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author | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-28 07:33:12 +0000 |
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committer | Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org> | 2024-04-28 07:33:12 +0000 |
commit | 36082a2fe36ecd800d784ae44c14f1f18c66a7e9 (patch) | |
tree | 6c68e0c0097987aff85a01dabddd34b862309a7c /doc/cha-shared-key.texi | |
parent | Initial commit. (diff) | |
download | gnutls28-36082a2fe36ecd800d784ae44c14f1f18c66a7e9.tar.xz gnutls28-36082a2fe36ecd800d784ae44c14f1f18c66a7e9.zip |
Adding upstream version 3.7.9.upstream/3.7.9upstream
Signed-off-by: Daniel Baumann <daniel.baumann@progress-linux.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'doc/cha-shared-key.texi')
-rw-r--r-- | doc/cha-shared-key.texi | 161 |
1 files changed, 161 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/doc/cha-shared-key.texi b/doc/cha-shared-key.texi new file mode 100644 index 0000000..394fd79 --- /dev/null +++ b/doc/cha-shared-key.texi @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +@node Shared-key and anonymous authentication +@section Shared-key and anonymous authentication + +In addition to certificate authentication, the TLS protocol may be +used with password, shared-key and anonymous authentication methods. +The rest of this chapter discusses details of these methods. + +@menu +* PSK authentication:: +* SRP authentication:: +* Anonymous authentication:: +@end menu + +@node PSK authentication +@subsection PSK authentication + +@menu +* Authentication using PSK:: +* psktool Invocation:: Invoking psktool +@end menu + +@node Authentication using PSK +@subsubsection Authentication using @acronym{PSK} +@cindex PSK authentication + +Authentication using Pre-shared keys is a method to authenticate using +usernames and binary keys. This protocol avoids making use of public +key infrastructure and expensive calculations, thus it is suitable for +constraint clients. It is available under all TLS protocol versions. + +The implementation in @acronym{GnuTLS} is based on @xcite{TLSPSK}. +The supported @acronym{PSK} key exchange methods are: + +@table @code + +@item PSK: +Authentication using the @acronym{PSK} protocol (no forward secrecy). + +@item DHE-PSK: +Authentication using the @acronym{PSK} protocol and Diffie-Hellman key +exchange. This method offers perfect forward secrecy. + +@item ECDHE-PSK: +Authentication using the @acronym{PSK} protocol and Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key +exchange. This method offers perfect forward secrecy. + +@item RSA-PSK: +Authentication using the @acronym{PSK} protocol for the client and an RSA certificate +for the server. This is not available under TLS 1.3. + +@end table + +Helper functions to generate and maintain @acronym{PSK} keys are also included +in @acronym{GnuTLS}. + +@showfuncC{gnutls_key_generate,gnutls_hex_encode,gnutls_hex_decode} + +@include invoke-psktool.texi + + +@node SRP authentication +@subsection SRP authentication + +@menu +* Authentication using SRP:: +* srptool Invocation:: Invoking srptool +@end menu + +@node Authentication using SRP +@subsubsection Authentication using @acronym{SRP} +@cindex SRP authentication + +@acronym{GnuTLS} supports authentication via the Secure Remote Password +or @acronym{SRP} protocol (see @xcite{RFC2945,TOMSRP} for a description). +The @acronym{SRP} key exchange is an extension to the +@acronym{TLS} protocol, and it provides an authenticated with a +password key exchange. The peers can be identified using a single password, +or there can be combinations where the client is authenticated using @acronym{SRP} +and the server using a certificate. It is only available under TLS 1.2 or earlier +versions. + +The advantage of @acronym{SRP} authentication, over other proposed +secure password authentication schemes, is that @acronym{SRP} is not +susceptible to off-line dictionary attacks. +Moreover, SRP does not require the server to hold the user's password. +This kind of protection is similar to the one used traditionally in the @acronym{UNIX} +@file{/etc/passwd} file, where the contents of this file did not cause +harm to the system security if they were revealed. The @acronym{SRP} +needs instead of the plain password something called a verifier, which +is calculated using the user's password, and if stolen cannot be used +to impersonate the user. +@c The Stanford @acronym{SRP} libraries, include a PAM module that synchronizes +@c the system's users passwords with the @acronym{SRP} password +@c files. That way @acronym{SRP} authentication could be used for all users +@c of a system. + +Typical conventions in SRP are a password file, called @file{tpasswd} that +holds the SRP verifiers (encoded passwords) and another file, @file{tpasswd.conf}, +which holds the allowed SRP parameters. The included in GnuTLS helper +follow those conventions. The srptool program, discussed in the next section +is a tool to manipulate the SRP parameters. + +The implementation in @acronym{GnuTLS} is based on @xcite{TLSSRP}. The +supported key exchange methods are shown below. Enabling any of these +key exchange methods in a session disables support for TLS1.3. + +@table @code + +@item SRP: +Authentication using the @acronym{SRP} protocol. + +@item SRP_DSS: +Client authentication using the @acronym{SRP} protocol. Server is +authenticated using a certificate with DSA parameters. + +@item SRP_RSA: +Client authentication using the @acronym{SRP} protocol. Server is +authenticated using a certificate with RSA parameters. + +@end table + + +@showfuncdesc{gnutls_srp_verifier} + +@showfuncB{gnutls_srp_base64_encode2,gnutls_srp_base64_decode2} + +@include invoke-srptool.texi + +@node Anonymous authentication +@subsection Anonymous authentication +@cindex anonymous authentication + +The anonymous key exchange offers encryption without any +indication of the peer's identity. This kind of authentication +is vulnerable to a man in the middle attack, but can be +used even if there is no prior communication or shared trusted parties +with the peer. It is useful to establish a session over which certificate +authentication will occur in order to hide the indentities of the participants +from passive eavesdroppers. It is only available under TLS 1.2 or earlier +versions. + +Unless in the above case, it is not recommended to use anonymous authentication. +In the cases where there is no prior communication with the peers, +an alternative with better properties, such as key continuity, is trust on first use +(see @ref{Verifying a certificate using trust on first use authentication}). + +The available key exchange algorithms for anonymous authentication are +shown below, but note that few public servers support them, and they +have to be explicitly enabled. These ciphersuites are negotiated only under +TLS 1.2. + +@table @code + +@item ANON_DH: +This algorithm exchanges Diffie-Hellman parameters. + +@item ANON_ECDH: +This algorithm exchanges elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman parameters. It is more +efficient than ANON_DH on equivalent security levels. + +@end table |