Adding upstream version 3.2.1+dfsg.upstream/3.2.1+dfsgupstream

Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>

4 files changed, 1621 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/modules/rlm_wimax/all.mk b/src/modules/rlm_wimax/all.mk
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..89e759b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/modules/rlm_wimax/all.mk
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+TARGETNAME	:= rlm_wimax
+
+ifneq "$(OPENSSL_LIBS)" ""
+TARGET		:= $(TARGETNAME).a
+endif
+
+SOURCES		:= $(TARGETNAME).c milenage.c
+
+TGT_LDLIBS	:= $(OPENSSL_LIBS)
diff --git a/src/modules/rlm_wimax/milenage.c b/src/modules/rlm_wimax/milenage.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e14086e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/modules/rlm_wimax/milenage.c
@@ -0,0 +1,642 @@
+/**
+ * @file src/modules/rlm_wimax/milenage.c
+ * @brief 3GPP AKA - Milenage algorithm (3GPP TS 35.205, .206, .207, .208)
+ *
+ * This file implements an example authentication algorithm defined for 3GPP
+ * AKA. This can be used to implement a simple HLR/AuC into hlr_auc_gw to allow
+ * EAP-AKA to be tested properly with real USIM cards.
+ *
+ * This implementations assumes that the r1..r5 and c1..c5 constants defined in
+ * TS 35.206 are used, i.e., r1=64, r2=0, r3=32, r4=64, r5=96, c1=00..00,
+ * c2=00..01, c3=00..02, c4=00..04, c5=00..08. The block cipher is assumed to
+ * be AES (Rijndael).
+ *
+ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
+ * See README for more details.
+ *
+ * @copyright 2017 The FreeRADIUS server project
+ * @copyright 2006-2007 (j@w1.fi)
+ */
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <freeradius-devel/radiusd.h>
+#include <freeradius-devel/modules.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "milenage.h"
+
+#define MILENAGE_MAC_A_SIZE	8
+#define MILENAGE_MAC_S_SIZE	8
+
+static inline int aes_128_encrypt_block(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx,
+					uint8_t const key[16], uint8_t const in[16], uint8_t out[16])
+{
+	size_t len;
+
+	if (unlikely(EVP_EncryptInit_ex(evp_ctx, EVP_aes_128_ecb(), NULL, key, NULL) != 1)) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("Failed initialising AES-128-ECB context");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	By default OpenSSL will try and pad out a 16 byte
+	 *	plaintext to 32 bytes so that it's detectable that
+	 *	there was padding.
+	 *
+	 *	In this case we know the length of the plaintext
+	 *	we're trying to recover, so we explicitly tell
+	 *	OpenSSL not to pad here, and not to expected padding
+	 *	when decrypting.
+	 */
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(evp_ctx, 0);
+	if (unlikely(EVP_EncryptUpdate(evp_ctx, out, (int *)&len, in, 16) != 1) ||
+	    unlikely(EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(evp_ctx, out + len, (int *)&len) != 1)) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("Failed encrypting data");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/** milenage_f1 - Milenage f1 and f1* algorithms
+ *
+ * @param[in] opc	128-bit value derived from OP and K.
+ * @param[in] k		128-bit subscriber key.
+ * @param[in] rand	128-bit random challenge.
+ * @param[in] sqn	48-bit sequence number.
+ * @param[in] amf	16-bit authentication management field.
+ * @param[out] mac_a	Buffer for MAC-A = 64-bit network authentication code, or NULL
+ * @param[out] mac_s	Buffer for MAC-S = 64-bit resync authentication code, or NULL
+ * @return
+ *	- 0 on success.
+ *	- -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int milenage_f1(uint8_t mac_a[MILENAGE_MAC_A_SIZE],
+		       uint8_t mac_s[MILENAGE_MAC_S_SIZE],
+		       uint8_t const opc[MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE],
+		       uint8_t const k[MILENAGE_KI_SIZE],
+		       uint8_t const rand[MILENAGE_RAND_SIZE],
+		       uint8_t const sqn[MILENAGE_SQN_SIZE],
+		       uint8_t const amf[MILENAGE_AMF_SIZE])
+{
+	uint8_t		tmp1[16], tmp2[16], tmp3[16];
+	int		i;
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	*evp_ctx;
+
+	/* tmp1 = TEMP = E_K(RAND XOR OP_C) */
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) tmp1[i] = rand[i] ^ opc[i];
+
+	evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+	if (!evp_ctx) {
+	  //tls_strerror_printf("Failed allocating EVP context");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+ 	if (aes_128_encrypt_block(evp_ctx, k, tmp1, tmp1) < 0) {
+ 	error:
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
+		return -1;
+ 	}
+
+	/* tmp2 = IN1 = SQN || AMF || SQN || AMF */
+	memcpy(tmp2, sqn, 6);
+	memcpy(tmp2 + 6, amf, 2);
+	memcpy(tmp2 + 8, tmp2, 8);
+
+	/* OUT1 = E_K(TEMP XOR rot(IN1 XOR OP_C, r1) XOR c1) XOR OP_C */
+
+	/*
+	 *  rotate (tmp2 XOR OP_C) by r1 (= 0x40 = 8 bytes)
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) tmp3[(i + 8) % 16] = tmp2[i] ^ opc[i];
+
+	/*
+	 *  XOR with TEMP = E_K(RAND XOR OP_C)
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) tmp3[i] ^= tmp1[i];
+	/* XOR with c1 (= ..00, i.e., NOP) */
+
+	/*
+	 *	f1 || f1* = E_K(tmp3) XOR OP_c
+	 */
+ 	if (aes_128_encrypt_block(evp_ctx, k, tmp3, tmp1) < 0) goto error; /* Reuses existing key */
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) tmp1[i] ^= opc[i];
+
+	if (mac_a) memcpy(mac_a, tmp1, 8);	/* f1 */
+	if (mac_s) memcpy(mac_s, tmp1 + 8, 8);	/* f1* */
+
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/** milenage_f2345 - Milenage f2, f3, f4, f5, f5* algorithms
+ *
+ * @param[out] res		Buffer for RES = 64-bit signed response (f2), or NULL
+ * @param[out] ck		Buffer for CK = 128-bit confidentiality key (f3), or NULL
+ * @param[out] ik		Buffer for IK = 128-bit integrity key (f4), or NULL
+ * @param[out] ak		Buffer for AK = 48-bit anonymity key (f5), or NULL
+ * @param[out] ak_resync	Buffer for AK = 48-bit anonymity key (f5*), or NULL
+ * @param[in] opc		128-bit value derived from OP and K.
+ * @param[in] k			128-bit subscriber key
+ * @param[in] rand		128-bit random challenge
+ * @return
+ *	- 0 on success.
+ *	- -1 on failure.
+ */
+static int milenage_f2345(uint8_t res[MILENAGE_RES_SIZE],
+			  uint8_t ik[MILENAGE_IK_SIZE],
+			  uint8_t ck[MILENAGE_CK_SIZE],
+			  uint8_t ak[MILENAGE_AK_SIZE],
+			  uint8_t ak_resync[MILENAGE_AK_SIZE],
+			  uint8_t const opc[MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE],
+			  uint8_t const k[MILENAGE_KI_SIZE],
+			  uint8_t const rand[MILENAGE_RAND_SIZE])
+{
+	uint8_t			tmp1[16], tmp2[16], tmp3[16];
+	int			i;
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX		*evp_ctx;
+
+	/* tmp2 = TEMP = E_K(RAND XOR OP_C) */
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) tmp1[i] = rand[i] ^ opc[i];
+
+	evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+	if (!evp_ctx) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("Failed allocating EVP context");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (aes_128_encrypt_block(evp_ctx, k, tmp1, tmp2) < 0) {
+	error:
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	/* OUT2 = E_K(rot(TEMP XOR OP_C, r2) XOR c2) XOR OP_C */
+	/* OUT3 = E_K(rot(TEMP XOR OP_C, r3) XOR c3) XOR OP_C */
+	/* OUT4 = E_K(rot(TEMP XOR OP_C, r4) XOR c4) XOR OP_C */
+	/* OUT5 = E_K(rot(TEMP XOR OP_C, r5) XOR c5) XOR OP_C */
+
+	/* f2 and f5 */
+	/* rotate by r2 (= 0, i.e., NOP) */
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) tmp1[i] = tmp2[i] ^ opc[i];
+	tmp1[15] ^= 1; /* XOR c2 (= ..01) */
+	/* f5 || f2 = E_K(tmp1) XOR OP_c */
+
+	if (aes_128_encrypt_block(evp_ctx, k, tmp1, tmp3) < 0) goto error;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) tmp3[i] ^= opc[i];
+	if (res) memcpy(res, tmp3 + 8, 8); /* f2 */
+	if (ak) memcpy(ak, tmp3, 6); /* f5 */
+
+	/* f3 */
+	if (ck) {
+		/* rotate by r3 = 0x20 = 4 bytes */
+		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) tmp1[(i + 12) % 16] = tmp2[i] ^ opc[i];
+		tmp1[15] ^= 2; /* XOR c3 (= ..02) */
+
+		if (aes_128_encrypt_block(evp_ctx, k, tmp1, ck) < 0) goto error;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) ck[i] ^= opc[i];
+	}
+
+	/* f4 */
+	if (ik) {
+		/* rotate by r4 = 0x40 = 8 bytes */
+		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) tmp1[(i + 8) % 16] = tmp2[i] ^ opc[i];
+		tmp1[15] ^= 4; /* XOR c4 (= ..04) */
+
+		if (aes_128_encrypt_block(evp_ctx, k, tmp1, ik) < 0) goto error;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) ik[i] ^= opc[i];
+	}
+
+	/* f5* */
+	if (ak_resync) {
+		/* rotate by r5 = 0x60 = 12 bytes */
+		for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) tmp1[(i + 4) % 16] = tmp2[i] ^ opc[i];
+		tmp1[15] ^= 8; /* XOR c5 (= ..08) */
+
+		if (aes_128_encrypt_block(evp_ctx, k, tmp1, tmp1) < 0) goto error;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) ak_resync[i] = tmp1[i] ^ opc[i];
+	}
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/** Derive OPc from OP and Ki
+ *
+ * @param[out] opc	The derived Operator Code used as an input to other Milenage
+ *			functions.
+ * @param[in] op	Operator Code.
+ * @param[in] ki	Subscriber key.
+ * @return
+ *	- 0 on success.
+ *	- -1 on failure.
+ */
+int milenage_opc_generate(uint8_t opc[MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE],
+			  uint8_t const op[MILENAGE_OP_SIZE],
+			  uint8_t const ki[MILENAGE_KI_SIZE])
+{
+	int		ret;
+	uint8_t		tmp[MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE];
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	*evp_ctx;
+	size_t		i;
+
+	evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+	if (!evp_ctx) {
+		fr_strerror_printf("Failed allocating EVP context");
+		return -1;
+	}
+ 	ret = aes_128_encrypt_block(evp_ctx, ki, op, tmp);
+ 	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
+	if (ret < 0) return ret;
+
+ 	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(tmp); i++) opc[i] = op[i] ^ tmp[i];
+
+ 	return 0;
+}
+
+/** Generate AKA AUTN, IK, CK, RES
+ *
+ * @param[out] autn	Buffer for AUTN = 128-bit authentication token.
+ * @param[out] ik	Buffer for IK = 128-bit integrity key (f4), or NULL.
+ * @param[out] ck	Buffer for CK = 128-bit confidentiality key (f3), or NULL.
+ * @param[out] ak	Buffer for AK = 48-bit anonymity key (f5), or NULL
+ * @param[out] res	Buffer for RES = 64-bit signed response (f2), or NULL.
+ * @param[in] opc	128-bit operator variant algorithm configuration field (encr.).
+ * @param[in] amf	16-bit authentication management field.
+ * @param[in] ki	128-bit subscriber key.
+ * @param[in] sqn	48-bit sequence number (host byte order).
+ * @param[in] rand	128-bit random challenge.
+ * @return
+ *	- 0 on success.
+ *	- -1 on failure.
+ */
+int milenage_umts_generate(uint8_t autn[MILENAGE_AUTN_SIZE],
+			   uint8_t ik[MILENAGE_IK_SIZE],
+			   uint8_t ck[MILENAGE_CK_SIZE],
+			   uint8_t ak[MILENAGE_AK_SIZE],
+			   uint8_t res[MILENAGE_RES_SIZE],
+			   uint8_t const opc[MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE],
+			   uint8_t const amf[MILENAGE_AMF_SIZE],
+			   uint8_t const ki[MILENAGE_KI_SIZE],
+			   uint64_t sqn,
+			   uint8_t const rand[MILENAGE_RAND_SIZE])
+{
+	uint8_t		mac_a[8], ak_buff[MILENAGE_AK_SIZE];
+	uint8_t		sqn_buff[MILENAGE_SQN_SIZE];
+	uint8_t		*p = autn;
+	size_t		i;
+
+	if ((milenage_f1(mac_a, NULL, opc, ki, rand,
+			 uint48_to_buff(sqn_buff, sqn), amf) < 0) ||
+	    (milenage_f2345(res, ik, ck, ak_buff, NULL, opc, ki, rand) < 0)) return -1;
+
+	/*
+	 *	AUTN = (SQN ^ AK) || AMF || MAC_A
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(sqn_buff); i++) *p++ = sqn_buff[i] ^ ak_buff[i];
+	memcpy(p, amf, MILENAGE_AMF_SIZE);
+	p += MILENAGE_AMF_SIZE;
+	memcpy(p, mac_a, sizeof(mac_a));
+
+	/*
+	 *	Output the anonymity key if required
+	 */
+	if (ak) memcpy(ak, ak_buff, sizeof(ak_buff));
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/** Milenage AUTS validation
+ *
+ * @param[out] sqn	SQN = 48-bit sequence number (host byte order).
+ * @param[in] opc	128-bit operator variant algorithm configuration field (encr.).
+ * @param[in] ki	128-bit subscriber key.
+ * @param[in] rand	128-bit random challenge.
+ * @param[in] auts	112-bit authentication token from client.
+ * @return
+ *	- 0 on success with sqn filled.
+ *	- -1 on failure.
+ */
+int milenage_auts(uint64_t *sqn,
+		  uint8_t const opc[MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE],
+		  uint8_t const ki[MILENAGE_KI_SIZE],
+		  uint8_t const rand[MILENAGE_RAND_SIZE],
+		  uint8_t const auts[MILENAGE_AUTS_SIZE])
+{
+	uint8_t		amf[MILENAGE_AMF_SIZE] = { 0x00, 0x00 }; /* TS 33.102 v7.0.0, 6.3.3 */
+	uint8_t		ak[MILENAGE_AK_SIZE], mac_s[MILENAGE_MAC_S_SIZE];
+	uint8_t		sqn_buff[MILENAGE_SQN_SIZE];
+	size_t		i;
+
+	if (milenage_f2345(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ak, opc, ki, rand)) return -1;
+	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(sqn_buff); i++) sqn_buff[i] = auts[i] ^ ak[i];
+
+	if (milenage_f1(NULL, mac_s, opc, ki, rand, sqn_buff, amf) || CRYPTO_memcmp(mac_s, auts + 6, 8) != 0) return -1;
+
+	*sqn = uint48_from_buff(sqn_buff);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/** Generate GSM-Milenage (3GPP TS 55.205) authentication triplet from a quintuplet
+ *
+ * @param[out] sres	Buffer for SRES = 32-bit SRES.
+ * @param[out] kc	64-bit Kc.
+ * @param[in] ik	128-bit integrity.
+ * @param[in] ck	Confidentiality key.
+ * @param[in] res	64-bit signed response.
+ */
+void milenage_gsm_from_umts(uint8_t sres[MILENAGE_SRES_SIZE],
+			    uint8_t kc[MILENAGE_KC_SIZE],
+			    uint8_t const ik[MILENAGE_IK_SIZE],
+			    uint8_t const ck[MILENAGE_CK_SIZE],
+			    uint8_t const res[MILENAGE_RES_SIZE])
+{
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) kc[i] = ck[i] ^ ck[i + 8] ^ ik[i] ^ ik[i + 8];
+
+#ifdef GSM_MILENAGE_ALT_SRES
+	memcpy(sres, res, 4);
+#else	/* GSM_MILENAGE_ALT_SRES */
+	for (i = 0; i < 4; i++) sres[i] = res[i] ^ res[i + 4];
+#endif	/* GSM_MILENAGE_ALT_SRES */
+}
+
+/** Generate GSM-Milenage (3GPP TS 55.205) authentication triplet
+ *
+ * @param[out] sres	Buffer for SRES = 32-bit SRES.
+ * @param[out] kc	64-bit Kc.
+ * @param[in] opc	128-bit operator variant algorithm configuration field (encr.).
+ * @param[in] ki	128-bit subscriber key.
+ * @param[in] rand	128-bit random challenge.
+ * @return
+ *	- 0 on success.
+ *	- -1 on failure.
+ */
+int milenage_gsm_generate(uint8_t sres[MILENAGE_SRES_SIZE],
+			  uint8_t kc[MILENAGE_KC_SIZE],
+			  uint8_t const opc[MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE],
+			  uint8_t const ki[MILENAGE_KI_SIZE],
+			  uint8_t const rand[MILENAGE_RAND_SIZE])
+{
+	uint8_t		res[MILENAGE_RES_SIZE], ck[MILENAGE_CK_SIZE], ik[MILENAGE_IK_SIZE];
+
+	if (milenage_f2345(res, ik, ck, NULL, NULL, opc, ki, rand)) return -1;
+
+	milenage_gsm_from_umts(sres, kc, ik, ck, res);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/** Milenage check
+ *
+ * @param[out] ik	Buffer for IK = 128-bit integrity key (f4), or NULL.
+ * @param[out] ck	Buffer for CK = 128-bit confidentiality key (f3), or NULL.
+ * @param[out] res	Buffer for RES = 64-bit signed response (f2), or NULL.
+ * @param[in] auts	112-bit buffer for AUTS.
+ * @param[in] opc	128-bit operator variant algorithm configuration field (encr.).
+ * @param[in] ki	128-bit subscriber key.
+ * @param[in] sqn	48-bit sequence number.
+ * @param[in] rand	128-bit random challenge.
+ * @param[in] autn	128-bit authentication token.
+ * @return
+ *	- 0 on success.
+ *	- -1 on failure.
+ *	- -2 on synchronization failure
+ */
+int milenage_check(uint8_t ik[MILENAGE_IK_SIZE],
+		   uint8_t ck[MILENAGE_CK_SIZE],
+		   uint8_t res[MILENAGE_RES_SIZE],
+		   uint8_t auts[MILENAGE_AUTS_SIZE],
+		   uint8_t const opc[MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE],
+		   uint8_t const ki[MILENAGE_KI_SIZE],
+		   uint64_t sqn,
+		   uint8_t const rand[MILENAGE_RAND_SIZE],
+		   uint8_t const autn[MILENAGE_AUTN_SIZE])
+{
+
+	uint8_t mac_a[MILENAGE_MAC_A_SIZE], ak[MILENAGE_AK_SIZE], rx_sqn[MILENAGE_SQN_SIZE];
+	uint8_t sqn_buff[MILENAGE_SQN_SIZE];
+	const uint8_t *amf;
+	size_t i;
+
+	uint48_to_buff(sqn_buff, sqn);
+
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(autn, MILENAGE_AUTN_SIZE, "AUTN");
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(rand, MILENAGE_RAND_SIZE, "RAND");
+
+	if (milenage_f2345(res, ck, ik, ak, NULL, opc, ki, rand)) return -1;
+
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(res, MILENAGE_RES_SIZE, "RES");
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(ck, MILENAGE_CK_SIZE, "CK");
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(ik, MILENAGE_IK_SIZE, "IK");
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(ak, MILENAGE_AK_SIZE, "AK");
+
+	/* AUTN = (SQN ^ AK) || AMF || MAC */
+	for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) rx_sqn[i] = autn[i] ^ ak[i];
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(rx_sqn, MILENAGE_SQN_SIZE, "SQN");
+
+	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(rx_sqn, sqn_buff, sizeof(rx_sqn)) <= 0) {
+		uint8_t auts_amf[MILENAGE_AMF_SIZE] = { 0x00, 0x00 }; /* TS 33.102 v7.0.0, 6.3.3 */
+
+		if (milenage_f2345(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ak, opc, ki, rand)) return -1;
+
+		//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(ak, sizeof(ak), "AK*");
+		for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) auts[i] = sqn_buff[i] ^ ak[i];
+
+		if (milenage_f1(NULL, auts + 6, opc, ki, rand, sqn_buff, auts_amf) < 0) return -1;
+		//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(auts, 14, "AUTS");
+		return -2;
+	}
+
+	amf = autn + 6;
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(amf, MILENAGE_AMF_SIZE, "AMF");
+	if (milenage_f1(mac_a, NULL, opc, ki, rand, rx_sqn, amf) < 0) return -1;
+
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(mac_a, MILENAGE_MAC_A_SIZE, "MAC_A");
+
+	if (CRYPTO_memcmp(mac_a, autn + 8, 8) != 0) {
+	  //FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(autn + 8, 8, "Received MAC_A");
+		fr_strerror_printf("MAC mismatch");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef TESTING_MILENAGE
+/*
+ *  cc milenage.c -g3 -Wall -DHAVE_DLFCN_H -DTESTING_MILENAGE -DWITH_TLS -I../../../../ -I../../../ -I ../base/ -I /usr/local/opt/openssl/include/ -include ../include/build.h -L /usr/local/opt/openssl/lib/ -l ssl -l crypto -l talloc -L ../../../../../build/lib/local/.libs/ -lfreeradius-server -lfreeradius-tls -lfreeradius-util -o test_milenage && ./test_milenage
+ */
+#include <freeradius-devel/util/acutest.h>
+
+void test_set_1(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 *	Inputs
+	 */
+	uint8_t ki[]		= { 0x46, 0x5b, 0x5c, 0xe8, 0xb1, 0x99, 0xb4, 0x9f,
+				    0xaa, 0x5f, 0x0a, 0x2e, 0xe2, 0x38, 0xa6, 0xbc };
+	uint8_t rand[]		= { 0x23, 0x55, 0x3c, 0xbe, 0x96, 0x37, 0xa8, 0x9d,
+				    0x21, 0x8a, 0xe6, 0x4d, 0xae, 0x47, 0xbf, 0x35  };
+	uint8_t sqn[]		= { 0xff, 0x9b, 0xb4, 0xd0, 0xb6, 0x07 };
+	uint8_t amf[]		= { 0xb9, 0xb9 };
+	uint8_t op[]		= { 0xcd, 0xc2, 0x02, 0xd5, 0x12, 0x3e, 0x20, 0xf6,
+				    0x2b, 0x6d, 0x67, 0x6a, 0xc7, 0x2c, 0xb3, 0x18 };
+	uint8_t opc[]		= { 0xcd, 0x63, 0xcb, 0x71, 0x95, 0x4a, 0x9f, 0x4e,
+				    0x48, 0xa5, 0x99, 0x4e, 0x37, 0xa0, 0x2b, 0xaf };
+
+	/*
+	 *	Outputs
+	 */
+	uint8_t opc_out[MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE];
+	uint8_t	mac_a_out[MILENAGE_MAC_A_SIZE];
+	uint8_t	mac_s_out[MILENAGE_MAC_S_SIZE];
+	uint8_t res_out[MILENAGE_RES_SIZE];
+	uint8_t ck_out[MILENAGE_CK_SIZE];
+	uint8_t ik_out[MILENAGE_IK_SIZE];
+	uint8_t ak_out[MILENAGE_AK_SIZE];
+	uint8_t ak_resync_out[MILENAGE_AK_SIZE];
+
+	/* function 1 */
+	uint8_t mac_a[]		= { 0x4a, 0x9f, 0xfa, 0xc3, 0x54, 0xdf, 0xaf, 0xb3 };
+	/* function 1* */
+	uint8_t mac_s[]		= { 0x01, 0xcf, 0xaf, 0x9e, 0xc4, 0xe8, 0x71, 0xe9 };
+	/* function 2 */
+	uint8_t res[]		= { 0xa5, 0x42, 0x11, 0xd5, 0xe3, 0xba, 0x50, 0xbf };
+	/* function 3 */
+	uint8_t ck[]		= { 0xb4, 0x0b, 0xa9, 0xa3, 0xc5, 0x8b, 0x2a, 0x05,
+				    0xbb, 0xf0, 0xd9, 0x87, 0xb2, 0x1b, 0xf8, 0xcb };
+	/* function 4 */
+	uint8_t ik[]		= { 0xf7, 0x69, 0xbc, 0xd7, 0x51, 0x04, 0x46, 0x04,
+			    	    0x12, 0x76, 0x72, 0x71, 0x1c, 0x6d, 0x34, 0x41 };
+	/* function 5 */
+	uint8_t ak[]		= { 0xaa, 0x68, 0x9c, 0x64, 0x83, 0x70 };
+	/* function 5* */
+	uint8_t ak_resync[]	= { 0x45, 0x1e, 0x8b, 0xec, 0xa4, 0x3b };
+
+	int ret = 0;
+
+/*
+	fr_debug_lvl = 4;
+*/
+	ret = milenage_opc_generate(opc_out, op, ki);
+	TEST_CHECK(ret == 0);
+
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(opc_out, sizeof(opc_out), "opc");
+
+	TEST_CHECK(memcmp(opc_out, opc, sizeof(opc_out)) == 0);
+
+	if ((milenage_f1(mac_a_out, mac_s_out, opc, ki, rand, sqn, amf) < 0) ||
+	    (milenage_f2345(res_out, ik_out, ck_out, ak_out, ak_resync_out, opc, ki, rand) < 0)) ret = -1;
+
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(mac_a, sizeof(mac_a_out), "mac_a");
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(mac_s, sizeof(mac_s_out), "mac_s");
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(ik_out, sizeof(ik_out), "ik");
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(ck_out, sizeof(ck_out), "ck");
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(res_out, sizeof(res_out), "res");
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(ak_out, sizeof(ak_out), "ak");
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(ak_resync_out, sizeof(ak_resync_out), "ak_resync");
+
+	TEST_CHECK(ret == 0);
+	TEST_CHECK(memcmp(mac_a_out, mac_a, sizeof(mac_a_out)) == 0);
+	TEST_CHECK(memcmp(mac_s_out, mac_s, sizeof(mac_s_out)) == 0);
+	TEST_CHECK(memcmp(res_out, res, sizeof(res_out)) == 0);
+	TEST_CHECK(memcmp(ck_out, ck, sizeof(ck_out)) == 0);
+	TEST_CHECK(memcmp(ik_out, ik, sizeof(ik_out)) == 0);
+	TEST_CHECK(memcmp(ak_out, ak, sizeof(ak_out)) == 0);
+	TEST_CHECK(memcmp(ak_resync, ak_resync, sizeof(ak_resync_out)) == 0);
+}
+
+void test_set_19(void)
+{
+	/*
+	 *	Inputs
+	 */
+	uint8_t ki[]		= { 0x51, 0x22, 0x25, 0x02, 0x14, 0xc3, 0x3e, 0x72,
+				    0x3a, 0x5d, 0xd5, 0x23, 0xfc, 0x14, 0x5f, 0xc0 };
+	uint8_t rand[]		= { 0x81, 0xe9, 0x2b, 0x6c, 0x0e, 0xe0, 0xe1, 0x2e,
+				    0xbc, 0xeb, 0xa8, 0xd9, 0x2a, 0x99, 0xdf, 0xa5 };
+	uint8_t sqn[]		= { 0x16, 0xf3, 0xb3, 0xf7, 0x0f, 0xc2 };
+	uint8_t amf[]		= { 0xc3, 0xab };
+	uint8_t op[]		= { 0xc9, 0xe8, 0x76, 0x32, 0x86, 0xb5, 0xb9, 0xff,
+				    0xbd, 0xf5, 0x6e, 0x12, 0x97, 0xd0, 0x88, 0x7b };
+	uint8_t opc[]		= { 0x98, 0x1d, 0x46, 0x4c, 0x7c, 0x52, 0xeb, 0x6e,
+				    0x50, 0x36, 0x23, 0x49, 0x84, 0xad, 0x0b, 0xcf };
+
+	/*
+	 *	Outputs
+	 */
+	uint8_t opc_out[MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE];
+	uint8_t	mac_a_out[MILENAGE_MAC_A_SIZE];
+	uint8_t	mac_s_out[MILENAGE_MAC_S_SIZE];
+	uint8_t res_out[MILENAGE_RES_SIZE];
+	uint8_t ck_out[MILENAGE_CK_SIZE];
+	uint8_t ik_out[MILENAGE_IK_SIZE];
+	uint8_t ak_out[MILENAGE_AK_SIZE];
+	uint8_t ak_resync_out[MILENAGE_AK_SIZE];
+
+	/* function 1 */
+	uint8_t mac_a[]		= { 0x2a, 0x5c, 0x23, 0xd1, 0x5e, 0xe3, 0x51, 0xd5 };
+	/* function 1* */
+	uint8_t mac_s[]		= { 0x62, 0xda, 0xe3, 0x85, 0x3f, 0x3a, 0xf9, 0xd2 };
+	/* function 2 */
+	uint8_t res[]		= { 0x28, 0xd7, 0xb0, 0xf2, 0xa2, 0xec, 0x3d, 0xe5 };
+	/* function 3 */
+	uint8_t ck[]		= { 0x53, 0x49, 0xfb, 0xe0, 0x98, 0x64, 0x9f, 0x94,
+				    0x8f, 0x5d, 0x2e, 0x97, 0x3a, 0x81, 0xc0, 0x0f };
+	/* function 4 */
+	uint8_t ik[]		= { 0x97, 0x44, 0x87, 0x1a, 0xd3, 0x2b, 0xf9, 0xbb,
+				    0xd1, 0xdd, 0x5c, 0xe5, 0x4e, 0x3e, 0x2e, 0x5a };
+	/* function 5 */
+	uint8_t ak[]		= { 0xad, 0xa1, 0x5a, 0xeb, 0x7b, 0xb8 };
+	/* function 5* */
+	uint8_t ak_resync[]	= { 0xd4, 0x61, 0xbc, 0x15, 0x47, 0x5d };
+
+	int ret = 0;
+
+/*
+	fr_debug_lvl = 4;
+*/
+
+	ret = milenage_opc_generate(opc_out, op, ki);
+	TEST_CHECK(ret == 0);
+
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(opc_out, sizeof(opc_out), "opc");
+
+	TEST_CHECK(memcmp(opc_out, opc, sizeof(opc_out)) == 0);
+
+	if ((milenage_f1(mac_a_out, mac_s_out, opc, ki, rand, sqn, amf) < 0) ||
+	    (milenage_f2345(res_out, ik_out, ck_out, ak_out, ak_resync_out, opc, ki, rand) < 0)) ret = -1;
+
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(mac_a, sizeof(mac_a_out), "mac_a");
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(mac_s, sizeof(mac_s_out), "mac_s");
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(ik_out, sizeof(ik_out), "ik");
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(ck_out, sizeof(ck_out), "ck");
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(res_out, sizeof(res_out), "res");
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(ak_out, sizeof(ak_out), "ak");
+	//FR_PROTO_HEX_DUMP(ak_resync_out, sizeof(ak_resync_out), "ak_resync");
+
+	TEST_CHECK(ret == 0);
+	TEST_CHECK(memcmp(mac_a_out, mac_a, sizeof(mac_a_out)) == 0);
+	TEST_CHECK(memcmp(mac_s_out, mac_s, sizeof(mac_s_out)) == 0);
+	TEST_CHECK(memcmp(res_out, res, sizeof(res_out)) == 0);
+	TEST_CHECK(memcmp(ck_out, ck, sizeof(ck_out)) == 0);
+	TEST_CHECK(memcmp(ik_out, ik, sizeof(ik_out)) == 0);
+	TEST_CHECK(memcmp(ak_out, ak, sizeof(ak_out)) == 0);
+	TEST_CHECK(memcmp(ak_resync, ak_resync, sizeof(ak_resync_out)) == 0);
+}
+
+TEST_LIST = {
+	{ "test_set_1",		test_set_1 },
+	{ "test_set_19",	test_set_19 },
+	{ NULL }
+};
+#endif
diff --git a/src/modules/rlm_wimax/milenage.h b/src/modules/rlm_wimax/milenage.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..758383a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/modules/rlm_wimax/milenage.h
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+#pragma once
+/**
+ * @file src/modules/rlm_wimax/milenage.h
+ * @brief 3GPP AKA - Milenage algorithm (3GPP TS 35.205, .206, .207, .208)
+ *
+ * This file implements an example authentication algorithm defined for 3GPP
+ * AKA. This can be used to implement a simple HLR/AuC into hlr_auc_gw to allow
+ * EAP-AKA to be tested properly with real USIM cards.
+ *
+ * This implementations assumes that the r1..r5 and c1..c5 constants defined in
+ * TS 35.206 are used, i.e., r1=64, r2=0, r3=32, r4=64, r5=96, c1=00..00,
+ * c2=00..01, c3=00..02, c4=00..04, c5=00..08. The block cipher is assumed to
+ * be AES (Rijndael).
+ *
+ * This software may be distributed under the terms of the BSD license.
+ * See README for more details.
+ *
+ * @copyright 2017 The FreeRADIUS server project
+ * @copyright 2006-2007 (j@w1.fi)
+ */
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+/*
+ *	Inputs
+ */
+#define MILENAGE_KI_SIZE	16		//!< Subscriber key.
+#define MILENAGE_OP_SIZE	16		//!< Operator code (unique to the operator)
+#define MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE	16		//!< Derived operator code (unique to the operator and subscriber).
+#define MILENAGE_AMF_SIZE	2		//!< Authentication management field.
+#define MILENAGE_SQN_SIZE	6		//!< Sequence number.
+#define MILENAGE_RAND_SIZE	16		//!< Random challenge.
+
+/*
+ *	UMTS Outputs
+ */
+#define MILENAGE_AK_SIZE	6		//!< Anonymisation key.
+#define MILENAGE_AUTN_SIZE	16		//!< Network authentication key.
+#define MILENAGE_IK_SIZE	16		//!< Integrity key.
+#define	MILENAGE_CK_SIZE	16		//!< Ciphering key.
+#define MILENAGE_RES_SIZE	8
+#define MILENAGE_AUTS_SIZE	14
+
+/*
+ *	GSM (COMP128-4) outputs
+ */
+#define MILENAGE_SRES_SIZE	4
+#define MILENAGE_KC_SIZE	8
+
+/** Copy a 48bit value from a 64bit integer into a uint8_t buff in big endian byte order
+ *
+ * There may be fast ways of doing this, but this is the *correct*
+ * way, and does not make assumptions about how integers are laid
+ * out in memory.
+ *
+ * @param[out] out      6 byte butter to store value.
+ * @param[in] i         integer value.
+ * @return pointer to out.
+ */
+static inline uint8_t *uint48_to_buff(uint8_t out[6], uint64_t i)
+{
+	out[0] = (i & 0xff0000000000) >> 40;
+	out[1] = (i & 0x00ff00000000) >> 32;
+	out[2] = (i & 0x0000ff000000) >> 24;
+	out[3] = (i & 0x000000ff0000) >> 16;
+	out[4] = (i & 0x00000000ff00) >> 8;
+	out[5] = (i & 0x0000000000ff);
+
+	return out;
+}
+
+/** Convert a 48bit big endian value into a unsigned 64bit integer
+ *
+ */
+static inline uint64_t uint48_from_buff(uint8_t const in[6])
+{
+	uint64_t i = 0;
+
+	i |= ((uint64_t)in[0]) << 40;
+	i |= ((uint64_t)in[1]) << 32;
+	i |= ((uint32_t)in[2]) << 24;
+	i |= ((uint32_t)in[3]) << 16;
+	i |= ((uint16_t)in[4]) << 8;
+	i |= in[5];
+
+	return i;
+}
+
+int	milenage_opc_generate(uint8_t opc[MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE],
+			      uint8_t const op[MILENAGE_OP_SIZE],
+			      uint8_t const ki[MILENAGE_KI_SIZE]);
+
+int	milenage_umts_generate(uint8_t autn[MILENAGE_AUTN_SIZE],
+			       uint8_t ik[MILENAGE_IK_SIZE],
+			       uint8_t ck[MILENAGE_CK_SIZE],
+			       uint8_t ak[MILENAGE_AK_SIZE],
+			       uint8_t res[MILENAGE_RES_SIZE],
+			       uint8_t const opc[MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE],
+			       uint8_t const amf[MILENAGE_AMF_SIZE],
+			       uint8_t const ki[MILENAGE_KI_SIZE],
+			       uint64_t sqn,
+			       uint8_t const rand[MILENAGE_RAND_SIZE]);
+
+int	milenage_auts(uint64_t *sqn,
+		      uint8_t const opc[MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE],
+		      uint8_t const ki[MILENAGE_KI_SIZE],
+		      uint8_t const rand[MILENAGE_RAND_SIZE],
+		      uint8_t const auts[MILENAGE_AUTS_SIZE]);
+
+void	milenage_gsm_from_umts(uint8_t sres[MILENAGE_SRES_SIZE],
+			       uint8_t kc[MILENAGE_KC_SIZE],
+			       uint8_t const ik[MILENAGE_IK_SIZE],
+			       uint8_t const ck[MILENAGE_CK_SIZE],
+			       uint8_t const res[MILENAGE_RES_SIZE]);
+
+int	milenage_gsm_generate(uint8_t sres[MILENAGE_SRES_SIZE], uint8_t kc[MILENAGE_KC_SIZE],
+			      uint8_t const opc[MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE],
+			      uint8_t const ki[MILENAGE_KI_SIZE],
+			      uint8_t const rand[MILENAGE_RAND_SIZE]);
+
+int	milenage_check(uint8_t ik[MILENAGE_IK_SIZE],
+		       uint8_t ck[MILENAGE_CK_SIZE],
+		       uint8_t res[MILENAGE_RES_SIZE],
+		       uint8_t auts[MILENAGE_AUTS_SIZE],
+		       uint8_t const opc[MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE],
+		       uint8_t const ki[MILENAGE_KI_SIZE],
+		       uint64_t sqn,
+		       uint8_t const rand[MILENAGE_RAND_SIZE],
+		       uint8_t const autn[MILENAGE_AUTN_SIZE]);
diff --git a/src/modules/rlm_wimax/rlm_wimax.c b/src/modules/rlm_wimax/rlm_wimax.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d2125eb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/modules/rlm_wimax/rlm_wimax.c
@@ -0,0 +1,842 @@
+/*
+ *   This program is is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at
+ *   your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *   GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ *   Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin St, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA
+ */
+
+/**
+ * $Id$
+ * @file rlm_wimax.c
+ * @brief Supports various WiMax functionality.
+ *
+ * @copyright 2008 Alan DeKok <aland@networkradius.com>
+ */
+RCSID("$Id$")
+USES_APPLE_DEPRECATED_API	/* OpenSSL API has been deprecated by Apple */
+
+#include <freeradius-devel/radiusd.h>
+#include <freeradius-devel/modules.h>
+#include "milenage.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_HMAC_H
+#include <openssl/hmac.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <freeradius-devel/openssl3.h>
+
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_RAND_SIZE	16
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_KI_SIZE	16
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_OPC_SIZE	16
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_AMF_SIZE	2
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_SQN_SIZE	6
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_MAC_A_SIZE	8
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_MAC_S_SIZE	8
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_XRES_SIZE	8
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_CK_SIZE	16
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_IK_SIZE	16
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_AK_SIZE	6
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_AK_RESYNC_SIZE	6
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_KK_SIZE	32
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_KS_SIZE	14
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_PLMN_SIZE	3
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_KASME_SIZE	32
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_AUTN_SIZE	16
+#define WIMAX_EPSAKA_AUTS_SIZE  14
+
+/*
+ *	FIXME: Fix the build system to create definitions from names.
+ */
+typedef struct rlm_wimax_t {
+	bool	delete_mppe_keys;
+
+	DICT_ATTR const	*resync_info;
+	DICT_ATTR const	*xres;
+	DICT_ATTR const	*autn;
+	DICT_ATTR const	*kasme;
+} rlm_wimax_t;
+
+/*
+ *	A mapping of configuration file names to internal variables.
+ *
+ *	Note that the string is dynamically allocated, so it MUST
+ *	be freed.  When the configuration file parse re-reads the string,
+ *	it free's the old one, and strdup's the new one, placing the pointer
+ *	to the strdup'd string into 'config.string'.  This gets around
+ *	buffer over-flows.
+ */
+static const CONF_PARSER module_config[] = {
+	{ "delete_mppe_keys", FR_CONF_OFFSET(PW_TYPE_BOOLEAN, rlm_wimax_t, delete_mppe_keys), "no" },
+	CONF_PARSER_TERMINATOR
+};
+
+/*
+ *	Print hex values in a readable format for debugging
+ *	Example:
+ *	FOO: 00 11 AA 22 00 FF
+ */
+static void rdebug_hex(REQUEST *request, char const *prefix, uint8_t const *data, int len)
+{
+	int i;
+	char buffer[256];	/* large enough for largest len */
+
+	/*
+	 *	Leave a trailing space, we don't really care about that.
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+		snprintf(buffer + i * 3, sizeof(buffer) - i * 3, "%02x ", data[i]);
+	}
+
+	RDEBUG("%s %s", prefix, buffer);
+}
+#define RDEBUG_HEX if (rad_debug_lvl) rdebug_hex
+
+/*
+ *	Find the named user in this modules database.  Create the set
+ *	of attribute-value pairs to check and reply with for this user
+ *	from the database. The authentication code only needs to check
+ *	the password, the rest is done here.
+ */
+static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) mod_authorize(void *instance, REQUEST *request)
+{
+	VALUE_PAIR *vp;
+	rlm_wimax_t *inst = instance;
+
+	/*
+	 *	Fix Calling-Station-Id.  Damn you, WiMAX!
+	 */
+	vp =  fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_CALLING_STATION_ID, 0, TAG_ANY);
+	if (vp && (vp->vp_length == 6)) {
+		int i;
+		char *p;
+		uint8_t buffer[6];
+
+		memcpy(buffer, vp->vp_strvalue, 6);
+		vp->vp_length = (5*3)+2;
+		vp->vp_strvalue = p = talloc_array(vp, char, vp->vp_length + 1);
+		vp->type = VT_DATA;
+
+		/*
+		 *	RFC 3580 Section 3.20 says this is the preferred
+		 *	format.  Everyone *SANE* is using this format,
+		 *	so we fix it here.
+		 */
+		for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+			fr_bin2hex(&p[i * 3], &buffer[i], 1);
+			p[(i * 3) + 2] = '-';
+		}
+
+		p[(5*3)+2] = '\0';
+
+		DEBUG2("rlm_wimax: Fixing WiMAX binary Calling-Station-Id to %s",
+		       vp->vp_strvalue);
+		return RLM_MODULE_OK;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Check for attr WiMAX-Re-synchronization-Info
+	 *	which contains the concatenation of RAND and AUTS
+	 *
+	 *	If it is present then we proceed to verify the SIM and
+	 *	extract the new value of SQN
+	 */
+	VALUE_PAIR *resync_info, *ki, *opc, *sqn, *rand;
+	int m_ret;
+
+	/* Look for the Re-synchronization-Info attribute in the request */
+	resync_info = fr_pair_find_by_da(request->packet->vps, inst->resync_info, TAG_ANY);
+	if (resync_info && (resync_info->vp_length < (WIMAX_EPSAKA_RAND_SIZE + WIMAX_EPSAKA_AUTS_SIZE))) {
+		RWDEBUG("Found request:WiMAX-Re-synchronization-Info with incorrect length: Ignoring it");
+		resync_info = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	These are the private keys which should be added to the control
+	 *	list after looking them up in a database by IMSI
+	 *
+	 *	We grab them from the control list here
+	 */
+	ki = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_WIMAX_SIM_KI, 0, TAG_ANY);
+	if (ki && (ki->vp_length < MILENAGE_CK_SIZE)) {
+		RWDEBUG("Found config:WiMAX-SIM-Ki with incorrect length: Ignoring it");
+		ki = NULL;
+	}
+
+	opc = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_WIMAX_SIM_OPC, 0, TAG_ANY);
+	if (opc && (opc->vp_length < MILENAGE_IK_SIZE)) {
+		RWDEBUG("Found config:WiMAX-SIM-OPC with incorrect length: Ignoring it");
+		opc = NULL;
+	}
+
+	/* If we have resync info (RAND and AUTS), Ki and OPc then we can proceed */
+	if (resync_info && ki && opc) {
+		uint64_t sqn_bin;
+		uint8_t rand_bin[WIMAX_EPSAKA_RAND_SIZE];
+		uint8_t auts_bin[WIMAX_EPSAKA_AUTS_SIZE];
+
+		RDEBUG("Found WiMAX-Re-synchronization-Info. Proceeding with SQN resync");
+
+		/* Split Re-synchronization-Info into seperate RAND and AUTS */
+
+		memcpy(rand_bin, &resync_info->vp_octets[0], WIMAX_EPSAKA_RAND_SIZE);
+		memcpy(auts_bin, &resync_info->vp_octets[WIMAX_EPSAKA_RAND_SIZE], WIMAX_EPSAKA_AUTS_SIZE);
+
+		RDEBUG_HEX(request, "RAND  ", rand_bin, WIMAX_EPSAKA_RAND_SIZE);
+		RDEBUG_HEX(request, "AUTS  ", auts_bin, WIMAX_EPSAKA_AUTS_SIZE);
+
+		/*
+		 *	This procedure uses the secret keys Ki and OPc to authenticate
+		 *	the SIM and extract the SQN
+		 */
+		m_ret = milenage_auts(&sqn_bin, opc->vp_octets, ki->vp_octets, rand_bin, auts_bin);
+		
+		/*
+		 *	If the SIM verification fails then we can't go any further as
+		 *	we don't have the keys. And that probably means something bad
+		 *	is happening so we bail out now
+		 */
+		if (m_ret < 0) {
+			RDEBUG("SIM verification failed");
+		  	return RLM_MODULE_REJECT;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	If we got this far it means have got a new SQN and RAND
+		 *	so we store them in:
+		 *	control:WiMAX-SIM-SQN
+		 *	control:WiMAX-SIM-RAND
+		 *
+		 *	From there they can be grabbed by unlang and used later
+		 */
+
+		/* SQN is six bytes so we extract what we need from the 64 bit variable */
+		uint8_t sqn_bin_arr[WIMAX_EPSAKA_SQN_SIZE] = {
+			(sqn_bin & 0x0000FF0000000000ull) >> 40,
+			(sqn_bin & 0x000000FF00000000ull) >> 32,
+			(sqn_bin & 0x00000000FF000000ull) >> 24,
+			(sqn_bin & 0x0000000000FF0000ull) >> 16,
+			(sqn_bin & 0x000000000000FF00ull) >>  8,
+			(sqn_bin & 0x00000000000000FFull) >>  0
+		};
+
+		/* Add SQN to control:WiMAX-SIM-SQN */
+		sqn = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_WIMAX_SIM_SQN, 0, TAG_ANY);
+		if (sqn && (sqn->vp_length < WIMAX_EPSAKA_SQN_SIZE)) {
+			RWDEBUG("Found config:WiMAX-SIM-SQN with incorrect length: Ignoring it");
+			sqn = NULL;
+		}
+
+		if (!sqn) {
+			MEM(sqn = pair_make_config("WiMAX-SIM-SQN", NULL, T_OP_SET));
+			fr_pair_value_memcpy(sqn, sqn_bin_arr, WIMAX_EPSAKA_SQN_SIZE);
+		}
+		RDEBUG_HEX(request, "SQN   ", sqn->vp_octets, WIMAX_EPSAKA_SQN_SIZE);
+
+		/* Add RAND to control:WiMAX-SIM-RAND */
+		rand = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_WIMAX_SIM_RAND, 0, TAG_ANY);
+		if (rand && (rand->vp_length < WIMAX_EPSAKA_RAND_SIZE)) {
+			RWDEBUG("Found config:WiMAX-SIM-RAND with incorrect length: Ignoring it");
+			rand = NULL;
+		}
+
+		if (!rand) {
+			MEM(rand = pair_make_config("WiMAX-SIM-RAND", NULL, T_OP_SET));
+			fr_pair_value_memcpy(rand, rand_bin, WIMAX_EPSAKA_RAND_SIZE);
+		}
+		RDEBUG_HEX(request, "RAND  ", rand->vp_octets, WIMAX_EPSAKA_RAND_SIZE);
+
+		return RLM_MODULE_UPDATED;
+	}
+
+	return RLM_MODULE_NOOP;
+}
+
+/*
+ *	Massage the request before recording it or proxying it
+ */
+static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) mod_preacct(void *instance, REQUEST *request)
+{
+	return mod_authorize(instance, request);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ *	This function generates the keys for old style WiMAX (v1 to v2.0)
+ */
+static int mip_keys_generate(void *instance, REQUEST *request, VALUE_PAIR *msk, VALUE_PAIR *emsk)
+{
+	rlm_wimax_t *inst = instance;
+	VALUE_PAIR *vp;
+	VALUE_PAIR *mn_nai, *ip, *fa_rk;
+	HMAC_CTX *hmac;
+	unsigned int rk1_len, rk2_len, rk_len;
+	uint32_t mip_spi;
+	uint8_t usage_data[24];
+	uint8_t mip_rk_1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], mip_rk_2[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+	uint8_t mip_rk[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+
+	/*
+	 *	If we delete the MS-MPPE-*-Key attributes, then add in
+	 *	the WiMAX-MSK so that the client has a key available.
+	 */
+	if (inst->delete_mppe_keys) {
+		fr_pair_delete_by_num(&request->reply->vps, 16, VENDORPEC_MICROSOFT, TAG_ANY);
+		fr_pair_delete_by_num(&request->reply->vps, 17, VENDORPEC_MICROSOFT, TAG_ANY);
+
+		MEM(vp = pair_make_reply("WiMAX-MSK", NULL, T_OP_EQ));
+		fr_pair_value_memcpy(vp, msk->vp_octets, msk->vp_length);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Initialize usage data.
+	 */
+	memcpy(usage_data, "miprk@wimaxforum.org", 21);	/* with trailing \0 */
+	usage_data[21] = 0x02;
+	usage_data[22] = 0x00;
+	usage_data[23] = 0x01;
+
+	/*
+	 *	MIP-RK-1 = HMAC-SSHA256(EMSK, usage-data | 0x01)
+	 */
+	hmac = HMAC_CTX_new();
+	HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, emsk->vp_octets, emsk->vp_length, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+	rk1_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+
+	HMAC_Update(hmac, &usage_data[0], sizeof(usage_data));
+	HMAC_Final(hmac, &mip_rk_1[0], &rk1_len);
+
+	/*
+	 *	MIP-RK-2 = HMAC-SSHA256(EMSK, MIP-RK-1 | usage-data | 0x01)
+	 */
+	HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, emsk->vp_octets, emsk->vp_length, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+
+	HMAC_Update(hmac, (uint8_t const *) &mip_rk_1, rk1_len);
+	HMAC_Update(hmac, &usage_data[0], sizeof(usage_data));
+	rk2_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+	HMAC_Final(hmac, &mip_rk_2[0], &rk2_len);
+
+	memcpy(mip_rk, mip_rk_1, rk1_len);
+	memcpy(mip_rk + rk1_len, mip_rk_2, rk2_len);
+	rk_len = rk1_len + rk2_len;
+
+	/*
+	 *	MIP-SPI = HMAC-SSHA256(MIP-RK, "SPI CMIP PMIP");
+	 */
+	HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, mip_rk, rk_len, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+
+	HMAC_Update(hmac, (uint8_t const *) "SPI CMIP PMIP", 12);
+	rk1_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+	HMAC_Final(hmac, &mip_rk_1[0], &rk1_len);
+
+	/*
+	 *	Take the 4 most significant octets.
+	 *	If less than 256, add 256.
+	 */
+	mip_spi = ((mip_rk_1[0] << 24) | (mip_rk_1[1] << 16) |
+		   (mip_rk_1[2] << 8) | mip_rk_1[3]);
+	if (mip_spi < 256) mip_spi += 256;
+
+	RDEBUG_HEX(request, "MIP-RK ", mip_rk, rk_len);
+	RDEBUG("MIP-SPI = %08x", ntohl(mip_spi));
+
+	/*
+	 *	FIXME: Perform SPI collision prevention
+	 */
+
+	/*
+	 *	Calculate mobility keys
+	 */
+	mn_nai = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, PW_WIMAX_MN_NAI, 0, TAG_ANY);
+	if (!mn_nai) mn_nai = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, PW_WIMAX_MN_NAI, 0, TAG_ANY);
+	if (!mn_nai) {
+		RWDEBUG("WiMAX-MN-NAI was not found in the request or in the reply");
+		RWDEBUG("We cannot calculate MN-HA keys");
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	WiMAX-IP-Technology
+	 */
+	vp = NULL;
+	if (mn_nai) vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, 23, VENDORPEC_WIMAX, TAG_ANY);
+	if (!vp) {
+		RWDEBUG("WiMAX-IP-Technology not found in reply");
+		RWDEBUG("Not calculating MN-HA keys");
+	}
+
+	if (vp) switch (vp->vp_integer) {
+	case 2:			/* PMIP4 */
+		/*
+		 *	Look for WiMAX-hHA-IP-MIP4
+		 */
+		ip = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, 6, VENDORPEC_WIMAX, TAG_ANY);
+		if (!ip) {
+			RWDEBUG("WiMAX-hHA-IP-MIP4 not found.  Cannot calculate MN-HA-PMIP4 key");
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	MN-HA-PMIP4 =
+		 *	   H(MIP-RK, "PMIP4 MN HA" | HA-IPv4 | MN-NAI);
+		 */
+		HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, mip_rk, rk_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+
+		HMAC_Update(hmac, (uint8_t const *) "PMIP4 MN HA", 11);
+		HMAC_Update(hmac, (uint8_t const *) &ip->vp_ipaddr, 4);
+		HMAC_Update(hmac, (uint8_t const *) &mn_nai->vp_strvalue, mn_nai->vp_length);
+		rk1_len = SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+		HMAC_Final(hmac, &mip_rk_1[0], &rk1_len);
+
+		/*
+		 *	Put MN-HA-PMIP4 into WiMAX-MN-hHA-MIP4-Key
+		 */
+		vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, 10, VENDORPEC_WIMAX, TAG_ANY);
+		if (!vp) {
+			vp = radius_pair_create(request->reply, &request->reply->vps,
+					       10, VENDORPEC_WIMAX);
+		}
+		if (!vp) {
+			RWDEBUG("Failed creating WiMAX-MN-hHA-MIP4-Key");
+			break;
+		}
+		fr_pair_value_memcpy(vp, &mip_rk_1[0], rk1_len);
+
+		/*
+		 *	Put MN-HA-PMIP4-SPI into WiMAX-MN-hHA-MIP4-SPI
+		 */
+		vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, 11, VENDORPEC_WIMAX, TAG_ANY);
+		if (!vp) {
+			vp = radius_pair_create(request->reply, &request->reply->vps,
+					       11, VENDORPEC_WIMAX);
+		}
+		if (!vp) {
+			RWDEBUG("Failed creating WiMAX-MN-hHA-MIP4-SPI");
+			break;
+		}
+		vp->vp_integer = mip_spi + 1;
+		break;
+
+	case 3:			/* CMIP4 */
+		/*
+		 *	Look for WiMAX-hHA-IP-MIP4
+		 */
+		ip = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, 6, VENDORPEC_WIMAX, TAG_ANY);
+		if (!ip) {
+			RWDEBUG("WiMAX-hHA-IP-MIP4 not found.  Cannot calculate MN-HA-CMIP4 key");
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	MN-HA-CMIP4 =
+		 *	   H(MIP-RK, "CMIP4 MN HA" | HA-IPv4 | MN-NAI);
+		 */
+		HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, mip_rk, rk_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+
+		HMAC_Update(hmac, (uint8_t const *) "CMIP4 MN HA", 11);
+		HMAC_Update(hmac, (uint8_t const *) &ip->vp_ipaddr, 4);
+		HMAC_Update(hmac, (uint8_t const *) &mn_nai->vp_strvalue, mn_nai->vp_length);
+		rk1_len = SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+		HMAC_Final(hmac, &mip_rk_1[0], &rk1_len);
+
+		/*
+		 *	Put MN-HA-CMIP4 into WiMAX-MN-hHA-MIP4-Key
+		 */
+		vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, 10, VENDORPEC_WIMAX, TAG_ANY);
+		if (!vp) {
+			vp = radius_pair_create(request->reply, &request->reply->vps,
+					       10, VENDORPEC_WIMAX);
+		}
+		if (!vp) {
+			RWDEBUG("Failed creating WiMAX-MN-hHA-MIP4-Key");
+			break;
+		}
+		fr_pair_value_memcpy(vp, &mip_rk_1[0], rk1_len);
+
+		/*
+		 *	Put MN-HA-CMIP4-SPI into WiMAX-MN-hHA-MIP4-SPI
+		 */
+		vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, 11, VENDORPEC_WIMAX, TAG_ANY);
+		if (!vp) {
+			vp = radius_pair_create(request->reply, &request->reply->vps,
+					       11, VENDORPEC_WIMAX);
+		}
+		if (!vp) {
+			RWDEBUG("Failed creating WiMAX-MN-hHA-MIP4-SPI");
+			break;
+		}
+		vp->vp_integer = mip_spi;
+		break;
+
+	case 4:			/* CMIP6 */
+		/*
+		 *	Look for WiMAX-hHA-IP-MIP6
+		 */
+		ip = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, 7, VENDORPEC_WIMAX, TAG_ANY);
+		if (!ip) {
+			RWDEBUG("WiMAX-hHA-IP-MIP6 not found.  Cannot calculate MN-HA-CMIP6 key");
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	MN-HA-CMIP6 =
+		 *	   H(MIP-RK, "CMIP6 MN HA" | HA-IPv6 | MN-NAI);
+		 */
+		HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, mip_rk, rk_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+
+		HMAC_Update(hmac, (uint8_t const *) "CMIP6 MN HA", 11);
+		HMAC_Update(hmac, (uint8_t const *) &ip->vp_ipv6addr, 16);
+		HMAC_Update(hmac, (uint8_t const *) &mn_nai->vp_strvalue, mn_nai->vp_length);
+		rk1_len = SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+		HMAC_Final(hmac, &mip_rk_1[0], &rk1_len);
+
+		/*
+		 *	Put MN-HA-CMIP6 into WiMAX-MN-hHA-MIP6-Key
+		 */
+		vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, 12, VENDORPEC_WIMAX, TAG_ANY);
+		if (!vp) {
+			vp = radius_pair_create(request->reply, &request->reply->vps,
+					       12, VENDORPEC_WIMAX);
+		}
+		if (!vp) {
+			RWDEBUG("Failed creating WiMAX-MN-hHA-MIP6-Key");
+			break;
+		}
+		fr_pair_value_memcpy(vp, &mip_rk_1[0], rk1_len);
+
+		/*
+		 *	Put MN-HA-CMIP6-SPI into WiMAX-MN-hHA-MIP6-SPI
+		 */
+		vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, 13, VENDORPEC_WIMAX, TAG_ANY);
+		if (!vp) {
+			vp = radius_pair_create(request->reply, &request->reply->vps,
+					       13, VENDORPEC_WIMAX);
+		}
+		if (!vp) {
+			RWDEBUG("Failed creating WiMAX-MN-hHA-MIP6-SPI");
+			break;
+		}
+		vp->vp_integer = mip_spi + 2;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		break;		/* do nothing */
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Generate FA-RK, if requested.
+	 *
+	 *	FA-RK= H(MIP-RK, "FA-RK")
+	 */
+	fa_rk = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, 14, VENDORPEC_WIMAX, TAG_ANY);
+	if (fa_rk && (fa_rk->vp_length <= 1)) {
+		HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, mip_rk, rk_len, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
+
+		HMAC_Update(hmac, (uint8_t const *) "FA-RK", 5);
+
+		rk1_len = SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+		HMAC_Final(hmac, &mip_rk_1[0], &rk1_len);
+
+		fr_pair_value_memcpy(fa_rk, &mip_rk_1[0], rk1_len);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Create FA-RK-SPI, which is really SPI-CMIP4, which is
+	 *	really MIP-SPI.  Clear?  Of course.  This is WiMAX.
+	 */
+	if (fa_rk) {
+		vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, 61, VENDORPEC_WIMAX, TAG_ANY);
+		if (!vp) {
+			vp = radius_pair_create(request->reply, &request->reply->vps,
+					       61, VENDORPEC_WIMAX);
+		}
+		if (!vp) {
+			RWDEBUG("Failed creating WiMAX-FA-RK-SPI");
+		} else {
+			vp->vp_integer = mip_spi;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Give additional information about requests && responses
+	 *
+	 *	WiMAX-RRQ-MN-HA-SPI
+	 */
+	vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, 20, VENDORPEC_WIMAX, TAG_ANY);
+	if (vp) {
+		RDEBUG("Client requested MN-HA key: Should use SPI to look up key from storage");
+		if (!mn_nai) {
+			RWDEBUG("MN-NAI was not found!");
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 *	WiMAX-RRQ-HA-IP
+		 */
+		if (!fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, 18, VENDORPEC_WIMAX, TAG_ANY)) {
+			RWDEBUG("HA-IP was not found!");
+		}
+
+
+		/*
+		 *	WiMAX-HA-RK-Key-Requested
+		 */
+		vp = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, 58, VENDORPEC_WIMAX, TAG_ANY);
+		if (vp && (vp->vp_integer == 1)) {
+			RDEBUG("Client requested HA-RK: Should use IP to look it up from storage");
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 *	Wipe the context of all sensitive information.
+	 */
+	HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
+
+	return RLM_MODULE_UPDATED;
+}
+
+/*
+ *	Generate the EPS-AKA authentication vector
+ *
+ *	These are the keys needed for new style WiMAX (LTE / 3gpp authentication),
+ 	for WiMAX v2.1
+ */
+static rlm_rcode_t aka_keys_generate(REQUEST *request, rlm_wimax_t const *inst, VALUE_PAIR *ki, VALUE_PAIR *opc,
+				     VALUE_PAIR *amf, VALUE_PAIR *sqn, VALUE_PAIR *plmn)
+{  
+	size_t i;
+	VALUE_PAIR *rand_previous, *rand, *xres, *autn, *kasme;
+
+	/*
+	 *	For most authentication requests we need to generate a fresh RAND
+	 *
+	 *	The exception is after SQN re-syncronisation - in this case we
+	 *	get RAND in the request, and this module if called in authorize should
+	 *	have put it in control:WiMAX-SIM-RAND so we can grab it from there)
+	 */
+	rand_previous = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_WIMAX_SIM_RAND, 0, TAG_ANY);
+	if (rand_previous && (rand_previous->vp_length < WIMAX_EPSAKA_RAND_SIZE)) {
+		RWDEBUG("Found config:WiMAX-SIM-Rand with incorrect size.  Ignoring it.");
+		rand_previous = NULL;
+	}
+
+	MEM(rand = pair_make_reply("WiMAX-E-UTRAN-Vector-RAND", NULL, T_OP_SET));
+	if (!rand_previous) {
+		uint32_t lvalue;
+		uint8_t buffer[WIMAX_EPSAKA_RAND_SIZE];
+
+		for (i = 0; i < (WIMAX_EPSAKA_RAND_SIZE / 4); i++) {
+			lvalue = fr_rand();
+			memcpy(buffer + i * 4, &lvalue, sizeof(lvalue));
+		}
+
+		fr_pair_value_memcpy(rand, buffer, WIMAX_EPSAKA_RAND_SIZE);
+
+	} else {
+		fr_pair_value_memcpy(rand, rand_previous->vp_octets, WIMAX_EPSAKA_RAND_SIZE);
+	}
+
+   	/*
+	 *	Feed AMF, Ki, SQN and RAND into the Milenage algorithm (f1, f2, f3, f4, f5)
+	 *	which returns AUTN, AK, CK, IK, XRES.
+	 */
+	uint8_t xres_bin[WIMAX_EPSAKA_XRES_SIZE];
+	uint8_t ck_bin[WIMAX_EPSAKA_CK_SIZE];
+	uint8_t ik_bin[WIMAX_EPSAKA_IK_SIZE];
+	uint8_t ak_bin[WIMAX_EPSAKA_AK_SIZE];
+	uint8_t autn_bin[WIMAX_EPSAKA_AUTN_SIZE];
+
+	/* But first convert uint8 SQN to uint64 */
+	uint64_t sqn_bin = 0x0000000000000000;
+	for (i = 0; i < sqn->vp_length; ++i) sqn_bin = (sqn_bin << 8) | sqn->vp_octets[i];
+
+	if (!opc || (opc->vp_length < MILENAGE_OPC_SIZE)) {
+		RWDEBUG("Found config:WiMAX-SIM-OPC with incorrect size.  Ignoring it");
+		return RLM_MODULE_NOOP;
+	}
+	if (!amf || (amf->vp_length < MILENAGE_AMF_SIZE)) {
+		RWDEBUG("Found config:WiMAX-SIM-AMF with incorrect size.  Ignoring it");
+		return RLM_MODULE_NOOP;
+	}
+	if (!ki || (ki->vp_length < MILENAGE_KI_SIZE)) {
+		RWDEBUG("Found config:WiMAX-SIM-KI with incorrect size.  Ignoring it");
+		return RLM_MODULE_NOOP;
+	}
+
+	/* Call milenage */
+	milenage_umts_generate(autn_bin, ik_bin, ck_bin, ak_bin, xres_bin, opc->vp_octets,
+			       amf->vp_octets, ki->vp_octets, sqn_bin, rand->vp_octets);
+
+	/*
+	 *	Now we genertate KASME
+	 *
+	 *	Officially described in 33401-g30.doc section A.2
+	 *	But an easier to read explanation can be found at:
+	 *	https://medium.com/uw-ictd/lte-authentication-2d0810a061ec
+	 *
+	*/
+
+	/* k = CK || IK */
+	uint8_t kk_bin[WIMAX_EPSAKA_KK_SIZE];
+	memcpy(kk_bin, ck_bin, sizeof(ck_bin));
+	memcpy(kk_bin + sizeof(ck_bin), ik_bin, sizeof(ik_bin));
+
+	/* Initialize a 14 byte buffer s */
+	uint8_t ks_bin[WIMAX_EPSAKA_KS_SIZE];
+
+	/* Assign the first byte of s as 0x10 */
+	ks_bin[0] = 0x10;
+      
+	/* Copy the 3 bytes of PLMN into s */
+	memcpy(ks_bin + 1, plmn->vp_octets, 3);
+
+	/* Assign 5th and 6th byte as 0x00 and 0x03 */
+	ks_bin[4] = 0x00;
+	ks_bin[5] = 0x03;
+      
+	/* Assign the next 6 bytes as SQN XOR AK */
+	for (i = 0; i < 6; i++) {
+		ks_bin[i+6] = sqn->vp_octets[i] ^ ak_bin[i];
+	}
+      
+	/* Assign the last two bytes as 0x00 and 0x06 */
+	ks_bin[12] = 0x00;
+	ks_bin[13] = 0x06;
+
+	/* Perform an HMAC-SHA256 using Key k from step 1 and s as the message. */
+	uint8_t kasme_bin[WIMAX_EPSAKA_KASME_SIZE];
+	HMAC_CTX *hmac;
+	unsigned int kasme_len = sizeof(kasme_bin);
+
+	hmac = HMAC_CTX_new();
+	HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, kk_bin, sizeof(kk_bin), EVP_sha256(), NULL);
+	HMAC_Update(hmac, ks_bin, sizeof(ks_bin));
+	kasme_len = SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+	HMAC_Final(hmac, &kasme_bin[0], &kasme_len);
+	HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
+
+	/*
+	 *	Add reply attributes XRES, AUTN and KASME (RAND we added earlier)
+	 *
+	 *	Note that we can't call fr_pair_find_by_num(), as
+	 *	these attributes are buried deep inside of the WiMAX
+	 *	hierarchy.
+	 */
+	xres = fr_pair_find_by_da(request->reply->vps, inst->xres, TAG_ANY);
+	if (!xres) {
+		MEM(xres = pair_make_reply("WiMAX-E-UTRAN-Vector-XRES", NULL, T_OP_SET));
+		fr_pair_value_memcpy(xres, xres_bin, WIMAX_EPSAKA_XRES_SIZE);
+	}
+
+	autn = fr_pair_find_by_da(request->reply->vps, inst->autn, TAG_ANY);
+	if (!autn) {
+		MEM(autn = pair_make_reply("WiMAX-E-UTRAN-Vector-AUTN", NULL, T_OP_SET));
+		fr_pair_value_memcpy(autn, autn_bin, WIMAX_EPSAKA_AUTN_SIZE);
+	}
+
+	kasme = fr_pair_find_by_da(request->reply->vps, inst->kasme, TAG_ANY);
+	if (!kasme) {
+		MEM(kasme = pair_make_reply("WiMAX-E-UTRAN-Vector-KASME", NULL, T_OP_SET));
+		fr_pair_value_memcpy(kasme, kasme_bin, WIMAX_EPSAKA_KASME_SIZE);
+	}
+
+	/* Print keys to log for debugging */
+	if (rad_debug_lvl) {
+		RDEBUG("-------- Milenage in --------");
+		RDEBUG_HEX(request, "OPc   ", opc->vp_octets, opc->vp_length);
+		RDEBUG_HEX(request, "Ki    ", ki->vp_octets, ki->vp_length);
+		RDEBUG_HEX(request, "RAND  ", rand->vp_octets, rand->vp_length);
+		RDEBUG_HEX(request, "SQN   ", sqn->vp_octets, sqn->vp_length);
+		RDEBUG_HEX(request, "AMF   ", amf->vp_octets, amf->vp_length);
+		RDEBUG("-------- Milenage out -------");
+		RDEBUG_HEX(request, "XRES  ", xres->vp_octets, xres->vp_length);
+		RDEBUG_HEX(request, "Ck    ", ck_bin, sizeof(ck_bin));
+		RDEBUG_HEX(request, "Ik    ", ik_bin, sizeof(ik_bin));
+		RDEBUG_HEX(request, "Ak    ", ak_bin, sizeof(ak_bin));
+		RDEBUG_HEX(request, "AUTN  ", autn->vp_octets, autn->vp_length);
+		RDEBUG("-----------------------------");
+		RDEBUG_HEX(request, "Kk    ", kk_bin, sizeof(kk_bin));
+		RDEBUG_HEX(request, "Ks    ", ks_bin, sizeof(ks_bin));
+		RDEBUG_HEX(request, "KASME ", kasme->vp_octets, kasme->vp_length);
+	}
+
+	return RLM_MODULE_UPDATED;
+}
+
+/*
+ *	Generate the keys after the user has been authenticated.
+ */
+static rlm_rcode_t CC_HINT(nonnull) mod_post_auth(void *instance, REQUEST *request)
+{
+	VALUE_PAIR *msk, *emsk, *ki, *opc, *amf, *sqn, *plmn;
+
+	/*
+	 *	If we have MSK and EMSK then assume we want MIP keys
+	 *	Else if we have the SIM keys then we want the EPS-AKA vector
+	 */
+
+	msk = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, PW_EAP_MSK, 0, TAG_ANY);
+	emsk = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->reply->vps, PW_EAP_EMSK, 0, TAG_ANY);
+
+	if (msk && emsk) {
+		RDEBUG("MSK and EMSK found.  Generating MIP keys");
+		return mip_keys_generate(instance, request, msk, emsk);
+	}
+
+	ki = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_WIMAX_SIM_KI, 0, TAG_ANY);
+	opc = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_WIMAX_SIM_OPC, 0, TAG_ANY);
+	amf = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_WIMAX_SIM_AMF, 0, TAG_ANY);
+	sqn = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->config, PW_WIMAX_SIM_SQN, 0, TAG_ANY);
+	plmn = fr_pair_find_by_num(request->packet->vps, 146, VENDORPEC_WIMAX, TAG_ANY);
+	
+	if (ki && opc && amf && sqn && plmn) {
+		RDEBUG("AKA attributes found.  Generating AKA keys.");
+		return aka_keys_generate(request, instance, ki, opc, amf, sqn, plmn);
+	}
+
+	RDEBUG("Input keys not found.  Cannot create WiMAX keys");
+	return RLM_MODULE_NOOP;
+}
+
+
+static int mod_instantiate(UNUSED CONF_SECTION *conf, void *instance)
+{
+	rlm_wimax_t *inst = instance;
+      
+	inst->resync_info = dict_attrbyname("WiMAX-Re-synchronization-Info");
+	inst->xres = dict_attrbyname("WiMAX-E-UTRAN-Vector-XRES");
+	inst->autn = dict_attrbyname("WiMAX-E-UTRAN-Vector-AUTN");
+	inst->kasme = dict_attrbyname("WiMAX-E-UTRAN-Vector-KASME");
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ *	The module name should be the only globally exported symbol.
+ *	That is, everything else should be 'static'.
+ *
+ *	If the module needs to temporarily modify it's instantiation
+ *	data, the type should be changed to RLM_TYPE_THREAD_UNSAFE.
+ *	The server will then take care of ensuring that the module
+ *	is single-threaded.
+ */
+extern module_t rlm_wimax;
+module_t rlm_wimax = {
+	.magic		= RLM_MODULE_INIT,
+	.name		= "wimax",
+	.type		= RLM_TYPE_THREAD_SAFE,
+	.inst_size	= sizeof(rlm_wimax_t),
+	.config		= module_config,
+	.instantiate	= mod_instantiate,
+	.methods = {
+		[MOD_AUTHORIZE]		= mod_authorize,
+		[MOD_PREACCT]		= mod_preacct,
+		[MOD_POST_AUTH]		= mod_post_auth
+	},
+};