = policy->image_spec;
+ *dev_handle = *(policy->dev_handle);
+
+ if (image_id == TRUSTED_BOOT_FW_CERT_ID) {
+ /*
+ * Process the header flags to perform
+ * such custom actions as speeding up PLL.
+ * CERT seems to be the first image accessed
+ * by BL1 so this is where we process the flags.
+ */
+ fip_dev_get_plat_toc_flag((io_dev_info_t *)fip_dev_handle,
+ &lcl_plat_toc_flg);
+ plat_brcm_process_flags(lcl_plat_toc_flg);
+ }
+ }
+
+ return result;
+}
diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_mhu.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_mhu.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..56f44e0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_mhu.c
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <drivers/delay_timer.h>
+#include <lib/bakery_lock.h>
+
+#include <brcm_mhu.h>
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+#include "m0_ipc.h"
+
+#define PLAT_MHU_INTR_REG AP_TO_SCP_MAILBOX1
+
+/* SCP MHU secure channel registers */
+#define SCP_INTR_S_STAT CRMU_IHOST_SW_PERSISTENT_REG11
+#define SCP_INTR_S_SET CRMU_IHOST_SW_PERSISTENT_REG11
+#define SCP_INTR_S_CLEAR CRMU_IHOST_SW_PERSISTENT_REG11
+
+/* CPU MHU secure channel registers */
+#define CPU_INTR_S_STAT CRMU_IHOST_SW_PERSISTENT_REG10
+#define CPU_INTR_S_SET CRMU_IHOST_SW_PERSISTENT_REG10
+#define CPU_INTR_S_CLEAR CRMU_IHOST_SW_PERSISTENT_REG10
+
+static DEFINE_BAKERY_LOCK(bcm_lock);
+
+/*
+ * Slot 31 is reserved because the MHU hardware uses this register bit to
+ * indicate a non-secure access attempt. The total number of available slots is
+ * therefore 31 [30:0].
+ */
+#define MHU_MAX_SLOT_ID 30
+
+void mhu_secure_message_start(unsigned int slot_id)
+{
+ int iter = 1000000;
+
+ assert(slot_id <= MHU_MAX_SLOT_ID);
+
+ bakery_lock_get(&bcm_lock);
+ /* Make sure any previous command has finished */
+ do {
+ if (!(mmio_read_32(PLAT_BRCM_MHU_BASE + CPU_INTR_S_STAT) &
+ (1 << slot_id)))
+ break;
+
+ udelay(1);
+
+ } while (--iter);
+
+ assert(iter != 0);
+}
+
+void mhu_secure_message_send(unsigned int slot_id)
+{
+ uint32_t response, iter = 1000000;
+
+ assert(slot_id <= MHU_MAX_SLOT_ID);
+ assert(!(mmio_read_32(PLAT_BRCM_MHU_BASE + CPU_INTR_S_STAT) &
+ (1 << slot_id)));
+
+ /* Send command to SCP */
+ mmio_setbits_32(PLAT_BRCM_MHU_BASE + CPU_INTR_S_SET, 1 << slot_id);
+ mmio_write_32(CRMU_MAIL_BOX0, MCU_IPC_MCU_CMD_SCPI);
+ mmio_write_32(PLAT_BRCM_MHU_BASE + PLAT_MHU_INTR_REG, 0x1);
+
+ /* Wait until IPC transport acknowledges reception of SCP command */
+ do {
+ response = mmio_read_32(CRMU_MAIL_BOX0);
+ if ((response & ~MCU_IPC_CMD_REPLY_MASK) ==
+ (MCU_IPC_CMD_DONE_MASK | MCU_IPC_MCU_CMD_SCPI))
+ break;
+
+ udelay(1);
+
+ } while (--iter);
+
+ assert(iter != 0);
+}
+
+uint32_t mhu_secure_message_wait(void)
+{
+ /* Wait for response from SCP */
+ uint32_t response, iter = 1000000;
+
+ do {
+ response = mmio_read_32(PLAT_BRCM_MHU_BASE + SCP_INTR_S_STAT);
+ if (!response)
+ break;
+
+ udelay(1);
+ } while (--iter);
+ assert(iter != 0);
+
+ return response;
+}
+
+void mhu_secure_message_end(unsigned int slot_id)
+{
+ assert(slot_id <= MHU_MAX_SLOT_ID);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear any response we got by writing one in the relevant slot bit to
+ * the CLEAR register
+ */
+ mmio_clrbits_32(PLAT_BRCM_MHU_BASE + SCP_INTR_S_CLEAR, 1 << slot_id);
+ bakery_lock_release(&bcm_lock);
+}
+
+void mhu_secure_init(void)
+{
+ bakery_lock_init(&bcm_lock);
+
+ /*
+ * The STAT register resets to zero. Ensure it is in the expected state,
+ * as a stale or garbage value would make us think it's a message we've
+ * already sent.
+ */
+ mmio_write_32(PLAT_BRCM_MHU_BASE + CPU_INTR_S_STAT, 0);
+ mmio_write_32(PLAT_BRCM_MHU_BASE + SCP_INTR_S_STAT, 0);
+}
+
+void plat_brcm_pwrc_setup(void)
+{
+ mhu_secure_init();
+}
diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_mhu.h b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_mhu.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c89a34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_mhu.h
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#ifndef BRCM_MHU_H
+#define BRCM_MHU_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+void mhu_secure_message_start(unsigned int slot_id);
+void mhu_secure_message_send(unsigned int slot_id);
+uint32_t mhu_secure_message_wait(void);
+void mhu_secure_message_end(unsigned int slot_id);
+
+void mhu_secure_init(void);
+
+#endif /* BRCM_MHU_H */
diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_scpi.c b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_scpi.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a703cb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_scpi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <arch_helpers.h>
+#include <common/debug.h>
+#include <lib/utils.h>
+#include <plat/common/platform.h>
+
+#include <brcm_mhu.h>
+#include <brcm_scpi.h>
+#include <platform_def.h>
+
+#define SCPI_SHARED_MEM_SCP_TO_AP (PLAT_SCP_COM_SHARED_MEM_BASE)
+#define SCPI_SHARED_MEM_AP_TO_SCP (PLAT_SCP_COM_SHARED_MEM_BASE \
+ + 0x100)
+
+/* Header and payload addresses for commands from AP to SCP */
+#define SCPI_CMD_HEADER_AP_TO_SCP \
+ ((scpi_cmd_t *) SCPI_SHARED_MEM_AP_TO_SCP)
+#define SCPI_CMD_PAYLOAD_AP_TO_SCP \
+ ((void *) (SCPI_SHARED_MEM_AP_TO_SCP + sizeof(scpi_cmd_t)))
+
+/* Header and payload addresses for responses from SCP to AP */
+#define SCPI_RES_HEADER_SCP_TO_AP \
+ ((scpi_cmd_t *) SCPI_SHARED_MEM_SCP_TO_AP)
+#define SCPI_RES_PAYLOAD_SCP_TO_AP \
+ ((void *) (SCPI_SHARED_MEM_SCP_TO_AP + sizeof(scpi_cmd_t)))
+
+/* ID of the MHU slot used for the SCPI protocol */
+#define SCPI_MHU_SLOT_ID 0
+
+static void scpi_secure_message_start(void)
+{
+ mhu_secure_message_start(SCPI_MHU_SLOT_ID);
+}
+
+static void scpi_secure_message_send(size_t payload_size)
+{
+ /*
+ * Ensure that any write to the SCPI payload area is seen by SCP before
+ * we write to the MHU register. If these 2 writes were reordered by
+ * the CPU then SCP would read stale payload data
+ */
+ dmbst();
+
+ mhu_secure_message_send(SCPI_MHU_SLOT_ID);
+}
+
+static void scpi_secure_message_receive(scpi_cmd_t *cmd)
+{
+ uint32_t mhu_status;
+
+ assert(cmd != NULL);
+
+ mhu_status = mhu_secure_message_wait();
+
+ /* Expect an SCPI message, reject any other protocol */
+ if (mhu_status != (1 << SCPI_MHU_SLOT_ID)) {
+ ERROR("MHU: Unexpected protocol (MHU status: 0x%x)\n",
+ mhu_status);
+ panic();
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure that any read to the SCPI payload area is done after reading
+ * the MHU register. If these 2 reads were reordered then the CPU would
+ * read invalid payload data
+ */
+ dmbld();
+
+ memcpy(cmd, (void *) SCPI_SHARED_MEM_SCP_TO_AP, sizeof(*cmd));
+}
+
+static void scpi_secure_message_end(void)
+{
+ mhu_secure_message_end(SCPI_MHU_SLOT_ID);
+}
+
+int scpi_wait_ready(void)
+{
+ scpi_cmd_t scpi_cmd;
+
+ VERBOSE("Waiting for SCP_READY command...\n");
+
+ /* Get a message from the SCP */
+ scpi_secure_message_start();
+ scpi_secure_message_receive(&scpi_cmd);
+ scpi_secure_message_end();
+
+ /* We are expecting 'SCP Ready', produce correct error if it's not */
+ scpi_status_t status = SCP_OK;
+
+ if (scpi_cmd.id != SCPI_CMD_SCP_READY) {
+ ERROR("Unexpected SCP command: expected #%u, received #%u\n",
+ SCPI_CMD_SCP_READY, scpi_cmd.id);
+ status = SCP_E_SUPPORT;
+ } else if (scpi_cmd.size != 0) {
+ ERROR("SCP_READY cmd has incorrect size: expected 0, got %u\n",
+ scpi_cmd.size);
+ status = SCP_E_SIZE;
+ }
+
+ VERBOSE("Sending response for SCP_READY command\n");
+
+ /*
+ * Send our response back to SCP.
+ * We are using the same SCPI header, just update the status field.
+ */
+ scpi_cmd.status = status;
+ scpi_secure_message_start();
+ memcpy((void *) SCPI_SHARED_MEM_AP_TO_SCP, &scpi_cmd, sizeof(scpi_cmd));
+ scpi_secure_message_send(0);
+ scpi_secure_message_end();
+
+ return status == SCP_OK ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+void scpi_set_brcm_power_state(unsigned int mpidr,
+ scpi_power_state_t cpu_state, scpi_power_state_t cluster_state,
+ scpi_power_state_t brcm_state)
+{
+ scpi_cmd_t *cmd;
+ uint32_t state = 0;
+ uint32_t *payload_addr;
+
+#if ARM_PLAT_MT
+ /*
+ * The current SCPI driver only caters for single-threaded platforms.
+ * Hence we ignore the thread ID (which is always 0) for such platforms.
+ */
+ state |= (mpidr >> MPIDR_AFF1_SHIFT) & 0x0f; /* CPU ID */
+ state |= ((mpidr >> MPIDR_AFF2_SHIFT) & 0x0f) << 4; /* Cluster ID */
+#else
+ state |= mpidr & 0x0f; /* CPU ID */
+ state |= (mpidr & 0xf00) >> 4; /* Cluster ID */
+#endif /* ARM_PLAT_MT */
+
+ state |= cpu_state << 8;
+ state |= cluster_state << 12;
+ state |= brcm_state << 16;
+
+ scpi_secure_message_start();
+
+ /* Populate the command header */
+ cmd = SCPI_CMD_HEADER_AP_TO_SCP;
+ cmd->id = SCPI_CMD_SET_POWER_STATE;
+ cmd->set = SCPI_SET_NORMAL;
+ cmd->sender = 0;
+ cmd->size = sizeof(state);
+ /* Populate the command payload */
+ payload_addr = SCPI_CMD_PAYLOAD_AP_TO_SCP;
+ *payload_addr = state;
+ scpi_secure_message_send(sizeof(state));
+
+ /*
+ * SCP does not reply to this command in order to avoid MHU interrupts
+ * from the sender, which could interfere with its power state request.
+ */
+ scpi_secure_message_end();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Query and obtain power state from SCP.
+ *
+ * In response to the query, SCP returns power states of all CPUs in all
+ * clusters of the system. The returned response is then filtered based on the
+ * supplied MPIDR. Power states of requested cluster and CPUs within are updated
+ * via. supplied non-NULL pointer arguments.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, or -1 on errors.
+ */
+int scpi_get_brcm_power_state(unsigned int mpidr, unsigned int *cpu_state_p,
+ unsigned int *cluster_state_p)
+{
+ scpi_cmd_t *cmd;
+ scpi_cmd_t response;
+ int power_state, cpu, cluster, rc = -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Extract CPU and cluster membership of the given MPIDR. SCPI caters
+ * for only up to 0xf clusters, and 8 CPUs per cluster
+ */
+ cpu = mpidr & MPIDR_AFFLVL_MASK;
+ cluster = (mpidr >> MPIDR_AFF1_SHIFT) & MPIDR_AFFLVL_MASK;
+ if (cpu >= 8 || cluster >= 0xf)
+ return -1;
+
+ scpi_secure_message_start();
+
+ /* Populate request headers */
+ zeromem(SCPI_CMD_HEADER_AP_TO_SCP, sizeof(*cmd));
+ cmd = SCPI_CMD_HEADER_AP_TO_SCP;
+ cmd->id = SCPI_CMD_GET_POWER_STATE;
+
+ /*
+ * Send message and wait for SCP's response
+ */
+ scpi_secure_message_send(0);
+ scpi_secure_message_receive(&response);
+
+ if (response.status != SCP_OK)
+ goto exit;
+
+ /* Validate SCP response */
+ if (!CHECK_RESPONSE(response, cluster))
+ goto exit;
+
+ /* Extract power states for required cluster */
+ power_state = *(((uint16_t *) SCPI_RES_PAYLOAD_SCP_TO_AP) + cluster);
+ if (CLUSTER_ID(power_state) != cluster)
+ goto exit;
+
+ /* Update power state via. pointers */
+ if (cluster_state_p)
+ *cluster_state_p = CLUSTER_POWER_STATE(power_state);
+ if (cpu_state_p)
+ *cpu_state_p = CPU_POWER_STATE(power_state);
+ rc = 0;
+
+exit:
+ scpi_secure_message_end();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+uint32_t scpi_sys_power_state(scpi_system_state_t system_state)
+{
+ scpi_cmd_t *cmd;
+ uint8_t *payload_addr;
+
+ scpi_secure_message_start();
+
+ /* Populate the command header */
+ cmd = SCPI_CMD_HEADER_AP_TO_SCP;
+ cmd->id = SCPI_CMD_SYS_POWER_STATE;
+ cmd->set = 0;
+ cmd->sender = 0;
+ cmd->size = sizeof(*payload_addr);
+ /* Populate the command payload */
+ payload_addr = SCPI_CMD_PAYLOAD_AP_TO_SCP;
+ *payload_addr = system_state & 0xff;
+ scpi_secure_message_send(sizeof(*payload_addr));
+
+ scpi_secure_message_end();
+
+ return SCP_OK;
+}
diff --git a/plat/brcm/common/brcm_scpi.h b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_scpi.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3b658f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/plat/brcm/common/brcm_scpi.h
@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019-2020, ARM Limited and Contributors. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
+ */
+
+#ifndef BRCM_SCPI_H
+#define BRCM_SCPI_H
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/*
+ * An SCPI command consists of a header and a payload.
+ * The following structure describes the header. It is 64-bit long.
+ */
+typedef struct {
+ /* Command ID */
+ uint32_t id : 7;
+ /* Set ID. Identifies whether this is a standard or extended command. */
+ uint32_t set : 1;
+ /* Sender ID to match a reply. The value is sender specific. */
+ uint32_t sender : 8;
+ /* Size of the payload in bytes (0 - 511) */
+ uint32_t size : 9;
+ uint32_t reserved : 7;
+ /*
+ * Status indicating the success of a command.
+ * See the enum below.
+ */
+ uint32_t status;
+} scpi_cmd_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+ SCPI_SET_NORMAL = 0, /* Normal SCPI commands */
+ SCPI_SET_EXTENDED /* Extended SCPI commands */
+} scpi_set_t;
+
+enum {
+ SCP_OK = 0, /* Success */
+ SCP_E_PARAM, /* Invalid parameter(s) */
+ SCP_E_ALIGN, /* Invalid alignment */
+ SCP_E_SIZE, /* Invalid size */
+ SCP_E_HANDLER, /* Invalid handler or callback */
+ SCP_E_ACCESS, /* Invalid access or permission denied */
+ SCP_E_RANGE, /* Value out of range */
+ SCP_E_TIMEOUT, /* Time out has ocurred */
+ SCP_E_NOMEM, /* Invalid memory area or pointer */
+ SCP_E_PWRSTATE, /* Invalid power state */
+ SCP_E_SUPPORT, /* Feature not supported or disabled */
+ SCPI_E_DEVICE, /* Device error */
+ SCPI_E_BUSY, /* Device is busy */
+};
+
+typedef uint32_t scpi_status_t;
+typedef enum {
+ SCPI_CMD_SCP_READY = 0x01,
+ SCPI_CMD_SET_POWER_STATE = 0x03,
+ SCPI_CMD_GET_POWER_STATE = 0x04,
+ SCPI_CMD_SYS_POWER_STATE = 0x05
+} scpi_command_t;
+
+/*
+ * Macros to parse SCP response to GET_POWER_STATE command
+ *
+ * [3:0] : cluster ID
+ * [7:4] : cluster state: 0 = on; 3 = off; rest are reserved
+ * [15:8]: on/off state for individual CPUs in the cluster
+ *
+ * Payload is in little-endian
+ */
+#define CLUSTER_ID(_resp) ((_resp) & 0xf)
+#define CLUSTER_POWER_STATE(_resp) (((_resp) >> 4) & 0xf)
+
+/* Result is a bit mask of CPU on/off states in the cluster */
+#define CPU_POWER_STATE(_resp) (((_resp) >> 8) & 0xff)
+
+/*
+ * For GET_POWER_STATE, SCP returns the power states of every cluster. The
+ * size of response depends on the number of clusters in the system. The
+ * SCP-to-AP payload contains 2 bytes per cluster. Make sure the response is
+ * large enough to contain power states of a given cluster
+ */
+#define CHECK_RESPONSE(_resp, _clus) (_resp.size >= (((_clus) + 1) * 2))
+
+typedef enum {
+ scpi_power_on = 0,
+ scpi_power_retention = 1,
+ scpi_power_off = 3,
+} scpi_power_state_t;
+
+typedef enum {
+ scpi_system_shutdown = 0,
+ scpi_system_reboot = 1,
+ scpi_system_reset = 2
+} scpi_system_state_t;
+
+extern int scpi_wait_ready(void);
+extern void scpi_set_brcm_power_state(unsigned int mpidr,
+ scpi_power_state_t cpu_state,
+ scpi_power_state_t cluster_state,
+ scpi_power_state_t css_state);
+int scpi_get_brcm_power_state(unsigned int mpidr, unsigned int *cpu_state_p,
+ unsigned int *cluster_state_p);
+uint32_t scpi_sys_power_state(scpi_system_state_t system_state);
+
+#endif /* BRCM_SCPI_H */