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authorDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 14:47:53 +0000
committerDaniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>2024-04-07 14:47:53 +0000
commitc8bae7493d2f2910b57f13ded012e86bdcfb0532 (patch)
tree24e09d9f84dec336720cf393e156089ca2835791 /Documentation/config/transfer.txt
parentInitial commit. (diff)
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Adding upstream version 1:2.39.2.upstream/1%2.39.2upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
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+transfer.credentialsInUrl::
+ A configured URL can contain plaintext credentials in the form
+ `<protocol>://<user>:<password>@<domain>/<path>`. You may want
+ to warn or forbid the use of such configuration (in favor of
+ using linkgit:git-credential[1]). This will be used on
+ linkgit:git-clone[1], linkgit:git-fetch[1], linkgit:git-push[1],
+ and any other direct use of the configured URL.
++
+Note that this is currently limited to detecting credentials in
+`remote.<name>.url` configuration, it won't detect credentials in
+`remote.<name>.pushurl` configuration.
++
+You might want to enable this to prevent inadvertent credentials
+exposure, e.g. because:
++
+* The OS or system where you're running git may not provide a way or
+ otherwise allow you to configure the permissions of the
+ configuration file where the username and/or password are stored.
+* Even if it does, having such data stored "at rest" might expose you
+ in other ways, e.g. a backup process might copy the data to another
+ system.
+* The git programs will pass the full URL to one another as arguments
+ on the command-line, meaning the credentials will be exposed to other
+ users on OS's or systems that allow other users to see the full
+ process list of other users. On linux the "hidepid" setting
+ documented in procfs(5) allows for configuring this behavior.
++
+If such concerns don't apply to you then you probably don't need to be
+concerned about credentials exposure due to storing that sensitive
+data in git's configuration files. If you do want to use this, set
+`transfer.credentialsInUrl` to one of these values:
++
+* `allow` (default): Git will proceed with its activity without warning.
+* `warn`: Git will write a warning message to `stderr` when parsing a URL
+ with a plaintext credential.
+* `die`: Git will write a failure message to `stderr` when parsing a URL
+ with a plaintext credential.
+
+transfer.fsckObjects::
+ When `fetch.fsckObjects` or `receive.fsckObjects` are
+ not set, the value of this variable is used instead.
+ Defaults to false.
++
+When set, the fetch or receive will abort in the case of a malformed
+object or a link to a nonexistent object. In addition, various other
+issues are checked for, including legacy issues (see `fsck.<msg-id>`),
+and potential security issues like the existence of a `.GIT` directory
+or a malicious `.gitmodules` file (see the release notes for v2.2.1
+and v2.17.1 for details). Other sanity and security checks may be
+added in future releases.
++
+On the receiving side, failing fsckObjects will make those objects
+unreachable, see "QUARANTINE ENVIRONMENT" in
+linkgit:git-receive-pack[1]. On the fetch side, malformed objects will
+instead be left unreferenced in the repository.
++
+Due to the non-quarantine nature of the `fetch.fsckObjects`
+implementation it cannot be relied upon to leave the object store
+clean like `receive.fsckObjects` can.
++
+As objects are unpacked they're written to the object store, so there
+can be cases where malicious objects get introduced even though the
+"fetch" failed, only to have a subsequent "fetch" succeed because only
+new incoming objects are checked, not those that have already been
+written to the object store. That difference in behavior should not be
+relied upon. In the future, such objects may be quarantined for
+"fetch" as well.
++
+For now, the paranoid need to find some way to emulate the quarantine
+environment if they'd like the same protection as "push". E.g. in the
+case of an internal mirror do the mirroring in two steps, one to fetch
+the untrusted objects, and then do a second "push" (which will use the
+quarantine) to another internal repo, and have internal clients
+consume this pushed-to repository, or embargo internal fetches and
+only allow them once a full "fsck" has run (and no new fetches have
+happened in the meantime).
+
+transfer.hideRefs::
+ String(s) `receive-pack` and `upload-pack` use to decide which
+ refs to omit from their initial advertisements. Use more than
+ one definition to specify multiple prefix strings. A ref that is
+ under the hierarchies listed in the value of this variable is
+ excluded, and is hidden when responding to `git push` or `git
+ fetch`. See `receive.hideRefs` and `uploadpack.hideRefs` for
+ program-specific versions of this config.
++
+You may also include a `!` in front of the ref name to negate the entry,
+explicitly exposing it, even if an earlier entry marked it as hidden.
+If you have multiple hideRefs values, later entries override earlier ones
+(and entries in more-specific config files override less-specific ones).
++
+If a namespace is in use, the namespace prefix is stripped from each
+reference before it is matched against `transfer.hiderefs` patterns. In
+order to match refs before stripping, add a `^` in front of the ref name. If
+you combine `!` and `^`, `!` must be specified first.
++
+For example, if `refs/heads/master` is specified in `transfer.hideRefs` and
+the current namespace is `foo`, then `refs/namespaces/foo/refs/heads/master`
+is omitted from the advertisements. If `uploadpack.allowRefInWant` is set,
+`upload-pack` will treat `want-ref refs/heads/master` in a protocol v2
+`fetch` command as if `refs/namespaces/foo/refs/heads/master` did not exist.
+`receive-pack`, on the other hand, will still advertise the object id the
+ref is pointing to without mentioning its name (a so-called ".have" line).
++
+Even if you hide refs, a client may still be able to steal the target
+objects via the techniques described in the "SECURITY" section of the
+linkgit:gitnamespaces[7] man page; it's best to keep private data in a
+separate repository.
+
+transfer.unpackLimit::
+ When `fetch.unpackLimit` or `receive.unpackLimit` are
+ not set, the value of this variable is used instead.
+ The default value is 100.
+
+transfer.advertiseSID::
+ Boolean. When true, client and server processes will advertise their
+ unique session IDs to their remote counterpart. Defaults to false.